Türkiye`de sermaye yoğunlaşması ve sermaye gruplarının oluşumu

Abstract

18- DEVA HOLDİNG GROUP 19- KURTKAYA GROUP 20- EGE YATIRIM GROUP 21- SANTRAL HOLDİNG GROUP 22- BORUSAN HOLDİNG GROUP 23- ENKA HOLDİNG GROUP 24- YAŞAR GROUP 25- TEKFEN HOLDİNG GROUP 26- BODUR GROUP 27- ALARKO HOLDİNG GROUP 28- HÜR-HÜRRİYET GROUP 29- MENGER GROUP 30- NARİN GROUP 31- SUNGURLAR GROUP 32- DO?UŞ HOLDİNG GROUP 33- DEMİRÖREN GROUP 34- ÇAVUŞO?LU GROUP Throughout the research work, the companies controlled by or connected to these 34 groups and the capital amounts and the capital compositions (partners) of these companies have been found out. All these data have been collected including the increases from year to year for the period 1950-79. The major assumptions of the thesis are as follows: a) In Turkey, an integration process is going on between the banking and industrial/commercial capitals. b) As a result of this proces, concentration of capital is emerging in Turkey. c) This process should be examined by taking into account the capital groups, and especially the largest ones and those that have the most intensive capital movements and activities. In order to have a basis of comparison of the comparies examined, the 1 979 values of the capitals have been calculated by multiplying each capital increase by an inflator belonging to the year of increase and adding these up. This way the sizes of the companies have become comparable. In Part 2, theoretical approaches to the growth and expansion of the corporations, concentration, factors influencing concentration, control of corporations and its consequences, changes in their structures, and monopolies have been discussed. Also, figures showing the extent of concentration reached in western countries have been given in Part 2. Part 3 gives general information about the banks, especially commercial banks in Turkey, about the development of holding companies and the dimensions of the present situation, and also how the struggle to control banks influenced the formation and development of interest groups. In Part 4, the 34 interest groups are analyzed. The analyses comprise the development schemes in total and the present day conditions; their shares in the various sectors (parts) of the economy, such as the total joint-stock companies, -xi -

ÖZET Bu tez çalışması, Türkiye'de sermaye yoğunlaşması olgusunu, tesbit edilen 34 ser maye grubu çerçevesinde incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Tez, Türkiye'deki sermaye yoğunlaşması olgusuna, banka-holding ilişkilerini de ele alarak yaklaşmaya ve kap sama alınan gruplar ile ilgili bilgi ve verileri mümkün olduğunca tam olarak vermeye çalışmaktadır. Araştırma çalışması, seçilen 34 grubun tüm bağlı şirketlerinin ve/veya iştiraklerinin tesbitini, bu şirketlerin yıllar itibariyle sermayelerindeki ve sermaye biieşimlerindeki değişimlere ait bilgilerin toplanmasını ve değerlendirilmesini içermiştir. Değerlendir melerin sağlıklı bir bazda yapılabilmesi için, kapsama alınan tüm gruplara bağlı şir ketlerin ve iştiraklerin sermayeleri, sermaye artışları da dikkate alınarak 1979 yılına taşınmış, böylece şirketlerin sermayeleri karşılaştırabilir hale gelmiştir. Tez çalışması sonucunda, a) banka-holding ilişkileri, b) 1 979 sonu itibariyle, sermayeleriyle birlikte, Türkiye'de mevcut tüm holdingler ve c) seçilen 34 grubun iştirak ve/veya bağlı şirketleri ve bunların sermayeleri ve ser maye kompozisyonları tümüyle saptanabilmiştir. Tezin ortaya koyduğu bulgular ve varılan sonuçlar şöyle özetlenebilir: a. Türkiye'de mevcut özel ticari bankaların büyük bölümü bir veya iki aile, ya da sermaye grubunun kontrolüne girmiştir. b. 1979 yılı sonu itibariyle Türkiye'de 210 holding bulunmaktadır ve bu holdinglerin en büyük % 8'i sermayenin yaklaşık % 50'sini kontrol etmektedir. Tek bir şah sın, ya da ailenin kontrol ettiği holdinglerin oranı ise % 57.4'tür. c. Tez kapsamına alınan 34 gruba bağlı şirketlerin ve iştiraklerinin tüm şirketler içinde sermaye olarak payları % 42'dir. Bu oran anonim şirketler içinde % 55'e çıkmaktadır. Bu şirketlerin sayıca tüm şirketler içindeki payı ise % 3'tür. 34 gru bun içindeki en büyük on grup ise, tüm şirketlerin sermayesinin 1/3'ünü kontrol etmektedir. d. Sonuç olarak, Türkiye'de sermaye yoğunlaşmasının, teoride tanımlanan biçim lerin dışında, kendine özgü bir biçimde oluştuğu ve bu kendine özgü süreç so nucunda, sermayenin ve fon kaynaklarının hızla, çok az sayıda, büyük çoğunlu ğu tek bir şahıs, ya da ailenin kontrolündeki sermaye grubunda toplanmakta ol duğu ve bu açıdan önemli mesafe katedildiği ortaya çıkmaktadır. - IXÖZET Bu tez çalışması, Türkiye'de sermaye yoğunlaşması olgusunu, tesbit edilen 34 ser maye grubu çerçevesinde incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Tez, Türkiye'deki sermaye yoğunlaşması olgusuna, banka-holding ilişkilerini de ele alarak yaklaşmaya ve kap sama alınan gruplar ile ilgili bilgi ve verileri mümkün olduğunca tam olarak vermeye çalışmaktadır. Araştırma çalışması, seçilen 34 grubun tüm bağlı şirketlerinin ve/veya iştiraklerinin tesbitini, bu şirketlerin yıllar itibariyle sermayelerindeki ve sermaye biieşimlerindeki değişimlere ait bilgilerin toplanmasını ve değerlendirilmesini içermiştir. Değerlendir melerin sağlıklı bir bazda yapılabilmesi için, kapsama alınan tüm gruplara bağlı şir ketlerin ve iştiraklerin sermayeleri, sermaye artışları da dikkate alınarak 1979 yılına taşınmış, böylece şirketlerin sermayeleri karşılaştırabilir hale gelmiştir. Tez çalışması sonucunda, a) banka-holding ilişkileri, b) 1 979 sonu itibariyle, sermayeleriyle birlikte, Türkiye'de mevcut tüm holdingler ve c) seçilen 34 grubun iştirak ve/veya bağlı şirketleri ve bunların sermayeleri ve ser maye kompozisyonları tümüyle saptanabilmiştir. Tezin ortaya koyduğu bulgular ve varılan sonuçlar şöyle özetlenebilir: a. Türkiye'de mevcut özel ticari bankaların büyük bölümü bir veya iki aile, ya da sermaye grubunun kontrolüne girmiştir. b. 1979 yılı sonu itibariyle Türkiye'de 210 holding bulunmaktadır ve bu holdinglerin en büyük % 8'i sermayenin yaklaşık % 50'sini kontrol etmektedir. Tek bir şah sın, ya da ailenin kontrol ettiği holdinglerin oranı ise % 57.4'tür. c. Tez kapsamına alınan 34 gruba bağlı şirketlerin ve iştiraklerinin tüm şirketler içinde sermaye olarak payları % 42'dir. Bu oran anonim şirketler içinde % 55'e çıkmaktadır. Bu şirketlerin sayıca tüm şirketler içindeki payı ise % 3'tür. 34 gru bun içindeki en büyük on grup ise, tüm şirketlerin sermayesinin 1/3'ünü kontrol etmektedir. d. Sonuç olarak, Türkiye'de sermaye yoğunlaşmasının, teoride tanımlanan biçim lerin dışında, kendine özgü bir biçimde oluştuğu ve bu kendine özgü süreç so nucunda, sermayenin ve fon kaynaklarının hızla, çok az sayıda, büyük çoğunlu ğu tek bir şahıs, ya da ailenin kontrolündeki sermaye grubunda toplanmakta ol duğu ve bu açıdan önemli mesafe katedildiği ortaya çıkmaktadır. - IX300 largest firms, etc.; the comparisons between the groups according to the total amounts of capital controlled, number of firms controlled by the groups etc.; the interrelationships; collaboration with the outsider groups, state economic enterprises and foreign capital; and finally, the characteristics of the companies controlled. The total number of companies related to the 34 groups are 722, the number of banks 12, and the number of insurance comparies 18. The number of the comparies controlled are 503 with a percentage of 70. The total volume of the capital of these 503 companies amount to TL 77.6 billion with 52.6% in total. The fact that 88.6% of the largest 35, and 68.1% of the largest 110 companies belong to the 34 groups studied in this thesis gives a fairly good picture about the sizes of the groups and the extent of their control. According to the volume of capital controlled, the KOÇ Group is followed by İŞ BANKASI and SABANCI Groups with TL 10.2 and 10.0 billion respectively. These three groups control 42.5% of the total capital controlled by the 34 groups. 62.1% of all the companies are industrial companies, 1.1% mining, 1.9% mixed, and the rest are service companies. Part 5 gives the results of the study. As the results, a) the bank-holding relations b) the holding companies existing by the end of 1 979 with their amounts of capital, and c) the companies controlled by or connected to the 34 groups, their amounts of capital and shareholder compositions are determined almost completely. As sited above, the nominal capitals of the companies are inflated according to each capital increase and given with the 1 979 figures, so as to have a common basis for comparison. The findings and the results of the study may be summarized as follows: 1- Today 15 of the total 24 private commercial banks are under the control of one or two families or interest groups. In fact, 3 of the 5 largest commercial banks of Turkey are among these 1 5 banks. The other two are TÜRKİYE İŞ BANKASI and TÜRK TİCARET BANKASI which have their own groups among the 34. Bank Controlling family or group 1-AKBANK SABANCI GROUP 2- T.GARANTİ BANKASI KOÇ GROUP (SABANCI GROUP has minority share) 3- KOCAELİ BANKASI T.GARANTİ BANKASI (KOÇ GROUP) 4- PAMUKBANK ÇUKUROVA GROUP 5- İSTANBUL BANKASİ HAS GROUP 6- EGE BANK ÖZAKAT GROUP 7- T.İMAR BANKASI KUTLUTAŞ GROUP 8- HÎSARBANK KOZANO?LU and ÇAVUŞO?LU FAMILIES - xii -9- ESKİŞEHİR BANKASI ZEYTİNO?LU FAMILY 10- ELAZI? İKTİSAT BANKASI ACARER FAMILY 11- DENİZLİ İKTİSAT BANKASI ERGÜR GROUP 12- DEMİRBANK CINGILLIO?LU FAMILY 13- TÜRK DIŞ TİCARET BANKASI İŞ BANKASI GROUP 14- YAPI VE KREDİ BANKASI ÇUKUROVA, SABANCI and DO?UŞ HOLDİNG GROUPS (ÇUKUROVA GROUP'S share is % 40) 15- ULUSLARARASI ENDÜSTRİ VE TİCARET BANKASI YAPI VE KREDİ BANKASI (i.e. ÇUKUROVA, SABANCI and DO?UŞ HOLDİNG GROUPS) 2- There are 210 holding companies that could be determined in Turkey by the end of 1979. 2.8% of these have capitals above 1 billion TL, and this 2.8% own 22.9% of the total amount of capital of the holding companies. 8% own half of the total capital. The percentage of the holding companies controlled by one person or family is 57.4%. This means that a great part of the total amount of capital of the holding companies belong to a very few number of people or families, and a small number of the holding companies own a substantial part of holding capital. These two facts indicate that a great part of holding capital has accumulated in the hands of a few people or families. 3- The share of the total capital belonging to the companies controlled by the 34 groups in the total amount of corporate capital in Turkey is 41.9%. This percentage rises to 54.9 among the joint-stock companies. Again the share of these companies among the 300 largest firms is roughly 50%. The number of these companies consists only 3% of the total. This implies that only a few companies control a great share of the total capital. Besides, the share of the capital controlled by the 3 largest groups among the 34 (KOÇ, İŞ BANKASI and SABANCI GROUPS) is 42.5% and the largest 10 control 74.7%. This means that these largest 3 groups control 18.7% and the largest 10 groups control 15.3% of the total capital. 5 of the 6 largest commercial banks are controlled by these 10 groups and these 5 banks collected 172.8 billion TL of deposits in 1978. This figure constitutes 54% of the total amount of deposits and 84% of the amount collected by the private commercial banks. These figures show that there is a high level of concentration in the banking sector also. 4- With all these characteristics the capital concentration phenomenon in Turkey does not conform with the general theoretical approaches and with the western practices. The Turkish experience, namely the expansion of the interest groups (and companies), the interrelationships of these groups with the financial institutions, and more specifically, the structural aspects of companies, their management and control, strictly diverges from that asserted in the theory. It is definite that in Turkey the banking capital and industrial capital are combining with each other. It is also definite that there is a high level of capital -xiii -concentration, but the way the capital groups expand, the way they come together with financial institutions, especially with banks, and their type of control are rather different from the world experience. In the world, the most common pattern of growth is internal growth or through mergers and acquisitions, and the way industrial and banking capitals join is through domination of banking capital over industrial capital and control of industrial concerns. First of all, it is seldom that growth of corporations in Turkey occurs through mergers and acquisitions, even through internal growth. The most common way of growth is not that of corporations, but that of groups. In order to grow and expand, the groups diversify and found new corporations, and this results with the growth and expansion of groups and not corporations. As the second point, the way the banking and industrial sectors come together in Turkey, is just the reverse of what has happened in the rest of the world. At a stage of its development, the industrial capital, that stemmed from agricultural and trading sectors, needed dominate the banks, and the major groups have made attempts to control these, and they succeeded in doing so. The way corporations are controlled also differ substantially from control in the western world. Throughout the recent history of development of capitalism, the corporations had a great volume of shareholders, they were `open to public` companies in the real sense, and were controlled by a small group of shareholders, who own a small part of the capital. These corporations were usually managed by professional teams. In Turkey, these two most important features of control and management are not valid. Majority shares of corporations, which means more than 51%, are owned usually by a few people, the rest is usually not open to public, and they are managed usually by the owners, or by those that own the majority shares. Only 2% of the shares of the holdings are owned by others than those majority shareholders. 5- These facts all imply that the formation of interest groups and the capital concentration experienced in Turkey is a very peculiar one. It is seen that capital and sources of funds are concentrating rapidly in a few hands in its own way and this has gone too far already. xiv