



**NEOCLASSICAL REALISM IN ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN  
CONFLICT: A CASE STUDY OF THE OSLO PEACE  
PROCESS, 1993-1995**

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A Thesis Submitted to The Graduate School of Izmir University of Economics Master of  
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## **ABSTRACT**

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**Political Science and International Relations**

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The purpose of this study is to examine the reasons for the failure of the Oslo peace process (1993-1995) through the neoclassical realist framework. After the 1967 war, Israel's triumph manufactured substantial turmoil in the balance of power and threat perceptions. A separate Palestinian Authority emerged due to the changing status quo, and new-born identity reshaped the dynamics of Arab-Israeli conflict. In the 1980s, the international

system crises erupted in which threats became murky, and relatively weaker —non-states— actors found great opportunity to maximize their material capabilities. Subsequently, the intifada erupted in 1987, and the Palestinians threatened Israeli existence in the occupied territories as well as inside the green line. The transition period in the international system and the escalation in radical threats revealed the fact that Israel could no longer rule the occupied territories. At the end of the cold war, the US launched a "new world order" based on her hegemony in world politics. With the broad support of the US, the Declaration of Principles in 1993 and the Oslo II Agreement in 1995 were signed between Israel and Palestine. However, the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin caused a deadlock in the Oslo Accords. In the light of evidence, the limited international pressures, and unbalanced relative material power of the parties resulted in the fragmentation of the Oslo peace process. Temporarily, the peace process persevered due to explicit intervention by leaders, yet permanently, systemic factors became the foremost determinant of the process and ultimately led to its collapse.

**Keywords:** Neoclassical Realism, Oslo Peace Process, New World Order, Middle East, Israel, and Palestinian Authority.

## ÖZET

### İSRAİL VE FİLİSTİN ÇATIŞMASININ NEOKLASİK GERÇEKÇİLİK BAĞLAMINDA İNCELENMESİ: OSLO BARIŞ SÜRECİ VAKA ÇALIŞMASI 1993-1995

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Bu çalışmada, Oslo Barış Anlaşmalarının başarısız olma nedenleri neoklasik gerçekçilik bağlamında incelenmiştir. 5 Haziran 1967’de patlak veren ve İsrail’in zaferi ile sonuçlanan Arap-İsrail savaşı, bölgedeki güç dengesinde köktenci bir değişime neden olmuştur. Değişen statüko ve tehdit algısı nedeniyle bağımsız bir Filistin Otoritesi ortaya çıkmış ve bölgedeki çatışma dinamiğini yeniden şekillendirmiştir. Bunun yanında,

1980'lerde patlak veren uluslararası sistem krizi nedeniyle tehditlerin belirsiz bir hal alması sonucunda, maddi güç kapasitesi bakımından zayıf olan asimetrik tehditler kaynaklarını en üst düzeye çıkarma fırsatı bulmuşlardır. Sonuç itibarıyla, 1987'de İntifada patlak vermiştir. İsrail içinde ekonomik ve güvenlik krizleri ortaya çıkmıştır. Bunun yanında, Ortadoğu'da yükselişe geçen radikal devletler ve onların devlet-dışı çevre aktörleri, İsrail'in güvenliğine doğrudan tehdit oluşturmuşlardır. En önemlisi, Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesi ile birlikte değişen dünya düzeni, İsrail'in işgal ettiği toprakları yönetemeyeceği gerçeğini ortaya çıkarmıştır. Tehdidin dengelenmesini sağlamak veya çeşitlenmesini engellemek adına başta sistemsel olarak ve sonrasında iç dinamikler yolu ile İsrail barış görüşmelerine teşvik edilmiştir. 1993'de Prensiplerin Deklarasyonu ve 1995' de Oslo II Anlaşması İsrail ve Filistin arasında imzalanmıştır. Filistin Otoritesi, İsrail tarafından meşru bir aktör olarak kabul edilmiş ve barışa olan inanç güçlenmiştir. Lakin, 1995' de Yitzhak Rabin' in suikasta uğraması süreci dondurmıştır ve Likud partisinin iktidara gelmesi ile birlikte süreç çıkmaza girmiştir. İncelemelerin sonucunda, Oslo Barış Anlaşmalarının sistemsel baskıların zayıf olması ve taraflar arasında güç eşitsizliğinin giderilmemesi sonucunda süreç tarafların güvenlik ve çıkar eksenli beklentilerini karşılamamıştır. Buna karşın, liderlerin sürece doğrudan müdahalesi sonucu, süreç kısa vadeli olarak başarıyla sürdürülmüştür lakin sistemik baskılar uzun vadede sürecin ana belirleyici olmuş ve çökmesine yol açmıştır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Neoklasik Gerçekçilik, Oslo Barış Görüşmeleri, Yeni Dünya Düzeni, Ortadoğu, İsrail ve Filistin Otoritesi

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .....	iii
ÖZET.....	vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT .....	viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....	ix
LIST OF TABLES .....	xi
LIST OF FIGURES .....	xii
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION .....	1
CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	9
2.1. <i>Neoclassical Realist Theory</i> .....	9
2.1.1. <i>Four Theories of International Politics</i> .....	12
2.1.2. <i>The Theoretical Debate on Democratic Peace “Bottom-up approaches”</i> .....	22
2.1.3. <i>Theoretical Debates on Peacemaking “Top-down Approaches”</i> .....	26
2.2. <i>Adaptation of Neoclassical Realist Theory to the Oslo Agreements</i> .....	30
2.3. <i>Methodology</i> .....	34
CHAPTER 3. COMMENCEMENT OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ARABS AND THE ZIONISTS OVER PALESTINE .....	37
3.1. <i>Historical Background</i> .....	37
3.1.1. <i>El-Nakba (Catastrophic Event) 1948 and the Declaration of the State of Israel</i> .....	42
3.1.2. <i>1956 Arab – Israel War and The Rise of the Egypt</i> .....	44
3.1.3. <i>Palestine Liberation Organization</i> .....	45
3.1.4. <i>1967 Arab – Israeli War, the “Six-Day War” and the Shifts in Status Quo</i> ..	46
3.1.5. <i>Black September; The Jordanian and Israeli Trust-Building</i> .....	48
3.1.6. <i>Yom Kippur War and Implementation of Status Quo Ante</i> .....	49
3.1.7. <i>The Camp David Accords (1978) and the Changes in Threat Perception</i> .....	50
3.1.8. <i>The Invasion of Lebanon 1982</i> .....	52



CHAPTER 4. HIGH AWARENESS LEVEL IN THE PERCEPTION OF THREAT AND CORE LEVEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS AT THE FAILED STATE .....	<b>53</b>
4.1. <i>Impact of Historical Roots and Grand Strategy of the Hostiles</i> .....	53
4.1.1. <i>Being a State and Grassroots of the Intifada “Shake Off”</i> .....	59
4.1.2. <i>Fragmentation of the Intifada and the Madrid Peace Conference</i> .....	67
CHAPTER 5. THE LACK OF MUTUAL INCENTIVE(S) AND QUESTION OF DISPARITY .....	<b>77</b>
5.1. <i>The Declaration of Principles through Track II Diplomacy; Systemic and Unit- level Concerns</i> .....	77
5.1.1. <i>Implementation of the Oslo I and the Gaza-Jericho Agreement</i> .....	82
5.1.2. <i>The Oslo Accords II and Chance for Future Building</i> .....	83
5.2. <i>Structural Changes and International Actors Roles During Oslo Accords</i> .....	86
5.3. <i>Relative Power of the Rivals and Interest-Maximization</i> .....	91
5.4. <i>Perception of the Leaders and Their Influence on the Oslo Accords</i> .....	95
5.5. <i>The Impact of Opposition Parties and Their Incentives: Obstacles for the Peace</i> .....	106
5.6. <i>The Role of Public Opinion: Desire for the Perpetual Peace</i> .....	114
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION .....	<b>121</b>
REFERENCES.....	<b>132</b>

**LIST OF TABLES**

Table 1. Classical Realism, Neorealism, and Neoclassical Realism (Source: Lobell et al., 2009, p. 20). ..... 18

Table 2. Constructivism and Neoclassical Realism ..... 21



## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Neoclassical Realist Model of Foreign Policy Analysis.....	12
Figure 2. Oslo II Accords and Partition of the Palestinian Lands (Source: Golan, 2008, p. 22). .....	84
Figure 3. Structural Conditions for the Oslo Peace Process. ....	86
Figure 4. Israeli Jewish Public Support for the Oslo Process (1994–2008), (Source: Hermann, 2009, p. 279).....	115
Figure 5. Palestinian Partisan Groups Support for the Peace (Source: Abusada, 1998, p. 71). .....	118
Figure 6. Palestinian Partisan Groups Support for the Peace Attendance (Source: Abusada, 1998, p. 72). .....	118
Figure 7. Causes of the Oslo Peace Process Breakdown at the Systemic Level.....	121
Figure 8. Internal Constraints for the Peace-making. ....	121

## CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

There are many conflicts in world politics. So long as there have been conflicts, there always be incentives for the conflict-resolution. Some of these incentives have provided sufficient peace treaties, and some have led to the greater disasters. Many direct and indirect variables have intervened in these security or interest-oriented conflicts. As a consequences of the anarchic nature of world politics, these period of strife are the inevitable part of states' foreign policy behaviors. The Arab-Israeli hostility was one of the long-standing examples of these conflicts, which initiated many negotiation stages for conflict-resolution, but did little practice on functional peace. The question is that why Palestinian-Israeli peace process has failed to establish mutual interests.

Nevertheless, in the last half-century, three international, as well as regional changes, affected Middle East politics. The first one is the 1967 war that divided the Arab-Israeli conflict on several fronts. Arab states began to shift their threat perceptions and attempted to establish de facto peace agreements with the Israeli in order to protect or regain their status quo from the state of Israel. First Jordan, then Egypt, established a functional conflict-resolution with Israel, thereby the Palestinian question was separated from its pioneer advocates. In contrast, other Arab states pursued their financial and military assistance for the Palestinian movements.

Indeed, Palestinians were the leading force of these conflicts because, after the 1967 war, Arab states realized that Israel was relatively much stronger than any other state in the region. In order to balance Israel's supremacy, Arab states posed the asymmetrical threats by the PLO. In doing so, the Arab states would no longer receive direct threats from Israel, while they would balance the Israeli expansionist behavior. With Arab states' encouragement, Palestinian nationalism became distinct from Arab nationalism, and the PLO became the legitimate representative of the Palestinians. Consequently, the war created a Palestinian identity and established legitimate Palestinian authority. In this regard, PLO became the governor of the failed state that had no territorial integrity and monopoly of legitimate violence among its people.

The second, in the 1980s, the bipolar international system weakened as a result of the USSR's declining material capability, but for the 'new world order', the circumstances did not mature due to the international constraints. Hence, the international system crises appeared in which asymmetrical threats or the oppressed societies found magnificent opportunities to maximize their interests. Whereas nation-states could not appease or deter these threats because of the transition period that posed instability through the world order; wherefore, threats became murky rather than foreseen.

Under these conditions, Israeli material capability decreased, and her monopoly of legitimate violence over the Palestinians was questioned. Therefore, in 1987, the intifada –Palestinian uprising–, seen as a nonviolent, mass-based political resistance, erupted. The uprising did not change the status quo but posed a sufficient threat to Israeli survival in the occupied territories. Israeli miscalculation of the international crisis caused another turmoil in her policy. Ultimately, for the first time, Israel's de facto recognized Palestinian existence and the right of self-governing. In fact, Israeli material capability was adequate to suppress the Palestinian intifada, but the crisis of the international system produced unpredictability that states could not estimate the material capability of rivals.

The last was the end of the Cold war, which had established a 'new world order', and altered international order. The US became the sole dominant state of the international system and inaugurated a foreign policy doctrine built on American hegemony. Hence, the Middle Eastern states commence to bandwagon her foreign policy. In the wake of the Gulf war, the US-led anti-Iraqi camp was the first expression of that doctrine and was supported by almost every Arab state. Even the USSR recognized the US's supremacy and followed her campaign. However, the PLO miscalculated the 'new world order' and supported Iraq. Eventually, the PLO's financial and diplomatic competence diminished, while Israel regained international legitimacy as well as the opportunity to suppress the intifada.

Moreover, the US liberal values have spread through the international order. In this regard, many peace talks were encouraged by the American. The first expression of this policy was materialized at the Madrid Peace Conference (1991) that launched by the US and USSR. The US encouraged all parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict to attend an

international conference, including Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestinians, and Israel, but due to Israel's rejection, the Palestinians were accompanied by the Jordanian delegates. As a consequences of the Madrid Conference, Palestinian-Israeli rivals endeavored to build mutual trust for the first time. Despite having an exhaustive pact, Madrid Conference did not succeed, yet its prepared rivals for peace-making. To be sure, Israeli and Palestinian decision-makers were aware of the necessity of the peace agreements because they had mutual interest and security concerns.

For the Palestinian decision-makers, the fragmentation of the intifada and the loss of legitimacy among regional actors due to its irrational support for the Iraqi invasion compelled PLO to negotiate with the Israeli. Moreover, the emergence of Hamas produced another survival threat for the PLO as well as Israel. On the other hand, the US-led 'new international order' forced Israel to grant concessions to Palestinians in order to utilize from the hegemon powers. Together with the intifada, Israeli also discerned the difficulties to maintain her status quo in the occupied territories, and thus she understood that the Palestinians living in occupied areas could pose a direct threat to Israel. Furthermore, Hamas terrorist attacks also coerced Israeli to negotiate with the PLO. The fact that the PLO was a more rational actor than Hamas, and the loss of PLO's legitimacy could pose a more compelling threat to Israel's survival. Hence, making concessions to PLO could alleviate radical threats.

Since the Madrid Conference, Israel and Palestinian political elite found great opportunity to build negotiation channel for later stages. With the extensive support of the United States, back-channel diplomacy was initiated between Palestinian and Israeli elites, which commenced in November 1992. Secret talks were held in Oslo, Norway. To do so, both parties reached an agreement on the Declaration of Principles (1993) by which Israeli recognized PLO as a political party and representative of Palestinian people. Whereas, the Palestinian organization recognized the existence and sovereignty of the Israelis. The DOP was the first step of the peace agreements, and Gaza-Jericho Agreements (1994) and Oslo Accords II (1995) followed it. As a result of the Israeli prime minister Rabin's assassinations, a peace process plagued to deadlock and eventually collapsed.

This thesis is a case study which aims to explain the Oslo Accords I and II (1993-1995) through neoclassical realist theory and explore why Oslo Accords did not succeed to contribute functional peace or to enhance mutual security between Israel and Palestine. To this extent, in order to explain the broke down, the study has adopted a neoclassical realist theoretical framework. Neoclassical realism is the international relations theory, which is considered to be the outgrowth of the structural realism (Rathbun, 2008), and allows the scholars integrate variables at the unit-level in extent to the structural perspective of defensive neorealism. Hence, neoclassical realism is consistent with the both classical realism and neorealism.

From the perspective of neoclassical realism, structural variables versus non-structural variables through the foreign policy decision-making process should be considered to analyze the state's foreign policy behavior, and thus we must look at the state's relative powers in the extent of their material sources and mobilization capacity in the system (Lobell et al., 2009). In doing so, three variables can be defined to observe the foreign policy behavior of states. According to Rose, as in structural realism, our first and independent variable is the anarchic international system of which determines the states' foreign policy in the structure regarding their relative material power and capability of extraction of these sources (Rose, 1998, p.145).

The second one is *innenpolitik* —unit-level— (intervening variables) which should be included; decision makers perception, strategic culture, domestic political constraints, state-society relations, social actors and public in order to disclose state's incentives with the non-structural variables. The intervening role of the “state” in neoclassical realism is related to how and under what conditions internal characteristic of states implement to its foreign policy decisions (Lobell et al., 2009). The last, state foreign policy (dependent variable) relates to the relative material capability of states to define their power and interests through decision-making process. Foreign policy of the state emerges when international pressures are turned directly or indirectly to decision-makers. Therefore, two distinct but interrelated outcomes define the dependent variable.

Above all that, numerous studies have deviated from well-known theories of international relations in hopes of gaining a more comprehensive understanding of the obstacles to

conflict-resolution. Many of these theories have succeeded in presenting intentions that lead to peace agreements, yet their explanatory capability on the failure of peace processes remain constrained because of their pure inductive or deductive understanding of world politics. The fact that Israeli-Palestinian conflict is related to various inter and intra-states security as well as interest concerns of international and regional actors. Regional balance-of-security was the chief impulsion to initiate the Oslo Accords. However, in the absence of internal motivations, Oslo peace process would never last for three years, and thus inductive approaches are necessary to explain the foreign policy behaviors of specific states rather than international outcomes at large (Foulon, 2015).

According to neorealists, the security concerns of the Israeli side could not be covered by the PLO, while PLO's expectations for the sovereign state were never approved by the Israeli. The lack of the mutual security and interest maximization left no incentive for the peace. Furthermore, Israel's relative material capability was not equivalent to the PLO, so neorealists assume that any peace settlements would be a zero-sum game for the Israeli (Rynhold, 2007). However, as Ripsman notes that if hegemonic states had filled power gap between rivals, the peace agreement would have achieved to provide mutual interests (Ripsman, 2005), but the US refrained from providing any security guarantees to satisfy the material gap between rivals. Indeed, the American position was controversial due to her long-term alliance with Israel.

In this regard, neorealists expected immediate collapse of the Oslo Accords. Hence, neither the balance-of-power theory nor the balance-of-threat theory appropriately described the reasons for the five interim stages agreed by the Palestinian and Israeli parties during the Oslo peace process. Despite the relative power vacuum and the lack of hegemon's mediating stance, the peace process contributed to conflict-resolution for a short-term. To sum up, with regard to security and power correlations, the neorealist theory is useful in understanding how systemic pressures force Israel and Palestine to initiate peace agreements, and under which international conditions rivals addressed conflict-resolution.

Nevertheless, in order to understand peace negotiations adequately, it is necessary to refer to the international, national and domestic perceptions of the counterparties. Therefore,



neoliberal theories are valuable to examine the peace talks. Especially, the American incentives to resolve regional conflicts was an important clue in the Oslo Accords (Mullin, 2010). With the end of the Cold War, the US policy was shaped by a democratic peace theory that promoted conflict-resolutions through the strong value-based institutions. To these extents, the development of the democratic peace depends on the spread of liberal values such as cooperation, freedom and economic interdependence. However, in the first place, the DPT's conflict resolution is based on the states that have liberal advocacy institutions, and thus it is difficult to resolve conflicts between different regime types (Coetzee and Hudson, 2012).

Although the US imposed liberal values on states, the Oslo Accords emerged as a result of security concerns. The DPT played a key role in shaping the Oslo peace process framework by offering a road map based on liberal values, yet the institutionalization of these demands was never fulfilled. In essence, peace talks pursued with no desire for democracy and liberal institutions. For instance, the Palestinian' right to self-determination was never revealed in the peace process. Together with US financial assistance, liberals would expect broad domestic support for the peace, but rejectionist parties were the main obstacles to Oslo's implementation. Indeed, both opposition parties denied each other's existence. Ultimately, US-led DPT was competent to innovate peaceful ideas, yet the theory does not explain to essence of security and opposition parties.

To be sure, Israeli and Palestinian social groups and identities were formed due to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and thus the constructivist theory may be an efficient approach to identify the grassroots that advocated the Oslo peace process. Constructivists argue that societies are shaped by the ideas and institutions that help to forge their identity (Wendt, 1992). With the USSR's downfall, the US's ideas and institutions shaped the international norms. However, these changes did not lead to an extensive shift in the perception of threats. Hence, during Oslo, there was no attempt to institutionalize peace because both sides did not trust each other.

In the absence of mutual trust, the intersubjective meaning of the peace did not translate into the parties' agenda. Wherefore, the Oslo peace Accords were disrupted by Hamas and

the Likud parties. In doing so, the rejectionist camps speculated the public opinion against the peace talks. In essence, temporarily, cultural changes at the international level led to major changes in Palestinian and Israeli societies, but permanently, security and interests shaped the expectations of internal actors. Besides, relative gains of the parties became suspicious for the rivals. Consequently, constructivism was a suitable theory for discovering the hostility and ideational interests of competitors at the peace table and at the same time in the post-agreement period in order to alter the social attitude of the rivals (Ripsman, 2016). Yet, the theory fails to demonstrate the importance of material gains and the security expectations of antagonists.

As stated, those international relations theories are essential to discover the causes and consequences of the Oslo peace process, yet the Israeli-Palestinian peace processes were the result of multivariate incentives both at the international and national levels. Hence, neither pure systemic theories nor the *innenpolitik* theories could not provide inclusive explanations for the Oslo Accords. Certainly, neoclassical theory, which has an eclectic nature, may help in solving this puzzle by using neorealism as primary sources and by using from *innenpolitik* theories as secondary sources. During the Oslo accords, there has been a clear correlation between international and unit-level variables, and thus neoclassical realism has been applied in this study to disclose a linkage between these variables.

To sum up, in the first chapter, neoclassical realism will be defined, and why it is more complementary than other theories will be discussed by comparing principal international relations theories related to the Oslo peace process. In chapter 2, nature and historical background of the conflicts between Palestinian and Israeli will be demonstrated by revealing the relevant literature on the relations between Arab states and Israel, firstly. Then, by using neoclassical realism on the road to the Oslo peace talks, the grand strategy and incentives of the Palestinian and Israeli will be explained concerning conflicts, material resources capability, relative powers, interests, and security concerns. Finally, the Oslo Accords will be discussed in the context of the international system, relative power of the states, the perceptions of leaders, the influence of opposition parties on peace

processes, and the public opinion. In light of structural and unit-level variables, the genuine causes of the Oslo peace process failure will be addressed.



## CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

### *2.1. Neoclassical Realist Theory*

The purpose of the study is to explain why the Oslo Process has failed and to link actors' role in the peace process with regards to their relative powers by using neoclassical realist theory. Neoclassical realism is an international theory that seeks to explain state's — specific states— foreign policy behavior by using structural realism in the first place and innenpolitik as a secondary source. Gideon Rose coined the term “neoclassical realism” in his reviewed works at *World Politics* in 1998. Rose describes neoclassical realism as a security / interest-based international relation theory that merges both external and internal variables to explain the foreign policy behavior of states properly. Yet, these combinations are not between two equal variables, and thus the foreign policy decisions of states are determined by systemic pressures, and these challenges are translated through intervening variables at the unit-level (Rose, 1998, p.146).

In this respect, systemic coercions produce incentives for all states to gain more power in defending their interests and security, but due to the relative power of states, these shares may be beneficial or harmful. Relative power distribution provides a prescription for the state's foreign policy behavior. Hence, Thucydides' observation for the state behaviors “The strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept” (Crawley, 1954, p. 264) is admitted by the neoclassical realist theory reasonably. Consequently, the value of international structure remains as our primary variable that all states must obey in the long-term.

According to Rose, similar to structural realism, our first and independent variable is the anarchic international system, which determines the states' foreign policy behavior regarding their relative material power capabilities. However, the impact of the international system is not direct, rather it is complex. As a result of this complexity, structural pressures must be catalyzed by the unit-level variables of which might be the perception of decision-makers, the interest of the social groups, state structure –regime, system, ideology, etc.– and so on (Rose, 1998).

Furthermore, the intervening role of the “state” in neoclassical realism is related to how and under what circumstances internal characteristics of states implement to its foreign policy decisions. International threats and opportunities force leaders to act with regard to their relative power, but domestic variables – mobilization of the mass, extracting resources, interest groups, ideas, perception of the decision-makers, historical background, the degree of state autonomy from society, and level of the impact of the public coercions through the decision-making process– might affect or even change this behavior for a short time (Lobell et al., 2009).

In order to elaborate on the foreign policy behaviors of states, perceptions of decision-makers in which ideas play a fundamental role, and internal impulses must be analyzed when states have defiant behavior towards international pressures or when states hesitate to follow international order. From this perspective, neoclassical realism is a new version of structural realism or Waltzian realism, yet theory contributes to some innenpolitik nuances (Juneau, 2010). In essence, systemic pressures are the foremost determinants of state's foreign policy behaviors, whereas intervening variables can also shape the foreign policy of countries and become temporarily chief determinants.

Neoclassical realism has brought a multivariate perspective to foreign policy analyses. For instance, during the Oslo peace process, domestic and ideational variables help us to comprehend why the state of Israel acts on behalf of the internal motivations, contrary to what the international system determines and how or under what conditions she applies different foreign policy decisions instead of monitoring global phenomena. To these extents, in order to observe the state of Israel’s behavior, domestic variables such as; political elite’s perception and their ideas, public opinion, political culture —if it is necessary— must be revealed.

Moreover, for the neoclassical realists, there is no one single neoclassical realist approach at the intervening level because states have various internal motivations. At the unit level, decision-makers –elected leaders, bureaucrats, and interest groups– engaging in a very complex domestic process, or they are subject to different institutional constraints. Hence, it is inaccurate to expect any generalizability from the neoclassical realist theory of which state specific. The theory also notes that the interests, identities, and behaviors of the actors

are grounded in the decision-making process (Lobell et al., 2009). Besides, compared to the neorealist theory, these inductive assumptions provide more empirical perspectives to produce a sufficient prescription for foreign policy behaviors.

Indeed, neoclassical realism is the theory of deviating foreign policy behavior. It elaborates on the reasons that why and how states do not always follow the orders in the system; because they have diverse ideas, different mobilization, and extractive capabilities that are the main function of the state-society relations. Therefore, Lobell et al. describe the two-level game that leaders play: “on the one hand they must respond to the external environment, but on the other hand, they must extract and mobilize resources from domestic society, work through domestic institutions and maintain the support of key stakeholders” (Lobell et al., 2009, p. 7).

For the neoclassical realists, the state as both a political entity and an analytical concept, but in the classical realist and neorealist approach, states are explained by three basic assumptions that are nation-based, security-oriented and structured the power environment to maximize interest. Especially, neorealist defines state as a black box that cannot be identified by reductionist approaches (Mearsheimer, 2001a). There is no specific definition of the state neither in classical realism in general nor neorealism in particular. However, states have distinct varieties, so with primary assumptions, these scholars have fallen short of the well-articulated theory of the state. Neoclassical realists have started to satisfy that gap in the literature (Lobell et al., 2009, p. 13).

On the other hand, mostly classical realists and then neoclassical realists stress the importance of the ideas. Thus, sometimes they are blamed to be constructivist. Rathbun states, “for instance, Walt’s balance of threat is often referred to as constructivist in assumption due to its emphasis on the “perception of aggressive intentions”” (Rathbun, 2008, p. 300). Walt’s assumption is also admitted by neoclassical realists. On the contrary, for the constructivists, ideas are instruments for decision-makers. While neoclassical realists admit that ideas have a limited impact on foreign policy, but these are efficient

only for short to middle term, and ideas are not the determining factors for the decision-makers.




Figure 1. Neoclassical Realist Model of Foreign Policy Analysis.

### 2.1.1. Four Theories of International Politics

*“Neoclassical realism builds upon the complex relationship between the state and society found in classical realism without sacrificing the central insight of neorealism about the constraint of the international system.” (Lobell et al., 2009, p. 13).*

In this context, the theory stands between classical realism—inductive— and neorealism—deductive— by using primary and secondary international system variables. Yet, it must be explained: what is the strength and weakness of the classical realism and structural

realism? What kind of correlation is there between classical realism and neorealism produced neoclassical realism? To what extent does this correlation affect neoclassical realist assumptions?

In 1984, Robert Gilpin, who proposed three core assumptions for classical realism, was one of the leading realist scholars of international political economy. The first one is the conflictual nature of the anarchic international system as a result of human behavior. The second one is the group as an essential part of social life. The last and primary one, being political power and security in human motivation is related to its anarchic heritage (Gilpin, 1984). Classical realism seems to be *innenpolitik* theory that considers human behavior and national power play a primary role in determining the foreign policy of states.

According to classical realism, the international system and human behavior show similarities, and thus exploring human behavior might help to explain the foreign policy of the states (Morgenthau, 1948). In this regard, the international orders are dependent on the state's practices of which motivated by social groups. Instead of receiving threats from the anarchical international system at large, actors or the social group's actions are the main threat to the global environment. Therefore, international relations are complicated and precarious (Apr and Stirk, 2016).

Nevertheless, the neoclassical realist theory is the outgrowth of structural realism (Rathbun, 2008). Therefore, the neoclassical foreign policy approach is based on interest-oriented and security-oriented nation-states rather than conflictual social groups. Furthermore, since classical realism is a group-centered approach, greater groups have a decisive role (Lobell et al., 2009) Whereas, neoclassical realists deal with social groups when they distort the foreign policy decisions of states and assume that social groups are powerful when foreign policy decisions adopted by domestic politics. Hence, neoclassical realists also accept the influence of the anarchic social groups such as, political elites, military, bourgeoisie, interest groups, opposition parties, and minorities, but not as the primary sources of international politics (Juneau, 2010).

Moreover, in contrast to classical realism, the neoclassical realists assume that because of their structural approach, security and power are not only survival for social groups, but also states as a whole. In essence, all realists share a similar definition of power and



security, but they show differences in terms of their level of analysis. According to Lobell et al. “Morgenthau, Kissinger, Wolfers, and others write extensively about the state and national power, but say little about the constraints of the international system.” (Lobell et al., 2009, p. 16). Therefore, the belief of classical realists on national power is not related to the international system, but to human behavior due to its inductive logic.

To be sure, classical realism is a long-standing theory that never has a consistent research program, so in the first place, the theory is a scattered approach that cannot be generalized to the whole (Ibid.). In contrast, for structural and neoclassical realists, power and security are survival for the states regarding their relative power in which its deductive logic is the determinant factor for these assumptions. Nevertheless, Rose argues that deductive theories are limited to explain the state's foreign policy behavior with traditional definitions of power and security. Consequently, *innenpolitik* approaches are essential to understand the way states interpret and respond to their external environment through its unit-level variables such as decision maker's perception, domestic incentives as well as the constraints, and internal structure of the states (Rose, 1998, p. 152).

The neorealist theory was presented in 1979 by Kenneth Waltz, who wrote the book *International Theory of Politics*. Neorealist assumptions show similarities with its ancestor to which is classical realism<sup>1</sup>. However, instead of exploring the state's foreign policy on behalf of human behavior, the neorealist theory is based on deductive assumption that takes the structure of the international system into its core. Moreover, neorealism also is known as “structural realism”; identifies anarchy as the main determinant of state behavior. Survival is a constant compulsion that states must respond by maximizing their power.

Hence, “Self-help” is necessary for the states which strive to prevent the threat from other states (Frankel and Waltz, 1980). Admittedly, Waltz's contribution is “the system-wide component that makes it possible to think of the system as a whole” (Waltz, 1979). Therefore, he creates a deductive theory to analyze repeating patterns of power and the absence of continuous hegemonic international systems throughout history (Ibid.) The

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<sup>1</sup> Three primary similarities might be defined. 1) Anarchic international structure, 2) The state is preoccupied with national security, 3) Power maximization for the actors.

focus of neorealism is to explain common patterns of international behavior over time (Lobell et al., 2009). To do so, the attitude of states becomes more generalizable and more predictable for structural realists.

Structural realism also admits the importance of *innenpolitik* (Waltz, 1979), but it does not define its power or its impact on foreign policy. On the contrary, neoclassical realists present comprehensible logic that incorporates ideas and internal politics. Therefore, neoclassical realism is the extension of structural realism with some *innenpolitik* nuances (Rathbun, 2008). However, neorealists assume that all internal interventions in the decision-making process harm foreign policy, so decisions should be made by actors following the international system order. (Waltz, 1979). While neoclassical realists do not present such a definition, and they do not criticize domestic influences either negatively or positively, but they accept the domestic politics and ideas are usually miscalculated, and thus only states make efficient decisions.

Waltzian realism assumes that all states are under certain constraints in which the system encourages states to do absolute things, though they may not adhere to coercions set by the international order (Rathbun, 2008, p. 304). Still, it says little about how and under what circumstances states do not follow the international structure. However, when states following a disparate path than the international system suggests, neoclassical realists look at the intervening variables in order to explain the state's deviating behavior. Neorealism provides a fascinating ground rules about what states should do because of its ad hoc approach, yet never considers what if states follow different phenomena.

The post hoc approach of neoclassical realism fills this gap to predict the future of the countries regarding foreign policy decisions. Yet, neorealism is a limited theory that does not imply to demonstrate any elements of foreign policy because primarily, the international structure does not offer any unit-level influences in foreign policy. As Waltz's famous example, "We cannot know how state X will do on Tuesday." (Waltz, 1979). So, treating all states in a restricted field leads uncertainty for the state's predictability, but the theory should have expectations for the future. Therefore, predictability might be flourished by the diversification of structural as well as unit-level variables with regard to states' foreign policy behavior.

Rose argues that political leaders can be constrained by both international and domestic politics (Rose, 1998, p. 152), and the same is always true for neorealism. However, these constraints are not considered to be Hobbesian or to be murky for the neoclassical realists. Neoclassical realists explore the system without any biases; this is the main reason for having a more comprehensive theory than structural realism, which often misdirects variables at the unit-level. For instance, neoclassical realists assume that intervening variables will not be defined positively or negatively until they cause deviating foreign policy decisions.

On the other hand, there are also similarities and differences between offensive and neoclassical realism. The first is the offensive realists, which considers that states can never be confident how much power it has to be achieved. Therefore, maximizing their share of material power is the only way to provide security (Lobell et al., 2009, p. 18). The second, offensive realists always tend to generalize the state's foreign policy behaviors. Its view of the international system is unpredictable as a black box (Mearsheimer, 2001a). Systemic incentives associated with the maximization of power that promote states to follow the same world order, but according to states material power these pressures can be less or more precious (Mearsheimer, 2001b).

In contrast, neoclassical realism approves the systemic incentives as a determinant factor of the states' foreign policy behavior, yet some differences might be observed. For the neoclassical realists, systemic incentives may change due to the state's instable relative material capability because there is no permanent balance under the anarchic world order. Moreover, even if state X, which has the same relative material capability as the state Y, might behave abnormally because foreign policy behaviors are indirect and complex. The system offers incentives to states, but it does not necessarily determine the actions of states (Waltz, 1979).

Rathbun assumes that states are responsible for mobilizing resources to respond to threats, but if there are internal restrictions, mobilization of resources can be blocked (Rathbun, 2008, p. 306). Indeed, whatever system offers if states tend to reject, offensive realism has no clue for this misbehavior. Neoclassical realism provides intervening variables to explain the misinterpretation of the states toward the international system pressures.

Although the anarchic international system, which is primarily influential in the foreign policy decisions of the country, seems to be indirect and complicated, while the internal factors are secondarily significant but have a direct impression on foreign policy decisions.



Table 1. Classical Realism, Neorealism, and Neoclassical Realism (Source: Lobell et al., 2009, p. 20).

<b>THEORY</b>	<b>VIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM</b>	<b>VIEW OF UNIT</b>	<b>UNDERLYING CAUSAL LOGIC</b>
CLASSICAL REALISM	In some cases, are important but generally unimportant.	Differentiated	Foreign policy decisions are affected by the internal factors.
OFFENSIVE REALISM	Very important. Anarchic and has negative impact on states.	Undifferentiated	Systemic incentives (Independent variable) affect states foreign policy (Dependent variable).
DEFENSIVE REALISM	Very important. Anarchic and competitive, thus it is murky.	Undifferentiated	International outcomes (D.P.) determine states foreign policy by its relative power capability (I.V.).
NEOCLASSICAL REALISM	Important. Anarchic and sometimes ambiguous to the decision makers.	Differentiated	Relative power capability (I.V.) affect foreign policy outcomes (D.P.) but must be translated through domestic variables and ideas (Intervening variable).

Neoclassical realists, who often integrate domestic policy and ideational effects into their analysis, were accused of being constructivists. (Rathbun, 2008). In fact, ideas also play an essential role in the neoclassical realist theory, but it has some nuances that distinct from constructivism. Hence, to distinguish these theories, one should be asking the following questions: what is the relationship between neoclassical realism and constructivism? Why does neoclassical realist suppose that inductive approaches are also essential to understand state's foreign policy behaviors?

Neoclassical realism stands between pure Waltzian realism and constructivism (Rose, 1998, p. 152). Thus, we should also examine the differences between constructivism and neoclassical realism. The constructivist assumption on anarchy is associated with the behavior of states concerning their perception of the international structure and ideas of social groups. Alexander Wendt mentioned that "anarchy is what states make of it" (Wendt, 1992). In contrast, neoclassical realists assume that the relative power of the states has an enormous impact on the outcome of the state's interactions (Rose, 1998). Remarkably, for neoclassical realists, anarchy is not what states make of it, but a logic that states must be adapted.

Besides, Hopf notes that anarchy has multiple meanings for different actors based on their communities of intersubjective understandings and practices (Hopf, 1998, p. 174). On this account, actors can be more or less anarchic according to their threat perceptions. On the contrary, neoclassical realism considers that anarchy has one primary conclusion that states are security-oriented, and there is no hierarchy in the system; ergo, conflicts and chaos are inevitable. All states behave according to their relative power capability in the first place, then their perceptions are matter.

Furthermore, the constructivist approach diverges from the neoclassical realism because neoclassical realists have never contemplated that identity is the cause of anarchy. Rationally, they conclude anarchy coerces states to form an identity in order to contribute to legitimacy as well as to material capability. In contrast, constructivists believe that shifting identity can also prevent the conflict (Wendt, 1992), yet realists have never admitted this assumption because conflicts are the nature of the international system. Therefore, anarchy is a doctrine that supposed to be power-oriented.

Most of the constructivists merely emphasize that ideas shape policies. However, ideas are tools for decision-makers (Tang, 2008, p. 465). To this end, the principle problem is that why states with similar ideas often behave differently in the sphere of foreign policy and why different states in similar situations often behave alike (Ripsman, 2007). Hence, the constructivist approach or their understanding of the ideas must be located in the second place, because permanently, the foreign policy of the state cannot move beyond the limits and opportunities imposed by the international environment (Rose, 1998). Neoclassical realists discover what impact the international order has on the ideas because the most dominant generalizable feature of the state in international relations is its relative material position in the system.

In addition, the intersubjectivity is used by constructivists to determine the degree of aggression or anarchy of the state (Wendt, 1992). Neoclassical realism does not reject these assumptions and even adds some objective approaches at the systemic level. The foreign policy behaviors of states are shaped in accordance with their relative power, which is intersubjective. Sincerely, for the neoclassical realists, the intersubjectivity is not based on how states perceive each other according to their ideas or social practices, but on the quantitative degree to the material capabilities and resources of states. Hence, neoclassical realism never contradicts the definition of intersubjectivity adopted by constructivism, though it provides an objective basis for the description at the international system level.

In essence, neoclassical realists accept all constructivist assumptions at the intervening-level. Therefore, neoclassical realist approach can clarify the behavior of states in many regions during many historical periods, which Hopf has described as a fundamental part of constructivism. (Hopf, 1998, p. 175). Moreover, the theory can also explore how various psychological, ideational, and cultural elements may affect foreign policy decisions and how political leaders, or interest groups perceive their own and the other's capabilities plus how such perceptions are translated into foreign policy (Rose, 1998, p. 168). To do so, all these variables must be present at the intervening level because primarily, the foreign policy of states is limited to systemic pressures.

Table 2. Constructivism and Neoclassical Realism

<b>THEORY</b>	<b>VIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM</b>	<b>VIEW OF UNIT</b>	<b>UNDERLYING CAUSAL LOGIC</b>
CONSTRUCTIVISM	Unimportant. Anarchic and has multiple meaning for different actors based on their communities of intersubjective understandings and practices.	Differentiated	Intersubjectivity that depends on how states perceive each other with their identities and ideas. Identity-based social groups determine the foreign policy of the states with their own ideas.
NEOCLASSICAL REALISM	Important. Anarchy is a reality and sometimes might be uncertain for the decision-makers.	Differentiated	Relative power capability (I.V.) affect foreign policy outcomes (D.P.) but must be translated through domestic variables and ideas (Intervening variable).



### ***2.1.2. The Theoretical Debate on Democratic Peace “Bottom-up approaches”***

In order to comprehend the research question of this work: “Why did the Oslo Accords fail despite extensive United States’ support, while both sides adopted the violence following the downfall?”, we need to look at the theoretical debate on peacemaking and attitudes of the actors in accordance with the neoclassical theoretical framework, but first we must look where bottom-up approaches stand. When do states tend to make peace? Answering these questions is particularly critical for understanding the failure of the Oslo peace process.

Democratic peace is the idea that bottom-up –liberals and constructivists– international relations theories consist in their nature (Ripsman, 2007). *Innenpolitik* theories concern about the state’s compromise and conflict resolutions rather than the balance-of-threat. Indeed, they promote conflict resolution through the societal norms and strong value-based institutions by which facilitate social control over the government (Ripsman, 2016, p. 20). Furthermore, overcoming barriers to ethnonationalism helps them to prevent societal conflicts in which the institutions are above states.

At the outset, the democratic peace theory contributed by Kant’s cosmopolitanism, which considers that the spread of liberal values such as, democracy, and freedom, would inevitably lead to the perpetual peace in world politics. As Kant mentioned, “state of peace must be *formally instituted*, for a suspension of hostilities is not in itself a guarantee of peace.” (Kant and Reiss, 1991, p. 98). Whence, peace must be content with a democratic and strong institution in order to build trust between hostiles.

Later, Benhabib revised cosmopolitanism by adding some features which are based on the establishment of a world federation of the republic that might provide hospitality and peace (Benhabib, 2004, p. 26). Henceforth, the development of the democratic peace theory lies under the classical liberal doctrine. In this regard, cooperation, freedom, and economic interdependency assist people to establish a bulwark against conflicts. However, liberal theories are based on the idea that liberal versus, non-liberal states logically, and thus it is difficult to resolve conflicts between different regime types (Coetzee and Hudson, 2012). From the beginning, the DPT has failed to address the non-liberal state's situation in the negotiation phase.

On the one hand, the DPT played an important role in the Oslo Accords by giving road map based on liberal values, yet institutionalization of the peace never occurred because of the security became primary concerns of Israeli sides. For the liberals, implementing democracy and liberal norms should help to create peace between rivals. However, it was not until 1994 that Palestinian National Authority was recognized following the Gaza-Jericho Agreement (May 4, 1994) to govern the Gaza Strip and Areas A and B of the West Bank, as a consequence of the 1993 Oslo Accords by the Israeli. So, peace talks persisted with no desire for democracy or democratic institutions.

Principally, peace talks were held that contained democratic and liberal norms but were never implemented. Therefore, the DPT was preferable for the states which experienced democracy and liberal institution at least for a medium to long-term, but in the Oslo Accords Palestinian side never experienced democracy or the liberal institutions. According to Doyle, “ When the citizens of who bear the burden of war elect their governments, wars become impossible.” (Doyle, 1986, p. 1151), yet as Doyle mentioned liberals always requested for the democracy that was not experienced by Palestinians.

The DPT and liberal theories consider that liberalism and war are two opposite sides because liberalism proposes on the cooperation and economic interdependency. To do so, the state would never choose the war instead of peace because war is too costly, and it can catastrophically cause states’ economies (Doyle, 1986). Indeed, the Palestinian intifada was the primary cause that pushed Israeli to the peace talks. In reverse, when peace talks failed Israeli and Palestinian rivals were more likely to go war and took its high costs. Hence, DPT and liberal theories again failed to point the value of the security and interest because giving to Palestinians a state could pose more challenging threat to Israel, so the Israeli side was ready to bear the high costs of the war.

As mentioned above, liberal theories are only useful when rivals share the same norms as well as the same worldview. As Doyle assumes that non-liberal states and their people are always suspicious for the liberal states’, and thus liberal states can use cooperative violence to appease their threatening behavior (Doyle, 1986, pp. 1161–1162). Paradoxically, these violent behaviors can lead to more aggressive non-liberal states. Remarkably, in the first-place theory considers that Israeli and Palestinian parties do not

build confidence because of Palestinians non-liberal behavior. However, trust is an essential condition for peace, but states' ideologies do not prevent the formation of it. Once more, by drawing non-liberal states as unreliable companions, the liberals failed to exhibit the importance of the peace in which states could ensure their interest and security.

Third parties' influences were also essential through the peace processes for the liberals. Indeed, we saw few participations from the West such as; the US and Norway. Hence, these states perceive Palestine in an irrational and barbaric sense, whereas Israel was the country that was reasonable and civilized (Mullin, 2010, p. 527). In this respect, Israeli sides were enjoying being rational and trustful allies to the West, yet Palestinians were treated as a subordinate by the third parties. Consequently, the DPT also failed to mention the importance of being neutral.

In sum, liberalism and the DPT's are beneficial to provide stability to peace talks (Ripsman, 2016) where states have minimal interdependency and institutionalization of the peace is a vital step to take, so DPT's might provide enduring and long-term peace by the cooperation, economic interdependency as well as by liberal values such as; democracy, supranational institutions (De Coning, 2018). Though, in the first place and primarily, we must take states' security matters and their survival interests into account. Moreover, international structure and its pressures on the states must be translated through the relations of the rival states that only possible via the top-down approaches.

On the other hand, constructivists stress on the democratic peace theory in their field because of their assumptions on the strong institutionalism. As distinct from liberalism, constructivism is based on identity and social groups. They argue that societies are shaped by the ideas and institutions that help to build their identity (Ripsman, 2016, p. 23). To the extent that states and societies are embedded in cooperative international institutions, they commence to create the "us" who view the international environment differently than others (Ripsman, 2005).

Bottom-up theories have similar logic about the peace of which must be institutionalized through the strong constitutions that are only possible in democratic states because they allocate their powers to provide strong institutions. Yet, they can be distinguished in the extent of its period that can be either long-term or short-term. Constructivists evaluate this

period in extent of the ideas that shaped by the societies, and thus peace can establish so long as societal groups perceive each other as an ally rather than a rival (Wendt, 1999, pp. 313-369).

Wendt notes that the anarchic international system was created by the social group's ideas and their incentives in which identities occurred (Wendt, 1992). However, by the USSR's downfall, these identities were shifted. The liberal ideas –especially the US– became a new hegemon of the international system (Ibid., p. 424). Hence, the US's beliefs and norms that spread throughout the world were the cause of peace processes in many places; Northern Ireland, South Africa, and the Balkans. The Oslo Accords were also the results of the 'new world order' (Ziv, 2011). However, new-born identity failed to prevent conflicts in the Oslo peace talks and the Balkans. Indeed, having an identity as a primary source rather than the states' interests, provide restricted explanations for the failure of the peace process.

Homogenizing in world identities and the concept of Westernization compelled Israeli to adopt the more liberal post-materialist agenda (Rynhold, 2007). Thus, the changes in the international structure indeed provided the Kantian world order. However, the importance of the intifada and economic problems in Israel because of her security expenditures were missed by the constructivists (Ziv, 2011). Besides, as the study observed in the Oslo peace process, the Israeli side got only a few serious steps —recognition of PLO and limited autonomy in Gaza and West Bank— to reach peace agreements; Palestinian refugees, Palestinian statehood, settlements in occupied territories were off the peace table.

Moreover, the Oslo accords was the reflection of the underwritten Western-based new security doctrine (Rynhold, 2007, p. 423). These changes were approved by the Declaration of Principles (1993), and in 1994 Paris agreement added an economic zone to new relations. Cairo Agreement (1994) and Oslo II agreement (1995) provided institutionalization of the peace by security cooperation (Ibid.). However, it did not end up as expected by Western countries. Despite the comprehensive support from the United States, conflict and violence never ended. Structural changes coerced Israel to launch the peace talks with the PLO, yet her foreign policy never shifted but was stabilized by the

Oslo Agreements. To do so, norms, as well as identities, remained a means of legitimizing conflict or peace to persuade domestic societal actors.

Besides, changes in identity or the cultural shifts at the international level and the unit-level could be effective for the short-term. For instance, according to constructivists, Rabin's assassination caused another turmoil at Israeli foreign policy after which right-wing parties came into power until Camp David II (2000). Constructivists again failed to indicate the actual reason for the collapse. In the first place, it was clear that Israel or the Western country's decisions were based on their relative gains. When the Israeli repaired her economy and got rid of the Palestinian intifada influence on international actors and Palestinians, she suddenly left the peace talks.

Consequently, constructivism can be helpful at the post-agreement period in order to change the social attitude of the rivals and to end their hostility by which peace agreement is likely to be permanent. A peaceful settlement must be in both local (i.e., democracies, social elites) and political institutions with regional and comprehensive bilateral security as well as economic change. Under these circumstances, communities of former rivals will resolve their grievances and overcome their hostility (Ripsman, 2016, p. 26). Therefore, they will continue to face robust incentives for peace.

### ***2.1.3. Theoretical Debates on Peacemaking “Top-down Approaches”***

Top-down approaches view the international system as the main determiner of the state's behavior, so if there is an attempt to prevent conflict by the peacemaking, we must look at the balance-of-power in international structure (Morgenthau, 1948; Waltz, 1979). Instead of bottom-up theories, realists perceive the international system in an anarchical way, so making peace is not the preferable solution. For the realists, states aim to ensure peace as long as they have mutual security concerns or interests that are required by the international system order (Waltz, 1979). In contrast, the Oslo peace process contribute to the development of a spiral of insecurity rather than mutual trust (Rynhold, 2008).

Defensive realists consider that the states cannot afford a huge amount of security expenditures because they can lose their self-sufficiency (Ripsman, 2005). Therefore,

Stephen Walt assumes that sometimes states must balance threat –balance-of-threat theory– (Walt, 1987) by finding new allies that were only possible with the peace agreement. This dynamic can only be functional when one of its competitors faces a greater threat that forces it to end the dispute, even at the expense of unsatisfactory concessions, to allow it to concentrate its strategic resources on a more urgent matter (Ripsman, 2016, p. 26).

According to neorealists, states can be compelled to make peace by the more threatening rivals or great powers to balance the enemy (Waltz, 1979). In 1987 the intifada commenced in Gaza and spread to the West Bank yet did not suddenly produce the peace initiatives. Nevertheless, at the end of the 1991 Gulf War and the Cold War, the crisis at the systemic level created a shift in the balance of power that accounted for the breakthroughs in the Arab-Israeli peace process in the 1990s (Rynhold, 2007, p. 424). International events and the US coercions on Israel led the peace innovations in the Middle East, such as; Camp David Agreement (1977) between Egypt and Israel, Madrid Conferences (1991) between Israel, and Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. In this respect, a three-level security-oriented unit-level and international events can be taken into account in the Oslo peace process by applying balance-of-threat theory (Walt, 1987).

First, the intifada, which was a non-violent uprising against the Israel oppression in the occupied territories, was the reaction to the war fines, taxes, and imprisonment of the Palestinian politicians (Awad and Hubers, 1993). With the intifada Israeli economy and power eroded, thus Israelis increasingly fatigued from the ongoing conflict. As a result, the rebellion led to key figures in Israeli politics, such as Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, and through their attempts, track-two diplomacy commenced with the PLO at the end of 1991. Neorealists may assume that intra-state or inter-state conflicts pose serious threats to the existence of Israel in the occupied territories and that Israel is attempting to counterbalance against Syria by engaging with Palestinians.

Second, the radical threats from Middle Eastern countries, particularly Iran and Iraq, forced Israel to compromise with Palestinians. For instance, in 1991, Iraq used the Palestinian question as an excuse to attack Israel; the revitalization of the peace process would reduce the likelihood of this happening again (Waxman, 2009). Saddam Hussein

funded the PLO to reduce Israel's influence over the Middle East that was also the reason why Yasser Arafat supported Saddam's Kuwait occupation in 1991 (Abdulla, 1994). Furthermore, Hezbollah and Iran shared the Shiite identity that created another enemy for Israel in the region. Hence, Israel's had no choice but to negotiate with the Palestine authorities to balance the radical states and improve her security against asymmetrical threats.

Third, with the end of the Cold War, Israel's presence as a security guard of the US interest in the Middle East was questioned by the US elites because there was no rival to challenge US supremacy (Dyson, 2015, pp. 46-65). As Mearsheimer notes that the genuine causes of war and peace were entrenched in the distribution and quality of the military power, so the international anarchy engendering the military power, all states must be able to provide their own survival and security (Mearsheimer, 2001a). Without the US comprehensive assistance, Israel might not be able to provide her survival and security. Therefore, the US compelled simply Israel to the peace table, and Israel gave consent for her sake.

However, neither the balance-of-power theory nor the balance-of-threat theory suitably explains how peace can be achieved and what the strategy of peace-making is (Ripsman, 2016). Both approaches imply that there is a time for regional peace to mature when enemy states face a common foreign threat. For Waltz, peace is just the way to provide security and to prevent threats which can affect states' survival (Waltz, 2000). Therefore, for the defensive neorealists, Israel attended the Oslo Peace Agreement to reduce radical groups' influence in the occupied territories such as, Hamas with Muslim Brothers back-up and Iran-backed Hezbollah.

On the other hand, according to offensive neorealism, the relative power of the states also matters (Coetzee and Hudson, 2012), and peace derives from an international concentration of power rather than a balance of power (Ripsman, 2016, p. 27). Therefore, Israel's relative power was not equivalent to Palestinians, so making-peace was not preferable solution for the Israeli. However, for the hegemonic or dominant approaches, states likewise as Israel must bandwagon the hegemon orders to utilize from its power. In this regard, Israeli-Palestinian peace process was supposed to be failed due to US's weak support for the peace process. Yet, the Oslo Accords lasted for three years without

hegemon's extensive participation. As mentioned above, the second and third variables were also valid for the offensive realists.

The hegemon or the dominant state may push the regional rivals to the peace talks in order to secure its interests and stabilize the region (Mearsheimer, 2001b). To do so, it might increase the costs of defection and reduce the risks of cooperation for other states. The hegemon can also gain economic and security concessions from the confronting sides by moderating the peace talks. Hence, establishing Israeli and Palestinian dependency also will help hegemon to consolidate its superiority over the region. Nevertheless, in the post-cold war era, the US's interests were not related to Palestine-Israel conflicts because, at the time, there was no country to challenge her superiority in the region. To this end, the study must be examined the ideas of the political elites and the internal pressures on the leaders, yet neorealists do not take these variables into accounts. In contrast, neoclassical realists assume that systemic pressures must be considered through intervening variables at the unit level (Rose, 1998, p. 146). Even at peace-making, internal factors may play an effective role. Thus, neorealist theories are limited to furnish a clear explanation for the peace innovations or peace failures.

To sum up, the neorealist approach is essential to understand the circumstances under which rivals' have launched the peace talks in Oslo (Ripsman, 2005). In addition, how international conditions produce an opportunity to end a hundred years of conflict between Israel and Palestine. However, neorealism is limited because it only explores systemic level variables that cannot provide an adequate description of the Oslo failure. In order to explain the downfall of the peace process, this study must be elaborated on the unit-level variables. For instance, how did Israeli and Palestinian peoples perceive the peace process? Did the hegemon's support come out as it should always be, despite the internal reactions?

Moreover, this work should be examined in the Zionist doctrine, to investigate Israel's ideas about peace or conflict. Therefore, it is also necessary to evaluate the radical and fundamentalist parties' approaches to peace. These variables may be explained by the bottom-up theories but should be considered as a secondary source because of foreign policy decisions taken by the political elites regarding the state's relative power and the



international system pressures on the states. As a result, the peace processes require explicit observation that is only possible in neoclassical realism. While changes in the realm of international politics might help explain Israel's orientation to the peace, it cannot account for the profound scope of failure. In this regard, we must look at the impact of the domestic variables.

## ***2.2. Adaptation of Neoclassical Realist Theory to the Oslo Agreements***

Neoclassical realists note that the foreign policy behavior of the states stem from their place in the international structure, and all states behave in accordance with their relative powers (Rose, 1998). States are unitary actors in international politics. In order to explain the Oslo Peace process, Palestine is defined as a failed state. Tyagi supposes that the failed states are deemed to be dysfunctional, and the government is characterized by a total lack of international legitimacy (Tyagi, 2012, p. 1). Following signing the Declaration of Principles (1993), the study is classified Palestine as a weak state which is insufficient to fulfill its core functions of providing security to its citizens (security gap), providing basic services to its citizens (capacity gap), and having monopoly of legitimate violence among its people (legitimacy gap).

Historically, after 1948, Palestine became a de jure part of Egypt and Jordan. West Bank was part of Jordan, while the Gaza Strip was part of Egypt. However, with the establishment of the PLO (1964), the fragmented Palestinian territories became politically a semi-autonomous under PLO administration but were only approved by the Arab League. Moreover, the Six-Day War (1967) altered the status quo, and Israeli administration was spread all over historical Palestine. To this extent, between 1967 and 1993, in this work Palestine is treated as a failed state that existed under the Israel occupation. During the Oslo accords, apart from the Arab states, the Palestinian nationalist movement and Israel were the central protagonists, and other countries –the US, the Norwegians, and so on– were supporting players (Khoury, 2005). Hence, during and after the Oslo accords, the Palestinian Authority is identified as a weak state actor because of its Palestinian semi-autonomy in the occupied territories and its limited legitimacy among international actors.

According to neorealist approach, shifts in the external balance of power bring about changes in foreign policy behavior of the states. Therefore, this study must be examined by the international system order in the post-cold war era in order to understand the Israel's and Palestine's peace incentives. Indeed, when this study is adopted 'new world order' to the Oslo peace process, Israel is expected to be under severe coercion to bandwagon with the US. In essence, the bandwagoning was the only way for Israel to deter radical threats from Iraq and Iran, and the forces they backed. To these extents, the conflict-resolution was a prerequisite for US military assistance to satisfy Israel's security concerns.

In this regard, by recognizing PLO and Palestinian reality, Israel planned to balance external threats that came from the radical states because she was dependent on the assistance of hegemonic power. Hence, this work can be applied the balance-of-threat theory to analyze Israeli foreign policy behavior by adding Israeli decision-makers' and political elites thinking of international politics. Theoretically, dominant states are identified as promoters of the peace-making process, mainly motivated by self-interests in order to maximize their profit by providing stability and maximize their power over the rivals. While states lacking security are expected to construct alliances with a more vigorous states to sustain its survival against the foreigner states. Therefore, systemic pressures enforced Israeli to innovate peace talks with Palestinians.

On the other hand, Palestinian national movements—especially Yasser Arafat—were losing its popularity among the Arab League members because of its meaningless support for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The intifada created the opportunity for the PLO to coerce Israel to the peace table, yet its insufficient support for the Iraq invasion created a reaction from the stronger states. Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon were bandwagoning the US, so these countries also forced PLO to the peace table. Until 1993, the PLO recognized two-state solutions but did not formally recognize Israel unless she withdrew from the occupied territories. However, Arab states coerced PLO to recognize Israeli state unconditionally.

For the neorealists, non-self-sufficient states need external support, which is possible only with the balance of power (Waltz, 1979). Hence, due to external threats, both states—Israel and Palestine—cannot survive without a more powerful state's assistance. For the PLO, as a failed state must bandwagon with the US and Arab League order to get its

sovereignty. Therefore, the PLO might be expected to pursue a more conciliatory approach with Israel, the US, and the Arab League. In doing so, the PLO can build economic and political advantages for Palestinians and at the same time, achieve strategic and territorial goals. These may also apply to Israel's interests and security concerns. Besides, Israel can ally with the Arab states, which are afraid of radical states such as Jordan, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon.

Nevertheless, discerning of the deadlock and failure lies under the domestic motivations of the states. The Israeli-Palestinian peace processes did not end in the way that neo-realists had expected, so failure might be observed through the neoclassical realist theory. As Rathbun defends that "Neoclassical realism begins with the premise that ideal state behavior is that which conforms with the unitary actor and objectivity premises of neorealism but shows that when these conditions are not met empirically, domestic politics and ideas are the culprits. Neoclassical realism is not known by what it incorporates but rather where it begins." (Rathbun, 2008, p. 312).

Although being influenced by systematic pressures at the beginning of peace talks, the Israeli side responses to these forces were not fully determined by the international structures. Instead of balancing the threats, the Israeli camp challenged the systemic coercions because of the internal motivations – political parties, public, etc.– were not convinced by the decision-makers. While once Rabin's assassination removed a most able Israeli leader to midwife a deal, it would have taken real political leadership on the Palestinian side to see things through, and Arafat failed the test. Therefore, foreign policy behavior can be adequately explained as a result of the state's interactions between the international level which is primarily and its internal motivations as an intervening variable.

In this study, the theoretical framework of neoclassical theory is adopted. International changes, as well as its pressures on the states, are our independent variables, and Israel's foreign policy behavior and Palestine National Authority's incentives are our dependent variable. The first intervening variable of this study is Israeli and Palestinian leadership perceptions about international relations concerning the Oslo Peace Agreement. The second intervening variables are domestic constraints that are considered to be identical

and ideational made up by the opposition parties such as; Likud party and Hamas. To this extent, second variable exhibits how these parties were influential on the public sphere to the peace talks. The third and last intervening variables are the Israeli-Palestinian public opinion and their interests and motives, which can be efficient on the decision makers – leaders, political parties, interest groups, etc.– incentives to utilize from the peace or to reject the formation of the peace.

If liberal or constructivist theories were adequate to explain the foreign policy behavior of states, the Israeli and Palestinian peace processes would succeed to end a hundred-year conflict. These theories are restricted because their understanding of foreign policy is based on social groups and ideational variables. In fact, in order to explain the foreign policy behavior of states, we need a specific correlation between ideas and systemic pressures. Thus, both external and internal variables must be incorporated into the analysis of the foreign policy behavior in the extent of the Oslo peace process.

Moreover, democratic peace theorists suppose that spreading liberal values and shared political norms will create a bulwark against the conflict and war, and consequently, these states will behave peacefully (Doyle, 1986). On the contrary, structural neorealists argue that liberal states will behave in the same way as illiberal states because they are compelled to follow anarchic international order to survive (Waltz, 1979). Ripsman asserts that “Indeed, anecdotal evidence would suggest that some democracies can, at times, act with considerable autonomy in the international arena.” (Ripsman, 2003, p.5) both theories stand in a practically impossible way.

Therefore, the Oslo Agreements can be explained by neither democratic peace theories nor structural realism because their expectations set down on the state’s regime typed or to comply with the systemic pressures. Both approaches do not explicitly answer the question that what if states follow different paths rather than the democratic peace theorists or structural realists assumed. To this extent, neoclassical realists assert that in order to explain the peace process, in the beginning, we must look at the international system, and its pressure on the states (Ripsman, 2016; Coetzee and Hudson, 2012). After that, when peace talks begin to mature as an intervening variable, we must look at the internal motivations that will help us predict whether peace talks will succeed.

To sum up, the failure of the Oslo Peace Agreement can only be demonstrated by acknowledging that internal and external dynamics are linked. Therefore, this study adopts the neoclassical realist theoretical framework. To do so, the first, I try to link the actor's behavior to their relative power positions, with some mediating factors established. The second, I deal with the structural imbalances between Israel and Palestine. The third, historical background of the conflict in the extent of societal elites' perceptions and possibilities to build peace. The last, I observe that why structural and innenpolitik conditions did not allow peace to materialize\*.

### **2.3. Methodology**

The case study method has been used in this study because it is well suited for answering research questions appropriately and adequately. The strength of the case study methodology enables the in-depth empirically observation of the phenomenon, the direct observation of events and the analysis of unit as well as system-level variables, using various evidence and opinions obtained from the books and articles related to them (Yin, 2003).

The study is both descriptive and explanatory in nature. The first, descriptive research design is concerned with the aspects of what has happened, what is going on, or what exists, and with the characteristics of how something behaves (Halperin and Heath, 2016). Moreover, the descriptive design is useful for observing the cause of the Oslo Peace process failure at historical, international, and internal levels. Hence, this work adopted the descriptive research design that used to test the proposed conceptual framework of the research in order to describe the ongoing violence between Israel and Palestine according to their relative powers and unit-level incentives.

The second, the explanatory research design identifies the outcome to be explained (dependent variable) and the factors (independent variables) considered to be associated

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\* I would like to thank Gideon Rose for his comments about my thesis. On 1 July 2019, Rose assisted me to get useful insight for my questions about the Oslo peace process. Therefore, in this paragraph, I was inspired by Gideon Rose's suggestions.

with it, and then shows what kind of correlation there is between them (Ibid.). Indeed, neoclassical realist theory necessarily requires such a variable. By doing this, firstly, this study explores the relative power of both Israel and Palestine and the pressures of the international system as its independent variables. Secondly, the study explains unit-level motivations and limitations as intervening variables in order to define internal pressures on the decision-makers. Finally, the dependent variable of this study is the failure of the Oslo peace agreements due to Israel and Palestine's response to structural and non-structural variables. The conceptual framework containing the relevant variables is also proposed through explanatory research design.

Document analysis and observations are the primary data collection techniques for the study. Primary and secondary data sources include journals, books, interviews which are provided by academics who studied the Middle East and international relations theories that pertained to the study. Document analysis is a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating document material on the purpose of political or social phenomena. Similarly, other analytical methods in qualitative research, document analysis requires examination and interpretation of data to gain understanding, and develop empirical knowledge (Merriam, 2002). These documents were collected without the researcher's invention and allowed to address the causes of the break down.

Moreover, observation is a method of data collection in which researchers observe within a specific research field (Jones et al., 2006). It is referred to as an unobtrusive method rarely (Ibid.). From this perspective, this study observation method lies under the Oslo Accords through the diplomatic elites, political leaders, and third parties' interviews, documentaries, and autobiographies. In doing so, the purpose of this study is to dispatch what effects pushed Israeli and Palestinian decision-makers into the peace table. Then, this study explores the systemic and unit-level variables on behalf of the Palestinian-Israeli peace processes.

In order to analyze the Oslo peace process failure, the first the study claims how Palestinian and Israeli hostility occurred regarding both states' historical backgrounds. Observing historical hostility between two societies encouraged me to be aware of the present and future contingencies to end the conflict and disclose the precise restrictions in

the Oslo Accords. To do so, this study benefited from the history books or journals of various academics and thus adopted these books and journals into this work to interpret hostility between those societies.

The second, by revealing the merits and weaknesses of the other international relations theories, the study attempted to assert why it selected neoclassical realism. Therefore, it criticized constructivist, liberal, classical realists, offensive neorealist, and defensive neorealists in the extent of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations in the Oslo by utilizing primary and secondary data sources. Moreover, using primary and secondary sources, the work analyzed the neoclassical realist assumptions through the international system, the relative power of states, and internal constraints. Subsequently, I reviewed the neoclassical realist-based peace approaches and strived to adapt the theory to the Oslo Accords.

In conclusion, the work sought to elaborate on the Oslo Accords by neoclassical realist framework, which is the outgrowth of the old-school —theory affected by classical realism and neorealism— realism (Rathbun, 2008). In this respect, the study analyzed all variables externally and internally through the Oslo Accords. To this extent, the study investigated the post-cold war international structure and its pressures on the states. Afterward, by elaborating Israel and Palestine relative powers' and their domestic motivations, the work endeavored to bring complete explanation for the failure. In the conclusion section, the study presented the causes and findings of collapse as well as future readings.

## CHAPTER 3. COMMENCEMENT OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ARABS AND THE ZIONISTS OVER PALESTINE

### *3.1. Historical Background*

Any attempt to understand the Palestinian-Israeli peace process lies under the legacy of the Arab-Israeli conflict of which started in the 1880s. Arab-Jewish friction and conflict began in the early 1880s when the first wave of Jewish immigrant —First ‘Aliya<sup>2</sup> (ascent)—came into Palestine between 1882 and 1903 some thirty thousand Jewish settlers, who escaped from the Eastern Europe discriminative and ethnic violence (Morris, 2008). These “Zionist” —Zion, one of Jerusalem hills, was, by extension, a biblical title for Jerusalem, and, by territorial distance, a name for the state of Israel—, were shaped by the old messianic dream (Harms and Ferry, 2017).

According to the number of academics who were called ‘new historians’<sup>3</sup>, first Jewish<sup>4</sup> settlers came into Palestine in the 1880s during which Palestine was under the Ottoman rule. Before that time there was no record of the Jewish communities in Palestine (Doumani, 1992, p. 6). Moreover, the Hebrew; Le-hithanel or Le-hityashev —the land was promised— has been used for the Palestine territory ever since 1882 by the Zionists<sup>5</sup> and later state of Israel. The Zionist movement was a pioneer to find that location for the Jews and this place was cited from the Bible. The idea of Holy Land —located in Jerusalem— actually belongs to the Christians (Pappé and Chomsky, 2015, pp. 21-23).

On the other hand, according to pro-Israeli academics, there were 25.000 Jewish indigenous before the 1880s (Gilbert, 2005, p. 3). Jewish community lived in Jerusalem

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<sup>2</sup> The first wave of Zionist immigrants who came into the Palestine territory between 1882 and 1903. Estimated some 30.000 Jewish settlers immigrated to Palestine.

<sup>3</sup> In 1980’s, the Israeli scholar Benny Morris coined the term "new historians" to describe a handful of young Israeli writers who were recasting the standard Zionist narrative and known as Ilan Pappé, Avi Shlaim as well as Benny Morris (Shlaim, 1995, pp. 288-290).

<sup>4</sup> When I use the term of Jewish, I just mention group of people who share same religion.

<sup>5</sup> When I use the term of Zionist, I mention the people who came together for a common purpose which means creating Jewish state.



for more than two thousand hundred years. Also, the idea of Israel did not necessarily come by the Zionists, this place —promised land— was sacred for the Jewish over than an ages (Ferry, 2012). In fact, under the Roman Empire rule, Jews were displaced from Jerusalem, yet at the extension of the historical records, few details proved Jewish existence in Palestine before the 1880s. However, the Jewish name “Eretz-Israel” appears in the Bible (I Samuel 13:19), while the name of Palestine derived from the Roman Empire, in which called the area with the name of Pleshet (Palasta in Roman usage) and gained wide currency from the second century CE (Biger, 2008).

To be sure, in the first place, the Zionist's claim regarding Jewish existence in the historical Palestine territory was unclear and mostly based on their religious beliefs. In this regard, Theodor Herzl's book, which was *The Jewish State —Der Judenstaat* (1896)—, played a crucial role in enabling the rise of the nation-based Zionist identity, and controversial-historical existence of the Jewish in historical Palestine (Mattar, 2004, pp. 1119-1121). Theodor Herzl, an Austria-Hungarian origin Jewish, was the leader of the Zionist movements. He knew no Hebrew, Yiddish, Russian, or Polish and had no contact with the poor masses of Eastern Europe (Pappé, 2006, p. 124), and thus his capability was restricted by the Christian mind. As a result, the Bible guided him to find a place for the Jews who suffered from European racism and discrimination.

Besides, the influx of the Zionists triggered the Arab national consciousness. The first step was taken in Istanbul from 1891 on when the first wave of Jewish immigrants landed in Palestine. Second ‘Aliya<sup>6</sup> were more influential than ever, and thus Arab hostility against Zionism was inflamed by the second wave of Jewish immigrants, and Arab nationalism grew with the presence of the Zionists in Palestine. With the second wave of Jewish immigration, the Arab-Israeli conflict began, and the violence increased. By the outbreak of the First World War, temporarily, the conflict appeased due to the uncertainty and complexity of international circumstances (Morris, 2008). Nevertheless, the war also created an opportunity for both sides to claim their right to have Palestine and spurred Arab and Zionist nationalism.

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<sup>6</sup> From 1904 to 1914.

During October-December 1917, British forces took the Palestinian territory from the Ottoman Empire, which had controlled the area over than four hundred years. In order to appease Arab rebellions, Britain promised the Hashemite<sup>7</sup> family for sovereignty over the Arab-populated areas of the expiring Ottoman Empire, yet Palestine was not included. Instead of serving Palestine to the Arabs, the British pledged to give Palestine to Zionists (Segev, 2000). By doing so, she launched Balfour Declaration<sup>8</sup> on 2 November 1917 during which the British provided legitimacy for Zionists to declare an independent state in Palestine and was one of the most important documents of this promise. Moreover, three months later Balfour said that “*My personal hope is that the Jews will make good in Palestine and eventually found a Jewish State. It is up to them now; we have given them their opportunity.*” (Morris, 2001, p. 75).

In essence, there were also imperial concerns on this decision because the Zionists had no good relations with Arabs, so they needed the UK's power to preserve Jewish survival, while the British required the Zionists to protect Suez Canal<sup>9</sup>, and her interests in the Middle East. International stipulations compelled the British and the Zionists to become allies in order to balance Arab tribal as well as maintain the British status quo over the Arab lands. The interdependence of these states made the Arab states more vulnerable. Undoubtedly, Britain had ignored the existence of Palestinians and will of indigenous people. According to Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916), Palestine was supposed to become a separate state that was thought to be unrelated to its old capitals Damascus and Beirut, which was under the French control at the time (Pappé, 1993).

As a result of Sykes-Picot agreement, Palestinians realized that they had no future with their old capitals. Therefore, the Palestinian nationalism rooted in 1920s by the disintegration of the old capitals in the Middle East. In addition, the escalation in violence

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<sup>7</sup> Ruling family of the Najd region of Saudi Arabia; became ruling families of Iraq (until 1958) and Jordan (Gelvin, 2005).

<sup>8</sup> Arthur James Balfour’s letter– “*His Majesty’s Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish People and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country*”–was to be considered by the Zionist movement (Schneer, 2017).

<sup>9</sup> The Suez Canal is a sea-level waterway in Egypt, connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea through the Isthmus.

led to a more polarized enmity between Palestinians and Zionists. They commenced to attack each other by knives, and the target of those attacks were civilians. Moreover, in these massacres, Haganah Organization played an active role (1921-1948), which was considered to be a Jewish paramilitary organization in the British Mandate of Palestine and later became Israel Defense Forces. The organization was created by the retired soldiers who fought with the British in World War I. Hence, Britain provided weapons to Haganah and gave them autonomy in the historical Palestine (Pappé, 2006).

In contrast, Palestinian families, who were also the cause of this violence, known as *Khatibs, Khalidis, Husseinis, Nashashibis, Nusseibehs, and Budeiris* families. Throughout the Mandate years, Husseinis and Nashashibis families were the pioneer of the conflict (Morris, 2008, pp. 12-13). Other side of the coin, Husseinis and Nashashibis were also blamed to sell Arab lands to the Zionists by the British mediations. To these extents, Jewish landholding increased between 1920 and 1947 from about 456,000 dunams<sup>10</sup> to about 1.4 million dunams, and even their population more than doubled by the uncountable wave of Jewish immigrants (Morris, 2008, pp. 14-15). Both communities increased their material power capabilities during the mandate years. However, the Zionists utilized from the British much more than Palestinians did. Indeed, without the British assistances to the Zionists, the 1948 war would have not been possible because all waves of immigrants and weapons were provided by the UK.

Meanwhile, the British realized that giving all Palestine territory to the Zionists was not feasible because Palestinian families strongly resisted the idea. Henceforth, on July 7<sup>th</sup>, 1937 the commission published a 404-page report<sup>11</sup> known as Peel Commission Plan, that was the first partition plan came into the British agenda, yet it was never implemented (Peel, 1937). The idea of two-state solution was contributed by the British. Between 1937-1947, the Zionists accepted the partition plan because the deal was supposed to distinct Palestinian territory in the favor of Zionists. Whereas, Arabs rejected the deal because

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<sup>10</sup> A measure of land area used in parts of the former Turkish empire, including Israel (where it is equal to about 900 square meters).

<sup>11</sup> The report admitted that the mandate was unworkable because Jewish and Arab objectives in Palestine were incompatible, and it proposed that Palestine be partitioned into three zones: An Arab state, a Jewish state, and a neutral territory containing the holy places (Peel, 1937).

their population was two times higher than Jews, but their promising part was even smaller than the Jewish part. In contrast, some sources disclose that the Zionists demand encompassed all Palestine under the Holy Land strategy, which mostly associated with the land of Canaan<sup>12</sup>. Thus, the rejection not only arose from the Arabs; Zionists also opposed the partition plan (Pappé, 2006). Both sides shared the idea of expulsion to others, and they did not want to live under one roof. On this account, the two-state solution was only feasible conflict-resolution for the rivals.

From September 1938 —Munich crisis<sup>13</sup>— onward, Britain came to view its Palestine policy exclusively as important in the terms of its security and interests. Under the circumstances of the upcoming global crisis, in 1939 by the Peel's recommendation, British promised statehood to Palestinians in order retain Arabs in her side, but it was not implemented due to the Zionists' rejection of the plan (Maoz, 2013, p. 6). During World War II, the World Zionist Organization stepped up efforts to save European Jews, so the war significantly accelerated the march toward Jewish statehood (Morris, 2009, p. 105). The fact that these immigrants were illegal according to mandate rules. Nonetheless, British Prime Minister Churchill thought that during WW2 the Zionists were more useful than the Muslims because the Muslims were sympathizing to the Nazis<sup>14</sup>. Strategically, Britain helped the Zionists to deter the potential German-Palestinian alliance.

To sum up, Jews boosted enormous power, and even more than the British expected. Thus, when they decided to establish statehood, the Zionist were capable to get rid of Arabs as well as the British. In January 1947, the British strove to impose peace agreements between Arabs and Zionists for the last time, but the Zionists boycotted the talks (Pappé, 1993, p. 22). Eventually, Britain comprehended that there was no mutual solution between Arabs and Zionists. While, Britain's imperial policy and the conflict of Arab-Zionist diminished the British economy. As a consequences, Britain left these groups to their fate

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<sup>12</sup> Today includes Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan and Syria, and the southern parts of Lebanon.

<sup>13</sup> The Munich Crisis was one of the many waypoints along the road to World War II. This Crisis began when Nazi Germany demanded the annexation of the Sudetenland, the Czech territory bordering Germany.

<sup>14</sup> American consulate in Jerusalem, in February 1941 found that 88 percent of the Palestinian Arabs favored Germany and only 9 percent Britain (Morris, 2008, p. 21).

in order to protect her interests through the region. After the British abandoned her mandate in Palestine, the war between Arabs and the Zionists became inevitable.

### ***3.1.1. El-Nakba (Catastrophic Event) 1948 and the Declaration of the State of Israel***

At the end of World War II, Zionists were supported by the Soviet Union and the USA, mostly. These powers supported Zionists in order to get the more modern and powerful partner in the Middle East. For the Soviet Union, the Jewish state was a way out to get rid of the Jews. Whereas, the US craved to establish a more moderate state that shared the same liberal values with her. Indeed, the Zionists were far more advanced politically and militarily than the Arab states because of their old associations with the European countries. Moreover, Holocaust was another reason for international support, and it accelerated the formation of a Jewish state (Gilbert, 2005).

Above all, before the 1940s, the British realized that there was no escape from an independent Jewish state in Palestine. However, her partition plans were never recognized by the Zionist or Arabs. Wherefore, the new-established international organization, the United Nations, took responsibility for the partition. At the time, the First Truce (11 June 1948) recommended by the UN, yet Zionists or Arabs did not show any interest in these recommendations. Both sides were ready to fight, but Arabs were unaware of the circumstances that were in favor of the developed Israeli army. Meanwhile, the Zionists desired a more substantial piece of land that comprises Jerusalem because they were consciousness about material supremacy of the Jews in the Palestinian land. Consequently, El-Nakba (1948) became inevitable (Kumaraswamy, 2006, pp. xvii).

At midnight on 14<sup>th</sup> May 1948, the British mandate over Palestine expired, and in the following days, the state of Israel was created. As a response, the Arab League<sup>15</sup> decided to destroy the new-born state of Israel by the regular armies of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon,

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<sup>15</sup> The League of Arab States, or Arab League, was founded in Cairo on 22 March 1945 with six members: Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan —later Jordan in 1949—, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. It is a voluntary association of countries whose peoples are mainly Arabic speaking or where Arabic is an official language. It has 22 members including Palestine, which the League regards as an independent state (Mattar, 2004, pp. 154-155).

Iraq, and Transjordan. The clash between the Arab Legion and Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) broke out, and the war mainly occurred outside the Israeli territory due to Israel's advanced military power. As mentioned above, Arab states were qualitatively more robust, but Israel, which had developed military technology, was sufficient to defeat Arab armies. In this regard, the war allowed Israel to expand her status quo throughout the historical Palestine territory (Shlaim, 1987).

Britain then took the lead calling for a cease-fire by May 29<sup>th</sup>. In the following days, the UN's proportions for the peace —First Truce— was brought into the table by the British on 11 June 1948, but again it was ignored. Therefore, Britain imposed an embargo on the supply of military material on both sides. Nevertheless, Zionist imported its military equipment from Czechoslovakia and other Eastern European countries as well as the United States. While, Arab states had suffered from the sanctions because Britain was the only country that supplied military equipment to the Arab states. Undoubtedly, the Zionists benefitted from the embargo by the European states' material assistance. Now, the circumstances of the war were in favor of Zionists (Ilan, 1989).

On 8-18 July, the second round of the fighting, which was led by Egypt, launched. Arab participants of the war suffered and lost more territory to Israel (Shlaim, 1987). Eventually, the war improved Israel's position immeasurably compared to Arab states. The truce was re-established by the UN security council on 18 July (Ibid.). The battle did not cease until 7 January 1949, when the UN-decreed cease-fire went into effect, marking the formal end of the Arab-Israeli war (Pappé, 1993).

To sum up, the El-Nakba —catastrophic event— occurred by the creation of Israel. More than 750,000 Palestinian Arabs —about half of prewar Palestine's Arab population— were expelled by the Zionists (Shlaim, 1995, pp. 295-296). Between 400 and 600 Palestinian villages were terminated during the war; indeed, the Palestinian metropolitans was almost entirely extinguished. The precise number of refugees settled in refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. At the end of the war, Arab Leaders attempted to reach a peace settlement with Israel. However, David Ben-Gurion, who was the primary national founder of the State of Israel, considered the price for peace was tremendous. According to the UN partition plan, peace required the right of return and withdrawal from the land

that Israeli occupied, but Ben-Gurion desired to protect the current status quo rather than granting concessions on refugees or definitive borders (Ibid.; pp. 300-301). As a result, the Arab-Israeli conflict, which was about to explode over and over again due to Zionists' interest in Palestine, became one of the endless conflict.

### ***3.1.2. 1956 Arab – Israel War and The Rise of the Egypt***

In 1949, the Arab states and Israel in conflict recognize the general armistice lines (GAA's) by which Israeli extended her territory and Arab states invaded the rest of Palestinian territories. To these extents, the existence of Palestinian land disappeared by Israel, Jordan, as well as Egypt's invasions, and it became the part of invader's lands. From 1949 to 1956, the conflict between Arabs and Israeli did not cease, but the degree of the conflict decreased. Further, the conflict was restricted to reprisals and raids. Hence, any peace effort did not succeed between conflictual sides, yet de facto ceasefire pursued among rivals until 1956 during which second Arab-Israeli war ensued (Eisenberg and Caplan, 2010, pp. 13-17).

Remarkably, in 1952, the King of Egypt Farouk was overthrown by the military coup as a consequence of growing anti-British roots in the Egyptian Army. The coup headed by Muhammad Naguib and Gamal Abdul Nasser, whom seized the king's power and declared the republic regime (Mattar, 2004, pp. 518-519). Between 1952-1954, Egypt administrated by Naguib, but due to his weaknesses to expulse British influence on the Egypt territory, he was deposed and placed under house detention. Consequently, in 1954, lieutenant colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser Hussein became president of Egypt. In the first years of his presidency, Nasser maintained a good relationship with Israel. However, when Nasser took nationalist reform and strived to nationalize Suez Canal<sup>16</sup> in order to fund the Aswan dam project, the idea was disaffirmed by Britain, France, and Israel (Crabbs, 1975).

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<sup>16</sup> “Suez Canal, Arabic Qanāt al-Suways, sea-level waterway running north-south across the Isthmus of Suez in Egypt to connect the Mediterranean and the Red seas. The canal separates the African continent from Asia, and it provides the shortest maritime route between Europe and the lands lying around the Indian and Western Pacific oceans” (Fisher and Smith, 2019).

With the British and French comprehensive support, Israel prepared for another war to protect her own interests. To be sure, the nationalization of the Suez Canal would provide economic independence to Egypt, which could maximize her material capability and threaten Israel's security. Furthermore, Britain and France were also against the nationalization of the Suez Canal because of their interests through Southern Asia. Strategically, two-third of the oil that Western Europe consumed passed through the Suez Canal; wherefore, Britain and France did not agree with Egypt's full autonomy over the canal. As a result, the war commenced by the Israel invasion of the Sinai Peninsula, on 29 October 1956. Surprisingly, the war was protested by the US as well as the Soviet Union (Yaqup, 2003).

The fact that the US considered that Britain and France acted regarding their colonial interests, so she rejected Israel's invasion of Egyptian land. While USSR endeavored to hold her only potential socialist ally in the Arabian Peninsula, and to expand her influence in the Middle East. By the US and USSR pressures, the UN, which sent troops to Egyptian-Israeli borders, took weighty steps. In sum, Israel withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula as well as Gaza Strip due to US's economic threats (Freedman, 2000, pp. 18-19). Meanwhile, Egypt, which gained a first diplomatic victory against Israel, became the hegemon of the Arab states. By the Egyptian triumph, Palestinian cause also found the opportunity to flourish, henceforward their own political organization established by Nasser's initiatives.

### ***3.1.3. Palestine Liberation Organization***

In 1964, the League of Arab states chartered the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) with the purpose of the 'Liberation of Palestine' through armed struggle (Hamid, 1975, p. 96). Ahmad Shuqayri was appointed as a chairman of the PLO by Nasser's extensive support. The organization included of variety of Palestinian splinter groups<sup>17</sup> that associated with secular and socialist worldview, and it supported the socialist-

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<sup>17</sup> The Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), the Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Palestine, The Palestine National Liberation Movement (Fateh), the Bloc of Palestinian Commandos, The Arab Front for the Liberation of Palestine; and The Nationalist Front for Liberation (Hamid, 1975, p.95).



revolutionary independence of the Palestinian people. In the beginning, the PLO agenda was complex because it was neither Palestinian nationalist movement due to the Arab state's coercions nor Arab nationalist organization because of the separatist ideas of Palestinian factions. Therefore, the organization did not professionally organize under the Shuqayri leadership (Hamid, 1975).

Furthermore, since the establishment of the PLO, some leaders of the Palestinian movement were against Shuqayri; Yasser Arafat, founder of Fatah<sup>18</sup>, and George Habash, founder of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine<sup>19</sup>, because he was an Arab nationalist rather than a separated Palestinian nationalist. At the end of the Six-Day War, Shuqayri concluded its career. In July 1968, the Palestinian National Council –the umbrella group of PLO subgroups– convened, and Yasser Arafat’s Fatah party won major seats of the PNC— Palestinian National Council—. In 1969, Arafat became chairman of the PLO. Under Arafat’s administration, Palestinian nationalism was separated from Arab nationalism. The PLO only aimed at the liberation of the Palestinian people and the creation of a sovereign state (Sorenson, 2014).

#### ***3.1.4. 1967 Arab – Israeli War, the “Six-Day War” and the Shifts in Status Quo***

In order to comprehend the causes of the Six-Day War, it is essential to observe Suez War consequences for both Arab and Israeli. Under the US coercions, Israel withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip, as long as the UN peacekeepers would stand on both the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip, to avoid any Arab-Israeli conflict and at the same time to prevent guerrilla attacks from Gaza. Moreover, Israel received a significant concession in which Egypt abolished the blockade of Israeli ships and guaranteed free

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<sup>18</sup> The Fatah movement was established in Kuwait (1959) by a group of Palestinian refugees headed by Yasser Arafat against the backdrop of the growing disappointment with the traditional Palestinian leadership and the Arab states' lack of promotion of the Palestinian problem. The Fatah movement (Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini, Palestinian National Liberation Organization), is a Palestinian national movement that since the 1970's has been the dominant faction in the PLO (Rubin's, 2005).

<sup>19</sup> The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was formed as a resistance movement by the late George Habash after the occupation of the West Bank by Israel in 1967. Combining Arab nationalism with Marxist-Leninist ideology, the PFLP saw the destruction of Israel as integral to its struggle to remove Western capitalism from the Middle East.

passage from the Gulf of Aqaba to the Strait of Tiran. Nonetheless, the *Fedayeen*<sup>20</sup> attacks continued through the Gaza Strip. Eventually, these attacks led to growing tension between Israel and Egypt, because Israeli considered that the Egyptian government had tolerated or sponsored the Palestinian *Fedayeen*'s attacks (Bass, 2005).

On the other hand, at the end of 1963, Israel appeared to end for its five-year-long National Water Carrier<sup>21</sup> project. Together with this pipeline, Israeli found the opportunity to divert water from Lake Tiberias in the north to the Negev desert in the south. Meanwhile, Arab states especially, Syria and Lebanon, denounced the pipeline threat to their survival. Therefore, Arab leaders decided to take any action to stop the Israeli National Water Carrier project. The first step was establishing unified Arab armies to balance Israel's supremacy. Yet, Israeli intended to deter the Arab leader's strategies by having border clashes with Syria. To do so, at the end of 1964, Israel started to attack the Arab states' counter diversion sides in order to maintain her project (Gat, 2004).

The tension between Arabs and Israeli reached a peak on 7 April 1967 when 80 Israeli aircraft attacked several targets deep within Syria's air space while in the process shot down six Syrian MIG jets. In addition to that, on May 13, Israel mobilized some ten to thirteen brigades on the Syrian border to prevent guerrilla attacks (Quandt, 2001, p. 24). Tit for tat, on May 14, Nasser sent Egyptian troops back into the Sinai Peninsula. Furthermore, on May 22, Nasser blocked the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. Israel perceived the blockade as a *casus belli* because her only tangible gain in the Suez war was the opening of the strait to Israeli shipping. Without this privilege, Israel began to prepare for another war (Ibid., pp. 23-51).

Last of all, on 5 June 1967, the Israeli air force launched a surprise attack on Egypt's and Syria's airfields, signaling the beginning of the Six-Day War<sup>22</sup>. Within two hours, the

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<sup>20</sup> The Fedayeen are freedom fighters who believe in a single state based on the ideals of socialism, non-sectarianism, secularism, and democracy. Many were inspired by the similar guerrilla groups in Algeria, Vietnam and Latin America also fighting against colonialism or imperialism.

<sup>21</sup> In the 1960s, the Sea of Galilee became the starting point of the National Water Carrier, a canal that conveys water from the Jordan River to Israel's densely populated coastal region as well as south to the Negev desert (Gat, 2004, p 57).

<sup>22</sup> The Six-Day War was brief but bloody conflict fought on June 1967 between Israel and the Arab states of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan.

Egyptian and Syrian air forces were destroyed by the Israeli jets—French made mirage jets—. The losses of the Arab countries in the war were disastrous. Israel dismantled the Arab coalition and doubled the amount of Israel-controlled territory; Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, from Jordan and the Golan Heights from Syria (Kumaraswamy, 2006, p. xx). The war radically changed the status quo established in 1949. As a consequence of war, Arab states hesitated to support Palestinian cause in order to pursue their survival against Israel, and thus the conflict between Arab-Israeli became separated from Palestinian question (Handel, 1977).

### ***3.1.5. Black September; The Jordanian and Israeli Trust-Building***

As a result of El-Nakba, many Palestinians became refugees in the Arab states. Jordan was one of the main countries that constituted a large portion of Palestinian refugees. Besides, with the 1967 war, the number of Palestinian refugees increased, and there were many Palestinians demanding independence in the occupied areas. Following the Six-Day War, in order to establish Palestinian sovereignty, the Palestinian *Fedayeen*, which led by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), used Jordan as a base for launching attacks into the occupied territories. Relatively, Jordan had a weaker central authority compared to Syria and Egypt, and thus PLO felt free to act on behalf of the Jordanian government. However, King Hussein, several times attempted to appease and control the Palestinian people in order to prevent the attacks against Israel, but he did not succeed. In essence, after the 1967 war, all Arab states were anxious to trigger another bloody war against Israel. (Miller, 2008).

Between mid-1968 and the end of 1969, there were severe clashes between the Palestinian and Jordanian army (Karsh, 2003, p. 28). Arafat's desire for the statehood took place under the Jordanian government, and he behaved like the feudal lord by having no authority over his reign. Hashemite's regime was losing control over Jordan while Yasser Arafat, who was the PLO leader, seized the opportunity for operating a state within the state. By the growing number of Palestinians, Arafat found a magnificent opportunity to extend Palestinian autonomy inside Jordan (Karsh, 2003). Moreover, instead of Hussein's cleric

leadership of Jordan, Syria supported the PLO, which shared the same ideological identity with the Syrian Ba'athist regime.

Meanwhile, Israeli perceived that the PLO holding fragile *modus vivendi* with Jordan, yet she did not invade the Jordanian soil directly. Nevertheless, Israel exhibited her impatience to the *Fedayeen* and took several actions to cease. For instance, between 1969 and 1970, Israel several times attacked the East Ghor Canal that located in the Eastern side of the Jordan Valley (Rubinovitz, 2010, pp 689-670). All of a sudden, on 17 September 1970, King Hussein proclaimed martial law and ordered a military crackdown on the Palestinian militias, but this was not sufficient step to conciliate Palestinians. In fact, *Fedayeens* was supported by Syria, which sent 300 tanks to occupy Jordan and backed *Fedayeen*. In contrast, instead of the PLO governor, Israel would desire to live with her old Hashemite's ally. Therefore, in order to rescue Hashemite's leadership, Israel Air Force Phantom jets underscored threat by flying low over the Syrian forces, claiming that worse might come for if they did not withdraw from the territory of Jordan (Rubinovitz, 2011).

To sum up, Hussein felt more confident by the Israeli support, and he began to attack more forcefully to coerce Syrian from the Jordan. On September 23, Hashemite's again took decisive victory over the PLO and regained control of Jordan. Between 1970-1971, the civil war prompted the Jordan government to take severe actions that later resulted in the killing of 1.300 *Fedayeen* and 5.000 Palestinian civilians by Jordanian forces (Sayigh, 1987, p.45). Furthermore, Jordan resorted to systemic security harassment against the Palestinian refugees. Ultimately, thousands of Palestinians arrested, exiled, or killed by the Jordanian forces. Since then, the event has been dubbed Black September by Palestinians, and they saw Hashemite as the perpetrator of the massacre.

### ***3.1.6. Yom Kippur War and Implementation of Status Quo Ante***

On October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria were hoping to retrieve territory lost to Israel during the Six-Day War in 1967; Egyptian and Syrian forces launched a coordinated attack

against Israel during Yom Kippur<sup>23</sup> of which was the holiest day in the Jewish calendar. Along with a surprise and sudden attack on the Israeli Defense Forces, Egyptian troops swept deep into the Sinai Peninsula and captured it, while Syria struggled to get rid of the Israeli troops from the Golan Heights. In essence, neither Egypt nor Syria had not advanced military technology compared to Israel. However, they counted on the USSR, which could deter any Israeli counterattacks (Quandt, 2001).

Although the USSR deterrence, Israel counterattacked and recaptured the Golan Heights. Israeli forces pushed the Arab forces back to the post-1967 borders. A cease-fire went into effect on October 25, 1973. Egypt begged for help to the Soviet Union to rescue her third army that surrounded by the Israeli troops. In the meantime, the US intervened in the process. The U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger flew to Moscow to negotiate a ceasefire. Both sides agreed upon the UN's renewed Resolution 338 that provided an immediate cease-fire and reinforced the previous Resolution 242. In addition to these, the UN also encouraged hostiles to negotiate for durable peace in the Middle East (Diller, 1994).

In sum, the deal was a win-win situation for both sides. The Arabs refreshed their self-confidence by defeating Israeli forces. At the end of the war, the blockade of the Suez Canal, as well as the Arab state's embargo, affected the oil prices that sharply increased, and this resulted in an economic recession throughout the world for two years. Therefore, Arabs became indispensable and vital elements of global economy. Dominant powers comprehended that the peripheral especially, the oil-rich states can influence the international outcome at large. Thus with tremendous oil resources, Arab states became semi-core actors in the 1970s. Eventually, their relative gains were higher than the states of Israel. However, for the Israeli, resolution was acceptable because of her loss was limited to the Sinai Peninsula compared to her enormous gain, in 1967 (Handel, 1977).

### ***3.1.7. The Camp David Accords (1978) and the Changes in Threat Perception***

By the declaration of UN Resolution 338, Arab states waited for Israeli to withdraw from the territories that occupied in 1967. However, Israel showed no curiosity to revert to pre-

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<sup>23</sup> Yom Kippur—the Day of Atonement—is considered the most important holiday in the Jewish faith.

1967 borders. Therefore, Arab countries were unpleasant with the ongoing status quo because Israel's occupation of Arab lands posed a great threat to their legitimacy in the eyes of Arab people. In contrast, Israeli rejection for the UN resolutions was strict because she tried to keep up her tremendous gain that taken from Arab states. By the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights occupation, Israel prevented the blockade imposed by Egypt and the geostrategic threats that came from Syrian controlled Golan Heights. Yet, in the occupied territories, the PLO, which was assisted by Arab states, attempted many attacks against Israel. Therefore, Israel was conscious that she could not preserve occupied territories without any functional peace agreement with the pioneer country. Moreover, by the Carter administration, in the 1970s, the US improved her relations with the Arab countries.

By the decline of Soviet influence in the region, the relation between Egypt and the US increased. Hence, the US initiated several diplomatic efforts to end Arab-Israel conflicts. The US attempts were headed by Kissinger, who tried to persuade the Egyptian president to negotiate with the Israeli. Consequently, on November 22, 1977, Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat decided to visit Jerusalem, and this visiting brought initiatives for the conflict-resolution. In later stages, Israel and Egypt signed the peace treaty on 26<sup>th</sup> March 1979 at a White House Ceremony in Washington DC. The framework of the accords foresaw Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula and the establishment of diplomatic channels between two countries (Naidu, 1992).

Nevertheless, Arabs were all opposed to the direct connection with Israel. The Camp David Accords were left other Arab countries and Palestinian to their fate. Sadat was accused of treachery to his Arab allies. In fact, Egypt was the leading country in the two Arab-Israeli wars as well as the dominant power among Arab states. By the Camp David Agreement, Egypt legitimated Israeli occupation in the Palestinian lands, and she abandoned the idea of pan-Arabism. Subsequent to the treaty, Egypt joined the pro-Western and pro-Saudi camps. Due to the neutralization of Egypt, Israel seized an opportunity to wage catastrophic war against the PLO as well as Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.

### ***3.1.8. The Invasion of Lebanon 1982***

As a consequences of Black September 1970, many PLO members were expelled from Jordan. Therefore, in Southern Lebanon, PLO stuff created a new basis for their activities against Israeli occupation. In the 1970s, Israel's diplomatic and military capability was on the rise with neutralization of Egypt in accordance with Arab-Israeli conflicts. The Zionist's desire for excessive expansion based on the physical destruction of the Palestinian national movement resulted in the invasion of Lebanon. Israeli aimed to expulse PLO stuff in order to ensure that the effective annexation of West Bank and Gaza Strip, their population by Israeli settlers, and quite possibly their forcible depopulation by a substantial number of Palestinians (Ryan, 1982).

To sum up, on May 10, Israeli cabinet officially endorses unilateral military action in Lebanon. On 3 June 1982, Abu Nidal, who was Yasser Arafat's arch-rival, was shown responsible for the assassination attempt in Israel's British ambassador, Shlomo Argov. Indeed, Israeli ignored the overwhelming evidence that indicated the PLO was not responsible for the failed assassination attempt and used it as a pretext to launch the Lebanon War of 1982. On June 6, Israel's defense minister Ariel Sharon launched an Operation Peace for Galilee to Lebanon. In a short time, Israel's army occupation extended through Beirut, which was the capital of Lebanon (Barak, 2017).

During the war, Israeli soldiers massacred over 500 Palestinians remaining in Sabra and Shatilla refugee camp. The PLO members were expelled from Lebanon. In addition, Israel encouraged and armed paramilitary Phalangist fighters —a Christian militia group— by which more than 3,000 Palestinian and Lebanese residents of Sabra and Shatila were raped, abused, slashed, and killed (Nasim, 2019). Afterward, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 521 condemning the massacre. Besides, the war caused the anti-Israeli movement and the creation of Hezbollah in Lebanon. In sum, the massacre of the refugees and discriminative Israeli policy against Palestinians motivated the Palestinian uprising.

## **CHAPTER 4. HIGH AWARENESS LEVEL IN THE PERCEPTION OF THREAT AND CORE LEVEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS AT THE FAILED STATE**

### ***4.1. Impact of Historical Roots and Grand Strategy of the Hostiles***

*“Neoclassical realists, in contrast to both, emphasize the contingency of history and the importance of how foreign policy is actually conducted, because they see certain situations as particularly “ripe for rivalry.”” (Rose, 1998, p. 171).*

Neoclassical realism is a theory that takes into account long-standing conflicts based on historical background. In order to understand incentives for the peace talks, we must look at under what circumstances or events that states have decided to attempt the peace of which requires interpretation of the historical roots. Genuine reasons or pressures not only arise from the external environment of the international system to the peace process, and thus it is essential to explore domestic motives. The Israeli-Palestinian conflicts require a multivariate perspective because as a failed state, Palestine is the country that exists under the Israel occupation since the Six-Day War, 1967. In this regard, it is necessary to examine this relationship in the extent of the neoclassical realist framework. Moreover, it is also confused to determine causes based on the state to state relations. Neoclassical realism is the only structural theory that can satisfy this gap because it develops the case on behalf of the material capability and relative power of specific states.

The external and the internal causes for the Intifada lie under the systemic pressures as well as Israel's foreign policy behavior. However, it is complex to identify variables purely based on a systemic level or unit-level. Therefore, structural pressures and Israeli material capability are formed as an independent variable. While Israel's influence on the Palestinians; the political, social and economic conditions in the occupied areas are developed as internal –intervening– motives or variables. After the Six-Day War in 1967,



Israel and Palestine societies whether became polarized, deeply-divide and connected because Israel imported many Palestinians to her industry as a low-level worker, yet Palestinians were treated as a foreigner or subjected to segregation by the Israeli apartheid policies in the occupied territories (Alimi, 2007). Palestinians were neither a citizen nor a labor class in Israel. However, the interaction between societies helped these people to recognize each other for the first time (Ibid).

As a matter of the Six-Day War consequences, legitimate and distinctive Palestinian identity was institutionalized because they were separated from the old capitals by the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in June 1967 (Pearlman, 2011). Historically, West Bank was dependent on Jordan whereas Gaza was dependent on Egypt. Subsequently, these countries lost control over the Palestinian territory. Hereafter, in order to balance Israeli supremacy in the region, Arab states encouraged Palestinians to become separate nations because any direct threat against Israeli might produce another defeat for the Arab states. Nevertheless, distinct Palestinian identity could balance Israeli superiority in the region, and Arab countries would be able to maintain their status quo thanks to the asymmetric threats posed by the PLO. Moreover, Arab states could also disengage Palestinian cause from the Arab nationalism. By doing so, the Arab states would no longer be responsible for protecting Palestinians, the cause of the three Arab-Israeli wars. Hence, the PLO came into power as an unofficial representative of Palestinians.

On the other hand, after the 1967 war, the state of Israel approximately for ten years adopted the 'carrot and stick' policy to create legitimacy quid pro quo her occupation for Palestinians that policy implemented by Israeli defense minister Moshe Dayan, who was the Labor party member (Pearlman, 2011). Indeed, the policy of rejecting Palestinian identity sustained, but the Palestinians received rights for traveling and working around Israel. To be sure, Israel's perception of Palestinians remained suspicious, and there was no way to appease Palestinians by the rejection of their existence. Nevertheless, due to security concerns, Israel endeavored to balance the occupied territories and strove to integrate Palestinians into the Israeli system. In doing so, Israel's purpose was to justify her occupation and to get a cheap labor force from Palestinians.

Meanwhile, security threats arose from the secular and socialist parties against the Israeli occupation. In order to balance the PLO influence on Palestinians, the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, which had emerged in the occupied territories in the 1970's as a social movement, was supported by the Israeli authorities (Usher, 1995, p. 18). In doing so, Israeli purpose was to create opposition groups against the PLO, which was the secular and more threatening organization for her existence in the occupied territories. Muslim Brotherhood was opposed to secular nationalism, of which PLO's fundamental doctrine. Consequently, the US 'green belt project'<sup>24</sup> had also inspired Israel's decision-makers, so they commenced backing fundamentalist factions in the occupied territories. Conceivably, Israeli was bandwagoning with the US, and thus she supported the US-led security doctrine through the Middle East.

Externally, backup for the Palestinian MB by Israeli aimed to cut the PLO's financial assistance by the Arab states. In essence, the Palestinian MB, funded also by the Gulf states, provided social and health services to Palestinians living in Gaza. To do so, Palestinian MB established its legitimacy among the Palestinians. However, this classic imperial policy 'divide and rule/conquer' did not function appropriately because of the Arab league recognition of the PLO as an official representative of Palestinians since 1976 (CNN, 2013). As a consequence of that, the Palestinian MB lost its legitimacy amongst Palestinians and the Arab states. Yet, it compensated for this loss in 1987 due to its support to the intifada.

Nonetheless, Palestinians demand for independence never got off the table. During the 'carrot and stick policy', the Palestinian upheaval could not occur because of the fear of the high casualties. In fact, first Jordan, and then, Egypt began to shift their threat perception due to increased US influence in the Middle East. Egypt, in particular, strove to establish close ties with Israel to regain her status quo ante. Therefore, interest-based security treaties of Jordan and Egypt with Israel diminished importance of the Palestinian question in and outside the occupied territories. Besides, Arab states were not capable of funding rebellion against Israel's occupation because of the Iran-Iraq war that could spill

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<sup>24</sup> During the Cold War, from 1945 to 1991, the idea of 'Green Belt' revealed against the USSR's influence over the Arab states. Thus, Islamic fundamentalist groups got supported by the US in order to stop socialist and secular threats in the Middle East (Dreyfuss, 2006).

over their territory. Hence, instead of balancing the Israeli threat, Arab states attempted to maximize their security.

In that manner, the PLO solidified in exile with Palestinians, and thus it failed to function as a state but organized Palestinians secretly to revoke Israel occupation. The PLO had succeeded in rally-around-flag to Palestinians. Therefore, Israel 'carrot and stick' policy failed to provide legitimacy to the occupation. As a result, stick became the main policy of Israel such as; punished politic activism, house demolitions, imprisonment, curfew, travel restrictions and "administrative detention". From 1967 to 1978, Israel deported more than a thousand Palestinians (Pearlman, 2011). When Israel realized that the 'carrot and stick' policy did not succeed but improved the PLO position in the occupied territories, the Likud came into power by the 'Iron Fist' policy, which was the main unit-level incentive for the Palestinian uprising.

'Iron Fist' policy that took place during the second Likud party<sup>25</sup> administration (1981–84), aimed to put many restrictions on the Palestinians life and extent Jewish settlers in the occupied territories (Lockman and Beinun, 1989). However, using hard power to subordinates only brought more anger rather than the appease. In 1982, Likud-led Israel's controversial intervention in Lebanon in order to eliminate PLO's influence in the occupied territories (Alimi, 2007) still could not stop Palestinians. Relatively, Israel was powerful enough to destroy PLO, but without functioning diplomacy or interest-based alignment Israel always failed to rule or control occupied territories. Therefore, the 'Iron Fist' policy and the invasion of Lebanon did not take long. In contrast, PLO became the sole representative of Palestinians.

As neoclassical realists note "leaders almost always face a two-level game in devising and implementing the grand strategy: On the one hand, they must respond to the external environment, but on the other, they must extract and mobilize resources from domestic society," (Lobell et al., 2009, p.7). Therefore, the policy may vary from party to party, but

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<sup>25</sup> The Likud Party was founded in 1973 as a group of parties that came together just before the 8th Knesset elections and included Herut, the Liberal Party, the Free Center, the National List, and the Great Israeli Workers Movement ("The Likud Party", n.d.). The movement headed by the Menachem Begin, who was the leader of the Zionist militant group Irgun, was born in Brest-Litovsk, Poland in 1913. Later, he became the sixth prime minister of the state of Israel (MFA, n.d.).

Israel's grand strategy was to control all Palestinian lands. Zionist doctrine constituted Israeli grand strategy, but it did not translate directly into her foreign policy. In practice, the bipolar international structure set up many obstacles for Israel because secular and socialist states or parties received support from the USSR. As for her part, the US and other Western countries had a close tie with the Arab – Gulf – states. As mentioned above, historically, in the formation of Arab identity, the Palestinian question was the main incentives, and thus Arab states subsidized Palestinian organizations. By disregarding these variables, Israel put her survival interests at risk.

Moreover, Israel's relative power was adequate to challenge all the Middle Eastern states, yet its power furnished because of the Western countries particularly the US supports (Chomsky, 2010). Without the US and the UK consent, Israel could have not been able to occupy all Palestine territories. Hence, according to neoclassical realism, Israel as a middle-range-power state that must obey the international structure determinations or bandwagoning the hegemon state for her part. However, the Likud party administration resisted fulfilling the US concerns for the conflict. For instance, during the Camp David process, in 1977, Carter became the first American president to call for the creation of a Palestinian "homeland" (Lewis, 1977), yet Israel never showed intention for the peace-making with Palestinians. Israel was able to follow different instruction away from the international system in the short to medium term but could not escape its consequences in the long term. The intifada was the reason for these miscalculation.

On the other hand, the Palestinians, who lived under occupation, always resisted Israeli authority because they were facing segregation and discrimination (Alimi, 2007). In point of fact, the real problem was to be stateless for Palestinians so, this problem could be solved only by self-determination. Historically, Palestinians were dependent on Jordan and Egypt, but they behaved as an autonomous state without pressure from the pioneers. Moreover, with the Arab League's acceptance of the PLO as the representative of Palestinian Arabs in 1964, people in Gaza and the West Bank became more self-autonomous. Palestinians now seem to be forgotten with the Israeli occupation. Moreover, a Likud-led expanding Jewish settler's policy added another threat to Palestinians survival and only resulted in favor of the PLO and Palestinian nationalism. Again, the pure

security-oriented foreign policy may put states' interest and survival at risk as it did in Israel's survival during the intifada.

Under these conditions, the PLO became representatives of Palestinians and generated its legitimacy among Arab states. Even Palestinian MB, which was supported by the Israeli until the intifada broke out, was not adequate the challenge PLO superiority (Usher, 2005). Moreover, PLO acted as a state that provides primary services to its people through the occupied territories (Lockman and Beinun, 1989). By doing so, Palestine National Council, which linked to the PLO, was established in 1973 to organize people in West Bank and Gaza against the Israel occupation (Pearlman, 2011). In 1980s, the PLO managed to extract and mobilize resources from domestic society and responded adequately to the external environment. For instance, PLO demanded Israel to withdraw all occupied territories under no conditions, which were assumed by the United Nations 242 resolutions (UN, 1967). Therefore, PLO's requirements and grand strategy were carried out in the intifada per the international order.

To sum up, the Palestinian resistance erupted due to Israel's aggressive treatment of Palestinians. Israeli resistance to the systemic coercions resulted in external support for the intifada. Besides, Israel's political elites took the decisions without considering the cost and benefits. As a result of this miscalculation, the 1982 invasion of Lebanon formed. Israel behaved like the big brother of the Middle East, yet other actors resisted, so she could not defend her earnings in the 1967 war. Inevitably, Israel received pressure and threats from regional powers such as Iraq and Syria, which commence to target Israel as an enemy state and supported PLO. Therefore, Saddam reacted to Israel's policy in the occupied territories and declared Israeli occupation as a *casus belli*. As a result, Israel faced a two-level crisis: first, in the occupied territories, the Palestinians craved for independence, and second, regional powers challenged Israel's autonomy to become a dominant state in the Middle East. Indeed, Israel's grand strategy was based on internal motivations that did not comply with structural pressures. Thus, Israel could not preserve her status quo.

#### ***4.1.1. Being a State and Grassroots of the Intifada “Shake Off”***

The Palestinian Intifada blew up on December 9, 1987, as a nonviolent confrontation between Israeli soldiers and Palestinians who demanded their primary right of self-determination and sovereignty. 1987 was an important date because it was 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the occupation. As Edward Said mentioned, “we [Palestinians] discovered ourselves, we discovered the world, and it discovered us ...— not as terrorists, but as an exiled and occupied people.” (Said, 1977, pp. xv). The Palestinians became a citizen of occupied territories by protests. As an intervening variable, war fines, taxes, and imprisonment of the Palestinians were the consequences of the intifada, yet its main incentives laid under the rebellion to the occupation. However, resistances to the occupation in previous demonstrations had not been adequately established by Palestinians due to the structural restrictions and limits on the material power capability. It took more than a decade for Palestinians to maximize their material power by structural opportunities and, finally, to desire independence for the occupied territories.

Prior to the intifada, systemic and domestic variables were not ready to grant incentives in order materialize through the Palestinian sovereignty. At the unit-level, Israel outlawed all political activities in the occupied territories, yet Palestinians never gave up demonstrating the occupation and discrimination. As a matter of fact, the PLO was an organization that functioned in exile because Israel prohibited all PLO activities inside the occupied territories and declared the PLO as a terrorist organization. Thus, PLO did not have adequate material capability to send the crowd to outside. By 1977, the Palestine National Fund (PNF), which subsidized the activities of the PLO in the political as well as military, social, and cultural areas, largely collapsed as a result of Israel deportation and imprisonment of the movement leading figures (Pearlman, 2011). Accordingly, the PLO’s material capability decreased in the occupied territories. Consequently, the imprisonment of PLO members also prevented a successful uprising.

At the external level, the international system was divided into two camps by the US and USSR. The cold war led to many interest-based proxy wars. The USSR occupation of Afghanistan caused another proxy conflict with the US. Meanwhile, the interests of the hegemon states clashed again due to the Iranian revolution, which was the chief cause of

the Iran-Iraq war. Therefore, Palestinians did not get support from outsiders because dominant states were confronting in a different part of the Middle East. Besides, the US-led Camp David Accords<sup>26</sup> (1979) had succeeded to disaffect Egyptian assistance to the PLO. To this extent, the peace provided an excellent opportunity for the Israeli to legitimize her occupation in the eyes of most powerful Arab state. In the 1980s, Reagan administration prevented sufficient Palestinian-Israeli peace process due to the US's pro-Israeli foreign policy (Alimi, 1994).

While at the regional level, the security-based shift in the Jordanian policy had created a bulwark against the PLO's influence in the occupied territories and changed regional balance in favor of Israel. Exclusively, three regional powers historically threatened Israeli survival; Egypt, Iraq as well as Syria. As mentioned above, by Camp David, Egypt became a neutralized country for the Palestinian cause. However, Iraq was another country that had supported the Palestinian question since the 1936-1939 Arab revolt (Neff, 1991), and her Ba'ath regime also shared the same norms with the PLO. As a result of Camp David, Saddam seized the opportunity to dominate the Arab states as the most powerful actor in the region. To do so, Saddam declared a war to Iran that commenced in 1980 and lasted for eight years. Instead of targeting Israel, Iraq strove to dominate the Gulf of Persia—or the Arabian Gulf—by which targeted Iran and Kuwait. Therefore, the Gulf war introduced another obstacle for the Palestinian cause because other Arab states worried about their own status quo in the Arabian Peninsula. With the rising of Iraq as a pioneer of the Arab states, Syria did not extract her sources against Israel, because Iraq's aggression could pose a serious security challenge to Syria's status quo. In addition, due to the weakening of the USSR and Syria's limited military capability, Syrians avoided any direct conflicts with Israel. Hence, the balance-of-security and balance-of-threat theories against Israel was not been successfully implemented by the Arab states.

Eventually, due to the neutralization of the Egyptian side, the diminishing influence of the Soviet Union, and the Iran-Iraq war, Israel could wage war against Palestinians in Lebanon and defeat the PLO without any serious threat. Therefore, Israel's purpose was

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<sup>26</sup> Apart from those, the first was called Framework for Peace in the Middle East (1978) by which the Egyptians and the Israelis launched peace talks that offered Palestinians limited autonomy rather than the state, but the Palestinians were not party to the agreement, so the attempt failed (UN, 1978).

to destroy the PLO's bases and to discontinue the party's physical contact with the Palestinians in the occupied territories. Beyond doubt, the 1982 war was an extended operation that eradicated the Palestinian Organization's political, administrative, financial, and military bases in that country (Lustick, 1993, p. 572). The invasion of Lebanon and three-year of occupation of her Southern part engendered a lot of dissension of Palestinians. After the invasion, the PLO became unable to assist or represent its people living in the occupied territories. As a result of this defeat, the PLO shifted its aggressive policy and initiated the non-violent intifada resistance. Thence, its organized Palestinians by the trade unions, student and youth movements, women's organizations, and refugee camp popular committees (Grinberg, 2012).

Between 1985 and 1987, there were many Palestinian rebellions against the Israeli occupation, but they were not as fascinating as the intifada. The fact that the systemic variables provided primary incentives for the Palestinian uprising, because in the late 1980s, with the weakening of the USSR, the bipolar system approached to its conclusion, but the evolution in the international system did not happen immediately, waiting for the conditions to mature. So, the international system crisis emerged. Antonio Gramsci wrote in the Prison Notebooks in the 1930s that the "crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear." (Hoare and Nowell-Smith, 1971, p. 276). In this context, morbid symptoms are asymmetric threats led by subordinates. Therefore, the Palestinian intifada was not a specific uprising that broke out in the occupied territories. Indeed, all the oppressed people resisted the status quo and demanded sovereign statehood against imperial states, such as; Algeria, Burma in 1988, most Eastern European countries in 1989, and then, in South Africa, and North Ireland.

Ultimately, this transition took place in favor of the US; ergo, the oppressed commence to bandwagon her doctrine. Hence, new challengers became detached from their traditional ideologies, and peaceful demonstrations flourished among morbid societies. Conclusively, there was a great distinction of power between states and non-state actors, but in this transition period, due to the unpredictable nature of the international crisis, temporarily, states' material capability diminished; hereafter, the oppressed discovered the



possibility and necessity of building independence state. The intifada reached its *modus vivendi* under these conditions. Moreover, the UN resolution 242 also created international legitimacy by which Israel supposed to be removed territories that she occupied. Palestinians got support from the outsiders due to the UN's proposal to withdraw Israel from the occupied territories. The intifada was not the first Palestinian rebellion, though it was the most effective because systemic variables were materialized.

Above all that, in London meeting in April 1987, a document was drawn up between the foreign minister Shimon Peres and King Hussein of Jordan that was meant to kick-start the peace process. The PLO also joined the treaty, yet it was chaired by Jordanian delegations. The London Treaty aimed to find a way forward to flourish a solution to the Palestinian problem in the occupied territories. However, the Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Shamir refused to sign the treaty. The problem was that Shamir's conservative ideas compelled him to preserve the traditional Zionist doctrine, which thought historical Palestine was a promised land for Jewish. Yet, the transitional period was too robust to resist and was in favor of Palestinians. A few months after the failed London Agreement, the intifada erupted in December 1987. In July 1988, King Hussein decided to separate Jordan's responsibility from the Palestinian question and approved the PLO's legitimacy in the occupied territories. Eventually, Jordan admitted Palestinians to negotiate their peace as a state actor (Aranoff and Aranoff, 1998).

Apart from structural motivations, Ward, in one aspect, assumes that imperialist exploitation could be useful in the development of nationalism, modern institutions, and education in which exploited people could benefit from the experiences of the colonial regime (Ward, 1957, p. 39). For instance, Palestinian people did not have a constitution for Arabic education until the 1970's during which university was opened in the Gaza Strip firstly (Pappé, 1999). To be sure, Palestinian nationalism matured under the occupation because of their restricted experiences based on Western-style institutions as a result of the undemocratic nature of Arab states. In essence, the young generation of Palestine had the opportunity to leave the traditional community-based structure by studying in Israel. Besides, the labor union was established by Palestinian migrant workers who commuted daily to Israeli made Palestinians an organized force. (Alin, 1994). In the

1970s and 1980s, in order to function as a state, these groups provided basic services to the population living under the occupation.

Furthermore, the emergence of an institutionalized Palestinian identity also encouraged insurrection because the Palestinians, who lived inside Israel, seized a crucial responsibility in building Palestinian identity. For instance, in 1974 the Council of Arab Majors was established by the Palestinians living inside Israel, as well as, The Monitoring Committee was initiated by the MK Darawshe, who was the leader of the pro-Palestinian party in Israel, and he was pro-PLO representative of the Knesset (Bligh, 1999, p. 136). This Committee called for a general strike of Palestinians to resist Israel's deficiency of the Arabs in June 1987, during which Palestinians extended their resistance sphere from the occupied territories to inside Israel. Over the years, Israeli Palestinians supported Palestinian statehood in the occupied territories (Bligh, 1999). By doing so, Palestinians challenged Israeli occupation not only in occupied territories but also in all Israeli territories with which posed a more serious threat. Israel suffered from the resistance of her citizens, which hampered the mobilization of material resources that could affect the relative power of the state.

In this wise, the PLO's subgroups enhanced legitimacy among Palestinians and gained material resources capability to resist Israel's occupation. Hence, the PLO had legitimacy recognized by about 90 percent of Palestinians in the occupied territories. (Pearlman, 2011). Likewise, the PLO's uprising strategy was adopted by masses, such as non-violent protests, boycotts, and civil disobedience. Palestinians realized that they were in a relatively weak position against Israel, the only country in the region with a nuclear arsenal—yet, not ratified by the Israeli authorities—(Yaqub, 2003). The intifada was sufficient uprising because systemic changes were rendered into the national incentives and motivations directly that was functioned sufficiently by the PLO. Therefore, the Palestinian strategy was to receive external support by setting up non-violent protests and using soft power for the uprising. To do so, Palestinians could establish legitimacy among international actors for self-determination right.

Within the PLO factions, the participation of the labor unions, youth organizations, and women's groups provided insights for the uprising to Palestinians. These organizations

gathered under the roof of the UNLU<sup>27</sup>, which was considered as an underground, anonymous, consensus-based body (Pearlman, 2011). The grand strategy of the resistance was composed by the UNLU members, who intended to establish a sovereign state. These groups were well-organized and were aware of Israel's capability to stop the uprising. Therefore, the PLO as a whole decided to engage in non-violent acts against the superior country. Moreover, during the resistance, the young generation, who were more educated, created more national mechanisms that build grassroots for the Western-style nationalism (Lockman and Beinun, 1990). The UNLU functioned as a state that served political, social, and economic assistance. To do so, it created an alternative for Palestinians, and this possibility dispatched masses to the street because Palestinians comprehended that they were self-sufficient to rule their nation-state.

During the intifada, protests were adopted to daily life by the Palestinians, who endeavored to minimize their dealings with the Israeli civil administrations and boycotted all Israel goods and services while expanded local manufacturing and food production in order to ensure self-sufficiency of Palestinians (Pearlman, 2011, p. 102). Palestinians' civil disobedience and disengagement transformed the revolt into revolution. The UNLU became the highest institution of law (Ibid.) and functioned as a legislative power. In doing this, the UNLU gained a monopoly of legitimate violence amongst Palestinians, and Palestinians followed UNLU instruction for the uprising. As a consequence of that, the organization became a failed state body power that did not have territorial integrity but established social and health services to its citizens and had a monopoly of legitimate violence among its citizens.

On the contrary, when the intifada blew up, the Palestinian MB was posed with a dilemma: either forgo its de facto recognition by the Israeli in the extent of providing social services and acting against the PLO or lose the Palestinian street, where people as a whole participated in national resistance (Usher, 1995). Ultimately, Hamas formed in Gaza on 8 December 1987 as a continuation of the Palestinian MB and commenced to support the Palestinian national liberation in 1988 (Litvak, 1998), but its opposition for the secularism

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<sup>27</sup> The Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) (al-Qiyada al Muwhhada) was a coalition of the Local Palestinian leadership during the First Intifada and thus played a vital role in mobilizing grassroots assistance for the uprising.

did not alter. Indeed, aim of Hamas was to constitute a 'religious endowment' on the territory of historic Palestine (Alin, 1994). However, internally, all factions were corresponding for the identical purpose, so at the beginning, the intifada was sufficient uprising to materialize resources through the Palestinian grand strategy. Hamas was not a member of the UNLU, yet it followed its instructions. To this extent, the UNLU leadership approved by all factions, and thus it established legitimacy among its citizens.

On the other hand, when the Palestinian upheaval broke out, Israeli elites did not expect such enormous demonstrations because, since 1967, the Palestinians had repeatedly revolted against ongoing segregation policy. Indeed, without international pressures, Israeli was able to suppress these protests, yet structural changes affected traditional ideologies. Nevertheless, Israel strove to maintain her post-1967 status quo, but she miscalculated her power. With the rising influence of the US in the Middle East, Israel began to lose her earnings in the 1967 war due to a decline in the US support for Israel. Besides, Israel was not a self-sufficient state that could abolish threats without foreign aids. The intifada led to international reactions to the Israeli occupation, and thus even her long-term allies hesitated to support Israel. For example, the UN recommendations on Israeli human rights violations were approved by the United Nations Security Council and undermined Israel's sphere of influence (UN, 1989).

In essence, the Israeli fear was an independent Palestinian state that, with the help of regional powers, could pose a survival threat to Israel's existence. As Mearsheimer points out, states always craved to maximize their interests and security to the extent allowed by the international system (Mearsheimer, 2001a), but Israeli lack of understanding of the international system crisis resulted in a severe threat to her existence. Correspondingly, the Israeli rejectionist view of the peace weakened her material capability. Furthermore, Israeli perceived Palestinians as a challenge for her survival in the Middle East, and thus she did not consider building an interest-oriented alliance until she suppressed the Palestinian uprising. Consequently, in the absence of alliance-making, Israel could no longer pursue control over the occupied territories.

Unaccountably, Israel responded to the uprising by using destructively hard power against Palestinians. One thousand three hundred and fifty Palestinians were killed by Israeli

forces, compared to fifty-five death of Israelis by the Palestinian stones (Awad and Hubers, 1993). The deaths of Palestinians were 43 per 100.000 inhabitants, at the hand of Israel military (Lustick, 1993, p. 566). During the six-year uprising, 120,000 Palestinians were arrested, and an estimated 130,472 Palestinians had been injured by the Israeli troops (Neff, 1997). Moreover, Israel ordered the closure of the universities and high schools in the occupied territories. Despite that, the UNLU established its own education system, and Israel penalties for the intifada contributed another occasion for the PLO to operate as a state. Even the most robust state of the Middle East could not resist the Palestinian rebellion because the systemic and internal variables were in favor of Palestinians.

For instance, UN General Assembly decisions on 3 November 1988 declared 43/21 resolution which assumed "Aware of the uprising (intifadah) of the Palestinian people since 9 December 1987 against Israeli occupation, which has received significant attention and sympathy from world public opinion,..." (UN, 1988). The UN resolution was supported by all countries except the United States and Israel. The following year, even the US started to criticize Israel's violation against the Palestinian civilians. To do so, the UN Security Council resolution 641 voted 14-0-1 to "strongly deplore [Israel's] policies and practices which violated the human rights of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories." (UN, 1989). The United States was the lone abstainer. International actors as a whole were defending the right of Palestinians self-determination. Therefore, Israel's relative material capability was restricted by the international system.

In contradistinction to states' comprehensive support for the Palestinian uprising, Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin said: "We will fight with all of our forces against the backdrop of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip." (Neff. 1997). Israel had sufficient military capacity to suppress the insurgency if systemic forces did not hinder the power of Israeli by supporting Palestinians. Israel's superiority did not stop the PLO but explicitly endorsed a Palestinian state alongside Israel in November 1988 (Rouhana, 1990). Despite Israel's cruel tactics, the Palestinian uprising went on year after, unarmed inhabitants against heavily equipped Israeli troops. The awakening of the Palestinians lasted for five years in the occupied areas. Abnormally, Rabin was a realist decision-makers, who ordered

'broken bone' policy in January 1988 (LA Times, 1990), led to the Israeli-Palestinians peace process as well as recognized the PLO as a legitimate representative of Palestinians.

In sum, the development of national consciousness, efficient and strategic extension of the uprising was approved by the international system that allowed the Palestinian bourgeoisie to gain legitimacy over the territories occupied by Israel. Moreover, extraction and mobilization of resources from internal variables functioned through the new Palestinian constitutions. All domestic resources were materialized at the hand of PLO by which Palestinian uprising became a Palestinian revolution. The international system and internal motivations as a whole provided an opportunity for incentives to materialize. As a result, the Palestinian rebellion accomplished to appease Israeli aggressive foreign policy behavior. Under these conditions, Israel and the PLO began the secret talks 'track-two diplomacy' right after the Madrid Conference with the exclusive support of the USA.

#### ***4.1.2. Fragmentation of the Intifada and the Madrid Peace Conference***

Between 1987 and 1991 the intifada reached its climate, despite the Israeli pressure, Palestinians adapted the protests to their daily lives. Therefore, imprisonment or deportation of Palestinians did not stop the resistance. However, inside the occupied territories, Hamas confronted with the PLO on several occasions and weakened the Palestinian resistance. The first, Palestine National Council's (PNC) decision to recognize Israel as defined in its pre-1967 borders and principally, adopted 'two states' solution' to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. In contrast, at that time, Hamas described Palestine territory in historical matter where it originates from the river to sea (Usher, 1995) as well as the promised territory for the Muslims. Purpose of Hamas was the destruction of the state of Israel, but its power was not adequate to challenge Israel supremacy. In truth, Hamas did not challenge the Israeli existence, its core problem was the PLO and its legitimacy over the Palestinians.

From the perspective of Hamas, the conflict was not amongst Israel and Palestine, rather between Judaism and Islam (Litvak, 1998, p. 150). During the intifada, Hamas did not recognize any rational solution that PLO insisted because Hamas was also an enemy of

the secular and nationalist parties. Hamas rejection of the peace talks also lied under its understanding of Palestine territory. For Hamas, Palestine, which was considered to be a waqf, assigned to the Muslim until the day of resurrection. Moreover, Hamas assumed that the Jews came into Palestine on behalf of the Zionist doctrine, in fact, they came to Palestine for religious reasons. In this respect, Hamas believed that it was impossible to fight with the enemy who came for religious reasons, so instead of Palestinian nationalism, Islamic Jihad more asymmetrical and catastrophic threats against Israel (Litvak, 1998). However, Israeli political elites believed that the Hamas could also diminish the Palestinian unity, and thus Hamas was also paradoxical terrorist organization for Israel.

Moreover, Israel suppressed all Palestinians brutally. To do so, by 1990, Israel imprisoned virtually all UNLU members who assumed a major role in the uprising, which caused weakness for the intifada because there were limited political elites to control the uprising. Without sufficient leadership, the intifada smashed into the multi factions, and Arafat also allowed second-tier groups to control resistance (Pearlman, 2011, p. 117). Albeit it functioned as a body, with the weakening of the UNLU, the intifada began to be an uprising of various splinter groups declaring their own demonstrations. Despite its successful launch, the Palestinians became divided people that led to further weakness for the sovereign state goals. Consequently, Israel's relative power compared to Palestinians became superior to dissolve the Palestinian unity. Indeed, Palestinian national resources were limited in the extent of economic and political impact on Israel. The extraction of the Palestinian material resources narrowed through the masses.

On the other hand, there were reactions to the intifada inside Israel because of the instability in Israeli economy caused by the Palestinian upheaval. According to the CIA report about the uprising, Palestinian resistance damaged the amount of Israeli money regarding lost revenues, lost tourism, lost Arab labor, and increased military expenditure (CIA, 1988). Moreover, in the 1990s, Israel's military expenditure considered to be 1.8 million dollars annually. The shift in public opinion brought the Labor Party into the power of which was administrated by Rabin, in 1992. The fiscal crisis forced Israeli to accept compromises with the Palestinians, but Israeli elites expected fragmentation of the intifada because of weakening influence of Hamas in the Palestinian upheavals.

Ultimately, Israel's national economy and power were eroding by the ongoing conflicts. Both sides suffered from circumstances, but Israel's grand strategy was a more sustainable and relatively stronger than the Palestinian dream of the statehood.

During the intifada, many people in Israel realized that the status quo policy was unsustainable, and that the situation formed by the resistance put a huge burden on the Israeli economy. At the same time, the occupied territories were now becoming a threat to the individual Israelis security rather than just Israel's security because there were Jewish settlers, who became the target of Hamas (Hassan, 2010-2011). Moreover, Israel's fears were also the Palestinian inhabitants, who lived in Israel, might expand their support for the intifada. Possibility of the security system losing control of the Palestinian in the state, was the central internal security concern for the Israeli. Nevertheless, Palestinian Israeli people limitedly participated in the uprising, therefore their movement mostly was based on solidarity with the Palestinians in the occupied territories. Also, there were Jewish peace organizations supported the Palestinian uprising. For instance, the Jewish peace activists were so appalled the way Israel was dealing with the intifada, so they called Israel to end the occupation or at least to mitigate the harsh measures taken against the Palestinians (Hermann, 2009). However, their capability to change decision-makers' perception was ineffective, so Israel stuck with her aggressive policy and waited for its strategy to materialize in the peace talks.

In this regard, Israel expected a clash between Hamas and the PLO. In essence, Hamas was both beneficial and detrimental. The first, Hamas was useful in regulating the purpose of the intifada because there was a non-violent secular resistance, and women played a vital role. Despite international and national support for the nonviolent uprising, Hamas started to use lethal force against the Israel army. For instance, the movement carried out 11 attacks from 1987 to 1991 but increased it to 46 during the next two years. To be sure, these attacks did not affect the Israeli army as much as Hamas hoped, rather it disrupted Palestinians' diplomacy capability among international actors. Second, the movement was a disaster for Israel because its purpose was to destroy the state of Israel. As mentioned above, when two-state solutions were adopted by the PNC, Hamas was the only movement that rejected Israel's reality.



However, the limited power of Hamas did not interrupt Israel because she could deter asymmetrical threats. In contrast, because of the Hamas doctrine, which rejected Israel's existence, Israel had the opportunity to exhibit international actors the Palestinians who were barbarians and did not accept Israel's presence in the Holy Land. Together with Hamas, the Palestinians were divided into two camps: the Muslim Brotherhood on one side and the secular and socialist on the other. In the later years, when Hamas got into power in Gaza, even the two-state solution became risky for the Palestinians because Hamas was also an antagonist to the secular groups (Hudson, 1990). Therefore, Israel waited for the decline of the international support and for the Palestinians to submit peace talks in terms of Israeli conditions. Israel did not stop to suppress the rebellions unless the Palestinians were ready to accept peace talks under Israeli conditions.

At the external level, Saddam Hussein ordered the invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. Hussein's assumption that his fellow Arab states would stand beside in the wake of his invasion of Kuwait, and not call in outside assistance to prevent the occupation, proved to be a false calculation. Two-thirds of the 21 members of the Arab League condemned Iraq's act of aggression, and King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, in accompany with Kuwait's leadership-in-exile, turned to the United States and her peripheral states in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for military intervention (Tripp, 2000). Despite international opposition, especially despite the Arab League's disapproval for the Gulf war, Arafat supported Saddam, and this led to a diminishing of the PLO's diplomatic and financial position in the international system. The PLO's support for Saddam alienated the US and her so-called moderate Arab allies.

The Gulf war had different aspects for the PLO and Israel. On the one hand, Iraq has supported the Palestinians sovereignty since 1936. Correspondingly, the PLO, subsequent to the Egypt neutralization, formed a good relations with Saddam. Moreover, in the late 1980s, Saddam threatened to use his missiles against the IDF during the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon. Moreover, by the Camp David (1979), the PLO lost the patron of the Palestine question, and Jordan decided to improve relations with Israel after the Black Friday. Externally, the PLO became an isolated organization due to regional changes, and Iraq was the only regional actor capable of supporting Palestinian

independence. Conclusively, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait sparked a reaction from the Arab League, but the PLO refused to bandwagon with the League as well as US. Arafat declared PLO's support for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. (Hassan, 2010-2011). Finally, the PLO commence to lose its legitimacy among regional actors. In the Oslo peace process, the solitude of the Palestinians became more visible. Ba'ath parties such as Iraq and Syria remained outside the peace process.

On the other hand, Israel perceived Iraq as a serious threat due to her radicalization, and Iraq's initiatives to purchase Western military-technology frightened Israel, because Iraq could endanger survival of Israeli. Moreover, Saddam's assistance to both Hezbollah and the PLO raised Israel's security concerns. Nevertheless, by the Gulf war, Israel had the opportunity to suppress the Palestinians in the occupied territories and to cut Saddam's back up to the PLO and to strengthen Israel's legitimacy at the international level. Hence, Israel seized a magnificent chance to normalize her relations with the Arab countries, which now bandwagoning with the US. To sum, the war created a spectacular opportunity in 1991 when Israel and her Arab states came to the peace conference in Madrid to resolve regional conflicts. The PLO also participated in this process as a non-state player accompanying the conference with the Jordanian delegations.

The Madrid Peace Conference began with the U.S.-Soviet letter of invitation to the peace talks in Spain, 18 October 1991. There were four Middle Eastern states, which engaged in the peace conference: Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Israel. In particular, Palestinians participated under the roof of the Jordanians delegates because of the Israeli rejection of the PLO as well as Palestinians as a state actor ("The Madrid Conference", 1992). At the beginning of the conference, while Israel preserved her position of rejecting the Palestinian existence to keep the occupied territories under Israeli rule. Yet, the US and USSR recognized the Palestinian representatives as a state actor. Accordingly, Israel's rejection of Palestinians was not feasible, yet her power was enough to keep the Palestinians away from the conference as a state actor.

Moreover, the letter posted by the US concluded that "We believe that Palestinians should gain control over political, economic, and other decisions that affect them and their fate." ("The Madrid Conference", 1992, p. 118). To this extent, Palestinian rights for self-

determination were admitted by the dominant power. The USSR also supported the independence of Palestinians, yet its internal problems, for example, the collapse of the Berlin Wall, affected the influence of the USSR during the peace conference. In addition to the foremost moderator of the peace conference, the United States was the only country capable of dictating the Palestinian right to exist in the occupied territories to Israel. On the contrary, the position of the American was controversial due to their long-standing alliance with Israel, which the US improved with enormous financial and military assistance to Israel. Besides, the US was only an obstacle for the UN resolutions because American always used her veto power in favor of Israel. Wherefore, Israel's position was superior, and there was no country to shift this balance.

In terms of alliances, the PLO could no longer rely on the Soviet Union that was about to collapse. Indeed, the breakdown of the bipolar system disrupted the balance of international politics that directly affected the PLO material capability. In this regard, the US-led new international order produced peripheral Arab states that attempted to build stronger relations with the US and Israel. For instance, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and even Syria started to criticize the PLO legitimacy because of its position during the Gulf war. As support from the new-born peripheral Arab states dried up, the financial crisis began to erupt. In March 1991, after a U.S.-led coalition defeated Iraq, Arafat admitted that the PLO had lost \$12 million a month from its main sponsors as a result of its support for Iraq —\$6 million from Saudi Arabia, \$2 million from Kuwait, and another \$4 million Iraq could no longer pay (Aburish, 2012).

Together with the Madrid Conference, the USSR endorsed the US supremacy and commence to bandwagon US's policy during Iraq's invasion. As a result, the transitional period of the international system was completed. Therefore, asymmetrical threats — morbid symptoms— diminished, and they started to lose their influential power, which was expected to be short-term. In addition to the intifada, the disintegration of the PLO began inevitably when the PLO refused to follow the rules set by the newborn international hegemon. Indeed, the Palestinian leadership was able to materialize its grand strategy during the international system crisis, but internally, Hamas divided Palestinian camp into two sides with different purpose of the independence. Externally, there were

regional conflicts that created a bulwark against the PLO's strategy to establish sovereign states. Moreover, when the international crisis ended, the PLO failed to convince international actors, and Israel's superior material capability suppressed the resistance.

For the Palestinian decision-makers, American peace proposal was hopeless, yet rejecting this proposal could catalyze a more catastrophe for the PLO. Even the USSR and PLO's long-terms allies recognized the supremacy of the American's by bandwagoning her through the Madrid Conference. To be sure, the PLO position was not as strong as in the Camp David peace process (1974-1977). The Palestinian leadership, which was a party to Iraq in the Gulf War, was weakened; and thus the intifada was diminishing—all of which implied that Israel could negotiate from a stronger position (Derfler, 2014, p. 143). Palestinians were compelled by the US to attend the Madrid Peace Conference. Hence, a process took place within Israel's agenda: no direct negotiations and Israeli withdrawals from the occupied lands as a prerequisite. Finally, the lack of alliance-building prevented the dream of the Palestinian state, and miscalculation of the shifts in the international system weakened PLO's positions. Hence, the Israeli side turned this weakness in her favor on the peace table.

At the beginning of the conference, the statements were based on the UN 's resolution 242, although Palestinians had to negotiate in two stages. The first, to reach an agreement on five years 'interim self-government arrangements' in the occupied territories. Second, to reach a final settlement based on UN 242 resolution could negotiate as long as the third year of the interim period expires. Despite the severe conditions, the Israeli side did not specify the Palestinian government model, as well as, there was no reference for the right of Palestinian self-determination. Besides, during the peace conference, the Israeli side gave an insight for the Palestinian delegations and restricted participation of all Palestinians from the occupied territories. For instance, she stipulated that Palestinians could be from West Bank and Gaza but not from East Jerusalem (Mansour, 1993).

As a consequences of the US coercions, the Likud party entered into indirect negotiations with the PLO, in the Madrid Conference. However, Shamir intended to stonewall the talks indefinitely while his government constructed more settlements in the territories by which Israel could de jure her occupation (Aranoff and Aranoff, 1998). Indeed, the US convinced

Israel that the Palestinian public was now ripe for substantive discussions toward a modus vivendi because Hamas caused fragmentation of the intifada. In addition to that the PLO began to lose international support to the Palestinian resistance by legitimizing Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Moreover, the five-year struggle intensified the existence of the Israeli army alone and Israeli settlement in the occupied territories because of Hamas armed struggle. Ultimately, the PLO refused to be an autonomous state in the Camp David 1974-1977, but from a position of strength, the Israeli expected for PLO to approve the peace under the Israeli conditions. Essentially, the PLO discerned that Israel had adequate material power to postpone peace negotiations for another 20 years.

In the 1990's, Israel began to control social, economic, and political areas related to Palestinian daily life. Israel also extended her settler's activity in the occupied territories, especially East Jerusalem became Israel's principal target to manage by de jure. To do so, Israel intended to impose the security dilemma brought by the Palestinian independence to international actors by playing the settler card in occupied territories. The policy of the settlers led Israel to demand maximum authority for the Jewish settlers who could legitimize her policy and law on the Palestinians. Indeed, Israel's assumption was based on the five categories –East Jerusalem, Palestinian localities, Israeli settlements, Israeli military encampments, "state land" –each to be governed by a different legal status. Consequently, Israel decided to seize power, and all occupied territories fell into a single military zone. (Mansour, 1993).

Madrid Conferences did not result as Israel, and the US expected. Although relatively weak, the PLO rejected separate and limited political autonomy in the occupied territories. By doing this, the PLO remained sole political representatives of Palestinians. Otherwise, the Islamic challenge could grow up in the Palestinian politics. The peace talks held many risks for the Palestinian leadership in the extent of its legitimacy, in the occupied territories. However, there were no serious steps to concern at the Madrid Conference. Israeli offers remained unclear, and main issues such as sovereignty, UN 242 resolution, the status of the Palestinians in the occupied territories, right of return, and status quo of Jerusalem all problems were ignored by the Israeli. Subsequently, Prime Minister Shamir

confessed that he plans to stall the Madrid talks indefinitely while intensifying Jewish settlements to prevent the return of land occupied by Israel in 1967 (Freedman, 1998).

In conclusion, the Israeli camp failed to protect her post-1967 status quo due to the 'new world order' that destroyed the classical understanding of hostility. As a result of US-led international order, influence of liberal values increased that principally, supported the right of self-determination. In this regard, when the PLO recognized the American hegemony, the international system pressures directly affected the Israeli material capability. Therefore, temporarily, Israeli endeavored to refuse international shifts to protect her interest and security, but eventually, in order to strengthen her relative power, she commenced to recognize the Palestinian existence. These structural shifts produced turbulence in Israeli internal politics, so the decision-makers became peace supporters to pursue their political carriers. Although the direct pressure of the US on Israel, circumstances did not end in favor of Palestinians because Israel's relative power was sufficient to impose her conditions on the Palestinians.

In contrast, regional conflicts caused diversification in the threat perception of Arab states. Many Arab states perceived radical states such as Iraq and Iran as a more severe challenge to their survival than Israel. In fact, during the international system crisis, if the Arab states had helped the PLO to implement its grand strategy, the peace process would have begun before the Gulf War, where Palestine would be almost equivalent to Israel. Moreover, the irrational support for Iraq added another obstacle for the Palestinian grand strategy because the PLO miscalculated the international shifts and its consequences. Hence, without material assistance from the regional powers, the PLO, which represented the Palestinian state in the absence of international legitimacy, could not maintain resistance against Israel. Eventually, temporarily, the PLO was able to build flourishing resistance and to get brief international support for the Palestinian question, but primarily, in the absence of regional support, the PLO had no choice, but consent to Israeli conditions in order to sustain its survival in and outside the region.

Once and for all, the Madrid Conference succeeded in bringing the opponents' requirements to the peace table, which showed distinct differences and failed to promote mutual interest for conflict-resolution. Furthermore, the US had the capability and power

to coerce Israel to recognize the UN 242 resolution. Still, Americans did not use their superiority over Israel. The Madrid Conference was the consequence of the anti-Iraq coalition of the US and USSR, as well as the outcome of forthcoming unipolar international order (Golan, 2008). Under these circumstances, the PLO miscalculated the global changes and made fatal decisions that resulted in the disintegration of its material strength. Despite the international shifts, Israelis and Palestinians did not find a useful solution to end conflicts. In this regard, the peace process must respond to the interest and security expectations of states. Therefore, Israel and Palestine expected for the maturation of conditions based on mutual assent. The maturation phase of this process ended with the commence of the Oslo negotiations. In the next chapter, throughout the Oslo Accords, I will address the security concerns and mutual interests of the parties.

## **CHAPTER 5. THE LACK OF MUTUAL INCENTIVE(S) AND QUESTION OF DISPARITY**

### ***5.1. The Declaration of Principles through Track II Diplomacy; Systemic and Unit-level Concerns***

The road to the Oslo peace process brought many disasters to both sides and was the touchstone for the hostiles. For each, in addition to the international system pressures resulting from shifts in the structure, there has been a gradual change in thought due to decades of tragic loss and bloodshed experience. The Israeli-Palestinian peace process began by the intifada, yet in the first-place systemic changes led resistance to materialize through the Oslo Accords. Any other factors and events, both before and after, played significant roles, but the crisis in the international system and the collapse of the USSR occasioned the emergence of a 'new world order' that was the primary incentive to start the peace process in Oslo. The US became the sole superpower and new hegemon of the international system. Therefore, American compulsions and interests through conflict resolution gave rise to the peace processes in the Middle East (Shlaim, 1994).

As Ripsman notes democratic states differ in their evaluation of the consequences, traditional realists and liberals agree that democratic foreign policy executives are necessarily weak and constrained by domestic politics (Ripsman, 2002, p. 41). Neoclassical realism almost stands in the same direction as the liberals and classical realists defend, but it acknowledges that internal motivations do not necessarily result in the weakness of the state. By doing so, it considers that internal variables can monitor international phenomena through election campaigns. Therefore, a Likud-led aggressive foreign policy was expelled by the Israeli internal motivations. 1992 change in the government was immediately followed by a shift in the formal policy regarding the peace talks, and the Israeli voters authorized Rabin to renew bilateral and multilateral talks with Arab countries under the framework of the Madrid Conference.

The intifada may also have tilted the scales in the direction that finally brought the Oslo Accords. Resistance and civil obedience of the Palestinians in the occupied territories



facilitated shift in the security perception of the Israeli because the decision-makers motivated to engage peace-making by the severe economic crises that threaten their hold on power. As a result of the Palestinian uprising, Israeli politics shifted direction from the aggressive policy to the conflict-resolution. Besides, opinion polls and surveys conducted throughout the years from 1967 to the 1990s exhibited a gradual alteration in public opinion towards a willingness to compromise over the territory and even to a much lower degree to accept the idea of a Palestinian state. Indeed, these changes sharply increased during the intifada, which led to the weaknesses in the Israel's material resources (Golan, 2008, p. 11). Over the years, Israel realized that her expansionist foreign policy triggered more threats from inside and outside the state, and thus peace-making was a fundamental step to ensure security.

Despite the extensive support of the Israeli people, Rabin hesitated to establish a direct channel with the PLO because he was known as Mr. security, who had fought against the PLO for decades and perceived the occupied territory as the holy land of the Zionists. Rabin was indeed extremely cautious when moving ahead with the formal peace talks taking place in Washington in 1992 because Israel's security-oriented expectations were not satisfied by the PLO. Hence, Rabin expelled hundreds of Palestinians believed to be members of Islamic fundamentalist groups. According to the Israelis, the PLO and Arafat were incapable of stopping the Hamas terrorist attacks, and thus they could not end the terrorist acts as promised in the Washington talks. In contrast, the Palestinian leadership believed that the Israeli leaders were not genuine to build peace in line with Palestinian expectations, and henceforth deadlock once again plagued Washington negotiations (Eisenberg and Caplan, 2010).

According to Hermann, the Oslo architects Shimon Peres and Yossi Beilin, both Labor party ministers in his cabinet, did not fully report to Rabin on the informal negotiation channel because of his perception for the PLO (Hermann, 2009, p. 109). In this regard, Rabin had first preferred peace with Syria, as a realpolitiker having always considered Arab states a greater existential threat to Israel than the PLO, he was willing, albeit skeptical, to pursue any track that might bring about a settlement. The Israeli leadership thought that by the Madrid Conference, many Arab countries such as Syria, Jordan, and

Lebanon reached a mutual recognition or agreement with Israel. Therefore, the PLO was left alone and weak by the Arab states, so Israeli were able to compel Palestinian political elites to concede her conditions. To these extents, during the Washington talks, Israel's aggression against the Palestinians persisted in order to discourage the PLO to demand sovereignty over the occupied territories and to put Jerusalem status quo and issue of settlements away from the peace process (Medalia, 2018).

The degree of Israeli material capability was effective and robust, and thus the peace process was shaped according to the interests of the dominant state. Indeed, for the Israeli, Arab states were divided, and weak, as was the PLO in the wake of the Gulf war, while Iran was developing nuclear power to establish her dominancy over the Arab countries. Correspondingly, Rabin's effort was to end Arab-Israeli conflict and protect his country from weapons of mass destruction. To be sure, Israeli decision-makers waited for the right time for the PLO to approve conditions without critical concerns. On the way to the Oslo, Rabin was encouraged by the public, but his realpolitik ideas were stronger than the internal motivations. As Musa described, "I feel like a man who has lost a million dollars and been given ten." (Usher, 1995, p. 11). Israeli leadership' prerequisite for the Oslo was based on the consent of ten by the PLO.

Meanwhile, in the secret corners of Israeli and Palestinian diplomacy, a group of academics launched informal meetings to explore the possibility of negotiating a peace agreement between Israel and the PLO under Yossi Beilin's guidance and encouragement. Beilin was a deputy minister of Israel between 1992-1995. Moreover, Yair Hirschfeld, a lecturer at Haifa University and Ron Pundak, an Israeli historian and journalist, arranged, with the help of Teije Larsen, head of the Norwegian Institute for Applied Social Sciences (FAFO), to meet with Abu Alaa who was sent by the PLO to Norway, head of the PLO finance department, in Tunis as well as Maher El-Kurd, who was a Arafat confidant, and Hassan Asfour, who was a militant communist (Medalia, 2018).

The five-hit it off, and it was decided that the 'track-two diplomacy' –secret back channel– could be opened under the auspices of FAFO and the Norwegian government, in 1992. The negotiations would have to be conducted in the utmost secrecy. Although, Arafat and Beilin were aware of the channel from its inception in July 1992, yet neither Rabin nor

Peres were not informed because their perception about the PLO was too suspicious, especially Rabin's. After eight-month-long consultations, in March 1993, two professors served a draft called the 'Gaza First' in Norwegian letter to Yossi Beilin by whom presented the draft Shimon Peres who was the foreign minister of Israel between 1992-1995. At first, the draft was not taken seriously by the Peres, but he noticed the importance of Abu Alaa's participation because he was the second man of the PLO (Newman, 2011).

However, two Israeli professors were unable to reach an agreement with the Palestinians, because they could not propose any substantial concessions on behalf of the Israeli government of which states law forbid any connections with the Palestinians. Therefore, according to Alaa, these negotiations process was fruitless regarding the capability of the negotiators. These professors operated a vital role to bring rivals to the peacemaking, but their mission ended when there were severe steps waited to be taken. While Rabin implemented hardline policy, and his agenda was related to security and defense concerns rather than cooperation and coexistence. Indeed, Rabin continued a hardline policy against the militant Islamic groups, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, and in March 1993, he closed the occupied territories off as a response to increasing terrorist attacks on the Jewish population (Qurei, 2006).

Unexpectedly, during the secret talks, the intifada shifted the directions, and the use of violence dramatically increased. Hamas and Hezbollah as asymmetrical threats, which reacted occupation by using lethal forces. The peace process with PLO showed no signs of revival. Security concerns and internal reactions forced Rabin to leave his cruel policy and attempted direct negotiations with the PLO. Literally, Rabin was stuck, and in order to maintain his political career, he must have taken the peace process more seriously. Therefore, Rabin and Peres decided to send high-level officials to the Oslo, but their anxiety was the public reaction, and thus peace talks persuaded through the secret channels (Freedman, 2000).

In May 1993, the Director-General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Uri Savir, as well as Joel Singer, a rigid military lawyer, and former colonel joined the negotiations. They imposed Rabin's agenda for the peace process; first security and defense, then cooperation and co-existence. Previous negotiations, documents, and traced all were erased by the

Israeli, and they addressed more urgent issues, such as terrorist attacks on civilians. Furthermore, Rabin refused to talk on the core issues of the conflicts and offered to discuss them at later stages. In doing so, Rabin launched a massive shutdown on the Palestinians living in the occupied territories in order to coerce Palestinians to commence negotiations without preconditions. Palestinians are now banned from crossing the green line and expelled from Israel. (Savir, 1999). Nevertheless, Israeli decision-makers strove to maximize their security at no cost, though this strengthened the material capabilities of terrorist organizations.

The peace process had been blocked several times due to the Israeli and Palestinian disagreement over the definitive border lines, rights of return, uprooting settlements, and dividing Jerusalem. All these questions attempted to be postponed by the Israeli. In contrast, Savir offered the mutual recognition of two parties as a first step of the interim agreement as well as the permission for Arafat to return his homeland in exchange for he demanded to denounce all terrorist attacks against Israel by the PLO. Meanwhile, mainstream media in Israel leaked out to the secret negotiations. The emergence of secret talks in the Israeli media posed a grave threat for the Israeli leadership because of the Likud party, which could accuse Rabin and Peres of as a traitor that conspiring with the Palestinian political elites (Qurei, 2006).

Still, these unit-levels barriers did not stop the ongoing peace process because the international system and external threats unleashed a considerable pressure on the proceeding negotiations to materialize. To be sure, the intervening variables had a low-level impact on foreign policy compared to systemic constraints. Initially, for the both sides, neither opposition parties nor fundamentalist groups had sufficient power to affect negotiation. Nonetheless, the rejectionist camps were adequate to postpone the permanent agreements. Therefore, leading parties were nervous about the opposition parties' reactions. Meanwhile, by mid-August, negotiators reached a full agreement on five issues and Israeli-Palestinian political elites impressed by the mutual concessions that both sides granted.

In order to sustain the peace process functionally, the first two issues were concerned with mutual recognition of the parties. Hence, the PLO admitted Israel's right to exist

peacefully, and her legitimacy in the extent of UN 242 definitive borders while Israeli approved the PLO as a legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Following their acceptance, three stages were provided by the negotiators. The first, Israel would withdraw from Gaza and Jericho and grant the Palestinians authority for self-governance, the second stage which would take place in a year the Palestinians authority would expand to most of the West Bank, the stage three, which concluded permanent peace treaty would be signed within five years, dealing with the core issues of the conflict such as; Jewish settlers in the occupied territories, definitive borders, Palestinians refugees and their right of return, and the status quo of Jerusalem.

In sum, on September 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup>, 1993, letters of mutual recognition were exchanged between Rabin and Arafat by the Norwegian minister of foreign affairs Johan Jørgen Holst. In contrast, the right-wing opponents called Oslo the signing of the treaty treason while Arab opposition parties called Arafat a traitor to the Palestinian cause. However, by the US's substantial support, both peace envoys did not concern to the domestic obstacles on the road to the conflict-resolution. As a consequence, on September 13<sup>th</sup>, 1993, the world witnessed the famous handshake on the White House lawn: the Oslo Accord, essentially a Declaration of Principles (DOP-1993), was signed by both Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. This agreement set out the general guidelines for the negotiations to arrive and laid the foundations for a Palestinian interim self-government in the West Bank and Gaza for a transitional period of five years interim agreements.

### ***5.1.1. Implementation of the Oslo I and the Gaza-Jericho Agreement***

The Gaza-Jericho agreement was signed between Arafat and Rabin in Cairo on May 4, 1994. This agreement was the follow-up agreement of the DOP, in which the details of Palestinian autonomy were finalized on Gaza Strip and Jericho. Palestinian institutions, security issues, safe passage, and specific issues are described in more detail in the Gaza-Jericho treaty. According to the agreement, Israeli military forces have withdrawn from the areas of the Gaza Strip and Jericho, in coordination with a newly established Joint Israeli-Palestinian Security Coordination and Cooperation Committee within three weeks. By the withdrawal, the establishment of the Palestinian police forces also guaranteed by

Israel. Monopoly of legitimate violence was shifted from the Israeli civil administration to the Palestinians (MFA, 1994).

Furthermore, after signing of the DOP, Hamas and Islamic Jihad increased their attacks against the Israeli settlers. In order to stop growing violence, Israeli approved the establishment of the Palestinian police to work under the auspices of the Palestinian Authority and be responsible for internal security and public order. For the confidence-building Israeli also promised to release about five thousand Palestinian prisoners within a five-week period and to negotiate further prisoner releases. During the ceremony, Arafat hesitated to sign the agreement because the treaty was only promoting small withdrawal from Jericho, but after the Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak's insistence, Arafat accepted to sign the agreement. However, the Gaza-Jericho agreement promoted limited autonomy to the PA because Israel retains control of 35-40 percent after withdrawal from the Gaza Strip (Shehadeh, 1994).

### ***5.1.2. The Oslo Accords II and Chance for Future Building***

The Oslo II Agreement, negotiated in the Red Sea port of Taba and on 24 September 1995, was signed in Washington by which Palestinian authority enabled de jure expansion of the Palestinian self-government as well as the legitimacy of the power itself. Together with the agreement, Palestinian authority extended through the occupied territories. However, the accords only promised smaller parts of the occupied territories to Palestinians. By the agreement, West Bank was divided into three areas (Figure 1): area 'A', which considered being under full Palestinian control, in area 'B', Palestinian authority took civic —internal— responsibility for the citizens and Israeli remained responsible for the security, areas 'C', which included East Jerusalem as well as the 60% of the occupied territories, remained under full Israeli control (Newman, 1998, p. 365).




Figure 2. Oslo II Accords and Partition of the Palestinian Lands (Source: Golan, 2008, p. 22).

Furthermore, Israel and the PLO promised to talk core issues of the conflicts — Jerusalem, right of return, settlements, water, and border issues—, and they pledged to solve these disputes no later than May 1996. According to the Oslo II Interim Agreement, the final peace settlements were to conclude by May 1999. However, these details were neglected by the parties. Instead of delivering a resolution for the Israel-Palestinian conflicts, the Oslo accords resulted in bad faith and triggered more violent between rivals. Still, there was no clear interruption separating the two populations and their respective territories. The fact that Israel had full or semi control over the occupied territories, which made no differences with the post-1967 borders amongst the two sides. Moreover, the privileges granted by the Israeli were limited because she was to retain free use of the roads for her military and civilians along with the responsibility for external security around the areas evacuated in the Gaza Strip and Jericho (Pearlman, 2011).

Despite having complete internal control over the area's 'A', Palestinians remained to adhere to Israel because Israel managed to take over all external security, where the borders or edges of area 'A'. The partition was complex, and it transmitted many cities to unconnected to their capitals. For instance, if the Palestinians decided to move from one city to another, they would probably pass through Israeli control, so the Palestinians experience of freedom will always be under Israeli supervision. Besides, in areas 'B' and 'C', Israel was to provide security to all settlements and settlers in the 'B' region and taking security measures in regions 'B' and 'C', but there would also be the Israeli police in 'B' district. Therefore, area 'B' was likely to become area 'C', and there were no measures to insulate these areas (Golan, 2008).

Although Oslo II was complicated, it was very well received by both societies, with over 55 percent support in each nation remaining constant for few years. In addition, apart from the PLO, the Palestinian political factions (left-right) as a whole did not support the peace processes. Especially, the Islamist groups altogether opposed the Oslo Accords (Hassan, 2010-2011). On the Israeli side, opposition arose from the right-wing parties and all the religious parties because they wanted to expulse all Palestinians from Jerusalem rather than granting concessions (Filc and Lebel, 2005). This resulted in the strengthening of the opponents of the peace process among both Israeli and Palestinian public. In Israel, extremist hysteria finally erupted in the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995, just two months after signing the interim Agreement (Lehrs, 2016).

Consequently, in order to assess the peace treaty through the systemic and internal variables, I will elaborate five related issues affected the peace treaty: the first one is what systemic opportunities did transformations contribute for peace to take place, and how did the hegemonic state impel parties to launch the peace process, the second is that, why did the rivals change their perceptions of threat and build the peace, and how their relative material capability formed in the peace process, the third, how did these two leaders come to alter their thoughts and belief system, the fourth, how did the opposition parties react to the peace process and why did the international and national compulsions not stop the threats posed by the opposition parties, the last, how did the coercions of the international system, the perceptions of the leaders and the influence of the opposition parties shape the



public opinion and to what extent did they create a bulwark or incentive for the decision-makers? All are discussed in the following section.

### 5.2. Structural Changes and International Actors Roles During Oslo Accords




Figure 3. Structural Conditions for the Oslo Peace Process.

The Soviet Union ceased to exist on December 31, 1991. The bipolar international system became the US-led global as well as the unipolar international order. By shifting the balance of power towards the US of which mastered the protector of the international system. Upon the demise of the USSR, the ideology-based conflicts between two great power disappeared. Hence, many countries began to bandwagon the US policy in the post-cold war era. To do so, hegemonic power' undertook many tasks beyond her limits, thus weakening herself in the long-run. These tasks can be identified under the aim of international stability, such as moderation, restraint, and forbearance. Accordingly, the US exercised inclusive control over the weak states, which started to worry about their future status quo.

However, there were no sufficient powers to check and balance the US supremacy, thus some states tried to increase their power by improving their material capabilities, or they attempted to build alliances with others to balance the distribution of international power. In order to strengthen their position in the system, the periphery states also posed asymmetrical threats to the hegemon by supporting ethnoreligious organizations. As Waltz presume that the bipolar system must have been remained because threats were predictable and definable for the rivals (Waltz, 1979). Whereas asymmetrical threats were problematic for the states which had regular army because threats did not necessarily come from the outsiders.

During the post-cold war era, structural realists also admitted the significance of domestic motivation as a result of an unbalanced international system nature. There were no more security challengers to hegemon' status quo but domestic variables, such as religion, ethnicity, and self-determination rights of the subordinates were the new risks that could pose threats against the core state and its peripheries. The meaning of asymmetrical threat did not come from the capacity of power, but rather came from its origin which was formed by the internal incentives. Therefore, characteristic of the new challenge could not explain by the structural realists adequately, and intentions for the peace-making also became murky for structural realists' approach. Yet, neoclassical realism can elaborate on the systemic pressures through the specific state's domestic motivations and relative power.

Above all that, Stephen Walt notes that sometimes states must balance threat –balance-of-threat theory–by finding new allies that only possible with the peace agreement (Walt, 1987) because peace processes or alliance-making is only way to maintain hegemon superiority among other actors. In the Middle East, peace processes were the result of the US' interests because she faced with the radical and asymmetrical threats that could not be identified. First in the Madrid Conference then in the Oslo, the US played an important role to moderate rivals, in order to stabilize region for her own interests. For the realists, peace and alliance findings, however, are defined to the liking of the powerful, which may conflict with the preferences and interests of others (Ripsman, 2005).

On the other hand, according to Waltz, the absence of the great threats to US security gave latitude in making foreign policy choices, thus its American policy was generated not only by external security interests but by internal political pressures and national ambitions (Waltz, 2000, p. 29). Therefore, liberal values were spread to international politics by the US in order to resolve inter or intra-states conflicts. To do so, the US intervened Middle East, South Africa, Northern Ireland, and Palestinian-Israeli conflicts by using liberal values to find a feasible solution. However, Waltz also adds that the states, which are in a weak position compared to the US, could also feel uneasy and dependent on the US hegemony. As a result, they can strive to strengthen their position against dominance (Waltz, 2000). In this regard, peace initiatives have two aspects; the first cures the conflicts by balancing rivals with the wide pressures of the hegemon', the second forces rivals' to resist American's impact on their foreign policy decisions.

Under these circumstances, the US considered that Palestinian-Israeli conflicts should be solved by her because this conflict was the primary cause of the Arab-Israeli war and instability in the region. Nevertheless, without a tangible solution, the Americans would face more threats against her interests in the Middle East. The Madrid Conference was the first step of the Oslo Accords and managed to resolve the conflict between the Arab states and Israel, but the Palestinian question could exacerbate this hostility. In the absence of Palestinians right to exist in the occupied territories, the Arab states again would target Israel due to their internal coercions. Therefore, the US hesitated to make direct pressures on the Israeli or Palestinians because any negative disruption in the peace process could pose fatal threats to the US's interests in the region. Moreover, geopolitically, the Middle East had wealthy resources, so in order to maintain US control over natural resources, the Oslo Accords were a peace process that must be concluded successfully. As a result, the DOP was signed in Washington to exhibit American supremacy all around the world.

However, the Oslo accords principally were supported by international actors, yet they did not participate actively. Singularly, the United States played an essential function in the Oslo accords. During Clinton administration, the US compelled both sides to build peace, and in some cases, it succeeded. In the first stages, the US was about to exhibit her muscles around the world that solved a hundred years of conflicts. Assuredly, the US

managed to coerce enemies to recognize each other's existence. However, the role of dominant actors since the Israeli and Palestinians recognized each other was problematic because the US did not push adequately Israeli to recognize Palestinians right of independence because Israel's purpose was not common with the US. Due to the weaknesses in the pressures, internally, the decision-makers could not convince the opposition parties. Externally, Israel desired to uphold her control over the occupied territories and to block the sovereign Palestinian state (Ross, 2005).

The US granted financial and military assistance to Israel and granted the PLO to only financial assistance in an attempt to peace-making as a trump that would force rivals to make concessions. However, instead of compelling both sides to reach an agreement and suggesting how their difficulties could be overcome, the US became embroiled in the peace process. Hence, parties were allowed to use, and often abuse their involvement. The problem was not the accuracy of the US central analysis, but its pessimism about the solution. Weaknesses lay under the US's realist policy and interest-based foreign policy behavior. In fact, she did not want to lose her oldest advanced partner in the region. Furthermore, Israel was the only state capable of balancing the threats of the emerging radical states such as Iraq and Iran. The US-led ideational policies diverted a beneficial role in shaping the Oslo peace process, but even in the unipolar system, states behaved regarding their national interests. Therefore, the United States was not enthusiastic enough to coerce Israel to lose its post-1967 status quo because Israel was a powerful state to balance future threats in the region (Barack, 2005).

Moreover, the USA did not assume enormous responsibility because of the Israeli government, which boggled from giving concessions to Palestine (Khoury, 2016). During the Oslo Accords, the Israeli government never mentioned the independence of Palestine, the right of return for refugees, and return to pre-1967 borders. In addition, the US was not sufficiently forthright in demanding that the Israelis stop settlement activity and that the Palestinians do more combat the terrorism (Rynhold, 2008). Most importantly, Jerusalem reminded on the table with its complex situation. Hence, the USA was expelled by the Israeli government in order to refuse Palestinians right and make the Oslo Accords worthless. As Wohlforth states that the interests can only be reliably gauged when

decision-makers accept unambiguous trade-offs to maximize profits (Wohlforth, 1994, p. 127).

Ultimately, international switches provided a magnificent opportunity for peace to materialize, yet hegemonic power failed to coerce Israel to approve the Palestinian sovereignty. In order to build a sufficient peace process, states must be equivalent, or the hegemon states must fill this gap, but the US did not fill this gap because Israel was the only robust state that relatively could sustain the interests and security of the US. Indeed, neither US interests nor Israeli aim for the peace did not approach the UN 242 resolution or the rights of return, and thus United States' position in the peace table was controversial because for the past two decades one American administration after another has poured a total of over 80 billion dollars into Israel's security (Said, 1996, p. 21). Despite progress on the mental and formal institutional dimension of recognition, the practical meaning of recognition revealed an enormous gap between rivals' core interests. This insatiable ambition led not to mutual trust, but distrust of the parties as well as the lethal reaction of the opposition groups.

By the Oslo accords, the US and Israel endeavored to appease the Arab world for being not targeted by the upcoming Islam-based sectarian wars. They were aware of the rising radical threats in the region as well as inside the US<sup>28</sup>, and the fact that Israel launched the peace process in order to maximize her security. Systemic variables were able to materialize on the peace, but the US had limited capability to force Israel for the peace agreement. Furthermore, Israel's relative gains created another obstacle for a sufficient peace treaty. As Lobell et al. assume that that states do not always respond to the international pressures directly because pressures are translated through the internal variables (Lobell et al., 2009, p. 14). Therefore, in the first place, the Israeli-Palestinian peace failure lay under the weaknesses of systemic pressures on the parties, but the states' relative power and internal variables also created impediments. In the following section, I will explore rivals' relative powers and their interests during the Oslo accords.

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<sup>28</sup> On February 26, 1993, a bomb exploded in New York City. Six people were killed, and more than 1,000 people are treated for injuries. Seven suspects who were from Middle East were convicted of participating in the bombing (CNN, 1993).

### ***5.3. Relative Power of the Rivals and Interest-Maximization***

Neoclassical realism is often associated with the idea that the states' interests are defined exclusively in terms of material power and their relative power amongst the international actors (Rose, 1998). Regarding distribution of material power states define their enemies or alliances by which states strove to maximize their security, and power. Since the beginning, the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts and rival's material capability have been problematic to describe because conflicts were expanded over the international system. Furthermore, the PLO had no territorial sovereignty and monopoly of legitimate violence among its citizens, yet it had legitimacy that derive from Palestinians and the Arab League to represent Palestinians and control the occupied territories. While the US vetoed over and over, Palestinians could not have legitimacy among international actors. Until the Madrid Conference, the complicity of material resources had persuaded, then Palestinians became the single actor resisting the Israeli occupation. In this regard, the Palestinian material resources were related to Arab states relative assistance to the PLO. Therefore, according to Arab states interests, the Palestinian organization strengthened or weakened its material resources.

Indeed, the collapse of the USSR had created a 'new world order' that opened the door for peace in the Middle East, but also shifted balance-of-power in favor of the Israeli. For instance, with the USSR downfall, many Jews from Russia and Eastern Europe emigrated to Israel, and they contributed to more human sources for Israel's settler policy. By allowing many thousands of Jews from the former USSR to immigrate to Israel, the Soviet Union had strengthened the relative material capability of the state of Israel. To these extents, Israel expanded her settler policy, which could change the demographic structure and balance Palestinian demographic dominancy in the occupied territories. Demographic changes weakened PLO's range of motions and material capability. Moreover, Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War weakened two enemies with one stone; the first constrained Iraq's material capability to pose direct threat against Israeli, the second absorbed Iraq's assistance for the PLO. In addition, Arab states withdrew their assistance for the PLO due to its support for Saddam, henceforth PLO diplomatically and financially isolated from Arab states. Finally, Israel could now negotiate with her close neighbors, the Palestinians,

Jordan, and Syria from a position of strength. Shifts in balance-of-power at the regional level compelled the PLO to approve Israel's demands.

Above all that, Israel was the only country that had a nuclear arsenal that provided by France in the 1960s and only country that was never defeated by the Arab states (Yaqup, 2003). Regarding military capability and modernization, Israel was far more glorious than any Arab state. However, the emergence of Hamas restored Palestinian deterrence against Israeli aggressions, but Hamas also posed threat to the PLO legitimacy and divided Palestinian movement into two camp. Therefore, the position of Palestinians was vulnerable, and they were expected to admit all Israeli conditions in the peace table. During the Oslo processes, Israel was in the position of free riding, which extended Jewish settlers, prevented Palestinians from traveling in the occupied areas, and close Palestinians off in the occupied areas. Moreover, the US-led Madrid Conference also strengthened Israel's relative power because other Arab states recognized her right to existence and attempted to balance Israeli with conflict-resolution.

On the other hand, PLO was desperate because of its diplomatic and financial cuts off by the Arab states due to its Gulf war position. Hamas also created a new dimension in the occupied territories and declared its aim to create a Sharia-based Palestinian state by which secular groups became enemies of Hamas. At the beginning of the Oslo talks, Hamas behaved on behalf of the PLO, but later it drew its support back for the Oslo and began to use lethal force against the Israeli civilians. As a matter of fact, aggression of Hamas in some aspect strengthened the PLO position in the peace table because Israeli decision-makers believed that if they had reached a peace settlement, Hamas would have blown away by the Palestinian Authority. Therefore, Hamas sometimes filled the power gap between the opponents by threatening Israel, but sometimes undermined the possibility of the Palestinian independence by conducting terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians. Besides, Iran unleashed another radical threat to Israel and declared its support for the Palestinian question. In this regard, Palestinians strengthened their material capability and coerced Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories and grant concession on the core issues (Roy, 2011). The lack of self-sufficiency produced an interest-based dilemma, namely the replacement of the PLO policy with domestic and

regional actors' radical approaches that continue to create asymmetric threats to Israel or initiating peace talks and bandwagoning the US's policy as a result of a 'new world order'.

Under these conditions, the Oslo process launched between the Israeli-Palestinian delegations. Relatively, Palestinians were much weaker than Israeli because Arafat's support for Iraq during the Kuwait invasion disengaged conflict from the regional vacuum. Afterwards, the rejection of the doctrine of radical states weakened the PLO's material capability. To do so, Palestinians looked for the US back up, but Americans had long interest-based relations with Israel than any other state in the region. According to realists, social trust could only be built through the relationship between near equals (Ben-Porat, 2008). However, the Palestinians position was never near the equal, and the US had little intention of filling this gap. At the same time, radical states or Hamas were not approved by the PLO to strength Palestinian positions in the Oslo.

Above all, Palestinians were the challenge to Israel's existence in the Middle East, and thus from the Israeli perspective, Palestinians were the obstacle against Israel's *raison d'être*. Although not self-sufficient or supported by the hegemon, Palestinians may pose a threat to Israel's power and stability in the region. For instance, the intifada costs 25% of Israeli GDP and increases further over the years (Freedman, 2000). Moreover, within the green line, Israel had about 15% of the Palestinians, who supported the PLO and the sovereign Palestinian state (Pappé, 2011). To be sure, the PLO was not relatively competent to compel Israel to grant concessions, but the Palestinian question had a strong influence on the Arab states, as well as the main motivation for Arab nationalism.

Although the Arab states opposed the support of Arafat and the PLO for Saddam, they never established close diplomatic relations with Israel unless Palestinian sovereignty was achieved. Besides, they also wanted to prevent another Arab-Israeli war, so they remained neutral during the Oslo. Therefore, Israel strengthened his hand against the PLO. Moreover, the settler's policy was another Israel strategy to strengthen her hand. During the Oslo, Israel never stopped the expansion of her settlement policy through the occupied territories. By doing this, Israel revealed that the status quo ante could never be implemented. Even if the Palestinians have limited autonomy, Israel can intervene in the Palestinian government at any time by playing the settler's cards.



Ripsman assures that internationally, the most critical underlying condition relates to the geostrategic situation faced by the regional antagonists (Ripsman, 2015, p. 435). Therefore, the 1967 war established a new geostrategic purpose on the ground. Israeli decision-makers were aware that if the peace process had succeeded, Israel would have lost privileges that the war contributed. Especially, Jerusalem was the most valuable place to secure not only because of its sacredness for the Jewish community but its strategic importance by which Israel exhibits her presence to all Middle Eastern countries. Moreover, the Israeli sides were aware that if they had gone to pre-1967 borders, their concession would not have stayed with Palestine, and thus other Arab states would demand what they lost in the 1967 war. Hence, the Palestinian independence was a threat not only for Israel's survival, but also for Israel's interests and the current status quo. Therefore, Palestinians desire for the statehood was not able to materialize due to Israeli interests and security concerns.

In sum, states do not always respond directly to international pressures because the relative material power of states determines their interests, and then the influences of internal variables help to implement these grand strategies according to the incentives of states. Therefore, the Israeli-Palestinian peace failed not only because of the weakness of systemic coercions on the hostiles, but also the relative power and inequality between the parties entailed the collapse. For the Israeli, the Oslo Accords were the zero-sum game because she had adequate material capability to deter any threats posed by the Palestinians. In essence, Israel's superior position was not interrupted by the hegemon state, contrarily the PLO's weak position remained in the table, and its legitimacy among Palestinians was diminished due to its material incapability to provide the Palestinian state.

Moreover, the threats posed by Hamas and the radical states did not cause Israeli security concerns as much as to grant a concession to a independence Palestinian state. Indeed, Israel could have succeeded in suppressing these threats in the long run, and wherefore the peace process failed to produce mutual benefits. When Israeli realized that PLO's material capability is restricted to block Hamas's attacks, the peace talks almost plagued a deadlock. In the absence of mutual interests, Israeli had difficulties in finding intelligible reasons to sustain the peace process. In contrast, for the Palestinians, there were

tremendous differences between the expectation and the power they had. As a consequence of miscalculated interests and security concerns, the Oslo Accords were initially supposed to be dissolved.

In contrast, by the Oslo Accords, five interim stages were agreed amongst the Palestinian and Israeli parties. Despite the power gaps between rivals and the weaknesses of the international pressures due to weak mediation stance of the US, the lack of mutual interests did not cause a deadlock or sudden collapse of the Oslo Accords. Indeed, Israeli and Palestinian leadership took a broad responsibility in sustaining the Oslo peace process, and in some cases, they succeeded. Therefore, in the following section, I will explore the leaders' role and their perception as an intervening variable in order to show the strength and weaknesses of leaders' influence on foreign policy decisions.

#### ***5.4. Perception of the Leaders and Their Influence on the Oslo Accords***

The Oslo Accords highlighted the role of state leaders in foreign policy decisions. The focus will be on the two principal political leaders, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and the PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. Charismatic leaders such as Arafat and Rabin, historically, provided the opportunity to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. Despite the systemic and internal constraints – weaknesses in promoting peace to embody – Arafat and Rabin found a middle way to compromise, and they resisted the internal pressures and systemic restrictions. Both leaders assumed excessive responsibility for the peace-making due to the weak systemic pressures and near absence of the hegemon moderation, hence their beliefs and ideas played an extensive role in shaping the Oslo Accords.

Yitzhak Rabin was the man, who desired for Israeli security and reached an agreement with his almost fifty-years enemy that seems for Israeli an impossible step to achieve. Rabin was an important figure for the Israeli because he was the first native-born prime minister in the country's history. His ideas were shaped mostly under the Zionist doctrine, during the mandate years. As a young man in the 1940s, he had been the second-in-command of the 'Palmach Haganah<sup>29</sup>', the commando unit of Israel's paramilitary forces,

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<sup>29</sup> By the creation of Israel, Haganah became the Israeli Defense Forces.

trained to prevent Arab attacks on the new Jewish settlements in Palestine (Ephron, 2015). His early military career accompanied many catastrophes for the creation of Israel. For instance, he confessed to 'ethnic cleansing' of Arab areas of Lydda and Ramle about 50.000 Arabs expelled by Rabin-led paramilitary forces (Shipler, 1979).

Furthermore, Rabin's earlier career did not narrow with the Palestinian ethnic cleansing. Rabin's first attempt at diplomacy took place in January 1949, when the Egyptian and Israeli delegates met on the island of Rhodes. However, until the 1967 war, his first priority was a military career in the IDF. Together with the Six-Day War, Rabin became the hero due to his preemptive attack against Egypt's air forces. To do so, in a short time, Israel managed to control a territory three and a half times that of her initial size. Despite the magnificent glory, Rabin was aware that the annexation of the Palestinian lands without granting of citizenship, would result in Arab disease and resistance. Even if they had granted citizenship to Palestinians, there would have been the end of the Jewish states. For Rabin, war was a way of peace, yet building peace with the Palestinians was more challenging than war (Derfler, 2014).

Rabin's political career began with the Labor party in 1968, but he did not play an active role due to his political mission in the US. Subsequent to his retirement from the IDF, he became ambassador to the United States commenced in 1968, serving for about five years. During the 1973 war, he assumed no responsibility, but Rabin contemplated that the US is a necessary partner for Israel's existence. When the Americans demanded Israeli withdraw from the canal, Rabin began to worry about Israeli dependence on the US. Together with the Henry Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy between Egypt and Israel, Rabin also set the stage and established the circumstances, yet it made the little process to reach an agreement, and thus these conditions were left for future Israeli-Egyptian peace-making. While there was also peace initiation with the PLO, but Rabin's rejection for the statehood suddenly resulted in the collapse of the attempt (Ibid.).

Rabin's political career always restricted with Israel's security and interests. His diplomacy of "realpolitik" and security-oriented rule abroad gave him the nickname "Mr. Security". To do so, Rabin who, as a defense minister in the late 1980s, resorted to an 'Iron fist' policy as well as ordered an aggressive crackdown against Palestinian 'shaking

off' for independence in these territories, sometimes violently (Ephron, 2015). However, Rabin realized that the ultimate violence against civilians could produce international reactions, and he was long aware that controlling Palestinians without the civil rights would make Israel a colonial state. Principally, Rabin strove to reach an agreement with Jordan because historically West Bank was connected to Jordan. Instead of giving PLO to limited autonomy, Rabin insisted on a treaty with Jordan and the same was valid for Egypt, but King Hussein and Mubarak disagreed (Levitt and Ross, 2006).

Forthwith, Rabin appeared to comprehend the emergence of Palestinian identity through the occupied territories. There was no longer Arab nationalism in the uprising because Palestinian were fighting for their existence and national identity at the outset. However, he preserved a two-level game against the intifada: the first he continued 'iron fist' policy to suppress Palestinians, and the second he initiated the peace talks with the PLO under the Jordanian roof. Substantially, Rabin's realpolitik ideas gained momentousness during the Palestinian uprising and his policy demonstrated great ideological breakthrough curves for peace. For Rabin, it was an impossible task to perceive and accept the PLO as a legitimate actor, and this was beyond his ideological constraints, but the security concerns of the Israelis encouraged Rabin to compromise (Eisenberg and Caplan, 2010).

First, via the collapse of the USSR, and then with the outbreak of the second Gulf War, Rabin seized a great opportunity for conflict-resolution with Arab states. Especially, with Syria, which could provide accurate threat against Israeli by supporting the PLO, now had lost her superpower ally. Predominantly, Rabin preferred to reach an agreement with the Syria because he thought that containment policy against the PLO would lead to immediate collapse for the Palestinian uprising. Indeed, significant effort was made by the Rabin in order to reach an agreement with Syria and he committed to Assad fully withdraw from the Golan heights, though Assad demanded for the immediate withdraw in a six months. As a result of Assad condition, the peace initiative immediately broke down (Ross, 2016).

Besides, the Madrid Peace Conference did not result in the way that Rabin wished, and Syria remained a grave strategical threat for Israel. Regarding, enlargement of the Islamic fundamentalism in Iran and her backed terrorist organizations Hamas and Hezbollah drew

Rabin's concerns over the Israeli security because these groups were shaping the direction of the intifada by directly threatening the existence of Israel. With the emergence of rising radical threats, Rabin got no choice but to accept the PLO as a peace actor. Initially, Rabin did not object to the peace stages with a PLO, but he was informed about ongoing secret negotiations by Peres, who was the foreign minister of Israel. Eventually, in early July 1993 and still skeptical, but Rabin was assured by the external threats that there was no other choice but to establish a peace with the Palestinians (Derfler, 2014, pp. 147-150).

During the intifada, Rabin discerned that the PLO also showed weaknesses to obtain Arab states' assistance because of its support for Saddam, thus Rabin thought that the PLO ready to reach a deal under the Israeli agenda. Personally, Rabin was the man, who considered to be a legend in Israel history, and wanted to be retired as a peace warrior through the Israel history. Yet, his understandings of peace were never link to the independence of Palestinians or the right of return for the Palestinian refugees. Rabin's idea was to appease Palestinians by furnishing limited sovereignty. Moreover, Rabin was the only trustworthy leader that could receive a vote of confidence from the Israeli public. However, initially, the Oslo secret talks were undertaken by Peres-led, then at the early stages, Rabin took control of the Oslo because he favored a peace and was aware that only he could reach an agreement with the Palestinians (Ephron, 2015).

Under the Norwegian government, it was difficult to reach an agreement because of Norway's restricted capability. Therefore, Rabin always desired to gain the American assistance for the peace insurance because solely the United States could mobilize the international support—political and economic—that was now needed. When Israeli and Palestinian reached mutual understanding, Rabin informed the secretary of the states Warren Christopher about the conditions of the ongoing peace talks. Together with the assurance of the US comprehensive support to the peace, Rabin implied consent to sign a peace document with Arafat, in Washington. On September 9<sup>th</sup>, 1993, Rabin and Arafat exchanged letters of mutual recognition, and Arafat's letter embodied commitments on renounce terror (Ross, 2016).

Following the signing of the Oslo Treaty, Rabin was supported by the Knesset, which ratified Oslo Accord I, 61 to 50, but Netanyahu and Sharon-led Likud party protested the

Oslo Agreement and accused Rabin of treason (Derfler, 2014, p. 160). Although the reaction of opposition parties, Rabin was confident to maintain the Oslo peace process, due to public advocacy, which was considered to be over 50 percent after the agreement. However, the suicide attacks by Hamas and Islamic Jihad against Israeli civilians inside the green line produced a more critical security issues that Rabin had to solve. In principle, Rabin believed that when they reached an agreement, ongoing violent could disappear by Arafat renounce of terrorism, but Rabin's expectations did not meet with the reality. Soon, he become conscious of the fact that the Palestinian movement already was divided into two parts and Arafat had no power to unify.

As a result of rising terrorist attacks, Rabin turned back to 'carrot and stick' policy by which he deported over thousands of Hamas members and ordered the close off the Palestinians in the occupied territories as well as annually, house demolitions rose to over 100 while carried on the peace process with the PLO. On the other hand, in 1994, Rabin signed the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, in which Israel promised to withdraw partly from the Jericho region in the West Bank and partly from the Gaza Strip, within three weeks of signing (Usher, 1995). Meanwhile, inside Israel, the Likud party and ultra-orthodox groups continued to urge Rabin to abandon the peace process. The most extreme reaction to Oslo Accords was the Hebron mosque massacre by Dr. Baruch Goldstein, who was an ultra-orthodox settler, killed 29 Arab worshipers on February 25, 1994 (Rosenblum, 1998). Still, Rabin was the stubborn person, who never gave up believing in the peace.

Nevertheless, the purpose of the peace was never approved by Rabin because he deprecated an independent Palestinian state. Rabin's goal for the peace was limited to Israel's security, and he became confused about the Oslo Accords because the agreement did not fulfill the Israeli security expectations. As a result, public opinion approval for the peace process dramatically decreased to less than 50 percent (Derfler, 2014, p. 167). Despite decreasing in public support, Rabin took a critical step and signed Oslo II Interim Agreement on 28 September 1995 by which established Areas A, B, and C in the West Bank. Two months after signing the Oslo II, in order to improve public advocacy and exhibit peace objectors to Israeli incentives for peace, a huge peace rally launched by Rabin, on November 4<sup>th</sup>, 1995, in Tel-Aviv. However, at the end of the enormous rally,

Rabin assassinated by Yigal Amir, who was a 27-year-old Jewish law student, had links to the far-right Jewish group Eyal (Ephron, 2015).

On the Palestinian side, Yasser Arafat, the legendary leader of the PLO, pulled all bulwarks against the peace initiatives, and he convinced Palestinians for the peace-making. In order to understand Arafat's perception of the peace processes, we must look at Arafat's background and determine how his beliefs and ideas formed in the Oslo Accords. The first, Arafat was born in Cairo, Egypt, but he always assumed that he was born in Jerusalem due to his relatives' origins; in fact, Arafat in some respects was correct<sup>30</sup>. Nevertheless, when the issue comes to Arafat's childhood, it is complicated to tell one story. Arafat accounted for a much controversial statement for his childhood. Therefore, Arafat's political stance can be predicted by his stories. He was the victim of Jerusalem when the Palestinians were exiled from the old-city, or he was the Gazan when people suffered from the Israeli occupation. Indeed, he was always a politician, who considered to be opportunist, and had empathy for the Palestinians living occupied territories (Karsh, 2003).

In his youth, Al-Nakba or the creation of Israel, as with all Arabs, was his most traumatic memory, but he was not directly overwhelmed by the creation of Israel. In Arafat's mind, Al-Nakba occurred because of the Arab states limited back up for their people. Arafat always blamed Arab states for abandoning that Palestinian cause and claimed that Arab states never solidly treated the Palestinian refugees, especially Egypt. For these reasons, his nationalism was separated from the secular-Arab nationalism. Hence, Arafat believed that Palestinian identity was the necessary step to take because all Arab states were unreliable (Rubin, 2005). To be sure, Arafat's distrust of Arab states also shaped the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, and thus he wanted the US to attend the peace process.

Furthermore, Arafat's nationalist roots were flourished by the Palestinian nationalist Sheikh Hassan Abul Saoud, who was Mufti's chief assistant and adviser, in historical Palestine. By the Sheikh Hassan encouragement, Arafat entered Cairo University to study mechanical engineering, in 1947. At the beginning of the university, Arafat joined the secular-based Federation of Palestinian Student's movement, yet his association with the

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<sup>30</sup> Arafat belonged Hussein family that supposed to be the largest Palestinian clan in Jerusalem.

Muslim Brotherhood remained. Arafat was the man, who regardless of ideology and had realpolitik stands the same as Rabin. In 1953, when Arafat was elected as a chairman of the General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS), undoubtedly he sought to build Palestinian identity along with Arab nationalism because at the time, all Palestinian groups needed to Arab state's assistance. Hence, in 1952, when Nasser came into power, Arafat supported him because Nasser was the chief sponsor of the Palestinian cause due to his nationalist doctrine (Aburish, 2012). Nasser's assumption of Arab nationalism had represented a major impact on the development of Arafat's thoughts and the PLO creation, but later he changed this attitude through the Palestinian nationalism.

Despite Nasser's hospitality to Palestinian people by whom Palestinians became an equal citizen, Arafat remained suspicious for the Arab states because of their position in Al-Nakba and craved to establish Palestinian nationalism that was not linked to Arab identity. Arafat's bandwagoning of the Nasser only could explain according to his will and interest, but soon Nasser realized that Arafat was an unreliable ally for Arab nationalism. By 1957, Arafat had to leave Egypt as a result of Nasser's pressures. The fact that Arafat was the invalid and congenital liar leader for the Arab leaders, but he prospered to protect his throne. In essence, in the Palestinian cause, apart from Arafat, there was also no Arab leader belonging to the secular-left organization that was supported by both the Arab monarchies and the Ba'ath parties. Therefore, Arafat found an excellent opportunity to gather the Palestinians around his command (Rubin, 2015).

In 1957, as a result of Nasser's displeasure with Arafat's beliefs, Arafat fled to Kuwait and his colleagues followed him. By 1959, the group, led by Arafat, decided to establish the Fatah movement, stating that the liberation of Palestine was possible only through an armed struggle to be carried out by the Palestinians themselves. Pragmatically, Arafat's ideas shaped the Fatah movement and revealed through the Palestinian people. On this account, Fatah presumed salvation precedes Arab unity, and liberation was considered as the primary step towards Arab unity rather than the regional nationalism. In detail, Fatah did not support any political factions and was open to all. The Fatah movement was related neither with Arab nationalism, nor with the MB, but it was too vulnerable to reject both camps' supports for the sake of the Palestinian national purpose (Aburish, 2012).



In the 1960s, when the Palestinian issue came into the Arab league agenda via Iraq's pressures, Nasser ordered the establishment of an organization representing the Palestinian cause in the Arab League. To do so, the PLO was formed under Ahmad Shuqeiri's leadership, who was the diplomat of Saudi Arabia and dismissed for being an agent of Nasser, in 1964. Ideologically, the PLO shaped the ideology of Fatah so that Arafat's movement became a secular and leftist organization. However, Arafat did not accept Shuqeiri's leadership because he was an Arab nationalist, who followed Nasser's command. Though Fatah was not adequate to stop the process, thus eventually, Arafat approved. While secretly Fatah organized under the Syrian regime and later Syria became Arafat's central supporter until the Lebanon war. Fatah financially subsidized by mostly Gulf states because of their position against Nasser. Since the middle of the 1960s, Fatah commenced attacking Israel through the occupied territories (Karsh, 2003).

Until 1967, Arafat did not fully control the Palestinian organization because Nasser backed Shuqeiri. However, the Six-Day War created a great opportunity for Arafat, who was ready to shape all Palestinian minds through the intifada. Nasser offered him to take control of the PLO and wage war on Israel. Initially, Arafat thought that the only way to win the war against Israel was a civil war, but Palestinians were neither freedom fighters nor politicized people. As expected, Arafat proposed guerrilla warfare against Israeli military bases in the occupied territories. As mentioned above, since Palestinian nationalism had not matured yet, the PLO attacks did not have the capability to mobilize masses for a war of freedom. As a result of these weaknesses, the PLO members were expelled from the occupied territories by the IDF, and Arafat escaped from the West Bank to Jordan. Hence, Arafat always lived in exile such as; Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunis whereas for a short time lived in Palestine, wherefore when Israeli offered him to return the occupied territories, Arafat suddenly accepted (Rubin, 2005).

Besides, except for Iraq, Arafat had gone many problems through Arab states. The first, at the beginning of the 1970s, Jordan was always complaining about Arafat's irresponsible attacks toward the occupied territories and accusing him of broking king's relationship with Israel. Moreover, the PLO commence to operate as a state in the Jordan. Hence, when Arafat decided to counter the king's position and his complainants about the Palestinian

movement, Hussein made a secret deal with Israel to expulse PLO from Jordan. Eventually, during the Jordanian and Palestinian civil war, thousands of people died. To the extent, Arafat was never afraid to put Palestinians life in danger, but this aspect was altered by the Oslo Accords (Aburish, 2012). As a result of Black Friday (1970), the PLO stuff created a new basis for their activities, in Southern Lebanon.

The second, when the Yom Kippur War broke out, Arafat seized an opportunity for the defeat of Israel, but Anwar Sadat reached an agreement with Israel. To do so, Sadat promised not to support the PLO, and Arafat again faced the betrayal of Egypt. In the meantime, the US also offered a peace agreement to Arafat, but he did not approve any solution without sovereignty. The third, personally, Syrian leader Assad never trusted him, so his support for the PLO was always restricted. The last, Lebanon also suffered from the PLO attacks because PLO stuff constructed a new basis for their activities in Southern Lebanon. Afterward, Arafat persevered his terrorist attacks by targeting both to Israel army and civilians, not only in the occupied territories but in abroad the Palestinian organization was responsible for many civilian deaths. Arafat comprehended that by terrorist attacks, the Israeli people, who could change Israel's aggressive policy towards the Palestinians, could force the Zionists to leave the occupied territories.

In 1982, in order to destroy the PLO, Israel invaded Lebanon that caused the third-longest catastrophe for the Palestinians. With the Israel encouragement, archenemies of the PLO found an opportunity to attack Palestinian refugees. Again, the civil war blew up by which resulted in 120.000 deaths (Ahmed, 2019). Syria also destructed PLO military infrastructure there. These Arab countries did not support Arafat because his attacks from Arab states could trigger another war in which Arab states were afraid to lose more territory. Arafat had no chance other than escaping from Lebanon to Tunis. Strategically, Tunis cut all the Palestinian leadership' physical connection with the occupied territories, from now on Arafat armed struggle ended. As a consequences of many catastrophes, Arafat understood that the armed struggle against Israeli had few implications on Israel compared to the hundreds of thousands of death of Palestinians (Karsh, 2003).

Between 1982 and 1987, Arafat's thoughts manifested through the sole Palestinian identity and he built a diplomatic tie with the European and Asian countries. Instead of

waging war against Israel, he started to be a realist and rebuild the PLO legitimacy among Palestinians as well as Arab states by applying soft power. Hereby, when the Palestinian resistance broke out, international actors as a whole began to support the Palestinian cause. Despite the enormous international support, Arafat's concern was not only the Palestinian uprising. In 1991, during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Arafat supported Saddam, although the international communities were opposed to Saddam's invasion. Arafat was not a predictable man because of his complicated cost and benefit calculation (Muslih, 1998).

After severe conflicts with the Arab states, Gulf states became the primary actors that funded Palestinian cause and the PLO. When Arafat declared his support for Iraq, Gulf countries withdrew their financial aid, and Western states' support for the intifada dramatically decreased. Incidentally, Kuwait was the country, which accepted the PLO members, became Arafat's enemy. Furthermore, Arafat also faced opponents in the occupied areas; Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Particularly, Hamas, which was considered to be an MB-based fundamentalist organization, now were supported by the Gulf States. In all aspects, Arafat's support for Iraq was meaningless, and his organization lost approximately 20M\$ assets given by the Gulf states (Rosenblum, 1998).

Apart from Tunis and Iraq, Arafat isolated from Arab states and became an illegitimate leader in the eyes of Arab states. In order to regain his popularity, he was ready to deal with Israeli, and he approved all Israeli demands. The lack of aid from the Arab states and the increased influence of Hamas in the occupied territories made Arafat desperate hence, immediately he launched secret negotiations with Israel. According to Edward Said, Israel would not accept the PLO as a negotiating partner if the PLO did not lose its credibility for the Arab states, so the Israelis were aware that the PLO was in a weak position (Said, 1994, p. xxxi). There is no doubt that Arafat approved all Israeli demands to pursue his political legacy. Therefore, a lot of pro-Palestinian academics accused Arafat for betraying Palestinian cause and for being a dictator. Indeed, they were right to say that because, in the 1970s, Arafat was offered to establish self-autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip provided that it stopped the PLO attacks. Yet, he did not accept (Ibid., 1994).

In sum, the Oslo talks started between the PLO and Israel. Rabin was the realpolitiker and perceived the opportunity to draw peace according to Israel's interests. In contrast, Arafat

had nothing but endured the conditions in order not to lose his legitimacy among Palestinians and Arab states. While there was also new rising power, Hamas challenged Arafat's authority. In contrast, by using lethal violence, Hamas also compelled Rabin to give some compromises. The Oslo talks commenced with the inclusive US assistance, but in later stages, Rabin doubted the American's position for giving many privileges to Palestinians. Despite the hegemon's weak pressures on balancing and the powerful rejection parties' efforts to devastate peace, Rabin and Arafat took enormous responsibility for the continuation of the peace talks.

After signing the Declaration of Principles, Israeli and Palestinian people positively perceived the process. Although a weak international support, the Oslo process was about the achieve its purpose by the leader's incentives. Nonetheless, neoclassical realism notes that if there is a weakness in the international system, we must look at the unit-level variables to explore states' foreign policy behaviors. To do so, two charismatic leaders worked to sustain the peace process, but there were also influential opposition parties on both sides. In the absence of international actors, opposition parties also found a way to ruin the peace process. In essence, financially and politically, the US played a primary role in order to encourage Israeli and Palestinian parties, but Israel's interests confronted with the US demands as well as the PLO failed to provide security in the occupied territories.

Meanwhile, leaders believed that the process could provide security, and thus they played a vital role to appease rejectionist camps. At the end, when Rabin was killed by Yigal Amir, the Oslo peace process immediately collapsed because the leaders were the main players in the peace process. Even if Rabin had not been assassinated, it was considered that the Oslo could collapse due to the uneven relative power of the states. In point of fact, the absence of mutual interests and security concerns led to the Oslo peace processes failure. In this regard, opposition parties also influenced the peace processes. In order to explore rejectionist parties' impact on the Oslo process, we must look at their interests, beliefs, and ideas. Therefore, in the following section, I will observe the perception of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, as well as, the Likud party and Ultra-orthodox organizations about the Oslo Accords.

### ***5.5. The Impact of Opposition Parties and Their Incentives: Obstacles for the Peace***

The second intervening variable analyzed in this study refers to the impact of the opposition parties on the outcome of the peace process. In the case of Oslo accords, Israeli and Palestinian decision-makers always attempted to appease opposition parties in order to stabilize the peace process. However, the both leadership failed to check and balance the rejectionist camps as well as their use of violence. At first, we must look at the rejectionist groups' beliefs and ideas because of their interests and expectations about the agreement shaped by these variables. The privileges of peace were not utilized by Palestinian and Israeli because of the violence of rejectionist radical parties. Therefore, the opposition campaigns mostly shaped public opinion and played a vital role in terrorizing people.

On the one hand, Hamas did not admit the existence of Israel and declared war to annihilate Israel. Despite the peace enterprises, it did not stop targeting civilians. On the other hand, Likud party and its peripheries radical nationalist as well as the Ultra-Orthodox groups, totally rejected peace attempt because they believed that Israel had the power to knock the Palestinian uprising down. To do so, they were terrorizing the settlers. Hence, both parties utilized from the ongoing violence. For radical groups, historical Palestinian land promised to Zionists, thus it must be controlled by Jewish. Moreover, modus vivendi of the Labor party and PLO, disturbed a Hamas-led and Likud-led rejectionist factions because they both started to lose support for their hardline policies. Agreements indicated that Palestinian and Israeli people were likely to solve their conflicts in a peaceful way, yet opposition parties played an influential role in altering these beliefs.

On the Palestinian side, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad organization have terrorized the Palestinian since the intifada. Especially, Hamas which considered to be a political faction of the Palestinian MB, and it has been carried the armed struggle against Israel, since 1988. The roots of these groups came from the MB, but they separated because unlike the MB, Hamas and Islamic Jihad Organization<sup>31</sup> first intended to liberate Palestinians rather than the Islamic Jihad<sup>32</sup>. Hamas was founded by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and his several

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<sup>31</sup> Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami (Islamic Jihad).

<sup>32</sup> It is the Arabic word that literally means fighting or struggling against the enemies of Islam.

closest associates. Prior to Hamas, Yassin also chaired the Palestinian MB-based outreach organizations. Nevertheless, when they were politically involved in the Palestinian cause in 1987, the organization became both political and social organizations. Hamas developed the Qassam Brigade for the military wing and started attacking Israel.

Historically, Hamas's roots came from Hasan al-Banna, who was the founder and leading ideologue of the Egyptian MB. Yet, in extent of Palestinian cause Hamas<sup>33</sup> can elaborate on four stages: first, since 1967 Hamas's roots grown on the Palestinian MB and it was an organization which aimed to provided social and health services to Palestinian without any political assumption, second, between 1976-1981 the organization expanded its influence through professional organizations and recruiting people by Islamic doctrine such as; al-Islamiyya and Islamic University in Gaza, per se, third, by the 'iron fist' policy and Lebanon invasion, Hamas gained political opportunity and extended its influence due to the expulsion of PLO from Lebanon and until 1987, Hamas prepared for the armed struggle against Israeli occupation, last, foundation of Hamas, and an implementing Islamic oriented strategy to destroy Israel along with an armed struggle ( Levitt and Ross, 2006, p. 22).

Furthermore, the Palestinian MB evolved into Hamas, because some members of the MB were opposed to military action, as well as they wanted to maintain their legitimacy for Israel. As mentioned in the previous chapter, since 1967 the Palestinian MB's purpose was to provide education and basic services to Palestinians by which Islamic doctrine — values— would expand through the Palestinians against the PLO's secular and nationalist vision. The priority of the MB was to revise the Palestinians secular worldwide with an Islamic doctrine because they emphasized internal social reform before the foreign political action. However, when the intifada erupted, the Palestinian MB had no choice but participated in the nationalist resistance of Palestinians. Otherwise, the Palestinian MB would lose public advocacy as well as legitimacy. In this context, Islamic Jihad guided to Hamas (Roy, 2011).

During the Palestinian resistance, the radical formation within the MB caused a decline in popularity among Palestinians. Hamas was seemed to be a cadre party rather than

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<sup>33</sup> Harakat al-Muqawwama al-Islamiyya (Islamic Resistance Movement).

representing all Palestinians, and thus at the beginning, its support given by the public was weak. However, the PLO became the party of corruption, and in the occupied territories, some Palestinians believed that the Palestinian leadership hijacking the intifada by recognizing Israel's right to exist. Therefore, the growing popularity of Hamas among Palestinians has developed owing to the PLO's soft policy implementation during the intifada. Indeed, as a result of the PLO's catastrophic policy in the Gulf War, Hamas also increased its legitimacy, and it began to be funded by the Arab states, especially Gulf countries. Hamas now financially got supported by both Arab states, and the Palestinian businessmen lived abroad. Together with the Arab states' economic subsidize, Hamas contributed more services to Palestinians by which Hamas recruited many Palestinians for its *Dawa* – to summon or to invite– (Kristianasen, 1999).

Although the Israeli rejection of Palestinian reality in the Madrid Conference, the PLO had attended to the peace talks under Jordanian delegates, as a result of the PLO decision, Hamas again enlarged internal support for its rejectionist approach. In 1992, Hamas challenged the PLO authority and commence to target Israel's military establishments in the occupied territories. In retaliation, Israel expelled 400 hundred Islamist of whom went to Lebanon and created relationships with the other Islamic groups such as; Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad Organization. Moreover, the degeneration between Hamas and Arafat's Fatah reached its nadir in Gaza with the street battle that leftover 100 injured and three dead. Duly, Hamas lost the street, and it realized that the identity of the Palestinians came before its *Dawa*. As a result, Hamas decided to engage a military option against Israeli fully because Hamas was too weak to fight on two fronts (Ross, 2005).

Above all that, Islamic Jihad Organization, which was the chief enemy of Hamas on the rejectionist camp, originated in the 1970's among Palestinian students in Cairo. Fathi Shiqaqi was thought to be a founder of the Islamic Jihad. The organization as a paramilitary threat was efficient, but it was elitist organization due to its illegitimacy. When the Iranian revolution had erupted, Islamic Jihad embraced the Iranian model of action. In doing so, Islamic Jihad separated from the MB. Unlike Hamas, Islamic Jihad had made little effort to provide primary services to Palestinians, and thus its ideology did not inspire to Palestinian people. In 1988, the organization members mostly expelled or

imprisoned by Israel. Hence, Islamic Jihad established a headquarters in Damascus, Syria and it became chiefly dependent on Syrians financial aids. After the Oslo signings, Hamas and Islamic Jihad met in the same purpose, and they joined the Damascus-based Alliance of Palestinian Forces (APF), in 1993 (Levitt and Ross, 2006).

By the unification of rejectionist side, Hamas established itself as the single largest political opposition in Palestinian society. Attacks of Hamas compelled parties to enter a peace process. However, when the DOP was signed in 1993, Hamas did not recognize the Oslo peace process because its condition for peace was the complete withdrawal of Israeli army from the occupied territories, the release of Palestinian prisoners, and the free elections in the state of Palestine. Henceforth, a peace agreement could be reached by parties. In some respects, Hamas attacks strengthened the PLO's material capability because the PLO was too weak to force Israel to grant concessions. This gap was filled by the attacks of Hamas, because Israel's greatest concern was her security.

In contrast, as Usher mentioned that in January 1994, 70 percent of Israelis said they would consider 'Palestinian autonomy as a failure if terrorists continue to murder Jews' (Usher, 1995, p. 23). Meanwhile, the Hebron massacre was carried out in February 1994 after that Hamas attacks exacerbated, and it started targeting Israeli civilians, who lived inside the green line. Despite the ongoing violent of Hamas against Israeli civilians, less than 20% of the Palestinian people, who lived in the occupied territories, preferred an armed attack against Israeli society, while in the case of Palestinian refugees, Hamas use of violence supported by over than 60% of Palestinians. Public advocacy increased when concerns were related to Palestinian survival in the occupied territories (Abusada, 1998, p. 76). Therefore, Hamas could not be stopped by the PLO as long as it was publicly supported.

To sum up, in the short-term, Hamas attacks strengthened the Palestinian political elites hands in the Oslo, but in the long-term, it unleashed many risks for the Palestinian national struggle and holds no promise for its historical claims of self-determination by terrorist attacks. As the peace process prolonged, the support for Hamas increased. Soon, Israeli decision-makers realized that the PLO or Arafat had no power to stop Hamas and even when the Gaza-Jericho agreement was signed between the Palestinian leadership and Israel in which the PLO got autonomy in certain areas; Hamas did not stop using violence.



The ineffectiveness of the Arab states in the Oslo coerced them to ally with the rejectionist camps. These external supports were the main incentive for the terrorist attacks of Hamas in the Oslo peace process.

Together with Hamas attacks, Israeli beliefs about the peace disappeared, and the Likud party increased its rejectionist influence on the Israeli people. On behalf of the regional actors, Hamas acted sufficiently, and even weaknesses in public advocacy did not hinder extreme policy of Hamas. To be sure, the Palestinian cause concerned all Arab states, and without their assistance, the PLO's efforts for peace were not long-standing. Consequently, Hamas became the foremost supporter of a Likud-led rejectionist campaign because all incursions of Hamas resulted in a fragmentation of peace camp in Israel. As realists note that even eternal rivals might become an ally regarding their interest, Hamas and Likud came together to destroy the peace process.

On the Israeli side, the Likud party's coherent political campaign against the Oslo Accords inspired many Israeli who became rejectionists and reacted the ongoing peace process. Likud party was a central right-wing party, which was considered to be an alternative in government with left-wing coalitions and founded in 1973 by Menachem Begin. Unlike the Labor, the Likud party formed coalitions with minor parties, especially those with an ultra-religious or a nationalist ideology. To do so, its manifest adopted by Zionist dream that considered the right of the Jewish People to Eretz Yisrael —historical Palestine— was eternal and indisputable, and linked to our right to security and peace, and thus peace with Palestinians were unacceptable and Palestinians were the primary obstacles for the greater Israel (Kaplan, 2005).

Despite its religious claimed, the Likud party was considered to be a secular organization. Indeed, Likud was more likely to be realist, thus its use of religion or Zionist dream was directly related to Israeli interests and imperial concerns. Greater Israel project or Zionist doctrine was a useful instrument to convince Israeli people and create legitimacy for its occupation policy. In the 1980s, by the replacement of political elites, Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Defense Minister Ariel (Arik) Sharon came into power, and both elites implemented a catastrophic settlement policy. To do so, Israeli legitimized the annexation

policy of West Bank and Gaza. Likud party had increased settlers sharply, and in 1992, approximately 90.000 people settled in the occupied territories (Shindler, 2002, p. 275).

Historically, the Likud's party manifest could elaborate on two stages, yet these changes were secondarily significant because its purpose of the annexation of Palestinian land never shifted. The first, between 1977-1979, Likud followed a more moderate policy, and by doing so, it established a peace agreement with Egypt in order to smash the anti-Israeli coalition. The second, by the replacement of political elites, the party followed more aggressive 'iron fist' policy against all foreign actors, and it increased Israeli settlement activity in occupied territories. In addition, to regain Israel's supremacy that lost by the 1973 war, the Likud party decided to invade Lebanon and destroyed PLO's military bases. As a result of the invasion, the right-wing government weakened, and thus it needed a coalition to pursue its administration (Peleg, 2000).

In reverse, a Likud-led extensive settlement policy in the occupied territories, and its discriminatory policy towards Palestinians under military law caused the development of a Palestinian national identity, and thus the evolution of Palestinian identity mostly occurred under the Likud administration. Further, the 'Iron fist' policy and segregation of Palestinians in the occupied territories as a whole accounted for the Likud leadership. These events strengthened the Palestinian identity. By the Lebanon invasion, a Likud-led Israel foreign policy became more aggressive, and Palestinians aversion to violence and aggression were ready to explode. In 1987, as a consequence of Likud's imperial concerns, the intifada, which led to the Likud's defeat in the 1992 elections, erupted (Pallis, 1992).

During the Palestinian uprising, under the Likud party administration, Israel was opposed to any peace settlements. Shamir assumed that the Gaza, Judea, and Samaria were the inseparable part of Israel. Since its establishment, the Likud party, which was always loyal to the Zionist doctrine, attempted to grant legitimacy for all Israeli interests and expansions through the Arab lands. Together with promoting only a military solution to the intifada, the Likud leadership exhibited that it was inadequate for conflict management. Even 46 percent of Likud Knesset members favored a Palestinian autonomy in order to provide security and to repair Israel's economy. Besides, Israeli people also

comprehended that the dream of Greater Israel was not applicable, and now as a result of this dream, Israeli people felt insecure inside the green line (Barzilai and Peleg, 1994).

Ideologically, the Likud administrations was not enthusiastic about granting concession to Palestinians. Hence, in the 1992 elections, the Likud party was defeated by the more peace-oriented Labor party, and it became the chief opposition party in Israel politics. After the fall of Likud in 1992 elections, Shamir stepped down from the party leadership, and more moderated leadership came to power. In 1993, Netanyahu, who was elected as a Chairman of Likud Party, endeavored to adopt a 'new world order'. In doing so, Netanyahu tried to soften Likud's position for the Palestinian cause and thus took neoconservative stand for the intifada. Although the Likud's new approach for the Israel foreign policy, the far-right parties changed the Likud newly established doctrine. Hence, Netanyahu returned the orthodox policy of the Likud. In fact, far-right parties were not effective at Likud leadership, but in order to strengthen his autonomy, Netanyahu became hawk defender of Greater Israel policy (Shindler, 2002).

Nevertheless, at the beginning of Oslo, the Likud party did not intervene in the ongoing secret negotiations, yet its coercions for the close the occupied territories off continued. When the Oslo Accords I was signed in White House between Arafat and Rabin, a Likud-led rejectionist strategy unleashed by Netanyahu. For the Likud, any deal with the Palestinians was zero-sum game and Palestinians were foreigners who had to be exiled by the Zionists. Therefore, the Likud's demand was the immediate retreat from the Oslo. Between 1993-1995, even the Labor party surrendered to the pressure of rejectionist camps, and it put extreme pressures on the Palestinians through closure off and the deportations. However, the Israeli decision-makers futile attempts did not appease the rejectionist parties or stop attacks of Hamas.

During the Oslo Accords, the Likud's political campaign and protests also triggered Israeli violence against the Palestinian civilians. Mostly, ultra-nationalist groups and the settlers commenced targeting Palestinians. When the Ibrahimi Mosque massacre took place, Netanyahu compared Goldstein with Arafat, in 1994 (Medalia, 2018). To be sure, the Likud party never honored to death of Palestinians, but now Arafat was the legitimate actor, and by Netanyahu's assumption we can say that the Oslo had no validity for the

right-wing oppositions. After the massacre, Hamas increased terrorist attacks against the Israeli civilians, who lived in the green line. Together with Hamas terrorist attacks, the Likud's party influence in public opinion dramatically increased, and Israeli hope for the peace was about to be lost. Hamas's terrorist operations against Israeli civilians provided a glorious opportunity for a Likud-led rejectionist camp.

Eventually, in 1995, hate speeches of Netanyahu and other radical party leaders against Israeli prime minister encouraged Yigal Amir, who carried out the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin and was associated with the ultra-nationalist groups. Between 1993-1995, the Likud party convinced Israeli people that the peace agreement could not provide the security of the Israeli. During the peace accords, the Likud party mostly targeted PLO for encouraging Hamas terrorist attacks. In essence, terrorist attacks of Hamas granted more opportunities for the Likud parties. After the death of Rabin, temporarily, a Labor-led peace process retrieved support for the peace from the public. However, Hamas increased its terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians. Therefore, in 1996, the Likud party came into power, and a deadlock plagued for the Oslo. In fact, the peace process was already collapsed by Rabin's death (Filc and Lebel, 2005).

Surprisingly, after two months of speculation, during the Israeli election, Hamas decided to reach an agreement with the PA security chief Mohammad Dallah to freeze all armed operations (Kristianasen, 1999, p. 29). To be sure, Hamas reached a ceasefire because it realized that the Labor-led peace process would lose upcoming elections. Hamas and the Likud party were the infinite enemies, but whenever their profit overlapped, these parties did not hesitate to work for the same purpose. Logically, both parties behaved based on the idea that the enemy of my enemy was my friend and their enemy was the ongoing peace agreements.

Furthermore, weaknesses in the international system coerced these groups to intimidate the peace process. First, by the regional actor's supports, Hamas found the material capability to interrupt the peace process. Externally, the suspension of Arab states generated a backlash against the PLO, and thus their support for the Hamas increased. Together with the regional actor's assistance, terrorist incursions of Hamas broke down the Oslo peace process. Second, by the intervention of Hamas, a Likud-led rejectionist

parties found a magnificent opportunity to shape the public advocacy against the peace process. In the absence of beneficial assistance from the third parties, as well as powerful external arbitrators, the Likud leadership found an exclusive chance to convince Israeli to return orthodox policy. The escalation of the violence contributed to another profitable occasion for rejectionist parties. Inevitably, the peace process went down to collapse.

If external actors or the PLO had been able to assure Israel to stop terrorist attacks of Hamas, the Oslo Accords would have provided security and mutual benefit, and the peace would have been successful in the end. On the contrary, Israeli decision-makers were confused about the agreement because they never referred to the resolution of the core issues. Besides, Hamas benefited from the weaknesses of the Oslo and thus recruited some Palestinians to meddle the Israeli-Palestinian peace by using lethal violence. Again, by creating weak pressures on the rivals, international actors, especially the US, provided an opportunity for rejectionist parties to ruin the peace process. Rejectionist camps on both sides utilized the weaknesses of Oslo, yet without calculating their influence on public advocacy, it would be difficult to reach an overall approximation for the failure. To this end, we must discover how rejectionist parties' propagandas shaped the Palestinian and Israeli public opinion.

#### ***5.6. The Role of Public Opinion: Desire for the Perpetual Peace***

The last intervening variable observed in this work adverts to the impact of public opinion on the outcome of the peace process. Public compulsions were the chief internal motivations which forced both Arafat's and Rabin's to initiate peace talks. Therefore, both leaders heavily relied on public advocacy. Together with the strong opposition parties, leaders needed to public assistance in order to pursue the peace talks. However, neither the Israeli nor Palestinians were ready to reach a compromise that peace required and to esteem another side in times of foreseen and unforeseen disasters. Indeed, the public's perception and expectation about the peace formed due to their interests. On the Palestinian front, people believed a peace would bring sovereignty for Palestinians. In contrast, Israeli people considered that the agreement would provide security, and they never supported the independent Palestinian states.

Subsequent to the outbreak of the intifada, social and financial crises mostly affected the Israeli civilians, who were also subjected to the violence of Hamas attacks in the early 1990s. The emergence of security concerns and economic crises coerced the Israeli to change the orthodoxy Zionist doctrine, which contemplated all historical Palestine land promised to the Jews. To do so, in 1992, the Labor's victory signed a climactic scene in Israel's traditional stance to the peace talks. The new government headed by Yitzhak Rabin, who was well known as 'Mr. Security', and in the eyes of the Israeli public, was the most reliable leader to preserve the cause of peace. According to Hermann, the people of Israel chose Rabin to take full responsibility for the Oslo peace process because they were unaware of the cost of political solutions (Hermann, 2008, p. 159).




Figure 4. Israeli Jewish Public Support for the Oslo Process (1994–2008), (Source: Hermann, 2009, p. 279).

As a matter of fact, until 1994, Israeli public did not favor the peace process by the majority. Indeed, the public was not informed by a negotiator party, so the public reaction was also about the process they were not aware of the outgrowths. In addition, an ongoing violence did not coerce Israeli to favor the peace process, though their beliefs for peace

gradually declined. Between 1993-1995, compare to later dates, there were more people rejecting peace agreements with the Palestinians. Nevertheless, according to Figure 4, support for the Oslo never became less than the 40 percent, so it indicates that public opinion remained skeptical, but they were not entirely desperate for a conflict resolution.

Figure 4 also reveals that at the beginning of the Oslo, the opinion of the majority of the Israeli people was not influential on the behavior of decision-makers because international pressures were the foremost concerns of the political elites. During the Oslo agreements, the citizens were not adequately informed by the policymakers, wherefore they were open to the speculation. Still, the process was entirely dependent on the decision-makers who were ambivalent toward a peace process that they approved and blessed. However, Rabin's capability was limited due to the restrictions of democratic constitutions. In democratic states, leaders can respond to international obligations as expected, but internal variables can spoil this process by the elections. Hence, decision-makers refrained from arguing core-issues of the peace agreement due to public coercions. Internal obstructions legitimated Hamas stands in the eyes of Palestinians and thus allowed Hamas to wage war on Israel (Handelman and Chowdhury, 2017).

Moreover, peace required the integration of the communities, yet Israeli people were not ready to affiliate with the Palestinians. The enmity amongst the Israeli and the Palestinian was never resolved because the Oslo peace talks were not institutionalized. Historically, Israeli perceived any peace attempt as a zero-sum game because the land was promised to Jews. Until 1993, Israel never recognized a Palestinian national identity, thus it was challenging steps for the Israeli to recognize Palestinian reality. Public opinion was shaped by the social environment, historical events, and current dynamics. In the case of the social conditions, the intifada, which left an enormous economic crisis and security risk for the Israeli, was executed by Palestinians. Together with the US financial subsidization, the economic disaster repaired, but security became chief obstacles for the Israeli (Lasensky, 2004). Unfortunately, expectations for safety never achieved. From this view, we can say that the Likud campaign against the peace process managed to convince Israeli people mostly, but there was no other turning point in the ongoing negotiations (Grinberg, 2014).

Nevertheless, more Israelis supported the peace treaty after the assassination of Rabin because they realized that terrorism not only arose from the Palestinians but also from the fundamentalist Israeli, who tended to use brutality. Therefore, Rabin's death presented excellent legitimacy among the Israeli people, and their support for the peace became approximately 60 percent. Afterward, terrorist actions of Hamas increased, and within 5 months, 65 Israeli killed by Hamas attacks. As a consequence of terrorism, Israeli public opinion shifted the direction against the peace process (Raviv Et al., 2000). To do so, in 1996, a more security-oriented hawk leader came into power. According to the Figure 4, contrarily to the Likud administration, until 2000, over 50 percent of Israeli continued to support the negotiations. In fact, during the peace process, public opinion had little influence on the leaders because of the weakness of the Israeli democratic institution prevented people from intervening in the peace process. For instance, a 10% threshold for the Knesset parties, excluded the parties which had support for the peace (Barak, 2005).

On the other hand, Palestinian support for the peace processes was much higher than the Israeli because of the intifada during which survival and security of Palestinians directly threatened by Israel's 'iron fist' policy. Between 1987-1994, 1.350 Palestinians were killed by the IDF as well as the Israeli demolished more than hundred-thousand houses (Awad and Hubers, 1993, p. 66). Together with the closures and military suppression, the economic conditions of the Palestinians also deteriorated, and even their primary needs were restricted by Israel. Hence, Palestinians were willing to admit all offers made by the Israeli. In comparison with Israel, the intifada damaged all aspects of life for Palestinians.



**SUPPORT FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS IN SEPTEMBER 1994 BY  
PARTISAN GROUPS\***

Party	Fatah PPP Fida	Natl Ind.	Islamic Ind.	Hamas Jihad	PFLP DFLP	None	Total
Support	82%	51%	36%	29%	15%	51%	642
Oppose	18	49	64	71	85	49	453
Total	513	65	36	146	103	232	N= 1097

\* The number in each cell entry is column percentages.  
Chi-Square value is 262.90, df = 5, Chi-Square test is significant at the .0001.  
Source: Center for Palestine Research and Studies, September 1994.

Figure 5. Palestinian Partisan Groups Support for the Peace (Source: Abusada, 1998, p. 71).

**SUPPORT FOR THE CONTINUATION OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS IN  
1995  
BY PARTISAN GROUPS\***

Party	Fatah PPP Fida	Natl Ind.	Islamic Ind.	Hamas Jihad	PFLP DFLP	None	Total
Support	94%	73%	66%	53%	47%	76%	826
Oppose	6	27	34	47	53	24	233
Total	502	70	90	192	49	156	N= 1059

\* The number in each cell entry is column percentages.  
Chi-Square value is 183.47, df = 5, Chi-Square test is significant at the .0001.  
Source: Center for Palestine Research and Studies, September 1995.

Figure 6. Palestinian Partisan Groups Support for the Peace Attendance (Source: Abusada, 1998, p. 72).

According to the figure 5, Fatah and its peripheries, which has much more member than the other parties heavily supported the peace process. Due to Arafat's charismatic leadership among Palestinians, it is thought that the Palestinians mostly favored the peace process. Moreover, as mentioned in the previous section, public advocacy for Hamas and Islamic Jihad was relatively weak compared to the Palestinian organization. Therefore, the PLO's position represented the majority of Palestinian public opinion. Nevertheless, inside the PLO leftist factions did not fully support the peace process regarding the conditions of the Oslo, which did not address the core issues. Neither in the DOP nor the Gaza-Jericho Agreement Israeli mentioned the independent Palestinian state. By these events, the DFLP and PFLP support for the peace process had sharply decreased and later became even lesser than the Islamic opposition parties.

Furthermore, the opposition groups had different attitudes toward the peace which was also related to Palestinian conditions under the occupation. Surely, Israeli closure off and military oppression persevered through the Oslo process. The expectation of the Palestinians was the entire Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as the establishment of a sovereign state. However, these expectations were undermined by the Oslo circumstances. The Palestinians were considering quick results on the ground, but the process was considerably slow after the signing ceremony in Washington. Contrariwise, Israeli public opinion was noticeably opposed to the idea of the independence Palestinian state. To be sure, Palestinians also began to sense Israeli perception, during the Oslo peace process.

As stated by figure 6, nevertheless, support for the peace continuation entirely approved by the Palestinian parties. The table reveals the fact that when Palestinians believed that the Israeli is serious about withdrawing from the occupied territories, their support for the peace had vigorously increased. Even inside the Islamic Jihad and Hamas, more partisans were supporting the peace process compared to the radical leftist partisans. In essence, in September 1995, the Israeli and Palestinian leadership were close to signing the Oslo II Agreement by which Palestinian Authority expanded its monopoly of legitimate violence over its citizens. However, Palestinians support for the peace was not enough to stop

terrorist attacks of rejectionist parties. Therefore, Palestinian public opinion was not adequate to stabilize peace or to create incentives for these processes.

Moreover, the Oslo peace process did not involve the public in any substantial way, so the public opinion remained skeptical on both sides due to their limited participation. In order to establish peace, societies must be integrated for the future-building. However, the perceptions of the Palestinian and Israeli people were not the leaders' priority. External variables mostly gave direction to the Oslo. In this regard, leaders' purpose and public expectations confronted through the ongoing peace process. In fact, leaders acted in line with public demand, but the public was not amply informed during the implementation of the peace. Hence, for the both sides, public opinion was not influential variable during the Oslo Accords.

In sum, As Pappé mentioned that the both Israeli and Palestinian people were not ready to live together due to their historical experiences (Pappé, 2006, p. 126). Logically, Israeli believed that the Palestinians were not supposed to be lived in Palestine because their beliefs were content with a Zionist doctrine. Whereas, Palestinian nationalist roots grew under the Israeli occupation, together with the Israel hostility, a Palestinian identity has flourished. Both societies were not ready because they had been confronting for a hundred years, and they were not eager to forget what both nations had gone through the Arab-Israeli conflicts. In this context, it was arduous to establish a peace upon historical enmity.

## CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION




Figure 7. Causes of the Oslo Peace Process Breakdown at the Systemic Level.




Figure 8. Internal Constraints for the Peace-making.

In the previous chapters, the Palestinian-Israeli conflicts and peace processes were analyzed. In light of the evidence, the answer posed at the beginning of the study, why did the Oslo Peace process fail to resolve a hundred-year conflict, was proven to be more

security and interest-oriented and complex than anticipated. The Oslo Accords examined in this study were successful in some respects and failed in others. Indeed, the success or failure of the peace treaty was defined by five interrelated outcomes: the achievement of balance-of-power or balance-of-threat between rivals, the fulfillment of the security expectations, the accomplishment of mutual interests, the alliance-building—if it is a necessary—, and the maximization of the relative material gains. Upon drawing these postulates, this study reached several conclusions.

Remarkably, neoclassical realist framework facilitated attaining the results of this research. Due to eclectic logic of neoclassical realism, systemic pressures and relative power of the states are directly or indirectly connected the domestic variables through the states foreign policy behavior. While admitting international system pressures and states' relative power area determining variables, neoclassical realism suggests also elaborating on the internal variables in order to contemplate states' foreign policy behavior. These internal variables are directly affective in foreign policy decisions, yet their influence is not as much as robust systemic pressures and states' relative power. Hence, neoclassical realism notes that the domestic motivations as an intervening variables have short to medium-term influence in the foreign policy decisions (Lobell et al., 2009).

As a consequences of states' distinct relative material capability and diversified internal constraints, neoclassical realists specify states according to their relative material power capability in the international order and domestic institutional motivations (Rose, 1998), and thus the privatization of the state outlining has allowed this thesis to contribute to a separate definition for the Israeli and Palestinian state. Despite having no monopoly of legitimate violence over its citizens, the absence of international legitimacy, and a lack of territorial integrity, the PLO treated as a governor of the failed state with limited legitimacy amongst Palestinians as well as the regional actors. In contrast, the state of Israel was described as a middle-range peripheral state that bandwagoning with the US and balancing power against the USSR-backed regional actors in order to pursue her survival and status quo, as well as the US's interests in the region. Further, Israel was depicted as a relatively superior power in the region.

The number of international relation theories analyzed the Israeli-Palestinian peace processes, yet there were many blurred consequences that did not provide actual reasons lie under the Oslo peace process failure. In the case of neorealist approaches, the generalization of the state definition left a controversial stance to define the position of the Palestinians (Rynhold, 2007). Besides, the Israeli-Palestinian peace processes could not be comprehended regarding purely international system coercions and its outcomes at large because a long-standing Arab-Israeli conflicts shaped states' threat perceptions. However, balance-of-power and balance-of-threats theories managed to clarify the chief incentives for the peace processes, but they could not demonstrate the strong influence of internal actors in the Oslo Accords. The peace processes are the result of multivariate factors, and hence they require both structural and unit-level variables to explain the events.

On the other hand, as a result of a 'new world order', the DPT was formed in an Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Logically, the peace theory is useful when rivals share the same liberal values (Doyle, 1986), but the lack of Palestinian democratic institutions by the Israeli occupation and the emergence of security concerns with the rise of Hamas and radical states revealed the fact that the DPT could not shape the Oslo peace process. In essence, the security concerns and interest maximizations were the main drivers of the peace process. Above all, norms, identities, and perceptions of decision-makers as well as social groups had an impact on the peace agreements, but their direct interventions were limited and short-term. Therefore, constructivist approaches are positioned among the secondary –intervening– factors in the peace process. All of the aforementioned theories have a vital clues through the Oslo, but in particular, none of these theories have given an appropriate explanation for collapse or success. Nevertheless, the overarching logic of neoclassical realism satisfied this gap in the Oslo Accords by combining structural and unit-level variables and utilizing from historical events (Ripsman, 2016).

Furthermore, it is essential to reveal the strengths and weaknesses of neoclassical realism. In this study, neoclassical realism is used as a model. The aim is to test the premises of neoclassical realist theory through the Oslo peace process. Four merits of neoclassical realism can be provided through the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. First, the theory stands

that systemic changes or international system crises can provide opportunities for domestic actors in the short to medium-term during which these intervening variables of states can maximize their relative powers and might become a primary determinant of the state's foreign policy decisions. To these extents, the Palestinian intifada and turmoil in Israel foreign policy behavior can be defined by taking the independent variables as both systemic pressures, and during the transitional periods, unit-level responses through the Oslo Accords. Second, neoclassical realists note that structural and unit-level variables are interrelated, and these correlations are translated by the decision-makers from systemic pressures to internal compulsions (Lobell et al., 2009). Hence, leaders serve as a bridge between systemic and unit-level variables. These two-level coercions shape leaders' perceptions and interests throughout the peace process, and thus the theory reveals an essential role for leaders. By doing so, the theory provides leaders with an area where they can pursue an independent policy in the peace process, as Rabin and Arafat have done against the international system and internal constraints. Third, defining the relative power of states as an independent variable according to their material capabilities assisted the study to observe conditions in the Oslo peace process. Indeed, Israel's supremacy and the weakness of the Palestinian material capability emerged as one of the principal element for the Oslo's failure. The last, the neoclassical realists also emphasize the contingency of history because past events have direct causes on foreign policy behaviors (Rose, 1998). Consequently, in order to understand security concerns and crucial interests of the parties, background of the archrivals must be disclosed. In this regard, the study expounds the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts by taking advantage of past events in the context of the international system order and grand strategy of the rivals. To do so, the theory offers a more in-depth and more valid explanations for the peace accords.

As a matter of fact, neoclassical realism has weaknesses and limitations in examining the foreign policy behavior of states. The theory is usually blamed for being reductionist, which repudiates the core assumption of structural realism (Lobell et al., pp. 21-22). Moreover, some scholars have criticized the multi-causal focus of neoclassical realism, lacks a theoretical rigor and foresight power (Ibid., p. 23). In fact, neoclassical realists presume that the domestic variables short to medium-term can be the primary determinant of state's foreign policy behavior, herewith they do not literally constrain the level of these

domestic influences. Due to the eclectic position of neoclassical realism, the theory has become a more blurred and boundless and thus became controversial for its deductive realist ancestors (Rathbun, 2008, p. 296). Nevertheless, it is believed that neoclassical realism successfully integrates domestic motivations into structural orders without sacrificing the paramount importance of realism. Apart from a theory, it is also admitted that the unit-level dimensions of this thesis have been limited to three intervening variables, which can be the weaknesses of the study. Due to the lack of a Palestinian legitimacy and territorial integrity, the Palestinian state-society relations have not been thoroughly explored during the Oslo peace process. Moreover, Israel's illiberal democratic institutions and semi-influential public opinion established complex state-society relations, wherefore the research could be frustrated at some points.

Sequentially, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process was the result of many independent and interrelated changes at systemic and unit-levels. One of the interrelated factors that were analyzed in the thesis was related to the historical context of the conflicts that shaped the threat and security perceptions of the rivals. Further, the grand strategies of the Israeli and Palestinian invented in the Oslo peace process was, in fact, the result of their historical experience. Therefore, the application of past events to the research provided extensive roots for defining the interest and security concerns of parties throughout the Oslo peace processes. In this regard, the Arab states and Israel perceived each other as a threat to survival due to conflicts of interest. In doing so, threat perception of the hostiles outlined in the conflicts. Until 1967, Arab states and Israel launched three regional wars to maximize their relative material competence. As a consequence of these wars, the regional balance-of-power shifted in favor of the Israeli.

With the disintegration of Arab lands, the Arab-Israeli conflict turned into an Israeli-Palestinian conflict that caused the new regional order. Indeed, Arab states encouraged Palestinians to separate their national identity because the Israeli state became a relatively powerful state in the region. In order to balance the supremacy of Israel, Arab states posed asymmetric threats with a newborn Palestinian identity. Henceforward, the Arab states would balance Israeli threats, but would not receive any direct threats from Israel and would not assume responsibility for protecting Palestinians. However, the international



alteration in power and the decline of the USSR influence in the region led to the collapse of this strategy. Two leading advocates of the Palestinian cause; Egypt and Jordan strived to resolve their conflict with the Israeli in order to bandwagon with the US. Ultimately, these conflict-resolutions diminished the PLO's material capability to pose any functional threat to the Israeli security. Meanwhile, due to regional power shifts, Israel's material capability strengthened, and her occupation of Palestinian lands was legitimized by the pioneer Arab states. Next, with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the PLO became dysfunctional to preserve its legitimacy over the Palestinians and to materialize its grand strategy in the occupied territories.

Nevertheless, Israel miscalculated ideational support of the regional players for the Palestinian question, and thus she invaded Lebanon to destroy the PLO's material capability, but contrary to this policy, the war provided external support for the Palestinian resistance. At the unit-level, Israel also ordered a 'iron fist' policy, which constituted the chief domestic incentive for the intifada. In spite of the relative material loss of PLO due to political change in Egypt and Jordan, the Israeli-Palestinian did exist in the regional vacuum. Therefore, Iraq and Syria challenged Israel's supremacy and supported the PLO. Eventually, Israel faced with two-level crises: first, in the occupied territories, Palestinians resisted the Israeli oppression and commenced to organize under the PLO's splinter groups, second, Israel's irresponsible invasion of Lebanon caused another threat to disrupt the status quo in the region, wherefore security concerns of Iraq and Syria emerged, and thus they challenged the Israeli aggressive foreign policy behavior. Yet, the relative power of anti-Israeli parties was not adequate to challenge Israel's belligerence. Besides, the bipolar international system coercions did not directly force Israel to change her foreign policy behavior because the interests of the US and the USSR clashed in different parts of the region, such as Afghanistan and Iran.

At the end of the 1980s, together with the weakening of the USSR, the bipolar system approached its end, but the transition of this period did not happen suddenly, and the international system crisis emerged. Antonio Gramsci wrote in the Prison Notebooks in the 1930's that the "crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum, a great variety of morbid symptoms appear." (Hoare

and Nowell-Smith, 1971, p. 276). In this context, the study identified morbid symptoms as asymmetric threats produced by subordinates. During the transition period, relatively weak actors maximized their material capability due to the unpredictable nature of the international systems. Meanwhile, the relatively strong states were diminished by the vague threats posed by the international system crisis. Hence, the international system glorified the Palestinians with a magnificent opportunity to materialize their grand strategy. Moreover, the development of national consciousness throughout trade unions, student and youth movements, women's organizations of the Palestinian enabled the extraction and mobilization of material resources.

Under these circumstances, the intifada erupted in 1987. Following the four years, the uprising reached its climate. However, the supremacy of the Israeli side and the limited material capability of the PLO managed to alter Israel's foreign policy behavior but failed to flourish any functional peace processes to conflict. In 1990's, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait resulted in another radical change in the regional and international balance of power, but the Palestinian organization miscalculated forthcoming shifts and supported the Iraqi invasion. The war contributed to a 'new world order' in which the US became the sole superpower of the international system. Together with the Madrid Conference, the transition period of the system expired, and supremacy of American recognized by Arab states. Correspondingly, relatively weak actors began to lose their material capability. Hence, the PLO's deflecting foreign policy decisions, and the transformations in international balance-of-power diminished Arab states' backing for the Palestinian resistance. The fact that Arab states started to bandwagon the US to take advantage of the dominant power. To sum, Israeli-Palestinian peace processes were launched by the US-led new foreign policy doctrine. However, the Israeli position of strengths shaped the peace process, and, according to Israeli conditions, peace negotiations were initiated.

While bipolar international system ceased to exist, the doctrines and ideology of American became the new determinant variable of the international system. The absence of the robust threats to the US hegemony provided wide latitude in foreign policy decisions of the US (Waltz, 2000, p. 29). Herewith, American's domestic political compulsions and national goals emerged through the US foreign policy behavior. On behalf of the unipolar

international system, the hegemon encouraged a liberal value-based conflict-resolutions. To do so, the US aimed to stabilize the regions that can pose threats her supremacy in the system. In the case of a Palestinian-Israeli enmity, the Americans several time initiated the peace talks but until 1993, neither of these phases addressed the conflict-resolutions.

However, with the US's comprehensive supports, on September 13<sup>th</sup>, 1993, the Declaration of Principles was signed by both an Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. This agreement laid down general rules based on the liberal values of the negotiations. Following the two years, this framework was implemented by the parties. First, on 4 May 1994, the Gaza-Jericho agreement was signed in Cairo, and Palestinians established limited autonomy in the Gaza Strip. Then, the Oslo II Treaty was signed in Washington on September 24, 1995, and the Palestinian Authority was allowed to expand Palestinian self-government throughout the West Bank. Consequently, just two months after the signing of the Oslo II Interim Agreement, Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by a member of Israeli radical Ultra-Orthodox groups (Lehrs, 2016). As a consequences of the assassination, the Oslo Accords plagued to a deadlock and then collapsed.

Exclusively, the conclusion of this study will be summarized in the extent of independent, intervening, and dependent variables that directly or indirectly influence on the failure of the Oslo peace process. The independent variables that were dissolved in this study were in accordance with international system pressures on the rivals and relative power of the states. Moreover, systemic-level factors were evaluated as a primary source of this study. The intervening variables that were examined in this study were connected to the leaders' perceptions, opposition parties' influence, and public opinion. In this study, there were two aspects of unit-level variables: on the one hand, leaders at a given time were analyzed as a primary determinant of the peace process because of their extensive responsibility and direct interventions. On the other hand, rejectionist camps and public opinion were analyzed as a secondary variable of this thesis due to their indirect and to some extent, limited influence in the ongoing negotiations. The dependent variables analyzed in this thesis were related to the outcome of the Oslo peace process.

The first, the unbalanced nature of the system, the increasing influence of domestic variables such as religion and ethnicity were new risks that could pose a threat to the US interests. Indeed, the question of Palestine was one of the main incentives for these threats in the Middle East. The Israeli-Palestinian peace process was crucial to counterbalance the growing radical threats and thus to prevent alliances between radical states and other states in the region. Hence, American managed to coerce hostiles to resolve their conflicts, but her position in the peace table was controversial. In essence, there was an immense power gap amongst the parties, and the US was utterly self-sufficient state to fill this gap, yet her long-term and interest-based partnership with Israel prevented her from straining Israel to grant concessions to the Palestinian state. The fact that Israel was the most powerful state that could balance radical states and sustain the US's interests in the region. Therefore, instead of balancing rivals in the Oslo, Americans became embroiled in the Oslo Accords. Subsequently, weak systemic coercions and the absence of dominant power chiefly resulted in the breakdown of the Oslo Accords.

Another primary factor examined in this study was the relative material capabilities of the hostiles. Since the onset of the conflict, Israel and Palestine had not been equal. However, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was widened into regional vacuum due to security perception of the regional actors, and thus Palestine's material capability was enhanced with the support of Arab states. Therefore, the PLO was able to pose adequate threats to the Israeli existence. Despite the Arab states' extensive support for the Palestinian organization, Israel was the only country that had weapons of mass destruction in the region –for some resource's nuclear arsenal (Yaqub, 2003)–. Hence, the threats emitted by the Palestinians or radical states did not cause Israel's security concerns as much as to grant concession to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. In sum, the peace process became zero-sum game for the Israeli due to her superiority over the PLO. In the meantime, the Palestinian material capability was not enough to coerce Israel to compromise on the core issues. The relative inequality of power and the lack of mutual interest amongst the parties caused the collapse.

Although the power gaps between competitors and weaknesses of international pressures, it did not cause the deadlock or sudden collapse of the Oslo Accords. Indeed, the Israeli

and Palestinian leadership played a broad role in sustaining the Oslo peace process. Therefore, the perception of the leaders was analyzed as a semi-independent variable of the study. Arafat and Rabin were authoritarian leaders, the foremost decision-makers, and assumed full responsibility for the peace process. In the case of Rabin, he seized the opportunity to draw peace with the PLO because the material capability of the Palestinian movement was weaker than ever before. Thus, the PLO had no choice but to accept the agreement according to the Israeli terms. In contrast, because of the erroneous foreign policy decision in the Iraq war, Arafat had to submit to Israeli conditions in order not to lose his legitimacy among Palestinians and Arab states. In fact, both leaders were realpolitikers, who wanted to maximize interests and ensure security. In conclusion, despite the international and internal impediments, Arafat and Rabin found a middle way to compromise, so the Oslo peace process lasted three years. However, when Rabin was assassinated, the Oslo Accords immediately collapsed because the leaders were the chief drivers of the peace process.

Even these charismatic leaders were limited when strong opposition camps intervened in the Oslo peace process. In this regard, rejectionist parties and their interests, beliefs, and ideas were analyzed as an intervening variables of this research. The structural conditions provided a great opportunity for the opposition parties because systemic weaknesses raised domestic-based hysteria such as religion and nationalism. On the one hand, by the Oslo Accords, the PLO commence to bandwagon with American, and henceforward the radical states assisted Hamas in order to prevent any peace settlements with the Israeli. By the assistance of the regional actors, terrorist acts of Hamas set the stage for disrupting the Oslo peace process. Meanwhile, by Hamas terrorist attacks, a Likud-led rejectionist campaign found a superb opportunity to speculate the public advocate. In summary, the escalation of violence contributed to another profitable event for the rejectionist parties, and inevitably held a considerable responsibility in the breakdown of the peace process.

Nevertheless, it would be difficult to achieve a general approach to failure, regardless of the impact of the leaders and rejection parties on the public sphere. In this context, public advocacy was examined as the last intervening variable of this study. Neither the Israeli nor Palestinian people were ready to build peace upon the hospitality, but the structural

shifts and security concerns of the public opinion resulted in the approval of the Oslo peace processes. In essence, the expectation of public about the peace process were far from fulfilling. While the people of Israel advocated the peace process to ensure security of Israel, Palestinians supported the peace settlement to establish an independent state. Consequently, on both sides, the public opinion remained skeptical for the ongoing peace accords, indeed they did not commit in the peace process any substantial way. Besides, the majority of Israeli people did not support the peace process until 1995 (Hermann, 2009). In contrast, the majority of the Palestinian people supported the peace process, but they did not have an efficient competence in preventing terrorist attacks of Hamas.

In the light of evidence uncovered in this study, it becomes possible to conclude that the lack of structural pressures and unequal relative material capability prompted the fragmentation of the Oslo Accords. Despite the international system determinant, temporarily, leaders preserved the peace process, and they reacted international order. Still, as neoclassical realists assume that the unit-level variables can directly intervene foreign policy decisions for the short to medium-term, but ultimately they cannot escape the consequences of these misconducts (Lobell et al., 2009). Hence, the miscalculation of leaders produced multiple catastrophic results; first, Rabin was assassinated, second, the use of violence between Israel and Palestine continued to grow, and third, the Israeli-Palestinian people became more divided and polarized. Eventually, structural conditions allowed the failure of the peace treaty to materialize; era, the leaders did not cause drastic shifts in response to systemic coercions on states' foreign policy behavior.

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