Fon kullanım maliyetini etkileyen bir faktör olarak kredi tayınlaması

Abstract

ABSTRACT This thesis both surveys and analyses the literature of credit rationing roughly defining the credit market equilibrium in which at existing price (interest rate) level every time demand surplus can be observed. The debate around the phenomenon has been going on since 1950's. This debate has importance due to its implication on both theoretical and practical level. Regarding to theoretical level it is very significant to ascertain non-price credit rationing equilibrium of credit market. Since the conditions leading to non-price rationing equilibrium deviates from assumption of standard market theory, namely symmetric (homogeneous) information distribution with in the market. Therefore the equivalent of the credit rationing does not occur in well-functioning markets for goods and services, because unlike a credit market both suppliers and rationed demanders in this kind of market have incentive to raise the price. In order to examine the phenomenon several approaches have been developed; such as primitive monopolistic models, back ward bending loan supply curves, customer relations models and asymmetric information models. Modern theory identifies the market failures moral hazard and adverse selection as much more general features of loan markets that can be the source of credit rationing when there is asymmetrical information. Moral hazard and adverse selection occur when the interest rate or loan size chosen by the lender affect borrower behaviour (moral hazard) or the riskiness of the applicant pool (adverse selection). Due to these adverse selection and moral hazard effects of asymmetric information, lenders have incentive to screen applicants, to set non-price terms such as collateral requirements and to offer loan contracts that cause borrowers to identify their risk attributes as a function of their contract selection. One of the problems detected in the economies which launched economic reforms is the continuation or even worsening of the finance constraint for the corporate sector, stemming from increasing systemic risk causing severe credit rationing regime implementations. This result is in sharp contrast to the expectations of the proponents of these reforms. The liberalisation measures were expected both to increase the savings and also enhance the ability of the economic system to allocate them to real projects with highest social returns.