

**“THE TUAREGS AND REBELLION IN MALI: THE 2012 REBELLION AND
FRENCH MILITARY INTERVENTION”**

YUSUF IBRAHIM GAMAWA

YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY

MAY 2015

**THE TUAREGS AND REBELLION IN MALI: THE 2012 REBELLION AND
FRENCH MILITARY INTERVENTION**

**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

OF

YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY

BY

YUSUF IBRAHIM GAMAWA

**IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY**

IN

THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Approval of the Institute of Social Sciences

.....

Prof. Dr. Zeki Salih ZENGİN

Head of Institute

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

.....

Prof. Dr. Birol AKGÜN

Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

.....

Asst. Prof. Dr Bayram SİNKAYA

Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Birol AKGÜN (YBU, International Relations)

Asst . Prof. Dr. Bayram SİNKAYA (YBU, International Relations)

Prof. Dr. Selcuk ÇOLAKOĞLU (YBU, International Relations)

Prof. Dr. Angelo SANTA GOSTINO (YBU, Economics)

Assist. Prof. Dr. Mehmet ÖZKAN (Polis Academy)

PLAGIARISM PAGE

I hereby declare that all information in this thesis has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work; otherwise I accept all legal responsibility.

Yusuf Ibrahim Gamawa

.....

ABSTRACT

“The Tuaregs and Rebellion in Mali: The 2012 Rebellion and French Military Intervention”.

Yusuf Ibrahim Gamawa

Ph.D., Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Asst Prof.Dr. Bayram SINKAYA

May 2015, 258 Pages

The Tuaregs, a nomadic group occupying the north of Mali had rebelled against the Malian state since 1963, only 3 years after Mali gained independence from the French. The group again rebelled in 1990 against the Malian government, and ever since then the Malian state has found itself in constant confrontation with the group and has remained in one negotiation or the other with the group until the outbreak of the 2012 rebellion that saw the intervention of France. The 2012 rebellion appeared to have differed from previous rebellions in that certain transnational group along with the Tuaregs rebelled against the Malian state. The Malian state's inability to stop the rebel advance resulted in the request by the Malian president for Paris to intervene. This research seeks to find out why France intervened in the 2012 conflict in Mali? The intervention can be viewed from two perspectives; the French perspective, which can be explained in terms of security threat to French economic interests not only in Mali but also in neighboring states like Niger, where France is seen to have invested heavily in various sectors of its economy, and the Malian perspective, which is explained in terms of the weakness of the Malian state and the eminent threat posed by the rebel groups, and the inability of the state to counter the offensive of the rebel groups which threatened stability in the region and the need to avoid what Paris termed as the emergence of a terrorist state in the Sahel region.

Keywords: Mali, Tuaregs, France, Intervention, UN, Negative Sovereignty.

ÖZET

“Tuaregler ve Mali'deki İsyani: 2012 İsyani ve Fransız Askeri Müdahalesi”

Yusuf Ibrahim Gamawa

Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi : Asst Prof. Dr. Bayram SINKAYA

Mayis 2015, 258 sayfa

Mali'nin kuzeyinde göçebe bir grup olan Tuaregler, Mali devletine karşı Mali'nin Fransa'dan bağımsızlık kazanmasından üç yıl sonrasında (1963'ten) beri isyan etmektedir. 1990'da grup yine isyan etti ve o günden beri Mali devleti kendini grupla sürekli karşı karşıya buldu ve grupla Fransa'nın müdahale ettiği 2012 isyanının çıkışına kadar bu ya da öteki şekilde pazarlık içinde kaldı. 2012 isyanı belli bir ulus ötesi grubun da Tuareglerle birlikte Mali devletine isyan etmesiyle önceki isyanlardan farklılaşmış göründü. Mali devletinin isyan hareketini durdurmadaki başarısızlığı Mali devlet başkanının Paris'e müdahale etmeyi önermesiyle sonuçlandı. Bu araştırma Fransa'nın 2012 ihtilafına müdahale etmesinin nedenlerini bulmayı amaçlıyor. Bu müdahaleye iki perspektiften bakılabilir, Fransız perspektifi, Fransa'nın yoğun şekilde çeşitli sektörlerde yatırım yaptığı, Mali'yle sınırlı kalmayan Nijer gibi diğer komşu devletlerde de Fransız ekonomik çıkarlarına karşı oluşan güvenlik tehdidi bakımından açıklanabilir, Mali perspektifi ise Mali'nin zayıflığı ve isyancı grupların yarattığı sürekli tehdit, devletin bölgenin istikrarını tehdit eden isyancı grup saldırılarına karşılık verememesi ve Paris'in Sahel bölgesinde terörist bir devletin ortaya çıkması olarak adlandırdığı şeyi önleme ihtiyacı bakımından açıklanmıştır.

Anahtar sözcükler: Mali, Tuaregler, Fransa, Müdahale, BM, Negatif Egemenlik.

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my grandfather, Malam Ibrahim Gamawa for his love, kindness, uprightness, and for his total support while alive. To Brenda for all her love and care to me in my childhood.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I thank God Almighty for making it possible for me to acquire a doctoral degree, without God's guidance and support, it would have been impossible for me. I am indeed grateful to my parents, my father, for his encouragement and advice, my mother for her patience and understanding. My BIG uncle for his encouragement and support, to all family members that have shown support to me, and my friends for their support too.

I remain indebted to my humble and hardworking adviser, Asst Professor. Dr Bayram Sinkaya, words are not enough to express my appreciation to this gentleman, I thank him for being patient with me and for his insights and advice regarding my work, Sir, I thank you so much. I thank the members of the thesis review Committee which include Professor Selcul Colakoglu and Professor Angelo Santa Gustino. I also thank Professor Birol Akgun our Head of department and Professor Mehmet Ozkan of the Police Academy who were part of the Jury during the defence of my thesis. I remain grateful to all the professors in the institute for the knowledge they have imparted on me and specifically thank the following people Professor Ramazan Gozen, Asst Professor Sabit Subasic, Dr Eryada Progonati and Professor Mustafa Sitki Bilgin. I thank my friends in the students Affairs department and specifically to Merve Erol for being a friend and always willing to help. I thank all my colleagues in the Ph.D programme who have been a family in the institute Abdulrazaq, Muzzein, Ibrahim Aydemir, Mustafa, Canan, Ozge and Yavuz in particular.

I thank all my friends here in Ankara for the wonderful time. I thank Ms Meera Sethi of the International Migration Organization for her help and support with materials that aided the writing of this thesis and for her friendship as well. I also thank Nancy for her support and interest in the progress of my work.. Burcu for the translation and editing of the work. I also thank Mr Adnan Alajeeli my Iraqi friend for his help in the course of adjusting this thesis. The staff of the Starbucks Coffee in Kizilay where all of this thesis was written for the friendship and support. I thank all those that have made my stay here memorable, particular to the African community .

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Plagiarism Page.....	i
Abstract.....	ii
Ozet.....	iii
Dedication.....	iv
Aknowledgement.....	v
Table of Contents.....	vi
List of Abbreviations.....	ix

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction.....	1
1.2 Research Question, Argument and Hypothesis.....	12
1.3 Theoretical Framework.....	14
1.4 Literature Review.....	30
1.5 Outline of the Research.....	35
1.6 Methodology.....	37

CHAPTER TWO

LAND AND PEOPLE OF MALI

2.1 Introduction.....	39
2.2 Physical Setting and Social Structure.....	40
2.3 The Ancient Mali Empire.....	47

2.4 The French Incursion Into Mali.....	50
2.5 Post Independence Mali.....	55
2.6 Conclusion.....	61

CHAPTER THREE

PREVIOUS TUAREG REBELLIONS IN MALI

3.1 Introduction.....	62
3.2 Who are the Tuaregs?.....	64
3.3 Tuaregs and the Malian State.....	69
3.4 The Tuareg Rebellion of 1963.....	80
3.4.1 Declaration of Rebellion by the Tuaregs.....	83
3.4.2 General Organisation and Operations.....	88
3.4.3 Victory of the Malian Army and End of Rebellion.....	91
3.5 The Second Tuareg Rebellion (1990).....	94
3.5.1 Transformation of the Tuareg Society and the Need for Revolution.....	97
3.5.2 Peace Process and Negotiations.....	105
3.6 Conclusion.....	110

CHAPTER FOUR

THE 2012 REBELLION AND FRENCH MILITARY INTERVENTION IN MALI

4.1 Introduction.....	112
4.2 Background and Genesis of the 2012 Rebellion.....	113
4.3 Drugs, Organized Crime and the Rise of Trans-national Islamist Groups in Mali.....	118
4.3.1 Outbreak of the 2012 Rebellion.....	124
4.4 French Intervention in Mali and UN, AU, ECOWAS, EU, US Response.....	126
4.5 French Africa Policy: Sarkozy/Holande Policies towards Africa.....	131
4.6 AFISMA and MINUSMA Missions in Mali.....	137
4.7 Economic and Strategic/Political Motivations for the French Intervention in Mali...	143
4.8 Impact and Consequences of the French Intervention in Mali.....	154
4.9 Conclusion.....	159

CHAPTER FIVE

POST CONFLICT MALI

5.1 Introduction.....	161
5.2 Implications of the 2012 Conflict/Rebellion.....	163
5.2.1 Population Displacement and Food Insecurity in Mali.....	163
5.2.2 Large Scale Internal Displacement, Cross-Border Flows and Impacts on Neighboring States.....	167
5.2.3 Human Rights Issues and Upholding the Rule of Law.....	172
5.3 The EU and Activities in Mali.....	178
5.4 Re-building the North: U.N and Partner Activities in the North of Mali.....	186
5.4.1 Gao Region.....	187
5.4.2 Timbuktu Region.....	190
5.4.3 Kidal Region.....	192
5.5 Disarmament: Weapons Seized or Abandoned by the Rebel Groups.....	195
5.6 Conclusion.....	203

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

6.1 Conclusion.....	206
----------------------------	------------

APPENDICES

Appendix A: The Mandate of MINUSMA.....	212
Appendix B: Vita	215
Appendix C: Turkish Summary of Thesis.....	217

BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	232
--------------------------	------------

Izin Formu.....	244
-----------------	-----

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADEMA -Alliance Démocratique du Mali

ADIDE-Association des Demandeurs et Initiateurs d'Emploi

AEF-Afrique équatoriale française.

AFISMA-African International Support Mission to Mali.

ALM-Armée de Libération Marocaine

AOF-Afrique occidentale française.

AQIM-Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

ARLA-Armée Révolutionnaire pour la Libération de l'Azawad.

ATNMC-Alliance Touarègue Niger-Mali pour le Changement.

BAUA-Base Autonome du Timétrine.

CAR/Nord-Consolidation des Acquis de la Réinsertion au Nord

CNID-Comité National d'Initiative Démocratique

CRN-Conseil pour la Réconciliation Nationale.

FAO-Food and Agriculture Organization.

FIAA-Front Islamique Arabe de l'Azawad.

FLN-Front de Libération Nationale.

FNLA-Front National de Libération de l'Azawad.

FPLA-Front Populaire pour la Libération de l'Azawad.

FPLSAC-Front Populaire pour la Libération du Sahara Arabe Central.

FULA-Front Unifié pour la Libération de l'Azawad.

GIA-Groupe Islamique Armé.

GSPC-Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat.

ICRC-International Committee for the Red Cross.

ILO-International Labour Organisation.

MDG-Millennium Development Goals.

MDJT-Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad.

MFUA-Mouvements et Fronts Unifiés de l'Azawad.

MINUSMA-Multi-dimensional United Nations Mission to Mali.

MNJ-Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice.

MNLA-National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad.

MPA-Mouvement Populaire de l'Azawad.

MPGK-Mouvement Patriotique Ganda Koy.

MUJWA-Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa.

OCHA-Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

OCRS-Organisation Commune des Régions Sahariennes.

PAREM-Programme d'Appui à la Réinsertion des ex-Combattants au Mali.

PDS-Parti Démocratique Soudanais.

PFLP-Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

POLISARIO-Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y Rio de Oro.

PSI-Pan-Sahel Initiative.

PSP-Parti Socialiste Progressif also Parti Progressiste du Soudan.

TSCTI-Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative.

UDPM-Union Démocratique du Peuple Malien.

UMADD-Union Malienne pour la Démocratie et le Développement.

UNESCO-United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

UNMAS-United Nations Mines Action Service.

UNICEF-United Nations Childrens Fund.

UNIDO-United Nations Industrial Development Organization.

UNFPA-United Nations Population Fund.

UNHAS-UN Humanitarian Air Service.

UNHCR-United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

UNIDIR-United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

US-AID-United States Agency for International Development.

US-RDA-Union Soudanaise – Rassemblement Démocratique Africain.

WFP-World Food Programme.

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Armed conflicts and the search for peace and security have for a very long time become issues of serious concern not only among African states in the post independence period, but globally. Many International and regional organizations within Africa and at the global level as well have for many years become engaged in solving one conflict or another among African states, yet insecurity is still bedeviling the continent. The African continent, it is believed by many scholars is composed of artificially created nation states imposed by the colonial masters. Many have also tried to explain the manner in which state structures developed in Africa, which they viewed as having developed mainly through coercive mechanisms, as well as centralized political and economic control through the use of army, policy and bureaucracy. The consequences of such were seen to have resulted in the emergence of a political culture that is largely seen to be based on ethnicity, and authoritarian patterns of governance. As such the control of a state and economic resources became the basis of political competition in many Africa states.

Most scholars appear to have heaped blames of many of the problems facing the African continent to the creation of nation states within Africa without any regards to ethnic diversity of the various peoples across the continent by the colonial powers. The scramble for and partition of the African continent appeared to have subjugated several ethnic groups within certain particular political regions. This overtime came to constitute a problem and has resulted in many wars and conflicts across the continent in the post independence period. According to several sources, beginning form the 1960's a total of about 24 African states had been engaged in one conflict or the other in the form of war, and that about 22 had had to make serious efforts to avert the breakout of war and conflict within their respective states.

A study conducted by the Institut Catalia International, Per La Pan, Barcelona and published in its working papers in June 2010, showed that about a total of 14 armed conflicts had taken place across the African continent by the end of the cold war¹. These armed conflicts were reported to have taken place in Angola, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo and Eritrea-Ethiopia. As a matter of fact Mali had been excluded from the list in the study conducted by the Institute in Barcelona mentioned above, perhaps Mali was not of interest to the study, but the truth is that Mali remained among states that started to witness armed conflict and violence at an early stage of its statehood, after gaining independence from the French in 1960. Most of the conflicts affecting the African continent were also seen to have possessed certain similar characteristics, most or all appeared to be internal conflicts that were also regional in nature, and sometimes internationalized or transnationalised. Many organizations and actors are sometimes seen to be involved in these conflicts, either in the management of the conflict or in the resolution process, and are sometimes seen to create complex scenario's and some of these actors at certain points came to be linked with some of the local armed groups. These conflicts were usually accompanied with grievous humanitarian consequences socially, politically and economically. It was estimated that over 5,000,000 (five million) people may have died as a result of the armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and in Sierra Leone, it was reported that about 2,000,000 (two million) people were displaced as a result of armed conflict. In Rwanda about 1,000,000 (one million) people were killed in what came to be known as the Rwandan genocide, while in Darfur about 300,000 (three hundred thousand) people were reported to have perished².

The situation in many African states appeared to have stirred up a debate on a new concept that came be known as “weak states”, “fragile states or failed states.” Although there is still a kind of disagreement between scholars regarding these terms or concepts, but the term remains a reality. While many agree to the weak/failed or fragile states concept and terminology, other scholars appear to be opposed to the entire idea. While others appear selective with regards to the different terminologies, and appear to favor the use of “fragile”, others prefer to use the term “weak states” instead of “failed states.” Fragile

¹ Rafael Grasa and Oscar Mateos, “Conflict, Peace and Security in Africa: An Assessment and New Questions After 50 Years of African Independence”, August 2010, p 9.

² Ibid, p 11.

states are also sometimes referred to as “Quasi states”, a term often used by Robert Jackson. These states, according to Jackson have de Jure but not de facto sovereignty. These states he argued have de jure sovereignty as a result of their acceptance in the international community, but are not recognized by their citizens as legitimate authority. However, it was observed generally that majority of the development agencies appear to have agreed with term “fragile states” when referring to certain states within the African continent and parts of Asia and South America. These agencies generally define the term fragile states to mean “a fundamental failure of states to meet the citizen’s basic needs and expectations. These states are incapable as described by the development agencies of assuring basic security, maintaining rule of law and justice, or providing basic services and economic opportunities for their citizens³.

The term fragility or fragile states is often contested by scholars when describing certain states, and they generally argue that fragility is not a condition and that it varies along a continuum of performance across areas of state function and performance. And as a result, nowadays many development agencies prefer to use the term fragility or fragile situations. F, Stewart and G, Brown defined fragility while describing nations that are failing or at high risk of failing in three different dimensions that include; authority failure, service failure and legitimacy failure. Another term frequently used in the state failure/weakness or fragility is the weak state terminology. Weak states here are described as poor states, suffering from significant gaps in security performance and legitimacy. These states, according to the Brookings Institution lack control over certain areas of their territory as well as capacity to combat internal threats of terrorism or insurgency. Again another term is that of “Failing states, ”which is a term used in describing states that are failing the citizens in achieving economic growth. Yet ‘failed states’ is another term used and is generally used to describe states whose central government has collapsed and has no authority to impose order, which results to loss of physical control of territory. Collapsed states is again another term used in describing states that have failed, and is sometimes used to describe states that have virtually ceased to exist.

However, in recent times there has emerged a critical analysis of these terms associated with state failure, weakness of states or fragility. The weak states terminology is often

³ Claire Mcloughlin, “Topic Guide on Fragile States”, Governance and Social Development Resource Center, University of Birmingham, UK, p 9-12.

criticized particularly for implying that all states move along set trajectories, for representing an “end state”, when in reality states recover from failure or collapse. It is also criticized for not offering a solution or a way of theorizing with regards to competing systems of governance. It was further observed that characterizing failed, collapsed states or anarchic situations completely absent of order and system of governance is misleading. Researches conducted in recent times have revealed how alternative forms of order, security and governance emerge and sustain themselves in the absence of a formal state. According to Zartman, W, societies continue to function and to offer sources of legitimate authority and that contemporary collapse did not mean societal or civilization collapse⁴. While Hagmann, T and Hoetine argue that the state failure debate is based on fundamental conceptual flaws that render its insight and recommendations unconvincing in the light of empirical evidence. They contend that scholars are quick to equate the lack of central government with failed states or anarchical states, and that contrary to this state centered approaches, life goes on with non state actors performing many functions usually associated with states. However despite all the criticisms associated with these various terms, it is clear that weakness, fragility or similar situations definitely exist. And the argument that non state actors perform the functions of a state cannot stand since non state actors cannot be recognized to represent such states in international organizations such as the U.N and similar bodies. And since our discussion is centered on sovereign states, then to consider any role played by non state actors is to digress or dismiss the central argument or topic of discussion. As such it must be admitted that there may have been disagreement among scholars on the use of the terms which all appear related, but it is misleading to say that weak, fragile or failing states do not exist, even if it is true that they do recover, the fact remains that they had at a particular point in time failed or appear to be failing or weak, and it cannot be disputed.

The present conflict in Mali is also seen to bear all the marks of the various armed conflicts highlighted above, and may have differed only slightly. It is significant to state from the outset that though the focus of this research is the 2012 rebellion in Mali and the intervention of France, it must however be understood that the Mali conflict did not start in 2012 and can therefore not be discussed in isolation from previous revolts that have taken place in the country, which date back to as early as 1963, only 3 years after Mali gained

⁴ Zartman W, 1995, “Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse in Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, Boulder, London, UK..

independence. The Mali conflict to an extent can also be categorized as an ethnic or regional conflict, like most of the other conflicts affecting the African continent. It is a conflict between the Tuareg group, inhabiting the northern part of Mali, and the Malian state, which is seen to be mainly dominated by the southern population, which is seen as mainly of Bambara extraction or in any case Malinke peoples. While there are arguments that the Tuareg is not an ethnic group but a race, nevertheless many see it and categorize the conflict as an ethnic and regional one. Though a thorough study of the nature and complexity of the causes and disagreements between the Tuaregs and the Malian state, would reveal that physical characteristics and not only language is seen as constituting a major difference between the southern Bambara or Malinke people and the Tuaregs and other Arab tribes inhabiting the north of the country. While the Tuaregs are light skinned, with physical characteristics similar to that of the Arabs or the Berbers peoples, the southern population consists of dark skinned negro population, and most at times issues related to superiority in racial terms have featured in the relationship between the two groups. This may not have been all clear, since it is not determined if such behavior was only against the Bambara population, since the Tuaregs had opposed the French earlier on in a similar manner.

It was very clear since the occupation of Mali by the French that the Tuaregs had not been interested in being part of any arrangement, and as a result constantly rebelled against the French. It is well known that Alla Albachir openly opposed and started a revolt against the French, just as his son Elledi ag Alla Albachir was also seen to have started the rebellion against the Malian state in the post independence era. The revolts against the French explain why the Tuareg group came to be exempted from forced labor and enlistment in the army during the colonial period. The group was exempted from these programs by the colonial government so that peace would reign; as the revolts had a many times caused a lot of damage to the French authorities, who now allowed some independence to the group. From this, one can say that the group may not have been particularly against the Malinke or Bambara people per se, but rather, the group may have been bent on preserving their independence and identity. And for this reason desired total political independence, and refused to accept any form of control or domination by any people. Many studies conducted including one by Francis Rodd revealed that the group had occupied a very large area of the land surface of the world in the past, and had dominated other groups

wherever they are settled. Rodd described the group as nomadic, and the group earned a reputation for treachery and that they had never been beloved of other men. The superiority of the group may perhaps have been informed by their history and glorious past as a warrior nation. According to Rodd, the Sanhaja Tuareg were responsible for the modification of the civilized world after the introduction of Islam into Africa, they were said to have formed a desert confederation on distinctly religious basis. The Tuaregs were converted to Islam by the El Merabat, it was this league of desert tribes that captured Fez and established what came to be known as the Almoravid Dynasty⁵. The dynasty prevailed over the whole of the Maghreb and into Spain and in its fullness was said to have stimulated arts and sciences to the greater glory of civilization in the west. According to Rodd, the Tuaregs gave the initial fire and impetus to the Almoravid movement.

In Mali the group found it difficult strange to comprehend the idea of servitude to the French and later to the Malian state, and it was for this reason that the Tuareg group perhaps tried to resist the French since the French incursion, and revolted several times in the post independence period against the Malian state. Although the rebellion in 2012 was seen to have slightly differed from previous revolts, especially if one takes into consideration the actors, as well the goals of the rebellion. While previous revolts saw the participation mainly of civilian Tuareg people and Associations and aimed at Tamasheq independence, the 2012 rebellion saw the participation of jihadist groups whose aim was the Islamisation of the north or the Tuareg country. The participation of groups such as AQIM, Ansardine and MUJWA gave a new dimension to the 2012 revolt that was unknown in previous Tuareg uprisings in Mali. And it would appear that situation in the Sahel region and the emergence of organized crime in the region may have led or helped in the emergence of these groups in the region, with the fall of Ghaddafi signaling a renewed mission by fleeing Tuareg returnees from Libya. However, other demands and grievances remained the same as those of previous revolts, especially as voiced through the M.N.L.A which is seen as a Tuareg movement, separate from the jihadist groups among the actors.

Until recently, Mali has remained a relatively stable country in West Africa since it gained independence from the French in 1960. Though considered poor, the country has nevertheless proved to be very important in the West African sub-region as a result of its steady growth in democracy, and even as a small country, Mali is accorded tremendous

⁵ Francis Rodd, "Origins of the Tuaregs", *The Geographical Journal*, Vol 67, No 1, 2013.

respect by other African nations, and particular among West African nations. The country continues to play a prominent role in the regional integration process of the West African Sub-region under the ECOWAS initiative since 1975. Mali has held the position of the Chairmanship of the regional body as a result of its commitment, progress and maturity in democratic governance. Mali's foreign relations interest are seen to be generally restricted to the West African sub-region, where it is seen to be involved in the promotion of regional cohesion and cooperation among West African States. The country became deeply involved in mediating in conflict resolution especially after its President, Mr. Konare assumed the Chairmanship of ECOWAS in 1999.

Mali's concerns in the sub-region extended to border security relations with its immediate neighbors which include Mauritania, Niger, Tunisia and Algeria as a result of lingering problems it faced with the Tuareg group in its northern part, which has led to instances of attacks within Mali by the group. Mali's influence in the region is sometimes only explained in terms of its progress in democratic practice, but the country remained a "weak State", with a relatively weak government and a smaller economy and inadequate resources. The country lacked any capacity to influence any country in the region and in fact tended instead to depend on Nigeria for economic and security assistance⁶.

Generally speaking, conflicts, peace and security issues in Africa have remained subjects of international debate, to the extent that they have over shadowed other important issues in taking place in the African continent. Conflicts and crises in the continent have tended to be given negative considerations, and most often the blame has always been on the misbehavior of African leaders or to the general uncivilized conduct of the African people. All the armed conflicts, failure of the economies of African States, as well as decline in democratic culture have often been blamed on reasons purely within Africa, highlighting most at times the failure of the continent to adjust to the changes brought about by globalization.

Such views however, have not gone undisputed, and as such other factors responsible for the situation in the continent have been identified and discussed by several scholars, and the general conclusion therefore, is that the evolution of post colonial Africa must be contextualized by two major factors. The first, remains within a historical and international

⁶ Mali: Defending Democracy," A Global Survey of Foreign Policy Trends 1992-2002," Democracy Coalition Project .pp 1-2.

context. It is generally argued that African political, economic and cultural heritage must be looked at from the point of colonial legacy⁷. It has been argued that any analysis of the situation that fails to take into consideration the European legacy in Africa will not be sufficient to any valid analysis on the African situation or condition. The second factor has mainly to do with the negative image of Africa, in which the international media is seen to be playing a leading role in propagating, and is seen not to have been substantiated and remains unclear. It is believed that for any meaningful evaluation of the security and stability of the African continent, a broader and all inclusive approach must be developed in order to grasp the reality of the African dilemma⁸.

The situation in many Africa states appeared to have stirred up a debate on a concept that came to be known as state failure, weakness or failure. There have been several disagreements among many scholars regarding what this concept or term means. While many scholars agree to the term “failed states”, others prefer to use the term “weak states”, and again other prefer to use the term “fragile states.” It was observed that majority of the development agencies prefer to use the term “fragile states” when referring to certain states, and generally define the term to mean a “fundamental failure of states to perform functions necessary to meet citizens basic needs and expectations.”

The recent insurgency in Mali; a rebellion in the north by the Tuaregs, which is a nomadic group inhabiting the northern Mali, is seen as a phenomena that has remained consistent since the 1890’s, and revived in the following periods; 1910’s, 1962, 1990 and 2002. It was not seen to have started only in 2012 and many reasons had been advanced by many writers and scholars for the continuation of the Tuareg rebellion in Mali, though some unsatisfactorily explained, but remain part of the problem⁹. An attempt was made to explain the continuation of the problem to the killing of herdsmen and the poisoning of wells during the 1962 rebellion, as well as the poor implementation and sometimes breaching of peace accords and decentralization initiatives in the 1990’s and the 2000’s. Generally scholars have tried to view such problems, including the one in Mali and all former colonies in Africa from what they termed as “a political heritage” that remained

⁷ Rafael Grasa and Oscar Mateos, “Conflict, Peace and Security in Africa: An Assessment and New Questions After 50 Years of African Independence”, 2010.pp 7-8.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Freedom C Onuoha & Alex Thurston, “Franco-African Military Intervention in the Mali Crisis and Evolving Security Concerns”, Aljazeera Center for Studies, 19 February, 2013.pp 2-5.

separated to its territorial cohesion. Mali like most countries in Africa faced the problem of achieving unity as a modern state as a result of artificial borders created by the Colonial Masters prior to the independence of many African States. These Colonial borders did not take into consideration the diverse socio-economic realities that existed in different parts of Africa, including Mali and as such abstract citizenship appeared highly unlikely in most parts of Africa till today¹⁰.

Prior to the period of colonial conquest in the African continent, the Mali empire as it was known in those days, was one of the most powerful African States, equal in status to only the likes of Kanem-Borno empire, in terms of wealth and control of trade in the continent. The Kanem-Borno Empire was a middle African empire of the Chad Basin centered in modern Chad and Nigeria and lasted from the 9th century AD until 1900. At its height of power, it comprised an area covering not only much of Chad, but also parts of southern Libya, eastern Niger, Northeastern Nigeria, northern Cameroun, Central African Republic and South Sudan with its capital at Borno in present day Nigeria¹¹. The Mali Empire has since then remained a reference point for sophisticated African societies that flourished before the advent of European traders on the African continent. In the fourteenth century, Mansa or Emperor Kankan Musa made the pilgrimage to Mecca, and news reached Europe of his generosity with gold in Cairo. It was Musa that brought to the empire architects and scholars that made Gao and Timbuktu important centers of Islamic learning. These cities were lost to the rising Songhai Empire, and in 1591, Morocco invaded the empire in search of gold. In 1747, a Tuareg Prince from the North, whose ancestors had founded Timbuktu in 11th century, regained control of the city. In the South, the Bambara people rose to power and by 1712, a Bambara Kingdom had been established at Segou. It is claimed that the influence of Bambara is still felt in Bamako and other cities. And in the 19th century, the Peal Macina and Tukulor empires of the Fulani peoples became powerful under ambitious leaders. However, through a war that took place between the years 1818-1844, a Fulani Islamic theocracy had been established and extended to Djenne and Timbuktu. And from 1854 to 1864 its leaders fought both the Bambara and the early French colonizers to expand the Fulani Empire from Segou to Timbuktu, while other tribal leaders continued to battle one another and in the end finally surrendered to the French.

¹⁰ Bakare Sambe, "The Crisis in Mali: Origins, Developments and Impact on the Sub Region", KAS International Reports, December 2012.pp 119 .

¹¹" Kanem-Borno Empire", en.wikipedia.org.

The French rule in Mali and West Africa in general is seen as more of direct rule as opposed to the British Colonial policy of indirect rule. The French pursued the policy of assimilation, which is said to have its origins in the French revolution and its ideas of freedom, equality and fraternity, which is to be applied to anyone who was French irrespective of race or color, the French initially considered all its colonies as extensions of France as a country. The assimilation policy is an idea that is seen to be based on the assumed superiority of French culture and civilization, but which was soon replaced by that of “association”. The French having realized the impossibility of the former reverted to the new system. The association policy was meant to respect the cultural and political values of Africans and the general belief that Africans should not be forced to become black French people. However, in practice, the association policy proved difficult, and as such Africans and traditional authorities became subordinates in the administrative set up, and carried out policies by French officials without any real consultation with Africans. African societies were made into districts and traditional authorities considered not subservient were deposed and replaced without due regard. French colonies in general and of course Mali, remained under the control of conservative elements and military force.

Mali gained independence from the French in 1960 and has since then witnessed certain political developments. Though considered a relatively poor country, with about 15.8 Million population, out of which about 64% are said to be living below poverty line. Mali’s immediate post colonial history shows that between 1960 and 1991, the country remained under the control of one political party and military dictatorship. This was seen to have led to the informalisation of state institutions by corrupt elites, which affected and politicized not only the military in Mali, but also other state security agencies in the country, leading to further weakening of the Malian state. It was only in 1992 that democratic rule returned to Mali, and at that time the country did not have any credible foundation for democratic governance, nor did it have any democratic institutions in place. However, between 1992 and 2012, the country had become a reference point in democratic governance by the international community, especially within the West African sub-region.

Mali’s leader, Ahmadu Toure who came to power in 1991, through a military coup, handed over power to a democratically elected government in 1992 when Alpha Omer Konare emerged as the civilian president in the 1992 elections. Ahmadu Toure again joined politics in 2002 and succeeded in winning the elections in the same year, for another term

again in the 2007 elections. It was while the country was about to hold another round of elections in 2012, that a rebellion was declared in the northern part of the country by a group known as the Tuaregs, under the name of the National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA). The cities of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu, often considered as the areas of the Azawad were taken over by the rebels. In the past, several efforts had been made toward creating a single state for the semi nomadic Tuareg group which is scattered across the Sahel region to places like Libya, Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Niger. Mali's government since independence appears to have been under the control of the settled Africans, and successive governments had tried to deal with the cultural differences that existed between the group and the Tuaregs. The Tuaregs generally felt isolated from political power, and at the same time felt deprived of certain basic rights by the Malian government. As a result of these grievances, two successive revolts were launched by the group in 1962 and 1964 respectively, which brought about a division and clear confrontation between the group and the Malian authorities. The two revolts were violently suppressed by the Malian authorities, but led to the migration of many Tuaregs of Mali origin into various countries within the Sahel region.

The rebellion of 17th January, 2012 by the Tuaregs and the MNLA saw the driving out of the Malian forces from the North and its occupation by the various rebel groups that collaborated and fought the Malian authorities together. The two other groups which are radical Islamists in nature include Al-Qaida in the Maghreb (AQIM) and the Ansardine, whose ambition is the Islamisation of Northern Mali. Obviously the objectives of the two Islamist groups differ from that of the MNLA, which is fighting for certain basic rights and general marginalization of the Tuaregs in the affairs of the Malian government. And as such soon after the takeover of the Northern part of Mali, the two groups pushed out the MNLA and took control of the Northern cities and immediately imposed and declared the region to be under Shariah or Islamic law.

Mean while, the success with which the rebels took over the Northern part of the country led to serious criticism of the Malian government's failure to counter the insurgency, particularly within the military. This was seen to have triggered a military coup, part of the Malian army tended to blame the civilian government's response to the rebellion which was seen to have exposed the weakness of the Malian state. The 22 March, 2012 coup ousted the government of Ahmadu Toure and replaced it with a military regime under

Captain Ahmadu Sango. The coup in Mali was condemned by the ECOWAS and the international community in general and led to a resolve to intervene in the Mali conflict, particularly by the ECOWAS, the regional body in West Africa that has an established mechanism for peace and conflict resolution since the establishment of the ECOMOG peace keeping force during the Liberian, Sierra Leone, and Niger crises. The body was initially involved in mediation efforts between the rebel groups and the civilian administration in Mali prior to the coup. ECOWAS had made efforts to broker a peace deal through its council of Ministers and had met with the rebel groups with a view to some kind of settlement. ECOWAS responded to the coup with a set of sanctions against the new government in Mali. Under these sanctions, Mali was suspended from the regional body as a member, and this included travel ban within the West African region, and all Ambassadors of ECOWAS states were withdrawn from Mali, and at the same time all borders with ECOWAS states were closed. Thereafter the military junta stepped down and an interim administration took over. And it was the interim administration that requested for the intervention of France, following continued rebel advance to the capital, Bamako.

1. 2 Research question, Argument and Hypothesis

This PhD dissertation aims at evaluating and analyzing the conflict in Mali, with a particular focus on the intervention in the 2012 conflict by France. Mali is considered an important country in the West African sub-region where it is playing an important role in the regional integration process under the ECOWAS. The dissertation is projected to answer why France intervened in Mali? Despite the fact that a UN resolution had authorized the deployment of an African led force under the AU and the ECOWAS, given the fact that France had been reluctant to intervene in the Central African Republic in the past until recently. It was found extremely important to understand the actual motives of France in Mali, if it had declined to intervene in other places, why did it accept without any hesitation to intervene in Mali? It is only by such inquiry that we can be able to understand the reasons behind the intervention by Paris, and grasp the Tuareg issue in Mali. As a matter of fact such inquiry is valid and may likely get us to an understanding of the Tuareg problem in Mali, as well as other problems with regards to the instability in the country. Could the intervention have been politically or economically motivated or otherwise? In essence, the intervention can be viewed from two perspectives; the French perspective,

which can be explained in terms of security threat to French economic interests not only in Mali but also in neighboring states like Niger, where France is seen to have invested heavily in various sectors of its economy, and the Malian perspective, which is explained in terms of the weakness of the Malian state and the eminent threat posed by the rebel groups, and the inability of the state to counter the offensive of the rebel groups which threatened stability in the region and the need to avoid what Paris termed as the emergence of a terrorist state in the Sahel region. No single factor or reason is sufficient enough to stand as the sole reason or explanation for the intervention by Paris, but that an analysis of the two perspectives is likely to reveal why Paris was prompted into quick action to rescue Bamako.

The researcher holds the view that the French intervention may have been triggered by several factors, and that no single factor is sufficient enough to be held as the sole reason for the intervention by France. Despite the various claims by different writers and scholars, whose various claims may equally hold true, but a careful observation of the sequence of events that culminated in the intervention by Paris would lead to the hypothesis that “The intervention was a combination of different factors which can be viewed from two different perspectives, namely; the French and Malian Perspectives.” The French perspective can be explained in terms of the security threat the situation in Mali posed to French economic interests not only in Mali but the entire Sahel region. Whereas the Malian perspective is seen from the weakness of Mali as a state and its inability to deal with the offensive of the rebel groups, and as explained by Paris, there was the need to avoid the emergence of a terrorist state, it became necessary to help restore the territorial integrity of Mali as a state. Imperial and economic motives may have prompted Paris to intervene, however this cannot stand as the main factor, given the fact that there were genuine concerns regarding the internal situation in Mali, and a request from the Malian President for Paris to take action. So it may be safe to assume that the internal situation in Mali provided the French with an opportunity to intervene and in the process took its security and strategic economic interests into consideration or, those imperial motives may have motivated France to intervene in the Mali conflict and in the process protect its economic interests in the Sahel region. For, if imperial reasons alone are taken, then, the intervention would have taken place with or without the conflict. Internal situation within France was also seen to play a role in the intervention, and domestic political and security reasons may

have led Paris to take the decision to intervene in the Mali conflict. As mentioned from the beginning, the French intervention can be viewed from two perspectives; the French perspective consisting of the factors mentioned above, and the weakness of the Malian state which jeopardized the security of a region where Paris is seen to have made significant economic investment, there by prompting a quick response from Paris to the request of the Malian authorities regarding the Tuareg challenge. This research it is expected will further help provide an understanding and analysis how foreign influence is sometimes shaping the patterns of conflicts especially within the African continent.

1.3 Theoretical Framework

International Relations theories such as Realism and Liberalism were conceived and constructed based upon the Westphalian world order system, where states are seen as the units of analysis and threats are conceived in state centric military terms. The international system is also characterized by cooperation and conflict among existing states; it is a system that depends on sovereignty of political units, territoriality and non intervention. However, overtime the Westphalian system came to be challenged, as it was observed that many parts of the world did not reflect the Westphalian model, particularly among the third world countries. The 21st century saw a period where threats to security were coming from weak or failing states, or even from non state actors within states. International Relations theories under the Westphalian model perceive threats as coming mainly from aggressive powerful states. It is particularly for this reason that many concepts and theories evolved to explain the situation in many parts of Africa and the third world which International relations theories sometimes cannot fully explain. In this research Robert Jackson's theory of negative sovereignty is being applied to explain the situation in Mali.

Most studies conducted on African states were seen to have employed the use of other theories such as sovereignty theory, conflict theory, modernization or dependency theories, as well as other concepts such as the failed states or weak states theory, which is sometimes also referred to as negative sovereignty, which was coined by Robert Jackson. Robert Jackson's work was seen as a milestone in the failed states debate. The failed states theory or concept has been used to analyze many issues and conflict affecting many third world countries that have defied any explanation using any of the international relations theories.

A careful empirical study of the Mali conflict and the intervention of the French, will reveal that the weakness of the Malian state and the threat to its security, which is coming not from another state, but within and from non state actors such as AQIM or Al-Qaida in the Maghreb, Ansardine and the Tuaregs or the MNLA, led to the intervention of the French, to help restore the territorial integrity of the Malian state from rebels that have succeeded in taking control of the northern part of the country and were advancing towards the capital city, Bamako. As correctly observed in the hypothesis, the intervention by France is viewed from two perspectives, the French, and the Malian perspectives, which is based on the weakness of the state. But the French perspective is dependent upon the Malian perspective, because whatever reason or intention or motives the French had, without the failing security situation in Mali, the intervention would not have taken place or there would have been no reason for any intervention. It is for this reason that the “failed/ weak state” theory, known also as “negative sovereignty” theory or concept was considered. It was thought that the theory would help explain very clearly the reasons for the French intervention as well as the general situation in Mali.

The weak or failed state is generally described as a state where the central government has a poor capacity to control public order within its territory, is unable to control its borders consistently, cannot reliably maintain viable public institutions or services, and is vulnerable to extra constitutional domestic challenges. Other indicators of state failure are poor levels of economic performance, human welfare, economic distribution and levels of conflict. The government is completely unable to maintain public service, institutions or authority, and that central control over territory does not exist and implies that central state authority and control do not de facto exist. The failed state or negative sovereignty theory or concept relies on historical perspective and sees colonization and decolonization as shaping the structure of African states. Jackson defined negative sovereignty as having a government not capable of the aspects of governing, and noted that pressure from the international community after the second world war to decolonize the colonies led to quick independence of many African states and this according to Jackson did not give the newly formed African states a good foundation to govern from a position of positive sovereignty.

There have been several arguments with regards to weak states or failed states and what distinguishes these states from other normal states. Most states that are considered either weak or fragile or at worst failed states are considered to have somehow experienced

conflicts. It is believed or argued that conflict itself can create weak states and that weak authority most at times creates conflict. As such the nature and causes of weakness or fragility of states is considered to be generally related to theories about causes and nature of different conflicts, just as we have tried to use the negative sovereignty theory of Robert Jackson to explain the present conflict in Mali. It should be noted however that Jackson's theory tries to explain weakness and fragility of states particularly in Africa in general, and this we will return to after discussing the perspectives of other scholars with regards to causes and nature of fragility or weakness of states.

Many studies carried out tend to suggest that several factors may have led to the emergence of weak or fragile states across the globe. Among the various factors are; economic and structural factors, which tended to indicate a co-relation between low levels of economic development and fragility or weakness of states. It is argued here that the strength and basis of the economy of a state in terms of its diversification, the historical patterns of its economic growth, openness and levels of direct foreign investments are always considered when assessing the weakness or strength of any state. According to the O.E.C.D low levels of economic production which is characterized by low levels of agricultural productivity and less investment in manufacturing are considered to be the main causes of weakness or fragility of states¹². Again natural resources and unearned state income are considered when explaining reasons for weakness and fragility in structural and economic terms. The "Rentier state model" argues that natural resources wealth at times make democracies unable to work, as it removes the need for states to make bargains or pacts that support social contract, but rather encourage the politics of patronage. Others argue that natural resources wealth leads to conflict over the control of resources. Again others see states with resources as likely to be more stable than states without resources. It is however generally argued that not having natural resources endowments may actually lead to weakness or fragility of states.

Similarly, other factors identified to have been responsible for the weakness of states or fragility are political and institutional factors. Here issues of institutional multiplicity are considered the main problem facing many states. Many states are seen as having diverse and competing claims to power, between formal states and informal institutions. It is

¹² Claire McLoughlin, "Topic Guide on Fragile States", Governance and Social Development Resource Center, University of Birmingham, UK, pp 16-19.

argued that the formal state institutions are seen to be weakened or operated in accordance with informal competing rules from traditional authorities, warlords, patronage networks as well as norms and customs. Chabal and Daloz also argue that neo-patrimonialism has undermined the functions of institutions in formal political system in states facing weakness or fragility, especially among African states. According to the duo, the inefficiency and weakness of states has been profitable to the African elites and that political elites bereft of the means of their patrimonial legitimacy, will seek the resources that the informalisation of politics will provide; which brings about more disorder and probably violence. Many other researches appeared to have focused on the relations between elite incentives and forms of political order created by the elites when discussing or analyzing the weakness or fragility of states. The notion here is that states will only be stable if the incentives of rulers and citizens are to preserve order. R. Bates argues that order only prevails when both rulers and citizens choose to employ their respective capabilities to the creation and maintenance of wealth and that the state exists when these choices form equilibrium. It was also noted that the transition between leaders can also be destabilizing in weak or fragile situations. It was reported that uncertainty and fears regarding the future arising from transitions could result in the emergence of nationalist, ethnic or similar populist ideologies and the possibility of violence. Elections are seen to sometimes become fields of violent contests that most at times result in instability¹³.

Other factors responsible for weakness or fragility of states include social and international factors which tend to look at the weakness or fragility of states from a state-society relations perspective. According to Migdal, the central of state-society relations are that; the nature of states are inseparable from the nature of societies, and that the emergence of a strong capable state can occur only with tremendous concentration of social control to the state. Migdal maintains that the state's struggle for social control is characterized by conflict between state leaders who seek to mobilize people and resources, and impose a single set of rules and other social organizations applying different rules in parts of the society. He argues that the distribution of social control in a society that emerges as a result

¹³ Ibid, pp 20-22.

For more details see R Bates, "The Logic of State Failure: Learning from Late Century Africa, Conflict Management and Peace Science". www.gsdrc.org/go/display. Also see Chabal and Daloz, "Whither the State?, Chapter 1 in Africa Works: Political Disorder as Political Instrument", African Issues, James Curry, Oxford, 1999.

of such a conflict, usually determines if a state will remain weak or strong¹⁴. Again social exclusion based on gender, ethnicity, class and religion has for quite a long time been considered among many critical factors responsible for weakness or fragility of states. When certain groups appear to be excluded from the state, there is likelihood that these groups will challenge the state. The inability or failure to manage such challenges through negotiation may lead these groups to have recourse to violence. As such, denial or violations of rights based on social exclusion could lead to weakness or fragility of states.

In a situation where the civil society is weak and lacks the capability to act as a check on the accountability of leaders, such has the implications of creating conditions favorable to weakness or fragility of states. And on the international front, factors related to the international political economy readily come to the front when addressing issues related to weakness of states or fragility. Factors such as the legacy of colonialism, international government/corporate interests are seen to create or worsen situations of weakness of states or fragility. It was argued by many scholars including C. Clapham that historically, colonialism had undermined the basis of state legitimacy and disrupted the formation of social contract in Africa in particular. It is also reported that weak states could not withstand external shocks due to the fact that they lacked the capacities to control the negative effects on their economies and their citizens. It was further argued that climate change also has the potential to overstretch the adaptive capacities of weak or fragile states, which could lead to mass displacement, destabilization and the possibility of the outbreak of violence¹⁵.

Underlying all the factors highlighted above which are considered to be responsible or explaining the causes of the weakness of states or their fragility, is Robert Jackson's theory of negative sovereignty, which appears to have captured the deeper or root causes of the weakness of states, and appears to have offered and captured all the explanations and factors highlighted above, explaining the various aspects of the causes of weaknesses of states or fragility. The theory of Robert Jackson appears to have considered the issue of sovereignty in Africa especially from a historical perspective. Jackson appeared to have

¹⁴ Ibid, pp 23-26.

For more details see J.S Migdal, "Strong Societies and Weak States: State Society Relations in the Third World", Princeton University Press, 1988.

¹⁵ Ibid, pp 23-26.

For detail on this see C.Clapham, "The Challenge to the State in a Globalised World", Development and Change, Vol 33, Issue 5, 2002.

focused his observation on colonialism and decolonization, particularly within the African continent. Robert Jackson's two articles "Quasi States, Dual Regimes and Neo-Classical theory" which appeared in 1986, and "Negative Sovereignty in Sub-Saharan Africa" which appeared in 1987, all appeared to have been focused on the nature of sovereignty in Africa states in the colonial period. In these articles Jackson argued as mentioned previously that the peace negotiations in Westphalia saw the emergence of new standards to define European states and actually led to the idea of statehood and that of self-determination, and ruling over defined territories under the principle of non-interference in the activities and interests of other states.

According to Robert Jackson, the concept of sovereignty revolves around legal theory, international law and international institutions. And that sovereignty was basically based in Europe and that the concept itself had been used interchangeably since other factors such as technology, globalization, conflict, colonization and decolonization have come to challenge the very meaning of the concept of sovereignty. According to Jackson the political value of sovereignty cannot be undermined and that certain factors come to play when sovereignty is achieved domestically and internationally, which Jackson identifies as justice and economic welfare. Sovereignty according to Jackson is also often accompanied by other consequences that are sometimes usually unforeseen, which appear in the form of a sudden civil and socio-economic problems which Jackson defined as consequences of what he called "Negative Sovereignty". Jackson saw the African state's way to sovereignty as having undergone an unstable history. Jackson took a look at the 1885 law of constitution, and how European powers created and defined the borders of African states, and argued that under such circumstances it was difficult for African states to attain what he called "Positive Sovereignty". Jackson outlined about two main reasons why it was impossible for African states to attain such positive sovereignty, which include; the conditions necessary for attaining sovereignty which Jackson argues were generally lacking or in any case absent. These conditions according to Jackson include; the ideology of the international society, cultural and economic conditions which were absent in most of the African states. The second reason according to Jackson had to do with the situation that many African states found themselves, and according to him the African states were basically owned by their various colonizing states that according to him did not have any interest in promoting sovereignty and independence in the manner it was happening in

Europe. Jackson argued that it was not until after World War II that many African states became independent and had the opportunity to make their constitutive rules and sovereignty¹⁶.

One of the problems identified by Jackson in the making of post colonial Africa, apart from the need to create international legitimacy for the newly emerging states, was the very framework within which African states were created. Here Jackson readily identified two frameworks as models for the new African states. They include the “territorial nation” and the “cultural nation”. According to Jackson, the creation of the cultural nation which would have actually reflected the cultural diversity of African states became basically impossible, and was considered expensive and as such ruled out in favor of the territorial nation. Jackson argues that the territorial nation created by the colonizing powers which tried to establish a common culture in the newly emerging African states could not be sustained after independence, since the African states in reality were multi-cultural in nature. And it is from here that Jackson tried to make a distinction between what he called positive and negative sovereignty. Positive sovereignty according to Jackson is a situation whereby a new state comes into existence when a community acquires not a momentarily, but with a reasonable probability of performance, the essential qualities and characteristics of what makes a state. Usually an organized government, defined territory and independence is what Jackson considers as the required characteristics that make a state and which qualifies positive sovereignty. Negative sovereignty on the other hand, which Jackson tended to associate with sub-Saharan African states, is having a government that is not capable of the acts of governing. Jackson had argued as previously mentioned at the beginning that pressure from the international society after WW II, forced the European powers to grant independence to many African states. Such process according to Jackson happened so quickly and could not provide the African states with the good foundation required from a point or position of positive sovereignty. Jackson was of the opinion that positive sovereignty takes a very long time to implement, and that the colonies differed in nature and composition, as well as in their capability for adaptation to the changes brought about by independence¹⁷.

¹⁶ Jackson Robert H, “Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World”. I: International Organization nr. 4, p 523.

¹⁷ Jackson Robert H, “Negative Sovereignty in Sub-Saharan Africa. I: Review of International Studies nr. 4,10. 1986, p 250.

Jackson further argued that most of the colonies were not organized by the European colonizers in a proper manner as they organized their respective governments in Europe. The European officials according to Jackson were usually very few in number and were usually concerned with their own benefits and the interests of their nations of origin. According to him(Jackson), the transfer of authority in the decolonization process to the indigenous people had a major consequence with regards to implementation. Robert Jackson argued that the indigenous population lacked any experience, and that there wasn't any careful plan on the ground for the independence of the colonies by the colonizing powers, but that independence was the result of the rapid changes in the international system. Jackson maintains that the lack of experience of the African people in governance and administration has led to the collapse of many states among the emerging independent states in the post colonial period. Jackson was of the opinion that that the colonial period has fostered a ruling that did not have the capability of continuing or creating the necessary foundation required for positive sovereignty and the result has been the weakness, fragility and eventual failure of the many emerging African states in the post colonial era¹⁸. And as seen Jackson's theory appeared to have captured and looked at weakness or fragility of states from its very roots, and did not just try to look at it from the surface as many scholars tried to do. Most scholars appeared to have focused on the immediate causes or factors, ignoring the root causes of weakness or fragility of states, and if observed seriously it will appear very clearly that Jackson had captured all the discussion and opinion expressed by other scholars regarding weakness, fragility or failure of states. In fact he differed only in the sense that he provided a deeper explanation to the reasons or factors responsible for weakness or failure of states from the very foundation of these states.

A careful study of the economic structure of Mali as a country will likely reveal its weakness and fragility economically and structurally. Mali has been described as one of the poorest countries in the world, with a population of 15 million people, a GDP of 10.31 billion in 2012 and a GDP growth of -1.2% and an inflation rate of 5.4% . According to reports of the world development indicators released by the world bank in 2014, Mali's GDP between the year 2000- 2012 witnessed a growth of 5.2%, 4.0% between 2012- 2013 and 5.2% between 2013- 2014. The country also witnessed a gross savings of 8.5% of GDP in 2012, and an adjusted net savings of -10.8 of GNI in 2012. The country holds a

¹⁸ Ibid, p 526.

current account balance of -12.6% of GDP in 2012, a central government cash surplus or deficit of -2.5 of GDP in 2012, a growth in consumer price index of 5.4% and a broad money of 32.2% of GDP in 2012.

The Malian economy had gone through several reforms in the 1970's, which saw the economy transform from a state economy to an open private economy. However economic growth was only seen to have improved around 1994, after a period of contraction in the 1980's which was marked by an average GDP growth rate of -1.2% between 1980 and 1986. Between 1987 and 1993, the growth of the Malian economy was recorded at 3%.. The GDP Per capita was seen to have risen from \$ 240 in 1994 to \$380 in 2004, with an average increase of 4%. Following the devaluation in 1994, the economy appeared to have recorded more growth and was recorded at 5.4% in 2006. Between 2005 and 2007, Mali's GDP growth appeared to have witnessed a decline, in 2007 the GDP was 3.2% as against 5.3% in 2006 and 6.1% in 2005. In 2008 and 2009, GDP growth was 5% and 4.5%, while in 2010 and 2011, growth was recorded at 5.8% and 2.7% according the Global finance magazine country data on Mali. Mali ranked 134 in the human development index in 2002, and in 2011. Mali was ranked 175 out 187 countries on the human development index which provides an overview of indicators such as life expectancy, education and income levels. Infrastructural development that supports production related to energy and agricultural development remains a challenge, just as the economy remained stagnant due to decline in agricultural production as a result of poor climatic condition. The entire Sahel region has been constantly facing drought, which has led to food insecurity and migration among its population. The above analysis clearly shows how weak Mali as a country is economically.

And the Malian economy appears to be largely dependent on activities related to agriculture which represent about 40% of GDP and three quarter of export revenues. Agricultural production is mainly centered on local food commodities such as sorghum, rice, millet and cotton which is considered a cash crop and usually grown in the south of the country. Malian agriculture is seen to rely mainly on human labor and remains not mechanized, and this has usually resulted in low output. Small farmers are seen to be engaged in farming and usually sell about 15-20% of their produce. Cotton production and profitability is usually determined by the world market fluctuations. In the northern part, livestock breeding is seen as the main pre-occupation, and most economic activities appear

to be concentrated in the areas irrigated by the Niger River. Most industrial activities in the country also appear to be centered on agricultural activities.

The growth rate of agriculture seems to have been on a decline at an estimated level of 2.6%. The decline and weakness of the agricultural sector in Mali has been a major source of concern, especially considering the fact that the low income household who constitute the majority depend on agriculture for their livelihood. The growth of the agricultural sector annually is seen to represent about 20% of GDP growth, and it usually comes from rice and cotton farming. Rice and cotton are seen to represent about 20% of agricultural value added, and usually have an annual average growth rate of between 7 and 4.5%. Other crops which include cereals and livestock represent 35 and 28% of agricultural value added, and appear to have witnessed an increase rate of 1.6% in cereals and 2.9% in livestock according to a World Bank report. The weakness in the agricultural sector is also seen to further expose the weakness of Mali as a country, since most activities in the country are centered on agriculture. Food security remains an important feature of strong standing nations or states, and is critical to the survival of any state.

Apart from agriculture, gold also accounts for a large part of Mali's income as a country. Mali is to be the world's 16th largest producer of gold according to reports of the gold facts. Mali produced an estimated 48.8 tons of gold or 1.63% of the world's total production in 2011, which was valued at \$2.3 billion. Gold is said to constitute a large percentage of Mali GDP more than any nation, an estimated 18.98 and accounts for 75% of the country's foreign earnings. In the year 2010 projected an increase in gold production to up to 52.2 according to a Reuters report in December 2009. Gold is said to account for about 15% of Mali's GDP.

In terms of infrastructural development, Mali's infrastructure networks appear to be a reflection of the population distribution. The distribution of Mali's economy and demography, which appears spatial, particularly between the north and south of the country, which differ greatly, while the south has a higher population density, and is where most of the nation's natural resources are to be found, as well as economic activities. The north on the other hand has important tracts of land that is considered important for agricultural production, but such land has not been fully exploited. As a result of this marked differences, the density of transport, power and ICT infrastructure is more concentrated in the south than in the north. Mali is said to have one of the most

spatially developed infrastructure networks on the whole of the African continent. Apart from a few roads that link to certain scattered mining sites and irrigation areas, northern Mali is said to be an inaccessible desert. The entire country appears to depend heavily on regional corridors and regional infrastructure for transport and water development. About three regional international trade corridors link Mali to the sea, and the country depends on the ports of neighboring states for its imports and its administrative capacity remains weak. Regional railway networks remain disconnected in the region, making railway interconnection difficult, and at the same time appears to have given road corridors high importance. Mali plans road regional connectivity which is presently absent, the country planned the construction of a 2 lane paved quality regional roads and a national connectivity 1 lane paved quality roads. Mali aims to construct rural roads that will give access to about 14% agricultural production, which at present are lacking and have stagnated agricultural growth in the country. And in the area of power, Mali is a member of the West African Power Pool (WAPP), but is yet interconnected with other countries apart from Senegal, and may require to generate 284 mw of electricity to achieve about 39% of internal electricity coverage which currently stands at 13% coverage, which also clearly shows the weakness of Mali as a state considering the importance of power to the industrialization of the country and its economic growth. Mali has also developed infrastructure related to ICT, and has developed a fiber optic network that is connected to the SAT sub-marine cables at two different locations in Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire. The country aims to achieve universal access to GSM signal and public broadband facilities.

However, for Mali as a country to meet its infrastructure needs and meet up with other developing countries, it must be able must be able to meet up with the targets it has outlined for itself, some of which were highlighted above in various areas. In meeting these set targets in the areas of roads, power, ICT and water resources, it is estimated that the country would require about \$ 1 billion dollar per year to finance its infrastructure needs through 2015. The water and power sectors are estimated to gulp about \$300 million each, while transportation and ICT may gulp about \$236 million and \$178 million respectively. The costs related to the water sector, is in line with the millennium development goals target for water and sanitation globally, while that of the power sector is so as to meet up with 284 mw of new electricity generation to meet 39% coverage of the country which currently stands at 13%. However, Mali's infrastructure spending needs are considered too

high for the country's GDP, and would cost about 19% of the country's annual GDP for a decade.

Mali as a state has been faced with political instability since it gained independence from the French in 1960, and had survived previous revolts from the Tuareg group in the past. The recent rebellion further confirmed the weakness of Mali as a state and made evident the existence of virtually all the symptoms associated with state failure or weak sovereignty, after it failed to counter or repel the attack by the rebel groups within its territory and the Malian authorities had to seek the intervention of France and the international community to be able to restore its territorial integrity. The rebels had clearly pushed the Malian army out of its northern part and taken control and established and declared Islamic law in that area. It was very clear that total control and authority over the entire territory had been lost prior to the intervention. And for this, Mali fits perfectly the description of a weak or failed state above, and such failure or weakness led to the intervention by Paris and the international community.

However, Jackson's Negative Sovereignty Theory appeared to have received much criticism, particularly from Euro-centric writers who tried to view his work as particularly against western ideology and very critical of colonialism. Despite such criticism, a careful study of the works of other scholars especially with regards to developments within the African continent will seem suggest that Jackson's theory and argument on the nature of sovereignty among African states can still stand. Important works carried out by reputable scholars on Africa like Christopher Clapham and Mahmood Mamdani among several others will provide an opportunity for further analysis of Jackson's theory.

Christopher Clapham in his work titled "The Challenge to the State in a Globalised World" which was published in 2002 observed that the threat of state collapse unsurprisingly arises in those parts of the world which the preconditions of state formation and maintenance were most uncertain.¹⁹ Clapham identified 3 main problems associated with the idea of statehood particular within the African continent. The first among these according to him is the readiness of states to go to war, and the second he identified as the price to be paid for a stable international order by state, which he saw with a high level of

¹⁹ Christopher Clapham, "The Challenge to the State in a Globalised World", Development and Change, Institute of Social Studies, Blackwell Publishers, 2002. p777.

repression. And the third he identified as the cost of maintaining a state and questioned if the world could actually afford states in the first place. Maintaining states here is not just in economic terms alone, but along with the social implications associated with such maintenance. Clapham observed that state building requires a high level social capital and interpersonal trust and the capacity to create institutions that are autonomous from the individuals that run them.

Clapham appeared to have based his observation on the post-colonial states and first observed that the creation of a European dominated world order and the ideology of progress in which state formation was key, was not made with the consent of the indigenous African population or in any case their voices did not matter. He also observed that states after their creation initially produced results that justified their creation and existence and were initially cherished by the elites that took over from the European colonizers. Clapham noted that the eagerness with which these elites adopted the ideology of the sovereign state appeared to have obscured the difficulties they were to face in implementing the ideology in the newly founded states. According to him the ideology of state power that post colonial rulers adopted appeared to have increased the demands on states and at the same time widened the gap between promise and performance. Clapham further noted that the third world states had been expected from the start to take responsibilities that they were ill equipped to meet and concluded that certain specific cases of state collapse were to be found either in the make up of the states or in the conduct of the rulers, who in certain instances are seen to facilitate the collapse of their respective states through their conducts²⁰. It was also noted in the study that the moral demands placed on the post-colonial states were equivalent to that of the industrialised world, and was viewed unfairly, since state building happens over time and the third world states couldnt have matched the bigger powers interms of expectations with regards to growth and development.

From Clapham ' s observations one can visibly see what Jackson outlined in his theory as the conditions necessary for attaining positive sovereignty, which he said were absent in colonial Africa, such as the ideology of the international society, inability of the

²⁰ Ibid, p 781.

Also see Christopher Clapham, "From Liberation Movement to Government, Past Legacies and the Challenges of Transition in Africa" for more detail on the challenges facing post colonial Africa.

colonizers to promote genuine positive sovereignty, and the lack of experience with regards to governance from the elites that took over from the colonial government. Of importance is also Jackson's argument that attaining positive sovereignty takes time, and here Clapham appears to have taken the same position especially when he said that "Third world states were expected from the start to take a range of responsibilities that they were ill equipped to meet". This statement if well interpreted means that not only did this states need to time but also adequate preparation, skills and knowledge of the art of governance and the system in general.

Other equally important works that tried to explain the developments and challenges facing the African continent and third world nations in general include those of Mahmood Mamdani. One of such works is titled "Political Identity, Citizenship and Ethnicity in Post Colonial Africa", as well as his celebrated "Saviours and Survivors: Darfur, Politics and the War on Terror". The two works were published in 2005 and 2009 respectively and appeared to have steered up a debate about the actual challenges and cause of violence across the African continent. While the former focuses on not the root cause of instability in post colonial Africa, the latter takes a look at the actual cause of the violence in Sudan.

Mamdani's work on political identity, citizenship and ethnicity in post colonial Africa tried to explain political violence from a cultural dimension. Mamdani argued that the political economy as a framework did not provide any explanation to the violence that is erupting in post colonial Africa. Mamdani noted that rather it seemed only to have provided explanation to the violence that appear to arise only as a result of clashes between market based identities. Mamdani appeared to have agreed with the idea of state collapse in Africa, he however argued that it was specifically what remained of the institutions of colonial rule that are in serious crisis and appear to be collapsing. He disagreed with the response that state failure or collapse had received from scholars and policy makers and particularly disagreed with the Pan Africanist point view. The Pan Africanists had tried to explain state collapse or failure as arising mainly from the crisis of colonial boundaries. Mamdani argued that all borders were artificial and not only those of Africa and saw the

solution to the political violence facing post colonial Africa not in the re-drawing of colonial borders, but rather in addressing the institutional political legacy of colonial rule²¹.

Mamdani tried to look at the colonial state from a legal perspective and observed that legal distinctions are different from others, and are enforced by the state and then reproduced by institutions that structure citizen's participation within a state. The works traced the issues of race and ethnicity to the colonial state which tried to make or create a distinction between the two. Races according to Mamdani were governed through the civil laws under the colonial administration, whereas ethnicities were governed through the customary laws. And from here Mamdani again raised the issue of indigene and non indigenes, and according to him the colonial state had made a distinction between the two which appeared to have raised the issue of rights and observed that rights belonged to the non indigenes, since indigenes had been confined to the customary laws.

Mamdani outlined three main problems associated with post colonial Africa. The first according to him was the growing tendency for indigeneity to become the litmus test for rights in the post colonial state. And the second according to him is that the colonial state was built upon this very foundation. He observed that indigeneity has been turned into a test for justice and entitlements in the post colonial state. The third problem identified by Mamdani is the growing tendency to identify a colonially constructed regime of customary laws with Africa's authentic tradition²². Ethnic clashes according to Mamdani appear to be more and more about rights, rights to land and to a native authority that can power those identified with it as ethnically indigenous. Mamdani gave example of the federal character arrangement in Nigeria, where the quota system is used in allocating resources and positions in government through the various state governments. Mamdani argued that democracy should seek to pay more attention on how to govern rather than who should govern the institutional identities by which they organise different categories of citizens. Mamdani suggested that the only way forward for post colonial African states was the reconsideration of the institutions inherited from colonial rule. And in doing so, the post colonial states must re-define political identity, political rights and political justice in

²¹ Mahmood Mamdani, "Political Identity, Citizenship and Ethnicity in Post Colonial Africa", Arusha Conference, New Frontiers of Social Policy, December 12-15, 2005, p 4.

²² Ibid, pp 9-10.

For more details see Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*.

relation to indigeneity. Mamdani sees these issues as the main set backs to progress and development in post colonial Africa, and that unless they are redefined it is difficult for post colonial Africa to make any meaningful progress.

Mamdani's other work titled "Saviors and Survivors; Darfur, Politics and the War on Terror" which was published in 2009, though heavily criticised appeared to have tried to provide an explanation to the violence in the Darfur region of Sudan at that time. Mamdani in this work appeared to have specifically tried to get to the root of the violence that broke out in Darfur which was explained as genocide by many writer. This is despite the fact that in this work Mamdani did not appear to have shared the opinion of other writers with regards to the genocide claim. In this work Mamdani noted that the violence in Darfur was a consequence of colonial rule. According to Mamdani, under colonial rule the British to re-introduce tribal and ethnic identity as a means of ensuring the effectiveness of the "Native Administration" through which they governed the Africans²³.

Here also, though not within a particular framework, Mamdani's two works did not appear to be in conflict with Jackson's theory of negative sovereignty. especially if we consider the conditions outlined by Jackson for attaining positive sovereignty. The issues raised by Mamdani if viewed from the negative sovereignty lens will show convergence of ideas though not clearly stated by Mamdani. In Mamdani's first work on Political Identity, it would appear that the issue of re-defining colonial institutions are related to the causes of weaknesses of state if looked at carefully. The issues of state authority and control are at the centre of attaining what Jackson calls positive sovereignty. And if observed carefully also it is this that provides the legal framework and determines of how a state should structure and organise its citizens in the best way possible as to strengthen state authority and legitimacy that results in positive sovereignty. Also it is worthy to note the issues of ethnicity and indigeneity and compare with Jackson's argument about the Cultural and territorial nations in the making of post colonial Africa. In Mamdani's second work, it shows clearly Jackson's argument that the colonizers did not have the intention of actual promoting positive sovereignty in the respective colonies, and the British especially has been blamed of pursuing a policy of divide and rule in most of its colonies.

²³ Eric Reeves, "Compromising with Evil, An Archival History of Greater Sudan, 2007-2012, Annex VII: Review of Mahmood Mamdani's Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror, 2009, p 5.

Although many writer have rejected Mamdani' s thesis on Darfur, but the fact remains that the British have in many works past and present been blamed for this policy and it is considered amon g the negative effects of colonialism on the African continent. And so here also what we see is convergence of ideas with that of Jackson who accused the colonisers of not promoting true or positive sovereignty in the colonies.

1.4 Literature Review

There is no doubt that the rebellion by the Tuaregs in January 2012 had attracted the attention of the international community as a result of the danger it posed not just to Mali, but to the Sahel region and West Africa in general. The rebellion was given serious consideration and deep implications were foreseen, far beyond the Sahel and West African sub-region. No thesis or book has been written on the current situation in Mali, the resources available on the Mali conflict appeared mostly in newspaper articles and news in both the electronic and the print media. Though some scholarly articles are available, but most of these articles provide scanty material on the different aspects of the conflict, and this is partly because of the fact that the conflict is recent and still ongoing. Most of the literature available generally tended to provide background information about the conflict, the likely reasons for the rebellion, and the general situation in Mali. But of course many works had been conducted in the past regarding political development in Mali, as well as the previous rebellions by the same group, generally explaining the grievances and the reason for the rebellion of the group.

Some of the existing literature regarding the 2012 conflict that were consulted include articles written by General Olivier Tramad and Lt Col Phillipe Seigneur titled “ Early Lessons from France's Operation Serval in Mali”, David J. Francis, “Regional Impact of the Armed Conflict and French Intervention in Mali”, Bakare Sambe, “ The Crisis in Mali; Origins, Developments and Impact on the Sub-region”, Freedom C. Onuoha and Alex Thurston, “Franco-American Military Intervention in the Mali Crisis and Evolving Security Concerns”, Damien Helly, Camilla Rocca, “The Mali Crisis and Europe-Africa Relations”, Jean-Marie Fardeau and Keneth Roth, “Letter to the French President Hollande on the Situation in Mali”, Mortein Boas. Liv Elin Torheim, “Mali Unmasked: Resistance, Collusion, Collaboration” as well as Anour Boukhars “The Mali Conflict: Avoiding Past Mistakes”. Many reasons and arguments by different writers and scholars were advanced

regarding the roots of the conflict in Mali, with some writers saying that the conflict may have arose mainly as a result of the ineffective responses of the Mali government to the previous revolts by the Tuareg group. It is believed this negligence on the part of the government may have created a feeling and sense of marginalization in the psyche of the Tuaregs as a people²⁴. Yet another factor often imputed to the lingering and eventual outbreak of the rebellion has mainly to do with illegal activities like smuggling and drug business across the Sahel region. The emergence criminalism and Jihadism in the region as a result of weapons proliferation since the civil war in Algeria in the 90's tended to have further compounded the problem in Mali. At the same time, corruption within the Malian government seems to have rendered it weak and led to the undermining of popular faith in the political system by the citizens. Regional issues such as the Libyan war that led to mass movement of people and weapons across the Sahel countries were seen to have worsened matters, and especially after counter terrorism cooperation efforts between the Sahel states failed.²⁵ The intervention of France was somehow not deeply considered by many writers, even though a few saw a kind of neo-colonial disguise in the operation. However these groups of writers did not provide any evidence or analysis on how and why they suspect the intervention to be neo-colonial. But majority of writers appeared to have supported the French action in the various analysis of the Malian conflict.

The situation was seen to have particularly gone out of control after the Tuareg association, MNLA in league with about two jihadist groups took control of important cities in northern Mali and imposed an Islamic rule or the Shariah in that part of the country, over powering the Malian army²⁶. As a consequence, a military coup took place in Mali, ousting the civilian government of Traore and blaming it for inaction. The Interim regime was faced with the threat of the Jihadists, and therefore sought the assistance of the ECOWAS to deal with the threat posed by the jihadist groups. Initially, the ECOWAS delegated the President of Burkina Faso the task to broker a peace deal, and was also considering military intervention should all negotiations fail. ECOWAS also forwarded the request of the Malian authorities for intervention to the United Nations Security Council, and by

²⁴ Bakary Sambe, "The Crisis in Mali: Origins, Developments and Impact on the Sub-region", KAS International Reports, December, 2012.p 119.

²⁵ Freedom C. Onuoha & Alex Thurston, "Franco-American Military Intervention in the Mali Crisis and Evolving Security Concerns", Aljazeera Center for Studies, 19 February, 2013.p2-3.

²⁶ Major General Olivier Tramond and Lt Col Phillipe Seigneur, "Early Lessons From France's Operation Serval in Mali", Army, June, 2013. P 41-43.

October, 2012, the UNSC adopted a resolution, 2071, authorizing ECOWAS and the African Union to develop a plan for military action in Mali and report after 45 days. Consequently, a meeting was held in Bamako with military experts from the African Union, UN, and Europe, and a blue print was produced for the deployment of about 3-4,000 troops to capture northern Mali from the rebels²⁷ after all efforts at negotiation appeared not to have produced any significant result, as the rebels refused to make any attempt to retreat from these captured cities, and were rather seen to further consolidate their control of that region in Mali.

However, before the deployment of the African led force into Mali, the forces of the French army intervened in the conflict on 11 January, 2013. French forces from bases in Chad, Ivory Coast and Senegal were dispatched to rescue Bamako from the rebel groups. Generally the intervention of France appeared controversial, given the fact that the UN had mandated an African led force to be deployed. And as such many have tried to find out the reasons why France intervened. This research is also seeking to establish the reason for the intervention of France in the Mali conflict. So the question is why did France intervene despite the fact the UNSC Resolution that warranted the intervention in Mali did in any way mandate France to carry out such operation? Many arguments and reasons have been advanced to explain the French intervention, some convincing, and others not. Some of the common reasons were that the African led force that resolutions 2071 and 2085 authorized, required more time to prepare and be deployed, whereas the rebel were constantly on the move sacking city after city, and advancing south towards the capital, Bamako. It was gathered that by 8 of January the rebels had taken over Konna and it was clear that nothing stopped them from taking over Bamako. For this, many argued that swift action was needed in order to rescue Bamako and stop the rebels from taking over the entire country, and yet the African led force was nowhere in sight. It was for this reason, and at that very moment that France moved in²⁸ The President of France was quoted justifying the intervention, saying that “France had no alternative but to intervene and prevent the emergence of a terrorist state that would have serious security repercussions for France and the West”. He generally tried to explain the necessity for the intervention in the absence of

²⁷ Freedom C. Onuoha & Alex Thurston, “Franco-American Military Intervention in the Mali Crisis and Evolving Security Concerns”, Aljazeera Center for Studies, 19 February, 2013.p 4-5.

²⁸ General Olivier Tramad & Lt Col Phillipe Seigneur, “Early Lessons From France’s Operation Serval in Mali”, Army, June 2013.p 42.

the African led force, in the circumstances; the eminent threat of taking over the country by the rebel Islamist groups. France further claimed that its actions were with the approval of the international community, including China and Russia as well as other African regional actors²⁹. France seemed to have legalized its military intervention in Mali from its historical ties with Mali, which it see as an obligation, and as such had to honor a request from the interim President of Mali, as the rebel groups approached Bamako³⁰. The French tried to defend this position, citing its refusal to intervene in the Central African Republic crisis, arguing that the Mali intervention was to prevent the emergence of a terrorist state in the Sahel region. The French Minister of Defense was quoted as saying “The threat is that a terrorist state will be created near Europe and France...we had to react before it was too late.”³¹ However, the intervention was seen to have helped booster the image of the French President, whose domestic rating was fast declining. The intervention was seen to have impacted on the Presidents political fortune, as well as the image of France internationally.³²

Several commentators have generally tried to interpret the actions of France as indicating the continuation of the country’s long tradition of military intervention in Africa, which is sometimes seen to be dictated by its national security and strategic interests under the Opaque Afrique tradition which President Hollande promised to end during his campaigns when he said “France will not need forces stationed in Africa.”The foreign policy of France here appears a bit controversial, considering that the country refused to send troops to Iraq in 2003, and withdrew troops from Afghanistan. Despite this, France is ever ready and willing to undertake even direct military action, once its national security and strategic interests were at stake. As a matter of fact, many have found the claim by the President of France that the intervention was to avoid the emergence of a terrorist state unbelievable. They generally tended to argue that the French intervention may have been primarily motivated by the desire of France to protect its national interest, which is basically economical, and within Mali and its neighboring states like Niger³³. The motive for the intervention was an attempt to stop the conflict from spilling over to Niger, which could

²⁹ David. J. Francis. “Regional Impact of the Armed Conflict and French Intervention in Mali”, Norwegian Peace Building Resource Center, April 2013.p 5.

³⁰ Ibid. p 5.

³¹ Ibid. p 5.

³² Ibid. p 5.

³³ Ibid.p6.

have an adverse effect on the mining activities of France in the country. France it is reported depends on uranium imports from Niger for its energy needs. France is considered to be the largest exporter of electricity, with an estimated income of about 3 Billion Euro annually from sales. France was producing 540.6 terawatt-hours (TWh) of electricity and 78.8% comes from nuclear power, which is considered the highest in the world. These nuclear plants are said to depend on uranium mines in Niger which are managed and owned by a French led consortium and operated on French interest. These and other reason combined to make the stability of Mali, and in essence Niger, an important part of French national security and strategic interest, hence the intervention in Mali.³⁴

This research aims to analyze the conflict in Mali, but with particular emphasis on the French intervention and seeks to explain the reason why France intervened in the Malian conflict, arguing that the intervention must be viewed from two basic perspectives, the French and the Malian perspectives. The perspective of the French can be seen from the deteriorating security situation in Mali which threatened French economic interests not only in Mali but across the Sahel region. Whereas the Malian perspective takes a look at the weakness of the Malian state and its inability to deal with the threat of the rebel groups, as well as to avoid what the French explained as the emergence of a terrorist state which was becoming eminent and which perhaps necessitated combination the request by the Malian President for Paris to take action and intervene in the conflict. And that no single reason or factor among those identified could be taken as the sole factor that has led to the French intervention. The research takes a further look into the various aspects of the conflict, such as the causes of the conflict, impact of the intervention, and peace building in post conflict Mali. As mentioned earlier most writers and scholars of the recent conflict did not provide any evidence or analysis on how and why they suspect the intervention to be neo-colonial in nature, and also no theory was employed to explain the situation in Mali. But majority of writers appeared to have supported the French action in the various analyses of the Malian conflict. In this research the negative sovereignty theory of Robert Jackson was used to explain the situation in Mali as shown in the theoretical framework part of the chapter.

³⁴ Ibid.p7.

1.5 Outline of the Research

Generally, the research is divided into five chapters; the introductory chapter covers the research question, research background, literature review, theoretical framework, as well as the hypothesis and the outline of the research.

The second chapter, which is titled “Land and people of Mali”, deals mainly with the history of Mali, from its pre-colonial past, through the period of colonial rule, as well as its post colonial history. The chapter from the beginning tried to look at the physical geography of Mali, the terrain, climate, rainfall and general weather conditions, with a view to providing or making an environmental assessment possible. The history of the ancient Mali Empire also featured in the same chapter, and was found extremely necessary to be discussed, especially considering the fact that Mali came to be known to the world as a result of its ancient history and the empire days. It was in the days of the empire and particularly during the reign of Mansa Kankan Musa that the Mali Empire not only reached its zenith, but also came to be known in the world. It was in fact Mansa Musa's famous pilgrimage to Mecca and his generosity with gold that first brought the Mali Empire to the attention of the world, and Europe in particular. It was following the pilgrimage that many European explorers and writers tried to reach Mali with a view to exploring the country. Mali until today is still blessed with gold deposits, as well as other important minerals, and is rated among the world's major producers of gold. And from this part, the French incursion into Mali and subsequent imposition of colonial rule was considered to be the next part of the chapter. This part tried mainly to look at the French colonial interest in Mali, initially; it appeared as if the French had initially considered Mali as a link to its possession in the Senegal basin. It was mainly as a route to the Senegal basin at first that the French sought to take Mali. The last part of the chapter tried to look at post independence developments in Mali, this part tried to analyze the various governments' administration and their policies in the country, though very briefly. It tried to look at the various problems and initiatives and responses of the various administrations in Mali, from that of Modibo Keita which took over as the first indigenous administration in 1960, at independence, to the present newly elected government of Boubacar in 2013.

And the third chapter titled “Previous Tuareg rebellions in Mali” tried from the beginning to look into the history and origin of the Tuareg as a people. While the origin group

appeared a little controversial, nevertheless many sources commonly traced the origin of the group from Libya. It was sometimes very difficult for certain scholars to actually differentiate between the Tuareg group and other Arabic peoples inhabiting the Maghreb areas of North Africa. Similarity in certain physical characteristics and desert life has actually led many people to assume or see the Tuaregs as belonging to these Arabic speaking people, though considered of separate dialect. Also part of the reasons for such confusion is the fact that the group is scattered across the Sahara and the Sahel regions, where many Arab speaking people are also found. The second part of the chapter tried to look at the relationship between the Tuaregs in Mali and the Malian state. One can see very clearly from this part that the relations between the duos have never been any good. The Tuaregs as mentioned previously had maintained a measure of independence even during French colonial rule in Mali, and had appeared not to have shown any interest at all in being part of any arrangement or any country.

The 1963 rebellion was discussed in detail in the third part of the chapter, and it shows how the group was organized along clan or “tewsit” lines. The rebellion was started after Elledi Ag Albachir took revenge on the “gourmiers” that confessed to killing his father Alla Albachir in collaboration with certain French officials. Unorganized and without sufficient arms and ammunitions, the Tuareg rebels could not withstand the fire power of the Malian soldiers. The Tuaregs rebels had their base in Algeria, and mobilized arms and men from the base and carried out attacks in Mali and quickly retreated back to the base. The 1990 rebellion or Al-Jebha was also discussed and was reported to have started after the rebels sent an invitation to the Malian army for a combat, and the Malian army responded to the request. The Tuaregs at this time appeared prepared and well equipped and more organized than in 1963

The fourth chapter which is titled “the 2012 rebellion and French intervention in Mali” is the main focus of this research. But it is thought that without a proper grasp of the previous rebellions it would be difficult to understand the rebellion under study. The chapter begins with a background, causes and outbreak of the 2012 revolt. Here, the 2009 rebellion that was said to have been initially started and ended with a negotiation was briefly discussed. The chapter discussed how the French responded to the request of the Malian president and conducted airstrikes that saw the rebels retreating towards the Ifogha Mountains and into Algeria.

The last chapter which is titled “post conflict Mali” dealt mainly with the post conflict period. The chapter from the beginning tried to look at the migration consequences of the crisis on raising livelihood or making these communities' food insecure. Issues related to human right violations and abuses were also discussed in the second part of this chapter. The post conflict stabilization effort by the E.U, United Nations and its partners and their activities in the cities of Kidal, Timbuktu and Gao was also presented. These activities of the UN and its partners in the three different regions were presented region by region. Also considering the activities of UNMAS, which organized sensitization training regarding land mines and was also responsible for clearing the remnants of contaminated weapons across the north, it became important to document some of the weapons found or seized from the rebel group in the post conflict period. The documentation brings the chapter to an end, and a general conclusion is provided at the end of the work, and followed by an appendix and bibliographical sections.

1.6 Methodology

This study is largely based on qualitative analysis and deductive research, and a synthesis is developed by analyzing documents in the form of Newspaper articles, articles from books, Journals, and documents from certain international organizations, as well as interviews with certain individuals that are in one way or the other related to the subject. Not much has been written about the present conflict in Mali and the reason is perhaps the fact that the conflict is ongoing, and as such the attention of scholars is yet to be focused on the subject. For this reason, there are no books on the subject, however books on the history of Mali as a country proved useful in this research, especially since there have been previous revolts by the same group in Mali, these books were analyzed and compared to the present situation. Going through daily news on radio, internet and satellite channels such as Aljazeera, CNN, BBC, France 24 and several others also helped in evaluating the situation in Mali and the role of some actors with regards to the conflict. Documents from ECOWAS, AU and the UN proved useful and were evaluated, since these organizations have been involved in the conflict from the beginning. The theoretical framework has considered the failed/weak sovereignty theory to explain the reasons for the French intervention in the Mali conflict, partly as a result of the inability of IR theories giving full

explanation to certain developments particularly in the African continent where threats are seen not to come from states but from non state actors within same states.

CHAPTER TWO

LAND AND PEOPLE OF MALI

2. 1 Introduction

The chapter provides a background and history of Mali not only as country but as a people. It did not only look at this history from its empire days, but also showed the position and importance that Mali occupies among West African countries, the Arab world and the world at large. The chapter started with the physical geography of Mali, describing in detail the location and area of the country, as well as states neighboring it. It further discusses the climate weather conditions of the country, which is divided into three; the Sahel, Sahara and the Sudan regions. The vegetation of the country and its rivers were presented vividly, and so also is the demography and social structure of the country, its culture, religion and its cities, which have been known for several years as a result of the importance they occupied the ancient period.

It is believed that without an understanding of the history of this country, one cannot understand or make any assessment of its present circumstances or make any future projections regarding what is happening in the country. First, it must be understood that Mali was historically an important country, and this is evident from its history and its glorious empire days which reached its zenith under Mansa Musa 1280-1337. The reign of Mansa Musa made Mali known to the outside world and brought it to the recognition of European explorers after Musa performed the pilgrimage to Hajj in 1324. Musa's travel and his generosity with gold portrayed the riches that Mali possessed at that time. Here history has shown that Mali was historically a rich country and it was its resources that brought it to the attention of the outside world, and is a fact that cannot be disputed. In fact

one can argue that Mali was conquered by the Europeans for its riches despite the claim by the French that Mali was to provide a link to its holdings in Senegal and Algeria, and that it was also to provide access to Congo through Lake Chad as will be seen in the chapter.

Just as the pre-colonial and colonial history is presented in the chapter, a glimpse into the post independence period is also provided, so as to show how the country fared initially. Here one can see how the first government of Modibbo Keita started and how it was perceived by the Malians. The policies and changes it tried to introduce in the new Malian state and the challenges it faced, and how it was ultimately overthrown and replaced by another regime, and regime upon regime until the present regime Ibrahim Boubacar Keita that came to power in July 2013 in the aftermath of the 2012 rebellion and the French intervention. The various regimes that ruled Mali had variously been blamed for mismanagement and corruption, and been partly blamed for the instability in the country for one reason or the other. It would not be totally wrong to refer to the Negative sovereignty theory of Robert Jackson while explaining post colonial regimes in Africa including Mali, in terms misgovernance, corruption and instability, especially if we recall his argument about having “a government that is not capable of the aspects of governing”. However it believed that this chapter will provide an understanding of what is happening in Mali, and of what Mali is and its position in history and among other nations, particularly West African states.

2.2 Physical Setting and Social Structure

Mali is a landlocked country located in the West African sub-region of Africa, covering an area of about 1,240,000 sq km, making it the eighth largest country in Africa. Mali shares a long border with seven countries. It shares a border with Algeria that stretches about 1,376 KM, Niger, 821 KM, Burkina Faso, 1000 KM, Cote d’Ivoire, 532 KM, Guinea, 858 KM, Senegal, 419 KM, and Mauritania, 2,237 KM.³⁵ Covering half the country from the north is the Sahara, consisting of shifting sand dunes of Erg Chech, the salt deposits of Taodenmi, and the rocky plains of the Tanezrouft reg³⁶. To the east and north is the Iforas Massif, a 600-m eroded sand stone plateau that extends from the Ahaggar mountains of the central

³⁵ Dona J. Stewart, “What is next for Mali? The Roots of Conflict and Challenges to Stability”, United States War College Press and Strategic Studies Institute November, 2013.p 6.

³⁶ A reg is described as a plain of sand and a black, red or white gravel.

Sahara. At the centre of the country is the Hombori Tondo, which is about 1,155m or 3,800 ft, which is Mali's highest point. The Bandiagara plateau and escarpment are also located in the same region³⁷. From the south west border with Guinea, the Futa Djallon Massif extends into the Madinque plateau, which has highlands up to 640 m (2,100ft) with deep river valleys.

In terms of climatic condition, Mali is characterized by three seasons as a result of the combination of annual rainfall with temperature changes. The weather is usually dry and hot from February to June, wet and mild from June to November, while it becomes cooler and dry from November to February. The weather pattern is responsible for the emergence of three climatic zones in the country- the northern part which is located in the Sahara seems to have no rainfall with mean daily temperatures of about 48 degrees Celsius (119 degrees F) and lower temperatures of 5 degrees Celsius (41F). The Sahel region between the Sahara and the Equatorial Africa, records an annual rainfall of between 100-200mm (4-8 in), with a daily mean temperatures of 29 degrees Celsius (84 degrees F). The Sudan region or zone records about 700-1,300mm (28-51in) of annual rainfall with a daily mean temperature of 27 degrees Celsius³⁸.

There are two major rivers in Mali that have continued to be the main source of water for both human use and for agriculture. The Niger River, together with its inland delta system is considered the most significant source of water in Mali. It is located from the south western border with Guinea, and is dammed in three different locations in southern Mali; at Selingue, Sotuba and at Markala. The navigable course of the river runs about 1,600 KM from Bamako's neighboring port, northeast, past Timbuktu, and then east and south, towards Gao. The river course appears straight in the Macina region, from Mopti to Kabara and spreads into a system of lakes and wetlands. Lake Faguibine amongst them runs about 400 KM east of Timbuktu and narrows dangerously, preventing navigation during dry season. It widens in the south upstream of Gao and is navigable south of Asongo. River Senegal is another important source of water in Mali, located in the south western part of the country. The river starts from the confluence of the Bakoye and Bafing rivers near

³⁷ Humans are said to dwell in the sand stone cliffs which rise to about 1000 m.

³⁸ "Mali in Perspective: An Orientation Guide", Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, Technology Integration Division, 2011. p 4.

Bafoulabe, and flows northwest past Kayes to form a border between the neighboring countries of Mauritania and Senegal³⁹.

Mali as a country consists of several ethnic groups and diverse languages numbering over fifty, with a total population of about 15.3 million. About 47.2% of the population consists of people between the ages of 0-14, while about 50.6% consisted of people between 15-64 years of age and 2.2% of people above the 65 years of age in the year 2010. Between 2005 and 2010, Mali recorded 680,000 births/per year and a death rate of 221,000 per year⁴⁰. The country recorded between 2012 and 2013 a total fertility rate of 6.1% and a total crude birth rate of 38.8% in both urban and rural areas⁴¹. The statistics indicates the possibility of high population growth in Mali, in 2013 the Malian population stood at 14.5 million.

The environment is generally described as multi-lingual and ethnic identity is made up of birth place, surname, native language, traditional occupation or social class. A great variety of these groups live in the densely populated areas of the south and west. Amongst the dark skinned people are the descendants of Mali's ancient empire. These groups are often located near historical centers of power, or areas that support certain occupations⁴². In the northern desert, the light skinned people⁴³ whose ancestors it was reported travelled from the Maghreb are to be found, and the same group appeared to have brought Islam into the region and is said be about 1.2 million in population at present. An estimated 90% of the population of the country is Muslim, mostly Sunni and belong to the Maliki School of jurisprudence⁴⁴. About 5% of the population is Christian, and include both Roman Catholics and Protestant denominations, while the rest of the population adheres to indigenous traditional religion⁴⁵. There are different and diverse groups of people in both north and south of Mali. The Mande people, according to many sources occupy most or about half of Mali's population is made up of the Mande peoples, who are mostly located in the south west of the country. However, the Bambara are the largest sub- group of the

³⁹ Ibid. pp 5-6.

⁴⁰ Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, "World Population Prospects":2010 Revision.

⁴¹ [Hppt://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/dh](http://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/dh).

⁴² Ibid. p36.

⁴³ The complexion of this group of people differs slightly with that of the southern population. While the population in the south is typical of the Negroid race, the light skinned in the north look more like the Arab people.

⁴⁴ Pew Forum and Public Life, "The World Muslims: Unity and Diversity", August 9, 2012.

⁴⁵ "International Religions Freedom Report 2008: Mali".

Mande people and make up the majority of the population in Bamako, which is the Malian capital. The descendants of the Bambara and the Kaarta kingdoms of the early centuries were traditionally farmers and craftsmen. The Bambara language is the first or second language of about 80% of the people of Mali⁴⁶. Other Mande peoples include the Solinke and the Malinke. The Bozo people are considered as the descendants of the Solinke, who migrated from the old Ghana Empire and are well known for as fishermen. The Fulani people constitute about 15% of the total population of Mali, and historically they are considered the descendants of the Peul, Macina and the Tokolor kingdoms. Their language is referred to as Fulfulde, with cattle rearing as their main occupation. The group is settled all over the grazing ranges on the north and south of the River Niger.

Senufo peoples also constitutes about 12% of the total population of Mali, they include the Mamara Senufo speaking Minyanka and the Bomu. They are mostly found along the border with Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire where it is claimed their ancestors ruled the ancient kingdom of Kenedougou. The main pre-occupation of this group is farming, and the group also retains strong traditional religious beliefs. The Dogon peoples constitutes less than 1% of the total population of Mali, west European ethnographers are well familiar with the group. The Dogon architecture located in the Bandiagara cliffs near the center of the country has been recognized as a world heritage centre by UNESCO. Many artifacts have been collected by international collectors among which include the ritual mask to the granary doors. The group speaks over forty different dialects to the extent that some are considered separate languages.


The Songhai people make up about 6% of the total population of Mali. And are located mostly in the eastern part of Mali along the Niger River, where they are known to be fishermen and farmers in recent history. The Songhai are descendants of the last ancient west African empire, the Songhai empire which prevailed in Mali and parts of Niger republic. The Tuaregs took over control and asserted their control after the demise of the empire. The Tuaregs and Maure Peoples are located in the deserts of the northern part of Mali, and together the two peoples constitute an estimated 5-10 % of the total population of Mali. For several centuries the Tuareg group has been known to be nomadic and is mostly found in the east of Niger, Algeria and Libya, and is known as the “blue men of the

⁴⁶ It should be understood that the Bambara do not constitute 80% of the population of Mali, but that about 80% of the people of Mali speak the Bambara language, including non Bambara people.

desert” who refer to themselves as “Kel Tamasheq” which means speakers of Tamasheq. The Tamasheq is generally recognized as the language of the Berbers, completely different from other languages spoken in Mali. Since the advent of the French in Mali, the Tuareg group rebelled against the government several times.

And to the west and into Mauritania are the Maure, known also as the Moors. They are considered to have descended from Berber- Arabs and call themselves “Amazigh⁴⁷”, which is in the Semitic Hasanya Arabic language which is the official language of Mauritania. The map below shows the various ethnic groups in Mali as well as their locations within the country;

Map 1. Ethnic groups in Mali



⁴⁷ It is a family of languages in the Afro-Asiatic languages, and considered a single language in the past, especially in French tradition. It is spoken by about 14 Million people scattered in the Maghreb states.

Source: [http:// www.tlfq.ulaval.ca/axl/afrique/mali.htm](http://www.tlfq.ulaval.ca/axl/afrique/mali.htm). Accessed 23/June/2014.

The upper part of the map shows the north where the Tuaregs and the Maure peoples are located, while the lower part shows the location of the rest of the groups, normally known as the southern population which is mainly Bambara dominated. Apart from these groups of people inhabiting Mali, the country is known to outsiders as a result a number of its cities, which served as either important centers of trade in the ancient period, during the trans-Saharan trade, or as cities that served as important learning centers that attracted people from far and wide. A brief on some of this important cities will shed light on the importance these cities occupy not only in Malian history but in ancient African history as a whole since these cities were mostly founded before the founding of the Malian state, and were mostly founded in the days of the great African empires of Kanem-Borno, Old Oyo Mali, Songhai as well as the Asante and Fante empires of Ghana between C. 1230 to C.1600. Among these cities, the following were found important and discussed briefly one after the other, so that a glimpse of what and how the cities are, is at least revealed. It is believed that this will also help in understanding the complexity of the composition of some of those groups of people mentioned above and the general political divide within Mali and its cities.

Bamako is Mali's capital and is located along the Niger River in the southern part of the country. The name of the city is derived from the Bambara words Bamako which means crocodile-river and is mainly Bambara dominated. History sources have it that Bamako was where Sundiata Keita defeated the Ghana Empire and founded the Mali Empire in the 13th century. The city was declared the capital of the French Sudan West Africa by the French in 1908. Bamako is the most densely populated city in Mali. In 2009 there were about 1.8 Million people living in Bamako and was rated the fastest growing city in Africa and the sixth fastest growing city in the world.

Djenne is known as the oldest city in sub-Saharan Africa the Jenne-Jeno trading center dates back 250 B.C.E. The city is currently located on an island where the Niger and Bani rivers meet and was developed since the 11th century. It is regarded as the key hub for the gold and salt trades, and was conquered by the Songhai, the Fulani, as well as the Tukulor peoples before it was occupied by the French. The great mosque of Djenne is also recognized as a world heritage site by UNESCO and considered the world's largest adobe building.

Timbuktu is also among Mali's most popular cities, it is located at a point where the River Niger meet the Sahara, and is Mali's most famous city to the world. Arab geographers wrote about the wealth of Timbuktu in the 14th century, and so also did the 19th century European among whom many died attempting to explore it environs. The city became an important centre of learning and trade in the 14th century and according to Tuaregs tradition the name "Timbuktu" means "a mother with a large navel". Timbuktu was designated as a world heritage centre by UNESCO in 1988. It has served as the capital of the ancient Mali Empire and Songhai Empire at different times. Timbuktu is considered to mainly dominate by the Tuareg people.

Kidal is another city in Mali, a small Saharan city located in the northeast of Mali. The city is has long been occupied by the nomadic Arabic speaking peoples of Mali. Many paintings dating back to 12th century are to be found in this city. It is also a city were many armed rebels seeking self governance are to be found in recent times. Gao, another city, was founded in the seventh century, and it is located on the southern course of the River Niger in the eastern part of Mali. Early Arab histories showed that the city was initially known as Kawkaw and was the capital of the Songhai Empire. It was reported that in the 14th century the ruler of the empire, Askia Mohammed embarked on the pilgrimage to Hajj and upon return converted its inhabitants to Islam. The tomb of Askia Mohammed at the great mosque of Gao, is recognized as a world heritage site by UNESCO.

Mopti is also another important city in Mali, and consists of a diverse population including the Fulani, Bamabara, Dogon, Songhai, Bwa, Tukulor and the Bozo. The city lies at the confluence of the Niger and Bani rivers in the Macina region of Mali. It is built on an Island and has a very busy port and is considered an important centre of fishing and livestock rearing. The city of Segou is located along the Niger River, between Bamako and Mopti, it served as an important city of the 18th century Bambara kingdom. It is the third largest city in Mali and is well known for its Sudanese colonial architecture, pottery and cloth markets.

Sikasso, another Malian city is to be found in the southern Sudan zone and has rainfall all through the year. It was the capital of the Senofu kingdom of Kenedougou in the 19th century, and was also the last to resist colonization by the French. The Malian city Koulikoro is mainly occupied by the Soninke, Bambara and the Malinke who are majority. The city links the nomads in the north with the farmers in the south of the country.

Commercial activities such as oil and soap production are known to also flourish in the city. Kayes city is said to be the first headquarters of the colonial French Sudan in 1892. Prior to this period, a Tukolor leader, Umar Tal was said to have laid a siege against the French at a nearby city, Medine Tukolor. The city is linked to Dakar in Senegal by rail in recent history⁴⁸.

2.3 The Ancient Mali Empire

The origins of the present Mali is traceable to the ancient Kingdom or Empire of Mali which existed between 1230- 1600 C.E. What initially started as a tribal state of the group known as the Madinka peoples under their ruler Sundiata Keita in 1217 transformed and grew into an Empire during his twenty five year rule which ended in 1242⁴⁹. The Empire succeeded in extending its influence over a large territory within West Africa and unto the Atlantic, an area far larger than the present Malian state. Most of the literature available about the ancient Empire appeared in the writings and works of Arab geographers and renowned scholars such as Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), as well as Ibn Batuta. In his famous travels from Morocco in the Sahara, Ibn Batuta travelled south by Caravan to stop at the Oasis and the salt mines, and within two months reached the junction of the trans-Saharan trade route. Ibn Batuta was able to reach Timbuktu, which was then a provincial city, and then proceeded to Gao which had been an important centre for trade at that time⁵⁰.

Ibn Batuta's accounts of Mali have been recorded in many books and reveal a lot about the importance that the Mali Empire occupied at that time as well as the activities taking place in the Empire. Ibn Batuta⁵¹ was quoted describing some of the activities in the Empire in this words "the black men come up from their country and take away salt from Taghaza. In the towns of Mali it sells for twenty to thirty Mithqals⁵² and sometimes as much as forty. The Negroes use salt as a medium of exchange just as gold and silver is used in other

⁴⁸ Ibid.pp8-12.

⁴⁹ Dona Stewart, "What id Next for Mali? The Roots of Conflict and Challenges to Stability", United States Army War College Press and Strategic Studies Institute, November, 2013, 2013.p 9.

⁵⁰ Ibid. p 10.

⁵¹ For detail of Ibn Batuta's travels see; Ibn Batuta, "Travels in Asia and Africa, 1325-1354", Translated and selected by H.A.R Gibb with introduction notes George Routledge & Sons Ltd, London, 1929.

⁵² It was a medium of exchange that was used in the Arab world in those days which Ibn Batuta tried to equate in describing the value of the exchanges that he witnessed in different commodities in Mali.

places; they cut it into pieces and buy and sell with it.” Many of Ibn Khaldun's⁵³ works also recorded the genealogy of the Malian Empire and its history, which it preserved and passed down. According to such genealogy, the Empire was formed in the 13th century, at the battle of Krina in 1235, and Mansa Musa⁵⁴ made the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1324 in the 14th century, and Timbuktu was sacked by the Mossi in 1391 and in 1430 a North African Tuareg, Sunni Ali Ber seized Timbuktu. By 1493, the Songhai had seized Toghaza and in 1610 the entire Empire became fragmented.

According to many sources, gold has been the major source of Mali's wealth. It was agreed that the availability of large deposit of gold as well as Mali's position and control over the Trans –Saharan trade, might have given Mali its significance worldwide in the ancient period and in the present as well. In the days of the Empire, Gao and Timbuktu, both located at the edge of the Sahara, served as important centers and trade routes through the desert to the Levant and to Europe. The two major commodities; gold and salt were usually exchanged for different goods far and wide. The gold was usually exported north of the Empire, while the salt travels to the south.

The Mali Empire reached its zenith under one of its famous rulers, known as Mansa Kankan Musa, whose reign made Mali known all over the world, especially after his famous pilgrimage to Mecca in 1324. The accounts of his travel not only revealed a lot about Mali's wealth to the outside world, but also its power and strength. Mansa Musa was accompanied to the pilgrimage by 60,000 men. It was reported that eighty camels carried hundreds of pounds of gold dust, and about twelve thousand slaves each carried 4 pounds of gold bars during the trip. Mansa Musa was reported to have spent so much gold in Cairo, to the extent that it caused inflation that lasted about a decade after his trip. Mansa Musa's display of wealth during the trip caught the attention of western scholars and mapmakers and as a consequence brought the attention of Europeans and at the same time made the cities of Timbuktu and Mali itself famous⁵⁵. One the account of his travels was described in these words “this man flooded Cairo with his gifts. He left no court Emir no holder of a royal office without a gift of a load of gold. The people of Cairo made


⁵³ For details of Ibn Khaldun's works see; Ibn Khaldun, “Histoire des Berbers et des dynasties musulmanes de l’Afrique septentrionale; traduit de l’Arabe par le baron de Slane (1852-1856)”, Algiers.

⁵⁴ Mansa Kankan Musa was the tenth Mansa or ruler and is considered the most famous ruler or Emperor of the wealthy Mali Empire which flourished between 12th - 16th century. Musa reigned between 1280 and 1337.

⁵⁵ Ibid. p11.

incalculable profits out of him and his men in buying and selling and giving and taking. They exchanged gold until they depressed its value in Egypt and caused its price to fall⁵⁶”. Mansa Musa brought to the Empire architects and scholars that made Timbuktu and Gao important centers of Islamic learning. Ibn Batuta describes religious practice in Mali in these words during his travels “another of their good qualities is their habit of wearing clean white garments on Fridays. Even if a man has nothing but an old worn out shirt, he washes it and wears it to the Friday service. Yet another is their zeal for learning the Quran by heart. They put their children in chains if they show any backwardness in memorizing it, and they are not set free until they have learnt it by heart⁵⁷.”The city of Timbuktu continued to grow into a centre of Islamic scholarship and learning up to the 15th century, apart from being a centre for trade. The city's population continued to increase and in the 16th century, Timbuktu alone was recorded to have housed between 150-180 Quranic schools, where basic reading and recitation of the Quran were taught. The schools had an estimated peak of between 4,000-5,000 students while the city's population was recorded at about one hundred thousand (100,000). The map below shows the ancient trans-Saharan trade routes across Africa to Arabia. From this map one can understand certain explanations especially with regards to Mansa Musa's pilgrimage during his famous trip to Saudi Arabia.

Map 2 Trans –Saharan trade routes.



⁵⁶ “The Wealth of Africa: The Kingdom of Mali Students ‘Worksheet’ The British Museum .www.britishmuseum.org. p 4.

⁵⁷ Ibid p 5.

Source: www.google.com Accessed 14/07/2014

2.4 The French Incursion into Mali

After the reign of Mansa Musa, the ancient Mali Empire began to witness a period of gradual weakness and eventual collapse. In 1391, the city of Timbuktu was sacked by the Mossi who originated from neighboring Burkina Faso where they remain the dominant ethnic group. The Mossi are said to be the direct descendants of Dagomba in Ghana⁵⁸. The group lived in villages of extended families and grew so powerful that they began conquering the surrounding villages and states including Timbuktu. By 1493, the Tuaregs also seized Timbuktu, and in 1493 the Songhai defeated Mali⁵⁹. The Songhai are a group settled on both banks of the middle Niger river and ruled by a dynasty of royal family of Sonni since the thirteenth century and became independent of Mali, establishing their own state known as the Songhai empire with Gao as their capital.⁶⁰ This was followed by the Moroccan invasion in the 15th century in search of gold. With an army of between 3000 - 4000, 8000 dromedaries, they moved and crushed the Songhai army thereby taking over all the important cities of Mali from the Songhai⁶¹. However, by the 16th century the empire had become split and this led to the rise of many different groups. In 1747, a Tuareg Prince regained control of Timbuktu, a city claimed to have been founded by the Tuaregs in the 14th century. In the southern part, the Bambara had risen to power and established their presence and rule at Segou, an important city in Mali. Between 1818 and 1844, a Fulani theocratic (Islamic) system of government was established and extended from Djenne to Timbuktu, and eventually a conflict ensued between the Fulani and the Bambara which lasted between 1854 and 1864, after the French colonizers had arrived Mali, to which all the groups in Mali submitted.

The interest of France in the West African sub-region is traced to 1637, when the French built a Fort at the mouth of the Senegal River with the aim of exploring the interior.

⁵⁸ Jackson Family, "Mossi People", www.memfamily.com/clark-history.

⁵⁹ The Soghai was another ancient Empire that rose to power and defeated Mali and took control of many of its cities.

⁶⁰ African History Online, "Songhai Empire", www.sahistory.org.za/topic/songhai-african-empire-15th-16th-century.

France, Netherlands and Portugal came into fierce competition for trade in the Senegal area. The relations between France and Algeria remained very strong and thousands of French citizens and other Europeans were settled in Algeria.

Changes in technological development in the 18th century led to renewed interest in African exploration by many Europeans. The invention of instruments such as the mariner's compass and marine astrolabe made movement across oceans less difficult leading to the emergence of what came to be known as the "age of exploration." During the Napoleonic wars many scientists numbering about 2,000 participated in a scientific expedition with a view to cataloging the artifacts of modern Egypt and its natural history, after Napoleon succeeded in capturing Egypt. The exploits of other Europeans like Richard Burton and David Livingstone of south and central Africa convinced Europe of Africa's strategic importance due to its location and untapped resources. The Berlin conference which was convened between 1884 and 1885 among European powers was supposed to provide a criteria and set of rules for colonization and trade activities in the African continent. Participants at the conference agreed that "effective occupation" should determine how nations would lay claim to any territory on the African continent⁶².

Many reasons have been advanced regarding the primary interest of France in Mali, though many accounts point to the great wealth of Mali and the entire region as attracting the French; the gold deposits of the old Mali Empire which is contained in different accounts of the empire's history. However, the interest of France in the area was explained as primarily to link its holdings in Senegal and Algeria which had been occupied earlier, as well as to provide access to the Congo and its resources through Lake Chad⁶³. The French Sudan is considered to be part of a set of colonies that made up the Federation of French West Africa between 1865-1960 which consisted of Senegal, Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Niger, Mauritania and Dahomey (Benin). Algeria remained an important part of the overseas empire of the French since it was annexed in 1830 and subsequently it became a department in metropolitan France in 1848. The penetration of the French into Mali was gradual and was met with stiff resistance by the locals. Mungo Park was the first European to travel through Mali to the river Niger, but drowned at the Bussa rapids in present day Nigeria. Another companion of Mungo Park known as

⁶² Dona Stewart, "What is Next for Mali? The Roots of Conflict and Challenges to Stability", United States Army War College Press and Strategic Studies Institute, November, 2013, 2013, pp 16-21.

⁶³ Ibid. pp 16-21.

Alexander Gordon was killed by the Tuaregs after a successful journey to Timbuktu in 1826. And in 1828, Rene Auguste Caillie Laign became the first European/French man that visited Timbuktu and returned alive. Between 1880 and 1881, a French Colonel Paul Flatters led an expedition with a view to survey a rail road that would cross the Sahara and was composed of 300 camels, 10 French soldiers and 78 native guides and porters. The expedition tried to cross the territory controlled by the Tuaregs in the Sahel, but was said to have failed as the Tuareg leaders rejected the idea and as a result laid ambush against the French team⁶⁴. Many were killed on the French side and others died as a result of injuries sustained and harsh weather condition, with no survivor from the French team. Consequently, the French dispatched military missions from Algeria, Senegal and Congo in 1899, led by Paul Vaulet and Adjutant Lieutenant Julian Chanoine which was accompanied by 2000 strong men, 100 guides and interpreters, and over 1,000 porters to support the heavily armed mission. The mission was reported to have burnt villages, enslaved the population and killed those that were not needed⁶⁵. As a result of the atrocities committed by the Vaulet-Chanoine led mission to Mali, the French had to make a reassessment of its military led pacification strategy of the Sudan region and replaced Vaulet with Klobb who was killed by Vaulet, complicating the entire issue. But the expedition by Vaulet and Chanoine marked the beginning of French colonial rule in Mali.

The introduction of colonial rule saw a transformation or change in the structure of the Malian society politically, economically and socially, it saw the emergence of a new system, with new officials. In pre-colonial Mali, people did not draw any distinction between regimes or reigns of particular individuals or a general political order, rather the notion of “fanga” or power connoting the institution of rule or the essence of rule or any form of rulership proved its *raison d'être* and derived its justification from its capacity to suppress any maneuvering between competing political factions or what is called “fadenkele.” Leadership in pre-colonial Mali was evaluated on the basis of its performance; the capacity to maintain social harmony as well as to ensure the well being of the community, even though it is sometimes assumed that fanga alone was sufficient, it was later debunked⁶⁶. Perhaps this may have aided the system of colonial rule in Mali which

⁶⁴ Ibid. p 19.

⁶⁵ Ibid. p 20.

⁶⁶ Dorothea Schulz, “Praise Without Enchantment : Griots, Broadcast Media, and the Politics of Tradition In Mali”, *Africa Today*, India University Press Journal, October-December, 1997 p 446.

relied solely on force, though accompanied by other political and economic tools, even though it was strongly resisted, but it would appear that adaptability to the colonial system may not have been difficult. Colonial rule in Mali saw the rise of new families and individuals to power by coming from the lower hierarchy for the natives in the colonial administration. French colonial rule was seen to have altered previous socio-political order, especially in southern Mali which saw a shift in political legitimacy. Two new types of political elites emerged in Mali during the period of colonial rule. The French replaced previous ruling families with the representatives of other families that are sometimes considered inferior in status. Literacy, geographic and occupational mobility tended to have given advantage to individuals from all social backgrounds to occupy positions in the colonial administration and who benefited from the growing trade opportunities. New moral and legal codes promoted the proclamation of equality among members of the society and made it possible for people of lower social origin to rise in status. As such previous influential families gradually acknowledged that power had moved or shifted hands⁶⁷ as the French introduced new systems and policies in various colonies.

Generally, French colonial policy has been described as more of direct rule in contrast to the British policy of indirect rule in their respective colonies, including Mali. The French had tried to use various policies overtime towards all its colonies, the earliest known policy of the French is known as that of “assimilation”, which tried or aimed to transform Africans into Frenchmen. The policy took root from the French revolution and its ideals of freedom, equality and fraternity. The policy was not seen to have enjoyed the support of the conservatives, the Catholics, as well as the monarchist tradition in France. The assimilation policy was based on the assumption of the superiority of the French civilization, and was seen as part of France’s mission to civilize the African people and thus turn them into Frenchmen in all ramifications. It was a policy that was seen to have little or no regards for African culture, history or civilization⁶⁸.

With the expansion of the French colonial empire in Africa in the late 19th, many African people came under French rule and this no doubt led to a debate on colonial policy as a result of the growing reaction against the assimilation policy. While some argued on racial basis, arguing that Africans were inferior and incapable of full assimilation, others argued

⁶⁷ Ibid. pp 447-450.

⁶⁸ Wallace G. Mills, “French Approaches in Colonial Policy”, St Mary’s University. www.saylor.org. pp1-4.

that the strenuous effort on education in making assimilation a reality was too much and considered unrealistic. However, above all these was the growing realization and recognition that the Africans have a very distinctive culture. The debate was said to have triggered a change in colonial policy to a new policy of “Association.” Association meant the recognition of African cultural and political values, and that economic activities were to be of mutual benefit to the Africans and the French. The policy also meant the retention of traditional customs and law, but in reality it became very difficult to implement, as the French divided African societies into cantons or districts and chiefs considered not subservient were deposed without any regards for their status.

In Mali, the country was divided into multiple chiefdoms and village confederations that varied in size and degree of political centralization. A lot of chiefdoms came under the control of more powerful chiefdoms that only come to be known during certain occasion such as annual tribute collection or during settlement of conflicts among political factions. All chiefdoms in Mali maintained influence over various regions through the use of military force, and in less centralized chiefdoms, it was the capacity of a clan to mobilize the labor for production and for military expeditions that determines the clan’s political position.⁶⁹

The policy of association also was seen to have brought about a high degree of authoritarianism and saw the usurping of the rights of African peoples as the colonies remained under the control of military and conservative elements. In terms of development, great efforts were made to increase exports and to build railways into the interior, while at the same time placing high taxation on the population. Economically speaking, the French businessmen and traders benefitted most from the system, followed by the Lebanese and the Syrians in collaboration with the French, to the detriment of the African people who could not compete with the Lebanese and the Syrians but not available to the indigenous African people.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ Dorothea Schulz, “Praise Without Enchantment: Griots, Broadcast Media, and the Politics of Tradition In Mali”, *Africa Today*, India University Press Journals, October-December, 1997, p 445.

⁷⁰ Wallace G. Mills, “French Approaches in Colonial Policy”, St Mary’s University. www.saylor.org. p 6.

2.5 Post Independence Mali

The process of decolonization in Africa became accelerated after World War II, and many African countries began to witness a period of rise in nationalism and the desire for self determination. It was a time when most European economies were experiencing a decline as a result of the devastating effects of the war, and as a consequence found it extremely difficult and expensive to maintain their respective colonies. Combined with the economic problems were the emerging violent nationalist movements across Africa demanding self rule from the colonial powers. The Mau Mau rebellion against the British in Kenya broke out in 1952, mean while the French also tasted a similar fate with the outbreak of what came to be known as the “Algerian war of independence”, against the French colonial administration in Algeria which lasted from 1954 to 1962. The consequences of the war were reported to have been huge both in terms of resources and casualties, with a death toll of between 960,000 to 1.5 million people according to Algerian sources, and about 350,000 according to French sources. During the war, France was said to have devoted about 400,000 soldiers to a war that saw the fall of the French fourth republic, which saw the return of General Charles de Gaulle to power. Upon coming to power General de Gaulle made a declaration in 1959, that self determination was the preferable solution to the Algerian war. And his words were followed by referendums in both France and Algeria though after many negotiations, the independence of Algeria was granted⁷¹.

Generally, the politics of decolonization in French Africa differed in other parts of Africa, while most of French West Africa tended to have sided with the Vichy of France, French Equatorial Africa remained inclined to the side of General de Gaulle. The liberation of metropolitan France during World War II was to have been made possible as a result of the participation of many African soldiers who fought on the side of Paris. And their participation appeared to have been obtained on the basis of what came to be known as the “blood for rights” principle⁷². It was back during the Brazzaville declaration in 1944 that General de Gaulle promised Africans more rights, as well as the abolition of the “indegnet” system and its replacement with citizenship within a new order to be known as

⁷¹ Dona Stewart, “What is Next for Mali? The Roots of Conflict and Challenges to Stability”, United States Army War College Press and Strategic Studies Institute, November, 2013,p 23.

⁷² This principle meant that the Africans were ready to risk their lives and go to the war and fight for the French in exchange for the freedom of their respective states from French control.

the French Union. It was a promise kept by de Gaulle but which came to be fulfilled over time as the gradual process of decolonization unfolded across French colonial Africa. Elections came to be organized for the first time in French Africa in 1945, where African candidates presented themselves to electorates of African origin to the Constituent Assembly which became responsible for the drafting of the constitution of the fourth republic. The French Sudan which Mali was part of elected Fily Dabo Sissoko as its representative. Thus the French Union came into being by 1946, while the indigenet system⁷³ was abolished and replaced with a citizenship of the French Union. Under the new system, African were given the right to establish their own Assemblies which were referred to as “Conseil Generaux.” This process was followed by the creation for political parties within the French Union, as well the proposal of certain reforms by General de Gaulle of the French Union and the French republic. Under the new Reform, the various territories within the French Union would become independent states or republic with authorities over all areas, with the exception of foreign policy, defense and finance. A referendum was held where all French colonies voted in favor of the new union in September, 1958, and by November, 1958 the colony known as the “French Sudan⁷⁴” which comprised of Mali came to be known as the republic of Sudan and a member of “Communaute Francaise” or community of French countries, or French Union, with its own Assembly and a Ministerial cabinet presided by a Governor (French) but with full participation of politicians of Sudan origin⁷⁵.

The emergence of the new order was seen as a setback by many Africans who saw the transfer of authority from a federation of French West Africa to the various semi independent states as a form of divide and rule; it was seen as setback for those territories that hoped to remain united with one another. The consequence was the search for some form of regional integration, and in this regard the “Union Soudanaise” (US-RDA), a political party led by Modibbo Keita took a leading role. Two visions emerged within the West African Rassemblment Democratique Africane (RDA). The first one remained under

⁷³ The Indigenet is a set of laws, creating in practice an inferior legal status for natives of French colonies from 1887 until 1944-1947. It was applied across the French colonial empire between 1887 and 1889.

⁷⁴ The French Sudan refers to the French colonial territory in the Federation of French West Africa which emerged around 1880 until 1960 when it became the independent state of Mali. It comprised of eight French colonial territories of Mauritania, Mali, Senegal, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Dahomey and Niger.

⁷⁵ Baz Lecocq, “The Disputed Desert; Decolonization, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern Mali”, Afrika-Studiecentrum series.p 28.

Modibbo Keita and known as the US-RDA, while the Senegalese PDS remained under Leopold Sedar Senghor, and generally advocated for a West African federation of states. However, the Ivorian PDCI-RDA which was under Houphoet-Boigny favored a West African federation which will be in close collaboration with metropolitan France. But, in 1958 delegates from the French Sudan which include Senegal, Benin and Burkina Faso voted in favor of the independent federalist alternative led by Modibbo Keita and Leopold Senghor and their respective political parties. Following this development, French Sudan received independence from France in 1960 amidst crisis over Algeria. The Sudanese republic (Mali) and Senegal were joined in a federation but such union was not to last long and few months later Senegal withdrew and the Sudanese republic was renamed the republic of “Mali⁷⁶”.

After the attainment of independence, bureaucrats that had occupied lower positions under the colonial administration became no longer accountable to their French masters. Political party leaders that had taken leading role in the nation’s independence struggle took over various positions in the new set up with the consent of the colonial administration which had given recognition to the political leaders as representatives of what was in the best interest of the new emerging nation state. However, in many parts of rural Mali, especially the south, the population was unwilling to acknowledge the leadership of this new emerging class, who were seen to have come from inferior social origin. Usually political parties, especially the leading US-RDA under Modibbo Keita who emerged as the president from independence, tried to justify its claims to power by referring to its leading role in the anti colonial struggles as well as to its socialist orientations which they claim is the surest way of reclaiming the authentic Malian culture which colonialism appeared to have destroyed. The regime tried to do this by using historians and artist to show some kind of continuity in their works between the new modern state and the old traditions and history, as seen in the adoption of the name Mali for the new republic instead of Sudan⁷⁷.

It was not only in the rural south of Mali that the US-RDA led administration faced the problem of convincing the population and consolidating its rule, but in the northern part of Mali as well. Keita and his party came under attack for its high modernist socio-economic policies which were considered unrealistic, unnecessary and which eventually became

⁷⁶ Ibid, p 29.

⁷⁷ Dorothea Schulz, “Praise without Enchantment: Griots, Broadcast Media, and The Politics of Tradition in Mali”, *Africa Today*, Indiana University Press, October- December, 1997, P451.

untenable in certain parts of the country. The patronizing attitude of the regime was criticized and was characterized by stereotyping ideas, which caused a kind of a buildup of tension between the northern populations consisting mainly of the Tuaregs, an ethnic group inhabiting the area. The Keita regime appeared to have lacked an understanding of local work ethics, gender relations, social dynamics as well as political power structures which led to the employment of a policy by the regime that was very much resented among a section of the population that favored the preservation of the colonial socio-political legacy, particularly in northern Mali. Here also one can see the justification of Jackson's Negative Sovereignty, when he argued that African states were not ready for self rule and that the Post Cold War politics made it possible for many states to gain independence even though they were not ready or capable of governance.

The presence of the French air force base and later Algerian fighters of the FLN on the invitation of Keita, appeared to have raised the fears of the Malian government of a possible neo colonial influence⁷⁸. First, they felt that the French were becoming involved in the internal affairs of the country, and secondly, the presence of the Algerian fighters was also seen to have some motive as they developed relations with the Tuareg group inhabiting northern Mali. The situation was further complicated as rumors of attack by the Tuaregs in collaboration with FLN and certain French elements started going round, though unfounded, but was an indication of the distrust and mutual suspicion that existed between the Tuareg group in the north and the Keita regime.

The Tuareg⁷⁹ generally accused the Keita regime of isolating them from the political equation of the country. It was agreed that the group did participate in the US-RDA anti-colonial struggles and quite a number of them have indeed acquired western education. However, it was not clear if the group wanted to be part of the new Mali or not, but what

⁷⁸ When the Keita government invited the Algerian FLN fighters it hadn't the slightest idea that a kind of relation will develop between it and the Tuareg group in the north which is where the training camp of the FLN is also located. And it was not so easy for the government to ask the FLN to vacate Mali since there isn't any evidence of any collaboration or plan between it and the Tuaregs against the Malian state at the point.

⁷⁹ It must be understood that the Tuaregs had not shown any interest in being part of the Malian state since its creation. Although the Keita regime did try to pursue a policy of integrating them, the group preferred the colonial period, due to the fact that they did not participate in all negative colonial policies like forced labor and enlistment in the army. And the group further despised the Malian state partly as a result of the new policies introduced by the Keita regime of volunteer labor which resembled the forced labor during French rule, and unfortunately the Keita regime unlike the French did not exempt the Tuaregs from these new policies which became a major source of dissatisfaction with the Malian state and the Keita regime by the Tuaregs.

became clear is that even if they wanted to, it was certainly under certain conditions and this became more clearer as the Malian state became established. The buildup of tension between the Keita led Malian regime and the Tuaregs in the north finally led to what is known in the Tuareg language as “Affelaga” or rebellion in 1963, against the Malian state, which will be discussed in the preceding chapter of this research.

Modibbo Keita remained the president of Mali from independence in 1960, until 1968, when an army General known as Mousa Traore overthrew the Keita regime in a coup d’etat. And under Traore, Mali was transformed into a police state where political activities were completely forbidden. The military regime of Traore lasted for two decades and was described as characterized by brutality and repression of the Malian people. By the 1970, it was clear that the welfare of the community could not be taken care of by the various leaders of Mali from independence, and by this time state resources had diminished due to mismanagement and economic adjustment measures imposed by International Economic organizations or Agencies such as the World Bank and the I.M.F⁸⁰. In March, 1991 Colonel Ahmadu Toumani Toure, who was a minister in the Traore regime joined a group of pro-democracy forces, after Traore ordered the shooting of several students that protested against his regime in Bamako, the capital, and several hundreds of students were killed in cold blood⁸¹. The consequence was that it resulted in the collapse of the Traore regime which also faced a rebellion from the Tuareg group in the same year, and saw the coming to power of Colonel Ahmadu Toumani Toure as the president of Mali in the same year also⁸². Upon coming to power, Toure promised to relinquish authority to a democratically elected government after one year. And in 1992, the Toure government launched a new political process that saw elections taking place in the country; it was the first time the country was witnessing a democratic election since the election of Keita at independence. The outcome of the 1992 elections was generally lauded both within and outside Mali, and Mali became a model of democracy particularly within the West African sub-region. Toure handed over the reins of power to Alpha Omer Konare who emerged winner of the 1992 elections for a 5 year term.

⁸⁰ Dorothy Schulz, “Praise Without Enchantment: Griots, Broadcast Media, and the Politics of Tradition in Mali”, *Indiana University Press Journal, Africa Today*, Vol, 44, No 4, December, 1997, p 455.

⁸¹ Dona J. Stewart, “What is Next for Mali? The Roots of Conflict and Challenges to Stability”, *United States Army War College Press and Strategic Studies Institute*, November, 2013., p 25.

⁸² It was following the Rebellion that Toure who was head of Traore’s personal guards arrested the president and later announced himself as the new president in Mali. So it was not a military coup as such, but the rebellion provided a good opportunity from Toure to seize power.

In 1997, Konare indicated interest to contest for the election and was successful for another 5 year term. Konare's administration was noted for the restoration of democratic values in Mali, as well as the management of the Tuareg problem since the 1991 rebellion. Konare was also opposed to the death sentence and reverted the death sentenced passed on Mousa Traore and his wife to life sentences. His government was however noted for corruption, particularly among official office holders. Under Konare Mali continued to play a significant role in the regional integration process under the ECOWAS⁸³. At the end of Konare's second term in 2002, Mali again went through another round of elections where 24 candidates presented themselves to the electorate to contest the office of the president. At this time the former Malian military president Ahmadu Toure had joined politics and was among the 24 contenders, and in the end emerged victorious and was announced the winner of the election. Mali's democracy under Toure was described as a success story among African states and finished the first 5 year term in 2007 and was again re-elected in 2007⁸⁴. In 2012, the government of Toure soon came to be criticized for its inability to handle an uprising in the northern part of the country by the Tuareg group and their Al-Qaeda affiliate groups. Toure's second tenure in office was to end in 2012 and it was while his government was making preparation for another round of election that the rebellion in the north broke out and all attempts by the Toure government to find a solution to the crisis did not yield any result. It was while Toure was making efforts to contain the insurgency in the north by involving the ECOWAS, that Captain Ahmadu Sango staged a military coup in March, 2012 ousting the regime of Toure which had ruled Mali from 2002-2012. After the coup, Toure was forced to flee the country, while the United Nations, ECOWAS, France, United States and other organizations condemned the coup and called for the restoration of constitutional order in Mali. Following this development, the ECOWAS became involved in the affairs of Mali and negotiated the establishment of an interim administration with the Sango military junta, and under an arrangement, the parliamentary leader, Diouncounda Traore emerged as the interim President of Mali⁸⁵. The interim president took over power and prepared the country for election in July 2013 after a French led force had restored order in the country. The election was won by Ibrahim Boubacar Keita after a run off in August to defeat Soumalia Cisse to become the new democratically elected president of Mali.

⁸³ www.africansuccess.org , "Biography of Alpha Oumar Konare".

⁸⁴ www.berkeleycentre.georgetown.edu, "Resources on Faith, Ethics and Public Life: Ahmadu Toure".

⁸⁵ www.aljazeera.com , "Mali Mutiny 'Topples' President Toure", March, 2012.

2.6 Conclusion

There is no doubt that Mali is an important country not only in West Africa, but across the world as the chapter has shown. The defunct Malian empire did bring fame to Mali, and exposed its resources, tradition and history. This is especially clear if one takes a look at the various groups of people in Mali as well as some of the Malian cities that were recognized as world heritage sites by UNESCO which include Timbuktu, Djenne and Gao. Cities such as Timbuktu were known as centers of learning and scholarship in the olden days, and this has given them their importance in the earliest times. Other cities like Gao were known as important centers of commerce particularly during the Trans-Saharan, when commodities like salt were in high demand across West Africa.

The chapter has also shown very clearly the relationship that exists between the various groups in Mali in a historical context, has therefore provided an understanding of why certain groups in the country are not content in the present set up. Various groups appeared to have come to power at different times since the demise of the ancient Mali empire, and some of this groups have taken control of certain cities at one point or another and have enjoyed a form of independence and have exercised control over a certain territory that is now considered as the Malian state, like the Tuaregs in the north. As such it is indisputable that without presenting a background and history of Mali, it will be almost impossible to understand all the Tuareg rebellions that have taken place, including the 2012 rebellion and the French intervention which is the main concern of this research.

CHAPTER THREE

PREVIOUS TUAREG REBELLIONS IN MALI

3.1 Introduction

This chapter was found extremely important and necessary if at all we want to understand what the conflict in Mali is all about. In order to understand the 2012 rebellion and the intervention by Paris, we must understand what has led to previous revolts in the country and how those revolts took place and their nature as well manner of operations of the rebel groups. The chapter will also help us understand the relations between the French, the Tuareg as a group and the Malian nation which had been a French colony. It will further help in analyzing the present rebellion as well predicting and directing us towards finding a lasting solution to the unending conflict in Mali that has led to the intervention of France in 2013. It is divided into eleven sub-sections, each dealing with different aspects of the two rebellions. It tried from the very beginning to trace the origin and history of the Tuaregs as a people. It appears there is a general misunderstanding about who the Tuaregs actually are, and the group are often mistaken or confused with the Berber group and other Arabic speaking peoples. However going through “who are the Tuaregs” at the beginning of this chapter will quickly make clear the identity of the group as well as their origin. Though the group is scattered across the Sahel, the Sahara and several parts of Africa, they however commonly trace their origin to Libya. It is also interesting to understand that the group remains united as a federation⁸⁶ under what is known as Tewsit in the Tamasheq or Tuareg language.

The chapter also tried to look at the relations existing between the Tuareg group and the Malian nation. Here, it becomes vividly clear that the Tuaregs did not have it good with the Malian state, and their predecessors, the French colonial masters. The group had constantly rebelled against the French even before the creation of the Malian state. It would appear

⁸⁶ A federation is an encompassing political or societal entity formed by uniting smaller or more localized entities.

that the group had never wanted to come under any other group or people, going by their history. The Tuaregs throughout their history had been independent and free of any foreign influence, instead asserted their control over other peoples, and earned the name “masters of the desert”, due to their specialization in warfare and conquest. As such after the creation of the Malian republic in 1960, the Tuaregs did not show any interest in being part of the new country, just as they did not show any interest in the post colonial politics of the time. And when Modibbo Keita came to power and brought about new policies in the country, the Tuareg group found it difficult to cope with the new changes. This is partly due to the fact that even during colonial rule; the group had been exempted from many colonial policies in Mali, like forced labor or conscription into the army. And so the Tuareg and the Malian government did not seem to have a good relation right from the start, until eventually the group declared their intention to seek independence from Mali and rebelled against the state in 1963.

However, the rebellion must be understood very clearly, due to the fact it is in a way a continuation of the defiance against the French which was started by Alla Albachir, which his son Elledi continued after French rule. The rebellion was started by Elledi initially to avenge the killing of his father by the French in collaboration with certain Malian officials. There is no doubt however that the Afellaga may have been motivated by certain policies initiated by the new Malian state. Of course incapacity or what Robert Jackson coined “Negative Sovereignty” sometimes explains the trial and error policies of many post colonial leaders in Africa, and it sometimes makes clear the non readiness or inexperience of the such leaders in the art of governance.

The chapter goes on to discuss the rebellion in its organization and operation until it was crushed. It discusses in detail the aftermath of the rebellion and the escape of certain elements of the rebellion to neighboring states and the emergence of what came to known as the Tuareg Diaspora. The emergence of the Tuareg Diaspora was facilitated by certain natural factors like the drought of the 1970’s and 80’s which deprived the Tuaregs the means of their livelihood, and were forced to migrate both within and outside Mali. And the result of such was the resurrection of a new spirit of revolution that came to be known as Al-Jebha in 1990.

The chapter discussed in detail the developments leading up to the 1990 rebellion, its organization and operation, as well as actors, to its very end. It discusses the negotiations

undertaken by the Malian government and the rebels to bring an end to the rebellion, from the Tamanrasset agreement, to the national pact. It discusses the emergence of the Gandakoy⁸⁷ to challenge the Tuaregs and how all the groups united and agreed to a cease fire with the Malian government.

3.2 Who are the Tuaregs?

There are various accounts and traditions about the origins of the Tuaregs, sometimes these accounts are conflicting and complicated, while others appear confusing and inaccurate, not only in locating the group but in their general description of the group. It is generally believed that very little is known about the Tuareg people, especially in Europe and other parts of the world. And for this reason the group's identity is often confused with those of other peoples that share a similar location, language or appearance with the Tuareg group. People often talk about the Tuaregs when referring in general to the indigenous North African people that are usually called the Berbers. However, the Tuaregs differ distinctly from this group of North African people in many significant ways. Herodotus, the acclaimed father of history has in his writings referred to the North African people as Libyans, referring generally to the area covering western Nile basin and north of the equator. And that among the Libyans exist a group of nomads whom European travelers called the Tuareg or Tawarek, in trying to imitate the name given to the group by the Arabs. The lives of this nomadic group are seen to have greatly differed from that of the sedentary populations of the inhabitants of the Mediterranean region. As knowledge and exploration of the Sahara increased, the presence of the Tuaregs came to be reported in many distant places, including Fezzan along the Niger⁸⁸. The individual characteristics of this group, wide extension, large number as well as their complex social organization came to be discovered gradually. Berth and Richardson were among the first European writers that reached a conclusion that the Tuareg was not a tribe but a race⁸⁹ of people of many clans and are said to occupy a large area of the world and range in various groups or

⁸⁷ Gandakoy means "sons of the land", and was a Para-military movement that was founded in May 1994 by Seydou Cisse due to the rising tensions between the Tuareg and the sedentary black tribes of the Gao region in northern Mali. The Gandakoy fighters were mainly recruited from among the Songhai, Bambara, Fulani, Buzo and the Tuareg Bella tribes men.

⁸⁸ Francis Rodd, "Origins of the Tuareg", *The Geographical Journal*, Vol 67, No 1, November, 2013. P 27.

⁸⁹ Rodd explains in his article that the spread as well as the physical characteristic of the group distinguishes them from other groups, and for this he concluded that the group constitutes more than a tribe and may only be referred or considered as a race.

confederations of tribes all over the central Sahara, south of Algeria, Tunisia, Tripoli and north of Sudan⁹⁰. The group is also to be found in the east from Murzak-Kawar Oasis along the Tripolitanian coast to Chad, far West to the Mediterranean and then to Timbuktu. The group is further known to dominate the countryside, though with little influence in the activities of the sedentary population of other groups. They are known to control the three central caravan routes from the Mediterranean to central Africa which runs from Fezzan to Lake Chad, to Nigeria and other tracks to Niger at Timbuktu and Gao. The Tuaregs are known to have penetrated the Niger area which is considered a Negroid area and as everywhere else, where they come in contact with other groups, they become the masters and no where were the Tuaregs considered as slaves or underdogs. They were known to have ruled in Borno, south west of Lake Chad, they held sway from Algeria to Timbuktu and took control of all lands as far as the Atlantic Ocean until the arrival of the moors and the French in the 16th and 18th century respectively.

Generally, the Tuaregs are described as nomads whose means of livelihood revolves around raiding neighboring communities. They were described by Rodd as a “Mendacious⁹¹ people”, whose tactics of warfare was that of surprise attack on the enemy, and the group were never known to have been beloved of men, but earned a reputation of “treachery” which is acknowledged by their rivals. Their knowledge of the desert warfare is legendary and is known to fight with swords and lances, and rifles if they could lay their hands on them. The Tuareg group is easily recognized as a result certain physical characteristic they possess. These characteristics were contained in categorization of the Libyan people where the Tuaregs are also to be found by a renowned French historian Sergi (author of *L’Antropologia della Stirpe Camitica* ‘and ‘*The Mediterranean Race*). He generally categorized the Libyan people into three distinct groups regarding their physical

⁹⁰ Ibid, p29.

⁹¹ Mendacious is a word that is used to mean either dishonesty, especially when it is habitual, untruthful, deceitful, it originated from Latin word mendacium, which means lie and was used by the French in 1610’s.

characteristic. The first category called Dolichocephalic⁹² actually describes the Tuareg people⁹³

The Tuaregs are said to fit the description into category perfectly up to the present generation among them. And around the 16th century, Leo Africanus, a famous scholar in his classification of groups in inner Libya between the Atlantic area and the Nile, which he divided into about six different categories, he identified the first area as Sanhaja, then Guenziga, Zanziga, Jedala, Ketama, Targa and then the Lenta. Interestingly all these groups identified by Leo belong to the Muleththemim or veiled category of people. According to Leo, the Sanhaja Tuaregs may have been responsible for modifying the history of the civilised world. According to him the group formed a desert confederation after the advent of Islam in the region, and became responsible for conversion to Islam of all Tuaregs of the west and referred to themselves as El Merabat. El Merabat was later adopted as a name of the desert tribes that captured Fez and what later came to be known as the Almoravid dynasty. The dynasty occupied the whole of the Maghreb and Spain in Europe, after they successfully defeated a coalition of Castilian and Aragonese armies at the battle of Sagrajas in 1086. The battle was led by the Almoravid King Yusuf Ibn Tashfin, and the Christian army was led by the Castilian King Alfonso VI. The Almoravids are at the same time responsible for stimulating the growth of science and arts as well as the glory of western civilization. But such impetus and drive of the Almoravids was given by the Tuaregs who inspired the Almoravid movement itself and all that it was able to achieve⁹⁴.

In Mali the Tuaregs like many other groups that exist either in Africa or elsewhere do have and are indeed familiar with social and political organization, despite their description as a war like race, but war itself requires some organization and preparation. Although the degree as well as form of socio-political organization certainly differs between various groups that exist in Africa and other places, the western Tuaregs which the Mali Tuaregs

⁹² The "Dolichocephalic", category describes the Tuareg as having a straight forehead with prominent eye brow bones. Tall stature, face tapering from temples, with unobtrusive cheekbones. Thin long nose and straight chin. Unobtrusive muscular development, but dry and sinewy limbs, broad shoulders and slender waists, the trunk forming a reversed cone.

⁹³ Ibid, p 34.

⁹⁴ Ibid, p 38

belong to have a hierarchy and clan or what is referred to as the “tewsit⁹⁵” in the Tamasheq or Tuareg⁹⁶ language as the two main basis of their socio-political organization. The tewsit or clan is seen to be common among all Tuaregs in general wherever they may be, and is described as a semi kin groups that is based on family lineage and ideology which is seen to differ from one family or clan to another. The tewsit is considered highly important in understanding the history and structure of the Tuareg society and politics. Although the meaning and interpretations of the word tewsit has often been confused and misrepresented, and the Tuaregs themselves have sometimes used the word to describe certain internal administrative organizations within their own society, but so far in anthropological terms the word is translated to mean clan. And here, the clan and genealogy are seen to form a kinship structure as the two are also considered to be interrelated. In the Tuareg society several genealogies exist and this include groups such as the “Imghad” or former slaves, as well as other groups which are considered poor or weak in the society and are known as the “Tilaqiwin”. And so a tewsit in this regard is considered as a socio-political group formed around a certain lineage or clan who are considered to belong to a particular category such as either the Imghad or Tilaqiwin in kinship terms. The male spine or what is otherwise known as in the Tamasheq language as the “Aran Meddan” or paternal male cousins and the “Tegeze”, which is explained as the relationship between sister’s children and mother’s brother. These two are considered the most significant relations regarding kinships in western Tamasheq society and in Mali. These two relations mean unrestricted material support and protection to nephews, nieces by mother’s brothers and on the other hand loyalty and protection to the uncle by the sisters children and vice versa for the Aran Meddan which is on the paternal side. These relations are extended from generation to generation and all the various tewsit are incorporated under the influence or control of what is known as an “Ettibel” which is explained as a grouping of clans and other ravage groups into a political unit in hierarchical order under a single leader known as the “Amenokal” or owner of the land. The literal meaning of Ettibel is federation, and in the Tamasheq or Tuareg society


⁹⁵ Tewsit explains the general organization in the Tuareg federation that is made up of several clans, this organization on the basis of clan is what is known as Tewsit.

⁹⁶ Tamasheq refers to the Tuareg people or their language. The Tuaregs themselves throughout the various records of their history refer to themselves as the Kel Tamasheq, which literary means “those that speak Tamasheq”.

federations are seen to rise and fall, depending of course in the strength and organizing ability of the dominant groups politically.

The map below shows the Tuareg federation across many states within Africa. They spread across to Libya, Algeria, Niger, Tunisia, Morocco and Burkina Faso. It is clear from the map that only the Kel Adrar, Kel Tademekkat and the Kel Atazam are found in Mali. The Kel Ahaggar and Kel Ajjer are found in Algeria, while the Kel Gress , Kel Air, Kel Dinno are located in Niger. Although no groups were indicated for some of the other countries nevertheless the Tuaregs exist in these states.

Map 4 showing the Tuareg Federation across other states.



Source: Philippe Rekacewicz, “Le conflit Touareg” Journal Le Monde Diplomatique, April 1st, 1995. Accessed 28/05/14.

3.3 The Tuaregs and the Malian State

Since the advent of colonial rule in the French Sudan and later in Mali by the French in the 18th century, the Tuaregs were known to have strongly resisted the French, and were said to have recorded many successes against the French at certain times⁹⁷. As a result, the French were forced to formulate a particular policy towards the group in order to maintain control over the colony at all costs. The first phase of colonial rule was a period of confrontation between the French and the Tuaregs, but in the second phase, the group tended to have exhibited an attitude of indifference, which was considered reserved⁹⁸ by the French colonial administration who sometimes describes such attitude as “deceitful”. However, despite such attitude, the French appeared to have shown great interest in the culture of the Tuareg people in the French Sudan. Certain aspects of their culture such as the matrilineal transfer of power as well as their hierarchical nature and structure of their society made the Tuaregs appear as the mythical lords of the desert, whose political system came to be compared with that of the European feudal system⁹⁹.

It was observed that the myth surrounding the Tuaregs or Tamasheq as the lords of the desert did have a tremendous influence in the French colonial policy towards the group. While the French was seen to pursue a policy of transformation and modernization across the Sudan, it was seen to have maintained a policy that was described as “protective” towards the Tuaregs and their culture. The Tuaregs came to be exempted from forced military participation, forced labor and French education which were considered to be diametrically opposed to the Tuareg way of life. The French attitude towards the group came to be described as one based on sympathy and attraction, but at the same time the group was kept under strict surveillance by the French authorities. The French policy was seen to have been rendered ineffective since introducing any changes in the Tuareg society proved impossible. It was a policy that was widely seen as contradictory especially considering the surveillance on the group, combined with the sympathy and attraction of

⁹⁷ Baz Lecocq, “Disputed Desert: Decolonization, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern Mali”, *Afrika-Studiecentrum Series*, Volume 19, p 77.

⁹⁸ The French found it difficult to understand the laid back attitude exhibited by the Tuaregs, as they refused to participate in all colonial programs and policies and also showed no interest in the colonial politics of the time.

⁹⁹ J.S Lecocq, “The Desert is Our Country: Tuareg Rebellions and Competing Nationalisms in Contemporary Mali”, Ph.D Thesis, Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences, University of Amsterdam, 2002, p 45.

the French towards the group¹⁰⁰. The policy appeared to have adopted certain beliefs held by the Tuaregs regarding the rest of the groups within the French Sudan. The group tended to consider themselves the natural lords and masters over the black inhabitants of the French Sudan. The Tuareg views of social and racial relations appeared to have been accepted and justified by the French colonial administration, and these tended to have created an image of superiority of the Tuaregs over other groups during the colonial period. It was a policy that was seen to have been responsible for the division between the Tuaregs and other groups within the French Sudan and later the Malian nation.

Another issue that became a source of concern regarding the Tuaregs during the colonial period, remained that of slavery. While the abolition of slavery was considered as one of the primary reason or mission of the colonial masters, the French appeared reluctant to bring an end to slavery in the French Sudan which was prevalent among the Tuareg group. The slave problem which came to be known as the “bellah question” in Malian history identified the Tuaregs as slave holders and as such responsible for the continued perpetuation of slavery in the Sudan. At the same time the French colonial policy did not appear to have aided the emancipation of slaves, as the critical infrastructure needed for such emancipation was not created in the north where the Tuareg are settled. The French colonial administration failed to create liberty villages as they did in other parts of the Sudan, and no army recruitment or labor were created to offer the slaves an alternative occupation to the servitude they render to the Tuaregs. The French policy regarding slavery was described as one based on political interest. Certain clans among the Tuaregs including the Kel Hoggar and Kel Adagh had been allowed to retain their slaves and could also acquire more if they so wished¹⁰¹. Thus, the actions, policies and decisions of the French colonial administration over time came to be interpreted by other groups inhabiting the Sudan as favoring the Tuaregs.

It would appear that the issues highlighted above formed the basis of pre-independence colonial politics in the French Sudan. And at the onset of political activities which came to be dominated by two major political groups among others, which include the Keita led

¹⁰⁰ Baz Lecocq, “Disputed Desert: Decolonization, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern Mali”, *Afrika-Studiecentrum Series*, Volume 19, p 78.

¹⁰¹ See Klute, G., “Herren und sklaven, Zur frage der kolonialen sklavenpolitik in Franzosisch-West Afrika”, Willer, H. Et al. (eds.), “Macht der identitat=identitat der Macht. Polische prozesse und kulturller wandel in Afrika”(Munster 1995), p 53-241.

Union Soudanaise (US-RDA) which became the dominant party in the French Sudan and the Senegalese Parti Democratique Soudanais (PDS) which remained under Leopold Senghor, as well as the PDCI-RDA which came under Houphet-Boigny. Generally, the politics of this era and these political parties appeared to have focused on the Tamasheq or Tuareg societies, which were seen by these parties as not conforming to certain norms that exist across the Sudan and the general policies of the French colonial administration throughout the French Sudan. The emerging political parties which became instruments of anti-colonial struggle in the French Sudan, began to advocate certain changes within the Tamasheq society such as the slave question, and tended to demand the emancipation of all slaves¹⁰². Such activities remained the basis of the struggle for independence by the political groups which soon gained followership from among the peasant group who were mostly slaves. The pre-independence politics appeared to have been against the Tuaregs who were seen as the favorites of the French colonial administration¹⁰³. Such thinking and relations between the Tuaregs and the other group laid the foundation of post colonial politics after the attainment of independence in 1960. With the separation of Senegal from the Sudan republic after independence and the emergence of Mali as a republic, the Keita led US-RDA came to dominate all political offices and activities in Mali as the founding ruling party in the new republic. Although at this time many Africans did not show much interest in political affairs in Mali, however, it was noted that in post colonial as in the pre-colonial period, the Tuaregs did not show much interest in the politics of the country¹⁰⁴, this is even though a limited number do participate, but their activities remained within their domain. At the beginning the group's participation was limited and they did not present themselves for election into various offices.

It was noted that in 1955 only 26% of the total population of the French Sudan registered to vote in the National elections prior to the introduction of the universal adult suffrage

¹⁰² It is important to understand that despite the fact that slavery had been banned by the French colonial regime since 1905, the Tuaregs still maintained slaves, and it was known by the authorities. And so the emerging post colonial political parties whose programs were against slavery could not garner the support of the Tuaregs.

¹⁰³ As mentioned previously, the reluctance of the colonial regime to stop the Tuareg group from continuing to maintain slaves as well as their exemption from other policies of the French like forced labor and enlistment in the army made it clear that they were favored by the French among other groups in the French Sudan.

¹⁰⁴ "Les partis politiques en AOF et les consultations electorales de 1945 a 1955", No 8: Sudan.ANSOM-1 Affpol/2263/6.

system in 1956¹⁰⁵. And a comparative analysis of nomad voters and sedentary population voters to the 1946 constitutional Assembly showed that in the Kidal area, which is a Tuareg region, 243 people or 1.7% of the total population, participated in the election, and among these people 73 were Tuaregs¹⁰⁶. And it was generally based on this that many argued about the participation of the Tuaregs in election, as there is an indication of participation by the group. Though even in subsequent elections, it was observed that the participation of the group remained minimal, despite the fact that at this time the Chief of the Tuareg¹⁰⁷ had also established a party that came to be identified as the Parti Socialiste Progressif (PSP), and was generally identified with the group. However, several reasons were advanced for the little participation of the Tuaregs in the political affairs of Mali, both during the pre-independence period as well the post independence era. The first explanation for the group's low participation in political affairs has to do with geographical location. The Tuaregs generally remained in villages as nomads and as a result became isolated from the political centre as all major political activities were concentrated in the urban areas¹⁰⁸. The second is explained from the general lack of interest in politics by the group, whose leaders were tribal chiefs that appeared to have relied on the French authorities for their influence, and did not appear to have either interest or confidence in the emerging post colonial order which they perceived as against them¹⁰⁹. The third reason came to be explained from an educational point of view, as the Tuaregs it was observed, resisted French education in their respective areas at the time it was introduced by the colonial administration, until around 1947. The educational factor was seen to have impacted negatively to the collective achievements of the group, as it denied the group of many opportunities and positions in both the colonial administrative set up, as well as in the post independence politics of newly emerging Malian state¹¹⁰.

The emerging post colonial regime which came under the US-RDA or Modibbo Keita who was Mali's President at independence, introduced so many changes into the nation's socio-economic and political sectors, which were to have a profound effect not only on the

¹⁰⁵ Ibid .

¹⁰⁶ "Elections generales de 10 Novemeber 1946" Cercle de Kidal. ANM-FR 7D-67.

¹⁰⁷ Known also as the Amenokal, he is the leader of the Tuareg group. The Amenokal is a position that has been occupied by different people from among the Tuaregs.

¹⁰⁸ see Ag Attaher Insar, M.A, "La scolarisation moderne comme strategie de resistance", H. Claudat-Hawad (ed), "Tuaregs exil et resistance", REMMM 57(1990), P 91-97.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

Tuareg but the country in general. The Malian economy at this time came to be redesigned in line with the new political system or ideology which the US-RDA Keita led government envisioned for the Malian people. At independence the President was quoted as saying that socialism was the best option for Mali as a political system or ideology, a system he called "African Socialism". Under such a system, a planned economy was expected to be put in place which will be supervised by Keita through his cabinet and such policy will be directed at strengthening two basic sectors of the Malian economy which are assumed to have received less attention from the past colonial administration. These include the agricultural sector which received little attention, and the industrial sector which did not receive any attention at all from the previous colonial set up. The new economy was designed by foreign experts, a team headed by an Egyptian Economist known as Samir Amin and others who include Jean Benard and Jean Leroy who were all well known Marxists as well as Eli Lobel, an Israeli planner¹¹¹. The plan was said to have been adjusted to fit the realities of the new emerging nation, according to these experts and in part aims mainly at agricultural and rural modernization. And in accordance with the new policy plan, farmers across the nation were to be organized into cooperative groups and a credit scheme was introduced as well as the introduction of modern farming equipments and education to all Malian farmers.¹¹²

The Keita administration remained optimistic about its new economic policies in the country which gradually began to appear unsuccessful due to certain reasons. It was observed that the regime has sought to the said envisioned modernization policy of the Malian economy by sheer will power, the regime assumed that the transformation of the mentality of the Malian people from a traditional, to one of modern outlook is the only possible way of achieving such objective. Here, it is argued that the regime appeared to have mistaken political changes and the economy which may not be necessarily so, since political do not necessarily mean a change in the economy. The regime envisioned the reshaping of the Malian peasant society based on modern scientific socialist principles combined with the tradition and the Mande "spirit of industriousness". Modibbo Keita, who is also of Mande origin appeared to have formed an opinion that that the Mande people were serious, hardworking, stubborn, patient and loyal, which are qualities that he

¹¹¹ Jones, W, "Planning and economic policy: Socialist Mali and her neighbours", Washington, Three Continental Press, 1974, p 115.

¹¹² Jones, W, " The rise and demise of socialist institutions in rural Mali", Geneva- Afrique 11, p 19-44.

hoped will form the character of the new Malian nation. The regime saw the Malian nation as originally communally based, and that such communality was destroyed as a result of the introduction of the monetary economy during colonial rule. Many adjustments were made by the regime as a result of which many modern young and disadvantaged groups came to be promoted among women and other members of the lower castes and former slaves within the traditional decision making system. Rural development schools were established all over the country with the sole aim of providing education in modern agricultural techniques, while elementary schools were established to teach courses based on the structure of the new Malian government's ideology of Marxism/Leninism as well as the aims of the US-RDA as a party. The new changes it was expected will propel the transformation of the Malian society into a modern prosperous nation, as envisioned by the Keita led US-RDA government.

In order to achieve such economic objectives, the Keita led government had to take certain measures which they deemed necessary for it to succeed. The regime also realized that certain groups within the country may be opposed to the new policies which were introduced¹¹³, and this largely led to the formulation of more policies that would ensure the implementation and actualization of the core economic policies. However, it was observed that the new policies that were introduced to see to the actualization and successful implementation of the economic programs of the new state were resented by the Malian people and of course the Tuaregs in particular. The Malian state at independence it was observed lacked the resources necessary for the development of the country, especially under its new economic policy. And as a consequence the regime created what came to be known as "human investments¹¹⁴", and what it meant was that the Malian population was expected to work voluntarily to ensure the development of the country without expecting of any reward from the government. The regime further introduced a policy that entailed the conscription of young people into labor brigades which came to be organized under agricultural schemes throughout the country. The two policies appeared to have awakened and reminded the Malian population of the policies of the past colonial administration. While the human investment policy came to be closely associated with the forced labor

¹¹³ It was of course known to the regime that the Tuaregs among other groups may not welcome the new policies which resembled the forced labor policy of the French that the group strongly resisted under colonial rule.

¹¹⁴ S.N.E.D "Societe Nationale d' Etudes pour le Development" , 1980, p44.

under the colonial governments, the “service civic” which forced young people to work in various agricultural schemes across the country came to be seen as a replica of the “little farming soldiers” of the French colonial administration in Mali.

The immediate consequences of the two new policies by the Keita led administration was that it led to the emergence of what was previously known during the colonial administration as “labor migration”¹¹⁵. The people resisted being forced to work and to avoid any confrontation with the authorities, they resorted to migration to other cities both within and outside Mali. During the French colonial rule in Mali, the French Sudan served as a labor reserve for other colonies in the Congo and sometimes the Middle East. And people reacted and in thousands migrated across the West African region to avoid being taken to any of these colonies to work. And so when the Keita regime insisted on these policies, the system of labor migration returned to Mali¹¹⁶, and the government was now looking for a way to put a stop to such migration, as it is affecting the new economic policy very badly. Several attempts were made to put a stop to such migrations but failed and as such the government introduced what came to be considered as a travel permits¹¹⁷ which enabled people to travel within the country. It was observed that the rural-urban migration to centers such as Bamako was to enable them further migrate from these urban centers to neighboring states. The government hoped that the introduction of the permits would stop such movements both within and outside the Malian state.

At this time migration came to represent a kind of resistance by the Malian people against the policies of the Keita government and its new economic policies. It was reported that between November and December 1962, hundreds of Tuaregs living along the Western part of the Niger bend, around Hombori and Douentza migrated to Upper Volta (Burkina Faso)¹¹⁸. Although the reasons for migration were explained in different ways, many

¹¹⁵ Bogosian, C, “The Little Farming Soldiers: The Evolution of a Labour Army in Post Colonial Mali”, *Mande Studies* 5, 2003, p 83-100.

¹¹⁶ Labor migrations first started during colonial rule, and many tried to escape colonial forced labor by migrating either within or outside the country.

¹¹⁷ Bogosian, C, “The Little Farming Soldiers: The Evolution of a Labour Army in Post Colonial Mali”, *Mande Studies* 5, 2003, p 83-100.

¹¹⁸ It is not clear if they still lived there or not. It is known that many Tuaregs did not return to Mali especially after the outbreak of the first rebellion and its end, thereafter a Tuareg Diaspora was known to have developed in many West African countries.

agreed that it was to avoid paying taxes, forced labor as well as payment of dues to the Keita led US-RDA political party that was made mandatory to citizens.

Of all the groups present in Mali, it would appear that the new policies affected the Tuaregs the most. There are many reasons that try to explain why the group felt most disturbed by the new policies. The Tuaregs were the only group in Mali that were exempted from forced labor and military recruitment during the period of French colonial rule in Mali. As such, the policies appeared completely strange to the group, in fact what made it worst and unacceptable was the practice of forced labor for the women by the Keita government. In the Tuareg tradition, women were free from work and only performed their domestic responsibilities of cooking and fixing tents, women who worked in the Tuareg societies were considered to be of lower social status, but even then, they only performed the role of goat herders. In the Tuareg society, the domestic slaves usually undertake all sorts of labor that include fetching water and fire woods, and the concept of labor and general world view is seen to differ between the Tuaregs inhabiting the north and the other groups inhabiting southern Mali which is considered Bambara and Mande which are the dominant groups.

Many argued that right from the inception of the new country, the historical foundations of the country was based on the history of the Mande and the Bambara nation¹¹⁹, and Keita himself, who emerged as president at independence was of Mande descent. It was maintained that the elements that made up national discourse and identity building were derived from the Mande culture and history¹²⁰. It was also observed that even the adoption of the name Mali was a reflection of the ancient Mali Empire which was founded by the Mande and Bambara peoples. At independence many African states changed their names and took neutral names to avoid ethnic problems as colonial borders came to put different people in one country irrespective of history and culture. Nations such as Benin which was formerly known as the kingdom of Dahomey changed to Benin republic for such reasons, just as the Gold coast avoided adopting the famous Asante empire name and took a new name known as Ghana. These countries avoided their ancient famous names mainly to

¹¹⁹ The Bambara People are part of the Mande people and constitute the majority among the Mande people. About 80% of the Malian population speaks the Bambara language regardless of ethnicity as a result of the dominance of the group over other groups, particularly among the Mande people.

¹²⁰ See Campmas, P, " L' Union Soudanaise R.D.D: L' histoire d' un grand parti politique africain". Communications Intercontinental, Abidjan, 1978 .

avoid ethnic tension in their various emerging states and as such the adoption of Mali was explained to mean the dominance of a part of its population in the affairs of the new state by the Mande or the Bambara people¹²¹

The above perception is sometimes used to explain why the Tuaregs of the north since the founding of the new nation continued to consider themselves separate from the Malian government. Scholars tend to explain the independence and the indifference of the Tuareg group to the Malian state as that of competing nationalisms between them and the Malian state. Although it is known that the group had maintained such attitude even during the colonial period, but it became more pronounced after independence. The Tuareg, from their actions did not wish to be part of the Malian state and generally tend to envision a Tuareg nation that is politically independent. And the Malian state on the other hand favored a single state embodying the various groups within it, including the Tuaregs. The Malian state envisioned a truly united country with all the groups promoting the interest of the state.

It was observed also that the Keita regime itself was aware of the sour relations that existed between the Malian state and the Tuaregs and from the beginning formulated policies that were seen to be favorable to the group with a view to create a positive image of the new regime and the Malian state in the eyes of the group. Keita did this by maintaining the tribal chiefs as well as recruiting local administrators from among the Tuaregs for a period of time and thereafter introduced a new policy.¹²² However, with the formulation of these new economic policies by the Keita regime, it succeeded in creating bitter relations not only between it (regime) and the Tuaregs, but also with other groups that opposed the policies and considered them oppressive within the country. With the Tuaregs in particular the economic policies were not the only grievance it had with the regime, but rather the policies formed part of the reasons why it was reacting openly and opposing the regime. The Tuaregs had generally blamed the administration for failing to include some of its educated elements in the governance of the new nation even within the northern area which

¹²¹ ¹²¹ Baz Lecoq, "Disputed Desert: Decolonization, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern Mali", Afrika-Studiecentrum Series, Volume 19, p 62.

¹²² Baz Lecoq, "Disputed Desert: Decolonization, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern Mali", Afrika-Studiecentrum Series, Volume 19, p 116.

is considered as the base of the group¹²³. The Keita administration refused to give any consideration in terms of appointments to the group after it abolished the tribal chiefs system that prevailed in the colonial period. The regimes refusal to appoint the educated Tuaregs was explained by many as a form of distrust¹²⁴ which the regime harbored against the group. But, the regimes denial of such appointment further became a source of concern and discontentment among the Tuareg group for the Keita led government, which in its early days tried to win the support of the group¹²⁵.

And prior to the adoption of migration as a form of resistance by the Tuareg and other groups within Mali that were opposed to the regimes new policies, the Keita government had announced as part of the new policies, the introduction of the Malian Franc as a new currency¹²⁶. The introduction of the new currency tended to have given the government control over imports and exports from, as well as to neighboring countries. Such policy was not seen to have gone down well with Dioula community, a group of the Madinka people and descendants of the old Mali Empire who were actively involved in trading activities and was said to have resulted to a protest by the group in Bamako on 20 July, 1962. The Dioula community protested against the Keita regime with slogans such as “long live France, down with the Malian Franc and down with Mali and its government of infidels¹²⁷”. Following the protest, many people were arrested by the Keita government and tried. Generally the regime accused those arrested of conspiracy against the state and in October same year the tribunal made its verdict known and in accordance with the verdict, 77 merchants received various punishments or sentences ranging from one year imprisonment to twenty years of forced labor in the Kidal prison. Those accused of organizing the protest on the other hand were given death sentences by the regime. They

¹²³ It this point the group did not make clear their intention or at least not openly, but the actions of the group clearly showed that they were not interested in the new arrangement. But at the same time they did not declare if they wanted to be independent or not. These were just grievances being expressed by the group and may form reasons for future disagreements with the Malian state.

¹²⁴ Baz Lecoq, “Disputed Desert: Decolonization, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern Mali”, Afrika-Studiecentrum Series, Volume 19, p 117.

¹²⁵ The Keita led US (RDA) had tried to win the support of the Tuaregs, however after the elections and subsequent introduction of new policies, the Tuaregs and the Keita government fell apart.

¹²⁶ Ibid, p 70.

¹²⁷ “Une nouvelle etape dans l’ affirmation de la personalite de notre jeune nation”, l’ Essor, 03/07/1962

include; Fily Dabo Sisiko, Mamadou Dicko and Kassoum Toure, but the Keita regime later changed the death sentences to life sentences with hard labor in Kidal¹²⁸.

After the protests it became clear that a confrontation was brewing up between the Malian government on the one hand and other groups within the Malian country, including the Tuaregs. Such confrontation came to manifest after the migration of some of the Tuaregs that lived in the western part of Niger to Upper Volta. The Keita regime at first did not react to the migration, but Keita was said to have later visited the area and appealed to the people of the area to desist from such migration¹²⁹. At about the same time, some government agents were killed in the area and obviously by the people in the area which include the Tuaregs. The government responded to these killings by sending 2 commando units to put a stop to the migration taking place in the area. In a particular clash between the fleeing population and the stationed commando unit in the area about 50 civilians were said to have lost their lives¹³⁰. And from this two events; the protest by Dioula group and the clash with the Malian soldiers as a result of the migration of the Malian population to foreign countries, it became clear that the Keita led US-RDA regime did not have or was losing control of the country^{131 132}. Prior to the occurrence of this two events, resistance to the regime by the Tuareg group has often been expressed in the form non-payment of tax, dues to the US-RDA party¹³³ and general disobedience to government instructions until the two confrontations, which were later followed by a rebellion by the Tuaregs in the following year (1963) which came to be known as the Afellaga or the Tuareg rebellion of 1963 in history.

¹²⁸ Baz Lecooq, "Disputed Desert: Decolonization, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern Mali", *Afrika-Studiecentrum Series*, Volume 19, p71.

¹²⁹ Baz Lecooq, "Disputed Desert: Decolonization, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern Mali", *Afrika-Studiecentrum Series*, Volume 19, p70.

¹³⁰ *Ibid*, p 70.

¹³¹ Here it must be understood that the Keita government did not collapse, but was grappling with a lot of internal problems.

¹³² J.S Lecocq, "The Desert is Our Country: Tuareg Rebellions and Competing Nationalisms in Contemporary Mali (1946-1996)", *Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences, University of Amsterdam*. p101.

¹³³ This was money being paid for membership by the public to the Keita led US-RDA which was the political party in power at that time.

3.4 The Tuareg Rebellion of 1963

The 1963 rebellion has been explained from various perspectives, while the rebellion is sometimes seen as primarily arising from the increase in taxes by the Malian administration which came to be resisted by certain groups among the Tuaregs and other people that were dissatisfied with the Keita regime and its policies, such as the Adagh and the Ifoghas. The rebellion is seen as arising not because of tax increment, and that the various Tuareg groups paid no tax at all and that it was basically for this reason that the Malian administration set out to punish them¹³⁴ and in the process the rebellion was declared by the group. But again, a careful observation of the rebellion will reveal that it was a combination of certain factors and events that took place overtime. Some of these factors may be considered historical, especially if one takes a look at the politico-historical development of the Tuareg as group in Mali since the pre-colonial period, and through the period of colonial rule as well as the relations that existed between the Malian state and the group from the post independence era¹³⁵.

Since the protests preceding the introduction of the Malian Franc and the clash between the commando units and the fleeing population in Mali, which mainly consisted of the Tuaregs, the Malian government appeared to have become uncomfortable with the situation in the country. If anything, the authorities came to the realization of their incapacity to fully have control over the newly emerging country. And from then on, the regime began to exhibit certain temperamental tendencies, and over reacting over very little issues. Such behavior on the other hand was seen to have made Tuaregs assume that breaking away from the Malian state was very possible at some point. This was what came to characterize the relations between the Malian state and the Tuaregs on the eve of the outbreak of the rebellion. The Malian administration made several attempts to win the confidence of various groups among the Tuaregs, as did the French during colonial rule

¹³⁴ J.S Lecocq, "The Desert is Our Country: Tuareg Rebellions and Competing Nationalisms in Contemporary Mali (1946-1996)", Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences, University of Amsterdam. p78.

¹³⁵ It is clear that the rebellion did not take place over night, and moreover it is important to look at the history of the Tuaregs themselves as a people that have been described as a war like nation, whose principal occupation was raiding, and then look at other development such as how the group found itself under colonial rule and other conditions that accompanied such colonial occupation, and the post independence developments as well.

such as the Adagh and the Ifoghas¹³⁶ but such attempts did yield any positive results. Another factor that was seen to have further complicated the relations between the Malian state and the Tuaregs was the spread of all manner of rumors, which had the effect of making things appear very intangible, and issues became misrepresented and misinterpreted, just as the atmosphere continued to create fear and mutual suspicion between the two sides.

The international setting also influenced and magnified the fears of the Malian government, especially concerning its borders and the Tuareg settlements along these borders. Many Tuareg groups located along the border were fleeing to Niger Republic, a country that opted to maintain ties with the French even after independence unlike the Malian state that chose the socialist path and tended to have broken its traditional ties with France in neo-colonial dependency. In Mauritania, French presence remained strong and the French maintained troops in the country even after independence, while in Algeria, the war of independence was still going on, but the war has not reached the southern part of the country which is occupied by the Tuaregs in that country. Attempts had been made to include certain groups among the Tuaregs such as the Kel Hoggar and Kel Agger into the Forces de Liberation National (FLN), there was strong military presence of the French and many officers that served in Mali got transferred after the independence of Mali to Algeria¹³⁷. The presence of these former colonial officers that served in Mali and were now serving in this neighboring states, naturally made the Malian authorities very nervous. The Malian government became concerned and suspicious of a sinister plan or agenda by the French to stir some kind of unrest within Mali, using the Kel Adagh. The Malian administration somehow convinced itself that the French were still interested in Mali, though such suspicion is without any concrete evidence¹³⁸.

The suspicions of the Malian authorities was confirmed when the minister of interior wrote a letter to the commandant in the north about the presence of French spies and agitators in

¹³⁶ These are all clans within the Tuareg federation. As discussed, the Tuareg society is organized along Tewsit(clans) lines, and these are many in the Tamasheq (Tuareg) world, bearing different names as seen with the Ifogha and the Adagh above.

¹³⁷ Valet, M, "Les Tuoregs du Hoggar entre decolonization et independences 1954-1974".

¹³⁸ J.S Lecocq "The Desert is Our Country: Tuareg Rebellions and Competing Nationalisms in Contemporary Mali (1946-1996)", Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences, University of Amsterdam. p 104.

Mali as far back as October 1960¹³⁹. Added to this was the presence of the French military at the air force base near Tessalit in northern Mali which it continued to maintain even after independence as well as the presence of FLN fighters, which initially came on the invitation of the Malian government as a policy of support for the independence of Algeria. The two issues i.e the presence of the French officer and the FLN fighters and their training camps in the north, an area largely dominated by the Tuareg was to later become a source of concern for the Malian state. The result was that the FLN became deeply involved in Mali as they were offered Malian passports and with time began to recruit the local population into their ranks, and this local population mainly consisted of the Tuaregs. The FLN planned to launch a new front in the Algerian independence from Mali with the recruited Tuaregs. Because of location and certain relations the Tuaregs came exert certain influence over both the FLN and the French officers at the air force base which were both located in their neighborhood. These were to later become a source of concern for the Malian regime and was said to have added to the general confusion, fear and distrust that characterized the relations between the Tuaregs and the Malian regime, especially with possibility of a revolt by the Tuaregs looming high.

Under such circumstances, rumors began going round among the Tuaregs of a new cattle policy by the Malian government, which also coincided with an increment in tax for cattle. Under the new cattle nationalization policy¹⁴⁰, cattle could now only be sold within Mali, and the Tuaregs usually sold their cattle in neighboring countries and particularly since the introduction of the Malian Franc, they focused on foreign markets in Algeria, Mauritania and Niger for their cattle. As matter of fact the Tuaregs perceived the introduction of the Malian Franc as a deliberate policy to curtail the export of cattle and at this time sought clarification from the Malian authorities regarding the cattle nationalization policy.

In the past, there existed some misunderstanding between the Tuaregs and certain tax collection officers known as the “gourmiers”. And during one incidence a “gourmier” was engaged in an argument with a Tuareg named Inadjelim ag Ebanzen who was a noble among the Iforgoumoussen clan and that in the course of such argument over the tax matter, the “gourmier” was reported to have shot and killed Inadjelim. Following this

¹³⁹Guillemin, J, “Les campagnes militaires française de la decolonization en Afrique Sud-Saharaine” Mois en Afrique XVII, 1982, p 136.

¹⁴⁰ Based on Chef d’ Arrondissement de Tessalit a Commandant du cercle de Kidal. 27/08/62, Confidential no../AT/CF.ACK.

development, a delegation from the Ifogha clan of the Tuaregs made a complaint officially about the killing, insisting that the *gourmiers* employed brutal and inhuman methods in collecting taxes from them. At the same time, family members of the killed Tuareg attacked and took revenge on the “*gourmier*”. These developments created a very tense atmosphere in the country, thus making the possibility of a revolt eminent¹⁴¹, especially as communication between the Tuaregs and the Malian authorities somehow became a little difficult and both parties continued to rely on rumors for information about one another. Meanwhile, fears that the French were planning a neo-colonial attack¹⁴² grew high among the Malian state officials, with certain developments taking place in Dakar and the general presence of French troops in neighboring Niger, Algeria and Mauritania. The Malian authorities tended to have a belief of a possible collaboration between the Tuareg group who are now dissatisfied with the new policies in the country, and that the French may arm the Tuareg against the Malian state. Not only that, the Malian regime also thought the Algerian FLN fighters were also likely to support the Tuaregs in the event of any revolt against the Malian nation. The alliance between the FLN fighters and the Tuaregs was contemplated from a racial point of view, as both groups share certain physical characteristics with light skin, unlike the Negroid population in southern Mali¹⁴³. And also given the fact that the training camp of the FLN is situated in the north among the Tuaregs and relations were seen to have developed between the FLN and the Tuareg local community.

3.4.1 Declaration of Rebellion by the Tuaregs

The famous 1963 rebellion began after Elladi ag Alla, son of Alla ag Albachir¹⁴⁴ and Touteka ag Effand attacked a group of *gourmiers* (tax officials) on the 15th May, 1963 and seized their guns and equipments. The *gourmier*, Ahyaya ag Quarezza was on a mission to Timiaouene when the duo of Elledi ag Alla and Touteka ag Effand stopped them and after taking their weapons, ordered the rest of the group to go and inform certain slaves at a

¹⁴¹ Gouverneur de Gao a Commandant du cercle de Kidal, 20/05/1960.ACK.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ J.S Lecocq “The Desert is Our Country: Tuareg Rebellions and Competing Nationalisms in Contemporary Mali (1946-1996)”, Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences, University of Amsterdam. , p 118.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, p 129.

location known as Bouressa that they were around.¹⁴⁵ This singular act was said to have marked the beginning of the 1963 Tuareg rebellion against the Malian state. Interestingly, the Afellaga is often linked to the resistance against the French that was led by Alla ag Albachir who was a member of one of the Adagh's leading clan known as the Irayaken, who at one time were said to have headed the Ifogha clan, which is seen to be leading all of the Kel Adagh Tuaregs. It was reported that during the period of colonial rule, Alla ag Albachir refused to obey all power, he refused to recognize the authority of both the French colonizers as well as that of the local Tuareg chief known as Amenokal Attaher ag Illi, who was obeyed by all the Tuareg groups¹⁴⁶. Alla ag Albachir lived his life as an outlaw and became very popular among the Kel Adagh in particular as a hero as a result his defiance against the French colonizers. Alla Albachir was a member of one of the Tuaregs' leading clan, the Irayaken, who at a point in time had influence over the Ifoghas of which they are a sub group.

Interestingly, the 1963 revolt was also started and led by Elledi ag Alla, the son of Alla ag Albachir, and came to be explained as a kind of legacy handed over to him by his father Alla ag Albachir. The Tuaregs never considered Alla Albachir as a common bandit as the French and other groups considered him. The Tuaregs regarded Albachir as a resistance fighter that resisted foreign domination and control, and generally considered him and all such people that resisted the French as the predecessors of the Afellaga (rebellion). Alla ag Albachir was said to have been killed when Elledi was only about seven years old, and in Tuareg tradition, the concept of Egha (revenge) was highly considered and it was expected that if Elledi grew up and came to know those who assassinated his father, then it was mandatory that he should avenge the killing of his father. Egha in Tuareg society is considered as a debt that one contracts against certain people that are considered to have stained one's honor, or a family honor and prestige, and caused shame either individually or collectively¹⁴⁷. The significance of Egha as a reason in the organization of resistance against a particular people by the Tuareg group cannot be down played. Elledi was quoted as saying that he became a rebel specifically to avenge the killing of his father under the

¹⁴⁵ Probably these slaves were among slaves taken away from the Tuaregs at independence since slavery had been banned since the colonial period, but the Tuaregs continued to have slaves and the French colonial masters did not do anything to stop them. But the coming Malian regime insisted on the policy of banning slavery and as a result took away many slaves and freed them from the Tuareg group.

¹⁴⁶ Baz Lecocq, "Disputed Desert: Decolonization, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellion in Northern Mali, Afrika-Studiecentrum Series, Volume 19, p 157.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, p 157.

French administration, after a group of Malian security personnel confessed to have participated in his father killing, while threatening to end his life the way they did to his father in a boastful manner. And the gourmiers that Elledi attacked at the beginning of the Afellaga were among those that confessed to have killed his father, and was said to have specifically made such attack with the aim of revenge or Egha in Tuareg tradition, which is binding on him. And so from here one can see that Alla ag Albachir led the resistance of the French during colonial rule, while his son Elledi is seen to have led or started¹⁴⁸ such resistance against the Malian state after independence. It was reported that the French never had full control over the Tuareg at all because there were people who always resisted power with violence. After the outbreak of the rebellion, a mission of the US-RDA officials and chiefs was sent to negotiate with the rebels and at such meeting the officials were said to have made clear the consequences of revolting against the state. But in response the rebelling Tuareg group made clear their aims and grievances which are clearly stated below;

“We fight for our independence, we don’t want any of this Mali, and the leaders have no patience. They throw us into prison for no reason. There are heavy taxes and exaggerated custom duties. We are beaten, chained and enslaved in front of our women and children. And the marriage act does not conform to Islamic custom. We are against Mali because all its institutions are anti-religious and against us. We want our independence, that is all we look for, but we cannot stay in Mali. We are against all the principles of the party and government.¹⁴⁹”

It appears that the declaration above did not consist of the entire reasons for, or feelings and grievances harbored by the Tuareg group against the Malian government. A captured rebel known as Amoukson ag Azandeher when interviewed revealed other concerns regarding the revolt. According to him, the Tuareg or nomads in the north found it inconceivable to take command from the black population of the south which they always consider as inferior and servants or slaves. He reiterated the position of the Tuareg as one opposed to racial equality, and as gaining nothing from Malian independence apart from taxes. He further accused the Malian state of arrogance and feelings of superiority over the chiefs of the Tuaregs without any consideration to their opinion and status in the affairs of

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, p 157-158.

¹⁴⁹ Dicko, “ Process verbal de compte rendu de mission”, n.d (+/-30/10/1963).ACK..

the country. He finally accused the Malian regime of high handedness and general maltreatment through its gendarmerie (soldiers)¹⁵⁰.

It however remained surprising to many how a few people could declare a revolt against a whole country that has thousands of well armed soldiers equipped with modern equipments like tanks, war planes and heavy artillery. Although by their very nature the Tuaregs are known to be a warrior nation and are known to have full knowledge of the terrain in the north which at the same time favors their tactics of ambush in warfare and surprise attacks since the pre-colonial period. But this according to many was certainly not enough to stand against a modern state in warfare. Certainly the group may have been assured of total support by all the various Tuareg groups, but certainly even that would not be enough to assure the group of victory and so such many wondered as to what may have motivated the group to confidently take up arms against the Malian nation¹⁵¹?

Here also it can be said that the suspicions of the Malian government of a possible collaboration between the Tuaregs and the Algerian FLN as well as the French was indeed a possibility. At least it became clear that the group had expected some kind of support from both the Algerian government and France in their struggles or rebellion against the Malian state. This hope and expectation of support from these two countries sometimes explains how a handful of people with no adequate arms and equipment would declare a rebellion against a state with soldiers, an air force and equipment for warfare that are well sophisticated. Such expectations of the rebels became revealed and clear after the capture of certain Tuaregs from among the rebels who spoke about the intentions and hopes of the group regarding the rebellion. The revelations from the captured rebels further made clear that the group did not have a clear idea or hope for victory and when such victory would be achieved. They also admitted to the military superiority of the Malian government over them, yet they remained hopeful of achieving victory someday. The captured rebels further revealed and confirmed the fears of the Malian authorities that they were counting on foreign support regarding their cause in diplomatic and military terms, and specifically expected such support from the Algerian government and France. It would appear sometimes also from such revelations that the group did not actually have any hope of

¹⁵⁰ Questions poses pae le Capitaine Diarra, Commandant la C.S.M er le Cercle de Kidal, "au rebelle Amouksou ag Azandeher", Kidal, 04/10/1963.ACK..

¹⁵¹Baz Lecocq, "Disputed Desert: Decolonization, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellion in Northern Mali, Afrika-Studiecentrum Series, Volume 19 , p 160.

achieving military victory over that Malian army in the real sense, but hoped that as the fighting intensifies, probably with the diplomatic support of France and Algeria independence from Mali could be achieved^{152 153}.

It was reported that the deposed Tuareg Amenokal (chief), Zeyd ag Attaher, who enjoys tremendous support from the Tuareg group was said to have been very optimistic of a Tuareg country, and had shared such optimism of the possibility of a Tuareg nation with other people from among the Tamasheq. Prominent among such Tuaregs with whom he shared such ideas are Amegha ag Sherif, who was among the few educated Tuaregs in Mali and whose early activism in the Tamasheq struggles led to his arrest and subsequent imprisonment by the Malian authorities. He upon release in 1962, moved to Algeria where he came to be employed at the French nuclear base. While working at the nuclear base, he was able to secure employment for many Tuaregs of Malian origin at the nuclear base, who in turn gave part of their income as contribution for the purchase of arms by Amegha in preparation for the expected rebellion. The deposed Tuareg chief had gathered many other personalities by this time from among the group who also shared his plans, and were continuing to make contacts with other from among the Adagh and non Adagh people as well. People like Ayyouba ag Mohammed Adargajoug, who was the chief of Tamesna, which are not part of the Kel Adagh. It was alleged with the help of the Tamesna chief in financial aid, about 30 rifles were purchased from certain French men working at the nuclear site.¹⁵⁴ Another group under the Tuareg chief, Zeyd include Sidi Alamine ag Cheick, who defected from being a gourmier to fight for the Tuaregs, his brother Issouf ag Cheick, and this group proved important in the preparation for the rebellion. Issouf it was who broke into an arms depot in Timbuktu and made away with many guns, arms, ammunitions and battle customs and fled to Algeria with his brother to join other rebels at

¹⁵² Questions posees par le Captain Diarra, Commandant la C.S.M. et le Cercle de Kidal, "au rebelle Amouksou ag Azandeher", Kidal,04/10/1963.ACK..

¹⁵³ There was no formal contact actually between the either the French or the Algerians and the Tuaregs. However, there are indications that some informal relations definitely existed between the group and the French, and the Algerians as well. First, if we will recall, some of the injured Tuareg fighters were mostly treated by French Doctors or citizens at the French Nuclear facility in Algeria. Secondly, it is well known that the Algerian border was widely open for the Tuaregs, and they mobilized all attacks from Algeria, and it is unimaginable that the Algerian authorities may have not been aware of the groups movement, and did not make any attempt to stop or arrest any member of the group.

¹⁵⁴ Questions posees par le Captain Diarra, Commandant la C.S.M. et le Cercle de Kidal, "au rebelle Amouksou ag Azandeher", Kidal,04/10/1963.ACK..

the nuclear site. Another group consisting of the notorious Elledi ag Alla¹⁵⁵, who had taken revenge on Ahyaya ag Quarezeza, the gourmier who was partly responsible for the death of Elledi's father, and Elledi's group met the other groups. Elledi, Zeyd and the rest of the groups met at Tidjin and took the decision and reached a conclusion that the time for the revolt was ripe, Elledi's encounter with gourmiers seemed to have justified their assumption. From a total of about 10 men, the group continued to enlarge until it reached about 250 men. These men appeared and dressed in green battle dresses, not wearing the usual indigo robes, mounted on camels and holding rifles, though mostly outdated. The uniforms were meant to indicate or represent that of a liberation army for the independence of Tuareg nation, at the same time it was meant to send a message to the Malian state. However, the choice of the color green came to be explained from a different angle, especially as it coincided with the colors of the French forces. And as such came to be explained as a strategy¹⁵⁶ to deceive the Malian army into believing that the French were invading Mali or in any case were supporting or behind the Tuaregs in their attempt to break away from the Malian nation.

3.4.2 General Organization and Operations

At the beginning of the rebellion, the Tuareg fighters generally organized themselves into three main zones of operation. Although several units were sometimes formed within these zones, these units sometimes fluctuated in nature and size, and leadership as well, as the occasion may demand. A normal or average unit usually consisted of between 20-30 people to be engaged in operations. It is interesting to note that the unarmed civilian population among the Tuareg that did not partake in warfare or military assault, played the role of spies and generally tried to gather as much information as possible about enemy movement (Malian army) and its advances towards the group or its plans generally through various contacts within and outside the Adagh area. The three zones of operation created by the Tuaregs include the Timetrine zone, which is a plain area west of the Adagh Mountains, and the zone came under the leadership of Sidi Alamine and Issouf ag Cheick. The second zone came under the leadership the famous Elledi ag Alla and Ikhrou Saloum and was located from mount Tigharghar and mount Doriet to Bouressa, and southward to

¹⁵⁵ Elledi ag Alla is considered to have started the rebellion because he was the first to attack and kill a gourmier, and is considered to have inspired the revolt proper against the Malian state.

¹⁵⁶

Kidal. Whereas the third and last zone came under the control of Azzezen ag Iksa and Mohammed ag Amane and was located at mount Quzzein and southwards. In considering the leadership of the various zones, certain factors were taken into consideration and these factors appeared quite logical. Familiarity of the terrain and area by the leaders of the various zones was considered highly significant, and as such the appointments of the leaders were reflective of their knowledge of the terrain and the areas to which they were appointed to lead. Knowledge of the areas was not restricted to the leaders alone, but so also the unit members to be deployed in the various areas¹⁵⁷. As such the various unit members deployed were people who were well acquainted with the terrain and the areas they were to serve and also came to be organized according to Tewsit or clan affiliation of the respective areas¹⁵⁸.

The Tuaregs generally mobilized arms from several sources, however, Algeria remained the main source of supply of arms for the revolt. An arms smuggling outlet had existed since colonial times and arms such as the Mamsers and Bouchetas, German and Italian rifles used in WW 2 as well as the French MAS-36 rifles which were cheap and affordable, became readily available to the group even as its membership expanded. It became very easy for more weapons to be purchased; sometimes even sophisticated weapons were available through other sources apart from those mentioned. Many of such sophisticated weapons came too shipped from Morocco by Mohammed Ali ag Attaher Insar and mainly consisted of battle dresses and Egyptian automatic rifles and ammunitions. Camels came to be used by the Tuaregs as means of transportation during the revolt, and this was explained to have been effective since the Tuareg area or northern Mali is usually covered with bolder formations and sharply broken stones. It was seen as a terrain that is much easier to cross using camels instead of cars. As the motorized Malian forces were seen to be effective only in an open terrain and generally encountered a lot of difficulty using vehicles in the area.¹⁵⁹ All Tuareg operations were planned at the Takormiasse base in Algeria and most attacks were usually in the form of raids on camels at fixed army posts. Units were usually composed, Mounts, arms and ammunitions usually distributed, while routes to take

¹⁵⁷ J.S Lecocq, "The Desert is Our Country: Tuareg Rebellions and Competing Nationalisms in Contemporary Mali (1946-1996)", Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences, University of Amsterdam. P 140- 141.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid p 140.

¹⁵⁹ Interrogatoire du prisonnier rebelle Eladi ag Alla par le Capitaine Diby Silas Diarra, Commandant d'armes et du Cercle de Kidal, 13/03/1964.ACK..

to Mali and back to Algeria for distribution of such materials depended on certain factors and information regarding the Malian authorities and army which were to be avoided. Units usually moved at night and remained hiding during the day, and as a tactic, only small forces were attacked by the group and when a rebel is captured, planned operations were usually cancelled to avoid any leak of information on such planned operations. Attacks in Mali were usually quick and the rebels retreat as fast as possible to Algeria where they remained safe from the Malian forces.¹⁶⁰

The Malian government responded to the rebellion by first deploying the local *gourmier* forces, and by August 1963, when the GNIG 14 *gourmier* forces appeared unable to suppress the revolt, the Malian government further deployed the 8th CCA forces, and again the 10th CCA, and as the fighting continued to escalate, the Malian government continued to increase its men steadily as the rebellion persisted. Between September and October 1963, 3 units were created, and the first CCA unit remained at Segou, while two other units came to be created, which include an artillery unit and a commando Saharan motorize unit, which came under the command of Captain Diby Sillas Diarra stationed in the Adagh area. The commando unit was said to have consisted of about 400 men and by October, it was reported that about 3 more units were further deployed to the Adagh area (north). An average of about 2,200 men, 35 armored cars, 2 airplanes and a high number of sophisticated heavy arms had been deployed and used in fighting the rebels who numbered only about 200 by October 1963. And by March 1964, most of the Malian units had retreated and the commando units were further reinforced with 20 vehicles from the Bamako based tank squadron. The number of men and equipment maintained by the Malian army in the fight against the rebel by 1964, was put at about 1,500 men, 40 armored cars, 160 vehicles (tanks, jeeps etc) and about 200,00 liters of fuel and food were mobilized to Kidal to maintain men and equipments¹⁶¹.

Despite the huge amount of arms, equipments and men deployed by the Malian government against the Tuareg rebels, the Malian army appeared unable to bring an end to the rebellion. Several reasons were advanced for such failure, and mostly seem to be associated with the geography and terrain of the Adagh region (northern Mali). The rough terrain of the region helped in demobilizing the vehicles of the Malian army, which came

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ This was based on; Mali, "Tableau des forces armee et forces publiques du Mali au 1er mai", 1964. CHETOM-15 H 77-2c.

to be under constant repair, and in some cases spare parts weren't readily available. This had the effect of bringing about logistical problems in the transportation of men, materials, food and even fuel to sustain the operation, and as a consequence affected the effectiveness of the Malian army and the operation. The landscape of the Adagh area, with its mountains, has been described as most favorable for ambush tactics, which the Tuaregs were famous for, since pre-colonial times. The terrain was not suitable for motorized forces, and this appeared to have given the Tuaregs an advantage over the Malian army, as the group used camels in the fight against the Malian army. Additionally, the Tuaregs were very familiar with the terrain and the entire Adagh region and all its surrounding mountains and as such it was easy to lay ambush and attack the Malian troops unexpectedly.

3.4.3 Victory of the Malian Army and End of Rebellion

Just as some factors were seen to have worked against the victory of the Malian army against the rebels, certain factors were seen also to have been responsible for the inability of the Tuaregs to defeat or succeed against the Malian army in their mission. Two factors become immediately identifiable, one factor is considered internal and from within the Tuareg group, while the second is considered as an external factor. The first factor which is considered internally and within the group, is the split within the group. The death of the Tuareg Chief, Amenokal Attaher ag Illi II, had caused division among the Ifogha clan and resulted in succession disputes among them. Thus, the group became divided between supporters of Zeyd (rebels) who is the son of the Ifogha Tuaregs chief Ag Attaher who died, and those of Intalla, the new chief, Zeyd's group generally viewed the new chief and those loyal to him as loyal to the Malian government. And such suspicion became clear when the new chief, clearly under instructions from the Malian authorities, contacted the rebels with a view to persuading them to surrender and abandon the rebellion. It was reported that many of those loyal to the new chief, never actually supported the rebellion and rather tended to look at the rebels as some bunch of thieves and therefore refused to give their support for the revolt. On the external front, the high hopes for support which the Tuaregs expected from the governments of Algeria and France did not materialize, despite the fact that the group secured some support from the two countries. The rebels enjoyed the liberty of staying and moving to Algeria at any given time, and used the French nuclear site as their base for all their operations. And at the same time the group received some

support in the form of sales of certain arms and ammunitions and medication from the French officials at the nuclear base¹⁶². It is not very clear why the French were collaborating with the Tuareg rebels.

The Tuaregs were generally considered to have been naïve, and greatly misunderstood the inner workings of international politics. Zeyd was considered a man of great diplomatic skills, and in the Tuareg tradition, personal contact was considered most significant in diplomacy. And as a result Zeyd, having made some contacts in Algeria through FLN, and some French administrative personnel in Algeria, became highly optimistic of the results of his contact with people from the two countries through some of their officials. Zeyd had expected that the two countries would render total support to the Tuareg cause based on his discussions with their officials.¹⁶³ However, these expectations came to be viewed with reservations, and such expectations were considered unrealistic, especially when existing relations at that time between Mali and the government in Algeria were considered excellent. The French on the other hand could not risk supporting the rebels, since it was already facing violent opposition from the FLN, and could not risk some of its highly important interests in Algeria, including the nuclear base, as such the Tuareg rebels were left to stand alone.

Despite all the realities on the ground, Zeyd still remained optimistic of support and decided to contact the Algerian government again and to remind it of its earlier promise to support the Tuareg cause. Zeyd was said to have made a request to speak with the Algerian President, Ahmed Ben Bella, as well as to be provided with transportation to Algiers. Zeyd's requests were met by the Algerian authorities, but unknown to Zeyd, the Malian Chief of Staff had visited Algeria on 25 September, 1963, and had discussed the revolt with the Algerian government and succeeded in convincing them of the necessity of arresting Zeyd and other rebels whenever they present themselves. Since it has become difficult to put an end to the rebellion, the Malian government resorted to the tactic of arresting the leaders of the rebellion, which is seen to be led by Zeyd ag Attaher. Upon

¹⁶² Declaration de Kaza ag Larlar, Kidal, 08/02/1964.ACK..

¹⁶³ Questions posees par le Capitaine Diarra, Commandant la C.S.M et le Cercle de Kidal, au rebelle Amouksou ag Azandeher, Kidal, 04/10/1963.

arrival in Algiers, Zeyd and other rebels that accompanied him, including Ilyas ag Ayyoub were arrested and put on a plane to Kidal city in Mali on 1 November, 1963¹⁶⁴.

The Malian government further laid the ground for the arrest of Mohammed Ali ag Attaher Inser, another important figure in the rebellion who had lived in Morocco. Here also, it appears international politics had worked in favor of the Malian state. The Malian president, Modibbo Keita had been involved in the mediation of a conflict between Morocco and Algeria over the border area of Tiemcen, and the conflict was successfully resolved with the help of Keita who was considered an international statesman of repute, and one with great diplomatic skills. In return for Keita's role for a fair mediation in the conflict, Morocco arrested and expelled Mohammed Ali ag Attaher Inser in March, 1964.¹⁶⁵ Yet, another serious blow to the rebellion, following these arrests, was the capture of the famous and legendary Elledi ag Alla by the Malian forces on 9 March, 1964 at Intachera, in Algeria. Elledi was considered the instigator of the conflict and was considered one of the most important military leaders from among the Tuareg rebel leaders.¹⁶⁶

Following the arrests and capture of the rebel leaders, two options became immediately available and clear to the rebels. One of the options, was to abandon the fight and seek asylum in Algeria under the protection of the French at the military base, or in any case under the protection of the Algerian government. The second option, which came to enjoy the support of the majority from among the group, was for the group to return to Mali and make an unconditional surrender to the Malian government. The decision to take the second option was taken in consideration of the fact that the leaders of the group who were arrested like Elledi, Zeyd and Mohammed Ali were not killed by the authorities and were indeed still alive.¹⁶⁷ And between May and June, 1964, Intallah ag Attaher, the chief of the Tuareg known to be loyal to the Malian government toured the whole of the Adagh area appealing to the rebels to surrender. Many rebels numbering about 48 surrendered to him and were subsequently disarmed. Yet, another group of rebels under Sidi Alamine and

¹⁶⁴ Bailey, P, "Les Touaregs Kel Adagh Dependence et revoltes du Soudan francais au Mali contemporain" Paris, 1999, p 318.

¹⁶⁵ This is based on; Interrogatoire du prisonnier rebelle Eladi ag Alla par le Captain Diby Silas Diarra, Commandant d'armes et du Cercle de Kidal, 13/04/1964.ACK..

¹⁶⁶ Ibid .

¹⁶⁷ Déclarations des deux rebelles rendus avec leurs armes le 10 juillet 1964 au chef de tribu Bissaada-l/ Déclarations du nomme Salia ag Bakarine, fraction Imerade Intalla.ACK..

Issouf ag Cheick did not surrender immediately, on 27 July, 1964, Sidi Alamine ag Cheick was killed on the run after a track down by the Malian army, while his brother Issouf ag Cheick fled to Algeria with some other rebels that survived the attack by the Malian soldiers. The disbandment of the last group signaled an end to the rebellion. On 15 August, 1964, the Malian administration officially declared the rebellion vanquished in a national newspaper "Essor". And the victory came to be celebrated in Kidal on 22 September, 1964, which was Mali's third national day¹⁶⁸.

Throughout the rebellion, it was reported that the Tuareg rebels maintained the use of honorable conduct in warfare, which meant that no combatants should be harmed in the fighting, and a minimum of civil behavior was expected also on the part of the Malian forces¹⁶⁹. However, it was reported that after the imposition of forbidden zone in the course of fighting after many of the fighter had fled the country with their families, those Tuaregs that remained in the forbidden zone were shot by the Malian army, while others died due to the poisoning of all the wells in the Adagh area by the Malian army since the rebels certainly needed water to survive. As a result many men, women and children died of the poisoned water¹⁷⁰. It was a conduct that was seen as dishonorable by the Tuareg and which continued to be a source of Egha (the need for revenge) by the group even in their recent disagreements with the Malian government.

3.5 The Second Tuareg Rebellion (1990)

The 1990 revolt came to be known as Al Jebha and in analyzing the rebellion, it will appear necessary to make a valid evaluation of the developments that have taken place between the Afellaga (1963 rebellion) and the outbreak of the rebellion in 1990. Without a fair knowledge of how the Malian nation fared within this period, it will be impossible to fully appreciate or explain what the 1990 rebellion signifies or means to both the Tuaregs and the outside world. Definitely within the 27 years period, several changes both positive and negative had taken place not only among the Tuaregs or Mali but all over Africa and the world at large. In Africa these changes were so profound, especially as the emerging

¹⁶⁸ "Kidal a celebre la fete nationale avec un eclat particulier", L'Essor Hebdomadaire, 28/08/1964.

¹⁶⁹ Claudat-Hawad, H., "Coups et contre-coups: l'HONNEUR EN JEU CHEZ Tuaregs, les Touaregs, portrait en fragments", Aix-en Pro vence, 1993 p 13-27.

¹⁷⁰ J.S Lecocq, "The Desert is Our Country: Tuareg Rebellions and Competing Nationalisms in Contemporary Mali(1946-1996)", Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences, University of Amsterdam, p 153.

new nation states across the continent grappled with problems of nation building and statehood. And it is perhaps in the second rebellion that the failure or weakness of the Malian state in accordance with Jackson's Negative Sovereignty Theory became evident.

The period preceding the Afellaga of 1963 was seen to have brought about several changes within the Tuareg society that had been largely nomadic. These changes were viewed to be revolutionary as they transformed not only the outlook of the Tuaregs, but also certain aspects of their culture that came to explain a change in their behavior and reaction to certain events both within and outside Mali. However, it must be understood that these changes were necessitated by certain inevitable events that followed the 1963 rebellion, which greatly affected the future and destiny of the Tuaregs as a people. These changes were to have a profound effect in all aspects of their lives such as education, economy and politics. The Tuareg society came to be transformed from a desert, rural society, to an urban one. The economy which had been mainly household based, became transformed into one based on wage labor, and one which came to witness the introduction of consumer goods which were hitherto non-existent. These changes came to be attributed to certain factors, among which was the drought that affected the Sahara in the 1970's and 1980's, which drastically affected the pastoral life of the Tuareg people. The drought forced many of the Tuaregs to abandon the pastoral life and look for new means of livelihood far and wide. This period came to be known as the "Teshumara" period in Tamasheq (Tuareg) history, it was a period that witnessed massive movement or migration of the Tuaregs to different parts of Africa, but particularly within West Africa. The migration became a factor that would lead to the development a Tuareg Diaspora. Migrations are not new in Tuareg society and history, but the migration that took place during this period remained the most significant, as an estimated number of about 500 families were said to have taken refuge in Algeria alone.¹⁷¹ In 1975, following the drought, about 13,000 Tuaregs fled to Niger republic, and about 12, 000 moved to some cities along the Algerian border where they were met and received by their relatives that had fled to Algeria since the 1963 rebellion. Internally, about 47,000 Tuaregs moved to Gao and Timbuktu regions, where they lived in refugee camps as they did not have the strength to migrate abroad.¹⁷² Movement towards Libya began around 1980, after a repeat of the drought which by this time completely crippled pastoral life in Mali.

¹⁷¹Courier de l'UNESCO, April 1975, NO 11.

¹⁷² Derrick, J, "The Great West African Drought, 1972-74", African Affairs LXXVI-305, 1977, pp 537, 586, 561.

Political developments within Mali after the Afellaga also appeared to have contributed towards the developments leading to Al-Jebha. The dissatisfaction of the Malian people towards the Keita regime and its economic policies is well known, and in 1968, some young military officers ousted the Keita regime in a coup. Keita and his lieutenants were subsequently arrested and sent to prison in Kidal. The fall of the Keita regime signaled a kind of relief and freedom, and an end to Malian rule, this feeling was particularly among the Tuaregs¹⁷³. The children (orphans) that came to be known as the children of the Afellaga, which were about 400 in number and in government boarding schools, abandoned their schools and caravans were formed and ready to move to Algeria. At this point the new military regime which came under the leadership of Mousa Traore had to quickly stop the caravans and have the children returned back to their schools. The new government tried to introduce new policies into Malian society, and as part of these policies, the economy was opened to foreign investment. However, soon corruption came to dominate the affairs of the new government, as everything came to be enjoyed and controlled only by Traore, his family and a few people around them. And this came to have a negative impact on the citizens, especially after the droughts of the 1970's. The drought disaster was so serious that relief aid had to be sought from a number of international agencies such as the FAO and USAID among others. But even this relief material could not be evenly distributed to the people by the government officials charged with the responsibility of such distribution. The corrupt officials of the regime diverted the materials and sold them in the market at high prices. As a result the Tuareg population in Mali and Niger were forced to migrate further south. A reporter known as Phillippe Decreane described the situation in the refugee camps in Mali as genocide as a result of the non cooperation on the part of the Malian government to the humanitarian situation, due mainly to corruption. The Tuaregs continued to migrate to other countries, including Nigeria and Libya. Migration to Libya became intensified around 1982, when during a speech¹⁷⁴, Libyan leader Ghaddafi declared Libya as the country of origin of the Tuareg people.¹⁷⁵

¹⁷³ The Tuareg had been fed up with the Keita regime, and when the Afellaga failed all hope for independence were dashed, as such the fall of the Keita regime in the imagination of the group meant an end to the Malian nation, or in any case signaled a possibility for independence again.

¹⁷⁴ In the material consulted, there was only a reference to the Ghaddafi speech and it was not clear where he made the speech and on which occasion or for what reason he declared Libya as the country of origin of

3.5.1 Transformation of the Tuareg Society and the Need for Revolution

The Tuaregs that did not migrate, as mentioned previously, but became engaged in seasonal migration to cities, since pastoralism no longer existed, as the droughts of 1973 and 1984 left the Tuareg without livestock. They now found employment in cities as salaried herdsmen, guarding of villas, construction, car mechanics, and fishermen and were mostly employed temporarily. Others that could not get employed became engaged in trafficking between Algeria, Mali and Niger. They generally engaged in buying and selling goods such as sugar, flour, oil, tea, petrol and dates into Mali, either on foot, camel or donkeys and used the profits to buy luxury goods and sometimes invest further into the trafficking business or set up legitimate business within Mali. As such gradually the lives of the Tuaregs came to change, not only did the changes affect food, income and clothing, but lifestyle also changed. The Tuaregs now ate different foods; different cloths and many no longer wore the turbans or veils and instead wore jeans with sneakers or sandals, and generally began to imbibe all sedentary habits.

At this time music became an important aspect of the Tuareg social life, especially among the Tuaregs that lived in foreign countries. They sometimes organized parties and invite fellow migrants, including women, sing songs and dance together. Sometimes at such parties griots¹⁷⁶ also performed, originally from Timbuktu and part of the Tuareg culture. There also developed a new music known as al-guitara among the Tuaregs in Libya and Algeria that had learned to use the electronic guitar and as such formed a band known as the “Kel Tinariwen” or those from the deserts. Most of the music from the newly formed band came to reflect the existence of the Tuaregs, from a quiet blues related to misery, to one that began to call for a revolution to all Tuaregs phrases such as “the world changes, we sit in ruins, we pull up our trousers and fasten our belts, we no longer accept the mistreatments we have endured.” These were followed by positive developments in education among the Tuaregs both within and outside Mali. In Mali, many of them enrolled in many institutions and joined various sectors of the Malian society with the

the Tuaregs. This is despite the fact that at the beginning of the chapter Rodd had indeed confirmed that the Tuaregs did originate from Libya as claimed by Ghaddafi.

¹⁷⁵ J.S Lecocq, “The Desert is Our Country: Tuareg Rebellions and Competing Nationalisms in Contemporary Mali(1946-1996)”, Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences, University of Amsterdam p 178.

¹⁷⁶ Griots are traditional praise singers. They very famous in Mali and are known to have played prominent role in government in the pre-colonial period.

exception of the army that had been closed to the group since the 1963 rebellion. Those in Algeria also enrolled into many educational institutions and the Ishumar¹⁷⁷ as they came to be known, overtime they appeared to have become more radical in their political outlook, but the educated from among them maintained a moderate outlook and this sometimes led to disputes between them. The Ishumar¹⁷⁸ continued to call for revolution and independence sometimes through music, and used music also to attack the educated Tuaregs for not cooperating on the need for a revolution and independence from Mali.¹⁷⁹

While all these developments were taking place in and outside Mali, certain events occurred that somehow appeared favorable to the call for action and revolution by the Ishumar. One of such events was the escape of the legendary Elledi ag Alla from prison in Bamako at the end of 1974, who travelled to Algeria by truck and was received by fellow comrades Amegha ag Sharif, Younnes ag Ayyouba and Issouf ag Cheick. The four rebels met and deliberated on issues affecting the Tuaregs at that precise moment, and generally, the discussions centered on whether to continue with the fight for independence from Mali or not. And the four agreed to continue with the fight for independence, the decision was followed by other activities that set in motion an agenda for Tuareg independence from Mali. Among such developments was the formation of a revolutionary organization or movement that came to known as the “Tanekra.”¹⁸⁰ And through many of their songs, the main aims of the Tanekra could be clearly understood. In one of the songs, the Al-guitara is quoted as saying;

“Friends, hear and understand me, you know there is one country, one goal, one religion. And unity hand in hand, friends you know there is only one stance to which you are unfettered and only unity can break it¹⁸¹.”

¹⁷⁷ The Tuareg communities that developed outside Mali came to be called the Ishumar in the Tuareg language which is similar to Diaspora. They were found in Niger, Algeria, Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Mauritania as well as some countries in North Africa.

¹⁷⁸ The Ishumar is used in describing the Tuaregs, the new culture that began to emerge among many of the economically and politically marginalized Tuareg youths, rebellious or revolutionary in nature, and reasserting cultural pride.

¹⁷⁹ J.S Lecocq, “The Desert is Our Country: Tuareg Rebellions and Competing Nationalisms in Contemporary Mali(1946-1996)”, Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences, University of Amsterdam, 2002.p 190.

¹⁸⁰ It is a Tuareg word and a synonym of the word revolution or revolutionary, it can also mean struggle at the same time.

¹⁸¹ Belalimat, N. “Le rapport a l’histoire dans les chants de lutte de la resistance Tuaregue contemporaine,” Les cahiers de l’IREMAM 7/8, 1996, poem 1.

The new movement as it came into being was first faced with problems of unity among the various clans that were competing for hierarchy among themselves. At this time the intellectuals from among the group discouraged the idea of tribalism and political competition and tried to replace them with political unity, social change and the upliftment of the lives of the Tuareg people in general. The most important force behind the Tanekra movement remained Egha, or the need for revenge, the concept of Egha appeared to have unified the Tuaregs from all the clans, who shared this common emotion. Sometimes such emotions also found expression in music, which mostly dwelled on the 1963 rebellion, in many of the songs of the Al-guitara, they are quoted as saying;

“Nineteen sixty three came, and goes on. Its days came leaving memories. It crossed wadis, killing cattle. It killed the elderly and new born children. The brave men died until no one was left. Only grave yards and loneliness came of it¹⁸².”

The Tanekra movement from the beginning came to be led by the old leaders of the Afellaga, who now found new means of livelihood in Algeria and were in a position to assist other Tuaregs migrating from Mali and other countries to join them. At this early stage, the movement remained highly secretive in existence, and embarked upon enlightening all Tuaregs from all works of life, of the need to re-organize and reclaim their country and gain independence from Mali. Generally, they used Egha, reminding the people of those that took part in the 1963 revolt and who were killed by the Malian authorities. The four rebels earlier mentioned took all major decisions for the movement. However, the group came to recognize the importance of education to the movement and tried as much as possible to encourage all Tuaregs to seek western education. They offered the educated from among leading positions and they became involved in making contacts with the Libyan and Algerian authorities regarding their struggle for independence. Throughout the 1970's, the movement largely remained invisible, and networked silently amongst its members. It was not until May, 1976 that an open name for the group was adopted. The movement then came to be known as “the Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad¹⁸³.” A movement that was destined to play a prominent role in future the Tuareg struggle.

¹⁸² Ibid, poem 2.

¹⁸³ Azawad is the name of a valley that is located at the heartland of the Tuareg area in northern part of Mali. The adoption of such name appeared full of meaning and the desire of a Tuareg country or nation.

As the movement gained momentum, it tended to have become more active in Libya. Part the reasons for this can be seen in the fact that since the 1963 revolt, many Tuaregs fled to Libya, when Ghaddafi declared Libya as the original country of the Tuareg. Not only that, the Libyan secret service had supported the struggles of the group, though secretly and many Tuaregs came to be part of the Libyan army. Though, it is often said that the Libyan support had been largely for its own benefit with regards to its conflict with other states like Chad and Lebanon where Libya sent its soldiers to fight for the Palestinians. Algeria had in the past made efforts to use the Tuareg movement for its own cause when it created the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (POLISARIO)¹⁸⁴ and requested the Tuaregs to join. However, the Tuaregs declined such offer when the Algerian secret police approached them with the offer, after they realized that it did not concern their struggle for independence from Mali and did not promote it.

Around 1979, the Azawad movement witnessed a tremendous change, after some contacts with certain Libyan officials and Army Officers¹⁸⁵. At this time about 70 delegates from various opposition networks in Niger and other places gathered in Libya to discuss various issues and to possibly come under one umbrella, which emerged as the “Al-Jebha ash-sh’biyya li Taghrir as sahara al –kubra al-Arabiyya al wasta (Popular Front for the Liberation of the Greater Arab Central Sahara).¹⁸⁶” And the new organization was said to have come under the leadership of Nigerien Arabs and under the control of Libya, and at the same time appeared to be promoting a pan Arab cause rather than a Tuareg struggle. The movement soon came to have a political bureau and a military camp which was opened to all members. In December 1980, a military training camp was opened for the Tuareg and known as “Ben Walid” due to its location. The camp came to accommodate 2,700 recruits, and by late 1981, about 4,000 recruits had received training, however the camp was closed later in the same year. The closure was necessitated by certain diplomatic problems between Libya and Niger, and between Libya and Mali as well, due mainly to some of the activities of some of the member of the new Al-Jebha organization.

¹⁸⁴ It was an organization for the liberation of the Western Sahara that sought to balance Algeria’s relation with other North African states like Morocco.

¹⁸⁵ It is worthy to note that Ghaddafi did not consider the Tuaregs as Arabs, however one cannot dismiss the fact that the Tuaregs have often been mistaken as a Berber group, an Arabic group as a result their resemblance, but they speak different languages. It is possible that Ghaddafi viewed this relation from racial terms and perhaps religion, since the Tuaregs were Muslims, just like the most Arabs.

¹⁸⁶ It is also known as the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Greater Arab Central Sahara (FPLSAC).

After the closure of camp Ben Walid, the Tuaregs were left with only few options, and they chose to enlist for training and combat in Lebanon with the Palestinian forces, instead of either returning to Mali or going to Algeria, especially since they have declined joining the POLISARIO¹⁸⁷ organization offered them by the Algerian authorities, on the grounds that it did not support their cause. Clearly the choice to join the Palestinian army by the Tuareg was largely to gain more military experience in preparation for their anticipated revolution in Mali.

About 500 Tuaregs volunteered for the Palestinian Liberation army, out of which about 300 chose to return back to Algeria, while the 200 that stayed went through military training in different areas. They received training in the use of heavy arms which include tanks, howitzers, Katyusha 40 and 12 calibers, Russian 130 mm howitzers, Russian tanks, machine guns, anti aircraft missiles, American canons that shoot tanks, caliber 106, Rockets, anti-vehicle mines and anti-personnel mines. After such training, the Tuareg volunteers were dispatched to various units where they served in air defense units, together with other volunteers from Libya. By 1982, Israel had occupied Lebanon and started a peace process that would see to the end of the conflict and this meant the end of the presence of all foreign troops in southern Lebanon, including the Tuareg volunteers. In the course of the war in Lebanon, the Tuaregs had lost one man, and 5 had been taken as

¹⁸⁷ In 1971 a group of young Sahrawi students in the universities of Morocco began organizing what came to be known as *The Embryonic Movement for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro*. After attempting in vain to gain backing from several Arab governments, including both Algeria and Morocco, but only drawing faint notices of support from Libya and Mauritania, the movement eventually relocated to Spanish-controlled Western Sahara to start an armed rebellion. The Polisario Front was formally constituted on 10 May 1973 with the express intention of militarily forcing an end to Spanish colonization. Its first Secretary General was El-Quali Mustapha Sayed. On 20 May, he led the Khanga raid, Polisario's first armed action in which a Spanish post manned by a team of Tropas Nomadas (Sahrawi-staffed auxiliary forces) was overrun and rifles seized. Polisario then gradually gained control over large swaths of desert countryside, and its power grew from early 1975 when the Tropas Nomadas began deserting to the Polisario, bringing weapons and training with them. At this point, Polisario's manpower included perhaps 800 men and women, but they were suspected of being backed by a much larger network of supporters. A UN visiting mission headed by Simeon Ake that was conducted in June 1975 concluded that Sahrawi support for independence (as opposed to Spanish rule or integration with a neighboring country) amounted to an overwhelming consensus and that the Polisario Front was the most powerful political force in the Morocco.

prisoners by the Israelis, but were subsequently released and returned to Libya in accordance with the peace process. At the end of the adventure, the 200 Tuaregs had gained military skills and knowledge that was to later prove useful as they continued to prepare for their impending revolt against the Malian state, as they took over control of the Tanekra movement upon return from Lebanon¹⁸⁸.

The Lebanon veterans tried to re-organize the Tanekra movement and gave it a new name called “Al-Jebha ash-shimalal Mali” or “The Liberation Front for Mali.” And the organization now came to be under the leadership Iyad ag Ghali. By March, 1983, about two training camps were opened in Libya for Tuareg recruits of Niger republic origin. The camps came to be known as camp “Ithnam Mars” and camp “ar- Rowd” and were all located in Tripoli. Though the camps were opened only for Niger Tuaregs, but many Malian Tuaregs were able to fake identities and join the camps. The recruits from these camps were to later serve in the Libyan mission to Chad, further gaining military experience which will in the future provide the Tuaregs with the experience of creating a well trained army of their own. The Libyan government paid each of the recruits about 30,000 Libyan Dinar, equivalent to about 20,000 dollars, and the Tuareg recruits donated one third of this income to the newly formed Al-Jebha organization. The money was used by the organization to get more recruits from within and outside Mali as well as for purchase of vehicles and equipments. At this time the Al-Jebha members were convinced that it was time they moved against the Malian state under Mousa Traore, as a result of the deterioration of living condition in Mali, due mainly to corruption. The group continued to re-organize and strategize, but still faced internal problems and divisions that sometimes affected the effectiveness of their newly formed organization Al-Jebha.¹⁸⁹

On June 28, 1990, an army barracks and an Arrondissement office were attacked by armed groups in Menaka, and a convoy of about four cars which belonged to an American N.G.O was ambushed by another group of fighters at the same time.¹⁹⁰ These two singular acts came to mark the beginning of what came to be known as the 1990 Tuareg rebellion in

¹⁸⁸ J.S Lecocq, “The Desert is Our Country: Tuareg Rebellions and Competing Nationalisms in Contemporary Mali(1946-1996)”, Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences, University of Amsterdam, 2002.p 219.

¹⁸⁹ See Haghebaet, B, “De wereld volgens Khadafi”, Breda, 1986; and Oyatek, R, “ La politique africaine de la libya 1969-1985)”, Paris, 1986.

¹⁹⁰ J.S Lecocq, “The Desert is Our Country: Tuareg Rebellions and Competing Nationalisms in Contemporary Mali (1946-1996)”, Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences, University of Amsterdam, 2002. , p 227.

Mali or Al-Jebha as known to the Tuaregs. It was a rebellion that was to last several years and which appeared to have slightly differed from the 1963 rebellion in terms of preparedness, organization and strength, especially on the part of the Tuareg rebels that at this time appeared more sophisticated militarily and stronger than in 1963. From June until October, 1990, the rebels maintained constant attacks on army camps and administrative posts in all parts of the Adagh and the Azawad area. The rebels attacked many different army formations in different locations at the same time as a strategy, and by this they hoped to give an impression that they were large in number and well organized as well and as such confuse the enemy. The second reason is to be able to secure the Algerian border, so as to ensure access to supplies, and as such more attacks were concentrated on the border areas. The third reason was to be able to seize arms, materials, weapons, food, ammunitions and fuel which were seriously lacking on the side of the rebels. The rebels succeeded in taking large number of arms from the Malian army, and had the advantage of knowledge of handling modern weapons as a result of the military training gained during the years of Ishumar in Libya, Chad and Lebanon. All the attacks within this period were said to have resulted in favor of the rebels against the Malian forces which did not have any combat experience. The Tuareg rebels had been trained to aim and shoot, and in one to one combat with personal arms unlike the Malian soldiers. And also an element that proved important in the fighting is motivation to fight. While the Malian soldiers fought as professional soldiers that were paid by the government, the Tuareg rebels on the other hand aimed to achieve the liberation of the Tamasheq country from Malian control, and by starting the rebellion they had two options; to fight and win, or abandon the cause and accept whatever consequences that would come with such defeat. As such the zeal with which the rebels fought cannot be compared to that of the Malian forces since the motivation of the two groups differed significantly.¹⁹¹

The rebels set up many bases after the first encounter with the Malian forces in many different locations. One of such bases was the mount “In-Taykaren,” to which they left an invitation for the Malian army, an invitation for battle that was repeated several times in radio messages at the gendarmerie post in Tarkimt which had been captured by the rebels during the first encounter. Other bases were opened at Essali near Bouressa, Tigharghar base which was historically the base of the legendary Alla ag Albachir in the 1940’s also

¹⁹¹ Ibid, p 234.

became a base. And gradually the number of bases continued to increase until it reached about fifteen bases in total.

The Malian army on 17 July, 1990 responded to the invitation for the battle at the In-Taykaren mounting, and mobilized men, weapons and all resources at disposal in preparation for an encounter with the rebel forces. Four hundred infantry and an artillery unit armed with track mounted rocket launchers were at the siege of In-Taykaren. It was reported that after four days of shelling, the infantry assault of the army was easily countered by the rebels who were unharmed. And that when the rebels began an offensive, just a day of sniper activity was enough to make the Malian army retreat after it lost about 40 men. The same operation was repeated in July and August, but with more disastrous consequences for the Malian army which lost about 100 men.¹⁹² All attacks by the army aimed at several of the rebels bases proved unsuccessful and the army was forced to retreat after realizing the invincibility of the rebel bases, whose terrain was virtually impassable by vehicles, and it was impossible to reach the interior of the mountains without proper knowledge of the known passages which the army does not have knowledge of. By far the largest victory recorded by the rebel forces was on the night of 4th September, 1990, near the former base of Alla ag Albachir at mount Tigharghar, where about 45 rebels, armed with knives and hand grenades took on an army unit of 450 soldiers and making use of knowledge of the terrain, internal organization of the military camp and their surprise attack tactics, the rebels succeeded in entering the camp and engaged in a close combat, dispersing the soldiers in panic, and afterwards the rebels claimed killing over 100 soldiers in the encounter and admitted losing 15 men to the soldiers.¹⁹³

After this encounter, the moral of the Malian forces became very low, while that of the rebel forces became further boosted. If anything, the Tigharghar encounter proved that the Malian regular army were no match to the guerilla Tuareg rebels and as a result a quick end to the rebellion appears almost impossible as the Malian army had hoped initially. The weakness or failure of the Malian state is vividly clear, especially if we are to by the indicators outlined by Jackson, among which are the inability of governments to control institutions of authority and vulnerability to extra constitutional domestic challenges. Other indicators had already been clear since the outbreak of the 1963 when Mali could not

¹⁹² Nous, Touaregs du Mali....(Paris 1990).

¹⁹³ Ibid.

control its borders. Prior to the outbreak of the 1963 rebellion, the Malian state could not effectively maintain public Services, and maintained a poor level of economic performance, economic distribution, human welfare which led to resentment of the Keita regime. And finally the Keita government could not maintain central authority over territories. In both rebellions, the Malian government appeared to have lost central authority and control over its territories which is among important indicators of the “Weak State or Negative Sovereignty Theory”.

3.5.2 Peace Process and Negotiations

The Malian was left with no option but to open negotiations with the rebels. It was surprising how a small but extremely skillful group of warriors were able to chase an army ten times its size, killing a large number of soldiers in true combat, man to man.¹⁹⁴ The negotiations between the Malian government and the Tanekra movement or Al-Jebha began in October, 1990 with a reconnaissance mission, and began in earnest by December 1990. It was undertaken by the government of Traore, which faced many other problems apart from the revolt from the Tuareg group in the north. The negotiations were welcomed by the Tuareg rebels also, who also for certain reasons related to lack of resources, weapons and exhaustion needed time to regain some energy, get more supplies in terms of food and ammunitions for adequate defense. However, the Malian forces were not aware of the situation of the Tuaregs, and so the first contact was made through some Tamasheq tribal chiefs, which the rebels appeared to have no recognition for, since they did not support the rebellion. As part of the negotiations on 6 January, 1991, a cease fire agreement was signed and a declaration of intent to continue negotiations for final peace was reached in a document that came to be known as the “Tamanrasset agreement”, which took place under the mediation of the Algeria government and not the chiefs, which had shown much interest in the conflict. The agreement generally consisted of a cease fire that stipulated the mutual transfer of prisoners of war, withdrawal of the army from the north, transfer of administration to civil servants, withdrawal of rebel forces from their bases and the possibility of integration into the Malian army. Others were; the creation of

¹⁹⁴ Klute, G, “Die Rebellionen der Tuareg in Mali und Niger”, Habilitationsschrift University, 2001, pp 480-486. It was described as man to man, in a form of a guerilla style, a physical combat, like in battle field, face to face as in ancient warfare.

commissions to monitor the application the agreement made, and a document was also signed that would guarantee a certain amount of autonomy to the north.

According to many sources the Tamanrasset agreement was never fully applied due to many reasons. A split occurred from among the ranks of the rebels and some factions saw the cease fire agreement as a kind of betrayal of the main aim of the revolt which was independence. And as such some factions continued to carry out attacks which were largely claimed by two new organizations that emerged out of the Tanekra movement after the signing of the agreement. These include; the Front for the Liberation of the Azawad (FPLA) and another Moorish organization known as Movement Populaire de l'Azawad (MPA). The two groups differed on certain principles regarding the rebellion, on the need to fight for independence or not¹⁹⁵. The Tamanrasset agreement came to be violated by both sides, while the Malian government did not fully implement some aspects of the agreement, the Tuaregs on their part continued their attacks contrary to the cease fire agreement. As such new negotiation had to be opened by the government, which came to be known as the "National Pact" on the 11 April, 1992 on the eve of the presidential elections in Mali¹⁹⁶. And the terms of the pact contained a six points agreement that were slightly different from the Tamanrasset agreement. The first is that there should be special social, economic and administrative status for the Tuaregs. Secondly, there should be tax exemptions for the inhabitants of the north for a period of ten years. Thirdly, there should be creation of two special funds to reconstruct the north. The fourth called for a decrease in the deployment and withdrawal of army personnel to a limited number of northern towns. And the fifth called for the creation of structures to secure the gradual return of refugees after the end of the conflict. While the sixth advocated for the integration of former rebels in the Malian armed forces and administration.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁵ "Proces verbal de la rencontre entre delegations a Tamanrasset du 10 au 12 octobre 1990".

¹⁹⁶ The Pact offered many special privileges to the Tuareg and appeared to have appeased the group at that particular time; it was supposed to be implemented overtime. The pact had promised some kind of autonomy to the group. Although it is known that in the past autonomy had been promised under the Tammanrasset agreement, but the agreement was never fully implemented by the Malian government, and so it was not immediately clear if the National Pact will also be fully implemented. And many among the Tuaregs remained skeptical about the full implementation of the Pact, especially as it relates to autonomy despite the fact that they officially accepted the Pact and the cease fire agreement.

¹⁹⁷ Boilley, P, "Les Kel Adagh. Unsiecle de dependances, de la prise de Tombouctou (1893)0au pacte National 1992", These de doctorat d'histoire, Universite Paris VII, 1994.

The National Pact was never fully implemented, as it became actually difficult in reality to meet or satisfy all the needs or demands of the rebel Tuareg group. While the Malian government made efforts to ensure the implementation of the agreement, autonomy could not be granted to the whole of the north at once as demanded by the rebels. So also was the exemption from tax which had been accepted in the pact, it couldn't be applied at once and needed to be implemented gradually just like that of autonomy. The reconstruction fund demanded by the rebels also came to be created, but the fund remained empty due to general lack of resources in the country as a result of the poor economy that the country found itself in. Regarding withdrawal of troops from certain cities, it was met by the government, as the government withdrew soldiers from a number of cities after the signing of the pact. As regards returning of refugees, efforts were made to rehabilitate refugees, and the UNHCR made a budget of about 3.5 Million Dollars, but even at this time fighting still continued by certain groups such as the FPLA which did not recognize the National Pact. However about 1,468 refugees were repatriated and under a pilot project that was later aborted, and effort was not made to make further repatriation of refugees which numbered about 12,000 in Algeria alone. And again not all rebels were integrated into the Malian army, as there were limited posts or vacancies available, and a limit to what the army could employ, while the rebels insisted that all rebels must be integrated. This led to dissatisfaction on the part of the rebels who felt that the Malian government had failed to fully implement the provisions of the pact.

The period preceding the signing of the pact was actually characterized by factionalisation among the rebel groups that continued to engage in violence in some parts of the country, since not all the groups agreed or fully accepted to be part of the National Pact which they felt was a betrayal of the independence struggle of the Tamasheq people. Generally the factionalisation was carried out along Tewsit lines (clan). While the Moors also formed their own group and as such many groups such as; MPA, ARLA, FIAA and FPLA emerged, some with Islamic background to challenge the existence of the pact. These groups tried to challenge the very political structure of the Tuareg landscape.

The same period also witnessed the emergence of an organization that came to be known as the "Ganda Koy" or The Movement Patriotique Ganda Koy (MPGK)¹⁹⁸, which was

¹⁹⁸ The Gandakoy emerged to challenge the Tuaregs, but was explained also to have come about after the Malian government signed the National Pact with the Tuaregs. The Gandakoy initially enjoyed government

created in April 1994.¹⁹⁹ The emergence of the Ganda Koy came to be explained as primarily the result of the Tamasheq or Tuareg rebellion, which provoked strong anger and reaction from the rest of the Malian population residing in the north of Mali towards the Tuareg population. The attacks of the Tuareg rebels' forces on several villages on the River Niger area such as Djebock and Bamba created resentment, panic and grief over the victims and a hatred towards the Tuaregs. The rebellion was also considered by these groups to have blocked important trade routes linking certain commercial cities such as; Gao and Timbuktu, and has as a result brought commercial activities to a standstill. And for this reason, the main backers, founders and financiers of the Ganda Koy movement came to be found among the wealthier merchants of Gao city. At a point it became very clear that the sedentary population in the north was not sympathetic to the rebellion, and the Ganda Koy came to replace the army in protecting the population from the attacks of the rebel Tuaregs as revealed when they tried to address the population when the Ganda Koy movement was founded, as contained in some pamphlets distributed by the newly formed movement which is as follows:

“Fellow citizens of the north, let us sweep away all nomads from our villages and cities, even from our barren land! Tomorrow the nomads will install themselves there as dominators. Black sedentary peoples from Nuro to Menaka, let us take up arms for the great battle that await us; let us send the nomads back to the sands of the Azawad. The existing social balance cannot be modified. The socio-economic problems of the north need to be solves for all citizens without discrimination. Why are there development projects for the nomads? Why are there army posts for the rebels? Why are there seats in the Parliament for the armed rebel bandits? Because they took up arms and killed? That is inadmissible. The Ganda Koy movement is born. Signed without us, the National pact is against us. The realities in the north show this. We should create insecurity for the nomad as they have created it for the sedentary population.”²⁰⁰

support, but later on, they saw the national pact as favoring the Tuaregs, and intensified their struggle against the Tuareg and requested to be incorporated into the provisions of the pact, so they could also benefit from the socio-economic integration plan offered to the Tuaregs by the Malian government.

¹⁹⁹ See Klute, G., “Die Rebellionen der Tuareg in Mali und Niger”, Habilitationsschrift, Siegen University, 2001

²⁰⁰ “Extract du no 00 de La Voix du Nord: organ de combat des peuples sedentaires”, (n.p. n.d). The Ganda Koy at some point became a problem to the Malian state despite the fact that their fight was directed at the Tuaregs who are seen as the perceived enemies of the Malian state. However, at some point the Malian state was interested in peace and the general stabilization of the country and the Ganda Koy at this time

And generally this became the main source of concern for the rest of the sedentary population inhabiting the major cities in the north. The Ganda Koy followed strategies similar to that of the Tuareg rebels in attacking civilian Tuareg population, and for several months the Tuaregs and the Ganda Koy continued to attack one another. On June 12, the Ganda Koy were reported to have killed between 26-60 Tuaregs in Anderamboukame, and the following day killed about 25 inhabitants of Lere. On the same day, about 75 Tuaregs were killed in Timbuktu, while at the same time; a caravan was ambushed on its way back from Taoundeint salt mines, killing 60 caravan drivers. Again, on June 19, 1994, the Ganda Koy attacked a refugee camp near the village of Ber, killing about 160 people. The Ganda Koy tried to interpret the rebellion by the Tuaregs as an attempt to take control of the Niger bend and its inhabitants on the basis of racial superiority. They further saw the various provisions of the National Pact and their accompanying privileges as unfair to the rest of the groups in the north which naturally resulted in anger and hatred caused by jealousy towards the Tuareg people.

It was not until October 1994, that it became clear that a military solution could not bring an end to the violence between the Tuareg and the Ganda Koy in the new ensuing conflict²⁰¹. As a result the Ganda Koy had to be involved in the peace process initiated by the Malian government with the Tuareg group under the National Pact. And from then, historical discourse was invoked to reconcile the warring parties. According to legends, the Tuaregs and the Songhai were descendants of the same mother and due to a curse; the two became enemies of one another. Other sources claimed that the two groups were cousins of one another, and so this history between them was used in bringing about harmony between the two groups. And some international Non Governmental organizations were also seen to have played a significant a role in organizing the disarmament of the respective rebel groups, including of course the Ganda Koy and their integration into the Malian army. Some of these organizations include the UNIDIR and UNDP, which conceived the idea of organizing the integration of the rebels. And both the Tuaregs and the Ganda Koy came to be assimilated into the provisions of the National Pact, and from

appeared to have made such peace impossible, and these did not go down with the Malian authorities even though there wasn't any confrontation between the state and the Ganda Koy.

²⁰¹ The Malian government had contemplated engaging the military to bring about an end to the Tuareg-Ganda Koy problem, but realized it would not be feasible, and therefore chose to engage the group in a dialogue and ultimately involved the group in the peace negotiations that was offered to the Tuareg under the National Pact.

then on, the Ganda Koy never saw the National Pact as against them , or favoring the Tuaregs since they were now a beneficiary of the pact.

After this, a second mission known as the round table conference of Timbuktu was held between 15 and 18 July, 1995 which united the Malian government and the MFUA (Tuareg Movement), and the Ganda Koy as well as the international donor community. The conference was aimed at allocating funds for the reconstruction of northern Mali and bringing the conflict to a final end. By this time also, all the rebel factions have been united under MFUA on the Tuareg side, which further made peace possible. At the end of the conference, an estimated 150 Million Dollars was promised for the reconstruction of northern Mali and a fund known as FAR-Nord was created to finance the disarmament and integration of former rebel fighters in the north. The integration was carried out through the creation of special sites in the north, where fighters could present themselves and hand over their weapons, and in return they will be registered in the integration project, with the assurance that they will be either integrated into the Malian army or assisted financially in setting up a civilian life. And on 26 March, 1996, the conflict ceremoniously ended by burning the weapons presented by fighters from various sites established for the integration of the rebels to Timbuktu's main market. It was a ceremony that was attended by elite politicians in Mali, the MFUA Tuareg movement and the international community. And as the weapons burned, FPLA leader Zeidan ag Sidi Alamine declared that all the rebel movements including; MPA, ARLA, FIAA, FPLA and the Ganda Koy are now united and to be known only as MFUA and that the rebellion which had lasted for five years was now over,²⁰²

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has clearly shown who the Tuaregs are, and brought an understanding of certain aspect of their lives to the reader. Not only did it provide an understanding of the lives of the Tuareg people, it also provided a glimpse into certain grievances expressed by the group, not only against the Malian state, but against the French as well during colonial rule. The chapter has further made clear how and why the Tuareg continuously rebelled against the Malian state even in recent times, but with particular focus on the 1963 and

²⁰² J.S Lecocq, "The Desert is Our Country: Tuareg Rebellions and Competing Nationalisms in Contemporary Mali(1946-1996)", Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences, University of Amsterdam, 2002 , p 295.

1990 rebellions. It did provide detailed information regarding these two revolts by the Tuaregs, unveiling the factors responsible or that favored certain revolts, particularly the natural factors that contributed to the developments leading up to Al-Jebha revolt in 1990.

The chapter did indeed discuss in detail the organization and operations carried out by the Tuaregs, as well as the various encounters with the Malian army during the Afellaga and Al-Jebha, until a cease fire was reached. It is expected that the chapter will provide a background and create an understanding of the next chapter, which is expected to deal with the 2012 rebellion and the intervention of France in the Mali conflict. This is because without an understanding of these two previous conflicts it will be difficult to understand why the 2012 rebellion happened or how it could be solved. But looking into these two rebellions will immediately make us understand why a revolt is happening in Mali more than once. The chapter has helped us to understand the capacity of the Tuareg militarily, the nature of their operations which they gathered through their experience in Libya and later Lebanon. It is also clear that independence had been the initial aim of the group, though at some point autonomy was also considered, but a careful observation will show that autonomy has never been the main objective of all the previous revolts, but that it was considered after all efforts at independence had failed, militarily or otherwise and the only option available was to negotiate a better status within the state in the form autonomy. This may perhaps explain the re-occurrence of the conflict, and suggest that the group may not have abandoned their initial plan of independence from Mali. If as recent as 2012 the group is still rebelling against the state, to the extent that an intervention was considered necessary to restore the territorial integrity of Mali by France which will be the focus of the next chapter, it shows that the Tuareg group still harbor their original plan for independence. It is however not clear if such an objective is achievable or not. The following chapter will shed more light on the 2012 rebellion and the intervention of France which is the main focus of the entire research.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE 2012 REBELLION AND FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MALI

41. Introduction

The previous chapter has made clear how and why the Tuareg people rebelled against the Malian state about two times since its independence in 1960. Of course these were not the only times the Tuaregs rose against the Malian state, but the two were considered more serious. And so the 2012 rebellion must be understood to be a continuation of all previous disagreements of the Tuareg people and the Malian state. The 2012 rebellion, however, is seen to have differed slightly from all previous rebellions in a very significant way. Unlike previous revolts, the 2012 rebellion saw the involvement of trans-national Islamist groups that had been officially designated as terrorist organizations by the United Nations in the conflict. The involvement of these groups no doubt added impetus to the rebellion and its intensity and impact. It is interesting also to understand that these groups in alliance with the Tuareg organization (MNLA) launched the rebellion.

This chapter focuses on the 2012 in its entirety and tries to trace the origin and genesis of the continuation of rebellion in Mali and in 2012 in particular. And for this it was divided into about six sub-sections, each analyzing a particular aspect of the rebellion. The chapter provides a background to the rebellion and also tries to trace the origin and genesis of the conflict right from the beginning. It goes further to look into how the flourishing drug business in the Sahel region, and the general organized prevalent in the area influenced the rise of trans-national groups in Mali, groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, Ansardine and Mujwa, who were deeply involved in the rebellion in league with MNLA. It show drugs and organized crime supports the activities of these groups across the region and in Mali and the rebellion in 2012 in particular. From here it shows how eventually the 2012

rebellion broke out in Mali after the fall of Ghaddafi. Though it is claimed that the rebellion had been conceived by Ibrahim ag Bahanga since 2009, nevertheless, it was only seen to have come to fruition in 2012 when the rebel groups attacked and took control of the northern part of the country.. In the fourth sub-section the chapter tried to present the response to the conflict by the international community after it became very obvious and upon a request to the ECOWAS by the Malian government for assistance after it failed to repel the offensive of the rebel groups. This part described how an effort to deploy an African force did not materialize due to logistical and financial constraints, and how France intervened after a request by the Malian president for quick rescue by Paris, as well as the transformation of AFISMA to a multi-dimensional UN mission in Mali (MINUSMA) The role played by MINUSMA in Mali, in conducting the July 2013 elections and general stabilization of the country. The chapter also tried to focus on the motivations of the intervention by Paris, and in this regard geo-economic and geo-strategic reasons were considered to make the fifth sub-section of the chapter. The armed impact of the conflict and its consequences was further provided in the last sub-section of the chapter. It mainly looked at how the violence affected parts of the country as well as other regional states. It also tried to explain the consequences of French actions and the threats posed to French citizens across the world, as well as how the conflict may likely lead to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism or jihad globally.

4.2 Background and Genesis of the 2012 Rebellion

The 2012 rebellion in Mali cannot be discussed in isolation from the general developments that were taking place not only in Mali, but across the Sahel region, since the end of the 1990-1996 Tuareg rebellion. It could be recalled the 1990-1996 revolt ended as a result of negotiations and the signing of the National Pact, which was followed by the implementation of provisions of the Pact within the Malian nation between the state and the Tuareg rebels, as well as other groups that rose to challenge the existence of the Pact. And afterwards Mali remained relatively peaceful after the reconciliation and integration programs that followed the implementation.

Many Tuareg rebels and members of the Ganda Koy came to be part of the Malian army, and many others were rehabilitated through various projects. As mentioned in preceding chapter, the National Pact was never fully implemented due to many reasons. One of the

most significant aspects of the Pact remained the issue of decentralization or autonomy for the north of Mali, as well as other regions, which could not be fully implemented by the Malian government at once. As such it continued to be a source of concern and a potential for future agitation and possible revolt, especially by the Tuareg group. All other reforms related to the National Pact, such as the integration into the army, which could enlist all rebels, was not fully appreciated by the population of the north and particularly among the rebels, including the Ganda Koy. Despite all these misgivings, the late 1990's saw Mali emerging as a forerunner of democracy in West Africa as a result of popular participation at the local level as well as the nationwide dialogue that was taking place throughout the country after the 1990 -1996 revolt.²⁰³

It was alleged that the restructuring of the public service brought by the decentralization policy, failed to bring about a change in the regimes authority structure, which was expected to be replaced by local and municipal authorities. Again, the official recognition of traditional chiefs under the decentralization policy tended to have created confusion and instability among various clans and groups within the Tuareg society and the north as a whole; as such groups began to compete for influence, and to have one of them appointed as a chief or otherwise. As such the decentralization policy came to be seriously criticized, since it was seen to favor only the elite class and existing structures of power, rather than create a new set up, with new officials from among the lower class. It further became very difficult to develop the infrastructure of the northern region, which is sparsely populated, and region appeared to have gained very little both in terms of aid from international donor agencies and from the Malian state as well, due mainly to corruption in both the central and local governments in Mali, as it came to be observed. Politically, the decentralization appeared successful as a model, but for it to be functional it was observed, it needed heavy economic investment and good governance to ensure the implementation of sound policies and development which were seriously lacking.

The consequences of the implementation of the provisions of the pact were that it created rivalry in the northern region which led to internal power struggle that brought a general dissatisfaction among the Tuareg group that was to later lead to the outbreak of a rebellion in 2006. The rebellion came to be explained as mainly arising due to the internal power

²⁰³ Signe Marie Cold-Ravnkilde, "War and Peace in Mali: Background and Perspectives", Danish Institute for International Studies, Report 33, p 30.

struggle within the Tuareg society, and as also signifying a protest to the violation of previous agreements such as the Tamanrasset²⁰⁴, and the National Pact, which they claimed was not implemented as contained in its written form. And between 2006-2009, Mali again came to be engulfed in violence, though the rebellion cannot be compared to the two previous revolts in intensity and impact, yet it was so serious that the Malian authorities had to open negotiations with the Tuaregs rebels which resulted in the signing of a peace accord in Algeria, known as the Algiers accord, soon after the violence broke out in 2006²⁰⁵. However, the agreement signed was soon to become a source of conflict between certain clans among the Tuaregs, such as ; the Ifoghas, the Berabish Arab clans, and the Imrad clans. The rebellion appeared to have been led by Ibrahim ag Bahanga, who had been among the veterans of the 1990 revolt. Iyad ag Ghali, also a former veteran of both the 1963 and the 1990 revolts, was also part of the leadership of the new rebellion. Bahanga was said to have formed a rebel group that continued to target the Malian army, until Bahanga was expelled from Mali in 2009 as a result of the actions of this rebel group against the Malian soldiers. It was reported that Libya granted Bahanga asylum after his expulsion from Mali, and that while in Libya, he continued to make plans for another revolt in Mali, but was killed in a car crash in August 2011 before his plans came to fruition. It was claimed that the 2012 rebellion was conceived and planned by Bahanga during his stay in Libya and that after his death the plan suffered some setbacks but was not completely abandoned by his followers among the Tuaregs, who formed the group that he founded. The 2012 rebellion was believed to be the outcome of Bahanga's plan for another revolution in Mali among several other factors.

A combination of several factors came to be advanced as likely responsible for the outbreak of the 2012 revolt. The immediate factor recognized, was the internal power struggle among the various Tuareg clans, which came to be used by the Malian authorities which played one group against another. The result of such actions was that it led to the development a gradual state of anarchy throughout the northern region of the country. It was asserted that such anarchy further created certain social conditions that led to many developments that favored the development of certain economic activities that were

²⁰⁴ This was an agreement that was signed between the Malian government and the Tuaregs after the outbreak of Al-Jebha rebellion on 6 January, 1991. The agreement considered a ceasefire, transfer of prisoners and civil servant between the north and south of Mali, as well as autonomy for the north. It took place at Tamanrasset in Algeria and came to be known as the Tamanrasset agreement.

²⁰⁵ "Tuareg-Mali 2006-2009", www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/tuareg-Mali-2006.

considered illegal and criminal that were to later culminate into a revolt by certain groups that emerged to dominate the affairs of the region in the absence of state authority in northern Mali.²⁰⁶

In order to properly understand the 2012 rebellion in Mali, it is important to understand the transformation that has taken place not only in Mali, but the Sahel region as a whole for about a decade before the 2012 revolt. It could be recalled that after the Afellaga in 1963, many Tuaregs became involved in trafficking business as a result of the drought that hit Mali and affected their means of livelihood. However, at this time they engaged mainly in trafficking of consumer goods such as; cloths, petrol and other house hold products in and out of Mali.

Over time trafficking in these commodities took a turn as other commodities came to be introduced, particularly after the second revolt of 1990. Usually the trafficking in consumer goods entailed the by passing of official customs system process, which came to be replaced by some kind of informal arrangement between traders and officials. Exports from Mali and Niger to Algeria and Libya came to grow overtime, and such activity relied heavily on informal established networks to thrive, and many Malians came to establish themselves in the trafficking system. In the 1990's, certain changes led to new developments in the trafficking business in the region, and this changes include; cuts to Algeria's subsidy budget²⁰⁷ that caused a fall in the economy, and also the embargo imposed on the Ghaddafi regime in Libya, as well as conflicts in Algeria, northern Niger and also Mali which turned the region into a major arms trafficking market. Weapons smuggling across the region came to be handled by networks that handled contrabands smuggling in collaboration with senior government officials²⁰⁸

Apart from contraband smuggling networks, the introduction of cigarettes smuggling appeared to have paved the way for the introduction of other illicit commodities and drugs in the network of existing commodities in the region. Cigarettes were usually smuggled to

²⁰⁶ Ibid, p 32.

²⁰⁷ A subsidy is explained as a financial assistance granted by a government or private organization for the purpose of promoting an enterprise that is considered beneficial to the public welfare. Subsidies were known to have originated from England in the middle ages, when parliament granted funds to the King to augment or replace customs and other taxes collected. Subsidies are often granted to keep prices low, to maintain incomes or to preserve employments.

²⁰⁸ Wolfram Lacher, "Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel Sahara Region", The Carnegie Papers, Middle East Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September, 2012 p 4.

North African market from Mauritania, mainly to Algeria and Morocco markets, and cigarettes were imported through Benin republic and Togo through Niger and Burkina Faso to Libya and Algeria. In 2009, it was estimated that about 60% of the Libyan tobacco market consisted of smuggled tobacco, with proceeds in retail amounting to about \$ 228 Million. Those involved in such business came to be identified as legal cigarettes importers and distributors, who usually imported their goods from free trade zones such as Dubai. Generally, the cigarettes smuggling business came to be explained as a deliberate strategy by tobacco companies to avoid taxes as well as break North African state's monopolies on cigarette distribution²⁰⁹. As a result of such business, customs service no longer functioned due to corruption between smugglers and state officials. In Libya, it was reported that the business was dominated and controlled by networks within the security who were mostly members of Ghaddafi's tribe.

Between Mauritania, Mali and Algeria, the Sahrawi networks in collaboration with officials in the POLISARIO movement which seeks the independence of the Western Sahara. Trade subsidized Algerian goods and humanitarian aid southwards, and cigarettes northward to Algeria and Morocco. The cigarette business further led to the emergence of many gangs of smugglers that transport goods from Mauritania, Mali and Niger to Algeria. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, was to later emerge as leading figure in AQIM, and was known to have run a cigarette smuggling racket across the Sahara.²¹⁰

Like the smuggling in licit (legal items) goods and cigarettes, migrant business also came to develop in the region and led to the emergence of carriers in the region who specialized in off road transport and arrangements with corrupt officials. The migration flows were normal from sub-Saharan Africa to North Africa and then to Europe. It was a business that started to flourish in the 1990's and became a source of concern to many European states. The cities of Gao and Agadez came to be known as important centers of migrants movement to Morocco, through Algeria or Libya and then from Morocco to Europe through Spain. In Libya many militia's emerged to control the migration business and the profits that came with it. This militia came from Ghaddafi's tribe and had close links to the Libyan security. At a point the Libyan territory became very dangerous to approach due to

²⁰⁹ Ibid, p 5.

²¹⁰ Ibid, p 5.

the presence of this militia's along the borders who intercepted travelers at many different locations.

4.3 Drugs, Organized Crime and the Rise of Trans-nationalist Islamist Group in Mali

Apart from the smuggling of cigarettes and migration business that developed in the Sahel region, the smuggling and business in illicit drugs also came to dominate the region. The two main flows that came to be identified and which have expanded overtime since 2005 include; South American cocaine to Europe, via Libya and Egypt, and Moroccan cannabis to Libya, Egypt and the Arabian peninsula. The growth in the smuggling of illicit drugs was seen to have rapidly expanded due to the rising demand of such drugs in Europe. It was estimated that about 14% of Europe's cocaine, with a total estimated value of about \$1 Billion transited through West Africa. Most of the cocaine passing through West Africa usually arrives to one of the coastal states such as Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Togo, Benin or Ghana, and is then moved by boat or air. It is sometimes also sent by couriers to Europe, as well as through airports in West Africa. Airports such as that of Bamako, Quagadougou and Niamey are well known hubs for air couriers and at times cocaine transits via Algiers airport.²¹¹

Overland routes across the Sahel and Sahara appear diverse, and sometimes cocaine is transported from the coastal hubs of Guinea or Mauritania, overland to Mali, and then to Morocco, Algeria or Libya. In 2009, a Boeing 727 containing ten tons of cocaine crashed in the desert, north of Gao city in Mali. The plane came to be named "air cocaine" by the media and was reported to have taken off from Venezuela, but registered in Guinea. According to investigations, the cocaine was smuggled overland to Morocco by networks of Spanish, French, Moroccan, Malian and Senegalese nationals. Apart from this, there have been many reports of smaller aircrafts being used to carry cocaine from the coastal hubs to the north of Mali.²¹² It was reported by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime that approximately 60 tons of cocaine and about 400 kg of heroine is smuggled through west Africa every year, generating over \$900 Million annually for the various groups involved in the business²¹³. It is estimated that of the about \$1 Billion worth of cocaine transported

²¹¹ Ibid, p 6.

²¹² Ibid, p 7.

²¹³ Signe Marie Cold-Ravnkilde, "War and Peace in Mali: Background and Perspectives", Danish Institute for International Studies, Report 33, 2013, p 36.

to Europe from West Africa, \$500 Million remained in West Africa. When compared to Mali's defense budget of \$180 Million, it appears much higher, in 2010 it was estimated that about \$1.25 Billion worth of cocaine was transported to Europe from West Africa.²¹⁴

Here, it is important to note that some of the groups that participated in the 2012 revolt in Mali have been accused of involvement in this drug business that flourished across the region, however no evidence has been found of their direct involvement. But there is evidence that among this groups Al Qaeda in The Islamic Magreb (AQIM) , for example may have tried or imposed transit fees on drug smugglers or lent its protection to smuggling convoys and is therefore indirectly involved and is benefitting from the income of this drug business²¹⁵

Kidnapping for ransom also emerged as another profitable business venture in the region side by side cigarettes, migration and illicit drugs business. Kidnapping for ransom came to be linked to and explained as part the main reasons behind the presence of AQIM in the Sahel region. Kidnapping foreign national for political and financial ends began to flourish since the end of the 1990's Tuareg rebellion in Mali and Niger. In 2003, 32 European tourists were kidnapped in southern Algeria, 17 came to be released in Algeria, while 15 remaining hostages were later released in northern Mali after 6 months of captivity. These kidnappings were mainly carried out by the Algerian Salafi group which changed its name in 2007 to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The involvement of AQIM was initially disputed, but by December 2007, it became clear after 4 French national were kidnapped and killed by AQIM members in Mauritania. In April 2012, 42 foreign nationals had been abducted, 24 were released, while 5 were killed and the remaining 14 remained in captivity until August 2012.

These kidnappings usually take place in areas such as; southern Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, Niger and northern Mali, by AQIM and later a splinter group from AQIM known as movement for Tauhid and Jihad in west Africa (MUJAO). Such kidnappings were seen to focus on foreign nationals of countries that are known to be willing to

²¹⁴ Ibid, p 36.

²¹⁵ Wolfram Lacher, " Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region", The Carnegie Papers, Middle East, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September, 2012, p 8.

negotiate²¹⁶. Political motives are sometime behind AQIM's role in hostage taking by spreading terror. Political demands appear to be somehow made in messages posted on the internet, and most release were usually made after ransom was paid, or after prisoners linked to the groups had been released. Generally, kidnapping for ransom grew to become a highly profitable industry that paved the way for AQIM and MUJWA to emerge as important political and military force in the Sahel and the Sahara regions respectively. It was reported that ransoms ranging between \$1.4 – 4 Million was paid for hostage taking, and it was estimated that between \$40 – 65 Million accrued to these groups from ransoms paid on kidnapped foreign nationals since 2008, and such payments were made by western governments.²¹⁷

At some point it became very clear that there was a link between the organized crime that was taking place in the region and nations such as Mali, Mauritania and other Sahel states. The complicity became too obvious as the rate of such kidnappings continued to rise, and which came to be seen as a business run by AQIM and MUJWA. It was observed that tensions related to the growing drug business, the absence of state authority due to complicity with organized crime, were seen to have played a significant role in the developments that led to the outbreak of the conflict or revolt in northern Mali in January, 2012. In Mauritania, the involvement of security officials and business men in contraband business and weapon's smuggling business is well known. In 2007, a major cocaine seizure was made that exposed the linkages between certain figures and the growing drug trade. The nephew of the former President of Mauritania, Sidi Ahmed Ould Taya, and Sidi Mohammed Ould Haidallah, the son of another former president were arrested for a cocaine smuggling transactions at Nouadhibon airport. And the serving President, Ould Abdel Aziz's decision to reduce prison sentences of cocaine smugglers in 2011 was seen have raised eyebrows in many quarters. Not only that, the Appeal Court's decision to release 30 convicted cocaine smugglers in July 2011 , was seen as a verdict that was reversed after high level players had fled the country^{218 219}. Again, special permits were

²¹⁶ European nations were usually ready to negotiate and pay ransoms to secure the release of any captured or kidnapped citizen, and as a result of this they became the victims of the kidnapping enterprise. Although sometimes the kidnapping of foreign nationals, particularly Europeans was explained as a form of a protest against perceived exploitation of natural resources and general economic misfortune and instability facing many African states.

²¹⁷ Ibid, p 9.

²¹⁸ Afrique-Drogue, "Mauritanie: un trafiquant de drogue francais en cavale", 16 September 2011, <http://afriquedrogue.blogs.rfi.fr/article/2011/09/16/mauritanie-un-trafiquant-de-drogue-francias-en-cavale>.

issued to certain individuals by the former head of police so as to avoid check points, just as retired military officers came to be linked to a cannabis seizure in May, 2012. The borders of Niger republic also appeared uncontrollable, contraband goods, and irregular migration became the order of the day and with full connivance of state authorities. Weapons or drugs are hardly seized in the northern side of the Niger border, as the state authorities tended to overlook the smuggling of these items (drugs and weapons). In 2011, an Arab rebel leader Abta Hamdine was arrested after a clash between the Niger army and a convoy carrying explosives and other weapons from Libya, clearly to be delivered to AQIM in northern Mali. Abta was subsequently released, just as Aghali Alambo, who served as adviser to the President of Niger Legislative Assembly and was also implicated in the matter was briefly arrested with Abta and was also released. The collusion in such crimes is seen to stretch to Algeria and Libya. In Libya, smuggling was managed by senior government officials until the overthrow of Ghaddafi; and since then arms smuggling out of Libya, to Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and the entire region has become boosted. It has succeeded in creating vested interest that would be difficult to dismantle by any future Libyan government. This instances of open collusion between government officials of the different states in the Sahel, including Mali is seen to have largely contributed to the rise of trans-national Islamist groups that came to launch the 2012 rebellion in Mali.

In Mali, organized crime is traceable to the 2006 rebellion which was led by many Tuareg officers from Kidal city. It was certain that the revolt started due to political grievances, but rivalry and struggle for influence over smuggling appeared to have become more prominent in the conflict than the politics of autonomy or implementation of the National Pact. The struggle by different smuggling networks to control smuggling routes or impose transit fees on smugglers from other groups became the main pre-occupation of various groups due to the growing profits in drug smuggling. The complicity of the Malian government is seen in the fact that it chose to show support, and allied itself with leaders from the Arab clan and the Lamhar tribes of the north in order to counter the Ifoghas and the Idnan Tuareg rebels. And from then on, a small group of Tuareg rebels from among the Ifoghas continued to attack many of the Merabuche and Lamhar drug smuggling convoys

²¹⁹ The decision to reverse the prison terms was seen as a way to make things a little easy for drug pushers, and this is because relatives of the former President have at one time or the other been involved in drug related issues. This further confirms the involvement or support that crime in the Sahel enjoyed from the leaders of the various states.

in the north. Clashes related to cocaine smuggling became very rampant²²⁰, and in certain instances, state officials were found to intervene. Lieutenant Colonel Lamema Ould Bou, an officer of the Malian army that is said to be close to the state head of security, interfered in a cocaine clash in 2007, and was said to have arranged a cocaine shipment in exchange for huge payment²²¹. In November 2009, a cocaine shipment by plane further made clear the relationship between the Malian authorities, local notables and business men in the drug trade. The shipment was said to have landed in Tarkint city, north of Gao and was handled by Lamhar notables, including the Mayor of Tarkint, Baba Ould Cheick, who is said to be very close to the Malian government. Many prominent Arab leaders in the provinces of Timbuktu and Gao tried to protect their business interest by establishing militias, and such position seemed to be in tune with the interest of the Malian government, whose interest and aim was to continue to mobilize Arab leaders to fight the rebel Tuaregs. Therefore, the militias created by businessmen such as Dina Ould Daya and Oumar Ould Ahmad came to be temporarily headed by members of the Malian army such as Colonel Mohammed Ould Meydou and Lieutenant Colonel Bou.²²²

The Malian government's alliance with certain groups amongst the Arab populations, based on organized crime, also extended to AQIM, in its kidnapping business for ransom²²³. In 2003, some European tourists were abducted, and the Malian government and western European governments relied on Itad ag Ghali, a former Tuareg rebel leader and head of the Ansardine organization, and the Mayor of Tarkint to act as intermediaries in ransom negotiations. It was alleged that successful negotiations, meant that intermediaries would take a large part of the ransom negotiated, which they share with political protectors in the Malian government. The many instances of open complicity in organized crime between the Malian government and organizations such as AQIM and other drug trafficking networks, had made the Malian authorities lose credibility, as the evidenced involvement of the Malian authorities tended to undermine all regional security arrangements in the region. All attempts by neighboring countries of Mauritania, Algeria

²²⁰ Scheele, "Tribus, Etats et Fraude", p 87-88.

²²¹ Diplomatic Cable, U.S Embassy, Bamako, 18 March, 2009, www.wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09BAMAKO163.html.

²²² Wolfram Lacher, "Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region", The Carnegie Papers, Middle East, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September, 2012, p 12.

²²³ The Malian government at a point was supporting certain Arab groups in the north against the Tuaregs, trying to use these groups to check the Tuaregs. This support appeared to have aided the perpetuation of unofficial organized crimes, and instead of putting a check on the Tuareg, led to the escalation of the Tuareg grievances with the Malian state.

etc to curb the excesses of AQIM and other organizations in the region, were frustrated by the Malian government which tended to protect certain individuals from within these groups²²⁴

Generally, the 2012 rebellion was not in any way a clash between competing drug smuggling related groups such as AQIM , MUJAO and other networks. However, it cannot be denied that actors and organizations or groups involved in organized crimes in the Sahel region, played a significant role in the conflict as a result of the political and military influence they came to wield over time across the region in the course of their illegal, criminal activities. The rebellion is seen to have come about as a result of a combination of several factors; though some linked to one another. But it was generally agreed among many writers and commentators, that apart from the organized crime which includes; trade in drugs, kidnapping for ransom and smuggling in goods such as cigarette, other factors were also seen to be at play as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, which are political, but created certain social, economic and environmental conditions that were highlighted above.

As mentioned previously, the 2006-2009 rebellion was led by Ibrahim Bahanga, Iyad ag Ghali and other former Tuareg leaders until a peace agreement was reached in 2009²²⁵, that saw to the end of the revolt. It was a revolt, but not as the 1963 or 1990, in terms of scale of fighting and intensity, but was all the same a revolt. After the agreement of 2009, Ibrahim Bahanga was said to have formed a separate rebel group and was planning to launch a new revolt or another Tuareg revolution, and upon discovery of such plans the Malian authorities expelled him from Mali. He was said to have relocated to Libya, where he continued to organize, recruit and plan he anticipated revolution, but died in a car crash in 2011. It was generally believed that the 2012 rebellion was initiated by Bahanga, and the

²²⁴ Ibid, p 13.

²²⁵ The rebellion was the fallout of previous revolts and the inability to fulfill terms of the previous pacts entered between the Malian government and the Tuareg groups especially after the 1990 rebellion. At the beginning of the chapter a reference to the rebellion had been discussed and how Bahanga was said to have actively participated in it, alongside other Tuareg leaders. The rebellion was characterized by guerilla attacks in certain parts of the country, until a ceasefire was brokered in 2008 with the help of Algeria. The rebellion appeared to have broken out in Niger also, even after the ceasefire in Mali, until an agreement was brokered by Libya in 2009. It is often referred as the 2007-2009 Tuareg rebellion, without any distinction between the Niger Tuaregs and Mali Tuaregs. This is partly because there was heavy influx of Tuaregs from Mali into the Agadez region in Niger after the breakout of violence in Mali, before it spilled into Niger.

plans continued to be followed by his group that was in Libya, and that it was only after certain developments had proved favorable to the groups' plan that the revolt erupted.

4.3.1 Outbreak of the 2012 Rebellion

The fall of Ghaddafi in 2011, was seen to have accelerated certain developments in the Sahel region and Mali in particular. First, the fall resulted in the proliferation of weapons across the region and especially into the hands of many armed groups in Mali, such as; AQIM, MUJWA and Ansardine. At this time, the social and environmental factors prevalent in the region, such as the trade and drugs, kidnapping for ransom and smuggling in illicit goods and weapons had already rendered the region and northern Mali in particular volatile. And so the weapons coming in from Libya further worsened the already existing volatile and dangerous situation.

Secondly, Ghaddafi's fall was explained as solely responsible for the return of a large number of former Tuareg rebels that had either been part of the Libyan army since the 1963 or 1990 revolts that saw many Tuaregs migrating to Libya, after Ghaddafi declared in a speech that Libya was the original country of the Tuareg people. After migrating to Libya, most of the Tuaregs were enlisted into the Libyan army, and returned after Ghaddafi's fall, numbering about 600, 000²²⁶. Perhaps many of them may have been part of Bahanga's group and plan for a new Tuareg revolution in Mali, while some sources even maintained that the group specifically returned with the intention of creating an Azawad country in Mali²²⁷. This position appears acceptable especially if the developments that followed their return is taken into consideration.

The aim of the formation of the MNLA (Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad) in October, 2011, was independence of the Tuaregs from Mali. The MNLA membership came to be dominated mostly by those Tuaregs that had returned from Libya after the fall of Ghaddafi. The MNLA from its inception was seen to have formed an alliance with other Islamist groups such as ; AQIM, MUJWA and Ansardine. AQIM and MUJWA were designated by the U.S as terrorist organizations, but Ansardine was not. Iyad ag Ghali was said to have formed Ansardine after it became clear the Amenokal Intalla ag Attaher

²²⁶ Kwesi Aning, Frank Okyere & Mustapha Abdallah, "Addressing Emerging Security Threats in Post-Gaddafi Sahel and the ECOWAS Response to the Malian Crises", Policy Brief, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Center, 1, May, 2012, p 3.

²²⁷ Interview with Pierre Berret, UN Consultant to the MINUSMA force in Mali, 11 April, 2014.

(Tuareg Chief) was opposed to his leadership of the MNLA, which later fell under the leadership of Bilal ag Acherif. Iyad ag Ghali was a former Tuareg rebel leader and many of his former officers joined the MNLA, and newly formed Ansardine formed an alliance with the MNLA. It was reported that the return of the Tuaregs from Libya altered the balance of power among the various competing groups in favor of the Tuaregs, which made it possible to for the group under the MNLA leadership form alliance with AQIM and other groups to launch attack against the Malian government in March 2012, when they declared northern Mali as the independent state of the Azawad.²²⁸

The attack launched by the rebel groups of MNLA, AQIM, MUJWA and Ansardine recorded some successes against the Malian army, which appeared ill equipped to withstand the fire power of the rebels.²²⁹ Between January 17 and April 1, the rebels had captured not only Menaka, but also Kidal on 30 March, Gao on 31 and Timbuktu on 1 April, 2012.²³⁰

However, after taking control of northern Mali, the rebel group's alliances were seen to have fallen apart, especially between the MNLA on one hand and the 3 Islamist groups of AQIM, MUJWA and Ansardine on the other hand, who appear to be much more stronger than the MNLA. And soon after their takeover of the north, the MNLA came to be driven out of the region by the Iyad ag Ghali led Ansardine and its allies, AQIM, believed to be led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar and MUJWA. These groups imposed Islamic law in the various cities captured in the north.²³¹ Ghali's introduction of Shariah was seen as move to consolidate his control in the area and to gain support of the population by exploiting religious sentiments. And with the help of AQIM and MUJWA, the 3 groups were able to restore order which had been absent since the outbreak of the conflict, and which forms part of the reasons why the MNLA came to be despised by the population in the north. The MNLA was accused of antagonism, robbery of civilians, including instances of rape, thereby bringing about so much disorder as the civilian population was forced to flee. This

²²⁸ David J. Francis, "The Regional Impact of the Armed Conflict and French Intervention in Mali", Norwegian Peace building Resource Centre Report, April, 2013, p 4.

²²⁹ Freedom C. Onuoha, Alex Thurston, "Franco-African Military Intervention in Mali Crisis and Evolving Security Concerns", Aljazeera Center for Studies", 19 February, 2013, p 2.

²³⁰ Alexander Thurston, Andrew Lebovich, " A Handbook on Mali's 2012-2013 Crisis", Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought in Africa (ISITA) Working Papers series, No 13-001, The Roberto Buffett Center for International and Comparative Studies, North Western University, September 2, 2013, p 28.

²³¹ Bakary Sambe, "Crisis in Mali: Origins, Developments and Impact on the Sub-Region", Kas International Reports, p 117.

came to be explained as the basis of the support for the Ansardine by the population in the north, and forms part of the reasons why the MNLA was driven out by the rest of the groups. As it drove out the MNLA, the Ansardine embarked on humanitarian assistance and distributed food and other relief items, further making its impact felt by the people in the north whose support for the group came to increase²³².

Under such circumstances in the country, a military coup took place on 22 March, 2012, shortly before the scheduled presidential election that would have marked the end of Toure's second tenure as president. The coup was explained to have come about as a result of growing dissatisfaction with the manner in which the Toure government was handling the crisis in the north of the country. It started from a mutiny that had its roots from a protest against the conditions in which the Malian soldiers fought with the rebel armed groups in the north²³³. The reasons given for the coup came to expose the many years of corruption and general mal-governance in Mali under Toure. Captain Ahmadu Sango emerged as the new military ruler in Mali, and gradually tried to consolidate his position within the military. Units considered loyal to President Toure came to be dissolved, while leading officers of these units were arrested and subsequently imprisoned.

4.4 French Intervention in Mali and UN, AU, ECOWAS, EU, US Response

The military coup in Mali attracted widespread condemnation from the international community, as contained in separate communiqués of the United Nations, African Union²³⁴, ECOWAS²³⁵, and the European Union, all of which called for immediate restoration of constitutional order in Mali. The African Union and ECOWAS made references to the provisions of the African charter on democracy, elections and governance, which rejects any unconstitutional change of government, including seizure of

²³² Freedom C. Onuoha, Alex Thurston, "Franco-African Military Intervention in Mali Crisis and Evolving Security Concerns", Aljazeera Center for Studies", 19 February, 2013, p 4.

²³³ Lori-Anne Theroux Benoni, "Situation Report", Institute of Security Studies, 25 February, 2013, p 1.

²³⁴ The African Union was the successor of the Organization of African Unity, which was founded by the former Ghanaian president Kwame and Nkrumah and his counterpart from Ethiopia, Hailes Salasie. The same idea came to revived in the 1990's under the leadership of Muamar Ghaddafi at the Sirte declaration in 1999, followed by the Lome summit in 2000 where the African Union act was adopted. The African Union is a geo-political entity covering the entire African continent with the exception of Morocco.

²³⁵ In May, 1975, 15 West African Heads of state met in Lagos Nigeria to sign the ECOWAS Treaty. The idea of forming a regional body is credited to Liberia's former president, William Tubman around 1965. The ECOWAS was founded to promote and achieve economic integration among West African states.

power by force.²³⁶ The ECOWAS first responded by refusing to recognize the new military junta, and requested for the establishment of a transitional civilian administration, to be headed by the Speaker of the Malian National Assembly, Diounounda Traore. In the event of any failure by the Malian military junta to comply with its demands, the ECOWAS came up with a set of sanctions against the new military regime of Captain Ahmadu Sango. These set of sanctions were imposed on the military junta on 27 March, 2012 by the ECOWAS included among others; the suspension of Mali's membership of ECOWAS, travel ban on the members of the junta and their associates, the recall of all ECOWAS Ambassadors from Mali, as well as closure with all member states. And in consideration of the weight and implications of these sanctions, the new military regime had to cooperate and it handed over power to a transitional administration which came to be headed by Diounounda Traore as requested by ECOWAS. Traore who had been the Speaker of the National Assembly under Toure took over as Mali's interim President on 6 April, 2012, and then ECOWAS lifted all sanctions against Mali.²³⁷

Despite the fact that the transition government had taken over power, problems still remained, as the role of the military junta under the transition administration was not clearly defined. This was seen to have created confusion, as the junta continued to occupy the political space, further complicating the already existing poor security situation in the country. At a point, the ECOWAS contemplated the reinstatement of the set of sanction it had earlier lifted, after it had appointed the President of Burkina-Faso, Blaise Campore to mediate in the conflict in Mali. The interference by the military junta was seen as contravening article 1 of the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, which bars serving members of armed forces from engaging in politics. The failure of ECOWAS to broker a peace deal through the mediation of Campore, prompted the regional body to consider military action in Mali. This was due to the fact that the political instability appeared to be complicating the security situation in the north as correctly observed by Victoria Nuland of the US State Department in the following words;

“We thought we had a deal brokered by ECOWAS to return Mali to civilian rule so that we could get to the elections. We have concerns that the deal appears to be breaking down, it

²³⁶ Kwesi Aning, Frank Okyere, Mustapha Abdallah, “Addressing Emerging Security Threats in Post Gaddafi Sahel and the ECOWAS Response to the Malian Crisis”, Kofi Annan International Peace Keeping Training Centre Policy Brief, 1 May, 2012, p 4.

²³⁷ Ibid, p 5.

is not being honored, of course, that's just providing space for more mischief in the north of Mali.²³⁸

Despite efforts made by ECOWAS, numerous problems were identified as solely responsible for the failure of its efforts in the Mali conflict. Expectations on ECOWAS to exert some influence was seen to be based on the principle of solidarity, and the fact that international and regional organizations are usually effective in putting measures to avoid, resolve and manage crisis, particularly within their sphere of influence. But in Mali, the situation appeared confusing, and it became apparent that the ECOWAS did not have a clear strategy on how to handle the crisis. There were blames on ECOWAS for not taking quick action on the conflict, until 3 September, 2012, when it could have long before then. It was reported that a number of high level meetings had been taking place among ECOWAS states regarding the crisis, but these meetings were not seen to have produced any meaningful results. It was for lack of clear strategy that the United Nations initially declined a request for military action in Mali by ECOWAS. ECOWAS it would appear required the support of certain countries that were not members, but some have observer status, such as Chad and Algeria, for any meaningful action in Mali. The Chadian army is well familiar with desert combat, but was not involved in all ECOWAS negotiations and meetings, just as Algeria, whose logistical support was inevitable but was not consulted. It became clear that ECOWAS could not go alone, and needed the help and support of other strategic partners such as the UN, AU, EU and states like US, France and UK.²³⁹

It could be recalled that after all negotiations by ECOWAS had failed, and the rebel threats continued unabated, the interim administration in Mali in September, 2012 sought the assistance of ECOWAS to suppress the offensive of the rebel groups. Following such request from the interim President, Traore, and ECOWAS forwarded such request to the African Union to facilitate the mobilization of the required international support and authority for any planned mission. The AU and ECOWAS, jointly prepared documents required by the Security Council of the UN to pass resolutions 2056 (2012) and resolution 2071 (2012), of 5, July and 12 October, respectively.²⁴⁰ The two resolutions gave authority

²³⁸ Ibid, p 5.

²³⁹ Bakary Sambe, "Crisis in Mali: Origins, Developments and Impact on the Sub-Region", Kas International Reports, p 127.

²⁴⁰ African Union, " Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Operationalization of the Rapid Deployment Capability of the African Standby Force and the Establishment of an African Capacity for

to the ECOWAS and the African Union to develop a plan for military action in Mali and to report to the UN within 45 days.²⁴¹ And it was on such basis that the AU Commission, in close collaboration with ECOWAS, concerned nations, the UN and other partners became actively involved in the preparation of a harmonized concept of operations (CONOPS), for the deployment of a military force in to Mali. The said concept of operations was endorsed first of all by the ECOWAS Summit of Heads of States, and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on 11th and 13th November, 2012 respectively. The document was said to have been the result of in depth consultations with various stake holders, and outlines the measures or actions to be taken to bring a quick end to the Malian conflict.

Consequently, on 20 December, 2012, the United Nations Security Council, adopted resolution 2085 (2012) authorizing the deployment of a 3,300 strong African led international support mission to Mali, known also as AFISMA, for an initial period of one year²⁴². The approval by the UN Security Council, did not seem to approve the request by the AU for the UN to establish a support package to be funded by contributions by the United Nations, but tended to acknowledge the establishment of a Special Trust Fund to receive voluntary contributions for AFISMA and another Fund for Defense and Security Forces of Mali (MDSF). The authorization for the military action by the UN also appeared to be based on certain political and technical conditions.²⁴³

While efforts were being made for the deployment of the African led mission in Mali, and mediation efforts were also ongoing, on 8 January, 2013, the rebel groups were reported to have taken control of Konna, a city about 70 KM north of the Malian governments stronghold in Sevare. This was viewed as a clear threat to Bamako, the Malian capital, and as such something needed to be done. The rebels started a series of assaults thereby taking over Lere and Menaka from local militias and the MNLA. The attack on cities such as Konna and Lere were seen as a strategic move to seize key infrastructure in the north,

Immediate Response to Crises”, 6th Ordinary Meeting of The Specialized Committee On Defense: Safety and Security, Preparatory Meeting of Chiefs of Staff, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 29-30 April 2013, p 4.

²⁴¹ Freedom C. Onuoha, Alex Thurston, “Franco-African Military Intervention in the Mali Crises and Evolving Security Concerns”, Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 19 February, 2013, p 4-5.

²⁴² African Union, “ Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Operationalization of the Rapid Deployment Capability of the African Standby Force and the Establishment of an African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises”, 6th Ordinary Meeting of The Specialized Committee On Defense: Safety AND Security, Preparatory Meeting of Chiefs of Staff, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 29-30 April 2013, p 4.

²⁴³ Ibid, p 5.

which included an airport. It was as a result of the offensive on these cities that the Malian authorities became afraid and thought that the Malian army may not be able to repel the combined offensive of AQIM, Ansardine and MUJWA. And the result was that, the interim President of Mali, Diounounda Traore called on France for a quick military action before the rebels could reach Bamako. The call for Paris to intervene was made by the interim President of Mali on 10 January, 2013.²⁴⁴

Mean while, since his election into office on May 15, 2012, the President of France, Francoise Hollande had found himself with need to give special attention to Africa as a result of the Mali crisis. He was said to have reached a conclusion that the crisis posed a fundamental threat to French national interest, and that it may enhance the capacity of the rebels and terrorists to stage attacks in France. And that the disintegration of Mali may lead to instability in the entire west African sub-region. As such, from inception, the French President was seen to have publicly given priority to the conflict in Mali, and had hosted members of the Malian community, including the interim President Traore at the Elysee Palace. Hollande, was also seen to have maintained Sarkozy's position, by aligning with ECOWAS on the need to restore constitutional order, as well as the proposal to send a military mission to Mali to rescue the north from rebel terrorists. Paris lobbied seriously during the summer and autumn of 2012, for the United Nations Security Council to support the ECOWAS proposal for the deployment of African troops to Mali²⁴⁵. Initially, the United States had opposed the proposal, on the grounds that the plans by ECOWAS were not comprehensive enough, and this led the Security Council to have initially been reluctant to accept the proposal. It was the sustained diplomatic efforts of Paris that finally convinced UK and other EU partners of the need to not only send troops to Mali, but also to train the African led international mission and provide all necessary support. And Paris succeeded in having the UN issue a resolution for the deployment of the African led force to Mali.

²⁴⁴ Freedom C. Onuoha, Alex Thurston, "Franco-African Military Intervention in the Mali Crises and Evolving Security Concerns", Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 19 February, 2013, p 4-5.

²⁴⁵ Paul Melly, Vincent Darracq, "A New Way to Engage? French Policy In Africa from Sarkozy to Hollande", Chatham House, May 2013, p 8.

4.5 French Africa Policy: Sarkozy and Hollande Policies towards Africa

The foreign affairs Ministry in Paris under Hollande appeared to have become very active in shaping French policy towards Africa unlike in the past. The ministry did not just rely on instructions from the presidency, and Hollande was seen to have empowered professional experts to deal with African issues, as well as his choice of people like Laurent Fabius, who is in the socialist party. As such the ministry came to be fully involved in all issues related to French policy in Africa. The constitution of France has vested all power related to foreign affairs and defense in the President, instead of Prime Minister and the government which usually relied on parliamentary majority before they take any major decision. And so the French President needed only to inform parliament about certain decisions related to foreign affairs and defense, it is seen as his prerogative and does not require any parliamentary approval to take any action.²⁴⁶ The President gave the French National Assembly a debate about the operations in Mali only after he had taken a decision, with broad support for the operation. It was reported that even the Socialists in Parliament supported the operation and 63% of the opposition member of Parliament also supported the operation²⁴⁷. However, the French President at this time appeared to have relied on a circle of colleagues that advised him on how to handle the Malian crisis, including his personal Military staff or Adviser, General Benoit Puga, who is known as a veteran of African interventions, Defense Minister Jean Yves Le Drian, who is a close confidant of the President, and is seen to have supported a strong military action in the crisis²⁴⁸. Hollande also relied on the African Advisory unit at his Elysee palace which he created and is headed by Helene Le Gal, who has been known to be a career diplomat. It was also reported that President Hollande and his ministers personally sought the opinion of many African Presidents regarding the Mali issue, both within and outside West Africa, including Jacob Zuma of South Africa, as well as the President of Algeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika. And that many African governments expressed appreciation for such consultation on the Mali crisis by Paris. Many African states became convinced of the need

²⁴⁶ Ibid, p 10.

²⁴⁷ Parliamentary Oversight of Armed Forces, "Mali and Operation Serval", <http://parliamentaryoversight.wordpress.com/2013/01/28/Mali-and-operation-serval/>

²⁴⁸ The French President may have relied on this circle of advisers probably as a result of the sensitivity of the military action required, and also partly due to the emergency nature of the request from the Malian President, which did not give room for long consultations with either Parliament or anybody for that matter. And also it is difficult to say which body was more influential in taking any decision, both the Ministry and the Advisers appeared to have worked in consultation with another, and took all decision together based on the situation on the ground and what needed to be done.

for military action and quick stabilization of Mali as a result of the French diplomatic effort. The Hollande government was worked in close collaboration with the African Union and other regional power blocs with regards to French policy in the Africa and the Mali conflict in particular.²⁴⁹

There have been many arguments about public support for operation Serval within France and in Mali among several commentators. Polls conducted in France showed that a hefty majority of French people supported the operation according to a report of the Voice of America on 14 January 2014²⁵⁰. The clarity of French goals of driving out the Islamist radicals and the fact that French forces produced rapid results contributed to such public support in France. There was a general feeling it was reported among French public that operation Serval was the right thing to do²⁵¹. The Parliamentary Oversight of Armed Forces blog on 28 January, 2013 was quoted as saying that “the French public is usually known for its support to the President who is seen to always help France maintain its international position”.

Following the request by the Malian President for Paris to intervene militarily, and in pursuance of UN resolution 2085 (2012), Paris launched “Operation Serval”, with a view to putting a stop to rebel advances, as well as all activities of the various armed groups in Mali, and the restoration of the territorial integrity of the country. Several reasons came to be advanced to support the French intervention, and the first reason was that there was considerable delay in the operational readiness, logistical preparation, as well as build up of units placed at the disposal of AFISMA, which came to be attributed to logistical and financial constraints. Secondly, lack of political commitment among African states regarding the Mali crisis and the UN resolution authorizing the deployment of the African led force, came to be observed among other reasons for such support of the operation by Malians. The African states could not respond to the emergency situation which the offensive of the rebel terrorist groups created, and which prompted Bamako to seek quick aid from Paris. Lastly, the geographical location of Mali also appeared to make coordinating the African mission complicated. The Sahel region is at the crossroads of

²⁴⁹ Ibid, p 10-11.

²⁵⁰ Voice of America, “French Military Operations in Africa Unpopular at Home, 14 January, 2014. www.voanews.com/content/french-military-operations-in-africa-unpopular-at-home .

²⁵¹ Parliamentary Oversight of Armed Forces, “Mali and Operation Serval”, <http://parliamentaryoversight.wordpress.com/2013/01/28/Mali-and-operation-serval/>.

west, north and the central regions of Africa, which belong to different regional bodies, and as such presented challenges of coordination.²⁵² The Malian public gave enthusiastic welcome to French soldiers when they came to rescue them from the Islamist terrorists. But according to certain sources, opinion in Mali may have changed a little after the operation. There is fear that France may maintain a permanent military presence in Mali. This position is contained in a newly published book by a Malian activist Aminata Dramare Traore and Senegalese Novelist; Boubacar Boris Diop titled “La Gloire des Imposteurs”. In this book, the authors tried to outline the fears of the Malian people and maintained that the Malian public is confused and faced with a choice of having to fight against jihadists for a very long time, or have their sovereignty challenged and their territory occupied by an ancient Colonialist state, or in any case partitioned to satisfy a group allied with the Colonial power²⁵³.

Operation Serval was launched by Paris on 11 January, 2013, when the Special Forces Aviation unit stationed in Burkina-Faso destroyed pick up vans belonging to the rebel groups. French forces from Chad, Ivory Coast and Senegal were sent in a contingency effort to rescue Mali from the rebel terrorist groups. After three weeks of fighting, certain cities were recovered from the terrorists, and include the towns of Timbuktu and Gao on the 26 and 28 January respectively, which are considered highly important and strategic in winning the battle against the rebels. .

And by March, the Chadian troops²⁵⁴, French Airborne and Armored troops had began clearing the positions of the terrorists in the Ifogha mountains, making sure that important

²⁵² African Union, “ Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Operationalization of the Rapid Deployment Capability of the African Standby Force and the Establishment of an African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises”, 6th Ordinary Meeting of The Specialized Committee On Defense: Safety AND Security, Preparatory Meeting of Chiefs of Staff, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 29-30 April 2013, p 6.

The countries in the region belonged to different regional bodies, and these bodies had different rules regarding movement, trade and military exercises, and this created coordination problems between the states. While for example Mali and Burkina Faso were ECOWAS members, Algeria and Mauritania were not ECOWAS states, and do not certain agreements between other ECOWAS states with regards to military exercises, trade or free movement.

²⁵³ Papa Sanba Kare “Mali: The Forgotten War, Aljazeera, 6 September, 2014, www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/09/Mali-Forgotten-War.

²⁵⁴ Chad deployed about 2000 troops, one infantry regiment with 1,200 soldiers and two support battalions with 800 soldiers into Mali. The Chadian army is considered as one of the best in Africa, and was considered to lead together with the French army for this reason. The Chadian army is seen to be experienced in fighting in the desert climate and had in the past suppressed many numerous internal rebellions in

cities and infrastructures could be able to withstand the offensive of the rebel groups. At this time, the rebel groups had moved to the country side so as to be able to regroup and re-strategize.

The French forces led the operation, while integrating the Malian soldiers into their ranks. It was reported that resistance in both cities was weak from the rebel's side and that in Timbuktu, resistance was almost absent. Kidal, which covers a wide strip of desert, is sparsely populated and located on the Algerian border proved rather more difficult to deal with it, as a result of humanitarian and geographical reasons. The Kidal region is seen as entirely different from Timbuktu and Gao for a number of important reasons. The most important military commanders from among the Tuaregs since the 1990 rebellion and the newly formed MNLA and Ansardine, including Iyad Ag Ghali, Ibrahim Bahanga and Hassan Ag Fagaga are all from Kidal. Among the three regions in the north, Kidal is known to have a Tuareg majority. The Ifogha Mountains located in the region are known to be a refuge for many armed movements. But here, the rebel groups were seen to have fled the city and unto the Ifogha Mountains even before the arrival of the French troops. The French are said to have arrived Kidal on 28 January, and found the city under the control of the MNLA, who had earlier welcomed the coming of the French, but on the condition that the Malian army stayed away. And for this reason the Malian army was not involved in the Kidal operations, which came to be known as "Operation Panther" that was launched on 18 February, 2013. The Kidal operation was said to have started around the small town of Tessalit, with a view to destroying all terrorist bases, and about 30 Chadian soldiers were said to have been lost to the operation. After a successful collaboration between the French army and the MNLA, Kidal was stabilized and the MNLA²⁵⁵ came to consolidate its position in the city.²⁵⁶

Generally, Operation Serval came to be described as highly successful in terms of organization, operation and planning, despite the many challenges that followed the

environments similar to that of Mali. Between 1983 and 1987, Chad fought and won a border war with Libya.

²⁵⁵ The MNLA initially started the rebellion in alliance with the Islamist groups of Al-Qaeda, Ansardine and MUJWA, but disagreed with the other groups after the capture of the north and specifically after the groups insisted on establishing Islamic rule in the north. The MNLA is not considered as a terrorist group, but is rather seen as an organization of the Tuaregs, seeking better conditions for the group under the Malian nation, and is seen as a regional pressure group.

²⁵⁶ International Crisis Group, "Mali: Security, Dialogue and Meaningful Reform", Africa Report, No 201, 11 April, 2013, Brussels, Belgium, p 6-12 .

operation. The French had deployed 4,000 soldiers to Mali, and the French army is seen to have vast experience in combat operations and have been part of many volunteer operations in Africa, Afghanistan, Middle East and the Balkans. And in terms of intelligence, the French and other allied intelligence have been following activities of the terrorist groups in the Sahel region for quite some time, and had been tracking the connections of the rebels. Joint intelligent collections, such as satellite, naval maritime patrol aircraft, U.S Air force unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as US army human intelligence have for long focused on Mali, and proved crucial during the operation²⁵⁷. They helped in providing targets for air strikes that paved the way for ground troops to advance. It further helped identify positions in the Ifogha Mountains. The operation in its entirety was seen to have consisted of three main phases; block, drive back and clear. In terms of supplies, allied contributions helped bridge French gaps in strategic and tactical transport at the start of the operations. With regards to planning, a contingency plan in support of AFISMA had been drafted, but was not implemented, and the G5 of the French armed forces was revised and deployed, and came to be known as “Guepard” or “Cheetah”. It generally consisted of a mechanized brigade on high readiness, backed by an airborne emergency element. The three phases of the operation had been clear to the French right from the start and provided enough latitude to the tactical commanders. The broadband global area network and other satellite communications systems, provided signals for the operation, though they were found not in the standard of army inventory and could not be used on the move. Serval was described as unprecedented in speed, number of troops and distances involved. According to certain sources, the operation revealed the determination, ruggedness and resourcefulness of the French troops as they fought in such austere conditions.²⁵⁸

Generally, the intervention by France in the Malian conflict militarily, appeared to have received a positive reaction from several countries, including organizations such as the UN, AU, EU, NATO and ECOWAS. Countries such as Italy, Denmark, Belgium, Canada and Germany appeared to have in one way or the other supplemented the French effort by providing logistics. Many countries and international organizations such as the UN were

²⁵⁷ The U.S it would appear only lent support to the French action, and generally supported the intervention by France, and provided intelligence and patrol aircrafts, which were lacking in the operation against the rebels.

²⁵⁸ Maj. Gen Olivier Tramond, Lt. Col. Philippe Seigneur, “Early Lessons From France’s Operation Serval In Mali”, Army, June, 2013, p 42-43.

seen to have lent their support for the French military action as a result of the security situation in Mali. The UN Secretary General Banki Moon was quoted during a press conference on 22 January, 2013 as saying “I applaud France for its courageous decision to deploy troops following the troubling move southward by extremist groups”²⁵⁹. The British Prime Minister was also quoted on 12 January, 2012 as saying “I welcome the military assistance France has provided to the Malian government, at their request, to halt, this progress in implementing UN Security Council resolution on Mali, and ensure that military intervention is reinforced by an inclusive political process leading to election and a return to civil rule.”²⁶⁰ Again on 25 January, 2013, the British Ministry of Defense in a speech by its Secretary for Defense, Philip Hamond said “Following discussion with the French, we have now decided to deploy Sentinel²⁶¹, a surveillance capability that proved its worth in Libya and an ongoing basis for counter insurgency operations in Afghanistan.²⁶²” London deployed about 20 personnel to support the French air transport liaisons, and 70 supporting ground crew for the Sentinel aircraft. Canada on its part, showed a small commitment to the French effort by providing a single CC-177 Globemaster III military transport plane. And also Canada’s special Joint Task Force was deployed to Mali to provide protection for Canadian assets and the embassy at Bamako.²⁶³

The United states, which was initially thought would oppose the French action, in a testimony by its Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs, Jonnie Carson, attached to a memo sent to the US President, Barrack Obama by the national security Adviser with the title: "The need for a stronger U.S policy towards the Mali crisis" on 15 February, 2013. Both the memo and the testimony appeared to have favored the French intervention in Mali. Jonnie Carson in the testimony was quoted as saying “we commend and strongly support the ongoing French and African military operation in northern Mali. On 20 December, 2012 the UN adopted resolution 2085, co-sponsored by the U.S, which recognized Mali’s overlapping challenges; underscored the international community’s support for restoring peace.”And in yet another testimony before the foreign affair committee, Amanda Dor, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Africa, office of

²⁵⁹ Claire Mills, Arabella Lang and Jon Lunn, “ The Crisis in Mali: Current Military Action and Upholding Humanitarian Law”, International Affairs Section, House of Commons Library, SN06531, 11 March 2013, p 4

²⁶⁰ Ibid p 5-6.

²⁶¹ This a battlefield and ground surveillance aircraft used by the Royal Air force of England.

²⁶² Ibid , P 6.

²⁶³ Stewart Webb, “Mali: The growing conflict”, esprit de corps, vol 20, March 2013, p 20.

the secretary for Defense, was quoted as saying “we are supporting the French by providing intelligence, aerial refueling services, and airlift, and are pursuing a range of funding options for our contributions. The counter terrorism effort in Mali complements the parallel U.S strategic objectives to support a sustainable solution to northern grievances, help Mali’s transition back to democracy, and ameliorate the humanitarian situation.”²⁶⁴

With regards to responses by organizations to the intervention, both the UN, AU, and ECOWAS seem to support the intervention by the French in Mali. The EU was seen to have established a training mission in Mali, to boost the operational capacity of both AFISMA and the Malian forces. The EU high Representative Catherine Ashton, speaking after a meeting of EU foreign ministers that took place on 17th January, 2013 to accelerate the deployment of the Mali EU mission, Catherine Ashton said “The situation highlights the need for enhanced and accelerated international engagement in support of the restoration of stability and state authority throughout Mali, in line with UN resolution 2085”²⁶⁵. The ECOWAS in a communiqué issued at the end of its 30th Ordinary meeting of the Mediation and Security Council on 15 July, 2013 held in Abuja, Nigeria, reiterated its gratitude to France and Chad for the sacrifices made to assist Mali in her time of need. ECOWAS also welcomed the deployment of AFISMA mission to Mali, and later supported the transition of AFISMA TO MINUSMA following a request to the United Nations and subsequent approval as will be seen in the following part.

4.6 AFISMA and MINUSMA Missions in Mali

In accordance with UN resolution 2085 (2012), AFISMA forces were deployed to Mali shortly after Operation Serval, beginning from 17 January, 2013 when troops from Nigeria began to arrive Mali to help further stabilize the country. African nations²⁶⁶ were seen to

²⁶⁴ National Security Advisor, Donilon, “The Need for a Stronger U.S Policy towards the Crisis in Mali, Memo to President Obama, , The White House, 15 February, 2013, p 6.

²⁶⁵ Claire Mills, Arabella Lang and Jon Lunn, “ The Crisis in Mali: Current Military Action and Upholding Humanitarian Law”, International Affairs Section, House of Commons Library, SN06531, 11 March 2013, p 4

²⁶⁵ Ibid p 11.

²⁶⁶ AFISMA is an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) organized military mission sent to support the government of ECOWAS member nation, Mali. The mission was authorized with UN Security Council Resolution 2085, which was passed on 20 December, 2012 and authorized the deployment of an African led international support mission in Mali for an initial period of one year.

have moved swiftly in troop contribution so as to expedite action, especially following the French action in Mali. Planning and coordination were initially seen to have presented certain challenges, but international partners provided support through strategic airlift, as well as ground transportation that assisted to help the challenge in the delay in the movement of troops and equipments. On 25 January, 2013 the AU Peace and Security Council requested all commissioners, ECOWAS, UN, EU and other partners to revise the joint strategic concept of operations, with a view to increase the troop strength of AFISMA. According To Major General Shehu Abdulkadir, the AFISMA force commander, 6,288 military personnel were deployed to Mali, including 84 officers at the AFISMA headquarters. It was expected that AFISMA contingents would be self sufficient for 90 days after deployment²⁶⁷, but soon the troop came to face serious logistical problems, including food, fuel and water. It was observed that adequate provision of logistical support remained crucial to the timely completion of deployment, sustainability, as well as effectiveness of the operations²⁶⁸. The UN military planners were seen to have provided or helped establish coordination mechanisms, identifying priority needs, for AFISMA operation, including increased awareness in terms of situations at the AFISMA headquarters. The UN planners helped in the development of key documents for the operation, which include among others; operational directives, guidelines for the protection of civilians, rules of engagement and a code of conduct.²⁶⁹ AFISMA was charged by the UN to contribute to the rebuilding of the capacity of the Malian Defense and Security Forces, in close coordination with other international partners involved in this process, including the European Union and other Member States. The mission was also to support the Malian authorities in recovering the areas in the north of its territory under the control of terrorist, extremist and armed groups and in reducing the threat posed by terrorist organizations, including AQIM, MUJWA and associated extremist groups, while taking appropriate measures to reduce the impact of military action upon the civilian population. AFISMA was to further help the transition and stabilization activities and support the Malian authorities in maintaining security and consolidate State authority through appropriate capacities. It was to also support the Malian authorities in their primary

²⁶⁷ The Mission appeared to have run out of supplies that were initially projected to last for up to 90 days from the beginning of the operation. But the terrain proved difficult and logistical problems led to shortage of supplies including food and fuel that were considered necessary for the sustainment of the operation.

²⁶⁸ United Nations Security Council, " Report of the Secretary-General on the Mali Situation", S/2013/189, United Nations, 26 March, 2013, p 9.

²⁶⁹ Ibid p 9.

responsibility to protect the population and again help support the Malian authorities to create a secure environment for the civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance and the voluntary return of internally displaced persons and refugees, as requested, within its capabilities and in close coordination with humanitarian actors. The mission is also to protect its personnel, facilities, premises, equipment and mission and to ensure the security and movement of its personnel²⁷⁰.

Despite the deployment of the AFISMA forces and the presence of French troops in Mali, the mission still faced a lot of challenges in terms of capacity, training and logistical support. AFISMA force Commander, Major General Shehu Abdulkadir, while briefing the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council during the 43rd Ordinary Session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of States and Governments, informed the council that AFISMA has covered the entire battle ground in Mali and performed professionally and effectively since deployment. He, however, noted in his briefing that the mission faced challenges that appeared to have complicated the operation of the troops in terms of logistics, intelligence, lack of air assets, as well as improvised explosive devices, the huge territory to be covered, communication equipment and accommodation. The commander affirmed that the mission had fulfilled its mandate as set out under UN resolution 2085, and recommended an after action program and a review of the regional peace and security architecture with regards to rapid response capabilities and strategic lift; as well as a harmonized pre-deployment common training and strengthening of ECOWAS standby force.²⁷¹

As a result of the continued security threat posed by the rebel terrorist groups in the north of Mali, as well as the challenges facing AFISMA and the need to stabilize Mali due to the humanitarian situation created by the conflict, there was urgent need to mobilize donor support to help address certain priority needs and rule of law institutions, reconstruction of offices, vehicles, communications equipments and basic supplies. It became clear that the operation required a larger commitment, beyond that of AU or ECOWAS. And it was against this background that the transitional government in Mali, in collaboration with

²⁷⁰ United Nations Security Council, “ Resolution 2085(2012), Adopted by the Security Council at its 6898th Meeting”, on 20th December, 2012, S/RES/2085(2012), p 4.

²⁷¹ ECOWAS COMMISSION, “ Report of the 30th Meeting of the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council “Forty-third Ordinary Session of ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government Abuja, 17th – 18th July, 2013, p 8.

ECOWAS and AU, sent a letter from the interim president of Mali, to the United Nation's Security Council. The Malian government, ECOWAS and AU sought for the transformation of AFISMA into a United Nations stabilization and peace keeping operation. Following which the Assistant Secretary General for peace keeping operations at the UN, Edmond Mulet led a delegation to Mali, with a view to developing recommendations for the Security Council's consideration on options for the establishment of a United Nations peace keeping operations in Mali.²⁷² The UN delegation visited Mali from 10th – 16th March, 2013 and reported back to the council its findings.

And upon assessment of the political and security situation in Mali by the UN delegation, the UN reaffirmed its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Mali. The UN in consideration of the offensive of the rebel groups welcomed the swift action of the French forces and also commended the efforts of the Malian and AFISMA forces in Mali. Following the letter received by the UN Security Council from the ECOWAS, AU and the transitional government of Mali, requesting the transformation of AFISMA into a UN stabilizing mission on 26 March, 2013, as well reports of the UN delegation to Mali, the UN took a decision and accepted such request, and consequently established the United Nations Multi-dimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). ECOWAS also welcomed the smooth transition of AFISMA to MINUSMA, and called on the UN to further strengthen cooperation and collaboration between African partners in the stabilization of the security and political situation in Mali. The ECOWAS in the communiqué expressed gratitude to all partners such as the UN, EU, US, France and all neighboring states for their cooperation in intelligence, financial, logistical and political support in Mali and appealed to the donor community to provide urgent financial support and relief supplies in response to the humanitarian situation in Mali.²⁷³

MINUSMA came into force on 1 July, 2013 in accordance with UNSC resolution 2100 (2013) 25 April, 2013. The mandate of MINUSMA as outlined by the United Nations Security Council resolution 2100 is mainly the stabilization of Mali, and this included

²⁷² United Nations Security Council, " Report of the Secretary-General on the Mali Situation", S/2013/189, United Nations, 26 March, 2013, p 10.

²⁷³ ECOWAS COMMISSION, "Report of the 30th Meeting of the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council Forty-third Ordinary Session of ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government" Abuja, 17th – 18th July, 2013, p 8.

among others; the re-establishing of state authority throughout the country²⁷⁴. It was also charged with the responsibility of supporting the re-building of the entire Malian society by supporting the Malian forces, and by helping in the disarmament and demobilization process started, as well as supporting re-integration programs. The mission was to also support in the general implementation of the transitional road map, as well as facilitating the progress towards national dialogue and reconciliation. The mission was to further supervise the organization and conduct a free, fair and transparent general election throughout the country. The mission was to provide protection to some of the areas that were under threats of violence during the election. MINUSMA was to also charge with the responsibility of supporting humanitarian assistance and the preservation of Malian culture in collaboration with other UN agencies, including UNESCO²⁷⁵.

The deployment of MINUSMA was met with several problems or difficulties, as a result of the security situation in Mali at that time. The absence of a central authority as well as harsh weather conditions made things very difficult for the mission, particular in the north of Mali which had been occupied by the rebel groups. MINUSMA deployed its logistical equipments to Kidal on 28 July, 2013 and its representatives made contacts with the Malian authorities, Journalists, civil society organizations and other UN specialized agencies resident in Mali. The first and immediate task before the mission remained the conversion of the 6,000 AFISMA forces to MINUSMA. The mission had been given a time frame of months to convert the forces by the United Nations. The mission appeared to have had some challenges making the conversion. These challenges came to be explained by the fact that some countries did not meet the stipulated number of troops requested. It was observed that countries such as Burkina Faso sent a contingent of between 500 and 600, as against 850 requested by the United Nations. The problems of child soldiers also posed a challenge to the mission as certain contingents from countries like Chad were seen to have included child soldiers in their contingent.

The mission's second immediate task remained the supervision of the conduct of general elections in the country, including the presidential elections. MINUSMA successfully supervised the conduct of the said elections that took place on the 28th of July, 2013, as well as the run off that took place on the 11th of August same year. The elections were said

²⁷⁴ See detail of MINUSMA mandate in Appendix A after the general conclusion part.

²⁷⁵ Isaline Bergamaschi, "MINUSMA: Initial Steps, Achievements and Challenges", Norwegian Peace building Resource Centre Policy Brief, September, 2013, p 1.

to have been conducted under a very conducive atmosphere devoid of violence or any confusion. About 27 candidates presented themselves to contest the presidency of Mali; however, the main contenders remained Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and Soumaila Cisse. In the first round of the elections, popular participation was recorded at about over 48%. Whereas in the run-off election Ibrahim Boubacar Keita emerged victorious with an estimated 77% of total votes cast²⁷⁶.

Prior to the elections, MINUSMA in collaboration with the UN and other agencies such as the UNDP had tried to support the establishment of a biometric electoral register and provided finger prints and photographic equipments so as to produce voting cards. The mission and other partners were seen to have supervised and organized workshops that were aimed at training the civil society on the conduct of peaceful elections. Flights were organized to Mauritania to distribute voters' cards to Malian refugees, as Diaspora voting had been agreed by the Malian government. Malians in Diaspora registered at the various Malian Embassies and Consulates of their respective countries of residence and voted at the Embassies and Consulates on the day of the election. All in all a total of about 6,829,696 million people registered to vote in the election. A three weeks campaign period had been approved before the election for all office seekers to campaign throughout the country, beginning from 9 July -26 July, 2013, while the elections took place on the 27th July, 2013²⁷⁷.

The elections were observed by both domestic and international observer teams. The United States Embassy sent about 70 observers across to areas like Bamako, Segou, Sikasso, Koutiala, Selingue and Koulikourou. The EU also sent about 50 observers to the southern part of the country. While the African Union on its part also sent about 60 observers to the south of Mali. The ECOWAS was said to have sent about 300 observer across different cities in Mali. The British Embassy sent 6 observers. The International Republican Institute also sent 12 observers to Bamako, Kayes, Segou and Sikasso.

Despite the successes recorded in various areas in Mali, including the supervision of the conduct of the general elections, the mission appeared to have been hit by leadership crisis right from the start. And it was seen to have affected the general coordination of its activities, as well as its capacity to function fully. From inception, resolution 2100 had

²⁷⁶ Ibid, p 2

²⁷⁷ International Foundation For Electoral Systems: "Elections in Mali, July 28 Presidential Elections, Frequently Asked Questions", Washington DC, 24 July, 2013, pp 1-7.

authorized “Operation Serval” and charged it with the responsibility of stabilization. Practically it became difficult to define the responsibilities and roles of MINUSMA and Serval. The role of Serval according to the UN resolution was the “enforcement of peace activities”, and MINUSMA was to “deter threats”. The two roles appeared confusing and complicated, and often brought about dispute and confusion in terms of command. Leadership came to be contended between the French mission and MINUSMA. A Dutch citizen Bert Koenders was appointed as head of the mission with the support of the French against Pierre Buyoya, the former President of Burundi, who was the head of the AFISMA forces in Mali. Meanwhile Major General Jean Bosco Kazuran was also appointed the force commander of MINUSMA by the UN, appeared to be sidelining Major General Shehu Abdulkadir, a Nigerian who had been appointed AFISMA forces commander since January 2013. And in all this, the commander of the French forces, General Vianney Pillot appears to be in control of the entire mission even though Operation Serval had ended²⁷⁸.

4.7 Economic and Strategic/Political Motivations for French Intervention in Mali

Despite the glaring security situation in Mali, and in consideration of the fact that there was a request from the interim President of Mali for Paris to intervene, the intervention by Paris has come under strong scrutiny in many quarters. As a matter of fact, many tried to question the motives for the intervention, and the actions of France were subjected to various interpretations. Many believed that France had actually intervened to rescue Bamako from the rebel terrorist groups, and to stop the emergence of a terrorist state in the Sahel region, that may pose a threat to Europe in the future, if not taken care of. However, many at the same time believed that certain economic factors may have motivated the intervention by Paris, and generally viewed the intervention as primarily motivated to achieve certain objectives.

Mali, like other African states has attracted a lot of foreign capital in various sectors of its economy. The influx of this foreign capital is without any restrictions under the Malian law, and permits for the repatriation of dividends and proceeds from sales and liquidations. About 2.4 Million hectares of land in Mali has been allocated to foreign national and

²⁷⁸ Isaline Bergamaschi, “MINUSMA: Initial Steps, Achievements and Challenges”, Norwegian Peace building Resource Centre Policy Brief, September, 2013, p 2.

companies engaged in the production of bio-fuels and cotton. Mali is also known to possess many minerals resources, some of which are yet to be exploited. It is the 16th largest producer of gold worldwide, and also has other mineral resources such as precious stones, bauxite and uranium among others, which are equally valuable and in high demand in the international market. There are speculations that petroleum may have been found at the Taoudeni region in the north of the country. Although oil exploration is seen to have posed a challenge due to the huge amount of capital involved, and partly as a result of the security situation in the north where it is located, nevertheless it has attracted the attention of many foreign nations and companies²⁷⁹.

Generally, France is known to have energy interests in Mali, and one of its companies, Areva Nuclear Energy Company, is known to have monopolized the exploitation of uranium deposits in Niger republic, located 300 km east of the Malian border. Much of the fuel consumed by French nuclear plants comes from Niger, and only recently, France signed an agreement for the exploration of the second largest uranium reserve in the world. It is located 80 km, south of Arlit, the contract was signed with Areva, and about 1.2 billion euro will be invested in the exploration. France is not seen to have a privileged position economically in Mali, despite being a former colonial power, as it has in other countries. Even though it was estimated that import from France by Mali in commodities including refined petroleum, cement, packaged medicaments among other items totaled about \$423,036,643,08 Million dollars in 2012, constituting about only 12% of Mali's total imports. Exports to France from Mali in commodities such as gold, cotton and other minerals were said to have totaled about \$57,862,745,79 Million in 2012, constituting about 20% of Mali's total exports. France remained Mali's second top import nation after only Senegal, while it is eighth export point for Mali, with South Africa at the top. And so the intervention in Mali came to be explained as being motivated by geo-economic and geo-strategic/political concerns of Paris, with regards to Mali and Africa as a whole. Though even as it is, it is reported that France had achieved a trade surplus of over 300 million Euros, which is said to be five times its foreign aid to Mali. As such many tried to see the intervention as a kind of military investment for economic returns²⁸⁰.

²⁷⁹ "Mali: A Neo-Colonial Operation Disguised as Anti-Terrorist Intervention. French war in its historical context", Europe Solidaire Sans Frontiers, 17 July 2013, p 6.

²⁸⁰ Ibid, p 6.

However, it was observed that France had reformed its armed forces since the end of the cold war, so as to be able to meet the challenges of the emerging security environment. The 1994 French government's white paper was seen to have created a plan for the military that no longer focused on the threat by the Soviets, but directed at dealing with pockets of instability around the globe. This is due to the risk associated with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well the emergence of threats associated with terrorism. The coming of Jacques Chirac to power in 1995 saw the French armed forces transformed into an all professional armed force that would be readily deployable and capable of operating within an international coalition.²⁸¹ And for about 20 years the French military had been involved in different operations overseas for different reasons, ranging from war against terrorism, humanitarian crisis, and mission related to peace keeping. However, a quick review of these interventions will reveal that the French appeared to have been more involved in African conflicts. The French were seen to have been involved in Rwanda, Somalia, Zaire, Comoros, Congo, Cote D'Ivoire, Chad, Gulf of Aden, Libya, and of recent, Mali. And most of these countries appeared to be former French colonies, with the exception of a few.

The costs for military intervention forced Paris to identify priority areas and zones for involvement in military intervention. These zones came to be identified by the French government as ; the European periphery, the Mediterranean Basin, Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, North Africa, from the Sahel to the equatorial countries. The Sahel region is seen and identified by Paris as a zone of vital interest that it believed, should be able to defend²⁸². Mali is among the Sahel states, which have historical ties with France during the colonial period. It is believed that about 210,000 French expatriates are scattered across Africa, and it is certain that certain countries like Gabon, Senegal, Djibouti and Chad have special defense agreements with France, which is sometimes seen to give the French legitimacy and operational advantage in terms of military interventions in the continent²⁸³. The geo-economic and geo-strategic/political motivations for the French intervention will be discussed in detail, with a view to understanding alternatives perspectives and dimensions to the Malian conflict.

²⁸¹ Dorothee Fouchaux, "French Hard Power: Living on the Strategic Edge", American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy, no 1, February, 2014, Washington, p 2.

²⁸² Ibid, p 7.

²⁸³ Ibid, p 7.

It has been observed that many of the African leaders that had been loyal to French interests in Africa during the cold war period, are no longer in power. As a result, the influence of the France became limited. On the other hand, it also came to be observed that the United States has of recent developed deep interest in the African continent. The U.S began to expand its legal framework for economic relations with African states. The African growth and Opportunity Act of 2000, which was adopted by the U.S Congress was specifically to ensure the eradication of customs restrictions on African goods. Many trade negotiations and bilateral investment treaties came to signed between the United States and several African states, including Nigeria, South Africa, Angola, Cameroun and Senegal among several others. The U.S in its effort to reach out to many African states, initiated the Millennium Change Corporation, with the aim of providing support for various economic projects across the African continent. It was observed that many of such agreements and treatise between the U.S and the African states fall under or are considered to be France's sphere of influence as former colonial power, and was seen to be a major source of concern for Paris²⁸⁴.

U.S military presence in the African continent also appeared to have led to expansion in economic relations with African states. The U.S State Department launched the Pan Sahel initiative in 2002, which later evolved into what came to be known as the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership Program (TSCTP)²⁸⁵. In the first year, about \$6.25 million was spent on training and capacity building in Niger, Mali, Chad and Mauritania. The program was said to have been born out of concerns for post 9/11 attacks, as the Sahel region was viewed as a potential place for members of the transnational Al-Qaeda network.²⁸⁶ The Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism program was allocated about \$230 million between 2005 and 2007; with Mali, Niger, Chad and Mauritania receiving larger part of the funds. Another significant development regarding the American policy towards Africa was the establishment of the U.S military's new Africa Command (Africom). The

²⁸⁴ A careful look at the Pan-Sahel Initiative will clearly reveal the United States strategic military plans in the Sahel region where almost all the countries were colonized by France. Although the initiative was to be implemented in collaboration with other stake holders, it however shows the interest of the U.S in the area and in these former French colonial states. And it is true that the U.S had been involved militarily in other parts of Africa, and though the French may not have openly been against the U.S penetration, nevertheless it is natural that they may want remain in control of these areas.

²⁸⁵ Mary Jo Choate, "Tran-Sahara Counter-terrorism Initiative: Balance of Power", U.S. Army War College report, 30 March 2007, p5. http://pdf_docs/PCAAB627.PDF .

²⁸⁶ Dona J. Stewart, "What next for Mali? The Roots of Conflict and Challenges to Stability", United States Army War College Strategic Institute, Press, November 2013, p 46.

Command was said to have been carved out of the Central and European Commands, due to threats posed by terrorism, as well as the strategic importance of African resources regarding U.S energy demands.²⁸⁷ The U.S military presence in the Sahel region is said to be a major source for concern for Paris, especially considering the fact that almost all the countries that had security and military relations with the French came to be part of the new American initiative. A report submitted to the French National Assembly on 6 March, 2012, noted with concern increased American presence in the Sahel region since 2005²⁸⁸.

Additionally, the involvement of the BRICs states in the affairs the African continent, became a major source of concern for Paris. In the past an axis of these states was formed in the Security Council, and was thought that the axis may systematically succeed in opposing the view of France, U.S and UK, particularly on issues related to the African continent. The 2011 intervention in Libya and Cote D'Ivoire made clear such opposing stance by the BRIC states over the intervention. As such Paris feared that the BRICs may transform into a politicized and institutionalized group that may be able to speak with one voice. France particularly became worried after South Africa joined the BRIC states, which it saw as adding a new dimension to the alliance and its reach to the African states. And for this reason, Paris came to promote a proposal to enlarge the UN Security Council, on the basis that it should reflect the shifts in global balance of power.²⁸⁹

It is also alleged that one of the drivers of the conflict in Mali, is the international competition over mineral resources, particularly over uranium deposits in the Sahel region. Northern Mali and Niger, are known to be rich in various mineral resources, and French companies such as Areva have enjoyed a monopoly on uranium exploration in the region. And it came to observed that the demand for uranium steadily increased in the international market as a result of the construction of new nuclear plants in India, China, Russia and the United States. A report from the International Atomic Agency revealed that about 450 new nuclear reactors will be constructed by 2030. Paris was said to have expressed its concern about the Tuareg uprising, which it fears may hinder Areva's ability to export uranium. France became particularly worried after the kidnapping of French workers at one of the

²⁸⁷ Fouad Farhaoui, "The Crisis in Mali: The Great Power Struggle for Africa", International Strategic Organization, Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Report No 13-03, April 2013, p 34.

²⁸⁸ Henri Plagnol et Françoise, "La Situation Sécuritaire dans les pays de la zone Affaires Etrangères", 6 Mars 2012, p74.

²⁸⁹ Paul Melly, Vincent Darracq, "A New Way to Engage? French Policy In Africa from Sarkozy to Hollande", Chatham House, May 2013, p 17.

new uranium operational zones on the eve of the rebellion. Paris, it appears is concerned about the safety of its investments in the Sahel and not only about the Tuareg rebellion, but also the competition in the uranium industry which is likely to affect certain projects that French firms are involved. The U.A.E nuclear power plant, which came to be known as the deal of the century, with French company Areva, and the new negotiations between China and Niger over uranium exploration became issues of concern for Paris.²⁹⁰

Russia also appeared to have shown its interest in Mali's mineral resources. Statements in certain newspapers quoted the special representative of the Russian President as saying "Given its rich reserves and resources, Mali is considered a likely field for future wars". And Russia was reported to have responded to the Malian crisis with security and military support, which it said was in its interest to see that order is restored in northern Mali. Russia sees the conflict in Mali as an opportunity to become engaged in the country, and since the end of the cold war it was observed that Russia's relations with African states were usually defined by geo-economic concerns.²⁹¹

There also appears to be significant conflicts and concerns over the oil reserves in the Sahel region and the Gulf of Guinea. Since the discovery of oil in the region, drilling activities have steadily increased in the region due to the rise in the price of oil in the international market. Companies from Algeria, France, Qatar, Tunisia and Italy became seriously engaged in exploration in Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Sudan. China is also reported to have indicated interest in the oil resources of the region. And a Chinese firm was said to have begun exploration in Niger and Chad since 2003. China's SINOPEC was said to have obtained two licenses to drill in five different zones in Mali, in the cities of Timbuktu and Gao since 2004. Total, a French company was given a license to drill in Mauritania, while SIPEX a British firm is also drilling in Niger. France is not seen to have acquired any license to explore oil in Mali despite its long relations with the country, and it is said that recently Paris is making effort to acquire one.

At some point, many African states were said to express concerns regarding China's dominance of its energy sector. Chad and China became engaged in a conflict over the management of Chad's oil refinery. Many African states had initially looked up to China to

²⁹⁰ Fouad Farhaoui, "The Crisis in Mali: The Great Power Struggle for Africa", International Strategic Organization, Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Report No 13-03, April 2013, p 37.

²⁹¹ Ibid, p 38.

play a balancing role with regards to the role of western European nations in the African continent, which is viewed as purely imperialistic. However, when an armed rebellion started in Chad around 2012, China was quick to show support to the rebels against the Chadian government, so as to maintain its investments in the country. China maintains 3 light arms production plants in Mali, Sudan and DRC. Mali in particular, is seen as a potential source of Chinese weapons, especially if the security situation is taken into consideration. And so also is Sudan, where China was initially seen to have Sudanese channels to support the Chadian rebels against their government.

France it appears is worried about the involvement of China in the oil and pipelines projects that are springing up, as well as new oil wells that are being discovered. Paris is also disturbed about the involvement of the Chinese in the infrastructural developments in countries like Mauritania, including the building of an oil storage facility. The new trans-Saharan gas pipeline, which is planned to transport natural gas from Nigeria through Niger, to Algeria and then to Europe, is also seen as a source of concern for Paris. Mali was also said to have given a Canadian the consultancy to draw up feasibility, with its potential participation in the trans-Saharan project, and Mali officially applied to join the project.²⁹²

Many European companies were said to have indicated interest in the project, including; French Total, Italian Eni and the Spanish national gas. But Russia was reported to have proposed a partnership on the project as it feared the pipeline may threaten its exports to Europe. Consequently, the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) went into joint venture with the Russian giant, Gazprom.

Another significant factor that has continued to attract the attention of France, especially within West Africa, has to do with issues related to international trade. The Mali conflict came to be explained as an expression of the international competition that exists between giant commercial powers like China, Brazil on the one hand and the U.S.A and Europe on the other. This competition is in areas such as bio-fuel industry, garment and textile manufacturing, as well as agriculture. Cotton is known to play a significant role in the Chinese economy, where about 40 million people are seen to be employed in the industry. Cotton represents 11% of China's GDP, and West Africa is seen as one of China's main sources of cotton imports. It was reported that between January and July, 2011, Mali

²⁹² Benjamin Auge, " Les nouveaux enjeux petroliers de la zone sahariene", Herodote, no 142, 3e trimestre, 2011, P 201.

produced about 7% of China's cotton imports from the African continent. As a result of the expansion and growth of China's textile market, the U.S enacted an Act that was explained to have been specifically enacted to prevent China from entering the American market. The Act states that textile products must be produced indigenously as laid out by the rules of origin framework.²⁹³

Brazil is also seen to have cotton project that was expected to cover the countries of Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin and Chad. The project aims to increase the competitiveness of cotton in these countries. The Brazilian foreign Minister was said to have visited Mali in 2009 to discuss with Mali's agricultural Minister regarding the project. The project is expected to put Brazil into the production stages of contemporary technologies, and is seen to be supported by the Brazilian Development Agency. Brazil and Mali reached a joint decision to expand cooperation in the field of cotton production, as well as the production of rice. France continued to view such activities a lot of concern in many of French African speaking states that were in the past considered exclusively France's sphere of influence.

The transformations witnessed in the maritime strategy of certain countries like China and Brazil, appeared to have been accompanied by several changes. These changes were seen in one way or the other to be related to certain developments with regards to the relations between these states and certain African states, which is not in the interest of France. Since the 1980's, China adopted the "Comprehensive Defense Theory", which meant preparing Chinese naval forces, so as to be able to move freely in the waters, to the west, south and north of China. This change came hand in hand with focus on economic developments with regards to increase in the need for marine and energy resources. Between 1995-1996, Sino-American relations had began to turn sour and as a consequence led to acceleration in the plans for the Chinese naval forces, which came to adopt a new policy known as "Active Maritime Defense" to replace the old policy. The new policy was seen to have widened China's geographical area of operation, which was meant to give China access to the international markets. As contained in its National Defense White Paper, by 2006, China was compelled to modernize its naval forces, as well as enlarge its area operations. The process of such modernization was put into effect in three different phases. The first stage was meant to develop capabilities for responding to Taiwanese potential threats. And

²⁹³ Vivian C. Jones and Brock R. Williams, " U.S Trade and Investment Relations with sub-Saharan Africa and the African Growth and Opportunity Act", (CRS), U.S.A, Congressional Research Service, A Report for Congress, November 14, 2012, P 18.

for this, a line had to be formed, connecting the islands that extended from southern Japan, through Philippines and Malaysia to Vietnam. Under the second phase, between 2010 and 2020, China envisions a connection between the islands of Japan, to Indonesia, with further penetration into the Asia Pacific region. And in the last phase which is expected to start from 2020, China will be able to close the technological gap between its navy and that of the United States²⁹⁴.

In the course of implementing the new policy, China had to make a series of military agreements and commitments with many of its neighboring states. China signed agreements with Cambodia in 2003, provided military equipments to Bangladesh to wade off threats from India. In 2007, China signed an agreement to construct a port in Sri-Lanka, south of India, just as it erected an eavesdropping station at the Gwardar region of Pakistan, west of India. At this time, the India Ocean came to occupy an important place for China and it was due to the fact the coast faces the Strait of Malacca and links to the Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa. And majority of the goods transported between China, the Middle East and Africa have to pass through this region. As a result, China found itself developing relations politically, economically and militarily with certain African states, particularly in Eastern Africa, with states like Kenya, Tanzania, including Egypt. Naval exercises were reported to have taken place with the participation of African states including Egypt and South Africa. China planned a military base in East Africa as a result of the piracy that began to emerge off the coast of Somalia, which forced China to deploy war ships to Djibouti. The base it is expected would ease problems for Chinese fleets on long distance journeys. China considers the East African states highly important as a result of their strategic locations on the Indian Ocean. Many have tried to see a connection between China's advances towards Africa's Indian and Atlantic Ocean coasts, and its relations with East African states, and U.S geo-strategic targets. China plans to establish military bases in Seychelles, Maldives, Singapore and Vietnam as part of its strategy in the Indian Ocean. China also believes that the United States is pursuing a policy of containing it, and preventing it from becoming a global power by increasing its presence in the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean through the establishment of military bases and

²⁹⁴Charles-Louis Labrecque, Hugo Bourassa et Gerard Hervouet, "La modernisation militaire de la Chine- Une analyse des capacités actuelles et des efforts de montée en puissance", Hautes études internationales, Université Laval, Canada, June 2011, P 27.

agreements.²⁹⁵ China's ambitions in Africa and other parts of the world is a source of concern for France geo-strategically.

Brazil on the other hand is seen to be drifting towards West Africa, a move that is being viewed with great concern by many countries, including France and the United States. Brazil, it is believed, started making its presence felt in West Africa since 1980. In 1986, Brazil succeeded in convincing the UN General Assembly to issue a decree that would proclaim the area between South America and Africa, as the "South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone." Again in 1996, a community of Portuguese speaking countries came into place, and consisted generally of states like Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau and Sao Tome and Principe. Brazil assumed a new role in West Africa through the new organization. Its success in convincing the United Nations to issue decree 41/11²⁹⁶ that proclaimed the South Atlantic Cooperation zone was seen to have further given it advantages. Under international law, Brazil enjoys exclusive economic rights up to 200 nautical miles off its coastline. Brazil's vision include the need to develop cooperation with geo-strategic regions in the south Atlantic, which include; the southern cone of South America, the Amazons and the Portuguese speaking African states.²⁹⁷

As a result Brazil's relations with African states began to develop gradually, not only with Portuguese speaking states but other African states also. These states include many that are seen to fall under the influence of the French. Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva's coming to power as President in Brazil was seen to have further made Brazil's foreign policy more focused on Africa, and about 17 out of the 35 diplomatic missions that Brazil has scattered across the African continent, came to be opened after 2003. Brazil was further seen to have entered into strategic partnership with several Africa states. The Brazilian national defense strategy that was published in 2008 came to include West Africa in the strategic and technical line of its navy. The Brazilian navy outlined about four major areas of concern, among which include; proactive defense for offshore oil drilling, defense of marine facilities, harbors and islands within Brazilian territorial waters, as well as a fast response to any threat directed against maritime trade routes from other countries. Brazil also aims to be able to participate in international peace keeping operations outside the Brazilian

²⁹⁵ Fouad Farhaoui, "The Crisis in Mali: The Great Power Struggle for Africa", International Strategic Organization, Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Report No 13-03, April 2013, p 49.

²⁹⁶ A military rule or incorporated into its policies or constitution.

²⁹⁷ Ibid, p 52-53.

territory. A study published by a Strategic Research Institute affiliated to the French Military Academy, reports that, Brazil is highly keen to assume a role of maintaining international balances. The report states that Brazil is relying on its “cultural fraternity” mission to assume this role. It further stated that Brazil desires to win a permanent UNSC seat and that the country has strategized a partnership with South Africa, India, and China to play a bigger role in international politics.²⁹⁸

According to a white paper published by the French Ministry of Defense in 2008, France needed to make its forces visible once more on the “strategic belt” axis. This axis is explained to extend from the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian Ocean²⁹⁹. The report was said to have been made in reaction to French concerns about the increasing roles of powers such as China, India, Brazil and the United States on the African continent. French interests in the Indian Ocean are identified to be based on two axes; one extends from Djibouti to the Persian Gulf, while the other falls on the south of the Indian Ocean, near Madagascar. And both axes are also seen to be areas of strategic interest to the Chinese. The Chinese presence in areas of critical interest to Paris, no doubt pushed Paris to adopt new policies and measures in certain places. These include leading the European anti piracy operations in the 1990’s, and the construction of a naval base in Abu Dhabi, to counter other threats. France’s main goal is to prevent China from entering the Gulf of Guinea. Paris is generally seen to be bothered by the fact that economic relations between the Chinese and African states were followed by military relations. At some point, France and the U.S had to sign a sort of guarantee agreement with India to contain China. As such, relations between Paris and China came to be defined by geo-strategic and geo-economic concerns, and relations between the two, it appeared started to become confrontational, though not militarily. Paris is seen to be trying its possible best not to lose influence in areas it considers to be under its sphere of influence in the past as a colonial power.

Generally, the intervention by Paris in Mali came to be viewed as also being motivated by concerns about China’s presence in northern Mali and its investments in the region³⁰⁰.

²⁹⁸Thomas Cooper Patriota, “ Le Bresil, Un Partenaire de L’Afrique qui S’ affirme-Les relations Bresil/Afrique sous les gouvernements Lula (2003-2010)”, L’Institut francais des relations internationales, Paris, France, P 21.

²⁹⁹ Antonin Tisseron, “Enchevetrements geopolitiques autor de la lutte contre le terrorisme dans le Sahara”, Herodote, No 142, 3 e Trimestre 2011, p 101.

³⁰⁰Pour plus de details sur le port “Gwadar” voir: Lionel Baixas, “Chabahar vs. Gawadar”, La revue Outre-Terre 2010/2-no 25-26, pp 215, 231.

Northern Mali is considered as that part of the country that is attempting to secede from the Malian state, and this became an issue of concern for France. The 2013 white paper which outlines France's new defense strategy appeared to have focused on Africa geo-strategically, and tried to see that France adapts to the new strategic environment, as a result of the Arab spring and the situation in the Sahel region. The white paper highlighted the need for France to maintain the 5 main strategic functions set out by the 2008 strategy of; protection, awareness, prevention, deterrence and intervention. The paper observed that the Mali operations has demonstrated the need for Paris to be prepared for short notice interventions, as well as the need to sustain interventions over vast distances, both within the theatre and between the theatre and the main military bases. It further emphasized the need to develop the capability to carry out multi-dimensional operations. Operation Serval appeared to have exposed the gaps in French capabilities, particularly; the lack of aircraft to transport troops and equipment. New air to air refueler so as to allow planes fly long distances, as well as in areas of intelligence and surveillance. The paper clearly indicated the willingness of Paris to intervene in areas where its interest is most acute, namely; the periphery of Europe, the Mediterranean Basin, Africa and the Persian Gulf.³⁰¹

4.8. Impact and Consequences of the French Intervention in Mali

The conflict in Mali and the French intervention that followed were viewed critically by many analysts. Among such views were that the conflict appears to have deep regional and international implications, with devastating consequences for neighboring states, and the continent at large. Mali came to be considered a threat to international peace and security, and as a result measures had to be taken to control the conflict and the emerging threats. The conflict and the French action came to be viewed with implications that were categorized into different levels. The conflict was seen by France as a potential threat to peace and security in the whole of west Africa, including the Gulf of Guinea, north Africa and the Sahel and Sahara region, as well as Mali's immediate neighboring states. It was feared that Mali may turn into a failed state that will come to be taken over by Islamist extremist groups, and the conflict may explode into a regional and global threat to peace and security, both within the African region and at the global level as well. Many years of misgovernance, poverty, neglect as well as reported marginalization of certain groups has

³⁰¹ CSS Analysis in Security Policy, "France's New Strategy: The 2013 White Paper", Center for Security Studies (CSS), no 139, September, 2013, P 1-4.

turned Mali into a recruiting ground for radical extremists. The Sahel and Sahara regions came to be gradually occupied and dominated by different motives that ranged from criminal enterprise to secession and global jihad with linkage to Al-Qaeda, which came to pose a trans-national threat to the Sahel and Sahara regions, as well as the Maghreb states. It was reported that the migration of international terrorism from its “traditional” zones of operations in south Asia, Yemen and Somalia into the Sahel region was facilitated by the effects of the NATO intervention in Libya that led to the fall of Ghaddafi in 2011.³⁰² Now Mali and its neighboring states are considered the new zones of instability as a result of the regionalization effect of the Malian civil war. The influx of refugees fleeing armed rebels and Islamist extremists into neighboring states has come to threaten the national security of these states, and the states may have to bear the effects and impact of the fall out of the crisis and the intervention in Mali by the French.

Islamist extremist groups operating in Mali are seen to pose a serious threat to Algeria’s security and stability. Most of people in these groups had been involved in the Algerian civil war in the 1990’s. And it was as a result of such experience that Algeria was initially opposed to a military action in Mali. Algeria may have feared the escalation of the conflict and a possible spill over and ultimate destabilization of its country by the rebel groups. Algeria feared that heavily armed rebels and Islamist militants would retreat to its country along the border with Mali. For this reason Algeria closed its borders to avoid such unwelcome movement arising from the conflict in Mali. Many rebels fleeing Timbuktu and Gao as a result of French air strikes, retreated to the mountain ranges near Kidal, close to the Algerian border. The rebels were said to have attacked the Amena gas plant in Algeria and kidnapped and killed certain foreign nationals in retaliation for the French air strikes in Mali during operation Serval. The kidnapping of the foreign officials at the gas plant led to an intensification in the fight against terrorism by many western nations in the region, including Britain and the United States.

Niger, like Algeria also witnessed the influx of armed Tuareg and Islamist rebels. The efforts of Niger and its involvement in ECOWAS and AFISMA activities, was with a view to help stabilize Mali, and to prevent the spillover of the crisis into its territory. Niger fears its own Tuareg community may easily be influenced to start an uprising, and may use

³⁰² David J. Francis, “The Regional Impact of Armed Conflict and French Intervention in Mali”, Norwegian Peace building Resource Center Report, April 2013, p 10.

Niger as a base to regroup and launch guerilla attacks against French and African forces in Mali. It became very clear that the Mali conflict will spill over to Niger as the two countries shared a common experience of the Tuareg uprising, which has largely remained unsolved in both countries.

The NATO Intervention in Libya and the fall of Ghaddafi have come to be considered as the immediate causes of the 2012 rebellion in Mali. It was claimed that hundreds of heavily armed Tuareg rebels who had been trained by Ghaddafi's army returned to Mali after the fall of Ghaddafi in 2011, and formed the MNLA with the intention of starting a rebellion in Mali. So, it was expected that the intervention may lead to the movement of part of these armed groups back to Libya again, which may further destabilize the already unstable atmosphere in the country. The conflict in Mali is considered by many as a casualty of the Libyan conflict³⁰³.

Nigeria does not share a border with Mali, but the country is among states that suffer from the effects of the Malian conflict. The government of Nigeria views the Mali conflict as a threat to its national security. Nigeria is currently fighting a war with a violent Islamist terror group known as "Boko Haram." Many intelligence reports indicate that AQIM had continued to provide insurgency training to Boko Haram members, just as another AQIM affiliate in Somalia, Al Shabaab is providing similar training to the group. Nigeria's involvement and commitment in the ECOWAS effort to stabilize Mali, is seen as primarily to prevent the collapse of Mali and the emergence of a terrorist state that may threaten stability within Nigeria. This fear came to be confirmed after a Nigerian based terrorist group known as "Ansaru" kidnapped a French family in northern Cameroun along the Nigerian border. And again on 10 March, 2013 the same group announced the killing of seven foreign hostages it kidnapped in the northern eastern state of Bauchi in Nigeria³⁰⁴.

The intervention by Paris in Mali also appeared to have raised fears of reprisal attacks on French citizens or interests both within and outside France. Since the intervention by France, attacks against French citizens in the Sahel and other parts of Africa has increased³⁰⁵. About 15 hostages were taken by Islamist extremist in the Sahel region, and these were explained as retaliatory attacks, mainly as a result of the French intervention in

³⁰³ Fessy, T, Ghaddafi's influence in Mali in Mali's coup" BBC African news, 14 January 2013.

³⁰⁴ Ibid, p 11.

³⁰⁵ AllAfrica.com. 2013. "Mali: fourth French soldier killed in Mali, Sarkozy criticizes intervention", 6 March 2013, www.allafrica.com.

the Mali conflict. The intervention is seen to have threatened the about 30,000 French citizens residing within the west-African sub-region. The kidnapping of a French family in Cameroun by Ansaru, which has also killed certain French citizens in Nigeria, were clear indications of reprisal attacks on French interest and citizens which was hitherto absent.

The intervention was also seen to have further raised concerns of possible attacks within France, from among its about five million Muslims, mostly from north and West Africa. It was thought that they may be motivated by the intervention to carry out attacks within France. These concerns were seen to have come about as a result of the fact that France had in the 1990's battled terrorism within its territory. And of recent 3 off duty French soldiers, 3 Jewish children and a rabbi were attacked by a French citizen that was trained in Pakistan, and is said to have links with Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb. This also includes the bombing of the offices of "Charlie Hebdo", a newspaper that published cartoons of Prophet Mohammed, as well as a grenade attack on a Jewish supermarket in Paris in September 2012. A bomb making outfit was also discovered by the police in Paris, and it was alleged that an Islamist terror cell was behind it, and was planning a bomb attack in Paris since the 1990's. A French citizen was also arrested while trying to join a rebel Islamic group in Mali, and as such the intervention was seen to have raised the level of domestic terror threat³⁰⁶. The mission is also viewed to have the possibility of drawing France into a violent and long insurgency war with terrorist and Islamist extremist groups. And it is thought that the killings of French citizens and soldiers will likely provoke a negative reaction domestically that may force the withdrawal of French troops from Mali before they completed their mission. The intervention is viewed with the possibility of creating a very volatile situation for France in the Sahel region that will make it difficult for the French troops to make a quick exit from the region.

The Mali conflict is also seen to have attracted and drawn foreign fighter and other Islamist extremists and jihadist groups that are committed to the spread of global jihad. The emergence of certain groups such as AQIM, Boko Haram, Al Shabaab and Ansaru, which are interlinked with each other and based in different countries, posed a serious security threat which appeared to have added a new dimension to the conflict. Mali came to serve as a new center for the recruitment of terrorist and Islamic jihadists. Foreign Islamic

³⁰⁶ BBC News.2013. "France probes suspects linked to African jihadists", 9 February 2013, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world_europe-2139907.

militants including Europeans fighting in Syria alongside the Syrian rebels against the Assad regime were reported to have gone to Mali to fight on the side of the rebels. A French citizen was caught fighting on the rebel's side in March 2013.

Neighboring states also appeared to have been drawn into the Mali conflict as a result of the spillover effects of the crisis. The Algerian gas complex hostage crisis and the kidnapping of French citizens in Cameroun appeared to have drawn these countries into the conflict as a result of the involvement of the French in the conflict. The reaction of these countries and their attempts to rescue the hostages and the violence that followed such attempts is viewed with negative effects for France. As such proximate states have found themselves forcefully drawn into the crisis and the conflict is seen to have been regionalized. These states found themselves reluctantly involved in the conflict in order to prevent the spread of terrorism and global jihad into their respective territories.

The French military action appeared to have paved the way for the expansion of U.S drone warfare in the Sahel region. It would appear that the U.S drones will hence forth be used in central and east Africa against the resistance army³⁰⁷. The emergence of a shadow, long war may lead the French mission to creep, and France may find itself fighting a war that requires different skills, equipment and tactics which France does not appear to have been prepared for. It would also appear that the conflict may require more counter insurgency warfare which may require the increased use of U.S drones against terrorists and militants, just as the U.S did in Afghanistan, Somalia, Pakistan and Yemen

There are also fears that the situation in Mali may turn out to be as it happened in the war with the Taliban in Afghanistan. It was thought that the French superior fire power may force the rebels to simply disappear into the civilian population and tactically withdraw into the mountains and inaccessible desert areas, from where they will regroup and launch renewed attacks on the French forces. The rebels were seen to have adopted new tactics of suicide attacks around the areas of Gao, while firing rockets at the French troops. Such scenes were reminiscent of the Al-Qaeda-Taliban insurgency attacks on the U.S led coalition forces in Afghanistan. And Mali is already considered a dysfunctional state, with ill equipped and ineffective armed forces. This is seen to present a danger that the Malian situation may turn into that of Afghanistan in the Sahel region, with devastating

³⁰⁷ See Keenan, J, "The Dark Sahara: America's War on Terror in Africa", Pluto Press, London, 2009.

consequences for French and western nationals and their strategic interests in the region. Most of the rebel fighters are seen to be battle hardened and have fought in insurgency wars in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Syria and Somalia, and have brought their experience and expertise to Mali, with deep repercussions for the French forces in Mali³⁰⁸.

4.9. Conclusion

The chapter has clearly shown how and why the 2012 rebellion broke out in Mali, showing how the Sahel region transformed into a hub of smuggling in both licit and illicit good. It has shown how trade in drugs and organized crime led to the rise of trans-national groups that appeared to have threatened stability in the region. This was eventually seen to have been partly responsible for the break out of the 2012 rebellion, apart from the age long Tuareg hostility in Mali. It was a combination of the Tuareg organization, the MNLA and these trans-national groups of Al-Qaeda, Ansardine and MUJWA that launched the 2012 rebellion in Mali. The chapter has also clearly shown the reasons that led to the intervention in Mali by France, and how the international community responded to the Mali conflict, after a request through ECOWAS to UN by the Malian President for assistance to counter the terrorist threat. And how the African led force approved by the United Nations could not be mobilized in time, until the request for France to intervene by the Malian President.

The chapter has shown how the rebel groups were pushed out the north of Mali by the French and Chadian troops, and how the deployed African led force was transformed into a multi-dimensional force known as MINUSMA. The activities of MINUSMA were clearly outlined, including its role in the conduct of the 2013 elections in Mali shortly after the intervention by Paris. Apart from this, the motivations behind the French intervention were clearly examined. While there are genuine security concerns regarding the intervention, a clear scrutiny into some of the economic and geo-strategic reasons highlighted in the chapter, clearly shows that the intervention enjoyed some economic and geo strategic motives. It is clear that France may have been interested in preserving its economic interests in the Sahel region, and may have intervened to prevent the violence from

³⁰⁸ Seay Laura, "Mali is not Afghanistan", 30 January, 2013, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/30/Mali_is_not_Afghanistan_fr.

reaching countries like Niger where it has invested so much in nuclear energy. It may have also viewed the intervention as advantage further its interests in Mali, especially in terms the vast mineral resources available in Mali. Especially considering the fact that many countries including China have stake in the oil sector, and France a former colonial power does not. So if these facts are considered carefully, an explanation into why France readily accepted to intervene will not be farfetched even as the territorial integrity of Mali is of great importance.

Geo-strategic reasons advanced also partly explain the motivations behind the intervention. The rise of the BRIC states, including China and the United States in the African region is alarming, and there are fears that these states are gradually gaining importance, and are establishing their presence across the continent, including former French dominated areas, or Francophone countries. It is rational to accept that the French may want to re-assert their position in those Francophone areas, and viewed the intervention as a step in that direction. Despite the lack of clear evidence linking the intervention to economic and strategic reasons, never the less, the motives could still be validly considered as motivating for Paris, especially considering how vital economic resources are to nation states. The last part of the chapter tried to look at the armed impact of the conflict and the intervention form internal, regional and global perspectives. An understanding of the impact and consequences will help in understanding the next chapter which deals mainly with the post conflict period in Mali. It will in understanding how the conflict has affected the country in terms physical destruction as well population displacement and the economic destruction accompanying both.

CHAPTER FIVE

POST CONFLICT MALI

5.1 Introduction

The post conflict phase in Mali was no different from all previous known conflicts in history, though may have differed slightly, as happened in states like Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Croatia, Guatemala, Sri Lanka, Angola and Afghanistan to mention a few. The 2012 rebellion in Mali cannot be explained in isolation from its effects or aftermath, and the “post conflict phase” is generally regarded as the legacy of all armed conflicts. These legacies usually include death, disease, destruction, population displacement, economic dislocation, human and capital flight, massive impoverishment and social break down. It is very difficult to give a specific definition of a post conflict phase. Most countries that are considered to be in a post conflict phase are usually categorized according to certain levels or milestone reached along a range of peace building process. The main peace building milestones used to determine the level at which a post conflict state is, is usually determined by seven major milestones. Ceasing hostilities and violence is considered the first and immediate milestone to be reached, followed by signing of peace agreements, then demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of rebels. And in the case of the 2012 rebellion, we have seen in the previous chapter how the AFISMA and MINUSMA forces were deployed to Mali after the military operation by France to maintain and restore order in Mali, and succeeded in stabilizing and conducting elections throughout the country. And there were no peace agreements signed due to the fact that it was a military action that provided victory against the rebels, and so no disarmaments took place, even though many arms were found abandoned by the fleeing rebels in the course of the military action. No reintegration took place for the rebels since the fighting did not end by negotiation or peace agreements. The third milestone is the

return of refugees and internally displaced persons, which is among other things that were considered in this chapter. The return of refugees is followed putting in place the foundations of a functioning state and the initiation of reconciliation and societal re-orientation, which is followed by the commencement of economic recovery. Economic recovery from a broader perspective is considered as achieving socio-economic well being, including food security, public health, shelter, educational systems and a social safety net for all citizens. As well as an economic strategy that is designed to ensure the reconstruction of physical infrastructure, generate employment, open markets, create legal and regulatory reforms and lay down the foundations for international trade and investment.

It was reported that about 35 countries entered the post conflict phase since the 1990's and majority of them are said to be low income countries. The ability of states to recover quickly is usually determined by the economic strength of these countries. Countries with considerable material resources are likely to recover faster than those without any resources by attaining the milestones range in the recovery process. The main challenges facing post conflict states including Mali remain the preservation of peace and security, re-integration of combatants, the resettling of displaced persons and the return of refugees, the rehabilitation of essential infrastructure and key public institutions, the restoration of private investor's confidence, the revival of public finance regime and the re-assertion of control over key national assets. The promotion of conditions that make the re-occurrence of conflicts less likely, the provision of employment opportunities, inequalities, upholding rule of law and justice process are considered to be challenging to post conflict states. Overcoming these challenges has always proved difficult. The destruction of national assets, disruption of social networks, signals and other incentives which are considered as impacts of armed conflicts usually result in a long transition to normalcy, and is same even the case of Mali.

Many studies also indicate that the characteristics of a conflict, including its duration, casualties and the manner in which it ended are all related to the possibilities of re-occurrence or otherwise. According to a study by the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, conflicts that have ended in peace agreements appeared to have lower rates of re-occurrence, as against conflicts that ended in outright victory for one side, and that all conflicts with ambiguous ending re-occurred.

The armed conflict in Mali, which began in January 2012, was seen to have been accompanied with devastating humanitarian consequences for Mali and the Sahel region as a whole. Given the background and situation of the prevalent food insecurity affecting the entire region, due to a combination of human and natural factors, the 2012 conflict worsened the situation. The conflict saw the huge displacement of the population in Mali, within and outside Mali, across the region and other West African states. Migration came to signify a new perspective about the conflict affecting Mali.

Generally, this chapter tried to look into the post conflict phase in Mali, after the intervention by France. Having looked at the impacts of armed conflicts and the challenges of recovery, an attempt was made to look at the population displacement, food insecurity and human right issues, as well as the activities of the EU, UN and other partners in rebuilding the society and key infrastructure that were destroyed during the conflict in Mali especially in the three regions that were affected, which constitute among others the milestones of the recovery process of post conflict states. A record of arms abandoned or seized by the rebel groups is provided even though the conflict did not end with peace agreements and no disarmaments took place, this it is expected will reveal the intensity and scale of the armed conflict in Mali. Certainly Mali is on the process of recovery, but whatever it has achieved can be seen after a study of these areas mentioned above. An assessment of the progress made is provided in the conclusion part of the chapter.

5.2 Implications of the 2012 Conflict/Rebellion

5.2.1 Population Displacement and Food Insecurity in Mali

The post conflict period in Mali came to be characterized by food insecurity and is seen to affect the entire Sahel region since 2011. It came to be considered unfavorable, especially with regards to food production. The food insecurity in the region is said to be the result of the drought that affected the region. The drought and the food insecurity led to a drastic rise in the prices of food items across the region, including Mali. Agricultural production faced a massive decline as a result of the drought, and the result was insufficient food for the population in the entire region. However, the drought as well as the food insecurity that affected the region was explained as arising mainly due to the inability of governments in the Sahel region to foresee, anticipate or plan for the likely occurrence of such disaster.

Lack of resilience came to be explained as the underlying factor behind the food crisis in the Sahel even before the outbreak of the Mali conflict in 2012 which further worsened the situation³⁰⁹.

Another significant factor to consider in assessing the food insecurity issue in the region has to do with the rampant re-occurrence of crisis in the region. It was reported that the impacts of the crisis and instability in the region in 2005, 2008, 2010³¹⁰ and 2012 remained a constraint and has not allowed the population build any livelihood³¹¹. The occurrence of crisis and conflicts over and over, weakened the population, as well as their capacity to cope with the situation. As such the population in the region continued to be impoverished, since they were hit by crisis over and over, and before they have recovered from one crisis, another followed. Although it was reported that crop harvest had been generally good in recent times, as a result of the high rainfall recorded between July/October 2012. The rainfall was also said to have resulted in floods in certain parts of West Africa and the Sahel region as well. The Rainfall was said to have affected about 1.5 Million people throughout the region. But despite the floods recorded, gross cereal production was said to have increased by up 37%, a s compared 34% in 2011/2012 and was said to 22.5 tons in output³¹².

Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad were said to have recorded surpluses, and so also did Senegal and Mauritania with regards to cereal production. Yet, public and private stocks were reported to shrunk and re-building the stocks proved difficult a task, owing mainly to the depletion in the previous seasons, and other reasons, including lack of funds. As such poor families that had no access to agriculture were forced to rely on the markets as the only source of supply for the daily needs. It was reported that after harvests in 2012/2013 period, prices of food stuff decreased, but that of course grain was reported to have increased in most of the markets across the region, in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Indications were that the prices of food may not significantly reduce in 2013, due mainly to the impact and decline in production witnessed in 2012, despite the good crop production

³⁰⁹ Food and Agricultural Organization, "Sahel Update: The Sahel Crisis". 22, April 2012, p 1.

³¹⁰ The entire region had witnessed drought prior to the outbreak of the 2012 rebellion. And in Mali in particular there were instabilities in the form of uprisings by the Tuareg group at one time or the other which greatly affected agricultural activities in the country and were seen to have greatly contributed to the food insecurity facing the country, particularly after the outbreak of the 2012 rebellion.

³¹¹ Food and Agricultural Organization, "Sahel Update: The Sahel Crisis". 22, April 2012, p 1.

³¹² Ibid, p 2.

recorded in the 2012/2013 season.³¹³ This is seen to have greatly affected Mali in the post conflict period, especially as the conflict also further worsened the situation, food became less available.

The military intervention in Mali has been generally described as successful, and many territories were recovered from the rebels. The rebels were driven into the mountains in the north and the intervention and the entire conflict came to be viewed with an implication, of large scale displacement of the population due to several reasons. The population displacement that arose from the conflict is generally characterized by large scale displacements, with a pattern described as corresponding to ethnic similarities. The dark skinned people chose to flee to the southern part of the country, which is seen as Bambara dominated, whereas the pastoralist groups that consist of light skinned people, including the Tuaregs and other Arab speaking peoples fled out of the country. These groups were seen to have fled to neighboring states and other West African states. The population in the north generally fled to areas that are seen to have a significant population of similar ethnic groupings. And many factors and reasons came to be advanced as responsible for how, why and where the Malian population was migrating. The same factors were also used to explain the possibility of returning to Mali by these groups that fled the country.

As mentioned previously, food insecurity remained one of the most important factors behind the migration. About 4.6 million people were reported to have been affected by food insecurity and mal-nutrition in 2012³¹⁴. It was further reported that about 1.3 million people were affected in 2013, and that about 585,000 of this number were located in the north of Mali. As such many families had to move to other areas so as to have access to food, particularly after the outbreak of the 2012 conflict which was seen to have complicated issues and led to the emergence of a humanitarian crisis due to the collapse of social services.

Some of the immediate factors identified and responsible for the migration in Mali, and one of such factors was the Malian economy itself, apart from the food insecurity mentioned above. The Malian economy it was reported shrunk by 15% as a result of the closure of most businesses in the north after the outbreak of the rebellion. The Algerian

³¹³ "Situation Update: Sahel Crisis", Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nations, 22 April, 2013, p 1-3.

³¹⁴ Diana Cartier, "Mali Crisis: A Migration Perspective", International Migrations Organization, June 2013, p 11.

border which is a major business link came to be closed and most people fled to different areas. The closure of such businesses led a shortage in the supply of basic commodities to the population such as milk, flour, sugar and oil, which are seen as daily basic needs. The prices of these products skyrocketed as a result of the shortage in supply. And what came to further complicate matters was the shortage of food, and for this reason, movements and displacements were expected to be on the increase.

Not only were there decline in the supply of basic commodities, but basic social services appeared also to be absent in almost all the cities, with the exception of Bamako. It is perhaps only in Bamako that certain social services could be obtained, but even then, the influx of people into the city from other places appeared to have rendered the services inefficient and insufficient to a now larger population. Many civil servants and health worker were reported to have fled the northern part of Mali, following the outbreak of the conflict and the intervention by France. Most health care centers were said to have been deserted and their facilities looted, and as a result health services appeared to have collapsed completely. It was reported that the crisis disrupted the education of about 700,000 pupils across the country³¹⁵. The availability of social services came to be considered as a significant factor in explaining the migration and displacement of the Malian population as a result of the conflict and intervention by France. And the availability of basic social services will continue to be a determinant of the possibility of return to Mali by this displaced population. Apart from the factors mentioned previously, the issue of security and protection of the population also remains a significant factor and cause for migration. During the conflict, and the intervention as well, a lot human rights violations were recorded, and women were said to have been subjected to gender based violence. Several acts of violence against women and young girls by armed groups were reported in many places, particularly in the north. Many women and children were forced into prostitution as a result of the conflict, just as many came to be forcefully recruited into the rebel armed groups, and others supporting the Malian government. After the intervention, ethnic conflicts were reported to have occurred in revenge against members of certain groups that were seen to be associated with the rebels.

Generally speaking, the patterns of migrations in post conflict Mali was seen to have taken three major patterns. The migration was first seen to have led to a large scale internal

³¹⁵ Ibid, p 12.

displacement of the population, and the second pattern that came to be observed was that of the cross border flows into neighboring states. And again it was observed that the migration had affected certain mobility patterns, including pastoralists and other nomadic peoples. The various patterns and flows are discussed below in order to analyze the post conflict period and the humanitarian crisis clearly, as well as to provide for future projections and for ascertaining the level of humanitarian aid required. The migration patterns observed includes the following;

1.2.2 Large Scale Internal Displacement, Cross-Border Flows and Impact on Neighboring States

It was reported that in May 2013, about 301,027 were internally displaced in Mali, and that such displacements were said to have happened between March and June 2012, with the highest taking place in April after the rebels succeeded in taking control of Timbuktu and Gao cities. After the military intervention, about 72,109 more people were said been added to the list of the internally displaced persons. Most movements or migrations occurred due mainly to the violence regarding the armed conflict. Although many fled due to food insecurity, others fled due to the poor economic condition as pointed out previously³¹⁶. Between March and June, which saw the highest number of displacement taking place, about 56% of the people fled from Timbuktu, 40% were said to have fled from Gao, while 2% from Mopti. Movements were also observed in Segou, but in very limited number. Majority of the people were seen to have moved from the northern cities of Mali to the south. About 26% of them moved to Bamako, 18% moved to Mopti, 16% to Segou and 9% to Koulikoro. Another 45 were located in Sikasso and 2% in Kayes. Most of the internally displaced persons migrated to urban areas and did not appear to gather in one location, a situation that proved difficult for them to be able to receive any assistance or protection for many international donor agencies. About 65% of the displaced persons according to a report of the International Migration Organization rented houses, 27% lived with host families, and that about 8% indicated other or living in community centers. Despite the ability of many people to move out the northern cities, many were unable to move due to security concerns, as well as lack of transportation, whereas others were considered financially incapable of migrating, or vulnerable (old and disabled people), and

³¹⁶ Ibid, p13.

unable to travel. It was however reported that many are displaced near the north region, between Gao and Kidal regions, as well as the district of Timbuktu. The composition and vulnerability of the internally displaced persons is explained³¹⁷.

According to reports of the International Migration Organization, there were about 43,084 internally displaced households, which consisted of about 301,084 people. The census conducted in Mali in 2009, showed that the average size of a household is considered to consist of 5 people. But in April 2013, the number of registered households stood at about 7 people per household, higher than the standard established by the census³¹⁸. This was seen to indicate that most families now included extended family members or even non family members living with them, due mainly to the conflict, as well as the intervention that followed. Figures indicated that about 51% of the internally displaced persons were women, 49% men, and that majority of the displaced persons appeared to be children under the ages of 18 and made up 53% of the total number of the displaced persons. Adults between the ages of 18-64 came to constitute 44%, and about 2% consisted of people that were above 64 years of age. Out of this percentages and number only 21% of the total number of internally displaced persons were reported to have received humanitarian assistance, and even then it varied from region to region, the nature of the assistance received.

Regarding the vulnerable population, a total of 26,559 vulnerable persons came to be identified, and constituted about 13% of the total number of internally displaced persons in Mali. These people formed part of the 47.5% of the total households registered. Separated and unaccompanied children constituted 43, with 11,295 separated children and 675 unaccompanied children³¹⁹. Lactating and pregnant women made up 245 of the vulnerable displaced persons list, while persons with chronic illnesses constituted 20%. The physically disabled people came to constitute %, and unaccompanied old people were seen to have constituted only 1% of the total number of the vulnerable displaced persons.

³¹⁷ Also see Disaster Needs Analysis -2011/2012, "Northern Mali : Conflict And Food Insecurity, Emergency Capacity Building Project, p 3-5.

³¹⁸ Many vulnerable person were affected by the conflict and as such were among persons displaced by the conflict and the intervention after s study by the I.M.O was carried out after the intervention.

³¹⁹ OXFAM Briefing Paper 167, "Mali's Conflict Refugees: Responding to a Growing Crisis", 22 January 2013, p 10.

About 38% of the households are reported to have no income at all at their places of displacement, while 29% are said to be on regular income. About 50% of the displaced persons were identified as requiring some humanitarian assistance, of food, while 39% were seen to be in dire need of cash assistance. Most of the displaced persons in Bamako appeared to have been part those in need of cash assistance, probably as a result of the metropolitan nature of the city, as the capital of Mali, whereas people in Segou and Mopti mainly requested for food assistance.

There were indications that return by the internally displaced persons to their original places of residence is possible at the end of 2013. About 93% of the displaced persons according to a survey carried out by I.M.O in February 2013, indicated their willingness to return to their original residences. Out of this percentage, 62% said their decision to return will be determined by the security situation in Mali. By April, 2013 95% of the displaced persons still maintained that their return will be determined by the security situation. The lack of social services was identified as the immediate factor motivating the return of many of the displaced persons, especially as observed in Bamako and Mopti. Many decided in the absence of such social amenities to return to the north which has been their place of origin before the outbreak of the conflict. Other returnees were encouraged to return as a result of the improvement in the security situation. Those that were seen not have any willingness to return to the north were identified as those who were directly affected by the violence, which include victims of rape, amputations or torture. It also came to be understood that among the returnees to the north, some returned temporarily to see the situation, as well as repair their houses due to the approaching new season. Many houses were reported to have been destroyed during the conflict. While some houses were partly damaged, other had been completely destroyed and as a result some of the returnees would have to build new houses.

Reports of the International Migration Organization indicated that as at the end of May, 2013, about 185,000 Malians had fled to neighboring states. About 176,000 of this number had been registered as refugees with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). Most of the refugees were located in Niger, Mauritania and Burkina Faso. About 26 were located in Guinea and about 20 also in Togo, a very minimal number as compared to other states. Algeria was reported to have hosted about 1,500 Malian refugees, while 4,000 were said to have fled to Cote d'Ivoire. The number of people migrating out of

Mali continued to increase until the military intervention, even then it continued, but at a very minimal level.

The composition of the migrants indicated that the majority from among them are the pastoralists, which include the Tuareg and the Maure ethnic groups. These groups preferred to migrate outside the country than move southwards within Mali, due mainly to similarity in pattern of livelihood and environmental condition shared with certain groups in other neighboring states. Another reason explained as causing such migration has to do with proximity and accessibility from their original locations in Mali, to these neighboring states. Most of the refugees consisted mainly of women and children. The women appear to be in the majority, followed by the children, since the men decided to stay behind in Mali to look after family properties. The needs of these refugees were viewed with serious concerns according reports of the UNHCR. About 80% of the children refugees were reported to have lacked access to primary school education in the areas they migrated to. The schools around the various refugee camps could not cater for all the children, and other schools were far located and it was difficult for the children to attend. It was also observed that the population of the refugees has had a significant impact on the local host communities. Especially given the food insecurity affecting many of the neighboring states, the influx of refugees and sometimes their livestock was said to have weakened many communities. The situation of the displaced persons living in the various neighboring states is explained country by country.

Reports of the UNHCR indicated that by May, 2013, there were about 74,108 Malian refugees living within the country. It came to be estimated that about 1,500 people crossed to the Mauritanian border every week from Mali. It was reported that the influx of refugees from Mali had particularly affected in the southern part of the country. The presence of refugees with their livestock was seen to have over stretched both the economy and the physical environment of the host communities south of the country. The refugees were seen to have been in dire need of shelter, water, sanitation and health, as the risk of diseases remain high, especially since latrines were few and inadequate for the number of refugees present in various locations³²⁰.

³²⁰ Diana Cartier, "Mali Crisis: A Migration Perspective", International Migrations Organization, June 2013, p 16.

About 50,515 refugees were reported to have fled to Niger, while about 5,000 are said to have been located along the border cities of Niger and Mali. Tillaberi and Tahoau region remained the most highly populated areas by Malian refugees. The refugees were said to be facing problems that ranged from food insecurity and malnutrition, to shortage of water, sanitation as well as health facilities in the various places they were living. After the French intervention, about 10,000 were reported to have crossed over to Niger. Apart from this figure, about 3,991 Nigeriens that had been living in Mali also returned to Niger. Concerns in Niger remained mainly associated with availability of food, which was not readily available, and supply from Mali was also not possible due to the security situation. It was reported that at some point, the nutrition situation had improved in various refugee camps across Niger. Returns from Niger to Mali appeared highly unlikely according reports by the International Migration Organization.

Reports also showed that About 40,975 Malian refugees were located in Burkina Faso by the end of April 2013. The situation of the refugees, just as in Mauritania and Niger remained the same in Burkina Faso too. More financial and moral support was required to meet the growing needs of the refugees in various camps across the country. The population in the country also appeared to have been rendered vulnerable due to food insecurity, as a result of the influx of refugees. Guinea and Togo were the two countries recorded very minimal influx of refugees. It was reported that only 26 refugees fled to Guinea, while about 20 were said to have fled to Togo. As such there were no reports of humanitarian crisis in the two countries arising from the influx of refugees as recorded in other states.

Since the outbreak of the conflict in Mali, Algeria closed its borders with Mali. But despite this, many people still found their way into Algeria. UNHCR reports in April 2013 indicated that about 1,500 Malian refugees were living in Algeria, and were mostly located in the cities of Timayawen and Tinzawaten, where they were said to have rented houses. No refugees were reported fleeing to Senegal since the beginning of the conflict until now, though some were observed in Cote d'Ivoire. The International Migration Organization in collaboration with UNHCR had made a contingency plan in anticipation of massive influx of people to Cote d'Ivoire based on an assessment made by the two organizations in November 2012, when about 4,000 Malians were reported to have crossed the Algerian border. After crossing over, they were said to be staying with family members and not as

refugees, as they did not seek for asylum or refugee status throughout their stay. And most of them it was reported might have returned to Mali, after the security situation improved according reports of the I.M.O. Reports indicate that there has not been any migration of refugees from Mali beyond the Sahel region. There have not been any records of Malians seeking asylum either in Europe or in America since the outbreak of the conflict in 2012. What is known is that Switzerland and France had removed Mali from the list of safe countries at the end of 2012, a situation that made it permissible for Malians to apply for asylum in Europe. In the year 2012, about 2,531 Malians were said to have applied, seeking asylum in Europe³²¹.

Many of the refugees outside Mali did not indicate willingness to return, despite expressing their intention to return ultimately. Many believed that the security situation is still not favorable for the return. Concerns about protection came to be raised as most of the refugees outside Mali is composed of the Tuareg and the Maure people which are largely associated with the rebellion. Since the military intervention by Paris, there were reports of violations of human rights, as well as ethnic conflicts and revenge attacks, particularly against the Tuareg and other light skinned peoples of the north by other groups, who are sometimes wrongly associated with the rebels. This factor was seen to have been responsible for most displacements, as well making returns by these groups refugees outside Mali difficult.

1.2.3 Human Rights Issues and Upholding the Rule of Law

It took almost about five months after the French intervention in the Mali conflict, before peace gradually came to be restored in the northern part of the country which is the Tuareg dominated area, and considered the actual conflict zone. As soon as peace and order were restored in the north, reports came to be received about issues related to human rights abuses or violations during the conflict, as well as during the stabilization period in the post conflict period. These reports appear to indicate that the said abuses and violations were carried out by both sides; the rebel's side were found guilty of these abuses, just as the Malian army and its security were found complicit and indicted in the reports, as having committed many of such crimes. As a matter of fact human rights violation was seen to have been responsible for the migration of thousands of people from the north to

³²¹ Ibid, p 16-17.

within and outside Mali during and after the conflict. There were various allegations of human rights abuses that ranged from extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, to torture and other inhuman or degrading treatments, including rape³²². Such violations or abuses constitute war crimes in humanitarian intervention law, and as such are viewed with serious concerns. As a result of the seriousness of these allegations, Amnesty International carried out a four week mission into Mali to investigate and verify the said allegations. After such mission, the organization released its findings which discussed the nature of such abuses, the victims of the abuses, as well as the perpetrators of these inhuman acts.

According to the reports, there were more than 20 cases of enforced disappearances, as well as extrajudicial executions carried out by the Malian army in the north of Mali after the French intervention. These executions, according to reports were carried out openly, and further indicates that about 11 people in the city of Timbuktu, which include Arab traders were arrested by the Malian soldiers and extra judicially executed. Some according the reports may have been subjected to enforced disappearances³²³. The bodies of some of many victims were found a few days after their arrests. Many of these bodies were discovered buried around the city's slaughter house a few days after their arrests by the Malian soldiers in Timbuktu³²⁴.

In Kidal, it was reported that the Malian army launched an attack on a large scale that was said to have resulted in the death many civilians that were suspected to be related to or supporters of the armed rebels. Testimonies collected in Gao region by Amnesty International showed that the Tuaregs remained targets of the Malian soldiers. Akiline Ag Mossa, Aljounagh Ag Bilal, Ghissa Ag Algateck Ag Mohammedu and Omar Ag Algateck were among those reported to have been arrested by the Malian soldiers in the house of a local family member, only for their bodies to be found a few days later. A school teacher, Ibrahim Ahoudou was also reported to have been shot at a check point after having revealed his identity and permitted to go, but was shot from the back by the soldiers at the check point. Mohammed Hamedou ag Mohammed, Assaleh and another Tuareg were also among those arrested by the soldiers and taken away 5km to Gossi, stripped

³²² Human Rights Council, " Reports of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Human rights Situation in Mali", Human Rights Council Twenty Third Session, 6 June 2013, P 3.

³²³ Ibid., P 9.

³²⁴ Amnesty International, "Mali: Preliminary Findings of a Four Week Mission, Serious Human Rights Abuses Continue", Amnesty International Publications, 2013, P 9.

naked and forced to lie on the ground until another soldier intervened to secure their release. Few hours later, the same people were re-arrested at the Gossi market by about 7 soldiers and their bodies came to be discovered in the bush about 3km from Gao and were buried by local inhabitants of the area. In the city of Niono, 350 km north-east of Bamako, the Malian soldiers were reported to have abducted a man held by the military police and his body came to be found three months later. Ousmane Yatassaye, a 40 year old merchant was arrested also in January, 2013 and was suspected of having some communications with Mauritania. He was taken by the Malian army, and when Amnesty International enquired during its mission, it was informed that he had been handed over to the state prosecutor. However, three months later, his body was discovered in a mango orchard in Niono, near the military camp.

Many testimonies collected by Amnesty International showed that the Malian army and security forces had been responsible for torture and other inhuman, degrading treatment after arresting certain individuals that were suspected of having links with the armed groups³²⁵. About 80 detainees and children were interviewed by Amnesty International, and physical observation of injuries sustained confirmed the testimonies of the people interviewed³²⁶. They generally in their testimonies claimed to have been tortured and maltreated by the soldiers and security forces after arresting them. In March, 2013, about 3 Tuaregs were arrested in Gossi according to Amnesty International reports, and were reported to have been beaten with cables and rifle butts, and released without trial in April. Also a raid was reported to have been carried out by the Malian army in Kadji, in collaboration with the French forces. Following the raid, the Malian forces were reported to have looted certain houses under the pretence of searching for weapons and members of armed groups and in the process arrested about 70 people and detained them without trial. It was confirmed by Amnesty International that the army tortured and maltreated many people during the raid. There were reports of about 50 people who were beaten or tortured and were forced to confess being members of MUJWA³²⁷

³²⁵ Human Rights Council, “ Reports of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Human rights Situation in Mali”, Human Rights Council Twenty Third Session, 6 June 2013, P 9.

³²⁶ Ibid., P 11.

³²⁷ Is among the rebel terrorist groups operating in the north Mali, and may have been responsible for many kidnappings and other related issues in the north, including trafficking in the Sahel region.

Amnesty International further visited more than 80 male detainees, including children that were arrested in the north and accused of having links with the rebel groups. They were actually part of about 200 detainees in different locations across the country and in Bamako, and consist of different nationals, including Algerians, Nigerians, Tunisians and peoples of the Western Sahara. They appeared to have been held under the counter terrorism law that was adopted in July, 2008 under the Malian penal code. Many of the detainees, including children, disclosed to Amnesty International that they had been subjected to torture and other inhuman treatment during their arrests and movement to Bamako. Many among them showed scars and marks on their backs and chests to confirm their testimonies to the Amnesty International delegates that visited Mali.

Five of those arrested and detained from the north of Mali, were reported to have died in detention. Before their death, most of them had complained to their fellow inmates of being beaten up before being transferred to Bamako. Most of these people, it is claimed were denied access to medical treatment. This five people include; Akassane Ag Hamina who was arrested in Timbuktu on the 4 April, and died on 11 April in Bamako prison. Al Hassane Mahammedu, who hails from Kadji was arrested in Gao and moved to the Bamako prison on 4 April also and was reported dead on 11 April, 2013 in Bamako. Fellow inmates reported that soldiers trampled on him after he was arrested and he fell unconscious one week after his arrival to Bamako. Inha Ag El Mahdi was arrested at Lere, and he was reported to have arrived Bamako prison on 4 April, and died on 11 April, just like the 3 people previously mentioned. And another inmate of Moroccan origin, Dakane, that arrived the Bamako prison on 4 April, and was reported dead on 12 April, 2013. While Houceiyn Traore was also said to have arrived the Bamako prison on 4 April and died on 14 April.

During the visit to Mali by Amnesty International, the organization made some effort to look into the condition of prisoners in the various prisons they were held. The results of the observation by the group indicated that the prisoners actually lived in very poor conditions. It was reported in the section where the 5 prisoners died, there were 34 and 21 people in only two cells, which were 5 by 5 meters in size. In the other sections, it was observed that there were about 8 people in a single cell which is 3.6 meters by 2 meters in size, and not properly ventilated. The prisoners revealed to the group that they were locked up 24 hours,

and not allowed to walk within the prison yard, until after the death of the 5 prisoners³²⁸. There were also reports of prisoners being denied access to medical care, and prisoners that sustained injuries during torture after their arrests, sometimes find parts of their bodies like their hands deformed due to lack of medical care. It was also reported that children were among the detained persons, under the Malian law, it was forbidden to detain children in the same place with adults, as confirmed to Amnesty International by the Malian Justice Minister during their visit. The Minister said he had ordered that the children be moved to a specific facilities center.

The rebel groups were also accused of perpetrating acts that were considered as constituting human rights violation or abuses of different nature. According to information gathered by Amnesty International, civilians, including Tuaregs were brutally killed by members of MUJWA, due to the fact that they showed support to the French military intervention in the conflict. Many of those killed by the rebel groups, could not be seen after their abduction from their houses by the rebels, only for their dead bodies to be found inflicted with wounds and cigarette burns due to torture.

The rebel groups were further accused of forcing children to join their ranks and fight on their side. Information gathered revealed that children between the ages of 12-17 were carrying weapons, and some were charged with the control of check points, while others cooked or ran errands for the various rebel groups. Sometimes, these children, according to reports were sent to the frontline to fight. The children were reported to have been arrested by the Malian army after the capture of certain cities by the French forces which forced the rebels to retreat. An estimated 40 children between the ages of 12-17 were said to have volunteered for MUJWA with the hope of getting paid, and underwent military training. The groups were said to have openly enlisted children in villages, while promising their families money, and in most cases paid nothing.

Many acts of sexual violence were also reported to have been committed by the rebel groups during the uprising. According to Amnesty International reports, there were 83 cases of rape recorded against women and girls in Gao and Menaka, after the occupation of the north by the MNLA. Again, between January and February, 2013, 11 new cases of rape were documented in Gao, among this number, six were between the ages 6-13. In the

³²⁸ Amnesty International, "Mali: Preliminary Findings of a Four Week Mission, Serious Human Rights Abuses Continue", Amnesty International Publications, 2013, P 18.

Mopti region, rape came to be considered very common, due to its rampant occurrence. The Mopti hospital is reported to have treated about 10 cases committed in Menaka in May alone, another 2 cases in Gao, and one in Timbuktu. Most cases reported were mainly gang rapes, by either the MNLA members, MUJWA or AQIM members. The armed groups were seen to have forbid the female victims of rape from migrating south of the country and only permitted them to move out to Algeria. But after the success of the French and the Malian forces, these victims have access to medical care and could move freely within the country to any region³²⁹.

Generally, the Malian authorities responded to the allegations by admitting to Amnesty International that these violations of human rights and other inhuman acts, did indeed take place. The authorities assured Amnesty International that investigations were still being carried out regarding the abuses, and that those found guilty will certainly be brought to book³³⁰. However, the Malian Defense Minister maintained that the abuses that were reported to have been carried out by the Malian army, were actually committed by elements which he said deserted the army, but still wore the uniforms of the Malian army. The Malian government also confirmed to Amnesty International that a section of the Malian population is bent on taking revenge on people suspected to have links or that support the rebel groups. The Malian government further denied the killings at Gossi, attributing it to the Gandakoy militia, which it said it was investigating the five members of the organization concerning the killings, and that the army bore no responsibility. With regards to the issue of human rights violation by the Malian security forces, the Malian Minister of Justice confirmed to Amnesty International that an enquiry had been opened into the alleged killings of 16 Muslim preachers by Malian soldiers in Diabaly on 8 and 9 September, 2012. He further said that the body of Ousmane Yatassaye had been exhumed and a judge had been appointed to handle the case. It was however noted that so far nobody from either the Malian army or its security forces has been prosecuted or arrested since the outbreak of the conflict and the violations that followed.

³²⁹ Ibid p 24.

³³⁰ To see measures taken by the Malian Government regarding Human Rights abuses see ; Human Rights Council, " Reports of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Human rights Situation in Mali", Human Rights Council Twenty Third Session, 6 June 2013, P 15.

Amnesty International was of the opinion that the Malian government should open a prompt, impartial and effective investigation of these reported violations of human rights and abuses, and identify those responsible and prosecute such persons. It further called on the Malian authorities to take adequate steps to prevent the occurrence of future violations and abuses, including torture and other inhuman treatment. It further called on the Malian authorities to suspend all members of the Malian army or security forces that are being suspected or found complicit in these reported cases of abuse and violations of human rights across the country. The organization also called on the Malian authorities to improve the conditions of its prisons, where suspects were being detained, as well as ensure that detained persons were not tortured or subjected to other inhuman treatment during the detention. It also called on the Malian authorities to ensure that all detainees were brought before a court of law in time after arrest and be given a fair hearing and access to an attorney. The organization called on the authorities to ensure that detainees have unlimited access to health care during the detention, as well be allowed to be visited by family members. It further advised the Malian government to ensure proper care and protection to victims of rape, and make effort to establish with the collaboration of UN, donors, national and international nongovernmental organizations, programs of humanitarian assistance to various rape victims and other forms of abuses. It also called for the government to make efforts to provide emergency health care programs and rehabilitation to victims of abuses. And finally, Amnesty International advised the Malian authorities to pay special attention to the issue of child soldiers, and set up a program that will facilitate their rehabilitation into their various communities and families³³¹.

5.3 The EU and Activities in Mali

EU-Mali relations are commonly traced to 1958 when the EU began carrying out projects in Mali that included rural development, road infrastructure and humanitarian aid³³². Over the years, cooperation between EU and Mali expanded to cover many areas including political dialogues, security and trade. Generally, the EU had for a long time maintained relations with the Sahel states and become involved in the development and security of the region which the EU considered vital to its own security. The EU views the Sahel region as

³³¹ Amnesty International, "Mali: Preliminary Findings of a Four Week Mission, Serious Human Rights Abuses Continue", Amnesty International Publications, 2013, P 25.

³³² "EU and Mali", http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/mali/eu_mali/index_fr.htm.

one of the poorest in the world, facing challenges of poverty, climate change, food crisis, high population growth, fragile governance, corruption, unresolved internal tensions, risks of violent extremism and radicalization, illicit trafficking as well as other terrorist linked security threats. The EU appears to have become more worried with the activities of groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) in the north of Mali whose activities appeared to have focused on western targets. The EU views the activities of these groups in the north of Mali with deep concerns, especially with regards to the development cooperation and the restriction of humanitarian assistance and development aid, which is further making the population of the region and Mali in particular vulnerable.

The EU had since 2008 advocated for a comprehensive security and development approach in order to respond to the complexity of challenges facing the Sahel region and Mali in particular. And in April 2009, the EU sent Fact Finding Missions to Mali, Mauritania and Niger at the political and technical levels, after the security situation in the region rapidly deteriorated, resulting in the kidnapping of several European nationals. Consequent upon which the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union invited the High Representative to draw up in close collaboration with the Commission, a strategy on Sahel on 25/10/2010, and a joint communication by the Commission and the High Representative was presented in March, 2011. The European Union drew up a development policy in partnership with concerned states in the Sahel, including Mali that was directed towards dealing with the root causes of the identified challenges facing the region³³³. The policy tried to look into ways by which the EU can create grassroots conditions for economic opportunity and human development to flourish. The EU became convinced that achieving such objectives would be difficult as long as security challenges remained unchecked. It also viewed the security challenges facing the region as cross border and closely intertwined, and as such, considered a regional integrated strategy as the only approach likely to succeed in overcoming the security challenges facing the region. The strategy appeared to have encouraged EU member states and other partners to play an integrated part in the region, with all instruments at their disposal. The EU strategy proposed a framework that would see the coordination of its current and future engagement in the Sahel region with a common objective of security and development in the region. Some of the challenges

³³³ Council of The European Union, "EUCAP Sahel Mali: EU Support Mission for Internal Security in Mali Established, 15 April ,2014, p 2.

identified by the EU include among others Governance, Development and Conflict resolution, Regional political level or challenges of policy coordination, Security and Rule of law and Fight against violent extremism. The EU concluded that if these challenges are overcome, the Sahel region would be free for investment and other economic activities and safe from terrorism and insecurity.

The EU views the challenges of governance in the region as partly responsible for the situation in many of the Sahel states, including Mali. Many governments in the region cannot provide security and public services to its population. Lack of education and uneven distribution of resources in many of the states are seen as another challenge, which coupled with a poor level of education and unemployment makes it possible for the youth population to likely cooperate with certain trans-national groups such as AQIM and Ansardine. Generally weak governance in the areas of justice, social exclusion, insufficient level of development and internal conflicts were identified to have left many of the Sahel states vulnerable to the activities of terrorist trans-national groups, and is a further confirmation of Robert Jackson's negative sovereignty theory and the weakness of the Malian state.

Again, the regional political level is not seen to encourage or help in finding a solution to the security issues in the region, which is viewed as "Transnational" in nature, though differing in intensity from one country to another. The divergence of perception by some of the Sahel countries, including Mali and some of the North African states of Algeria, Libya and Morocco, and the absence of a sub-regional organization encompassing the Sahel and the Maghreb states has always led to a unilateral and poor coordinated action, which is seen to affect an effective regional action. And most of the Sahel states are also seen to lack sufficient strategic capacity in terms of security, law enforcement and judicial sectors which include the Police, Military, Customs and Immigrations to control territory, provide human security and respond to various security threats, thereby exhibiting all traits associated with the "Negative Sovereignty" as explained by Robert Jackson in his theory. Factors such as poverty, social exclusion and other economic needs, as well as radicalized

Islamist ideologies pose the threat of extremism and the recruitment of youths by groups such as AQIM in the region³³⁴.

It was in realization of these challenges that the EU considered the four areas highlighted above its strategic lines of action in the region. It focuses in finding solution to the problems in the Sahel by improving upon governance, development and internal conflict resolution, promoting a common political and diplomatic vision or strategy by the relevant countries in the region to handle cross-border threats, as well as addressing development challenges. The EU further focused on the need to strengthen the capacity of the security, law enforcement and rule of law within the Sahel states to fight threats of terrorism and organized crime. The EU also considers the provision of basic social services important just as it considers the stimulation of economic activities and provision of employment opportunities necessary in order to prevent the radicalization of the youth population and recruitment by trans-national groups such as AQIM.

The EU has carried out many humanitarian interventionist programs in Mali through its Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Office³³⁵ (ECHO) even before the outbreak of the 2012 rebellion, as part of its security and development strategy for the Sahel region. However, after the outbreak of the 2012 rebellion and the intervention of France which saw to the end of the violence that engulfed Mali at that time and the restoration of state authority and normalcy in Mali, the armed conflict appeared to have brought about serious humanitarian crises in Mali, especially the north of the country which appeared to have been hit most by the conflict. As such there was the need to rebuild the north of the country and provide relief and aid materials to many of the displaced and vulnerable population in the country. The needs of Mali after the 2012 conflict were enormous and there was also a need to raise sufficient funds to rebuild the country, as well as provide relief materials and aid to the vulnerable population. Consequently, the President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, the President of France, Francoise Hollande and the President

³³⁴ Ibid, p 4.

³³⁵ EU and Mali, "Humanitarian Aid",
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/mali/eu_mali/humanitarian/index_fr.htm.

of the republic of Mali, Diocounda Traore took an initiative and held a high level donor conference for the development of Mali after the 2012 conflict³³⁶.

The conference was supposed to provide an opportunity for Mali to present its sustainable recovery plan and request the support of the international community in financing such plan³³⁷. The conference which came to be known as “Together for a new Mali” took place in Brussels, and saw the participation of delegates from 108 countries and institutions, including about 13 heads of states and government, a large delegation of Foreign ministers and senior representatives of regional and international institutions, together with representatives of local authorities, civil society, the Diaspora and the private sector.

During the conference, the Malian authorities informed the conference that the 2012 conflict has revealed to the Malian people and the rest of the world of the weakness and fragility of the Malian state; its institutions, military and poor governance that have led to corruption to the eventual loss of confidence in government by the citizens due to what the authorities described as lack of credibility in the government by the citizens. After the conflict, the transitional authorities was faced with the task re-establishing constitutional order and identified three immediate tasks, which include among others: re-establishing the integrity of the national territory, review of public policies, and the pursuance of structural reforms with the aim of creating conditions for sustainable economic growth. The Malian authorities reiterated to the conference its concerns for maintaining the macroeconomic framework by trying to pursue a policy of moderating public expenditure by freezing appropriations where the returns in terms of revenue were not assured, a policy that it said was lauded by both the World Bank and the I.M.F³³⁸.

Presenting Mali’s plan for sustainable recovery to the conference, the Malian authorities said drafting the document became necessary after the European Union and France proposed to the Malian authorities that they will facilitate the organization of a donor conference “Working Together for Mali”. The Malian authorities then drew up a document

³³⁶ International Donors Conference ‘Together for a New Mali’, Brussels, 15 May, 2013, Joint Chairs Conclusions, p 2.

³³⁷ Ibid, p 2.

³³⁸ Republic of Mali, “Together for a new Mali International Conference”, Plan for the Sustainable Recovery of Mali 2013-2014, Brussels, May 15, 2013, p 6.

known as “A Road Map for Political Transition, Strategic Growth and Poverty Reduction 2012-2017”. The strategic document was meant to create the foundations for a resilient economy and was based upon certain structural elements. First among such elements is infrastructure investment programs, such as roads and energy development, which are considered necessary for any meaningful economic development. The second element is improvement in the quality of administrative services, with a view to strengthening trust between the government and the citizens which was fast eroding. The third element is the issue of food security, in a country where about 70% of the population lives in rural areas. Improvements in agricultural methods and techniques and the establishment of functional markets as well as processing channels were considered necessary. The fourth and the last element highlighted by the Malian authorities, remained the provision of basic social services or amenities to the citizens, such as education, health care and access to portable drinking water throughout the country. Apart from these elements which are considered the basis of any meaningful recovery plan in Mali, the Malian authorities presented to the conference 12 priority areas that needed immediate support in order to rebuild the Malian society³³⁹. The total amount of money required to finance the plan stood at 2.849 Billion Malian Francs. The 12 priority areas identified and mentioned in the introductory part of the chapter include the following:

- Ensure peace, security and public service everywhere
- Respond to humanitarian emergencies
- Organize credible elections
- Increase governance through decentralization and public service reform
- Ensure a well functioning judicial system and the fight against corruption
- Strengthening public finance system
- Rebuild the economy by strengthening private sector, agriculture, investing in infrastructural development and youth employment
- Addressing the challenge of education
- Ensuring access to quality health care services for all
- Supporting cultural projects for peaceful co-existence
- Promoting the role of women
- Integration of environmentalism into policies and strategies

³³⁹ Ibid, p 7.

At the end of the conference, the donors, based on the 12 priority areas contained in Mali's recovery plan, agreed to donate the sum of 3.25 Billion Euros to Mali within a two year time frame. However the donors support for the recovery plan and their budgetary commitments will depend on the Malian authority's determination to pursue vigorously a public finance reform that will ensure transparency. The EU made known its intention to continue to collaborate with the republic of Mali in the area of political dialogues and security. The collaboration according to the EU will be based on a humanitarian response based on the needs of the most vulnerable population in line with humanitarian principles. The conference called for a political support to the peace talks and reconciliation in Mali, as well as the modernization of the state. In terms of cooperation, action will be based on direct response to the most pressing needs of stabilization and reconstruction in the post conflict areas, while maintaining a perspective of recovery and long term development, while taking into account regional dynamics affecting Mali with regards to security. The EU as seen in the table below had expended almost a billion Euros on various projects in different areas in Mali between 2008 and 2014, the highest being in the Macroeconomics and public sector reforms which cost about 305 Million Euros, and is closely followed by construction of road networks across Mali which cost about 207 Million Euro. The EU expended about 140 Million Euros on humanitarian activities in Mali just as it spent millions in other areas that include elections, human rights, decentralization, justice and security, environment, food security, health and social services, etc. As can be seen, the total cost of various projects carried out by the EU in many different areas within the period mentioned above amounted to about 993 Million Euros, very close to a Billion Euros. The EU plans to spend another 615 Million Euros between the year 2014 and 2020³⁴⁰.

³⁴⁰ EU-Mali, Humanitarian Aid: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/_mali/projects/index_fr.htm. Accessed 4/01/14

Areas of Cooperation	2008-2013
	EUR in million
Elections	23
Human Rights	2
Decentralization	45
Justice and Security	21
Environment	5
Conflict Prevention	77
Food Safety	33
Health and Social Services	4
Civil Society	14
Macroeconomics and Public Sector Reform	305
Agriculture	57
Culture	4
Water and Sanitation	51
Migrations	2
Transport Network	207
Energy	3
Subtotal Development	853
Humanitarian	140
TOTAL EU	993

Source: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/_mali/projects/index_fr.htm. Accessed 4/01/14.

5.4 Re-Building the North: U.N AND Partner Activities in the North of Mali

The establishment by the United Nations of the Multi dimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), was mainly with the aim of achieving the objectives of ensuring a peaceful political transition, as well as to support all efforts aimed at rebuilding the Malian society in all areas, including security, stabilizing key population centers, restore state authority, deter threats, as well as take an active role in preventing the return of armed elements to all parts of the country³⁴¹. In line with this objective, MINUSMA was able to conduct elections in July 2013, which were widely acclaimed to be free and fair, and without rancor. The elections saw the transfer of authority from the Malian transition administration under Traore to the newly elected democratic President, Boubacar. Having succeeded in ensuring a peaceful transition, the newly elected government and the MINUSMA mission in Mali were now left with the responsibility of rebuilding the Malian society as a whole. Consequently, a road map was adopted by the Malian government which highlighted the humanitarian needs of displaced persons, as well as the need to ensure the facilitation of return of displaced persons once the right conditions are put in place. The main focus of the recovery plan for Mali was seen to have focused on the needs of refugees and displaced persons, as well as returns and reintegration process. In order to achieve this noble objective, the Malian government needed the support of many international nongovernmental organizations and donor agencies, who are seen to have one role or two play in rebuilding the country. A detailed plan for the sustainable recovery of the country had been drafted and presents at a conference in Brussels to the international community on 15 May, 2013 after the intervention by France. The final version of the document identified 12 main areas of priority in the recovery plan and these areas include among others; ensuring peace, security and public services everywhere, responding tot humanitarian emergencies and the implications of the crisis, organize credible elections, increase governance through decentralization, ensuring a functional judicial system, support public finance reform, rebuilding the economy by strengthening the private sector, agriculture, investment in infrastructure and provision of employment, address the challenges of education, ensure access to quality health services, supporting cultural

³⁴¹ Diana Carter, "Mali Crisis: A Migration Perspective, International Organization for Migration, June 2013, P 19.

projects, promoting the role of women and lastly, the integration of environmentalism into policies and strategies. These were the milestones that Mali hoped to achieve in the recovery plan over time³⁴².

The conflict appeared to have only affected the north, and such all activities were seen to have been concentrated in the region, and the three main regions in the north which include Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal, were seen to have received greater attention by the United Nations and other partner agencies, in an effort to assist and rebuild the Malian state. The activities in these regions by the U.N and its partners are discussed below region by region;

5.4.1 Gao Region

There were several challenges identified in the Gao region in the post conflict period, and by far the most important among these challenges remained that of basic social amenities, which had to be rebuilt. Water, electricity and education remained the major challenges, but were gradually being rebuilt, though civil servants and other technical staff remained absent and were yet to return to the region. Livestock, water and food also remained a challenge in a region where about 150,000 of the population is pastoral. Displaced persons had started returning to the region, and were making effort to restore their livelihoods, but appear to be under pressure due to lack of pasture for their livestock, which was seen as mainly due to drought.

MINUSMA is seen to have deployed civilians and uniformed personnel to Gao city, while the military personnel are said to have been based at Menaka and Asongo. MINUSMA was seen to have expanded its mission from mere mission support to that of security and other areas that include civil affairs, political affairs, human rights, rule of law as well as electoral assistance in Gao. MINUSMA was also observed to have conducted outreach missions to other circles (sub division). Again the United Nations police³⁴³ was seen to have established a co-location program to mentor and support the Malian police. It was reported that about 600 UN police were scattered across the north of Mali, and that out of this number, about 11 individual police officers and 210 formed police units for the Gao

³⁴² Republic of Mali, “ Plan for Sustainable Recovery of Mali 2013-2014”, Final Version, International Conference, Brussels, May 15, 2013, p 7.

³⁴³ The United Nations usually deploy police men from member nations to crisis areas when needed. Many police officers from different countries serve as UN police in conflict states for the purpose of maintaining security and stability in those areas.

region. The police units formed carry out joint patrols day and night in conjunction with the national police, gendarmerie and the Garde national³⁴⁴.

Generally, the U.N and its partners responded in a robust manner to the various challenges facing Mali in the post conflict period, and in rebuilding the north and Gao in particular. Office of the Coordination of Human Affairs (OCHA) as an organization is stationed in Gao, and has been providing coordination support to all humanitarian partners on the ground, including military coordination. About 182 civilian and military personnel were trained by the U.N in civil-military coordination in March 2013. The areas to secure for humanitarian actors, as well as the identification of all markets in these areas were mapped out and shared with military actors in the region. The U.N and its partners worked to promote human rights, fight against gender based violence, and the promotion of peace and reconciliation. Some of the immediate problems were that of food insecurity and human right issues as well as social amenities, and the WFP were said to have responded to the issue of food insecurity appropriately and is assisting close 230,000 people, including internally displaced persons and returnees, through free food distribution for 87, 260 beneficiaries. The organization is also making effort to prevent acute malnutrition, and is treating victims of malnutrition in the region.

In March 2013, MINUSMA conducted three fact finding and protection field missions to the Gao region to document human rights violations and make recommendations to improve the situation. It also visited detention facilities about 20 times to assess the legal status of detainees and their conditions. In this regard MINUSMA's Justice and corrections section was seen to be supporting the process of redeploying judicial and prisons authorities to Gao region. As a result, the tribunal and the prison in Gao region came to be opened in February 2014. In partnership with the UNDP, the court house partially restored by the French Serval forces in early 2014³⁴⁵, is undergoing reconstruction, just as efforts are being made to establish the remaining Justice of Peace Tribunals and prisons in the region and ensuring access to justice. About 10 monitoring and early warning committees came to be established by the U.N and its partners to alert the authorities about sexual violence, forced marriages and rape. Meanwhile, the MINUSMA child protection unit also

³⁴⁴ United Nations Mali, " United Nations and Partner Activities in Northern Mali: Gao", 15 April 2014, p 1.

³⁴⁵ Before the Serval operations by the French, the courts had been non-functional and physical destroyed during the conflict. The intervention saw the restoration of the premises, while reconstruction work continued to be carried out by the Malian authorities and other partners.

continued to monitor violations against children, and also trained U.N peace keepers on child protection. It also conducted training sessions for 72 Chinese and 62 Nigerien troops that were stationed in Gao, and further conducted a two day workshop on monitoring and reporting mechanisms which was organized by UNICEF³⁴⁶.

The U.N and its partners were also seen to have focused attention on the social sector, and given attention to education and health care services in Gao region. Several communities according to reports had been unable to re-open schools due to insecurity. But as a result of an initiative led by the Malian government with the support of UNICEF and other partners, about 91,227 students are returned to school in Gao, compared to 100, 307 in the pre crisis period. About 2,023 teachers in the Gao region have reported to various schools out a total of 2, 691 in the pre crisis period. And about 250 teachers were said to have undergone training in psychological support and about 350 in peace education with the support of UNICEF. In the area of health, the World Health Organization is seen to be helping to strengthen disease surveillance and response in the Gao region. And about 13,000 children were said to have been vaccinated against cholera in the region. In collaboration with other partners, technical support and medicines were provided to control the outbreak of measles in Asongo which ended in March 2013.

The U.N and its partners, such as the UNDP also appear to be strongly supporting the reconciliation process started by the Malian government. The UNDP was seen to have launched a social cohesion and inter community dialogue project in the north of Mali, and deployed staff in Timbuktu, Gao and Mopti. The UNDP further supported many local organizations that have been involved in dialogue and peace consolidation. These organizations received small grants to enable them continue their mediation efforts and crisis management activities in Gao. The U.N and its partners supported the broadcasting of messages of peace and reconciliation in many languages including French, Arabic, Amazigh and Songhai in the local radio in Bourem. The U.N Mines Action (UNMAS) also continued to mark and clear dangerous areas contaminated by remnants of war. In March UNMAS with the support of MINUSMA Senegalese "deminers", completed a battle area clearance task within the future MINUSMA super camp area in Gao, as well as the area that was to be allocated to the Niger battalion in Asongo. UNMAS is reported to have cleared a total of 467,617 square meters of land in Gao and identified and destroyed two

³⁴⁶ Ibid., p 2.

unexploded ordinance. It is said that about 763 villages had been surveyed since February 2013 and have led to the destruction of about 1,100 UXO's and some 45,000 items of small arms ammunitions by UNMAS. Mean while since February, 2013, UNESCO undertook an assessment mission in Gao with the support of MINUSMA to rehabilitate certain sites such as the tomb of Askia the great, the Sahel Museum, as well as the Sanaye archaeological site. An inventory of the intangible heritage was started through a project that came to be managed by the Ministry of Culture, but funded by UNESCO, and logistical support was provided by MINUSMA³⁴⁷.

5.4.2 Timbuktu Region

United Nations agencies in Timbuktu are reported to have set up programs and strengthened their presence and activities throughout the region. An inter-agency multi sectoral assessment mission was reported to have taken place in Agouni, Atilla and Likraker on 27, March, 2014. Although the security situation is still not so good, security forces continued to be deployed throughout the region. Many civilians and uniformed personnel had been deployed to the towns of Timbuktu, while military personnel remained stationed in the cities of Goundam and Gossi by MINUSMA. MINUSMA's personnel on human rights, rule of law, UN police and its civil affairs divisions are all reported to have established their presence in Timbuktu, with outreach missions across the region. The number of UN police in Timbuktu includes 11 individual police officers and 140 formed police units in the region. The OCHA organization is reported to have been providing coordination support to humanitarian partners on the ground, including civil-military coordination. The U.N and its partners continued to promote and support human rights, and supports women, as well assisting returnees, while responding to protection needs in the Timbuktu region. MINUSMA's human rights division is said to have conducted two fact finding and protecting missions, including a joint protection mission with JMAC and UNHCR, to assess the overall human rights and security situation in the areas of Lere and Lerner. These also include the humanitarian needs of refugees and internally displaced persons. The division was also reported to have conducted 9 visits to detention facilities in

³⁴⁷ Ibid., p 3.

Timbuktu region, with a view to assessing the legal status of detainees and their detention conditions³⁴⁸.

In the area of social services, the back to school initiative led by the Malian government with the support of UNICEF and other partners was reported to kicked off and targeted about 82,365 students and 2,199 teachers. It is reported that Timbuktu is ahead of the other regions in terms of progress recorded in the restoration of education in the region. About 84% of schools were said to be functioning in Timbuktu, or a total of about 483 schools out of 588³⁴⁹. Furthermore, about 350 teachers were said to have undergone training in psychological support, while about 400 trained in peace education with the support of UNICEF. WFP, was also seen to have assisted 44, 561 school children in 328 schools with food through its feeding program. With regards to the health sector, WHO trained health workers in Timbuktu on HIV treatment and care. It is also supporting health services and strengthening disease surveillance and response. Mean while, the UNHCR is has supported the Timbuktu referral center with 5 tons of drugs and 4 tons of medical devices as part of a program to improve basic social services in areas of return, as well as to ensure equitable access to primary health care for the returned populations. The UNICEF on its part, ensured the vaccination of about 15,000 children across the Timbuktu region. The international Migration Organization also distributed drugs in 15 different communities, with a view to providing health care to vulnerable families³⁵⁰.

In order to support the government's efforts towards recovery, economic reconstruction as well as social cohesion, about 4 U.N agencies, including UNDP, UNFPA, WFP, FAO and ILO initiated a joint program on youth and resilience, with a view to creating employment for the youths and other vulnerable groups, as well as support micro enterprises. The WFP began to tackle the problem of food insecurity in the region, which showed that about 271,360 were food insecure in the region. The organization is said to be currently assisting about 39,820 people across the Timbuktu region, through distribution of food freely. And the FAO on its part target 2,500 households and distributed animal feeds and medicines, and was reported to have distributed over 100,000 vaccines in the region. The program also came to include reproductive health matters, including HIV/AIDS awareness-raising

³⁴⁸ United Nations Mali, "United Nations and Partner Activities in Northern Mali: Timbuktu", 15 April 2014, p 2.

³⁴⁹ Ibid., p2.

³⁵⁰ Ibid., p 2.

campaigns. And about 600 youths were reported to have participated in the rehabilitation program initiated by these agencies. The UNDP provided equipment and raw material for 18 associations or 300 women for the processing of local products. The assistance was part of the implementation of the MDG accelerated framework that would enable the rehabilitation of small business in the Timbuktu region. The International Migration Organization also provided 208 returned families with income generating activities, including trade, herds or flocks reconstitution, livestock farming, market gardening, as well as agricultural activities in certain communities, including Soumpi, Soubourdou and Lere. UNIDO on its part, was seen to have initiated a program in collaboration with the Ministry of Crafts and Tourism, a creative village project for the city of Timbuktu, whose objective is the promotion of tourism as well as to create jobs through small enterprises and trade capacity building in the region. UNESCO also undertook activities aimed at rehabilitating and protecting cultural heritage centers in northern Mali. In this regard, a strategy for the reconstruction of mausoleums in Timbuktu was prepared and presented to the Timbuktu community in March 2014. Also, the UNMAS or Mines Action organization continued to identify, mark and clear dangerous areas that have been contaminated by explosives, remnants of the conflict in Timbuktu city. About 90 villages were surveyed in Timbuktu region. The UNMAS was also said to have helped to coordinate post blast response, as well investigating activities after improvised explosive dense incidents³⁵¹.

5.4.3 Kidal Region

Kidal unlike the rest of the regions proved a little different to handle as a result of the nature of the security situation in the area. Insecurity was reported to have increased in March and April, 2013 in the towns of Kidal, Aguelhok and Tessalit. Road access to many areas in the region has remained extremely dangerous as a result of improvised explosive device incidents. Many organizations such as ICRC and UNHAS have constantly been flying to Kidal, with the ICRC planning to extend its coverage to Tessalit. It was reported that local authorities and security forces have difficulties returning and sometimes being deployed throughout the region. Despite such challenges, the U.N and its partners were seen to have stepped up their activities in the region. And organization such as ICRC, Medecins du monde, Norwegian Church Aid and Solicitarites International continue to play

³⁵¹ Ibid., p1.

a prominent role in any different fields in the area. Meanwhile MINUSMA has deployed civilian and uniformed personnel in Kidal and has stationed soldiers at Aguelhok and Tessalit. All MINUSMA outfits, including its civil affairs division, rule of law, electoral affairs, human rights division and public information division are present and very visible in Kidal. The number of U.N police in Kidal is estimated at about 10 individual officers and 140 formed police units for the Kidal region in its entirety³⁵².

The United Nations and its partners continue to support the redeployment of administration in Kidal, and aims to accelerate the provision of basic social services in the region. Among the major problem facing the region is food insecurity. About 25, 410 people are said to be food insecure, 6,000 in emergency condition, 18,000 are said to be in crisis, while about 45,000 are said to be under pressure in Kidal. WFP and its partner, Association pour l' appui au Development Global responded to the food insecurity issue by assisting about 27,300 people with free food distribution. At the same time WFP is supporting about 8,900 children aged 6 months-6 years through its malnutrition prevention program, and is also supporting about 1,366 pregnant and lactating women across the region.

To restore social services and other critical issues, technical service as well as the launch of tenders for the rehabilitation of public infrastructure, including offices of the prefecture, sub prefecture, the residences of the prefect, sub prefect and that of the deputy prefect of Kidal region are all reported to have been carried out. MINUSMA continues to provide support in terms of both food and non food items for a list of about 1,847 elements of signatory armed groups in 3 initial pilot pre cantonment sites in Kidal since September 2013. Such activities were seen to have been supported through the Trust Fund for Peace and Security in Mali. UNOPS, which is the implementing partner, initiated the construction of the first 3 cantonment sites under a 3 million dollar Peace Building Fund (PBF) project that was meant to ensure effective cantonment elements of armed groups. This was seen as one of the confidence building measures, while other parties continued to negotiate a global peace accord that would ensure the disarmament of the armed groups.

In terms of protection, the U.N and its partners continue to promote human rights and women rights, as well as fight against gender based violence across the Kidal region. MINUSMA continues to monitor and report detention conditions in the detention premises

³⁵² United Nations Mali, " United Nations and Partner Activities in Northern Mali: Kidal", 15 June 2014, p 1.

run by MNLA and Haut Conseil Pour l'Unité de Azawad (HCUA) within their cantonment sites, and also monitors the situation of detainees under the custody of the police. The human right division of MINUSMA continues to document, investigate violations and abuse cases, and refers victims to adequate services. About 50 police officers were trained by the human rights team, with U.N police on human rights standards. In Tessalit, the U.N and its partners established a project for psychological and economic assistance for women and girls. The project is seen to be led by the UNWOMEN, which has carried out activities in the region that has so far benefitted about 250 displaced women and girls, it has also secured funding for 150 income generating activities. UNICEF on the other hand has continued to support activities that promote mine risk education, psychological support for GBV survivors. And MINUSMA as part of its child care protection has called on all armed groups to vacate all occupied educational centers across the entire region. About 117 Chadian troops were further trained by MINUSMA in Tessalit on child protection and child rights, by its child rights division³⁵³.

In the social sector, which includes education and health, seven schools in the Kidal region have been reported to be functioning out of a total of 62 schools that functioned in the pre crisis period. Prior to the conflict, there were 7,710 students in Kidal, and about 398 teachers, but so far there are only 772 students and 26 teachers present in Kidal region. The UNICEF and one of its partners, GARDL, had provided assistance to over 770 students and 22 teachers throughout the region. While WFP and one of its partners, MUSTABAL are making an assessment on the possibilities of restarting school feeding programs in Kidal. In the area of health care, the UNICEF and its partners Medeins du Monde-Belgium, which are seen to be the only NGO's providing health care in the region, have continued to operate in the Kidal region. W.H.O was also reported to have conducted a humanitarian mission to Kidal in March, and provided over 100 consultations, and 155 surgical interventions, including wounds caused by weapons such as land mines. About 2000 children were reported to have been vaccinated with the support of W.H.O in the entire Kidal region. The regional medicine depot was also reported to have been refurbished, and that delivery of services has improved throughout the region.

And to support the reconciliation process, the UNDP was said to have launched a social cohesion and inter community dialogue project. It has so far supported about 3 local

³⁵³ Ibid., p2.

organizations involved the dialogue process and peace consolidations. These organizations received small grants that was expected to enable them restart mediation and crisis management activities across the Kidal region. Mean while the UNMAS or Mines Action organization has so far cleared 36 government buildings and their immediate surroundings, and has removed and destroyed over 440 items of remnants of the conflict. Also about 487 personnel were reported to have received awareness training in Kidal regarding Mines between January and March, 2013. The WFP was also reported to have started activities that are seen to be aimed at the creation and rehabilitation of community assets, which include ponds, dams, water retention points, a sea wall and market garden perimeters, which is said to have covered 2,730 beneficiaries across the region. MINUSMA was also seen to have embarked upon the rehabilitation of a center for garbage collection in the urban centers in Kidal the gendarmerie and the police station in Kidal, one for water and two were related to the rehabilitation of the gendarmerie and the police station in Kidal city. UNICEF on its part continues to provide support in the areas of water, sanitation and hygiene initiatives in Kidal, and has so far rehabilitated 35 water points in various communities. The project is targeting about 23, 970 people in four districts of Kidal, and is said to benefit women and children enrolled in nutritional programs³⁵⁴.

5.5 Disarmaments: Weapons Seized or Abandoned by the Rebel Groups

At the end of the French operations (Serval) and the recapture of the north of Mali from the rebel groups, many weapons were found or taken in the course of the encounter with the extremist groups. Some of these weapons were seized, while others were abandoned by these groups in a hurried attempt to flee the area due air strikes of the French forces. The 2012 rebellion is generally explained to have differed from previous revolts, such as the 1963, 1990, as well that of 2006. The 2012 revolt is seen to differ in both intensity and scale, not only because of the involvement of Islamist rebels, but according, many commentators, due largely to the kind's weapons in the possession of the rebel groups. Different varieties and categories of weapons were reported to have been available to these groups. The origins of these weapons are sometimes complicated and difficult to explain. While there are claims that most of the weapons may have originated from Libya after the fall of Ghaddafi, a claim that is logical, nevertheless, most of these weapons appear to have

³⁵⁴ Ibid., p3.

been originally manufactured in other countries not Libya. The fact many Tuaregs serving in the Ghaddafi or Libyan army returned to join the MNLA and start a rebellion is well known, is enough explanation to link some of these weapons to Libya. A part of these weapons was also explained to have been taken from the Malian army by the rebels in the course of the encounter. Many of the weapons appear to be part of stockpile of weapons of the Malian army prior to the conflict, and it is common knowledge that even in the previous revolts the Tuaregs had always target and carted away arms and ammunitions from many military bases. Some of these weapons were manufactured in many countries outside Africa, but were acquired by many West African countries including Mali for defense purposes. Such explanation came to be give as the reason why weapons manufactured in either Russia, Belgium or France came to be found in Mali. It was found important to present and document these weapons in this work in order to be able to make the assessment of not only the conflict or the capacity of these rebel groups militarily, but also the nature of the violence that erupted in Mali. It will further help us understand how the Libyan conflict had impacted on the violence in Mali, as well provide for further research into the sources of these weapons that this research may have failed to provide. A variety of weapons that came to be categorized into ; Small arms, Light weapons, Light weapons ammunitions, Larger conventional weapons, Ammunitions for conventional weapons and Armored military vehicles were documented by the Conflict Armament Research in collaboration with the Small Arms Survey, with a view to making an assessment of the security situation in the region.

In the category of small arms, weapons such as Kalashnikov-pattern 7.62 x 39 weapons were found in Gao, Timbuktu and in the Ifogha mountain areas, and were of different models. Some were Russian Federation designed, but exact provenance remained unclear. AR-M Bulgaria model 63 and 65, as well as Romanian M-70 pattern and Serbia, and possibly Iraq, type 56-1 and type 52- China made were also found and documented. However, the year of manufacture could not be identified from the film footages available³⁵⁵. FN FAL- pattern 7.62 x 51 mm rifle were also documented in the Gao region between April and May 2012. The film footage did not make clear the country of

³⁵⁵ Ben Rabie/Echoruc, "Northern Mali Taliban Stronghold in Africa?", TV, Part II "Gao", 18 June 2012, www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAx5AtLUgW8. It is visible in minutes 11:19-11:37, 12:59—13:06, 13:16-13:17, 20:42-20:44, 36:49- 36:50 and 38:25-38-26.

manufacture³⁵⁶. G3 pattern 7.62 x 51 mm rifle was found in the Gao region, but the film footage did not make clear the manufacturer³⁵⁷. Again Mat- 49 9 x 19 mm Sub- machine gun was also found in the Gao region, between April and May, and may have been manufactured in France around the late 1940's to the 1970's. It is reported that many West African states are in possession of this particular weapon, including Mali³⁵⁸.

Other small arms found include RPD- pattern 7.62 x 39 mm light machine gun which was documented in the Gao region, but the film footage did not enable the identification of factory or country of manufacture or year in which it was manufactured³⁵⁹. PK- pattern 7.62 x 54 mm general purpose machine gun was also found in Gao between April and May, 2012, and was also found at Aguelhok in January, 2013. The film footage did not make clear the country or year of manufacture. But its rampant appearance in the film footage may suggest widespread deployment of the weapon among the rebel groups. FN MAG –pattern 7.62 x 51 mm general purpose machine gun was also discovered in Gao around April, 2012, but the film footage did not provide for the identification of the manufacturer or year of manufacture³⁶⁰. Barrels for 7.62 x 54 R MM RP-46 general purpose machine gun barrels were found in Diabaly on 24 January, 2013 after the recapture of the town by the French and the Malian forces. The identification is not so clear, but indications are that they may have been manufactured in the Soviet Union in the 1940's or 60's. Dragunov SVD- pattern 7.62 x 54 R mm sniper rifles were documented in Timbuktu in April, and again at Aguelhok in January 2012. The manufacturer as well as year of manufacture could not be identified from the film footage³⁶¹. PSL- pattern 7.62 x 54 R mm sniper rifle was located in Timbuktu and Aguelhok in April 2012 and January 2013 respectively. It is not confirmed if it was a Romanian FPK variant of PSL or an Iraqi Al-Kasedih which look similar³⁶². SKS – pattern 7.62 x39 mm rifle were found in Gao in April 2012. The country of manufacture and date could not be identified, but the film

³⁵⁶ Ibid., it can be viewed from minutes 12:28-12:30.

³⁵⁷ Ibid., minutes 12:28-12:30.

³⁵⁸ Ibid, visible in minutes 02:10-02:20.

³⁵⁹ Ibid., minutes 02:39-02:43.

³⁶⁰ Ibid., visible in minutes 04:14-04:18, 04:38-04:46, 11:44-11:50, 12:15-12:20, 12:28-12:30 and 12:35-12:43 and can also be viewed on; AFP (Agence France-Presse), "Islamist Fighters call for Shariah Law in Mali, 14 March 2012, www.youtube.com/watch?v=OM1AyeIRLPO, minutes 00:08-00:11.

³⁶¹ NBC News, "Mali Islamist Rebels seize Town Despite French Fighting, 14 January, 2013, www.nbcnews.com/video/nightly-news/50461319#50461319 . Is visible in minutes 02:11-02:15.

³⁶² AFP (Agence France-Presse), "Islamist Fighters call for Shariah Law in Mali, 14 March 2012, www.youtube.com/watch?v=OM1AyeIRLPO, minutes 00:26-00:29.

footage tends to suggest that large number of this weapon may have been in circulation among the rebel forces³⁶³.

Many small arms ammunitions were also among weapons found and these include among others; Ammunition 7. 62 x 39 mm which were documented in Diabaly and Gao between January and February, 2013 after the recapture of the area by the French and the Malian forces. In Diabaly, the ammunitions were of 2 types, one was manufactured by factory 31 in China, while the other was manufactured also in China but by factory 61. But it is not known when the weapons were transferred from China, and who the recipient was. The ammunitions in Gao on the other hand include m67 which was manufactured by Prvi Partizan, Serbia in 1981., while the cartridges were manufactured in factory 711 in Russia or Soviet Union in 1989. And the third may have been manufactured by Arsenal, Bulgaria in 2011. But beyond the dates and countries of manufacture, there is no evidence indicating sources of this weapon into Mali. Ammunition 7.62 x 54 Rmm (Relative molecular mass) was also documented in Gao in April 2012 and February, 2013. The film footage did not provide for the identification of the manufacturer and date. However, better documented samples from a base abandoned by MUJWA included 3 types. One is said to have been manufactured by Barnaul machine tools plant, Soviet Union in 1988, the second was by factory 60 in Frunze, Kyrgyzstan in 1986, while the third was manufactured by Arsenal, Bulgaria in 2011³⁶⁴.

Among weapons documented are light weapons which include DSHKM- pattern 12.7 x 108 mm heavy machine guns that were found in Gao in April 2012, and again in February 2013. It was recovered by the French forces in the Adrar and Ifogha mountains in March, 2013. The weapons were deployed on Toyota land cruiser 4 x 4 vehicles. Such weapons that are mounted on different kinds of vehicles appeared widespread among the rebel forces³⁶⁵. Type 8512, 7 x 108 mm heavy machine gun box was also documented in Diabaly

³⁶³ Ben Rabie/Echoruc, "Northern Mali Taliban Stronghold in Africa?", TV, Part II "Gao", 18 June 2012, www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAx5AtLUgW8, minutes 37:29-37:44.

³⁶⁴ Ibid, in minutes 11:37-11:41.

³⁶⁵ Ibid, minutes 10:10-10:14, 10:32-10:38, 10:53-11:00, 12:33-12:35 and 12:49-12:52 and (2) AFP (Agence France-Presse), "Islamist Fighters call for Sharia Law in Mali, 14 March 2012, www.youtube.com/watch?v=OM1AyeRLP0, minutes 01:24-01:32;(3) BFMTV, "QUAND l' armee recupere les armes abandonnees par les islamistes, 25 February, 2013, www.bfm.com/video/bfmtv/international/mali-larmee-recupere-armes-abandonnees-islamistes-25-02-113446, minutes 00:14-00:15; (4) Francetv, "L'impressionnant arsenal des jihadistes au Mali", 4 March 2013, www.francetvinfo.fr/video-l-impressionnant-arsenal-aqmi-au-malli_274103.html, visible in minutes 00:28-00:33 and (5) BFMTV, "QUAND l' armee recupere les armes abandonnees par les islamistes", 25 February,

on 24 January, 2013 after the recapture of the north by the French and Malian forces. Indications are that it may have been manufactured in China in 2007. No recipient country was indicated for transfer. KPV/KPVI- pattern 14.5 x 114 heavy machine guns were also documented in the Gao region, and again at Aguelhok during a rebel attack in January, 2013. These weapons were mounted also on a Toyota land cruiser 4 x 4 vehicles in single barrel ZPV-I configurations in both Gao and Aguelhok. No manufacturer was indicated³⁶⁶. Also found include Mortar 81/82 mm shown in Ansardine released film footage of a military action, during a rebel assault on Aguelhok in January 2012. The footage did not provide for any identification of either manufacturer or year of manufacture³⁶⁷. PG-7 rockets were also was documented in Diabaly on 24 January 2013. All the samples documented in the area indicated that they were manufactured in the Soviet Union from the 1960's. It is not clear when the rockets were transferred out of the U.S.S.R as well as the recipient of the transfer.

Other light weapons found include OG-82 and PG-82 rockets found in Diabaly around January 2013, after the city fell to the French and Malian forces. They were found to have been manufactured in the Soviet Union and are used in the SPG-82 anti-tank rocket launcher, and it is suggested that they may have been manufactured before the 1970's. The OG-82 is said to feature a high explosive fragmentation war head for anti- personal use, while the PG-82 features a high explosive anti tank war head. Mortar bombs 82 mm were also documented in the Adrar of the Ifogha Mountains on 3 March, 2013, after the French and the Malian forces succeeded in taking over the area from the rebel forces. No manufacturer was identified from the film footage provided³⁶⁸. And again Mortar bombs 120 mm were found in the same place as above, in the Ifogha Mountains in the north of Mali after it fell to the French and the Malian forces. No manufacturer was also identified

2013, www.bfm.com/video/bfmtv/international/mali-larmee-recupere-armes-abandonnees-islamistes-25-02-113446, minutes 00:23-00:30.

³⁶⁶ Cahier du RETEX, " Les rebellions Touaregues au Sahel", Paris: Ministere de la Defense, Centre de Doctrine d'Emploi des forces", January 2013, P 1, www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/publications/cahiers_drex/cahier_recherche/Rebellions_Touareues.pdf and Ben Rabie/Echoruc, "Northern Mali Taliban Stronghold in Africa?", TV, Part II "Gao", 18 June 2012, www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAx5AtLUgW8, minutes 00:02-00:05.

³⁶⁷ NBC News, "Mali Islamist Rebels seize Town Despite French Fighting", 14 January, 2013, www.nbcnews.com/video/nightly-news/50461319#50461319, visible in minutes 02:09-02:11.

³⁶⁸ Francetv, "L'impressionnant arsenal des jihadistes au Mali", 4 March 2013, www.francetvinfo.fr/video-l-impressionnant-arsenal-aqmi-au-malli_274103.html, visible in minutes 00:04-00:14.

in the film footage provided³⁶⁹. Unidentified Nose fuses were also documented in Diabaly, in the north around January 2013, after the recapture of the city by the French and the Malian forces. No manufacturer was also identified in the footage. F1 pattern fragmentation grenades were documented in Diabaly and in the Ifogha mountain areas. It was identified to be a Soviet Union design F1, with UZRG type fuses. It is reported that production of the grenades had been widespread among other countries that make up the Soviet Union, including China; as such it became difficult to determine specific country of manufacture³⁷⁰. An RPG-7 pattern launcher was documented in Gao in April 2012 and again during a rebel assault in Aguelhok in January 2013. There was no indication of a manufacturer from the film footage provided³⁷¹. •SPG-9- pattern 73 mm recoiler's gun were among other light weapons documented in March 2013 and recovered by the French and Malian forces in the Ifogha mountains range in the north of Mali. No manufacturer was identified in the film footage provided³⁷². M 40 106 mm recoilless gun were also found and documented in Gao around April and May 2012. The same weapon was said to have been photographed in two other areas, namely; Diabaly and Konna. It is also reported that the same weapon is available in Libya, but scarce among West African states. It is therefore suggested that the weapon may have been transferred from Libya in 2011³⁷³.

Light weapons ammunitions were also documented at the end of the French operation. Some these include Ammunition 12.7 x 108 mm which were found in Diabaly on 24 February, 2012, and again in Gao in February 2013 after the recapture of these cities by the French and the Malian army. The cartridges indicate a Chinese manufacturer. In Gao ammunition box markings tend to indicate API ammunition manufactured by factory 41 in China around 2007³⁷⁴. Ammunition 14.5 x 114 mm was also documented in Konna, on 26 January 2013, and again in Diabaly on 24 January 2013, after the recapture of the cities by

³⁶⁹ Ibid., visible in minutes 00:04-00:19.

³⁷⁰ Ibid., minutes 00:04-00:19.

³⁷¹ Ben Rabie/Echoruc, "Northern Mali Taliban Stronghold in Africa?", TV, Part II "Gao", 18 June 2012, www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAx5AtLUgW8, is visible in minutes 00:09-00:13, 12:21-12:26 and 13:08-13:11 and (2) NBC News, "Mali Islamist Rebels seize Town Despite French Fighting", 14 January, 2013, www.nbcnews.com/video/nightly-news/50461319#50461319, minutes 02:09-02:11.

³⁷² Aemee francaise, "Operations de fouille dans le massif de l'Adrar", Armee francaise-operstions militaire OPEX (page offiecielle), Facebook, www.facebook.com/photo.php?v=51064348981384, visible in minutes 00:15-00:24.

³⁷³ Ben Rabie/Echoruc, "Northern Mali Taliban Stronghold in Africa?", TV, Part II "Gao", 18 June 2012, www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAx5AtLUgW8, minutes 11:00-11:25.

³⁷⁴ Armee francaise, "Operations de fouille dans le massif de l'Adrar", Armee francaise-operstions militaire OPEX (page offiecielle), Facebook, www.facebook.com/photo.php?v=51064348981384, visible in minutes 00:44-00:46nm.

the French and the Malian forces. The footage did not provide for the identification of a manufacturer. However, certain features on the jackets that appear non-plated with clear Lacquer grayish appearance tend to suggest that it was manufactured in the Soviet Union or Russia. In Konna, marks on the ammunition box, suggested that it was manufactured by factory 41 in China, in 2007. Light weapon ammunitions NR-160 106 mm heat projectiles were documented in Diabaly and Konna in January 2013, after the cities fell to the French and Malian forces. They were also reported to have been documented in Gao and the Ifogha mountain regions. It is designed for use in m40 106 mm recoilless guns. There is indication that the ammunition may have been manufactured in Belgium, as revealed by certain marks. It is reported that Belgium had supplied such weapon to Libya since the 1970's when the weapons were manufactured. The weapon did not also appear on the stockpile of weapons belonging to the Malian army, and as such may not have been taken from the army by the rebels³⁷⁵.

Larger conventional weapons also featured in the various weapons found in the post conflict period, and these include among others single barrel 2A 14 23 x 152 mm cannon that were documented in Gao, and was mounted on a Toyota land cruiser 4x4 vehicle. The film footage did not provide for the identification of a manufacturer³⁷⁶. Zu-23-2 pattern twin barrel 23 x 152 Rmm Cannon was also documented in Gao in April and also in May 2012. It was also documented in film footage of a rebel military action in Aguelhok in January 2013. According to the photographs of the ammunition for the weapon displayed, suggestions are that, the weapon may have been deployed by the rebels in Diabaly area³⁷⁷. Type 63-pattern rocket launcher was among large weapons found in Gao between April and May 2012. It was mounted on a civilian pick up vehicle, and may have been manufactured in China, according to reports. Similar rockets of the same type are also said to be produced in Egypt, Iran, Sudan and Turkey, and appear quite identical. UB-32 mm multiple rocket launcher was documented in Gao on 25 February, after the recapture of the city by the French and the Malian forces. It is a weapon that is usually designed to be

³⁷⁵ Chivers, C. J, "Looted Libyan Arms in Mali May Have Shifted Conflict's Path", The New York Times, 6 February, 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/02/08/world/africa/looted-libyan-arms-in-mali-may-have-shifted-conflicts-path.html?_r=2&=<; (2) ³⁷⁵ Ben Rabie/Echoruc, "Northern Mali Taliban Stronghold in Africa?", TV, Part II "Gao", 18 June 2012, www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAx5AtLUgW8, minutes 11:14-11:22 ; and (3) Francetv, "L'impressionnant arsenal des jihadistes au Mali", 4 March 2013, www.francetvinfo.fr/video-l-impressionnant-arsenal-aqmi-au-malli_274103.html, visible in minutes 00:18-00:20.

³⁷⁶ Ibid., can be viewed in minutes 12:07-12:10.

³⁷⁷ Ibid., minutes 12:51-12:53; and) NBC News, "Mali Islamist Rebels seize Town Despite French Fighting", 14 January, 2013, www.nbcnews.com/video/nightly-news/50461319#50461319, minutes 02:02-02:07.

mounted on aerial platforms, like Mi-24 attack helicopter, Fires 32-S-5 air to ground rockets. It can also be mounted on a 4x4 vehicle. The same weapon is said to have been used by the Malian army, and is suspected to have been taken from the army by the rebel, but the exact origin is not very clear³⁷⁸. Again D-30 A 122 mm Towed Howitzer was found in the Adrar and Ifogha mountain areas on 3 March, 2013. The weapon is recognized to have been in use by the Libyan and Malian armies, prior to the outbreak of the conflicts in both countries, as such its origin remains unclear³⁷⁹. BM-21 122 mm multiple-launch rocket system was also documented in Gao in April and again in May 2012, in a film footage taken at the Gao international airport. Two BM-21 systems were documented, and one is said to be immobile, while the second is said to be moving and loaded with 34 rockets of 9m 22 m type. The French forces were reported to have destroyed one BM-21 system, and captured three more systems near Bourem. The total number of systems in possession of the rebel is not clear. However, the reveals may have captured the systems from the Malian army³⁸⁰.

The last category of weapons documented in the post conflict period is ammunitions for conventional weapons. Among these include ammunition 23 x 152 B mm which was found in Diabaly on 24 January 2013, after the recapture of the city by the French and the Malian forces. It is a high explosive incendiary load and is used in ZU-23-2 cannon. Images did not make clear the country of manufacture; however, the box design suggests that the ammunitions may have been manufactured in either Bulgaria or Russia. Disintegrating links for 23 x 152 B mm ammunition belts were also documented in Diabaly on 24 January 2013, after the city fell to the French and Malian forces. The links indicate the redeployment of ZU-23-2 cannon by the rebel forces. Again the Howitzer ammunition 122 mm was documented in the Adrar and Ifogha mountain areas in a footage of weapons captured by the French and the Malian forces. The weapon is known to have been in the service of Libyan and Malian forces, prior to the outbreak of conflicts in both

³⁷⁸ BFMTV, "QUAND l' armee recupere les armes abandonnees par les islamistes", 25 February, 2013, www.bfm.com/video/bfmtv/international/mali-larmee-recupere-armes-abandonnees-islamistes-25-02-113446. And can be viewed in minutes 00:00-00:21.

³⁷⁹ Francetv, "L'impressionnant arsenal des jihadistes au Mali", 4 March 2013, www.francetvinfo.fr/video-l-impressionnant-arsenal-aqmi-au-malli_274103.html. It is visible in minutes 00:25-00:27.

³⁸⁰ The Guardian (Online edition), "Footage of French Airstrikes on Mali, Video", 24 January 2013, www.guardian.co.uk/world/video/2013/jan/24/footage-mali-airstrikes-video. The video shows a laser guided GBU munitions being dropped on a BM-21 launch vehicle and a pick up truck coming under fire from a tiger helicopter.

countries³⁸¹.Rockets 9 mm 122 mm were captured in Diabaly, after the city fell to the French and Malian forces. The same type also came to be documented in Konna on 26 January 2013, and in Gao on 25 February 2013. The rocket is said to have a range of about 20 km and is generally used in the BM-21 multiple-launch rocket system. They are said to be of Soviet Union/ Warsaw pact origin, and may have been manufactured between 1972 and 1988, but it is not clear how it was obtained by the rebels³⁸². BRDM-2 armored personnel carrier was documented in Gao around April and May 2012, and may have been manufactured in the Soviet Union. It was thought that the rebel forces may have captured it from the Malian army during the 2012 operations. Mali is said to have deployed 64 BRDM-2 vehicles prior to the 2012 rebellion, and Bulgaria is reported to have supplied Mali with about 44 of them between 2007 and 2009³⁸³. And lastly BTR-60 armored personnel carrier is among ammunitions for conventional weapons captured by the rebel forces from the Malian army in March 2012. The Malian army is said to have deployed 44 of the vehicles prior to the outbreak of the 2012 rebellion. However, the color of this particular vehicle is said to differ from those of the Malian army, which were usually painted in plain dark green color³⁸⁴.

5.6 Conclusion

Based on this study, it is clear that Mali has indeed reached certain significant milestones ranges along the recovery process in the post conflict phase. Looking at the population displacement and the return of refugees, food security as well as human right issues related to the upholding of the rule of law and justice process among other milestones necessary in the recovery process. It must be understood that Mali took the first step after AFISMA and MINUSMA missions were deployed to help in the ensuring peace and stability in Mali.

³⁸¹ France tv, "L'impressionnant arsenal des jihadistes au Mali", 4 March 2013, www.francetvinfo.fr/video-l-impressionnant-arsenal-aqmi-au-malli_274103.html. It is visible in minutes 00:17-00:20.

³⁸² Ben Rabie/Echoruc, "Northern Mali Taliban Stronghold in Africa?", TV, Part II "Gao", 18 June 2012, www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAx5AtLUgW8. Visible in minutes 37:59-38:08, and also on BFMTV, "QUAND l'armee recupere les armes abandonnees par les islamistes", 25 February, 2013, www.bfm.com/video/bfmtv/international/mali-larmee-recupere-armes-abandonnees-islamistes-25-02-113446. It is visible in minutes 00:10-00:12 .

³⁸³ AFP (Agence France-Presse), "Islamist Fighters call for Shariah Law in Mali", 14 March 2012, www.youtube.com/watch?v=OM1AyeRLP0. The film footage can be seen in minutes 00:17-00:24 Ben Rabie/Echoruc, "Northern Mali Taliban Stronghold in Africa?", TV, Part II "Gao", 18 June 2012, www.youtube.com/watch?v=yAx5AtLUgW8. Here the minutes are seen in minutes 11:54-11:55, 12:33-12:35 and 12:54-12:57 respectively.

³⁸⁴ Ibid, Minutes 10:23-00:31.

The missions helped supervise elections and restored constitutional authority in Mali. This no doubt marked a significant step in the peace building process. Many displaced persons and even Malians in Diaspora participated in the elections. A study by the International Migrations Organization in February 2013 showed that about 93% of displaced persons indicated their willingness to return to the places of origin.

The armed conflict appeared to have been limited to the north of the country and as such much of the destruction appeared affected the north only, which consists of three main regions of Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal. The activities of the Malian government, the EU, the UN and its partner in rebuilding these regions is shown in this chapter, at least the progress recorded so far. So one can see that among the about seven milestones range along the recovery process in the post conflict phase, Mali have achieved or reached the sixth milestone and may be on its way to achieving economic recovery which is the last milestone. Mali has since outlined a 12 point economic recovery plan which it intends to implement gradually. It is hoped that after the implementation of the recovery plan a return to normalcy economically in terms GDP is possible.

However, there are unavoidable fears, particularly with regards to the re-occurrence of the conflict. As shown in many studies, most armed conflicts that did not end with peace agreements between warring parties are likely to re-occur, it is a position reached based on empirical evidence as happened in many countries. About 35 countries are said to be in the post conflict phase since the 1990's all across the world, and an observation was made based the experiences of some of these states. And this therefore clearly shows that a re-occurrence cannot be ruled out in the future. Despite the fact that a time frame for such re-occurrence may not be predictable, yet it remains a reality and a possibility. Especially if we consider the fact that the rebel group had not been engaged in any meaningful peace agreement after the French intervention, and that the fire power of the French was what drove the rebels towards the Ifogha mountain areas in the north and to neighboring states. There is no guarantee whatsoever that the rebels had abandoned the rebellion forever, or whether they have plans of re-grouping with the aim of launching another rebellion in the future. And going by the records of the weapons seized or found after the rebels had fled; it will appear that the rebels were heavily armed, as many sophisticated weapons with enormous destructive capability featured in the list. It is an indication also that the

rebellion in 2012 was one of great intensity and scale, if the capability of the rebels is put under consideration.

It is worthy to mention here that French forces numbering about 1,000 remained in Mali after the intervention, together with the UN deployed MINUSMA forces and coordinated their activities together. Although the commander of the MINUSMA Mission remains in charge for the entire mission, nevertheless, the French Serval Commander appears to have considerable influence over the entire mission. And as such the French still maintain military presence in Mali, and are helping in the post conflict reconstruction, particularly with regards to peace and stability in the country.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

6.1 Conclusion

The aims and objectives of this research is to find out why France intervened in the 2012 Tuareg rebellion in Mali, and by doing so, get to the root of the Tuareg issue in Mali, since it is almost impossible to discuss the 2012 rebellion in isolation from previous ones. The research tried to provide a general understanding of the Tuareg problem in Mali which could be traced to the first rebellion of 1963. In providing an answer to the research question, the researcher had argued that the intervention by France can only be explained from two perspectives; the French perspective and the Malian perspective. The French perspective was explained in terms of French economic interest not only in Mali but in the Sahel region as a whole. France feared that instability in Mali will likely affect other Sahel states where France is seen to have made significant economic investment. The Malian perspective on the other hand views the intervention mainly from a security point of view and the weakness and inability of the Malian state to deal with the offensive of the rebel groups, hence a request by the Malian president for Paris to intervene. It is basically from these perspectives that the intervention of France in 2012 conflict in Mali was explained in this research.

And as can be seen, this research has not only looked into the 2012 Tuareg rebellion in Mali and the the intervention of France in the conflict, but it has also shown how Mali emerged as a nation in recent history, its ancient past and the old Mali Empire, which reached its zenith under Mansa Musa is also presented in the research. It was found impossible to discuss the 2012 rebellion in Mali in isolation from Mali's history and previous revolts by the Tuareg group. French incursion into Mali has been discussed, and it has shown clearly that French interest in Mali was initially to have access to its possessions

in the Senegal basin. The work did also discuss the establishment of colonial rule in Mali, during which Mali came to be known as the French Sudan. The French Sudan as it was known came to include Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Mali. These countries however were seen to have separated after the attainment of independence from the French in 1960. But until independence they constituted what was regarded as the French Sudan. The policies of both the French regime and the post independence administration of Modibbo Keita and other successive regimes in Mali had been discussed in the research. And from here it can be observed that the Tuareg revolt may have started since colonial times, and a further study into the history of the Tuaregs is likely to help us understand why the Tuaregs resisted control by the French. The history of the Tuaregs shows that foreign control or influence over Tuareg people, culture or domination is alien to the group. In their history, the Tuaregs have never come under the influence of any group or people, and this came to explain their initial resistance to the French after Alla Albachir at different times succeeded in organizing resistance against the French which at times were in favor of the Tuaregs. As a result of such actions during the colonial times, the Tuaregs were exempted from many activities including forced labor and service in the colonial army. Although Alla Albachir's son Elledi that started the Afellaga (rebellion) in the post independence period in an attempt to avenge the killing of his father, which was in accordance with Egha or revenge in the Tuareg culture, it should however be understood that the policies of the Keita regime were what first ignited hostilities between the group and the Malian authorities. The policies of the Keita regime included many programs that were similar to those of the colonial period and as such the revenge by Elledi of his father's death in the post independence period only marked the outbreak of the revolt, but other factors may have motivated the group to take arms against the Malian government. After the failure of the 1963 rebellion, the persecution of the Tuaregs by the Malian government led to their migration into other neighboring states. Although it is certain that the droughts of the 1970's and the 1980's also facilitated such migration which took place overtime. The migrations and the emergence of a Tuareg Diaspora are explained as critical in explaining the second Tuareg rebellion in 1990 that came to be known as Al Jebha. Al Jebha appeared to have been decided in favor of the Tuaregs. Long years of military training and preparation abroad appeared to have prepared the group, and they appeared to have had an upper hand against the Malian army and after about two encounters the Malian government was forced to open negotiations with the group.

Since Al Jebha, which lasted between 1990 and 1996, there have been some Tuareg uprisings, but among all these, one came to be considered as a revolt that appeared to have laid the foundation for the outbreak of the 2012 rebellion. This revolt is known as the 2009 Tuareg revolt, and although a peace agreement was reached, certain parties among the Tuaregs remained unsatisfied and were bent on continuing with the rebellion. Among these people was Ibrahim Bahanga, who is seen as the master mind of the 2012 rebellion. Bahanga, it was according many sources that started the plan for the 2012 revolt, but his plans came to be carried out, and it was partly aided by the civil war in Libya and the fall of Ghaddafi. After the fall of Ghaddafi and the return of several thousands of Tuareg fighters from Libya to Mali, it was followed by the formation of the MNLA, and the rebellion was declared. So many factors also appeared to have favored the starting of the rebellion and its success before the intervention of France. The situation in the Sahel region and the emergence of smuggling networks, and trade in drugs and the general organized crime that saw the emergence of groups such as AQIM, Ansardine and MUJWA, who in alliance with MNLA launched the 2012 rebellion, was partly responsible for the outbreak of the conflict. The availability of weapons from Libya after the fall of Ghaddafi had made it very easy for the rebels to overpower the Malian soldiers and Mali had to seek the help of France to regain control of the country.

France responded to the request of the Interim President of Mali by conducting airstrikes that resulted in the retreat of the rebels to the Algerian border. The French action was supported by ECOWAS, A.U, E.U and the United Nations as well as many other European states including the United State, Britain, Norway, Canada and Germany. ECOWAS had been involved in a negotiation with the rebels prior to the intervention of France, and had called for the deployment of an African led force which was approved by the United Nations. However, the African led force could not be mobilized in time and the rebel advance was seen to be quick, and this came to explain why the Malian regime sought the help of Paris. And as explained and in trying to give an answer to the question of this research which is “why did the French intervene in Mali?”, several factors apart from that of security may have motivated Paris into quick action, but these were explained from the two perspectives that were identified in the research; The Malian and the French perspectives respectively. However, as argued in the hypothesis, all other factors were dependent on the security factor, considering that without the security factor no

intervention would have taken place whatsoever. But of course many valid geo-strategic and geo-political reasons had been advanced to explain the French intervention. The presence of other countries economically and militarily in certain African countries that are seen as part of French sphere of influence is explained as largely motivating Paris into action. Struggle for control over the mineral resources such as oil, uranium and many others in some of these African states among the big powers such as U.S.A, China and the BRICS states and France on the other hand is considered among such motivating factors. This competition between the countries is also extended to trade in certain commodities that include textile and cotton, which were explained to have played a significant role in convincing France to intervene in Mali. The intervention is seen to increase French presence and influence in Mali, and to project French influence and interest not only in Mali, but across the Sahel region as a whole.

The intervention was viewed as successful despite whatever problems that may have been encountered. After the intervention, the United Nations approved the deployment of a UN Multi-dimensional force, which is seen to be playing a prominent role in the rebuilding of the Malian society, especially the north which was most affected by the conflict. Immediately after the restoration of peace, elections were conducted and authority was transferred from the interim administration to the new democratically elected government under President Boubacar in 2013. Many agencies of the United Nations and other international agencies appear to have concentrated their activities in the north which was faced with a humanitarian crisis as a result of the conflict. Migrations and displacements both within and outside the country appeared to have worsened humanitarian issues in the post conflict period. As such re-establishing and restoring basic social amenities and the provision food as a result food insecurity remained a main challenge, especially in the north which suffered most in the crisis. A lot of progress was made by many of these organizations in collaboration with the Malian government in many areas, as many schools and health centers are now operating in the north. Organizations such as the UNMAS continued to clear the north of the remnants of dangerous weapons and mines, and a survey of the weapons seized and abandoned by the rebels is contained at the end of the last chapter, and it shows a variety of weapons and their sources. Generally, a document for the sustainable recovery of Mali was drafted; the plan is focused for the year 2013 – 2014, contains both short term and long term plans for Mali, and outlined major areas of concern.

The first item on the list of the plan is the restoration of peace and security, as well as that of public services throughout the country. Response to humanitarian emergencies, and elections which was carried in July 2013 came second on the list. The document further called for increased governance through decentralization, so as to achieve balanced development and reform of the public service. The fight against corruption was also found necessary in order to ensure the well functioning of the judicial system. There is also the need to rebuild the Malian economy through the strengthening of the private sector, Agriculture, as well as investment in infrastructural development and youth employment. The educational sector according to the document needs to be addressed quickly, so also is health care, which is considered insufficient and inaccessible to many people. The document further called for the support of cultural projects, with a view to promoting peaceful co-existence between all groups. Promoting the role of women within the society was also identified as a key area that should be given attention. And environmental issues was the final item on the list, the document called for the formulation of policies and strategies that would improve the environment which it recognized as a priority, especially if the desert north is taken into consideration. The food security which has constantly affected the country due to poor climate appears to have been linked to the environment.

It is generally believed that if attention is focused on these identified areas, the rebuilding of the country will not take long, and it may in turn bring about peace all over the country. However, in order to avoid the outbreak of another Tuareg revolt, especially since the 2012 rebellion did not end with any peace agreements, and this makes the possibility of re-occurrence high, it is necessary to look into decentralization of the country as a policy, as well as previous agreements entered between the Malian government and the Tuaregs such as the National Pact and its provisions, otherwise the partition of the country into north and south is seen as a solution to the lingering Tuareg conflict if all options fail. And as can be seen this research has helped in not only understanding the 2012 conflict and the French intervention in Mali, but it has also helped us understand why Mali had seek the intervention of France. This will especially clear if take into consideration the weak or negative sovereignty theory which was used as the theoretical framework. It could be recalled that the Malian perspective which was used to answer the research question has found the weakness of Mali as a state as responsible for the security situation in the country. And Robert Jackson's theory had appeared to provide some explanation regarding

the weakness of many African states from a historical perspective, explaining the collapse or weakness of these states. However there may be need for further research not only on the Mali conflict, but on Jackson's theory of "weak or negative sovereignty". There is especially need to look into the issues raised by Jackson and see how positive sovereignty can be obtained by African countries and other third world states which he classified as "quasi states".

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

THE MANDATE OF MINUSMA (UNSC RESOLUTION 2100 2013)

(a) Stabilization of key population centers and support for the reestablishment of State authority throughout the country

(i) In support of the transitional authorities of Mali, to stabilize the key population centers, especially in the north of Mali and, in this context, to deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas;

(ii) To support the transitional authorities of Mali to extend and re-establish State administration throughout the country;

(iii) To support national and international efforts towards rebuilding the Malian security sector, especially the police and gendarmerie through technical assistance, capacity-building, co-location and mentoring programs, as well as the rule of law and justice sectors, within its capacities and in close coordination with other bilateral partners, donors and international organizations engaged in these fields, including the EU;

(iv) To assist the transitional authorities of Mali, through training and other support, in mine action and weapons and ammunition management;

(v) To assist the transitional authorities of Mali in developing and implementing programs for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants and the dismantling of militias and self-defense groups, consistent with the objectives of reconciliation and taking into account the specific needs of demobilized children;

(b) Support for the implementation of the transitional road map, including the national political dialogue and the electoral process

(i) To assist the transitional authorities of Mali to implement swiftly the transitional road map towards the full restoration of constitutional order, democratic governance and national unity in Mali;

(ii) To exercise good offices, confidence-building and facilitation at the national and local levels, including through local partners as appropriate, in order to anticipate, prevent, mitigate and resolve conflict;

(iii) To assist the transitional authorities of Mali and communities in the north of Mali to facilitate progress towards an inclusive national dialogue and reconciliation process, notably the negotiation process referred to in paragraph 4 above, including by enhancing negotiation capacity and promoting the participation of civil society, including women's organizations;

(iv) To support the organization and conduct of inclusive, free, fair and transparent presidential and legislative elections, including through the provision of appropriate logistical and technical assistance and effective security arrangements;

(c) Protection of civilians and United Nations personnel

(i) To protect, without prejudice to the responsibility of the transitional authorities of Mali, civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capacities and areas of deployment;

(ii) To provide specific protection for women and children affected by armed conflict, including through the deployment of Child Protection Advisors and Women Protection Advisors, and address the needs of victims of sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflict;

(iii) To protect the United Nations personnel, installations and equipment and ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel;

(d) Promotion and protection of human rights

(i) To monitor, help investigate and report to the Council on any abuses or violations of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law committed throughout Mali and to contribute to efforts to prevent such violations and abuses;

- (ii) To support, in particular, the full deployment of MINUSMA human rights observers throughout the country;
- (iii) To monitor, help investigate and report to the Council specifically on violations and abuses committed against children as well as violations committed against women including all forms of sexual violence in armed conflict;
- (iv) To assist the transitional authorities of Mali in their efforts to promote and protect human rights;
- (e) Support for humanitarian assistance In support of the transitional authorities of Mali, to contribute to the creation of a secure environment for the safe, civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance, in accordance with humanitarian principles, and the voluntary return of internally displaced persons and refugees in close coordination with humanitarian actors;
- (f) Support for cultural preservation to assist the transitional authorities of Mali, as necessary and feasible, in protecting from attack the cultural and historical sites in Mali, in collaboration with UNESCO;
- (g) Support for national and international justice To support, as feasible and appropriate, the efforts of the transitional authorities of Mali, without prejudice to their responsibilities, to bring to justice those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Mali, taking into account the referral by the transitional authorities of Mali of the situation in their country since January 2012 to the International Criminal Court.

APPENDIX B

CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Yusuf, Ibrahim Gamawa

Nationality: Nigerian

Date of Birth: 24 February 1972

Place of Birth: Zaria

Phone: +2348069634196

email: yusufgamawa@ymail.com

EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
B.A	Unimaid History	1999
M.A	Unibuja History	2008
Ph.D	YBU IR	2015
2008		

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2006 - 2009 Officer	Bauchi State civil service,	Administrative
2009-2011	Nurul Bayan Intl Academy	Teacher

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Hausa, English.

PUBLICATIONS

Yusuf Ibrahim Gamawa, "The Impact of the Administration of Tattari Ali on Bauchi State 1976-1999" , M.A Thesis, University of Abuja, 2008.

Yusuf Ibrahim Gamawa, "Cyprus Issue Between the Period of Independence and Turkey' s Intervention in 1974" , Journal of International Affairs Global and Global strategy, Volume 26, 2014.

Yusuf Ibrahim Gamawa, " Post 9/11Turkey-American Relations and Iraq" , Journal of International Affairs and Global Strategy, Volume 26, 2014.

Yusuf Ibrahim Gamawa, "The Life and Times of Ibrahim Gamawa-A Biography" , Lambert Academic Publishing, 2015.

APPENDIX C

TEZİN TÜRKÇE ÖZETİ

TUAREGLER VE MALİ'DEKİ İSYAN: 2012 İSYANI VE FRANSIZ ASKERİ MÜDAHALESİ

Bu tezin amacı, Mali'deki isyanı; özellikle Fransa'nın 2012 deki müdahalesini analiz etmektir. Araştırmanın anlamaya çalıştığı şey ise Fransa 2012 Mali'deki isyana neden müdahale etti? Bu istihbarat özellikle Birleşmiş Milletler'in yetkilendirdiği Afrikalı güçlerin Mali'de konuşlanmasından sonra geçerlilik kazandı. Araştırma, Tuareg sorununu ve ülkenin bağımsızlığından sonra açığa çıkan bu sorunun neden olduğu dengesizliği derinlemesine inceliyor. Araştırmacı, Fransa'nın müdahalesinin birçok sebebinin olacağı görüşüne sahip. çünkü tek bir sebep bu müdahale için yeterli değil. Birçok yazar ve bilimadamının iddialarına rağmen, ki bunlar eşit derecede doğru olabilir, Fransa'nın müdahalesi sonucu ortaya çıkan olaylar dizisi bizi şu hipoteze götürüyor: “Bu müdahale birçok faktörün birleşimi, bu faktörlere de Fransa ve Mali'nin perspektifinden bakılabilir.” Fransa açısından bu, Fransa'nın sadece Mali'de değil, bütün Sahel bölgesindeki ekonomik ilgisine bir güvenlik tehdidi olarak açıklanabilir. Mali tarafında ise Mali'nin bölge olarak güçsüz olması ve isyancı gruplara müdahale edemeyecek durumda olması olarak açıklanabilir. Paris tarafından açıklandığı üzere, terör bölgesindeki acil durumdan kaçınmak gerekiyordu. Mali'nin ülke olarak bölgesel bütünlüğünü yeniden kurması zorunlu hale gelmişti. Ekonomik sebepler Fransa'nın müdahalesine sebep olmuş olabilir fakat bu asıl sebep olamaz, çünkü Fransa'nın Mali'deki ekonomik durumlara ilgisi ve Mali başkanının Fransa'nın müdahalesini istemesi sözkonusu. Mali'deki ekonomik sorunlar Fransa'ya müdahale etme şansı verdi denebilir. Ekonomik sebepler tek başına düşünülürse, müdahalenin isyanlarla ilgisi olabilir de olmayabilir de.

Bu araştırmada, Mali'deki durumu açıklamak için Robert Jackson'ın negatif egemenlik teorisi kullanılmıştır. Realizm ve Liberalizm gibi Uluslararası İlişkiler teorileri, devletlerin analiz birimleri olarak görüldüğü ve tehditlerin devlet merkezli askeri koşullar bakımından algılandığı, Vestfalyan dünya düzenine göre tasarlanmış ve yapılandırılmıştır. Uluslararası sistem, mevcut devletler arasındaki işbirliği ve çatışma tarafından da karakterize edilir; bu, siyasi birimlerin egemenliğine, mülkîlik ve müdahale etmeme üzerine kurulmuş bir

sistemdir. Fakat zaman içerisinde Vestfalyan sistem sorgulanır hale gelmiştir, zira dünyanın çoğu kısmının, özellikle de üçüncü dünya ülkelerinin, Vestfalyan modeli yansıtmadığı gözlemlenmiştir. 21nci yüzyıl, güvenlik tehditlerinin zayıf veya başarısızlık içinde olan veya devletler içindeki devlet dışı aktörlerden geldiği bir döneme tanıklık etmiştir. Vestfalyan modele dayanan Uluslararası İlişkiler teorileri, tehditlerin çoğunlukla agresif ve güçlü devletlerden geldiğini düşünür. Özellikle bundan dolayı, Afrika'nın çoğu kesimindeki ve üçüncü dünyadaki, Uluslararası ilişkiler teorilerinin bazen tam anlamıyla açıklayamadığı durumu açıklamak için çok sayıda kavram ve teori geliştirilmiştir.

Aynı şekilde, Afrika ülkeleri hakkında yapılan çalışmaların çoğunda egemenlik teorisi, çatışma teorisi, modernleşme veya bağımlılık teorisi gibi diğer teoriler ve bunun yanı sıra, Robert Jackson tarafından üretilmiş olan, negatif egemenlik ismiyle de bilinen, başarısız devletler veya zayıf devletler teorisi gibi diğer kavramlar kullanılmıştır. Robert Jackson'ın çalışması, başarısız devletler tartışmasında dönüm noktası olmuştur. Başarısız devletler teorisi veya kavramı, üçüncü dünya ülkelerini etkileyen ve uluslararası ilişkiler teorilerini kullanan herhangi bir açıklamaya uymayan çok sayıda meseleyi ve çatışmayı analiz etmek için kullanılmaktadır.

Mali'deki çatışmanın ve Fransız müdahalesinin hakkında yapılan dikkatli bir ampirik çalışma, Mali devletinin zayıflığını ve güvenliğine tehdit oluşturan unsurların başka bir devlet kaynaklı değil, AQIM veya Mağrip El Kaidesi, Ansardine ve Tuaregler veya MNLA gibi devlet dışı aktörlerden geldiğini ortaya çıkaracaktır. Fransa, ülkenin kuzeyinin kontrolünü ele geçirmeyi başaran ve başkent Bamako'ya doğru ilerleyen isyancılara karşı Mali devletinin toprak bütünlüğünü korumaya yardım etmek için müdahalede bulunmuştur. Devletin zayıflığına dayanan hipotezin doğru bir biçimde gözlemlendiği gibi, Fransa'nın müdahalesi iki bakış açısından, Fransa ve Mali bakış açılarından görülür. Ama Fransız bakış açısı, Mali bakış açısına bağlıdır çünkü sebepleri veya gerekçeleri ne olursa olsun, Mali'deki güvenlik konusundaki başarısızlık olmasaydı, Fransız müdahalesi gerçekleşmezdi veya herhangi bir müdahaleye gerek kalmazdı. Bu nedenle, aynı zamanda "negatif egemenlik" olarak da bilinen "başarısız/zayıf devlet" teorisi veya kavramı dikkate alınmıştır. Bu teorinin, Fransız müdahalesinin sebeplerini ve Mali'deki genel durumu açıklamaya yardımcı olacağı düşünülmüştür.

Zayıf veya başarısız devlet, genellikle, merkezi yönetimin toprakları içerisindeki kamu düzeni konusunda yetersiz kapasitesi olan, sınırlarını düzenli şekilde kontrol edemeyen,

güvenilir şekilde tutarlı kamu kurumları veya hizmeti sağlayamayan ve anayasaya aykırı iç tehditlere açık olan bir devlet olarak tanımlanır. Devletin başarısızlığının diğer göstergeleri, kötü seviyede ekonomik performans, sosyal refah, ekonomik dağılım ve çatışma seviyeleridir. Hükümet, kamu hizmeti, kurumları veya otorite sağlayamaz ve toprak üzerinde merkezi kontrol yoktur ve bu da merkezi yönetim otoritesi ve kontrolünün fiili olarak da olmadığını gösterir. Başarısız devlet veya negatif bağımsızlık teorisi veya kavramı tarihsel bakış açısına dayanır ve kolonizasyonu ve dekolonizasyonu Afrika ülkelerinin yapısını şekillendiren şey olarak görür. Jackson, yönetim özelliklerine sahip olamayan bir hükümete sahip olmak olarak görür ve İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında, sömürgelerin sömürgeleikten kurtarılması konusunda uluslararası zümreden gelen baskının, çoğu Afrika ülkesinin hızlıca bağımsızlık kazanmasına sebep olduğunu belirtir ve Jackson'a göre bu durum, yeni oluşmuş Afrika devletlerine pozitif bir egemenlik pozisyonundan yönetim sağlama için iyi bir altyapı sağlamamıştır.

Robert Jackson'ın negatif egemenlik teorisi, devletlerin zayıflığının daha derin veya temel nedenlerini yakalamış ve devletlerin zayıflıkları veya kırılmalıklarının nedenlerinin farklı yönlerini açıklayan, yukarıda belirtilen tüm açıklamalar ve unsurları sunmuş ve yakalamış gibi görünür. Robert Jackson'ın teorisi, Afrika'daki egemenlik meselesinin özellikle tarihsel bir bakış açısından değerlendirir. Jackson, özellikle Afrika kıtasındaki kolonizasyon ve dekolonizasyon konusuna odaklanır. Robert Jackson'ın 1986 yazdığı, “Quasi States, Dual Regimes and Neo-Classical theory” ve 1987'de yazdığı, "Negative Sovereignty in Sub-Saharan Africa” makaleleri Afrika ülkelerinde sömürgeci dönemdeki egemenliğin yapısına odaklanmıştır. Jackson bu makalelerde, daha önce dendiği gibi, Vestafalya'daki barış müzakerelerinin Avrupa ülkelerini tanımlayan yeni standartlar doğurduğunu ve aslında devlet olma ve özerklik fikrine ve aslında tanımlanmış topraklar üzerinde, diğer devletlerin eylemlerine ve çıkarlarına müdahale etmeme prensibi ile hüküm sürme anlayışına yol açmıştır der.

Robert Jackson'a göre, egemenlik kavramı hukuk teorisi, uluslararası hukuk ve uluslararası kurumlar etrafından şekillenir. Ve egemenlik aslında Avrupa merkezlidir ve bu kavram, teknolojisi, küreselleşme, çatışma, kolonizasyon ve dekolonizasyon gibi diğer unsurlar egemenlik kavramının temel anlamına meydan okumaya başlayana kadar değişen şekillerde kullanılmıştır. Jackson'a göre, egemenliğin siyasi değeri küçümsenemez ve ulusal ve uluslararası egemenlik sağlandığında belirli unsurlar sahneye girer. Jackson

bunları, adalet ve ekonomik refah olarak tanımlar. Jackson'a göre egemenlik, genellikle öngörülemeyen ve iç ve soysö-ekonomik sorunların aniden ortaya çıkması şeklinde meydana gelen diğer bir takım sonuçları beraberinde getirir; Jackson bunları "Negatif Bağımsızlık" dediği şeyin sonuçları olarak tanımlar. Jackson, Afrika ülkelerinin egemenliğe giden yolu istikrarsız bir geçmişe sahip olmuştur. Jackson, 1885 anayasasına ve Avrupalı güçlerin Afrika ülkelerinin sınırlarını nasıl yarattığına ve tanımladığına bakmış ve Afrika ülkelerinin bu şartlar altında "Pozitif Egemenlik" dediği şeyi kazanmasının zor olduğunu öne sürmüştür. Afrika ülkelerinin böyle bir pozitif egemenlik kazanmasının imkansız olmasının, Jackson'a göre, iki sebebi vardır. Bunlardan biri, egemenlik kazanmak için gereken koşulları içerir ama Jackson'a göre bunlar genellikle az veya hiç bir zaman mevcut değildir. Jackson'a göre bu koşullar, çoğu Afrika ülkesinde mevcut olmayan uluslararası toplum ideolojisi ve kültürel ve ekonomik koşulları içerir. Jackson'a göre ikinci sebep, çoğu Afrika ülkesinin kendisini içinde bulduğu koşullarla ilgilidir ve ona göre Afrika ülkeleri, temel olarak, Avrupa'daki türden bir egemenlik ve bağımsızlığı desteklemek gibi bir kaygıları olmayan çeşitli sömürgeci devletlere aittir. Jackson, çoğu Afrika ülkesinin İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası bağımsız hale geldiğini ve kendi anayasaları ve egemenliklerini kurma fırsatı bulduğunu söylemiştir.

Sömürgecilik sonrası Afrika'nın oluşumundaki sorunlardan biri, Jackson'ın tanımına göre, yeni oluşan devletlerin uluslararası meşruluğunu yaratma konusundaki ihtiyacın yanı sıra Afrika devletlerinin içinde yaratıldığı çerçevenin ta kendisidir. Jackson, yeni Afrika devletleri için model olan iki çerçeveyi kolayca tanımlar. Bunlar, "bölgesel millet" ve "kültürel millet"dir. Jackson'a göre, Afrika devletlerinin kültürel çeşitliliğini gerçekten yansıtabilecek olan kültürel milletin yaratılması temel olarak imkânsız hale gelmiştir ve masraflı görülmüştür ve bölgesel millet karşısında tercih edilmemiştir. Jackson, sömürgeci güçler tarafından yaratılmış olan ve yeni ortaya çıkan Avrupa devletleri içinde ortak bir kültür kurmaya çalışan bölgesel milletin bağımsızlıktan sonra sürdürülemeyeceğini öne sürer, çünkü Afrika devletleri aslında yapısı itibarıyla çok kültürlüdür. Ve Jackson bu noktadan yola çıkarak, pozitif ve negatif egemenlik dediği şeyler arasında bir ayırım yapmaya çalışmıştır. Jackson'a göre, pozitif egemenlik, bir devleti devlet yapan temel özellikler ve nitelikler bir toplum tarafından anlık olarak değil de, makul bir performans ihtimali içinde elde edildiği zaman yeni bir devlet ortaya çıkaran bir durumdur. Düzenli bir hükümet, tanımlı toprak ve bağımsızlık, Jackson'a göre bir devleti devlet yapan ve pozitif

egemenliđi oluřturan gerekli niteliklerdir. Jackson'ın genellikle Sahra altı Afrika devletleri ile bađdařtırdıđı negatif egemenlik ise, yonetme kapasitesi olmayan bir hukumete sahip olmaktır. Jackson, daha once de belirtildiđi gibi, İkinci Dünya Savařı sonrası uluslararası kamuoyundan gelen baskı, Avrupalı guçleri Afrika devletlerini çođuna bađımsızlık vermeye zorlamıřtır. Jackson'a gore bu sureç çok hızlı gercekleřmiř ve pozitif egemenlik durumu veya konumu için gereken iyi altyapıyı Afrika devletlerine sađlayamamıřtır. Jackson, pozitif egemenliđi uygulamanın çok uzun zaman aldıđını ve sömurgelerin yapı ve içerik ve aynı zamanda bađımsızlıđın getirdiđi deđiřimlere uyum sađlama kapasiteleri bakımından farklılık gösterdiđini düşünür.

Jackson'a gore, Avrupalı sömurgeler sömurgelerin çođunu, Avrupa'daki hukumetleri řekillendirdikleri gibi düzgün bir biçimde řekillendirmediđini öne sürmüřtür. Avrupalı yetkililer, genellikle sayıca az olmuř ve kendi çıkarları ve geldikleri ülkelerin çıkarları ile ilgilenmiřtir. Ona (Jackson) gore, dekolonizasyon süreci sırasında otoritenin yerli insanlara devredilmesi, uygulama bakımından büyük sonuçlar doğurmuřtur. Robert Jackson, yerli nüfusun deneyim sahibi olmadıđını ve sömurgeci guçlerin sömurgelerin bađımsızlıđı konusunda dikkatli bir plan yapmadıđını, bađımsızlıđın uluslararası sistemlerde gercekleřen hızlı deđiřimlerin sonucu olduđunu söyler. Jackson'a gore, Afrikalı insanların yönetim ve idare konusundaki deneyimsizlikleri, sömurgencilik sonrası dönemde ortaya çıkan bađımsız devletlerin çođunun çöküřüne neden olmuřtur. Jackson, sömurgeci dönemin devamlılık veya pozitif egemenlik için gereken zemini yaratma kapasitesine sahip olmayan bir yönetim ortaya çıkardıđını düşünür ve sonuçta sömurgencilik sonrası dönemde çođu Afrika ülkesinin zayıf, kırılğan ve nihayetinde başarısız olmuřtur. Jackson'ın teorisi, devletlerin zayıflıđının veya kırılğanlıđının köklerini bulmuř ve bunları incelemiřtir ve çođu akademisyenin yaptıđı gibi bunu yüzeysel olarak yapmamıřtır. Çođu akademisyen anlık sebeplere veya unsurlara odaklanmıř, devletlerin zayıflıđı veya kırılğanlıđının temel nedenlerini göz ardı etmiřtir ve eđer ciddi bir řekilde bakılırsa, Jackson'ın devletlerin zayıflıđı, kırılğanlıđı veya başarısızlıđı hakkında diđer akademisyenler tarafından dile getirilen bütün tartışma ve düşünceleri yakaladıđı açıkça görülecektir. İřin aslı, devletlerin zayıflıđı veya başarısızlıđından sorumlu ve bu devletlerin altyapısından kaynaklanan nedenlere veya unsurlara sadece daha derin bir açıklama getirmiřtir.

Mali'nin bir ülke olarak ekonomik yapısı hakkında yapılan dikkatli bir çalıřmanın ülkenin ekonomik ve yapısal olarak zayıflıđını ortaya çıkarması olasıdır. 2012 itibarıyla, 15 milyon

nüfusa, 10.31 milyar GSYİH'e, %-1,2 GSYİH büyüme oranına ve %5,4 enflasyon oranına sahip olan Mali, dünyadaki en fakir ülkelerden biri olarak tanımlanır. Dünya Bankası tarafından 2014 yılında yayınlanan dünya gelişim göstergeleri raporlarına göre, Mali'nin GSYİH 2000-2012 yılları arasında %5,2, 2012-2013 arasında %4,0 ve 2013-2014 arasında %5,2'lik bir büyüme göstermiştir. Ülkenin 2012'deki brüt geliri %8,5 GSYİH ve tespit edilmiş net geliri %-10,8 GSMG'dir. Ülkenin 2012'deki cari işlemler bilançosu % -12,6 GSYİH, merkezi hükümetin nakit fazlası veya açığı %-2,5 GSYİH, tüketici fiyat endeksi %5,4 ve geniş para arzı %32,2 GSYİH'dir.

Mali ekonomisi, devlet ekonomisinden açık özel ekonomiye dönüşün yaşandığı 1970lerde bir takım reformlar geçirmiştir. Fakat ekonomik büyüme sadece, 1980 ve 1986 arasında ortalama %-1,2 GSYİH büyüme oranının yaşandığı 1980lerdeki küçülme döneminin ardından 1994 senesi civarında gerçekleşmiştir. Mali'nin 1987 ve 1993 arasındaki ekonomik büyümesi %3'tür. 1994 senesinde 240\$ olan kişi başına düşen GSYİH, 2004 senesinde, ortalama %4 artış ile, 380\$ olmuştur. 1994'deki devalüasyondan sonra, ekonomik büyüme devam etmiş ve 2006'da %5,4 olarak kaydedilmiştir. 2005 ve 2007 yılları arasında, Mali'nin GSYİH büyümesi düşüşe geçmiş ve 2005'teki %6,1 ve 2006'daki %5,3'e oranla 2007'de %3,2 olmuştur. Global Finance Magazine'in Mali'ye ait verilerine göre, 2008 ve 2009 yıllarında, GSYİH büyümesi %5 iken, 2010 ve 2011'de %5,8 ve 2,1 olarak kaydedilmiştir. 2002 ve 2011'deki insani gelişmişlik endeksinde Mali 134. sırada yer almıştır. Mali, ortalama yaşam süresi, eğitim ve gelir seviyeleri gibi göstergelere genel bir bakış sağlayan insani gelişmişlik endeksinde, 187 ülke arasında 175'inci olmuştur. Enerji ve tarımsal gelişime bağlı üretimi destekleyen altyapı gelişimi bir sorun olarak kalmış, benzer şekilde, kötü iklim koşulları nedeniyle tarımsal üretimde yaşanan düşüş ekonominin durgun kalmasına neden olmuştur. Sahel bölgesinin tamamı sürekli olarak kuraklığa maruz kalır, bu durum bölge halkının gıda bulamamasına ve göçe sebep olmaktadır. Yukarıdaki analiz, Mali'nin ekonomik açıdan ne kadar zayıf bir ülke olduğunu gösterir.

1960larda Fransa'dan bağımsızlığını kazanmış olan Mali, yakın zamana kadar nispeten istikrarlı olan bir Batı Afrika ülkesiydi. Fakir olarak kabul edilse de, küçük bir ülke olmasına rağmen gösterdiği istikrarlı demokratik gelişim nedeniyle Batı Afrika bölgesinde oldukça önemli bir ülkedir. Diğer Afrika ülkeleri, özellikle de Batı Afrika ülkeleri, Mali'ye büyük saygı duyar. Ülke, 1975'ten bu yana ECOWAS girişimi altında gerçekleşen Batı

Afrika bölgesi bölgesel entegrasyon sürecinde önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Demokratik yönetim konusundaki adanmışlığı, ilerlemesi ve olgunluğu nedeniyle bölgesel yapının Başkanlık pozisyonunu elinde tutmaktadır. Mali'nin dış ilişkiler konusundaki ilgisi, genel olarak, Batı Afrika bölgesiyle sınırlı gibi görünmektedir; burada, Batı Afrika ülkeleri arasında bölgesel bütünlük ve işbirliğini teşvik etmeye çalışır. Özellikle, Başkan Konare'nin 1999'da ECOWAS'ın başkanlığına gelmesinin ardından çatışma çözümünde arabuluculuk yapma konusuyla yakında ilgilenir hale gelmiştir.

Mali'nin bölgedeki kaygıları, sınır komşuları olan Moritanya, Nijer, Tunus ve Cezayir ile sınır güvenliği ilişkilerini de kapsar hale gelmiştir. Bunun nedeni, bir takım saldırılarda bulunan Tuareg grubu ile ülkenin kuzeyinde yaşadığı süregelen sorunlardır. Mali'nin bölgedeki etkisi zaman zaman sadece demokratik gelişimi ile açıklansa da, ülke, nispeten zayıf bir hükümeti ve küçük bir ekonomiye ve yetersiz kaynaklara sahip olan "zayıf bir devlet" olarak kalmıştır. Ülke, bölgedeki herhangi bir ülkeyi etkileyecek kapasiteye sahip olmamıştır ve aslında ekonomik destek ve güvenlik desteği bakımından Nijerya'ya bağımlı olmuştur. Nijerya, Mali'nin sorunlarla boğuştu bölgenin tamamında ülkeye seneler boyunca tam destek vermiştir.

Genel anlamda, Afrika'daki barış ve güvenlik meseleleri uluslararası tartışmaların konusu olarak kalmış, öyle ki bu durum Afrika kıtasında gerçekleşen diğer önemli meseleleri gölgede bırakmıştır. Kıtada yaşanan çatışmalar ve krizler olumsuz izlenim vermiş ve bu durum çoğunlukla Afrikalı liderlerin yanlış davranışlarına veya Afrikalı insanların genel gelişmemiş tavrına bağlanmıştır. Silahlı çatışmaların, Afrika ülkelerinin ekonomik başarısızlıklarının ve demokrasi kültüründeki düşüşün hepsi çoğu zaman sadece Afrika'nın içindeki nedenlere bağlanmış, kıtanın küreselleşmenin getirdiği değişimlere ayak uydurmayı başaramaması sıklıkla vurgulanmıştır.

Fakat bu türden yaklaşımlar sorgulanmış ve kıtadaki durumundan sorumlu diğer unsurlar bir takım akademisyenler tarafından tanımlanmış ve tartışılmıştır ve genel kanı, Afrika'nın sömürgecilik sonrası evrimini iki büyük faktör bağlamında ele almak olmuştur. Birincisi, tarihsel ve uluslararası bir bağlamdır. Afrika'nın siyasi, ekonomik ve kültürel mirasına sömürgeci miras noktasından bakmak gerektiği genel olarak öne sürülür. Afrika'daki Avrupa mirasını dikkate almayan bir durum analizinin, Afrika'daki durum veya şartlar hakkında geçerli ve yeterli bir analiz olmayacağı söylenir. İkinci faktör, Afrika'nın uluslararası medyanın yaymak konusunda başı çektiği, gerçekliği ispatlanmamış ve belirsiz

kalmış olan negatif imajı ile ilgilidir. Afrika kıtasının güvenlik ve istikrar gelişimi hakkında yapılan herhangi bir anlamlı değerlendirme için, Afrika ikilemi gerçeğini kavrayabilmek adına daha geniş ve her şeyi kapsayan bir yaklaşım geliştirmek gerektiğine inanılır.

Mali'deki en son ayaklanma, Kuzey Mali'de yaşayan göçebe bir grup olan Tuaregler tarafından kuzeyde gerçekleştirilen isyan, 1890lardan bu yana devam eden bir olgu olarak görülür ve 1910lar, 1962, 1990 ve 2002 senelerinde tekrar canlanmıştır. Bu durum 2012 senesinde başlayan bir şey olarak görülmemiştir ve birçok yazar ve akademisyen Mali'deki Tuareg isyanının devamlılığı konusunda çok sayıda neden öne sürse de, bunların bazıları soruna tatmin edici bir açıklama getirememiş, sadece kısmi olarak açıklamıştır. 1962 isyanı sırasında çobanların öldürülmesi ve kuyuların zehirlenmesi şeklinde devam eden soruna ve bunun yanı sıra 1990larda ve 2000lerdeki barışın sağlanamaması ve bazen bozulması ve özerk yönetim girişimlerine açıklama getirilmeye çalışılmıştır. Akademisyenler genellikle, Mali'deki ve diğer eski Afrika kolonilerindeki de dahil, bu türden durumları "politik miras" dedikleri şey görmeye çalışmışlardır. Mali de, çoğu Afrika ülkesi gibi, çoğu Afrika ülkesinin bağımsızlığından önce Sömürgeci Efendiler tarafından yaratılan yapay sınırların bir sonucu olarak, modern bir devlet olarak birlik sağlama sorunu ile karşılaşmıştır. Bu Sömürge sınırları, Mali de dâhil, Afrika'nın farklı kesimlerinde mevcut olan birbirinden farklı sosyo-ekonomik gerçeklikleri dikkate almamıştır ve bu yüzden Afrika'nın çoğu kesiminde bugün hala soyut vatandaşlık pek olası değildir.

Afrika kıtasındaki sömürgeci fetih döneminden önce, Mali İmparatorluğu o günlerde en güçlü Afrika ülkelerinden biriydi, zenginlik ve kıtadaki ticaretin kontrolü bakımından tek dengi, Kanem Bornu devletiydi. Kanem-Bornu devleti, bugünkü Çad ve Nijerya merkezli bir orta Afrika imparatorluğuydu ve MS 9ncu yüzyıldan 1900 senesi kadar hüküm sürmüştü. En güçlü olduğu dönemde, imparatorluğun toprakları sadece Çad'ın çoğunu değil, aynı zamanda güney Libya'nın, doğu Nijer'in, kuzeydoğu Nijerya'nın, kuzey Kamerun'un, Orta Afrika Cumhuriyeti'nin ve Güney Sudan'ın bir kısmını kapsıyordu. Başkenti, bugün Nijerya topraklarında olan Borno'da bulunmaktaydı. Mali imparatorluğu, Avrupalı tüccarların Afrika kıtasına gelmesinden önce gelişmiş olan karmaşık yapıdaki Afrika toplumları için o zamandan beri bir referans noktası olmuştur. On dördüncü yüzyılda, Mansa veya İmparator Kankan Musa Mekke'ye hac ziyaretinde bulunmuş ve Kaire'deki altınlar konusundaki cömertliğine dair haberler Avrupa'ya ulaşmıştır. Gao ve

Timbuktu'yu önemli İslam öğretim merkezi haline getiren mimarlar ve alimler imparatorluğa Musa tarafından getirilmiştir. Bu şehirler, yükselişte olan Songhai İmparatorluğu tarafından ele geçirilmiş ve Fas 1591'de altın kaynakları için imparatorluğu işgal etmiştir. 1747'de, 11nci yüzyılda Timbuktu'yu kuranların soyundan gelen Kuzeyli bir Tuareg Prensi şehrin kontrolünü geri almıştır. Güneyde, Bambara halkı iktidara yükselmiş ve 1712 senesine gelindiğinde, Segou'da Bambara Krallığı kurulmuştur. Bamako'da ve diğer şehirlerde Bambara etkisinin halen hissedildiği söylenir. Ve 19ncü yüzyılda, Fulani halkına ait Peal Macina ve Tukolor imparatorlukları hırslı liderleri sayesinde güçlü hale gelmiştir. 1818 ile 1844 arasında, savaşlar sonucunda bir Fulani İslam teokrasisi kurulmuş ve bu Djenne ve Timbuktu'ya kadar genişlemiştir. Ve 1854 ile 1864 arasında, Bambara ve ilk Fransız kolonistler ile savaşan Fulani İmparatorluğu topraklarını Segou'dan Timbuktu'ya kadar genişletmeye çalışmıştır. Diğer kabile liderleri ise, birbirleriyle savaşmaya devam etmiş ve sonuçta Fransızlara teslim olmuşlardır.

Mali ve Batı Afrika'daki Fransız egemenliği, İngilizlerin dolaylı sömürgecilik anlayışının aksine, daha doğrudan bir yönetimdir. Fransa, Fransız İhtilali'ni ve beraberinde gelen, ırka veya renge bakılmaksızın bütün Fransızların tabii olduğu, özgürlük, eşitlik ve kardeşlik düşüncelerini temel alan bir asimilasyon politikası izlemiş, kolonilerinin hepsini, en başta, bir ülke olarak Fransa'nın devamı gibi görmüştür. Asimilasyon politikası, Fransız kültürünün ve medeniyetinin üstünlüğüne dayanan bir fikirdir ama bu politika çok geçmeden "birlik" politikası ile yer değiştirmiştir. İlk politikalarının imkansızlığını fark eden Fransızlar yeni bir sisteme dönüş yapmışlardır. Birlik politikası, Afrikalıların kültürel ve siyasi değerlerine saygı duymayı amaçlamış ve genel olarak Afrikalıların siyasi Fransızlar olmaya zorlanmaması ilkesine dayanır. Bununla birlikte, pratikte, birlik politikası sorunlu hale gelmiş ve Afrikalılar ve geleneksel otoriteler, Fransız yetkililer tarafından Afrikalılara gerçekten danışılmadan kurulan ve yürütülen yönetim içinde ikincil pozisyonda kalmıştır. Afrika toplumları bölgelere ayrılmış ve itaatkâr görülmeyen geleneksel otoriteler, saygı çerçevesi dışında görevden alınmış ve yerlerine yeni birileri atanmıştır. Genel olarak Fransız kolonileri ve tabii ki Mali, muhafazakâr unsurların ve askeri gücün kontrolü altında kalmıştır.

Mali, Fransa'dan bağımsızlığını 1960 senesinde kazanmış ve o günden beri belirli siyasi gelişmelere tanıklık etmiştir. Nispeten fakir bir ülke olan Mali, 15,8 milyon nüfusa sahiptir ve nüfusun %64'ü fakirlik sınırının altında yaşamaktadır. Mali'nin sömürgecilik sonrası

geçmişi, 1960 ile 1991 yılları arasında ülkenin tek bir partinin ve askeri diktanın kontrolü altında kaldığını gösterir. Bunun sonucunda, devlet kurumları yolsuzluk yapan elit kesim tarafından gayri meşrulaştırıldı ve bu durum, sadece Mali ordusunu değil, aynı zamanda ülkedeki diğer güvenlik kurumlarını kötü yönde etkiledi ve politikleştirdi ve Mali devletinin daha da zayıflamasına neden oldu. Demokratik yönetimin Mali'de tekrar etkin olması 1992'ye kadar gerçekleşmedi ve o zamanlar, ülke demokratik yönetim için herhangi bir kayda değer altyapıya ve demokratik kuruma sahip değildi. Fakat 1992 ile 2012 yılları arasında, uluslararası topluma göre, ülke, özellikle Batı Afrika bölgesinde demokratik yönetim için referans noktası haline geldi.

1991 senesinde askeri darbe ile Mali'nin devlet lideri olan Ahmadu Toure, 1992 seçimlerinde Alpha Omer Konare'nin sivil bir başkan olarak ortaya çıkmasıyla, 1992'de demokratik şekilde seçilen hükümete devretti. Ahmadu Toure 2002'de tekrar siyasete girdi ve aynı yıl ve devamında 2007'de seçimleri kazanmayı başardı. Ülke 2012 yılında tekrar seçime gitmek üzereyken, Azavad Ulusal Kurtuluş Hareketi (MNLA) adı altında, Tuaregler olarak bilinen bir grup ülkenin kuzey kesiminde ayaklanma başlattı. Genellikle Azavad bölgeleri olarak kabul edilen Kidal, Gao ve Timbuktu şehirleri isyancılar tarafından ele geçirildi. Sahel bölgesinde, Libya, Cezayir, Burkina Faso, Moritanya ve Nijer gibi yerlerde dağınık halde yaşayan yarı göçebe Tuareg grubunu tek bir devlet altında toplamak için, geçmişte bir takım girişimler olmuştu. Mali hükümeti, bağımsızlıktan bu yana, yerleşik Afrikalıların kontrolünü sağlamayı başarmış gibi görünmektedir ve peşi sıra gelen hükümetler de bu grup ile Tuaregler arasındaki kültürel farklılıklarla baş etmeye çalışmıştır. Tuaregler genellikle siyasi sahneden dışlanmış olarak hissetmiş ve Mali hükümeti tarafından belirli temel haklardan yoksun bırakıldıklarını düşünmüşlerdir. Bu şikâyetlerin sonucunda, grup tarafından 1962 ve 1964'de peşi sıra iki ayaklanma başlatılmış ve bu durum, Malili yetkililer ile grup arasında bir ayrılığa ve belirgin bir çatışmaya sebep olmuştur. Bu iki ayaklanma Malili yetkililer tarafından sert bir biçimde bastırılmış ama Malili Tuareglerin çoğunun Sahel bölgesi içinde çeşitli ülkelere göç etmesine sebep olmuştur.

17 Ocak 2012'deki ayaklanmada, Tuaregler ve MNLA Mali güçlerini kuzeyden sürmüş ve Mali otoritelerine karşı ittifak yapan ve savaştan çeşitli isyancı gruplar ile bu bölgeyi işgal etmiştir. Bu gruplardan ikisi, radikal İslamcı Mağrip El Kaidesi (AQIM) ve Kuzey Mali'nin müslümanlaştırılmasını amaçlayan Ansar Dine grubudur. Bu iki İslamcı grubun

amaçlarının, Tuareglerin belirli temel hakları için ve genel olarak Mali hükümeti tarafından dışlanmalarına karşı savaşıyor MNLA'nıninkilerden farklı olduğu ortadadır. Ve hal böyle olunca da, Mali'nin kuzey kesiminin ele geçirilmesinden kısa bir süre sonra, bu iki grup MNLA'yı buradan sürmüş ve Kuzey şehirlerinin kontrolünü ele geçirerek, vakit kaybetmeden bölgede Şeriat veya İslami kanunlar ilan etmiş ve uygulamaya koymuştur.

Bu arada, ülkenin kuzeyini ele geçiren isyancıların başarısı Mali hükümetinin, özellikle ordunun ayaklanmaya karşı gelme konusunda ciddi eleştiriler almasına sebep oldu. Bu da askeri bir darbeyi tetiklemiştir, Mali ordusunun bir kısmı, sivil hükümetin ayaklanmaya karşı tutumunun Mali Devleti'ni zayıf gösterdiğini söylemiştir ve sivil hükümeti suçlamıştır. 22 Mart 2012'de Ahmadu Toure hükümetini fes etmiş ve yerine Yüzbaşı Ahmadu Sango liderliğinde askeri bir rejim kurmuştur. Mali'deki darbe ECOWAS ve genel olarak uluslararası kamuoyu tarafından kınanmış ve Mali çatışmasına müdahale edilmesine sebep olmuştur. Liberya, Sierra Leone ve Nijer krizleri sırasında barış sağlayan ECOMOG'un kurulmasından sonra, Batı Afrika'da barış ve sorun çözümü için kurulan, bölgesel bir örgütlenme olan ECOWAS krize özellikle müdahale etmiştir. Bu örgütlenme öncelikli olarak isyancı gruplar ile Mali'deki askeri darbe öncesindeki sivil yönetim arasında arabuluculuk yapmaya çalışmıştır. ECOWAS, Bakanlar kurulu yoluyla bir barış sağlamaya çalışmış ve bir tür çözüm bulmak için isyancı gruplarla görüşmeler yapmıştır. ECOWAS, askeri darbeye Mali'deki yeni hükümete bir dizi yaptırımlar uygulayarak yanıt vermiştir. Bu yaptırımlar doğrultusunda, Mali'nin bölgesel örgütlenmedeki üyeliği askıya alınmış, Batı Afrika bölgesi içinde seyahat yasağı getirilmiş ve ECOWAS büyükelçilerinin tamamı Mali'den geri çağırılmış ve ECOWAS ülkeleri ile olan bütün sınırlar kapatılmıştır.

ECOWAS, Mali sorununun arabuluculuk ile çözülmesi fikrinden vazgeçse de, en başta askeri müdahalenin de çözüm olacağına, insani ve jeo-stratejik sebeplerden dolayı inanmamıştır. Sahel bölgesi zaman içinde genel olarak oldukça dengesiz bir bölgeye dönüşmüş ve Afrika kıtası içindeki terörist faaliyetler için yeni bir gelişme alanı haline gelmiş gibi görünmektedir. Sahel devletlerinin zayıf ekonomisi ve istikrarsızlığı, silah ve uyuşturucu kaçaklığının, terörizmin ve organize sınır suçlarının ortaya çıkmasına neden olmuştur. Libya'da Kaddafi rejiminin yıkılması, bölgedeki aşırı İslamcı grupların eline geçen silahların çoğalması nedeniyle güvenlik sorununu şiddetlendirmiştir. Bu gruplar arasında AQIM, Boko Haram (Nijerya'nın Kuzey Doğu kesiminde terörizm faaliyetinde bulunan ama eğitimlerini Sahel bölgesinde gerçekleştiren Nijeryalı radikal terör örgütü) ve

Ansar Dine bulunur. Sahel bölgesindeki zayıf ülkeler bölgede faaliyette olan bu terörist gruplar tarafından ezilmektedir ve bütün bölgenin radikalleşmesi ve bunun ortaya çıkardığı sonuçlar neticesinde, bu devletlerin dış bir destek olmadan güvenlik ve birlik sağlamaları mümkün olmayabilir.

Kuzey Mali'nin kontrolü, uzlaşma umudundan yoksun bir şekilde isyancıların kontrolünderken, BMGK'nın 2085 sayılı kararı ile Afrikalı askerlerden oluşan bir kuvvetin Mali'nin toprak bütünlüğünü geri almasına yardım etmesine dair uluslararası bir çağrı yapıldı. Bununla birlikte, 10 Ocak 2013'te isyancılar Mali'nin başkenti Bamako'ya doğru harekete geçti ve başkenti ele geçirmeleri konusunda önlerinde hiçbir engel olmadığı ortadaydı. Sonuç olarak, isyancıların bütün ülkeyi ele geçirmesini engellemek için hızlı ve seri bir hareket gerekliydi ve Afrikalı askerlerden oluşan birlik bu sırada daha seferber edilmemişti. Fransa, Mali Devlet Başkanı veya Malili otoritelerin isteği üzerine, bu tehlikeli durumu engellemek için hızlıca müdahale etme kararı aldı. Fransa'nın bu hareketinin yasallığı hala tartışılan bir konu olarak kaldı ama Fransa Burkina Faso'ya özel hava kuvvetleri birimi yerleştirdi ve Çad, Fildişi Sahili ve Senegal'den gelen birlikler Bamako'yu kurturma operasyonuna katıldı ve üç hafta içinde Timbuktu ve Gao kara hareketlerinin yanı sıra hava bombardımanı ve saldırılarını da kullanan Fransızlar tarafından geri alındı. Fransa, Mali'ye 4000 asker yollarken, Kanada ise Fransa'ya karşılık Mali'ye sadece bir tane CC-177 Globemaster III askeri sevkiyat uçağı vermekle yetindi. Kanada'dan gelen Özel Kuvvetler, Mali'ye sevk edilse de, bunun genel amacı Kanada'ya ait mülkleri ve Bamako'daki Kanada Büyükelçiliği'ni korumaktı.

Fransa Devlet Başkanı Hollande, Fransa'nın müdahale etmek ve Fransa ve Avrupa veya Batı için ciddi güvenlik tehditleri yaratabilecek olan, “terörist devlet” diye tanımladığı şeyin ortaya çıkmasını engellemek dışında başka bir seçeneğinin olmadığını söyledi. Mali devletinin çoktan çökmüş ve silahlı kuvvetlerinin saldırıda bulunan isyancı gruplara ve onların İslamcı müttefiklerine karşı koyamamış olması ve aynı zamanda BM onaylı Afrikalı askeri birliğin zamanında sevk edilememiş olması, Fransız müdahalesini meşrulaştırdı. Fransa, Fransa'nın kendisinin desteklediği ama prensipte sadece Afrikalı askeri bir birliğin konuşlanmasına yetki veren 2085 sayılı BMGK kararına dayanarak meşrulaştırdı.

Fransa, temel olarak Mali ordusuna ve devletine İslamcı grupların bütün ülkeyi ele geçirmemesi konusunda yardım etmek olan müdahale amacını meşru kılmıştı. Fakat

Fransa Mali'nin bir ülke olarak bütünlüğünü korumanın ve isyancılar tarafından esir alınan Fransızları kurtarmanın da yollarını aradı. Bununla birlikte, gazetecilerin ve akademisyenlerin Fransa'nın Mali'deki eylemleri konusundaki görüşleri birbirinden farklıydı. Genel olarak, bazıları Fransa'nın eylemlerini sadece Moritanya, Burkina Faso, Gine, Cezayir ve Nijer'den oluşan Sahel Bölgesindeki ulusal çıkarını korumak olarak yorumladı. Fransa, Sahel bölgesindeki ülkelerin maden kaynaklarına yönelik temel bir ilgiye sahip gibi görünmektedir ve Cezayir petrol sahalarında, Nijer'deki uranyum üretim yerlerinde çok fazla sayıda yatırım yapmıştır ve Mali'de yaklaşık 6000 Fransız vatandaşının yaşadığı söylenmektedir. Ve Fransa'nın hızlı davranarak Mali'de harekât yapmasını açıklamak için bu nedenler dile getirilmiştir.

Diğer akademisyenler ise, Mali'deki çatışma ve müdahaleyi tamamen jeo-politik ve jeo-ekonomik boyuttan açıklamaya çalışmıştır ve müdahaleyi büyük güçlerin bu bölgede kontrol sağlama mücadelesi olarak görmüştür. Fransa'nın hareketinin genel olarak Amerika'nın, eski sömürgeci güç olan Fransa'nın etki alanı olan bölgedeki varlığından kaynaklandığını söylemişlerdir. Bu rekabet, bölgedeki maden kaynaklarına ilgi gösteren BRIC ülkeleri Rusya, Hindistan ve Çin'in Afrika'nın çeşitli bölgelerinde varlık göstermesi ile daha da genişlemiştir. Çin'in Afrika'daki varlığı ve rolü, Afrika'nın eski sömürgeci güçlerinin ekonomik faaliyetlerini tehdit etmektedir ve Fransa, ABD ve Çin, Hindistan ve Rusya gibi BRIC ülkeleri arasında bölgenin kontrolü konusunda güçlü bir rekabet vardır.

Bu iddialara rağmen, Fransız müdahalesi, bazı kaynaklara göre, özellikle ABD'ye büyük avantajlar sağlamıştır. Amerikalıların, bir takım Afrika ülkeleri ile askeri yardım programları gerçekleştirdiği ve bu bölgeyi jeo-stratejik haritalarına yerleştirdiği bilinmektedir. Ve ABD'nin müttefiki olan Afrika ülkelerini terörist rejimlere kaybetmek konusunda tepkisiz kalmayacağı düşünülmüştür. Fransa'nın Mali'deki Serval Operasyonu'na verilen ABD desteğini açıklamak için iki neden öne sürülmüştür. Birincisi, Fransa'nın eski sömürgeci olarak ülkeyle olan tarihsel bağıdır. Fransa, Amerikalılara nazaran Mali topraklarına daha aşinadır. İkincisi, Fransa NATO üyesidir ve aynı askeri ittifakın içinde buldukları için ABD'nin bu konuda bir çekince yaşamasına gerek yoktur. Ve Başkan Obama, genel olarak, Mali'deki çatışmadan ziyade başka meselelere öncelik vermiş gibi görünmektedir. ABD'nin Mali meselesine dahil olmaması, ABD'nin Mali'deki Fransız müdahalesine verdiği destek vermesi ile açıklansa da, ABD Mali'deki Fransız harekâtına her türlü destek vermek konusunda gönüllüydü ve ABD'nin doğrudan

müdahalesi için bir gerekçe yoktu. Ve ABD ve Başkan Obama Fransız hareketi konusundaki desteklerini açıkça dile getirmiş ve Mali'deki Fransız müdahalesini desteklemek için her türlü katkıyı sağlamaya hazır olduklarını söylemişti.

ECOWAS, Fransız müdahalesinin en başta bölgedeki güvenlik sorunları konusunda Pandora'nın Kutusu'nu açacağını düşünmüştü çünkü bu müdahale sonrasında terörist gruplar Sahel bölgesi boyunca farklı yerlere dağılmıştı. Fakat genel görüşe göre, Avrupa destekli Fransız müdahalesi Mali'de olumlu karşılandı. Fransız müdahalesinin isyancı gruplarla savaşma konusunda ilerleme kaydedilmesine sağladığı kabul edilse de, Fransız Seval Operasyonu'nun sonrasında, Afrikalı Kuvvetleri'nin (AFISMA) BM'nin direktifleri doğrultusunda bölgeye hızlıca sevk edilmesi gerekiyordu. ECOWAS, 11 Kasım 2012'de düzenlediği bir toplantının ardından, Kuzey Mali'yi İslamcı gruplardan geri almak üzere 3,300 askerden oluşan bir müdahale kararı aldı. Bu karar, Afrika Birliği Barış ve Güvenlik Konseyine bildirildi ve konsey tarafından uygun bulundu. Fransız müdahalesinin öncesinde, bu bölgesel örgütlenme isyancı gruplar ve Malili otoriteler arasında bir tür uzlaşma sağlamaya çalışılmıştı. Fakat ECOWAS ülkelerinin ve hükümetlerinin karşı çıktığı darbeden sonra darbe liderlerinden yönetimi devralan Geçici Mali Devlet Başkanı Dioncounda Traore'nin isteği ve AFISMA'nın konuşlandırılmasına dair BM Güvenlik Konseyi'nin 2085 sayılı kararının onaylanması neticesinde, Benin, Burkina Faso, Nijer, Nijerya, Togo ve Senegal'den gelen yaklaşık 8000 askerden oluşan bir Batı Afrika birliğinin harekâtı Fransızlardan devralması bekleniyordu. Fransız harekâtı İslamcı örgütleri Kuzey Mali'deki sığınaklarından çıkarmasının sonrasında, Sahel bölgesi ve Mali'deki güvenlik durumu maalesef hala istikrarlı değildir. Bu arada, Malili kuvvetler zayıf, finanse edilmemiş ve yetersiz ekipmana sahip durumdadır. Başkanlık seçimlerine hazırlanan ülkede, topluluklar arası şiddet ve intikam saldırıları riski oldukça yüksektir. Sonuç olarak, Afrika Kuvvetleri (AFISMA) ve Fransız birliklerinin geriye bıraktıklarının, ulusal uzlaşma için gerekli olan sosyal ve ekonomik reformlara için yeterli olmayacağı düşünüldü. Sonuç olarak, Nisan 2013'te, Birleşmiş Milletler 12,000 askerden oluşan güçlü bir barış gücünün yaratılmasını ve Mali'de konuşlandırılmasını onayladı. Bu gücün adı, "Mali'de Çok Boyutlu Entegre İstikrar Misyonu" (MINUSMA) olacaktı. Bu, Mali'deki büyük şehirleri ve otopanları ve yolları korumakla görevli olacaktı ama Cihatçı savaşçılarla herhangi bir şekilde karşı karşıya gelmeyeceklerdi. Bunlar, 1000 kişilik güçlü bir Fransız birliği sorumluluğuna bırakıldı. MINUSMA Mali'deki operasyonlarına Temmuz 2013'te

başladı. 28 Temmuz 2013'te seçimler gerçekleşti ve 11 Ağustos'taki ikinci turda İbrahim Boubacar Keita, Soumalia Cisse'yi geçerek Mali'nin demokratik olarak seçilmiş yeni başkanı oldu.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS AND DOCUMENTS

Achterberg A. Van, Van Geiten Narr Goud: Veranderingen in de Sociaal-Economische Positie Van Toearegvrouwen in Tamanrasset. (M.A Thesis Anthropology, Amsterdam University 1988)

Belimat N., "Le Chant des Fauves": Poesies Chantees de la Resistance Touaregue Contemporaine (Memoire de Maitrise Ethnologie/Ethnomusicology, Universite Paris X Nanterre 1996).

Cutter Ch., Nation Building in Mali: Art, Radio, and Leadership in A Pre-Literate Society. (PhD Thesis Political Science, University of California Los Angeles 1971).

Droge K., Die Tuaregrebellion in der Malischen Presse (MA Thesis, Siegen University 1999).

Klute G., Die Rebellione Der Tuareg in Mali Und Niger (Habilitationsschrift, Siegen University 2001).

Letter du 1er adjoint au Commandant du Cercle Kidal a Gouverneur de Gao. Sujet- Mouvement de liberation des Terres Tamacheq, December, 1990.

Mann G., The Tirailleurs Elsewhere: Military Veterans in Colonial and Post Colonial Mali, 1918-1968 (PhD Thesis History, Northwestern University 2000).

Proces verbal de la rencontre entre la Delegation du Gouvernement du Mali et la Delegation du Movement Populaire de l'Azaouad et du Front Islamique Arabe de l'Azaouad a Tamanrasset, les 5 et 6 Janvier 1991.

Swift J., The Economics of Traditional Pastoralism: The Tuareg of the Adrar n Iforss (Mali) (PhD Thesis Economic University Microfilm International Michigan 1979).

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

Council of The European Union, New Mission Commander for EUTM Mali, Press Release, 9 October 2014, Brussels.

Council of The European Union, EUCAP Sahel: EU Support Mission for Internal Security in Mali Established, 8773/14, 15 April 2014, Luxembourg.

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) , Protocol Relating to The Mechanism For Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace Keeping and Security, December 1999, ECOWAS Commission, Abuja.

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Conclusions of The Fifth Meeting of The Support and Follow-Up Group on The Situation in Mali, Bamako International Conference Centre, 1 July 2013.

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Preliminary Agreement on The Presidential Election and Inclusive Peace Talks in Mali.

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Extraordinary Session of The ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council Final Report, 9 November 2012, Abuja.

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Memorandum on Mali, 30th Meeting of the Mediation and Security Council, 15 July 2013, Abuja.

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Communiqué of The Emergency Mini-Summit of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government on The Situation in Mali, Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire, 29 March 2012.

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Report of The Forty-Third Ordinary Session of The ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government and 30th Meeting of the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council, 17-18 July 2013.

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Final Report of The Extraordinary Session of The ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council, Abidjan, 25 February 2013.

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Report of The 30th Ordinary Meeting of The Mediation and Security Council, 15 July 2013, Abuja.

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Revised Treaty of ECOWAS, Executive Secretariat Abuja.

Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights On the Human Rights Situation in Mali, A/HRC/23/57, 6 June 2013.

International Donors Conference 'Together For Mali', Joint Chairs' Conclusions, 15 May 2013.

Republic of Mali, Together For A New Mali, Plan For The Sustainable Recovery of Mali 2013-2014 Final Version, International Conference, Brussels, 15 May 2013.

The White House, Memo To President Obama, The Need For A Stronger U.S. Policy Towards The Crisis in Mali, National Security Adviser Donilon, 15 February 2013.

United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, S/2013/189, 26 March 2013.

United Nations General Assembly, Human Rights Council Twenty Fifth Session, Report of the Independent Expert Suliman Baldo on The Situation of Human Rights in Mali. A/HRC/25/72, 10 January 2014.

United Nation Security Council, Resolution 2100 Adopted by the Security Council at Its 6952nd Meeting, S/RES/2100(2013), 25 April 2013.

United Nations Security Council, 6985th Meeting, Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Mali, S/2013/338, 25 June 2013, New York.

BOOKS AND ARTICLES

Ahisala N, African Standby Force : West Africa Moves On, African Security Review, Vol 13, No 2.

Albaka M., D. Casajus, Poesies et Chants Tuaregs de l'Ayr, Paris, 1992.

Allman J., The Quills of the Porcupine-Asante Nationalism in an Emergent Ghana, Madisson, 1993.

Amoda J, Will Nigeria lead ECOWAS To Be A Footnote to The French in Mali?, Vanguard Newspapers, www.vanguardngr.com.

Andrew Lebovich, Post Conflict Mali: Reprisal or Reconciliation?, Academic/Article, Think Africa Press, 27 February, 2013, www.thinkafricapress.com/mali/reprisal-or-reconciliation-mali-post-conflict-peace.

Anour Boukhars, The Mali Conflict: Avoiding Past Mistakes, FRIDE Policy Briefs, No 148, February 2013.

Ashcroft B., G. Griffiths, H. Tiffin, 'Race', Post Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts, London, 2000.

Bakare Sambe, The Crisis in Mali: Origins, Development and Impact on the Sub-region, KAS International reports, December 2012.

Barnett M.M, M.O Donnell, L Sitea, Peace Building: What Is In A Name? Global Governance, Vol 13.

Barate C., 'Administration Locale et Socialisme Dans le Mali Independent', Revue Juridique et Politique Cooperation et Independance 3, 1977.

Barth F., Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. The Social Organization of Culture Difference, Oslo, 1969.

Behnke R., The Herders of the Cyrenaica, Ecology, Economy, and Kinship among the Bedouin of Eastern Libya, Chicago, 1980.

Belalimat N., 'Le Rapport a l'Histoire Dans Le Chants de Lutte de la Resistance Touareque Contemporaire', Les Cahiers de l'IREMAM 7/8, 1996.

Bellil R., B. Dida, ' Evolution de la Relation Entre Kel Ahaggar et Kel Adagh', Cahiers de l'IREMAM 4, 1993

Bernus E, 'Le Nomadisme Pastoral en Question', Etudes Rurales 120, 1990.

Bernus E., S. Bernus, 'L'evolution de la Condition Servile Chez Les Touaregs Saheliens', Paris, 1975.

Bernus E, et. Al (eds), Nomades et Commandants- Administration et Societes Nomades dans l'ancienne A.O.F, Paris, 1993.

- Bernus S., et.al. (eds), *Le Fils et le Neveu. Jeux et Enjeu de Parente Touaregue*, Cambridge, 1986.
- Boiley P, *Les Touaregs Kel Adagh. Dependances et Revoltes: Du Soudan Francais Au Mali Contemporain*, Paris, 1999.
- Brujin M., de H. Van Dijk, *Arid Ways. Cultural Understandings of Insecurity in Fulbe Society, Central Mali*, Amsterdam, 1995.
- Bruce Whitehouse, *Behind Mali's Conflict: Myth, Realities and Unknowns*, Blog/Academic, 16 January, 2013, www.bridgesfrombamako.com/2013/01/16/behind-mali-conflict/.
- Bruce Whitehouse, *What To Love About Mali?*, Academic/Blog, 4 February, 2013. www.bridgesfrombamako.com/2013/02/04.
- Bruce Whitehouse, *What Threat From Mali's Islamist Groups?*, Academic/Blog, 11 February, 2013, www.bridgesfrombamako.com/2013/02/11.
- Bruce Whitehouse, *Understanding Mali's "Tuareg Problem"*, Academic/Blog, 25 February, 2013, www.bridgesfrombamako.com/2013/02/25.
- C. Meillassoux, *L'esclavage en Afrique Precoloniale*, Paris, 1975.
- Campmas P., *L'Union Soudanaise R.D.A L'histoire d'un Grand Parti Politique Africaine*, Tome Premiere (1946-1960), Abidjan.
- Chapman M., M. McDonald, E. Tonkin (eds.) *History and Ethnicity*, London, 1989.
- Claudot-Hawad, H., 'Coups et Contre-Coups: l'honneur en jeu chez les Touaregs', *Les Touaregs Portrait en Fragments*, Aix-en-Provence, 1993.
- Claudot-Hawad, H., (ed.), *Le Politique dans l'histoire Touareg. Les Cahiers de l'IREMAM* 4, 1993.
- Captain Lars Scraeyen, *Mali: Antagonists or Terrorists Around the Table?*, E Note 9, 25 January, 2013.
- Damien Helly, Camilla Rocca, *The Mali Crisis and Africa-Europe Relations*, ecdpm Briefing Note, No 52, June 2013.

David J Francis, The regional Impact of Armed Conflict and French Intervention in Mali, Norwegian Peace Building Resource Center Reports, April 2013.

Defending Democracy; Mali, A Global Survey of Foreign Policy Trends 1992-2002, Democracy Coalition Project.

Edward Newman, Failed States and International Order: Constructing a Post Westphalian World.

Ernst K., Tradition and Progress in the African Village: The Non-Capitalist Transformation of Rural Communities in Mali, London , 1976.

Evans-Pritchard E., The Nuer, New York, 1940.

FAO, Component of the Sahel 2013 Humanitarian Appeals, www.fao.org

FAO, FAO's Response to the 2012 Sahel Crisis, www.fao.org

Francis Rodd, "Origins of the Tuaregs", The Geographical Journal, Vol 67, No 1, November 2013.

Freedom C. Onuoha, Alex Thurston, Franco-Africa Military Intervention in the Mali Crisis and Evolving Security Concerns, Al-Jazeera Center for Studies, 19 February, 2013.

Fridja N., 'De Lex Talionis: Over Wraak', De Psychologie heeft zin, Amsterdam, 1993.

French Speaking West Africa, Current History, Vol XLV-268, 1963.

Fukuyama F, The Imperative of State Building, Journal of Democracy, Vol 15, No 2.

Folz W.J., From French West Africa to the Mali Federation, New Haven & London, 1965.

Gelliner E., Nations and Nationalism, Oxford, 1983.

Giantz M., (ed.), The Politics of Natural Disaster: The Case of the Sahel Drought, New York, 1976.

Gilmore D. (ed.), Honor and Shame and the Unity of the Mediterranean, Washington, 1987.

Glassman J., 'Sorting Out the Tribes: The Creation of Racial Identities in Colonial Zanzibar's Newspaper Wars', Journal of African History, Vol 41, 2000.

Gurt T., B. Harif, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics*, Boulder & Oxford, 1994.

Hannah Armstrong, *Winning the War, Losing the Peace in Mali*, New Republic Academic/Article, 28 February, 2013, www.newrepublic.com/article/112539/malis-ethnic-tensions-fester-after-fighting.

Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2013 on Mali*, www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapter/mali.

Human Rights Watch, *Mali: Malian Army, Islamist Groups, Executed Prisoners*, NGO, 1 February, 2013, www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/01/mali-malian-army-islamist-groups-executed-prisoners.

Henry J-R., 'Les Touaregs des Francais', *Les cahiers de l'IREMAM* 7/8, 1996.

Hopkins N., *Popular Government in an African Town, Kita, Mali*, Chicago, 1972.

Ibn Batuta, *Travels in Asia and Africa, 1325-1354*; Translated and Selected by A.A.R.Gibb With Introduction and Notes, London, 1929.

Ibn Khaldun, *Histoire des Berbers et des Dynasties Musulmanes de l'Afrique Septentrionale*; Traduit de l'Arabe Par le Baron de Slane, (Algiers 1852-1865).

Idris A., *Sudan's Civil War: Slavery, Race and Formational Identities*, Lewiston, 2001.

Israeli R., *PLO in Lebanon: Selected Documents*, London , 1983.

Jamous R., *Honneur et Baraka. Structures Sociales Traditionnelles dans Ir Rif*, Cambridge, 1981.

Jackson Robert H, "Quasi States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World. I: International Organization nr. 4, 1987.

Jackson Robert H, "Negative Sovereignty in Sub-Saharan Africa. I: Review of International Studies nr. 4, 10, 1986.

Jean-Baptiste de Boissiere, *Operation Serval in Mali: The Fight Against Terrorism and the Strengthening of Fragile States*, *The National Strategy Forum Review*, Vol 22, 2013.

Jean-Marie Fardeau and Kenneth Roth, Letter to French President Hollande on Situation in Mali, NGO, 21 January, 2013, www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/21/letter-french-president-hollande-situation-mali.

Jeremy Konyndyk, Mercy Corps, Mali: What We Must Get Right Before World's Attention Falls Elsewhere, The Guardian, 19 February, 2013, www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/feb/19/mali-worlds-attention-elsewhere.

Jok J. M., War and Slavery in Sudan, Philadelphia, 2001.

Jones W., Planning and Economic Policy: Socialist Mali and her Neighbours, Washington, 1976.

Kabore G., 'La Paix Fragile de Tamanrasset', Jeune Afrique, No 16, 22 January, 1991.

Keita M., Discourse et Inventions, Bamako, 1965.

Kingebiel S, Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture: Converging the Roles of External Actors and African Interests, African Security Review, Vol 14, No 2.

Kiresi Aning, Frank Okyere, Mustapha Abdullahi, Addressing Emerging Security Threats in Post Gaddafi Sahel and ECOWAS Response to the Malian Crisis, Kofi Anan International Peace Keeping Center Policy Brief, 1 May, 2013.

Klein M., 'Slavery and French Rule in the Sahara', Slavery and Abolition, Vol 19, 1998.

Klute G., Die Schwere Arbeit Der Welt- Alltag Von Touareg-Nomadeb, Munchen, 1992.

Major General Olivier Tramond and Lt Col Phillipe Seigneur, Early Lessons from France's Operation Serval in Mali, Army, June 2013.

Marc Andre Boisvert, The Unexpected Crisis, A Year Later, 31 December, 2012. www.matsutas.wordpress.com.

Marc Andre Boisvert, Reports From Mali, Academic/Blog, 11 February, 2013. www.matsutas.wordpress.com/2013/02/11/report-from-mali.

Mats Utas, On Sporadic Radicalism, Presentaion/Blog Online, 27 January, 2012. www.matutas.wordpress.com/2012/01/27.

Mats Utas, Post Kaddafi Repercussions in the Sahel: The Mali Emergency, Questions of Radicalization and Emerging West African Discourses of “Clashing Civilizations”, Academic Blog ,7 October 19,2012, www.matsutas.wordpress.com/2012/07/10.

Mats Utas, The Best Recipe for Protracted Warfare in Mali is Aerial Bombing and Rushed Deployment of Peacekeeping Forces, Academic Blog, 14 January, 2013, www.matsutas.wordpress.com/2013/01/14.

Mats Utas, New Situation in Mali and Wider Sahel, Academic/Blog, 1 February, 2013, www.matsutas.wordpress.com/2013/02/01.

Morten Boas, Liv Elin Torheim, Mali Unmasked: Resistance, Collusion, Collaboration, NOREF, March 2012 Report, www.peacebuilding.no/Regions/Africa/Mali/Publication/Mali-unmasked-resistance-collusion-collaboration.

Morten Boas, Myten Om Mali, Dagsavisen, Academic/Article, 1 March, 2013, www.dagsavisen.no/nyemeninger/alle_meninger/cat1002/subcat1021/thread268586/#post_268676.

Morten Boas, Belmokhtar og Zeid Drept? Er Dette et Vendepunkt?, Dagsavisen, Academic/Article, 4 March, 2013, www.dagsavisen.no/nyemeninger/alle_meninger/cat1002/subcat1021/thread268815/#post_268815.

Ministry of Defense, UK-France Relationship Strong in Mali Operations, News Story, www.gov.uk/news/uk

Murithi T, African Indigenous and Endogenous Approaches to Peace and Conflict Resolution in Africa, New York, Zed Books.

Newman E, Securitization Vs Desecuritizing African Problems, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol 30, No 1.

Norris H., The Tuaregs: Their Legacy and its Diffusion in the Sahel, Warminster, 1975.

Olli Teirila, Military Intervention Brings No Simple Solution To Conflict in Mali, Academic Blog, 18 December, 2012, www.matutas.wordpress.com

Ouattara T., *Le Destin du Socialisme Malien*, Bamako, 1979.

OXFAM, *Mali's Conflict Refugees: Responding to Growing Crisis*, OXFAM Briefing Papers, No 167, January, 2013.

Paul Rogers, *Al Qaeda, Idea in Motion*, Academic/Online, 20 March, 2013, www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/al-qaida-idea-in-motion.

Paul Rogers, *Mali, Dynamics of War*, Academic/Online, 15 January, 2013, www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/mali-dynamic-of-war.

Paul Rogers, *Algeria, Mali and Beyond*, Academic/Online, 21 January, 2013, www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/algeria-mali-and-beyond.

Paul Rogers, *Mali, and the Al-Qaida Trap*, Academic/Online, 25 January, 2013, www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/mali-and-al-qaida-trap.

Paul Rogers, *Mali, War After War*, Academic/Online, 20 March, 2013, www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/mali-war-after-war.

Paul Rogers, *Mali, and Remote Control War*, Academic/Online, 28 February, 2013, www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/mali-and-remote-control-war.

Peristiany J., J. Pitt-Rivers (eds.), *Honor and Grace in Anthropology*, Cambridge, 1992.

Rafael Grasa, Oscar Mateos, *Conflict and Security in Africa: An Assessment and New Questions After 50 Years of African Independence*, ICIP Working Papers, August, 2010.

Raffaella del Sarto, R. And Tholens, S, *Conflict at the EU'S Southern Border: The Sahel Crisis*, Academic/Online, 20 March, 2013, www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/ern-borders-sahel-crisis.

Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*, Cambridge, 1990.

Rosemary McCarney, *Mali: The People Behind The Headlines*, Huffington Post, 22 February, 2013, NGO, www.huffintonpost.ca/rosemary-mccarney/mali-crisis-malnutrition_b_2736033.html.

Rossilin C., 'CIVIC Service and Community Works in Mali', International Labour Review, XCIII-1, 1996.

Roland Marshall, The Coup in Mali: Result of a Long Term Crisis or Spill Over from the Libyan Civil War?, NOREF Online, 20 March, 2013.

www.peacebuilding.no/regions/Africa/publications/The-coup-in-Mali-the-result-of-a-long-term-crisis-or-spillover-from-the-Libyan-civil-war.

Said E., Orientalism, New York, 1978.

Savage E. (ed.), The Human Commodity- Perspectives on the Trans-Saharan Slave Trade, London, 1992.

Schachter-Morgenthau R., Political Parties in French Speaking West Africa, Oxford, 1964.

Sheets H., R. Morris, Disaster in the Desert: Failures of International Relief in the West African Drought, Washington, 1974.

Shryock A., Nationalism and Genealogical Imagination- Oral History and Textual Authority in Tribal Jordan, Berkeley, 1977.

Situation Update, The Sahel Crisis, 22 April, 2013.

Smith A., The Ethnic Origins of NATIONS, Oxford, 1986.

Spittler G., Les Touaregs Face aux Secheresses et aux Famine- Les Kel Ewey de l'Air, Paris, 1993.

Stewart Webb, Mali: The Growing Conflict, Espirit de Corps, March, 2013.

Tesdall S, France's Lonely Intervention in Mali, The Guardian, 14 January, 2013.
www.guardian.co.uk.

'The Political Thought of Modibbo Keita', Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol 1, 1967.

The Political Revival of Mali, World Today, Vol XXI-4, 1965.

H. Johnson, The Political Use of Economic Planning in Mali, Chicago, 1967.

Traore A., Cheikh Hamahoullah-Homme de Foi at Resistant, Paris, 1983.

Stephen Ellis, The Mali Effect, Academic/Online, 7 March, 2013, www.opendemocracy.net/stephen-ellis/mali-effect.

United Nations, Reconciliation Efforts Urgently Needed in Mali to Address Displacements, United Nations News Center, 1 March, 2013, www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44258.

United Nations, Two Out Of Three Victims Of Leftover Munitions in Mali in Mali Are Children, UN Says, United Nations News Center, 5 March, 2013, www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44280.

Wallace G. Mills, French Approaches in Colonial Policy, www.sailor.org.

Webster D., 'Journey to the Heart of the Sahara', National Geographic, 195-III, March, 1999.

Winston P. Nagan, Aita M. Haddad, Sovereignty in Theory and Practice, University of Florida Levin College of Law, 2012.

Winter M., 'Slavery and the Pastoral Twareg of Mali', Cambridge Anthropology, Vol 9, 1984.

Wolfram Lacher and Denis M. Tull, Mali: Beyond Counter Terrorism, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, www.swp-berlin.org/en/scientist-detail/profile/wolfram_lacher.html.

Yvan Guichaoua, Mali: The Fallacy fo Ungoverned Spaces, Part 1, Academic/Blog, 14 February, 2013, www.matsutas.wordpress.com/2013/02/14.

Yvan Guichaoua, Mali: Towards a Neo-Trusteeship?, Part 2, Academic/Blog, 26 February, 2013, www.matsutas.wordpress.com/2013/02/26.

Zolberg A., Creating Political Order- The Party States of West Africa, Chicago, 1966.

TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü -

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü -

YAZARIN

Soyadı :

Adı :

Bölümü :

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) :

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans - Doktora -

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. -
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. -
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınmaz. -

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: