

NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN TURKEY

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by

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to my lovely family...



APPROVAL PAGE

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
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AUTHOR DECLARATIONS

The material included in this thesis has not been submitted wholly or in part for any academic award or qualification other than that for which it is now submitted.

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ABSTRACT

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NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN TURKEY

Turkish politics has been constructed on nationalism and democracy for almost a hundred years. These two political agendas have become the most important issues of Turkey from foundation of Turkish Republic to nowadays. Atatürk and state elites grounded Turkish Republic on Turkism, and they determined Turkish Republic's policy to reach 'contemporary civilizations'. With this target the main topic of Turkey was to reach contemporary civilizations. After foundation of Turkish Republic basis on Turkish nationalism had started to assimilate and ignorance the Kurds and other ethnic and cultural groups into Turkishness. This process made the Kurds' nationalist emotions to be increased and caused Kurdish rebellions existed. With this thesis I believe that democracy and nationalism affect each other. Therefore, I benefited from Anthony D. Smith's ethno-symbolist nationalism theory. In addition, I used Will Kymlicka's liberal theory of minority rights for democratization theory. Moreover, I found opportunity to analyze relationship between democracy and nationalism thanks to interviews from four parties in the parliament's provincial chairmen and district heads of parties. In conclusion, nationalism has both positive and negative effects on democracy in Turkey. In this respect, if Turkey adopts multicultural citizenship, democracy in Turkey will show positive progression.

Key words: Turkey, Nationalism, Democracy, Multicultural Citizenship, Kurdish Rebellions

KISA ÖZET

Murat ÇELİK

Temmuz 2016

TÜRKİYE’DE MİLLİYETÇİLİK VE DEMOKRASİ

Türkiye’de politika yaklaşık yüzyıldır demokrasi ve milliyetçilik üzerine inşa edilegelmiştir. Cumhuriyetin ilk yıllarından günümüze bu iki politika Türkiye’nin en önemli iki ana meselesi olmuştur. Atatürk ve devlet elitlerinin milliyetçilik üzerine kurduğu bu ülkeye daha sonra muassır medeniyetler seviyesine ulaşma hedefi verilmiştir. Bu hedef ile günün modern devletlerine ulaşmak Türkiye’nin en önemli konusu olmuştur. Yıllar içerisinde Kürtleri ve diğer etnik ve kültürel grupları asimilasyon ve yoksayma politikasıyla Türkleştirmek istenmiştir. Bu süreç Kürtlerin milliyetçi duygularını daha fazla kabartmıştır ve bir çok Kürt isyanının ortaya çıkmasına neden olmuştur. Ben bu çalışma ile demokrasi ve milliyetçiliğin bir birlerini etkilediğini düşünmekteyim. Bu yüzden Anthony D. Smith’in ethno-symbolist milliyetçilik kuramından yararlandım. Bunun yanında Will Kymlicka’nın Azınlık Haklarının Liberal Teorisi’nde demokratikleşme kuramı çerçevesinde kullandım. Ayrıca mecliste grubu bulunan dört siyasi parti il ve ilçe başkanlarına yapmış olduğum mülakatlar ile Türkiye’deki demokrasi ve milliyetçilik arasındaki ilişkiyi analiz etme imkanı buldum. Sonuç olarak milliyetçilik Türkiye’deki demokrasi üzerinde hem pozitif hem de negatif etkiye sahiptir. Bu bağlamda eğer Türkiye çokkültürlü vatandaşlığı benimser ise demokrasi pozitif yöde ilerleme gösterecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Milliyetçilik, Demokrasi, Çokkültürlü Vatandaşlık, Kürt İsyamları

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DP:	Democrat Party
NP:	National Party
NSC:	National Security Council
JP:	Justice Party
NTP:	New Turkey Party
RPNP:	Republican Peasants Nation Party
TLP:	Turkish Labor Party
NTP:	National Trust Party
RRP:	Republican Reliance Party
NOP:	National Order Party
MP:	Motherland Party
NDP:	Nationalist Democratic Party
SDP:	Social Democratic Party
TPP:	True Path Party
CUP:	Committee of Union and Progress
WWI:	World War I
WWII:	World War II
KKTC:	Kürdistan Tevaun ve Teali Cemiyeti
KTC:	Kürdistan Teali Cemiyeti
NAP:	Nationalist Action Party
GUP:	Grand Unity Party
NSP:	National Salvation Party
WP:	Welfare Party
VP:	Virtue Party
FP:	Felicity Party
JDP:	Justice and Development Party
TCF:	Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fıkrası
SCF:	Serbest Cumhuriyet Fıkrası
CHF:	Cumhuriyet Halk Fıkrası
RPP:	Republican People Party
SPP:	Social Democratic Populist Party
DLP:	Democratic Left Party
HEP:	People's Labor Party
HADEP:	People's Democracy Party
DTP:	Democratic Turkish Party
HDP:	People's Democratic Party
OZDEP:	Freedom and Democracy Party
PKK:	Kurdish Labor Party
DEHAP:	Democratic People Party
DTP:	Democratic Society Party

BDP: Peace and Democracy Party
LGBT: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender
EU: European Union
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization



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INTRODUCTION

1876 French Revolution created new world order by existing new ideology as known 'nationalism'. After this time, multicultural empires had been affected by this ideology. Ottoman Empire, for example, is one of them that were collapsed, and Atatürk and other state elites founded Turkish Republic in which Turkish nationalism played crucial role as becoming main argument of state elites. In the creation process other ethnic groups have been ignored and assimilated into Turkishness by state elites. However, the Kurds have resisted to assimilation and ignorance process with rebellions that were seen from 1925 Sheikh Said Rebellion to 1938 Dersim Rebellion. In this time almost 20 large and small rebellions existed. These rebellions have influences on Kurdish nationalist awakening directly.

My thesis attempts to research how assimilation and ignorance on the Kurds make the Kurds embrace Kurdish nationalism and fight against it. That is, my thesis focuses on Kurdish political identity in Turkey. Moreover, I have tried to analyze how these nationalisms, Kurdish and Turkish nationalisms, effect democratic consolidation of Turkey for long term. Because of that reasons I divided my thesis into four chapters. The first chapter is about the root of Kurdish nationalist awakening by referencing the late Ottoman Empire and early Turkish Republic. In this time space I attempted to analyze the five biggest and important Kurdish rebellions and Kurdish Unions' effect on Kurdish nationalism. These are Bedirhan Pasha Rebellion (1846), Sheikh Ubeydullah Rebellion (1876), and Sheikh Said Rebellion (1925), and Mt. Ararat Rebellion (1928-30), and Dersim Rebellion (1938) as well as Kurdish Newspaper (1908), and the KKTC (1908), and the KTC (1918).

In the second chapter I had attempted to look Turkish Political Experiment from 1923 to nowadays. In this time space I needed to look how the Kurds joined mainstream Turkish politics, and how this combination has affected Turkish politics and democracy in Turkey. I divided factors of consolidation of democracy in Turkey as internal and external factors. For internal factors two arguments are important to see democratic increasing in Turkey. One of them depends on transition from single

party system to multi party system in 1945. The other is that converging of different parties from different ethnics and ideology in parliament has positive influences on democracy in Turkey. For external factor is the candidacy process of Turkey for the EU from 1999 to nowadays. After 1999, Turkey has started to bring freedom in such areas like minority rights and human rights that has affected democracy level in Turkey. In the third chapter I did interviews with four major parties' provincial chairmen from Manisa, Izmir, and Gaziantep, which have groups in the parliament. This chapter is like continuous of the second chapter because I have tried to analyze how parties' focus for democracy in Turkey. In addition, I attempted to analyze how Kurdish party (the HDP) finds a seat in mainstream Turkish politics after June 7 Election in 2015. In the last chapter, which is my theory chapter, I have tried to see how nationalism and democracy are in relationship on case of Turkish and Kurdish nationalism. I grounded my nationalist theory on Smith's ethno-symbolism, and for democratization theory I focused on Kymlicka's liberal theory of minorities rights.

After all these analyzes and literature reviews, I found that nationalisms have positive effects on democratic consolidation in Turkey because pro-Kurdish parties joined to mainstream Turkish politics after 1991 election thanks to the SPP. There are 21 deputies were elected under umbrella of the SPP and pro-Kurdish supporters. After that time, Kurdish issue became effective agenda of mainstream Turkish politics. That is, Kurdish nationalism has found a way to present their desires in the parliament. Nowadays one can see easily if one looks the parliament's structure. There are four parties, and one of them is pro-Kurdish party, the HDP, that is joined last two elections as party. These shows that nationalism has direct effect on increasing in democracy in Turkey.

CHAPTER 1

1. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: LOCATING KURDISH POLITICAL IDENTITY

The Kurdish issue has been one of the main problems of Turkey for a long time. The date of the problem traced 1915 during First World War. “The roots of the problem date back to the nineteenth century and the ‘Eastern Problem’, which involved competition between the great powers, Russia and Britain, for influence over the Ottoman Empire” (Noi 2012, 15). During WWI, Britain, France, and Russia signed a secret agreement, Sykes-Picot agreement, in order to divide Ottoman territory to increase their power in Middle East. Actually, the name of agreement came from British and France signatories, Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot. It was secret because it would affect Ottoman territory’s integrity and contemporary states. Map of the Middle East had been redesigned by this agreement. Especially, Kurdish region including Iraq and Syria would have been shaped with Sykes Picot agreement. “Sykes-Picot called for the division of Kurdistan into Russian, French, and British spheres of influence” (Dahlman 2002, 278). Also, according to the agreement, most of Kurdish territory would have been under the control of France. However, the October Revolution, 1917 in Russia released this agreement. Lenin, who was the leader of the revolution, told the agreement’s details to all states, and the agreement abolished.

After abolishment of Sykes–Picot agreement, those states changed their strategy by supporting the Kurds to create independent state within Ottoman territory. The Sevres Treaty in 1920 became part of those states’ strategy. With Sevres Treaty, those states supported the Kurds to create their own independent state. “The division of the empire and final settlement of the ‘Eastern Question’ by promising the Kurds their own country were formalized in the Sevres Treaty, which was signed between France, Britain, and Russia (allies) and the Ottoman government in 1920” (O’ Leary

2002 in Noi 2012, 15). According to Michael M. Gunter, “the stillborn Treaty of Sevres, signed in August 1920, provided for ‘local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas’ (Article 62), and in the Article 64 even looked forward to the possibility that ‘the Kurdish peoples’ might be granted independence from Turkey” (2004, 199). However, countries did not apply the Sevres Treaty. Treaty of Lausanne was applied instead of the Sevres Treaty. “A resistance movement, which opposed the terms of Sevres Treaty, emerged in Anatolia and ended with the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and the establishment of the Republic of Turkey” (Kirişci and Winrow 1997 in Noi 2012, 15). After Treaty of Lausanne, Allies and Turkey agreed to shelve independent Kurdish state dream. In other words, Lausanne integrated the Kurds to Turkish Republic, and the Kurds became as one of the biggest minority group in Turkey once again. Thus, rule of Treaty of Sevres, which was promise of Kurdish independent state, was canceled an obligation. It means that assimilation and ignorance got momentum.

1.1. Debating the Future at the End of Ottoman Empire: Turkism, Islamism, Ottomanism:

From late of Ottoman Empire to founding of Turkish Republic, Turkism, Islamism, and Ottomanism had been discussed by statesmen. The main aim was to ensure Ottoman territorial integrity. The Youth Turks (Committee of Union and Progress, the CUP) played important role to shape Ottoman policy in order to save Ottoman integrity. The CUP discussed these three doctrines before and after of the Youth Turk revolution. Actually, the CUP believed that Ottomanism and Islamism is easier way to bring all subjects under control of Ottoman Empire because these two ideologies had been used by Ottoman Empire in the past. In other words, Ottoman Empire has experiences of these two. In contrast to Islamism and Ottomanism, Turkism, which is based on policy of ethnic Turkish nation, did not applied as official ideology of Empire in the past. Because of that case, its acceptability is hard by not only the CUP but also other subjects such as the Kurds.

The new world order was designed by French Revolution's nationalist understanding. The world's new ideology became ethnic nationalism. In other words, after French Revolution, nationalism got momentum to shape state's agenda. Not only non-Muslim minorities but also Muslim minorities rebelled to their government for founding their independent state. Mostly, Ottoman and Austrian-Hungary Empire were affected by nationalism because of having different ethnics in their territory borders. Even, Sheikh Ubeydullah's [I will mention about him later] rebellion is partly about Armenian's independent state desire in East of Ottoman territory by using nationalism. As noted above, the CUP played crucial role for saving salvation of Ottoman Empire by using Turkism, Islamism, and Ottomanism interchangeably. "...[T]he Ottoman Elites [the CUP] were torn between at least three broadly discernible political projects [Turkism, Islamism, and Ottomanism] at the turn of the nineteenth century, not all of them national, let alone nationalist" (Özkırmılı 2011, 90). Yusuf Akçura's, who is originally Tatar Turk, nationalist background became effective for the CUP to accept Turkism as state ideology. According to Heper, Yusuf Akçura's nationalistic background became effective to build upon secular and racist policies in Ottoman Empire (2007, 70). His article, *Three Types of Policy (Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset)*, can be accepted as a manifesto of Turkism by discussing Turkism, Islamism, and Ottomanism. He stated that:

It seems to me that since the rise of the desires for progress and rehabilitation spread from the West, three principal political doctrines have been conceived and followed in the Ottoman dominions. The first is the one which seeks to create an Ottoman Nation through assimilating and unifying the various nations subject to Ottoman rule. The second seeks to unify politically all Muslims living under the governance of the Ottoman State because of the fact that the prerogative of the Caliphate has been a part of the power of the Ottoman State (this is what the Europeans call Pan-Islamism). The third seeks to organize a policy of Turkish nationalism [*Türk Milliyet-i siyasiyesi*] based on ethnicity. (Akçura 1998 [1904], 1; translated by David S. Thomas in Özkırmılı 2011, 90)

Ottomanism and Islamism had lost its effectiveness in the Ottoman Empire because of nationalist awakening. After Balkan Wars, Ottomanism is depreciated. "Ottomanism was manifestly dying; the question was whether Islam or Turkism

would inherit its place, as the basis of cohesion and loyalty of the Turkish people” (Lewis 1967, 352). Beside that, Albania’s independence, Muslim minority in Ottoman Empire, and Arabs’ rebellions during WWI caused Islamism to down.

Ottoman’s downswing against capitulations is another reason to replace Ottomanism and Islamism to Turkism gradually. These reasons made the CUP follow Akçura’s Turkism understanding based on ethnicity. “In this period [after WWI] pan-Turkism had potent appeal, even if its political attraction proved ephemeral” (Hyman 2007, 342). Additionally, Akçura’s aim was that Turkism should be official ideology of Empire for both social and economical level. Creation of national economy will help Ottoman Empire to be more powerful against capitulations, which were given both England and French by Ottoman Empire. “During the last years of the Empire, the growing nationalism of the Young Turks led them to initiate some economic and social changes which were to reach a fuller development under the Republic” (Lewis 1967, 459). Decreasing in value of Ottomanism and Islamism assisted the CUP to follow Turkish nationalist ideology in order to bring all Turks together that is actually dream of Turkism.

The Young Turk regime found itself for both domestically and internationally as follower of pan-Turkism in order to consolidate power (Fuller and Barkey 1998, 8-9). Russian revolution in 1918 made Turks left from Russia to Ottoman territory. After this immigration, Turkism became more applicability. In other words, Turkism dream became more visible than past. Akçura created Turkish Homeland Journal in 1911 (*Türk Yurdu Dergisi*) by working seven years as editor of the Journal in order to affect both the CUP and public (Georgeon 2005; translated by me). “Turkish Homeland Journal, which rapidly became the organ of a more systematic and political form of Turkism” (Lewis 1967, 350). In those years, different nationalist journals, newspapers, and clubs were founded in order to provide nationalist awakening. Turkish Hearts (*Türk Ocakları*) were founded in 1912 by providing newspaper, conferences, meetings, and publishing books and essays. “Its [Türk Ocakları] aims were to advance the national education, and raise the scientific, social, and economic level of the Turks” (Lewis 1967, 350). Arai (1992) stated that

Akçura's goal in publishing a newspaper was, 'to make *Türk Ocağı* a window on Central Asia, a centre of the interchange between Turks inside and outside the Ottoman state'. Now we can say that Turkish nationalist idea spread from Istanbul to all territory of Ottoman Empire thanks to both *Türk Yurdu* and *Türk Ocakları*.

Akçura's Turkism ideology did not gain acceptance by his contemporaries. Foundation of Turkish Republic, based on nationalism, however, demonstrated that Turkism became dominant ideology on Turkish political agenda during the last century, and also it exercised for the evolution of the Turkish nation-state. Akçura's idea about nation-state is that "nation-state was necessary setting for the flourishing of Turkish culture and self-realization" (Yavuz 1993, 177). To increase self-awakening in the level of both state and society, nation-state is needed. In other words, Turkism was chosen by state elites during creation of Turkish Republic. The intellectuals and political elites of the 1930s have reformulated Ottoman Turkism or pan-Turkism to define Turkishness on the basis of the ethnic and even racial characteristics and asserted it as the political project of secular nationalism" (Üstel 2004, 215- 229 in Çırakman 2011, 1895). Turkish Republic has motivated by secular nationalist pillar to protect priority of ethnic Turkish race against 'the others'. Turkism idea has to be analyzed in terms of its reflections on the Turkish nation-state in order to understand ethnic identity politics.

1.1.2. Turkism and Turkish Nation-State

Nation-state building aspired to achieve a homogenous society as "[h]omogeneity is nationalism's ultimate dream" (Gellner 1983 in Özkırımlı 2011, 83). After creation of Republic, Atatürk and the state elites played critical role in order to increase one nation understanding. Homogenizing of population regardless of the Kurds, and non-Muslims such as Armenian and Jewish people was the basic argument of assimilation of new Turkish Republic. Some argue that "[s]ince all citizens of the Republic were considered Turks irrespective of religion and ethnicity, ... Atatürk attributed to his citizens an identity deriving from civic nationalism, and not from cultural nationalism. The civic nationalism is a subjective identity; a person

himself/herself decides whether or not s/he considers herself/himself the citizen of a country” (Heper 2007, 89). Accordingly, cultural nationalism could not apply to create one nation because with cultural nationalism Turks cannot be in power alone without the Kurds because of sharing same culture as well as the same religion. “The nation state tends to homogenize the population, and transform social, religious, cultural dimension of identities into a single, and in most cases, secular entity” (Orhan 2012, 343).

Turkish state decided to improve one nation state understanding in Turkey in order to increase its power both in external and internal affairs. “The dislocation of the Greeks from Anatolia was made mandatory via the Lausanne Accords pertaining to the exchange of populations that were signed between the Turkish and Greek delegates in 1923. The thought behind the accords was to create a nation-state with a homogenized population structure” (Kadioğlu 2007, 287). Homogenizing the population and cultural diversity into one citizenship understanding is one way of building a nation state. Turkish political elites determined Turkishness as based on linguistic unity of Turkish (*Türkçe*) and ethnic identity as Turk. According to Ayşe Kadioğlu (2007, 286-289), three ‘others’ had been created after homogenizing the population under the new Turkish Republic. The three ‘others’ categorized as non-Muslims, non-Turkish Muslims, and religious and traditional supporters of the Ottoman past. Non-Muslims were Jews, Greeks, and Armenians within the Empire. These are totally different because their native language was not Turkish and they were not Muslims. In the idea of Turkishness, the others found themselves as minority groups. Therefore, the exchange population became main issue of two parties, Turkish and other states. Accordingly, the ratio of non-Muslim in 1913 was one in every five persons, and the rate was one in 40 persons at the end of 1923 (Kadioğlu 2007). Non-Turkish Muslim was the Kurds, Arabs, Georgians, and Slavic Muslims. These ethnic groups lived in Anatolia, which became the main region for them. While these groups were Muslim their native language and cultural practices were different from Turks. These differences located these subjects as ‘other’s of the Turkish Republic. Arabs were lucky more than other ethnic communities because they rebelled to the Ottoman Empire during WWI, and they separated from the

Ottoman Empire by the Treaty of Lausanne. In addition, Alevis, which actually represented non-Sunni sect of Islam in the Kurds and Arabs, were also discriminated by the state.

Abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 helped political state elites to start political agenda of assimilation towards non-Turkish groups within Turkish Republic. Especially the Kurds were exposed to assimilatory practices such as restraints of using Kurdish Language, names and traditional features besides of constraints of expression of Kurdistan in the history books and magazines. Education system that was one way of assimilation towards ‘others’ was changed to increase of feeling Turkishness in Kurdish region. The system was based on Turkish language, and it was obligatory. The last ‘other’ can be explained with modernization and secularization of the Republic. “Atatürk believed that national progress would come by emulating, absorbing, and reproducing ‘European’ cultural values and political institutions” (Haynes 2010, 314). Accordingly, Atatürk made reforms (*inkilaps*- these were; abolition of the Sultanate in 1921, proclamation of the Republic, abolition of the Caliphate, the hat act, abolition of Islamic monasteries, approval of the Gregorian calendar, adoption of the Turkish Alphabet, adoption of civil law which recognized women’s rights, and also adoption of surname act) to reach level of contemporary civilization. Ottoman past was ‘othered’ as the symbol of backwardness (Kadioğlu 2007). People, who were discriminated by central government, represented Islamic and traditional orientations of the Ottoman Empire. For example, Minyeli Abdullah and Said Nursi (*Bediüzzaman*) were affected by the discrimination policies of the state. Independence Tribunals hanged Minyeli Abdullah, and Said Nursi was sent to exile.

Reforms showed that the transition from Ottoman Empire to Turkish republic, tradition and religion were reconstructed by the central government in order to adopt modernism and secularism in the new Turkish Republic easily. Accordingly, Şerif Mardin claimed that Islam is main trivet of Turkish culture. To respect this, the action between Islamists and laics grounded and cumulatively continued from

Turkish Republic to today (2007, 146). These three ‘others’ demonstrated that state centric Turkish Republic made them stay in the periphery.

[T]he Kemalist regime and its others, nationalist discourse played a crucial role in enabling the state to be successful in its performance: to operate on the basis of the assumed coexistence of the state and the nation, to exclude the Islamic Other and the Kurdish Other from the political landscape, to subjugate them to the secular and homogenous national identity, and to prevent them from becoming political actors (Keyman 2011, 18).

Perhaps one of the most significant rejections of above-mentioned project was the Sheikh Said rebellion. Kemal Kirişci cited “[Sheikh Said] rebellion occurred right after the establishment of the new Republic and the introduction of major political and social reforms intended to create a modern, centralized, homogeneous and secular Turkish state and society” (2008, 180). Additionally, Umut Özkırımlı stated that Turkish government used deportation of families’ policy from Balkan and Caucasian to Kurdish areas mostly southeast and east of Turkey with the Law of Settlement (*İskan Kanunu*) in 1934 (2013, 29). Before elaborating on Sheikh Said, next section will give a review of early Kurdish nationalism. Juxtaposing Kurdish nationalism to Turkish nationalism would lay the groundwork for understanding nationalism in multicultural societies theoretically in the following chapters.

By applying the law, some the Kurds were replaced to west, and some Turks were replaced to south where is traditionally represented by Kurdish culture. One of the main pillars of assimilation is to build homogenous population in order to establish ultimate dream of nationalism, which is known a pipe dream of state elites to see in the level of both life and political units. Accordingly, nationalism never withdraws from homogeneity in order to get divisions and different ideas that exist in a nation. State elites decided to change education system by applying nationalism understanding for all. They believed that homogeneity of society could be supplied with education. Başak İnce (2012, 116) cited that ‘Citizenship education has been a vital part of the Republic’s project to create a modern homogeneous nation-state out of the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire’. Now, if Atatürk and state elites accepted the Kurds as an independent state during foundation of Republic, they would override all

interests of country even pipe dream. Therefore, they would not talk about ultimate dream of nationalism.

1.2. Early Kurdish Nationalism:

In the literature, academicians have different ideas about when Kurdish nationalism built. Robert Olson and David McDowall argued that Kurdish nationalism started during the time of Sheikh Ubeydullah from 1876 (1991; 2004). However, Martin van Bruinessen stated that there is no evidence of nationalism effect in Sheikh Ubeydullah's rebellion (1992). In addition, some others argue that Kurdish nationalism was built after WWI (Özoğlu 2001; 2004; 2011; Oran; 2002). In addition, modernists view Kurdish nationalist manifestation as a reaction to the political changes that followed the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (Hassan 2013, 76). Hassanpour suggests that modern Kurdish nationalism was formulated around the mid-nineteenth century but did not crystalize until the events of the early twentieth century, such as the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 (1992 in Hassan 2013, 78). From these approaches it can be argue that there are four stages of Kurdish nationalism. I will first name these four stages and then explain them. One of them is 19th century Kurdish nationalism during the Ottoman Empire that surfaced through rebellions, especially Sheikh Ubeydullah rebellion. Second stage is the very beginning of the Hamidiye Cavalry in 1890. Third is three Kurdish societies that were formed before and end of the WWI starting with Kürdistan Tevaun ve Terakki Cemiyeti [Kurdish Society for Mutual Cooperation and Progress, KKTC) in 1908, Kurdistan Newspaper, Kurdistan Hevi Cemiyeti, and Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti [Society for the Advancement of Kurdistan (SAK), KTC) in 1918. And the last is rebellions in new Turkish Republic such as Sheikh Said in 1925, Mount Ararat in 1928-30[also known as Ağrı rebellion], and Dersim rebellions in 1938.

These four stages are turning points of Kurdish nationalism in the Ottoman Empire and early Turkish Republic. After Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, the new Turkish Republican State was found. the Kurds lost opportunity to create an independent state under the name of Kurdistan in southeast and east of Turkey. "The new order of

forced homogenizing nationalism has been the major source of conflict in Turkey” (Yavuz 2007, 1). With new ideology, Turkish State wanted to create nation state with a citizenship understanding based on one ethnicity. That is to say, the other ethnic groups could not define themselves as their ethnic background in the level of constitution.

1.2.1. Bedirhan Pasha and Sheikh Ubeydullah Rebellions

To understand the existing Kurdish political identity within Turkey, along with the Republican aim for creating a homogenous society, Kurdish nationalism has to be scrutinize. Analysis of Kurdish nationalism is necessary to understand how the Kurds mobilize themselves and how they perceive their position within Turkey and forming an independent state. The proto-Kurdish nationalism was demonstrated by two rebellions, Bedirhan Pasha (1847) and Sheikh Ubeydullah (1880-81), in the late of Ottoman Empire. The Kurds lived in Ottoman Empire as state (*eyalet*) in Southeast and East of Ottoman territory. The Kurds were under control of two big tribes (*aşiret*), Şemdinan and Bedirhan families. Sheikh Ubeydullah was leader of Şemdinan, and Bedirhan was leaders of Bedirhan family. “Kurdish notables played an important role in promoting the idea [independent state] and assuming the leadership” (Özoğlu 2001, 386). “The Şemdinan family emerged as political and military leaders of the Kurds in the second half of the 19th century and controlled a vast region in southeastern Anatolia and northwestern Iran. The rise of this family, headed by Sheikh Ubeydullah in the 1870s and 1880s, marks an important era in Kurdish history” (Özoğlu 2001, 387). Additionally, “Bedirhan Pasha (1802/3-1869/70) became the ruler of Botan in 1835 and controlled this strong emirate in the first half of the nineteenth century” (Özoğlu 2011, 209-210).

These two figures are important to understand Kurdish nationalism during and after Ottoman Empire. In the nineteenth century, two big rebellions happened by Bedirhan Pasha and Sheikh Ubeydullah. Mainly, these two leaders wanted to protect their fatherland (*Kurdistan*) from Ottoman Empire’s policy, which gives privileges to non-Muslim in Southeast and East of Ottoman territory. Bedirhan Pasha was emirate of

Botan in Southeast of Ottoman Empire. He increased both his political power and territory power not only in Ottoman Empire but also in Iran. Bedirhan Pasha was loyal leader to Ottoman Empire during his time. To see loyalty of Bedirhan Pasha to Ottoman State, two campaigns, Nizip Campaign and Mr. Said Campaign are important. Bedirhan Pasha assisted to Ottoman Empire to suppress these campaigns before he became Botan Emirate. Two American missionaries, Dr. Wright and Mr. Breath, stated that;

[Bedirhan] told us that eight years ago, when he was weak and Turkey strong, he entered into an engagement with the latter; and that now, though the power changed hands, he did not violate his word.... He is an uncommon man. Eight years ago he was poor, without power, and little known. The Turkish government then took him by the hand; and now his wealth is incalculable (Özoğlu 2004, 71).

Bedirhan Pasha benefited from Ottoman Empire's power to become regional power. He helped Nurullah Bey, who is another Kurdish leader of region, by attacking Nestorians in order to increase his regional power. Bedirhan Pasha wanted to create semi-independent state in his powerful territory. However, Ottoman Empire limited Bedirhan Pasha's power by taking Cizre and Diyarbakir under the control of its power. According to Özoğlu, taking Cizre and Diyarbakır from Bedirhan Pasha were important to break his regional power (Özoğlu 2001). Bedirhan Pasha rebellion seems to aim protecting his power more than being a nationalistic movement. However, Bedirhan Pasha's desire for semi-independent Kurdistan state can be evaluated to increase Kurdish nationalism in his family and region because Bedirhan's children will be leader of creation of Kurdish nationalism in the late 19th and very beginning of 20th century.

The other figure is Sheikh Ubeydullah in the late Ottoman Empire. He was originally a notable Kurdish religious leader. He came from the background of Nakşibendi religious order. He became from an emirate of Hakkari after Ottoman-Russian war in 1877. Bedirhan Pasha was defeated by Ottoman Empire in 1847. Therefore, there was no other rebellion that happened in Ottoman Empire until Sheikh Ubeydullah rebellion in 1880-81. After Bedirhan Pasha, there was power vacuum in the

Southeastern territory of Ottoman Empire. This is one of the reasons for Sheikh Ubeydullah increased his power in the region. According to Özoğlu, the most important reason for Sheikh Ubeydullah to increase his personal leadership is power vacuum that was created by the destruction of Kurdish tribal leadership in the 19th century (2004, 73). In addition, “In the aftermath of this brutal war [Ottoman and Russian war], which paralyzed the region, we see Sheikh Ubeydullah of Şemdinan filling the political and military power vacuum and assuming Kurdish leadership not only in most of Ottoman Kurdistan but also in Iran” (Özoğlu 2004, 74). Sheikh Ubeydullah’s personal desire is to increase his regional power both in Ottoman and Iran territory. Thus he purchased lands from different tribes in Ottoman and Iran. From Hakkari to Ardalán he created powerful administrative body. His personal desire was to create independent Kurdistan on his powerful territory both in Iran and Ottoman Empire. However, as it mentioned above, Ottoman Empire gave opportunity to Armenia and Nestorians [supporter of England in region and especially Christians] to create their independent state in the region of Kurdistan. In terms of that case Sheikh Ubeydullah rebelled to Ottoman Empire to create independent Kurdistan in the region both against interest of Armenia and Nestorians. “[T]he main reason for revolt was to promise made to Armenians after Treaty of Berlin, signed on 13 July 1878 by the Ottoman Empire” (Özoğlu 2001, 390).

“Article 61 of the treaty [Treaty of Berlin] stipulated that the Sublime Porte would undertake necessary steps to protect Armenians against the Circassian and the Kurds” (Hurewitz 1956 in Özoğlu 2001, 390). It shows that Ottoman Empire had been losing both its external and internal power. Accordingly, people in Kurdistan can be protecting themselves without any support from Ottoman Empire. Sheikh Ubeydullah was the most known figure to protect Kurdistan from both Ottoman Empire and Armenia. Özoğlu stated that to show dissatisfaction with treaty, in July 1880 Ubeydullah warned Tosun Pasha, the governor of Baskale:

What is this I hear, that the Armenians are going to have an independent state in Van, and that the Nestorians are going to hoist the British flag and declare themselves British subjects. I will never permit it, even if I have to arm the women (Parliamentary Paper 1881, 5 in 2004, 74).

Waide Jwaideh (1960) stated that ‘fear of the Armenian ascendancy in Kurdistan appears to have been one of the most powerful reasons behind [Ubeydullah’s] attempt to unite the Kurds and lead them to revolt’. Sheikh Ubeydullah and his follower wanted to build independent or autonomous state under name of Kurdistan. Because Sheikh Ubeydullah’s territory power and struggle power included not only Ottoman territory but also Iran. “His [Ubeydullah’s] political control extended over a vast region that was formerly controlled by the Botan, Bandihan, Hakkari, and Ardalan confederacies” (Özoğlu 2011, 212). From parliamentary papers and Sheikh Ubeydullah’s letter, Sheikh Ubeydullah’s rebellion can be read as a spark or encourage of Kurdish nationalism.

The Sheikh ... states that he and all the Kurdish Chiefs are now agreed as to necessity of establishing *a united Kurdistan* in order that they may be in a position to manage their own affairs without the interference of either Turkish or Persian authorities.... There seems to be no doubt from ... the proclamations and correspondence which [Ubeydullah] has lately sent to various Kurdish Chiefs along the lines of the Persian border that his design is to detach the entire Kurdish population from their allegiance to Turkey and Persia and to establish under his own authority a separate autonomous Principality (Parliamentary Paper 1881, 5 in Özoğlu 2004, 75).

In addition to this, Sheikh Ubeydullah’s letter is most important argument to demonstrate that it includes nationalistic discourse. Sheikh Ubeydullah stated that:

The Kurdish nation, consisting of more than 500,000 families, is a people apart. Their religion is different [from that of others], and their laws and customs distinct.... We are also a nation apart. We want our affairs to be in our hands, so that in the punishment of our own offenders we may be strong and independent, and have privileges like other nations.... This is our object [for the revolt].... Otherwise the whole of Kurdistan will take the matter into their own hands, as they are unable to put up with these continual evil deeds, and the oppression, which they suffer at the hands of the [Persian and Ottoman] governments (Parliamentary Paper 1881, 5 in Özoğlu 2004, 75).

Sheikh Ubeydullah’s letter and parliamentary paper demonstrated that Ubeydullah’s revolt carried nationalistic meaning. Thus Waide Jwaideh (1960) claimed that

“Relying on the aforementioned letter to demonstrate the secessionist favor of Ubeydullah, some scholars state that Ubeydullah’s statement certainly leaves no doubt as to his strong nationalist sentiment” (Özoğlu 2011, 214). The next stage of Kurdish nationalism includes Hamidiye Cavalry and Kurdish Newspaper.

1.2.2. Hamidiye Cavalry (*Alayı*) and Kurdish Newspaper

Hamidiye Cavalry was a project of Sultan Abdulhamit II. The Union was founded in 1891 and it continued until 1914. Sultan’s two confidantes, Şakir Pasha and Zeki Pasha played important role to design and spread effects of Hamidiye Cavalry in the region. They took role of convincing Kurdish landlords and spiritual leaders to recognize that union. Abdulhamit II organized this union as military force in the Southeast and East of Ottoman Territory. Leaders of Hamidiye Cavalry were chosen both citizens (*tebaa*) of Ottoman Empire especially between Kurdish and Turkish leaders. “[T]he impact of the Hamidiye militia on the transformation of the regional structure of power, on tribal society, on socio-economic relations among the local people, and on changes in the land tenure and land holdings” (Ünlü 2010, 245). Hamit Bozarlan (2008) stress that the regime [Hamidiye Cavalry] were founded for combating revolutionary desire of Armenians in east of territory (336). In other words, Kurdish notables and feudal were played important role to defend Ottoman integrity against Nestorians and Armenians.

The mission of Hamidiye Cavalry is same as Village Guard System (*Köy Koruyuculuğu Sistemi*) of current politics of Turkish Republic. For both of them, the Kurds are chosen to defend integrity of Empire/State. However, nowadays Village Guards played role to decrease effects of Kurdish Worker Party (the PKK), which is founded by extreme nationalist group among the Kurds. Abdulhamid II’s Hamidiye Cavalry project took important role in the regions in the short term by depriving anti-state potential of both Kurdish and Armenian revolutionary. On the other hand, for the long term, Hamidiye Cavalry became problematic issue of empire as well as the CUP. Kurdish nationalist self-awareness became effective between Kurdish notables such as İhsan Pasha and Hamidiye Cavalry commanders. “Some of these co-opted

tribes, keen to preserve their own autonomy rather than defending the state's interests, later became the most fervent supporters of the Kurdish challenge to state authority" (Bozarslan 2008, 336). Their effects were seen on rebellion for both Sheikh Said (1925), and Mt. Ararat rebellion (1930). In Hamidiye regime, they were taught for both militaristic and leadership, and their title were Hamidiye Pasha. The CUP also continued Hamidiye regime until 1914. However, Zeki Pasha was dismissed from Hamidiye Cavalry because of confidante of Sultan.

After creation of Hamidiye Cavalry, some Kurdish notables who were sent to exile by Ottoman Empire found the new organization in 1897. Some of them were been in Hamidiye Cavalry, but they were sent to exile. The organization was known as Kurdish Newspaper that was the first newspaper of the Kurds. It was firstly published in Cairo and later in the West especially, England. Its language covered both Kurdish and Turkish. The main aim was not totally based on Kurdish nationalism. Bedirhan Family organized the first Kurdish newspaper in 1897 (Edmonds 1971, 89). In addition, son of Bedirhan Pasha Mithad Miktad Pasha published Kurdistan newspaper in Cairo. However, the cultural effects outweighed more than political aspect. Bedrihan's another son, Abdurrahman Bedrihan, published Kurdistan newspaper in Geneva, 1897 (Hür 2008). Ahmad Xani's Mem u Zin [there are different opinions in the literature about Mem u Zin. Some scholars accepted that it is the first nationalist awareness. However, opposition to this idea was about that it includes cultural values of the Kurds] was published in Kurdistan Newspaper in the establishing cultural nationalism.

Kurdistan Newspaper protected its availability until creation of the KKTC (Kurdistan Terakki ve Tevaun Cemiyeti) in 1908. After that time, the KKTC controlled newspaper with same policy, but some nationalist columns were shared in time. However, as noted already, outweigh of cultural values were seen more than political values. In other words, despite the fact that political self-awareness columns were shared, the creation of the KKTC was almost based on Kurdish social cooperation and progress. Next sub-section gives historical background of the KKTC.

Kurdish nationalism's third stage mostly includes Kurdistan Newspaper, Kurdistan Tevaun ve Terakki Cemiyeti, Kurdistan Hev-i Cemiyeti, and Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti. This stage is important for Kurdish nationalism spread into the Kurds. It helps the Kurds reach self-awakening. This stage was continued to Sheikh Said.

After WWI, Middle East and Ottoman Empire's map was redrawn. Kurdish population was divided among different states. "Most the Kurds found themselves living in Turkey, Iran, and two new Arab states, Syria and Iraq, after WWI" (Kirişci and Windrow 1997 in Noi 2012, 16). "Before WWI, Kurdistan was divided between the Ottoman Empire and the Persian Empire. Following WWI, Kurdistan was divided among five different states. Although only approximation can be cited, Turkey has the largest portion of Kurdistan (43 percent), followed by Iran (31 percent), Iraq (18 percent), Syria (6 percent), and the former Soviet Union (now mainly Armenia and Azerbaijan- 2 percent)" (Gunter 2004, 197). Kurdish population is the largest population among other minorities that do not have a state. "The Kurds are one of the world's largest transnational and stateless ethnic groups. As a language/ethnic group, they comprise 14-16 percent of Turkey's population" (Ergin 2014, 324). "Current estimates of Ethnic the Kurds in Turkey based on mother tongue, not subjective identification, range between 12 and 20% percent of Turkey's population" (Gündüz and Smits 2002 in Somer 2004, 249). According to Michael M. Gunter (2004, 198), "Kurdish population is almost between 12 to 15 million of Turkish population, and also 6.5 million of Iran, 3.5 to 4 million of Iraq, 1 million in Syria beside of two hundred thousand in former Soviet Union".

1.2.3. Kurdistan Terakki ve Tevaun Cemiyeti (KKTC)

From late of 19th century, Ottoman Empire fell down day by day. Nationalism could be seen more than past in the Ottoman Empire. Kurdish Nationalism also got momentum with different organizations. Now, *Kurdistan Terakki ve Tevaun Cemiyeti* [Society for Mutual Aid and Progress of Kurdistan, KKTC] would become effective to spread cultural nationalism after 1908. Two families, Bedirhan family and Şemdinan Family, were played important role in the emergence of Kurdish

nationalism. As I noted before, Bedirhan rebellion was not directly about Kurdish nationalism, and for some intellectuals, especially Hakan Özoğlu and Martin van Bruinessen, there is no record that Sheikh Said rebellion was also Kurdish nationalist rebellion. However, the foundation of KKTC was created under control of both of these two families. Initially, Kurdish cultural nationalism became one of the issues of KKTC. Sheikh Abdulakdir, son of Sheikh Ubeydullah became President of KKTC in 1908.

Sheikh Abdulakdir is most important figure in order to understand Kurdish nationalism because his contribution was seen for Sheikh Said rebellion. Sheikh Said rebellion will be discussed below. Now, Sheikh Abdulkadir was sent with his father to exile, Medine after Sheikh Ubeydullah rebellion. He stayed until 1908 in the exile. After the Young Turks revolution, Enver Pasha met with him to convince Kurdish notables and feudal for recognizing the Young Turks' administration. He sent telegram to Kurdish notables in order to convince them. He became member of the CUP in 1908 by turning back to Istanbul. Sheikh Abdulkadir built new dimension of Kurdish nationalism. However, Sheikh Abdulkadir did not find enough space for Kurdish nationalism. KKTC was not based on Kurdish nationalist movement (Özoğlu 2004). On the other hand, Janet Klein is opposed to the idea of Özoğlu. She argued that KKTC was the first Kurdish nationalist club in 1908 (2007, 137-139). There are no enough researches about KKTC in literature. However, what I analyzed that cultural effect of Kurdish nationalism outweighed than political nationalism because of Young Turk revolution. KKTC was founded in Istanbul instead of Kurdistan in order to increase idea of independent Kurdistan by affecting new government, the CUP. In addition, being Istanbul can help them to get in contact with other states easily. Even, resulting of communication created Sevr Treaty. After creation of KKTC, Kurdistan took new form as *Kürd Tevaun and Terakki Gazatesi* (Kurdish Journal of Mutual Aid and Progress). Janet Klein emphasized that the journal's publications were based on 'Kurdish freedom' and 'Kurdish right' (2007, 139). Accordingly, there is differentiation between two leaders of KKTC. Actually, this differentiation was determinant with their fathers' goal about Kurdistan. Bedirhan Family are, which wanted to create an independent Kurdistan state in East,

called them as secessionist. On the other hand, Şemdinan Family wanted to become an autonomous state in Kurdistan territory. KKTC was dissolved during WWI. However, the new one was opened by under control of Sheikh Ubeydullah in 1918 as called *Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti* (Society for the Advancement of Kurdistan, KTC).

1.2.4. Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti (KTC)

Kurdish Notables such as Sheikh Abdulkadir, Şerif Pasha, and Emir Bedirhan founded KTC in 1918. KTC demonstrated us that Bedirhan Family and Şemdinan Family became again effective for Kurdish nationalist movement in KTC. According to Kirişçi and Winrow, when the CUP's ideology concerns Turkism more than Ottomanism and Islamism, they [Abdulkadir and Emir Bedirhan] left from the CUP in order to establish KTC with Kurdish nationalism (1997, 81). Hakan Özoğlu stated that the most importance view of the KTC was based on nationalist line and followed political projects for Kurdish self-awareness (Özoğlu 2011, 217). Sheikh Abdulkadir played most important role than other leaders. In contrast to KKTC, KTC opened new branches in outside of Istanbul. KTC also established new Journal as named Jin. The main purpose of Jin is that spread Kurdish self-determination with Kurdish nationalism. Accordingly, socio-political articles about Kurdishness became effective topic for journalists. Even they mentioned about KTC's functions proudly. Moreover, Şerif Pasha communicated with other countries in order to create an independent Kurdistan. Because of that case, Şerif Pasha and some other members of KTC joined Paris Peace Conference in 1919. As I believed that Şerif Pasha had effect over creation of Sevr Treaty. However, Şerif Pasha compromised with England in order to create independent Kurdistan as well as an independent Armenia. However, Sheikh Abdulkadir's idea was not based on secessionism. Accordingly, different opinions in KTC made Union broke up. On the other hand, Sheikh Abdulkadir never gave up his idea. His effects were seen on Sheikh Said rebellion later. I will discuss it in part of Sheikh Said rebellion.

As mentioned above, the Lausanne Treaty was break point for the Kurds in order to create independent Kurdistan with their ethnic and cultural background such as

mother tongue, Kurmanji. However, with the Lausanne Treaty in 1923, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and State Elites established Turkey. Main purpose of them is to create one nation state. Not only international level but also domestic level there was contradiction between State Elites and the Kurds. 1921 and 1924 Constitution included different ideas about minorities. For example 1921 Constitution stated;

... a kind of local autonomy is to be granted. Hence, provinces inhabited by the Kurds will rule themselves autonomously. ... (The) Grand National parliament of Turkey is composed of the deputies of both the Kurds and Turks and these two peoples have unified their interest and fates (Mustafa Kemal Eskişehir-Izmit Speeches (1923) in Yeğen 2009, 599).

The 1921 Constitution was important for minorities especially the Kurds because they would present themselves by protecting their cultural and ethnic interest as Turks in the parliament. On the other hand, after the establishment of Turkish Republic, the new Constitution could not include such issues for minorities especially the Kurds. Even, limitations for the Kurds were first issue of States Elites. 1924 Constitution stated;

Our state is a nation state. It is not a multi-national state. The state does not recognize any nation other than Turks. There are other peoples which come from different races (ethnic groups) and who should have equal rights within country. Yet it is not possible to give rights to these people in accordance with their racial (ethnic) status (Gözübüyük and Sezgin 1957 in Yeğen 2009, 599).

Before continuing to discuss the processes of political reflections of Kurdish identity, the next section examines how Turkish state has been developed with an emphasis on Turkish ethnic identity.

1.3. Formation of State based on Turkish Ethnic Identity

Turkish Republic accepted the Kurds that are ethnic group but they do not have political rights as Turks in the parliament. They are only citizens of Turkey. “After 1924 constitution defined all citizens as Turkish. The state did not tolerate cultural

expressions of Kurdish identity, for example publicly speaking one of the Kurdish languages” (McDowall 2004 in Ergin 2014, 325). “Though this new state acknowledged the existence of ethnic groups other than Turks, it denied recognizing their legal rights” (Yeğen 2007, 126). In addition, “the transition from multicultural cosmopolitan Ottoman Empire to a Republican Turkey resulted in the promotion of a homogenous secular nationalism that did not tolerate diversity and insisted that all inhabitants become Turks” (Yavuz 2001, 7). The new Turkish Republican period was grounded on nationalist ideology and it was supported by 1924 Constitution. In the idea of the Turkish Nationalism is that the Kurds would become Turks by assimilating them. They started to assimilate the other ethnic groups to become Turk. “Turkish nationalism of the republican era has principally perceived the Kurds as future Turks” (Yeğen 2006, 137). “The Kurds in Turkey mostly been seen as prospective –Turks and accordingly have been subject to the assimilationist practices of citizenship throughout the Republican period” (Yeğen 2009, 597). “The estimated 13 million the Kurds living in Turkey have been the object of an intense assimilation campaign by the state ever since the Turkish Republic’s establishment in 1923” (Strategic Comment 1997, 1).

After foundation of Republic to present, Turkey did not give up nationalism which can be seen every square of Republic from East to West and North to South. According to Tanıl Bora (2011), Turkish Republic was based on nationalism of Akçura and Ziya Gökalp which are based on German and French style understanding of ethnic nationalism, to determine its ideological frame of nation-state. Tanıl Bora drew five nationalisms in his article, Nationalist Discourses in Turkey. Official Nationalism: Atatürk nationalism, Kemalist Ulusçuluk, the Liberal “Neo-Nationalism”, pan-Turkist Radical Nationalism, and also Nationalism in Islamism (Bora 2011; Bora 2003). Nationalist discourse has been effective from early Turkish political thought to now [party in power, Justice and Development Party, JDP] with different names, which was given above. Turkish Republic was shaped with Official Nationalism: Atatürk Nationalism. The other nationalist movements have been framed by Atatürk nationalism. “In fact, no single Turkish nationalism exists; there are Turkish nationalisms” (Özkırımlı 2011, 89). However, Atatürk nationalism has

still protecting its powerful hegemony in Turkey. There are reasons to keep continue its hegemony. One of them is army, whose idea has been constructed with Atatürk nationalism. “The army... takes on a central role in the reproduction of the official nationalism” (Bora 2011, 63). Accordingly, “ the army considers itself to be true owner and personified symbol of nationalism” (Bora 2011, 64). Accordingly, army followed exclusive strategy of Atatürk nationalism by closing political parties in Turkey. “[T]he army forces could-and did- close down political parties which they believed extremist [threat for Atatürk nationalism and secularism], that is, either to religious oriented, too ideologically radical, or too separatist in orientation, for example, those connected to Kurdish demands for autonomy or independence” (Haynes 2010, 315). Another is that Atatürk nationalism is largely emanated by state-centered and assimilationist by propagated ethnic exclusiveness. “ ...[i]n the Turkish case, construction of self-image alongside modernization and secularism has been a concern of the early republican elites” (Çırakman 2011, 1895).

Atatürk’s principles and reforms were applied to spread official nationalism and secularism in the every unit of life beside of state for reaching ‘level of contemporary civilization’. The last reason is that official nationalism used exhibitionist strategy, which means that to demonstrate itself in every part of life and institutions with flag, Atatürk posters, the Turkish national anthem, and anthem in the primary school besides of Atatürk’s Address to Youth (*Gençliğe Hitabe*). The other nationalist doctrines have been named with different names in terms of “globalization, minorities and human right issues in the new world order, and transnational process of economy” (Bora 2011, 57). Above mentioned that these can be counted as external effects on nationalism. The other reason is internal that determines political agenda of state. Governments shape state ideology with their ideological framework. It is also effective issue of reconstructed ideology with their agenda. As already noted, Çırakman stated that in the early republican period, state elites took active role to shape government’s ideology throughout ethnic nationalism and secularism whereas for the ethno-nationalist, asserting a nationalist self-image has become a political project to be pursued throughout the 2000s (2011, 1895).

Nationalisms have been seen in the Turkish political process with different issues. Turkey's political process has been changed from one-party system to multi-party after 1946. After 1960, a military coup demonstrated itself in the politics of Turkey, and 1960s opened new way of creation of pan-Turkism with National Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, the NAP*) under leadership of Alpaslan Türkeş, who played crucial role in the 1960 military coup. In time, some different movements and parties was created as same ideological framework of the NAP such as *Büyük Birlik Partisi* (the GUP). Those have same aim that exclude Kurdish politics. Additionally, "From the 1990s to the beginning of the twenty-first century two dynamic have been at play in the shaping of Turkish nationalism. One of them is reactionary nationalist movement [the NAP's political way] that uses the theme of national survival in a dramatized way. This movement... affects not only center/right –wing politics but also left/wing politics besides of the army. The other is Kemalist Ulusçuluk. Kemalism, which was represented by leftist movement in Turkey of 1980s, is the main pillar of Kemalist Ulusçuluk. The Kemalist Ulusçuluk's main aim is that to interpret nationalism for secularization and modernization of Turkey.

To be more secular and modern, the term 'ulusçuluk' was used by state elites to give nationalist meaning. The secularist is against political Islam in Turkey and New Right-Wing. Kemalist Ulusçuluk represents itself in 1960s and 1970s as anti-imperialism and looking for independence. However, it follows discourse of anti-globalization in 2000s. That is, it performs as xenophobia in its understanding. For example, *These Crazy Turks (Şu Çılgın Türkler)* dramatically constructs war as the Turkish's nationalist resistance against imperialism under the leadership of Atatürk (Bora 2011, 67). Additionally, during Ottoman period, the term 'millet' was used instead of 'ulus'. Actually, these two have same meaning in English. However, 'millet' stands for all habitants of Empire regardless of race and religion. After foundation of Republic based on ethnic and language understanding, the term 'ulus' has been used to perform one nation as Turks.

The other nationalism in Bora's analysis is liberal 'neo-nationalism'. It spreads thanks to globalization and collapse of Soviet Union for 1990s. The second [the liberal neo-nationalism] is a pro-Western nationalistic movement (reminiscent of the nationalism of the late 1980s and 1990s [because of increased globalization and liberal economy, and collapse of Soviet Union]), which believes that the nation's best interest lies in merging with the globalization process" (Bora 2011, 62). It is based on developing view of modernization. There is no xenophobia understanding. This ideology also has exclusive understanding based on economical and ethnic level. It creates class racism because of chauvinism of prosperity. For example, the Kurdish immigrants, who come to the western regions in search of jobs and/or as refugees from the war, as parasites gnawing at economic prosperity can easily ally the chauvinism of prosperity with ethno-nationalist radicalism (Bora 2011, 69).

The last is nationalism in Islamism. This is created as new right political Islam in Turkey by criticizing nationalism and nation-state of Atatürk because Islam is above both nation-state and nationalism. This stream has been followed by National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi, The NSP*), Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi, the WP*), Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi, the VP*), Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi, the FP*), and also Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, the JDP*). The main pillar of this movement is accepted as anti-Western xenophobia.

Analysis show that "when Turkish self-image reflects such an inflamed condition, nationalism ceases to be a unifying discourse and divisive against enemies (Çırakman 2011, 1903). In terms of this case, Turkish political process has been shaped with nationalist frame. In 2000s, the nationalist movements got momentum because of Kurdish and Alevis' desiring of political identity or Orhan Pamuk's interview, who stated that 'One million Armenians and thirty thousands the Kurds were killed in these lands, and nobody but me dares to talk about it' (BBC News 2006), makes people's nationalist idea are increased. People have excluded him and even they have claimed that he is the traitor. Additionally, Hrant Dink was assassinated because of his Armenian identity and his political vision for Turkey.

Hrant Dink's assassination was organized by pan-Turkist movement in 2007 because of Dink's idea about Armenian genocide.

1.4. The Kurdish Rebellions of Sheikh Said Rebellion (1925), Ararat Rebellion (1930), and Dersim Rebellion (1938) in early Turkish Republic

From foundation of Turkish Republic to 1938, 18 of all sizes Kurdish rebellion were seen in order to suppress Turkish new government's political agenda. Those are important to see Kurdish self-awareness on not only nationalist but also religious. Those 18 rebellions' common feature but one was that all of them were seen in Southeastern and East of Turkey where Kurdish population resident. Most known three of 18 rebellions are Sheikh Said rebellion, Ararat (*Ağrı Dağı*) rebellion, and Dersim rebellion. As noted already, in the new Turkish Republic, the Kurds were not recognized as different political and cultural ethnic group. They were accepted as only citizen of Turkey without any political rights in the parliament by 1924 Constitution. the Kurds were expected to create their new independent territory by Treaty of Sevres. On the other hand, they became subject of assimilation of new Turkish Republic, and they rebelled to new government to take opportunity for creating independent or autonomous state. Mehmet Orhan stress that “ One should pay attention to two symbolic factors in the Kurdish context in the 1920s: the struggle of actors over the political and social system and symbolic violence as a trigger of the rebellion” (2012, 343).

Sheikh Said Rebellion of 1925, and the other small rebellions were important to understand why the Kurds rebelled to new government. The importance of Sheikh Said rebellion is that it is first rebellion to Turkish Republic. The rebellion was started from city of southeastern, Diyarbakır. “The revolt spread rapidly from the north of Diyarbakır to other towns and cities in the southeast, centered along Murat River between the Euphrates River and Lake Van” (Dahlman 2002, 279). “Sheik [Sheikh] Said of the Nakşibendi order was initially successful and even controlled the surrounding of Diyarbakır and Elazığ” (Yavuz 2007, 7). Sheikh Said Rebellion was originally represented both nationalist and religious. According to Martin van

Bruinessen (1992), Sheikh said rebellion was “neither a purely religious nor a purely nationalist one...” (298-9). Uğur Mumcu stated that Sheikh Said rebellion was based on Islamist reactionary movement to Turkish new government (1993). Also, Baskın Oran stress that Sheikh Said rebellion was an Islamist movement as well as the first Kurdish nationalist rebellion (2004, 875). “Some of the leaders who were involved in the Sheikh Said rebellion were very conscious of their distinct Kurdish identity and clearly had articulated a separatist political agenda, albeit with a heavy dosage of religious discourse” (Kirişci & Winrow 1997, 104). However, Robert Olson stated that nationalist incentives were more considerable than religious arguments for Sheikh said rebellion (2000, p. 70). Moreover, Olson gives Mehmet Bayrak’s (1993) inferences about Sheikh Said rebellion with 5 components. 1) rebellion was affected as far by Kurdish nationalism as by religious factors; 2) evidence claims that there was relationship between Sheikh Abdulkadir and Sheikh Said; 3) religion was not main goal (*amaç*) of rebellion. It is simply cover (*perde*) which was used to hide independence of Kurdistan argument of rebellion; 4) rebellion carried nationalist meaning which was based on Sheikh Said letter: “I am fighting for the Kurds”; and 5) Sheikh Said wanted to supply jobs for Kurdish bureaucrats who were ignored by Turkish Republic, and he added that for Bayrak’s view, the nationalist and political reasons caused rebellion more than religious factors (Bayrak 1993 in Olson 2000, 71). The nationalist part of the Sheik Said rebellion was determinant by Freedom (*Azadi*) Party, which was founded by Kurdish intellectual, such as Sheikh Abdulkadir, and Kurdish commanders in Ottoman Army Force (van Bruinessen 2013; Kirişci and Winrow 1997). Additionally, According to Ayşe Hür, Azadi Party, which was originally founded as secular by Ottoman Kurdish commanders, members supported Sheikh Said rebellion. However, new Turkish government especially State Elites projected an image that Sheikh Said rebellion, which was not a Kurdish nationalist rebellion, was religious (*irticai*) rebellion to rise up government’s political agenda such as abolishing Caliphate because of afraid of raising Kurdish nationalism in the Kurds (2008, 20). The most famous actor in that time was Sheikh Abdulkadir.

He organized rebellion by choosing Sheikh Said because Kurdish people did not have nationalist consciousness. He knew that Kurdish people would come together

under umbrella of religion. Sheikh Said could steer rebellion because he came Nakşibendi Religious Order. From the late Ottoman Empire to Turkish Republic, Nakşibendi got momentum in Ottoman Territory especially Kurdish populated area. What caused Sheikh Abdulkadir chose religious leaders. After Sheikh Said started rebellion, many other sheikhs and religious leaders supported rebellion. In terms of that case, Sheikh Said rebellion was seen as religious rebellion, and the religious part of the rebellion was based on political agenda of new government on religion. The new government abolished Caliphate in 1924, and mostly the rebellion used this case for resisting new government. What I understood that Sheikh Said rebellion was about neglected of political and religious factors by Turkish Republic.

Sheikh Said himself represented Islamic orientation of Nakşibendi religious order of rebellion, and Kurdish intellectuals and commanders also represented nationalist movement of rebellion. The Kurds were not successful for all rebellions from 1925 to 1938. There are two reasons. 1) There is no Kurdish nationalist consciousness and identification between the Kurds because they chose Islam as supra-identity instead of Kurdishness. They were virtuous man (*erdemli vatandaş*) of Ottoman Empire even Turkish Republic until assimilation process. According to Nurgün Koç, Kazım Karabekir persuaded the Kurds by using religious card to promote Turkish side in the Independence War (2013, 156). Because of that case, there was seen differentiation between non-Sunni Muslim Alevi and Sunni Muslim the Kurds. This made the Kurds both Alevi and Sunni the Kurds did not support each other. For example, Zaza Alevi designed Koçgiri Rebellion in 1920. However, Sunni the Kurds did not support them even they supported center government to suppress rebellion. Another example is that Alevi did not promote Sheikh Said rebellion. 2) Power struggle between Kurdish feudal notables. It was seen mostly between landlords. Those two reasons made Turkish Army force broke up rebellion in the same year, 1925. “The Sheikh Said Rebellion of 1925 emerged as a Kurdish separatist movement, but was suppressed by the Republican of Turkey” (Noi 2012, 16). Sheikh Said Rebellion caused new Republican Turkey increase its assimilation policy on the Kurds. “Preventing the development of an ethnic Kurdish cultural and political movement has been a priority of the Turkish state since the Kurdish-led Sheikh Said Rebellion

of 1925” (Kirişci and Winrow 1997 in Watts 1999, 631). “The term ‘Kurd’ largely disappeared from circulation after the Sheikh Said Rebellion, and ‘race’ for the Kurds was used only to deny Kurdish identity in pseudo-scientific studies and governmental reports” (Toprak 2012 in Ergin 2012, 327).

Turkish new parliament passed new amendment (*Takrir-i Sukun Kanunu*) in order to bring hard punishment for rebellious. Independence Tribunal was established, and Sheikh Abdulkadir and Sheikh Said got the death penalty. In contrast to all negatives, there is positive effect of rebellion for new Republican Turkey. “After the 1925 Sheik Said Rebellion against the new Republican, the nation building process was intensified” (Yavuz 2007, 7). After Sheikh Said rebellion, the new rebellion occurred in 1927 to 1930, which called Mt. Ararat rebellion. It is also known as Ağrı rebellion because Ararat Mountain is in Ağrı. According to Hakan Yavuz, Kurdish tribal leaders and intellectuals formed the Kurdish National League (Hoyboun) under İhsan Nuri Paşa of Bitlis, and they organized Ararat revolt in 1930-31 in Ağrı. However, the rebellion was defeat and İhsan Paşa took refugee in Iran (2007, 8).

Ararat rebellion was well organized than Sheikh Said rebellion because İhsan Nuri Pasha organized Hoyboun by taking supports from both Armenian and Iran. It takes time more than Sheikh Said rebellion. According to Hamit Bozarslan, Hoyboun had two pillars; a military, which was controlled by İhsan Nuri Pasha, and the other is political, which was controlled Bedirhan Pasha’s family as well as Western states from Damascus (2008, 340). With Ararat Rebellion, Kurdish self-awareness was increased. According to Syracuse Herald Newspaper, the reason of rebellion was based on Kurdishness (*Kürtçülük hareketi*) (1930, 6 in Değerli 2010, 106). Turkish army suppressed the rebellion in 1930. As I noted before, Turkish history of between 1923 and 1938 are called as rebellions era. The other and big rebellion occurred in 1938 by non-Sunni Muslim sect, Alevi. The rebellion’s leaders are both religious and political. Seyyid Rıza represented as religious part of rebellion, and Nuri Dersimi, who was an intellectual, became effective in the part of political side. Hamit Bozarslan cited that the Dersim law of 1935 became effective to rebel Turkish republic (2008, 340). Accordingly, the name of Dersim replaced Tunceli by law and

exchanging of population also played role fro rebellion. This rebellion was an another Kurdish rebellion but most Sunni the Kurds did not support that rebellion because of two reasons; sect is one of two. Another is that Alevis did not also support either Sheikh Said or Ararat rebellion., Turkish army suppressed Dersim rebellion in 1938 with not only over-land but also over-air. 50, 000 Turkish troops were commissioned against Dersim forces. Even, Atatürk's inner daughter played important role to suppress rebellion from over-air. "After suppressing the rebellion, the Turkish state erased Dersim from map and renamed it Tunceli" (Yavuz 2007, 8).

Turkish government took precaution by increasing its violence of suppressing in Southeastern and East of Turkey, which is mostly known Kurdish places. According to Carl Dahlman, Atatürk placed the southeast under martial law and military octhe CUPation. The effect of this period was to continued destruction of villages, massive displacement, and long-lasting mutual mistrust between the government in Ankara and Turkey's sizeable Kurdish population (2002, 279). Thanks to these three rebellions, Turkish political process was based on one party system and strong centered-state system.

CHAPTER 2

2. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: TURKISH POLITICAL EXPERIMENT

The transition from a multinational Ottoman Empire to a nation state Turkish Republic, changed political life of new Turkish Republic radically. Nation-State understanding became main point of new of Turkish Republic. For the new government, applying nationalism and homogeneity as a political agenda gained priority. In this chapter, I will discuss historical context of new Turkish Republic and how internal and external factors became effective to shape political life of the Turkish Republic. This chapter will first look at the formation of political parties in Turkish context, starting from single party rule to transition to multi-part process. Next, I will examine the Kurdish political behavior and involvement to mainstream politics. My aim is to show how from the early Republican years to today, mainstream Turkish politic did not allow ethnic diversity in the political arena by showing how political ground played out on the issues of secular vs. religious politics, center vs. periphery and in some degree left vs. right. Systemic and permanent existence of Kurdish political parties in the mainstream politics has been either prevented, banned or interrupted.

2.1. Establishment of Turkey

Republic was established in 29 October 1923. Mustafa Kemal, later known as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk [Father of all Turks], became immortal President of Turkish Republic. Elections took place in the early Republic with different political parties

such as the *Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fıkrası* (Progressive Republican Party, *the TCF*) and the *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fıkrası* (Free Republican Party, *the SCF*) in addition to *Cumhuriyeçi Halk Fıkrası* (Republican People's Party, *the CHF*), which is known nowadays *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, the RPP. The TCF was closed in 1925 because of supporting Sheikh Said Rebellion, and Fethi Okyar, founder of the SCF, also closed his party in the same year, 1930.

Generals as known, Rauf Orbay, Ali Fuad Cebesoy, Adnan Adıvar, Refet Bele, and Kazım Karabekir founded *Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fıkrası*. What distinguished the party agenda from that of CHF was its more moderate approach to religion than that of the CHF. Because of this reason, they were accused of supporting Sheikh Said Rebellion, and they were faced trial by the Independent Tribunals. Therefore, the party was closed down in 1925 with *Tahkir-i Sukun Kanunu*. After closing of the SCF in 1930, the political life of new Republic was based on single party system until 1945.

Attempts to establish alternative political parties to CHF were an effort to create multi party system and surely it would have made early Republican period more democratic. However, closing opposition parties made Turkey lean towards monopolization of politics by powerful political parties that came to power. İsmet Binark stated democratic weakness in Turkey caused multiparty regime was not applied (2004, XIII). In addition, according to Feroz Ahmad, there are two reasons that affected Turkey to adopt single party regime. One of them was the Great Depression in 1929, which was spread from America. Turkey was also affected by the depression and increased the role and interference of the state not only, in the economical life but also in the political life of Turkish Republic, encouraging the endurance of the single party system. The other reason was that regional powers [neighboring countries such as Italy, Germany, and Soviet Union] followed a single-party system in their countries. Atatürk was influenced by trend of mono-party regime and he adopted for Turkey with the Six Principles of Atatürkism known as republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, revolutionism/reformism, and laicism (2008, 230) that stress the strength of the state.

The President of Turkish Republic, Atatürk, chose all candidates of parliament in 1935. Even all bureaucrats were member of the CHP. Therefore, ministry for internal affairs and general secretary of party were unified. Additionally, all governors became provincial chairman of the party (Feroz 2007; Lewis 2007). Moreover, ethnic and religious rebellions, from 1925 to 1938, made regime more aggressive and monopolized political power. “[A]nd a single party regime was instituted in 1925 following the Kurdish rebellion that year” (Alpay 2008, 6). Under the control of six principles, Kemalism became the state ideology, and state’s organizations, branches, and institutions set up by Kemalist ideology thanks to 1924 Constitution. The state elites and military itself described themselves as the real guardians of Kemalism, and also consider Islamism and Kurdish nationalism/separatism as the main two enemies of the Turkish Republic. “The military has always lain at the heart of the Turkish concept of statehood” (Strategic Comment 1997, 1). Atatürk played active role until his death at 10 November 1938. After Atatürk’s death, the parliament met up at 11 November of 1938, and they chose İsmet İnönü as new president of Turkey. İsmet İnönü was also a General like Atatürk. He played crucial role of creation of new republic with other state elites, and he became general vice president of Cumhuriyet Halk Fıkrası. After Atatürk’s death, İsmet İnönü became president of the party. İsmet İnönü was titled as ‘National Chief’, and his period was called “national chief” (*milli şef*) period.

2.1.1. İsmet İnönü Period

İsmet İnönü’s period was Second World War (WWII) period. Turkey did not enter the war but was affected by economic crisis. Turkey’s modernization and secularization perspective made her side with Western Block. Because of that, Turkey signed United Nations declaration in 1945, and became a charter member. Turkey turned her face to West. During this time, Turkey approached more democratic level than past. Accordingly, “İsmet İnönü announced the end of the party’s control over the bureaucracy; provincial governors would no longer head local party organizations, nor would the secretary general be minister of the interior. Within the parliamenta faction called the Independent Group was set up to act as the

loyal opposition” (Feroz 2008, 231). Moreover, Binark asserted that America claimed that if Turkey did not increase its democratization in the political life, America would not support Turkey. This statement caused single party regime change its view on democracy especially political life (2004, XV). Accordingly, İsmet İnönü said that “Due to the needs of the country and thanks to the natural workings of the democracy and freedom air, the establishment of other political parties will also be possible” (Feroz 2007, 25; translation is mine). İsmet İnönü’s words are important to understand how Turkish political life’s transition from single party to multiparty regime became effective, and this transition is one of the most important reforms in recent history of the Turkish Republic.

2.2. Internal Factors of Democratization Process in Turkey

As I have already noted before, there are factors, both internal and external, that have affected Turkish democratization process. In this part, I will discuss how internal factors, such as multiparty regime, military interventions of 1960, 1971, 1980, and post-modern coup of 1997 as well as Kurdish political parties, influenced Turkish political process.

Turkish political experiment has been shaped with multiparty regime after 1945, which provides more democratic structure. Ersin Kalaycıoğlu stated that democratization has been paved with the foundation of social and political organizations as well as multitude of political parties (2004, 249). In multiparty system, different parties compete with each other in order to come to power. Therefore, these parties can bring more liberalization or freedom in a democratic race. In Turkey, Turkish politics was set up as multiparty regime by amending law of associations in 1945. It allowed different political parties to be formed. According to Ülman and Tachau, the sources of change [social and political change] have been seen in period of WWII with two related changes: multiparty system and rapid economical growth (Ülman & Tachau 1965, 153). Democrat Party (DP) and National Party (MP) were two of them.

2.2.1. The DP Periods

DP founded under control of Celal Bayar, a banker and close friend of Atatürk; Adnan Menderes, a landowner in the Aegean region of Turkey; Refik Koraltan, a bureaucrat and state elite; and Fuat Köprülü, a historian of Turcology. Actually, those were representatives of the RPP, and they left from the RPP in order to create DP. In 7 January 1946 was the creation of DP. İsmet İnönü and other partisans of the RPP did not criticize DP's member in the creation time. Even İsmet İnönü became happy because he believed that DP was not different from the RPP in the level of ideology because DP determined its political ideology on six principles as required by the 1924 Constitution. İsmet İnönü perceived DP like Free Party in 1930, whose main aim was to become opposition to the RPP not being party in power. Also, founders of DP were member of the RPP. "Despite some hostility to the new party in the RPP circles, there was no sense of alarm at the advent of opposition party. After all, its [the DP] leaders were all Kemalists of long standing who espoused the same basic philosophy as their opponents, with only a difference in emphasis" (Feroz 2008, 233). Those reasons made İsmet İnönü trust DP. With the DP, İsmet İnönü created more democratic life in the politics of Turkish Republic, and it made Turkey be closer to the Western Block well. As I noted already, the DP applied six principles in their political agenda as required by constitution. However, the DP used those principles differently than the RPP by interpreting them for needs of the time. In time, the DP became powerful and organized well in both urban and rural. Those years, people differentiated the DP and the RPP as urban and rural.

Most people believed that the DP would present urban class, and the RPP would speak for rural class. However, the election of 1950 demonstrated that DP organized both in rural and urban class by taking majority seats in parliament. After establishment of DP in 1945, İsmet İnönü wanted to prepare for the election early to be elected again while DP was a new party and not well-organized. The election was set up in 1946, and İsmet İnönü won the election by landslide. Two reasons can explain İsmet İnönü's victory. One of them is that DP did not organized quickly and was not well organized yet. The other reason is that all bureaucrats of state attempted

to work for the RPP's election victory. DP's leaders knew that they could not win the 1946 election. Therefore, DP's political maneuver became effective in order to gain more votes by choosing Ismet İnönü as their candidate in his political district.

Turkey increased its democratic level by bringing multi party political system in 1945. However, the 1946 general election demonstrated that Turkey have to pass more levels in order to become more democratic because DP did not compete with the RPP in the same level due to the RPP's effects on all institutions. For example, Feroz Ahmad stated that the DP considered that they could be party in power only in an equitable and honest election where the bureaucracy held neutral (2008, 234). Accordingly, bureaucracy and institutions played important role in order to direct 1946 election results. Thus, the DP presented an opinion for separate powers such as President of the state and President of the party were under the control of the same person, Ismet İnönü. Otherwise, the DP would not join the next election. For this reason, Grand Chamber of the RPP met in order to bring new changes for democracy. That is, bureaucracy would be freer than before. However, the RPP did some changes. According to M. Ali Aybar, one of the changes was interesting because the RPP decided to allow religion lessons in school. He criticized that the RPP boasted with both secularism and reformism until that time. Now, they allowed it in order to compete with the DP and pull more votes. (Feroz 2007; Tachau, 2007). In sum, between 1946 to next election of 1950, Turkey was ruled as a single party regime. More democratic election can be counted as election of 1950. The DP increased its political effect in both rural and urban until the next election.

Election of 1950 promoted this idea by choosing the DP with landslide votes. That is to say, the DP avenged the election of 1946. The DP's election victory was 53 percent of the general vote, and 84 percent of the seats in the parliament, in contrast to the RPP's 40 percent of the popular vote and 14 percent of the seats. In other words, the distribution of seats in parliamentary was 397 for the DP, 69 for the RPP, 1 for MP as well as 7 for independents. The election of 1950 votes' capacity was exactly 8 905 743. However, 7 953 055 people voted. Accordingly, the percentage of participation of election was 89.3% (Öztürk 1998, X). Ersin Kalaycıoğlu stated that

with democratization process after 1946 and with 1950 election, Turkish center and periphery relation was designed again as well as establishment of the new political sides such as the right and the left wing. After 1950, country has increasingly become urban, industrial and more democratic. (2004, 247-248). Additionally, “[S]uggesting that the RPP [stands for the RPP] spoke for the social and political center of the society, while the DP represented the periphery” (Tachau 2007, 130).

In Turkey, conservatives stand for the right wing, and more republicans stay in the left wing. On account of democratization, many members within periphery gained new status in the political life of Turkey such as representatives, cabinet ministers, judges, prosecutors, ministers as well as party leaders. In other words, the homogenous center has increasingly become more heterogeneous because of state elites has lost their power. New patrons were born from periphery by controlling center politics besides of economy. Also, the interpretation of 1950 election is important to see how periphery’s political victory within countryside over center-based nationalist elites. The DP became party in power with 1950 election results. Celal Bayar was chosen as President of Turkey, and Adnan Menderes was chosen as Prime Minister. The DP stayed as party in power between 1950 and 1960 by gaining three general elections. With regional elections the DP also controlled more provinces than other parties. The DP increased its power by controlling Grand parliament after elections. The DP brought new changes in order to diminish the RPP’s control over bureaucracy and institutions. For example, to make more free elections, responsibility of election was taken from governors, thereby from ministry of internal affairs, in order to give independent judges. In addition to, the DP brought liberal understanding for both religious and economical level. In other words, undeniable that democratization of Turkey increased in political period of the DP. Additionally, “The DP governments under the Premiership of Adnan Menderes followed three main goals. These governments wanted to weaken the RPP by undermining the influence of its supporters in the bureaucracy, educational system and the army” (Karpas 2004, 16).

After 1950 election, the DP was more moderate for different identities and cultures

beside of religion. For example, call to prayer (*ezan*) changed back to its Arabic origin, which was changed by the RPP to Turkish. However, the DP became more authoritarian party under control of Adnan Menderes after 1954 election. The party gave up initial liberal changes. It had started to use bureaucracy and institutions for its own powerful for long life in the politics. That is, it had become like the RPP's single party period. The DP lost 800,000 votes in the 1957 election. The DP's period was closed with 1960 military coup. The DP became more effective in all institutions but military force because The DP's leaders knew that military, especially generals, had played important role of establishment of the Turkish Republic.

2.2.2. 1960 Military Coup

27 May 1960 was a day of military intervention for abolishing the DP from politics. It means that 1924 Constitution was withdrawn from circulation by primary constituent power. According to Yaprak Gürsoy, four military coups affected democratic consolidation of Turkey by intervening politics several times. It goes without saying again that military sees itself as protector of Republican security. As Ümit Cizre noted that 'the protection and maintenance of the state's constitutional order, national presence, integrity, all political, social, cultural and economic interest on an international level, and contractual law against any kind of internal and foreign threat' (White Paper 1998 in 2008, 303). It assumed that not only external threat but also economical, social, cultural, and political threats to secularist Republic are issues of military in Turkey which means that military has power to control all parts of the Turkish Republic. For democratic consolidation, civilian control over the military forces is a required clause (2012, 736). One of the biggest apprehensions for liberal democracy is unelected groups' intervention to politics. No unelected group can reserve pressure or hold tutelary as well as veto powers that can limit elected for policy-making abilities (Gürsoy 2012). In other words, if in one state where the army forces play as political power and obstruct freedom of executive and legislature in the process of decision-making, it refers that there is no democracy in this country. That is too say, Turkey has not enjoyed liberal democracy since 1960 with military intervention. According to Kemal Karpat (2004), 'the coup was an action against the

anti-democratic policies of the DP leaders and the prime minister's misuse of the extensive power of the executive branch under the one-party Constitution of 1924, which remained in force until 1961' (17), and he added that in reality intervention was just a reaction of Turkish elites [above, center-based elites] against populist stump from below [periphery] (2004, 17). Besides, Şahin Alpay stated that 'the military in Turkey have an ambiguous attitude towards democratic politics' (2008, 8). 415 deputies of the DP were arrested including Celal Bayar, who was current President, and Adnan Menderes, who was Prime Minister. The number was two-thirds of Assembly. Prime Minister, minister of foreign affairs, and minister of finance as well as 9 members of party got hanged in 1961. Celal Bayar was also punished death sentence. However, the punishment was not applied. Additionally, transitional government [generals] started to decrease the DP's political power within institutions and bureaucracy. Many military officials were retired.

After military junta, Turkey needed to normalize both social and political life. The new constitution process was started, and it was published with new amendments in 31 May 1961. The new Constitution included greater liberalization for political system and continued power of the majority party. New institutions were established. One of the most important of these institutions is Constitutional Court, which has a status over all hierarchies. With the new Constitution, party in power was chosen by majority votes. Nevertheless, "The 1961 Constitution institutionalized the (guardianship) role of the military by creating the National Security Council (*Milli Güvenlik Kurulu-MGK*)" (Heper 2009, 35).

2.2.3. Fragmentation of the DP and the First Coalition Periods

Justice Party (Adalet Partisi, the JP), which was successor to the DP, was founded in 1961 by Ragıp Gümüşpala. The new election was done 15 October 1961 under the new Constitution. Election includes different parties such as old the RPP, the JP, New Turkey Party (NTP), and Republican Peasants Nation Party (RPNP). The JP and the NTP came from the same background as successors of the DP. The NTP was designed and participated to 1961 election under Ekrem Alican. Ekrem Alican, who was representative of the DP, left from the DP in 1955 and became one of the

founders of the Free Party. Even under the Free Party, they collaborated with the RPP as opposition to the DP. After 1960 military coup, Aican established his party, NTP. His aim was to collect the DP's 5 million votes in general election. However, Voters punished him by not giving mass support in general election. Thus the JP became as successor of the DP by demonstrated election result. Votes' distribution was 36, 7% while 173 seats for the RPP, and 34,7% with 158 seats for the JP, and rest of the votes were distributed for other parties. In other words, the RPP received 3.7 million votes while the combination of the JP and the NTP included 5.1 million of total votes, and RPNP took 1.4 million votes. The task of forming new government was given to the RPP. However, the RPP did not create new government itself because of majority of parliament. The coalition formed new government under the combination of the RPP and the JP.

From 1961 to next election in 1965, coalition government ruled the country. Coalition time has been started with these two parties, and many other coalitions created in Turkish politics in the process. According to Heper and Keyman (1998), in the formation of coalition governments within well-established democracies, if the political figures were threatened, all parties in the regime use their resources to deal with problems. As well as, if the political life divided into two sides as left and right wing, each of them tried to form government with their political background. However, in Turkey, any of the above situations performed a significant role during coalition governments. Agreement among parties within coalitions in Turkey was generally based upon short-term and strategic matter such as each of the parties tried to prevent the other to gain more votes in the next election (1998, 262-263). The first coalition was good example to understand Heper and Keyman (1998) analysis.

The first coalition between the RPP and the JP continued almost six months. They did not trust each other. The next coalition included all parties and independents except the JP. However, it did not run for a long term. the RPP's coalition partners performed badly in the local and municipal elections in 1963 that made them withdrew from coalition. The last remedy of the RPP was that to forming government under new coalition with independents. In the coalition process, the JP

increased its popularity within country that made the JP became successful in 1965 election by taking 52.9% of votes.

2.2.4. The JP Period

The JP came to power. Süleyman Demirel run as party leader and became Prime Minister. According to Feroz & Bedia Turgay Ahmad, the JP won great victory in 1965. However, only 9,748,678 voters out of 13,679,753 voters voted in 1965 election. The percentage was only 71 % that was the lowest among other elections (1976, 299). 1960s were bad years for the RPP because the party was divided, and Turkish Labor Party (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi, TIP*) was organized by departed elites from the RPP. The election result made Cemal Gürsel, who was the President, gave the task of forming government to the JP. It was hard for Süleyman Demirel to rule country after unsteady coalitions and military pressure. Süleyman Demirel did also not properly provide his dominance in his party. It was big challenge for Süleyman Demirel.

The tension between right and left wing of the political spectrum increased in 1960s. Under control of the JP from 1965 to 1969, Süleyman Demirel mostly worked for increasing his popularity and charisma. Nevertheless, country's social, political and economical issues were not improved. In other words, 1969 election demonstrated that voters had been bored for instability of social, political and economical circumstances of Turkey. Thus the lowest participated election of history of Turkish Republic was seen in 1969 election as 64.3%. This rate made parties lost their power in the Assembly. The good example is that NTP lost all representatives except 2 after 1969 general election. Süleyman Demirel lost his popularity among intelligentsias and his party members. Even some party's representatives sided opposition, the RPP, and voted against Süleyman Demirel in the parliament for withdrawing from government. In 1970 [after 1969 election], the Assembly's new period started. However, to choose Turkish parliamentary speaker and the president of the senate became the most important issue for the parliament because of division in the JP (Ahmad & Turgay Ahmad 1976, p. 399). According to Feroz Ahmad, in 11 February 1970, oppositions within the JP voted against budgetary proposal that caused

government under control of Süleyman Demirel to fell, and Süleyman Demirel resigned from government (2007). In addition, oppositions within party created their own party as Democratic Party (the DP) under leadership of Ferruh Bozbeyle, who was current President of the Assembly, and he resigned both from the JP and President of the Assembly. It can be argued that Süleyman Demirel had lost his influence on his own supporters which created weakness for Süleyman Demirel to deal with the tension between left and right. Also, fears of oppositions and conflict within both country and party itself motivated military intervention, and the overthrow of party in power in 12 March 1971. As noted before, after not choosing president of the parliament and president of the senate, Süleyman Demirel abdicated from presidential seat. However, Cevdet Sunay, who was chosen as President in 1966 after Cemal Gürsel, gave the task of forming the government to Süleyman Demirel again (2007, 257). Accordingly, instability and mistrust within both the party and the country made the JP lose its power day by day.

2.2.5. 1971 Military Coup and the First Technocrat Government

During that time, universities were more independent than other institutions. Government or army could not directly intervene any university during protests if Presidents of universities did not allow. Most of the protests ignited from the universities that weakened the position of the JP. Period of the JP was continued with unrest. Violence and conflict among left and right groups had increased day by day. The tension between left and right wing was perceived within the communist and anti-communist paradigm. "By 1970 the universities had almost been brought to a standstill by seemingly constant clashes between the armed partisans of left and right" (Hale 1994, 178). Because of these cases, military sent a memorandum to the JP. The message was announced on Turkish radio at 1.00 p.m. with three messages. The entire of three messages included that there was no stability within country. If government would not prevent or intervene the existing anarchy in the country, military would intervene the politics directly with the right given to military by 1961 Constitution to preserve Turkish Republic in order to reach level of contemporary civilization. Military did not intervene politics directly as it did in 1960 military

coup. However, military warned the JP to prevented anarchy and ensured stability. If this was not possible, military ensured that it would intervened politics and abolished the party in power, namely, the JP. Because of this, the JP withdrew from government in the same day. In other words, the JP officials gathered under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel in 12 March 1971 at 5. 00 p.m. and Demirel sent resignation letter to the president in which he stated that ‘it is impossible to reconcile the memorandum with the constitution and the principle of the rule of law’ (Hale 1994, 185).

New government created under the control of majority of technocrats. William Hale’s point was that Turkey was to face with a few disorders, and military intervention deposed the JP from government in 1971 (1994, 175). That way, elected people was withdrawn from politics because of enforcement of military. In other words, democracy was harmed in the process of withdrawing of elected people from politics by the military force. After Süleyman Demirel resigned from government, the new government was collected under the control of Nihat Erim who was chosen directly by army as a leader who held the power as a nonpartisan leader (*Partiler Üstü*). Nihat Erim, who actually was a politician of the RPP side, competed with Bülent Ecevit for becoming the secretary general of the RPP. However, he lost the competition until army chose him for the new government after military intervention of 1971. He resigned from the RPP in 1971 to form the government. Cevdet Sunay gave the task of forming the government on 19 March. The army took responsibility within a week in order to ensure and restore order by overcoming anarchy in the country. Nihat Erim’s minister cabinet included 5 ministers from the JP, 3 ministers from the RPP, 1 minister from National Trust Party (the NTP). Democratic Party did not want to join the executive board. The other ministers were chosen outside of the assembly. It is interesting that the JP supported the new government while it was pressured to resign from government. This may be because the JP wanted to protect its legality and interest within the new government and the country.

The new cabinet was called as a technocrat government. Nihat Erim’s first governmental period continued around eight months because of many executives

resigned. Erim also desired to resign from the government but Cevdet Sunay did not let him. His second term was started with a new government. However, his second term finished early. In those periods, significant democratic, economic or political developments were not seen in Turkey. Military's idea about political parties did not work well for Turkey. After 1971 military intervention, multiparty system ended until the next election, 1973. After Nihat Erim's resignation, Ferit Melen and Naim Talu took task of forming government, respectively. However, during their governmental period, military continued to increase its influence within the country with martial law.

2.2.6. 1973 General Election and Second Coalition Periods

The next election was done in 1973. The RPP's party leader was changed to Bülent Ecevit who became the leading party in 1973 election. However, he did not have enough parliamentary seats to create single party government. The RPP's votes 33.29% while the JP took 29.82%, and the DP's votes included 11.89%. Landau stated that the RPP's seat rank included 185 of the 450. The JP emerged with 149 representatives in the Assembly. The other parties' total seats were 116, Nation Salvation Party (the NSP) under leadership of Necmettin Erbakan took 48, and the DP emerged with 45, also Republican Reliance Party (the RRP) held 13 seats under the leadership of Turhan Feyzioğlu while Alpaslan Türkeş's Nationalist Action Party (the NAP) took 3 seats in the parliament. 7 seats were shared as 6 for independents and one stands for Turkish Unity Party, which presented Turkish Alevi (1976, p. 17; Official Paper (*Resmi Gazete*) in 31 October 1973). The result demonstrated that any party could not create a single party government. Thus the RPP and the NSP formed a coalition government in 25 January 1974. The below table shows the percentage of parties' votes and seats from 1950 election to 1977 election.

TABLE 1
PERCENTAGE OF VOTES AND PERCENTAGE OF SEATS
IN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

Election Year	DP/JP	RPP	NP	FP	NTP	TLP	NAP	UP	RRP	Dem.P.	NSP
1950	53.3 (83.8)	39.8 (14.2)	3.0 (0.2)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1954	56.6 (93.0)	34.8 (5.7)	4.7 (0.9)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1957	47.7 (69.5)	40.8 (29.2)	7.2 (0.7)	3.8 (0.7)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1961	34.8 (35.1)	36.7 (38.4)	14.0 (12.0)	-	13.7 (14.4)	-	-	-	-	-	-
1965	52.9 (53.3)	28.7 (29.8)	6.3 (6.9)	-	3.7 (4.2)	3.0 (3.3)	2.2 (2.4)	-	-	-	-
1969	46.5 (59.9)	27.4 (31.8)	3.2 (1.3)	-	2.2 (1.3)	2.7 (0.4)	3.0 (0.2)	2.8 (1.8)	6.6 (3.3)	-	-
1973	29.8 (33.1)	33.3 (41.1)	1.0 No Seat	-	-	-	3.4 (0.7)	1.1 (0.2)	5.3 (2.9)	11.9 (10.0)	11.8 (10.7)
1977	36.9 (42.0)	41.4 (47.3)	-	-	-	0.1 No Seat	6.4 (3.6)	0.4 No Seat	1.9 (0.7)	1.9 (0.2)	8.6 (5.3)

Notes
The first figure refers to the percentage of votes and the second figure in parentheses to the percentage of seats. Abbreviations: DP - Democratic Party; RPP - Republican People's Party; JP - Justice Party; NP - Nation Party; FP - Freedom Party; NTP - New Turkey Party; TLP - Turkish Labor Party; NAP - Nationalist Action Party; UP - Unity Party; RRP - Republican Reliance Party; Dem.P. - Democratic Party (formed in 1970); NSP - National Salvation Party.

Source: Özbudun 1981, 229.

Table 1 displays that Turkey's party system was based on single party system from 1950 to 1973 but 1961-1964 four coalitions period (Özbudun 1981, 230). It is true that the DP and its successor the JP won five elections between 1950 and 1973 elections. After coalition of the RPP and the NSP, the minister cabinet was created as six ministers of the NSP and seventeen ministers of the RPP. That is, coalitions can bring different ideologies under the same structure. The NSP and the RPP, for example, come different political ideological backgrounds as conservative and secularist. Bring different political ideologies to government would have helped increase democracy level of Turkey if the parties would trust each other and plan for long term policies. However, the RPP and the NSP coalition did not work for long term. The coalition was ended in 18 September 1974 when Ecevit resigned. According to Feroz Ahmad (2008), Ecevit wanted to become a single power after his decision of intervention to Cyprus after Greece's coup against President Makarios. Thus he resigned from the government (252). However, current parties were

threatened that if an early election would be done, Ecevit had potential to win early election. Thus they did not allow making an early election. Instead, they came together under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel as the ‘Nationalist Front’ name. ‘Nationalist Front’ parties such as the NSP, the JP, the RRP, and the NAP designed the new cabinet in 31 March 1975. The NAP’s two representatives out of three found seats in this cabinet. That is, the NAP, which was established as successor of RPNP, got advantages in contrast with becoming minority party. Now the NAP’s neo-fascist ideology had been legitimizing in the new cabinet. Thanks to 1961 Constitution, all parties could find a way to represent their ideology in the parliament without looking how big or small they were. It is to say that 1961 Constitution created more democratic representation for all parties than 1982 Constitution. In other words, democratization process of Turkey was found itself in the representation of parties in the parliament as well as election procedure from 1961 to 1980 although all instabilities within political, social, economical,

Table 2

Fragmentation in the Turkish Party System 1950–77

	Election year							
	1950	1954	1957	1961	1965	1969	1973	1977
Number of parties gaining parliamentary seats	3	3	4	4	6	8	7	6
Per cent of votes won by the two strongest parties (%)	93	93	89	72	82	73	63	78
Per cent of seats won by the two strongest parties (%)	98	98	98	73	83	88	74	89

Source: Sayari 1978, p. 45.

Table 2 displays the increase of fragmentation of parties within Turkish politics thanks to changing electoral system by 1961 Constitution; the change from a simple plural system to proportional representation system (Sayari 1978, 45-6).

After single party period, Turkish party system read as bipolar system in which left wing had been represented by the RPP while the DP/THE JP were represented right wing. There were other parties existed in this bipolar system but they stayed as minority parties. However, thanks to coalition regime, they found a way to represent themselves in the cabinet.

As I noted before that a coalition between the NSP and the RPP or among the NSP, the JP, the NAP, the RRP's 'Nationalist Front' coalition demonstrated that there was pluralism in the legislature. From 1973 to next election, 1977, the NSP interestingly became a key point for coalitions. Despite that the NSP referenced Islam for its political agenda; it became part of first coalition in 1974 government with the RPP, center-left secularist party. Additionally, Hakan Yavuz's evaluation about the NSP is that after migration from to urban, the JP/the DP increased their votes. Supporters of both two parties voted for them because of cultural and religious reasons. However, the JP changed its agenda through industrialization process in Turkey. Because of that, supporters changed its political side to NOP (National Order Party) in 1970 led by Mehmet Zahir Kotku, and its successor the NSP led by Necmettin Erbakan (1997, 66). Additionally, the JP had lost its votes with another reason of the NAP's political maneuver. It was also a right wing party by respecting cultural and religious rights that made the JP lost its power within conservatives. According to Ergun Özbudun, the NAP's political maneuver of polarizing voters made to increase its power in 1977 general election such as doubled its votes from 3.4 in 1973 to 6.4 in 1977 election as well as increased seats as five times from three to 16 (1981, 233-4). The JP desired to prevent losing votes by suggesting another general election. That is, 'National Front' would be dispersed with new election. Despite the other parties in the parliament, two major parties, the RPP and the JP, agreed on new election in 5 June 1977.

2.2.7. 1977 General Election

The new election was fixed only 4 months earlier than the constitutionally required time of 14 October. Two major parties desired to win the election with absolute majority of votes because the coalitions demonstrated that they would not trust each

other and would not plan for long-term stability. They thought that if the JP or the RPP became the party in power as a single power, they would end instability in the country. However, 1977 election result displayed that no absolute majority was chosen as 213 seats went to the RPP while 189 seats went to the JP. The other seats were shared among the NAP with 16 seats, the RRP with 3 seats, the DP with 1 seat, and the NSP with 24 seats while independents with 4 seats (Sayari 1978, 42). According to Dankwart Rustow, the extended political vacuum at the center of the government was charged by conflicts among right and left wing of political side. In this vacuum, there were seen 20 to 30 killings of lives in every day at the start of 1970s to by mid-1980 (1991, 19). Accordingly, starting from 1970s to 1980 military coup, Turkey demonstrated that there was no economic, politic and democratic stability., The 1977 election was held in this political vacuum and 6 parties but independents took seats in the parliament. None of the parties took majority of the votes for forming a single government. Especially after 1973 election, the RPP led by Bülent Ecevit increased party's vote rate from 33,29% to 41,38% because of new political agenda of the RPP as called themselves social democrats which made the current vote rate was the highest rate since 1950. Moreover, the JP led by Süleyman Demirel increased its votes from 29,82% to 36,87% because of Democratic Party's election failure. Other small parties such as the NSP, the NAP, the RRP, the DP took seats in the new parliament.

The result of 1977 general election revealed that the RPP, the JP, and the NAP which had been most outstanding in the aggravation of Left-Right separation since 1973, had been primary beneficiaries of the ascending of the political polarization in the party system (Sayari 1978, 54). Majority parties' vote rate consisted of 78,25% of all votes. The history showed that two major parties could not create single party government. Now, the new coalition period was inevitable between the JP and the RPP as the first coalition in 1961. However, Bülent Ecevit's main aim was to create a single party government. They did not come together to create new coalition. Bülent Ecevit became successful by creating single party government thanks to representatives who left from the JP and supported the RPP. In this way, Bülent Ecevit became Prime Minister in 1978. However, the tension between Left and Right

prepared Bülent Ecevit's end. Süleyman Demirel played crucial role to bring the NAP and the NSP together in the second 'Nationalist Front'. In other words, although the RPP emerged from 1977 election as primary victor, it became once again opposition party. The new coalition period was started with them until 1980 military intervention. On the other hand, Turkey's socio-political and economic situation emerged as big challenge for political stability for not only the RPP but also the JP.

2.2.8. 1980 Military Coup

Second 'Nationalist Front' led by Süleyman Demirel was seized by the new military intervention as in the 1960 and not like 1971 because Turkish army force intervened directly to politics by pulling down the government and dismantling 1961 Constitution. Ahmet Evin argues that the main aim of 1980 military intervention was to end the fragmentation in political arena and to find feasible system of government with an established mechanism to preclude the repetition of ideological polarization (1998, 203). Before 1980 military coup, main civil bureaucracy and institutions had been lost its power in politics because of waxing periphery's condition until 1970s in the center. The military found only itself as guardian of Kemalism and the country. Accordingly, Ahmet Evin stated that both 1971 and 1980 military coups were identical: parties in the parliament stalemated the condition of the country by not achieving political consensus that caused the increase chaos and violence in Turkey (1998, 203). In other words, the lack of consensus in the parliament caused not having consensus within public. The result of this was seen as public disorder as well as insecurity.

After dismissing old government, military generals, who fulfilled executive and legislative body by establishing NSC (National Security Council), set up a new government by creating technocrat cabinet under leadership of Bülend Ulusu. During this time, Kenan Evren, who ruled NSC and led the military intervention, became the new president of Turkey. Three interventions demonstrated that 'the state giveth and the state taketh'. In the governing process of military government, the constitution,

situation of the universities, and the electoral law amended. For example, the 1980 military coup brought more limitation for politicians. Parties in parliament were closed and their leaders punished by banning from politics for ten years. The military government ruled the country almost 3 years, and the military decided to pass governmental process to civilian governments. Thus, the new election, in which only new politicians and parties could participate, was designed in 1983 with new 10 percent threshold. Thus only three parties joined the election competition. The result was the MP's, (*Anavatan Partisi*, Motherland Party) led by Turgut Özal, victory with 45.14% votes and 211 seats while Populist Party (PP) led by Necdet Calp emerged 39.46% with 117 seats and Nationalist Democratic Party (the NDP) took 23.26% votes with 71 seats. The NDP and Populist Party were established under control of generals within left and right sphere in order to control the politics through legal means. However, victory of the MP was like victory of the JP in 1964 election because people punished the military once again.

The MP took absolute majority with 211 seats out of 400. The new electoral law designed parliamentary seat rate from 450 to 400. In addition, the reason of three parties only joined election was that NSC checked parties before joining election. Thus Bülent Ecevit's Social Democracy Party led by Erdal İnönü, Süleyman Demirel's Great Turkey Party (*Büyük Türkiye Partisi*, *BTP*) and True Path Party (TPP) and Erbakan's Welfare Party and Conservative Party as successor of the NAP were vetoed by NSC. According to Ilter Turan, NSC played an active role in the shaping of the party system. Accordingly, 'the military leadership appears to have been guided by a consideration to prevent the pre-1980 parties from emerging under new names and engaging in the kind of activities they had engaged in during the last years of their existence' (1998, 73). With new Political Parties Law's 95 and 96 articles: the new parties could not be founded if its members' majority belonged to

1 More information about 1980 military coup can be found in Heper, M & Evin, A 1998 (eds.), *State, Democracy and the Military Turkey in the 1980s*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin & New York.

party that was banned. In addition to this, no new parties could use symbol or name of banned parties and new parties could not be continuation of abolished parties in 1981 (1998, 74). These new amendments led by NSC demonstrated that Turkey's democratic stability and development was harmed. NSC controlled all institutions in order to prevent democratic development. Only three parties' election was the lowest party participation to election from 1950. Without military party, the NDP, only two party participations regard as different side was seen in 1983 election. Turkey enjoyed more than two party participations from 1950 to 1983. Different parties brought more liberalization and democratic competition for voters. That is good to say 'more parties, more alternatives'.

2.2.9. Turgut Özal Periods

Turkey started with new process until next military intervention in 1997. Turgut Özal wanted to collect supporters from different political spheres regardless of left or right. The new government was actually based on economic changes into its political agenda. The new cabinet established dominantly by economists. Two reasons for economist dominant cabinet was, one because Turkey's economic position was not advanced enough, and the other reason was that Özal himself was an economist. Özal ruled the country as the Prime Minister from 1983 to 1989 and Kenan Evren left the Presidency end of the 1980s. Özal's prime minister period brought economical development by opening many trade centers. Also, banned leaders, Ecevit, Türkeş, Erbakan, Demirel who played active role on proxy parties, were given their political rights with referendum of 6 September 1987. After the referendum in 1987, Necmettin Erbakan and some party members of the pre-1980 cadres became the leadership of Welfare Party. (Hakan Yavuz 1997, 71).

The early general election was set up in 29 November 1987. The Aim of the early election was that Özal wanted to prevent organization of new parties especially banned leaders because Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit were two serious rivals for Özal. The result of the early election showed that the MP reduced vote rate to 36.29% while rivalries shared other votes as 24.81% for Social Democrat Party (the

SPP) led by Erdal İnönü, and TPP emerged as 19.15% while Democratic Left Party (the DLP) led by Ecevit won 8.53% but 10% threshold kept him outside of parliamentary. Özal's political situation was declined with elections. Even that good example of declining was local election in 1987. Özal's vote reduced from 45 to 22 percent. It was not hard to assume for Özal that he would lose majority vote in the next election. Thus, Özal put himself for Presidency and he became the civilian president in 1989. A new government was shaped under leadership of Yıldırım Akbulut. Kurdish insurgency in 1980s caused Özal and Akbulut loss their popularity within public. In 1991, the MP chose its new party leader through Mesut Yılmaz who became the new Prime Minister. However, he acted as the Prime Minister almost 5 months from June to December. Özal's estimate became true when the MP lost 1991 general election. Two parties, the SPP led by Erdal İnönü and TPP led by Süleyman Demirel, became apparent over coalition after 1991 election.

2.2.10. Third Coalition Periods

After coalition, the new government was created and Süleyman Demirel became President once again, and he ruled country from 1991 to 1993. After Özal's death, Süleyman Demirel was chosen as 9th President of Turkey. Thus, Tansu Çiller was chosen as party leader of TPP and she became Prime Minister from 1993 to 1995 in a coalition government. Tansu Çiller has been the only female party leader since the establishment of the Republic. She was educated in doctorate of economics. During her leadership TPP's vote declined. Representation of Kurds in other political parties along with the rise of Islamist Welfare Party are among the reasons of TPP losing votes. Pro-Kurdish politics was formed under the control of HADEP (People's Democracy Party). Before this period, Kurdish politicians became active under HEP (*Halkın Emek Partisi*, People's Labour Party) but they did not have enough supporters to pass the threshold. Thus, some of them became representatives under the SPP.² During this time, Welfare Party, which increased its popularity within voters, took 21.38% of the vote with 158 seats that made it a key point for coalition

² I will discuss Kurdish political parties in the following sections.

similar to coalitions in 1970s. After 1995 election, none of the parties took majority to form government. Thus, Tansu Çiller and Mesut Yılmaz agreed to form coalition government with a rotating premiership. However, that coalition period did not continue for long-term because of ‘Erbakan’s threat to expose Çiller’s alleged corruption by launching a parliamentary investigation’ (Ahmad 2008, 258). Mistrust between Çiller and Yılmaz made Yılmaz resign on 6 June. Erbakan’s blackmail became effective, and Tansu Çiller made new coalition with the WP that meant Erbakan became new Prime Minister until 28 February 1997 military intervention in the form of a ‘memorandum’ that is known as postmodern military coup.

2.2.11. 1997 Military Coup: Post-Modern Military Coup

Actually, Erbakan’s the WP won 1995 general election as the leading party. the MP under the leadership of Mesut Yılmaz became second, and TPP under the leadership of Tansu Çiller became third Both Yılmaz and Çiller did not want to form coalition government with Erbakan. Therefore, they came together to form a new government called ‘Anayol Government’. After this government, Erbakan and Çiller formed a coalition which was called ‘Refahyol Government’. Welfare Party program was based on moderate Islam in politics. Hakan Yavuz argues that ‘the overall ideology of the WP is from of Islamic “liberalism” in that it does not see Islam as an alternative to politics but searches for ways in which to integrate Islamic identity and its symbols into the political sphere’ (1997, 76). Accordingly, the WP wished to increase Islamic figures into politics. Thereof, many secular groups read 1995 election as a revolt versus Kemalist principles. It was like 1950 general election that brought periphery to center of Turkish politics. the WP’s religious background helped it to organize in different organizations and clubs that brought potential voters together. In addition, the WP designed different organizations in order to support Islamic togetherness. For example, organization of protesting Israel was designed in 1997 in order to defend Palestine’s right on Jerusalem. Although all of these reasons assisted Erbakan to become the Prime Minister and increase his popularity, they also

brought Erbakan's end with military memorandum in 28 February 1997 after panel for Jerusalem Day. Erbakan resigned in 18 June 1997.

Abolishment of Erbakan government is yet another interventions of military to a civilian government. President Demirel gave the task of forming government to Mesut Yılmaz. Therefore, the new coalition was designed under control of Yılmaz's leadership with the DLP and Democratic Turkey Party (DTP) until November 1998 because of Yılmaz's claimed relationship with the 'mafia'. Thus, Ecevit and independents formed the new coalition until the early election call was made. The capture of Abdullah Öcalan in 15 February 1999 helped Ecevit to held early elections. After the capture of Öcalan, nationalist parties increased their votes. In this period Ecevit used a lot more nationalist elements in his political discourse. The election result displayed that the DLP became the leading party with 136 seats, and the NAP led by Devlet Bahçeli took 129 seats as being the second largest party, and Virtue Party (VP), which was the continuation of the WP, led by Recai Kutan took 111 seats and also the MP won 86 seats while TPP got 85 seats. The new parliament covered 5 parties' representatives and 3 independents. The RPP led by Deniz Baykal did not pass 10% threshold, so the party did not join the parliament.

The new cabinet set up by the DLP, the NAP, and the MP under the Prime Minister of Bülent Ecevit. Turkey's economy was in trouble and 17 August 1999 Earthquake exacerbated the crisis that the economy faced. The coalition government agreed to change the President in 2000. Ahmet Necdet Sezer was chosen as new President instead of Süleyman Demirel. Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who was the President of Constitutional Court, was chosen because of being equidistance to all parties. "Ahmet Necdet Sezer rebuked Ecevit for tolerating corruption in his cabinet" (Ahmad 2008, 260). He promised to bring the required reforms of Copenhagen Criteria for Turkey's full membership to the EU. The new economic crisis existed in 2001 that brought political instability. In these respects, Turkey became once again socially, politically and economically instable. Thus Devlet Bahçeli finally declared the early elections to be held on 3 November 2002. After the election, Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, the JDP) led by Recep Tayyip

Erdoğan won the election with 34.28% and 365 seats, and the RPP was reborn from its ashes by getting 19.39% and 177 seats while 8 independents took seats in the parliament. Vice President of the JDP was Abdullah Gül who was given the task of forming government because Erdoğan was in prison. After Erdoğan's freedom, he became Prime Minister in 2003. Now he is the President while Ahmet Davutoğlu is Prime Minister. It is undeniable that Erdoğan's has power to control both the JDP and overall politics of Turkey right now.

2.3. Kurdish Parties in Mainstream Turkish Politics

I have already mentioned that there are different factors that have affected development of Turkish democratization process since Turkish Republic. Trails of multiparty system were steps to develop democratization process. In the multiparty system, different ideas from different political spheres have directly influenced democratization process. The detailed account above about the political parties and elections in Turkey indicate that Kurdish identity and politics were not given visibility and focus in the mainstream politics. Because of this, I am going to analyze Kurdish presence and politics in the mainstream political scene in this sections. Political participation is the most constructive form to reflect demands and grievances of different communities; hence, Kurdish parties' effective participation in the parliament and mainstream politics of Turkey would have positive effect on democracy. I will mostly examine People's Democratic Party, the HDP in this section as it appears as a good example of how inclusive discourses can offer alternatives and representation as the HDP achieved passing the 10% threshold by speaking to other minority identities. Before focusing on the HDP, I start by examining Kurdish participation in mainstream politics in Turkey from early Republic to today.

Except some, Kurdish people did not participate the parliamentary experience directly along with early republican elites. They occupied Turkish political agenda of Republican Elites with rebellions such as Sheikh Said Rebellion (1925), Mt. Ararat

Rebellion (1930), and Dersim Rebellion (1938).³ Kurdishness is as an umbrella or ‘mosaic’ by harboring different cultural backgrounds into it. For example, some Kurds are Sunni while others are Alevi. As noted in the first chapter, some Kurdish Alevis did not support Sheikh Said Rebellion, and some Sunni Kurds also did not support Dersim Rebellion. It can be said that Sunni Kurds are perceived to be non-Turkish while for Alevi Kurds both non-Turkishness and non-Sunni Muslim identity is emphasized. Hence, Kurds, in different instances are both ethnically and religiously treated as the “other” to the dominant group. From the start of the Republic, Alevis commonly supported secular politics that the RPP promoted. It can be argued that “the secular versus pro-Islamist party divide is also linked to the observed Alevi–Sunni divide” (Çarkoğlu 2005, 273) ⁴.

It is important to draw attention that Kurds cannot be understood from a single framework. Similar to different political colors of right and left political spheres, Kurds are complex and diverse. For analytical purpose, I will show this diversity within three categories:

- 1) Supporters of political separatism/autonomy of Kurds, who want to separate themselves from Turkey by political borders or distinguish their administration through self-governing body.
- 2) Cultural rights supporters, who desire that Kurds are given cultural rights but they do not want to separate from Turkey as an independent or autonomous state.
- 3) Assimilated persons who are born in a Kurdish family but accepted social and cultural assimilation of the dominant group in Turkey. For example, many people claimed that Turgut Özal, who was born in Malatya where majority of the residents are Kurds, came from a Kurdish origin. However, he never based his politics on Kurdish political identity nor he spoke about cultural rights of Kurds.

⁴ The separations of Kurdishness, is not my research topic for current thesis, should be researched in details. In the literature, this topic has not been researched enough and satisfactory.

Sheikh Said Rebellion (1925), Mt. Ararat Rebellion (1930), and Dersim Rebellion (1938) are examples of the first category as they meant that Kurds wanted to separate from Turkish Republic in their independent Kurdistan in South and East of Turkey. 13 years of single party period of the RPP perceived these Kurdish rebellions as political conflicts against Turkish Republic. Prior to the establishment of the Republic, during the Independence War Mustafa Kemal indicated his commitment for a federal structure or an autonomous Kurdistan (Yeğen 2007). Hence, Kurds always occupied place in Turkish politics but not as independent political actors in the mainstream politics with their political parties and elected officials. Turkish government took restrictions to limit Kurdish political activities. Martial law and not having economic and social developments in Kurdish regions were ways to weaken Kurds' separatist demands. Ferit Melen, former Prime Minister and a parliamentarian from Van, for example, once stated that 'in that time (single party period), the unofficial political agenda of state was to deny Kurds' material wealth and higher education (Birand 1992 in Aktürk 2010 96; translation is mine). In these respects, Kurds were ignored by 1924 Constitution to join parliament in order to support Kurdish rights until multiparty regime.

Here the important question is whether there are any Kurdish parliamentarians during the single party regime or not? There were ethnically Kurdish parliamentarians. However, they were forced to not make any Kurdish political propaganda in the parliament by the constitution and restrictions basis on effective and dominance of Turkish nationalism in Turkish politics. Thus, Kurds' participation to politics was seen with the DP regime. As I already mentioned that periphery became more active by translating them into center. Kurds, found them with the DP's political calculations, has actually been sample of periphery in which mostly rural conservative voters emerged. According to Şener Aktürk, thanks to multiparty regime, Kurds became active politicians within the DP mostly in their political districts because pressure of the RPP's single party regime (center based politics) on Kurds was abolished. For example, Mustafa Remzi Bucak, Mustafa Ekinci, and Yusuf Azizoğlu, were originally Kurd, became parliamentarians of the DP with 1950 election (Aktürk 2010, 96-7). Below, Table 3 helps us to interpret voting distribution

for parties, demonstrates Independent, the DP, NP, and the RPP's voting rate.

Table 3: 1950 Election Results in Intensively Kurdish Population Cities

District	Independents	The DP	The NP	The RPP
Ağrı	0	34,115	0	18,797
Bingöl	1,560	8,341	0	15,700
Bitlis	4,732	7,989	0	16,025
Diyarbakır	0	53,691	0	48,000
Gaziantep	0	69,792	0	49,333
Hakkari	0	0	0	12,384
Kars	0	54,112	0	76,561
Mardin	47,771	45,078	0	44,882
Muş	0	16,880	0	16,040
Siirt	0	22,144	0	15,363
ŞanlıUrfa	0	55,959	0	51,924
Tunceli	0	13,089	0	9,209
Van	10,374	16,785	0	20,653

Source: https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/secim_sorgu.secim_parti_illler?p_secim_yili=1950

the DP's political maneuver, Kurdish candidates and more libertarian construct, became effective on Kurds who supported the DP in 1950 election. For example,

Table 3 demonstrates that eight out of thirteen political districts supported the DP more than the RPP. According to Hamit Bozaslan (2008), transition to political pluralism after 1945 was important way for Kurds to join politics by the DP's integrative policy with 1950 election that also allowed many Kurdish deportees to return Turkey. Additionally, the DP widened its electoral district among Kurdish notables and tribes as well as religious figures (343). The economic and educational development came with participation of Kurds to politics in 1950s. Many students went to big cities especially Istanbul and Ankara for higher education. That is, Kurdish periphery has been seen in center. An important religious figure Said-i Nursi was a Kurdish religious notable and some people named him Said-i Kurdi. Said-i Nursi supported the DP's decision to changed back call for prayer to Arabic. Thus Said-i Nursi's followers supported the DP in 1950s. However, Kurdish supporting of the DP had decreased in the third period of the DP because of changing its diversity to authoritarian regime. Thus, Kurds had disappointed as developments turned to be misleading in the end (Barkey & Fuller 1997, 66). In the 1960s, Ekrem Alican, was former parliamentarian of the DP but he left from the DP in order to establish Freedom Party (the VP) in 1955, played effective to collect Kurdish votes for his party. In other words, Kurdish opinion was changed to New Turkey Party (NTP) led by Ekrem Alican and Yusuf Azizoglu, Accordingly, Kurds supported NTP in 1961 general election in which NTP took highest support by mostly Kurdish political districts. For example, NTP took total votes of 54.61% of Bingöl, 50,97% of Siirt, 46.87% of Bitlis, 45.27% of Erzurum, 43.91% of Muş, 42.75% of Diyarbakır, 38.03% of Van, and 35.42% of Tunceli. Thus, NTP was called as Kurdish party (Aktürk 2010, p. 98-9).

For next elections, Kurdish political side was changed for the RPP and other parties. Hakan Yavuz explained the transition of Kurds supporting from right, the DP to left, the RPP. He claimed that the “secularization and [transformation] of Kurdish identity took place as a result of interaction with socialist ideology”, and thus, “under the 1961 Constitution, Kurdish intellectuals [who took higher education] expressed Kurdish concern and grievances in socialist idioms to promote the self determination of the Kurds” (2007, 9).

Until 1990, there is no legal Kurdish Party that directly created through Kurdish cultural and/or separatist idea. Kurdistan Worker Party (the PKK) was established by Abdullah Öcalan in 1980s, but Constitution Court closed it immediately because of insurgency and zeal of separatist idea. Even though, mainstream political identity of Kurds and Kurdish parties are the main focal point in this thesis, the role of the PKK cannot be overlooked in influencing Kurdish political identity and Kurdish politics in general in Turkey. Additionally, without understanding the PKK, we cannot understand leftist pro-Kurdish parties. Aylin Güney states that the PKK's political ideology is based on Marxist-Leninist views in which it has used an anti-imperialist rhetoric of the left. Because of that, the PKK opposed 'Turkish Imperialism' that prevents 'Turkish Kurdistan' (2002, 123).

The PKK makes the argument that the PKK was instrumental to create self-awareness in Kurdish people. Additionally, the PKK played crucial role to form Kurdish political identity in 1980s and 1990s in Turkey. As Hamit Bozarslan stated, "while Turkish politicians have yet to exhibit the courage necessary to negotiate a political solution to the Kurdish issue, the PKK continues to rely upon guerrilla warfare in its struggle to achieve self-determination for Turkey's 15 million Kurds" (1996, 16). Additionally, Kemal Kirişci and Gareth Winrow claimed that official denial of Kurds by the Turkish state caused the growth of Kurdish self-consciousness. Mutually, the PKK's use of violence against the Turkish state contributed to bring more limitations of Kurdish rights (2011, 112). Abdullah Öcalan played a crucial role to determine the PKK's ideology on socialism because of equality approach of socialism. Choosing this ideology caused that increasing Soviet effect in Turkey. First of all, TLP (Turkey Labor Party) followed communist ideology in Turkey. Additionally, left wing socialist organizations were created under leadership of Dev-Genç and DİSK in 1960s and 1970s.

Founders of the PKK especially Abdullah Öcalan followed these organizations besides of Kurdish organizations. For example, the Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths (DDKO) was based on development of social and cultural consciousness of the Kurds. Aliza Marcus cited that Kurdish intellectuals and university students

established DDKO in 1960s, and it was closed by the state in 1970. The idea of the group was based on Marxism that was blended with Kurdishness as an ethnic identity, thus marking new way in developing of Kurdish political identity (2009, 21). Other political activities were shaped by two figures who are; Şerafettin Elçi and Kemal Burkay were seen in 1960s as two advocates of Kurdish rights. In fact, these two leading persons represented two sides of Kurdish political spectrum. Kemal Burkay played in the TLP as socialist while Şerafettin Elçi was being conservative in Kurdistan Democracy Party of Turkey (TKDP). Mostly the PKK's activities were shaped in 1970s. The PKK ideology is based on socialism because of the position Kurds hold in Turkey's social structure. They believed that the Kurds are under the repression of the state, and they needed to be equal with Turks and their rights to be recognized. Thus, socialism advocates for equal rights and stands against discrimination.

ADYOD (Ankara Democratic Higher Education Association) promoted socialist ideas, and Abdullah Öcalan joined to this organization. His activities went against the state after joining this organization. Aliza Marcus stated that after joining ADYOD, he [Abdullah Öcalan] and his friends decided to establish an independent organization to fight for Kurdish national right. Therefore, they needed to bring Turkish and Kurdish socialists in order to carry out the revolution (2009, 28). In 1975, the foundations of a new organization were built which were shaped by Marxist and Leninist ideology, by Abdullah Öcalan and 15 of his friends in Dikmen, Ankara. The main idea of new organization is to fight for independent Kurdistan. After the foundation of the new organization, later called the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan became its leader. "He [Öcalan] argued that the previous Kurdish uprisings in Turkey failed because they were neither sufficiently socialist nor truly national liberation struggles" (Marcus 2009, 34). Accordingly, Abdullah Öcalan shaped the new organization's idea via socialism and liberation struggle. The PKK has occupied Turkish political life since the end of 1970s. The literature argues that the PKK played a crucial role to create Kurdish self-determination of identity. However, it has also affected democratization process of society negatively as Kurdish political identity started to be associated with violence. Hence, rather than Kurdish

independence or Kurdish rights the PKK became the symbol of violence.

Simultaneously to the PKK's existence outside of mainstream politics, there have been pro-Kurdish political parties in Turkey which needs to be analyzed from the perspective of their influence on democratization process of Turkey. Pro-Kurdish parties in Turkish politics have been shaped with socialist ideology. Until 1990s, there was no legal Kurdish party. With Halkın Emek Partisi, the socialist based political figures had been seen in Turkish politics. Nicole Watts argues "the status of Kurds in the republic within parameters of legal activism has come from a series of pro-Kurdish political parties, the first of which was the Halkın Emek Partisi (HEP, or People's Labor Party)" (1999, 631). In other words, HEP led by Fehmi Işıklar was set up as legal political party of Kurdish people in 1990. As Fehmi Işıklar stated the party agenda determined for 'all of Turkey' political agenda. He defined his party's ideal membership as: "We are a party of the masses. Our right line extends to 'democrat' but our left line stops before armed action. We are inviting the people between these two lines to join us" (Turkish Daily News 1990 in Watts 1998). Nevertheless, HEP was called as pro-the PKK because the PKK leader Abudllah Öcalan and the flag had been appeared in HEP's meetings and organizations in 1992.

The HEP's initial party propaganda assisted it to join Assembly. They became successful by becoming parliamentarians of the SPP led by Erdal İnönü in 1991 general election. The HEP agreed with the SPP to come together under the umbrella of the SPP in which 22 Kurdish representatives were chosen in 1991 election. Otherwise, HEP would stay below the 10% national threshold without being able to take representative to the parliament. Turgut Özal played a crucial role during his presidential period in 1990s. He wanted to prevent increasing violence between the state and the PKK after 1984. Kemal Kirişçi and Garet Winrow mention that togetherness of the SPP and HEP made Turgut Özal take restrictions in order to limit tension. His idea was that the state should allow Kurdish radio and television broadcast, and Kurdish should be second language in the schools. (2011, 160-1). HEP's collaboration was beneficial for the SPP as it increasing its popularity and votes. the SPP's social democrat discourse made it possible for these two parties to

collaborate in the elections. Kurds found the SPP as a party that regarded minority and human right issues as important elements. Henri J. Barkey stated that the pact between the SPP and HEP continued until HEP parliamentarians' persistence of taking the parliamentary oath in native language [Kurdish] in the ceremony at the starting of the new parliament after the elections. This case made dissolution the pact between the SPP and HEP (1998, 130). In addition, oath problem played crucial role for Constitutional Court that closed the HEP in 1993. The ÖZDEP (Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Partisi or Freedom and Democracy Party) was established as an alternative party of HEP but it was also soon closed. Representatives of the former the HEP were met under the umbrella of the DEP (Democracy Party) that was established in 1991 and it was closed by Constitutional Court in 1994. It was also known as follower of the radicalization of the formal Kurdish politics. After Kurdish parliamentarians resigned from the SPP, Tansu Çiller called them as 'terrorist representatives' (Barkey 1998, 130), and she played a key role on arrest of seven parliamentarians in 1994, most famous of those arrests being Leyla Zana. Zana insisted to read the oath in her native language during the new parliamentary year after 1991 election. The others' lost seats in the parliament. From 1990 to 1995, five pro-Kurdish parties established. The HADEP (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi or People's Democracy Party) was founded after DEP's political banishment. It was that if one party closes, another can be established immediately. Even if the party members are arrested, new members can move in. In 1995 election, The HADEP was not successful both in the general election and local election.

For general election, the threshold prevented HADEP's political participation to the parliament while for municipal election; the party boycotted it in 1994. The party waited until 1999 election. However, the HADEP decided to participate the election as party, and it took 4% of total vote while it became the first party in 9 districts. HADEP once again could not pass the election threshold. Finally, HADEP was also closed in 2003 by constitutional court because of supporting of separatist propaganda of the PKK.

The fate of Kurdish parties including current People's Democratic Party (the HDP) is

that most of their party supporters are also called supporters of the PKK that made Kurdish parties lose its popularity within voters. It is not surprising because DEHAP (Democratic People's party or *Demokratik Halk Partisi*), was an attendant substitute party due to HADEP's closure. Kurdish political sphere was seen as right and left wing. Left wing was presented by firstly the SPP, and other pro-Kurdish parties such as the HEP, the DEP, the HADEP, the DEHAP, and the DTP (*Demokratik Toplum Partisi* or Democracy Society Party) while right wing was represented by initially the DP, and later by the WP and the VP. One of the main reasons of right wing parties' popularity for the Kurdish voters is the long history of Kurdish commitment to political Islam. Kurdish Parties have increased its constituency power within Kurdish populated regions such as Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Muş, Şırnak, Bitlis, Batman, Van, Tunceli, Siirt, Bingöl, Mardin, Şanlıurfa, Kars, Iğdır, and Ağrı in 2000s.

The DEHAP benefited from these cities in 2007 general election in which 22 independent representatives were chosen. Now, DTP, successor of DEHAP, changed its political maneuver by joining elections as independents. Later, they came together in the DTP. In other words, Kurds found seats in the parliament once again. In 2009, the DTP was also closed like other pro-Kurdish parties. Thus, the BDP (*Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi*- Peace and Democracy Party) had been seen in Turkish politics as pro-Kurdish party until it dissolved itself to join the HDP in 2014. Nil Satana stated that political continuousness of the Kurds in mainstream Turkish politics is possible via non-ethnic political parties, while they have been othered by virtue of high threshold and the practice of closing political parties that called threat to the regime (2012, 174). In 2011 elections, pro-Kurdish candidates did not join to the race as party because of the threshold. The party once again used independent candidates.

The BDP changed its political strategy by adding conservative candidates such as Şerafettin Elçi and Altan Tan in terms of the JDP increased its voting rate in the southeast and east Anatolia. Also, the new formation of socialist Kurdish parties was acceptable more than before as having different opinions brought more votes to the BDP. Kurdish parties' political evolution is important to understand why the HDP's

political agenda has been based on having different cultures, identities, and opinions. As I noted, HEP and the HDP's political propaganda is similar, because two of them harbor both left and right voters. The HDP's discourse on being a party for all which they called it 'Türkiye Partisi (Turkey Party)' pushed it over the 10% threshold. As of 2016, it is the third party in the Assembly.

As my research question departs from understanding the role and influence of the HDP on Turkey's democracy, I will focus on the HDP in the following section. While Turkish political system is experiencing pluralism in political party diversity which contributes to democratization process, at the same time Turkey goes through the banning of political parties or abolishing immunity of parliamentarians which creates democracy deficit. Thus, the meaning of not only Kurdish political parties but also existence and flourishing of all political parties in the parliament is crucial for enjoying more democratic practices in Turkey.

2.3.1. People's Democracy Party (*Halkların Demokrasi Partisi*, the HDP)

The HDP is one of the pro-Kurdish parties. It is combination of the BDP (Peace and Democracy Party) and other five small parties such as Revolutionary Socialist Workers' Party, Social Party of the Oppressed, Socialist Democracy Party, Re-establishment of the Socialist Party, and Greens and the Left Party of the Future. These parties' ideology is grounded ideology of socialism and Marxism of the left wing of Turkish politics. As one knows that the HDP is successor of these left wing parties. However, the party changed its political perspective by applying 'Party of Turkey' slogan. It means that the party wants to embrace all differences regardless of left or right wing, Kurds or Turks, and Muslim or non-Muslim, and woman or man. Therefore, the party has changed its political strategy that is to join election as party. Before June 7 Election in 2015 they attempted to see party's supporters. Selahattin Demirtaş, who is current party leader with Figen Yüksekdağ, was Presidential candidate of the HDP. The party decided to join election as party by getting %9,76 votes from Presidential Election. After this election the HDP joined to general election, June 7 Election. Many different sides supported the HDP because of party program and agenda. For example, Unions, Feminist Groups, LGBT [Lesbian, Gay,

Bisexual, and Transgender], and Left wing and Right Wing supported it in this election. The party has increased gender quota as the highest level in Turkey like %50 of candidates. The party applies zipper system and co-chairmanship in order to increase gender quota. In other words, after June 7 Election, there were 80 deputies of the party in the parliament. The half of this number, 40 deputies, was woman. One knows that more women in the parliament increase consolidation of the democracy in Turkey.

In Turkey after June 7 election, the party has started to take position in the mainstream Turkish politics. Therefore, both the JDP and the RPP's votes can be decreased because of the HDP. It can be explained as the HDP's surplus votes cannot be divided into the JDP and the RPP. I will not mention the NAP because there is no common voter profile. Now, the table will be beneficial when analyzing there parties' relationship over voters profile.




Figure 1: Common voters relationship

Accordingly, these three parties have common voters relationship for each election. They can steal each other's voters for each election. One knows that the RPP represents social-democrat left wing of Turkish politics while the JDP is in side of

right wing as conservative-democrat. However, the HDP is in the left wing as socialist. Turkish voters' profile is divided into two categories as right wing and left wing. Kurdish voters have crucial role in this paradoxes because Kurds also are divided into two categories as conservative and socialist. Therefore, the JDP collected more Kurdish votes than the RPP and the HDP. The analyzing of the table is that intersect of the JDP and the HDP depends on Kurdish Sunni voters while intersect between the RPP and the HDP depends on socialist and democrat voters, that means left voters. Now, I have two general hypotheses for the HDP for gathering more voters for next elections.

H1: The more the HDP appeals Kurdish nationalism, the less contribution it could provide to mainstream politics in Turkey.

H2: a) the more the HD assumes Sunni center discourse, the more chances it would have to contribute mainstream politics in Turkey.

b) the more the HDP appeals center-to-left discourse, the more chances it would have to contribute mainstream politics in Turkey.

The HDP is different than other pro-Kurdish political parties because of applying both Sunni politics and left politics more than Kurdish nationalism. Therefore, it became successful for November 1 Election in 2015. It decreased its deputy numbers from 80 to 59 and total votes from % 13, 12 to %10, 76. This result made the part became third party in the parliament. The following tables are important to interpret how pro-Kurdish parties have started to join the parliament as agent of Kurdish nationalism.





Figure 2 and 3: Turkish General Elections from 1991 to 2015



The Kurds have started to join mainstream Turkish politics after 1991 general election. 21 pro-Kurdish deputies were chosen in the umbrella party with the SPP. This figure shows that how parties got votes in general election from 1991 to 2015. For table, the percentage of parties' votes is calculated over 100 percent. To understand Turkish politics, I clustered parties as; the JDP was an extension of the WP. Even though the two converge on political Islam, the JDP was more of a liberal party as opposed to the WP's more statist policies. They still attracted the same constituency. In addition, the SPP was successor of the RPP because of that case the SPP is evaluated as the RPP. In order to see parties' effect in general election from 1991 to 2015, table 6 will help.




Figure 4: Distrubition of Representatives from 1991 to 2015 General Elections




Figure 5: Local Elections from 1994 to 2014

Figure 5 shows that how pro-Kurdish parties became effective in local elections.

2.4. External Factors: Westernization of Turkey

The relationship between Turkey and Europe has always based on complex mutually relationship. Turkey's relationship with West was started the end of the Ottoman Empire. Europeanization desires in Turkey laid latter decades of Ottoman Empire, especially to the Tanzimat Reforms Era of 19th century. (Macmillan 2013, 107). In other words, the developments of modernization for educational, military, social, and political started in 1936 by the rescript of Gülhane (*Tanzimat Fermanı*). The main aim of the reforms was to make over Ottoman Empire into more equal state based of 'the rule of law and to grant its subjects modern citizenship rights, including equality of all citizens before the law, the supremacy of the law over political authority and security of life, property honour of all citizens as well as taxation reform' (Macmillan 2013, 110). The transformation of Empire was followed almost a

hundred years until establishment of Turkish Republic. As I noted before that the main aim of Turkish Republic led by Atatürk is to reach ‘contemporary level of civilization’. Atatürk designed Republic under six principles that all of them attempt to reach Western modernization. In other words, discourse of Kemalist idea about Europe is that Europe is a model of development and civilization for Turkey. We can read as reforms of 1920s and 1930s by Atatürk, such as secularization, liberation of women, and adaptation of the Latin alphabet, western dress, and western calendar to new Turkish Republic, new Turkish Republic has been started with new understanding of world. Institutions from military to society had been designed with Europe understanding of modernization. Thus, West was seen as the final stage of civilization (Bardakçı 2010, 27). Additionally, “For Turkey, EU membership is the most important step towards the goal of integration with ‘modern civilization’ shown by the founder of our Republic and modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk” (Friends of Europe 2004 in MacMillan 2013, 108).

Kemalist principles have shaped Turkey’s political and social spheres. From single party period to multiparty regime, Turkish political life had designed by six principles. Turkey’s another step of democratic modernization was transition of single party to multiparty. After Atatürk’s death, İsmet İnönü’s main idea was to continue of increasing relationship with not only Europe but also America especially called West. As I noted in the entrance of this chapter that İsmet İnönü’s close tie with West can be explained due to Soviet Threat. Turkey’s joining United Nations in 1946 and then NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) in 1952 made Turkey became more democratic than the past. Turkey’s close ties with West needed Turkey change her political regime from single party to multiparty. That case can be explained that Turkey’s single party regime was reminder of Soviet Union political regime. Therefore, the first step of Turkey’s being side of Western states was to transform her political regime. Of courses, not all political parties, political and social groups and organizations accept Europe; especially nowadays it changed to European Union (EU). For example the NAP, some Kemalists, and some conservative parties such as successors of the WP but the JDP have not like EU because of Sevres and Tanzimat Syndromes. I will mention the JDP specifically

because almost all reforms were taken by the JDP. Sevres and Tanzimat Syndromes mean is that state's integrity was shaken by Western states.

Tanzimat brought more equality to foreigner subjects of Ottoman Empire while France, Italy, British, and Greek shared Ottoman territory with Sevres Treaty. Because of these cases, they fear the EU. However, Turkey's biggest desire to join full membership of EU was seen in 1999 by coalition government. The new dimension of Turkey's EU membership process can be determined on globalization and increasing minority and human right issues in 1990s. These concepts, made Turkey has been becoming liberalization more than past, also got momentum in Turkey of 1990s. Tanıl Bora explained 1990s as the Liberal 'Neo-Nationalism' in which people were more liberal than past about the EU. Turkey's more liberal but also nationalist period brought to discuss Turkey's Kurdish issue more. Many organizations, meetings, conferences, and field works organized by intellectuals and businessmen, such as Sakıp Sabancı and Doğu Ergil. For example, Doğu Ergil's interview in Eastern provinces with mostly Kurds of 1267 samples gave important momentum to discuss Kurdish issue. His analysis or report, included that most of samples do not want to separate from Turkey, but they expect that Turkey should change her political and governance construction, published by TOBB in 1995 (Kirişçi & Winrow 2011, 176). In Turkey, new evolution was begun in 1990s because the EU was seen as beneficial union for Turkey to increase her socio-political and economical level. Thus, Mesut Yeğen claims that being full membership of the EU for Turkey is hard if Turkey tackles with Kurdish issue with such instruments of the past such as assimilation and compulsory settlement (2006, 141). Accordingly, Meltem Müftüler Bac states that Turkey need to become more democratic than past to attain candidacy membership of the EU. Thus, if Turkey had to adopt changing political reforms for fulfilling the EU's accession criteria, the accession negotiation begins (2005, 17).

An accession criterion of the EU has been changed in time. The last one is called Copenhagen criteria, in which pre-condition of accession to the EU was handled, need democratic stability and respect for human rights. Thus, Kurdish issue became

more valuable and visible reason for Turkey in order to solve it through EU's pre-conditions. Turkey took important steps for being membership of EU. Thus, European Council granted Turkey's candidacy in 1999 at Helsinki, and Turkey became candidate country of EU. Kemal Kirişci evaluates candidacy of Turkey for EU as Turkey adopt reforms and reconcile their laws and policies via EU's principles that bring to put Kurdish issue on the agenda, also decreasing of effects of military in Turkish politics, the abolishment of death penalty and state security courts, protecting minority rights by providing broadcast and education in their language, acquiescence of a modernized penal and civil code. These reforms make Turkey became more democratic than the past (2011, 335). Additionally, according to European Commission:

The basic feature of a democratic system exist in Turkey, but a number of fundamental issues, such as civilian control over the military, remain to be effectively addressed. Despite a number of constitutional, legislative, and administrative changes, the actual human right situation as it affects individuals in Turkey needs improvement (2001, 32 in Müftüler Bac 2005, 20).

As I understood from this paper that Turkey needed to develop democratic reforms for all subjects of Turkey. The institutional developments could help Turkey to close the EU. The biggest development was seen after 2002 when the JDP became party in power after general election. The JDP's liberal and developing political agenda make it to follow candidacy process of EU. New government has started developing of both socio-political and economical functions of Turkey. In other word, new government's foreign policy agenda was based on the EU's accession criteria in order to develop internal peace within state's citizens. That why, from 2001 to 2004, Turkey adopted various political reforms in order to fulfill Copenhagen Criteria. Turkey made eleven political reforms between 2001 and 2004. Nine of them are called constitutional packages, and the other two is known as new civil code and new Turkish penal code. These packages include to bring gender equality, abolishing death penalty, allowing broadcasting in minority languages, revising penal code for torture, abolishing state security courts, increasing freedom of press, and revising violence against women and children that all assisted Turkey's democracy level directly. These as I mentioned right now affect institutionalization of democracy

process directly. In other words, when the comparing of procedure democracy and institutionalization of democracy, the procedure was seen more than institutionalization until end of the 1990s. When Turkey, however, wanted to be member of the EU thanks to fulfill Copenhagen Criteria, Turkey's democratic institutionalization got momentum and became more apparent in all level of bureaucracies and institutions. In the different aspect, Ziya Öniş states that rapid economical developments through growth of foreign investments and trades has brought a positive and useful impact on the democratic consolidation process in the internal politics (2003, 11). As I understood that Turkey became more powerful state as called 'democratic state' than past because Turkey opened to new political and economical area. That is, Turkey's both foreign policy and domestic policy was based on Europeanization process in the early of 2000s. That made Turkey became model state for Middle Eastern states. In their views, Turkey is a country as all in one democratic and Muslim than themselves. In addition, at desiring of being membership of the EU creates challenges to nation-state understanding of Turkey as well as privileged national elites' position in Turkey. Because human rights and minority rights are main aim of the EU to fix it in the member states.

In addition, especially, Turkey's long time candidacy demonstrates that without solving minority and human rights issues especially Kurdish Issue, Turkey cannot be full membership of the EU. Therefore, the Kurdish Issue is the main challenge of Turkey in processing. Because of that case, Turkey started to bring more democratic solutions for issues. 'Resolution Process of Kurdish Issue' is the main important example to understand the aspect of Turkey for recognizing the Kurds as political structure in Turkey. Turkey has bargained with Kurdish party, the BDP, to solve main problem of Turkey. However, nowadays, the bargain is disappeared because of increasing violence in Southeast and East of Turkey. This is not my main topic. I focus how the evolution of democratization process of Turkey has been increased in time. I believed that resolution process is one of the policies for being membership of the EU. Kerim Yıldız states that the ongoing process of conflict in Southeast and [East] set up major obstacles for Turkey's full membership of the EU (2005). Not only Kerim Yıldız but also many other academicians share same idea such as Kemal

Kirişci (2011), Ayşe Betül Çelik (2005), and also Catherina Macmillan (2013). Therefore, if Turkey wants to be member of the EU, she has to solve Kurdish Issue.

CHAPTER 3

3. METHODOLOGY

I have already analyzed formation of competing nationalisms and process of democratization within Turkey in the first two chapters in detail. In this chapter, I will focus on the methodology by presenting my interview results, explaining how I conducted my fieldwork with the politicians from different political parties. My contribution in this thesis is presenting the similarities and differences in perception of different political spectrums about the role and position of Kurdish politics in the mainstream politics in Turkey.

My research is based on qualitative methods. I use semi-structured interview questions as my method. I did interviews with political province chairmen of the parties in the parliament. In the following sections, I will follow briefly discuss qualitative method, semi-structured interview method, my research participants, and the design process of the interviews as well as the data sorting and analyzing.

3.1. Qualitative Methods

Qualitative methodology is one of the social research methods. For the qualitative research, interpretative procedures such as non-standardized interviews and focus

group are often used. My thesis focuses on semi-structured interview method of qualitative research. Therefore, I focus the way of using qualitative research method in this chapter. In the triangulation of data in qualitative research depends on data that is drawn and collected from a variety of sources and in different time and also in various places as well as from different samples (Flick 2004, 178). Ines Steinke et al. state that there are quality criteria in qualitative research. He determines the criteria as objectivity, reliability, and validity (2004, 184) while Jack Katz (1982) bases these criteria on four “R’s” that orders as representativeness, reactivity, reliability, and replicability. It is important that readers of qualitative case studies or field researches raise these criteria as questions about the evidence. “The transformations in the field of qualitative research that were taking place in the early 1990s continued to gain momentum as the decade unfolded. Many scholars began to judge the days of value-free inquiry based on a God's-eye view of reality to be over” (Denzin and Lincoln 2005:x). Accordingly, the qualitative research has been started to affect world in a positive way. Therefore, Peshkin claimed that qualitative research, as a form of radical democratic practice, is necessary to be reengaged in the very beginning of the 21st century (1993). Additionally, Norman K. Denzin divided the qualitative research’s time period of being affective in social sciences into seven as the traditional (1900-1950); the modernist, or golden age (1950-70); blurred genres (1970-86); the crisis of representation (1986-90); the postmodern, or experimental (1990-6); the post-experimental (1996-present); and the future, the seventh moment (2001). The purpose of the qualitative method is based on actually ‘why’ question. The qualitative method gives me way to interpret and analyze my data, which are collected from semi-structured interviews.

3.1.1. Semi-Structured Interview Method

Gathering data through observations and information from the source of the inquiry is an important tool for understands the world easily. Not only researchers but also lay people do observation in order to give meaning to current events of daily life. In the social sciences, qualitative research, researchers may observe variety of people such as ordinary people, politicians, communities, or groups of people, different

sexualities, classes, religious figures or groups. Different tools of gathering data can be used, for example, participant observation, observation or interviewing. Documentation of this data gathering may happen via specific means as field notes, video- or audiotaping for the qualitative researcher. Moreover, “open-ended questions in a structured survey or questionnaires are sometimes referred to as producing qualitative data” (Bloor 1997, 170).

In this research I have used interviewing as a method for gathering data. Interviewing researchers are divided into two categories as structured interviewing and qualitative interviewing. In structured interviewing “each person is supposed to be asked identically worded questions to assure comparable findings” (Taylor et al. 2015: 102). In contrast to structured interviewing, the qualitative interviewing is more non-rigid and sliding. The ways of using qualitative interviewing are as “unstructured, nondirective, open-ended interviewing, and non-standardized” (Taylor et al. 2015: 102). Accordingly, the in-depth interview is seen in the scene in which there are branches of qualitative interviewing as called the “life history or sociological autobiography” (Taylor et al. 2015). In this interviewing, interviewer considers to catch the life history of interviewees. The second of the in-depth interview is that researcher wants to learn about not directly observed events and activities of informants. The last one is that using large number of samples in short time in order to compare them.

For my method, I prefer semi-structured interview method of qualitative interviewing in order to gather data. The semi-structured way is that the open-ended questions are determined before interview. However, the interviewers use the sub-questions that are produced from interviewee’s speech during the interview process. That is, interviewers use this way to gather more detail and extended information from interviewees. On the other hand, structured interview, as I mentioned, interviewer determines the all question even sub-questions before doing interview. Additionally, structured interviewer uses standardized way in which the words in the questions have same meaning for all participants. In spark contrast to this, in semi-structured interview there are no standardized words. Interviewees can perceive words

differently, which makes interviewer gather more information than structured interview method. According to K. Louise Barriball and Alison While, the opportunity of changing the words in semi-structured interview is meant that changed words cannot affect the meaning of questions in anyway. He said, “not every word has the same meaning to every respondent and not every respondent uses the same vocabulary” (1994:330). That is, the meaning cannot be changed if the words replaced with new one. In my way, face to face interview data gathering played effective role because in the interviewing procedure, the interpretive tool help me collect more data by interpreting not only transcriptions but also interviewees’ behavior by asking sub-questions during interview. The following example is good to see how I produce sub-question during interview in terms of interviewee’s speech. My main question is that ‘which policy should be followed for the existing political conjecture?’. Mehmet Karayılan from the HDP from Gaziantep mentions that Turkey’s existing political conjecture bases on violence, terrorism, and ignorance. Turks create nation-state in order to pressure the Kurds. ... We can change current political conjecture. I produce sub-question basis on current way during interview, and I asked:

Interviewer: OK. You mentioned current way that you imply democratic way. In this regard, you believe that 1982 Constitution should be changed?

Mehmet Karayılan: Yes. For example, in the first four laws of 1982 Constitution, citizens of Turkey are Turks. That is lie; big lie. I am a Turk, originally Turkmen. However, the Kurds are not Turks. Now, if we create start of constitution based on ignorance and lie, it is hard to develop democracy, and also we cannot provide cohabitation [of different ethnics]. Therefore, we must change 1982 Constitution⁵.

Methods that allow observing and listening people provide extended information that involves emotions and commitment to a certain issue. This type of access is unique to interviews For example, in one of my seven interviews, I observed that provincial chairman of the NAP in Manisa was emotionally invested in being against the HDP. He was not only oppositional to what the HDP represented but also perceived them

⁵ Interviews were held in Turkish and then translated to English.

as a threat to the existence of the Republic. When he was talking about the HDP and the PKK, he became extremely angry. The excerpt below is the example:

Interviewer: Now, the HDP joined as a party to the parliament. How do you evaluate this?

Tanju Balatlı: ... I do not sometimes understand perceptions [in the beginning of this interview, he mentioned the RPP supported the HDP in June 7 election]. You say that I am Kemalist and guardians of Republican as well as the supporter of the HDP in the June 7 election. Here there is fault and mistake! If only the HDP would be the supporter of peace and democracy as it argues it is!. [He became angry and shouting at this point]. If only the HDP prevents terrorist attacks of the PKK...

His anger is an indication of the polarization of political spectrums as disagreement and anger are two different ways of approaching an issue. Observing the provincial chairman of the NAP, Tanju Balatlı, during the interview process shows the level of distance the NAP officials see between their position in politics and that of the HDP.

3.1.1.1. Interview

The interview is the way of gathering basic information in the social sciences for a full century (Denzin, 2001). Holstein and Gubrium (1995) claim “90 percent of researches in social science benefit from interview data. Therefore, the media, social investigators, and also human service professionals produce their information about social life and society via interviews” (cited by Denzin, 2001). In other words, we are called as an interview society. Norman K. Denzin mentions that Annie Dillard (1982) has a different aspect of looking at interviews, “the interview is a way of writing the world, a way of bringing the world into play. The interview is not a mirror of the so-called external world, nor is it a window into inner life of the person” (cited by Denzin, 2001: 25). On the other hand, Laurel Richardson (1997) stated that the interview is not a method of gathering data, but it is a tool in order to produce performance texts and ethnographies about own self and society. Moreover, Nicole Cook (2009: 176) described the interview, as “interview is a staple, even canonical qualitative method in the social sciences; it generates a significant proportion of data collected by social scientists- data that are mostly spoken and

written”. Accordingly, the interview assists researchers to interpret the world via collected data. Moreover, according to Richardson, researchers’ job is not only to report findings but also their job is to transform field notes, documents, interview transcript, and other information into a form of prose (1992). Steven J. Taylor et al. state “no single writing should be related with the ‘qualitative way’. Therefore, qualitative researchers are practicing with new styles of writing ethnography and qualitative research” (2015). Most of the researchers believe that studies in qualitative research especially interview technique is an attempt to paint an advisable picture of the social life of both individual and group of people. Also, it can benefit from researcher’s role in leading the study and preparing the last narrative production by using his/her power of distinguishing and interpreting of the events. For example, researchers’ identities affect and shape the data gathering process even to shape the analyzing collected data (England 1994; Mcdowell 1992). Moreover, Nicole Cook state that the field appears like an uncertain picture (2009) in which interviewer shapes this uncertainty by using his/her reasoning. In addition to this, Delph-Janiurek (2001) pointed out that the identity of both sides plays crucial role of shaping the delivery in interviewing process. As I understood that, the sub-questions are determined during the interviewing by interviewer because of interviewee’s identity. Because of these cases, the interview is an operative text in which the new meaning of text is created and performed. Therefore, the performed text gives the world its proper meaningfulness (Denzin, 2001). Due to this perspective, ‘the interview is a fabrication, a construction, a fiction’, [an] “ordering or rearrangement of selected materials from the actual world” (Dillard, 1982 cited by Denzin, 2001: 25).

The researchers should determine his/her interest by preparing to clarify questions. That is, interviewing should be well prepared and suited by researchers. The process of taking appointment from interviewees sometimes gets a week or a month as my interviewing process. However, not like participant observation that sometimes waits a month or more than a month in order to gather data, the interviewer gather data in the same time of interviewing. Therefore, the popularity of interviewing has been increased today. In addition, researchers should decide how many interviewees are enough to gather data. Also, this is the challenge to researcher because researchers

cannot decide it easily. Therefore, as Klave (1996: 101) stated that to the common question, “How many interview subject do I need?” the answer is simply, “Interview as many subjects are necessary to find out what you need to know”. The other challenge is to taking appointment from interviewees. One of the challenging parts of interviews, which are the challenge of the existing research, also is that if participants of an interview are politicians, researcher will face last minute cancellations, time pressures and unavailability because politicians are a group that is hard to spare time for scientific inquiry. One way is important to take appointment that is to find contacts that are directly in relationship with the interviewees.

3.1.1.1.1. Finding the Research Participant for the Interviews

For my thesis, I decided to do interviews with political parties, which hold seats in the parliament. Hence, I aimed to interview the provincial chairman of, the JDP, the RPP, the HDP, and the NAP. I have interviewed seven provincial chairmen, in cities of Izmir, Gaziantep, and Manisa. That is, in these three cities I interviewed politicians from the JDP and the NAP, the RPP, and the HDP political parties, while I have interviewed with the NAP chairmen from both Manisa and Gaziantep, and with the RPP’s vice head of provincial chairman from Izmir while chairman from Gaziantep, and the HDP’s provincial chairman was arrested for being member of terrorist organization of the PKK. I do not know reality, it is just claim. Because of that case I did interview with district head of the HDP of Karşıyaka, Izmir while chairman from Gaziantep. I have also interviewed politicians from Gaziantep from the JDP. Each interview took minimum of 30 minutes and the maximum was almost an hour. That is, from 30 minute to one hour I had total of 7 interviews with all male participants. There is no woman provincial chairman of any of these parties that shows the commonality in their politics regarding gender equality.

At first, I have attempted to interview every provincial chairman only in two different districts, namely Izmir and Gaziantep. I chose two different regional parts of Turkey, Aegean and Southeast. As both sides are chosen within different regional political districts. Therefore, working within different directives can help to do

comparisons between the two sides in order to gather possible interesting and beneficial findings. I ended up including Manisa and Şanlıurfa to my sample, as I could not reach some of the politicians. I have chosen Manisa and Şanlıurfa because of their geographic proximity to the first two original field sites. As my interviewees are political figures the biggest challenge was to convince them to have a meeting with me. Most of them made the argument that their schedules were busy. Additionally, my direct attempts to reach them personally were futile except the RPP provincial chairmen in both Izmir and Gaziantep. Thus, I needed to find some people as contact people or gatekeepers to communicate with chairmen and try to arrange an appointment suitable for their time. For three parties, I found different contact people. For example, I made contact with the Hür Dava Partisi (Free Cause Party, the HÜDAPAR)'s Gaziantep provincial chairman in order to contact with the JDP's directors. Moreover, I contacted with the NAP's Gaziantep provincial Chairman, Muhittin Taşdoğan, via a gatekeeper. Also, I communicated with Manisa provincial chairman of the NAP via Mr. Taşdoğan.

The contact process and arrangement of interviews took almost forty days. As I mentioned earlier, I had to include other cities to my sample and the reasons of why I needed to include other cities have implications for understanding the level of polarization in Turkish politics. I contacted with chairman of the NAP of Izmir in March, 2016 via Gaziantep provincial chairman Mr. Taşdoğan. I talked with the director by telephone in order to make an appointment. I wanted to emphasize that he accepted me due to Muhittin Taşdoğan. At the beginning of the phone conversation, because of the referral of another the NAP politician, he was friendly and welcoming. In the process of arranging a time he asked me if I was also going to speak with other parties and when I confirmed he specifically asked me if I was going to be talking to the HDP as well. When I confirmed that I was indeed going to talk to the HDP as well his tone changed and he said "I cannot talk to you because of the the HDP. I have my principles; I do not want to be part of anything if the HDP is part of it". I told him that due to the scientific nature of the work I needed to talk with all the parties in the parliament. He was very firm and short. He said, "No. Thanks. I cannot give up my principles for your thesis". He hang up the phone

without any possibility for further discussion. This incident is not only explaining why I needed to add an alternative site to my research but also level of disconnection in the mainstream politics. Participating to a student thesis entailed only giving opinions and no face-to-face meeting with any politician from the HDP. Even though, Turkish mainstream politics in the parliament scene includes the HDP, for some there is not ground for discussing anything relevant to the HDP or any project that involves hearing the views of the HDP.

While I have faced resistance from Izmir chairman of the NAP where its location allowed more opportunity from avoiding tensions, as it is located in the West of Turkey in Aegean region, the NAP Gaziantep chairman was more accessible even though the presence of the PKK is felt in greater degrees. In other words, I started my analysis with focusing on regional differences as the proximity of political parties' branches to Kurdish regions may shift their perceptions to be more hardliner. However, I did not find what I expected. The reason may be the fact that in the region that Gaziantep is located, politicians are interacting with diverse populations and many have interactions with Kurdish people and everyday engagement with the supporters of the HDP is more common.

The reason for including Şanlıurfa is because the JDP provincial chairman in Gaziantep whom I contacted in March of 2016, did not accept to do the interview. I talked with him twice with the hopes of arranging an interview. One time I have met him face to face in the office of the JDP party branch. In other meeting he asked me the topic of my thesis and said “as this subject is about Turkish politics, I cannot do the interview now. I need to take permission from the Secretary General of our party. After our meeting next week, I will ask and if they give the permission, I will do the interview then”.

I called him the following week without being able to reach him. After two weeks I communicated with him by telephone. He told me that he could not get any answer from the party and since this topic included the HDP and other parties as well and it was political, it was a critical thing and he could not talk to me. This difficulty is an

indication of the limited autonomy that party figures have even if they are the heads of provinces. This field experience is an important aspect to think and further investigate for Turkish politics; internal democratic practices of parties and in general its implications for Turkey's democratic governance.

The parties' roles for provincial chairmen are different from one another. The NAP's chairmen are not just party provincial heads. They also have job separate from their position within the party. They run the head of provincial chairman and held a separate job together. For the RPP and the JDP the role of the provincial chairman is given importance and emphasized compare to the other two parties. Izmir demonstrates a good example for this. Both the JDP and the RPP are well organized in this city. They have almost 12 vice chairmen, each having a different focus. For example, one of them is a "political relationship" vice head, and another deals the "environmental and natural rights". Additionally, I observed that there is no womanpower in the parties' provincial chairmanship even in the HDP even though the co-chairmanship understanding directs the agenda of the HDP. However, I did not see any co-chairman being present during my interview.

The focus of the interview was to understand how political parties perceived the HDP, their position vis-à-vis to each other and how they emphasize democratization process of Turkey. In this aspect, I choose two regional parties' chairmen by comparing them for expecting to find the relation of what regional view for democratization process of Turkey is. The interview sample is small; hence, I am not arguing that through this method I am trying to reach a generalizable truth. Comparison of different parties and these parties in politically very different regions of Turkey would give us a snapshot of the existing situation in this particular moment and place where researchers could get information for further research interests in relevant topics that emerged in this study.

3.2. Data Sorting and Analyzing

The following process of interview after transcription is data sorting that means at determining the themes from interviews. I have extracted six themes as ‘democracy’, ‘terrorism’, ‘the EU and regional relations’, ‘mosaic’, ‘polarized’, and ‘woman’. The first three were the themes asked in my interviews and the participants elaborated the most. Words mosaic and polarized appeared as repeating concepts that needed to be analyzed here. The word ‘polarized’ is repeated 11 times in the interviews, and the word ‘mosaic’ is repeated 19 times. As there were no women in the interview processes and as the HDP emphasized women’s participation to politics and being elected, I have also analyzed if and how they perceive women. Additionally, women’s equal participation to politics is one of the important elements in democratizing politics. Interview results are an indication of how political arena still does not have women even when the focus is democratization of politics in Turkey. The parties but the HDP’s provincial chairmen for both Gaziantep and Izmir did not use the word ‘woman’ in their interviewing.

When I chose the themes, I have also used related words that fall into the same category in order to not miss information relating to the themes under scrutiny. ,For example, the word ‘terrorism’ includes terror, violence, chaos, and anarchy. I evaluated the sentences that included these words under the terrorism heading. For the mosaic, I include within this definition different cultures and ethnic groups living together in peace and justice not in ignorance and alienation. Hence, tolerance, respect, peace, justice, recognition are the words I also looked for in the interviews to analyze under the concept mosaic. For the word, polarization, ethnicity, difference in a negatively expressed way, us vs. them are part of the words that includes polarization. The last one is, the EU and regional relations, I look the relations of Turkey and the EU and regional relations on democracy. Once I decided the themes and which words would also be part of the meaning of these words, I went to the text and looked at the sentences in order to interpret the meanings. For example, “difference” can be used positively or negatively depending on the political approach one has. I decided by directly looking at the context and meaning they used the words.

3.2.1. On Democracy

The main aim of choosing the democracy as the first concept is that my thesis basically depends on democratization process of Turkey. The other themes are related to how democracy is shaped. When one analyzes the concept of terrorism, one seeks to reconcile the relationship of democracy and terrorism. In the basic understanding, if the terrorism is high in a country, democracy challenges that this country faces are higher.

When analyzing interviews, I realized that parties' democratization understanding was based on different arguments. The NAP's democratization argument, for example, is based on terrorism. Terrorism for them was strongly connected to the disintegration of Turkish soil and people. Two provincial chairmen mentioned same argument for democratization process of Turkey as following:

Tanju Balatlı: The democratization process of Turkey did not bring democracy while it is bringing disintegration of Turkey. ... We know and support that in the name of democratization of Turkey we divided into groups. ... Democracy does not mean to attack my basic values, integrity, and basic reasons of being state.

Muhittin Taşdoğan: Man [the HDP] is trying to shallow us the disintegration as democratization packet. ... People who desire peace are in the mountain. People who talk about the peace have guns and they mention democratization process more than the others.

Accordingly, the NAP evaluates Turkish democratization process, including democratization packages and resolution process, negatively. They mention that democratization process is the part of the separation process of Turkey. In addition, the NAP connects its democratization process understanding based on terrorism. In the transcription of the NAP's interview I repeatedly came across with the same arguments of the NAP for relationship of democracy and terrorism. For another example is that the fist four laws of 1982 Constitution became visible argument in order to discuss democracy level of Turkey.

The first four laws as following in the below:

I. Form of the State

ARTICLE 1- The State of Turkey is a Republic.

II. Characteristics of the Republic

ARTICLE 2- The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by rule of law, within the notions of public peace, national solidarity and justice, respecting human rights, loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the preamble.

III. Integrity, official language, flag, national anthem, and capital of the State. ARTICLE 3- The State of Turkey, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish. Its flag, the form of which is prescribed by the relevant law, is composed of a white crescent and star on a red background. Its national anthem is the "Independence March". Its capital is Ankara.

V. Irrevocable provisions

ARTICLE 4- The provision of Article 1 regarding the form of the State being a Republic, the characteristics of the Republic in Article 2, and the provisions of Article 3 shall not be amended, nor shall their amendment be proposed. (1982 Constitution)

When I analyze the transcripts, I realized that the NAP, both Manisa and Gaziantep, and the RPP of Izmir emphasized the four laws of Turkish Constitution. They believed that we couldn't give up these four laws. However, both Izmir and Gaziantep of the HDP supported that the law is based on ignorance and alienation. Mehmet Karayılan's comment is demonstrated in the below:

Yes. As the first four laws of Turkish Constitution mention that 'All people who live in Turkey are Turks'. This is lie, big lie [became a little angry]. I am a Turk, originally Turkmen. However, the Kurds are not Turks. Now, if we create start of constitution based on ignorance and lie, it is hard to develop democracy, and also we cannot provide cohabitation [of different ethnics]. Therefore, we must change 1982 Constitution.

İsmet Basmacı from the RPP thinks as:

The Turkish state is a Republic, the language is Turkish, and the flag is composed of a white crescent and star on a red background. The red lines are based on the first three or four laws.

In addition, Tanju Balatlı's speech is drawn as:

The four laws that are sine qua non supplied by the NAP's leader, Devlet Bahçeli. We can discuss the others but the sine qua non laws.

What I understood from the excerpts is that Turkisness determines these two parties' argument for integrity of Turkey. They do not want to give any extra rights besides of being citizenship. It is important to understand why Turkey's democratic condition is still not as high quality. In addition, my interpretation is that Turkey's terrorism condition is based on ignorance and assimilation into Turkisness in which the Kurds have not accepted from early Republic to now. Because of that case, Kmylicka's 'national minorities' argument will be beneficial when to understand Kurdish position in Turkey. Accordingly, Turks and the Kurds are two side of the same coin that means Turks and the Kurds have lived in this territory for sixteenth century. It means the Kurds are obviously resident of this territory from Ottoman Empire to nowadays.

Another example is to understand parties' idea for democracy is that the opposition parties believe that the monism desiring in Turkey by party in government and President affects Turkish democratic regime negatively. As they mentioned that party in power and President want to bring all powers under control of themselves. The RPP in Gaziantep, former minister Abdulkadir Ateş, said:

The parliamentarian regime should be more powerful than now, but it should not be over not only executive body but also judiciary body. The main tasks of them must be drawn sharply.

Here, the importance of the separation of power is drawn by opposition parties in order to fix democracy. The powers are mixed now. There is no real separation between powers.

The last important argument is to consolidate the democratic regime in Turkey by understanding how Kurdish parties joined the mainstream politics and how it affects Turkish democratization process. As I mentioned in the second chapter, the Kurdish political life in mainstream politics of Turkey was seen after 1991 election in where 21 Kurdish candidates became deputy of the SPP led by Erdal İnönü. One interviewee, Abdulkadir Ateş, was a minister and deputy of the SPP. He mentioned about how the SPP and Kurdish side agreed. It is important to understand Kurdish political life in mainstream politics. He said:

Let me say that we always try to think the HDP apart from the PKK. Maybe I want them to be apart and it causes me think like this. Our discussion in 1991 election could be a good example. I was a member of central executive board and also deputy secretary general. We discussed nearly four days about the issue that if we were going to make an electoral alliance with the HEP. Everyone of us shared ideas and Mr. Erdal [Erdal İnönü] listened carefully. Then Mr. Erdal told that I listened all of your ideas and they are different from each other, but at least we should make our citizens living in East and South East Anatolia seek to be ruled from Ankara instead of Beka Valley [Abdullah Öcalan and his supporter resided in Beka Valley], so let's make this electoral alliance.

In addition to this he continued that:

At that time we were the partners for the coalition. Before the council of ministers was announced, we were having a talk with Mr. Erdal and he was thinking which ministers he was going to appoint. When I got into the room, he asked me if I knew Mrs. Leyla [Zana]. Then I said not really, Again, he asked me would it be a good idea to appoint Mrs. Leyla. He was thinking to appoint Mrs. Leyla as minister before oath as the minister of Woman and Family Affairs [right now it is known Ministry of Family and Social Policies]. However, Mr. Erdal appointed Mrs. Esra who was the deputy from Tokat because Mrs. Leyla was uneducated.

Mr. Ateş shows that the SPP emphasized the mosaic parliament than contemporary parties. 21 Kurdish deputies were chosen and joined parliament, which made them to represent their ideology with legal way. The SPP's idea is closer to multiculturalism understanding than other parties. With multiculturalism 'others' can find the seat in the parliament in order to advocate their political and cultural rights as Turkish

nationalists do. In other words, consolidation of democracy must be based on multiethnic and multicultural representation in the parliament.

Turkey has started to experience with multicultural and multiethnic parliament after the 1991 election because of combination of the SPP and 21 pro-Kurdish candidates. Accordingly, if multi-voices in the parliament affects consolidation of democracy directly, converge of different political parties can bring more democracy. Now, I can create two general hypotheses that are important to read Turkish political experiment after the SPP and pro-Kurdish candidates' combination.

H1: If four main political parties in Turkey converge on political issues, more democracy is possible.

H2: If three Turkish parties converge but the HDP diverge, less democracy is possible.

I have already mentioned Turkish political experiment in detail in the second chapter. I will only analyze these two hypotheses that basis on how Kurdish political parties have influences on democratic consolidation of Turkey. I will take reference for these two hypotheses from both the RPP and the HDP's interviews. These two parts support mosaic parliament more. They support multicultural parliament for solutions of ethnic conflict and violence based on diverge in Turkey. In Turkey Kurdish issue became a political agenda after 1990s more than past. It shows that when the Kurds' numbers increased in the parliament, the issue became seen by state elites. Therefore, the 1991 election is turning point for not only the Kurds but also democratic consolidation of Turkey. Current Turkish politics is covered with four parties, which means that more democratic representation is possible.

3.2.2. On Woman

From interviews, I realized that the 'woman' word is used only by the HDP. The other parties did not mention the rights of woman or woman's joining to politics is

the important in order to increase democracy level of Turkey. For example, in the JDP there is no gender quota while the RPP has gender quota that increased %25 to %33 in 2012. When analyzing of the HDP's interviews, we can see that the word 'woman' is mentioned besides of the youth problem and the environmental problem of Turkey. The HDP's political agenda is based on duumvirate system that is called 'zipper system'. In the zipper system man and woman are ordered respectively. In Turkey the JDP defines itself as conservatives-democrat while the RPP defines itself as social –democrat. However, analyzing of interviews of both parties claims that the JDP and the RPP have similar gender agenda because of quota. "In Turkey, even though political parties from the center-right [the JDP] and center-left [the RPP] have a different approach to gender quotas in politics, the implementation of these approaches has similar results" (Cansun 2012: 1).

3.2.3. On Polarized

Parties' political aspect became more visible effect when they answer the questions. When I analyze the transcripts, I consider that the NAP's answers include being polarized and terrorism. The other parties did not give same reflections for all questions. The NAP's aspect determined with Turkishness, and it was hard to accept.

Tanju Balatlı: There is no friend of Turks except Turks.

Ahmet Alagöz: The NAP's 'Love it or leave it' or 'stay here or get out wherever you go'... These two arguments also have used by the JDP recently.

Bülent Delican: There is no absolute integrity and absolute division.

As I understood that parties' leaders speech or parties' ideology make people became polarized. If you solve the problem with the ideology, you polarized people because all people do not follow your ideology. The good example comes from the interview of the RPP in Izmir; Ismet Basmacı mentioned that President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, comes to presidency with the support of citizens. That is, semi-residential regime was applied in Turkey. He said that if I want, 50 % of population

takes to the streets. Which means that people are divided and polarized into two categories as supporter of President and opposition to the President. The social ties strain, and people have started to talk they are on us or not on us in whom people do not trust each other easily. There is always ignorance and alienated understanding among people because of leaders' directions. Another example is that Abdulkadir Ateş mentioned that Leyla Zana's parliamentary oath with Kurdish language made the other parties' deputies became polarized because they did not accept Kurdish deputies who were supporter of the PKK. In addition to this, Leyla Zana's Kurdish oath made people lash out 21 Kurdish deputies. One thing is interesting that I asked question to the NAP of Manisa, "Do you believe that party leaders' speech make people be polarized? He said "Absolutely. Political parties' discourse must be proper". However, I mentioned in excerpt from above, and also he continued his speech for the same question as "We see the HDP as not dove of peace while we see it as jackal" Now, he mentioned in starting of his speech "Absolutely" but he finished with polarized people as Turk-Kurd like the NAP of Gaziantep provincial chairman. He said, "If we want to understand problem, we need to look problem as Turk-Kurd perspective". The JDP's interview basically based on the JDP's political agenda for regional and domestic. However, provincial chairman, Bülent Delican, mentioned "Sure, government always wear out. The JDP should equalize its discourse with inner conscience". It means that the JDP's discourse make people to be polarized.

3.2.4. The EU and Regional Relations

It is interesting that all parties have same idea about the EU and they all mentioned Atatürk's 'Peace at home, peace in the world' sentence in their interviews when I asked the question about the EU. Atatürk's sentence became visible connector in which parties come together and think the same idea. They all believed that the EU's countries are more democratic than Turkey. Even Muhittin Taşdoğan mentioned that Turkey is not as middle-east country, she is still western country. We need to increase our democratic regime as western countries level.

Muhittin Taşdoğan: European's democratic regime is developing faster than Turkey. Naturally, we want to catch modern civilization in which we mean European countries and applications within European states. We need follow them for democratization of Turkey such as state, judiciary, and life order beside of social welfare.

However, when I asked question about the minority right issue, his answer is so interesting that he mentioned that Turkey is more democratic than the EU countries in terms of minority rights. He argued that we give citizenship rights to minorities and they are our citizens. However, the EU does not support minority rights like us.

Abdulkadir Ateş also does not believe that Turkey does not have minority right problem, she has a few cultural problems. However, for minority rights, Mehmet Karayılan supports to increase the power of local administrations that means the minority right will be evaluated broadly. He said, "Enfranchisement to minorities expresses consolidation of local administrations". The JDP thinks that Europe represents multiculturalism in the world, and Turkey should benefit from this idea regardless. Now, when we analyze parties' aspect to Europe, they are differentiated in terms of minority right issue. The NAP and the RPP do not accept that there is no minority problem within Turkey. On the other hand, the HDP supports to joining the EU where Turkey will give more right to different ethnic groups because being full membership of the EU needs to become more democratic.

3.2.5. On Mosaic

Parties have different ideas about being mosaic that is to bring different ideas, ethnic backgrounds, and cultures. This is the main topic in which I want to learn parties' idea for democracy because mosaic brings more democratic consolidation in Turkey. In this respect, the HDP's structure became effective argument to discuss the mosaic.

Mehmet Karayılan: The HDP represents different ethnic groups and cultures, different identities in addition to woman, youth, alienated people by monistic system. The HDP is important to represent them in the parliament. Always, people mention that Turkey hosts multicultural that is expressed as mosaic. However, the system always talks mosaic while it

makes the parliament be black-concrete (*Kara beton*). Because of that case, the meaning of the HDP's joining to parliament is reflection to parliament of all folks and cults in Turkey; that is, all Turkish people in Turkey. It is reflection of mosaic.

However, the JDP sees the HDP as party of one ethnic group [Kurdish ethnic group]. Moreover, he criticizes the NAP in terms of understanding nationalism. His argument is that the NAP cannot move with its understanding of nationality and nationalism in the regional and universal multiculturalism. In addition, the NAP's provincial chairmen see the HDP as the PKK's supporter and even as the backyard of the PKK. The RPP's aspect for the HDP is that "we do not want to see the HDP as supporter of the PKK. It is legal party."

In this respect, the NAP and the JDP have the same idea for the HDP. When I analyze Ahmet Alagöz's interview, I realize that the first four laws and election laws of 1982 hinders the mosaic. Moreover, the RPP's provincial chairmen supported mosaic understanding for Turkey. Even, they see the 10 percent national threshold as barrier in order to create mosaic parliament because the small parties' members should be in the parliament.

Abdulakdir Ateş: ... I am in favor of a certain level of representation in parliament of different ideas. The HDP is one of them. Absolutely, different ideas, colors, and voices must be represented in the parliament. However, our election law and political parties law cannot allow it. 10 percent threshold is the most important hinder behind democratic representation.

This excerpt demonstrates that if Turkey wants to create more mosaic parliament, the threshold must be decreased, as the RPP believes. The NAP's interviewees do not talk about the mosaic parliament or mosaic society. They believe that there is Turk and Kurd problem in Turkey. The JDP argues that the JDP covers multiculturalism and mosaic because almost it takes votes in all cities of Turkey.

3.2.6. On Terrorism

As I already mentioned before when I analyze the transcripts, I understood that the NAP's idea is based on terrorism and polarization because they believe that Turkey's current condition depends on recent increased terrorist organizations. In other words, their political agenda determines violence and chaos. The other parties believe that terrorism has increased in Turkey before and after 7 June Election. The NAP blames the PKK and the HDP that increase violence and chaos in Turkey. Even, the NAP in Manisa mentioned that the HDP joined to parliament then the terrorist organizations, chaos, and violence increased. The RPP in Gaziantep believes that the battle condition of Turkey is based on ethnic cleavages. We can stop this battle. In contrary to these arguments, the HDP did not talk about terrorism in their interview too much.

The NAP and the RPP are similar in one level that is Turkish nationalism. In Turkey these two parties are not intersect for many level but Turkish nationalism can bring these two parties together. They have supported Turkish nationalism that protects Turkish Republic. However, the NAP is more closed party than the RPP in the level of supporting Turkishness and one nation understanding. The NAP's idea is similar to founders of Turkish Republic. This idea bases on assimilation and ignorance. Therefore, the NAP does not want to see mosaic parliament that is based on different ethnic groups rather than one ethnic, Turkish ethnic. The RPP's idea, on the other hand, is differentiated from the NAP in terms of supporting mosaic parliament. The RPP has changed in time. The party changes her idea of assimilation and ignorance of 'others' in politics. Both the RPP in Gaziantep and Izmir show how current the RPP is different from the RPP in the early Turkish Republic. [Which I mean here the RPP in early Turkish Republic stands for state elites who created Republic basis on assimilation and ignorance of 'others']. Mr. Ateş mentioned that the parliament should be included with 'others' besides of Turkish ethnic. The parties are differentiated for the starting of terrorism in Turkey. Actually, they evaluated before and after 7 June Election because the ceasefire has been done between Turkey and the PKK until almost the early 7 June Election. Many bombs attacks has started before 7 June Election such as the Suruç attack, the Ankara attack, and the Diyarbakır attack are the most known.

After 7 June Election, the violence and chaos condition of Turkey became the battle condition. Now, the oppositions blame the government, the JDP, because the JDP wants to be single party government. The result of 7 June Election did not allow the JDP became single government. Therefore, the JDP left no avenue unexplored to make early election. The oppositions also mentioned that the JDP gathered the nationalist votes by increasing of fighting with terrorism. In addition to, on contrary to the NAP and the JDP believe that the consolidation of local administrations increased the level of violence and terrorist organizations especially in Southeast, the HDP believes that the consolidation of local administrations makes Turkey became more democratic country. Here, the importing issue is that how parties' ideology became effective to shape their mind. The HDP believes the consolidation of local administration is a part of democracy while the NAP and the JDP believe it brings chaos. The following example is good to see the differences between them.

Tanju Balatlı: ... However, you [the JDP] brought that such a skewed system without looking the geopolitics condition of country. You brought the consolidation of local administrations law, and you see results. The baits are organized with state tools such as oil, cars, and ladle. These baits are organized to state forces.

CHAPTER 4

4. THEROTICAL FRAMEWORK: NATIONALIST AND DEMOCRATIZAION THORIES

In this chapter, I will focus that how nationalisms in Turkey affect the democratization process of the country. I have focused two different nationalisms, namely Turkish nationalism and Kurdish nationalism, in the first chapter. Now, in this chapter, I will dig further into relations between nationalism and democracy in general by applying these two nationalisms, which have lived in this territory for a long time. My focus about nationalism is based on Anthony D. Smith's nationalist conceptualization, applying it to both Kurdish and Turkish nationalisms. For democratization theory, I decide to use Will Kymlicka's Multicultural Citizenship understanding in order to discuss possibilities of democratic consolidation in Turkey.

4.1. NATIONALISM

Nationalism, which is one of the most important theories in recent years, is a 'rediscovery' subject of academic inquiry. Nationalism itself was born as an ideology that has affected mass to mobilize them for political and social movement. It has started to shape world's social and political order since its birth as an ideology during the French Revolution (1789) in France, and have affected many nations ever since. During the initial phase of the 19th century, nationalism triggered dissolution of multi-national empires like Ottoman Empire. The first nation that got independence from Ottoman Empire was Greece and not even 100 years passed since nationalism came up. Even as I have already mentioned in first chapter, the main reason of losing power of Ottoman Empire during WWI depended on Arab and Balkans' desiring of independence due to nationalism. Moreover, after nationalism was born, Kant, Rousseau, Herder, Mill, Lord Acton, Fichte, Marx, Engels, Lenin, Bauer, Luxemburg, Stalin besides historians such as Michelet, von Treitschke, Renan and also social theorists like Durkheim and Weber contributed to spread nationalism around the world (Özkırımlı 2010). Many scholars have focused nationalism and

ethnic issues nowadays. According to Umut Özkırmılı (2010), after the collapse of the Soviet Union that ended the cold war, many recent academic researchers has attempted to focus on researching of proliferation of nationalist and ethnic conflicts. For example, Delanty and Kumar underline that “nationalism has seemingly returned with renewed vigor in recent decades” (2006 cited by Özkırmılı 2010). Moreover, Smith remarks that ‘The last ten years have witnessed a phenomenal growth in the practice and study of nationalism and that ethnic nationalism has flourished more widely and powerfully than at any period since the Second World War’ (1998a). Accordingly, nationalist theory has been subject of the academic inquiry from French Revolution to nowadays. However, it became more effective research topic after the end of the cold war in 1991.

In my research, I will try to find out meanings of nationalism in the view of different approaches such as primordialism, modernism, and ethno-symbolism. In this respect, nations and nationalism have become permanent issues for researchers as social scientists and political theorists in order to allege what the relationship between nation and nationalism is. “Even where we are deeply critical to the nationalism, we should recognize the continuing importance of national solidarities. Even if we wish for a more cosmopolitan world order, we should be realistic enough not to act on mere wishes (Calhoun 2007: 1). Özkırmılı (2010) is interpreting the idea of Calhoun as that nations and nationalisms become important academic inquiry for both social and political theory of the twentieth century. Many scholars have similar ideas about nationalism that is concomitant product of the modernization continuum from French revolution. In other words, it is an outcome of the conversion from traditional to modern society. According to Partha Chatterjee (2012), for example, there are many problems such as bloodshed and bitterness existed in many regions of Soviet Union because of national desire of small countries living under control of the former Soviet Union. With the end of the socialist regimes, the former Soviet Union has shattered into different independent states thanks to nationalism. The other good example is seen in the essay of Sandra F. Joireman’s *Nationalism and Political Identity*. “The cold war ended and wars of ethnic nationalism began; or so it seemed to many observes of world politics at the turn of the twenty first century” (2003: 1).

In this process, some books and their authors have meaningful contributions for academic inquiry of nationalism after the 1980s. John Armstrong's '*Nations Before Nationalism (1982)*', John Breuilly's '*Nationalism and the State (1982)*', Benedict Anderson's '*Imagined Communities (1983)*', '*Nations and Nationalism (1983)*' by Ernest Gellner, '*The Invention of Tradition (1983)*' by Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger as well as '*The Ethnic Origins of Nations (1986)*' by Anthony D. Smith. Therefore, in the contemporary world, qualities and counts of nationalist works get momentum by depending on researches of sociologists, political theorists, and historians. In terms of the importance of nationalism, it cannot be swept under the carpet easily. Now let's look at different understandings of nationalism what I mentioned above that how ethnicity and/or nationalism was shaped under these approaches.

4.1.1. Primordialist Approach

Primordial itself has an adjective meaning in Oxford English Dictionary which defines it as 'of, relating to, or existing from the very beginning of time; earliest in time; primeval, primitive; (more generally) ancient, distant in time' and also 'that constitutes the origin or starting point from which something else is derived or developed, or on which something else depends; fundamental, basic; elemental' (Oxford English Dictionary 2016). Accordingly, Umut Özkırımlı describes the term 'primordialism' as "the belief that nationality is a natural part of human beings, as natural as speech, sight or smell, and that nations have existed from time immemorial" (2010: 49). Moreover, "the notion of primordialism has been used to describe the origins and strength of ethnic attachments in the literature on ethnicity for the last three decades. It was originally coined by Shils and developed by Geertz in the 1950s" (Eller and Coughlan 2010: 1). Shils' view of primordialism is defined as the following:

As one thought about the strengths and tensions in family attachments, it became apparent that the attachment was not merely to the family member as a person, but as a possessor of certain especially "significant relational" qualities, which could only be described as

primordial. The attachment to another member of one's kinship group is not just a function of interaction It is because a certain ineffable significance is attributed to the tie of blood... The fact that those both factors operated in many of the more intensely knit families does not demonstrate that the two variables are one, but rather that two types of attachments each move in the same direction. (Shils 1957, 142).

Accordingly, modern society came together with primordial affinities as well as moral obligations in concrete conditions. Moreover, Geertz, who has similar understanding of primordialism like Shils, provides that primordial ties:

[A]re seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coercive-ness in and of themselves . . . as the result not merely of personal affection, practical necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great part by virtues of some unaccountable absolute importance attributed to the very tie itself. The general strength of such primordial bonds, and the types of them that are important, differ from person to person, from society to society, and from time to time. But for virtually every person, in every society, at all times, some attachments seem to flow more from a sense of natural some would say spiritual affinity than from social interaction. (Geertz 1973, 259-60)

Accordingly, Geertz underlines race, blood ties, language, and religion. In this respect, primordialism alleges the effect of social issues in the development of ethnic identity as well as kinship ties within any society. It goes without saying that the theory draws the boundaries of ethnic groups with assumed similarities and differences. Kasfir (1979) states that language, territory, kinship, and culture determine ethnicity. In the one example of construction of identity of sub-Saharan African tribes; the new ethnic group cannot construct arbitrarily while they were constructed by culture, language, kinship, and territory. In this respect, Shils narrows Kasfir's idea of primordialism from society to family in where each individual in family related each other because of 'significant relational' that means there is an ineffable connection between family members because of the tie of blood (Shils 1957).

Umut Özkırmılı (2010) identifies primordialism into four approaches as the 'nationalist', 'culturalist', 'sociobiological', and 'perennialist', and the main feature of them depends on naturalness and/or remains of nations. For the nationalist, nationality is an inherent fact of the human nature. According to the culturalist, primordial ties are 'given' and 'ineffable' as well as it based on emotion and affect.

Edward Shils and Clifford Geertz are most known supporters of the ‘culturalist’ group. The other is that the idea of the ‘sociological’ bases on common descent and endogamy. For the perennialism, Smith introduces ‘perennialism’ in order to describe the historical remains, immemorial, and perennial of the nations. He states that the perennialists do not see the nation as a ‘fact of nature’; they, however, see nation as stable and fundamental attribute of human life along with history (1998a).

Here, I attempt to allege primordialist understanding of nationality and ethnicity. However, there are many objectives that come from basically by modernist/constructivist scholars such as). Ernest Gellner, Tom Nairn, John Breuilly, Paul R. Brass, Eric J. Hobsbawm, Benedict Anderson, and Miroslav Hroch . Fundamentally, these criticisms develop against the four approaches of primordialism as: the nature and origins of the national and ethnic ties, the date of existing of nations and the question of emotion and affect, states Özkırmılı (2010). The basic understanding of primordialism is that ethnic and national identities are ‘given’, and this heritage passed to next generation because of its fixed or static features. However, the new periphery of new generation became effective to shape their features in time. Therefore, it is not static or fixed. In other words, continuous relations between group even individuals make new generation redefine their features by adapting changes. It is called ‘socially constructed’ by instrumentalist [it is a part of modernist]. Ethno-symbolist Smith (1995) argues that ethnic ties can be changeable with political, economical, and social circumstances. Inter-marriage, migrations, importation of people, and external conquests make primordialist cannot preserve the pure essence. Suffice it to say that new generations are products of exogamy and endogamy that make to save cultural homogeneity hardly for long term. It is also another critique of primordialism.

4.1.2. Modernist Approach

The modernist approach determines into three categories as economical, political, and cultural/social transformations (Özkırmılı 2010). It emerged as a reaction to primordialism itself. Basically, the nations and nationalism are outcome of the modernism. The main idea of the modernist approach dated back to the 1960s of

movements of decolonization in Africa and in Asia. In other words, the origin of nations and nationalism is based on the modernization process of the world like secularism, capitalism, urbanization, and industrialization. According to the modernists, Gellner asked, “does nationalism have navel?” which demonstrates the idea of modernist for nations and nationalism. The answer is that there is no navel of nationalism, and there is no place for nations and nationalism in the pre-modern era (Smith 1995). Ernest Gellner’s *Nations and Nationalism* (1983), Tom Nairn’s *the Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism* (1981), John Breuilly’s *Nationalism and the State* (1982), Paul R. Brass’ *Ethnic Groups and the State* (1985), Eric J. Hobsbawm’s *the Invention of Tradition* (co-edited with Terence Ranger, 1983), Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (1983), and Miroslav Hroch’s *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe* (1985) are more known modernist theorists and their works. They shape origin of nations and nationalism by modernist approach.

Tom Nairn is most known as economical transformation of modernist approach. The idea of Nairn is based on understanding of nationalism in materialist terms. It is to say that the main task of the theorists is to find out the correct interpretive framework where nationalism is properly evaluated (Özkırımlı 2010). The true explanatory framework of nationalism is supplied by historical development since the very beginning of the nineteenth century. That is, the origin of nationalism could not be seen in the individual societies that mean there are no roots of nationalism before nineteenth century. Nationalism is an outcome or by-product of the world political economy in the epoch of the French and Industrial Revolution to nowadays. Also, every nationalism faces both progress and regress in time, remarks Nairn (1981). For political transformation of modernist approach John Breuilly is seen one of the most effective supporter of it. He believes that nationalism is a form of politics. He used the typology of nationalism method in order to explain nationalism by comparing and contrasting selected cases. In other words, selecting a few cases from different categories of history in order to analyze them with comparative method. According to him, nationalism refers to ‘political movements seeking or exercising state power

and justifying such action with nationalist arguments which are classified as independent and sovereignty of nation, national interest, and nation's explicit and peculiar character' (1993a: 2). Breuilly's idea for nationalism depends on the relationship between power, politics and nationalism. He insitences explicitly that nationalism is over politics that is about power. He does not deny that there are different references to nationalism such as culture, ideas, economical modernization, and class interest. However, these are not enough to understand nationalism irrespective of power and politics. In his aspect, power is a main tool of control of the state. Therefore, "to relate nationalism to the objectives of obtaining and using state power. We need to understand why nationalism has played a major role in the pursuit of those objectives" (Breuilly 2001: 1).

Paul R. Brass represents instrumentalist thinking in modernism approach (Özkırmılı 2010). The main argument of instrumentalists is based on political elites who shape ethnic and national ties within any state. On contrast to primordialist, they believe that the changing conditions also have effects on shaping of ethnic and national attachments. Smith remarks that elites play crucial role to mobilize people for social and political activities by using ethnic and cultural traditions (Smith 1998). In other words, Brass says:

The study of ethnicity and nationality is in large part of the study of politically induced cultural change. More precisely, it is the study of the process by which elites and counter-elites within ethnic groups select aspects of the group's culture, attach new value and meaning to them, and use them as symbols to mobilize the group, to defend its interest, and to compete with other groups (Brass 1979: 40-1).

Moreover, Özkırmılı (2010) states that Brass' instrumentalist frameworks rely on some assumptions. The first is about fluidity of ethnic identities. The rise of ethnic identities as well as the transformation of these identities into nationalism is not certain. Second, the ethnic conflict cannot depend on cultural differences; the source of conflict relies on elites' political and economical competition. Third, the competition affects identification of ethnic identities because elites use

identifications of ethnic groups for their prestige and power. In other words, symbols, meanings, and values of ethnic groups are used by elites in order to create political power. Briefly, the instrumentalist understanding of Brass is based on the competition and manipulation of elites is mean to understand nationalism.

Another good example of modernist approach's supporter is Eric J. Hobsbawm and his 'invented traditions' idea for nations and nationalism. He believes that nations and nationalism are an outcome of social engineering. The 'invented traditions' means "a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past" (1983: 1). He shares the same idea with modernist about nationalism. He underlines that the origins of nationalism depends on modernist indexes such as technology, social transformation, and overlapping of politics. According to his idea, nations also are product of modernist indexes. Nations cannot therefore be thought only outcome of territory. Modernism makes people to invent new ideas and new technologies. Moreover, with the idea of invented traditions, myth, symbols, flag, and anthems are also product of invented traditions. Accordingly, "historic continuity had to be invented, for example, by creating an ancient past beyond effective historical continuity, either by semi-fiction (Boadicea, Vercingetorix, Arminius the Cheruscan) or by forgery (Ossian, the Czech medieval manuscripts)" (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983: 7). Umut Özkırımlı states that 'invention of tradition' was one of the main strategic productions of the ruling elites in order to respond the threat of mass democracy (2010). Moreover, 'national community', that is against the idea of 'invented traditions', wanted to secure itself against social fragmentation and social disorder led by rapid industrialization. However, After French revolution, the new idea has spread quickly. It combined with industrial revolution in nineteenth century that made social fragmentation increased. Therefore, this social disintegration and fragmentation within society caused people did not obey rules and be loyalty to the ruling elites who used strategy of invention of tradition against them. Suffice it is to say that the main idea of 'invented tradition' relies on modernization of the world after French Revolution as well as Industrial Revolution. Also, "nations do not make

states and nationalisms but the other way round” (Hobsbawm 1990: 10). That is, nations are a product of nationalists. Smith (1998) underlined that invention and social engineering play effective role by entering into the processing of making of nations.

Ernest Gellner and his theoretical framework for nationalism became most important academic inquiry for modernist approach of nationalism since the 1960s. Gellner, who combines nations and nationalism to the requirements of producing a ‘high culture’ for industrial development and modernization, represents socio-cultural thought within modernist theorists. Smith (1998) underlines that Gellner drew a new theory of nationalism that based on the influences of procedure of uneven global modernization. In this uneven global modernization, nationalism rises with the new role of linguistic culture. Moreover, uneven developments made to create new groups within any society. It also made increased distinctions between new groups and old groups that caused social conflict within social groups such as the newcomers and the urban old-people. Sometimes, the conflict wave can be changeable from social to ethnic conflict because of having and understanding different belief system, language, and customs. In other words, the cultural divisions within social groups increase ethnic conflict that causes nationalist movement desiring secession from the current political unit. Accordingly, “for Gellner, nations do not create nationalism. Rather, nationalist movements define and create nations” (Smith 1998: 28). In addition, Gellner himself define this process as “nationalism is not awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist-but it does need some pre-existing differentiating marks to work on, even if, as indicated, these are purely negative” (1964: 168). In the idea of Geller, the modern world creates nations and nationalism because of power and culture. That is, there is absence of nations and nationalism in pre-modern era because of the relationship of culture and power. When Smith (1996) underlines Gellner’s general idea of nationalism, he believes that nation is an outcome of modern clauses such as social mobility and public education and the like. In other words, Modern conditions causes transformation of society from low culture as non-literature to highly culture as literate and cultivated. It is also another reason of ethnic conflict between groups

because of existed different classes. For Gellner, not having homogenous culture in the pre-modern times caused to see no nation. However, modern time helps group of people come together with nationalism to create homogenous culture in any state. That is, nation-state depends on Gellner's nationalist theory. The good example is that the foundation of Turkish Republic in 1923 by state elites by ignoring and assimilating 'the others'. In other words, nations, which can be emerged when general situations are standardized, homogenous, maintained high culture and spread entire population, are product of nationalism in modern world. Suffice it to say that nationalism plays crucial role creating legitimacy of political units in modern era in which nations and nationalism are an outcome of industrialization.

The last modernist to be mentioned is Benedict Anderson who proposed 'imagined communities'. Both Anderson and Hobsbawm share Marxist ideology. In his idea, nationalism and nations emerged in very beginning of the nineteenth century as an outcome of modern artifacts. He believes that nationalism itself is as an ideology. Anderson defines nation as, "an imagined political community- and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (1991: 6). Accordingly, he underlines that being limited and sovereign determines nation's boundaries. "Nation is an imagined as limited each nation has finite boundaries beyond which lie other nation" (Özkırımlı 2010: 106). Moreover, nation is an imagined as sovereign because nations want to be independent and free as sovereign state in terms of French revolution and the age of Enlightenment. The nation is imagined as a community because "regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship" (1991: 7).

The relationship between nations and nationalism is not similar to what Gellner's theory proposed; that is, nationalism creates nations. Anderson argued that not each of them creates one another but these two are production of cultural artefacts. He continues that 'imagining' is not meant 'falsity'. He criticizes Gellner's 'imagining' aspect as "assimilating 'invention' to 'fabrication' and 'falsity'" (Özkırımlı 2010: 107). Accordingly, Anderson believes that all communities are imagined because of the style not falsity. Anderson remarks that religion and dynastic realm are effective

to emerge the idea of nation before the age of Enlightenment and revolution. On the other hand, cultural roots of the modern nation depend on three developments as “a change in the conceptions of time, decline of religious communities and dynastic realms as well as commercial book publishing on a wide scale as known ‘print-capitalism’” (Özkırımlı 2010: 110). Print-capitalism makes people have new ways to think of finding themselves. Anderson underlines three factors such as sacred tongue, vernacular market, and certain dialects that are none of these factors have alone influences to rise of a nation; rather, “what, in a positive sense, made the new communities imaginable was a half-fortuitous, but explosive, interaction between a system of production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of communications (print), and fatality of human linguistic diversity” (Anderson 1991: 42-3). Accordingly, capitalism plays a crucial role for mode of production that affects print-languages directly. It means that these two have influence of the growth of national consciousness. That is, Smith remarks that by fixing and standardizing the language in order to induce sense of national remains; moreover, by creating new language-of- power in dialects and language affect the idea of nation in global diffusion. Also, “print-language is what invents nationalism, not a particular language per se” (Anderson 1991: 134). Print-capitalism [both language and productivity] has true impact on national consciousness and nationalism. In addition, Smith criticizes Anderson’s religion and nationalism relationship. Anderson remarks that when nationalism increases, religion decreases. Here, Smith underlines that some states like Iran, Israel, and Armenia in which religious units and institutions braced nationalism. Also, some cases demonstrate that nationalism and religion reform together. Then, it is hard to say that rising of nationalism causes the decline of religion.

4.1.3. ETHNO-SYMBOLISM

Ethno-symbolism is a counter argument against modernist nationalism theory. Anthony D. Smith’s ethnic origins of nations and John Armstrong’s myth-symbol complexes are two the most important contributors of ethno-symbolism. I will apply ethno-symbolism understanding of Smith, who is Gellner’s student, in order to

allege the origins of Kurdish and Turkish nationalism. My academic inquiry also depends on Gellner's 'Does nationalism have a navel?' question that is highlighted by Hakan Özoğlu in order to explain Kurdish nationalism in Turkey via his extended question, 'Does Kurdish nationalism have a navel?'

Ethno-symbolism attempts to emphasize the role of myths, memories, symbols, values and customs in the formation, continuation and transformation of ethnicity and nationalism (Özkırımlı 2010). According to Smith there is *la longue* that;

[I]s a time span of many centuries; the importance of continuity, recurrence and appropriation as different modes of connection the national past, present and future; the significance of pre-existing ethnic communities, or ethnies, in the formation of modern nations; the role of memories of golden ages, myths of origin and ethnic election, cults of heroes and ancestors, the attachment to a homeland in the formation and persistence of national identities; the different kinds of ethnic groups that form the basis of various kinds of nations; and the special contribution of the modern ideology of nationalism to the dissemination of the ideal of the nation (Smith 2002 cited by Özkırımlı 2010: 143).

Smith used French word, *ethnie*, which refers a common myth of ancestor, a shared history and culture besides of a collective name, to describe ethnic communities. Ethno-symbolism rejects modernist approach for nations and nationalism that two are an outcome of modernization and industrialization. Even, nations did not invent nationalism but nations are also product of nationalism. Smith obviously disagrees modernization theory of rejecting the root and origin of nation in pre-modern era. Smith creates the link between nations and ethnicity, and he argues that ethnic identities transform more slowly than modernists generally assumed. These ethnic identities are also save its origins for centuries even they faced migration, intermarriages, and invasion. It can say that the identity of any one is concomitant of ethnicity. Accordingly, "the different kinds of *ethnie*, which modern forces transform, but never obliterate" (Smith 1995: 59). Moreover, ethno-symbolism can help us to interpret persistence and change of ethnicity in history by using power of myth, symbols, heroes, and antiquity. It also helps us to understand the relationship or link between nations and nationalism in modern era. In this respect, Smith believes that modern nations cannot be interpreted or valued without getting pre-

modern ethnic components, such as myth, symbols, and customs. Otherwise, modern understanding of nations and nationalism cannot be understood well, and it brings some impediments to ‘nation-building’ process. In other words, the rise of nations in modern era should be evaluated with their ethnic background in pre-existing time in order to understand contemporary nations well. Smith cites as “grounding our understanding of modern nationalism on an historical base involving considerable time-pans, to see how far its themes and forms were pre-figured in earlier periods and how far a connection with earlier ethnic ties and sentiments can be established” (1995: 13). Now, to understand Smith’s idea about the link between nation and nationalism, the definition of both are necessary.

‘Nationalism’ is an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity of a human population, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential “nation” that means a named human population sharing an historic, common myths and memories, a mass public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members (Smith 1996: 359).

Smith grounded his theoretical framework of ethno-symbolism with three questions in order to understand how pre-modern figures affects modern nation and nationalism. The questions are listed as:

1. Who is the nation? What are the ethnic bases and models of modern nations? Why did these particular nations emerge?
2. Why and how does the nation emerge? That is, what are the general causes and mechanisms that set in motion the process the process of nation-formation from varying ethnic ties and memories?
3. When and where did the nation arise? (1986: 19)

These questions are also important for my thesis to find out origins of both Kurdish and Turkish nationalism that affect democratization process in Turkey. The first question’s answer depends on that pre-modern ethnic communities (*ethnies*) form the root of many modern nations by using a collective indigenous name, myth of fellow ancestry, common historical memories, common culture, specific homeland, and sense of solidarity for population (Smith 1986). Smith finds out four mechanisms

that affect self-renewal directly. These are counted as religious reform, cultural borrowing, popular participation, and myths of ethnic election. These are main four mechanisms cause of the survival of any *ethnie* across the centuries in spite of changes in demographic and cultural scopes. The second answer relies on two words as the *lateral* (aristocratic) and the *vertical* (demotic) that affect existing of different proponents of nation formation. These two words, aristocratic and demotic, help us to interpret how a nation emerges.

Lateral ethnies include an aristocratic class such as richer merchants, high military officers, and bureaucrats while vertical elites are counted as common people. The lateral class's nation process relies on bureaucratic incorporation, which means that the survival of aristocratic ethnies resides to using their capacity in order to incorporate other people within their cultural ties. In other words, aristocratic class allows the middle class and periphery to be incorporated into elite orbit. The result of this incorporating depends to born new bureaucratic class. The second nation formation is of vertical ethnies. Religion is the key point to form new nation. As I said that vertical ethnies represents subject communities. “[M]yth of chosenness, sacred texts and scripts, and the prestige of the clergy that the survival of communal tradition was ensured” (Özkırımlı 2010: 152-3). In the national formation of vertical ethnies, ethnic intelligentsia has crucial role to construct new formation through basis of “the historic home of the people and the repository of their memories; and by a cult of golden ages” (Özkırımlı 2010: 153). The last answer is framed through where nationalism comes in. What is nationalism for Smith has five conceptual components:

1. The whole process of forming and maintaining nations;
2. A consciousness of belonging to the nation;
3. A language and symbolism of the nation;
4. An ideology (including a cultural doctrine of nations); and
5. A social and political movement to achieve the goals of the nation and realize the national will (1991a: 72)

Accordingly, Özkırımlı defines nationalism as “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity, and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’ ” (2010: 154). In this respect, autonomy, unity, and identity are important to define nationalism because they have power to mobilize people around nationalist framework. Turkey, for example, is good example to see these three on case of Kurdish and Turkish issue. Some Kurds want to be separated from Turkey, or at least seeking autonomy by mobilizing the Kurds through nationalism and identity, which means creating of sameness and collective self. On the other hand, most Turks would like to protect unity of the state through Turkish nationalism. Turkey’s recent history shows this example very well. Smith’s identification of territorial nationalism and ethnic nationalism helps us to see how nationalisms in Turkey, both Kurdish and Turkish, are constructed. Now, as I mentioned in the second answer, lateral and vertical ethies play active role of forming of nationalism. Here, Özkırımlı addresses Smith’s nationalism through two main routes:

1. Lateral (aristocratic) ethnies > bureaucratic incorporation > civic- territorial nations > territorial nationalism (from above; usually led the elites).
2. Vertical (demotic) ethnies > vernacular mobilization > ethnic-genealogical nations > ethnic nationalism (from below; usually led by the intelligentsia) (2010: 155).

Now, the foundation of Turkish Republic led by state elites through Turkish nationalism is good example for territorial nationalism. On the other hand, Kurdish nationalism led by intelligentsia is an example for ethnic nationalism.

Smith developed new definition of nation as “a named and self-defined community whose members cultivate common myths, memories, symbols and values, possess and disseminate a distinctive public culture, reside in and identify with a historic homeland, and create and disseminate common laws and shared customs” (2005: 98). Smith puts away ‘a common economy’ proponent of construction of nation from new definition. Now, one can says that proponents of nations are counted as shared a language, religion, a shared custom, common history, and territory. Therefore, Smith develops a counter argument against modernist approach by using power of pre-

existing figures on nationalism and nation formation. That is, without referencing to the ‘past’ modern nations and nationalism cannot be constructed and understandable easily.

4.1.3.1. The origins of Kurdish nationalism

I have already mentioned that my academic research of Kurdish nationalism will be based on Smith’s ethno-symbolist approach against Hakan Özoğlu’s theoretical debate of Kurdish nationalism based on Gellner’s modernist understanding. Hakan Özoğlu consistently emphasized that Kurdish nationalism emerged with the SAK in 1918. Until that date, there was no Kurdish nationalist-awareness for Kurds. I have dug Kurdish and Turkish nationalist awareness in the first chapter particularly. Here, the theoretical background of nationalism and nation will help me to interpret the roots of both nationalisms.

For Kurdish nationalism, scholars and researchers are divided into two sides. The first group believes that Kurdish nationalism is an outcome of modernization while the other argues pre-modern figures affect the construction of nationalism.. Hakan Özoğlu, Martin van Bruissnen, Robert Olson, and Baskın Oran are supporter of modernist approach while Amir Hassanpour supports ethno-symbolist understanding. Modernist believes that both nationalism and nations are products of modernization and industrialization. Nations do not affect emerging of nationalism. Contrary to this idea, nationalism invents nations after French revolution. However, Smith believes that nationalism emerged in the eighteenth century. Furthermore, in his newer research, he believes that nationalism could emerge earlier than the eighteen century. “A certain kind of popular and vernacular nationalism could be found in some seventeenth century states like England, Scotland, and the Netherlands- and perhaps elsewhere too” (Smith 2008: x). Özkırımlı mentioned as “a further aspect of Smith’s later work [Smith’s 2008 inquiry] is the stress he laid on the ‘sacred foundations’ of nations, and their relationship to the older beliefs, symbol and rituals and traditional religions, in explaining the strength and durability of national identities” (2010: 157). Accordingly, Smith’s aspect, there could be seen other vernacular nationalism in outside of Europe such as Ottoman Empire and Persian Empire. Therefore, the

academic debate on Kurdish nationalism was based on Şerefhan's *Şerefname*, Ahmad Xani's *Memu Zin*, and also even Evliya Çelebi's *Seyahatname*. The one common ground between them is mentioned of Kurdish territory or Kurdish population. Hakan Özoğlu extended Gellner's question 'Does nationalism have a navel?' to 'Does Kurdish nationalism have a navel?'. General idea of Özoğlu about Kurdish nationalism relied on modernist approach basis on nationalism is an outcome of modernization, and it can be seen after the French Revolution. There is no nations and nationalism in pre-modern era. Therefore, he believes that Kurdish nationalism does not have a navel before the French Revolution. He underlined that Kurdish nationalism, which emerged only after the SAK in 1918, is an ideology to affect the late Ottoman Empire and the early period of Turkish Republic directly. Here, the important questions are that Does Kurdish nationalism have relationship with 'past?'- "In other words, which type of connection did Kurdish nationalism have with the 'past' when it emerged?" (Özoğlu 2011: 199). These two questions will be answered with Smith's three questions argument that help to find root or origin of any nations and nationalisms. Özoğlu's argument depends on modernist approach basis on some nations have navels, but some of them do not, and he added that Kurdish nationalism and Kurdish identity have two adopted brothers. However, while Kurdish identity has a navel, Kurdish nationalism does not have navel. Here, there is contradiction because identity affects nationalist consciousness because identity of any group or state is influenced by simply language, memories, symbolisms and values. "In certain societies it is possible to find distinct linguistic groups that set the boundaries of belonging" (Joireman 2003: 5). That is to say, the language plays key role to shape identifying feature of different ethnic groups. Moreover, Hassanpour (1993) remarks that language is a significant constituent of Kurdish ethno-nationalism.

To recapitulate, modernist approach does not believe that pre-modern figures have power to shape nations and nationalism and also some nationalist figures, such as anthem and flag are products of the modernist elites. On the other hand, ethno-symbolism believes that pre-modern figures have power to shape nations and nationalism that could be seen in seventeenth century before modernization. Now, I

want to ask that how we can ignore ‘past’ such as myths, memories, a shared culture, a shared history, territory, language, customs, and belief when nations and nationalism emerge. Hakan Özoğlu think that of all nationalisms as navel-ness. Accordingly, He does not accept Ahmad Xani’s Memu Zin that presented Kurdish nationalism. Smith’s nationalism definition helps us to find nationalism in the past because of nations. The Kurds has presented origins to become nation for sixteenth century. On the one hand, the assumption is that the root of being nation for the Kurds can be seen before this time. However, in the literature Hassanpour remarked that Kurdish nation could be interpreted from Ahmad Xani and Şerefhan as well as Evliya Çelebi. However, the Kurds are not separated the nation that used to live in Mesopotamia, in the territory between Turkish [Ottoman] and Iran [Persian]’s governance. In other words, on the one hand, the Kurds has not had their own state; on the other hand, their national awakening has been available because of myths, a shared history, and language. Hassanpour underlines as “from the sixteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century, much of Kurdistan was under the rule of independent and autonomous Kurdish principalities that produced a flourishing rural and urban life in the seventeenth century” (1994: 1). This time is important for Kurdish nationalist awakening. The most important manifestation of political awareness was supplied in the text of Ahmad Xani’s Memu Zin as:

Look, from the Arabs to the Georgians,

The Kurds have become like towers.

The Turks and Persian are surrounded by them.

The Kurds are on all four corners.

Both sides have made the Kurdish people

Targets for the arrows of fate.

They are said to be keys to the borders,

Each tribe forming a formidable bulwark.

Whenever the Ottoman Sea [Ottomans] and the Tajik Sea [Persian]

Flow out and agitate,

The Kurds get soaked in blood,

Separating them [the Turks and Persian] like an isthmus (Hassanpour 1992: 53).

Accordingly, Özoğlu states that *Memu Zin*, is written in the native language of the Kurds, *Kurmanci*, is a love story between Mem and Zin. Also, Ahmad Xani's purpose is to show territorial border of the Kurds in his study. In other word, the location of Kurdistan between Ottoman, Persian, Arab, and Georgian is emphasized in the text. However, For Kurdish nationalists like Hassanpour, it stands for national awareness of the Kurds against other empires. Now, when one interprets ethno-symbolist approach basis on myths, a shared culture, a shared territory, a shared customs, language and values, one can see that *Memu Zin* helps the Kurds to construct Kurdish nationalism in the seventeenth century through language and territorial border. Moreover, Hassanpour used *Memu Zin*'s other part as "why have the Kurds been deprived, why have they all been subjugated?". Accordingly, Ahmad Xani rejected the aspect that the Kurds were 'ignorant' or 'without perfection' (Hassanpour 1994). Then, Kurdish nationalism is not a product of modernization even though its origins were seen in seventeenth century thanks to Ahmad Xani's *Memu Zin*.

After the discussion of the origins of nations and nationalism, I need to measure how different nationalisms affect consolidation of democratization of Turkey. It means that Kurdish nationalism and Turkish nationalism are the two most known nationalisms of Turkey for long time irrespective of modernist approach and ethno-symbolist approach, and these two nationalisms influence democratization process of Turkey. In this respect, my other theoretical framework, known as multicultural citizenship based on liberal democracy theory, will help us to understand how nationalisms affect democracy in Turkey directly.

4.2. Liberal Theory of Minority Rights

Turkey is a successor of Ottoman Empire from 1923 to nowadays. Turkish Republic has been founded by state elites according to nation-state understanding. In this

respect, the new Turkish political agenda ignored its 'past'. Decentralization in Ottoman Empire turned to a nation-state known as Turkish Republic. In this new Turkish Republic, there are three 'others' that have been seen as assimilated into Turkishness. As I have already mentioned in the first chapter, the foundation of Turkish republic is based on ignorance and assimilation that make people became polarized into different groups such as Kurds, Alevi, Sunni-Muslim, non-Muslim, and Turks. The polarization of new Turkish Republic directly has influenced decentralization of Ottoman Empire, which stands for that there were many ethnic and cultural groups lived in the system of decentralization of Ottoman Empire. Multicultural understanding was seen in Ottoman Empire. However, founders of Turkish Republic were affected by nationalism and their contemporary periphery such as Hitler in Germany, Franco in Italy that all wanted to create nation-state over nationalism. Now, my purpose is to show how 'national minority' in Turkey will help to create multicultural citizenship. I believe that there are also different groups living in Turkey nowadays. For their both political and social life, multicultural citizenship will help Turkey to create a more democratic country. I will focus the Kurdish issue as a case study to develop multicultural citizenship. In this respect, I will discuss liberal theory basis on Will Kymlicka. He remarks that the aim of the liberalism is to not give individual rights to all people, who live in multinational empires. However, the aim is to give political rights for all nations in each empire (1998: 95). Here, the important case is that nations are more important to preserve their political rights against empires. Kymlicka divided minorities into two parts in order to be more understandable, and he grounded his liberal theory on these two parts that he describes as:

In the first case, cultural diversity arises from the incorporation of previously self-governing, territorially concentrated cultures into a larger state. These incorporated cultures, which I call 'national minorities', typically wish to maintain themselves as distinct societies alongside the majority culture, and demand various forms of autonomy or self-government to ensure their survival as distinct societies. In the second case, cultural diversity arises from individual and familial immigration. Such immigrants often coalesce into loose associations, which I called 'ethnic groups' (1995: 10).

These two explanations are important to see the condition of the Kurds within

Turkey. I have attempted to show the root of the Kurds grounded to sixteenth century thanks to ethno-symbolist approach. Now, the coalescence of ethno-symbolist approach for the Kurds and the meaning of 'national minorities' suggest that the Kurds have been 'national minority' from Ottoman Empire to nowadays. They are not in category of 'ethnic groups' because they have already emerged in this territory from sixteenth century. Kymlicka advocates that liberalism supports protection of rights of 'national minorities'. Therefore, he states that liberal statesman should recognize minorities' rights in order to provide cultural equality. Naturally, the meaning and understanding of liberalism can be differentiated through scholars. Basically, liberalism prioritizes individual rights, freedom, and human rights within democratic regime. However, J. S. Mill thought that democracy is governance of the public; their preservation is possible within a nation-state. Accordingly, Kymlicka underlines that Mill and T. H. Green believe that the nation-state to be free, and national minorities should be assimilated into their identity (1998: 96). This is important to understand that these kinds of liberalists have been seen in the Turkish political life since the foundation of Turkish Republic. On the other hand, other liberals advocate counter arguments for minority rights. Lord Acton, who is one of them, believes that real freedom can be provided in multinational states. For example, Turkey is now multinational state. If it supports multicultural citizenship understanding, Turkey will be more democratic country.

There are different ideas in liberal ideology for minority rights. I attempted to show how liberals see minority right in the level of group not individuals. In Turkey, the Kurds are the largest minority whose population reaches as high as 20 million. I support Kymlicka's 'national minorities' idea and his liberal approach to minorities. The Kurdish case in Turkey can be solved the notion of multiculturalism.

4.2.1. Multicultural Citizenship

Nowadays, many countries are culturally diverse. According to recent estimates, there are 184 independent states, which contain 600 different language groups and 5.000 ethnic groups (Kymlicka 1998). Therefore, only in a few states citizens share the same language and belong the same ethno-national groups. That is, structures of

most countries contain multiculturalism. Turkey, for example, is one of them composed by culturally diverse identities such as Turks, Kurds, Armenian, Jews, and many others. However, in Turkey the Kurds have remarkable position as being 'national minority' more than the others because they left Turkey after 1923 gradually. Population exchange is good example. However, Kurds resisted Turkish political agenda started from 1923. Rebellions, for example, were outcomes of this resistance. Both Turkish past and current political agenda for minority rights are not enough to reach western democracy. Turkey should see her multicultural structure, and it should protect it. We know that there are large and small rebellions emerged in the early of Turkish republic until 1938. After this time, there were no rebellions virtually until 1980. The main reasons can be counted as assimilation agenda and desiring of undeveloped southeastern region. Even, after the 1980 military coup, Kurdish language is banned with Law No. 2932 in 1982 Constitution. Moreover, after the PKK, which made its first attack in 1984, emerged as a terrorist organization, and large numbers of citizens were pressured to immigrate, and many Kurdish villages were burned in this period as part of the military's anti insurgent strategy against the PKK.

The Kurds did not join political rights directly until 1990 when the SPP and the Kurds created a coalition party to participate the 1991 general parliamentary election. Therefore, the Kurdish issue became the most important problem for Turkey. In the evolution of the Kurdish problem for the Turkish side, Turkish nationalism is developed by state in order to ignore other ethnic identities. I believe that Kurdish nationalism, as a strategy of demands for recognition, emerged against Turkish nationalism. The clash of these two nationalisms is the most serious hurdle in the way of a democratic resolution of the Kurdish issue, hence being the biggest obstacle before democracy in Turkey.

Kymlicka (1998) remarks that culturally diverse brings many problems that are listed as language rights, regional autonomy, political representation, land claims, and education curriculum over which minorities and majorities clash. In Turkey these problems emerge because of both nationalisms. Özkırmı (2013) states that

‘ontological insecurity’ in the face of difference and pluralism is the main issue of Turkish nationalism because they see ‘the others’ as opponents of Turkish nation-state. That is, according to Turkish identity and constitution, the Kurds in Turkey are marginal, and actually existence of the Kurds and political rights are often ignored by Turkish state-elites. Now, the solution can be grounded to multicultural citizenship agenda in Turkey.

Multiculturalism is one political way to increase minority rights within current states. When Kymlicka defines multiculturalism, he considers that multiculturalism is combination of multination and multiethnic. The term ‘multiculturalism’ has different meaning in different countries. For example, the term is used in Canada that immigrants express their ethnic identity without bias and fear of discrimination. Moreover, in Europe, it means the sharing of power between national communities in general. On the other hand, it is often used to meet demands of marginalized social groups in the U.S. By the way, culture stands for nation in my usage. That is, the culture and nation have the same meaning in my definition of each of them. Kurdish nation, for example, actually equals Kurdish culture. Accordingly, I will use multiculturalism when I define ‘national minorities’. Moreover, Özkırımlı used multicultural constitutional citizenship in order to give more constitutional rights to minorities especially the Kurds. “Multicultural constitutional citizenship based on democratic deliberation and dialogue, and promoting a rights-based approach to Kurdish demands for the public recognition of their identities, taking justice and equality as a point of departure” (Özkırımlı 2013: 32). Moreover, the notion of multicultural citizenship or multicultural rights means to intend to promote integration of minorities into the larger society, not self-government. According to Banting and Kymlicka, forms of multicultural citizenship include a combination of six elements in different states as listed:

- 1- federal or quasi-federal territorial autonomy;
- 2- official language status, either in the region or nationally;
- 3- guarantees of representation in the central government or on a Constitutional Court;

4- public funding of minority language universities/schools/media;

5- constitutional or parliamentary affirmation of ‘multi-nationalism’;

6- according to international personality (e.g. allowing the substate region to sit on international bodies, or sign treaties, or have their own Olympic team) (2006 cited by Özkırmı 2013: 37)

Accordingly, the Kurds as ‘national minority’ in Turkey have not met any of six elements yet. However, as I mentioned in the second chapter, Turkish candidacy process of the EU has started to emphasize minority rights and human rights from 2001. In other words, multicultural rights have become subject of political agenda of Turkish Republic from 2001 in order to welcome culturally diverse. Expression themselves with native language became free, and publication in languages is also free. Moreover, television and radio broadcasting as well as the teaching and learning language in ‘forbidden languages’ became free in 2002. In addition, “They [Turkey] promise the adoption of a concept of citizenship that is above and beyond membership to a national unit and that embraces human rights” (Kadıoğlu 2007: 292). These new amendments are important to give privileges to the Kurds who now have opportunities to live their culture, myths, symbols, values, and identity in Turkey. However, Turkey does not bring more democratic rights to the Kurds. The 1982 Constitution is a problematic when it defines citizens. It ignores the Kurds. Article 66 of the 1982 remarks that “Everyone bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk.” Moreover, first three laws of the 1982 Constitution are also problematic if one wants to create multicultural structure. Therefore, Baskın Oran’s idea can be remarkable when one evaluates the laws. For example, he suggest that “Its language is Turkish” ought to be changed to “Its official language is Turkish”. In addition, he advises that using of the *Türkiyeli* (to be from Turkey- a territorial claim) instead of *Türk* (to be a Turk- an ethnic claim) (Kadıoğlu 2007) can brings more multicultural structure that makes Turkey embraces ‘the others’ especially the Kurds as a ‘national minority’.

As a result, Turkey can be more democratic country if it changes the state’s reflection towards the Kurds in Turkey. Also, public opinion should be changed

towards the Kurds. They should embrace the Kurds because of a shared history, a shared culture, and shared religious values. In addition, according to Maykel Verkuyten's study, "Most of these participants (72%) argued that a multicultural society is a good thing because it enriches society, and allows one to learn about other ways of life and to improve and develop oneself" (2010: 153). Accordingly, people in Turkey irrespective their race; ethnicity, and identity should accept multiculturalism is a beneficial outcome of politics.



CONCLUSION

Nationalism and democracy in Turkey have been two of the main political discussions from early Turkish Republic to now. In the process of foundation of Turkish Republic nationalism became the most effective ideology as well as political agenda. Atatürk and state elites benefited from nationalism in order to create new state that was based on Turkish nationalism. In other words, multiethnic or multicultural Ottoman Empire was collapsed because of nationalism, and after this collapsing Turkish Republic was born in 1923 that grounded its roots to Turkish nationalism. Yusuf Akçura and Ziya Gökalp were two supporters of Turkism that is an ideology for creation of new state. Before foundation of Turkish Republic these two figures supported new state that should be grounded Turkism. For example, Yusuf Akçura's Three Types of Policy article became affective supporter of Turkism. He mentioned Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism in this article. He affected CUP [the Young Turk] to use Turkism as state ideology. In addition, Akçura found Turkish Homeland Journal in order to spread effect of Turkism. That is, Turkism played important role to create Turkish Republic. After foundation of Turkish Republic basis on Turkism, the other ethnics or cultural groups were not recognized by new Turkish Republic. Kadioğlu (2007) divided assimilated and ignored minorities into three categories as non-Muslims, non-Turkish Muslims, and religious and traditional supporters of the Ottoman past. Greek, Jews, and Armenia were examples of non-Muslim. Kurds, Arabs, Georgians were examples of non-Turkish Muslim. In this way, assimilation and ignorance process had been applied.

The purpose of assimilation is to make 'others' to become Turks. That is, Turkishness became effective politics to transform 'others' to Turks. Because of that case 1924 Constitution is created via this framework. Also, the purpose of ignorance

is to make 'others' to be denied from politics. They did not have political rights as Turks. In Turkey the Kurds are main target of assimilation and ignorance from early Turkish Republic because the other ethnic groups such as Armenia, Greeks, and Jews left from Turkey in the early Turkish Republic because of exchange population, and assimilation and ignorance. However, the Kurds have not left from Turkey because they are main residents as Turks for this territory. According to Kmylicka's definition, the Kurds are still 'national minority'. The Kurds increased its nationalist awakening against Turkish nationalism with rebellions not only in the early Turkish Republic but also in the late of Ottoman Empire. From literature scholars are divided into different categories. Some of them believe that the first Kurdish nationalist awakening depends on Sheikh Ubeydullah in 1876. Robert Olson, Waide Jwaideh, and Amir Hassanpour, for example, are supporter of this idea. On the other hand, some of them, Baskin Oran and Hakan Özoğlu, believe that Kurdish nationalism has been started with KTC in 1918. According to literature, I categorize Kurdish nationalism into four different time periods. The first depends on Bedirhan Pasha Rebellion in 1840 and Sheikh Ubeydullah Rebellion in 1876. The second is Hamidiye Cavalry and Kurdish Newspaper.

The third period depends on KKTC [*Kurdistan Terakki ve Tevaun Cemiyeti*], Kürdistan Hevi Cemiyeti, and KTC [*Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti*], and the last period depends on Sheikh Said Rebellion in 1925, Mt. Ararat Rebellion in 1928-30, and Dersim Rebellion in 1938. After foundation of Turkish Republic there had almost 20 rebellions that were small and large. However, the last three rebellions were the most known. These rebellions made Kurdish nationalist awakening to be increased between the Kurds. Nationalism became an ideology after French Revolution in 1789. It has affected both small and large states and empires. The result of nationalism in Ottoman Empire helped two nationalisms, Kurdish and Turkish nationalisms, existed. Those I mentioned above are results of nationalism. There are different ideas of nationalism, which are counted as primordialist, modernist, and ethno-symbolist. I grounded my theoretical framework on ethno-symbolism. Antony D. Smith's ethno-symbolist understanding became effective when I research roots or origins of nation and nationalism. Ethno-symbolists improved their theory against

modernist approach that believes nation and nationalism are two products of modernism, and creation of nations depends on nationalism. On the other hand, ethno-symbolists believe that nations and nationalism are in relationship in the pre-modern periods. Ethno-symbolism attempts to emphasize the role of myths, memories, symbols, values and customs in the formation, continuation and transformation of ethnicity and nationalism (Özkırmılı 2010). Pre-modern figures [myths, memories, symbols, values and customs, a shared history] have affected foundation of modern nationalism and nations. Because of that case some of scholars, the most known is Amir Hassanpour, believe that the origin of Kurdish nationalism traced to Ahmad Xani's Mem u Zin in 16th century. If one starts from this point, pre-modern figures have influences on modern Kurdish nationalism. For my thesis Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms have effects on democratic consolidation of Turkey. In addition to nationalism, Westernization process of Turkey has affected on democracy in Turkey. I divided these two as internal factors and external factors of democratic consolidation of Turkey. For internal factors, Kurdish nationalism and multiparty system are important while Turkish candidacy of the EU is important for external factor.

After foundation of Turkish Republic, single party system became effective until multiparty system in 1945. Atatürk found the RPP that became the most important party in the single party system. After transform of single party to multiparty system, the DP and the RPP were two important players for Turkish politics. The DP became single government until 1960 military coup. With the DP periphery found way to join center. However, state elites especially the Turkish military, which defines itself as guardian of secularism and nation-state, changed political framework of Turkey by dropping the DP from government. Turkey also lived another three military coup in different time periods as 1971, 1980, and 1997. These four military coups had negative wave on democratic consolidation of Turkey. That is, democracy in Turkey had been affected negatively after each military coup. However, Turkey has stepped to increase democracy level in Turkey with multiparty system. In multiparty system different ideas can find representation of their ideology and ethnic desires easily. In time fragmentation of parties also made democracy in Turkey to be increased. For

example, Bülent Ecevit's the DLP and Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu's the GUP brought alternative political ways to voters. In addition, if other parties from different ethnic backgrounds find seats in the parliament, it also increase democracy level in Turkey because the parliament considers minorities' right more than before. The good example is pro-Kurdish parties' participation to the parliament. In Turkey the Kurds participated the parliament with 21 deputies thanks to election alliance with the SPP in 1991 election. After that time, pro-Kurdish parties found ways to participate the parliament that makes Turkey has started to internalize Kurdish fact and stepped another democratic development. In fact that pro-Kurdish parties have started to increase their political supporter in time. Nowadays the HDP joined two last elections as party, and it passed ten percent national threshold in two elections, and now it is the third party in the parliament.

The other factor of democratic consolidation of Turkey has been developed and increased after Turkish candidacy of the EU from 1999 to nowadays. The main argument of the EU depends on minority and human rights. Turkish balanced scorecard of minority and human rights is underwhelming because of Turkish political agenda basis on assimilation and ignorance of minorities and human rights. Once again Turkey has started to increase democracy level in Turkey by applying Copenhagen Criteria after Helsinki Summit in 1999. Thus Abdullah Öcalan's death penalty is removed because of being candidate of the EU. After 2002 election, the JDP became single government, and it has followed candidacy procedure of the EU. Minority rights and human rights got momentum after 2002 by bringing different democratic packages. Some of them are counted as; Kurdish native language is allowed. People give Kurdish name for their children, and they can speak Kurmanji easily. Radio and TV broadcasting in native language is allowed, and education in native language is also allowed. Those new changes are important for minorities and human rights supporters but current Turkish Constitution is one of the obstacles for more democratic Turkey. Definition of citizenship and 10 percent threshold still deny minorities in Turkey. As mentioned in above, the Kurds are 'national minority' in Turkey. Therefore, multicultural citizenship understanding can help Turkey to increase democracy level of Turkey for both short and long term. For example,

Baskın Oran suggests that “Its language is Turkish” ought to be changed to “Its official language is Turkish”. In addition, he advises that using of the *Türkiyeli* (to be from Turkey- a territorial claim) instead of *Türk* (to be a Turk- an ethnic claim) (Kadioğlu 2013) can bring more multicultural structure that makes Turkey embraces ‘others’ especially the Kurds. In addition to literature reviews, I did field work with current parties in the parliament such as the JDP, the RPP, the HDP, and the NAP from Izmir, Gaziantep, and Manisa in order to analyze parties’ aspects on different themes such as democracy, woman, polarization, terrorism, the EU and regional relations, mosaic. These themes are important to read democracy level in Turkey. From my interviews I analyzed that the NAP has power to change political structure of mainstream Turkish politics. The NAP is one of the powerful candidates of coalition government because it is close to both the JDP and the RPP because of Turkism. The other thing what I analyzed from interviews is that if four parties converge, the more democracy is possible. Hence if three parties except the HDP converge, the less democracy is possible. Therefore, participation of the HDP in the mainstream Turkish politics increases democracy level in Turkey.

In conclusion, Turkey’s the biggest exam is nationalism and democracy relation from early Turkish Republic to nowadays. One can argue that if Turkey creates check and balance system between nationalism and democracy, she will increase democracy level in Turkey for long term.

Appendix A: Interview Protocol sample – Görüşme Protokolu

Effectiveness – Etkililik

- 1- How do you evaluate the parties in parliament?
Mecliste grubu bulunan partileri nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?

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.....
.....
.....
.....

- 2- How do you evaluate process of June 7 general election and 1 November general election?
7 Haziran seçimleri ve 1 Kasım seçim süreçlerini nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?

.....
.....
.....
.....

- 3- What do you think about the beginning and progress of democratization process of Turkey?
Türkiye'deki demokratikleşme sürecinin başlangıç ve gelişimi hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?

.....
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.....
.....

4- Which policy should be followed for the existing political conjecture?

Şu anki politik konjektörde nasıl bir politika izlenmelidir?

.....
.....
.....

5- What is the role of the parties in parliament for determining Turkish foreign policy?

Türkiye'nin dış politikasında mecliste grubu bulunan partilerin rolü nedir?

.....
.....

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