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**FAILED TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT**

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## PLAGIARISM PAGE

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## ABSTRACT

### FAILED TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT

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Democracy is one of the most demanded issues not only in Egypt but also in the region. Egyptian people have tried to reach democracy for a long time. Sometimes they tried to rise up to the authoritarian leaders yet; they failed all the time because of the weak support of the citizens. At the end of 2010, the Egyptian people supported the mass demonstration against the authoritarian rulers. The people in the region see that if they are a huge and decisive mass, then the ruler would have to stop doing undemocratic governance. Therefore, the uprising in Egypt had great hopes for a new politics in the region in which people freely vote for their political leaders. Hosni Mubarak was ousted after 18 days of uprising during the revolution on the 11<sup>th</sup> February 2011 in Egypt. He resigned from presidency and gave a mandate to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). The people optimistically believed that the old system would be replaced with the new democratic one. Among the Egyptians, there were significant differences in how these goals were understood in practice and how they would be reconciled with the cultural and, in particular religious' values. Mohamed Morsi, who was the first democratically elected president, was over thrown from the presidency by force from the military coup d'état on the 03<sup>rd</sup> July 2013. The domestic factors paved the way for the failure of Morsi namely the democratic transition process. Also the external factors both the global and regional powerful states secretly supported the coup and they gave financial aids just after the counter-revolution. This transition process was also blocked by the established order. Therefore, the main purpose of this dissertation is to find out the reasons for failure of the transition to democracy in Egypt. This dissertation argues why transition to democracy in Egypt failed.

**Keywords:** Egypt, Democracy, Arab Spring, Revolution, Military Coup D'état

## ÖZET

### MISIR'DA DEMOKRASIYE BAŞARISIZ GEÇİŞ SÜRECİ

TURAN, Şuayip

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Demokrasi sadece Mısır'da değil, bölgede de en çok talep edilen konulardan biridir. Mısır halkı uzun zamandır demokrasiye ulaşmaya çalıştı. Bazen otoriter liderlere başkaldırmaya çalıştılar fakat halkın zayıf desteği yüzünden her zaman başarısız oldular. 2010'un sonuna gelindiğinde, Mısır halkı otoriter yöneticilere karşı kitlesel gösteriyi destekledi. Bölgedeki insanlar, büyük ve belirleyici bir kitle olduklarında, baskıcı yöneticilerinin demokratik olmayan bir yönetim anlayışını bırakmak zorunda kaldıklarını anladılar. Bu nedenle, Mısır'daki ayaklanma, insanların siyasi liderleri için özgürce oy kullanabilecekleri bölgede yeni bir geçiş için büyük umutlar taşıyorlardı. Hüsnü Mübarek 11 Şubat 2011'de Mısır'da 18 gün süren ayaklanma sonrasında devrildi. Başkanlıktan istifa etti ve Silahlı Kuvvetler Yüksek Konseyi'ne (SKYK) görevini devretti. İnsanlar iyimser bir şekilde eski sistemin yeni demokratik olanla değiştirileceğine inanıyorlardı. Mısırlılar arasında, bu hedeflerin pratikte nasıl anlaşıldığı, kültürel ve özellikle de dinî değerler ile nasıl uzlaşılacağı konusunda önemli farklılıklar vardı. Demokratik olarak seçilen ilk cumhurbaşkanı olan Mohamed Morsi, 3 Temmuz 2013'te askeri darbe ile cumhurbaşkanlığından uzaklaştırıldı. İç faktörler Morsi'ye diğer bir ifade ile demokrasiye geçişin başarısızlığına sebep oldu. Hem bölgesel hem de batılı küresel aktörler darbeyi gizlice desteklediler ve karşı devrimden hemen sonra mali yardımlarda bulundular. Bu geçiş süreci de müesses nizam tarafından engellendi. Bu nedenle, bu tezin ana amacı Mısır'da demokrasiye geçişin başarısızlık nedenlerini bulmaktır. Bu tez, Mısır'da demokrasiye geçişinin neden başarısız olduğunu tartışıyor.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Mısır, Demokrasi, Arab Baharı, Devrim, Askeri Darbe

To my beloved family...



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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

ASU: Arab Socialist Union (Hizbu't Tecemmu'l- İştiraki)

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency

EEDC: Egypt Economic Development Conference

ERTU: Egyptian Radio and Television Union

EU: European Union

FJP: Freedom and Justice Party

GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

GMEP: Greater Middle East Project

GNP: Gross National Product

LP: Liberal Party

MB: Muslim Brotherhood

MENA: Middle East and North Africa

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDP: National Democratic Party

NGO: Non-Governmental Organization

NPUP: Nationalist Progressive Unionist Party (Hizb al-Tagammu 'al-Taqaddumi al-Wahdawi)

NSF: National Salvation Front

NWP: New Wafd Party, (Hizb al-Wafd al-Jadid)

OSCE: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

PJD: Justice and Development Party (Partide la Justice et du Développement)

SCAF: Supreme Council of the Armed Forces

SLP: Socialist Labour Party (Hizb al- 'Amal al-İştiraki)

SME: Small and Medium-sized Enterprise

UAE: United Arab Emirates

UGTT: Tunisian General Labor Union

USA: United States of America

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WTO: World Trade Organization

YMMA: Young Men's Muslim Association



## **CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION**

The democratic transition is very difficult for most of the Arab countries as their state structures and institutions are mostly different from the western countries. Democracy is a government system in which political leaders are elected by the citizens in free, fair and regular elections. Democracy is just a political methodology that enables selecting political leadership via the will of the people. The citizens in a country have a preferential right to select their leaders among rival political parties competing for more votes. When they choose a leader then the last decisions are generally taken by politicians between elections. In the following elections, citizens are able to take the positions of their elected officials. Crick (2002) highlights that “the idea and practice of democracy have captured the attention of scholars, politicians, activists, and revolutionaries and served as the focus for a lively and often intense debate regarding the specific character of a ‘genuinely’ democratic polity” (p.121). Therefore, it has not been easy to make national elections in order to create a democratically freely chosen leadership. Zguri (2012) stated that “democracy is something people learn with time” (p. 432). The meaning of democracy according to R. Dahl’s criteria is very important so as to understand why the people in Egypt struggle. Governing the citizens is a chief objective of the democracy, just as it is not enough to think a state is completely democratic. Moreover, Dahl, (1998) emphasizes that “power affects people positively; it becomes clear that both government and procedures are not merely a reflection of human nature, but also contain a productive component that helps shape human conduct” (p. 48). Schumpeter (2003) defines democracy as being “an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’ votes” (p.260). Schumpeter's definition displays that countries differ in the degree to which institutional decisions are made, more than the specific ‘method’ where they arise.

There is a list of criteria which allows people to choose their political leaders among one of the modern contemporary definitions of the democracy. These lists of criteria especially known by Robert Dahl and of course, these standards have lately emerged decades after the establishment of many accepted democracies. However, these lists of criteria, which will be mentioned later, supply accessible targets for democratizing countries with guidelines to help

strengthen the weak and static democracies. Dahl (1998) states that “the eight political institutions that a large-scale (country-level) democracy requires are: elected officials; free, fair, and frequent elections; freedom of expression; alternative sources of information; associational autonomy (the right to form organizations such as political parties); inclusive citizenship (universal adult suffrage)” (p.85). A healthy democracy necessitates that citizens can be actively and freely elected in the public life. Democracies evolve when citizens are willing to participate in public debate, choose representatives and join political parties. Without this wide participation, democracy cannot develop and democracy begins to become a guardian of small and elite groups. Participation is also an essential constituent because extremism, extreme point and abstention are the enemies of democracy.

Democracy has long been accepted as the most satisfactory style of the ruling for not only the international society but also for the people of the Arabic Republic of Egypt. Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak eras had been very difficult for nearly all Egyptian people as well as they had no right but to obey their only one leader. When the situation in Egypt is explained, elections could be seen in these three eras too. But these elections were not free and fair. Therefore, there were some difficulties in making national elections and creating democratically elected governance. Several Egyptian people maintain the struggle for the transitions to democracy in Egypt. They had tried many times to uprising and voice up, but the people could not find supporters from their nations as they were scared from their dictator leaders and also from the international community. Yet, the implementations of democracy would give the people of the region a chance to reflect their national will in their country's decision-making mechanisms. When it came to the end of 2010, nations in Middle East and North Africa started to awaken as the international system and conjecture had mostly changed in the region. The struggle for freedom and bread (economic welfare) by the masses are also another issue in this study. This dissertation, by aiding to understand Egyptian opinion about democracy, will improve the international community's awareness of Egypt in a specific situation along with North Africa in general with their new freedom of choice on their path to democratic government. Democratic thought proceeded rapidly to take form in Egypt in 2011; so the opinion of common Egyptian women and men were very important in this process.



## 1.1. Statement of the Problem

The democratic transition events began at the end of 2010 and influenced all the Arab worlds. This event has happened on the other side of the world like Huntington's (1991) analysis of the waves of democratization. There were three waves of democratic transition. The first one occurred in America in the 1820s with the shape of enlarging suffrage to the high proportion of the male population. The first wave continued till 1920s. The second one is in between 1945 to 1962. The third one started 1970s and continued till 2000s. The third wave happened as Colored Revolutions of countries in Eastern Europe. These waves covered the countries that have almost no experience of a self-governing rule. Therefore, the same events occur in the Arab states too. They had nearly no experience, but as we are living in the internet age, some called this revolution an internet revolution. Communication technology enabled the achievement of the protests. Therefore, social media like Facebook, twitter, etc. with the help of other strategies enabled them to oust the presidents in their autocracies such as in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, and Syria. The results are the same at first glance, but the protests and revolts took various shapes. In a way, social media played a vital role in order to reach the success of protests for them come together. Besides social media, civil societies in Egypt and activists facilitated the meeting and political consciousness so as to be strong as a nation. It is not difficult to see the democratic institutions and the path to reach democratic virtue. At the backdrop of these waves, there are harsh economic crises and some political pressures on the people from authoritarian rulers. As in other Arab countries, there was great anger towards Hosni Mubarak because of his dictatorship and pressure on the people. After the Tunisian uprising that was seen as the immediate cause of the Arab Spring, Egyptian people and activists started to come together against the regime. Muhamed Bouazizi set the thames on fire from Tunisia and made a tremendous impact on the youth there which began a huge protest. He became the symbol of the popular uprisings both in Tunisia and in the region. Therefore, the uprising spread to the other nations changing in effect and vastness, yet the melting point is the connotation of 'spring' due to its non-violent nature and hope of democracy and a welfare country. Zorlu (2016) stated that these uprisings have been under various titles and discussions, but in the last decades the movements were mainly affiliated with non-violent movements with the uprisings in Eastern European countries in the 2000s. It was also called a 'spring' because it

emerged in the methods and willingness of the protesters. The protesters used similar slogans which were imitated from one country to another as their problems were the same but the actors were different. They all ran to the main city square in order to voice up. These people had no power to stand with their leaders and they desired to change the regime and their dictators.

Taken inspiration by the movements in Tunisia, Egyptian people came together to raise their voice on 25 January 2011 (Day of Revolt). Those people in the region wanted only one general thing with these protests: end of corruption, injustice, poor economic conditions. Therefore, their slogan is “bread, freedom and social justice”. This was also evidence that many of the political organizations were described by weak national economic condition, high level of corruption, joblessness, rising cost of food, misconduct of the regime and loss of belief in the electoral system (Sorenson, 2011; Johnstone & Mazo, 2011). So as to have a solution, with the help of the other countries successes, the street demonstrations swiftly became a national revolutionary demonstration which detracted from the thirty-year-old regime of the President Hosni Mubarak and his National Democratic Party (NDP) from power in just 18 days. When the people living in Egypt broke through the wall of fear, they became huge. At the very beginning of the revolution, mass demonstrations started in Cairo especially in Cairo's central Tahrir (Liberation) Square that was the symbol of the uprising, Alexandria and other big cities, but they faced with the oppression and the police brutality and supporters of the regime, that's to say, the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). Consequently, these protests were the reasons of demanding democratization and much more citizen participation to the politics in the country. The relentless and endless one-man governance makes the people revolt against the governors and they want much more freedom. Sorenson (2011) draws attention that never-ending rules became the hallmark of the regimes. “For instance, the Al-Saud family ruled Saudi Arabia since 1932, Sultan Qaboos governed Oman since 1971, the Alouite family prevailed in Morocco since 1956, the Assad family governed in Syria since 1970, Qaddafi reigned Libya since 1969, Mubarak since 1981 and Ali Abdullah Saleh governed or reigned in Yemen Arab Republic in 1978 and again as the president of unified Yemen in 1990 to mention just a few cases of longevity” (p.28). The circumstances are similar in Egypt too. Before the revolt, people were in economic and political crisis. There are unsolved and deep social problems such as tackling, inefficient and bulky bureaucracies and starvation because of the high and constant increasing food prices.

This study aims at displaying the transition period of democracy and its failures in Egypt. In the transition period, there were also some fatal mistakes. Firstly, the SCAF took the power and did not want to give the civilians. This attempt made the Egyptian people angry with them and the activists and other youth organization made demonstrations. Finally, there was an election and Morsi from Muslim Brotherhood got the presidency and the Islamist MB and Salafists became dominant in the parliament. What was wrong on the transition road was the lack of a political pact with the other political parties. As the new actors were not experienced in the state politics and they encountered bureaucratic obstacles and some judicial veto. The MB should have tried to get rid of these clamps coming from Mubarak regime by making political pacts with its opponents. Hamzawy (2017) stated that “the drifting of the MB was both an internal process within the movement as well as a trajectory imposed externally on it due to the escalating nature of the civil-versus-religious state debate. On the other side, liberals and leftists, who were championing the cause of the civil (secular) state, were drifting in the direction of no conversation and no dialogue with the MB” (p.2).

Democracy is the name of the remedy that would give happiness and welfare in the region. What is a democratic transition? Egyptians have tried to reach the virtues of democracy for a long time. They were waiting for the welfare of the democracy. Another goal of the study is to seek and determine the necessary institutions of the democracy as defined in Dalh’s Polyarchy and whether Egypt has these eight criteria in place and their true applications. Egypt needed to apply democratic institutions in the state and also nationwide. There seemed to be elections, but these were not free and fair as the low turnout and biased results. The so-called presidential candidate won the presidential election with a very high percentage for many years. Yet, the official participation was lower than half of the voters. The participation rate was very low in the first round of the election and in the parliamentary election too. Unfortunately, there was no action to increase the turnout. Gammal (2015) states that

A general sense of disillusion with the current system has driven Egyptians away from elections. Since the outbreak of the first uprising almost five years ago, two presidential elections, three referendums over constitutions, and two parliamentary elections have been held; queuing at polling stations has not, thus far, led to change. While some revolutionaries view defying the status quo and imposing political will by taking to the streets as productive, the government’s crackdown on protests—as illustrated by the killing of Sabbagh and the countless arrests of anti-regime activists—has halted the momentum of street politics. Unless the coming parliament demonstrates that the political process can lead to progress, no amount of cajoling from government and media will bring droves of Egyptians to the polls (timep.org).

The Prime Minister Sharif Ismail in Egypt at that time draws attention that "Egyptians should strongly participate in these important elections to choose their representatives. It's in their hands to determine the turnout"(ibtimes.com). Therefore, it is certain that election is a strong weapon for the people to change their political leaders. To some extent, according to the democracy index report, it is stated that "almost one-half of the world's countries can be considered to be democracies, but, in our index, the number of 'full democracies' is low, at only 20 countries; 59 countries are rated as 'flawed democracies'. Of the remaining 88 countries in our index, 51 are 'authoritarian' and 37 are considered to be 'hybrid regimes'" (p.2). Consequently, a fair election law is very crucial for determining the political leaders. Zakaria (2003) states that democracies have been built on the elections; these elections become an inevitable part of the institution and cannot survive without them. Diamond (1999) stated that "the minimalist democracy, also known as procedural democracy, is considered to be suitable for a country that has just entered the democratic transition stage" (pp. 9–10). In sum, in this century, if the nations cannot organize a competitive multiparty election, we call them as non-democratic. Bingöl (2007) claimed that "although it is generally accepted that democracy is essentially a procedural process to the problem of how power will be created, that is to say the elections, how the power will be used or what norms and rules will be the most controversial issue about democracy" (p.4). Bjornlund (2004) also focuses on elections and says that "the growth of the acceptance of democracies worldwide has meant a growing focus on elections; in fact, it has become acceptable that intergovernmental organizations routinely monitor elections under the clause of promoting democracies" (p.31). Stepan (2000) emphasized that "democracy should have a constitution to guarantee the basic freedoms, rights, and protections towards the rights of minority groups. That's to say, democracy should be applied in everyday life and be part of the political culture that can guarantee the basic rights and ensure the freedoms of individuals and groups" (p. 39). Related to the elections, it is very important to remind the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' (UDHR) Article 21 (2015) which states that "the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures" (p.3).

There were many authoritarian regimes which were not able to meet democratic governance criteria in the MENA region. Huntington (1991) stated that "authoritarian regimes suppress

competition and participation” (p.581). In the same way, Perlmutter (1981) indicated that “authoritarian regimes abused and restricted freedom of religion, freedom of thought and expression, freedom of information, freedom of assembly and freedom of association, freedom of demonstration, and freedom of participate and form union, freedom from terror and punishment of unjust jail. Furthermore, authoritarian regimes restricted the autonomy of civil society organizations by monitoring each of their activities. Authoritarianism was generally grounded on the centralized executive control and domination” (p.8). The basic goal of the authoritarianism is to reveal the elite’s sovereignty via undermining and demolishing the self-governing individual and collective behavior. Thus, as Perlmutter (1981) argued that “authoritarian regimes objected to enhance the power of authorities at the expense of autonomy of citizens” (p.25). Huntington (1991) indicated that “non-democratic or authoritarian regimes have taken a variety of forms like monarchies, aristocracies, one-party systems, military regimes and personal dictatorships” (p.580). Broker (2000) argued that “there are three different types of modern democratic regimes: the party type of non-democratic regime, the military type of non-democratic regime and the actor type of non-democratic regime” (p.36). Huntington’s non-democratic regimes’ first type is a one-party system that “the ruling party effectively monopolizes the power, access to power is through the party organization and the party legitimates its rule through ideology” (p.580). Secondly, Broker (2000) emphasized that

The military regimes are created by coup d’états replacing democratic and civilian governments. Military exercises power on an institutional basis, with the military leaders, either governing as a junta or circulating the top governmental positions among the top generals. Military regimes tend to be of shorter duration than one-party systems and personal dictatorships. Military regimes generally have limited and short-term political goals. In most cases, the military regimes terminate when the military voluntarily withdraws from power and relinquish power to civilians (p.5).

Lastly, the third type of non-democratic systems is the personal dictatorship. Huntington (1991) stated that “the distinguishing characteristics of a personal dictatorship are that the individual leader is the source of authority and that power depends on closeness to or support from the leader. All the important positions in the state are filled with the loyal followers, relatives, friends, kinsmen, and tribesman of the leader. The leader commands a web of informal networks and patron-client relationships.” (p.581). In the Egyptian case, there was the problem of power and governance. The people risked their lives in order to oust Mubarak who was a thirty-year dictator. Yet, after he was brought down, the people could not get

what they want. Most of the elites and youth thought that the power changed from Mubarak to Morsi. They were not satisfied with the new government too as the new regime were not able to solve their economic and social problems immediately. Then the military coup led by El Sisi got the power from Morsi by force. The intervention of the military so directly means that they wanted to stop the transition to democracy in Egypt.

The logic of the dissertation is to display the causes of failed transition to democracy in Egypt. There was an attempt to democracy in Egypt in the transition period, yet this attempted ended with the coup in 2013. This study focuses on last decade specifically from 2011 to 2013. It has a long period, but after understanding its past legacy then the study mostly focuses on the contemporary time as the democracy is a hot issue in the last decade with the Arab Spring and afterward. This time period is taken into consideration so as to reveal the impacts of mass protests and afterward. In the Arab Spring time, the whole country poured into the streets to get rid of Mubarak regime. Then Egypt witnessed the first free and fair election after Mubarak's ousting. Just after a year of elected president Mohamed Morsi, the military coup d'état took over the presidency and seized the power. This time was also crucial as the established order/ ruling elites did not want to leave the power to the selected Egyptian people. Therefore, there were mass societal mobilizations towards the political choices of the ruling elites. Also this time period was the time of endless contradictive political issues in Egypt. Throughout the MENA region, especially Egypt, the citizens' protests and uprising against the governors broke out because of the poor condition of the people. It was not bearable anymore to live in these conditions. However, the living conditions became worse than during Hosni Mubarak's time.

There was a democratic transition in Egypt in the last decade yet this failed because of the military coup d'état. Egypt failed in the transition period because their state structures hinder democratic governance. Egypt had difficulty in applying Dalh's Polyarchy's democracy criteria in the country. These criteria were not well implemented in the country over the years. Dirdala (2009) cited from Robert Dahl and the Road to Polyarchy as that "the right to vote and to be elected, the right of political leaders to compete for electoral support, free and fair elections, freedom of association and expression, alternative sources of information, and lastly institution for making public policies depend on votes and other expressions of preferences" (p.7) Egypt also had problems in their multiparty and election system. I also argue that the transition to democracy was blocked by external and international factors.

## **1.2. Significance of the Study**

This study is remarkable in contributing to the untouched area of the literature related to democracy in Egypt after Hosni Mubarak. When this study concludes, it then would be a guide for future researchers. The main significance of this study through facts is well-qualified and comprehensive one. More researches are necessary to provide accurate data to the democracy-building process that desires to assist Egyptians to reach an acceptable level of welfare and democracy. This study will provide foundational information for other researchers who want to expand our knowledge of the democracy in Egypt after Hosni Mubarak. Democracy in the region of MENA is generally discussed from the perspective of the major powers. The incentive for democracy frequently deals with the US and the EU's democracy incentive agendas. Yet, in this study, the impact of major powers on the failed transition to democracy in Egypt is analyzed. Dalh's eight criteria are also searched before and after transition era. With the help of the research findings, Egyptian people are going to be enlightened about their democracy level and they are going to seek some concrete qualities in their political leaders who offer the best living standards to them. In general, the aim is to examine transition, failure and their effects on the people. Moreover, the primary objective of the study is to conduct research to find reasons of the failure of the transition to democracy in Egypt.

This dissertation is anticipated to contribute to the literature on the field of failed transition to democracy in Egypt. It is going to prompt a new point of view of knowledge on the issue. The democratization studies often claim that MENA cultures are not adaptable with democracy as they weaken individual freedoms because of their emphasis on hierarchical social order in such cultures. That's to say, they argue that democracy is incompatible with non-western culture owing to the political culture, which is wrong. Yet, the case of Turkey and Malaysia demonstrates that democracy is also suitable for the Islamic Eastern Countries. This study also focuses on the democratic criteria which enable the national democratic governance. These criteria are not the source of solution, but they facilitate the modern democratic governance method. When this study concludes, it will enlighten why the revolution was emerging and so necessary for the people in the Middle East and also North Africa. Some of the revolutions may be successful and some not. There have been changes

in the governance but the strict bureaucracy and established order restrain the democratic governance in Egypt.

### **1.3.Scope of the Study**

This study focuses on the last decade especially during the revolution and afterwards, namely from 2011 to 2013. This time period marks the beginning of the democratic transition and its failure. Yet, Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak eras are mentioned in order to understand Egypt's past legacy and Muslim Brotherhood organization as it had an influence on Egypt both on the religious side and the political arena. Lastly, Morsi's time was a very-short and problematic governance in terms of the political disorder. But the election and form of governance is the first democratic one in Egypt's history. The legacy of the Egyptian past and political parties in Egypt are very important. Therefore, this study focuses on the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) which is supported by Muslim Brotherhood Movement. In this part, it also covers the structure of the political life and some non-governmental organizations during the uprising. While looking at the political life, it deeply investigates the Muslim Brotherhood (its whole political organizational life since its foundation in 1928). It also analyzes the effects of the military in Egypt's failed transition to democracy. This is very important as there are a lot of problems and obstacles in the country waiting to be solved like economic, social and political problems. When putting these together, their whole effects constitute a significant challenge that requires many years of steadfast policy implementation that can be understood from wide segments of the population in the country. In their history, they have no democratic governance in terms of the modern western world. After the Ottoman Empire, they were invaded by England and it took many years to become independent from the external invaders. From the 1950s to 2011 they were governed by a one-man presidency; therefore, they had to select the candidate compulsorily. Therefore, this was not a democracy. On the other hand, there had no chance to change the president until he died or wanted to resign. Lastly, the internal and external/international factors focused in order to see what was happening before the events and what would happen after the actions. There was a transition period via the SCAF for a new constitution and the free election atmosphere after Mubarak. This time was a bit painful as the Supreme Council of the Armed



Forces (SCAF) was not willing to give up the governance and power easily to the democratically elected people. Yet, the people were again on the street to get their power, and after everything the new constitution was accepted with a high participation. Mohamed Morsi was elected from a free and fair election in 2012. Unfortunately, the military coup d'état took over the power and imprisoned Morsi on the 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2013. The regime used various tactics to keep hold of power in mid-2013. In the presidential elections, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, former defense minister got the presidency with a so-called election. But today Egypt is worse than the Mubarak era from the point of social rights, political rights and freedoms in the field of the socio-economic and political situation.

The limitation of this research mostly concerns the field knowledge. This subject has a variable structure due to its nature, the region has a constant complexity, and it is a very hot issue which makes it difficult to deduce general results. The limitation of this research work is also from using the second source of data collection about Egypt. The Egyptian regime does not allow any work that will affect the regime negatively. Moreover, it was impossible during Al Sisi administration to be able to conduct an in-depth interview in Egypt because the regime is entirely against this work to be done. Also, people think that they may have trouble after answering interview questions. It is not possible to conduct an in-depth interview when the idea of the foreign conspiracy is widespread and the fear and hesitations of the poll takers living in most authoritarian regimes are also considered. Articles, newspapers and books used in research provided both primary and secondary data. Books, theses, articles and academic publications are important secondary sources of data and predominantly used. It was also used as a secondary data from previous researches. However, especially the recent development and current debates have not been included in the previous research. Therefore, the data set out in this study is grounded on a large amount of new information. Another limitation of this study is the absence of investigating literature in the Arabic language as my Arabic skills are not adequate to review Arabic literature. Yet, I've done the best to analyze the issue in English and Turkish from the perspective of the prominent academicians, journalists and specialists' articles, research and data.

#### **1.4. Research Methodology**

This study makes certain that the data collection from secondary sources like books, journals; online materials are within the scope of the issue. Therefore, this study follows mainly an explanatory approach focusing on analyzing existing literature. As this study focuses on the secondary source of data deduced from books and, academic journals such as Journal of Democracy, Democratization, International Studies Review, European Journal of Economics, Journal of North African Studies, Finance and Administrative Sciences, World Politics and Journal of International Politics, etc., it needs clarification on the reasons of Arab Spring and past and today's institution of the government to see the level of democratic transition. This study is categorized as an explanatory and descriptive research as it both supplies identifying key issues and key variables so as to better understand the subject, and at the same time provide an accurate description of the observations of the event by providing explanations and exploration additional data. In order to evaluate the failed transition to democracy in Egypt, an in-depth interview method was not able to be used in the research as discussing this issue in Egypt was not possible because of the existing regime. Therefore, already existing data and materials are used. Thus, this research performs a data collection operation with existing data which then are brought together and analyzed. The use of qualitative research methods is suitable for the study of the failed transition to democracy in Egypt. As this method is helpful and beneficial for collecting data that show the values, perspectives, experiences and world views of the target population under this study. As the people follow certain tribal, political, or spiritual leaders, it is very difficult to comprehend the essence and beauty of the democracy. The citizens' connections with these, directly and indirectly, influence the developing democracy. Since freedom of expression is increasingly understood and practiced, Egyptian people are trying to deal with something different. This research asks some questions inside the study about the failed transition to the democracy in Egypt and how the people perceive democracy. Merriam (2009) explained that "qualitative researchers are interested in understanding the meaning people have constructed, that is, how people make sense of their world and the experiences they have in the world" (p.13). In this dissertation, after analyzing data, the findings evaluated with content. "Qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that makes the world visible. These practices transform the world. They

turn the world into a series of representations, including field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and self-memos. At this level, qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, these phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005: 3). As the failed transition to democracy in Egypt is a complex issue, I preferred to use a qualitative for data gathering method. The Arab Spring phenomena and transition to democracy in the region is so novel and flexible that new theories and hypothesis may emerge. So, this flexible field of study allows a deep understanding of topics and richness of meaning. Because the failure of democracy is largely dependent on the qualitative data of this thesis and the clarification of this issue is better understood, therefore the qualitative data method is the main source for this dissertation. I also focused on the historical perspective of the Arab Republic of Egypt after 1952 on the purpose of deducing the attempts of liberalization and democratization. The historical analysis gives the characteristics of Egypt's region and actor-based perspective in this thesis. In addition, the institutional-level features of the long-term historical perspective as well as the actors' recent actions will be analyzed through both structured and actor-focused approaches. It is more suitable to use the qualitative methods by examining the democratization processes of the country historically rather than the quantitative methods. Actor-centered approaches challenge the structure with indefinite actions of independent individuals. These individuals act within the framework of the specified limited conditions. During a regime change, action areas are very different in a stable institutional environment. Instead a repetitive model of actor choice, goals and decisions change rapidly in the event of an unstable transition. Babbie (2013) explains that historical perspective provides a deep analysis of today’s phenomenon and comprehensive understanding of the events. This method is widely used by political scientists, sociologists and other social scientists. While using the historical perspective, I also focus on the structural approach which is mostly used in the comparative politics. The use of comparative techniques could be valuable both for explaining events of a democratic transition and also for improving causal generalizations and forecasting. This dissertation refers to the structuralist institutions of democracy while analyzing the failure of transition to democracy in Egypt. Mahoney and Snyder (2000) stated that “structural factors are treated as barriers external to actors which may or may not stand between them and achievement of their pre-

existing goals and interests” (p.217). Because the existing structures before the actors, define and motivate the actors. Moreover, these structures may change according to time and naturally influence the actors’ talent to enhance his or her success. The structural approach commonly used in the theory of modernization and consequently democratization studies that are well known with the studies of Lipset (1959). Lipset (1959) emphasized the economic prerequisites of democratization and took the attention on a striking correspondence between the economic performance and the stability of democracy. Huntington (1993) stated that “democracies are created not by causes but by causers” (p.107). Structuralists are mainly examining how structure the institutions shape politics. Katznelson (1997) stated that “structuralists analyze the relationship between actors in an institutional context. Structuralists also examine the ways in which communities and states interact with each other” (p.81). In Egyptian case, people were not able to compose democratic institutions which would enable them to be safer on the way of democratic transition. Their state structure and ancient institutions were so strong that Morsi and his administration could not make a remarkable reform on them.

The structures form the rules of individuals’ relations and make choices for their acts. Lipset (1968) and Moore (1966) claimed that “the prospect of democratic change is embedded in the architecture of the social system-structural changes in society matter in terms of understanding the causes of democratization” (p.99). What is important is that the entire democratization process is governed by the elites who try to balance their profits via influencing political institutions which serves to restrict their actions although it is limited to the conditions in which political preferences are chosen. Aoki (2011) stated that “institutions influence behavior by an acting the structure of the situation in which actors select strategies for the pursuit of their preferences”. It fundamentally considers the actor’s role in shaping institutions and vice versa via building political choice structure which lead to elite action. This thought is also embarked by the rationalists. The democratization setting constitutes a system of elite and institutional unity in a certain political arena. Mutzel (2009) claimed that “human shapes democracy (non-human institutions of governance) and democracy gives shape to human behavior; therefore, democracy acts” (p. 587). It can be said that democratic institutions offer a framework for the "democratic" behavior of the elite as a procedure. Clearly, the structures of the democratic institutions are in a relationship with the elites in the process of democratization. Therefore, it should be a dynamic relationship

between actors and institutions in order to build a specific democratic political appearance. The actors are logical in the sense of the alternatives that will maximize their interest in realizing their goals. At the time of transition, the actors' behaviors may vary greatly in the presence of the unchanging institutional situation. Therefore, the actors' aims and decisions change fast in the uncertain transition period. The interests of actors are valid in the impact of external actors on the failure of democracy. In the case of Egypt, the external actors chose their benefits and approve the coup d'état. Geddens (1993) points out that the external actors in a country choose their choices among the alternatives that will maximize their interests" (p.1). Within this scope, the powerful external and regional foreign policy-makers selected the authoritarian regime which enables them stability in the region, economic development and more interests; in this way they can maximize their advantages. Economic development is very crucial for them because of some factors such as providing new markets with the new employment for the young who are eager to migrate to rich lands. Sayarı and Bilgin (2014) stated that "individuals have to act within the constraints of socio-economic structures coming from the past and make decisions accordingly. Performing profits and losses analysis of actors' influences people, their classes and other political conditions they are in. From this point of view, there is no contradiction between the theories of structuralism or modernism and the transition theories of democracy" (p.95).

The dissertation also depends on modernization, political actors, and international approach theory in the transition to democracy and its failure. In the modernization approach, I mentioned and focused on the correlation between democracy and socioeconomic situation of Egypt. As Egypt's socioeconomic position was very low among the people, these poor people upraised against Mubarak regime in order to be free, welfare and democratic. Lipset (1959) pointed out that there is a high correlation between democracy and social structure like income, education, religion of a country, yet this should not always be highlighted as they are a must for democracy. On the other hand, Weber emphasized the differences of national design in a society reflect the key historical affairs that work in harmony in a country, yet some aspects may not work in another country. Kurun (2015) stated that "wealthy countries, those in Western Europe, USA and Japan are better with democracy whereas the poor African, Asian and Latin American countries have mostly bad records thereof. It seems, for instance, easier to make military coup in poorer countries" (p.194) Therefore, I also investigate the modern history of Egypt from the time of Nasser until

recently. While doing this, I try to find out liberalization or democratic openings especially in Mubarak's era. The impact of the army and Muslim Brotherhood Movement on the transition period is deeply analyzed. The theory of modernization focuses on structural and social conditions. Therefore, I focus on the domestic factors that caused the failure of the democratic transition in Egypt. The domestic factors, which affected the transition period were social, economic and political issues. Naturally, democracy is one of the elements of modernity. Therefore, there is a transition from agrarian-oriented, feudal and traditional societies to capitalist, industrialized, rationalized and organized in the framework of nation level. Democracy is the result of changing society from the radical ideas and poverty to increasing richness and education. If the Egyptian society succeeds in changing from the structure of pyramidal type to diamond model, then they can achieve in transition to democracy. The political actors' approach gives priority to them as they affect the destiny of a country. Therefore, Nasser, Sadat, Mubarak and Morsi eras are studied to see their impact on Egypt. The role of President Morsi and the role of the military in politics are examined in order to find out their roles in the transition and failure of the democracy in Egypt. Actually, if the historical tendency of the Egyptian army can be determined, then the motivation for military coup d'état after the Arab Spring can be better deduced. Lastly, the impacts of global actors on the process are investigated through the international approach. Researchers have convincingly demonstrated that strong external actors play an important role in the process.

## **CHAPTER TWO: ARAB SPRING IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA**

The unprecedented Arab Spring crisis broke out in late 2010 and influenced the whole region especially the Middle East and North Africa. As the time progressed it occupied the world agenda. It has seen some strong support on the protestors in order to get their rights from the brutal presidents. After a while, something changed in the world agenda and the supports leaned towards the other sides. In this time some nations have been more successful than others in their responses to the crisis, although the reasoning for this is yet to be determined. A young unemployed college-educated fruit vendor from a small city of Sidi Bouzi – located in central Tunisia, Mohammed Bouazizi, set himself on fire in his hometown on the 17<sup>th</sup> December 2010. He was obliged to make something in order to tell his problem to the officials, therefore; he set himself on fire after the policemen captured his wares. Tunisian authorities ignored his complaints of the police brutality. His purpose was to protest ill-treatment by the security forces and the absence of opportunity in Tunisia (Noueihed and Warren 2012:74). Kışlakçı (2012) stated that “the Tunisian unemployed youth Mohammed Bouazizi ignited the Arab revolution unintentionally. At that time, there was a large group of young people and most of them were unemployed in all countries of the world” (p.124). In a very short time, the demonstrations spread throughout the country with the organization of the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT). Finally, the protests reached to the capital city of Tunisia in January 2011 (Lynch, 2012:77). The Tunisian protestors demanded the resignation of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, who had been in government for 24 years. But the president tried to suppress the uprisings by offering a range of political reforms. These so-called reforms were below satisfaction for the citizen of Tunisian. Therefore, as Kirkpatrick (2011) informed that the president stepped down and fled to Saudi Arabia on 14<sup>th</sup> January 2011. Just a day later the Tunisian prime minister quitted his position and paved the way for new elections as well as planned a new constitutional package. Tharoor (2011) took the attention that in a few weeks’ time; the protest of Bouazizi led to a complete revolution of human power, spreading rapidly throughout the Middle East. After Tunisia, it firstly moved to Egypt and then to Jordan, Yemen, Libya, Bahrain, Morocco, and Syria. Fahim & El-Naggar (2011) stated that hundreds of thousands of Egyptians, with taken inspiration by the uprisings in Tunisia, rushed into the streets on the 25<sup>th</sup> January especially in Cairo’s Tahrir Square to call for the ousting of the nearly thirty-year rule of President

Hosni Mubarak. One of the main actors of the Tahrir Square, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood organization, which had been banned from active participation in the political arena since 2005, joined in the protests (Shane, 2011). As in Tunisia, President Hosni Mubarak got on television on the 10<sup>th</sup> February to inform that he would not be a candidate for the next election. (Fahim & Cambanis 2011). This also makes Egyptian people angry with the president and the number of demanding President Hosni Mubarak immediate resignation highly increased and almost one million people rushed into the streets of Cairo. With the power of the huge amount of crowded angry protestors, the president flew from the throne and Kirkpatrick (2011) informed that “temporary power had been handed over to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to manage the country’s affairs until a new constitution could be written and elections could be held” (p.11). Pasha (2011) stated that ultimately Mubarak was forced to retire a day after his public speech; therefore, that day, on the 11<sup>th</sup> February 2011, was thought as the second symbol liberation of Egypt. The first one was in 1952 when Egypt was liberated from the British occupation. Joffé (2011) indicated that “from early January to end of February the protests continued on high unemployment rates and increases in utility prices in other Arab countries” (p.510). The Egyptian government used their downward pressure such as blocking down all internet and cellular phone services, using tear gas, water cannons, blocking twitter and Facebook and using batons and live bullets. But amazingly the people of Egypt did not return. On the other hand, several protesters began to fill the streets and main squares in Cairo and other Egyptian cities. And also young activists had used social media, Facebook, Twitter and other technologies to call for protests in the style of those living in Tunisia and Egypt. Pasha (2011) stated that the tremendous impetus to a revolution in Egypt was a like 1970s protests in terms of its large- scale protests. The number of the protestors was so high that the police was not able to control the situation by the demand of Mubarak. He tried to solve the problem by using the military to take over security. Although the Egyptian people have high regard for the army, they did not turn back to their houses till Mubarak resigned. Pasha (2011) informed that Tahrir Square was the symbol of the revolution and the gathering of over three million protesters was very lucky as the army abstained from using real slaughters when Mubarak commands to attack the protestors senselessly. Therefore, these uprisings in the MENA region after 2011 were considered under the topics of revolutions, insurgencies and resistance in a broader literature on Arab Spring. A self-burning action in Tunisia had



normally little relevance to the diplomacy environment and intelligence service of Washington, London, and Paris and developed finance sector. Yet, Mohamed Bouazizi had an impact like a suicide bombing in front of the official's building. It leads to an electric shock in the MENA region and also western countries. Prashad (2012) indicates that "the people of Tunisia got angry against their gentle but merciless leader Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali who was fed praise by France and the United States governments, the International Monetary Fund and the bond markets" (p.28). These uprisings made Tunisian people happy with the fleeing of Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali to Saudi Arabia. For them this escaping would bring the society's welfare lives like other western countries in a free environment. Therefore, the number for Mohamed Bouazizi increased day by day in the North African streets and marketplaces. In MENA region, fewer earnings and fewer services have created the poor slums. Prashad (2012) stated that "the working classes wanted to show their anger not only against the cost of living, but also against the rapidly increasing waste of the elite and the consumption of luxury. The rate of social inequality and the elites' extreme consumption of the countries sources has been a factor that has lifted the people's ambiguity on the decision of uprising" (p.30). According to Adam Ferguson, the distribution of property determines the social character of a society. According to him, property is the beginning of development. As property and its fair distribution progress then society will advance towards civilization. Sunar (2012) indicated that "Ferguson see the despotism that felt by the power in the Eastern countries as one of the biggest threats towards civilized society" (p.37).

After the Second World War, the Arab world has survived despite its pain, poverty, and disappointment. They have been under the pressure of the foreign countries for many years. Although they had been exposed many obstacles they tried to regain their rights. Arabs wanted to be independent at that time of nations taking their independence. And the idea of freedom and equality had spread in the international arena. However, despite all this desire, a military defeat in 1948, and the division of Palestine by the United Nations resolution and the establishment of Israel made Arab geography and all the people living there disappointed in the timeline. Gerger (2008) stated that "this event was a difficult situation to be forgotten by the Arab world as the time was a long-term accumulation of national sentiments" (p.24). After this event, the Arab society wanted to make a counter-attack altogether but their leaders had to yield to great states in the interests of their people. This situation has dragged the Arab

people into despair and pessimism. Their leaders' western admiration and interests continued for years. And this admiration made Arab people slow and dependent. At the beginning of the year 2000, the Arabs again saw the bright lights of hope on the horizon. Therefore, some uprising attempts had seen a new hope in many Arab countries. 'War on Terror' announced after the September 11<sup>th</sup> events made the Arab world again introverted. Not only just Arab countries but also the world had been quiet for a while at the end of the 2000s. However, everyone predicted that there would be a great mobility after this silence. Therefore, in the year 2011 the uprisings were accepted as a war year against dictators and tyrants. People living in Arab countries wanted to show for all humanity that it was possible to have revolutions and establish another world in the 21st century. The power of ordinary people and believers was desired to reveal in these uprisings. As the revolution spread throughout the region and into ever larger areas, every movement had excited others and this has strengthened the people. Kışlakçı (2012) stated that "each uprising encouraged other nations in the MENA region and with a pushing force had emerged forward. This was exactly what was called 'Domino effect' (p.58). When the relationship between politics and religion is analyzed in Muslim countries, the idea of the most western and Muslim scientists and activists can draw our attention. Hassan (2010) claims that "Islam is not only a religion but also a social order. Therefore, it covers the law, the state and also all living areas in a society" (p.23). For this reason, Muslim societies are separated from the Western state where it is based on the division of the state and religion according to these characteristics. When we look at Europe, we can see that the economy began its industrial transformation at the outset of the nineteenth century. The United Kingdom was the pioneer of this industrial economic transformation. The feudal and traditional land ownership structures had undergone change. The new mercantilist formation began to settle in the colonial settlements. So, the bourgeois revolution has entered the stage of victory. When World War I began, Europe and America began to exploit large areas of the earth as a colonial yoke.

Regardless of historical evidence, the relationship between religion and state has always been an important issue in contemporary Muslim countries. When many Muslim countries are investigated, we can see that these countries, which are products of the decolonization process that led the movements, are nationalist. So the new states define their identities as nationalist entitlements. Simultaneously, in many cases, the heritage of the colonial period like secular law, politics and educational institutions remained unchanged. Hassan (2012)

stated that “in the periods of Islamic awakening movements in these countries; these movements were condemned by making calls to return by the states who live and represent Islam and embrace the Islamic lifestyle” (p.134). When the Arab Spring erupts, it has become a feature bearing the hope to the whole people in the region from Tunisia to Egypt, from Yemen to Libya with the flames of revolution surrounding the entire Arab world, a new hope for humanity. Kışlakçı (2012) cited from Başkaya, among one of the famous leftist thinkers of Turkey, his idea on the subject is as follows “the Nile Revolution was a lesson to the Western masters and to the people looking at the world from the eye of Western masters” (p.57). The people, who participated in the uprising in the conditions of heavy dictatorship, along with the workers and young people by learning to organize, gaining new knowledge and acquiring experiment with armament, continued to struggle with strength in the meantime. Those people who could not understand the uprising looked down on the development in the region. However, in order to comprehend the rebellions, the revolutions and the uprising processes, it is a requirement to look at it from within the movement and uprising. In addition to this, there are some scholars who regard the developments in the world as the reorganization of the USA. They do not see the reasons leading to the beginning of the movement. Kışlakçı (2012) stated that “on the basis of these revolts and revolutions, there are people who have been forged for years. There is a reaction to massacres in Iraq and Palestine. There are the effects of the imperialist forces defeated in Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan and also the 2008 economic crisis” (p.58). Şahin (2011) explained the reasons for the Arab Spring in five themes. The high amount of the young population, corruption and bribery mechanisms and lack of democracy in the region, external dependence and the development of technology caused the rapid organization of masses on platforms like Twitter and Facebook with the effect of globalization.

The Arab World has a historic period in 2011. The people in the MENA region began to realize their power; therefore, the fear has changed its place from citizen to governors. The governors who had not been changed easily were in horror and confused in the uprising time. Demonstrations and protests have broken out all around the Arab World. Kışlakçı (2012) stated that the Arab world with youth, women, labor, civil servants, the poor, the rich, Christians, Muslims, Sunnis, Shi'ites, intellectuals, artists, doctors, engineers and so on run to the street arm in arm in order to topple the dictator in their counties despite all the obstructiveness of dictators and rulers. Everyone's common motto is "people want the regime

to fall" Therefore, it is not true to say that these people who were in the street had not economic or political project in order to change their regime. This thinking can just serve current dictators and status quo supporters. Atalay (2013) stated that young Muslim generations in the Middle East have also changed with the rapidly changing world. The world's rapidly changing cultural, economic and postmodern compound against the forty years of classicized, slummed and even rotten systems triggered the uprising of young people with global winds.

External dynamics as well as internal dynamics have influence in the uprising time. The magnificent political figures such as Muammar Gaddafi, Hosni Mubarak, and other political figures that were seemed as could not be ousted in the MENA region had been changed and regimes had been destroyed. The process at first went fast, the government changed in Tunisia, the internal conflicts in Libya brought the end of Gaddafi, and Hosni Mubarak then resigned in Egypt. Some claimed that these movements, which have led to unpredictable radical changes in the MENA region where the whole world focused on it carefully, have shown up when the US and Western allies have mobilized their hidden plans in this geography. Yet, according to some, the social, political and economic crises in the countries caused an explosion by the expansion use network of the social media in the technological field. According to these views, the world is almost becoming a 'small village' which has created the necessary environment for the people of the region coming to the explosion point (politikakademi.org).

There was a continuing violation of right and oppressions in the Arab world, so the people were like a bomb that waiting to explode. People had never been in squares in such a harsh temper till 2011. It was an important detail that this exciting resistance was made by young masses, without symbol, without leader and without flag. When we look at society psychology, it is possible to say that this rebellion is the rebellion of the postmodern Arab people. They have been oppressed for years under various oppressions, dared to postmodern rebel with the means of communication of the modern world. The United States and France called to calm to the people and advised to the dictators to solve the problems. The United Kingdom and Russia preferred to continue watching the events till the winner came to be decided.

## ARAB SPRING

Revolutions have no specified schedule. Karl Marx used the “mole” image to describe the incredible but unreliable nature of the revolutions. The mole spends time on the ground digging down the tunnel and then, unexpectedly, exits the surface to breathe. It is the part of the revolution that appears to be on the surface and released, but the most important part is digging the tunnel, which is the preparation and background of it. The less the mole prepares, the easier it will be to overcome it because it has not effectively designed the underground space. Prashad (2012) indicated that this is right for the revolution too: if the people’ complaints were not understood and the counter-revolution did not create organizations that could stand and if these citizens’ grievances were not under the discipline of revolutionary power then it is easily defeated. The main thing is to dig a tunnel, not just to go out on the stage of history.

Many of the dictators and their relatives in the Arab world had led a life in luxuries which were not easily imagined. Private aircraft, yachts, luxury electronic goods, many marriages, mistresses, luxurious mansions in many parts of the world, lots of luxury, comfortable and top model private designed cars were just some of their pleasures. This commitment to the luxurious lives has led to the end of their governing. In the MENA region, there were some ultra-rich staffs with some very poor staff surrounding. This socioeconomic reality points to a danger to the top people, therefore they had transferred their wealth to Europe. Like Kışlakçı’s (2012) statement, the regime took no real social and economic precautions in order to solve some of the people obstacles and deep grievances despite these deep contradictions between the rich and the poor. Therefore, people attempted to uprising and rebel against the regime in the 2000s in the part of the region. Sunar (2012) explains that the East reminds the childhood of the mankind according to Hegel. There is mental freedom for the child, but subjective freedom is not yet available. Freedom is the right of the despot. It is clear that there is no rational state and the state is framed by family relations. Therefore, there is no individual freedom and vehicle institution between the state and society when we look at eastern countries. It is said in a report about Arab economy by the United Nations that the problem is a depleted economy that does not give a sign of leap. Arab economies like the economies of poor countries ruled by the authoritarian regimes have been described as a third world economy. The old dictators, who are dependent on western countries, have

made their own people dependent on them. The old dictators are the constitution, the law, the legislation, the people and the government itself. Dictators govern the country like a profit-oriented company. There are also loyal companions under the management of the company, who have done coup d'état together. The dictators never trust anybody on the governing board; they prefer to often replace them with other friends as they fear ousting by their governing board. Kışlakçı (2012) stated that the only principle applies in authority administration politics: 'ensuring that people always pursue a piece of bread!' The fact that this growing wealth is disproportionately distributed among countries and within the country has led young people to question the social order and the legitimacy of their governments. Therefore, this fact has been a factor that triggered popular uprisings in many years later. In reaction to the decisions taken by political powers at the beginning of the 2000s, the social activism and protests, including students and marginalized groups, have increased remarkably despite the economic pressure of international arena and the Arab world was facing harsh social conditions.


The Arab Kings and their dictators have not able to adequately understand the post-cold war world. The Arab elites could not comprehend the changing era with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and also the totalitarianism in Eastern Europe. At that time the world started to leave a repressive system and move into a liberal structure. Kışlakçı (2012) cited from the Egyptian Famous Politician and journalist Mohammed Hasaneyn Heykel that it has become an urgent need to bring the forms of regimes and governments to the line of the younger generations while getting into the 21st century in the Arab World. Sixty percent of the Arabs are under the age of eighteen. And their slogans are related to the dignity and employment. While entering the new century, one hundred million young people in their twenties would start to ask their parents, grandparents and grandmothers why they could not give them the tools of the state and government. The leaders can delay the reforms but not prevent. Young people with big dreams and broader horizons of thought will take the world of Arabs out of today's stagnation and swamp, and guide them prosperity sooner or later. Arab regimes did not want see this truth. The USA has enabled the sovereign totalitarian systems in the Arab countries to survive despite its democracy discourse and human rights rhetoric. This time period in the region was famous for its corruption in their governments, the lack of law and the rule of the ruling elites' benefits over the benefits of the people in the Arab countries. The USA Management supported many overbearing and overwhelming Arab countries by

being silent to unfairness and corruption in the region. Which is the primary importance for America; to trade, to include Arab economies in the global economy or to ensure the safety of Israel? Arab dictators and America have succeeded in these issues quite well.

The Arab Spring started with optimism about the expectation of democratization in the region. However, the suddenness of the uprisings was not due at the end of 2010 and at the very beginning of 2011. Pearson and Salamey (2012) stated that apart from the historical grievances of specific groups based on their social, cultural, economic or tribal inequalities, one important factor was the political learning process that came with the protest, new modes of communication, globalization and the influence of non-violent rights-based movements. On the other hand, transition toward democracy was generally harsh and violent, imposed scarification from the people who were eager to get freedom. There were uprisings in the MENA region at the end of 2010 and at very early of 2011. The common consciousness formed by the popular uprising was observable at the big city center and squares. Especially in Egyptian case, the revolution can be explained as a dictatorship collapse by mobilized political action. Zorlu (2016) stated that

This was a revolutionary process but whether it suits the determinants of revolution or a coup is another area of research. The research politics escapes the debate whether what happened was a revolution or not, but expresses that it is the dynamics/characteristics of the movement that had created an interaction between the challengers and the authorities. In whichever name used the revolt/uprising/spring/revolution, not spring nor winter, not an event for a season but a dynamic process is a dynamic process with the interaction of various actors (p.15).

In general, Arab Spring is evaluated as popular movements starting from December of 2010 and up to current day in the MENA region where many countries are ruled by “iron fist”. The people, we can call the symbol of the Arab revolution, challenged the iron fist rulers and killed the dictatorial regimes. Kışlakçı (2012) informed that “nearly one hundred people had burned themselves in the first five months since the day the riots started. This situation was the first in an Islamic-Arabic world in its own history. Suicide is forbidden in Islamic religion; therefore, such acts are rarely encountered in Muslim countries” (p.137). This demonstrates to us that people are now at the end of their intolerable power. So the people in the region could do everything in order to get rid of the autocratic rulers. Those people especially the youth did their best for the democracy, yet the outcome of the uprisings of 2010 and 2011 gave a different birth in each Arab country.



**Figure 1:** The Arab Spring 2010-2011

**Source:** [newsocialmovements2014.web.unc.edu/files/2014/11/arabsspring-map.gif](http://newsocialmovements2014.web.unc.edu/files/2014/11/arabsspring-map.gif)

Zorlu (2016) stated that “the aftermath of the uprisings was molded by the dynamics and structures of each one. While the dictators in Yemen, Tunisia, and Egypt left their seats, Bahrain, and Yemen have been the stage to military interventions from their neighbors; Syria was dragged into one of the worst conflicts of the century. Whereas, the aftermath of the international military intervention rebounded Gaddafi’s fall in Libya which had failed to succeed stable governance, and the monarchies endured in the wave” (p.2). Therefore, Egypt and Tunisia were successful in ousting the autocratic regimes, but Libya and Syria were not as successful as the other countries. In this successful and peaceful transition, the army was very important in the first step because they were on the side of public, not on the side of the autocrat leaders in Egypt and Tunisia. Yet, it is not easy to be named a successful or failed transition according to the just mass uprising. Goldstone (2011) claimed there were four criteria in order to decide its success.



...a government that seems so irreversibly unjust is commonly believed to be a threat to the country's future; elites, especially in the military, it must feel alienated from the regime and no longer prefer to defend it; a majority of the population, including different ethnic and religious groups and socioeconomic classes, must mobilize; international powers must either constrain a government from using all possible means to defend itself or refuse to interfere and defend the government in power (p.9).

The military is a determinant fact for the success in the revolution. The result may not end with democratization, in other words what the people get with the uprising may not end with a democratic transition but transition to another one-man regime. On the other hand, the military personals were loyal to the regime in Yemen and Syria. Therefore, the uprisings were not successful without the support of their military. That's to say, military prevented their citizens' demand for the transition to democracy by standing on the side of the regime. Therefore, in the peculiarity of these two countries, severe acts from both countries, severe acts from both countries like this caused the tough transition towards democracy. Consequently, Syrian autocrat regime has still been in power despite civil war in the country. In Bahrain's case, the situation is different. As there is no strong army force to support the uprising of the people, there becomes a passive revolution with no transition to democracy. One of the most significant events of the 21st century is the popular movements in the Arab geography mainly in the region of the MENA which started at the end of the 2010 and increased at the beginning of 2011. It was firstly called the "Jasmine Revolution" as the Arab public movements were thought to be limited to Tunisia before the name "Arab Spring", "Arab Spring" has emerged in the wake of the demonstrations that started after the young Tunisian, Muhammad Bouazizi burned himself. Tunisian bloggers who advocate that "the police who opened fire on the demonstrators should protect their activists instead of using violence" came out with the slogan of "Let's give jasmine for the police." TUIÇ Academy (2012) stated that this definition has been adopted by the identification of "the flowers of jasmine" symbol of the revolutionary countries, which then spread to the social networks as well. Thus, the name "Jasmine Revolution" emerged. However, as the process progressed, they called this popular movement "Arab Spring" because of the limitations short of the "Jasmine Revolution" they wanted to expand its borders and to better define the "Jasmine Revolution". Many countries, organizations, and experts in the field have adopted the diversity of the movements with a constantly painful, turbulent change as spring. Therefore, Arab Spring is metaphorically symbolizing happiness coming after from the sour and pain.

Actually, Arab Spring became worse due to internal and external factors as the movements continued. Badiou (2012) defines the Arab Spring as “a rebirth of history by attempting to make history from below. According to his Marxist view, the reawakening of history is the idea that people take the initiative against the oligarchs in the capitalist world” (p. 15). He explains the events and how the protests spread according to imitation idea. From his point of view, an imitation occurs in a place and then is taken to another point. While these uprisings happened, communication was very crucial, therefore the people in the region closely followed social media to inform each other with Facebook, twitter etc. Another scholar, Vijay Prashad investigates the Arab Spring from a Marxist point of view, as something that originated in a class struggle. Prashad (2012) analyzes the Arab Spring within the framework of revolutionist perspective in the historical preparation process. There were adequate reasons to uprising against monarch regimes in the MENA region. Prashad (2012) asserts that “the social crisis engendered by the inflation of food prices triggered long-felt grievances against the national security state and the institutions of neoliberal economic policy” (p.17). He tries to find a causal mechanism between the “social crisis,” which originated in poverty, and the neoliberal policies of “the national security state (Prashad, 2012:88-89). At the very beginning there was a big optimism about the transition to democracy, in the region but Tariq Ramadan was skeptical about the reliability of the Arab Spring. That is not the opinion but the reality is totally different. Ramadan (2012) depicted that these revolts were not political, instead intellectual revolutions, and the people had hoped that their awareness were able to change the regimes of power. Hence, these people were not real politicians, but they noticed their power. There were many reasons that broke out the Arab Spring and it was not easy to change. Clark (2013) stated that “the protesters wanted to have democracy in MENA region as well as good governance. Therefore, it was an awakening of the people to their miserable reality, which was not new, but this time with the novel realization of their power and hope to demand change” (p.46). Within this scope, the events of the Arab Spring made the millions of the Egyptian people excite, yet after the uprisings their demands were not met. The dreams of democracy have not been realized from the coup in 2013. They have also lost their confidence towards the ballot box. Kılıç (2015) asserts that Tariq Ramadan puts a big question mark over the optimistic idea that the Arab Spring was about movements of democratization. This is why Ramadan (2012) avoids defining uprisings as revolutions and predicting their final outcomes. According to

Ramadan, it is very hard to predict when this event concludes. Also it is very early to say with the uprising and the term Arab Spring weather, it may or may not become real spring for the Arab nations. Therefore, Kılıç (2015) claims that “it is impossible to prove or determine the probabilities of how many intelligence agencies sent their agents to participate in the uprisings or which unknown powers trained the youth to manipulate the Arab people to start riots in the MENA zone” (p.27). In this respect, external factors have affected the region profoundly in both positive and negative ways. Goldsmith (2007) stated that “democratization is an irregular process of replacing authoritarian regime with rule-bound competitive system... it is not a universal historical sequence ending in the same types of political system, but more national states are adopting the western models” (p.87). It is quite well to demand freedom of the people and declining of the monarch. On the other hand; these uprisings affected the regions’ economy badly. At the very beginning the people were in the street with the hope of more bread and income, but now the scene is not the demanded one. Zizek (2013) seeks to explain the determinants of the uprisings, such as “poverty, political pressure, and lack of freedom etc. especially with the explosion of outrage. He also emphasizes that the driving force behind the uprisings were similar demands” (p.12). It is quite similar in the authoritarian regimes that when they feel their end is soon, two steps start in the dissolution. Firstly, there is a widespread disinformation that the monarch is about to collapse. So the people are no longer afraid of the autocratic leaders as they know the game is about to over. Zizek (2012) says that “it is not only that the regime loses its legitimacy; but also its exercise of power is itself perceived as an impotent panic reaction” (p.1). Moreover, people broke through that wall of fear and start popular uprising with the loss of legitimacy of the autocratic leaders. Zorlu (2016) emphasized that the Tahrir square occupations in Egypt and forums in the squares or parks created a new repertoire of collective action and the squares became theaters when the barrier of fear was lifted. Giugni (1999) informed that contentious politics was formed with non-violent methods like student strike, boycott of social affairs, social disobedience, and strikes, but the current work of the organizers consisted of bringing together temporary coalitions to suppress risky tactics, negotiating with multiple agendas and finding public voice to collective action.

Without any doubt, communication played very crucial role in the succession of first attempt to oust the autocrats. Therefore, in the Arab uprising communication methods were very active. Lynch (2012) divides the effects of the new media into three categories: the first

effect is the “free flow of information and the explosion of public discourse” (p.33). The second effect is the fact that “it has given today’s activists and ordinary citizens new skills, expectations and abilities”. “Finally, it has unified the Arab political space, bringing together all regional issues into a common narrative of a shared fate and struggle” (p.11). Communication and media have helped to people to overcome their fears. As a result, when they communicate in healthy ways, they start to come together and speak in a certain way that does not look at their background or differences. Arendt (2012) stated that “revolutions are not only occurring when the governors’ are not able to maintain its authority and dignity. On the contrary, the bizarre and long lives of deteriorating political structures are important. A large number of people wanting to revolutionize may not to be necessary. Mirebau (2012) says that "ten united people can shake hundreds of people who have not been able to do it" (p.150). Therefore, the name of the revolution was used by the people of the uprising, certain scholars, activists, etc. (Fadl, 2015, Alexander, 2013, De Smet, 2015). In the Egyptian example on the other hand, one crucial debate was whether the uprising in Egypt was a military takeover as Brown defined the fall of Mubarak as a military coup that came with public pressure (Brown, 2012). Many scholars like Hussain asserted that Arab Spring might not occur without the true and planned usage of social media. Fayad (2013) claimed that “social media was a catalyst for the Arab uprising, not a reason for it. In the case of Egypt and Tunisia, there have vast amounts of internet connectivity with high internet penetration in the society” (p.30). The improvement in social media and its tools strengthened the Egyptian and Tunisian youth to be able to share the regime’s brutalities and corruption of the state structures. Related to this, Howard and Hussain (2011) gave an example that “a YouTube video in Tunisia showed Tunisia’s presidential aircraft on the runways of exclusive European shopping destinations, with a split screen showing the dates and the places asking who was using this jet. The suggestion was that Ben Ali’s noble wife was flying in the jet” (p.30). When this video was clicked by many in citizen in Tunisia the regime took severe measures in order to block the usage of all social media like YouTube, Facebook, twitter, etc. By means of such videos about the corruption of the regime, the Tunisian people came together to up-rise the bad governance. Fayad (2013) asserted that “countries like Yemen and to a lesser extent Syria have restrictions on social media sites by banning them. By doing so, the regime is able to control to some degree the flow of information to its citizens. Therefore, citizens tend to express their resentments towards the regime by violent actions

that destabilize the democratic process” (p.30). Castells (2012) depicts Arab uprising in the framework social movement theory and he gave the label of network society. Therefore, he claims that “networked social movements first spread in the Arab world”. The social media and internet help, through networking, the number of the people to increase dramatically on the streets and public spaces. They have common demands by sharing their grief and happiness on the social networks. They can easily share everything without paying attention to their personal views and organizational structure because their aim is to be successful in their true demands like bread, freedom and jobs. Castells (2012) pointed out that the people in the region passed from the autonomous cyberspace to the public space in order “to make their history”. Their voice echoed all over the networked world via internet and media. Therefore, internet has shown us that we cannot confine information through the national border in this age. States are to be more transparent. It is important to reinterpret concepts with internet such as state secret, national security, holding out on information, and confidential data. People are able to reach the information which comes in forms of their fundamental rights such as freedom of communication, which is the right, to get information and freedom. The Internet network has become a shelter for freedom of opinion. The youth movement found this network more suitable for them than the others. Tunisia is the first country among the Arab states to provide Twitter and Facebook contact. Facebook and Twitter have become a tool for revealing their objections of these new Arab generations.

In the end, the protestors succeeded in ousting President Mubarak, yet the established order and the military kept de facto control in Egypt. Owen (2012) noticed that “the crucial lesson is that the uprisings were created as a result of horrible situations that made people suffer like high rate of unemployment, poverty, inflation, and other economic failures that came to have a more idealistic/revolutionary flavor in terms of slogans, but which in fact never fundamentally challenged the underlying system of power” (p.376).

## Arab Spring Protest Movements

The oppression of people, the ruling of minorities to countries, and the lack of representation of the majorities, and the governors' exploitation of the people in the MENA region made people up-rise. Steinert-Threlkeld (2017) emphasized that protests emerge as a consequence of the decentralized coordination of individuals, and this coordination can help to explain the fluctuations of protest levels. The governors and its environment had luxurious lives while the people in the region lacked bread with their meal. To tell the truth, they were in hunger and misery along with an unjust distribution of income. There was a lack of freedom of thought and opinion. All these factors have brought the people together to rebel. Mittermaier (2014) informed that the masses that spilled in the streets in Egypt voiced three basic demands: "bread, freedom and honor ('Aīsh, huriyya, 'adāla igtimā 'iyya). Bread ('aiṣh) in Egyptian Arabic literally means life. The call for bread evokes the immediate need. Social justice is often associated with structural transformations and a better tomorrow" (p.73). Bread indicates the chronic and severe economic problems of the requesting country. Freedom refers to the suppression and oppression order, the opposition to the extraordinary state law. Honor expresses the reaction to the US and Israeli foreign policy understanding that is followed without considering the beliefs, values and demands of the people. Sarigöl (2012) indicated that external factors are considered more effective than internal causes. The reason why the rebellions are so effective and why the dictators who rule the country cannot suppress the rebellion with the old methods has been the change of the world system and its structure. As a result of the disappearance of the bipolarity of the old world, the idea of supporting one side finished. Kışlakçı (2012) stated that there were Islamist, leftist, rightist, liberal, democratic and nationalist movements in the background of these revolts in the MENA region. But the people in the region were active in the winds of change. Without any doubt, the youth had a great role in the succession of the rebellion. The establishment of wider alliances around protest events, trade unions, political parties and movements, political bloggers, and youth organizations referred to a different organization style. Political opposition groups in the Arab world have been silenced or suppressed for years. Some of these opposition groups have maintained their organization within the country and abroad for many years. Arab dictators do not allow any leftist, liberal, Marxist or Islamist to form in their own countries. The permits were also either faded or removed

from where they have grown. Kışlakçı (2012) informed that there are some differences between young activists and trade union protesters. Activists from the trade union argue that the active usage of social media and internet creates short-lived associations instead of long-lived structures and organizations that are very useful. It is important to note that such 'virtual' groups can be established quickly, but are rapidly dispersed in the same way.

Left-wing movements had a crucial role in the demonstrations in Morocco, Jordan and Algeria. In Algeria, just after the uprising in Tunisia, leftist movements and young activists' movements organized mass demonstrations against unemployment, price increases and corruption on the 22<sup>nd</sup> January, 2011. Even though the Islamic movements themselves did not take part in the first days of action, the young people, women and all the other supporters of the Islamic movements participated in the uprisings from the first day. Islamists had a crucial role in the uprisings in other Arab countries. Some Islamist movements had recently joined protesters designated by the leftist movements, professional foundations, trade unions and young activists. The rise of Arab youth movements beyond the narrow request of classical student movements is a proportionally new event. Increasingly the widespread protest-shape was a blog post. The number of bloggers in Arab countries had increased day by day in the region. Governments were scaring them and trying to control the internet. The blogger was associated with an impulsive youth movement as most blog authors were young at that time. The youth movement used blogs as a means of communication. Blog authors were effective in dispensing audiovisuals of the excesses of governments and security forces, disseminating information and announcing news of protest plans. Kışlakçı (2012) stated that by using such tactics, Egyptian bloggers have been effective in publishing human rights violations along with the practices of torture. Tunisian bloggers were the only real source of news about the Jasmine Revolution at the beginning of the events. Meanwhile, in a majority of Arab countries, dozens of blog authors are still in jail today.

The role of women's movements in the Arab revolutions was also great. It could be said that the predominance of popular uprisings was almost completely handled by women in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen. The fact that women played such an active role in revolutions had also undermined the image of the traditional Arab woman. The perception of "passive Muslim women", obedient, submissive and not fighting for their rights, has begun to turn everything upside down with the revolutionary movements. In Tunisia, where the popular uprising began, hundreds of women, lawyers, academics, and students, came out to the streets for

change and yelled for freedom. In Yemen women marched on protest. The increase in prices of foodstuffs and the increase in poverty are the causes of these uprisings. Totalitarian Arab states have ignored the political impact of social and economic problems caused by insecurity and unrest. This also means preventing human power in the most productive age, the youth. This power includes university graduates who have the power to help developing countries by providing that will provide development and advancement. The underground treasure or abundance paradox has provided little economic development in a small part of Arab societies. Prashad (2012) informed that trained lower-middle class and middle-class youth cannot find jobs worthy of human dignity. The humiliations attached to each other disgust these young people: no job, no respect from the authoritarian state, and a general resentment of being second-class citizens on top of the world scene, all of which has been overwhelming to the youth.

The dictatorial Arab leaders have not made well on given words to their people since the beginning of governance when they held the power. Consequently, the people have lost all confidence in their governors. There is a deep gap between their talk and actions. Therefore, when you look at all the speeches by leaders about economic and social performance, everything in the country is always improving. Arab leaders have come to ignore other cities when they regard capital cities. There is no confidence in the youth of Arab countries. This situation eliminates the hope to change the current situation by political means in the hands of youth. Young people were encouraged to participate in the walk itself to express their demands without being in the organization. Parties are indifferent to social demonstrations. For young people, there is no other option apart from flocking into the street and squares in order to express their suppressed anger. In the Arab world, power has been under the dominance of certain families for approximately 40 years. Every dictator can prolong the power period by changing the act by means of the state of emergency law. Election can be made by one leader in the election period. Therefore, elections are being made under the supervision of the state of fear; the certain candidate easily wins the election without any powerful rival. In the Arab countries, dictators, kingdoms and military regimes have abstained from realizing the political reforms for many years. At this stage, it can be deduced that Arab administrators have sustained their power by feeding from severe for a long time under the framework of the State of Emergency Law. Kışlakçı (2012) stated that dictators in Arab countries have left their power to their sons, whether or not it is in compliance with



state administration. The sons who take over the power from their father looked at the heritage of the state from their ancestors. There was no free and fair election. International organizations have not intervened, even with certain doubts whether these elections were free and fair. The election rigs in the MENA region are now popular among the public and even seen in the stories. Election results are usually very predictable in advance. There is neither surprise in voting rates nor election results in these countries. In the Arab world, protests and demonstrations are not allowed. In the streets the people can only gather to celebrate the dictator's birthday or to express their happiness on the wedding anniversary. Those who leave the streets with the desire to express their self-emancipated political anger are severely punished. In countries claiming to be a parliamentary regime outside the kingdoms and military regimes in the Arab countries, the multi-party system can be considered a successful theater play. The head of state can only permit even in the presence of opposition parties in these countries. Trade and politics are intertwined in the Arab world. They both grow and feed each other. In the meantime, people are ignored by elites and politicians. Laws are issued for businessmen from time to time and the earned money is offered to politicians. The anger that accumulates in shrinking of business areas and the widespread unemployment becomes even bigger when combined with the concern for the future. Even though the people live in misery, there is a group that benefits from the blessings of power lives in luxury and abundance. Even when the official work of the state is being done, illegitimate ways can be used. The number of people who cannot handle the daily work without going outside of law increases day by day. Bribing more or less has become a necessity. Corruption in all its forms has always been the most important part of the relationship with the citizen. The only way to win people's support and respect is to get wealth and goods no matter what the way. Unfortunately, the university degree and talents no longer hold of any importance. The collapse of the middle class, a sign of socio-economic equilibrium, is seen as a sign of the collapse of society. When you examine closely the Arab countries, it is clear that it is indistinguishable from a dungeon. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that every family in this country is like a prison of sorts. Unlawfulness, corruption of public morality, lack of accountability and getting away with crimes has become part of everyday life. By the pressures of the IMF and the World Bank, Tunisian, Syrian and Egyptian economy have made people's living standards even worse. Taxes have increased, public spending has been reduced, and employment has been narrowed. With the withdrawal

of the social state, the living conditions are getting worse. The fact that the Arab countries cannot keep up with the changes in the world and the region are among the biggest factors that trigger protests. The freedom that people have witnessed abroad has become a force pushing their desire to see change in their countries. The repressive Arab regimes closed their eyes to the world after the Cold War. These regimes did not feel obliged to organize themselves. Information, communication and the new media revolution are among the factors that influence political fear that then break the silence of the Arab public. Kışlakçı (2012) remarked that this revolution generation has not tasted democracy since its arrival in the world, nor has it benefited from the blessings of pluralism and freedom.

### **The role of Media and Internet**

The press and media is an important tool not only for the explanation of the thought but also for the formation of the thought. Therefore, the press does not just convey the thought to the people but also contributes to the creation of new ideas in society. Al Jazeera had a significant role in the Arab Spring process. It had managed to overcome the internet censorship. At the same time, it found alternative internet connection solutions. Therefore, it is an important example of how a media organization would get news to develop, publish and integrate into social media. The Al Jazeera was made many publications through social media, and this news had broad repercussions in the world press. Al Jazeera channel which founded by the Emir of Qatar in 1996 was a part of the press revolution in the Arab world. The channel affected the Arab world. Regime opponents, leaders of religious organizations, western leaders, and the officials of Israeli and Palestinian were able to express their views without any obstacles on the Al-Jazeera channel. This was an unprecedented situation in the Arab world. Therefore, the Al-Jazeera's broadcasts became a nightmare for the dictatorial Arab leaders. Gaddafi, Ben Ali, Mubarak, Ali Abdullah Saleh and the kings have made great efforts to ban and silence Al-Jazeera. Today this nightmare has been continuing for the countries that are slightly affected by the Arab spring. Many countries, especially the Algerian military junta, have banned the watching of the Al Jazeera channel in their countries. Kışlakçı (2012) stated that Mubarak always said, 'television, which was as small as this match box, would shake our seats'. Al-Jazeera is considered independent when

compared to official newspapers and televisions in the Arab World. Naturally, totalitarian regimes have been disturbed by the channel that broadcasts free thinking. From time to time, Al-Jazeera was clearly mocking Arab leaders. They put their satirical talk and lifestyle on the screen. Afterwards, they managed to get the opponents on television, whose voices were interrupted, give the audience the opportunity to evaluate their leaders. All these developments are among the indicators of the great change in the Arab world. WikiLeaks' documents announced the slogan of 'We Open Governments' in 2010, and then the Arab Uprising events in 2011 shook the whole world. These WikiLeaks' documents, particularly related to the Middle East correspondence, have caused the people of the region to consolidate their hatred that already existed against their own presidents.

At the beginning of 2011, it is certain that the Arab Spring in the MENA region turned into such a massive popular uprising with the great contributions of social media. Actually, even the use of this new media as a gathering and communication tool has a yield to social media revolution the defining the beginning of Arab Spring. Therefore, this definition is partly true as millions of Arab people living in the region have utilized various social networks like YouTube, Facebook and Twitter to arrange meetings and wide participatory uprisings. In this way, they could reveal their reactions to their own governments. However, it could not be claimed that the internet is the primary factor in the uprisings and new revolutions against the dictatorship regimes in the MENA region. It was primarily the youth organizations that started to organize from the tool of the internet. In the Arab world, the majority of the population is formed by youth who belongs to the internet and satellite television generation. They have chosen this lifestyle with the values they have constituted by rejecting the inheritance of the previous generation. They have formed their own cultures through internet and social media. The effect of the new media in the overthrow of oppressive regimes was agreed by the whole world as the Arab Spring process that began in Tunisia and shortly after affected the entire region. The impact of technology was spreading rapidly to the other states and becoming a massive feature which was important. Especially in Tunisia and Egypt internet has become a very crucial tool as an accelerating function in politics. With the extensive use of Facebook, YouTube, Twitter and similar social networks, Arab people have started to share more on the social media. Therefore, the physical boundaries between the populations have become totally ineffective. The shared awareness, that is to say, social media and the people with a common agenda, has a big effect on the dominance of the

Domino effect which is constantly voiced in the Arab Spring process. In Arab revolts, text messages, social sharing sites, photo and video sharing, blog pages and other social media tools have displayed such power. With these tools, many activists could be organized, communicative while spreading the images by their hands. At this point, they could then organize into wider masses.

The social movements that attract millions of people in Cairo's Tahrir Square have become so self-conscious with Twitter that there has been a widespread belief that nothing would change in Egypt without Twitter. On the other hand, this belief was not actually true. According to a research made by Business School in Dubai, the twitter users' number in the entire Arab world, including North Africa was 1 million 300 thousand. In Kuwait, twitter users had the highest percentage of population, and this figure did not reach 9%. Egypt, claimed to owe its revolution to twitter, this rate was 0.26%. On the other hand, in March 2012, when the Arab Spring was the most active, only 58 million tweets were made from Kuwait, with 239 thousand users. Irak and Yazıcıoğlu (2012) stated that in this period all the issues in the first place were political. Twitter had been heavily used by a very small part of the population in this geographical area. It was used by a small political party rather than being used for political purposes. Blogs throughout the Arab geography had political importance in the opinion of leadership. On the other hand, the repressive regimes started to arrest bloggers in order to prevent more from spreading. To tell the truth, social media like twitter and Facebook was an important tool, but revolution could not only be successful by these alone. The revolution reached its aims at that time with the help of social media and word of mouth. Contemporary communication tools were used to move the demonstrators to fill the streets of Tunisia and Egypt. Prashad (2012) informed that the dismissal of mobile phone and internet services on the 28<sup>th</sup> January 2011 severely aggravated the uneasiness in at least three crucial manners. It awakened many Arab apolitical citizens who were unwilling to the unrest; that is, it required more physical assets to be shown on the streets with face-to-face increased communication. Finally, the control and repression of the rebellion, through the newly developed mixed communication tactics, effectively led to a struggle much harder than a single mass meeting in Tahrir Square by spreading out of the center.

## 2.1. Arab Spring in Tunisia

Having a homogeneous structure with a population of approximately 11 million, Tunisia in 2010 was in a better position than any other countries in the MENA region with regard to social, economic and socioeconomic aspects, but still had a set of problems. In fact, unemployment was up to 13% overall with 30% in the youth sector. The pressure and corruption in the country had increased in recent times. Ben Ali and his family captured the country. At the beginning of the enterprises, including the pharmaceutical industry, all-around communications, shipbuilding, banking, food and beverage sectors, Ben Ali and his family had such a mob like structure.

The popular uprising in Tunisia began with a one-man action against the Tunisian police officer named Mohamed Bouazizi, who moved away from training in Sidi-Bouzyd in December 2010. Mohammed Bouazizi, who had a market of mobile car in Sidi-Bouzyd, confiscated his car because he did not give bribery to the police officers who wanted him. Ayhan (2016) stated that Bouazizi has applied to the police office several times and demanded the return of his car which he sold, but he did not get a positive response, and one of the women policemen slapped him during the events. Muhamed Bouazizi, grew up in an environment where a slap by a woman was regarded as dishonorable. He then set himself on fire in front of Sidi-Bouzyd-state house. Before Bouazizi's suicide, people committed suicide from poverty and unemployment. With the action of Bouazizi, workers, university students, teachers, journalists, lawyers, human rights activists and opposition politicians had started to appear on the streets to protest the policies of Ben Ali government. Protests against Sidi-Bouzyd began to take place in neighboring provinces starting from 18<sup>th</sup> to 21<sup>st</sup> December 2010. Not only the tribal links but also the local trade unions played a crucial impact on the progress of the actions. Ayhan (2016) informed that Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali visited Mohamed Bouazizi on the 28<sup>th</sup> of December in Arous Hospital in Tunisia after the rebellion spread to the chief executive of the city. Meeting with his family in the hospital too, Ben Ali promised medical and economic support. Also on the 29<sup>th</sup> of December, President Ben Ali explained that he would tend to some changes in his cabinet and removed some ministers. Despite these developments, events had not ceased and Tunisian lawyers set up a major protest against human rights violations in Tunisia. On the 4<sup>th</sup> of January, 2011, after Bouazizi's death at the hospital where he was treated, the protests spread throughout the

country once again. The forbidden political parties besides the local unions explained that they supported the demonstrations in the country so then the demonstrations in many parts of the country were arranged. Thousands of demonstrators in the capital exceeded five hundred, despite the fact that Ben Ali announced on the 5<sup>th</sup> of January that he would make an investment of \$5 billion to create jobs in the next few months for 50,000 university graduates. After this event, Ben Ali called the army to suppress the protest as the number of the rebellions increased day by day. Then, on the 9<sup>th</sup> of January 2011, Tunisian Chief of General Staff, General Rachid Ammar did not obey Ben Ali's commands and did not open fire on unarmed activists; therefore, clashes between police forces and members of the army initiated. As the angry crowd did not leave the streets, Ben Ali then removed the Minister of Internal Affairs, who was criticized for using the brute force for the activists. Then he released the detained activists and announced that a commission would be established for investigating the corruption. As these concessions did not provide an end to the protests, the government announced a ban on the streets on the 12<sup>th</sup> of January, when the demonstrations in the capital increased. The Assembly had an extraordinary gathering on the 13<sup>th</sup> of January, despite the fact that the actions were increasing. Murphy (2011) stated that "the following day saw the president imposing a state of emergency, under the terms of which gatherings of more than three people were banned. To sweeten the pill, Ben Ali sacked the entire government and promised fresh elections within the next six months. However, the president found himself unable to convince the army chief of staff, Rachid Ammar, to order his troops to fire on protesters. The Tunisian military has always taken a back-seat as a political player, but has a close collaboration with American and European militaries in managing the security of the Western Mediterranean" (p.301). On the other hand, Ben Ali, once more publicly addressed and promised a clearer more democratic society. Although new concessions such as the promise that he would not be able to stay in power when he finished his term in 2014 and the renewal of election for parliamentary, the investigation of the deaths in the demonstrations and the claims of corruption these efforts failed. As he failed to suppress the protests as in the past, the protests increased dramatically. President Ben Ali left the country in the end on the 14<sup>th</sup> of January 2011. A new period in Tunisia began with Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali fleeing to Saudi Arabia.

There are many reasons behind the uprising, but one of the most remarkable reason is the unreasonably high unemployment rates among young university graduates in Tunisia. There

was a crucial problem in the education system. Mabrouk (2011) informed that “there were weak policies in higher education: the state is making higher education more easily accessible at a time when demographic growth generated far greater demand. As it encouraged two-thirds of all university students to work in literature and the human sciences, irrespective of what their future employment opportunities would be” (p.628). The officials’ role in the government is reorganizing the education system which is vital for the welfare and peace of the society. When Tunisia’ demographic and economic structures are investigated, it is easily seen that Tunisia needs lower paid industrial workers who do not have much skills. So, it is useful to change its education system according labor market’s needs. When young people study long time and do not get a job, they feel stressed and deprived to the others. If a man is jobless then it is quite normal to go out to the streets and voice up. Mabrouk (2011) stated that “people lose their fear; they are not afraid of this kind of situation .... death is more attractive than life under these conditions” (p. 629). As there were lots of unemployed educated people in Tunisia, they caused Arab Spring in the country. They were successful in this event by the help of social media and internet. By using these means, they became aware of the up to date news from the world like democracy and welfare in Western countries. As the people in the region have not gained experience on freedom of press, expression and speech along with similar liberties as they seen on the western countries from the internet, they are strangers to these ideas of wellnesses. Therefore, their past legacy is very important in succeeding transition to democracy. Bingöl (2009) stated that “according to the idea of past legacy, the shadow of the past is still present on today's and future. In general, today's debates on the introduction and defense of new institutions are also taking place in the shadow of the past legacy. More importantly, the defenders of this theory claim that the past legacy would undermine the process of liberalization in the final analysis” (p.121). Intentionally or unintentionally they compared their situation with the western ones and they saw the difference easily. With the result of this comparison they wanted to reach some certain goods and conditions which were to beyond them in their country. To tell the truth, the youth of the region wanted to have same rights like western counties in their own countries. Actually, Western style of thinking of the democracy ideology and Western culture are very different from the Middle East countries. Although these differences, people wanted live in a country in which people have equal facilities and opportunities. However, it shouldn’t be forgotten that in order to live in democracy which

needs long time and experience, people need to have the understanding of the criteria of democracy. When it is investigated of the Arab countries, they have not applied truly the criteria of democracy for a long time. They had obeyed one leader for years. The leader and his relatives had a luxurious lifestyle. These people ignored economic crisis as well as their poor and starveling people. They continued their extravagant and luxurious lives by closing their eyes to its people. In the last period they spent money on the unnecessary staff while the unemployment rate was rising and the economy was getting worse. Cavatorta and Haugbølle (2012) stated that “Tunisia was believed to be one of the least likely to experience such a massive uprising against a regime that had seemingly obtained a number of notable achievements” (p.182). The social structure of Tunisia is varied from other Arab countries in the MENA region. The women have a right to vote and they can file for divorce. Lynch (2011) indicated that “women poured into the streets and protested together with everyone else clearly demonstrates that Tunisian society should have already been one step closer to a new democratic era as Tunisia has also been long considered as the most liberal among the Arab states”. Murphy (2011) discusses that “Islamist tendency has deep roots and historically wider appeal than it is often credited with. Thirty years of fierce repression, and regime discourses that focused on violent factions and episodes, combined with the high visibility of secular public cultures in the capital, obscured very real significance of Islam for rural populations, lower socio-economic strata and formats of opposition activism”. Islamist party “Ennahda” came into power just after the first free elections following the revolt. Islamist party Ennahda was criticized by western societies because of its Islamic ideology on women’s position inside the society. On the contrary, this criticism did not interfere to women’s right and gender equality. Actually, equality is the corner stone of the democracy, and without it, there will be no such a term.

## **2.2. Arab Spring in Egypt**

Egypt is the most crowded country in the Arab World with a population of approximately 95 million among the counties in the MENA region. It has the fourth largest economy of the Arab world following Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Egypt is a transit point between Africa and Asia, as well as its population and economic magnitude. Egypt has



a critical significance to Europe as a strategic transit point with the Suez Canal.



**Figure 2:** Egypt at a Glance      **Source:** Created by CRS

Kılıç (2012) emphasized that the population was mainly composed of two different ethnic communities, namely Arabs and Copts. The Arab communities, both Muslims and Coptic Christian spoke Arabic and they composed a homogenous structure. Much of the Muslim Arabs belong to the Sunni and Shafi sects, while, the Coptic Christians belong to the Orthodox sect. Aydın (2014) emphasized that in Egypt, there were over a thousand social protest movements between 1998 and 2004, and these protests laid the groundwork for the uprising and new political reforms of the later periods. For the first time in 2005 in Egypt, opposition groups organized a symposium on fundamental change in the country. These symposium texts were published a year later (*Borders of Political Reform in Egypt*). The text implied that the people of Egypt wanted change and that this change must be provided with the inner dynamics and the importance of the cooperation. Along with this symposium, protests of every field were beginning to be organized. Kışlakçı (2012) mentioned those regulations in the field of health and education, payment of salaries, determination of working hours, etc. there has been protest on every issue.

The Mubarak administration had taken some steps against the growing opposition in Egypt and especially in the direction of some regulations in line with the 2005 elections. Aydın, (2014) informed that within this scope, the presidential elections were proposed to be held

with a secret voting procedure and with the participation of more than one candidate, and in February 2005, a multi-candidate election process was initiated in Egypt. Under these conditions, the election was held in Egypt on the 7<sup>th</sup> September 2005 and ten candidates, including Mubarak, were participated. The election results were announced on the 9<sup>th</sup> September. Aydin (2014) reported that Mubarak was elected the Egyptian president for another six years, taking the votes of 88.7% of the Egyptian voters who voted. The 2005 presidential elections were also considered an election that did not reflect democratic results, in that only 23% of Egypt's 31 million electorates voted. Egypt was deeply affected by the 2007-2008 world economic crises. The rise in food prices had left the public in a very difficult situation. In addition, unemployment rates were as high as 25%. Gözakman (2014) stated that the corruption, bribery, torture and unlawfulness of anti-democratic practices in Egypt made the demonstrations inevitable after Tunisia. In Egypt, Abdülhamit Şetta committed suicide because of the corruption of public morality. Kışlakçı (2011) indicated that Şetta was a university graduate; his job application was rejected because of being a farmer's young boy. Şetta had not consented to the acceptance of his 43 friends, who had applied together, and then committed suicide (p.108). The Egyptian people who heard these events also brought social violence.

Events and demonstrations continued from time to time in the country until the protests of 2011 when tension rose on the 6<sup>th</sup> January, 2010, after the Christmas midnight mass, with the killing of 8 Coptic Christians and the punishment of those involved. Five months later, Khalid Saed, a young man, was beaten and killed by the security forces in the internet café. Atacan (2014) indicated that along with all these, the Muslim Brotherhood won one deputy despite the heavy pressures and non-transparent elections in 2010 and 2012, President Mubarak's preparation for the transfer of power to his son Gamal increased the anger by Egyptian people towards the power. Orhan (2013) informed that protestors in Egypt started on the 25<sup>th</sup> January, 2011, but it was after the 28<sup>th</sup> January 2011 that the Egyptian people would be able to become revolutionary. Since this date, it has become irreversible for protestors throughout the country to invade public areas, to burn state and police buildings, and to make prison raids. Hosni Mubarak brought General Omar Suleiman, the head of Egyptian intelligence since 1986, to the vice-presidency, which had been empty for thirty years, because of the rise of the rebellions on the 29<sup>th</sup> January 2011. Atacan (2014) stated that the Prime Minister Ahmet Shafiq also apologized for the injuries and the loss of his life

in this conflict. Masses of people continued protests in Cairo when Mubarak addressed the public from the television at 23.00 at night and promised reform, with the task remaining until the end of the mission. He also announced that he would not be a candidate again. However, the Egyptian people continued to protest and asked Mubarak to resign immediately and prepare a new constitution as a nation. Subsequently, the army, which was loyal to Mubarak, became silent to the protests, and the fact that the army was in favor of the protesters led to the loss of the initiative of Mubarak with the subsequent loss of power. Finally, on the 11<sup>th</sup> February 2011, he had to leave the power to the SCAF. People and groups from different parts of the country participated in the protest, which took over the Mubarak regime in Egypt. Groups affiliated with Muslim brothers, Salafists, April 6 Movement, Khalid Said Movement, Kefaya (Enough), labor movements and other opposition groups had an important role in the Tahrir events aimed at overturning Mubarak.


The Egyptian Uprising which was named as the ‘Egyptian Revolution’ or ‘25 January Uprising’ started to in order to oust President Hosni Mubarak and to select a new leader via a pool of candidates in a free atmosphere. Demonstrations were nearly in all cities in Egypt, but Cairo being the capital of Egypt, was the symbol of this uprising. There were a hundred thousand people from various social and political classes as well as different religious sects. Even though Coptic Christians were well with Mubarak, they were also in the squares. With the help of the unprecedented scale of human support, they reached their demand in 18 days. In these days, there weren’t any dismissive sectarian slogans or any specific leaders. They had common slogans “bread, freedom and social justice, human dignity, and political freedom”. Zorlu (2012) indicated that the movement created new metaphors for how Egyptians defined themselves with solidarity, abnegation, a common goal and the ability to conduct a shared decision. The results of the 18 days showed a remarkable social movement which concluded with the removal of the President Hosni Mubarak. In other respects, this process strengthened the army officials and they were poised for intervention as an authoritarian counter-reaction. Actually, the 18 days uprising reached its aim to dismiss Mubarak and it was very successful in the method and solidary of the Egyptian people. After Mubarak left his presidency, some basic but important concrete steps were taken such as the first free elections in Egyptian history, various referendums and so on. Zorlu (2016) pointed out that “as the movement from below continued its quest for democratic governance, authoritarian reconstruction continued while on the other hand, it had finally resulted in the

coup that took place in June 2013. Since then all opposition and protest movements have been criminalized in the country, placing Egypt to a worse subordinated condition on rights and freedoms.” (p.5). It was so called easy to topple the autocratic regimes by means of people, power and military forces of the country. On the other hand, democracy that was a much demanded issue in the region was disappearing because of the reproducing authoritarianism. Zorlu (2016) focused on this issue;

There is a long history of protest and discontent in the Arab countries, but there are not many examples of regime change or the overthrow of leaders due to a mass uprising. After the fall of colonial rule in the Arab World, there has been few significant cases of popular mobilization and none of them were ‘regime threatening’. The distinctiveness of the Arab Uprisings was that the mobilizations influenced the dynamics of the mass popular movements which transformed the question on what are the factors that keep authoritarian regimes standing on their feet. Therefore, in order to understand the wave that occurred and how the authoritarianism reproduced itself in 2011, it became crucial to investigate the strategies that were put forward (p.6).

Egypt got a positive experience in the way of uprising and taking down Hosni Mubarak. The citizens waited patiently to have a democratic arena in the political environment, but it became a bit late because of the military and bureaucratic status quo. Also Mubarak’s thirty years of suppressed governance did not allow quick and desired change in the political transition. Rezaei (2015) emphasized that “Egypt’s transition to democracy has been undermined by the legacy of almost 60 years of consecutive rule by men from the military. With attention in Egypt focused on the current political situation, it is critical to look back and understand how the country arrived to where it is today. Crucially, this entails a serious examination of the failures of democracy in Egypt” (p.218). The transition process is a vehicle for reaching or managing democratic virtues in Egypt. Therefore, there was in the mind that the old numerous political institutions had to be reformed systematically according to societal needs and international norms. In old Egypt which was ruled by authoritarian dictator rulers, societal needs and international norms were always swept under the rug intentionally in order not to disturb their organizations. These are our core conditions for the beginning of the Arab Spring in Egypt. These are as Blitz (2014) indicated “the absence of political violence, absence of press freedom, unemployment, and oil exports” (p.53). As Egypt got high amount of income from oil, they did not need much productive economy. Kamrava (2007) emphasizes about the relationship between oil, economy and democracy as “Egypt is often considered to be a rentier economy. This greatly hinders democracy because

it provides Middle Eastern states great autonomy from society, meaning they do not have to react to demands to society because they can rely on oil revenues instead of taxes. Egypt's possibility for democratic success was lowered because of these factors" (p.203). Robbins (2018) emphasized in the Arab Barometer IV that "definition of democracy means "jobs for all" according to the %73 percent of Egyptian. And also Egyptians blame the political actors for the bad situation of the country. Lastly, Egyptian attitudes about democracy have changed little from before the uprisings and are remain similar to those in other authoritarian countries in MENA" (pp.11,12). The Egyptian case is seen as an example that these four conditions also caused protest in other countries in the name of Arab Spring, and actually these are the basic conditions of the MENA countries.



**Figure 3:** The Causal Characteristics of Arab Spring in Egypt (Blitz, 2014:52)

### **2.3. Arab Spring in Libya**

The Arab Spring showed itself in Libya too in February 2011 with the influence created by the popular movements in Tunisia and Egypt. As Libya is in-between Tunisia and Egypt geographically, it was affected by the protests. Colonel Muammar Gaddafi initially described the actions as simple disrespectful events and humiliated protestors by saying that they were "addicted adolescent youths" and advised their families to keep their children at home. Gaddafi had endured this tough style and described the participants as "reptiles". Gaddafi did not attempt to ban internet and telephone networks nor did he do it nationwide. Gaddafi did not hesitate to use the army to suppress the actions after the actions returned to an armed struggle. Airplanes bombed the towns and soldiers harshly interfered with protestors. These events were broadly seen on television channels. Therefore, there was no need for Libya to use social media for sharing images as they were shown on television with all of their bleakness. Pilkington (2009) stated that Gaddafi spoke for nearly a hundred minutes despite the Assembly recognizing him in fifteen minutes for the first time in 20 years when he spoke in the United Nations General Assembly. At the end of his speech, Gaddafi threw the United Nations Charter to Ban Ki Moon, UN Secretary General. Gaddafi, who made this behavior in the UN Assembly, ignored the international oppression as expected. The first demonstration started in Benghazi against the cruel dictator. Libya's Arab Spring was different from the Arab world in terms of the brutality of the dictator. He targeted protestors with weapons as a counter attack. Libya had a rare civil war. The international community blocked all of Gaddafi's money and gave direct support to the activists. Activists who had received support from the international community had set up a new central bank in the Benghazi city which had financed their expenditures through this bank with borrowed money from abroad. Wenzel (2011) informed that this was a very rare genius work, allowing them to easily find their weapons and material needs. As a result of ongoing actions, the country has had internal war initiatives and activists have received airspace control, weapons, money and education from outside the country. Rebels who received these benefits were victorious in an internal battle where approximately 50 thousand people died, and they had control throughout the country. "The National Council was established in this region against the Gaddafi regime and received worldwide support. The Arab Spring had spread from this region towards the east of the country". Many civilian people have been harmed

by the forces of Gaddafi during this time and the events which resulted in the killing of innocent people have caused the international public to take action. Turkey has also contributed to the actions of the United Nations Organization and to the operations of NATO, which has been included in this international public opinion. On the other hand; Russia, China, South Africa, India and Brazil were opposed to the operations and accused NATO of exceeding the UN authority.

The turning point of popular movements in Libya has been the National Transitional Council established in Benghazi on the 5<sup>th</sup> March 2011. The establishment of the Council has strengthened the popular movements and organized order. National Transitional Council consists of representatives of the cities of Libya and elected representatives in the fields of economy, justice, youth, women and military affairs. This movement in Libya has increased the belief that a peaceful, just, free, independent and democratic Libya would emerge. Kit (2011) told about the Arab Spring in Libya as;

The constellation of contradictory forces is typical of most revolutionary processes. The Egyptian revolution of the 25<sup>th</sup> January to the 11<sup>th</sup> February brought together varying social forces who's only unifying demand was embodied in the revolution's principal slogan: "the people demand the end of the regime." ("Ash-shab yurid isqat an-nizam") The protests initially united capitalists frustrated by rampant government corruption along with youths and professionals who wanted an end to the police state. Hossam el-Hamalawy's description of people getting out of their Mercedes Benz cars to distribute water to protesters is telling. During those heady days at Tahrir Square western media attention focusing on the roles of Mohammed el-Baradei and the Muslim Brotherhood. Yet neither of them proved capable of controlling events. Only in the last three days did a strike wave break out which ultimately forced Mubarak to step down. The aftermath of the 11<sup>th</sup> February has brought a military regime led by former Mubarak generals. They have set up an electoral system which favors traditional, more conservative parties. On the streets violence against women continues, as does anti-Coptic violence. And the military's first priority appears to be to break strikes and institute a counter-revolution. What is important, however, is that the protests and strikes are continuing. Independent unions and left organizations have formed. By defeating the dictator Egypt's revolutionaries have opened the door to new possibilities. Exactly where it will lead is impossible to predict (solidarity-us.org).

The Libyan revolution started in a different way from the others in the region. Unfortunately, it has taken on a different shape and it turned into a military character, which caused many deaths in the street. Also the democracy was demanded through the intervention of international army forces. So, the meaning of democracy and its application in Libya would be very challenging as they grew up in tribe culture that obeyed the rules without any question. Social, political, demographic, and other conditions are fundamentally varied from other Arab Countries like Egypt, Tunisia and so on. Chivvis (2014) informed that "as a case

of military intervention, therefore, Libya does not tell us much about how useful the lower-cost, a lighter footprint adopted there can be under more challenging conditions, or when the objective is broader and more transformational, as was the case at the outset in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, it does serve, at a minimum, as a reminder that military power has a role to play in toppling tyrants and saving people from humanitarian disasters” (p.1). Consequently, Libya took the first step towards democratization by ending the 42-year Gaddafi sovereignty. Libya encountered a different process from Egypt and Tunisia because of their specific situation. Democratization is a long and troublesome process that does not happen immediately. Of course, Libya tries to cut the ties with the ancient regime.

The foundations of the economy would be rebuilt based on the changing administrative and political structure. Libya has gotten worldwide support for the democratic struggle. Chivvis (2014) emphasized that “even though Libya's fate is ultimately in the hands of Libyans themselves, the international community still could take steps to avert further deterioration of Libya, as well as the broader region” (p.1). Libya is totally different from other countries with regard to its state structure. As there are many tribes in country, the post-Gaddafi state is very weak politically and administratively. Therefore, Libya’s constitutional work is still far away from the schedule that was planned in 2011. Also Libyan politics remain disagreeable and turbulent. Chivvis (2014) stated that “Libya’s most serious problem since 2011 has been a lack of security, which has undermined efforts to build functioning political and administrative institutions, further constricting an already minimal international footprint, and facilitated the expansion of criminal and jihadist groups. The lack of security stems primarily from the failure of the efforts to disarm and demobilize the rebel militias after the war” (p.2). According to some American analysts, the real effect of the Arab Spring can only be measured not in years but in decades. As the 'spring' symbolizes fruits and wideness and also a sense of liberty and freedom. Unfortunately, spring turned to fall in especially Libya; the people had not gotten the fruits of the spring with the fall of Qaddafi. Some people in Libya claimed that they were in a much worse condition than before.



## 2.4. Arab Spring in Yemen

Autocratic regimes, lack of representative institutions, widespread inequalities, corruption, nepotism and thinking public resources as their private property for the executives can be listed for the common causes of these protests in Yemen. In spite of these similarities in the countries, the characteristics of the country itself (history, population structure etc.) were effective in the emergence of these movements and the demands of the people. These characteristics have also affected the way of the protestors whether it is peaceful demonstrations or confrontation with the civil war. Gün (2012) informed that Yemen has the highest annual population growth rate of 3% per annum, 40% of unemployment, 43% of the population living below the poverty line and 57.9% of children with inadequate nutrition. The first protests in Yemen started in January 2011 at the "Square of Change" near Sana University. The most important factor to understand Yemen is the state structure that the nation has shaped through this conflict-filled history. Therefore, the reasons for the problems, that Yemen lives today, must be sought in the history of the country. Under the name of "Youth Movement", protesters made demands for work, education, social assistance programs, and equal rights for women, ending corruption and leaving the office of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Carabico (2014) stated that "the demonstrations increased its intensity and the demonstrators invaded the public spaces in an unprecedented way inspired by Tunisia and Egypt" (p.149). For this reason, the reveal of the economic, political and social environment of the pre-public uprising of the country in 2011 would facilitate understanding both of these events and the possibility for the course of the events. Terrill (2011) stated that

Yemen is a large and strategically important country in the southern Arabian Peninsula bordering Saudi Arabia, Oman, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden within the Arabian Sea. It is also the poorest country in the Arab World, with a population that has been unrelentingly resistant to significant central government involvement in local affairs (except to provide resources). The territory outside of the capital of Sana'a is difficult for a national authority to control due to restive, well-armed, and powerful tribes spread across a diverse geography, including vast desert areas and extremely rugged mountains. These tribes have at various points in their history where they resisted the authority of the Ottoman Turks, British military forces in the south, and various Yemeni governments that was judged as being too heavy-handed in their relations with tribal leaders. Historically, Yemeni tribes have also been willing to show conditional loyalty to national government authorities that avoid taxing them and that provide them with gifts of money, weapons, and other forms of support. A frequent and sly comment on the political culture is that loyalty is rented in Yemen rather than bought (p.3).

Unlike the Youth Movement, the opposition parties took a more cautious attitude until the last moment when they asked for serious reforms rather than ousting President Saleh. The opposition, which allowed demonstrations, stood on political reforms rather than leaving the task of Saleh and in their official slogans and speeches, they tried not to face direct regime supporters. However, these attitudes did not last very long and they wanted Saleh to leave duty as soon as possible. Tawakkul Karman Mohammed al Nahmi has come to the fore and has become a symbol of Yemen movement in the protests. CARabico (2014) informed that the Nobel Peace Prize 2011 was given to Yemeni Tawakkul Karman because she had represented the scream of freedom and justice in the whole Arabian geography. (She got the prize with the struggle for the exclusion of violence for the right to full participation of women in the peace-building process.)

The president Abdullah Saleh had taken a series of economic measures against the protests. The salaries of troops and other security units were increased while free food and gas were supplied. The salary increases foreseen at the end of the year for civil servants were put into effect shortly after the uprisings began. Taxes had been seriously reduced; subsidies and new price regulations had been applied. University fees had been removed and a project had been announced to help new graduates find jobs. Social assistance programs had been extended to half a million additional families. As these economic measures did not work, President Saleh began to make some political concessions. Yet, the rise in the number of protests and the opponents' number over time had caused Saleh to use violence like all the authoritarian regimes of the region. Because of this violence, 150,000 people marched on Sana's biggest anger day until that time. Ersoy (2014) verified that "Ali Muhsin Ahmar, the Commander of the Republican Guards, the most important commander of President Saleh in Yemen, took a side with the opponents with a sudden change" (p. 241). The fact that the parties (ruling and opponents) failed to reach agreement in 2011 led to the possibility of a long-term conflict between rival military groups in Sana, and even brought to fear of civil war. The international formation, in which the US and the EU were located, proposed the withdrawal of President Saleh, the creation of a new government and new a presidential election. On the other hand, Saleh and its relatives had also planned to be exempted from punishment, but this proposal had not been accepted by Saleh. (CARabico, 2014:168). CARabico (2014) confirmed that "the president Saleh agreed to leave the power the result of the pressure of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) on the 23<sup>rd</sup> November 2011" (p. 169).

With this agreement, President Saleh and his family would not be punished for their former activities, but Saleh would give up his authority. After this resignation, “Abdurabbu Mansur el-Hadi won the new elections. He swore in to office on the 27<sup>th</sup> February 2012 and became the president of the Republic of Yemen” (Aras, 2014: 89)

The Arab Spring did not work in Yemen. The things have not been reduced or even increased. After the resignation of the President and Prime Minister on the 22<sup>nd</sup> January 2015, resignations were not accepted. On the one hand, the Shiite group, Houthis and the Al-Qa’ida, were the biggest obstacles to stability in the country.

## **2.5. Arab Spring in Jordan**

Arab Spring was playing a role in changing the seasons in many Arab countries. These included Lebanon, Jordan and the Gulf States in the Near East, as well as Morocco and Algeria in North Africa. Sociological developments and changes in regime in all these countries were watched closely by both global and regional powers. We cannot think of the "Arab Spring" phenomenon independently of the revolutionary concept that brought about major changes. When we analyze the phenomenon of "Arab Spring" deeply, we see that it is a social phenomenon that has passed its starting phase, but it has not yet completed. Therefore, it is uncertain whether the "Arab Spring" phenomenon will take place in the future.

The people, who started the spring, poured into the streets and overthrew cruel and dictatorial regimes, and yet could not get what they wanted. "Arab Spring" did not play a serious role at the point of people's participation in or participation in elections and at the point of change of administration. On the other hand, the people did not accept what they obtained with their demand because they were different from what they wanted. Lynch (2011) asserted that decision-makers who were not well organized in the political arena have hindered the realization of a close and concrete reform on the basis of validity. Therefore, the international community was not so optimistic that Arab Spring would bring real change, given the power of these authoritarian regimes and their record of resilience.

In the first days of 2011, when the Arab Spring shows began, the opposition organized in Jordan via civil society. This opposing civil society has tried to organize the demonstrations

against King Abdullah by adding relatively large masses of people. The youth movement, consisting of Jordanian teachers, students, pensioners, day laborers, and nationalists organized a big show including the left and the right on the 14<sup>th</sup> January to protest rising food and oil prices while calling for the end of corruption. Although the government put in a \$ 160 million emergency aid plan on the 10<sup>th</sup> January, the demonstration took place on the appointed day, but there was not much participation. Another group organizing the protests was the Democratic Action Front (Islamic Action Front-IAF) which was the Muslim Brotherhood and its political extension. On the 28<sup>th</sup> January 2011, about 3500 Jordanian met in the city center of Amman's capital in order to make the anti-government movement. Especially in 2010, economic-based problems such as rising inflation, high unemployment rate and inequality in income distribution, as well as recent arrests in the intelligence units were among the protestors' reaction. Al Jazeera News (2011) stated that “thousands of people in Jordan have taken to the streets in protests, demanding the country's prime minister's step down, and for the government to curb rising prices, inflation, and unemployment”. From this point of view, the context of the popular movement in Jordan pointed to a different situation than the protests in other Arab countries. Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain were largely aimed at protesting the government and the regime.

The Prime Minister Samir Rifai and his cabinet were unseated by King Abdullah II on Tuesday 1<sup>st</sup> February 2011 after widespread demonstrations by crowds of people in the country. Protestors have stepped back after this change and have paused for a few moments. Those who participated in the protest stated the opposition's attitude by underlining that this governance could only be possible by carrying out political, economic and cultural reforms. The Washington Post (2011) indicated that “the king met with members of parliament and the appointed Senate, urging reforms. Officials say he has talked to representatives of various groups, including unionists and Islamists, to hear their grievances, and even visited poor areas of the country to get a firsthand look at people's needs”.

One of the most important points that should be noted in the early periods of these popular movements in Jordan was that the protestors did not directly target King Abdullah. Therefore, a revolution that could take place in Jordan was accepted by the opposition, which might be in a form that did not require the direct overthrow or change of power, unlike the examples of Egypt or Tunisia. It seemed possible in the context of the political system structure when the unique monarchical nature of Jordan is taken into consideration which

was the constitutional monarchy that functioned well in the country after the revolutionary demonstrations. The protests could not gain intensity although they continued in Jordan. King Abdullah, who was aware of the demands of the people, was trying to transcend this process by making new appointments. One point in which the King was advantageous is that the reaction was not directly aimed towards him. More precisely, the Jordanian opposition knew that the reaction to the King would be limited. This prevented the unification of the protests to the direction of the whole of the regime. In addition, some of Jordan's unique characteristics were the strengths of the country to make a total change.

## **2.6. Arab Spring in Morocco**

On Sunday the 17<sup>th</sup> February 2011, Arab Spring wended from Tunisia and Egypt to influential in Morocco, the most stable country in the MENA region. In the first protest, the public complained about unemployment and the excessive cost of basic necessities. The 20<sup>th</sup> of February Movement continued with more than 100 cities, especially in Casablanca, Rabat, Tangier and Marrakech, with more than thousands of people attending from time to time. Demonstrators demanded the transition to the parliamentary monarchy, reducing the powers of the king, and removing some of the people among the ruling elites. Çoşkun (2011) told that more than three hundred thousand people participated in the demonstrations from fifty different centers when they reached the peak of the protests. The activists had not made any call for the King to leave. The reason that the people did not want the King to withdraw from office was because of the love of the people.

In the Arab uprisings in Morocco, as in the other countries, more effective factors in management were expected from the society and also economic reasons were in the core of the protests. However, apart from the fact that it is governed by the monarchy, the distinction of Morocco from other countries is that there is an obstacle here with the domino effect, even though this administration is supported by the majority of its citizens. In this process, the will of the people was not the arrival of democracy, but rather the abandonment of some of King Muhammad's rights. The new demands are related to employment and reforms, like in the other countries too.

Economic demands have been the employment of young unemployed graduates, the increase of minimum wages, protection of the purchasing power of citizens, and better social services reached by everyone. Politically, a democratic constitution based on the independent judiciary, separation of powers, freedom of the speech and press, the ending of human rights abuses and recognition of the Berber language as the official language have been some of these demands. It is also desirable that the current government might be withdrawn from office and those involved in corruption should be on trial.

The events in Morocco developed more calmly than those under the influence of the Arab Spring as, King VI. Muhammad responded swiftly to the protest movements. When we compare the Moroccan case to other countries, we can say that the police abstained from violence. However, this situation could not prevent conflicts. Especially after the conflicts on the 20<sup>th</sup> February when five bodies of burned corpses were found on a bank, which caused the people to spill again on the 22<sup>nd</sup> February. With the growth of events, King VI Muhammad announced that he would make a comprehensive constitutional amendment on the 9<sup>th</sup> of March. Speaking on the 9<sup>th</sup> March 2011, only twenty days after the demonstrations, the King made some political concessions, such as the release of some criminals of thought and a comprehensive constitutional reform. On the 20<sup>th</sup> March 2011, a technical committee set up to prepare a new Constitution. Although the constitutional reform package, which was the subject of the constitution, did not fully meet the demands of the demonstrators, it was voted on with a vote of 98.94 % on the 1<sup>st</sup> July 2011. In the general election dated the 25<sup>th</sup> November 2011 the Justice and Development Party (Partide la Justice et du Développement, PJD) won and party leader Abdulilah Benkiran was appointed prime minister under the new Constitution. The Justice and Development Party had a saying that blends modern politics and religion which was noted as the model of the AK Party in Turkey. In Morocco, one of the least-populated countries in the region, it will show how effective constitutional reforms are. However, it is not possible to talk about a revolution for the Moroccan example in the Arab Spring.

Just like in Tunisia and Egypt, the events that occurred in Morocco caused the people to have expectations from power and reactions to the aggravated living conditions. Yet, the most important point for the Moroccan case among the Arab world is, being a Monarchy, the king receives support from the majority of its citizens and so, the revolts were against the government and its prime minister. After all, the Arab Spring in Morocco brought a number

of economic reforms which have resulted in the acceptance of the Constitution, which only made partial changes in the King's powers. This did not make any major changes to the political structure, and the elections were made according to these constitutional amendments.

## **2.7. Arab Spring in Bahrain**

In 2011, Bahrain became a significant center of attention in the Middle East and the Gulf due to events that occurred in the country. Consequently, the 2011 Bahrain events are a development that has been taking place in the Arab Spring process and has widespread effects in both regional and international dimensions. The events in Bahrain are not just a domestic political development, but the effects are also of importance beyond the borders of the country. The background of the Bahrain events, which started long before the Arab Spring movements, reached an advanced dimension under the influence of this process. It can be regarded as a pause for the Arab Spring process which started in Tunisia and continued in turn in Egypt, Libya and Yemen respectively.

The popular desires such as "the open regime, democracy and representation in the administration, respect for human rights, fair distribution of income and improving social and economic conditions" are the essence of Arab spring as part of Bahrain events. However, the stage reached in the country has also been an important backlash for the regional agenda, which we call Arab Spring in its name and for having caused the regime changes in the MENA region. It is necessary to discuss the impact of regional powers such as Iran, as well as many democratic countries, especially the US, in this reversal or disappointment. Iran explicitly supported the Shiite demonstrators in Bahrain. However, Iran responded with tough military and police measures against the masses that were initially stranded on similar roads in their home country. Similarly, Western Countries like the USA and the UK, where the current administration has always had close ties in Bahrain, have a strategic prescription in the Gulf, while favoring street demonstrations in other countries. They were in favor of a regime minded approach to Bahrain events for the continuation of the status quo in the Gulf. In other words, popular movements and street demonstrations supported in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Iran and Syria did not find enough interest and support from Western countries in

Bahrain. This attitude of the West has made the Bahraini administration more powerful against insurgency and political turbulence in the interior, resulting in the postponement of the main demands of the majority of the groups in the country, such as democracy, human rights and equal participation in political and economic life. From this point of view, Bahrain's uprising also functions as a kind of litmus paper in Arab Spring as part of the countries' approach to events.

One of the biggest impacts of the Arab Spring probably was in Bahrain where this, a very rich country was famous for its oil richness. The Arabian spring was an opportunity for the people of Bahrain as the ever-mounting troubles of the years had worn away the people in the country. The protests helped to reveal Bahrain's secrets and richness behind the scenes. While the Arab Spring ignited the wick of MENA rebellions, Bahrain could not find much in the world press. It was necessary to place the rebellion in this small country in place of a whole piece to understand its historicity and its dynamics. The colonialism history in Bahrain dates back to the discovery of petroleum as its geopolitical importance. In the end of 19th century, Britain tactically worked with strong families and rulers who were tribal at that time so as to secure their interests in the Gulf region; therefore, they tried to keep the region under control. In this context, despite the country's Shiite majority, Britain signed a series of agreements between the years 1861-1914 with the Sunni al-Khalifa family holding hands in management since the end of 1700. However, in analyzing the rebellions in Bahrain history and today, it is necessary to open a parenthesis here in order not to be confined to the perspective of a narrow Shia-Sunni conflict. The colonization process that accelerated with the exploration of oil in the Gulf in the 1930s deeply affected the formation of the classes along with the social dynamics of the states in the Middle East. To ignore these effects and reduce conflict to mere sectarian clashes particular to 'primitive' societies between 'regional' powers could be more than taking the easy way out, and it would serve for the dominant view. With the discovery of the world's most important strategic asset, petroleum, the Gulf's prosperity required the United States and Britain to form a business alliance with the status quo governors of the region. The first political party of the Gulf, the 'High Execution Committee', was established in Bahrain as part of the nationalist and leftist wind that rose in the Middle East in the 1950s. In suppressing the rising anti-colonial movements during this period, Britain helped the al-Khalifa dynasty. With the militant workers' movement rising in the country in the 1960s, Bahrain was standing out as one of the strongest rebels in the



region's rebellion against British colonialism. When it came to 1971, Bahrain became independent from the 'formal colonial' of Britain, but this did not ensure the establishment of a democratic structure. The two left-wing parties in the 1970s did not only struggle because of the democracy and labor struggle, but also opposed the renewal of the US Navy base in the country. However, the response of the regime to these developments was severe. The regime started a period of heavy political pressure and torture by means of the State Security Courts. In the 1990s, the weakening left wing was taken by the dissident Shia organizations influenced by the Iranian revolution. However, the Constitutional Movement, which was the extension of the revolt from June 1994 to 2000, and hosted many opposition sections of nationalist, leftist, Shiite, Sunni, society, was not a movement based on sectarianism. The regime suppressed this opposing wing violently which escalated the clash of sects to discredit and divide the rebellion. The changes promised by the new King in 1999 also ended in disappointment. At the beginning of the 2000s, the constitution confirmed that the new King would not be different from his predecessor.

In the first decade of the 2000s, the society witnessed an era of the political pressure increase despite the efforts of the opposition parties. The ever-mounting and increasing pressures of Bahrain's political history had prepared the appropriate zone for the 2011 uprising that exploded on the 14<sup>th</sup> of February. But the only factor that did not trigger the revolt was the collapse of the semi-democratic political model. The uncompromising implementation of neoliberal policies privatized the country resources which led to increasing unemployment with an inequality in income distribution. These also had a remarkable role in the uprising. The people first gathered at Pearl Square and showed their consistency. The aim of the people was to bring equality, justice and freedom in the country. However, the Bahrain administration did not allow it and tried to suppress the uprising by violence. Therefore, the government responded very strongly to the protests. In just three days, seven people lost their lives. The government's reaction to it had affected many people throughout the country and caused the protest to grow. The secular leftist organization Vaad, who supported the uprisings on the first day, was the objective of the regime's heavy oppression; it was subsequently restrained from the politics. Then the general secretary of the secular leftist organization, Ibrahim Sharif, was taken into custody on the 17<sup>th</sup> March 2011. The sheriff was also Sunni, and he revealed that the real motivation behind the sect's incitement of the regime was protection of the status quo.

In Bahrain, opposition in especially Shia organizations often is taken out on the streets to demand freedom of political prisoners. More than 3,500 political prisoners arrested in anti-government demonstrations were reported to have been tortured. The Bahrain administration has invested in becoming an important financial center for the Gulf trade to compensate for the oil reserves that are limited by the other Gulf States. In 2006, a free trade agreement (FTA) with the USA was signed which was the first free trade agreement the US has made with any Gulf country. The two other sectors that are most active in the country's economy after oil and aluminum exports were finance and construction. This had caused the population to diversify with many workers coming from outside. However, the neoliberal financial center model that dominated the country triggered the contradiction between the elite and the poor working class. The Shiite population at the intersection of intense political oppression and poverty had thus come to the forefront in both the labor and political opposition movements. Although the country has not been the scene of the jihadist assaults against the Shiite communities until now, the government has stigmatized all kinds of opposition as Shiite separatism. Repressive, impoverishment policies imposed by the Shiite bloc, such as in Iraq and Yemen, were increasing the tension of taking the US as one of the coalition partners in every reactionary operation in the Middle East. The protests of equality were publicly turned into Shiite-Sunni conflicts. Iran has stirred up riots and conflicts with its involvement in the internal affairs of Bahrain fueled the unrest. In the country, sect tension was increasing. The opposition and Shiite journalists were arrested. The Shiite with the demand for rights strengthened the rebellion in general. The country was dragged into an atmosphere of sectarian conflict. The difference between the other rebellious countries was that instead of freedom and democracy, the people struggled for Shiite rights only.

It is necessary to think about the existence of some social and political problems that exist in the country for a long time but they were under the shadow of the 2011 events in Bahrain and apart from the fact that the Arab Spring events. Bahrain has been an important center of human trafficking in the Gulf for years as a result of the uncontrolled population movement to the country. Foreigners living in Bahrain found themselves in the middle of the fire with the outbreak of events. Even though many foreigners have left the country as a remedy, they have become indirect victims of the Bahraini events because they were forced to leave their business and investments halfway. Moreover, in Bahrain the restrictions and limitations imposed in the field of communication and broadcasting have become more widespread in

recent years due to the Arab Spring events in the country, conflicts and political problems. In this context, social media networks and applications that operate on the internet have become more strictly controlled by the state during and after the events. The censorship applied to the Internet in written and visual media has been strengthened. Lastly, the Guardian (2011) informed that discrimination in the public and private sector employment, which constituted a serious problem in the country in the previous years, became even acuter after the events of 2011. The Guardian (2011) published that during the events of the 2011, on the 11<sup>th</sup> of May, the Bahrain National Petroleum Company has taken off from nearly 300 of those involved in the events. As a result, the 2011 events further deepened the existing problems in Bahrain and made the solution more difficult. The isolation between social groups depended due to events.

## **2.8. Arab Spring in Syria**

The Syrian Arab Republic gained its independence in 1946. However, since the administration has changed hands many times, a stable structure has been a time-consuming country to reach. One of the most significant centers of the world is the Middle East. Syria is one of the most crucial actors of the Middle East, not only in the today's Middle East, but also in the past centuries as, it is one of the most powerful forces in the region. The historical background that the country has intellectual capital, the strategic importance of bringing geographical position, and the political tradition are the most important factors of Syria's post-independence leadership of the Arab world. Syria's geographical location and neighboring states of the Middle East as well as ethnic and religious differences within the country, brings much more sensitive position to Syria. Mercan (2012) informed that "Arabs, Kurds, Armenians, Turkmen and Circassians live together in the country. In addition to the diverse ethnic structure, the most important element in the shaping of modern Syrian history is the efficacy of religious and denominational groups on governance" (p.20). Atalay (2013) also stated about the governance of Syria that "Syria had been governed by the state of emergency laws for 45 years and the 49th law enacting death or life imprisonment for membership of the Muslim Brotherhood of the 7<sup>th</sup> August 1980. The administration is single-party, anti-democratic, and oppressive over the majority of the 10% minorities" (p.72). This

minority governance doubtfully caused major problems. Caner (2012) claimed that “the rhetoric of liberty and equality initiated against capitalism and imperialism reminded them of the new excitement with rebellion option for communities that lived were oppressed by the West for many years” (p.15). It is accepted by the international community that the change is politically inevitable even if it is heavy. This has become an endless process for Syria. At the same time, the price is now even so heavy that countless people are being urged to leave their homes and have since fallen into refugee status in other countries, especially going to Turkey and Jordan. Through this, thousands of people have lost their lives. Consequently, the changes in Egypt and Tunisia were in a short period of two months, so Syrian people hoped to oust their leaders’ in the same way.

After the 19th century, as the western countries entered the Middle East geography with imperialist thinking, the social, political and economic problems in this region gradually increased. Kıymaz (2012) informed that “the struggle seen in the geography of the Middle East is far away from the struggle of independence and sovereignty of the Arabs living in the region, but the struggle for sharing the underground resources, mainly oil and natural gas in the region” (p.11). Kıymaz (2012) stated that “Asad selected Nusayri and Arab people who unconditionally obeyed him and his family. Other people have also been Baas Party executives. The secular Sunnis who did not dominate religious rhetoric were also tasked with the top administration of the state” (p.26). The Asad regime was accused by the people who spilled to the streets for justice, freedom and democracy as "agents of the West wanting to divide the country". He also used the same rhetoric as Libyan, Tunisian and Egyptian’s overthrown leaders. They also reacted in the same at first with the idea that they would suppress the protests easily as in the past. They also accused the people on street as rebels and traitors. The main factor in the survival of the Asad regime for many years is that Hafız Asad knows the internal, regional and international politics very well. Kışlakçı (2012) emphasized that for the past 45 years, the regime has refused to do any serious political reform. On the other hand, this process blocked a demographic, economic and social transformation. The population has increased and at the same time has become younger, so that today more than half of the Syrians are not even 20 years old yet. The most negative and brutal aspect of the dictatorial regimes is the political life strangles, weakens society's power, and restrains the dreams of better and free lives. Therefore, good politicians, thinkers, writers, and honest businessmen have to leave the country as they cannot find a good living

space in a free atmosphere. Only the small group of supporters remained around the dictator. This is what happened in Syria. When the dictator feels that the end is near, he appoints a crown prince. Basil Asad, the eldest son of Hafiz Asad was crown prince of the regime at that time. When Basil Asad was killed in a suspected traffic accident, Bashar Asad, who had not been considered for this position, came forward. Bashar Asad said that in the first speech he made in parliament, he would launch "change" winds in the country. Kışlakçı (2012) asserted, that period is called the "Damascus Spring". The former management, who was uncomfortable with these developments, claimed that the initiatives of Bashar Asad would constitute a serious threat to the regime. Thus the Damascus Spring has come to an end and the system is closed again. From the beginning of 2011, the reflections of the Arab Spring in Syria along with the voice of the opposing forces in Syria has been heard more often. Kıymaz (2012) remarked that Bashar Asad did not make economic innovations in domestic politics for the welfare of the Syrian citizens. He followed a repressive and illiberal policy more like his father Hafiz Asad. He has not changed the ideological structure of the Ba'ath Party based on worldly interests.

Syria passed to the parliamentary democracy in the following years when Syria had gained its independence. Political instability had taken place in this process and therefore, this allowed the soldiers to intervene frequently in the administration. For these reasons, the Syrian people in the post-independence period did not have much time for civilian political institutions to be able to develop and consolidate them. When we investigated the sixties of Syria, the Ba'ath, the ruler of Syria, was seen as a classic socialist party. Kışlakçı (2012) stated that "in 1970, Hafiz Asad, who came to power as the "one man", created a new Ba'ath. This party, which has no interest in the previous Ba'ath, has become a tool that screens Hafiz Asad's personal power. Hafiz Asad ruled the country alone from 1970 until his death in 2000" (p.204).

The events in Syria constitute the last wave of the popular movements in the Middle East. President Bashar al-Assad's reform allegations delayed the popular movements in Syria, but the imprisonment of many political offenders caused mass demonstrations. During this period of rapid spread among Arab countries, Syria had a different background. It had painful and problematic domestic politics and a closed structure compared to other Arab countries. Atalay (2013) cited from a Syrian President Bashar Assad speech to Wall Street Journal about during the uprising in Tunisia, Yemen and Egypt that Arab countries should take into

consideration to the economic and political demands of their people. While Assad stated the position of Syria, it was especially underlined that Syria could not establish close relations like other countries with the US and Israel. In addition to the economic reasons for those events in Syria, it is necessary to mention the fact that the uprising is the product of more political concerns, such as political freedom along with the abolishment of the state of emergency law that has been applying since 1963. However, it is possible to say that the noble events of present day are in a product of the controversial period in which the liberal ideas and propositions were suppressed by the regime in the autumn of 2001. This period was also called as Sham Spring with the death of presidency of President Hafez al-Assad in 2000. At that time intellectuals had a fundamental role in shaping today's rebellions.

The Arab Spring fires, which have impacts on other regions of the MENA region, turned to winter in Syria. The uprising of the people in Syria began on the 15<sup>th</sup> March 2011, and devastated the country but Assad and Baath Party have still kept his chair. (politikademi.org) Syria was the last country that joined the Arab world fire. The first demonstration calls in Syria which has been under the rule of the Assad family for decades happened on a Friday. Kışlakçı (2012) stated that young people, from a relatively small city of the country in the south Deraa influenced by Tunisia and Egypt, were taken into custody as they wrote on the wall, "the people desire the regime to fall". After this event, the demonstration started in Deraa while other cities had also participated from time to time. Although the security forces and army units' commenced fire and many people died, the demonstrations continued. Considering the ongoing internal conflict in Syria, it can be said that the Syrian crisis has begun to lose its common parts during the Arab Spring period. Unlike the Tunisian and Egyptian examples, there is now an internal power struggle in Syria, which has been deliberately sought from the rights and freedoms aspirations.

The future Bashar Assad's regime maintains its uncertainty. The internal conflict and the struggle for power in Syria force the problem to become more complicated by the inclusion of Iran, Russia, and Western countries. Turkey, on the other hand, faces the risk of losing the moral and principled attitude it has been following since the beginning of this crisis, where different nations have been affected. It is difficult for Turkey to act on the same grounds in support of the anti-opposition because Turkey is bound to moral justifications, and also the Syrian issue has become a national security problem for itself. On the other hand, it is a fact that the opposition, which Turkey supports strongly, is subjected to criticism

due to organizing, co-existence under the roof, and the use of extra power. What needs to be done from now on and how to shape the future of Syria are the questions that need to be addressed first. However, there is more than one factor that makes the solution of the Syrian crisis difficult. These are the fact that the actors, who have different priorities and interests at the beginning, are directly or indirectly crisscrossed. Often, Russia's and America's uncompromising attitude in the region is strengthening the solution.

The perception that the opposition in Syria is heavily made up of Islamists also leads to questioning whether the western countries are in fact desperate for their own alternative to Assad. Mechanisms for collective intervention or precautions require the approval and consent of the Security Council, but China and Russia do not allow the operation of these mechanisms. However, since the Syrian administration cannot fulfill this responsibility by protecting the people, the intervention of the international community in Syria is still one of the options in the resolution of the crisis. In addition, the radical Islamist terrorist group of Iraqi and Syrian Islamic State (Iraq and Islamic State of Islam) DAESH, which is active in Iraq and Syria, is a serious threat to Turkey's national security as its neighbors increasing its effectiveness in these countries. The end war of civil war is a prerequisite for re-security, stability and peace in Syria and surrounding provinces. However, if the peace is sustainable, it is necessary to determine a road map that includes political, economic, legal and social reforms to establish a nationality. The first issue to be addressed in this context is political arrangements involving the construction of national identity, the identification of the new political system and constitutional work.

In Syria, social and cultural NGOs along with internet information systems are under state control completely. Atalay (2013) informed that "Syria is also regarded as one of the most closed and controlled countries of the Middle East at the same time" (p.76). Political and civil organization in Syria identity problems expressing cultural rights, crimes of thought and the closure of entering of the human rights observers, visual and written media, and internet communication were completely under the state control. This was a serious problem that needed to be solved. In Syria, the regime did not take steps that would put its own existence at risk and so as to prevent the improvement of the opposition within the country, economic and occasional political expansions were realized. Nevertheless, in time the demands of the people had not been realized and the implementation of radical change programs in Syria had harassed the Syrian people. The Syrian people externalized their anger

that they have accumulated for many years against the regime. The fact that the regime did not keep the promise of reform and continued its repression policies led to increased uprising. Against this uprising, the regime, as always, stepped back at the very beginning and raised the salaries of civil servants while closing some nightclubs. The Muslim community ensured that some previously veiled women were taken back to their jobs. However, the protestors continued their protests in order to get their real freedom this time.

At the end of 2014, the results of the Arab Spring period in Syria have reached a serious dimension with the number of dead around 200,000 with 9 million leaving their homes. Again at the end of 2014, on the aggravation of the events in Syria, the European countries that exported about 90% of the oil produced by Syria had taken a decision to implement oil embargo against the Assad administration.



### **CHAPTER THREE: ARAB SPRING IN EGYPT**

For the last two decades, Egypt was the center of strikes, uprising movements, and bread riots. It has always been in the center of inconsistent political and economic issues stemmed from various internal and external reasons. As the region is in the disordered problematic political issues, Egypt is in the middle of its street protests many times. Therefore, the uprising of the 25<sup>th</sup> January is not the first and will not be the last in the Egyptian history. Some examples of the protests after 2000s were Palestinian Intifada in 2000, America's invasion of Iraq in 2003, and loss of labor movements in the heart of Egypt, in Tahrir Square, Cairo. These are the protests to the other nations from the small group of people, but the distinctive point in the 25<sup>th</sup> January uprising was the aim of the Egyptian people. They all intended to oust Mubarak and his regime and start a new free and democratic regime. As it is known, there were faulty elections in 2005 and 2010, but there were little changes in the management according to the results of the elections. 2005 election was also important as it was the first multi-contested elections in Egyptian history. The Western countries wanted Mubarak to make some reform of the election law so that the opposition, for the first time, could organize and voice up legally and publically. Again with the help of these reforms civil society grew but the authoritarian officials implemented a new tactic to manage the society. The officials tried to change the shape of power and decrease the conflict via new strategies by forming a systematic change. Yom (2005) highlighted that "Arab autocrats promoted reforms that encourage political competition and liberal opposition; but when civil discord becomes a viable threat, the state does not liberalize, retracting its indulgence and intensifying repression until anti-regime sentiment has abided" (p.23). To tell the truth, Mubarak made some reforms of the election law, yet he maintained control in a way to limit the potential rise of opposition. He intensified the pressure on the opposition groups where they were powerful: on the ballot boxes. Mubarak's National Democratic Party, (NDP) prevented citizens to vote against their party where the opposition was strong. Even they fired on voters; they blocked up the ballot boxes and what was worse they arrested the candidates after the election. Clearly, Mubarak tried every option possible in the election in order to stay in power. Kraetzschmar and Cavatorta (2010) stated that:

While including force selectively, on the other hand, the regime would further undermine the regime's legitimacy at home and build on the fear of Islamism and international stability. In the end, the regime opted for what it must have perceived as the lesser of two dangers to

authoritarian survival, cracking down harshly on the Muslim Brotherhood, its candidates and sympathizers (p.330).

Yet the movements of the labor unions were very important in the forming a new social group and movement. Therefore, there were uprising and protests against the regime, yet they were not able to announce their voice to the whole society. With a small group of protestors, they were not able to pass the security forces. Cook (2012) stated that “there were moments when the regime and its defenders enjoyed the tremendous popular support, but it always managed to maintain through a combination of bribery and, importantly, coercion (p.22).”

A general feature of the Arab uprisings was the suppression of the undemocratic regime in which people lack of freedom and human rights. The people lived in an atmosphere where they were afraid of their governments' authority; while on the other hand, some of the privileged group lived in wealth and power. The authoritarian states do not hesitate in making extraordinary decisions which enable them stability and more power; therefore, the benefit of its citizens is not important to them. Egypt seemed to be democratic in the theory, but there was huge democracy deficit in practice. For instance, there were elections in Egypt yet there was only one candidate who ran for president for decades. If anybody wanted to be a candidate and announce his intention, there would be a sudden change of the election laws. So, it is not easy to be a candidate and run for the presidency as of a member of the parliament. This is a general rule in the MENA region; however, Libya differs from other countries as there was no a presidential election. Gaddafi set up his own political system in which ordinary people had no right to voice up even though; they were affected by rising in food prices, which made people poorer. The management of the country was only in favor of the power and their fortune; they did not give any right to the people in the decision-making process. Ordinary people could be exposed to police torture, brutality and even death.

### 3.1. The Political Life before the Arab Spring

There were many obstacles that dominated Egypt as a whole before the Arab Spring broke out. Yet, the most important and striking ones are: poor economic performance, absence of social equality and justice, and political pressure with limited freedom. As the state continued to shape Egypt with all its strength, difficult socioeconomic conditions such as rising poverty, increasing food prices, and high unemployment were on the rise and affecting everyday life. Jason (2013) stated that “on the political side, increasing (or rather intermittently brutal) pressures, such as abuse of human rights and political authoritarianism are used as tools of suppression to ensure obedience in the face of underdevelopment. There are similar to the conditions of Europe in 1848” (p.169). Jamoul (2012) argued about the situation of Egypt before the Arab Spring as,

Economic and political factors are always the two main factors that bring revolutions. Unemployment and inflation in the Arab region are also a major source of economic insecurity and for destabilization of any political system... Even when most states arrived at a very high level of democracy and political rights, the Arab region still suffers from bad political systems based on corruption, state of emergency laws, the lack of free elections and freedom of speech (p.7).

While Owen (2016) emphasized “the increased power of the state and the centralized economy, where the leading planning system was based on rapid industrialization, tight control over foreign capital and a huge extension of public ownership was seen in Egypt through different stages, at different times and at different rates” (p.115). The most basic economic rule: more people mean more consumption, which means more opportunities are required. If these living possibilities are not provided by the state, then people will inevitably compete more for these opportunities, or suffer from the lack of resources. Therefore, they would be more dissatisfied with the situation. As most people fell under the hunger threshold, they were politically dissatisfied with Mubarak regime. Behr and Aaltola (2011) pointed out that “the lack of basic freedoms was another important impetus for protesters to take to the streets. Furthermore, police violence and the abuse by public authority have also been a routine part of daily life, and corruption has been an endemic at every level of society” (p.3). The Egyptian authorial rulers had controlled people’s lives so as to secure their compliance with the state which made Egypt one big open prison. According to the Egypt state structure, the President is the most crucial actor of the state with the single authoritarian

party administration. For this reason, the protestors have undergone a significant change of "regime" presidency rather than a meaningful change. Foreign Affairs Committee (2012) underlined that Egypt was one of the most crowded countries in the MENA region in which generally it was in the lead position of the Arab world. On the other hand, Egypt had oppressive and comprehensive state of security and a weak or deficient judicial system which was liable for many violations of human rights, including torture and killings. Basically, the stability of any human society is subjected to the degree to which the system guarantees political and human rights. Jason (2013) informed that "Egypt among the Arab world is suffering from bad political systems that are shaped by corruption, emergency laws, and elections that are anything but free and fair actually" (p. 169). Therefore, it was waiting for an earthquake in the Arab region. Behr and Aaltola (2011) indicated that,

The popular uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia have been triggered by a combination of deteriorating living standards and growing inequality (an economic deficit), a lack of political freedoms and public accountability (a political deficit), and the alienation of the demographically dominant age cohorts from the political order (a dignity deficit) (p. 2).

### **3.1.1. The Modern Egypt**

Egypt is one of the oldest places in in the history of human beings. The Egyptian army has always had very crucial political roles in the governing process of the country. The Egyptian army is both the undetectable part of oppression, the holder of violence and defender of Egypt from external threats. The history of the modern Egypt began in the 1805 when the Ottoman Sultan appointed Mohammad Ali Pasha as the governor of Egypt. He was an Albanian origin not from Egypt. He was the governor in Egypt when the Ottoman Empire was declining. Vatikiotis (1980) stated that Muhammad Ali had already gained the trust of Egyptians and had built a powerful base for his military before he was appointed as the governor in 1805. He began acting independently far from the Ottoman Empire. Although he tried many efforts to make Egypt independent from the Ottoman Empire, he was not able to succeed in gaining formal independence for Egypt. Dodwell (2011) informed that Egypt was a de facto independent state in between Mohammed Ali's governance from 1805 to 1848. It had a destabilized relation with the Ottoman Empire. Mohammed Ali was occasionally fully loyal and from time to time he warred against the Empire. Vatikiotis

(1969) stated that Khedive Ismael came into power in 1863; he was willing to transform the country in European ways. Despite the socio economic and even geographic realities of Egypt, his slogan was: “My country is no longer in Africa, it is in Europe” (p.73). Khedive Ismail's policies created a great deficit on the Egyptian economy which made Egypt more dependent on colonial powers especially England. Vatikiotis (1991) claimed that Khedive Ismail's period brought many improvements and changes including: the introduction of new technical skills, the modernization of crowded cities and municipalities, the abundant increase of cotton production, and the expansion of the country's well-watered lands while training and employing bureaucrats with the European style. He created an Assembly of Delegates, and endeavored an inclination towards the constitutional policy.

The Urabi uprising against the financial control of the British and French forces raised the voice of nationalists and class consciousness during the Khedive Pasha period. The Urabi rebellion was unsuccessful, but it was a huge and remarkable phenomenon against the British colonialism. The leader of this revolt movement was a leading officer of the Egyptian army. Blunt (1922) reminded that his revolt and resistance reflected Egyptian people's dissatisfaction with the British invaders. His slogan which is Mīsr li'l-Mīsriyīn (Egypt belongs to Egyptians) flamed the Egyptian nationalism that influenced Egyptian people. Dunn (2013) stated that this event adhered to Egyptian nationalism by the impact of this historical perspective.

After many years of British involvement from 1882 and later on, Egypt finally became a constitutional monarchy in 1922. Sayyid-Marsot (2007) stated that the British had a concession and authority over the Egyptian people in the following four subjects: the defense of Egypt against external aggression, the Sudan, the security of Suez Canal, and the security of minorities and foreign investments. The British occupation had been felt by all parts of Egypt, and the people were not happy with this situation. Deep (2007) focused on the issue that the Wafd party was always against British imperialism. They supported the idea of a Nile unity in which the Sudan was redesigned as a part of Egypt. On the other hand, Sayyid-Marsot (2007) stated that this movement was partly intended to divert public attention from internal ills and incompetence of the government. While all of this was happening, Egyptian nationalists attacked the British Forces in the Canal area with the aim of these guerilla attacks, to make the British leave the country. In a deeper side, the Egyptian people wanted to be free from all the pressure especially from the British invasion, but the

British authority reacted harshly to these attacks. Their military forces encircled a police station in Ismailia, a town along the west bank of the Suez Canal. Sayyid-Marsot (2007) stated that forty policemen were killed and many more wounded during this encircling by the British artillery and tanks. This made the Egyptian people angry with the foreigners so they mobbed attacks against foreign business enterprise. Deeb (2007) depicted that the Egyptian people invaded these British owned stores, markets, clubs and business centers. With these big demonstrations, parts of Cairo were in flames and this day, the 26<sup>th</sup> January 1952 was then called “Black Saturday”. Therefore, while Egypt was in flames, the monarch and the government were unsuccessful in restoring order in those days and upcoming months. Later that year, a group of the young military officers best known as the “Free Officers Movement”, organized a military coup d’état which took over the rule of modern Egypt on the 23<sup>rd</sup> July 1952. With the words of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the sense of dignity, Egypt's independence and stability required a revolution (Nasser, 1959). This nationalist movement with hostility against colonization and its cooperators made the politicians excessively doubtful. Therefore, any attempt towards to democracy forever seemed as a “trojan horse” of Western powers. As Cook (2012) on the modern Egyptian regime stated that “there were moments when the regime and its defenders enjoyed tremendous popular support, but it always managed to maintain through a combination of bribery and more importantly pressure” (p.226). Actually the end of Mubarak’ presidency, which took place on the 25<sup>th</sup> January 2011 had the similarities with the coup d’état in 1952. At that time the Free Officers toppled King Farouk and handled the power. They declared that there would be a parliamentary system very soon. Then Mohammad Naguib who was a very well-known leader was chosen as the first President of the Republic of Egypt. As the Free Officers promised, the parliamentary system came to Egypt as the president was elected for the new system. To tell the truth, the parliamentary system was an ideal that had not yet been reached. Just after one year of the Free Officers’ coup, monarchy was abolished and Gamal Abdel Nasser held the power following the resignation of Naguib. Nasser was immensely popular among people at that time. The military coup d’eat was realized with the support of the people in 1952. After Gamal Abdel Nasser took the power in to his own hands, he banned political parties all over the country. Cook (2012) stated that the Muslim Brotherhood and the Wafd were the only supporters of the regime that saw them as a trustful ally. These were two confidential partners of the regime at that era, but popular support of the Egyptian people

to the regime started with the hope of independence of Egypt from British rule. Zorlu (2014) stated that the military gained a legacy by the takeover of 1952, the Suez Crisis of 1956, and the conflict with Israel. The Nasser era which was called “Arab Socialism” had a closer relation with Russia. There were two close realities with Russia as Cook informed. Cook (2012) stated that “Outside, the military enjoyed aids from the Soviet Union in the era, but stayed as a representative of the Non-Aligned Movement that posed a midway in the Cold War. Inside, the military regime, with a statist Soviet-style planned economic program, pursued land reform policies that benefited the peasants like giving workers job security which made it harder for the bosses to fire employees (p.73). Russia spent large amounts of money for the welfare and profit of villagers who worked on the land especially in the cotton fields. Kandil (2011) asserted that the new regime presented free education for its citizens, expanding employment in the public sector, reachable healthcare from seven to seventy, cheap housing, and other types of social protection. All of this came in return for obedience. In general, the people in Egypt were obedient and they supported the regime without any opposition despite the regime being authoritarian. Zorlu (2014) stated that as there was no opposition to the Emergency Law which was enacted in 1958 for the military rule legacy. The Emergency law gave the government extraordinary powers under a state of emergency which continued to exist till the end of the Mubarak Era. Cook (2012) stated that “the age of Nasser was when Egypt was perceived as the big brother of the Arab World, and with the contentious movements against the colonial powers on the agenda, he became the Arab cause” (p.72). He was a very active and powerful leader because of his Arab Nationalist policies along with his conflict with Israel. Although, Egypt led by Nasser lost Israel War in 1967 which led to his potential resignation, but the people did not want him to resign. Therefore, he continued to rule till his death while his reputation and respectability continued in the Arab world. As all his life was grounded on the Arab nationalism and abolishment of Israel, the defeat of the 1967 war made him ill and he then died from heart attack. How could the military regime born in Egypt be understood from Khadduri’s point of view? Khadduri (1953) informed in his remarkable analysis that

Democracy from its very inception failed to command general respect, and when adequate reforms were not achieved democracy had to bear the blame. Opposition to democracy came from the right (religious) as well as from the left (socialist and communist) parties and groupings; and when neither side could muster sufficient support to achieve power, the army intervened to carry out a moderate program of reform by force (p. 511).

This point of view takes the most considerable points to clarify the failure of democracy and flourishing of the military regime in Egypt. The roots of military impacts on politics are very much concerned with the modernization in Egypt. The officers of the army have a crucial role in the political and social structure of Egypt. It is extremely significant that the creation of modern Egypt is owed a military coup with its independence from British patronage. This event also started the period in which Gamal Abdel Nasser was seen as a major role in the political scene of Egypt and the Arab world.

### **3.1.2. Gamal Abdal Nasser (1952-1970)**

Gamal Abdal Nasser was the dominant leader in the Revolution of Egypt in July 1952. Yet, before that, the English hegemony in Egypt rose at the end of the World War II. The Egyptian people's protests were decreased and came to a stop during the Arab- Israel war in 1948. With this English hegemony and failure in the Arab-Israel war, people were made angrier with the English and their government. In 1950, the governing Wafd party took some measures in order to decrease the English oppositions among the people, and they were partly successful in their attempts. On the other hand, the economic stagnation and pressure for freedom increased creating the general strikes and protests on the street. While these were happening, the English soldiers strictly interfered to the people, which caused disturbance in the country. The King Farouk changed the government and gave a presidency to the military government headed by Ali Maher. The government preferred to put more pressure on the people so as to solve the obstacle. In 1952, the government lost their control on the country. This date was also a turning point in Egyptian history as some events happened like Black Saturday. Ari (2008) stated, a group of soldiers, with a nationalist, anti-imperialist and anti-corruption agenda, were anxious about the heavy pressure on the Egyptian people. So they planned to make a coup d'état for the sake of full independence for Egypt. Gamal Abdel Nasser justifies the conceptual framework of 1952 revolutionary coup:

Egypt has passed through a critical period in her recent history characterized by bribery, mischief, and the absence of governmental stability. All of these were factors that had a large influence on the army. Those who accepted bribes and were thus influenced causing our defeat in the Palestinian War [1948]. As for the period following the war, the mischief-



making elements have been assisting one another, and traitors have been commanding the army. They appointed a commander who is both ignorant and corrupt. Egypt has reached the point, therefore, of having no army to defend itself. Consequently, we have taken it upon ourselves to clean up and appoint from within this army to command us men from whom we trust in ability, character, and patriotism. It is certain that all of Egypt will meet this news with enthusiasm and welcome it.

As for those whose arrest we saw fit from among the men formerly associated with the army, we will not deal harshly with them, but will release them at the appropriate time. I assure the Egyptian people that the entire army today has become capable of operating in the national interest and under the rule of the constitution apart from any interests of its own. I take this opportunity to request that the people never permit any traitors to take refuge in deeds of destruction or violence because that is not in the interest of Egypt. Should anyone behave in such ways, he will be dealt with in a forceful manner such as has not been seen before and his deeds will meet immediately the reward for treason. The army will take charge with the assistance of the police.

I assure our foreign brothers that their interests, their personal safety, and their properties are safe, and that the army considers itself responsible for them. May God grant us success? (July Revolution Plan, 1952).

Free officers headed by Gamal Abdel Nasser declared a state of siege on the 23<sup>rd</sup> July 1952. Following the King Farouk left the country with a ceremony on the 26<sup>th</sup> July 1952. When he left the country, the period of the monarchy ended. With the end of Monarchy in Egypt, the army officers were unwilling to lose their governing power. So they preferred an authoritative regime. The revolution government acted firstly to restrict the land owners' assets. The rich land owners were the relatives of the King Farouk. Also, all the political parties were terminated with a promulgated law banning all political parties and started one party period with the name of Arab Socialist Union (ASU) (Hizbu't Tecemmu'l- İştiraki). The one party regime suppressed all shapes of opposition whether it be secular or religious. The new constitution was prepared by the one party in 1956 which selected Gamal Abdel Nasser as the president of the Egypt in June 1956. Binder (2004) elaborated that

For many Egyptians and many foreign observers, Nasser appeared to be larger than life—a symbol representing Egypt itself, a new class, an awakening, Arab authenticity, or even the resurgence of the Third World. Despite much solid evidence to the contrary, Nasser was portrayed at first as a charismatic leader, capable of breaking with tradition and of unleashing huge pent-up powers—a danger to the West, a blessing for Egypt and the Arab masses, and a double-edged sword for the Soviets (p.45).

Nasser was a crucial Arab Nationalist; he took the socialist supports and started to decrease the Muslim Brotherhood organization's support by some precautions. The Muslim Brotherhood organization was the main opposition to the Nasser's Governance. Nasser, who

had a great respect for the people of Egypt with his nationalist rhetoric, prevented the opponents from forming political structures on legal grounds. Abu el-Feth (1965) took the notice that there was a fear of revolution by a mass of people in opposition so they began to get arrested in 1953. The parliament was the place of their legislative power in their political life. There were elections, yet this did not do enough for democracy. Nasser was very successful in anti-West and anti-Israel rhetoric which made him respected among the Egyptian people. As Nasser had problems with America and the West, he turned the country's focus toward a different arena. He wanted to shape a third bloc by leading Egypt from the west toward the east. He started to realize his aim with India and Yugoslavia in 1955. Abu el Feth (1965) told that he was selected the man of the year by the American Magazine called Time. As Nasser's heavy effort in the rebirth of Arab nationalism, his most prominent act was his swear of the abolishment of Israel (Langlois, 2000:291). At the beginning of the 1950s, Nasser was very popular and had too much support. Later, Nasser's regime faced some crises in the country in the late 1960s. Hill (1977) stated that crisis emerged in 3 shapes:

1. The suppression of political dissent on both the right and the left. Nasser has established a one-party system as a means of reforming political life.
2. The accumulation of power in the hands of one set of elites, the military, and more particularly in the hands of one man, Nasser.
3. The de-politicization of political relations: The ruling elites had a non-political view of politics. Political action was seen as an instrument for social and economic development (pp. 12-65).

Egypt had a heavy defeat by the Israeli war which lasted only six days. Syria and Jordan were also defeated badly by Israel. With the call of the United Nations, the parties declared a cease- fire. But in 6 days' time, Israel came into much income. Although America, Russia and the United Nations called Israel to retreat its own land, Israel did not retreat. Armaoğlu (1989) stated that "despite all the support of the Arab and Muslim world, Nasser resigned after the defeat; but the people of Egypt went out into the streets to make Nasser reinstate" (pp.248-250). This defeat changed many things in the Arab world. Bodur (2005) stated that "Nasser underlined a kind of new understanding in the MENA. He enabled the demolition of the monarchs which he called "reactionary" and let the establishment of socialist republican regimes" (p. 476). Nasser lost his life from the heart attack in 1970. He left Arab nationalism under the name of "Nasserism"

### 3.1.3. Anwar Sadat (1970-1981)

Anwar Sadat succeeded the presidency in 1970 after the death of Nasser. He worked as the parliament president between 1960 and 1969. He was also a member of the Free Officers who made a military coup d'état in 1952 in Egypt. He was also the vice president of Nasser, therefore; it made it easy for him to be elected after the death of Nasser. In the election of the 15<sup>th</sup> October 1970, he was elected with 90% of the votes. This also meant that the people were happy with him. He launched a new page in Egyptian politics. He changed the policy that Nasser made with Israel, and in 1973 he made a peace agreement with Israel. He utilized the foreign policy from Nasser. When he came into power, there was an economic and social crisis. Despite these problems, there was a strong state mechanism. He wanted to gain support by the elites who withdrew their support in the last period of Nasser. He collaborated with these elites to stop the policies which helped the lower-middle class in Egypt. His changing of policy from villagers to elites made villagers unhappy. He lifted the social protection and suspension of some privileges on the villagers.

He wiped out the people close to the Soviet Union in the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). He also removed the Soviet thought in the administration. He also turned his face toward America and liberation of the markets after dismissing the Soviet sentiments. Therefore, he had two crucial policies: the first one was promoting relations with the USA and the second was that launching a liberal economy on the market. In 1971, the coup d'état against him was brought to light, which enabled him to become a single authority both within the country and at the party level. Hassan (2010) stated that "Anwar Sadat tried to legitimize his rule by using three slogans: The rule by law; government by institutions and political freedom. Sadat himself spearheaded the critique of the ruling ASU by issuing the October 1974 Manifesto which basically outlined the Sadat regime's plans to liberalize the Egyptian polity, as a major departure from the Nasser regime" (p.321). The October 1974 Manifesto was an ideological document laid out by Sadat. This document's aim was to be the principle for national action till 2000s. Sadat (1974) declared in the October Working Paper that,

I reject the idea of an artificial division of the people by establishing political parties, and I also reject the idea of a one-party system which impose its tutelage upon the people... Hence I am in favor of maintaining the Arab Socialist Union as a sound framework for national unity, in which all groups can express their legitimate interests and views. The Arab Socialist Union must become a melting pot for differing points of views (p. 30).

Thanks to the sayings of Sadat, it is understood that Egypt was going to face a new political atmosphere. As the time passed, the state would see the demand of the public, so in the new era the concept of democracy became a public concern. The first signs of democracy in Egypt were seen in 1976 when Sadat assigned a committee named “Future of Political Action”. Hassan (2010) stated that “the Committee’s main duty was to study the issue of establishing forums, their role in consolidating democracy and their effect on the future of political action in Egypt” (p.321). Thereafter having dozens of meetings, the committee found out four fundamental ideas.

1. The majority of the members of the committee opposed multi-party system and instead advocated for the establishment of fixed forums within the ruling Arab Socialist Union.
2. A smaller group also supported the continuity of the ASU, but favored the establishment of changing opinion forums to increase the party’s effectiveness.
3. Some members of the committee supported the establishment of a multiparty system as the best formula to achieve real democracy.
4. A residual minority view favored the establishment of forums inside and outside of the ASU. (Hassan, 2010: 321)

Sadat had some crucial roles in the liberalization of Egyptian politics by allowing the transition to a multi-party system; his model for multiparty system was a bit different from other systems. It was like forums. When the time passed Sadat became more moderate in the idea of establishing more forums. In 1976, he decided to allow the foundation of three political forums inside the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). These three forums would represent the “right, left and centre”. With this decision three forums were accordingly formed: “Egypt’s Arab Socialist Forum (the centre), the Liberal Socialist Forum (the right) and the Nationalist Progressive Unionist Forum (the left).” These three forums took part in the 1976 parliamentary election. This was quite interesting that this election was the first competitive election since the Free Officers took over the power in 1952. Several political groups, including individuals from the Old Wafd party and the Muslim Brotherhood joined the election campaign too. Hilal (1986) asserted that the candidates’ views and their political programs were presented to the Egyptian voters in order to get their votes. Stacher (2004) informed that “Anwar Sadat’s policy of pluralism has actually avoided any power-sharing between people and the ruling regime” (p.220). Political participation in Egypt was under Sadat’s NDP control. That is, in 1977, a law prohibited the establishment of a party related to a religious class, a social class, or an existing political party. The Muslim Brotherhood

Organization, which was excluded from this policy with this law participation process, represented a mass that would not be underestimated in social areas. Compared to the Nasser period, political freedoms were extended, legal practices restricting private property were abolished, censorship was reduced, and political parties were opened up. In practice, however, the state maintained its authoritarian structure based on the personal legitimacy of the Nasser period. As Cropsey and Milikh (2011) states that “if there is a constraint on the political debate in a country, no election leads to the liberal democracy” (p.51). Therefore, Muslim Brotherhood Movement was banned from politics because of its views on Islam. Also Sadat put more than two thousand people in prison because of their opposing ideas against the ruling party. Aknur and Karakır (2007) declared that “Sadat’s policies have caused an increase in opposition due to the misgovernment of the ruling regime despite its political openness” (p.313). After 1977, the multi-party system had maintained its effectiveness until the days of the Egyptian Revolution and the political structure had been gathered in three main headings: the “right, left and Centre”. Sadat wanted to be more democratic in elections so he decided to release the people to establish new parties beyond forums. Therefore, three parties were established in 1978. Their names were “the New Wafd Party (NWP), the National Democratic Party (NDP) which was formed to substitute the Egyptian ruling ASU, and the Socialist Labor Party (SLP)”. The more party involvement in Egypt meant the more liberalization which was decided from Sadat, the regime’s leader. In addition to the so called political liberalization, there was an economic dimension of Sadat's political initiatives. It was quite amazing to notice that Sadat had encountered many barriers and faced extreme difficulties while he was trying to be a more democratic governance. Therefore, he published some decrees in order to suppress some of the threats and riots in the country. Unfortunately, these decrees harshly curtailed political freedoms, and civil liberties in the whole country. Sadat implemented an open door policy so as to get foreign investors to promote private initiatives. Tıǧlı (2011) stated that “Sadat’s open-door economic policy served only the ruling class and deepened the gap between rich and poor people” (p.7). Sadat, seeking to cope with the economic and political stagnation of the country, found an option that would enable him to become an ally with the United States of America. Consequently, he recognized Israel and made a peace treaty. Sadat’s liberal economic policies increased the dependence of Egypt on international finance institutions like the IMF and the World Bank, thereby increasing foreign debts which lead to a decline in the

purchasing of power in society. In March 1979, the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty made the relationship between Sadat and the opposition greater. While the Israeli-Egypt peace period was welcomed by Western countries, it was harshly criticized by the Arab leagues. Sander (2007) emphasized that “Egypt was ensured to gain an important amount of economic assistance from the US; the condemnation by Arab countries’ with the decision has pushed Egypt into isolation in the Arab World. Egypt was accused of betraying the Arab nationalism with this peace treaty” (p.545). Munro (2000) informed that “this peace agreement had cost Egypt isolation from the Arab world and Sadat’s life. Sadat’s assassination has proved the existence of the strong Arab nationalist and Islamic sentiments” (p.69). Hilal (1986) confirmed that “the Sadat regime included forbidden communists, religious extremists and former public service workers before the 1952 revolution. They then were left to undertake public service or participate in public activities”.

We can notice that the personalized character of governance persisted throughout the rule of Sadat, who managed to prevent the emergence of any organized opposition within the ranks of the political elites, notwithstanding the disagreement voiced by some of its members. Sadat succeeded in purging the ranks of the political elites by ostracizing the pro-Nasserist ideological faction. The elites, quite aware of their inability to intervene in the decision-making process and to voice any kind of opposition, turned into silent and docile individuals. The president’s powers were cemented by the 1971 Constitution, which augmented presidential hegemony over every other institution. The President thus stood on top of executive authority (Hassan, 2010: 322).

Egypt tried to become a more liberalized society from the beginning of 1970s. On the other hand; Himdan (1987) claimed that the presidency maintained the most politically dominant institution. The president had tremendous constitutional and legal authoritative power in a society with a long tradition of a paternalistic political culture. Egypt had a complicated circumstance at that time. It had to be justifiable by the presidency to begin any project in Egypt. Ayubi (1989) indicated that “any important policy or project must normally have the blessing of the president before it can proceed with a reasonable prospect of success” (p.48). Sadat was successful in transforming the presidency into a kind of presidential monarchy. Hassan (2010) informed that “Sadat formed a kind of royal family of influential relatives in his entourage. He also resurrected the traditional legitimacy by insisting on his role as the lord of the Egyptian family. He was actually able to consolidate his power through the building of a strong client network of politicians which allowed the ability to enrich themselves by often illicit manipulation of the economic opening that his policies afforded”

(p.322). The Brotherhood helped release nearly 1500 members which, formed an opponent party against Sadat's rule in their short time of freedom. They opposed mainly Sadat's collaboration with Israel and the United States of America.

The Islamists, who were involved in these arrests, further strengthened their attitude towards Sadat. The debate over whether he was Muslim according to the Islamic principles had begun to be done publicly. Anwar Sadat was murdered during the anniversary of the Arab Israeli War on the 6<sup>th</sup> October 1981 by Khalid al-Islambuli, a member of the Salafi (Cemaatul-Islamic Society), who was the subject of the inhibited practices in the last of these developments. Khalid al-Islambuli gave the following reasons during his trial: his governance was not suitable to the book of Allah, the Camp David Treaty was an evil alliance toward Islam, the pioneers of Islam were imprisoned, and there were no solutions for the economics problems in the country. Anwar Sadat encountered many international problems in his life span in which he had to overcome. On the other hand; he tried to solve the internal perpetual problems. Sadat compared himself to Nasser in his political life. Heykel (1986) stated that "Sadat and Gamal were the biggest pharaohs of Egypt. Sadat's difference from Nasser was that Sadat tried to reach his aims through democratic methods while Nasser tried to reach like a dictator" (p.95).

Lippman (2016) explained the results of Sadat's policies as the following:

...while Sadat gained international prestige as a result of his peace treaty with Israel, he remained disliked at home. The peace treaty brought no immediate benefits to the Egyptian people, and Sadat's liberal economic reforms caused massive discontent. His decision to make peace with Israel isolated Egypt from the other Arab countries, worsening his approval ratings throughout the region. By the time of his assassination, Sadat was viewed as a visionary abroad but reviled and alienated in Egypt (p.34).

#### **3.1.4. Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011)**

Hosni Mubarak who was an old member of the air force succeeded Anwar Sadat in 1981, and he tried to liberalize Egypt in his governance, but he was not very successful in his attempts. He took some measures to transform the ruling from authoritarianism to democratization. The first objective was to let prisoners of conscience out and the second was the call of national unanimity among Egypt's polarized political organizations. By taking such steps, he received considerable approval and goodwill from all Egyptians. Hilal

(1986) stated that Mubarak's first practical examination was handling the 1984 parliamentary elections for the first time in Egypt's history according to the proportional representation electoral system. In this election, five political parties contested: The National Democratic Party (Hizb al-Watani al-Dimuqrati) NDP, Liberal Party (LP), New Wafd Party, (Hizb al-Wafd al-Jadid) NWP, Socialist Labor Party (Hizb al- 'Amal al-Ishtiraki) SLP and the Nationalist Progressive Unionist Party (Hizb al-Tagammu'al-Taqaddumi al-Wahdawi) (NPUP). According to the outcomes of the election, Mubarak's ruling National Democratic Party NDP got 87% of the vote and all except 58 of 448 selected seats. Mubarak's second parliamentary elections were held in 1987. For many academicians, the 1987 elections were a crucial beginning in the process of the democratization of Egypt. The opposition shared the elected seats in the parliament from 13% in the 1984 elections, to 22.32%, while the number of seats held by the ruling party dropped from 87% to 77.78%. The 1987 elections witnessed the de facto recognition of the political opposition forces like the Egyptian Marxists and Muslim Brotherhood which refused to participate in the political arena. The Muslim Brothers participated in the election with the coalition of the Socialist Labor Party SLP and won seats in the assembly (Hassan, 2010: 323). After the certain result was announced, Mubarak made a speech to the people. Hilal (1986) reported Mubarak's sayings as that democracy is a stable reality that did not need anxiety. Democracy is not only necessary in it, but it also foresees stability and provides welfare. It is a necessity for the growth of the economy and the welfare of the people. The regime is all-inclusive and the opposition is an indivisible part as Egypt is the homeland of all Egyptians. The opposing parties harshly criticized the election law and brought it to trial. Because of some events and protests, Mubarak dissolved the parliament and made a new election in 1990, but the opposition parties boycotted the election. The results of the 1995 legislative elections enabled the largest number of seats in the People's Assembly to the ruling NDP. Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies (1995) gave the statistical data that "the NDP held 417 seats, The New Wafd Party (NWP) 6 seats, National Progressive Unionist Party (NPUP) 5 seats, Muslim Brotherhood 1 seat, The Liberal Party 1 seat, NP 1 seat and true independents 13 seats" (p. 386). The Egyptian government compressed the control over society in various ways in order to decrease the opposition groups. They were successful in their attempt to reduce their citizens' skill to affect politics. When it came to the 2000s, there was a turning point in the Egyptian political life. Egypt's Supreme Constitutional court



proclaimed that the elected parliament was illegitimate due to the ruling NDP party used illegal ways to win the several elections. Therefore, both the 1990 and 1995 elections were considered unlawful. After this court's verdict, Hassan (2010) informed that "the year 2000 witnessed the first parliamentary election in Egyptian history to be held under full judicial supervision. However, The NDP, as usual, easily secured the overwhelming majority in the People's Assembly– 388 of the 454 seats (87.8%)" (p. 323). The NDP got the expected victory and winning a total of 311 seats in the parliamentary 2005 election. There were "nine candidates outside Mubarak that attended the presidential elections held in 2005. Two days later, Hosni Mubarak was selected as a president again with 88.7% of the vote according to the election results". Al Shobky (2005) stated that the Muslim Brotherhood movement achieved 88 seats which were strongly represented by an Egyptian opposition party for more than 50 years. And more impressively was the rate of achievement, that is to say, 88 seats out of the 144 candidates. In 1993, Mubarak received 93% of the vote in the election as the only candidate. It was seen that "the recent amendment of the constitution did not reflect on the will of the people and the practice on democratization was not successful. Another incident that has cast doubt on the elections is the presidential ban on independent groups keeping observers despite court decisions. The elections of the People's Assembly, following the presidential ballot, were held in three stages in which the ruling party again won the majority". The elections, which were completed in a more democratic process than the previous elections, were joined by the forbidden Muslim Brotherhood's independent candidates, leaving 88 deputies. The number of representatives of the People's Assembly increased to 518 in 2010. Although the governing party, the National Democratic Party, released 440 deputies in the elections, opposition boycotts won a limited number of seats (Ayhan, 2011:21).

To tell the truth, the system of multiparty elections which has been applied since the 1970s, showed that the political representation of the opposition was very limited in parliamentary elections. Moreover, the political pluralism multiparty system worked to a certain extent at the very early stages of Mubarak's presidency. Meital (2006) emphasized that "although the Muslim Brotherhood, one of the opposition organizations, joined the elections by penetrating into a number of professional associations and syndicates, Egyptian government's high level of fraud and intimidation together with use of force by state security forces toward opposition under President Mubarak has prevented the Brotherhood to win elections"

(p.276). On the other hand, there was a dominant party system which Mubarak was a member. So, this party was far from solving Egypt's perpetual and deep problems. It was quite clear that the governing NDP rules on behalf of ruling. This ruling party unfortunately could not solve the problems and bring the welfare to the Egyptian society. In the political arena, there was no chance for a real power rotation in Egypt. Many political opponents demanded President Mubarak many times to keep him away from the NDP so that he would become the President representing all Egyptians. Koehler (2008) stated about the elections in Egypt as that,

Elections never served their purpose and never represented the general will in Egypt. Although there has been a strong competition between the NDP and the opposition parties, opposition parties were never allowed to challenge the ruling government in any political elections. Neo-patrimonial characteristic of the Egyptian politics in which there are a number of informal institutions has always allowed for survival of the highly-personalized political power (p.976).

In Egyptian society, there was a political favoritism tendency to buy votes from the ballot boxes. As a result, elections have always been used as tools to legitimize the power regime. Mubarak's era was not a time of big turbulence and war when compared with Nasser and Sadat era. Also the parliament worked for a long time without any interruption. In Mubarak's time the Soviet Union collapsed and democratic movements were empowered. On the other hand, Egypt did not consolidate its political life in the time being. There were some developments such as releasing political prisoners and increasing the political organizations like forums and parties that diminished harsh pressure on the press but individual freedoms were not as demanded. On the other hand, the state did not decrease its dominant power on the political institutions and its citizens. Mubarak tried to empower himself with some application. In foreign policy, Mubarak gained the support of the West and the USA by continuing Sadat's policy and maintaining good relations with Israel. "Having improved relations with the Arab world over time, Mubarak allowed Egypt to be re-admitted into the Arab League in 1989. He utilized the growing public support and radical discourse of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood organization as a support element to strengthen his central authority in the West. Mubarak ruled for 30 years without difficulty based on an undemocratic electoral system in Egypt until the serious demonstrations in recent years" (Ayhan & Ayhan, 2011:41). His international policy was a balance according to Nasser and Sadat. There was some rising and falling of the external supports. Egypt was one of the most

crucial countries for America in order to control and balance the radical elements in the region, especially Iran. That's why Egypt got the second highest soldiery aid from America beyond Israel. However, in Mubarak's era the relation was not as strong as Sadat. There were some diplomatic problems between America and Egypt. The most remarkable was the Davos meeting where Bush did not attend so Mubarak protested him. Because of this event the soldiery aid which had been two billion dollars since 1979 decreased 1.3 billion dollars in 2009. "He made some constitutional arrangements in 2005 to overcome the problems he faced in his domestic politics. It legalized the multiple candidate and secret voting rights in the presidential elections. The parliament, which has the authority to nominate candidates with the arrangements made, aimed to increase the participation of the people by transferring this authority to the political parties. However, it bought some conditions which could not be reflected on the candidates' lists of the society. For example, the nominating party had to have a five-year political background and be at least 5% of the last election. Independent candidates had to support a minimum of sixty-five deputies from the People's Assembly". All these applications cut off the Muslim Brotherhood organization which made it impossible to organize under a legal political party in the Assembly by the regime. It also blocked Al-Baradei, who was known as the strong candidate from the outside. Although there had been an increase in political parties in Egypt, which spent about 30 years with Hosni Mubarak, a popular will to change the political fabric had never been exhibited. In this period, when the number of the party was around 24, the Muslim Brotherhood organization, which was trying to politicize, managed to enter the People's Assembly by cooperating with many legal parties but it could not reflect its political will. The Communist Party of Egypt, which shares the same destiny of destitution, also announced that it had ended its illegal activities after the revolution in 2011, and announced that it had made a new start to its political activities (Yıldırım & Abdülcelil, 2012, pp. 4-5). Analyzations were made on the domino effect of the change of power in Tunisia after the people's wishes could not be brought to desired level for years. Mubarak, who prioritized the regime protection policy during his rule, could not take an active role in solving the recent problems. At the beginning of the revolutionary period in Egypt, the demand for change of the military and civil bureaucracies as well as the opposition wing Muslim Brotherhood organization and the pro-Al-Baradei groups became influential. The Egyptian citizens actually had more justified excuses than the Tunisian citizens because of the economic obstacles they faced, the

disproportionate use of force by the police. Therefore, the unemployment of the young population ensured that all sections of the society acted together. The first request of the people who poured into the streets was for Mubarak to leave his seat. The most striking indicator of economic problems was that nearly half of the population of 85 million had to survive with an income of around two dollars a day. Zorlu (2016) informed about the economic situation of the 2000s that

The late 2000s was marked by the increase in food prices with the lack of any food subsidy causing more deprivation. The Egyptian economy had grown from about 4 percent in 2004 to 7 percent in 2008, but 40 percent of Egyptians live on less than \$2 a day today. Furthermore, the reduced rate in oil-producing countries of the Gulf caused the return of migrants to Egypt with no jobs and lack of satisfaction in the social status (p.33).

Bowen (2012) stated that food prices rose by 21% percent in 2010 and besides this, there was a rise of the unemployment. 700,000 young people joined Egypt's workforce every year which made the public weary about this situation. Corruption, bribery, torture and unlawfulness brought about by antidemocratic practices led to the exhaustion of the future expectations of the Egyptians (Ayhan, 2011: 12). There were serious differences between the Egyptian people and the regime in the execution of foreign policy especially on the Palestinian and Israeli issues.

The most important event that led to the mass demonstrations against Mubarak was undoubtedly his desire to assign his power to his son. He hoped that the SCAF would support him by being able to stay in power with the principle of "only being able to be Asabiyyah" (Say, 2011:321). Mubarak, who had ruled the state through emergency laws for 30 years, had strengthened the police and military forces against possible coup attempts made against him; Despite the constitutional amendment, the president's assistant, who should have been appointed in 2011, could not be appointed. This strategic position is considered as a fear of not being able to appoint anyone, a structure that would develop outside of him, and the possibility of bringing his son Gamal Mubarak for this office. This had begun to bother the bureaucracy within the state. As a result, "pursuing a policy of ensuring Israeli security during the period of Hosni Mubarak, the failure to develop a national policy on the Palestinian issue, and the adoption of a pro-Israel attitude on top of it, constituted the critical points of the foreign policy by the Egyptians. Especially in the intellectual and academic circles, particularly among the foreign affairs staff, the mistake of Palestinian politics and the fact that the steps taken were not at the desired level had been criticized, while Egypt's

prestige in the Middle East and international area had been considerably weakened. The harsh intervention of the police against the Egyptians who boycotted Israel's attacks on Palestine led to an increase in anti-Mubarak rhetoric and actions” (Ayhan, 2011: 24). The Egyptian citizens started to seriously question the relations of the United States in the face of the invasion of Iraq with human rights abuses; despite the active role of Iran in the region, Egyptian influence decreased dramatically. These developments made the opponent's hand grow stronger in their criticism. There had been a remarkable progress in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Egypt in the period from 2005 until 2010. This favorable climate had brought the Egyptian state to the level of the world's 26th largest economy. This growth brought with it many problems and prevented half of the 94 million populations from falling beneath the poverty threshold. Moreover, the high unemployment ratio prevented the economy from growing healthily which caused social problems. With the constant depreciation of the money, the purchasing power of the poor, who had already a low income level, was diminishing. Although the recent struggle against corruption had been unsuccessful, the gap between wealth and poverty in the country before the uprising has increased steadily (MacQueen, 2012). During the Mubarak period, most of the members of the parliament were powerful businessmen with concessions. In addition, the vast majority of businessmen accused of corruption were members of the ruling party, headed by Mubarak. Businessmen have chosen to enter the parliament to gain immunity and power.

Egyptian people from all the sides supported the protest and people came together to express themselves in the streets at the very beginning of 2011. “Omer Suleiman was given the vice-presidency of the Mubarak presidency, which had not been appointed for 20 years to relocate the protest. In the early days of Mubarak's announcement, he said that he wanted to die in Egypt and that he would not participate in the presidential elections. This was an indication that he would not resist much in the face of the pressures” (cnnturk.com, 2011). In the past, the assassination of Anwar Sadat at a time when he suppressed the pressures of internal opposition showed that it was not easy to calm social events. Islamists were the target group for the pressure from the regime, yet other parties and groups also took their shares from the oppression. After Sadat's assassination, there was an extensive pressure and there was no place for the Islamists groups in the secular administration. “All publications of the opposition groups were outlawed and religious centers were taken under the state supervision” (Cook, 2012:153). It was easy for the president to make a law under the

emergency law which strengthened the presidential hand. Kraetzschmar and Cavatorta, (2010) took the attention to the fact that especially after 2000s with economic difficultness, the emergency rule outcompeted which allowed Mubarak to hang down rights and liberties, censorship on the media, and imprisonment of the opposition when necessary. Therefore, Cook (2012) stated that “Egypt as a country remained largely poor, authoritarian, and dependent on a global power” (p.133). “The opposition parties and youth movements agreed that Mubarak would go, and they voiced the fact that they would not consent to the concessions to be given. Mubarak, who had been managing the country in a repressive way for 30 years, came face to face with his opponents who criticized his domestic and foreign policies again in 2006 and 2008. In those years, Mubarak, who could not respond to the demands of the people well, could not manage the atmosphere of uneasiness that peaked in 2010” (Tuiç-Yadam, 2012:18). Hosni Mubarak saw himself questioning his regime and he listened to the calls of many countries to resign. He resigned on the 11<sup>th</sup> February 2011. Therefore, Mubarak transferred his authorities to the SCAF.

The survival of the authoritarian regime depends on the support of military and public. Holgar (2005) expressed concerning the survival of Mubarak regime that “Mubarak kept the military as a privileged position as the regime would not totally ignore any group or community layer that could lead to a serious challenge” (p.384). As the military firstly dealt with the security issues, the concept of security changed in time. Zorlu (2016) stated

The hegemonic place of the army was changing in practice as security measures were transformed giving more power to Central Security Forces and from time to time the baltagiya which are the infamous gangs to deal with the discontent. The military was not on the political scene but remained as a chief partner to the ruling class and an ally to the regime (p.32).

There are four basic reasons why the Egyptian Army did not support the Mubarak government and indirectly supported the Arabian Spring Revolution. Firstly, the army elite did not accept Gamal, the son of Mubarak's, the supposed successor as the President of Egypt which would be the chief commander of the army. Generals had not warmly welcomed the idea that this business man, who had benefited from liberal economic reforms by abusing the status of his family and the position of the ruling party, would become president. Secondly, the military considered the Islamic movement a threat, which grew in terms of both the interests of the country and its own interests, which would lead to the deterioration of the economy and the alienation of young people into the state. Thirdly, as Barany (2011)

informed that the armed forces were not pleased with the police and security forces which included 1.4 million of the country. The fourth reason was the possibility that the regular soldiers, who form at large part of the army and come from within the people, could not obey to fire on the demonstrators. Moreover, the internal causes of the Egyptian Army's absence of support to the Mubarak ruling, which was one of the other key determinants was the attitude of the USA. The Obama administration was to leave Mubarak's mission. The US influence on the Egyptian Army and its common interests had directly affected the position of the military against the popular movement. One of the most crucial cornerstones of the US Middle East policy was the security of Israel. It was unthinkable that in absence of authority, violence and instability in Egypt could threaten Israel's security. In this context, the US wanted to leave Mubarak's mission for Egypt and consequently, for the stability and security of Egypt, without the rivalry of the popular movements of Egypt being transformed into a conflict and chaos.

Egypt had a series of political openings beginning with the administration of Sadat and his successors. Yet, in Egyptian politics, there was no practical benefit for the achievement of political liberalization and democracy. Yet, political initiatives have generally been used for the survival of the authoritarian regime and for a distraction. The survival of the authoritarian regime was clear both in Sadat and Mubarak era, and their so called political openings. That introduction of the multi-party system by President Sadat and Mubarak's was a constitutional amendment idea. In both situations, the authoritarian qualities of the regime have not allowed any progress towards political liberalization or democratization in Egypt. Furthermore, the economic liberalization policies served in favor of only a small number of people in society who were supporters of the ruling regime. So, this created a line between the rich and the poor. All in all, these temporary political initiatives served only to balance social opposition towards the ruling regime and to provide financial support from Western powers, especially the US, international financial institutions such as the IMF, and the World Bank.

### 3.1.5. The Birth of the Muslim Brotherhood

The Muslim Brotherhood, one of the most crucial actors in Egypt, was formed in 1928 by Banna in Ismailiyye. One of the small cities of Egypt. El-Awaisi (2000) informed that “Hasan al-Banna was a 22-year-old elementary school teacher in an Islamic revivalist movement following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent ban of the caliphate system of government that had united the Muslims for hundreds of years” (p.2013). Hasan al-Banna started to convey Islamic ideas in at coffeehouse in Ismailiyye. At the very beginning, all of his friends believed that it was impossible to serve such a method. On the other hand, his activities of this notification made its accomplishments within a record time and the members of the staff of the Movement grew thanks to the efforts of this notification. Thus, the Islamic studies that began in the city of Ismailiyye became increasingly popular and spread to other cities in Egypt like Cairo. Bulut, (2009) stated that “the political organization of the hierarchy formed in 1935 and the political party was accepted in the 5th Congress in 1939, along with all other political parties in Egypt, were declared superstitious. Within the organization in which the scout and sports units are formed, reform projects to be carried out in political, social, educational and religious areas have been determined” (p.49). Many Muslim Brotherhoods established schools, hospitals, mosques and factories as well as becoming social, political and religious units in Egypt. Esposito (2003) noticed that “Banna has created an organizational structure that would fulfill Banna's vision, based on existing networks, especially mosques, social aid organizations and local groups. In this way, the organization seems to be "the state within the state" (p.71). In a short period of time, dozens of branches were opened in various regions of the country. Built on the foundation of the Qur'an and the Sunnah, this Movement became known in Egypt and became effective on other African and Middle Eastern region. Therefore, the Muslim Brotherhood members declared that any leader in Egypt who does not work towards the coming of the Islamic administration will not be tolerated. They will be in war with each party leader or committee and that this will be a dispute not to accept peace again. Cağlayan (2011) emphasized that “the organization is more like a civil society organization. At the same time, the Muslim Brotherhood believed that politics is a part of the religion and that there is no change in the goals of the organization, stating that Islam is politics from both the rules and the rulers” (p.169). The students from various countries who came to Egypt to study at al-Azhar



University started their activities by establishing some Islamic organizations with the extension of Ikhwan when they completed their education and returned to their home countries. Thus Ikhwan became influential not only in Egypt, but also in Syria, especially in Tunisia, Sudan, Libya, Yemen, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and many other countries which ensured the organization of Muslims. As a matter of fact, Rashid al-Ghannushi, who founded the Movement of Islamic Tendency, Ikhwan extension in Tunisia, completed his education in Syria after he was expelled first in Egypt in 1960. Rashid al-Ghannushi had met with the leaders of Ikhwan during his years in Egypt and Syria gained him experience by participating in such activities. He founded the Movement of Islamic Tendency in 1969 when he returned to his home country after completing his education. This movement continued its activities after 1987 after taking the name of the Al Nahda (Resurrection). The Movement of Islamic Tendency, or Al Nahda Movement in its later name, had emerged as the first party, with 41.47% of votes in the first elections held in Tunisia although they were not allowed to be recognized by the regime for many years as their activities were not allowed and their leaders were exiled to prisons for many years. The same issue applies to Egypt. Despite all the pressure and tricks, Ikhwan received more than 47% of the votes in the first election in Egypt. The Salafi party, known as the Al-Nour Party, received 24% of the votes, which together received 70% of the votes. This shows that Egyptian society traditionally has not lost its Islamic sensitivities despite all the oppression and torture. Therefore, it is quite difficult to understand modern Islamic radicalism without closely knowing Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin. Spears (2002) indicated that “Al-Banna based his ideas that Islam was not only a religious observance, but a comprehensive way of life, on the tenets of Wahhabism, better known today as Islamism. He supplemented the traditional Islamic education for the Society's male students with jihadi training” (p.1). Aboul-Enein (2003) implied that the Muslim Brotherhood became the first example of a model that politicized Islam in the era of colonialism. This movement was impressed mostly with the doctrines of Salafist prominent thinkers like Jamal Al Din Al Afghani and Muhammad Abduh. They tried to put their theories into practice.

### **3.2. The Political Life during the Arab Spring**

This paper limits the historical overview to the 1952 revolution and its aftermath. In this time period, there is focus on the socio-economic and political histories of each political era. Due to the scope of this paper, it gives high importance to the Arab Spring period especially from 2011-2013 in order to understand Egypt's current situation. Officially Egypt remained under Ottoman rule till the declaration of Egypt being a British patronage in 1914. Just after eight years, Egypt became so called independent in 1922 from Ottoman Empire both formally and judicial. On the other hand, Egypt was still under dominant control of the British troops who had been in Egypt since 1882. Egypt was under the control of the crown of from 1922 to 1952. These years were turbulent because of the pressure of British Colony, the separation and dependence of Sudan and lastly World War II. Consequently, the 1952 revolution from the Free Officers Movement, which was a group of nationalist officers in the Egyptian military, against the Egyptian King Farouk. The first Egyptian president was General Mohammad Naguib by the Free Officers headed by Nasser. The Egyptian citizens put a lid on bad governance and changed the future of their country. Rogan (2009) stated that "Naguib was ousted by Nasser. In two years' time, he finished in the presidential seat and was then put under house arrest during a Nasserist purge of his rivals, which included the arrest of thousands of Muslim Brothers" (p.288). With the help of revolution from the Free Officers, they chose a leader who made sure that the global society knew about Egypt. At that time this was crucial because selecting a leader that would understand the needs of the people would change everything in Egypt and the surrounding region.

Egypt has a historical background of seven thousand years with a very rich demographic structure. For this reason, the political structure of the country has a colorful mosaic of socialism, authoritarian regime, liberalism and conservative. Although the beginning of the process of the political party was at the beginning of the 19th century, Gamal Abd al-Nasser (1952-1970), Anwar Sadat (1970-1981) and Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011) could not follow the political developments in the West at the demanded level. Hizbu'l Ümme (Ummah Party), which was organized during the British invasion of Egypt, pioneered national resistance at that time. Yıldırım and Abdülcelil (2011) stated that "the Wafd (Delege) Party, established in the next period, gained an identity that conducted official negotiations with the British which maintained its presence for many years by gaining the support of the

masses in Egypt's political life. The Egyptian Communist Party founded by Husni Urabi in 1922 was influential on the post-Hidivism social structure in Egypt” (p.4). Leaders who have not shown the desired sensitivity to the wishes of the people have tried some reform movements, but they have not been able to make any essential changes in the society. Specifically, the social problems that were experienced during Hosni Mubarak's period attracted the attention of the world too. The US, which complained that Egyptian democracy and its relations with Israel could not be brought to the desired level, made its most significant debut in November 2003. Essam El-Din (2004) stated from the US President Bush amazed everyone with the following statement: "Egypt showed the way towards peace in the Middle East, and it is now time [for it] to show the way towards democracy” (p.1). This saying was the preview of the changing policy of the USA in the Middle East. America invaded Iraq just in a year before this speech and started to change every player in that region showing the deep changes. Algan (2011) stated that the usage of internet activism escalated greatly and internet became a new meeting point for the opponents. “Between 2005 and 2008, young Egyptian people developed themselves on internet activism. The first collective action of these young people was to organize a general strike for two weeks. This was announced on Facebook to support striking textile workers and to protest the price increase”. Bayhan (2012) stated that “due to violations in human right applications in Yemen, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Egypt and Syria a change process started in 2010 which affected the entire region” (p.169).

The President Hosni Mubarak, who was too old to continue good governance, decided to bestow his crown to his son Jamal for the next election which made many people and the army angry with him. Moreover, political turbulence has also fueled religious and ethnic discrimination among the society. Also, many Coptic Christians in Alexandria city lost their life on Christmas night in 2010. The official Egyptian authorities announced that this action was carried out by religious extremists. That year pasted in turbulence for the region, especially in Egypt and Tunisia. Cairo's famous square, Tahrir, had begun to take action, while the Egyptian people had agreed that these actions, made by communicating through social media, are planned by secret dealers who want to open up between the two communities, Muslims and Coptic Christians. Yavuz & Erdurmaz (2012) informed that “Hosni Mubarak, who saw the end of the days as a result of the actions, declared that he left his duty on the 11<sup>th</sup> February 2011 and handed over the administration to the Supreme

Military Council (SCAF)” (p.44). The day of President Mubarak’s resignation was declared as "victory day" by the Muslim Brotherhood Egypt's largest opposition group.

### **3.2.1. Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimin)**

Hasan al Banna is the founder of Muslim Brotherhood organization. Banna is the most impressive intellectualist among the contemporary Political Islamic understandings. He affected one hundred thousand of the people in Egypt and other countries. In October 1906, he was born in a small town Mahmudiyya. At that time Egypt was under the sway of Britannia. Therefore, his ideas were affected by the current situation of Egypt especially in politics, economy, and culture. He grew up in a religious family and he was impressed by his father, who was a watchmaker. His father also studied Al Azhar University, which was the most impressive school of Sunni Islam, during the time of Muhammad Abduh, one of the most known Islamic reformists. Therefore, Banna was affected very much by the ideas of Abduh and he became familiar with ideas and teaching methods. With all these ideas they believed that Muslims had fallen behind of the modern age owing to the distance of Quran and Hadith, the teachings of Prophet Muhammad. If the Muslims want to regain their power, they have to turn back and go into Quran and Hadith wholeheartedly. Abu Rabi (1995) stated that “Banna believed that Islam is understood as a religion, a civilization, a way of life, an ideology, and a state” (p.65). He thought that the political future of Egypt would be in Islam; therefore, he had organized a group of students for preaching and teaching from Dar’ul Ulum College that he was studying and from Al Azhar University during the school period. This time was very important because Banna had a turning point in his life because he left his hometown for the first time and went to a college that teaches both Islamic and modern sciences. He was different from other contemporaries because he took also a secular formal Egyptian education too. He often visited a Salafiyya bookstore that affected his ideas on Islamic view. On the other hand, Soage and Franganillo (2010) stated that “Banna did not distance himself from the idea of Sufism even after he established Brotherhood. The leader of the society received the title al-murshid al-amm (Supreme Guide), as in the case of Sufi orders” (p.39). When the social side of Banna was investigated it is easily seen that Banna was subjected more generally to the British influence in Egyptian society. Mitchell (1993)

emphasized that “Banna was affected by British influence on daily basis from politics, economics and growing up around Christian missionary organizations. The environment that Banna faced in Cairo led him to become idealist about the future position of Islam in Egyptian society. After seeing such scenes deviated from Islam, Banna organized students from both Al Azhar and Dar’ul Ulum to train for guidance and preaching, because to Banna mosques did not suffice to educate people on their religion. They started to preach in places where people got together such as coffee shops” (p.5). After the training that they had received in Cairo, these students were assigned to call to Islamic messages in various places of the country where they worked as well as to spread the thoughts of the Muslim Brotherhood community. Mitchell (1993) informed that “Banna graduated from the school in 1927 and was appointed as an Arabic teacher for the primary school in the city of Ismailia in the channel area. Banna continued to work until 1946 when he resigned. In 1928, he laid the foundations of the community together with his subcontractor in the canal company” (p.6).

The Muslim Brotherhood had gradually gained value from the public because some items played an accelerating role since the foundation. The people had serious reactions and dissatisfaction to the British invasion just after the First World War. This impact on the faces of the people could be seen easily. Moreover, Hasan al-Banna's leadership ability was influential on the bad reactions towards British occupation. As his school time passed during this invasion time there was a huge nationalist tendency in Egypt against the British occupation. He also participated some of the freedom meetings as an activist. Osman (1991) stated about Al Banna that “he had been faithful to Allah and His Messenger with faith. He was working to be a modest soul of Allah, and that he was not pursuing any wealth or presidency aside from this. He stated these messages on his talks and writings were quite influenced by the public” (p.51). People were very willing listening to Banna; therefore, they invited Banna to have talks in their homes and workplace. This made the Muslim Brotherhood more interconnected among the Egyptian society. The speeches of the Muslim Brotherhood members were more appealing to the Egyptian people than those duty holders they hear in the mosques. When Banna started to talk he certainly touched on the topics of daily life and put forward a solution for the up-to-date obstacles of the citizens. At that time the British invasion and alienation from Islam were the most popular issues. Commins (1994) stated that “Banna supported the establishment of a society to spread the true message

of Islam, Young Men's Muslim Association, (YMMA) that call for a return to the true Islam as it is found in the Quran. YMMA was the foundation that Banna emulates in the future for Muslim Brotherhood." (p.130). When Banna was in Ismailia and going on his preaching, six members of the British labor force camp conferred with Banna. They intended to form the Muslim Brotherhood Society in March 1928. Mitchell (1993) stated that "Banna accepted the offer and chose the name for the organization; we are brothers in the service of Islam, hence we are the Muslim Brothers" (p.8). After the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood, they worked in order to increase the number of its members. This was also the same in any other Islamic social organization or any non-profit organization. Munson (2001) emphasized that "Muslim Brotherhood organization opened new branches in Canal Zone towns and in the Egyptian Delta in the following years. They built mosques, schools, and clubs to attract more and more people to their cause." (p.501). Banna stayed and continued to comment on political issues till Banna was appointed to Cairo in 1932 by the Minister of Education. The Muslim Brotherhood organization started to organize big conferences after its establishment starting from 1932. This year was very important because Banna was appointed to Cairo where the Brotherhood expanded quickly as the city was very crowded with people who had sympathy towards this organization. On the other hand, conferences had a major impact so as to issue the program of what kind of organization that Muslim Brotherhood would be in the future. The first five conferences showed the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood Organization from 1932 to 1939. In the first conference, the organization sent a letter to King Fuad in order to advise him to limit the free Christian Missionary activities in Egypt. In this way they also showed themselves on the Egyptian Political Arena. In the second conference, they decided to advertise their activities in order to be known by other Egyptian citizens. Thus, Mitchell (1993) informed that "they decided to publish weekly magazines (Majallat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimin and Majallat al-Nadhir) which would be the voice of the organization" (p.13). This weekly published magazine increased the visibility of the organization among the society. Mitchell (1993) emphasized the importance of the third 1935 March conference as "it was a turning point, because of its classification of membership. There was a three-layered membership process: (1) assistant, who intends to join with a small amount of money due, (2) related, those who accept the teachings of the movement and (3) active, the one that commits to the movement both physically and ideologically" (p.183). The Muslim Brotherhood Organization was very

successful on the basis of the group since other organizations failed to survive the longevity. Munson (2001) argued that “this membership process was the reason that the Muslim Brotherhood had survived from political suppressions better than the communist groups in Egypt of the same time” (p.500). The fifth congress of the organization was very crucial for the Muslim Brotherhood because it was also the tenth anniversary of its foundation in 1939. Hasan al-Banna determined some guidelines for the Muslim Brotherhood organization on the politics; these principals lighted the way of the organization in the coming years. Mitchell (1993) explained these principles:

The kind of Islam in which the Brothers believe makes government an important cornerstone of their program; 2) without the power to legislate, the voice of the reformer would be as a scream in the wilderness; 3) thus, shirking the quest for governmental power is an Islamic crime; 4) the Brothers do not seek power for themselves and are prepared to be the troops of those who would carry this burden in an Islamic way; 5) before anything can happen, there must be a period during which the principles of the Brothers are spread (p.308).

The Muslim Brotherhood Movement’s mastermind is not Hasan el Banna, but rather a well-known and radical thinker named Sayyid Qutb. Baser (1999) informed that “the reason for him being so popular and well-known according to Hasan al-Banna is the radical ideas that dragged the masses into action and his books that all deeply affect the whole society till the tremendous end. Qutb adopts a more radical and elitist idea and method instead of a connotative method and a moderate attitude that adopted the founder leader Banna adopted, which covers the entire society” (p.234).

### **3.2.2 National Opposition Groups in the Uprising in Egypt**

The majority of people do not actually have any existence in a world formed by exploitation and oppression. There are no values given to them too. This is the case for Africans in today's world. They have no right to change their own destiny in the decision-making process. Therefore, hundreds thousands of people poured into the streets after Friday prayers in the Arab World in order to discover their self-identities and get rid of the pressure on them. Arab nations are seen as the people of the third world, and they had no rights to demand their rights. Actually, these imposed identities humiliated them, so they chose to go out on the streets and rebel against the dictators and their supporters. Young people were the

pioneers of these uprisings; they rebelled against the old, ruined and unjustified regimes. These young people under the age of 25 have pioneered the popular revolution in an environment where freedom of political and social participation was absent especially in Tunisia and Egypt, in the Arab countries. Kışlakçı (2012) stated that both the uneasiness caused by the Israeli Arab policy and lack of a productive Arab economy, which satisfied to the university graduate, were the messengers of a great social explosion in the MENA region. The unemployment rate of university graduates had increased day by day in the majority of the MENA region. Some university Arab graduates were very well equipped with the electronic culture. They were quick to communicate to social networking sites like Facebook, Twitter, etc. There were many reasons behind these young people to mobilize. The majority of these causes were: rejection of despotism, corruption, possession of human dignity, creating business opportunities, and replacing family power with an ultimately fully democratic parliamentary regime. These are the powerful young people who initiate sit-in protests and organize them on a daily basis because those who lead the protest were the unemployed and unorganized university students. They had no loyalty to any organization or party of people. These educated university graduates were coming from every layer of the social life lived under the pressure of the police state in Egypt and Tunisia. These people grew up in a world of fear. When they obtained a conditional job opportunity with the knowledge of one of the relatives of sovereign despots, they maintained fright in their lives as their phones were listening and intelligence reports were keeping up with them. Despite being a cultured and enthusiastic generation, they were also angered by lack of employment opportunities, corruption, human rights violations, unmanageable governments and the law restricting freedom of thought. The Leftist ideas dominated in the Arab countries were not affected by nationalist and rightist ideologies. Ever since they opened their eyes to this world, they have seen the same people in power for three generations, and they have never known polyphony or freedoms. In a few weeks, they could put a great popular revolution on the agenda, which could even inflict the most dictatorial Arab system. It was freedom and their revolution; citizen's political and law revolution.



### 3.2.3. 25 January Revolution

The Arab World had seen a turning point at the very beginning of 2011. There were some successful and semi-successful revolutions. So successful as the autocratic governors were changed, on the other hand, the transition to democracy had not yet consolidated smoothly therefore, it was semi-successful revolutions. Ben Ali, the Tunisian iron fist dictator for twenty-three years left his seat on the 14<sup>th</sup> January 14, 2011. Therefore, Tunisia was successful in the first step. Four days after this event, an activist Egyptian Asmaa Mahfouz from April Six Movement uploaded a video to YouTube on the 18<sup>th</sup> of January which called to the Egyptian people:

Four Egyptians have set themselves on fire so that maybe we can have a revolution like Tunisia; maybe we can have freedom justice honor and human dignity. I am a girl, and I am going down to Tahrir Square, and I will stand alone. We want you to go down to Tahrir Square on January 25<sup>th</sup>. If you still want to live in honor, we have to go down and demand our rights, our fundamental human rights. (Asmaa Mahfouz & the YouTube Video that Helped Spark the Egyptian Uprising, 2011)

Hundreds of thousands of people poured into streets especially in Cairo, Alexandria, and Suez on the 25<sup>th</sup> January 2011. Cairo's Tahrir Square was the heart of this revolution so the government took strict measures in order to prevent the events and protests by using riot control methods and closing all forms of communication. The meeting places were also announced on the on social media pages of the April Six and We Are All Khalid Saed Movements in Tahrir Square. The police also took some precautions in order to prevent them entering Tahrir. They used tear gas and shot rubber bullets in Cairo. Yet, the police could not disable the crowd's meeting in Tahrir as the number people increased day by day. The protestors in the square called out their friends to the squares from Twitter and Facebook pages. The residents of the square opened their houses to their citizens for help and mercy against the police brutality. The protests increased day by day and on the 28<sup>th</sup> January, the military took over the security role from the police. Mubarak thought that he could quell the protests before it increased, but the more he increased pressure, the more people came to the street particularly on the organized Friday rallies. The Egyptian demonstrators came together with Muslims in mosques and Christians in the churches by giving the message of no matter of people believes, they would go out and contend for their county welfare. That's to say, corruption of the state governance, unemployment of the youth, pressure on the people lives

and lack of freedom in their thought and behavior. These protests were happening most heavily in Cairo. When the people broke from the fear barrier, other cities also joined the protests after the Friday rally on the 28<sup>th</sup> January. Muslim Brotherhood also declared that they were joining the protests and they would be in the squares and street with the other people. The protestors could set up a local radio station and used the internet and social media very effectively. Mubarak cut down the internet servers and also the metro line was shut down. Actually social media had a crucial impact so as to enhance the number of the people on the street even though the restrictions and pressures. People were able to break the code of the internet and share the new codes to the people via passing Internet restrictions. By means of social media and internet, the protestors shared vital and updated information. Ghobashy (2012) stated from Mohamed ElBaradei from National Association for Change saying that “the people have broken the barrier of fear. There is no going back. The contention was everywhere, while Friday was chosen for the day of anger against the regime on the 27<sup>th</sup> of January, hundreds of relatives of the detainees demonstrated in front of police station chanting the slogans ‘Enough! We want our kids!’” (p.21). Day by day the protests had new shapes. On 30<sup>th</sup> of January, the head of the judiciary, many judges even the head of armed forces General Tantawi attended the protests. They all wanted a transitional government and new constitution as soon as possible with oust of the Mubarak regime. There was another important issue that became the symbol of the uprising. There was an unprecedented solidarity between Muslims and Christian on the squares seen in the example where they protected each other from interference while praying.

The revolution in Egypt displayed a revolutionary takeover that emerged when the continuous exclusion of opponents from the system, due to years of political oppression in authoritarian regimes combined with chronic economic troubles and social injustice. In Egypt, especially during the Hosni Mubarak period, almost all opponents of the opposition took the shape of political pressure, along with the increasing injustice, and social masses came to the point of rebellion. As Gramsci (1971) pointed out about civil society and the revolution that it started with the process of reviving the masses from the political passivity to the active position to voice their demands in a collective way. In other words, the popular uprising that has mobilized the revolution has been realized by a mass movement initiated in a spontaneous and rapid manner as in the traditional definition of the revolution, which contains groups from almost every part of the society. As a result of the 18 days of

revolutionary demonstrations, Hosni Mubarak's regime was overthrown and Egypt was the scene of a revolutionary process with many new elements of the day. The increasing usage of internet and communication tools had crucial roles in the realization of the Egyptian revolution that indicates that these tools will have made vital improvements in the revolutionary movements in the 21st century. The 25<sup>th</sup> of January Egyptian revolution proved that especially in the emergence of the revolution and in the process of its continuation, many different social groups act simultaneously more than in just the prominence of a class structure. In other words, the Egyptian revolution was not possible in any particular class such as the workers, farmers, bourgeois or aristocracy, but as well as in the action of many different classes as experienced in some of the social upheavals in the 21st century. These external actors, who provided the logistical and political support to the actors who were not satisfied with the course of the revolution which were the supporters of the old regime, completely changed the course of the revolution. In this respect, the Egyptian revolution began with the internal actors, but in the later period it was a counter-revolutionary stage, deviating from its orbit by the intervention of external actors.

#### **3.2.4. Khaled Saed Movement**

Khaled Saed was 28 years old when he was tortured to death at the hand of two policemen in Egypt. He was from a small coastal city of Alexandria. While he was in an internet cafe the policemen mercilessly dragged him along the café where they brutally beat, punched and kicked him in front of many people. These policemen wildly banged his head to the wall and stone stairs haphazardly. While he was writhing in blood and aches, he tried to call for mercy and help yet the policemen continued their torture till he died in front of many people. After his death without any crime, he has become the symbol for many Egyptians. The Egyptian people have the imagination of seeing Egypt as a country in peace with democratic life, free from brutality, torture and ill treatments. These people were really got tired of this kind of bad treatment by the policemen and officials. These inhuman treatments became so common that the people could come across it on daily life in the streets, police stations and any official buildings. They did not like these things but they could not voice up in mass till the death of Khaled Saed. Egyptian people wanted to have freedom, economic welfare, and an honorable

life. They believed that this would come when the thirty years old state of emergency law by Mubarak ended. When Mubarak left his throne they could freely select their correct representatives. With this realization, why was Khaled Saed killed? Associated Press statement, Khaled Saed was murdered after he posted a video on the Internet of the officers sharing the spoils from a drug bust among themselves. Quite strangely that the police authorities deliberately rejected making inquiries on Khaled Saed's death with the reason of saying "he died because he used a pack of marijuana". As his death was the agenda of the Egyptian people, they started to ask questions about his unjust death. The police officer explained that he was a drug addict. With this statement, they made self-justification on the right of murdering or torturing all the drug users. More interestingly, everyone knew in his town that he was not a drug addict. Another claim about Khaled was that he was an army deserter which was proven false by the publishing of his army service report. But actually, there was no relation with killing him and his military service. The authorities in Egypt rejected any further investigation in order to cover the faulty issue. The domestic and external pressure started and then increased in a short time. The European Union representatives in Egypt requested an unbiased inquiry of his suspicious death. Finally, the Egyptian authorities made a decision and arrested the two Policemen involved from two accusations: "using excessive force" and "unjustified arrest" of Khaled Saed. These two policemen were not accused of Khaled Saed's murder. According to the official autopsy report, Khaled Saed had wounds and bruises showing that he could have hit a solid material. Another official autopsy report did not record any clear cuts or bruises on his body. According to the in depth interview with Ahmed Emad Hamdya, a resident of Alexandria, it was said that Khaled Saed was someone that everyone had sympathy too. He was one of us. He was killed when trying to reach home, and the government lied about him. They said he used drugs, but later we learned that he was tortured to death. His death was one of the reasons I joined the protests." Actually, he was the Bouazizi of Egypt. It made the same effect as in Tunisia. His death did not cause mass protests when he died, but the Facebook page on his memory motivated millions of Egyptians. Therefore, this motivation sparked the 25<sup>th</sup> of January Uprising.

### 3.2.5. Kefaya Egyptian Movement for Change

The Kefaya movement emerged in 2004. It was created by some intellectuals and university officials against firstly the transfer of the presidential succession of the former president Hosni Mubarak to his son Gamal Mubarak through the extension of his tenure. With a group of young Egyptians, George Ishak, initiated the "Kefaya (Enough)" movement in the town of Al Mahalla after the time constraint on the re-election of the head of state in the Egyptian constitution was changed to "unlimited". Subsequently, this movement continued its activities in many regions of Egypt, and on the 6<sup>th</sup> April 2008, it was harshly suppressed by Egyptian authorities. This structure, formed by the liberal, secular, nationalist, and Islamist groups of different social layers, has organized the great protest against the regime and established the Egyptian Movement for Change. Therefore, the actual name of the movement is 'Egyptian Movement for Change'. Immediately after its establishment, it gained a great reputation both within the country and abroad. The movement has often been the target of the ousted leader Hosni Mubarak. Mubarak accused the movement of trying to put pressure on its own regime by using international conditions. The Kefaya Movement was one of the most important civilian opponents in Egypt, with the protest initiated with the slogan "Enough" to prevent Hosni Mubarak from participating in the elections that would be held in 2005. Tıǧlı (2011) stated that the Kefaya Movement has become a center of attraction and has become the most effective opposition force. The movement in the leadership of well-trained professional lawyers harshly criticized the government and forced Mubarak to take democratic steps with the hot issues like civil liberties, the freedom of press and expression, the development of democracy, and the adoption of law enforcement. Yıldırım and Abdülcelil (2012) informed that the Kefaya Movement had found the possibility to move and organize more easily than the Muslim Brotherhood Movement from the way it emerged with the different ideas it had. Because of the protests they have made, their leaders had been arrested and the movement weakened. However, in the Egyptian People's Revolution, which started on the 25<sup>th</sup> January 2011, they still had a crucial role and were effective in the destruction of the regime.

Blogs have improved since the Kefaya Movement came out, bringing people together against authority. Blogs that allow a struggle against power without using political language in a non-political arena have also displayed that the effect of the state on the individual is not

unlimited. Blogs firstly keep individuality pre-programmed beforehand and provided an active opposition. One of the most significant characteristics of the Kefaya movement is bringing individuality to the foreground along with the defense of rights in all circumstances. Blogs are the appearance of Kefaya on the internet in a sense. They offer an atmosphere that allows people from various political thoughts to read and comprehend the ideas.

### **3.2.6. April 6 Youth Movement**

The April Six Youth Movement, which has an important role in the awakening of the Egyptian people, has manifested itself as a powerful activist group in raising the public consciousness during the revolution time. The group, which started its organization on the internet web page established in 2007, took its name as the result of the success of the call for general strike which was launched on the 6<sup>th</sup> April 2008. Many socio-economic and political demands, such as improving economic conditions, increasing salaries of workers and civil servants, improving working conditions, initiating the fight against corruption and terminating torture, have been demanded through the internet group that was created. Ayhan and Ayhan (2011) stated that “the youth group landed in the squares and announced their voices to people who did not use social media in order to reach more people. From these demonstrations, memorial ceremonies are held annually for three activists who have lost their lives”. This group aimed at reaching more people in order to be successful in their demands. As in the revolution time, a hundred thousand people were in the street, and they succeeded in the toppling of Hosni Mubarak. This group, supported by both the university youth and the intellectual segment, organized their demonstrations through social media like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. More and more internet sites were shut down by the government because these internet sites attracted the attention of many people, and social networking sites were then also blocked. Ahmet Maher, the founder of the internet site (April Six movement), was arrested several times for calling on people to perform and for participating in these acts; but the other members continued with their activities. Despite the pressure on the group, many people became increasingly aware of the wider voice, and the attention of the trade unionists began to attract attention. The call of the workers' rights in Mahalla al-Kubra, where workers were many, was announced to the government with the

support of trade unions. But all these attempts were ineffective during the meeting with the government. SETA (2012) emphasized that “it was also reflected in the international press as a result of the demonstrations made for the release of Ezra Abdülfettah, who was arrested for said actions taken in 2008. The political demands of this youth movement, which was established virtually and interactively, were also supported by anti-Mubarak groups. Therefore, the calls made were not only for the workers but also for all the complainants. The April 6th Movement reached thousands of people on the internet in a short period of time, and expressed that they did not belong to any political structure in the meetings held. It is striking that they do not include any Islamic terminology in the texts they prepare”. Nasser admirer liberals, Islamists, women's movement groups and academicians also supported the call for what they had done because they did not have a political extension. The main emphasis is on democratization when looking at the basis of the movement. Although it seemed to focus only on workers' rights at the beginning, it later contributed to the work for a better Egypt and broad-based movement of the activities of terminating the Hosni Mubarak regime.

### **3.2.7. Social Media and Its Effects**

The world has become a global town now. It is clear that we live in a dizzying communication age. Internet, television, smart phones and social media tools can be the basis of sudden and unexpected social movements. It is valuable to remember that the world is no longer the world of 1970-1980. Atalay (2013) indicated that Arab people read everything fast to see, learn and evaluate now. In those years there were no televisions, but today there are smart phones with internet and social media networks. So it is no longer easy to fool people with imaginary messages and slogans. Let alone the messages, allow people to discuss whether they believe that they see or not.

Arab geography, in other words the Middle East, is made up of countries in interaction with each other. For this reason, changes and rebellions in one country can spread to other countries. The events in Egypt after the revolution that was started in Tunisia are a sign of this. The movements of rebellion in Tunisia and Egypt were supported by new means of communication in the new world order. If it is thought that twenty percent of the population

has internet access and social media accounts, it is not unreasonable for the demonstrations in Tunisia to be organized so quickly. Sifry (2011) informed that Wael Ghonim, Google manager in Egypt, briefly summarizes the situation as “if you want to liberate a government, give them the internet” These revolutions, which saw the support of the Internet, offered hope and opportunity to the people against oppressive regimes. It is clear that the masses are influenced by social media, and through this interaction, it is possible to act jointly. In the context of a protest called the Arab Spring, social media had important roles in the process of revolution against the dictatorial regimes, and this is an accepted reality in the whole world. With today's technology, computers have included in the internet; The Internet has become available not only on computers, but also on smartphones, and moreover, a concept called "social media" has entered into our lives. These events, which started in Tunisia and are reflected in many of the other Middle Eastern countries, have become a major social media issue. Great dictatorial leaders had left the administration within a few months of starting; in this accelerated process of political change, social media had a great role. Social media sites like Facebook, YouTube and Twitter are the most favorable nowadays when social media is expressed. Through these sites, societies in Arab countries could share more with each other. In this sense, a common consciousness has been formed in society against these oppressive administrations. Individuals have supported each other by expressing their uneasiness of management through social media.

The critical turning point for political and social issues was open to debate on social media and was relevant to Arab countries. This had been realized with thanks to the Al Jazeera television network. This television channel has become a channel that can make publications that allow the public to notice their problems by getting rid of the censorship while the internet is not so widespread. The role of the Al Jazeera channel is also great in spreading the demonstrations, which started in Tunisia, all over the Arab geography.

It is also clear why people prefer social media and internet when compared to the possibility of being caught in streets and exposed to police violence. The risk of exposure to police violence in mass movements has been reduced to almost zero through the organization on the Internet. Tekek (2011) implied that the most common word entered on Twitter in 2011 is "Egypt", which shows through social media how important “Egypt” was in the MENA region during the time of Arab Spring, and even in the world as a whole. Korkmaz (2012) asserted that in the twenty-first century, revolutions would be spread and announced through



social media, without the need for television and radio channels. Scientific studies to investigate the events of the Arab Spring clarified that more than 3 million tweets were written; thousands of blog posts that have been entered along with YouTube videos used hundreds of gigabytes of space. Korkmaz (2012) stated that social media had many effects on the Arab Spring uprisings (2010 and 2011) in Tunisia, Egypt and other countries. In particular, events have led managers to abandon the political scene thanks to social media for revolutionary purposes, with ability to criticize governments and so they could defend the idea of freedom. The age we are now in is equipped with internet, visual media and social networks. This age is now far beyond just computer use; Information provided by the internet can now be shared instantly, and people reflect their daily activities on sites like Facebook, Twitter and Instagram. The Facebook users' number in Egypt is ranked first in the Arab world. The third most visited website in Egypt is Facebook. It is envisaged that the number of Facebook users was 3.4 million comprise and these were mostly of the youth. The number of blog authors is increasing day by day. Kışlakçı (2012) emphasized that perhaps it is not wrong to say that there is no other period in which human beings are so addicted to a machine (internet and social media) they produced.

These Arab revolutions, which broke out in 2011 with the Egyptian and Tunisian events that played a domino role, were chosen by Time Magazine as the most important event of 2011. The protestors were chosen as the people of 2011. Telli (2012) stated that these events, which sounded internationally, have shown that social media is effective in motivating and organizing individuals, however social media is not the maker of these movements, but the accelerator. Moreover, there is no general unanimity on social media was the sole vehicle in democratization movements. Morozov (2011) indicated a critical point of view with the correlation in between the revolution and social media, expressed that the internet power will not permanently bring democracy. Telli (2012) reported that

In Egypt, the government cut the Internet connection, but the demonstrations continued. In the case of Libya, the power of social media could not be mentioned. There was a very important detail that had been skipped: The Internet control of the Tunisian and Egyptian states was extremely weak, there was a stale structure from the 20th century. Yes, they shut down several Internet sites and arrested bloggers, but in the style it is seen that in Russia and China, they were involved in cyber-attacks, digital propaganda and tracking systems. So the Internet in Tunisia and Egypt had benefited for this reason, but that did not mean that the same method would work for the rest of the world. The opponents were using the internet and did not assume that the states were watching the events (p. 97).

The idea that people can be liberated through social media in the authoritarian regimes is also the "internet illusion". The state in these countries is able to use intelligence info such as who talked with whom, where and what they do via social media. The rebellion in Egypt was called "Facebook Revolution" by Newsweek. However, besides this, it could be titled as "Twitter Revolution". Nevertheless, there is no common consensus that the revolution in Egypt is a social media revolution. Ingram (2011) stated that

Malcom Gladwell believes that the influence of social media is limited, and the revolutions would have happened anyway: "I mean, in cases where there are no tools of communication, people still get together. So I don't see that as being... in looking at history, I don't see the absence of efficient tools of communication as being a limiting factor on the ability of people to socially organize. Gladwell goes on to argue that other similar events have taken place in the past — including the demonstrations in East Germany that eventually led to the collapse of the Berlin Wall — and they didn't require any such tools.

It is not the social media practices that make the revolution, but of the course people. Nevertheless, without the social media factor, the revolutionary fire in Egypt might not have caught so fast. The Egyptian government's interception of internet connections, blocking access to social media sites, and blocking Wi-Fi connectivity in Tahrir Square are also interpreted as a development that confirms the importance of new communication technologies in this process.

It should not be forgotten that social media, a primary duty in the revolts in Egypt, is not the only dragon of the revolution. This is especially the case when the demonstrators became more determined and the number of participants continued to increase after the internet was cut off in order to prevent the demonstrators from using the mass media. The social media at the point where the vast majority of demonstrators are in the streets and close to each other has lost its significance. In other words, the revolution in Egypt is nourished by online communication, but the revolution is not leaning on a single medium of communication. In the process of planning and organizing, the circulation began to take the place using social media, which provided a great service and other means of communication as the masses descended to the streets. Written messages and specially designed images circulating on social media have strengthened the support of the world to the Egyptian revolution.

The contribution or impact of social media throughout the uprisings is a tool in which the people organize and deliver news rapidly. Uçkan (2011) stated that the rebellion undoubtedly started on the street. The reasons were also the rapid increase in food prices, the increasingly

unjust income distribution, the rise of young unemployment, socio-economic dynamics such as the violent oppression of freedom of expression and information, the police state, and revealed corruption. “The Middle East and North Africa is the region with the least internet users of the world making up only 3.3% of world use according to the 2011 data.” (internetworldstats.com). The MENA is a place where almost every government forbids or punishes criticizing the state. There is no doubt that governments in the region had slowed the growth of the internet out of the anxiety that democratization would undermine state control over knowledge. Particularly, the level of prevalence of social media in these countries just before the revolutions was very limited from the state pressure on the internet usage.

The declaration of human rights of citizen dates back to 1789 in the first article “Men are born and remain free and equal in rights and live so. Social distinctions may be based only on considerations of the common good.” But in this case, it is more accurate of J.J. Rousseau saying “All men are born free, but they are everywhere in chains.” In every geography and time, these chains have been in different shapes but they have been seen as a necessity of a similar life. These chains were in the lives of the people, but Facebook, Twitter, etc., where people can freely express themselves. They hid from hierarchical control until they had the opportunity of social media. The widespread usage of the internet and the expansion of social networks have emerged in such political ideas; feelings can be shared very quickly, freely and confidently. Even if pursued, at least the invisible (non-physical) pursuit leads to a relatively more liberated people.

It is a great mistake to interpret these actions as if they were an act, as in every social event, and to consider the day separately from past There had been problems and solutions in countries where there were actions, but these actions had been suppressed so they could not take place in the country and the world agenda. When there was no national and international conviction and no international pressure, the states provided authority with law enforcement agencies. However, along with the widespread usage of social media, people could extract information from the hegemony of state-controlled media with video and photographs about the circumstance they were in. This awareness created international pressure and pushed the dictators into the corner. The mistake of the authorities was to try to suppress the people again even though they saw international pressure. Increased bullying had increased the public's appetite for torture and the fact that the images of these enthusiasts were served by

the government with the hope of that the people would be afraid to return to their homes. On the contrary, the society was more annoyed with the government and poured into the street and squares. The repressive and tortuous interventions of the government that had hoped to stop the actions had further increased public uprisings.

The foundation of the Arab uprisings consisted primarily of the NGOs, associations, unions, organizations and publications of these institutions. Young people organized through social media afterward. Muhammad Bouazizi did not quite think that all these revolutions would spark a fire when he burned himself, but unwittingly it opened the Pandora's box and moved the people to death and revolutions. (Balfour, 2011:1). Ezrahi (2011) declared that "these revolutions have been carried out by people who have been caught up, arrested, and imprisoned, tortured with the fear of being killed by the so-called guardians of the regime, who have thus become unstoppable. They were fighting for their own freedom by rebelling political repression" (p.2).

Today it is now well known that internet is a tool for communication. Therefore, we can use the internet as a city square where we meet each other. We can think the internet as a place in this context. It is identified as the 11<sup>th</sup> of September of the diplomacy when Wikileaks shared the secrets of US bureaucrats' with the world's public policies that wrote each other among the US bureaucrats' especially in the USA and its policy toward the MENA region. Wikileaks' slogan was "We Open Governments". From these documents, in particular the Middle East-related correspondence had caused the people of the region to consolidate their hostility and hatred that had already existed against their own presidents. Sarıgöl (2012) stated that "this has been the factor that led to the transformation of emotions into actual actions in the impasse that was created by oppression and despair" (p. 205). The Arab Spring started to surround the MENA at the end of 2010. This uprising turned into such a massive and even regional revolution with the great contributions of the media. This Arab Spring was also called the "social media revolution" because of the internet usage as a communication tool that organized everything so effectively. Although those characterizations are incomplete, they are not totally wrong. Millions of people in this region had organized meetings and wide participatory demonstrations by organizing the people through many social networks, especially Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. They could reveal their reactions with social media tools. Jarvis (2011) claimed that the social media tools utilized by the people might be used to check the power of the state. Twitter, Facebook, YouTube

and all the other social media tools had greatly helped the Arab citizens to show up as real people. It was realized to some extent of the legitimacy of the organization of the nations through social media (p.15).

The young generation has chosen the way to live with the values they have created by using the internet and especially social media. They rejected the inheritance of the previous generation after they got used to internet culture. They formed their own popular culture. At the point where they clash with traditions, they develop ways to overcome that point thanks to that culture. We can see nations might move separately from the bounds of the government thanks to the Internet and social tools. An example of this was seen in the protestors of the Middle East especially in Egypt. Therefore, it was really very difficult to continue without the support of the people. It could not be deduced that only the internet was the principal factor in the demonstrations. Kışlakçı (2012) stated that “it was an undeniable fact that youth organizations were started on the internet. Youth organizations were also organized through the internet. The youth, who made up the majority of the population in the Arab world, belong to the internet and the satellite television” (p.81). The interactions and the rapidness of the social media can not only be used to bring together protesters, but also to show alternative ways of free those trapped by the police. Following the beginning of the revolts on the 25<sup>th</sup> of January, Tunisian activists had shared their experiences with Egyptian activists via social media. Among the messages, protests should have been held at night, away from suicide actions; social developments were also shared through social media so as to win the support of the international public opinion.

Social media's role in the overthrowing of repressive regimes was accepted all over the world in the Arab Spring era, which started in Tunisia and quickly affected the entire region. The impact of technology was crucial when the Arab Spring turned into massive quality which spread rapidly to other countries. Social media and internet had come to the forefront with the function of accelerating politics, especially in Tunisia and Egypt. The entire world especially the dictators in the MENA region, has become aware of the power of social media, so the governments regulate the laws in order to control the internet usage. In addition to these, they had also developed technical methods for ensuring information security. An example of this was the monitoring of all communications over the internet, including mobile communications, in the wake of uprising and rebellion in Arab countries (Kaymak, 2011:29). Although social media had a crucial impact on the Arab Spring process, these

countries in Arab Spring had not had a similar effect. For example, Libya remained the intact following the social media at a very low level compared to Egypt. For this reason, it was necessary to evaluate the important countries within the Arab Spring separately.

The Internet network has been the shelter of intellectual freedom. The youth movement saw this network as a more favorable tool to them than the others. Kışlakçı (2012) stated that Tunisia was the first place among the Arab countries providing contact via Twitter and Facebook. Electronic mail, Facebook and Twitter had become a tool for revealing their objections which formed this new Arab generation's freedom of communication (p. 81). It could be watched live, and with the help of "Jan25 and Egypt" hashtags an audience was opened on Twitter while Egyptian protests were happening in Egypt, especially in Tahrir. Analyses of the progress had been made by looking at the quality and quantity of the news coming which then tried to predict what would happen after the events. Apart from the actions on the streets, the background was focused on the production of solutions for the remaining problems. While the images taken on mobile phones were being watched from Youtube and Facebook, various groups related to the subject were also established. With the help of these established groups on Facebook and FriendFeed, even alternative ways of the activists to use the kill switch had been discussed with the theoretical and practical methods that had been put forward in this subject (Polat, 2011:32).

Arab societies have begun to share more with the help of the widespread usage of Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and other social vehicles. In addition, the physical boundaries among the people had lost all of their influence. The shared awareness, namely, social media and society having the common agenda, had a big impact in the dominance of the Domino effect which was constantly voiced in the Arab Spring process. The most prominent of the social events marked by 2011 was undoubtedly the Arab uprisings and revolutions. These actions were even more noticeable in text messages, emails, video and blog pages, and the other social media tools had displayed their power in these actions. With social media tools, activists could be organized, and communicative. They were able to spread the images in their hands. In this way, wider masses were able to move toward uprisings. Szajkowski (2011) claimed that "crowds had been organized effectively using the possibilities offered by smartphones and the internet which were probably the two most important discoveries of the 20th century, and these organized uprisings had resulted in revolutions" (p. 421).

The importance of social media, especially with the Arab Spring, both in Egypt and in the world had given the perception that social media had an unshakeable "agenda setting" feature/power formed. In particular, the social movements that attracted millions of people to the Tahrir Square in Cairo were so self-centered with Twitter that if Twitter had not been used in Egypt, nothing would change. This was a widespread belief. (Irak & Yazicioglu, 2012: 83) In an environment where other expression channels were censored, it could be assumed that a practical tool such as Twitter had a positive effect on organizing capacity. However, how accurate were the inferences that "Arab Spring would not have happened without Twitter" or "Arab Spring has happened thanks to Twitter"? Irak and Yazicioglu (2012) stated about the usage of the Twitter and other social media tool that:

The total number of Twitter users in the entire Arab geography, including North Africa was one million three hundred thousand. Twitter users had the highest population ratio in Kuwait yet, this figure did not reach 9%. Egypt claimed to owe its revolution to Twitter, this rate was 0.26%. On the other hand, in March 2012, when the Arab Spring was most active, only 58 million tweets were made from Kuwait, with 239 thousand users. In this period, all issues in the first place were political. One of the conclusions that made inference about the Arab Spring when passive users were removed was; Twitter was the political destination for the majority of the population in this geographical area. It had been heavily used by a relatively small political group. All Blogs in the Arabian geography had political importance in the opinion of the leadership level, the representatives of the oppressive regimes were related to the issue; they had started to arrest bloggers (p.126).

To tell the truth, the revolution was not on Twitter and Facebook, but with Twitter and Facebook on the streets. Yet, social media had been used as effectively as possible in these revolutions although the Arab uprisings were not exactly a social media revolution. It was possible because the speed of the internet and prevalence in Arab countries were limited so it had reduced the efficiency of the social media. The prevalence of the internet before the uprisings and the number of members of Facebook were as shown below.

**Figure 4: The internet usage and Facebook users' information**

Country	Population	Internet usage rate		Facebook users		Facebook Age slice		Distribution by gender	
		Rate	Person	Rate	Person	18-24	25-34	Male	Female
Tunisia	10.549.100	34.0 %	3.586.000	2 406 500	22.73%	42%	28%	58%	42%
Egypt	81.121.077	21.2 %	17.200.000	6 668 700	8.29%	50%	28%	64%	36%
Libya	6.355.112	5.5 %	350.000	32 640	0.51%	34%	36%	79%	21%

The data is a compiling from the web site according to the March 2011 usage from "internet World Stats and Social Bakers". <https://www.socialbakers.com/> and <http://www.internetworldstats.com/>

As it can be seen in the table, it can be said that the internet is used widely in Tunisia and Egypt, but it would be wrong to talk about the influence of social media in other countries. There is no current and confidential data on Yemen and Syria's usage of social media and internet. Therefore, careful examination of the explosion of the anger through the years, the tough behavior of the police shot by mobile phones, and its publication of torture on television thus created both national and international pressure and sanctions on the despotic countries. Social media had been very effective in mobilizing ideas like democracy, freedom and civil liberties in these countries where the internet was not so widespread while Facebook did not have many users compared to the west. It has also been effective in publishing these images on TV and in organizing people. It was also useful in giving information as well as the sharing of practical information such as "how cola and lemon would benefit in eliminating the effect of tear gas". Internet and social media tools provided these opportunities, while the most effective contribution to the actions was seen by smartphones. Mass messages, multimedia messages, and images from smartphones, Facebook and twitter had completely organized the public. Those who were reflected on social media first brought social media followers, and then the international community into action. It is said that mobile devices come before social media, and social media is then followed by international media organizations with this sort of thing.

In the historical process, ideas of action were spreading through conversations and debates in the early times. Later, with the spread of the printing press, and with the newspapers and



magazines, masses began to be formed with the newspapers. When the radio and cassette players were invented, the speeches of the prolocutors were broadcasted and the cassettes were distributed. Propaganda tools changed quickly. Daily newspapers became widespread and radios became commonplace. The increased popularity of television brought it to its peak. Televisions that could be guidance for hours in every house eventually operated effectively, though not as freely as they were due to the fact that there were central broadcast stations and rules. Later invented rapidly, widespread and decentralized was the internet; people have had an opportunity to freely share information as they have never been before. Social media tools have also reinforced this. Being a civil society had been a very difficult and risky business in the past, but with internet and social sharing sites, people had a structure that could be entered and organized within minutes. The efforts taken to establish a non-governmental organization in the past have begun to turn into groups formed by a few clicks. In this way, civil society has become more civilized with the help of technological developments.

Now those who produce and direct knowledge lose their privileges. As technology becomes liberated and individualized, the state roof is cracking and the walls are open to certain leaks. Institutions, organizations, communities and individuals state that those, who are not "transparent" in the new period, should not be surprised when they see that their voices or videos are leaked on sites like YouTube, daily motion etc. Modern means of communication have been used to mobilize the protestors' masses filling the streets of Tunisia and Egypt. Kışlakçı (2012) stated that this revolution has overcome all obstacles including: the destroyed site, blocked e-mails, and police barricades. With the start of the uprising, the teenagers also uploaded videos and photos to Facebook. Thus, at a time when there was the great talent of demonstrations in the state press, this barricade built a news agency that spans broad networks that contribute to breaking through. Facebook has become a real ground for the revolution and has been used to press on Arab systems to reveal the truth.

Considering the international press, the governments of Tunisia, Syria, Libya, Yemen and Egypt were not able to overlap the human rights abuses. Through the new press, the approach allows the voice and images of the protests to be heard and seen by the whole world. One of the features of these publications is the number of bloggers who support the demonstrations. The society has played a major role in publishing internet information and photographs. Even international media channels contacted these sites to get news and photos. What

attracts attention here is that these uprisings appeared after WikiLeaks had published many hidden corruption documents. Prashad (2012) claimed about the cutting of the internet and mobile phones services:

The dismissal of mobile phone and internet services on January 28 severely enhanced restlessness in at least three crucial ways. It awakened many apolitical citizens who were unaware of or uninterested in unrest; increased the face-to-face communication, that is, more physical assets on the streets were required to be displayed; Finally, on January 20th, the effective control and repression of the rebellion, effectively through the newly developed mixed communication tactics, led to a knotty problem that was much more difficult to solve than a single massive meeting in Tahrir. In fact, the closure of Facebook has reached new masses and new opportunities to expand the movement (p.35).

Technology is developing more rapidly than in the past. When television was invented, people thought that it would disappear from the market within six months at the latest. People did not want to look at such a box every night. It is a big mistake to ignore the internet and social media today and to be unaware of the potential it carries. The Internet and the opportunities it offers are inseparably covering the world. Particularly if the states with repressive regimes try to stand in the way of this change, it is highly likely that they will encounter similar actions as seen during the Arab Spring. For this reason, it is not necessary to chase these change actors, but to reform the systems and remove the problems such as human rights and democratization which are the source of the actions. As a result, the world is changing. Youth can quickly update itself and adapt quickly to new technologies. For this reason, the future trend of the society should be determined well with solid infrastructure and investments shaped accordingly. Undoubtedly, this change process is crucial for the future of states and societies.

The number of internet applications is increasing day by day. An Egyptian protester has commented on the impression of the social media on the rebellion process: "We use Facebook for the demonstration calendar and YouTube to announce our Twitter and our voice to the world." This sentence also highlighted the social media preferences of Egyptian protesters. Howard (2011) stated about the importance of the social media from an activist during the uprising.

During the heady days of protests in Cairo, one activist succinctly tweeted about why digital media was so important to the organization of political unrest. "We use Facebook to schedule the protests, Twitter to coordinate, and YouTube to tell the world," she said. The protesters openly acknowledge the role of digital media as a fundamental infrastructure for their work (psmag.com/).

### 3.2.8. Religious Organizations in Egypt

There was a very heavy pressure on the Islamic movement towards the system in Egypt. Therefore, the Islamic movement has not been very successful in attracting the mass base into the actual political struggle. Maybe there are many people who want to support the Islamic struggle, but the official terror of the state has encompassed these people all the way from the administrative, legal and economic point of view. In Egypt, the mass of people on which the Islamic movement is based is not found elsewhere in the world. However, the fact that this movement does not reach the reform is really thought-provoking. In addition to the lack of political understanding, knowledge, belief and dynamism of the ordinary Egyptian people, there are some inconsistencies within the Islamic movement itself have not been able to reinforce the movement. First of all, the Islamic movement was broken in Egypt. These parts are not in their own line, but they have dealt with each other, and even they have muttered to each other. This is the biggest drawback. One of the factors affecting and shaping the movement in a negative way is the economic factor. The poverty, distress and despair affected the Egyptian people as well as the Islamic movement. One of the obstacles in front of the Islamic movement is the traditionalist attitude. Excessive devotion to tradition has shadowed the identity of the Islamic movement which led to a more passive movement in the face of other movements.

Egypt is the most important footstep after Tunisia for the change movements that Arab societies living under authoritarian regimes for years have realized. However, unlike the periods of Abdul Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhood was not an important part of the opposition in this new period, but later became the official representatives of the state administrations themselves. Undoubtedly, the Brotherhood's performance in management would be closely related to the difficulties experienced by past processes. Therefore, it is very significant to understand the Muslim Brotherhood, which is the most vibrant and dynamic movement of the country so as to deduce the recent past and future of Egyptian social and political life.

The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt that operates in some Middle Eastern Islamic countries, was formed by Banna giving the name of Cemiyet al-ihvân al-müslimîn (Muslim Brotherhood Society) in the city of Ismayilia in 1928. It is a religious-political organization

and movement. Policies of oppression and violence directed against Muslim Brotherhood have led to some changes in the movement. Due to the changing international political environment of the 1990s, a relative transformation has occurred in the level of the organization's relationship with the administration. Despite the fact that Mubarak continued to restrict the Muslim Brotherhood movement with the political activities, the activities of the organization in the societal area caused the Muslim Brotherhood to maintain its efficacy during the movements in the country. The movement has emerged as an actor with a political party agenda and strong political influence in Egypt. Thus, apart from being a purely religious community, the Muslim Brotherhood has evolved into the movement from the congregation. The rehabilitation movement, which started in the 1990s in the organization, has led to considerable debate on how to act on the local and global level. In this period, various debates around the concepts of democracy, secularism, justice, women's rights and freedom, dialogue, human rights, freedom, and international law have taken place in which remarkable progress has been made especially in the discussions of secularism and democracy. As regards democracy, the Muslim Brotherhood has continued to debate within themselves, as well as partnering with other parties in Egypt. Believing that obtaining the power of the country is only possible by means of democratic practices, that is, by elections, the Brotherhood gave guarantees to its partners in 1991 that it would fulfill its obligations on "democratic principles" by working together with other opposition parties in the country. This seems to be a pragmatic business alliance for the Mubarak regime in the first place, but it seemed that this did not lead to a big deviation when the Brotherhood's later shared views were reflected. With regard to this business association, they conveyed the following: the granting of human rights, public rights, freedoms as prescribed by Islamic law and international law, the imposition of the state of emergency and the imposition of martial law, the elimination of barriers of the establishing political parties, the free, fair and democratic elections, agreement on the subjects such as the adoption of the parliamentary structure to continue their work, the provision of legislative and supervisory authority to the Council, and the determination of the president directly by the people, provided that they did not exceed two periods.

Especially in the 2000s, the Muslim Brotherhood has become a mass movement that can become powerful in society. Even today it is seen as the pioneer of modern Islamist movements. There was no radical change in the Muslim Brotherhood in terms of

organization functional and discourse from its establishment to the early 2000s. The Muslim Brotherhood had begun to rejoice in the political scene and the politics of getting a seat in the parliament, through independent deputies. Thus, Brotherhood members began to take part in the parliament, while at the same time trying to expand their field of activity further. The fact that the members of the organization, who felt the troubles of Mubarak's period until the end, did various studies for the establishment of an era against Mubarak together with the different sections of the society, and that they were in formations, proving that Egypt was taking a new turn. While all these developments were taking place, the rise of new voices from within the organization signaled that the organization of the Muslim Brotherhood had also entered into a change/transformation process like the Egyptian society. Indeed, the process of revolt against the leaders of the Arab people in Tunisia and the beginning of a new era with ousting Mubarak in the Egyptian society through the January 25<sup>th</sup> Revolution caused the Muslim Brotherhood to come to the brink of a critical period.

The legitimacy of the Mubarak regime in public in recent years has been shaken to a great extent. The fact that Mubarak was preparing his son Gamal instead of him was not welcomed by many parts of the society. Therefore, the process of going to the presidential elections was in great competition leading to the emergence of different kinds of criticism and demonstrations in Egypt in 2010. Not only was there criticism by opponents, but also those who opposed the presidency of Gamal Mubarak from the regime's wrongdoers. Following such a situation, the beginning of the uprisings in Egypt at the beginning of 2011, and the dragging of this work especially by young people became the messenger of Mubarak's end. The fact that the Muslim Brotherhood, which traditionally protected its opponent line and appealed to a broad social base, was acting together with Kefaya, which was supported by the intellectual and liberal sections of the country; this was an indication that the ideology might be behind the formation of a revolutionary coalition in the process.

The Muslim Brotherhood, who managed the revolutionary process well in the social welfare and showed its success at the political level later, succeeded in establishing a new party by acting quickly in Egypt after Mubarak with its organizational mechanism. Members give thanks to its past accumulation and assuming a founding role in the new administration of Egypt. The move officially announced on the 30<sup>th</sup> April 2011 that they had established the Freedom and Justice Party so that they would join the Parliamentary elections. With the formation of the party, the Muslim Brotherhood began to embrace all Egyptian people. Thus

the Muslim Brothers moved the people to victory over the parliamentary elections and made Muhammad Morsi, who took part in the Egyptian presidential election as acting candidate, to become the head of the presidency. Politics based on concepts such as democracy, transparency, and freedoms have been the most important elements reinforcing the Brotherhood's triumph over Egyptian elections. The Freedom and Justice Party expressed that democracy is the most important tool for them and that efforts should be made to strengthen it. They demanded separation of powers (legislative-executive-judiciary) be provided on the grounds that this is the closest system to Islam, stating that the political authority must maintain democracy with individual rights and freedoms in which the legitimate authority should be recognized by the people. The Muslim brothers clearly emphasized that democracy was adopted as the basic method for them, and stated that the Brotherhood's institutions and organizations were democracy-based organizations from the very top down. As it can be understood from this statement, the Muslim Brotherhood organization has made it ready to confront democracy and has signaled that it would build an order on the axis of democracy in Mubarak, in parliamentary elections, or in the victory in presidential elections. In this context, the problems of change, transformation, or preservation of the MB in the new post-revolutionary era would be understood in terms of democracy, and foreign policy which struggle with the remnants of the regime, and whether the movement has changed.

With the beginning of the demonstrations on the 25<sup>th</sup> January 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood movement supported the first demonstrations but did not actively participate, yet they released the young members to participate. According to the findings of revolutionary groups, one-third of the crowds gathered at Tahrir Square were members of the MB. The MB movement, in particular, adopted the policy of not being in the forefront and adopted the principle that religious items should be at the minimum level in the slogans. The strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood here was to prevent the regime from portraying the attempt as an Islamic uprising. There had been serious debate about the position of the MB in this first position of the revolution. On the other hand, many Western researchers argued that the MB took part in this uprising process to impose its own agenda and achieve an Islamic revolution with the involvement of the young generation of the movement in the revolutionary process and in the participation of the protest. The argument of the Islamization of the revolution was, in large extent, a false misinformation that had been advanced for the purpose of

disinformation of those caught unprepared for this social uprising in Egypt. Yet the fact that there were a number of different groups, a clear observation of the people's support and no Islamic revolutionary agenda by the Muslim Brotherhood as claimed beforehand falsified the Western arguments. The Muslim Brotherhood had crucial roles both in the success of this revolutionary strategy of the Egyptian revolution and in the political scene in the post-revolutionary period.

The Muslim Brotherhood movement, which has contributed significantly to the revolutionary process, also wanted to have a dominant role in the country's politics. As the movement with the widest social base, the Muslim Brotherhood followed a pragmatist policy during this period and made negotiations with the Egyptian army unlike other revolutionary actors, which prepared the way for power. The Muslim Brotherhood wanted some guarantees from the military in these negotiations. These terms were to be accepted as an equal political actor, to be able to form a political party and to be prohibited from politics in the future. Tadros (2011) stated the role of the military at that time as;

The military's solution to this was to withdraw from the public spotlight while maintaining overall control over the country. This formula came to an end on February 11, 2011, as the military was forced to govern Egypt. Neither interested nor prepared for the task of daily governance, the military wanted out as soon as possible. Every day it spent dealing with workers' strikes or sectarian clashes decreased their public support and put their real economic interests at risk. The military's objectives have thus been to maintain stability, to ensure economic success in Egypt, and to hand over power to civilian politicians as soon as possible to let them deal with the unsolvable problems (p.6).

Actually, the military wanted to give power to civilian politicians with whom they could do everything with this new government since it was really difficult to find a solution to the problems which had lingered many years. The Muslim Brotherhood made an official application for the establishment of the Freedom and Justice Party in April in order to take part in the politics after the revolution. The establishment of the party was approved in June. In the party's official program, it was stated that the aims of Freedom and Justice Party were to provide social justice and equality, to defend human rights and to establish a democratic regime connected with Islamic rules. Daher (2011) informed that "the Muslim Brotherhood had created its own political party; the Freedom and Justice Party, which was claimed to be independent of the Muslim Brotherhood movement" (p.3). They were similar to the Justice and Development Party in Turkey as the AK Party in Turkey stated they were not a totally Islamic party on the first hand. Daher (2011) also claimed that "the Egyptian Freedom and

Justice Party were distinguished by its civil and democratic nature. Unlike most other Islamist parties, its manifesto did not mention Islamic sharia as its frame of reference; it only refers to the Arab Islamic civilization. They stated that they could not refer to the Islamic sharia because it was not an Islamist party, and the party was more diverse than Brotherhood youth.” (p.4). Freedom and Justice Party reached thousands of members after its establishment thanks to the wide social base and social service network of the Muslim Brotherhood and they were quickly organized in the whole of the country. Consequently, this situation displayed itself at the high rate of votes of the FJP in the parliamentary elections held at the end of 2011. In the three-round parliamentary elections held in November 2011, FJP won 37.5% of the vote, winning 235 of 508 seats in the parliament. (Al Jazeera 2012). In the second round, Mohammed Morsi became the first president to take power in a democratic election in the country, receiving 51.7% of votes. In Egypt, which has been under political instability since the Revolution, Morsi was expected to take steps such as preparing a new constitution, resuming foreign investments to the country, ensuring economic stability and eliminating social injustice. Due to the effective opposition and campaign of the political groups working against the Muslim Brotherhood, Morsi had difficulty concentrating on the problems of the country so he tried to console the first months of its administration with political power. In this process, it was necessary to break down the actors who were the remains of the Mubarak period, especially those present in the judicial and state bureaucracies. The tasks of a vital role in maintaining power, such as the elimination of the demands of the opposition who tried every way to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood's movement from producing political solutions with the response of the media to a massive scandal campaign against the Morsi administration, seriously disturbed Morsi administration. Therefore, the Freedom and Justice party had to deal with such multidimensional problems after coming to power. Fans of the old regime, from the very beginning, have pursued a vigorous policy aimed at the failure of Morsi's ruling experience. In the midst of this tense environment, Morsi issued a statement in November giving the president significant authority which raised blood pressure in the country. In addition, the constitutional referendum without opponents' consent further increased blood pressure in the country. The reactions to the Muslim Brotherhood movement rose from many sections. In a regulation published by Morsi, there was an aim at purging of the ancient regime with an establishment of a new order in which the revolutionary actors were active. Telci (2012)



explained this regulation items as;

1. Retrial of former regime officials responsible for crimes committed during the revolution.
2. As from the date of appointment, all decisions taken by the president were valid until a new constitution was adopted and a new people's assembly was elected, could not be brought to trial in any way and cancellation of cases filed against them.
3. The election of the President of the Chief Public Prosecutor of Egypt for a period of four years by the members of the judiciary and the immediate enforcement of this decision.
4. The Constitutional Declaration dated March 30, 2011 regarding the establishment of the Constituent Assembly which would prepare the new constitution, "the new constitution draft should be prepared within the latest 6 months from the date of its establishment" shall be changed to "within 8 months".
5. No judicial organ shall denounce the Constituent Assembly and the House of Councilors.
6. Recognition that the President has the power to take all kinds of measures to protect the goals of the revolution (p.80).

Morsi's decisions had been severely criticized by both former regime actors and oppositionists who were revolutionary, but opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood. Adopting the new Constitution by referendum at the end of 2012, protestors against Morsi reached serious dimensions and organized demonstrations in many cities. The unprecedented freedom which the MB has after the Arab Spring has brought its utmost advantage with its effective organizational skills. It might be difficult to establish a balance between quickly withdrawing the army from politics and resorting to the army to strengthen the alliance with non-Islamists. Even more challenging, it would draw attention to the similar balance between the Salafist and non-Islamists. Moreover, even if all these obstacles were managed, the MB would need to deal with more challenging tasks that were living up to the impossible hopes of directing Egypt and Egyptian harbors. The long-term goal of the Muslim Brotherhood had remained unchanged since its foundation: "the full transformation of society along Islamic lines". In this context, one of the most powerful weapons in the movement would be the contributions of military and police forces, as well as the civilian services it has done for years.

### 3.2.9. The Salafists

The representatives of the Salafi ideology in Egypt, formed in the framework of a conservative interpretation of Islam, have lived an apolitical life in large scale with the influence of these teachings. It was only after the Arab revolutions that it made us fully aware of the greatness and effectiveness of these apolitical welfare movements, which advocated the Islamization of society and the state, with the methods of education, guidance and invitation. There were four different Salafi groups in Egypt in general. Firstly, traditionalists absolutely reject political activism as they are apolitical. Secondly, scholars emphasize religious education and communicative activities. Thirdly, politics those prone to politics and lastly Jihadist Salafist are known for their conservative interpretations. While with these movements they did not engage in political activities during the Mubarak period, the Jamaat Islamic movement, which was affiliated to the Jihadist Salafi, actively took part in the peninsula of Sinai. In the face of very rapid developments, the Salafiyya group, which has formulated the social and political strategy against the repressive regimes as "to avoid politics and to concentrate on education, guidance and invitation activities", has found its place in the face of mass demonstrations since 25<sup>th</sup> January. They were in a dilemma as to whether or not to participate in these demonstrations, and they had found themselves at a crossroads in the face of the outcome of the uprising and the realization of the revolution. Some of the Salafist groups, who did not participate in the pre-revolutionary period because of the pressure of the Mubarak regime or in principle in opposition to the anti-government protest, have begun to change their position with the revolution and become politicized. Although the movement participated in acts of violence during the period of Mubarak, after the revolution, it had a role in the country politics that kept away from violence.

The vast majority of the Salafist movement, which opposed ideologically politicization, did not massively participate in the January 25th Revolution demonstrations. However, in response to the pressure of the Mubarak regime, many Salafist individuals participated in the demonstrations. Following the increasing protests, Salafist leaders made supportive statements to the revolutionaries when the ousting of Mubarak was certain. The absence of the post-revolutionary administration has been one of the most important elements that pushed the Salafist movement into politicization. Being aware of social support, the Salafist movement ended the apolitical stance it previously had after the revolution when they

entered politics. The Salafist, who organized the demonstrations by demanding the expression of political, economic and social rights, were at the forefront of the protest against the Military Council leaving the administration to the civilian authority. El-Ashwal (2013) stated about the biggest and most effective political organization of Salafi movement as:

Among all Salafi groups, the Salafi Call of Alexandria achieved the most extensive grassroots presence in Egyptian society, in particular in the countryside and the towns and medium-sized cities of the densely populated north. Its political arm, the Nour Party, emerged as the strongest single party within the Salafi alliance that contested the 2011–2012 parliamentary elections, securing 123 out of its 136 seats. The decision to establish the party had been taken in March 2011, and, according to its leaders, was largely driven by concern over the possibility of the abolition of article 2 of the constitution (sharia as the main source of law). The leaders cite pressure from their base as the main reason to become an active and autonomous player in the political field, rather than simply mobilizing electoral support for the party affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood (p.4).

There is a different type of Salafi movement in the political arena. El-Ashwal (2013) informed that “the Salafists formed the Islah (Reform) and Asala (Authenticity), Ar-Raya (the Flag) and Virtue (Al-Fadilah) parties; however, they were not able to achieve a tangible presence on the ground” (p.4). Although divided into different groups, the Salafist movement was at the forefront of defining Egyptian politics as conservatives. The latest development in which all of the different branches of movement move together was in the first presidential election after the revolution. Salafist, who did not nominate their own candidates for the 2012 presidential elections, announced that they would support the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood. After the election, the Salafi Nur Party allied with the Muslim Brotherhood in the process of constructing a new constitution. On the other hand, they harshly criticized Mohamed Morsi's presidential decree issued in November. Thus the relations between the two groups started to worsen. Mctighe (2014) emphasized that “a growing rift between Nour and the Brotherhood that helped push the Salafi party to oppose their former allies first came out into the open in early January 2013 when Younes Makhyoun, Nour chairman, told media that the party had ideological disagreements with Brotherhood. In late January, a senior member of Nour and an advisor to Morsi criticized the Brotherhood for monopolizing power and excluding others. At the same time, Makhyoun revealed that he had met with the National Salvation Front (NSF). The NSF and Nour then announced a set of unified demands to end the political stalemate that was gripping Egypt.” (p.3).

### 3.2.10. Liberal-Secular Revolutionary Movements

“Change is underway in Egypt. But, its end is not clear and the road ahead is likely to be long and difficult” (Rutherford 2008: 1)

Firstly, it would be correct to explain the meaning of liberal and secular concepts in Egypt and their naming. Indeed, as many researchers who try to analyze the Egyptian transition have experienced, it is necessary to explain the process of "identification" of some groups in the uprising. The naming of some groups as liberal or secular may not correspond to an ideological structure similar to the Western interpretation of political science. As a matter of fact, liberal or secular understanding in Egypt was characteristic and peculiar to this country. It is worth pointing out that in Egyptian society, religion deeply penetrates almost every aspect of social life, which seriously affects ideological approaches too in the country. In this respect, it should be noted that they have certain qualities of secular or liberal groups apart from western meaning. Rutherford (2008) stated that “modern Egyptian liberals were different from those in the west because they accepted a role for religion in public life. They supported Article 2 of the 1971 constitution which declares that the principles of Sharia would be the main source of legislation. Moreover, the Wafd, under the leadership of al-Nahas (Zaghloul’s successor) played a key role in the creation of the Arab League”. Mustafa (2006) stated that “there is a widespread misconception that Egypt lacks a liberal, secular legacy, and for this it has no base upon which to build a genuine project of reform to confront the political challenges facing today’s society. On the contrary, liberal ideas have deep roots in Egyptian society and have been a coherent and consistent feature of Egypt’s political landscape for decades” (p.1). The masses that took part in the Egyptian revolution that were outside the Islamic movements were called "liberal" by Western analysts, but this was not a correct description. According to Tadros (2012), it cannot be said that the anti-Mubarak revolutionary groups in Egypt that were not Islamic were an ideological system of those who were not socialists. The lack of a complete liberalist mentality in Egypt also implies that the literature of liberalism in the Arabian geography has not been developed. You cannot even find five books that defend liberalism in Arabic, because the basic western works of liberalism are not translated into Arabic. Similarly, it is articulated that the idea of liberalism in the MENA region is misunderstood, or that it has social and cultural obstacles to this political ideology. Opinions have also been put forward that the Arab world is far from the

idea of liberalism. Mustafa (2006:6) emphasized the situation of the liberals in Egypt as; “independent liberal writers and intellectuals face systematic restrictions on their freedom of expression, especially in the media. In this way, the regime deprives them of opportunities to challenge and revise the closed political discourse of the regime’s monolithic voice”. If the autocratic regime did not allow the liberals to have roles in the governing party, they would not allow them to state themselves as the opponents too. March (2017) stated that

The heroic events of January and February 2011 seemed at first to rewrite the rules of Middle Eastern politics. One of the longest ruling autocrats in the Arab World fell not to a military coup, an assassination, or violent uprising, but to the immovable presence of the people demonstrating in public. The Tahrir Revolution was ‘liberal’ in the sense that its demands were for freedom, the rule of law, and social justice. Its promise was that these goals seemed to reflect a shared will unite the secular and the Islamist, the masses and the middle class (p.2).

For this reason, the individual was at the center of a liberal worldview that would be protected at all costs, as a subject with untouchable rights and against the freedoms, dogmatism, or the invading tendencies of the state apparatus. Faruqi and Fahmy (2017: 5) informed that “during their pre-revolutionary political careers, moreover, these liberal figures were quite nuanced in how they handled their associations with the Muslim Brotherhood. As avowedly secular figures, none were remotely sympathetic to Islamism as a political platform, but their opposition to the discourse of Islamism did not preclude them from accepting the Brotherhood as a reality in Egyptian political life.” Ahram (2015) informed us that

Democracy means communal participation in decision-making, which is different from talking about ‘rights and freedoms.’ And if democracy is achieved, then the Egyptian masses [have the prerogative to] decide at a certain moment that we cannot grant freedoms one hundred percent in the name of [achieving] the national interest, as circumstances require (p.9).

### **3.2.11. Revolutionary Socialists**

In the course of the Egyptian Revolution, the masses that flocked to the streets generally have three different tendencies. We can classify it as the Left, Liberal and Christian National Front, the Salafi, and the MB Movement. “The democratization of Egypt depends on the occurrence of a real revolution in which sovereignty and priority are given to the demands

of the masses,” stated Ahmad Ezzat, the Revolutionary Socialists’ member. “However the SCAF’s idea for democratic transformation is a deal which is made with a number of elitist liberal political forces and others, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, who represent the majority of voters, to draw up a roadmap for the country which will ensure it has a semi-permanent position allowing it to intervene in the country’s governance” (Charbel, 2012:1). Revolutionary Socialists rely on the power of democracy. In this democratic sense, they fully support the freedom of expression, opinion and opposition. For many experts, Revolutionary Socialists are significant for a radical political structure and polyphony, but they are far from demolishing the state.

The Revolutionary Socialists in Egypt have been at the center of the movement in Tahrir from the outset, since the ousting of Mubarak in February. The Revolutionary Socialists in Egypt are expressing themselves by getting rid of the shadow of the underground political movement in Egypt. Since then, the Revolutionary Socialists had crucial roles in the progression and building the revolutionary struggle against the SCAF of Mubarak's former generals with the US-backed military dictatorship. The Revolutionary Socialists claimed that “the revolution is a popular revolution. This is not a revolution of the elite, political parties or religious groups. Egypt's youth, students, workers and the poor are the owners of this revolution. In recent days a lot of elites, parties and so-called symbols have begun trying to ride the wave of revolution to hijack it from their rightful owners.” The socialist movement has been in a marginal position, but has existed for many years in Egypt. A small group of socialist ideologies have been adopted in the country which have continued to communicate with both regional and international socialist networks. Lantier and Stern (2012) emphasized the role of the socialists as

The Revolutionary Socialists are affiliated internationally with parties of the International Socialist Tendency, including the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) in Britain, and unofficially with the International Socialist Organization (ISO) in the United States. These parties oppose the independent mobilization of the working class against the junta. Politically, they defend the legacy of military rule in Egypt and the Stalinists’ nationalist support for it, even after the working class has risen in revolt against Mubarak and, subsequently, the SCAF. Sociologically, these parties draw their membership from affluent sections of the middle class, a social layer tied financially and politically to Western imperialism that seeks to keep the workers under the control of the state and trade union bureaucracies. They collaborate with bourgeois forces like the right-wing Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and the National Alliance for Change of the former director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohammed ElBaradei while working through back channels with Washington (p.2).

The Revolutionary Socialists, founded in 1991 to stand by workers who strike during trade union elections, were at that time advocating the rights of workers by standing out with their attitude towards neoliberal policies of the regime. After then they organized large-scale actions for dismissing workers (1994) and protecting farmers' rights (1997). The socialists, especially those who continued their existence with the efforts of students and some intellectuals, attained a more institutional identity under the roof of the Socialist Studies Center established in Cairo in 2003 with the initiative of Kemal Khalil. The Revolutionary Socialists, who stand out with their demonstrations to support the Intifada in Palestine at the beginning of the 2000s, then protested the US intervention in Iraq with wide participation. They had also organized some protests with Muslim Brotherhood but this was harshly criticized by the leftist groups. The movement that stands out in the anti-regime stance is closely under the security units of the Mubarak regime, its activists have been arrested many times, and their offices have been raided by police.

The anti-regime stance of the Revolutionary Socialists, especially supporting the anti-Mubarak demonstrations held in liberal and Islamic movements in 2005, has become increasingly hard. In the following years, the Revolutionary Socialists continued their opposition and fought for the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak. The Revolutionary Socialists, who were the first groups to land in the squares when the January 25 Revolution uprising began, had significant roles in the movement of masses, particularly in cities like Cairo, Alexandria, Mahalla al-Qubra and Suez. Following the January 25 Revolution, the Revolutionary Socialists carried out a serious opposition in the course of the revolution against the regime and military forces not to cover the crimes of the security forces against the revolutionaries, and not to seize power with an overwhelming coup d'état. The movement took the reaction of the Supreme Military Council because of this opposition and the demand for termination of the military regime. Revolutionary Socialists have also aimed to have a role in the politics in Egypt with the political parties they founded. Naguib (2015) stated that

Thus, the real completion of the democratic revolution requires that the working class lead, the poor peasants, the urban poor, the oppressed sections of society, the poor Kopt, and the Sina Bedevilis. It is necessary to complete the process of "cleansing", in order to save this encirclement, reaction and counter-revolution, and then to prepare for a new uprising that will complete the overthrow of the regime and by destroying state structures of the old regime. Then the task of building a "social republic" begins by taking the political power of the working class with the support of the poor peasants and the urban poor (p.11).

In general, the aim of these parties was to establish a state in Egypt based on socialist principles that could achieve the function of a socialist government. The Revolutionary Socialists movement issued a report in December 2011. The movement said it was aimed to establish a socialist state in which management officials would have workers, farmers and student representatives with broad rights to workers' unions, trade unions and student movements that could be given and social justice would be realized in the whole country. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) emphasized that "Neither democracy nor social justice can be achieved without institutions that ensure transparency of decision-making, provide voice to all stake-holders and hold government officials accountable." In the first post-revolutionary democratic election process held in 2012, the Revolutionary Socialists decided to support Mohammed Morsi, a Muslim Brotherhood candidate. Although they sometimes took different positions from time to time, the Revolutionary Socialists argued that the Muslim Brotherhood movement should be supported against the actors of the old regime, seeing it as the bearer of the revolution. On the other hand, the Revolutionary Socialists reacted to the constitutional declaration published by Morsi in November 2012 and joined the anti-Morsi coalition along with the other groups. The Revolutionary Socialists stated that the Muslim Brotherhood betrayed the revolution in a statement they made a few days before their June 30 demonstrations, but they emphasized that the Revolutionary Socialists and many other movements acted for different purposes to regain the revolution. The Revolutionary Socialists, who claimed to be uninsured by the Muhammad Morsi administration, joined the other groups who were thinking in the same direction and started the anti-Muslim Brotherhood rebellion. However, following the military coup on the 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2013, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi 's administration, as well as all the opponents, targeted the Revolutionary Socialists, indicating that these groups were used by former regime members and externally supported actors.



## **National Association for Change**

In 2010, when the anti-Mubarak opposition increased, the former president of the International Atomic Energy Authority, Mohammad al-Baraday, turned to Egypt and decided to make a new case for a new formation in order to collect all opposition groups together. As a result of the negotiations, Baraday was instrumental in bringing together the anti-Mubarak coalition with the support of 30 leading political dissidents. The formation of the movement for National Association for Change was supported by the Muslim Brotherhood movement alongside Eymen Nur, who competed against Mubarak in the presidential elections. The main objective of the movement for the National Association for Change was to make a free and independent election to a democratic administration. Cook (2012: 267) informed that “the movement in this framework decided to boycott the parliamentary elections held in November 2010, like Kefaya and many other anti-regime groups”. They could contribute to the formation of a stronger opposition bloc by complementing the shortcomings of the groups in the revolutionary coalition. Baraday's National Association Movement for Change, which lacked social support was close to intellectual and international circles; they formed an alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood movement, which has a strong social base in order to overcome this shortcoming. Although these alliances might be able to separate themselves in later periods, it was also important that the coalition against the regime in the pre-revolutionary period was strong. On the 25<sup>th</sup> January 2011, Kefaya was among the movements that called on the Egyptians to protest the regime, calling ahead of the demonstrations. The National Association Movement for Change initiated the "1 Million Egyptian Letter Campaign" before January 25, in which they hope to share the objectives and aims of the movement with the Egyptians. During the demonstrations, Kefaya and members of the National Movement for Change organized in squares, using media and social media to help revolutionize their mass demonstrations.

The Movement for National Association for Change has continued to be active in the post-revolutionary period and has been influential in the country's politics. The movement has made occasional calls to the Military Council to vacate the governance by organizing demonstrations. However, the movement leaders, who also met with other opposition groups, aimed at establishing a democratic and secular political structure. In the presidential elections in 2012, the Kefaya movement supported Hamdeen Sabbahy from the group's

founders and in the second-round they decided to vote for Muhammad Morsi. Like the April 6 Movement, Kefaya claimed that Morsi's policies were authoritarian, and in the following periods they appealed to push Morsi out of politics. In the process, the Kefaya Movement rejected all calls for reconciliation and dialogue by Morsi and the Movement of the Muslim Brotherhood, struggling for political clogging and the country becoming unmanageable. The movement to encourage civil disobedience in many cities was called for the resignation of Morsi's presidency. In support of the Tamarod Movement, which was established in April for this purpose, Kefaya was also on the frontline in the signature campaign against Morsi.

### **3.3. The Egyptian Revolution**

Revolutions and especially the Arab Spring are the most well-known and detailed studied aspects of political life about the MENA region. The revolutions have been studied in social sciences considerably, and there is some serious literature on this subject. In short, revolution is a rapid, radical and fundamental change in any field. Merriam Webster dictionary (2016) defines revolution as “a fundamental change in political organization; especially: the overthrow or renunciation of one government or ruler and the substitution of another by the governed” On the other hand; Oxford dictionary (2016) defines revolution as “a forcible overthrow of a government or social order, in favor of a new system. Another one is that a dramatic and wide-reaching change in conditions, attitudes, or operation.” When we look at the meaning of the word, it is understood that radical changes sometimes take place in violent political and social order in the revolution time. This is due to the content and forms of the revolutions that happened in mostly the West. In other words, there are radical changes in the nature of the revolutions, which are violence, political and social order. The modern forms of the revolutions, especially the first examples of Western political structures, have begun to be experienced in Eastern societies as well as in the 20th century. Economic distresses, social problems, unemployment, hunger, revolutionary alliances, and the role of dictators were among the causes of the revolution in the MENA region too.

The revolutionary literature, which has a long history and a considerable number of examples, can be said to be two basic approaches that outline in general terms. Of these, the

structuralist approach emphasizes the structural elements of the revolutionary process. The new situations and elements that emerged in the revolutions in some Eastern European countries have led revolution theorists to turn to actor-based analysis. On the other hand, actor explanations that suggest that revolutions are the product of human or social movements emphasize that actors who play a role in these processes must be examined in understanding the revolutions. Nevertheless, the positions that internal or external actors in the process of revolution have been regarded as important actors in the understanding of social transformations, which are accepted as actors and who take on variable roles. According to Karl Marx, one of the most cited thinkers of the revolutionary studies, the revolution is taking place in the struggle between the working class and the bourgeoisie. Parallel to the growing numbers of working-class people, the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the working class is intensified. Marx (1976) states that the revolutionary movement will take place with the political organization of the working class and the rebellion against the bourgeoisie, whose rights have been usurped in such an environment and which have to work in disadvantaged conditions. While explaining the Egyptian revolution, it also includes work that emphasizes both internal and external actors in the processes of the formation of the revolutions and the subsequent processes. The formation of a national and international atmosphere for the realization of a revolution is regarded as one of the priorities of the revolution. In the Egyptian case, it was also true that the national atmosphere was ready to be exploited because of the unemployment, hunger, corruption, and social disorder. Moreover, the international atmosphere was also ready after the Tunisian uprising. The international community was waiting for more uprising and protests in the region with the Arab Spring events so as to oust long year ruling dictators. The situation of the actors who participated in the revolution in Egypt and the engagement of their domestic politics affected the revolution process. Moreover, external factors, such as the fact that the actors who carried out the revolution seriously supported the global actors, influenced the course of the revolution. In the upcoming parts, there will be mentioned of the effects of global actors in the time of counter-revolution. Theda Skocpol is also a theorist who emphasizes the role of external actors in the revolutionary process. Skocpol (1979) emphasized external developments also had roles in the three phases of the emergence of the revolution. He claimed that international influences lead to the emergence of a revolutionary crisis in the first hand. Secondly, international factors shook political stability immediately

before the revolution, leading to the removal of power. Finally, there was a revolutionary breakdown that would cause the collapse of the state or regime after these two events, in which international actors played a role. These three phases are linked to each other, and the military intervention is naturally very important.

All these definitions and scientific explanations are taken into consideration, and it turns out that the revolution is far greater than social events such as rebellion, uprising, rebellion and civil war. As it can be seen in the Egyptian case, the reasons for pushing people uprising are not prominent in 2011, and they are proliferating and accumulating year by year. Although these factors can be seen as parts of the revolution, they cannot be considered as a revolution on their own. However, the detailed examination of the changing roles of internal and external actors in the revolutionary process contributes to the determination of who is the dominant actor in the revolution and counter-revolution. In the first place, counter-revolutionary processes, which are thought to be more effective by internal actors, are transformed into processes where external actors are at a decisive position in some cases.

One of the most important issues in this context is the passive stance of the external actors in the process of the revolution. This is because the demonstrations that started on the 25<sup>th</sup> January 2011, are unexpected, timely, and intensified by external actors, no matter what kind of relationship they have with Egypt. The revolutionary demonstration, which started with a spontaneous break, had caught unprepared actors such as the US and Saudi Arabia, which have been closely associated with Egypt for many years. This prevented them from taking an early position to influence the revolutionary process. Therefore, the fact that these and other countries have not been directly involved in the revolutionary demonstrations in Egypt played an important role in the realization of the revolution. Yet, in the process of counter-revolution, the opposite happened and these actors, who are not satisfied with the political developments in Egypt, had directly influenced the revolutionary process as a part of this plan.

### **3.3.1. The effects of the Revolution**

The developing technologies have become almost a part of the lives of the individuals with all new proceeds. In this context, people can spend their spare time using all the facilities provided by the new technology. All of these developing technologies have played a role in spreading the events happening faster so that what remains hidden cannot stay hidden for a long time, and that people become more active in sharing. With the formation of virtual communities, it is also possible for individuals to assume a more participatory role. The Arab Spring is also a debate about whether these popular movements are a social media revolution or whether it is a real revolution. Actually, while the anger that accumulated over many years had to break out in the absence of social media, yet this has enabled strength to this revolution. The Arab people were treated as imprisoned in their country while living under pressure and lack of freedom and liberty before the years that Arab spring broke out.

The negative developments that have been experienced from the economic perspective have made the region people completely desperate. This paved the way for the social explosion in the MENA region. At this point, it is clearly seen that the need for revolt and change was going to be manifested in some way. The governors had made it clearer that the people were overwhelmed by authoritarian regimes, and that they were willing and resistant to get rid of them. The revolutionary process in the region coincided with the desire and wish for a change of the human beings who were evolving in the changing world conditions. Perhaps it is a manifestation of a conscious, perhaps unconscious, reaction of the people who wanted to have freedom and welfare.

The new Constitution aimed to form the institutional substructure of the coup that took place in Egypt, basically, apart from a few make-up items, like if the counter-revolution was offered to the people as a constitution of liberties and rights. Acun (2013) stated that along with the new constitution, Egypt is proceeding step by step to becoming an Army-Police and Judicial state with the help of junta, which carried out the July 3 coup d'état. The military and judicial elite, who terminated the Mubarak regime in Egypt and dominated Egyptian politics, also had damaged the reliable politics when it situated the military at the center of the Egyptian political mechanism through coups. Kurt (2014) emphasized that the politics under military tutelage during the Mubarak period would directly go under the control of the

military bureaucracy with the new voted constitution. The institutional practices of the new order, which was established after the coup, is not going to change this fact that the military bureaucracy's administration, along with the new constitution, has become civilian power. The State of Emergency has officially obtained a constitutional status with the voted constitution in 2014. This constitution also gained a position that they could interfere in politics when necessary as it was seen in Morsi period. The judiciary has gained an autonomous appearance with the new constitution. The judiciary played an important role at the point where Morsi, the elected President, was dismissed by the military coup. Even if the demands of the people are hampered by the military coup in 2013, there are two gains of the uprisings for Egypt. Firstly, the Arab Spring once again revealed that the great community of humanity, which was crushed, humiliated, devalued and even unified, was able to break down the tyranny sets when it came to action. Secondly, the psychological balance between the forces of the people and the domestic and foreign sovereigns was changed. Nothing would be like the old one anymore. The power balance of the people and of the collaborators, the money, the technique and all the hard devices, the oppressed and oppressors, the perception of power and all the psychological illusions of the relationship have been drastically changed on both sides. The frightened society and the duressors have been replaced.

## **CHAPTER FOUR: THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC FACTORS ON THE FAILED TRANSITION**

People have their own unique and distinctive cultural characteristics in the world like all regions. In fact, Egypt is not a region where democracy is uniquely unsuitable or has an oriental despotic behavior. The Egyptian people have always tried to be namely democratic, yet their authoritarian leaders did not make possible such an environment. The attempt to democracy in MENA, especially in Egypt, asserts that the Western outlook is not right when they claim the culture, social-economic and political situation do not fit for democratic governance. The Arab Spring uprising certified that the notion of exceptionalism was misleading and no longer valid, as protesters demanded democracy at great risk to their own lives. Moghadam (2013) made the definition of democracy like that “democracy is a response to the needs of individuals and societies for a better way of life. Also, it is a process and not an end, and it is a type of political system in which power alternates through regular, competitive elections in which citizens enjoy basic rights” (p.394). Bingöl (2011) stated that “democracy is not a final point, yet an endless process; therefore, democracy cannot be consolidated” (p.13). This definition suits the situation of Egyptian case. Toscano et al. (2012) defined that “democracy is premised on the principles of freedom of choice, expression, association, equal citizenship, and inclusion of all... it is also premised on free and fair elections, separation of powers, accountability, and transparency” (p.11). Therefore, in order to be fully democratic, there should be some criteria applied in the country. If there is lack one or two of these criteria, then this cannot end up with democracy. The Egyptian society tried to reach the welfare of the democracy by applying the criteria gradually. Giugni (1999) stated that “compatible models fail in relation to general causes as there are no stable motives in life itself. For him, different conditions and historical circumstances are conducive to varying movement outcomes” (p.27). Toscano et al. (2012) stated that “the democratic practice can vary from time to time and from place to place according to norms of the society and its choices. Thus there is no perfect model of democracy” (p.11). Every society and culture can decide their democracy model with its own cultural values and social values. Yet, while deciding the model of democracy it should be done carefully in order to not understand democracy like a dictatorial regime or one candidate election. Democracy is the sovereignty of the people so that people can model what they want according to their

culture and traditions. Therefore, the people expect a different type of democracy in Egypt than in the West as there are major differences in the presentation of democracy in the European style. However, many nations accept the Western democracy model with the same values and norms like R. Dalh's criteria for democracy. Goldsmith (2007) discussed about an authoritarian regime as that "democratization is an irregular process of replacing the authoritarian regime with rule-bound competitive system... it is not a universal historical sequence ending in the same types of political system, but more national states are adopting the western models" (p. 87). The ruling people were pushed into the militarist dictatorships to protect their freedom from the authoritarian powers in the modern world. The nations in the MENA region should object to taking the Western style of democracy by creating their own model suited to their values, socio-economics and political structure. On the other hand, the so-called democratic Western countries helped the dictators by the financial, militaristic and diplomatic support. However, there are some common mechanisms that democracy should take in order to achieve the basic level of this power dynamic. Moghadam (2013) informed the criteria of democracy as,

For a country to democratize, there are different stages that have to take place. First, liberalization, which means the authoritarian regimes ease their iron fist on their societies and start to soften their policies. Second, when an authoritarian regime collapses, a transitional period takes place during which outcomes are determined on whether the society is heading to democracy or not. Some factors facilitate the establishment of democracy as Moghadam would argue, such as economic development, level of education, a strong middle class and a vibrant civil society (p. 395).

Merkel (2004) claimed that "these factors do not indicate the country to be democratic. The general framework of democracy like institutions or elections does not capture the concept of democracy although some Arab countries listed by the Freedom House as democracies because democracy is generally conceived of as electoral democracy" (p.33). Even if elections in Egypt are regularly done, these elections cannot prove that there is a real democratic atmosphere as in every election there are high rates of turnout like higher than 90% which cannot be seen any fully democratic country. Bellin (2012) pointed out that there was no unique roadmap for democratization in the world, and what was a success in one country would not be the determinant of how the other would democratize for neighboring nations. Therefore, democracy as a concept demanded issue is the same, yet it could be applied in various shapes. This attempt to democracy has repercussions in all MENA regions in 2010 and 2011. One of the reasons for the Egyptian revolution is the social unrest that the



country is building up against the neoliberal politics that the government carried out in the 2000s. The wave of privatization initiated in the country in 2004 drew public reaction. Increasing basic food and transportation prices have also boosted inflation in general terms, with the privatization of the workforce making it more difficult for Egyptians to fight poverty. The reasons such as the bad working conditions, the low minimum wage and the desire to monopolize the regime's union structure made the workers' movement much more active in this period. The mobilization of the workers' movement in this sense constituted the core of the revolutionary waveguide. Mahmood (2011) explained the situation of the country as

The vast majority of public institutions and services in Egypt have been allowed to fall into a dismal state of disrepair. Countless Egyptians die in public hospitals for lack of medical care and staff; Egypt's universities are no longer capable of delivering the education of which they once boasted. Lack of housing, jobs, and basic social services make everyday life impossible to bear for most Egyptians, as do declines in real wages and escalating inflation. It is these conditions that prompted the workers—from the industrial and service sector—to stage strikes and sit-ins over the past ten years. These workers were an integral part of the demonstrations over the past two weeks in Egypt; various unions formally joined the protests in the days immediately preceding Mubarak's resignation, prompting some to suggest that this was a turning point in the evolution of the protest (p.7).

The people in Egypt had some goals and objectives when they started to mobilize everyone. They demanded the end of the official 'state of emergency' where the regime had given a legal excuse for the repression for decades. Another goal was the dissolution and new formation of both chambers. A new transition government, then a new parliament, free and fair elections, and then the representatives of the constitution allow substantial electoral reform. Finally, the Egyptians wanted justice to all the victims of the regime through judicial proceedings against corrupt officials and security officers. Another reason for the Egyptian transition is the political pressure that has been on the country for years. Throughout the Hosni Mubarak period, all opposition movements, both Islamic and other ideological groups, were under political pressures. While the political formations of liberal, socialist and secular movements could not succeed due to the electoral frauds, the media organs and civil society organizations belonging to these groups have been subjected to various forms of oppression. Islamic movements were also excluded from the political system during Mubarak rule and were mostly directed to social services. Nevertheless, the MB, the most organized Islamic organization in Egypt, had been struggling to engage in political activities. The movement in this framework won 88 seats in parliamentary elections in 2005 with their independent

candidates. Following this success of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, the Hosni Mubarak administration further intensified the political oppression and aimed at eliminating the Islamic opposition which was the most serious threat to itself. Indeed, in the parliamentary elections of 2010, the MB movement was able to get only one seat from the intense pressure of the government. Such a political environment has led to the emergence of a revolutionary wave guard coupled with other factors that cause social unrest. In countries such as Egypt, movements that cannot conduct democratic opposition due to the pressure of the regime have come together in response to regional injustices and since have created a culture of solidarity. Indirectly, the most important factor in this revolution is that the Western actors are increasingly involved in the Middle East. The West has followed the attitudes of the Middle East to the occupation of different countries in the 2000s. Another indirect cause of the Egyptian revolution is the widespread usage of the internet, and young Egyptians, especially those who reacted to the Mubarak regime, should be more aware of regional and global developments about the event. It is a requirement to have there is a background behind this wave of revolutions that has been happening in Egypt since 2000 because there is tradition in this sense to have revolutionary movements. The revolutionary movement as a protest culture that has been active in Egypt since 2000 that led to a revolt movement especially in January 2011.

Democratic values are not peculiar to the West and its culture; therefore, it can be learned practically like any other system. Zguri (2012) emphasized that “democracy is something that people learn with time and practice” (p.432). The geography and place of the country is very important in order to implement democratic criteria. Al Sisi (2006) criticized the western attitudes toward Egypt that clearly true democratization in the Arab world could endanger Western interests in the MENA region, particularly Egypt. As expressed by General Al-Sisi, the transition to democracy may endanger the interests of the United States of America; therefore, the US is not going to allow any endangerment of Israel’s or its benefits. It also displays that the East is still in the West's compassion; therefore, the West can dictate the criteria according to their wills and interests. In the Egyptian case, it was seen that Morsi was not fit for their interest in the region to which they paved the way into the military coup. Cammack (1994) claimed that “there were fundamental differences in the culture and nature of the MENA region countries to Western culture, and thus they were not a good ground for Western democracy to flourish” (p.353). There may be some differences

in cultures, but democracy is not just about the political culture. The Western countries look at the situation according to the geostrategic interests of them, so they do not see any practical implications in Egypt. The USA and Western countries have supported the dicta regimes for the sake of their benefits and interests. “The model of totalitarian governance in the Arab world suited Western powers, which they see as a shield against radical Islamism” (Trabelsi, 2013: 253). Barnes (2013) stated that “the impact of the US democracy and governance activities in Egypt has been limited and unnoticeable in indexes describing the country’s democratic environment” (p.62). Desai (2012) emphasizes that “there is no effect of Western aid on democracy” (p.2). Because their aids did not fit the real owners, the money turned into an aid to the dictators who obeyed and continued the stability.

The US is the main guarantor of the authoritarian regimes with comprehensive financial, militaristic, political and diplomatic aid and blocking the appearance of democracy in Egypt. Barnes (2013) claimed that “an illustrative index of this is that prior to 2011, no Arab country could be claimed to be democratic despite 20 years of democracy promotion by the US” (p.55). Alhassen (2012) stated that “even within the Arab world, there was a kind of blind optimism linked to the events, with the hope that it was more than just a democratic blooming, rather a revolutionary demand for recognizing their right to human dignity” (p.1). It was understood by the most international experts that there would be no change if the ancient regimes handled the power in reverse, despite any leader change forced by their citizens. Howard (2012) argued in a pessimistic way that Arab societies lacked the essential elements such as “economic development, civil society, middle class, institutions, social mobilization, political culture and proximity to the role model of democracy, and that democracy could not be practiced for these reasons”. Muasher and Wilkens (2012) emphasized that the Arab Spring showed the desire of people for freedom and democracy, that’s transition from authoritarianism to democracy even though Egypt had some kind of civil society, middle class, and institution. Therefore, “the spring case marks the beginning of a democratic transition in the Arab world, whose aims are social justice, people’s rights and collective economic development” (Trabelsi 2013). Consequently, what is the transition to democracy? “A transition is the interval between one political regime and another. Transitions are delimited on the one side by the launching of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime, and on the other by the installation of some form of democracy, the return to some form of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative”

(O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, quoted in Mainwaring 1989:6). This definition emphasizes the process and expected approach. The transition period can or cannot pave the way to democracy, and can or cannot yield to stability in a country. Trabelsi (2013) defined transition as that “democratic transition is a political process known by a progressive movement from a governance system to another capable of achieving the main democratic principles” (p.254). Therefore, If Morsi had not been ousted by a coup; the transition to democracy might have continued in order to reach a model democracy for Egyptian people. As Aydinli (2013) indicated that “a transition did not occur overnight, and did not always end with similar results. Berman (2017) underlined that “the history of European democracy proved that transition took a long time, as the West needed a century and a half to see the result of a long and violent transition”. Moreover, “revolution takes time, and freedom has a price” (Ramadan 2011). Berman (2017) stated that “the transition process was usually associated with violence and chaos, and the history of democracies had been filled with turmoil, conflict, and even violence” (p. 30). Therefore, the democratic transition process is confronted with difficulties and enemies. Actually, “as the history of democracy shows that the transition to establish democratic institutions takes years (Pace and Cavatorta 2012); thus, as it takes time, it also needs determination because the deep state and the old institutions will fight back, as they have the largest stake in the old regimes” (Sorenson, 2011). If a nation overcomes these enemies and difficulties, then the nation can move towards the welfare of democracy. The old regimes naturally resist any demand for change. In the Egyptian case, the ancient regime supporters and the rivalries of the Muslim Brotherhood came together so as to oust Morsi, the first elected president of the transition era. Hamid (2011); Stepan and Linz (2013) underlined that the transition toward democracy was filled with uncertainty. At the same time, it is clearly understood that the transition period can lead to the stability of the democratic future or to the return of the authoritarian regime or to a complete revolution.

Egypt has experienced some violent incidents in the course of the Egyptian uprisings and in the following process. However, Egypt carried out a massacre under the army following Sisi's coup against the elected President. This is a counter-revolution rather than a reassertion of the power. The military coup was done in order for the so-called reassertion of democracy and peace in the country. Yet, in the Egyptian case, it caused more problems for which thousands of people died. Severe conflicts between the opponents and the President Morsi

supporters caused death and injuries. The first revolution started to protest the bad economic condition of the country and the people tried to change the situation by ousting Mubarak. Yet, Mubarak's ousting was not enough to improve the economic condition. As it was remembered the protestors' slogan was "bread, freedom and social justice". Sorenson (2011) informs that "economic decline can be a barrier to democracy, or even if democracy takes place, the economic status will not change fast and will not solve the problems of the society in the short term, and thus disappointment will take place". Therefore, it is a must to improve the economic condition so as to move toward democracy. A society in a country will have more democracy if it has more prosperity. Therefore, when the MENA region investigated their economic and social problems, it did not let them deal with democracy in the country.

In Egypt, nothing is guaranteed and everything seems to be ambiguous for the sake of democracy. There are elections done by regular time even though there is no real opponent for the presidency. This displays the corruption and pressure of the regime. As a result, "it is not a normal transition period when we compare the transition with European cases, continuing in the region, it was long, violent and uncertain. In this way, many countries in the world fall into the categorization between authoritarianism and democracy, which is a transitional process" (Democratization 2013). Egypt was not successful in the transition period as the army made an unexpected coup towards democracy, not Morsi. Some may claim that Morsi was not a democratic leader or not good for the country. On the other hand, the Egyptian people became bored with the more than sixty years of the authoritarian leaders such as Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak. Under these circumstances, the secular, liberals and other opponents could change Morsi with the power of votes, that's to say, the power of democracy. After the collapse of Mubarak, the SCAF gave the power unwillingly to Morsi and its Islamic party. Yet in this situation, Egypt experienced a very fragile condition between the Islamists, the secularists and also the army. In the present situation, this tension caused ousting the elected president Morsi and prohibition of the MB from any political process. The Egyptian military forces had an exaggerated role compared to a traditional state. The army used its influence and weapons to oppose democracy; so the transition to democracy in Egypt needs much time that is free from the pressure of the military forces.

There is no tradition of pluralistic administration that has been formed by the people until the revolution time in Egypt where the Arab Spring happened. For the first time, with the Arab Revolution, people with their free will in the elections elected their leaders who came

to power. When the people opted for the parties established by Islamic groups, the minority in the country mobilized the old system remnants and external power as the elites did not want the change system that came with the ballot box. At the time of the 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2013, Egypt returned to the time of 1952 with the military coup. Though this seems to be the case with the one dimension, comprehending the struggles after Mubarak in Egypt as a struggle between Islam-secular conflicts or between new democrats and former regime remains will not help to understand the transition period in all its complexity. The Egyptians, who had achieved freedom by ousting Mubarak free of charge in a very short time, once again have entered a very difficult and blind way with giving permission and approving silently to the military coup. Thus, the Mubarak era returned to life once again. However, now the Egyptians could change their president with an election held once in every four years. The free, fair and regular election was one of the indicators of democracy. In fact, poverty and unemployment were the main factors driving the people to the streets at the beginning of the revolts, yet the people demand freedom and justice and they did not want to be ruled by the existing elite administrators. However, the interim transition period and post-Morsi demonstrations showed that the masses could be channeled in the wrong direction by the elites and external power. In the January 25 demonstrations, minorities who opposed military tutelage were able to support military tutelage again, as long as they did not have their own power from the ballot boxes. The process of ousting the elected president easily ("waiting for solutions to the accumulated problems of the years within 48 hours") corresponded with a non-political coup d'état. While this coup strengthens the tutelage system, the real danger is that the public has lost confidence in the pool. Consequently, Al Sisi, who was the top of the military, had been elected two times with high rate of the vote with a low turnout. This shows that the turnout is low while the received votes were high. There is a big question for democracy here.

The politics are directly under the control of the military bureaucracy now in Egypt. The military and judicial elites, which terminated Egypt's Mubarak regime became active since the revolution took place and have still dominated the Egyptian politics at present, made the people lose their confidence in politics. These elites have resettled the army at the center of the political mechanism by means of coups. Thus, the politics that proceeded to overshadow under the military tutelage during the Mubarak period are directly under the control of the military bureaucracy at the moment.

## Why Did Egypt's Transition to Democracy Fail?

The causes of the Arab spring may be hidden inside the other, and the causes are connected to each other in such a way that one can be the cause of the other. Every transition has its own peculiarities and each of them may be terminated differently; therefore, there is no guarantee for the success of the transition as there are many criteria that affect the course of the transition. There are two crucial factors in the study of the transition to democracy. The first is political institutions which deal with the regime while the other one is the political culture that refers to the political elite and the people, the society and its values. Guenaïen (2014) took the notice on the existence of middle class for successful transition and stated;

The middle class is a necessary condition for a democratic culture to emerge because it will push for changes. The middle class is the only class that is able to change a regime's behavior and achieve its political goals by pursuing democratic behavior that encourages peaceful conflict resolution and avoids violence. The lower class is generally only focused on economic interests and is rarely involved in politics. On the other hand, the upper class is always interested in maintaining its status quo, since any political change could jeopardize its wealth and political status (p.15).

In the Egyptian case, there are two apparent classes. The first one is with a limited number upper class, the elites. And the other one is lower class whom is under poverty threshold. Therefore, the members of lower class deal with finding enough nutrition for their health. Actually, Rivlin (2011) stated the fact as “most Egyptians were more concerned about worsening economic conditions than they were about the political situation. Their primary concerns were; rapidly rising prices, unemployment, lack of security in the streets, low wages, and poverty” (p.3). The transition was somehow successful and the Egyptian people removed Mubarak with the consent of the military. After Mubarak, there was a long period of time for a free election and new figures. Tessler (2002) insisted that “as soon as the uprisings successfully removed the old regime and brought about a new one, then it was the responsibility of the political culture to build new institutions that support the establishment of democracy” (p.338). In their society, the people of Egypt really desired to have democracy in their country as a governing system respecting the rule of law, freedom of speech, and equality, yet they might have a model in mind different from EU and USA.

At the very beginning, the main problems of the people living in the Middle East, especially in Egypt, were the ethnic fundamentalist pressures from the western countries and the

sectarian problems which are adhered to the people of the region. Yet, the resident people in the region are struggling with the main problems of democracy, liberty and freedom in terms of fair distribution of rights, balanced income distribution, irregularity, unemployment, hunger, social justice, and freedom of expression. In the governance of the state, the formation of the general administrative structure was in the hands of certain families/groups and the continued enrichment of these families has led to a gradual increase in the space between the rich and the poor. The formation of these causes was the basic stone in the uprising of the people. Due to the fact that the region has a very wide historical background, it has many different cultures. Yılmaz (2014) stated that incorporation of different ethnicities into different political borders also affects the regional balances so it may often be the second source, although it is not the main source of problems. Actually, the transition to democracy in Egypt was not so easy, as it has stayed under the centralized authoritarian regime. It covered all authorities within the state. The undemocratic ruling party got all the power and dominated all parts of the political, social and economic aspect of life. Hanefi (2011) and El Ashkar (2016) stated about the failure of the transition as;

The Egyptian state apparatus has great influence so that the executive power dominates the legislative and judicial powers, which are considered as a necessary supervisory authority for each democratic experience. Thus, the presence of dominance of the executive power, directly affects the performance of the other two powers and their role in supervisory level. The other reason is that one of the obstacles of democratic transformation in Egypt is also the quality of Egyptian political elite. Political elite at the Mubarak's time was followed by him, and represent an integral part of the dominant political system at that time. In fact, this elite during its political practices, has confirmed that it does not do anything about democracy, whether in its opinion or practice (p.87).

While trying to determine the global and regional influence of the Arab Spring, it is also crucial to take into consideration that the process is problematic. It is going not to be spring without storms or even hurricanes. In Egypt, the military administration did not want to hand over its powers at all as the results of the first two rounds of the elections were being taken. As a result of simple events, the vicious and brutal violence exhibited a corresponding invitation for violence, creating a suitable opportunity for deviating the revolution. This showed signs that the military would not easily leave their authority or guardianship. The regional influence of the Arab Spring makes the demands of the region on the road to democratization unpredictable. Hence, if Arab Spring reached its goal, Islamic political parties would come to power in a democratic way. However, for the US, Israel and the EU,



the Islamic parties remind of different agendas. This, from time to time, tried to calm down how much common sense evaluations, serious worries, and antipathies act.

Islam in the West is the object of a "fear" and "hatred", and the rising star, as the strongest carrier of democracy, causes serious disappointments. However, Islamic parties say "freedom", "justice", "development", "democracy", "human rights" or "virtue" are the needed values. It is really hard to expect a great danger from the politics that are organized around these values. In contrast, news of xenophobia and Islam phobia, which are increasing day by day in the West, speak to a much more real danger. The Arab Spring process led to a convergence, fusion and possible cooperation among the Arab people. In each country in the MENA region, democratization has begun to crystallize as a result of the independence. It has become inevitable that the governments, who would bring liberty and emphasize of the will of the people, review all international relations.

It is no wonder that such a spring will bring happiness to the American, Israeli and European sides. That's why they were doing their business from their hands to try to make the revolution go astray. After the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions that took place without arms, the role of the USA and the EU was put into the ranks of revolution through Libya. No one cared in the international community when hundreds of people died after the military coup in Egypt. Therefore, it would be a mistake for Egypt to wait for humanitarian concerns from EU, USA, Israeli and other powerful regional countries. Democracy is a kind of phenomena which comes to existence when unique and original circumstances are formed in a certain period of time. Therefore, it does not occur automatically or with the demand of actors or people. Therefore, the existence of Dalh's criteria in a country is so important. Unfortunately, these criteria are not well applied in Egypt because of the military, economic and social obstacles along with their past legacy which was full of authoritarian regimes.

#### **4.1. Social Reasons**

The people in the MENA region lack of some of the fundamental rights, human rights and the human desire for human life. They have a desire to enjoy freedom, justice, and equality. Both Muslims and other religions' members want freedom of religion and conscience, respect for religious beliefs; these people have been suppressed by their administration for

decades. People are fed up with oppressive and corrupt management of their countries because they have no right to defend themselves. For almost half a century people were governed by autocratic regime by the results of the coup d'état. People have understood that they were beyond the world and the autocratic regimes from the lack of benefit anymore. The social depression was caused by the inability to find jobs for the youth and adults along with rapid population growth.

Uprising, protests, strikes, and occupation of buildings are not desired by any regimes, and authoritarian regimes do not want any kind of demonstration as it may be a spark for big changes, but they sometimes cannot prevent demonstrations, protests and so on. If the protests become so bigger like in the Arab Spring in 2011 then these protests and uprisings determine the survival of regimes. Haynes (1997) stated that the protests cause authoritarian instability and they shake the power and durability of the regimes; on the other hand, it triggers the authoritarian learning process. Therefore, they emerge as an important variable as it threatens the regime and gains the capacity of collective mobilization. The regime has to find their supporters from a vast amount of loyal citizen and armed security forces so as to continue its endurance against the protests. In the example of the Arab Spring, the regimes in the MENA region had lost its supporters from the citizens and armed forces because of the social, economic and political obstacles which were unsolved for many years. The beginning of the uprising can be defined simply by claiming a general issue; protests occur when citizens are not satisfied with the conditions that they are in. The protestors generally aim at shifting their well-being via trying to transform the political and economic structures. So, they force the government to take action so as to solve the obstacle and increase the welfare of the protestors. If the ruling class is able to achieve to balance these demands, then the survival will continue.

In the Egyptian case, there were some new, creative slogans, artworks, exciting songs and most importantly emotive national symbols. The protestors come together and create a common goal, identity and motivation. When it is investigated, the regime has the power of armed forces that are ready to use in any time, yet the protestors have the advantages of huge numbers, crowds of focused people and the capture of crucial locations. 'Friday Demonstrations' after setting off mosques in Egypt was a good example for capturing location and creating an ethical superiority. So, it is so novel that capturing squares and encampments for days or weeks since 2011, as it worked and changed the regimes in the

MENA region. The opponents of the Morsi Administration also captured the main squares in order to fall down Morsi. Bayat (2013) described the situation as 'resistance in daily life through squares'. Formerly, the 'reclaim the streets' movement beginning from 1991 occupied streets and highways, World Trade Organization (WTO) protests held the streets in Seattle in 1999, while Global Justice Movement and stop war coalitions occupied streets and squares even in Egypt in 2003. On the other hand, none of them stayed there for days and established collective management of these occupied spaces and forums. Chabot and Sharifi (2012) pointed out that the occupation of the Tahrir Square led to the creation of communities that worked daily on cleaning, media coverage and preparing nonviolent direct action campaigns. Primarily the Tahrir Square and other public spaces were the reflection of an alternative way of life along with confronting authorities. There were incredible crowds of people in the square in 2013 from all kind of walks of society, and they were there for the welfare and common good of the society. There were also demonstrators in the square that let the people think they were the real owners of the country. Yet, they were not sure who would take power After Morsi.

The Arab rulers who have been in power for decades have been excommunicated by their people's desire. The desire of human beings is to live humanely, have human rights and have fundamental rights such as freedoms, liberty, justice, a moral society, governmental structure, freedom of belief and conscience with respect for religious beliefs and the development of relations with other states on equal terms along with freedom of expression. People were overwhelmed by the oppressive and corrupt management mentality (having the army, police and intelligence, and managing the country with the consent of the West). There were some social reasons that outstand directly. One of the most important social reasons is "unemployment". In particular, the worsening economies of Arab countries have unemployment rates which do not fall below 10% on average. Therefore, this high unemployment rates caused people to question this situation which then caused protest and revolt. Another social reason is "poverty". As a large majority of people had to live in poverty for many years, they rose up against the regime. The average rate of people under the poverty line was above 20%, which increased the dissatisfaction in the country. The Egyptian people did not have any mechanisms that they could easily question the bad condition and this poverty so, they revolted against the regime. Another reason is "social injustice". In the Arab countries, as in the historical process, most of the people live in poverty despite the fact that

the people in the administration, their families and their immediate surroundings live in luxury. Corruptions, unlawfulness, corruption of public morality, unaccountable works, and punishment of innocent people have become part of everyday life while this situation has brought constant criticism of the administrations. These reasons are also the causes of uprisings and also military coup in Egypt. The people were too expectantly waiting a country where there were no such problems. When they ousted Mubarak, they thought that they could overcome every problem in a very short time with the wellness of democracy. Therefore, they had started to road with dreamy hopes. Even Morsi elected in a democratic way, he was not able to solve all the backlogs which came from Mubarak administration. Therefore, these social problems caused another uprising and protests and finally ended with the military coup in 2013.

Another reason is that the Arab people had been deprived of their fundamental rights and freedoms. They have never had the same conditions as the individuals in the Western countries, and even the conditions of human living have been deprived of them by their rulers. They forced to live in the context of such social conditions, have started popular movements in the Arab Spring for many other reasons such as unemployment, poverty, and social injustice. Kışlakçı (2012) stated that "the spread of bribery and corruption" was another reason for the uprising. People in the region have become unable to deal with day-to-day matters under the laws. Even the simplest officer saw the bribe as part of his monthly income. Bribery, appeal, irregularity had become the law itself; this distorted structure which became one of the causes of protest that had begun to be valid in every field that enters the state. This bad condition was not able to be corrected after the Arab Spring too in the era of Morsi Presidency. With the head of Tamarod movement, the opposing groups came together in June 2013 and started to protests Morsi Administration so as to find solution to social problems of the country. Yet, they were not able to find satisfactory answers from Morsi. Therefore, the opposing wing wanted to get rid of Morsi and reelection for the presidency.

There were many civil society organizations in Egypt before and after the Arab uprising despite the emergency law which let endless underpinning of some democratic freedoms written in the Egyptian Constitution:

The authorities in Egypt have used a series of alternative methods to control the activities of such organizations. These include the selective repression of opposition groups; the adoption of strict regulations which effectively allow the government to prohibit the founding of new organizations; the transfer of public funds only to those organizations which follow

government directives; and the systematic restriction of the freedom of assembly and the right to hold public gatherings (Paciello 2011:7).

Women also have a crucial role in Egyptian society. Besides, they have shown themselves as a member of NGOs. Rishmawi and Morris (2007) declared that an Association Act was issued to enhance limitations on NGO outputs and fundraising efforts in 2002, and 16,000 organizations in Egypt were forced to enroll in the Ministry of Social Affairs. This Ministry was in firmly charged for the non-compliance of the activities of all organizations with the regime. El Wakil (2016) took the notice on the civil society's role;

Civil society has played a major role in qualifying the activists and the creation of the Egyptian society to become prepared for the outbreak of the revolution. Civil society, its institutions and active members participated in shaping the course of the Egyptian revolution through the many roles it has played after the outbreak of the revolution. Their role had a great impact on the success of the revolutionary first demands. As civil society contributed to the success of the first revolutionary demands, it also had to bear part of the burden that caused the current failure of the revolution (p.66).

The NGOs' activities were under control so as not to raise any big demonstration or effect on the people. In this way, the regime ensured itself for the criticism. Evaluations in the case of the historical reasons of the failed transition to democracy in Egypt and the determinations are as follows. The states located in the MENA region were founded with the plans of European powers when the Ottoman sovereignty and the World War I concluded. Therefore, the national independence of the states was not gained by the wars, but the blessing of the West within secret agreements which served the West interest. After all; although the demands of the people vary from country to country, it is understood that the common causes that are related to each other above mentioned social reasons. The demand for the changes came from the middle and lower class, not the elites. (Rosiny: 2012). After just one year of Morsi's power similar obstacles continued and the government could not develop constant solution for them, like unemployment. The deepening social unrest and other problems hindered the transition to democracy process. As the people waited fast solution for all these obstacles they wanted to get rid of the Morsi administration as he was not able to solve all the social problems in a very short time.

## 4.2. Political and Administrative Reasons

Democracy is the best form of ruling that human beings have established so far. The leaders of Egypt were not able to step in the way of liberalization and democratization. The existence of non-democratic regime had created a reaction to the public's inadequacy of individual freedoms, bad, repressive, irregular and corrupt governments. In the elections held in Egypt during Hosni Mubarak's ruling, the rate of participation in the elections was very low, but he was elected by getting the votes of almost all of the participants.

The globalization process weakened the current dominance of authoritarian governments during the 2000s. The Arab societies began to question their rulers with the globalization of their understanding that their respect for civil liberties is the source of legitimacy, spreading from the western world to the whole world. The administrators of the Arab States insisted on establishing absolute sovereignty over society, rather than producing a suitable strategy in their own geography. The rights and freedoms of individuals were restricted in the interests of the government and the demands for freedom were pushed to the next plan. The authoritarian leaders struggle to stay in power for the life. Aydın (2014) indicated that while the leaders were leaving their power, they started to ignore the wishes of the people and started to transfer power to the son of the ruling father. These events caused the public's reaction. The Middle East is a cluster of countries that are aligned on the map as a geographical location that have created the turmoil, fragmentation, authoritarian regimes, instability, poverty, unemployment, battles, and civil wars, which is defined as a field of conflict in which terrorism prevails. Uysal (2016) informed that in the Middle East, countries in the region are viewed as "siblings" in cultural analyzes, "enemies" in strategic interpretations, "allies" in political evaluations and "competitors" in economic considerations. The MENA region has been on the agenda of the global public opinion under the grip of a different crisis every period. The territory of the Middle East is the land where the Abrahamic religions are born. Hence, Islamic religion and Sharia rule were born and spread in these lands. There is a longing in the region in order to bring back the first Islamic regime because Islamic governance has secured its own rights, such as the right to equality of people, family relations, the right to personal security, and the perfection of the first administrations. There are political Islamic reformist groups established for this purpose. These groups have been the cause of the mention of the people of the region as terrorists in

world politics and public opinion.

The best the governance model has ever built up for humanity is the democracy, but the leaders of the Arab countries did not take a step towards democratization from being an endeavor for these events to take place today. Kışlakçı (2012) indicated that the absence of democracy and justice, the absence of transparency and reliability in Egypt and the decision of the president to decide who could be a candidate or not in the election process were the main reasons of the Arab Spring and also failed transition to democracy. The leaders of Egypt had the absence of institutional relations of the Arab countries with the West. This causes many problems; the people believed that if their leaders changed their investment or incomes from the west, it would directly decrease. When it is checked the governance system it is seen that the state is like managing a family business. Therefore, there is a crucial deep wound in the governance system, and ordinary people cannot reach the top of the governance system no matter how s/he clever or successful. Therefore, Egypt seemed to be governed by authoritarian regime. Rezaei (2015) stated that

The country is at a very critical point between despotism and democratization which is battling it out. At this critical point, the country can easily slip back into authoritarianism. Moreover, regarding Egypt's fragile political state, Egypt's political history can further exacerbate this slip back into authoritarianism, which is not in favor of successful democratization. Egypt's political history poses the greatest impediment to Egypt pursuing a democratic form of governance on account of its numerous cycles of authoritarian rule (pp.2018-2019)

The nonfunctional parliamentary practices, the lack the true will of the people, the lack of proportional representation of minorities and the Shiite show that they do not want to go to ballot box so far. Owing to these negative factors, every segment or every society cannot have a say in the administration. It has caused political crises because the leaders have taken their political legitimacy internationally, and not from their own support groups. In Mubarak's administration period, the opponents were imprisoned, civil liberties were arbitrarily exploited and freedom was constrained to maximum limits. There was really a governance problem in the country. Rishmawi and Morris (2007) informed the crisis as;

Central to the problem of freedom and governance is the fact that at the political level, decision-making has remained in the hands of a minority-focused on serving its own interests. The vast majority of people are excluded and thus left to impoverishment and marginalization. Present day regimes have not achieved fundamental reform from within which would correct their course and enhance hopes for a better future (p.24).

Political institutions are regarded as the most durable ingredient of opportunity structures. These political institutions work in a way that various groups within a society cannot challenge the ruling coalition. As Kriesi and Wisler (1999:42) remarked that “the order of institutional oppression tends to narrow preferences in the thought of any political alternative of the rule is just impossible.” Josua and Edel (2014:3) defined the relationship between mass social movement and authoritarian institutions as ‘regime characteristics influence the government from above and interact with the factors from below, namely the characteristics of the challenge that threatens stability’. The causes and the results of protest and political opposition need a qualified analysis for the state. Stacher (2009:6) explained that ‘the nature and the effectiveness of opposition are not determined primarily by the actor’s inherent characteristics, but by the state to which it is reacting’. The effectiveness and well structural features of a state determine the survival of the regime. Therefore, if the government renovates itself according to the society and modern needs then the government increases its capacity to survive and stay long. Ambrosio (2014) pointed out that “having inclusive institutions in place to respond to the needs and interests of societal forces creates a more stable foundation for any regime’s continued rule something just as true in autocracies as it is in a democrat” (p. 484). Gordner (2013) stated that

There is no set path from authoritarian rule to democratic governance. It is neither an expected outcome nor a straight line. Uprisings, rebellions, revolts, and revolutions bring, by and large, a great amount of uncertainty and instability. Historically, democracy is in fact the exception. The majority of acts of contentious politics fail to bring immediate policy, let alone regime, change, and most that do not peter out or meet brutal repression amount in the end to some shade of grey in between, on the one hand, the over-determined category of liberal democratic and, on the other, the many varieties of authoritarian, governance. For onlookers of democratic politics, rather than assuming a trajectory in which democracy (by which too many onlookers assume Western liberal democracy) prevails, it is prudent to heed the contested nature of this concept and note that among populations that are deeply divided on the separation of religion and state, if some form of democracy does arise once the dust settles it will by virtue of the democratic process likely take place in between the essentialized and polarizing categories—those “secular” and “Islamist” conceptions—that are so prevalently and popularly discussed in popular discourse and the media. There in lay myriad possibilities (p.36).

Every actor in Egypt needs to have consensus on transition to democracy otherwise as Yumitro and Estriani (2017) concluded that “the success of Egypt’s democratization in post-Arab Spring Egypt is an illusion as long as the country’s current ruling elites, military forces,



judiciary, and Mubarak remnants insist on maintaining their longstanding authoritarian tendencies in domestic affairs. The reluctance of these actors to move the country towards democratic governance has left all the Egyptians' efforts and struggles in establishing and preserving democracy in vain" (p.181). Therefore, the political actors and the army should believe democracy is going to prosper Egyptian society. The elites and the remnants of the ancient regime had better prefer democracy to their interest.

### **Administrative Reasons**

The widespread corruption and bribery in the bureaucracy is the fact that the people have a desire for a moral government. The administration is based on misguided practices such as populism, nepotism, favoritism, and also they take their foreign support to govern their country without many difficulties. They have applied tight and swift security intelligence practices in the name of protecting the regimes and powers of the governments; therefore, they were very repressive, suppressive and prohibitive in their managerial methods. Mubarak made preparation to the delegate their power to their sons at the end of the long-ruling process. People understood that such a change, that's to say, the delegation of power from father to son had made it impossible for the ordinary people to have a management right or give a word or representation. The people in Egypt were normally poor people and they needed food and bread all the time while the administrations and their families had brilliant and luxurious lifestyles.

The administration in the region was based on wrong practices such as populism, nepotism, patronage, and favoritism. They received foreign support and to governed the country accordingly. There were oppressive, insidious and prohibitive administrative insights, strict and overwhelming security-intelligence practices in the name of protecting the regimes and powers of the rulers. Mubarak's government intelligence chief, Omar Suleiman, had arrested people suspected of being a Hamas, Muslim Brotherhood members or people in opposition to the regime in which he was torturing these people who were constantly being monitored by political policemen. Additionally, after the coup, Al Sisi regime was not willing to foster democracy in Egypt, as the transition to democracy might happen and consolidate then their ultimate regime and economic benefits would terminate.

#### **4.2.1. The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement**

Egypt was one of the most strategic countries in the MENA and became a country under the control of the external forces for long years. In the modern era, brutal neo-liberal policies had been implemented and a monarchical administration policy had been applied over the people by the hands of a repressive dictator. In addition, the people had always been on the poor and oppressed side. This important situation also laid the basis for the protest culture that we could extend to the Egyptian 'change process' until the last years. Because Egypt has been the scene of a total of over one thousand small and large social protest movements in the last ten years until the revolution. Indeed, Egyptian Arab Spring acts were the last and most effective of the past and failed actions. However, actions up to the revolution had always been quelled in a bloody way by the dictators who got the power with so-called elections in Egypt by the secret support of the USA. The regime and Mubarak were so easy to fall which did not stem from its weakness of course. Mubarak had seen many rebellions and protests in his government for 30 years, and he suppressed all of them in brutal ways. The Mubarak regime constituted of Mubarak family and generals, bureaucracy, member of the police forces, police informant bandits, and thieves. The backbone of the regime was the army and was the class of capital that had become autonomous through international connections. This alliance ruled Egypt for 30 years, creating a fear empire. Yet the hope that the Tunisian revolution created in humans had led to the overthrow of the horror wall in Egyptian people. With the withdrawal of the army and the support of the regime's Western powers, the regime had collapsed in 18 days. Therefore, it is understood that if everyone came together and struggled without compromise despite their risks, it was possible to transfer from a radical regime which had the power for 30 years without any wound.

In the Arab Spring process, the Egyptian uprising was not started by the Muslim Brotherhood movement which had been banned politically since about the beginning of its foundation. Yet, they quickly took advantage of the organization by organizing the masses. The sizes of the demonstrations and their partners have legitimized the MB to take up political leadership. They had both a pragmatic choice and did not first take part in the actions due to the policy of abstaining from violence. However, the members of Muslim Brotherhood flocked to the streets without boycotting, the Muslim Brotherhood administration decided to support the action with the military remaining silent on the uprising. The rebellious youth and the MB

had the common demand for democracy and free elections in the post-revolutionary period in Egypt. During the Arab Spring period, more young people have appeared on the frontline, but social media played a major role too. Moreover, the most important effect, however, is the chaos and unemployment created by the neo-liberal era. The rebellious youth and the MB had the common demand democracy, free elections, and an independent foreign policy with the share of production in the post-revolutionary period.

The Muslim Brotherhood has proposed a three-stage model in government. The first is political Islam; the second is anti-imperialism and finally, Arab nationalism, which will not be contrary to the rule of law. The reason for the existence of these three proposals is that this movement did not occur in any society, but in the colonial country; internal-external dynamics are shaped accordingly. The internal-external dynamics are always crucial in Egypt as the politics and economy depend on these issues. Kirkpatrick (2011) informed that President Erdogan promoted the virtues of the Turkish model of Islamist-led democratic capitalism. He advised the new governors of Egypt as to “manage the people, manage the science and manage the money,” by sticking to slogans rather than details. “If you do these three, you will accomplish your goal.” Before the MB responds to what a society model suggests, it is necessary to find out what kind of country they lived in and what period they emerged. Therefore, social institutions have been dissolved because of the colonial society and decay continues to be effective everywhere. The MB has established its own charities by advocating social justice and has consistently emphasized income injustice. They emphasized that the development of the country should be reflected in all segments of the society. They put forward the model of statism and pointed out that the property of the foreigners should be confiscated; they advised the cultivation of barren soils and mentioned a total development. At that time, this understanding of development resembles the ‘statist’ model, is a mixed economy model. In fact, these principles laid down in the economic, political, cultural and social arena are the idealist views. Moreover, many principles in the development process of democracy in Egypt are in opposition to human rights. The strict control of the individual in the social life has been taken as the basis of Muslim Brotherhood.

The MB has remained on the agenda of the world during the Arab Spring although it was a movement of more than ninety years. Movements are based on religion or ethnicity, such as MB; secular, democratic, egalitarian and law-abiding governments are in the best interests of the whole world to be able to make changes from these movements. As a matter of fact,

when Muslim Brotherhood came to power they declared ‘changes of their structures and ideas’ that like Tunisian Al Nahda movement had changed in their country. However, the army, which constituted the most important weight of power in Egypt for more than a century, was the most important obstacle on the completion of the Egyptian revolution and the establishment of a democratic government. The MB/Morsi government had come to the solution of the problems of the people coming out on the streets in the Arab Spring in a slow way, yet as they had encountered a strict bureaucratic obstacle which had gone to the position of staffing to overcome obstacles. This has made both the opposition and the US guarantor in Egypt worried about the Army. The Salafists and the left / liberal front have remained silent to the army administration to get rid of the MB government. On the other hand, these prohibitions and arrests are not new to the MB. The MB date has also been tortured and banned at the same time. So the MB will not disappear, and it will wait to catch a new opportunity to get the power again at least being in the parliament with their free propaganda.

Political incompetence, compromised cultural inadequacy, the opposition used as a balancing factor against one to another by the regime for many years, showed a Mubarak regime without Mubarak. There were two axes whatever the content of the political turbulence of Egypt. Democratization was with the hand of Islamists or a privileged tutelage regime through the old-regime institutions. Özkan (2012) stated that the political tutelage never refused to cooperate with secularists, liberals and Christians against the painful democratic transition process. It was important that the liberals and Christians meet with a founding political mind in the new Egypt for democracy. Özkan (2012) warned the Egyptians seven months before about the political dilemma that was under Egyptian conditions, every political actor, including the MB, who had chosen to stay on the street instead of doing politics on legitimate grounds, must realize that he was playing with fire. The name of this fire was the possibility that the military-judicial tutelage regime seized power. Maybe the MB movement was not able to notice the upcoming coup, yet it was clear from the outside of Egypt as the atmosphere was becoming worse. The common feature of MB and some liberals was being inexperienced; and the most fundamental characteristic of the old regime supporters had on years of political experience. Hamzawy (2017) emphasized that “...after 11 February 2011 was the political vacuum left by Mubarak's resignation. Liberals and leftists as well as young pro-democracy activists needed a vision of how to manage an orderly democratic transition in Egypt. But, no one had it. Moreover, the key

power pillars and institutions of the authoritarian regime, like the security services, did not disappear after the revolution only Mubarak who left its power” (p.2). Actually, most of the authoritarian institutions were still active during the transition period; therefore, political actors were unable to build a common vision in order to pass from authoritarian regime to democratic one. They firstly failed to form political and social consensus around the democratic road map. The military made the coup easily because of the lack of political and social pact. Hamzawy (2017) stated that “Egypt's failure to democratize began in the failure to agree on a consensus-driven vision as to how to manage politics after 11 February 2011. Controversies between the Muslim Brotherhood and liberal and leftist groups pushed the former towards the Salafists and added to the secular suspicion of Islamists” (p.2). The Muslim Brotherhood was not the experienced with state administration, yet they made ambitious statements without considering the opinions and suggestions of experienced ones. Finally, the Morsi administration could not please the Egyptian streets. The Morsi administration was unable to read any of the reasons for the revolution regardless of who the officers, townspeople, farmers, women, men, young, old, rightist, leftist, liberal, secular, Coptic, and Salafi. Therefore, they could not realize the demand of the impatient people. Tadros (2011) stated about the situation of the political atmosphere of Egypt as,

For the Brotherhood, politics in Egypt is a game of three players-itself, the military, and the “liberal” elite. The three players are not equal in power, but the game remains one in which each has significant chips. In the Brotherhood’s eyes, it represents the majority of the people; the army obviously has the guns. The elite deserve more elaboration. Hardly liberal in ideology or discourse, they are an amalgam of diverse groups whose only common denominator is the fact that they are not Islamists. They thus include Christians, Nasserites, Socialists, Trotskyites, businessmen, and a portion of the upper middle class. The only thing uniting this combination of contradictory groups is their fear of the Islamists. As a result, they have traditionally run to the state for protection from the Islamist threat, as was the case during the Islamic terrorist campaign in Egypt during the 1980s and 1990s. Their strength according to the Brotherhood is in their control of the cultural institutions and media of the country (p.8)

If two of the three actors combine their power together, then the third player loses against the other two actors. The MB Movement’s biggest anxiety was that the opponents might reach their goal with the help of the army. These two players came together and achieved their ultimate objective. On the other hand, there were two losers of Egypt, not only The Muslim Brotherhood, namely Islamists, but also the Egyptian people who missed democracy and economic welfare. The Islamists eventually paid the price and became oppressed. Again, the Muslim Brotherhood should have understood the secret plans made behind the closed

doors so as to pave the way for democracy. The Muslim Brotherhood could build bridges over the non-Islamists as they did before the revolution. The established order in Egypt can be clear out in time with a strong consensus therefore, they had to be more moderate on the hot issues which people made mass protests before the counter-revolution. Hamzawy (2017) claimed that there were two reasons of quick disagreements on building consensus between the main actors. These are; “first, identity-related controversies emerged and gained traction and second, they could not easily fill the political vacuum left by Mubarak's departure” (p.1). There were two options in front of the Islamic movement/Muslim Brotherhood Movement to keep control in hand to be able to direct this process. Beki (2013) indicated that the first of two options was to force the West to agree on half the power, they had to be confronted with the threat of exclusion from the process. Yet, the second option enforced by the Muslim Brotherhood Movement and Morsi was ousted through military coups. This was a US-style control mechanism for the MENA region. In order to understand these troubles and the causes of failure after a year, it is beneficial to descend into the historical roots of psychology in the community and in the party. There is a psychology of states, politics and even political parties. This psychology is sometimes influenced by social or political events, and sometimes by external sources. Since this influence is within a certain historical trend, the psychological reflection of historical events indirectly shapes the current perceptions and behaviors of politics and political parties. The Muslim Brotherhood Movement got the power so suddenly and quickly that they could not even understand. This organization that had been accustomed to the opposition for years found itself in a power struggle with a regional storm. However, there were many chronic problems waiting to be solved. These chronic problems were: how FJP would develop a relationship with Israel and the Arab world, how would they precede with the Gulf States and how would they overcome economic problems? The transition period was so hard that before they solved these problems they could not reach demanded freedom and democracy. Consequently, they failed during the transition period from external reasons, yet they were not able to solve the problems due to the established order resistance.

The Islamic movements like MB-type gained strength along with Arab Spring. Yet, MB should have manifested a strong tendency in the political arena towards “conservative-democratic” rather than its own identity like “Islamist” as in the sample of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in Turkey. This method could have greatly reduced various

tensions and their pragmatic implemented policies could have led to an increase in political power. On the other hand, the liberals, secularists, and supporters of the old regime have always criticized FJP with their Islamic identity and political Islam in Egypt. If FJP had gradually followed a development and change policy process, then they could see the benefit of this policy to a large extent and made great progress towards purging the old status quo powers. However, the FJP had taken several democratic steps, yet there had been no visible increase in revival and prosperity owing to pressure from the economy and instability within the country. Though thousands of martyrs were lost after the coup d'état, he preferred his country when he and his country conflicted, and he preferred to be in the center of the society.

The MB supported social justice, religious tolerance and political pluralism in order to take down Mubarak's regime remnants with MB's democratic identities. Zahid (2012) stated that through professional trade unions and student organizations existed, the MB focused on the democratic virtues that promote inclusiveness independently of the race, religion or ethnic origin. The MB was contingent upon the democratic criteria that promoted civil society, political competition, civil liberties, and civil-military relations as indicated in their organization's principles (Hudaibi, 2010). Apparently, everything seemed to be fine and on the transition to democracy, yet as MB applied for getting the power after Mubarak ousting, then the obstacles began to arise. Eric (2012) stated that "the problem that the MB faced after the ousting of Mubarak was to transform from a competing organization to a ruling political power and implementing its democratic principles" (p.61). This obstacle became a challenge when the Muslim Brotherhood Movement met with a political scene with long-staying authoritarian institutions like the military and security forces. Moez (2014) claimed about the failure of democracy and MB's role inside it as that "the MB's political actors were not able to form a pact against a previous authoritarian regime, which were not able to compromise and compete democratically. Failure to address a road-map for transition were the factors that contributed to a division among political actors, which then led to the military intervention" (p.35). The MB allied the military at the first hand; therefore, they trusted the army so much that they did not try to form consensus with other political actors. They did not get the ideas of others as the secularist, liberals and leftists had always doubtful to this movement.

Morsi made a sudden decision and retired the chief generals of the military. This was a good step for the consolidation of democracy by blocking military tutelage. However, there were some mistakes as Khazbak and Afify (2012) emphasized that “decision to send the military back to the barracks was part of the democratic transition to present it to civilian controls. Yet, the decision was taken unilaterally and involved neither the military nor other political parties”. It would be better if MB made this decision unanimously. If the other political actors had supported this act, then the idea of society was united and committed to democracy could have appeared. In the ruling of Morsi period, the MB tried to reconcile and sympathize with the Salafists and the secularists, yet they did not continue the negotiations in the writing process of the constitution. Brown (2012) asserted that “non-Islamist political ineffectiveness made it harder for the MB and Morsi’s government to keep moving forward in this transition” (p.3). The Al-Jazeera Center for Studies affirmed that the opposition group was more threatening than negotiating in its dialogue with the MB owing to the opponent’s belief in its leaders recently, the media, and the Salafists joining the opposition side. Actually domestic and international support was a necessity in order to succeed an important duty like transition to democracy in Egypt. Childress (2013) stated that “from the start of Morsi's rule, the MB lacked support from the police, the army, the judiciary, and the media. The MB was seemed to have power, but they did not actually have power. The security forces, many of their leaders were loyal to Mubarak regime, refused to support the MB to ensure order and peace during a critical transition period”. Kremer (2011) underlined that any transition attempt to democracy was not able to be obtained without the support of internal security forces. More interestingly, the Interior Ministry affected the destiny of Egyptian transition attempt towards democracy under the sovereignty of the Muslim Brotherhood. This Ministry did not do its duty that included the intelligence and internal state security services, the security forces deliberately left the street to the vandals in order to increase political instability and create a chaos environment in Egypt. Aclimandos (2012) stated that “during the transition attempt to democracy, the state security proved that it was not willing to renounce its primary mission, shaping the political sphere as a continuation of Mubarak’s era”. Therefore, one of the most fatal mistakes of MB made was as Şahin (2014) stated that MB did not touch the military’s longstanding political and economic privileges. Moreover, the military used these privileges as weapons to the MB and its president. In this way, they preserved their own interest till the military coup. The members and supporters of the MB



believed that elections could solve the obstacle by getting majority of the votes. By this belief, they thought they could overcome and win some of the state apparatus inside the presidency. Stacher (2012b) claimed that the Brotherhood was to insist on electoral legitimacy by belittling the street movement which was unstoppable under the military and Morsi rule. Revkin (2012) asserted that “the growing security problems and worsening social conditions since Mubarak’s departure alienated diverse and large segments of Egyptian society. Morsi’s ‘will of the majority’ argument to justify rulings by decree was no longer convincing. After a marathon of national elections and referenda, which only aggravated political polarizations, millions took to the streets calling on Morsi to step down” (p.101). Actually, many people tried to blame MB on the failure of transition to democracy, yet there were other actors affected this transition period such as military, elites, and the economic situation of Egypt. Therefore, transition to democracy was not so easy under these circumstances; it required some years in order to be rooted democratic institutions and changes on the culture and social issues at the state level.

### **The Role of Mohamed Morsi as a President**

It was known that the presidential election in 2012 was between Mohamed Morsi, the candidate of Muslim Brotherhood organization, Ahmed Shafiq, former Commander of the Air Force and the Prime Minister, Hamdeen Sabbahy, founder of left leaning Karama Party, a Salafi politician, Hazem Salah Abu Ismail, a former Muslim Brotherhood member, former foreign minister for ten years under Hosni Mubarak and opposition leader, Amr Musa, and Abul Futuh, former Commander of the Air Force. This was because the social base of the other candidates was supported by the non-wide parties despite the 13 candidates participating in the elections. The Muslim Brotherhood Movement was not willing to display any candidates in the presidential elections, but later in the process, the Freedom and Justice Party announced their presidential electoral candidate by changing their mind with the regard that Egypt’s transition towards democracy was in danger due to the attitude of the military. The Freedom and Justice Party Executive Officer (2012) explained the needs of president candidate as:

the latest changes that occurred in recent months, both in the domestic and international arenas, especially the continuous attempts to derail or obstruct the progress of democratic transition, the clear and utter failure that has become increasingly evident in the performance of the current government, and attempts to disrupt and undermine the Egyptian parliament and its decisions and actions, which did shake the people's confidence in the steps so far taken towards democratic transformation (fjponline.com).

According to the Egyptian election system, no candidate received more than 50% of the votes in the first round, so a second round was held between the two candidates who received the most votes. As a result of the first round, İnanç (2013) informed that 24.78% of the votes were to Morsi and 23.66% them to Ahmed Shafiq to take the first round. In the second round, Ahmed Shafiq received 48.27% of the votes, while Morsi won with 51.73% of the votes. Participation in the elections was at 46.42% for the first round and at 51.85% for the second round for various reasons. As soon as the official results of the presidential election were announced, Morsi made two public speeches in Tahrir Square and Cairo University. Morsi emphasized the importance of the superiority of the Egyptian nation and the "will of the people" rather than reflecting a religious political vision. Morsi (2012) expressed in his victory speech in Tahrir Square that

I say to everyone now... to all the people, the Ministries and the government, the army and police of Egypt, men and women, at home and abroad... I say it with full force "No authority is over or above this power". You are the source of power. You are the owners of the will. You grant power to whomsoever you choose, and you withdraw power from whomsoever you choose (fjponline.com).

Morsi was the president in a complicated setting that he had to deal with many obstacles. The judiciary and the armed forces tried to hinder the functionality of legislation by resolving the People's Assembly and restricting the powers of the new president. The judiciary and army did this for the sake of preserving the country's independence and territorial integrity. Morsi (2012) also expressed his intention how he would run Egypt for the transition to democratic process in Cairo University. "It is necessary to keep up the armed forces, police, and judiciary, and to protect all the people of Egypt. SCAF has honored its promise and pledges not to be a substitute for the popular will. I will not differentiate between supporters and opponents." (fjponline.com). Morsi, who aimed to defeat the state and the bureaucracy, primarily throughout democratization and transparency, suffered very much from the established order and the old regime supporters inside the state during his presidency. Morsi had been the first elected civilian president of the country in the history of the Republic of Egypt since 1952.

In Egypt, civil-military relations were a serious fault line for democracy. After sixty years the Egyptian Army was forced to accept a civilian president. When Morsi was president, the Egyptian state did not accept him as a president. The state institution, which considered Morsi as a stranger, struggled for his weakening and overthrowing. The fact that Muslim Brotherhood and Morsi were not in a particularly strong relationship within the state and they had not been in important position beforehand and this situation had been used very well by supporters of the old regime. Yet, when the Egyptian conditions were taken into consideration, it was impossible for Morsi and his team to have a crucial duty and to be a part of the government before, as there was pressure by Mubarak to disable the Islamists and prevent them from taking important roles in the state and the military. The division, instability, security problems and worsening of the economy in the country during the Morsi era laid the groundwork for the actors of the old regime to overthrow the President. After Morsi got the presidency, the state structure was not subject to a comprehensive reform due to political stereotypes, divisions, instability and the resistance of the institutions of the old regime. During the Morsi era, the old regime protected the whole old institutional existence. Even each step taken by Morsi for reform increased polarization and diversification in the country. Ashour (2013) discussed the reforms that Morsi tried to do:

A forward step was taken toward balancing civil-military relations following the election of President Mohamed Morsi in 2012. President Morsi attempted to change the balance of power between the elected civilian administration and the military establishment. He initially attempted to reinstate the parliament by ordering deputies to reconvene within ten days of having taken office. Yet, while that attempt to balance the power of the military was unsuccessful, less than two months later he was not only able to freeze the constitutional addendum enforced by the SCAF in June 2012, but also to purge the generals who had issued it (Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawy and his deputy General Sami Anan). The order to remove the head of the SCAF on the 12<sup>th</sup> August 2012 marked a historic step forward: for the first time in Egypt's history an elected civilian head of state had altered critical decisions made by the heads of the military establishment and then removed them (p.5).

The biggest breaking point in the reforms was that some of the Constitutional articles were religiously referential among the rest of the society with the Islamists on the Constitution. The dependence of the certain constitutional articles on Islamic law constituted a problem for the non-Islamic groups. Atawna and Othman (2015) claimed that "President Morsi and his party FJP did not care about the complications that faced Egypt after a long autocracy governance that requires wide national coalition from the revolutionary parties, in particular those who supported them in the presidential elections. They took the responsibility alone

with only two of the Islamic parties from many of the Egyptian parties to share them. This helped in founding a wide national opposition coalition” (p.546). Therefore, the Constitution prepared by the Salafist and the Muslim Brotherhood in the agreement was not adopted by non-Islamic parties and Coptic religious institutions. The submission and adoption of the Constitution in 2012 without a comprehensive consensus brought with it a serious political crisis in Egypt. Abdoulenein (2012) informed that “secular and liberal forces headed by Hamdeen Sabbahy and Muhammad al-Baradey were joined in the blog by the Nasserist Party, the Karama Party, the Constitution Party, the Egyptian Democratic Party, the Socialist Popular Alliance, the Free Egyptian Party, Kefaya Movement, the Egyptian Socialist Party, and the Revolutionary Democratic Coalition”. They prepared joined statement signed by the opponents’ parties as;

Due to the lack of basic concepts of guaranteeing Egyptians basic social and economic rights such as the right to honest work, healthcare and equal opportunities in the texts that have so far been leaked from the Constituent Assembly, the national and democratic forces call for a boycott of this assembly and rejection of all that comes out of it especially after the undemocratic way it was composed for the second time. The signatories to this statement call on all representatives of national and democratic forces to withdraw immediately from the current composition of the Constituent Assembly and invite them to participate in the exerting of legal, political and popular pressure with the aim of forming a new Constituent Assembly capable of fulfilling the Egyptian people’s ambition and drafting a modern 21st century constitution (dailynewsegypt.com).

In addition, Morsi's self-empowerment decree in November deepened the crisis. Various political movements and groups landed on the streets and filled Tahrir Square. Some political parties demanded Morsi's resignation and the early phase of the presidential election. What was misleading in this era were the non-consensus constitution and Morsi’s presidency over authorized decree which was above the judiciary and parliament. During the writing process of the 2012 Constitution, the Egyptian Army aimed to secure three basic positions for it. Hamad (2012) stated these demands that maintaining the institutional autonomy of the armed forces, continuing to protect the economic independence and privileges of the army and the establishment of a national security council, in which majority of the army commanders could participate. Through this council the army was active in the policy-making process and ensures its place. The army was worried that a possible democratic constitution could institutionalize civilian control over the army for the first time since 1952. The generals worked hard to remove this possibility and they tried to reconcile with the MB and the Salafists who have a majority in the Assembly.

The Muslim Brotherhood kept the autonomous status and privileges of the army in the new Constitution in order to not have conflict with the army. “When pro-democracy groups contested a military’s ‘constitutional declaration’ in March 2011, the Brotherhood acquiesced, thereby legitimating the military’s interference in constitution writing. When the military cracked down on civilian protesters, they tried some ten thousand civilians in military courts” (Shehata 2012). In general, the Brotherhood chose cooperation rather than confrontation with the military irrespective of democratic principles. The Brotherhood also kept the military budget out of state control, including the revenues from the economic activities in the new constitution. Moreover, the army budget supervision was left to the National Defense Council, which consists mostly of soldiers. Brown (2013) emphasized that the new acquisition of the army from the new constitution that the Egyptian Parliament had to consult the National Defense Council before enacting future military-related laws. This gave the army the right of veto concerning national security and sensitive foreign policy issues. Maghraoui, (2014) emphasized that “the Brotherhood tied its political destiny to the goodwill of a military corps that was not brought under civilian control”. In other words, from the statement of Bernard, Lacroix, Schoch, and Angell (2016) “once the Brotherhood took power, they felt they had to side with the military in order to prevent a coup” (p.31). The army got more political and economic privileges than the Mubarak era. The alliance of the army and MB deeply wounded the politics for democracy. This was the biggest fault of MB, as the military had never fostered democracy for the Egypt, yet it aimed to enabled stability in the whole country to get more economic shares, and to get profits from the government. But then, the military’s real goal was to bring back the old system again with a restoration period in which the Islamists gave into pressure. That’s to say, their cooperation (MB and Military) enabled the military to have a right to intervene the political life in Egypt. El Sharnoubi (2012), Maghraoui, (2014) identified that “the alliance opened the door for other remnants of the old regime – entrenched in the judiciary, the Ministry of the Interior, and the bureaucracy – to also claim a role and exert inherited influence. From the delivery of basic social services to routine law enforcement operations, the elements within the so-called ‘deep state’ could sabotage the government at will. For example, for weeks, the policemen in charge of traffic control mysteriously disappeared from the streets which created a chaotic situation. The police magically reappeared to direct traffic the day after the military coup” (p.2). Yet, Morsi's election as President of the MB was not welcomed by

actors of the ancient regime, such as bureaucracy, the judiciary, the media, and the business world. Those groups, who thought that they would lose the privileges they had obtained during the Mubarak period, did everything so as to make the Morsi's administration fail. During the Mubarak period, the actors who supported the banning and marginalizing of the Muslim Brotherhood, accused President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood of staffing inside the state and imposing their own agenda on the country. Those who gave consent for 30 years to the dictatorial orientation of Mubarak could not tolerate the Morsi administration for a year and started collecting the signatures to force the President to resign. The remnants of the ancient regime, realizing that they could not reach power from the democratic ways, united against the Morsi administration by expecting the politics of street and violence, with the judiciary, media, bureaucracy, policemen, military, businessmen, and interest groups of the Mubarak era. Opposition groups using non-democratic and violence-prone methods have achieved their targets with the support of the media, intelligence, police, and military. Muslim Brotherhood's dependence on the army weakened the motivation to create political pacts. O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) emphasized that "the common occurrence of political pacts, which set the rules of the game, the continuing conditions, for political developments in the foreseeable future until, eventually, accumulated consequences make possible another change – an institutional breakthrough – in regime" (p. 43). If there is no communication among the actors, then there may be violence inside the politics and social environment. Eric (2012) stated that "the fragmentation among Islamists and non-Islamist actors caused a failure to agree on a road map and build a pact against the military which in turn provided the latter with a chance to intervene and dictate its rules for transition. In an atmosphere of mistrust among political actors, combined with social unrest, the military emerged as the only institution that could save Egypt" (p.61). Moreover, the failure in the political pact and lack of consensus road map of the transition to democracy was the reason of military coup. That's to say, the military sought a reason for the coup and end of democratic acquisition in Egypt.

In Egypt, the ruling elite share a common interest in creating a hegemonic system. The maintenance of the existing system is the common interest of executive elites. Salem (2011) stated that "the army's interventions in 2011 and 2013 can be viewed as an attempt to restore its centrality within the ruling class (especially after 2011), and to protect its privileges from the protests themselves" (p.6). The Muslim Brotherhood Movement, which has been seen as

an enemy by the state since 1952, was not familiar with the state and state institutions. The most important factor in Egypt's aspiration for democracy and reaching the summit without getting stuck in the pits and muds on the slope of this challenging democracy undoubtedly passes through the leaders who have the characteristics to manage society. Therefore, the mistakes made by the Muslim Brotherhood Movement, which had no experience of government management, were used by the coup plotters and their supporters to legitimize the coup. Tadros (2012) took the notice of the inexperience of the political parties and leaders by saying that “under a non-democratic regime, it is very difficult to find experienced political parties. Mubarak’s ruling party was the only one that had full support with chance to work and develop his abilities in Egypt while MB and many other parties were not allowed practice real political work, except the limited role in some parliament’s sessions. They were busy with thinking how to avoid the security measures against them. They did not have the time or the space to develop their abilities” (p. 546). Therefore, the institutions of the old regime, primarily the army, allied with liberals, nationalists, and leftists against President Morsi, were seen as foreign in the state structure. Nefissa (2013) claimed that the inexperience of Morsi's state governance, the inability to develop policies to solve economic, and the political problems very quickly, made the situation in the country even more insecure. Yet, the harsh criticism from inside and outside the country and attempts to block the administration have made Morsi administration fail in a very short period of time. The external forces and internal pressure groups have struggled to worsen the economic outlook of the country so that the Morsi management has begun to lose community support. On the other hand, Can (2013) reported President Muhamed Morsi speaking at the International Conference Center in Cairo,

On the first day, I am confronted by conspiracies one by one by those who want to overthrow me as Egypt's first free and democratically elected president. In such a poisonous climate, how can even the best of the leader achieve great successes? In just one year, close to 4,900 strikes and 22 million people protests calls were made. The former collaborators of the ancient regime are planning to collapse the state (tv5haber.com).

Strikes, street movements, bureaucratic obstacles, non-functioning security units, black market and stocking activities had made the already weak Egyptian economy worse. In Egypt, the public debt and poverty increased. Fuel shortages (gasoline, tube-gas), electricity and water interruptions had become permanent with the result of all these obstacles. Egypt's currency depreciated by 10 percent while the unemployment rate rose to about 20 percent,

tourism revenues and foreign investment declined as foreign exchange reserves shrank. The value of Egyptian currencies was depreciated by 10 percent against the US dollar. As a result of street movements, tourism declined as the unemployment rate increased. The police did not perform their duty with the passive resistance. Since they did not provide security in the streets of Egypt, the crime rates increased.

The Muslim Brotherhood leaders trusted Al Sisi that he seemed to be a devout religious Muslim. At the end of elections, the military leaders seemed to end their bargains. In June 2012, when Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohamed Morsi won the presidency, the Army did not interfere. Shortly after he was stationed as the president of Egypt, Morsi forced the retirement of the Defense Minister, the Navy commander, Air Defense and Air Force. This action was approved by young Egyptian revolutionaries. New Defense Minister, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi was at age fifty-seven when he replaced a seventy-six-year-old general. Many people have been encouraged by Sisi's choice as the appointment seemed to reflect the transition to a younger, more enlightened army officer. Until the 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2013, the Morsi administration did not realize the seriousness of the possibility of a coup. Perhaps if he had noticed the possibility of a coup, he could hold an early election even if it lost, the democratic process would have not been affected by the interruption. However, the Morsi administration had fallen into the trap of the coup because they did not think a military coup was possible. Al Sisi was thought of as a fan of Morsi. The interesting point is that all these negativities and problems in Egypt immediately after the military coup began to decrease in a week; fuel, bread, inadequacy of food, electricity, and water shortages have disappeared. As soon as police officers landed on the scene, the apparent violence and crime rates started to diminish. Another crucial fact about Egypt is that Kuwait gave support from the first day of the coup and it was announced that 4 billion from Kuwait, 5 billion from Saudi Arabia and 3 billion dollars from the United Arab Emirates which equaled a total of \$ 12 billion that would be sent very soon to Egypt so as to develop their economy.

A regime cannot stand long with tough and repressive mechanisms. This pressure can break out one day abruptly. However, a weak ground of legitimacy of the ruling in terms of socially and politically constructs with these mechanisms can cause trouble in the field of domestic and foreign policy. Kurt (2014) states that there is no rationale for saying "to save the gains of the revolution from the danger of Muslim Brotherhood" and to destroy all the continuing sins on MB administration. It is not possible that the methods that suppress political and



social demands can be continued forever.

It was wrong to present democracy as a pill remedy to a totally foreign country in its history to the issue, and then expect all problems to be resolved immediately. Therefore, the process began for the bureaucratic and military elites who had a great resentment and hatred to the freely elected Morsi and his political and religious organization. These circles, including the media who showed their anger against Morsi in all platforms both in their statements and applications. As a matter of fact, the capital that dominated most of the Egyptian media was in the hands of liberal, secular and Mubarak-influenced actors.

#### **4.2.2. The MB's Relations with Secularists**

In Egyptian politics, there is always a split between Islamists and Secularists. Therefore, the political tolerance and also pluralism was not competing for the democracy or taking the power. Actually, there was a multiparty system, but the parties were a symbol for authoritarian regime and the revolutionary elites. When it is investigated there were weak secularist or socialist parties who had no political power and had no representation of the Egyptian society, therefore; they had not been a real competitor of the regime. Arafat, (2011) Moez (2014) stated that “these parties represented only the elites who wished to connect to the state and further their interests; it was designed for indoctrination, surveillance, and repression” (p.43). Therefore, it can be deduced that secularists and leftists were so weak that they had no talent for Egyptian politics while also having no support from the public as they were elites and focused on their benefits and interests beforehand. Brown (2013) stated that just after ousting Mubarak, the conflict between Muslim Brotherhood and secularists groups started because of the timing of the election and also writing new constitution. The debate was about whether the elections should precede the writing of the constitution or not. The MB insisted on the election first as they were the most organized party in Egypt after the first revolution. On the other hand, the secularist and liberal wanted time in order to be ready and be organized for the elections. Unfortunately, the transition to democracy route had an ill start with also the army that composed the constitution committee from the parliament where the Islamist had more seats. The first split emerged after the revolution between Islamists and secularists on the process of elections and new constitutions. Then

this split became deeper after the presidency of Mohammed Morsi. The secularists thought that they succeeded in ousting Mubarak with the help of Liberalists, yet now they were undermined from the system as the Islamists dominated the Parliament and MB got the presidency. Guenaïen (2014) highlighted this situation as, “over time secularists became more outspoken toward President Morsi’s policies than before, and they refused to collaborate in the constitutional process, preferring to protest on the street instead. Under this pretext, President Morsi issued a presidential decree giving him power to challenge any laws and neutralize the judicial branch until the approval of the constitution” (p.44). This presidential decree gave Morsi extra ordinary power. Egypt's failure to democratize happened because of the lack of a pact between parties on the governing the state after revolution. The controversies increased so high that the secularists, leftist groups and liberals supported the opponents in order to take down Islamists namely Morsi from the power. Moreover, “the Freedom House has shown very little improvement on the basic necessities of democracy in Egypt regarding political and civil liberties” (Barnes 2013). Ghanem (2014) stated that “the Brotherhood’s failure to compromise with secular forces and reach consensus on important issues of national identity, together with their inability to tackle economic problems, led to the popular uprising against them in June 2013” (p.1). As the Muslim Brotherhood lost confidence in domestic policy because of the continuing economic obstacles, the people from the opponents’ side uprisied.

#### **4.2.3. The MB's Relations with other Islamist Groups**

There are many Islamic groups in Egypt with different levels of supporters who play a crucial role in society and political relations. In the political atmosphere that emerged after the 25<sup>th</sup> of January, there appeared to be an ambiguity about how the Salafists would act on the democratic order, that is to say whether it would be against or besides MB, but the Salafists changed their views on politics without losing much time and set up the political parties. The Salafists, who had previously acted under the roof of the Islamic movement with MB, have appeared on the scene as a political opponent of MB While MB was in politics since the foundation; the Salafists had preferred to stay away from politics until recent years. “During the transition process, Salafists changed their political position and have engaged in a variety of

political activities ranging from forming parties to staging mass demonstrations” (CSS, 2011: 3). Even if they communicate on general affairs they have seen MB as a group making concessions from Islam while engaging in politics. Gümüş (2014) stated that “there were ups and downs in the process so that it had an unstable nature affected by the events emerged in that process” (p.70). The Salafists claimed that the MB was in good relation with military for the sake of political benefits. Stein (2012) stated that “the Saudi influence on the rise of the Salafi is undeniable. Salafism, which has long been fostered as a counterweight to the Brotherhood and took Saudi support, remains as a second option if the Brotherhood disappoints, although the Salafi movement is far from monolithic structure and may not remain as an ally of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf monarchies as they imagine” (p. 27). Koçak (2013) emphasized that “Western countries refrained from describing the 3<sup>rd</sup> of July as a "military coup", arguing that the army had an "intervention" to end the tensions in the country and to suppress the authoritarian Morsi government. In addition, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates have refrained from standing next to a government known as Islamist, who supported the coup by receiving 12 billion dollars in financial aid to Egypt after the coup. Moreover, the Nur Party (Salafi), which is linked to Saudi Arabia, also caused the Muslim Brotherhood to be left alone because of the Islamist unity established in Egypt by giving the coup d'état” (pp.42-43). There are a lot of parties of Salafists. The other groups/ parties were sided near the MB Yet, Al -Nour party was the only Islamist party backing the army. McTighe (2014) stated that “

Nour’s initial position wielded much power. The army needed Nour’s participation in the interim government in order to portray themselves as an inclusive government answering to the will of the people and not the perpetrators of a violent military coup. Nour immediately used this to their advantage. When the interim government sought to appoint a prime minister, the liberal leader Mohamed El Baradei was the favorite, Nour’s lone objection blocked his appointment. While it initially appeared that Nour had supported the military as a means of gaining a powerful position in the new government and make political gain, this explanation did not hold up when its power-wielding position quickly slip away and they continued supporting the military regime (p.4).

The fact that some of the amendments, previously contained in the predominantly constitutional suffrage of the predecessors, were not included in the new constitution made by the coup management which has attracted the reaction of the most Salafists base. Gümüş (2014) emphasized that

It is possible to see the difference between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists in that sense. The MB is considered as more moderate and flexible in their religious understanding compared to relatively more radical view of the Salafists. This comparison can just be done

with the religious ideas and principles of both sides. The political connections and alliances with other groups make the situation more complicated. For example, the Salafists could establish closer ties with the secular groups in the recent period. Therefore, the religious and political spheres should be taken into account separately not to cause confusion (pp.71-72)

#### **4.2.4. The Tamarod Movement**

A new group emerged in April 2013 to organize the most serious protests against Morsi in order to have a new election and change in the Morsi administration. The movement named Tamarod (Revolt) is one of revolutionary groups with different ideologies, part of the former regime actors. The Tamarod Movement's revolution includes, those, who have different motivations, who share common interests up to a point, but who serve different purposes in the formation by the alliance of groups. Nevertheless, they were not satisfied with the progress of the revolution, so external factors such as America, Israel and Saudi Arabia, which thought Morsi's success did not match its own interests directly and indirectly supported the Tamarod Movement which strengthened the anti-Morsi block. According to the pioneers of this protest movement that started with signature campaign against Morsi had gathered 22 million signatures. Morsi got 13 million votes in the 2012 presidential elections. Although the anti-Morsi movement lacked social ties, the elitists and activists in the country seemed much stronger than normal.

The prominent businessmen of Egypt tried to take down Morsi by working with remnants of the Mubarak regime. Mr. Sawiris, one the titan and richest people of Egypt, publicly supported Tamarod movement in order to oust Morsi. Mozes (2014) declared that "Mr. Sawiris used his own visual and written media to support the Tamarod movement that ousted President Morsi." Alsharif and Saleh (2013) stated that "security services, masquerading as the grassroots movement of Tamarod, were collecting signatures on a petition demanding Morsi's ouster. On the 3<sup>rd</sup> of July, following massive demonstrations organized by Tamarod and the security services, SCAF openly seized power again" (p.7). Ottaway (2014) stated that "by spring 2013, pressure against Morsi and his government was relentless. The Tamarod campaign to collect signatures on a petition demanding Morsi's ouster was in full swing, with the ministry of the interior and the security services doing most of the work" (p.10). Kurun (2015) stated that "the protesters in Tahrir Square became gradually more tumultuous and wanted the resignation of Morsi. They were mostly from

secular, leftist and Coptic groups. The protesters started a popular movement at the same time called 'Tamarod (Revolt)' collecting signatures for Morsi's resignation and calling for early presidential elections" (p. 190). Who was inside this Tamarod movement? Shebata (2018) stated that "the ascendance of Islamists provoked a full-fledged social crisis. The upper class, the state bureaucracy, women, Copts, and secular Egyptians united in rejecting the Islamists' agenda and in supporting the military overthrow of the first elected Egyptian president, Mohammed Morsi, on the 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2013" (p. 106).

### **4.3. Economic Reasons**

The unprepared capture of the economic crisis in Egypt in the first decade of the second millennium in this process caused the sale of bread in Egypt to the public to be more expensive while subsidies were reduced. Therefore, these people were directly affected and damaged by the world economic crisis. However, the incomes of the countries in this region have not been invested to help the citizens' interest and their future of the country. Most of the countries in the region lack of the powerful industrialization, development centers, health services. Food inflation, unemployment, poverty, bad living conditions and wasted and stolen public resources were not able to be returned into the people. The absence of national economic policies of Arab countries made them obey other nation's policies. Corruption, favoritism and inequality, which are too common in the MENA region behind the uprising in the countries, are also valid for Egypt. Dalacoura (2013) stated that protests and revolts contained many events and phenomena that were both disjointed and mutual in both the cause and effect. She emphasized that the chronic and increasingly worsening of unemployment in the countries of this region, created poverty that is due to the discrimination in the economic and political administration by corruption with the economic, social and political pressures of authoritarian regimes. In addition to the political effects of the Arab Spring, the distribution of incomes, the proportion of underemployment was due to economies based on the state sector rather than the private sector; unemployment, overpowering of the defense spending, and fluctuations in oil prices can show the reasons for the Arab spring. When countries are to be examined economically, economic growth is among the main divisions. Economic growth is also referred to as an increase in the real

GDP of an individual country over a period of one year. We need to be able to examine the sectorial structure as well as the GDP growth rate so as to be able to measure the economic activity volume of the countries along with the level of social welfare. In the countries where Arab Spring was experienced, the contribution of the agricultural sector in GDP was seen as 11%. Aydın (2015) stated that “in developed countries, the share of agriculture was 5%, the share of industry 20% and the share of service 70%. In underdeveloped economies, however, the share of agriculture was above 20%, while the share of services is below 50%”. In other words, when the strengthening of national economies was seen, the share of agriculture within the GNP was relatively decreasing. The share of agriculture in the Arab countries is very large in these economies. For this reason, it is possible to say that the Arab Spring countries are agricultural societies. Especially it seems to be more prominent in terms of Egypt and Syria. Taking into account the dependence of the large population on the agricultural sector, this leads to poverty and an unbalanced economic situation in the distribution of income. The sectorial situation of the economy determines the level of social prosperity and the welfare of the people.

Egypt was caught unprepared for the 2008 economic crises, parallel to the increase in basic food prices around the world. This increase also took place in Egypt, and in this process, the bread in Egypt was being sold for more while the subsidies were being reduced. Because in Egypt one person's daily receipt was around one dollar and sixty percent of the Egyptian families had to eat subsidized bread. As a matter of fact, the Egyptian President Morsi, who was aware that one of the causes for the revolt in Egypt was the bread problem, promised before the elections that after he came to work, he would solve the problem of bread, fuel, daily life including security, traffic, and health within 100 days. These promises had raised expectations, yet there was no visible improvement within 100 days which was disappointing. The fact that most private sectors were under the control of the military had been one of the reasons for the hindered promises. It is worth mentioning that the attitude of the Egyptian army is largely pragmatist in its approaches to consoling his position within the country rather than the ideological approach. Another economic reason was that the revenues of the countries are not invested for the benefits of the citizens of the country. Moreover, the income of the countries was not used for industrialization, development, health investments, to which the Arab countries had no stable economic systems. In Egypt's business world, trade and politics are intertwined. They both grow and feed each other. In the meantime, the

ordinary people (citizens) were ignored by the rich. Laws were issued for businessmen from time to time so that the money earned is offered to the service of politicians. The anger that accumulated with the shrinking of business areas and the spread of unemployment became even bigger when combined with the anxiety of the future. Although the people lived in misery, this community had benefited from the blessings of power lives in luxury and abundance. Even when the official works of the state were being made, illegitimate ways could be used. A kind of decay and degeneration was spread through all of the social layers. The number of people who had ever been involved in daily affairs without going out of law decreased very much day by day. Bribing more or less had become a necessity. All corruption had always been the most important part of the relationship with the citizen. The only way to gain people's support and respect was to give wealth and goods no matter what the way, so there was no importance of university diploma and talent.

The diminishing of the middle class, who was regarded as a sign of socio-economic equilibrium, also marked the collapse of society. In Egypt, it was not surprising that one person from almost every family had a prison experience and that people had constant anxiety of being taken into custody. Unlawfulness, corruption of public morality, inability to account, and punishment-free of criminals had become part of everyday life. Paciello (2011) informed that “Egypt has pursued a series of market-oriented reforms with the objective of limiting the state’s intervention in the economy, promoting private sector growth and integrating their economies into the world market since 1991 to nowadays” (p.3). Because of the repression of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the Egyptian economy had made the living standards of the people even more inferior. Taxes had increased, public spending had been reduced and employment had been narrowed. The structural harmonization policies of the unqualified economic packages undermined the local economy and at the same time created long-term unemployment. Lapeyre (2004) emphasized that “the increase in structural adjustment policies has increased the political influence of commercial interests so they promoted strategic alliances between public officials and private entrepreneurs, most of which can be accused of encouraging corrupt practices”. With the withdrawal of the social state; the living conditions were getting worse year by year. Egypt had triggered protests because the Egyptian regime could not keep up with the changes in the world and the region. The Egyptian people had desire to change after they saw the freedom of western people via the social media tools that then had become the

driving force behind the uprising. The oppressive Egyptian regimes closed their eyes to the changing after the Cold War, and decided that they did not need any comprehensive reforms on the political system which could enable welfare and equality in the economy. Information, communication, and the new media revolution were among the factors that influenced political fear and since breaking the silence of the Arab public. The people in Egypt had not tasted democracy and never benefited from the blessings of pluralism and freedom. Harvey (2012) emphasizes that the life of the poor depends on the cotton thread that is already targeted by the victim's field with vulture tactics which also make life more difficult. Therefore, the poor and oppressed people poured into the street in order to find more bread, freedom and dignity. On the other hand, some people may argue that the people of these streets were neither economically nor politically a project, so them being directed was nothing more than working for those dictators or the western account. The lack of economic development challenged and extended the transition to democracy. Yet, it was not necessarily the reason of failure itself. The theory of modernization focuses on structural and social conditions. So, the relations between socioeconomic development and democracy are correlated with each other. If a country is poor economically then it is difficult to transition to democracy, there when compared with the rich country. Lipset (1959) focused on this fact that "the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it would sustain democracy". Egypt had to supply adequate economic and social services to its citizens so as to change their perception of the legitimate regime. As a fact, the number of the lower class in Egypt is so high that they often force their economic interest and they do not deal with politics. Moreover, the upper class is too low in Egypt; these class members take care of maintaining their status quo as any change in the regime may endanger their interests and political situation. This elite class got used to being a Member of Parliament in the framework of Mubarak's party. They could easily solve bureaucratic obstacles by wielding their influence. Yet, as Lipset (1959) asserted that "the middle class was a necessary tool for a democratic culture to emerge because it would push for changes. The middle class is the only class that can change the behavior of a regime and then achieves its political aims by chasing a democratic form that encourages peaceful conflict resolution and prevents violence". Przeworski et al (2000) told that "it was difficult to return to a non-democratic regime when a country reaches a certain level of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita". Yet, countries on the process of transition to democracy are missing some economic



development and do not have the threshold GDP. They would face great risks to return to authoritarian regimes like in the Egyptian case. On the other hand, as Boix and Stokes (2003) discussed that economic growth alone was not adequate for the transition to democracy. Yet, income equality emergent from economic growth was a must for democratic transition. There are some countries in the Gulf region that have high economic growth, but this reflects on the citizens of the country although very limited elites take most of the income of the country. Egypt was exposed to social unrest, lack of political instability and security during Morsi era. Yet, these obstacles came from the Mubarak era, especially in the 2007 unprecedented economic crisis in Egypt. These economic and social problems both caused the Arab Spring in Egypt and as they continued during Morsi period which made way for the failure of the transition to democracy in Egypt. As Mozes (2014) emphasized that “the deep state interfered with sabotaging the MB to restore public order, enraging Egyptians against President Morsi’s government. It stirred social unrest through manipulation through a variety of resources that many of Mubarak’s government remnants still controlled like energy and the security sectors. Electricity blackouts and fuel shortages caused many protestors to turn against the MB” (p.72). These both caused economic problems for the people and also made the Egyptian government weak in the state structure.

#### **4.4. The Role of Egyptian Military in Politics**

Each regime has its own characteristics and it has some rules which do not work in all types of situations. It was the same in the Egyptian case, the closeness of government and its main actors composed the regime. Britannica defines authoritarianism as;

...the principle of blind submission to authority, as opposed to individual freedom of thought and action. In government, authoritarianism denotes any political system that concentrates power in the hands of a leader or small elite that is not constitutionally responsible to the body of the people. Authoritarian leaders often exercise power arbitrarily and without regard to existing bodies of law, and they usually cannot be replaced by citizens choosing freely among various competitors in elections. The freedom to create opposition political parties or other alternative political groupings with which to compete for power with the ruling group is either limited or nonexistent in authoritarian regimes (britannica.com).

In the simplest meaning authoritarianism is a kind of political system that freedom of the

individual is in the hand of the power or authority of the state which is centered either in one person or small elite which is not responsible and accountable towards its people under the constitution. The slogans and mottos of 2011 uprisings show that the uprising and riots stemmed from the inner dynamics of authoritarianism and its shortcomings. Just a decade ago, there were studies on authoritarianism by Heydemann, (2007), Heydemann and Leenders, (2012), Bellin (2004, 2012), Josua and Edel (2014), Anderson (2011), Lust, (2005), Gandhi and Przeworski, (2007), Droz-Vincent (2011), Valbjørn and Bank (2010), Ottoway (2010). These scholars analyzed how they maintained the existence of authoritarian systems and their ways of suppressing the threats to the regime. Yousef (2012) stated that “the military has served as the guardian of the regime for decades. With the uprising, it has shifted to serve as the guardian of the state and then took control. Then they moved to act as guardian of their own material interests, seeking to maintain their position of privilege in the Egyptian state” (p.79). For Egypt, there are hot issues in most of the time. For the end of Hosni Mubarak time, the military was also the supporter of the ousting Mubarak because of his inconsistent policies in domestic and external affairs. Especially his intention to transfer his power to his son made the military disturbed. Therefore, there were many discussions on the issue. As Tarrow (2011) pointed out that

...contentious politics occurs when ordinary people – often in alliance with more influential citizens and with changes in public mood – join forces in a confrontation with elites, authorities, and opponents. It is triggered when changing political opportunities and constraints create incentives to take action for actors who lack resources on their own. People contend through known repertoires of contention and expand them by creating innovations at their margins. When backed by well-structured social networks and galvanized by culturally resonant, action-oriented symbols, contentious politics leads to sustained interaction with opponents – to social movements (p.6).

The military was an incontrovertible power in Egypt in terms of its influence and economic power. Anne and Bassiouny (2014) stated that “the military proved to be an important route for gaining power in Egypt, as joining the military was the common route to joining Egyptian bureaucracy and had great influence over civilian courts” (pp.287-288). It had also a very crucial role in the ousting Mubarak along with the military coup d'état in 2013. At the midst of uprising in Egypt in 2011, the military changed its alliances because of the shifting changing policies in the MENA region. Bellin (2012) pointed out that the uniqueness of each democratization process underlines the military's capacity and decision ‘to shoot or not to shoot at the protestors’ remained one of the crucial aspects for collective action to form its

path and authoritarians to survive. Yumitro and Estriani (2017) stated that “the military has enormous power in building Egypt’s democratization process. It can be said that the success of Egypt’s democratic transition is decided by the military” (p.173). In the revolution time, the military was close to the public as the regional movement and external changing policies in the Middle East. Also the support of the whole society became bigger and bigger day by day. Hinnebusch (2015) drew the attention to the role of mass mobilization and stated that if it possesses cross-class coalitions or not opportunity structures, regime capacity, the role of bureaucracy, political economy, external intervention and the role of a transitional coalition for reconstruction of authority in different cases. Therefore, if there were huge class collations with mass mobilization then reconstruction was inevitable. Stacher (2012) stated that by focusing on the capacity of the flexibility of the regimes, it examines political structures, alliances of elites, institutions, and ‘governance in Egypt because ‘even in successful revolutions they are seldom renounced’. Zorlu (2016) focused on the fact that the authoritarian counter-attack becomes visible when the security reactions of power become successful in dealing with these measures (this challenge of authority regarded as policing in the literature; repression, new legislation, bans, criminalization of the participants, etc.) the challenges are forced to invent new repertoires of action. Therefore, Grinberg (2014) discussed that security forces could develop as a response to power against resistance, riots, and social movements. Both opponents socially learn how to act against each other and they prepare their own tactics. Therefore, the regimes develop up to date strategies so as to stay more in power. Heydemann and Leenders (2012) called these kinds of strategies as counter-revolutionary yet not simply defensive or reactive. Heydemann and Leenders, (2012:83) clarified the issue as,

“They are complex, multilevel games involving regimes, publics, and external actors, in which regimes develop strategies that aim to affect the strategic calculus of citizens, allies, and adversaries, even while constantly updating their own probabilities, both of successfully suppressing their opponents and, should this become unlikely, negotiating the terms of their departure from office”.

Developing strategies is not a simple a day of work, but it needs structural capacity and reasons for the survival of authoritarian regimes. Bellin (2012) stated that ‘the financial power of autocratic structures with receiving support from international networks’, which becomes an existential necessity to hold on combined with ‘low levels of institutionalization and weak capacity for societal mobilization’. If the authoritarian regimes had these common

features, then these could determine its survival. Yumitro and Estriani (2017) clarified that “the shadow of the old regime has led to a flawed process of democratic transition in post-Arab Spring Egypt. It can be said that the repressive measures used by the SCAF, and the military coup towards Morsi, have depicted Egypt taking a hardline approach to the country’s ongoing transitional process” (p.173). There is more than one tactic for the regime to endure its survival of authoritarianism. Lynch (2012) explains that “regimes adapt strategies to prevent the emergence of internal splits within the ruling coalitions and their key support bases. They can be ingratiated to the military like increasing the salaries of armed forces so as to hand-outs to the regime constituencies” (p.83).

The armed forces, the most important actors of Egyptian politics, held political power for a while after the revolution in 2011 but left the political leadership in 2012 for the pressure of the revolutionary groups. When the military got the power in the transition period, it was fast to form its own cabinet to control politics. Before the elections, the military explained that the basic principles governing Egypt would be adopted by the constitution. Such a constitution was formed to secure that the elected leader of Egypt would have no choice but to take into account the interests of the army. Dorsey (2011) explained the reason of this constitution as,

Elections would enable the military to return to its barracks, but retain its grip on national security, including the right to intervene in politics to protect national unity and the secular character of the state, maintain its direct, unsupervised relationship with the United States, be shielded against civilian oversight and scrutiny of its budget, and keep control of its economic empire. In effect, the military would continue to enjoy the privileged status it had under Mubarak (p. 475).

This statement displayed that the military guaranteed its place and its structure inside the state. Actually, the army has always been the dominant actor in Egyptian politics and economy; therefore, it took the control just after ousting Mubarak which unwillingly paved the way for a democratic transition one year later. Yumitro and Estriani (2017) stated that “taking into account the fact that Egypt’s military has deep connections in politics and the economy, and has tightened their relationships with the external actors, along with Egyptian ruling elites, it is clear that the success of transition and the democratic process is all in the hands of Egypt’s military” (p.174). The army never abandoned its economic profits and crucial political role in Egypt. It has a deep fear of the consolidation of democracy, therefore, the military took precautions in order to control and decelerate the democratic transition.

Pollack (2011) reported from the statement of Shadi Hamid's political situation as;

There is little doubt that Egyptian politics has been fundamentally changed since Mubarak's fall. In an increasingly open political space, an array of groups and parties, spanning a wide ideological spectrum, are contending for influence, power, and legitimacy in a new Egypt. This competition can lead to conflict—increasing instances of sectarian clashes are particularly worrying—but it can just as easily lead to coalition-building, a renewed political ethic, and, ultimately, a slow but steady movement toward greater democracy (p.110).

In the Arab Spring event, the military condoned ousting Mubarak, the head of the authoritarian regime, yet the army maintained the underlying power structure in the state. After the presidential election, the elected president Mohamed Morsi made, one of his first acts to replace Chief of General Staff Hussein Tantawi, who was one of the actors of the former regime from Abdulfettah al-Sisi, who was the head of the military intelligence unit. This significant change in the military field was expected to accelerate the revolutionary transformation in Egypt because the military was much-closed institution as the defender of the political established order but later in the course of time, the army took a clear counter-revolutionary attitude in which these expectations were wasted.

Abdulfettah al-Sisi cooperated with the internal and external coalition against Mohamed Morsi under the command of the Egyptian army and carried out the military coup to close the way to democracy in the country. Despite the days of protests, military coups took place in the eyes of America, Europe and regional powers. So the process of transition to democracy, which started with great hopes and recorded a certain distance, suffered a very heavy wound. The military withdrew from the political arena leaving the political power to be held on its own by Mohammed Morsi, who came to presidential by the election which was held in a democratic way with high participation. Therefore, it can be said that the Egyptian army aimed to open chaos in the country to open the way for the intervention of politics by using some actors in the country as a counter-revolution. Loveluck (2015) indicated that the Tamarod movement, established in April 2013, made secret meetings with the members of the armed forces and even received instructions from these people they could organize the protests meeting in later periods. This truth was reflected years later on the news. Brown (2012) stated that “the military as an authoritarian actor played a key role in transition because of the heavyweight of Egypt's authoritarian past” (pp.51-52). The cooperation of the Egyptian army with the revolutionary actors within the country continued to the military coup that was the most important development of the counter-revolutionary

period. Shebata (2018) emphasized that “the authoritarians are led by the military and usually come to power through a military coup against the backdrop of deep social and economic crises that threaten the very existence of the capitalist state and the dominance of the bourgeoisie” (p107). During this period, the army used the revolutionary actors, who actively participated in Mubarak's departure in the Arab spring process, to provoke the anti-Morsi feelings of the people. However, after the military coup, an intensive and pressured process began for the groups that supported Abdulfettah al-Sisi in the coup process like the 6<sup>th</sup> of April Movement, the Tamarod Movement, and the Revolutionary Socialists. The demonstrations organized by these groups were found to be harsh interventions by the police; the demonstrators were injured or killed while many activists from these movements were arrested after the coup. This pressure has affected even the Tamarod movement which had a huge role in the process of going to the coup. The military did not let the Tamarod movement establish a political party. The fact that almost all of the actors that allied with the army during the counter-revolutionary period were then excluded from the political scene after Abdulfettah al-Sisi came to power which can be interpreted as the use of these actors by the armed forces in this process. On the other hand, the Egyptian army has also made a serious cooperation with foreign actors in the process of counter-revolution. Many pro-regime army members, especially Abdulfettah al-Sisi, who have close relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in particular, have used these ties to build external support during the counter-revolutionary period. As a matter of fact, the leaders of these countries congratulated Abdulfettah al-Sisi on the 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2013 immediately after the coup occurred. In the process following the military coup, the Gulf countries especially gave a huge amount of financial support to the Abdulfettah al-Sisi administration. Thanks to these supports, the country's economy has survived from the collapse, and the armed forces have continued their activities in an economic sense.

After the coup, the army became the most active actor in Egyptian politics. In this way, they shape politics in line with their own interests and desires. Abdulfettah El-Sisi, the leader of the Supreme Military Council, especially made visits and contacts with foreign countries in this process, to support the military and self-promote in the process of counter-revolution. In this context, Sisi, who made high-level contacts with Russia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, signed many military agreements which guaranteed economic support for these countries. After the election of President Abdulfettah El-Sisi, his contacts were even

more intense spreading to Western countries such as France, Germany, Italy and to the USA. Consequently, the fact that Abdulfettah El-Sisi, who already carried out the military coup in the country, had been already serving as president in Egypt. This is the secret proof that a closed military regime has prevailed in the country. As a matter of fact, while the military forces acted directly in relation to Abdulfettah El-Sisi during this period, the president personally directed military operations, especially in Sinai. Abdulfettah El-Sisi actually visited the operation center in Sinai while wearing his military uniforms. In addition, army troops had been deployed in city centers to provide security many times and intervened in protests and demonstrations.

Military tutelage penetrated into every area of the state and the society. No civil organization was unable to go beyond certain boundaries, the development of civilian institutions was prevented, and the area of civilians was narrowed. The civil society did not have the means of developments. Even if the power was fully transferred, as in the case of Morsi, there was no necessity for any political parties to have governance and management experience to be in power in Egypt. In other words, the military tutelage, which encompassed the country and destroyed all the alternatives, has almost become the destiny of Egypt. The neutrality of the army allowed the people to overthrow the dictator Mubarak. Therefore, the army saw itself as an indirect but important actor of the revolution. The indirect support that the army gave has made the army desirable to help in the determination of the post-revolutionary basic policies. Savaş (2014) stated the coup that Al Sisi made in 2013 was a reminder that "Morsi came to power thanks to the army's neutral attitude and now the army got him from there". Military tutelage showed itself as a very powerful political actor in the post-Mubarak era. The Muslim Brotherhood Movement along with President Muhamed Morsi was unable to establish a strong stance in foreign policy and the economy because of the pressure; therefore, they become soldiers and judiciaries in the country. Not only was it possible for Morsi, but it was also not possible for any parties to succeed as the Egyptian economy had already collapsed. In addition, powerful sectors were under the control of the army, and the army had strong concessions. During the one-year transition period time, the army put Morsi and his administration in a breathless atmosphere. There was no ideological version of the Egyptian army as it was based more on interests. The army wanted to legitimize itself and the coup d'état by excluding Muslim Brotherhood and pushing them to violence. The innocent and unarmed people in the streets tried to become provoked by making point shoots

to MB members while also martyring many Muslims. In fact, the army lost its legitimacy by turning the weapons into the will of the people with the coup.

It can be argued that the Egyptian army came into more intense politics than the Hosni Mubarak period after the military coup in 2013. It can also be interpreted that Egypt, which was described as a “police state” during the Mubarak period, is already on its way to becoming a "military state". This indicates that the revolutionary process that started in 2011 has seriously regressed and turned into a starting point, and even evolved into a tighter and worse direction than during the Mubarak period. In other respects, the Egyptian army had the most important roles in the achievement of the counter-revolution when this process was taken into consideration by the dominant player, the Egyptian army.

The army has traditionally been a crucial part of political life in Egypt. This was the reality in the past and it is also valid today after the military coup d'état. The three leaders who came to power in the period from the Free Officers' 1952 coup d'état to the 2011 revolution were also of military origin. This case is an indication that the impact of the Armed Forces has been continuing in the country's politics. During the periods of Gamal Abdul Nasser, Anvar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian army became the most important political and economic actor in Egypt from the privileges and distinctions the army received. In particular, during the period of Hosni Mubarak, the economic activities of the army reached its highest level. It was stated that commercial and industrial activities of the Egyptian army constituted at least 30% of the country's economy in this period. Egyptian army serving in sectors like tourism, finance, heavy industry, textile, food and construction was like a giant company in this respect. In order to sustain these activities, the army acted together with politics inwardly, and the army was also supported by some foreign actors especially the USA and Israel. This was seen as the most reliable ally in the country. Hence, there was the Egyptian army's dominance of political aspects related to the external actors alongside the economic magnitude.

The Egyptian army's role, one of the most influential actors in the country's politics as seen in the demonstrations that started on the 25<sup>th</sup> January 2011, was much different than the other countries where the Arab Spring happened. The fact that the Egyptian army was professional and institutionalized along with the active involvement of senior military officials in the politics of the country had been influential in the transition period. As an institution, the armed forces have implemented their own decisions during and after the revolutionary



uprising although they were in close contact with the Mubarak regime. In the early stages of the demonstrations and uprising, Mubarak tried to fight the protesters with the support of the police forces. In many cities, the army troops, who were sent to the provinces where the demonstrations took place to control the crowds, were welcomed with love by the Egyptians. The army, which was far from interfering with the protesters, had secured the protection of cultural attractions such as national museums, high courts, official buildings and shopping centers in this frame. Barany (2011) emphasized that “no institution matters more to a state’s survival than its military, and no revolution within a state can succeed without the support or at least the acquiescence of its armed forces” (p.28). Any transition cannot be won by the support of the military of a country. Mubarak left from the presidency on the 11<sup>th</sup> of February and the Supreme Military Council announced that they would conduct the transition process in the country until the administration of the country has transferred a legitimate government to the civilian staff. Despite these explanations, the Egyptian army did its best to delay the abandonment of the administration to the civilians in the post-revolutionary period. It can be said that the Supreme Military Council wanted to prevent a fundamental and political transformation that would bring the revolution to this point. As a matter of the fact, as a result of such a transformation, the administration’s power would be able to be passed to groups that were new and social base, and therefore the interests of many actors, both within the country and abroad, would seriously suffer from these changes. The army privileged in the country for many years had been worried that they would lose their privileged position, and therefore they struggled to postpone a possible regime change. The revolutionary actors who were aware of the agenda of the army had called through protests that they frequently organized to the Supreme Military Council to leave the leadership to the civilians. The Supreme Military Council, which had long been unresponsive to these calls, eventually replied to the demands of the revolutionaries and the Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohamed Morsi won the June 2012 presidential elections. Shortly after his election to the presidency, Mohamed Morsi expelled Defense Minister Hussein Tantavi from office and appointed Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in August 2012. It was alleged that Al Sisi was close to the MB movement as he was a faithful Muslim. Yet these claims were not true. Indeed, the army did not even protect the Presidential Palace during demonstrations against Morsi on the 30<sup>th</sup> June 2013, where hundreds of thousands of people participated. Abdalfettah Al-Sisi, who gave 48 hours to compromise with the conflicting sides on the first July, announced on

the 3<sup>rd</sup> of July, the armed forces had taken over the administration. Sisi became the most influential actor when the revolutionary process that started in 2011 had ended with a counter-revolution.

Three main political actors in Egypt throughout history have also been involved in the struggle with each other in determining the future of the country. These are statist, liberals, and Islamists. In 1952, the statist-nationalist actors, who seized power in a military coup d'état, neutralized opposition by using state power and deepened state hegemony. Yet, in spite of all these ineffective, exterminate and repressive politics, opposition movements have continued to oppose their existence on social and historical grounds. For instance, the Mubarak regime had published various decrees to prevent Islamists from infiltrating the army and to misrepresent them in society. In Egypt, military courts have been widely used to suppress opponents showing that the power of the Egyptian military was an historical issue. The military was out of state of judiciary control and also had also distinguished an influential position in politics before and after revolution. Especially civilians, accused of carrying out terrorist acts in the Mubarak period, were on trial in military courts with decisions that cannot be appealed. Military courts one of the demonstrations of the role of the army in domestic politics, took the lead in the suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood and other oppositional groups of Islamist. Owen (2006) informed about the situation of the judiciary life as “court life was not just; its pattern structured by the dictates of a system that rulers need political servants to advise them and to carry out their orders and find it easier to draw them from a small, loyal, continuously circulating elite” (p.45). The army remained part of the powerful coalition forces that objected to the privatization, the withdrawal of the state from economic affairs and the further access of court-based rules of law.

The military has its own institutional obligations which mean that their technological, economic or administrative resources are not simply accessible to the rest of the society for any kind of civilian needs. In Egypt, not only the President himself but also many of the officers in the Presidency are either retired or still serving officers. These officers have important roles in government administration. These officers are appointed as ministers and deputies to prevent the imposition of intensive bureaucracy on the priorities of the government. Therefore, the armed forces hide behind so-called democratic institutions and hold them in their hands. There are two reasons for the army to keep the misleading democratic image. Firstly, the existence of so-called democratic institutions offers the

capacity of the various demands of the society to ensure that the character of the political system is fundamentally unchanged. Secondly, the existences of these institutions that resemble a democratic political structure isolate the army from changes that occur in everyday politics. Besides the apparent face of the government is not clearly the army as the oppositions are directed to other political actors. The army remains powerful and beyond the harsh criticism and the army still has reliability among the society.

The so-called democratic institutions and representations in Egypt prevent the authoritarian political order from being seen by the public. The current political system has been designed to serve the interests of the state elite and the army. In Egypt, Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak had established a so-called democratic political system that leaves power with the army to others. Various control and monitoring tools placed within this political system allowed the army to manage the country by staying on the backplane. The political, social and historical conditions in Egypt have not allowed the development of institutions such as NGOs that citizens can use effectively against the state under control and control of the army. It is also seen in the experience of the last revolution, that even if a democratic election is made, the military is always going to be active and effective unless the established order in the state is changed. In Egypt, the most important factor in the political intervention of the army is the interests of the army. Therefore, Morsi has been ousted by a military coup d'état when the army's interests started to change and decrease. The state elites and old regime supporters were in an alliance to fight against the Islamist movements perceived as a threat by the army.

Authoritarian administrators have dominated certain areas of the army to secure their own administration. The power vacuum, created by weak political institutions and weak political parties was occupied by the army. In Egypt, the military institution is generally larger than the armies of third world countries, and military spending is higher than these countries. The expenditure of the Egyptian army in the Arab world is greater than the GNP of the country and the expenditure size of the army is greater than its population. The increase of military spending and volume reflects the accelerating political role of the armed forces in the governing system.

In Egypt the army did not need to take direct action in power. Because the military is already in power and the demands are met by the President (Abdalla, 2007). When President Muhamed Morsi, a member of the MB, who was not an officer, was elected, his army's attitude towards the President changed. It is the first time that the country has been ruled by

a person, a non-ideological member of the army since 1952. In the face of this scene, the army felt its short and long-term interests threatened. For the first time, the interests of the Presidency and the army did not overlap at many points. Until the Morsi period, the army, which was a partner of the government and realized its demands by the President, resisted the change of the political system functioning in its favor.

After the July 3<sup>rd</sup> military coup, the constitution draft prepared under the control of the military government was presented as a referendum on the 14<sup>th</sup>-15<sup>th</sup> January 2014. BBC News reported that Egypt's Supreme Election Commission President Nabil Saleh said that 20 million 613 thousand of 53 million registered turnouts voted and that the draft constitution was adopted with the support of 98,1% of those who participated in the referendum. This displayed the highest rate of acceptance of the referendum, yet when analyzed, the turnout it was really too low with the election turnout compared with the democratic countries. Therefore, receiving a high rate of the vote from the referendum or presidency election cannot deceive the public opinion of the world. On the other hand, the leaders in the consolidated democratic countries win the election with little vote difference from the nearest political competitor.

The army had significant roles in the political life of the countries, either by rebuilding the regimes or filling the political gap that emerged during the power struggles. In the MENA region, Libyan army dragged the country into civil war in the time of Arab Spring while the Tunisian Army preferred to stay on the edge of the political system and contribute to the transition to democracy in the country. Yet, the Egyptian Army chose to govern and direct the country's politics. The Egyptian Army had more crucial roles than other countries in the region. It gave permission for ousting Mubarak in the revolution of 2011 by not interfering with the uprising. Yet, the same army directly interfered with the politics and power of Morsi in 2013 when they made a military coup d'état. No revolution can succeed without the intervention of the armed forces. The support of the army is not enough but it is a necessary condition for the success of the revolution. Then why did Egyptian army make the coup? Firstly, "military interventions can be explained by the fact that societies are politically underdeveloped. For example, military interventions are observed more often in countries where political institutions are not functioning properly, those institutions are not legitimate, people have little political participation and civil society organizations are weak" (Finer 1988, pp. 77-126, 110-127, Huntington 1968, pp. 192-198). In the case of Egypt, the people

had lived under the pressure of authoritarian leaders for more than thirty years. They were totally apolitical society; and everything was under the control of the authoritarian regime. After the revolution, again the SCAF took control of Egypt, and the people were not able to organize well. In the post-Mubarak period, together with Morsi, the political and economic crisis deepened within the country. The military identified itself with the national identity and thought that it was obliged to protect the interests of the state. So they entered the military coup d'état on the grounds that they protected national interests. Crises also brought opportunities for legitimate military interventions. Secular, liberalist and youth organization indirectly supported the order to take down the Morsi administration. The economic and social problems were the reasons of people' support. Especially Tamarod movement collected millions of signatures so as to represent Morsi as inexperienced and incompetent on solving the economic and political problems. "In the case that the political system and institutions are in crisis and are not legitimate, both the reasons for the military coup d'état are increasing and the appropriate environment is being set up to do them" (Finer 1988, pp. 20-76, Nordlinger 1977, pp. 85-95). Secondly, the internal culture of the armed forces is also related to military coups. The likelihood of avoidance from conflict is higher in situations where certain social and democratic values are internalized (Huntington 1985, pp. 70-79, Janowitz 1960, p.240). However, the army can make interventions to protect its interests and to provide for the recruitment of the armed forces. In times of crisis in the country, "the institutional, class, and sometimes personal interests of the soldiers are also threatened and adopt the coup-driven authoritarianism" (Nordlinger, 1977, pp. 63-85). For the Egyptian case, the Morsi administration tried to intervene with the military officials when he tried to change some of the big and old commanders of the soldiery. He did not take into account their economic interests, yet there was no guarantee for the army's power. Therefore, the military made the coup with the support of external power along with also some secular, liberal and youth organizations.

There are a wide range of civil-military relations in the governance of the countries from the democratic governments where the army is subject to the control of the civilians as well as the regimes governed by the armies. The nature of these relations, the specific nature of the military, the education of the soldiers, and the historical experience of the countries, institutionalization, and the political and socio-economic conditions impacts the governance of a country. There are historical, social and economic factors that shape the relation of the

army with their societies. The military mentality consists of values, attitudes and perspectives that are part of the performance of professional military service and arise from the nature of this task. Soldiers all over the world have a different mindset than civilians. The influence of an army with a certain weight in each country on civilian politics varies according to the historical experience of the countries and the social-economic structures. In countries where the level of political culture is low, the military is likely to intervene in civilian politics. Decreasing the power of political institutions negatively affects civilian control over the military. There is a need for functional and strong institutions for effective civilian control over the army. Civil society and political parties in underdeveloped countries have not been sufficiently developed and widespread. In these countries where institutionalization is weak, the army is the most organized and effective power. Civilian control of the army is easier in countries which have grown economically, achieved stability, achieved a certain level of development, and built social peace. The armies are at the forefront in countries that struggle with economic and political instabilities, and ethnic and sectarian problems. This does not solve the problems of poverty and corruption, and does not have effective and strong institutions.

Egypt's most powerful institution is the army, one of the basic roles that determine the country's politics. The Egyptian army has been a part of the power class since 1952. In Egypt, the level of political institutionalization is low and civil society and political parties are weak with a lack in the strong political and economic structure, and strong middle class which has caused the dominance of the army in the country politics. The political system in Egypt is established and designed by the army to ensure the dominance of the army. The military officers who adopt a nationalist, autocratic, and statist approach with a bureaucratic and security center have kept Egypt's political, social and economic life under control since 1952.

The prominence role of the army in the politics of Egypt above other sides has appeared clearer than after the 2013 coup. The political business cycles of today's politics are shaped under the control of the military establishment. According to Shahin, the military intervention had a single goal: "the exclusion of Islamists and revolutionary young people, the elimination of opponents" (Shahin, 2015). Shebata (2018) highlighted that "Al-Sisi regime sought to demobilize all opposition through a number of measures, such as an extensive campaign which targeted not only the political leaders of the movement, but also its extensive network of social, educational, and economic Islamist institutions, which the

regime had previously tolerated” (p.107). These were not just for Islamists, but also for secular and youth activists. They were all restricted and demobilized for any upcoming uprisings. Shebata (2018) finally confirmed that “civil society organizations became subject to new legislation that restricted the ability of NGOs to receive foreign funding outside of the scrutiny of the state” (p.107). That’s to say, the army restricted every possible danger for its entity via Al Sisi regime.

The political establishment of the Egyptian army is not a new event with the coups, yet previously it was integrated into the authoritarian Nasserist regime. The president of the country suffered from the heavy influence of the army, but the military has history of politics, which long 66 years of politics since 1952. Therefore, the army emerged in the political arena in 2011 publicly and became the most political force. Potts (2016) emphasized that “the military had much to do with the failure of Egypt’s transition to democracy. The military in Egypt had a vast amount of power and influence over the country. Although the military was not entirely subordinated in the Mubarak regime, it was used as the means to enforce Mubarak’s policies”. So, the efficiency and heavyweight power in politics and economics gave right itself to block the transition to democracy, and with the coup, the military destroyed democracy.

#### **4.5. The Role of the Media**

The state was always monitoring and controlling the written and visual media, magazines, journals, internet sources and publications from the standpoint of freedom of speech and press. The state gave some figures to brighten the image of the state, making some fabricated news about the state’s freedom of the press. The freedom of press and speech was not at the demanded level in the country. Warkotsch, (2012), Blitz (2014) emphasized about the lack of press freedom in Egypt as;

The absence of press freedom in Egypt is an indicator of the complete alienation of the common people with the political sphere in Egypt and it gave the people little possibility to be heard and to give political meaning to their lives than through protests. In Egypt, politics is seen as an affair of the elites and not the common man, a vision which is actively pursued by the leaders. The people are limited in expressing themselves in mainstream media and the leaders in the political sphere express themselves in a language and a discourse that is not understood by the common man: terms like democracy may be uttered by an Egyptian

politician, but they do not resonate with the people in the way the politician meant it. This means that in a country where almost every citizen has a satellite television, the possession of a television does not foster political understanding or a sense of belonging by the people (p.49).

Even human rights activists were brutally oppressed as their websites and publications were blocked and prohibited. As Henry (2011) claimed that “an activist might be stopped on the street, forced into a car by five men in plain clothes, driven off, beaten up, and stripped of his possessions shortly after giving an interview about rampant corruption in the presidential family” (p. 22). This was a clue against the brutality of the state over the media and broadcasting together with the security forces. Social networks have been very effective in organizing, massing, and raising awareness of protests against authoritarian regimes. In an environment where regimes control media, the internet has been used widely and effectively by young people in particular. Thousands of people organized with the help of social media and communication technologies have come into the streets. Media companies have served as the leading institutions of global power in the globalization process. These media companies are using television effectively to try to convince societies to live within the boundaries of local governments under the control of global power. Blitz (2014) asserted that “absence of press freedom indicated ineffectiveness of the government, structured the political opportunities for the people in such a way that they had little alternatives to voice their concerns than through protests, and it made protests themselves beneficial for the people because the people were now being listened to” (p.61). Watching television turns into one of the routines of everyday life, so its ideological influence is invisible. It also has an active role in the alienation of the masses. It is still the most effective ideological carrier in this respect. Television is more influential than other means of communication in determining a social consciousness structure. The series and other programs broadcast on TVs greatly change the structure of society and their outlook. Those who dominate the media and communication means to adopt a frame, an image and an interest in any matter, and events are often deeply influenced almost all over the world. In modern times, the mass media has an influence that leads and drifts the societies. The mass media began to occupy people's entire life, subconscious and desire. In the Arab Spring, the mass media had not only the tool but also the power to trigger the Arab uprising process itself.

It is undoubtedly an impressive factor that such big upheavals are organized through Twitter and Facebook. But social dynamics are more complex. Even in the toughest circumstances,



living events are spreading to the world through sharing networks, and the public's reaction to events is growing in size. It can also be said that the Arab intellectuals and intellectuals who are exiled abroad are active on the social movements in the West. Indeed, almost everybody agrees on the social media's role in rebuilding, compiling, organizing in the Arab transition. The journalist broadcasts with the citizen's sense. It has been seen in the Arab world that the media is subjective in its news. The media, which is usually near the government, is sometimes one of the most important power sources that make the opposition's block visible. The groups dominating this media are mostly secular, liberal, and Coptic. Fifty-five media channels in the Mubarak period and more than fifteen channels in the post-revolution period belong to the wealthy capital owners who became rich during Mubarak period. When we recall that Egypt is a country where the literacy rate is not very high, and 90% of the people have TV at home, the power of the media to influence public opinion is obvious. In the Mubarak period, the enriched secular and liberal actors, as well as multinational companies, continued their opposition by using their advertising preferences for non-Islamic channels. The media served the political interest and spread government messages. The official language of the media had changed drastically since the events that started at Tahrir Square in 2011. The state-owned channels and newspapers that decided the old president and regime in a grievous way, who were trying to humiliate the revolution and make false claims, had begun to change their side with the fall Mubarak and attack Mubarak' wrongdoings and support the revolutionaries in Tahrir. The national press had begun to support the revolution directly with the fall of the Mubarak regime. However, after a while, this situation was reduced and turned into support for the High Council of the Armed Forces. Gradually, the national press had focused on supporting the military regime, which was actually in control of the country, and at this point, the national press had sought a power to envision itself. When the state-owned and controlled media were involved, nothing changed much within the first waves of the revolution. When Mubarak fell after a thirty-year dictatorship, many people thought that all of the country's dreams would take place. Immediately after the revolution, SCAF's rule authorities announced that there was no need for licensing for the TV channel. In the process that followed, sixteen new private satellite television channels were launched, opening up freedom of expression and voice. Yet this freedom environment did not last long. Abdulla (2014) stated about the situation of the media as;

The reinstatement of the infamous and unpopular ministry at this critical juncture is of particular concern. In recent months, the SCAF and other organizations of the state, particularly military prosecutors and courts, have censored media, harassed journalists in an effort to intimidate and dissuade them from further critical reporting, and imprisoned at least one blogger for his critical writing (p.14).

Ossama Heikal, was appointed as a minister to the Ministry of Information and started his career as a military correspondent for Al Wafd newspaper. This also displayed the pressure of the media from the military staff. Soon after, the state media became a strong supporter of the military regime. Abdulla (2014) emphasized that “those who criticized the army were intimidated by the regime in several ways. At the beginning of March 2011, the army started to subject bloggers and journalists into military trials and investigations” (p.14). Apart from the fatalities and imprisonment of the journalists, the abuses included chasing, detaining, and beating free journalists. Time to time more it was done more severely by shooting with plastic bullet, and damaging cameras and equipment in front of the people. Just after the coup, TV channels were closed, critical and satirical programs were taken off and finally private channels and newspapers which were out of the state’s direct pressure were banned. It is challenging to predict the future of the independent media in Egypt by looking the current political atmosphere. The state media serve more regime than public. Mohammadpour (2016) “Egypt is not free, which is proven by a lack of freedom of speech as one of the fundamental rights of citizens. Moreover, most of the magazines and televisions belong to the government limiting the publication of independent media.” (pp. 147-153). The private satellite channels primarily served the interests of their businessmen, most of them closely allied to the former Mubarak regime. They then supported the current president Abdel Fattah Al Sisi determinedly.

Abdulla (2014) stated that

A few voices have also started discussing (on social media) ways to publicly finance an independent satellite channel, although the legal and logistical procedures remain major issues. For now, online media continues to play an important role in exposing what the state-owned media will not cover, and activists and citizen journalists on the ground trying to push their material as far as they can on social media. Egypt’s revolution will continue until it achieves its goals and young people on the streets reach the democratic Egypt of their dreams. A more democratic political leadership would give way to a revolution in Egyptian media, making possible the expansion of small efforts that are currently trying to emerge from within Maspero and the national newspapers. Despite a few bad signs, it remains to be seen if the new regime will manage to bring about some guarantees of freedom of speech and expression and pave the way for a more democratic process or if it will revert back to a state of direct or indirect military rule. Short of political will for reform, dissident voices inside

the media will need significant backup from civil society and their audiences to make progress (p.28).

As the military had a visible effect on the government and also media, they could make every broadcast essentiality. Freedom House (2012) mentioned that under the military rule, “the Egyptian authorities adopted a series of strategies in order to monitor and observe the internet activities including restricting connectivity during major protests and using content filtering devices”. Normally, there were usually no clear red lines on topics such as the presidency, army, and Muslim-Christian relations, yet these were hot issues; traditional journalists and citizens should not deal with them otherwise they might be taken into custody unexpectedly. On the other hand, online activists and bloggers tried to be critical in these issues in the transition period and encouraged the traditional media workers to challenge sensitive topics in order to test and see the limits of freedom of media both online and offline.

The Egyptian constitution and the criminal code state that the media was free within the boundaries of society. Such a vague statement gave the right to limit the freedom of expression under the premise of “keeping public order”. Actually, there were no clear rules allowing the government to censor or monitor the behavior of citizens in the Egyptian constitution. Yet the government used this blank and ambiguous explanation under the emergency law effectively. Abdel Kouddous (2012:1) stated that “it rapidly became clear that silencing those media voices critical of military rule was central to the SCAF’s strategy for dealing with continuing protests. The military forces assaulted and detained journalists, destroyed and confiscated media equipment and targeted news outlets”. The army also accused the media of ‘sabotaging’ Egypt in front of the national and international press. Since the revolution, journalists had faced harassment at various levels, especially from the authorities. Many foreign journalists had been taken into custody from these pressures. These journalists were photographed and recorded to be shown as “terrorists” on national television. Among these detainees were a team of reporters for CNN. Security agencies in other words the military, often interfered with the press in secret ways. Hassan (2015) reported from Abd al-Moneim Aboul Futouh about the pressure on the media in Egypt as:

The security press was a number of journalists in different places; some of them were editors-in-chief of state-owned publications. Their role was to be an instrument of the security agencies. The security agencies used them to harm a political opponent, to defame his reputation, or to injure an organization like the Muslim Brotherhood. I called this group the security press, the press that gets its instructions from the security agencies, that did not

practice the function of media and journalism as professionals – neutral, honest, clean (p.24).

Khamis (2011) also indicated that the ability of the regime to apply various pressure tools to the media outlets like controlling the advertising revenues further limited the ability of the media outlets to provide counter-narratives. El Issawi (2014) emphasized the new situation on the newly approved Egyptian constitution as;

The new constitution (January 2014) provides real progress in the protection of freedom of information, such as guaranteeing freedom of expression and opinion, press freedom and media independence and banning censorship and prison sentences for media offenses. However, these improvements are at odds with an unprecedented repression campaign, implemented by the military-backed government and designed to silence dissenting voices. According to Reporters Without Borders: “arrests, detention, and trials were on trumped-up charges – the authorities flout the constitutional guarantees enshrined in article 71 and stop at nothing to silence those who refuse to relay the government’s propaganda (p.301).

The independence of the state media has recently been adopted in the new 2014 constitution, yet this freedom conception is not realistically possible because of the heavy bureaucratic nature of the state media and the important role of the Ministry of Information in monitoring and censorship. Mansour (2015) gave information about the press in Egypt as;

Egypt has more than five hundred newspapers, magazines, journals, and other publications. While many of these titles are owned by the Egyptian state, many others are privately owned. Most publications struggle financially; the country’s economic collapse has forced both state and private newspapers to implement deep budget cuts, though as of 2014, no major news outlet was forced to close its doors. In addition to their lack of resources, independent news organizations suffer from a lack of advocates. Organizations charged with representing journalists’ interests before the government, such as the Egyptian Journalist Syndicate, are reliant on state funding and have consequently proven to be ineffective guardians of press freedom (p.2).

The pressure on the media from the military and government has increased dramatically after the coup d’état on the 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2013. Mansour (2015) stated about the role of the media under the military regime as;

After the military takeover, the Sisi regime quickly consolidated control of the state media, moving in January 2014 to name new chairpersons for all of Egypt’s state newspapers. The regime has used its media control to demonize civil society organizations, foreign journalists, and the political opposition, and the generous subsidies given to state media indicate that the leadership places a high priority on its ability to shape public discourse in this way. Control of the state media is undoubtedly one of the last levers of power the current regime would be willing to release (p.2).

Consequently, autocracy in the Egyptian media became widespread. Instead of encountering

legal, financial and physical pressures, many media owners abstained from direct criticism of the government and the military and also they avoided the hot issues in Egypt. The broadcast of the coup by Al Sisi is the most obvious example of a relationship between the army and the media. Rezaei (2018) highlighted that “an observer could easily conclude that the country is a classic example of stable authoritarianism. The regime controls much of the media, dominates political life, and suppresses its opponents with a vast array of legal and extra-legal tools. It also carefully monitors and manipulates civil society groups and political parties. Yet, Egyptian political life includes several features that suggest a different picture” (p.220). The military coup on the 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2013 against the president Mohamed Morsi was made in front of the cameras and with the attendance of several representatives of Egyptian society. This official undemocratic event’s legitimacy and public support seemed to have been won by using this political appearance. Yet, the influence of the army on media is not limited to this action. The military regime has used media institutions for its own interests for many years and has tightly controlled the media in order to avoid any opposition against their ruling. Attalah and Rizk (2011) informed that Media ownership by the state was a figure of Nasser’s sovereignty and this principle is still effective with various media organizations of the state. Three mainstream printed newspapers, al-Ahram, al-Akhbar and al-Gomhureya, are under the supervision of the state. The Middle East News Agency, Egypt’s main wire service, is also bound up to the state with major publishing houses. These media institutions are not able to get their privilege of autonomy. On the other hand, media organizations are exposed to heavy state control with, censorship via the demands of the military in the last decades. The Supreme Council for the Media Regulation committee is mostly composed of the military officers. Egypt has a central broadcast model. The Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU) (1989) summarized the principles, which are still valid, of the broadcasting that “it is strictly prohibited to broadcast any program that criticizes officers of the courts, military officers, or security officers as well as religious leaders”. Independent and objective journalism in Egypt is a very difficult job. The Egyptian media is even more controlled after the coup d’état. The new development with the coup is that the control over the media is more systemized. No criticism is allowed against Sisi or the army. Noueihed and Mourad (2015) stated that the control over media is further tightened by a law that prohibits reporting about the army without permission. If anybody makes broadcast without permission, then this person will be imprisoned for up to five years and fined an excessive

amount of money that cannot be bearable for most employee. There, the Egyptian people can only hear the voice of Sisi and regime supporters; the society is unaware and unnoticed about the certain and opposing news. In the Mubarak era, media could broadcast the official statements of the army, yet after the coup in 2013, the state and military control over the media is widespread and it becomes impossible to make any criticism or opposition through media channels. Abuyounis (2018) cited from Mutaz Matar's interview, an Egyptian journalist and TV presenter, about the pressure on the media;

I have witnessed the Egyptian revolution on Jan 2010, and the coup which happened there on July 2013. I have good experience in using traditional media and digital media. The media is leading the conflict since the starting of the revolution of Jan 2010, the Egyptian army used the media in order to control the policy directly and indirectly, they established new TV channels and spent millions of dollars to continue their control of the institutions of the country which was called 'the deep country', and they succeed in fact'. 'Today the situation is different from the past. Today, social media changed everything. The regimes before social media were doing everything far away from media and they were successful in hiding the truths in the past. However, in social media age, we have used social media as we crowded the people to the streets in our revolution of the 25<sup>th</sup> January 2010 which is a basic part of Arab Spring'.

"The army in Egypt had closed a lot of TV channels in order to control the media and do the coup on 2013 which confirms the important role of media in the conflict. The uses of media in the coup in 2013 in Egypt had started in broadcast the statement of the coup on TV. The Egyptian army could control the oppositional media by closing all the channels of opposite and use the official media to do the coup on 2013". "Digital media not just networks for communication between people, it exceeded that a lot. Social media today contributed mainly in sparing the knowledge worldwide. Social media on a positive side of it reduces the ignorance among people, and when I say knowledge I mean news not just education. So everyone who has smartphone with camera can record everything by an icon and post it on social media which contributes in spread the news at a quick speed".

"Closing a few TV channels was one of the first steps on the coup in 2013 in Egypt, and establishing new channels was in order to continue the coup to stay as far away as possible. That confirms the too important role of media in the conflict. "The army in Egypt leads and controls the traditional media today, and as we are journalists in the front of the coup we depend on social media in the coverage of the events in Egypt. Since the coup happened, I was received in my program as a presenter hundreds of messages on social from people or you can say 'citizenship press' as they cover the events in Egypt by their smartphones and send the materials to me so then I can broadcast them on my program (pp.43-44).

## **CHAPTER FIVE: THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL FACTORS ON THE FAILED TRANSITION**

Throughout Egypt's history, there have always been external actors with no positive political influence under the name of democracy promotion. They served for the authoritarian regime in the shape of economic grants in Egypt rather than promoting the democratization. Eventually, while supporting democratization in the country politically via huge amount of aids and grants, the external actors, the westerners and powerful regional countries abstained from criticizing the repressive policies the regime had over the opponents namely Muslim Brotherhood. Dictators' governance of countries with authoritarian regimes for many years has undoubtedly caused a rise in the longing for the democracy of the people of the region. In addition, institutional transformations in these countries cannot be achieved in the post-Cold War era. The existing social inequality in the region continued to increase after the 2008 crisis. The youth population, which is the most damaged class from this crisis, has started to uprising in order to get their rights. Authoritarian leaders of the region were not able to set up relations between state structures and their citizens. The reason for this was that the oil-rich countries of the region had state structures that did not need political institutions to provide representative justice. Some scholars like (Fortna and Huang, 2012: 803; Abbasi, 2012: 9) claimed that "oil and democracy do not coexist in any part of the world." In the period of state-building, the purpose of Arabism is to function as glue, tribal system, kinship ties brought by feudalism, favoritism, and corruption which have emerged as the greatest obstacle to the development of democracy in the region. Countries and their leaders who were not very rich in terms of underground resources such as Egypt and Tunisia had provided economic benefits for regime pros with thanks to their sectarian relations. The development brought about by economic modernization led to an increase in corruption, and favoritism to the regime bias, which led to a more rigid authoritarian regime leading to the management style. Strong authoritarian regimes had continued to become stricter to the basic human rights violations. Yet, the political liberalization that should be expected as a result of the changing movements does not seem possible in the near future. The most important proof of the paradigm forgetting political liberalization, before the "Arab Spring", which was generally built on economic liberalization, was the rhetoric of popular movements. The reasons for the uprising in the region were not only the economic difficulties. The new

generation of the Arab population is a more politically and pragmatically structured generation that uses technology better and is aware of the living standards of its peers in other geographies of the world. In this context, the European Union needs a more proactive policy along with the acceptability of a more active European Union in the perspective of the people of the region who are going to increase accordingly. Perthes (2011) stated about the reaction of the EU and USA to the 'Arab Spring' as;

The European Union and the United States, taken by surprise by the sudden outbreak of the Arab Spring, have had to accept their lack of influence over these revolutionary upheavals. They may assist or obstruct, but they cannot determine the course of events. This applies even to Libya. Without NATO's intervention, it would certainly have taken much longer to oust the Gadhafi regime. Whether Libya, however, remains divided or spirals into anarchy, whether the outcome will be a new dictatorship, some kind of tribal confederation or the emergence of a democratic system, will be decided by Libyans, not by Europe or NATO. If anything, the limited influence of Europe and the international community on the timing and progress of the uprisings is an advantage. Alongside their peaceful trajectory, the beauty of the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions was that they were autochthonous; immune to accusations of foreign meddling, but having little influence is not the same as escaping all responsibility (p.73).

Therefore, it is imperative that Western states or institutions, which should not be forgotten, help with the election of the territorial rights, should not escape this responsibility. It is a fact that the western world has not taken as much responsibility for the arrival and settlement of democracy and human rights. Transformation and changes may be risky. In this respect, European Union had been indifferent to taking part in contributing to the transformation of the region, and EU had not taken responsibility for democracy and civil liberties in the MENA. The most important element that distinguishes the experience of revolution in Egypt from the ones that have existed before is that the external actors are intensely involved in the developments experienced in this process. Although many foreign actors were caught unprepared for the developments in Egypt when they engaged at a very low level in the early period of the revolution which started on the 25<sup>th</sup> January 2011, regional and global actors in the following period had crucial roles in the country's political developments by rapidly repositioning. The period in which this situation is most explicitly experienced is the period of counter-revolution. External actors were silent in the following the process in the first place because they were caught unprepared for the Arab Spring and did not expect such a result. Later on, foreign powers supported the counter-revolution in Egypt when they saw that the things did not go as they would have liked. They expressed their support most clearly in the post-coup statements discussing military and financial issues.



The supporters of the counter-revolution, which was organized after the sixth month of the Muhammad Morsi period, soon became an active force. At this point, the internal actors who have lost their power in the revolutionary period have come into commission and have started the process of counter-revolution with the support by the governments of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in the region. It should be noted that the importance of the alliances that these internal actors have established along with the external actors in carrying out the counter-revolution. Despite the support of the armed forces, the media and the business world, counter-revolutionary internal actors needed the support of external actors, especially in their economic sense. As a matter of fact, this external support has great importance in ensuring the legitimacy of future administration of power in the process of counter-revolution. Inside the counter-revolutionary front, regional actors, as well as the support of actors at the global level, successfully managed the process. In this respect, although the internal actors were direct actors in the process of counter-revolution in Egypt, they got the support of external actors who have succeeded in realizing them. This external support also initiated the process of internationalization of the Egyptian revolution with the counter-revolutionary process. In this process not only the actors in Egypt but also regional and global countries, international organizations, supranational organizations and transnational organizations were involved in the revolutionary process in a sense as counter-revolutionary support in Egypt. Direct involvement of external actors was often painful in the previous revolutionary process which has been very explicit in the case of Egypt. Egypt is another example of the counter-revolution in that some countries favoring the protection of the status quo supported by the institutions and figures of some countries, create the scene of the revolutionary movement.

In the case of Egypt, the regional countries that most strongly supported the counter-revolution movement were Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait. These countries supported Sisi regime both financially and politically, and they demanded that the counter-revolutionary process is carried out successfully. The alliance of the Gulf States with the Egyptian army, which also includes the former regime actors, should be seen as a result of co-operation with the past. As a matter of fact, the coup d'état architect Abdulfettah El-Sisi developed important relations with Saudi Arabia. Likewise, Hazem El-Biblavi, who was the first prime minister after the coup, stayed in Kuwait for 18 years as well as in the Arab Money Fund in the United Arab Emirates for 11 years. Farouk (2014) stated that “as a

matter of fact, the first congratulations to Sisi after the military coup on the 3<sup>rd</sup> July were Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Kuwait, and these three countries became direct supporters of the coup d'état and thus the counter-revolutionary period” (pp. 9-10). In this part, which is to uncover the role that the global actors had in the course of the counter-revolution, the roles of both global and regional actors in Egyptian politics will be analyzed. Since the involvement of the external actors in the revolutionary process, the revolutionary literature shows them as less experienced than the role played by the internal actors; this part is important in that it constitutes a new example in this field.

### **5.1. The Role of the Global Actors**

The Middle East and the Gulf countries are designed by an absolute global power. The leading countries here have been the United States and the Western Countries that have formed the system of the region within the framework of a capitalist system. After 1970, when the oil began to be used as a weapon, the countries of the region felt the influence of the designing countries more and more. In the Gulf States, we see that the state establishment is shaped by a family/dynasty as that they exist in the management of the families throughout their history. These families have used the people who live under the authoritarian regime in order to guarantee their existence, the achievements of the trade that precedes the geostrategic position. After the discovery of petroleum, they have gone to the benefit of distributing a portion of their gains from the oil rent to make the small profit partner and thus managing them. When this profit was not possible or sufficient to their citizens, the authorized family made an agreement with the powerful states that were active at that time in order to protect their sovereignty. This was because military forces were insufficient or they could not trust the existing military forces or the police forces. To get the blessings that the Gulf and Middle East region wanted, the powerful states allowed existing families to enrich their oil wealth with oil after the commerce and before they were able to govern the small states where the Western Democratic meaning was not allowed to be created. Stability and democracy in these regions are particularly necessary as long as it permits uninterrupted flow of oil or natural gas. Indeed, while analyzing the countries affected by the mass uprisings, the dictators or the families of the theocratic rulers influenced by the Arab Spring

were in relatively good relations with the West till that time. Of course, on the basis of this relationship lied bilateral earnings. Therefore, while evaluating the Arab Spring movements, it is important to take about the following points by granting the complaints of the regimes. It may be a reductionist approach to see these movements as just a struggle for freedom of the oppressed or the people's communities.

In these social movements, which are described as Arab Spring and military coup in Egypt, some analysts think that the United States is behind the events and that it is the restructuring of geography as part of the Greater Middle East Project. In this context, a point of view that external forces are the ones that mobilize the internal dynamics in Arab geography gains strength. Mahalli (2011) stated that even the American newspapers say 'the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is helping the Syrian opposition', but some still talk about the struggle for democracy in this country and they do not see the big game being played there. They either do not want to see it or they are not allowed to see it. Therefore, there was the existence of a hegemonic point of view that made things in a plan and program. Western countries leading the United States and their democratic or non-democratic supporters are trying to put in place or deliberately say that everything is complicated in the name of democracy. According to the West, however, the Islamist parties, which came to power with the Arab Spring, have no experience of democracy and will not be able to make political, economic and social choices without different contradictions. In addition, the social and cultural character of these countries and their political and economic characteristics are not similar to Israel, the USA or European countries. If this is not the case, there can be a suitable democracy for them. The Arab Spring could be another name for the completely justified claims of the Arab people who have been forced to live under the oppression of the dictators for decades with their dignified struggles. However, in countries that live "in the spring" there has been no change in the living conditions of the people and this will never happen because the concept of democracy is a way of life that has political, economic, social, cultural and psychological dimensions. Using free will voting is only one dimension, but it is not a very important dimension. The basic concept that should not be ignored in Arab democracies is honor. The honor will not be provided by tanks, planes, and dollars from the US or NATO. Qatar and Saudi riyals will never get the honor of Egyptian people. If the illiterate, poor, unemployed and hungry Egyptian are frightened before going to the ballot, and they have been convinced that all their problems would be solved, then there was a problem in this

democracy.

The United States, which has been described as the hegemonic power of the world, has been following important events that have emerged around the world, and they are striving to be involved in the process. Once the process is complete, they are always on the move in the direction of their own interests. When we consider the Egyptian example, the US wants to secure its own interests first and then Israel's security and future. The US wanted to shape the post-Mubarak era in Egypt within its own interests. In the first place, the Muslim Brotherhood's coming to power and representing the majority was not directly beneficial for their self-esteem. As a matter of fact, to intervene in this political affair, the US first provoked the other part of the people by using internal dynamics. The army has also achieved its goal by incorporating it into its business. On the way to the target, the United States was in contact with key actors in the country. Ultimately, the minority is superior to the majority.

### **5.1.1. The Role of the United States of America**

The United States of America, which was caught unprepared for the revolutionary process in Egypt and could not develop a coherent policy for this country for two years, also showed an inconsistent attitude during the July 2013 coup. The USA, after the declaration of the will of the Egyptian army to make a military coup, invited MB to reconcile with the opposition by meeting with Hayrat Shatır, one of the well-known leaders of the MB, yet with the realization of the coup d'état, the US directly took the side of the new administration which disappointed the supporters of democracy in Egypt. The US administration, which did not give a sincere support to the democratization of Egypt in the post-Mubarak period, failed to react to the demobilization of Morsi, who came to power with democratic elections, in his military coup. In this period, some Egyptian civil societies and figures supported by the USA participated in the anti-Morsi field and contributed to the removal of the first president who came to the country with democratic elections in the country with the military coup. To understand America's reactions, we first need to look at its interests. Yazıcı (2014) emphasized that “for ages, the West has never worried about the democratization of the Arab world, and nothing matters for the West except the regional stability and their economic interests” (p.104). The EU and USA formed several military bases in Egypt and made

military aid agreements. While America's belief in the developmental dominance of the world continues, a result of the internal dynamics of the Egyptian uprisings is considered the first sparks of the Arab Spring. Oğuzlu (2011) informed that prior to the Arab Spring, America's interests in the region were establishing close ties with Israel, facilitating the flow of oil to the West and making it difficult for other global powers to access the region. Before the Arab Spring, everyone in the region was aware that some states were seen as one of the most important threats by the USA. The existence of some nuclear weapons claimed by the US made it possible for all American governments to be regarded as the most important regional threat. With the demands of radical religious governance, the countries questioned Israel's existence and legitimacy in the most brutal manner. Prashad (2012) informed that the events at Tahrir Square echoed in Washington. The prospect of a growing wave of protests spreading throughout the region has made America uneasy. Because of the uncontrolled events, American politicians were questioning the following: was the US power in the region shaking? How would Israel respond to the fall of the Mubarak regime? With confidence and enthusiasm brought about by the fall of Mubarak and Ben Ali, what would bring to the Emirates in Yemen and Saudi Arabia and the Gulf of Basra? For this reason, internal turmoil in the revolutionary countries like Tunisia and Egypt could serve America's interests. Therefore, the attitude of America had been to strive for ways of falling how to favor with them. Bingöl (2007) asserted that “in terms of the interests of America, rather than bringing the democratic and libertarian governments to work, it will be the most rational choice to contribute to its regional policies and to keep the most faithful and closest political staff on the job. In this context, it is often a favorable choice for the interests of the United States to support a certain degree of authoritarian rule, free from the public and therefore democratic norms” (p.16).

The Middle East accounts for 41.5 percent of world natural gas reserves, 55.5% of its reserves. A more striking example is that Qatar's natural gas reserves alone can heat up all the houses in the US for a hundred years. There are also advantages when the Middle East and the Gulf are controlled by international powers. Yazıcı (2014) cited from a Noam Chomsky's report that “the US never permits the processes of democratization to develop fully in the Arab world, and they will allow only managed democracies in the region. The US supported the regimes in the Arab world for the economic interests, and then withdrew the support for the sake of democracy” (p.105). The US wanted to control the MENA region

as a tool of the world superpower. The US, which sees Europe as an important competitor, is more or less comparable to the US in terms of economy and population. The way to keep Europe under control is to make it dependent on oil by controlling the oil on its own.

Egypt always had an important position in the Arab world. So as to explain the policy of the US towards Egypt during the Arab Spring, it is necessary to examine Egypt's relations with Israel, the West and the Islamic world. Following the popular uprising that took place in January 2011, after ousting Hosni Mubarak, the ruling soldiers took a decision to open the Gaza border with Palestine in the spring of 2011. This was done in order to secure their own legitimacy and to control the potential social opposition and anger. Then the Muslim Brotherhood, who took over the power, kept the human corridor open to Gaza and keep the Hamas and Fatah support consensus negotiations. The Muslim Brotherhood candidate in a general sense, the Morsi administration, favored a relationship based on rational and common interests that would be unexpected in its relations with the West. Morsi's visit to the United States for the UN General Assembly, his negotiations with EU officials in Brussels, and his visit to Italy and Germany were the infrastructure preparations for rational and joint constructive relations. The Israeli attack on Palestine in 2012 is important for the Morsi administration to reveal its side. Morsi played an active role in the movement that led to a visit to Gaza. The new power with Islamic identity was already a usual doubt for the US and Israel. Therefore, one of the first actions of the military regime, who replaced the Muslim Brotherhood by a military coup d'état in 2013, was to close the Gaza border gate.

The attitude of Morsi from an Islamic tradition, the attitude of him after Israel attack on Palestine, and the attitude of the 10 million Christian minority constituting the Egyptian population were in favor of the military regime against the Morsi administration which were decisive in US policies regarding the military coup against Morsi. According to US thinking, millions of Egyptian people worried about the country and wanted the army to intervene on behalf of the government in order to stop the chaos and violence. The United States is undertaking tremendous tasks related to the order of the world. During the Cold War, the United States has used discourses such as civil liberties, democracy and the right of nations to self-determine to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) as a foreign policy tool. With the collapse of the USSR, the US has abandoned such discourses as democracy, human rights, and the right of the nations to self-determination in a unipolar world while it has focused on 'order' for the continuation of the hegemony. It is possible to say that in this

framework, the policy of the USA against the military coup is in the direction of its benefits. America has prevented the Islamic-dominated government from long-term use by taking advantage of Egypt's internal balances for its own interests in the US. Egypt is an important strategic point between Africa and Europe and it is more than useful and practical for the policies of US in the Middle East.

Ever since the first traces of the Arab Spring began to emerge, arguments have been raised that the severe social movements in the region were prepared and directed by the United States. Since the beginning of the Arab Spring, many analysts who were interested in and working on the process had found that the United States has restructured this geography under the Greater Middle East Project (GMEP). The initiatives of the USA in the past in this geography mean that the force of the dominant powers in the world in every period of history, in searching of the new sources, particularly in the geography of the Middle East, means that the potential domino effect in this region was very low by happening spontaneously. There must be a strong power to make the people mobile in order to change the old autocratic regime. Especially, the biggest demand of the global economy, energy like oil and natural gas was the most common in the region; therefore, it reduced the likelihood that large states would give the Middle Eastern People up to the future of the region on themselves. Besides the energy resources, the Middle East has been the center of world trade for centuries. Due to its geopolitical position, this region connects the East and West along with the North and South. However, in the case of both peace and war, this geography is a great market for capitalist forces. In the time of peace, the population living in the region constitutes a large market for the global companies. In addition, the Middle East is the largest market for weapons trade, as it is the place where wars have been prominent in the history. If ideological, ethnic, political and religious reasons also add to these factors, it would be more optimistic to imagine that the imperialist powers would leave the region to their fate. Therefore, the recent history of the Middle East clearly demonstrates that there are constant conflicts of interest over this region. The intervention of the USA in Iraq and Afghanistan along with the intervention of the NATO army in Libya and Syria were the proofs of this idea. Undoubtedly, the Western world and especially the United States, the most powerful military-political-industrial complex of the global world, closely followed the improvements in the Middle East. They wanted to intervene in the progressive stages, even if not at the beginning of events. In Egypt, for example, in this sense, the United States had attempted

to shape the post-Hosni Mubarak rule in the direction of its own interests and had attempted to establish close ties with key actors for this purpose. America had been quite successful. The Gaddafi administration, which had been in ruling for many years in Libya, had been a threat to the whole world and humanity in the Arab Spring process and military operations had been organized there with the demand of the United States. America chased similar policies on Syria. Without a doubt, the United States was involved in the process in its center. All these reasons leave the impression that the events of Tunisia in the Middle East are spread by domino effect and that millions of people were influenced by the leading of great powers. The statement of President Obama's post-coup demonstration shows that Washington had an ambiguous policy on Egypt, and yet the USA can be easily adapted to turn against Morsi. Obama has not described the Chief of General Staff Abdel Fattah El-Sisi's Egyptian seizure as a military coup. In addition, he also expressed that Egypt wants rapid democratic governance. Having said that the US would not be able to support the one-party or one-man government, Obama said that Washington would reassess Cairo's aid in the wake of the US's failure to help the countries governed by the military coup and that Egypt must now meet democratic institutions. In the following days of the coup, contacts and high-level statements emerged that the United States was not disturbed by the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood and approved the administration of the country by the military regime under Al Sisi leadership. US Deputy Secretary of State William Burns, who made his first official visit to Egypt after the coup, did not give any reference to the military coup in his statement after he visited the General Abdulfettah Al-Sisi and other transition process leaders. He stated that "the truth is that only Egyptians themselves can make the hard choices required to build an inclusive, tolerant, democratic future," Burns said. "I also know that they will find a determined partner in the United States" ([www.dw.com](http://www.dw.com)). He also emphasized in his 15<sup>th</sup> July 2013 visit that "he did not come with American solutions, nor did he come to lecture anyone. America would not try to impose their model on Egypt." This visit, which was made just right after military coup d'état and their statements such as "America were ensured that Egypt would advance towards democracy with this new administration", also gave the signs that America would act with the Egyptian army in the transition period together. Therefore, Burns did not require meeting any members of the MB, who were eager for Morsi's reinstatement. Quite interestingly, he did also not meet with the representatives of "Tamarod movement," the anti-Morsi movement that led to his fall. At that time MB representatives



accused the USA of backing or even instigating the coup. The Muslim Brotherhood spokesman Farid Ismail (2013) stated that “the Americans carried out the military coup - they didn't just recognize the new leaders, they carried out the coup. We know, and we have specific information about the communications that preceded the coup, which proves that the US planned it and General Abdel Fattah Al-Sissi executed it” (www.dw.com). Fisk (2013) stated about the issue and America’s stance as;

For the first time in the history of the world, a coup is not a coup. The army takes over, depose and imprison the democratically elected president, suspend the constitution, arrest the usual suspects, close down television stations and mass their armor in the streets of the capital. But the word ‘coup’ does not – and cannot – cross the lips of the Blessed Barack Obama. Nor does the hopeless UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon dares to utter such an offensive word. It’s not as if Obama doesn’t know what’s going on (independent.co.uk).

This also shows that America did not do anything for democracy in Egypt; on the other hand, it supported the coup surreptitiously. In fact, “what democracy aid has done is to represent the superiority of the US model of liberal democracy in maintaining the national interests of the US at the expense of subject colonial people” (Snider and Faris 2011). The USA gave a high amount of aid, yet this was not spent on the democratic tools or human right organizations. On the other hand, these aids went through for the military which was the main supplier of the regime and the main set against democracy in Egypt. Hamid (2011) confirmed about this aid and its yield as;

Egypt provides unconditional and complete support for US objectives and operations (including anti-terrorism), and provides a big market for US products, while providing legitimacy for Israeli actions (particularly in Gaza, historically considered to fall under the auspices of Egypt in international Arabism), securing access to the Suez Canal and giving use of its airspace for US military operations (p.27).

Also it promoted the military by their statements and also financial support. Therefore, the US administration, which had performed poorly in order to pursue a democratic attitude immediately after the military coup d’état, lost the credibility of democracy in Cairo along with the Egyptian public confidence. Yazıcı (2014) stated about the attitude of the USA from the news of Washington times and BBC news as;

John Kerry speculated that Egypt’s military was restoring democracy and was asked to intervene by millions of people who were afraid of chaos and violence. He said on GEO TV: “The military was asked to intervene by millions and millions of people, all of whom were afraid of a descendant into chaos, into violence. And the military did not take over, to the best of our judgment so — so far.”<sup>388</sup> As obvious, the US government rejected to describe

removal of Morsi as a coup not to cut off its annual aid to Egypt. Kerry reminded that the military did not take over so far and to run the country, there is a civilian government (p. 129).

Nevertheless, the general policy of the US to post-revolutionary Egypt, whoever comes to power, was the policy of protecting America's interests by developing relations with the administration which has continued more openly during the Sisi's period. The Obama administration has given military and political support to the Sisi and junta regime to guarantee the US interests in the region. The US has been supporting the Egyptian army and the former regime in the aftermath of the coup d'état. Despite the intense pressure campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood movement that damning the violence and the abuses of human rights in the country, the unresponsive attitude of the USA to the Sisi administration, is a proof that Washington does not care about a real sense of democracy in the country.

The US aid policy to Egypt has also been achieved by ignoring democratic principles in the interests of Washington. The United States has not announced military intervention as a coup d'état so that 1.5 billion dollars of aid given to Egypt every year cannot be cut off. Yet, after international reactions and increased human rights abuses in Egypt, the USA has frozen \$ 260 million in aid to Egypt at that time. In contrast, the US State Department spokesman Jan Psaki indicated that military aid to serve the interests of the USA and Israel would continue and these military aid benefits were vital to the Egyptian terrorist fight and border security issues. As a matter of the fact that US government expressed that apache helicopters which were being delayed to deliver till 2014 would be sent to Cairo as soon as possible. In this way, while the United States continued military aid to Egypt from one side, the US aimed to ensure that the Sisi administration acted in line with US interests.

The oppression politics and human rights violations carried out by the Sisi administration against both the Muslim Brotherhood movement and other revolutionary movements during the counter-revolutionary period in Egypt have not been met with a serious reaction by Washington for a long time. Even so, even if hundreds of MB members were condemned to death in Egypt, the US could not prevent Egypt from transmitting arms aid. Murphy (2014) emphasized that America has been underestimated by the death penalty given as a result of purely political trials. Despite the human rights violations in the country, the decision to maintain military aid to Cairo is an indication that the US preferred democracy to the status quo in Egypt. America continued this policy until Sisi was elected President of the Republic. In the following years, America has supported Sisi more and has contributed to strengthening

his international legitimacy. Because of the human rights abuses in Egypt and ongoing pressure, a group of intellectuals was asking Obama to cut off military support for Egypt. The Obama administration, which did not listen to the calls, continued to support the coup in Egypt. Abdulfettah El-Sisi, who came to the United States for the United Nations General Assembly, also met with Barack Obama as part of his contacts. Obama met with Sisi despite the call of the human rights institutions to the opposite side. Obama emphasized that Egypt and the US have common concerns, and that the strategic cooperation between the two countries was inevitable. This approach of the Obama administration has not only brought legitimacy to the Sisi regime but has also paved the way for the pressure on opponents of the coup to continue increasingly in Egypt. The United States continued its economic, political and military aid to Egypt after the coup too. US Secretary of State John Kerry underlined that America attaches great importance to Egypt's security and stated that America was ready to make political and economic aid to Cairo for democratization. Secretary of State John Kerry (2015) stated officially in U.S.-Egypt Strategic Dialogue forum in Cairo that

...And finally, the last thing, let me just reiterate the United States and Egypt are both at our best when we are working to improve institutions of governance, to support political reform, because good governance is the single most important platform for any country's success in the 21st century. It's more vital than oil or precious minerals or a deep-water port. And, believe me, we are confronting our own challenges in the United States. We are not suggesting we have all the answers. But we are engaged in a pretty open process of working at our own process to develop ongoing reform. Egypt has a very long, very proud history of independence and leadership. Egypt has really always been the hub of the Arab world and of this region. And we have no doubt that, with the right economic choices and the right choices about governance, Egypt is going to continue to play this vital role. That's why the United States is so deeply committed to this relationship. We are confident that Egypt has really good reason to ensure that the fundamental rights of its citizens are protected, that vital principles such as due process and freedom of press and association are cherished, and that women are empowered, and that every Egyptian has the right to participate peacefully within a truly democratic political process. No great country – and Egypt is without question a great country – should settle for any less... (eg.usembassy.gov).

The American policy has shown that since the Egyptian military coup, the Washington administration wants an ally to emerge in Egypt that will serve its long-term interests rather than democratize it. Obama administration was aware of the necessity of a strong regime in Egypt for establishing a regime preceded by the regional interests of Israel and the USA which had not seen any disadvantage in supporting the Sisi regime and the counter-revolutionary process in Egypt.

### **5.1.2. The Role of the European Union**

The European Union is a regional integration process that is constantly evolving with the tendency towards everyday expansion and deepening from the past. The EU has tried to carry out the enlargement with some political, economic and institutional treaties, but decided to carry out a neighboring policy with the neighboring countries at the end of the enlargement process so as to maintain the principle of manageability within the boundaries of the existing borders. The EU has preferred to behave differently to the countries where it attaches more importance to the geographical area, especially in the Middle East. The EU has come to regard the oppressive attitudes of authoritarian regimes in the countries in the light of their political interests. Brussels A 70/13 Press (2013) highlighted the fluency of the democratic situation and underlined “while overall significant progress has been made in promoting democratic reforms (e.g. holding of elections in line with democratic standards, strengthening of the role of civil society, increased freedom of expression and assembly) many obstacles still need to be overcome in order for these transitions to be successfully consolidated” (p.1). Egypt, for example, where the regime was highly oppressive, had also become the most beneficiary of EU funds. There were countries such as Jordan and Morocco, which were geographically important for the EU, although the EU had done little to reform. In short, the EU is in the Middle East politics; democracy, good governance, human rights, the rule of law, etc. aimed at disseminating and developing the concepts, but the result showed the limit of the EU in the subject area.

The regional cooperation that the EU wanted to realize towards the Middle East has faced some difficulties. At the head of these difficulties were authoritarian regimes in the region. The concept of democratization that the EU wanted to promote was inherently dangerous for authoritarian regimes. The mentioned regimes had sometimes resisted changes in the point where they were beginning to clash with their interests, even if they had supported regional cooperation. The conflicts in the Middle East, a challenging geography, had caused the EU trouble in its politics in the region. In addition to the Arab Spring process, internal disturbances and wars, stability in the region had suffered serious damage and cooperation had remained quite backward. Of course, as well as adding to the fact that the EU always puts itself at the center as well as positions other collaborators according to EU benefits, bilateral relations had been adversely affected. In addition to all these, the EU was fighting

the dilemma of democratization and stabilization in the region. This dilemma was related to the different foreign policy initiatives of member countries, their different interests and their security preferences.

The EU in principle has adopted cooperation and stability as a common foreign policy objective, thus choosing a democracy-based security model. The regional security, free trade and the development of civil society, the EU had assumed that EU could achieve its goal for the Middle East. The failure of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership policy, the Arab Spring, which started at the end of 2010, as well as the repressive regimes in the Middle East, have prevented it. The EU, which has pursued various policies for the democratization of the Middle East, wanted to guarantee its security on this issue, but in any case, did not support the idea of bringing new ones instead of existing regimes like the US. Since the beginning of its interest in geography, the EU has preferred not to communicate with religion-based movements, preferring to maintain distance with local dynamics. Yet, after 2010, the political power of the political Islamic movements in the MENA increased and their voices started to rise. In the Arab Spring period, the EU's lack of communication was felt deeply and the EU wanted to make up its mistake by recognizing the Muslim Brotherhood Movement in Egypt. This situation has clearly shown that the EU is actively promoting its own security, not spreading the democratization movement in the region. The lack of democracy in that region and Arab countries has created a great security threat for the countries in the West. The political pressure created by the authoritarianism of the regime in Egypt had caused the radicalization of various groups away from the peaceful paths in order to be able to have a say in politics. Therefore, these events threatened the security of the West as a result of regional instability. Emphasizing the need for the development of civil liberties and democracy in the region, the EU has stated that political reforms should be enhanced. However, differences have arisen between what was said and what was done while the changes that the EU has made with the Neighborhood Policy have not been realized. Brussels A 70/13 Press (2013) took the attention on that "EU support to stimulate sustainable economic growth is therefore crucial to the promotion of democratic institutions, provided that the countries of the region contribute to the promotion of a friendly environment for investments, jobs and growth. It should be underlined that economics has a deep connection with politics. An economic collapse would imply a political failure of the transition" (p.2). Economic assistance to support the political reforms in the region has not

reached adequate levels and most of the assistance has been transferred to issues such as terrorism, immigration and border control rather than projects to support democracy. That's to say, the EU did not regard the concept of democracy as a self-imposed value but instrumentalized it as a concept that could prevent terrorism, especially targeting the Western countries. The authoritarian regimes have been the most beneficial to this situation, and with the support of the West, they have created a fear that radical Islamic groups would be able to seize power over the people. However, the authoritarian regime's policy carried out by the Western countries had not brought security to the countries of the region. On the other hand, the inadequate political reforms that have been carried out by the authoritarian regimes had worsened the situation in the region. The EU's endorsement of the authoritarian regimes in the political arena to block radical Islamic groups had brought more confusion than stability. For instance, the political rights in Egypt had been reduced and the field of action of civil society organizations had been narrowed. The authoritarian regime became even stronger in countries where repressive regimes were effective.

The EU used some tools to better manage the process of Arab Spring. These tools to support the construction process included: persuasive international diplomacy, humanitarian aid, various sanctions, embargo, many visits made by the EU representatives to the region (Commission Members, High Representative of the Foreign and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission and members of the European Parliament). When the developments began, perhaps it was unlikely that the events would spread so quickly, that most authoritarian regimes in the region would end, and that the region might have varied in many ways. Arab Spring was initially called with relatively more positive approach at the beginning. Yet, when the time passed, Arab awakening, Arab uprising, Arab revolution, and Arab transformation was called in a different way. However, it is referred and called, one thing is certain that the process is still uncertain and unpredictable as to where it will go.

The European Union has given importance to developing its relations particularly in the economic, political and in terms of security with the states, which have the Mediterranean coast. In this context, the EU has placed great emphasis on developing relations with Egypt, one of the most important states of the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The relationship between Egypt and the European states has a long history. The economic and political relationships between the EU and Egypt began to develop, especially in the period of Hosni

Mubarak. One of the main reasons for this is that Mubarak was following a foreign policy consistent with the interests of Western states and the EU attached importance to cooperation with Egypt in economic, political and security matters. Mubarak's emphasis on cooperation with Western states had allowed him to be supported during his thirty-year governing power without questioning his government, even though it had not come with democratic elections.

The European Union is shaping the democratization of the Middle East region. Archick, Belkin, Blanchard, Ek and Mix (2011) emphasized that first of all, a significant number of African Muslims live within the borders of the European Union. It is estimated that this number is 15 to 20 million. Thus there is a "Muslim ghetto" that can affect political life in European countries and each year there is official and informal migration from the Middle East to Europe. In this case, the number of the Muslim population is increasing rapidly. Secondly, the European Union imports nearly half of its energy sources from the Middle East. The instability in the region or, in other words, the threat of the security of the energy supply is threatening the 'life vein' for Europe. Third, the EU is a major commercial partner of the Middle East countries. The process of conversion, called the Arab Spring, has served as a litmus paper for the differences between the union countries. After this event, the domino effect of the countries of the region is the change of the administrations one after another. It is clear that the basic policies of the locomotive countries of the EU differ, and that the common security and foreign policy, that had become more institutionalized after the Lisbon process, had not worked. Britain, France and Germany have pursued a differentiated foreign policy due to their historical, geographical and varied interests on the MENA region countries, revealing that the unity is not real. How the EU reacts to the changes in the Arab world is presented in the framework of the neighborhood policy, which is dated the 8<sup>th</sup> March 2011. "Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean." This report (2011) stated that "the EU wants to support them in building real democracies and peaceful and prosperous societies. Each country and people will of course choose their own path and make their own choices. It is rightly for them to decide and not for us to seek to impose solutions" (p.14). So as to define the regional policy of the Union, it is stated that the people living in common communities have a historical process which will give result not only for the regional states but also for the whole world as well as the EU. In terms of the people of the region, civil liberties, pluralism, the rule of law and the prospect of social justice flourish, whereas the transition periods of democracy

have never been easy, and the transition process has always been faced with risks and uncertainties. For this reason, it is emphasized that the EU should not be passive, but should be supportive within the framework of the three elements determined by the transition states. European Commission (2011) declared these as;

Democratic transformation and institutional structuring, liberties, constitutional reforms, judicial reform and fight against corruption,

Strong partnerships with the people, support for civil society, increased communication from the people,

Sustainable and inclusive growth and economic development, especially small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), health improvement, education systems and the development of poor regions (ec. europa.eu).

The relations between Egypt and the EU are realized within the framework of the European Commission declared document mentioned above. However, we can see that the values written in these documents do not take place in practical relations, and values do not reflect in the actions. In short, there are serious differences between words and actions. The last example of this can be seen just after the coup d'état in Egypt. As a matter of fact, the European Union, which supports the institutionalization and consolidation of democracy and democratic reforms in Egypt, had shown its failure to the illegitimate overthrow of the first elected first president of Egypt. This event led to the questioning of the normative power of the EU. It is also seen in the last case that the European Union that when it is in between values and benefits, European Union has always been in the benefit side; therefore, the values remain in the back seat. Ceyhun (2013) summarized the process of European Union towards Egypt; it was the fact that the emergence in Egypt showed that the Copenhagen Criteria of the EU did not apply to Muslims. Muslims have democratically applied their right of self-determination; this revealed the real faces of some in EU countries because they were at odds with the Copenhagen Criteria in this sample. In particular, it would have been the most sacred of the EU principles to respect the right of the Muslims who claim their own destinies by saying 'more democracy'. The EU, which supported the downfall of the democratically elected president with the military coup in Egypt, understood democracy, however they just chose to serve their own benefits.

The Arab Spring has created some serious advantages and opportunities in order for the EU to be able to put forward a common foreign policy while bringing with it a lot of complications. The Arab Spring process seems to be an opportunity to create a new foreign



policy on behalf of the member states or to revise the existing one to create a process of repairing its weak sides, but as a result it has not caused a comprehensive political change that could bring the EU's relations with the Middle East geography to a new level. It has not allowed the EU to change its common foreign policy image, which was exhibited before the Arab Spring, to be renewed. The Arab Spring has led to an increase in mutual competition and conflict of ideas between the member states of the EU with the ongoing process of conflict, and the impact of the EU on the process has been further diminished by the fact that the members have their national foreign policies in front of the EU. With the Arab Spring, it is now clear that nothing will be as old as MENA. From now on, the countries in the region will determine their own future, while international actors will have to adapt to the situation in question. Unfortunately, the power struggle that followed the Arab Spring is a battle for global and regional actors to widen their influence in order to dominate the region, leading them to a position than before the revolutions of the region began. In terms of the EU, the situation seems even worse. Whether or not the EU, which is trying to make every opportunity feel like it wants to be a global actor in important regions like MENA, has a real sense of this, the Arab Spring had emerged. The Union, which has been struggling to become a global power, has not succeeded in implementing a common policy in Egypt for the democracy. In this policy difference, conflicts of interest between members and conflicts of ideas are taking great importance.

Dersan (2006) stated that “the United States and Europe share key interests with regard to the Middle East. The first and most important common concern related to the Middle East is strategic interests. Both parties express their desire for a stable Middle East since instability and domestic conflicts in the Middle East interrupt commerce, create refugees and generate domestic pressures” (p.100). In other words, the European Union’s policy toward the Middle East has been shaped around security, political and economic interests in general terms. Security interests are possible risks from regional conflicts, terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and illegal immigration from geographical proximity to Europe. Political interests, on the other hand, are generally peace and stability in conflicts in Arab-Israeli and other regions. Finally, economic interests, a more important issue, include secure access to energy resources along with increased exports of the EU to regional markets. The EU has supported the developments that have taken place in countries in the region since the beginning of the Arab Spring for them to become democratic. The Foreign Ministers of

the term stressed civil liberties in the uprising process and explained that they expect the changing governments to respect every aspect of the different social groups in these countries. At the G8 Summit in France in 2011, tips for the EU's new policy on the Middle East and North Africa were announced by German Chancellor Angela Merkel. It has been recommended that new democracies established in consideration of the developments that are realized in the Arab world should be restored to a stable structure so as to resolve the present economic instabilities as soon as possible. It was also emphasized that new governments and reforms should not be in danger. Merkel said that helping the Arab Spring process alone would not provide a solution, and that in the past it had fallen into this fault, and that other basic points were also overlooked because of this mistake. She also stated that Arab countries should take steps to take responsibility for economic and social improvement in the Arab world without ignoring human rights. Merkel emphasized that the EU should play a leading role among other western states in helping to promote economic cooperation and employment policy among Arab countries. Merkel clarified the outline of the foreign policy perspective of the EU towards the MENA region. It was seen that in the process called the Arab Spring, the commercial relations of the European Union with the countries in this region gained concrete momentum.

Less democratic countries have tried to move to a more democratic system with various rebellions and protests with the Arab Spring. However, it has been a difficult process and experience for the MENA countries, which have been governed by colonial and authoritarian regimes until now. The historical heritage of the country, which has an administrative democracy that revolves around an anti-democratic manner like Egypt, has also affected the mentioned democratization process in a negative way. Revolutions in the Arab Spring have initiated a major process of change in the MENA region. Considering the human and natural resources in the region, historical reflexes and the political demands of the people, it is clear that the Arab Spring case is going to cause serious changes and transformations over time. For this reason, it may be wrong for us to make comments about the future of the region with the events that take place only by considering today's hot issues. Moreover, it is not right to evaluate that the developments experienced in the MENA region in the process of transition to democracy as successful or unsuccessful. As a result, people living in the MENA have suffered various experiences which has worn people out over time because of the unrest and demanded democracy. On the other hand, we can understand that no

transformation on earth is easy, as the French revolution has begun to show its consequences after almost 200 years.

One of the most challenging exams of the EU foreign policy, at the beginning of 2011, the European Union had five main political aims. These aims were; economic cooperation, immigration and refugee policy, fight against international terrorism, living in peace with its neighbors and human rights, the rule of law, democratization, and modernization. The EU has adopted an approach that promotes economic welfare in providing a democratic transformation in Egypt. The EU has supported the rule of law and increased employment in the transitional cooperation process for Egypt. The EU took a concrete step on the role to play in Egypt's democratic transformation in 2011 with various agreements. The EU stressed the Egyptian people's desire to achieve a promising economic structure, stating that a democratic and human rights-based government should be established and that the demands raised by the people should be taken into account. In February 2011, the first reaction from European Union to Mubarak's resignation came from Merkel. Merkel explained that the resignation of Mubarak was a service and historical change to the people of Egypt as they shared in the happiness with the Egyptian people. In this context, for the EU countries considering Israel's security in the region, European Union followed a more cautious policy in Egypt because of the emergence of popular movements in Egypt and the predominance of Islamic structures. Behr (2012) stated about the policy of EU after Arab Spring as;

... when it comes to the democratic transition processes in the region, the EU's new policy is unlikely to have a significant impact or to translate into a new role for the EU as a promoter of "sustainable stability" in the region. Similarly, the EU has so far failed to stake out a viable new position for itself in the emerging geopolitical context of the Middle East. What makes matters worse is that the EU's commitment to Arab democracy once again appears to be sidelined by its broader geopolitical goals. This makes it more and more unlikely that the EU will act as a driver for change in the southern Mediterranean. Instead it seems bound to pursue a new variation of its long-standing Euro-Mediterranean vision that places partnership over democratic principles (p.87).

In the history of the MB for the first time, elections in the Middle East have led to a worrisome situation in many issues in the EU. Western states have experienced the fear that they would lose their sovereignty over Egypt. This is because the Muslim Brotherhood's Islamic discourse and the foreign policy they pursued during their one-year rule are different from the politics of the Egyptian political leaders to which Western states are so accustomed. As a result, the US, Israel and the European Union were not satisfied with the policies of the

MB. Unlike the Mubarak regime, the policies of the Morsi administration raised concerns that the Egyptian-Western alliance, which had existed for a long time, might be damaged as predicted. The EU had not provided strong support for reforms and power in Egypt during the transition period of democracy. The EU had perceived the Muslim Brotherhood Movement in general terms on the perception of the actors in domestic politics, media and soldiers. They did not provide the necessary support to Egypt during the transition period of democracy. In this case, the democratic transformation in Egypt made the process even more fragile which resulted in a military coup on the 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2013.

In July 2013, after Morsi was removed from office by the General Abdulfettah Al-Sisi, the European Union made a faint call for the release of President Morsi, who was arrested during the coup in Egypt. The EU Foreign Policy Unit Report (2014) stated about the situation in Egypt as “EU member states agree informally to suspend export licenses for some types of equipment that could be used for internal repression, but do not impose an arms embargo or other negative measures” (p.14). Just after the coup, as the Sisi administration imprisoned 528 anti-coup people in Egypt. The Foreign Minister of Germany, Frank-Walter Steinmeier (2014) explained that “it is not a positive trend in the European Union that the majority of the people in Egypt continued to be exempted from the political representation” (dw.com). In September 2014, following general elections, Sisi made formal negotiations in various EU countries. Therefore, Sisi’s politic negotiations showed that European Union does not care about the democracy of the democratic election. After the coup on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of July, the America and the Gulf states avoided calling the Egyptian coup as a military coup d'état. The European Union did not describe the military coup d'état in Egypt as a ‘coup’. Therefore, this showed that European Union had a similar attitude to the US with the statement he made in the EU. The former High Representative of the EU External Relations and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton explained that after taking control of the army in Egypt “I challenge all sides of Egypt to retail to the democratic process including free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections in the framework of the new constitution”. The newly elected president had to govern in a completely inclusive approach so that the country could survive and complete the democratic transformation”. A spokesman for the EU Commission said that while the process of going to the coup was assessed, “the army in Egypt has moved into action with the support of a significant majority of the Egyptian people, because of the rising tension and polarization”. These show that EU did not support Islamic governance as the

members thought that Morsi's government could not respond to the expectations of the people and did not make necessary reforms in the country. Although these statements, contradicting the EU's democratic principles, show that the EU was, in fact, a dilemma between 'stability' and 'human rights' in the region. The Conversation (2013) emphasized the attitude of the EU "the EU has always preferred stability over democracy in the Middle East, conscious that any political change towards democratic reforms in this region would produce instability in the short to medium term" (theconversation.com). It is important that the degree to which new parties in power such as in Egypt, where democracy is beginning to take a turn for the better, attract importance to the relations with the West, and that it cannot protect the interests of the region after the transformation is complete. Concerns such as 'political Islam' show that the West prefers the 'stability' that has taken place for a long time.

After the army's coup in Egypt ousted Morsi, the first elected president of the country, the opponents gathered in Rabi'at'ul Adeviyye Square to protest the coup and declared that they would not withdraw from the squares until Morsi returned. The international community, especially the EU and the US, have remained silent about the massacres committed by the army against the Muslim Brotherhood and the demonstrators. The international community and the EU have not provided the necessary support for the democratic transformation of Egypt. Having had significant roles in the democratic transformation of Eastern Europe, the EU did not have an effective role in the democratic transformation of Egypt. Barnes (2013) stated that "the impact of our democracy and governance activities in Egypt has been limited and unnoticeable in indexes describing the country democratic environment" (p.62). The silence of the EU and the international community gave 'legitimacy' to coup management. The crisis in Egypt has also adversely affected the expected change in the region with the Arab Spring. The crisis in Egypt, which has led Arab geography for many years with the possibility of lasting longer, continues to adversely affect Egypt and the region in the short term.

To sum up, "the European Union has not produced serious policies on democratization. There is no effect of Western aid on democracy" (Desai 2012:2). There are two reasons for this. First, although the European Union has stated that it gives priority to issues such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law, it has in fact given priority to issues such as the development of migration, trade and economic relations. Therefore, topics like

democracy and human rights are lower on the agenda for the European Union. On the other hand, there is no perfect harmony between the members of the Union on foreign policy production. Disagreements among the Member States prevent the European Union from producing a concrete and clear policy.

Egypt is important for geostrategic and geopolitical aspects for the Western countries, especially the EU. The Israeli-Palestinian problem, radical Islam, the fight against terrorism and intense cooperation on trade and energy are the reasons for this great importance. For these reasons, the EU has always been in favor of good relations with the Egyptian authorities. The EU has progressed in the same way as Egypt on the peace settlement in the Middle East while developing Egypt's cooperation in areas such as security, migration, weapons of mass destruction and terror after 9/11. There have been disputes between the EU and Egypt for some time in the field of human rights, but the EU's misrepresentation of human rights abuses in Egypt has hurt the image of the EU. While the EU was criticizing Mubarak for violating human rights in Egypt, violations were limited to liberal movements and individuals only. For example, while the EU on one side reacted very seriously to the arrest of Eymen Nur and liberal intellectual Saadettin Ibrahim, who are among the liberal dissidents of Egypt, they kept silent about the arrested members of the MB.

The EU, which strived to be constructive throughout the lives of Egypt, organized a meeting with the member foreign ministers in August of 2013, in response to the violent suppression by policy of the military administration to Morsi supporters. The EU decided that the embargo should be applied to all kinds of goods that may be used for violence at the meeting, and they decided to rethink financial aid in addition. Some members of the EU had not found enough of the democratic development level in Egypt as time goes on, and they were quite disturbed by social and sectarian disagreements. The European Parliament, which could not clearly show that it is anti-coup, had demanded to stop the aid in March 2013. Yet, the EU had not stopped financial support for Sisi's military administration, as it would undermine the interests of corruption in Egypt. The EU had stopped the arms trade to Egypt in order to prevent its use only for the people. In order to influence the coup, the EU has used many instruments either individually or separately, including: economic and humanitarian aid, various sanctions, and military interventions that they did not like much during their history. However, the variety of tools the EU used in this process does not show that it has undergone a change at the core of the policy that it is trying to carry out in the region. Since the countries

of the MENA region differ from each other in every sense and give different reactions to the same events, the EU has preferred, especially to support of political change in some regions while maintaining the existing authorities to help stability in some countries. Unless the EU's approach, which positions the EU upside down and centered on Europe, is changed, more and more various instruments will be the more it will not lead to a real change and development in relation to the regional countries.

It is seen that the EU is pursued softer and constructive policies in Middle East politics, not destructive like the US. The EU has the means to improve its economic and commercial relations and to ensure its own security, while taking into account its own interests, rather than changing the borders and locations of the countries or regimes in the region. It is also aimed to continue to meet energy needs by providing stability to the region. Of course, the recent financial crisis has prevented the EU from being an effective foreign policy. It is also far from reality to be able to provide sufficient financial support alone to the countries of the region. The EU is having a hard time to fully imagine its current policy towards Egypt due to the problems in the region as well as the incompatibilities it has experienced within itself. One of the most important reasons for this is the fact that they have different opinions and interests among the members of the Union, and that the EU wants stability instead of democratization in the region. In other words, the EU, which is experiencing a democratization-stabilization dilemma, preferred ensuring security in the short-term regional countries while democratizing and stabilizing the countries in the long run. Of course, since it is not possible for the authoritarian regimes in the region to internalize and embrace the concept of democracy without a serious power pushing them, the EU is at the point of producing and executing foreign policy, transitioning from the idealistic preferences to the real worry in Egypt.

The EU needed to rapidly change the policies and rhetoric against the coup in Egypt. The EU preferred to ensure its own security and stability in the region instead of turning the authoritarian regime in Egypt to democracy. Therefore, Islamic radical movements have strengthened, resulting in an increase in illegal immigration. There is a terrible sense that terrorist structures have begun to take effect in the world. In order to change this trend, there must be new mechanisms that will enable Egypt to enter the axis of democratization again, taking into account past experiences. The unstable situation of the region is a great threat not only to the EU but also to all the rest of the world. For this reason, it is also wrong to treat

only the EU as responsible for resolving the chaos in the Middle East and push the EU on its own. Already experiencing serious problems, the EU must provide support to international organizations like the USA, Russia, China and India as well as the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Arab League. In order to evaluate the EU's approach to the Arab Spring process, regarding the events that took place in the region, each member preferred to implement a policy in line with its own national interests while remaining inadequate and reluctant to form a common foreign policy. The MENA region has led to serious divisions among EU members, ranging from illegal immigration to the fight against terrorism. This diversity has become more evident with the beginning of the Arab Spring, and the division into military intervention in Libya has started to be felt seriously. On the other hand, it would not be wrong to say that the European Union is helping the countries in the MENA region in the transition period of democracy by using various economic, political and cultural means to protect their national and regional interests because they really want to see democracy in these countries. The EU mainly deals with economic aid in the region, the area and groups to which these benefits are transferred. Some financial programs, the use of various civil society instruments, have focused on short-term tools. The members link the relationship with the countries of the region to a short-term plan rather than a long term one. From here it is clear that neither the EU nor its members are far from being a strong global actor in the Middle East, preferring to prepare their plans for a maximum of five years, although it is necessary to plan for at least 25-30 years so as to become a global power. The European Union's plan for the region after a 30-year period seems to be impossible to understand at this stage.

The Arab Spring process has resulted in a revolution in Egypt, but since economic development has not been achieved and external interventions have continued, instability has begun in the country. Although Morsi's domestic and foreign policy is ambitious, Morsi has been removed from the administration by powerful military coups because he could not offer solutions to internal confusion and economic problems in the country. Subsequently, Egypt entered a new process, and the power struggle between the pro-revolutionists and the coup supporters began. As a result, even if the developments in Egypt were related to the democratic transition, it was frustrating that the political and economic demands of the people of the country were not overcome after the Arab Spring. This has also shown that political transformation is not enough for such movements to be successful. Political needs



must be complemented by economic and social needs. The EU has preferred to be more cautious in order to not repeat the mistakes it made in Tunisia in the first place to the events in Egypt. Since Egypt is an important country in many respects for the EU, the EU has been in favor of keeping the relationship with Egypt in good condition in all circumstances while carrying out the policies accordingly. They had good relations that EU with Morsi, who succeeded Mubarak's withdrawal, also aimed to establish good relations with Sisi too who took the power by a military coup d'état. This policy of EU proved that the EU would do its utmost to ensure stability in Egypt, not for democracy.

### **The Role of the Other Western Countries**

In the process military coup in Egypt, which caused regime changes in the country and failure to transition to democracy, the death of thousands of people, Germany did not take a pro-interference stance in the first instance as opposed to other European countries. Germany has acted with a preference for economic sanctions instead. Germany's Egypt policy also provides some clues about the EU's Egypt policy. When the EU's Egypt policy was noticed, it was seen to be parallel to each other in general terms. The major reason for this is the fact the EU in the German control, which is not in the forefront as a political force in Egypt, is under German influence in this respect. Thus, the ineffective Germany in the Egypt and ineffective EU in the Egypt equation emerged. Germany had supported the opposition in the face of the events that started before the coup in Egypt. As a result, it is possible to see that Germany follows a line in support of financial assistance to all countries, mainly against harsh interventions, in view of Egypt policy. For this reason, it appears that Germany, which does not stand out as an effective force in the military coup in Egypt, has a policy of self-positioning, but not in a very effective position.

The British administration, which did not show a primal attitude towards the military coup in the Egyptian counter-revolution and did not support the pro-democratic opponents, contributed to the regional and global legitimacy of the military regime. Following an equidistant politics with the USA at the time of the coup in Egypt, England communicated with the Sisi administration immediately after the coup and aimed to protect his economic and political interests in the new era. Martin (2013) stated that from the statements of

William Hague;

Britain will work with the new regime in Egypt while not supporting military intervention. The Foreign Secretary said the overthrow of Mohamed Morsi was a 'dangerous thing' that risks setting a precedent in the volatile region. But he said the UK will be forced to work with the army-backed government to protect Britons and British firms in the country. It's of course a dangerous precedent to do that, if one president can be deposed by the military then of course, another one can be in the future – that's a dangerous thing. 'It's happened, so we have to recognize the situation will move on.' Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg said the Government did not support coups and wanted Egypt to a return to democratic rule as soon as possible. He added: 'We recognize states, not governments. We recognize the state of Egypt and we have to work with whoever is in authority in Egypt, we have to do that for the safety of British nationals. 'We have to do that because there are so many British companies there. There isn't really any question of not recognizing a particular government (dailymail.co.uk).

Similarly, the former British Foreign Secretary David Miliband criticized the British and Western governments' silence against the coup in Egypt, emphasizing the intervention against democracy as a coup and supporting non-extremist Islamic movements in countries like Egypt. Mr. Miliband said: "I think we've got to be clear this was a coup." He added that "the entry of Islamist parties – so-called 'political Islam' – into the democratic process is a good thing, not a bad thing, that political prisoners need to be released, and genuinely democratic politics restarted in Egypt" (ft.com). The fact that the administration of Abdulfettah Al-Sisi, who encouraged the unresponsive attitude of the Western countries to the coup, carried out massacres in the squares of Rabia and Nahda on the 14<sup>th</sup> of August did not change the attitude of the United Kingdom. Foreign Minister Hague said he was "saddened by the violence in Egypt and that the killing of the protesters was unacceptable. Having no criticism of the military coup d'état and not commenting on the killing of thousands of people, Hague made it clear that they should support democratic institutions and political dialogue in Egypt.

The fact that Britain did not criticize the activities of the coup administration in Egypt is an indication that Britain has taken a position against the Muslim Brotherhood in the process of counter-revolution, although it did not directly support the coup. The most important reason why Britain did not react to the civil liberty abuses and anti-democratic implementations of the Egyptian Sisi administration was the economic relations of London with Cairo. In order to keep these relations alive, Britain has not reduced its interaction with the Sisi administration. Britain has 50% of all foreign investments in Egypt. The economic and trade agreements, which are among the biggest foreign investments in Egypt's history, also revealed the motivation of Britain's politics in Egypt's counter-revolutionary period,

which did not react to the human rights violations of the Egyptian military administration in the interest of protecting economic interests.

To summarize the politics of the British counter-revolutionary period in Egypt, it must be said that economic and political interests outweigh democratic values. London, which did not want its investments in Egypt to be dangerous, demanded the continuation of the new status quo that by not reacting to the civil liberty abuses that followed the coup d'état under the leadership of Abdal Fattah El-Sisi. The UK and its global and regional partners, the US and Israel, followed the same policy, facilitating London's work in this process and causing future reactions to remain at a lower level due to this policy.

## **5.2. The Role of the Regional Actors**

In history, there were no samples until today before any event broke out; it did not give various signals, show any signs, or try to attract attention like Arab Spring. In history, each major event has a symbolic starting point. However, it has already been noted that there were continuing public unrests in this region, increasing problematic attitudes of the repressive regimes, and sectarian confrontations while pushing people's desires backward. Here Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian university graduate and was able to make a living by being a peddler, also passed away as a symbol triggering the Arab Spring process. Of course, Bouazizi could not imagine that he could ignite the process, which, before burning himself to death on the 17<sup>th</sup> December 2010, created a great danger for authoritarian regimes in the MENA region, preparing a powerful end that could not bury them in the dusty pages of history. The end of authoritarian leaders who had a great place in the Middle East after the Cold War came with the Arab Spring.

The role of the Gulf States in the time of change in these regions has increased considerably in the turmoil that has occurred in the MENA region. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, which consist of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait and Qatar, have developed ambitious regional policies for countries with political transformations. The Gulf States have begun to change the parameters related to engagement and multilateral cooperation, by participating more in international systems. Moez (2014) stated that with the lead of Saudi Arabia, the GCC states were counter-revolutionary forces

during the Arab Spring. The overthrows of Ben Ali and Mubarak along the success of Islamists in elections were signs of threats and challenges to the dynastic monarchies” (p.62). As the other powerful countries had a fear of uprising of its people with the success of Egyptian revolution, they took their sides on the failure of the democratic transition. They openly supported the opponents of Morsi and military both in financially and politically.

### **5.2.1. The Role of Saudi Arabia**

In Egypt, Saudi Arabia was at the head of the countries in the region, following Muhamed Morsi's anxious development. The Riyadh government, which noticed the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat to its regime security, soon began to intervene directly in Egyptian politics with a decision to support the counter-revolution movement. There were two important reasons for Saudi Arabia to regard the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat. First, the Muslim Brotherhood movement did not see any drawbacks about collecting political power and religious authority at the same time. Yet, in the Kingdom of Saudi, political and religious forces were shared between two different schools. The second reason was the Muslim Brotherhood supporters lived in Saudi Arabia, but Riyadh had not spoken too much. However, security experts were paying attention to them. Riyadh worried that more than 2 million Egyptians living in Saudi Arabia, a significant portion of them, were supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood. For these reasons, the King Abdullah regime considered the termination of the Muslim Brotherhood's power in Egypt as an important issue for his own security and developed politics there. The Saudi Arabia administration, which seriously ignored the principle of interdependence of internal affairs and was considered to be one of the important principles of diplomatic tradition, became the clearest supporter of the counter-revolutionary movement in Egypt. The Egyptian Armed Forces, leading the internal actors to prevent the revolutionary movement, carried out a military coup with serious support from Saudi Arabia during the counter-revolutionary period which ended Morsi's rule. Supporting the anti-Muslim Brotherhood campaign was launched in Egypt in the post-coup era. Riyadh has strived for the Muslim Brotherhood to declare itself a "terrorist organization" and lose its legitimacy to the people of the region. Saudi Arabia had financially supported Egypt after the counter-revolution. Isaac (2014: 414) stated about the issue that “this was manifested in

the immediate response of King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia to release huge financial packages, estimated at around \$13 billion, as a royal gift in social, unemployment and housing benefits. The funds were aimed at appeasing the political demands of the Saudi people to fend off possible contagious effects of public revolts". At the beginning, the reason for pushing Saudi Arabia to such a position laid the concern that the unique wave of the Arab Spring was transforming into a movement that demands more rights and freedoms by affecting the masses. The Riyadh administration, which has similar circumstances to that of other countries, adopted the security of the regime as the most important task. Therefore, they gave support to the affected countries from the Arab Spring and tried to make return in their democratic way. However, Riyadh was also worried that the demographic structure of its own country would change and rapid population growth would lead to economic troubles. The widespread use of social media and modern means of communication in parallel with increasing demands for population and freedom was also one of the worries of the Saudi administration in this period. Adding to these internal dynamics as the reasons for instability in the region, Saudi Arabia has been tempted to take this position in the face of change, especially in Egypt.

The most obvious indication of Saudi Arabia's support for the counter-revolutionary process in Egypt is that King Abdullah publicly congratulated the architect of the military coup d'état Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, after the military coup on the 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2013. The Chief of General Staff Abdel Fattah El-Sisi was a pasha recognized by the Riyadh administration. While he was in military attaché in Riyadh, Al-Sisi developed close ties with the Prince, King Abdullah's second heir. Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, who made visits to Saudi Arabia for a period of time following his commencement as the Chief of General Staff in Egypt, met with Prince Muqrin here in a sense to take the support of Riyadh. Muqrin expressed that Saudi Arabia would meet the need in this sense if it carries out a military coup. Their correctness of these meetings and statements emerged immediately after the 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2013 military coup, and Saudi Arabia became the largest supporter of the Sisi administration in political, financial and military terms. Saudi Arabia pioneered the creation of an economic summit in Egypt to revive the economy affected by political instability and attract foreign investors to the country after 2013. Abdel Fattah El-Sisi thanked Saudi Arabia, the strongest supporter of the coup d'état, for the other Gulf countries at every opportunity. King Abdullah, the leader behind Saudi Arabia's support to Egypt, lost his life in the first days of 2015. This was a

turning point in the two countries' relations and Riyadh's support for the counter-revolutionary process in Egypt.

King Salman, who came to Saudi Arabia in exchange for King Abdullah's support for Sisi, has made new appointments, opening the way for the radical change of Riyadh's Egyptian policy. King Salman officially confirmed this change by appointing Muhammad Bin Nayif as Crown Prince instead of Muqrin, who hoped to become King. Despite the fact that this nomination and the reduction of support for Riyadh's Sisi administration were gradually diminished, the leaders of the two countries were careful not to publicize this situation. As a matter of the fact, although the new Saudi administration was somewhat distant to Egypt's leadership, it was essential that the post-coup economic aid and the strategic cooperation initiated at that time continued at a certain level. In addition, Saudi Arabia's demand for Egypt's support for its operation in Yemen to prevent Iran's expansionist policy meant that Riyadh and Cairo would continue their allied relationship for a while. Moreover, the Houthi under Iranian control became effective in Yemen seriously disturbed Egypt in terms of the security of the Red Sea and Saudi Arabia in terms of border security. As it was known, the Riyadh administration was in the process of following the coup d'état as the country with the most financial aid to the Sisi regime. The Sisi Administration and the Riyadh government, which were strategic partners in terms of regional policies and they decided to transfer Tirana and Sanafir islands, which are strategically located on the Red Sea exit of Cairo's Aqaba Gulf to Saudi Arabia. In a statement made by the Egyptian government, it was said that President Sisi endorsed the Red Sea border settlement, which envisages the transfer of sovereignty of Tirana and Sanafir islands to Saudi Arabia. With a majority vote, they extradited it to the parliament to be presented at the plenary. The Egyptian Parliament eventually approved the deal on the same day. This indicated that the actors who determined Riyadh's Egyptian policy during the period of counter-revolution that has existed since 2013 were largely continuing.

### **5.2.2. The Role of the United Arab Emirates**

The United Arab Emirates was at the forefront of countries that were troubled by the revolutionary process that started in Egypt in 2011. Developing intense economic relations with Western countries, Abu Dhabi opposed the change because the UAE saw the revolutionary process in Egypt as a development that would lead to the destruction of the status quo in the region. However, the possibility of the Muslim Brotherhood movement coming to power in Egypt was seriously disturbing the UAE too. However, like many other countries, the United Arab Emirates have been caught unprepared for the revolution and have not developed an effective policy, especially in the first phase of the revolution. Realizing that the movement of the MB was proceeding to a point where progress was irreversible, UAE decided to directly support the counter-revolutionary process in Egypt with the encouragement of regional and global allies with similar worries.

The most important factor in the UAE's decision was that the Muslim Brotherhood's ruling would be instrumental in spreading the revolutionary period in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood movement followed active policies from Syria to Yemen and from Tunisia to Libya. These were the countries where almost all the change movements were taking place with a candidate for the ruling groups. However, the Muslim Brotherhood's Islah (reform) Movement, a branch in the UAE, actively pursued political activities which influenced Abu Dhabi's policies against the movement. Abu Dhabi was concerned that the leadership of the MB in Egypt would export the revolution through Islah (reform) Movement to the UAE. The United Arab Emirates supported both the fiscal and the political process of the counter-revolution in Egypt. The United Arab Emirates government intervened in the counter-revolutionary process in Egypt using opposition actors within the country. The UAE administration provided the most serious support for the Tamarod movement, which was effective at organizing protests before the 30<sup>th</sup> of June. In this process, one of Abu Dhabi's most important instruments was Ahmet Shafiq, the last prime minister of Hosni Mubarak's era, who settled in the United Arab Emirates after losing to Mohamed Morsi in the presidential elections. Having very close connections with the former regime actors and keeping it open to communication with some revolutionary groups, Ahmed Shafiq had significant roles in the realization of the counter-revolutionary process in Egypt. The Abu Dhabi administration, which made good use of Ahmed Shafiq's connections, influenced

Muhammed Morsi's removal from office. The UAE has had a significant role in the success of the counter-revolutionary movement, with economic and political support for the military coup.

The MB movement, which came to power after the revolution in Egypt, was seen as a threat by the United Arab Emirates government too. Abu Dhabi claimed that the Muslim Brotherhood sent the revolution to export the Gulf countries with agents to do so. Attempts by Morsi to communicate with Abu Dhabi and to explain that this was not the case failed. At the same time, while some Muslim Brotherhood was defined as an enemy movement in some analyses of close figures of the regime in the UAE media, it was demanded that the diplomatic relations with Egypt, where Muslim Brotherhood was in power, were cut off. The United Arab Emirates, which provided direct financial support to the Tamarod Movement against the Muslim Brotherhood before the 30<sup>th</sup> of June demonstration, was one of the preparers of a reconciliation military coup. The United Arab Emirates' financial support for the Tamarod movement was also proven by voice recordings in the first months of 2015. Kirkpatrick (2015) stated that “they appear to be discussing a bank account controlled by senior defense officials that had been used by Tamarod, and a movement called for protests on the 30<sup>th</sup> June 2013 to demand an early end to Mr. Morsi’s presidency” (p.1). Their voice recordings said more than this. Kirkpatrick (2015) proved that “he then apparently says to General Sobhy, we will need only 200 from it — yes, 200,000. If that sum was in Egyptian pounds, it would have been equivalent to about \$30,000 at the time.” (p.2). As it was evident from these records, one of the most important actors in the military coup in Egypt is the United Arab Emirates. Authenticated recordings indicated that the Egyptian army and its supporters in the UAE had a crucial role on both sides of the protests against President Morsi in June 2013. Kirkpatrick (2015) lastly emphasized that “once Mr. Morsi was ousted, both the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia swiftly made it clear that they approved of the step. Both became major donors to the new government. In addition to financing, the protest effort, the leaked recordings suggest the Emirates and the Egyptian military played active roles in organizing the protests” (p.4). In the aftermath of the coup, the United Arab Emirates continued to support the coup in Egypt in political and economic terms. During this process, high-level visits were made between the two countries. Abdulfettah al-Sisi, the military coup architect, visited Abu Dhabi in March 2014 and gave thanks to the UAE administration in a sense. During his visit, Abdulfettah al-Sisi indicated that the relationship between the



UAE and Egypt was very valuable and the strategic cooperation between the two countries would continue forever.

In the post-coup era, the United Arab Emirates' most serious support to Egypt was in the economic sense. The UAE, which delivered \$ 4.9 billion in cash aid to Egypt by 2014, had also made a serious contribution of petroleum products. The United Arab Emirates, which held a high participation in the Egyptian Economy Conference, announced that it would provide \$ 4 billion to Cairo. Also in this conference, the UAE showed that Cairo's support would continue by signing an agreement that the Egyptian government had promised to support the "New Capital East of Cairo" project, which was planned to cost 45 billion dollars. Al-Ghamrawi (2015) stated that “the deal comes as part of the Egypt Economic Development Conference (EEDC) currently taking place in the Red Sea resort city of Sharm El-Sheikh. The Egyptian government was hoping through the conference to attract much-needed investments from Gulf and global partners in order to fulfill future development plans, and among them plans to build the new capital” (p.1)

One of the most important elements behind the United Arab Emirates' support to Egypt is the long-term security cooperation plan with the Cairo administration. Although it is not currently facing a direct security threat, Abu Dhabi sees Iran as a threat to itself, and in this sense lives a security concern. UAE, with a population of only 9 million, 7 million of which are foreigners, is one of the countries with the highest defense expenditure in the Middle East. Despite having military equipment and sophisticated weapons, UAE is weak in terms of human power. At this point, there is a plan for Egypt to support the UAE security needs with the help of military governance. With a population of 94 million and 500 thousand active military personnel, Egypt has the potential to meet the needs of UAE in this sense. Schreck (2015) stated about the aid of the UAE as;

The Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait pumped billions of dollars into Egypt following the military's ouster of Islamist President Mohammed Morsi in July 2013. Like Saudi Arabia and new Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi, the UAE sees Morsi's Muslim Brotherhood as a threat, and they moved aggressively to stamp out sympathizers of the group in the wake of the Arab Spring. It followed Cairo's and Riyadh's lead in branding the group a terrorist organization in November (p.2).

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were publicly supporting the military coup d'état with their money and political power in the region in front of the eyes of the whole world. They had some fears and anxieties related to their country but not related to the democracy

or consolidation of the democracy in Egypt. Schreck (2015) emphasized that “the Emirates stand to gain, too while making financial aids. The seven-state federation saw Egypt as central to regional security given its location, the size of its population and its outside historical and cultural role. Egypt was the number one strategic partner for the UAE outside the Gulf itself. It was partly because they share a very similar vision for the region and a very similar threat perception” (p.3).

It was also worth noting that the United Arab Emirates had made a special effort to ensure that people close to the Muslim Brotherhood did not come to power during the transformation process in the Middle East. It seems that the United Arab Emirates’ support for the President Al-Sisi administration, which has been fighting a serious struggle against the Muslim Brotherhood, will be long term. The direct impact of the United Arab Emirates on the counter-revolutionary process in Egypt has also been a sign that Abu Dhabi has begun to pursue an active and interventionist stance, leaving the long-term low-profile foreign policy. Gargash (2015) stated about the views of the UAE in the second annual Abu Dhabi strategic debate as “the UAE believes that extremist ideologies and terrorism are two faces of the same coin, which mutually reinforce the other and contribute to instability. The battle against extremism and terrorism is not just a physical one. It is also more importantly an ideological, intellectual, and societal one” (p.2). In this statement, they put the Muslim Brotherhood movement as extremist and a terrorist organization who used religion for their own gain. Ibish (2007) stated that “the UAE remains alarmed by the continued political viability of Islamist groups like the Brotherhood, and continues to be one of the strongest voices against self-described jihadist organizations like al-Qaeda and ISIL” (p.37). The United Arab Emirates was against the Islamist and jihadist political movements in the Arab world from the beginning of their foreign policy. Ibish (2017) also emphasized their foreign policy as “because they regard Egypt as a crucial Arab state and the vital bulwark against the spread of Iranian influence and the rise of Islamist movements, the UAE and Saudi Arabia strongly supported the ouster of Morsi. Both countries pledged and delivered billions of dollars in financial support for the new Egyptian government led by Sisi shortly after he took office.” (p.38). Dorsey (2014) claimed that “the UAE believes that it represents a forward-looking, modernizing, and moderate Arab approach while the Islamists, including the Brotherhood, represent a backward, obscurantist and an extremist agenda. Others, however, see the UAE position as representing the interests of monarchists as opposed to

Republicans (which almost all Islamists are), and even as the cutting edge of a counterrevolutionary reaction to the Arab Spring” (p.2). Ibish (2017) took the attention that “the UAE is not exactly secular in the Western sense, but it is (literally) militantly anti-theocratic. This profound opposition to the politicization and radicalization of Islam in all of its varieties is among the most important principles guiding the UAE’s domestic and foreign policies” (p.43). Anti-terrorism and counter-radicalization are the main concerns of all countries in the Middle East, especially all the Gulf monarchs under the direct threat of various extremist groups, including the Sunni Salafi-jihadist groups.

The Gulf States made various types of aid or resistance to different Arab transitional periods. The desire of the Gulf States to seek radical change resistance and stability in the region and open support in Egypt’s counter-revolution and the allocation of huge aid funds to invest in the political stability of this country. Isaac (2014) clearly finalized the Gulf States’ aid in the region as;

Finally, it is key to highlight that a relative change in Gulf aid allocation to Arab MENA started to emerge in 2013 following the events in Egypt in June and July. This has been represented in an increasing tendency, especially by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to finance economic projects instead of sending cash support. The call of the Saudi king in June 2014 for a donors’ conference in support of the Egyptian economy indicates a continuation in this direction. This could be the case in the future, especially noting the ambitious economic projects in the Suez Canal zone and in the Western Desert (the Development Corridor project) that the new leadership in Egypt is keen to implement (pp.428-429).

The Gulf States made all these for the sake of overthrowing the possible success of democratic transition. If Egypt had been successful in the transition period, then it may turn to come to their land by the will of their citizens.

### **5.2.3. The Role of Israel**

Israel was really anxious about the Arab Spring and its upcoming results. As the time passed, Israel’s fear happened, and an Islamist party, FJP from the movement of MB got the power both in the parliament and also presidency. Israel was afraid of the abolishment of its past treatment like Camp David with Egypt. Israel really worried about the development such as Morsi's withdrawal of the Israeli ambassador from Tel-Aviv after the Israeli attacks on Gaza,

the declaration of the Israeli ambassador in Egypt as an unwanted man, the opening of the Rafah border gate and sending the Prime Minister Hisham Kandil to Gaza for being in solidarity with Palestinian. Following the announcement that Morsi might cancel the Camp David treatment because of the news that Israel would launch a land offensive in Gaza in 2012, the Muslim Brotherhood movement for Israel had begun to be perceived as a far more dangerous threat. Therefore, Israel started to engage in lobbying activities in order to be in touch with Western governments and to influence international public opinion. Therefore, Israel publicly supported the actors in the counter-revolution in order to get rid of Morsi and Islamist parties. Melman (2013)

Israel's primary concerns regarding Egypt are the possible fall of the military regime or a descent into civil war, either of which could render null the peace treaty that has brought relative calm to the border for more than 30 years. (...) Israel has been engaging in some diplomatic lobbying, particularly in Washington and a number of European capitals, with the intent of persuading those governments against rushing to step up their condemnation of the latest Egyptian military operation to remove the pro-Muslim Brotherhood protesters from the streets of Cairo and other cities. Since the Egyptian military (...) ousted the Islamist government of president Mohamed Morsi six weeks ago, Israel has been secretly maneuvering via friendly nations, deploying heavy diplomatic leverage to stop Western governments, first and foremost the United States, from denouncing the overthrow by the Egyptian security forces, deterring them from calling it a 'massacre'. Israel's fear is that such condemnation would weaken the new military-backed Egyptian government, strengthen the will of the Muslim Brotherhood to continue its policy of brinkmanship (p.1).

Schwartz (2013) stated in the Jewish Telegraphic Agency that

The Israeli government is pressing its efforts to convince the United States and the European Union to support the military-backed government in Egypt. The New York Times reported late Sunday that Israeli ambassadors in Washington and the Europe some capitals will lobby foreign ministers, and that Israeli leaders will urge diplomats to see the Israeli viewpoint that the Egyptian military will prevent a further deterioration of the situation in Cairo. The newspaper cited an unnamed 'senior Israeli official involved in the effort.' 'If you insist on big principles, then you will miss the essential — the essential being putting Egypt back on track at whatever cost,' the official told the Times. "First, save what you can, and then deal with democracy and freedom and so on. At this point its army or anarchy (p.1)

In the period following the military coup, cooperation between Egypt and Israel in different areas has increased; particularly close relations in security and intelligence have been developed. Israel has attempted in the post-coup era, especially in the field of security and intelligence, to endorse the repressive policies of the MB and to win Egypt's legitimacy in the US and Western countries. Egypt aimed to gain an alliance against the threats towards him by getting closer to Israel.

## CONCLUSION

This thesis aimed to analyze the failed transition to democracy in Egypt. There were many reasons of the Arab Spring in the MENA region. Egypt was one of the successful countries when they succeeded in ousting Mubarak who had the power for thirty years. On the other hand, there was a strict and strong established order with army inside the state. These two major factors blocked the democratic transition. What is more, the army made a military coup d'état on the 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2013. The military gained the support of external powerful states along with fans of the ancient regime. The impact of foreign actors like the USA, the EU, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates supported the ousting Morsi by the military coup d'état which assisted the failure of the transition to the democracy in Egypt. Although Latin America, East Asia and almost all Eastern European countries have completed their democratic transitions in the 1980s and 1990s, the Middle Eastern countries including Egypt are still ruled by authoritarian regimes. Despite dramatic changes in the region due to the Arab Spring, it is too early to judge the results of these social movements as democracy is moving forward to backward. The military and its components have been still trying to be dominant in political life in Egypt. Unfortunately, it was like this in the past when the dictators were on the state, in the Arab Spring time. The efficiency of the army is still continued with the hand of the SCAF. Nowadays, they are still active with the president of Abdulfettah Al-Sisi

The changing powers and the overturning authoritarian governments with the Arab Spring have initiated a process of transformation in the politics of the MENA region. In the MENA region, the monopoly of long-time dictators seems to have been forced to change hands or to reform in the direction of democratization. At this early stage of the revolution, internal dynamics were influential, and there was hope that a democratic process could be implemented in the country. During the transition period, democratic elections took place due to the intense demands of the revolutionary actors, and the Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood, who had a broad social base, gained a majority in parliament. At the end of the process, a dream of the Middle East was established in which democratic governments and rulers dominated, democracy and human rights were at the forefront, peace was demanded instead of war, information and technology exchange took place instead of the arms trade, and socio-economic development accelerated. The new administration, which emerged at

the end of the Egyptian revolution, declared that they would meet a majority of the people's expectation in 100 days, stating that they would go to a constitutional structure considering the demands of the people. On the other hand, İskender (2013) claimed that after 100 days, the indicators for the country's economy were still falling rapidly. While there was little change compared to the pre-election transition period, electricity and water were more accessible to the rich. Yet a year after the free and fair election, the President Morsi was taken from the administration by the military coup and thousands of his supporters were killed. During the demonstrations on the 30<sup>th</sup> June 2013, the police and army troops did not intervene to deepen the chaos, and a legitimate environment was set up to seize control of the armed forces. On the 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2013, Chief of General Staff Abdulfettah al-Sisi announced that they had taken control of the administration on the television broadcast which appeared together with the Tamarod Movement, the Coptic and the Salafi Nur Party representatives. If the transition process had continued democratically, it would have been beneficial for the people of the country to have more trust in themselves, to defend their rights, to regulate their own political preferences in their own control, to create a more just and peaceful social life structure. They did not want to be mentioned with expressions like chaos, confusion and terror. If the management style had changed and democratization had taken place in Egypt, marginalized groups and terrorist organizations would have lost their influence. Besides this, the military and the former regime supporters would lose and with the consolidation of the democracy, the people would have freedom and peace.

In Egypt, the West, especially the United States, which displayed 'army' as a safety cushion, used military to interfere with the legitimacy crisis caused by the MB government and made a coup, though it did not appear during the rebellions during Mubarak's reign. Perlmutter (1974) stated that "in countries where civil governments fail to legitimate themselves, the military appears and intervenes in civilian affairs and often dominates them" (pp. 4-5). He also insisted that "when the authoritarian regime falls, the army tends to intervene in the transition process as the political sphere is stuck in a fragile condition. And if the executive body is ineffective and compounded by political decay in developing and underdeveloped countries, then army is very eager to intervene with the politics and want to get the power totally" (p. 18). In the post-coup era, the new constitution in Egypt seemed to have been turned back to democracy through new elections. The head of the coup was Al Sisi, now the head of state, banned MB from both political and social life. Al Sisi applied intense pressure

on all actors against the military coup. In this period, which can be called the counter-revolution process, civil liberty abuses have reached the highest level, freedoms have been restricted to a great extent and the old regime actors have started to return to their lost positions with the revolution. The external actors were openly accepting the coup d'état and the pressures and human rights violations were seen in the process. Powerful states in the region such as Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait as well as countries such as USA, Israel, France, and Germany directly and indirectly supported the Sisi administration. The death penalty was given to five hundred members of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement, including overhead and leading people. Despite the fact that everything was going well, Egypt has now returned to the days of problems before the Arab Spring. The political crises that Egypt lived and continued underlies the struggle for active political actors in the country in the aftermath of the Arab Spring revolution to take their most advantageous positions in the new power struggle. Among these, the actors are from the Islamic segment which also includes the MB, the Mubarak factions, the intellectual liberals, the army, and finally the high judiciary. Challenges are aggravating from time to time among these groups. Countries like the US, Germany, France, and Israel wanted Egypt to be governed by a friendly actor, an important partner in the protection of regional interests. The possibility that Egypt under the Muslim Brotherhood could have a negative effect on the regional policies has led to the formation of a serious Western amphibious against the revolutionary process. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait have all taken the initiative to end the democratic transition process. These three countries, cooperating with the anti-Morsi domestic actors in Egypt, have become the main actors behind the counter-revolution movement, especially by increasing their financial support to the opponents. Undoubtedly, the domestic actors had crucial roles in the failure of the democratic transition period. The revolutionary actors who claimed that Morsi did not show a comprehensive administration model after the election of the president and did not keep the promises he had given earlier have entered into anti-Muslim Brotherhood attitude. The ancient regime actors have acted together in order to end the Morsi rule and end the democratic transition process. The pro-political movement of the Salafi movement, the Nur Party, has also strengthened the counter-revolutionary coalition by taking itself into an anti-Muslim Brotherhood stance. The convergence of all these actors in the opposition to Morsi has been the most important factor in the realization of the counter-revolution.

The success of the democratic transition in Egypt could have led to a democratization process in the whole region, especially in the Gulf monarchies in the medium term. Many regional actors, who saw this possibility as a serious threat to their regime security, had struggled to make the transition to democracy in Egypt fail. Similarly, Western actors, who thought that a regional democratization movement could harm their regional politics, did not want the transition in Egypt to be successful. The leading countries such as Germany, France and England of the Western civilization, which define themselves through values such as democracy, human rights and the protection of liberties, were against democratization in the Middle East. The Western countries displayed their preferences in Egypt by being silent about the military coup d'état. After the coup d'état, they also expressed their support of the new Egyptian administration. This situation clearly shows the contrast between the actions of the West and their discourses. Moreover, as far as the interests of the West are concerned in the MENA region, the abuses of democracy and human rights are backward and so-called. As an example of this Egyptian case, the support of the regime under the leadership of Al Sisi by the Western countries nullifies the discourses of the Western democracy. It is not known that Egyptian people are going to make a revolutionary takeover again, but it is not hard to imagine that a democratic order in the country will take decades. The Egypt Independent Newspaper (2016) underlined this situation from the President Al Sisi statement as, "it is too early for Egyptians to practice real democracy, demanding that the media relents in its criticism of the government. "It is too early before you start practicing democracy with its broad meaning. He said it was more important to preserve Egypt and the current social consensus" (Egypt Independent).

The overthrow of democratically elected President Morsi with a military coup on the 3<sup>rd</sup> July 2013 meant the failure of the 2.5-year democracy transition period after the popular movement in 2011 against the authoritarian Mubarak rule. Egypt has not revealed the will to successfully end the democratic transition period. In the aftermath of the military coup, the army, which seized control directly in the country, has attempted to build a regime that it has foreseen. The regime that the Egyptian Army desires and builds is a regime in which the army is the primary actor and the privileges are preserved, governed by the army behind the scenes of the country. The legitimacy of the controversial constitution adopted by the referendum during the interim government period under the control of the army makes the armed forces into a state within the state. With this constitution, the army becomes an



institution that is independent, privileged, non-transparent and unaccountable. There are several reasons for failed transition to democracy in Egypt. The most important of these is the legacy of authoritarian rule. The army, one of the authoritarian actors in the country, refused civilian control, that's to say, transition to democracy from authority. The army tried to direct a large number of political actors in the direction of their own interests. Secondly, the media in the country attacked the newly elected President Morsi and the Movement of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2012 and 2013. After years of political turmoil behind the authoritarian regime, they were left with a weak economy, polarization, and instability. Institutions, practices, and procedures of the authoritarian regime have continued to exist within the state. The established order, which was started with the Free Officers and served their successors, has been blocking progressive political development in order to provide a stable authoritarian regime. There have been many journalists in prisons. According to the Democracy Index, the MENA region is the world's worst press freedom zone with 3.6 regional averages out of 116.2 averages. Therefore, "Egypt ranked 130 of 165 on the Economist Intelligence Unit's 2017 Democracy Index". This authoritarian regime in Egypt restrains the freedom of journalism through censorship practices that is compressed of the president, Al-Sisi, and other senior officials. The army has a remarkable impact on state news channel while the private media is far away from independence from the state. The defense of religion, morality and established order is usually the reason given in the Egypt for ignoring media freedom.

The Egyptian military, which pursues its own interests rather than the interests of the people, has put the country into a difficult process. The declaration of the MB Movement, the most organized political and social movement of the country, as a terrorist organization displays that Egypt is waiting for a very difficult period in the coming years. Kalabalık (2013) informed that after the bombed attack on the Dekahliyye Police Headquarters in Mansure in Egypt's Nile Delta on the 24<sup>th</sup> December 2013, the Egyptian interim government declared the Muslim Brotherhood Movement, which has millions of members and supporters, as a "terrorist organization". The Muslim Brotherhood was held responsible for this attack. In Egypt, which is under the control of the army, the steps of democratization and demilitarization should not be expected in the medium or long-term. Snider and Faris (2011) claimed that "democracy could flourish in the decentralized government, ruling system. Yet, in Egypt, the sovereign regime supports the centralization of political power at the highest

level under the unlimited control of the Egyptian presidency. Moreover, civil society organizations have a limited functional capacity controlled by the Egyptian sovereignty regime” (pp.61-63) Parliamentary elections, despite the existence of a multiparty system, in favor of the ruling government are going through a process of high-level fraud and intimidation. The prospective candidates have no possibility to compete for the presidency because of the heavy pressure. They may be taken into custody owing to due to their statements. Frankly speaking, this displays why the transition to democracy failed in Egypt. Al Sisi regime, military regime, does not give any right to any other opposition group so as not to lose their power. Although the Constitution has established a secret voting system for multi-party presidential elections, presidential elections are still in favor of the current president. This is also seen in the last presidential election in Egypt. Al Sisi has gotten nearly all the votes. General Sisi, who was elected President in 2014 after the military coup, initiated a period like the Mubarak period after a short interim period in the country. The high rate of voting does not show that the country is very democratic and that Sisi is the one who is accepted and desired by all. On the contrary, this is in an environment where the participation rate is 38% and the competitors are not allowed to be candidates in the presidential election except so-called competitor. As a matter of fact, it is seen that the soldier-based president, which started in 1952, is going to continue with the period of Sisi. Egypt needs an army such as the Tunisian Army, which respects the civilian will and does not pursue political power and concessions.

Democracy is not a matter of culture inside the opinion of people, that is to say, it will be wrong to say that democracy cannot be achieved without political culture. Democracy cannot be settled by making so-called elections and getting too high votes from the polls. A country must live with democracy for several generations so that democracy can settle. When democratic governance is blocked, the way of the democratic regime must be opened by expressing that democracy is, in fact, a constantly developing regime. Dictatorships are formed as a result of leaving the democracy and looking for any regime besides it. By the expression of an author; "Liberal democracy may not be perfect, but a better one has not been found." It is not possible for a nation to have total plural democracy with its people in a very short time. First, under a certain guardianship, a democratic lifestyle should be applied for many years. Prosperous societies should be exemplified via press and broadcast media. In order to move towards community democracy, general and local elections should be made

when some deviations are seen. Then, when it comes to the democratic stage of the polls, it must be very careful. The pool cannot be used for the external powers and military tutelage' desires. Only one case is allowed in democracy; it is the democratization and liberalization of the people. This phenomenon is a process that can last for centuries. In other words, democracy does not only come out on top in the polls. Winning in the polls only gives the winner the right to practice democracy, which consists in ensuring that you have full freedom of belief, freedom of religion, freedom of property, and personal freedoms. The winner cannot dominate the social, economic or political principles of any dictatorship in order to demand a majority. The winner can only take sides of universal values, rights and freedoms. According to democratic philosophy, there is no absolute truth which is subjective. The task of the state is to eliminate the obstacles so that the individual can freely express himself with the freedom and satisfaction of his organic and instinctive needs and desires. The state cannot have a job to guide and advise the citizen. The biggest thing at the governor is going to do is maintain and secure the fundamental rights, freedoms and universal values fully and equally to each individual.

The weaknesses of political institutions also affected the failure of the transition. There were hardly any democratic political institutions which have an important role since Mubarak era. Therefore, these institutions could not be formed in a short time. Moreover, there is a need time to make a stable institution apart from the pressure of the politics like an independent judiciary system. Roshdy (2013) emphasized that the lack of democratic institutions made a contribution to the absence of political actors' compliance rules to prevent political polarization and the religious division in society. For this reason, without a set rule and without the lack of a legislative body, President Morsi used the power of deciding to manage with the pretext of protecting democratic transition. The political institutions and civil societies are the crucial determinants of success or failure of the democracy. That's to say, if there are more independent and developed political institutions and NGOs then democracy can flourish more rapidly. It is also very important to comprehend the meaning of NGO in Egypt because the NGOs provide social services. Yet they are not able to have active roles as this issue is banned by the law and criticism of the state and military is strictly forbidden for anybody. Unfortunately, there were very few independent state institutions and NGOs free from state control and pressure. The military is the main factor in the failure of the transition as it was not able to give the power to the civilian owing to the fear of losing its

political and economic interests forever. The economic structure of a country is another driving force for the success of democratic transition. Huntington (1991) stated in his Democracy's Third Wave work that democracy can be sustained. Even with economic development, political actors are a necessity for this to happen. These actors must reach consensus against the authoritarian regime must be bound to democracy in order to be successful in the transition period. Rustow (1970) stated "the democracy was a long process of inclusive political struggle in the transition process" (p.350). Yet, the political actors failed in staying united against the military and ancient regime supporters. There was religious and ethnic division among the citizens. One of the most important actors, the youth, also lost its belief to transition to democracy as they believed this period was being derailed from its goal of restoring dignity. The liberals, the Salafists, nationalists, and leftists accused MB of overpowering itself and discarding the opponents from the state governance. All the other actors disappointed with disunities atmosphere in Egypt. Both sides accused each other against the disability and poor economy. Yet, MB asserted that they gave opportunity to the opponents, but the opponents rejected the negotiation of any issue. The opponents' main goal was to out throw the president Morsi, as they thought MB served only its own and betrayed the revolutions. While the opponents were doing this, they were not alone but they got the support of the USA, EU, UAE, and Saudi Arabia and so on. Therefore, MB became incapable of developing a moderate discourse or a strategy of harmony. In the end, the military gave 48 hours to the Morsi administration to solve the problems which could not be possible in that time. Undoubtedly, the MB and the competitors were not successful in the democratic transition period. When asking both sides, they told their excuses and accused the other side of the failed transition to democracy in Egypt. Actually, the opponents and Morsi had some faults in the transition period. The president Morsi did not pay attention to the oppositions as his party was dominant in the parliament and he relied on his supporters. Yet, the opponents refused any negotiations as they had a strong support from external actors and also Egyptian military. No matter what Morsi did, he could not succeed as there were many opposing enemies both inside and outside the country. They were working for the depravity of the country in terms of economic, social, political issues.

The international approach focuses global actors' impact on the transition to democracy process. Schmitter (1993) emphasized that "the existence of global and regional democratic forces, economic interdependence and the presence of international organizations contribute

to a smooth democratic transition”. Normally, international actors played a positive role like in the Eastern European countries. On the contrary, international actors gave positive support to the opponents in order to oust Morsi and interrupt the transition process because of their regional interests. The powerful Gulf countries cut their aids to Egypt as soon as MB and Morsi got the power. The EU and the USA were unwilling to their democratic promotion agenda for Morsi and they stayed silent for the coup in 2013, namely they publicly approved the coup and ousting democracy for an unknown time. The Gulf countries expressed their support for the restoration period after the coup. This clearly displayed that they do not care about the democracy or the tools of democracy as they fear the turn will come to them. Some expert scholars studied Egypt and claimed that the reason for failure was Morsi’s incompetence in ruling Egypt. Because of this ruling incompetence, there was a deeper economic crisis, and this caused a rise in the gas prices. Laiq (2013) asserted that “the deep state worked to keep President Morsi from power” (p.33). The deep state in Egypt did everything. On the other hand, the supporters of Morsi claimed that the judiciary, the police, the army, and the media did not support the regime, namely democracy as the MB, Islamist, was in power. President Morsi tried to end the corruption and army’s intervention to the politics. Actually, fuel stagnation and power interruptions returned to normal and security forces did their jobs as soon as Morsi was ousted by the military coup.

The Egyptian people must comprehend that the way to democracy is very long and hard to reach; therefore, they must be patient. "Getting rid of an authoritarian regime is one thing; (Berman 2007: 31). Every culture has its own values and norms, and for this reason democracy in Egypt may be different from the West. Zunes (2011) noticed that "democracy in the MENA region will not come through foreign intervention, sanctimonious statements from Washington or Europe, voluntary reforms from above or arm struggle by a self-elected vanguard. It will only come through the strategic application of nonviolence action by the people of the Middle East "(p. 9). Last but not least, “the Arab world is in a transitional process from authoritarianism to democracy. This transition has brought hope as well as fear to the societies (Trabelsi 2013). Although more repressive and anti-democratic outcomes seem inevitable in some cases, the long term the events of 2010-2011 marked a fundamental turning point (Toscano et al. 2012: 15), setting the region on course for the ultimate realization of eventual democracy” (Ibrahim 2013:14). People demand and have a desperate longing for democracy and together with economic welfare. Even though a long time has

passed since the military coup in Egypt, the political instability which is shown as the reason for military coup has increased deeply. Egypt has regressed in many ways like matching the Mubarak period, drawing a negative picture of the economy, political stability, security and human rights. The process that needs to be closely monitored in Egypt in the upcoming period and not the ones who are in power. The changes that will lead to a democratic transition will be institutionalized and all opponents will be included in this founding process. If the second option is realized, then we are going to witness that the economic, political and social structure of Egypt has changed from the top and down, which is a big change in what will be really happening.

It is imperative for the Egyptian regime to immediately implement the reforms that will ensure stable, sustainable and employment-creating economic growth so as to be inclined to transition to democracy. The fight against corruption, favoritism and the realization of the appropriate judiciary system represent other short-term necessities in the country. While the private sector is being encouraged, the efficiency of the public sector needs to be increased and the public sector must be organized in such a way as to fulfill the tasks of the welfare state. The long-term deterioration of income distribution along with the struggle for the elimination of poverty in the mid-term, and the fluctuation in food prices, which affects the welfare of large masses in the short term, should be minimized. Egypt several times underwent a series of democratic initiatives during President Sadat and the Mubarak era, none of which has actually led the country to democratize. Political past legacy, civil society, other political institutions and the external actors are important factors shaping the political liberalization process in Egypt. In the case of Egypt, foreign actors, namely the western actors such as US and the EU and regional actors like Saudi Arabia, UAE and Israel have played vital roles through aid, grants, initiatives, defamatory campaign via international media and pressure policies. With all of their help, the military and internal actors succeeded to oust Morsi and democracy from power, namely the first free and fair elected president. The actors shape the political progress through their own choices. According to findings, the external actors of Egypt preferred stability and their security interests rather than democracy in Egypt.

It is too early to decide whether transition to democracy in Egypt will happen in the future, even though there is an ardent effort from the beginning of the Arab Spring until the military coup in 2013. Egypt has been dealing with some minor partial democratic opening for

liberalization. The political liberalization is the basic step for democracy, yet the officials or the authoritarian use this as a tool for more survival of the authoritarian regimes supported by their militaries. In Egypt, there are some democratic openings so as to decrease the number and voice of the frustrated people, yet these openings are temporarily suspended owing to the security and protection of their regime.



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## TURKISH SUMMARY

Demokrasi sadece Mısır'da değil, bölgede de en çok talep edilen konulardan biridir. Mısır halkı uzun zamandır demokrasiye ulaşmaya çalıştı. Otoriter liderlerine başkaldırmaya çalıştılar fakat halkın zayıf desteği yüzünden her zaman başarısız oldular. 2010'un sonuna gelindiğinde, Mısır halkı otoriter yöneticilere karşı kitlesel protestoyu destekledi. Bölgedeki insanlar, büyük ve belirleyici bir kitle olduklarında, baskıcı yöneticilerinin demokratik olmayan bir yönetim anlayışını bırakmak zorunda kaldıklarını anladılar. Bu nedenle, Mısır'daki ayaklanma, insanların siyasi liderleri için özgürce oy kullanabilecekleri bölgede yeni bir geçiş için büyük umutlar taşıyorlardı. Demokratik geçiş, Arab ülkelerinin çoğunda, devlet yapıları demokratik kurumlar açısından batılı ülkelere tamamen farklı olmasından dolayı çok daha geç başlamıştır. Demokrasi yer ve zamana göre farklılık göstererek farklı bireylere farklı anlamlar ifade edebilir. Schumpeter'in (2003) minimalist demokrasi fikirlerine göre, demokrasi siyasi liderliğin seçilmesini sağlayan politik bir yöntemdir. Bir ülkede vatandaşların, daha fazla oy için yarışan rakip siyasi partiler arasında liderlerini seçme hakkı vardır. Arab bölgesinde özellikle de Mısır'daki insanların neden mücadele ettiğini anlamak için, R. Dahl'ın poliyarşi kıstaslarına göre demokrasinin anlamı çok önemlidir. Vatandaşları bu kıstaslar ile yönetmek bir devletin tamamen demokratik olduğunu düşünmek için yeterli değildir. Schumpeter (2003) demokrasiyi, " bireylerin, bu alanda rekabet mücadelesi yoluyla karar verme yetkisini elde ettiği siyasi kararlara varmak için kurumsal bir düzenleme" olarak tanımlamaktadır (s.260). Dahl (1998) ülke düzeyinde bir demokrasinin gerektirdiği sekiz siyasal kurumu şu şekilde sıralar : "1. örgüt kurma ve bunlara katılma hürriyeti; 2. ifade hürriyeti; 3. oy verme hakkı; 4. kamu görevlerine getirilme hakkı; 5. siyasal liderlerin seçmen tercihini kazanmak için yarışabilme hakkı; 6 alternatif haber alma kaynaklarının varlığı; 7. serbest ve adil seçimler; 8. hükümet politikalarını oylara ve diğer tercih belirtilerine dayandırmak için gerekli kurumların varlığı"(s.85). Sağlıklı bir demokrasi, vatandaşların kamusal hayata aktif ve özgürce seçilebilmelerini gerektirir. Demokrasiler, vatandaşların kamuya açık tartışmalara katılmaya, temsilcileri seçmeye ve siyasi partilere katılmaya istekli olduklarında evrimleşmektedir. Bu geniş katılım olmadan, demokrasi gelişemez ve demokrasi küçük ve seçkin grupların koruyucusu olmaya başlar. Katılım, aynı zamanda temel bir unsurdur çünkü aşırılık, uç nokta ve çekimserlik, demokrasinin düşmanlarıdır.

Mısır'da insanların Hüsnü Mübarek'e, diktatörlük ve baskıları nedeniyle büyük bir öfkesi vardı. Arab Baharında Mısır halkı ve eylemcileri rejime karşı bir araya gelmeye başladı. Bu insanlar, bu protestolarla: yolsuzluk, adaletsizlik, kötü ekonomik koşulların sona ermesini istiyorlardı. Dolayısıyla sloganları 'ekmek, özgürlük ve sosyal adaletti'. Bu aynı zamanda pek çok siyasi örgütün zayıf ulusal ekonomik durumun, yüksek düzeyde yolsuzluk, işsizlik, artan gıda masrafları, rejimin suiistimal edilmesi ve seçim sistemine olan güvenin kaybedilmesi ile açıklandığını gösteren kanıtı. Mısır'da yaşayan insanlar korku duvarını kırdıklarında çok büyük oldular. Devrim başlangıcında, özellikle ayaklanmanın sembolü olan Kahire'nin merkezi Tahrir Meydanında kitlesel gösteriler başladı. Sonuç olarak, bu protestolar demokratikleşmeyi talep etmenin ve ülkedeki siyasete daha çok vatandaş katılım talebinin nedenleri arasındaydı. Acımasız ve sonsuz tek kişilik yönetim, halkı rejime karşı isyan ettiriyor ve halk daha fazla özgürlük istiyordu. Hüsnü Mübarek 11 Şubat 2011'de Mısır'da 18 gün süren ayaklanma sonrasında devrildi. Başkanlıktan istifa etti ve Silahlı Kuvvetler Yüksek Konseyi'ne (SKYK) görevini devretti. İnsanlar iyimser bir şekilde eski sistemin yeni demokratik olanla değiştirileceğine inanıyorlardı. Mısırlılar arasında, bu hedeflerin pratikte nasıl anlaşıldığı, kültürel ve özellikle de dinî değerler ile nasıl uzlaşılacağı konusunda önemli farklılıklar vardı. Uzun süren SKYK yönetiminin ardından seçimler yapıldı. Seçimlerin sonucu açıklandığında Müslüman Kardeşlerin partisi olan Özgürlük ve Adalet Partisinin adayı Muhammed Mursi demokratik yolla seçilen ilk başkan oldu. Ayrıca İslami gelenekten gelen Müslüman Kardeşler ve Selefiler parlamentoda çoğunluğu elde etti. Doğal olarak hem parlamentoda hem de başkanlıkta İslamcılar kazanınca devrimci liberaller, laikler, sol görüşlüler ve Hristiyan azınlık bu durumdan ciddi şekilde rahatsız oldular. Geçiş süresince siyasi aktörler arasında demokratik geçişin tam sağlanması ve demokratik kurumların ülke sathında oluşturulması için ortak görüş ve yol haritası sağlanamadı. Yeni aktörler devlet siyasetinde deneyimlenmedikçe bürokratik engellerle ve bazı yargı vetolarla karşılaştılar. Müslüman Kardeşler, Mübarek rejiminden gelen bu statükocu bürokratik muhalifleriyle politik manevralar yaparak kurtulmaya çalıştı. Demokrasi, Mısırda mutluluk ve refah verecek olan çare adıydı. Ama demokrasiye geçiş hiçte kolay olmadı hem iç faktörler hem de güçlü dış faktörler sürecin başarısız olmasına neden oldu. Demokratik yolla seçilen Muhamed Mursi, 3 Temmuz 2013'te askeri darbe ile başkanlıktan uzaklaştırıldı. Hem bölgesel hem de batılı küresel aktörler darbeyi gizlice desteklediler ve karşı devrimden hemen sonra mali yardımlarda bulundular. Bu geçiş süreci de müesses nizam tarafından

engellendi.

Demokrasi uzun zamandır sadece uluslararası toplum için değil, aynı zamanda Mısır Arab Cumhuriyeti halkının da en tatmin edici tarzı olarak kabul edilmiştir. Nasır, Sedat ve Mübarek dönemleri, Mısırlıların neredeyse tamamı için çok zor geçmiştir. Mısır'daki modern döneme bakıldığında bu üç dönemde de seçimler görülebilir fakat bu seçimler özgür ve adil değildi. Bu nedenle, ulusal, özgür ve adil seçimler yapmakta ve demokratik olarak seçilmiş bir yönetim oluşturma konusunda çok ciddi engeller vardı. Mısır'da birçok insan, Mısır'daki demokrasiye geçiş mücadelesini sürdürüyor. Mısırlılar, pek çok kez ayaklanmaya ve seslerini duyurmaya çalışmışlardı, ama insanlar diktatör liderlerinden ve güvenlik birimlerinin baskılarından korktukları için geniş tabanlı tüm topluma yayılan destek bulamıyorlardı. Oysa demokrasinin uygulanması, bölge halkına kendi ülkelerinin karar alma mekanizmalarında kendi ulusal iradesini yansıtmaya şansı verecekti. 2010'un sonuna gelindiğinde, Kuzey Afrika'daki uluslar uyanmaya başladı ve uluslararası sistem ve bölgedeki var olan durum çoğunlukla değişti. Kitlelerin özgürlük ve ekmek (ekonomik refah) mücadelesi de başlamış oldu. 2011'de Mısır'da demokratik düşünce hızla şekillendi. Mısır, devlette ve ülke çapında demokratik kurumları uygulamak zorundaydı. Seçimler var gibi görünüyordu, ancak bunlar düşük katılım ve yanlış sonuçların yanı sıra özgür ve adil değildi. Seçimlere resmi katılım, seçmenlerin yarısından daha düşüktü. Buna rağmen oy kullanmayanlara sözde ceza korkutmasının dışında demokratik katılımı artırmak için herhangi bir eylem yoktu. Mısırlılar, bu önemli seçimlere temsilcilerini seçmeleri için güçlü bir şekilde katılmalıydılar. Bu katılımı artırmak kendi ellerindeydi. Ama Mısır'daki asıl sorun başkanlık ya da parlamento üyeliği için yarışacak adayların adil bir şekilde yarışması için rekabet etme haklarının uygulamada olmayıştıydı. Başkanlık seçimi için muhtemel pek çok aday başkanlık seçimlerinden zorla çıkarılmışlardır. Bu nedenle, seçimin, halkın siyasi liderlerini değiştirmesi için güçlü bir silah olduğu kesin olmakla birlikte bu sadece demokratik yönetimler için geçerlidir. Mısır'da geçiş süreci hariç diğer dönemlerde maalesef özgür ve adil seçimler yapılmamıştır. Başkanlık koltuğuna oturan Nasır, Sedat, Mübarek ve Sisi çok uzun yıllar başkanlıkta kalmışlardır. Yapılan sözde seçimlerde %35-40 arası katılımı neredeyse halkın tamamının oyunu almışlardır. Sonuç olarak, özgür ve adil seçim kanunu siyasi liderleri belirlemek için çok önemlidir. Zakaria (2003) seçimlerde demokrasilerin kurulduğunu ve bu seçimler demokrasinin kaçınılmaz bir parçası haline geldiğini belirtir. Prosedürel demokrasisi olarak da bilinen bu minimalist demokrasinin,

demokratik geiş ařamasına yeni girmiř bir lke iin uygun olduėu dřnlmektedir (Diamond 1999: 9–10). zetle, bu yzyılda, eėer uluslar rekabeti ok partili seim organize edemezlerse, o lkelerde demokrasinin varlıėından sz edemeyiz. Yani, demokrasi gnlk yařamda uygulanmalı ve temel hakları garanti edebilen, bireylerin ve grupların zgrlklerini gvence altına alabilecek siyasi kltrn bir parası olmalıdır. Seimlerle ilgili olarak, İnsan Hakları Evrensel Bildirgesi'nin (UDHR) 21'inci maddesinin (2015) “halkın iradesinin hkmetin otoritesinin temeli olacaėını” hatırlatması ok nemlidir. Bu, evrensel ve eřit oy hakkıyla yapılacak ve gizli oyla zgr oy kullanma usulleriyle tutulacak olan periyodik ve gerek seimlerde ortaya ıkacaktır ”(s.3). Huntington (1991) “otoriter rejimlerin rekabeti ve katılımı bastırđını” belirtmiřtir (s.581). Aynı řekilde, Perlmutter (1981) “otoriter rejimlerin din, dřnce ve ifade zgrlėn, toplanma ve rgtlenme zgrlėn, gsteri ve katılım zgrlėn kısıtladıėını belirtmiřtir. Dahası, otoriter rejimler, faaliyetlerinin her birini izleyerek sivil toplum rgtlerinin zerkliėini kısıtlarlar. Otoriterlik genel olarak merkezi ynetimsel kontrol ve hkimiyete dayandıėını” ifade etmiřtir (s.8). Otoriterliėin temel hedefi, bireyin, bireysel ve kolektif davranıřlarını baltalamak ve yıkmak yoluyla sekinlerin egemenliėini ortaya ıkarmaktır. Huntington (1991) “demokratik olmayan veya otoriter rejimlerin monarřiler, aristokratlar, tek parti sistemleri, askeri rejimler ve kiřisel diktatrlkler gibi eřitli biimler aldıėını” belirtmiřtir (s.580). Dikta rejimler, demokratik ve sivil hkmetlerin yerini alan askeri darbeler tarafından meydana getirilir ve askeriye nin ıkarları her zaman n plandadır. Mısır rneėinde, g ve ynetiřim sorunu vardı. Otuz yıllık diktatr olan Mbarek'i devirmek iin insanlar hayatlarını tehlikeye attılar. Ancak, onun indirilmesinden sonra, insanlar istediklerini alamadılar. Yeni rejim, ekonomik ve sosyal problemlerini derhal zemedikleri iin yeni hkmetten memnun deėillerdi. Daha sonra El Sisi liderliėindeki askeri darbe, iktidarı darbe ile Mursi'den aldı. Ordunun bu řekilde doėrudan mdahalesi, Mısır'da demokrasiye geiři srecini bařarısız kıldı. Arab Baharının ardından Mısır Silahlı Kuvvetler Yksek Konseyi (SKYK) bir yıl buuk aradan sonra zgr ve adil seimler yapılmasına izin vererek demokratik geiři srecine onay vermiřti. Mısır'da demokrasiye geiři giriřimi i ve dıř faktrlerin de desteėi ile Temmuz 2013 yılında yařanan askeri darbe ile sona erdi. Bu geiři sreci aynı zamanda, messes nizamın ve ynetici sekinlerin Mısır halkına iktidarı bırakmak istemedikleri iin ok nemliydi. Mısır'ın tek adam rejiminden kalma kurumsal yapıları istikrarlı demokratik geiři engeller oldular. Mısır'da, halkın kt ekonomik ve sosyal

durumundan dolayı vatandaşların protestoları ve yöneticilere karşı ayaklanmalar patlak verdi. Bu koşullarda yaşamak artık katlanılmaz değildi. Ancak, gelinen noktada yaşam koşulları Hüsnü Mübarek'in zamanından daha kötü hale geldi. Bugün Mısır, özgürlükler, sosyoekonomik ve siyasi haklar açısından Mübarek döneminden daha kötüdür.

Mursi'nin zamanı, siyasi otorite açısından çok kısa ve sorunlu bir yönetişimdi. Fakat seçim ve yönetim biçimi Mısır'ın tarihinde ilk demokratik olanıdır. Mısır geçmişinin ve Mısır'daki siyasi partilerin mirası çok önemlidir. Ordunun Mısır'ın demokrasiye başarısız geçişindeki etkileri de hayati önem arz ediyor. Bu itibarla, geçiş sürecinde askeriyenin olumlu ya da olumsuz etkisi mutlaka ön plandadır. Ülkede ekonomik, sosyal ve siyasi sorunlar gibi çözülmeyi bekleyen birçok sorun ve engel olduğu için bu çok önemlidir. Mısır tarihinde, modern batı dünyası açısından demokratik bir yönetişim yoktur. Mısır, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan sonra İngiltere tarafından işgal edildi ve dış işgalcilerden bağımsız hale gelmesi uzun yıllar aldı. 1952'den 2011'e kadar tek kişilik bir başkanlık tarafından yönetildi; bu nedenle halk baskın tek aday zorunlu olarak seçmek zorunda kaldılar. Bu nedenle, bu bir demokrasi değildi. Öte yandan, başkan ölene kadar başkanın yapılan sözde seçimlerle değiştirilme olasılığı yoktu.

2010 yılı sonunda Arab Baharı olarak isimlendirilen kitlesel hareketler, bölgede demokratikleşme beklentisi konusunda iyimserlikle başladı. Ancak isyanların aniden ortaya çıkması 2010'un sonunda ve 2011'in başında gerçekleşmedi. Pearson ve Salamey (2012) bu durumu sosyal, kültürel, ekonomik veya aşiret içi eşitsizliklerine dayanan belirli grupların tarihsel şikâyetlerinden ayrı olarak, önemli bir faktör olarak protesto, yeni iletişim biçimleri, küreselleşme ve şiddet içermeyen haklara dayalı hareketlerin etkisiyle gelen politik öğrenme süreci olarak nitelendirir. 2010 yılının sonlarında ve 2011'in başında Orta Doğu ve Kuzey Afrika bölgesinde ayaklanmalar yaşandı. Özellikle Mısır örneğinde devrim, harekete geçirilmiş siyasi eylemle diktatörlük çöküşü olarak açıklanabilir. Bu başarılı ve barışçıl geçişte ordu ilk adımda çok önemliydi çünkü onlar Mısır'da Mübarek'in yanında değil, halkın yanındaydılar. Ordu, devrimin başarısı için belirleyici bir unsurdur. Ama devrimde sonuç demokratikleşmeyle bitmeyebilir, başka bir deyişle halkın ayaklanma ile elde ettiği şey demokratik bir geçişle bitmeyebilir, ancak başka bir tek kişilik rejime geçebilir. Sadece kitlesel ayaklanmaya göre demokrasiye geçişi başarılı veya başarısız bir geçiş olarak adlandırılması mümkün değildir. Nitekim ilerleyen süreçte Mısır özellikle minimal düzeyde ve R. Dalh'ın demokrasi kıstaslarının tesis edilmesinde ve kurumsallaşmasında çok ciddi

sorunlar yaşamıştır. Devam eden süreçte askeriye; siyasal, sosyal ve ekonomik yönden kendini ülke içinde yetkili kılmış ve demokratik seçimle iş başına gelmiş başkana darbe yaparak hem geçiş sürecini sonlandırmış hem de halkın demokratikleşme umutlarına ket vurmuştur. 2013'teki darbe ile demokratikleşme ve özgürleşme hayalleri yok olmadı aynı zaman da halkın sandığına olan güveni de kayboldu. Bu açıdan, dış faktörler bölgeyi hem olumlu hem de olumsuz yönde derinden etkilemiştir. Goldsmith (2007) “demokratikleşmenin, kurallara bağlı rekabete dayalı sistemi ile otoriter rejimin yerini alacak bir süreç olduğunu belirtir” (s.87). Halkın özgürlüğünü talep etmesi ve hükümdarı değiştirmek istemleri iyiydi. Diğer yandan; bu isyanlar bölge ekonomisini olumsuz yönde etkiledi. Başlangıçta insanlar daha fazla refah ve gelir umuduyla sokaktalardı, ama şimdiki durum hiçte umdukları gibi değil. Bölgedeki insanlar, korku duvarlarını kırdı ve otokratik liderlerin meşruiyetini yitirmesiyle halk ayaklanmasına başladılar.

Mısır'ın demokrasiye geçişi, ordudaki erkler tarafından 60 yıl süren ardışık yönetimin mirası tarafından baltalandığını aşikârdır. Mısır'da mevcut siyasi duruma odaklanarak ülkenin bugün olduğu yere nasıl geldiğini anlamak çok önemlidir. Mısır'daki geçiş süreci, demokratik erdemlere ulaşmak için bir araçtı. Bu nedenle, eski sayısız siyasi kurumun, toplumsal ihtiyaçlara ve uluslararası normlara göre sistematik olarak yeniden şekillendirilmesi gerektiği anlaşılmıştı. Otoriter diktatör yöneticiler tarafından yönetilen eski Mısır'da, toplumsal ihtiyaçlar ve uluslararası normlar kasıtlı olarak görmezden gelindi. Yönetici elit topluma karşı taleplere tepki vermek zorunda olmadıkları için vergiler yerine petrol gelirlerine güvendiler. Robbins (2018) Arab Barometresi IV'te yaptığı çalışmasında, demokrasinin tanımını, “Mısırlıların %73'ünün herkes için iş” olarak gördüklerini belirtmiştir (ss. 11-12). Mısır devlet yapısına göre, devlet tek otoriter parti yönetimi ile ülkenin en önemli aktörüdür. Bu nedenle, protestocular anlamlı bir değişimden ziyade bir rejim başkanlığı değişikliği ile karşılaşırlar. Mısır, işkence ve öldürmeler dâhil olmak üzere birçok insan hakları ihlalinden sorumlu olan baskıcı bir yönetim ve zayıf bir yargı sistemine sahipti. Arab dünyasında Mısır, yolsuzluk, olağanüstü hal yasaları ve aslında özgür ve adil bir olmayan seçimlerle şekillenen kötü politik sistemden muzdaripti. AB ve Amerika'dan demokratikleşme için finansal destek gelse de bu yardımlar proje temelli olmadığı ve ihtiyaç duyulan yerlerde harcanmadığı için bir türlü istenilen demokratik reformlar yapılamadı. Sivil toplum bir türlü devlet baskısından ve şüpheli konumundan kurtulamadı. Bu bakış açısı, demokrasinin başarısızlığını ve Mısır'daki askeri rejimin geçiş sürecindeki

engellemedeki rolünü gözler önüne sermektedir. Siyasete yönelik askeri etkilerin kökenleri, Mısır'daki modernleşme ile çok ilgili. Ordunun subayları Mısır'ın politik ve sosyal yapısında çok önemli bir role sahiptir. Modern Mısır'ın oluşturmasının, İngiliz himayesinden bağımsızlığıyla bir askeri darbeye borçlu olması son derece önemlidir. Milliyetçi, anti-empyralist ve yolsuzlukla mücadele gündemi olan bir grup asker, Mısır halkı üzerindeki ağır baskıdan endişe duyuyordu. Bu yüzden, Mısır için tam bağımsızlık uğruna bir darbe yapmak niyetindeydiler. 1952 Temmuz'unda Mısır Devrimi'nde lider Cemal Abdul Nasır'dı. Nasır çok önemli bir Arab Milliyetçisi idi; Sosyalistlerin destekleri aldı ve Müslüman Kardeşler örgütüne halkın desteğini bazı önlemlerle azaltmaya başardı. Milliyetçi söylemiyle Mısır halkından büyük beğeni toplayan Nasır, muhalifleri koyduğu yasalarla siyasi yapı oluşturmasını engelledi. Böylece askeri baskının etkileri Nasır dönemi boyunca devam etmiş ve liberalleşme adına bir gelişme olmamıştır. Enver Sedat ise hukukun üstünlüğü, kurumsal devlet yapısı ve siyasi liberalleşmeyle özgürlük sloganı ile yönetimin başına geçti. Sedat, çok partili bir sisteme geçişe izin vererek Mısır siyasetinin liberalleşmesinde önemli role sahipti. Çok partili sistem için onun modeli diğer sistemlerden biraz farklıydı. 1976'da, Arab Sosyalist Birliği (ASU) içinde üç siyasi forumun kurulmasına izin vermeye karar verdi. Bu üç forum, “sağ, sol ve merkez” i temsil edecekti. Stacher (2004)'de “Enver Sedat'ın çoğulculuk politikasının aslında insanlar ve iktidar rejimi arasında herhangi bir güç paylaşımından kaçındığını” bildirdi (s.220). Mısır'da siyasi katılım, başkan Sedat'ın kontrolü altındaydı. Sedat'ın izni olmaksızın dini, sosyal veya mevcut bir siyasi parti ile ilgili bir partinin kurulmasını yasa ile yasakladı. Nasır dönemiyle karşılaştırıldığında, siyasi özgürlükler genişletildi, özel mülkiyeti kısıtlayan yasal uygulamalar kaldırıldı, sansür azaltıldı ve siyasi partiler açıldı. Bununla birlikte, pratikte devlet, Nasır döneminin kişisel meşruluğuna dayanarak otoriter yapısını sürdürdü. Daha demokratik yönetim yapmaya çalışırken, Sedat'ın birçok engelle karşılaşması oldukça şaşırtıcıydı. Bu nedenle, ülkedeki bazı tehdit ve ayaklanmaların bastırılması için bazı kararnameler yayınladı. Ne yazık ki, bu kararnameler tüm ülkede siyasi ve sivil özgürlükleri sert bir şekilde kısıtladı. Sedat, yabancı yatırımcıları özel girişimleri teşvik etmek için açık kapı politikası uyguladı. Tıǧlı (2011) “Sedat'ın açık kapı ekonomik politikasının yalnızca yönetici sınıfına hizmet ettiğini ve zengin ve yoksul insanlar arasındaki uçurumu derinleştirdiğini” belirtmiştir (s.7). 1981'de Sedat'ın ölümü ile başa geçen hava kuvvetlerinin eski bir üyesi olan Hüsnü Mübarek ve Mısır yönetimini liberalleşmeye çalıştı, ancak



girişimlerinde çok başarılı değildi. Egemenliği otoriterlikten demokratikleşmeye çevirmek için bazı önlemler aldı. Amacı Mısır'ın kutuplaşmış siyasi örgütleri arasında ulusal birlik yapmaktı. Bu adımları atarak tüm Mısırlılardan önemli ölçüde onay ve kabul aldı. Mübarek döneminde anayasada yapılan değişiklikler halkın iradesini yansıtmıyordu ve demokratikleşme pratiği başarılı değildi. Doğrusu, 1970'lerden beri uygulanan çok partili seçimler sistemi, parlamento seçimlerinde muhalefetin siyasi temsilinin çok sınırlı olduğunu gösterdi. Dahası, siyasal çoğulculuk çok partili sistem, Mübarek'in başkanlığının çok erken aşamalarında bir ölçüde çalıştı. Meital (2006) “muhalefet örgütlerinden biri olan Müslüman Kardeşler, seçimlere halkın büyük desteğiyle katılmasına rağmen, Mısır hükümetinin, devlet güvenlik güçleri tarafından güç kullanımıyla birlikte yüksek düzeyde sahtecilik ve sindirme yoluna siyasi güç elde edemedi”(s.276). Mısır'da siyasi partilerinde bir artış yaşanmış olmasına rağmen, Hüsnü Mübarek ile yaklaşık 30 yılını dolduran siyasi partinin değişimine dair gerçek bir irade hiç sergilenmemişti. Ayrıca, Mübarek döneminde, parlamento üyelerinin çoğu, imtiyazları olan güçlü işadamlarıydı. Buna ek olarak, yolsuzlukla suçlanan işadamlarının büyük çoğunluğu Mübarek tarafından yönetilen iktidar partisinin üyeleriydi. İşadamları, dokunulmazlık ve güç kazanmak için parlamentoya girmeyi seçtiler. Özellikle ekonominin sıkıntılı olduğu 2000'li yıllardan sonra, Mübarek'in hak ve özgürlükleri askıya almada, medyaya sansür konmasında ve gerektiğinde muhalefetin hapsedilmesine izin veren olağanüstü hal yasalarını artırdı. Otoriter rejimin hayatta kalması, askeri ve kamunun desteğine dayanır. Holgar (2005) Mübarek rejiminin hayatta kalmasıyla ilgili olarak “Mübarek rejimi ciddi bir soruna yol açabilecek herhangi bir grup ya da topluluk katmanını tamamen göz ardı ederek orduyu her zaman ayrıcalıklı bir konumda tuttuğunu ifade etmiştir” (s.384). Antidemokratik uygulamaların yol açtığı yolsuzluk, rüşvet, işkence ve kanunsuzluk, Mısırlıların gelecekteki beklentilerinin tükenmesine neden olmuştu. Mübarek'e karşı kitlesel gösterilere yol açan en önemli olay, şüphesiz iktidarını oğluna verme arzusudur. Devleti 30 yıldır olağanüstü hal kanunlarıyla yöneten Mübarek, polis ve askeri güçleri kendisine karşı gerçekleştirilecek isyan girişimlerine karşı güçlendirmişti. Anayasa değişikliğine rağmen, 2011 yılına kadar başkan yardımcısı görevlendirilemedi. Bu stratejik pozisyon, kimseyi atamadığı, onun dışında gelişecek bir yapı ve oğlu Cemal Mübarek'i başkanlığa getirme olasılığı olarak görülüyordu. Bu, askeriyeyi ve bürokrasiyi devlet içinde rahatsız etmeye başlamıştı.

Mısır'daki protestolar 25 Ocak 2011'de başladı, ancak bölgedeki gelişmeler Mısır halkının devrimci olacağını gösteriyordu. Bu tarihten itibaren, ülke genelinde protestocuların kamu alanlarını işgal etmeleri, devlet ve polis binalarının önünde kitlesel toplanmalar ve sosyal medyanın da etkisiyle sürekli artan kalabalık artık devrimin gerçekleşeceğini göstergesiydi. Mısır halkı protesto etmeye devam etti ve Mübarek'ten derhal istifa etmesini ve halk olarak yeni bir anayasa hazırlamasını istedi. Daha sonra Mübarek'e sadık olan ordu protestolara sessiz kaldı ve ordunun protestocuların lehine olması, Mübarek'in iktidarı kaybetmesine neden oldu. Son olarak, Mübarek 11 Şubat 2011'de, iktidarı Silahlı Kuvvetler Yüksek Konseyi'ne (SKYK) bırakmak zorunda kaldı. Mübarek'i deviren Arab Baharı protestolara ülkenin farklı bölgelerinden insanlar ve gruplar katıldı. Müslüman Kardeşler, Selefiler, 6 Nisan Hareketi, Halid Said Hareketi, Kifaye, işçi hareketleri ve diğer muhalefet gruplarıyla bağlantılı gruplar Mübarek'i devirmeyi amaçlayan Tahrir olaylarında önemli bir rol oynamışlardır. Mısırlılar, daha önce görülmemiş ölçekte insan desteği ile 18 gün içinde taleplerine ulaşmışlardır. Arab Baharı sürecinde halkın “ekmek, özgürlük ve sosyal adalet, insanlık onuru ve siyasi özgürlük” gibi yaygın sloganları vardı. Mısır halkı, ayaklanma ve tek adam rejimini devirme konusunda olumlu bir deneyime sahip oldu. Vatandaşlar, siyasi ortamda demokratik bir arenaya sahip olmak için sabırla beklediler, ancak askeri ve bürokratik statükodan dolayı biraz geç kaldılar. Ayrıca Mübarek'in otuz yıldır süren bastırılmış yönetimi, siyasi geçişte hızlı ve istenen değişime izin vermedi.

İnsanların dünyada kendilerine özgü ve değerli kültürel özellikleri vardır. Aslında, Mısır, demokrasinin oryantal despotik bir davranışa sahip olduğu bir bölge değildir. Mısır halkı her zaman demokratik yönetime geçmeyi denedi, ancak otoriter liderleri böyle bir ortamı mümkün kılmadılar. Demokrasi, seçim ve ifade özgürlüğü, eşit yurttaşlık ve herkesin katılımı ilkeleri üzerine kuruludur. Aynı zamanda özgür ve adil seçimler, güçler ayrılığı, hesap verebilirlik ve şeffaflık konularında da öncülük eder. Bu nedenle, tamamen demokratik olmak için ülkede uygulanan bazı kıstaslar bulunmalıdır. Eğer bu kıstasların bir ya da iki tanesi uygulanmıyorsa bu demokrasi ile sonuçlanamaz. Mısır toplumu, Dalh'ın demokrasi kıstasları kademeli olarak uygulayarak demokrasinin refahına ulaşmaya çalıştı. Geçiş döneminde ilk olarak özgür, adil ve düzenli seçimi hayata geçirdiler. Bu seçim sonucunda %52 ile Mursi başkan olarak seçildi. Fakat seçim sonucunda istediklerini kişinin başkan olduğu göremeyen çıkar grupları Mursi'nin başarısız olması ve demokrasiye geçiş sürecinin sonlandırılması için ellerinden geleni yaptılar. Bunun yanında tam demokrasiye

geçiş Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin çıkarlarını tehlikeye atabilirdi; bu nedenle ABD, İsrail'in ya da kendi çıkarlarının tehlikeye girmesine izin vermemiştir. Mısır örneğinde küresel aktörlerin çıkarlarına uygun hareket etmeyen Mursi iktidarı askeri darbe ile sonlandırılmıştır. Demokrasiye geçiş, bir tarafta otoriter bir rejimin sonlanması sürecinin başlatılmasıyla, diğer tarafta ise bir çeşit demokrasinin kurulmasıyla ilgilidir. Diğer bir ifadeyle, otoriter rejimden devrimci bir alternatifin ortaya çıkmasıyla ya demokrasi ya da otoriter rejimin el değiştirmesiyle sonlanabilir. Geçiş dönemi, demokrasiye giden yolu açabilir ya da açamaz ve bir ülkede istikrarı sağlar ya da sağlayamaz. Demokrasiye geçiş temel demokratik kıstasların gerçekleştirmesini ifade eden siyasi bir süreçtir. Dolayısıyla demokrasiye geçiş süreci sanılanın aksine bir anda gerçekleşmez ve her geçiş süreci farklı ülkelerde aynı sonuçlanmaz.

Ekonomik gerileme demokrasiye engel olabilir. Demokrasiye geçiş gerçekleşse bile ekonomik statü hızlı bir şekilde değişmeyecek ve kısa vadede toplumun sorunlarını çözemeyecektir. Böylece halk sorunlardan dolayı hayal kırıklığı yaşanacaktır. Bu nedenle, demokrasiye doğru ilerlemek için ekonomik koşulların iyileştirilmesi şarttır. Bir ülkede, bir toplumda daha fazla refah varsa daha fazla demokrasiye sahip olacaktır denilebilir. Geçiş döneminde askeriye Mısırda, Mursi'ye değil demokrasiye yönelik beklenmedik bir darbe yapmıştır. Bu koşullar altında laik, liberaller ve diğer muhalifler, Mursi'yi oyların gücü ile yani demokrasinin gücü ile değiştirebilirdi. Mübarek'in çöküşünden sonra, Silahlı Kuvvetler Yüksek Konseyi iktidarı Mursi ve İslami partiye isteksizce verdi. Ancak geçiş sürecinde Mısır, İslamcılar, laikler ve ordu arasında çok kırılmalı bir ortamda ilerledi. Mevcut durumda, bu gerilim seçilmiş başkan Mursi'nin devrilmesine ve MB'nin siyasi süreçten yasaklanmasına neden oldu. Mısır askeri güçleri geleneksel bir devlete kıyasla abartılı bir role sahipti. Ordu, nüfuzunu ve silahlarını demokrasiye karşı koymak için kullandı. Bu yüzden Mısır'daki demokrasiye geçiş, askeri güçlerin baskısından uzak bir zamana ihtiyaç duyuyor.

Mısırlıların çoğu, siyasi durumdan çok, daha da kötüleşen ekonomik şartlardan endişeliydi. Temel endişeleri; hızla artan fiyatlar, işsizlik, sokaklarda güvenlik eksikliği, düşük ücretler ve yoksulluktu. Bölgedeki yerleşik insanlar dengeli gelir dağılımı talep ediyorlardı. Devletin yönetiminde, genel idari yapının oluşumu belli ailelerin / grupların elindeydi ve bu ailelerin devam eden zenginleşmesi, zenginler ile yoksullar arasındaki boşlukta kademeli bir artışa yol açmıştır. Aslında, Mısır'daki demokrasiye geçiş o kadar kolay değildi, çünkü Mısır çok

uzun yıllar merkezileşmiş otoriter rejim altında kalmıştır. Bu nedenle devlet içindeki tüm siyasi kurumları otoriter sisteme göre inşa etmişlerdi. Demokratik olmayan iktidar partisi tüm iktidarı ele geçirdi ve hayatın politik, sosyal ve ekonomik yönünün tüm bölümlerine hükmetti. Demokrasi, belli bir süre içinde özgün ve spesifik koşullar oluştuğunda var olan bir olgudur. Bu nedenle, demokrasi otomatik olarak aktörlerin veya insanların talebi ile gerçekleşmez. Bu nedenle, bir ülkenin Dalh'ın kıstaslarının varlığı ve uygulanışı çok önemlidir. Maalesef bu kıstaslar, Mısır'ın otoriter rejimlerle dolu geçmiş miraslarıyla birlikte askeri, ekonomik ve sosyal engeller nedeniyle Mısır'da ya kurumsallaştırılmamış ya da iyi uygulanmamıştır. Bunun yanında, Mursi'nin bir yıllık iktidarında da, benzer engeller devam etti ve hükümet, işsizlik, yoksulluk ve güvenlik gibi kanayan yaralara kalıcı bir çözüm geliştiremedi. Derinleşen toplumsal huzursuzluk ve diğer sorunlar demokrasi sürecine geçişi engelledi. Çünkü oradaki insanların önceliği ekonomik sorunlarının çözülerek karşı karşıya oldukları yoksulluk, açlık ve güvenlik sorunlarının çözülseydi. İnsanlar yıllardır yaşadıkları sorunlara hızlı bir çözüm beklediler ama Mursi yönetimi tüm sosyal sorunları çok kısa sürede çözemedikleri için halkın bir kısmı da bu yönetimden kurtulmak istedi. Demokratik olmayan rejimin varlığı, kamunun bireysel özgürlüklerin, kötü, baskıcı, düzensiz ve yozlaşmış hükümetlerin yetersizliğine bir tepki oluşturdu. Hüsnü Mübarek'in iktidarı sırasında Mısır'da yapılan seçimlerde, seçimlere katılım oranı çok düşüktü, ancak başkan neredeyse tüm katılımcıların oylarını alarak seçilirdi. Mısır'da şeffaflığın ve güvenilirliğin olmaması, adaletin yokluğu ve devlet içinde eski yönetimden kalma katı bürokrasinin de demokrasiye geçişte başarısızlığa etkisi oldu. Bu nedenle, yönetim sisteminde önemli derin bir yara vardı ve normal insanlar ne kadar zeki veya başarılı olursa olsun yönetim sisteminin zirvesine ulaşamazlardı. Bu da Mısır'ın otoriter rejim tarafından yönetildiğinin göstergesiydi. Bir devletin etkililiği ve iyi yapısal özellikleri, rejimin hayatta kalmasını belirler. Bu nedenle, normal şartlarda eğer hükümet kendini topluma ve modern ihtiyaçlara göre yenilerse, o zaman hükümet hayatta kalma ve uzun kalma kapasitesini artırır. Mısır'ın Arab Baharı sonrası Mısır'da demokrasiye geçişin başarısı, ülkenin şu andaki yönetici elitleri, askeri güçleri, yargı ve Mübarek kalıntılarının iç meselelerde uzun süredir devam eden otoriter eğilimlerini sürdürmekte ısrar ettiği sürece bir yanılsamadır. Bu aktörlerin ülkeyi demokratik yolla yönetme konusundaki isteksizliği, bütün Mısırlıların demokrasiyi geçiş çabalarını ve mücadelelerini boşa çıkarttı. Bu nedenle, siyasi aktörler ve ordu, demokrasinin Mısır'a katkısının büyük olacağına inanmalıydılar.

Maalesef eski rejimin kalıntıları ve seçkinler, çıkarlarını demokrasiye tercih ettiler.

Mısır'ın siyasi türbülansının içeriği ne olursa olsun iki eksen vardı. İslamcıların eliyle demokratikleşme ya da eski rejim kurumları aracılığıyla ayrıcalıklı bir vesayet rejimi. Müslüman kardeşler, demokrasiye geçiş sürecinde laikler, liberaller ve Hristiyanlarla işbirliği yapamadı. Mısırlılar, darbeden yedi ay önce Mısır'ın siyasi ikileminde, meşru gerekçelerle siyaset yapmak yerine sokağa çıkmayı seçen liberaller, laikler sosyalistler ve Hristiyanlar dâhil her siyasi aktörün ateşle oynadığını fark etmeliydiler. Bu yangının adı askeri-vesayetçi vesayet rejiminin iktidarı ele geçirmesiydi. Belki MB hareketi yaklaşmakta olan darbeyi fark edememişti, ancak Mısır'ın dışarısından atmosferin daha da kötüleştiği anlaşılıyordu. MB ve bazı liberallerin ortak özelliği deneyimsizlikti ve eski rejim destekçilerinin en temel özelliği yıllarca siyasi deneyime sahip olmalarıydı. Aslında, otoriter kurumların çoğu geçiş döneminde hala aktifti; bu nedenle, politik aktörler otoriter rejimden demokratik olana geçmek için ortak bir vizyon oluşturamadılar. İlk olarak demokratik yol haritasının etrafında siyasi ve toplumsal bir konsensüs oluşturmayı başaramadılar. Ordu, politik ve sosyal pakt eksikliği nedeniyle darbeyi kolayca gerçekleştirdi. Hamzawy (2017) "Mısır'ın demokratikleşmemesini, 11 Şubat 2011'den sonra Müslüman Kardeşler ile liberal ve solcu gruplar arasında aktörler siyaseti nasıl yöneteceğine dair fikir birliğine dayalı bir ortak görüşün olmayışına bağlar"(s.2). MB Hareketi'nin en büyük kaygısı, rakiplerin ordunun yardımıyla hedeflerine ulaşabilmeleriydi ki askeri darbe ile muhalefet MB hareketinin iktidardan indirdi. Ama darbe ile sadece Müslüman Kardeşler, yani İslamcılar değil, aynı zamanda demokrasi ve ekonomik refahı arayan Mısırlılar da kaybetti. İslamcılar sonunda bedelini ödedi ve siyasal alandan çıkarıldı. Yine, Müslüman Kardeşler, demokrasinin önünü açmak için kapalı kapılar ardında yapılan gizli planları anlamalıydı. Müslüman Kardeşler, devrimden önce yaptıkları gibi İslamcı olmayanlara köprüler kurabilirdi. Mısır'daki müesses nizam, zaman içinde güçlü bir mutabakatla açıklığa çıkarılabilirdi. Demokratik geçiş için bir yol haritasının oluşturulmaması, siyasi aktörler arasındaki bölünmeye neden olan etkenlerdi ve bu da askeri müdahaleye yol açtı. Geçiş döneminde MB ilk olarak askeriyeyle işbirliğini tercih etmişti; bu nedenle orduya o kadar çok güveniyorlardı ki, diğer politik aktörlerle fikir birliği oluşturmaya çalışmadılar. Mursi başa geçtikten kısa bir süre sonra ani bir reform kararı verdi ve ordunun baş generallerini emekli etti. Bu, askeri vesayeti engelleyerek demokrasinin sağlamlaştırılması için iyi bir adımdı. MB'nin bu kararı diğer siyasi aktörlerin görüşünü de alarak vermesi daha iyi olurdu.

Eğer diğer politik aktörler bu eylemi desteklemiş olsalardı, o zaman toplumda fikri birliği olur ve demokrasiye bağlı olabilirdi. MB, ordunun uzun süredir devam eden siyasi ve ekonomik ayrıcalıklarına dokunmadı. Dahası, ordu bu ayrıcalıkları MB ve başkanına silah olarak kullandı. Bu şekilde, askeri darbeye kadar kendi çıkarlarını korudular. MB üyeleri ve destekçileri, seçimlerin oy çoğunluğunu alarak engeli çözebileceğine inandılar. Bu inançla, başkanlık içindeki bazı devlet aygıtlarını yenebileceklerini ve kazanabileceklerini düşündüler.

Mısır'da sivil-asker ilişkileri demokrasi için ciddi bir engeldi. Altmış yıl sonra Mısır Ordusu sivil bir başkan kabul etmek zorunda kaldı. Mursi başkan olduğunda, Mısır devleti onu başkan olarak kabul edemedi. Mursi'yi bir yabancı olarak gören devlet kurumları, onun zayıflaması ve devrilmesi için mücadele etti. Müslüman Kardeşler ve Mursi devlet içinde güçlü bir ilişki içinde olamadılar ve önceden önemli bir konumda bulunamadılar. Eski rejim destekçileri MB'nin bu zayıf yönünü çok iyi kullanmışlardır. Mursi döneminde ülkedeki bölünme, istikrarsızlık, güvenlik sorunları ve ekonominin kötüleşmesi, eski rejim aktörlerinin Başkan'ı devirmek için temel argümanını oluşturdu. Mursi başkanlığı kazandıktan sonra devlet yapısı, politik kutuplaşmalar, bölünmeler, istikrarsızlık ve eski rejimin kurumlarının direnişi nedeniyle kapsamlı bir reform yapılmadı. Mursi döneminde eski rejim kurumsal varlığını korudu. Mursi'nin reform için attığı her adım bile ülkede kutuplaşmayı ve ayrışmayı artırdı. Genel olarak, Müslüman Kardeşler, demokratik ilkelerden bağımsız olarak orduyla karşı karşıya gelmekten ziyade işbirliğini seçti. MB ayrıca, yeni anayasadaki askeriye ekonomik faaliyetlerden elde edilen gelirler de dâhil olmak üzere, askeri bütçeyi devlet kontrolünden uzak tuttu. Dahası, ordu bütçesi denetimi, çoğunlukla askerlerden oluşan Ulusal Savunma Konseyi'ne bırakıldı. Bu da orduya ulusal güvenlik ve hassas dış politika konularıyla ilgili veto hakkını verdi. Maghraoui (2014) MB'in siyasi kaderini, sivil kontrol altına alınmamış askeriye iyi niyetine bağladığını iddia etti. Siyasi aktörler arasındaki güvensizlik ortamında, toplumsal huzursuzlukla birleşince, ordu Mısır'ı kurtarabilecek tek kurum olarak ortaya çıktı. Dahası, siyasi pakttaki başarısızlık ve demokrasiye geçiş konusunda mutabakat yol haritasının olmaması askeri darbenin sebebiydi. Yani, ordu, Mısır'daki darbe ve demokrasiye geçişin sona erdirilmesi için bir neden aradı.

Ordu Mısır'da rejimin on yıllar boyunca koruyucusu olarak hizmet etti. Ayaklanma zamanında da devletin koruyucusu olarak görev yapmış ve daha sonra ayaklanma silah zoru

kullanılmadan kontrol altına alınmıştır. Daha sonra ordu, kendi maddi çıkarlarının koruyucusu olarak hareket etti ve Mısır devletinde ayrıcalıklarını sürdürmek istedi. Hüsnü Mübarek döneminin sona ermesi için ordu, onun iç ve dış ilişkilerde tutarsız politikaları nedeniyle, Mübarek'in devrilmesini destekliyordu. Özellikle de iktidarını oğluna devretme niyeti, orduyu ciddi şekilde rahatsız etti. Mısır siyasetinin en önemli aktörleri olan silahlı kuvvetler, 2011'deki devrimden sonra bir süre iktidarda bulundular, ancak devrimci grupların baskısı için 2012'de iktidarı sivillere bıraktılar. Ordu geçiş döneminde iktidara geldiğinde, siyaseti kontrol etmek için kendi kabinesini oluşturmada oldukça hızlıydı. Kısa süren geçiş sürecinin ardından, Amerika, Avrupa ve bölgesel güçlerin gözü önünde askeri darbe yaşandı. Dolayısıyla, büyük umutlarla başlayan ve belli bir mesafe kaydeden demokrasiye geçiş süreci çok ağır bir yara aldı. Ordu, siyasal iktidarı yeniden ele geçirdi. Yüksek katılımı demokratik bir şekilde düzenlenen seçimle başkanlığa gelen Muhammed Mursi darbe sonucu iktidardan indirildi. Bu nedenle, Mısır ordusunun siyasete müdahale yolunu açmak için ülkede kaos açmayı amaçladığı söylenebilir. Bunun için de ülkedeki bazı aktörleri karşı-devrim için örgütlemiştir. Örneğin, Nisan 2013'te kurulan Temerrüt hareketi, silahlı kuvvetler mensuplarıyla gizli toplantılarda bulunmuş ve hatta bu kişiler protestolar toplantısı yapabilmek için ileriki dönemlerde ordudan talimatlar almışlardır. Askeri vesayet devletin ve toplumun her alanına girdi. Hiçbir sivil örgüt belli sınırların ötesine geçemedi, ordu sivil kurumların gelişimi önlendi ve sivillerin alanı daraltıldı. Sivil toplum, gelişme araçlarına sahip değildi. Her ne kadar iktidar tamamen sivillere bırakılsa bile, Mursi örneğinde olduğu gibi, herhangi bir siyasi partinin Mısır'da yönetim ve yönetim deneyimine sahip olma şansı yoktu. Başka bir deyişle, ülkeyi kuşatan ve bütün alternatifleri yok eden askeri vesayet neredeyse Mısır'ın kaderi oldu. Mısır da, Mursi yönetimi, askerin büyük ve eski komutanlarının bazılarını değiştirmeye çalıştı. Bu nedenle ordu, bazı laik, liberal ve gençlik örgütleriyle birlikte darbeyi dış güç desteğiyle gerçekleştirdi. Mısır'ın en güçlü kurumu, ülkenin siyasetini belirleyen temel aktörlerden biri olan ordudur. Dolayısıyla, ordunun siyaset ve ekonomideki etkisi ve ağır gücü, demokrasiye geçişi engellemeye ve askeri darbeye vurmaya sebebiyet vermiştir.

Muhammed Mursi döneminin altıncı ayından sonra karşı-devrimin destekçileri tarafından düzenlenen örgütler kısa zamanda aktif bir güç haline geldi. Bu noktada, iktidarını Arab Baharı devrimci dönemde yitiren iç aktörler devreye girdi ve Suudi Arabistan ve Birleşik Arab Emirlikleri hükümetlerinin bölgedeki desteğiyle karşı-devrim sürecine başladılar. Bu

iç aktörlerin karşı-devrimi gerçekleştirirken dış aktörlerle birlikte kurdukları ittifakların öneminin de dikkate alınması gerekir. Silahlı kuvvetlerin, medyanın ve iş dünyasının desteğine rağmen, karşı devrimci iç aktörler, özellikle ekonomik anlamda dış aktörlerin desteğine ihtiyaç duyuyorlardı. Nitekim bu dış destek, gelecekteki iktidar yönetiminin karşı-devrim sürecinde meşruiyetinin sağlanmasında büyük önem taşımaktadır. Karşı devrimci cephede, bölgesel aktörler ve küresel düzeyde aktörlerin desteği, süreci başarıyla yönetmiştir. Bu bağlamda, iç aktörler Mısır'da karşı-devrim sürecinde doğrudan aktörler olsalar da, bunları gerçekleştirmeyi başaran dış aktörlerin desteğini aldılar. Bu dış destek aynı zamanda Mısır devriminin karşı-devrimci süreçle uluslararasılaşma sürecini başlattı. Bu süreçte sadece Mısır'daki aktörler değil, aynı zamanda bölgesel ve küresel ülkeler, uluslararası örgütler, ulus ötesi örgütler de Mısır'da karşı-devrimci sürece destek olarak katılmışlardır. Dış aktörlerin doğrudan katılımı, Mısır örneğinde çok açıktı. Dünyanın hegemonik gücü olarak tanımlanan ABD, dünya çapında önemli olayların olmasında rol alıyor ve sürece dâhil oluyor. Süreç tamamlandığında, her zaman kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda hareket halindedirler. Mısır örneğini ele aldığımızda, ABD önce kendi çıkarlarını ve ardından İsrail'in güvenliğini ve geleceğini güvence altına almak istiyor. ABD, Mısır'daki Mübarek sonrası dönemi kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda şekillendirmek istemişti. Her şeyden önce, Müslüman Kardeşlerin iktidara gelmesi ve çoğunluğu temsil etmesi, Amerika için doğrudan faydalı değildi. Nitekim bu politik meseleye müdahale etmek için ABD önce iç dinamikleri kullanarak muhalifleri kışkırttı. Orduyu da işin içine dâhil ederek hedefine ulaşmıştır. Hedefe giden yolda, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ülkedeki kilit aktörler ile temas halindeydi. Mübarek sonrası dönemde Mısır'ın demokratikleşmesine samimi bir destek vermeyen ABD yönetimi, askeri darbeye demokratik seçimlerle iktidara gelen Mursi'nin askeri darbe ile indirilmesine tepki göstermedi.

Avrupa Birliği, özellikle Orta Doğu'da, coğrafi alana daha fazla önem verdiği ülkelere farklı davranmayı tercih etmiştir. AB, ülkelerdeki otoriter rejimlerin baskıcı tutumlarını siyasi çıkarları ışığında değerlendirmiştir. AB'nin geçiş döneminde Mısır'daki siyasi reformları desteklemek için ekonomik yardımı yeterli seviyeye ulaşmadı ve yardımların çoğu, demokrasiyi destekleyecek projelerden ziyade terörizm, göç ve sınır denetimi gibi konulara aktarıldı. Yani, AB demokrasi kavramını toplumların kendinden bir değer olarak görmemekte, ancak bunu özellikle Batı ülkelerini hedef alan terörizmi önleyebilecek bir araç olarak benimsemektedir. Avrupa Birliği'nin Mısır'a yönelik demokrasi politikası farklıydı.



Müslümanlar kendi kaderini tayin hakkını demokratik olarak uyguladılar. Özellikle, daha fazla demokrasi diyerek, kendi kaderlerini tayin ettiğini iddia eden Müslümanların haklarına saygı duymak, AB prensiplerinin en kutsal olanı olacaktı. Demokratik olarak seçilmiş başkanın Mısır'daki askeri darbeye düşüşüne karşı çıkmayan AB, demokrasinin kıstaslarını görmezden gelerek demokrasiyi araç olarak kullanmış ve kendi çıkarlarına hizmet etmesini tercih etmiştir. ABD ve AB, istikrarlı bir Orta Doğu'ya olan arzularını dile getiriyorlardı çünkü iç çatışmalar ve istikrarsızlık, ticareti engeller ve mülteciler sorununu gündeme getirirdi. AB, Mursi iktidarını yeterince desteklemedi, çünkü üye devletler Mursi hükümetinin halkın beklentilerine cevap veremeyeceğini ve ülkede gerekli reformları yapamayacağını düşündüler. Bu ifadeler, AB'nin demokratik ilkelerine aykırı olsa da, AB'nin aslında bölgede “istikrar” ve “insan hakları” arasında bir ikilem olduğunu gösteriyor. Ordunun Mısır'daki darbesi, Mursi'yi devirmesinden sonra uluslararası toplum, özellikle AB ve ABD, ordunun Müslüman Kardeşler ve göstericilere karşı yürüttüğü katliamlar hakkında sessiz kaldı. Uluslararası toplum ve AB, Mısır'ın demokratik dönüşümü için gerekli desteği sağlamamıştır. AB'nin ve uluslararası toplumun sessizliği, darbe yönetimine meşruiyet kazandırdı.

Suudi Arabistan ve Birleşik Arab Emirlikleri, askeri darbeyi finans olarak ve siyasi gücü ile tüm dünyanın gözü önünde açıkça destekliyorlardı. Ülkeleriyle ilgili bazı korkular ve kaygılar vardı ama demokrasinin ya da Mısır'daki demokrasinin sağlanmasıyla ilgili değillerdi. Ayrıca Birleşik Arab Emirlikleri Müslüman Kardeşlere yakın olan insanların önemli görevlerde bulunmamasını sağlamak için özel çaba sarf ediyordu. Körfez ülkeleri, geçiş dönemine muhaliflere özellikle de Temerrüt hareketine çeşitli finansal yardımlar yaptılar. Körfez ülkelerinin bölgedeki radikal değişim direnişini yıkmak ve bölgenin demokrasi dışında istikrarını sağlama arzusu göze çarpmaktadır. Mısır'ın karşı devriminde muhaliflere ve orduya destek olmak için devasa yardım fonlarının tahsis etmişlerdir. Körfez ülkeleri, bütün bunları demokratik geçişin olası başarısını engellemek uğruna yaptılar. Mısır geçiş döneminde başarılı olsaydı, o zaman kendi vatandaşlarının iradesiyle sıra kendi ülkelerine gelebilirdi.

Ordu, eski rejimin taraftarlarıyla birlikte dış devletlerin desteğini aldı. ABD, AB, Suudi Arabistan ve Birleşik Arab Emirlikleri gibi dış aktörlerin etkisiyle, Mısır'daki demokrasiye geçişin başarısızlığına sebep olan askeri darbeye Mursi'yi iktidardan zorla indirildi. Ordu ve bileşenleri, Mısır'daki politik hayatta hâlâ baskındırlar. Ordunun etkinliği hala Silahlı

Kuvvetler Yüksek Konsey'in eliyle devam ediyor. Mısır'da, özellikle de ABD'nin ordu eliyle, MB hükümetinin yol açtığı meşruiyet krizine müdahale etmek için askeri kullanması ve darbe yapılması gerçekten geçiş sürecindeki kazanımlar açısından çok düşündürücüydü. Otoriter rejim düştüğünde veya bariz bir siyasi kriz zamanında ordu, siyasi alanın kırılğan bir durumda sıkışıp kalmasıyla geçiş sürecine müdahale etme eğilimindedir. O zaman ordu siyasete müdahale etmek ve güce tamamen sahip olmak için çok isteklidir. Demokratik olarak seçilmiş Başkan Mursi'nin 3 Temmuz 2013'te askeri darbe ile devrilmesi, 2011'deki halk hareketinin ardından otoriter Mübarek yönetimine karşı yapılan 2,5 yıllık demokrasiye geçiş sürecinin başarısızlığı anlamına geliyordu. Mısır, tüm aktörler ile birlikte demokratik geçiş dönemini başarılı bir şekilde bitirme isteğini ortaya koymadı.

Seçim, dış güçler ve askeri vesayet arzuları için kullanılamaz. Demokraside sadece bir amaca izin verilir; halkın demokratikleşmesi ve liberalleşmesidir. Bu olgu yüzyıllardır süren bir süreçtir. Diğer bir deyişle, demokrasi sadece sandıkta en çok oyu almak değildir. Seçimde kazanma, kazanana sadece inanç, mülkiyet ve kişisel özgürlükleri güvence altına alan demokrasiyi uygulama hakkı verir. Kazanan, çoğunluğu talep etmek için herhangi bir diktatörlüğün sosyal, ekonomik veya politik ilkelerine hükmedemez. Kazanan sadece evrensel değerlerin, hakların ve özgürlüklerin yanlarını alabilir. Demokratik felsefeye göre, öznel olan mutlak bir gerçek yoktur. Devletin görevi engellerin ortadan kaldırılması, böylece bireyin kendi organik ve içgüdüsel isteklerinin ve arzularının özgürlüğü ve tatminiyle özgürce ifade edebilmesidir. Başkanın yapacağı en büyük şey, temel haklar, özgürlükler ve evrensel değerleri her bireye tam ve eşit bir şekilde sürdürmek ve güvence altına almaktır. Mısırdaki, demokratik siyasi kurumların olmayışı ya da olanlarında evrensel değerlere uygun çalışmaması demokrasiye geçişin başarısızlığını etkiledi. Mübarek döneminden beri önemli bir rolü olan tam anlamıyla demokrasiye hizmet eden neredeyse hiç siyasal kurum yoktu. Bu nedenle, bu kurumlar geçiş döneminde bir yıl gibi kısa sürede oluşturulamadı ya da reformlar yoluyla iyileştirilemedi. Dahası, siyasetin baskısından uzak bağımsız bir yargı ve hukuk sistemi erkini tesis etmek ve istikrarlı bir kurum haline dönüştürmekte çok kolay olmadı. Bu nedenle, adil ve şeffaf yasalar olmadan ve hukukun üstünlüğü ilkesine riayet etmeden, demokratik geçişi korumak ve sürdürmek geçmiş mirasın etkisiyle de mümkün olmamıştır. Bu nedenle, siyasal kurumlar ve sivil toplumlar demokrasinin başarısının veya başarısızlığının hayati belirleyicileridir.

Ordu, siyasal ve ekonomik çıkarlarını sonsuza dek kaybetme korkusu nedeniyle sivillere tam yetki ile iktidar olanağı sağlayamadığı için geçişin başarısızlığındaki temel faktördür. Bir ülkenin ekonomik yapısı, demokratik geçişin başarısı için bir başka itici güçtür. Ekonomik gelirlerin yüzde otuzunu elinde bulunduran ordu, ülkenin iktisadi yapısını direkt etkileyecek gücü elinde bulundurmaktadır. Mısır da siyasi aktörler (MB), askeri ve eski rejim destekçilerine karşı birleşmeyi başaramadı. Vatandaşlar arasında dini ve etnik kutuplaşma vardı. Arab Baharının en önemli aktörlerden biri olan gençlik, demokrasiye geçişe olan inancını da yitirdi, çünkü bu dönemin onurunu yeniden kazanma amacından saptırıldığına inandılar. Liberaller, Selefilere, milliyetçiler ve solcular, MB'nin kendisini aşırı güçlendirdiğini ve muhalifleri devlet yönetiminden uzaklaştırdığını iddia ettiler. MB, muhaliflere fırsat verdiklerini, ancak muhalifler herhangi bir sorunun görüşülmesini reddettiğini belirttiler. Bu durumda, muhaliflerin ana hedefi, MB'nin yalnızca kendi başına hizmet ettiği ve devrimlere ihanet ettiğini düşündüklerinden, başkan Mursi'yi iktidardan indirmektir. Muhalifler bunu yaparken, yalnız değillerdi, ABD, AB, BAE ve Suudi Arabistan'ın desteğini aldılar. Bu nedenle MB, ılımlı bir söylem ya da bir uyum stratejisi geliştiremedi. Sonunda, ordu o dönemde mümkün olmayan sorunları çözmek için Mursi idaresine 48 saat verdi. Kuşkusuz MB ve muhalifler demokratik geçiş döneminde başarılı olamadılar. Ancak, muhalifler, dış aktörlerden ve ayrıca Mısır ordusundan güçlü bir destek aldıkları için müzakereleri reddettiler. Mursi ne yaparsa yapsın, hem ülke içinde hem de dışında birçok muhalif olduğu için başarılı olamadı.

Uluslararası yaklaşım, küresel aktörlerin demokrasiye geçiş süreci üzerindeki etkilerine odaklanmaktadır. Normalde, uluslararası aktörler Doğu Avrupa ülkelerinde olduğu gibi demokrasiye geçişte olumlu bir rol oynamıştır. Mısırdaki ise, uluslararası aktörler Mursi'yi devirmek ve bölgesel çıkarları nedeniyle geçiş sürecini durdurmak için muhaliflere destek verdiler. Güçlü Körfez ülkeleri, MB ve Mursi'nin iktidara gelir gelmez yardımlarını azalttılar. AB ve ABD, 2013 yılında darbe için sessiz kaldılar. Körfez ülkeleri darbeden sonra yenilenme dönemini desteklerini dile getirdiler. Bu, demokrasiyi veya demokrasinin araçlarını önemsemediklerini, çünkü dönüşün kendilerine geleceğinden korktuklarını açıkça ortaya koydu. Öte yandan Mursi taraftarları yargının, polisin, ordunun ve medyanın demokrasiye geçişini desteklemediğini iddia etti.

Arab Baharı ile birlikte Arab dünyası otoriter rejimden demokrasiye geçiş sürecindedir. Bu geçiş, toplumlara korkunun yanı sıra umut getirdi. Bazı durumlarda daha baskıcı ve anti-

demokratik sonuçlar kaçınılmaz görünmekle birlikte, uzun vadede 2010-2011 olayları temel bir dönüm noktası olmuştur. Mısır'daki askeri darbeden bu yana uzun zaman geçmesine rağmen, askeri darbenin nedeni olarak gösterilen siyasi istikrarsızlık iyice artmıştır. Siyasi geçmiş miras, sivil toplum, diğer politik kurumlar ve dış aktörler Mısır'daki politik liberalleşme sürecini şekillendiren önemli faktörlerdir. Mısır örneğinde, dış aktörler, yani ABD ve AB gibi batılı aktörler ve Suudi Arabistan, BAE ve İsrail gibi bölgesel aktörler uluslararası medya ve baskı politikaları yoluyla finansal destek ve hibeler ile Mısır'daki aktörleri şekillendirmeyi başarmışlardı. Muhalifleri güçlü destekleri ile birlikte ordu ve iç aktörler, özgür ve adil seçimlerle seçilmiş başkan Mursi'yi iktidardan indirmeyi başardılar. Bulgulara göre, Mısır'ın dış aktörleri Mısır'da demokrasi geçiş yerine istikrarı, ülkenin güvenliğini ve kendi çıkarlarını tercih ettiler. Mısır'ın gelecekte demokrasiye ulaşip ulaşmayacağına karar vermek için henüz erkendir. Mısır, demokrasiye geçiş için az da olsa bir mesafe kat etmiştir. Siyasi liberalleşme demokrasinin temel adımıdır, ancak ordular bunu otoriter rejimlerin daha da ayakta kalması için bir araç olarak kullanmaktadır. Mısır'da ülkenin güvenliği ve korunması gerekçesiyle demokratik kıstasların uygulanması tarihi belli olmayan bir zaman kadar askıya alınmıştır.