

T.C.
ZİRVE ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ MÜDÜRLÜĞÜNE
GAZİANTEP

Uluslararası İlişkiler Ana Bilim Dalı Uluslararası İlişkiler Programı Yüksek Lisans Programı öğrencisi Tasiu Magaji tarafından hazırlanan '**Settler-Indigene Conflicts in the Plateau State of Nigeria: A Perspective from the Theories of (Post) Colonial Studies**' başlıklı tez, 16/05/2014 tarihinde yapılan savunma sonucunda aşağıda isimleri bulunan jüri üyelerince kabul edilmiştir.

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ZIRVE UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
POSTGRADUATE PROGRAM

MASTER THESIS

**SETTLERS-INDIGENE CONFLICTS WITHIN THE PLATEAU
STATE OF NIGERIA: A PERSPECTIVE FROM THE THEORIES
OF (POST) COLONIAL STUDIES**

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June 2014

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DEDICATIONS

To the eternal memory of my mother, late Hajiya sa'adatu.

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Thesis Subject: Settler-indigene Conflicts within The Plateau State of Nigeria: A
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The material included in this thesis has not been submitted wholly or in part for any academic award or qualification other than that for which it is now submitted.

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ABSTRACT

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Settler-indigene Conflicts within The Plateau State of Nigeria: A Perspective from
the Theories of (Post) Colonial Studies.

Settlers-indigenes syndrome is an extremely thought-provoking issue within Plateau State of Nigeria that created division within the state. Because, in a bizarre fashion, here in this state population is categorized into ‘indigenes’ and ‘settlers’. This connotes that opportunities (i.e. political and economic) are granted to those Plateau State habitants who are unjustifiably categorized as ‘indigenes’, whereas denying the same to those who are alleged to be non-indigenes or ‘settlers’. Such an act of political exclusion in the name of “indigenes” and “settlers” is the reason, that this thesis argues, that brings about constant tension, resentment and even violence. One way to look at this conflict, so argued in this thesis, is to see the conflict as issuing from, and erupting out of, controversial claims to the land ownership. Another way to look the same conflict is to read it as a religious and ethnic enmity. This is because of the fact that majority of the ethnic group considered as indigenes (i.e. Berom, Anaguta and Afizere) are Christians, whereas those designated as settlers (Hausa-Fulani) are predominantly Muslims. Against this backdrop, this dissertation contents that the conflict sources from a mixed base: it is due to a perceivably irreconcilable identity class as much as a fierce struggle over access to power and privileges. Hence settlers are denied access to political office, military academic, health care, education, and civil service jobs, both at the State and federal level. It is the main thrust of this dissertation the said social split derives from all those structures set in place by the British colonial masters, whose primary intention was to ease the management of the colonized through infamous divide and rule policies. The rulers of Nigeria in the post-colonial epoch, as it is also surmised in this thesis, left these colonial artifacts (such as Nigerian constitutions) untouched as these institutions have somewhat helped them advance their political as well as economic capital within the Nigerian domestic politics. In other words, one of the key reasons as to the persistence of the said social split (i.e. indigene/settler) is attributable to the unwillingness of the political actors to disengaging their political status from the ongoing ethnic/religious tensions within the State of Plateau. The most significant proof to politicians’ intentional absentee from dissolving the tension, if not funneling more flame on it, lays in the presence of a constitution that mostly sustains the terms of colonial era. The flaws of the Nigerians constitutions to address the issue indigeneity reinforce or enhance the settlers-indigenes dichotomy even after colonialism.

Key Words; The Plateau State, Ethnic Conflict, settler/indigene hostility, Colonialism, Post-colonial legacies, Post-colonial Nigerian Politics, Post-colonial Nigerian Constitutions, Modernization and Land Ownership.

KISA ÖZET

Tasiu Magaji

Haziran 2014

Nijerya'nın Plateau Eyaletinde Göçmen-Yerleşik Çatışması: Sömürgecilik Çalışmaları Üzerinden Teorik bir Perspektif

Nijerya'nın Plateau eyalet yapısı içerisinde ayrışma yaratan yerleşik-göçmen sendreomu uzmanları yoğun bir biçimde düşünmeye teşvik eden, kritik, bir konudur. Bahsi geçen eyaletin sakinleri resmi biçimde 'yerleşik' ve 'göçmen' biçiminde, ayrıştırarak, kategorize edilmiştir. Bunun manası, siyasal ve ekonomik hakların nüfusun 'yerleşik' olarak tanımlanan bir kısmına sunulması, buna karşılık nüfusun kalanının, pek de adilane olmayan biçimde, yerleşik olmayan, veya göçmen, diye tanımlanarak bu haklardan mahrum bırakılmasıdır. Böylesi bir yerleşik/göçmen ayrıştırması, bir siyasal dışlama eylemi olarak, bahsi geçen coğrafyada yoğun biçimde tansiyona, öfkeye ve hatta çatışmaya sebep olmaktadır. Bu tezin de öne sürdüğü gibi, çatışma bir bakıma hem tarafların toprağın mülkiyeti üzerindeki zıt taleplerinden doğmaktadır, hem de bu konuyla çatışma doğrudan ilişkilidir. Bir başka açıdan bakılırsa, çatışmanın bir biçimde etnik ve dini boyutları da var. Çünkü yerleşik olarak lanse edilen etnik grubun ağırlıklı kısmı (Berom, Anaguta ve Afizere) Hristiyan'dır. Buna karşılık göçmen denilerek dışlanan grup (Hausa-Fulani) gene büyük nispette Müslüman'dır. Bunların hepsini bir arada düşünürsek, bu tezin de tartıştığı üzere, bu çatışma algı düzeyinde barıştırılmaz olduğu düşünülen kimlik farklılıklarından kaynaklandığı gibi, bu kimlik ayrışmaları ile çakışan toprak ve başka benzeri ayrıcalıkların paylaşılması ile de doğrudan ilgilidir. Bu çalışmanın bakış açısından, göçmen/yerleşik çatışması kökenini koloni döneminde inşa edilen ve halen ayakta kalan yapılardan almaktadır. Buna göre, İngiliz idaresinin sistematik biçimde kullandığı böl-buyur politikası neticesinde adı geçen dikatomi ilk defa koloni döneminde yüzeye çıkmıştır. Değindiği gibi, koloni döneminden bağımsızlık dönemine anılan ayrıştırmayı besleyen pek çok kurum, özüne dokunulmaksızın, faaliyetine devam etmiştir. Çünkü Nijerya'nın politik elitleri bu kurumlar vasıtası ile kendi siyasal ve ekonomik sermayelerini, etnik katmanlaşmayı/ayrışmayı manipüle ederek ilerletme gayretindedir. Yani, tezin de ileri sürdüğü gibi, siyaset kurumu etnik gerginlikten beslenmektedir, tam da bu nedenle bu tansiyonu gidermekten aktörlerin menfaati kısıtlıdır. Bu 'gönülsüzlük' halinin en açık ifadesi ise bahsedilen ayrıştırmayı gidermeyen, ama tersine besleyen bir anayasa metninin varlığı.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Plateau Eyaleti/Devleti, Etnik Çatışma, Yerleşik/Göçmen Düşmanlığı, Sömürgecilik, Sömürgeciliğin Mirası, Sömürge-sonrası Nijerya Siyaseti, Sömürge-sonrası Nijerya Anayasası, Modernizasyon ve Toprak Sahipliği.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AJHC	African Journal of History and Culture
ALF	African Leadership Forum
ANPP	All Nigeria People's Party
CAN	Christian Association of Nigeria
CMG	Citizens' Monitoring Group
CGAR	Crisis Group Africa Report
COCIN	Church of Christ in Nigeria
ECWA	Evangelical Church of West Africa
FCT	Federal Capital Territory
FRN	Federal Republic of Nigeria
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDN	Internal Displacement in Nigeria
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks
JDPC	Justice Development and Peace Caritas
JIBWIS	Jama'atu Izalatul Bidiah Wa'Ikamatul Sunna
JNI	Jama'atu Nasril Islam
LGA	Local Government Area
NIFES	Nigerian Fellowship of Evangelical Students
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PDP	People's Democratic Party
PSJCI	Plateau State Judicial Commission of Inquiry
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I have to thank Almighty God who gives me strength, courage and infinite perseverance to complete this research. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Oğuz Dilek for his indefatigable guidance, motivation, immeasurable knowledge and enormous contribution in every step throughout the process. His guidance equipped me with immense enthusiasm and vast knowledge that simplify the methods and procedures to carried out this research. Certainly, this research would have never been materialized without his enormous and generous contribution. I could not have imagined having a better supervisor for my Masters' thesis. I owe my deepest gratitude to you for all your inspirational guide, advice, corrections and vast knowledge.

I would like to offer my heartfelt appreciation and thankfulness to the rest of my thesis committee: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Bezen Balamir Coşkun, Asst. Prof. Dr. Alper Dede, Asst. Prof. Dr. Isa Afacan and Asst. Prof. Dr. Selin Akyuz for their constructive questions, insightful comments and suggestions. Your intuitive observations and warm encouragement has been a great help to the completion of this research. Thank for your guidance and illuminating knowledge you imparted on me over these past two years.

I thank my fellow classmate at Zirve University for stimulating discussions, sharing ideas, tolerance and for all the fun we have had in the last two years. Also, I thank my friends there at Nigeria who offered their affection and encouragement through phone calls and other social media.

Last but not the least, I would like to thank my family: parents Alh. Magaji Adamu and Late Haj. Saadatu Musa for their parental guide and support both financially and spiritually throughout my life—may almighty Allah reward them abundantly. I owe a very important debt to his Excellency the executive governor of Kano State, Dr. Rabi'u Musa Kwankwaso.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. General Introduction

Nigeria is one of the postcolonial states in Africa vigorously striving to incorporate its enormous ethno-religious groups into one nation-state that arbitrarily amalgamated by British colonizers. Ethnicity, one of the major stumbling blocks, threatens the existence/continuation of Nigeria as a unified nation. Ethnicity, defined as a common identity or inherent qualities of a certain group of people, has always been the boundaries that determine who should be the ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, in each state, in Nigeria. Historically, Nigeria endures ethnic conflict ever since the hasty exit of the colonial masters—especially over land ownership, natural resources, most if not all the ethnic conflicts in Nigeria are closely connected to political and economic interests rather than primal or kith and kin bonds (Yang 2000, 43; Goldstein and Pevehouse 2014, 163). Settlers-indigenes strife, for this matter, is one of the most traumatizing and devastating identity conflicts bedeviling Nigeria. Having emerging out of in-group biases by which one unjustifiably excludes another, non-indigenes, from any meaningful political participation within the state. As will be discussed in more detail, indigeneity/citizenship is tightly connected to land ownership. Thus, state-granted indigene-ship has become the exclusive right for the natives whose ancestral origins can be traced back to the early group[s] inhabited the land. This means, a person who migrated to any land that is not his/her ancestral place of origin should be permanently considered a settler—irrespective of how long he/she stayed in that host community. Fiberesima Commission of Inquiry Report defines indigene as:

...one whose ancestors were natives...beyond living memory. This does not include any person who may not remember from where his father or grand father left his native home for...as a fixed home, domiciled there as of choice for life; or who is ignorant about from where his family moved to...permanently in quest of better living or in the process of his business...¹

¹ Plateau Peace Conference, 30-31; Fiberesima Commission Inquiry Report, 1994: 25, Item 3.1.4.

Consequently, any Nigerian who moves out from the socio-political space within which he/she is indigenous will experience discrimination and dehumanization. In other words, such exposes non-indigenous groups to the lower status of a 'second-class citizen' who lacks the complete packages of human rights. This signifies that all ethnic groups in Nigeria have identifiable/classifiable homeland or region. Therefore ethnic tag makes someone part of indigenous group only in one socio-political space and, elsewhere, no more than a settler (Alubo 2006, 5). For this reason the homeland has been jealously guarded by the alleged 'owners of the land' against any 'trespassers' (aliens, foreigners or settlers), who may try to benefit from the socio-political and economic resources of 'their' land. This uncalled-for behavior is always associated with unequal treatments and unjust deprivation on the part of 'settlers', thereby producing ethnic hatred, which all the time metamorphosed into violent conflict. Plateau State is one of the volatile states in Nigeria experiencing settler-indigene conflict. Therefore, this thesis delves into the settler-indigene conflict within Plateau State in order to grasp the causes and consequences of the crisis.

Indigene-settler tensions in Plateau State etches out of in-group tendencies of one group and has become the instrument to unjustifiably exclude 'settlers' (out-group) from access to scholarship, military/paramilitary services and others government employments within the state. Similarly, the self-styled indigenes vehemently denied the purported settlers from access to any political power within the state. This contestation over land ownership spearheaded between the alleged 'sons of the soil', otherwise called indigenes (i.e. Berom, Anaguta and Afizere), and the professed non-indigenes/settlers (Hausa-Fulani). This political exclusion creates self-reinforcing process of ethnic fragmentation that trigger violent conflict between indigenes and settlers. Concurrently, the settlers-indigenes fault-lines in Plateau States precariously coincide with ethnic and religious division. For this reason Islam is always considered as a religion of Hausa-Fulani settlers in the state, whereas, Christianity habitually associated with the indigenous groups of Plateau State. As Ibrahim James states, "...both ethnicity and religion in Nigeria have provided a tangible set of common identification...." (2000,146). Accordingly, the conflict

appears multi-dimensional, sometimes religious, ethnic or even political.

However, colonialism has a lion's share from inducing ethnic violence in post-colonial states in Africa, because it first and foremost pieced together various ethnic and religious groups with different historical backgrounds into a single nation-state without prior consultation with Africans. Hence, colonial masters deliberately merged diverse African fiefdoms or kingdoms into one socio-political entity. Each empire has greater autonomy within their boundaries and traditionally governs its people separate from other empires. Most of these medieval political structures were to some degree cohesive groups—combined of people with the same ethno-cultural background and mostly speaking similar language. But, the advent of colonialism entirely changed the established settings of African continent via merging multiple ethno-religious groups/empires into one Nation. As a result of it, post-colonial states in Africa never coincided with their natural boundaries but, rather, epitomize colonial spheres of influence. Most of these ethnic groups in Africa came into contact with other groups for the first time during colonialism.

Furthermore, colonial policies encourage ethnic divisions among/between African peoples. The underlying institutions/structures left behind by colonial administration creates division and thwarts any effort to achieve unity in post-colonial states of Africa. British colonial masters employed a divide-and-rule policy to segregate Nigerian people along ethnic and religious lines in order to create mistrust and disunity among them. It was part of the colonialists' strategies to keep the country under their control, for it undermines or curbs any effort to gain the right to self-determination. They systemically constructed a political identity around ethnicity, thereby inducing Nigerians to compete for political power and economic resources based on these ethnic/religion lines. Larsh and Friedman argued that the construction of identity within the socio-political space is the "dynamic operator linking economic and cultural processes" (1992:336). Colonialism induces Nigerians to use ethnicity and religion as daises to pursue economic and political benefits. This incident awakens ethnic consciousness and complicates the process of nation-building. Another issue that produces ethnic jingoism and open-hatred of one group against another was colonialists' tendency to define/treat one group in favorable

terms while denying others the same privileges. Relatedly, British colonizers were the first to classify Plateau natives into two groups, settlers and indigenes, and even encouraged the so-called indigenes to guard the right of their land. The Hausa-Fulani was defined as ‘aliens’ whereas, Berom, Anaguta and Afizere were specified by colonizers as the only ‘indigenous communities of Plateau’.

However, the post-colonial constitution, which is one of the colonial legacies, recognized place of origin rather than place of residence as a prerequisite for citizenship. The inherent constitution firmly established that “every person born in Nigeria before the date of independence, either of whose parents or any of whose grandparents belongs or belonged to a community indigenous to Nigeria” (FRN 1999). This indigeneity clause contained in the constitution provides a platform for the Nigerian political elites to manipulate identity consciousness in order to achieve their political/economic ends. Political elites refers to an influential group of people who initiate and influence decisions of the state. They are the movers and shakers of the political arena in the society. Harold Lasswell defines the political elites “as the power holders of a body politics”. He maintains that the “division into elite and mass is universal, and even in republic, the “few exercise a relatively great weight of power, and the many exercise comparatively little” (1980, 41). Peter Bachrach, on the other hand, define political elites as “those persons who regularly exercise a significant amount of authority and power in making decisions and non decisions that affect a significant number of people” (2010,7-8). He argues that political elites consist individuals who actually exercise an inordinate amount of political power in the society. Conversely, Joseph Dunner asserts that political elites are “...those with large shares in the distribution of power...whether through elective or appointive office, or indeed whether through influence exercised without office” (1970,162).

Furthermore, the political institutions left behind by colonialism including state laws endorse ethnic division, and the haphazardous competition over scarce resources. They induce political elites to employ identity politic as means of gaining mass support from their clients. R. Joseph sum it up that identity politics is “the mutually reinforcing interplay between identities and the pursuit of material benefits within the arena of competitive politics” (1987:52). Therefore, the

structures/institutions left behind by British colonizers remains intact in the current Nigerian socio-political system with almost no resistance from domestic players for checkmating those policies that encourage division among Nigerian population. This situation gives Plateau state's elites an incentive to instigate ethnicity (i.e. indigeneity) to gain political support and possibly amass economic and political capital in the state. Elaigwu (1994, 70) depicts political elites' behavior in this sense as nothing more than to "...maximize gains in situation of conflicting interests and claims over scarce resources". This factional struggle among the political elites drags the people into violent conflict that claimed many lives and millions of dollars properties.

This thesis consists of five chapters: Chapter one is an introduction to the background of the research problem. The chapter also covers research objectives, questions, hypotheses and that of methodology. It specifies the core issue of the study, thereby formulating the research questions. The research problem starts with the inquiry from the contentious issue of settler-indigene within the Plateau State of Nigeria and proceed along investigating the facts, results, and the genesis of the conflict. The conflict emerges out of political exclusion of one group to the advantage of another. It is a communal clash perpetuated between an in-group (indigenes) and out-group (settlers). The Nigerian constitution provides 'indigenes' with a legal backing to openly deprive 'settlers' of access to the state's resources on the account of their ancestral origin. Consequently, the political, economic and social rights/privileges are granted only to exclusive advantage of 'indigenes' of Plateau, whereas it sidelines those who are arbitrarily called settlers with no equal rights of citizenship. It is this circumstances that motivated this research to problematize the legal and political structure.

Chapter two focuses on theoretical framework of the study. It delves into colonial experience of Nigeria to analyze and explain the manner in which ethnic identity has been constructed through colonial state formation. The chapter posits that identity politics in Nigeria can be traced back to the period of colonialism, since the country is a colonial creation that never corresponds the ethno-cultural roots of the people but rather, characterize British sphere of influence. Like other colonial

states in Africa and Asia, Nigeria was initially created to achieve colonial economic/political motives. For this reason, colonialists not only merged different ethnic group into one nation but make surely they employed a policy (divide-and-rule) that creates division between/among the Nigerians (Castells 2010, 1). Consequently, colonial framework is employed as a theory to explore and analyze the causes of the Plateau's settler/indigene conflict. Nevertheless, the colonialists' perspective could only clarify how colonialism accomplished its mission in creating division among Nigerians under the pretext of indigenes and settlers yet, failed to explain how and why settler-indigene conflict has become more meaningful and destructive after the departure of colonial rule. Accordingly, this research used "institutional approach" and "instrumentalist" or "political entrepreneurs approach" to explain the remaining part (Crawford 1998, 17, Blagojevic 2009, 8-9).

Instrumentalist approach argued that the departure of colonial masters not only offers the Nigerian political class a chance to substitute their colonial counterpart but, also, provides them an opportunity to manipulate ethnic sentiment to gain political support. Moreover, Nigerian political class saw colonial institutions/structures as appropriate tools for them to accomplish their political and economic aggrandizement. Therefore, they embrace the colonial epistemology of governance, thereby abiding by the colonial legacy. Instrumentalist approach maintains that the Nigerian elites fails to unified the various ethnic groups but saw it as a tune-up to accomplish their economic/political interests by inciting ethnic consciousness or keep it alive. This is one of the crucial factors that trigger settler-indigene conflict among ethnic groups that shakes Plateau state to its foundation.

Chapter three is to review literatures associated to the key concepts of afore mention study. The chapter sub-divided into the pairing concepts as such: colonialism and modernization, modernization and identity conflict, colonialism, nation building and ethnic conflict (ethnic politics) and finally colonialism and land ownership. All these concepts are employed as part of the epistemology initiated to explore and explain all those essential factors that have trigger and prolongs settler-indigene conflict in Plateau State even after the demise of colonialism. Comparably, the twin of concepts of colonialism and modernization in this thesis viewed as

contradictory concepts that have opposite outcomes—they never meant to help Africans, as it was claimed by Europeans. Rather, colonialism fans the flames on ethnic hatred among African population that produce the unending African (Nigerian) identity conflicts. Indigene-settler conflict within Plateau State is a clear archetype of how colonial policies (divide and rule) might at the end fuel ethnic divisions. Modernization, on the other hand, strengthens the stated ethnic consciousness and systematically encourages ethnic groups to compete over scarce resources as we are witnessing in Plateau State.

Moreover, the notions of modernization and identity conflicts under this research specify that ethnic awareness, contrary to the general belief, become ever-more pronounced as a result of modernization in Africa. Modernization causes weak institutions to produce that are inept in creating unity among Africans. Hence, the cardinal principles of modernization such as fundamental human rights, rule of law and divided of democracy are solely prerogatives of those groups who earned from the state the entitlement to indigeneity. This lopsided and uneven allocation of modernization benefits (both economic and political), ever-increasing into violent conflicts as one witnesses now in the Plateau State.

The same chapter examines the relationship among the threesome concepts of colonialism, nation-building and ethnic conflict. It sum up that nation-states in Africa are colonial invention that defy political/economic cooperation of different, antagonistic, social groups. It was a type of a top-down nation-building project externally forced on the newly African states without their consent. This situation sparks ethnic resentment and backlash that drags ethnic groups into violent conflict.

Chapter four covers the historical development of Jos/Plateau particularly from colonial period to its current stage. It exposes how the state develops as an urban center in association with colonial tin mining activities. Additionally, the chapter traces the historical and socio-cultural underpinnings of indigene-ship among other outstanding matters that would be studied holistically. Plateau state endowed with abundant natural resources (tin mining) and that make it one of the most attention-grabbing land within the country. Colonialists saw it as a prospect to accrue natural resources, which was their main objective of coming to Africa. To have smooth and

ease administration, British colonialists employ indirect rule as a policy to achieve their aims and objectives. Indirect rule in Nigeria were supplement by divide-and-conquer policies. Divide and rule was a policy used to govern people by creating division among them. They saw it as the only way to achieve their objective in keeping Nigeria within the orbit of capitalist exploitation. In other words, colonialists aspired to keep Nigerian divided so that they would never cooperate and fight for their independence. Consequently, employed divide and rule policy, which upheld to be successful in strengthening the colonial grasp on Nigerian society and deteriorating the people's capacities to rebel against colonialism. Colonialists from the onset used ethnic and regional division to separate ethnic clusters in Nigeria so that they would never join and struggle against colonial rule as a collective front.

From the beginning of colonial rule (divide-and-rule policy) in Plateau state, Britain favored Hausa-Fulani ethnic group against the alleged indigenous group, which both undermined hitherto built inter-communal bonds and connections and gave birth to mistrust and ethnic hatred. Nevertheless, the most life-threatening legacy of this policy was that of discriminative categorizations ordained in place by the colonizers with the view of grouping each ethnic populace into permanently distinct positions as regards to the rights/obligations in relation to the state systems. The British colonialists disseminated the fable that Hausa-Fulani were "aliens" or "settlers", whereas other ethnic groups such as Berom, Anaguta and Afizere were identified as truly "indigenous group[s] of Plateau". Colonizers even go to the extent of shifting the traditional authority from the privileged Hausa-Fulani group to the self-styled owners' of the land. Subsequently, the "owners' of the land" (Moyo 2008,107; Plotnicov 1967, 44) started rebuking the authority of Hausa-Fulani within the State. This single action by 'indigenous group' alongside with the support of British colonizers propelled a great anger and profound feelings of animosity between the groups. Besides, this colonial categorization has shocking outcomes on Plateau's ethnic clusters as that it instilled a stronger and more conflict-ridden sense of ethnic emotions that operate as a time-bomb, which occasionally burst under the pretense of settler/indigene divide after the exit of colonial masters.

Colonialism forged a Western-style government thereby coercing a single

national identity on diverse ethnic, cultural and religious groups without essentially creating a social/economic/legal atmosphere conducive to imbue them into a consistently all-inclusive identity. The western political and economic institutions were predominant structures of the nation-state established by colonizers in order to supplant the obtainable conventional ones that once administered throughout the country. These colonial political and economic institutions operated through ethnic and national fault lines, and that led to the adoption of a settler/indigene dichotomy as a platform to strive for economic resources of the state. The colonial state, by means of its policies and institutions, is, in fact, adding up to the production of settler/indigene division in Plateau State. It stimulated patronage networks, which, in the long run, brought about colossal instability and intricate the process of unifying separate groups into a Nigerian nation.

Still, those colonial institutions that were founded at the early stages with the purpose of safeguarding colonial administration were similarly part of a manner that African political class after the demise of colonial rule anxiously preserved and continued to practice it. Conversely, African political class substituted colonial masters in administering the similar institutions that were previously applied to control them. Africans have failed to checkmate or amend colonial structures; rather, they artfully manipulated ethnicity as a strategic tool to build, this time around, their own social networks of patronage. Their single purpose was evidently to make it sure that the union among the main ethnic groups don't reach a point beyond which they become a threat to their privileged political order seeding the sows of dispute among themselves. The previous anxiety generated by colonizers via lopsided and unequal treatment of ethnic groups give political class of the time the knack looked-for to organize ethnic clusters as resources of within their own, individual and ethno-centric, national agendas.

Chapter five as a final section of this research covers the summary of the findings, conclusions and recommendations. This dissertation find out that ethnic identities and land ownership (material logic) have together generated settler/indigene conflicts in Plateau state. It maintained that ethnic identity on its own couldn't be the reason of settler/indigene violent in Plateau State, but there are

economic reason attached to it. Identity politics play by the Nigerian political class sustains settlers-indigene conflict within Plateau State. This research pinpoints that ethnic identity construction and the indigenous-favored definition of citizenship in Nigeria, are certainly not the root causes of the conflict in Plateau State. But, they still play the key part in removing the potential for finalizing it with a peaceful and lasting settlement. It recognized that the persistent discriminations and favoritisms instilled by colonialism and modernization jointly with political class' self-enrichment has bred the volatile phenomena of "indigene" and "settlers" skirmish in Nigeria (Plateau State) and other African countries.

1.2. Background/Research Problem

Since the end of Cold War, intra-state conflicts have come to overshadow and outnumber those that occur in-between states (Wolff 2006, 11). The identity-based conflicts (i.e. religious or ethnic) have recently become a global phenomenon, threatening human security due to its ferocity and volatility in scale. Nigeria is one of the African countries entrapped in a vicious cycle of ethnic violence. By the same token, the Plateau State has been experiencing prolonged and protracted ethnic strife that generates much tension, animosity and violence among the neighboring, different ethnic groups. Unlike other ethnic conflicts, the Plateau conflict follows from *indigenes* versus *settlers* pattern, thus merits further conceptualization and academic research. The said settler/indigene conflict, in the case of Plateau, issues from countering claims over a shared piece of land and represents itself under the guise of rivaling ethnic identity. Such has created a state of mutual exclusiveness between those who claimed to be indigene (Berom, Anaguta and Afizere), and those who are regarded as settlers (Hausa-Fulani). The alleged natives, here in this conflict, express and mediate their political demands through the terms of their ethnic identity, contrasting their indigenous status with that of the Hausa-Fulani's as immigrants with no historical tie to the disputed lands of the Plateau. Therefore the said conflict could also be framed as a political confrontation between the Berom supported by the Anaguta and the Afizere, who are among the ethnic groups referred as the 'indigenes' of Plateau State, and the Hausa-Fulani, commonly regarded as the

'settlers'. The situation encapsulates identity politics that Alubo (2006, 6) described as a twin process of "in-group" and "out-group". Indigene-settler conflicts generate social segmentation and fragmentation among the contended ethnic groups as that self-coagulator indigenous people of the land deny those who are stereotyped as settlers any meaningful access to land, full citizenship rights and the attendant privileges. The settlers have been excluded, or better-said deterred, from obtaining political posts, military positions, academic career, health care, education and civil service jobs, both at the State and Federal level.

Furthermore, the indigene/settler conflicts in plateau state appeared to be multi-dimensional due to the fact that, majority of the group alleged to be an indigenes, are Christians and the other group regarded as the settlers are Muslims. For this reason, sometimes the conflict appeared with the claimed of land ownership or territorial possession, sometimes with religion and sometimes with politics. This increase identity formation, politic of exclusion and boundary redefinition, that opens up violence and destruction of lives and properties. The two groups have been at each other throat in an excessive violence that devastated the whole state. Due to the existing lack of trust, antagonistic and irreconcilable nature of the conflict there has been a process of residential division in the state along ethnic, native, settler, religious, and cultural lines; segregating the state into predominantly Muslim and Christian areas. This to a great extent brought about lack of cohesion among the Plateau state people in particular and Nigeria in general, because of its potentiality to bring disunity and disintegration of the country. For this reason the research have to focus direction on this problem in this particular state of Nigeria.

However, to understand Plateau conflict, one has to analyze how primordial identities has been politicized particularly the issue of indigene-ship (citizenship); in which the so called indigene or native people used ethnic, communal, religious and regional origins to discriminate and excluded those alleged to be a settlers (non-native, non-indigenes, migrants) from equal access to the resources, political power, rights and privileges of a state. This provoked intense and bitter competition for political power, control of limited socio-economic and environmental resources. Consequently, violent conflicts erupted among the contended ethnic groups (Osaghae

and Suberu 2005).

Additionally, Nigerian constitution is to blame for enhancing and solidifying settler/indigene conflicts in Nigeria by including “indigeneity clause” (ICG 2012, 3). In this amendment, being from an indigenous origin is apparently utilized as an instrument for keeping political power and resources in the states or local governments under the control of ‘natives’ while denying economic/political capital to those others who have migrated from other states of Nigeria. The constitution privileges local descent over residency. Those who leave their state of origin risk becoming ‘second-class citizens’ in another part of the country, no matter how long they stay in that state (Ojukwu and Onifade 2010, 176).

Indigeneity rather than residency has therefore become the determining factor for one’s status of citizenship. This discriminative practice is bound to generate problems insofar as that one ethnic group is more indigenous to a particular space or territory than the other as a usual condition. As a direct result of this, in Nigeria, conflict is almost imbedded; because for one to have access to political power, resources, rights and privileges is for one to pose ‘indigenous’ status in a state or local government concerned. Constituting a palpable injustice, this residency-defying praxis has become part of, and given justification by, Nigeria’s legal framework as of the Constitutional amendment of 1999 (Jibo Ibrahim 2003, 5). The study also analyzes how claim to land ownership has become concealed under the cover of ethnic identity; and how Nigerian constitution enhances or gives way to this problem. Finally, this dissertation purports to reveal how ethnic identity and/or kinship (i.e. in the Nigerian context) together with fundamental economic motives laid the grounds for the protracted indigene/settler conflict in Plateau State.

1.3. Research Objectives

This research aims to delve into the enduring conflicts in Plateau state of Nigeria. The research hopes to understand and explain the identity conflicts, specifically those that have overlapping dimensions of controversial claims over land and mutually

exclusive construction of ethnic identities. Against this backdrop, this thesis has its focus on accomplishing the following objectives:

1. To further emphasize the role of colonialism, which has been glossed over within previous research on this topic.
2. To analyze and explain the genesis of settler/indigene conflicts of Plateau State through the use of secondary data.
3. To examine how the combination of ethnic identity, land ownership and politics generate or intensify settler/indigene conflict.
4. To identify how the components of ethnic identities and ineffective state structures solidify violence conflicts.

1.4. Research Question

This research has the purpose of elaborating on the following research questions:

- (1) In what manner does identity (ethnic identity) combined with land ownership causes settler/indigene conflict in Plateau state?
- (2) Is identity construction enough to produce settler/indigene violence or should there be another reason attached to it?
- (3) Why the conflict under consideration could maintain its density and scope for such an extensive period of time?

1.5. Research Hypotheses

1. Ethnic identities and land ownership (resource scarcity) have together generated settler/indigene conflicts in Plateau state.
2. Ethnic identity on its own cannot be the reason of settler/indigene confrontations in Plateau state.
3. Ethnic identity construction and the indigenous-favored definition of citizenship, the Plateau State of Nigeria, are certainly not the root causes of the conflict. But, they still play the key part in removing the potential for

finalizing it with a peaceful and lasting settlement.

1.6. Methodology

Social Science inquiry follows from the dictums of science, employing definite techniques of generating data in the logical sequence of explanation of social reality. D. Nachmias and C. Nachmia defined methodology as "...a system of explicit rules and procedures upon which research is based and against which claims for knowledge are valued" (1996, 13). Research methodology is a technique to scientifically solve the research problem. Alternatively, scientific method could be described as "...the pursuit of truth as determined by logical considerations" (2004, 9). Bernard Ostle and Richard W. Mensing viewed scientific method as an "...ideal by experimentation, observation, logical arguments from accepted postulates and a combination of these three in varying proportions" (1975, 2).

Additionally, for the purpose of achieving logical and coherence research techniques this research employs qualitative analysis as its tool of performing research operation. Van Maanen (1979) says that the term "qualitative" has no precise meaning, that it is an umbrella term which covers a variety of techniques that which "...seek to describe, decode, translate and otherwise come to terms with the meaning, not the frequency of certain more or less naturally occurring phenomena in the social world" (Van Maanen 1979, 520). Conventionally, qualitative research is about certain verbal, but not visual, situations that involve a series of "...phenomena relating to or involving quality or kind" (Kothari 2004, 3). Qualitative research aims at answering the question as to why people think or do certain things? It is an act of inquiry or investigation about human behavior. The main purpose of this type of research is to uncover the motivational factors behind the way human agents relate themselves to the world outside (i.e. ethnic identity conflict). The research should ascertain various elements that are believed to influence people on how to behave under specific circumstances (Kothari 2004, 3). As it is deduced from this perception, qualitative approach is the most appropriate method or technique for investigating and analyzing identity conflict (indigene-settler conflict). For they

cannot be reasoned through statistical measures as it is deeply imbedded in self and other conception of parties in any given conflict. The measures that positivism offers for that matter is limitedly applicable to understanding the sources of identity-induced conflicts. To such an extent that one could only interpret the motives of protagonists of a conflict by the means of explicating parties' identity construction in relation to the social structure that shapes, and is shaped, by these identities. A case in point is, most of the researchers who aim at exploring identity conflicts tend to privilege qualitative method over alternative measures, such data collection, statistical presentation and analysis. This research as consequences mainly relies on library research as an instrument in selecting and constructing research technique.

Furthermore, this research explores text books, reports from government commissions of inquiries, reports from assigned committee at the institute for peace and conflict resolution, human right watch, newspaper reports, magazines, archives and journals. The material use include; *Strangers to The City: Urban Man in Jos, Nigeria*, Plotnicov, L. 1967, AHAK: SNP 1/38/307. *Memorandum on Native Administration Policy: Pagan Administration 1934*, NAK: JOSPROF 99/1931: *Jos Division Report No. 56 of 1930*, NAK: JOSPROF 540/1922 *Provincial Annual Report*, AHAK: SNP 1/38/307. *Memorandum on Native Administration Policy: Pagan Administration*, 1934, Premium Times. *Plateau Governor, Jang, elites fuel Jos crises-* report; December 31th 2012, *The Foundation of Jos; who were the First Settlers*. News Rescue July 24th, 2012, Sahara Reporters, Nov 26 2013. *Plateau State Violence Escalates As 37 Villagers Are Killed*, Gazetteer of The Plateau Province (Nigeria). *Jos Native Administration*, Republished with prefatory note by A.H.M. Kirk-Greene (1972), *Human Rights Watch* telephone interview with Chief Toyo Ogunshuyi, president-general of the Yoruba community in Plateau State, Jos, February 16, 2009, Crisis Group Africa Report. 2012. *Curbing Violence in Nigeria (I): The Jos Crisis*. Africa Report N°196 – 17 December 2012, *They Do Not Own This Place. Government Discrimination Against “Non-Indigenes” in Nigeria*. HRW. April 2006, Volume 18, No. 3(A), and *A Deadly Cycle: Ethno-Religious Conflict in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria*. Working paper by Geneva declaration 2011.

However, the scope of the former studies mostly prioritize settler-indigene conflicts a main theme, instead of specifying the details of the conflict within Plateau State of Nigeria. This dissertation differs from these formerly made researches by the degree to which it, relying on a rather secondary data, investigates and analyze the conflict through an extent that encapsulates both rural and urban areas of the Plateau.

Notably, the author of this thesis thinks it is apt to investigate the topic through direct interviews with individuals who have taken part in the conflict. But, understandably, such is not within the reach of this dissertation on the account of time limitations and financial constrains given the large size of the study areas. Additionally, due to the ferocity of clashes and the unforgiving nature of the zone of conflict, it is for the researchers incredibly dangerous to go there and physically conduct any interview.

The research probed into closely connected or appropriate books, articles and historical documents written by both local and international organizations/individuals. Here the purpose of browsing through these specific recourses is to trace the historical development of ethnicity in Nigeria from 1884/1885. As known, this historical phase is marked by the arrival of Western colonialism to Africa and, from then on, subsequent fragmentation of the natives' lands by the settler colonialism, from which this thesis argues has emerged the genesis of settlers-indigene conflict in Plateau.

Furthermore, Eli Zaretsky (1994, 198) argued that identity politics “...must be situated historically” so as to critically analyze how identities have been constructed. Accordingly, the research analyzes colonial archives particularly those connected to the interethnic relation in Jos, Plateau state. Also, the research analyzed the memoranda of government officials related to this research, reports of the commissions set up by the government to investigate the settler-indigene conflict in Nigeria and the records kept by different ethnic groups related to this study. One of the most well known exemplar of such research is made on the Plateau languages of Central Nigeria, which was submitted as part of the proceedings of the Hamburg meeting on the retirement of Professor Ludwig Gerhardt, March 2004—Revision VI. 27 May and PSJCI (*Plateau State Judicial Commission of Inquiry*, 2010). *Plateau*

State Judicial Commission of Inquiry Main Report. Vol. 1 may also be mentioned on this account. Apart from that, relevant newspapers, Magazines, publications and pamphlets, specifically those that are on Jos, will be explored.

This research utilizes relevant concepts such as modernization, colonialism, identity, ethnic conflict and land ownership to explain how colonial divide-and-rule policy bred a sense of self-view that is colored by ethnic sensitivities within the political psyche of Nigerian people in post-colonial era. Concurrently, the research thoroughly examined the Nigerian constitutions; both, colonial and post-colonial ones in order to provide considerable empirical evidence in support of the argument that colonial structures, institutions and legal system sustain and solidify ethnic conflict even after the demise of colonial rule.

Besides, this research employ a deductive approach based on the reasoning and logical analysis of the available facts. Deductive reasoning follows from a level of abstraction to that of a rather concrete and seemingly unique one. It usually begins “...with an abstract, logical relationship among concepts then moves towards concrete empirical evidence” (Neuman 1997:46). Deductive reasoning ingrained with the existing theory since it enlightens the development of hypotheses, the choice of variables, and the resultant measures that researchers intend to use. Consequently, this dissertation formulates a theoretical framework as a guiding principle to analyze the phenomenon.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter aims to propose a theoretical framework that will help explain settler-indigene conflict within Plateau State of Nigeria. The phenomenon in question is related to identity politics in which individual share, or presumed to share, certain identity with others, on the basis of which/according to which, one group may be distinguished from others. It as a concept is relational, but not that of an isolated one, insomuch as that ethnic, religious and/or gender identities of one group only make sense in relation to the way the identities of others are constructed (Adebayo and Liisa 1996, 31). Therefore, identity is a social construction whereby people see or define themselves as distinctly different from others. William L. Yencey (1976) posits that ethnic identity is a phenomenon that emerges from the structure of colonial conditions. Accordingly, the present social order in Nigeria, just as in many other post-colonial states, could be traced back to the period of colonial state formation. For this reason, this paper set forth by exploring colonialism as a way of broadening the theoretical framework towards analyzing the issue under consideration. There are most certainly many other reasons as well, but the legacies left behind by colonialism have the greatest share of responsibility from the ongoing discourse of identity politics in Nigeria. Such is that the established colonial institutions constitutes the structure that which Nigerians have had to mediate/transform/legitimize in view of consolidating a stable course of domestic politics in aftermath of their independence from the British rule (Post and Michael 1976, Okoli 1980). The legal or constitutional framework to manage the nature of interaction among the different segments of the population inherits from the time of British rule; thus, colonial institutions, policies and laws, cannot be ignored but should be given a fore place in explaining all those structural limitations on resolving identity-based conflicts. It is no other than the still extant colonial laws that, by framing the fundamental meaning of political rights and political identity, define the borderline between whom to be called as a native and whom as a settler. Raymond

C. Taras and Rajat Ganguly (2010, 213) assert that ethnic identity determine the place of any person within the colonial and postcolonial state.

Colonialism derived from the word “colony” whereby the indigenous people living in a place for generations with their own organized system of government, traditions and cultures were conquered and incorporate into foreign administration. The resources of the colonies were exploited, their culture were displaced and their civil right were alienated by the colonizers (Philip Wolny 2005, 5-6). Gloria Emeagwali perceived colonialism as:

...a system of administration; a process of exploitation, and a production system often geared towards the creation of capitalist relations and the economic and socio-cultural aggrandizement of the colonizer. This may be done by covert or overt, psychological, legal and military mechanisms (1998).

In fact, colonialism can be identifying as an extension of a country’s rule to lands beyond its own borders. These “new” lands established by the colonizers are called colonies. Darrell Kozlowski and Jennifer L. Webber define colonialism as a system of direct political, economic, and cultural control by a powerful country over a weaker one (2010, 1). Therefore, colonialism is the most direct form of conquest and domination of people by a foreign nation. It is a practice of establishing control over foreign territory and turning it into a colony and thereby exploiting their resources. Colonizers from the mother country who were ethnically distinct from the colonies population carried out colonialism (Andrew Heywood 2011). In this context, colonial practice is the most appropriate framework to analyze the historical evolution and transformation of identity formation, and ethnic consciousness that creates settler-indigene conflicts as we are witnessing today in Nigeria and some other postcolonial states in the world. Therefore, native and settler dichotomy as an identity formation is not natural and immutable as primordialists tended to demonstrate it (Wolff: 2006:33). It is rather a phenomenon invented by the colonizers for the purpose of polarizing the existing ethnic groups, by defining the local citizens distinctively from one another in a way some become indigenes and some other settlers.

Colonialists observably force different ethnic and religious groups to fuse into a

one single artificial nation-state without considering their ethno-cultural differences. Basing it on his study of colonialism in Latin America and Indonesia, Benedict Anderson (1991: 6) defined the concept of nation as an “imagined political community and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”. He proposed that nation is an “imagined community” on the basis that all those who assume a sense of community with others extremely rarely know of their fellow co-nationals, actually never met with them or even heard from them yet, in the minds of the each, they nevertheless conjure up the same image of their communion (Anderson 1991, 6). Anderson identified nation as a social construction insofar as that self-identification of one (imagined) nation is contingent on the presence of another (again imagined) nation. As he asserts, nations are neither organic nor eternal entities. Imagining a nation has logical limitations for even the enormous nations with a population of a billion living human beings are confined in spatial and demographic boundaries. Hence, such limitation automatically envisages that there are other nations beyond a nation’s boundaries (Anderson, 1991: 7). Therefore national identity is something constructed through interaction with others as Kornprobst (2005, 409) puts it;

...national identity is historically and socially contingent construct, and it is relational. Part of what gives meaning to a nation is the relationship between itself (self) and other nations (others). National identities are constructed through telling stories about self and the relationship between self and others. Identity is a narrative category. It is constructed through communicative act that, by connecting events of the past, present as well as desires and expectation about future, tell stories about self and others...

Consequently, political imagination creates a bond (collective nationalism) among people in which they ‘imagine’ that they share general beliefs and attitudes. This imagination makes them not only able to kill but also ready to die for their nation (Kornprobst 2005, 409). Anthony D. Smith (2008: 19) on the other hand sees nation;

...as a named and self-defined human community whose members cultivate shared myths, memories, symbols, values and traditions, reside in and identify with a historical homeland, create and disseminate a distinctive public culture, and observe shared customs

and law...

He identified ethnic variant of nationalism as “genealogical ties, vernacular culture...indigenous history, nativist history (a belief in virtues of indigenous history), and population mobilization” (Smith 2008, 19).

Concomitantly, national identity has a great impact on the formation and transformation of the state². It is incredibly vital to develop and sustain nation-state. Smith noted that national identity is a process in which individual or group can be distinctively distinguished from others through certain characteristics such as symbol, memories, values, traditions and myths (2009, 19). These features more or less differentiate one nation from another. Conversely, Robert M. Kunovich noted that national identity is a socially constructed sameness resulting from nationalism (2009, 574). In a similar vein, Markus Kornprobst, deriving from Michel Foucault’s idea of ‘episteme’, designated national identity as a “...taken for granted background capacity that consists of a shared set of interrelated...beliefs on the basis of which social actors construct the world” (2005, 409). Furthermore, Christian Karner provides an ideal-typical definition of national identity as a “...group of people [who] share set of assumptions about themselves and the world, which are held on a semi-conscious or unconscious level and have tangible political consequences” (2011, 47). He noted that, “...within a national context, national identities are not ideologically monolithic but are defined by heterogeneity, disagreement and discursive struggle” (Karner 2011, 26). Identity is not unmovable or permanent but flexible as it is multi-layered due to the fact that every person has different identities, i.e. belong to several groups of people at the same time. In a powerful theorization, Manuel Castells states that:

...all identities are constructed. The real issue is how, from what, by whom, and for what. The construction of identities uses building materials from history, from geography, from biology, from productive and reproductive institutions, from collective memory and from personal fantasies, from power apparatuses and religious revelations (2010, 7).

² Actually nation is a construction of nation-makers (or state). Yet, once they construct an official identity, state becomes an effect of this identity, and the relationship becomes two-interaction.

Precisely, identity serves as the principle bedrock for the formation of an in-group distinctiveness, which performs the function of representing the important social bond between individuals and community. Yet, as a prominent hybridity theorist, Homi Bhabha (1990: 4) posits ‘ambivalence’ and ‘impossible unity’ are intrinsic to the idea of the nation. It is assumed that single identity is one of the idealized, but not realistic, dimensions of a nation-state formation.

The nation-state was regarded as a nation-building project in Europe to bridge ethnic, cultural and linguistic dichotomy and creates one official national identity. Therefore, various communities in Europe were yoking into one nation during 18th and 19th centuries, though not all of them ‘imagine’ themselves as being *One Nation*. However, this idea of modern nation state, which was based on culturally homogenous state, was imported to Africa during the period of colonialism. As it turned out, this near impossibility of creating a one-uniform-costume for every member of a country is even more acute in the case of the colonial states in Africa. The difficulty in this continent is aggrandized as a result of arbitrarily drawn boundaries that hardly correspond with the self-knowledge of various sub-state identity groups and seldom conform to the historical background of this continent’s cultural heritage—such as the names of the countries, creating irredentism, ethnic clashes, and inter-state conflict (Verdery 1994, 37; Duijzings 2000, 18-23). As Katherine Verdery posits, “...the kind of self-consistent person who ‘has’ an identity is a product of a specific historical process” (1994, 37), which is not a given when it comes to the experience of nation-making process in Africa.

Wilson and Donnan (1998, 13) contended that, for the specific cause of Africa and other formerly colonial spaces around the world, because of the liminal and contested nature of borders, there are often shifting and multiple national identities to counter loyalty to the state identity. In the same vein, Anderson deliberated that the penetration of colonial administration invented or perhaps created divisions among the residents of a colonized space (1991). Bhabha (1990: 4) argued that the;

...locality of national culture is neither unified nor unitary...nor must it be seen simply as ‘other’ in relation to what is outside or beyond it. The boundary is Janus-faced and the problem of outside/inside must always itself be a process of hybridity...

Colonialist put together diverse ethnic, cultural and religious groups into a single nation-state and thereby neglecting Africans' self-knowledge and history. This single process kept ethnic consciousness alive and complicated any effort to alter the perception of 'insider' and 'outsider' from the psyche of the colonized population. Ethnicity become salient factor in shaping political identity in those postcolonial states (Adebayo 1996,12; Kamungi 2013, 1). This xenophobic relationship undertones tension and animosity against the perceive outsiders.

Consequently, post-colonial states left untouched, or perhaps thoroughly enjoyed, the contentions among various different ethnic, religious and cultural groups, thereby never funneling them into constructing a banner of *one-nation*. Hence the modern nation-state of Africa as a colonial construct is a top-down nation-building approach by and for the interests of colonial powers. African state has always been one of a geopolitical construct that could never enjoy democratic consociation that could help diverse identities co-exist. The institutions of nation-state in Africa were built on undemocratic structures, which became a force for rendering national unity and regime consolidation difficult. Basil Davidson (1992, 12) lamented that African crisis emanated from the inherent colonial institutions, which he identified as nation-state of post-colonial state. He argued that colonized states in Africa and Asia are mere geographical expressions, but not nation-states, since they lack natural boundaries, which is the pre-requisite for the likelihood of nation-states to the extent that it converges cultural and political boundaries together (Campbell 2011, 2; Akanji 2005, 130). Davidson referred them a "curse of the nation-state"(1992)³. For this reason, to have a clear understanding of settler-indigene conflict it is needed to analyze institutional legacy of colonial rule. Most specifically, one needs to count for legal and political institutions through which political identities gained shape in contemporary Nigeria. Ali Mazrui (1994), for example, reminds that the ongoing identity clashes in Africa are rooted in the institutional/political legacy of colonial rule, even more so than the artificial

³ Davidson blames colonialism for planting the seeds of discord in Africa. He linked African problems with the partition of Africa into numerous nations that more or less depict unnatural boundaries. People who were ethnically, socially and politically unrelated imposed into one nation-state.

boundaries curved out by colonialists. He thereby argued that the identity crises could only be resolved by addressing the structure of colonial institutions.

From the onset, British colonialism made distinction between colonized and colonizers and endowed each group with different legal systems. Colonized population was regulated through customary law, which premised on tradition of the natives. In contrast to this, daily lives of colonizers was governed through civil law. This was the process that laid the foundation of native-settler division. Hence only natives (colonized) were identified or categorized ethnically. In fact colonial laws distinguished between native and non-native. Colonizers were considered more civilized than colonized and therefore regarded as potential members of civil society thereby excluding colonized (Natives). Mamdani asserted that “if we understand civil society not as an idealized prescription but as a historical construct we will recognize that the original sin of civil society under colonialism was racism” (2001, 654). Colonial states were Janus-faced, consisted two forms of authorities; civil authority and customary authority. The former aimed to protect rights and the later proposed to enforce tradition. That was how ethnic division and political identities has been institutionalized.

The dilemma about the customary law is: it introduced not a single, unified legal codification for the entirety of natives. Instead it laid down multiple and exclusive customary codifications for each group of native peoples. The laws of the various ethnic groups differentiated from one another on the account of their customs. Each ethnic group had its own customary law, which was entirely different from others. The issue is that “colonial state could be identified as an ethnic federation, comprising so many native authorities, each defined ethnically...each native authority was like a local state under central supervision” (Mamdani 2001, 656). That was how colonialism constructed native customs across ethnic fault-lines, which held people from identifying themselves with each other, enhancing ethnic consciousness and identity hatred (Attah 2011,96).

Furthermore, British employed divide and rule tactics to drive a wedge among the native population so as to conserve their own administrative privileges, unchallenged power and, above all, capability of weakening nationalists’ agitation of

self-government (Campbell 2011, 2; Blagojevic 2009,8; Akanji 2011, 121). Divide and rule was key to the policy of indirect rule, which could be impossible if then the native factions behaved in harmony and unison against colonial administration. In an indirect rule policy, colonialists maintained the existing traditional institutions and customary laws of the various colonies, thereby, encourage disunity and erode the trust that exists among people before colonialism (Nnoli 1997, 113; Attah 2011,92; Akanji 2011, 120). In fact, colonialism has sown the seeds of discord among different ethnic groups. From the place of this discord consequently surfaced the specter of violent identity conflicts and issues, having back-grounded the native-settler conflicts in post-colonial states with Nigeria being only one of them. Let browse through the period of time during which colonial system took start. This chapter of history should be more thoroughly analyzed so as to hold a grip on how foreign rule established structural origins of conflict in Plateau state.

Nigeria as an African country was colonized by Britain. Lord Fredrick Lugard was the first colonial governor in Nigeria. He amalgamated three separate entities; northern protectorate, southern protectorate and turned the colony of Lagos into what came to be known as Nigeria. Lugard governed Nigeria by using indirect rule, in which the local power structure became part of colonial administrative structure. Jeremiah I. Dibua define indirect rule as a “system of local government that enable the British to govern Nigeria through indigenous rulers and institutions ” (2006, 58). He noted that the main reason of indirect rule was to undermine the culture and traditions of the indigenous people and most importantly to exploit their resources. In other word, Lugard introduced indirect rule in Nigeria due to the shortage of personnel. There were no enough British officials capable of administering the country effectively to achieve the exploitative end of colonialism. So he decided to use the existing traditional rulers as agents of exploitation. The traditional rulers who were expected to be the custodian of indigenous culture and traditions became colonialists’ puppets, serving the colonialists’ interest rather than Nigerians (Khapoya 2012, 117-118).

Indirect rule in Nigeria was supplemented by divide and rule strategy, which promote ethnic sentiments among Nigerians. Dibua argued that, “...ethnic groups

was defined as the unit of indirect administration with the belief that every Nigerian belonged to an ethnic group ” (2006, 61). This process bred structural inequalities and identity consciousness that dichotomized Nigerian population along ethnic and religious lines. James Coleman argued as early as 1958 that the divide and rule ethos of indirect rule artificially compartmentalized the “diverse elements” of the Nigerian area and subsequently made national unity extremely difficult (1958:194). This strategy of indirect rule functioned to propagate demarcations among and in-between the Nigerians by the means of empowering one group against another. Emmy Irobi, too, contends that indirect rule always helps “re-enforce ethnic division” (2005). Melson and Wolpe (1971, 3) handle the impact of divide-and-rule policies of colonial era on the current formation of societies in the East from a similar ground, stating that:

...much of contemporary communal conflict is being waged not by traditional entities, but by communities formed in the crucible of mobilization and competition...moreover, political conflict associated with culture pluralism is due not to the nature of pluralism or diversity in itself, but to a process of inhuman and uncontrolled modernization which pits one community group against another in a frantic search for wealth, status, power and security.

Jos has become the capital city of Plateau in Nigeria. The choice of this was hardly coincidental as it emerged from instrumental thinking of British colonial rule towards parceling out the country into manageable portions. Because of the Hausa/Fulani population, which constituted the predominant portions of all society in this area, British called it “Hausa town of Jos”.⁴ It was initially designated to protect the political as well as economic interests of colonialism. The town was artificially divided into two (Native town and Township) by colonial masters to segregate the population settlements. The Hausa and some Yoruba (Ogbomoso) were encouraged to live at the Native town. While other groups referred as ‘pagans’ were given incentives to lead a separate life within remote villages. However, Europeans and Asians along side the educated people of Nigeria, regardless of their tribal origins, cohabited within the Township (Isichei 1982, 267-268). This entire plan of

⁴ NAK: JOSPROF 540/1922 Provincial Annual Report.

residency, by British, was surely to distance ethnic groups from each other to such an extent that they could never form a countervailing union and subsequently challenge colonialists.

...the whole of the Plateau in Jos Division is divided into clearly cut Hausa areas recognized by the natives and quite workable as such...and do not in any way coincide with the pagan areas. This matters no more than it matters when in England Roman Catholic dioceses are independent of the areas of other systems.⁵

This situation helped create an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and mistrust among the population in the area. Davis and Kalu-Nwiwu posit that “the structure of British colonial administration” and the drawing of arbitrary boundaries delineating “[ethnic] territories restricted development of a national consciousness within the broad expanse of Nigeria's borders” (2001, 1-11). Interestingly, Jos was organized under native authority but the overall control was still left with the colonial administration. British, in so doing, believed that empowering one group against another would cause to create clash of interests among different groups and that strengthening their tribal identity would provide British colonialism an avenue to continue with subjugation and exploitation of the country (Orr 1965, 153). Therefore, they deliberately empowered Hausa/Fulani ethnic group by handing traditional power to them (Hausa/Fulani). Even the Sarki Jos (emir of Jos) was from Hausa/Fulani ethnic group; other ethnic groups who were mostly “Pagans” were sidelined. It was due to the fact that “Pagans” were viewed as uncivilized, thus incapable of protecting the interest of colonial government. In order to reinforce fear and mistrust among groups, colonialists constructed Hausa/Fulani ethnic group through terms that are distinctly different from other identity groups. Hausa/Fulani was identified as “...clothed, civilized, cultivated, learned, well behaved, highly organized and mobile for economic activities”. In contrast, other ethnic groups who were largely “Pagans” were described as “naked, primitive, ignorant, untutored, superstitious, and independent” (Orr 1965, 59 and 151).

Moreover, the colonial government used derogatory names to identify the

⁵ NAK: JOSPROF 2/9/394/1917: Head of Naraguta Division Hausa Settlements

groups. Hausa/Fulani was referred as “aliens”, while “pagans” were indicated as “indigenous communities of Plateau”.⁶ All these labeling came to add to the growing confusion and suspicion among the population, whereby colonialist used deliberate measures, which treat each group in highly uneven and inconsistent fashions. Should the need arises, it was also seen that colonialists shifted their favor from one group to another. A case in point, the colonial policy unexpectedly changed its perception of the ‘favored native’ by all of a sudden promoting themselves as the guardians of the ‘rights’ of pagans, now demonstrating them as the sole “owner of the land” (Plotnicov 1967, 44). The change of heart issued from the awareness that Hausa/Fulani outlived their benefit as the favored ethnic group. Therefore they decided to abolish Hausa/Fulani headship and instead put pagans in their place. For this reason the British restrained Hausa authority and positioned pagans against aliens (i.e. Hausa). The Hausa/Fulani authority that had hitherto been used as an instrument of colonial exploitation was relegated and, thereby, Hausa/Fulani abruptly saw its authority eroding over pagan. Berom (i.e. pagans) began to challenge the Hausa/Fulani domination of Jos (Isichei 1982, 274). In addition, colonialists engineered the “owner of the land” notion and even heartened the Berom to lay claim to the right of the land.⁷ This process sets “owner of land” (i.e. pagans) against Hausa/Fulani, which was then called with one or all of the following names—aliens, immigrants or strangers. In fact, Colonialist left behind a legacy that produced mistrust, suspicion and a bitter rivalry for the control of Jos. This rivalry has always been expressed in ethnic or religious terms, even permeating ethnic contours to the political discourse of Plateau state. Therefore, the political and economic structure made-by-colonialism situated people across the ethnic divisions by using Native/settler dichotomy, which soon became the political language of both parties’ claims.

Colonialism as an approach may however help us understand the genesis of identity formation (i.e. native/settler division), it still is far from being flawless to ably explain as to why native/settler conflict have become more meaningful and violent in post-colonial states. In order to explains this one needs to employed

⁶ NAK: JOSPROF 99/1931: Jos Division Report No. 56 of 1930

⁷ AHAK: SNP 1/38/307. Memorandum on Native Administration Policy: Pagan Administration, 1934

“institutional approach” and “instrumentalist” or “political entrepreneurs approach”. Institutional approach argues that colonialism separate groups along ethnic lines, but the dilemma came during decolonization. Douglas North (1981, 201-202) defined institutions as:

...a set of rules, compliance procedures, and moral and ethical behavioral norms embedded in those rules and compliance procedures designed to constrain the behavior of individuals in the interests of maximizing wealth, social order, and the well-being of a society. Institutions establish the cooperative and competitive incentives in society by virtue of their norms, rules, and procedures.

Precisely, institutions motivate or encourage cooperation or conflict among/between ethnic groups in the state as Crawford (1998, 17) argued, “the institutions of the modern state are crucial in either cementing, creating, or attenuating cultural or identity politics that were created in historical power struggles.”

Bojana Blagojevic lamented that “the absence of old institutional mechanism of group control allowed for ethnic emotions to surface and ethnic intolerance to take place. Such situation exploited by political elites, lead to inter-ethnic competition and conflict”(2009, 8-9). The inability of the state of Nigeria, from the independence onwards, to curb colonial structure and to address identity question (indigeneity) therefore made conflict inevitable. Hence Nigerian state out of desperation have sustained the legacy of colonialism, holding the indigeneity as the legal basis of entitlement to the land. Insofar as the law or constitution is concerned, ethnic identity has constituted the primary principle according to which political identity is carried on. It is the way of ethnicity metamorphosing into becoming the consequential dimension of political identity within the contemporary Nigeria. Cynthia Enloe (1981) asserts, “...if the state’s administrative structure and legal institutions distribute resources based on ethnicity, this encourages political mobilization along ethnic line.” In addition, “...countries whose political institutions politicized cultural (ethnic) identity are more vulnerable to cultural (ethnic) conflict than countries whose political institutions promote social integration of diverse cultural groups” (Crawford 1998, 556). Institutional factors escalate or sustain identity conflict by mobilizing politics of exclusion as we can witness in Jos (Plateau) in which

indigeneity has become a legal basis of entitlement to the land ownership. Indigeneity has been legally inscribed and reinforced by the present Nigerian constitution.

Institutional approach pays little or no attention to the role of political and economic interest in the construction of identity. Therefore, in order to explain economic and political interest we need to encompass political entrepreneurs approach in the analysis. Political entrepreneurs or instrumental approach argued that the inability of the state institutions to checkmate inter-ethnic rivalry provides a fertile ground for the political elites to hijack the situation and mobilize ethnic groups for their own narrow political interests. Blagojevic advances that "...politicians who use ethnicity to their advantage can successfully operate only within those institutional arrangements that support/allow such practice or are unable to prevent it" (2009, 10). Therefore, in analyzing identity conflicts, a strong correlation could be discerned between political leadership and institutional structures of state. In this regard Sharon Morris (2001, 3) contended that "...the two (political leadership and institution) are filters through which all other causes of conflict have to pass". She follows up the same argument by claiming that, "...institutions can fuel grievances through political exclusion or inefficiency". For this reason they view ethnic identity as socially and politically constructed overtime. Ethnic identity is "foremost a resource in the hands of the leaders to mobilize followers in the pursuit of other interests" (Wolff 2006, 33). Consequently, ethnic violence emerges when, and if, political elites construct antagonistic ethnic identities for the purpose of strengthening their hold on power. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin (2000, 853) argued that political elites manipulate ethnic emotion to win the support of their group. They normally use fear, uncertainties or historical memories of grievances as mechanisms of awakening identity consciousness and hatred, which aid them about scoring their political and economic ambitions (Lake and Rothchild 1996). Simmel (1955) and Coser (1956) argued that political elites instigate ethnic conflict to gain political support probably well aware of the fact that such only aggrandizes hatred among ethnic groups and escalate more violence.

To cap up, one can identify how colonialism succeeded in redefining yesterday's

natives into post-colonialist settlers and post-colonialist natives in Jos (Plateau). Due to the fact that the institutions left behind by colonialism continues operating without alteration, they gave way for the political elites to exploit ethnic emotions as part of their strategy to reap economic and political capital. The post-colonial Nigerian institutions failed to address indigenes/settlers dichotomy created by colonial government. In which political identities are inscribed and reinforced by law. Mamdani once argued that, "...if the law recognized you as a member of ethnicity and state institutions treat you as member of that particular ethnicity, then you become an ethnic being legally". He identified that, "...you understand your inclusion or exclusion from right or entitlement based on your legally defined and inscribed race or ethnicity" (Mamdani 2001, 663). It is also significant to note that the scarcity of the resources makes the situation only more volatile. As it is posits by Blagojevic, when resources are scarce it is even more probably for political elites to get their way through ethnicity-induced conflicts. He further argued that "political mobilization of ethnic identities result in ethnic intolerance and competition over resources and right, which, if unresolved, can lead to a violent conflict" (Blagojevic 2009, 11). To this dilemma did Crawford come up with the sole possible solution as being that "...if states provide a legitimate arena for political elites to compete and if resources available for allocation...identity politics, like other kinds of political competition, will be legitimate and stable" (Crawford 1998, 556).

CHAPTER THREE

LITERATURE REVIEW

The Literature review aims to examine the existing literatures related to the key concepts in the study. For this purpose, the literature review is divided into the following pairings of concepts. These are, accordingly, colonialism and modernization, modernization and identity conflict, colonialism, nation building and ethnic conflict (ethnic politics) and finally colonialism and Land ownership. All of these concepts are employed as part of this dissertation's model of analysis. They are believed to be helpful about understanding indigene/settler conflict and, most importantly, they are considered to be imperative for grasping the reasons as to why, and how; the said conflict could reproduce itself once colonialists were out of Nigeria. The chapter also explores key relevant themes to see the linkages among those causes that in interaction escalated the ethnic conflicts in Plateau State.

2.1. Colonialism and Modernization

Jeremiah Dibua (2006) posits that colonialism is the genesis of most if not all the identity conflicts in Africa. To him, colonialism was the process through which contemporary African nation-states emerged as a product of modernization. Hence, modernization here is used as a justification for imposing colonial rule in African geography, so as to hide the real rapacious and exploitative aims of colonialism. European colonizers claimed that African societies and cultures were primitive, backward, barbaric and uncivilized and therefore European colonization of Africa was a self-sacrificial act of altruism on the part of colonizing western powers. It was a "civilization mission" by which the "irrational" and "backward" African institutions and cultures would be finally abolished and replaced with "civilized" western institutions and cultures (Dibua 2006, 53). It was his assertion that here in lies the genesis of the so-called 'modernization' in Africa in general and Nigeria in particular. For better or for worst, colonialism was a vehicle through which

‘modernization’ has extended to Africa. In essence, colonialism and modernization are dual phenomena that shaped, transformed and changed the world.

Dibua maintained that the main purpose of colonialism was economic. Consequently from their (colonizers) advent to Africa, they realized that the existing African traditional institutions, laws and cultures were less than convenient to introduce and sustain a complex system of economic exploitation and political obedience. For this reason they initiated various policies and reforms with the view of transforming Africa into a version of modern Western state system. This overall political as well as social reconfiguration was seen inseparable from colonizers’ need for surmounting all those obstacles that, they foresaw, would one day hinder them in Africa (Dibua 2006, 58). Accordingly, Nigerian institutions, culture and identity were reconstructed in the image of a modern western state. The Nigerian political, economic and social institutions were dragged toward “modernization” project for the successful exploitation of Nigerian’s resources.

Economically, Nigerians were discouraged from sustaining subsistence-agriculture and, thereby, forced into cash crops farming. Cash crops unlike subsistence crops were produced for commercial value rather than self-consumption. For this reason colonizers rendered subsistence agriculture as irrelevant, hence it did not fit well with a local commodity market integrated to the circuits of the world commercial system. African natural resources became crucial for providing European capitalist economies with a basis of raw material since the advent of industrial revolution, which overall first took them into transforming the political structure of native African societies/communities.

Dibua eloquently argued that Berlin West African Conference (i.e. BWAC) of 1884-1885 was hold by self-aggrandized European countries to concretize, legalize and, if possible, to find a working compromise among their rivaling claims on the African continent. This conference was necessary to avoid war between/among the competing Western countries over African resources as they were each induced to competing over a diminishing window of economic opportunities on the planet. Two most important agreements were reached at the end of the conference; first, “sphere of influence”, whereby the African territories shared among the European countries

as their own area of control. Second was the “effective occupation”, which meant to be entering and taking over the control of the African land (Dibua 2006, 54). This process called “scramble for African territories” (Blunt 1923), dragged African countries into the modern colonialism, which left behind a new form of desolation and crisis of modern African nation-states. Hence, this action more often than not changed the political and cultural landscape of the world, thereby demarcating new boundaries of modern nation-states, which became the genetic make-up of identity conflicts in postcolonial Africa (Mudimbe 1988).

However, Dibua identified how traditional authorities or African political entities rendered obsolete or reduced to merely subservient of colonialists authority through the use of indirect rule. In his study of Nigerian crisis of modernization, he described indirect rule as “...a system of local government that enabled the British to govern Nigeria through indigenous rulers and institutions” (Dibua 2006 58). Due to lack of personnel capable of managing the whole territories, colonizers decided to utilize the already perfected structure put in place by the traditional rulers. Traditional authorities became subordinates or agents of colonizers. The traditional rulers who had been giving order in the past started receiving order from the colonial authority (mother country). They were relegated to merely tools of exploitation by collecting taxes from indigenous people for the colonizers, thereby, deprived of any meaningful degree of executive power. Apart from the economic motives, indirect rule in Nigeria aimed to displace indigenous culture and tradition. The traditional institutions that served as an agencies or custodians of traditional practices and culture rendered obsolete and replace with a western institutions. Therefore, modernization of Nigerian political body was out of technical needs to better colonize Nigeria. At this juncture modernization and colonization meets. Colonizing bastards were trying to accomplish higher efficiency in extracting Nigerian resources.

Dibua, other than these, believes that indirect rule bred and facilitated ethnicity in Nigeria. Before colonial imposition to Nigeria, traditional rulers main ruled over a sufficiently amalgamated tribal and pre-modern social order. Such pre-colonial harmony was to later lay shattered as having been redefined and carved out as rivaling spheres of influence—off course, without any consideration for the demands

of local people. He added that, indirect rule policy was used concurrently with ‘divide and rule’ tactics to encourage ethnic sentiment among various ethnic groups in Nigeria. Consequently, under the arrangement for the colonial-indirect rule, Nigerians tended to define themselves on the grounds of their ethnic backgrounds. It became a ‘norm’ to believe that each and every Nigerian inescapably belongs to an ethnic group. Dibua (2006, 61) states;

...ethnic citizenship rather than civic citizenship became the basis for defining a Nigerian thereby giving rise to a situation where Nigerians close in separate ethnic containers, each with a customary shell guarded over by a native authority.

Therefore, divide and rule policy of indirect rule was intentionally created to fragmentize Nigerians along ethnic and religious lines.

Furthermore, he linked that Nigerian ethnic identity crisis with colonial constitutions, particularly the Richard constitution of 1946. It was the first constitution that divided Nigeria into three administrative regions (Northern, Eastern and Western regions). As a continuous sequence of divide and rule policy of British colonialism, colonizers make sure that the three major ethnic groups in Nigeria represented each region so as to promote intense ethnic sentiment in the country. The constitution promotes ethnic identity to the extent that different Nigerian ethnic groups hardly work or seek employment in the region other than their own. This regionalization of Nigerian political structure further orchestrated ethnic jingoism among various ethnic nationalities in the country.

1945 to 1960 was identified as the final stage of colonial administration in Nigeria; the era witnessed the pretense of “modernization” with various political, economic and social reforms geared toward constructing the country into modern western nation-state. It was realized that this modernization process subverts Nigerian development rather enhancing it, as Dibua argued that “...colonial imperialism entrenched the modernization paradigm in Nigeria’s development process” (2006, 82). Those western institutions were put in place to ensure regular and profitable capitalist exploitation not to develop Nigeria. For this reason the

established modern structures were very fragile and incapable of promoting national unity among ethnic nationalities in the country.

Kwame Nkrumah, on the other hand, had a different perception of colonialism as that he saw it lopsided and exploitative as a pattern of social relationship between colonized and colonizers. The latter one, according to him, aspires to expand the economic, military and political power/influence of the 'source-country' over the former colonized people. Nkrumah asserts that, "colonialism is the policy by which the 'mother country', the colonial power, binds her colonies to herself by political ties with the primary objective of promoting her own economic advantages" (1973, 18). He noted that colonial power pursues a policy of strict monopoly of colonial trade, and the building up of national power. Thus, colonialism always comes up with strict economic and political policies, which produce negative consequences to its colonies. Nkrumah share the same view with Dibia that wherever colonialism exists it has one major motive, that is, economic (raw materials). Yet, Nkrumah also believe that African colonies also serve as a fountain that fill capitalist industries with raw materials and at the same times become a "dumping ground" of their saturable manufactured goods (Nkrumah 1973,15). Therefore, colonial imposition in Africa was to exploit African resources for the rapid growth of capitalism in Europe. Africa became cheap source of raw materials to feed the capitalist industries in Europe

Colonialism never meant to modernized or develop Africa as western colonizers claimed, Nkrumah contended, "...it is incoherent nonsense to say that Britain or any other colonial power has the 'good intention' of developing her colonies for self-government and independence" (Nkrumah 1973, 17). Hence the driving force of colonialism was economic and the economic motive embedded by imperialism. He describes modern imperialism as the "...annexation of one nation or state by another and the application of a superior technological strength by one nation for the subjugation and the economic exploitation of a people or another nation..." (Nkrumah 1973, 18). Most if not all the colonial policies were to limit African progress so that they would continue syphoning the African resources. These policies aimed to render Africa remain consuming, but not producing, as an economic sphere

so that it will be forever dependent on western industrial products. That was the reason why Europeans prevent Africans from acquiring modern skills and techniques capable of developing indigenous industries in Africa. These to a great extent deprived Africans from engaging into any significant trade relation with other continents or among African nations. Basing his research on British colonies, Nkrumah has this to say:

...Britain...controls exports of raw materials from the colonies by preventing direct shipment by her colonial 'subjects' to foreign markets, in order that, after satisfying the demands of her home industries, she can sell the surplus to other nations, netting huge super-profits for herself.

Even if a few number of modern infrastructures were launched during the era of colonization, these basically meant to enhance economic exploitation. Roads, railways and bridges were constructed for hitch-free exporting African resources to Europe. Hospitals were built for all but to ensure the health of the industrial workers insomuch as that their illness would not negate production power of the capitalist industries (Nkrumah 1973, 32).

In addition, Nkrumah clarifies the differences between French and British colonial policies. He noted that the French policy of 'assimilation' tended to centralize government with the same policy derived from Paris. French colonies were regarded as part of the mother country (French). However, the British policy of "indirect rule" was more destructive. Indirect rule generate disunity by awakening ethnic sentiments among the colonized populations. This policy usually consummate with a parallel strategy of "divide and conquer" (or rule); a policy to maintain control over one's subordinates or subjects by encouraging disagreement between them. Divide and rule policy of indirect rule systematically implant mistrust and intense hatred among various groups to cover their eyes from colonialists' tricks of achieving exploitative economic ends.

However, James Mahoney (2010) perceived colonialism as "the power of the colonialists to transplant the civilization they represent to the new natural and social environment in which they find themselves" (Hobson 2005, 7). He noted that

different societies fall under certain kinds of colonialism. For this reason the level of economic prosperity and social well being of the post-colony was directly related to the form of colonization it experienced and this is the reason why some postcolonial states developed more than others. Mahoney maintained that eight European countries that engaged in colonialism follow as Britain, Spain, Italy, France, Belgium, Germany, Portugal and Netherlands. Each had different institution that determines the form of colonization, which more often than not affect the level of development of their respective postcolonial states (Mahoney 2010).

Mahoney and his colleagues vividly show that the economic model of the colonization determines the level of progress of in the postcolonial state. The argument was built based on comparative study between Spain and Britain colonies. Depending on either colonizing nation used mercantilist or liberal economic model. The research shows that the societies colonized by mercantilist Spain became worst after independence. In contrast, the most underdeveloped pre-colonial societies that were colonized by liberal Britain became better after independence (Mahoney, Lange and vom Hau 2006, 1). Consequently, pre-colonial society could be underdeveloped but emerge as developed nation in the postcolonial era and vice versa.

In this comparative-historical analysis, Mahoney came up with a new theory of colonialism and postcolonial development, where he explain how institutions forged under colonialism bring countries to relative levels of development that may prove remarkably resilient in the postcolonial period. He also has the belief that global trade emerged out colonialism, thus, "...by disseminating people and institutions, moreover, colonialism forever changed the structure of trade and production within what had been an almost exclusively European commercial system" (Mahoney 2010, 1).

The research found out that the level of colonialism over a long period of time also determines the colonies development. They define level of colonialism "as the extent to which a colonizing power installs economic, political, and sociocultural institutions in a colonized territory" (Mahoney et al. 2006, 1414). It identified that extensive colonization by Spain produced an undemocratic society, where the population seeking to exploit or oppress their fellow society's members and it would

equally produced imperfect market in the postcolonial state. Whereas limited colonization by Spain could not generate perfect market and an effective state's institutions, it can be also be said that a limited-colonization actually refrain the society from transplanting most destructive institutions and this would give them a chance to achieve high level of progress after independence. Conversely, long time or extensive British colonialism produced democratic institutions, rule of law, liberal markets and these directly lead to development of the postcolonial states. Yet, short form of colonization in British case arrests future development of the colonies, destroying the existing indigenous institutions. That is the single most important stumbling block to their progress.

However, Mahoney's analysis was highly Eurocentric, representing liberal perspective by viewing colonialism as a humanitarian mission to develop non-western countries. Mahoney's argument that extensive British colonization brought prosperity to the colonized countries proved to be unsubstantial considering how the countries colonized by Britain became underdeveloped. Another crime of colonialism was dehumanization of the African people since they were treated in much the same way as objects that, by using military force or other means available, should be forced to relinquish their power. With regard to this Welter Rodney (1981, 224) lamented that:

...power is the ultimate determinant in human society, being basic to the relations within any group and between groups. It implies the ability to defend one's interests and if necessary to impose one's will by any means available...when one society finds itself forced to relinquish power entirely to another society that in itself is a form of underdevelopment.

In the first place colonialism was imposed on the African without their consent. Some scholars perceived that colonialism led to African underdevelopment (Immanuel Wallenstein 1974;Welter Rodney 1981; Kwame Nkrumah 1973; Samir Amin 1974; Harrison 1988).

In addition, the arbitrary nature of the colonial construction of African boundaries has a great negative impact on post-colonial states in Africa. In order to exploit African resources, colonialists forged various ethnic and religious groups into

one Nation-state, which became the generic make-up of political violence in postcolonial state. Even the name “Africa” was constructed through the historical trajectories of colonialism. Therefore in reality colonial imposition never meant to develop Africa but rather to exploit African resources for the betterment of Western European. This is the reason why most of the key problems bedeviling Africa today could be traced back to colonialism, particularly political and economic crisis.

A classical anti-imperialist writer, Walter Rodney (1981), used the concept and theory of development and underdevelopment to evaluate and explain how colonialism resulted in African underdevelopment. He explored the historical evolution of colonial exploitation over some years and explained beyond reasonable doubt that most, if not all the current Africans’ morass, spring from colonial legacies. Rodney argued that colonialism did more harm than help to Africa. Africa’s economic/social conditions significantly deteriorated in contact to Western Europe: because previous to the arrival of the Europeans, Africa were developing at its own pace, which was halted with the colonialists/Europeans as the latter deviated all African development in order to suit it to their exploitative aims. Hence, observed Rodney (1981), “before even the British came into relations with our people, we were a developed people, having our own institutions, having our own ideas of government” (33). Sadly enough, Africa’s traditional authorities, education system, cultural institutions and practices were callously abolished in the wake of colonization and this undermines African development.

However, some western authors contend that colonialism actually benefited Africans in certain ways; a stance that conforms to the famous dictum of white man’s burden of “civilizing mission”. Rodney exposes the exploitative nature of colonialism and thereby explores, analyzes and explains how colonialism brought underdevelopment to Africa. Based on his determination to found out the negative and positive sides of colonialism in Africa, Rodney concluded that any effort to draw the balance sheet between positive and negative sides of colonialism proved abortive, “colonialism had only one hand-it was a one armed bandit” that never brought any benefit to Africa and the whole concept of the “civilizing mission” was a farce (Rodney1981, 205-206). During the many years of colonial rule in Africa, hardly

anything was done for the benefit of Africans. As Nkrumah, Rodney asserts, even the modern facilities built by colonizers were self-serving, put in place to smuggle African resources abroad.

Also, in the chapter five of his book, Rodney use Marx's labor theory of value to explain how Africa during colonialism contribute to the capitalist development in Europe. He describes colonialism as not solely a system of exploitation, but rather a system whose central motive was to return the profits to the "mother country" (Europe). He categorically stated that the appropriation of the surplus value generated by African labor from Africans, during the era of colonization, was to serve for "... the development of Europe as part of the same dialectical process in which Africa was underdeveloped" (Rodney 1981, 149). Rodney continued, "colonial Africa fell within that part of the international capitalist economy from which surplus was drawn to feed the metropolitan sector" (Rodney 1981, 149).

Rodney makes a formidable contribution to the analysis of how Europe exploited African resources that rendered the continent underdeveloped. Yet, he failed in identifying how European rule in worked, which is equally important as regards to explaining postcolonial political conflict. Rodney like most of the postcolonial nationalist writers, emphasized more on expropriation of African resources as a great crime of colonialism while neglecting the way colonizers used divide and conquer policies for the purpose of fragmenting Africans along ethnic and religious lines; a phenomenon that played the key part in the subsequent political violence in postcolonial Africa. In addition, colonial rule became part of a process in which Africans became alienated to their self-identity, cultural values and dignity. Therefore, Rodney's literature is more of a framework of political economy. It therefore falls short of analyzing ethnic identity violence in postcolonial African continent. Hence a hindsight from a vantage of political-economy into the market-based identities or the talk of antagonism between capitalist and proletariats may not be sufficient to unfold the causes of ethnic violence in post-colonial spaces. It is to the extent that identity-based conflicts are often found to be resulting from cultural identity (political identity), which is discursively constructed and transformed through human history (Mamdani 2001, 19). He also disregarded cultural

subjugation, which was the sine qua non of economic and political exploitation of Africans.

Mahmood Mamdani (2001, 14) argued that expropriation and dispossession of African resources was not the only hideous crime of colonialism; politicization of indigeneity has even more devastating consequences, which became the root cause of ethnic identity violence in postcolonial states. He was identifying how boundary was drawn between settler and native as distinct political identities. Native and settler dichotomy could be explored and explained within the “logic of colonialism”. Likewise the ‘self-definition’ of ‘we’ and ‘them’ as a colonial construct can be understood from the historical development of colonialism. The postcolonial political violence is a reflection of the lines of manufactured identity demarcations among the natives drawn by the colonizers. Consequently, Mamdani contended that native and settler as political identities could not be detached from the process of modern state formation created in the hands of colonialist powers (Mamdani 2001, 22-23).

Mamdani distinguished modern Britain ‘indirect rule’ policy with the previous ‘direct’ form of colonialism. He argued that Roman and British ‘direct rule’ that occurred before mid-19th century was entirely different from the modern indirect rule. Mamdani maintains that previous colonization focuses on eradication differences, whereas the modern indirect rule not only recognizes differences but also encouraging it. Indirect rule represent the most perfect or typical example of modern colonial rule. It introduced a new form of governance thereby defining and managing different political identities (Mamdani 2012, 1). The main feature of indirect rule state was dichotomizing citizens into settlers and natives. Mamdani continues as saying that “...native does not designated condition that is original and authentic. Rather...the native is the creation of the colonial state...” (Mamdani 2012, 2). Therefore, the explosive combination of native and settler were creating by colonizers in order to divert the attention of colonized population away from the reality of having been colonized.

Under colonial indirect rule arrangement, a minimum traditional power was given to the native authorities to govern the local communities. To understand native/settler as a fragmented form of political identity, one has to take into

consideration the ethnic composition that made-up the colony as each group is ascribed as native in a particular land and governed through native authority. This resulted in native to become settler in the land outside the one he/she designated as a native. Therefore, only those ethnic groups that are ascribed as natives in a particular territory could claim land ownership over the same area. For this reason the political participation was exclusively prerogative of the native who belong to the land, and all other groups reside in the land had no right whatsoever to participate in the public affairs. This situation produced insecurity and hatred among the groups, which become the basis of political struggle in the modern states in Africa between and among the groups as each one try to subdue the other. Settler/indigene conflicts of Plateau state could be analyzed and explained within this context by historicizing how British colonizers succeeded in dividing the plateau populations into settlers and natives.

Colonial political identities (settler and native) are relational concepts that can be understood in terms of interaction between/among ethnic groups within the colonial and postcolonial state. Mamdani posits, "...settler and native go together. There can be no settler without a native and vice versa. Either the two are reproduced together, or the two are abolished together..." (Mamdani 2012, 2). Therefore the only way to dismantle settler and native dichotomy is for both of them to stop functioning as political identities. Mamdani vehemently criticizes Primordialists and Instrumentalists for their assertions that political identities were something inherited from one's ancestors (Shil 1957, Geertz 1963, Vanden Berghe 1997) and/or it generated out of selfish political elites only interested in grabbing power (Portes and Bach 1985, 24; Banton 1983; Hechter 1986, 1987; Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan 1975). He argued that African political identities were constructed through historical process of colonial state formation (Mamdani 2001, 15).

In addition, Mamdani asserts that modern nation-state was construct by the colonizers as the first stage of their "civilization project" in Africa. Their intention was to govern Africans through western laws. For this reason, from its inception colonialism abrogated African culture and institutions and replaced them with those from western legal constituency. This is the process by which colonialism

institutionalizes and legalizes ethnic identity through promulgating law that encourages division among ethnic groups. Colonial laws set the basis of ‘we’ and ‘them’ in the process of interaction with others, which aggravated political violence that come to arouse hatred of ‘others’, an evil hostile to ‘us’. Hence western law inscribed political identity, it was the process where one would emerge either as native or a settler of the state. The western law also defines natives, their rights and privileges within the state through which one could understand either one was included or excluded from enjoying those special rights reserved only for the natives.

Mamdani takes the case of Rwandan genocide to demonstrate how colonial law produced ethnic identity as grounds for determining access to land and political power. He argued that Rwandan genocide was committed by a group styled by the colonizers as the ‘sons of soil’, which as a self-percept motivated this same group to perceive ‘others’ as a nuisance in their own land (Mamdani 2001, 14). He refers Rwandan genocide as:

...not a violence against one who is seen as a neighbor but against one who is seen as foreigner; not a violence that targets a transgression across a boundary into home but one that seeks to eliminate a foreign presence, from home soil, literally and physically.

He contended that Rwandan genocide could be seen as a ‘native’ genocide to completely remove the settlers from the land they regarded as their own. The Hutu challenged the presence of Tutsi not as neighbors but rather as ‘alien settlers’ who came to reap the fruits of the land that did not belong to them. Mamdani argued that Hutu and Tutsi emerged as native and settler respectively through historical momentum of modern colonization, creating citizenship crisis in the postcolonial state of Rwanda (Mamdani 2001, 14).

Following this colonial law’s legacy one can understand how Plateau’s political identities were constructed through colonial indirect rule in Nigeria. The people of Plateau state came to define themselves as indigenes and non-indigenes through the formation of colonial state and laws, which predicts who should be ‘in’ and who should be ‘out’. Therefore, indirect rule in Nigeria literally institutionalized discrimination among ethnic groups, which became both apparent and pronounced

once after Nigerian independence. As Mamdani concluded that “what horrifies our modernity is violence that appears senseless, that cannot be justified by progress.” (2007, 1).

2.2. Modernization and Identity Conflicts

Andreas Wimmer (2004, 4) in his book, explore the negative sides of political modernization, as he argued that modernization bred weak institutions that encourage group inclusion and exclusion along ethnic lines and this creates xenophobic relationship between/among ethnic groups that make-up the modern nation-states. He contended that ethnic identities are unavoidable synthesis of modernization that emerged out of the process of modern nation-states formation. Modernity is underlying by ethnic and nationalist ideologies. Wimmer categorically identifying three instances related to this phenomenon;

1. Ethnic identities (ethnic politics) and nationalists were certainly complementary to the process of modernization. State making, specifically in the global south, has always been based around ethnic/national ideals, which draws unbridgeable lines among and in between different identity groups.
2. The three concepts (i.e. citizenship, democracy, welfare) are components or elements of modern state, and they are harmoniously embedded in ethnic identities. This provides the situation according to which ethnic groups could easily be included or excluded. One’s share from the national wealth or access to political capital is determined according to one’s (ethnic) identity
3. Nationalists as state-makers in the third world helped build states within a setting that they inherited from their colonial pasts. They instead of challenging the inherited identity cleavages, and creating a form of social contract, try to convert them into tools of constructing a ‘nation’ state. As a result this weak statehood from the inception became a reason for an enduring and unforgiving power struggle among these rivaling identities. Hence, mistrust, hatred and ethnic violence are part and parcel of modern nation-state formation in Nigeria and elsewhere in third world.

The research maintained that someone could enjoy modern state's rights and privileges to the extent that one belongs to the privileged ethnic group. The fundamental principles of modernity—such as equality before the law, right to vote and be voted, state protection/security, social justice and so forth—are reserved only for those groups who are identified with the state's official identity. Political modernity as such has never bred the same outcomes as it is in the global north, whereby creating outcomes that even counter the very principle of modernity. Certain ethnic groups are deliberately excluded from the management of their political society, as aliens, in order to favor some others who are believed to convey 'native' identities. Consequently, those who were excluded by virtue of their ethnic identities always-already challenged the status quo of the so-called ethnic members of the nation, becoming a reason sufficient to sustain ethnic conflicts for much of the last century (Wimmer 2004, 1-4).

However, Craig Jenkins and Esther E. Gottlied (2007) were also influenced by George Simmel's classical modernization theory, according to which, the transformation of social structure in Western Europe during the 19th century was a result of transition from traditional to modern society. Such led to what he called an "organic society" (Durkheim 1933, 229) in which individuals are thought of as equal and, in the mean time, different according to their social functions (i.e. classes). As can be seen, European societies differed from a feudal past by the virtue of enmeshing people with different interests around the principle of 'functionality.' The argument is that traditional societies were rather organized around divine principles from which emerged an unfair and localized social system as opposed to Simmel's ideal modern society that is based on a simple division of labor and inter-group interaction among various identities. Jenkins followed this up stating that failure to achieve modernity in the South meant to be a parallel failure in creating organically organized societies in which one needs another in order to sustain his/her welfare. Jenkins and Gottlied called this as "interlocked conflict" that causes ethnic identity division. In contrast, modern societies facilitate higher social interactions among/between constituted different ethnic groups over a wide area. People with different ethnic and cultural background, yet, interact with one another with little or

no particularistic social relation. These societies encourage cooperation and non-violent conflicts (Jenkins and Gottfried 2004,7). To them, the reasons of ethnic animosities in the third world is firmly related to the historical absentee of constructing a truly modern society, rather being related to the emergence of modernity.

Their interpretation of traditional societies should not come to mean that they were more violent than a modern society. Rather than that, in such societies ethnic groups were concentrated and isolated from one another to such extent that disadvantageous or marginalized ethnic groups had other way, other than violent uprising, to challenge the existing social order. Because of this ultimate separation of identities, the oppressed groups were devoid of any other political tools around which to organize their opposition and fight for their rights. In traditional societies, this sort of strict social divisions were both appreciated and considered as norm, which ruled out what was otherwise only possible: identity intersections. Thus, whenever a perceived reason for conflict arrived, it almost always sufficed to turn into a violent one. Furthermore, violent conflict would be inescapable when the traditional societies begun to wither away as a result of emergence of modernization. Basing it on Simmel's analysis, Jenkins posits that "...the most vulnerable societies are transitional societies that moving from traditional to a modern division of labor" (Jenkins and Gottfried 2004, 7) This is because of the fact that modernization (i.e. democracy and rule of law) give the disadvantageous ethnic groups an opportunity to react against the existing social order. It is to say that economic or political centralization is offset by the emergence of a sphere in which individuals now enjoy a degree of autonomy from this 'leviathan' (Hobbes 1651).

Jenkins argued that history of conquest and colonization is another factor that contributed to ethnic identity division. David Held (2005) seemed to influence the debate, too, with his point of view that goes beyond modernization thesis, thereby exploring the impact of the current globalization on the ongoing identity conflicts. As Jenkins and Gottfried derive it from Held that "...globalization provides a useful complement of modernization..." (2004,12). According to this argument, political, technological, socio-cultural and economic integration shape and change the world,

which has become exogenous reasons of identity conflicts in our times. Economic globalization generates interdependence among different cultures and identities across the borders. The emergent pressures from international system towards deeper economic interpenetration often left even the most isolated national economies with no option but to accommodate the rights of previously alienated ethnic groups under the banner of human rights and democracy, which creates whole new ammunition for the continuance of identity conflicts.

Modern state as bedrock of Modernization facilitates national identity construction in the sense of creating an imagined image of self (nation) and other (surrounding world). What differentiate third world nations from that of the west is, the human material (social setting) they inherited from colonial era was already structured and handled: ethnicity had already been a vehicle within the political life. Thus, they 'had to' conform to this ethnic-based political climate when they were constructing national identity. Ethnic diversity was already a powerful impediment to creating a homogenous national identity. In the West, there were surely ethnic identities with a degree of self-consciousness. Yet, they were with few exceptions edible to be reconstructed towards conforming to the ideal of a unifying national identity.

The construction of national identity in the South culminated in creating a one single identity (i.e. nation) that mostly overlaps with one or few more previously dominant ethnic group. It inevitably resulted in the exclusion of formerly disfavored groups from the mainstream society, thus never ending cycles of domestic violence. In this sense, the nation-state making from the independence onwards, such as in Nigeria, came to forge the conditions for 'internal colonialism' because of the fact that a favored ethnic group now represent whole of the nation whereas others, excluded groups had to live under their sheer domination as 'outsiders'. It is interesting to see that colonialism from without has reproduced itself as colonialism from within in aftermath of the nominal independence in Nigeria and in other post-colonial spaces on earth. Therefore, transitional modernization creates violence rather than unity, particularly in non-western European states, most of ethnic groups in postcolonial and other non-western state failed to accommodate their differences

and live together in harmony as single nation-states.

Samuel P. Huntington (1973) in his works on modernization and political decay, describe modernization as a "...multifaceted process involving changes in all areas of human thought and activity". It involved political, economic and socio-cultural transformation of human society. Huntington, accordingly, identified the principle aspect of modernization as "urbanization, industrialization, secularization, democratization, education, media participation do not occur in haphazard and unrelated fashion" (1973, 32). He suggested that these principles historically never appeared separately: rather, they were going hand in hand in a fashion of mutual selectiveness. He viewed ethnic and religious identities as social forces whereas the modernization is the process that brought them into contact with one another within the boundaries of the same political unit (i.e. state). To him, modernization means, "...all groups, old as well as new, traditional as well as modern, become increasingly aware of themselves as groups and of their interests and claims in relation to other groups" (Huntington 1973, 37). As can be seen, this perception of modernity approximates Simmel's organic society approach as that both of them deem it as a process whereby formerly isolated segments become known to one another as components of the same political/economic reality.

The main challenge of modernization, Huntington comes to claim, has always been always-existed multiple identities, critically, within a one single modern state. Most of these groups, as explained above, were already strongly affiliated with their previous ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds, with a deep-seated habit of using these identities as instruments of seeking employment, capital and influence within the society. The foundation of nation-states, in this sense, did not break free from this political culture, but in fact awaken them to their full extent (37-38). They came even stronger than the colonial times because of the fact that they were given the chance of taking over the space once filled by colonial masters: independence often times created even more formidable causes for ethnic rivalry in Nigeria. Huntington argued that ethnic identity was a byproduct of modernization in Africa that emerged from western colonialism. Modernization undermined or destroyed African traditional societies to produce strong ethnic and group loyalty to such an extent that this new

loyalty now suggested economic/political strength to its members. He identified this version of ethnic consciousness as "...a response to modernization, a product of the very forces of change which colonial rule brought to Africa" (Huntington 1973, 30). He cited how Yoruba ethnic group (i.e. one of the three major ethnic groups in Nigeria) was created by modernization. He notes that the named 'Yoruba' as an ethnic group was first use by Anglican missionaries in the 19th century.

The development of identity consciousness became a stumbling block to creating and consolidating strong political institutions capable of containing various ethnic, cultural and religious groups. It is difficult to achieve unity in the state whereby different groups ardently pursue incompatible goals. Political institutions formed on the basis of fragmented ethnic and religious identities; the likelihood of identity conflict is high as Huntington (1973, 39) asserts that;

Ethnic or religious groups which had lived peacefully side by side in traditional society become aroused to violent conflict as a result of the interaction, the tensions, the inequalities generated by social and economic modernization. Modernization thus increases conflict among traditional groups, between traditional groups and modern ones, and among modern groups

Huntington like Jerkins, believe that transition from traditional society to modern society produce identity conflict. They share the same view that the early phase of modernization facilitates ethnic consciousness and violent conflict.

Donald L. Horowitz (1985) asserts that the main problem facing developing world today is the issue of modernization particularly the process of changes from traditional to modernity. Harowitz reiterates three ways whereby modernization could be studied in relation to ethnic identity conflict. The first is to perceive ethnic identity conflict as a historical artifact that survived from an earlier time but is now outmoded through the process of modernization. A second way is to study it as a tradition that became impediment to modernization and, as third, ethnic identity conflict could be labeled as an unavoidable byproduct of modernization itself (Horowitz 1985, 96). As is seen, all these positions are equally plausible perceptions of modernization-ethnic conflict relationship with each of them might be supported with case studies. The key point is that the definition of modernity is key to taking

either one of these approaches as valid. Modernization produces intense ethnic enmity to the extent that it means the centralization of state bureaucracy, educational system and military. Or, much the same token, modernization as a way of improving economic sub-structure and/or bringing a more libertarian political system is exogenous to ethnic conflicts, which originated from far-off times.

He argued that society members who acquire western education (education elites), organized military forces and urban population were expected to be detribalizing people in the society, due to their modern experience but unfortunately they appear to be at the forefront of ethnic conflict. A tenacious grip to ethnic affiliation makes it easier for identity conflicts to survive and hardly disappear. Even the educated elites and armies in the developing countries were highly divided along various ethnic groups and this creates tension and mistrust among them that might drag the whole country into ethnic violence (Horowitz 1985, 97).

Horowitz contended that the increase of ethnic consciousness in western countries exhibit that ethnic conflict could not be minimized to merely demise of traditional society hence western countries has already passed the stage of traditionalism. He maintain that ethnic conflict resulted from the traditional and deep-seated ethnic hatred that hardly overtaken by modernization. Therefore, ethnic consciousness could be identified even among the modern states and modern elites. The natural consequences of ethnic conflict are more of traditional origin than modernity. However, some ethnic conflicts did not re-emerge from obstinate hostility but rather newly created through the process of modernity. Ethnic groups are not necessarily traditional, let alone having traditional enemies among themselves, this is due to the fact that many ethnic groups particularly in Africa get into contact with one another during colonial era (Horowitz 1985, 97-98). For this reason, not ethnicity, but ethnic conflict can be explained as a modern phenomenon. The degree to which it engendered in Nigeria, visibly sharper than in Western locales, is on the other hand explicable to the fact colonialism actually reinforced them as legitimate/acceptable instruments for obtaining state posts or ownership of lands.

The literature explains another version of argument developed by Karl W.

Deutsch (1961) that “social mobilization” was related to ethnic conflict. That social mobilization viewed as “an overall process of change, which happen to substantial parts of the population in countries which are moving from traditional to modern ways of life” (Deutsch 1961). Social mobilization generates ethnic competition particularly in process of modern politics. Following Deutsch assertion, Harowitz (1985, 100) quoted that:

...commitment to traditional ways of living...ethnic conflict is the product of something analogous to a race between rate of social mobilization and rates of assimilation. The proportion of mobilized but unassimilated persons is “the first crude indicator” of ethnic conflict.

The desire to benefit from the modern political and economic sector induced political elites to seek compliance from their various ethnic groups “to advance their position in the competition for the benefits of modernity”. To Paraphrased Roberts H. Bates (1974, 471) that:

Ethnic groups persist largely because of their capacity to extract goods and services from the modern sector and thereby satisfy the demands of their members for the components of modernity, insofar as they provide these benefits to their members, they are able to gain their support and achieve their loyalty.

The perception of the people can easily change insofar they are mobilize toward achieving modernizing economy.it was identifying that people engaged into violent conflict not because they are not the same but rather through perusing the same goal. This is the process where modernization can generate ethnic conflict. Furthermore, unequal distribution of modernization benefits (i.e. economic and political) also creates resentment among ethnic groups (Harowitz 1985, 102).

2.3. Colonialism, Nation-building and Ethnic Conflict

Peter Batchelor, Kees Kingma and Guy lamb (2004) clarified the distinction among the three key concepts; state, state-formation and nation-building. State here

is defined as “...a territorial space, an idea, a set of public institutions, collection of political elites; (which) divided into parts, has policies or instruments on how to react to, or change the world around it”⁸ (Batchelor et al. 2004, 115). Conversely, state-formation is framed as the “...process by which the institutions and instruments of the state are established, maintained and developed overtime” (2004, 115). However, nation-building is described as a “...process by which a common or shared identity as a nation (as opposed to a state) is established, maintained and developed overtime, through shared or common history, symbol, ideology, language and borders” (2004, 115).

Nation building in Africa was described as a colonial process. It was replication of European model applied to newly African states without consideration of the diverse ethnic, religious and cultural background of the African people. Most of the nation-states in Africa were artificially created without common cultural and historical experience. Colonialism has been intertwined in the development of the state and nation in Africa (137). Similarly, Jon Orman (2008) asserts that most colonial states is comprised of multi-ethnic and multi-lingual groups, some states encompasses hundreds of different languages. Due to the fact that boundaries of postcolonial states reflecting colonial sphere of influence not the actual borders of those different cultural or religious groups in Africa, this create nation-building crisis. Hence most of African people for the first time came into contact with other groups they did not have any historical or cultural affiliation. Also, some found themselves along side with a group of people with whom they had a deep-seated historical animosity and intense conflicts. These volatile combinations make the process of nation building difficult. National identity became mirage hence people kept identifying themselves not with their nation but rather with their individual ethnic or linguistic groups (Orman 2008, 55).

It was argued that European model of nation-state was inconsiderably repeats in African colonies without foresight of the negative consequences. Orman noted that even the nation-building in Europe undergone certain problems, it took several centuries before most of the European population integrate and assimilate into their

⁸ Original quote by, seegers 1996

respective national state system. Conversely, nation building in Africa began in the 1960s during the de-colonization period. Therefore, African national-identities are relatively new constructs by colonial masters designed to force Africans into a European pattern of national identity that somewhat sustains the nation-building process (Orman 2008, 56).

Orman posits that the problem-facing nation building in Africa was not ethnic, cultural or religious diversities but rather the inability to forge into the unifying national identities created by former colonial masters. This produced conflicting interests from various ethnic and religious groups in the state. Incompatible demands or interests have been always the bedrock of violent conflict in multi-ethnic society. The irony was that social peace could only be achieved through recognition of diverse ethnic groups interests, and this would not generate and sustain unifying shared national identity.

...in most poly-ethnic state, some degree of supra-ethnic symbolism is required if only to avoid riot and unrest. To depict the nation as identical with a 'mosaic of ethnic groups' could, at the same time, threaten to undermine the project of nation-building since it focuses on differences instead of similarities (Orman 2008, 56; Eriksen 2002).

Therefore, the national identity could not be sustained through recognition of individual or group interests. National interest must overshadow all other interests in the process of nation-building. Unfortunately, the current African nations arise from various cultures and ethnic groups, which makes it difficult for them to assimilate or rather, integrate into the unifying nation-state system, created by colonialism. Consequently, the postcolonial states' identities were highly fragmented and heterogeneous that hardly produces a common sense of national identity.

Ali A. Mazrui and Christopher Vondji (1993) refer to nation-building as a multi-dimensional process. Nation-building and state-building are somehow complementary parts, according to which the members of the nation unanimously accept and recognize the central government as the symbol of their authority (Mazrui and Vondji 1993, 439). It was not the state that matters but the willingness of the people to accept and recognize it as a symbol of their political representation.

Acceptability of shared national identity serves as a bedrock of nation-building. Mazrui (1993, 439) noted that nation-building:

...involves the acceptance of other members of the civic body as equal fellow-members of a 'corporate' nation recognition of the rights of other members to share a common history, resources, values and other aspect of the state buttressed by a sense of belonging to one political community.

The members of a society need to have a common feeling toward their nation and be ready to share the prospect and the challenges that may occur in the process of nation-building. They continued that "nation-building is the widespread acceptance of the process of state-building; it is the creation of a political community that gives a fuller meaning to the life of the state" (Mazrui (1993, 439). However, the nation-building in Africa started at a relatively late date, and most of the population in the postcolonial provinces in Africa did not share common belief, values, cultures and religion, and this made it difficult for them to create a significant political culture.

African independence is accompanied by multiple problems descending from colonialism. Against all odds traditional leadership survived colonialism and that negatively influenced the nation-building process, hence the population continued to be recognized the respective leadership of their various traditional authorities. However, on the eve of independence, colonialists encouraged multi-party system so as to create division among the African nationalist aspirant for self-government. Therefore, multi-party democracy along side the parliamentary system of government was bequeathed to postcolonial states. In addition, European law and judicial system were imposed to African people. Most of these European models of democracy and laws were not convenient with African culture and way of life (Mazrui, 1993, 444-445).

Colonizers organized that western education was the only way to get access to modern sector. This process helped create new African elites who once participated in colonial bureaucracies. The institutions built by colonial masters continued unabated. Furthermore, the form of government bequeathed by colonial masters was problematic. In Nigeria British colonizers left behind 'federalism' as their legacy,

despite the fact that Britain was practicing unitary system of government in spite of its diverse cultures (Mazrui 1993, 445). It was observed that federal system of government has great negative consequences in African pluralist societies because it usually amalgamates different ethnic, cultural and religious groups into a single entity without their consent.

Stephen M. Caliendo and Charlton D. Mcllwain (2011) observed that, there was a general view among most of political scientists, historians and anthropologists that “African ethnicity” was a modern construction through the historical development of colonialism. Diverse African population was categorized and defined based on ethnicity; ethnic group became the symbol of social units and identification during colonial rule. Caliendo maintained that African people were living peacefully with their neighbors, sometimes with minor conflicts but the 1884-1885 Berlin conference brought Europeans into African land; this single process destroyed the previous peaceful co-existing among the African population. Colonizers rearranged African groups without consideration of their social and cultural background. For this reason, some groups were cut-up and merged with another whose were entirely different from one another. Through this process the three major ethnic groups (Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba) along side some other hundreds of minority groups were merged together and created Nigeria. This petitioned of Africa by Europeans was identified as “birth of modern African ethnicity” (Caliendo and Mcllwain 2011, 30-31).

Concomitantly, this process was viewed as the genesis of African conflicts, thus; “... it would not be an exaggeration to say that virtually every postcolonial conflict in Africa has its root in the ethnic identities cultivated during European colonization” (Caliendo 2011, 31). The theme cited Rwandan genocide to substantiate the argument that, colonizers induced ethnic division that produced ethnic antagonism between Hutu and Tutsi. Belgium colonizers ‘formally’ and ‘legally’ classified these two groups. Here, ethnicity had been politicized and this culminates into 1994 Rwandan genocide. Stephen Kinzer (2008) gave impressive statement about this horrible incident as that “...no aspect of colonial policy was more devastating to Rwanda than creating the myth that one group was indigenous while the other was a foreign presence”.

Furthermore, colonial administration systematically created strong institutions and structures through which social, economic and political interaction had been effectively governed. These institutions and structures mold and shaped African identities and creating division among the groups. They argued that British colonizers used those structures to facilitate internal ethnic division so as to divert the attention of the African colonies from rebelling against colonial power. The structures facilitated bitter political competition among ethnic groups that produced more ethnic conflicts in postcolonial states.

Emmy Irobi (2013) had similar view, that colonizers out of self-enrichment setup structures in Africa, believing that it would continue serving their economic interest. Western colonizers created, rearranged and even induced ethnic groups into engage with ethnic competition with one another to defend their respective interests. That was how colonizers sown the seed of discord among the African groups. Like Caliendo and McIlwain, Irobi identified how colonial masters arbitrarily curved out artificial borders, thereby construction fake identities among African groups that later becoming the genesis of postcolonial conflict in Africa (15-16). In his comparative analysis between Nigeria and South Africa, Irobi concluded that ethnic conflict appears to be so strong to the extent that any attempt to eliminate or reduce it, proved no positive result. Irobi (2005, 1) observed:

Politicized ethnicity has been detrimental to national unity and socio-economic well being. It is important to note that most of these ethnic conflicts were caused by colonialism, which compounded inter-ethnic conflict by capitalizing on the isolation of ethnic groups. The divide-and-conquer method was used to pit ethnicities against each other, thus keeping the people from rising up against the colonizers.

He maintained that unequal economic resource distribution in favor of one ethnic group, created by the colonial structures facilitated ethnic mobilization to the detriment of disadvantageous or marginalized groups. In Nigeria British divide and rule was used to categorize Nigerian population thereby denied equal political and social amenities to them, one group was favored against another. For this reason, economic factor became the bedrock of multi-ethnic conflict in Nigeria. Ethnic

groups engaged in bitter competition for securing jobs, education, land ownership, political participation, army forces etc. However, colonial laws also encourage resident segregation to the extent that one group of people hardly got land outside their own region or the region of another group. Non-indigene areas were created for a group of people who reside in the region or state other than their own. This situation creates suspension, hatred and prejudices among ethnic groups in Nigeria.

Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh and Vill Kymlicka (2004) argued that the undemocratic and highly authoritarian institutions established by colonial states in Africa generate divisions and fragmentation among the African groups and this make it difficult to achieve national unity. Colonialism invented ethnic groups and dragged them into competition over material benefits. Berman et al. (2004, 45) vividly stated that:

...colonial legacy of bureaucratic authoritarianism, pervasive patron-client relation and a complex ethnic dialectic of assimilation, fragmentation and competition has produced contained and divided communities of trust based on particularistic and personalistic linkages that undermined the functioning of universalistic institutions...

This struggle intensified African ethnic identities and ethnic consciousness. Hence, ethnic identity was systematically fixed to be the basis where people gain access to material recourses. For this reason, African population began to split into a number of well-defined categories. There was group-solidarity across the boundaries of ethnic or cultural groups. In this respect, ethnic identities became stumbling block for democratic consolidation and nation-building in postcolonial states.

It can be concluded that ethnic identities have been constructed dynamically as a result of African encounter with Western modernity and its institutions during both the colonial era, through the actions and choices made by colonizers to build on and use them in their administration of territories and also, in the postcolonial era in which they have become means of accessing to state resources. Consequently, ethnic identities continue to be constructed and exploited in the new dynamics of pluralism in Africa as a powerful tool for mobilizing populations to gain economic benefit.

2.4. Colonialism and Land Ownership

Sam Moyo (2008) observed that the incidence of growing conflicts over land ownership could be understood by exploring pre-colonial land tenure system and the changes it went through during colonial rule. To him, “land tenure consist of the social relations established around the control and use of land...” (58). It was a law related to the land use and land acquisition. Moyo (2008, 58) continued,

...land tenure system and their sets of tenure relations are interwoven and related to other societal structures and institutions, including economic as well as family structures, with their marriage and inheritance practices.

In most of the post-independent African countries the dispute over citizenship was embedded in relation to land ownership. To analyze how citizenship contest entangle with land ownership, one has to thoroughly understand the complex and controversial colonial land policies, and most importantly the social, political and economic impacts of those policies to the colonized population. The era of colonialism witnessed dramatic replacement of the pre-colonial land laws with the western laws (land tenure reforms).

Following Cheater’s (1988) argument, Moyo asserts that, “...colonial powers initiated and nurtured the notion of customary tenure with three key distortions.” Thus; it first came with the idea of community rights which was inconsistent with the notion of individual rights, second, the customary authority responsible for allocating land for household was used deliberately to combine religious authority with ownership rights, third, which he regarded as the most destructive one, was the identification of community with blood ties, common culture or language, which meant that all migrants who could not be identified with one of the groups reside in the land would definitely be viewed as a stranger/non-indigene and therefore has no traditional rights to land. Another feature of colonial land laws was that it “...defined land as a superimposed statutory and private value on prior land tenure system” (58). In this context, British colonizers in Nigeria promulgated native rights decree in 1927 that gave colonial governor-general leverage to grant customary

rights of land occupancy to the native populations and at the same time to confer statutory right on non-natives and foreigners. Here, colonizers viewed land as a customary ownership so as to tighten the control of the colonial traditional authorities on the natives (Moyo 2008, 59). Lands ownership bestowed on traditional authorities, except in some certain circumstances like ‘freehold’ or ‘leasehold’ lands. This line drawn for the native obstructed other people from possessing land somewhere else.

The post-colonial African states found themselves ensnared by a mixed set of colonial laws and customary practices. However, the livelihood of the people depend on having land accessibility, and therefore any attempt to prevent people from such basic needs may lead to conflict as witnessed in Plateau and some other part of Africa.

Victor Turner (1997) argued that most of African societies came to know and use the concept of land ownership during colonial rule. Colonialism changed the perception of how African people viewed and used lands in pre-colonial era. Before the advent European colonizers, majority of African communities had hardly a grip on land but rather use it when the need arouse (i.e. for farming, ritual activities etc.). Colonial rule initiated European notion of land tenure system in African colonies, which was regarded as a modern legal system and expected to be generally applicable. This incident precipitated the use of land right in African continent that covered the concept of proprietary ownership (possession or holding of the land). Paraphrasing Bohannan (1963), Turner (1971, 198) asserts that;

...‘land tenure’ in speaking of African system of land use, on the grounds that the term is based on the European idea that land is something that can be measured, plotted and subdivided into units which become ‘things’ in themselves and subject to rights assigned to holders.

The ownership rights also assumed that if it was apparent that a particular land belongs to no one then it is considered as being the property of the political unit of the indigenous people of the area.

These changes affected not only the relationship between people and lands but

also the way people relate to one another in the societies. Acquisition of land by groups and individuals generated rapid changes in market economy, urbanization, mobility, modern way of farming and industrialization. This situation still renders people dependent on land, more than ever before, which resulted in a pattern of estranged and even hostile social relationships among people hence the colonial state emphasized on property right more than the social values. For this reason, one could be an owner of land in a particular community without being a citizen. It changed the previous pre-colonial settlement whereby the early 'settlers' hardly distinguished from the 'latecomers'. The official search for entire land possession encouraged the system of communal land tenure in which the land became the property of the community members (Turner 1971, 211-212). Kenneth Omeje and Tricia R. Hepner (2013) like Tuner, also posits that colonialism drastically altered African system of land tenure and, thereby, unevenly dislocating the population density across the country, land use and even the structure of African populations. They noted that the extensive movement, population displacement and rearrangement of the colonies negatively affected the access to land and inter-group relations (27).

Land question or contest over land ownership shaped ethnic identities, counterpoising indigenes and settlers against one another. Colonialism brought together different ethnic, cultural and religious groups into a single entity. Consequently, land ownership and ethnicity became the fundamental factor reinforcing political identity in poly-ethnic regions of Nigeria. Indigeneity is thought to be fixated to the land, to the extent that only those who were identified as the 'sons of the soil' could enjoy the political, economic and social rights of the land. It became a process in which one could justifiably exclude some others on the basis of its virtual attachment to the land. Those who were migrated for one reason or another from another place now had no recourse to the legal framework of Nigeria as it only acknowledged the 'settled' as truly citizens. This political ramification of 'insider' and 'outsider' precipitate violent conflicts as we could witness in Plateau.

CHAPTER FOUR

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

4.1. Historical Background of The Conflicts

Historical background of the conflicts could be traced back to 1914 when the Northern and the Southern protectorates were amalgamated within a single geographic mass called as the colony of Lagos. With that happened, multiple multi-ethnic political entities became incorporated into a single political unit. The name 'Nigeria' was given by Flora Show, who was the editor of Time of London magazine and later married to Lord Frederick Lugard (first Nigerian colonial governor). Such fabrication of the name of geographic definition constructed Nigeria as one of a British invention that is devoid of collective identity and indigenous roots. The final outcome became a nation-state with no less than 400 different ethnic groups, each having its own distinct language. Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba considered the largest ethnic groups in the country, while the rest have been regarded as minority ethnic groups. The said complex cultural, religious and ethnic identities now forced into residing side-by-side under one, again externally and arbitrarily designated identity, has insinuated enduring conflicts into the social fabric of the country, creating one of the most deeply divided states in Africa (Campbell 2011,1-2; Osaghae and Suberu 2005). According to 2013 world population data, Nigerian population was in the neighborhood of 173.6 million living in 36 states (divided into 774 local governments) with a total of area more expansive than 900,000 sq. km. The country endowed with abundant natural resources such as gas, petroleum and other untapped resources, making it the largest oil producer in the continent and the sixth largest oil-exporting nation in the OPEC.⁹ The incessant conflicts that engulfed the country could not be separated from these just elaborated artificial boundaries and the institutional structures, all formed under the aegis of the colonial administrations.

⁹ See, African Development Bank, African Economic Outlook, Tunis, 2012. Cf. The International Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Board Concludes 2011 Article IV Consultation With Nigeria, Washington DC, 28 February 2012.

The Niger and Benue rivers divide the country into two jurisdictional zones as Northern savannah and the Southern forest zones. The center where the two rivers meet is commonly referred to as “Middle belt”¹⁰ (Falola and Genova 2009, 227) and it is the most polyglot region in Nigeria. It also constitutes the central place that demarcates the country’s religious fault-lines: The most populous Muslim region of the North ends at this central zone whereupon starts the highly Christian region of the South. Consequently, the region consists largest area of mixed ethnic and religious groups, combined together with groups associating themselves with the North and South. According to Leonard Karshima Shilgba:

...it is generally acceptable to many scholars from the region that the Middle Belt federation consists of people in the present Benue, Nassarawa, Taraba, Adamawa, Plateau, Southern Kebbi, Kogi, Kwara, Niger, Southern Kaduna, FCT, Southern Gombe, and the two minority local government areas of Tafawa Balewa and Bogoro in southern Bauchi State (News Rescue 2012).

¹⁰ Concept of the Middle Belt emerged during the 1940s, when the United Middle Belt Congress was formed as a political party in opposition to the dominant Northern People Congress (NPC)

Map.1. Nigeria: divided by Benue and Niger rivers.




Source: Cruise Nigeria. 2012

The region is equally representing the homelands of three quarters of Nigerian ethnic groups, exhibiting different religion and cultural groups. Such heterogeneity is obviously what makes it an incredibly volatile and conflictual area. Plateau state is one of the most diverse Nigerian states springing from the middle belt, with more than 58 ethnic groups. However, The Nigerian states are grouped into six geopolitical zones based on geopolitical considerations: North-East (NE), North-West (NW), North-Central (NC), South-West (SW), South-East (SE) and South-South (SS). Under this division Plateau state emerge as one of the North-central zone states, other North-central states consisted Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nassarawa, Niger and Federal capital territory (Abuja). During the era of colonialism, these states were part of

Northern region with Kaduna state as their capital. For this reason many people now consider Plateau as part of the North (Jana Krause 2011, 17).

Map.2. Nigeria: Middle Belt



Source: News Recue 2012. The imagevoice.com

Jos was once the capital of Plateau state, established in 1915¹¹ even before Nigerian independence (Jana Krause 2011, 19). The town was originally founded in order to enhance British colonial exploitation and control, specifically for the reason of improving the conditions of resource extraction in and around the tin mines, which was vastly available in this town. During colonialism Nigeria emerged as the sixth largest tin producer in the world because of the highest tin supply from Jos-Plateau

¹¹ There were different views concerning when the city was established, some said it was 1904 see, divide and Dominate; Conflicts as a Legacy of British Colonial Policy of Transformation in Jos. By Ibrahim Khaleel Abdussalam, Department of History Bayero University, Kano. Also, Sliding Towards Armageddon: Revisiting Ethno-Religious Crises in Nigeria. By Gwamna Dogara Je'adayibe and Amango Kudu A. argued that the city was built in 1902.

tin mining. As a result, more than 200 mining camps had been established by the mid-1940s in the Jos-Plateau and the miner population exceeded to a total of 40,000, comprising people mostly originating from different other parts of the country to find job in the mines or colonial administration (Dung-Gwom and Rikko, 2009, p. 6). Whereas the Hausa-Fulani constituted the most numerous ethnic group, a significant numbers of Igbo, Yoruba and some other members of smaller ethnic groups also migrated to Plateau for seeking employment in these mine fields during the same period. Additionally, those who had received a Western education from the southern part of Nigeria served within the colonial administration (Plotnicov 1967, 36).

Shadrach G. Best asserts that Hausa-Fulani ethnic group single-handedly founded Jos and transformed it into a modern city. He maintained that Hausa-Fulani were the major workers of tin mining whom accompanied by traders, butchers and Quran teachers (2007, 24). Other ethnic group of Plateau who were living at the outskirts of Jos, such as Ngas, Ron, Mpun and Mwaghavul came into the city for business transactions or to work at the mining industry (Best 2007, 25). However, there already existed small villages or settlements, built on the outskirts of the Jos, populated by some minor ethnic groups such as Afizere or Jarawa, long before the mining fields magnetically attracted a voluminous flow of immigrants to the region. This lucidly exhibits that all ethnic groups currently living in Jos (including those claimed to be an indigenous groups of Plateau) actually, emigrated from other places (Dorman 1978, 6). Anthony D. Bingel, as opposed to this generally held perceptive, opined that Jos was built on the settlements of Naraguta and Guash from which Berom, Anaguta and Afizere emerged as the indigenous group of the town (1978, 2).

Colonialists, consequently, transformed the town into an important city where they could coordinate and manage their political and economic institutions. And, a major part of all these transformation of this area into place for resource extraction was also part of another process that radically recomposed the ethnic profile of Jos. Yet, despite such diverse ethnic social structure of the city, peace has prevailed even after the independence of the country from the indirect British rule. However, this peaceful discourse should not come to mean that the ethnic tension was not stoking slowly but surely in the overall embodiment of Jos. Recently, the state entangled into

lethal religious and ethnic clashes that plunge the country into great danger and insecurity. Plateau is one of the Nigerian state became embroiled in violent conflict between two disputed groups over claimed of land ownership. The conflict developed as a deeply rooted conception of mutual hatred among the groups and this threatens the peaceful co-existence in the state in particular and Nigeria in general. Before the out-break of peace in 2001 the town was regard as the peaceful city as it was called 'Home of peace and tourism' (This is the official state motto).

In 1967 Nigerian structure changed from the initial regional government into one of a state system. 12 states were created in which Benue-plateau became one of the states within a larger federation and, in 1976; Plateau state was carved out of Benue-Plateau. Furthermore, Nassarawa state was created out of Plateau state in 1996, and that significantly reduced the population of Plateau state.¹² Presently, the major ethnic groups in Plateau are the Berom, the Anaguta, the Afizere, the Igbo, the Yoruba, and the Hausa–Fulani among others (Best 2007, 4).¹³ The Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere as predominantly Christian tribes are stereotyped as indigenous groups in Plateau. On the other hand, owing to their long residence in Jos-Plateau, many Hausa–Fulani in the city refer to themselves as Jasawa (people of Jos). The name is meant to distinguish them from the Hausa–Fulani population that reside in the states farther to the north. The term Jasawa is also used for political representation of the Hausa in Plateau state.¹⁴ The Fulani have mostly remained cattle herders and their grazing routes often take them beyond Plateau State. The majority of the population in Plateau State is Christians, although accurate religious breakdowns are lacking (HRW 2001, 5). Muslim Hausa–Fulani constitute the majority within the center of Plateau metropolitan (Jos).

Furthermore, under British colonial rule, Jos was divided into two (township and native town): the township, reserved mainly for Europeans, other foreigners and educated southerners who were working under colonial administration. Whereas the Native town occupied by mainly Hausa-Fulani mineworkers along side the other

¹² For a comprehensive overview on the history of Nigerian federalism in general, and of Plateau State in particular, see Suberu (2001, pp. 91, 102).

¹³ Other, larger indigene ethnic groups on the Plateau include the Ngas, Goemai, and Tarok.

¹⁴ Other Hausa groups in northern states have their own designations, such as the Kanawa in Kano. The author thanks Adam Higazi for pointing this out.

ethnic groups emigrated from the southern part of the country. The colonial indirect rule from the onset relied on Hausa-Fulani traditional authority structures to govern the people of Plateau. Subsequently, the traditional authority was transferred to the allegedly 'Native' ethnic group of the Plateau (i.e. Berom). In other word, The Hausa-Fulani had been the pace-setting and dominant group in Jos from 1914 to circa 1948 until the colonial administration's final decision of transferring the traditional power to the so-called 'native people'. The Hausa-Fulani traditional leadership (Sarkin Jos) was relegated to *Magajin Gari* (District head) and subsequently dismantled to be replaced with the *Gbong Gwom Jos*¹⁵ under the leadership of Berom (Krause 2011, 20-21). As it was argued in the historical document of Benue-Plateau (This is Jos) that:

...it was not until 1951 after innumerable agitations (instigated and decided by the colonial masters) that the status of Chief of Jos was reduced to Magajin Garin Jos and the area (was maneuvered to) become known as Berom Native Authority and later changed to Jos Native Authority in 1954 (because many districts out of Jos division were not Berom speaking areas). That was when Chief of Beroms became the Chief of Jos...(Information division 1987, 50).

That was the time when Berom started challenging Hausa dominance and claimed ownership of Jos after about 50 years of Hausa leadership¹⁶. Hence colonialists identified Berom as the owners of the land in order to create discord among the groups (i.e. Berom and Hausa-Fulani) so as to have auspicious condition for economic exploitation. Berom, becoming one of the largest ethnic groups, vehemently defended their 'ownership' rights over Plateau state along side the other (allied) minor ethnic groups against, and thereby excluding, the Hausa-Fulani whom they regarded as the 'settlers' of Plateau.

The situation has resulted in an intense ethnic rivalry between Hausa-Fulani 'settlers' and other groups now favorably stereotyped as indigenous people of

¹⁵ He was initially called Sarkin Berom but the demised of the last Hausa leader Isyaku in 1948, the Sarkin Beron started answering Sarkin Jos not Sarkin Berom. That was how the Hausa leadership diminished and Berom authority ascended.

¹⁶ See, The Foundation of Jos; who were the First Settlers. Africa News Rescue July 24th 2012 <http://newsrescue.com/foundation-jos-settlers/#axzz2qdeNEB8P>

Plateau (Krause 2011, 10). Plotnicov (1967) argued that colonial masters realized that Jos “with its polyglot population must always be considered a potential trouble spot” (42). The Berom supported by Anaguta, and Afizere argued that the city was established on land that belonged to them as the native people of the Plateau. The Hausa–Fulani contest this claim and hold that the city was established on ‘virgin land’ that belonged to nobody (Best 2007, 17). Indeed, Jos-Plateau was originally founded as an extension of the tin mining, and the Hausa-Fulani constituted the most populous ethnic groups that worked at the mine industry. Whereas, the other groups (Berom, Anaguta and Afizere) whom initially resided at the outskirts of Jos were mostly farmers with little interest in tin mining. This settler/indigene problem more than any other one has posed a severe dilemma on the contemporary Nigerian state. Danfulani and Fwatshak (2002, 245) eloquently argued that:

...the ownership of Jos town is hotly contested among the three main indigenous ethnic groups (the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere) whose traditional land meets on an unmarked borderline in Jos town, on the other hand, and the descendants of Hausa-Fulani settlers who initially settled in Jos as traders and tin miners, today known as the Jasawa (a Hausanised term for Jos)...

The series of migration to Jos by different ethnic groups in the early commencement of tin mining industry making the entire population to be immigrant. Okwudiba Nnoli contended that the high migration of people from rural to urban area during colonialism was one of the major cradles of ethnicity (1987, 65-66). Not even the self-assertion ‘owner of the land’ could be unanimously accepted as an indigene of Jos. As Plotnicov puts it, “...geographically and culturally, almost everyone is a stranger in Jos” (1967, 4 & 61). He further argued that, “...the extreme heterogeneity of Jos reflects the variety of peoples of Nigeria, of whom almost all are represented” (1967, 61). In the same vein, S.U. Fwatshaks (2005/2006, 122) posits that;

...indigene-settler divide has no basis in history...mankind has a common ancestry. They customize this general theory of common origin of man to the peoples of Plateau state by reconstructing the origins of the peoples mainly from the point of view of migrations...all ethnic nationalities in the state and indeed the whole of Nigeria are products of

migration, and that all were formed within the past few centuries.

Bala Usman, Shaba Jimada and Barira Mohammed (2004), too, emphasize the absence of a nativity in the Plateau state, drawing attention to that,

...all the ethnic groups in Plateau State are settlers, in many cases relatively recent settlers; settling in the last few centuries, on the Plateau, with their places of origin, largely, identifiable...historical documents have brought out clearly, how through migration and settlements, various ethnic groups have been transformed and intermeshed to shape the various tribes that today inhabit the state (7-8).

Historical records about the origins of the Berom only substantiate these remarks. Accordingly, The Berom were emigrated from Rom in Lere (currently Bauchi state) to Plateau, where they settled at Riyan and then disperse to other areas such as Machi, Afang, Assob, Rim, Jal Kuru, Ron Gyel, Zawan, Heipwang and Foron, which became southern part of Jos.¹⁷ According to another version of explanation Berom¹⁸ was originally emigrated from the forest around Wukari (Taraba state) (Usman et al. 2004, 7-8; News Rescue, 2012); whereas Hausa-Fulani¹⁹ originated from Gwarzo (Kano state). Usman and others argued that Hausas' place of origin is rather Gwarzo in Kano State. Usman (2004) concluded that, "...while the Hausa group in Kwande were Gwandara migrants," descending from Kano around the 17th Century, such date, he asserts, is far "earlier than many other Plateau tribes" (7-8). Before 1926 there was no one single resident of Berom in Jos town (News rescue 2012). For this reason, colonialism was identified as the major factor that brought division among the Jos population. Plotnicov concurs: "...had the British not arrived these people

¹⁷ AHAK: SNP 1/38/307. Memorandum. No 283/1934/117. For more detail of the origin and spread of the Berom, and the area they inhabit, see C.G.Ames, (1934), Gazetteer of The Plateau Province (Nigeria). Jos Native Administration. Republished with prefatory note by A.H.M. Kirk-Greene (1972), as Gazetteers of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria. Vol. IV (The Highland Chieftainces). London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd. Pp. 61-76


¹⁸ Formerly called Burrum.

¹⁹ Hausa-Fulani were initially two separate ethnic groups (Hausa and Fulani) whom united and indivisibly becoming one through intermarriages and the bond of Islam, which they share together. This process made Fulani to lost their culture and herdsman-ship in favor of the Hausa culture. In fact Fulani who were descended of Usman Ibn Fodiyo (who fought an Islamic Jihad in most of Hausa land and other part of Nigeria) got a political influence in the Hausa land. In fact, while the Fulani conquered the Hausa politically, the Hausa conquered the Fulani culturally. This is because the Fulani rulers have adopted the Hausa culture, language, mode of dressing and system of administration.

would have evolved some... administration for themselves...” (Plateau Provincial Annual Report 1921). Colonial masters empowered one ethnic group against another and/or identified one group as natives and others as aliens. Plotnicov (1967) continued with pinpointing “...this unholy marriage of convenience,” as what he considers “...as the collaboration of the colonists and Beroms...[which is]...motivated by the desire to control the mining filed in the area (i.e. divide and rule)” (1967, 65).


Also, Jos-Plateau became volatile an area due to the fact that over a long period of time it has been the headquarters of several Christian and Islamic organizations. It has been a vital center of missionaries, which consisted Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN), Evangelical Church of West Africa (ECWA), Sudan Interior Mission (SIM), Fellowship of Christian Students (FCS), and Nigerian Fellowship of Evangelical Students (NIFES) among others. Jos-Plateau, in the mean time, hosts the national headquarters of the Jama’atu Izalatu Bidiah Ikamatu Sunna (JIBWIS). This partly explains as to why, and how, the Plateau conflict more often than not taken religious dimension (Higazi, 2011, 6).

MAP.3:Jos



Source: Jana Krause, A Deadly Cycle: Ethno-Religious Conflict in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria(Geneva, 2011).Jillian Luff, MAPgrafix/Geneva Declaration Secretariat.

MAP. 4. Plateau State Nigeria.



Source: Jana Krause, A Deadly Cycle: Ethno-Religious Conflict in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria (Geneva, 2011) Jillian Luff, MAPgrafix/Geneva Declaration Secretariat.

4.2. Periods of Conflicts in Plateau State

The demise of military rule in 1999 ushered in a new era for democratically elected government to steer the course of the Nigerian people. This situation provided an opportunity for ethnic groups to renegotiate their claims, which were

previously superseded, or better-said set aside, by the military regime. Unfortunately this new phase culminated in a first long-standing tension, hatred only subsequently to escalate into a violent ethno-religious conflict that pervaded the country. It is the same era wherein the Plateau state, “...began to be threatened by intolerance, tension, and mutual suspicion...” (Imo 2001, 104).

The first large-scale uprising broke out across Plateau on September 7th 2001, over the federal government appointment of one Hausa-Fulani as a new coordinator of National Poverty Eradication. The appointment attracted strong protest from the so-called indigenes. The incident degenerated into a fierce, violent confrontation between Hausa-Fulani ‘settlers’ and ‘indigene’ (Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere). The conflict erupted on Friday at an area known as Congo-Russia when one Christian woman tried to cross through a Muslim crowd gathered up for a congregational prayer. Although her intention was pass to the neighboring area predominantly habituated by Christians, her appearance during a religious ritual was considered offensive by an already infuriated Muslim populace due to ongoing tensions with the Christian portions of the Plateau State. As stated, this single act exploded the already existing tension into the violent confrontation between Hausa-Fulani Muslims and Beron along side with other alleged indigenous ethnic groups whom were dominantly Christians. The conflict last for almost a week to claim about 1,000 lives and caused the destruction of properties worth hundreds thousands of US Dollar (Best 2007, 66–67; Krause 2011,35-36; HRW 2001, 6 & 9). The conflict took religious dimension to the extent that church bells were ranging to alert other Christians to come and fight for Jesus. Whereas, Muslim mosques called prayer to invites fellow Muslims to come and fight for their religion. The conflict quickly spread into rural areas whereby local weapons like bows, arrows, sticks, machetes, and guns were extensively used during the conflict.

From 2001 onwards this ethnic/religious enmity became the order of the day in the Plateau state. From 2001 to 2004, more than 80 incident of violence was reported between BBA (Berom, Anaguta and Afizere) and Hausa-Fulani in the State. This deep-seated hatred turned Plateau into a theater of violence and that of ethnic clashes. There were cycle of attacks and reprisal attacks between the two contended

groups that spill over to other places such as Shendam, Wase, and Langtang North and South LGAs. Some areas like Kanam, Kanke, Mikang, and Pankshin experienced lesser conflicts. The violence grew in intensity and scale in 2004 even though there was no exact number of deaths due to the poor access to the rural villages (Peter-Omale and Duru, 2004). But, According to plausible estimate, the entirety of this rural conflict claimed between 1,000 and 2,000 lives in 2002 and 2004 respectively (Krause 2011, 32; African report 2012, 2).

Violence continued spreading to the neighboring villages to such an extent that more than 100 villages directly involved themselves in the vitriolic conflict whereby many houses, mosques and churches were damaged or rather destroyed by the well-armed militias. Unlike its initial stages in 2001, inter-communal violence appeared even more vigilant during the following years with the inception of the use of highly sophisticated weapons, such as G3 rifles, AK-47s, machine guns and sub-machine guns, single- and double-barrel shotguns, obsolete firearms, pistols, Mark 4 rifles and other locally made weapons (Blench 2004, 33–34, Higazi 2008, Krause 2011, 36-37).

Higazi (2008) posits that, “the main protagonists were generally small, highly mobile, well-armed groups with excellent local knowledge and familiarity with the bush” (3–4). In 2004 the estimated number for internally displaced people as a result of the domestic strife was 220,000. Many refugees flight to the neighboring state of Nassarawa, Bauchi and Kano. This incident of immigration helped diffuse the conflict towards the migrants’ destination of arrival, neighboring states. The reprisal attacks followed in the neighboring states of Kano and Nassarawa in between the immigrants from both parties. According to *Guardian*, retaliatory attack, in an amount of time as short as two days, in Kano, ended with the loss of approx. 1,000 lives and the destruction of houses and places of worship (IRIN, 2005; Emelonye 2011, 27).

The horrible violence and large-scale killings resulted in the declaration of six months state of emergency by the federal government, in the Plateau state. Also, as a repercussion of the said domestic strife, the federal government immediately suspended the governor of the Plateau, Joshua Dariye, and the State House of

Assembly so as to restore peace and harmony in the state. President Obasanjo installed Major General (Rtd.) Mohammed Chris Alli to administer the state (Emelonye 2011, 27-28; Daniel 2004; Ologhondiyan and Ogbu 2004). Alli came up with amnesty policy by offering large amount of money for those who return their weapons to government but this provided no positive result. That left him with no option but to carry out house-by-house search (Xinhua, 2004). The state of emergency failed to address the indigene-settlers conflict, the violence continued unabated over the following years. Another round of conflict erupted in 2005 and 2006 in the town of Namu in Shendam (close to Yelwa) whereby about 100 men and women were killed (This day, 2006).

Political elites identified as the masterminds behind the inter-communal conflict in Plateau, by taking advantage of indigene and settlers division, thereby politicizing or rather manipulate ethnic or religious rift in order to achieve their political and economic ends. Ethnic and religious dichotomy employed as a great political weapon to subdue the opponents while struggle for access to political power. International Crisis group (2012) reported that,

Plateau's political elites have not only failed to keep violence out of Jos and the state, they have actually taken measures that have worsened it. By demonstrating political weakness and unwillingness to think outside the box, the Nigerian government appears to sanction the perception that there is an elite conspiracy against peace (16-17).

Plateau political elites have turned ethnic and religious fault-bounded into a political arena and the means to gain political recognition and support from their various ethnic and religious groups. The former Governor of Plateau state, Joshua Dariye made a volatile statement while interviewed by Human Right Watch, that:

Jos...is owned by the natives. Simple. Every Hausa man in Jos is a settler whether he likes it or not. In the past we might not have told them the home truth, but now we have...they are here with us, we are in one state but that does not change the landlord/settler equation, no matter how much we cherish peace...our problem today is that...the tenant is becoming very unruly. But the natural law is simple: if your tenant is unruly, you serve him a quit notice...the unruly group must know that we are no longer willing to tolerate the rubbish they give us

...the days of 'over tolerance' are gone forever (HRW 2006, 45).

In the same vein, the current Governor of Plateau state, Jonah Jang made similar statement by addressing his people, the 'indigenous group' that they should not to sale land to any 'settler'. These statements by the political elites transformed into physical violence (Premium Times 2012).

The burst of another inter-communal struggle, sourcing from the same all reason, took place on 28th November 2008 as a result of the outcome of the local government elections in Jos North. Essentially all ethnic or religious strives in Plateau originated from Jos North LGA because it is the area that consisted the overwhelming Hausa-Fulani ethnic group. The return of democracy in 1999 generated bitter competition and struggle over the control of Jos North LGA. The 1999 chairmanship election brought the Frank Bagudu Tardy into the position of chairman of the Jos North LGA; he was the first 'indigene' to hold the position. This situation condenses the 'indigenes' and 'settlers' relationship to gradually become edgy, hidden tension was awakened and overly politicized. Tardy completed his tenure in 2002, since then there was no election in the Jos North LGA until in 2008 when the state government decided to hold another election. The excuse of suspending elections for those previous years by the state Government was related to the ongoing security situation in and around the state and Jos North. That was the reason why the state government suspended the election in the volatile areas (such as Jos North) due to the security concern. The leading figures from Hausa-Fulani, from 1999 to 2008, attempted at negotiating with state's Governors (both Joshua Dariye and Jonah Jang) to settle down matters of dispute. Those issues associated with their demands for political representation of their local communities, were on top of their agenda of negotiation. But this process of negotiation returned them almost no fruitful outcome (HRW 2009, 3; Mohammed 2007, 18).

An election, which was hoped to remove the causes of the said inter-communal mistrust and hatred through peaceful measures, was finally held on November 27th 2008. The indigenous group supported the Christian candidate under the umbrella of People Democratic Party (PDP), whereas the Hausa-Fulani 'non-indigene' sided with the Muslim Hausa-Fulani candidate from the All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP).

Even before the election, however, the political discourse and election campaign assumed a religious undertone with both parties displaying it as a struggle that should be fought against a rivaling identity. As proof, both Muslim and Christian candidates tried to mobilize their peoples by the means of employing themes and narratives borrowed from their Holy Books, and conducted their electorate campaign often through congregational prayers. Philip Ostien (2009, 30) argued that

The pastors were preaching in the churches that everyone should go out to vote, that they must not vote for any Muslim, the Muslims are infidels and we must not have them ruling over us. They want to Islamize the place. Don't vote for any unbeliever.

Considering their large number in Jos North, Muslims strongly believed that the PDP would never win the election in the local government. Ostien maintained that "...state local government elections took place, the stage was set [...] as a showdown between Jang and the Jasawa²⁰ in Jos North LGA" (2009, 28). The election process went peacefully as both sides casted and guarded their votes to the collation centers. But the relocation of collation center for the Jos North local government to Kabong (outside Jos North LGA headquarter) invoked mistrust among Hausa-Fulani that their votes would be rigged. Hausa-Fulani went to the new collation center and wait for the pronouncement of the result, but the police forces were dispatched to disperse them. As a result of that, violent conflict broke out in the following day with the widespread allegation that the governing PDP rigged the election. Youth from both Muslim and Christian sides were quickly bogged down into a sheer violence, which spread to neighboring areas of Nasarawa, Tudun Wada, Ali Kazaure, Rikkos, Dutse Uku, Congo Russia, Angwan Rogo, Angwan Keke, Bulbulla and Congo Junction (Ostien 2009, 31-32; HRW 2009, 4; Krause 2011, 39).

The two days uprising claimed several lives from two sides, mostly youth and an approximate number of 50 women and children. The toll of death was not certain but according to the local estimates: about 700 to 850 people lost their lives. Hausa-Fulani Muslims reported that they lost 632 lives and more than 5,000 of their people

²⁰ Jasawa is the common name called Hausa-Fulani in Jos so as to distinguished them from other Hausa-Fulani from the North

were injured. In addition, Christian mobs set on fire 22 mosques, 20 Islamic schools and 891 Muslim houses²¹. However, Christians reported that 103 to 129 of their people dead in Rikko, Sarkin Mangu, Nassarawa, Tudun Wada and Congo-Russia and about 330 houses were burnt²² (PSJCI 2010, 259–63). Catholic Church’s report, meanwhile, declared 23 people to be dead as a direct result of the domestic strife, which, according to the same report, ended with the destruction of about 600 houses (JDPC, 2010). Ajibola Commission reported that 118 Christian Igbo and 31 Yoruba were killed during the incident (PSJCI 2010, 266–70). In addition, Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) lamented that not less than 10,000 people were displaced and many Christian pastors were killed (Dung-Gwom and Rikko, 2009, 7). At the same time Yoruba leader reported the death of about 180 Yoruba ethnic group, which is comprised of both Muslims and Christians²³. Furthermore, at least 118 innocent people were extra-judiciously killed by security agency when trying to escape from the crisis (HRW 2009, 9).

Many Hausa-Fulani business places were destroyed which included petrol and gas stations, Katako market and used-car lots, which caused them to suffer great economic loss (Krause 2011). Ephraim Kadala (2009, 124) cites from the *News Magazine* that Bala Zubairu trading company (car sale business) lost almost 20 Million US Dollar when the place was set to fire. Alhaji Musa Haruna Adamu owner of the Pama motors lost about cars worth of ₦601 Million Naira (More than \$3.6 US Dollar). 2008 conflict could be analyzed not only as a political crisis but also as an event attached to the religious and economic motives. It helps lay in place a strong grasp on the indigene/settlers conflict in Plateau. Human right watch (2009) contended that;

...at stake in the local government election was not just control of the

²¹ See, Jos North Muslim Ummah, 2009. ‘Muslims Massacred Toll Recorded during November 27th, 2008, Post Plateau State Local Government Council Elections.’ Memorandum.

²² See, Stefanos Foundation. 2010. ‘Deceased Name Recorded in Rikkos / Nassarawa / Congo / T / Wada / Sarki Mangu Area (2008).’ Unpublished memorandum obtained from the Stefanos Foundation.

HRW. 2010. ‘Christian Houses Burned in Jos North in 2008.’ Unpublished memorandum obtained from the Stefanos Foundation.

²³ Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Chief Toyé Ogunshuyi, president-general of the Yoruba community in Plateau State, Jos, February 16, 2009.

large sums of public funds disbursed by the federal government, but also control over determining which ethnic groups would be granted indigene status in Jos. Local governments throughout Nigeria have generally had the discretion to determine who the indigenes are in their communities and to issue “certificates of indigeneity” that serve as documentary proof that the bearer is an indigene of the local government area (4).

Many Hausa-Fulani suspected the Governor for facilitating violence against them and thereby supporting indigenous group of Plateau State against Hausa-Fulani Muslim whom they regarded as a ‘settlers’. All these were to set the stage for the rise of yet another inter-communal conflict in the State of Plateau.

On 17th January 2010, as a result of the disagreement over re-building one Muslim house (Alhaji Kabir Mohammed) at Nassarawa Gwom, which was destroyed during the election crisis in 2008, surfaced a major armed struggle between the ‘indigenous’ and ‘settler’ populaces of the State. Some groups from Christian youth (indigenes) who didn’t want the house to be reconstructed started stoning the workers employed by the house owner. They threatened that they would destroy the house again, thereby mobilizing their people by state mottos of the sort as; “come out and fight for Jesus” (Higazi, 2011, p. 24). The tension stoked in place, paved way for violent conflict after the security agency close to the scene failed to quench the minor skirmish, which spilled over to the neighboring towns (Adi 2010, 23; Emelonye 2011, 28). Christians’ main line of defense was the argument that the mentioned reconstruction project meant to stir up trouble. They contended that the house owner brought hundreds of arm-men to work in the construction site, abusing Christians who came to pass through the way (CMG, 2010; Krause 2011, 40-41).

The conflict culminated in the cruel destruction of lives and properties, extending to Bukuru and Anglo Jos. It was reported that the conflict between the parties ended with the death of about 400 people whereas 18,000 people were displaced (IRIN 2010). According to the police report, 326 to 362 people were killed (The Nation 2010, 1). Conversely, Muslim documented a total of 968 deaths from Muslims in 2010 conflict. The memorandum, on the other hand, stated that 206 people were killed in Jos North LGA, 144 at Barkin Ladi LGA while Jos South reported a much higher Christian body count, to them, 578 individuals were killed as

a direct result of clashes with Muslims (Plateau State Muslim Ummah, 2010). Human Right Watch reported that about 150 people were killed to be dumped into the wells, in Kuru Karama, and more than 8.000 people fled to the soils of Toro, in the neighboring Bauchi State, as refugees (The Nation 2010, 51). Heavy military deployment in Jos and Bukuru finally managed to quell the crisis. Yet, the end of the actual clashes is not meant to be also the end of the mutual distrust and hatred between the revengeful sides waiting for an opportunity to strike again (IRIN, 2010).

Crisis unfortunately continued on the outskirts of the city by claiming the lives of 150 Muslims in Kuru Karama on 19th January 2010. At least 200 Christians were killed in Dogo Nahauwa in an act of revenge on 7th March 2010 (HRW 2010). Most of the victims were women, old people and children who were unable to hide or run away from the conflict. The carnage was more traumatic and devastating than the previous conflicts. There was an allegation that the security agents while handling the conflict in favor of their own brethren.



Source: Reuters 2010

Picture: Villagers look at bodies of victims of attacks lying in a mass grave in the Dogo Nahawa village near Jos, the capital of Plateau State in central Nigeria, on March 8, 2010.

The last episode of 2010 conflict occurred on the eve of Christmas when unknown people detonated bomb in one market then filled mostly by Christian customers. Out of the bomb explosion died 107 people when they were purchasing items for the Christmas festival (HRW, 2011). A close number of people were wounded from the terror attack. The Jama'atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda' Awati Wal Jihad popularly known as Boko Haram²⁴ claimed responsibility for the attack but most of the people doubt the authenticity of their claim. The bombing's first repercussion was the escalation of a full-scale conflict between Muslim and Christians within the capital of Plateau state (Jos). Since then, silent killings have become both common and rampant in the state to such an extent that no Christians would ever go to the Muslim area without fear, and *vice versa*. Physical in-fight between two groups of Nigerians continued in the following year (Nigerian Observer 2011), too, as at least 37 people having been killed in 2013, in various villages of the state (Sahara reporters 2013).

4.3. Nigerian Constitution: The Contradictions Between Indigeneity and Citizenship

The settler-indigene conflict in the post-independence Nigeria could be explored and analyzed as a process that reflects from, and to some extent caused by, developments in the making of Nigerian constitutions. Nigerian constitutions have been classified to shed light on three distinct period of political self-definition: pre-independence, independence and post-independence constitutions. All of these legal papers should be thoroughly examined for one to understand the genesis and transformation of indigene-settler conflicts in Nigeria (Ismail 2010, 87). As this dissertation argues, these constitutions not only mirror the developmental phase of the ethnic politics across the country, but also establish the ground that somewhat sustain them to this far. Thus, these legal frameworks should be critically read as they, instead of leaving a space for removing the root causes of the conflict, which is

²⁴ Boko Haram (Western education is infidel) is a Maiduguri-based organization who agitating for an Islamic state in Nigeria and fighting the western-style of government whom they perceived as an abominable rule.

connected to the colonial era, actually provided the parties of the conflict with ideological/perceptual legitimacy to sustain them. As Olajide O. Akanji also argues “...the nature of Nigerian colonial and post-colonial constitution affected the traditional notions and practice of native-settler dichotomy” (2011, 117). He maintained that it is the genesis and sustaining factor of the post-colonial indigene-settlers conflict.

To start with, the features imbedded in the pre-independence constitution (colonial constitution) to the most extent affected both independence and post-independence constitutions in an adverse fashion. Chika B. Onwuekwe, for instance, posits that the Britain’s self-centered policies and failure of the colonial constitution to settle the Nigeria’s political problems has become the major factor that worsened the current native-settler conflict in Nigeria (Oyebade 2003,153). Leading from Akin Alao’s remarks Adebayo Oyebade (2003) asserts that;

...the necessity to set up British legal system and subsequent judicial reforms was derived from imperial interest rather than from a desire to establish a viable, democratic, self-governing state in the future...Britain’s interest was to use the instrument of law to pacify Nigerians to ensure the necessary conducive atmosphere for the manifestation of imperial economic interest (4).

The Britain ruled Nigeria for about 60 years (1900-1960), leaving behind a political culture with established precedents according to which Nigerian now have had to govern themselves in aftermath of break-up with London. These colonial legacies transformed and changed political, economic and socio-cultural lives of the Nigerians in substantial and often in irreversible ways. Most importantly, the same legacies of the colonial rule “...in many respects remain an integral part of the state today” (Oyebade 2003, 15).

First Nigerian constitution, albeit a miniature/premature one, was imposed after the 1914 Amalgamation of Nigeria into one single country under the leadership of Lord Lugard. But this first attempt at bringing a constitutional costume to the newly formed country did not gather wide recognition from both Nigerians and the British. In 1919, Hugh Clifford was to replace Lugard as the new governor of Nigeria. He set himself the task of introducing a constitutional reform, which came to be known as

Clifford's Constitution of 1922 (Ismail 2010, 89). Despite the fact that 1922 constitution recognized citizenship rights to Nigerians, it still disfranchised the majority of the native people for its certain, discriminative principles. The life span of 1922 constitution was very short due to these shortcomings. This resulted in the emergence of Richard's Constitution of 1946 under the leadership of Arthur Richard. Unlike its predecessor, this recent attempt surely encouraged more participation in the government from local people. The issue with it was that it constructed a legal structure that located identity politics (aka commitment to identity as a vehicle of building political carriers) at the center of Nigerian domestic politics. Richard Constitution was first within a long line of legal papers that envisaged regionalization policy by dividing the country into three regions based on ethnic lines: North (Hausa), West (Yoruba) and East (Igbo) (Akanji 2011, 120). Consequently, apart from the central legislature, the constitution was in effect heartening each region to retain its own separate house of assembly. This provided a conducive-atmosphere for the political elites to compete for power with their ethnic backgrounds turning into their fundamental ammunition and support basis, which in return rendered citizenship an altogether contested issue. As Akanji concludes, "...ethnicity became the criterion for determining access to political power and political patronage in each of the three regions" (2011, 120).

Macpherson's Constitution of 1951 came into place as a result of the failures of the previous constitution. The 1951 Constitution, be that as it may, also retain the notion of regionalism, sending deeper the roots of ethnicity-led political identifications into the soil of Nigerian politics. In addition, Macpherson's Constitution officially acknowledged the already devised geographic division of the country, even though such division overlapped with geographical locations of the ethnic groups. What is worse, the same constitution also made it a legal point of reference to separate certain groups as indigene from others with the title of settlers. This legal logic is what has entitled the former group with right of ownership to a certain land whereas denying the same to the latter group of people on accounts of their lack of attachment to the same land in the historical era. The continuation this regionalization policy became more defined with the amendment of the 1954

Constitutional (Lyttleto Constitution) changes, which drew a line of separation in civil service between the favored indigenes as opposed disfavored non-indigene group (Ismail 2010, 89; Akanji 2011, 121; Oyebade 2003, 24). This profound political legacy promotes indigene and non-indigene dichotomy by institutionalizing entrenched forms discriminatory citizenship.

Nigeria became an independent state on 1st October 1960 and the new constitution was adopted under the act of British parliament in 1960. In addition to regionalization policy, the constitution introduced “bill of right”²⁵ so as to reduce the fear of minority ethnic groups about the political domination of the three major ethnic groups (Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo). The ethnic politics characterized by colonial period outlived the colonial era and extended into the periods of independence and post-independence. Akanji maintained “...the foremost reason for the settler-indigene within territorial space is the official conception and use of indigeneity in post-colonial constitutions” (2011, 122). Upon relying on section 4 of 1960 Constitution, the Nigerian government amended the pre-colonial constitution, which gave birth to the 1963 republican constitution as the first post-colonial constitution in Nigeria. 1963 Constitution also adopted the regionalization policy thereby promoting the use of ethnicity and indigeneity as what should govern the daily lives in Nigerian economic and politics. It facilitates regionalization policies as it was clearly stated in section 28 (2c) and 29 (2d) of the constitution (Bach 1997, 376). The policy acknowledged the framed regionalization in order to “...establish restrictions with respect to the acquisition or use of land or other property...” (Akanji 2011, 122). Other post-independence regulations on the constitutional system of the Nigerian state include 1979, 1989 and 1999 constitutions. All of them, however failed in creating national citizenship in Nigeria since they in parallel established the political and economic basis of the use of ethnic identity in the Nigerian politics, where as making indigeneity a legally acknowledged status to reap economic benefits and achieve employment in state offices. The indigeneity phrase as such “belongs to” contained in section 25 (1a) of the 1999 constitution lay greater stress

²⁵ It was one of the recommendations of the Willinck Commission of Inquiry into the fears of minorities in Nigeria. Under this Constitution the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council continued to be Nigeria’s highest court.

on place of birth rather than national citizenship. It stated that, “every person born in Nigeria before the date of independence, either of whose parents or any of whose grandparents belongs or belonged to a community indigenous to Nigeria” (FRN 1999). Within a constitutional body that organizes the course of politics within a customary nation-state, citizenship is considered as a birthright made available to everyone who was born within the jurisdictional boundaries of the state. In other words, citizenship has a powerful and meaningful attachment to a pre-defined land mass considered as ‘country.’ Unlike the Nigerian state, nation-states in general endow the right of citizenship without taking into account the ethnic/religious background of its constituents. In Nigerian case, however, the term ‘belongs to’ is confusing insomuch as that failure to clarify this ambiguity has made people resort to ethnicity as one way of in defining citizenship.

However, the 1999 constitution clearly stated that all Nigerian citizens irrespective of where he/she born or live is free to work in any part of the federation. Section 42 (2) of the 1999 constitution vividly stipulated that, “...no citizen of Nigeria shall be subjected to any disability or deprivation merely by reason of the circumstances of his Birth” (FRN 1999). But in reality one could only be a citizen of a particular space (place of origin) and thereby becoming a settler in all other parts of the Nigerian states because of the said lack of reference to the idea of having originated from a defined territory as equal members of the same political community (i.e. nation). Ojukwu and Onifade argued that:

...citizenship in Nigeria infers an equality (of rights) bestowed on all who are Nigerian citizens backed up by adequate constitutional provision in order to ensure that this is so...in principle, all Nigerian citizens are equal no matter the circumstances of their birth and whether or not they reside in their places of origin. But in practice, one is a Nigerian citizen only in his state of origin [...], no matter for how long one resides or domiciles in a state other than his own (2010, 176).

Another legal anomaly that either instigated ethnic divisions or, some other time, even made ethnic conflict an inevitable outcome under the said legal framework, is the inclusion of the phrase of ‘federal character’²⁶ in the Nigerian constitution as

²⁶ The Federal Character Commission (FCC), created and mandated by the constitution to ensure strict

stipulated in section 147 (3) of the 1999 constitution stating that, "...provided that in giving effect to the provisions aforesaid the president shall appoint at least one Minister from each State, who shall be an indigene of such State." This section contradicts the Section 15 (3b), which acknowledges that, "...for the purpose of promoting national integration, it shall be the duty of the State to...secure full residence rights for every citizen in all parts of the federation" (FRN 1999). The use of the phrase "indigenes of each state" at federal level is obviously recognition of one group's alleged 'latecomer' status vis-a-vis some other groups whose ties to the land (and everything that stands on this land as political institutions or economic resources) is both natural and exclusive. This contradicts the citizenship provision of the constitution (CGAR 2012, 3).

The contradiction between indigeneity and citizenship generate great concern in Nigeria to the extent that a person born and raised in a particular state could not enjoy the citizenship rights so long as he/she cannot prove himself/herself as a member of a group alleged to indigenous to the same state. This phenomenon happened mostly in post-colonial states, contrary to current political discourse in western countries in which all citizens regardless of their ethnic backgrounds are considered 'indigenous' to the land. In a way, in the west, land as a common birthplace shapes the essentials of indigeneity whereas, in almost all post-colonial spaces, it is pairing of ethnicity with indigeneity that that decides whether, or not, one should be considered as part of a shared land (i.e. country). If someone lives in the USA for a certain period of time (as stipulated in the constitution) should have the right to vote and be elected as representative of the nation. For instance, Barrack Obama to become President of the USA was not required to prove his indigeneity even though his father was from a Kenyan origin. By the same token, Arnold Schwarzenegger's place of origin, Australia, had no weight in his successful election campaign for the governorship of California. Conversely, in Nigeria no Hausa man could become a governor of Lagos (Yoruba state) even if he was born and spent a lifetime there. Likewise, no Igbo man can contest election in the Northern states,

adherence to the federal character principle. The article 14 (3) stated "the composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria..." it was used to protect minority interest.

which is predominantly Hausa. Femi Omotoso reported that indigeneity is an issue of decisive importance affecting the survival of Nigeria as a geo-political entity. He maintains that, "...there is a deep attachment of Nigerians to their states of origin, regardless of whether or not they are residing there" (Abayomi, Adigun and Ibramim 2012, 4). The controversy over indigene status and citizenship haunted not only Plateau State, but also other Nigerian states. The Nigerian constitution grants absolute privileges to place of origin over residency. In response, ethnic groups need to construct various historical narratives so as to prove their 'natural' attachment to a land, which is absolutely necessary to create boundaries to separate 'insiders' from those who are held outside of these cognitive boundaries (Golwa and Ojiji 2008; Krause 2011, 26). The constitution favor indigenes within the state and exclude settlers from enjoying full citizenship rights (political, economic and social). Nigerians become a second-class citizen in any place of the federation outside his/her state of origin, and such threatens to tear the country apart.

In Plateau state Hausa-Fulani lamented that since the return of democracy in 1999, their indigene status has been denied despite their long existence in this particular state (HRW 2006; Krause 200, 25). Though Hausa-Fulani dominate the Northern States, most of the Hausa-Fulani who currently live in Plateau are without any ancestral background. Therefore it would be difficult for them to acquire indigene-ship in any of the Northern States. This situation renders them 'stateless citizens' in their own country (Molavi 2013, 3; HRW 2006, 38). On the other hand, Berom argued that Jos is not only our land "...but Jos is our JERUSALEM and is indigenously inhabited by the Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere" (Best 2007, 35). Traditional leader of Berom insisted that even if Hausa-Fulani had been in Plateau for more than 1,000 years, they would nevertheless remain non-indigene (HRW 2006, 42).

However, it is notable that Plateau conflict is less about religious or cultural conflicts than the self-aggrandized politicians who used ethnic and religious division to achieve their aims (BBC, 5 May, 2004 cited in IDN; 2005). The recent crisis in the Plateau State is described as a manipulation of the political elites who bid for access to political power by using historical narration or constitutional provision as

platforms to justify their claims. A former President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, in a seminar organized by African Leadership Forum (ALF) on Conflict Prevention and Management on 15-17th December 1993, opined that:

...the concept of settler or non-native syndrome has of recent hardened into a theory of ethnic exclusiveness and molded and propagated to foist a pejorative meaning to advance economic and political control among competing elite groups for interests during democratic regimes (Plateau Patriots 1993 13-14).

Therefore, to find a lasting peace in Plateau, residency rather than indigeneity should be accounted in as the primary principle for Nigerian citizenship. The indigeneity phrase accommodated in the constitution should be revised or, perhaps, altogether revoked. An influential Muslim leader made the case by uttering that "...if a solution could be found to the conflict over indigene rights, 95 per cent of the potential for violent conflict in Plateau State would be removed" (Krause 2011, 26). Nigerian government needs to give precedence to national citizenship over indigeneity.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMENDATION

5.1. Conclusion

In recent years Plateau state is engulfed in an incessant ethnic conflict that plunged it into the state of disarray, and all efforts to achieve permanent solution to the problem turned into a fiasco. Thus, even if there were peace in the state, it would be only a temporary before another conflict erupts. Moreover, Plateau has become a theatre of violence and ethnic clashes for such an extensive period of time that it epitomizes a deeply rooted conception of mutual hatred. This inherent hatred shared by different ethnic groups in the state stemmed from the political and historical evolution of the state. Hence the conflict is characterized by settlers-indigenes strife over land ownership. Indigene-settler divide has long been a serious bone of contention in the state that overshadowed, or perhaps framed, what is commonly known as national question. Indigeneity is attested as the major impediment to the peaceful co-existence among various ethnic groups in Plateau state. The vigorous tussle over land ownership assumed a serious dimension that creates violent conflict in the state, because some ethnic groups (i.e. Berom, Anaguta and Afizere) identifying themselves as the “sons of the soil” of plateau, questioned the indigeneity/citizenship of Hausa-Fulani within the state. All of this is because of the fact that identity tightened to the soil come down to mean that only those who could trace their genealogy to an alleged first generation are allowed for involving themselves in economic activity within the state’s geographical boundary, thus, considered as full indigenes. Moreover, identity politics in Nigeria like other post-colonial states were constructed around ethnicity and territorial space, which constitute a basis of justification to tag on ‘latecomers’ as non-indigenes or settlers. This mutual exclusiveness and politicization of identity on the basis of who are ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ of Plateau state precipitate into settler-indigene conflict (Malkki 1992, 25-26, Jackson 2006, Geschiere 2009).

The entirety of this work in terms of its main assumptions and historical reading can be found encapsulated within the first chapter of this work. In detail, it consists a general introduction, background/research problem, research objectives, research question, research hypothesis and research methodology. The chapter establishes the basis of the study by identifying the central issues and questions raised by the research. Similarly, this chapter formulates the specific research hypotheses and the methodology to the end of first generating data (primary data) and, testing, the authenticity of extracted findings. While the applied methodology provides the framework for the interpretation of data, a number of strategies were also used to gather the relevant data, which constituted the fundamental basis to prop up primary data.

The research problem emerge from a specific political and legal framework that by providing political/economic/social privileges with a group of people, and to the total exclusion of some others, created a visible social rift in Plateau State in between favored indigenes and disfavored settlers. It is this background that inspired this dissertation about problematizing the legal and political framework. As it is, this said framework entitled indigenes as the only ones to enjoy the political, economic and social rights/privileges in the state, whereas discriminating those who are arbitrarily presumed to be settlers with no equal rights of citizenship and other benefits attached to it. Thus, settlers' are denied access to political office, military service, health care, education, and other civil service jobs, both at the State and federal level. It is recurrently touched upon within the thesis that the Plateau conflict draws from these irreconcilable identity differences, which set the course for ethnic groups to struggle over access to power, opportunity and privileges. It is clear that whenever an individual or group of people are denied access to 'basic needs' (i.e. political participation, health care, academic career and social well-being) conflict becomes an inevitable consequence (Burton, 1990, 13).

The chapter maintained that the indigene-settler syndrome in Nigeria is far from being a figment of imagination. Rather, its very presence owes itself to the Nigerian constitution. Nigerian constitution has always been a remarkably fertile source of ethnic resentment as it defines indigeneity as the basis of citizenship, which mainly

contradicts national citizenship that one could discern in Europe and the US. The relevant clause in the Nigerian constitution about the concept of indigeneity reduces every Nigerian to a status of being native in a specific state and, in the mean time; deprive them of the chance of being native to the remaining parts of the Nigerian soil. It is suffice to say that every Nigerian is only indigene in his/her place of origin and settler in all other places within the federation. Such internally discriminative formation of citizenship based on indigeneity awakens, or keep awakened, ethnic consciousness by creating a not-so-artificial separation between ‘them’ versus ‘us.’ By this means, as this thesis argues, the same constitutional framework sets the stage for a bitter, violent competition among various ethnic groups over land and political power or the prevalent definition as to how distinguish a settler from indigenes in any given geographical segment of the country. This situation makes the nation building an impossibly difficult endeavor hence Nigerians keep identifying themselves mostly with their localities, not with their nation-state. Habitually, Nigerians identify themselves as Nigerians only outside the country.

Chapter two deals with the theoretical framework of the study. It surveys the conceptual meaning of colonialism, identity, nation-state and nation building. Most importantly, the chapter employing colonial perspective and thereby framing a theory to explain how ethnic identities has been constructed through colonial rule. The chapter argued the genesis of identity politics in Nigeria is traceable to colonialism, because the country is first and foremost, an artificial creation by the British colonial masters. It attempted, but evidently failed in, duplicating the already existing “modular” forms of nation-states in Europe. Unlike those forms of state in Europe, the nation-states in any postcolonial place from Africa or Asia reflect spheres of influences that were forged according to the resultant compromises and interests among major imperialistic powers. And, even more dreadfully, the emergent states had borders that somewhat never coincided with the ethnic and cultural roots of the people. This marriage of convenience fabricated by colonialists not only dislocates the natural boundaries of Africa, but also fuel mutual suspicions and ethnic resentment among African populations (Castells 2010, 1). For this reason colonial framework is adopted as a theory to analyze the genesis of the Plateau’s

settler/indigene conflict. However, the colonialist perspective could only explain how colonialism succeeded in splitting indigenous population into settlers and indigenes, but still fall short of clarifying how and why settler-indigene conflict has become more momentous and devastating after the demise of colonial rule. Consequently, this dissertation employed “institutional approach” and “instrumentalist” or “political entrepreneurs approach” to explain the remaining part (North 1981, 201-202, Crawford 1998, 17, Blagojevic 2009, 8-9).

Instrumentalist approach suggests that the institutions/structures left behind by colonialism were anxiously accommodated by the Nigerian elites. They fail to question the colonial epistemology of governance, thereby abiding by the colonial legacy that lumped unharmonious ethnic groups together into one country. Instrumentalist approach as such posits that the colonial structures, when left intact, may provide a fertile ground for the political elites in aftermath of the independence. So much so that elites instead of moving towards the aim of unifying their people saw it in the service of their economic/political interests to incite, or keep alive, ethnic consciousness. Such is one of the most prominent reasons behind what generated violent conflicts among ethnic groups that teeters Plateau state on the brink of lawlessness.

Chapter three reviews and analyzes related literatures as regards to the key concepts in the study. The literature review is broken into the following pairing concepts: colonialism and modernization, modernization and identity conflict, colonialism, nation building and ethnic conflict (ethnic politics) and finally colonialism and land ownership. These concepts, this thesis asserts, are part of the model established to analyze all those facilitating factors and forces that have sustained ethnic conflict in Plateau State even after the departure of colonial rule. The dual of concepts of colonialism and modernization are each deemed in this thesis as a double-edged of sword that determines the parameters of the oddity of the ongoing African (Nigerian) identity conflicts. Plateau State is a lucid exemplar of how colonial policies (divide and rule) might at the end fuel ethnic divisions. Modernization, on the other hand, took it from here only to reinforce the mentioned sense of separateness and the urge for competing over what is so scarcely available

as political and economic opportunities.

Similarly, under the mutually constitutive concept of modernization and identity conflicts, the dissertation finds out that ethnic identity is a spin-off of modernization in Africa and, to say the least, materialized from western colonialism. Modernization produces hollow institutions that are incapable of welding the diverse elements into a Nigerian nation. These institutions encourage ethnic chauvinism or excessive support for one's own ethnic group. Even the basic doctrines of modernization such as fundamental human rights, rule of law and divided of democracy are solely prerogatives of those groups who earned from the state the entitlement to indigeneity. This resulted unequal and differential distribution of modernization benefits (both economic and political), escalating into violent conflicts as one witnesses now in the Plateau State.

The same chapter ascertains the correlation among the trio concepts of colonialism; nation-building and ethnic conflict. It concludes that nation-building in Africa was a colonial process that lacks political consociation. It was a sort of a top-down nation-building project externally imposed on the newly African states—with Nigeria being no exception to this, imbedding a legal/economic/political environment, which allowed little space for Nigerians to unify their country as one. Hence, not only did colonialists lamp together different ethnic groups with various cultural and religious background into a single entity (i.e. nation-state), but they also fanned the flames in ethnic identities through facilitating colonial structures facilitate hostile political competition among those groups and that fanning ethnic violence among them.

Chapter four discusses the historical origins of Jos/Plateau and how it develops as an urban center in association with colonial tin mining activity. Plateau state is one of the strategic places; deliberately designed or planned to serve for British colonial administration. The state is endowed with abundant tin mines making it advantageous for those colonizers that arduously searched for material resources to feed their indigenous industries. To facilitate their own objectives of colonial subjugation, British colonizers employed divide-and-conquer policies. It was their objective to keep Nigeria within the orbit of capitalist exploitation. In other words,

colonialists never considered it in their best interests to help unify the natives under one common identity in the knowledge that unification would eventually produce much stronger adversaries with the ultimate objective of emancipation from the foreign rule. They for this specific reason consequently used divide and rule policy, which proved to be effective in fortifying the colonial clutch on Nigerian society and dwindling the people's potentials for challenging the status quo. Colonial policy of divide and rule initially used ethnic and regional sectionalism to segregate ethnic groups in Nigeria so that they would never unite and fight against colonial rule as a common front. From the onset of colonial divide-and-rule policy in Plateau state, Britain empowered or favored Hausa-Fulani ethnic group against other groups within the state, which both weakened previously built inter-communal ties and bridges and gave birth to suspicion and ethnic resentment. But, the most destructive legacy of this policy was that of discriminative nomenclatures installed in place by the colonial masters with the view of clustering each ethnic populace into irreversibly separate positions as regards to the rights/obligations vis a vis the state apparatuses. The British colonialists propagated the saga that Hausa-Fulani were "aliens" or "settlers", whereas other ethnic groups such as Berom, Anaguta and Afizere were identified as truly "indigenous group[s] of Plateau". Colonizers even go to the extent of transferring the traditional leadership from the favored Hausa-Fulani group to the so-called owners' of the land. Since then the "owners' of the land" (Moyo 2008,107; Plotnicov 1967, 44) began challenging the dominance of Hausa-Fulani within the State. Such move by them, now with the full support from British, catapulted a tremendous anger and deep feelings of hatred between the groups. Furthermore, this colonial stereotyping has devastating effects on Plateau's ethnic groups considering that it inculcated a sharper and much more divisive sense of ethnic consciousness that serve as a time-bomb, which occasionally exploded under the guise of settler/indigene divide after the demise of colonial rule.

British colonial masters introduced Western-style administration thereby forcing a single national identity on different ethnic, cultural and religious groups without actually creating a social/economic/legal environment conducive to infuse them into a coherently comprehensive identity. The western political and economic institutions

were central structures of the nation-state set up by colonial masters to replace the existing traditional ones that once reigned over the country. These colonial political and economic institutions worked across ethnic and national fault line, and that led the adoption settler/indigene dichotomy as a dais to compete for economic resources of the state. The colonial state, by means of its policies and institutions, is, in fact, adding up to the production of settler/indigene division in Plateau State. It encouraged patronage networks, which, in the long run, brought about enormous instability and complicated the process of bonding diverse components into a Nigerian nation.

Furthermore, those colonial institutions that were established at the initial stages with the function of protecting were also part of a process that African elites after the demise of colonial rule desperately retained and continued to practice it. In other words, African elites replaced colonial masters in managing the same institutions that were once applied to govern them. Africans have failed to question the colonial structure of governance, thereby unscrupulously manipulating ethnicity as a strategic tool to build, this time around, their own social networks of patronage. Their sole purpose was obviously to make it sure that the convergence among the main ethnic groups don't reach a point beyond which they become a challenge to their favored political order seeding the sows of contention among themselves. The prior tension created by colonial masters through unequal and differential treatment of ethnic groups give political elites of the date the ability needed to mobilize ethnic groups as assets of within their own, individual and ethno-centric, domestic agendas.

5.2. Policy Recommendation

From the above evaluation of settler-indigene conflict the dissertation now turns to the recommendations of how these problems can be solved. It identified that the enduring injustices and discriminations triggered by colonialism and modernization together with political elites' self aggrandizement has generate the hot-blooded phenomena of "indigene" and "settlers" conflict in Nigeria (Plateau State) and other African countries. Hence colonialism established ethnic identity as the basis for

determining access to land and political power in post-colonial states of Africa. The severe struggle for political power and economic resources provides or serves as a reason for the persistence of hostile memories, which afterward re-awakened and offer justification for violent conflict. The conflict is immanent over fierce competition and discrimination perceived by disadvantageous group (settlers) and the need for the advantageous group (indigenes) to be the exclusive owners of Plateau State. This situation is manipulated by the political elites of various ethnic groups as they deliberately dragged their own people into long-drawn-out communal clashes, sometimes with a sturdy religious dimension.

Alongside, colonial masters used political logic (administrative and legal) to achieve their economic motive. For this reason, this dissertation argued that soft or non-violent measures rather than military action must be employed as means of resolving settlers-indigene conflict in Plateau State. But, unfortunately Nigerian government eludes the idea of a lasting peace due in large part to having almost no conflict resolution mechanism. Concomitantly, the major shortcomings of Nigeria's constitution have still not been addressed, in spite of countless demands from civil society, international organizations and other protagonists who strongly believe that the solution to the problem lies in the 'indigeneity' clause contained in the Nigerian constitution. Constitution is a sustaining factor of settler-indigene conflict. The indigenous-favored citizenship is unquestionably not the root causes of the Plateau settler-indigene conflict, but it is certainly one of salient stumbling blocs before Nigerians could break the vicious cycle of violent conflict and achieving lasting peace. Therefore, Alfa Belgore Committee report on constitutional review needs to be taken into consideration. The said Committee endorses several recommendations. It reported that Nigerian government has to make "...several innovative additions to strengthen the constitution, deepen our democratic ethos to promote good governance and the speedy dispensation of justice for all". There is need for the constitutional amendment that would support national citizenship, genuine democracy and good governance in the country. Basically, it is painful that many Nigerians are categorized as "settlers" or "strangers" in a place where they have had true residency for an extended period of time, some even prior to colonial conquest,

or for decades before independence.

Practically, the indigeneity clause contained in the Nigerian constitution proved to be ambiguous and controversial: it has been interpreted and arbitrarily applied by many Nigerians to suit their selfish interests. Consequently, corrupted politicians have taken advantage of the fuzziness connected to the definition of indigeneity so as to sideline other ethnic groups, which becomes springboard of the conflict in Plateau state. Indigeneity more often than not provides certain groups of people exclusive rights and privileges (Ambe-Uva 2010, 51-52). Similarly, even before Alfa Belgore Constitutional Review Committee several organizations/individuals appeal to the Nigerian government to give residency more priority than indigeneity in order to defuse settler-indigene conflict. Nigerian constitution should be amended in a way that grants full residence rights to every Nigerian wherever they may reside, provided that they could meet minimum residency requirements. The Bureau maintains that the adoption of residency requirement will help in creating national citizenship.

Stefan Wolff (2006, 8) persuasively argued “...ethnic conflicts are likely to stay with us for some time, but understanding their causes, consequences, and dynamics can equip us to deal with them earlier and more effectively in the future”. Moreover, to achieve stable peace there is an urgent need to thoroughly analyze the structural problems that trigger the conflict. Settler-indigene conflict proved to stem from a structural level, which, under this specific case, takes the form of Nigerian constitution, operating as a lethal fume that ignites the conflict. Therefore, constitutional change is a significant move to resolve indigene-settler conflicts. Settler-indigene conflict could be defused if only the political leaders are sincere and willing to stop playing ethnic politics. They should have a sense of reasoning, wisdom and ability to bring their groups along to the path of peace.

Furthermore, negative culture and poor leadership is another factor that facilitate inter-communal conflict in Plateau State in particular and Nigeria in general. Akpokpari (2004: 243) vehemently lamented that:

...system of administration that is democratic, efficient and development-oriented has remained illusive in Africa as legitimacy has

been determined not by democratic process but largely by ascriptive and patron-client relations while corruption has remained pervasive.

Inefficient state apparatuses and leadership without a firm sense of democratic representation inspires the political elites to incite ethnic hatred among their loyal subjects, thereby intensifying primordial identities that discourage national integration. For this reason, this thesis concludes that only competent leadership with transparent institutions could enhance economic growth and civil society, which is hoped to produce a peaceful environment wherein both settlers and indigenes will peacefully coexist (Wolff 2006, 7). In effect, settler-indigene violence in Plateau State can be effectively resolved when Nigerian government embark on truly democratizing the domestic political theater (i.e. equal opportunity and social justice). Because unequal political and economic opportunities lay behind the scene as what drives various ethnic and religious groups into ethnic resentment and violent conflict. As the findings of many researches also attest to this fact, communities with higher socio-economic inequality are more prone to violent conflict than the ones that provide equal opportunities for all (Wimmer et. el. 2009, 316–317; Østby 2008). Therefore, intense conflicts are more prevalent in the societies where government fails to provide equal opportunities with its citizens.

Following up this last point, the research identified that ethnicity on its own could not produce violent conflict, contrary to Primordialists' assertions (Wolff: 2006:33). Rather, violent conflict spring from ethnic chauvinism and competition over scarce resources. Lack of economic opportunities and quagmire of deepening poverty induce people to resort to ethnicity as a strategy for gaining scarce economic benefits. It is obvious that scarcity of material resources has a way of morphing ethnic resentment into violent conflict. In such societies social mobility, ranging from serving in any government offices, securing jobs, serving in the military, acquiring a higher education and other governmental opportunities—are observed to be firmly linked to ethnic group membership, paving the way for inter-communal enmities. Consequently, this thesis recommends the construction of a market economy with all the attendant norms and values, as it often helped conflict-ridden societies step out of violence through firmly knit distribution of economic labor. It is

to maintain that a strong and healthy market economy, wherever surfaced, will increase social mobility, enhance cooperation and thereby weakening tribal networks that may produce a new Nigerian identity. Hence, any advance in the sphere of productive forces will generate a more inter-dependent society in which individuals will identify themselves with social classes and interests, which crosses vertically built ethnic loyalties. It increases economic opportunities, social equality and reduces poverty, which will certainly minimize clientalism and dependence on state's natural resources. As literature also confirms this point, a single-handedly redistributed economic wealth, often earned from the production of one or few commodities, such as oil, fosters inter-ethnic animosity, suffocates advances towards democracy and loyalty to state identity (Chua 2004, 17; Jega 2000, 16; Timothy. 2007, 33-35).

Moreover, suitable market economic reform will boost the real economic sectors and that will create development (socio-economic and political prosperity). This will break the cycle of poverty and ethnic resentment, which are certainly the causative agents of 'conflict trap' (Collier 2007). The research found out that lack of opportunities/economic alienation of certain groups of people in the country induces them to join violent conflict (Gates 2011). Therefore, the economic reform should focus on bridging the socio-economic and political gap between the contended groups. It should be for the benefit of all Nigerians, irrespective of ethnicity. The reform should touch not only the lives of the privileged class but it must encompass ordinary Nigerians. Nigerian government should create equal economic opportunities for all its citizens in order to defuse indigenes-settlers violence and provide political environment where people will start trust one another and living together peacefully. The reform will hold the state together and foster unity, which produce new Nigerian identity that is beyond ethnic cleavage and kinship.

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