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ISLAMIC ACTIVISM IN THE SAHEL: A CASE OF AL-QAEDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB (AQIM) AND BOKO HARAM

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Gaziantep
June 2014

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Dedication

I dedicated this thesis to the memory of my beloved father Ibrahim Adamu Danguguwa, who passed away on 8th April, 2014.

APPROVAL

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The material included in this thesis has not been submitted wholly or in part for any academic award or qualification other than that for which it is now submitted.

Kabiru Ibrahim Danguguwa

June 2014

ABSTRACT

Kabiru Ibrahim Danguguwa

June 2012

Islamic Activism in the Sahel: A Case of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Boko Haram

The transitional zone between North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa – the Sahel – is considered by international community as safe haven and hotbed for violent Islamic activism. This thesis uses social movement theory to examine the rise and development of the popular movements in this region. The Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Boko Haram emerged in Algeria and Nigeria, respectively. The fecundity of social movement theory in studying these movements lies in the presence of tripartite social movement theory factors of political structures opportunity, mobilizing structures and cultural framing/framing process in Algeria and Nigeria to establish the AQIM and the Boko Haram. The AQIM and the Boko Haram were initially established as moderate and conservative movements, respectively but ended as violent movements when what they regarded as free-spaces diminished after they gathered material and non-material resources. This coincided with the radical view of view of the groups' members. The AQIM was originally a political party – the FIS but changed names to the GIA, GSPC and AQIM each with different modus operandi. The Boko Haram retains its name but espoused anti-system frame alongside violent tactics since 2009. Therefore, these movements followed similar trajectory to radicalization and are more likely to focus on the entire Sahel as the region provides what they regarded golden opportunity to thrive. The AQIM in particular has a strong command in the Sahel and the Boko Haram actors also exist in some Sahelian countries. They had focus of overthrowing governments in Algiers and Abuja, but now threaten the whole Sahel region with violence and illegal activities such as kidnapping, and taking hostages.

Key words: Islamic Activism, Sahel, AQIM and Boko Haram

ÖZET

Kabiru Ibrahim Danguguwa Haziran 2014

Sahil Bölgesinde İslami Aktivizm: İslami Mağrib'deki El-Kaide (AQIM) ve Boko Haram

Kuzey Afrika ve Sahra altı Afrika arasındaki geçişken Sahil bölgesi hem yerel, hem de uluslarası camia tarafından şiddet yanlısı İslami aktivizm için bir güvenli bölge ve münbit bir zemin olarak ifade edilmektedir. Bu tez, bölgede halihazırda aktif halde bulunan sosyal hareketlerin ortaya çıkışını ve gelişmesini sosyal hareketler teorisini kullanarak incelemektedir. Müslüman Mağrib'deki El-Kaide (AQIM) ve Boko Haram örgütü sırasıyla Cezayir ve Nijerya'da ortaya çıkmıştır. Sosyal hareketler teorisinin Cezayir ve Nijerya'daki AQIM ve Boko Haram hareketlerini çalışmada sağladığı zenginlik, teorinin siyasi fırsat yapıları, mobilizasyon yapıları ve kültürel çerçeveler gibi üçlü analitik araçları sağlamasından kaynaklanmaktadır. AQIM ve Boko Haram başlangıçta ılımlı ve muhafazakar hareketler olarak ortaya çıkmalarına ragmen daha sonra kendilerince maddi ve maddi olmayan kaynakları bir araya getirerek oluşturdukları serbest alanların yokedilmesiyle şiddete yöneldiler. Bu yöneliş, grupların üyelerinden bazılarının radikal görüşleriyle de örtüştü. AQIM aslında başlangıçta bir siyasi parti olan FIS hareketinin değişen şartlara göre GIA, GSPC ve AQIM'e evrilmesiyle ortaya çıkan bir harekettir. Boko Haram ise ortaya çıkışından bu yana ismini değiştirmese de 2009'dan bu yana sistem karşıtı bir kavramsal çerçeve kullanan şiddeti bir taktik olarak benimsemiş bir gruptur. Bu nedenle, bu iki hareket de radikalleşmelerinde benzer bir yol izlemiş, ve faaliyetlerini, bölgenin genişlemeleri için bulunmaz fırsatlar sunması yüzünden bütün Sahil bölgesinde yaygınlaştırmaya çalışmışlardır. Özellikle AQIM Sahil bölgesinde güçlü bir varlık gösterirken Boko Haram da bazı Sahil ülkelerinde faaliyet göstermektedir. İki örgüt de başlangıçta Cezayir ve Abuja'daki hükümetleri devirmeyi hedeflemiş ve daha sonra da adam kaçırma ve rehinecilik gibi yasadışı faaliyetlerle bütün Sahil bölgesini tehdit etmeye başlamışlardır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İslami Aktivizm, Sahil, AQIM, ve Boko Haram

LIST OF CONTENTS

Dedication Page………………………………………… i

Approval Page……………………………………….. ii

Author Declarations…………………………………… iii

Abstract………………………………………………… iv

Özet……………………………………………………. v

List of Contents... vi

List of Abbreviations……………………………… ix

Acknowledgements…………………………………… xi

Figure one ……………………………………… 3

CHAPTER

I. INTRODUCTION………………………………………… 1

Theoretical Framework…………………………………….. 8

Research Questions………………………………………… 11

Research Methodology…………………………………….. 13

Chapters and Organization…………………………………… 15

II. LITERATURE REVIEW…………………………………………… 16

Literature Review: Social Movements Theory……………………… 16

Political Opportunity Structures……………………………………… 17

Mobilizing structures………………………………………………… 20

Framing Processes…………………………………………………… 22

Islamic Activism in the Sahel……………………………………… 25

III. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF AL-QAEDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB (AQIM) AND BOKO HARAM……… 33

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)……………………… 33

The Armed Islamic Group GIA, (al-*Jama'ah al-Islamiyah al-Musallaha*, *Groupe Islamique Armé*)…………………………….. 35

The Salafist Group for Call/Preaching and Combat GSPC (*Groupe salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat*)……………….......... 37
The AQIM……………………………………………………….. 39
The Boko Haram………………………………………………….. 40
Boko Haram as a Clandestine Movement…………………………. 44
IV. THE RISE AND EMERGENCE OF AL-QAEDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES/CONSTRAINTS STRUCTURES, MOBILIZING STRUCTURES AND FRAMING PROCEESSES…………………………………………………… 47
Political Structures Opportunities/Constraints and Mobilizing Structures for Algeria's Islamists……………………………………………. 47
Free Space for Islamists' Mobilizations in Algeria…………………. 51
An Inopportune Political Context: State Reactive Repression and Emergence of Violent Islamic Activism in Algeria……………….. 54
From GSPC to AQIM: A Political Process Explanation…………… 56
The Sahel: A Safe Haven for Violent Islamists? 57
Framing Processes………………………………………………….. 58
V. THE EMERGENCE AND RISE OF THE BOKO HARAM: A SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY APPROACH……………………….. 65
Mobilization and Recruitment for Boko Haram: Political Opportunity structures and Mobilizing Structures……………………………. 65
The Study and Preaching Sessions as Mobilizing and Recruitment Grounds for the Boko Haram………………………………….. 66
Boko Haram Gathered Resources……………………………… 69
Cultural Framing……………………………………………. 72
Repression, Exclusive Organizations, and Anti-system Frames…… 76
VI. CONCLUSION…………………………………………………… 80
Similarities and Differences between the Algerian Islamist (The FIS/GIA/GSPC/AQIM and the Boko Haram…………………… 82
Similarities……………………………………………………… 82
Differences……………………………………………………. 85
What can Possibly Happen? ………………………………………. 87

BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………… 91

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIS: Armée Islamique du Salut / Islamic Army of Salvation.

AOF: Afrique occidentale française / French West Africa.

AQIM: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

EIJ: Egyptian Islamic Jihad.

EUCOM: United States European Command

FIS: Front Islamique du Salut / Islamic Salvation Front

FLN: Front de Libération Nationale / National Liberation Front

FTO: Foreign Terrorist Organization

GIA: Groupe Islamique Armé / Armed Islamic Group

GSCP: Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat / Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat.

HAMAS: Harakat al-Mujtama al-Islami/ Movement for an Islamic Society.

HCE: Haut Comité d'Etat / High Committee of State.

JTF: Joint Task Force.

LIFG: Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.

MEND: Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

MDJT: Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad/Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad.

MEI: Mouvement pour l'Etat Islamique / Movement for Islamic State.

MIA: Mouvement Islamique Armé / Armed Islamic Movement.

MNLA: Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad / National Movement for the Liberation of Azwad.

MNI: Mouvement de la Nahda/ Movement/ Nahda Movement.

NGOs: Nongovernmental Organizations

OPC: Oodua People Congress

PSI: Pan Sahel Initiative

SDGT: Specially Designated Global Terrorists

TSCTP: Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership.

UN: United Nations

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

In the Muslim world, raising the banner of Islam to challenge status quo or the West are not new phenomena. In fact, this is the most obvious element since the end of Cold War that marked the end of the ideological conflict between the West and the Soviet bloc. In Western societies however, movement under liberal democracy are also prevalent insofar as movements are all over the places and are basic components of contemporary societies (Giugni et al.1999, xv). As Crossley (2002) puts it, one can hardly "open newspaper or turn on the TV news without being informed of an act of protest somewhere in the world" (Crossley 2002, 7).

In respect to religious activism, factors accounting for why people resort to both violent and non-violent activism vary from one nation to another. Nevertheless, some factors are similar across countries. Although various Islamic activists may have different motives, methods, goals, and strategies, they all believe in one core assumption. Therefore, Islamists have in common, an understanding about responsibility of the problems facing the Muslims. This assumption is that the problems facing the Muslims can be resolved through return to "pure" Islam. Thus, they are united on the conviction that *Al-Islam huwa al-hall* – Islam is the solution – (Wickham 2002, 1-2).

In a quest to solve the perceived and/or actual problems, some Islamists organize collective actions to create what they believe a better society. It's argued that some Islamists prefer to change their society through formal political participation. They formed political parties, which do not necessary include their will to establish Islamic societies in the manifestos. Prevalence among Muslim societies are activists that restrict their activism to preaching and proselytization. More often than not, the latter complement the former's political activism. And more importantly both can espouse violent tactics.

Interestingly, a cross national study in the Sahel[1] shows that there is tendency for Islamists to change their strategy especially when political opportunity structures that allow their emergence changed. In many respects, the Sahel is strategically important for several reasons, including its role as a bridge between the Arab Maghreb and black Sub-Saharan Africa (Bilad as-Maghreb and Bilad as-Sudan), as well as its important natural resources, both renewable and non-renewable. Therefore, Sahel has been a strategic location since pre-colonial time for trade and scholarship. North and West Africa have long pre-colonial connections through trade and scholarship, which led to the introduction of Islam to the West Africa[2]. Moreover, the Sahel belt touches several countries with serious security challenges of their own that could easily spill over their borders. Despite all this, the borders there are virtually unguarded, permitting ease of movement, as well as access to populations which, are at least receptive to Islamists message due to both their social, economic, and political marginalization and historical memories of jihad out of the desert (Pham 2011, 247).

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[1] The Sahel is the ecoclimatic and biogeographic zone of transition, in Africa, between the Sahara desert to the north and the Sudanian Savannah to the south. Having a semi-arid climate, it stretches across the southernmost extent of Northern Africa between the Atlantic Ocean and the Red Sea. The Arabic word *sāḥil* (ساحل) literally means "shore, coast", describing the appearance of the vegetation found in the Sahel as being akin to that of a coastline delimiting the sand of the Sahara. The pre-colonial Arabs had no idea how significant the term would be today. The Sahel covers parts of (from west to east) the Gambia, Senegal, southern Mauritania, central Mali, Burkina Faso, southern Algeria and Niger, northern Nigeria and Cameroon, central Chad, southern Sudan, northern South Sudan and Eritrea. For geography and specific features of the Sahel see for example, Olivier, Walther and Denis Retaille. 2010. "Sahara or Sahel? The Fizzy Geography of Terrorism in West Africa." CEPS/INSTEAD Working Paper No 35.

[2] For historical, and religious links between Northern Nigeria and other sub-Saharan and North African communities see Murray, Last. 2011. "The Book and the Nature of Knowledge in Muslim Northern Nigeria, 1457-2007." In The Trans-Saharan Book Trade: Manuscript, Culture, Arabic Literacy and Intellectual History in Muslim Africa, edited by Kratli Graziano and Ghislane Lydon, 175-212. Leiden: Brill N.V. Ghislaine, Lydon. 2009. On Trans-Saharan Trails: Islamic Law, Trade networks and Cross-Cultural Exchange in 19th Century Western Africa. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Alexander, Thurston, B.A. 2009. "Interactions between Northern Nigeria and the Arab World in the Twentieth Century." (M.A Thesis, Georgetown University.



Figure 1: Map of Africa showing the Sahel Region.

Source: https://www.google.com.tr/search?q=sahel+map+of+africa&source

It's when changes in political structures occur that some Islamist movements become radicals and militants thus, attract much attention. Radical/militant Islamists openly indict government policies in their countries, some attack the West directly or indirectly, while others attack whatever they label Western "proxies". As Huntington argues, some Islamists may prefer to "resist and to balance against the West" (Huntington 1996, 29, see also Hafez 2000). Accordingly, international institutions, media outlets, the marketplace, and secular modernization projects are all framed and targeted as vehicles for the strategic infusion of alien value systems calculated to undermine the strength of Islam. They think that their targets whether near or far enemies have been conspiring and fraternizing with the West to undermine, weaken and eventually dominate the Muslims. Rosenfeld thus, argues that targets and victims of modern "terrorist movements have been associated with modern states" (Rosenfeld 2011, 2).

Despite the existence of peaceful and violent Islamist movements, use of violence by Islamist groups has recently received more attention, especially after the 9/11, which marked the "ominous threat to the world by Islamic terrorism" (Perry and Negrin, 2008). Scholars, pundits, policy makers and general public have been

struggling to fathom the rationale and motivation for the use of violence by some Islamists. These have led to different interpretation inasmuch as many believe that such occurrences tend to affirm the worst stereotype about Islamic contention and Islam in general.

Conversely, not all Islamists champion violence. Whereas all Islamists (not necessarily all Muslims) give credence to a society that is governed by the *Shari'a* (Islamic Law), there is no cohesion on how to establish it. Ismail succinctly categories Islamists based on their tactics as *conservatives, moderates, and militants* (see Dede 2008). Conservatives believe in the propagation and missionary activities (*da'awa*), which is intended to transform individual beliefs. Those individuals will eventually transform the entire society, hence implement Islamic laws. Moderates are noticeable in the political scenes. They form political parties and advocate formal political participations. They often engage in da'awa, however. The militants embrace violent measures and attract many attentions than the formers (Hafez 2000, Wiktorowicz 2004, Perry and Negrin 2008).

A number of sources on Islamist activists label them as mainly terrorist, extremist and/or Islamic fundamentalist that emerge under the banner of Islam to challenge modernization and the West. These are sources written by "Self-proclaimed experts on Islamic terrorism" (Wiktorowicz 2004, 20) that rely on misleading sources to address specific audience. They draw causal relations between Islam and terrorism. For instance, Bachman (2009) states that his book "is an explanation of global Jihadist praxies… it is an attempt to make a body of complex thought and previously obscure personalities [global Jihadists] accessible to a Western audience" (Bachman 2008, 6). The militant Islamists are viewed as "irrational" actors who engaged in a holy war with ultimate aim of destruction of the Western civilization, the reestablishment of Muslim power, and the imposing of religious law, wherever Muslims hold sway. Perry and Negrin (2008) argue that some Islamists engage in selective reading of Islamic texts to justify their actions.

> For inspiration and justification they turn back to Muhammad himself and to [a] selective reading of Islamic religious texts... analysts frequently view radical Islamism as a totalitarian movement— some refer to it as Islamofascism—in the tradition of Communism and Nazism (2-4).

Similarly, others relate the emergence of radical Islamists with either economic grievances or religious extremism. This is true with many studies that assume a causal linkage between grievances or frustration to the collectivity of actors (McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1212-15; Wiktorowicz 2004, 4; Baylouny 2004, Dede 2008, 5; Adenrele 2012, 22-23). The proponents of these socio-psychological understandings emphasize what the Islamists themselves often present as the cause of their collective actions – alleviating psychological, economic and political discomforts occasioned by structure. The advocates of the above maxims trivialize and/or ignore the fact that grievances and what causes them are themselves subject to interpretation. Those interpretations explain why grievances are ubiquitous and movements are rare, despite the fact that "there is always enough discontent in any society to supply the grass-roots support for movements" (McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1215). Moreover, the populations that have these grievances are very large, and very small number of them organizes collective action.

Gurr (1968 and 1970) and his associates have an assumption that the gap between an individual's expected and achieved welfare results in collective discontent (Gurr: 1968, 1970, and Borum 2003,). More generally, explanations based on socio-psychological model underestimate the role of human agency. Contextual factors do matter; they may create grievances and opportunities for violence; but the grievances and opportunities in question may not actually lead to violence in the absence of political entrepreneurs, ideologues, and/or organizations that can frame and channel the relevant grievances in violent directions, and that can make the most of the opportunities for violence with which a particular setting presents them.

It is very difficult to generalize, across regions, countries, and time periods, about the conditions that give rise to radical/militants activism. This is because those organizations emerge in radically different social, political and economic environments. If one focuses on social and economic conditions alone, one must note that radical movements have manifested itself in a wide variety of socioeconomic settings, from impoverished societies to advanced industrialized countries and from the Western societies to the Muslim world. Social movements scholars argue that

perpetrators of mass violence are not simply driven by motivational imperatives, such as relative deprivation, ideological orientation, or rational calculation as emphasize by other theories.

This study argues that whatever their differences, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (hereafter AQIM) and Boko Haram followed similar path to radicalization. Worth noting is that AQIM and Boko Haram went through some processes, which hypothetically turn similar movements to more radical outlook, hence violence. This study explores those processes. Though emerged in different countries and indeed in distinctive political structure, AQIM and Boko Haram followed similar path to radicalization. The AQIM dates from the 1990s and grew out of an insurrection mounted by an Islamist resistance movement protesting the Algerian regime's decision to end parliamentary elections in 1992,which would have resulted in the Islamic Salvation Front (French: *Front Islamique du Salut,* FIS) party gaining a majority (Foster-Bowser and Sender 2002). The military seized power outlawed the FIS and imprisoned its leaders, and thousands of Islamic activists in Saharan concentration camps. These developments began to turn some members of FIS into militants. Coincidentally, by the early 1990s, hundreds of Algerian militants who were trained and, in some cases, fought alongside the Afghan mujahidin began returning to Algeria. Some of these Algerian-Afghans, *Les Afghanis* as they were called joined the militant faction of the FIS which led to the establishments of Islamic Armed Group (French: *Groupe Islamique Armé,* GIA). The GIA believed in total war by labeling both Algerian regimes, its supporters and even other FIS members who formed another moderate group, Islamic Salvation Army (French: *Armée Islamique du Salut*, AIS) as infidels. The GIA adopted indiscriminate killings measures, which resulted in massacres against many civilians. Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (French: *Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat GSCP*) emerged, growing out of elements of the GIA leadership, these dissidents rejected the GIA's policy of attacking civilians by allowing only security targets. Most of those groups accepted amnesty and by the January of 2000 deadline, almost 5,000 AIS militants had surrendered their weapons but the GSPC refused amnesty hence decided to continue the struggles against Algerian state. In September 2002

government ordered a crackdown on the GSPC, Algeria's largest anti-Islamist operation in five years (Harmon 2010, 15). The Group responded with stepped-up raids, including attacks on military bases. While some leaders within the GSPC began to favor global jihad, it was the US invasion of Iraq that became a major recruiting tool for the global jihad. Indeed, Iraq brought the GSPC and other national jihadists in line with mainstream Al-Qaeda. Subsequently, in January of 2007 the GSPC was formally integrated into Al-Qaeda, adopting the new name Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.[3]

Boko Haram is an Islamist movement based primarily in the north-eastern region of Nigeria. The group was primarily based in the states of Borno and Yobe in its early years, but has since expanded to virtually all northern and some central states of Nigeria. Boko Haram movement is believe to be founded in 1995 by Abubakar Lawan under the original name *Ahlulsunna Wal'jama'ah Hijra* in Maiduguri, the Borno state capital. Lawan's mission was to organize Islamic movement that addresses economic hardship and poor living standards the Nigerian people were facing especially in his state and to produce personnel who can help create Islamic government. The movement began to get popularity in 2003 when, under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf, some of its members migrated to the outskirts of Yobe and established a community called Afghanistan. Members of the group gathered in mosque under Yusuf and have since then adopted several name from *Muhajirun, Yusufiyyah, Nigerian Taliban, Jama'atu Ahlissunnah Lidda'awati Wal Jihad* and *Boko Haram.* The clashes between Boko Haram and Nigeria's security started in 2003 and reach its climax in 2009. The clashes of 2009 have much casualty from both sides. The Nigerian police killed Mohammed Yusuf, one hundred of his followers and associates including his father-in-law. Since 2009 Boko Haram has been more militant and has been popularizing the repression on their members in 2009 as an excuse to avenge. Meanwhile, Nigeria's security continued to crack down

[3] Chapter three discusses the historical development of AQIM. For details, see Stephen, Harmon. 2010. "From GSPC to AQIM: The Evolution of an Algerian Islamist Terrorist Group into an Al-Qaeda Affiliate and its Implications for the Sahara-Sahel Region." Concerned Africa Scholars. Peter, J. Pham. 2011. "Foreign Influences and Shifting Horizons: The Ongoing Evolution of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb" Paper presented at Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) annual security conference.

on them, which make Boko Haram as encapsulated movement that continue to recruit and radicalize members.[4]

These two movements are household names as far as Islamic activism in Africa is concerned. Interestingly, this study finds that the emergence of the AQIM and Boko Haram happened in countries touched by the Sahel belt. However, the formal declaration by Ayman al-Zawahiri welcoming the GSPC in to the mainstream Al-Qaeda witnessed the advancement of the AQIM attacks in Sahelian countries especially Mali, Mauritania, Chad and Niger republic. Correspondingly, Boko Haram attacks advance from its root in Sahelian northeastern Nigeria to non-Sahelian parts of Nigeria, though little is known about its activities in countries like Mali, Niger, Chad and Cameroun. The anti-civilian violence and massacres and indiscriminate killings of both combatants and noncombatants being perpetrated by these organizations popularized their names.

1.1 Theoretical Framework

Due to the disciplinary fragmentation in understanding Islamic activism – "mobilization of contention to support Muslim causes" (Wiktorowicz 2004, 2) – this study develops frameworks that explain how different elements fit together, interact, and influence the rise and radicalization of two movements in the Sahel. So, this thesis will be a novel study that combines interdisciplinary analysis to examine the rise and development of the AQIM and the Boko Haram. The thesis looks at these movements from social movements' perspective. Social movements are conceptualized as collective ventures that are inspired by wishes and hope of establishing new order of life (Crossley 2002). Crossley operationalization of social movement will help us understand how a social movement framework, which focuses on trinity of factors: *political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings,* is an effective tool for providing a comprehensive explanations for these movements.

[4] Read full report here http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/SR308.pdf, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/nigeria1012webwcover.pdf and also in chapter three of this thesis.

Scholars of social movements hypothesize that movements occur when the following three factors exist: political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures, and framing processes. Political structures opportunity considers the openness of a political environment to change. Political opportunities are present when there is the possibility and/or perception of feasibility of changes in the institutional structure or informal power relations of a given national political system.

Additionally, such political opportunities "account for cross-national differences in then structure, extent, and success of comparable movements on the basis of differences in the political characteristics of the nation states in which they are embedded (MacAdam et al. 1996, 2-3). Hence, social movements are shaped by broad political constraints and opportunities exclusive to each individual nation that determine the organizational structure and dynamics of movements evolved.

Mobilizing structures are the collective organizations, informal and formal, through which people mobilize in a collective action. Political systems shape the prospects for collective action and its associated movements. People are usually mobilized and recruited through network of friends, family and colleagues and movements use the existing organizational structure within society (Della Porta 1995, and Tarrow et al. 1980).

Framing processes "represent interpretive schemata that offer a language and cognitive tools for making sense of experiences and events in the 'world out there'… and thus, a process of meaning construction" Wiktorowicz, 2004, 15). MacAdam et al (1996) maintain that for the frame to be resonant there must be grievances and optimism. It's through framings that actors define discontent and construct social realities to motivate collective action. The ability of a particular movement to create frames upon indigenous cultural symbols, language and identities with resonances, lured not only sympathizers but even bystander publics into activism.

When the trinity of social movements factors are present, inclusive movements are likely to emerge. *Inclusive* movement or organization is one with relatively unrestricted criteria for membership. It usually "requires minimum levels of initial commitment —a pledge of general support without specific duties, a short indoctrination period, or none at all" (Wiktorowicz 2004, 41). An *exclusive* organization on the other hand, is one that establishes strict criteria for membership.

Only those who share a set of beliefs and meet a demanding standard of conduct are accepted as members. An exclusive organization requires not only a greater amount of energy and time be spent in movement affairs, but it more extensively determines all sections of the member's life, including activities with non-members" (Wiktorowicz 2004, 41 see also Della Porta 1995). It also requires a period of initiating and training, the acceptance of strict discipline, and a high level of involvement.

When inclusive organization is affected with changes in political environment, coupled with radical view of some members, it may eventually transform to exclusive organization. The repressions by states force radical activists to abandon the inclusive organization and instead they chose to rely on exclusive armed organizations to protect themselves against the agents of the repressions. These groups basically promote anti-system frames to motivate "total war" against the ruling regime, frames that readily resonate within the movement given the brutal repression of their members. Once exclusive organizations and anti-system ideologies thrive in the movement, the tendency of violence expands.

Similarly, Hafez (2004) argues that use of violence especially indiscriminate killing by militant Islamists is likely to occur when political opportunity structure seems repressive. State repressions create environment of brutality which forces insurgents create exclusive organizations to shield themselves from the repressions. The AQIM and the Boko Haram members at the onset of their activism faced great repression including extrajudicial killings of their members. That created a sense of injustice, a call to arms and forced them into clandestine organization as the repression increased. Hafez further explains, when such things happen, the insurgents while underground create anti-system frames to motivate collective action. He however, maintains that where regimes are frame as corrupt these clandestine movements "become further radicalized through a growing belief of total war" (Hafez, 2004). Lawson (2004) finds that harsh regime measures itself are likely to radicalize and push moderates into violence (Lawson 2004).

1.2 Research Questions

This study attempts to examine the AQIM and the Boko Haram in two aspects. First, the interplay between political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures, and framing processes leading to the rise these movements at initial stage will be analyzed. Second, the radicalization of some activists within these movements will be studied which is a result of unique circumstances that serve as triggers to violence and of course the radical view of their new actors . Thus, this study asks:

(1) *Do the AQIM and the Boko Haram utilized political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures and framing processes to transform some individual's grievances into collective venture?*

(2) *Does shifting political opportunity structures, plus the radical view of some of AQIM's and Boko Haram's members have relation to the radicalization of these movements?*

Several studies[5] reveal that the AQIM and the Boko Haram emerged as moderate and conservative Islamist movements respectively. The two movements followed similar trajectory to radicalization after their members believed in violence. What conditions give rise to the two inclusive but different Islamist movements in Algeria and Nigeria? To what extent does the interaction between political structures opportunity/constraints and *inclusive* Islamist movements have the propensity of creating *exclusive* and violent movement?

The contemporary Islamist movements in Algeria were formed in the late 1970s and early 1980s. From 1979 to 1988 Islamists were chiefly *conservatives* and engaged in very little visible political mobilization and opposition. Islamic activism in this period was fragmented and was largely limited to preaching and proselytizing on university campuses and in mosques. Political opportunity structures have changed in Algeria in 1988. For example, political environment in Algeria became

[5] See for Example, Erin, Foster-Bowser and Angela, Senders. 2010. "Security Threats in the Sahel and Beyond: AQIM, Boko Haram and al Shabaab." Comprehensive Information on Complex Crises (CFC), Mohammed, M. Hafez. 2004. "From Marginalization to Massacres: A Political Process Explanation of GIA violence in Algeria." Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, edited by Quintan. Wictorowicz, 37-60. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

more open and multiparty system was allowed. Accordingly, Islamists began to forge formal political parties/organizations. That development led to the emergence of more inclusive Islamist movements such as FIS, *Harakat al-Mujtama al-Islami* (HAMAS), and *Mouvement de la Nahda Islamique* (MNI) in form of political parties. The FIS became the most dominant party and mobilized through its inclusive nature (Hafez 2004). The victory of FIS and subsequent nullification of 1991 election by military junta indicated a shifting political opportunity structure. The repressive nature of the military toward FIS led to the transformation and development of FIS through the GIA and GSPC to what is known today as the AQIM championed by its members with radical view.

Similarly, the political structure opportunity in Nigeria enables the rise of conservative Islamist movements. Unlike in Algeria where Islamists used establish formal political parties, Islamists in Nigeria have been carrying out their activities as conservatives but in inclusive organizations. Several Islamist movements such as *Qadriyya, Tijjaniya* and *Jama'atu Izalatul Bid'a Wa Ikamatul Sunnah* have been popular in Nigeria. Like other Islamist movements in Nigeria, the Boko Haram emerged as conservative organization in 1995 when Abubakar Lawan established *inclusive* organization under the original name *Ahlulsunna Wal'jama'ah Hijra.* Until 2003 when it first clashed with police, the movement remained pretty much nonviolent. Subsequent, after the 2009 clashes, radicals among Boko Haram members changed the group modus operandi to violent one.

Interestingly, the AQIM and the Boko Haram began their radicalization process under military and democratic regimes respectively. The nullification of the 1991 elections, outlawing FIS and subsequent arrest of FIS top officials has always been presented as an excuse by Islamists in Algeria to espouse violent measures. Those events serve as drivers to radicalization for Algerian Islamists. Similar events drove Nigeria's Boko Haram to violence when in 2009, Yusuf and many of his followers were killed. In what was labeled by the Boko Haram as retaliation for the extra judicial killing of its leader, the group changed to militant movement with alibi of vengeance. Those developments happened under democratic regime in Nigeria. And also, throughout their metamorphosis, they use political environment, mobilization structures, and collective action frames to recruit members.

1.3 Research Methodology

This research uses qualitative approaches and collects data to study two similar movements and answers the research questions based on secondary data analysis. Secondary data analysis is simply the extraction of knowledge on topics other than those which were the focus of the original survey and the further analysis of an existing dataset with the aim of addressing a research question distinct from that for which the dataset was originally collected and generating novel interpretations and conclusions (Fielding 2000 and Hinds et al 1997). Accordingly, the aim of the secondary analysis in this study is to address new research questions by analysing previously collected data from books, books, journals and scientific articles reports, newspapers, government and nongovernmental organizations surveys, YouTube clips etc.

The thesis applies secondary data analysis because it pursues interests distinct to those of the original analysis, perform additional analysis of secondary sources (Hinds et al., 1997); apply a new perspective and a new conceptual focus to the original research issues. Therefore, secondary analysis may be of benefit because the case of the AQIM and the Boko Haram are sensitive one and participants are difficult to access.

The data collected in this study were originally collected as first hand information, documentary, surveys, etc to examine the conditions that gave rise to Islamic activism in both Algeria and Nigeria. The data are analyzed through social movement framework. Though the social movement theory has been popular on peaceful and western movements, several religious and nonreligious violent movements are studied through social movement theory as well.

Because this study uses the social movement theory, the literatures analyzed consist of analysis of Western social movements and movements from non-Western countries. The latter, in general, and especially radical Islamism has been witnessing paucity of research. On the violent Islamic activism, similar studies have been conducted on *Ḥarakat al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah* (HAMAS), the GIA, the Egyptian Islamic movement etc. Other Islamic movements that are analyzed from this framework of include the Egyptian Islamists, and Yemenis Islamists that strived

as a result of alliance forged between them and the regime[6]. Due to the lack of this framework in studying violent Islamism, it will be a great contribution to this line of research. One of the unique characteristics of this study is that it treats two movements from non-Western countries that always emphasize 'Islam' in their actions.

This type of study can be later repeated by other scholars across Muslim regions/countries since the use of violence is recurrent phenomenon. Radical Islamists do not just commit indiscriminate killings. The histories of ethnic nationalism, fascism, socialism, and non-Islamic fundamentalism share similar phenomena. One needs only to recall contemporary events in Bosnia, India, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Sri Lanka. Thus, this study will be useful to policy makers, citizens and international community and institutions. It will contribute to the both social movements and terrorism study since the study focuses on two movements within and outside the Arab world.

The major limitation in this study is its reliance on secondary sources. This is because Islamic activism in the Sahel, like in other part of the world is still on-going process, and it's risky to collect data about them and have access to members for interviews. However, one of the weaknesses of social movement research has been the overrepresentation of studies conducted in a Western context, where a well functioning democratic political system is the norm. Thus, this study contributes to the literature on social movements in non-democratic settings because such studies are not abundant. The lack of studies on radical Islamism makes the whole study a novel one. Hence, not all aspects of the theoretical concepts extracted from this line of research will be directly applicable to the AQIM and the Boko Haram cases. As a result, another challenge in this study is to ensure that the concepts, and their operationalization in the analytical framework, are adapted to fit the specificities of these two movements.

[6] Analysis of known Islamic terrorism from social movement theoretical framework is considered new, yet Wiktorowicz collected several scholarly articles that use similar approach to study Islamism in, Quintan, Wiktorowicz ed., 2004. Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

1.4 Chapters and Organizations

This study consists of six chapters. The first chapter is the introductory chapter. In this chapter I introduced the whole case and discussed theoretical framework employed in this study. The chapter also contents the research questions answered in the study and research methodology. Chapter two is a literature review chapter. The chapter is divided into two parts: the first part reviews social movement literatures while the second part dwells on literatures on the AQIM and the Boko Haram.

The third chapter discusses the historical development of the AQIM and the Boko Haram. The chapter makes a brief historical overview on Islamism in Algeria and their development from a political party – the FIS in the late 1980s to the final integration of some of the dissidents to the mainstream Al-Qaeda in 2006. On the Boko Haram, the chapter traces its origin from 1995 when Abubakar Lawan founded it. It also takes into account its metamorphosis under late Muhammad Yusuf to its present leader, Abubakar Shekau. Chapter four and five are similar in many ways. The fourth chapter is the application of theory to the case of the AQIM. The tripartite social movement factors are applied to the AQIM. Chapter five is similar to four except it focuses on the Boko Haram.

The sixth chapter compares and contrasts the two movements. Similarities and differences between the two are examined. The chapter speculates on further instability as well as peace in Algeria and Nigeria. It evaluates the two cases and speculates what may possibly happen in the Sahel as a result of the AQIM and the Boko Haram operations. The chapter, in essence provides the conclusion.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Literature Review: Social Movement Theory

Social movement theorist and scholars underscore the importance of three set of factors in analyzing the emergence, developments and even decline of the social movements/revolutions. These triads of factors are referred to as, in conventional shorthand, as political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures and framing processes. The structure of political opportunities and constraints confronting the movement; the availability of organizational structure (both formal and informal) through which people mobilize collective actions; and collective processes of interpretation, attribution and social construction that mediate between opportunity and actions are inseparable for activism inasmuch as the presence of only two is "insufficient to account for collective action" (MacAdam et al. 1996, 2-5 also see Coy 2011, 1 and King's College 2007, 15-17). Though fathered and developed by American and European scholars, and dominated by study of movements in America and Europe (MacAdam et al. 1996, 2 and Wiktorowicz 2004, 4), the field has been one of the scholarly growth industries in social sciences. Today, social movement theory is extended to include non-Western movements such as Islamic activism. The official published call to integrate Islamic activism – which includes propagation movements, political movements, terrorist groups and other collective actors that strive to establish a society govern my 'Islamic law' – within social movements analytical tools is pioneered by David Snow and Susan Marshall in 1984 (see Wiktorowicz 2004, 1- 5). And Wiktorowicz[7] edited anthology is exciting development for scholars in social movement. Furthermore, social movement theory has been yielding fruitful results in providing unified frameworks for studying Islamic activism.

[7] This study acknowledges that the publication of an anthology in 2004 by Wiktorowicz Quintan to serves as a stepping stone for other scholars that study Islamic activism from social movement theoretical framework.

2.1.1 Political Opportunity Structures

This model suggests that mobilization can take place under favorable political conditions and it focuses on the relationship between social movements and political institutions to understand movement mobilization. MacAdam et.al (1996) argue that movement's actors have at the onset of their collective actions some grievances and optimism that they can sooner or later address the problem collectively. Social movements do not operate in void, but belong to a broader social settings characterize by shifting and fluid arrangements of enablement and restrictions that shape their dynamics. These changes take place within a wider environment, in which the movement is embedded. Due to the divergences in purpose and goals, the extents to which a given political structure is vulnerable or receptive to changes are themselves subject to interpretation by actors within the movement's organizational structure. Therefore, no matter how important the change is, and how optimistic the actors are, the political opportunity can only be available when defined as such by actors organized on shared definition of the situation (MacAdam et al. 1996, and Kurzaman 1996). Though focus on non-Islamic movements, MacAdam et al call for cross-national study to analyze similar movements by their size, form of organization structure and degree of success "by reference to cross-national differences in formal structure of political power (1996, 17). This study will answer the calls by comparing two movements cross-nationally to substantiate not only political opportunity structures variable, but all the tripartite factors in social movement theory.

It's argued in social movements theory that Islamist (irrespective of their types, goals and tactics), act rationally by engaging in cost/benefit analysis to bypass and escape obstacles to mobilization occasioned by structure. Various studies (Hafez 2004, Hafez and Wiktorowicz 2004, Lawson 2004, and Robinson 2004) concur that even radical Islamists respond rationally and strategically to opportunities they find in the political structures. Thus, "Islamic terrorism" Beck (2008) argues, is not accidental or unplanned. It "takes place in an environment with political structure" (2008, 1565), which empowers and often limits collective actions. This accounts for why scholars in Islamic activism underscore the importance of closeness and

openness of political space, which Olesen (2009) argues is determined by country's political history and character of political system in general.

The most cited variables in political opportunity structures model vis-à-vis Islamic activism are the nature of state repression; the state institutional capacity; level of formal and informal access to political institutions; and level of state receptivity to movements (MacAdam et al. 1996, Wiktorowicz 2004, Olesen 2009, and Munson 2001). All these factors will affect Islamic activism in particular and social movements in general.[8] Because of their strategic calculations, Islamists occasionally contribute to changing political structure itself, which account for why political system is more or less open to change at different time.

However, the processes that radical Islamists follow to embrace violence are not only peculiar to Islamic actors. The dynamics of other movements are relevant for understanding their actions. Social movement researches maintain that radical militancy can be one of the outcomes of contention (Della Porta 1995). For instance, while state repression – which signifies closeness of the system – can suppress mobilization, it can also make militancy more likely. Della Porta's, study of leftwing radicals in Germany and Italy inferred that state repressions suppress moderate alternatives, radicalize remaining supporters and increase radical actions (1995, 139, 143).

Terrorism also, Beck argues, depends on the external environment in which the group operates rather than exclusively internal dimension. For instance, in an insecure environment without effective central authority, militants are able to seek a given place, attract recruits, get resources, and carry out attacks. Al-Qaeda fighters in Iraq and other militant organizations emerged not just from grievances or the mobilization of resources but because the American invasion demolished centralized authority, creating the opportunity for new mobilization and a threat to established power arrangements (Beck 2008, 1569). It is therefore likely that political violence

[8] Kurzman study of Iranian Revolution is instructive here. He argues that sometimes people perceived opportunity while there is not and vice versa. Therefore, some collective actors instead organize actions without foreseeing any opportunity with conviction that their action is powerful enough to create opportunities. See Charles, Kurzman. 1996. "Structural Opportunity and Perceived Opportunity in Social-Movement Theory: The Iranian Revolution of 1979." American Sociological Review, 61: 153-170

can be dependent on specific event-based opportunities. Beck's argument is significant because actors often perceive the weakness of central authority as prerequisite for their success. Conversely, Kurzman (1996) concludes that even when actors believe that the central authority is not weak, they can mobilize collective actions against it. This may eventually weaken and occasionally overthrow the government. He cited example of Iranian revolution where Islamists believe in formidability of the Shah governments but mobilize against its coercive tendency. The consequence is overthrowing the whole Pahlavi dynasty in Iran (1996, 164-66).

Alan B. Kruegler (2007) shows that countries with low levels of civil liberties are more likely to be the countries of origin of the perpetrators of terrorist attacks (2007, 79). Accordingly, perpetrators of terrorism and the states' propensity for repression are rather low in countries with high level of liberties. Even in modern democratic states nonetheless, some forms of activism can unleash repressive responses from authorities. This will typically involve the use of infiltrators, informers, agent provocateurs, police and intelligence services to check activism. Obviously, repressive political contexts that deny opportunities for political action and organizations in the open and through legal channels also tend to encourage the opposition to structure itself into secretive cells that operate underground. That type of environment and structuring of the political opposition, in turn, often foster political reflexes and outlooks that is conducive to extremism also. They feed into conspiratorial mentalities, put a premium on secrecy and discipline, and encourage oppositional movements to insist that their members abide by a strict ideological and behavioral code.

Della Porta opines that policing is an important indicator of the character of a country's political opportunities (1995). Policing not only includes police crackdowns on demonstrators or other forms of activism deemed to be disruptive, but also infiltration and surveillance efforts directed towards activists and their organizations. The important aspect here is the dynamic and sometimes self-perpetuating interaction between authorities and activists. For example, authority responses to terrorism are obviously provoked by certain statements and/or actions by terrorists, which later interpreted as injustice by the terrorists.

2.1.2 Mobilizing Structures

The mobilizing structures perspectives in social movements have also dismissed the causal importance of grievances in explaining the emergence of political contention. As a result, they maintain that there must be intermediary variables that translate individualized discontent into organized contention (Wiktorowic 2004, 10). McCarthy and Zald (1977)[9] argue that grievances alone are not enough to explain contention as most individuals at most times and in most places have complaints. Grievances are thus necessary, but insufficient to explain why some events become organized into sustained contentions and movements and others do not. For sustained collective action, movements depend on material resources and a base of supporters. Therefore, the fundamental problem for collective action is the resources available for mobilization and the methods by which they are organized (Beck 2008, 1567-68). One solution to the problem of resources is the establishment of an organizational capacity that can rally supporters, seek material contributions, and formalize collective action into a movement. These processes make us see actors not as irrational outbursts intended to alleviate psychological distress, but rather as organized contention structured through mechanisms of mobilization that provide strategic resources for sustained collective action. These types of mobilization take place whenever movement is formal.

In the case of formal Islamic activism that are akin to social movement organizations, formal mobilizing structures are used (Wiktorowicz 2004, 10) [10]. Legal Islamic activists frequently make use of existing college and university students' unions to mobilize followers. Islamic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) like clinics, hospitals, schools charity societies and cultural centers offer some basic incentives in form of goods and services to show that "Islam is the

[9] See John, D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald. 1977. "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A partial Theory." The American Journal of Sociology, 82:6 for more about Resource Mobilization Theory and its significance in social movements' mobilization.

[10] Some Islamists, especially conservative and moderates peaceful and reform minded organizations enjoy free mobilization within states where radical Islamic activists are demonized. These types of movements have, in most cases good relations with state apparatus that make them legal organizations. They may also be seen as terrorist in some aspects but enjoy legal mobilizing structures in their society. See Glenn, E. Robinson. 2004. "Hamas as Social Movement." Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, edited by Quintan Wiktorowicz, 112-142. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

solution to everyday problem in Muslim society" (Wiktorowicz 2004, 11). Even though those NGOs may not challenge state authority directly, they highlight the inability of the states to effectively cater for the socio-economic needs of its citizens. They therefore, exploit their donations to promote Islamic messages without direct confrontations.

The recruitment "magnets" – mobilizing structures – to radical religious activists, on the other hands, include prison and religious institutions such as church and mosque. These are informal mobilizing structures that are commonly used by radical activists. In the case of Islamic activists, they often concentrate their mobilizing activities in mosques and preaching and study circles, which serve as an alternative to other formal mobilizing structures (Wiktorowicz, 2004: 11 and King's College 2007, 33). King's College's report (2007) underscores the roles of "radical mosques" in dragging people to terrorism:

> Unlike most Christian churches, mosques play an integral part in the day to day lives of Muslim communities. They are not just centres for worship and spiritual enrichment, but they host educational activities, perform welfare functions and serve as a gathering place for different generations... 'safe havens' from which to arrange logistics and raise funds for active mujahideen, but also in order to attract potential recruits, 'monitor [them] closely in the early stages and… offer facilities' to support the process of integrating new recruits into the structures of the Islamist militant movement (33-9)

Interestingly, mobilizing recruits through religious institutions is not only peculiar to Islamists or radical Islamists in particular. MacAdam's (1982) study of Afro-American Civil Rights Movements is illuminating. He examines how activists in the movement were often recruited through black churches. MacAdam's point is not that churchgoers had certain personal characteristics that render them more prone to activism. Rather, the conversion from churchgoers to activists took place within the church. "it was not so much that movement participants were recruited from among the ranks of the churchgoers as it was a case of church membership being redefined to include movement participation as a primary requisite of the role" (128-29). Such conversions require an active roles played by religious leaders sympathetic to movement demands. The actions of these leaders served to convey to their constituents the significance and legitimacy of the movement, as a result of that they

encourage participation. Thus, movement leaders were able "to appropriate existing leader/follower relationships in the service of movement goals" (132).

Nevertheless, as places that gather large number of Muslims, mosques can help the development and subsequent dissemination of ideas. Basically, mobilization tasks are not roles that mosques play in Muslim society, rather preachers and clerics see in mosque the potentiality of spreading their ideology thereby mobilizing recruits. As relations between state and movements become tense, the role of mosque as mobilization structure decreases. One can make sense of this argument considering the fact that most radical Islamic activism are not open in society. The initial stage of mobilization could be done in open places such as mosque, which may be demolished by state as Islamists become militants, hence apparent foes. The mobilization ground shifted to prison, which often shelter great number of Islamist arrested in mosques (King's College 2007, 39-4, also in Olesen 2009). Prison can be a target for mobilization because inmates are very prone to radical messages.

Scholars of social movements have it that network of friends, family and colleagues assist mobilizations in high risk activism (Della Porta 1995, MacAdam 1982, King's College 2007, Wiktorowicz 2004 and 2006 and Olesen 2009). As the name indicates, high risk activism may result in risking freedom, health and life. Della Porta finds similar trends in non-Islamic high risk activism in Germany and Italy (1995). In his study of terrorist recruitment and radicalization in Saudi Arabia, Hegghammer (2006) has a similar inference as well. While many Jihadists in Saudi Arabia were motivated by religious duty, "some referred to the fact that they had sworn an oath [of allegiance] together with their friends...to liberate the Arabian Peninsula" (2006, 52). They opted to keep the promise they made with their friends by participating is radical activism.

2.1.3 Framing Processes

The concept of frame has considerate circulation in social sciences. Its fecundity for both descriptive and analytical purposes can be found in psychology, linguistic and discourse analysis, communication and media study and political science and policy studies. And also, it has been applied analytically and explored empirically in

sociology (Benford and Snow, 2000, 611). In social movement theory, the term framing is used to describe the process of meaning construction that resonates with potential participants and general public (Snow and Byrd 2000, 123, Benford and Snow 2000, 614, and Wiktorowicz 2004, 15). Thus, analyzing how individual participants ideate themselves as a collectivity; how potential participants and bystander publics are convinced to partake in movements; and the ways in which meaning is produced, articulated, and disseminated by movements actors through interactive processes is done through the study of framings. Strategic calculations by social movement's actors to link their interests and interpretive frames with those of prospective constituents and actual or prospective resource providers is what Benford and Snow conceptualized as "frame alignment processes" (Snow et al. 1986, 464 and Benford and Snow 2000,624).

Snow and Byrd (2000) identify three core framing tasks for social movements. These framing tasks are imperative in studying Islamic activism. *Diagnostic framing* involves diagnosing some events and aspect of social structure and system of government and society as problematic that requires redress. Attribution of blame and responsibilities also occur in the process thereby asking basic questions of "what is or went wrong" and "who or what to blame". Accordingly, actors view some features of political and social life that might be previously viewed as misfortunes now as injustice perpetrated by someone or something. *Prognostic framing* offers solution to the problem including pinpointing tactics and strategies, designated to serve as antidotes. Prognostic framing therefore addresses the question of "what to be done". Those subscribed to diagnostic and prognostic framing might still remain in "balcony" of activism without motivational framing. *Motivational framing* entails elaborating rationale and constructing of vocabularies of motive, provide stimulant to action and overcome fear and risk that often associated with collective actions (Snow and Byrd 2000, 124-30 also in Wiktorowicz 2004, 15-16).

Fundamentally, the essential feature of framing processes for movements' mobilization is frame resonance (Snow et al. 1986, and Snow and Byrd 2000). The key determinant of the differential success of framing efforts is variation in the degree of frame resonance, such that the higher the degree of frame resonance, the greater the probability that the framing efforts will be relatively successful. The

credibility and its relative salience determine the success of framings. Islamic activism frame "sacred values" which "surpass economic thinking or considerations of *realpolitik* (Altran and Axelrod 2008, 226). A similar process is conceptualized by Wickham (2004) as "transvaluation of values" (Wiktorowicz 2004, 25). For example, in a social milieu in which people desire to have a secular university degree as both a status symbol and an instrument of career advancement, the Islamists may diminish the relative value attached to secular knowledge gained through formal education. Instead, greater priority and status may be given to religious knowledge gained informally through self-study and group lessons at mosques and madrasas. In their deliberate rejection of values widely held within their own communities, young Islamists frequently confronted intense opposition from their parents and authority (Wickham 2002). This reordering or "transvaluation" of values indicates that the Islamic movement lessened graduate frustration not by providing the means to satisfy their aspirations for middle-class status, jobs, and lifestyles but by promoting goals more readily fulfilled within existing resource constraints.

The success of framing processes increases when its articulators are able to use publicly recognized symbols and languages that connect social and cultural experiences with collective memories. The mindset of the recruits is reconstructed in accordance with new set of beliefs created by frame articulators. In Islamic activism, participation is frame as religious duty which is absolute and all-embracing (King's College 2007, 75). Moral obligation frames encourage participants to embrace an ideology that mandates participation as a moral duty, demands self-sacrifice, and encourages fearless commitment.

However, Islamic activism is bedeviled by both intra and inter-movement framing disputes. While Islamists may unanimously and mutually agree about responsibility for a problem, there is less or no cohesion over strategies and tactics (Benford and Snow 2000). Wiktorowicz thus, argues that prognostic framing puts Islamist activists in to different categories.[11]

[11] In introductory chapter of his edited anthology, Wictorowicz acknowledges that the concept of *Islam Huwa al Hall* (see Wickham 2002), unites various Islamists. But, responding to be done splits them as they vary in tactics and strategies. Therefore, Isma'il categorization of Islamists can be contingent upon prognostic frames. See Dede, 2008 for Isma'il categorization.

2.2 Islamic Activism in the Sahel

Generally, the study of Islamic activism has been fragmented across disciplines. Political scientists, for instance are mostly concerned with how Islam influences the state and politics; historians detail the histories of particular Islamist group; sociologists are interested in demographic surveys concerning roots of Islamist recruits; and religious studies scholars primarily focus on the ideas that motivate Islamic activism. Certainly, those disciplines are able to produce greater understanding about each particular element of Islamic activism without developing models or frameworks that explain how all of those elements fit together, interact, and influence the patterns of Islamic movement.

There is in particular, a paucity of literatures that deal with Islamic activism from social movement framework. More often than not, scholars underscore the causal links between the "global war on terror" in strengthening Western enemies and inciting violence in other Muslim countries that show solidarity to Muslims invaded by Western powers (Wiktorowicz 2004, Nye 2008, Galbraith 2008). These kind of arguments treat Islamists in other Muslim countries in conjunction with "global phenomenon" of political Islam. Islamic movement is rarely inscribed as an actor or subject per se, to be evaluated or assessed on its own terms. Instead, it's seen as part of, or synonymous with the general movements of radical Islam prospering in the Muslim world and the immigrant communities in the West. The few sources that analyze Islamic activism from social movement frameworks concentrated on the Arab world and some Muslim countries in Asia. Therefore, we seldom find studies that focus on non-Arab countries of sub-Saharan Africa.

Mohammed Hafez (2004) provides a political process explanation that spurred Algeria's GIA to espouse violent measures. These measures included indiscriminate attacks on security forces, government officials, journalists, intellectuals, foreigners, and public workers and especially the civilian. Indeed, during the 1990s, the GIA was responsible for an outbreak of civilian massacres that claimed the lives of hundreds of lives. He outlines the interplay between three dimensions of contentious politics—political environment, mobilization structures, and collective action frames—to explain how anti-civilian violence is an outcome of an ill-fated

convergence of three variables—indiscriminate repression, exclusive organizations, and anti-system ideologies in Algeria. Hafez (2004) summarized his arguments thus:

> Perpetrators of mass violence are not simply driven by motivational imperatives, such as relative deprivation, ideological orientation, or rational calculation. They must undergo a progression of radicalization that is intimately connected to the broader political process of violent contention. Specifically, massacres are more likely to appear when three conditions related to repression converge: (1) state repression creates a political environment of bifurcation and brutality; (2) insurgents create exclusive organizations to shield themselves from repression; and (3) rebels promote antisystem frames to motivate violent collective action to overthrow agents of repression (38).

The authorities in Algeria fraternized or actively helped to bring into existence, the FIS and sought to use it for their own purposes (ICG 2004). Hafez examines the political opportunities that favored the establishment of FIS and what accounts for the tense relations between states and faction of FIS, which in many ways shares important qualities with National Liberation Front (*Front de Libération Nationale*, FLN). The FLN and the FIS had the tendency to thrive the anti-French colonialism; Arab socialism; including Islam as basic element of national identity, etc. (Fuller 1996, xi-xiii).

The debate for military annulment and outlawing of the FIS, Malmvig (2006) argued, created mix reactions from analysts both within and outside Algeria. Each side, hence, portrayed its own position as being moved by the imperative of safeguarding democracy and stability. The first – "democracy as machinery" – recognized the FIS's probable victory as a necessity of democracy, hence considered the annulment of the elections and the takeover by the army as undemocratic. The work of any democratic system rested on the fact that democracy must allow even anti-democratic parties to be elected into government, whether their ideology is approved of or not. To overrule an electoral result only because "the wrong people had won, was to violate the very core of democracy" (2006, 108). The interruption of the electoral process reveals an antidemocratic and dangerous character. It is an error to interrupt an ongoing electoral consultation because the results are not convenient to you alone. The second – "democracy as values" – describe a possible victory of FIS as an equivalent to an abolition of democracy, and hence inscribed the takeover

by the army as, if not being democratic, then at least being carried out in the defense and to the advantage of democracy in the long run. It was accordingly possible for both groups to inscribe the annulment and the takeover by the army as anti-democratic and democratic. They contended, however, that democracy could not allow its own eradication. The FIS would, as soon as it was elected into office, will eliminate the very electoral process that had brought it to power (2006, 109). If democracy, in this way was to support its own abolition, this would constitute a contradiction and possibly lead to catastrophic results. The Algerian army had merely, acted preventively.

Thus, for the first time after attaining independence, the political structure in Algeria became open to multi-party politics. This development made Islamists visible in the political scenes whose prior roles manifested only in mosques and schools across the country. From the independence until late 1980s, political Islamism was not a strictly organized movement with a well-defined ideology but rather an unstructured and disparate mass of actors, brought together because of their marginalization by the state. It was only with the founding of the FIS in 1989 that political Islamism found structure and organization. The FIS only gained "power when the opportunity arose in the 1990 municipal elections and the 1991 parliamentary elections" (Boubekeur 2008, 5).

Tsogo and Johnson (2011), examines how Nigeria's political environments is conducive to "religious extremism". They argue that religious and ethnic tensions in Nigeria are inseparable variables. They share similar conviction with those who believe religious fundamentalism has been part and parcel of northern Nigeria. Will to Islamize Nigeria they contended, by predominantly Muslim region of the north provoked the creation of fundamentalists. In the case of Boko Haram, the group indiscriminate killing of Muslims is a "blow back" to northern Nigeria, according to this category. The moves and plans to Islamize Nigeria had been in place since 19th century when Sokoto was established and flourished to these days after the implementation of Shari'a by 12 northern states (Mazrui 2012, and Solomon 2013). Those studies ignore the fact that the outbreak of ethnic and religious violence in Nigeria suggests that minority groups facing oppression tend to react as long as there is a political opportunity at hand and the group has the motivation to act. For

example, in the Christian dominate-southern Nigeria, people seldom use religious motivations to organize collective actions. Nevertheless, they forged other organizations to defy what they see as domination or injustice occasioned by states[12]. In northern Nigeria, (Muslim states in particular) Islam can serve as instruments through which people mobilize for collective actions. Tsogo and Johnsons' work is important as it examines the Maitatsine[13] movement of 1980s, which is synonymous to Boko Haram in strategies and tactics. They contend that the sect's demonstrations were also violently repressed but their activities gave rise to a "new type of activism, using religion for political ends" (2011: 55). The Boko Haram is accordingly, viewed by some as reincarnation of Maitatsine movement (Solomon 2013, ICG 2010, Adesoji 2010, Danjibo).

In J. N. C. Hills's accounts, the threats pose by the Boko Haram is unique in terms of tactics. But, it's not the only terrorist organization that emerged in northern Nigeria. He argues that despite its both local and international concerns about the audacious attacks in north and central Nigeria, "it was the Federal Government's failure to take adequate care of all its citizens that led to Boko Haram's emergence and growth" (2013, 242). This study explores in essence, how the Boko Haram leaders utilized the available opportunities to elicit peaceful collective action and changed to radical only after the opportunities had changed. It's imperative to note there is consensus among a number of sources that until 2009 Boko Haram conducted its operations more or less peacefully and that its radicalization followed a

[12] In the oil reach region of Nigeria, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) is one of the largest militant groups in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The organization claims to expose exploitation and oppression of the people of the Niger Delta and devastation of the natural environment by public-private partnerships between the Federal Government of Nigeria and corporations involved in the production of oil in the Niger Delta. Among the Igbos, a tribe that ignited Nigerian civil war between 1967-70 the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) reemerged with the aim of securing the resurgence of the defunct state of Biafra from Nigeria. The Oodua People's Congress (OPC) is a militant Yoruba nationalist organization situated in south-western Nigeria.

[13] Maitatsine is a fundamentalist organization that spurred religious upheavals in 1980s. The riots began in Kano and extended to northern states of Maiduguri, Kaduna and Yola, capital of Adamawa state. For details study on Maitatsine see, Katarzyna, Z. Skuratowic. 1987. "Fundamentalist Religious Movements: A Case Study of the Maitatsine Movement in Nigeria." M. A Thesis, University of Louisville. Mervyn, Hiskett. 1987. "The Maitatsine Riots in Kano, 1980: An Assessment." Journal of Religion in Africa 209-223.

government clampdown in 2009. (Human Rights Watch 2012, Walker 2012, Onuoha 2012, and Adibe 2013).

However, due to the increased concerns on Sahel as new hub for Islamic radical activism and the threats those groups pose to the entire Africa, some scholars treat Boko Haram and AQIM as synonymous movements in many aspects (Blanquart 2010, ICG 2010, Tanchum 2012, Foster-Bowser and Sanders 2012, Gourley 2012, Connell 2012, Adibe 2013, Hill 2013, and US Homeland Security Report 2013). Most of these are reports and mere historical narrations that focus only on the identity of the AQIM and the Boko Haram as mere terrorist organizations. More so, emphases are based on the fact that the two movements demonize and indict the West, serve as threats to Western interests in their home countries, and had attacked United Nations buildings in their various countries. Regarding similarities and differences, this study takes into cognizance those variables examined in existing literature. In addition, the lacunae left by existing work will be filled. The vacuum lies in the fact that different political opportunities produced the AQIM and the Boko Haram who share similar goals with other Islamists all over the world. Instead of underscoring raising the banner of "Islam" in their activism, more attention will be on the Boko Haram and the AQIM similar developmental process.

The FIS emerged as conservative and suddenly developed into moderate movements that mobilized in a similar way that Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) mobilize resources. The membership criteria for the FIS facilitated its rapid expansion. It divided its members into sympathizers, supporters, and activists. Only activists had to avoid link with any religious or political and devote their time and energy to the activities of the organization. Furthermore, only active members had to contribute 5 percent of their monthly income to the organization (2004: 45-6). In Nigeria, Boko Haram's sponsorship has been a mysterious issue. Reports demonstrated that other Salafists and Jihadists in Middle East, Asia and some philanthropists from northern Nigeria provided financial aid to Boko Haram (Human Rights Watch, 2012 and Walker, 2012). The roles played by ideology in alluring people to support movements that seem to support the causes of their sacred values are ignored. Coreligionists in other religions support religious movements as well. In Christian society for instance, churchgoers pay tithe to support their churches. The

underlying idea is that aligning movements' struggles with religious creed encourages people to give out percentage of their income. This is contingent upon movements' leadership ability to forge framing that resonate with potential sympathizers. When partakers donate to activism, they cannot delimit what to do with or how to utilize the resources.

In two separate studies, Brandler (2012) and Liolio (2013) inferred that the methods and tactics employed by Nigerian security forces to crush the Boko Haram insurgency have been counterproductive. Liolio for instance, believes that the root cause of Boko Haram is connected to bad governance, he further explains "my argument and final conclusion therefore, is that the root cause of insurgency [Boko Haram] is traceable to bad leadership as one or two or even ten persons cannot successfully conduct insurgency" (97). He concurs that insurgency is a collective of many who are given reasons why they have to join, and the chances of joining increases if they are frustrated by bad leadership. Counterinsurgency on the other hand, has the effects of not just destroying the state, or leading to the death of innocent civilians, but that it has a higher possibility of "leading a mere insurgency into a classical state of terrorism and for this reason, it is better to avoid any situation that can lead to insurgency than attempting to counter one" (98). The use of force by Nigeria's government to quell the Boko Haram at the threshold, Brandler concluded, "is counterproductive in protecting the state, its citizens and reducing [the Boko Haram] violence" (5). This study takes into account those arguments and compares the Boko Haram with the AQIM to gauge the effect of state repression, plus the radical view of their members in producing radical Islamists.

Onapajo and Uzodike (2012), maintain that the emergence of the Boko Haram is inseparable to the trinity of factors – individual, state and international. At the individual level of analysis, they inferred that Yusuf interpretations of Western civilization as incompatible with Islamic creed provided the ideological basis for the Boko Haram's dramatis personae. The recruits got ideological justification from Yusuf who "saw the state as an image of Western ideas and systems, given its secular nature" (2012, 29). The personality of the Boko Haram members however, maintained the struggle when they consider their actions as vengeance on behalf of comrades whom were killed by security agents. The last individual factor that lured

some wards into the Boko Haram was, according to this study, monetary rewards that accompanied their actions (30). “Nigeria typifies a good example of a failing or weak state that is fast gravitating towards a failed or collapsed state like Somalia and others”, Onapajo and Uzodike argued. The failure of Nigerian state explains, to a greater extent why the Boko Haram members demonize the state. “Besides poverty, inadequate security, the negligence of security officers and general impunity in the country are clearly significant factors that aid the activities of the group... the porosity of Nigeria’s borders has also aided easy access to arms and ammunition used by the group (31-33). Internationally, they draw a relationship between the current wave and rage of religious terrorism in the modern world, which is largely informed by an increased opposition to cultural and economic imperialism in the present world system – and the outbreak of the Boko Haram terror in Nigeria (2012, 26).

Handful of sources on Islamism in Algeria also narrates the roles played by Algerian military as counterproductive (Volpi 2003, Filiu 2009, Thornberry and Levy 2011, Gray and Stockham 2008, Pham 2011, and Harmon 2010). In the early days of the conflict between military junta and the Islamists, political opposition between ‘radicals’ and ‘moderates’ – or conservatives and reformers – inside the FIS was transformed by the advent of the armed insurrection. These two political groups had different opinions on why it was most useful to have a stake in the state apparatus. ‘Moderates’ had argued that their political participation in the ruling institutions ought to be dictated by pragmatic considerations, such as their need for the Islamization of society. By contrast, the ‘radical’ faction pointed out that this political involvement was a means of ensuring that the state repressive apparatus could not be utilized against the Islamic movement (the FIS). After the June 1991 strike and the arrest of some radical leaders, they began to think that the regime would increasingly use the security apparatus to suppress political dissent, and suggested that the FIS should take counter-measures by developing its military capabilities (Volpi 2003, 67). The ‘moderates’, had during that period concurred that these tactics were counterproductive and that, besides handing over the moral high ground to the regime, they would endanger the very institutions that the party wanted

to utilize for the struggle against France neo-colonization and propagation of Islamic reform. With this repression, the army effectively destroyed the organizational capabilities of the FIS by disconnecting the linkage between the party leadership and its base. The ‘moderates’ suffered most from the repression, as the FIS members who were caught in this wave of arrests were the ones who confronted the soldiers with slogans and stones in street demonstrations. However, the more radical Islamic fundamental actors, inside and outside the party bureaucracy began recruiting disappointed FIS members and sympathizers stigmatized by government repression into underground networks, and prepared them for an armed uprising. Thus, civil disobedience turned into civil war. After the military intervention of January–February 1992, the guerrilla organizations began to emerge and challenge the new Algerian regime.

Those sources explained much on radicalization processes. They however, followed the same fragmented research agenda as they only focus on causal relations between state repression and insurgency. The authors do not link the environment, organizations and frames, which are imperative intervening variables that sustain the recruitments and radicalization even under state repressive measures. Conventionally, repressions have the propensity of suppressing rebellion and deter people from participation but do not sustain movement’s struggle. Generally, a movement in a repressive environment encounters several constraints that it must overcome to effect change. On the other hand, the movement tries to mobilize more partakers. To overcome this problem, movement organizers must and ways to recruit only trustworthy activists. There is also threat that a decisive blow from the security forces could torpedo a movement. Movements under a repressive environment, therefore accumulate material and organizational resources slowly and must be careful not to lose them to state repression.

CHAPTER THREE
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF AL-QAEDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB (AQIM) AND BOKO HARAM

3.1 Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

Political Islamism and the associated manifestations of Islamism are not new to Algeria but, the objectives pursued by its adherents have varied considerably. During their anti-colonial struggle, the words ‘‘jihad’’ and ‘‘martyrdom’’ were appropriately used by Algerian nationalists in consolidating their support among the Algerian citizens. The emergence of a secular socialist state after the 1962’s independence, thus, came as a disappointment to those who had sought the establishment of an Islamic regime. The political and economic discomforts of the late 1980s disillusioned the feasibility of Islamic regime, and created vulnerable group attracted to their cause (Boubekeur 2008 and Pham, 2012).

Since the time Algeria gained independence from France, it has been dominated by the FLN, a political party derived from liberation movement that expelled the French colonialists after an armed and popular struggle. While the FLN always had Islamic overtones, it was from the start a secular-nationalist liberation movement based on the Nasserism, which was amongst the most potent political ideologies in the Arab World. The Algerian Islamists that fought alongside the FLN during the independent struggles were marginalized by Mohammad Ahmad Ben Bella’s (r. 1963 to 1965) quasi-socialist government.

Algeria’s first militant Islamist group, the Armed Islamic Movement (Mouvement Islamique Armée MIA), appeared in 1982. Also known as the Bouyali Group, named after its founder Mustafa Bouyali (1940-1987), the MIA fragmented after Bouyali was assassinated by security forces in 1987. President Chadli Bendjedid (r. 1979-1992) introduced limited political reforms in October 1988 including allowing multi-party elections. Numerous religious movements/parties emerged, including the FIS, Harakat al-Mujtama al-Islami (HAMAS), and *Mouvement de la Nahda Islamique* (MNI). Alongside these registered Islamist organizations and parties, a number of small groups with a radical Islamist

orientation emerged as well. These included *Amr bil Ma"rouf wal Nahi "an al-Munkar*, *Takfir wal-Hijra, Jama"at al-Sunna wa al-Shari"a,* and *Ansar al-Tawhid* (Hafez, 2004, Harmon, 2010 and Chivvis and Liepman). Although there were other Islamist parties, the FIS was by far the most dominant one. The FIS first of all, rejected the modern Algerian state with its political process. "Nevertheless, the party decided to use democratic methods and tools, such as party organization and participation in elections" to achieve the end (Boubekeur 2008, 5). The FIS therefore participated in local elections in June 1990 and was able to secure more seats in local government elections. More significantly, the FIS expressed serious ambitions to participate in the national elections of 1991 and mobilized myriad social forces to support its interest. It was able to organize Islamic political parties and mobilizes followers through preaching, rallies, demonstrations and especially the 1990's local government elections. The inclusive nature of the FIS facilitated its rapid expansion in the movement because the membership criteria made room for less committed activists.

Coincidentally, the same period saw the return of hundreds of Algerians who had gone to join the Afghan mujahedin in the fight against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Some have noted that on their return, *les Afghanis*, as they became known, continued wearing Afghan-style clothing, beards, and turbans. These Algerian ''Afghans'' had been among the most numerous of the Arab contingents in the Pakistan-based jihadist community and, once returned home, often equated the ''infidel'' regime in Moscow that, at least according to their narrative, they had defeated with the ''infidel'' regime in Algiers which still ruled their country (Pham 2012, 241-42).

After a strong showing in national elections that brought the FIS to the edge of assuming power, the secular military fatefully decided to nullify the election results, seize power and initiated anti-FIS measures that included its ban in March1992. Hafez (2004) succinctly described the situation:

> In February of that year [1992], the authorities opened five detention centers in the Sahara desert to hold thousands—estimates range from 6,000 to 30,000—of FIS activists, including 500 mayors and councilors. Special courts, which had been banned under the 1989 constitution, were re-established to prosecute "terrorists," and in July one of these courts

> sentenced Abassi Madani and Ali Belhaj (the top FIS leaders) to twelve years in prison. As time went on, the state closed down all the cultural and charitable organizations of the FIS and ordered the destruction of all unofficial mosques, which were popular with Islamists. In 1992 and 1993, a total of 166 Islamists were sentenced to death, mostly in absentia. By 1996, according to an Algerian human rights organization, there were 116 prisons with 43,737 prisoners, half of whom were accused of terrorism. The gravest development since 1993, however, was the almost daily killing of Islamists, either through manhunts or clashes during searches. Many human rights organizations condemned the military regime's use of torture, [disappearances], and the extrajudicial killing of suspected Islamists (46).

The political exclusion and indiscriminate repression against the FIS resulted in the migration of many FIS activists toward radical organizations that rejected democracy, the electoral process, and the Algerian military regime altogether (Volpi 2003). The prohibition of the FIS at once removed a political outlet for Islamists energy and vindicated those within the movement that believed violent jihad would be the only means by which the faithful could establish a state ruled by Islamic law. In light of the above development, by the end of 1992, many of the FIS activists united around one of the following three militant organizations: the Islamic State Movement (*le Mouvement pour l'Etat Islamique*, MEI), *Mouvement Algérien Islamique Armée*, and a conglomeration of armed groups in *Takfir wal-Hijra and Amr bil- Ma"rouf* and from the informal network of the Algerian Afghans (Hafez 2004, 46-7). However, the MIA after the coup became one of the most important principal movements determined to overthrow the regime and committed to the restoration of the FIS's plans through violent means. Abdelkader Chebouti was selected as the MIA's national emir in 1992. Despite his leadership, the MIA was not entirely unified and he found it difficult to consolidate authority over so many emerging and diverse militant groups.

3.1.1 The Armed Islamic Group GIA, (al-*Jama'ah al-Islamiyah al-Musallaha*, *Groupe Islamique Armé).*

The Islamists' leaders organized a conference of unity to face a common enemy in 1992. However, security forces launched a surprise attack on the leaders of the armed groups during the conference, killing several people, including the leader of one of

the armed groups. The attack led to suspicions that state agents had infiltrated the armed groups, putting an end to unity talks. Consequently, some of the disparate radical groups decided to form a new organization —the *Jama"a al-Islamiyya al-Musalaha* or GIA which became the most prominent armed group in 1993 because of its daring attacks against security forces. The GIA attracted a number of former FIS activists and leaders including Muhammad Said, Abderrazak Rejjam, Yousuf Boubras, and Said Mekhloufi (head of MEI), who all joined in May 1994 (Hafez 2004, 47).

The anti-GIA FIS's leaders responded by forming a rival group, the *Armée Islamique du Salut* (AIS), in July 1994. The AIS brought together the fighters from the MIA and other groups not affiliated with the GIA. The formation of the AIS changed the terms of the militant Islamist movements, because the AIS claimed to have formed a resistance organization that was officially subordinated to the political leadership of the FIS. Presenting itself as the military wing of the banned FIS, the AIS distanced itself from the GIA and attempted to stimulate Muslims who wanted to see a return to normality and the democratic process because of the indiscriminate killing the GIA espoused. The AIS stressed its connections to the imprisoned FIS leaders. As a result, the GIA under Djamal Zitouni began a violent campaign against both the AIS fighters and the FIS leaders. Therefore, the creation of the GIA in 1993 and the AIS in 1994 had the effect of turning entire regions of Algeria into "battlefields". Some scholars and commentators suggest that the GIAs acted more as a singular organization, and that they formed a more or less united front with a common agenda. The GIA thus, united under common motive of an antigovernment guerrilla movement. Zitouni expanded the organization through supports by *les Afghanis*.

To be a true Muslim, according to the GIA members, one must unite under one banner and prepare for jihad in order to secure your homeland in the name of "Islam". The GIA initially targeted government and military facilities but also became known for attacking civilians and personnel associated with the AIS (Hafez 2004 and Smith 2009). The GIA engaged on a campaign of bombing and indiscriminate killing across Algeria throughout the mid-1990s. Several villages

suspected of supporting AIS elements were burned to the ground and its inhabitants killed by brutal methods. Many of the victims, including women and children, were executed by machete attacks and had their bodies dismembered.

The primary goal of the GIA was the establishment of an Islamic state in Algeria, and transforming the entire society. While many Algerians wanted the same state, the brutal nature of the GIA rendered it unpopular among the people in Algeria. As the 1990s progressed, several members of the GIA leadership began to disagree with the methods in which the GIA attacked civilian targets. They realized these attacks were leading to a continual loss of support. Two men, Hassan Hattab and Amari Saifi, issued a fatwa in 1997 calling for the GIA to cease targeting civilians and for the creation of a new Islamic organization that would carry the will of the people. The struggle in Algeria had now taken another turn.

3.1.2 The Salafist Group for Call/Preaching and Combat GSPC (*Groupe salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat*).

Created in 1998 by a former GIA regional commander, Hassan Hattab, as a corrective to the strategic and tactical mistakes of the GIA, the GSPC became the numerically strongest of the breakaway groups. Condemning the GIA doctrine of the apostasy of the entire Algerian society, the GSPC directed its attacks on government and security officials. The various attempts by the Algerian government to achieve national reconciliation with Islamists actually helped the GSPC to expand. GSPC's national emir, Abdelmalek Droukdel, (a.k.a. Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud), who eventually acceded to the leadership after Hattab was displaced for trying to make his peace with the regime expanded the group.[14]

Under the Droukdel, the GSPC actively sought out closer relations with the Al-Qaeda and initiated the conversation with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (*Jama'at al-Tawid wal-Jidad*). Droukdel had first reached out to the

[14] Ousted founder of the GSPC Hassan Hattab, announced in 2005 that he backed Bouteflika's reconciliation program and that he would do all he could to bring the GSPC in from the fight. The GSPC immediately declared Hattab an "apostate"who had "fallen into the trap of the tyrant." See Le Seuer chapter 7.

Al-Qaeda in Iraq in order to help free Saifi in Chad.[15] It must be noted that the GSPC reached out to the Al-Qaeda as early as 2003, but the latter's leadership was reluctant to embrace it. Al-Zarqawi too understood the benefits of a merger with the Algerians. In an interview, Droukdal confirmed that al-Zarqawi and his "brothers" within the Al-Qaeda had played a "pivotal role" in his decision to join "the organization." "We and Al-Qaeda are one body. It's normal that they get stronger by us and we get stronger by them. They back us up and we back them up. They supply us and we supply them with any kind of support, loyalty, advice and available support." (Le Sueur 2010, 155).

Perhaps the most interesting—and, potentially, most dangerous— developments in the ongoing evolution of AQIM are taking place with respect to the group's southern command, what was formerly its Zone 9, covering most of southern Algeria. The southern command has been operating in some of the Sahelian countries in its bid to make the struggle regional and international in the long run.

Under the leadership of Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a.k.a. Khaled Abou al-Abbas, popularly known as Laaˆouar (''one-eyed'') or Mr. Marlboro, an acquaintance of Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi from the year-and-a-half he had spent in Afghanistan in the early 1990s, receiving military training in the Khaldin and Jihadwal camps, as well as at al Qaeda camps in Jalalabad, AQIM has spread its operations across the Sahel into Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and elsewhere (Pham 2012, and James 2012). Regional socioeconomic conditions, especially in the Sahelian states of Mauritania, Niger, and Mali, offer an excellent environment for the growth of militant groups. Vast distances, weak states, dispersed populations, and deep poverty all leave these lands susceptible to cross-border crime and insurgency. Opportunities for smuggling and other illegal activities are widespread and regional powers' capacities—and sometimes motivation—for combating them are very limited.

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[15] Amar Saifi, also known as El Para became popular after he successfully orchestrated a high-profile multi-million-dollar kidnapping of 32 European tourists (ten Austrians, 16 Germans,four Swiss, one Swede and one Dutchman) in the Sahara Desert in February–March 2003. El Para also brought jihadis from Mauritania, Mali, and Niger into his operations. In March 2004, with the US and other international military forces in pursuit, Saifi and his band of men were found in Northern Chad. After a gun battle, he escaped from a US-led force but was caught on March 16, 2004 by a local rebel group known as the Movement for Democracy and Justice in Chad Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad MDJT.

The GSPC under Belmokhtar expanded from its original base in the hinterlands of Algiers into the Algerian Sahara and northern Mali partly because it was pushed out of northern Algeria by security forces. This pressure had like intensified by September 2002, when President Bouteflika cracked down on the militants (Harmon 2010)

3.1.3 The AQIM

While AQIM is expanding its operation toward other Sahelian countries, Droukdel quickly revamped the organizational structure and set the group on a path in line with Al-Qaeda's strategy. Despite its global connections with the Al-Qaeda and other groups, the GSPC might not have been able to pursue its cause of overthrowing Bouteflika's government[16] had it not been for George W. Bush's decision to attack Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003. The American-led invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq, in particular, galvanized waning militant Islamist movements and helped to radicalize the disenfranchised Algerian youth (Le Sueur 2010) Aware of a possible destabilizing blowback from the Second Gulf War, Bouteflika himself argued openly against the Iraq invasion in 2003. Understanding the context and the ferocious disapproval of the American occupation of Iraq throughout the Muslim-majority countries, the GSPC stated that it would join forces with the Al-Qaeda which was determined to attack coalition forces and Western interests. In September 11, 2006, GSPC links itself officially with the Al-Qaeda[17].

In 2007, the GSPC proclaimed its formal merger with Al-Qaeda. With Zawahiri and bin Laden leading Al-Qaeda's charge, Droukdel soon decided to change the name of his organization and to focus on the global jihad. In January of 2007, a message was posted declaring the establishment of the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Some Jihadist groups posted congratulatory messages to AQIM as they had joined the global jihad (Smith 2009). AQIM followed this announcement with deadly bombing attacks, the attacks have continued not only in Algeria but also in

[16] Abdelaziz Bouteflika (born 1937) is an Algerian politician who has been the fifth President of Algeria since 1999. Previously he served as Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1963 to 1979.
[17] See http://www.discoverthenetworks.org/Articles/Al%20Qaedas%20New%20Ally.html and/or http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5345202.stm (accessed 15th December, 2013)

Morocco and elsewhere. In turn, these developments in Algeria have encouraged the US and other militaries to partner with Algeria and its neighbors in the Sahel in major counter-terrorism initiatives (Le Sueur 2010).

3.2 The Boko Haram

Nigeria has an estimated population of 180 million. The country is approximately fifty per cent Muslims forty-four per cent Christians and one percent of traditional religion. Prior to and even after the arrival of Europeans into Africa, Arabs and Africans interacted through pilgrimage, politics, trade, war, slavery, and Sufi missionary activities in both West and East Africa. Between approximately A.D. 1000 and 1600, Islamic scholars, traders, and missionaries migrated from North Africa to much of West Africa primarily in search of gold and salt resources (Trans-Saharan trade). The close association of religious and commercial endeavours resulted in the partial Islamization of West Africa (Nast 1996). In northern Nigeria, Islam's penetration was limited in the beginning; the court elite and some populace professed the faith, but they mixed Islam with paganism. Yet Hausa cities like Kano earned a reputation for Islamic scholarship as early as the fifteenth century and became destinations for traveling Muslim scholars, including North Africans (Thurston 2009).

In the 19th century, Islam in northern Nigeria was revived by the Sokoto caliphate[18], an institution which remains the center for religious and administrative affairs of Nigerian Muslims until the colonial conquest of the region in the first decade of the 20th century. Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya were the first established and by far the largest Sufi brotherhood in Nigeria, and probably in all parts of West Africa. A countervailing group to the Sufis in the north and throughout Nigeria is the Izala movement[19] and later Shiite movement in 1980s.

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[18] Hundreds of sources exist on the sokoto Caliphate; this study cannot explore them in details. See for instance Murray, Last. 1967. Sokoto Caliphate. Michigan: Humanities Press. John Spencer, Trimingham. 1962. A History of Islam in West Africa. Oxford University Press. R. A Adeleye. 1971. Power and Diplomacy In Northern Nigeria, 1804-1906: The Sokoto Caliphate and Its Enemies. California: Humanities Press.

[19] The Izala Movement (formally, Jama'atu Izatul Bid'ah Wa Iqamatus Sunnah) in Nigeria is an anti-Sufi movement that was established 1978 by Sheikh Ismai'il Idris (1937-2000). The reform program

The exact date of the emergence of the Boko Haram sect is full of controversies especially if one relies on media accounts. Most local and foreign media trace its origin to 2002, when Mohammed Yusuf emerged as the leader of the group. However, the Boko Haram is said to be founded in 1995 by Abubakar Lawan under the original name *Ahlulsunna Wal'jama'ah Hijra* in northeastern state of Borno. Lawan later left the country for studies at the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia, which accorded Mohammed Yusuf[20] opportunity to emerge as its new leader. (Connell 2012, Human Rights Watch 2012, JSOU Report 2012, and Onuoha 2012). Since then, the sect has metamorphosed under various names like the *Muhajirun, Yusufiyyah, Nigerian Taliban, Boko Haram and Jama'atu Ahlissunnah lidda'awati wal Jihad.*

Therefore, origins of the Boko Haram lie in a group of radical Islamists youth who gathered at the Alhaji Muhammad Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri under their leader a decade ago. In 2002, an offshoot of this youth group (known as Nigerian Taliban) declared that they were embarking on *hijra* (a withdrawal) from what they regarded as "corrupt", "sinful" and "unjust" secular state. The group moved from Maiduguri to a village called Kanama, Yobe state, near Nigerian border with Niger republic, to set up a separatist community run on "Islamic" principles. Some of them were believe to be college and university graduates who tore their diplomas to join the *muhajirun*. They espoused anti-state framings and called on other Muslims to join the group and return to a life under "true" Islamic law, with the aim of making a more perfect society away from the "corrupt" establishments. Following dispute regarding fishing rights in a small lake between the group and the host community, the government sought to dissolve the group. This created the first clash between them and the Nigerian police.

Following the involvement of Nigerian army, the security operatives successfully crackdown on the group. Many of the Nigerian Taliban members were

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of the movement consists primarily of fighting "Bid'ah" (innovations) and establishin the Sunnah of the Prophet. Obviously, Sheikh Abubakar Gumi (1922-1992), influenced the rise of Izala.

[20] Mohammed Yusuf (29 January 1970 – 30 July 2009), also known as Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf, was a Muslim sect leader. He was born in Girgir village, in Jakusko, present day Yobe state, Nigeria. Yusuf enrolled for and received a Qur'anic education in the Chad and Niger Republic.

either killed or captured, which dispersed the Boko Haram members from the area.[21] The group reappeared in early 2004 in Borno but again, they were overpowered by the security operatives. Conflicting accounts exist on whether Yusuf went to Saudi Arabia voluntarily or escaped the 2004 encounter with security forces. Nevertheless, Human Right Watch quoted Yusuf acknowledging his role in teaching the Nigerian Taliban Qur'an and urges them to eschew violence:

> These youths studied the Koran with me and with others. Afterwards they wanted to leave the town, which they thought impure, and head for the bush, believing that Muslims who do not share their ideology are infidels... "I think that an Islamic system of government should be established in Nigeria, and if possible all over the world, but through dialogue" (Human Rights Watch 2012, 31-2).

Yusuf continued preaching, writing books and pamphlets in the newly established mosque in a piece of land believed to be owned by Yusuf father-in-law, Baba Fugu Mohammed. Video and audio CDs that carry his interpretations of Qur'an and some religious books were distributed throughout northern Nigeria.[22] Until 2008, the name Boko Haram was not popularized but the group had gained press attention in Nigeria, and interest from the U.S. because of the catchy name locals had given it: the *Nigerian Taliban*. It also caught the attention of the Nigerian media because many of the group's members were the sons of wealthy and influential people in Borno (Walker 2012, 3). Yusuf's movement eventually took on the name *Jama'atu Ahlissunnah lidda'awati Wal Jihad*, (people committed to the teachings [of the Prophet], preaching, and jihad). The locals named the group Boko Haram, which literally translates as "Western education is forbidden" in Hausa language.

In the summer of 2009, the clash between the Boko Haram and security intensified and that event made the former popular. The confrontation began on June 11 in Maiduguri when security personnel and participants in a Boko Haram members' funeral procession clashed over latter refusal to wear motorcycle helmets.

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[21] See Anna Borzello, "Tracking down Nigeria's 'Taliban' sect," BBC Online, January, 14, 2004. Accessed October 9, 2013
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3393963.stm.

[22] For the analysis of Yusuf preaching and writings as well as the counter response from Boko Haram antagonists among Islamic clerics see The Popular Discourses of Salafi Radicalism and Salafi Counter-radicalism in Nigeria. 2012. Journal of Religion in Africa 42: 118-144. However, the discs, pamphlets, books and even clips were outlawed in Nigeria as anybody caught with them will be apprehended by security. Nevertheless, few exist on YouTube.

Nigeria had passed a law mandating the use of motorcycle helmets, but during a funeral procession to bury some of their members who died, the Boko Haram members were refused to adhere to this law. Members of a task force (Joint Task Force popularly known as JTF) comprised of military and police personnel opened fire on the procession, injuring 17.[23] "Yusuf demanded justice, but the authorities neither seemed to investigate the alleged use of force nor apologized for the shootings" (Human Rights watch 2012, 33).

As tensions escalated, the police on July 21 raided houses of suspected Boko Haram members in Biu, southern Maiduguri. In Maiduguri, the police surrounded the group's mosque, but some members of the group managed to break out and for three days they had to run out of the town (anonymous). In the early morning hours of July 26, Boko Haram members burned down a police station in Dutsen Tanshi, on the outskirts of Bauchi, the Bauchi State capital. Few Boko Haram members died and several police officers were injured. The military and police responded by raiding a mosque and homes in Bauchi where the Boko Haram members had regrouped, killing dozens of the group's members. Yusuf vowed revenge, saying he was ready to avenge the killing of his followers (Human Rights Watch 2012, and Walker 2012).

Boko Haram fighters also launched pre-dawn attacks on a police station in the town of Wudil, Kano State, and on government buildings, including a police station, in Postiskum, Yobe State[24]. On July 28 and 29, the army shelled Yusuf's compound, killings and/or flushing out his followers. In Postiskum, security forces also raided the group's hideout on the outskirts of the town, killing many of Yusuf's disciples (Human Rights Watch 2012).

Later that day, the military captured Yusuf who said to be hiding in his father-in-law's house. Mohammed Yusuf was arrested by the army and handed him over to the police for interrogations. The police later killed him. Police officials denied that he had been executed, saying he was shot while trying to escape (Onuoha 2012 and Walker 2012). Video clips from the interrogation showed him with a bandage on his left arm.[25] An eye witness account however, stated that:

[23] http://allafrica.com/stories/200906120007.html. October 10, 2013.
[24] http://allafrica.com/stories/200907280047.html. Accessed October 22, 2013.
[25] See "Video shows Nigeria 'executions,'" Aljazeera, February 9, 2010,

> On Thursday [July 30], about 6:30 p.m., I heard that they [the police] had brought in Mohammed Yusuf…. We went inside the compound of the police headquarters. There were many people watching. I saw him sitting on the ground. He was handcuffed with a bandage on his arm. He was saying they should pray for him. The MOPOL [anti-riot Police Mobile Force] were enraged. They said he killed their leader—who is a 2IC [second-in-command of the Police Mobile Force]. The MOPOL said we must kill him. But the commissioner of police [Christopher Dega] said they should leave him alive. Then three of the MOPOLs started shooting him. They first shot him in the chest and stomach and another came and shot him in the back of his head. I was afraid and started running. When I came back he was dead. There were a lot of people taking pictures [of his body] (Human Rights Watch 2012, 35).

The army spokesperson also confirmed that they apprehended Yusuf alive and handed him over to police force. Worth noting is that after the July battle between the Boko Haram and Nigeria's security, sent the movement underground and loosen the tensions it created.

3.2.1 Boko Haram as a Clandestine Movement

The government may have thought that it had crushed the uprising in July 2009. But again, the death of the group's leader and many of his disciples and few associates did not end the saga. In less than a year after the first encounter, Abubakar Shekau[26] who was Yusuf's deputy announced that he had taken over leadership of the movement and threatened fresh attacks to avenge the deaths of his colleagues.

Since then, the remnants of the group members had an alibi to call Nigeria an "unjust" secular state that they could rally behind. They emphasized what they call extrajudicial killings of their colleagues to recruit new members and further radicalize existing members. In September 2010, for example, a Boko Haram

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http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2010/02/2010298114949112.html Accessed October 15, 2013).

[26] Abu-Muhammad Abubakar ibn Mouhammad al-Shakwi (a k a Abubakar Shekau) took ever the leadership of the Boko Haram since its reincarnation in 2010, which dispel the allegations that he was killed in 2009 too. His leadership therefore witnessed the most attacks carried out by the group.

member told the BBC's Hausa radio service that "we are on a revenge mission as most of our members were killed by the police." (Human Rights Watch 2012, 36-7).

Despite the assumption of Shekau as the new leader, since the 2009 violence the Boko Haram has remained underground, and little is known about its leadership or organizational structure. Statements from the group used to come from two spokespersons, using the pseudonyms "Abu Zaid" and "Abu Qaqa," who have conducted telephone interviews and emailed statements with journalists, but their actual identities remain opaque. Since 2010 Shekau has appeared in several videos posted online claiming responsibility for attacks and threatening further violence. The clandestine nature of the group has led to much speculation about the composition of its leadership and membership, possible factions, sponsors, and links with foreign groups.

Despite the little or absent of obvious evidences regarding the movement's sympathizers, financers and supporters, the Boko Haram's structure became controversial. In January 2012, for example, President Goodluck Jonathan warned that Boko Haram sympathizers were present at all levels of government:

> Some of them are in the executive arm of government, some of them are in the parliamentary/legislative arm of government, while some of them are even in the judiciary. Some are also in the armed forces, the police and other security agencies. Some continue to dip their hands and eat with you and you won't even know the person who will point a gun at you or plant a bomb behind your house (Human Rights Watch 2012, 38).

The Boko Haram attacks in northern and central Nigeria have increased since 2010 in a largely consistent pattern of violence suggesting a degree of coordination or organizational control. The movement continued to recruit members with more radical outlook. The more successful and coordinated the Boko Haram attacks have been cause great number of researchers to monograph the linkage between the group and other radical Islamists like AQIM and the Somali *Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen*, more commonly known as al-*Shabaab* (see for example Manni 2012, Tanchum 2012, Peter 2012 and Sean 2012).

From their establishment onwards, the Boko Haram and AQIM founders had grievances that they wish to redress. The leadership within these organizations

played the major roles in identifying and making the grievances collective ones. The AQIM and the Boko Haram consider states as the agents of undermining Islam hence the cause of social and economic problems facing the populace. Despite their relatively weak military capabilities – no armor, no artillery, and no air power – these groups created a major social upheaval by taking advantage of the terror-prone individuals to support their cause. By targeting the security personnel, representatives of the state and all those deem to support the regime or to benefit from it, these groups exacerbated the state elite's distrust of some citizenry and encouraged it to use harsh repressive policies. On the other hand indiscriminate killing of citizens make them unpopular in the eyes of even Muslims. However, the AQIM southern command has been penetrating to *Bilad as Sudan* (West Africa), which makes the region a new hub for terrorism.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE RISE AND EMERGENCE OF AL-QAEDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES/CONSTRAINTS STRUCTURES, MOBILIZING STRUCTURES AND FRAMING PROCEEESSES

4.1 Political Structures Opportunities/Constraints and Mobilizing Structures for Algeria's Islamists

Much of the sources in social movement theory have focused on political opportunity structures – the organization of the broader political system and how it shapes possibilities for collective action mobilization. Key areas of concern regarding political opportunities/constraints include the level of state repression, relative openness of the system (including the opportunities for mobilization to take on particular forms), the level of elite-actor alliance, and relations between state and social actors (see Porta and Diani, 1999 also in Hafez and Wiktorowicz, 2004). Whenever changes in any of these factors occur, the opportunities for mobilization change as well (Schwedler, 2004).

Schwedler (2004) argues that "one of the most dramatic shifts in the structure of opportunities occurs during political liberalization" (206). When a regime decides to launch a process of political liberalization, no matter how limited it is the new opportunities increase the likelihood that new forms of mobilization will emerge to take advantage of such changing political conditions. Zack (2006) modeled this maxim and traced the roles of post-war French government-sponsored reforms in 1919 that fostered the surge of Islamic activism in Algeria at onset, which eventually led to struggle for Algeria's independence. When opposition groups are permitted to organize and campaign as political parties, for example, it provides political actors with the opportunity to expand their support bases and convey alternative political visions to a wider audience. Similarly, regimes may open the political system by allowing civil society organizations to function freely, therefore changing the structure of the public sphere to allow for an increased level of political debate.

System accessibility is important for examining levels of violent contention because it bears directly on the question of reform versus revolution. Goodwin (1997) argues that political system that is accessible, "discourages the sense that the state is unreformable or an instrument of a narrow class or clique and (accordingly) needs to be overhauled" (quoted from Hafez and Wiktorowicz, 2004:66). Hypothetically, the more accessible the state system, even an authoritarian state, the less likely it is to unify opposition behind a violent strategy. In contrast, the more exclusionary and inaccessible the political system is, the more likely the oppositions will unite around a violent strategy. While espousing violent measures, the opposition movement is often viewed by many people as more realistic and potentially effective than the status quo, which come to be viewed as hopelessly ineffective.

Hafez and Wiktorowicz (2004) explain two dimension of repression: pre-emptive and reactive. Repression is pre-emptive when applied before the opposition movement has had an opportunity to organize and mobilize disparate supporters and sympathizers around a common goal. Repression is reactive when it is applied after activists gained both material and nonmaterial resources. And this study adds that, pre-emptive repression is more likely to be "soft" whereas reactive repression usually seems "hard". They further maintain that reactive repression is more likely to predispose movement to rebellion, hence encourage violent contention (68-9). Activists encountering reactive repression after a series of mobilizations will not only become more aggravated but will also command resources to fight back. Therefore, reactive repression that seeks to eradicate an organized and mobilized movement is more likely to induce mass rebellion because activists and supporters will seek to halt the loss of resources accumulated over time.

As discussed in Chapter three, just like most African countries, Algeria gained independence from French in July, 1962. One peculiar feature with Algerian struggle was the Algerian war of independence fought between French colonizers and Algerian nationalists (1954-1962). Most literature on Algerian history concur on the fact that the success of the Algerian struggle for independence was, albeit not exclusively, contingent upon the support provided by Islamists (see e. g, Le Sueur,

2010 and Cook, 2007). The fraternization between 'secular' nationalists and 'conservative' Islamists initiated to fight colonizers was the first political opportunities utilized by Islamist to mobilize grassroots supporters in Algeria. During that war of independence, some Algerians living in cities with an estimated number of one million French settlers (Le Sueur 2010, 13) might be ready to assimilate and even accept French citizenship, rural dwellers (largely Arabs and Berbers) tended to conserve their Islamic culture. Therefore, Islamic activists have been at forefront of mobilizing rural masses to support nationalist's course during the independence struggle. The Algerian Islamists in pre-independence Algeria had a reason for long distrust of Western-inspired secularism. The French parliament had deprived Algerian Muslims of their civil rights and imposed extraordinary civil obligations on them. That discrimination coupled with other issues elicited the revolution in 1954, as well as to an understandable, though often pathological, urges to keep foreign influences out of the nation even after independence.

One of the more interesting questions for social movement theory is why certain movements opt to take advantage of political opportunities, especially liberalization by forming political organizations/parties while others do not. Organizing as political party holds different advantages and disadvantages for different groups, depending on resources, objectives, ideological orientation, and—importantly—relations with the ruling elites. For groups with close ties to the ruling elites, the chances of organizing formal political movements are somewhat plentiful. But without regime connections, other movements may feel more vulnerable and less willing to walk into the political field as a party (Schwedler, 2004). Therefore, the availability of allies, the absence of pre-emptive repression and the emergence of elite division create opportunities for collective action, while the opposite conditions tend to discourage mobilization (Hafez, 2004). While organization as political party enables a group to establish infrastructure such as mouthpiece, central and regional offices, distribute literature, and reach a wide audience, it also opens the movement to a level of state control and monitoring that may not be desirable for all movements (see, e.g.; McAdam et al. 1996; Porta and Diani 1999). Decisions to transforming movement into political party thus, entail careful consideration of the group's resources (including alliances) and ultimate objectives.

Even with long history of collaboration between the nationalists and the Islamists in Algeria; plus socio-economic problems that bedeviled the country in years after independence; the Islamists remained outside formal political mobilization until 1980s. These were true despite the fact that the pioneers of the FLN and the revolution's architect were conservative Islamists and "a conflict among elites in power," (Le Sueur 2010, 37). Smith (2009) argued that "leading the FLN's push for independence was Larbi Ben M'Hidi, an Algerian nationalist and devout Muslim" (56). From 1979 to 1988 the Islamists engaged in very little overt political opposition or extra-institutional protest instead, Islamic activism in that period was chiefly limited to propagation in university campuses and in mosques, upon the great inspirations the Islamic gained from the1979 Iranian revolution. These may be, though not exclusively, the consequence of President Houari Boumedienne (1970-76) one-party system and also concentrating power within the military elite, bypass-ing even the FLN political structure (Harmon, 2010: 12). This means that the period was characterized with "soft and pre-emptive" repression from the regime to keep the Islamists outside the box of politics. In other words, while Islamists were betrayed after independence, the political environment allowed only limited and informal mobilization.

Algerians witnessed palpable changes in their political life in the aftermath of the 1988 October riots that began the reform process (see, Le Seuer 2010, 31-8). Consequently, political reforms began to appear in 1989. When the state announced a 'glasnost' in 1989, the Islamist movements began to exert themselves politically. Series of reforms in Algeria guaranteed freedom of expression, association, and assembly; afforded the right to forge unions hence restricted the role of the 'military cleavage'. Those conditions also favored political Islamists moving quickly into the breach created largely by the labor and youth protestors. Ironically, not even the leading Islamists could have anticipated their movement's political successes as they organized around the protests initiated by the youth and labor unions. Within few days, the Islamists understood that they could use the momentum created originally by street protesters and benefited from a full-blown, multi-pronged campaign to gain political power. It thus substantiate the maxim in political process approach that

individuals make strategic choices but such choices are not made independent of the changing contexts, relations, and networks in which people actually live. To be sure, the Islamists in Algeria regarded Chadli Bendjedid's limited reforms as a tacit support and opportunity for return of the past, and not returning to the past. That is to say, the Islamists believed that establishing Islamic regimes seemed only feasible through formal democracy not by *Shura* council. There was evidence, Cook (2007) contended, that Chadli and FIS's executive by virtue of their common confrontation with leading elements of the FLN, had made a political deal. And, according to Roberts, Chadli supported the FIS at the expense of the FLN, which began to criticize his actions. The aim was "to weaken the FLN just enough to discredit Chadli's critics and pave the way for the president to lead the party unencumbered" (quoted from Cook 2007, 55). Based on that, the FIS, Algeria's first official Islamic political party, and the first openly established Islamist party in the contemporary Middle East, was founded on March 1989. Several other Islamist organizations emerged that period, but the FIS was the most formidable.

4.1.2 Free Space for Islamists' Mobilizations in Algeria

The political liberation in Algeria legalized the FIS and helped its leaders to mobilize supporters in different ways. As Hafez (2004) argues, the FIS led a process of organizing an Islamic political party in 1989 and thus situated itself at the nucleus of Islamic activism. Through rallies, demonstrations, and more importantly, local government elections in 1990, the FIS was able to draw thousands of supporters and proved to be the most effective mechanism for mobilization. However, like new social movement organizations, the FIS was an inclusive organization which made its rapid expansion easier. With its limited finance, the FIS collected only five per cent from only the activists' monthly income. Supporters and sympathizers were also welcomed even if they belong to other groups. The FIS established cultural and charitable organizations and constructed schools and mosques, which were popular with Islamists mobilization.

More so, the principal cause for the meteoric rise of the FIS had as much to do with the population's discontentment toward the FLN, due to decades of corruption

and mismanagement. MacAdam (1999) underscored the significance of "the level of organization within the aggravated population" or "degree of organizational readiness" within the community in question" in facilitating movements' mobilization (quoted from Bedford 2009, 27). This focuses on the means available for movements to turn their efforts into an organized campaign. Abassi Madani and Ali Benhadj[27] organized people on common cause. Both moderates and conservatives Islamists considered them as great leaders who committed to solving their problems. Accordingly, the FIS gained a lot of manpower, especially among urban population who mostly settled in urban centers after independence and affected mostly by lack of jobs and shortage of houses. Le Sueur (2010) analyzed the capability of FIS's manpower during local governments' election:

> When the local elections were held on June 12, 1990, with approximately 65 percent voter turnout, the FIS trounced the FLN, winning 54 percent of votes cast. The FLN obtained only 28 percent. The FIS showed strongest amongst urban voters, and scored mostly heavily in the urbanized northern part of the country. And, capping the FLN's humiliation, the FIS gained control of the *wilayas,* taking 32 in total. Suddenly, FIS politicians were in firm control of both local and provincial governments, and had a firm popular mandate as they moved toward the first round of the nation's scheduled parliamentary elections (43-44).

As stated in the introductory chapter, Islamists may only differ in the means but establishing a state governed by Shari'a remains the end. Embolden by their victory in the local election, the FIS leaders began instituting moral reforms. They began to prohibit sales of alcohol, required women to wear hijab and separated boys and girls in school which, were viewed as a "threats" to both socialists and secularists' ideology in Algeria. Those changes also generated considerable discomfort within the Algerian military, who Cook (2007) described as high modernists. The military in Algeria, like their counterparts in Egypt and Turkey have

[27] The top FIS leaders facilitated its mobilization. Dr. Abassi Madani (born in 1931) was imprisoned by France at the onset of Algeria's independence struggle. After his release in 1962, he furthered his education and became a professor in educational psychology. He became more popular as voice of dispossessed Algerians when he co-founded the FIS and served as its first president. Ali Benhadj or Belhadj (born in 1956) on the hand, is charismatic, eloquent Islamic scholar and preacher at the famous Al-Sunna mosque in Bab el-Oued, a popular district in Algiers. They were imprisoned by military in 1991.

“high modernism’s worldview, which places a premium on the scientific knowledge necessary for modernization”...and according to their conviction...”only those with these types of specialized skills, i.e. themselves, have a mandate to exercise political power” (15)

Despite their high modernists’ worldview, growing suspicion of Chadli’s regime and the threats by the Islamists, the officers were reluctant after the popular October 1988 riots. Paradoxically, Chadli brought the military back to the scene when he appointed Major-General Khaled Nezzar minister of defense in July 1990. The decision to assign such an important portfolio for the first time since independence, to a military commander, would have granted military a return to power. Evidence to halt the foreseen victory of FIS was obvious with the high modernist military commander, who became ambivalent about the regime, in that influential ministerial position.

When the date for first round of elections was quickly set for June 27, 1991, and the second round set for July 18, the military influenced the regime to increase number of constituencies especially in rural areas (where FIS had not done well during the local elections). Prime Minister Mouloud Hamrouche (1989-1991) designed those plans considered by the FIS leaders as an asunder to their success. Nezzar himself wrote in his memoirs that within days of the first round of voting, “the military resolved not to allow the FIS to attain a majority in the National People’s Assembly” (Cook 2007, 56). By April 1991, Madani and Benhadj called for strike, which eventually led to their arrest, trial and imprisonment. The strike was to protest what the Islamists regarded as menace to their victory. Alongside Madani and Belhadj, thousands of FIS followers, including members of the FIS executive council and activists, were arrested and sent to large concentration camps in the Sahara Desert.

For the military, the arrest of the FIS leaders by regime was meant to weaken the party, but at Batna conference on August 1991, Abdelkader Hachani was nominated to serve as interim FIS president. Le Sueur (2010) wrote:

> The arrests of FIS leaders temporarily derailed the party, but it quickly set about organizing their districts. Clearly backfiring, the government’s political purges galvanized FIS followers and increased its chances of success. The FIS enjoyed especially strong support from younger voters.

> Since the majority of the population was under 30, this advantage yielded huge dividends, as voters broke on generational lines. On December 26, the FIS defied the odds and carried off a crushing victory against the FLN and other rival parties. Of the 231 contested seats in the national assembly (out of a total of 430), FIS captured 188. In contrast the FFS won 26, the FLN picked up 15, and independents claimed what was left. With 47.5 percent of the voters casting ballots for the FIS, the FIS clobbered its opponents and shocked everyone, especially the political elite, who complained of voter irregularities and election fraud. Because the new election laws in place allowed only the two most successful parties to advance to the second round, the FLN was abruptly shut completely out of Algeria's political future (50-1).

That development indicated that most Algerians were looking for avenue to get rid of the FLN and even the military that are themselves product of FLN's anti-political Islam strategies. This means that the support given to the FIS as political party would linger even under strategic maneuver to weaken it.

4.1.3 An Inopportune Political Context: State Reactive Repression and Emergence of Violent Islamic Activism in Algeria

The FIS, though consisted of different smaller Islamist movements had no history of violence (Cook 2007). Led by Chief of Staff, Adbalmakek Guenaïza and Nezzar, the officers first forced President Chadli to resign on January 11, 1992. They also proclaimed the creation of the High Council for Security, whose first action was to nullify the results of the December election and to propose the creation of a permanent five-person ruling body known as the High Committee of State (Haut Comité d'Etat HCE) (Stone 1997). The HCE went further to authorize the arrest of FIS newly appointed care-taker Abdelkader Hachani on January 24, declared a state of emergency on February 9, and banned the FIS on March 4 (Le Sueur 2010, 51). On February, the authorities opened five detention centers to house thousands—estimated range from 6,000 to 30,000 of FIS activists, including 500 mayors and councilors. In 1992 and 1993, a total of 166 Islamists were sentenced to death (Hafez 2004, 46). These developments had placed Algeria under exclusive military control committed to repressing against the Islamists who, according to the officers, regardless of their different public identity and platforms, shared the common

objective of turning Algeria into a theocratic state. But, according to the military "it was better to be Turkey than Iran".

In a repressive environment like that, movements encounter several constraints that it must overcome to effect change. The tasks necessary to overcome constraints generated by a repressive environment strongly encourage movements to develop to exclusive organizations which as described in chapter one, remains underground and establishes strict criteria for membership. Among the FIS leadership, Benhadj is believed to be radical but beliefs in fecundity of democracy to achieve the ends made him to eschew violence (see for e.g., Le Sueur 2010 and Volpi 2003). Pragmatically, political exclusion and indiscriminate repression against FIS disillusioned the failure of reforms through democratic process and pushed many FIS activists toward radical organizations that rejected democracy, the electoral process, and the Algerian ruling class altogether. Therefore, many of the FIS's activists were by the end of 1992 united around one of three militant organizations: Armed Islamic Movement (*Mouvement Islamique Armé*, MIA) of Abdelkader Chebouti, the Islamic State Movement (le Mouvement pour l'Etat Islamique, MEI), Mouvement Algérien Islamique Armée, and a conglomeration of armed groups in Takfir wal-Hijra and Amr bil- Ma"rouf and from the informal network of Algerian "Afghans." (Hafez 2004, and Volpi 2003)

Attempt by the Islamists in 1992 to unite nascent violent movements was marred by military attacks on the activists at Tamesguida, a town in Medea province. Despite constant security surveillance, infiltration of agent provocateurs and hard and reactive repressions, some of the desperate radical Islamists forged the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). As newly formed movement, the GIA made rational calculus by engaging in guerrilla war tactics and located its manpower in the mountainous areas. In December 1992, to demonstrate yet another opportunity for mobilization, a letter wrote by Benhadj, was smuggled out of jail to convey his support for the GIA's guerrilla fighters. In the letter, Benhadj wrote "If I was outside the walls of this prison I would be a fighter in the ranks of the army of my brother Abdelkader Chebouti" (Volpi 2003, 68). The political strategy of the GIA was to extend the

range of legitimate guerrilla targets to politicians supporting the provisional government, high-ranking civil servants and people working in the security forces and administrative departments. By its actions, the GIA sought to demonstrate the inability of the state to protect its own supporters and collaborators. In 1997, the GIA was responsible for mass massacres against civilians in villages and hamlets with over 120,000 death tolls (Hafez and Wiktorowicz 2004, 61). Anti-civilian massacres and demonizing some FIS leaders' moderate view by GIA led to the creation of the Islamic Salvation Army (*Armée Islamique du Salut*, AIS) in 1994 as official armed wing of the FIS.

4.1.4 From GSPC to AQIM: A Political Process Explanation

The GSPC was formed in 1998 as an alternative to the GIA with aim of concentrating attacks only on security personnel among others. Islamists movements such Ayman al-Zawahiri's Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), broke publicly with the GIA for its anti-civilian tactics and supported the GSPC leaders. Meanwhile, that period coincided with time President Abdelaziz Bouteflika started a reconciliation process that amnestied over 5,000 Islamists and another 5,000 prisoners including Madani and Belhadj whom were put under house arrest. The remnants of Islamists that refused amnesty regrouped under the GSPC to continue fighting the regime. Initially, reconciliation was not as successful as Bouteflika had expected. In fact, as Le Sueur argues, in 2000 the number of terrorist-related deaths went up to 5,000, approximately twice the number reported in 1999. In part, that was due to the rapid and constant war against those militant Islamists who refused government's offer. In September 2002 Bouteflika ordered a crackdown on the GSPC, Algeria's largest anti-Islamist operation in five years (Schanzer 2002, quoted from Harmon 2010, 15).

While it organized zones of command throughout Algeria, the GSPC focused its energies and operations in two key areas in particular: the Kabylie or Kabylia region in the north, which gave it access to the major cities along the Mediterranean coast while still providing in its forests and mountains considerable haven for bases, and the vast southern region along Algeria's Sahara that borders Mali and Niger, which

offered access to long-established smuggling routes.This revealed a division within the organization, as the Saharan branch, led by El Para and later by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, focussed on smuggling and kidnapping, mostly for fundraising purposes, whereas the Kabylia branch under Droukdel continued to target the symbols of the Algerian state in a more conventional fashion. In addition, in 2004, Abdelmalek Droukdel took over from Nabil Sahraoui, who replaced Hassan Hattab for alleged fraternization with the regime. Abdelmalek Droukdel took the GSPC closer to mainstream Al-Qaeda, and in January of 2007 the GSPC was formally integrated into Al-Qaeda, adopting the name Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (Filiu 2009, 223)

4.1.5 The Sahel: A Safe Haven for Violent Islamists?

Historically, Tuareg people have long occupied the empty expanses of the Sahel. Moving from oasis to oasis with their camels, they often survived on traded goods and lived in tents of woven camel hair. They were preeminent in trans-Saharan trade throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This nomadic community has mastered the desert way of life for centuries. Following the establishment of French West Africa[28], artificial borders were created that restricted the Tuaregs from traveling long established routes across the Sahara. After independence of the French colonies of Africa, Tuareg territory was divided among a number of modern nations of Niger, Mali, Algeria, Libya, and Burkina Faso. These states of the Sahel region are characterized with long and porous borders, extremely difficult to patrol; complex and unstable ethno-religious make-up; political instability; economic underdevelopment; and high levels of corruption. The weakness of the Sahelian states means that they constitute opportunities for mobilization and recruitment. Mokhtar Belmokhtar finds great opportunities in the Sahel region. Belmokhtar uses the opportunity to marry some women from local Tuareg tribes, thus establishing a connections with them (Dario and Fabiani 2011, Filiu 2009 and Pham 2011). The

[28] French West Africa (French: Afrique occidentale française, AOF 1895-1960) was a federation of eight French colonial territories in Africa: Mauritania, Senegal, French Sudan (now Mali), French Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast), Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Dahomey (now Benin) and Niger.

marital alliances helps him gained access into smuggling of arms, cigarettes, drugs, in southern Algeria and the Sahel, and other extralegal activities for which the region is infamous. He also uses the desert routes and smuggling networks to funnel arms to the AQIM command in northern Algeria. The GSPC's early operations in the Sahel included its abduction of, in 2003, 32 tourists – sixteen Germans, ten Austrians, four Swiss, one Swede and a Dutchman. They were released after months of tough bargaining and allegedly collecting one million dollars as ransom from the German government (Filiu, 2009 and Pham, 2011).

4.2 Framing Processes

In social movement literature, the term "framing" is simply used to describe the process of meaning construction (Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988; Benford and Snow 2000, also see chapter two for review). The major questions are when social movements' framings are accepted by un-mobilized individuals and how participants are retained in collective action. Acceptance of these framings solely relies on the degree of frame resonance – the credibility and relative salience of the proffered frame (Benford and Snow 2000). Three important aspects of framings incite collective actions: movements construct frames that diagnose a condition as a problem that needs to be redressed. This includes pinpointing the responsibilities and targets. Then, movements offer solutions to the problem, including specific tactics and strategies intended to serve as remedies to the perceived problems – what should be done. And finally, movements provide a rationale to motivate participants that support collective action – diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames.

Basically, no matter how much the level of grievances are, resource availability, or the prevalence of mobilizing structures, collective actors are both limited and empowered by interpretive schemata that offer a language and cognitive tools for making sense of experiences and events in the "world out there", which often delimit movements' ability to mobilize participants and the menu of tactics, actions, and choices (Wiktorowicz 2004).

In Algeria, the FLN had managed to keep the population at bay up until 1980s. Collective action in post-independence Algeria began largely as a labor strike and

riots of October 1988. The unrest quickly spread all over the country. As riots spread, the dynamics of mobilization shifted. Political Islamist movements, which had been waiting for such an opportunity, quickly understood that substantial ground could be used if they could be able to convince the mobs to support Islamic activism. Apparently, labor unions, civil societies and other participants of October Riots had diagnosed the problems and the responsibility was attributed – the FLN. Thus, the major master frame was to design tactics and motivate participants to end the sufferings. Master frames also known as 'interpretive packages" are ideational reservoirs existing at a structural or cultural level that color and constrain the orientations and activities of other movements (Benford and Snow 2000).

Predominantly, at least two main currents of thoughts influence the development of modern Islamists prognostic and motivational framings – the Reformist movement and the *Qutbist* doctrine. The former chiefly represents the doctrine pioneered by Afghani and Abduh.[29] They share some common views that Islam is somewhat compatible with some "aspects" of democracy. This group and their contemporaries favor Muslim participation in electoral democracy, while at the same time defy some aspects of Western democracy like drinking alcohol, gambling, prostitutions, etc. The latter was pioneered by Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian educator, Islamic theorist and leading member of Muslim Brotherhood. Fundamentally, some followers of this doctrine reject democratization altogether, hence dissociate themselves from its institutions. Some Reformists however, turn to Qutbists' doctrine when the tactics hitherto adopted to change the society failed.

Algerians on the street protests in 1980s believed that the ruling elites were the only cause of predicament in the country; and that made them more susceptible to Islamists' messages, which carried alternatives for FLN. Among the factors that increase frame resonance is the credibility of the frame. The consistency between movement's claims and actions make its frame more acceptable to the targeted participants. In Algeria, Islamists and especially FIS leaders joined the rioters in the demonstration. However, Benford and Snow (2000) theorized that the greater the

[29] Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-97) and Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) were influential Islamic thinkers that laid the foundation of political Islamism. They borrowed some concepts from modern democracy and showed their compatibility with Islamic regimes. For their view, see Sayed, Khatab and Gary, D. Bouma. 2007. Democracy in Islam. New York, Routledge.

status and expertise of the framers the more resonant their claims – the credibility of the framers increases frame resonance (621). The FIS's founding fathers – Madani and Benhadj had such credibility. Madani was former veteran of independent struggles, Islamic scholar and university professor. He obtained PhD in educational psychology and had years of experience as teacher at the university of Algiers. Similarly, Benhadj was a local Islamic teacher, preacher and Imam. Madani and Benhadj became the first president and vice-president of the FIS respectively. The two, alongside other FIS members quickly transformed the mobs to support FIS the inasmuch as the slogans of the demonstrators changed to a mixture of Islamic and democratic demands (Volpi 2003, 42).

The Islamists frame however, had what Benford and Snow termed as "experimental commensurability" (621). That is the congruent of the movement's framing and the personal and everyday experience of its targets. Two decades after the independence, hopes and faith that Algerian population had on the FLN as well as the ruling elites began to diminish. With worsening of the socioeconomic condition, Islamists began to run some of the Algeria's private welfare and education system (Volpi 2003). While the regime seemed incapable of solving the problems of housing shortages, rising unemployment, declining social services, rising prices, and a general sense of cultural, political, and economic weakness, the Islamists offered the little they had to gain more support.

As stated in the previous section, the Islamists' massages arose in nonofficial mosques and on university campuses. By adopting Islamic reformists discourse against the FLN's "Westernized" institutions, the FIS represented an opportunity for the "marginalized" youth to by-pass the FLN and embraced the Islamists' massages when regime tacitly allowed dissemination of Islamist messages. For this post-independence generation, like for the most mobs, political Islamism was an attempt to restore the values they advocated: social justice, the redistribution of political power, and saving the threatened Islamic identity that had underpinned the War of Independence but had been abandoned by the FLN. Under Madani and Benhadj, the Islamists joined the street protesters to motivate them toward achieving the end – Islamic state in Algeria. Le Sueur (2010) contended that, after considerable internal

debate about what the Islamists' next move ought to be, Benhadj succeeded in organizing a larger show of force in the streets of Algiers on October 10 with an estimated 20,000 men. (35).

With the influence of Madani's moderate view, the FIS opted to trust the government and to be pioneers in representing political Islam. This risk-taking strategy, which consisted of participating fully in the process of democratic transition, was at first very well rewarded. In April 1990, just over a year after its creation, during the campaign for the local elections the Islamic party attracted between 600,000 and 800,000 people to a massive political rally in Algiers. Volpi (2003) argued that, at that time no other political party, not even the well-established FLN, could gather such incredible number of people for an electoral rally.

Therefore, throughout its existence as legal organization, the FIS focused its energy to framings that mobilize supporters to challenge the FLN in ballot boxes. In other words, the FIS's framing work heavily relied on mobilizing electorates that would enable the party take over power from the FLN during elections. This process marginalized some radical Islamists who had been advocating for complete sweep of the FLN and its secular and socialist-oriented reforms. All what FIS leaders were saying and actually united upon to motivate participation was that, we reject Western democracy and its institutions; but we try to use them to gain power in order to bring back moral reforms. Wiktorowicz (2004) argued that, like many "new social movements driven by issues of identity, culture, and post-materialism (as opposed to class, economic, or narrow political interests), Islamic movements are embroiled in struggles over meaning and values" (16). The FIS are heavily involved in the production of meaning and concomitant framing processes to bring back moral reforms in Algeria.

However, after the dissolution of the FIS, the new radical actors—who, in contrast to the FIS elite, lacked clear political or ideological socialization—abandoned the project of creating an Islamic state through politics. Their idea of jihad was greatly influenced by their criminal or marginal experience and by their experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. They transformed jihad into a project in itself, as a way out of their political and social marginalization. The salient of GIA's frame of total Jihad as the only option strengthened as military continued to clamp down on

Islamists. Thus, even some of those whom were targeted by the GIA also suffered arrests and imprisonment from the regime. For example, after gaining much support from various Islamic groups in Algeria, in 1995, Jamal Zitouni, the leader of the GIA at that time, issued *Hidayat Rab al-"Alamin fi Tabyeen Usul al-Salafiyeen wama Yajib min al-"Ahd "ala al- Mujahedeen* (The Guidance of the Lord of the Universe in Clarifying the Traditions of the Salafis and the Requirements of Allegiance among the Holy Fighters)[30].

Thus, these new actors, largely *les Afghanis* became the core element of the new GIA (Boubekeur 2008). Unlike in 1980s, this time the Islamists were no longer inclusive organization. They accordingly, changed frames to anti-system one. As Hafez (2004) put it, exclusive organizations with anti-system frames do not categorize anybody as neutral. In the case of GIA, the whole struggle was portrayed as a holy war between "we" (the Islamists) and "them" (regime and its collaborators). Anyone perceived as either supporting an "unjust" social order or opposing the legitimacy of total war is part of the problem and hence deserve elimination. This was true with remnant of FIS followers who still believed in political participation.

While violent/radical Islamic activism—even in the form of suicide attacks—is not an Islamic phenomenon by definition, it cannot be ignored that the GIA claimed to have perpetrated indiscriminate killings of even civilians in the name of "Islam". To consolidate their anti-system framing of the conflict, the GIA insisted that violent action was an "Islamic obligation" – Jihad. Although the military coup of 1992 was the driver for armed struggle, the leaders of the GIA portrayed jihad as a struggle against apostasy, infidelism, and tyrannical rule. Anyone who sustained the regime in one way or another (even through tacit approval) was considered an "apostate

[30] In that pamphlet, Zitouni declared apostates, all those refuse to join GIA and GIA leadership rules: (1) A member had to adopt the *Salafiyya* tradition; (2) obey the *amir* (commander) on order; and (3) repent if he at one point or another belonged to the FIS, Islamic Salvation Army (AIS, which developed as the armed wing of the FIS in 1994), and any other Islamists movement. Former FIS members who wanted to join the GIA had to "proclaim the banner of the [FIS] a polytheist, democratic banner; repent from political, electoral, and democratic activities; and declare their innocence from all calls for dialogue with the apostate tyrants [i.e., the regime]." Any *imam* (prayer leader or cleric) who sought entry into the GIA had to "issue a *fatwa* [Islamic legal ruling] to motivate jihad." Finally, those who wanted to leave the GIA were considered apostates, defectors, opportunists, or potential informers and corrupters (see, Hafez, 2004)

(*murted*), infidel (*kafer*), or tyrant (*taghout*), and consequently deserved death" (Hafez 2004).

On the contrary, the GSPC at initial stage, explicitly demonized the GIA's anti-civilian tactics, and focused its energy on motivational frames that would resonate with people who had broken up with the FLN and had mistrust for the GIA. Locally, the GSPC got an upper hand because of its pro-civilian ideas. When it was founded by former Algerian paratrooper, Hassan Hattab, the GSPC immediately seized the manpower of the GIA and began operations. However, presenting a global master frames and symbols and the global circulation via the media suggest the existence of a global information space in which there is a constant flow of frames and images related to radical Islam. In any society, as well as at the global level, there are several competing master frames or interpretive packages. In the radical Islamic version, the West is viewed, in a historic and contemporary perspective, as an aggressor against Muslims and Islam. This master frame is centered on globally available symbols of injustice and aggression against Muslims, such as the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan and the Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib prisons. These are what other radical Islamists, like the GSPC modifies and applies it to their cause.

The affiliation with mainstream Al-Qaeda and eventual incorporation and rebranding of the GSPC to the AQIM had to do with the latter focus on "far enemies" as well as its quest for international networks. Interestingly, Dario and Fabiani, (2011) argued that, the GSPC's affiliation to the Al-Qaeda and its renaming as the AQIM should be seen more as a survival tactic than a sign of strength. The association with Al-Qaeda is more or less rhetorical, tactical and strategic, as the AQIM has adopted the jargon, techniques and long-term goals of the Al-Qaeda without being a clear evidence of a logistical or financial relationship between the duos. Again, however, it's certain that the AQIM or let's say some faction of it, has been targeting civilians but the "affiliation" with the Al-Qaeda remained. Thus, the GSPC/AQIM has reorganized its media propaganda, renewing its old rhetoric about the illegitimate Westernized Algerian state to enlarge its membership and increase its popularity as a regional and international actor (Fabiani, 2011).

In the Sahelian countries, AQIM's failure to frame its struggle into a truly pan-Maghreb organization and to capture Islamist groups in neighboring North African

countries did not put an end to its activities (Filiu 2009). As argued above, the Sahel is considered a safe haven for Islamists' ideology. The marginalized Tuaregs and local Islamists in Sahelian countries found in Islamists message, motivation and inspiration to achieve their goals. For instance, the Tuareg struggles for independent state intensified with AQIM's presence in northern Mali. The declaration of the independence of Tuareg state, Azawad in northern Mali is illuminating. In 2012, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azwad (*Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad*; MNLA), declared independence, Azawad country in northern Mali.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE EMERGENCE AND RISE OF THE BOKO HARAM: A SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY APPROACH

5.1 Mobilization and Recruitment for Boko Haram: Political Opportunity structures and Mobilizing Structures

In social movement theory, success and/or failure of a collective action is determined by movement's mobilization tactics and the environment in which actors live. Therefore, social movement theorists recognize the importance of structural change in creating the conditions necessary for collective action, as well as recognizing that how groups take advantage of and interpret the change is critical to understanding the differences in outcomes of collective actions. Robinson (2004) therefore, described social movement theory as simple as middle way between structural change and agency.

First, changes in political opportunity are wide as it's not restricted to one event but covers various sources. They include changes in internationals structures (e.g., globalization, and the success of a similar movement in another country or region), regime or government change at home, domestic policy or legal changes, or changes within movement itself. Second, mobilizing structures also vary from the formal (e.g., political parties as the case of FIS and other Islamists parties across the Muslim world) to the informal (e.g., informal urban networks and propagation movements) to the illegal (e.g., underground terrorist groups). It is through these structures that movements recruit potential participants, socialize new them, and mobilize contention. Therefore, in any society, there exist both opportunities/constraints and mobilizing structures to organize collective actions, and Nigeria is not an exception.

Tsogo and Johnson (2011) hence claimed that, the eruption of ethnic and religious movements in Nigeria "suggests that minority groups facing oppression tend to react as long as there is a political opportunity at hand and the group has the motivation to act" (55). Similarly, in Walker's account, Boko Haram was created under the Nigeria's conditions of long history of ethno-religious tension, which accounts for the possible rise of religiously and ethnically motivated movements. There is also

growing religious and ethnic groups all over the country as well as "weakness in the institutions of politics and the security services" that creates a political opportunities for those threats to thrive (Walker 2012, 2).

However, despite the fact that collective actions may take advantage of any opportunity to blossom, Nigeria's religious movements remained more or less conservatives since independence in 1960. Nigeria witnessed its first radical Islamist activities in 1980s by Nigeria-based Cameroonian man, Mohammed Marwa. That group – the Maitatsine, gathered large followers among the urban dwellers in city of Kano and within few years flourished to other northern cities of Maiduguri and Yola, Adamawa state capital. The Maitatsine crisis is an example of a radical activists who wanted to bring change to society because they felt that their religion was corrupted by secular governments and corrupt religious leaders manipulated by Western influences (Schwartz 2010 and Tsogo and Johnson 2011) .The group's violent activism were also violently repressed but their activities spilled over to "a new type of activism, using religion for political ends" (Tsogo and Johnson 2011, 55). The Maitatsine, according to Muslims did not represent their interest.

5.1.1 The Study and Preaching Sessions as Mobilizing and Recruitment Grounds for the Boko Haram

Teaching has proved to be an effective way of recruiting followers and maintaining membership is religious movements. People may join both conservatives and moderates Islamist groups in search of knowledge because they meet some of their specific expectations. In countries like Nigeria where Islamic clerics preach freely in mosques, market places and schools, they attract even passers-by when they hear what they are interested in. When Yusuf took over the leadership of the Boko Haram, and even prior to that time, people used to gather and listen to his preaching (wa'azi) in mosques and other preaching grounds in some states across northern Nigeria. It's clear that in Nigeria Islamic scholars deliver Tafsir (Qur'anic exegesis) and translation of other religious texts in both formal and informal mosque, schools and *majalis* (Kane 2003). It's this milieu that Yusuf utilized to gather around him desperate youths that some observers say constituted a "state within a state," with a

cabinet, its own religious police" (Walker 2012, 3). Many of the initial Boko Haram recruits met at Yusuf's study and preaching sessions in Borno, Yobe and Bauchi states. It is therefore true that movement participants are recruited along established lines of interaction embedded in the basic structure of everyday life. In societies where such structures do not exist, collective action is unlikely to emerge and even if it emerged, it's not likely to be anything more than short-term sporadic outbursts of contention.

Another unique opportunity that the Boko Haram exploited is the Almajiri system in northern Nigeria. The name Almajiri is from the Arabic word al-Muhajiroun (emigrants). In Hausa language, the term refers to those itinerant students that travel across cities and villages in northern Nigeria and neighboring countries in search of Qur'anic education. The system is a traditional way of learning the Qur'an and Borno state has been famous center for that, hence hosted large number of Almajirai (plural of Almajiri) from all over Nigeria and neighboring West African countries of Mali, Togo, Niger Republic, Chad and Cameroon since the 11th century (Goodluck and Juliana (n.d), 98). In that milieu, Almajirai were not only prone to the teacher's ideology but also gain the opportunity to meet other students in the study circles. These kinds of kinship and friendship developed in Almajiri schools means a lot when comrades joined movements. The success so far made by the Boko Haram sect for instance, might not be unconnected with the proliferation of the Almajiri schools in Maiduguri, Bauchi Yobe and Kano, Goodluck and Juliana (n.d) further argued. Apart from the fact that Yusuf recruited most of his members from mosque where he used to preach, Almajirai constituted significant percentage in the Boko Haram recruits. As the Almajirai beg for food, money and other basic needs, they easily become vulnerable to anti-government protests that seem to affect their lives. This is some of the things that make Federal government to begin the establishment of modern Almajiri schools in some northern states. Almajirai are mostly conservative people that consider government illegitimate that play no roles in their lives and fails to treat them well. This was the main philosophy of Boko Haram according to Yusuf. With very little hope for the future, this group often become instruments of violence for those looking to perpetrate such acts as they were usually recruited during riots e.g. the 1980s Maitasine riots in Kano, Kaduna Yola, and Maiduguri.

Unlike in the West where contentious groups have the legal rights and possibilities to act openly, in autocratic or less democratic countries, those “open and free spaces” are limited. This increases the needs for collective actors to create those free spaces, which in this respect means places where actors consider safe. Regimes often knowingly or unknowingly provide these kinds of spaces through leaving loopholes of administrative freedom where, contentious words are uttered along with non-contentious ones (Bedford 2009). These safe places are more prevalent in societies where government is rather weak. Thus, failed states provide great opportunities for anti-system movements to thrive. According to some scholars therefore, Boko Haram is a symptom that the Nigerian state has become either a failed, or failing, state. (Adibe 2013, 10), and this manifested itself in the fact that the multi-ethnic character of the Nigerian state manifests in all aspects of its life including Boko Haram issues. In Nigeria, traditional cultural spaces such as market places, study circles, religious places like mosque, churches, community schools and Madrasas etc., have been among the free spaces where indigenous opposition movements grow.

Whenever movement began to gather both material and non-material resources, it obviously starts to present collective demands. Having gathered manpower, the Boko Haram began to present collective demands. The first problems the Boko Haram, like most Nigerians considered Nigeria’s government responsible for, are corruption and poor governance, which according to Boko Haram is the result of un-Islamic government. In Onapajo and Ozodije (2012) words “Nigeria is a country where corruption is celebrated as a political culture. State resources are usually siphoned by political elites to enrich themselves and oppress the masses. Regimes are “irresponsible and irresponsive to the demands of the people” (31). According to Ahmad Salkida, a journalist who interviewed a Boko Haram member:

> Corruption became the catalyst for Boko Haram. [Mohammed] Yusuf [the group’s first leader] would have found it difficult to gain a lot of these people if he was operating in a functional state. But his teaching was easily accepted because the environment, the frustrations, the corruption, [and] the injustice made it fertile for his ideology to grow fast, very fast, like wildfire (Human Right Watch 2012, 24).

And in 2004, one of the Yusuf's pupils explained that their goals of fighting corruption by institutionalizing Islamic government must be achieved very soon (Human Right Watch 2012). This tend to uphold the view that Islamism can be indigenously constructed response to the realities of everyday life, conditioned by government corruption, rising unemployment, and declining social services. From this perspective, deprivation has created a unit of disaffected recruits who seek culturally acceptable places and explanations that address their marginalization and social anomie (Hafez and Wiktorowicz 2004).

The above arguments point to the general conditions that give rise to the Boko Haram as its members also argued, but they do not effectively explain the emergence and proliferation of violence in Boko Haram actions. In most cases, Islamic movements are not "born" violent, Hafez and Wiktorowicz (2004) argued. Instead, proponents of violence develop a clique of militants from within established, predominantly nonviolent Islamic movements as demonstrated in the GIA's case discussed in previous chapter. And while violent Islamic groups may represent constituent elements of a general reaction to intense crisis conditions, this does not in itself explain decisions to utilize violence rather than other mechanisms of collective action.

5.1.2 Boko Haram Gathered Resources

No matter how freely Yusuf and his disciplines established and organized the Boko Haram as a group, they must have overcome some 'soft repressions' from the state. This repression or expectation of it compelled the group to focus on mobilizing participants in prayer, study and preaching sessions – the so called free spaces. In 2003, the group gathered many resources inasmuch as it established a base called 'Afghanistan' in Kanamma village in Yobe State, on the Nigerian border with the Republic of Niger.

It attracted more and more people, especially unemployed youth under its roof by offering welfare handouts mostly in *Ajami* (using Arabic letters to write Hausa), food, and shelter. The sources of the group's money are still opaque. The possible source of funding during that period was from members who had to pay a daily levy of 100 naira to their leader. This provided the basic source of funding for the group,

at initial stage in addition to donations from politicians, government officials and other individuals or organizations within Nigeria (Walker 2012, 3 and Onuoha 2010, 56). Accordingly, some people have been arrested since 2009 for allegedly financing Boko Haram activities. For instance, in July 31, 2009—the day after the police killed Mohammed Yusuf—the military apprehended one of Boko Haram's alleged financial backers, Buji Foi, a former commissioner in the Borno State government (Human Right Watch 2012, 62).

The group also alleged to be receiving funds from outside Nigeria especially from other Islamists in North Africa[31]. In 2007, for instance, Mohammed Yusuf was tried for terrorism-related offences, among which was receiving monies from Al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan to recruit terrorists who would attack residences of foreigners (Onuoha 2010, 57). Walker (2012) concluded that the Boko Haram may have been nurtured from outside Nigeria, especially the possibilities that money from Salafis groups supported it in the early years.

Onapajo and Ozodije (2012) therefore, believe that some of the Boko Haram members were attracted by monetary benefits that accompany their terrorist's acts. They contended that in some cases there were direct payments for recruitment into the group. A case of Abdulrasheed Abubakar who told journalists when apprehended that he was paid the sum of USD 500 to be trained as a bomb specialist in Afghanistan and was promised another USD 35000 if he returned for more training is a good example. They wrote:

> Similarly, it was also reported that Mohammed Manga, the man who carried out the June 16, 2011 suicide bomb attack on the Nigerian police headquarters in Abuja, was paid the sum of 4 million Nigerian naira (approximately US$25 400), which he willed to his family members. Besides these, some simply enjoy the proceeds from attacks on banks. This is against the backdrop of a series of attacks on several banks in the metropolis of Maiduguri and other areas of their operation. They usually justify the act by the assertion that they 'investigated the affected banks and found that the owners and majority of its depositors were big men who siphoned public funds and kept them there (31).

[31] Read more at http://saharareporters.com/news-page/boko-haram-gets-n40million-donation-algeria-premium-times. Accessed February 20, 2014.

From 2003 and 2004, the Nigerian Taliban, as the group was called, began their provocative attacks on police stations in Damaturu, the Yobe state capital. Those attacks necessitated the Nigerian government to deploy task force comprised of military and police to control the situation. According to Bedford (2009) a call for change in society championed by movement is likely to provoke some kind of reaction and response from the political establishment (and in some cases also from other groups in the society). Once the mobilization process has been achieved, the strategies adopted by the movements may have a feedback effect on the strategies adopted by the authorities. An interactive system will be established with a dynamic of its own (43)

At that time, how threatening Boko Haram became was to a large extent determined by its "type", i.e. the issues it focused upon as well as where and how members opted to pursue their goals. This means that from 2003 the Boko Haram began to change its tactics by attacking symbols of states like police stations and government buildings and schools. Not only the tactics used, but also the character of the issues raised by a movement and who they are approaching with their activities are of importance for how the movement is perceived by the state.

As discussed earlier, movement that gathered both material and non-material resources change its tactics, which cause state to apply *reactive* repression. Repression is reactive when applied after activists gain organizational strength and began to present collective demands (Hafez and Wiktorowicz 2004). This kind of repression hypothetically means that the Boko Haram might begin to become more aggrieved and also command resources that can be used to fight back. Or the repression crushed their insurgency. Thus, Onapajo and Ozodije (2012) believed that among the factors that allowed the Boko Haram to reach organizational level is Nigerian government failure to act preemptively in order to forestall the incident. They argue that intelligence failure by state is when state security and intelligence agencies are unable to obtain, collate, assess and disseminate intelligence that would inform on preemptive steps to be taken by the authority to forestall the actual outbreak of the Boko Haram saga (61). Wiktorowicz and Hafez (2004) however, hypothesized that pre-emptive repression halts activists' opportunity to rapidly

expand material and organizational resources, thus weakens supporters and sympathizers and compels them to keep their grievances and anger to themselves.

However, even when the Boko Haram became more radical, espoused violent tactics, and the free spaces diminished, it continues to recruit from biographically and structurally available activists (Snow 1980 and McAdam 1986).The biographically available are those that are characterized by "absence of personal constraints that may increase the costs and risks of movement participation, such as full-time employment, marriage and family responsibilities" (McAdam 1986, 70). This means that activists require the qualities that encapsulated organization needs from its members. These qualities include investment of substantial time resources, which make some individuals more available for movement exploration and participation than others. Therefore, exclusive organizations leaders recruit only like-minded individuals and further regulate the behaviors by limiting external ties and demanding adherence to a strict code of conduct, all of which aids in the development of committed activists and group cohesion. This explains why Almajirai and some unemployed youths constituted large percentage of Boko Haram's recruits. Now the group chooses to use the porous nature of Nigerian borders with other Sahelian countries as free spaces to base its operations. It's no coincidence that Boko Haram as encapsulated organizations relies on hit- and-run tactics remains very active in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, the states that border Chad, Niger Republic and Cameroun respectively.

5.2 Cultural Framing

Activism, whether violent or peaceful, inclusive or exclusive, are always associated with framing processes – the process of meaning construction that resonate with potential participants and general public (Benford and Snow 2000). The framings adopted by movements' actors are contingent upon the environment in which frames are proffered, its articulators and the targeted partakers. The most critical dimension of the framing process for movement mobilization is frame resonance. That is ability of frame to resonate with potential participants. Where a movement frames draw upon indigenous cultural symbols, language, and identities, it is more likely to

resonate with targeted participants, thus enhancing mobilization. Such reverberation, however, depends upon not only its consistency with cultural narratives, but also the reputation of the frame articulators in that society, the personal salience of the frame for potential participants, the consistency of the frame, and the frame's empirical credibility in real life (Benford and Snow 2000, and Wiktorowicz 2004).

In case of the Boko Haram, like for other terrorist with religious motivations or ideologies, cultural factors are crucial at the onset of activism. For instance, in northeastern Nigeria, a society that is predominantly Muslims, Islamist' messages presented by the Boko Haram were likely to be acceptable since it carried Islamic messages and that messages used to motivate people to be in Yusuf's preaching sessions. Getting what someone wants from non-state actors, no matter how insignificant its value, are parts of the selective incentives that motivate potential participants to join the group or movement that offer either religious or emotional benefits.

Apart from language and cultural congruency between group framing project and the demands of participants, group approach could stress collectivity as a method for creating and maintaining a collective identity. For instance, militant groups often make overt appeals to a broad identity to justify their actions and seek sympathy. A good example is al-Zawahiri's famous cry 'We are Muslims!' from an Egyptian prison cell in 1981 (Beck 2008, 1571). This claim is similar to what Yusuf made by calling his group ahlus-sunnah that fights anything that "spoils the belief in one God"[32]. Such identity claims became obvious when Boko Haram released, in 2011 the following statement:

> We want to reiterate that we are warriors who are carrying out Jihad (religious war) in Nigeria and our struggle is based on the traditions of the holy prophet. We will never accept any system of government apart from the one stipulated by Islam because that is the only way that the Muslims can be liberated. We do not believe in any system of government, be it traditional or orthodox except the Islamic system and that is why we will keep on fighting against democracy, capitalism, socialism and whatever. We will not allow the Nigerian Constitution to replace the laws that have been enshrined in the Holy Qur'an, we will not allow adulterated conventional education (Boko) to replace Islamic

[32] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8172270.stm. Accessed February 18, 2014.

> teachings. We will not respect the Nigerian government because it is illegal. We will continue to fight its military and the police because they are not protecting Islam. We do not believe in the Nigerian judicial system and we will fight anyone who assists the government in perpetrating illegalities (Human Right Watch 2012, 30).

Such a claim is both an identity and political statement. Identity statements can be more than cultural expression because they link potential supporters to a cause and implicitly suggest goals to be achieved. Thus, as discussed in chapter one and elaborated by Perry and Negrin (2008), radical Islamists select some religious text to create distinct identity and justify their actions, which are usually not in tune with how other Muslims understand it. For instance, following Nigeria's 1999 transition to democracy, the democratically elected governments of 12 Muslim-majority states in northern Nigeria, the stronghold of the Boko Haram incorporated Shari'a into states law and launched extensive Islamic social and economic reforms. Rather than rejecting popular democratic institutions as a barrier to Shari'a, non-violent Islamists believe that Islamic law implementation would improve their performance, by protecting the religious rights of Muslims, enhancing economic development and social justice, and improving governance by holding elites accountable to shared standards, which will eventually lead to full implementation of Shari'a. These make other Islamists and Muslims in northern Nigeria to question the credibility of the Boko Haram's Islamic creed. For instance, several Islamic clerics in Nigeria work with government, pursuit Western education and encourage their followers to get Western education, which is not in tune with Yusuf's philosophy. Recently, at the first annual Conference of Ahlus-Sunnah of Nigeria, held on 15th February, 2014, the Sultan of Sokoto also questioned Boko Haram's Islamic faith.[33] He referred to them as terrorist organization that carries activities against the country and therefore whosoever calls them Islamic is unfair to Muslims[34].

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[33] The Sultan of Sokoto also known as *Amir-ul-Momineen*" is considered the first spiritual leader in the Muslim community in Nigeria. The office dated back to the 19th century Sokoto Jihad that unified and established Islamic caliphate in northern Nigeria – the Sokoto Caliphate. The title of the Sultan became popular 1815, and now the Sultan is the president-general of the National Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs, a council that regulates Islamic affairs in Nigeria.

[34] Read more at http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/02/boko-haram-dont-label-muslims-criminals-sultan/. Accessed February 20, 2014.

Despite the efforts by both government and even Islamic clerics to deter people from joining Boko Haram, the group's framing works resonates with a lot of their targets. Literatures on framing processes take into account the role of framing articulators in making it acceptable among participants. Yusuf was a good public speaker who devoted his time preaching to make his pupils believe that Western education and governmental employment are both *haram*. To make that possible, Yusuf used to read some selected text to his audience. For example, on 30 May 2008, Yusuf presented a translation of *al-Madaris al-alamiyya al-ajnabiyya al-istimariyya: tarikhuha wa makhaṭiruha* (Global, foreign and colonialist schools: Their history and dangers) by Bakr b. Abdullah Abū Zayd (d.2008), in which he highlighted several quotations from the Qur'an and Hadith with which Abū Zayd supported his contentions that he believes condemned western education. Yusuf "reaffirmed his total and sweeping condemnation of modern secular education with the authority of this book, to the repeated applause of his disciples who chanted *Allahu Akbar* each time Yusuf ridiculed his opponents with sarcasm and disgust" (Journal for Religion in Africa 2012, 124). In debates with other Islamic scholars and also in an interview with BBC, Yusuf maintained that:

> There are prominent Islamic preachers who have seen and understood that the present Western-style education is mixed with issues that run contrary to our beliefs in Islam. Like rain. We believe it is a creation of God rather than an evaporation caused by the sun that condenses and becomes rain. Like saying the world is a sphere. If it runs contrary to the teachings of Allah, we reject it. We also reject the theory of Darwinism[35].

Yusuf's reputations made him able to reorder the priorities of his group members to reject Western education and its institutions. When his pupils began to challenge the Nigerian states, which they claimed responsible for their sufferings, the struggles took a new dimension by framing it as moral obligation which led some students from higher institutions in Borno and Yobe states "withdrew from school, tore up their certificates and joined the group for Quranic lessons and preaching"(Onuoha 2010, 56). Wickham found similar case in his study of Egyptian Islamists and wrote that "in a social milieu in which aspiring students coveted a

[35] http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8172270.stm. Accessed February 18, 2014.

secular university degree (*shahada*) as both a status symbol and an instrument of career advancement, the Islamist subculture diminished the relative value attached to secular knowledge gained through formal education" (Wickham 2004, 243). This occurs at a time when formal education no longer guaranteed permanent employment, and/or desired jobs. And, in Nigeria, lack of employment is among the problem that make youth susceptible to collective actions.

Wickham further contends that, when Islamists become radicals, they have ways of facilitating a progress toward high-risk activism. In such cases, Islamists frame activism as a moral obligation that demands self-sacrifice and commitments to achieve the desired goals (Wickham 2004). Whenever such happens, movement leaders begin to mobilize individuals into actions by issuing a "call to arms" or normative rationale for collective action—motivational framing. Having perceived the tensed situation between the Boko Haram and securities forces, Yusuf began to give motivational guidelines to his followers, instructing them to donate money and blood because both would be required to treat the injured; to follow his orders even if they are going to die while obeying; and wait for his command before taking any decision (Journal for Religion in Africa 2012). This followed Yusuf claims to have hidden plans after issuing what he called an open letter to Nigerian President[36]. Now Boko Haram began to possess the qualities of exclusive organizations, which pragmatically changed its guidelines, frames and modus operandi.

5.2.1 Repression, Exclusive Organizations, and Anti-system Frames

State repressions have the power to end collective actions and/or send it underground and in the case of the latter, radicalize some members who espouse anti-system frames. At the onset of their struggle, the Boko Haram members referred to Nigerian system of government as un-Islamic hence should be replaced. Whether because of the limited resource they had or soft repression from the state, Yusuf himself was

[36] Copies of this open-letter were sent to air force, army, navy, police and state security service, members of the national assembly, and the Governor Ali Sheriff of Borno State, warning them that he and his followers would not let the shooting of his followers be in vain and clearly threatening retaliation.

said to defy the use of violence in achieving the end – Islamic state. As the leader of Nigerian Taliban whose pupils established a camp away from the mainstream society, Yusuf believed that "an Islamic system of government should be established in Nigeria, and if possible all over the world, but through dialogue" (Human Rights Watch 2012, 32). But the danger that his students posed to the people and government compelled Nigerian security forces to strengthen the repression against them.

Open confrontation between security and Boko Haram began on June 11, 2009 in Maiduguri when the latter felt bold enough to defy government rules by refusing to wear motorcycle helmets. That event triggered open struggles that changed the tactics adopted by both the government and the Boko Haram toward each other. One explanation is that the government believed that the group was arming itself and then lunched preventive strike when Boko Haram members defied state law and began to fight security operatives (Adibe 2013). As explained in chapter three, the event of July 2009 led to the death of the Boko Haram members, security personal and even civilians. That was exactly when the Boko Haram members stepped in to openly confront security not only in Maiduguri but in Kano, Yobe and Bauchi as in what they called "reprisal attacks for the police arrest and humiliation of their members (Adibe 2013, 12).

Since that time, the Boko Haram has been claiming the revenge for the death of their members, which Yusuf himself started when he declared that they were on revenge mission before he was apprehended.[37] The use of audio-cassettes and cell phones are now proven to be an effective media for disseminating movements' messages. The circulation of Yusuf's preaching in Nigeria is a good example of how efficacious these media are. Among other reasons for the wide circulation of the cassettes and MP3 is that they create income-generating activities for the many persons involved, who are mostly not propagandists for the Boko Haram. However, only the most important preaching sessions were recorded and/or diffused, and in Yusuf's case they carry anti-system frames. Nevertheless, most of those audio

[37] http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/11/we-are-on-revenge-mission-boko-haram-suspect-tells-court/. Accessed February 20, 2014.

recordings now rarely circulate in Nigeria. When Shekau resurged in 2010 as the group new leader, he regularly include in his statements anti-system frames to mobilize participants. In a video released by Abubakar Shekau, he claimed that the Yusuf was killed because the regime is un-Islamic "Everyone knows how our leader was murdered and everyone knows the way the Muslims were killed… Catastrophe is caused by unbelief, unrest is unbelief, injustice is unbelief, democracy is unbelief and the constitution is unbelief"[38].

Therefore, Boko Haram's anti-system frames have been similar to that of the GIA in which the messages frame whoever disapproves of their actions or sustain the regime in one way or another as part of "them" hence a legitimate target. Immediately after UN building suicide attacks on August 2011, Qaqa, a Boko Haram spokesperson told journalist that Boko Haram is responsible for the attacks.[39] He however, reiterated that they attacked the UN building because "UN represents unbelief and they support the Nigerian government whom we are fighting (Human Right Watch 2012, 56). On January 2012, leaflets believed to be distributed by the Boko Haram around the city of Kano stated that:

> We have on several occasions explained the categories of people we attack and they include: government officials, government security agents, Christians loyal to CAN (Christian Association of Nigeria) and whoever collaborates in arresting or killing us even if he is a Muslim (Human Right Watch 2012, 52).

Apparently, government was able to crush the Boko Haram uprising, which led to the arrest and executions of hundreds of its members. But as the event resulted in what led to the arrest and executions of Yusuf, his father in-law and the supposed financer of the group, it meant the hitherto "free spaces" for mobilization and recruitment no longer exist. For movement to link the environment with anti-system frames there must be a kind of repression that it uses to present that. Wiktorowicz and Hafiz (2004) believed that the way and manner in which the state combines the timing and targeting of repression determines movement strategic calculations.

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[38] Watch the video here http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/01/20121122529369976.html. Accessed March 5, 2014.

[39] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14677957. accessed March 6, 2014.

Reactive and indiscriminate repression is likely to encourage violent tactics, which go hand in hand with anti-system frames. Indiscriminate repression targets not only leaders and core activists but include supporters, sympathizers, and ordinary citizens suspected of involvement in the movement.

So many constraints confront movement in repressive environment which include threats from the security forces and government infiltrators and informers that undermines the movement (Hafez 2004). As discussed earlier in the introductory chapter however, the need necessary to overcome those constraints generated by a repressive environment strongly encourages movements to develop exclusive organizations. Thus, as Della Porta argued, radical militancy can be one of the outcomes of contention (Della Porta 1995). And, this outcome shapes not only the way states response to militancy but also the trajectory adopted by the radical militants. For instance, while state repression – which signifies closeness of the system – can suppress mobilization, it can also make militancy more likely by increasing anti-system frames. The salience and the credibility of Islamists' message become obvious when state hunts all suspected participants.

Paradoxically, the presence of frames and ideology of the Boko Haram often contradicts their actions. It is obvious that the availability of easily accessible information –products of Western education – can prime individuals for radicalization and recruitment attempts by organization entrepreneurs or even inspire individuals without prior network contacts to actively approach radical milieus. While the government-owned media may readily diffuse images of terrorist acts, they may do so in a manner that is unsympathetic to the terrorists and their acts. Based on that, the Boko Haram has launched several attacks on the media. In an online statement, for example after bombing a media office, the group said it bombed Thisday, a Lagos-based private newspaper, because the newspaper had reported many "lies" about them (Human Right Watch 2012, 56). That compelled the Boko Haram to use the Internet and international media, which in contrast, enable frames and images to bypass the filters of the traditional media, hence present the required message to the potential participants. This inconsistency between Boko Haram actual philosophy and modus operandi is among the future research agenda that now are based on so many conspiracies. Nevertheless, what remains clear is that the Boko

Haram group relies on technological tools to disseminate information to their "enemies" and carries out their terrorist acts with sophisticated weapons produce through technology.

CHPATER SIX

CONCLUSION

There is much evidence to suggest that all the tripartite social movement theory factors – political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures, and framing process or cultural framing – exist in both Algeria and Nigeria. Without those variables, organizing collective action like that of the AQIM and the Boko Haram at initial stage could be just a mere protest for few days or weeks. Out of the three social movements theory factors, framing and political opportunities/constraints play major roles in maintaining the collective action by the two movements. Rather than ending their struggles when environments seemed constrained, the AQIM and the Boko Haram exemplified movements that believe in the power of anti-system framing and exclusive/clandestine approach to transform individuals' perception about their society and prime them into violent activism. Its confirmed from this study that when someone's life revolves around a small group of like-minded individuals who, collectively, are cut off or cut off themselves from the mainstream society, that person's judgment and behavior become, to a large extent, a function of group dynamics. It's clear that as the GIA/GSPC and the Boko Haram drifts ever further away from mainstream society as a result of their violent activities, the propensity of their members to adopt radical views rises as well. The worldview of both the group and the individuals in it frequently become more and more divorced from reality, and they strike some outside observers as bizarre in their disconnection from the actual world. In effect, the groups created not only their own specific micro-culture, with a distinct set of moral and behavioral standards, but they also build and live in a universe of their own, delimit by their radical leaders.

The factors in social movement theory still linger in both countries as they do in almost every country and other groups may exploit them to present collective demands or organize collective actions. It's important to note at this juncture that Islam does not bring about violent action, no does any other religion but usually political and economic grievances are primary causes or catalysts, and religion becomes a means to legitimate and mobilize (Juergensmeyer 2005). Thus, group like

the GIA/GSPC/AQIM and the Boko Haram's decision to turn to violence is usually situational and is not endemic to Islam.

Appeals to Islam were only one of the ways of framing or representing a struggle in terms that a potential constituency will understand rather than the determinants of a strategic choice. Obviously, groups espousing similar goals often choose different methods, disagreeing over the means more than the ends. This explains why other social movements continue to exploit the available opportunities and organizing structures to frame specific events as collective responsibilities to ameliorate.

No other strong and violent Islamists operate either in Nigeria or Algeria without being linked to the AQIM or the Boko Haram. Nonetheless, ethnic and political movements blossom especially in Nigeria. But Algeria and Nigeria locally and in conjunction with other Sahelian countries have intensified their efforts to end the AQIM and the Boko Haram's operations. For example, since the 1990s, Algerian authorities have led several measures and policies to end the activities of the GIA/GSPC/AQIM. This policy has been accompanied by several amnesties, whose goal was to coax the remaining GIA/GSPC/AQIM members and deter bystander public from joining the movements as well. The political jargon adopted in Algeria has two approaches, which have been supported by different factions: the *éradicateurs* (eradicators) and *dialoguistes* (dialoguers), representing the two side of an endless political debate that has influenced decision-making in Algeria over the last two decades (Cristiani and Fabiani 2011). This polarization of the political approach led to the adoption of a policy mix between the two. The relative success of this approach has effectively led to a significant weakening of the Algerian Islamists. Similar approach has been in place in Nigeria since 2009 inasmuch as a faction allegedly from the Boko Haram accepted amnesty while the security personnel continue to fight those who chose to remain violent and underground. The dialogue offer is still on from the Nigerian government. Declining dialogue means continued government crackdown on the Boko Haram as stressed by the military.[40]

[40] http://www.dailytimes.com.ng/article/accept-dialogue-now-or-get-crushed-cas-tells-bokoharam. Accessed March 7, 2014.

6.1 Similarities and Differences between the Algerian Islamist (The FIS/GIA/GSPC/AQIM and the Boko Haram

6.1.1 Similarities

One of the major similarities between the AQIM and Boko Haram is that both claim to offer solutions to some specific problems that according them bedevil Muslim through the slogan of "Islam is the solution". Even though both the FIS and the Boko Haram metamorphosed from moderate and conservative to violent movement respectively, the trajectories followed proved that political constraints affected how their framing and mobilization tactics work. It's seen in chapters four and five that when government in Algeria and Nigeria changed their approaches towards the AQIM and the Boko Haram, those movements also devised other means to shield themselves from losing their resources hence maintained the struggles. The governments in Algeria and Nigeria began responding at the time when the AQIM and the Boko Haram's actions appeared threatening. Though the AQIM and the Boko Haram threatened their states in different ways at the onset, the reactions from states share similar pattern as the AQIM and the Boko Haram gathered both material and non-material resources before their actions began to be checked.

The second similarity is about how the Boko Haram and AQIM see themselves and how authorities, sympathizers and non-sympathizers both within and outside their countries see them. The way members of those movements consider themselves is more or less parallel to a situation of "we against them and/or vice versa". This fits Haberfeld and Hassel's (2009) description of anti-system movements. According to these scholars, dissidents in their societies consider themselves as:

> Individuals who have some sort of a grievance against the larger society in which they live, either physically or identify with conceptually. They represent a minority in the majority world dominated by those who have or claim to have this that the minority do not have or claim not to have. These **Have Nots (the minority)** seek to acquire what the majority (**The Haves**) claim to have or/and the Have Nots also seek to disrupt or destroy whatever it is that The Haves claim to have and enjoy. It is a battle of the Have Nots versus Haves and their weapon is Fear (2).

This confirms the notion that all Islamists – conservatives, moderates and militants – agree over the end than the means. On the part of states and international community, these two movements are only terrorist organizations that strive to challenge democracy and Western interests in their home countries. For the Muslim in Sahelian countries, the AQIM and the Boko Haram do not share similar religious belief with them. Thus, apart from different measures employed by Algeria and Nigeria to end the AQIM and the Boko Haram respectively, the US has been responding to help curtail the expansion of both. The two movements are designated by the US as Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), and there leaders labeled as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT) as well as the US placing bounties on Belmokhtar and Shekau.[41] The AQIM and the Boko Haram also serve as saviors to their members whom, as discussed in chapters four and five are influenced by framings works to accept these movements' appeals. However, both enjoy little support from the general population whom were often targeted as government collaborators.

The third similarity between the AQIM and the Boko Haram is the aligning frames with the issues that resonated with their targeted participants. Due to the nature of the societies in which the AQIM and the Boko Haram emerged, the social movement theory concept of frame alignment has been significant in mobilizing participants. In other words, aligning the struggles with cultural and religious duties means that only movements with such qualities have the highest tendency of organizing collective actions for those participants in both Algeria and northern Nigeria, perhaps at that time when the AQIM and the Boko Haram emerged. In 1980's Algeria only Islamists could rally the mobs on the streets chiefly because of the concord between their actions and the frame proffered. Similarly, Yusuf carefully selected his targets while demonizing Western education so that only messages related to their religion and everyday life could prime them into collective action. These are among the reasons both movements find those who are biographically and structurally available to answer and accept their calls. In other

[41] http://www.africansinamericanewswatch.com/a/p/news/news0174.html accessed on 17th March, 2014.

words, the AQIM and the Boko Haram carefully have been selective in targeting participants and locating where to present their demands.

The forth similarity is that these movements also share similarities of victims. The victims of the GIA and the GSP and the Boko Haram were in one way or the associated with states of Algeria and Nigeria. The degree to which their targets are associated with nation states is however strictly based on their interpretations. According to them any non-targeted individuals who lose his/her life as a result of their actions is considered martyr. Nevertheless, the most affected victims by the GIA, the GSPC/AQIM and the Boko Haram attacks have been Muslims because their strongholds are predominantly Muslims. This is plus the similarity they share in kidnapping foreign and local civilians. The AQIM usually kidnaps foreigners as hostage, while the Boko Haram often kidnaps people to attract more attentions. The recently kidnapped school girls at Chibok exemplify Boko Haram's kidnapping tactics.

Another similarity is the leadership structure of the AQIM and the Boko Haram is pretty much similar. There are spiritual and perhaps, according to them fallible leaders who issue fatwa (legal opinion) and in extension delimit the trajectory of the movements' actions. Although both movements used to have a clear organizational structure with specific location and headquarters, especially in the case of the FIS as political party; their leaders and activists are now the most wanted personalities by security personnel in Algeria and Nigeria in particular and other Sahelian countries in general. Two actors in the Sahel – Belmokhtar and Shekau control the AQIM and the Boko Haram movements from opaque and mysterious locations. They sometimes appear on YouTube to claim responsibilities and/or specify next target but their actual locations rather than their actions are unknown. Similarly, there is good number of the AQIM and the Boko Haram members who are active in Sahelian countries. Seizing of Gao in northern Mali by Tuaregs could not be successful without Islamic fighters from the Boko Haram and the AQIM's Sahel commands under Belmokhtar. This is clear sign that the AQIM and the Boko Haram strategically help and recruits other dissidents from Sahelian countries.

However, the Boko Haram of Muhammad Yusuf, which predated the current one, was well known in regards to its location, leaders, activists, demands etc. Though the name given to the group – the Boko Haram remains, but the location, and leadership of today's Boko Haram remain unclear. The only thing that is clear about the Boko Haram of today is taking harbor in mysterious, targeting and attacking both civilian and security forces. Therefore, the only difference with the AQIM is the changes of name from FIS, to GIA GSPC and finally AQIM, with each one witnessing changes in the method of operations. The FIS of Madani and Benhadj was formal organization with headquarters and regional offices, manifesto, but all formal characteristics began to disappear when radical actors took over the struggles. Likewise in the case of the Boko Haram, the specific areas where Yusuf fathered the original Boko Haram had been subjected to security surveillance, which made some desperate actors to exist in a mysteriously unknown location but still under the name of the Boko Haram.

6.1.2 Differences

The FIS had since its establishment some veterans from Afghanistan as members but the struggles were limited to fighting Algerian government at home until the creation of the AQIM. The Boko Haram was composed of local mobs that also focused solely on northern Nigeria as nucleus of operation. Right from the onset, the AQIM and the Boko Haram adopted different means in achieving their goals. The FIS was a formal political party, whereas the Boko Haram started as propagation movement that focused energy on youths with some sort of grievances. That placed the AQIM and the Boko Haram as moderate and conservative Islamists respectively. Similarly, the Islamists in Algeria were power-oriented who established political party to topple the FLN and establish an Islamic society. Boko Haram was identity-oriented with much focus on transforming what they consider corrupt and un-Islamic society in Nigeria.

Following the rise of the GIA and the subsequent merger of GSPC with Al-Qaeda, the organization of the GSPC/AQIM did not change. Overall, the group is divided into nine geographic sectors that are commanded by an Emir each. Each of these sectors is semi-independent. This sometimes led to a degree of competition and

disagreement between regional commanders. Indeed, the Sahelian group has often acted independently, pursuing different goals and using different tactics from the Kabylia command. The Kabylia command as mentioned in chapter four operates in mountainous areas within Algeria under the supposedly AQIM's general commander, Droukdel.

Another difference is about leadership. In the Sahel, Droukdel has assigned Mokhtar Belmokhtar and Abdelhamid Abu Zeid as his two principal deputies in the region. Yahya Abu Ammar (aka Yahya Jouadi), Abu Anas al-Shingeiti or al-Shanqiti, and Abdelkarim "the Touareg," assist Belmokhtar and Abu Zeid with operations in the Sahelian command. These regional commanders have autonomy not only to create their own paramilitary organizations but also create local partnerships across international borders into neighboring countries. Overall, the organization of the AQIM has given regional commanders a large degree of autonomy making it difficult to precisely define membership strength, ideological aims, sources of finance, and the formation of local alliances.

According to Onuoha (2013), following the murder of Yusuf, the Boko Haram under Shekau has him (Shekau) as spiritual leader with two deputies whom receive orders directly from him. There is *Shura* consultative council members among whom are the head of various committees. The Shura members command state commanders and strategists who also give order to local commanders. Under local commanders are operational cells saddled with local operations. While directives and instructions come from top to bottom the information flow in other way round.

A Third difference is about whether they engage in illegal business or not. The hybrid approach adopted by the AQIM's Sahel command between a terrorism and illicit business of smuggling and helping smugglers to get access to the Sahara desert has therefore become a far more complex threat to stability in the area and differentiate the AQIM from the Boko Haram whose members do not participate in illegal business (Christiani and Fabiani, 2011). The level of inclusion/accommodation by both the Algerian and the Nigerian regimes differentiates the FIS from the Boko Haram. The glasnost in Algeria officially accommodated the Islamist into the scene. In Nigeria, the Boko Haram had no formal

inclusion but perceived the vulnerability of the system hence decided to challenge it. Though both Nigerian and Algerian activists now receive the same responses from the authorities, they were perceived differently at different time. Dede (2008) believed that "when Islamists achieved successes in elections (at associational, local or national levels) both regimes changed their inclusionary-accommodationist policies with exclusionary-confrontationist ones towards the Islamists" (346). As the governments perceive the FIS as a double threat (ideological and political) they start implementing an exclusionary/confrontationist policy towards them which consequently gave birth to radical activism from within the FIS. The Boko Haram never had opportunity to organize into political party let alone winning an election.

6.2 What can Possibly Happen?

Domestically, the groups will continue to attack their targets in Algeria and Nigeria rather than international targets inside or outside those countries. In Algerian, the attacks by the AQIM may continue to threaten the stability of the state, the Algerian base of AQIM has been weaken though. On the part of the Islamists, the instability caused by violent Islamists within the Algeria will probably halt any plan to legalize Islamist party in the future. Islamists may therefore be subjected to surveillance by state for fear that their action will subsequently incite violence. In Nigeria on the other hand, it is possible for the Boko Haram to become increasingly involved in the ethno-religious violence taking place in different part of the country. It will probably involve in Plateau State crises, where indigenes fight over ethnic and religious identity. Such a move would further threaten to destabilize the country's stability and unity.

The Boko Haram's violence in northern Nigeria may lead to the increased isolation of this region. Trade in Kano, the economic hub of the north, is estimated to have been reduced by half in recent years (Siegle 2013). As Boko Haram's violent attacks have increased, fewer traders are investing in northern Nigeria while many businesses are being relocated to Southern part of the country. This coincides with a lot of local business engage by youth in the northern Nigeria being banned by the states. For instance, the hit-and-run tactics on motorcycle by the Boko Haram

members led to the outlawing commercial motorcyclists in different states of the north. This may multiply the number of unemployed youth in the north, which means increased menace to stability.

There are however, prospects regarding stability with the AQIM and the Boko Haram in both Algeria and Nigeria. From the experiences gained in conflict situations with Islamists after US invasion Iraq and Afghanistan, the prospects for stability with the AQIM and the Boko Haram will probably come from Algeria and Nigeria respectively. There should be home-driven policies based and inspired by local actors who understand the local dynamics within these countries. “A society’s path to peace and security greatly depends on the vision and values that can shape such a society’s future and these can only come from within” (Olojo 2013). Algiers and Abuja need to be more creative in their approach and intensify joint endeavors with academic and research institutions working on peace, conflict and terrorism issues.

While the government’s military approach cannot always match the hit-and-run guerrilla tactics of the AQIM and the Boko Haram, the dual approach of dialogue and eradication should be strengthen. Therefore, the governments in Algiers and Abuja also need to strengthen coordination, improve intelligence gathering and facilitate the flow of crucial information in a timely and pre-emptive manner. Intelligence and security agencies within Algeria and Nigeria must also recognize that the realization of objectives depends on their ability to work with and win the trust of local communities. Developmental reforms and policies need to be geared towards improving economic infrastructure, stimulating human enterprise and supporting political institutions that are corruption-free and accountable.

Now, the AQIM and the Boko Haram may strengthen their union in the Sahel as both operate and complement each other not only in their countries of origin but some Sahelian countries. The AQIM in particular has been recruiting among the citizenry in the Sahel and the Sahel command is the most threatening in the region. The attacks by the Boko Haram have since second part of 2013 been concentrated on Nigerian states of Borno, Yobe, Adamawa and Taraba. Those states border the Sahelian countries of Chad, Niger and Cameroun respectively. This explains why

Nigeria recently shut its border with Cameroun and increase security in other borders with Chad, Benin, Niger and Cameroun joining the crusade[42]. Another interesting development apart from security crackdown that might have sent the Boko Haram out of its strongholds in Nigeria is the rise of Vigilante Youth Group (Civilian JTF). The civilian JTF is a group of Youth in Borno and Yobe that began operation in complementing the efforts of the military JTF in the arrest and curbing of activities of the Boko Haram. This development may further send hundreds of Boko Haram members out of their strongholds in north-eastern Nigeria and desperate among its members may join the AQIM. The immediate thing that can happen is the transformation of the AQIM and the Boko Haram into a single regional organization that strikes and hides, as well as seeks a safer base of operations and an easier life in the Sahel. The Boko Haram has been more close to some of the Sahelian countries as significant members come from Niger, Cameroun and Chad. As a result, the Boko Haram affiliation to the AQIM and maybe re-branding and forging a single name as a survival tactic than a sign of strength is possible. This merger between the Boko haram with the AQIM is more possible since the latter, finds strength in the 2006's rhetorical, tactical and strategic affiliation with the mainstream Al-Qaeda (Christani and Fabiani 2011).

When the AQIM and the Boko Haram become a single or unified Islamist movement that all other movements recognize as mother organization, counter-measures will consequently involve all Sahelian countries. All the Sahelian countries may automatically join and help the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) aimed at curtailing the spillover of activities of the AQIM and the Boko Haram in their countries. The measures will therefore require the hands of international communities. The transnational threats pose by AQIM were taken into account as early as 2003 by international community and the United States launched the Pan-Sahel Initiative. The PSI was initiated to increase the reaction capacities of Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger by training and equipping some soldiers in each of these participant countries with counterterrorism tactics through exposing its military to

[42] http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/02/nigeria-seals-state-border-with-cameroon-2014223154723696322.html. and http://leadership.ng/news/360083/terrorism-nigeria-chad-benin-cameroon-niger-joint-border-patrol-deal. Accessed March 27, 2014.

U.S. training, under the responsibility of United States European Command (EUCOM). In 2005, the PSI developed into the more ambitious Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), which included the four Sahelian countries that had been part of the PSI as well as Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia in the Maghreb, and Nigeria and Senegal (Filiu 2009). This initiative will be strengthen with more members.

Whatever happens either between the AQIM and the Boko Haram or among the Sahelian countries, Algeria and Nigeria will still be the most affected countries by the two movements, hence at the forefront of any counter-measures. Therefore, Algeria and Nigeria will continue to face little or more pressures to end these movements as the countries of their origin. Nevertheless, the AQIM and the Boko Haram will affect Sahelian countries as a whole.

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