


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GETTING TUNED: STIMMUNG, FINITUDE AND ECSTATIC EXPERIENCE



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ABSTRACT

This thesis tries to trace temporal and spatial implication of the “notion” of Stimmung mainly in *Being and Time*, *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* and *Contributions to Philosophy*. Accordingly, Stimmung is evaluated as the temporal and spatial occurrence of the ecstatic experience, displacedness and loss of “sense/meaning”. Time for Heidegger, at least in *Being and Time*, is the key to the meaning of being. Being with respect to its meaning, and time with respect to its origin is observed in the way in which beings become manifest. If the beings get disclosed and become meaningful on the basis of this manifestation, then there should be a connection between beings and our own "ecstatic" being. The existential analytic of Dasein is after uncovering the transcendental horizon in which the meaning of Being in general gets articulated. And this is done through the interpretation and exposing of human being, or Dasein more properly, as temporality. Heidegger is after this hidden relation that lies beneath the presence. He is after Dasein's ecstatic being as being-outside-itself-in-the-world and time. He is after a time that does not present itself, that does not come to presence but traverses all the layers of being and establishes a field where "things make sense". In this study, Stimmung is treated as the key concept through which the articulation of space in the sense of being-in-the-world, and time in the sense of attunement and gaining tempo is displayed. Specifically, Stimmung will be handled as the originary unfolding space of sense.

ÖZET

Bu tez, temelde *Varlık ve Zaman* olmak üzere Heidegger'in *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* ve *Contributions to Philosophy* eserlerinde Stimmung "nosyonunun" zamansal ve mekansal içerimlerinin izini sürmektedir. Heidegger'in bahsi geçen eserleri ile bazı başka makale ve kitaplarında Stimmung, zamansal ve mekansal anlamda dışarıda olma, yerinden edilme ve "anlam" yitimi tecrübesinin meydana geliş hissi olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Heidegger için zaman, en azından *Varlık ve Zaman*'da, varlığın anlamının anahtarıdır. Anlam bakımından varlık ve köken bakımından zaman, varlıkların tezahür ettiği biçimde ele alınır. Varlıklar bu tezahür temelinde açığa çıkıyor ve anlamlı hale geliyorsa, varlıklar ile kendi "dışarıda" varlığımız arasında bir bağlantı olmalıdır. Dasein'in varoluşsal analitiği, varlığın anlamının artiküle edildiği aşkın ufuk olarak ortaya koymaya çalışılır ve bu, Dasein'in zamansal bir varlık ya da zamansallık olarak yorumlanması ve ortaya koyulmasıyla gerçekleştirilir. Heidegger mevcudiyetin altında yatan bu gizli ilişkinin, Dasein'in ve kronolojik zamanın dışında kalan bir alanın peşindedir. Kendisini göstermeyen, varlığa gelmeyen, ancak tüm varlık katmanlarını geçen ve "şeylerin anlamlı olduğu" bir alan oluşturan bir zamanın peşindedir. Bu açıdan Stimmung bu çalışmada dünyada/n olma anlamında mekan; tempo kazanma, uyumlanma ve ritme girme anlamında zaman tecrübesinin dile getirildiği temel "kavram" olarak ele alınacaktır. Hususen Stimmung, varlık/var olma hissinin doğduğu yer olarak okunmaya çalışılacaktır.

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INTRODUCTION

In the second division of *Being and Time*, Heidegger poses and explicates the problem of temporality as the question par excellence. Stakes are high: life and death. But life, in this enormous book, winks at us in the shades of death. "*Death is something that stands before us— something impending [Bevorstand]*" writes Heidegger. As that which stands before us, or that towards which itinerary leads is death: it waits. "We" are *already* late for this unavoidable rendezvous because as the welcoming, it has *always already* been waiting us. Here is where the heart of things pulsates. This is, to Heidegger, what constitutes the basic determination of Dasein. As a finite being, Dasein comes back to itself from this impossibility, from the impossibility of bringing before itself what constitutes its essence. If death, in this sense, is Dasein's possibility of impossibility and its improper possibility, Dasein becomes contaminated, parasited and divided by the improper.¹ On the other hand, although it is impossible to arrive on time to this rendezvous, Heidegger tells us, it gives time, *Es gibt Zeit*. Being-towards-death discloses Dasein and it also discloses *to* Dasein its temporal horizon by granting the direction of a "towards which".

The question Heidegger asks is the question of the "meaning of being". In the Western experience of being, being is said to be first and foremost as presence. Presence as a single sense that envelops every being is the primordial meaning of being because what presents itself makes sense, and what makes sense becomes meaningful. It is in presence that things manifest themselves to us. In this regard, from Aristotle onward *ousia*, interpreted as *parousia* which designates *praes-ens*, is the primordial meaning of being.² Why presence is so important? It is the most important "category" of being because what *is* is first and foremost what is

¹ Jacques Derrida, *Aporias*, tr. by Thomas Dutoit, Stanford University Press, 1993, p. 77.

² Miguel de Beistegui, *The New Heidegger*, Continuum, 2005, p. 60.

present.³ For Heidegger what the whole tradition of Western thought inherited from Aristotle is this idea of presence, and presence does not designate the fundamental meaning of being. Presence cannot think time properly just because this metaphysics thinks the origin of time on the basis of present. The meaning of being as presence presupposes the present as the origin of time.⁴ But this idea of time originating in the present cannot think time "to the ground". Understanding of time based on present is a derivative mode of time and misses the temporalizing of time. It replaces the question of how, i.e. temporalization of time, with the what of time as presence and chronologically ordered nows. For Heidegger, time or temporalization of time as ecstasis is the underlying "phenomenon" below the sense of Being that adherers of the metaphysics of presence fail to reach. Time for Heidegger, at least in *Being and Time*, is the key to the meaning of being. Being with respect to its meaning, and time with respect to its origin is observed in the way in which beings become manifest. If the beings get disclosed and become meaningful on the basis of this manifestation, then there should be a connection between beings and our own "ecstatic" being. The existential analytic of Dasein is after uncovering the transcendental horizon in which the meaning of Being in general gets articulated. And this is done through the interpretation and exposing of human being, or Dasein more properly, as temporality. Heidegger is after this hidden relation that lies beneath the presence. He is after Dasein's ecstatic being as being-outside-itself-in-the-world and time. He is after a time that does not present itself, that does not come to presence but traverses all the layers of being and establishes a field where "things make sense". And Dasein and sein are said to be finite, if they are so, the horizon in which Being becomes meaningful should also be finite. In trying to avoid the understanding of being as presence, Heidegger comes to a point where he needs to "demonstrate" a transcendental horizon that is itself finite, or at least, it should bear traces of finitude to become "meaningful" and to make sense.

³ Ibid., p. 60.

⁴ Ibid., p. 60.

It is the “claim” of this thesis that *Stimmung*, “neither a concept nor a word”, is kind of a *pass* key that opens different locks and doors in Heidegger’s deconstructive building (bauen). But this metaphor does not do justice to his thinking. For Heidegger, when one says “Ich bin”, that is “I am”, or I exist, one says that I build (bauen). This construction is not a stable one because in so far as one exists one has to *assume* it. According to this formula, if one exists, one builds; that is, one has to bear its building, shell and shelter *with* [bei] itself like a snail, just like spending the night wherever it appears to be. According to his understanding, be-ing is a mobility and a motion that cannot be erected, reified or objectified. In so far as one is, that is in so far as one exists, there is always something that exceeds and comes to *pass*, a presence that does not present itself. *Stimmung* is the cling to this coming to pass and in this sense, is the key to the passage between space and time, between Dasein and world, between “human” and animal. At very key instances in Heidegger’s corpus we witness the accompanying or attendance of *Stimmung*. Be it the happening or the event of Being, be it the spacing of time or be it the stupor that holds Dasein and animal, one recognizes that these “couples” are binded together in and through *Stimmung*, in an experience of being *taken away* [benommen] or being *held*. *Stimmung* is in play whenever and wherever a pre-spatial and pre-temporal field of *making sense* is at stake. Thus, it always refers to field where “things make sense”, or *start* to make sense: always a beginning in deferral.

Stimmung is disproportionate and out of place. In Heidegger’s works, *Stimmung* as emotion that sets into motion can be found in different “contexts”. As that which exceeds and comes to pass, it sets the tone for thinking or opens to language, it lets one be taken to the spacing of time or occurrence [geschehen, Geschichte] of being. It would be a very huge task to follow all these tracks. Furthermore, it is very easy to get derailed and run off. That is why I will restrict myself to delineate the play of *Stimmung* in the spacing of time, and focus on the ecstatic experience of being.

In order, I will first explicate this peculiar “notion’s” linguistic fate and its philological neighbors. In so doing I aim to show its essential relation to the spheres of sound, music, tempo, and temporality. In the second chapter, the main task will be to lay open the spatial implications of the term and prepare the “ground” for the time to play its dance. In the third and fourth chapters, I will try to expose Heidegger’s understanding of temporality and its essential relation to spatiality. To this end, I will try to relate the experiences of *Grundstimmungen* (Angst and tiefe Langeweile in focus) to the happening of temporalization and spacing of time. The final chapter, under the light of previous chapters, will try to put temporal and spatial aspects together and search for a possible sense in, or, of finitude.

1. PHILOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS

1. a. *Stimmung*, Tempo, Temporality

By way of an introduction to this key term, I will start with a quotation from one of the most prominent philologists. Leo Spitzer writes the following:

It is a fact that the German word "*Stimmung*" as such is untranslatable. This does not mean that phrases such as *in guter (schlechter) Stimmung sein* could not easily be rendered by Fr. *être en bonne (mauvaise) humeur*, Eng. to be in a good (bad) humor, in a good (bad) mood; *die Stimmung in diesem Bilde (Zimmer)* by *l’atmosphère de ce tableau (cette chambre)* or *l’ambiance...*; *Stimmung hervorrufen* by *to create, to give atmosphere, créer une atmosphère*; *die Stimmung der Börse* by *l’humeur, le climat de la bourse*; *für etwas Stimmung machen* by *to promote*; *die Seele zu Traurigkeit stimmen* by *disposer l’âme à la tristesse etc.* But what is missing in the main European languages is a term that would express the

unity of feelings experienced by man face to face with his environment (a landscape, nature, one's fellow man), and would comprehend and weld together the objective (factual) and the subjective (psychological) into one harmonious unity ...The Frenchman can neither say *l'humeur d'un paysage* nor *mon atmosphere* ..., whereas the German has at his disposal both "the *Stimmung* of a landscape" and "my *Stimmung*." And there is also in the German word a constant relationship with *gestimmt sein*, "to be tuned," which, with its inference of a relative solidarity or agreement with something more comprehensive (a man, a landscape, must be tuned to "something") differentiates it from *state of mind*.⁵

The semantic field of *Stimmung*, as Spitzer points out, indefinitely traverses through diverse topologies and constitutes the tonality of place or "mood" of a landscape, or a situation with pervasiveness. It can leak into a "state of mind", as it can be found in the atmosphere of a room or landscape or a painting. In contradistinction to feeling [*Gefühl*] or emotion [*Emotion*], semantic field of the term proposes that this out-of-place "sense" resists interiorization and confinement, and by this cannot be rendered a property of humans. Neither can it belong to objects in general. Although Spitzer here thinks *Stimmung* as the unity of objective ("factual") and subjective ("psychological"), as we will see in the coming pages, Heidegger proposes it as the place where terms such as "objective" and "subjective" does not suit. It is the place of happening of being: pre-objective, pre-subjective. Let us say in passing, for Heidegger, it is the *place* of taking place of Being and comes before every distinction.

In addition to aforementioned semantics, it is essential to note that the sonic aspect of the word is inseparable from its atmospheric connotations and indeed it comes first from the musical context. As one reads from Grimm Brothers' *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, alongside many indications and uses of the word, it is also

⁵ Leo Spitzer; "Classical and Christian Ideas of World Harmony: Prologomena to an Interpretation of Word 'Stimmung'", in *Traditio*, Vol. 2 (1944), pp. 409-464.

rendered as the musical accord between the elements of a musical instrument, for example, accord of the strings of a violin [Stimmung der geigensaiten]. Stimmung means how the musical instruments are attuned, i.e., how they are accorded to the proper tonality and by this to each other as well.⁶ Grimm Brothers' explanation indicates that Stimmung is not the totality or adding of mere sounds (of strings) of musical instrument. Rather it refers to a kind of *shared space* of musical tonality where different sounds come into a "harmony".

In explaining this word, another Latin word comes to scene: temperament.⁷ *Stimmung*, in this sense, as Agamben tells: "originally belongs to the sphere of musical acoustics. It is semantically linked to the Latin words *concentus* and *temperamentum*, Greek *harmonia* and originally means intonation, chord, harmony."⁸ Although this acoustic usage of the word is displaced in many languages into the sphere of psychology and translated as mood or state-of-mind, in German it still keeps acoustical reverberations. *Temperamentum* as Agamben indicates belongs to the aforementioned acoustical sphere but adding to this semantic complexity, there is also the affective temperament, as in the ethical temperance. The same word inheres an acoustics and ethics in itself. In consonance with the acoustical there is also ethical side to this word. It is neither "outside" nor "inside". In congruence with affective temperament, the word is also related to the atmospheric sphere of temperature and seasons. One should keep in mind this "fabric of the word woven of different etyma" as Spitzer reminds, and be alert to its *temporal* implications when reading Heidegger. In the introduction we indicated that Stimmung plays a key role in temporalization of

⁶ Grimm, *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, X/II, Leipzig, 1960, p. 3128.

⁷ "The concept of *concentus –consenantia – armonia*, cannot be treated without that of *temperare – kerannumi* – and vice versa. Two patterns, both of them ultimately originating in the same pattern of thought, must necessarily and continually have been intertwined. We are here faced with a remarkable phenomenon in semantics: for the modern German word *Stimmung* we must count, not with one etymon, as it usually the case [...], but with a mixture, a fabric woven of different etyma which have lent each other parts of their respective semantic contents, so that the particular modern word *Stimmung* reflects semantically sometimes the one, sometimes the other etymon". Leo Spitzer, "Classical and Christian Ideas of World Harmony: Prolegomena to an Interpretation of the Word "Stimmung" (Part II)", *Traditio*, Vol. 3, 1945, p. 314.

⁸ Giorgio Agamben, "Vocation and Voice", *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 40, No. 2, Winter 2014.

time. Let's briefly mark the etymological neighboring of the word with temper(ament) and temporality and then pass to its link with *Stimme* (voice).

To temper as a verb derives from the late Old English *temprian* "'to moderate, bring to a proper or suitable state, to modify some excessive quality, to restrain within due limits," from Latin *temperare* "observe proper measure, be moderate, restrain oneself," also transitive, "mix correctly, mix in due proportion; regulate, rule, govern, manage." This is often described as from Latin *tempus* "time, season", with a sense of "proper time or season." But as the root sense of *tempus* seems to be "stretch," the words in the "restrain, modify" sense might be from a semantic shift from "stretching" to "measuring" (compare *temple*). Meaning "to make (steel) hard and elastic" is from late 14c. Sense of "tune the pitch of a musical instrument" is recorded from c. 1300."⁹ As the etymology of the word suggests, temperament is related to proportion and observing proper measure, like tuning the pitch of a musical instrument. It is very close to the attuning of the strings in finding a proper tonality of *Stimmung*, as Grimms write. Temperament, is also related to the discussions of four humors in the old medicine. Temperament, we read in the in the article on *temperament*, is the "'proportioned mixture of elements," from Latin *temperamentum* "proper mixture, a mixing in due proportion," from *temperare* "to mix in due proportion, modify, blend; restrain oneself", meant a combination of qualities (hot, cold, moist, dry) that determined the nature of an organism; thus also "a combination of the four humors (sanguine, choleric, phlegmatic, and melancholic) that made up a person's characteristic disposition." General sense of "habit of mind, natural disposition" is from 1821."¹⁰ As the etymology offers, general sense of "state-of-mind" is gained after 1820s. Temperament is not a personal or subjective state. It refers to a *sphere* beyond psychology of moods and related more to the "climate", "mixing" and "blending" with it.

⁹ <https://www.etymonline.com/word/temper> (Etymonline, article on verb to *temper*)

¹⁰ https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=temperament&ref=searchbar_searchhint (the article on *temperament*)

Temper bears an originary relation to tempus, which is “stretching”. (“Dasein is stretched (*erstreckt*)” writes Heidegger in *Being and Time*. This topic will be treated in the third chapter on temporality.) Like the stretching of the steel, Stimmung is related to taking shape in the sense of acquiring elasticity and changing of the “state”, a fluid lava getting a shape. Thus, there is a *tempo*, a movement regarding it. Tempo is, acoustically and musically, “the relative speed of a piece of music.” Recorded in 1724, states the dictionary, the word derives from Italian *tempo* which literally means “time”. Musically speaking, *tempo* can be defined as the gaining speed/tempo of different tones, tonations and tonalities. It can be said that musical tempo is an acoustic variation of different times, temporaryities or *temporalities*; their combination as their contraction, their drawing together and making contract in contrarity, “mixing” with each other. Regarding this kind of tonality Heidegger, in *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, writes the following: “a *Stimmung* is a way, not merely a form or a mode, but a way – in the sense of a melody that does not merely hover over the so-called proper being at hand of man, but that sets the tone for such being, i.e. attunes (*stimmt*) and determines (*be-stimmt*) the manner and way of his being.”¹¹

To close the circle, let me make another short detour and relate the temperament, tempo and temporal(ity). Dating back to late 14th century, *temporal* means “worldly”, “secular”. The dictionary offers that temporal is also ““terrestrial, earthly; temporary, lasting only for a time,” from Old French temporal “earthly,” and directly from Latin *temporalis* “of time, denoting time; but for a time, temporary,” from *tempus* (genitive *temporis*) “time, season, moment, proper time or season,” from Proto-Italic **tempos-* “stretch, measure.”” As it is a finitude being, Dasein is temporary. Its temporality is based on its temporarity, its coming to pass. What is temporary is temporal, related to the tempus, or *temporalis*, to seasons. Stimmung attunes Dasein to finitude, to temporarity; it’s seasonal coming to pass. As the translation of *Sein und Zeit* into French suggests, *Être et*

¹¹ Martin Heidegger, GA 29-30: *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt-Endlichkeit-Einsamkeit*, edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann, 1983 p. 67. *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*, tr. by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker, Indiana University Press, 1995, p. 101.

Temps, Italian *tempo* is displaced with a few modifications into French *temps*. Although there is no direct lingual relation of Stimmung to time, circularly and through a detour of Romance languages we arrived Stimmung's philological neighboring with time.

1.b. The Voice of the Friend, The Voice of the Conscience

"als Hören der Stimme des
Freundes, *den* jedes Dasein
bei sich trägt"* (SZ, §.34,
p.163)

“Stimmungen sind die lautlose
Stimme, in dem das Wesen
des Menschen in seinem
Bezug zum Sein gestimmt
ist.“** (GA 54, Parmenides, p.
157)

Another instance of this rich fabric is the word *Stimme*. *Stimmung* derives from *Stimme*, voice in English. In *Being and Time*, at key instances *Stimme* comes fore: voice of conscience [Stimme des Gewissens] or voice of the friend [Stimme des Freundes]. This of course does not amount to say that the acoustics is the only and whole intent of Heidegger. As Rodolphe Gasché argues: "What is true of *Stimmung*, namely, that it must be understood beyond all psychology of moods, is also true of *Stimme*— although the original basic meaning of the verb *bestimmen* in Middle High German has been 'to name by voice, to fix by voice'."¹²

* "as hearing the voice of the friend which every Dasein carries by itself." (translation is mine)

** "Stimmungen are the soundless voices, in which the essence of human being in its relatedness to being is tuned." (translation is mine). *Parmenides*, Vittorio Klostermann, 2. Auflage, 1992.

¹² Rodolphe Gasché, *Of Minimal Things*, Stanford University Press, 1999, p. 117.

Although *Stimmung* indicates a consonance between Dasein and Being, it is also a dissonance, being-not-at-home [Unheimlichkeit] and thrownness. In so far as *Stimmung* is a connection and articulation; it is at the same time a dis-connection and dis-articulation; it is the threshold where being takes place in giving itself withdrawing.

Dasein carries his friend, bei sich (with or by itself). Dasein does not carry the voice, but rather, as "*den*" carries the friend, it is hearing the voice of the friend in vicinity in his/her absence. Dasein doesn't carry its friend *in itself*. Friend, or friend as voice, is not somewhere in Dasein; but "bei" Dasein; that is, with itself, or by itself. It is the voice of mitsein, or of mit-dasein, that co-incides with Dasein. Voice of the friend, carries Dasein out of itself, ex-poses its being-in-the-world since "this voice permits Dasein to open itself to its own potentiality for being."¹³ Exposition of Dasein means that the voice of the other, is carried "bei sich". In a sense, Dasein carries its double, its other side "bei sich". It is neither inside, nor outside, but "bei sich": at the threshold; or better, as the threshold.

For Heidegger, hearing is not an acoustic phenomenon. Hearing is "the primary and authentic opening of Dasein for its *ownmost* potentiality-for-being (*eigenstes Seinkönnen*)."¹⁴ Thus, the voice derives its importance and indeed essence from hearing [Hören] because Hören is a belonging to another [Zugehören] in the sense of an originary sharing [Mitteilen] in talking [Rede], addressing or responding. What is at stake in hearing or "bei sich tragen" of the voice of the friend is the originary sharing, carrying of the other as friend, or friend as an other. As Dasein hears [hört], it belongs [gehört] to the other. Dasein hears, and in hearing Dasein hears (understands) its being-in-the-world with the other. In hearing, it hears its belonging [Zugehörigkeit] and originary sharing [Mitteilen]. Heidegger says: "As understanding being-in-the-world with the other, it is attentively or obediently *listening* to Mit-dasein and itself. And in this obedient [hörig] listening it belongs,

¹³ Jacques Derrida, "Heidegger's Ear: Philopolemology", in *Reading Heidegger Commemorations*, ed. by John Sallis, Indiana University Press, 1993, p. 172.

¹⁴ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, tr. by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, HarperPerennial, 2008, p. 206.

or it is partner, it participates or shares."¹⁵

Not assigning a certain place to the voice of the friend, neither inside nor outside, neither close nor far away, *bei sich* co-incides with the opening of the *Da* of *Dasein*. This voice participates in the opening of *Dasein*, though the origin or the carrier of this voice is absent. In hearing, *Dasein* understands its being-in-the-world by hearing the voice, of whose carrier is absent. *Dasein* is essentially constituted by this other "*bei sich*", which at the same time, opens to *Dasein* that it is "*bei dem Seienden*", that is, it is side by side and beside beings. In hearing the call, or hearing the voice of the friend, *Dasein* comes to face its uncanny, not-at-home [*Nicht-zu-Hause*] and "non-human" origin. Be it the voice of the friend or the silent voice of the conscience, *Dasein* is brought to its beside, it is brought to the other that faces it essentially [*Wesenhaft*]. Non-human origin here designates the non-transparency or the parasite which *Dasein* cannot appropriate. This amounts to say that *Dasein*, with its non-appropriable double, is essentially and fundamentally open to a touch that always exceeds itself. For Heidegger, in this sense, constitution of *Dasein* never signifies an autonomous subject that gives an image of itself in an act of sovereign representation. On the contrary, this non-human origin always haunts it behind. Non-representable parasitic double calls *Dasein* to its finitude. *Lautlose Stimme* is the *Stimmung* of anxiety that calls and attunes *Dasein* "to the terror of the abyss." Being one of the *Grundstimmungen*, anxiety is for *Dasein* a *lautlose stimme*, a voice without sound that attunes it to the opening up of the world. This voice without sound calls *Dasein* to its non-human origin, to the experience "of the wonder of wonders: that being (*essente*) is."

¹⁵ *Being and Time*, p. 206, (SZ, p. 163).

2. BEING-IN-THE-WORLD

The “*in*” of the “being-in-the-world” for Heidegger is not a question of spatial inclusion. He thinks this “in” in terms of dwelling. He insists that we need to hear in this word “*in*”, the Old German verb *innan*, which means “to inhabit” and “dwell”. Heidegger distinguishes being-in as a characteristic of the being of Dasein from mere spatial location and emphasizes that this “in” of being-in-the-world cannot and should not be thought in terms of mere spatial inclusion. Being-in is tied to residing or dwelling. This kind of dwelling inheres a *sense* of caring, curiosity, curing and looking after; dwelling inheres a sense of attentiveness, a certain *Achtung* toward the world. To be “in” the world is to be neighbor, as the Old English usage of the word literally suggests: it is *neahgebur*; *neah*, near, and *gebur*, dweller. Thus dwelling according to Heidegger, comes before any other form of relation. As it is, or as it unfolds, the world cannot be treated as an object. World is inhabited, it is not a container and cannot be treated as empty space. The world can never be a neutral or indifferent empty space for Dasein. We are always surrounded by beings, we live by [*bei*] and *in* the world. The world is not something objectively present, it is always an environment [*Umwelt*] in which we live:

Being-in, on the other hand, is a state of Dasein's Being; it is an existiale. So one cannot think of it as the Being-present-at-hand of some corporeal Thing (such as a human body) 'in' an entity which is present-at-hand. Nor does the term "Being-in" mean a spatial 'in-one-another-ness' of things present-at-hand, any more than the word 'in' primordially signifies a spatial relationship of this kind. 'In' is derived from “*innan*”—“to reside”, “*habitare*”, “to dwell” [*sich auf halten*]. ‘*An*’ signifies “I am accustomed”, “I am familiar with”, “I look after something”. It has the signification of “*colo*” in the senses of “*habito*” and “*diligo*”. The entity to which Being-in in this signification belongs is one which we have characterized as that entity which in each case I myself am

[bin]. The expression 'bin' is connected with 'bei', and so 'Ich bin' ['I am'] means in its turn "I reside" or "dwell alongside" the world, as that which is familiar to me in such and such a way. "Being" [Sein], as the infinitive of 'ich bin' (that is to say, when it is understood as an *existentiale*), signifies "to reside alongside...", "to be familiar with... ". *"Being-in" is thus the formal existential expression for the Being of Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state.*¹⁶

As indicated for neighbor, Heidegger suggest that being "in" as neighboring means dwelling in the near. "The Nachbar is the Nachbar, the Nachbarbauer, the near-dweller, he who dwells nearby."¹⁷ Dasein dwells near *bei* beings, it is a close neighbor. Why insisting on neighboring? Heidegger delineates a trajectory of relation between building and dwelling with neighboring. Bauen means to build in German and the root *buan* belongs to the family of verbs *buri*, *büren*, *beuren*, *beuron* all signifying "dwelling, the abode, the place of dwelling." Bauen in this etymology means to dwell. Heidegger proposes: "Where the word *bauen* still speaks in its original sense it also says *how far* the nature of dwelling reaches. That is, *bauen*, *buan*, *bhu*, *beo* are our word *bin* in the versions: *ich bin*, I am, *du bist*, you are, the imperative form *bis*, be. What then does *ich bin* mean? The old word *bauen*, to which the *bin* belongs, answers: *ich bin*, *du bist* mean: I dwell, you dwell. The way in which you are and I am, the manner in which we humans are on the earth, is *Buan*, dwelling. To be a human being means to be on the earth as mortal. It means to dwell. The old word *bauen*, which says that man *is* insofar as he *dwells*, this word *bauen* however also means at the same time to cherish and protect, to preserve and care for, specifically to till the soil, to cultivate the vine."¹⁸

Caring for the beings that Dasein is a neighbor to, is to dwell. To dwell is to open

¹⁶ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 79 (SZ, p. 54).

¹⁷ Martin Heidegger, "Building, Dwelling, Thinking", in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, tr. by Albert Hofstadter, HarperPerennial, 2001, p. 145.

¹⁸ Martin Heidegger, "Building, Dwelling, Thinking", in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, tr. by Albert Hofstadter, HarperPerennial, 2001, p. 145.

and build a place for abode. Dasein builds [bauen] a place because it does not have an already given abode and this abode reaches *so far* that it constitutes its essence: its being a *bin*, an *am*-ness, being, or existence. Building in the sense of *bin*, is dwelling, it is staying near to the things around, beings and world in general. Since Dasein is not-at-home [nicht-zu-Hause] in the world, it relates to beings essentially, by the undeniable tie of existence, that is being, by its *bin*: *sein*. Since Dasein is a being of to *be*, that is, it has to be a be [sein], it dwells near to its surrounding. It becomes a near-dweller *bei* (by) beings. Dasein's being at home, is referring to Heidegger's sense of "bei sich", or its coming to itself. In coming to itself, Dasein comes to *bei-sich*, it comes near to things near itself. It is coming to this originary *sense* that the existent comes to exist "for itself". In coming to exist for itself, it comes to exist near *bei-sich*, that is, the others around itself. It exists the other *bei-sich*, the otherness dwelling in its *Da*. Thus this *bei-sich* dwelling refers back to the inability to occupy a place since originally Dasein does not have a place of its own. Dasein has to make its *bin* (*sein*) its neighbor. It has to dwell on its *Da*, and its *be* [*bin* of *Ich bin* and *sein*], refers to the originary pathos. The world makes sense, because Dasein has nothing other than this fabric of being and dwelling. Dasein's being-in does not designate its standing still by beings, it is always ex-isting this world, projecting itself into countless possibilities. And this projection always occurs amidst being and in the world. Being-in-the-world means in this sense nothing other than "to 'inn' the world; to dwell in the world and to enjoy its openness through an initial attunement [Einstimmung] and expansion [Ausgriff]."¹⁹

As Dasein exists, it ex-ists the world. The relation between Dasein and the world is an entanglement and in a sense its relation is a spatial repetition. The world is not the sum total of the things in the world. Dasein is spatial because it is in the world, and not in the world because it is spatial. In dwelling, *innan* of being-in, Dasein is both the active and transitive spacing. In ex-isting, it also exists the *da*-of the world. As an always-already act of inhabiting, Dasein's spatiality cannot be

¹⁹ Peter Sloterdijk, "Nearness and Da-sein: The Spatiality of Being and Time", *Theory, Culture & Society*, 29 (4/5), 2012, p. 37.

separated from its existentiality.²⁰ This is an inescapable result of being thrown in to the there. And by this token Dasein cannot be its there in an indifference. Dasein is always concerned about the world because the world always matters to it. The relation between Dasein and the world is a relation of care (*Sorge*) or concern (*Besorgen*).²¹ As Dasein exists its Da-, it is always the Da- of the world which in turn endures its being in the Da- of Dasein. Dasein takes its Da- from the world which is kind of an umbilical cord that was cut before but trace of which one carries. Da- is inscribed in Dasein and the *experiences of ground* open the Da- anew into the Open like the cut of umbilical cord that individualizes the new born. That is why the world cannot be said to be an object that we put against us. It is first and foremost a relation of *with, beside, by, near or alongside* the world.²² As Heidegger writes: "... the 'above' is what is 'on ceiling'; the 'below' is what is 'on the floor'; the 'behind' is what is 'at the door'; all 'wheres' are discovered and circumspectively [*umsichtig*] interpreted as we go our ways in everyday dealings [*Umgangs*]; they are not ascertained and catalogued by the observational measurement of space."²³

The relation between Dasein and the world is intrinsically spatial. The attitude of Dasein towards the world in this sense cannot be derived from a theoretical understanding of space. It is not an objective relation like an observer treating its object of research in a laboratory:

According to what we have said, being-in is not a 'quality' which Da-sein sometimes has and sometimes does not have, without which it could be just as well as it could with it. It is not the case that human being 'is', and then on top of that has a relation of being to the 'world' which it sometimes takes upon itself. Da-sein is never 'initially' a sort of being which is free from being-in, but which at times is in the mood to take up a 'relation' to the world. This taking up of relations to the world is possible

²⁰ Ibid., p. 37.

²¹ Miguel de Beistegui, *The New Heidegger*, Continuum, 2005, p. 64.

²² Ibid., p. 65.

²³ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 137. (SZ 103).

only because, as being-in-the-world, Da-sein is as it is. This constitution of being is not first derived from the fact that besides the being which has the character of Da-sein there are other beings which are objectively present and meet up with it. These other beings can only 'meet up' 'with' Da-sein because they are able to show themselves of their own accord within a world.²⁴

As an attempt to surpass the trap of *res extensa* and *res cogitans* (which is incapable of providing a *meeting place* for thinking and extension) Heidegger situates the relation in a layer other than the objectivity and articulates it in a pre-objective and pre-subjective dimension which is constitutive of Dasein's existence. In this sense, for Heidegger, even thinking or cognition is a very specific mode of dwelling in the spatiality (*Geräumigkeit*) of the world which gets opened through heedfulness (*Besorgen*):

In directing itself toward... and in grasping something, Da-sein does not first go outside of the inner sphere in which it is initially encapsulated, but, rather, in its primary kind of being, it is always already 'outside' together with some being encountered in the world already discovered. Nor is any inner sphere abandoned when Da-sein dwells together with a being to be known and determines its character. Rather, even in this 'being outside' together with its object, Da-sein is 'inside', correctly understood; that is, it itself exists as the being-in-the-world which knows. Again, the perception of what is known does not take place as a return with one's booty to the 'cabinet' of consciousness after one has gone out and grasped it. Rather, in perceiving, preserving and retaining, the Da-sein that knows remains outside as Da-sein."²⁵

²⁴ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, tr. Joan Stambaugh, State University of New York Press, 1996, p. 53–54.

²⁵ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, tr. Joan Stambaugh, 1996, p. 58.

This originary *relatedness*, that is being in the out, derives from the spatiality of existence. “In accordance with its spatiality, Dasein is initially never here, but over there. From this over there it comes back to its here.”²⁶ Dasein in its being is *einräumend*, a making room for things. Its *daheit*, its being there itself is a clearing of a horizon. The things we encounter, for Heidegger, are located and contained in this *Raum* (space). It is this pre-objective dimension that *belongs to* and *shares both world and Dasein*. The 'Da' of Dasein itself points to this proto-place from which things take place and find their place.²⁷

Dasein dwells in the world, understands it pre-theoretically (even in an “intuitive” way), since the world is related to Dasein's being essentially (*wesenhaft*). But this dwelling in the sense of “being-in” (*innan* in German) presupposes the openness to -and the experience of- that which throws us beyond the familiarity of things into the uncanny of the Open as such, where we find ourselves primarily not-at-home.²⁸ Being-in and dwelling begins with *Unheimlichkeit*. That is why intrinsical spatiality is always a relation of care and concern, because whatever Dasein encounters stems from the danger, danger of being broken (vulnerability) and coming to an end. The chair and carpet in the sitting room wears out, the dust should be cleaned from the kitchen counter, the flowers should be watered, the cats and dogs one sees in the way to home get older day by day. Mother and father are ageing and falling sick. Everything in the world, as being in the world, share this destiny: there is an end, coming closer, gnawing slowly. It can come, and indeed it comes abruptly and as if it were a neighbor climbing up the stairs and knocking on the door. Dwelling in the sense Heidegger uses, begins with *Unheimlichkeit* because everything that there is is subject to the law of finitude. Everything wears out, gets older, becomes sick; they should be nurtured and cared for. Decay, ruination, withering away and rottenness are coming into surface from the *deep* structure of the “in”. That is why Dasein *understands* the basic law of being in the world long before any theoretical approach. Its understanding derives

²⁶ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, tr. Joan Stambaugh, p. 140.

²⁷ Miguel de Beistegui, *The New Heidegger*, p. 65.

²⁸ Miguel de Beistegui, *The New Heidegger*, p. 196.

from its being there, from the “in” that it has to *assume* and *bear*. This pre-theoretical and pre-objective understanding is derived from its intrinsic spatiality. But what does this dimension consist of? How should one understand this originarity in space? *Where* does it come from?

To come closer to this *place* from where a *where* or *anywhere* comes, we need to follow Heidegger’s steps in the clarification of the path. First of all, he delineates two aspects of spatiality of Dasein: *Ent-fernung* and *Aus-richtung*. *Entfernung* is translated as de-severance/de-distancing and *Ausrichtung* as directionality. In the usual sense “fern” refers to distance or remoteness. Television is, for example, in German *Fernseher*. More or less it means the medium with which one watches/sees from distance or from afar. As we have seen in previous chapter, *ent-* is a privative prefix that cancels out or removes. In this sense *Entfernung* means cancelling out the distance. In cancelling the remoteness Dasein’s spatiality brings things closer. In *Entfernung* the remoteness is recognized, but by way of removal of this distance it is brought closer and made less remote: “De-severing [*Entfernung*] amounts to making the farness, and this means the remoteness of something, vanish; it amounts to a bringing close or nearing.”²⁹ The things are encountered from out of this compartment and it is in this way they appear as ‘close’, ‘far’, ‘here’ or ‘there’. The farness or nearness here is not an issue of objective measuring, it is always a relation with the surrounding and things themselves: “The objective distances of things that are merely present do not coincide with the remoteness and closeness of what is ready-to-hand within-the-world.”³⁰ The farness or closeness of the beings around are not a matter of measurement, we are not having an ‘objective’ relation with them. We are always “at a 5 minutes’ distance”, “a smoke’s walking”, “at a stone’s throw”; it is always a relation of existence imbued in life. It is always a qualitative, and most of the time a practical relation. We keep the things “close” to us so as to use them in case of need. We have urge to keep them near: “De-distancing discovers remoteness... Initially and for the most part, de-distancing is a circumspect

²⁹ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 140.

³⁰ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 141.

approaching, a bringing near as supplying, preparing, having at hand... *An essential tendency toward nearness lies in Da-sein.*"³¹

The second spatial character of Dasein is directionality [*Ausrichtung*]: "As being-in which de-distances, Dasein has at the same time the character of directionality. Every bringing near has always taken a direction in a region beforehand from which what is de-distanced approaches... Circumspect heedfulness is a directional de-distancing."³² Dasein is always oriented towards being, and engaged in the activity of 'bringing close'. Existence is always engaged in directions: right, left, here, there, above, below. These directions are all in accord with the things encountered *there*. "Letting inner worldly beings be encountered, which is constitutive for being-in-the-world, is 'giving space'. This 'giving space,' which we call making room, frees things at hand for their spatiality... As circumspect taking care of things in the world, Da-sein can change things around, remove them or 'make room' for them [um-, weg-, und einräumen] only because making room –understood as an existential- belongs to its being-in-the-world... the 'subject', correctly understood ontologically, Da-sein, is spatial."³³

Dasein is directional. Left, right, above and down are the allocations of the there, all these directions are according to something there, according to a "there", to a kind of proto place, the dawn of the place that Dasein is also a "part" of. Dasein directs itself from this "originary place". Directionality, that is *Ausrichtung*, derives its direction from the aus-, from the ex-, from the out. Dasein's spatialization is the experience of or being the Da, the Da- of the out, of out-there. It is in this sense that, and as an "originary" spatial entanglement, Dasein is a room-making being, it clears the space for things to emerge. In letting things to be encountered Dasein gives them space.

For Heidegger, "It is not the case that man 'is' and then has, by way of an extra, a relationship-of-Being towards the 'world' — a world with which he provides

³¹ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, tr. Stambaugh, 1996, p. 97-98.

³² Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, tr. Stambaugh, 1996, p. 100.

³³ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, tr. Stambaugh, 1996, p. 103.

himself occasionally."³⁴ Dasein cannot be thought in isolation from the world, they are inseparable. In the world, Dasein does not meet with something "outside" itself, it always finds itself in the world. Dasein's comportment towards and encounter with beings is prior and this encounter is possible only on the basis of being in the world. And this encounter with an entity is possible just because an entity can "show itself within a world."³⁵ To say that Dasein is always in the world is to say that the world is prior and condition of the sense and understanding.

This priority refers to the facticity of Dasein. "Whenever Dasein is, it is as a Fact; and the factuality of such a Fact is what we shall call Dasein's '*facticity*' [Faktizität]. This is a definite way of Being [Seinsbestimmtheit], and it has a complicated structure which cannot even be grasped *as a problem* until Dasein's basic existential states have been worked out. The concept of '*facticity*' implies that an entity 'within-the-world' has Being-in-the-world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its 'destiny' with the Being of those entities which it encounters within its own world."³⁶ With a certain modification of *a priori*, Heidegger says that "Being-in-the-world is a state of Dasein which is necessary *a priori*..."³⁷ Obviously *a priori* here does not refer to the transcendental ego that "in general determines in advance the constitution of the Being of the entity..."³⁸ To come to terms with the world and encounter the beings "directly" it is necessary to leave aside the ready-made conceptualizations and schemas, presentations and representations and start from the "everydayness". This is the positive side of what Heidegger calls "everydayness". Since Dasein is "always already" in the world it is always already contained and contaminated in the everydayness. This is everydayness in the sense of being-alongside. Dasein's task is to start from where it already finds itself. Aforementioned *a priori* is this place where Dasein finds itself. It is in the everyday occupations and being surrounded by beings in

³⁴ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, tr. Macquarrie & Robinson, p. 84.

³⁵ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 84.

³⁶ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 82.

³⁷ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 79.

³⁸ Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, tr. Richard Taft, Indiana University Press, 1997, p. 15.

the world where Dasein always finds itself. Being-in-the-world belongs to formal structure of Dasein. The world does not refer to something like a trash bin that contains garbage but it is through the formal structure of Dasein that the world touches and makes sense. As Heidegger writes "When Dasein directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does not somehow first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but its primary kind of Being is such that it is always 'outside' alongside entities which it encounters and which belong to a world already discovered."³⁹

Dasein's containment in the world is its being contaminated, and this contamination means being co-constituted with the world. The world is not an entity; it is rather a characteristic of Dasein. "Dasein itself has a 'Being-in-space' of its own, but this in turn possible only *on the basis of Being-in-the-world in general*."⁴⁰ World is not Dasein's property, it is an involvement and involvement never happens in isolation, it is a plural action. As John Sallis says, "an involvement is possible only within a totality of involvements."⁴¹ These involvements according to Heidegger always imply a totality which is concealed in our daily occupations with them. As being-in-the-world Dasein cannot do without these occupations. Since the world belongs to the formal structure of Dasein it is always a concern [Sorge] for it. With these daily occupations, or everydayness in general, Heidegger will show the totality of these involvements through the concepts such as Umwelt, Zeughaftigkeit, 'in-order-to', zuhanden, vorhanden etc. in order to bring forth the gap behind this whole. This gap will show its face when the totality of involvements no longer has any signficatory force. This will mark the rare moments in which Dasein faces its groundlessness/finitude. But before going into that we should have a detour and cover the totality of involvements which is at work in dealings (*praxis*).

³⁹ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 89.

⁴⁰ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 82.

⁴¹ John Sallis, "The Concept of World: A Study in the Phenomenological Ontology of Martin Heidegger", Ph.D. Thesis submitted to Tulane University, 1964, p. 86.

2. a. Tools, Environment, Reference and Totality

"In order to" get a closer look at... In making explanations we frequently employ this kind of a vocabulary and we have right to do so. If we are not referring to something "outside", that is to something like a world, our words will fail to "mean" anything. They will be "meaningless". This "in-order-to" expression is utmost important for Heidegger since it refers to reference and significance in general. This is one of the essential points where Heidegger will interpret the ways of access to worldhood.

Heidegger designates the everyday world of Dasein as environment [Umwelt] and the entities with which "we encounter in concern" is called equipment [Zeug]. The beings, or better, entities which are encountered as equipment are ready-to-hand. And the entities regarded theoretically are present-at-hand.

Taken strictly, Heidegger says, "there 'is' no such a thing as an *equipment*. To the Being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipments, in which it can be this equipment that it is. Equipment is essentially 'something in-order-to...'"⁴² Equipments cannot be isolated, they belong to a totality or to a task such as "serviceability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability." In short, equipments are equipments only insofar as they are in the domain of 'in-order-to'. Heidegger explains this in-order-to structure as following: "Dealings with equipment subordinate themselves to the manifold assignments of the 'in-order-to'. And the sight with which they thus accommodate is circumspection [Umsicht]."⁴³ In the in-order-to lies the reference or assignment. In the horizon of work [that which in-order-to heads] the equipments can be encountered. "The work bears with it that referential totality within which the equipment is encountered."⁴⁴ Only within the circumspect of a "toward-which" do the items show themselves as equipments. Apart from this "toward-which", in the work "there is also a reference or assignment to the 'materials': the work is dependent on leather, thread, needles and

⁴² Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 97.

⁴³ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 98.

⁴⁴ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 99.

the like." Thus it is not only the "towards-which" but also the "whereof" is discovered. Whereof also refers, taking leather into account, to nature around. The animals from which the leather is taken is also in the circumspect. Along with the materials is given the person and public who will use it. "Any work with which one concerns oneself is ready-to-hand not only in the domestic world of the workshop but also in the public world. Along with the public world, the environing Nature is discovered and is accessible to everyone. In roads, streets, bridges, buildings, our concern discovers nature as having some definite direction. A covered railroad platform takes account of bad weather, an installation for public transportation takes account of the darkness... In a clock, account is taken of some definite constellation in the world-system."⁴⁵

From this it can be said that the structure of what is ready-to-hand is determined by the reference or signification. For the equipments to be comprehended and used as equipments we need a pre-ontological understanding of Being. For these "things" to matter, we need a *projection* (which is the ultimate formal/temporal structure of Dasein for Heidegger, at least in *Being and Time*) in which the items could be used and employed. Otherwise these items cannot be rendered tools. The encounter with the equipment is determined by the structure of references. For this complex to be lit up, Heidegger says, we need this totality to be disturbed. "When equipment cannot be used, this implies that the constitutive assignment of the 'in-order-to' to a 'towards-which' has been disturbed. The assignments themselves are not observed; they are rather 'there' when we concernfully submit ourselves to them. But *when assignment has been disturbed*—when something is unusable for some purpose— then the assignment becomes explicit."⁴⁶ What is at stake in the disturbance of the referentiality is the world itself. The world itself gets illuminated as the referential totality. In the disturbance, the context of the equipment is lit up. This context for Heidegger is nothing other than the world. In ready-to-hand and referentiality, Heidegger explicates the worldhood of the world. "The context of equipment is lit up, not as something never seen before,

⁴⁵ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 100-101.

⁴⁶ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 105.

but as a totality constantly sighted beforehand in circumspection. With this totality, however, the world announces itself."⁴⁷

Breaking up of the equipment shows the referentiality and orientation that Dasein structures as an environment. But in this disturbance and break-up, what is lit up is not "just one thing among others."⁴⁸ Rather Dasein comes across an emptiness and "sees for the first time *what* the missing article was ready-to-hand *with*, and *what* it was ready-to-hand *for*."⁴⁹ Through this emptiness, environment announces itself afresh. *With*, *what* and *for* shivers and before any ascertainment or observation the 'there' shows itself in the shivering. Heidegger calls this 'there' which is "... inaccessible to circumspection, so far as circumspection is always directed towards entities; but in each case it has already been disclosed for circumspection." This environment indicates the involvement that never happens in isolation. Involvement gets disturbed and Dasein is put into an in-between where neither ready-to-hand nor the present-at-hand upon which equipment ready-to-hand is founded makes sense. Break-up of the referentiality lights up the totality which reaches to an end and leads back to a final "towards which" where there is no further involvement. This is the moment where place (the rare moment where environment gets stripped of its significance) shows itself as *disclosed*. Heidegger calls this ultimate "towards which" "for-the-sake-of" that "pertains to the Being of Dasein, for which, in its Being, that very Being is essentially an issue."⁵⁰ Since Being of Dasein for Heidegger is its potentiality-for-being, any referential totality points to a potentiality-for-Being and to its disclosed 'there'. This amounts to say that any particular (or ontical) "in-order-to" includes an entire referential structure and the breaking of the this "in-order-to" opens the totality of references which Heidegger calls the "significance". Thus, significance structure comes to fore at the moment when the ready-to-hand and involvement gets broken.

⁴⁷ *ibid.*, p. 105.

⁴⁸ *ibid.*, p. 105.

⁴⁹ *ibid.*, p. 105.

⁵⁰ *ibid.*, p. 116-117.

§ Just like the experience of emptiness in the disturbance of the referentiality, Dasein comes to experience its emptiness in Angst. If we think Dasein as a tool-being, the moment of disturbance/break-up corresponds to the moment of that Grundstimmung that holds Dasein to its own impotentiality and ungroundedness. Just as the lonely and in the "there" standing broken equipment, Dasein comes to its own ungrounded (not referring, not present-at-hand) ground that that faces itself to "save" and collect itself from the ruination. In the experience of anxiety Dasein is not cut off from the world, but it comes to realize that it is essentially bound to it. What gets broken in anxiety, in this sense, is not the essential relation with the world and da, but the familiarity that characterizes its everyday being-in-the-world. Grundstimmung in this sense clears the ways of the access to the world, and it lights up the shadow on things which are most of the time gets reified in their "environment" by the signification system. This lighting up of the world brings Dasein before being.

2. b. Being-in, Disclosedness, Dasein, There

"The entity which is essentially constituted by Being-in-the-world is itself in every case its 'there'."⁵¹ In existing Dasein encounters beings by virtue of its openness (disclosedness) to them and this openness is a characteristic of Dasein's spatiality. Dasein is essentially characterized by a disclosedness that makes possible the disclosure of the world. In section 16 of *Being and Time* Heidegger clarifies the notion of disclosedness as follows: "'Disclose' and 'Disclosedness' will be used as technical terms in the passages that follow, and shall signify 'to lay open' and 'the character of having been laid open' ... 'to disclose' means anything like 'to obtain indirectly by inference.'"⁵² And later on, in the paragraph 28 he establishes the relation between Da (of Dasein) and Disclosedness:

In the expression 'there' we have in view this essential disclosedness. By

⁵¹ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 171.

⁵² Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 105.

reason of this disclosedness, this entity (Dasein), together with the Being-there of the world, is 'there' for itself... By its very nature, Dasein brings its 'there' along with it. If it lacks its 'there', it is not factually the entity which is essentially Dasein; indeed, it is not this entity at all. Dasein is its disclosedness... But in so far as the essence of this entity is existence, the existential proposition, 'Dasein *is* its disclosedness', means at the same time that the Being which is an issue for this entity in its very being is to be its 'there'.⁵³

Dasein "carries in its ownmost Being the character of not being closed off. In the expression 'there' we have view this essential disclosedness."⁵⁴ Beings matter to Dasein thanks to this disclosedness: "... the Being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being is to be its 'there'."⁵⁵ If it were a closed being it couldn't get into touch with the entities. For there to be a surrounding environment and something like 'here' and 'yonder', there has to be something like a there, kind of place that Dasein finds itself and by way of which takes a directionality. In existing Dasein exists it's there. It's being *is* there. "By its very nature, Dasein brings its 'there' along with it. If it lacks its 'there', it is not factually the entity which is essentially Dasein; indeed, it is not this entity at all. *Dasein is its disclosedness*."⁵⁶ Disclosedness inheres coming into the open and light. Dasein is its disclosedness means at the same time that it is not confined in somewhere, it is not buried, closed-off and staying in the darkness. "To say that it is 'illuminated' means that *as* Being-in-the-world it is cleared in itself, not through any other entity, but in such a way that it *is* itself the clearing." This is tantamount to saying that Dasein's being-in-the-world is identical with its disclosive character. Dasein exists as disclosive: "Dasein is its disclosedness' means at the same time that the Being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being is to be its 'there'."⁵⁷

⁵³ *Being and Time*, p. 170.

⁵⁴ *Being and Time*, p. 171

⁵⁵ *Being and Time*, p. 171.

⁵⁶ *Being and Time*, p. 171.

⁵⁷ *Being and Time*, p. 171.

For Dasein to be its 'there' means "to be open for the disclosive encounter with the entities."⁵⁸ But as we have seen in the foregoing pages, this encounter can be possible only on the basis of understanding of Being of these entities. Readiness-to-hand was the term Heidegger employed in describing this situation and everydayness was the horizon for this encounter. This horizon was the structure of significance as the everyday world of Dasein. Thus, ready-to-hand is constituted by the significance structure and if Dasein is open for an encounter with those entities, it has to be in the world. Risking the repetition, we should remember that the structure of significance could be understood as a significance structure as a whole only on the basis of its breakability. When the significance structure gets disturbed (or the ready-to-hand gets broken), the world retreats "as a whole". Dasein as a disclosive being is also disclosed to this retreat of "significance" and of the world. But how does this happen? How does Dasein come to experience this fading away of the world and still have a *sense* for it? Since being-in-the-world is an essential characteristic of Dasein, how can it be possible for it to "articulate" this fading away of the world? In other words, how is it possible to come to terms with 'outside' in staying 'inside' the world?

3. TOWARDS DEATH

Being is not in a place, but Dasein finds himself always surrounded by beings. It finds itself always-already being in openness [Offenheit]. Heidegger, in section 29 of *Being and Time*, introduces *Stimmung* as "fundamental existential" way through which Dasein opens itself to itself, or, encounters its being openedness in the openness. *Stimmung*, insofar as it carries Dasein in its Da, accomplishes the "primary disclosure of the world" [*die primäre Entdeckung der Welt*]. Said in advance, *Stimmung* is the place where the world opens; it is its opening place. What is at stake in *Stimmung*, in this sense, is not the ontical plane -that which we can feel in the world as this or that thing- but the ontological plane, namely the

⁵⁸ John Sallis, *ibid.*, p. 133.

self-opening of the world. To this end Heidegger states the following: "it does not come from the outside nor from the inside but arises in being-in-the-world itself as a mode of that being."⁵⁹ In the following passages, he goes on to add: "To be in *Stimmung* is not initially related to something psychical, it is itself not an inner condition which then in some mysterious way reaches out and leaves its mark on things and persons." *Stimmung* is neither in the world, nor out of it; but at its limit conjoining with Dasein's Da. In and through *Stimmung* Dasein finds an orientation. Dasein's orientation is not derived from consciousness; it is anterior to it. Before anything else world opens itself in and as Dasein's Da, holding this openness as the originary opening of both world and the Da. This is why being-there is always already being in a *Stimmung*. Dasein is always already in an openness; which opens itself to Dasein simultaneously opens Dasein. World opens itself to Dasein in *Stimmung*. As Agamben says: "We could say then that more than being is itself in a place, *Stimmung* is itself the place of the opening of the world, the place of being itself."⁶⁰

Here we should stop for a moment and look at this opening more closely because in this opening, Heidegger claims, also lurks concealment. In a similar fashion to Dasein's "double", unconcealment of the world veils itself. How does this happen and what is the relation between *Stimmung* and this concealing unconcealment? To get close to matter at hand, perhaps it is better here to make short detour to highlight some passages from the section 40 of *Being and Time*.

As articulated above, *Stimmung*, brings Dasein to its opening of Da- but on the other hand, it discloses to Dasein its own thrown being. For Heidegger, Dasein is always already delivered over itself. Openness he argues is the openness of being thrown [Geworfenheit]. This being delivered over to itself signifies one of the fundamental determinations [bestimmung] of Dasein: negativity. This negativity is analyzed in detail under the rubric of anxiety in the section 40 of *Being and*

⁵⁹ *Being and Time*, p. 129.

⁶⁰ Giorgio Agamben, "Vocation and Voice", *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 40. No.2, p. 495, tr. Kalpana Seshadri.

Time. Being the fundamental *Stimmung*, Heidegger specifies it as following:

The face-to-face of anxiety is completely undetermined... Therefore, anxiety does not have eyes to see a determination here or there from which that which threatens approaches. That which characterizes the face to face of anxiety is the fact that the threat is not in any place...; it is already there, but is not in any place; it is so close that it oppresses us and it takes our breath away, yet it is not in any place. In the face-of-which the "it is not nothing and nowhere [nirgends]" is disclosed.⁶¹

The anxiety before which Dasein finds itself could be told in many ways. Here I want to stress its two features: first, in *Stimmung*, Dasein finds itself always already thrown in an opening (to world, to beings) and secondly *Stimmung* discloses to him that what brings him to this opening and da- is not himself. To this end Heidegger concludes: "Being, *Dasein* is thrown, and is not brought by itself to its *Da*... Existing, it never goes back to its own being thrown... Since it itself does not have a basis, it rests upon its own weight, which the *Stimmung* discloses to him as a burden."⁶² Never being the master of its own opening Dasein faces its finitude or the *unheimlich*, not-at-home character of its own essence. Dasein is open to the world but this openness has nothing to do with its own will. With this absolute passivity Dasein cannot find any place for shelter and "Anxiety brings being back from its feeling itself at home in the world and has therefore first of all the character of un-homeliness." To recapitulate, at the moment of leading Dasein to its opening, *Stimmung* discloses to it its being out of place. Accordingly, what Da- of Dasein shows is that Dasein never brought himself there.

Dasein faces the dissonance in the attunement [*Stimmung*] and consonance between himself and world. As a finite being, Dasein comes back to itself from

⁶¹ *Being and Time*, pp. 174-75.

⁶² *Being and Time*, p. 262.

this impossibility, from the impossibility of bringing before itself what constitutes its essence. The call is the call to Da-sein, to his anticipated being in the world and to its Da. What does this mean? It means the necessity of bearing/carrying its *Da* to its *sein*. From where, then, does this call come? This call comes from Dasein's being-towards-death [Sein Zum Tode] because Dasein exists as thrown in the direction of death. Death, in this sense, opens Dasein to itself as that which exists as being thrown to end. Thus, being-thrown necessarily implies anxiety in the face of death. As Jean François Courtine states: "Anxiety... necessarily refers to anxiety in the face of death, is in truth the principle auto-affection, the *Stimmung* in which the Self is constituted by the very fact that it is 'claimed', 'called', as an *individual* for its ownmost being able, absolute and unsurpassable."⁶³

Traditionally death is reduced to "an occurrence, which reaches Dasein, to be sure, but belongs to nobody in particular."⁶⁴ By this token, Heidegger argues that death is effaced from Dasein. But in *Being and Time*, death, being the end of Dasein, is "Dasein's ownmost possibility —non-relational, certain and as such indefinite, insurmountable."⁶⁵ In its ontologically structural whole, Dasein is the being-for-the-end, or being-towards-death. "In being towards its death, Dasein is dying factually and indeed constantly, as long as it has not yet come to its demise."⁶⁶ Death is insurmountable and cannot be avoided, it is the law, the law of finitude. It is in this sense that Heidegger talks about death in the form of anticipation/running ahead [Vorlaufen] and possibility. It is not here yet but it waits, it is to come [Zu-kunft]. Death is a possibility that is absolutely certain.⁶⁷ It is also a confidence in the to-come, the future. It is possible at each moment and all the while its "when" is not known and indeterminate. We do not know when it will come but but we are sure that it *will* come. It is in nowhere but there. It is a

⁶³ Jean François Courtine, "Voice of Conscience and Call of Being", in *Who Comes After the Subject*, ed. Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor and Jean-Luc Nancy, Routledge, 1991, p. 86.

⁶⁴ *Being and Time*, p. 297.

⁶⁵ *ibid.*, p. 303.

⁶⁶ *ibid.*, p. 303.

⁶⁷ Emmanuel Levinas, *God, Death and Time*, tr. Bettina Bergo, Stanford University Press, 2000, p. 49.

certainty that survives any and every certainty, a confidence that cannot be shaken by any doubt. Death is so certain [gewiss] that it becomes the origin of all conscience [Gewissen].

In *Being and Time*, Being-towards-death is conceived as a relation to the possibility of one's own non-existence. The experience of death is proposed in the form of anticipation of its own possibility, but this possibility provides no positive content: "It gives nothing to be 'actualized', nothing which Dasein, as actual, could itself *be*."⁶⁸ If it gives nothing to be actualized, death represents the possibility of the impossibility of existence in general. Death is the disappearance of "every reference to... and of all existing." Although Dasein cannot experience its own death as actual, it always relates to its own end as a possibility. Death has to remain as a possibility before Dasein since "its actualization marks its abolition."⁶⁹ Dying in this sense is not the final instant of Dasein. It is what characterizes the very way in which man is his being.⁷⁰ To be born and to live, i.e., to exist, is the constant approaching of death. To be towards death is to relate to death by the very being that I am.⁷¹

The death of the others, to Heidegger, is an experience but it is an experience of being-with them as dead; it is a mode of our continued existence. "The greater the phenomenal appropriateness with which we take the no-longer-Dasein of the deceased, the more plainly is it shown that in such Being-with the dead, the authentic Being-come-to-an-end of the deceased is precisely the sort of thing which we do *not* experience. Death does indeed reveal itself as a loss, but a loss such as is experienced by those who remain. In suffering this loss, however, we have no way of access to the loss-of-Being as such which the dying man 'suffers'. The dying of others is not something which we experience in a genuine sense; at

⁶⁸ *Being and Time*, p. 307.

⁶⁹ *Being and Time*, p. 307

⁷⁰ Emmanuel Levinas, *God, Death and Time*, p. 51.

⁷¹ *Ibid.* p. 51.

most we are always just 'there alongside.'"⁷² Thus the death of others, for Heidegger, does provide a sense of loss, but it never provides "the loss of Being."

Death, in each instance, is inseparably tied to some individual Dasein. No one can bear the death of another Dasein, everybody dies its own death. In a radical sense, my death is mine, it is what individualizes me. Death is a possibility that cannot be substituted. Obviously one can die for the other [für einen Anderen in den Tod gehen], but cannot take from the other its own death [dem Anderen sein Sterben abnehmen]. In dying, *Jemeinigket* (mineness) reveals itself. The moment of my death is the moment where all the relations to others come to an end. Heidegger states that one cannot be represented by at one's death — "that Dasein dies alone, and that this founds the possibility of Dasein's individuality and integrity as authentically itself."⁷³

Death is my "ownmost", cannot be "outstripped" and it is my ownmost possibility; the "possibility of the impossibility of existence". Heidegger writes: "Dasein's death is the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there. If Dasein stands before itself as this possibility, it has been fully assigned to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. When it stands before itself in this way, all its relations to any other Dasein have been undone."⁷⁴

Heidegger calls this being-towards-death, anticipation/running ahead [Vorlaufen]. *Vorlaufen* indicates that Dasein is in such a way that its "not-yet" belongs to it, and yet is not yet.⁷⁵ Dasein is on the way to become its running ahead, in running ahead it becomes its not yet, but the not yet never actualized. In page 307 of *Being and Time*, he concludes: "anticipation of the possibility of death is what first discloses and makes this possibility possible." By this way of anticipation, assuming the possibility of death, Dasein "appropriates" its own death [sich zu ereignen]. To this end, Heidegger states: "When, in anticipation, resoluteness has caught up the possibility of death into its potentiality-for-Being, Dasein's

⁷² *Being and Time*, p. 282.

⁷³ Christopher Fynsk, "The Self and Its Witness: On Heidegger's Being and Time", *boundary 2*, vol. 10, No. 3 (Spring 1982), pp. 185-207.

⁷⁴ *Being and Time*, p. 294.

⁷⁵ Emmanuel Levinas, *God, Death and Time*, p. 40.

authentic existence can no longer be outstripped by anything."⁷⁶ Thus, while experiencing the most radical impossibility, Dasein attains its proper place: Possibility of not-being encompasses the whole of existence, and in that brings into proper view *being-able-to-be*. Dasein is always *zum Ende, zum Tode*, that is always *at-the-point-of-death*. For something to live is to always live mortality, at the very edge of its ultimate possibility, which is to have no more possibility and so to be dead... Something that is alive is able to die at any moment.⁷⁷ Anticipation of no longer to be there intensifies the potential to be, "opens for Dasein its being-in-full-time, its being to the limit of its time."⁷⁸ *Vorlaufen* is towards death, that is the limit of Dasein's time. With the anticipation of death Dasein intensifies and comes closer to a possibility that is far from any concretization. In this sense, anticipation is never a realization, "it means attaining a *nonpresent proximity*."⁷⁹ Heidegger rejects "thinking about death" and "expecting it". The thought of death he says "weakens death through a calculating will to dispose over death." and "expecting drags the possible into the actual."⁸⁰ Anticipation does not refer to these manners of relating to death, it [Vorlaufen] is not a representation [Vorstellen], it is not a matter of putting death before itself so as to overcome it but rather to let oneself to be penetrated by it. It is "to understand oneself in the potentiality for being..."⁸¹ *Vorlaufen* (which could also be rendered "running ahead") does not provide any support [Anhalt] for any project, it is not a basis for any "picturing" that could be realized, it is immeasurable: "In the anticipation (running ahead) of this possibility it becomes 'greater and greater', that is to say, the possibility reveals itself to be such that it knows no measure at all, no more or less, but signifies the possibility of the measureless impossibility of existence."⁸² Being-towards-death, and anticipation,

⁷⁶ *Being and Time*, p. 355.

⁷⁷ Thomas Sheehan, "Astonishing! Things Make Sense!", in *Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual*, 1 (2011): 1-25, p. 5. Sheehan refers to GA 27, p. 331.33-332.1-8: "Dasein existiert ständig entlang diesem Rande des Nichts."

⁷⁸ Michel Haar, *Heidegger and the Essence of Man*, SUNY Press, 1993, p. 5.

⁷⁹ Michel Haar, *Heidegger and the Essence of Man*, p. 8.

⁸⁰ *Being and Time*, p. 307-308.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 307.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 307.

in short is un-representable. But on the other hand, it discloses: "Being-towards-death, as anticipation of possibility, is what first *makes* this possibility possible, and sets it free as possibility."⁸³ For this possibility to be possible and free, anticipation is needed. Heidegger calls it first [allererst], prior to running ahead-anticipation death is not free, that is, it is not truly possible. "Being-towards-death is the anticipation of a potentiality-for-Being of that entity whose kind of being is anticipation itself. In the anticipatory revealing of this potentiality for being, Dasein discloses itself to itself as regards its uttermost possibility."⁸⁴ In anticipation/running ahead Dasein comes face to face with death, and with itself as well. "In anticipating the indefinite certainty of death, Dasein opens itself to a constant *threat* arising out of its own 'there'."⁸⁵ Anticipation of death is not an empty form for Heidegger. It is embedded with a "feeling". This threat will refer to the anxiety, the Grundstimmung through which death will appear as a "concrete" possibility.

This "concrete" possibility constitutes the essence of facticity: Dasein is a being which it cannot not be. In this sense Dasein always possibilizes what it is "obliged to be", it is obliged to be its *not yet*. "Dasein is never more than it factually is, for to its facticity its potentiality-for-Being belongs essentially. Yet as-being-possible, moreover, Dasein is never anything less; that is to say, it is existentially that which, in its potentiality-for-Being, it is *not yet*."⁸⁶ Dasein is towards its *not yet* and death accordingly is not the final moment but the fact of making this possibility possible, "relating to the possible as possible."⁸⁷ It is in this sense that Dasein is not thrown into just any possibilities. It is an intrinsic *Ermöglichung*, an enabling of itself, in the sense of making itself possible. Dasein is not imprisoned in monadic subjectivity because as thrown it is the occurrence of disclosure.⁸⁸ This is, if one is allowed to say, an *a priori* for Dasein in making sense of itself and of others as well. But making-sense happens in an environment, in openness.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 307.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 307.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 310.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 185-186.

⁸⁷ Emmanuel Levinas, *God, Death and Time*, p. 53.

⁸⁸ Thomas Sheehan, "Astonishing! Things Make Sense!", p. 16.

Dasein is stretched into the openness by its temporal character. Heidegger calls this *Erstrecktheit*, the stretchedness. Dasein is stretched into the possible, which in turn refers to its possibility to be not possible. Heidegger calls this state always already aheadness, or being ahead of oneself. This stretchedness, as an ecstases, "carries us away and gives us distance." In this distance the possibility of making-sense is disclosed and the sense of being-towards-death arises the sense of time. As Levinas articulates: "To take death on in anxiety as the possible is what is originally to-come or future (*à venir*) (which is itself to be); a future engaged in a past because anxiety is an affectivity containing the always already, and the already-there. The entire structure of time is drawn from the relation to death, which is a modality of being."⁸⁹

4. TEMPORALITY OF ANXIETY

For Heidegger anxiety "is anxious about naked Dasein as something that has been thrown into uncanniness [*Unheimlichkeit*]. It brings one back to the pure 'that-it-is' of one's ownmost individualized thrownness."⁹⁰ In anxiety Dasein gets attuned to naked being-there that holds it into suspension, that is, into Dasein's *unheimlich* ground which makes bare that it is just a being-there and *nothing more*. As an existentiale of Dasein, thrownness indicates the impossibility of Dasein to be otherwise than "what it is". Individualized as a constant uprooting, in anxiety Dasein gets exposed to the pure that-it-is of its thrownness. This is an unescapable moment and Dasein has to take up this "bare" being-there that constitutes it *factically*. It is *fact* and Dasein has to *facere*, that is, *make* something from this given nakedness. Heidegger in many places says that Dasein has to "bear" this nakedness. Bearing is a taking on and in a figurative way it is wearing. Dasein wears this nakedness, that is, assumes and makes (*facere* in Latin) it its "basis": it dwells in *Unheimlichkeit*. The "basis" or the "ground" that withdraws in *Unheimlichkeit* is what makes Dasein's being and what makes existent be.

⁸⁹ Levinas, *God, Death and Time*, p. 57-58.

⁹⁰ *Being and Time*, p. 394.

What Dasein assumes, in this sense, is what constitutes its essence. Dasein comes to face the fact that its existence has no essence or existence itself is its own essence. Or, to put it otherwise, Dasein has to existentiate its essence and has to be that which it is thrown. Here we reach a point where Dasein gets ex-posed to a disclosedness (of which we will focus on in the coming pages); it is a disclosedness that cannot be appropriated but still, as a fact, stands bare before Dasein. Temporally speaking this fact refers to having-beenness of Dasein. Anxiety attunes Dasein to the “ground” that it has to be, bear, and existentiate. It has to existentiate its essence in the sense that it has to “assume” its own being which is nothing other than its having-beenness. Dasein comes to face the bare fact that it was always already there as a thrown being, an always already ex-posed ground that is not at home. In Heidegger's analysis, thrownness temporally refers to having-beenness, that is past. But, this past is not a moment in the chronology that comes before the present. The same also holds true for the present and the future. These "ecstases" are not the pure successions of meaningless, empty flow of time. It is neither a mode of time where the past comes before the present which is followed by the future.⁹¹ Time is not sequential, but rather "Dasein qua time temporalizes itself."⁹² But how temporality temporalizes itself? Heidegger proposes that it temporalizes as "a future which makes present in the process of having been."⁹³ But what does this enigmatic and at the same time tautological statement mean? How does the temporalization occur as ecstasis? How is the ex- of the ecstasis related to Dasein's ek-sistence? What is the relation between the ex-, the out, and Dasein's being out of itself and how the spatial character of ex-, of the out, is related to ecstasis of temporalization? Or, is this supposed “relation” between the two ex-s something we easily and immediately take for granted and do not give any heed to?

Dasein is a thrown being, thrownness belongs to its essence. First and foremost, Dasein is thrown into the future, it is thrown to its limit that is death. This is one

⁹¹ W. Blattner, *Heidegger's Temporal Idealism*, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 92.

⁹² Martin Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, tr. Theodore Kisiel, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985, p. 319.

⁹³ *Being and Time*, p. 401.

of the first lessons we get from Heidegger's *Daseinanalysis*. And furthermore, we also learn that the temporalization of temporality in the sense of the future making present in the *process of having been* overlaps or coincides with the *having been* of anxiety. This is another moment of Heidegger's thought that *relates* the future to the past and offers a unity of the ecstases. In this sense, *Grundstimmung* opens Dasein to the originary temporality, to their ecstatic unity, because as having been and thrown Dasein encounters its temporal character in ecstasis. Dasein is ahead-of-itself, it is ex-, just as the ecstatic character of temporality. But in order to avoid a conclusion drawn tangentially, we need to resort to Heidegger's understanding of ecstasis.

In section 65 of *Being and Time* he argues the following four points:

- a. "Time is primordial as the temporalization of temporality [die Zeitigung der Zeit], and as such it makes possible the constitution of the structure of care."
- b. "Temporality is essentially ecstatic."
- c. "Temporality temporalizes itself essentially out of future."
- d. "Original time is finite."

As to the first point, being-in-the-world is to be there, being alongside beings for which Dasein must care. Care is a question of "how", and care structure is an empirical attestation of Dasein's being a 'coherent' whole. Underscoring the temporal character of the deeds, care structure outlines the different features of existence. In point of fact, if Dasein is the meaning of care, and care is the Being of Dasein, then temporality is the Being of Dasein. Care [Sorge] encompasses every dimension of Dasein's dealings and deeds, and existence in general. Formally defined, care "is being-ahead-of itself already being-in (a world) as being-alongside (beings encountered in the world)."⁹⁴ *Ahead, already* and *alongside* refers to the structures of existentiality, facticity and falling. We also hear the temporal references at work: Being ahead (existentiality) indicates the future, being always already in a world (facticity) intimates the having-been and

⁹⁴ *Being and Time*, p. 375 (SZ 327).

the alongside (falling) implicates our being in the present. Thus the care structure in total implicates the temporalization of time, its unfolding [Zeitigung]. Care structure in its whole inheres three dimensions: thrownness into the world [Geworfenheit] in which Dasein finds itself attuned to its past in a definite way. There is projection [Entwurf] or the realm of possibilities that Dasein can carry itself into in a myriad of ways, and as the third dimension there is being-alongside-of-things. The things to be done tomorrow, the deeds that I have done two days ago, and the moment I think this refers to this temporal signification of the care structure. With the care structure Heidegger refers to the existentiell or ontical place that gets ontologically rooted in anticipatory resoluteness [vorlaufende Entschlossenheit]. Temporality constitutes the ontological meaning of care because it makes the unity of existentiality, thrownness and fallenness the structures of care. The phenomenon of temporality, to Heidegger, is the root of all features and aspects of existence.

Being-ahead-of-oneself	>	future
Being always-already-in	>	having-been
Being-alongside	>	present

Temporality as the arche-structure is what underscores each item of the care structure denoted in the sketch above. And their co-belonging is the paradoxical simultaneity of a diachrony which is rooted in the temporalization of time. Care structure and temporalization does not refer to the beings at hand, or the things that one does, temporalization [Zeitigung] is no sort of a being. Heidegger is looking for a more primordial time that cannot be defined as a flowing river. What is the ontological significance of care structure then? It is time, or temporalization: care structure refers to the temporalization of time. Time *is* not, it temporalizes. But how are to understand the temporalization of temporality? We have seen that it is not a being. Heidegger tells that is “the ekstatikon pure and simple.”⁹⁵

⁹⁵ *Being and Time*, p. 377 (SZ, 329).

This leads us to the second point, *ekstaten*: “Temporality is essentially ecstatic.” Ecstasis is originally a Greek expression deriving from *ekstatikon*, which refers to stepping-outside-itself. At section 65, Heidegger states the following: “Future, having-been, and present show/display the phenomenal characteristics of the ‘coming toward’, ‘the back to, and the ‘letting-oneself-be encountered-by’ [‘Auf-sich-zu’, ‘Zurück auf’, ‘Begegnen lassen von’]. The phenomena of the “towards...”, the “to...” and the “alongside...” make temporality manifest as the *ekstatikon* pure and simple. *Temporality is the primordial ‘outside-of-itself’ in and for itself*. We therefore call the phenomena of the future, the character of having been, and the present, the ‘*ecstases*’ of temporality. Temporality is not, prior to this, an entity which first emerges from *itself*; its essence is a process of temporalizing in the unity of ecstases.”⁹⁶ Temporality as this original ‘outside-of-itself’ is not something to be absorbed by a consuming interiority, it is the essence of temporality. *Ekstatikon* is movement or an event, it does not come of a self-sustained subject. Heidegger writes: “Having-been springs from the future in such a way that the future which has been (better, is *having* been) releases from itself the present.”⁹⁷ Temporality is essentially ecstatic and ecstatic is “in the *unity* of ecstases.” Its essence is a process of temporalizing. If the ecstases are unified, does not that mean that they are enclosed? If so, how are the ecstases getting united? If they are enclosed and constitute a unity, how can they be outside themselves? And finally what is the relation between temporalization as ecstases and *Dasein*?

Ekstatikon shares the same root with existence, it is related to essential exteriority. Heidegger states the following: "It is with ecstatic character that we interpret existence, which, viewed ontologically is the original unity of being-outside-itself that comes-toward-self, comes-back-to-self and entpresents. In its ecstatic character, temporality is the condition of the constitution of *Dasein's* Being."⁹⁸ Time itself is carried away within itself as future, past and present. "Temporality

⁹⁶ *Being and Time*, p. 377 (SZ, 328-29).

⁹⁷ *Being and Time*, p. 374 (SZ, 326).

⁹⁸ Martin Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, tr. Albert Hofstadter, Indiana University Press, 1988, p. 267.

as unity of future, past and present does not carry the Dasein... instead, as temporality, it is itself the original outside-itself, the ekstastikon."⁹⁹ To Heidegger temporality is an ekstastic unfolding and ek-sistence is the event of being as being entirely outside. Carrying away is the "ecstatic character of time" and Dasein is brought out-of-itself by its temporal constitution: 'It [Dasein] is this outside-itself itself.' In this regard it is time which leads to the arise of future by virtue of the anxious existence. Being towards death as a finite horizon brings Dasein before future and uncovers its existence as an ectases. Temporal structure of Dasein, intrinsically, is the outside-itself. Dasein insistently exists, ek-sists its in-sistence. It is *in* ecstasy. But how does Dasein come to experience this temporal constitution as outside itself?

The essential connection between existence and ecstasy lies in the vibrancy of Dasein or its *being moved*. Dasein is not a self-moving being, but rather Heidegger maintains that it is *set in motion*. As the past participle of verb *bewegen*, that is moving, Heidegger uses the word *Bewegtheit*. Dasein is moved by the ecstases of time, it is moved initially from the "start". It is not fixed on a ground but set into motion moodwise (*Stimmung*). Such movedness would give us the essential relation between "existence" and "ecstasy".¹⁰⁰ Dasein exists its ec-statis essence, its being out-of-itself. Existence is ecstatic, it is a going out of itself; it is the fundamental condition of ex-perience. Ex-sistence is an ec-static ex-perience. Etymologically, experience is made up of two constituents: the suffix *ex-* and *peritus*. "*peritus*" cognates the *-perience* of experience and means to try, to risk, an attempt, a trial, an experiment and a danger. Experience is a risky and a dangerous endeavor because the *ex-* connotes to be in the mercy of the out. In the *ex-* one cannot reserve its being, it is an already given condition, a condition given by being. Movedness, or being set in motion, as the connection between existence and ecstasis refers to this interior exteriority that cannot be encapsulated and reserved. Dasein is moved from within the world to its out; from within the world

⁹⁹ *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, p. 267.

¹⁰⁰ David Farrell Krell, *Ecstasy, Catastrophe: Heidegger from Being and Time to Black Notebooks*, SUNY Press, 2016, p. 25.

to be there. Its thrownness into the future that is coming is the originary movedness of Dasein. Its very being *there* is temporally opened and set into motion by the future coming to its having-been. Heidegger says that “As soon as a human being comes to life, it is old enough to die.” (Sobald ein Mensch zum Leben kommt, sogleich ist er alt genug zu sterben.)” The moment Dasein is born, it is old enough to die. Its being set-into motion is the juncture where any *emotion* is born. To Heidegger, Dasein is not a being that can be defined by physical movement and its measurement. Its movement, or being set-into-motion, belongs to its temporal character because from the very beginning, being there is a being-towards-death.

In addition to this, Heidegger uses another word that sutures the existence and ecstasis in the section 68 and 69 of Being and Time. He calls the ecstases of temporalization *Entrückungen*. In section 69 Heidegger writes “The ecstatic unity of temporality, that is, the unity-of-outside-itself in the raptures [*Entrückungen*] of future, having-been, and present, is the condition of the possibility of there being a being that can exist as its ‘there’.”¹⁰¹ The there of Dasein, if to take this last sentence directly, is the unfolding place of temporality. Or Dasein as a being there, in order to attain its there, needs the unfolding of temporalization. When Dasein is there, then, it is not there, or when you finally get there there is no more there, but the unfolding of temporalization, or the raptures of temporality.¹⁰² The raptures or *Entrückungen*, will be key to the understanding of the relation between temporalization of time, the moment [Augenblick], *gesetzt werden* (being placed in motion) and Anxiety. But for the moment let’s keep up with the third characterization of temporalization as Heidegger proposed: “Temporality temporalizes itself essentially out of future.”

Heidegger designates future as the prior ecstasis: *zu-kunft*. *Zu-kunft* is implied in Dasein’s ability to be [Seinkönnen], an ability to confront one’s ownmost

¹⁰¹ *Being and Time*, p. 401 (SZ, 350).

¹⁰² David Farrell Krell, *Ecstasy, Catastrophe: Heidegger from Being and Time to Black Notebooks*, SUNY Press, 2016, p. 25.

possibility: death. “Existentiality” in Heidegger’s formulation is the futural essence of existence. Death is for Dasein’s own sake; it is always an issue for it. Death and time constitute the meaning of being and the temporality that ecstasis of future implies is first derived from the to come [zu-kunft]. Being exposed to death is an exposure to a possibility as a possibility and by this very token Dasein’s temperament toward this possibility is its being-ahead-of-itself. This future as being-ahead-of-itself as dying is not a final fixed point of Dasein’s being. Dasein is being at the end, being ‘endlich’ as Heidegger calls it, *at* or *in* every moment. By running ahead/anticipating “Dasein becomes free for the ownmost possibilities that are determined on the basis of the *end*, and that means possibilities are understood as *finite*...”¹⁰³ As the mark of finiteness, death is not a moment of one’s being yet Dasein exists always at its end. It is not an empty or unfulfilled future that Dasein will fill up. As long as Dasein *is*, it is always a “not-yet”, and *always* at its end. Dying is not extrinsic attribute of existence, it comes from “within”. And dying is not an interruption of existence but rather as Heidegger maintains it is what constitutes Dasein’s relation to its own being, that is existence. In this sense death is the mark of finitude that is anchored in the future. Death is that which will *come*, for sure. And it is so sure [gewiss] that it becomes the conscience [Gewissen] of finite beings.

Keeping this idea in mind, we can tie the third point to the fourth: “Original/originary time is finite.” Temporality temporalizes out of future, and originary time is finite. The end as said above is not the place where Dasein stops and ceases to be, rather, Dasein exists finitely/endlich. [Dasein existiert endlich.]¹⁰⁴

The question is not about everything that still can happen ‘in a time that goes on’, or about what kind of letting-come-towards-oneself we can encounter ‘out of this time’, but about how ‘coming-towards-oneself’ is *as such*, to be primordially defined. Its finitude does not amount primarily to a stopping, but is a characteristic of

¹⁰³ *Being and Time*, p. 308 [SZ, 264].

¹⁰⁴ *Being and Time*, p. 378 [SZ, 329].

temporalization itself. The primordial and authentic future is the ‘toward oneself’, existing as the possibility of nullity [Nichtigkeit]. The ecstatic character of primordial future lies precisely in the fact that the future closes [schlisst] one’s potentiality-for-being; that is to say the future itself is closed [geschlossen] and as such it makes possible the resolute [enstchlossene] existentiell understanding of nullity.¹⁰⁵

The prior ecstasis that allows temporality to temporalize itself, is a closed one, it is an end. Future as Heidegger said before was the ecstasis from “where” Dasein turns back toward itself. But here we see that the *Zu-kunft* is the advent of what is *closed*. As it is a saying in everyday German, one closes the door, *zu-machen*. Then what is closed in the *Zu-kunft*? What comes as closed? It is Dasein’s ability to be anything other than a nullity.¹⁰⁶ As a thrown being into the future, Dasein encounters its possibility not to be. The future opens as closed, or it opens the closedness. Heidegger writes, “The future proper, which temporality primordially temporalizes insofar as it makes out the meaning of the resolve that runs ahead, thus reveals *to be finite*.” As an entity that thrown into future, the future marches toward Dasein, and Dasein comes to itself as a possibility-being; yet this possibility is nothing other than the “insurmountable possibility of nullity.” For the reason Dasein relates to its end, “it relates to its being able to be; even when, still existing, it has nothing before it, its being remains determined by the ahead of itself.”¹⁰⁷ Dasein is in this sense essentially ahead-of-itself and always towards itself because it is a being towards its own death. It is the finite essence of Dasein that gets disclosed in the ecstasis of future.

For Heidegger, the insurmountable possibility that stand before Dasein is the source of all affectivity (at least in *Being and Time*) as anxiety. It is an anxiety *for* and *of* being and the relation with the insurmountable and measureless possibility

¹⁰⁵ *Being and Time*, p. 378-379 [SZ 330].

¹⁰⁶ David Farrell Krell, *Ecstasy, Catastrophe: Heidegger from Being and Time to Black Notebooks*, SUNY Press, 2016, p. 28.

¹⁰⁷ Emmanuel Levinas, *God, Death and Time*, p. 31.

is the experience of nullity in time. What gets disclosed in the ecstatic being of Dasein as futural is the advent/coming of a closedness. What gets disclosed in the primary and originary temporalization of time is a darkening which is not the opposite pole of light but an exceptional possibility that brings the *end* of existence in its actualization. Thus, the revelatory power of *Zu-kunft* is not comparable to any power. "It realizes nothing."¹⁰⁸ This possibility of impossibility, possibility of ending in any moment, is temporally revealed in the ecstasis of future. We can say that the future for Heidegger is the gravitational center of the time, it is the source from which time flows.

The ecstasis of future is exceptional in that when this "potentiality" becomes actual it leaves nothing to be actualized any more. In this sense what gets "lighted" or disclosed by the ecstasis of future is that it is a "ripening" darkness that waits there or "approaches". Temporality¹⁰⁹ temporalizes itself out of future: it gains a tempo, it cannot stay closed off; time as temporalization is going out of itself, it moves.

In stepping from the third characterization of temporality to the fourth, we have alluded to the *Entrückung* in passing. Now it is time to turn back to that "rapture" and explicate its significance in the temporalization of time as ecstasis. I will try to find a passage or a conjointment in *Entrückungen* that will clear the way in relating the temporal and spatial opening that *Stimmung* (which suddenly overtakes us) brings fore.

Entrückung is translated as rapture. *Rücken* as a verb in German means to move or to shift, and the *ent-* that precedes *rücken* is a privative prefix. It has several meanings but the reference to remove or to reverse a process or activity stands out. As one of the spatial characteristics of Dasein, Heidegger employs the noun

¹⁰⁸ Emmanuel Levinas, *God, Death and Time*, p. 52.

¹⁰⁹ A note on the etymology of the tempo: late 14c., "worldly, secular;" also "terrestrial, earthly; temporary, lasting only for a time," from Old French temporal "earthly," and directly from Latin *temporalis* "of time, denoting time; but for a time, temporary," from *tempus* (genitive *temporis*) "time, season, moment, proper time or season," from Proto-Italic **tempos-* "stretch, measure," which according to de Vaan is from PIE **temp-os* "stretched," from root **ten-* "to stretch," the notion being "stretch of time."

Entfernung. *Ent-fernung* is demolishing, cancelling or the removal of the far (fern); and by this, it means a bringing close. As a similar operation of the prefix, *ent-rücken* means to move away or shift away, to be translated into a different state or to be stripped of a certain state, to be displaced. *Entrückung* as the noun form then means rapture, a sudden being caught up and being “carried away”. It comes closer to meaning of ecstases and by being moved away, it denotes being seized by something (that is not Dasein itself) suddenly. As a key term for ecstasy, *Entrückung* is employed by Heidegger also to describe the moment of or blink of insight [Augenblick]. Heidegger says that *Augenblick* is itself an ecstasis: “It [Augenblick] means the resolute *rapture* [Entrückung] with which Dasein is carried away to whatever possibilities and circumstances are encountered in the situation as possible objects of concern, but a *rapture* which is *held* [gehaltene Entrückung] in resoluteness... In *Augenblick* nothing can occur; but as an authentic present or waiting-towards, the *Augenblick* permits us to encounter for the first time what can be ‘in a time’...”¹¹⁰ The suddenness of *Augenblick* is an *Entrückung*, a displacement or dispersal, in time and it is so miniscule that ‘nothing can occur in it’. To put it otherwise, *Augenblick* is a very tiny dispersal in time that we do not “sense” it. But all the same it is a “held” moment; it is a hold on our ownmost possibility, and by this token it carries us away. As mentioned above, it is a hold that carries us forward. Although the moment of vision is suddenness, it does not lead to dispersion at all. It is a holding, *Halten*. At first sight it sounds paradoxical to be dispersed and to be held at the same time. What does Heidegger mean when he proposes that it a rapture and a hold at the same time? We can understand the rapture, but what a about being hold in the rapture? In short, what holds in this suddenness?

If the moment of vision is an authentic, as Heidegger says, or appropriate present, what holds us in this moment of vision is *the possibility which is unsurpassable, non-relational and untransferable finitude*. What do we catch in this moment of vision? In the moment of vision, we catch the sight of the possibility of our being

¹¹⁰ Being and Time, p. 387-388 (SZ, 338).

a nullity. In the moment of vision, the finitude of time glimpses suddenly, and this suddenness is nothing other than the out-of-itself. If we remember the creeping up of *Angst* on Dasein that comes in a strike [*den Atem verschlägt*] and takes the breath, we can start to recognize the relation between Stimmung, ecstasis as displacement, suddenness, *Augenblick* and temporalization. It seems that Heidegger offers a profound connexion between displacement/suddenness and the finite temporality. I will try come a little bit nearer to that point of connexion in the subsequent paragraphs by trying to expose the inner relation and intercommunion of space and time in Stimmung. But for the sake of clarity, let's proceed a little bit more with the temporal connotation of Anxiety and its relation to ecstasis.

As we have seen, the futural character of Dasein derives from its running ahead. Being towards death as the disclosure of a closedness, gives us the ecstasis of *Zukunft*. The future is the coming of a closedness, but as Heidegger explains Dasein comes back to itself from this future. Future is not a 'now' that is not yet *actual*, but the coming [Kunft] with which Dasein comes towards itself. Future is marked by death as the disclosure of a closedness, it is a mark of a possibility that is in excess of all *actuality*.

In relating to this excess, which is death, Dasein is outside of itself, but in any case, it comes back to its thrown self, that is, *kommt zu-rück*. Let reckon a little bit with the *zu* of *zu-rück*. When we talk about the *zu* of the *zu-kunft*, we should recognize that this *zu* is also the *zu* of *zu-rück*. From one end to the other, Dasein comes to a closedness. What does this mean? As Dasein runs ahead, it comes to meet its closed end, what gets disclosed to it is a closedness. It is a being *towards* death, the future is opened as a closed end and if it is thrown into this future, *what gets disclosed is that it is always already have been this running ahead (towards closedness)*. The "most proper" possibility, then, does not happen only on some occasion. Dasein has always already *been* this possibility upon which it is compelled. Dasein runs its having-beenness, that is, Dasein is en-closed from one end to the other end with the *zu*. The *rück* of the *zu-rück* is the rück-of Ent-

rückung. As being thrown, ecstatic being of Dasein as rapture [Entrückung] is thrown back *and* forward.¹¹¹ Enclosed from both ends, Dasein is stretched between its future and its past.

We are getting closer to the thread that Heidegger weaves but it seems that there is a dead end in the explication of ecstasis of future. Although we have “intuited” the sense of finitude as opening up of the closedness in *Zu-kunft*, we have not arrived to the point of unitary structure of ecstases. Heidegger proposes the priority, or maybe even apriority, of future as the first ecstases from when the time starts to temporalize. But it is a blind alley, it leads to nowhere, to the no of where. It does not give any direction whatsoever, it refers to the end, that Dasein exists *endlich*. Then how are we to conjoin the ecstatic temporality and finitude and the unitary structure of three ecstases?

Let’s take a step *back* and proceed with the temporalization of having-beeness [Gewesenheit]. *Gewesenheit* is the ecstasy of Dasein’s having-been, and it constitutes the “temporality of *how we find ourselves* to be.” To understand itself futurally, as being-towards death, Dasein must also take over its having-been [*Gewesen*]. The importance of the ecstasis of *Gewesenheit* comes from finding oneself, because Dasein finds itself *posited* so and so. Heidegger states the following: “The character of having-been is constitutive for the stimmung of anxiety; and bringing one face to face with *repeatability* is the specific ecstatic mode of this character.”¹¹² Always-already as we mentioned is attested by a stimmung: it is to be delivered over death, in anticipation of it Dasein comes to “realize” that it has always already been the *thrown ground* of this nullity. Dasein marches towards this possibility as it already was in it. And this past attested in anxiety is the *past of future*. Dasein cannot catch the point it is thrown to: Dasein comes to experience in a moment the dispersal or ec-centric essence of its own in the *having been of its future*. The future as a closed end comes fore and Dasein comes to its past that has always already been sealed by its future. Heidegger

¹¹¹ David Farrell Krell, *Ecstasy, Catastrophe: Heidegger from Being and Time to Black Notebooks*, SUNY Press, 2016, p. 49.

¹¹² *Being and Time*, p. 394 [SZ, 343].

states the following: “The temporality of anxiety is peculiar; for anxiety is grounded primordially in having been, and only out of this do the future and the present temporalize themselves; in this peculiar temporality is demonstrated the possibility of that power which is distinctive for the mood of anxiety. In this, Dasein is taken all the way back to its naked uncanniness, and becomes fascinate by it.”¹¹³ The past Heidegger mentions here is the already past that is attested to in anxiety. Anxiety temporalizes from the past because “Anticipation of one’s ownmost and uttermost possibility is coming back understandingly to one’s ownmost ‘been’. Only in so far as it is futural can Dasein be authentically as having-been. The ‘having-been’ [*die Gewesenheit*] arises in a certain way, from the future.”¹¹⁴ When the anxiety blows or captures in a moment of sight, Dasein comes to its past future that it has to repeat *endlich*.

What is distinctive about anxiety temporally and how it operates? Anxiety, is “an exceptional disclosedness of Dasein” in which two aspects coincide. As Heidegger repeats many times, anxiety is the anxiety *of* death. But it is also the anxiety *for* being that is precisely being-toward-death. As Levinas puts is very succinctly: “The able-to-be is in danger of death, but the able-to-be is precisely what threatens. This emotion is not the fear of finishing life, it is the opening of the fact that Dasein, as thrown into being, exists toward the end. Dasein has to be, but to-have-to-be is also to-have-to-die.”¹¹⁵

Fear in distinction to anxiety brings confusion and darkens the world Dasein inhabits; but anxiety introduces an extraordinary and crystal clear lucidity into it. Where does this clarity come from? In anxiety *in the face of which* and *for the sake of which* coincides. In Heidegger’s formulation *Wovor* and *Worum* come to coincide. Dasein is anxious in the face *of* death and *for* the sake of itself. In other words, the anxiety is the mood in which “*the disclosure and the disclosed are*

¹¹³ *Being and Time*, p. 394 [SZ, 343]. German reads as following: “An der eigentümlichen Zeitlichkeit der Angst, dass sie ursprünglich in der Gewesenheit gründet und aus ihr erst Zukunft und Gegenwart sich zeitigen, erweist sich die Möglichkeit der Mächtigkeit, durch die sich die Stimmung der Angst auszeichnet. In ihr ist das Dasein völlig auf seine nackte Unheimlichkeit zurückgenommen und von ihr benommen.”

¹¹⁴ *Being and Time*, [SZ, 326].

¹¹⁵ Emmanuel Levinas, *God, Death and Time*, p.47.

existentially selfsame."¹¹⁶ The movement of ordinary temporality as the experience of anxiety opens up a nullity in the "middle" of time and Dasein is dragged into this vortex. That in the face of which Dasein is anxious is its *thrown* [*geworfen*] being in the world and that which Dasein has anxiety is its *potentiality* [*Entwurf*] for being-in-the-world. Thus what gets opened in anxiety is nothing other than the inseparability of *Geworfenheit* and *Entwurf*.

Anxiety arises from being-towards-death. Heidegger states the following: "Anxiety arises out of Being-in-the-world as thrown being-towards-death. When understood temporally, this 'mounting' of anxiety out of Dasein, means that the future and the present of anxiety temporalize themselves out of a primordial being-as-having-been in the sense of bringing us back to repeatability."¹¹⁷

*Anxiety attunes in such a way that Dasein's confrontation with its mortality becomes possible. Since it comes out of nowhere and as a nullity, it is a moment of insight [Augenblick] that displaces Dasein into the finitude, a rapture that holds it to repeatability [Wiederholbarkeit]. We should here remark the repeating *holen* (hold) of the *Wiederholbarkeit* (repeatability) and *Unüberholbarkeit* (unsurpassability) of death. What gets repeated, that is what holds and stays, is the hold of finitude in its past future. Bringing Dasein back to its thrownness anxiety relates the *Entwurf* (projection) to *Geworfenheit* (thrownness). "Anxiety is anxious about naked Dasein as something that has been thrown into uncanniness [*Unheimlichkeit*]. It brings one back to the pure 'that-it-is' of one's ownmost individualized thrownness."¹¹⁸ What Dasein repeats is its thrownness into future, its end comes back to its other end that is its past: "Anxiety merely brings one into the mood for a possible resolution. The present of anxiety holds the moment of vision at the ready [*auf dem Sprung*]; as such a moment it itself, and only itself, is possible."¹¹⁹ Anxiety holds Dasein into the possibility of not being-able-to-be, marking its stretchedness from the immemorial past to never ending coming. The*

¹¹⁶ *Being and Time*, p. 188.

¹¹⁷ *Being and Time*, p. 395 (SZ, 344).

¹¹⁸ *Being and Time*, p. 393-394 (SZ, 344).

¹¹⁹ *Being and Time*, p. 394 (SZ, p. 344).

past that Dasein is being held is a past that has never been present, and by this, cannot ever, never be presented or presentified. We can call this absolute past, or the past of future as absolute finitude.

FINALE

Disposing of the Sense

Anxiety reveals that the object causing the distress is an X, it cannot be determined as an object, it cannot be tamed by rendering it something present at hand or it cannot be situated in a place by giving a representation of it. The topos of anxiety is unmeasurable, as the time of its irruption is unknown. It is a mark of the approaching "unknown", ex- or the out. This *out* has no *interiority* in which Dasein can find a place to inhabit.

Death as the ultimate cause of anxiety is absolutely invisible and it radically eludes all presence.¹²⁰ Yet its invisibility is paradoxically more "present" than everything present and actual in life that ever can be. It is uninhabitable and brings the out, out there in the world as unescapable. As Levinas puts it: "... anxiety has no object, has the non-object as its object: nothingness. Heidegger's description of death thus reveals a possibility, the possibility of non-possibility."¹²¹ To be in the world is to be affected there, and as a radical form of this affection, i.e. anxiety, Dasein is affected to the ground where there is nothing except the refusal of time and space. It is a refusal in the sense that unarticulated unity of time and inextricable spatiality of Dasein's Da- with the world refuse to get appropriated. They refuse to let themselves to extract any constituted and signified "meaning" from themselves. No more now, a little later, tomorrow or yesterday; and no more here, at the corner, in the house or on the ground.

¹²⁰ François Dastur, *Heidegger and the Question of Time*, Humanity Book, 1998, p. 41.

¹²¹ Emmanuel Levinas, *God, Death and Time*, p. 63

It is the moment of the sensing of the ground that just allows the sense of pure space and time, their co-originary belongingness. The experience of anxiety is an experience of the ground in the sense that it makes possible the sense of the ground in covering itself in its withdrawal. It is a ground that lets only sense the groundlessness of the ground by refusing every attempt to locate it. What gets sensed in the experience of anxiety is the very withdrawal of the "conditions of the possibility of knowledge". It is an understanding, but not knowing, that is in harmony with the sensibility as such. Understanding is always an understanding of this coming into being and withdrawing, not as dialectical process and moment to be sublated, but the experience of the out that only touches and gives the possibility of every sense making. In anxiety, and in *Grundstimmungen* in general, Heidegger tries to extract a kind of sense, a single sense, in which all things or beings said to be or could be said to be.¹²²

Death is the uninhabitable habitation of Dasein, and anxiety before death exposes Dasein to ex-sist this elemental place. Heidegger writes: "... the primordial belonging to moods, in which Dasein is brought before its Being as 'there'... A mood makes manifest [offenbart] 'how one is, and how one is faring'. In this 'how one is', having a mood brings Being to its 'there'. In having a mood, Dasein is always disclosed moodwise as that entity to which it has been delivered over in its Being... 'To be disclosed' does not mean 'to be known as this sort of thing.'"¹²³ Even in a situation where Dasein pays no attention to mood, Dasein is unveiled "in its Being-delivered-over to the 'there'. In the evasion itself the 'there' is something disclosed." In the usual, everyday dealings beings are familiar and known to us in a very definite way. Moreover, even "where we do not turn to beings explicitly, they lie before us and surround us accessible."¹²⁴ The world is unveiled to Dasein, it is delivered over to its being-there. In disclosedness Dasein finds itself in 'there'; that is, "the pure 'that it is' shows itself, but 'whence' and 'whither' remain in darkness."

¹²² Miguel de Beistegui, *The New Heidegger*.

¹²³ *Being and Time*, p.173.

¹²⁴ Martin Heidegger, *Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected "Problems" of "Logic"*, tr. Richard Rojcewicz & Andre Schuwer, Indiana University Press, 1994, p. 177.

Dasein's being brought to its Da becomes the clearing of a darkness. Saying that Dasein is "illuminated [erleuchtet] means that *as* Being-in-the-world it is cleared [gelichtet] in itself, not through any other entity, but in such a way that it *is* itself the clearing. Only for an entity which is existentially cleared in this way does that which is present-at-hand become accessible in the light or hidden in the dark. By its very nature, Dasein brings its 'there' along with. If it lacks the 'there', it is not factually the entity which is essentially Dasein; indeed, it is not this entity at all. *Dasein is its disclosedness.*"¹²⁵ Dasein is its disclosedness means "at the same time that the Being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being is to be its 'there'".¹²⁶ Dasein brings its 'there' along with itself and this bringing means that Da of Dasein is opened to itself in and through *Stimmung*: "... the mood brings Dasein before the 'that-it-is' of its 'there', which, as such, stares it in the face with the inexorability of an enigma."¹²⁷

To be disclosed, showing itself of the pure 'that-it-is', is called thrownness. Dasein is "thrown in such a way that, as Being-in-the-world, it is the 'there'. To be 'there' means finding 'itself in its thrownness.'" Heidegger says: "In a state-of-mind Dasein is always brought before itself, and has always found itself, not in the sense of coming across itself by perceiving itself, but in the sense of finding itself in the mood that it has. As an entity which has been delivered over to its Being, it remains also delivered to the fact that it must always have found itself..."¹²⁸ Dasein as coming to itself in and through *Stimmung* finds itself as thrown, as being delivered over to itself. It is a thrown possibility. Dasein primarily finds that it is sent to itself, it finds its thrownness in its 'there'. Da of Dasein is opened in *Stimmung*. It finds itself opened to have a free relation with beings. Having a free relation means that Dasein is not determined in this or that way but determined [bestimmt ist] only and as being open to the touch of being(s). Heidegger goes on to add: "A mood assails us. It comes neither from 'outside', nor from 'inside', but

¹²⁵ *Being and Time*, p. 171.

¹²⁶ *Being and Time*, p. 171.

¹²⁷ *Being and Time*, p. 175.

¹²⁸ *Being and Time*, p. 174.

arises out of Being-in-the-world, as a way of such Being."¹²⁹ *Stimmung* neither happens 'in' the world, nor arises 'out' of it; but rather it happens *at* the threshold, as the 'between'. *Stimmung* is the place of Being's taking place in such a way that from that taking place it is possible to call something like an inside and outside. *Stimmung* is a threshold in the sense of coming into openness before granting any "orientation" or "inclination". We could also say that *Stimmung* is originary in the sense that through and in which we come to experience any direction. Mood (*Stimmung*) is "ontologically a primordial kind of Being for Dasein, in which Dasein is disclosed to itself prior to all cognition and volition, and beyond their range of disclosure... Only because the 'there' has already been disclosed in a state-of-mind can immanent reflection come across 'experiences' at all."¹³⁰

Having a mood, in this sense, does not refer to psychical or mere feelings. *Stimmung*, as Heidegger says: "*has already disclosed, in every case, Being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards something.*"¹³¹ Dasein's openness to the world is constituted existentially by the attunement [*Stimmung*]. *Stimmung* brings Dasein to its Da as an openness to the world. And only because "the 'senses' belong ontologically to an entity whose kind of Being is Being-in-the-world with a state of mind, can they be 'touched' by anything or 'have a sense for' something in such a way that what touches them shows itself in an affect."¹³² As Agamben says: "We could say then that more than being is itself in a place, *Stimmung* is itself the place of the opening of the world, the place of being itself."¹³³ Opening of the world presences before Dasein in such a way that in that opening Dasein itself is also gathered. In *Stimmung* world gets opened and in this opening Dasein comes to itself as this unconcealment. Opening gathers Dasein in the happening of Being. In Heidegger's words: "In unconcealedness beings as beings, i.e., as open presences, approach man and displace him into the essence of one who perceives and gather in the open and

¹²⁹ *Being and Time*, p. 176 (SZ, 137).

¹³⁰ *Being and Time*, p. 175 (SZ, 136).

¹³¹ *Being and Time*, p. 176 (SZ, 137).

¹³² *Being and Time*, p. 176-177 (SZ, 137).

¹³³ Giorgio Agamben, p. 494, *Vocation and Voice, Critical Inquiry*, vol. 40, No.2 (Winter 2014), p. 492-501.

thereby first experiences the hidden and closed as such."¹³⁴

Opening of the world in *Stimmung* as unconcealedness brings Dasein before the world, it brings Dasein before its presencing. Just because this presencing is also the opening up of Dasein, unconcealment simultaneously brings Dasein before the closedness. Dasein experiences the coming into open of closedness. In this manner, "attunement of a ground *Stimmung* is the transformative displacing of Dasein into beings and before them."¹³⁵ [In German: *Stimmen eines Grundstimmung ist die verwandelnde Versetzung des Menschen in das Seiende und vor dieses.*] A *Stimmung's* transformative power does not mean changing one's attitude in this way or that way. A Grundstimmung is transformative [verwandelnd] power in the sense what Kafka wrote in his *Die Verwandlung*. A Grundstimmung places Dasein in displacement in which beings show their 'other' faces; moods [*Stimmungen*], in other words, reveal "the co-presence of all things in a way more comprehensive than any comprehension, more immediate than any perception."¹³⁶ Its displacement takes place as facing the unusual in the usual and everydayness. A Grundstimmung compels Dasein toward the "all-decisive beginning". It begins where the beings turn their other, *unheimlich* face and in this turning, they turn back [ver-rücken] into concealedness when Dasein gets hold on them. Transformative power of *Stimmung* comes from turning the 'inside' out, or *insistent existence* which brings Dasein to its Da where it experiences its ek-static being-in-the-world. *Stimmung* is the place of happening of Being, the limit case where the allocation of in and out arises to be experienced and since it is the limit, it is thus *a limine*, illimitable, never ending open touch of being.

Stimmung as Threshold

Following Agamben's formula of *Stimmung* ("*Stimmung* is itself the place of the

¹³⁴ Martin Heidegger, *Basic Questions of Philosophy*, p. 146-147.

¹³⁵ Martin Heidegger, *Basic Questions of Philosophy*, p. 149.

¹³⁶ Michel Haar, "Attunement and Thinking", in *Heidegger: A Critical Reader*, Blackwell, 2005, p. 159.

opening of the world, the place of being itself.”) we can say that *Stimmung* operates as a threshold that sutures being and world, or, maybe we can even call it the hypens of the being-in-the-world. "*Stimmung* doesn't refer to any particular object, it is the presupposition for the objects to appear, it is the "medium" within which thinking, doing and acting first happen."¹³⁷ In this sense, *Stimmung* is not intentionality that concerns a subject facing an object [Gegenstand], it is the equiprimordiality of the subject and object; and Dasein and the world. *Stimmung* is a "power" that takes place conjointly; it is the happening of existence and of the world. "It is essential to Dasein that along with the disclosedness of the world, it has been disclosed to itself, so that it always understands itself."¹³⁸ In this sense, as existing, Dasein relates to itself as it relates to the world. "Attunement is not something standing for itself but belongs to being-in-the-world as being addressed by things. Attunement and being related are one and the same."¹³⁹ Attunement defines the reciprocal relation between Dasein and world, and is never a blind-street.

In this sense, we can think of anxiety, contrary to the fear in not having any object, as an instantiation of *Stimmung*. In anxiety, unarticulated- that is disjointed but still not (p)articulated/articled- unity of temporality is accompanied by the pure that-it-is. As an instantiation of *stimmung*, in anxiety time collides with space/place. In the rising of the *Grundstimmung* time shrinks into the moment (always already-futural character of temporality). This can happen in different ways. In anxiety for example time gains speed and one "feels" that something is approaching or coming (Kunft) whereas in boredom [Langeweile] time slows down and does not get pass, it becomes longer as the use of *Lange* indicates. It whiles long, or its while gets extended and longer. In either case one thing becomes lucid: time shortens into the moment [Augenblick], where Heidegger will find the exit for *Ereignis*, Er-augnis. It is the eye of the issue, the source, because there happens the colliding of time and space. Time comes to sit

¹³⁷ *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, p. 67-68.

¹³⁸ *Being and Time*, p. 317.

¹³⁹ *Being and Time*, p. 246.

in the place, trying to find itself a place to reside and inhabit. Or more precisely, *non-present in coming necessarily needs a passage to present itself: the non-present pre-sense that precedes and exceeds itself.*

Zu-kunft designates the to-come that always remains to come and has never finished coming. In this sense, *zu-kunft* is inconsumable. *Stimmung* is the receptivity to come, that is, temporality which is not shaped into a certain time: the presence of the to-come, never presentable or representable. But as the two are different in nature, both space and time come to clarify themselves in their co-belonging. In *stimmung*, space and time "find their place". What gets sensed is that time and space are experienced in their co-belonging disparity. *Stimmung* as the threshold is the happening of the co-belonging disparity. Their disparity is sustained by the appropriated ex-sistence. If time or temporality is meant to refer to the ekstatic openness¹⁴⁰ [ekstatische Offenheit] then what brings Dasein, and together with Dasein the whole as such into "presence", is never pure actuality but always a traverse in place. What ties as in this originary moment is the passing of happening, as that which touches and with that touching withdraws back. Never pure presence but as a "going out" and becoming ek-static. Time is never seized but "temporalizing", it is experienced as dispersion [Zerstreuung] and stretching: never actualized but arrives in as the opening of possibilities. Stretching from the "sich schon vorweg sein" (already aheadness) to the archi-ancient immemorial past that Dasein cannot appropriate, temporality "carries away and gives us distance (distentio)".

Thus, time functions as being carried away into possibility from where Dasein needs to turn back [zu-rück] to "itself". Dasein is this distance, *erstrecktheit*, Da of which is the dis-closedness where the utmost possibility is "actualized". Dasein's actuality *is* this dispersed and distanced possibility. Dasein is ec-centric in that disparity of time and space is broken into the very structure of itself which sustains its ex-sistence as the occurrence of openedness in being attuned.

¹⁴⁰ GA 16, p. 10-11 "Ich habe in Sein und Zeit einen neuen Begriff der Zeit und Zeitlichkeit im Sinne der ekstatischen Offenheit zu entwickeln versucht." (Thomas Sheehan "What Does Heidegger Mean by Time?", quote is from Sheehan's academia page)

Stimmung is the threshold where time and space borders each other. Since Dasein is dis-closed, it sustains and endures the space where the distance comes to pass. In the distance, opened as the possibility of impossibility, Dasein makes sense of whatever it meets because its own structure is attuned to the happening (of *being* itself, being as being). Understanding derives from this ground attunement and we understand this or that thing "meaningful as". In fact Dasein does not make sense; it is from this ground attunement that Dasein is necessarily sense making; because its structure, its very being of existence is to *take place* and by this, necessarily make sense of things: "even the most trivial thing is meaningful."¹⁴¹

Receptivity of the *Stimmung* does not refer to purely physical sensibility. For Heidegger sensibility is already permeated with understanding and attunement: "... our human-mortal hearing and seeing do not have their genuine element in mere sense reception." It is because Dasein is always already "over there", "outside", related to the world, that it sees and understands "at a distance". The bearing of the "senses" is not a "natural" bearing, it is the bearing of a grasp which "distances". Vision and hearing traverse distances only through an understanding of distance... To be in the world is to be inhabited by the distance, by an essential remoteness...¹⁴² "Dasein takes -in the literal sense of the word- place. In no manner is it simply present-at-hand in a bit of space that the body fills up."¹⁴³

Stimmung, as the threshold, marks the outside-of-itself as the relation to time. *Stimmung* has two directions at once: it is becoming time of space and becoming space of time. It is not the receptivity of taking inside the outside (time). It is by relating to the outside as-outside-of itself still residing "in" it. *It is the receptivity of the out of out that has not yet become*. It is the instant of the temporalization of sense, that which from the very "beginning" is spatial or spacing. Sense as temporalizing is always already outside-of-itself which requires a passage and as a passage it needs to become other than itself. Stimmung is the passage of the

¹⁴¹ Heidegger, GA 58, *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, edited by Hans-Helmut Gander, 1992; lecture course, winter 1919–20, p. 104

¹⁴² Michel Haar, *The Song of the Earth*, Indiana University Press, 1993, p. 34-35.

¹⁴³ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* p. 419 (SZ, 368).

instant where in passing it also remains. If the leap from one second to the other does not refer to the destruction of the first so as to become the second, but to remain in passing, it is because the moment "needs" to get spatial, to relate to itself by going out of itself. Thus *the instant inheres a split, where something that does not become present keeps itself distanced*. This distance in the instant is the space, or an exteriority in which "leap" from the first second to the second second becomes possible. *Passing, time remains in space, in an irreducible exteriority, as an ecstasis going out of itself*. Thus the essence of time is spacing, or rather, at the heart of instant space insinuates and inserts itself so as to time to "flow". We can also say that at the heart of presence there is something other than presence¹⁴⁴, kind of an absence that comes in the blinking of the eye. The blink is the space for the time to pass. The irreducible exteriority of the ex- insinuates itself for anything to pass. The blink is the exteriority that cannot be encapsulated, and is a kind of blind spot that allows the time to pass but does not let itself be discovered. We are not dis-covering a mystery, but the sense of there is and nothing more.

In *Stimmung* Dasein comes to the verge of coming very close of time and space, or time-space, and in its *Da echoes* the allocation of the two (the minimum). Time-space is not captured but in an instant it is "felt" as coming to verge of the collapse of time and space, their becoming the other. *Stimmung* is the passage of becoming time of space and becoming space of time. In its *Da*, inside-outside comes to the verge of touching the outside inside. In the *Grundstimmungen* the uninhabitable ex- (the limit that has no interiority), the out of out comes close; out of its being-out-there comes very close. It is the limit of the instant to pass, as it is the space itself that poses a limit for time to pass. Space secures a place to time for it not to get out of joint. It is the out of the out that attunes Dasein to its being there. In fact, time does not flow from one moment to the other, they reside side by side, they are ecstatic, and out of joint. In a moment, when one is dragged into the past, to a memory, the past cohabitates with the present, as in another moment

¹⁴⁴ Marie Eve Morin, "The Spacing of Time and the Place of Hospitality: Living Together According to Bruno Latour and Jacques Derrida", *Parallax*, 21:1, pp. 26-41.

with the *idea* of a future. They are residing side by side, and temporality is the unarticulated open trajectory of possibilities and happenings. But this out of jointness has to be somewhere, otherwise it would be meaningless to talk about or to talk *on*. This should be somewhere, at a where. Where *is* the there of Da, its place of happening. Thus place holds together, it joints the out of jointness of time. It is not the now or present that is the origin of time. It is rather that *there* and *moment* belong to each other. Is *now* there? No. Are you there at that moment? Yes yes still there. It is this uninhabitable getting to pass of temporality in/an/through place. Its happening comes to a still in the moment of going out, that is, there. *There (da) stands still in the passing of time, allowing it to find a place to sit. There where Dasein ex-periences this happening, it is there as attuned to this never finished coming.*

§

"To be thrown existentially" is to be affected from the "start". Dasein is thrown to its future, that is, its past/having-been starts from the future and Dasein's future in this sense is older than its past. Being there as thrown to the future, Dasein is affected from ground temporally and spatially. It is disclosed to the world, to the others, and even to itself by this "originary" affection through which we can see, hear or touch, in short, sense. Because of the necessity of going outside of itself, auto affection is always already a hetero-affection. *Stimmung* is a kind of opening to exteriority in general. in this sense it comes closer to the image that is always outside the thing itself, and by of exteriorization is close to imagination. *Stimmung marks the impossibility of anything ever being in itself. Stimmung cannot be thought on the basis of being interior to itself because sense happens in going-out oneself, and in this sense the ground of the sense is ecstatic. Ecstasis makes it necessary to account the temporality in dealing with sense: "the temporalization of sense is, from the very beginning, spacing"*¹⁴⁵ If spacing is an opening to the outside, there can no longer be absolute interiority, Space in this way is 'in' time, "it is the pure going out of itself of time, it is the being outside

¹⁴⁵ Jaques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, tr. David B. Allison, Northwestern University Press, 1973, p. 85-86.

itself of time as its self-relation... the exteriority of space, exteriority as space, is not something that supervenes upon time, it opens itself as pure outside 'in' the movement of temporalization."¹⁴⁶ Movement of temporalization is thus an irreducible opening to other, the spatial split insinuating itself in time splits the now into two, entrancing the one to the other. Of one now to the other ecstasis is this spacing that occurs in ordinary being outside itself of time. What is indissociable from the exteriorization or primordial opening is that what gets opened is also opened to corruption and finitude/death. Spacing breaches any interiority and exposes Dasein to finitude, it gets disclosed to a closure, to its abysmal fecundity.

From End to Out

Dasein is always and already, somehow and anyway there, in the world; it is a modality of being. And this "always-already-being-in-the-world" Heidegger calls being attuned [*gestimmtsein*]. Origin of the being attuned lies in the totality of ecstatic-temporal structure of Dasein as it is a temporal movement in there. Attunements are the manners in which how we as finite beings exist there. Attunements are the ways we are related to our finiteness, which we understand on the basis of *stimmung*. *Stimmungen*: they are latent, and come from out of themselves, not being waited. They come over us. They are latent until they get awakened. We "feel" and experience being in the world and time in and through them. *Stimmungen* always accompany us, never leaving aside. They arise in the handling of the *wordly* issues, in their arousal the world gets arisen. In their waking up everything gets waked up. Various configuration and endless possibilities can cause the arise of them, because they constitute the *Verhältnis* (relation) itself, the relation that not only relates a this and a that, but the relation as such that brings the "two" side together, its first exposedness and approaching

¹⁴⁶ Jaques Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, p. 85-86.

each other, en-counterling each other. And first of all this: encounter of space and time.

From end to out: "the epochal essence of Being appropriates the ecstatic essence of Dasein"¹⁴⁷ By bearing out [Austrag] or disclosing, Stimmung marks the place of the essential difference happening in Dasein. "Being as difference", this bearing bearing out bears the "out" into the "out", into *lethe*, forgetting and death. Dasein comes to "itself" from its end, or from the end, from the out of itself, as finitely *related* to the happening of being as difference, it is held into [Verhaltenheit as Heidegger names in *Contributions to Philosophy*] the end as out, and brought *into* the out of the world. It is the appropriation of the out as the finite end. Dasein receives its Weise, and its style from this end and the definition of each and every experience is received from it. "However the "out", the "not" does not allow itself to be thought."¹⁴⁸ It is known but not grasped; it is what grasps Dasein as the the *grundverfassung* of it. Dasein only comes to know too "lately" because it is that which first touches, in and through which "later on" Dasein comes to find it. This is why in *Being and Time* Heidegger used *Befindlichkeit* (finding oneself) and *Stimmung* interchangeably. Dasein comes to find itself in a situation, it finds itself being contained and "included" in an environment, in a situation, in an atmosphere. And there is no "in" of this out, the end has no interiority. It is an opacity that we cannot find any tool to measure its extent; it resists presupposition because its sense occurs first in the going (out).

Here and Then

Dasein's essential constitution lies in being-in-the-world, it is a part of the world and by the same token the world is a constituent of Dasein. It is not only one of the two ways, it is both at once. Not a unity, but a unicity that holds the disparity

¹⁴⁷ Martin Heidegger, *Of the Beaten Track*, "Anaximander's Saying", tr. Julian Young & Kenneth Haynes, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 254-55.

¹⁴⁸ Werner Hamacher, "En-counterings of Time", tr. Peter Hanley, *Philosophy Today*, vol. 60, Issue 4, (Fall 2016), p. 61.

together. Ek-sisting Dasein insists the ex-posing of time, or the time as exposal. Time is not metrical unit here, it is the structure of Dasein, its *Erstrecktheit*, stretchedness; from its *Ankunft* (coming) to its *gewesen* (having-been). Da of Dasein is both active and transitive. The primordial phenomenon of space, the ecstatic clearing of there is the place where world “worlds”. This place is coextensive with existence itself in its active and transitive sense. Heidegger is after the “act” of this originary space which is coextensive with spacing and clearing. It is the place of happening/punctuation of the truth.

Sense defers its end in itself, it never gets completed, it is not a product or work completed. In deferring its end, it is always being *toward*. Heidegger is not after a sense of history, but rather, the history [Geschichte] of sense or its *geschehen*, its happening. Existence constitutes the taking-place of the world. In this sense *stimmung* drags the essence into existence before it gets petrified, close on itself and become essence. Being as act, that is ek-sistence, constitutes the taking place of world. The essence of experience is ek-sistence; or ex-perience is the sense of existence. Essence of Dasein is eccentric in this sense, like an odor. It is a scent of time. Essence simply and on its own does not take place. Being entrances the essence. Existence as extract, a scent inhaled.

Stimmung is the sense as the act of sensing and being sensed. Getting tuned is to let oneself be given a rhythm. “It is an experience of a sense where the sensing and sensed constitute themselves in a common rhythm like the two edges of single wake.”¹⁴⁹

Stimmung, or sense in general, is *common*, or it is not. *Stimmung* is the eccentric fabric of place and time. It individuates because it is a one-time experience but at the same time it is bringing together as it is what shares everything. It is the commonness shared. *Stimmung* is the play of place and time, their weaving into each other. It is the momentary appearance of the far, though

¹⁴⁹ Jean-François Lyotard, *Discours, Figure*, tr. Antony Hudek & Mary Lydon, University of Minnesota Press, 2011, p. 20.

being very close, where the farness becomes the distance that Dasein exists as its Da.

Boredom unties time. Boredom derives this vacuity from the emptiness of time. The *Achtung*/attention cannot get hold on any object and Dasein, gets overwhelmed by indifference. Beings withdraw themselves as a whole. When there is no anchor point in time that Dasein can put a foot on, then time becomes empty. “All beings withdraw from us without exception in every respect [Hinsicht], everything we look at ... everything in retrospect [Rücksicht], all beings that we look back upon as having been and having become and as past ... all beings in every prospect [Absicht], everything we look at prospectively as futural”¹⁵⁰ Sense/Sinn: temporally *rücksicht*, *hinsicht* and *absicht* refer to past, present and future. In the moment of the occurrence of the profound boredom, the ties that tie the joints of time and the relation between them is untied. Meaning/sense is a tying of relation; when there is no relation between things then there is no meaning/sense.

Attunement is the occurrence of that which never ends. Its coming never ends, because it is the archi-place of space’s and time’s never ending coming together. They never finish coming because their essence or their end do not belong to themselves. They can never *end* coming, since they are the finite essences of *being* (as act). It is a coming that keeps coming without arriving. Attuning of the sense, sense in all senses, is inconsumable just because it is the finite essence itself; it cannot bring its end, it cannot contain its end in itself. There stands as the ex-, never coming and never ending. We said sense is a tying of relation and that attunement attunes to the finitude. How then? In attunement Dasein is displaced, brought out before (and after the event of coming) the end that never ends coming. Dasein is attuned to this untying movement itself. It is brought into the open where sense resides “either this side of or beyond the appropriation of signifieds and the presentation of signifiers.”¹⁵¹ That is why in the experiences of

¹⁵⁰ Martin Heidegger, *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, p.

¹⁵¹ Jean Luc Nancy, *The Sense of the World*, tr. By Jeffrey S. Librett, University of Minnesota Press, 1997, p. 3

the ground (that is, *grundstimmungen*, attunements of the ground) signifiers and the presentation of signifiers gets suspended for a moment, where the ab-sense of the sense touches only for a moment, in the blink of an eye. “In” the blink of an eye the ex-, the *archi-space*, insinuates itself in time for time to pass. Putting an interval in time, space spaces out. Thus the passage is a distance; it is extending. Sense enchains Dasein to this spacing out. Attunement attunes to the open as said above, but the open is “tightly woven and narrowly articulated.”¹⁵² It is tight because it is the coming close of time and space, it is narrow because it shortens into the moment [*Augenblick*]. It is also articulated, that is it is jointing and at the same distributing in “articles”. Tightly woven texture of open (as space-time) is narrowly articulated because it both joints and ties to this inappropriable happening, and simultaneously distributes in “articles” in becoming narrow, that is singular. It is the moment of distributive collecting, or getting collected in distribution. It touches and attunes Dasein to the inappropriable eventuation of the ground. On the other hand, it makes sense because it is the *taking of place*; a distribution of *topos*, an ex-change or topological inversion. As a “case” of this narrow articulation we can think of *Angst*. *Angst* derives from Old High German *Angust*, “from Proto-Germanic *angustu- (source also of Old Frisian *ongost*, Old High German *angust*, Middle Dutch *ancst* “fear,” also Old English *enge*, Old Saxon *engi*, Gothic *aggwus* “narrow”), from PIE *anghosti-, suffixed form of root *angh- “tight, painfully constricted, painful.”¹⁵³ It is also related to Latin *angere* or *anguere* which refers to choke and squeeze. *Angst* attunes as choking, narrowing and squeezing. It is tightness and narrowness. As is easily recognized, all the verbal connotations of *Angst* is spatial. They are all referring, if we think through Heidegger’s path, to the spacing of time, its taking place and making sense. But this happening cannot be brought before oneself because it is so miniscule that goes into the depths of Dasein and echoes from this distance that is so close (*zu*) like the sound of blood. Though, this does not mean to say that it a dimensionless occurrence. It is the miniscule dimension of the two that Dasein

¹⁵² Jean Luc Nancy, *The Sense of the World*, p. 3.

¹⁵³ <https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=angst> (Online Etymology Dictionary, the article on *Angst*)

cannot appropriate and represent, but it is that which entrances and enchains to the passing, to the passage. If it were a dimensionless occurrence, nothing would get hold on it. Even the nonsense makes sense because whatever, the there itself, is held in this passage. That is why it is not dimensionless, but bringing of the minimum (of the two). “From touching, from the ‘mere’ contact between two things (as soon as there is something, there are several things, and there is the being-toward of one thing toward the other), all the way to the general, the absolute signifyingness or significance of a world as a world...”¹⁵⁴

In the attunement of boredom Dasein is attuned to loosening the ties of the event of temporality. In anxiety the moment gets so intense and narrow (*eng* in German connoting the root of Angst) as if the width of the world is suspended, as if Dasein is turned into a two-dimensional being. Stimmung is the in-between of time and space as happening of grinding and granulating of the two (time and space) in the “in-between”. As being attuned, Dasein is grinded and granulated (to the ground), in very depth of which the notes and echo of nothing that does not present itself is played out. It is the place where accords as are tuned. Dasein is never a subject, Heidegger is clear on this point, but the difficult point is that it is neither an object. There is something in between subjectness and objectness; stimmung is the attunement to the happening of this third dimension which is nothing other than the communication of time and space, their coming close (*zu*).

On the other hand, in proposing different attunements -like anxiety, profound boredom, love, joy, *thamauzein* etc.- Heidegger also proposes different experiences of it. There is difference between anxiety and boredom. In anxiety time becomes *eng*, it gets narrow to the extent that Dasein cannot get a hold anything, it cannot inhabit this happening. But in boredom, time is so abundant that Dasein cannot get out of it. No matter how much Dasein spends time, it cannot finish it. Plentiness of time wraps and wings Dasein from four sides. It becomes kind of sea that Dasein cannot jump out of, as if it is a fish in the water.

¹⁵⁴ Jean Luc Nancy, *The Sense of the World*, p. 15.

To let experience be disposed (attuned) by Da-seyn¹⁵⁵. “The “Da,” as a concept understood with respect to the history of being, does not have a directional character according to which it is distinguished from the “over there” (here and there [da und dort]). Even the “there” is a Da or, more precisely, is in the Da (Da does not equal ibi and ubi).”¹⁵⁶ Da-sein is to be together with, it is *beisein*. Da is not a point in space from where a direction is derived. It is not in the character of a directionality that Dasein distinguishes itself from the over there. It is moreover the unavoidable exteriority that *comes* first. It is the priority for anything to come into being and in this sense it is the apriori without which ex-istere is impossible. Da is the pure exteriority “in” which everything is situated. As Heidegger says “even the ‘there’ is a Da or, more precisely, is in the Da.” Time, from this perspective is, then, the finite ecstatic experience of Da. Well, what is it then that makes this experience possible? Is Da an inception that never leaves and still lays the ground? Is it the ground, like the earth that shakes in earthquakes? “What is at that place where we can no longer compare? What is it when something precludes comparison? Then this something points purely to itself and so points to the search for what it itself is- out of itself?”¹⁵⁷ The experience of the event is the endurance of difference¹⁵⁸ says Heidegger. And yet again, how?

Stimmung is the original unity of intimacy and absence, it is meeting place of the near and the far. When one gets attuned, it is not that the person is attuned to particular instantiations of feeling, but rather it is getting attuned to the this originary place of happening itself. Stimmung first disposes to go out of itself and is the originary tie of ecstasis. In this sense by being or existing, it is *able* to go outside itself essentially, as its essence does not belong to itself.

¹⁵⁵ Martin Heidegger, *Event*, tr. by Richard Rojcewicz, Indiana University Press, 2013, p. 179.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid. p. 180.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. p. 185.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 181.

Concerning the Fact of Sense: Ad-fect, Per-fect, Fact

Dasein is a *fait accompli*, it is a completed fact. The moment it “realizes” (in both senses of the word: in realizing as a fact it comes to *realize* that is in the making of difference as *praxis*) its *being*, it realizes its having-beenness, that is it is in the difference of difference making, it comes to difference in differencing. It is so per-fect that it cannot be corrected: it is irreparable. It is perfect, it is a fully completed factum: per-fectus (*perfectus* "completed, excellent, accomplished, exquisite,"). It is so completed and perfect that it is impossible to find any other, or any ultimate ground for its ex-istence. Facticity is the bare condition of ad-fection (affection). Stimmung is the time-place for the ad-fact, ad-facere. Stimmung is the atmosphere of the *to*, going out of anything towards.

Affect: ad-facere. The Latin ad- is to in English; and facere is to make. It is a make *to*. Dasein is made to be a *to*. Affect as ad-facere, like ad-vocare one called *to*; it is one made to. Affect is always a *to*. A *to* not to the “other”, but an always *to*, that brings one always to a *to* without any determination. The sense *is* there with a *to*, unavoidably.

Ad- : is manifold and translated as *to*, *near*, *at*. *To* is *zu* (*zu* of *Zukunft*, *zu* of *Sein zum Tode*) in German. It is at close, that is why one makes the door *zu*; one makes it close. One *closes* the door, it is an act bringing the two sides to near, making them near one another; making one *toward* the other. Like in tying or knotting buttons of shirt or a jacket. A bringing *to*: towards, together.

Ad- is *to*, in other words or in another language, it is *zu*. *Zu-kunft* is in this sense a closing, or coming close. In one sense it is the coming of the close. In *Augenblick*, the *zukunft* comes close, *zu* or to the present: the happening of which cannot be caught because it is what holds together.

Stimmung is the place, der Ort, of the affect. It is the place of generation and genesis. It is the coming of *to* of the at least two. If there is always a *to*, an *ad-* in affect, then it is a *to* and *fro*. There is no *to* without a *fro* (auf und zu). It is not a duality, because *to* cannot be confined to one direction and at the same time a *to*

does not necessarily take place between one and the other. Ad- as a direction is an open *to*. Open to anything other, it is just a *to*, directionless and *nothing more*.

Exteriority and *Stimmung*

As Leo Spitzer pointed out in detail in his discussion of the term, *Stimmung* can be of a music, of a painting, of a person or a landscape, it can refer to human beings, objects and nature at the same time. What can it be then that makes possible to speak about things so much different from each other? What is it that brings together a “state of mind” with an object? Could it be the simultaneous exteriority of both “objects” and the “subjects”? Can we say that *stimmung* is the going out of things from themselves and getting *together* in phenomenality? Could *Stimmung* be the manifold tendency and merging together of whatever in a place that is neither subject nor world? Can *Stimmung* be the matrix and in-between that transforms everything, that makes them go out of themselves (necessary leave from the in-itself) and become phenomena and by this make it possible for them to find ways to reach one another, a sharing and being shared *together*?

With *stimmung* I would like to suggest that phenomena in question is never particularly cognitive in nature. It is an awareness, but this awareness does not have to be cognitive by definition. *Stimmung* is the awareness of being aware, an awareness that is woke up by something *else*. It is an awareness of at least the two in the beginning, and an awareness and fact of being touched and awakened by this something *else*, outside-itself. *Stimmung* is the zone, dimension or the medium of individuation which is itself pre-individual. It is the zone where ontological difference is "sensed". In the withering away of things, and happening of the "not" as the unarticulated unity of time, time and space come to a stand so as to take Dasein into its there and then. It is the sense of the abyss and the end that in their happening in disclosing Dasein they close themselves to Dasein, their absence as presencing bring forth the difference between Being and beings. It is the *deep* experience of the withdrawal.

"Stimmung doesn't refer to any particular object, it is the presupposition for the objects to appear, it is the "medium" within which thinking, doing and acting first happen."¹⁵⁹ *Stimmung* does not refer to a particular "feeling", it is not concerned with a feeling that is determined and that arises from a particular situation. It is not about, for example, getting angry with somebody in the traffic. This does not mean that feeling a particular temperament is out of *stimmung*. Rather, in every instantiation it is there, but this is not everything about it. *Stimmung* is the *to* that refers to the milieu in which at least two sides come *together*. In this sense *Stimmung* makes possible the happening of that particular feeling, it is the generative tying knot where everything going out itself wind around the "other". *Stimmung* can be likened to a third body that everything gets entangled to each other in their going out of themselves. If Dasein exists ecstatically then affect is texture where being going out of itself, that is differing from the mere beings, withdraws in appearing, where the going from itself and becoming another in turning back to (zu).

Attunement opens Dasein to the world and it also opens Dasein to itself. Dasein gets opened in opening of the world. Therefore, attunement is the opening of a shared background that neither belongs to world nor belongs to subject merely. In this sense, attunement is the opening of an opacity that blurs the *view*; because it is opening up of the shared background that is constitutive of both world and Dasein. In contrast to feelings and emotions that are directed to and determined by objects, *Stimmung* points to an indeterminability of experience. But at the same time this indeterminability is very condition of every attunement. There is always a constitutive inseparability between feeling oneself and feeling something; *stimmung* marks this juncture. It is the jointure of oneself and the world. It can be argued that the *stimmung* is different from feelings because *stimmung* is not related something in world, but rather it is a *fact* that the world is.

In attunement the relation between the 'container' and the 'contained' is constantly reversible. The there itself becomes Dasein's Da and Dasein's Da

¹⁵⁹ Martin Heidegger, *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, p. 67-68.

becomes the there. There is a constant uprooting that lies in a topological inversion. The supposed border between subject and object (and the world) is suspended in this oscillation. In ecstasis Dasein mixes with the “there” of the world. This mixture does not refer to a state of the composition of elements; it is rather the topological ex-change and inversion. In mixture what is at stake is passing (*geschehen*) itself, the ex-change of places and going out. It denotes the passage from one state to another. *Stimmung*, in this sense, is the originary attunement to the passage, to change and originary being open (or to be able to) be affected.

Stimmung has nothing to do with the aggregation of matter, neither is it psychological occurrence. In attunement *formally* there is no change in Dasein. It keeps and endures its *form*. On the other hand, since the place of Dasein gets changed, that is since it is brought to the *other* place and posited and positioned before beings, all the places in the configuration of being changes. Since the place is ex-changed with the “there”, the “point of view” changes totally. It is a displacement or difference in the “view”, a parallax of far and close. It is an obviousness in the literal sense of the word. Dasein is brought in front of or against (as *ob-* denotes) the *viam* (accusative of the *via*) the way; or a passage.

Attunement attunes Dasein to openness, to passivity and by this makes it able to receive the passing itself. It is an open receptivity to passing. What passes can pass from Dasein. Thus the “form” of Dasein gets intact since it is the openness. Its form is openness. The openness of to the happening of time-space is in-scribed in/at the *Da* of Dasein.

Dasein bears an inscription, written by the happening [*geschehen*] of the time-space. Attunement attunes to trace in this this inscription that never ceases coming. The future, the to-come [*zu-kunft*] is inscribed in its having beenness as trace. The traces in the inscription are left behind by the passing: “the future becoming past in the present”. Dasein is traversed through and through by the “there” without being destroyed. Dasein is not destroyed but a trace of this passage (being traversed) leaves its mark. In fact, this state is not unique to

Dasein; it is the trace of Being, or cosmos if you like.

The origin of Dasein is not in it, but outside, in an open air, in the atmosphere. Otherwise it could not breath and petrify in its own place. Stimmung opens Dasein and opens to Dasein simultaneously the distance where it can inhabitate. Dasein is stretched between these “two” places, between the exchange of topology. And this distance is originary so much so that both temporal and spatial farness comes near. (Temporally the far future is near in the moment of its passing. Spatially, Dasein’s characteristics of *Ent-fernung* is de-distancing because it is already the being of the distance, the gaia, the dark timber of the earth that shows itself in the ground removing ex-periences, and the ex-change of the da.)

In the depths of Dasein there lies a constant uprooting, a perpetual instability. This constant uprooting is the happening of attunement. Attunement is the *grund-geschehen* of Being as self-differentiation. Stimmung attunes to the spacing of time and temporalization of space. Time needs to go-outside of itself in order to pass. This passing is going-out of itself. It needs a minimal exteriority to externalize and to be “felt”. Time is not being, it is not a what, but a how, it temporalizes. Its how happens as nearing, spatializing. Stimmung is this connective tissue of time and space, the motion of the self-differentiation of time and space, their going out-of-themselves: the womb of sense.

Da is inscribed as a trace in Dasein and stimmung is the immersion in this womb, sea and fluidity of being (world). In *tiefe Langeweile* Dasein is soared/soaked in the sea of time; it cannot go out of it. For this attunement Dasein can be likened to a fish that is soared and immersed in the water. Heidegger proposes that “we cannot speak on Stimmung since we are in it. (“wir sollten nicht über Stimmung sprechen, sondern in ihr handeln.” GA 29/30, p.103) This means that we are floating in the *Stimmungen*. Stimmung is the “medium” in which Dasein is immersed in and it is what allows it to be what it is: the sense of the there. Inseparability of doing, acting, thinking, working or breathing derives from this “fact”.

The fish is in the sea, the water of which passes through it, goes into and brought out it. And the fish also moves through water, it is also in the sea. Likely Dasein passes through the space by being in the world and the world passes through it. It is a relation of interpenetration and permeability.

The relation between Dasein and the world (of there itself) is a complex spatial entanglement. *Tiefe Langeweile* temporalizes as becoming long, its how acquires spatial dimension, it stands there as the there stripped of itself: showing a bare state, appearing as naked that becomes our “skin”. It is the first skin before any material skin that every there being wears. Attunement attunes their (time and space) distancing from each other as the necessary belonging of two in their separation. *Stimmung* is the porous border between time and space. Since it allows permeability it is impossible to distinguish these elements on their own. In their separation, as separating, they come to a closeness never experienced before because it happens as the there and then of that single situation.

If Dasein is held into this happening, if it is an immersion in which thinking, doing and acting cannot be separated, then the “feeling” is not something we make with a body organ but with the totality of our being. Heidegger does not neglect the body. He is after another “body” that feels. He is, I think, trying to propose Dasein as an immersed organ of sense, “all ears and eyes”. “Dasein hears not because he has ears but because it belongs [gehört].” Its essence lies in belongingness [gehörigkeit], to be together [mit-sein].

With *stimmung* Heidegger does not claim the superiority/supremacy of sense over existence. They are specific sites and vibrations of *stimmung*. *Stimmung* is like breathing, it is the moment of penetrating into the world and be penetrated by it, a dual operation. It is traversing the world and with the same impetus becomes the place of the world as a singular ex-perience. Nothing stands in itself, or rather, even nothing cannot stand in itself. “Nothing was there” says Heidegger, it appears. If nothing appears in the moment of anxious attunement, then this void (as openness) of receptivity and enchainment is a superior unity that happens in the ecstasis: in going out and at the ex-. It is an ex-change, changing of the ex-.

The ex- of the world becomes the ex- of Dasein and/or vice versa.

In getting attuned Dasein is “held” into bi-directional movement. In ecstasis Dasein gets out from its place and this moment is at the same time the moment of there (Da) going from itself to Dasein. Dasein does not inhabit the there, it is opened to this inhabitation through *Stimmung*. Held (or immersed) into the happening, like breathing, Dasein is “agriculturing the atmosphere”.¹⁶⁰ It is the moment of circulation of life, and death, in going out (exhaling) and taking back (inhaling). *Stimmung* is the rhythmic movement of immersion in the immaterial texture, being penetrated in penetrating. It is the always taken for granted, like breathing. It is not tiring, breathing never tires one, except for the intensification of it. When we cannot breathe for a while, we feel the burden of this least tiring action. In a similar vein, when attunement intensifies to the extent of showing the hardrock of the passage (from time to space, that is *grund geschehen*), it becomes a “burden” although we always live “in” it and not recognize it. Thus *stimmung* opens Dasein to this contact that is always there, but not “recognized”. In existing Dasein in-sists the Da. For an instant Dasein traverses and becomes the place of being’s happening. Space in this sense is not generalized category of extension; it is a “universal interiority”. Attunement is a moment of repetition and differentiation. A repetitive differentiation of containing within itself the place that contains us. We can say that spacing in attunement is the moment of exposure to be traversed and at the same time to existentiate and to traverse it. In existing Dasein exists the ex-, instantly and insistently. Immanence in this sense is not the relation between an object and the world, it is what ties them together; it is the relation that ties together. Being in the world is not a containment. It would be a one-way relation. It is rather this: being contained co-ex-ists with the containing of the same thing. Although Dasein crosses and traverses the space, it can never make it a house; it cannot establish itself in it because it is the out of it that becomes in, because it is the happening of being itself that cannot be appropriated and made a house.

¹⁶⁰ Emmanuela Coccia, *The Life of Plants*, Polity Press, 2018, p. 60.

In attunement there is an invisible, like the atmosphere, passage between time and space. This, though, is not a split, it is the dawning sphere of the two: space and time spark from this well, start to fork for themselves to be individually temporalize and spatialize. From the outer limit of space and time, lurks the finite essence of being: going towards (outside) in separation. It is kind of a prism that stands between space and time where and in the middle of which (through) the colours parade. It is kind of an Aleph, as Borges writes, it changes nothing in the person but altogether the (*ex*)position of each and every thing. It is the moment of in-finite fecundity of the finite.

Its coming to (an) end never ends. It is the in-finite and inconsumable multiplication of the simple. It may sound that we are talking of a joyful happening. Indeed, it is. But at the same time, it is the most sorrowful of happenings: It will come to an end; the separation, leaving behind or being left behind is inevitable. Everything is temporary, everything comes to being only for a while. Everything comes for a period; everything passes, *even the pain of death*. Stimmung is the tissue of everything since it is the middle of space-time. Its character is *likely* [mögen] and by this makes possible [möglich]. Attunement attunes space and time, is their going towards each other, the operation/movement of which is the in-finite range of colours that paint the landscape.

Attunement is the moment of pure sensibility, which is the closing of being on itself repeating moment of its repetition. What is sensed is the passing in arising, it is kind of the touch of the out (ex-), that only for a moment spark; it is being affected, becoming a *to* of the fact. Fact of what? For Heidegger, a fact of Being.

Stimmung determines nothing but the determinateness to be open to everything. It is a minimal inclination, a minimal *to*. It is that minimal and initial determination so miniscule and immanent that we always forget. It is as if the air of atmosphere breathed. In taking it in, we take the world in us, it inhabits in us, and giving back (ex-haling) we give back a part of us. Giving it back, a part of us mingles with the out there. Da of Dasein “operates” in the same manner. *The space inhabits in the*

da of Dasein; the Da as stepping outside itself inhabits and sets it into motion; but in this setting, space places Dasein in its spacing.

Stimmung poses the existence of a “domain” (sphere) before reason that guarantees its existence. Thus the reason/mind is affected with something that comes before itself. Every objectification “assumes” something before itself to “objectify”. Attunement first and only attunes to this “something”. This attunement occurs as a third body, or immaterial substrate. This sphere is the sphere that also includes the mind. In its happening the mind gets opened. It is the climate in which the mind is also cultivated. And it is such a something that is everymoment everywhere. *Stimmung* is the continuation, contiguation and infinitization of the experience. In contact with the ex-, Dasein and things become phenomenal, that is, they appear, unconceal from their places. “It” makes sense in this inter-mediary space, where knowability becomes possible thanks to this originary place.

Truth, or truth of Being to Heidegger, is *aletheic*. Lethe gets disclosed, a closedness gets opened. It appears and in its appearing, the *appearance itself* gets veiled. In the phenomenon the phenomenality so to say withdraws. Being “needs” to go out, leave its place, it “needs” to appear and become phenomenal. Where does this appearing then? The passage from the *lethe* to appear happen in attunement. First and foremost, *Stimmung* “holds” (*Verhaltenheit* in *Beitrage*) the coming out of space and time, the *Zeit-Raum* as Heidegger names it. As the “condition of the possibility of knowledge”, space and time –their co-originary belonging happens in every sensation, while affect means their going *towards* each other. Appearance, the phenomena, are held to this ground-happening [grundgeschehen] of truth. The world is not essentially phenomenal. What is essential to the truth of being is *taking place*, that is, making sense (and becoming phenomenal). *Sense is thus the ecstasy of truth.*

In going out, in aletheic movement, sense is what draws whatever to go out and become an ex-. *Stimmung* is the place where sense gathers, it is the place of becoming together of whatever. This place that attunes is neither an objectual

space nor a psychological state. It is the originary unfolding space of sense, the topology of motion and mobility which constitutes the intangible tissue of emotion. “Doing, acting and thinking” derive from the touch, contact and relation with this ec-static inter-mediary space. It is the space of receptivity that welcomes every out-going, and by this and this alone (its simple feature) relates every there *to* the coming of that never ends. This dual “nature” (or culture?) of truth uncovers the coveredness: opening of close (*zu*) and closed and extending *to*. *Stimmung* operates as if it is a supplementary space but the supplementing never ends. *No cyst or closing, it never gets closed because it is itself the ex of closing.* Coming and passing of attunement never encloses, while it is the exclosing (a made up word, the chemistry of language). It opens new supplementary places, new inhabitation in-finitely. The finite sense extends in and as in-finite supplementation.

Stimmung is the sur-viving stream of the sensible (but not the material). Sense making that exceeds the consciousness and resists interiorization [Er-innerung]. It is that which opens the field of remembering, an exceeding forgetting that makes one remember forgetting. The touch of the extreme ex- that en-trances the Da, traversing and transporting it beyond itself.

We can think of *stimmung* as the ontological void immanent to Dasein; it is the originary passivity that renders an undetermined openness to be affected. It is the capacity to receive, a receptivity but not to be what it receives. Thanks to its finite essence, essencing of being attunes without transforming the affected into what affects it. Dasein is finite, it cannot be infinite because its *end* does not belong to itself. In this sense Dasein is a derivation, derived from somewhere *else* or rather from the *elsewhere*. Its end is *in* its out. Death is not the end, because as the coming of an end it does not have its end *in* itself, does not contain its end. Should it be the case, then death would endure (as having its end itself). But there is life, death does not endure, one is *passed* by it. One, someone, every one. It operates as an invisible enchainment that ties things together.

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