A Decision making analysis of the Turkish government during the second world war period (1939-1945)

Abstract

ABSTRACT This study aims at analyzing the foreign policy decision making process of the Turkish government during the Second World War period. There is one basic approach and two main assumptions to be proved. The suggested model of the study concerns the bounded rationality approach which proposes satisfaction rather than maximization. First proposition aims to show that it is not feasible to evaluate all the possible alternatives at the start of the decision making process and to maximize among them. Second proposition concerns that past strategies and their outcomes are influential on present strategies of the decision makers. In Chapter I, the aim and scope of the study, the basic approach and its assumptions and the limitations of the study are stated. In Chapter 2, the literature review related to the decision making in international crisis is given and the relevance of the bounded rationality approach in decision making studies are discussed. Chapter 3 includes the level of analysis in the context of presidential decision making. In chapter 4, the analysis of the Turkish foreign policy decision making process during the Second World War period is presented and the primary strategies and the revisions of these strategies are discussed. Chapter 6, the - iii -last chapter, gives the conclusions of the study. This thesis has 6 appendices including the Treaty of Mutual Assistance: Britain, France and Turkey, the Treaty of nonaggression: Germany and Turkey, three telegrams from Papen to Ribbentrop and from Ribbentrop to Papen and a protocol between the Soviet Union and Turkey. - iv -