

**T.C.
ISTANBUL AYDIN UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**



**EUROPEAN UNION'S ROLE IN SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN
AFGHANISTAN**

**THESIS
Nesar Amad BASHARI**

**Department of Political Science and International Relations
Political Science and International Relations Program**

January, 2020

**T.C.
ISTANBUL AYDIN UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**



**EUROPEAN UNION'S ROLE IN SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN
AFGHANISTAN**

**THESIS
Nesar Amad BASHARI
(Y1712.110001)**

**Department of Political Science and International Relations
Political Science and International Relations Program**

Thesis Advisor: Prof. Dr. Hatice Deniz YÜKSEKER

January, 2020

T.C.
İSTANBUL AYDIN ÜNİVERSİTESİ
LİSANSÜSTÜ EĞİTİM ENSTİTÜSÜ MÜDÜRLÜĞÜ



YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZ ONAY FORMU

Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Tezli Yüksek Lisans Programı Y1712.110001 numaralı öğrencisi NESAR AHMAD BASHARI'nın "European Union's Role in Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan" adlı tez çalışması Enstitümüz Yönetim Kurulunun 14.01.2020 tarihli ve 2020/01 sayılı kararıyla oluşturulan jüri tarafından oybirliği/oyçokluğu ile Tezli Yüksek Lisans tezi 27.01.2020 tarihinde kabul edilmiştir.

<u>Unvan</u>	<u>Adı Soyadı</u>	<u>Üniversite</u>	<u>İmza</u>	
ASIL ÜYELER				
Danışman	Prof. Dr.	Hatice Deniz YÜKSEKER TEKİN	İstanbul Aydın Üniversitesi	
1. Üye	Dr. Öğr. Üyesi	Filiz KATMAN	İstanbul Aydın Üniversitesi	
2. Üye	Dr. Öğr. Üyesi	Deniz ÖZÇETİN	Kadir Has Üniversitesi	
YEDEK ÜYELER				
1. Üye	Dr. Öğr. Üyesi	Hazar VURAL JANE	İstanbul Aydın Üniversitesi	
2. Üye	Doç. Dr.	Ateş USLU	İstanbul Üniversitesi	

ONAY

Prof. Dr. Ragıp Kutay KARACA
Enstitü Müdürü

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that all information in this thesis document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all materials and results, which are not original to this thesis.

Nesar Amad BASHARI



FOREWORD

The subject of this thesis is focused on one of the current issues of Afghanistan, which is unreformed security sector. I tried to explore the study in which I focused on the role of the European Union (EU) in regards to the issue. I learned to study all academic published knowledge. Moreover, I learned to be patient and work hard to get a better result and hope for great things. In truth, I could not have achieved my current level of success without a strong support group. First of all, my parents, who supported me with love and understanding. Secondly, my thesis advisor Dr. Hatice Deniz Yüksek, who showed me how to start my research, what to write and how to end my thesis. At the end, I want to thank you all for your unwavering support.

January, 2020

Nesar Amad BASHARI

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
FOREWORD	iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS	v
ABBREVIATIONS	vii
LIST OF FIGURES	viii
ABSTRACT	ix
ÖZET	x
1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Purpose and Importance of Research	2
1.2 Research Methodology	3
1.3 Determining the Status of Afghan National Defence and Security Forces and Security in Afghanistan from 2001 until 2019	4
1.4 General Overview of Chapters	7
2. LITERATURE REVIEW	11
2.1 Introduction	11
2.2 Background, Definition and Conceptualization of Security Sector Reform	11
2.2.1 Objectives and Principles for The Operations of Security Sector Reform	15
2.2.2 Approaches to SSR by Intergovernmental Organizations	15
2.3 SSR in Post Conflict Peace Building	17
2.3.1 Difficulties Against Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Peace Building	21
2.3.2 Local Ownership.....	25
2.4 Conclusion.....	26
3. POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF AFGHANISTAN	28
3.1 Introduction	28
3.2 The Soviet Invasion in Afghanistan 1979-1989	28
3.2.1 The Collapse of Dr. Najibullah’s Government.....	32
3.3 Bonn Agreement.....	35
3.3.1 Democratic Institutions and Electoral Processes in Afghanistan	36
3.4 Conclusion.....	43
4. EU’S ROLE IN SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN AFGHANISTAN	45
4.1 Introduction	45
4.2 The EU and Afghanistan Relations	45
4.3 The London Conference and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy	47
4.3.1 The International Engagements in Security Sector of Afghanistan.....	49
4.4 EUPOL-A	55
4.4.1 Background of the Afghan National Police Reform.....	56
4.4.2 Justice Sector Reform	57
4.4.3 The Mission’s Objectives	59
4.4.4 The Main Objectives of EUPOL-A	60
4.5 The Police Staff College and Crime Management College.....	60

4.6 Conclusion.....	63
5. CONCLUSION.....	65
5.1 Shortcomings of Research.....	72
5.2 Recommendations	73
REFERENCES.....	75
RESUME.....	79



ABBREVIATIONS

AACA	: The Afghan Assistance and Coordination Authority
ANA	: Afghan National Army
ANBP	: The Afghan New Beginnings Programme
ANDS	: Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ANDSF	: Afghan National Defence and Security Forces
ANP	: Afghan National Police
AUP	: Aid to Uprooted People
BCPR	: The Beaurue for Crisis Prevention and Recovery
CEE	: Central and Eastern Europe
CIA	: The Central Intelligence Agency
CSDP	: The Common Security and Defence Policy
DDR	: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DIAG	: The Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups
ECHO	: The European Community Humanitarian Aid Office
ESDP	: The European Security and Defence Policy
EU	: European Union
EUPOL-A	: EU Police Mission in Afghanistan
GAERC	: The General Affairs and External Relations Council
GPPO	: The German Police Project Office
ISAF	: International Security Assistance Force
ISI	: The Inter-Services Intelligence
JSSR	: Justice and Security Sector Reform
LOTFA	: The Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
MOI	: The Ministry of Interior
NATO	: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OECD/DAC	: The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee
PDPA	: The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PRR	: Priority Reform and Reconstruction
PRTS	: The Provincial Reconstruction Team
SIGAR	: The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SSR	: Security Sector Reform
UNAMA	: The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNOPS	: The United Nations Office for Project Services
USA	: The United States of America
USAID	: The United States Agency for International Development
USDOD	: The United States Department of Defence

LIST OF FIGURES

	<u>Page</u>
Figure 1.1: Problems faced in Afghanistan according to Asia Foundation survey, 2006.	5
Figure 1.2: Problems faced in Afghanistan according to Asia Foundation survey, 2009.	5
Figure 1.3: Fatalities of civilians from 2009-2018.....	6
Figure 1.4: District control by the government of Afghanistan and Taliban.	7



EUROPEAN UNION'S ROLE IN SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN AFGHANISTAN

ABSTRACT

The Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Afghanistan started with the intervention of United States of America (USA) and its allies in 2001 when the state institutions were destroyed by previous regimes and internal conflicts.

with the international intervention forces presence as (SSR) suggests was needed for the reform of security sector until the successful state building process and the rebuilding of security forces in the country. (SSR) is essential for creating a security sector which is not political but an effective and professional security force that is responsible and accountable for the security of not just the state but the citizens too.

The scope of this thesis is to find out the amount of contributions to the process by the European Union (EU). The EU apart from its vast assistance in different sectors in Afghanistan contributed in the reform of police and the justice reform which can be called as its main contributions in the SSR of Afghanistan through its police mission started from 2007 which is the concentration of this thesis to find out the extent of its contributions in the process.

Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) is used as the wider term which covers the whole security sector of Afghanistan that include the Afghan Border Force, Local Police, National Army, Air Force, National Police, National Civil Order Force, Special Forces, Territorial Army, and the National Directorate of Security with the level of active 352,000 personnel as of December 2018 according to the report by the US Department of Defence (USDOD).

Keywords: *Afghanistan, Security Sector Reform, European Union, Post-Conflict Peace Building, State Building.*

AFGANİSTAN GÜVENLİK SEKTÖRÜ REFORMUNDA AVRUPA BİRLİĞİNİN ROLÜ

ÖZET

Afganistan'da Güvenlik Sektörü Reformu (GSR), ülke kurumları önceki rejim ve iç karışıklıklar tarafından tahrip edildiğinde, 2001 yılında Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD) ve onun müttefiği olan devletlerin müdahalesiyle başladı. GSR gibi uluslararası müdahale kuvvetler varlığının, başarılı bir ülke inşa etme sürecine kadar güvenlik sektörü reformu ve ülkede güvenlik kuvvetlerinin yeniden yapılandırılması için gerekli olduğu görüşündeydi. Güvenlik Sektör Reformu, politik olmayan fakat sadece ülkenin değil vatandaşların da güvenliğinden sorumlu ve mesul olacağı etkili ve profesyonel güvenlik kuvveti meydana getirmek için esastı.

Bu tezin faaliyet alanı, Avrupa Birliği tarafından (AB) sürece verilen katkıların önemini ortaya çıkarmaktır. AB farklı bölümlerdeki geniş desteklerinin yanı sıra Afganistan'ın Güvenlik Sektörü Reformunda kendisinin 2007 den bu yana başlayan güvenliği sağlama misyonundaki en temel katkısı denilebilecek emniyet ve adalet reformuna katkı sağlamıştır ki bu tezin, süreçteki katkılarının boyutunu ortaya çıkarmaya yoğunlaşmasıdır.

Birleşik Devletler Savunma Bakanlığı (BDSB) raporlarına göre: Afgan Ulusal Savunama ve Güvenlik Kuvvetleri (AUSGK); Afgan Sınır Güvenliği Kuvveti, Yerel Polisler, Ulusal Ordu, Hava Kuvvetleri, Ulusal Emniyet, Ulusal Sivil Emir Kuvveti, Özel Kuvvetler, Bölgesel Ordu ve Ulusal Güvenlik Müdürlüğü kapsamında Aralık 2018'den bu yana 352,000 seviyede aktif personel ile birlikte Afganistan'ın tüm güvenlik sektörünü çevreleyen geniş çaplı bir terim olarak kullanılır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Afganistan, Güvenlik Sektörü Reformu, Birleşmiş Milletler, Çatışma Sonrası Barış İnşası, Ülke İnşası.*

1. INTRODUCTION

Security Sector Reform (SSR) which became popular as a concept with a speech made by Clare Short the first minister of the department for the international development in 1998 in Britain, although there was a feel for the need of a term or concept as security sector reform in the 1990s. Because during the era of the cold war the role of the military in politics increased and the security forces instead of securing the citizens supported the security of the elites or the regime. Thus, security sector reform is essential for creating a security sector which is not political but an effective and professional security force that is responsible and accountable for the security of not just the state but the citizens too. The war in Afghanistan which is going on for over 40 years and especially during the Soviet rule in the country, and the internal wars between different parties of Mujahideen destroyed the state institutions and with it, the security sector was destroyed and even the military equipment were sold to the neighbouring countries. Those devastating wars almost destroyed every function of the state until the American invasion in 2001 when the Taliban was removed from the power and the intervention paved the way to the state-building process in Afghanistan with the help of the United States and its allies. In the reforming of the security sector in Afghanistan many countries contributed. In this thesis the European Union (EU) role in the security sector reform will be analysed and will find the answer to the what extent the EU has been contributed in the security sector reform of Afghanistan. For answering the above question the literature review is going to be analysed and the relevant evidence will be found especially the literature review in the context of Afghanistan from 2001 will be reviewed, as the topic indicates it will be limited on Afghanistan and the European Union with the time frame of 2001 until its contributions in the areas related to the security sector reform in Afghanistan. The thesis aims to find the academic and current useful information by searching, briefing, and collecting the answerable information to determine the concept of security sector reform and to find the relevant documents to show the amount of contribution by EU to the security sector

reform in Afghanistan, with relation to the broader assistance by the world to SSR in Afghanistan. Security in recent years observed great attention by the public for its link to development and human progress especially its argued that in democratic governments to reduce the conflicts an organized, operative and accountable security sector is essential, and it can eventually cause development progress (OECD, 2008). The EU apart from its vast assistance in different sectors in Afghanistan contributed in the reform of police and the justice reform which can be called as its main contributions in the reform of security sector in Afghanistan through its police mission started from 2007 which is the concentration of this thesis to find out the extent of its contributions in the security-related sectors. The reason for the international forces presence in post-conflict countries is known to be for the creation of a safe atmosphere which is also recommended by the security sector reform process in order to create a professional and effective security sector and to transform them into the organizations which is responsible for the protection of citizen's political, social, economic, and cultural rights. Afghanistan as a country emerging from war since 2001 made a great transformation with the help of international assistance, and EU is known to be in the second position of a great contributor after the United States of America(USA) to the Afghan people and also contributed to the SSR in the country.

1.1 Purpose and Importance of Research

In emerging new threats in the world the insecurity became a big concern for the countries and Afghanistan which became one of the countries faced with the threats such as terrorism and as a country which emerged eventually from devastating wars and as a country in which all the state institutions were destroyed due to the wars and as a post-conflict country, and the presence of international forces became the focus of state-building, and democratization from the withdrawal of Taliban regime by the government of the USA and its partners. To study and analyse this topic is important because without a security sector which is not interfering in politics, a professional, and effective force accountable for the people which is the aim and main target of security sector reform the development and the progress and well-being of the people in any country will not be possible and for the safety of any nation such a security sector is a must. As the context of Afghanistan is considered it was a country newly

emerged from war and the time was ready to rebuild and train the security forces with the presence of the international forces. According to Walter, the reform of security sector is important for the reason that in some cases the security sector instead of providing security for the citizens they encounter in oppressing them and the reform of this sector is essential for preventing such cases of oppression (Walter, 2018).

The main target of the research is to create a deep knowledge on the concept of security sector reform, the reform of security sector in post-conflict peacebuilding and the role international forces in providing the necessary training and infrastructures for the security sector of Afghanistan. Especially the focus is on the contributions by the EU in this regard. The main objective of the thesis is to define and analyse the amount of effort provided by EU to the security sector and will find out its focus on any specific sector of security in which the EU contributed its most efforts.

The peace process in Afghanistan is going on from a long time after the Taliban withdraw from the country but still there is no possibility for the signing of a peace accord, only in the year 2018 the current president of Afghanistan claimed that 45000 troops were killed in the war with the Taliban and other terrorist organizations and insecurity became one of the main challenges against development and well-being of the people in the country, to tackle the problem of insecurity there is a vital role of security sector and in order to work properly the security sector is in need of prompt reforms that can cure the biggest issue Afghanistan is currently facing.

1.2 Research Methodology

This is an exploratory study of the subject and to write an organized and proper academic thesis, I will be using different types of research methods to appropriately write a better conclusion. The data will be collected through secondary data analysis and some government documents and published reports will be used too. The government documents and published reports will be used as the primary data analysis. And the secondary data will be taken from books, journals, newspapers, articles, and national and international surveys. The focus of the study is in the concept of Afghanistan but for a proper and reliable conclusion, the international academic researches regarding the field of study will be analysed.

1.3 Determining the Status of Afghan National Defence and Security Forces and Security in Afghanistan from 2001 until 2019

Afghan national defence and security forces (ANDSF) is used as the wider term which covers the whole security sector of Afghanistan that includes the Afghan Border Force, Local Police, National Army, Air Force, National Police, National Civil Order Force, Special Forces, Territorial Army, and the National Directorate of Security with the level of active 352,000 personnel as of December 2018 according to the report by the US Department of Defence (USDOD). With the fall of the Taliban regime the creation and support to the Afghan security forces was the main priority to the USA, but the process was not as successful as it was thought to be for the reason that the soldiers abandon the army, low morale and corruption, the other main challenges which are faced by both the Afghan National Army(ANA) and the Afghan National Police(ANP), which is stated by USDOD is the attrition rate with the result of soldiers fatality and their sudden leaving of the force . In an interview conducted with the president, Ashraf Ghani in January 2019 said that since 2014 when he took the power in the country witnessed (45000) fatalities of security forces. With the new road map for four years introduced in 2017 aimed to make the administration simple and to strengthen the ANDSF with planning to make sure to tackle the problems related to the leadership, management of resources, and fight against corruption and with the plan of making the special forces two times stronger with the progress in the air forces and to change the status of ANP from battleground to the civil policing. As of the annual campaign plan marked according to USDOD resulted to make the ANDSF as an offensive force rather than the defensive force with regards to the intelligence services which is failed to detect information before the attacks in some provinces and suggested that the intelligence forces are significantly in need of progress. As for the current road map the Afghan border police and the national civil order police which were under the command of ministry of interior changed their command to the ANA and became a part of the ministry of defence which resulted in a reduce in the number of police personnel in the ministry of interior to (117940) members. The mission of Afghan national police as defined by the USDOD is the force which is responsible for civil order, provide security to the people, communities, to defend their legal rights, freedom and to prevent the

illegal narcotics cultivation, smuggling and its production (European Asylum Support Office, 2019).

The survey conducted by the Asia Foundation in 2006 shows that insecurity is indicated as the biggest problem facing the Afghan people and in the survey conducted in 2009 also shows that the lack of national security remained as the biggest challenge for the people of Afghanistan and 36% of the respondents selected the insecurity to the question of what the biggest problem as a whole facing Afghanistan is. The survey also shows that following insecurity as the biggest challenge for the country, the lack of proper jobs, poor economy, corruption, poverty, education, and the Taliban insurgents' presence.




Figure 1.1: Problems faced in Afghanistan according to Asia Foundation survey, 2006.




Figure 1.2: Problems faced in Afghanistan according to Asia Foundation survey, 2009.

In the presence of 20 different insurgent groups, the security situation remains precarious in Afghanistan in an ongoing cycle of war with the ANDSF, and the international forces (The Asia Foundation, 2018).

The United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan documents on the civilian casualties also shows an increase in the fatality of civilians from 2009 until 2018 which is the highest record until date.




Figure 1.3: Fatalities of civilians from 2009-2018.

Considering the increase in civilian’s fatalities and the statement by President Ashraf Ghani confirmed that 45000 soldiers lost their lives in defending Afghanistan against 20 different terrorist organizations who have got sanctuaries outside Afghanistan indicates that the security situation in the country is worse than previous years.

In recent years the perception that the Afghan war is impossible to win militarily got the higher attention and this mostly happened after a three days ceasefire by the Taliban and the government of Afghanistan from 15 to 17 June 2018 which resulted in speeding the peace process and according to The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), in those three days without attacks by ISIS or Daesh in the province of Nangarhar, there were no other attacks occurred, and a peaceful environment was created which became a big hope for reconciliation among the government and the Taliban. But with series of negotiations with the Taliban leaders and the USA to reach an agreement of peace, stopped due to the attacks on the American forces during the negotiations by President Trump and by his order the attacks against Taliban increased in recent months (BBC, 2018).

With the end of 2014 the security responsibility was transferred to the ANDSF from the International forces and the Taliban started to spread in more provinces from

2010 and Afghan security forces were supported by the resolute support mission by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which was a smaller and civilian mission and withdrawing the international forces in 2014 made it easier for the Taliban to expand faster in all regions of the country.

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in November 2015 started to archive information on the district control and its new findings shows that the insurgents took more districts from 2015 and their influence and control has been raised 5% and it shows 18% decrease in the government control and it also found the decrease of government control in contested districts about 13% (SIGAR, 2017).




Figure 1.4: District control by the government of Afghanistan and Taliban.

1.4 General Overview of Chapters

The concept of security sector reform became popular in the 1990s because during the cold war the military role in politics increased and the security forces provided security to the authorities, rather than the people or the citizens and sometimes they oppressed people. as the definitions of security sector reform indicates, the reform of security sector is for the purpose of creating a security force which is not political, but effective and professional forces that is responsible for both the state and the citizens. The concept of SSR was used in different contexts such as the community of donors for progress to the discussions on the reform in transition countries of central and eastern Europe, to change in the western industrial nations and spread to all over the world rapidly. In this thesis I will focus on the process of security sector

reform in Afghanistan and the role of EU regarding this issue. This thesis will also provide a brief understanding of the SSR in post conflict peace building, the obstacle to the process in such environments and the local ownership in the literature review of second chapter, the literature review has long argued about the background definition and conceptualization of SSR, where the majority of the studies points out that the concept of security sector reform is ill-defined and relatively new and in the studies regarding security the term is replaced by the defence reform, but the current term to address the new threats to the security which is not only military threats but also non-military threats seems to be the suitable term. Although the term and its meaning was thought to be not clear and many attributing scholars have used different words to describe the concept at least until the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Developments/ Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) provided guideline on SSR in 2004 in which they redefined security and included not only state security or national security but also individual security and wellbeing, recognized the interdependency of security and development in the partner countries known to be viewed as a public policy and governance issue which received a great public attention and the fact that wars and conflicts decreases with a democratic governed, security system which is effective and accountable for the people and eventually creates an environment capable of development. in this guideline the term security sector reform is replaced by security system reform which provide a new direction for the practitioners involved in the process of security sector reform and also challenged them to make sure how their process is designed, implemented and evaluated and how to use the resources provided by different government agencies to use it the better way to assist the security system reform process. From a long time, different intergovernmental organizations are assisting the partner and member countries in certain dimensions of SSR. Until date, the OECD/DAC and the European Union developed or are in the course of developing a comprehensive policy framework to guide different SSR activities. The literature review is going on by explaining SSR in post-conflict peacebuilding where the amount of international intervention is more obvious and needed to bring security and train the local forces and rebuild the infrastructures, training the local forces and building the infrastructures is seems to be very crucial in such environments for a last longing security because the international forces cannot stay for long to keep the country safe and for this purpose there is a need for a strong local security sector for a sustainable

peace to take over in the length of time. And to reach this goal in the post-conflict environment is not easy but as the study suggests its possible if the international community cooperate with the local government to reform the security sector and over time reform the political, economic and cultural sector to reach a sustainable and lasting peace in local context which also helps to have a peaceful and democratic community. Although SSR is difficult especially in the post-conflict countries many suggest that for a sustainable security sector reform the local ownership is essential as mentioned in the OECD/DAC it's one of the four main objectives of the international donors active in the process of SSR.

In the third chapter the political background of Afghanistan from the Soviet Union invasion and the intervention of USA and its allies in December 2001. Followed the intervention a new interim administration was formed in the country which was led by Hamid Karzai with international support in December 2001 in Afghanistan, the Karzai administration came into existence in the Bonn Agreement on Afghanistan for six months on 22 December 2001 As guaranteed in the Bonn Agreement the interim administration after six months in June 2002 an emergency Loya Jirga (grand council meeting) should be organized to appoint the transitional authority that was to rule until the new constitution was adopted within 18 months, and the political timetable included the mechanism to share the power until then which worked toward a measure of democratic consolidation. The constitutional Loya Jirga met on December 2003 and January 2004 as suggested to draft and ratify a new Afghan constitution and the presidential elections in October 2004 in which Hamid Karzai became the elected president and the parliamentary election in September 2005 which was a success by any measure. the institutional reconstruction was a top priority that needed a long-term process and resources also attention to create accountable, free, stable and democratic representing institutions to implement the policies of the government.

In chapter four the main focus of the thesis is on the EU contribution to the SSR and the EUPOL-A, as its main mission to contribute to some of the aspects of SSR, that started in 2007 and it further goes on explaining the objectives of this mission and its role in building of institutions for the police forces in Afghanistan and namely the staff college and the crime management college as its main contribution regarding the institution building for the police forces are explained in details this chapter also

focused on the EU commission role in the justice sector reform. Before the Taliban regime which was settled in 1996, Afghanistan had a strong national civilian police force which was assisted and supported by West and East Germany between 1960 and 70s but with the arrival of Soviet Union in Afghanistan the role of police changed with the help of KGB to paramilitary to stand against the forces belonged to Mujahedeen and later when the Soviets left the country the Afghan national police were more weekend with the fight between different parties of Mujahedeen which resulted in elimination of civilian police force that was effected mostly during Soviets and Mujahedeen (Wilder, 2007P.03).

Furthermore it provides a brief explanation of the international engagement on the security sector reform in Afghanistan that started with The G8 donors meeting in Geneva that was held in 2002 for the purpose of creating a framework for the operations in Afghanistan and tried to use the SSR approach to develop such framework, that contained five tasks such as the reform of military, police, counter-narcotics, judiciary and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former fighters and in this meeting each donor country promised to lead these five tasks such as the USA led the military reform, Germany took the responsibility of police reform which later on changed to the EU, counter-narcotics was led by United kingdom, judicial reform was led by Italy and Japan led the DDR process. This framework aimed to make sure that there is a safe environment while restructuring the fundamental institutions in Afghanistan and covered many sectors, but as it was expected higher progress in each pillar seem to be slower (Chesterman, 2002).

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter provide a review on the background and process of Security Sector Reform (SSR) becoming a concept and it further it goes on providing its definition, objectives and working principles by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) guidelines of SSR and the second part explains the term in post-conflict peacebuilding, the obstacles it faces and the ownership of locals in the post-conflict environments.

2.2 Background, Definition and Conceptualization of Security Sector Reform

The goal for promoting democracy was not part of the decisions in providing development assistance to some countries from the superpowers in East and Western World, but rather exclusively, it was for the purpose of encouraging and keeping strategic relationships with the partner and recipient countries based on their requirements. Even assisted the countries that were ruled by the military type of regimes and with the nations which were ruled by the civic government with strong ties with the military and some other military services as ball explains (Sedra, 2010).

In consequence, the highly self-governing security sector decreased the ability of states to promote democracy, advance a solid civic capacity and a society which is devoted to the rule of law for governing and managing the security-related sectors, and the inappropriate, useless and unnecessary security costs reduced the existing development funds. Thus, the capability of the security sector services reduced, and they couldn't function properly to carry out the objectives they were assigned to, most of them were busy in the provision of security to the regime and the elite groups instead of booming the security for the state, its public and communities. Although the involvements of military in politics during the cold war era was in the centre of the focus for academics as ball states the work carried out by them was never satisfactory for finding the relation between the leaders of security and the

civilians that was formed by the complex political, societal and economic movements which affected the requirements of citizens for a far-reaching security for sustainable socio-economic and political progress and consistently reduced the capacity of state for the provision of such security (Ball, 2010).

However, throughout the 1980s the publications on the role of the military in the governance were increased especially in the cases of transition countries because the civilian governance was increased and the literature on the impact of a broad security sector on development emerged in this period (Ball, 1988). In addition the topics such as the prevention of violence, intragroup hostilities(internal and transborder) avoiding states to violent the citizens and the settlement after wars were studied by the peace research community, which overall provided inputs into the concept of security sector reform as it started to progress as a concept in the late 1990s (Ball, 2010).

According to Brzoska “SSR can be understood as an attempt to connect, in one concept, the opportunities of expanding development assistance into security related fields and the challenges of new demands on development donors, and to provide both with a common vision” (Jackson, 2016 P.121).

One of the main missions of SSR is the promotion of human progress for the purpose of reducing poverty to make sure the people increase their opportunities in life including poor people. The new concept of security is distinguished with the traditional concept by including not only state or nations security but as well focused on the security and well-being of the people (OECD, 2008).

The security in other countries faced with great public attention for its knotty link with development and it became a governance matter and the public policy, it’s also argued that in democratic governments with a well-organized, operative and accountable security-related sector reduce the chances of conflicts to occur and it eventually make the way for development progress (OECD, 2008).

The definition of Security sector reform which is renamed as the security system reform in the OECD DAC Handbook on security sector reform guidelines provided in 2004 and As Ejodus listed there are five elements in this definition as listed below:

- Efficiency as the contest between achieved result and means.
- Effectiveness as the harmony between aims and achieved result

- Human security as the protection of human rights and freedom from fear. Human security is explained with two more elements such as the chronic threats and the protection from a sudden and damaging disruption in all aspects of life.
- National security as the political stability of government institutions, preserving territorial integrity, national independence and sovereignty.
- “Democratic governance within the concept of SSR refers to legitimacy, representativeness, transparency, the participation of citizens, legality and accountability in the governing of the security sector. Thus, given the criteria of democratic governance SSR is not an easy, simple technical process of the reorganisation of the security sector. The concept of SSR also incorporates the values of liberal democracy and the efforts invested in the adoption of those values” (Ejdus, 2009 P.63-68).

According to Hanggi security sector reform refers to several activities and issues associated to the elements of public sector which is responsible for the internal and external security since its emergence in late 1990s and became widely recognized by the specialists of security, practitioners in the area of development and progress, and to a lesser degree the supporters of democracy. The concept of security sector reform is relatively complex as Hanggi states with the main goal of providing the human and state with efficient and effective security inside the framework of democracy, Although the concept of security sector reform is still an evolving and questioned concept with a rare practical experience on the ground the security cooperation, international programmes for development assistance and the promotion of democracy is progressively formed by the concept (Hanggi, 2004).

According to Michael Brzoska with the labour government of Britain came to power in 1997 the Department for International Development was created and Clare Short was appointed as its first minister who made a speech on the concept of SSR in 1998. Although the necessity for a comprehensive approach was recognised earlier the speech by him added an importance to it and made it as a term and concept (Brzoska, 2003).

In the article published by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces argues that the concept of security sector reform is relatively new and ill-defined, which also states that in the researches on the security the concept is

replaced by the original term defence reform and its thought to be the suitable term for the new threats which are not only military threats to defend against it, but terrorism, organized crimes, illegal trafficking, civil wars, or spread of small arms and even the weapons of mass destruction which are non-military threats. And to address all these threats there is a need for the security services of all states to function in a concentrated manner, and therefore the reform of the security sector seems to be the suitable policy concept with which we can address all the above-mentioned threats. Security sector reform is being implemented to create systematic accountability and transparency, the agenda of good governance which is substantively concern on democracy, human rights and the rule of law contains the security sector reform in its context because of its emphasis on accountability and transparency (Born et al., 2003).

The term security sector reform which only emerged in the 1990s used in different contexts from the community of donors for progress, to discussions on the reform in the 'transition' countries of central and Eastern Europe' to change in the key industrial nations in Western Europe and it spread in the international discourses quickly (DPI, 2016).

According to Brzoska the term security sector reform is widely used because for the plenty activities and phenomenon related to the sector which is responsible for the security, and the second reason is that the time was prepared for its usage, but its meaning is still not clear and many researchers have been used different varieties of words for the term such as the security sector transformation, security sector transition, or different approaches to the subject and claims that the term is confusing and not clear for them, and as he states there is a requirement for the new term to emerge, and the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) of United Nations Development Programme started to promote a new term which is named as the Justice and Security Sector Reform (JSSR) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) switched to security system reform (Brzoska, 2003).

Furthermore, as Ball suggests some cases where some of the nations and intergovernmental organizations undertook some activities which are seen to be the examples for security sector reform on the ground such as the reconstruction of the Liberian armed forces and the ministry of defence by the united states of America,

and plenty of operations by the United Kingdom based on the Banner of ‘SSR’ which are characterized as the security sector reform, and the Netherlands has also started a major multiyear security sector development program in 2009 and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF) have been created for the aim of establishing a standing capacity to support the operations for SSR activities and with an SSR command the United Nations has been providing with a peace support mission and strengthening its capacity to work in this field (Ball & Van de Goor, 2008 cited in Sedra, 2010 P.36).

2.2.1 Objectives and Principles for The Operations of Security Sector Reform

For the purpose of increasing the capabilities of partner countries to reach the degree of security and challenges in the justice department, they meet based on the rule of law and democratic norms and values. as defined in the OECD DAC Guidelines on SSR. “SSR helps create a secure environment conducive to other political, economic and social developments, through the reduction of armed violence and crime” (OECD, 2008 P.21).

According to the OECD guideline to SSR the international community involved in the process in the partner nations should consider these four overarching objectives:

- A security system based on oversight, accountability and effective governance.
- To provide progress in the delivery of justice and security services.
- To develop the role of locals in the leadership of security system reform.
- Sustainability in the process of reform in the sector of justice and security.

The above mentioned objectives or missions as provided and accepted in the OECD guideline on SSR must be achieved based on the working principle which are people centered, owned by locals, based on the norms and values of democracy, the rule of law and the principles of human rights which are agreed in the policy statement (OECD, 2008).

2.2.2 Approaches to SSR by Intergovernmental Organizations

The role of Structuring and implementing programmes related to SSR is increasingly played by the intergovernmental organizations but their methods vary broadly based on some reasons such as their focus geographically, centered globally, region or sub-

regional, whether their activities were the reason for development, governance or security standpoints to security sector reform, whether the aim of their activity in a specific country, their functions on the ground or the development of norms. Most of the international organizations focused on some of the pieces of security sector reform rather than concentrating on the whole process but still they are all faced the same problems and issues. Regardless of its origin and operations, there is a lack of overarching concept and a proper implementation framework or guidelines, the lack of cooperation among donors, the need to make sure there are enough resources both material and human, the operations in the area of security sector reform need to be accountable and clear. Recently by the by the two intergovernmental organization, the OECD DAC and the European Union(EU) a comprehensive policy framework developed or is on the course of developing to guide and clear the path for the implication of SSR process and some other intergovernmental organizations have also been assisting some partner nations in some aspects of SSR from a long time (Law, 2007).

The OECD along with the comprehensive policy framework also developed the implementation framework for SSR to better guide the different intergovernmental organizations involved in the procedure and along with it covers the issues and problems the involved actors might face, and they put the ownership of locals as the starting point for the reason of its highly political nature. In addition, emphasized on the importance of SSR concept because there is a big difference between the normal security sector reform and the post-war situation, it also recognized the importance of interpreting all these principles into practical devices for those donors involved in the process of reform in the field (Law, 2007).

From over the past years the EU was in the process of conceptualizing its method to SSR, intended to be flexible and pragmatic, relied too much on the OECD DAC guidelines, recently drafted the EU wide SSR document by the commission and council and some more work need to be done to make sure it's working on the ground in the operations by the council or commission. The activities related to SSR is done by the commission or council separately or with close coordination. About The concept and the operations of security sector reform on the ground relatively few are aware in the EU, especially regarding the holistic approach, design and

implementation process and the EU need a long-term training in the field of SSR because it can be a big obstacle against the operation phase of SSR (Law, 2007).

2.3 SSR in Post Conflict Peace Building

According to Schnabel and Ehrhart “the security sector includes all those organizations that have the authority to use, or order the use of force, or the threat of force, to protect the state and its citizens, as well as those civil structures that are responsible for their management and oversight” (Schnabel and Ehrhart, 2006 P.6).

The importance to reform the security sector is because in some cases instead of focusing to empower the civil society they are involved in their oppressing, and to prevent such cases there is a requirement for the process of reforming the security-related sector (Walter, 2018).

The security and justice sectors reform in the situations after wars are regularly a high priority for the safety and security of the citizens and to avoid the wars to arise again. which is a priority most of the cases and its said that such situations provide opportunity for SSR because the time and environment might be ready for it, for the reason that in post-war situations the war comes to an end and during peace negotiation there must be declared the need for the reforms and including parties might compromise and in the signed agreement they might include international forces to take part in the elements of a bigger peace building plan and to reform the security sectors (DCAF, 2017).

The key reasons for the failure of government in the process of providing safety and security for the residents are internal wars and violent disasters, and this fact that the state of social disorder and threat is the main hindrance to progress and peace process is recognized by the international organisations and development agencies. And the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for the first time came with the suggestion to add human security as a prominent part to the concept of security and eventually widened the whole concept. In recent years to support the nation-building process and to overcome the culture of violence the international community emphasized the SSR as an integral part of third-party interference. The EU also focused on supporting the rule of law and in the regions of wars to reform the police

forces and this issue is in the core of its missions for civil crisis prevention (Clem, Martina and Oliver, 2004).

Expanded armies with a very less amount of civic management or with no civic management at all, the weakness of internal security forces, informal and paramilitary forces, the large number of artillery and ammo in the hands of government, private and all the military and security remnants of the war are the main motives for internal insecurity in post-conflict situations. In the process of political and economic transition in such environments and the transition of security of the time of war, the intergovernmental organizations, united nations and peacekeeping forces from different nations have been playing a prominent role. Even after withdrawing peacekeeping forces from such environments with the lack of sustaining security to its not possible to reconstruct political, economic and culture in such societies, to make sure this progress is being made there is a requirement for reform in the security-related sectors and a precise democratization in the sector of local security which is responsible for the security of citizens and to make sure that the security forces are not threatening the safety and security of people and to make sure there is a close coordination among local security forces and international assistance forces to rebuild the process. A comprehensive reform in the sector of security which also includes political economic and military actors for a peace building process to work effectively. A comprehensive security reform in the police forces, military, intelligence services, border guards, custom services, the judicial and penal system, and specific civic institutions that are responsible for the oversight and their administration (Schnabel and Ehrhart, 2006).

Post-conflict societies are when the wars between rivalries or the intrastate wars came to an end and the environment become ready for the rebuilding process which follows by a peace agreement between the parties involved in conflicts or follows by a cease-fire and a specific feature of such societies is that the international community can play a prominent role to the reconstruction process, and the parties involved in war commits to the rebuilding process (Controle, 2009).

The number of international actors such as the armed forces, agencies, non-state actors such as warlords, international terrorist organizations, religious actors and private companies involved in post-conflict security sector reform is one of the main features of such environments. SSR in post-conflict environment can be separated

with normal SSR in parts where it deals with the remnants of conflicts this situation can be the same in post-authoritarian environments but with the differences that in post-conflict environments there is a need to reintegrate and demobilize parties involved in conflicts, the need of an immediate security and decrease the number of security actors. The strategy of security sector reform is to rebuild and or strengthen the capabilities of the state to make sure it can provide security to its citizens in whole and not only the elites of its politics and for this aim SSR seek to increase the accountability and the performance of the police forces, army and secret services to improve the basic elements of the security of the individuals, its far beyond the technical definition and many actors involved in the process met difficulties with its political nature in different countries where they were involved such as the United States(USA), and the United Kingdom(UK) (Sedra, 2010).

Fragile states, weak governance, insecurity, poverty underdevelopment and violent threats are common issues to international community and are known as the factors of intervening in the third country for stabilization process and especially these threats are against the strategic interests of the United States and the Western world currently to articulate and imply stabilization in such environments is a priority because from these unstable countries regional threats are being regulated and an obvious link to the international terrorist organizations, transnational and other threats (Collinson, Elhawary and Muggah, 2010).

In the sector of security, the programmes which are focused on decreasing or eliminating obvious dangers and the gradually increased experience of international intervention and their involvement in ending conflicts and to create a peaceful situation for development and for the past decade they emphasized the need to integrate politically, military, development and humanitarian action (Brahimi, 2000).

As a wider transformative mission to achieve stability, there are some interconnected and similar goals to create a safe and secure environment, including the creation of stable administration, the establishment of the rule of law, an economic system which is market-based and capability to promote psychological and social wellbeing. And according to these stabilization policies, the politics and counterterrorism cannot be separated based on the belief that security and progress are mutually strengthening. And the belief that intervention for development strengthening security by creating a stable environment which gives legitimacy along with profit for

both the government and intervening forces, in turn, creates the environment secure and safe and eventually it creates the opportunity to implement development which embeds stability for a longer-term, therefore in the diverse concept as Afghanistan, Timor-Leste, and Haiti the stabilization process became a key part of the wider liberal transforming project of peacebuilding (Collinson, Elhawary and Muggah, 2010).

For a fair existing on the ground and to improve policy position on the strategies related to stabilization process from disarmament, reintegration, arms control, and demobilisation to apply reforms in the sector of security and the deployment of peacekeepers and to align international or regional commitments with national priorities many western countries created cross-departmental working groups including the UK, USA, Australia, Canada, France and Switzerland and for this intention the US came with the idea of opening an office for better coordination, stabilization and reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq. The areas in Afghanistan that are fragile and out of control by government forces which are unsafe are on the emphasize for stabilization and counterinsurgency and these efforts are reflected in the context of counterinsurgency (Collinson, Elhawary and Muggah, 2010).

By giving legitimacy to one party over another by international donors and the funds they provide can have different effects on security, in countries where the political settlement is contested the higher presence of the insurgents in four provinces in Southern Afghanistan spent half of the USAID assistance fund in 2007 (Wilder and Gordon, 2009 cited in Collinson, Elhawary & Muggah, 2010).

In Afghanistan the rivalries and disillusionment on the impact of assistance aid which was produced by the development funds by international community, weak governance and the high presence of corruption in the country, seemed to have decreased public pleasure from the assistance forces and the government forces of Afghanistan which might have resulted in a very low effect stability or no effect on stability at all (Wilder and Gordon, 2009 cited in Collinson, Elhawary & Muggah, 2010).

In post-war countries the provision of security is related to train and rebuild the infrastructure for security forces which is a vital need of such societies, and for the aim of a sustainable peace to take over in the duration of time until the international

security forces withdraw, there should be a trained, strong and capable local forces to sustain security, and a strong security sector is a must for such societies because the international forces cannot stay for a long period of time. The suggestion of security sector reform in post conflict countries and the process of peace building suggested that the environment must be safe and non-violent for political, economic and cultural well-being of a country and this reason emphasized on the presence of international military forces in such countries to transform the security related sector into a group of institutions that are responsible to protect the political, economic, cultural and social rights of the public, For this purpose the international forces must work in a close coordination beside the locals to follow the principles of civic authority, the roles and responsibilities based on the constitution, indigenization, and the negotiation between the military and political leaders, to reach this goal in the unfair environment in post-conflict societies is not easy but it's possible by cooperating with the local government to reform the security sector and with the duration of time reform the political, economic, and cultural sectors and eventually it will help in accomplishing a long-lasting peace domestically and also helps to have a peaceful, democratic and global community thus it's in the interest of international community to cooperate and help such societies to reform their security sector in the context of a larger process of peacebuilding (Walter, 2018).

2.3.1 Difficulties Against Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Peace Building

In the process of reforming the security sector in some of the counties achieved experience by the international actors involved throughout the intervention is that the reform to the security sector has little in common with the era of cold war transitional military and police reform and among the most important lessons they learnt is to recognize the need of reform to the sector of security in these countries, the need of a coherent and comprehensive international aid, the necessity to strengthen the commitment between the national and local leadership, an essential need to carefully design confidence-building measures to overcome the distrust between the public and security forces and the need for commitment and perspective for a long term (Ball and Brzoska, 2002).

For the intention of achieving economic and political liberty that was caused by the end of cold war around the globe, states looked to attain democratic governments with strong economies and for its management there was a need for a capable and strong administration and political structure and for reaching these goals that also includes political, civil and security institutions to protect the state and the citizens to achieve these goals a well-managed security sector is a crucial component. And the security sector reform or transition is emphasized by the international aid for the reason that it's known as the fundamental part of changing one-party system to pluralist political system from enteral planned to market economies, and from conflict to peace (Hendrickson and Karkoszka, 2002).

The activities and dynamics of cold war determined the assistance aid to the third world countries including humanitarian, development and security aid before 1989 and stable international system, stable regime, and to protect client regimes from internal and external threats became equivalent to security and the concept of militarized security emerged during cold war that increased security by arms and regional integrity which was problematic to change and the assistance programmes did not focused on the whole aspects of security sector reform and didn't establish a security system that is based on the ethics of today's democracy (Hendrickson and Karkoszka, 2002).

Assisting SSR on the ground by the international community is comparatively partial and with a specific nature, due to the lack of a common definition among the actors involved in the process and therefore it is not easy to evaluate its current progress and obstacles that are still coming its way. The most popular security sector reform programs have been in the countries of developing world after conflicts and from the CEE states aside where it mainly focused on the military reform and border security (Hendrickson and Karkoszka, 2002).

The expectations for a great impact of international assistance to SSR is low in countries where there is no incentive for reform by locals, week institutional capacity, week constituency that also caused week participation by international assistance forces to support SSR which is spreading western norms and values to inform the aid receiving countries how their security sector should operate which is the same until date (Hendrickson and Karkoszka, 2002).

Although the agreement on the standards of SSR in Asia is not as apparent as in European countries because the condition is not fair in Asian countries for SSR due to the fragility of states institutions, unstable politics, limited resources and the lack of courage by the western world to support SSR process since the countries that are most in need of reform lacks the strategic importance to them and due to a large cultural gap between them the international community have to choose those national experiences that are fairly suitable for the developing countries SSR and concentrate on how to facilitate the development of a national vision and domestic constituency for sustaining the process of reforming the security-related sectors (Hendrickson and Karkoszka, 2002).

In term of providing assistance by the international community there must be a holistic and long term approach but they were slow to develop such an approach and also they couldn't be successful to make sure that the national and international actors on the ground, work together effectively in a cooperative manner, for this reason many international actors involved in the process of security sector reform rebrand their long term operations as SSR and in relation to new circumstance they couldn't develop relevant policies and had no evaluation for the requirements of aid receiving countries, eventually the international community had little focus in many cases such as the police training and direct military to demobilize and reintegrate the previous fighters involved in the war and also to provide training to security forces on the human rights along with addressing the rise of light weapons, while all of them are the important parts of SSR but without focusing on the broad agenda of strengthening the institution building for the management and control of security sector its effects will be for a limited long term. Due to the lack of capacity and national interest in reforming the security sector in most of the cases the focus is on the models and timetables of international forces to implement on the ground with the lack of clear understanding the environment and without knowing what exactly happened before the war and how the new power dynamics are arranged. The war-ravaged countries present the greatest challenges for the implementation phase of SSR and the increased security forces involvements in politics is also a major obstacle to the process (Hendrickson and Karkoszka, 2002).

In recent decade some progress has been made to provide a clear definition for security sector reform but a regular, complete or a whole state approach is still

missing, for the reason that the concept is new and its objectives that are to establish proficient establishments, government oversight and the relationship between civic and military, were not followed after cold war, and it was mainly considered as the process of providing arms to the external forces and nothing was achieved on its main objectives. Only after 1990 academics focused to provide applied models which paved the way for the topic, but it was highly remained theoretical until recently that the OECD DAC developed a guide book for the practical use of security sector reform and some countries also tried to begin the strategy to create a regular SSR capacity, in particular, the Netherlands and United Kingdom. The United Nations also started the same efforts. but without considering the significant activities of SSR in Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, Sudan, Sierra Leon and democratic republic of Congo the United States and the United Nations has recently begun to develop generic SSR guidelines (Mcfate, 2008).

The reason for the missing international comprehensive approach to security sector reform is the difficulty of the process especially in the situations of post-conflict countries and its political nature is another big issue for the staff and contributors to the process in fragile or failed states. The security sector reform faces many issues and obstacles but with other challenges, the security sector reform can be successful with the local ownership although it's difficult to obtain but it's crucial for the sustainability of the process. Cooperation is the most important element in the success of SSR process because in reforming the security sector of a country many international actors with different perspectives, objectives and priorities which make it difficult for cooperation and resulted in uncoordinated and urgent implementation and many donor countries may also discourage because a noticeable change to produce may take very long (Mcfate, 2008).

The environment for reform differ widely and the process for SSR should be suitable to the environment on the ground, and each engagement of the process is a unique case but with considering the key principles of security sector reform, to implement the process of security sector reform there should be a clear understanding of the environment even its prominent for a successful implementation along with adapting the suitable programmes and the political legal economic social technology and environmental factors need to be considered to determine the nature and consequence of security sector reform programmes (DCAF, 2017).

Many unpleasant factors of post-conflict environment such as a security sector which is not functioning properly, continued violence, the flexibility of institutions, the collapse of structures, unclear mandates, weak local elites, gender-based violence, strong donor role, external engagement tiredness and the predominant role of the military could have a considerable impact on the process of security sector reform. And engagement in such societies can also bring with it several issues and challenges, such as the collapse of state institutions, freedom from punishment due to the lack of law enforcement, high 'political volatility' and 'uncertainty', the legacy of violence that need to be managed and a wide feeling of distrust between public towards the authorities (DCAF, 2017).

2.3.2 Local Ownership

In the last two decades the activities related to SSR by the international actors seemed to be the failure and did not gain a great result in the developing countries, because it was almost in the hands of the outsiders and recently the focus on local ownership to the process gained the attention of the international community and the fundamental questions of the intervention at its core which are the focus of the discussion on local ownership such as who is going to make decisions, manage, apply or evaluate. Joseph Stiglitz emphasized on the local ownership for the vision of development and evaluated the last decades' attempts as challenging on the beginning and eventually self-defeating and blamed it on the external forces as they took in hands the whole process and imposed the policies that didn't work on the ground but accepted superficially (Stiglitz, 1998 as cited in Donais, 2009). He argues that for development assistance to use effectively in any mission the local ownership must play a vital role even if it is short of principles and with remaining challenges to apply on the ground. Although this idea is largely accepted to implement local ownership on the ground, but to change the ownership quickly to the locals is still not accepted by all, particularly in the situations after wars because in such situations the aim of a democratic, accountable, and professional security sector which is guided by the public services approach that supports the mainstream security sector reform philosophies which are against the interests of the local political leaders and even the situation can be the same in more stable political environments. The international community for taking a wide control over the process and particularly after 911 attacks preferred their security rather than the security of the countries

where they were operated and for this, they are largely criticized. To adapt local ownership is also emphasized by Timothy Donais who states that without considering local ownership the process of security sector reform cannot be effectively executive and sustainable as shown in the last experiences by the actors. Applying local ownership and leadership by the actors involved in the implementation of security sector reform is known as one of the four overarching objectives they should consider, and this statement was declared by the OECD DAC official meeting (Donais, 2009).

The strategy and implementation of security sector reform initiatives should be in the focus of local ownership control and influence as stated by timothy Donais. And he quoted the definition provided by Laurie Natan as “the principles of local ownership of SSR means that the reform of security policies, institutions and activities in a given country must be designed, managed and implemented by domestic actors rather than external actors” (Donais, 2009p.120).

2.4 Conclusion

Thus, with the above in mind the literature review has long argued about the background definition and conceptualization of security sector reform, where the majority of the studies points out that the concept of security sector reform is ill-defined and relatively new and in the studies regarding security the term is replaced by the defence reform, but the current term to address the new threats to the security which is not only military threats but also non-military threats seems to be the suitable term. Although the term and its meaning was thought to be not clear and many attributing scholars have used different words to describe the concept at least until the OECD DAC provided guideline on SSR in 2004 in which they redefined security and included not only state security or national security but also individual security and wellbeing, recognized the interdependency of security and development in the partner countries known to be viewed as a public policy and governance issue which received a great public attention and the fact that wars and conflicts decreases with a democratic governed, security system which is effective and accountable for the people and eventually creates an environment capable of development. in this guideline the term security sector reform is replaced by security system reform which provide a new direction for the practitioners involved in the process of security sector

reform and also challenged them to make sure how their process is designed, implemented and evaluated and how to use the resources provided by different government agencies to use it the better way to assist the security system reform process. From a long time, different intergovernmental organizations are assisting the partner and member countries in certain dimensions of SSR. Until date, the OECD DAC and the European Union developed or are in the course of developing a comprehensive policy framework to guide different SSR activities. The literature review is going on by explaining the security sector reform in post-conflict peacebuilding where the amount of international intervention is more obvious and needed to bring security and train the local forces and rebuild the infrastructures, training the local forces and building the infrastructures is seems to be very crucial in such environments for a las longing security because the international forces cannot stay for long to keep the country safe and for this purpose there is a need for a strong local security sector for a sustainable peace to take over in the length of time. And to reach this goal in the post-conflict environment is not easy but as the study suggests its possible if the international community cooperate with the local government to reform the security sector and over time reform the political, economic and cultural sector to reach a sustainable and lasting peace in local context which also helps to have a peaceful and democratic community. Although security sector reform is difficult especially in the post-conflict countries many suggest that for a sustainable security sector reform the local ownership is essential as mentioned in the OECD DAC it's one of the four main objectives of the international donors active in the process of SSR.

3. POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF AFGHANISTAN

3.1 Introduction

This chapter explains the political background of Afghanistan from the Soviet invasion in 1979, the collapse of Dr. Najibullah government which was backed by the Soviets and further it goes by explaining the soviet withdrawal, the factional wars between the different groups of mujahideen and the Taliban regime until the interventions of the United States(USA) and its allies in 2001, the Bonn Agreement and democratic institutions and electoral process in the country.

3.2 The Soviet Invasion in Afghanistan 1979-1989

Looking at the political background of Afghanistan in the last three decades which is also known as the black and bloody decades of war started from 1970s and continued until 2000, shows that the Afghan government became weaker in the 1970s due to political instability began from the kingdom of Zahir Khan who was the monarch of Afghanistan for 40 years from 1933-1973, who unfortunately did nothing, for the development of the country while he was also famous for living a luxury life. This period was followed by a military coup by Daoud Khan in 1973 and declared himself as the president of the Republic of Afghanistan.

In 1972 some Afghan officials requested Soviet Union military consultants and 100 of them arrived in that year. The government of Daoud couldn't stabilize the country and in April 1978 a coup by Nur Mohammed Taraki with the support of Soviet Union took the control of the government and assassinated Daoud Khan along with his family (Oliker, 2011).

With the new constitution in 1965 the formation of political parties legalized in Kabul, and many political organizations were formed, among them the prominent parties such as people's democratic party (PDPA), which was a pro-soviet party and was fully supported by the Soviets from its establishment, Afghan Millat (Afghan Nation), Shula-e Javid (Eternal Flame) which was a Pro Chinese Party and Hezb -e

Islami. Among these parties (PDPA) was playing an important role in the countries politics with a strong support from the Soviets, which was based on Marxist Leninist ideology and its first secretary-general Nur Mohammad Taraki announced that the concentration of all power should be in the hands of the working class, but failed to mobilize the working class because most of the Afghan society was rural Muslims and was lacking the working class, and after the coup in 1978 which overthrown president Daoud its leaders became presidents or vice presidents such as Taraki, Amin and Keshmand. Although the parties aim was Marxist Leninist, they were split into two factions each named after their newspaper Khalq (masses) which was led by Taraki and Hafizullah Amin and Parcham (banner) Babrak Carmel. The reason for their split was not based on ideology but personality differences and ethnolinguistic factors too played an important role in their division. The Khalq members were mostly middle-class Pashtuns from other provinces but the Parchamis were mostly Persian speaking and the sons of the upper-middle-class bureaucrats in Kabul, the party never became to the state of harmony after their division again (Payind, 1989).

The Taraki and Amin government was lacking legitimacy from the coup to the invasion in the Afghan and Muslim context. because of their ambitious reforms by the Soviet advisors such as changing the Islamic flag, land reforms, socialist instruction classes and the destroying of the opposition by executions and imprisonment of the active and even the imaginary opposition which all of them were against the religious, cultural and economic practices of Afghans, even the peoples who were helped by the government were against the strategies they were applying. And many other factors such as the personality difference, internal clashes, ethnolinguistic factors and the pressure from mujahidin brought the conflicts among the two factions of the PDPA, and soon after the presidency of the Khalq leader Nur Muhammad Taraki and Amin as the head of the secret police, some of the top leaders of the parcham branch of the party were sent to foreign countries as ambassadors mostly the Soviet bloc countries, but many other low-status Parchamis were killed or imprisoned by the Khalq regime. The new government after the exile of the Parchamis became weaker and with no support by Afghans inside the country made them more dependent on Soviet support in order to survive , although the Soviets deny their involvement in the country and in December 1978 signed a Soviet -

Afghan Friendship Treaty and sent a large number of weapons, military, and civil advisors, and by which they later legitimized their invasion in Afghanistan. By this time the resistance by mujahidin from their headquarters in Pakistan and Afghanistan started and a general uprising started from a rural and mountainous province in east Afghanistan which was very soon spread towards all 28 provinces, and in early March 1979 a general uprising in Herat province in western Afghanistan cost many government troops lives and many Soviet advisors were slaughtered which is known as the first large scale slaughter of the Soviets in Afghanistan. From 1979 onwards, the democratic republic couldn't prevent the general uprising and resistance in the country, even there are some cases that military brigade along with their weapons stood against the government and joined mujahidin in the front line. After the general uprising in Herat, general Aleksey A. Yepishev who was a key general in the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 came to Afghanistan with a military contingent and after his visit, all the prominent military decisions were made by the Soviet advisers (Payind, 1989).

Taraki went to Moscow to meet Brezhnev in September 1979 the meeting was a kremlin secret but according to reports Brezhnev pressured Taraki to reconcile with Babrak Karmal the head of the Parcham Faction who was living in Moscow in that time and was brought to sign a reconciliation with Nur Mohammad Taraki but in Afghanistan everybody knew that reconciliation between Khalq and Parcham will not possible until Babrak's archenemy Hafizullah Amin still in power but Amin knew the plan and after Taraki returned to Kabul Amin removed him and declared himself as the president of the democratic republic of Afghanistan and Taraki was the second president killed by the Soviet-backed communists after Daoud (Payind, 1989).

The Soviet military transport five and a half division landed in Afghanistan in late December 1979 and in night of 27 December a special unit of Soviet military attacked Amin palace and after a deadly resistance by the forces loyal to Amin finally he was killed along with many other members of his family, installed Babrak Karmal who came along with them from Moscow at this time Soviets fully controlled Kabul City, Babrak although released political prisoners and tried to show sympathy with Islam in order to legitimize his regime but it seemed to be very late, and the rebellion was increased by Mujahideenn and on the other hand the disputes

among the two factions of the PDPA was not reconcilable. The Mujahidin guerrilla forces attacks on government forces and the Soviets made them change their strategy of 'winning hearts and minds' tried to bring down the people by force, but the Islamic faith and the Afghan tradition who think that glory is to those who do Jihad increased the resistance even much more (Payind, 1989).

When Gorbachev came to power he tried to find a solution for the Afghan invasion he seemed to have the strategy of withdrawal the Soviet forces from the country and soon ask the committee on Afghanistan to find the pluses, minuses, and consequences of the withdrawal, but later he dissolved the committee of the old men whom he thought were a brake to the progress and he requested Babrak Karmal in 1985 to visit Moscow and his withdrawal strategy was more visible at this time and told Babrak that Afghanistan should survive by its own from the summer of 1986 promised him equipment but not the troops and he was told to share the power with the Mujahidin and others involved in politics in Afghanistan and forget about socialism and restore the religious rights and the rights of the religious leaders, the Politburo agreed with Gorbachev on building the Afghan government and then leave the country by its own, he later announces to the Congress in Moscow and stated that after a political solution negotiated soviet will leave Afghanistan as an independent, friendly, non-aligned state which will guarantee against the external interference (Braithwaite, 2011).

Gorbachev for the negotiation had to bring all parties involved in the war in Afghanistan such as the Mujahidin who were all the enemy of each other but with a common goal to get rid of the 'Godless Communists' in Kabul, Pakistan who want a friendly Islamic regime in Afghanistan and the American who wanted to forget the memory of their defeat in Vietnam with whatever price the Russians or the Afghans must have paid the highest possible blood and humiliation were the reasons that the negotiations took more time than Gorbachev had thought. Babrak Karmal was removed when the soviet lost faith on him and forced him to resign in April 1986 and wanted to replace him by Dr Najibullah the young and powerful leader of the KHAD (khadamt-i itelati dawlat) but until November 1986 Babrak was the president with all the powers in the hands of Dr Najibullah until he was declared as the new president of the democratic republic of Afghanistan, and Babrak was then sent to Moscow for treatment and died there a decade later. Dr Najibullah, unlike Babrak Karmal, had

the idea of reconciliation he wanted to make a joint government with other moderate opposition and Mullahs, but a few groups joined him because he wanted to give the key posts in the government to the PDPA such as the ministry of interior, and security, and he was not showing mild behaviour towards non- Pashtun politicians, on the other hand, there was no trust on his reconciliation policy by the Mujahideen leaders, and his offer of reconciliation was seemed suspicious by them (Braithwaite, 2011).

In May 1987 the Afghan army was falling apart and Pakistan and America did whatever they could to fail the Policy of National Reconciliation and the Politburo met for the second time with the senior officials to discuss the withdrawal Gorbachev concluded the hopeless discussions that united nation and the united states should be fully involved in the process and the UN could play the neutral role to create a framework for the negotiations, and the Americans which were the biggest ally of the Mujahidin and were the largest supplier of arms and financial aid to mujahidin and without their involvement in the negotiation process there will be no guarantee of non-interference, and decided to submit more economic aid to the government of Dr Najibullah and ways should be found to associate with the government, the mujahidin, the exiled king Zahir Shah, and moderate opposition and in eighteen months the issue of Afghanistan should be solved and Russians will no longer associate in the problem of Afghanistan. After ten months of diplomatic manoeuvring in Geneva, Islamabad, New York and Washington with the sponsorship of the united nation to reach an agreement on Afghanistan finally on 14 April 1988 reached an agreement in Geneva and signed a bilateral agreement among Afghanistan and Pakistan provided for non-interference and non-intervention , the united states and Russians signed a declaration on international guarantees and to withdraw the Soviet troops in two stages by 15 February 1989. The Mujahidin refused the terms because they were not the party involved and this was the reason for the fall of Najibullah's government and the start of the murderous civil war (Braithwaite, 2011).

3.2.1 The Collapse of Dr. Najibullah's Government

Najibullah government survived three more years after the withdrawal of the Soviet army from Afghanistan, but even after their withdrawal the life support to the

Afghan government was continued, and the arms and ammunition left from the Soviets was another reason of the regime survival (Maley and Saikal, 1989).

The government was very successful in beating the rebels throughout 1989 and Dr Najibullah created a militia group from the former mujahidin fighters which were around 10,000 militia fighters and the number of total government forces was now 30,000 fighters in 1988. But with the full support from Pakistan Mujahideen were getting stronger and the government forces at the end of the 1990 summer became defensive in all over the country, Ahmad Shah Masoud in north Afghanistan became a strong opponent of the government and managed to create a force of around 20000 men equipped with tanks and artillery and in the first half of 1991 government forces controlled only ten percent of the country. Government forces became weaker when the military support and fuel aid were cut off by the new regime in Russia in January 1992 and Najibullah most effective weapon were now on the ground because of the lack of fuel (Braithwaite, 2011).

The capital was lacking a central authority by this time, general Dostum once an ally and most effective military general in Najibullah's government has united with Ahmad Shah Masoud and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar the Mujahideen fighters and were on the way to take the capital, but their friendship was temporary and soon turned to a vicious form of violence which took the life of around forty thousand citizens of Kabul and two thousand fled the country, and Afghanistan suffered more than nine-years of Soviet invasion during the civil war until 1996 by the careless bombardments, rapes, and murders by the various mujahidin groups. A group called Taliban emerged from the refugee camps in Pakistan and were educated with an orthodox teaching of Islam in madrasas in Pakistan captured the city of Spin Boldak in the Afghan and Pakistani border and moved forward to capture Kandahar soon and keep their attention to the west of the country and capture the base in the town of Shindand and gained many aircrafts and artillery later captured Herat with no battle, but Kabul seemed to be difficult to capture from the powerful mujahidin leader Ahmad Shah Masoud, but captured the city of Mazar-i Sharif in the north Afghanistan with a very bloody massacre to both sides and based there in 1996, later in September of the same year captured Kabul and Jalalabad cities. Taking control of the country by Taliban brought hope to the citizens of Kabul because they brought a sense of security and order in the country at first, although they were following a brutal

version of the sharia law, but for Dr Najibullah it was the end soon he was captured in the headquarters of united nations and was forcibly seized brutally tortured, sterilized him and hang his body in the centre of the city along with his brother (Braithwait, 2011).

Afghan Jihad against the Soviet Union was more encouraged by the Central Intelligence Agency(CIA)and the Inter-Services Intelligence(ISI) of Pakistan to turn it in to a Global Jihad against the Soviets between 1982-1992, the madrasas in Pakistan educated tens of thousands of Radical Muslims and there were 35,000 Muslim radicals from around forty countries involved with the fight against Soviets, the training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan turned to virtual universities to promote pan Islamic radicalism in Algeria, Yemen, Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, the Philippines and Bangladesh. Osama bin Laden who was the main recruiter of the Arab militias for the Afghan jihad was a wealthy and one of the highest ranking family in Saudi Arabia who was fully supported by Saudi intelligence and ISI of Pakistan came back to Afghanistan when the Taliban came to power in 1996 and soon after his arrival to Afghanistan declared Jihad against the Saudi royal family and America whom he takes responsible for occupying his homeland, and the attack on world trade centre in 1993 in which six people were killed and thousands were injured seemed to be took place by the Arab militias trained in military camps in Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden while in Afghanistan became friend with Mullah Omar the leader of Taliban movement and was staying in his base in Kandahar city in early 1979, however, the Taliban didn't know about the pan Islamic ideology, but their leader was influenced by Osama bin Laden for his attacks on united states, united nations, Saudi Arabia and all pro-western Muslim countries. Osama bin Laden got together all the Arab militia who were remained from the war against Soviets in Afghanistan equipped them and trained them and created the 055 brigades in Afghanistan, later in 1998 attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania was accused of giving financial aid to terrorist camps in Somalia, Sudan, Egypt, Yemen and Afghanistan, few days after the attacks Americans launch cruise missiles on ben laden camps in eastern Afghanistan which killed twenty of ben Laden's militias but his al-Qaida network was still unharmed, and made some major problems for Pakistan and Saudi Arabia two most prominent allies of the USA in the region who

recognized the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, thus the USA requested the Taliban to hand him over but they have refused to do so (Rashid, 1999).

The attacks on world trade centre and Pentagon in September 11, 2001, killed around 3000 people and injured many more and destroyed the properties but above all destroyed the reputation of the only superpower in the world after the collapse of the soviet union, and the united states had to act to gain back its reputation and to pursuit of its self-reassertion, and finally did accordingly with the worldwide support, with the American led intervention in Afghanistan which resulted in the collapse of the Taliban regime along with their Pakistani allies and al-Qaida. Followed the intervention a new interim administration was formed in the country which was led by Hamid Karzai with international support in December 2001 in Afghanistan, the Karzai administration came into existence in the Bonn agreement on Afghanistan for six months on 22 December 2001 (Maley and Saikal, 1989).

Immediately after the attacks in Washington and New York, the al-Qaida network recognized responsible for the attacks and the Taliban regime as the host for this network became the centre of the prime enmity on Bush administration policy of 'declared war on terror' (Rogers, 2004).

3.3 Bonn Agreement

Afghanistan a country which was almost destroyed in more than two decades war from the Soviet invasion, deadly civil war and a very brutal Taliban regime until 2001 when the American led intervention destroyed the Taliban regime and established the new interim administration was considered a failed state where state-sponsored terrorism can grow, but with the USA led intervention Afghanistan was liberated in November 2001. The Bonn Agreement by the supervision of the United Nations(UN) where all the Jihadi factions involved in the civil war and the political leadership of the exiled king Zahir Shah meeting in the Bonn Germany and agreed to the creation of an interim administration and Hamid Karzai as the head of the government played as the roadmap for the reconstruction of the country after deadliest wars in the past two decades, and also agreed that the new interim government will be the counterpart of the UN and all other donor countries during the reconstructing efforts and will act as the semi-sovereign body during the course of the transitional governance period. As guaranteed in the Bonn Agreement the

interim administration after six months in June 2002 an emergency Loya Jirga (grand council meeting) should be organized to appoint the transitional authority, Loya Jirga which is traditional consensus-building body in Afghanistan held in Kabul which was to include a broad-based transitional administration until the representative government which will be appointed through a free and fair elections in not more than two years from the date of the convening of the emergency Loya Jirga (UN.org, 2019).

The transitional authority was to rule until the new constitution was adopted within 18 months, and the political timetable included the mechanism to share the power until then which worked toward a measure of democratic consolidation. The constitutional Loya jirga met in December 2003 and January 2004 as suggested to draft and ratify a new Afghan constitution and the presidential elections in October 2004 in which Hamid Karzai became the elected president and the parliamentary election in September 2005 was a success by any measure (Koenig, 2006).

3.3.1 Democratic Institutions and Electoral Processes in Afghanistan

Democracy in Afghanistan is not new to the people, but since the times of King Amanullah Khan thousand men and women's sustained intervention in democratization in the country paved the way for the new democracy in 2001, but the darkest age in Afghan governance in two decades of Soviet invasion, civil war and post 2001 Taliban regime destroyed the framework of the government institutions in the country (Nijat, 2014).

Afghanistan an Islamic, unitary, independent and indivisible republic as stated in the constitution of the country, although its stated in article 3 of the constitution that the laws should be tied to the Islamic norms and principles but the article 7 states that it's the obligation of the government to follow the international declaration of human rights, ratified human rights conventions, UN charter, and international treaties (Nijat, 2014).

Afghanistan with 34 provinces and 34 provincial councils for each province and the municipality which is responsible for the urban governance the mayor and the municipal council members are elected by direct secret ballots. Based on the original laws on basic institutions of the state which is 43 years old, instructed that the state is centralized and head of three branches of the state which are executive, legislature

and judiciary is the president with two limited vice presidents the advisors to the ministries is president's discretion, bicameral legislation, executive branch consist of 25 ministries and the judiciary is independent. the subnational governance in the provinces and districts which is led by the provincial governor and represents the executive branches and subnational agencies and ministerial line departments, the revised draft of this law is pending in the parliament since early 2008 (Nijat, 2014).

According to UN and international community Afghanistan will never reach to peace without basic and accountable institutions, although many thought that this policy is not part of the Bonn reconstruction program, and it's only a misguided approach but followed by 27 November to 5 December the Bonn Agreement became a historical opportunity for the Afghan people, and seemed to be the only way for the reconstruction of the country by the united nations and international community (Nijat, 2014).

Although the time table of the Bonn Agreement was very tight according to the former head of special mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), and in thirty months the new constitution should be drafted and through free and fair elections the new head of the government must be elected (Nijat, 2014).

which was a tough job to do because elections were one of the most expensive and prominent missions of the Bonn agreement, which cost the US\$ 318 million because of the operational issues regarding the registration of the voters and security issues concerning the election workers but the elections were held with a very little delay with the leadership of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the United Nations Development Program(UNDP) and the United Nations Office for Project Services(UNOPS) with co-leadership of Afghan government under the joint electoral management body secretariat (JEMB) (Nijat, 2014).

At the beginning of the Bonn Agreement the elites of Afghanistan suggested that along with the legal democratic authority, there should be traditional authority to govern the country and to prevent civil war, and even if it's by cooperation of the criminal leaders, the suggestion got the attention of the gathering and it seemed a better alternative versus the colonialization, partition or the transitional international administration, but to restore the country to a peace with a competitive afghan

authorities there was a need for a hybrid model of governance and to bring together all the domestic partners on the various levels of the society and for this they had relied on the traditional institutions and approaches to governance with the international community and political support (Nijat, 2014).

The other issue emerges in reconstructing the institutions was the neighbouring countries interventions in many regional institutions in the country, and some of the functions of the regions were heavily influenced by them, in the past two decades of war the neighbouring actors with their financial and military aid with whom they had political, ethnic, or religious ties, and this needed an outstanding effort to reduce the interference among factional competitions every neighbouring actor were concerned about the refugees, narcotics, terrorism and co-ethnic elements, and all have some ethnic ties to some of the ethnic groups in Afghanistan but with a lack of annexation tendencies. The financial support of expertise to the Afghan institutions were the international and inter-governmental bodies which were the primary channel of distributing the aid to institutions in Afghanistan. To produce political and institutional stability, and to reach this purpose the international community under a system of government control. Legal authority and the executive and legislative powers will exist within the Afghan government with full support and assistance from the international community. And with rights from the Bonn agreement to the special representative of the united nations as the head of all united nations agencies but the world bank and bilateral development agencies will coordinate but will function separately through a reconstruction guidance committee. There was a need for a capability of national planning under the authority of the Afghan government in Kabul to quickly make sense of the thousand international actors' presence in the county. And for this purpose, the interim administration in Kabul created the Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority (AACA) which will be responsible for the coordination, approval and monitoring all program support to Afghanistan (Thier and Chopra, 2002).

The interim administration and the transitional authority were inspired mainly on keeping two tasks done, the first was the creation of the new political environment in Afghanistan and the second was the start of the reconstruction and relief process in a war-ravaged country without a firm political environment and institutions with the

requirement of financial and human resources provided by the international community (Thier and Chopra, 2002).

The institutional reconstruction was a top priority and needed a long-term process and resources and attention to create accountable, free, stable and democratic representing institutions to implement the policies of the government. Initially the financial and technical support for the reconstruction of the institutions came from abroad because this process needed implementers which had to work honestly and not self-interested which established a problem for domestic leadership, and at the same time the regions which were most devastated and neglected need financial support from local centres, thus there was a need for the establishing the institutions and reconstructing institutions in all levels of the government and society (Thier and Chopra, 2002).

In the sectors of food, agriculture, education, healthcare and demining were on top priority to uphold the population and to stabilize the environment reconstruction of the above-mentioned institutions would help Afghans and provide for them the most immediate needs and other major projects which need a higher financial and technical support will start to implement after the government institution strengthen and government capacity and stability increased (Thier and Chopra, 2002).

The one prominent reason for the collapse of Afghan government institutions in the past was the 'inequality' which always created deep issues of dissatisfaction and turning the country into conflicts, because most of the resources were in the centre of Kabul and other provinces, and in particular Kabul was the centre for the resources distribution which was so-called 'six-mile rule', by which the people around six miles of the centre received almost the whole resources of the country (Their and Chopra, 2002).

The civil administration which is not a physical institution but plays a significant role in solving the disputes among the local villagers are called Shura or consultative council which people will accept its terms if it's clear that it will benefit them. This administration body was even used by the Taliban and they appointed their leader in district level and above, it was established decades ago, and many Afghan villagers solve their issues through this institution, which is very legitimate (Thier and Chopra, 2002).

Fragile or weak states overall became a concern for the policymakers around the world in the recent years and three-factor which are well known for this reason first the human security became one of the major duty of the state to protect the citizens, second the consensus of a post Washington in finding out that the states are the main actor in development of a country and the third factor is the post 9/11, concerns about the fragile state which dictate the fragile and weak states can be transmitted as the hub for the organized crimes, terrorism, and other threats. And the above factor became a pressure point for the states to perform well domestically and internationally and are expected to act according to the new standards and norms (concept and dilemmas of state-building in fragile situations, 2008).

There were two objectives for the international intervention in Afghanistan, first to defeat the international terrorist organizations such as al-Qaida and their host Taliban regime and second objective is to help Afghanistan rebuild, and reconstruction of a democratic government and humanitarian assistance and help in the interim administration to achieve these goals there must be a stable political and social environment (Thier and Chopra, 2002).

The informal actors who are enriched from the drug trafficking, smuggling, land appropriation and illegal taxation and their relations with the formal actor of the government created a big problem for the reformations of the state institutions both in national and subnational levels. According to UNAMA report in 2004 recognized this issue and acknowledge that the state formal institutions are thought to be able to take control of the informal actors who played an important role in government institutions in recent years along with their networks, but this will only be achieved by strengthening the legitimate institutions of the country mainly the organs of police, court and armed forces, but the informal actors who are the previous warlords are the barrier to the reforms in the institutions (Ottaway, 2002).

When the state-building efforts started in Afghanistan Central Government always coexisted with the traditional and decentralized factions of society, for the negotiation and patronage for centuries the tribal leaders created 'micro-society' that were related to central and other powers (Rubbin, 1995). But the nature of politics changed during the Soviet invasion and civil wars, both in local level and between national and local levels. The tribal leaders in local level were operating in different areas and the co-existence was no longer there to relate the local level with the

national level, and the power became decentralized and they tried to make an alliance to take the centre or to resist against it and the alliance of the warlords dominated larger areas and in some of the regions they had close relations to the tribal leaders (Rubbin, 1995).

After the USA intervention in Afghanistan, the warlords of the north and west became under one umbrella known as the northern alliance, this structure was interacted with international intervention and helped them to collapse the Taliban regime which later in the interim administration gained formal government positions. After the emergency Loya Jirga in 2002, Hamid Karzai appointed them in the transitional government. The warlords in the south and east in relations with the tribal leader made an effort to control the politics in national and local institutions and managed to take control over the political economy in local areas. The period after the collapse of the Taliban regime immediately the post warlords took control over the formal political power in national and subnational levels in the upcoming new government (Cramer and Goodhand, 2002).

Before and During the constitutional Loya Jirga the question that how will the government structured to be able to take all the unites interests as a whole and united, and there were different answers to this question by afghans but some of the minority leaders specifically pushed for power-sharing in the central government or either to recognize them through some mechanism of self-governing locally (Rubin, 2004).

Many policymakers and Afghan politicians regardless of ethnicity favour a strong and central government to control and limit the power of local warlords, and to make them weaker to prevent them from criminal influencing the local government structures (Ottaway, 2002).

The local warlords are not able to use military force visibly, and the international military forces, Afghan national army and the disarmament efforts made it difficult for them, so, the government can make changes in power dynamics at the subnational level. But we can't deny the influence of illegal militia groups in power 'equation' (Ottaway, 2002).

The informal rules based on patronage in Afghanistan needed to be shifted to formalized and depersonalized form, but Afghan and international actors failed to do

so, after the start of reconstruction the subnational institutions reforms was viewed as a priority, and for some years many opposing departments in US administrations and some of them really wanted to weaken the local warlords. Even those actors who did not undermine efforts to 'change the rules' in the provinces did not pay attention to rebuild the subnational institutions instead they focused on strengthening the central administration in 2002-2005, the basis for this was that the reforms in the subnational institutions was very difficult and they thought that the parent ministries reform is more important. But in late 2005 the policymakers paid serious attention to the subnational institutions and a strong reason was the increased opium cultivation and it seemed that only subnational institutions can fight the increased opium cultivation and to determine the functions of the provincial council prior to the 2005 elections (Ottaway, 2002).

The public administration reform is the only obvious area in which a system implemented at the subnational level, that depersonalize, formalize and rationalize the power through bureaucracy, the government is committed to the public administration reforms strategy, consist of administrations reform, salary and incentive revision, and the building of civil service management, the introduction of merit-based appointments, and capacity enhancement. And under a priority reform and reconstruction process the restructuring of departments and changing of recruitment practices were piloted (lister, 2009).

State-building as for the American definition refers to the creation of a self-sustained democratic government in other countries and the capability of surviving after the withdrawal of foreign support (Brownlee, 2007).

Three aspects of the state-building process are relevant in the determination of the military intervention as a mechanism of state-building in foreign countries first the scope of state institutions, second the strength of state institutions and third the regime type governing the country, therefore in order to build a state refers to strengthen the existing state institutions or creating new state institutions, in the context of United States military intervention often choose the third aspect of state-building to begin to create new institutions or strengthening the existing ones that are legitimated by democratic control (Monten, 2014).

In the World Bank measure of governance in 2000, Afghanistan was ranked near or at the bottom of the percentile including government effectiveness, corruption and political stability (World Bank, N, D).

The US intervention in Afghanistan focused both on the scope of the state and strengthening the existing institutions and tried to expand the state institution in a new area such as education which was under regional and local control and to expand the reach of government institutions deep into local and regional areas (Monten, 2014).

3.4 Conclusion

The PDPA, which was backed by the Soviets, on a deadly military coup collapsed the government of president Daoud and killed him along with his family. on 27 April 1978 which was called 'April Revolution' by them and it was when the scene had been set to establish a new phase and converted the entire country. After the coup in 1978 which overthrown president Daoud, its leaders became presidents or vice presidents such as Taraki, Amin and Keshtmand. Although the parties aim was Marxist Leninist, they were split into two factions each named after their newspaper Khalq (masses) which was led by Taraki and Hafizullah Amin and Parcham (banner) Babrak Karmal. The Taraki and Amin government was lacking legitimacy from the coup to the invasion in the Afghan and Muslim context. The Soviet military transport five and a half division landed in Afghanistan in late December 1979 and in night of 27 December a special unit of Soviet military attacked Amin palace, he was killed along with many other members of his family, installed Babrak Karmal who came along with them from Moscow later on the mujahideen guerrilla fighting against the Soviets who were strongly backed by the United States and Pakistan made the soviets to choose the withdrawal strategy when Gorbachev came to power. Babrak Karmal was removed when the soviet lost faith on him and forced him to resign in April 1986 and wanted to replace him by Dr Najibullah, After ten months of diplomatic manoeuvring in Geneva, Islamabad, New York and Washington with the sponsorship of the united nation to reach an agreement on Afghanistan finally on 14 April 1988 reached an agreement in Geneva and signed a bilateral agreement among Afghanistan and Pakistan provided for non-interference and non-intervention, the USA and Russians signed a declaration on international guarantees and to withdraw

the Soviet troops in two stages by 15 February 1989. the Mujahideen refused the terms because they were not the party involved and this was the reason for the fall of Najibullah's government and the start of the murderous civil war, Najibullah government survived three more years after the withdrawal of the Soviet army from Afghanistan. The murderous wars between different factions of Mujahideen destroyed Afghanistan and killed millions later on in 1996 when the Taliban regime came to power, people had a sense of security for the citizens of Kabul but for Dr Najibullah, it was the end. The attacks on world trade centre and Pentagon in September 11, 2001, killed around 3,000 people and injured many more during the Taliban regime in Afghanistan which was done by al-Qaida who had safe havens in Afghanistan and with the American led intervention in Afghanistan which resulted in the collapse of the Taliban regime along with their Pakistani allies and al-Qaida. Followed the intervention a new interim administration was formed in the country which was led by Hamid Karzai with international support in December 2001 in Afghanistan, the Karzai administration came into existence in the Bonn agreement on Afghanistan for six months on 22 December 2001 As guaranteed in the Bonn agreement the interim administration after six months in June 2002 an emergency Loya Jirga (grand council meeting) should be organized to appoint the transitional authority that was to rule until the new constitution was adopted within 18 months, and the political timetable included the mechanism to share the power until then which worked toward a measure of democratic consolidation. The constitutional Loya Jirga met on December 2003 and January 2004 as suggested to draft and ratify a new Afghan constitution and the presidential elections in October 2004 in which Hamid Karzai became the elected president and the parliamentary election in September 2005 which was a success by any measure. the institutional reconstruction was a top priority and needed a long-term process and resources and also attention to create accountable, free, stable and democratic representing institutions to implement the policies of the government.

4. EU'S ROLE IN SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN AFGHANISTAN

4.1 Introduction

This chapter explains briefly the background of EU and Afghanistan relations until the launch of the EU police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL-A) and further, it goes on explaining the EUPOL-A in detail.

The European Union (EU) has a long-term partnership with Afghanistan, in close coordination with Afghanistan's international partners and it's been helping Afghanistan government to fight corruption, improve oversight, enable economic growth, reduce poverty and strengthen democratic institutions. The EU involved in some elements of SSR through the EU police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL-A) and the EU commissions contributions to justice reform which the (EUPOL-A) constitutes the main element of the EU contributions to security sector reform in Afghanistan.

4.2 The EU and Afghanistan Relations

EU was engaged in Afghanistan from the beginning of the conflicts contributions by the European community goes back to 1985 by its Aid to Uprooted People (AUP). EU represented a major engagement in a number of fronts by the creation of (ECHO) in 1991 began its activities in 1994 but due to the sovereignty and security issues the NGOs were its main implementing partners during the civil war including the Taliban era, even then it was the only largest single donor by the estimate of EC which allocated more than 500 million euros in aid to Afghanistan (Tripathi and Ferhatovic, 2017).

The international community along with the EU in 1994 refused to extend its diplomatic relations when the militias seized Kabul. And after the Taliban withdrawal from Afghanistan in November 2001. The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC, the Council of EU Foreign Ministers) recognised the arrangements as the basic roadmap for the political future of Afghanistan.

Reconstruction assistance will be conditional on all parties positively contributing to the process and goals agreed, and since then the EU made essential political and economic assistance for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. According to the list of the European security strategy in 2003 recognized state failure, terrorism and organized crimes among the most important threats facing Europe today. And considering the stated threats Afghanistan has been the most important case for the European Union. European Union was the second largest contributor to Afghanistan only after the United States of America from 2002 to 2006 and the combined contribution of European Community, European Union and the member states was 3.7 billion euros and 1.1 billion euros came from the budget of European community (Delegation of the European Union to Afghanistan, 2019).

The government of Afghanistan and the EU agreed on the partnership in 2005 to succeed the Bonn Agreement and to set the priorities for the upcoming phase of Afghanistan reconstruction process, this EU joint declaration was signed to create an official political dialogue between the European Union and Afghanistan, to strengthen mutual collaboration and to observe the progress in meeting mutual commitments For signing the joint declaration in 2005 obliged both parties to make sure to cooperate and reaffirm their commitments in some areas such as the commitment from the Afghan government to strengthening democratic institutions and governance which is responsible and accountable to strengthen the rule of law and to protect the rights of humans to develop civil society, the government of Afghanistan also emphasized on promoting economic progress to eliminate poverty, progress in terms of state finances, combating against corruption and to eliminate the production and trafficking of drugs and the successful implementation of the joint declaration is said to depend on local ownership. The EU and its international partners also committed themselves to cooperate with the government of Afghanistan to achieve these targets (Council of The European Union, 2005).

The EU along with other commitments to assist Afghanistan also assisted to security sector along with the international assistance community and also the NATO-led assistance forces received the assistance from the EU in terms of military and civilian resources including Provincial Reconstruction Teams(PRTs) and the US-led Coalition Enduring Freedom Operations for the aim of improving safety, extend stability and boost progress across Afghanistan and the Afghan government to

guarantee a stable and safe environment in the country, must cooperate with the international assistance forces while improving the internal capacity in the meantime the international assistance force would support the national and border police and the European Union along with its member states will provide the financial aid and the experts in these areas. the unbiased and effective police sector is known to be the main element of the rule of law in Afghanistan which is considered by both the government and EU similarly reform in the sector of justice which can be the powerful framework for establishing the rule of law, and the request for urgent need of reform in this sector was accepted and promised to increase the assistance and urgent fund in the area and with the help of Afghan government it will be assured that the judicial organs have the effective coordination among each other. It is also believed that the democratic governance can only be guaranteed with a trustable legal system that strengthens the rule of law, protects human rights and reforms the criminal and civil justice sectors in the country. The fact that a professional judiciary and solid, impartial civil administration is required to create a stable and peaceful environment, where the rule of law is respected recognized by the EU and supported Afghanistan with political and financial support regarding the disarmament and reintegration process which is believed by the EU to be crucial for the stability in Afghanistan (Council of the European Union, 2005).

4.3 The London Conference and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy

After the implementation of the Bonn agreement until 2005, a conference on Afghanistan was organized in London and came with Afghanistan compact which was the main document of this meeting and started the journey with some time-limited targets in the sectors of security, governance and development to confirm the obligations of the world for the next level of building the state in Afghanistan (Murray, 2011).

The London conference was chaired by the Afghan president Hamid Karzai, Kofi Annan the United Nations Secretary-General, and Toni Blair the British Prime Minister which was participated by sixty states and international organizations that issued the Afghanistan compact setting forth both the international community's commitment to Afghanistan and Afghanistan's commitment to state-building and

reform over the next five years. this compact supported the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), a provisional version of this strategy was offered in the conference by the Afghan government, the compact aimed to improve security, governance, and development which also include measures for reducing the narcotics economy and promote regional cooperation. Some ways and mechanisms were agreed in this conference to make sure that the aid which the Afghan state received was used in the right place and to monitor the loyalty of donors and activists to the timelines and targets, with its principle recommendations that the ANDS and the Afghanistan compact should fully be funded by all stakeholders, the compact provided a strategy for building an effective, accountable state in Afghanistan (Rubin and Hamidzada, 2007).

The policymaking process is messy, but it can be characterised as involving various stages, these include agenda setting, policy formulation and policy implementation, and the process can be influenced both by external or internal factors but the result is usually evident in the agenda of the party in power but it is not the case in Afghanistan because to identify who is in power is difficult and the reason for this is its dependency on foreign aid and the government autonomy is weekend. Sixty-two donors support the Afghan government with billions of dollars in entire development programmes. These donors have diverse mandates and approaches to the development of various sectors in the country and spend a large portion of development funds directly, without the government's involvement, on specific programmes in their regions of interest and also tries to ensure integration of their priorities in national programmes, making it very difficult for the government to decide on national priority programmes. For all the donors who try to influence in policy or practice an understanding of the policy-making mechanism is important, and since 2001 the Afghanistan national development strategy has been the biggest strategy development and policymaking event in the modern history of the country, in which consultations were conducted at national and sub-national levels. The occasion has provided a golden opportunity for broader observation and understanding of the policymaking process (International Monetary Fund, 2008).

This strategy uses the pillars, principles and benchmarks of the Afghanistan Compact as a foundation and serves as Afghanistan poverty reduction strategy paper (Shah, 2009).

The ANDS represents the combined efforts of the Afghan people and the Afghan Government with the support of the international community to address the major challenges facing the country, to comprehensively address the security, governance, and development needs of Afghanistan. The ANDS reflects the government's vision, principles and goals for Afghanistan which builds on its commitment to achieving the Millennium Development Goals by 2020 and the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact benchmarks. The strategy is based upon an assessment of current social and economic conditions, offers clear intermediate objectives, and identifies the actions that must be taken to achieve these national goals. The Afghan government has developed Afghanistan's national development strategy which reflects Afghanistan's long-term goals, including the elimination of poverty through the emergence of a vibrant middle class, an efficient and stable democratic political environment and security throughout the country. But its main focus was the next five years after it developed (Shah, 2009).

The 'Afghan Compact' in the London Conference in 2006, wherein the Afghan Government had articulated its overarching goals for the well-being of its people in the 'Afghanistan Millennium Development Goals Country Report 2005–Vision 2020. Consistent with those goals, the Compact identified three critical and interdependent areas or pillars of activity for the next five years from the adoption of the Compact: Security, Governance, Rule of Law, Human Rights, Economic and Social Development. A further vital and cross-cutting area of work was eliminating the narcotics industry, which remains a formidable threat to the people and state of Afghanistan, the region and beyond. the European Union's approach in Afghanistan was later on based on the Afghanistan compact (Tripathi and Ferhatovic, 2017).

4.3.1 The International Engagements in Security Sector of Afghanistan

The G8 donors meeting in Geneva that was held in 2002 for the purpose of creating a framework for the operations in Afghanistan and tried to use the SSR approach to develop such framework, that contained five tasks such as the reform of military, police, counter-narcotics, judiciary and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former fighters and in this meeting each donor country promised to lead these five tasks such as the United States led the military reform, Germany took the responsibility of police reform which later on changed to the EU, counter-

narcotics was led by United kingdom, judicial reform was led by Italy and Japan led the DDR process. This framework aimed to make sure that there is a safe environment while restructuring the fundamental institutions in Afghanistan and covered many sectors, but as it was expected higher progress in each pillar seem to be slower (Chesterman, 2002).

The G8 donors meeting was a division of labour, and each of the donor had their prominent role in appointed pillars and they took the responsibility of it, but the united states was the leading donor in terms of providing money to the four out of five pillars except for the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration which was led by the government of Japan(Sedra, 2013).

DDR is the process to demilitarize the official and non-official armed groups by controlling and reducing the possession and use of arms, disbanding on state armed groups and reducing the size of state security services and assisting former combatants to reintegrate into civilian life (Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2006).

The interim authority should have been commanded all the Mujahideen, Afghan armed forces and armed groups in the process of the official power transfer under the December 2001 Bonn Agreement and to be reorganized according to the obligations of the new Afghan security and armed forces. And as the assigned tasks in the G8 donors meeting the only driving vehicle for dissolving the militias was the DDR process, part of the Japanese led Afghan new beginnings programme which was a contract for the purpose of assisting the DDR project. This programme in 2003 targeted 100,000 militiamen but as the true size of the militia was not clear they selected a random figure. The Afghan New Beginnings Programme (ANBP) was introduced by the United Nations development programme in 2003 and controlled by the Afghan president Hamid Karzai for the purpose of supporting the afghan government in the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of former combatants that continued until March 2011. The government of Japan was the main donor for this programme but other countries such as the USA, Canada, United Kingdom(UK), The EU, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, and the European commission also contributed in the process. This programme was managed by the UNAMA and ISAF with close coordination by

the Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (D&RC) instituted by the Afghan government.

The intention was to dissolve informal and formal military structures prevailing from the times of the Taliban and to re-establish the rule of law and the authority of the Afghan government by building up a national army and police force. UNAMA identified around 83,000 armed fighters to participate in the DDR programme. They were either to be reintegrated into civilian life or recruited into the newly established Afghan Army or police force (Globalsecurity.org, 2018).

The first phase of this programme was to collect all the heavy arms that were stored in different parts of the country. In the second step, the various armed groups had to be dissolved. Between 2004 and 2005, about 60,000 militiamen were demobilised. In compare to DDR programmes in other countries, the former combatants were not gathered in camps but rather demobilised in their homes. Fighters who wanted to return to civilian life had to pass through a variety of steps: First, they had to hand in their armaments. Then, their units were inspected during a last parade where some fighters were awarded with a medal. Each fighter was then formally demobilised and received 200 US dollars in Afghani, 130 kg of foodstuffs and some commodities. After they joined the programme, they were also advised on their civilian career, about 44 per cent decided in favour of a job in farming for which they were given instruments or seedlings while 39 per cent selected professions such as carpentry, mechanics or tailoring. Eight per cent wanted to become self-employed and enjoyed further training in business as well as advice on how to start up a new business. The remaining nine per cent joined the army or the police or were educated as mine sweepers (Globalsecurity.org,2018).

One of the biggest problems was around 200 warlords with support from the people and with a substantial amount of power from the times of the Taliban regime, they depend on armed units that were loyal towards them and not the central government. To reintegrate these individuals, who are a potential threat to the stabilisation process. And the government created the special incentives in the framework of the Commanders Incentive Programme. It offered high-ranking commanders (e.g. from Brigadiers upwards) various pleasant reintegration incentives, such as financial support during their unemployment to secure a

minimum income, business training as well as travels abroad. About 450 high-ranking commanders took up the offer. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) began specific demobilisation and reintegration programmes for children's up to 17 years of age who had been involved in the fighting. And were treated with special support such as schooling and further training, included literacy classes as well as medical care and food aid.

The Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) project was also initiated by the ANBP, that dealt with the dissolution of illegally armed groups of people who, for instance, were not registered as official fighters because they had fought as 'part-time guerrillas. aimed at improving security by encouraging all armed groups to dissolve (Globalsecurity.org,2018).

To advance DDR in Afghanistan, an additional Reintegration Support Project was initiated to prepare government administrators for questions regarding the reintegration of former fighters and to build capacity for the DDR process, the project ended in 2007. A total of US \$141 million has been spent on DDR which were paid by the international donors, Japan as the leading country contributed US \$91 million and several million dollars were contributed by the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, Italy, Germany and the European Commission. DDR can be viewed from different perspective first of all we can say it was a successful programme that disarmed and demobilized fighters that could have been another big problem for the country. This involves 60,000 to 70,000 fighters who were apparently integrated into civilian life. On the other hand, the result of this programme was not fair for those fighting units who joined this process because their life was in danger and the government couldn't provide them with better jobs opportunities. Some commanders often maintained a core of loyal fighters around them to pressurize officials into providing them with politically profitable positions in the government. And some younger fighters, not long after having been demobilised, fell victim to the temptation of closing ranks with the Taliban who had regained strength, or with other fighting rebel groups in Afghanistan (BICC, 2011).

There were two main international military commands in Afghanistan, the Coalition led by the United States of America and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), both with different rights of actions but for the shared goal of providing security directly, although their priorities were different, the Coalition which was led

by the US operated in Afghanistan first to ensure the American security from al-Qaida and the second priority was to secure the Afghanistan government from terrorist organizations and insurgency, that operated under the right of United States self-defence took its right of operation according to Bonn Agreement, a bilateral agreement with the government of Afghanistan and the UN security council resolutions with the purpose of supporting Afghan authorities to provide security until their withdrawal from the country and until the Afghan security forces are able to take the responsibility of providing security for the citizens and for this reason the international forces need the security sector reform policy that included both the termination of informal armed groups by the process of demobilization and reintegration and disarmament and to transform the previous armies into professional and regular forces (Rubin and Hamidzada, 2007).

The reasons for the disability to achieve these goals is said to be the light footprint which both of the operations used that was insufficient to provide security, the lack of coordination between them and a different definition of security priorities is known as the second major barrier that delayed the achievements and goals. The coalition fault in the beginning of their operation became a major insecurity for the afghans by the air offensive against the Taliban and al-Qaida the Coalition funded and armed local commanders to take control of regions where the terrorist left behind which later on those local commanders abused the power and used the money in the production of drugs and engaged in land grabs, predation, political terrorisation and ethnic cleansing (Rubin and Hamidzada, 2007).

During this time the ISAF was headquartered in capital Kabul which later on took the responsibility of standing against the local commanders, Taliban and al-Qaida fighters. Even though the Pentagon was against the ISAF to spread in other provinces until 2003 and some other countries were also not getting ready to volunteer, but still, the commanders on the ground got the approval for Coalition-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and deployed many people with few civilian aid providers with largely military presence. And after 2003 with no opposition by the Pentagon, NATO took the responsibility of ISAF and expanded it outside the capital Kabul (Rubin and Hamidzada, 2007).

European Union except for humanitarian support and some other economic programs arranged by European commission did not contribute to military operations in

Afghanistan until 2007, with the security situations, remained tenuous in the country, EU stepped up its engagement in Afghanistan, a major initiative was launched by the EU- European Union Police Mission to Afghanistan (EUPOL) on June 17, 2007, in Kabul to deal with the security situation in the country, the EU has added a new element to its reconstruction efforts with the launch of (EUPOL-A) under the European security and defence policy (ESDP). The EU engaged in aspects of SSR through EUPOL and the European Commission's contribution to Justice Reform by the European Union and some other international forces. The weak law enforcement agencies and more generally a weak justice sector makes the role of building a professional police force more important to address the challenges facing Afghanistan. The mission built on police reform efforts already deployed on the ground, notably the German Police Project Office (GPPO) while simultaneously serving to bring together individual national efforts under an EU hat (Tripathi and Ferhatovic, 2017).

This mission was not only for the purpose of providing training but also to provide and contribute to form the whole policy, another main plus of EUPOL-A was that it brought together all the NATO member states and as well as some other countries in the same mission which resulted in the improved coordination due to the increase in exchanging information on the activities related to the police reform. The Afghanistan compact pushed EU to take a greater part in the process of justice sector reform, although many countries were involved in the process before Italy got the lead of the process, but since the justice sector reform is a prerequisite for political, economic, and social progress in Afghanistan and the EU took the lead in reforming the judiciary in 2006 in the London conference. The EU took part in the developing of the Afghanistan national police, fought against illegal drug business and sustained basic human rights and the rule of law but without a functioning justice system, progress cannot be made in any of these sectors. However, all of the Afghan public sectors were in need of reform, but the justice reform remained one of the most important sectors which was in need of urgent reform although the progress has been made in reforming the formal justice system which is not sufficient. EUPOL-A complementing the US/NATO military deployment by suddenly increased civilian role. EUPOL- Afghanistan was a vital mission for the European Union although

more than half of the ISAF forces were coming from the EU member states (Tripathi and Ferhatovic, 2017).

4.4 EUPOL-A

The European Union (EU) on holding the lead role in peacekeeping operations around the world is based on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and it also activates the EU role to prevent wars and to boost the global security. The missions are varying in military and civil missions, the military missions are funded by the EU states and CSDP is responsible to fund the civilian missions. Until 2014 there were 32 mission deployed and among these missions 16 missions were completed and 11 civilian and 6 military missions were still operating, the civilian missions of CSDP varying in range such as police, monitoring, judicial and security sector reform (SSR), in executive and non-executive nature and differ in size (European Court of Auditors, 2015).

The CSDP missions are operating as part of the EU's approach towards crisis management which suggested a mission by the EU police to Afghanistan in the areas of policing and also in relation to the wider rule of law and after the evaluation of a mission which was sent to Afghanistan in 2006 for finding facts, the council approved in 2007 and the mission was to work in Afghan police force with ownership by locals and according to the rule of law in accordance with the CMC, and this mission should have addressed the obstacles to the reform of Afghan police in central, regional and provincial levels (European Court of Auditors, 2015).

The European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL-A) constitute the main element of EU contribution to SSR in Afghanistan, the civilian mission launched in June 2007. EUPOL-A main tasks are to significantly contribute to the establishment under Afghan ownership of suitable and effective civilian policing arrangements, which will ensure appropriate interaction with the wider criminal justice system under afghan ownership, the operation will assist the reform process towards a trusted and efficient police service which works with accordance to the international standards within the framework of the rule of law and respects human rights (Gross, 2010).

The German Police Project Office (GPPO) was working towards Afghan national police forces from 2002 that was considered unsuccessful and the EUPOL-A started following GPPO for the aim of creating the effective civilian police force in Afghanistan (RAND Corporation, 2010).

4.4.1 Background of the Afghan National Police Reform

Before the Taliban regime which was settled in 1996, Afghanistan had a strong national civilian police force which was assisted and supported by west and east Germany between 1960 and 70s but with the arrival of Soviet Union in Afghanistan the role of police changed with the help of KGB to paramilitary to stand against the forces belonged to mujahideen and later when the Soviets left the country the Afghan national police were more weekend with the fight between different parties of mujahideen which resulted in elimination of civilian police force that was effected mostly during Soviets and Mujahideen (Wilder, 2007p.3).

With the intervention of international community in Afghanistan, the sector of police was totally destroyed for 20 years which was a tough situation for reforming because both the structures and training for a large number of police force was needed and in reforming this sector the international community faced with many challenges, In November 2001 with the arrangements by the Bonn Agreement, Germany was to overtake the lead role in this area with its mission the GPPO with 40 working officers that started to give training to the senior Afghan police officers and worked to create a coordination among international community to reform the interior ministry and also focused to provide long term training to the Afghan national police forces, but this mission was regarded as less successful with fewer resources provided by them and in 2005 the United States spent more than Germany in the area of police reform (Gross, 2009 P.27). According to gross after 2005 the United States(USA) established the Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A) because of the German police project office failure in providing enough in the area of police reform and its pressure on EU to take a larger role in efforts in Afghanistan, although the EU was then in the second position of the largest donor to Afghanistan at the same time, but it started the EUPOL-Afghanistan with the mandate of three years in 2007. From the rapid reaction mechanism, the European Commission considered 4.93 million euros in assisting the political transition in

Afghanistan and the most significant aid to Afghanistan from 2002 until 2006 from the EU was 3.5 billion euros (Gross, 2009P.1). And until 2010 the EU along with its members' states contributed in Afghanistan with 10 billion euros in different areas such as governance, rule of law, health, rural development and in particular in the area of rule of law was under the main focus of development efforts by EU. The EU is also the biggest donor to the law and order trust fund that is responsible for paying the cost of operations by Afghan national police forces (wilder, Murray & gross as cited in RAND Corporation, 2010p.18).

4.4.2 Justice Sector Reform

Because police and justice sectors are interrelated and for an effective security sector this needs to be considered, but it seems that the police reform did not gain too much attention, but the justice sector was even weaker and to link these two sectors, a realisation which came very late to the international community, this was a crucial mistake committed by all donors in Afghanistan that they separated their efforts in the police, prosecutorial and justice sectors (Tripathi and Ferhatovic, 2017).

While the military and law enforcement units have been significantly progressed but in the provision of resources to the justice sector almost nothing was accomplished, this mistake was recognized by the afghan judicial reform strategy 'Justice for All' of 2005. The constitution of 2004 provided a relatively progressive basis for a legislative framework which all together guaranteed the most fundamental principle of rule of law including judicial independence and the following three major reform in the judicial system were introduced in the Afghanistan constitution. Article 97 of the constitution declared the judiciary an "independent organ of the state" which discharges its duties side by side with the legislative and executive organ (Tripathi and Ferhatovic, 2017).

The Constitution created a unified judicial system with an organisational structure that is headed by the Supreme Court; and created a unified system of laws. The Constitution and statutes created under the Constitution are legally dominant, with the basic principles of the Sharia law acting as a guide to the legislature. When the new supreme court was approved by the national assembly in august 2006, later, adopted the new code of conduct based on the internationally recognized Principles of Judicial Conduct and establishing ethical standards. As outlined in the

Afghanistan programme by the European Commission the EU has been involved in the judicial reform of Afghanistan in the following four areas (EUPOL-A, 2014).

- Providing technical assistance
- Supporting the justice project of multilateral Afghanistan reconstruction trust fund
- The salaries of justice ministry personnel by LOTFA
- The project of united nations development program accession to the justice at the district level (EUPOL-A, 2014).

The relations between EUPOL-A and the EU commission have been developed and also its relations with all the donors in the country and the EU member states who were involved in the reform of the judiciary have been put in place together with the primary tasks which were done by the commission at the same time. The codification of laws and to train the Afghan judges were part of the second pillar of the rule of law that was done at the beginning of reform in the sector of the judiciary that resulted in a great development in the indexed legislature and the training of personnel. For tackling the corruption in the sector of the judiciary the EU justice reform plan tried to increase salaries in close coordination with the Afghan government, took into account costs related to the training of new defence lawyers and also created a schedule for present judges and prosecutors (Tripathi and Ferhatovic, 2017).

The Afghan judicial system is known as the world most weak judicial system and the reason for the difficulty in implication of this system was the high amount of corruption, civilian instability and the criminality, and many other reasons such as the inappropriate communication tools between the judges in centre and the provinces and the lack of coordination between the Supreme Court, Ministry of Justice and Advocate General's Office – and often the common challenge facing the judges and prosecutors are security issues and the lack of proper judicial arrangements outside the cities were the main issues in the judicial system of Afghanistan and above all the unqualified staff at all level made it difficult for the citizens living outside the cities to trust on this system, rather they tend to go for the traditional and informal justice practices. However, this needed to be emphasized that justice reform in any society is one of the most difficult reforms because Involvement in justice and law enforcement is inherently political as there is a

creation of a new legal order. Afghanistan provides ample illustrations, in respect of which Sharia versus state law or support versus exclusion of the informal justice sector is only a small element. The discrepancy between legislation conforming to international standards and the deficiencies in its implementation might constitute a further factor that would need to be taken into account (Tripathi and Ferhatovic, 2017).

4.4.3 The Mission's Objectives

EUPOL-A was initiated as a non-executive mission for three years with a review of its scope and size six times a month following the GPPO, but its policy was different. It was gone far beyond the training mission it also contributed to from a whole strategy for the interior ministry with the purpose of staff mentoring in the Ministry of Interior (MOI), the deputy minister and the chiefs of police in provinces to construct and coordinate policies, this mission was for mentoring, advising, monitoring, and training. The EUPOL-A tried to coordinate with the member states and also non-member states and advised them on the projects where they were active in the areas related to the mission, the mentoring of higher-ranking officers in the MOI by EUPOL mission is known as the complement to the USA short term training approach which was to make sure the police forces were ready to take an active role on the battlefields with its main difference with the GPPO the EUPOL-A included all parties active in police reform and through sharing information it was successful in coordinating the national efforts in police reform which is known as the main advantage over the GPPO (European Commission, 2019).

When the EUPOL-A began its deployment in Afghanistan it faced many challenges which prevented it from operating and those challenges were ranging from the lack of proper administration to materials such as secure vehicles and other needed staff for running the operations. The approved personnel for EUPOL-A was 400 but according to Eva Gross the authorized amount was never accomplished and it was always short of what it was officially approved, the process of deployment was always a big challenge and it was planned to be deployed half in central and regional level and the other half in five specific provinces through the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) which got off with the problem of the lack of bilateral agreement with International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and until the agreement the deployment was delayed even its geographical reach was limited because there was still a lack of agreement with the USA and Turkey. The beginning of the EUPOL-A is known to be unsuccessful due to the challenges mentioned above and some other issues inside the institution which expected a negative effect on the reform process of Afghan National Police (ANP) and it also negatively affected the EU position against other international players (Gross, 2010).

The support to reach the objectives by the EUPOL-A was delivered by the experts of the rule of law and police forces of the EU member states mainly to advise the relevant Afghan institutions in Kabul, Herat and Mazar Sharif to carry out the tasks with close cooperation by local and international partners and jointly with the Afghan government (European Court of Auditors, 2015).

4.4.4 The Main Objectives of EUPOL-A

The (EUPOL-A) to apply its mandate worked with three following action lines:

- To improve the reform of institutions in the interior ministry of Afghanistan
- To form a professional police force
- To create harmony between the police force and the judiciary

Each line of the act was partly implemented with many challenges remained in each of its operating fields, but it was less successful in terms of advising and mentoring, although some external factors may have also been the reason for its failure in some aspects other faults are all due to the issues in EUPOL-A, however the mission trained around 5000 police forces in the country and almost delivered its helps to the general number of ANP (Tripathi and Ferhatovic, 2017).

4.5 The Police Staff College and Crime Management College

The Afghanistan police officials requested EUPOL-A to provide scholarships for the Afghanistan police forces, in the beginning, to study abroad but EUPOL-A hired police specialists from the EU countries to train Afghan police forces inside the country, instead of offering scholarships, established the staff college that could afford higher education for the police with much fewer charges and to train many police officers compared to providing scholarships. The institution-building process for the police forces in Afghanistan is one of the most important contributions and

it's one of the greatest successes for EUPOL-A but the establishment of police staff college is its flagship. This college played its role as a stage for delivering further training for the police staff at a strategic, operational and technical level, this project was funded by EU delegation and Service for Foreign Policy Instrument and EUPOL-A developed its training curriculum and courses to build the college. With the total cost of 7.3 million euros, it was inaugurated in January 2014 (Suroush, 2018).

The police staff college headquarters in capital Kabul consisted of 324 staff among them 192 professors and 132 administrative staff and currently has six provincial offices each of them staffed with 12 officers, the college is providing four different courses such as Bachelor of Arts (BA), Master of Arts (MA), strategic leadership and capacity building courses each with different time duration, the police staff college was effective in terms of providing the facility to the ANP officers in covering the full range of work they have done by providing support to the ANP training facilities such as the ANP academy and the ANP training centres in different provinces, the design of constructing the staff college was promoted by the EUPOL-A with close coordination with MOI and technical expertise by EUPOL-A in 2010 (European Commission, 2019)

Along with designing staff college the EU delegation, EUPOL-A with close coordination to the interior ministry of Afghanistan designed the first concept of creating the crime management college which was completed in 2014 with a total cost of 3 million euros provided by the EU. The crime management college is useful for the training in all the training academies for police in the centre and provinces for providing criminal investigation and to advance further and to develop professional skills and techniques (EUPOL-A, 2014).

The new Crime Management College(CMC) is a progression from the provisional training capacity at the Central Training Centre by the MOI, and until 2014, over 3,500 students have been trained at the provisional training facility including detectives from the ANP, MOI and wider partner organisations including the UNDP, the Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA), Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission and Family Response Units. The focus of CMC in the training previously conducted was in the area of Crime Scene Management at both basic and advanced levels, the 5-week Core Investigator Programme which included

intelligence, interviewing and evidence gathering training, Prevention of Violence against Women, and Police-Prosecutor Cooperation Training. The training has been conducted at the new Crime Management College along with new course programmes (EUPOL-A, 2014).

EUPOL-A has been providing a provisional staff college from 2010 until the initiation of the staff college to provide temporary training to the ANP with close coordination with the MOI training general command leadership, the GPPO team and the NATO training mission in Afghanistan which was a process of testing the capability in practice and theory of these joint forces in providing temporary trainings which is known to be a successful term which provided training to more than 6,000 ANP forces, along with providing training to the soldiers they have provided training to the afghan training staff under specialist training skills and made them able to be the leader and planner of training programmes in the inaugurated staff college which made them to take a greater role in advising and in the sector of techniques rather than to deliver the training in classrooms (European Commission, 2019)

The police staff college was handed over to the local police officials in 2016, it is still working normally and did not face many issues yet, and the issue which was noted by the officials visiting staff college was the lack of enough budget or financial resources for printing and publication of training materials (Suroush, 2018).

The staff college is known as the most important help to the Afghanistan national police forces along with the crime management college, and the EUPOL Afghanistan also helped the MOI and the ministry of justice with training, mentoring, advising and monitoring sittings and also provided the MOI with policies and training materials. In 2008 when Afghanistan was secure the EUPOL-A forces were advising the Afghan police forces on the checkpoint and helping them to check the vehicles properly and provided them with the necessary advice (Suroush, 2018).

To examine the amount of success the EUPOL Afghanistan earned throughout its operations with taking the afghan concept in consideration we can say that it went through difficulties in its beginning and designing but its operational period was considered as the strength of the mission, the civil policing concept in Afghanistan was not known and it was something new for the people which is defined as non-

political, professional, and a force which is responsible for law enforcement. Although the EU was tensely involved in assisting Afghanistan, over half of the ISAF troops came from the countries that are members of the EU and it also contributed to LOTFA which is the organization for funding the expenses of the Afghan forces and the EU police mission which worked in the field of civilian policing, but people don't really understand about its role and it's not known for the public and the picture of the EU as a smaller contributor is continued (Suroush, 2018).

EUPOL-A was mostly known for its rule of law and human rights programmes in Afghanistan and the policing came after because the work which was done in the area of gender equality in the police forces was eye-catching, prior to the EUPOL-A the number of policewomen was 180 members, and this number reached 3,200 policewomen with the help of the mission which is still very less compared to men forces. The MOI is planning to reach the number of policewomen to 10,000 and to reach this goal MOI and the EUPOL-A contributed to establishing the Human Rights, Gender and Children Directorate within MOI under the command of a women officer which is known as a great achievement because in Afghanistan there is still challenges against the women police officers and throughout its history Afghanistan never had this amount of women police officers, EUPOL-A was closed on December 31, 2016 (Suroush, 2018).

4.6 Conclusion

EUPOL-A started working in 2007 in capital Kabul and its constituted as the main element of security sector reform in Afghanistan, which was a part of the EU comprehensive approach to crisis management, although the EU engagement in Afghanistan goes back to 1985 its main engagement started after 2001 with the intervention of international forces in the war on terror led by the United States of America. EU contributed in different areas for the development of Afghanistan since 2001, even it was the first single largest donor to Afghanistan in the 1990s and assisted Afghanistan through NGOs, the European Union signed a joint agreement which based on that tried to formalize its political negotiation, to boost bilateral collaboration and to analyse improvements in meeting mutual promises, the purpose of signing joint declaration was to confirm its promise to strengthen the democratic

political system, to establish accountable and responsible government establishments, strengthen the rule of law and protection of human rights (including the rights of women) and the progress of civic society, with other aid commitments to Afghanistan, the EU also reaffirm its commitments to assist the security sector along with the international assistance force and also accepted its responsibility to support the NATO-led International Assistance Forces in supplying with military and civilian resources which included the (PRTS), and also supported the US-led Coalition Operation Enduring Freedom activities. Later, when the London conference on Afghanistan was convened the EU approach was based on the Afghanistan compact which was focused on the next five years of its convention. To create a framework for operation in Afghanistan the approach of security sector reform was used in the meeting of G8 donors in 2002 that contained five pillars and the responsibility of reforming the sector of police was taken by the (GPPO) which was called underrated and the justice sector was led by Italy. The EUPOL-A began with a pressure from the USA on the EU to take a bigger role in the security sector of Afghanistan. After sending a fact-finding mission to Afghanistan the EU came with the concept of EUPOL-A, with the aim of creating a civilian and effective police force that was followed by GPPO. Considering the Afghanistan concept the implementation phase of the EUPOL-A Afghanistan is known to be the strength of the mission, unlike its design and beginning phase.

5. CONCLUSION

The intervention of the United States of America (USA) in Afghanistan paved the way to the security sector reform (SSR), which was the most needed factor for the state building process in Afghanistan, this process was initiated with the G8 security conference in Geneva in 2002, which can be said that it was a meeting to divide tasks among the G8 countries, this meeting was initiated for the purpose of creating a framework for the operations in Afghanistan and used the approach of SSR for creating such a framework, this framework was created with five tasks or pillars such as the reform of military, police, counter-narcotics, judiciary and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of former fighters and in this meeting each donor country promised to lead one of these five tasks such as the USA led the military reform, Germany took the responsibility of police reform which later on changed to the European Union (EU), counter-narcotics was led by United Kingdom(UK), judicial reform was led by Italy and Japan led the DDR process, this framework aimed to make sure that there is a safe environment while restructuring the fundamental institutions in Afghanistan and covered many areas, the focus of this thesis is to find out the amount of contribution by the EU in the process of SSR. The thesis focuses on the period after 2001, when the international funds were injected for the state building process in Afghanistan. The introduction part of the Thesis determines the importance of the subject and explains the research methodology and data collection methods for collecting academic information, furthermore chapter one is going by determining the status of the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces(ANDSF) and security from 2001 until 2019. ANDSF is used as the wider term which covers the whole security sector of Afghanistan that include the Afghan Border Force, Local Police, National Army, Air Force, National Police, National Civil Order Force, Special Forces, Territorial Army, and the National Directorate of Security with the level of active 352,000 personnel as of December 2018 according to the report by the US Department of Defence(USDOD). To know about SSR process is essential because insecurity is the most prominent problem of Afghanistan

and the reform to the security sector is a serious need for the country's safety and wellbeing of its people.

Chapter two has broadly argued on the general concept of SSR, such as the term SSR becoming as a concept, its definition, objectives, and the working principles provided by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/ Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) guidelines. The term SSR which only emerged in the 1990s used in different contexts from the community of donors for progress, to discussions on the reform in the 'transition' countries of central and Eastern Europe(CEE) to change in the key industrial nations in Western Europe and it spread in the international discourses quickly (DPI, 2016).

The majority of the studies points out that the concept of SSR is not clearly explained, and relatively new and in the studies regarding security the term was replaced by the defence reform, but the current term to address the new threats to the security that are not only military threats but also non-military threats seems to be the suitable term. Although the term and its meaning was thought to be not clear and many attributing scholars have used different words to describe the concept at least until the OECD DAC provided guidelines on SSR in 2004, in which they redefined security and included not only state security or national security but also individual security and wellbeing, recognized the interdependency of security and development in the partner countries known to be viewed as a public policy and governance issue which received a great public attention and the fact that wars and conflicts decreases with a democratic governed security system which is effective and accountable for the people and eventually creates an environment capable of development.

In the second part of the literature review the process of security sector reform in post conflict situations is analysed, in such environments the war has come to an end and a peace accord between rivalry parties has signed and the environment is ready for the rebuilding process and the uniqueness of such environments are that the international community can play an essential role in the rebuilding process and the parties in wars commits to the rebuilding process. Furthermore, the obstacles to the process in such environments is explained along the local ownership. Although security sector reform is difficult especially in the post-conflict countries many suggest that for a sustainable security sector reform the local ownership is essential

as mentioned in the OECD DAC it's one of the four main objectives of the international donors active in the process of SSR.

The presence of international forces in the post conflict countries is one of the main specification of such societies and the reform of the security sector is also the main priority in such environments and providing security is directly related to the formation of a trained security sector and to rebuild their infrastructure, and for a sustainable peace in the post conflict countries when the international forces withdraw, there must be a be a trained, strong and capable local force to sustain security, and a strong security sector is a must for such societies because the international forces cannot stay for a long period of time.

As the process of security sector reform and peace building suggests in post conflict countries the environment must be safe and non-violent for political, economic and cultural well-being of a country and this reason emphasized on the presence of international military forces.

The case of current Afghanistan as a post conflict country is a dubious assertion due to the increasing insurgency and recovering from conflicts. but the international forces presence in the country can bring it in the category of post conflict country, the security sector in such environments is a difficult task and it's a long-term process, to expect a rapid security sector reform is unrealistic. The local ownership in Afghanistan which is a prominent tool for the succession of the process was a gap due to the lack of intention by the Afghan government to take the responsibility for the management of the process and also there was no such an institution or actor to take the responsibility of the overall process, although with the help of international donors the office of the national security council was established for the intention to take the leading role in the process, but there was also no political will to really take the responsibility for it, at least on the paper and the process was mostly running by the donors.

The environment for reform differ widely and the process for SSR should be suitable to the environment on the ground, and each engagement of the process is a unique case but with considering the key principles of security sector reform, to implement the process of security sector reform there should be a clear understanding of the environment even its prominent for a successful implementation along with adapting

the suitable programmes And the political, legal, economic, social, technology, and environmental factors need to be considered to determine the nature and consequence of security sector reform programmes (DCAF, 2017).

For better understanding of the environment in Afghanistan, the third chapter explains the political background briefly from the soviet invasion in 1979 until 1989, the collapse of Dr Najibullah's government which was a soviet backed regime. and further it goes by explaining the Soviet withdrawal, the factional wars between the different groups of mujahideen and the Taliban regime until the interventions of USA and its allies in 2001, the Bonn Agreement and democratic institutions and electoral process in the country.

In chapter four the thesis specifically collects the data on the role of EU to the process of security sector reform and analyse its main contributions to the process. also, briefly explain the background of Afghanistan and EU relations.

The EU has a long-term partnership with Afghanistan, in close coordination with Afghanistan's international partners and it's been helping Afghanistan government to fight corruption, improve oversight, enable economic growth, reduce poverty and strengthen democratic institutions. The EU involved in some elements of SSR through the EU police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL-A) and the EU Commission contributed to justice reform but the (EUPOL-A) constitutes the main element of the EU contributions to SSR in Afghanistan.

EU was the second largest contributor to Afghanistan only after the USA from 2002 to 2006 and the combined contribution of European community(EC), EU and the member states was 3.7 billion euros and 1.1 billion euros came from the budget of European community (Delegation of the European Union to Afghanistan, 2019).

The government of Afghanistan and the EU agreed on the partnership in 2005 to succeed the Bonn Agreement and to set the priorities for the upcoming phase of Afghanistan reconstruction process, this EU joint declaration was signed to create an official political dialogue between the EU and Afghanistan, to strengthen mutual collaboration and to observe the progress in meeting mutual commitments For signing the joint declaration in 2005 obliged both parties to make sure to cooperate and reaffirm their commitments in some areas such as the commitment from the Afghan government to strengthening democratic institutions and governance which

is responsible and accountable to strengthen the rule of law and to protect the rights of humans to develop civil society, the government of Afghanistan also emphasized on promoting economic progress to eliminate poverty, progress in terms of state finances, combating against corruption and to eliminate the production and trafficking of drugs and the successful implementation of the joint declaration is said to depend on local ownership. The EU and its international partners also committed themselves to cooperate with the government of Afghanistan to achieve these targets (Council of The European Union, 2005).

The EU along with other commitments to assist Afghanistan also assisted to security sector along with the international assistance community and also the NATO-led assistance forces received the assistance from the EU in terms of military and civilian resources including Provincial Reconstruction teams (PRTs) and the US-led Coalition Enduring Freedom Operations for the aim of improving safety, extend stability and boost progress across Afghanistan.

After the implementation of the Bonn Agreement until 2005, a conference on Afghanistan was organized in London and came with Afghanistan Compact which was the main document of this meeting and started the journey with some time-limited targets in the sectors of security, governance and development to confirm the obligations of the world for the next level of building the state in Afghanistan (Murray, 2011).

EU also funded the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration(DDR) which was led by japan and the EU regarded the process of DDR as the crucial process for the stability of Afghanistan. EU except for humanitarian support and some other economic programs arranged by EC did not contribute to military operations in Afghanistan until 2007, with the security situations, remained tenuous in the country, EU stepped up its engagement in Afghanistan, a major initiative was launched by the EU- European Union Police Mission to Afghanistan (EUPOL-A) on June 17, 2007, in Kabul to deal with the security situation in the country, the EU has added a new element to its reconstruction efforts with the launch of (EUPOL-A) under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

The main tasks of the EUPOL-A are to significantly contribute to the establishment under afghan ownership of suitable and effective civilian policing arrangements,

which will ensure appropriate interaction with the wider criminal justice system under afghan ownership. The operation will assist the reform process towards a trusted and efficient police service which works with accordance to the international standards within the framework of the rule of law and respects human rights (Gross, 2010).

EUPOL-A was initiated as a non-executive mission for three years with a review of its scope and size six time a month following the German Police Project Office(GPPO), but its policy was different, It was gone far beyond the training mission it also contributed to form a whole strategy for the Ministry of Interior(MOI) with the purpose of staff mentoring in the MOI, the deputy minister and the chiefs of police in provinces to construct and coordinate policies. This mission was for mentoring, advising, monitoring, and training. EUPOL-A tried to coordinate with the member states and non-member states and advised them on the projects where they were active in the areas related to the mission. The mentoring of higher-ranking officers in the MOI by EUPOL-A mission is known as the complement to the USA short term training approach which was to make sure the police forces were ready to take an active role on the battlefields. With its main difference with the GPPO the EUPOL- Afghanistan included all parties active in police reform and through sharing information it was successful in coordinating the national efforts in police reform which is known as the main advantage over the GPPO.

The support to reach the objectives by the EUPOL-A was delivered by the experts of the rule of law and police forces of the EU member states mainly to advise the relevant Afghan institutions in Kabul, Herat and Mazar Sharif to carry out the tasks with close cooperation by local and international partners and jointly with the Afghan government (European Court of Auditors, 2015).

The EUPOL-A to apply its mandate worked with three following action lines:

- To improve the reform of institutions in the interior ministry of Afghanistan
- To form a professional police force
- To create harmony between the police force and the judiciary

Each line of the act was partly implemented with many challenges remained in each of its operating fields. But it was less successful in terms of advising and mentoring, although some external factors may have also been the reason for its failure in some

aspects other faults are all due to the issues in EUPOL-A, however the mission trained around 5000 police forces in the country and almost delivered its helps to the general number of Afghan national police forces (Tripathi and Ferhatovic, 2017).

The Afghanistan police officials requested EUPOL-A to provide scholarships for the Afghanistan police forces, in the beginning, to study abroad but EUPOL-A hired police specialists from the EU countries to train Afghan police forces inside the country, instead of offering scholarships, established the staff college that could afford higher education for the police forces, with much fewer charges and to train many police officers compared to providing scholarships. The institution-building process for the police forces in Afghanistan is one of the most important contributions and it's one of the greatest successes for EUPOL-A but the establishment of police staff college is its flagship.

The design of constructing the staff college was promoted by the EUPOL-A with close coordination with the MOI and technical expertise by EUPOL-A in 2010. And alongside the police staff collage the EU delegation, EUPOL-A with close coordination to the MOI of Afghanistan designed the first concept of creating the crime management college which was completed in 2014 with a total cost of 3 million euros provided by the EU.

The crime management college is useful for the training in all the training academies for police in the centre and provinces for providing criminal investigation and to advance further and to develop professional skills and techniques (EUPOL-A, 2014).The staff college is known as the most important help to the Afghanistan national police forces along with the crime management college, and the EUPOL Afghanistan also helped the ministry of interior and the ministry of justice with training, mentoring, advising and monitoring sittings and also provided the MOI with policies and training materials.

In 2008 when Afghanistan was secure the EUPOL-A forces were advising the Afghan police forces on the checkpoint and helping them to check the vehicles properly and provided them with the necessary advice (Suroush, 2018).

To examine the amount of success the EUPOL Afghanistan earned throughout its operations with taking the afghan concept in consideration we can say that it went through difficulties in its beginning and designing but its operational period was

considered as the strength of the mission. The civil policing concept in Afghanistan was not known and it was something new for the people which is defined as non-political, professional, and a force which is responsible for law enforcement. Although the EU was tensely involved in assisting Afghanistan, over half of the International Assistance Forces (ISAF) troops came from the countries that are members of the EU and it also contributed to LOTFA which is the organization for funding the expenses of the Afghan forces and the EU police mission which worked in the field of civilian policing, but people don't really understand about its role and it's not known for the public and the picture of the EU as a smaller contributor is continued (Suroush, 2018).

EUPOL-A was mostly known for its rule of law and human rights programmes in Afghanistan and the policing came after, because the work which was done in the area of gender equality in the police forces was eye-catching. Prior to the EUPOL-A the number of policewomen was 180 members, and this number reached 3,200 policewomen with the help of the mission which is still very less compared to men forces. The MOI is planning to reach the number of policewomen to 10,000 and to reach this goal MOI and the EUPOL-A contributed to establishing the Human Rights, Gender and Children Directorate within MOI under the command of a women officer which is known as a great achievement because in Afghanistan there is still challenges against the women police officers and throughout its history Afghanistan never had this amount of women police officers, EUPOL-A was closed on December 31, 2016 (Suroush, 2018).

5.1 Shortcomings of Research

This section describes the shortcomings of the research. The SSR as a concept emerged since 1990s, and the academic data was relatively less on the subject. For this reason, I have faced hardships to find out academic data throughout the internet. And it was difficult to find out the data related to the security sector reform in Afghanistan on the websites of the security related ministries and directorates.

Furthermore, I was not able to conduct interviews with the officials of SSR of Afghanistan or the practitioners from the international donors or especially from the EU. And for better analysing such issue there is a need to conduct interviews to find out the official's personal experiences in the process of SSR and to understand the

status of reforms in the security sector by reviewing the official documents and reports by the government of Afghanistan, although there were some reports by the United Nations(UN) and the EU regarding the process .

5.2 Recommendations

At the end, I recommend some activities to eliminate corruption in the security sector of Afghanistan, before initiating a comprehensive security sector reform process. Especially the reforms in the police and justice sectors that are essential to be taken as the top priority by the MOI and the international donors. for implement the law which is the main principle of an authority governance to keep its legitimacy and sustainability. and for the interdependency of the police and judiciary they should be well-organized, systematic, and cooperative to make sure that criminals which are arrested by the police are not released by the justice sector.

The judiciary should be independent of any interference by the government administration, the process of appointment of judges should be transparent, and the recruitment process should be clear according to the law. Furthermore, the security sector should be strengthened to chase corrupt officers and make procedures that prevent them to be involved in corruption and bribery, so that the rule of law is strengthened, this can come true with increasing the salaries and in case they commit crime, they face serious punishments.

Civilian policing is new procedure for the people of Afghanistan there should be dialogue and awareness programmes on the importance, and its benefits so that the civil society, the media and the government get more involved in the process.

The local ownership as one of the overarching objectives in the process of security sector reform should be taken seriously for the successful implementation of the process, as I mentioned in Afghanistan the local ownership was a gap for the process and due to the lack of a proper organization to take the responsibility of the reform process.

I also recommend that the educated, well trained, and skilled officers are appointed in key positions, without the influence of politicians so that in turn the police become apolitical, professional and effective, that are accountable to the people which is the main aim and target of the security sector reform.

The EU that already have the experience in the SSR in the CEE states and in western European states, must take a bigger role to the process for sustaining stability in the country, which in turn will benefit from the peace in the process.



REFERENCES

- Ball, N.** (2010). The Evolution of the security sector reform agenda. In: *the future of security sector reform*.
- Ball, N. and Brzoska, M.** (2002). *Voice and accountability in the security sector*. Bonn Bicc.
- BBC** (2018). Why Afghanistan Is More Dangerous than Ever. *BBC News*. [online] 13 Sep. Available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-45507560> [Accessed 6 Mar. 2019].
- BICC** (2011). *Case study: DDR Afghanistan | War and Peace*. [online] Warpp.info. Available at: <http://warpp.info/en/m2/articles/case-study-ddr-afghanistan> [Accessed 6 Jan. 2020].
- Born, H., Philipp Fluri, Lunn, S., Centre, G. and NATO Parliamentary Assembly** (2003). *Oversight and guidance: the relevance of parliamentary oversight for the security sector and its reform: a collection of articles of foundational aspects of parliamentary oversight of the security sector*. Brussels; Geneva: DCAF.
- Braithwaite, R.** (2011). *Afgantsy: the Russians in Afghanistan, 1979-89*. Oxford University Press.
- Brownlee, J.** (2007b). Can America Nation-Build? *World Politics*, 59(2), pp.314–340.
- Brzoska, M.** (2003). *Development donors and the concept of security sector reform*. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control Armed Forces.
- Chesterman, S.** (2002). Walking Softly in Afghanistan: The Future of UN State-Building. *Survival*, 44(3), pp.37–45.
- Clem, M., Martina, F. and Oliver, W. eds.,** (2004). *Security Sector Reform Potentials and Challenges for Conflict Transformation*. 2nd ed. Berlin: Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation.
- Collinson, S., Elhawary, S. and Muggah, R.** (2010). States of fragility: stabilisation and its implications for humanitarian action. *humanitarian policy group*, 34, pp.1–23.
- Concepts and dilemmas of state building in fragile situations.** (2008). *OECD Journal on Development*, 9(3), pp.61–148.
- Controle, L.** (2009).
- Council of The European Union** (2005). *EU-Afghanistan joint declaration: committing to a new EU-Afghan partnership*.
- Cramer, C. and J. Goodhand** (2002). "Try Again, Fail Again, Fail Better? War, the State and the 'Post-Conflict' Challenge in Afghanistan." *Development and Change* 33(5): 885-909.
- DCAF** (2017). *SSR in a Nutshell: Level 1 Training Manual - International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT)*. [online] International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT). Available at: <https://issat.dcaf.ch/Learn/Resource-Library/Tools/SSR-in-a-Nutshell-Level-1-Training-Manual> [Accessed 17 Sep. 2019].

- Delegation of the European Union to Afghanistan** (2019). *Delegation of the European Union to Afghanistan*. [online] EEAS - European External Action Service - European Commission. Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/afghanistan_en [Accessed 26 Aug. 2019].
- Donais, T.** (2009). Inclusion or Exclusion? Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform. *Studies in Social Justice*, 3(1), pp.117–131.
- DPI** (2016). *Security Sector Reform in Transitioning Environments: Potential and Challenges to Peace-building and Post-Conflict Transformation*. [online] DPI. Available at: <https://www.democraticprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/FINAL-SSR-Report-Proof.pdf>.
- Ejdus, F.** (2012). concept of security sector reform. In: Hadžić, M., Milosavljević, B., Stojanović, S., & Ejdus, F *yearbook of security sector reform in Serbia*. Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. 63-68.
- EUPOL-A** (2014). The Crime Management College and its Training Role. EUPOL-A.
- European Asylum Support Office** (2019). *Afghanistan Security Situation*. European Asylum Support Office.
- European Commission.** (2019). *Delegation of the European Union to Afghanistan*. [online] Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/afghanistan_en
- European Court of Auditors** (2015). *The EU police mission in Afghanistan: mixed results*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of The European Union.
- Globalsecurity.org.** (2018). *GlobalSecurity.org*. [online] Available at: <https://www.globalsecurity.org/> [Accessed 28 Apr. 2019].
- Gross, E.** (2009). *Security sector reform in Afghanistan: the EU's contribution*. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies.
- Gross, E.** (2010). Towards a comprehensive approach? The EU's contribution to Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Afghanistan. *Sicherheit & Frieden*, 28(4), pp.227–232.
- Hanggi, H.** (2004). Conceptualising Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction. In: *Reform and reconstruction of security sector*. pp.3–5.
- Hendrickson, D. Karkoszka, A.** (2002). The challenges of security sector reform. In: *SIPRI Yearbook 2002*. Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 176-202.
- International Monetary Fund** (2008). *Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: poverty reduction strategy paper*. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
- Jackson, P.** (2016). *Handbook of international security and development*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, p.121.
- Law, D.M.** (2007). *Intergovernmental organisations and security sector reform*. Zürich: Lit; Piscataway, Nj, pp.3–21.
- Lister, S.** (2009). Changing the Rules? State-Building and Local Government in Afghanistan. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 45(6), pp.990–1009.
- Maley, W. and Amin Saikal** (1989). *The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan*. Cambridge Cambridge University Press.
- Mcfate, S.** (2008). *Securing the Future, a Primer on Security Sector Reform in Conflict Countries*. United States Institute of Peace.
- Monten, J.** (2014). Intervention and State-Building. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 656(1), pp.173–191.

- Murray, T.** (2011). Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan, 2002–2011: An Overview of a Flawed Process. *International Studies*, 48(1), pp.43–63.
- Netherlands Institute of International Relations** (2006). *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, Dilemmas and Guiding Principles*.
- Nijat, aarya** (2014). *Governance in Afghanistan An Introduction | Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit*. [online] Areu.org.af. Available at: <https://areu.org.af/archives/publication/1402>.
- OECD** (2008). *The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform Supporting Security and Justice*. Paris OECD.
- OECD** (2008). *The OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform Supporting Security and Justice*. Paris OECD.
- Oliker, O** 2011, historical overview: 20th century security Aid to Afghanistan before the Soviet invasion', *Afghanistan's security forces in wartime*, RAND Corporation, pp.3-17.
- Ottaway, M.** (2002). Rebuilding State Institutions in the Collapsed States. *Development and Change*, 33(5), pp.1001–1023.
- Payind, A.** (1989). Soviet-Afghan Relations from Cooperation to Occupation. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 21(01), pp.107–128.
- RAND Corporation** (2010). EUPOL Afghanistan. In: *EU Civilian Crisis Management*. RAND Corporation, pp.17–29.
- Rashid, A.** (1999). The Taliban: Exporting Extremism. *Foreign Affairs*, 78(6), p.22.
- Rogers.** (2004), *War on Terror*, Pluto Press
- Rubin, B.** (2006). "Peace Building and State-Building in Afghanistan: constructing sovereignty for whose security?" *Third World Quarterly* 27(1): 175-185.
- Rubin, B.R. and Hamidzada, H.** (2007). From Bonn to London: Governance Challenges and the Future of State building in Afghanistan. *International Peacekeeping*, 14(1), pp.8–25.
- Shah, S.M.** (2009). *Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) Formulation Process*. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU).
- Schnabel, A. and Georg Ehrhart, H. eds.,** (2005). *Security sector reform and post-conflict peacebuilding*. Tokyo; New York: United Nations University Press, pp.1–10.
- Sedra, M.** (2010). *The future of security sector reform*. Waterloo, Ont.: Centre for International Governance Innovation.
- Sedra, M** (2013). *A Conversation on SSR in Afghanistan with Mark Sedra (15 April 2009)*. YouTube. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P-gR_X7O5Ng&t=422s [Accessed 6 Jan. 2020].
- SIGAR** (2017). *Reconstructing the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces*. Arlington, Virginia.
- Suroush, Q.** (2018). Assessing EUPOL Impact on Afghan Police Reform (2007-2016). *EUNPACK*, pp.10–19.
- The Asia Foundation** (2018). *A Survey of the Afghan People*. The Asia Foundation.
- The Brahimi Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.** (2000). *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, 6(4–6), p.168.
- The European Union Delegation to Afghanistan** (2014). *The European Union Delegation to Afghanistan*. The European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL).

- Thier, A. and Chopra, J.** (2002). The road ahead: Political and institutional reconstruction in Afghanistan. *Third World Quarterly*, 23(5), pp.893–907.
- Tripathi, S. and Ferhatovic, E.** (2017). The European Union’s Crisis Response in the Extended Neighbourhood. *EUNPACK*, pp.10–33.
- Un.org.** (2019). *AGREEMENT ON PROVISIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN.* [online] Available at: <https://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm>.
- Walter, N.** (2018). *Summary of “Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding.”* [online] Beyond Intractability. Available at: <https://www.beyondintractability.org/bksum/ehrrart-security>.
- Walter, N.** (2018). *Summary of “Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding.”* [online] Beyond Intractability. Available at: <https://www.beyondintractability.org/bksum/ehrrart-security>.



RESUME

Name/surname : Nesar Ahmad Bashari
Place/date of birth : 03/21/1993, Afghanistan
E-mail : nesarahmadbashari@gmail.com

Education:

- On-going master's degree in political science and international relations, started in 2017 at Istanbul Aydin University, Istanbul, Turkey.
- Participated in Training/Education Program as Erasmus+ Exchange Student in University of Lodz (POLAND) in third semester.
- Graduated from the Bachelor of Arts (political science) from Noida International University Noida, India.
- Joined ICYF, Diplomacy Academy (2019), Istanbul, Turkey.
- Graduated from the IQRA English Academy in 2012, Herat, Afghanistan.

Language skills:

<i>Language</i>	<i>Speaking</i>	<i>Writing</i>	<i>Listening</i>
Pashto	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent
Dari	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent
English	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent
Hindi	Excellent	Not good	Excellent
Urdu	Excellent	Not bad	Excellent
Turkish	Good	Not Bad	Good