La critique de la métaphysique de la présence chez Derrida

Abstract

Bu çalışma Derrida'nın mevcudiyet metafiziğini eleştirisini aydınlatmayı ve çözümlemeyi amaçlıyor. Bunu, Derrida'nın en önemli ilk yayınlarından biri olan Ses ve Fenomen'e odaklanarak, Husserl fenomenolojisi aracılığıyla, yapmayı hedefliyor. Bu önemli eserde Derrida, Husserl'in önemli eseri Mantıksal Araştırmalar adını taşıyan kitabını merkeze almaktadır. Konumuzu incelerken, ilk kısımda, Derrida'nın Ses ve Fenomen'de bütün bir çalışmasını üzerine kurduğu Husserl'in Mantıksal Araştırmalar'ındaki görüşlerine değiniyoruz. İkinci kısmın ilk bölümünde ağırlıklı olarak Ses ve Fenomen'in ilk üç bölümüne odaklanıyoruz. Daha sonra, ikinci bölümde, 4. ve 5. bölümleri inceliyoruz. Çalışmamızın üçüncü bölümü ise Derrida'nın kitabının 6. ve 7. bölümlerine yoğunlaşmaktadır. Ve son olarak, dördüncü bölümde, Ses ve Fenomen'in sonuç sayfaları olarak görülebilecek son altı sayfasını göz önünde bulundurarak çalışmamızı sonlandırıyoruz. Mantıksal Araştırmalar'da, Husserl bir dizi önemli ayrım yapar. Bunlardan ilki dışavurumsal/ifadesel(expression) ve endikatif (indication, indice, Anzeichen)göstergeler arasında yaptığı ayrımdır. Her göstergenin bir şeyin göstergesi olduğunu söyler fakat her göstergenin o göstergenin ifade ettiği (dışavurum, expression) `bir anlamı` yoktur. İfadeler (dışavurum, expression) `anlamlı göstergeler` olarak farklılaşırlar. İfade ettikleri (expression) bir `anlamdır`. Endikasyonlarda durum farklıdır. Her türlü şey endikatif göstergeler olarak görev alabilirler. Bilerek üretilmelerine rağmen, bu tür göstergeler kendiliğinden bir anlam içermezler. İlişkileri dışavurumdaki (expression) gibi değildir, daha çok bir şeyin başka bir şeyi temsil etmesi türünden bir ilişkidir. Bütün endikatif ilişkiler, bir şeyin varoluşundaki bir inancın başka bir şeydeki inancı harekete geçiren `ortak durum`u paylaşırlar. Birinden diğer şeye yönelen harekete geçirmenin temelinde `çağrışım`(association) vardır. Buna karşın, bir dışavurum ile ifade ettiği (dışavurum, expression) anlam arasındaki ilişki bir inanç meselesi değildir. Dışavurum kendisinin dışında olan anlamına işaret ediyor gibi görünmektedir. Fakat bu işaret etme bir endikasyon değildir. Burada işlevin iki türü arasında bir ayrım vardır. Aynı göstergenin hem endikatif hem de ifadesel (dışavurum, expressif) işlevi olabilir. İletişimsel konuşmada, bu çifte işlev kesinlikle bulunması gerekir. Husserl için, bu iki işlev türü her zaman birlikte bulunmak zorunda değildir. Göstergeler bir şeye endike (indiquer, indication) etmeksizin dışavurumsal (expressif) bir işleve sahip olabilirler. Bütün ifadelerin endikatif bir işlevi yoktur. Oysa iletişimsel konuşmada endikatif işlevleri vardır. aracılığıyla mevcuduz. Her ulaştığımızda, sözcükler aracılığıyla ses somutlaşır. Bunu tekrar tekrar yapmamız nedeniyle, sözcükler tekrar tekrar geri ya da yeniden döner. Derrida için, sesin orijinalitesini kuran, onu diğer signification elemanlarındanayıran onun zamansal (temporel) olan tözüdür (substance). Böyle bir zamansallık (temporalite) öz-etkilenimimizin (auto-affection) gerçek temeli gibi görünmektedir. Bunu tesis etmek üzere, Derrida zamansallık kuramını ortaya koyar. Yeni anların eklenmesi (addition) ve bunların sonraki tutulması, korunması (retention) olarak anlaşılan zamansallık mevcudiyetin öz-etkileniminin (self-affection) sonucudur. Bu yüzden altta yatan mevcudiyet Derrida'nın différance olarak adlandırdığıdır.Zaman, ` 'bu öz-etkilenim 'hareketi' (mouvement)` olarak aslında ` tuhaf farklılığın hareketidir (le movement d'étrange différence)`. Tuhaf farklılık, `faklılaşmanın işlemi (l'operation de différer)` olarak anlaşılan différance'dır. Bu işlem (operation) yeni şimdinin ve aynı zamanda, yeni şimdinin yerini yer değiştirdiği şimdinin tutulmasının (trace retentionelle) ` saf üretimine (productionpure) yol açar. Hem üretim (production) hem de tutulma (retention) yaşayan mevcudu (le présent vivant) karakterize eder. Différance ayrıca bu kendimevcudiyetin mevcudundan sorumludur. Yaşayan mevcudiyet kendine geri ya da tekrar dönmediği yani yeni ya da tutulmuş bir anda kendine-mevcudiyetiylekarşılaşmadığı sürece, kendine mevcut olamaz. Bu geri dönüş (retour) `farklılaşma işleminden (operation de différer)` doğar, yani şimdiye `saf` bir fark (différence) sunan eylem. Bu hem yeni bir hem de tutulmuş bir mevcudiyet ürettiği ölçüde, bu saf fark yaşayan-mevcudun kendimevcudiyetini oluşturur. `Saf fark` terimi öyleyse yaşayan mevcudun şimdiliğinin `kendiyle özdeş-olmayanı (non-identité à soi)` gösterir, ona kendini etkilemesine izin veren bir özdeş-olmayan. Bu öz-etkilenim (auto-affection) mevcudiyete bir geri dönüşe yol açtığı ölçüde, yaşayan mevcuda kendine-mevcut olma izni verir. Fark özdeşlikten önce gelir. Şimdi ile doldurulmuş her içeriğin doğasında varolan (inherent) `saf fark` kendisini etkiler (s'affecter). Bu öz-etkilenim gelecek-şimdiye yol açar. `Tutulan izler (traces retentionelles)` tarafından verilen geçmiş anlar için de geçerlidir. Onlar da `saf fark` (différence pure) sayesinde mevcuttur. Bu fark,yaşayan şimdiyi yeni bir esasi (primordiale) aktüalite, bir gelecek şimdi, yeni bir izlenimsel an (moment impressional) ile kendini etkilemesine neden olur. Derrida, esasi olanı (primodiale) azlederek, onu ardışıklığı (succession)açıklamak için kullanamaz. Onun orijini erteleme ya da gecikme olarak anlaşılan, yani sonraya bırakma anlamında, différance'tır. Differance hem farklılaşma (différer)hem de erteleme (delai) anlamına gelir. Farklılaşma işlemi mevcudiyeti hem ayırır veyarar hem de geciktirir; eş zamanlı olarak onu esasi bölmeye (division primordiale) ve erteleme ya da geciktirmeye tabii tutarak yapar bunu. 7. bölümde, Derrida orijinalin olmadığı iddiasında bulunur, bunun yerine devam eden yerine geçme (substitition) süreci vardır, bir şey gelecek olanın yerini alır (à la place de). Burada Derrida görüşlerini `ekleme` (supplémentation) kavramıile dile getiriyor. Eklenilen orijinalin eksikliğidir, orijinalin esasi (primordiale) mevcudiyetinin eksikliği. Onun kavramı her endikatif ilişkiye uygulanır. Bu yapıyı zamansallığa uygulamak yaşayan mevcudun (le présent vivant) orijinal olarakmevcut olmadığını varsaymaktır. Onun devam eden mevcudiyeti, `eklerin` (supplément) tekrar tekrar mevcudiyetin yerine konulduğu (à la place de) bir tekrar eden (repetitive) eklemenin (supplémentation) sonucudur. Bu halde, yaşayan şimdi mevcudiyetin tam-olmayanı (non-plenitude) az önce çıkılan anın yerinde (à la place de) bulunan tutulma (retention) tarafından eklenir. Burada Derrida'nın iddiası, şimdi, sadece tutulmaların (retention) silsilesi aracılığıyla ortaya çıkabilir. Silsile, ancak, yerine geçmelerin (substitution) bir silsilesidir, herbiri tuttuğunun (retenir) gayri-mevcudiyetin (non-presence) yerine geçer. Eğerorijinalin sadece silsile aracılığıyla ortaya çıkacağını varsayarsak, söylemeliyiz ki, fenemenolojik olarak, silsile ilktir ve orijinal ikincildir.Normal olarak orijinal olanın ilk olduğunu söylerdik. Aktüeldir. Tutulmalar (retentionlar) ikincildir, eğer orijinal varsa onlar da olanaklıdır, tutulmalar olarak eklendiği bir orijinal. Derrida bunu tersine döndürür: burada olanın ` ekin tuhaf yapısı (structure étrange de la supplément)` olduğunu ileri sürer. Derrida için, ekleme (supplémentation) eylemi aslında différance eylemidir. Differance'ın kendisi hem farklılaşmayı hem de ertelemeyi, sonraya bırakmaanlamında, gerektirir. Bu, onun işlemi mevcudiyeti hem ayırır ve yarar hem de geciktirir. İlk anlam nedeniyle, mevcudiyet kendinden ayrılır. Gayrı-mevcudiyetigerektirir. İkinci anlam nedeniyle, bir ekleme anlamında, bu bir gecikme ya da erteleme gerektirir ve böylece ardışıktır. Derrida bu ardışık eklemenin orijinal'i, yani `apaçıklığın` (evidence) kaynağı olarak yaşayan mevcudu kurduğu iddiasında bulunur. Sonuç olarak, Derrida şunu göstermek ister: Ne zaman Husserl bir fenonemenolog olarak davransa, onun analizleri Derrida'nın konumunu teyit eder.

This study aims to enlighten and analyze the critique of the metaphysics of the presence in Derrida through Husserlian phenomenology, specifically in Voice and Phenomena, one of the first major publications of Jacques Derrida. In this major work, Derrida focuses on Husserl's major book Logical Investigations.When examining our subject, in the first part we are trying to deal with Husserl's view in general at the First Logical Investigation on which Derrida's whole attempt in Voice and Phenomena is based. In the second part we are passing through the general atmosphere of Voice and Phenomena. While carrying out our study, in the first chapter of second part we are mainly focusing on the first three chapters of Voice and Phenomena. And then, in the second chapter, we are examining chapters 4 and 5. The third chapter of this part of our study corresponds to the chapters 6 and 7 of Derrida's book. And finally, withthe fourth chapter, we are finishing our study by taking into account the last six pages of Voice and Phenomena which can be seen as the concluding pages of the book. In the First Logical Investigation Husserl makes a number of preliminary distinctions. The first is between expressive and indicative signs. He says every sign is a sign for something, but not every sign has 'meaning,' a 'sense' that the sign expresses`. Expressions are distinguished by being `meaningful signs`. What they express is a meaning or sense. The case is different with indications. All sorts of things can serve as indicative signs. Although they are deliberately produced, these signs do not by themselves have meaning. Their relation is not that of expression, but rather that of one thing standing for another. Behind this there is a relation of beliefs. All indicative relations share the `common circumstance` that a belief in the existence of one thing motivates the belief in another.The motivation to proceed from one to the other is based on `association`. By contrast, the relation between an expression and the sense it expresses is not a question of belief. The expression seems to point away from itself to its sense. But this pointing is not an indication.What we have here is a distinction of two types of functioning. The same sign can have both an indicative and an expressive function. In communicative speech, this double functioning is absolutely required. For Husserl, these two forms of functioning are not coextensive. Signs can function expressively without indicating anything. All expressions do not have an indicative function. But, in communicative speech they do. However, speaking with others is not our only type of discourse. We also speak to ourselves. When we do, the expressive function continues, but the indicative one disappears. Husserl says that expressions also play a great part in uncommunicated, interior mental life. They continue to have meanings as they had before. They do not, however, function as indications. It is not the case that in xiiisoliloquy one speaks to oneself, and employs words as signs, that is, as indications, of one's own inner experiences. The reason for this is that indications stand for their referents. But such standing for seems out of place when the referent itself is present. In interior monologue, then, we are in our mental life, self-present without any mediation. Husserl makes a further distinction between indication and expression. It concerns their relation to their referent. Referring in the case of indications is a matter of standing for something. This is a direct relation where the existence of one thing brings about the belief in another. By contrast, an expression's relation to its referent is mediated by its sense. The expression refers through its sense. In so doing, it has the possibility of having its reference confirmed by a direct experience of the referent. There can be a `fulfillment` of its sense in a corresponding intuition. In the second part of our investigation, firstly in the Chapter I, we are beginning Derrida's critique in Voice and Phenomena. His critique involves the concept of reduction. Husserl has the distinction between mental life as involving contingent associations, as empirical which needs to be bracketed to get at the ideal, noncontingent relations and mental life regarded genetically as the `pre-expressive, prelinguistic stratum of sense, which the reduction must sometimes disclose by excluding the stratum of language.Derrida makes the claim that the turn to solitary mental life is an implicit reduction which embodies this opposition between transcendental and empirical. For Derrida, indicative signification implies empirical existence. If expressions could not function without such signification, then the bracketing of empirical existence also brackets the functioning of expressions. What would remain after this bracketing would, then, be devoid of both language and meaning. Derrida's claim is that, in fact, the functioning of the meaning intentions that animate our speech also requiresindication. The `pre-expressive, pre-linguistic stratum of sense` that generates sense in our acts is, he claims, interwoven (Verflochten) with indication. Thus, the reduction is contradictory. In the third chapter, Derrida asserts that expression and indication cannot really be distinguished because both are externalizations. Expression is externalization that intends an outside which is that of an ideal object. Indication is also externalization even though it intends a real object. Both are voluntary: I intentionally produce the indication and the expression. Meaning is Bedeutung (wanting to say, vouloir dire).In addition, communication to the other cannot occur without indication. My words stand for my thoughts. But, as Husserl admits, `expression is 'originally framed' to serve the function of communication. As such, it requires indication since the hearer does not directly experience the inner experiences of the other. As Derrida notes, the premise here is presence. We must rely on indication because we have no primordial intuition of the presence of the other's lived experience. When, however, in solitary speech, indication disappears, we must be in the sphere of pure presence.The meaning has therefore a presence to the self in the life of a present that has not xivyet gone forth from itself into the world, space, nature. All these `going-forth` effectively exile this life of self-presence in indications. In Chapter II, our study is dealing with the chapter 4 and 5 of Voice and Phenomena. Derrida begins with the retaking of Husserl's claims about interior speech. Firstly, in inward speech, I communicate (indicate) nothing to myself. I can at most imagine myself doing this. Husserl says, but in the genuine sense of communication, there is no speech in such cases. One merely imagines (man stellt sich vor) oneself as speaking and communicating. Secondly, in inward speech, I communicate (indicate) nothing to myself. Such an operation would make no sense. The existence of mental acts does not have to be indicated because it is immediately present. Also Husserl says, in monologue, words can perform no function of indicating the existence of mental acts, since such indication would there be quite purposeless.Here, Derrida engages in a general argument against the distinction between expression and indication through the concepts of re-presentation(Vergegenwärtigung) and repetition. For him, re-presantation is essential to the functioning of signs. One cannot therefore eliminate it to make the distinction between expressive and indicative sign. Ideality of language, thus senses, involves repetition, re-presentation, thus indication. Ideality in the case of the sign is the result of re-presentation. Thus, the ideality of signs necessarily implies representation. The ideality of the sign, for Derrida, is constituted by this repeated act of substitution. Re-presentation (Vergegenwärtigung) is the `productive act` whose repetition produces ideality.In both expression and indicative communication, the difference between simple presence and repetition is exhausted. As an attack on presence, the claim is that the presence of the present is derived from repetition and not the reverse. This means that the direct presence Husserl takes as definitive of such speech cannot obtain. Such presence is negated by the absence required by the representative relation. Husserl asserts that the distinction between indication and expression shows itself in soliloquy by introducing the concept of im selben Augenblick, at the same moment, or at the same blink of eye.According to Derrida, this claim indicates that self-presence must be produced in the undivided unity of a temporal present in order to have nothing to reveal to itself by the agency of signs.Also since the move to soliloquy is an implicit reduction, this too fails. There is no escaping empirical contingency. Derrida says that if the present of selfpresence is not simple, if it is constituted in a primordial and irreducible synthesis, then the whole of Husserl's argumentation is threatened in its very principle. Whole notion of knowledge has to be abandoned when we say with Derrida that ideality is constituted by a repetitive substitution. It is not the ideal content that grounds the possibility of the return, and thus of knowledge in Husserl's sense. Rather the return grounds the possibility of the ideal content. xvAccordingly, the ideal is what may be indefinitely repeated in the identity of its presence. For Derrida, to include the ideality of the sense in consciousness (to assume that we can encounter it directly in our consciousness) is to assume that presence to consciousness can be indefinitely repeated. This, however, assumes that the present or rather the presence of the living present can sustain this repeated presence. Derrida's position is that this supposed self-presence is actually the result of a repeated substitution. The presence-of-the-present is derived from repetition and not the reverse. Its ground is a non-presence. Its basis is the absence that allows the substitute to take the place of what it substitutes for. If presence itself involves absence, I never directly encounter the content. I only grasp it through its substitute or indicative sign. Chapter III of our study is investigating the chapter 6 and 7 of Derrida's book. Chapter 6 is about the account of the possibility of soliloquy. It is `the voice that keeps silence` that makes the illusion of solitary silent speech possible. Speech actually requires indication which requires a physical medium. The voice provides this and yet does not visually appear. As a result, the voice seems internal. It gives us the illusion of an internal self-presence. This presence of the voice to consciousness is a self-affection. Derrida asserts that the voice is that which is present to itself in the form of universality because the self-presence involves the repeated return to the same. We are present to ourselves through an ongoing process of auto-affection. Each time we access, it is through the words that the voice embodies. Since we do this again and again, the words are returned again and again. For Derrida, what constitute the originality of speech, what distinguishes it from every other element of signification is that its substance seems to be temporal. Such temporality seems the real basis of our auto-affection. To establish this, Derrida gives his theory of temporalization. The temporalization understood as the addition of new moments and their subsequent retention results from the selfaffection of the present. This is because underlying presence is what Derrida calls `differance.` `Time,` as `the 'movement' of this auto-affection` is actually `the 'movement' of this strange difference`. The `strange` difference is différance, taken as the `operation of differing`. This operation results in the `pure production` of the new now as well as the retention (or `retentional trace`) of the now which this new now replaces. Both production and retention characterize the living present. Différance is also responsible for this present's self-presence. The living present cannot be present to itself unless it can return to itself, that is, encounter its presence in a new or retained moment. This return arises from the `operation of differing,` namely, the action that introduces a `pure` difference into the now. Insofar as this produces both a new and a retained presence, this pure difference constitutes the self-presence of the living present. The term, `pure difference` thus designates the `non-identity with itself` of the living present's nowness, a non-identity that allows it to affect itself. Insofar as xvithis self-affection results in a return to presence, it permits the living present to be self-present.Difference is prior to identity. The `pure difference` inherent in each content filled now makes it affect itself. This auto-affection gives rise to the next now. Each now, thus, has its identity as a distinct now `only by becoming the other of the same.` It has it by virtue of the self-affection of the same, which makes explicit the otherness, the `pure difference,` inherent in the same. This also holds for the past moments given by the retentional `traces.` They are also inherent in the present by virtue of the `pure difference` it embodies. This difference makes the living now affect itself with a new primordial actuality, which is a next now, a new impressional moment. Derrida, having dismissed the primordiality, cannot use it to account for succession. Its origin is, in fact, differance understood as deferring or delaying, that is, differance in the sense `of postponing till later`. Differance, then, means both differing and delaying. The operation of differing both fissures and retards the presence by submitting it simultaneously to primordial division and delay.In chapter 7, including the last six pages, we have the claim that there is no original, what we have instead is a process of continual substitution, one where one thing substitutes for (or stands in the place of) the next. Derrida put this claim in terms of the notion of supplementation. What is supplemented is the lack of the original, the lack of its primordial presence. Its concept applies to every indicative relation. To apply this structure to temporalization is to assert that the living present is not originally present. Its continued presence is the result of a repetitive supplementation, one where supplements are repeatedly put in `in the place of` this present. Thus, the non-plenitude of presence of the living now is supplemented in the direction of the past by the retention that stands in the place of the just departed moment. Derrida's claim here is that the now can only appear through its chain of retentions. The chain, however, is a chain of substitutes, each acting to substitute for the non-presence of what it retains. If we suppose that the original appears only through the chain, we have to say, phenomenologically, that the chain is first and the original is second.Normally we would say that the original is first. It is actual. The retentions are second, they are possible only if there is an original, an original to which they are added on as its retentions. Derrida reverses this: He asserts that what we have hereis the `strange structure of the supplement`. For Derrida, then, the action supplementation is actually that of différance. Différance itself involves both differing and delaying in the sense of postponing till later. This means that its operation both fissures and retards presence, submitting it simultaneously to primordial division and delay. By virtue of the first sense, presence differs from itself. It involves non-presence. Fissured by it, it only appears to disappear. By virtue of the second sense, this reappearance, understood as a supplementation, involves a delay and thus is successive. Derrida's claim is that this xviisuccessive supplementation constitutes the original, that is, the living present as the source of evidence. In chapter IV of our study, we are examining the concepts of aporia and difference through the concept of experience (épreuve). Here, Derrida claim that deconstruction is an experience (épreuve) of the difference. The experience that Derrida is trying to bring forth is an experience –'the making appear' or presence –of the irreducible void, of the difference or lack, which is original and yet not a foundation. So the experience of deconstruction must be conceived as the presence of the non-foundation.As a conclusion, Derrida wants to show that when Husserl acts simply as a phenomenologist, his analyses confirm Derrida's positions. It is only when he gives way to the prejudices of a metaphysics of presence, that he opposes these positions