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**THE NEXUS BETWEEN HEGEMONY AND
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS: THE US
HEGEMONY AND THE UN IN THE CASE OF
GULF WARS**

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DEDICATION

To my grandfather, may his soul rest in peace.

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Thesis Subject: The Nexus Between Hegemony and International Institutions: The US hegemony and the UN in the case of Gulf Wars

Thesis Date: June 2014

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This is to certify that I have read this thesis and that in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts.

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The material included in this thesis has not been submitted wholly or in part for any academic award or qualification other than that for which it is now submitted.

Özgün Tursun

June 2014

ABSTRACT

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June 2014

The Nexus Between Hegemony and International Institutions: The US hegemony and the UN in the case of Gulf Wars

Gulf War of 2003 was a signature that underlines the dramatic change of the US foreign policy from multilateral to unilateral. This aforementioned transformation was stemmed from the change in the base of the hegemonic world order in the 1970s and directly affects both the role of the United Nations (UN) as a tool of the US hegemony and as an emergent actor in international politics. To understand the reciprocal relation between the US hegemony and the UN, this thesis will interpret the historical context of the Gulf Wars within the framework of Gramscian hegemony theories and institutionalism theories. The study analyzes the interplay between the US hegemony and the UN in order to explain current ineffectiveness of the UN in international politics with a systemic understanding.

Key Words: Hegemony, American hegemony, the United Nations, Gramsci, Gulf War, legitimacy.

KISA ÖZET

Özgün Tursun

Haziran 2014

Hegemonya ve Uluslararası Örgütler arasındaki bağlantı: Irak Savaşları örneğinde
Amerikan Hegemonyası ve Birleşmiş Milletler

2003 yılındaki Irak savaşı Amerikan'ın çok taraflı dış politikadan tek taraflı dış politikaya geçişinin dramatik bir işaretidir. Bahsedilen bu dönüşüm 1970lerde hegemonik dünya sisteminin temelindeki değişimden kaynağını almakta ve Birleşmiş Milletlerin (BM), hem Amerikan hegemonyasının bir aracı olarak, hem de uluslararası politikadaki bağımsız yapısını açıkça etkilemektedir. ABD hegemonyası ve BM arasındaki bu karşılıklı ilişkiyi anlamak için, bu tez Irak Savaşlarının tarihsel sürecini Gramscici hegemonya teorileri ve kurumsalcı yaklaşımlar çerçevesinde yorumlayacaktır. Çalışma ABD hegemonyası ve BM arasındaki karşılıklı etkileşimi analiz ederek, BM'nin uluslararası politikadaki güncel etkisizliğini sistemsal bir kavrayışla açıklamaktadır.

Key Words: American hegemony, the United Nations, Gramsci, Gulf War, legitimacy.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

GATT	General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
LON	League of Nations
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Forces
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organization

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Problem Formulation

'By the war's end, the United States had half of the world's wealth and a position of power without historical precedent. Naturally, the principal architects of policy intended to use this power to design a global system in their interests.'

Noam Chomsky (1999, 02)

As Chomsky stated, right after the World War II, the United States became the most dominant power, in fact a hegemon, in global politics. Historically speaking no other power has held that much power throughout the history. However this power does not “automatically creates incentives to project one's power abroad” (Keohane 2005, 35). Thus the United States used this power as a leverage mechanism in global politics, by having a preeminent role in the process of establishing new world system with the coercive and consent power of the international institutions. Bretton-Woods system, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), World Trade Organization (WTO), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations (UN) were the main institutions formed aftermath of the WWII and determine the characteristic of newly formed international system that is based on institutional multilateralism. The main determinant of this newly established American led international system was, it mainly restrains US power and create legitimacy of US predominance among other western democracies and Japan. Crucially, the immediate post-war order laid the foundations of a highly institutionalized international system that provided key benefits for a number of states whilst simultaneously constraining and enhancing American power (Beeson and Higgott 2003, 1).

However this institutionalized international system changed, via the natural course of the world politics, which is the systemic change. Every change in the

system weakens the *consent regime* that UN created due to change of global power distribution and the policy implementations caused by this power shifts. Most important fracture in the system was the dissolution of Soviet Union that caused a dramatic shift in American foreign policy from a “highly institutionalized multilateral” stance to unilateral (Beeson and Higgott 2003, 1) since the US. became the singular power dominating the world politics. As Krauthammer puts it as “now is the unipolar moment ... there is but one first-rate power and no prospect in the immediate future of any power to rival it” (1990/91, 24, cited by Cronin 2001, 103). This change in the US’s foreign policy makes institutions less effective, hence the mutual Soviet threat that brings the US. and its followers, quitted the scene.

The purpose of this thesis is to apply Gramscian hegemony theories to institutionalism theories in order to explore the reciprocal relation between the US hegemony and the UN, in the Gulf Wars cases. The main concern of the thesis is to make a systemic reasoning to the current ineffectual condition of the UN in political matters. With the help of hegemony and institutionalism theories this thesis will argue that UN is still the only mechanism that is the last resort of dialogue in global political matters, but in contemporary political realm UN lost its hegemonic incentives due to the response to change in the system.

1.2. Research Questions

The main focus of this thesis will be the relationship between the US hegemony and the UN before and after the Gulf Wars. Moreover, to make clear assumptions about their relationship, this thesis will observe the creation process of the American hegemonic order and its mutual relation with the UN. On the theoretical basis of the relationality between hegemony and institutionalism, the answers for the following questions will be searched:

- How and why does the US as a hegemonic power determine the functioning of the UN and how does their relation affect each other cyclical?

- In this framework, a secondary question will be: How does change in the system affects the hegemonic order and the effectiveness of the institution?
- Why the UN is not able to perform those functions that was once succeeded right after the II. World War?

1.3. Theoretical Framework and the Methodology of the study

In the light of neo-Gramscian interpretation of hegemony and institutionalism theories, this thesis will attempt to formulate post World War II international order to explain the affect of hegemon on the functioning of the international institutions and argue that the current ineffectiveness of the UN in the major political struggles depends on the response to the change in the system by the declining hegemon.

The main question that this thesis will attempt to answer is: How does the US as a hegemonic power determine the functioning of the UN and how this functioning reciprocally effect hegemon? In other words this thesis aim to explain the cyclical relation which affects the power and legitimacy of both the institution and the hegemon that influenced directly by foreign policy choices of hegemon and the changing structure of the international system, that has been formed by the hegemon in the first place, as a result of foreign policy choices of the hegemon. Throughout the thesis the relationship between hegemon and institutionalization will be examined within the context of the theories of hegemony and the theories of institutionalism. Even if the thesis main argument claims that there is a correlative bond between hegemony and institutions, the starting point will be clarifying the concept of hegemony and choice of most appropriate theory of hegemony to apply into this thesis, since it is the hegemon that creates a world order based on consensus that institutions provides.

Keohane (2005) observed that both Realist and Institutional theories were able to explain the post World War II order, but they did so in very distinct ways. The important thing about these theories, that they have valuable explanations but unable to explain whole scheme. Keohane suggest that “a synthesis of Realism and

Institutionalism is necessary” should adopt to overcome this deficit (2005, 135). For this thesis the synthesis was already available in hegemony theories. To understand the post World War II order hegemony theories provides this synthesis. The neo-Gramscian concept of hegemony offers reliable theoretical explanation about how consensual recognition is constructed by hegemon within the institutions in the international system. However, before getting deeper into the neo-Gramscian analyzes of hegemony, its crucial to describe Gramscian conceptualization and practice of hegemony since nearly all hegemony definitions in International Relations were derived from the theoretical basis of Antonio Gramsci’s *Prison’s Notebooks* (1999). The first part of the chapter one presents Gramsci’s concept of hegemony and review of its interpretations about the application of the concept to the international realm.

This thesis will apply qualitative methodology to find a plausible relationship between theory and reality. Anselm Strauss and Juliet Corbin stresses “theories represent our best understanding of how life operates” (1994, 278, cited by Babbie 2010, 394). The more a research approves certain sets of relationship between certain concepts, that research will become more confident about the resemblance between our understanding and the social reality (Babbie 2010, 394). Qualitative methodology also provides this thesis with a “continuing interplay between data collection and theory” (Babbie 2010, 394). Since this work is interested in how international organization operates in a hegemonic order and their reciprocal relationship with hegemon, it is important to use case-oriented analysis. While theoretical aspects give insight into hegemony, it is crucial to observe the US hegemony and the UN to explore this thesis main concern. In case-oriented analysis, the one would look more closely to into a particular case (Miles and Huberman 1994, 436, cited by Rubin and Babbie 2011, 479). “In depth study of a particular case can yield explanatory insights” (Babbie 2010, 310). Exploratory research methodology in a case study also gives researcher the incentive to improve the theory not to test it rather discovering flaws (Babbie 2010, 92; Gerring 2007). A case study is expected to capture the complexity of a single case (Johansson 2003, 15); therefore to understand contemporary issues relating to the US hegemony and the UN, one should observe their historical progression carefully. This thesis will

promote a historical case study in which the analysis of a specific case from a historical perspective and methodology of case study combined together.

To understand the role of the hegemon in the functioning of international organizations this thesis empirically evaluated two cases- First Gulf War of 1991 and the Second Gulf War of 2003- in which the US sought to lead the international community to gain their support in order to achieve both its foreign policy ends and international stability and security. However as will be discussed in the last chapter of this thesis, nature of these two conflicts were different from each other. In the first case the US actively seek the consensus of international community to punish Iraq's aggression. However the second case marks the shift in the foreign policy goals of the US hegemony, as it changed from multilateral one to unilateral. In this framework, the research design of this thesis first evaluates the role of the hegemony during the establishment phase of the international organizations, by comparing the role of the British hegemony and American hegemony during the founding periods of the League of Nations and the United Nations. Secondly, to make a systemic reasoning in the current ineffectiveness of the United Nations, this thesis will analyze both the foundations of the British and American hegemony in detail in order to understand how international order operates as a reflection of the economic infrastructure of the hegemony. Finally, by comparing the cases of the Gulf Wars, this study will reveal the role of the American hegemony in the functioning of the UN and the consequences of the systemic change occurred in the 1970s.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORIES OF HEGEMONY AND INSTITUTIONALISM

2.1. Gramscian analyses of hegemony

The concept of hegemony as commonly used in political science and international relations was first developed by Antonio Gramsci to explain social relations that transform political sphere in Italy. He departed from more orthodox Marxist-Leninist formulations and “offered a constructivist, or volitional, approach to both theory and practice” (Viotti and Kauppi 1998, 347). Keohane draw attention to Marxist and Realist resemblance of the definition of the hegemony as he argues they are “using different language to make similar points” (2005, 32). It was Gramscian conception of hegemony that “provides an insightful supplement to purely materialist argument” of Realist and Marxist conception of the hegemony (Keohane 2005, 32). Later the Gramscian hegemony concept was reformulated into international relations and further developed by many scholars but mainly by Robert Cox. In this section Gramscian analysis of hegemony will be discussed to make sense of neo-Gramscian definition of hegemony and its relation with international institutions as Cox argues, “Gramsci’s thinking was helpful in understanding the meaning of international organization” (1983, 162).

Hegemony concept is generally used to refer the dominance of one state over others in orthodox realist usage. However, Gramsci’s concept of hegemony differs from the orthodox realist usage. He used hegemony concept to analyze “the relation of forces in given society” (Gill and Law 1993, 93). He defines hegemony as the ability of a social group to direct society both politically and morally (Iseri 2007, 2). Cox defines *hegemony* in Gramscian sense as a special case of dominance in which the dominant state and the dominant social group within that state enhance their position throughout the imposition of the principles and norms universalized by the hegemonic group to the subordinate social groups and states (Cox 1993). The term ‘hegemon’ is derived from the Greek “egemon” (guide, ruler, leader) and

“egemonia” and refers to an agent that is “the partner who, by virtue of his special prerequisites, occupies a leading role in a community or an alliance and who, by virtue of this leading role, can claim a relatively larger share of the spoils of war” (Fontana 2008, 81; Ougaard 2004, 171, cited by Goepel 2007, 235). Lebow and Kelly (2001, 593) in their article argued that Thucydides in the fifth century Greece made a distinction between control and *hegemonia* and defined the concept of hegemony as “legitimated leadership.” The critical point in those definitions are the *leading role in a community* and *legitimated leadership*, since these themes are the main pillar of the definition of hegemony in Gramsci and neo-Gramscian sense of hegemony. In the following section this definition will be examined thoroughly.

The term hegemony in Gramscian sense has two faces, which he took from the Machiavellian concept of power as a centaur, ‘(...) half man, half beast, a necessary combination of consent and coercion’ as Cox defines it (Cox 1993, 52). This dual perspective can be perceived on different levels but Gramsci reduced it into two basic levels; “they are the levels of force and consent, authority and hegemony, violence and civilization” (1999, 385-387). Anderson argues that Gramsci is mainly focuses on consensual aspect of power unlike Machiavelli who particularly interested in force (1976, 49). Gramsci (1999, 50) states the supremacy of a social group over other groups in two ways, “as ‘domination’ and/or ‘intellectual and moral leadership’”. Where ‘domination’ refers to subjugation by force, and ‘intellectual and moral leadership’ refers to leading allied groups (Augelli and Murphy 1993, 98). Supporting this idea, Hopf defined Gramscian concept of hegemony as “not only coercion, but subscription to a shared and legitimized ideology” (2013, 320). Another important supporter who separated hegemony and domination is Arrighi. He claimed that hegemonic power is “something more and different from ‘dominance’ and should be understood as “the additional power” (2010, 29). Unlike Gramscian conceptualization of force and consent as mutually supportive, liberalism and realism see a radical separation between force and consensus. For example a hegemony theory in material sense is Gilpin’s, which argues, the rise and fall of the hegemonic powers depends on the relative growth and decline of their material capabilities; namely economic and military power (Gilpin 1981). Keohane in his influential work *After Hegemony*

(1984) argued that hegemon constructs international regimes in order to enhance and preserve its material interests. Indeed, material power is one of the most important elements for a hegemon, but it is the ability to create consent that characterizes the hegemony and differentiates from domination.

Furthermore Gramsci differentiates this two faces of hegemony and explains the emergence of a hegemonic group in a given society:

On the one hand hegemony is contrasted with power based 'domination', and on the other hand 'hegemonic' is used to designate an historical phase in which a given group moves beyond a position of defending its economic position and aspires to a position of leadership in the political and social arena. (Gramsci 1999, 20)

With this explanation Gramsci gave insight for his definition of hegemony and explains hegemony, coercive power and consent power in the framework of state and social interaction in given society. His work on social and political life of Italian example shows us how he analyzes the hegemony concept. He used a bottom up approach, as he uses class as level of analyzes. For Gramsci the change in the world of production and class struggle results a dominant class became a hegemon inside the state apparatus. Gramsci distinguish *civil society* and *state* as the two major superstructural levels that these two levels corresponds on the one hand to the function of *hegemony* in which the dominant group exercises consensus throughout society and 'domination' trough the state and *juridical government* (Gramsci 1999, 145). This bottom-up relation inside society have a mutual relation, as after the transformation of the structure of the system by dominant social group results a top down reproduction of the moral values promoted by the dominant group. He clearly explains how consent and coercive power *legally* constructed and how they become inseparable and balance each other in state structure with those sentences:

The 'normal' exercise of hegemony on the now classical terrain of the parliamentary regime is characterized by the combination of force and consent, which balance each other reciprocally, without force predominating excessively over consent. (Gramsci 1999, 248)

Gramscian sense of hegemony refers to *leading* or *direction* of the certain group over great masses. He emphasizes the importance of *leading* with these

words, “one should not count solely on the power and material force, even before attaining power a class can (and must) “lead”; when it is in power it becomes dominant, but continues to “lead” as well...” (Gramsci 1999, 211). Goepel defines hegemony as *leadership* in Gramscian sense as “... capability of consensual dominance, the capability to organize cooperation and everyday living practices of a social collective through terms, institutions and obligations that appear necessary or justified” (2007, 236). But yet hegemon still needs coercive power to form in-state relations with hegemonic group and who do not ‘spontaneously’ consent as Gramsci puts it clearly:

The apparatus of state coercive power which *legally* enforces discipline on those groups who do not ‘consent’ either actively or passively. This apparatus is, however, constituted for the whole society in anticipation of moments of crisis of command and direction when spontaneous consent has failed. (1999, 145)

It can be argued that Gramsci did not undermine or grade one precondition of hegemony over other. Gramsci stated that to become hegemonic a social group has to achieve “the unity between political and economic ends” as well as “the intellectual and moral unity” (cited by Fusaro 2010, 9). Unlike many neo-Gramscian scholars this thesis do not accept the differentiation of the consent and coercion. As Fusaro puts it forward, “Gramsci’s centaur should not be conceptualized as ‘half man, half beast’ but as dialectical synthesis between the two” (2010, 12). In his article he tried to explain how its impossible to cut the relation between consent and coercion as they together unite hegemony, but it can be argued that consensual aspect of the hegemony is the main difference between hegemony and great powers. Gramsci explains this difference, as a hegemonic power is “a great power that is chief and guide of a system of alliances and of greater and minor agreements.” (cited by Fusaro 2010, 26). This quotation supports the stance of this thesis, as being a great power is an inseparable condition of hegemony, yet it’s the ability to ‘guide the system’ that makes a great power, a hegemon. As Chomsky puts it forward, “hegemony means the capacity to coerce and control others”.

In the following part, this paper will analyze the neo-Gramscian interpretation of hegemony in international relations, since those inter-state/inter-

society relations can be framed in international level by using neo-Gramscian analyzes. As mentioned before neo-Gramscian concept of hegemony provides an applicable ground for understanding the functioning of the international organizations in the world order formed by hegemon.

2.2. Cox's conceptualization of hegemony

Although praising Gramsci for historicizing the concept of hegemony, it was Robert Cox who applied Gramscian concept of hegemony to the international relations with maintaining the "Machiavellian connection" (Fusaro 2010, 4). Except Cox's neo-Gramscian reading, the international relations literature on hegemony are predominantly materialist orientation and rarely combines material capabilities and ideas together and did not develop a systemic account of ideas in hegemonic transition (Hopf 2013, 317-319; Bieler and Morton 2004, 87).

Cox is the first scholar to systematically combine material capabilities with ideas and institutions in a comprehensive theory of hegemony (Hopf 2013, 320). Cox expresses Gramsci's concept of hegemony as "a unity of structure and superstructure in which power based dominance over production is rationalized through an ideology incorporating compromise or consensus between dominant and subordinate groups" (1977, 387). He argued that the bottom up revolution profound in social and economic spheres were so powerful that led a spillover effect over national boundaries and became an international phenomenon (Cox 1993, 61). Even if state were the main actor in international relations in Gramsci's work it explained only a certain aspects of hegemony, namely social conflict inside state. State is the entity where social hegemony emerges and it reproduces hegemony of given society legitimately by using juridical system, it also "is the place hegemonies of social classes can be built" (Cox 1993, 58). However this explanation is somewhat reductionist in the international relations, especially for the relations among states in the international system. In his pioneer work, Cox implement Gramsci's hegemony concept into the international relations generally and world order particularly. Cox agrees with Gramscian analysis of hegemony, as a state should emerge as hegemony after experiencing profound social and economic revolution

inside the state (Cox 1993, 59). Furthermore he distinguishes from Gramscian reductionist definition and explains how a state become hegemonic:

Historically, to become hegemonic, a state would have to found and protect a world order which was universal in conception, i.e., not an order in which one state directly exploits others but an order which most other states could find compatible with their interests (Cox 1993, 61).

Yet there are some scholars arguing that Gramsci had written about the hegemony in the international realm, in the first place. Fusaro claims that, for Gramsci “international level of hegemony exercised by states, not classes” and explains his claims by using this quotation from Gramsci, “Any organic innovation in the social structure, through its technical-military expressions, modifies organically the absolute and relative relations in the international field” (Fusaro 2010, 30-32). He furthermore continues and claims that Arrighi, not counted as a neo-Gramscian scholar, is closer to Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony in international realm than Cox. This thesis is not concerned with the discussion about whether Gramsci had his own hegemony in international level or Cox was the first one who implemented hegemony to international realm. Rather this work accepts unity between all preconditions of hegemony in the creation process and after formation of hegemony mainly concerns about the consensual aspect of the hegemony hence it makes a difference between hegemony and great power. As Robert Cox puts it forward;

World hegemony is describable as a social structure, an economic structure, and a political structure; and it cannot be simply one of these things but must be all three. (1993, 62)

Unlike mainstream IR theory, which reduces hegemony to a form of dominance based upon the economic and military capabilities of states, Cox developed a theory of hegemony by adding ideas and institutions to the concept of hegemony, as they are inseparable part of the hegemony like material power of the hegemon (Bieler and Morton 1999, 87; Hopf 2013, 317). Cox accepted hegemony is a form of dominance, but it has deeper meaning that conventional IR theories undervalue, it is a consensual order so that “dominance by a powerful state may be necessary but not a sufficient condition of hegemony” (Cox 1981, 139). Hegemons

are powerful states by definition, but to become successful they have to do more than providing material capabilities (Lebow and Kelly 2001, 595). Supporting this idea Cox stated that consent is more important than coercion under conditions of hegemony, because the “hegemon interconnects its interests with other states, and employs consent as a mean to achieve its larger interests in dominating other governments and gaining a leadership role” (Iseri 2007, 3). Hegemony, in Cox conceptualization, appears as broadly based on consent, with the acknowledgment of the ideas sustained by material capabilities, and institutions, which is established by the social struggle within the state that leads to profound social and economic change and then projected outwards on a world scale (Bieler and Morton 1999, 87). Cox and other neo-Gramscian scholars have written about how hegemony rests on relative economic and military power, a legitimizing ideology and a collection of institutions (Hopf 2013, 317). The critical point in this conceptualization is as Cox furthermore argues that hegemony prevails if only “the consensual aspect of power is forefront” (1987, 164). Hegemons have the material capabilities to pursue its own foreign policy ends, but they do so at the expense of the very order they created. Hegemons can act unilaterally, but they cannot remain as hegemons if they do so (Cronin 2001, 103).

Earlier in the paper, the main characteristic of the hegemony defined as the ability to create consent among the members of the international system. Cox argues that the institutions materialize this ability; he stated, “(...) the universal norms of a world hegemony are expressed in international organization” (Cox 1993, 62). To create a world order with the support/consent of many states, a great power should bind itself with the universal norms and rules. Cox explains this binding inside the state apparatus as “hegemony of the ruling class, which is exercised over a whole social formation, eventually constrains the administrative, executive and coercive apparatuses” (1987, 164). However in the international realm hegemon on one side creates a financial system that will enhance its economic superiority over other states, on the other side hegemon should have create or play crucial role in the creation process of a political apparatus that makes the order statutory and constraints its own power. This leads us to this thesis main problematic that is; i) How and why does the US, as a hegemonic power,

established a political body to enhance its hegemony? ii) To what extent the effectiveness of the UN is affected by the response of the hegemon to the change in the system? iii) Why the UN is not performing once it used to do right after the II. World War?

2.3. Role of international institutions in the hegemonic order

After making sense of which hegemony definition this thesis promote, it is important to clarify the relation between hegemony and institution in the light of the aforementioned questions. To find answers to those questions, this thesis will try to combine neo-Gramscian hegemony concept to institutionalism theories. Before relating hegemony to institutionalism, it is important to explore the relation of hegemony and institutions, in neo-Gramscian theories. As Cox also puts it forward;

Gramsci's thinking was helpful in understanding the meaning of international organization with which I was principally concerned.(1993, 162).

As this thesis analyzed thoroughly, Cox, as a neo-Gramscian scholar, was the pioneer in theorization of hegemony and in the aforesaid quotation he stated why he interpreted Gramscian concept of hegemony. From this view it is easy to claim that there is a steady relationship between hegemony and institutions in neo-Gramscian literature.

Hegemons, to create a world order based on consent, should promote universal norms and values and constraints itself with those principles in order to bind all actors in the international system. To achieve that, hegemon greatly needs institutions. Cox explained the functions of international organizations in a hegemonic order as following:

- (1) They embody the rules, which facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world order;
- (2) they are themselves the product of the hegemonic world order;
- (3) they ideologically legitimate the norms of world order;
- (4) they co-opt the elites from peripheral countries;
- (5) they absorb counter hegemonic ideas. (1993, 62)

Legitimization function of the institutions became more prominent than the other functions in the neo-Gramscian works. Indeed international institutions are the legitimizers of the existing hegemony. Gareau (1996) once stated “Legitimization function is held to be central to the maintenance or undermining of a social system, usually referred to as a hegemony in Gramscian terms” (224-225). Yet before coming to the relation between international institutions and the legitimacy, it is better to clarify what legitimacy means in international relations. Legitimization function of the institutions became more prominent than the other functions in the neo-Gramscian works. Indeed international institutions are the legitimizers of the existing hegemony. Yet before explaining the relation between international institutions and the legitimacy, it is better to clarify what legitimacy means in international relations. Kissinger explains a legitimate order as something “whose structure is accepted by all major powers” (1973,145). Yet how do states form a structure that can be accepted by all other great powers? To this Ikenberry (2001) has a plausible answer. Ikenberry argues that leading states emerged after wars “strategically restraint” themselves with the binding rules of the institutions in order to “lock in” a favorable postwar position by gaining the consent of the weaker and secondary states (2001, xi). In other words order formed by the leading state would accepted by other great powers through the binding and legitimate apparatus of the institution. Ian Hurd (2007) explains this situation as the maintenance of the hegemony, in which “strong states subscribe to a minimum standard of compliance with the legitimized rule or institution” (78-79). The point being made here is hegemonic actors by the means of compromising on some of their coercive power in order to obtain broad-based acceptance from other powers for their global preponderance. Thus this trade-off between ‘power’ and ‘legitimacy gives even further strength, making hegemon even more powerful in the sense of “consensual empowerment” (Clark 2005, 238). Yet, critically, such is possible only through embodying this legitimacy through the norm and rule building, which come into being by the international institution. On the other hand, this legitimacy provides authority not solely for the hegemon but also for the institution itself. Hurd (2007) explains this position of authority as an expression of the exercise of the legitimated

power. In international realm this legitimated international organizations can also possesses sovereign authority apart from its creator, the hegemon. Supporting this idea Dunne (1998) explains the legitimacy of the institution depends upon “how far their special privileges are made acceptable to others” (Cited by Clark 2009, 14). But critical point here to keep in mind is those special privileges are belong to the organization and accepted by also hegemon itself.

Additionally, institutions may legitimize the existing hegemony institutions also “can serve the opposite function of delegitimizing the ongoing hegemony” (Gareau 1996, 223). In his work Gareau (1996) criticizes the conventional view of the hegemony theories about the institutions as just a tool for legitimizing the hegemonic order. Gareau (1996) observes the situations where hegemon lost control of the institutions temporarily to the third world countries, these peripheral players may turn the institution a tool of delegitimizing the hegemonic actor along side the established ideological order that was once designated to serve for this hegemon. The crucial contribution made by the Gareau that will be used in this theory is the clarification of the legitimizing process. He claimed, “legitimizing is seen as a static concept, not as a dynamic, dialectic one” (Gareau 1996, 224). What this thesis will add to this notion that the process of delegitimization, just as the legitimization process, is a dialectical process by which the hegemon because of its own actions loses its basis of legitimacy through a rather gradual process. In other words, the image of the hegemon that stems from its consensual power is a product of a long-term aggregation. With each coercive action that undermines the rule and norms of the institution, the very basis of its hegemony, delegitimizes both its hegemonic rule and the organization itself, yet this reverse change of position occurs marginally and slowly. Since Bukovansk argues, “the hegemonic state does not stand outside the hegemonic order, but is subject to it”, it is also responsible for not only for the rise of the institution, but also its decline (cited by Hurd, 2007, 47). As will be discussed in detail in the following chapters of this thesis, legitimacy matters in the functioning of the international institutions, since hegemons “can endure long after it strictly material power waned” if only they can be consistent with their claims and values (Lebow and Kelly 2001, 595). In other words as long as hegemons control the mechanisms of consent power within a consistent manner,

it controls the manner to which other actors internalize its consent to hegemon's policies. In the lights of these clarifications this thesis will use ineffectiveness and delegitimization interchangeably, since an institution that is not counted as a legitimate one in international system cannot perform effectively.

2.4. Liberal Institutionalism

Institutionalism theories provide this thesis with valuable theoretical concretion with hegemony theories. Keohane, one of the pioneers of institutionalism theories, tried to explain the roots of cooperation by using institutions with and without the existence of the hegemonic order. He claims that in an alliance system, "it is easy to explain cooperation as a result of the operation of a balance of power", but explaining system wide patterns of cooperation needs different explanation as he puts it forward "if international politics is a state of war, institutionalized patterns of cooperation ... should not exist" (Keohane 2005, 7). He furthermore continues that patterns of power and interest are not fully explicable without taking institutional context into consideration (Keohane 2005, 14). Even Keohane tried to explain the existence of the institutions without a hegemon, his arguments and theoretical framework could relate with the hegemony in Gramscian sense.

First of all framework of institutional theories relied on states as unit of the international realm as they take institutions as the tools of cooperation among states with the acceptance of realist argument "states are pursuing their own interest in the cooperation" (Keohane 2005, x). When Keohane explains his works familiarity with realism, he accepts that Realism provides a solid ground for understanding international system but he also argues that Realism lacks of explanatory power about institutionalism as he stated "we need to go beyond Realism not discard it" to understand institutionalism (2005, 16). This explanation makes perfectly well combination with Gramscian concept of hegemony and this works stance as well. As examined thoroughly in the first part, Gramsci accepts the units of hegemony in international realm are states. In a new edition of *After Hegemony* Keohane accepts that he adopted what Alexander Wendt (1999) explains as "Lockean culture of

anarchy”, which explains state of anarchy as “actors are neither friends, but rivals” (2005, xiii). Hoffman defines international competition in world politics as, “International competition of units in the kind of state of nature that knows no restraint other than ... of the players impose” (1965, viii; cited by Keohane 2005, 7). The most powerful actor in the system that can impose its rules and norms is hegemon and the most significant characteristic that differentiate it from great powers in the sense of enforcing rule is its consent power as Keohane argues that “agreements in world politics have to be self-enforcing” (2005, xiii). This adaptation is very helpful in understanding how international institutions created by hegemon reproduces consent among other states in an anarchical environment. It can be claimed that hegemonic world order is a response to the state of anarchy in international relations in the light of the hegemonic features of the international institutions and institutionalism, as institutions provide a stable world order that is in the interest of both hegemon and states that consent to the leadership of the hegemon. Kautsky’s view support this idea as he claims, “capitalism could go through a phase in which capitalist states could maintain unity for a considerable period of time” (cited by Keohane 2005, 43). Hegemon with material capabilities, ideas and institutions provide an order to other states that will also enhance their interests. A hegemonic order as Cox defines it “... in which power takes a primarily consensual form, distinguishes from a non-hegemonic order in which ... no power has been able to establish the legitimacy of its dominance” (1981, 153). This order has to be legitimate to prevail, for Kissinger to become a legitimate international order it has to be “accepted by other major powers” (cited by Waltz 1979, 63) and Waltz explains, “a legitimate international order tends toward stability and peace” (1979, 63). Those definitions combined together, match with the case of creation process of the American hegemony after II. World War. With the support of this ideas this thesis argues hegemon in a limited time scale attempts to be the authoritative and legitimate allocator of wealth and power, establishes an order that can enforce inclusive rules and makes decisions about economic outcomes (Keohane 2005, 18).

Another theoretical convenience that institutionalism theories offer to this work is the clarification of the level of analysis. As Waltz puts it through behaviors

of state can be studied either from “inside out” or from the “outside in” (Waltz 1979, 63). To understand the US. hegemonic era and its cyclical relation with UN, beginning right after the II. World War, the one should use both level of analysis, yet promoting systemic analysis over unit-level analysis. As Keohane explains, “any theory will, of course, take into account the distinctive characteristics of actors as well as of the system itself” (2005, 25). Systemic analysis provides, “some part of the explanation of behaviors and outcomes is found in the system structure” (Waltz 1979, 73). Also system theory enables this thesis to focus on the affects of systemic change established by hegemon, as Waltz states, “structure affects behavior of agent and agencies within the system, but does so indirectly” (1979, 74). Thus, this theory supports the stance of this thesis as Keohane puts it forward, “when the international system changes, so will incentives and behaviors” (2005, 26). Hegemon as an actor creates a world order, an international system that affects both other actors (states) and the hegemon itself and this situation results a change in the system in the first place because system is not exclusive of the behaviors of the agents. System is not independent from the acts of the states; both system and actors affect each other reciprocally. However system analysis lacks some explanatory power, as there is no comprehensive theory that explains both international politics and foreign policy together (Waltz 1996). To avoid systemic analysis ineffectual attitude on internal factors while explaining American hegemony case, this work will observe foreign policy choice of the US foreign policy makers. This dual evaluation will help this thesis to clarify the relation between the US hegemony and the institutions, as Keohane puts it through “Since the United States shaped the system as much as the system shaped it ... we have to look at the United States from the inside-out as well as from the outside-in” (2005, 26). There are several works trying to explain the decline of American hegemony by the choices of the foreign policy makers, hence those studies sidelined the effect of the systemic change. Shift from multilateral institutionalism policies to unilateral policies can be understood with foreign policy choices but this formulation lacks systemic explanation. Even though “domestic attitudes, political structures, and decision making processes are also important,” this thesis will mainly consider the effects of the system on choice.

In the following chapter this thesis will examine the failure of the League of Nations (LoN) as the political institution of the British hegemony. Failure, ineffectiveness will be used interchangeably and strictly means the inability of the institutions in the major struggles, which shapes the world politics. Historical context in which LoN rise and declined will help us to realize the relation between the hegemon and its political order. It is crucial to understand the factors that undermine the effectiveness of the LoN since it will be useful for this thesis to compare LoN with the UN. This comparison will reveal the effects of the hegemon on the functioning of the institutions.

Third chapter will address the creation of the American hegemonic order with a specific attention to the creation and aims of the UN as a political pillar of the hegemonic order. This chapter will focus on American foreign policy acts and the UN involvement in the global politics till to the end of the Bretton Woods regime. The end of the Bretton Woods regime is very significant for this thesis stance, since it marks the change in the American hegemonic order. The very basis of the order changed after 1970's. This change reflects the shift of the American foreign policy ends, as American foreign policy became more unilateral than the previous order. The Bretton Woods system and the petro-dollar system will be analyzed comprehensively as former marks the economic foundations of the American post war order; latter underlines the change in the system.

In chapter four the Gulf wars will be compared as this thesis case. The historical context of both wars will be examined thoroughly. The claims of "new world order" by the American foreign policy makers and the reasons why it did not last long as many expected will analyze in this chapter. The Gulf Wars offers vital outcomes for hegemon and its relations with the institutions it created. Especially, the consensual aspect of the first war and the unilateral intervention aspect of the second war will be discussed exclusively. In this chapter this work will argue the failure of the efforts of establishing a new order has systemic roots and this effect the functioning of the UN. While change in the system has effects on the foreign policy choices of the US, it indirectly, through the hegemon's acts, affects the functioning of the institutions it created. Like Keohane argues, it doesn't have

destructive effect immediately, this thesis will argue without a hegemonic order, the institutions that was established by hegemon will not function effectively as it was.

And finally in the concluding chapter, there will be a brief summary of the purpose of the thesis, relating it to the concluding remarks.

CHAPTER THREE

From League of Nations to United Nations¹

In this chapter this thesis will examine the failure of the League of Nations (LoN) as the political institution of the declining British hegemony. Historical context in which LoN rise and declined will help us to understand the relation between the hegemon and its world order. It is crucial to understand the factors that undermine the effectiveness² of the LoN since it will be useful for this thesis to compare LoN with the UN to reveal the role of the hegemon during its establishment phase. This comparison will reveal the impact of the hegemon on the functioning of the institutions. After exploring the structure and functioning of the LoN, in the final section of this chapter, conditions arise right after the World War II and the establishment of the UN will be analyzed thoroughly in order to find out whether there was a continuity or diversity in organizational sense when comparing LoN and UN. In the conclusion section of this chapter the reasons of LoN's failure and the establishment of the UN will be examined in the light of the theories of hegemony.

This historical context, combined with the theories of hegemony, will provide this thesis with a clear evaluation of the effectiveness/ineffectiveness of the international organizations, as Cox argues those organizations are the product of the hegemonic order which materialize the rules of the order and legitimize it (1993, 62). Most important characteristic of the international organization that this chapter mainly interested is the legitimization of the hegemonic order as it directly/indirectly affects both the organization and the hegemonic order respectively.

3.1. Interwar era and the League of Nations experience

Anyone desiring to understand the machinery, how it operates, the conditions of its success, must look to the experience of the past, and

¹ Leland M. Goodrich

² Failure or ineffectiveness will be used interchangeably and strictly means the inability of the institutions in the major struggles, which shapes the world politics.

particularly to the rich and varied experience of that first attempt at a general international organization, League of Nations.

Leland M. Goodrich (1973, 21)

As Goodrich states above, it is very important to explore the very first attempt of “institutionalizing an idea” (Yearwood 2009, 1) to form an inclusive international institution in its historical context. The aim of this section is to find out the historical roots about the establishment, structure and functioning of the LoN. Instead of writing historical progress in chronological order, this work will apply a selective reading about the relation between the hegemon and the international organization. Implications from these historical interpretations open the way toward to this thesis to make a comprehensive analysis about i) vitality of hegemon to the establishment and functioning of international institutions in world politics, ii) implications of the failure of the LoN to the establishment of the UN.

The outburst and endless bloodshed of the Great War stirred people up and to think about a framework for international relations towards eliminating the possibility of the war (Yearwood 2009, 1). After the war the US emerged as the leading power of the world and it brought with an institutional agenda to bind democratic states together by a comprehensive set of rules (Ikenberry 2001, 117). The League of Nations is the first attempt to forge an institution out of an idea to find solutions to problems of a particular time on global scale. It was a challenging project because “an organization on such a scale, covering all fields of international cooperation, never existed before” (Van Ginneken 2006, 1). Very first aim of the League was to provide a peaceful international realm, since with the collapse of the Concert of Europe, which was based on balance of power of the realist school of thought, Europe experienced the wrath of several devastating wars ended with the Great War. The failure of the balance of power system led “most nation-states to reject the balance of power system as the basis for international security” (Ebegbulem 2012, 23). Van Ginneken (2006) provides a good example about the understanding of the statesmen of the powerful states think about the balance of power system in post war period, as he mentions what Woodrow Wilson, one of the most important figures during the establishment of the LoN, think about balance of power system. Van Ginneken argues, “Wilson had always hated big-power politics

and the balance of power system that went with it” (2006, 4). With keeping the historical context in mind, Ellis argues that LoN is “more or less conscious attempt to get away from the balance of power by developing the latter in some sort of league or concert or association of nations” (1928, 69). Instead of using the balance of power system, victorious states sought to ensure peace in international relations by institutionalizing LoN with collective security framework, fundamentally “pledging all other states to combine against a potential aggressor, which thereby be deterred from attacking” (Yearwood 2009, 1). Owing to that reason the LoN is an endeavor to “build on the peace-organizing tendency to give formal and binding expression to interdependence of modern nations” (Ellis 1928, 60). Nevertheless the great powers would still stand at the core of this community but legal and rule-governed mechanisms of dispute resolving would replace power balancing. Yet those attempts at forming a league system that contains collective security measures, did not work properly because of several reasons that will be handle in detail. Throughout the section, the failure of the collective security in the league system is will be analyzed in depth to find a relation between failure of the LoN and the deficiency of a hegemonic power.

Analyzing the historical process that LoN experienced during its establishment and functioning towards the important disputes is very crucial for understanding the failure and its implications to the following international organization. To capture the picture as a whole it’s crucial to expose the affect of hegemon during the establishment phase, since it gives us an explanation about the aforementioned concerns.

The most important incident during the establishment phase of the LoN was the end of the Great War. President Wilson of the US pursued an agreement during the war in 1917 to establish a “peace without a victory”, but in 1919 this was not an option anymore (Yearwood 2009, 90). When the war ended, the US did not have a vast military deployment in the Europe and allied powers were well aware that the share of sacrifice in fighting the war would effect who would have more voice in peace process (Ikenberry 2001, 121). This condition created a duality in the talks of the organization. Since the US didn’t involve victory as other Allied powers, it became hard to pursue Allied powers as Wilson endeavored. The way the war

ended left the US unable to dictate the terms of peace (Ikenberry 2001, 162). The clashing national interests between the US and the UK, which tried to form a body of an international organization in order to maintain a peaceful international order, created a duality that can be realized through their intentions and expectations from the institution. For instance, even its prominent role in the creation process and their enthusiasm British government wanted “a relatively loose deliberative and consultative body to promote international cooperation, rather than one with strong and binding coercive powers” (Yearwood 2009, 1). On the other hand President Wilson attempted to form a kind of an extensive association of states formed under specific covenants that he personally describes its aim; “for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike” (Ellis 1928, 72). He heavily influenced from the Article 3 of the Articles of Confederation, which is the founding agreement of the US and its first constitution. Wilson desired an institution based on collective security measures, which would bind all states to “assist each other against all force offered to or attacks made upon them or any of them” just like the Articles of Confederation (Ellis 1928, 71-72). Wilson aimed to make the League to be “the first step toward a world society” (Ellis 1928, 63), but he couldn’t even persuade his own legal advisors to write Covenant with collective security measures. Wilson’s legal advisor David Hunter Miller opposes any kind of guarantee to other nations and argues “any guarantee of independence and integrity means war by the guarantor if a breach of independence or integrity of the guaranteed state” (Ellis 1928, 72-73). Also Britain opposes the idea to turn League into coercive machinery to ensure peace because it eventually leads to war. Basically it can be deduced from the different perspectives between Anglo-American thinking, it is hard to accommodate “old European political thinking and new Wilsonian concepts of international organizations” (Van Ginneken 2006, 4).

Unlike general belief about the theoretical roots of LoN as ‘Wilson’s idealism’, Yearwood opposes this idea as he argues, “the League of Nations was product of British wartime policy” (2009, 7). Ray Stannard Baker (1922) makes even harsher comments about presenting Wilson as the founder of League of Nations as he puts it;

Practically nothing- not a single idea- in the covenant of the League was original with the President Wilson. His relation to it was mainly that of editor or complier, selecting or rejecting, reclassing or combining the projects that came to him from other sources... All the brick and timber of the structure was old” (cited by Ellis 1928, 67).

Supporting this idea historian Peter J. Yearwood differs from the idea that League was an attempt to apply a theory, as it is an expression of idealism and states “I can only see the League, both the idea and institution, as being part of, not apart from, British Policy” (2009, 4). This deep disagreement between Anglo-American parties about the structure of the LoN resulted in American refusal to ratify the League agreement and British established institution as an unattached deliberative and advisory body. This turned League into a machinery without coercive power and whole scheme depends on the goodwill of the pledging states as we can see it in the Article X of the Covenant;

The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. (Van Ginneken 2006, 207)

Even though aforementioned quotation contains some characteristics of the collective security, it still lacks certainty of the concept. For Van Dyke in collective security system “a number of states bound to engage in collective efforts on behalf of each other’s individual security” (1957, cited by Ebegbulem 2012, 23). The following part of the Article X shows us there are no binding words for the member states:

In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council should advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled. (Van Ginneken 2006, 207)

And, the necessary actions they would take to punish aggressor was sanctions, mainly economic ones, according to Article XVI of the Covenant:

Member of the League undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their national and the national of covenant-breaking state. (Van Ginneken 2006, 211)

However these economic sanctions have never become effective since the most important economic power failed to become a member of the League (Van Ginneken 2006).

League of Nations failed to preserve peace on some occasions and undermined its role as peacekeeper in international system. All of the disputes LoN failed to resolve are important to discuss since they might reveal some important reasons of the failure but this thesis is not interested in the collapse of the LoN directly.

First of all, main purpose of the LoN during the establishment process was to find sustainable solutions to preserve peace on global scale. For example H. Ellis in his book written in 1928 explained this aim as a response to the old anarchy. His ideas show us that even back in the 1920s, academia viewed LoN as a response to anarchy. As this thesis discussed earlier hegemony, need to come forward to restrain the anarchical environment and to promote its own values and principles. From this point of view it can be claimed that League was an attempt to establish a hegemonic order but failed right from the beginning. As Cox put it forward, international institutions are “themselves the product of the hegemonic world order” (1993, 62). However it can be easily claimed that LoN was not a product of a hegemonic order for various reasons. First, contrary to the 1945 post war settlement the US entered the war very late and “was not able to marshal its resources to gain allied agreement on postwar goals” (Ikenberry 2001, 118). In addition to this, the US failure of ratifying the League treaty and the exclusion of the Soviet Union and Germany made the institution and the order that institution endeavored to promote ineffective in terms legitimacy. As discussed earlier to become legitimate, an order should have accepted by all great powers. Supporting this idea Dunne (1998) argues that the legitimacy of the institution depends upon the acceptance of its special privileges to other states (Cited by Clark 2009, 14). Finally, violations of the Covenant by member states like Japan and Italy and indifference of other permanent member states to those violations delegitimized the League.

League was revolutionary due to range of matters its handling and its pioneering role in the history of international organizations. Yet the US failure to

adopt collective security measures resulted with a failure of superseding old methods of state crafting as states used power balancing between two world wars. This failure shows that, this kind of umbrella organizations needs both consent and coercive power that hegemon provides for them Also the founding agreement of the LoN attached to the peace treaties undermined the organization right from the beginning since provisions of the peace treaties recognized unfair and unjust (Goodrich 1973, 7). This section proves that in general hegemony's pursuit of stability would be successful if it can procure a general agreement about its legitimacy. Supporting this idea Kissinger argues "stability has commonly resulted not from a quest for peace but from a generally accepted legitimacy" (1973, 1). Keeping the aforementioned quotation in mind, it can be claimed that League was an unsuccessful attempt to establish a hegemonic order. In addition to that, the lack of a hegemon in the League system undermined the legitimacy of the institution. After all these, there were other reasons of League of Nations failure rather issuing from the US unwillingness to act upon a hegemonic role. The attempt to form a political institution like LoN needs a hegemonic power, as discussed earlier the US was not ready or enthusiastic for such role. However beside the US, it was the inability of the British hegemony to legitimize League system as the political order of the world. League of Nations established during the hegemonic transition process in which relative power of British hegemony faced a decline and in the mean time, thanks to wartime economy, the US had gained more material capability than Britain. During the decline period, hegemon can still be counted as a major power, yet it has lost its overwhelmingly predominant economic and military advantage. In this period, the consequence of the erosion of its material capabilities, hegemony's face challenges from other states (Shannon 1989, 121-122). After World War I, it became impossible for Britain to sustain the economic power once they used to. Britain, despite its efforts, was too weak to form an order effectively (Kindleberger 1973). In general, whereas Britain could not fulfill the role as a hegemon owing to its inability, the US was unwilling to take this role.

Retrospectively speaking this era can be defined as the hopeless struggles of Britain to restore old system that can be expounded as the gold standard, self-regulating market economy, and worldwide peaceful atmosphere (Lairson and

Skidmore 1993, 51). The failure of maintaining international peace and security had destructive consequences for world. Yet League of Nations experience taught valuable lessons to United States which they used during the establishment process of the United Nations right after the World War II. During the interwar period and after the World War II important changes occurred in the economic and political structure and power distribution of the world. These changes create new problems and ineffective League couldn't deal with the new problems. Because of this reason the need for a new institution emerged. The UN established under these conditions became a success story for a considerable time, even the machinery remain same as its predecessor.

3.2 Post World War II order and the establishment of the United Nations

The First World War simply transformed the US power into a global dominance, mainly through redistribution of wealth from the declining hegemon to rising hegemon brought about by the economic surplus of wartime economy (Arrighi et al. 1999, 78). With the end of the World War II, the US emerged as the world power that is defined as “provider of global services” by George Modelski (cited by Koçak 2006, X). Those services can be explained as formation of political system, the solution of global conflicts, the establishment of an economic order (Tayfur 2000, 13). The hegemonic takeover process, which started during the World War I, ended with a full hegemony achieved by the US. An important determinant of “the full hegemony period stems from the hegemon’s ability in using its strength in order to construct the institution and rules of the interstate system” (Strange 1994, 558). Out of the World War II, the US emerged as a new hegemon and enjoyed the same kind of leadership that Britain exercised during the long Pax-Britannica. One of the most important features of the order that has established by the US hegemony is, its institutionalized nature. The economic system, institutionalized by Bretton-Woods, backed with the political UN system. In this section the establishment process and structure of the UN and the role of hegemony during this process will be analyzed thoroughly to make analogies or dichotomies about the functioning of the LoN and the UN.

Even though this thesis explains the functioning of the UN in a systemic manner, it is clear that policy makers of the US had learned a lot from the shortcomings of the LoN. In this part key actors that influenced the establishment phase of the UN and their aims will be analyzed. After these explanations, the reasons of promoting systemic approach while exploring functioning of the UN will be clarified. Since, after a couple of years the UN was established, the UN moved to different direction than the policymakers intended at the first place and still became effective. As discussed earlier, this work promotes systemic analysis without excluding the behaviors and choices of the agents and agencies. To make a more comprehensive explanation about the functioning of the UN, the one should pay attention to cyclical relation between the hegemonic system and the agents of it. Due to this reasoning this section provides explanation about how system affected from the choices of the statesmen.

The UN established in April 1945 even before the official end of World War II. This time the US was in a much more commanding position than the post First World War juncture and take advantage of its position to lock in a set of institutions that would serve its interest as well as restrain and commit itself to that set of institutions (Ikenberry 2001, 164). Although this time the US started interactions with other states to formulate postwar order. In the course of the war President Roosevelt made some plans about an organization to sustain peace. During the war, in 1941, England and the United States come along and called for the postwar settlement as “a wider and permanent system of general security” (Meisler 1995, 4). He would like to win the war and he would like to win the peace afterwards. For Roosevelt the most important task in 1943-1945 was to commit the US to a postwar structure of peace (Butler 2005, xii). Just like the First World War some thought it is best for the US to isolate itself from everything. Even for some counting upon a world organization was a mistake and it cannot be repeated again, most of the public opinion envision a peaceful world order policing by the US together with the Soviet Union (Meisler 1995, 2). Yet Roosevelt anticipated a strong institution formed with its wartime allies. He often mentioned about the need

for “Four Policemen”- the US, the Soviet Union, Britain and China to establish postwar order (Meisler 1995, 3). This shows how the United States seek for the consent and active involvement of other great powers, unlike the post World War I. Roosevelt was determined neither of the shortcomings of the post First World War order happen in his watch; his ultimate aim is to form a world organization that would prevent the world from getting drawn into war again (Butler 2005, 10). The most important state, considering its material capabilities among other three, was the Soviet Union. Thus, Roosevelt showed special attention to the Soviet Union and its existence inside the United Nations. Roosevelt achieved a great progress during the Tehran Conference in 1943. After this conference Roosevelt believed that he managed to bring Soviets into “cooperation with western powers in a formidable organization for the maintenance of peace” (Butler 2005, 163). In 1945, during the Yalta Conference Roosevelt succeeded bringing the Soviet Union to the UN in his own terms. In return the US accepted Soviet wishes to have its dominions, Belorussia and Ukraine, to become members of General Assembly (Butler 2005, 28). This move perceived as a compromise both in American public and Soviet public, however in reality it is not even close to a compromise. Roosevelt was well aware that one or five votes do not effect either the world distribution of power or the control mechanisms of the UN. On August 21, 1945, the US formally presented the blueprints of the postwar peacekeeping organization to the England, China and the Soviet Union, which was clearly the ultimate fruition of what Roosevelt struggled for almost three years of wartime diplomacy (Butler 2005, 240).

To avoid from repeating the mistakes of the post World War I context, the US took a careful approach during the establishment phase of the UN. First, this time they managed to separate the peace settlements and the establishment of the UN. The Charter of the UN, unlike the Covenant of the LoN, was not tied to peace settlements (Ikenberry 2001, 163). This distinction prevents the perception of the UN as unjust or unfair like its predecessor. Second, the US insisted on a voting system in which parties to dispute should not vote in the decisions of the Council. On the other hand the Soviet Union offered an alternative against this system. The Soviet offer was the unanimity of agreement of Four Powers (Butler 2005, 256-

258). However this voting system will lock the organization, since one single veto means there will be no kind of resolution to disputes. In the League of Nations Italy and Japan vetoed the decisions taken against them. Because of this reason the Soviets and the US find a compromise in the final draft of the UN Charter. According to the Article 27 of the Chapter Five of the UN Charter:

To be adopted, a draft resolution must have the affirmative vote of the seven members of the Security Council, including the concurring votes of the five permanent members: if a permanent member casts a negative vote (veto), the draft resolution is not passed. (1945, 7)

Yet, addition to this paragraph Article 27 contains other rules:

A party to dispute shall abstain from voting. (1945, 7)

Which is basically putted into the UN Charter to avoid lockdowns in Security Council. The Security Council formed with five permanent members with addition of a few other rotating delegates with the authority to be responsible for the maintenance of the international peace and security. Those five permanent members, four policemen plus France, have right to veto all procedural issues but they cannot involve in voting procedure in which they are a party of the dispute. in the case of dispute resolution, a member of the council that is a party to dispute would only abstain from voting.

One of the most important progress in the structure of the UN comparing to the LoN was its' stance towards to the international peacekeeping duty. Article 41 suggests that Security Council may decide to take necessary measures before considering the use of armed force. Supporting the Article 41, the Article 42 of the Chapter VII of the UN Charter Security Council held responsible for the threats to the peace and the Security Council is authorized to take any military actions necessary. Article 42 contains the very basis of the collective security as it says:

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

With this article it is declared that the five victorious states that formed Security Council, bind themselves to ensure postwar international peace and security. Yet in reality only two strongest powers, the US and the Soviets, would secure the postwar peace. However emergence of the Cold War prevented this aim to become true. Roosevelt's Five Policemen could not police the world together since a hostile enmity tear the two biggest power apart. Besides that the European powers were too weak to sustain a regime that contains a coercive protection for its members. Even if the states that constitute Security Council could not achieve to sustain this collective security regime, the US maintained the coercive apparatus of the UN by its own material capacity. With this regime the US guaranteed the protection of territorial integrity of lesser states and promoted the UN as the last resort of peaceful solution before armed conflict. As will be discussed in the next chapter thoroughly this guarantee to smaller states resulted with their active consent to the UN and its decisions. On the other hand, this situation created overdependence to the Security Council in dispute settlement. Members of the Security Council have generally supported or opposed UN action based on to their national interest. Thus, Collective Security in the UN exercised mostly as a reflection of their national interest, not as a general practice (Ebegbulem 2012, 27). It can be claimed that the UN have a loosely attached mechanisms that depends on the multinational willingness to promote the UN peace agenda, rather than have an institutionalized collective security regime (Ebelgulem 2011, 27). The focus of the collective security under the UN system rather dictated by 'five policemen', especially by the US but it has done much by prevent small scale conflicts turn into worldwide conflicts and maintain the international peace. It is clear that even though there are some flaws in the collective security system that the UN promoted, it is relevant and needed. During the course of the Cold War this system turns into a security system provided by the American hegemony only.

Even though the UN established not in a way that statesmen attended, it easily became one of the key features of the post World War II order. The UN played "a secondary, still significant role" (Meisler 1995, 20) during its first three decades. The success stories of the UN relating to dispute settlements in the first

couple decades of the UN will be analyzed to make a point to the effectiveness of the UN even it was established in a different environment than it was intended with a Gramscian perspective.

In the final section of this chapter, continuity and diversity in between the League of Nations and United Nations will be explored and the success of the UN, even they couldn't manage to exercise it as they planned, will be analyzed in the lights of the existence of a hegemony.

3.3 Continuity and diversity in organizational functioning

In this section the continuity and diversity of the functioning of the LoN and the UN will be addressed, since it supports this thesis secondary argument which is an international organization greatly needs power of the hegemon to function effectively. There are many reasons that the LoN, predecessor, counted as an organizational failure or the UN, follow-up, as a success story, but besides those micro explanations, this thesis will promote a macro justification of this reasoning as absence or existence of hegemony during the establishment period matters most.

Social institutions were more successful in achieving their goals, when they evolved gradually. Although progress critically depends on the discovery and application of new ideas and techniques, it has always been the test for the statesmanship to adopt what had been useful in the past (Goodrich 1973, 4). The UN actually represents a continuum with the past, during the establishment period old ideas and methods applied with some modifications that were necessary in the light of past experience. There may be important changes in order to meet changed political conditions, however there is no real break in the steam of organizational development (Goodrich 1973, 20). Indeed this general continuity shows that functioning of the organization in its establishment process greatly depends on the existence of the hegemony. Since organizations that have had similar structure would function in similar ways, but in reality it did not happen. One of these institutions counted as a failure, yet the other one still works to this day. To prove this point, it is important to observe continuity throughout the structure of the both

organizations. Clearly to make a useful comparison of the LoN and the UN, the one should observe the Covenant of the League and the Charter of the UN since many provisions of the UN have been taken directly from the Covenant (Goodrich 1973, 5). It is inevitable to make a brief comparison about these organizations as Goodrich argues, “space doesn’t permit a detailed analysis ... extent to which the UN is a continuation of the League system” (1973, 4). The attempt of this thesis is to consider important features of functioning of the both systems and the effects of the hegemon in these functioning. And since the structures of the both organizations explained in detail in the first two sections of this chapter, an overall evaluation to clear the role of hegemony during the establishment phase will be done in this section.

Even there were an apparent readiness among the consultants of the UN to write old League off as a failure and to regard new institution something unique to resolve the problems that threatens worldwide peace and security, Leland M. Goodrich (1947) argues that the structures of both these organizations similar. She argues that “the element of continuity in the progression from the League of Nations to the United Nations is perhaps most obvious when we examine the structures of the two organizations” (1973, 12).

Before making any structural evaluations it is crucial to make comparisons between aims of both organizations. First of all both of these institutions have had a goal to provide and maintain stability and peace on a global scale. As mentioned in detail in the first chapter of this thesis, great powers should transform into hegemony in order to preserve its power even if its material capabilities declines. To transform its power into a hegemonic one, a powerful state should provide stability and peace to other states so that it can gain the consent of lesser states. In the League example it is clear that there were no hegemon to secure the system. Kindleberger (1973) explains this instability with the relative decline in British power and the US reluctance to lead the system. Indeed, Britain was in a decline period after long Pax Britannica era and the US was still a rising power but not a hegemon yet. This situation best experienced in the conflicts between members of the League Council and the smaller states. To punish those aggressors the League imposed sanctions, but without the US subscription to those sanctions it is

impossible for the League to make a successful embargo. On the other hand, even the decision-making mechanisms of the United Nations consisted of only victorious states, the UN avoided to fall into the same deficit that the LoN experienced.

Both of these institutions based primarily upon the principle of voluntary participation, which is only possible by the leading of a hegemon. As it can be observed from the League example, in a situation where there are no existing hegemony in the international system it is inevitable for the institution to fail to preserve peace and stability. Contrary to the LoN, the UN achieved a position above national sovereignty in conflict resolutions. The UN provided this security by having a back up from the existence and the self-restriction of the hegemony. Crucial point here is the self-restraint, as more the hegemon binds itself to the rule of the institution, it gives leverage to the institution and becomes more legitimate. As a result the legitimate hegemonic order reduces the scope of freedom of the hegemon relating to its national interest (Hurd 2007, 47). Instead of pursuit of self-interest, a successful hegemon pursuits collective interest of the system. The leader of the system becomes the leader in expense of its national interest in some occasion. As a result of this self-restriction of the hegemony, lesser states internalize the perception of the hegemony as the leader of the system by actively producing consent to the ongoing hegemony. Yet this creates a systemic anomaly for the hegemony. Cronin (2001) explains the result of this anomaly as the ‘paradox of hegemony’, which is the debating roles of the hegemony as a great power and leader of the system. A detailed overview about the relation between this paradox of the hegemon and its effects to the institution will be done in chapter four of this thesis, however it is important to note down how hegemon makes an institution from its establishment.

Another important similarity between the LoN and the UN is the composition of the councils in both organizations. Both the League Council and the Security Council comprised of the victorious states of the world wars except the US absence in the LoN. However this formation of the victorious states did not affect the UN negatively as it did the League. Indeed the UN have had its historical inferences from the League example as it established unconnected to the peace agreements, yet both organizations established to favor the victors of the great wars.

Only difference between those two institutions is their responsibilities and functions, for example the League Council had general responsibilities yet limited power to fulfill its duties, on the other hand the Security Council is responsible mainly with the maintenance of international peace and security with a power to enforce any kind of measures to fulfill its responsibility (Goodrich 1973, 14). The LoN established in order to protect post-war status quo and to protect victorious states from the possible challenges of the vanquished ones. In the mean time as mentioned earlier the UN, in particular the Security Council, established to preserve peace for all. The Security Council did this duty by preventing the conflict of lesser states to become a global issue in which all great powers would involve. Goodrich supports this idea as she argues, “The United Nations...is an organization for the enforcement of peace among the smaller states (1973,17). To make this protection happen the most important change made in voting system, which is the unanimity rule of the League Council. Under the UN charter, it is possible to take a binding decision without the consent of all members, the Security Council is the only mechanism to take this binding decisions relating to the peace and security.

It is not possible to claim that both the League of Nations and the United Nations have same structural characteristics, yet there is no real break in the organizational development (Goodrich 1973, 21). There may be “changes of emphasis, and in fact important substantive changes” in order to avoid past experiences or to met the changing conditions of present, however it can be argued that more or less the UN is the continuity of the LoN in a structural sense. The real difference, and the most important one for this thesis, is the alteration in the functioning of organization as a result of existence of hegemony. This difference can be seen in the establishment of the UN. Right after the establishment of the UN, wartime alliance broke and victorious states split and formed separate groups. The UN, which was established to ensure peace by the victorious states in post-war circumstances, did not effected negatively by this change in power distribution. In fact the UN become effective not as the founders strived for, yet it quickly settle to the changing facts. The UN established to create a peaceful world order by the ‘Five Policemen’, yet at the end it was only the US that makes the UN function.

The US by binding itself and the other states to the norms and rules of the organization provided the UN with a sense of legitimacy, which basically creates active consent of lesser states. Addition to the lesser states, other great powers accepted leadership of the US, because of the self-restraint of the US and its willingness to shoulder the cost of maintaining the system.

Comparison between the LoN and the UN proves that even the institution establishes not in a way it supposed to be, it could still be effective with the existence of the hegemony. It is clear that an umbrella organization like the UN greatly needs support of the hegemon to function effectively. In the following chapter the relation between the American hegemony and the United Nations will be analyzed thoroughly to clarify the role of the UN in an American hegemonic order and the importance of the US hegemony in the functioning of the UN. Addition to this reciprocal relation economic infrastructure and political superstructure of the US hegemony will be holistically analyzed in order to clarify the breakage in the hegemonic order and the effects of this breakage to the functioning of the UN.

CHAPTER FOUR

PAX AMERICANA

This chapter mainly intends to constitute a holistic framework of the American hegemony. To make a comprehensive explanation, it is crucial to combine historical context with the theoretical framework of hegemony. First of all, this work will briefly explain roots of the British hegemony and its decline at the end of 19th century. Afterwards this work will turn its attention to the main concern of this chapter, which is the basis of the American hegemony. The timeline of the emergence of the American hegemony that this thesis will use starts from the interwar years till to the end of the World War II. This era marks the hegemonic transition process in which the US experienced profound economic and social changes that shapes both internal and external relations of the US. First of all, structure of the American hegemony will be explained in the light of Gramsci's understanding of hegemony, since it is those great changes in economic and social sphere that transforms a great power into a hegemony. Those changes in infrastructure of the American hegemony will be clarified in this section to make a point for the next section, in which superstructure of the American hegemon will be revealed. Superstructure of the American hegemony materialized in the political and economic institutions/arrangements of the world order that was established right after the Second World War with the American leadership. After making sense of the hegemonic transition, the maturity period of the American hegemony will be explained. The time period of this era will start from the end of the World War II to 1973, which marks a structural change in the hegemonic order. This change in the system also had reflections in the American foreign policy ends, as American foreign policy become more unilateral compared to its institutionalized nature at the beginning of its hegemonic order. The political, military and economic spheres, which comprise the hegemonic order, will be revealed in this chapter. In the third section of this chapter, decline and crisis of the hegemony will be explored in the 1973. Addition to that, the major internal and external factors that changed the course of American hegemony will be exposed in order to mark the importance of the 1973. In the final section of this chapter change in the infrastructure of the

hegemonic order and its effects to the superstructure will be analyzed. Throughout this chapter characteristics of the American hegemony will be explored and special focus would be on the UN.

4.1. Interwar Years: Hegemonic Transition

Many international relations theories attempted to explain the US preponderance in global politics. These theories predominantly frame hegemony concept to find viable answers to this matter. Since debates over the definition of hegemony were discussed in the first chapter in detail, there will be only a brief summary of those debates and theoretical stance of this thesis in this section.

World-system theory, pioneered by Immanuel Wallerstein (1974), explains hegemonic transition as a continual process in which competition among great powers (core powers) results with a breakout of the wars that historically takes places for approximately thirty years. In his important work, he explained rise and decline of the hegemon with a historical materialistic perspective and argues that a hegemon should have a high level of efficiency not just in agricultural and industrial production but also in trade and finance. On the other hand hegemonic stability theory explains the main features of the global hegemony, as protector of the open market, main consumer of the global economy and last resort of debt. Kindleberger (1973) argues by virtue of this properties, hegemon can lead the anarchical international realm into a stable one, because only by this properties competition between states can be avoided and they feel secure to open their markets with a harmony (Okur 2010, 218). Neorealist account of American hegemony takes military, political, technological and economic power into account as a prerequisite of being a hegemon. Gilpin (1981) explains rise and decline of the hegemony with a rise and fall of their relative power on military, economic, technological and political domains. Neorealist perspective offers an implication like world-system theory that argues rise of the hegemonic power intersects with the end of major wars. Neoliberal institutionalism is another approach that attempted to fill the voids that they claim neorealist methodology contains. Without rejecting fundamental assumptions of neorealist approach, neoliberal

institutionalism offers insights about the operation of international institutions and markets as important indicators to analyze hegemonic order. This method differentiates hegemony from other great powers by defining its characteristic features as the provider of public goods, main consumer of the global goods, last resort of debt, guarantee of financial stability and finally protector of political economy by military means (Okur 2010, 230; Keohane 2005).

Those theories pretty much have same explanations about the world hegemony. They all attempted to apply the theory to the historical context. However these historical implications are very much efforts to overlap the historical context to the theory. On the other hand, Cox's pioneering work, heavily influenced by Gramsci, offers more holistic approach rather than attempting to support theory over some coincidental historical events. Addition to this historical materialistic approach, Cox based his arguments about the hegemonic transition on Gramsci's intrastate application of the hegemony. Gramsci's hegemony view first explores the predominant production method, which is mainly controlled by single social group, and after maturing, how this social group legitimizes their order through ideology and state apparatus. In his work, *Production, Power and World Order* (1987), Cox single out the importance of production, and yet he managed to sustain unity of structure and superstructure when characterizing hegemony. Cox (1977) reveals how power based dominance over production is rationalized through ideology to create consent between dominant and subordinate group in international realm (387). Because of this reason this work will explain the hegemonic transition from neo-Gramscian perspective, mostly from Cox's works.

4.1.1 Rise and Fall of the British hegemony

Framing hegemonic transition with the help of Gramscian perspective requires accumulative historical reasoning. Transition takes place between two world wars, but main driving force behind this transition process started long before the World War I. Cox (1987) explains this transformation as a complex process involving simultaneously

1. Change in the relative powers of the principal states.

2. Uneven development of productive forces leading to a new distribution of productive powers among social formations.
3. Changes in the relative power of social groups within social formations and the formation of historical blocs.
4. The formation of a social structure of accumulation, i.e. the putting into place of new social relations of productions and new mechanisms of capital accumulation through which economic growth is able to continue and increase. (209)

Thus, before explaining how the US acquires a position of hegemony in the global politics, it is crucial to clear up the fall of the British hegemony and the rise of the US with the impact of the production methods. Robert Cox (1987) explains the importance of production as he argues “production creates the material basis for all forms of social existence” which “generates the capacity to exercise power” (1). For him production not only generates power but also it creates resources that can be transformed within the state and world order (Cox 1987, 5). Because of this reason, transformation of the production methods directly related to the states and world orders. States provide the “legal-institutional framework” for the “economic practices of the economically dominant class” which will define the patterns of the production relations to subordinate other modes to the dominant mode (Cox 1987, 149).

The world order before British predominance in world order characterized with the mercantilist production and the balance of power that mercantilism created. After the victory achieved by the coalition powers led by the Britain over the Napoleonic France, this order changed into something Britain framed in order to promote liberal principles of political economy espoused in Britain (Cox 1987, 111). This victory secured “the military-political conditions for continuing economic supremacy” for Britain (Cox 1987, 148). Karl Polanyi in *The Great Transformation* (1957) explains the components of the world order under the British hegemony as “the age of market, internationalized gold standard³, balance of power, liberal state and self-regulating market” (cited by Yamashita 2011, 8). This components framing the world economy throughout the eighteenth century functioned through private agencies symbiotically related to the British state,

³ With gold standard this text refers to fixing values of national currencies to a fixed amount of gold in the world monetary system.

financial institutions centered mainly in the city of London and the Europe-centered state system (Cox 1987, 111).

Before explaining the world order established by Britain in detail, it is important to explore the intrastate relations and transformation inside state apparatus. Since as Cox argues;

Liberal state and liberal world order emerged together, taking shape through the establishment of bourgeois hegemony in Britain and of British hegemony in the world economy. (1987, 123)

Moreover, British hegemony is actually a successful blend and division of the politics and economy between aristocracy and the merchant class inside the state. In Britain case politics remained predominantly the sphere of the aristocracy; on the other hand economics became the domain of the bourgeoisie (Cox 1987, 127-128). Bourgeoisie gained strength because of the change in the dominant mode of production. As a consequence of the industry revolution and the usage of steam power to power modern machinery, growth in material production rised in massive numbers. Industry revolution that took place in Britain brought a system into existence in which elaborate, specialized, and expansive industrial facilities radically changed the relationship of commerce to industry (Silver and Arrighi 2003, 330). Agricultural production that was controlled preeminently by the aristocracy lost its importance comparing to industrial production. Thus, as Cox argues, “The aristocratic British governing class recognized that the Britain’s world power depended on its commerce and manufacturing” and was therefore organized to govern Britain in a such way as to let bourgeois economy to prospered and expand (1987, 148). The blend of old and new resulted with a formation of new superstructure in which “feudal classes became the intellectuals of the bourgeoisie and kept some privileges on the land, in the management of government and in the military” (Augelli and Murphy 1993, 145). This aristocratic-bourgeoisie division of labor established the bourgeoisie hegemony in Britain, which spilled over and constitute British hegemony in world economy (Cox 1987, 128). This bourgeoisie hegemony in Britain first intended to remove the existing impediments to economic freedom inherited from feudal and mercantilist practices (Cox 1987, 130). This could be achieved only by transforming the state into a liberal one. Besides

removing obstructions, Cox argues liberal state also established the required conditions for free market in goods and labor (1987, 130). Supporting this idea Eric Hobsbawm (1989) states, “such an economy recognized no frontiers, for its functioned best where nothing interfered with the free movement of the factors of production” (41). Moreover state had to ensure soundness of the money, which is basically fixing currency to the gold standard in strict terms (Cox 1987, 132). It can be claimed that during this period the “visible hand” of modern corporate organization and management replaced the “invisible hand” of Adam Smith’s anonymous market (Hobsbawm 1989, 45). Arrighi (1993) claims that the success of the British bourgeoisie to be represented within the dominant bloc was “the final touch on the making of British world hegemony” (175).

Intrastate expansion of the British hegemony started with the massive expansion of British share in the world trade. British economy had a hard edge supremacy over all other great powers economies because of its production and its ability to sell those goods all over the world. This productivity results with a hegemonic position in world commodity, monetary and capital markets which enforced “the rules of the system upon the world’s economies” (Gilpin 1987, 126). Economic preponderance of the British hegemony created *haute finance* that can be defined as “a closely knit body of cosmopolitan financiers” (Arrighi 1994, 55). *Haute finance* operated as the main link between the political and economic organization of the world during this era (Polanyi 1957, 10). These financiers mainly settled in the city of London and they have close and organic relations with the British government (Arrighi 1993, 172). This close links between *haute finance* and the British government resulted with their decisive and important role as an instrument of the British rule over the world (Arrighi 1993, 172).

Another important aspect of the British hegemony is the balance of power system it promoted through Europe to reinforce its hegemonic position. First of all securing peace in the continental Europe by the balance of power resulted in “an overwhelming preponderance of British strength in the rest of the world” (Cox 1987, 124). Secondly, keeping balance between continental powers stemmed those states to challenge to the British superiority. It is quite important since during the Napoleonic wars it was the British subsidies that financed the allied armies to

fought against the Napoleon's armies. In 1814, "Britain was subsidizing armies of 150.000 men in each of her major allies" (Cox 1987, 119). Sponsoring allies is not a cheap task for the Britain, however securing Britain from a European threat without keeping armies in the continent is a "cheap foreign policy in financial terms" and also it let Britain to follow an expansionist foreign policy in the rest of the world (Cox 1987, 125). Balance of power system that emerged right after the Congress of Vienna, is also removed external obstructions to the bourgeoisie to transform Western Europe, which proves that balance of power system was more than a state system, it was also "perceived as a social order" (Cox 1987, 119-126). Most remarkably, the balance of power system pivoted by Britain resulted with a long peace period all over the world that ensued rise of the British predominance in the world market. As soon as Britain turned the European balance of power into a mechanism of peace, the appeal of self-sufficiency waned and that of economic interdependence waxed (Arrighi 1999, 221).

This control over the world market, combined with the achievement of the balance of power and close connection of mutual instrumentality with *haute finance* make the United Kingdom to rule the interstate system as it likes (Silver and Arrighi 2003, 173). Addition to these its coercive apparatus sometimes "sway by the ominous poise of heavy ship's cannon" but more frequently its consent power prevailed by "the timely pull of thread in the international monetary network" (Polanyi 1957, 14). Silver and Arrighi explains this capacity, as the United Kingdom achieved a position of power that served not just its national interest but a 'universal' interest as well (Silver and Arrighi 2003, 173-174).

Yet the hegemonic system that Britain rules, comes to an end with the relative decline in production and disruption of the political stability as a result. At the end of the nineteenth century the monopolistic position of Britain in industry shattered by the competition of more dynamic industrial powers. It was an important determinant of the decline of the British hegemony. In Cox's words "industry was the basis of military and naval power" of the British predominance and "Britain's lead had been overtaken by Germany and the United States" in the late 18th century (1987, 153). Moreover these two rising powers become the "epicenters of the protectionist countermovement" towards the free trade system

that Britain promoted (Silver and Arrighi 2003, 337). This challenge seems to persist solely in economic sphere yet it has important consequences for the system that Britain established. Silver and Arrighi explains these consequences as,

This struggle did not just lead to a steep increase in the protection costs of Britain's overseas empire. It also generated demands for improvement and empowerment among world's subordinate groups and strata that could be neither repressed nor accommodated within the structures of Britain's free trade imperialism (2003, 337).

Britain did keep its commitment to unilateral free trade policy till the end of their hegemony, but as the major powers – like Germany and the US- switched to protectionism in the late 19th century, Britain didn't take any serious deliberate trade policies or military actions to prevent it (Yamashita 2011, 21). Supporting this idea Hobsbawm's states, "Britain never actually abandoned the free trade system it had created; it was the world that abandoned Britain" (1968, 207). This loss of power in material capabilities resulted with the end of the European balance of power and of British world hegemony, which is followed by a two hegemonic wars. Thus to conclude with Cox's words,

The last decades of the nineteenth century witnessed a simultaneous pattern of changes that cumulatively transformed the social structure of accumulation of the liberal era and brought into existence of a non-hegemonic world order (1987, 210).

4.1.2 Productive base of the American hegemony: Fordism

Out of World War II the United States emerged as a new hegemon and presumed same kind of leadership that Britain had exercised for a long time (Cox 1987, 211). However, the structure that determines the norms and rules of the British hegemonic order is somewhat seems superficial when comparing the penetrative and transformative power of the institutions of the American hegemony (Okur 2010, 201-202). American hegemony offers a wide analyze opportunity to understand the interplay between infrastructure and superstructure, ideas and material capabilities, and coercion and consent. Supporting this idea Henry Luce owner of the famous Life magazine wrote an article named *American Century* in the year of 1941, which explains that the US is facing a chance to establish a global hegemony in the economic and cultural spheres. He furthermore continues and

claims that the post-war order would be characterized with the American values: free enterprise, competitive market and mass consumption (Okur 2010, 243). Yet those values are consequences of the social transformations that occurred with the change in the productive base of the American economy. Because of this reason, this work will intend to explore the change in the mode of production and its transformative effects on micro level. To achieve this goal this work will use Gramscian analyses of hegemony as Clarke argues “Gramsci attempted to shift the superstructural analysis of hegemony back to its infrastructural origin in the factory” (1990, 8). This is crucial as Cox argues, “the expansive energies released by a social hegemony-in-formation move outward onto the world scale at the same time as they consolidate their strength at home” (1987, 149). In other words this part will focus on the consolidation process of the social hegemony within the United States.

The first prerequisite to achieve hegemonic position is establishing an effective industrial productivity appearing from the technological innovation (Koçak 2006, 48). American hegemony acquired a hegemonic position that imposes its ideology and economic rules first achieving social hegemony through the labor-saving innovation of Fordist production methods. Gramsci saw Fordism as stemming “from an inherent necessity to achieve the organization of a planned economy” (1999, 561). Supporting this idea Cox (1996) argues if anyone observe more than “one hundred years of the contemporary era”, then it will become clear that “Fordism and its related social and political structures can be seen as a reaction to what Karl Polanyi called self-regulating market” (278-279). In the *Great Transformation*, Polanyi questioned whether self-regulating market was a natural or superficial phenomenon by analyzing “how the British state used its legal force to create free markets in goods, money, land and labor” (Cox 1996, 279). Indeed establishment of Fordist production methods “marks the passage from the old economic individualism to the planned economy” (Clarke 1990, 8).

Fordism is complex technological phenomenon that is fundamentally based on “mass production, the assembly line, and replacement of the skilled worker... with the semi-skilled quickly trainable workers in Taylorized production systems” (Cox 1996, 276). Hobsbawm explains methods of Taylorism as:

- (1) by isolating each worker from the work group, and transferring the control of the work process from him/her on the group to the agents of management, who told the worker exactly what to do and how much output to achieve in the light of
- (2) a systemic breakdown of each process into timed component elements and
- (3) various systems of wage payments which would give the worker an incentive to produce more. (1989, 44-45).

This new structure of production was linked to “economic organization, consumption and income distribution, welfare” which decisively changed the social relations of production (Cox 1996, 276-277). For Clarke (1990) Fordism “broke down what had been an extremely rigid technology, and an equally rigid organization of the labor process” into its components to re-form it to its own rationale (2). The new structure shaped social relations of production for its own existence. Fordism is not just revolutionized technological and social relations of production also it triggered a revolution in consumption (Clarke 1990, 6). With the application of Fordist production methods by other manufacturers, market started to offer to, “middle class consumer a range of choice which had hitherto been available only to the ultra-rich” (Clarke 1990, 7). Under the Fordist production large corporations concentrated economic power, and employment, wage and welfare policies adopted in order to enable mass consumption of standardized goods to sustain the mass production (Cox 1996, 277).

Importance of the Fordist production, as a hegemonic feature of the US hegemony, reached its peak with the end of World War II. The domestic production doubled in the US during the World War II, it raised from 91 billion dollars in 1939 to 210 billion dollars in 1945 (Ikenberry 1989, 380). Wartime production gave an edge to the United States, as it was the biggest arms dealer during the war. With the Fordist production the US produced immense numbers of arms and ammunitions, which created a strong productive base for the US. Military production was important both during and after the war. During the war it provides enormous productive capacity and after the war it was crucial to convert wartime production since once a military production base established without the military demand mass-production industry would be vulnerable (Cox 1996, 280). After the ceasefire the US have had to give immense amount of export surplus in order to sustain its

productive capacity. Thus, the primary concern of the US government after the war was the “formation in Europe of a market big enough to make profitable the methods of mass production and distribution” (Silver and Arrighi 2003, 340). It is important to read the immediate postwar order established with this concern, since to provide mass consumption to sustain mass production the US needed “forms of institutionalization of class relations” both on domestic and international levels (Clarke 1990, 12). This urge can be understandable since its economical power is also its weakness unless it can sustain the mass production. To sustain the production the US had to achieve “maintenance of reasonably high levels of employment and social security” (Cox 1987, 213). By the 1948, the national income of the United States was twice more than the joint national income of Britain, France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries, and six times more than that of USSR (Silver and Arrighi 2003, 339). The US established its hegemonic order under these structural circumstances and concerns emerged out of its structural base. Following section will briefly explain the superstructure that was established to sustain the structure of the American hegemony and the role of the UN as one of the key components of the American hegemony.

4.2 The Rise and the decline of the American hegemony

World War II changed the global power distribution dramatically; no state except the US had a position of power to establish a world order after the war. In fact the war had eliminated the alternative hegemonic challenges of Germany and Japan, and ratified the destruction of the old order controlled by the British imperial order (Ikenberry 2001, 167).

Establishment of a world order led by the US and its allies came across in years between 1944 and 1951, in which victorious states brought about “history’s most sweeping reorganization of international order” (Ikenberry 2001, 163). Ikenberry (2001) separated the postwar order into two interrelated settlements. He explained the first one with the bipolar nature of the Cold War as the US and its allies took position against the Soviet Union and its allies. The other settlement Ikenberry (2001) remarks is the economic formation of the Western world with

highly institutionalized nature. He differentiates these economic and ideological ends of the postwar settlement, yet what this work offers is read these settlements as they complement each other mutually. This section will explain the postwar American led world order through a holistic perspective to make sense of the hegemony as a unification infrastructure and superstructure. The Pax Americana offers a great example for this unity, as its material capabilities united with ideas and norms promoted by the new institutions that they established. This section will help this work to materialize the theoretical aspect of the hegemony with the support of the historical context. With the help of historical context this section will reveal the Machiavellian Centaur, as a successful combination of force and consent emerged in the characteristics of the American hegemony.

4.2.1 Economic and Political World Order

The American world order expanded to project itself onto the world scale and its methods of production became the “world model, exported and emulated abroad” (Cox 1987, 266). This section aims to explain the institutional origins of the US hegemony in general and the role of the UN as a hegemonic institution in particular. In this section this work will try to relate the structure of the hegemony to its superstructure. The very nature of the world order that the US established depends on to its structural basis. In other words in this part, this work will explore the superstructure of the American hegemony based upon to its infrastructure which this work explained it in the previous section.

As discussed earlier a dominant actor in the world politics becomes hegemon when it primarily gains an overwhelming position of power in economic sphere. After achieving this position it simultaneously transform the interstate structure of production and trade into its dominant mode of production in order to keep the world economy under its control. The postwar political and economic conjuncture in the world puts the US in a position of leadership to reconstruct the political and economic structure of the world politics, attaching its interests with the interests of the other lesser states. Addition to its overwhelming economic power, flawless historical records and self-confidence helped the US to acquire a

leadership position through the World War II (Yamashita 2011, 20). It is clear that the international economic order that emerged after the World War II reflected US preferences (Mastanduno 2009, 128). However this time international monetary system would be managed through institutions rather than left to market forces, to reinforce free trade (Mastanduno 2009, 128). The first mechanism in the postwar conjuncture that create a powerful incentive for the world to follow the US leadership was the Marshall Plan.

As mentioned earlier, after the war the US endeavored to create high level of employment to adapt the thousands of discharged soldiers to the national production and create a social security structure to sustain high level of consumption to replace the military spending with domestic spending. Thus they need to reconstruct the devastated economies of Western Europe, since those aims could only be achieved to create a market that was big enough to profit from mass production. Because of these reasons the Marshall Plan became the principal structure of the postwar world economic order. Besides running the national economy of the US, Marshall Plan also provided the Western Europe to relieve economically. It provided the incentive to join the new economic order with the funds to recover the economies of Western Europe. Additionally during the transition period, roughly from 1946 to 1958, Marshall Plan paved the way to resistance and allowed time for the major participant states to adjust their economies to the prerequisites of the new economic order (Cox 1987, 215). It clearly led the Western Europe progress toward “trade liberalization and exchange convertibility” the basic settings for the open economy envisaged in the postwar context (Cox 1987, 214-215). Addition to create an economic recovery for the Western Europe, Marshall Plan was also able to bring the center right orientation in the domestic politics, which provided the political basis of the neoliberal policies (Cox 1987, 216).

Marshall Plan provide the most important incentive for the industrialized countries to agree upon the new economic world order, yet it was not the only mechanism to harmonize national policies to the norms of the newly established system. Another important institution that shaped the postwar economic order was the Bretton Woods system. Basically, the Bretton Woods system was based on a

implicit deal between the US and its allies that covered trade, finance and security (Mastanduno 2009, 129). The Bretton Woods-the institutional structure of the world economy-started to function only in the late 1950's (Cox 1987, 224). However initial Bretton Woods system "hardly constituted a global order" (Mastanduno 2009, 128). Rather than forming an inclusive order, it represented a "rich country club" established by the US and its Western European friends (Mastanduno 2009, 128). Western European and Japanese economic recovery was the prerequisites for effectiveness of the Bretton Woods. Yet, during the 1950's the slow economic recovery in the Western Europe and Japan forced Americans to take serious measures in the Bretton Woods system to function properly. The US, during this time, anticipated the task of regulating international monetary management "through assumption of a de facto dollar standard" (Mastanduno 2009, 128-129). The main reason behind this decision was the unexpected slow economic growth of other member states. Because in the original Bretton Woods agreement International Monetary Fund (IMF) was the mechanism that was supposed to manage the exchange rates of the participant states throughout "taking asymmetrical arrangements to maintain fixed rates through domestic adjustment measures" (Mastanduno 2009, 128-129). Thus it can be claimed that the new world economy grew very largely as the consequence of the hegemonic role the US played after the Second World War (Cox 1987, 216). The main consequence of this de facto dollar standard in the international monetary order was the increasing liquidity of the US dollars all over the world, especially in the Western Europe and Japan which helped them to recover fast. While Western European and Japan governments committed to secure the value of their national currencies relative to dollar, the US government took the responsibility to fix the dollar to a certain amount of gold and accept to pay the dollars that other central banks held in return of gold (Mastanduno 2009, 129-130). This policy, this pledge made the US dollar perceived "as good as gold" in international monetary system (Mastanduno 2009, 130). However this flow of dollars transformed the US public debt into a world debt and the more dollars held by the foreigners, they become more hostage to the US hegemonic policies (Cox 1987, 217). While governments of Western Europe and Japan enjoyed free access to the US market and dollars to sustain economic

growth, they had to compensate the system regulation expenses of the US. Critical point in this deal was, it was not solely an economic arrangement. To secure a stable monetary order and to get the consent of other industrial states to its norms and principles, the US had the burden to secure the international political system. A stable and peaceful political order had the utmost importance in the postwar context to sell the US production surplus to the rest of the world and create a free trade regime among these industrial states. The core of the US postwar security strategy was providing security protection to Western Europe under NATO alliance and to Japan with asymmetrical security treaty between Japan and the US (Mastanduno 2009, 129). In return the US made a long-term investment to the economic well being and political stability of the other states, which would eventually transformed those states into markets that is big enough to consume the US exports (Mastanduno 2009, 129). That situation had two ends, a win-win for both parties, yet with these arrangements the US dollar became the “lynchpin of the transatlantic and transpacific deal” (Mastanduno 2009, 129). This crucial role of the dollar granted a leverage for the US, like as long as other states hold dollars in their federal banks US could finance their security arrangements and various foreign and policy goals only by printing more money (Mastanduno 2009, 130). And reciprocally the Western Europe states and Japan were willing to hold dollars as long as the US fulfills its security commitments.

To sum up, even though the institutions of the economic world order were not established as it supposed to be, it quickly transformed itself parallel to fulfill the needs of the hegemon and created hegemons’ norms and principles. These machineries of the world economy supervised the application of the systems’ norms and made all industrial capitalist countries to harmonize their national polices in order to match them with the new rules of the system. Basically, the idea of free trade was the perfect for the US, as it “requires little or no direct involvement of the US (Ikenberry 2003, 60). Once the major states participated in this open world economy, the economic world order would be “self-generating” (Ikenberry 2003, 60). However, it is important to read this economic hegemonic order with the political hegemonic order all together, as they jointly constitute the hegemonic order.

The United States would favor a stable and secure postwar order but they wouldn't like to manage the order directly or without restraining their political autonomy (Ikenberry 2003, 60), in other words the US would favor an order that self-reproducing the rules and the norms of the US. Economically, Bretton Woods and Marshall Plan fortified the mode of production of the American hegemony internationally. West European states and Japan adjusted their national economic settings in order to fit into the new economic world order. However all these efforts should be read together with the political world order that American hegemony established, since it is only possible to read economic order together with the political order to make a holistic analysis. Ikenberry argues that a mutual reciprocal binding drove the postwar political organization between the US, Western European states and Japan (2001, 211). As a matter of fact, the perfect combination of the dollar hegemony in international monetary order and political stability institutionalized by the UN and executed by the NATO and the other regional security complexes that provide the US to establish the interstate structure of the world order as they endeavored. As a result of this world order Western European states and Japan became more and more deeply incorporated to the American leadership. Thus, it is crucial to understand how NATO and asymmetrical security arrangements affected the economic world order?

Ikenberry argues that this global system provided a "bulwark for stability through commitments and reassurances they manifest" (2005, 138). However addition to stability provider role of this system, it generated a high level of economic integration and cooperation among the countries Western European, North American and Northeast Asia. The main idea was that keeping Western Europe and the United States in a single security system. Marshall Plan paved the way to a more united Europe, which will position itself easily with the United States in terms of security perceptions. One of the most important reasons behind these security arrangements is that the US leadership believed that it is only possible to stabilize the world by securing and combining economics with security. "For US officials economics and security were inextricably linked" (Mastanduno 2009, 127). They realized that economic depression had led to war; rivals in the marketplace became enemies in the battle (Mastanduno 2009, 127-128). NATO was the final touch in

this security system that the US seek with the Europe. This security system ensured that the US and its allies would not go back to the “dangerous game of strategic rivalry and balance of power politics” (Ikenberry 2005, 139). However in the postwar context it is impossible to sustain a balance of power in conventional sense as the Britain did back in the 18th century, the only possibility in this conjuncture was “condominium or bipolarity” (Cox 1987, 211). Undoubtedly, bipolarity is the most important political feature of the political world order in the postwar context. Bipolar structure of the world order helped the US to form a military alliance with the Western European states easily. As discussed earlier Marshall Plan cleared the resistance and the leftist political entities from the European politics. With the emergence of the Soviet threat, Western European governments seek security from the US and as a matter of fact NATO as a collective security organization emerged in such conditions. NATO and Japan-US military alliance benefited those states greatly as they devote greater efforts to the “economic competitiveness and prosperity” instead of concerning about security. As a result European and Asian partners of the US not solely gained military security, “they have gained access to the large open market of the United States” (Mastanduno 2009, 126), but in return those countries agreed to be “reliable partners who provide diplomatic, economic and logistical support for the United States as its leads the wider Western postwar order” (Ikenberry 2005, 140).

Even though the US positioned itself at the heart of the new world order that is built around “American provision of security and economic public goods, mutually agreeable rules and institutions, and interactive political processes that give states a voice in the running of the system” (Ikenberry 2005, 137), it was not easy for the US to maintain the system. First, economically American-European economic ties weakened after the end of Marshall Plan and “neither European integration nor currency realignments were adequate to maintain” (Arrighi 1994, 297). Western European and Japan governments with the exception of France supported the US to ensure that flow of dollars in excess amounts continues. First solution of this economic problem was situated in the security regimes that the US established. The solution of the major economic problems of the US was the massive domestic rearmament of the Europe (Arrighi 1994, 297). This policy

helped the US to sustain its productive base and additionally it creates an incentive for the US to continue providing aids to the Europe after the Marshall Plan. Second solution indirectly leads to the first one was the creation of a gold pool by the “Group of Ten” by the finance ministers of western European states except the France (Mastanduno 2009, 131). Finance ministers of these ten states were well aware that the relative decline in US gold reserves and increasing dollar holding abroad would force the dollar price of gold upwards (Mastanduno 2009, 131). The main idea behind this gold pool was to create a collective fund that would forestall or counter to the dollar crises that might threaten stability of the monetary system (Mastanduno 2009, 131). By keeping dollars in their central banks this ten state financed the US commitment to their national security, “including the stationing of US troops on their territories” (Mastanduno 2009, 130). “Due to its rapidly recovered economy, large dollar holdings, and pivotal position in the forward defense of NATO” (Mastanduno 2009, 131), the West Germany was the most important state in both domestic rearmament and gold pool strategies of the US. Throughout the 1960s West Germany “pledge to hold surplus dollar rather than turn them back to the United States” and spent a certain share of this dollar surplus to purchase US military equipment which in return recycled dollars back to the US, supported US military industry complex, and created a security interdependence for the West Germany with the US (Mastanduno 2009, 131-132). In other words, “West Germany agreed to accept more and more dollars in order to maintain a US military presence in Europe” (Cox 1987, 217). This close economic and military integration between the US and its postwar allies creates reciprocal binding of the Western Europe and Japan to the policy choices of the US. Addition to the politics, this “integration of European and American military forces provided a means to prevent Europe as an economic region from closing itself off from the US” (Arrighi 1994, 297). In other words link between the hegemon and the rest in the postwar context were like a double-edged sword: Japan and Western European states gained economic recovery and military security but attached to the hegemonic order deeply.

Another important structure that determines rules and norms of the postwar political order was the UN. As explained broadly in the second chapter of this

study, the UN established to preserve postwar peace by allied powers. ‘Five Policemen’ supposed to sustain peace by military means if necessary. However Cold War and the great power disparity between the US and the other great powers resulted with a bipolar structure of the UN. Even though the Cold War was the most important determinant in the functioning of the UN in its early establishment, it still showed hegemonic features of the US. Meetings for the first draft charter were a great example of it. First, unlike its predecessor League of Nations, the US sought active consent of the other great powers in order to make the organization legitimate. Ian Hurd explains this aim as “it attempts to legitimize a universal legal system among all countries that would entrench a system of Great Power dominance through the Security Council” (2007, 89). The Security Council was designed to “institutionalize special rights for the Great Powers and to entrench those into international law” (Hurd 2007, 109). However this system was also beneficial for the small states they were content with the draft so long as “they had the opportunity to discuss, criticize, and vote on it” (Hurd 2007, 106-107). During the early Cold War years the UN became one of the most important instrument that was used by US foreign policy to shape the global politics. US foreign policy goals were pursued in the UN via;

...threatened vetoes in the Security Council, preponderant influence over the selection of successive Secretariat General, key positions and general overrepresentation in the Secretariat, and deferential majority consisting mostly at West Europeans and Latin Americans in the General Assembly. (Puchala 2005, 573)

However it was not just the US predominantly controls the Security Council. As Alvarez explains, international law produced by UN is somewhat different than other sources of hegemonic legitimacy (2005, 215). It means even the US needs to consider the impact of its actions on the UN’s legitimacy (Johnstone 2008). Supporting this argument Innis Claude points out that the 1945 settlement;

... so much that the Great Powers extracted concessions to their strength... the Charter scheme represented acceptance by the great powers of a framework of constitutional limitations within which their de facto power was to be exercised. (1956, 81)

This constitutional settlement after the war created the basic institutions and operating patterns that limits the capabilities of the leading state (Ikenberry 1999, 130).

In short, the postwar settlement had highly institutionalized nature that created active consent of the most of the governments around the globe. With collective/bilateral security arrangements and economic recovery the US provided its allies with “free access to raw materials; free movement of goods, capital and technology; and elimination of discrimination in economic relations” (Cox 1987, 216). However this was not solely achieved by high levels of cooperation through institutions, it was the hegemonic power of the US that creates those incentives to its allies. Supporting this argument Mastanduno (2009, 129) points out that 1950s and 1960s were only the bare foundations of the liberal economic order that the US managed to create. Even though the world order was not established as it supposed to be, “postwar II reconstruction was a period of unprecedented prosperity and expansion for the world economy” (Arrighi 1994, 298). Between 1950 and 1975 income per person increased on average by 3 percent per year (Arrighi 1994, 298). But this golden age of the free trade capitalism has come to an end in the early 1970s. Last section of this chapter will focus on this decline through change in the economic foundations of the American hegemony.

4.2.2 Structural shift from the base of the hegemony

There has been significant amount of studies about the decline of the American hegemony in the International Relations literature since 1970s. From the early 1970s onward, academic pieces concerning the decline of the US hegemony has mushroomed in the International Relations discipline, due to changing basis of the structure of the hegemony. There are grounds for assuming that these years manifest a turning point in the course of the history, since what the US experienced during those years were quite similar with the long depression of the late nineteenth century’s Pax Britannica. The 1970s indeed marked a dramatic shift from the production-based structure of the hegemonic system into a financialized one. This final section of the third chapter will focus on the crisis of hegemony during the

1970s and its results to the functioning of multilateral institutions in general, and UN in particular. It is crucial to understand the change in the structure of the hegemony, since it is accepted that it is the economic structure that determines the hegemonic order.

According to Cox (1987) the transition in the transformation in the structures of production, state and world order began with the world economic crisis in the 1970s. He furthermore emphasizes the importance of the economic crisis, as it was “a threshold- a phase of transition between the definable structures of recent past and the as yet unclear structures of the emerging future” (1987, 2). The principal financial indicators were of this crisis was inflation and indebtedness (Cox 1987, 270). “High level of inflation accompanied by mass unemployment, low growth, the emergence of substantial surplus capacity, and low rates of investment” (Cox 1987, 274). Addition to these economic indicators, the revival of Europe and Japan had been weakened the ability of the US to dominate world-economy arrangements (Cox 1987, 224). Governments of the Europe and Japan were “unwilling to accept the obligations that accompanied their renewed economic strength” and challenge to the economic world order (Mastanduno 2009 133-134). As discussed earlier throughout the 1960s European governments, especially West Germany, and Japan supported the role of the US dollar in the international monetary order. Main reason behind this unwillingness was what they experienced during those years. They were unwilling because it turned out that supporting the US dollar made the foreign dollar holders of debt increasingly dependent on the system that generated (Cox 1987, 277). By the 1971 the US had only 10 billion dollars worth gold in its federal bank, while foreign dollar holdings had increased to 80 billion dollars (Mastanduno 2009, 134). However economic recovery of the other industrial countries triggered the raw material prices to increase drastically, “especially fivefold increase in petroleum prices brought about the agency of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was the most dramatized instance” (Cox 1987, 278). This pressure on the raw materials and national currencies redirected a pressure to the US by the Western European states and Japan to decrease the US budget deficits. The US response was remorseless to these demands. The US closed down the gold window, which actually meant; “excess

dollar holdings abroad could no longer be exchanged for the more secure and tangible asset” (Mastanduno 2009, 134). This situation led to the growth of an unregulated transnational Eurodollar market, a financial market trading in foreign-held liquidities that continually fed by the US deficits (Cox 1987, 277). Throughout the late 1960s there were subsequent efforts to restore the monetary regime and fixed exchange rates, yet pressure against dollar and finally oil shocks those efforts come to an end. 1971 year marked a visible decline of American hegemony. The US transformed the postwar economic order when it refused to exchange gold for dollars. With using these measures, the US “knocked out the monetary and commercial underpinnings of postwar international economic relationship” (Stein 1984, 382). By refusing to exchange gold for dollar, the US demonstrated that would not maintain world order at any price; rather, “it would require a renegotiation of the original asymmetric bargain” (Stein 1984, 382). In 1973 gold parity and fixed exchange rate principles of the Bretton Woods agreement terminated. As Susan Strange once put it “the dollar was slipping from top currency to negotiated currency” (Cited by Cox 1987, 278). However after the oil shocks “the de facto special role of the US dollar” resumed (Mastanduno 2009 134). The US kept the special role of the dollar by using its economic and political ties which were successful to bind the Western European states and Japan to its world order. The US bought off key oil producers with military rearmament, bilateral security agreements, and the promise of investment (Spiro 1999, cited by Mastanduno 2009, 136). The US forced the industrial states to abandon fixed exchange rates in 1973 and allow their currencies float according to market prices (Mastanduno 2009, 138). During 1970s West European governments and Japan accepted that the US debts were ‘quid pro quo’ for US military commitments, and general recovery in the world economy depends on the recovery of the US economy (Cox 1987, 277). For the recovery of the US economy advanced industrial countries would have to continue to help to finance the US debts. For this reasons the US market remained the world’s largest and the dollar remained the primary currency of the world economy albeit the Bretton Woods system collapsed (Mastanduno 2009, 139).

The economic crisis of the 1973 not just changed the superstructure of the American hegemonic world order; it also changed the infrastructure of the

American hegemony. With the collapse of the Bretton Woods regime in 1973, Fordist production also began to give way to a new kind of production especially in the technologically advanced sectors (Cox 1996, 277). This mode of production called Post-Fordist production, which meant, “a shift away from large plants, mass-producing standardized goods, towards shorter-run production for a greater variety of more specialized markets” (Cox 1996, 277). Change in the production transformed the relations of the production as well. Large numbers of semi-skilled workers were no longer needed for the production. “The need was to combine the outputs of a large number of smaller production units according to shifting demands” (Cox 1996, 277). This shift in the relations of production leads to a change in the international economic relations of the Fordist era. The new world economy emerged after this shift was based on transnationalized production and finance that could “either escape interstate regulation or become self-regulating with the support or connivance of states” (Cox 1996, 277). Essentially, post-Fordist production internationalized the production; it linked groups of producers in different jurisdictions to supply markets in many countries (Cox 1996, 278). Internationalization of the production cannot be achieved without the existence of a successful international financial system. Fundamentally, Fordism encouraged the organization of national economies under state regulation, whereas post Fordism encourages the internationalizing of the state; “making the state an instrument for adjusting national economies to be exigencies of world-economy expansion” (Cox 1996, 278).

It is clear that change in the economic structure of the world order deeply affected its superstructure. Multilateral and formal nature of the world economic institutions turned into bilateral and informal in which the American authority felt stronger. For example, “formal obligations of Bretton Woods were replaced by the commitment of advanced industrial states to informal coordination through G7 summits” (Mastanduno 2009, 139). Yet this shift in the economic structure and institutions were not exactly reflected in the political order that the US hegemony established. Even though most of the economic mechanisms of the hegemonic order changed during the 1970s, the political arrangements and institutions remained effective more than two decades. Especially the United Nations frequently used as

an instrument of American hegemony, as for example “in episodes having to do with Atoms for Peace, Korea, Suez, United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), the Congo, decolonization, the condemnation of Iran in 1979, and censuring the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan” (Puchala 2005, 573).

CHAPTER FIVE

FUNCTIONING OF THE UN BEFORE 1990s

5.1. Functioning of the UN before 1970s

As discussed in detail in the second chapter of this work, the original United Nations was a continuation of the wartime alliance with certain deference to the smaller states to gain their support and to make the organization legitimate (Holtz 1961, 128). Indeed, hegemony may lead, yet “they need followers, and they must make concessions to gain others assent” (Stein 1984, 358). The UN established to provide a peaceful coexistence of the rival ideologies, harmonize divergent national interest of the great powers and balance their power capabilities (Holtz 1961, 128). Yet the direction of the events led the organization become somewhat different than expected. General belief about the UN was pessimistic in the first decades after its establishment. It was presumed as a dead organization, dead in the sense that the organization had been developed for the great powers interest and primarily based on the idea that they could together operate the world order, an idea that had proved false even in the 1950s (Boyd 1970, 357). Indeed it was not created as endeavored, yet the UN effectively involve in the matters concerning world peace and stability. One of the most important reasons behind this success was the role of the lesser states inside the UN mechanisms. The UN regarded as “a dispenser of politically significant approval and disapproval of the claims, policies and actions of states” (Claude 1966, 367). In other words even the lesser states don’t have the power to shape the power politics globally, they found a way to effect the system. Even the independence claims of the newly found states were decided in the UN. “New states have been inclined to regard the grant of membership as the definitive acknowledgment of their independence” (Claude 1966, 376). It became an instrument for international recognition and legitimacy. The exercise of the legitimization function was a highly significant part of the political role of the UN (Claude 1966, 370). This function also strengthens the influence of the UN in global matters. Participation of large numbers of states means a wide range of countries believe in the institutions legitimacy (Woods 2003, 93). This creates a

paradoxical relation between the lesser states and the UN. States should have acknowledged by the UN to be recognized as a sovereign ruler of its own territory and when they applied to the UN to secure this end they automatically reinforce the legitimacy of the institution.

Another important determinant in the early success of the UN was the role of the hegemon in the organization. Ngaire Woods argue that once an institution is created by a powerful state with a set of rules to serve its interest that state “has to show itself willing to subject itself to those rules even they do not further its interests if the institution is to retain legitimacy and institution” (2003, 93). Ikenberry (2001) explains this situation as a ‘lock in’ process in which hegemon strategically restrains its power with the rules and norms of the institution to gain other states assent to the world order it is established. This creates a transparency and also predictability for the hegemon, which creates consent of other states to its leadership. This American dedication in the UN aftermath of the devastation of the World War II created a perception that from the very start of the organization, “the UN never was totally and automatically docile “American tool” (Boyd 1970, 368). Even though the “voice of the United Nations may not be authentic voice of mankind”, it is clearly the best option for the representation of the global general will (Claude 1966, 372). In brief, quoting the UN Secretary General Hammarskjöld’s words:

It is not the Soviet Union, or indeed any other big powers, who need United Nations for their protection; it is all the others. In this sense the Organisation is first of all their Organisation. (Boyd 1970, 361)

After its establishment the UN involved in many global issues that might have disrupted stability of the international order otherwise. This section will offer analysis of brief historical context of those events starting from 1945 till the early 1970s. One of the most important disputes the UN tried to solve in the postwar juncture was the establishment of the state of Israel. Surrounded with hostile states the Israeli state had no choice but to apply to the UN for an international recognition that enhances the legitimacy of the newly founded state.

Furthermore, the action taken by the US within the UN as a response to the aggression of the North Korea and collaboration of the China clearly defined postwar

stance of the US. In 1950, the US pursued and won an endorsement of a collective military action against North Korea. This response “gave convincing evidence throughout the Korean War of its high valuation of the United Nations stamp of legitimacy” (Claude 1966, 377). Even though Korean War was a “classic case of the use of the UN to pursue US interests” (Dunne 2003, 272), still acting within the institution clearly improved the effectiveness of the UN.

In the 1956 a small-scale conflict turned into close combat in the Middle East. After the nationalization of the Suez Canal by the Egypt, the British and French joined with the Israeli troops and coordinated an attack to Sinai Peninsula. Response of the US to this conflict was clearly represents its general stance towards the solution of crises. The US pressured the British and France through diplomatic and economic channels to force a ceasefire and concluding withdrawal. The Suez Crisis of 1956 was clearly a reminder about the proper role of the UN as the US pursued the resolution of the crisis with the Assembly of the UN (Dunne 2003, 257). In 1960 in the Congo crisis the US pursued its interest by the “...robust peacekeeping by the UN mission” regarding to Belgian intervention (Thakur 2006, 51). In 1964 the US intervened the close combat between Greece and Turkey by using the UN to keep these NATO members “from each other’s throats” (Thakur 2006, 51).

1960s started with a major campaign to delegitimize colonialism in the UN. This waged campaign “invalidate the claims of colonial powers to legitimate possession of overseas territories- in short, to revoke their sovereignty over colonies” (Claude 1966, 376). The most important moment in this anticolonial moment was the invasion of Goa, former Portuguese colony, by India. India was cited before the Security Council for its invasion of Goa (Claude 1966, 376). India was accused in legal terms in front of the Security Council and it responded to those accusations accordingly. India’s defense was, delegitimization of colonialism deprived Portugal;

...to claim to sovereignty over Goa and thus any right to protest the invasion which, by virtue of the same process, had become an act of liberation, terminating Portugal’s illegal occupation of Goa. (Claude 1966, 376)

The US support to the anticolonial movements in the UN makes the organization even more effective. Especially the case of India shows how norms and rules of the institution internalized within its members. However this adroit use of the UN

disrupted during the 1960s, particularly, with the addition of Soviet ‘satellite’ states from Eastern Europe and the former colonies in Africa, Asia and the Middle East to the UN Assembly (Dunne 2003, 273). This situation led to an American dissatisfaction with the UN in the following years. Americans found the Afro-Asian bloc unreliable and economically demanding and Latin Americans were no longer dependable to the US (Dunne 2003, 273). This dissatisfaction from the UN peaked after the Six Days War between the Israel and the Arab states. Anti-Americanism overspread as an outcome of this war led third world countries to capture the UN to pursue their agenda (Thakur 2006, 51). Still, the US returned to pursue its goals by using the UN in the 1970s.

Table 1

Topic	Date of session	Security Council resolution, date and votes
Northern Greece Creation of UNSCOB	October 21, 1947	Security Council moved the issue to General Assembly, September 15, 1947
Korea Calling for China to remove its forces	February 1, 1951	Security Council Resolution 90, voting unanimous
Suez	November 1-10, 1956	Security Council Resolution, October 1956, Adopted by 7 votes to 2 (France and UK) with 2 abstentions (Australia and Belgium)
Hungary	November 4-10, 1956	Security Council Resolution 120, November 4, 1956
Lebanon	August 8-21, 1958	Security Council Resolution, August 7, 1958, Adopted unanimously
Congo question	September 17-19, 1960	Security Council Resolution 157, September 17, 1960, Adopted by 8 votes to 2 (Poland and USSR) with 1 abstention (France)
Middle East 1967 War	June 17-September 18, 1967	Letter from USSR; under Article 11 of the Charter

Table 2

Topic	Date of session	Security Council resolution, date and votes
India /Pakistan	December 16, 1971	Security Council Resolution 303, December 6, 1971, Adopted by 11 votes to 0 with 4 abstentions
Afghanistan (Soviet invasion)	January 10-14, 1980	Security Council Resolution 462, January 9, 1980, Adopted by 12 votes to 2 (Germany, USSR) with 1 abstention (Zambia)
Palestine (Israeli withdrawal)	July 9, 1980 to September 24, 1982	Convened pursuant to the Uniting for Peace Resolution
South West Africa/Namibia (Sanctions on South Africa)	September 3-14, 1981	Convened pursuant to the Uniting for Peace Resolution
Occupied Arab territories	January 29-February 5, 1982	Security Council Resolution 500, January 28, 1982, Adopted by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (UK and the US)

5.2. Functioning of the UN after 1970s

In the 1980s the Security Council has acquired more central place in international affairs prior to the 1970s. However, this international legitimacy that the UN enjoyed more than three decades ended with the evident undermine of its legitimacy by the US-led invasion of Iraq 2003 (Cronin and Hurd 2008, 12-13). During the early 1980s the global issues that the UN involved with was quite controversial for the UN. In general Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980 and Israeli invasion of Lebanon, again in 1980 undermined the collective action taken by the Security Council and generally the authority of the council transferred into the General Assembly as it can be seen in the table at the end of this section. The

most important incident during 1980s was the Security Council resolutions concerning the economic sanctions that had to be imposed on Libya. Whole issue concerning the Libyan sanctions was peaked right after the infamous Lockerbie bombing. Two Libya nationals were accused to be involved in the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 in 1988 and Libyan authorities refused to cooperate with the West with their trials (Hurd 2008, 143-144). The West, specifically the US and UK wanted to impose sanctions by the authority of the UN till Libya surrender all suspects that charged with the bombing crime for trial and “accept complete all responsibility for the actions of Libyan officials” (Hurd 2008, 144). However those sanctions was not successful like the ones that devastated the economy of Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait. Main reason of these unsuccessful sanctions was the interdependent economic ties between Libya and some EU countries, significantly Italy. Even though several governments imposed economic sanctions bilaterally, on national level, absence of a successful sanctions regime authorized by the Security Council weakened the efforts to make the Libya government accept its responsibility in the Lockerbie incident. Supporting this idea Thakur (2006) argues “Countries are in much stronger position to impose sanctions if targets are asymmetrically dependent on sanctions-imposing countries” (142). Another important event during the 1980s was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that affects the role of the UN. The incompetency of the UN to prevent Soviet occupation in Afghanistan pushed the US to take more radical measures. Instead of using the UN to revitalize public opinion of international community against Soviet aggression, the US used fundamentalist jihadists from all over the world. These Muslims flocked to Afghanistan in order to fight their victorious struggle against Soviets (Thakur 2006, 155). It is clear that without active involvement of the US in the functioning of the UN and the failure of the collective action taken by the Security Council during the 1980s resulted with a visible inefficiency in the functioning of the UN. Yet characteristics of this decade pretty much follows the 1950s and 1960s. In general the US pursue its interests within a framework of legitimacy that the UN provides. The US acted within the boundaries of “legitimate behavior associated with its identity as hegemonic leader” (Lee 2010, 17).

1990s, the end days of Cold War, marked a shift in the scope and depth in the involvement of the US in the matters of the UN. Next chapter will analyze the context of the Operation Desert Storm of 1990-1991- or named as First Gulf War⁴ as some of the academia accepted later- and the role of the US in the functioning of the UN.

⁴ Some scholars acknowledge the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980-1988 as the First Gulf War instead of the Operation Desert Storm of 1991. This work will acknowledge the Operation Desert storm of 1991 as the First Gulf War and Iraq War of 2003 as the Second Gulf War.

CHAPTER SIX

FUNCTIONING OF THE UN IN THE CASE OF THE GULF WARS

This last chapter specifically interested in explaining the functioning of the UN and the influence of the US in its decision making process. To understand this cyclical relation this work will compare the role of the UN and the US during the Gulf War and Iraq war. Collective action taken during the Gulf War in 1991 somewhat differs from the bilateral action taken by the US in the Iraqi war in 2003. The critics during and after the Iraq war was not just about concerned the single action taken by the US, it also raised questions about the effectiveness of the UN as an international organization that involved in numerous conflict resolution and peace endorsement events. Finally, this chapter will find the evidence how the legitimacy of the actions of the hegemon created through the international institutions. First section of this chapter will provide a brief summary of the functioning of the UN before the systemic change that was explained earlier.

6.1. The First Gulf War

The structural change that was mentioned in previous chapter was laid the ground for the most of the conflicts after the 1973 in the Middle East region. The oil crisis in 1973 following the end of Bretton Woods regime followed by bilateral agreement in 1975 between the most important oil producer of the OPEC, Saudi Arabia, and the US. These two states agreed to price oil exports of the OPEC countries in dollars (Iseri 2009, 137). The petro-dollar regime succeeded fixed-exchange system of the old order. This agreement in return enabled the US to “recycle the petrodollars” to the US banks and in return the US provided OPEC countries with the US armaments (Spiro 1999). In the beginning of this section the role of the petrodollar regimes in Middle East will be revealed to make a good understanding of the underpinnings of the First Gulf War.

First of all, the lengthy and indecisive Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988 has to be analyzed in order to understand the US involvement in the region. One of the most

important events during the war was surfaced: the infamous Iran-Contra affair. The US administration used “a labyrinthine scheme designed inter alia” to covertly sold arms to Iran and support Nicaraguan Contras to wage a civil war (Dunne 2003, 262). Addition selling arms to Iran, the US governments also backed Saddam led Iraq to continue this lengthy war. But the most significant help to the war efforts of the Iraq came from its fellow Gulf States. Led by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, most of the Gulf States give “outright and lend an easy terms billions of dollars in aid as well as supply oil to third parties for later payment by Iraq” (Dunne 2003, 262). Eventually all those aids returned to the US banks to buy more US armaments. New structure of the global order worked successfully as dollars came out of from oil production of OPEC countries recycled back to the US markets.

The Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988, it took eight years to reach an end in this devastating war. This war had ruined the economy of the Iraq; their debt grew approximately to 80 billion dollar. Iraq owed nearly half of this amount to Saudi Arabia, 13 billion to Kuwait, and rest to the other Gulf States (Dunne 2003, 263). Saddam would not like to pay the debts of Iraq to other Gulf states since he believed that it was the Iraq that protected all Arab land from the Iran’s threat. Saddam sought three-part solution for arranging the Iraq’s debt. First, all Gulf states should have to waive the Iraqi debts; secondly, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) should have to reduce of the amount of the oil they produce; and finally, OPEC should have to raise oil prices so Iraqi oil revenues would have rised both because of the increase in the production volume (Dunne 2003, 263). However Kuwait, along with the UAE, was specifically blamed by the Iraq of producing too much and depressing prices (Dunne 2003, 263). In 2002 Iraq seized an invasion to the Kuwait declaring its intention to reunite a nineteenth century province with the motherland, but the actual goals of Saddam was to obtain a deep-water port secure from Iran threat and also annexation of one of the world’s richest oil field in Kuwait (Dunne 2003, 263). However Saddam miscalculated the response of the US and the UN. Joseph C. Wilson, who was in charge of the diplomatic envoy in Baghdad in 1990, explained these miscalculations in two accounts in an oral historical record taped in the eve of the Second Gulf War. What he suggests was first; the US would not jeopardize the safety of its troops for the sake of Kuwait and secondly; Saddam hung his hopes to

get Iraq-Kuwait issue into the UN system. Basically, Saddam hoped that he could use the UN to absorb and deflect international wrath for its aggression (Malone and Cockayne 2006, 19). Contrarily, the US made accurate calculations for many accounts. First, the US was well aware the regional ambitions of the Saddam Hussein. One of the most important American aim was;

...to prevent Saddam in person and Iraq as a state from acquiring 9 per cent of the World's estimated oil reserves lying under Kuwaiti soil, plus the 26 per cent in Saudi Arabia to add to the 11 per cent in Iraq itself: 46 per cent of the global total. (Dunne 2003, 264)

Safety of the Saudi Arabia had utmost importance for the preservation of the system that the US established after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. Protecting Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States meant preservation of the petrodollar regime.

For the decades following the end of the World War II the US actively and effectively used the UN for solving the global crises that might had threaten the stability of the world. Even though the US lost the control of the UN for a while in the 1970s, it turned its back upon to the organization with the start of the First Gulf War. The timing of the war coincided with the end of the Cold War, dissolution of the Soviet Union. This condition made the First Gulf War even more important as it marked the utter victory of the US and the western camp. Even though the US became the sole great power on the face of the earth, it did not involved in the Iraq bilaterally. Instead of getting rid of the Saddam threat with its military might, the US waged a war under blue helmet of the UN. Invasion of Kuwait by the Iraqi forces in 1990 sparked events that transformed the United Nations' role in maintaining the stability of the world order and both the "nature and scale of peace operations it was subsequently deploy" (Malone and Cockayne 2006, 21).

He had basically made the bet that if he could get the Iraq-Kuwait issue thrown into the United Nations system, then he could have 20 years in Kuwait... He envisioned some toothless resolutions. He had already been the recipient of two resolutions on his use of chemical weapons. Nobody remembered them because they had no biting sanctions to them. (Ignatius 2004)

From Joseph C. Wilson's words it can be implied that indeed the role of the UN in preserving stability of the world order transformed something more effective.

In this peace enforcement duty the US played its cards according to the rules of the UN. The US clearly embraced its leadership of the international system in the post Cold War context. Within hour of the invasion the US took the initiative to draft a resolution and spurring the Council to take emergency action (Lee 2010, 26). Following this initiative, Security Council issued a resolution, resolution 660, in the very same day that the Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait and condemned the Iraqi occupation and demanded a complete withdrawal (Malone and Cockayne 2006, 21). Four days after the first resolution, the Security Council established Committee 661 with the newly adopted resolution 661 to implement the resolution (Malone and Cockayne 2006, 21). On the other hand while waiting for the impact of the sanctions for the peaceful solution of this crisis, the US mobilized an international coalition from more than dozen countries of land, air and sea forces to ensure that its threats were not empty (Dunne 2003, 264). This commitment shows how the US would like to solve the problem in the UN, yet prepared for a bilateral solution if needed because it is crucial to preserve stable and peaceful world order in order to preserve its hegemony. Addition to that this taken action in the Security Council proves the “fundamental shift in the capacity of the UN in the post-Cold War era” (Malone and Cockayne 2006, 21).

Also in the UN, the US turned the issue of Iraq-Kuwait as an example of how to treat the aggressor. As this work discussed later on comparison between the LoN and the UN, it is crucial to protect the rights of the smaller states in the organization since it is the worldwide participation and the norm building that empowers the institution. Consensus in the international community was reached freely and easily and stemmed from a general view about the Iraq’s actions were illegitimate and the implications were serious under the UN Charter (Lee 2010, 26). Because of this stance and the importance of “common global interest in stable oil supply and prices” (Malone and Cockayne 2006, 21), some Middle Eastern conflict turned into a global matter. Furthermore the US achieved a position to be perceived itself as providing critical services, like military protection to vulnerable states in the Middle East and stable oil prices and supplies to the energy-dependent allies in Western Europe and Japan, and “it collected sizable financial contributions from other states to finance the war effort” (Mastanduno 2009, 125). The US once again successfully

transformed a regional matter to global and converted its interests to be perceived as the interest of all.

The first steps taken by the US after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces clearly shows that the US sought to lead the international response under the UN banner. The US did that by proposing sanctions to show its commitment to the Iraq and encourage them to abandon Kuwait territories. The statements made by the representatives of the Security Council reflect a convincing consensus opinion that Iraq's invasion was "grossly illegitimate when assessed against the core principles of legitimate conduct between states expressed in international law and the UN charter" (Lee 2010, 32). Therefore, the aggression of the Iraq could not be "allowed to stand because the damage that would be done to the credibility of the UN collective security system (Lee 2010, 32). To secure this end Security Council and the US tried to get a result from economic sanctions and diplomatic efforts. In August 1990, Council demanded Iraq's utter withdrawal from Kuwait territory and imposed economic sanctions. Diplomacy and the sanctions were given several months to work (Wedgwood 2006, 416). Even though the economic embargo proved to be effective after issued in the August 1990, "Iraqi leadership remained unresponsive to diplomatic approaches... and refusing to budge from Kuwaiti soil" (Lee 2010, 39). After couple of months, the US leadership lost its trust to the effectiveness of the sanctions and the diplomacy (Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 377). Following the diplomatic failure Security Council voted to authorize member states to use "all necessary means" in order to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait and to restore peace and security in the Middle East region, as well as "uphold and implement... all subsequent relevant resolutions" in Resolution 678 on 29 November (Wedgwood 2006, 414). 12 members⁵ of the Council voted in favour of the Resolution 678 while China abstained and Yemen and Cuba against. Even though this resolution authorized the use of force against the Iraqi forces under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter, Soviet delegate put a 90 day time delay to undertake one last round of diplomacy (Wedgwood 2006, 416). Saddam took this time to prepare for the battle

⁵ Permanent member states of the Security Council that was in favour of this resolution were France, United Kingdom, United States and Soviet Union. Non-permanent member states of the Security Council that was in favour of the Resolution 678 were Canada, Ivory Coast, Colombia, Ethiopia, Finland, Malaysia, Romania and Zaire.

even findings after the war proved that he loaded biological reagents into aerial bombs and warheads (Wedgwood 2006, 416). War was inevitable.

Instead of narrating the First Gulf War, this study would turn its attention to how this operation financed. It is important to understand the financing of the war efforts of the US, since it will point out the changing nature of the world order. It also helps us to understand the incentives of the follower states, especially non-Arab states, to join this war. After the war, the US General Accounting Office estimated the cost of Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm to be more than 120 billion dollars (Lee 2010, 51). Even the cost of the operations against Iraq was heavy in financial terms; the US received substantial financial contributions from its allies and international community. In sum, the US bore 60 per cent of the financial costs of operating the war and 70 per cent of the military contribution to the coalition's military capabilities (Lee 2010, 52).




Figure 1 (Lee 2010, 53)

The motivation of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia for supporting the war was clearly understandable. The Iraqi forces occupied Kuwait and Saudi Arabia felt threatened by the Iraqi aggression. However addition to these clear reasons, the structure of the petrodollar regime in the Middle East was very decisive in this financial assistance.

The financial assistance of Gulf States accelerated the recycling of the petrodollars to the US. On the other hand for the non-Arab contributors of the coalition main driving force was maintaining international economic stability. For Germany and Japan threats to the international economic stability can be understood into two intersected reasons. First, both of this countries were energy demanded countries, mainly relied on Middle East oil supplies and secondly, international trade was the motor force of their economy. Thus any threat to the stability of the oil supply/price addition to the unstable international environment that reduces the scale of trade would hurt these two states deeply. Finally close economic and political relations that were established after the World War II between the West Germany and Japan with the US affected these two states to follow American leadership in the case of the Gulf War of 1991. "Their fears of abandonment outweighed their fears of entrapment" (Lee 2010, 50). This fear originate in a 'security dilemma' between alliance states that stems from being either abandoned by an ally in a conflict or sucked into a conflict in which their ally's interests are exceed their own interest (Snyder 1984, 466-467). As a result of convincing US diplomatic efforts West Germany and Japan actively participated in this issue by supporting the US military financially. It can be claimed that the US still had the hegemonic incentives to interconnect its interests to the interests of other great powers.

As mentioned earlier this study would not focus on the war directly. Rather, this work will analyze the outcomes of the war since it can be argued that the way that the First Gulf War ended laid the foundations of future conflicts and eventually the Second Gulf War. The ground campaign of the international coalition ended in couple of months. Saddam's threats were come up empty and the US led coalition forces easily stripped Iraqi forces from Kuwait lands and liberated Kuwait. Even though the US fought and won the war, removing Saddam from his post could not be achieved and Saddam kept ruling the Iraq with its iron fist till to the Second Gulf War. The post Gulf War I settlement and conflicts are crucial to understand the following conflicts between Iraq and international community. Because the ceasefire did not transformed into a peace settlement after the first war. Security Council explicitly conditioned the resolution 687 on "Iraq's compliance with the Council's requirements of Iraqi disarmament and full accounting for prior weapons

programmes” (Wedgwood 2006, 414). Arguments about the post Gulf War I settlement will be analyzed more thoroughly in the following sections since one of the main reasons of the Second Gulf War rooted in this peace settlement.

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, diplomatic efforts, the role of the UN Security Council in this conflict, and the Operation Desert Storm had shaped the relation between the US and the UN in the post Cold War context. The results of the First Gulf War generated “unwarranted and unsustainable optimism” (Thakur 2006, 48) about the effectiveness of the UN in the new world order and role of the US inside the UN scheme. Supporting this argument the Security Council passed 185 resolutions between March 1991 and October 1993 (nearly five times greater than that of previous decades) and launched 15 new peacekeeping missions (as against 17 in the preceding 46 years) and vetoes in the Council dropped by roughly 80 per cent (Malone and Cockayne 2006, 22). However this golden age of the UN was not everlasting because it was based on “unique confluence of circumstances that had produced a fortuitous conjunction of US national and international interests” (Thakur 2006, 48). Indeed the Iraqi aggression provided a solid ground for the use of force by the international community and this situation coincides with the fortification of the petrodollar regime that serves both the national and international interests of the US. In that sense, the Gulf War I was not a “representative example but a deviant case from which it is not possible to assess the future course of US behavior in the post-Cold War era” (Karawan 2006, 176). Even though the Operation Desert Storm heated up the debates about the centrality of the multilateral institutions in the post Cold War context, road to the Second Gulf War shows that change in the structure of its hegemonic order affected the US to pursue its national interests rather than following collective interest of international community.

6.2. The Second Gulf War

The literature of the Second Gulf War is somewhat extensive. There had been a lot of studies nearly from all theoretical perspectives. The reasons of the war vary from one study to another, in sum there are some studies explaining the reasons of the war as an imperialistic ambition of the US (Ikenberry 2002, Okur

2010), or establishing US supremacy in the Middle East in order to control oil supply of the world (Billon and Khatib 2004, Jhaveri 2004) or taking the role of the dollar in broader picture and explaining the main motive of the Second Gulf War with the petrodollar economy (Clark 2003, Gökay 2006, Iseri 2009), or simply with using the main arguments of the US government like proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in Iraq and liberation of the Iraq from Saddam's tyranny (Wedgwood 2006). This work accepts that there may be more than one reason and all those arguments might have valid points. However what this work will promote as the main reason of the Second Gulf War is the possibility of undermining its hegemonic order that had changed its path after 1973 and mainly depend on the continuity of the petrodollar regimes.

In the aftermath of the Operation Desert Storm, the US strengthened its position as the Middle East's premier power (Ehteshami 2006, 157). However, even though the US liberated Kuwait they could not achieve liberation for the people of Iraq. Saddam Hussein increased his authority by using brutal intelligence agency and cruel methods on his people even using chemical and biological weapons. This situation creates a tension that marks a clear continuity between the first and second Gulf Wars. The famous UN Resolution 687 was very decisive in the post war context. The Resolution 687 included certain conditions, especially imposing WMD disarmament obligations. This resolution obliged the Iraqi government to show and destroy all ballistic missiles, all chemical, biological and nuclear storages, and to give up any intention to acquire and produce such weapons (Lee 2010, 77). The tension between the Iraq and the US never eased because of this proliferation of WMDs after the 1991. As a result of Iraq unwillingness to give up on its chemical and biological arsenal, the US enforced practically a full embargo that seemed to be more of a "collective punishment rather than real economic sanctions" (Martinez 2006, 346). Up until 1996 the Iraq was exposed to this embargo that have had devastating socio-economic affects to the people of Iraq. Iraq was authorized to sell a small amount of oil at a certain price fixed by the UN. Even though the Iraq gained this small amount of income from this oil export legally, international community restricted to sell essential materials for oil refineries and electricity power stations to Iraq, arguing that these materials "could have had dual civil and

military use” (Martinez 2006, 346). Especially medical goods were blocked because the chemical substances inside them could be used for production of chemical weapons. This embargo cost hundred thousands lives of infants that need medical assistance for basic child diseases. To stop this kind of humanitarian suffering a programme established for Iraq to sell oil in return of food and basic human needs in 1996. Main consumer of the Iraqi oil was the US market, which bought off 60 per cent of the all exports under UN supervision, through trade companies that were selling 83 per cent of all oil exports in Iraq (Martinez 2006, 347).

However things started to change with the formation of Eurozone in European Union. In 1999 euro was introduced to the world as the single currency of the EU and it had started using as physical currency after 2002. In financial markets it presented as an alternative, or a rival currency for some states that are already despises the US and its policies. One of the most important states that tried to use euro as a weapon to weaken the economic power of the US hegemony was Iraq. Yet how does economically devastated Iraq would hurt the US? In 2002, Iraq announced that they were no longer accepting the US dollars for their oil that they sold under the UN supervision for the Oil for Food programme. The government of Iraq also added that from 2002 Iraq would accept their oil export currency as euro. Actually, “it was the first time in the history that an OPEC member had started to export its oil not in US dollars, but in euros” (Iseri 2009, 144). Rejecting to sell oil in return of dollars is something but declaring that you would only accept euros, the one currency that had the prospective to challenge dollar hegemony, for oil export is very critical. However the US policy makers publicly did not take this statement seriously, “they considered this act to be unwise and ill-advised due to their presumption that Iraq’s oil revenues would subsequently decline if the regime...switch to the euro for its oil exports” (Iseri 2009, 144). They taugh so because dollar was more powerful in financial markets as euro was worth around 82 cents when this switch transpired (Clark 2003). However, in two years time the euro’s valuation against the US dollar posed a challenge to the hegemony of the US dollar. Just in 2002 the US dollar declined 17 per cent against the euro (Clark 2003). This situation sparked the greatest nightmare of American Federal Reserve

in which all OPEC countries abandon the dollar standard for their international transactions and switch to a euro standard (Clark 2003). If other OPEC countries followed Iraq's example and export their oil in return for euros, as a result euro would continue to pressure value of the US dollar, "and it could potentially replace the US dollar as the primary international reserve currency" (Iseri 2009, 145). In addition to lost all the leverage on the oil producing countries and its petrodollars, the US also would face a financial breakdown because as Gökay observed that;

If a significant part of the petroleum trade were to use euros instead of dollars many more countries would have to keep a greater part of their currency reserves in euros. (Cited by Iseri 2009, 145)

This possible shift in the international economic order has had possible several implications that would have undermine the US hegemony. Because since the end of the Bretton Woods the size of the US economy was not one of the most important determinant that underpins the US hegemony. As discussed in detail in the pervious chapter petrodollar system became the main feature of the American hegemony. Clearly, shift from the petrodollar system to euro's predominance in the global financial system dynamite the US supremacy.

As discussed earlier the US had been interested in disarming Iraq and topple Saddam Hussein from his presidency post and liberate Iraq. There are many reasons behind the US goals, but one of the most important reason consistent with the stance of this research is the new government which will be following the US leadership revert to the dollar standard. And in addition to the US military presence in the Saudi Arabia, the US would increase its existence in the region. In other words liberation of Iraq would provide the US with direct involvement in the oil contracts signed with the Iraq and also secure the international supremacy of the US dollar. Supporting this argument only after couple of months after the invasion of Iraq, "the US terminated the UN's Oil for Food program, converted the Iraqi euro accounts into dollar accounts, and declared Iraqi oil would once again be sold in US dollars" (Iseri 2009, 146).

The crucial point here is how does the US threatened to the UN when handling the issue of Iraq's WMD's and the operation to the Iraq? Answer of this question will reveal the main intent of this thesis. The relation between the US and the UN and the role of the US in the functioning and effectiveness of the US is quite

apparent in the case of the Second Gulf War. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the US sought to tighten up the UN inspection of the Iraq's WMD's. However on the other hand the US political elites, especially President Bush, toughen the rhetoric against the Iraq. In his State of Union speech in 29 January 2002, Bush addressed the people of America as he identified Iraq, Iran and North Korea as the 'axis of evil' (Dunne 2003, 270). President labeled these states as - directly or indirectly- supporter terrorist organizations and trying to acquire WMD's and share this technology with those organizations. However there were no "clear and reliable evidence" that prove that Iraq "reconstituted its WMD programmes or had formed an alliance with al-Qaeda" (Lee 2010, 83). Addition to point out possible threats, President Bush also addresses the solution in his State of Union speech. He stated "If [other governments] do not act, America will" (Dunne 2003, 271). It was obvious that, with its preponderance military capacity, the US sought to solve so called 'axis of evil' problem and the 'war on terror' bilaterally if multilateral ways are closed. It is undoubtedly clear that the US government will pursue its interest whether under the legal authority of the UN Security Council or against the international law and UN Charter (Dunne 2003, 277). However the European states inside the Security Council believed the effectiveness of the UN when it comes to disarm 'rogue states' and furthermore they argue that the UN "had already given proof of its capacity in this matter in Iraq" (Martinez 2006, 348). On 8 November 2002 Security Council find a compromise and unanimously passed Resolution 1441, latest of the 17 resolutions concerning the Iraq from 1990. As Dunne (2003) argues Resolution 1441 is a long and detailed piece yet its message is clear:

Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions concerning WMD and ballistic missiles and consequently... begin to comply with its disarmament obligations. (274)

This resolution presented as the last chance for Iraq to abide the inspection of the UN and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and reporting its own arsenal accurately with the inspectors. However, failure by the Iraq to take this "final opportunity" presented in Resolution 1441 and the continuation of the violation of the nonproliferation of WMD's will lead to "serious consequences" for Iraq (Dunne 2003, 274). And eventually Iraq was taking this last chance by

cooperating with UN inspectors (Krieger 2006, 385). While waiting for diplomatic efforts to become successful, the US was also pursuing the Security Council to authorize use of force to Iraq. On the other hand considering possibility of the diplomatic failure the US gradually deployed its military might to the region. It was obvious that the US “will not be deterred from waging its war against Iraq and pursuing regime change in Baghdad” (Dunne 2003, 275) with or without the Security Council. Conversely, Resolution 1441 clearly stated that the “Security Council would remain seized of the matter” an indication that refers without further authorization issued by the Council “there was no legal justification for the United States and its allies to proceed war against Iraq” (Krieger 2006, 385). Moreover the reports of the Hans Blix, former chief UN inspector in Iraq explained the efforts of Iraq with these words;

Saddam Hussein did not have any weapons of mass destruction in March 2003, and the evidence invoked of the existence of such weapons had begun to fall apart... Saddam Hussein was not a valid object for counter proliferation. He was not an imminent or even a remote threat to the United States or to Iraq’s neighbors. (Krieger 2006, 387)

Eventually the US leadership neither waited nor cared the results of the UN inspection, and did not request for authorization for their bilateral- with support of its closest allies- action and “abandon its quest for UN authorization and proceed to attack and invade Iraq” (Krieger 2006, 385). This war against Iraq was not considered to be a just war by the members of the Security Council (Martinez 2006, 347). Even though the invasion of the Iraq by the so-called ‘coalition forces’ was not counted as a legitimate action in international community, the Bush administration sought to justify their illegal actions with regard to Security Council Resolutions. One of the resolutions that the US tried to justify its actions were Resolution 678, which dates back to 1990 that issues removing of the Iraqi forces from Kuwait soil by using “all necessary means” and restore peace and security in the region (Krieger 2006, 385). This resolution was also the one that authorize the use of force to the Iraq in the First Gulf War by the US led UN forces and in the Second Gulf War by the US led coalition. Another important resolution was Resolution 687 that the US leadership relied on to legitimize their action. As discussed earlier Resolution 687 was the one that established post Gulf War I

settlement in 1991. Wedgwood (2006) named this resolution as the “mother of all resolution” concerning the Iraq and WMD’s issue (cited by Ku 2006, 403). What Iraq accepted with this resolution was as Wedgwood argues nonproliferation of WMD’s obtained by Iraqi government, “as a continuing condition of the Gulf war ceasefire” (cited by Ku 2006, 402). Moreover the US not solely relies on the Resolutions 678, 687 and 1441 as roots for military action they have taken against Iraq. The US leadership also based their actions on the “sovereign authority to use force in assuring its own national security” (Ku 2006, 403). This unilateral endeavor along with the military might of the US has caused a concern about the future of the United Nations security system. This unjust attack against Iraq comprises a clear undermining of the legitimacy of the UN in general and Security Council in particular (Krieger 2006, 385). Ku’s (2006) words represent a general worldwide concern for the relation between the US and the UN;

...whether the United States intends to break away from the UN security system that it helped to create after World War II in order to address other ‘deviant states’ that it might regard as a threat to its own or the world’s security. (403)

Clearly Second Gulf War was one of the most important events in the history of the UN as it marked the troubled relationship between “the world’s premier international organisation and its most important member state” (Thakur 2006, 48). The nature of the war in the Iraq and what happened aftermath undoubtedly poses a serious threat to the UN system. Most importantly, the heated debates about the controversial relation between the UN and the US shaped around the future of the “system of multilateral governance centered on the United Nations” and “the capacity and propensity of the USA to embark on unilateral adventures” (Thakur 2006, 48).

The Iraq war revealed the impact of the US in the effectiveness of the UN. The US affects the UN in two manifolds, directly and indirectly. Direct relation between the UN and the US consists of the leadership ability of the US inside the UN mechanisms. Pursuit of the US national interest inside the UN affects effectiveness of the UN negatively. Puchala’s (2005) pioneering study including interviews of key representatives of the UN between 2001 and 2004 clearly shows how the US was perceived by others in the UN. In this study the US perceived as a

leader of the international community, dragging the UN with its power to pursue its own self-interest (Puchala 2005, 574). A French diplomat acknowledge this pursuit of self-interest of the US in 2002 with these words; “Nothing can be done without the concurrence of the United States” (Puchala 2005, 574). Indeed this was the case before the Second Gulf War. Unlike the inclusive leadership of the first Bush Administration in the First Gulf War, the second Bush Administration was stating its unilateral right to decide the legitimate goals of the collective” (Lee 2010, 84). The threat of unilateral action unless Security Council authorizes the use of force in the Iraq showed the US leadership’s “unwillingness to compromise and to take the views and interests of other states into consideration” (Lee 2010, 83). A Latin American diplomat reported;

The US is using the organization for its own purposes and interests, which are not necessarily those of the international community... it frequently leads in directions that others don’t want to go. (Puchala 2005, 574)

The UN perceived as the tool used for the achieving American foreign policy ends by many UN representatives. One of the main problem seen by a secretariat official was “the UN has to become the organization of its members, not the tool of one of its members” (Puchala 2005, 575). They believe the US is running the organization by itself. However the US had been running the organization from the very beginning. What changed the perception of the other states about the UN and the US leadership? One argument that this work can suggests is the structural change that occurred in 1970s in the hegemonic world order. After that the collective interest of the international community differentiated. In other words the US could not create passive consent of its allies since its priority changed. Before 1973, the most important public service that the US leadership provided was maintaining of the free trade all around the globe. The US sustained this system because it was the main benefiter of this system. Strange once described the purpose of the multilateral institutions as “an instrument of the structural strategy” (cited by Woods 2003, 93). However after 1973, structural strategy of the US leadership changed and most important task of the US was to control petrol physically and financially. This hypothesis creates a further question; how does the UN continue to

be effective after the change in the system? The answer of this question lies in the indirect relation between the US and the UN.

From the very foundation of the United Nations, the US strictly followed the rules and norms of the organization. The US did not even let its closest allies to violate the principles of the newly founded organization that endeavored to establish post war world order. There are many examples that this study explained in the previous sections. From Korea War of 1950-1953 to peace enforcement in Cyprus, from Suez Crisis to Congo Crisis the US backed the UN with its economic and military power. With every action authorized by the UN in order to comply with its rules and norms, the legitimacy of the UN had risen. It became, more or less, the universal voice of the world governments. Aggressor states punished, newly established states gained recognition, bloody wars between archrival societies settled. It happened so because by abiding the rules of the UN and enforce those rules when necessary the US proved its role as the leader of the international politics. However, the rules and norms of the international order becomes emergent from the national interests of the US and it becomes self-enforcing. Lesser states follow this order not only they felt threatened of the coercive power of the US if they oppose the principles of the order; they also internalize the rules and norms of the order as “doing so is rightful, proper and appropriate” (Lee 2010, 16). This institutional empowerment provides the US hegemony to maintain its order with less effort and cost than a coercive system. As Hurd (1999) argued coercion is more likely to generate resistance and it requires substantial resources to both monitor and enforce compliance. However this consent power has also some constraints in it. Once a hegemon creates an institution with norms and principles, those norms and principles are not just for the followers of the hegemon, it also constraints the hegemon’s power.

The nature of the Second Gulf War and the actions taken by the US has had devastating affects to the legitimacy of the UN. The US directly put the legitimacy of the UN at stake by their unjust actions. The US attack on Iraq without taking further authorization from the UN undermined the credibility of the United Nations. Because the US undo what it had done to make the UN legitimate till to the Second

Gulf War. The US violated the basic, yet the most important commitment to the UN and clashed with the principles of the UN Charter. The US-led invasion without the authorization of the Security Council's approval was a direct challenge to the "principle of prohibition on the use of force in the UN Charter" (Krieger 2006, 389). They waged an illegal, unjust war without having the consent of the most of the world and the Security Council. Even the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan indicated, "From our point of view and from the charter point of view it was illegal" (Krieger 2006, 386).

The cases of the First and Second Gulf Crisis provided this study with clear juxtaposes of the functioning of the UN and how the US is the most important actor in this functioning. The first case was a great example of the leadership of the US inside the UN. Even the US has had its own motivations for the invasion of the Iraq, Iraq's aggression and violation of the UN charter resulted with a broad consent of the states all over the world for the use of force. The US- politically or economically- did not felt the consequences of the systemic change occurred in the 1970s. The first war against the Iraq was a perfect example of maintaining the principles and norms that the UN promoted as the US endeavored in the post World War II context. On the other hand the Second Gulf War was a total contrast to its predecessor. In the Second World War, the US maybe followed by its closest allies yet general public opinion of the international community were disapproving the invasion of the Iraq. Bypassing the Security Council by using some controversial interpretations of some resolutions that were manifested at least a decade ago is not a proper way to use a multilateral institution. It can be argued that when a hegemon "acts outside the bounds of legitimate behavior associated with its identity as hegemonic leader", as a consequence of its action that hegemon should not be expecting voluntary followership of other lesser states, "but would have to resort to costly dominating behaviors in order to achieve its interests" (Lee 2010, 17). Even if the structure of the hegemonic order changed, the UN still has a role to play as stability provider. Its role as the protector of the small states, last resort of dialogue and its restriction of the great powers unlawful actions make the organization

emergent from the structure of the hegemony, yet it still affected by the direct/indirect affects of the hegemon.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

This thesis attempted to interpret the historical context of the Gulf War I and Gulf War II within the framework Gramscian notion of the hegemony and institutionalism theories in order to find plausible answers for the relation between the American hegemony and the United Nations. Main problematic that this dissertation attempts to answer is the affect of American hegemony in the functioning of the United Nations. To explain this relation this thesis combined two different approaches. Combination of neo-Gramscian hegemony and the institutionalist perspective helped this study in two manifolds. First, theories of hegemony helped this work to formulate the main determinant behind the creation process of an umbrella organization like the UN and the deep connection between the American hegemony and the UN. Also systemic explanation that the neo-Gramscian view offers helped this study to mark the systemic change clearly after the end of the Bretton Woods regime. Secondly, institutionalist perspective clarified the controversial role of the UN- an emergent structure from the economic basis of the American hegemony. Finally this first part theoretically discussed the cyclical relation between hegemon and institution as they respectively create/constrain/undermine legitimacy for each other's action.

Secondly, this thesis examined the failure of the League of Nations as the political apparatus of the British hegemony. It is crucial to understand the functioning of the LoN and the role of the British hegemony in the functioning of the institution. Comparing political organizations like the LoN and the UN revealed the importance of the hegemony during their establishment phases. Furthermore, significance of show of consent by the other great powers is also made visible to support the thesis theoretical stance. Additionally, by comparing the effectiveness of these two institutions in international affairs, the importance of the hegemon underlined until the norms and principles of the institution internalized by the rest of the world. Finally, even though the role of the UN anticipated as stability provider for the world by the victorious states of the World War II, it born into the Cold War context. Even the UN did not come out as the US endeavored it became

one of the key features of the post-World War II order just by functioning with the strong support of the US hegemony.

Thirdly, this thesis aims to constitute a holistic framework of the American hegemony with the help of theoretical basis. To do so, this work intends to combine the historical reality in which the American hegemony emerged with the theoretical framework comprehensively explained in the first chapter. The foundations of the British hegemony as a successful merger of infrastructure and superstructure were very important to understand before expanding world scale. This work also marked the hegemonic transition by the change in the mode of the production. Moreover new mode of production that established the basis of American hegemony extensively revealed. By discussing the role of the Fordism in the hegemonic transition process the nature and characteristics of the American hegemony understood clearly. Discussions about the transformation inside the US and their worldwide reflections give this thesis an explanatory power that gives insight to the role of the political-economic institutions established in the postwar context. After making sense of the usage of the institutions as the pillars of the postwar hegemonic order this study turned its attention to explain how this world order operate till to 1970s. The interplay between the aims of the institutions and the hegemonic order coincides during this period as the institutions legitimize the rules and norms of the hegemonic order and binds the interest of all to the interest of the hegemon.

This study turned mainly focused on the functioning of the UN and its relation with the US. From its establishment to the early 1970s, the US made the UN function effectively. The US did this by two methods. First, the US actively used the organization in international disputes rather than solving those dispute bilaterally. This method enhanced the legitimacy of the UN and the norms of the UN became norms of the world in this period. The US increased the effectiveness of the UN by abiding the rules and norms of the UN. Secondly, the US strengthened the rule of the UN by forcing other states, including its close allies, to abide the main principles of the UN. In other words the US maintained its system of order by acting inside the boundaries and self-constraining its power and expect other states to act accordingly.

After 1970s the base of the American hegemony shifted from its productive base to the petrodollar system. Before 1970s the worldwide stability and peace had utmost importance for the US hegemony as it profited vastly from the free trade regimes. However after the end of Bretton Woods regime, the US abandoned the fixed-exchange rate and replaced it with fixing the dollar to another important resource- oil. This change in the system reflected the foreign policy goals of the US, as the primary goal of the US changed from preserving the stability of the world to ensure that the oil exports can only be done with the US dollars. The UN was still effective in this period because there were no incidents that undermine the legitimacy of the institution. Most important example of this continuing efficiency in the UN was the First Gulf War. This war constitutes the first case of this study, as it is a great example of the collective action taken by the UN under the US leadership that has a different characteristic than the Second Gulf War. Even though the role of the UN during this first war had arisen the optimistic views about the future of the UN, the following years clearly signified that it was only a conjunctural coincide- a historical incident that interests of the US and the rest matched perfectly. Iraq's aggression during the First Gulf War united the international community against Iraq, but in the mean time it provided the US to physically control the supply of the oil reserves. Second Gulf War had completely dissimilar nature from its predecessor. Even though, the literature argues that the second one is a follow up war, this study accepts the opposite assumption. Second Gulf war stemmed from the Iraqi challenge to the post 1973 economic world order. Saddam Hussein tried to export oil for Euros and abandon the US dollar as the fiat currency. Considering the huge balance of payment deficits that the US budget had, this challenge threatened the American financial supremacy. The US decided to wage a war against Iraq to get rid of Saddam and pursued to this end in the UN. However UN authorities opinions and general international view about a war against Iraq was unnecessary and more importantly unjust. The US decided to wage this war without the UN authorization and claimed that earlier Security Council resolutions authorize the use of force against Iraq and only couple of its closest allies joined the US in this war. This situation turned the UN into a 'lame duck', clearly a negative impact on its effectiveness. The rules and norms of the institution

persist if only its members obey its rules and nonobservant states are punished according to the rules and norms of the institution. This is quite important since it was the US that mainly established the rules and norms of the institution and actively used the UN to punish states that acts outside the bounds of legitimate behavior that the UN promoted. The US by-pass of the UN in the Second Gulf war raised a lot of questions concerning the legitimacy of the UN. On the other hand, this damage done to the effectiveness of the UN by the US had a direct impact on the legitimacy of the US since international institutions are not only legitimizers of the hegemonic order they can also work vice versa. This situation is like a 'double-edged sword', as it is not only undermining the effectiveness of the UN, it also has negative impact on the legitimacy of the US hegemony. However this unilateral political choice had devastating effects on the world order that the US established. While undermining the legitimacy of the UN and the world order, they create worldwide resistance to their foreign policy choices. Without the existence of the economic world order most of the states felt as hostages to the US foreign policy choices and coercion replaces consent as a tool of American foreign policy. However without the consent power the US will spend more efforts to preserve current order.

After the Second Bush administration, Obama administration visibly adopted rapprochement policies with the UN. Even though the US military machine can exterminate any other armies in the world, the US administration realized that it is impossible to sustain that kind of foreign policy in foreseeable future. Nevertheless the emergent structure of the UN damaged during the Second Gulf war and it needs time to recover its legitimacy. It takes time and compliance to the rules of the institution to build legitimacy for it. However the incompetency that the UN has experience after 2003 obstruct that kind of legitimacy rebuild for the UN.

Finally it can be argued that without hegemons, international realm would not be hospitable to the international institutions. International institutions need power sharing with the hegemon to function effective and also the hegemon would have to be willing to constrain its power within the borders of the rules of the institution. If the US hegemony continues to decline and eventually fall and no new

hegemony takes its place the future of the UN would be pretty much the same as the end of the LoN.

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