



KADIR HAS UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES

**INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND TURKEY-GERMANY RELATIONS:
THE DIPLOMACY OF THE REFUGEE DEAL**

AYŞE GÜL ÖCAL

MASTER'S THESIS

ISTANBUL, MAY, 2019

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MASTER'S THESIS



Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Kadir Has University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master's in the Program of Social Sciences And Humanities.

ISTANBUL, MAY, 2019

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
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
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
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


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INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND TURKEY-GERMANY RELATIONS: THE DIPLOMACY OF THE REFUGEE DEAL

ABSTRACT

This study will address the EU-Turkey negotiations with the help of two level game by focusing particularly on domestic factors and their possible influences on governments in both Germany and Turkey. These domestic factors can be seen as a open-door policy of Merkel and the hung parliament in Turkey. From this perspective, the refugee deal and negotiations involves one of the fundamental foreign policy instruments: diplomacy. In order to clarify the deal in detail, bilateral talks and negotiations must be explained to have a broader perspective about the diplomacy of the refugee crisis between the EU/Germany and Turkey. To support the aim of the thesis, historical background of the EU/Germany- Turkey relations was also addressed. In this direction, my aim is to explain how to address negotiations between the EU/Germany and Turkey, mostly between Merkel and Erdogan on the refugee crisis in terms of inter-governmentalism and two level game. In order to make this analysis, this study uses books, articles, newspapers, speeches and statistical data.

Keywords: Syrian refugee crisis, the refugee deal, diplomacy, relationship, migration, two-level games, negotiation

ULUSLARARASI GÖÇ VE TÜRKİYE-ALMANYA İLİŞKİLERİ: MÜLTECİ ANLAŞMASININ DİPLOMASİSİ

ÖZET

Bu çalışma, özellikle yerel faktörlere ve bunların hem Almanya hem de Türkiye'deki hükümetler üzerindeki olası etkilerine odaklanarak, iki seviyeli oyun yardımı ile Avrupa Birliği-Almanya/ Türkiye müzakerelerini ele alacaktır. Bu yerel faktörler Merkel'in açık kapı politikası ve Türkiye'deki koalisyon hükümet olarak sıralanabilir. Müzakereler açısından bakıldığında mülteci krizi önemli dış politika enstrümanlarından biri olan diplomasiyi içermektedir. Anlaşmayı ayrıntılı bir şekilde açıklamak için, AB/Almanya ile Türkiye arasındaki mülteci krizi diplomasisi hakkında daha geniş bir perspektif sağlayan ikili görüşmeler ve müzakerelerin açıklanması gerekmektedir. Buna ek olarak tezin amacını desteklemek için Avrupa Birliği/Almanya-Türkiye ilişkilerinin arka planı ele alınmıştır. Bu doğrultuda amacım, uluslararasılık teorisi ve iki seviyeli oyun bağlamında AB/Almanya-Türkiye; çoğunlukla Merkel ve Erdoğan arasındaki müzakerelerin nasıl irdelenmesi gerektiğini açıklamaktır. Bu analizi yapmak için kitaplar, makaleler, gazete haberleri, diyaloglar ve istatistiksel data kullanılmıştır.

Anahtar sözcükler: Suriyeli mülteci krizi, mülteci anlaşması, diplomasi, ilişki, göç, iki seviyeli oyun, müzakere

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1. INTRODUCTION

In the midst of the unstable situation of Syria, while also the country has diverse religious and ethnic groups, demonstrations which inspired by the 'Arab Spring' erupted not only in Syria but also neighboring countries in March of 2011. These uprisings that are widely known as an 'Arab Spring' has started to unseat presidents of Tunisia and Egypt and paved the way of pro-democracy movements in Syria. With the help of large scale spread of activist movements, resignation of Bashar al- Assad was demanded by many Syrians who have long been struggling with a lack of freedom, corruption, and high unemployment. At this point, Syria slid into a civil war and as the crisis escalated quickly, the response of Assad was brutal which he has lead to the killing of demonstrators and imprisoning many more of them.

While Syria was grappling with the large scale of the crisis, it was unavoidable for Turkey to stay out of the situation as a country which shares quite a long border with Syria. At the first stage of the crisis in 2011, the situation of the refugees was not seen as critical as seen in 2019 and it has been expecting that refugees would be returning their country of origin. Based on this view, the Turkish government has called the Syrian refugees as a 'guest' instead of adopting conventional refugee status but adopting another policy did not generate a violation of 1951 Refugee Convention because refugee status based on the Convention was only regarding refugees coming from European countries. However, rising number of Syrian refugees that fled from their country and using Turkey as a transit country has forced Turkey to take the crisis more seriously and in subsequent years Turkey was defined as a key player in this refugee crisis.

From an international perspective, the refugee crisis was not only about the Syrian civil war. It must be noted that Turkey has a long history based on its transit country feature and bridge role for refugees since 1980s and 1990s. On the other hand, Europe has also been handling refugees that tried to reach borders and smugglers which comes from the Middle East, Asia, and even India. Within these long history of both Turkey and Europe, the Syrian refugee crisis has created a new era and particularly in the summer of 2015 the crisis evolved into a European crisis because thousands of refugees reached the borders of Europe by using mostly illegal ways.

When the crisis heated up in Europe in 2015, Germany as a major country based on population, economy and strong position in the European Union and Merkel as a leader of Germany has sought a settlement with Turkey to get over the crisis and to protect European Union borders. Hence this refugee crisis has created a chain of negotiations particularly after the crisis led to serious concerns for Europe in the summer of 2015. In the following months, Merkel paid several visits to Turkey to reach sustainable solutions and this negotiation process ended up with a 'refugee deal' in March of 2016.

Based on the international relations and foreign policy perspectives particularly in the context of refugee policies, this agreement has a diverse place in the migration studies and remarkable impacts were seen in not only neighboring countries but also worldwide. Moreover, this deal means a new chapter for Turkey and Germany relations notably their common history regarding migration is taken into consideration. Therefore the deal can be seen as a milestone of the EU/Germany-Turkey relations and a case study to worth to explain.

The following thesis will address the issue and the agreement which have features of international relations. From this perspective, the refugee deal involves one of the fundamental foreign policy instruments: diplomacy. For clarifying the deal in detail, bilateral talks and negotiations must be explained, which provides a broader perspective about the diplomacy of the refugee crisis between the EU/Germany and Turkey. More clearly, my aim is to explain how to address negotiations between the EU/Germany and Turkey, mostly between Merkel and Erdogan on the refugee crisis in terms of international relations theories.

In the following chapters, to address the diplomacy of the refugee deal; chapter 2 will elaborate background of Germany-Turkey relations by highlighting previous migrations which involve labor recruitment between the years 1961 and 1970s, asylum seekers and refugees in 1980s-1990s and diasporic feature of the 2000s' migration. Chapter 3 will then continue by emphasizing Turkey-Germany relations in the international setting of the EU and the refugee deal to understand the EU factor in the relations and to point out changing features of the bilateral relations. Particularly changing features of the relations between the EU/Germany-Turkey became more apparent during the refugee deal; even though Merkel and Erdogan are considered as chief negotiators of the refugee deal, their

maneuvers were reconfigured by the EU. The diplomacy of the refugee deal has added a significant factor to the balance of power between Turkey and the EU in addition to accession process of Turkey which mostly shaped by the national interest of the member states (e.g. Germany). In chapter 4, the refugee deal will be addressed as a case study and a sample of diplomacy between the EU/Germany- Turkey. In accordance with this aim, chapter 4 will explain diplomatic negotiations between the EU/Germany-Turkey by highlighting not only negotiations but also personal statements of the leaders. The thesis will finish with chapter 5 discussion and conclusion which present an explanatory framework for the case of the refugee deal in the light of the two-level game. Particularly, domestic factors such as the open-door policy of Merkel and hung parliament in Turkey have affected their bargaining power and against the background of the crisis, the EU/Germany-Turkey negotiations require detailed explanation which is provided by two-level games and its explanations regarding bargaining and negotiations leading up to the refugee deal. In parallel with this purpose and in the light of two-level games, the thesis will evaluate implications of level II which is domestic developments and level I international negotiations and their outcomes based on the diplomacy of the refugee deal between the EU/Germany-Turkey.

2. BACKGROUND OF GERMANY-TURKEY RELATIONS WITH THE SETTING OF PREVIOUS MIGRATIONS

Throughout migration history based on particular experiences of countries, Turkey has the ongoing experience of migration. Particularly the common history that shared with Germany based on labor recruitment was a remarkable pattern to highlight migration experiences. It has been fifty years of large-scale emigration from Turkey to Germany and it can be still seen reflections of it in many parts of disciplines such as social, cultural, political, and economic life.

This chapter will present a brief background regarding relations between Turkey-Germany in terms of migration history of both countries by dividing the migration periods into several parts. As it is known, Germany-Turkey relations have been maintained in different terms and migration issue is one of the most important dimensions of bilateral relations. Even though the migration process was officially and substantially started with confirmation of bilateral treaty by the Federal Republic of Germany to employ guest-workers from Turkey in 1961, long-standing Turkish-German migration history can be traced back to the 19th century which is the term of the migration of high-ranking German officers, military specialists as well as merchandisers. This occurred in both directions which involve also sending young officers to the German Empire for training (Aydın, 2016).

The 20th century witnessed a different dimension of Turkey- Germany relations and Jews constituted an important share of it. Between 1933-1955 years, German-Jewish intellectuals and scholars have originated a diaspora in Turkey. Due to political and racial reasons, the Nazi regime has discharged scholars because of their academic studies and the Turkish government has provided a settlement for some of them in Turkey in the hopes of empowering higher education of Turkey. With the help of those invitations which had been extended to German, Czech, and Austrian scholars, the country's educational reform has flourished and no other policy has served Turkey's educational reforms more than these particular invitations. Turkey has capitalized on the developments by documenting a letter to the American Ambassador Robert F. Skinner about the arrival of exiled scholars in November of 1933 and has shown its interest by enclosing a list of names of foreign professors designated to the University of Istanbul.

Turkey as a country which preferred intellectual advancement of Western lines, has employed thirty-five foreign professors in the University of İstanbul (Reisman, 2007, pp.458).

Beyond the large-scale destruction of the Second World War, Germany was one of the countries that had the largest emigration flow in the years between 1945 and 1961. The new era that emerged after World War II paved the way of re-constructions and improvements which required labor force for West European countries and labor forces were being imported from relatively under-developed South European nations. However, the demand for foreign labor was more than these nations can afford to and Turkey joined the migratory labor movement with the official labor recruitment agreement that signed with Germany in 1961. As the number of foreign workers reached 280.000 by 1960 and this upward trend makes German employers think that they need legal basis to manage the process healthy which brings the issue recruitment agreement which was signed with Turkey in 1961 which include particular provisions different from the one which signed by Turkish Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Labour of Schleswig-Holstein in 1957 (Bagdoshvili, 2010).

Although migration of Turkish people to Europe had been experienced at the individual level before the agreement; migration movement based on labor recruitment turned Turkey into a country which experiences a large scale emigration for the first time in its history (Şen, 2003; Akgündüz, 1993).

Even though the process started with the recruitment based on bilateral agreement in 1961, as the scope of Turkish migration to Germany is wide, following years brought about different dimensions that also influence the nature of migration: family reunification, from 1973 to the beginning of 1980; asylum seekers, 1980-1990; illegal migration, from the early 1990s until now; in fact aging population of Europe was also contributing factor which remains its existence currently (Sirkeci, 2002).

2.1. LABOUR RECRUITMENT, ‘GUEST WORKERS’ AND FAMILY REUNIFICATION BETWEEN THE YEARS 1961 AND 1970S

Recruiting foreign workers temporarily in order to compensate labor shortages in Germany created a ‘guest worker’ term as ‘human capital’ and after the first ‘Agreement on the Recruitment and Placement of Workers’ contract, further agreements accompanied by several countries including Turkey in 1961 and 1964 (Icduygu, 2012, p.11).

Immigrants were mainly recruited in the industry by filling positions which not require high-skill jobs such as dressmaking, shoemaking, and jobs that native Germans do not prefer to do. The ‘guest worker’ model was providing temporary work and residence permits. At the beginning of the recruiting process, Turkish migrants were mainly men who aged between 20 and 40 and they were seen comparatively skilled based on Turkish population that works in Turkey (King and Kılınç, 2013).

The labor migration that has started in the early 1960s and accelerated with bilateral recruitment agreements onwards brought about a remarkable change that influenced other phases of migration. While Germany was expecting a healthy agreement and collaboration with Turkey, requirements of the process were abandoned due to the critique of representatives of German industry. These critiques have emerged because labor agreements between Germany and Turkey have been developed based on the rotation. However, employers wanted to hold workers to familiarise to work to follow the rotation programme well while workers preferred even illegal ways for a family reunion which is impossible to prevent. Hence, this situation leads to abandoning the rotation programme of guest-workers (Abadan-Unat, 2011, p.12).

The year 1973 was a milestone of the German-Turkey migration history because the oil crisis leads to a shift in migration based on migration against policies and legislation of family reunification emerged. Up until the eruption of the oil crisis, German legislative procedures were supporting the immigration of family members of workers and they could settle in towns nearby their workplaces. Based on the oil crisis and price shocks, in November 1973 guest workers were banned to enter Germany and this was also an opportunity to reduce the foreign population. Hence, Germany brought recruiting migrant workers to end by banning non-EEC guest workers. Nevertheless, the fear of Turkish immigrants about returning to Germany for working had convinced them to stay in

Germany; besides they were able to plan immigration of their family by benefiting from family reunification right that was given them while other guest workers from different countries such as Italy and Greece saw a considerable decline (King and Kılınç, 2013).

In addition to family reunification, Germany was also an attention-grabbing destination for irregular migrants that come from Turkey while they were entering not only by illegal ways or tourist visas but also working informal positions. Some of the irregular immigrants that have illegal status afterward got legal status via application and marriage (Aydın, 2016). From the beginning of family reunification in 1973 to the early 1980s because of several changes of migration trend and type, Germany carried out three policy rules under Helmut Schmidt administration which states that determining the integration of foreigners who live in Germany legally, remaining the banning of recruitment of non-EEC workers and financial support to motivate returnings of migrants to their homeland (King and Kılınç, 2013).

The other remarkable issue that emerged in the first phase of immigration to Germany was the Kurdish speaking population which emigrates from Eastern Turkey setting off by two reasons and constituted 7% of total Turkish emigrants. By the years this percentage fluctuated and reached 10% because of the Keban Dam project which destroyed many villages and destructive earthquake in Muş, Varto in 1966. Consequently, they were provided an opportunity to go abroad by getting rid of re-locate in Turkey. By the end of this phase, Germany hosted about 800.000 Turkish citizens and their families; possibly 60.000 of them was Kurdish origin (Sirkeci, 2003, p.13).

Even though the structure of highly homogeneous and invisible character of Turkish workers in the public space; gathering families in Germany in the middle of 1970s set the stage for new phases and the end of labor recruitment by implementing restrictor policies could not end up the ongoing process (Sirkeci, 2000).

2.2. 1980's AND 1990's: ASYLUM SEEKERS AND REFUGEES

While 1970s political upheaval promoted Turkish people to migrate to Germany; in late 1980, a military coup was the main reason which forced 105.480 asylum seekers fled Germany (Sirkeci, 2002, p.14). In the midst of those people, there were also political actors and skilled persons who were blocked from accessing the labor market because of unauthorized conditions as well as deficiency of legal status. Moreover, political movements paved the way of deterioration of Turkish community based on not only political but also social and cultural terms in Germany but as a counter-attack Turkish state supported all Turks in respect of remain identification with the culture of Turkish. Hence, particular institutions such as Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs were constituted to boost Turkish state and sense of values in 1984 (Sirkeci, 2002, p.15).

Within the family reunification phase, it can be said that the insecure environment of pre-1980 military coup years, as well as political upheaval, generated another attempt to migrate to Germany. In fact, the capital of Turkish immigrants and families in Western Europe rose 1.700.000 and only 720.100 of them who were workers sent by official channels while some of them continued family-reunion migration by clandestine migration. (Sirkeci, 2002, p.15). In response to this rise, Klusmeyer and Papademetriou (2009) state that German officials launched Foreigners Repatriation Incentives Law in 1983 to foster immigrants and their families return to their home country. This return policy was seen as a solution by German officials for rising unemployment and growing family reunification percentage. They also considered that they control the integration of immigrants who stayed. Hence, between the years 1983 and 1985 return migration happened and ended up the return of 250.000 Turkish people to their country of origin (Abadan-Unat, 2011, p.22).

Another remarkable point of the 1980s was the German-born/second generation of Turkish guest workers who reached maturity and created a new theme in Germany society which shaped the multi-cultural feature of the country with other nationalities such as Italians and Greeks. This second generation of Turkish immigrants called 'European Turks' (Sirkeci, 2002, p.9).

From the middle of the 1980s and 1990s clashes between PKK and Turkish army caused another influx of asylum seekers including many Kurds. In this case, Turkish migration also experienced ethnopolitical scope which stems from a large Kurdish population in Turkey which promotes ethnic tension and fragmentation that eased asylum migration to Germany. According to Sirkeci (2002), possible decisive factors that encourage emigrants between 1980s and 1990s was also poverty that emerged because of inefficient return of Keban Dam project. He also points out that in addition to the Kurds population, Alevi majority in East of Turkey involved the highest emigration rates in Turkey. Thus, these circumstances created networks and reasons to flee by leading more migration movements during the 1980s and 1990s.

While the complex relationship between Germany and Turkey based on migration, the 1990s started a new era that makes relations more ambiguous with the effect of a large immigrant population. Until the 1990s Germany was implementing particular policies which refuse immigrants as a part of their population as well as the claim of not sharing a common ethnocultural background with German societies. However, these perceptions of conservative politicians witnessed the opposite stance by liberal politicians and media by emphasizing the reality of the permanent status of immigrants instead of the faulty presence of country of immigration. On the other hand, the new era that was shaped in the early 1990s even lead to higher immigration rates more than 'guest workers' did. At the end of the Cold War and afterward with the effect of political changes the number of migrants rose and ethnic Germans who settled in former German lands started to return. Hence, in addition to Kurdish ethnic problem that led to immigration to Germany, the collapse of the Soviet Union and separation of former Yugoslavia motivated the influx from Eastern Europe as well (Ehrkamp and Leitner, 2003).

2.3. The 2000S: GERMAN IMMIGRATION POLICY AND DIASPORIC CITIZENSHIP OF ‘GERMAN-TURKS’

The changes of the 1990s which was explained previously, paved the way for further implementations such as providing German citizenship for foreigners. Since 2000, the German officials have taken measure to reform transmigratory movements which require integration process as well as a legal framework based on nationality. These measures basically were identified based on the integration of non-nationals, ensure coherence between both sides and solving social problems that stem from guest workers. At the beginning of the new millennium based on *jus soli* principle children who was born in Germany and have at least one parent who has a right to stay continuously at least eight years were gaining German citizenship automatically on the contrary to *jus sanguinis* which specifies citizenship based on the nationality of the parents. This principle that implied before was the restricted version of naturalization law which also discourage naturalization of foreigners (King & Kılınc, 2013, pp.7-8).

With the help of adjustments and reform in migration policies, the naturalization process took a different form and turn into a more flexible feature. Hence they have a right to keep both Turkish and German citizenship until the age of 23 when they were in the process of deciding between German citizenship and citizenship of their parental origin. In addition, first-generation of immigrants were provided citizenship easily by having lower residency requirements. Based on citizenship, denization was another issue that highlighted the 2000s. In spite of the fact that a number of Turks who applied for naturalization varied between 50.000 and 100.000 differently from the early 1990s; since 2003 it has been a considerable decline in the number of naturalized Turks (Kaya, 2004, p.38)

It was clarified that this decline based on the satisfaction of German Turks' with denizenship status which gives them particular rights such as cultural, civil and social; except political ones. It was also stated that expectations of German-Turks about more democratical citizenship regulations which prevent limitations on dual citizenship were the second possible reason for the decline. It is also stated that German-Turks probably had kept their expectations low and did not see further advantages to gain German citizenship. Another reason can be defined as ignoring new nationality law by German-

Turks who reside generally in urban areas and discouraging influence that changes the trend of the naturalization process. In addition, German-Turks who have not been given the right for voting in Turkish elections in their country of origin may have led to weak voting habits and having a right to vote in their residential areas in abroad may have outweighed other option (Kaya & Kentel, pp. 11-12, 2005).

In addition to Citizenship Law which was implemented in January of 2000, in February of the same year, green card reform was generated which mainly created for IT specialists as 20.000 temporary visas. In 2005 regulations were extended by creating an immigration law which involves integration courses funded and adjust by the federal government for adult immigrants. This reform was encapsulating immigrants who have poor German language skills mandatorily while involving other newcomers voluntarily. There were also particular regulations for those who self-employed immigrants and if they invest at least € 1.000.000 they could benefit from this principle by also having a visa (Süssmuth, 2009, p.2).

On the other hand, extended visa opportunity was allowed for international students with a particular time restriction. In August of 2007 Law on the Transposition of European Union Directives eased regulations for self-employed immigrants, for victims of human trafficking a temporary residence right is applied and people who have an EU Member State citizenship no longer need a visa for residing in Germany legally. (European Commission, 2007). In the following year, particular regulations came out based on EU membership criterion which is determinant on academic job opportunities and third-country national academics. In the process of migration and integration policy in Germany, such reforms that have a regulation aims became valid in 2005 and these reforms were created to correct past failure policies. In spite of the fact that the success of the regulations further progresses always require new steps that must be taken not only in a short but also long term (Süssmuth, 2009, p.2-3).

Beyond national citizenship and particular rules for immigration process throughout the migration experience of Germany, it must be noted that citizenship in Germany was reconstructing by involving state and civil society as well as social practices of them. Cultural institutions, teashops, communal celebrations, and own cultures of Turkish immigrants have transformed the German nation. Also, Turkish immigrant organizations

have been played an active role in the battle with discrimination against immigrants that include full citizenship, particularly right to vote. However, the remarkable point of this evolvement process is that citizenship is not just related to passive criteria in national community or right given by the state but also about social practices that have been done by individuals in beyond the state based on institutions of civil society. Hence, these practices engaged and challenged the state which also points out re-construction of the state. As an empirical evidence, Turkish immigrants took a place in German state and society and have found a chance to practice their own culture and identity. They have also expanded their attempts and demands from a national base to supra-national base (Ehrkamp and Leitner, 2003, p.128).

Kaya and Kentel (2005) state that extended network based on communication between Turkey and Germany have a significant part in development and continuation of diasporic identity in not only in Germany borders but also among transnational communities. In other words, it is about the connection between diasporic theme both to the homeland and to the rest of the world. Moreover, the term of German-Turks represents a good pattern based on characteristics of modern diaspora networks and on globalization from below which refers to extending the access of transnational migrants to the political, economic and cultural structure. Most importantly the ability of diasporic identity to defeat limitations of the country of reside in requires a new definition beyond national and traditional citizenship discourse by taking new forms such as transnational citizenship or diasporic citizenship which also points out limitations of representation by labelling them *Almancı* (German-like) or *gurbetçi* (emigrant) which carry pejorative intention. As a result allowing new citizenship status and following reforms originated that Germanness is no longer restricted to ethnic descent and new laws paved the way of recognizing newcomers also instead of supremacy of ethnic identities such as 'German', 'Turkish' etc. and it was provided an opportunity to construct civic identities such as 'German-Turkish' (a Turk from Germany).

In this chapter fluctuating nature of Turkish migration to Germany until 2000s was elaborated which shows itself by shaping these phases and the migration has particular waves that all have distinctive features. With the light of these multiple parameters of Turkish migration to Germany, Chapter 3 will explain the significance of Turkey-

Germany relations under the setting of the European Union and the refugee deal within the changing parameters of relations between the EU/Germany and Turkey.



3. TURKEY-GERMAN RELATIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING OF THE EU AND THE REFUGEE DEAL

The EU is a significant parameter to define the relations between Turkey and Germany, regarding the refugee deal. Therefore in this chapter, the picture of Turkey-Germany relations under the auspices of the EU will be drawn. The refugee crisis and the following deal involves not only features of bilateral relations but also collective dialogues that lead by the EU. Therefore, in this chapter of the thesis, it will be reviewed the failure of the EU to develop common foreign policy solutions for the crisis, several problems to apply migration policies. In fact, the refugee crisis has continued mostly a ‘non-European crisis’ until April 2015. While the crisis was taken into consideration, Angela Merkel rose as a supporter to prompt the EU and called all the EU states to accomplish the process but by the end of 2015, the EU was not close to being successful at solidarity among its member states.

Beyond the particular features of the EU, it will be evaluated that changing situation of the bilateral relations of Turkey-Germany which paved the way of diverse diplomatic connections as well. These diplomatic connections have different characteristics which require to divide the bilateral relations into different terms by taking into account the crucial role of Germany. Different characteristics of the relations have also been influenced by the EU’s incentives for the security of the EU borders and from the diplomatic perspective within the EU constitution, the relations regarding the refugee deal between the EU/Germany-Turkey has experienced a new era which enhanced negotiations regardless of whether it was a disagreement or agreement.

Moreover, the refugee crisis that emerged shortly after the Syrian Civil War changed all features and dimensions of not only bilateral relations of Turkey and Germany but also long-standing accession process with the EU. At the peak time of the crisis in 2015 when migrants and asylum seekers fled to Germany, the approach of Berlin dramatically changed towards Turkey. Merkel presented an offer to restore the accession process of Turkey and visa liberalization opportunity as a part of the deal with Ankara to help to control refugee influx. In other words, a vicious circle between Turkey’s relations with Germany and the EU broke after the worlds biggest crisis since World War II (Paul and Schmidt, 2017).

In the eyes of Ankara, the deal and following advances created a major shift not only in the accession process and getting involved in the EU but also a balance of power. It was a golden opportunity since the Cold War term that Turkey had a chance to reinforce the security of Europe against Communism; once again Turkey foresaw that it had gained significant force over the EU. The changing of the balance of power has been seen by looking at Turkey's disappearing fear on the deal while Germany remaining its silence over the human rights conditions that worsening in Turkey in that term. However, in this fast-changing relations triangle as the crisis with Berlin, evolved and deepened, parties mostly changed their attitudes which also led to the complex structure of contemporary relations (Paul and Schmidt, 2017).

About the scope of bilateral relations, Szabo (2018) states that contemporary Turkey-Germany relations can be defined with the term of the partnership. As they are linked by large numbers of Turkish people living in Germany, extensive economic ties and particularly refugee flows after the Syrian Civil war and the following drastic refugee crisis it can be said that there are two closely interwoven polities yet sometimes experiences great stress and ups and downs. With the eruption of the refugee crisis in Europe in 2015, Merkel discovered what does Turkey mean to Germany and the EU.

3.1. A NEW-BORN GERMANY-LED REFUGEE DEAL BETWEEN TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Since World War II, the world is facing with a large scaled refugee crisis which is not restricted to the conflict area, in fact, led to a global scaled crisis that influences many countries. Among those countries, as a particular region, Turkey and Europe desperately struggling with the influx of refugees since the beginning of the crisis. The Syrian conflict that started in March 2011 with demonstrations against the government and escalated very fast while creating arguably the worst humanitarian crisis of world history. Since the first emergence of protests in Syria that lead to conflict in the long term, 60% of Syrian people have been living far from their devastated country and more than 12.5 million people not only have been forced to flee their homes but also killed (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], 2018). When a total number is considered ,it must be noted that 22 million people of the pre-war population of Syria

need urgent humanitarian aid and assistance regardless they still live in their own country or fled their homes (UNHCR, 2018).

The seriousness of the situation is quite clear in the number of a refugee who fled from conflict areas to Europe that reaches 1.011.712 in 2015 while most of them also entered Europe by using illegal channels that mostly led to the high death toll. At the end of 2015, an additional 143.886 migrants reached Europe through Turkey (UNHCR, 2015). While Turkey was being considered as a transit country for refugees journey from Syria to Central Europe, it mainly provided a settlement places for displaced Syrians which is the situations that whet Europe's appetite about the solutions of the crisis. Turkey as a host country exceedingly generous against refugees and the EU as a constitution which tries to preserve integrity while struggling with internal challenges that involve nationalist tendencies and member states which are not able to speak with a single voice on the issues of common policies and enlargement. Under these circumstances, it can be assumed that the effect of the refugee crisis on both the EU and Turkey would have created options to point out the crisis while coordinated approaches also helping both parties. Instead, it is argued that the refugee crisis originated a shifted balance of power between the EU and Turkey and the most important reason of this situation may be the taken advantage moment of Turkish leadership while the EU was caught in a moment of weakness. Principally this weakness not only leads to failure to capitalize on the EU's bargaining position but also lead to a contradiction of European understanding of human right and democracy. However, the EU considered the refugee deal as a game changer which also may help to preserve its integrity and intended to discourage migrants from reach out the EU borders via dangerous routes (Schoenhuber, 2018, pp. 647-649).

In the sense of steps for the migrant crisis, 2013 was a year that has experienced a rebirth of relations between the EU and Turkey. The Readmission Agreement which is one of the cores of the European migration external policy allowing the return of non-EU nationals to their country of origin and to countries that they transited was signed with the guarantee of visa liberalization for the Turkish citizens. The very first round of this principle with Turkey was held in 2005 and abandoned also in 2006. In the new readmission text in 2011, there was an untied part on visa, migration, and mobility which arouse Turkey interest in negotiating Readmission Agreement once again. With the agreement that was signed on 16 December 2013, Turkey was requested to take back

irregular migrants of not only its own citizenship but also third country citizens who use Turkey as a transit country and from European Union member states that involve Schengen area. Based on the visa liberalization subject, the EU presented 72 criteria that must be accomplished in several areas such as security, migration, fundamental rights, and border control (European Commission, 2013). On the contrary to past accession and agreement process between Turkey and the EU, it can be said that it was a revival of relations by taking into consideration lifted the blockade of the French government that delayed the accession process, the re-considering Kurdish PKK problem. However, with the effect of Gezi Park protests and Turkey's stance against the situation, relations decelerated again in 2013 (Benvenuti, 2017, pp.7-8).

In the summer of 2015, the EU began to find out that is the peak year of 'migrant crisis' for Europe because of the number of migrants who tried to reach out Europe mostly fled from Syrian Civil War. Moreover, the Dublin Convention and Schengen Agreement were losing its function because of the burden of a large number of migrants while there is no functional agreement to manage the migrant's crisis within the EU territory. According to this convention, an asylum seeker applies for asylum in the country where he/she arrived which paved the way of reaching the EU by passing its Mediterranean borders rapidly. Shortly after the European Union realized that it has no such a working migration policy on this issue which requires controlling refugee flows. Therefore, as it was stated before, the EU could not be able to speak with a single voice; while Denmark was introducing border control, Hungary built a wall to halt the refugees. Even the canceling of the Schengen Agreement was offered by France. Most importantly, across the EU xenophobia and Islamophobia was on the rise in Europe because of the terror attacks that committed on behalf of radical Islamic beliefs; in fact, nationalist and far-right parties were using this as a political tool which brought about a rising support from those who share the same views with nationalists and far-right parties. Thus, the refugee crisis was a domestic problem for the EU and its member states as well as a global problem (Gedikkaya-Bal, 2016, p.16). Instruments for border controls such as Frontex and Triton was not adequate to face with the large-scale crisis while particular policies, border controls and fight against smuggling were keeping ineffective characteristics. It was quite clear that the EU was not capable to cope with this crisis with the help of existing policies and regulations on its own, in fact accepting much more refugees could destroy economic

and cultural sustainability even in a short term. Besides adopting new policies to cope with the crisis, since no influential agreement was achieved over managing the crisis, the EU decided to direct its efforts to transit country and one actor was determined as the solution of chaos which is Turkey (Gedikkaya-Bal, 2016, p.17).

In 2015, a joint action plan was activated between Turkey and the EU for managing the refugee crisis and since the beginning of 2015, 880.000 people arrived in Greece by using Turkey as a transit country. To diminish this immense scale of irregular crossing over the Aegean Sea the EU and Turkey agreed on a plan that regulates irregular arrivals and also this plan was activated during the November 29 EU-Turkey Summit that intended to the same aim (European Commission, 2016a). Open chapter 17 (Monetary policy and Economic) was agreed by European leaders before and guarantee the fully implemented Readmission Agreement and the visa liberalization. In addition to this, the Readmission Agreement was set up to implement in June 2016 while also visa obligation was lifted for Turkish citizens by October 2016. Based on the Joint Action Plan the EU was expected to supply humanitarian assistance in Turkey as well as financial aid that reach 3 billion euro for the 2.2 million Syrian people that settled in Turkey at the time (European Council, 2016). In exchange to this Turkey was requested to block the refugee influx to the EU territories while also enhancing the living conditions of the irregular migrants. One of the aims of the Summit was also vitalizing the accession process after all fail period. Thereby, it was decided to hold summits twice a year to evaluate the way of relations (Benvenuti, 2017, p.10).

Ever since the refugee crisis erupted in 2015, the stability of the Middle East has become a vital issue not only for the European Union but also in Germany. In autumn of 2015, the EU-Turkey relations were being analyzed with domestic elements in both Turkey and Germany and their potential influence on their governments. The polemical 'open-door policy' of Chancellor Angela Merkel and suspended parliament of Turkey after the June elections were exemplifying domestic factors. Merkel's ad hoc decision in 2015 was for the unconditional crossing of refugees by causing a queue at the Balkan route to enter Western Europe has added a new dimension to the EU, Turkey, and Germany relations. According to the ad hoc decision Merkel suspended European asylum rules and allowed thousands of refugees entering Germany which reach out 1.1 million ends of 2015. To meet the basic needs of refugees such as food, house, and health local agencies were

transmitted which led to struggling but after a while, ad hoc decision of Merkel turned into a disputed issue. Because of pressures from public opinion and her own party, discourses became more critical day by day even the flexible era of humanity and moral leadership status of Merkel. Thus, rough discourses paved the way of weak position towards both EU policy-making and Turkey. Although some obstacles have emerged, the Merkel's decision at the beginning of September engendered an opportunity to build up new dimensions in relations with Turkey. In other words, as a result of the Syrian refugee crisis German domestic policy was influenced while Turkish-the EU relations were evolving. Also, Turkey was seen as an important actor that cope with the crisis by having an impact on Germany's open door policies since the beginning of September in 2015 (Krumm, 2015, p.21).

In March of 2016, the leaders held a meeting to discuss collaboration over the crisis and agreed upon the deal which is improved. According to the EU significant progress has been achieved already such as open labor market of Turkey for Syrians and new visa requirements. In addition to this, the European Union had begun to pay the 3 billion euro for the refugees settled in Turkey while the process advancing with accession talks, visa liberalization and opening of chapter 17 last December. With the new version of the agreement, the EU and Turkey decided to stop the irregular migration from Turkey to the EU. Based on this revised agreement all migrants reaching Greece shores will be returned to Turkey as from 20 March 2016 in return an additional 3 billion euros. For Turkey, to have visa liberalization there was still 72 criteria that must be fulfilled. Another point of the deal is that 1-to-1 condition which means that for every Syrian exiled to Turkey by passing from the Greek islands, another Syrian would have a right to resettle in the EU territory (European Council, 2016).

While thousands of refugees and migrants reaching in Greece every day, the plan that agreed as the EU-Turkey Statement on 18 March 2016 seemed impossible to implement but according to the European Commission data, irregular arrivals dropped by %97 on the year later, while also tragical death tolls that happened at sea decreased. The EU has provided financial support in return Turkey's efforts for hosting refugees and resettling Syrian refugees from Turkey to the EU Member States. Based on the report of European Commission, despite significant issues the first years of the EU-Turkey Statement has generated visible solutions and paved the way of less arrivals which also can be observed

daily crossing numbers that have gone down from 10.000 to an average of around 43 while also death toll in the Aegean decreased from 1.145 to 80 in 2017 (European Commission, 2018). While controlling borders crossings Europe also supported Syrian refugees by providing 3 billion euro for 2016 and 2017 and aim of this fund was ensuring needs of refugees and host communities by giving human assistance, health and education (European Commission, 2018).

In 2018 resettlements based on the EU-Turkey Statement remained at a steady pace and in addition to the previous fund, the second 3 billion euro was also mobilized that 1 billion of it was from the EU budget. The year before the EU Turkey Statement registration rate at hotspots was around %8, this number rose %100 in 2018. Another remarkable detail of the European Commission is that the number of returns of irregular migrants to Turkey rose from 627 to 2.164 in two years while the loss of lives decreased from 1.145 to 130 in 2018. However, two years after the statement between Turkey and the EU it is stated that additional efforts are still required for the health of this long process and to diminish the backlog of asylum applications (European Commission, 2018).

3.2. GERMANY'S GAMBIT: AN ASCENDANT ROLE OF GERMANY IN REFUGEE DEAL WITH TURKEY

In spring of 2016, the crisis entered its last stage and 'German' factor has become more apparent through the finalization of the EU-Turkey deal by discussing the scope of cooperation and managing the refugee influx to Europe. Not so long ago, in January 2016 the first bilateral meetings were held in Berlin between Turkey and Germany and both countries agreed upon particular subjects such as close cooperation in the field of war against terrorism, EU membership, sharing the burden of refugees and irregular migration (Turhan, 2016).

In the way of generating a fruitful deal that has a potential to cope with the crisis, the leading role of Angela Merkel in shaping the bilateral relations with Turkey based on the refugee crisis is as important as particular statements and meetings that were held by heads of the states or governments of the EU member states. According to Turhan (2016), there are several significant aspects of Germany's role not only in the determination of

the relations between Turkey and the EU but also Germany's relations with Turkey. It is stated that behind the closed doors of European Council meetings and summits with Turkey Chancellor Merkel was seen as a key player and created the background for advances based on the refugee crisis.

Under these circumstances, calling Angela Merkel is the EU leader most willing to engage with Turkey despite domestic pressures and discourses over the rising population of migrants make sense. In fact, she may be the last European leader doing a favor in answer to the refugee crisis. In Janning (2016) words, it is indicated that Merkel had no choice but continue to implement her policy, otherwise any change in Germany's approach would cause serious consequences for the stability of the European Union. For instance, if Berlin would have limited the number of refugees arrived or close the borders, Schengen had not survived. As an example of the same approach, Germany adopted a policy which involves a close relationship with Turkey and she proved this movement by visiting Turkey frequently throughout the years of 2015 and 2016. Evidently, Angela Merkel was under pressure because of her stance to the bilateral relationship with Turkey that also supported with paying several visits to Turkey however for as long as Europe's solutions for the refugee crisis is relatively unproductive, collaboration with Turkey seemed like the best option to manage the influx of refugees. Even though Germany supported the EU about providing financial aid and visa liberalization process in return for controlling the flow of migrants from Turkey to Europe there were also disputes about a contributor who will pay to Ankara. While Italy considering the EU budget for paying, other member states were thinking that Germany should fund as a country mostly benefited from the deal and as a government which depends heavily on its carrying out. One of the most important detail that shows Turkey-Germany relations dynamics is how far Berlin is willing to go. It is stated that Merkel relies on Turkey as a vital partner even at the expense of a divided and weak EU. Under these circumstances, it can be said that the EU- Turkey deal has a tendency to take the form of an extended bilateral agreement between Ankara and Berlin.

According to Turhan (2016a) five significant notes related to defining the role of Angela Merkel in the EU-Turkey cooperation that manages the refugee crisis: First, with the help of bilateral and mini-lateral talks, Chancellor Merkel took a leading role not only to create the background for the meetings of European Council but also EU-Turkey summits

pertaining to the Syrian refugees and controlling irregular migration to Europe. That being said, EU-Turkey deal that signed on 18 March 2016 has the characteristic of the 6 March trilateral meeting between Merkel, Davutoğlu and Mark Rutte who then leading representative of the Dutch Presidency of the Council.

Secondly, in spite of the fact that numerous multilateral meetings and statements throughout the process that paved the way of the EU-Turkey refugee deal, it was also stated that Merkel mainly collaborated with Commission President Juncker rather than European Council President Donald Tusk which means that Germany prefers to act alone in the European Council. Third, the Franco-German line did not seem as the steering wheel which is significant to determine the scope and conditions of EU-Turkey cooperations based on the refugee crisis. This also can be seen as a difference of opinion which mostly experienced by member states (Turhan, 2016b, p.467).

Fourth, Angela Merkel was also the first European politician who declared the opening of new chapters based on the accession talks of Turkey with the Union after the European Council Summit in 2015. Even though lack support for opening chapters from post-summit statements and European Council conclusions, Merkel unilaterally declared the opening of new chapters in Turkey's accession task. By taking into consideration Germany's old habits based on Turkey's accession process, this movement brought about a different dimension between not only Turkey-Germany but also Germany and the EU. Finally, by means of Merkel's decisions, Germany has no reluctant hegemon role within the EU, having prudent and indecisive discourse particularly at the time of crisis and practicing leading role that is roughly restricted to the economic field (Turhan, 2016a, p.28).

To understand Germany's leading role and such initiative that strongly shaped the process Arisan-Eralp (2016) points out the refugee burden of Germany, Merkel's efforts to create a solution for the refugee crisis in order to prevent perpetual crisis within the Union. However, with the effect of talks behind the closed doors between Turkey and Germany initiatives, exceeded the priority of the EU integrity and shifted bilateral talks mainly. In addition to the reason of why Germany took a leading role is combating with xenophobia and anti-immigrant discourses which also experienced by Germany since the recruitment agreement was signed. While Germany willing to create remarkable solutions for the

refugee crisis, Turkey was also ready to accept such a deal which may reinforce long-lasting relations with Germany as well as curb its economic slow down with the help of the EU and re-vitalization of the long-standing accession process (Arısan-Eralp, 2016, p.21).

Even the refugee crisis has a global scale it must be noted that Turkey has a vital role since the beginning of the process that firstly stems from geographical proximity to crisis area and if Germany had not volunteered any other EU member state may not have been eager to lead negotiations. Hence, the refugee crisis had an important influence on the EU-Turkey relationship and despite the controversial discourses about Merkel's approaches, multi-dimensional aspects, bilateral relations between Turkey and Germany and their common history based on migration brought them together. Even though the so-called refugee deal seems as the European-Turkey collaboration it can be seen that Germany took such initiatives more than the EU is able to take and these initiatives directed the rapidly progressive migration flows. Thus, following the refugee crisis, Germany's leading role in the European Union took a new turn which influences the whole process and state of relations between Ankara and Brussels (Ott, 2017, pp.8-10).

Ott (2017) defines Ankara and Brussels' relations as a complex relationship which composed of different layers: Accession negotiations and key areas involving the fight against terrorism and migration. It must be noted that one of the most dynamic fields in relations in the last five years has been migration which significantly affected the accession process and association policy. Despite the new opportunities and dynamic presence of the EU-Turkey relations, the interrelations between layers were not fast enough. Moreover, visible incentives raised in such statements between the EU and Turkey in 2016 that aims to achieve visa liberalization for Turkish citizens by June 2016, has not been actualized. In sum, the EU-Turkey relations may be related to hedgehog's dilemma which is the dilemma that both sides do not feel comfortable together but do need to be in each other's closeness for economic, geostrategic and political purposes. For these reasons, both sides have been trying to hold meetings and trying to make a dialogue for years (p.7).

Undoubtedly the refugee crisis that turned into also Europe migrant crisis required new ties between Turkey and the EU. But it must be noted that Germany as an arbiter in the

Union took conspicuous stance throughout the process by creating new dimensions and also ebbs and flows in contemporary relations with Turkey by also giving a shape Turkey and the EU relations. The next section will be clarified the changing dynamics of bilateral relations of Turkey and Germany by taking into consideration Merkel and Erdoğan's role and their partnership that enriched their common history (Turhan, 2018).

3.3. TURKISH-GERMAN DIALOGUE UNTIL THE ERUPTION OF 'EUROPEAN' REFUGEE CRISIS

Based on the chronologic order of contemporary relationship of Turkey and Germany, it is clarified by Szabo (2018) that the characteristics of Turkey-German relations can be defined as 'intermestic' which involves not only domestic but also policy components. Particular unsolved problems such as Turkish and Kurdish immigrants who live in Germany in addition to democracy and human right that interrupted has also affected the bilateral relationship between Turkey and Germany. While the European and NATO aspects playing a pivotal role in German party politics, Christian Democratic Union (CDU) was more aware of Turkey than Social Democratic Party (SPD) based on the NATO alliances of Turkey. Lastly, Turkey and Germany's economic relations has been confident and constant elements in the relationship. After growing concerns of Germany about Turkish membership during the end of the chancellorship of Helmut Kohl's relations also significantly enhanced during SPD-Green coalition in the beginning of the 21st century which coincided with Turkey's Justice and Development Party government which had promising years. During this year, Germany supported the EU membership of Turkey and provided German citizenship opportunity to German people who belong to Turkish origin. However, in 2005 CDU the accession to power in charge of Angela Merkel changed the march of events. Her call for a privileged partnership with Turkey that involves the possibility of falling short of full EU membership which was seen by Turkey as a second-class membership. In the following process, the Merkel government did not make a proactive move to promote Turkey's EU accession. Moreover, with no changes of German policy and presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy in France which composed Franco-German dual has proved that the EU membership of Turkey still open but was not bolstered up. In 2006 after the EU suspended particular negotiations the EU accession

process of Turkey gradually decelerated. One of the most important aspects of stagnant relations and distance between the EU and Ankara which also related to Syrian Civil War and the following refugee crisis is the Arab Spring and lack of domestic reforms in the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The incident that changed the process of relations once again was the mass migration from Syria to Europe that leads to large scale crisis among European countries that also convert Merkel's behavior against Turkey (Szabo, 2018,pp.2-3).

Turkish-German dialogue composed by the complexity of interdependent terms has generally specified by sequent stages of ebb and flow. Particularly relations between Germany and Turkey is defined as a rollercoaster relationship that includes both tensions and signals of rapprochement. Regarding ebb and flow in Turkish relationship, it is also indicated that one of the key reasons that pave the way of ebb and flow is the relations based on mutual interests more than historical ties (İnat, 2016, p.21).

Fundamentally, with the light of convergent/divergent interests, it is witnessed that deeper cooperation until the 'European' refugee crisis in 2015. Before the influx of Syrian refugees to Europe and the transformation of crisis from Middle East scope to a Europe crisis, two remarkable factors had emerged to define key elements of the Turkish-German dialogue : The eruption of uprising in the Middle East at the end of 2010 which pointed to Arab Spring in company with the rise of Syrian civil war in 2011, and the birth of the Eurozone crisis in 2009. When it was time to concern about the Arab Spring and birth of the Syrian civil war, Turkey and Germany have carried out a divergent foreign policy at the beginning of those related crises (Yorulmazlar and Turhan, 2015, p.9).

Regarding the involvement of Turkey and Germany to the uprisings, their methods were different from each other. While Turkey preferred to point out removal of the Assad Regime by also cutting off diplomatic relations with Damascus which was considered as a proactive method, Germany preferred constrained approach by also refusing proposal of both British and French about providing the EU weapons to control opposition forces and did not support to join military operations against attacks of Assad Regime in 2013 (König, 2016, p.103).

Another key discrepancy of Germany and Turkey based on the crucial stages of the crisis was their approaches towards the Syrian refugees. Turhan (as cited in VOA, 2012)

outlined these differences that in the early stages of the crisis Turkey was implementing 'open door' policy regarding the refugees but Germany abstained from showing hospitality to the Syrian refugees and believed that hosting must be provided by neighbor countries.

Turhan (as cited in Auswärtiges Amt, 2013) indicates that despite the background that included the divergent structure of Turkish and German foreign policies, these differences were preferred and strategic Turkey policy was implemented by Berlin at the beginning of 2013. Furthermore the Strategic Dialogue Mechanism was signed between ministries to foster Turkish-German dialogue on significant incidents which are defined as an upheaval in the Arab World, combat with international terrorism, and organized crimes. Germany's attempt that includes extensive cooperation with Turkey, as well as foreign policy implementations, were also supported with the accession process of Turkey among leading German political actors.

Even though the outset of the Eurozone crisis at the end of 2009 affected European economies by leading to immense losses, Germany was not affected at its core; nevertheless intended to have deeper relations with Turkey by using enriched political dialogue. These changes were also observed in regular official visits including high-level business commissions and Angela Merkel's call for starting talks based on new chapters of Turkey's EU attempts while those talks were absent on this issue in the previous years. Nevertheless, because of the unexpected shift in Germany's stance towards the accession process of Turkey, the stage of rapprochement evolved into alienation and conflict in June of 2013. When Germany vetoed the starting of negotiations that involved Chapter 22, this decision was not compatible with the EU decision and even though the German federal government linked this decision to Gezi Park protests, Germany was accused by several European politicians for using Turkey's accession process as an instrument for federal elections (Turhan, 2014, p.16).

Shortly after, diplomatic relations between Turkey and Germany evolved into an alienation while also Germany did not show interest in the revival of Turkey's EU path except the term that the Syrian refugee crisis exacerbated. In fact, it is also stated that the rise of the negative discourse of German media coverage on Turkey played a significant

role in growing discrepancy and tension between the two countries (Turhan and Bozdağ, 2016, p.95).

3.4. BILATERAL RELATIONS IN ADVANCE OF EU-TURKEY REFUGEE DEAL

The stage of alienation between Turkey and Germany which started off veto of Germany based on the opening of Chapter 22 remained until autumn of 2015 while also Syrian refugee crisis turned into a crisis in the European one. Such developments that contain Germany's abandoning of its old constrained stance towards the Syrian refugee crisis and taking more proactive role accelerated the tension during this period because Turkey's understanding of taking a proactive role in the crisis was quite different from the one of Germany. By delivering weapons to Kurdish Peshmerga based on the decision of federal government the role of Germany turned into an assertive one in 2014 and according to Ankara, this was nothing but empowering Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) that recognized by Turkey as a terrorist organization. Thus, concerns about the territorial integrity of Turkey culminated because of possible threats of the rise of Syrian Kurdish autonomy (König, 2016, p.93).

During the phase of divergence, despite the existence of several meetings that hold in 2013 and 2014 based on the Strategic Dialogue the mechanism got into a dilemma in 2015. Along these lines, referring to the official idea of Germany based on Turkey's EU bid, it was not called for membership negotiations by Germany until the seriousness of the refugee crisis accelerated and they reached out Germany's borders and by this way, negotiations came to a standstill over two years of the period between 2013 and 2015. Whereas Merkel did not prefer to pay a visit to Turkey between the years of 2013 and 2015 then Prime Minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan paid a visit in 2014 priorly presidential election which was reflected in German media once again with negative discourses (Turhan and Bozdağ, 2016, p.97).

However, Turkish-German dialogue evolved into a different stage in the third quarter of 2015 with the escalation of Syrian refugee crisis particularly in borders of Germany while the EU was not showing interest to cope with the crisis and had no solidarity to implement

such policies that pave the way of EU-wide relocation for the refugees. In September of 2015 Germany most likely to accept approximately 1.000.000 Syrian refugees until the fourth quarter of 2015 which surpassed the forecasts about the number of the refugees reached out the borders (Al Jazeera, 2015).

On the other hand, Germany's 'open door' policy that was implemented unilaterally effected the previous image of Merkel that points out German interests as a strict protector and an image coincided with the debt crisis based on the Euro both German and European public opinion. The seriousness of the issue for Merkel was clear because of the elections in federal states of Germany in 2016 and also federal elections in 2017 while 52 percent of Germans rejected refugee policies of Merkel (Zeit Online, 2015).

After the announcement of the 'open-door' policy and an unprecedented influx of the Syrian refugees, domestic support for Merkel diminished shortly before both state and federal elections thus, Merkel directed her attention to Turkey to cope with the crisis. Hence she stated that also Turkey is a significant partner regarding coping with the crisis well. Germany's forced choice or in other words 'strategic dependency on Turkey' peaked very fast and aimed to enrich collaboration with Turkey to find a solution for entering of migrants into the EU (Akkaya, 2016, p.40).

In the formulation of the stance of the EU towards Turkey in the crisis, the period was shown by the German leadership because the EU was preferring not to make any reference to the opening of the new chapters in several summits but Merkel unilaterally declared that the EU was willing to start to negotiations with Ankara. It is stated that changes in Merkel's ideas about Turkey's EU process emerged when the strategic dialogue with Turkey was unavoidable to handle with the crisis and not surprisingly Merkel's new stance came out on the eve of her official meetings that hold with Turkey. This move of Merkel was crucial that indicated her key role based on the scope of the so-called 'EU-Turkey deal' that aimed to minimize irregular migration from Turkey to the EU. Hence, following efforts such as visa liberalization, monetary aid for refugees hosted in Turkey and the opening of new chapters contributed by Merkel. It can be concluded that based on growing interdependence of Germany during the crisis paved the way of reconciliation with Turkey while also Germany's attitude transforming into a new phase about Turkey's accession (Turhan, 2018, pp.198-199).

3.5. TURKISH-GERMAN RELATIONS AFTER THE EU-TURKEY REFUGEE DEAL

In the aftermath the declaration of the EU-Turkey refugee deal which also known as the EU-Turkey statement and signed on 18 March 2016, Angela Merkel was seen as a leader of the deal between Ankara and Brussels. While this role of Merkel creating an enhanced dialogue between the EU and Turkey also Merkel had a responsibility to achieve successful implementation of the deal and promised reward system that must be applied successfully (Turhan, 2018).

As a requirement of the deal, Turkey was requested to fulfill 72 criteria that contained also in the Readmission Agreement between the EU and Turkey. Indeed, visa liberalization regime for Turkish citizens was regulated as a rewarding formula in the Readmission Agreement by connected to 72 benchmarks as a condition, it was also strongly considered linkage to the refugee deal. According to the statement, visa liberalization will be lifted by the end of June 2016 in return meeting all benchmarks by Turkey (European Council, 2016)

Regarding to 72 benchmarks that must be fulfilled by Turkey, Progress report of the European Commission in 2016 declared that Turkey already had a significant move about completing criteria which have been done 65 out of 72 that was necessary for visa-free travel for Turkish citizens and it was said that visa liberalization could actualize until the end of June 2016 (European Commission, 2016b).

With the light of these advances, it can be said that there was no negative environment both between Turkey and Germany as well as Turkey and the EU in the early stages of the EU-Turkey statement until the report that published by European Commission. Several adjustments that lead to tension were including regulating law based on terrorism and protection of personal data which was highly difficult to fulfill in a short term according to Turkish officials. Consequently, these amendments escalated tension between the EU/Germany and Turkey. Moreover, Merkel's tonality also turned into more negative one when Turkey started off to declare its objections about the benchmarks that must be fulfilled. In the following process, such negative discourses have been raised by both Germany and Turkey as the unable position of Turkey to fulfill required conditions and Turkey's tendency of not to ratify Readmission Agreement (Al Jazeera, 2016).

Nevertheless, despite the fact that diverse views of Turkey and Germany regarding roadmap that involved bilateral statements, with the help of Merkel's balanced actions to preserve the deal, Turkey-German relations did not witness instant tension until the end of May 2016. However, since then bilateral relations of Turkey and Germany faced a sharp turn because diverse incidents cultivated bilateral mistrust between two countries. The decision of the German Federal Parliament which declared the Armenian resolution that points out the genocide of Armenians and their exiles escalated the tension with the withdrawal of the Turkish ambassador to Germany. Banning German officials from visiting Incirlik military base because of the Armenian resolution as well as accusing Turkey as a center for terrorist organizations and the diplomatic gap between Turkey and Germany that enlarged in the process paved the way of fostered tension and distrust. Another contemporary issue between two countries 15 July 2016 coup attempt and post-coup developments that mostly had the potential to change the course of developments. Regarding the coup attempt, many of the public statements in Germany had negative emphasis (Turhan, 2016a).

On the other hand, Turkey accused Germany of not taking a clear stance against the coup attempt and not doing a remarkable move against Fethullah Gülen's organization. Following advances after the coup attempt such as army and judiciary detentions against thousands of people that include teachers, university officials and civil servants and their escape to Germany, Kurdish rallies in Cologne Germany, arrest of German citizens in Turkey by accusing supporter of terrorist organizations and one of the most important reason which clarifies why Turkey-Germany relations are so strained is Angela Merkel's speech in September 2017 during an election debate which clarified by her that Turkey should not become a member of the European Union. In fact, she made a move to cut pre-accession EU funds (Deutsch Welle, 2018).

The particular crises above mentioned as well as diplomatic ones signaled that it may be time to end the deal between the EU and Turkey while Turkey points out the significance of itself for Europe's security because of hosting more than 3 million Syrian refugees (BBC, 2017).

Even though the deal currently remains to be officially implemented, particular tensions that emerged because of significant incidents may pave the way of future tensions and

these ebbs and flows show that Turkey-Germany has kind of rollercoaster relationship (Deutsch Welle, 2018). That being said in accordance with rollercoaster nature of relations Turkey and Germany has potential to have rapprochement in the future despite relationship of two countries have reached a new low in recent years (Turhan, 2018).

Like Germany, with the rising of Turkey as a pivotal actor in the refugee crisis and its management based on geographical factors, policies and share of burden made Turkish-German dialogue was crucial. Despite the EU's constitutional and significant presence throughout the evolution of the refugee crisis, Turkish-German dialogue also must be clarified to understand the role of both Turkey and Germany in the refugee crisis. Regarding this dialogue changes and continuities was evaluated consecutive eras such as current Turkish-German dialogue until the eruption of 'European' refugee crisis, bilateral relations early on EU-Turkey 'refugee deal' and Turkish-German relations after the beginning of the deal while the pivotal role of Germany was pointed out (Turhan, 2018, p.187). In the following chapter, the refugee deal will be evaluated as a case study by pointing out negotiations between Autumn 2015 and March 2016 which shows particular diplomacy characteristics between the EU/Germany-Turkey.

4. DIPLOMACY OF THE REFUGEE DEAL

In this chapter, the refugee deal that signed in March of 2016 will be discussed as a case study within the diplomatic features of international relations. This case study has broader meaning because of its large extent; diplomatic features will be presented by using a chronological order and press statements of the leaders which reflected in media while also creating new literature for migration studies.

The diplomacy of the refugee deal flourished in autumn of 2015 which is the year following the summer when the crisis peaked and generated a serious problem for Europe. The refugee crisis was put on the table by the EU and its officials involving a member of the EU and its sub-constitutions to establish a useful model for refugees to preserve its unity and security while also aimed to help the refugees. During these negotiations it must be noted that role of Merkel was remarkable in the sense of the refugee deal and because of the peaked time of the negotiations was autumn, that term has experienced diplomacy between the EU/Germany-Turkey until the signature of the deal in March of 2016. With the help of existent literature of the refugee diplomacy and media the chance of putting order the diplomatic connections have emerged. Chapter 4 will review this process as a case study with the help of statements of the leaders, diplomatic connections and incidents by providing content of the meetings between October 2015 and March 2016.

4.1. THE EU-TURKEY REFUGEE DEAL

After the eruption of the crisis, the European Union stated that humanity and solidarity features must be involved in the process however realpolitik preference of the European Union which is German tactic has emerged. The crisis made Angela Merkel think that she must close the German borders to refugees not only Syria but also beyond (Janning, 2016). On the other hand, she was aware of the seriousness of the situation and it was expected that a large number of refugees may rise until Berlin take measures and reach a controversial deal with Turkey. Moreover, this deal was composed by transferring a large amount of money approximately \$7.1 billion to Ankara for hosting refugees, re-opening several chapters based on the accession process of Turkey and visa liberalization. Another crucial detail that creates bilateral relations and refugee diplomacy is engineering the deal with the help of Merkel, even though the agreement was formally signed between Turkey

and the EU. From Germany side, the aim was to reduce the refugee influx dramatically down to 280.000 in 2016, and 186.644 until 2017 (Deutsche Welle, 2018). Even though Merkel defied the upper limit of the number of refugees that suggested by Christian Social Union (CSU), she has promised to diminish refugee numbers. Moreover, the effort was successful because the number of registered migrants have declined month after month.

Table 4.1: Refugee arrivals in Germany by month

	Refugee registrations	Notes
January-June 2014	12,900	Average per month
July-December 2014	27,000	Average per month
January-May 2015	34,500	Average per month
June 2015	53,721	
July 2015	82,798	
August 2015	104,460	It seems that Germany will no longer impose the Dublin Agreement by opening its border for refugees coming from other European Union countries.
September 2015	163,772	
October 2015	181,166	
November 2015	206,101	
December 2015	127,320	
January 2016	91,671	
February 2016	61,428	
March 2016	20,608	March 18: The refugee deal
April-July 2016	16,200	Average per month

Source: Spiegel, 2017, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/taking-stock-one-year-after-the-arrival-of-refugees-in-germany-a-1110654.html>

Negotiating with Erdoğan was a priority for Merkel contrary to her former stance to Erdoğan that determined by her as a ‘agonizing’ because the agreement with Erdogan was a significant element to decelerate the refugee flow (Szabo, 2018, p.11-12).

The significant point is that states can prefer different strategies to engage in migration diplomacy, depending on a series of elements such as their bargaining power, foreign policy interests, the feature of the existent bilateral relationship between two states. Hence

the approach of both Turkey and European states regarding migration diplomacy has changed over time. For instance, while Turkey was pursuing absolute gains which reduced unemployment rates and alleviated foreign exchange with the signature of guest worker agreements with diverse European states during the 1960s and 1970s, by 2015-2016 relations between Europe and Turkey had turned into counter nature as Turkey attempted to leverage interest of Europe in stemming migration to guarantee significant economic profits (Greenhill 2016 ; Adamson 2018).

In summer 2015, shortly before diplomatic connections have started with Turkey, Angela Merkel emerged as a pivotal actor to response European-wide crisis. On August 31 , she declared : ‘*If Europe fails on the question of refugees, it will not be what Europe wished for*’ (BBC, 2015).

At this point, Merkel’s reaction was considered as a ‘Europe’s conscience based on her emphasis on values of Europe and her intention to reach common response for the crisis. However, as it mentions earlier of this section, Merkel’s reaction can be defined as a *realpolitik* by pointing out her audacious pragmatism. By taking into consideration refugee arrivals in Germany, it seems reasonable that Germany called for a common European solution thus it can be said that intentions of Merkel and her diplomacy incentives could be a harmony of solidarity and *realpolitik*. As the Balkan route was experiencing its heated time because of the refugee influx during 2014-2015, Turkey was identified as a partner who can help to solve the crisis (Benvenuti, 2016, p.1).

On 7 October 2015 Merkel and President of the French Republic Hollande shared a speech that stated a key role of Turkey in the European Parliament in Brussels ahead of her visit to Ankara while German government taking strict measures to diminish the refugee influx (Reuters, 2015). What is central to control the refugee influx was a collaboration with Turkey while thousands of people flee from their country of origins and the EU was struggling to manage the crisis with its divided feature. In the meantime Merkel was facing pressure from Bavarian Christian Social Union, a close party of her Christian Democrats to take tightened rules on the refugee issue, in fact, the issue of foreigners and refugees has been listed as the most significant problem that Germany faced in the 2017 election later. While she was expressing that the European Union should

support Ankara to deal with the crisis she was also describing the refugee issue as a historic task (Reuters, 2015).

Table 4.2: Bilateral/mini-talks between Germany and member states/Turkey/top EU officials ahead of EU/EU-Turkey summits on the management of the refugee crisis

7 October 2015 Merkel-Hollande in the European Parliament / speech on how to tackle the refugee crisis Merkel: “Turkey plays a key role”	15 October 2015 European Council agrees on the Joint Action Plan Merkel: “EU is ready to open new chapters”	18 October 2015 Merkel’s Turkey visit “Germany is ready to open Chapter 17 and make preparations for Chapters 23 & 24”
23 October 2015 Merkel-Anastasiades meeting to discuss chapters to be opened	25 October 2015 Merkel-Juncker mini summit with member states on Balkan Route	29 November 2015 EU-Turkey Summit, Activation of the Joint Action Plan
17 December 2015 Merkel-Juncker mini summit with Turkey & 8 member states	22 January 2016 1st German-Turkish intergovernmental consultations	8 February 2016 Merkel’s visit to Turkey
4 March 2016 Merkel-Hollande meeting / joint press conference	6 March 2016 Merkel-Davutoğlu-Rutte meeting Preparation of a ‘trilateral’ proposal for EU-Turkey cooperation on the management of irregular migration	7 & 18 March 2016 EU-Turkey Summits / EU-Turkey ‘deal’ of 18 March 2016

Source: Turhan, 2016, Europe’s Crises, Germany’s Leadership and Turkey’s EU Accession Process

The question of how Europe and Merkel were willing to embrace Erdoğan can be explained by changing the tune of the EU on Turkey. In October of 2015 Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had also pariah status according to Europe (Politico, 2015). Even though the European Union has criticized sharply decision of Ankara by attacking rebel forces which abandoned the peace process this criticism was not long-lived. While top EU official hosting Erdoğan, their goal was not criticizing him ; instead, their aim was to request the help of the Turkish leader. The desperate situation of the refugees can be seen

in Erdoğan's transformation from pariah person to partner and aims of the European Union about finding a solution for the refugee crisis. While the EU continues deeply shared opposite views about how and whether the refugees must be distributed among its members. At this point, the question was the price that must be paid by the European Union, in fact, this price mostly depended on Germany. Moreover, Angela Merkel's visit Turkey was expected to change diverse dimensions of the crisis (Politico, 2015).

Merkel held a meeting then Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu on 18 October 2015 and assurance to provide support to Turkey which involves four demands in return for agreement on a migration action plan: visa regulations, re-opening of negotiation chapters, transferring money aid to Turkey and attending of Turkish leaders to EU summits. Davutoğlu also pointed out that sharing the burden fairly is crucial and he expressed that expectations of Turkey for the visa liberalization by 2016 in return for the EU to send migrants to Turkey. The most important part of this meeting was undoubtedly Davutoglu's statement on accelerating the opening of the negotiating chapters 17, 23 and 24 and agreeing on this demand. However, the German chancellor particularly pointed out that they would support to open chapter 17 while they were also discussing on chapter 23 and 24. She also repeated her country has long-standing hesitations based on membership of Turkey and added that full membership of Turkey is an open-ended topic. However, the situation seems more than open-ended issue because Merkel admitted that help hand of Turkey had not changed her ideas that Ankara should not become a member of the EU. Finally, Turkey and the European Union agreed on 'draft' agreement on the refugee issue which applied after Brussels met political requirements of Ankara (Hürriyet Daily News, 2015).

Despite the fact that Turkey's long term accession process, demands of Davutoglu has shown that Turkey had a chance to make a move for its long-standing expectations from the EU. By taking into consideration Erdogan's bargaining skills and character, a feature of negotiations seemed different when it compared with previous experiences based on the accession process and diverse EU dialogues.

Turning back to a meeting of Erdogan and German Chancellor Merkel in Yıldız Palace, it was also stated by Erdogan that chapters should be opened and they are sensitive about joint action plan with Germany, the efforts based on chapters were reviewed and they also

had been opened during ongoing negotiations of Turkey with the EU. Merkel expressed her awareness based on the burden of Turkey while hosting 2 million refugees in 2015 and she highlighted the agreement that they reached on visa liberalization and the readmission agreement (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, 2015).

Beyond these diplomatic details, it must be noted that Merkel's visit could be seen as a gift for Erdogan based on his election campaign (BBC, 2015). Setting a meeting with Merkel after welcoming President Erdogan in Brussels by top officials of the EU was seen as a way of displaying the glory of this visit. Because there was already failure election results that happened in June but meeting with Merkel that held exactly two weeks before an election was a golden opportunity. In fact, Erdogan as a leader who has been accused by leading Turkey into isolation internationally, responsible for the sharp decline in human rights and maintained conflict with terrorist organizations to win the support of nationalist voters has needed a boost for pre-election. In addition, possible advances that emerged from promises in the accession process of Turkey have cultivated a pre-election strategy of the government. On the other hand, the reason for re-routing relations with Turkey that based on *realpolitik* sense of the word is because the EU needed the support of Turkey more than it needed before. However, Merkel has been accused by setting foot on a mine zone because of her supportive visit regarding Erdogan's election campaign. Tensions were already high because of the bomb blasts and elections that was set for November 1, 2015. While Merkel was criticizing in parliamentary debates, her goals were not to discuss domestic problems, instead of taking steps for stopping the influx of refugees to Europe. Moreover, Turkey was seen as a privileged partner even the large amount of criticism based on the latest collaboration (BBC, 2015).

In addition to reaching a healthy agreement which can be a solution for the refugee crisis, both leaders of Turkey and Germany seemed that they were pursuing to reach their goals which can involve also domestic goals. Reaching a deal with the EU means prestige for Turkey both globally and domestically and Erdogan seemed that he prefers both of them. Merkel as one of the pivotal actor of the deal did not consider opposite internal voices that much even this means losing her reputation (Hürriyet Daily News, 2015).

Based on the press releases of Turkey-EU statement that engineered by Merkel on 29 November, 2015 Turkey once again felt Merkel's support because Turkey's request for

financial aid reached 3 billion Euros while the EU was offering only 1 billion euros and Merkel stated that Turkey had already spent a large amount of money to host refugees and according to Merkel it was logical to provide equal aid for Turkey. She also stated that Turkey has not been provided much aid for the crisis while also undertaking a great task. According to Daily Sabah (2015) despite the existence of several open-ended answers while meetings were holding Turkish- German -the EU relations were likely to flourish. On the other hand, it was stated that the EU and Germany were aware of the seriousness of the situation and that is not a joke and they saw this in Merkel's statement when she said that they should keep their promises that have not been kept until now. According to the newspaper, the meetings that hold during winter of 2015 will reflect the EU report about Turkey which is the first test because the report is more significant than opening chapters.

While the perception of the EU and Germany gradually change about Turkey, German media reflections have also altered their discourse about Erdogan particularly after the EU has pointed out the importance of Turkey for coping the crisis and necessity for working closely with Ankara. Previously Erdogan has been criticized for the authoritarian approach but new reflections of media have covered him as a gatekeeper and must be convinced future improvements for the crisis. Accordingly, the advantages and disadvantages of the action plan has continued and it was stated that Turkey was strong-minded to kill multiple birds with one stone because of feeling loneliness about the burden of the refugee issue while also spending over \$7 billion and most importantly failure of making itself heard. But in the meantime the EU seemed to be listening to Turkey; in this way, Turkey had a chance to ease its burden (Daily Sabah, 2015).

In Turkey- the EU issue with Merkel, statement of the officials of Cyprus was relatively negative because it was stated that Cyprus would not confirm accession negotiations of Turkey with the EU and it was also stated that previous reasons that paved the way of blocking chapters were valid. However, based on the joint news conference and Yıldız Palace meeting with Erdogan and Davutoglu, Merkel stated that they were ready to open Chapter 17 which involves economic policy and they were preparing to open Chapters 23 and 24 which are parts of the blocked chapters by Cyprus. Cyprus was not confident to lift bans but also was open to meet with Merkel to discuss further details of the deal.

Finally, the deal gained its shape in the EU summit on November 29 (Cyprus Mail Online, 2015).

On December 2015 Merkel-Juncker mini-summit with Turkey and 8 member states of the EU was another milestone for the deal. Because in media this mini-summit was reflected as an EU core group on refugees in addition to mini-summit. Moreover one of the goals of this summit was drawing together eight European countries Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden, and Turkey to discuss resettling of the refugees from Turkey. The other aim was replacing illegal migration with legal migration according to Merkel. The mini-summit also has been called as a 'coalition of the willing' which points out the separation of the 28 nation of the EU based on their struggle the refugee crisis (Sputnik International, 2015). Calling the summit as a coalition of the willing can be seen as a significant situation because despite Merkel's personal efforts and willingness particularly Eastern European states were not sharing same ideas with Merkel about the agreement and resettling them. In Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Cavusoglu's words the meeting must be held with like-minded nations led by Angela Merkel who helped to push a deal between Turkey and the EU (Hurriyet Daily News, 2015).

The leaders of the 'like-minded' nations were set to agree to accept Syrian refugees voluntarily and resettle them to each of the mini-summit states. Even though this mini-summit was seen as a split in the European Union, Merkel has stated that this was only a meeting with those taking into consideration the offers the European Commission has made for Turkey (Sputnik International, 2015).

Based on the EU-Turkey summit it was agreed to provide financial aid for Turkey, holding summits twice in a year, opening Chapter of economic policy while also preparing further chapters and finally visa liberalization by October 2016. However, it was stated in Euobserver (2015) that despite positive advances, both Turkey and the EU have minimized their quick fix expectations because it was seemed hard to control the crisis unless coping well with the conflict in Syria while also Europe trying to protect its borders.

On 22 January 2016, first German-Turkish inter-governmental consultations were held between Turkey and Germany and both leaders of the countries re-affirmed their words

about the quick and full activation of the EU-Turkey action plan, as it approved at the Turkey- EU summit in November 2015. Both sides also agreed that financial support will be contributed to host the Syrian refugees who have temporary protection in Turkey. These statements and several improvements about the deal was considered a significant step for the future relations of both countries. Moreover, Davutoglu stated that he appreciated Merkel's effort while the whole world was preferring to be silent and he also pointed out that Merkel has raised awareness by taking a humanist approach to tackle the crisis. While he was expressing the importance of the humanist approach in addition to a political one, he also added that the refugee crisis has always been in their agenda which has strategic importance and they felt the pain when baby Alan washed ashore not as a politician but as a mother or a father. After it was highlighted the collaboration between Turkey and Germany, Davutoglu stated that the issue neither the problem of Germany nor Europe and also Turkey. Mainly none of these export the crisis, instead the crisis emerged in the Middle East and reflected both Europe and Turkey. On the other hand, Merkel believed that Syrian talks will not provide healthy solutions without the involvement of Turkey (Sputnik International, 2016).

Shortly after inter-governmental consultations in January 2016, Angela Merkel visited Turkey in February with the goal of galvanizing the solutions of the refugee crisis. She guaranteed to take refugees into Europe and postulate NATO patrol to provide security of the Aegean Sea. During the meeting at the Presidential Complex in Ankara Davutoglu and Merkel also discussed the most recent incidents and humanitarian challenges that experienced in Syria. Hence, the most important issue at the joint news conference was clarifying the details of the crisis (The Guardian, 2016).

In their previous meeting, it was agreed to implement visa liberalization for Turkish citizens visiting the Schengen area by October of 2016 and Turkey was responsible to diminish the influx of refugees to Europe. According to Daily Sabah (2016), Turkey was doing its best to cope with illegal migration to Europe and will keep 'open door' policy for refugees fleeing from their country of origin. Just as previous meetings, this meeting that holds between the leaders of both countries had significant outcomes for Turkey and Germany that emerged as an important player of the biggest crisis since World War II. Hence the outcome of February talks was not only important for Merkel who battled with

intense pressure to restrict Germany's refugee intake but also important for Europe once again where public opinion was becoming hard against refugee influx.

In the middle of February ongoing effort of Turkey reflected as a harsh statement by Erdogan during his speech in Ankara: *'We do not have the word 'idiot' written on our foreheads. We will be patient but we will do what we have to. Planes and buses are there for a reason'* (Reuters, 2016).

His harsh statements have maintained and he told EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker at the G20 summit that they can open the borders to Balkan route any time. He also stated that Turkey has defended the rights of the refugees and they told the Europeans that Turkey can open the borders and say 'goodbye' to the migrants. These harsh statements have been remained by Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu at a news conference that;

If the EU does not take the necessary measures , it would be unthinkable for Turkey to do so. I don't see much of a possibility of EU taking a step to change this process after we have come this far...The deal we struck with the EU is very clear. We want this human tragedy to end, our citizens to travel visa-free, and the customs union to be updated. But if the EU doesn't keep its word, including the migrants deal we will cancel all agreements. (Reuters, 2016)

Among these statements and strong position of Turkey, EU member states and particularly the leaders felt trapped. Besides, fear of supranational and domestic political costs led to member states of the EU be more willing to negotiate and even accept demands which they have been deem as 'blackmail'. In other words, Europe needed Turkey to stop the refugee influx to save its borders and Turkey was aware of its power and upper hands in these negotiations. In the meeting between Erdogan, Juncker, and Tusk the words of Erdogan w proved the upper hands of Turkey once again:

'We can open the doors to Greece and Bulgaria anytime... So how will you deal with refugees if you don't get a deal? Kill the refugees?' (Reuters, 2016).

As it can be seen the refugees was used as an instrument of political influence and threats turned into a weapon which gave Turkey fruitful bargaining leverage over the EU not only in a diversity of issue extent but also in extracting diverse concessions based on its previous objectives.

In March of 2016, a feature of the bilateral and mini-lateral talks between Germany/member states and Turkey was different. Because reaching the deal could be

happened within hours according to Merkel. Most importantly a summit was set to come together Turkey and the EU on March 7 in Brussels based on the future efforts of a joint action plan on the refugees and night before the EU-Turkey summit in March of 2016. Besides the details of the trilateral meeting has composed the deal that agreed in the summit. At the meeting of the two European leaders Merkel and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte and Ahmet Davutoglu, it was agreed to accept hundreds of refugees from Turkey as a part of the deal but preferred not to inform other EU leaders which made the meeting more interesting. During the meeting, all the significant conditions of the future EU-Turkey agreement was agreed by Merkel and Rutte. Those conditions also were represented as a spontaneous Turkish initiative at the summit. Particularly they shared the same idea about Europe's taking Syrian refugees from Turkey between 150.000 and 250.000 and acceptance of the EU based on one Syrian refugee for each refugee who came back from Greece to Turkey was not functional anymore. However, it was clarified that this particular 'deal' has never been turned into the official content of the deal and it was named as a '*gentleman's agreement*' between Turkish officials, Rutte and Merkel. In addition to lack of official text of the deal, this part of the deal has never been unveiled neither to the EU leaders, not to German society. In fact, instead of the official text of the EU-Turkey deal, it was determined a condition of ending or decreasing illegal border crossing between Turkey and the EU in return a regulation based on voluntary admission of the refugees. Thereafter, this condition was accepted by all EU leaders at the summit that holds in March 2016. However, it was foreseen that attendance of the EU countries voluntarily and the reason of Merkel's persistence based on mandatory refugee quota for other European countries was the possibility of Germany and Netherlands to cope with the crisis on their own. There was also one more big concession that Rutte and Merkel made is that the Turks will decide who would send to Europe based on the structure of the refugee quota system that agreed before. Based on the agreed deal, Turkish Interior Ministry had an authority to decide who must be sent to Europe and the list of the refugees will be reviewed by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (RT, 2017).

According to Financial Times' chief Germany correspondent Alexander, the EU-Turkey deal was not only an alternative to the blockage of the Balkan route that used by the refugees to reach Europe but also a more extended resolution to the refugee crisis. Nevertheless, it was also stated that Merkel was fighting for not only borders but also her

political portrayal. Moreover, Germany's decision to open borders and accepting a large number of refugees was related to gain time to create a perpetual and common solution which may replace the EU-Turkey deal instead preferring only closure of the Balkan route (Financial Times, 2017).

Finally 11 days after trilateral meeting the EU-Turkey deal was signed but it remained to create reactions. For instance, the resignation of Ahmet Davutoglu seen as a harmed for the future of the deal while Merkel clarifies that she strongly disagreed the criticism of the EU-Turkey deal was a failure particularly because of the resignation of Davutoglu. She also stated that it was early to draw a conclusion, instead, the deal was a long process which required persistent effort and the deal will stay unharmed. Resignation of Davutoglu will be paved the way of significant changes such as the central role of Erdogan which had the potential to empower his authority. It was also clarified that disturbance in Turkey was a sign that Erdogan needed the aid of Western but he does not require Western values. The EU was seen on the ropes and it was stated that under these circumstances those who deal with Erdogan need strong endurance because Turkey was seen as a country that had no rule of law and freedom. On the other hand, it was also stressed that in the policy of bargaining, Erdogan can be determined as an absolute master (Sputnik International, 2016).

As it was discussed above, EU-Turkey-Germany relations have been put under pressure for taking useful action particularly after the large numbers of refugees tried to enter Western Europe by using Turkey-Balkan route. Besides, domestic factors in both Turkey and Germany and their influence on their governments based on bargaining power must be clarified. Reviewing the news with the help of media based on the diplomatic connections of both countries regarding the refugee crisis is useful but requires a deeper understanding of detailed dynamics and instruments of bilateral and mini-lateral talks between the EU-Turkey and Germany. In this chapter brief history of the refugee deal was depicted with the help of significant meetings, several statements of leaders and content of negotiations which is the deal was addressed in terms of diplomacy as a case study over 6 months period between October 2015 and March 2016. In accordance with this aim, Krumm (2015) has stated that wider explanation of the negotiations until the reaching the agreement which basically pointed out the EU/German-Turkey negotiations is possible with considering these negotiations as a 'two-level game'. Bargaining and

negotiation as a foreign policy instruments had an immense role to reach the agreement and ‘two-level game’ approach significantly highlights foreign policy instruments of both Turkey and Germany while also focussing impacts of domestic factors of Germany and Turkey that directly affect bargaining powers of them. In this context, it worths to mention the open-door policy of Merkel and hung parliament in Turkey after June elections as a particular domestic factor. Because The Justice and Development Party (AKP) lost its majority by falling 18 seats after that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called for AKP leader Ahmet Davutoglu to shape a government and Erdogan’s aim was to lead to the largest party in the Grand National Assembly (Wikiwand, 2015). Hence, the final chapter of the thesis will argue the conceptual framework of this diplomatic picture within the context of international relations theory by taking into account both domestic and international factors. The aim of the final chapter is to highlight the case of the refugee deal by presenting a conceptual framework with the help of liberal inter-governmentalism and two-level game.

5. DISCUSSION: AN EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK FOR THE CASE OF THE REFUGEE DEAL -TWO LEVEL GAME

More recently, a feature of the EU/Germany-Turkey relations had gained different character and the refugee crisis opened up a ‘window of opportunity’ for creating new momentum such as ad hoc decision of Merkel in September 2015 regarding the unconditional transition of refugees at the Balkan route. When large numbers of refugees queued at the Hungarian border Merkel decided to suspend asylum rules of Europe and allowed the refugees to arrive in Germany. This decision was criticized by officials widely but curbing open-door policy even partially did not help negotiations on the EU action plan (Batalla, 2017, p.49).

In order to analysis the new dimensions and bilateral relations, the focus of this chapter is on the EU/Germany-Turkey negotiations and explaining these negotiations as a ‘two-level game’ by pointing out domestic factors and their possible influences in Turkey and Germany. As it was mentioned in previous section particular domestic factors can be seen as a controversial open door policy of Merkel and the hung parliament in Turkey after the Justice and Development Party (AKP) lost its majority in June elections and transmitted Ahmet Davutoglu for a temporary election government. In order to cope with the complex character of the case, interests of constellations and negotiations that paved the way of the EU ‘action plan’ which reconciled on the summits in Brussels on October 15 and November 29, 2015, will be the focus. From the European Union side, this focus involves Germany because significant policies, particularly in the beginning of the negotiations, were shaped by German authorities.

Implications of the joint action plan in October 2015 and negotiations have a meaning for international relations of Turkey in terms of Germany and EU and this meaning takes into consideration leading role of Germany and its ‘privileged’ relationship with Turkey. Even though there is a difference between German interests and policy-making of EU, Germany has emerged as an effective actor not only in shaping policies of EU but also in relations with Turkey which bring to mind their long migration history. Besides, determinants of both Germany and Turkey win-sets in the negotiations which followed by Merkel’s visits will be also in the center point of view.

5.1. TWO LEVEL GAMES IN THE SETTING OF INTERGOVERNMENTALISM

5.1.1. Liberal intergovernmentalism

The multi-level approach introduced by Putnam and the opinions of Moravcsik can be seen related to the field of international relations theories. Moreover, regarding EU/Germany -Turkey relations not only IR theories but also that inter governmentalism provides significant context for international cooperation. Even though it is stated that European integration can only be clarified with the help of general theories of international relations, Putnam(1988) suggest that the European Union can be examined as a lucrative inter-governmental regime which aims to control economic interdependence by way of policy system that negotiated.

According to liberal inter-governmentalist approach, altering international policies experience several stages. These stages can be defined as an articulation of preferences in domestic politics, pursuing these policies by national governments in negotiations or bargains, shaping policy outcomes and even international organizations. Each one of them has its own selective features for instance in terms of veto players. Because of the approach was labeled as a liberal, the focus highlights institutions such as the European Union which pursues several interests as seen to be in the 'national interest' and the approach goes beyond explaining intergovernmental negotiations' policy outcomes. In other words, the focus of Moravcsik is seen in not only states but also their characteristics as a forecaster of impact in integration negotiations and this means that the approach is more than the focus of Putnam who particularly explains policy outcomes of intergovernmental negotiations. Hence in contrary to the realist approach, the focus of states can be recognized on process related issues rather than the situation of maximizing relative power (Moravcsik, 1993, p.518).

Based on the refugee negotiations of the EU and Turkey, the liberal inter-governmentalist approach would point out national actors 'principals' and consider the European Commission as a dependent 'agent' slightly in the EU-Turkish refugee meetings of autumn 2015. In this case, the European Commission can be assumed to operate as a replicant agent based on the governments' general policies and within the boundaries

drawn by member states of the European Union. Therefore, governments did not have any autonomy because they used these institutions for their goals (Coşkun, 2015, p.390).

According to Krumm (2015) liberal inter-governmentalism is unique approach to explain European integration and its main assumptions may present significant insights for the case of the EU-Turkey refugee meetings of autumn 2015 even though this view has been criticized by a supranational perspective which considers the remarkable role of member states as a policy shaper within the EU. Liberal inter-governmentalism suggest that European integration is determined by social actors, states and motivations of leaders such as bilateral meetings of Merkel and Erdogan and mini-lateral talks with other top officials of the EU instead of traditional schools; thus the approach may provide useful insights based on the policy-making in the case of the EU/Germany-Turkey refugee talks.

5.1.2. Two-level games : Interaction of Domestic-international Politics

International policy-making is generally analyzed as a ‘game’ which is the metaphor that highlights the players, the playing areas, the rules, and the results. Significant part of existing literature based on relations between international and domestic affairs comprises domestic influences on foreign policy and observations which international and national relations are seen as linked. In his article named ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, Putnam (1988) argued the dynamics of national and international policy. He puts forward that each of international and domestic relations have an influence on the other and they can specify each other by considering bureaucratic mechanism, involuntary and voluntary separation, ratification process and believability of the commitment at the level I negotiators’ bargaining and strategies, institutions, choices, and coalitions based on the level II. The first stage of this game that played by states is about how states define their policy preferences based on the conditions and the second stage is about how they manage international bargaining processes at the international level.

Putnam’s studies unveiled that the existent literature mostly evaluates one of the levels. For instance, the studies of Deutsch (1957) and Haas (1958) do not involve specific policy developments regarding domestic and international developments. However Haas (1958) particularly pointed out the influence of interest groups and parties in the stage of

European integration and the notion that created by him 'spillover' identified the feedback between international and domestic incidents.

The 'bureaucratic politics' which is the school of foreign policy analysis presented definitions based on the problem of domestic-international interaction. As Graham Allison (1971) noted that the bureaucratic politics model points out intra-national games, the overlap of which comprises international relations. However, the core of this overlap continued unclarified which did not evolve beyond the matter of bureaucratic interests.

According to Putnam (1988), the most cultivated work on domestic factors of foreign policy has highlighted structural factors; in particular 'state strength'. The studies of Peter Katzenstein (1978) and Stephen Krasner (1978) show the significance of domestic factors in foreign economic policy and the core of the issue captured by stating that the major aim of all strategies in foreign economic policy is about making domestic politics compatible with the international political economy. According to Katzenstein (1978) a more explanations of the domestic factors of foreign policy and international relations must point out politics which are interest groups, parties and social classes, even elections and public opinions. In addition, both authors state that the significant point which central decision-makers must concern about international and domestic pressures.

This framework that emerged from domestic factors and their influences on international affairs are relevant to 'two-level games' which is considered as a first step to understanding liberal governmentalism as well. According to liberal governmentalism, firstly states indicate their own preferences, secondly, they manage the bargaining process with other states and finally states authorize European institutions to reach their interests. Based on this framework, the two-level game comes up and indicates that better collaboration is obtained with the existence of common negotiation forum and national governments empower against internal opposition parties (Mo, 1994,p.405).

Moreover, according to Putnam (1988), the politics of diverse international negotiations which conceptualized as a two level game are define at the national level where domestic groups pursue their interests by making pressure on government to embrace prosperous policies; also politicians endeavour power by composing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments aim to maximize their capacity to please domestic pressures and aim to minimize the adverse results of foreign developments.

Across the international table of negotiation, each one of national political leader perform at the game boards by sitting their foreign counterparts as well as diplomats and other advisors. Domestic table of him is composed by parliamentary body, spokespersons regarding to domestic agencies, delegates of crucial interest groups and finally political advisors of leaders. At this point, the complex feature of this two level game is that rational moves of player at board for instance limiting imports can be seen impolitic for same player at the other board. Nevertheless, strong incentives regarding consistency between the two games are emerged. Also in this two level game the political complexities of players are fluctuating. Because any crucial player who is displeased with the outcome of negotiation may agitate the game board and in other situation any leader who is failure in satisfying his or her associate players at the domestic table endanger being expelled from his or her seat (Putnam, 1988, p.434).

Other scholars have observed multiple-game character of international relations. For instance Druckman (1978) has noted that a negotiator endeavours to establish a package deal that will be satisfactory both to his or her bureaucracy and to the other side. However Druckman (1978) displays international and domestic processes independently.

According to 'gamma paradigm' in which the U.S. president follows policies mutually the Soviet Union with the goal of maximizing their popularity at home. However this paradigm ignores domestic segmentations and it involves that one of the international actors which is the situation that the Soviet leadership concerns about international gains and confront no domestic restraints while the U.S. president concerns only about domestic gains except to that degree as his public ascertain the international competition (Axelrod, 1987).

One of the most interesting explanation to the connection between international and domestic bargaining can be seen studies of Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing. They have observed that understanding internal bargaining is significantly improves prediction of international outcomes, particularly regarding to minimally adequate compromises (Snyder and Diesing, 2015).

Against this background of two level games, Moravcsik (1993) suggests that European integration can be explained by the two-level game concept but also regarding the EU/Germany-Turkey relations inter-governmentalism come out to be a most suitable

analytical framework and state governments are considered as the most relevant actors at international level.

However, positions of Turkey and Germany can be determined also by dominant domestic preferences which influence the bargaining powers of governments. For instance, the interests that have overlapped feature generally considered as alleviating consensual decision-making but they also able to diminish the bargaining power of states. Inter-governmentalism notices that decrease of bargaining power of governments, the more beneficial a policy agreement and the larger a for a government is however different interests of domestic constellations can promote expanded bargaining power at international level (Krumm, 2015, p.23).

The refugee deal negotiations involve 'two-level game' insights and picture much of a multi-level game where domestic constellations designate the 'win-sets' of both international negotiations and outcomes. That is why it was useful to introduce the basic logic of a two-level game as Putnam (1988) has outlined. According to him, two-level analysis responds to the need for considering both international relations and comparative politics in order to obtain analytical instruments which is suitable methodologically (p.459).

Overall, the two-level game concentrates the influence of level I constellations on level II and vice versa. In other words, voluntary or involuntary withdrawal from agreements may pass from one level to the other level and domestic issues may influence outcomes of negotiations. Moreover, these cross-level coalitions bolster decision-makers at home while making them also weak in terms of international bargaining power abroad. In addition, international offers and threats, additional payments, uncertain domestic politics can be seen as further subject to focus on (Putnam, 1988, p.460).

The important term emerged based on the two-level game is the win-set which was mentioned above basically means acceptable results of negotiations in international relations. Also, the win-set highlights the overlapping of indifference curves which regulate which policy attitude is still covered by the interests of an actor and which are not. Putnam (1988) assumes that larger win-sets make Level I more likely, *ceteris paribus*. Based on the definition any successful agreement must fall within the Level II win-sets of each of parties to the accord. If those win-sets overlap, then the agreement is possible

and the larger each win-set means that they tend to overlap more likely. On the contrary, the smaller win-sets means greater risks which pave the way of collapsing the negotiations and create a bigger risk of the unintentional quit of agreed outcomes.

In the words of Putnam (1988), the distribution of the mutual gains from the international bargain can be affected by the size of an actor's win-set. If a negotiator perceives larger win-set then he is more likely to be bullied by the other Level I negotiator. But on the contrary, a small domestic win-set can be turned into a bargaining advantage : '*I would like to accept your proposal, but I could never get it accepted at home*' (p.440).

Therefore domestic restrictions are not always detriment in international negotiations ,it can be preferred to maximize the actualization of own interests. Moreover, there are several elements which influence the size of a win-set such as preferences ,the distribution of power and possible coalitions among Level II constituents; level II political institutions and finally the strategies of the Level I negotiators. Based on the several dimensions which influence the size of a win-set that also mentioned above basically means that lower costs of non-agreement will diminish the size of win-set (Iida, 1993, p.406).

Before explaining the several elements which were mentioned above and influence the size of a win-set, some significant remarks based on win-sets must be clarified. Even though the concept of win-sets highly dependent on assumptions of game- theory with a quantitative character, because of the feature of political science and international relations which often derived from 'real life' it is possible only limitedly to quantification those processes, e.g. preferring qualitative variables (Krumm, 2015, p. 24).

5.2. APPLYING THE TWO LEVEL GAME EU/GERMANY- TURKEY NEGOTIATIONS AND INDICATIONS OF WIN-SET

International relations and domestic politics are generally entangled and the politics of many international negotiations can practically be perceived as a two-level game. In the refugee negotiations between EU/Germany-Turkey, both Germany and Turkey have also experienced domestic factors which is compatible with bargaining powers of the states which have negotiations. While Turkey was handling with the hung parliament after elections and resignation of Ahmet Davutoglu, Merkel had controversial 'open doors

policy' which can be seen as a domestic factor for the case. For the moment it can be presumed that both Turkey and Germany sides represented by a single leader or 'chief negotiator'; Merkel and Erdogan and that these individuals have no independent policy preferences however they basically seek to reach a deal that will be attractive for their constituent. When the process divided into two stages (Putnam, 1988):

1. Bargaining between negotiators and leading to a tentative agreement which is called Level I.

2. Separate discussions within each group of coalitions about whether to sign the agreement which is called Level II.

Moreover, in the stage of ratification at the national level, the choice of principals is a given agreement against non-agreement but it must be noted no agreement generally points out status quo; even may pave the way of worse situations (Putnam, 1988, p.442).

The influential elements of win-set sizes have meaning for the case of EU-Turkey negotiations which the costs of non-agreement would be much higher for the EU severally Germany than for Turkey. According to Krumm (2015) in case of non-agreement, the status quo would hardly change for Turkey side; but for the EU because of the possibility of ongoing refugee influx and increasing gradually would worsen the situation. However, a non-agreement situation could lead to a negative impression on both the international reputation of Turkey and a domestic statue of the government (p.24).

According to Iida (1993), domestic constellations can influence the bargaining powers of individual actors at the international level and those domestic constellations can be homogeneous or heterogeneous. In the case of homogeneous constellations which pave the way of boundary conflicts, he believes that the higher possible gains at the level I means the better his chance of guaranteeing ratification at home for an actor. Also, an actor can use the threat of being a failure in ratification at home to try to enhance his profits or curb his losses in the negotiations.

In Krumm's words (2015) factional conflicts (cross-national segmentations during international negotiations) the possible influence of ratification in it can be considered much more intense when it compared with the refugee crisis in Turkey. Because the refugee crisis of Turkey and Germany is represented as a homogeneous (border) conflict.

Even though the existence of several factions within Germany and Turkey, those factions did not influence significantly sequences of events. On the other hand, factions emerged at the end of 2015 at the EU level among member states because the welcoming stance of Germany disappeared; in fact, Eastern Europe governments rose their opposite voices more loudly. However, the turning point is that the influence of functional constellations at the European Union level can be seen as questionable because Turkish and German interests have dominated negotiations about the refugee crisis. In other words, relatively homogenous interests of both Turkey and Germany have dominated the factional dimension on the EU side (p.25).

Furthermore, Putnam (1988) adopts that the combination of the level II constituency which directly points out the feature of the win-set diversifies with the politicization of the issue. Groups are often actuated by politicization and those groups are less worried about the costs of no-agreement, thus this situation diminishes the effective win-set (p.445).

Based on the German domestic constellation, assuming of Putnam can be observed. Important opposition to the Merkel can be seen as a Bavarian Christian Union or the new right-wing 'Alternative für Deutschland' and approval rates of these parties scored up to the end of 2015 which is the term of the negotiations between the EU/Germany and Turkey. Hence, the politicization of the refugee issue could diminish the political flexibility and the size of the win-set of the Merkel government. On the Turkish side, the issue would have affected by a caretaker government after the June 2015 and politicization of the issue can be observed based on the elections (Krumm, 2015, p.25).

Furthermore, the issue-linkage theory which is bargaining strategy can explain the dynamics of the refugee crisis talks between the EU/Germany-Turkey. It can be defined as a simultaneous discussion of at least two issues for joint agreement or as bargaining that includes several incidents (Sebenius, 1983).

Moreover, these issues can be generated from a situation where a majority of people have opposite ideas in particular domestic circumstance ,for instance, opposition towards EU membership of Turkey; however some of the majority can be willing to switch their stance regarding the issue in return for another policy issue. This can be exemplified by the remarkable contribution of Turkey to handle the refugee influx to the EU borders.

Within the refugee action plan and further negotiations, issue-linkage was observable because the refugee issue was linked to visa liberalization of Turkish citizens which can be considered as a significant achievement for the reputation of the Turkish government. Considering the new chapter to open in the accession talks can be given as another example. This also proves that issue-linkage shows that domestic and international politics are entangled (Poast, 2013, p.288).

In addition, issue-linkage is a part of the concept of side-payments which is the occurrence that leaders prefer monetary payments and even bribes to reassure the given issue which may follow international offers and threats, uncertain domestic politics (Firman, 1993, p.388; Tollison and Wilett, 1979, p.426). In addition to the combination of the level II constituency, the win-set size is influenced by the level II political institutions and it is also pointed out confirmation procedures such as required majorities (Putnam, 1988).

Namely, it assumes that the higher required majority lead the smaller win-set. This can be seen as a problem because the decision-making process in the European side has required qualified majorities such as the opening of the new chapters based on the negotiations. Hence, this constellation highly reduces the size of the win-set of the EU as bargaining power. On the other hand, one side of the medal is that power of party discipline within the governing party influences the size of win-set. Powerful party discipline of the ruling party tends to flourish the win-set by broadening the extent of agreements for the level I negotiator to gain support (Iida, 1993, p.407).

The other side of the medal is that powerful party discipline involves autonomy emerged from domestic pressures which diminish the bargaining power of a government. In parallel to these explanations and the aspect of 'powerful government' is more suitable for the position of Turkey than the EU and powerful governments tend to reach easy consent to having outcomes in their policy arena which involves domestic incentives or cabinet. At this point, Turkey seemed that it had a better chance to reach offered deal which confirmed in the cabinet even though in the meantime Turkey had a caretaker government (Iida, 1993, p.407).

As it was previously explained above the EU action plan of autumn 2015 based on the refugee crisis can be defined as a 'game within a game' (Krumm, 2015, p.26). While the general feature of the EU-Turkish relations mostly involves accession negotiations these

policies are also influenced by the German factor lead by Angela Merkel. In the negotiations based on the refugee crisis bargaining power of parties has changed in favor of Turkey mostly because of Erdogan's dominant impact in the process and his unique bargaining skills. Parallel to this argument, it was previously stressed in media analysis that in the policy of bargaining, Erdogan can be determined as an absolute master by the European officials (Sputnik International,2016).

On the other hand domestic situation of Turkey influenced its win-set. The November elections could affect the international bargaining power of Turkey negatively because of several uncertain results and this means replacement of negotiators or setting up new advancements. However, for the Turkish side, a replacement of Prime Minister was not considered as a question and the only question was whether minor coalition partner is required or not. Besides generating small coalition does not prevent Davutoglu's chair and power of AKP. (The Guardian, 2016).

Turkey's leading role which makes it the best options feature to tackle with the crisis and relatively less pressured public opinion regarding refugee crisis when it compared with the Western European countries and Southeast part of the bloc have put Turkey quiet powerful bargaining position. Previously mentioned issue-linkage which framed by Putnam (1988) and Iida (1993) the refugee crisis and negotiations of it has opened a new chapter for Turkey's long-term accession process which has been halted in the recent past by originating new momentum in relations with the EU. By taking advantage from lack of alternative solution of European Union officials in addition to the key position of Turkey which makes it vital actor to handle with the crisis has gained strength with a Twitter statement of Burhan Kuzu , an advisor of president Erdogan. As he clearly defined the refugee deal as a win for Turkey side:

' The EU finally got Turkey's message and opened its purse strings. What did we say? We will open our borders and unleash all the Syrian refugees on you.'
(Independent, 2016)

Moreover, it is also indicated that time works in favor of Turkey while works against Germany because Merkel was the politician who was required to visit Turkey to reach a healthy agreement as soon as possible and she was seen as a rescuer for the security of Europe. In that situation, Turkey was already hosting a large number of refugees and

much more incoming refugees worthed to host to reach a deal because of long-standing goals of Turkey based on the EU membership and accession process which still have been remaining mostly affected the intentions of Turkey. Moreover, delay of the refugee crisis meetings, bilateral and mini-lateral talks would lead to a much higher price for both the EU and Germany. Because Turkey has been already waiting for its membership in the EU and both short and long term can be seen acceptable even opening new chapters are a new opportunity for the long-standing process but the refugee crisis was a huge and relatively new crisis for the EU that must be overcome (Batalla-Adam, 2017, p.52).

In Germany and the European Union side it was clear that the role of the EU mostly tended to set the agenda while Turkey was playing the veto player role based on diverse suggestions of the EU. At this stage, the veto power of Turkey could get more outcome with the help of the EU particularly generated by the German open door policy. Hence, it can be said that Merkel's controversial open-door policy which points out Germany's large scale win-set weakened the EU's bargaining power. As it can be seen domestic factors both in Germany and Turkey has affected the march of the events and outcomes of the meetings regarding the refugee crisis (Krumm, 2015, p.26).

Based on the above-mentioned analysis which supported by the two-level game approach, domestic constellations influence slightly the size of the national governments or actors win-set. Also based on the concept of the two-level game, it can be understood how a leader needs to balance between domestic interests/pressures and positive outcomes that emerged at international level by seeking an international deal which can also be admissible for domestic stakeholders. In other words, the leader is categorized between two levels and it is stated that statesmen prefer to manipulate both the international and domestic politics (Putnam,1988, p.440).

According to the approach which states that domestic policies can be put into practice to affect outcomes of international bargaining and that international action can focus on reaching domestic goals. International outcomes may depend on the strategy of leaders because they may choose to impact domestic polities of their own and other countries. The leader also can benefit from his/her control over agenda-setting vis-a-vis his/her own domestic polity and can prefer to apply international strategies to convert the character of domestic restrictions. With the help of using the power to set the international agenda, the

leader reaches the chance of shaping the way of deciding and framing of the incidents domestically. According to him, the preferences may involve not only the interest of the leaders in strengthening his or her domestic position but also an optimal response to international imperatives regardless of domestic elements. Based on political history or personal ideas, those preferences may involve individual polity features about the circumstance in question. Regarding these theoretical explanations, both Erdogan and Merkel have some features which can be explained by Moravcsik's approach that also involves individual level (Moravcsik, 1993, p.15-18).

According to Nykanen (2016), Merkel was in 'trapped' situation between national and international level: while a bigger picture of the refugee crisis requires long-term policies which spread both European wide and internationally, states were facing short-term results of the refugee influx and calling for quick solutions. After Merkel's situation that made her feel 'trapped' when she stuck between quick national solutions and longer-term policies, the international frame of the crisis has become visible. On the other hand, because of the historical burden regarding migration, the refugee crisis was not an easy task for Germany. Hence, Merkel perpetually pointed out the positive actions that taken domestically and she also introduced the migrant issue as a national concern particularly with the goal of gathering support. According to the logic of two-level games, this gave Merkel international room for maneuver such as EU negotiation tables. In addition, she admitted that integration of migrants was not successful in the 1960s when Germany welcomed foreign workers as a 'Gastarbeiter'; that is why one of the most significant national mission for Merkel has been how to integrate the migrants. Namely, in the background of her policy stances can be viewed German difficult history and unsuccessful integration of the migrants in the 1960s. As the refugee issue turned into a global challenge internationally, it was easy for Merkel to remain to alter policies internationally with longer-term outcomes while this opportunity helping to boost German influence. Moreover, this has also alleviated Merkel's burden because of domestic opposition thus she has had more room for maneuver with the help of the international frame.

As it was mentioned before, regarding the concept of two-level game which clarifies leaders balance needs between domestic interests and positive outcomes that appeared at international level, Merkel has tried to balance her domestic situation with international

frame of the crisis because her hands were tied nationally and promoting the crisis international level has provided her ability to maneuver. In other words, Merkel has made domestic politics with foreign policy because she was able to act in foreign policy matters and had room for maneuver to define policies (Nykanen, 2016, p.6-10).

With the help of Putnam's (1988) perspective, it seems that several features of Erdogan's preferences and stances can be explained. However, he was less concerned about the acceptance of the outcome of the EU-Turkey refugee deal with the body politic. He was mostly concerning how to benefit from the outcome of the Turkey-EU bargain to influence the public to achieve his own political goal particularly because of the elections that coincide with a bilateral meeting with EU/German officials.

While Turkey was required to meet several criteria which involve the anti-terror law, Erdogan was not willing to confirm the amendment of the law and he has remained a hard stance on the incident. An alternative explanation to why he had such a hard stance against the law which may pave the way of visa-free travel for his citizens can be analyzed with his domestic goals which are highlighted by two-level game. Firstly the way of drafting anti-terror law was serving his domestic goals and he has preferred to drown any type of opposition by associating it with terrorism. Secondly, the issue of terrorism was kept as a priority because implications of terrorism were seen as important for the foreign policy interests of Turkey. However, the most important detail that may be explained by the concept of a two-level game was the inter-linkage between Turkey's domestic political area and its diplomacy towards the EU. That is why it can be considered that Erdogan was playing a game on two levels which involves the first level domestic area and international diplomacy at the same time. It seems that this play had domestic importance for him that strongly associated political future of Turkey (Zenonas Tziarras, 2016).

6. CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion from the viewpoint of international relations and migration studies, the two-level game was applied to understand negotiations and bargaining process of the EU/Germany-Turkey and domestic factors that was influenced. For both Turkey-Germany and Turkey-the EU relations, the refugee deal was a remarkable case which generates shuttle diplomacy.

My research aim was to understand the negotiations of the refugee deal within the context of the international theories and find out the meaning of negotiations incentives of the leaders. By using intergovernmentalism and two-level game, my endeavor to understand the issue theoretically by taken its final shape. The thesis also tried to explain the size of the win-set and influential factors on it; also bargaining power of each side. In order to avoid the complexity of the topic, the focus was on negotiations between the EU/Germany- Turkey and as it can be seen this triangle has been revived as a result of the Syrian refugee crisis and German domestic policy had a remarkable effect in the process.

To support my research, the background of the case was addressed by dividing into 4 chapters: Chapter 1 has drawn a general picture of the thesis by highlighting main points; chapter 2 has represented a brief background of Germany-Turkey relations with the setting of previous migrations. In Chapter 3, these relations were framed by the international setting of the EU and the refugee deal. Before concluding, chapter 4 explained the diplomacy of the refugee deal by pointing out significant dates regarding the refugee deal. Finally, chapter 5 tried to explain the case of the refugee deal between the EU/Germany-Turkey with the light of theoretical explanation.

However, the refugee talks which were explained in the thesis have not been an isolated game which they can be influenced by further games with the help of new advances in the process and this may require to extend the research. In accordance with this, to complete possible deficiencies of the thesis and for future studies, media analysis can be useful to carry on the research in detail. Also, media analysis can be used with international relations and diplomacy while media theories and concepts taking into consideration. Hence different media studies and data can enrich the context of the case

of the refugee deal for instance discourse analysis of the leaders of the agreement. However, my study which was presented with a conceptual/theoretical framework and coherent flow tried to explain the refugee deal which is an interesting case study with regard to EU-Germany relations, EU-Turkey relations and EU factor in the bilateral relations of Turkey-Germany. With the light of existent sources, this can be considered as a humble and little contribution to literature yet it waits for future studies which have diverse perspectives and methodologies of international relations and media studies.



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