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DIVERSIFICATION OF ETHIOPIA'S FOREIGN POLICY AND POST-COLD WAR  
ETHIO-TURKISH RELATIONS

MUZEYEN HAWAS SEBSEBE

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DIVERSIFICATION OF ETHIOPIA'S FOREIGN POLICY AND POST-COLD WAR  
ETHIO-TURKISH RELATIONS

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## Approval of the Institute of Social Sciences

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Manager of Institute

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy .

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Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

---

Prof. Dr. Mustafa *Sitki* BILGIN  
Advisor

Prof. Dr. Mustafa *Sitki* BILGIN (AYBU)

-----

Prof.Dr. Mustafa ERAVCI (AYBU)

-----

Prof. Dr. Mehmet Seyfettin EROL (Gazi University)

-----

Prof.Dr. Suna Timur AĞILDERE (Gazi University)

-----

Assoc. Prof. Giray SADIK (AYBU)

-----

## **DECLARATION**

I hereby confirm that all information in this dissertation has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that all materials and results that are not original to this work are fully referenced and cited; otherwise I accept all legal responsibility .

Muzeyen, SEBSEBE



## **ABSTRACT**

### **DIVERSIFICATION OF ETHIOPIA'S FOREIGN POLICY AND POST-COLD WAR ETHIO-TURKISH RELATIONS**

Muzeyen, SEBSEBE

PhD, Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Mustafa Sitki BILGIN

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Ethiopia has long-survived socio-cultural, economic and political relations with various countries of the world. Together with external factors, the nature, structure and content of these foreign relations have been influenced by the domestic regime type. During the past several decades, authoritarian regimes of Ethiopia used foreign policy as an instrument to legitimize their government and ensure their persistence to power. This has resulted in the formulation and implementation of state-centric and elite-dominated foreign policies and strategies. There were extremely limited efforts to make the country's foreign policy responsive to the socio-economic and political demands of the masses.

The end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of the pro-Socialist regime in Ethiopia in 1991 have led to the beginning of a new era in the country's foreign policymaking. In place of the former Eastern or Western-centric foreign policy approach, post-Cold War Ethiopia has begun to diversify its relations and constructively engages both the established and emerging powers. Furthermore, the foreign policy and strategy of post-Cold War Ethiopia provides attention to promote strategic cooperation with countries of the Horn of Africa. On the other hand, however, foreign policy analysts have forwarded various arguments regarding the ongoing policy diversifications. Some commentators are pro while others are skeptics on the outcomes of the foreign policy diversification process. In this study, I argue for the importance of a comprehensive foreign policy diversification scheme to assure Ethiopia's national interests.

Taking into consideration the occurrence of various interest groups in Ethiopia and their potential role in the country's foreign policymaking, this dissertation infers the important insights of the pluralist school of thought. This study demonstrates that the maintenance of a comprehensive foreign policy diversification enables the various pressure groups in Ethiopia to coexist and positively influence the course of developing and advancing their socio-economic and political interests.

Although there are some studies on post-Cold War Ethiopia's relations with the traditional and emerging powers, none of them examined the relations in a comprehensive manner. Based on quantitative and qualitative data's and taking the post-Cold War Era Ethio-Turkish relations, as an illustration, this dissertation examines the course of partner, agenda, instrument and actor diversifications and its implication in addressing the national interest.

Keywords: Foreign policy, Diversification, Ethiopia, Turkey, Rising powers.

## ÖZET

### ETİYOPYA'NIN DIŞ POLİTİKASI ÇEŞİTLENDİRİLMESİ VE SOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASI ETİYOPYA-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ

Muzeyen, SEBSEBE  
Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü  
Danışman: Prof.Dr. Mustafa *Sıtkı* BILGIN

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Etiyopya, dünyanın çeşitli ülkeleriyle uzun yıllara dayanan sosyo-kültürel, ekonomik ve politik ilişkilere sahiptir. Dış faktörlerle birlikte, bu dış ilişkilerin yapısı iç rejim tipinden de etkilenmiştir. Geçtiğimiz birkaç on yıl boyunca, Etiyopya'nın otoriter rejimleri, dış politikayı hükümetlerini meşrulaştırmak ve iktidarda kalmaya devam etmelerini sağlamak için bir araç olarak kullandılar. Bu, devlet merkezli ve elit ağırlıklı egemen dış politika ve stratejilerin oluşturulmasına ve uygulanmasına yol açmıştır. Ülkenin dış politikasını kitlelerin sosyo-ekonomik ve politik taleplerine cevap vermek için kullanma yönünde son derece sınırlı çabalar vardı.

Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesi ve 1991'de Etiyopya'daki sosyalist rejimin çöküşü, ülkenin dış politika yapımında yeni bir dönemin başlangıcına yol açtı. Eski Doğu veya Batı merkezli dış politika yaklaşımının yerine, Soğuk Savaş sonrası Etiyopya, ilişkilerini çeşitlendirmeye başladı ve hem kurulu hem de yeni ortaya çıkan güçleri devreye soktu. Dahası, Soğuk Savaş sonrası Etiyopya'nın dış politikası ve stratejisi, Afrika Boynuzu ülkeleriyle stratejik işbirliğinin geliştirilmesine dikkat etmektedir. Öte yandan, dış politika analistleri, devam eden politika çeşitlilikleri ile ilgili bazı argümanlar ileri sürmektedirler. Bazı yorumcular çeşitlendirme yanlısı iken, diğerleri ise dış politika çeşitlendirme sürecinin sonuçlarına kuşkuyla yaklaşıyor. Bu çalışmada, Etiyopya'nın ulusal çıkarlarını sağlamak için kapsamlı bir dış politika çeşitlendirme programının önemi tartışılmaktadır.

Bu tez, Etiyopya'da çeşitli çıkar gruplarının ortaya çıkması ve ülkenin dış politika yapımındaki potansiyel rolleri göz önünde bulundurularak, çoğulcu düşünce okulunun

önemli anlayışlarını ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Bu çalışma, kapsamlı bir dış politika çeşitliliğinin sürdürülmesinin, Etiyopya'daki çeşitli baskı gruplarının, sosyo-ekonomik ve politik çıkarlarını geliştirme ve ilerletme seyrinin bir arada bulunmasına ve olumlu yönde etkilemesine olanak sağladığını göstermektedir.

Soğuk Savaş sonrası Etiyopya'nın geleneksel ve gelişmekte olan güçlerle ilişkileri üzerine çalışmalar olsa da, hiçbiri ilişkileri kapsamlı bir şekilde incelememiştir. Bu çalışma, niceliksel ve niteliksel verilere dayanarak ve Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemdeki Etiyopya-Türkiye ilişkilerini örnek alarak, ortaklığın, gündemin, aracın ve aktör çeşitliliğinin seyrini ve ulusal çıkarları ele almadaki etkisini incelemektedir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Dış Politika, Çeşitlendirme, Etiyopya, Türkiye, Yükselen Güçler.





To my wife Rahel and my children Rahma, Abdurahman and Yusuf.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AA	Anadolu Agency
AfDB	African Development Bank
AMISOM	Africa Union Mission in Somalia
CJTF - HoA	Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa
CoHE	Council of Higher Education
CRC	China Railway Corporation
DFID	Britain’s Department for International Development
EDU	Ethiopian Democratic Union
EEA	Ethiopian Economic Association
EIA	Ethiopian Investment Agency
EIIPD	Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development
ENA	Ethiopian News Agency
EPDA	Ethiopian Patriotic Democratic Alliance
EPLF	Eritrean People’s Liberation Front
EPRDF	Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front
ERPR	Emergency Recovery and Reconstruction Program
ERA	Ethiopian Roads Authority
EU	European Union
FANSPS	Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy document
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
FOCAC	Forum for China – Africa Cooperation
FSS	Forum for Social Studies
GTP	Growth and Transformation Plan
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGO	Inter-Governmental organizations
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IO	International Organizations
LDC	Least Developing Countries
LLDC	Land-locked Developing Countries

LN	League of Nations
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MNC	Multinational Corporations
MoFED	Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Nongovernmental Organizations
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OIC	Organization of Islamic Council
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
PORAD	Policy Research Analysis Department
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Program
REC	Regional Economic Commissions
SAF	Structural Adjustment Facility
TAP	Turkey - Africa Partnership
TIKA	Turkish Development Cooperation Agency
TPLF	Tigray People's Liberation Front
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank
WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction
WPE	Workers Party of Ethiopia
WWII	Second World War
YTB	Turkish Abroad and Related Communities



## CHAPTER I

### 1 INTRODUCTION

The global system of the post-Cold War period has witnessed various changes and developments in the socio-economic and political practices of the world society (Dietz, Havnevik, Kaag, & Oest, 2011). With the collapse of the former USSR in the late 1980s, the world transformed from a bipolar international system into a unipolar in which the US emerged as a supreme global power. This, in turn, led to the establishment of democracy and the free market economy as a universal paradigm (Dietz, Havnevik, Kaag, & Oest, 2011; Schraeder, 1992).

One of the most important developments of the post-Cold War era that significantly influence Africa's political economy was the relaxation of the East-West tension and the subsequent disengagement of Western powers including the US from the region. This consequently marked a shift in the socio-economic and political relationship between African countries and traditional western powers (Cheru & Obi, 2010).

Since the mid-1990s countries like China, India, Brazil, Turkey, and the Gulf States began to emerge as an alternative foreign relations partner to the various African states and build multipolarity at the global level. As compared to the approaches adopted by the traditional Western powers, these rising countries articulated new forms of engagement under the framework of the 'South-South Development Cooperation'(Cheru & Obi, 2010; Alden, 2005).

As it is distinguished by its proponents, this new form of collaboration is characterized by a two-way or an equal partner relationship that doesn't rely on conditionality. Different from its counterpart of the 'North-South' relations the 'South-South cooperation' focused South-South flows of finance, trade, investment, technology and know-how which have positive implication to address the longstanding problem of economic underdevelopment in various regions of the global south (Alden, 2005). Like that of the other African countries, the content and direction of Ethiopian foreign policy were also influenced by this new form of international relations.

Following its inception to power in 1991, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has introduced various socio-economic and political reforms. Together with the local demands, many of these reforms were triggered by the new global order of the post-Cold War era. One of these reforms was the formulation of the Ethiopian Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy document (FANSPS). The document highlights the main objectives and strategic approaches to the country's relations with the outside world.

The post-Cold War era Ethiopian foreign policy and strategy identified both the traditional Western as well as the newly emerging non-Western powers as a main external relations partner. The document noted countries like China, India, Turkey and Iran as an emerging foreign relations partner of Ethiopia and provides special attention to their particular significance in maintaining Ethiopia's socio-economic as well as political interest (FANSPS, 2002).

The period this study focuses, from 1991 to the present, has witnessed various policy diversification efforts in Ethiopia. In this particular study, however, I emphasize on the diversification in the foreign policy formulation and execution. A diversified foreign policy making is the one that allows the participation of various interest groups which have multiple agendas and policy objectives. Hence, the power to formulate and implement foreign policies is not monopolized by a single group rather multiple interest groups, both from the state and non-state actors, take part.

## **1.1 Statement of the Problem**

Ethiopia's external relation of the past several decades was featured by a highly securitized and 'Western-centric' approach. Together with domestic aspects, the changes in the global political economy have had their implication in this regard. From 1950s-to 1970s Ethiopia obtained much attention from the US foreign policymakers. Of all countries of the Horn of Africa region, Ethiopia turned out to be the 'most reliable ally towards the US. This enabled Ethiopia to serve as the centerpiece in the region for U.S. financial, technical, military, and material assistance (Zewde, 1991; Mantzikos, 2010).

Although this prolonged economic and military relationship between Ethiopia and the United States was temporarily disconnected with the coming to power of the military regime led by Colonel Mengistu Hailemariam, the two states revived their ties following the current EPRDF regime came to power in 1991 (Mantzikos, 2010).

On the other hand, however, despite longstanding financial and technical assistance of the West, Ethiopia remained one of the poorest countries in the world. These supports to Ethiopia had been inadequate to deal with its critical challenges. Hence poverty, economic underdevelopment, and the subsequent high rate of unemployment remained as the characteristic feature of the country. Ethiopia also had poor records in those aspects like human rights and human security which have a direct implication on the overall well-being of the masses (Metaferia, 2009).

Why Ethiopia failed to benefit from its past external relations and achieve economic and political interest of the masses? How the past ill-advised foreign policy and strategy of Ethiopia negatively affect its economic prosperity as well as the democratization process? Will Ethiopia uphold its desire to establish a stronger democracy and economic prosperity by diversifying its foreign policymaking? To provide a reliable answer to these fundamental questions a sound understanding of the causes of the malfunctions above-mentioned of the past foreign policy behavior of Ethiopia is needed.

Although it is likely to identify a variety of factors that can be regarded as responsible for the poor formulation and implementation of the past Ethiopian foreign policy, most of these challenges stemmed from one fundamental reason: its state-centric and elite-dominated nature. During the past several decades the role of the Ethiopian society in setting and executing foreign policy agendas of the country was marginally considered. There were extremely limited efforts to communicate and dialogue with the society and its representatives to identify and prioritize the country's foreign policy program (Abota, 2002). This elite-dominated foreign policy approach has also had its implication to the lack of independent foreign policy decision making in dealing with important economic and political affairs of the country. Instead, external powers were frequently superseding. In some instances, economic and political interests of the traditional foreign policy partners of Ethiopia were imposed upon the national interests of the latter (Tekle, 1989). This domineering nature of the traditional foreign policy partners of Ethiopia sometimes

affected the latter to behave in the same manner, especially in its relations with the neighboring states. This seriously affects Ethiopia's image towards the international community on the one hand and its economic, political and security relations with neighboring countries on the other.

External powers intrusion's on the foreign policy decision making process also inhibited Ethiopia's competence to use proactive foreign policy approaches which have an enormous role to address regional and inter-regional issues creatively and sustainably. As a result, most of Ethiopia's past foreign policy process was marked by event-driven and reactionary approaches (Metaferia, 2009). In most instances, foreign policymakers were busy with issues that lack long-term strategic significance to the masses. In short, these internal and external factors seriously limit Ethiopia's potential in formulating and adequately executing its foreign policy agendas.

The course of addressing the above-mentioned highly interrelated domestic and external issues entails a sound understanding of the changes and continuities of the international politics and its implication on Ethiopia's foreign policy behavior.

Since the late 1980s, the global ideological tension of the Cold War period came to an end. The final decline of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) in 1989 paved the way for the emergence of the US as a supreme global power. With this, the international political economy that had been characterized by a bipolar pattern transformed into a unipolar one in which democracy and free market economy have established as a universal paradigm (Cheru & Obi, 2010).

One of the most important developments of the post-Cold War era that significantly influence the political economy of the Ethiopian region and Horn of Africa was the relaxation of the East-West tension and the subsequent relative disengagement of Western powers including the US from the region. This consequently marked a shift in the socio-economic and political relationship between Ethiopia and the traditional Western powers (Shinn, 2012).

Since the mid-1990s and early 2000s countries like China, India, Turkey and the Gulf States have emerged as an alternative external relations partner to African states in general and that of Ethiopia in particular. As it is indicated by the Ethiopian Investment Agency (EIA), the flow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), especially from these emerging countries is growing dramatically. As compared to the case in 2000, Ethiopia's trading relations with countries like Turkey, India and China also grows many folds. The significant amount of loans and development assistance on the one hand and the lions share their companies have been taking on those huge infrastructural development projects on the other also clearly exhibit the ongoing shift in the external relations partners of Ethiopia (Cheru, 2016).

In spite of all the above-mentioned transformations, however, it is logical to ask what does this change mean for the Ethiopian masses? How can it contribute to alleviating the past marginalized position of the society in setting and executing the country's foreign policy agendas? Will Ethiopia maintain its national interest by comprehensively diversifying its foreign policy behavior?

Currently, there is an ongoing debate among Ethiopian academia regarding the purpose and objectives of the rising powers like China, India, Turkey and other countries involvement in the former's political economy. There are two views regarding the implication of emerging actors' engagements to Ethiopia. The first view considered this engagement as responsible for the multiple instances of land grab induced human right violations in different parts of the country. Advocators of this view asserted that several thousand of local peoples in Ethiopia have been displaced and denied their access to farmlands because of the huge projects owned by countries like Turkey, India and China. On the other hand, the second perspective regarded this process as a new form of collaboration that allows Ethiopia to sustain its economic and political growth. Proponents of the second view have also stated that the contemporary engagements enable Ethiopia to further diversify its foreign policy approaches by balancing the past Western-centric type (Cheru, 2016; Sisay, 2016).

In order to substantiate such arguments on the implication of Ethiopia's engagement with the rising powers, series of empirical researches need to be conducted. Although there are continuous initiatives taken by both Ethiopian and foreign researchers to evaluate the

characteristics and framework of Ethiopia's relations with the emerging actors, most of them targeted on the situation of one country: China. They offer little interest to the effects of other nations involvement in Ethiopia's political economy.

Here it is also necessary to unveil the concern of those foreign policy commentators who are so critical about Ethiopia's over-dependence on China to finance most of its development projects. According to Geda, for instance, China has loaned more than \$15 billion to Ethiopia for infrastructure projects (Sisay, 2016). This extreme reliance on China may lead to collapse of Ethiopia's economy if any problem occurs and the former decides to stop its financing. Hence as part of the foreign policy diversification process, Ethiopia need to assess other alternative partners that will enhance its competitiveness in securing foreign investment and loans.

By taking the various aspects of the post-Cold War era Ethio-Turkish relations, as a case analysis, this study inferred valuable insights regarding the challenges and opportunities of Ethiopia's engagement with the emerging international actors. Furthermore, this study unveiled how can Ethiopia advantage from the competitions between its conventional and recently growing international actors on the one side and between the recently growing non-Western actors themselves on the other.

## **1.2 Objectives of the Study:**

The general objective of this study is to critically examine how comprehensive diversification of foreign policy approach enables Ethiopia to achieve its national interest better.

The specific objectives of the thesis are to:

- Assess the distinct features of Ethiopia's relations with the rising powers.
- Point out the role of non-state actors in highlighting the national interest and foreign policy strategy of Ethiopia.
- Assess the compatibility of Ethiopia's foreign policy tools to achieve its objective.
- Examine the correlations between domestic politics and foreign policy agendas.
- Highlight Turkey's foreign policy objectives and its implication on Ethiopia's political economy.

### **1.3 Research Methodology and Data Sources:**

This research utilized a combined method. Both qualitative and quantitative research methodologies have been utilized. The researcher conducted extensive field research in Ethiopia in 2015 and 2016. Important data on the proposed issue were collected through interviews with experts and authorities working in the various national, regional and international organizations who have a direct or indirect influence on Ethiopia's foreign policymaking. In addition, in-depth interviews were also done among Ethiopian foreign policy experts to grasp their views on the nature of Ethiopia's relations with the rising powers in general and Turkey as a case study. Apart from interviews, critical analysis of the literature on the subject, official documents and the press are also analyzed to generate secondary data.

Moreover, audiovisual recordings of higher-level government officials and policymakers and the various policy debates which were made by top-level decision makers and scholars at different times are also critically examined. Ethiopian ministry of foreign affairs, the ministry of Economic Development, the Ministry of defence, the ministry of trade and investment, TIKA and Turkish embassy in Addis Ababa and Ethiopian embassy in Ankara. The library of African Union in Addis Ababa, Institute of Ethiopian Studies, Foreign policy Institute and Addis Ababa University are only some of the sources for related primary and secondary data.

Quantitative information's conveyed by international organizations, governments and research institutions that demonstrate foreign trade, bilateral and multilateral aid, foreign direct investment and loan are also used to substantiate qualitative data.

### **1.4 Scope of the Study**

Despite the variations in the outcome, foreign policy diversification measures have had taken by several regimes of Ethiopia. The down-fall of the military regime and the coming to power of the EPRDF in 1991 had resulted in a shift in the foreign policy approach of Ethiopia. This particular study tries to investigate those efforts done by the EPRDF regime to diversify Ethiopia's foreign policy partners, agendas, actors and instruments, from 1991 up to the present. In doing so, an attempt is made to assess how policy objectives such as

economic development and democratic governance affect post-Cold War Ethiopia's foreign policy partners, agendas and instruments.

Post-Cold War Ethiopia has been closely monitoring its external relations with both the traditional Western as well as emerging powers, including Turkey. Furthermore, relations with regional actors such as Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti and the two Sudan's are also strictly revived. The study reveals the factors that in one way or another influence the nature and structure of post-Cold War Ethiopia's foreign policy making.

The study uncovers the role of pluralizing foreign policy agendas and instruments in furthering post-Cold War Ethiopia's bilateral and multilateral relations. Furthermore, considering post-Cold War Ethio - Turkey relations, as an illustration, this study provides valuable insights regarding the role of comprehensive foreign policy diversification to maintain the economic and political interest of nation-states.

## **1.5 Theoretical Framework**

Foreign policy analysts assess various theoretical options to systematically study how states and non-state actors interact within the international system. These theoretical frameworks, in turn, determine the type of foreign policy instruments used by states, institutions, and peoples to promote their policy agendas. Similarly, foreign policymakers use theoretical frameworks to define the nature of the characters-NGOs, GOs, IGOs, Media, think tanks, pressure groups as well as ordinary citizens-which take part in the interaction. There is a close interconnection between states' foreign policy options and policy objectives, actors and partners.

For realists, for instance, foreign policies are formulated to protect states self-interest. In the anarchic international system, states work to promote their socio-cultural, economic, diplomatic and political interests. In doing so, states use military power and balance other states. Hence, for realists, the main purpose of formulating foreign policy is to enhance national security.

As E.H. Carr (prominent British realist) asserted, the relation between countries and people is characterized by the struggle between conflicting interests. The international system is dominated by the rivalry between states and people who have better socio-economic and



political privileges in the one hand and those who do not have on the other (Jackson & Sorensen, 2010). Morgenthau on his part highlighted that the national interest that states strive to assure using their foreign policy is power. Maintaining and enhancing power, especially military power is regarded as a fundamental foreign policy tool that safeguards nation's socio-economic as well as political interest (Alden & Aran, 2012).

Foreign policy theorists who promote the realist approach regarded states as the only autonomous and rational foreign policy actor, whereas non-state actors considered as an instrument of foreign policy. This assertion of realists limits the need to assess the role of non-state actors in determining the foreign policy nature of a given country.

Liberalists, on their part, believe that the relation between states, institutions and people is not fundamentally characterized by rivalry rather by cooperation. The interaction between states and people serves as a means to promote mutual interests both at national as well as international level. Hence, for liberals foreign policy is a means to maintain not states and peoples self-interest but to maintain cooperation among countries and people in different parts of the world. In other words, foreign policy decision makers use their reason to enhance cooperation among states and achieve mutual interest. This, in turn, led to the prevalence of peace and order among the international community (Jackson & Sorensen, 2010).

The development of political liberalism with the quest for democracy and constitutional government resulted in the rise of several strands of liberal thinking's, including pluralism- a theoretical framework that I employ to explain post-Cold War Ethiopia's foreign policymaking.

### **1.5.1 Pluralism**

As it is recognized by most scholars, the concept pluralism refers to a perception in more than one thing or a propensity to be, to keep, or to do more than one issue. The notion of pluralism advocates showing tolerance towards ideas and practices which vary from what we assumed (Austin E., 2006).

According to the dictionary of social science, for instance, pluralism defined as "a social system which has different political, ethnic or religious groups co-existing within it and exerting influence over the government" (Collin, 2004, p. 180). In his study on the idea of

pluralism in the United States, Norman (2010) highlighted that “the development of pluralism as an idea is intertwined with questions of democracy, religion, race and ethnicity, and assimilation” (p.1). Hence, the occurrence of various pressure groups and interests and the need to use these differences constructively and productively necessitate for the rise and expansion of pluralist outlook in various contexts.

Pluralism has various aspects: economic pluralism, cultural pluralism, psychological pluralism, media pluralism, political pluralism to mention only the principal ones. All these different facets claim the importance of multiplicity and co-existence to sustain better outcome in their respective focus areas.

Political pluralism, one of the main tenets of pluralism, highlights how power and influence are allocated in a political process and shape the procedure of decision making. As it is noted by Eisenburg (1995), political pluralism refers to “theories that seek to organize and conceptualize political phenomena on the basis of the plurality of groups to which individuals belong and by which individuals seek to advance and, more importantly, to develop their interests”(p.2). Similarly, Norman understood political pluralism as “the representation of and participation by numerous and competing groups organized around class, racial, ethnic, and cultural interests...” (Norman R., 2010, p. 1). These definitions provide particular attention on how the varied needs which prevail among members of a given political community are properly considered.

The central concepts of political pluralism revolve around the following major themes. Fragmentation of power: most pluralists argue that political power and resources should not be concentrated in the hands of few. Rather there must be a plurality of interest groups which possess relatively equal access to power and decision making. This enables particular groups to protect and promote their interests (Austin, 2006).

Bargaining: The prevalence of competitive multiple pressure groups lead them to negotiate with each other and maintain the socio-economic and political demand of their members. As it is stated by Austin (2006) “Political pluralism argues individual rights and interests are protected by an ongoing process of negotiation and renegotiation between interests...” (p. 679).

One of the essential factors that influence the successful negotiation of multiple interests is existing political structure. Some political structures and processes provide limited attention to the protection of individual rights and interests. Instead, they used to serve a single elite or group of elites interest. In his comparative study between aristocratic and democratic government, Dahl (2006) notes that although it has its challenges, democratic government provides better features in negotiating diverse interests. In democratic systems, where individuals have the right to organize, people can form various pressure groups. These groups serve as a basis for the protection and development of the interests of the masses.

Compromise: a political system that characterizes negotiation among balanced interest sets also asserts a series of compromises where the groups give way to agree. This, in turn, led to political stability (Dahl, 2006).

#### **1.5.1.1 Classical Pluralism**

The emergence of pluralism as a mode of thinking goes back to the ancient Greeks. In many of their writings, the ancient Greek historians and philosophers noted the ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural differences and similarities between Greeks, Egyptians, Persians and other peoples of the ancient world (Norman R., 2010).

Despite the above-mentioned fact, however, the development of several strands of pluralist thought was observed during the last one hundred years. In this regard, the studies of H. Laski and G.D.H. Cole regarded as an underpinning work of political pluralism by later generations. Cole and Laski, as Austin noted, are the one who "moved pluralism and its understanding of the state away from the abstract and idealized treatment in philosophy to a more concrete, instrumental analysis that recognized corporations and associations as independent formations and interest sets" (Austin, 2006, p. 678).

Most of the earlier pluralist commentators that included Frederic Maitland, Samuel G. Hobson, and Richard H. Tawney emphasized the importance of group life. They focused on the negative aspects which were caused by uncontrolled capitalism. For them, the rise of industrial capitalism and the subsequent mode of life in various parts of Europe had resulted to the alienation of individuals from the social context. This detachment of the individuals from the community adversely affects their participation in the socio-economic

and political process of the society they are from. It was necessary, they argued, to introduce various economic and administrative reforms to integrate the individual with his/her respective community (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2014).

Together with the scholars mentioned above, Truman also made a further contribution in sharpening the focus areas of political pluralism. Truman abandoned descriptions of institutions and structures as a center of attention of political pluralism. Instead, he shifted the dominant focus of political pluralism towards how political and policy activities are shaped by interest groups (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2014).

Since the second half of the twentieth century, political pluralism and its related concepts such as pluralist democracy and interest group pluralism have been attracted the attention of various researchers. It was mainly because of the work of Robert A. Dahl, a prominent American political scientist and educator. Dahl's prominent contribution to political pluralism is his assertion regarding the role of associations, groups, and organizations played in politics. In his best-known work, *Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City* (1961), Dahl argued that political power in the United States is pluralistic rather than monopolized by a single elite group. He highlighted the role played by non-state actors in identifying and implementing socio-economic and political policies (Munro A., 2003).

According to McFarland, Dahl's pluralism is forwarded on four fundamental concepts. Each of these ideas highlighted how political power is composed and exercised in a community that assumed multiple interest groups. The first of these propositions is Dahl's definition of power as causation. This definition of power states that "A has power over B to the extent that A causes changes in B's behavior in the direction of A's intentions" (McFarland, 2007, p. 47). Although this definition of power is not universal, it has its important implication to understand states decision making process. Dahl's second concept of pluralism is the political process model. In his study, Dahl (2006) outlined that a researcher needs to empirically observe a political or policy-making process to recognize agents having the power to influence and change the behavior of others. Together with emphasizing the need to examine the political process, Dahl (2006) also noted separate domains of the political process as his third assumption. This is to bring to light the existence of numerous separate policy areas and the potential disparity on the structure of

power and the nature of the process. The fourth assumption is reliance on actors' definition of their interests. In Dahl's pluralism, 'researchers should accept the definitions of interest given by the subjects themselves, or perhaps as inferred from observations of subjects' patterns of behavior' (Dahl, 2006).

In general, the concepts mentioned above regarded as the main theoretical patterns of Dahl's pluralism and they served as a reference for later scholars who endeavor to criticize or substantiate the idea.

On the other hand, a proper understanding of Dahl's pluralism has entailed to close scrutiny of the critiques provided by Dahl's colleagues as well as later political philosophers. Among the various groups which posited their critical assessment of Dahl's pluralism theory, the idea of the power-elite theorists is worth mentioning. Power-elite theorists asserted that political power often resides in the hands of a small group of elites. In their study of the American political systems, Mills and Hunter (main proponents of power-elite) noted the United States as "a country ruled by a small group of interconnected individuals occupying key positions of power" (Munro A., 2003).

Furthermore, power-elite scholars challenge pluralists' argument of citizens' participation in the political and economic affairs of their country through their representatives. According to their observation, the democratic ideals propagated by pluralists have masked the real inequity of economic and social distribution of benefits.

#### **1.5.1.2 Neo-Pluralism:**

Neo-pluralism is one of the social science models that evolve from the main arguments of Robert Dahl's classical pluralism. The frameworks posited by the generation of the post-war political scientists have been serving as a guideline in many writings of the "post-modern" pluralist theorists. A good illustration of this claim might be the meaning McFarland posited to neo-pluralism: "The basic meaning of neo-pluralism is a finding about power structure within the framework of four assumptions underlying Dahl's theory of political power (process, power as causation, domains, subjective definition of interests)" (McFarland, 2007, p. 58).

In addition to its main focus on the structure of political power and policymaking processes, however, neo-pluralism has also been dealing with issues like agenda building, the logic of collective action, special-interest sub-governments, social movements, advocacy coalitions, and the theory of political processes.

The rise of neo-pluralism is also related to the efforts to point out and address the inadequacies of traditional pluralism. William E. Connolly, as Mark Wenman quotes it, commented classical pluralism and its main arguments as too simplistic. Connolly highlighted the influence of multiple pressure groups on the contemporary public policymaking (Wenman, 2015). Instead of a simplistic coalition of an interest group, government agency, and legislative committee, neo-pluralists observe participation of several interest groups including government actors in policymaking. In his comparative study of policymaking in the United States, McFarland mentioned the diverse interest groups which might involve in formulating air pollution regulation. Accordingly groups such as, producers of electricity, coal mining companies, auto manufacturers, the United Autoworkers, railroads (carriers of coal), environmentalist groups, the American Lung Association, the American Public Health Association, various state governments, the association of state public utility regulators, and probably other groups (McFarland, 2007).

Despite the fact that neo-pluralists consider inputs of diverse pressure groups in public policy, they also noted the possible bias of political agenda towards corporate power. This assertion of neo-pluralists regarding the role of corporate power differs with what Dahl and other classical pluralists argue about the position of the government. For many neo-pluralists, the government does not act as a mediator between interest groups rather as an actor that represents its group and work to represent its interests (McFarland, 2007).

### **1.5.2 Pluralism and its implication on Ethiopia's Political Economy**

Among the main benefits brought by the 1991 regime change in Ethiopia, considering the country's diversity and presenting policy options accordingly is worth mentioning. This move has its role in ending the age-old dominance of one ethnic, religious and language group up on others. Besides, this shift of the post-1991 assists the course of maintaining a political structure that allows the various religious, language and ethnic groups to promote themselves and safeguard the interest of their respective members. This paved the way for

defining socio-economic and political interests by the respective interest groups themselves, as argued by neo-pluralists.

The constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE, 1995) highlighted the reality mentioned above. Under the section of Freedom of Religion, Belief and Opinion, Article 27 sub article 1 of the constitution noted:

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include the freedom to hold or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and the freedom, either individually or in community with others, and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. (Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1995, p. 7)

Furthermore, under the Democratic Right section of the FDRE constitution, Article 31 assured: “Every person has the right to freedom of association for any cause or purpose” (Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia-FDRE, 1995, p. 9).

These constitutional provisions and other subsequent dynamics had resulted in the making of various civil society organizations in Ethiopia which have been serving as a way to attain individuals as well as groups socio-economic and political interests. Similarly, both classical, as well as neo-pluralists, argue the increasing role of groups, associations and communities in identifying the nature and content of states political economy.

The development of non-state actors’ position in the affairs of a given country contributed to the formulation of various kinds of policies which signify the real societal interest in a better manner. On the other hand, policies of those societies in which groups, associations and communities have limited role in the dealings of their country would target only the interest of those who monopolised political power. Taking into consideration of this reality, pluralists asserted that political power is or should not be concentrated in the hands of elites or a group of elites. Instead, it should be dispersed among various groups, associations and communities.

Attaining citizens’ active participation in the economic and political decision making processes has special importance in maintaining the stability and advancement of a given country. It is obvious that without the prevalence of the freedom of association, it is unlikely to realize citizens’ involvement in the affairs of their country. Hence, the assertion of freedom of association is a pre-requisite to get people involved in the dealings of their

country. As it is highlighted by pluralist thinkers, citizens right to organize themselves and form groups pave the way for the emergence of multiple and competent interest sets which actively involve on the formulation and implementation of various policies (Austin E., 2006).

A close scrutiny of the post-1991 political economy of Ethiopia indicates a reality in which people obtain a relatively better time to organize themselves and form various interest groups. Professional associations, civil society organizations, trade unions, religious and ethnic groups were established in different parts of the country. Nevertheless, however, these groupings hardly transform themselves to a position that enables them to safeguard the interest of their respective members constantly. Although one can discern several causes responsible for this limitation, groups limited capacity and experiences on the one hand and governments' inadequate efforts to upgrade them on the other are the main ones.

To address these gaps and enhance the role of multiple interest groups in shaping the process of decision making, the neo-pluralists assertion has its insights. It is by considering these realities of Ethiopia's political economy; I would like to use the main arguments of neo-pluralism. I believe the ideas will enable me to systematically analyze the importance of entertaining multiple pressure groups to formulate and implement policies which are in line with the real societal interests.

## **1.6 Structure**

This study is classified into seven chapters. The introductory chapter presents the background, statement of the problem, objectives, methodology and data sources, scope and theoretical frameworks. Chapter two investigates the pertinent literature that explains the notions of comprehensive foreign policy diversification. Related literatures that encompass the course of partner, actor, instrument and agenda diversification present under this section.

The third chapter revisits the foreign policy diversification efforts made by past Ethiopian regimes. Ethiopia's systematic engagements with European powers that had colonial possession in the region and Emperor Haileselesie's policy to substitute Europeans with the US also assess under this part of the study. Together with this, the foreign policy



measures of the military regime (1974-1991) and the shift from the past Western-centric approach to a more East-look policy is also review.

The fourth chapter analyzes post-Cold War Ethiopia's foreign relation with the established and emerging powers. Together with the traditional and emerging partners, this part of the study also highlights post-Cold War Ethiopia's relations with neighboring countries. It also reviews the factors that determine the foreign policy partner selection of Ethiopia during the post-1991 period. In addition, ongoing arguments regarding the implication of Ethiopia's engagement with rising powers is also explained in this chapter.

The fifth chapter investigates the course of diversifying foreign policy agendas of the post-Cold War Ethiopia. It examines the effort to diversify the past security dominated foreign policy agenda. It also analyzes the post-Cold War Ethiopia's foreign policy actors. This is by assessing the role of state and non-state actors in the policy formulation and execution of post-Cold War Ethiopia. Besides, the type of foreign policy instruments and their implication in keeping Ethiopia's national interest also reviews under this section.

The six chapter analyses post-Cold War Ethio-Turkish relations and its implication in forwarding comprehensive foreign policy diversification scheme of Ethiopia. It examines the important areas of cooperation and the role of state and non-state actors in furthering the growing relations. It also assesses the factors that are responsible for the growing relations between Turkey and Ethiopia.

The concluding chapter encompasses both the main findings of the study and its policy implications.

## CHAPTER II

### 2 REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

#### 2.1 National Interest and Foreign Policy:

The notion of foreign policy has been defined by various scholars. As it is proposed by Hill (2003), foreign policy refers to “The sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations” (Hill, 2003, p. 3). This definition emphasizes the interaction between states as a dominant form of foreign relations and regarded the state as a sovereign actor. Foreign policy can also be depicted as “set of ideas or actions designed by policymakers to solve a problem or promote some change in the policies, attitudes or actions of other states; in non-state actors (terrorist groups), in the international economy or in the physical environment of the world (Both, 2004, p. 5).

A relatively comprehensive definition that I also use for the purpose of this study is given by Carlsnaes (2002). He puts foreign policy as “those actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly stated goals, commitments and/or directives, and pursued by governmental representatives acting on behalf of their sovereign communities, are directed toward objectives, conditions and actors – both governmental and non-governmental – which they want to affect and which lie beyond their territorial legitimacy”(p.9). The phrase “beyond their territorial legitimacy” notes the distinctive aspect of foreign policy. Unlike that of domestic policies where actions are taken within its own boundaries, in the case of foreign policy actors try to manage issues outside of their territory (Both, 2004).

The shared trait in all the above definitions is that they noted foreign policy as a platform that serves to maintain what a given state coined as a national interest. The concept of national interest is one of the important but at the same time ambiguous idea in international relations literature. Scholars of the field have been inferring various opinions at different times.

For many realist scholars, for instance, the notion of national interest asserts country's goals and/or ambitions to keep, increase and demonstrate power which is essential to maintain national security and physical protection. In their relations with other countries, states formulate and execute policies which enable them to strengthen their economic, political and military power and thereby safeguard their national interest (Donnelly, 2005).

Other groups on their part have emphasized on the maintenance of peace, economic prosperity, and cooperation as a priority of the nation. Many liberal scholars, as well as those in the various versions of liberalism, argue that relations among nations aim to maintain peace and cooperation and thereby safeguard their mutual interests. In doing so, states formulate foreign policies that prioritize and facilitate political and economic cooperation as national interests (Burchill, 2005).

Still, other states act to protect and promote the values, beliefs, traditions and cultures of their citizens as national interest. Foreign policy analysts of this category argue that national interests are stemmed from the identities individuals and/or groups claim from. Hence by formulating policies which provide attention to the protection as well as the promotion of identities, states can protect their national interest in their interaction among other states (Reus-Smit, 2005).

Holsti, as it is quoted by Both (2004), argued that on the basis of the weight states provide, national interest can be classified into three main categories. The first of this group is known as Primary/core interests. According to Holsti, these are the most fundamental type upon which state survival depends on. As a result, states sacrifice what they possess to protect their core interests. Territorial integrity, state sovereignty, defense of vital economic and security areas are to mention some examples of core interests. The next important category is secondary/middle range interests. Although they are not equally important as that of core interests, this group also plays a significant role in keeping a state's advantages in the global political economy. Promotions of the state's ideology, keeping its prestige or protection of its nationals abroad etc. are some prominent examples under this section. In some instances, a state may declare war upon another state with the aim of protecting these interests. The third type is tertiary/long-range interests. As compared to the above-mentioned two types of national interests, this kind has not a direct implication on the survival of the given state. A good example of states long-range interest

is the maintenance of international peace. Although it has its advantage towards the overall well-being of the international political economy, it has an indirect impact on the interests of individual states, especially small states. As a result, states exhibit less commitment to grant their resources for the attainment of long-range interests (Both, 2004).

The above-noted labelling of national interest has a direct implication on states foreign policymaking and implementation. In most instances, countries budget their human as well as financial resources on those interests which they depicted as core and/or middle range. The proper allocation of these resources enables a country to uphold its national interest in an effective and sustainable manner. It is due to this fact; many foreign policy analysts stress the need to take the necessary procedures in formulating national interests. Questions like, how is the national interest of a country formulated? By whom and for whom? What is the role of citizens in defining national interest of their respective country? What kinds of tools have key policymakers been applied to assess the interest of their subjects? Should be raised and critical investigation needs to be also made for a viable answer.

As it is noted by Both (2004), social, economic and political interests are considered as national only when members of a given state have participated directly or indirectly in designing them. In most instances, however, policymakers do not provide enough attention to the interest of the masses. It is what the policymakers want that is designated as the people want. In many developing countries, like Ethiopia national interests do not target the interest of the masses. Hence, despite the long-standing relationship these countries have maintained with the outside world, its role in addressing the economic and political problems of the masses is still very minimal.

Many previous studies conducted in relations to Ethiopia's foreign policymaking are process-focused. Limited attentions have provided to critically examine how national interest formulated, by whom and for whom? The role of the various governmental and Nongovernmental Organizations in setting the interest of the diverse groups in Ethiopia also not properly considered. In fact, in countries like Ethiopia where diversified nations, nationalities and people with varied expectations have resided, researches that appreciate the need to incorporate these diverse interests in the country's foreign policy will have vital importance. It is with these kinds of researches societal demand can effectively be channelled to policymakers.

## **2.2 Determinants of Foreign Policy:**

Foreign policy analysts assert two major categories of factors that in one way or another influence the nature and structure of foreign policy of a given country. These are internal and external factors.

### **2.2.1 Internal Sources of Foreign Policy:**

These are those attributes that often stemmed from the existing socio-political and economic arrangements of a given country. The nature of the domestic political system, the individual leaders, public opinion, the local organizational structure, material attributes to mention some of the central domestic factors that affect foreign policymaking.

Alden and Aran (2012) in their assessment of the process of foreign policy analysis depict how this process has affected by the bureaucracies of the respective institutions. For them and other advocates of the 'bureaucratic politics approach', understanding the official procedure of those organizations such as specialized ministerial offices, specific departments, key decision makers and other actors provides insight regarding the influence of domestic factors in setting foreign policy objectives.

States' local political structure has a strong interconnection with its foreign policymaking and also has a capacity to influence the nature and process of its foreign policy behavior. In most instances, states choice of its foreign policy partners is determined by the political orientation the given states have been practicing. The kinds of institutions which have established to keep states national interest are also influenced by domestic political structure. Moreover, a state's decision of using soft and/or coercive instruments to address their foreign policy goal is also constrained by the local political environment (Alden & Aran, 2012).

A good illustration of the domestic political arrangement as an internal source of foreign policy can be traced from the arguments of the democratic peace theory. As it is argued by proponents of the democratic peace theory, “democracies inherently produce a more peaceful foreign policy, at least as far as relations with other democratic states are concerned” (Alden & Aran, 2012, p. 9).

Together with the above-noted determinants, the individual decision maker is another important variable in assessing the domestic influences of foreign policymaking. This approach mainly focuses on the values and perceptions and socio-cultural backgrounds which have their influences on the nature of a states' foreign policymaking. As it is quoted by Alden and Aran (2012), Boulding highlights how the structure and process of the foreign policy of a given country is determined by the values, beliefs, biases, stereotypes and other personal attributes held by foreign policy decision makers.

Furthermore, a proper understanding of how state actors influence the process of foreign policy decision making also demands to analyze the role of leaders particularly those occupying higher positions in the state bureaucracy. Similarly, a study on how leaders personality influences the process of foreign policy decision making highlights the need to consider those factors which in one way or another influence leaders behavior. Together with other components culture, ethnicity, gender, beliefs, values, goals, energy level are worth mentioning (Mintz and De Rouen, 2010).

These components also have their insight on the course of diversifying foreign policy actors. To design and implement a foreign policy that targets the interest of the masses, considering the above-noted variations in appointing key foreign policy decision makers will have its importance.

Furthermore, a states' foreign policy should provide enough space to the public opinion as a domestic source of foreign policy. This is because in most cases public views serve as a reference in defining a foreign policy objectives and agendas which coincide with the interest of the masses. As it is highlighted by foreign policy analysts, the concept public opinion incorporates the views of the masses, attentive public, elite and the various interest and lobby groups. Foreign policy literature highlight the salience of the various socio-economic and political agendas of foreign affairs towards the public. At the same time, there is a significant rise of the effect of public opinion on foreign policymaking (Soroka, 2003).

The various media outlets have also been serving as an important domestic source of a states' foreign policymaking. As it is argued by Soroka (2003), media serves as a bridge between policymakers and the public.

...policymakers follow media reports on public opinion, and the media are the public chief source of information on what policymakers are doing. In addition, the media are the principal means by which the vast majority of individuals receive information about foreign affairs, an issue for which personal experience is unlikely to provide much useful information (p. 28).

Although this relationship between the public, the media and policymakers influence by several factors such as regime type and advancement of the media sector, media play a prominent role in channelling public interest to policymakers.

In general, all the above-mentioned internal sources of foreign policy indicate the diverse influences that determine the nature and content of a states' foreign policy. And this calls for the need to acknowledge the salience of diversified approach in foreign policy decision making instead of the state-centric arrangement.

### **2.2.2 External Sources of Foreign Policy:**

The characteristic of the international political economy has a direct influence on the foreign policymaking of individual states. The nature of the international system that is designated as anarchic by many scholars lacks the arrangement to determine the interactions among states. In such a situation, the driving force of states foreign policy becomes the effort to look and defend their security (Jackson & Sorensen, 2010).

As it is noted by Chris Alden and Ammon Aran (2012), “the pursuit of security and the efforts to enhance material wealth place states in competition with other states...” (p. 5). This competitive global environment gears foreign policy objective of the individual state towards power maximization that enables its survival. Hence, maintaining a strong military and economic power becomes the number one objective of a state's foreign policy.

Moreover, the rising socio-economic and political interconnectedness fuelled by the globalization process has its challenges and opportunities for both states as well as non-state actors. And hence, to minimize the risks and fully exploit the opportunities countries should formulate a foreign policy compatible with this global context.

Together with the nature of the international system, Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) and International Organizations (IOs) are also regarded as external sources of foreign policy.

### **2.3 State and Non-State Actors**

Foreign policymaking is a highly complex process that involves various state, sub-state, non-state and international actors. These various actors also have their institutional arrangements which dictate the nature of their participation in foreign policymaking.

#### **2.3.1 State Actors**

In his investigation of the important foreign policy actors, Carlsnaes (2012) notes candidates like “heads of state, heads of government, foreign ministers or secretaries of state, politburos, parliaments, parliamentary committees, political parties ...” (p. 114). These are those groups who act as a ‘politically responsible’ actor on the making of their respective states' foreign policy.

Together with the ministry of foreign affairs, other offices like the ministry of defense, economic ministries, intelligence services... also take part on the discussions of foreign policy decision making (Jackson & Sorenson, 2010). They design and implement a states’ interaction with other states, MNCs, and international institutions. Together with that, the above-mentioned institutions and people in charge are also responsible for crafting the platform in which non-state actors like Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), MNCs and international institutions act in a particular territory and/or population governed by the given state.

Hence, state actors have played crucial roles by directly engaging in foreign policy formulation and implementation on the one hand and in preparing the ground for non-state actor’s participation on the other.

Various literature of the realist tradition focus on inter-state affairs as a distinct feature of relations on the international stage. In their analysis of the position of MNCs on the international political economy, realists pointed that

Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) are not regarded as independent or autonomous actors in the international economy but seen rather as an



extension of state power or an instrument of foreign policy. MNCs are not, then, held to be a significant economic and political force in their own right, exercising power and influence, but a measure and reflection of the power and might of particular states (Steans, Pettiford, Diez, & El-Ansari, 2010, p. 59).

On the other hand, this realist understanding of the role of state actors in foreign policymaking and implementation has had its effect on the effort to diversify the role of non-state actors.

For liberalist scholars, however, the above-noted assertion provides an exaggerated role to states in foreign policy decision making and neglect the role of sub-state and non-state actors.

### **2.3.2 Non-State Actors**

According to Aw Joey (2013), “non-state actors are individuals or organizations that have powerful economic, political or social power and can influence at a national and sometimes international level...” (p.1). In spite of the limited attention, realists have provided, non-state actors have a prominent contribution in states foreign policymaking. Several research findings have reported the growing role of non-state actors in transforming states foreign policy behaviors. As it is noted by Steans, Pettiford, Diez and El-Anis (2010), the position of MNC), NGOs, pressure groups and Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) on foreign policy decision making have been growing from time to time. In his analysis of the different types of non-state actors and their role on foreign policy decision making, Joey (2013) highlights sub-state actors, IGOs, MNCs, NGOs, Think tanks as some of the important categories.

#### **2.3.2.1 Sub-State Actors**

These are those groups of people or individuals who have gathered with the aim of maintaining their shared interest<sup>1</sup>. In many instances sub-state actors use lobbying, donating to political candidates or parties, influencing public opinion on certain issues as an important strategy to effect foreign policy decision making.

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<sup>1</sup> A good illustration of Sub-state actors’ role in foreign policymaking is the way the automobile and tobacco industries of the US influence the American foreign economic policy. They have influenced policy makers to favor policies that allow them to sell their products abroad and to limit the importation of similar products from outside.

#### 2.3.2.2 Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs)

These are those organizations whose members are consisting of three or more sovereign states. The main purpose of the creation of IGOs is to protect the mutual socio-economic and political interest of the member states. Similarly, such a platform enables member states to conduct collective decisions on their common foreign policy agendas (Joey, 2013).

#### 2.3.2.3 Multi-National Corporations (MNCs)

The other important category of non-state actors having a considerable effect on the nature and content of a states' foreign policy are Multi-National Corporations. Most MNCs have headquartered in one state but operating on a worldwide basis.<sup>2</sup> Given the strong financial capacity, MNCs often influence the foreign economic behavior of states especially the poorer ones (Joey, 2013).

#### 2.3.2.4 Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)

These are private organizations founded by groups of people or individuals aiming to promote their shared interests. Many NGOs engage in activities relating to poverty reduction, provision of health and educational services, human rights, environmental protection that enhances the wellbeing of humanity. Because of their close contact with people at grass root level, NGOs often provide reliable policy ideas and options. Currently, many states seek the contribution of NGOs in designing foreign policies that tackle national, regional as well as global problems (Joey, 2013).

#### 2.3.2.5 Think tanks

Think tanks are those important research organizations that are engaged in "...developing and marketing foreign policy ideas and strategies to shaping public opinion and influencing government policy" (Jackson & Sorenson, 2010, p. 269). In most instances, these establishments have contributed to the maintenance of peace and cooperation among states and to address the problems of war. This is mainly achieved by conducting in-depth studies and analysis related to the content and function of states foreign policy.

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<sup>2</sup> Based on the nature of their membership IGOs can be grouped in to two: Global and Regional IGOs. The first type is those characterized by a universal membership like the United Nations (UN), World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and many more. While the second is characterized by members having particular interest or region.

The role of think tanks in providing foreign policy advice and directions has been rising from time to time. Needless to mention, however, the effectiveness of think tanks in this regard is seriously constrained by the readiness of policymakers of the particular government to listen and implement the provisions of the foreign policy experts. In their comparative study of the role of think tanks, Jackson and Sorenson (2010) have asserted that foreign policy expertise in the US has high visibility to the public than those of most other countries. And this enables them to maintain greater impact on foreign policy decision making of the US.

In general, as compared to state actors, non-state actors have their special feature in facilitating relations within states as well as non-state actors. In many instances, non-state actors are free from the various political and legal constraints which seriously constrain state actors accomplishments.

#### **2.4 Soft Power and Foreign Policy**

The effort to maintain one's socio-economic and political interest is often related to the resource that particular group has possessed. In the past, states mainly focused on their military force, economic strength, population size, natural resources to advance their national interest. Although these resources have had their contribution in keeping and promoting states interest, they have posited them to pay costs.

The costs of using military and economic supremacy to keep groups interest in the international politics become so huge from time to time. As it is noted by Joseph Nye (2002), important development on the evolution of the foundation of power in international politics has discouraged the use of hard power.

Among others, the technological advancements of the past centuries have made the use of military force more costly. "...as we know from the Cold War; nuclear weapons proved so awesome and destructive that they become muscle bound-too costly to us" (Nye J., 2002, p. 4). Together with that, the rise of the feeling of nationalism in different parts of the world makes the course of conquering and imposing colonial administration too difficult.

These and other critical arguments regarding the challenges on the extreme reliance on hard power have commenced foreign policy analysts to pay attention to the alternative source of power, more importantly, soft power.

The term soft power is first coined by Joseph Nye to insert a kind of power that is originated not from coercion but attraction and co-option. Using their power of attraction, Nye (2011) argues, states got other countries “to want what they want”. As it is extended in his later researches, soft power also infers “the ability to affect others through co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading and eliciting positive attraction to obtain preferred outcomes” (Nye, 2011, pp. 20-21).

As Nye also notes it (2011) “Culture, values, institutions, past policies...are among the currencies of soft power” (p.85). Hence, the platform a given country has attained determines the degree of utilizing these currencies and influence other countries and/or people. Major Powers like the US and many European countries and since recent time countries like China, India, Turkey and other emerging powers have been implementing different techniques to enhance the affinity of the public in various countries to their culture, values, institutions and foreign policy decisions in general. These powers have strengthened their public diplomacy engagements to win positive opinion of people living in other countries.

As various research findings highlight media outlets, both print as well as audio-visual, play a vital role in promoting the soft power currencies of a given country. In his assessment of the US’s soft power capabilities Nye (2011) stresses the role of the various films and television programs in advancing the country’s global image. Hence, maintaining strong and efficient media outlet is a requisite to promote one’s soft power successfully.

Furthermore, genuine and independent media also serves as a means to point out the contradiction between what states propagate as their soft power capability and their actual conduct. In some instances, states claim the values of democracy, human right, personal freedom, tolerance and other universal values as their soft power, but the local community suffers from the absence of value-based public policymaking and implementation.

In general, as various comparative studies have depicted soft power capabilities enable states to promote their interest in an effective and sustainable manner than using coercive

power. Nevertheless, however, the above-noted argument by no means undermines the position of hard power in safeguarding state's interest in the global political economy.

## **2.5 Impact of Globalization on Foreign Policy**

One of the main alterations brought by globalization on foreign policy is against the state-centric view of policy formulation and implementation. The global interconnectedness, especially during the last three decades has resulted in the coming to the stage of non-state actors in the course of foreign policymaking. As Schunz notes it (2008), quoted in Grand (2000), "...the growing tendency towards transferring sovereignty or delegating functions to inter and supra-national organizations..." has contributed to the decline of state monopoly in foreign policy decision making (p. 7).

Similarly, the technological advancements that speed up the global interconnection also enable non-state actors, which are found in different parts of the world, to communicate and cooperate in their common agendas easily. The global networks that are formed by various civil society organizations further consolidate their capacity to influence sovereign states' foreign policy decision making.

The other important development of foreign policy formulation and implementation, which is also culminated by the globalization process, is the blurring of the distinction between the inside and the outside (Keukeleire & Schunz, 2008). As it has been witnessed in many instances, in the globalizing world socio-economic and political phenomenon's that happen in distant places, have their impacts on the domestic situation of other states. Similarly, domestic happenings of a particular state have also their impact on the global setting. Hence, this amalgamation of the inside and the outside compel foreign policy decision makers to critically analyze both the internal and external variables at a time.

Together with civil society organization, the increasing involvement of individuals in foreign policymaking can also be traced as one effect of globalization. The mass mobility of people from one corner of the world to the other that is induced by the globalization process has led to the development of citizen diplomacy. In this form of diplomacy, individuals serve as an agent to propagate the foreign policy agenda of their respective country (Keukeleire & Schunz, 2008).

Together with the above-noted interlink between globalization and foreign policy, Scholars have depicted models that help to analyze it systematically. There are two key approaches on the basis of the extent of the influence that globalization induced in foreign policymaking and implementation: hyper globalist and global-skeptic thesis.

Proponents of the first argument assert that the globalization process, particularly the economic globalization, has constrained the power and position of nation-states. This global process affects the status of sovereign states in passing a supreme decision in their socio-economic and political affairs. As it is noted by Held (1998)

Virtually all nation-states become part of a larger pattern of global transformations and global flows. Goods, capital, people, knowledge, communications and weapons, as well as crime, pollutants, fashions and beliefs, rapidly move across territorial boundaries. It has become a fully interconnected global order... (Held & McGrew, 1998, p. 235).

Hence, as hyper globalists argue, the assertion mentioned above regarding the implications of globalization has inferred that instead of state monopoly in making and implementing foreign policies, in the post-Cold War era various non-state and sub-state actors such as NGOs, civil societies, multi-national corporations, and transnational corporations become more active and visible.

On the other hand, as the global-sceptics highlight, the contemporary process of globalization is not a new phenomenon to restrain the role of traditional nation-states. Instead, it is the manifestation of a high-level internationalization of the world economy. As it is argued by Hirst and Thompson (2009), there is a difference between internationalization and globalization. In the former case, the role of nation-state to determine the nature and structure of the international economic and political situations is not constrained rather strengthened. Hence, proponents of the global-sceptics argue against on the influence of the growing interdependence between states in their sovereign power of making and implementing foreign policies and strategies (Keukeleire & Schunz, 2008).

In general, considering and examining such diverse views enables to attain a fuller understanding of foreign policy decision making during the era of globalization.

## CHAPTER III

### 3 OVERVIEW OF ETHIOPIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

Ethiopia, one of the oldest nations in the world, has long-lived socio-economic and diplomatic relations. Although it was during the reign of Emperor Menelik II (1889-1913) that Ethiopia had started its formal external relations, there were commercial and political attachments prior to this period as well. Since the early years of the nineteenth century the European States who had economic, missionary and scientific interests sent their envoys to Ethiopia. From the side of Ethiopia, its strong desire for European armaments necessitated the establishment of close ties with Europe. Ethiopian emperors of the past, from Tewodros and Menelik to Haile Sellasie, worked to strengthen their contact with the then European powers and thereby to consolidate their regimes (Zewde, 1991; Marcus, 1994). In their contact, most of these leaders presented Ethiopia as a country encircled by Muslim forces. In fact, this siege mentality has had its impact in the foreign policy formulation and implementation of Ethiopia.

Following the 1884 -1885 Berlin Conference and European powers decision to partition Africa, Ethiopia's foreign relations begun to take a new form. British colonialists who were in control of Egypt and wanted to prevent the expansion of France, their colonial rival, in the Nile basin region made consent with Italy over Ethiopia.<sup>3</sup> The Italians who obtained a pledge for necessary support from Britain started to penetrate towards the interior part of Ethiopia from their possession in Eritrea. This finally led to the historic battle of Adwa between Ethiopia and Italian colonialists in 1896 (Zewde, 1991).

Ethiopia's decisive victory at the battle of Adwa had various effects on its foreign policy behavior. Firstly, it enabled Ethiopia to promote its domestic and foreign politics in an independent manner. Together with that, it obliged European powers who had a colonial possession in Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and other neighboring countries to recognize Ethiopia's sovereignty and act accordingly. Moreover, the battle of Adwa also allowed

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<sup>3</sup> In fact, this European powers colonial interest in the Ethiopian region and Horn of Africa had a strong impact on the nature of Ethiopia's external relations. There were series of secret agreements made between Britain and Italy, Britain and France and Italy and France that posed grave consequences on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ethiopia. See Marcus pp.119-125.

Ethiopia to be regarded as a symbol of freedom and dignity for those people who strive to address the various forms of colonial impositions.

The ministry of foreign affairs was established in 1900 as part of Emperor Menelik II's effort to establish institutions of a modern administration. A man called Negadras Haile Giorgis was appointed as the first minister of commerce and foreign affairs. Since it was difficult to find staffs with the desired quality, many of the appointed workers had only church education (Marcus, 1994). This educational experience of leaders has had a tremendous influence on the country's foreign policy decision making pattern during the next several decades. Furthermore, these bureaucrats of the then were not also conscious enough on the importance of pluralizing the country's foreign policy agendas, methods and instruments.

Following the death of Menelik II in 1908, and coming to power of the young prince, Lij Iyasu, however, this relation started to change. European colonialists agreed to partition Ethiopia and extend their territorial possession in the region. On his part, Lij Iyasu had the vision to maintain Ethiopia's independence by ridding the Horn of Africa from colonialism. In doing so, the young prince established close relations with Somali nationalist leaders who were fighting against British and Italian colonialism. Furthermore, Lij Iyasu also allied with the Ottoman Turks and the Germans to remove Britain, France and Italian colonialists from the Ethiopian region and Horn of Africa. These foreign policy measures annoyed the colonial powers, and they begin to work against Lij Iyasu using his domestic opponents. This finally led to a coup against the young prince and his deposition from power (Marcus, 1994).

European power colonial interest of the Ethiopian region and Horn of African has had a serious impact on the external relations of Ethiopia, especially with neighboring countries. The colonial rivalry between Europeans and their frequent harassment against Ethiopia made the latter defensive in its foreign policy strategy. Hence, instead of designing a policy that can diversify the country's relations with its immediate neighbors, Ethiopian foreign policy decision makers considered regional powers as a threat to Ethiopia's territorial integrity. This impact of European powers on Ethiopia's foreign policy behavior has continued for several decades even after the demise of colonialism. Mesfin (2010) in his assessment of the factors that determine the foreign policy behavior of countries of the



Horn of Africa also depicts similar assertion. He highlights that most of the contemporary challenges regarding the external relations of Horn of Africa have stemmed from the colonial era. For several decades, European colonizers had sowed seeds of distrust among countries of the Horn of Africa. Till now most of the regional states see each other with suspicion and threat. And this seriously hampers the effort to maintain external relations that positively influence the regional political economy.

### **3.1 Foreign Policy of the Monarchy (1916-1974)**

From 1916-1930 as a regent to Empress Zewditu and from 1930-1974 as an Emperor of Ethiopia, Haileselassie I and his government had played an important role in the formulation and implementation of the country's foreign policy. Contrary to his predecessors, Haileselassie's past educational and political experiences enabled him to establish strong relations with European countries. By properly realizing the danger that revolves around Ethiopia's colonial encirclement, Haileselassie had systematic engagements with the various European powers that had colonial possession in the region such as Britain, France and Italy. This finally resulted in the making of series of foreign policy measures which have had a considerable impact on the external as well as domestic affairs of the country.

In 1935 the Fascist regime in Italy, headed by Benito Mussolini invaded Ethiopia. This occupation continued until 1941 although the resistance movements had intensified throughout Ethiopia. Parallel to the Patriots' movement at home, Emperor Haileselassie, who was in exile in Europe, continued his propaganda campaign against Fascists' aggression of Ethiopia. As Abota argues it (2002), these campaigns of the Ethiopian emperor in exile "...symbolized a free Ethiopia, and his activities reminded the world of the Italian aggression that they wished to forget" (p. 36).

In 1941 a joint Anglo- Ethiopian force flushed out fascists from the Ethiopian region. This participation of British forces, for their political benefit, provided them with an opportunity to dominate Ethiopia's international relations in the post-liberation period. Ethiopia obliged to sign agreements that severely limit its sovereignty. Together with other economic and political restrictions, Britain put strong supervision over Ethiopia's diplomatic relations with various countries of the world (Zewde, 1991). Although Haileselassie was thankful for the support of the British government against the Fascist

invasion, he was unhappy about the former's interference on the domestic as well as foreign affairs of Ethiopia and was looking for a way out.

With the decline of British influence in the international political economy in the post-WWII period, Ethiopia had also been striving to diversify its foreign relation partners. Although many of his officials were unhappy up on the US because of the latter's failure to support Ethiopia against the 1935-41 Fascist invasion, Emperor Haileselassie showed strong interest to reinstate the ties. He properly examined US's rising economic and political interest in the Ethiopian region and Horn of Africa and was behaving accordingly. This pragmatic foreign policy measure of Haileselassie had played a significant role to maintain Ethiopia's sovereignty in that terrible time. On Haileselassie's first meeting with President Franklin Roosevelt, for instance, "the first duty and one that had been specifically emphasized at the time of negotiation was to replace the 1942 agreement, so as to release Ethiopia from what in fact not in name, British protectorate" (Spencer, 1984, p. 10).

This regional interest of the US becomes stronger with the rise of the Cold War era ideological rivalry led by the USA and the former USSR.<sup>4</sup> And from 1950s-1970s Ethiopia turns out to be the 'most attractive' ally of all countries of the Horn of Africa region towards the US. Together with other factors, Ethiopia's large human and economic resource, its geo-strategic significance-near to the Middle East and Europe, its long-survived ties with the US and Addis Ababa's role as headquarter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) attract the attention of US foreign policymakers (Woodward, 2006; Mantzikos, 2010).

Metaferia (2009) on his part highlights various socio-economic and geo-political factors which enhances the post-liberation period Ethio-US relations. The historical ties that goes back to the period of Emperor Menelik, the large population size with a potential to attract resourceful US investors, Ethiopia's independent existence that makes her free from any

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<sup>4</sup> During this era the two superpowers of the period had been aggressively engaging in promoting their economic as well as political ideology in to different parts of the world. The US aimed to propagate its capitalist ideology while took steps to contain the spread of Communism. The Soviets on their part acted to contain the spread of capitalism by expanding communism.

colonial legacy, its determined effort to control the spread of communism, its geographic proximity to the Red Sea etc. are worth mentioning.

Hence, it is by considering these strategic significances that the US foreign policymakers took steps to maintain close ties with Ethiopia. This, in turn, enables the latter to get military and economic assistance that was provided by the US government to many of its non-NATO allies of the Cold War era<sup>5</sup> (Metaferia, 2009). The below mentioned are some of the important agreements:

Table 1: Part of the Agreements Signed between Ethiopia and the US (1948-1974).

No.	Type of Agreement	Year
1	Mutual Defense Act	1949
2	Mutual Security Act	1951
3	Foreign Assistance Act	1961
4	Foreign Military Act	1968

Source: Author's computation

Nevertheless, however, US-Ethiopia relations of the post-WWII era lacked long-range strategic engagements. Most of the supports were security-dominated induced by the Cold War era East-West rivalry. The 1953 defense assistance agreement can be taken as a good illustration of the above assertion. In this contract, similar to many other prior agreements, the US promised to provide military aids, while Ethiopia offered a radio communication station in Asmera called kaqnew Station. This treaty allowed the US to use the station for about 25 years to maintain its global communication interest during the Cold War period. It is possible to mention a number of similar event-driven agreements than that of strategically-planned one (Zewde, 1991).

These security-dominated relations of the two states started to decline when the US began to lose its geo-political desire of the Ethiopian region and Horn of Africa. With the development of satellite-based communication technology and information gathering, for instance, the Kaqnew station also lost its importance to the US. This, in turn, led to the deterioration of the US supports to Ethiopia in other sectors as well (Zewde, 1991).

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<sup>5</sup> Other non-NATO allies that were the beneficiary of the American military and economic assistance such as Iran, Turkey, and South Korea.

On the other hand, Haileselassie's pro-America foreign policy of the Cold War era had its impact on Ethiopia's relations with other states. The proliferation of the Communist ideology among many of the newly independent African states led to a rivalry with those pro-America African states, such as Ethiopia. In Egypt, for instance with the coming to power of militant nationalists the former friendly relations between Ethiopia and Egypt began to shake. The government of Gamal Abdel Nasser blamed Ethiopia as a threat to the unity and cooperation of the Nile basin region (Metaferia, 2009).

Similarly, the rise of the idea of Greater Somalia, which includes the Somali inhabited areas of Ethiopia was also another phenomenon of the Cold War era that affected Ethiopia's foreign policymaking. Some countries like Libya, Egypt and Syria, were supportive of the idea of Greater Somalia. They were accusing Ethiopia on various international stages. At the OAU summit of 1973, for instance, Libya accused Ethiopia as an "imperialist state faithless to African traditions... and opponent of the realization of Greater Somalia" (Metaferia, 2009, p. 47). The designation of an imperialist state is basically to refer the close cooperation of Ethiopia with that of the US.

Together with the issue of Greater Somalia, the secessionist movement in Eritrea also had its impact on the foreign policy behavior of Ethiopia during the Cold War era. Ethiopia's relations with many Arab and Islamic countries was unfavorable due to the latter's provision of military and financial supports to the Eritrean secessionist.

Hence together with the international political economy of the Cold War era, local and regional issues had also their own effect on the nature and structure of post-WWII Ethiopia's foreign policymaking. In fact, regional affairs implication on the foreign policy behavior of Ethiopia has continued up to this time. In some instances, non-regional powers have manipulated regional matters to take advantage of their own economic as well as political interest. During the Cold War era East-West rivalry, for instance, rival superpowers were supporting opposing groups. While the US supports Ethiopia, Soviet Russia was providing military as well as financial support for both the Somali irredentists and Eritrean secessionists. These external powers interferences, as argued by Mesfin (2012) are among the primary responsible factors for the persistent instabilities throughout the Horn of Africa region. The prevailing suspicion and doubt among regional states negatively affect the effort to maintain sustainable peace and development.

On the other hand, the Post-WWII relations between Ethiopia and the US started to decline when the latter began to lose its geo-political interest in the Ethiopian region and Horn of Africa. Together with that, there was the growing tendency of anti-Americanism among Ethiopian students, especially university students. These youths regarded the dominance of Americans in every sector of Ethiopian life as part of the global framework of American imperialism. Furthermore, the coming to power of a pro-American president in Egypt, Anwar Sadat, the importance of Ethiopia for US's Middle East project have diminished (Zewde, 1991).

Finally, the 1974 popular revolution of Ethiopia has brought the end of the half-century rule of Emperor Haileselassie. This also marked a shift in the pro-US foreign policy behavior of Ethiopia.

### **3.1.1 Some Illustrations of Haileselassie's Foreign Policy Diversification**

The course of diversifying Ethiopia's foreign policymaking is not a recent phenomenon. Following the inception of official external relations, foreign policymakers of the different times had been trying to pluralize Ethiopia's foreign relations. Nevertheless, however, many of these efforts aiming at partner diversifications and limited attention provided to instrument, agenda and actor diversification. The magnitude of these efforts also varies from regime to regime depending on existing local as well as international contexts.

Internally, the extent of key foreign policy decision makers' exposure to the external world and their determination to promote the states' national interest by engaging the international political economy is the main factor. Furthermore, socio-economic as well as political phenomenon's which take place outside the boundary of the given state also oblige to interact with various countries of the world.

Concerning on the Ethiopian case, those efforts of foreign policy diversification started by Emperor Menelik and Lij Iyasu gained momentum during the reign of Ras Teferi Mekonen, the late Emperor Haile-Sellase I. Thanks to his educational background and frequent contact with many European representatives in Ethiopia, Haile-Sellase was against to the isolationist foreign policy approach propagated by the then conservatives. Instead, he had a strong belief in securing Ethiopia's national interest by diversifying its external relations with various European powers. Of course, there were fierce oppositions

of the traditional nobilities against Teferi's foreign policy measures. They accused many of the reforms as a threat to Ethiopia's economic as well as political independence (Marcus, 1994).

In 1924 Ethiopian delegates headed by Ras Teferi Mekonnen went to Europe to make a direct visit of European technological advancement and administrative system. Teferi also planned to regain Ethiopia's access to the sea, which was blocked by Italy's expansion around the Red Sea Coast region. Although European powers did not support Ethiopia's claim to the sea, the visit highly motivated many members of the delegates. They returned to home with the motive to implement the knowledge and experiences (Abota, 2002).

This and other similar engagements paved the way for using European experts on various governmental services. The use of German and Israeli professionals to train and equip the police force is a case in point (Zewde, 1991). Another important manifestation was the relations with Belgium. The Belgians had provided modern military training to the Imperial bodyguard and other staffs of the army in Addis Ababa as well as other parts of the country. Similar relations were also maintained with the government of Sweden. This relation reached its peak with the arrival of Swedish officers to open the late Holeta Military Academy in 1934 (Zewde, 1991; Marcus, 1994).

Another important manifestation of foreign policy diversification during the reign of Haile-Sellase was the effort to assure Ethiopia's membership in the League of Nations (LN). Haile-Sellase had strong desire to maintain Ethiopia's political as well as economic interest using international cooperation. To this effect, he introduced various reforms that enhance Ethiopia's positive image among the international community and thereby achieve the country's request for admission to the LN. The effort has continued and on September 28, 1923, the general assembly of the league admitted Ethiopia's membership request (Marcus, 1994). As Abota (2002) argued, the acceptance of Ethiopia as a member of the LN was an important step in diversifying the country's foreign policy partner as well as method, i.e. using negotiation and renegotiation in various international forums to keep national interest. In one of his public speech, Haile-Sellase himself noted this reality: "what Menelik successfully achieved in war can be accomplished by a mere putting signature on a piece of paper" (Abota, 2002).

Nevertheless, however, the expectation of collective security via the league of nation remained ideal. When Mussolini endangered Ethiopia's independence in 1935, Ethiopia presented the case to the major European powers of the League. As it was presented by emperor Haile-Sellase to the League of Nations Assembly at Geneva:

I, Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia, am present here today to ask for the impartial justice due to my people and for the help, which fifty-two nations had undertaken to extend to it when they affirmed eight months ago, that a war of aggression in violation of international law, was being waged against Ethiopia. I ask the fifty-two nations who have given promise to the Ethiopian people that they would come to their aid at the time of aggression against them, in order to prevent the aggressor from defeating them.... I ask these fifty-two nations for their support by upholding this promise. What are you willing to do for Ethiopia? (Keller, 1998, p. 89).

Major European powers of the LN including the US, France and others didn't take any meaningful action against Italy that violated international law and invaded Ethiopia, a member country of the League of Nation. They shamefully preferred to remain silent in order not to affect their economic as well as political benefits in the Horn of Africa (Marcus, 1994). This finally led to the 1935-41 Fascists occupation of Ethiopia that resulted in brutal treatments of the Ethiopian masses. In violation of the Geneva Protocols, Mussolini used poison gases, WMD that took the life of thousands of Ethiopian civilians.

This phenomenon of the LN's failure to maintain the very purpose of its foundation has illustrated how the interest of weak states entertained in the global political economy. In fact, similar kinds of double standards have been the day to day scenarios of the various international organizations which come into existence after Second World War (WWII). Although the United Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) and other similar organizations of the post-WWII era have been contributing to addressing some pressing problems of the international community, they have been also suffering from dozens of unequal treatments of the cases of weaker and powerful states. And these happenings have posed serious doubts about the credibility of such institutions especially in safeguarding the national interest of weak states.

Ethiopia's close tie with the US in the post-WWII period is also part of this diversification effort. The relations enabled the two countries to diversify their areas of cooperation further. Although many of the agreements focused on military supports, there were also acts that aim to address the economic and developmental interest of the partners. As it is depicted by Zewde, on the post-WWII era Ethio-US relations the latter left its stamp on

various aspects: “the American impact was felt in many facets of Ethiopian life, but perhaps most conspicuously in the spheres of military organization, communication and education” (Zewde, 1991). The active role of the Americans in the establishment of the Ethiopian Air Lines (EAL), the Imperial Highway Authority (IHA) and the Imperial Board of Telecommunication are to mention some of them.

In his analysis of the Point Four Technical aid agreement, Metaferia (2009) also highlights the diverse sectors that the post-WWII Ethio-US relations tried to encompass.

Teacher education, vocational trade schools, agricultural research, extension and technical schools, crop and livestock protection programs, health programs, nurse education, malaria eradication, mapping and national archives and a Blue Nile basin survey. It also established several programs to assist Ethiopia in regional development, national airlines training and public administration (p. 41).

The other important manifestation of foreign policy diversification of the post-WWII era was the relations with the former USSR. In fact, Ethiopia had long survived relations with Russia. Since 1902 the latter had permanent diplomatic representation in Addis Ababa. During the 1935 Fascist invasion of Ethiopia, Russia showed a firm opposition and decisively asked the League of Nation to take measure against the aggressor (Abota, 2002).

During the post-WWII era Haile-Sellase systematically approached the former USSR to counterbalance first the British and later the US. As it is noted by Dr Tafesse Olika, one of my interviewee, Haile-Sellase’s visit of Moscow in 1957 was aimed to exhibit the US the existence of alternative power to maintain Ethiopia’s socio-economic and political interests. By using such kinds of foreign policy tactic, Haile-Sellase successfully raised “the appetite of the US towards Ethiopia” (Abota, 2002, p. 82).

In general, during the reign of Emperor Haile-Sellase I there were series of reforms that aimed to diversify Ethiopia’s foreign policymaking. In spite of this, however, many Ethiopian foreign policy analysts argue that the outcomes of these efforts in maintaining the national interest of the masses were and/or are very limited. These scholars highlight several factors responsible for the limited outcomes of the diversification efforts.

Firstly, the very purpose of these diversification efforts was not to address the interest of the masses rather consolidate feudal autocratic rule. A good illustration of this assertion is the areas of cooperation. Although there were pressing economic problems and



infrastructural underdevelopment, the then Ethiopian foreign policymakers highly emphasized on military alliances and arms trade. This is mainly because of the un-participatory way of formulating foreign policy agendas. In such a situation, the national interest of the masses will take aside while the interest of the governing elites presented as prime foreign policy agenda. As to Metaferia, elite-dominated external relations often serve as a tool for undemocratic regimes to extend their stay in power. Many of the military assistance provided by the US for instance, used by emperor Haile-Sellase to break internal resistances (Metaferia, 2009).

Secondly, there was lack of a clear foreign policy direction. The course of maintaining a successful diversification in foreign policymaking and thereby securing a state's national interest demands a clear and long-range foreign policy strategy. Such a strategy serves as a reference for both foreign policy decision makers as well as implementers. In this respect, when we examine past foreign policymaking of Ethiopia, most of them were not dictated by long-range strategic plans; rather emerging issues were the prime movers. These have resulted in random decisions that seriously affected the country's political economy.

Thirdly, most of the efforts focused on partner diversifications. Although it is essential to diversify foreign policy partners of a given country, there should also be parallel efforts to diversify the actors, instruments and agendas of a given states foreign policy. In fact, the above-noted foreign policy variables are highly interconnected. Change in one of them brings impact on the other. Hence to maintain the outcomes of policy diversification, there must be balanced efforts in all aspects of the policy-making processes.

Fourthly, there was also limited implementation capacity. In the past several decades those organizations which have direct relations with foreign policymaking and implementation didn't get enough attention to build their capacity. During the reign of Haile-Sellase, for instance, many initiatives related to the country's external relations were strictly supervised by the emperor himself. The ministry of foreign affairs as well as other offices should get the emperor's approval to realize any foreign policy initiatives. This seriously impeded organizational freedom and capacity to effectively implement the various diplomatic as well as economic agreements signed between Ethiopia and its partners.

### **3.2 Foreign Policy of the Military Regime (1974-1991)**

As it is emphasized in the previous sections, the past elite-dominated structures and processes of the foreign policy-making hardly benefit the interest of the Ethiopian masses. In fact, this marginalization of the masses in the country's foreign policymaking had its influence for the 1974 popular revolution in Ethiopia. Although this public protest has resulted in the demise of the feudal regime in Ethiopia, it failed to maintain a strategic shift in policy-making and implementation. A good illustration of this argument was the field of foreign policy. Similar to its predecessors, the foreign policy goals of the military government of Ethiopia also provided limited attention to the political and economic desires of the masses.

In his assessment of the main foreign policy goals of revolutionary Ethiopia, Tekle (2009) highlighted national security and territorial integrity, the defence and legitimacy of the regime and a restructured Ethiopian society as the three priorities that determined the external relations of Ethiopia during the past seventeen years military regime.

In order to fulfill the above-noted goals, the regime believes the need to frame Ethiopia's foreign policy on the basis of proletarian internationalism and non-alignment. Based on these principles the Derg<sup>6</sup> strove to maintain support and solidarity with Socialist countries that struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism and Zionism. Although this support and solidarity had diverse aspects, the main attention was provided to military aid. This was partly determined by the domestic political context of Ethiopia. The Derg regime determined to maintain internal political stability by controlling the secessionist forces in Eritrea and Tigray provinces and other forces such as the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) and Ethiopian Patriotic Democratic Alliance (EPDA). Moreover, the military regime had also to withstand Somali aggression that aims to capture the Somali inhabited areas of Ethiopia (Tekle, 1989).

#### **3.2.1 Substituting U.S.A with U.S.S.R**

As it is noted by foreign policy analysts, time has a special role to enhance relations among states and thereby to achieve intended foreign policy goals. When states able to maintain

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<sup>6</sup> The Derg, is the short name of the Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, and Territorial Army that ruled Ethiopia from 1974 to 1987.

long-lasting relations, they will have a better capacity to improve, develop and diversify their cooperation. On the other hand, when states have intermittent relations, it is unlikely to take valuable experiences from their friendship and put it on a strong base.

A close scrutiny of the past foreign policymaking process of Ethiopia demonstrates the above-noted fact of discontinuous external relations. When the military regime came to power following the 1974 popular revolution of Ethiopia, for instance, there were limited efforts to maintain Ethiopia's relations with Western powers in general and that of the US in particular (Schraeder, 1992). In fact, the foreign policy approach of the US as well as many European countries was not in favor of the interest of the Ethiopian masses. However, the decision of the military regime to disconnect its relations with the traditional foreign policy partners of Ethiopia was not on the basis of this reality. There were also no efforts to deal with the former partners and thereby address the prevailed limitations in their foreign policy undertakings. The military regime has concluded to substitute the US with the USSR because of the latter's unconditional recognition and support, which was badly desired by the Derg (Zewde, 1991).

In his comparative study of the military regime's foreign policy behavior with its predecessors, Tekle (1989) commented that:

Although the previous Government had proclaimed Ethiopia to be non-aligned, this stance included not only maintaining cordial relations with the Soviet bloc, but also providing the United States with military bases and facilities. By way of contrast, the present Government considers the Soviet Union to be a 'natural ally' of the Non-Aligned Movement. Whereas the organization's founding fathers had, on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence, emphasized mutual accommodation, understanding, tolerance, and co-operation, Ethiopia's Marxist leaders advocate class struggle and world revolution (p. 480).

Apart from consolidating Ethiopia's external relations with the Socialist countries, the Derg had also been regarded many of the traditional foreign policy partners especially the US as Imperialists and threat for the national interest of Ethiopia. This labelling of the military regime against traditional foreign policy partners of Ethiopia negatively affected those prior efforts of policy diversification. Moreover, the various imbalances of the military regime foreign policy behavior also affected Ethiopia's influence in the non-Aligned movement, the O.A.U and U.N (Tekle, 1989).

Various scholars have different proposals regarding the causes for the switch of the military regime's foreign policy orientation from the U.S.A to the U.S.S.R. Some

scholars emphasize the effect of domestic factors for this shift while others stress on the international dynamics. As for Abota (2002), both local as well as external factors contribute to this shift:

The tendency of the *Derg* right from the very beginning towards Marxist-Leninist ideology, the decision of the U.S.A Government under president Carter not to supply arms and military equipment which was agreed upon earlier, the opening of war by the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU), the intensification of the Eritrean war of secession in the North – West (pp. 104-105).

The military regime officially declared this shift on May 6, 1977. Colonel Mengistu Hailemariam, chairman of the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE), signed a Declaration of the Basic Principles of Friendly Mutual Relations and Cooperation with the U.S.S.R. Following this agreement, Moscow decided to terminate its arms supplies to Somalia and provided defensive weapons instead to Ethiopia (Metaferia, 2009).

On the other hand, the above-noted measure of the military regime in Ethiopia has annoyed the US foreign policymakers. The decisions were against the age-old US dominance in the regions socio-economic and political process. Hence, in order to balance the Ethio-U.S.S.R relations US begun to arm the Somalis. This further aggravates the arms race between Ethiopia and Somalia. And finally, in 1977, a full-scale war erupted that led to huge destruction. The 1977-78 Ethio-Somali war is a good manifestation of the impact of the Cold-War ideological rivalries on the relations of states which are geographically far from Europe and/or the US (Mantzikos, 2010).

In general, the foreign policy behavior of the military regime was highly influenced by the Cold War environment. The economic as well as political tensions caused by the Cold War rivalry have resulted in arbitrary foreign policy decisions. Many decisions were made without critically analyzing its implications. Such actions have had their influence on Ethiopia's role in the regional as well as the international political economy.

In addition, the Derge's foreign policy was also characterized by full dependence on the Soviet bloc countries. Ethiopia fully detached herself from the West in general and that of the US in particular. This full dependence on the Soviets had jeopardized Ethiopia's sovereignty. The Soviets were frequently interfering on both the domestic as well as foreign affairs of Ethiopia. They had been trying to dictate Ethiopia on various regional as well as international stages to support their propositions. Although the Derg refused, as

it is highlighted by Tekle (1989), the Soviets even tried to put a permanent advisory group in Ethiopia's ministry of foreign affairs (Tekle, 1989).

In spite of the above-noted features, however, the foreign policy behavior of the military regime of Ethiopia had also characterized by a good reading of the then international political economy and pragmatic response to it. The Derg systematically exploited the rising ideological rivalry of the Cold War era to maintain its foreign policy goals. By fully aligning itself with the Soviet bloc countries, the Derg successfully secured an immediate recognition of its government by the U.S.S.R and other members of the Soviet bloc. Similarly, the military regime had required various assistance which was badly desired to restructure Ethiopia's socio-economic and political order. Most importantly Derg's total dependence on the Soviet bloc permitted to get military support and successfully defend Somali aggressors during the 1977-78 war.

## CHAPTER IV

### 4 DIVERSIFYING ETHIOPIA'S FOREIGN POLICY PARTNERS

The early 1990's have shown radical revisions on the nature and structure of Ethiopia's foreign policy. Following the coming to power of the EPRDF in 1991, the government has strived to maintain a policy option for Ethiopia that is not entirely overthrown by the then dominant dogma of neoliberalism (Cheru, 2016). As it is illustrated in the Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy document, promulgated in 2002, Ethiopia has to keep a constructive foreign policy engagement both with its traditional Western as well as emerging development partners from the South. Among other factors, the shift to focus on economic diplomacy as the number one priority of EPRDF's foreign policy has taken the significant role for this policy alteration.

Foreign policy partners' diversification, as some Ethiopian foreign policy analysts argue, serves as a means to address the gaps associated with the past Western and/or Eastern-centric approach. And it provides for Ethiopia relative freedom to choose its policy options. According to Cheru (2016), keeping a balanced relationship with the traditional Western powers and emerging Southern actors is a prerequisite for countries like Ethiopia to promote an independent foreign policy decision making. Such type of policymaking paves the way for setting and prioritizing foreign policy agendas according to the real demand of the society.

#### 4.1 Determinants of post-Cold War Ethiopia's Foreign Policy Partner Selection

One of the important determinants of country's choice of its foreign policy partner is the nature of the foreign policy goals, the socio-economic and political interests a given state wants to achieve. The Post-Cold War era Ethiopia's foreign policy and strategy document asserts (at least at the system level) the maintenance of sustainable development as a foundation of the country's foreign policy goal. Although some foreign policy analysts such as Alemayehu (2009), Assefa (2011) have their reservation on the validity of this claim, it serves as a reference in selecting the country's external relations partner. Accordingly, market opportunities, investment, technical and financial support to secure rapid economic development are essential variables in prioritizing foreign policy partners (FANSPS, 2002). Together with that, those states as well as non-state partners, which assist the effort to

advance democratic governance and the rule of law, have also been prioritized as strategic foreign policy partners.

The level of dependence of a given state upon others also noted as an important factor that determines the selection of foreign policy partners. Accordingly, many weak and poor governments who are entirely dependent on external support lose their policy and partner preferences (Mulat, 2016). During the feudal regime of Haile Sellasie, for instance, Western governments used their economic and political assistance to impose their interests. This imposition constrained Ethiopia's capacity to look for alternative foreign policy partner and pursue its national interests. The same happened during the military regime of the Cold War era. Ethiopia's full dependence on the Socialist bloc countries seriously undermines the former's capacity to pluralize its external relations partners.

It is by considering the limitations of these past foreign policymakings, the EPRDF government of the post-Cold War era has had strived in order not to be fully dependent on certain foreign policy partners (Cheru, 2016).

Furthermore, the global political economy of the post-Cold War era, as argued by Cheru, affected the nature and type of Ethiopia's foreign policy partners. With the increase in the influence of the emerging powers of the global south, the US-led unipolar global economic and political power has shifted to a multipolar order. Among other outcomes induced by this change, the space Ethiopia has obtained to diversify its foreign policy partners worth to mention. New actors including China, India, Brazil, and Turkey become key players. They advocate the strategic significance of maintaining South-South cooperation that enables many developing countries, including Ethiopia, to carve their alternative developmental course.

Similarly, the impact of the US-led Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) on Ethiopia's foreign relations is a good illustration of how the international political economy determines states choice of foreign policy partners. As Mulat (2016), in his analysis of domestic sources of international action highlights, Ethiopia has strengthened its relationship with the West by using the security concern of the latter. Mulat (2016) further notes that after the attacks of 2001, the Ethiopian government has successfully positioned itself as a key ally in the fight against global terrorism and a lynchpin in the stability of the Horn of Africa.

Foreign policy decision makers of the post-Cold War era Ethiopia have been striving to choose the country's foreign policy partners on the basis of national interest. The FANSPS of the EPRDF classifies those traditional and emerging powers as strategic and/or not strategic according to their implication on the democratization as well as economic development of Ethiopia. This categorization has its influence on latter economic, political and diplomatic interactions between Ethiopia and its foreign policy partners.

#### **4.2 Post-Cold War Ethiopia's Foreign Relations with Established Powers**

As it is noted in the previous sections of the study, Ethiopia has had external relations with different countries of the world. Although these relations have continued for the past several decades and even centuries, for the purpose of this study I limit my analysis on those traditional foreign policy partners whose influence has continued on the political-economy of post-Cold War era Ethiopia.

During the seventeen years of military regime, Ethiopia had disconnected its relations with the West, in particular with the US. It is obvious that this measure of the military government negatively affected the bilateral and multilateral relations that Ethiopia established with its traditional foreign policy partners (Feyissa, 2011). As to some Ethiopian foreign policy analysts, the active involvement of the West to initiate and lead regime change negotiation, such as the London Peace Conference in 1991, is stemmed from the West's strong desire to reinstate its dominance on Ethiopia's political economy. The London Peace Conference between the collapsing military regime and the three major armed groups, the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) was chaired by Herman J. Cohen, US Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. This negotiation has had multiple outcomes on both the domestic and foreign policy behaviors of Ethiopia. Locally, London Peace Conference contributes to the relatively smooth regime change and formation of a transitional government. Also, the London Peace Conference paved the way for the revival of the post-Derg Ethiopia's relations with the West (particularly with the US) (Metaferia, 2009).

In his assessment of post-Derg Ethiopia's relations with the Western world, Feyissa (2011) conceptualizes how the EPRDF regime strategically engages the US (winner of the Cold War era). Despite its Socialist background, the EPRDF has revised its position and assumed a liberal political economy. Privatization of public enterprises, liberalization of trade and the



emergence of the private sector, the modest trend towards multi-party democracy, manifest in the mushrooming of opposition parties and more press freedom further cemented EPRDF's relations with the West.

This shift towards liberalism and the subsequent reforms were welcomed by the West and later translated into an influx of development aid. A good manifestation of this fact is the support provided by the various governmental as well as Nongovernmental Organizations of the West. During the 1990's and 2000's, as argued by Feyissa (2011), Ethiopia has received

Some USD 26 billion in development aid from donors, notably the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Union, Britain's Department for International Development (DFID), GTZ (Germany), CIDA (Canada), the Netherlands and Italy... (p. 788).

Furthermore, the support provided by the World Bank under the EPRP (Emergency Recovery and Reconstruction Program) is also worth to mention. The support continued until 1993, and in 1992, for instance, a total of \$1.2 billion was granted for various development activities. Furthermore, in September 1992 Ethiopia has signed a policy framework known as Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) with the World Bank and the IMF. This policy framework, as argued by Feyissa, helped Ethiopia to “participate in the joint support program of the World Bank and the IMF known as the Special Program of Assistance to Africa” (Feyissa, 2011, p. 790).

Although some scholars like Metaferia (2009) and Jalata (2011) have their reservations, the above-noted supports of the West during the immediate post-Derg Ethiopia have had crucial importance to the political stability and economic growth of the country. In many African countries regime changes often followed by internal tensions and unrest which usually lead to chaos and bloodshed. The EPRDF, however, adopting pragmatic foreign policy measures, to grant the economic as well as political support of the West, maintained order and stability.

Ethiopia's relations with its traditional foreign policy partners have shown various changes since 2000. A new aid relationship known as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Program (PRSP) was declared. As noted by Zack Williams and Mohan, quoted in Feyissa (2011) “the essence of PRSP is to give African governments a say in the choice of policies and a move away from what has been described as the one-size-fits-all approach of SAP” (p.792).

The PRSP has enabled particular countries to own and led development programs by them. This relative freedom to choose policy options has had direct impacts on the output of specific projects. As it is argued by donors such as DFID, Ethiopia's remarkable success in achieving many of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)<sup>7</sup> is partly related to this essence of the PRSP.

Country's ownership of programs is not something provided by donors; rather it is highly dependent on the bargaining power of recipient countries. Similarly, Ethiopia's limited human, as well as material strength, has negatively affected its capacity to determine the nature and implementation of the various development programs of the then.

One of the primary constraints of Post-Derg Ethiopia's relations with the West is the latter's extreme reliance on individual leaders. Instead of "encouraging the establishment of a broad-based institution that is close to the people" and can address the real societal interests, the West incline on personalities, especially on ex-prime minister Meles Zenawi. This, in turn, negatively influences the persistence of real democracy and the rule of law which was depicted as the prime foreign policy objective of the EPRDF (Metaferia, 2009).

Together with that, the short-sighted nature of the West's foreign policy approach severely constrained post-Cold War era Ethiopia's external relations with traditional partners. In most instances, immediate issues take much of their energy while strategic issues, which have a long-term impact on the overall well-being of the Ethiopian masses, take aside.

The other main determinant of the post-Cold War Era Ethiopia's relations with its traditional partners is the latter's security interest in the Horn of Africa region. In fact, before the declaration of the GWOT, the US has maintained repetitive military operations against many countries of the Horn, accused having links with terrorists. The bombings of the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es-Salaam in 1998 were associated by Western political analysts with the rise of 'political Islam' in the Horn. One of the various policy recommendations to address this 'threat' is establishing "frontline states" in the region. In the 1990s Ethiopia, together with Eritrea and Uganda, served as a frontline state to contain the spread of political Islam in the Horn of Africa.

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<sup>7</sup> The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set by the UN Millennium Summit in 2000 aim to eradicate poverty worldwide by 2015 through setting specific goals such as improving health, education, gender equality, environmental protection, halting the spread of HIV/AIDS etc.

With the 9/11 attack, the EPRDF government in Ethiopia systematically consolidates its security-centred rapprochement with the West. As Mulat (2016) highlights:

A turning point came during the 9-11 terrorist attacks which Zenawi (then Prime minister) regarded as a golden opportunity to curry the favour of Western donors in general and the USA in particular. Ethiopia branded itself as an “anchor state” in an otherwise turbulent region and a strategic ally to the West (p. 136).

EPRDF’s strong attachment as a strategic partner in the US Africa command of the GWOT, i.e., Djibouti-based Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF - HoA) is an excellent manifestation for the above assertion. Since 2011, the US has established a drone base in the southern part of Ethiopia at a place called Arba Minch. The base had been using to target al-Qaeda operations in Somalia and Yemen (Whitlock, 2011). These and other similar strategic cooperation’s of post-Derg Ethiopia with the West have enabled the former to get huge development assistance and political gains.

Table 2: US Economic and Military aid to Ethiopia in million (1992-2012)

Year	Economic	Military	Total	Military as share of Total
1992	288.6	0	288.6	0
1993	99.04	0.16	99.2	0.1
1994	149.2	0.88	150.1	0.59
1995	119.3	3.7	122.9	2.94
1996	104.7	4.9	109.7	4.51
1997	82.8	1.3	84.1	1.56
1998	118.5	1.3	119.8	1.07
1999	147.0	3.4	150.4	2.27
2000	277.4	1.5	277.6	0.05
2001	211.8	0	211.8	0.00
2002	175.9	3.3	179.1	1.81
2003	721.6	4.5	726.1	0.62
2004	433.0	3.0	436.1	0.69
2005	680.2	7.6	687.8	1.11
2006	324.5	2.6	327.0	0.79
2007	479.4	2.4	481.7	0.49
2008	1,011.4	1.4	1,012.8	0.14
2009	966.2	1.5	967.7	0.15

2010	988.2	3.4	988.5	0.03
2011	655.2	0.7	689.3	0.16
2012	748.2	5.6	753.9	0.75

Source: Data from Mulat, USAID report and Author's computation.

As it is indicated in Table 1, the US has been serving as a major source of foreign aid for Ethiopia. Almost a third of the country's total bilateral aid is provided by the US (Feyissa, 2011). The table has also presented some important landmark which signified a modest increase in the aid flow. In this regard, the 1990s and 2000s US's anti-terrorism operations in the Horn of Africa and Ethiopia's strategic position in this respect can be regarded as the main factor for the periodic rise in aid flow. In 2008, for instance, US aid to Ethiopia had reached to \$ 1 billion. Together with other developments, the 2006-2009 Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia to overthrow the Union of Islamic Courts from power is worth to mention. As it is argued by Mulat (2016), "Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia in 2006 signified a convergence of the interests and threats of Ethiopia and the USA" (p. 137).

Moreover, the regime change in Egypt caused by the Arab Spring in 2011 also resulted in the further strengthening of US's relations with Ethiopia. With the collapse of Mubarak's government and its replacement by Mohammed Mursi, Washington lost part of its influence in the region. In order to balance the new regime in Egypt, Ethiopia has emerged as a more strategic partner to the US. As Klosowicz, quoted from Whitlock, highlights

In 2011, the U.S. American embassy in Addis Ababa was opened in a new, impressive building, which is currently the biggest U.S. diplomatic mission in Sub-Saharan Africa. Military assistance was radically stepped up by 256% compared to the previous year. In 2011, a base for American drones was opened in Arba Minch in southern Ethiopia... (Klosowicz, 2015, p. 92).

As part of the military aid, the various military training provided by Washington to Addis Ababa have had special importance to capacitate the latter's armed force. As it is presented by the Global Fire Power (World Military Strength Ranking), among the Sub-Saharan countries, Ethiopia is the strongest regarding its military capacity, and it is also regarded as the third strongest country in Africa next to Egypt and Algeria (Global Fire Power, 2016)<sup>8</sup>. Together

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<sup>8</sup> This assessment takes into account 40 factors defining specific country's military strength. Interms of the size of military personnel, for instance, Ethiopia has around 180 thousand active frontline personnel, with about 24 million persons fit for the military service (see Global Fire Power 2014).

with the US, as it is disclosed by Wiki Leaks, Israel has also been playing an important role in training and arming Ethiopia (Berhane, 2011).

The afore-mentioned facts challenge the view that Ethiopia's geo-strategic importance has declined following the secession of Eritrea and the former turn out to be a land-locked country. In the words of Inhoffe, ex-US senator "... Ethiopia continues to be a close friend of the US and a strong ally in the war on Terror in the Horn of Africa..." (Mulat, 2016, p. 140). The Senator also notes that the political unrest in the Horn like the instabilities in Somalia and the Ogaden region and the border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea are threats for the long-term US national interest in the region. And this scale up the geo-political significance of Ethiopia (Mulat, 2016).

Despite the afore-mentioned cooperative relations of the Post-Derg Ethiopia with its traditional foreign policy partners, there were and/or are disagreements which were mainly caused by differences in economic and political ideologies. Regarding addressing problems associated with poverty and underdevelopment, for instance, EPRDF promotes the idea of "Developmental State". The EPRDF-led government considers donor approach as "neoliberalism" and criticised the limited attention the latter approach provides to the state to maintain economic transformation. EPRDF emphasizes leading role of the state in realizing development, while donors argue for the dominant role of the private enterprise and free market. Post-Derg Ethiopian government also further asserted the challenges posed by liberalism especially in those countries where the market and the private sector are not effective (Feyissa, 2011).

In addition, the afore-mentioned ideological differences between post-Derg Ethiopia's government and its traditional foreign policy partners have also impacted other spheres of relations. The aid-conditionality donors set against Ethiopia were good illustrations in this regard. These conditionalities required the EPRDF government to take reforms on its approach in agriculture, economic management, financial market and privatization of land. Nevertheless, however, the EPRDF remained with its firm stand against donor's conditionality (Feyissa, 2011).

This tension between EPRDF and Ethiopia's traditional foreign policy partners was further exacerbated by the 2005 contested parliamentary elections. The election which was preceded by a relatively free campaign and open media debates among the opposition and leading government led to the rise of public pressure towards a change in the country's political economy. As some reports indicate, there was a high rate of voter registration and turnout, estimated between 80-90% (Abbink, 2006).

All the afore-mentioned pre-election platforms were also regarded as remarkable by foreign observers. Although the leading EPRDF emerged as dominant power according to official results (371 seats = 67.8% of the vote), opposition groups also obtained great gains from 12 member in the previous parliament to 174 (Abbink, 2006).

Nevertheless, however, the opposition parties refused to accept the result. They alleged the voting and counting process as full of irregularities and called for re-vote. In fact, the allegation of the opposition parties was also supported by international observers. This finally led to post-election controversy between the leading and opposition groups. The situation becomes more violent when opposition parties called their supporters for demonstrations and the security forces responded harshly (Weinstein, 2005). As it is noted by Abink (2006), the aggressive response of the security to suppress post-election protests led to the death of more than 46 people, hundreds injured and a large number of them (including opposition party leaders) were put under arrest.

These measures of the EPRDF, in turn, led to a strong critique and condemnation from traditional foreign policy partners, particularly the EU and the US. In their letter to the then prime minister, Meles Zenawi, both the EU and the US criticised the persecution against the demonstrator and urged restraints. In addition, international organization such as the WB also provided warnings to reduce aids and change its programs. In December 2005, for instance, the EU and WB (not the USA) decided to withhold \$374 million from the budget support to Ethiopia (Abink, 2006). This can be noted as an indication of the hostile relations of post-Derg Ethiopia with its traditional partners.

The above-noted aid conditionality's, on the other hand, forced Ethiopia to look for alternative foreign policy partner and diversify the source of foreign aid. This finally led to the rise and development of Ethiopia's diverse engagement with the emerging powers of the global South.

### **4.3 Post-Cold War Ethiopia's Foreign Relations with Emerging Powers**

Together with strengthening the relationship with traditional foreign policy partner, post-Cold War Ethiopia has been taking measures to consolidate its relationship with emerging powers. Despite the fact that Ethiopia strives to diversify its foreign relations with many of the emerging powers, for this study I purposively select the interaction with China, India and most importantly with Turkey.

As part of their Africa policy, China, India and Turkey have been taking series of measures to maintain strategic and sustainable relations with Addis Ababa as well. Similarly, post-Cold War Ethiopia maintains strong economic, political and diplomatic relations with China, India and Turkey as compared with the other emerging powers such as Russia, Brazil and South Africa. Since the late 1990s and early 2000s China, India and Turkey have emerged as the major trading partner of Ethiopia. In 2012, for instance, Ethiopia's export share to China, India and Turkey had reached to 15% while it was less than 1% in 1995. Together with this, the afore-mentioned three countries are also the major source of FDI in Ethiopia during the past two decades. As far as development assistance is concerned, China, India and Turkey have been providing organized and diverse supports which have a long-term impact on Ethiopia's development endeavors.

As it is stated in the FANSPS, Ethiopia provides particular attention to enhance its relationship with the rising powers and thereby attain its foreign policy objectives. In this regard, the emphasis is given by the Ethiopian government to enhance the country's infrastructural development and thereby assisting economic growth was and/or is a strategic decision. As research results have shown, from 2003-2012 Ethiopia's economy had grown on average 10.8% per year. It is a remarkable growth as compared to the regional average of 5.3% (Klosowicz, 2015). The World Bank report of 2015 also noted Ethiopia as having the 12<sup>th</sup> fastest growing economy worldwide.

To achieve this economic development, emerging powers such as China, India, Turkey, Brazil and others have contributed a lot as a potential partner. Since Turkey's role will be a major point of discussion in the coming chapters, I will focus here on China and India: the major emerging foreign policy partners of Africa in general and Ethiopia in particular.

The rise of Ethiopia's relations with the emerging powers is accompanied by the latter's strong desire to open up Africa. As it is argued by Large (2008), for instance,

...a new Wind from the East is blowing across Africa and is attracting unprecedented attention. This is driven in part by the wider resurgence of China in world affairs, but much is also the result of the recent visibility and interest in the growing presence, roles, and impacts of Chinese actors throughout the continent (p.45).

Since the last decades of the 20th century, emerging powers such as China, India, Brazil and others had been striving to keep up their rapid growth and economic advancement by accessing Africa's abundant resources and growing market potentials. Together with the economic interests, emerging powers have also been negotiating with the already established powers to have representation and say at the 'high table of global governance.' In achieving this leadership ambition, emerging powers badly desire diplomatic support and backing of African countries (Vickers, 2013).

In sum, the relationship between Africa and the rising powers appears to be increasingly symbiotic, one in which resource diplomacy, development assistance, seeking new markets and forging consensus around reforming the global order that would be more inclusive, equitable and multilateral are points of interaction. These feature of the relations, which are the central tenets of the South-South development cooperation school of thought, have their contribution to maintaining a relatively 'balanced' and 'win-win' interaction between Ethiopia and the emerging powers.

Furthermore, the afore-mentioned diverse socio-economic and political demands from both sides encourage the partners to take care of the relations, which, in turn, paved the way for long-lived bilateral and/or multilateral relations.

#### **4.3.1 Ethiopia's Engagement with China**

One of the famous illustrations of the benefits of post-Cold War era foreign policy diversification of Ethiopia is its remarkable engagement with China. In fact, Ethio – China relations is not a phenomenon of the post-Cold War era; rather it has continued for the past several decades. Emperor Haileselassie's visit to China in 1971 regarded as a foundation for the beginning of official diplomatic relations between the two states. During the seventeen years military regime in Ethiopia, however, ideological differences strained the relationship



between Ethiopia and China. This weak association continued until the downfall of the military junta in 1991.

The coming to power of the EPRDF led to the revival of Ethio-China relations on various spheres. Subsequent high-level visits further solidified the bilateral relationship. In 1995 and 2004, ex-Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, visited China. Similarly, the former Chinese President, Jiang Zemin, visited Ethiopia in 1996 and 2003 Premier Wen Jiabao also visited Ethiopia. Similar high-level visits which aim to diversify and consolidate the bilateral relationship have been taking place till then (Cheru, 2016).

As it is vividly presented in the EPRDF's foreign policy and national security document, the prime objective of the country's domestic as well as foreign policy is assuring economic development, democratization and peace. The paper identifies poverty as an ardent opponent that endangers the survival of Ethiopia and its people. It is on the basis of this reality the policy document prioritizes Ethiopia's foreign policy partners. In this way, China regarded as a potential partner as a 'newcomer in the world of foreign investment' and a reliable market destination for Ethiopia's primary commodities (FANSPS, 2002).

In fact, the relations between Ethiopia and China were and/or are not in favor of one party at the expense of the other. Rather, it is characterized by symbiotic relations. China as a primary advocate of the South-South Cooperation strives to secure and promote the economic and political interest of developing countries. In many international stages including the UN Security Council, China endeavors to protect the interests of African nations, including Ethiopia. The launching of the Forum for China – Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in October 2000 is a good illustration of China's commitment to maintaining 'win-win' relations with Africa. FOCAC serves as an important platform to have a high-level dialogue and practical cooperation between China and Africa.

Addis Ababa's hosting of the second FOCAC conference in 2003, which was the first to be held in Africa, exemplifies Ethiopia's strategic position in the wider China's Africa policy. Chinese foreign policymakers highlight the strategic significance of Ethiopia as a seat for the headquarter of the African Union. China can easily promote its economic and diplomatic interests using this symbolic importance of Ethiopia.

In addition, the signing of political consultation mechanism in 2002, the formation of the inter-parliamentary friendship groups, the cooperation at sectoral ministries and administrative unit level and the close interactions between the ruling parties further reinforce the political sphere engagement of Ethiopia and China. This diversified cooperation of the political dimension, in turn, paved the way for other engagements.

Together with the political sphere, the economic cooperation between the two countries has also been rising. As compared to China's economic relations with many African countries, Sino – Ethiopian relationship has its own distinctive feature. As it is commented by some foreign policy commentators, China's Africa engagement solely targets to benefit from the latter's strategic mineral resources. Although this argument is justifiable in some respects, China's active engagement with countries like Ethiopia that hasn't actual mineral deposits such as oil and gas obligated to consider other motives.

Similarly, Legget (2005) also conceptualizes the peculiar feature of China's engagement with Ethiopia in comparison with other African countries:

A poor, landlocked nation ..., Ethiopia lacks the vast natural resources that have drawn China's interest in other countries. But it has something else Beijing craves: geo-political clout in the region. Ethiopia is the source of the Blue Nile, the river that slakes Egypt's thirst. It is the meeting ground between largely Muslim North Africa and the Christian south. And it is the seat of the African Union, the political body that represents the continent (p. 1).

Ethiopia's economic importance to China stems from the former's potential as a source of raw material and market for the latter's industrial products. For its part, Ethiopia badly desires Chinese investment to accelerate its economic growth and maximize its competitiveness in the global market. Many analysts agreed on the indispensable role of China's foreign investment in harnessing Ethiopia's sustainable growth since the 2000s (Desta, 2009; H.Michael, 2013).

Table 3: Chinese investment in Ethiopia by sector and status (1998 - 2014).

No.	Sector	No. of projects	Capital in \$	No. of projects under			Employment opportunity
				Implmentation	Operation	Pre-Implmentation	
1	Agriculture	39	4,127,458	3	3	33	7154
2	Manufacturing	657	37,952,918	89	257	311	101,493
3	Mining	10	174,238	1	3	6	1818
4	Education	3	2430	1	1	1	29
5	Health	13	28,605	1	10	2	167
6	Hotels	68	1,006,266	6	19	43	3386
7	Tourism	11	19,974	1	3	7	519
8	Real estate	150	2,594,889	10	76	64	47,093
9	Construction	138	11,601,107	20	56	62	56,553
10	Others <sup>9</sup>	5	57,600	1	2	2	361
11	Total	1094	133	133	430	531	218,573

Source: Adapted from Fantu Cheru.

Chinese investment in Ethiopia mainly focused on three strategic sectors: those which are vital to foster bilateral cooperation (including agricultural technology demonstration center), integrated economic and trade project (including the construction of hydropower stations) and the establishment of an industrial zone to attract investment from Chinese companies. (Xinhua News Agency, 2008).

As it is reported by the Ethiopian Investment Agency, between 1998 and 2012 more than one thousand Chinese projects are registered. These investment projects encompass various sectors such as manufacturing, construction and real estate, agriculture, mining, transport health and other strategic areas. According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, China's direct investment in Ethiopia has reached \$900 million by the end of 2011. These investments have created permanent and temporary employment opportunity for more than 200,000 Ethiopians, as it is indicated in Table 2.

<sup>9</sup> Note: other investments

As it is already noted at the beginning of this section, Ethiopia's massive infrastructure projects and the Chinese government willingness to finance them is the rationale behind the two countries strategic partnership. In this perspective, the railway and road construction sector is worth to mention. Data obtained from the Ethiopian Roads Authority (ERA), quoted by Cheru (2016) indicate that Chinese road construction firms engaged in almost 70% of the road work being accomplished in different parts of Ethiopia.

Together with the road projects financed by the Chinese government, Chinese companies in Ethiopia have also been benefitting from massive projects sponsored by the WB, the African Development Bank (AfDB), the European Union (EU) and some Middle Eastern countries. During the past decade, many international bids in road construction are won by Chinese firms (H.Michael, 2013).

Furthermore, state-owned Chinese companies also dominate the construction of railways in different parts of Ethiopia. As it is noted in the first Growth and Transformation plan (GTP1) 2010/11-2014/15, the Ethiopia government launched the construction of more than 2000 km national rail network. This project together with the 37 km-long Addis Ababa light railway is being constructed by China Railway Corporation (CRC). Ethiopia has massive railway construction projects with the aim of harnessing its economic transformation. The land-locked Ethiopia sought to network itself with the port in Djibouti and other countries of the Horn through railways. Here, it is necessary to mention the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway which has been constructed by the CRC. Upon its completion, the 656 km Addis Ababa-Djibouti rail line will enhance the efficiency of the country's trading activity (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2010).

China's support in financing the road and railway construction projects of Ethiopia has an excellent implication in transforming the latter's economy. Road construction facilitates the development of agriculture, industry, mining, tourism and service sectors. Ethiopian Ambassador to China, Seyoum Mesfin, also marked this reality in many forums: China has been playing an irreversible role in Ethiopia's economic transformation by investing in strategic sectors and funding our infrastructure projects (Ethiopian News Agency, 2016).

The other important gain of Ethiopia's foreign policy partner's diversification of the post-Cold War era, especially in its relations with China, is in the power sector. As it is also presented in the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP1), 2010-2015, Ethiopia has planned to escalate its electricity supply to 10,000 MW. In achieving this, Ethiopia has been worked with China's hydro and wind energy firms. In 2009, for instance, the total costs of power-related projects were estimated about \$1.7 billion (Cheru, 2016).

Ethiopia's post-Cold War engagement with China has also marked significant rise in trade relations. The consolidation of diplomatic cooperation paved the way for the increase of bilateral trade between Ethiopia and China. As it is indicated in table 4, in 2006 exports from Ethiopia to China had elevated to more than \$100 million from its negligible amount before 2000. Similarly, exports from China to Ethiopia grew to \$630 million in 2006 from less than \$50 million in the 1990s.

Table 4: Ethiopia's Trade with China (1994-2016).

Year	Import	Export
1994	26.195.248	578.076
1995	26.195.248	578.076
1997	54.480.632	722.381
1998	67.432.784	806.326
1999	76.419.072	882.615
2000	96.672.856	934.522
2001	134.760.688	4.510.654
2002	144.808.224	7.410.574
2003	313.696.640	5.028.978
2004	367.772.324	15.046.773
2005	516.952.326	90.443.904
2006	639.539.294	101.352.707

2007	1.138.770.490	69.581.814
2008	1.750.434.869	85.079.962
2009	1.920.403.823	243.129.218
2010	2.062.084.699	241.763.380
2011	1.718.111.460	283.442.809
2012	2.572.357.995	320.919.096
2013	3.244.696.547	329.051.980
2014	5.808.429.600	533.171.812
2015	7.166.912.395	378.491.348
2016	6.095.987.645	88.693.600

Source: World Integrated Trade Solution

The two states took serious of reforms to enhance their bilateral trade relationship further. In this regard, China's preferential trade policy that aims to encourage the Least Developing Countries (LDCs), including Ethiopia to export to China is worth to mention. This enables Ethiopia to raise the quantity and diversity of its exports to China. In 2006, for instance, China had emerged as the number one market destiny for Ethiopia's export items, reaching 13.3%. As it is presented by the Ethiopian Ministry of Trade and Industry, important trading items such as sesame, leather and leather products, coffee, horticultural products, incense, edible oil and many other have been exporting to China (H.Michael, 2013).

On the other hand, however, taking the fluctuation in the Chinese market in the following year of 2006, some analysts began to question the position of China as a dependable destination for Ethiopia's export items. According to the 2009 report made by the Ethiopian Economic Association (EEA), the 2005/06 China's 1<sup>st</sup> place slides to 7th place in 2007/08 taking only 4.3% of Ethiopia's export commodities. In addition, many scholars are also critical on the trade imbalance between Ethiopia and China. In 2012, for instance, Ethiopia's export to China was \$219 million while China export to Ethiopia was \$1.3

billion (Ethiopian Economics Association/Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute, 2009; Cheru, 2016).

Hence, together with working to maintain the opportunities obtained from the bilateral relations between Ethiopia and China, measures have to be taken to address the challenges above. Parallel to other reforms, Ethiopia has to take additional measures to diversify its export markets further. Extreme reliance on a limited number of foreign policy partners has its own economic as well as political drawbacks.

#### **4.3.2 Ethio-Indian Relations**

Post-Cold War era's proactive foreign policy measure of the Ethiopian government also helped it to maintain multi-dimensional cooperation with another strategic partner of the developing world: India. Like that of China and other emerging power of the global south, India provides maximum attention to the proliferation of the South-South Development Cooperation. India criticizes the uninclusive contemporary global political and economic order in which the interest of the developing countries is unfairly treated. In many international stages, India has been calling for the promotion of inclusive global order where African and Asian countries fairly represented.

It is from this perspective; India strives to enhance its socio-economic and political cooperation with Africa. Since recent times India has been taking series of measures which solidify the decade's old partnership with Africa. Measures which target to deepen the historical and civilizational links with the African continent have been introducing by Indian foreign policymakers especially during the last three decades. The rise of India's trade with Africa (excluding oil) from \$900 million in 1991 to \$30 billion in 2008 often noted as a good illustration of this remarkable rise (Cheru & Obi, Pambazuka News, 2016).

The ongoing bilateral relation between Ethiopia and India is also part of the aforementioned India's Africa policy. Many of the socio-economic, diplomatic and political relations between Ethiopia and India are excellent illustrations of the South-South Development Cooperation which is characterized by capacity building and knowledge transfer among other values.

Needless to mention that the broad and diversified contemporary engagement is benefitted from the 60 years formal diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and India. In 1997 the two

governments signed a Trade Agreement that laid the foundation for the rise of trade both in quantity as well as diversity during the next periods. A Joint Trade Committee (JTC) comprised of trade and foreign affairs ministries of the two countries was also formed by the same year. The joint committee is in charge to assess and effectively utilize the trade and investment opportunities both in Ethiopia and India. This economic cooperation between the two countries is further solidified by India's announcement of the Duty-Free Tariff Preference scheme (DFTP) for LDCs on April 2008 (Ethiopian Economics Association/Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute, 2009).

Between 1995 and 2012 bilateral trade between the two countries has raised from less than \$50 million to over \$890 million (Cheru, 2016). This increased India's contribution of Ethiopia's imports to 11%. Ethiopia's main exports to India are agricultural products such as cotton, pulses, spices, leather and leather products. This, on the other hand, led to a massive trade imbalance in favor of India (Ethiopian Economics Association/Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute, 2009).

Together with the bilateral trade relations, India has been providing economic assistance to Ethiopia that enables the latter to enhance its development projects. In 2006, for instance, the government of India disbursed \$65 million to support rural electrification projects. A year after India has granted its largest overseas credits, \$640 million to Ethiopia. This loan, which realized during the next five years, provided to expand Ethiopia's sugar industry. According to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development of Ethiopia (MoFED), in 2007/08 out of the total bilateral creditors, India's share was about 28% (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2010).

In addition to the financial assistance, India has also been offering technical supports which allow Ethiopia to build its human capital. The training program organized by the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) becomes an excellent platform for Ethiopian trainees to share valuable experiences in rural development and poverty reduction. Similarly, each year India has been providing scholarship opportunities for 50 Ethiopian students to follow their second and third-degree studies in various Indian Universities. This kind of cooperation laid the foundation for society to society relations by letting socio-cultural exchanges.



The Ethio-Indian bilateral relationship of the post-Cold War era is also substantiated by investment opportunities. The various incentives offered by the Ethiopian government to attract foreign investors since 2005 have also had its contribution to the dramatic increase in the number of Indian investors. Data obtained from the EIA indicates that between 1993 and 2004 more than 600 Indian companies took investment licenses. The total capital registered is \$4.7 billion. In fact, this figure seems overstated when it is compared with the number of projects in under-implementation and in operation with that of the pre-implementation stage. As Cheru (2016) commented, for instance, of the 624 registered projects, more than half are in the pre-implementation phase. As far as the sectoral distribution is concerned, almost half of the afore-mentioned investments are in the manufacturing and nearly quarter of them is in the agricultural sector. The remaining distributed in the service and construction industry.

On the other hand, however, Ethiopian government's incentives towards Indian private sector (especially in agriculture) have been facing sharp criticisms from local as well as international civil society groups. During the past decades, the Ethiopian government granted a total of 3.5 million hectares of lands to investors, out of this a significant portion is secured to Indian investors. In some instances, this land provision was made by evicting local farmers and pastoralists. Nevertheless, however, after taking a large tract of land many Indian investors had stayed for long without starting the actual agricultural activity. This finally obliged the Ethiopian government to take measures against those Indian investors in the agricultural sector. Accordingly, some large investors forced to give back portion of the granted land while others voluntarily left the area.

Despite the afore-mentioned diversified relationships between Ethiopia and the emerging powers, however, some analysts such as Thakur (2009), Gamora (2009) are critical of the impact of this cooperation in addressing the real interest of the Ethiopian masses. On their views, as it is the case in many other African countries the ongoing bilateral economic and political cooperation between Ethiopia and the rising powers targets the interest of the elites in Ethiopia. These scholars are concerned on the monopoly of Ethiopia's relations with China, India and other rising powers by few business and governing elites. If this is the case, the current relationship of Ethiopia with the emerging southern powers will lose its capacity to benefit the diverse social categories in the country which were also marginalized by the foreign policymaking of the previous regimes.

In summary, as compared with the previous regimes, the foreign policy behavior of the post-Cold War era Ethiopia's government has been characterized by series of efforts to diversify the country's foreign policy partners. This was and/or is by continuing relationships with the traditional partners and by cultivating strategic partnerships with emerging powers. These efforts of partner's diversification have had various short and long-term implications on the country's foreign policymaking:

1. It enables foreign policy decision makers to critically assess the opportunities that a given partner owns and to interact accordingly. The Ethiopian government has been engaging Western powers to attain its soft projects (democracy, good governance, human right) while cooperating with emerging powers to achieve its hard projects (road and railway construction, agriculture, telecommunication).
2. The effort to interact with diverse partners also has its implication to promote the socio-economic and political interest of the multiple stakeholders in Ethiopia. This strategy helps to improve the elite-centered foreign policymaking of the previous regimes.
3. On top of the gains mentioned above, working with diverse policy partners, in turn, paves the way for diversifying the actors, agenda, and instruments of Ethiopia's foreign policymaking that is presented in the next section of the thesis.

#### **4.4 Emerging Powers between an Opportunity and a Threat**

With the acceleration of emerging powers economic and political engagements, various contending arguments regarding the former's real intentions for being in Ethiopia and the wider Africa has been presented. Over the past decade, different assumptions that deal with the opportunities and/or threats posed by the emerging southern powers presence in Ethiopia and the wider Africa have raised. Policy analysts are expected to objectively assess the pros and cons regarding Ethiopia's economic and political engagements with the emerging southern powers. This objective analysis, in turn, paves the way for taking adequate policy amendments before things get out of control.

Although there are various classifications of these contending views, for the purpose of this study I broadly categorize them as skeptics and proponents of emerging southern

powers engagement in Ethiopia. The ongoing foreign policy diversification of Ethiopia also has seen from these perspectives.

Those who are in the skeptic camp sees the intentions of emerging southern powers existence in Ethiopia and the broader Africa as a strategy to exploit mineral wealth, monopolize raw material and exert political pressure to enhance their foreign policy agenda in various international stages. As Fox quoted it, Melber (2007), for instance, argued that “the Chinese penetration only presents the ugly face of predatory capitalism and the imperialist nature of China in Africa” (p. 556). In a similar fashion, French (2014) also asserted that China is responsible for the limited economic growth of many African countries. In his views, the Chinese government is aggressively working to attain its imperialist agenda by encouraging its citizens to migrate into Africa. French has referred Africa as ‘China’s second continent’ in order to emphasize the influence of the one million Chinese who flood into the various parts of Africa (French, 2014).

In fact, such kinds of critiques regarding the real motives behind emerging southern powers presence in Africa are not only forwarded by Western analysts. African experts have also been arguing the neo-colonialist discourse vis-à-vis the rise of emerging powers. According to Lamido Sanussi (2013), former Nigerian Central Bank governor, for example, contrary to the South-South Development Cooperation school of thought argues rising powers, especially Chinese engagement in Africa is not accompanied by skill transfer to the local communities. This is because Chinese contractors imported labor from home. Furthermore, the unbalanced trade between emerging powers and Africa in which the former takes raw materials and sells manufactured goods to the latter regarded as a manifestation of the neo-colonialist conjecture of this relationship (Sanussi, 2013).

Hence, for the skeptics emerging southern powers engagement has not any strategic importance for Africa’s political economy. Emerging powers haven’t any genuine effort of industrial development in Africa rather than exploiting the abundant raw materials and using the latter as a market destination for their export manufacturers.

The afore-mentioned essence of neo-colonialism has also served as a reference to analyze Ethiopia’s foreign policy diversification and especially its relations with emerging southern powers. According to this assumption, the economic and development assistance, investment and trade as well as technical and military support of the emerging powers to

Ethiopia are aimed to achieve the formers economic and political influence. Proponents of this view claimed that the prime objective of emerging powers entire engagements in Ethiopia is not to make the latter self-sufficient and achieve sustainable development.

In order to further elaborate their argument, the skeptics analyze Ethiopia's trade relations with China. The flood of Ethiopian markets with China's cheap consumer goods has devastated local consumer industries, as they argue. This severely constrains Ethiopia's effort to achieve its agriculture-led industry strategy (GebreEgziabher, 2007; Desta, 2009). Some of my informants also presented their concern on how emerging powers investment, especially on textile and footwear sectors, has fired labor intensive Ethiopian manufacturers from the local as well as the third market.

Together with the critiques on trade relations, in road and railway constructions local and some foreign firms have also been displaced by Chinese construction companies through meagre initial bid prices. This led to the monopoly of Chinese firms in many of Ethiopia's road and railway projects. The other critique of skeptics is that in some projects emerging powers, especially China, prefer to use workers from home than use local labor. This hampers the course of skill transfer for Ethiopian technicians (Thakur, 2009; Cheru, 2016).

On the other hand, the second camp argues that Ethiopia's socio-economic and political relationships with the emerging southern powers promise various opportunities to advocate its national interest. Although scholars of this camp acknowledge energy and market desires, they argue that limiting emerging powers motive only on these perspectives would be misleading. As it is noted by Alden, for instance, it is important to examine the expectations of the various African countries from their engagement with the emerging southern powers (Alden, 2005).

Contrary to that of the skeptics, proponents of this view claim that emerging powers engagement with Ethiopia and the wider Africa is on the basis of the South-South development cooperation that is characterized by equality and mutual benefit. As it is indicated in many policy guidelines, Africa's strategic engagement with emerging southern powers aims to maintain the common interest of both parties. The first Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which was held in 2000, for instance, marked the framework of China-Africa relationship as assisting Africa's agricultural development,

enhancing the health and education sector, developing Africa's infrastructure, and maintaining peace and security in Africa and cooperation on international forums.

Emerging powers engagement with Ethiopia is not motivated by the latter's deposit of oil and other strategic minerals. Unlike that of the two Sudan's, Angola or Nigeria, Ethiopia has not endowed with wealth above or below the ground (Cabestan, 2012). Rather, Ethiopia's huge population (expected to reach to 170 million in 2050), stable economy, its role as a stabilizing force in the most unstable Horn of Africa region and Addis Ababa's position as Africa's diplomatic capital attract the attention of emerging southern powers. And here also lies the logic of examining other motives of the emerging powers engagement with African countries like Ethiopia.

Proponents of Ethiopia's engagement with the emerging southern powers such as Cheru (2016), H.michael (2013) consider the various spheres of interactions to illustrate the strategic nature of the prevailing partnership. As far as the trade relationship is concerned, the rising demand for raw materials and the subsequent boost in price is of particular importance for Ethiopia. The economic growths in many emerging powers during the past decades have contributed to the increase in their appetite to commodities such as leather and leather products and cotton. The boost in the price of the commodities above has its positive impact on Ethiopia's economy.

Similarly, emerging powers foreign direct investment in Ethiopia is also another important manifestation of being a strategic partner. The FANSPS of the FDRE highlighted that conquering poverty is the prime objective of Ethiopia. The rural community, who constituted 85% of the country's population and lived in areas where insufficient infrastructures existed, is the primary victims of the prevailing poverty in Ethiopia. The task to conquer poverty and change the life standard of the rural community requires accomplishing persistent and massive development activities. Given the limited capacity of the government to do so, any foreign actor that has the willingness to invest in the desired developmental projects is a strategic partner for Ethiopia. The nature of the emerging southern powers engagements in road and railway construction also have to be examined from this perspective (Waal, 2013).

Furthermore, emerging powers, especially Chinese investment in the power generation and transmission sphere can also be taken as an important manifestation of Ethiopia's strategic

engagement with the rising powers. Although Ethiopia is regarded as the water tower of Africa, having a number of potential rivers for generating hydroelectric power, the majority people have no access to electricity. This is mainly because of the country's limited capacity to invest in it. Since recent time, however, massive power generation projects estimated about \$2 billion have been carried out, mainly with the support of the Chinese government. This enables Ethiopia to back its economic development by exporting electric power to neighbouring countries (H.Michael, 2013).

As far as the development assistance is concerned, the various training programs provided by emerging powers have strategic significance to develop the human capital of African countries including Ethiopia. Training in small-scale agricultural production and hydro-irrigation techniques organized by the Chinese government, for instance, enables to transfer valuable experiences to local farmers. In addition, China's technical support to build Africa's first railway Academy in Ethiopia is also another important strategic assistance to further expand the railway technology in Ethiopia and the wider Africa (Cheru, 2016)

The other important strategic significance of emerging powers engagement with African countries is the attention provided to give an institutional framework for this linkage. New institutional arrangements such as the BRICS<sup>10</sup>, IBSA<sup>11</sup>, BASIC<sup>12</sup>, AU, ASEAN<sup>13</sup>, SCO (Shangai Cooperation Organization), IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) and COMESA<sup>14</sup> are important frameworks to sustain the emerging socio-economic and political relations between countries of the global south. These new institutions facilitate policy coordination among emerging powers and African countries like Ethiopia (Stuenkel, 2015).

In general, the emerging southern powers have been endeavoring to promote their national interest by capitalizing on Ethiopia's socio-economic, political and diplomatic potential. This is the true nature of a strategic partner. On the other hand, many of the challenges raised by the skeptics camp obligate Ethiopia to see its relationship with the emerging southern powers in suspicion. And even in some instances to pause its foreign policy

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<sup>10</sup> Grouping that includes Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

<sup>11</sup> Grouping that includes India, Brazil and South Africa.

<sup>12</sup> Grouping that includes Brazil, South Africa, India and China.

<sup>13</sup> Association of South East Asian Nations.

<sup>14</sup> Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa.

diversification effort and restrict its socio-economic and diplomatic relationship with the emerging powers. In fact, it is unlikely to consider Ethiopia's relation with the emerging powers free from challenges. However, instead of limiting foreign relation, academicians and policymakers need to critically think possible options that enable Ethiopia to promote persistent and strategic engagements and thereby safeguard its economic and political interest.

To this effect, diversifying foreign policy partners and thereby enhancing its bargaining power on important economic and political matters can be one alternative among others. The prevailing international political economic system is also welcoming to do so. Unlike that of the Cold War and the immediate post-Cold War period, the current global system is not dominated by one or two camps. Instead, since the 1990s and especially the 2000s, we have been experiencing a multipolar international system in which emerging powers such as China, India, Brazil and Turkey become principal actors.

The multipolar arrangement of the international political economy, in turn, grants African countries such as Ethiopia to have alternative foreign policy partner to maintain its national interest. When the economic and political conditions of a given foreign policy partner become unfit to the national interest of developing countries such as Ethiopia, the latter will have an option to look for another actor that is ready to work for mutual benefits.

Together with this, in the contemporary multipolar international political economic system, there is a competition between established and emerging powers to secure their national interest. This competition assures developing countries like Ethiopia better position to maintain its economic and political interest. Furthermore, as proponents of the South-South Cooperation argue the rivalry among emerging powers themselves, in their relations with Africa, has also its importance for countries such as Ethiopia to secure its demand.

Hence, instead of extreme reliance on few countries and limit its foreign policy partners, Ethiopia has to work proactively and maintain a comprehensive foreign policy diversification scheme. This assists the effort to preserve its national interest on the one hand and acquires a strategic foreign policy partner on the other. By strategic foreign policy partners, it is to refer those actors who are responsive to the real societal interests. This is against to the elite-dominated socio-economic and political benefit which was

central during the past several decades Western-centric Ethiopia's foreign policy decision making.

Moreover, the voices of neo-colonialism especially those coming from the West lack sincerity. This is because the critiques are stemmed from the tendency to consider the emerging southern actor's engagements in Africa as a danger to the economic, culture and geopolitics dominance of the traditional Western powers. In some instances, the growing influence of rising powers, especially China, in Africa is regarded as a threat to the national interest of the US and its allies (Cheru, 2016). Hence, the policy recommendations derived from such an interest-based view cannot be in favor of the African masses.

#### **4.5 Ethiopia's Relations with Neighboring Countries**

Together with the established and emerging powers, a proper understanding of the post-Cold War era foreign policy partner diversification of Ethiopia obliges to evaluate its relationship with countries of the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia has had long-standing socio-cultural, historical, economic and political ties with Horn of Africa countries. There are two perspectives concerning in the states that comprised the Horn of Africa region. In its restricted sense, the Horn of Africa region consists of countries such as Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, and Eritrea. However, the broader definition of the area includes Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan and sometimes Uganda (Klosowicz, 2015). For the purpose of this study, a broad definition of the Horn of Africa is applied.

As it is indicated in the foreign policy and national security document of the EPRDF, Ethiopia's past relationship with countries of the Horn is characterized by both friendship and hostility. This reality has had its impact on the nature and structure of Ethiopia's foreign policy towards the Horn. The past Ethiopian government's foreign policies and strategies which were founded on 'siege mentality' (regarding Ethiopia as a country surrounded by enemies) is a good illustration in this respect (FANSPS, 2002).

Although it is evident that there were and/or are regional powers which inspect Ethiopia's development as a threat to their national interest, it is also naive to define all neighboring countries as a threat. This kind of hasty generalization that dominates Ethiopia's past foreign policy and strategy of the Horn of Africa severely constrained the socio-economic and political benefit that the former could get from its neighbors. Instead, such emotional



external relations approach further provoked mistrust and suspicion between Ethiopia and its neighbors.

Foreign policy commentators have noted numerous internal and external factors which are responsible for the past hostile relations between countries of the Horn of Africa. Among these possible dynamics, the nature of the regime type and its influence in the foreign policy decision making of the Horn of African countries is worth to mention. In the immediate post-independence period, in almost all countries of the Horn political power was residing in the hands of authoritarian regimes. The foreign policy agendas formulated by these governments were extremely elite-dominated. Instead of enhancing economic and political cooperation among regional powers, past foreign policies of Horn of African countries aimed to secure the interest of one state at the expense of the other. This, in turn, aggravated interventionist tendencies in inter-state relations of the Horn of Africa. As Mesfin (2010) commented,

Sponsoring subversive activities had merely become a customary tool poised to destabilize and endanger the security of another state, in what some observers called the time-honoured principle of my enemy's enemy is my friend extending throughout the Horn of Africa (p. 11).

This illustrates the magnitude of Horn of African states interference in the affairs of one another. When we see past Ethiopia's relations with Sudan, for instance, for decades the two regimes were persistently supporting rebel movements. When Sudan supported anti-government movements in Ethiopia, the latter responded by arming the Sudan People's Liberation Army. The same was true in the post-1974 Ethiopia's regime relations with Somalia (Mesfin, 2010).

Together with the nature of the regimes, external factors also influence past Ethiopia's connection with countries of the Horn of Africa. In this perspective, inter-state relations in the region were further complicated by the interference of external powers, which have had their own economic and political agendas. The East-West rivalry of the Cold War era to maintain their presence in the strategic Horn of Africa region and the subsequent proxy war between Ethiopia and Somalia is a case in point (Mantzikos, 2010).

The Horn of Africa region is known for its extraordinary geo-economic and political importance. The location of the Horn across the Arabian Peninsula and near the Strait of Bab al-Mandeb makes it a prime location for international trade, especially in gas and oil

transportation. According to some reports between 3.5 - 4 million barrels of oil passed through the Bab al-Mandeb on a daily basis (Ryan, 2015). Besides, through the Suez Canal, the Horn intersects Southeast Asia and the Persian Gulf with the West.

Hence, to secure their economic and political interest Western as well as non-Western powers seek to maintain their presence in the region. This rivalry, in turn, affected foreign policy decision making among regional powers themselves as well as in their relationships with global forces.

In general, the nature of the regime and the subsequent external forces interference adversely affected Ethiopia's past socio-economic and political relations with countries of the Horn of Africa.

On the other hand, however, the end of the Cold War brought significant developments on the political economy of the Horn of African countries. In 1991 the seventeen years military dictatorship in Ethiopia was substituted by the EPRDF. By the same year, Siad Barre's government of Somalia collapsed due to internal resistance. This was accompanied by the unilateral declaration of independence of North West Somalia, known as Somaliland. In 1993 Eritrea achieved its independence from Ethiopia. In Sudan also a new Islamic government led by Omar al-Bashir came to power (Woodward, 2006).

The 1991 regime change in Ethiopia has had a direct implication on the nature and structure of the country's relations with the Horn. As it is indicated in the FANSPP of the EPRDF, foreign policymakers abandoned emotion and started to assess Ethiopia's national interest vis-a-vis its immediate neighbors consciously. In place of the long-survived regional mistrust, the new regime in Ethiopia has been endeavoring to maintain mutual economic and political relationship with its neighbors. In achieving that, Addis Ababa used different mechanisms other than force. Post-1991 Ethiopia took the initiative to put on diplomatic processes as a better strategy to maintain state's national interest. Given its symbolic role as a founding member of the UN, the AU and other regional organizations, Ethiopia is expected to play this role.

As Klosowicz notes it, Ethiopia's impressive economic growth and political stability during the post-Cold War era, especially since the 2000's, adds to its reputation in the Horn of Africa as well as across the continent. From 2003/04 – 2012/13 Ethiopia's

economy experienced an average growth of 10.8% per year while the regional average was 5.3% (Klosowicz, 2015). The afore-mentioned growing economic potential was accompanied by the significant development of the country's infrastructure, especially road and railway networks. This, in turn, enabled Ethiopia to diversify its relations with countries of the Horn of Africa.

In this perspective, the constructions of roads which facilitate Ethiopia's overland links with countries such as Sudan and Kenya have had a significant implication on the regional political economy. Besides, the renewal of the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway line further crystallizes the diversification of Ethiopia's relations with neighboring countries. As some reports indicate, 90-95% of landlocked Ethiopia's import-export conducted via the port of Djibouti. This cooperation between Ethiopia and Djibouti especially strengthened following the 1998-2000 Ethio-Eritrean war that abandoned the former use of ports of the latter (Styan, 2013). Furthermore, there is an ongoing negotiation between Ethiopia and Djibouti to construct a pipeline for water supply of the later. The realization of these and other similar projects further consolidate the bilateral relationship between the two states.

Similarly the production and export of oil in Sudan have had an important implication on the nature of post-Cold War era Ethio – Sudan relations. As it is noted by Verhoeven (2011), Ethiopia has been importing about 85% of its oil from Sudan. Together with oil, Ethiopia and Sudan also agreed to mutually benefit from their water resources through constructing irrigation and hydroelectric infrastructures.

As it is commented by Tadesse (2004), post-Cold War Ethiopia is well positioned to exploit its water resources and generate hydro-electric power properly. Parallel to addressing its local demand, Ethiopia planned to export electricity to its neighboring countries such as Djibouti, Sudan, Kenya and South Sudan. Using its rivers and waterfalls, Ethiopia has the capacity to generate up to 45,000mw of electricity. Ethiopia has been continuing the effort to maximize its hydroelectric generating capacity to 17,000mw by 2020 (Girma, 2017).

Furthermore, Ethiopia has also signed a cooperation agreement with Somalia. As regional analysts noted, this agreement will ease the past hostile relationship between the two states. Addis Ababa is also taking measures to enhance its trade relationship with Mogadishu. According to the World Integrated Trade Solution (2015) report, between 1995 and 2015,

for instance, Somalia becomes the third top export destination of Ethiopia next to Germany and China. This also made Somalia the number one export partner of Ethiopia as compared with the other countries of the Horn. Together with other trading items, Somalia has a huge demand for cereals and other farming products. This is strategically important for a country like Ethiopia whose principal export items are agricultural commodities.

Hence, the afore-mentioned strong economic cooperation highlights post-Cold War era Ethiopia's foreign policy diversification scheme with countries of the Horn of Africa. Unlike that of the previous regimes, post-1991 Ethiopia's government has benefitted from its economic diplomacy strategy to promote a win-win relationship with regional powers. The current relatively stable relationship between countries of the Horn is induced by the widespread strong economic interest among regional powers. As a result, Ethiopian foreign policymakers need to act to consolidate regional economic cooperation and integration further consciously.

Together with the state to state interaction, foreign policy decision makers have also shown priority to establish a platform that will enhance regional cooperation and integration. In this perspective, IGAD served as an important arrangement in substantiating post-Cold War Ethiopia's foreign policy diversification. As Maru comments it; "IGAD is a key regional institution through which Ethiopia pursues its regional objectives" (Maru, 2014).

IGAD was organized by eight East African states namely: Uganda, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, South Sudan and Eritrea in 1996. The founding fathers of IGAD asserted maintenance of regional cooperation and integration by culminating violent conflicts and instabilities as a grand mission of the organization. In addition, the forum also aims to harmonize efforts that will assure persistent socio-economic and political developments in the region (Klosowicz, 2015).

Ethiopia, as a founding member of the UN and AU, has real experiences on how to promote its national interest using international and regional organizations. As part of its post-Cold War era foreign policy diversification, Ethiopia has invested a lot to strengthen the financial as well as the organizational competency of IGAD. Ethiopia accepts symbolic responsibility to work proactively with member countries and realize IGAD's initiatives of regional peace and development. In achieving this, Ethiopia needs to focus on economic and trade diplomacy with IGAD member countries.

Despite the above-noted economic and political cooperation between countries of the Horn, however, the human and material resource allocated by the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not balanced. While a number of diplomats and supporting staffs are assigned to those countries where Ethiopia has limited economic and political interest, Ethiopian embassies in the Horn of Africa have been suffered from inadequate human and material resources (Maru, 2014). This severely limits the socio-economic, political and diplomatic gains Ethiopia can get from its neighbors. Hence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs needs to reconsider its financial and human resources to enhance the opportunities Ethiopia could exploit from its relationship with Horn of African countries.



## CHAPTER V

### 5 DIVERSIFYING ETHIOPIA'S FOREIGN POLICY ACTORS, AGENDAS AND TOOLS

#### 5.1 Comprehensive Foreign Policy Diversification

A glimpse on the evolution of Ethiopia's external relations presents the significant changes in the nature and structure of the country's foreign policy. These changes become so quick, especially in the post-Cold War period. As it is highlighted in the previous section of the study, Ethiopia has been striving to diversify its foreign policy partners using the relative domestic political stability and the change in the international political economy of the post-Cold War era. This effort has enabled Ethiopia to consolidate its relationship with the established, emerging and neighboring states as well.

In fact, the effort to diversify Ethiopia's foreign policy partner was not started by the current regime. Former governments such as the military and feudal regimes had also been endeavoring to seize new external relations partners. However, these efforts of the past regimes hardly contribute to the maintenance of the real societal interest. This was mainly because; former governments' efforts to diversify foreign policy partners were not substantiated by well-articulated agendas, adequate policy instruments and appropriate actors. In short, the diversification schemes were not comprehensive.

Unfortunately, with all its persuasive arguments regarding the rationale, objectives and priorities, the Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy Strategy document of the EPRDF also deprived to argue the role of diversifying foreign policy actors, tools and agendas to maintain the stated national interest. Hence, as some foreign policy analysts claim, like that of its predecessors the current foreign policy and strategy of Ethiopia hardly contribute to addressing the socio-economic and political expectation of the masses adequately.

As one of my informant (former Ethiopian Ambassador in Saudi Arabia) commented, although there are remarkable achievements during the past two decades in increasing the number of Ethiopian Embassies and consulate offices in different parts of the world, these efforts were not substantiated by allocating skilled workforce. To quote him "we had been

waiting for years to get a diplomat who can properly communicate using the Arabic language." The absence of such skilled personnel negatively affects the socio-economic, political and diplomatic interests Ethiopia could get from its external relations.

A notable neo-pluralist Norman (2010) asserted that the existence of various interest groups in a given society led to the prevalence of diverse socio-economic and political expectations. The course of addressing these multiple anticipations necessitates maintenance of diversified approaches in public policymaking. Hence, as it strives to diversify partners, a successful foreign policy and strategy need to provide equal attention to pluralize and strengthen foreign policy agendas, instruments and actors. This is because, for a state to have a win-win interaction with diverse foreign policy partners, it has to benefit from the following three crucial elements. Firstly it should employ multiple actors, which constitute a state, non-state and sub-state actors. Secondly, it has to apply various foreign policy tools, which combine hard and soft instruments. And thirdly plural social, cultural, economic and political agendas, which target the interest of the masses, have to be entertained.

This is the real essence of foreign policy diversification that enables the current Ethiopian government to exploit the country's foreign policy potentials effectively. The EPRDF government can maintain a strategic partnership with its traditional as well as emerging partners by keeping the balance of the above-noted essential ingredients of foreign policymaking.

Furthermore, the contemporary international environment also requires the need to maintain comprehensive foreign policy diversification. In the current global context, states experience compelling socio-economic and political interests. They have been striving to achieve multiple agendas, by communicating with diverse actors and through employing plural instruments. Hence, for Ethiopia also to be fit and survive in this incredibly dynamic international environment, it has to diversify its foreign policy approaches. Unless otherwise the current foreign policies and strategies of Ethiopia lose its credit to safeguard the real interest of the masses.

## 5.2 Agenda Diversification

Agendas determine the very nature and structure of foreign policy of a given country. This is because the primary purpose of formulating any public policy is to execute particular agendas. As foreign policy analysts highlight, various governmental and non-governmental bodies have direct and/or indirect influences on the making of foreign policy agendas. Together with the different governmental organs, which are formally in charge to carve policies, media agencies, elites, research institutes, opposition political groups and the wider public have their influences in setting and diversifying policy agendas. In fact, the active involvement of the above-noted actors in setting and diversifying foreign policy agendas is determined by public awareness and existing political culture of the given political community.

The nature of one's social, cultural, economic, political, diplomatic, and environmental agendas in one way or another influence the type of partners which are ready to cooperate on these issues and the means to execute them. Hence, when a given state has multiple agendas in its foreign policy, this potentially led it to interact with the various state as well as non-state actors and to utilize compound instruments.

Furthermore, unlike that of domestic policy issues, foreign policy agendas execute in an environment that is not controlled by the country that established the agendas. Hence, in the course of setting foreign policy agendas, it is also essential to consider the socio-economic and political priorities of the potential external relations partners. Here also lies the need to diversify foreign policy agendas concerning the interest and expectation of one's external relations partners.

In most of the past Ethiopian regimes, the participation of the media organs, intellectuals, research organizations and the broader public in setting the country's foreign policy agenda was insufficient. It was almost unlikely to reconcile the interest and priority of the public with that of the economic and political elites. Hence, foreign policy agendas were often dominated by the benefit of the governing elites while societal priorities take aside. Security-related issues were frequently on the table. Those socio-cultural and economic agendas, which sometimes bring to the table, never considered the identity of the various social categories existing in the country.



It is due to this fact, the various agreements former Ethiopian governments signed with the traditional partners and the subsequent support barely contributed to improving the living standard of the Ethiopian masses. Instead, they were exploited to strengthen the socio-economic and political positions of particular groups. In some instances, the above-noted type of policy agenda-setting led to disagreements among the various nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia. This, in turn, severely constrained the country's political and economic development.

The FANSPS of Ethiopia (2002) asserts the main agenda of the country's external relations as to assure national development and build a democratic political system. These economic and political agendas are broad in nature, and they encompass diverse issues. The document provides maximum attention to economic agendas and articulates the need to utilize external relations as a means to address the abject poverty and economic underdevelopment. In doing so, during the past decades, the country has been undertaking economic diplomacy as its number one foreign policy agenda. In its relation with countries, regional organizations, MNCs etc., Ethiopia exerts its utmost effort to identify investment opportunities, markets and grants and loans.

As reports on Ethiopia's foreign policy and its achievements between 2002 and 2012 highlight, economic interests such as market opportunities, investment and tourist attractions and technical and financial support as top priorities of the country's foreign policy agendas (Ethiopia's Foreign Policy and its Achievements, 2012). Hence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Diplomatic Missions of Ethiopia have budgeted much of their human and financial resources in the field of economic diplomacy. The ministry has highlighted the crucial role that economic diplomacy plays to promote the country's economic interest abroad and thereby successfully achieve its development goals.

Using international trade fairs and exhibitions, Ethiopian diplomats have made persistent efforts to promote the country's export products. This coordinated effort has resulted in the rise in the demand for Ethiopia's products such as livestock and livestock products, oilseeds and pulses, cotton, flowers etc. in the global market. This subsequently led to the increase in the amount of the country's export revenue. In 2011 Ethiopia's total annual foreign currency obtained from foreign trade has reached more than 2 billion USD from less than 500 million USD in 1997.

The particular attention given by policymakers to diversify the country's foreign policy agendas by promoting economic cooperation has had a significant role in the rapid developments Ethiopia has been passing through. Also, the focus post-Cold War Ethiopia has provided to economic diplomacy also facilitates the provision of adequate attention to other strategic sectors such as road and railway networks. The development of infrastructures has had direct implications on enhancing Ethiopia's import-export sector.

Tadesse (2004) in his assessment of post-Cold War Ethiopia's relations with neighboring states also asserts the prominent role of economic agendas. Cooperation in energy, port services, transport and other strategic sectors has a potential role in maintaining regional peace and thereby grant long-term economic developments.

Apart from foreign trade, post-Cold War Ethiopia's foreign policymaking also provides attention to attract foreign investment and thus assist the country's development goals. In this perspective, the Ethiopian diplomatic missions and diplomats have been engaged in promoting the various investment opportunities in the country and the favorable policy environment for foreign investors.

As part of the economic cooperation, the ministry of foreign affairs prioritizes those investments which are labor intensive (capable of consuming available human resources) rather than capital intensive. Furthermore, foreign investments which support the rise of Ethiopia's export trade by adding value to agricultural products and producing industrial goods were also encouraged by Ethiopian diplomatic mission. Using different modes of communication such as attending international trade fairs, business conferences and by organizing forums abroad, the diplomatic missions have exerted massive efforts to promote the investment opportunities in Ethiopia. Zeray (2016) highlighted the essential opportunities presented by the Ethiopian diplomatic missions to attract the potential foreign investor to Ethiopia "... prevalence of secured political and economic environment, abundant and affordable labor, proximity to international markets particularly to Asia and Europe, improved infrastructure and competitive incentive packages".

Together with attracting foreign investors, the diplomatic missions have organized events in which Ethiopian investor's dialogue with their foreign counterparts to invest jointly. In this perspective, the joint investments of Ethiopian businesspeople with their Chinese and Indian counterparts are worth to mention (Cheru, 2016).

The above-noted organized agenda diversification efforts of the past two decades made Ethiopia as the third largest foreign direct investment destination in Africa next to Nigeria and South Africa. A report obtained from the EIA has noted that Ethiopia's annual foreign direct investment has reached more than 2 billion USD. Indonesian Ambassador to Ethiopia Imam Santoso also commented that "Ethiopia has become Africa's prime foreign direct investment destination attracting business from across the world" (Zeray, 2016).

In comparison with that of domestic investment, foreign investment has accounted a significant portion of the capital flow. Out of the total investment projects licensed by Ethiopian government from 1991-2011, 85.5% of them are owned by foreign investors. This is a good illustration of how Ethiopia can promote its national interest by maintaining a comprehensive foreign policy agenda diversification.

The other important manifestation of post-Cold War Ethiopia's foreign policy agenda diversification is in the Tourism sector. Together with accelerating foreign trade and foreign direct investments, the economic diplomacy of the past two decades has had a valuable contribution in attracting foreign tourists towards Ethiopia. Although Ethiopia is a home for rich sociocultural and historical heritages, during the previous regimes, the tourism sectors contribution to attract foreign visitors and thereby assist the national development was insufficient. This was mainly because of weak national tourism development policies and lack of skilled manpower that can manage, promote and market the real tangible and intangible heritage of the country.

The various economic and political reforms in Ethiopia since the 1990s, however, have had direct and indirect influences on the rise of the tourism sector and its contribution to the country's development strategy. In this regard, the efforts of the Ethiopian diplomatic missions to promote and market the major tourist attraction sites of the country have had a significant role in accelerating the number of foreign tourists visiting Ethiopia. According to a report made prepared by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, around a million tourists annually come to Ethiopia from different countries of the world including China,

America, Canada, England, Germany, India etc. This is a dramatic increase as compared to less than 200,000 visitors in 2004 (Kidane-mariam, 2015).

From 2007-2012 Ethiopia has earned around \$ 948 million from the tourism sector and in the next five year, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism has planned to secure more than 1.6 billion USD (Ethiopia's Foreign Policy and its Achievements, 2012). Hence, by incorporating the tourism sector in the economic diplomacy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the diplomatic mission have played an important role in the national development.

In fact, there is a gap between the rhetoric of foreign trade, foreign direct investment and tourism industry and its implication in changing the life condition of the Ethiopian masses. Various research findings reveal the prevalence of mass poverty, high rate of unemployment and seasonal and chronic food insecurity that affect the lives of millions of people in the country.

On the other hand, however, despite the efforts mentioned above of the MoFA and the diplomatic mission in promoting economic diplomacy, there are critical limitations in conducting these negotiations using skilled manpower. Trained manpower in the area of economic diplomacy is essential to efficiently assure Ethiopia's interest in the current competitive global environment. Nevertheless, however, the economic attaches who have been engaging in those countries, which are strategically important for Ethiopia's development agendas, are not well trained (Addis Fortune, 2013). This severely constrains Ethiopia to exploit its potential in attracting FDI and foreign trade fully.

Together with maintaining rapid development, assisting the effort to establish a democratic system is the other important foreign policy agenda of the post-Cold War Ethiopia. During the past authoritarian regimes, the various nations, nationalities and religious groups of Ethiopia were unfairly represented in the country's political economy. Important economic and political decisions were made without considering the interest of the various social categories in the country. This endangered the unity and integrity of the state. Instead, it led to protracted ethno-religious conflicts of the past several decades.

Taking into consideration the adverse impact of the authoritarian regime against the economic and political well-being, public policymaking of the post-Cold War Ethiopia highlights a democratic order. Similarly, the FANSPS also asserts democracy as a prime foreign policy agenda. As part of the strategy to look the outside from inside, the document emphasizes the need to address domestic problems often caused by violations of individuals and groups human and democratic rights. During the previous regimes, the interests of the various social and religious categories in Ethiopia were not equally treated. They marginally participated in setting domestic as well as foreign policy agendas. These severely constrained citizen's commitment to ensuring their country's overall well-being. In most instances, such internal discontents and divisions paved the way for the interferences of external powers, which in some cases endangered the survival of the state.

Hence, to assure Ethiopia's security and territorial integrity, maintaining a democratic order that secure individuals and groups socio-economic and political right is critical. Post-Cold War Ethiopia's FANSPS also underlines the significance of affirming good governance to mobilize the various social categories around a common goal of maintaining a developed and stable Ethiopia. "In the absence of a democratic order, national and religious divisions will invariably intensify, the abuse of human rights would result in strife, and poverty would spread further – a recipe for disintegration and destruction" (FANSPS, 2002, p. 6). By doing so, post-Cold War Ethiopia's foreign policy asserted maintenance of individuals and people's rights as its main agenda.

Nevertheless, however, some foreign policy analysts argue the gap between the rhetoric of assuring the human and democratic rights of the various nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia and the practice. In his assessment of post-Cold War era, Ethiopia's foreign policy Fenta (2009) asserts this discrepancy. Instead of promoting society-dominated foreign policy formulation and implementation, the government still favors a state-dominated approach that marginalizes the economic and political interest of the Ethiopian masses. For Woldemariam (2009), the terrible human right record of the FDRE government is a proper manifestation of the gap between the policy rhetoric and the practice in considering human and democratic rights as a prime foreign policy agenda.

On the other hand, the limited attention provided to the interest of the ordinary people potentially endangers the unity and territorial integrity of Ethiopia. Hence, together with other agendas, the foreign policy and strategy of post-Cold War Ethiopia need to take practical measures to constitute human security.

Together with the afore-mentioned issues, a comprehensive foreign policy agenda diversification scheme demands to consult the role of socio-cultural matters on the relations among nations. In our contemporary cases, socio-cultural characteristics have been playing a central role to harness political and economic solidarities among various nations. As it is commented by Liland (1993); “it is increasingly acknowledged that culture matters in the way states deal with one another” (p. 5).

Although Ethiopia is a home for more than 80 nations, nationalities and peoples, the effort to utilize these diverse socio-cultural characteristics as a foreign policy resource was extremely limited. During the past regimes, these diverse entities prevented equal opportunities to promote themselves. This, in turn, negatively affected the role of the various socio-cultural, religious and linguistic groups to effectively integrate Ethiopia with another state as well as non-state actors having a similar identity. Hence, the lack of political will of the past governing elites marginalized the contribution of the various socio-cultural entities of Ethiopia in the country's foreign policymaking.

Despite the constitutional provision of the FDRE, there are still challenges which hinder the active participation of the various socio-cultural groups in the country's political economy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for instance, has provided limited attention to socio-cultural characteristics in conducting economic and political diplomacies with its strategic foreign policy partners. A good manifestation of this claim is the marginalized human and material resources provided to cultural diplomacies. Besides, in assigning ambassadors and other staffs of the diplomatic mission, socio-cultural contexts of the host country rarely analyzed. As one of my informants commented, the effort of the MoFA to study, document and utilize the identity markers of the various socio-cultural categories of Ethiopia for diplomacy purpose is near to none.

By carefully examining the increasing role of socio-cultural values in the relations among nations, the MoFA and its diplomatic missions have to proactively engage to utilize the diverse ethnic, religious and linguistic groups in Ethiopia to promote the country's national interest. In doing so, the ministry has to budget enough resource to promote the various socio-cultural identity markers of Ethiopian nation, nationalities and peoples internationally. Together with this, the government should avail the required institutional supports for these groups to effectively integrate themselves and their nation with countries and peoples having similar socio-cultural characteristics.

### **5.3 Actor Diversification**

One of the major limitations of past Ethiopia's foreign policymaking was its state-centric nature. During the feudal regime of Emperor Haileselesie, for instance, the task to formulate and implement foreign policy was dominated by governmental actors. As it is commented by Abota (2002), during the monarchic rule of Haileselesie important foreign policy decisions were made under the close supervision of the Emperor himself and officials who were very close to him. Similarly, during the military regime, the task of deciding the nature and structure of the country's foreign policy was monopolized by government actors. Senior officials of the military regime, who had limited perceptions of the country's national interest, were in charge to take decisions of having a long-term impact on the nation's political economy.

In general, in both the feudal and military regime the role of non-governmental actors in setting the agenda and instrument of Ethiopia's foreign policy was severely constrained. Besides, governmental organs other than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also had only a marginal role in molding the content and behavior of the country's external relations. Hence, during the past Ethiopian governments, the effort to diversify the foreign policy actors and thereby enhance the country's national interest had got limited attention.

On the other hand, however, foreign policy analysts argue the emerging role of non-governmental actors in informing, shaping and directing relations among nations. As Alden and Aran conceptualize, one of the leading features of the globalizing world is the increasing involvement of non-state actors such as MNCs, NGOs, think tanks and individual activists in various transnational affairs. This, in turn, resulted in the influence of private actors in determining the outcomes of foreign policies.

Hence, the contemporary global political economy necessitates the need to effectively link governmental actors with that of the non-governmental to formulate and implement a foreign policy that is responsive to real societal interests. Here lies the logic of promoting a comprehensive foreign policy diversification that also assures the role and participation of non-governmental actors.

The above-noted global dynamics also has had its influence on the role of private actors in the post-Cold War Ethiopia's foreign policy decision making. Although the constitution of the FDRE granted the authority to formulate foreign policy to the federal government, the FANSPS highlights the role of non-governmental actors in policy implementation. Article 51(8) of the FDRE constitution, under the powers and functions of the federal government, presents as: "It (federal government) shall formulate and implement foreign policy; it shall negotiate and ratify international agreements" (Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1995, p. 18).<sup>15</sup>

On the other hand, the FANSPS highlights the importance of utilizing the emerging non-governmental actors to implement the country's foreign policy successfully. Among the various socio-economic and political developments of post-Cold War Ethiopia, the proliferation of institutions in different sectors is worth to mention. In this respect, the spread of higher education and the opening of new universities in different corners of the country have resulted in the rise of intellectuals who specialize in Ethiopia's foreign policymaking. This, in turn, paved the way for the development of research institutes which conduct policy-relevant studies.

Since recent times the findings of these universities and research institutes have started to influence the country's foreign policy decision making. As it is noted in the FANSPS (2002, p. 53) "The role higher educational institutions and scholars play in enriching policies and implementing them is crucial" (2002, p. 53). One of my interviewee, who is the director of the Policy Research Analysis Department (PORAD)-internal think tank of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs- commented the recently developing linkage between the ministry and independent research institutes. The director presented the joint research

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<sup>15</sup> In fact, there have been various changes on the exclusive power of the federal government on foreign relations. Since recent times regional governments are also becoming actors in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. Regional governments started to sign bilateral agreements in the area of trade, investment, culture, aid, training and other capacity-building projects (Assefa, 2012).



undertakings PORAD has been conducting with local and international think tanks, analysts and academia. And, foreign policymakers (who are busy with daily routines) informed with different policy options and recommendations, which have long-term and strategic significance to the country's national interest.

PORAD also organizes forums to present and discuss its research findings and get valuable insight from researchers and diplomatic community. In this regard, PORAD's effort to work together with former members of the diplomatic community enables to address the gap between the knowledge and practice of socio-cultural, economic and political diplomacy. One of my interviewee, former Ethiopian ambassador in Saudi Arabia, for instance, has been involving in policy related researches. He underlined how the practical experiences of ex-diplomats provide valuable insights on the country's foreign policy behavior.

The Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development (EIIPD) is the other important research and think tank institution. It is a semi-governmental institute founded in 1996. The center actively works to inform and influence Ethiopian foreign policy decision making. Together with this EIIPD also conducts policy-relevant studies which contribute to the maintenance of sustainable peace and development in the Horn of Africa. One of my interviewee, a senior researcher at EIIPD, commented that the center has striven to help Ethiopia to enhance friendly and cooperative relations with its neighbors including Eritrea. In many of his writings, he highlights the role of public diplomacy in settling disputes and tensions in the conflict-ridden Horn of Africa. EIIPD is also active in organizing important forums on the issues of diplomacy, peace and development. By inviting prominent researchers who specialize in the Ethiopian region and the Horn of Africa, the center works to inform foreign policy decision makers.

Another important manifestation of the increasing presence of intellectuals and research institutes in influencing and shaping the country's foreign policymaking is the Forum for Social Studies (FSS). This independent think tank group was established in 1999 with the aim of promoting constructive dialogue and partnership between the government and non-governmental actors. Together with other economic and political issues, FSS has been engaging in democratizing the foreign policy decision making of the country. In many of its forums, issues related to the pros and cons of Ethiopia's engagement with the

established and emerging powers are critically analyzed. The nature of Ethiopia's diplomacy of the past regimes and its lesson to the current regime is also discussed by foreign members of the diplomatic community.

The other important think tank group with massive influence on the behavior of Ethiopia's external relations is the Ethiopian Economic Association (EEA). EEA was established as a professional association in 1991. Focusing on economic researches, EEA has been providing critical policy recommendations on how can Ethiopia maintain its national interest in a sustainable manner. The implications of the ongoing economic diplomacy in addressing poverty and securing the economic and political wellbeing of the Ethiopian masses are also among the major interest areas of the association.

These are some of the emerging think tanks and research institutes in Ethiopia that are engaged in conducting foreign policy-related studies. As it is commented by some of my informants, however, since recent times governmental restrictions and interferences have become critical on the independence of think tanks and research institutes. There are various forms of governmental sanctions on the issues think tanks investigate as well as the research findings they propagate to the broader community. These restrictions have a serious impact on the delivery of alternative foreign policy ideas and implementation. In fact, the effect of the afore-mentioned sanction varies according to the organizational capacity of the think tanks. Those research institutes which are staffed with prominent scholars can conduct researches on critical economic and political matters and disseminate their outputs using various mechanisms.

Together with research institutes and think tanks, the rise of the media has important implication in shaping foreign policymaking of a given country. The spread of internet, print media, radio and television have a substantial role in facilitating communication between the public and policymakers. This, in turn, contributes to the making of an informed policy that targets the interest of the masses.

In the Ethiopian perspective, the role of media to promote citizens participation in the affairs of their country has remained marginal. For the last several decades, the state-run Ethiopia Radio and Television served as the only source of information for most of the country's population. Hence, the role of the radio and television media, which is entirely

monopolized by the state, to disseminate alternative ideas and inform the country's foreign policymaking has remained negligible.

During the last ten years, Ethiopia has witnessed increasing number of radio broadcasting. Several radio stations (most of them are FM and short waves) secured the license and started their operation. However, since many of these radios are commercial, they have shown limited interest to propagate policy-related topics. As a result, their implication in enhancing the participation of the public in the economic and political affairs of the nation is extremely limited.

In this respect, those radio stations, owned by foreign governments, such as the Voice of America (VOA) and Deutsche Welle (DW) have better coverage towards Ethiopia's external relations. These radios have better opportunity to present both the views of the ruling government and opposition groups. Experts from home and abroad, who have different outlooks regarding Ethiopia's foreign policymaking, are invited and discuss how the policymaking affects the national interest. Issues such as the role of the Ethiopian diaspora to link home with the external world, regional dynamics and its implication on Ethiopia's national interest, etc. are among the issues with extensive coverage. Using major languages such as Amharic, Oromiffa, Tigrigna these radios serve as a source of alternative ideas to both the public as well as foreign policy decision makers.

Besides to the audiovisual, print media has also its role to inform and shape post-Cold War Ethiopia's foreign policymaking. The newly approved press law of the immediate post-1991 period provided relative freedom to write and discuss on the country's socio-economic and political affairs. Together with other issues, Ethiopia's foreign policy behavior was also a major point of analysis in many newspapers and magazines. The independence of Eritrea from Ethiopia in 1993 and emergence of the latter as a landlocked country was one of the hot and debatable issues in many newspapers and other print media. In Addis Ababa and other major regional cities, opposition groups used newspapers as an important vehicle to channel their foreign policy option to the public. This information had a serious impact on the results of the contentious 2005 Ethiopian parliamentary elections.

Nevertheless, however, the relative press freedom of the post-military regime in Ethiopia started to decline following the contentious parliamentary election of 2005. A report presented by the International Press Institute (IPI) and World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers (WAN-IFRA) marked the deterioration of the development of independent media in Ethiopia (2013). The imprisonment of journalists and another form of repression against the free press severely constrained its role to influence and shape the country's foreign policymaking.

Together with the afore-mentioned media outlets, the spread of internet use and the subsequent rise of social media enhance people's access to news related to their country's political economy. This, in turn, resulted in public discussions and participation on various affairs including foreign policy. In this respect, Facebook, Twitter, website and other online platforms serve as an important platform for different interest groups to easily access socio-economic and political information.

In Ethiopia governments investment to spread information and communication infrastructure during the post-Cold War period enhances the use of the internet. This, in turn, enables ordinary citizens to access information of various kinds easily. Furthermore, the ruling party, opposition groups and scholars have been utilizing online communication to disseminate policy options including foreign affairs of the country. The course of influencing foreign policymaking through online communication becomes more visible with the spread of social media. Since recent time, facebook, twitter, blog etc. emerged as more effective platforms to conduct political discussion (Alemayehu, 2013). In fact, the shift towards using social media as a means to present and discuss important economic and political issues is affected by the repressive media policy against the private press.

Prominent political activists (living home and abroad) who have hundreds of thousands of followers can easily communicate with their group members and influence stances of the government on various issues including foreign policy. In this way, the online media assists the public to express its views and emerge as a force that can influence the country's foreign policy behavior.

In addition, official websites of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ethiopian Embassies in different countries of the world also have been serving as an important channel to communicate with the public of the host country. By providing information regarding investment opportunities, trade, tourist attractions, socio-cultural values and other political and economic updates the online communication promotes Ethiopia's diplomacy. To further enhance Ethiopia's national interest, however, trained workforce who can proactively communicate with the public of the host country is desirable.

In spite of the afore-mentioned advantages, however, care has to be taken in using media, particularly social media as a foreign policy actor. Unlike that of TV, Radio and print media, online media is difficult to handle and it often exposed to mismanagement. Some people may use social media to propagate hatred politics and thereby mobilize the public to illegal acts. This kind of irresponsible practices can ignite inter and intra-state conflicts which seriously constrain peaceful coexistence of people of a particular country or region. The Ethiopian region and Horn of Africa, which is inhabited by diverse socio-cultural, economic and political categories is highly exposed to unrests which may come from disseminating hatred politics.

#### **5.4 Tool Diversification**

Ethiopia's relations with the outside world intended to maintain a wide range of socio-economic and political interests. As it is explained in Article 86, sub-article 1-3 of the FDRE constitution, Ethiopia's international relations targeted

(1) to promote policies of foreign relations based on the protection of national interests and respect for the sovereignty of the country. (2) To promote mutual respect for national sovereignty and equality of states and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. (3) To ensure that the foreign relations policies of the country are based on mutual interests and equality of states as well as those international agreements promote the interests of Ethiopia (Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1995, p. 32).

In spite of the above-noted principles of the country's external relations, however, the actual impact of Ethiopia's foreign policy in keeping the national interest is not as expected. Together with other factors, the expected outcome is constrained by the wrong mix of foreign policy tools the country has been employing (Jalata, 2011). There were and/or are imbalances in using diplomatic and military tools to safeguard the national interest.

The type of foreign policy instruments that a given country applies has been determined by various factors. The nature of a nation's foreign policy goals, available national resources and the network and relational power of the state are to mention some of them.

The foreign policy agenda of the post-Cold War Ethiopia is founded on assuring national security and integrity. The policy document highlighted internal problems such as poverty, authoritarian regime, the absence of good governance etc. as major threats that endangered the nation's survival. Hence, the foreign policy direction provided maximum attention to promote relations that prioritize maintenance of rapid development and peace. In this respect, efforts which aim to enhance trade relations, employment opportunities, economic investment, tourism, local industrialization, and the rule of law and democracy carved as primary agendas. Here lies the logic of diversifying the country's foreign policy instruments. The execution of the afore-mentioned diverse economic and political agendas, in turn, requires the application of various foreign policy tools.

Considering economic cooperation as a major pillar of the country's foreign policy goals, the FANSPS highlights economic diplomacy as a prominent instrument. The MoFA regarded economic diplomacy as a center of the country's diplomatic effort. Hence, unlike that of former governments, "Post-Cold war Ethiopia's diplomacy is guided not by ideological affiliation to states and parties but based on the economic benefit that emanates from the relations" (EIC, 2014).

Economic attaches working on the various Ethiopian embassies actively engages with governmental and Nongovernmental Organizations of the host country to identify market opportunities, secure investment, financial aids, and technical support. To this effect, they attend trade fairs, bazaars, business forums etc. and communicate the various opportunities provided by the Ethiopian government for foreign businesspeople. In highlighting the contribution of the economic centered diplomacy, Kebede Abera, MoFA Business Diplomacy Director-General noted that the number of foreign investors who come to Ethiopia for business feasibility study grew to 1000 in 2006 from 365 in 2005 (EIC, 2014).

Together with dealing governmental and non-governmental actors, influencing the attitude of the public in other country is also becoming another important strategy in executing foreign policy objectives. In our contemporary situation, the public is participating, directly or indirectly, information and execution of foreign policies. Hence, for Ethiopia,

the cultivation of the public opinion by communicating its socio-economic and political policies will have important contributions.

To this effect, embassies and diplomats have to engage and influence the foreign public. Using online and print media, Ethiopian diplomats, can provide up to date information to the public of the host country. A study conducted by Metaferia (2011) depicted the role of a newsletter in conducting public diplomacy in the United Kingdom. Together with other effects, the newsletter published by the Ethiopian embassy in London helped to keep the public engaged and informed about the socio-economic and political affairs of Ethiopia.

In a world where the advancement of communication technology eases access to information, the foreign public can get information about Ethiopia and its policies from multiple sources. These sources have their views about Ethiopia and its socio-economic and political behavior that, in turn, influence the perception of the foreign public. In this respect, Sertsedengel (2013) commented that various foreign media have been disseminating unverified and/or imbalanced reports about Ethiopia. Hence, unless otherwise, Ethiopian diplomats actively engage in balancing this information, the foreign public will define Ethiopia in a wrong way. This negatively affects the image of Ethiopia and severely constrains its role in regional and international political arena.

The need to maintain active and successful engagement with the foreign public, however, requires professional diplomat. A diplomat, who acquired the necessary skills of public diplomacy, can proactively engage with the various segments of the host community. The FANSPS also highlights the importance of conducting diplomacy using qualified professionals. It is unlikely to attain satisfactory results from the proposed foreign policy instrument without the persistent efforts of skilled diplomats.

Nevertheless, however, as Yacob (2007) noted, there is a gap in conducting public diplomacy professionally. The lack of experienced public diplomacy professionals together with financial constraints in the MoFA limited the proper application and the expected outcome Ethiopia can get from public diplomacy.

In addition to the embassy level engagements, Ethiopian diaspora and their community organizations abroad can effectively present the national interest to the foreign public. Hence, together with enhancing the capacity of diplomats, foreign policy decision-makers have to take practical measures to improve the participation of Ethiopian diaspora in the execution of public diplomacy in their respective host country.

Millions of Ethiopians are living abroad in different corners of the world. Unlike that of members of the diplomatic missions, diaspora communities have a wide and strong network with the foreign public in which they have been residing. This enables them to play an important role in image building and rebranding Ethiopia by communicating the ongoing economic and political development at home (Sertsedengel, 2013).

Cognizant of this capacity of the diaspora, the FANSPS noted the necessity of mobilizing Ethiopians living abroad and equipping them with the required skill so that they can effectively bridge Ethiopia with their land of residence. Hence, together with other efforts, effective diaspora mobilization can also assist Ethiopia to achieve its foreign policy objectives better.

As part of the effort to mobilize the Ethiopian diaspora, the MoFA has established a special department. The Diaspora Affairs Directorate General was founded to enhance the contributions of Ethiopians living abroad to promote the country's foreign policy objective. The Directorate General in collaboration with the diplomatic missions abroad provides the diaspora up to date information about the socio-economic and political conditions at home. This enables Ethiopians living abroad to properly inform the public in their country of residence and thereby encourage the latter to consolidate their cooperation with Ethiopia. In addition to individual-level efforts, community organizations established by Ethiopians living abroad can make an organized effort in the image building and integration of Ethiopia with the outside world.

In spite of this policy provisions, however, the role of the Ethiopian diaspora in image building and networking the country remains marginal. Both at the ministry as well as embassy level, the task of diaspora mobilization has been undertaken poorly.



The effort to diversify the country's foreign policy tools can also be assisted by enhancing Ethiopia's soft power capability. As many foreign policy analysts commented, countries that work to raise their soft power capability can favorably affect their foreign policy outcomes (Nye, 2011; Goldsmith & Horiuchi, 2013). Contrary to that of hard power, soft power strategies that are characterized by attraction and persuasion promote sustainable cooperation among states.

In his comparative analysis of the hard-soft power continuum, Wagner noted that "...while military or economic coercion tends to result in an immediate but short-duration outcome, attraction and persuasion have the tendency to cause a long-term change which explains why soft power solutions tend to last longer than hard power solutions" (WAGNER, 2014). Hence, post-Cold War Ethiopia's foreign policy decision makers need to act proactively to promote and market the country's soft power currencies. Among the various soft power capabilities of Ethiopia, its historical legacies and past foreign policy decisions can be utilized as prominent tools to promote the national interest on various regional and international stages.

Ethiopia's legacy as the only African country that successfully resist European colonizers and keep its independence brought a huge impact on the political history of the whole African countries. The victory of Ethiopia against Italian colonialists in 1896 served as a source of inspiration for independence movements among Africans at home and in the diaspora as well as other freedom fighters. Klossowicz commented the implications of the victory of Adwa on later socio-economic and political context of Africa as "... has a highly symbolic meaning for Africa as a whole, which is reflected, for example, by the fact that upon gaining independence many African countries chose the Ethiopian colours for their national flags" (Klosowicz, 2015, p. 93). Hence, the outcomes of Adwa can be regarded as an important soft power currency that enables Ethiopia to enhance its national interest in many regional as well as international platforms.

The above-noted role of Ethiopia in the political economy of Africa is further strengthened by the formers prominent contribution as a seedbed for pan-Africanism which later led to the formation of the OAU later AU. The OAU that was established in 1963 aimed at eradicating all forms of colonialism from Africa and thereby promote the unity and solidarity of the African states (OAU Charter, 1963). From this time onwards till to the

present (almost for five decades), Addis Ababa has been serving as home to the AU headquarter. This special responsibility of Ethiopia is mentioned in the FANSPS “Ethiopia all along steadfastly championed the cause of Africa and Africans dating back to a time when it stood virtually alone” (FANSPS, 2002).

Ethiopia's diplomatic and political support to Africa never affected by regime changes. In both, the feudal regime of Haileselesie and the military regime of Mengistu, Ethiopia had provided persistent supports to Africa. As Meles Zenawi, in one of his speech at the AU asserted, Mandela in his struggle against the apartheid regime in South Africa received training and other technical support from Emperor Haileselesie of Ethiopia. Similarly, the military led by Mengistu granted a wide range of support to President Robert Mugabe in his struggle against the Rhodesian government. The list goes on like this. Maru in his assessment of Ethiopia's major political support to Africa stated that “As the first independent black African nation to be a member of the League of Nations and also as a founding member of the UN, Ethiopia promoted and defended the interests of Africa in various global forums” (Maru, 2013, p. 22). This assistance to the OAU/AU as well as individual African states enhances Ethiopia's soft power capability and thereby influences its national interest.

Similarly, Ethiopia's past foreign policy decisions together with its historical legacy add to its legitimacy both at the regional as well as international level. This legitimacy, in turn, enhances Ethiopia's soft power capability. The support AU member countries have provided to Ethiopia's proposals regarding economic, political and security-related issues of Africa is a proper manifestation of this legitimacy.

Furthermore, Ethiopia has played a prominent role in establishing and strengthening IGAD. The financial and technical supports Ethiopia has been providing to IGAD projects enhance the former's positive image among the regional as well as international actors who have interest in the sub-region. The post-Cold War Ethiopia's government is highly committed to achieving the objective of IGAD, especially in promoting economic integration through infrastructural connectivity.

Infrastructural projects such as road, railway, water, and electricity with countries like Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan, Djibouti and Somalia contribute not only to economic development but also to the maintenance of order and stability in the region. As it is stated by Mohammed Seyd, Deputy-Director General of the Ethiopian Investment Commission, “Ethiopia believing itself not as a land-locked, but as a land-linked” country has been acting proactively to boom the regional integrations. This commitment and the subsequent reputation Ethiopia has obtained from IGAD member countries, in turn, enable the former to promote its economic as well as political interests.

Moreover, Ethiopia's prominent contribution to the transformation of the OAU into AU can also be attributed as a major source of soft power. Unlike that of the late Colonel Muammar Qaddafi and his supporter's proposal of immediate integration agenda by forming the United States of Africa, Ethiopia promotes a gradualist approach. Ethiopia pursues to begin the integration from regional level through establishing economic communities. Ethiopia and its supporters focused on economic and market unity as the first step for the continent-wide integration. With the skillful leadership of the late Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, the idea of gradual integration favored by prominent members of the AU such as South Africa, Nigeria, Uganda, Sudan and others.

In spite of all these soft power capabilities of the country, however, there is a wide gap in utilizing them. As it is noted in the previous sections of the study, the foreign policy-making of past Ethiopian governments, in some way, was established on a ‘siege mentality’. This tendency of considering external powers as a ‘threat’ had its influence on the nature of the foreign policy instruments Ethiopia had been implementing to secure its national interest. Instead of co-optive measures, coercive tools were often used. This further complicated Ethiopia's relations with its external partners when the latter also reacted by intervening in the internal affairs of the former.

In his assessment of the dynamics of Ethiopia’s foreign policy and diplomacy, Dibaba noted that past Ethiopia's relations with countries of the Horn of Africa were characterized by the use of coercive measures even to address minor socio-economic as well as political issues (Dibaba, 2017). This seriously constrained the effort to persuade and attract foreign policy partners using Ethiopia’s soft power capability. Furthermore, in the FANSPS of the post-Cold War, the strategy of using the country’s soft power to promote its national

interest did not get enough attention. This, in turn, affected the focus provided by MoFA as well as diplomatic missions to enhance and utilize Ethiopia's soft power potential in the diplomatic arena. The lack of proper analysis and investigation of additional soft power resources also limit the outcome Ethiopia can attain using this strategy.

On the other hand, however, for countries like Ethiopia who has limited resource to maintain large armed force and thereby build its hard power, cultivating the soft power capability and using it in foreign policy formation and execution has strategic significance. In doing so, however, a proper analysis of Ethiopia's historical legacies and past foreign policy decisions and presents them into the market as a soft power currency is required.

Together with public diplomacy and diaspora mobilization, the post-Cold War Ethiopia's foreign policy instrument diversifications need to be supplemented by cultural diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy refers to "the exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples to foster mutual understandings" (Cummings, 2003, p. 1). By promoting societal interconnectivity, cultural diplomacy assures the participation of diverse groups in the foreign policy formation and execution. In addition to the traditional actors of diplomacy, cultural diplomacy brings new actors such as journalists, artists, business communities, youth, elders, religious groups etc. (Liland, 1993).

Given the diverse socio-cultural and religious groups, the proliferation of cultural diplomacy in Ethiopia provides unique opportunity to link the country with various people and society of the outside world. This, in turn, paves the way for the exchange of different values, beliefs, traditions and other cultural aspects of the various nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia which cannot be addressed by the conventional diplomacy. Nevertheless, however, the one-sided cultural policy of the past Ethiopian governments that strived to represent the country with single socio-cultural and religious identity severely constrained the outcome.

In fact, this exclusive policy of past Ethiopian governments has its influence on the post-Cold War Ethiopia's foreign policy and diplomacy. It is obvious that people's identity influences the way they think and pass policy decisions. Hence, the limited representation of a particular socio-cultural and religious group in the country's foreign policy decision-making process causes the exclusion of values, beliefs, traditions and customs of that

particular social category. This, in turn, negatively affects the cultural exchanges that Ethiopian nations and nationalities can make with various peoples and societies of the world and thereby secure the national interest.

To benefit the country's foreign policy from the gains of cultural diplomacy, MoFA has to ensure the fair representation of the various socio-cultural categories in the formation and execution of public policy. In doing so, socio-cultural diversities need to take into consideration in assigning diplomats and recruiting experts for the ministry. This ensures the maintenance of cultural diplomacy compatible with the identity of the host community.

Together with this, MoFA in collaboration with other ministerial offices needs to initiate and assist the task of studying, documenting and propagating the cultural heritage of the various Ethiopian nations and nationalities. This paves the way for exploiting the many traditions, values, arts, knowledge and other cultural aspects of the various social categories as foreign policy resources. In addition, foreign policy decision makers need to maintain just distribution in linking sister cities and educational institutions. This will create better opportunities for enhancing people-to-people relations among communities of the respective cities and academic institutions and thereby facilitate cultural interchange.

## CHAPTER VI

### 6 POST-COLD WAR ETHIO-TURKISH RELATIONS

Although this study is focused on the diversification of Ethiopia's foreign policymaking of the post-Cold War period, assessing the current situation per se does not provide us the full picture of the issue under investigation. Hence, it is essential to highlight some historical ties which influence the contemporary relations.

In fact, the past Ethio-Turkey relations are affected by the latter's long-established socio-cultural, economic and political cooperation with Africa. In his assessment of Turkey-Africa relations, Kurşun (2013) commented that ancient people of Turkey established contact with Africa even before they expanded to Anadolu. Prior to the formation of the Ottoman Empire, the Turks marched to North Africa. Gradually, they intermarried with the local people and became part and parcel of the regional community. In addition, the Turks also played a significant role in the formation and consolidation of local governments in various parts of Africa, particularly in North Africa (Kurşun, 2013; Kavas, 2017).

Turkey-Africa relations further strengthened during the Ottoman period. The Ottoman Empire had strong cooperation and presence in the East, West, South and North Africa. Apart from economic and political cooperation, the Ottomans maintained diplomatic representation in Africa. In this respect, in 1861 the Ottoman state appointed its first honorary consul-general Pe de Roubex in Cape Town, South Africa. Until 1914, the Ottomans kept this relation using honorary consuls. In 1914, however, Mehmet Remzi Bey, the first Turkish diplomat assigned to South Africa (Özkan, 2010). Furthermore, the Ottomans signed a defense pact with the then African states. As Hazar (2000) highlighted, during the time of Sultan Murad III, the Ottoman state signed a military agreement<sup>16</sup> with the Kanem Bornu Empire, located in the present countries of Nigeria, Chad and Libya.

Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and establishment of the republic of Turkey in 1923, however, the above-noted diverse and long-survived Africa-Turkey relations

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<sup>16</sup> As part of this pact, the Ottoman state was providing military equipment and trainers to the Kanem Bournu Empire.

downgraded, if not collapsed at all. In this perspective, Özkan (2010), in his assessment of the three stages<sup>17</sup> of Turkey-Africa relations, commented that Turkey's foreign policy approach between 1923 and late 1990s was highly restrictive and inward looking. This policy orientation seriously undermined the socio-economic and political relations between Turkey and Africa. Turkish foreign policy makers showed little interest and exerted limited efforts to promote long-term and strategic partnership with Africa. Wheeler (2011) asserted that in the years between 1923 and 1998 Turkey played a passive role in international affairs particularly in its relations with Africa. Atatürk's slogan 'peace at home and peace in the world' obliged Turkey to prioritize domestic issues in the one hand and to limit its external relations with neighboring countries only on the other.

Since the late 1990s onwards, however, various local and global economic and political dynamics started to influence Turkey's foreign policy decision making. This also resulted in the revival of Turkey-Africa socio-cultural, economic, diplomatic and political cooperation. In 1998 Turkish foreign policy decision makers in collaboration with non-governmental actors and honorary consuls of various African countries prepared a document that later become 'Turkey opening plan to Africa'. This plan served as a road map for the multi-dimensional Turkey-Africa relations over the last 15 years (Sebsebe, 2017).

Enver Arpa (2017) commented that the contemporary Turkey-Africa relations are characterized by diverse foreign policy measures. In this respect, efforts taken to enhance diplomatic representation can be noted as a prime manifestation. In 2009, while Turkey had only 12 embassies (7 of them in sub-Saharan Africa), currently this number has reached to 41 (Arpa, 2017). On their side, many African countries have responded Turkey's move by opening embassies in Ankara. While only 10 African countries had embassy in Turkey, this number has risen to 32 in 2018. Parallel to opening embassies, Turkey appointed commercial attaché, who are actively working to enhance bilateral and multilateral trade, in 26 of its embassies in Africa. As reports indicate foreign trade between Turkey and African countries has reached to \$17.5 billion (Daily Sabah, 2018).

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<sup>17</sup> Turkey-Africa relations can be categorized under three major classifications: Turkey-Africa relations of the Ottoman period, between 1923 and 1998 and after 1998 up to the present.

During the last 15 years, Turkey's direct investment in Africa has also exhibited remarkable development. While it was only \$100,000 in 2003, in 2017 Turkey's direct investment in Africa has reached to \$6.5 billion. Together with this, Turkey has signed mutual protection of investments with 26 African countries (Daily Sabah, 2018). These agreements aim to provide assurance and there by attract additional investments from both sides.

As far as the Ethio-Turkish relations are concerned, the two states maintained commercial and political ties centuries ago. As Mordechai notes it, since the early decades of the 16<sup>th</sup> century there were trade relations between Ethiopia and the Ottoman Empire (Mordechai, 1980). In his assessment of Turks relation with people of the Horn of Africa Kavas (2017) noted that the first contact between these people stretched back to the late 12<sup>th</sup> and early 13<sup>th</sup> century, i.e. during the Ayyubid dynasty. In fact, strong economic and socio-cultural relations started during the Ottoman period. A prime manifestation of this argument is the coins which were find in northern Somalia carried the name of an Ottoman leader Srilm II (1566-1574).

Following their conquest of Egypt in 1517, the Ottomans were striving to further their influence towards the Red Sea coast region. However, this measure of the Ottomans had faced resistance from the then European powers, especially from Spain and Portugal that also had commercial as well as geo-strategic appetite in the same region. In some instances, this rivalry was accompanied by large scale sea and ground wars that finally resulted in the expulsion of Spain and Portugal from the Red Sea coast region.

On the other hand, as Yusuf (2001), Kavas (2017) noted, the rivalry between Ottoman Turks and Portuguese of the 16<sup>th</sup> century resulted in their interference in the local conflict between the Central Highland Christian Kingdom of Ethiopia and the Muslim Sultanates of the South. To secure its economic and political interest in the region, Portugal allied with the Christian Highland Kingdom and made an anti-Muslim alliance. The Ottomans on their part allied with local Muslim forces and started to provide arms.

Ottoman's support to Muslim forces in Ethiopia reached to its remarkable level with the coming to power of Imam Ahmed Ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi (1506-1543) as political leader of the Sultanate of Adal. In his analysis of Ottoman archives and Ethio-Ottoman relations, Yusuf Sarinay (2001) noted that



Upon the Portuguese provocations on the people in Abyssinia, Ahmed bin Ibrahim declared war against the kingdom of Abyssinia in 1527. He gained great success with the Ottomans' support during this struggle. The Sultan and the Caliph Sultan Suleyman the Magnificent had been very pleased about this success and addressed him as the 'Sultan Ahmet El Hakim be Vilayet-I Habesh' (p. 9).

Quoting from Lockhart and Orhonlu, Ali (2013) pointed that the Ottoman's sent between 900-1000 elected soldiers armed with modern rifles. This support of the Ottomans had played a significant role for Imam Ahmed's upper hand over the Christian Highland Kingdom till to 1543.

Ottoman contact with the Ethiopian region and Horn of Africa further intensified following Ozdemir Pasha was assigned as governor-general of Yemen in 1548. This led to the expansion of Ottoman's influence in the Red Sea coast region and later resulted in the establishment of the province of Abyssinia in 1555 (Sarinay, 2001). The province of Abyssinia incorporated places such as Massawa, Suakin, Djibouti, part of Somalia and the Harar region in modern Ethiopia. Until its collapse in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the province served as a bridge on the socio-economic and political interaction between the Ethiopian region and Horn of Africa and the Ottoman Empire (Kurşun, 2017; Kavas, 2017). The above-noted historical ties have had important implications on the contemporary socio-economic, political and diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Turkey.

The post-Cold War Ethiopia – Turkey relations, in some way, is part of the former's foreign policy diversification schemes. This policy diversification primarily stemmed from the unimpressive external relations partners of the past Ethiopian governments. External relations, which were often dictated by ideological attachments rather than socio-economic and political interests of the Ethiopian masses, were among the main factors for the past unremarkable policy outcomes.

With the coming to power of the EPRDF in 1991, Ethiopian foreign policy and diplomacy experienced significant changes. Together with keeping the national security and integrity, Ethiopia's foreign policy highlighted maintenance of rapid development as its primary objective. Post- Cold War Ethiopia asserted poverty as the number one threat to the national survival. This redefinition of the national interest, in turn, affects the standards to identify the country's foreign policy partners. States and/or non-state actors, which can

substantiate Ethiopia's development regarded as strategic partners by Ethiopia's foreign policy decision makers.

The nature and structure of the post-Cold War socio-economic and political relations between Ethiopia and Turkey also revolve around this spectrum. In fact, Ethiopia-Turkey relations of the post-Cold War have symbiotic nature. Since the late 1990s, Turkey had also taken various reforms to reintegrate itself with its regional and global neighbors. Foreign policy experts asserted that the rejection of Turkey's request to join the European Union in 1997 was one of the contributory factors that obliged Turkey to look for new partners in other parts of the world, including Africa. This resulted in the development of a strategy that served as a roadmap for the Turkey-Africa relations on various aspects. Taking into consideration the diverse areas in which Turkey can enhance its mutual relations with Africa, the plan predicted cooperation in political, economic, cultural and other strategic aspects. Hence, the local demands to maintain a strong economic and political cooperation, both from Ethiopia and Turkish side, contributed to the mutual interest for a stronger relationship.

In general, the post-Cold War Ethiopia-Turkey relations encompass diverse areas of cooperation such as economic, political, diplomatic and socio-cultural spheres. In promoting these diverse engagements, both governmental and non-governmental organs both from Ethiopia and Turkey side have been increasingly involved especially in the last decade. Using various forms of diplomacy, the two states are working to maintain their national interest in various bilateral and multilateral forums.

## **6.1 Economic Sphere**

The FANSPS in its assessment of the challenges and opportunities regarding Ethiopia-Turkey relations of the post-Cold War stated that “Turkey’s large market and relatively developed economy can make an important impact to our development... it represents in some areas a source of investment and technical assistance” (FANSPS, 2002, p. 136). According to this assertion development assistance, trade and investment opportunity highlighted as the foundation for Ethiopia-Turkey cooperation. Now let us examine the important features of each of these manifestations of economic cooperation.

### **6.1.1 Developmental Assistance**

The post-Cold War developmental cooperation between Ethiopia and Turkey benefitted from the century-old diplomatic relationship. A good manifestation of this claim is that even before the declaration of Turkey's Africa policy, Ethiopia and Turkey signed agreements in various strategic areas. In 1993, for instance, Ethiopia and Turkey signed an Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation and Trade. The 1993 Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation and Trade has encompassed various spheres by addressing the limits of the 1967 Trade Agreement between Ethiopia and Turkey. This bilateral agreement paved the way for the later cooperation of the two governments in areas like agriculture and irrigation techniques, hydroelectric power generations, education, health etc. As Ali comments it, this agreement aimed to further strengthen the traditional friendship and cooperation between Ethiopia and Turkey (Ali, 2012).


Besides, similar agreements and protocols which aim to strengthen the strategic cooperation between Ethiopia and Turkey also signed. On 13 March 2000, the two states signed a memorandum of understanding that led to the establishment of the Ethio-Turkish Joint Economic Commission (JEC). From 13-17 November 2000 JEC organized its first meeting in Addis Ababa (Addis Tribune, 2000). This meeting, which was attended by senior government officials and policymakers of the two states, created a good opportunity to discuss the challenges and prospects in expanding development cooperation.

Turkey's developmental assistance to Ethiopia becomes more organized and diverse following the opening of the Turkish Development Cooperation Agency (TIKA) office in Addis Ababa. Ankara opened its Africa's first TIKA program coordinator office in 2005, a year that Turkey declared 'Year of Africa'. The Addis Ababa office was also in charge to manage TIKA's projects in neighboring countries of Ethiopia. In addition, Ankara's decision to open TIKA's first Africa office in Addis Ababa indicates the favorable disposition Turkey foreign policy decision makers maintains towards Ethiopia.

As it is stated by former TIKA's Ethiopia country coordinator, Mr Ismail Durhat, many development projects have implemented by TIKA. In different areas of the country such as in Oromiya, Somali, Afar, Harar, Tigray and Addis Ababa, TIKA enacts projects which enhance the capacity of the local community. Furthermore, TIKA's capacity building activities under the Africa Agricultural Development Program has special assistance for

Ethiopia to improve its human resource in the specific areas (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011; Özkan & Akgun, 2010). In August 2008 TIKA started an African Agricultural Development Programme. Thirteen African countries namely Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Senegal, Comoros, Madagascar, Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda were chosen for the program, and implementation started. The following diagram shows Turkey official development assistance to Ethiopia in 2013, implemented through TIKA.

**Figure 1: Ethiopia's share from TIKA's Budget**



Source: TIKA report 2013

A further look at the budget breakdown of TIKA's development assistance to Ethiopia in 2013 reveals that more than 40 percent is allocated to water and sanitation. The following table lists the complete sectoral distribution of TIKA's 2013 budget to Ethiopia.

**Table 5: Sectoral Distribution of TIKA Budget Ethiopia 2013.**

Water and sanitation	40.36%
Education	7.01%
Health	2.07%
Administrative and Civil infrastructure	5.26%
Production sector	10.22%

Banking	0.24%
Other social infrastructure	34.84%

Source: TIKA Report 2013

### Development Loans

Turkey also granted loan for Ethiopia's transportation projects. In this respect, the signing of a \$1.7BN Awash-Woldiya railway project between the Ethiopian Railway Corporation and a Turkish company known as Yapi Merkezi is worth to mention. As it is stated by the chairman of the contracting company, Emre Aykas, the length of the project is around 500km. The Awash-Woldiya railway project is part of the 2010/11-2014/15 Ethiopia's first Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP). The railway line connects northern Ethiopia to the port through the Addis Ababa-Djibouti line. By doing so, it enhances the share of northern Ethiopia in the country's import-export activities. It is for the first time for a Turkish firm to win a bid for such a huge infrastructural project.

During the previous time almost all of Ethiopia's road and railway bids monopolized by Chinese companies (Vanham, 2012). As some commentators stated, this agreement infers the enhancement of Ethio-Turkish relationship on the one hand and the success of Ethiopia's economic diplomacy in further diversifying its development partners on the other. With the consolidation of Sino-Ethiopian relations in the post-Cold War, the later extremely relied on the former to finance many of its development projects. As some commentators argue, such a dependence on one foreign policy partner negatively affects Ethiopia's independent foreign policy decision-making capability and its national interest as well. Hence, Ethiopian foreign policy decision-makers have to maintain the balance between external relations partners by making the policy environment fertile to all contestants. Furthermore, the effort to maintain balance among foreign policy partners led to competition among themselves that, in turn, gives room for Ethiopia to promote its economic and political interests.

### **Humanitarian Aid**

Turkey's development assistance to Ethiopia is also supplemented by humanitarian supports. During the 1990s and 2000s, the humanitarian crisis that endangered the lives of thousands of people occurred in different regions of Ethiopia. In 2006 Turkey, through

international organizations such as WFP and UNICEF delivered around 300,000 USD of humanitarian support.

In 2017 TIKA in collaboration with Turkish community in Ethiopia organized humanitarian supports to assist the drought-hit areas in the Afar National Regional State of Ethiopia. In October the same year, the Turkish Red Crescent also provided humanitarian supports to drought-affected communities in the same region. On the other hand, TIKA has handed over some humanitarian aids to Ethiopian Somali Regional State, another drought vulnerable pastoralist region.

Humanitarian aid programs are run not only by government organization. Government organizations engaged in Humanitarian services in Ethiopia includes the Turkish Red Crescent, Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD), Turkey Diyanet Foundation. There are also large numbers of non-government organizations that provide humanitarian support to needy Ethiopians. Some of these organizations include the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, Doctors Worldwide etc.

A large number of Humanitarian projects are implanted during religious festive including the holy month of Ramadan, the two major Eid holidays. Particularly on such religious occasions most of the beneficiaries are from the Ethiopian Muslim communities. Turkish government organizations and non-government organizations travel to most of the regional states in Ethiopia and distribute food items to the needy and poor communities. According to the 2017 report of the Global Humanitarian Assistance, Turkey is the second, after the USA, with a total of \$6 billion in humanitarian assistance (Development initiatives, 2017).

### **6.1.2 Trade Relations**

Together with strengthening other forms of cooperation, post-Cold War Ethiopia has been taking measures to expand the nation's foreign trade. As part of the economic diplomacy, Ethiopian diplomatic missions have been participating in various trade fairs organized by the host country and thereby promote Ethiopia's export products. The bilateral trade relations between Ethiopia and Turkey of the post-Cold War are also part of the process mentioned above. Hand in hand with the developmental cooperation, Ethiopia has been striving to diversify and enhance its export trade with Turkey. Turkey's large market and

its important contribution to Ethiopia's development is highlighted in the FANSPS (FANSPS, 2002)

On its part, Turkey also has similar demands of consolidating its foreign trade with Ethiopia. Turkish foreign policy decision makers consider Ethiopia's large population (second in Africa) as huge market potential and provide special attention to increase the bilateral trade. In many of the high-level visits, challenges and opportunities associated with Ethiopia-Turkey bilateral trade are major points of discussion. Following the establishment of the Ethio-Turkish Joint Economic Commission (JEC) in 2000, more organized efforts have made to enhance the bilateral trade. During the third JEC meeting, that was held between January 11 and 13 2005 in Addis Ababa; the two governments agreed to enhance their bilateral trade further. The following tables and related graphs show the Ethio-Turkish trade relations.


Table 6: Ethiopia's Import from Turkey

Years	Import	% increase
1994	5,777,127	
1995	5,940,568	2.8
1996	13,171,486	121.7
1997	17,186,187	30.5
1998	26,351,941	53.3
1999	26,407,450	0.2
2000	21,275,890	-19.4
2001	22,867,806	7.5
2002	35,087,742	53.4
2003	42,707,656	21.7
2004	73,786,641	72.8
2005	112,802,071	52.9
2006	97,964,971	-13.2
2007	148,316,349	51.4
2008	157,225,286	6.0
2009	260,930,019	66.0
2010	238,708,833	-8.5
2011	359,723,725	50.7
2012	513,586,039	42.8
2013	477,807,015	-7.0
2014	432,361,996	-9.5

2015	504,398,902	16.7
2016	532,001,113	5.5

Source: IMF Directions of Trade Statistics (DoTS)

Figure 2: Ethiopia’s Imports from Turkey



Source: IMF

As shown in the table and related graph, Ethiopia’s imports from Turkey has gradually increased. The trade volume between the two countries has increased from a mere 5.78 Million dollar in 1994 to 532 Million dollar in 2016, which is more than nine thousand times higher. Looking at specific years in these periods, there is generally an upward move, despite a drop off in some of the years like 2000, 2006, 2011. The years 1997, 1998, 2002 and 2005, 2009, 2011 and 2012 has seen a sharp increase in Ethiopian import of Turkish goods.

Ethiopia’s export to Turkey has also witnessed a sharp increase in the same period. As the data from the IMF, Directions of Trade Statistics (DOTs) show, Ethiopian export to Turkey has slowly but consistently increased in the post-cold war period. The following table and the related graph show these trends.




Table 7: Ethiopia's Export to Turkey

Years	Export	% Increase
1994	288,015	-13.2
1995	305,115	5.937
1996	424,927	39.27
1999	264,745	-37.7
2000	134,477	-49.2
2001	96,354	-28.3
2002	5,573,814	5685
2003	11,070,756	98.62
2004	16,051,787	44.99
2005	12,659,421	-21.1
2006	15,147,813	19.66
2007	37,764,068	149.3
2008	38,390,387	1.659
2009	30,061,253	-21.7
2010	33,297,361	10.77
2011	45,215,030	35.79
2012	50,571,500	11.85
2013	61,498,457	21.61
2014	72,674,647	18.17
2015	38,467,542	-47.1
2016	38,028,102	-1.14

Source: IMF Directions of Trade Statistics (DoTS)

Figure 3: Ethiopia's Export to Turkey



Source: IMF Directions of Trade Statistics (DoTS)

According to a report by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the type of goods that Ethiopia imports from Turkey is very diverse which includes metal and metal products, machines, mechanical and electrical devices and their spare parts, voice recording devices, plastics, chemical products, textile and ready-made clothes, food, tobacco products, visual equipment, musical instruments, clocks, measurement devices, medical and surgical equipment, vegetable oil, paper, stone, gypsum, cement, asbestos, mica, shoes, artificial flower, wood and wooden products, mineral products, leather and leather products, bags, suitcases, furs, gem stones, metals, imitation jewelries. Main import items from Ethiopia to Turkey are vegetable (sesame, oilseeds) and animal products, leather and leather products, textile and ready-made clothes, paper and plastic products (Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

As compared with the other trading partners of the emerging powers such as China, Ethiopia-Turkey bilateral trade relations did not develop as expected. As it is indicated in Table 4, the volume of trade between Ethiopia and China reached more than six billion in 2016, while it remains half a million between Ethiopia and Turkey. Together with other factors, the relatively low prices of Chinese products which are compatible with the purchasing

power of the majority of the Ethiopian population is a case in point. Furthermore, the huge budget allocated by China to introduce its products and penetrate the Ethiopian market also contributes a lot.

### **Trade in Service**

Trade between Ethiopia and Turkey is not limited to merchandise/goods but includes services. The two countries have a long history of trading with services. In this regard, the volume of trade in services is increasing through time. Medical service is one of the areas where large numbers of Ethiopians are benefiting from. The Turkish health tourism sector is one of the fastest growing sectors attracting a large number of people from around the world which made Turkey one of the global destinations. Data prepared by the Turkish Statistical Institute (Turk Stat), showed that Turkish health tourism sector has increased by 12 percent to reach \$700 million in 2016. A large number of people from around the world visit Turkey to get various medical services which include, but not limited to hair transplant, physiotherapy, eye surgery etc. Ethiopia is one of the four African nations that benefited from the booming health tourism sector of Turkey. The health tourism sector is expected to attract more Ethiopian patients in the years to come, and the sector can earn Turkey a huge sum of money.

#### **6.1.3 Investment**

According to 2017 report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Ethiopia is found to be the largest recipient of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Ethiopia's investment inflow formed nearly half of the total inflow of investment earned by the Land-locked Developing Countries (LLDC). FDI flows to Ethiopia have constantly been rising since 2012, even when FDI declined in many other LLDCs (UNCTAD, 2017). Ethiopia is also the highest receiver of FDI among the East African countries. For example, in 2016 Ethiopia received \$3.2 billion FDI out of the total regional FDI inflow which was \$7.1 billion. Ethiopia's remarkable achievement in attracting FDI is attributed to massive investment and development in infrastructure and booming industrialization.

Similarly, Turkish investment in Ethiopia has seen a remarkable increase. Ethiopia and Turkey signed a bilateral investment treaty on November 11, 2000, which entered in to

force on 10th March 2005. More than 350 Turkish companies are operating in Ethiopia to date creating job opportunities for more than 50,000 Ethiopians.

During the presidential visit to Ethiopia, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan asserted that Turkey and Ethiopia agreed to boost their investment types further. Ethiopia's Prime Minister Hailemariam is appreciating Turkish companies' investment in Ethiopia, expressed his countries interest to see more Turkish investment and to work very hard with Turkish government and companies. The Prime Minister also expressed to increase the trade volume which was around \$400 million.

The following table shows Turkish FDI in Ethiopia, together with FDI from other European and Asian economies.

Table 8: FDI Flows to Ethiopia

Country	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
China	-	-	1	-	5	24	13	10	74	59	72	122
France	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	..	..	..
Germany	8	- 4	9	- 1	- 2	1	5	4	3	-	-	-
Italy	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	41	32	10	8	- 39
Turkey	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	6	-	-	-	1
United States	1	2	1	1	- 2	1	-	-	-	4	2	-

Source: UNCTAD FDI/TNC database.

According to a report prepared by the Turkish embassy in Addis Ababa, a total of 238 Turkish companies were granted investment license as of April 28, 2011. The investment sector, the number of companies in each sector and the number of people employed in thereof is given in the table below. It must be noted that all the companies that secured investment license do not necessarily make a real investment. Only a few of those companies start operation, and the rest do not start due to different administrative, technical and financial factors. It is highly believed that the number of Turkish companies operating in Ethiopia has increased since 2011.

Table 9: Turkish Investment in Ethiopia as of 2011

No	Investment sector	Number of Companies	Investment Amount (\$)	Number of workers
1.	Textile and confection production	23	498,638,424	17317
2.	Cement Factory	1	217,888,889	526
3.	Iron Steel and Pipe production	4	150,445,498	2135
4.	Education	6	111,728,099	216
5.	Construction ( Machinery equipment investment )	18	125,198,899	2250
6.	Health ( Hospital )	1	69,690,265	600
7.	Food Generation	12	44,482,056	307
8.	Farming	23	47,828,003	3320
9.	Building Materials production	35	24,883,370	871
10.	Water Drilling	8	23,188,658	87
11.	PVC and Aluminum Window and Door production	16	21,998,096	1282
12.	Other *	59	29,893,107	1101
13.	Plastic Products production	4	13,199,525	375
14.	Shoe and Slipper production	3	7,055,832	382
15.	Various machine Mounting and Replacement Piece production	5	6,970,918	308
16.	Gold Processing	2	6,106,030	35
17.	Cable production	2	158,851,974	1070
18.	Furniture production	10	3,621,674	204
19.	Bus, Tractor, Trailer Mounting and manufacturing	2	1,769,912	120
20.	Integrated Meat Installation	1	1,514,988	120
21.	Agriculture Tool and Machinery production		979,843	10
22.	Chicken Hittite production	1	904,470	20
23.	LPG Tube production	1	602,980	50
	TOTAL	238	1,567,441,518	32706

Source: Turkish embassy in Addis Ababa

As it is commented by officials from the Ethiopian investment agency, Ethiopia is the largest destination of Turkey's investment in Africa. Out of the total six billion USD Turkey's investment in Africa, between 2.5 and 3 billion USD is in Ethiopia. Turkey also surpassed other emerging powers FDI in Ethiopia including China. In 2012, for instance,

Chinese investment in Ethiopia was \$836 million while Turkey has invested \$1.2 billion (World Bulletin, 2014).

## **6.2 Political Sphere**

Ethiopia and Turkey have long survived political relations. The first formal contact between these two states goes back to the last decade of the 20th century. Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia sent delegations with various gifts to Sultan Abdulhamid II of Ottoman Empire. This laid the foundation for the diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Ottoman Turkey. In 1912 the Ottomans opened their Consulate General in Harar.

The diplomatic relations has continued following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. Two years after the fall of the Ottomans, in 1926, Turkey opened its first embassy in sub-Saharan Africa in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa responded this move by opening its embassy in Ankara in 1933. Turkey's decision to open its embassy in Addis Ababa in the immediate post-Ottoman period and Ethiopia's similar reaction illustrates the attention provided by the two nations to consolidate their diplomatic relations. The interwar period foreign relations between Ethiopia and Turkey, however, disrupted following Fascist Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935.

Turkey's recognition of Italy as having a sovereign authority over Ethiopia further deteriorated the relations between Ankara and Addis Ababa. Emperor Haileselesie of Ethiopia expressed his strong complaint to President Kemal Ataturk for the latter's recognition of Fascist Italy's occupation of Ethiopia. In the letter (Jara, 2015, p. 29) quoted from Argus, Haileselesie asserted that

---The granting of this title to the sovereign of Italy is an outrage of international engagements, namely, the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Borland-Kellogg Pact...Turkey, similar to other members of the League, is pledged to respect and, if need be, secure respect for the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Abyssinian Empire...The people of [Ethiopia] are now fighting with desperate energy and increasing success for the complete liberation of their territory, and up to the present, the Italians have not succeeded in establishing military control over even one half of [Ethiopia]. It is with profound sadness that I learn of the default of a friendly, country like Turkey

In the post-liberation period, Ethiopia and Turkey continued their cooperation on various matters. During this time, there were efforts from Addis Ababa to approach Ankara strategically and promote its foreign policy objectives. During his visit to Turkey in 1959

and 1967, Haileselesie made discussions with Turkish leaders to enhance the bilateral relations.

The coming to power of the pro-Socialist military regime in Ethiopia in 1974 and the subsequent ideological difference between Ethiopia and Turkey led to the decline of the bilateral relations. In 1984 the communist Derg regime in Ethiopia decided the closure of its embassy in Ankara. And for the next two decades, diplomatic relations between Addis Ababa and Ankara were extremely limited.

Following the end of the Cold War and the consequent regime change in Ethiopia in 1991, the two states began to take measures to revive their diplomatic relations. In fact, various internal and external factors occurred both in Ethiopia and Turkey influence the revival.

From the Ethiopian side, the regime change in 1991 was followed by policy reorientation, including foreign affairs. Instead of a siege mentality and ideology-centred approaches, post-Cold War Ethiopia proactively engaged with those actors who have strategic significance in enhancing the national interest. Similarly, Ethiopia also strives to maintain the positive outcomes of globalization while managing its negative socio-economic and political consequences. In doing so, Ethiopia is looking for external partners working for related agendas. This is the premise behind the diversification of Ethiopia's foreign relations with the emerging powers.

Similarly, Turkey also redefined its foreign policy orientation since the late 1990s. Especially following the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP in its Turkish acronym) in 2002, Turkey has intensified its socio-economic and political relations with various actors. By avoiding the former Western-centric approach, Turkish foreign policy decision-makers took series of measures to diversify the country's foreign policy partners. Relations with African countries in general and Ethiopia, in particular, are also part of this policy reorientation package.

The political sphere relations of Ethiopia and Turkey have been undertaking using various platforms such as high-level visits, diplomatic channels, political consultations, and parliamentary friendship and security aspects.

High-level visits which resulted in negotiations and signing of bilateral agreements are made by officials from Ethiopia and Turkey at different times. In this respect, from 13-15 March 2000 with the invitation of the then Turkish Foreign Minister, Ismail Cem, Ethiopian delegation headed by Seyoum Mesfin (former minister of Foreign Affairs) visited Turkey. The delegation discussed on the economic, political, trade and cultural relations of the two countries and strategies to enhance these cooperation.

Another important high-level visit that indicates the attention Turkish foreign policy decision makers provided to Ethiopia was made in 2005 by then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. This historic visit, accompanied by senior government officials and businesspeople, made Erdogan the first Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey who conducted an official visit to sub-Saharan Africa. During his two days stay in Addis Ababa, Erdogan met his Ethiopian counterpart Meles Zenawi and discussed on important bilateral issues. Together with socio-economic matters, Erdogan underlined the need to reopen Ethiopian Embassy in Ankara "... the closed Ethiopian embassy in Ankara has to be opened in the nearest possible time ... Prime Minister Meles Zenawi will be in Turkey for the opening ceremony" (Ali, 2012, p.199; quoted from Zemen, 2005). This finally led to the reopening of Ethiopian embassy in Ankara in 2006.

As it is noted by former Ethiopian Ambassador in Ankara Dr Mulatu Teshome (now become President of the Republic of Ethiopia), the reopening of Ethiopian embassy in Ankara has contributed to the later enhancement of the bilateral cooperation between Ethiopia and Turkey. The diplomatic community in Ankara works to establish networks that enhance the bilateral trade, foreign direct investment and economic aid which show a significant rise in the late 1990s and 2000s.

During his seven years stay in Ankara, as Ethiopian ambassador, President Mulatu played an important role for strengthening Ethio-Turkey socio-cultural, diplomatic and political ties. Furthermore, he had also series of negotiations with Turkish business people to invest in Ethiopia. He also presented Ethiopia's massive construction projects and lobby Turkish contractors to actively participate in the bids. President Mulatu's experience and smooth relation with various governmental and non-governmental actors in Turkey can serve as an important asset to further promote the bilateral relations. It is also an important opportunity



for Turkish foreign policy makers to enhance Turkey's relation with Ethiopia and other countries of the Horn of Africa.

Since the reopening of the Ethiopian embassy, Addis Ababa and Ankara have been taking various measures which aim to strengthen their diplomatic ties. In this respect, the agreement signed in 2011 regarding the mutual abolition of visas for holders of diplomatic passport is a good illustration. This agreement eases the movement of high officials and the diplomatic community of the two states.

The foreign policy and national security strategy of the post-Cold War Ethiopia underline the need to enhance the professional capability of the diplomatic community. It is obvious that carving well designed foreign policies and objectives alone would lead a given state nowhere unless it is complemented with a substantial implementation capacity. On the basis of this fact, the MoFA has been endeavoring to maintain cooperation with its foreign policy partners which have better diplomatic experience. In 2006 the MoFA signed an MOU with its Turkish counterpart concerning Foreign Service training. This MOU aims to consolidate institutional and technical cooperation, exchange of experts and researchers, organize joint forums and training.

Nevertheless, however, the Ethiopian embassy in Ankara is suffered from a limited number of staff. Given the strategic significance of Turkey to Ethiopia's economic diplomacy, Addis Ababa has to diversify its diplomatic representation in Ankara both in number as well as expertise. This will enhance the economic and diplomatic cooperation between the two countries.

Furthermore, the late Foreign minister and Prime minister of the Republic of Turkey, Prof Ahmet Davutoglu's visit to Ethiopia in 2010 and 2012 had also important contribution on the bilateral relations between Ethiopia and Turkey.

From the Ethiopian side, in response to Erdogan's invitation of 2005, the ex-Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, conducted a four-day official visit to Turkey in 2007. During his visit to Turkey, Meles was accompanied by more than 20 business people involved in agro-industry, textile, construction, leather manufacturing, floriculture, investment and other areas. The business people met with their Turkish counterparts and discussed on the possible ways of partnership. This negotiation between Ethiopia and Turkish business

people contribute a lot to the latter strong cooperation in foreign trade and investment (nazret.com, 2007).

Together with the 2007 official visit, Meles also represent Ethiopia and act as co-chair of the first Turkey-Africa Partnership Forum held in Istanbul in 2008. These and other high-level visits have an important contribution to consolidating the socio-economic and diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Turkey.

The contemporary political relations between Ethiopia and Turkey are also strengthened by their diplomatic ties. The importance of Addis Ababa as a diplomatic hub is growing day by day. Addis Ababa, which is regarded as the diplomatic capital of Africa, hosted important regional and international organizations such as the AU and the United Nations Economic Commissions for Africa (UN-ECA). In addition, it also serves as a regional office for many other international organizations like the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the European Economic Commission (EEC). More than 120 foreign embassies and diplomatic missions as well as head offices of various bilateral and multilateral organizations are also situated in Addis Ababa. This made Addis Ababa the third diplomatic hub in the world next to New York and Geneva (Wubineh, 2013).

Addis Ababa also hosts various business as well as political forums, including the annual African Union heads of state meeting. Hence, businesspeople, state officials and other important personalities come to Addis Ababa to deal economic and political affairs. All these strategic advantages, in turn, enhance Ethiopia's reputation on various regional and global economic as well as political affairs.

Together with this, Ethiopia's historical legacy as a seedbed of pan-Africanism further boosts its position in the AU. On various regional and continental issues, Ethiopia attracts the support of other member states of the AU.

On its part, Turkey has been taking series of diplomatic measures to enhance its socio-economic as well as political relations with Africa in general and Ethiopia in particular. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared 2005 as 'the Year of Africa' and launched various programs that further consolidate Turkey-Africa relations. In return for this commitment, the AU at its 10th summit announced Turkey as a strategic partner of the

continent. By the same year, 2008, Ankara organized a meeting, the first Turkey – Africa Partnership Summit (TAP) that was attended by 49 African states. The summit, held on 18-21 August 2008, was a good manifestation of Turkey’s commitment to open up Africa. As it is commented by Wheeler (2011), the summit is a major step in assuring steady and sustainable cooperation between Turkey and Africa.

As it is stated in the Istanbul Declaration on Africa-Turkey partnership, the two parties agreed to cooperate in the maintenance of peace, social justice, human right and eradication of hunger and poverty to mention some of them. The forum also highlights the significance of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) to maintain a comprehensive development in the continent. The NEPAD initiative postulates a wide range of development and governance program to establish peace, democracy and the rule of law. Turkish policymakers acknowledged NEPAD as an African solution for the widespread economic underdevelopment and political tension in the continent.

The Turkey-Africa partnership forum that was scheduled to be held every five years established a follow-up mechanism to check the level of implementation of its important decisions. In this respect, Africa-Turkey Cooperation High-Level Officials Meeting and Turkey-Africa Ministerial Review Conference are among the major platforms. On December 15, 2010, the first High-Level Officials Meeting was held in Istanbul to review the implementation of the first summit. Measures taken to implement the socio-economic and political decisions of the first TAP were evaluated. The meeting also assessed the challenges and opportunities and assignments were given to address the constraints.

In short, Turkey has been taking various measures to institutionalize its relations with Africa in general and Ethiopia in particular and thereby secures a long-lasting socio-economic and political cooperation. In doing so, Turkish foreign policymakers attempt to benefit from Ethiopia’s soft power capabilities. The selection of Meles as co-chair of the first Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit and nomination of Addis Ababa to host the second Africa-Turkey Cooperation High-Level Officials Meeting is good manifestations. Moreover, Ethiopia as the primary destination of Turkey’s Prime Minister visits of sub-Saharan Africa and the opening of TIKA’s first Africa Program Coordinator Office in Addis Ababa can also be taken as an indicator of Turkey’s strategic move to benefit from Ethiopia’s soft power capability.

The diplomatic cooperation between Turkey and African countries in general and Ethiopia in particular also manifest on various global forums. Turkey openly criticizes the nature and structure of the current international political economy system that marginalizes the interest of low-income countries. In addition, Turkey also condemns the lack of fair socio-cultural representations on many of the UN institutions, including the UN Security Council and how these biased representations affect the interest of LDCs in general and that of Africa in particular.

As it is indicated in the Istanbul Declaration, Turkey notes that the effort to maintain peace and development in the world is adversely affected by the vast gap between the North and South. In fact, Turkey's commitments to enhance the socio-economic and political interest of Africa on various international stages have acknowledged by the latter. During the 2009-2010 election of a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, Turkey got decisive support from most African countries that resulted in its victory.

The post-Cold War cooperation between Ethiopia and Turkey is also characterized by bilateral military and security relations. Ethiopia asserted the direct relationship between the prevalence of sustainable peace and security, both at home and in the region, and its national interest. Hence, in the course of negotiating with its foreign policy partners, Ethiopia provides attention for cooperation which aim to grant peace and security. Foreign friends who seek to provide technical supports that enhance Ethiopia's defense capability are welcomed by foreign policy decision makers.

The Ethiopian region and the Horn of Africa is featured by protracted inter and intra-state conflicts. The long survived civil war in Somalia, the political instabilities in the Darfur region of Sudan, the ongoing conflict in South Sudan and the tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea, to mention some of them. These disorders, in one way or another, influence the national interest of regional powers, including Ethiopia. Furthermore, any security threats in the strategically important region of the Horn of Africa also affect the economic as well as the political interest of many non-regional powers. In this perspective, given the significantly rising bilateral and multilateral trade between Turkey and countries of the Horn of Africa, the former is also highly concerned about the regional security.

The Istanbul Declaration of 2008 provides a legal framework for Turkey to support the effort to maintain peace and stability in Africa. Using the platforms of AU and Regional

Economic Commissions (RECs), Turkey has been playing an active role in settling conflicts in Africa. As part of this involvement, Turkey's contribution to managing the dispute in Somalia is worth to mention.

Since 2009, Turkey has been playing an active role to keep the maritime security of the Gulf of Aden. Turkey sent its troops to Somalia and joined the Combined Task Force 151 that was established by the UN Security Council. A total of 263 Turkish military personnel were sent to Somalia mainly to keep the Security of Turkish Merchant Ships against the pirates and thereby to pacify the regional maritime trading activity (Özkan, 2014).

Together with sending its troops and addressing immediate security concerns, Turkey is also taking important measures to build the capacity of the Somali national army. In 2010 Turkey and Somalia signed a military cooperation agreement that aimed to restructure and train the Somali army. This led to the provision of military training to hundreds of Somali security officials by its Turkish counterpart (International Crisis Group, 2012). This cooperation to build the capacity of Somali national force has special importance to maintain sustainable peace not only in Somalia but also throughout the Horn of Africa, including Ethiopia.

Here lies the distinctive feature of Turkey's engagement in Africa. Contrary to other non-regional powers which prioritize the use of force to address instabilities in Africa, Turkey favors multiple approaches. As it is stated in the Istanbul declaration (2008) Turkey promotes "peaceful settlement of international disputes and resolution of conflicts between states through negotiation, consultation or by other peaceful means rather than by use of force or by the threat of use of force" (Institute of Security Studies, 2008). Instead of promoting short-term gains at the expense of others, Turkey focuses on win-win approaches through long-term strategic interventions.

A good manifestation of Turkey's diverse and strategic engagement in Somalia is the active involvement of its GO's and NGO's in addressing the humanitarian crisis caused by the civil war and natural disasters. In this respect TIKA, the Turkish Red Crescent and other organizations support is considerable. Together with this, Turkey also used its reputation in the Organization of Islamic Council (OIC) to mobilize various supports for the crisis in Somalia. In August 2011 Turkey initiated a meeting that was attended by 40 member states of the OIC. Turkey asserted the critical situation in Somalia and urged OIC

member states to forward their support. The meeting ended with a promise to donate \$350 million to address the humanitarian crisis in Somalia (Mesfin, 2012).

Another important manifestation of Turkey's commitment to maintaining a real solution to the Somali crisis is its determination to base inside Somalia while delivering technical and humanitarian support. Unlike some Western governments, who intervened in the Somali issue basing in Nairobi or Addis Ababa, Ankara takes the risk and sent its officials and institutions to Mogadishu. In this respect, the August 2011 visit of the then Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan with his families, high-level government officials, businesspeople, artists etc., despite volatile security, is a case in point (Mesfin, 2012).

The above-noted efforts and commitments of Turkey to pacify Somalia is appreciated by Ethiopian foreign policy decision makers. One of my interviewee, Teshome, head of the Turkish Desk under the MoFA noted that Ethiopia acknowledges Turkey's persistent effort to address the instability in Somalia. He also highlighted the positive implication of Turkey's effort to pacify Somalia towards Ethiopia's engagement to maintain a stable and long-term socio-economic and political cooperation with its neighbors.

The dynamics in Somalia, on the other hand, has had its influence on Ethiopia's political economy. As a result, Ethiopia has been critically following the socio-political dynamism in Somalia and taking measures accordingly. As Kidist (2009) asserted, "... Ethiopia regards the Somali conflict as one of its national security issues..." (p. 25). The more than 1600 km border with Somalia which is not properly demarcated and hence often serve as a passage for arms smuggling and the existence of more than six million ethnic Somalis in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia present the above-noted concern of Addis Ababa (Kidist, 2009; CIA, 2007).

Moreover, Somalia also serves as a safe haven for Ethiopian ethnic militant groups such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), who fought to secede their respective ethnic group. For the past several decades, the militant groups have been utilizing Somalia to recruit, train and organize insurgency attacks against the Ethiopian government.

These and other threats obliged Ethiopia to involve in the affairs of Somalia in different forms. During the 1990s and 2000s Ethiopia together with other IGAD member states

organized several peace processes among the rival groups in Somalia. The Sodere Peace Process<sup>18</sup> in 1996, the Arta Conference<sup>19</sup> of 2000 and the Eldoret Peace Process<sup>20</sup> of 2002 are among the major efforts that showed Ethiopia's active involvement to maintain peace and stability in Somalia (Kidist, 2009).

Apart from IGAD member countries, the security threat posed by unstable Somalia forces Ethiopia to cooperate with non-regional powers including Turkey. On its part, Ankara acknowledges the strategic significance and reputation Addis Ababa has maintained in regional organizations such as IGAD and the OAU. In his 2011 visit to Ethiopia, Ahmet Davutoglu, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs discussed with Meles Zenawi and the then head of the African Union Commission, Jean Ping. Davutoglu asserted the need to maintain peace and stability in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Somalia, and Turkey's readiness to further strengthen its technical and financial support (African Union, 2011).

In addition, Ethiopia and Turkey have been working with the AU peacekeeping mission known as Africa Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)<sup>21</sup>, as a common ground to promote their effort. The First Ministerial Review Conference of the Turkey-Africa Cooperation (2011) noted this commitment. Turkey and Ethiopia (together with other African states) have been assisting AMISOM and its mission in Somalia (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011).

On the other hand, however, some foreign policy commentators argue the existence of competition between Ethiopia and Turkey in relations to the Somali agenda. As to Jara (2015), for instance, apart from their cooperation on various issues, there is a rivalry between Addis Ababa and Ankara in leading the course of stabilizing Somalia. This

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<sup>18</sup>Ethiopia hosted it. Twenty-seven faction leaders attended this peace process. The participants agreed to establish a National Salvation Council but later collapsed before meeting its objectives. For further information regarding the Sodere Peace Process, please refer Kidist Mulugeta (2009): *The Role of Regional and International Organizations in Resolving the Somali Conflict: The Case of IGAD*.

<sup>19</sup> Another important initiative organized by Djibouti to address the problem in Somalia. The peace process promoted the bottom-up approach to enhance peace and stability in Somalia. In doing so, IGAD member countries encourage the role of civil society in place of warlords. See Kidist Mulugeta (2009) for additional information.

<sup>20</sup> This forum is the most inclusive Somali peace process IGAD members organized. The conference was hosted by Kenya. A high number of delegates from different Somali clans participated and discussed the options to end the civil war. Refer Kidist Mulugeta (2009) for additional information.

<sup>21</sup> AMISOM was formed by the African Union's Peace and Security Council. Since its establishment in 2007, AMISOM has been striving to maintain peace and stability in Somalia and thereby strengthen the Somali government.

competition may lead to a unilateral intervention that adversely affects the effort to stabilize Somalia.

### **6.3 Socio-Cultural Sphere**

Similar to the economic and political spheres, post-Cold War Ethio-Turkey relations are also characterized by socio-cultural cooperation. Addis Ababa asserted the role of enhancing social development to achieve foreign policy objectives. Ethiopia's foreign policy decision makers of the post-Cold War highlight the purpose of maintaining strong cooperation in the fields of education, health, tourism, sport, media etc. to enhance its national interest. Hence, various bilateral and multilateral agreements, MOUs, and protocols which targets socio-cultural cooperation have been signed.

As part of its foreign policy reorientation, Turkey also acknowledges the importance of socio-cultural relations to promote its national interest. Turkey has been taking series of foreign policy measures which aim to reunite its people with those having common historical and socio-cultural attachments (Aras, 2009). The proliferation of Turkey's socio-cultural cooperation with sub-Saharan African countries during the post-Cold War period is also affected by this policy alteration.

Turkey has a relatively better socio-cultural and historical attachment with countries of the Horn of Africa as compared with the other regions of sub-Saharan Africa. The various tangible and intangible heritages which are existent in regional countries such as Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti etc. are good manifestations for this claim (Wheeler, 2011; Shinn, 2012).

In 2004 Ethiopia and Turkey signed an agreement that laid the foundation for later socio-cultural assistance. The agreement on cooperation in the field of culture, education, science, mass media, youth and sports signed in Addis Ababa serves as a basis for Ethio-Turkey collaboration in socio-cultural spheres (Ethiopian Embassy in Ankara, 2017).

#### **6.3.1 Education and Training:**

In her analysis on Turkey-Africa cooperation in the area of education, Ağildere (2008) highlighted that Turkey is becoming one of the major destinations for thousands of African students every year. A study that assessed the foreign education preference of African



students noted that, in 2010 Turkey was the 34<sup>th</sup> order of preference while it becomes 13<sup>th</sup> in 2015. It is a remarkable shift that indicates the development of Turkey-Africa cooperation in education. According to the Council of Higher Education (CoHE) 2017 report, out of the nearly 100 thousand foreign students studying at the graduate and under-graduate level, 14,270 of them are Africans (Ağildere, 2018).

In this regard, measures taken by Ankara to institutionalize the scholarship provision have played an important role. The establishment of the African Desk with in the Turkish Abroad and Related Communities contributed to the enrollment of students from various African countries. Since 2017, 3,891 Africa students under the Turkish scholarship have been attending under-graduate and post-graduate studies in various Turkish universities (Ağildere, 2018; YTB, 2017).

Together with providing scholarship, Turkey and Africa work to further enhance their cooperation in the area of education. Between 19 and 21 October, 2017 the Ministry of Education of Turkey organized Turkey-Africa Education Ministries Conference. This resulted in the signing of 41 cooperation agreements between Turkey and 28 African countries (Ağildere, 2018).

One of the essential manifestations of the Ethio-Turkey bilateral socio-cultural cooperation is education. Education plays a vital role in enhancing Ethiopia's human capital and thereby ensures sustainable development. Ethiopia has a young and vibrant population. However, the role of the youth to overcome poverty and assure economic growth has severely constrained by inadequate educational policies.

The post-Cold War Ethiopia developed Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) system that aims to equip the youth with fundamental skills. By producing graduates having the required technical expertise in their area of study, the government works to feed the industrialization process and agricultural transformation of the country. Turkey's rich experiences in technical and vocational training, especially in the fields of textile, leather, construction, irrigation techniques and others provide special importance to Ethiopia.

In article 2 of the Agreement on Cooperation on the fields of Culture, Education, Science, Mass Media, Youth and Sports Ethiopia and Turkey agreed to strengthen their cooperation

in the vocational and technical education and training and in providing workshop and laboratory materials (Ethiopian Embassy in Ankara, 2017).

In addition to vocational/technical education, Ethiopia and Turkey also maintain cooperation in granting scholarships for undergraduate and post-graduate studies. Turkey offers a scholarship to Ethiopian students at different academic levels and various disciplines. The great share of the Turkish scholarship program is organized by the presidency of the Turkish abroad and related communities (YTB). As it is indicated in table 9, Turkey government provides a scholarship for 40-50 students from Ethiopia every year. The beneficiary students are admitted to different universities in different cities throughout Turkey and study PhD, Masters and bachelor programs.

Table 10: Distribution of Turkish Scholarships to Ethiopia, 2009/10-2015/16

Scholarship Level	Academic Year						
	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16
Bachelor	3	-	2	2	15	20	15
Masters	5	5	8	18	8	15	17
PhD	2	4	10	15	6	17	22
*Others	3	5	3	7	7	7	7
Total	13	14	23	42	36	59	61

Source: YTB, 2015 and Authors compilation

\*Scholarship provides by the president of religious affairs of Turkey to high school students.

As it is shown in table 9, the number of Ethiopian students in Turkish scholarship is increasing every year, though the quota is not proportional to Ethiopia's large population. Together with this, the attention provided to graduate level is strategic and compatible with Ethiopia's ever-rising demand to highly qualified personnel in various sectors. The data from YTB also presented that up to 2015; around 20 Ethiopian students had finished their study in the undergraduate and postgraduate level. Currently, these graduates have been assuming responsibilities on various governmental and Nongovernmental Organizations in Ethiopia. Turkish graduates serve as an important agency in furthering Ethio-Turkey socio-economic and political relations.

In addition to YTB's scholarship program, other institutions like the Diplomacy Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and many other organizations provide short and medium term technical training and capacity building programs to the Ethiopian government staff. Between 13 and 16 March 2018, the Diplomacy Academy of Turkey organized training for senior Ethiopian diplomats. Issues such as economic diplomacy, negotiation techniques, global Issues and international relations and global and regional framework of Turkish foreign policy were the major focus areas of the training (Diplomasi Akademisi, 2018). Such kinds of trainings have critical importance in furthering Ethiopia's national interest by enhancing its human resource. The Turkish Government is covering all the costs related to these training including tuition fees, transportation, health insurance and other related costs of the education and training programs.

Apart from the normal teaching-learning scheme, Turkish scholarship provides various opportunities for international students to share the country's development experience. Visits to huge industry zones, business centers, historical sites and other places which illustrate Turkey's progresses regularly organized for international students including Ethiopians. These programs aim to exhibit Turkey's economic and political capacity and thereby lobby future leaders.

Together with this, series of forums have been organized by universities, think tanks and other research institutes. Turkish socio-economic and political policies are presented and discussed. Such kinds of forums provide a better opportunity for Ethiopian students to assess the lessons taken from Turkey's development experiences closely.

In a similar manner, Ethiopian students in Turkey present and highlight the socio-economic and political features of their country to the Turkish community. Through their academic writings and by participating in various forums and conferences, Ethiopian students have been introducing their country. In addition to other agendas, this information provisions carryout by Ethiopian student's in Turkey also paves the way for promoting the former's soft power. The roles Ethiopia has been playing in the international and regional political economy, its historical legacies and other soft power assets are propagated on many academic gatherings attended by Turkish students, intellectuals and researchers.

Hence, Ethiopian students serve as an agent in shaping the attitude of the Turkish public and thereby influence the nature and structure of their policies towards Ethiopia. This role

of Ethiopian students can be further enhancing with the support of the diplomatic community in Ankara. Ethiopian embassy in Ankara has to harmonize its public diplomacy efforts with the engagements of students as well as other Ethiopian communities living in different areas of the host country.

Although it is a limited amount, there are Turkish students who have been attending their post-graduate studies in various Ethiopian universities. Students who want to specialize in African history, African literature, African economy, African international relations and other related fields have joined Addis Ababa University. There is a high possibility on the rise of Turkish students studying in Ethiopia. This is mainly because of Turkey's desire of experts on African issues who have the know-how to formulate effective bilateral and multilateral policies.

The other important aspect of Ethiopia-Turkey cooperation in the field of education is the twinning of universities and research institutes. As it is noted by one of my informants, Teshome there are ongoing efforts to sign an MOU between Addis Ababa University and Adama Science and Technology University with Ankara University and Middle East Technical University respectively. Similarly, there are efforts to twin Debre Birhan University with Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University. In addition, EIIPD is twinned with the Strategic Studies Institute in Ankara. As it is highlighted by Abebe Aynete, a senior researcher at EIIPD, these aspects of the institutional relations ship have special importance to maintain sustainable cooperation between Ethiopia and Turkey. This is mainly because relations among academic institutions and their communities have stayed longer regardless of regime changes. Furthermore, joint work among universities and research institutes also provides strategic ideas for practitioners.

Apart from higher education, there was cooperation between Ethiopia and Turkey at primary and general education level. This cooperation was under the Nejashi Ethio-Turkish School, established in 2004. The schools are claimed to be owned and run by the Gulen movement. Following the 2002 attempted coup in Turkey, however, Ankara has been negotiating with Addis Ababa to hand over the schools to Maarif Foundation. This foundation was established after 2015 to take over overseas Turkish schools owned and administered by the Gulen Movement.

During their official visit to Ankara, FDRE president Dr Mulatu Teshome and Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn promised to hand over all the six branches of the Nejashi Ethio-Turkish school which are found in different parts of Ethiopia to Maarif Foundation.

### **6.3.2 Cultural Cooperation**

Despite the fact that Ethiopia is home to diverse cultural groups, during the past several governments the country hardly benefit from this resource. Instead, the one-sided cultural policies of the past Ethiopian governments resulted in the marginalization of many cultural identities by favoring certain others. Together with the undemocratic local governments, Ethiopia's traditional foreign policy partners who were intolerant to certain cultural identities of Ethiopian societies are also responsible for the above-noted marginalization.

On the other hand, however, post-Cold War Ethiopia's external relations with many of the rising powers, including Turkey are characterized by respect for socio-cultural diversity. In fact, Turkey as an initiator and advocator of the Alliance of Civilization (AoC) has appreciated socio-cultural variations. Ankara asserted the need to maintain mutual respect between cultures in its roadmap to Turkey-Africa relations. Since recent times, many Turkish institutions have been working to revive the long established historical and cultural relations with Africa. Ataturk Culture, Language and History High Authority in collaboration with many African Universities has been organizing workshops, congresses and projects which brought together many Turkish and African scholars and researchers<sup>22</sup>. Such kind of academic forums and project undertakings play important role in knowledge production and thereby substantiate Turkey-Africa cultural and historical cooperation.

In addition, to further promote Turkey-Africa socio-cultural cooperation, organizations such as Yunus Emre Institute have been playing strategic roles. This government related institute mainly aim to promote Turkish language, history, culture, art and other currencies of soft power and thereby improve Turkey's bilateral and multilateral relations (Yunus Emre Enstitüsü, 2015). As Yılmaz & Kılıçoğlu (2018) highlights, Yunus Emre Institute has been executing cultural diplomacy using various platforms. The institute provides Turkish language course that serves as an entry point to promote the country's socio-cultural

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<sup>22</sup> Various governmental organs and academic institutions including Gazi University, TRT, Turkish Historical Society, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey and Halk bank in collaboration with Mediterranean Basin and Africa Civilizations Research and Application Center (GAKAF) and 39 African countries state universities which specialized in the humanities area.

values, norms and standards. In addition, organizes events which paved the way for cultural interactions and exchanges are also organized by the institute. Using its offices in Algeria, Rabat, Johannesburg and Khartoum Yunus Emre Institute has been actively working to enhance Turkey-Africa socio-cultural cooperation. Together with the aforementioned countries, the institute has also plan to open offices in Ethiopia, Mozambique and Tanzania (Ağildere, 2018; Yunus Emre Enstitüsü, 2015).

The agreement signed between Ethiopia and Turkey in 2004 is a good illustration in this respect. The two party's agreement to carry out research and experience sharing between cultural organizations and institutions promotes dialogue among cultures and nations.

The cultural cooperation between Ethiopia and Turkey enables the former to use its diverse cultures and civilizations as an opportunity to promote its national interest. In doing so, Ethiopia has to exploit its cultural and historical heritages as currencies of cultural diplomacy. As one of my informant, a senior diplomat at the Ethiopian embassy in Ankara, Anteneh Tariku asserted, Ethiopia has to conduct cultural diplomacies in consideration with the cultural background of its foreign policy partners.

As far as the Ethio-Turkey cultural relations are concerned, the former has to use its soft power currencies such as King Nejashi, Bilal al-Habeshi, Umu Ayman (Baraka) etc. to successfully communicate with state and non-state actors of the later. Both policymakers as well as the public in Turkey have a special place for the above-noted Ethiopian ancestors. Hence, Addis Ababa can further consolidate its economic as well as political cooperation with Ankara by strategically utilizing the legacy of Nejashi, Bilal al-Habeshi and other ancestors.

It is important to mention here the special role of untraditional foreign policy actors in conducting effective cultural diplomacies. Actors like artists, religious leaders, business communities, journalists and members of the diaspora communities have to supplement the efforts of the diplomatic communities in Ankara. In most instances, the diplomatic staffs are busy with office works, and they have limited access to the general public. On the other hand, Ethiopian diasporas living in different areas of Turkey have better access to the host community. Hence, by creating a platform that enables the participation of non-state actors Ethiopia can enhance the outcome of its cultural diplomacy in Turkey.

As part of the Ethio-Turkey cultural cooperation, the two parties agreed to conserve and preserve cultural and historical heritage. In this perspective, Turkey's commitment to restore the Ottoman Consulate in Harar and the mosque of al-Nejashi in Wuqro/Mekele are among the meaningful works.

The consulate building in Harar was built during the Ottoman era, in 1912. It was constructed using the Ottoman architectural style. As it is commented by Dr Hamit Pilehvarian, head of the project, the building serves as living evidence regarding the socio-cultural and diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Ottoman Turkey. Other buildings which resemble the classical Turkish architecture also existed in the city of Harar. These houses were used by Turkish families from the Ottoman period.

Fazil Akin Erdogan, TIKA's Addis Ababa coordinator, suggested that the restored building of the Ottoman consulate will be open for local and foreign visitors. This enhances the touristic value of the historic city of Harar, which is on UNESCO's World Cultural Heritage (Alaturka News, 2016).

On the other hand, the Turkish families living in Harar and other areas of the Ethiopian region indicates the long-survived socio-economic and political relations between Harar and the Ottoman Empire. This relation, in turn, forces Ankara to permanently tie with Addis Ababa as one of its strategic partners. Hence, The Turkish families serve as a bridge in the contemporary Ethio-Turkey cooperation.

The attention Ankara has been providing to restore the cultural and historical heritages around Harar can forward new insights regarding Ottoman relations with the Ethiopian region and the Horn of Africa.

Together with the Ottoman Consulate General, TIKA has been restoring another important historical and cultural heritage in northern Ethiopia, i.e., the mosque of king Nejashi and its surroundings. Al-Nejashi was an ancient Ethiopian king (610-630), who provided shelter to the first Muslim immigrants from Meca. When the Quraysh Arabs emerged as an enemy against the new Islamic teachings and started to persecute Muslims, Prophet Mohammed ordered some of his followers to migrate and take refuge in the then Abyssinia. Al-Nejashi's kind treatment to the immigrants (in their most difficult times) laid the foundation for Ethiopia's special position among Muslims all over the world (Hussien,

1997). The respect and tolerance that al-Nejashi has shown to then Muslim immigrants regarded as an outstanding universal value. In his 2015 visit to Ethiopia, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan also reflected this fact as:

In 615 the then king of Abyssinia, Nejashi (by then he was a Christian) granted protection for the Muslim immigrants of Meca. Despite the strong pressure from the Quraysh Arabs to expel the immigrants from his territory, Nejashi allowed them to stay as they want and practice their religion freely in his land. This was the manner a Christian king treats Muslims. Hence, Ethiopia from the seventh century onwards becomes a land of respect, peace and tolerance for diversity... Had it been the world takes a lesson from Ethiopia, we may not have the holocaust in Germany...we may not have the civil strife in Syria, Iraq etc. caused by religious sectarianism...we may not have the religious discrimination against Muslims in Palestine and some European countries... (TRT HABER, 2015).

The President's speech asserts the significance of the above-noted cultural and historical legacies to enhance Ethiopia's image and reputation in the global political economy. Hence TIKA's restoration of the tomb of al-Nejashi and some 20 companions of Prophet Mohammed enables Ethiopia to utilize its outstanding heritages as currencies of soft power systematically. Furthermore, as TIKA's Addis Ababa coordinator-Fazil Akin Erdogan commented the restoration that encompasses a mosque (Nejashi Mosque) and other buildings including a multi-purpose hall will make the site an important local and international tourist destination.

#### **6.4 Factors for the Growing Relations between Turkey and Ethiopia**

Different economic and political factors are identified as major factors that contributed to the sharp increase in trade and development relations between the Ethiopia and Turkey in the post-Cold War period. Some of these factors are discussed below.

##### **6.4.1 Turkish Airlines**

Among the main actors which play important roles in Turkey's opening to Africa, Turkish Airlines worth to mention. By rapidly expanding its flights into various parts of the continent, the airline eases movement of people for education, tourism, business etc. and goods between Turkey and Africa. Currently, Turkish Airlines has direct flights to 31 African countries with 50 different destinations (Arpa, 2017).

Turkish Airlines began flights to Addis Ababa in 2006. It flies every day from Istanbul to Addis and back trip. The number of passengers is growing year by year. The direct flights have enabled a large number of Ethiopians and Turkish citizens to travel to the countries



for different purposes including trade, tourism, and education. A large number of passengers, other than Ethiopian and Turkish citizens, also benefit from this service.

The start of the direct flights by the Turkish airline has highly facilitated trade and investment between the two countries. The Turkish airline, which is one of the most preferred airlines in Ethiopia, has an office in Addis Ababa, which facilitates easy movement for Turkish businesspeople and investors in Ethiopia.

#### **6.4.2 Media and Communication**

Media and communication is an important factor in international relations. The more information governments and citizens of a country get about other countries, the higher will be the interaction in all areas and/or sectors. The same is true for the growing relations between Turkey and Ethiopia. The Anadolu Agency (AA), which is Turkey's international news agency, operates in all parts of the world including Africa. AA represents one of Turkey's soft powers in its international relations and public diplomacy. The AA has four coordination offices in Africa, one of which is in Addis Ababa. The AA office in Addis Ababa produces information about all aspects of Ethiopia, social and cultural, business and economics, politics and diplomacy etc. Accordingly, Turkish people, corporations, and government officials can easily access to a large amount of information about Ethiopia.

In return, the AA also disseminates information and news about Turkey to the Ethiopians side. The agency organizes press release and photograph workshops about major developments in Turkey. In 2014, the Ethiopian News Agency (ENA) and the AA signed a protocol for the ENA to buy news from the AA. The protocol paved the way for the two parties to exchange news and information in Ethiopia and Turkey and also information and news from other parts of the world. Hence, it is easier to see the positive impact played by the Anadolu agency to the fast-growing and all-round relationship between Turkey and Ethiopia.

#### **6.4.3 Civil Societies**

Since recent times, Turkish NGO's have been playing crucial roles in shaping the nature and structure of their country's foreign policy. This attention Ankara provided to strengthen the role of civil society organizations in its international relations has valuable insights for Ethiopia. Similarly, apart from the government to government interactions, the

cooperation between Ethiopia and Turkish civil society organizations has special importance to maintain long-lasting relations. This is because cooperation among civil organizations hardly affected by regime changes.

As part of Turkey's effort to institutionalize its relations with Africa, Turkish-African civil society organizations forum was held in Istanbul in August 2008. The forum was organized by the Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Studies (TASAM). Suleyman Sensoy, Chairman of TASAM, highlighted the special role civil associations can play in enhancing socio-cultural, economic and political relations among nations (Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Research, 2008). Hence, given the rise of dynamic civil society organizations in Turkey, Ethiopia can further develop its relations with the former by enhancing the role of Nongovernmental Organizations in the formation and execution of the country's foreign policies. This, in turn, assists the effort to maintain the real societal interest in the bilateral relations between Ethiopia and Turkey. Connections among civil society groups serve as a means to get the real attitude of the public regarding the economic and political cooperation between Ethiopia and Turkey. Assessing the attitude of the community at the grass root level enables foreign policy decision-makers to take timely reforms. In the absence of connectivity among civil society groups, public policies potentially become elite-dominated. This seriously constrains the effort to maintain sustainable partnership among nations.

#### **6.4.4 Turkish Graduates**

It has already mentioned that Education and training constituted an essential component of the Ethio-Turkish relations, especially in the post-cold war era. Accordingly, a large number of Ethiopian students received education and training opportunities in Turkey. Most of the Ethiopian students in Turkey are beneficiaries of the Turkish scholarship program. They constituted the larger proportion of the Ethiopian students. Moreover, a good amount of Ethiopian students in Turkey are sponsored by different national and international NGOs including the OIC and Turkish NGOs. Few self-sponsored students also study in different Turkish universities.

All the Ethiopian students that graduated from Turkey constitute a strong bridge between the two countries. Many of the Ethiopian Turkish graduates work in different government and nongovernment organizations in Ethiopia. A study by the Horn of African Strategic

Studies (HASS), one of Turkey-based think-tank established by Ethiopians in Turkey, has proved that Turkish graduates in Ethiopia have played an indispensable role in strengthening the Ethio-Turkish relations. Some of these graduates are working in the Turkish embassy, some in TIKA office, and others in the Turkish Airline Addis Ababa office. The bigger parts of the graduates are also working in Turkish companies operating in Ethiopia. Those working in government offices also contributed to the bilateral relations by assisting and facilitating projects in their departments and areas.

Ethiopian students also established different NGOs and business organizations both in Ethiopia and also in Turkey. These organizations are engaged in a large number of development and business activities which includes education, health, infrastructure development, tourism, and humanitarian assistance. The existence of the Turkish graduates and the organizations avoid language and cultural barriers, mitigate any other challenges that adversely affect the bilateral relations between Ethiopia and Turkey.

## CHAPTER VII

### 7 CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION

#### 7.1 Conclusion

In conclusion of this study, attempts have made to highlight the salient features of the topic that has been investigated so far. By analyzing the post-Cold War Ethiopia's foreign policymaking, I have presented the implications of a comprehensive foreign policy diversification in promoting the socio-economic, political and diplomatic interest of Ethiopia.

Before the beginning of the formal external relation, Ethiopia had long-survived socio-economic and political contact with different countries of the world. The rise of colonial rivalry in various parts of Africa, especially in the north and north East Africa severely constrained the nature of Ethiopia's foreign policymaking. Although European colonialists, who competed to consolidate their possession in the Horn of Africa, strived to annex Ethiopia, the latter strongly resisted and maintained its independence. This made Ethiopia the only African country that kept its sovereignty and served as a symbol of freedom for those people who fought against colonial impositions.

To address the then colonial threats, past Ethiopian governments worked to diversify the country's foreign policy approach. Lij Iyasu (1913-16), for instance, attempted to balance the colonial threat by cooperating with Sayid Mohammed Abdulle Hassen (a Somali nationalist leader) who fought against British and Italian colonialists. In addition, Lij Iyasu joined Ottoman Turkey and Germany against Britain, France and Italy during WWI.

In most instances, past Ethiopian governments used external relations as a tool to consolidate their autocratic regime. This adversely affected the role of foreign policy in promoting the socio-political and developmental interest of the masses. Many of the past feudal lords, for instance, strengthened their relations with European powers to benefit from the latter's armed supplies. European armaments were badly desired by Ethiopian

emperors to dominate local opponents and emerged as a supreme power. In doing so, they collaborate with European powers.

From 1916-1930 as a regent to Empress Zewditu and 1930-1974 as an emperor of Ethiopia, Haileselesie I had played a significant role in determining the nature and structure of the country's foreign policymaking. During this period, Ethiopia followed a Western-centric foreign policy approach.

Ethiopia's foreign relations with European powers such as Germany, Belgium, Sweden, and most importantly Britain markedly influenced by Haileselesie's prior contact with these states. In the post-WWII period, British economic and political influence over the Ethiopian region and Horn of Africa declined. This created a good opportunity for Ethiopia's foreign policy decision-makers to look for an alternative and strategic foreign policy partners.

On the other hand, the rise of the Cold War era ideological rivalry made the strategically important area of the Ethiopian region and Horn of Africa center of attraction. Together with other factors, Ethiopia's geo-strategic significance, near to the Middle East and Europe, and its long-survived ties with the United States resulted in the 1950s-1970s Ethiopia-US relations. This entitled Ethiopia to get economic and military assistance that was provided by the US to many of its non-NATO allies of the Cold War era.

In spite of the US economic and military support of the Cold War, however, post-WWII Ethio-US relations lacked long-term strategic engagements. Most of the security-dominated supports were event-driven, and they were not strategically planned to promote the real interest of the masses. Furthermore, Ethiopia's pro-America foreign policy of the Cold War negatively affected the effort of diversifying the formers external relation. Ethiopia was designated as an 'imperialist state' by many of the newly independent African states such as Egypt, Libya, and Somalia etc. where communism prevailed.

Ethio-US relations of the post-WWII period started to weaken with the decline of the latter's geo-political interest in the Ethiopian region and Horn of Africa. The rise of anti-Americanism among Ethiopian university students that finally led to the 1974 revolution also aggravated the decline of Ethio-US relations. The 1974 popular revolution that

marked the collapse of Haileselassie's regime resulted in the shift on the pro-US foreign policy behavior of Ethiopia.

Like the previous regimes, the military government used external relations as a tool to defend and legitimize its rule. The unconditional support and recognition provided by the Socialist bloc countries led the military regime to consolidate its relations with them. The economic and political tensions of the Cold War era, on the one hand, and the domestic grievances on the other severely constrained the effort to diversify Ethiopia's foreign policy partners and agendas. Ethiopia's full detachment from the West by favoring a more Eastern-centric foreign policy approach seriously undermined its capability to diversify and capitalize the long-survived relations with the US and other Western powers.

Marxist leaders of Ethiopia regarded traditional foreign policy partners, especially the US, as imperialists and threat for the former's national interest. This measure of the military government was, on the other hand, against the age-old dominance of the US in the Horn of Africa. Hence, to balance the growing Ethio-USSR relations, the US began to collaborate and arm Somalia. This finally led to the disruptive 1977-78 Ethio-Somali war-a proxy war of the East-West ideological rivalry of the Cold War era.

The downfall of the military regime and the coming to power of the EPRDF in 1991, have resulted in radical shifts in the nature and structure of Ethiopia's foreign policymaking. Instead of the past Eastern or Western-centric foreign policy approaches, post-Cold War Ethiopia has determined to promote a constructive engagement both with its traditional as well as emerging partners. Maintaining a balanced relationship with the traditional and emerging foreign policy partners enabled Ethiopia to promote an independent foreign policy decision making and thereby to keep a policy option which is responsive to the real demand of the society.

Maintenance of sustainable development and promote democratic governance highlighted as foundations of post-Cold War Ethiopia's foreign policy goals. Hence, irrespective of ideology, state and non-state actors who are willing to cooperate in trade and investment and maintenance of democratic governance and the rule of law are prioritized as strategic foreign policy partners of Ethiopia.

Together with the local dynamics, the transformation of the global political economy also determined the foreign policy behavior of post-Cold War Ethiopia. In this respect, the increase in the involvement of emerging powers in the international political economy has resulted in the shift on the US-led unipolar world order into a multi-polar arrangement. New actors such as China, India, Brazil, Turkey, Russia and South Africa among others emerged and became key players in the international political economy. These actors underlined the strategic significance of promoting South-South development cooperation that provides developing countries with an alternative foreign policy partner. This, in turn, allows countries, like Ethiopia to set its foreign policy agendas on the basis of the national interest.

A good illustration of post-Cold War Ethiopia's balanced foreign policy engagements among the traditional and emerging powers is the revival of its relationship with the West, particularly with the US. Washington took the initiative to organize a regime change negotiation, the London Peace Conference in 1991. This negotiation, chaired by US Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Herman Cohen, was between the collapsing military regime and the three major armed groups: the TPLF, EPLF and OLF. Together with facilitating a relatively smooth regime change, the London Peace Conference also stimulated the beginning of post-Derg Ethiopia's relations with the US.

The various economic and political reforms of post-Cold War Ethiopia have furthered its relations with the US and other Western powers. These reforms resulted in the provision of massive aid during the 1990s and 2000s. Various governmental and Nongovernmental Organizations of the West granted more than \$26 billion as development aid. These supports had strategic importance to keep the economic and political stability of Ethiopia in the immediate post-Cold War period.

US's security interest in the Horn of Africa, especially following the 9/11 attack, also further strengthened the Ethio-US relations of the post-Cold War era. Addis Ababa becomes a strategic partner of the US Africa Command of the GWOT. In addition, US's establishment of a drone base in southern Ethiopia, at Arba Minch, that aimed to target al-Qaeda operations in Somalia and Yemen also enhance Ethiopia's strategic significance to the US.

On the other hand, the post-Cold War Ethiopia's relations with the US and other powers of the West were also characterized by disagreements. Differences in economic and political ideologies were the prime factors. Since the early 2000s, the EPRDF has started to promote the idea of 'developmental state' and criticized the neoliberalism as unfit for Ethiopia's economic and political transformation. This disagreement was also accompanied by aid-conditionality mainly set by donors. The EPRDF government was requested to take reforms in areas such as agriculture, financial market, and land liberalization, but replied negatively. In fact, this disagreement between Ethiopia and traditional foreign policy partners has led the former to consolidate its relation with emerging powers further.

Together with promoting economic and political relations with traditional powers, post-Cold War Ethiopia provides particular attention to diversify its foreign affairs by engaging emerging powers such as China, India and Turkey among others. The relationship between Ethiopia and the rising powers appears to be symbiotic in which socio-economic and political demands presented by both sides.

Ethio-China relations of the post-Cold War can be regarded as one of the famous illustrations of Ethiopia's foreign policy diversification scheme. Chinese foreign policy decision makers highlight the economic and diplomatic significance of Ethiopia to realize its Africa policy. Ethiopia's large population, and the subsequent market potential and the symbolic importance of Addis Ababa as a permanent headquarter of the African Union regarded as vital resources to promote Chinese economic and diplomatic expectations. Similarly, Addis Ababa also acknowledges Beijing's economic importance as a source of FDI and market destinations for Ethiopia's primary commodities.

The post-Cold War Sino-Ethiopian relations are also characterized by diverse approaches such as political consultations, inter-parliamentary friendship group, sectoral ministries and administrative unit level cooperation and close interconnection between the ruling parties. These multiple mechanisms enable Addis Ababa and Beijing to reinforce their national interests further. Furthermore, China's huge investment in road and railway network projects and power sector is also a proper manifestation of Sino-Ethiopia's strategic engagements. According to the Ethiopian Roads Authority (ERA), 70% of the road work that has been accomplished in Ethiopia is owned by Chinese road construction firms



(Cheru, 2016). Measures taken by China and Ethiopia to enhance the bilateral trade are also important manifestations of the diverse agendas the two states have been promoting. In 2006, for instance, China became the top market destination (13.3%) for Ethiopia's export items.

Like that of China, post-Cold War Ethio-India relations are also regarded as an important manifestation of Ethiopia's foreign policy diversification scheme. Ethio-India bilateral relations of the post-Cold War are benefitted from past diplomatic relations that stayed for several decades. To promote trade and investment opportunities, the two countries instituted a Joint Trade Committee that comprised of trade and foreign affairs ministries. This resulted in significant rise in bilateral trade from less than \$50 million to over \$890 million between 1995 and 2012 (Ethiopian Economics Association/Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute, 2009). Furthermore, India has been funding Ethiopia's development projects. In this respect, Delhi's support to expand rural electrification and sugar industry of Ethiopia has strategic significance.

In spite of the above-noted benefits induced by Ethiopia's relations with emerging powers, however, some policy analysts have their doubt regarding the long-term implication of the bilateral and multilateral cooperation. According to these analysts, the economic and development assistance provided by emerging powers aimed not to promote Ethiopia's national interest, instead to maintain the former's socio-economic and political influence. The main objective of emerging powers engagement with Ethiopia is not to make the latter developed and self-reliant, rather make it destiny for cheap industrial goods. The trade imbalance between Ethiopia and emerging powers in which the former sell raw materials with low prices and buy industrial products is regarded as a prime manifestation of the exploitative nature of the relation.

Other foreign policy commentators, on the other hand, argue for the various opportunities Ethiopia has earned from the ongoing bilateral and multilateral relations. In fact, these foreign policy analysts accept the economic and political desire of emerging powers. In their views, emerging powers motive to support Ethiopia's agricultural, health, education and infrastructure development stemmed from the symbiotic nature of the relations. Ethiopia has a common agenda to promote with emerging powers. Hence, for these

analysts diversifying foreign policy partners enhances Ethiopia's bargaining power to secure its national interest in the current competitive international environment.

Hand in hand with intensifying its relation with emerging and established powers, post-Cold War Ethiopia's foreign policymaking is also characterized by the effort to strengthen Ethiopia's relation with its neighbors. In place of the 'siege mentality' that dominated past Ethiopia's foreign policymaking of the Horn of Africa mutual economic and political cooperation have prevailed in the post-Cold War period. Ethiopia's foreign policy decision makers strategically engaged neighboring states that resulted in diverse social, economic and political opportunities.

The road and railway networks that post-Cold War Ethiopia maintained with countries such as Djibouti, Sudan, Somalia and Kenya have resulted in significant rise in bilateral and multilateral trade relations. As it is indicated by WITS (2016), neighboring countries like Somalia, Djibouti and Sudan become major export destinations of Ethiopia's agricultural products. It is also believed that this economic relationship promotes peace and security in the widely unstable region of the Horn of Africa.

Post-Cold War Ethiopia's pursuit of diversifying foreign policy partners has been substantiated by pluralizing foreign policy agendas, instruments and actors. Without keeping a comprehensive foreign policy diversification scheme that involves not only partners but also adequate foreign policy tools, appropriate actors and well-articulated agendas, it is unlikely to promote a state's national interest. Hence, to effectively address post-Cold War Ethiopia's foreign policy objectives, a policy environment that assures the formulation of various social, cultural, economic, political and diplomatic agendas in a democratic and participatory manner is required. This is particularly important for Ethiopia where multiple interest groups who have multiple agendas exist. Furthermore, diversifying foreign policy agendas enables Ethiopia to revise the past elite-dominated policymaking on the one hand and to entertain the interests of the masses on the other. The FANSPS of the post-Cold War Ethiopia highlighted maintenance of national development and a democratic political system as the country's prime foreign policy agendas. The document asserted the role of external relations as a means to fulfil the above-noted strategic agendas and thereby to secure the national interest.

It is obvious that successful execution of diverse foreign policy agendas requires multiple foreign policy actors. Together with state actors, NSA also plays a prominent role in framing and implementing policy objectives. Past Ethiopia's foreign policymaking that was suffered from a state-centric approach inhibited the role of NSA in the country's foreign affairs. This, in turn, negatively affected the contribution of non-governmental actors to secure the national interest. Considering the rising role of NSA in promoting nations socio-cultural, economic, political and diplomatic agendas, the FANSPS highlights the role of non-governmental actors to enhance Ethiopia's national interest. Research institutes, intellectuals, media, activists, and the diaspora begin to play a relatively active role in the foreign policymaking of post-Cold War Ethiopia.

The effort to diversify Ethiopia's foreign policy partners and agendas can't attain the desired objective without substantiating by adequate foreign policy tools. Among other factors, a state's preference to certain foreign policy tools is determined by a nation's foreign policy objective. To promote its economic and political objectives, post-Cold War Ethiopia has been utilizing tools such as economic diplomacy. Both the MoFA and diplomatic communities are using economic diplomacy as a prime foreign policy instrument to engage foreign governmental as well as non-governmental actors.

In addition, the Ethiopian diplomatic community also strives to influence the attitude of the host community and promote Ethiopia's foreign policy objective using public diplomacy as an instrument. Ethiopian diasporas have the potential to link with members of the host community effectively and thereby enhancing society to society relations. The Diaspora Affairs Directorate General, a special department under the MoFA has been working to mobilize the Ethiopian diaspora and enhancing their role in public diplomacy.

Together with the above-noted foreign policy tools, exploiting Ethiopia's soft power capability is also an important strategy to enhance the foreign policy objectives. Through promoting its historical legacies, past foreign policy decisions, and other currencies of soft power Ethiopia has a special quality to keep the national interest. Furthermore, the diverse socio-cultural and religious groups of Ethiopia also serve as a soft power currency. This provides a unique opportunity for Ethiopia to conduct cultural diplomacy with various nations that have diverse socio-cultural and religious categories.

In spite of the huge soft power capability, however, Ethiopia lacks the required human resource and organizational framework to exploit them and enhance the national interest properly. In some instances the prevailed one-sided cultural policies of past Ethiopian governments severely constrained the cultural exchanges of the various nations and nationalities of Ethiopia with the outside world. Despite the fact that post-Cold War Ethiopia has been working to pluralize foreign policy agendas, the effort made to use multiple instruments to execute them is still limited. This constrained the outcomes of Ethiopia's foreign policy decision making.

In this study, efforts also have made to highlight the post-Cold War Ethio-Turkish relations as a manifestation of the former's comprehensive foreign policy diversification scheme. Foreign policy decision makers of Ethiopia have identified Turkey as a strategic partner based on its contribution to substantiate Ethiopia's national interest. In fact, there were and/or are demands from Ankara to reintegrate itself with regional and non-regional powers and thereby promote its foreign policy agendas. Since the coming to power of the AKP, in 2002, Turkey has been consolidating its socio-economic, political and diplomatic relations with many African countries, including Ethiopia.

The FANSPS (2002) highlighted Turkey's large market and the developed economy as an important pulling factor for the bilateral economic cooperation. In 1993 Ankara and Addis Ababa signed an important agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation and Trade. In addition, in 2000 the two states established the Ethio-Turkish Joint Economic Commission (JEC) that led to sustained developmental cooperation. JEC has been organizing series of meetings in Addis Ababa and Ankara interchangeably, that is attended by senior government officials and policymakers.

With the opening of TIKA's first Africa office in Addis Ababa in 2005, Ethio-Turkey bilateral relation further intensified in various strategic areas. In this perspective, Turkey's development loan to Ethiopia's massive infrastructural project is worth to mention. The rise in bilateral trade between Ethiopia and Turkey, from less than \$10 million in 1994 to more than \$500 million in 2016, is also noted as an important indication of the strategic partnership of the two states. Together with the trade in goods, the booming of Turkish health tourism sector increased the number of Ethiopians who have been visiting Turkey.

Turkey's investment in Ethiopia has manifested a significant rise in the post-Cold War period. Many Turkish firms with a total capital of around \$3 billion have been investing in various sectors. This has resulted in the creation of permanent and temporary job opportunity for more than 50,000 Ethiopians. In this perspective, to make the investments compatible with Ethiopia's sustainable development, Turkey needs to focus on those areas which are not engaged by local business people.

The long-lived political and diplomatic relations consolidate the economic cooperation of Ethiopia and Turkey. Ankara and Addis Ababa have maintained a diplomatic relation that goes back to the last decade of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. In 1926 Turkey opened its embassy in Addis Ababa. This was reacted by Ethiopia by opening its embassy in Ankara in 1933.

High-level visits, parliamentary friendships, political consultations, security and diplomacy, have characterized the post-Cold War era Ethio-Turkish relations of the political sphere. Apart from the bilateral relations, Ankara and Addis Ababa have also been cooperating in maintaining peace and stability in the troubled Horn of Africa region, particularly in Somalia. The various socio-economic and diplomatic measures taken by Turkey showed its commitments to maintain sustainable peace and security in the Horn of Africa region. Turkey has been collaborating with important state and non-state actors of the region such as IGAD and AMISOM

Turkey's opening of Africa policy and the new model of partnership for the strengthening of sustainable development and Addis Ababa's diplomatic significance (as the headquarter of the African Union) further solidified the political relations of the two states. In this regard, Turkey's decision to open TIKA's first Africa office in Addis Ababa and the nomination of Meles as co-chair of the First Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit in 2008 in Istanbul are proper manifestations.

Socio-cultural cooperation also characterizes Post-Cold War Ethio-Turkish relations. In 2004 Addis Ababa and Ankara signed an important agreement on cooperation in the field of culture, education, science, mass media, youth and sports. Together with other assistance, this agreement has enabled Ethiopia to benefit from Turkey's experiences in the area of Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) and promote the formers industrialization and agricultural transformation endeavors. Furthermore, the scholarships opportunities provide by Turkey have also been assisting Ethiopia's human capital and

thereby strengthen its economic development. Since recent times, Turkish students' who want to specialize in African history, African economy, and African international relations have been attending at Addis Ababa University.

The cultural relations between Ethiopia and Turkey promote dialogue and experience sharing among various cultural groups that are found in the two sovereign states. This, in turn, paves the way for using the diverse cultural and historical heritage of Ethiopia as currencies of Soft power and thereby promotes its national interest. Turkey's enduring effort to conserve cultural and historical heritages that are found in different places of Ethiopia such as the Ottoman Consulate in Harar, the Mosque of al-Nejashi in Wugro etc. will further enhance the cultural diplomacy of the two nations.

In general, the above-noted multidimensional relations between Ethiopia and Turkey have been affected by various socio-economic and political factors. The beginning of Turkish Airlines Flight to Addis Ababa, the opening of Anadolu Agency office in Addis Ababa, the active role of Turkish NGOs, and Turkish graduates in Ethiopia are the principal ones.

## **7.2 Policy Recommendation**

As it is presented in the preceding sections of the study, post-Cold War Ethiopia's foreign policymaking is characterized by a diversified approach. Ethiopia has constructively engaged both the traditional and emerging foreign policy partners and strived to attain its foreign policy objectives. Nevertheless, however, it should also be noted that there are ongoing debates regarding the extent that post-Cold War Ethiopia has provided to maintain a comprehensive foreign policy diversification scheme. Some analysts argue the limited attention provided to enhance the real interest of the Ethiopian masses by assuring the role of NSA in formulating and executing foreign policy agendas. Others also argue the imbalance on the foreign policy instruments which have been utilizing to achieve the socio-economic, political and diplomatic agendas. Taking into consideration of these critiques, I found it essential to forward the following policy recommendations.

1. Ethiopia should keep the balance of its external relations with both the traditional and emerging foreign policy partners. This is crucial to enhance Ethiopia's prominence and influence in the regional and international diplomacy and thereby sustain its national

interest. Failure to keep the balance will lead Ethiopia to extremely rely on certain foreign policy partners that endangers its national sovereignty.

2. To maintain a win-win relationship with its traditional as well as emerging foreign policy partners, Ethiopia should formulate coherent policies and strategies which can address the challenges caused by foreign business and aid practices. In doing so, the active participation of untraditional foreign policy actors and their effective integration with the traditional ones paves the way for the formulation of policies and strategies that promote the real societal interests.

3. Ethiopia needs to take series of measures that will address the foreign trade imbalance with its traditional and emerging partners. This can be achieved by exporting value-added products in place of its primary agricultural products. In doing so, Ethiopia should attract foreign investors who have the interest and capacity to engage in the agricultural sector and diversify the narrow range of Ethiopia's export products.

4. Together with promoting economic and political agendas, Ethiopia should provide adequate attention to socio-cultural relations. Given the diverse socio-cultural categories, Ethiopia has a special capability to link with various nations which have multiple socio-cultural groups. Ethiopia needs to consider its socio-cultural diversity as an asset to promote successful diplomacy. As far as the Ethio-Turkey relations are concerned, the former should utilize its ancestors such as Bilal al-Habeshy, King Nejashi, Umu Aymen (Baraka) etc. as currencies of soft power and promote successful cultural diplomacy.

5. As it is commented by some foreign policy commentators, Ethiopia's relations with many emerging powers heavily relied on economic cooperation. In some instances, this extreme focus on economic security endangers other values such as good governance and human security. Hence, Ethiopia's relations with rising powers should provide equal attention to the principle of the rule of law, good governance and observance of human security.

6. The crisis in Yemen has made the geo-strategically important region of the Horn of Africa a center of rivalry between many regional and non-regional powers. The tension in the already unstable region further escalated with the establishment of military bases. This negatively affected the economic and political security of regional powers such as

Ethiopia. Turkey, as the main stakeholder, that has been enhancing its presence in the region should take the initiative to organize dialogue and negotiation among regional and non-regional powers and thereby relax the tension.

7. To attain its foreign policy objectives, Ethiopia needs to enhance its trade and economic relations with countries of the Horn of Africa. In doing so, Addis Ababa has to collaborate with those regional and non-regional powers, including Ankara that has been working to maintain sustainable peace and security in the region, especially in Somalia. Ethiopia and Turkey should harmonize their engagement in Somalia. In doing so, the two states can address disagreements and rivalry induced by unilateral decisions.

8. Ethiopia's current foreign policy towards Turkey and other emerging powers rely too heavily on the state to state interactions. Although the state to state relations are important, Ethiopia's foreign policy approach should be substantiated by the active engagement of NSA. This enables Ethiopia to promote its foreign policy goals in a more sustainable manner, irrespective of regime changes.

9. Ankara should speed up the opening of Yunus Emre Institute's branch office in Addis Ababa. This paves the way for the provision of Turkish language, culture, art and literature in various Ethiopian universities. This, in turn, enhances the knowledge of the socio-cultural and historical backgrounds of the two people and thereby furthers the society to society relations.

10. Given the rise of its socio-economic and diplomatic relations with Africa in general and that of the Ethiopian region and Horn of Africa in particular, Ankara should further its diplomatic representation in Ethiopia. This is because, Addis Ababa as a capital of Africa has been serving as a center for various kinds of negotiations between African states and their foreign partner. Both the traditional as well as emerging global actors are using their diplomatic community accordingly. Hence, Turkey to enhance its diplomatic outreach to Africa should raise the size and diversity of its diplomatic mission in Ethiopia.

11. Turkey should encourage its big companies to invest in Ethiopia and enhance the latter's economic development through creating job opportunities and technology transfer. Especially, Ankara's investment in the energy sector is most welcomed by Addis Ababa. This will enhance Turkey's credibility as a real and strategic development partner of



Ethiopia. Ethiopia's foreign policy decision makers and local business people are unhappy with the influx of small-scale Turkish investors and their engagements in those areas which are exhausted.

12. Ethiopia should further its policy reforms to attract additional FDI from Turkey and other emerging powers. In this regard, Addis Ababa needs to reconsider Ankara's request for a Free Trade Agreement and the opening of a bank in Ethiopia-important steps to raise the bilateral trade and FDI flow.

13. Given the huge economic and political capacity, the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs should increase the number of its diplomats in Turkey. Enhancing the human and material resources enable Ethiopia to manage its socio-economic as well as political expectations properly.

14. Turkey needs to benefit from Ethiopia's reputation in IGAD, AU and other regional organizations to successfully promote its socio-economic and political interests in Africa in general and that of the Horn in particular. Similarly, Turkey's reputation in many international organizations such as the UN, OIC, G20, NATO and other platforms serves as an asset for Ethiopia to further its foreign policy objectives.

15. It is also important that Turkey needs to assess the views of those Ethiopians who are skeptical about its FDI in various parts of the country. Apart from governmental actors, Turkish business people should communicate with scholars, journalists, activists, and community leaders etc. to have the real feeling of the society and make amendments accordingly. Neglecting the interest of the grass root communities could lead to tensions and social unrest, and this may affect the entire Ethio-Turkey relations in the future.

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix A: TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu çalışmanın temel amacı, Etiyopya'nın ulusal çıkarlarına yönelik kapsamlı bir dış politik yaklaşım çeşitliliğinin rolünü değerlendirmektir. Etiyopya uzun süredir devam eden dış ilişkilere sahip olmasına rağmen, bu ilişkilerden faydalanamamış ve kitlelerin ekonomik ve politik çıkarlarını sağlayamamıştır. Geçmişin yanlış yönlendirdiği dış politika ve stratejisi, ekonomik refahı ve demokratikleşme sürecini olumsuz yönde etkilemiştir.

Geçmişteki Etiyopya dış politikasının zayıf formülasyonu ve uygulanmasından sorumlu olarak kabul edilebilecek çeşitli faktörlerin tanımlanması mümkündür. Ancak, bu zorlukların çoğu tek bir temel nedenden kaynaklanmıştır: devlet merkezli ve elit ağırlıklı egemenlik. Geçtiğimiz birkaç on yıl boyunca, Etiyopya toplumunun ülkenin dış politika gündemlerini belirleme ve uygulamadaki rolü marjinal olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Ülkenin dış politika programını tanımlamak ve önceliklendirmek için toplum ve temsilcileriyle iletişim kurmaya ve diyaloga son derece sınırlı çabalar sarf edildi.

Öte yandan Etiyopya'da, farklı millet ve halklar için bir yuva olarak, ülkenin dış politika yapımına ilgi duyan çeşitli gruplar vardır. Etiyopya'nın dış politika yapımını çeşitlendirmek için bazı çabalar olsa da, bu başarılar sadece ortakları genişletmekle sınırlıydı. Dış politika gündemlerini, araçlarını ve aktörlerini çeşitlendirme çabaları son derece kısıtlıydı. Bu nedenle, yukarıda belirtilen zorlukları ele almak ve ülkenin kitlelerin çıkarına duyarlı dış ilişkilerini sağlamak için dış politika yapımının kapsamlı çeşitlendirilmesinin gerekli olduğu tartışılmaktadır.

Çalışmanın özel hedefleri şunlardır:

- Etiyopya'nın yükselen güçlerle ilişkilerinin farklı özelliklerini değerlendirmek.
- Etiyopya'nın ulusal çıkar ve dış politika stratejisini vurgulamak için devlet dışı aktörlerin rolünü belirtmek.
- Etiyopya'nın hedeflerine ulaşmak için dış politika araçlarının uyumluluğunu değerlendirmek.
- İç politika ve dış politika gündemi arasındaki ilişkileri incelemek.
- Türkiye'nin dış politika hedeflerini ve Etiyopya'nın ekonomi politiği üzerindeki etkilerini vurgulamak.

Çalışmada birleşik bir araştırma yöntemi kullanılmıştır.Hem nitel hem de nicel araştırma metodolojileri kullanılmıştır.Araştırmacı, 2015 ve 2016 yıllarında Etiyopya'da kapsamlı saha araştırması gerçekleştirdi. Konuyla ilgili önemli veriler, Etiyopya'nın dış politika oluşturma üzerinde doğrudan veya dolaylı etkisi olan çeşitli ulusal, bölgesel ve uluslararası kuruluşlarda çalışan uzman ve yetkililerle yapılan görüşmelerle toplanmıştır.Etiyopya'nın genel olarak yükselen güçler ve Türkiye ile ilişkilerinin niteliği hakkındaki görüşlerini kavramak için Etiyopyalı dış politika uzmanları arasında derinlemesine görüşmeler yapıldı.Buna ek olarak, dış ticaret, ikili ve çok taraflı yardım, doğrudan yabancı yatırım ve kredi veren uluslararası kuruluşlar, hükümetler ve araştırma kurumları tarafından sunulan niceliksel bilgiler, nitel verilerin doğruluğunu kanıtlamak için de kullanılmaktadır.

Dış politika yapımının kapsamlı çeşitlendirilmesi fikrini sistematik olarak kavramsallaştırmak için çoğulcu yaklaşım, özellikle siyasi çoğulculuk kullanılmıştır.Siyasi çoğulculuk, çeşitli baskı gruplarının ve çıkarlarının ortaya çıkışını ve bu farklılıkları yapıcı ve verimli bir şekilde kullanma ihtiyacını kabul eder.Ayrıca, siyasi bir süreçte gücün ve etkinin nasıl tahsis edildiğini ve karar verme sürecini nasıl şekillendirdiğini vurgulamaktadır.Çoğulcu yaklaşımın yukarıda belirtilen argümanları, Soğuk Savaş sonrası Etiyopya'nın politika karar verme sürecini anlamak için önemli bir etkiye sahiptir. Ayrıca, farklı çıkar gruplarını dikkate alma ve buna göre politika seçeneklerini sunma yolunu açar. Bu hareketin, bir etnik, dini ve dil grubunun gelecekteki hakimiyetini diğerlerine dayandırmasında rolü vardır.Buna karşılık, çeşitli dini, dil ve etnik grupların kendilerini tanıtmaları ve kendi üyelerinin çıkarlarını korumalarını sağlar.

Resmi dış ilişkinin başlangıcından önce, Etiyopya, dünyanın farklı ülkeleriyle uzun süreli sosyo-ekonomik ve siyasi temastan uzaktı. Afrika'nın çeşitli bölgelerinde, özellikle de kuzey ve kuzeydoğu Afrika'da sömürgeci rekabetin artması, Etiyopya'nın dış politika yapısının doğasını ciddi biçimde sınırlandırmıştır.Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki sömürgeciliklerini pekiştirmek için yarışan Avrupalı sömürgeciler, Etiyopya'yı ilhak etmek için çaba sarf etmiş olsalar da, Etiyopya bağımsızlığını sağlamıştı ve bağımsızlığını korudu.Bu, Etiyopya'yı, egemenliğini koruyan ve sömürgecilik emellerine karşı savaşan insanlar için özgürlük sembolü olarak hizmet eden tek Afrika ülkesi yaptı.

Daha sonra sömürgeci tehditleri ele almak için, geçmişte Etiyopya hükümetleri ülkenin dış politika yaklaşımını çeşitlendirmek için çalıştılar.Örneğin Lij Iyasu (1913-16), İngiliz ve

İtalyan sömürgecilerine karşı savaşıyan Seid Mohammed Abdulle Hassen (Somalili bir milliyetçi lider) ile işbirliği yaparak sömürge tehdidini dengelemeye çalıştı. Buna ek olarak, Lij Iyasu Birinci Dünya Savaşı sırasında İngiltere, Fransa ve İtalya'ya karşı Osmanlı Türkiyesi ve Almanya'ya katıldı.

Çoğu durumda, geçmişte Etiyopya hükümetleri, dış ilişkileri kendi otokratik rejimlerini pekiştirmek için bir araç olarak kullandılar. Bu durum, dış politikanın kitlelerin sosyo-politik ve gelişimsel çıkarlarını desteklemedeki rolünü olumsuz yönde etkilemiştir. Örneğin, geçmiş feodal beylerin çoğu, silahlı armatörlerden yararlanmak için Avrupalı güçlerle ilişkilerini güçlendirdi. Etiyopya imparatorları tarafından yerel silahlı düşmanlara hükmetmek ve yüce bir güç olarak ortaya çıkmak için Avrupa silahları kötü bir şekilde arzulandı. Bunu yaparken Avrupalı güçlerle işbirliği yaptılar.

1916-1930'dan İmparatoriçe Zewditu bir sükunet dönemi olarak ve 1930-1974 yılları arasında Etiyopya'nın imparatoru olan Haile Selassie 1. ülkenin dış politika yapısının doğasını ve yapısını belirleyicisi olarak önemli bir rol oynamıştı. Bu dönemde Etiyopya, Batı merkezli bir dış politika yaklaşımını izledi.

Etiyopya'nın Almanya, Belçika, İsveç ve en önemlisi İngiltere gibi Avrupalı güçlerle olan dış ilişkileri, Haile Selassie'nin bu devletlerle önceden temasından önemli ölçüde etkilenmiştir. İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası dönemde, Etiyopya bölgesi ve Afrika Boynuzu üzerindeki İngiliz ekonomik ve siyasi etkisi reddedildi. Bu, Etiyopya'nın dış politika karar vericileri için alternatif ve stratejik bir dış politika ortakları aramaya yönelik iyi bir fırsat yarattı.

Öte yandan, Soğuk Savaş döneminin ideolojik rekabetinin yükselişi, Etiyopya bölgesinin ve Afrika Boynuzu'nun cazibe merkezinin stratejik olarak önemli bir alan olmasına zemin hazırladı. Diğer faktörlerle birlikte, Orta Doğu ve Avrupa'ya yakın olması, Etiyopya'nın jeostratejik önemi ve ABD ile uzun süredir devam eden bağları 1950'ler-1970'lerde Etiyopya-ABD ilişkileri ile sonuçlandı. Etiyopya, ABD'nin Soğuk Savaş dönemindeki NATO üyesi olmayan müttefiklerine sağladığı ekonomik ve askeri yardım alma hakkına sahipti.

ABD'nin Soğuk Savaş'taki ekonomik ve askeri desteğine rağmen, İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası ABD-Etiyopya ilişkileri uzun vadeli stratejik ilişkilerden yoksundu. Güvenlik



ağırlıklı desteklerin çoğu olay odaklıydı ve kitlelerin gerçek çıkarlarını teşvik etmek için stratejik olarak planlanmamıştı. Dahası, Etiyopya'nın Amerika'nın dış politikası, Soğuk Savaş'ın dış politikasını şekillendirme çabalarını olumsuz yönde etkiledi. Etiyopya, komünizmin hakim olduğu Mısır, Libya ve Somali gibi yeni bağımsız Afrika ülkelerinin çoğu tarafından "emperyalist bir devlet" olarak tanımlandı.

İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası dönemin Etiyopya-ABD ilişkileri, Amerika'nın Etiyopya bölgesinde ve Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki jeopolitik ilginin azalmasıyla zayıflamaya başladı. 1974 devrimine yol açan Etiyopya üniversite öğrencileri arasında anti-Amerikancılığın yükselişi de Etiyopya-ABD ilişkilerinin azalmasına neden oldu. HaileSELLASIE'nin rejiminin çöküşüne damgasını vuran 1974'teki popüler devrim, ABD yanlısı Etiyopya'nın dış politika davranışının değişmesine yol açtı.

Önceki rejimler gibi, askeri hükümet de dış ilişkileri kendi yönetimini savunmak ve meşrulaştırmak için bir araç olarak kullandı. Sosyalist blok ülkeleri tarafından sağlanan koşulsuz destek ve takdir, askeri rejimin onlarla ilişkilerini sağlamlaştırmasına neden oldu. Bir yandan Soğuk Savaş döneminin ekonomik ve siyasi gerginlikleri, bir yandan da yereldeki şikâyetler, Etiyopya'nın dış politika ortaklarını ve gündemlerini çeşitlendirme çabalarını ciddi biçimde sınırlandırdı. Etiyopya'nın daha Doğu merkezli bir dış politika yaklaşımını benimseyerek Batı'dan tamamen kopması, ABD ve diğer Batılı güçlerle uzun süredir devam eden ilişkilerini çeşitlendirme ve bundan yararlanma yeteneğini ciddi biçimde zayıflattı.

Etiyopya'nın Marksist liderleri, geleneksel dış politika ortaklarını, özellikle ABD'yi, emperyalist ve Etiyopya'nın ulusal çıkarları için tehdit olarak gördüler. Diğer yandan, askeri yönetimin bu ölçüsü, ABD'nin Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki asırlık egemenliğine karşıydı. Bu nedenle, büyüyen Etiyopya-SSCB ilişkilerini dengelemek için ABD, Somali'yi işbirliği için desteklemeye başladı. Bu, nihayet 1977-78 Etiyopya-Somali savaşını, Soğuk Savaş döneminin Doğu-Batı ideolojik rekabetinin vahşet savaşına çevirdi.

Askeri rejimin çöküşü ve 1991'de EPRDF'nin iktidara gelmesi, Etiyopya'nın dış politika yapısının doğası ve yapısında köklü değişimlere neden oldu. Önceki Doğu veya Batı merkezli dış politika yaklaşımları yerine, Soğuk Savaş sonrası Etiyopya, hem geleneksel hem de yeni ortaya çıkan ortaklarıyla yapıcı bir ilişki kurmaya kararlı. Geleneksel ve gelişmekte olan dış politika ortaklarıyla dengeli bir ilişki sürdürmek, Etiyopya'nın

bağımsız bir dış politika karar verme sürecini desteklemesini ve böylece toplumun gerçek talebine cevap veren bir politika seçeneği elde etmesini sağlamıştır.

.Sürdürülebilir kalkınmanın sürdürülmesi ve demokratik yönetişimin desteklenmesi, Soğuk Savaş sonrası Etiyopya'nın dış politika hedeflerinin temelleri olarak vurgulandı.Bu nedenle, ideolojiden bağımsız olarak, ticaret ve yatırım, demokratik yönetişimin ve hukukun üstünlüğünün sürdürülmesinde işbirliği yapmaya istekli olan devlet ve devlet dışı aktörler, Etiyopya'nın stratejik dış politika ortaklarıyla ilişkilerde önceliklendirilmektedir.

Yerel dinamikler ile birlikte, küresel politik ekonominin dönüşümü, Soğuk Savaş sonrası Etiyopya'nın dış politika davranışını da belirledi.Bu bağlamda, ortaya çıkan güçlerin uluslararası politik ekonomiye katılımındaki artış, ABD öncülüğündeki tek kutuplu dünya düzeninin çok kutuplu bir düzenlemeye kaymasına neden olmuştur.Çin, Hindistan, Brezilya, Türkiye, Rusya ve Güney Afrika gibi yeni aktörler ortaya çıktı ve uluslararası ekonomi politikasında önemli aktörler oldular.Bu aktörler, gelişmekte olan ülkelere alternatif bir dış politika ortağı sağlayan Güney-Güney kalkınma işbirliğinin teşvik edilmesinin stratejik önemini altını çizdiler.Bu da, Etiyopya gibi ülkelerin dış politika gündemlerini ulusal çıkarlar temelinde belirlemeye izin veriyor.

Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Etiyopya'nın geleneksel ve gelişmekte olan güçler arasındaki dengeli dış politika ilişkilerinin iyi bir örneği, özellikle ABD ile olan Batı ile ilişkilerinin yeniden canlandırılmasıdır.Washington, 1991'de bir rejim değişikliği müzakeresi, Londra Barış Konferansı düzenlemek için girişimde bulundu. ABD' nin Afrika İşleri Bakanı Herman Cohen'in başkanlığını yaptığı bu müzakere, çökmekte olan askeri rejim ile üç büyük silahlı grup arasındaydı: TPLF, EPLF ve OLF.Nispeten yumuşak bir rejim değişikliğini kolaylaştırmakla birlikte, Londra Barış Konferansı da, askeri rejimden sonra ABD ile Etiyopya'nın ilişkilerinin başlamasına neden oldu.

Soğuk Savaş sonrası Etiyopya'nın çeşitli ekonomik ve politik reformları, ABD ve diğer Batılı güçlerle ilişkilerini ilerletti.Bu reformlar, 1990'larda ve 2000'lerde büyük yardımların sağlanmasına neden oldu. Batı'nın çeşitli hükümet ve sivil toplum kuruluşları kalkınma yardımı olarak 26 milyar dolardan fazla bağışta bulundu.Bu desteklerin, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde Etiyopya'nın ekonomik ve politik istikrarını korumak için stratejik önemi vardı.

ABD'nin özellikle de 11 Eylül saldırısının ardından Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki güvenlik ilgisi, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemin Etiyopya-ABD ilişkilerini daha da güçlendirdi. Addis Ababa, ABD'nin Terörizm Üzerine Küresel Savaş Komutanlığı'nın stratejik ortağı oldu. Ayrıca, ABD'nin Güney Etiyopya'da, Arba Minch'de, Somali ve Yemen'deki El Kaide'nin operasyonlarını hedefleyen bir drone üssü kurulması da Etiyopya'nın ABD'ye olan stratejik önemini artıracak.

Öte yandan, Soğuk Savaş sonrası Etiyopya'nın ABD ve diğer Batılı güçlerle ilişkileri konusunda anlaşmazlıklar vardı. Ekonomik ve politik ideolojilerdeki farklılıklar başlıca faktörlerdi. 2000'li yılların başından beri, EPRDF, "kalkınma devleti" fikrini desteklemeye başlamış ve neoliberalizmi Etiyopya'nın ekonomik ve politik dönüşümüne uygun olmayan bir biçimde eleştirmiştir. Bu anlaşmazlığa, çoğunlukla bağışçılar tarafından belirlenen yardım koşulu eşlik etti. EPRDF hükümetinden tarım, finans piyasası ve arazi liberalizasyonu gibi alanlarda reformlar yapılması istendi, ancak olumsuz cevap verdi. Aslında, Etiyopya ile geleneksel dış politika ortakları arasındaki bu anlaşmazlık, Etiyopyanın ortaya çıkan güçler ile olan ilişkilerini daha da pekiştirmesini sağlamıştır.

Geleneksel iktidarlara ekonomik ve politik ilişkileri teşvik etmenin yanı sıra, Soğuk Savaş sonrası Etiyopya, Çin, Hindistan ve Türkiye gibi yeni ortaya çıkan güçleri diğerlerinin yanı sıra dış ilişkilerini çeşitlendirmeye özellikle önem vermektedir. Etiyopya ile yükselen güçler arasındaki ilişki, her iki tarafın da ortaya koyduğu sosyo-ekonomik ve politik taleplerin olduğu simbiyotik gibi görünmektedir. Çalışmanın sonuçları, Etiyopya'nın dış ilişkilerinin dengesini hem geleneksel hem de yeni ortaya çıkan dış politika ortaklarıyla tutması gerektiğine işaret etti. Bu, Etiyopya'nın bölgesel ve uluslararası diplomaside öne çıkan etkisini artırmak ve böylece ulusal çıkarlarını sürdürmek için çok önemlidir. Dengenin sağlanamaması, Etiyopya'nın ulusal egemenliğini tehlikeye sokan bazı dış politika ortaklarına aşırı derecede güvenmesine yol açacaktır.

Soğuk Savaş sonrası Etiyopya-Çin ilişkileri, Etiyopya'nın dış politika çeşitlendirme çabasının önemli örneklerinden biri olarak görülebilir. Çin dış politikası karar vericileri, Afrika politikasını gerçekleştirmek için Etiyopya'nın ekonomik ve diplomatik önemini vurgulamaktadır. Etiyopya'nın büyük nüfusu ve pazar potansiyeli ve Afrika Birliği'nin daimi merkezi olan Addis Ababa'nın sembolik önemi, Çin'in ekonomik ve diplomatik beklentilerini desteklemek için hayati önem taşıyan kaynaklar olarak görülüyordu. Benzer

şekilde, Addis Ababa ayrıca, Pekin'in ekonomik önemi, Etiyopya'nın birincil emtiaları için bir DYY ve pazar yeri kaynağı olarak kabul ediyor.

Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Sino-Etiyopya ilişkileri, aynı zamanda, siyasi istişareler, parlamentolar arası dostluk grubu, sektörel bakanlıklar ve idari birim düzeyinde işbirliği ve iktidar partileri arasındaki yakın ilişki gibi çeşitli yaklaşımlarla da karakterize edilmektedir. Bu çoklu mekanizmalar Addis Ababa ve Pekin'in ulusal çıkarlarını daha da güçlendirmesini sağlıyor. Ayrıca, Çin'in karayolu ve demiryolu ağı projeleri ve enerji sektörüne yaptığı büyük yatırım da Çin-Etiyopya'nın stratejik anlaşmaları için uygun bir tezahür. Etiyopya Yolları Kurumu'na (ERA) göre, Etiyopya'da gerçekleştirilen yol çalışmalarının % 70'i Çin yol inşaat firmalarına aittir (Cheru, 2016).

İkili ticareti geliştirmek için Çin ve Etiyopya tarafından alınan önlemler de, iki devletin teşvik ettiği çeşitli gündem maddelerinin önemli tezahürleridir. Örneğin 2006 yılında Çin, Etiyopya'nın ihracat kalemleri için en iyi pazar hedefi oldu (% 13.3). Bu açıdan Etiyopya, geleneksel ve yeni ortaya çıkan ortaklarıyla dış ticaret dengesizliğini ele alacak bir dizi tedbir almalıdır. Bu, birincil tarım ürünlerinin yerine katma değerli ürünler ihraç ederek başarılabilir. Bunu yaparken, Etiyopya, tarım sektörüne girme ve Etiyopya'nın ihraç ürünlerinin dar çeşitliliğini çeşitlendiren yabancı yatırımcıları çekmelidir.

Öte yandan, Etiyopya'nın Çin'e ve diğer gelişmekte olan güçlere karşı yürüttüğü mevcut dış politika, devletle devlet arasındaki etkileşimlere çok fazla bağımlıdır. Devletin devlet ilişkilerine önem vermesine rağmen, Etiyopya'nın dış politika yaklaşımı, Devlet dışı aktörlerin aktif katılımı ile kanıtlanmalıdır. Bu, Etiyopya'nın, rejim değişikliklerine bakılmaksızın, dış politika hedeflerini daha sürdürülebilir bir şekilde destekleyebilmesini sağlar.

Çin'inki gibi, Soğuk Savaş sonrası Etiyopya-Hindistan ilişkileri de Etiyopya'nın dış politika çeşitlendirme planının önemli bir tezahürü olarak görülüyor. Soğuk Savaş sonrası Etiyopya-Hindistan ikili ilişkileri, on yıllardır kalan diplomatik ilişkilerden yararlanmaktadır. Ticaret ve yatırım fırsatlarını teşvik etmek için, iki ülke ticaret ve dışişleri bakanlıklarından oluşan Ortak Ticaret Komitesi kurdu. Bu, iki taraflı ticarete, 1995 ile 2012 yılları arasında 50 milyon dolardan daha fazla olan 890 milyon doların üzerinde bir artışa neden oldu. Dahası, Hindistan Etiyopya'nın kalkınma projelerini finanse

ediyor. Bu açıdan, Delhi'nin Etiyopya'nın kırsal elektrifikasyon ve şeker endüstrisini genişletme desteği stratejik öneme sahiptir.

Bununla birlikte, Etiyopya'nın ortaya çıkan güçler ile ilişkilerinin yarattığı yukarıda belirtilen faydalara rağmen, bazı politika analistleri, ikili ve çok taraflı işbirliğinin uzun vadeli çıkarımlarına ilişkin şüphelerine sahiptir. Bu analistlere göre, ortaya çıkan güçlerin sağladığı ekonomik ve kalkınma yardımı, eskiden sosyo-ekonomik ve politik etkilerini sürdürmek yerine Etiyopya'nın ulusal çıkarlarını desteklememeyi amaçladı. Etiyopya ile ortaya çıkan güçler işbirliğinin temel amacı Etiyopya'nın gelişmesini ve kendine güveni sağlamak değildir. Bunun yerine, ucuz sanayi malları için Etiyopya'nın kaderini oluşturmayı amaçlamaktadır. Etiyopya'nın hammaddelerini düşük fiyatla sattığı ve sanayi ürünleri satın aldığı Etiyopya ile ortaya çıkan güçler arasındaki ticaret dengesizliği, ilişkinin sömürücü niteliğinin temel bir göstergesi olarak kabul edilmektedir.

Diğer dış politika yorumcuları ise, Etiyopya'nın devam eden ikili ve çok taraflı ilişkilerden kazandığı çeşitli fırsatlardan yararlanıyor. Aslında, bu dış politika analistleri gelişmekte olan güçlerin ekonomik ve politik arzusunu kabul etmektedir. Onların görüşüne göre, Etiyopya'nın tarımsal, sağlık, eğitim ve altyapı gelişimini desteklemek için ortaya çıkan güçler, ilişkilerin simbiyotik doğasından kaynaklandı. Etiyopya, ortaya çıkan güçler ile işbirliğini teşvik etmek için ortak bir gündeme sahiptir. Bu nedenle, dış politika ortaklarını çeşitlendiren bu analistler için, Etiyopya'nın mevcut rekabetçi uluslararası çevrede ulusal çıkarlarını korumak için pazarlık gücünü arttırmaktadır.

Gelişmekte olan ve kurulu güçlerle olan ilişkisini yoğunlaştırmakla birlikte, Soğuk Savaş sonrası Etiyopya'nın dış politika yapması, Etiyopya'nın komşularıyla olan ilişkisini güçlendirmek için çaba harcanmasıyla da karakterize edilir. Etiyopya'nın Afrika Boynuzu'na yönelik dış politikalarını aşan “kuşatma zihniyetinin” yerine, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde karşılıklı ekonomik ve politik işbirliği hüküm sürdü. Etiyopya'nın dış politika karar vericileri, farklı sosyal, ekonomik ve politik fırsatlarla sonuçlanan komşu devletleri stratejik olarak devreye soktu.

Soğuk Savaş sonrası Etiyopya'nın Cibuti, Sudan, Somali ve Kenya gibi ülkelerle sürdürdüğü yol ve demiryolu ağları, ikili ve çok taraflı ticaret ilişkilerinde önemli bir artışa neden oldu. WITS (2016) tarafından da belirtildiği gibi, Somali, Cibuti ve Sudan gibi komşu ülkeler Etiyopya'nın tarım ürünlerinin büyük ihracat yerlerine dönüşüyor. Bu

ekonomik ilişkinin, Afrika Boynuzu'nun istikrarsız bölgesinde barış ve güvenliği desteklediğine de inanılmaktadır.

Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Etiyopya'nın dış politika ortaklarını çeşitlendirme arayışı, dış politika gündemlerini, araçlarını ve aktörlerini çoğaltarak doğrulanmıştır. Sadece ortakları değil, aynı zamanda yeterli dış politika araçlarını, uygun aktörleri ve iyi ifade edilmiş gündemleri de içeren kapsamlı bir dış politika çeşitlendirme şemasına sahip olmaksızın, bir devletin ulusal çıkarlarını teşvik etme olasılığı düşüktür. Bu nedenle, Soğuk Savaş sonrası Etiyopya'nın dış politika hedeflerine etkin bir şekilde hitap etmek için, çeşitli sosyal, kültürel, ekonomik, politik ve diplomatik gündemlerin demokratik ve katılımcı bir şekilde oluşturulmasını sağlayan bir politika ortamı gereklidir. Bu, çoklu gündemleri olan çoklu çıkar gruplarının bulunduğu Etiyopya için özellikle önemlidir. Dahası, dış politika gündemlerini çeşitlendirmek, Etiyopya'nın bir yandan elit ağırlıklı egemen politikaları gözden geçirmesini ve diğer yandan kitlelerin çıkarlarını eğlendirmesini mümkün kılmaktadır. Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Etiyopya, ülkenin başlıca dış politika gündemleri olan ulusal kalkınmanın ve demokratik bir siyasi sistemin sürdürülmesine vurgu yaptı. Etiyopya, ekonomik ve politik gündemleri teşvik etmenin yanı sıra sosyo-kültürel ilişkilere de dikkat çekiyor. Farklı sosyo-kültürel kategoriler göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, Etiyopya'nın çok sayıda sosyo-kültürel gruba sahip çeşitli uluslarla bağlantı kurma yeteneği vardır. Etiyopya, sosyo-kültürel çeşitliliğini başarılı diplomasiyi teşvik etmek için bir araç olarak görmelidir.

Farklı dış politika gündemlerinin başarılı bir şekilde uygulanmasının birden fazla dış politika aktörü gerektirdiği aşıkardır. Devlet aktörleri ile birlikte, Devlet dışı aktörler de politika hedeflerini çerçevelemek ve uygulamak için önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Geçmişte, Etiyopya'nın devlet odaklı bir yaklaşımdan muzdarip dış politika oluşturma süreci, Devlet Dışındaki Aktörlerin ülkenin dış ilişkilerinde rolünü engellemiştir. Bu da, ulusal çıkarları korumak için hükümet dışı aktörlerin katkısını olumsuz yönde etkiledi. Devlet dışı aktörlerin ülkenin sosyo-kültürel, ekonomik, politik ve diplomatik gündemlerini teşvik etmedeki rolü göz önüne alındığında, Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Etiyopya da sivil toplum aktörlerinin kendi ulusal çıkarlarını geliştirme rolünü vurgulamaktadır. Araştırma enstitüleri, entelektüeller, medya, aktivistler ve diaspora, Soğuk Savaş sonrası Etiyopya'nın dış politika yapımında nispeten aktif bir rol oynamaya başlıyor. Geleneksel olmayan dış politika aktörlerinin aktif katılımı ve geleneksellerle etkin entegrasyonları,

gerçek toplumsal çıkarları teşvik eden politika ve stratejilerin oluşturulmasının önünü açmaktadır.

Etiyopya'nın dış politika ortaklarını ve gündemlerini çeşitlendirme çabaları, yeterli dış politika araçları ile kanıtlanmadan istenen hedefe ulaşamamaktadır. Diğer faktörlerin yanı sıra, bir devletin belirli dış politika araçlarına olan tercihi, bir ülkenin dış politika hedefiyle belirlenir. Ekonomik ve politik hedeflerini desteklemek için, Soğuk Savaş sonrası Etiyopya, ekonomik diplomasi gibi araçları kullanıyor. Hem Dışişleri Bakanlığı hem de Etiyopya diplomatları, yabancı devletleri ve sivil toplum aktörleri ile iletişim kurabilmek için ekonomik diplomasiyi en önemli dış politika aracı olarak kullanıyorlar.

Ayrıca, Etiyopya diplomatik topluluğu, ev sahibi topluluğun tutumunu etkilemek ve Etiyopya'nın dış politika hedefini kamu diplomasisini bir araç olarak kullanarak teşvik etmek için çabalamaktadır. Etiyopya diasporalar, ev sahibi topluluğa etkin bir şekilde bağlanma ve böylece toplumu toplum ilişkilerine daha da zenginleştirme potansiyeline sahiptir. Dışişleri Bakanlığı bünyesindeki özel bir birim olan Diaspora İşleri Genel Müdürlüğü, Etiyopya diasporasını harekete geçirmek ve kamu diplomasisinde rollerini arttırmak için çalışıyor.

Yukarıda belirtilen dış politika araçlarıyla birlikte, Etiyopya'nın yumuşak güç kabiliyetinden faydalanmak, dış politika hedeflerini geliştirmek için önemli bir stratejidir. Etiyopya, tarihsel miraslarını, geçmiş dış politika kararlarını ve diğer yumuşak güç yeteneklerini destekleyerek ulusal çıkarlarını koruyabilir. Dahası, Etiyopya'nın farklı sosyo-kültürel ve dini grupları yumuşak güç potansiyelini artırır. Bu, Etiyopya'nın farklı sosyo-kültürel ve dini kategorilere sahip çeşitli milletlerle kültürel diplomasi yapması için eşsiz bir fırsat sunmaktadır.

Bununla birlikte, büyük yumuşak güç kapasitesine rağmen, Etiyopya bunları kullanmak ve ulusal çıkarları doğru bir şekilde geliştirmek için gerekli insan kaynağı ve örgütsel çerçeveden yoksundur. Bazı örneklerde, geçmişteki Etiyopya hükümetlerinin hüküm sürdüğü tek taraflı kültürel politikaları, Etiyopya'nın çeşitli ulus ve milletlerinin kültürel alışverişini dış dünyayla ciddi biçimde sınırlandırdı. Soğuk Savaş sonrası Etiyopya'nın dış politika gündemlerini çoğaltmaya çalıştığı gerçeğine rağmen, bunları yürütmek için çok sayıda enstrümanı kullanma çabası hala sınırlıdır. Bu, Etiyopya'nın dış politika karar verme sürecinin sonuçlarını sınırlandırdı.

Bu çalışmada, Soğuk Savaş sonrası Etiyopya-Türkiye ilişkilerinin Etiyopya'nın kapsamlı dış politika çeşitlendirme planının bir tezahürü olduğunu vurgulamak için sarf edilmiştir. Etiyopya'nın dış politika karar vericileri, Etiyopya'nın ulusal çıkarlarını destekleme konusundaki katkısına dayanarak Türkiye'yi stratejik bir ortak olarak belirlemiştir. Aslında, Ankara'nın kendisini bölgesel ve bölgesel olmayan güçlerle yeniden bütünleştirmesi ve böylece dış politika gündemlerini desteklemesi talep edildi. 2002 yılında AKP'nin iktidara gelmesinden bu yana Türkiye, Etiyopya dahil olmak üzere birçok Afrika ülkesi ile sosyo-ekonomik, politik ve diplomatik ilişkilerini sağlamlaştırmaktadır.

FANSPS (2002), Türkiye'nin büyük piyasasına ve gelişmiş ekonomiye ikili ekonomik işbirliği için önemli bir faktör olarak dikkat çekti. 1993 yılında Ankara ve Addis Ababa, Ekonomik ve Teknik İşbirliği ve Ticaret konusunda önemli bir anlaşma imzaladı. Buna ek olarak, 2000 yılında iki devlet, kalıcı kalkınma işbirliğine giden Etiyopya-Türk Ortak Ekonomik Komisyonunu (JEC) kurdu. Ortak Ekonomik Komisyon, üst düzey hükümet yetkilileri ve politika yapıcılarının katıldığı, birbirini tamamlayan Addis Ababa ve Ankara'da bir dizi toplantı düzenliyor.

TİKA'nın 2005 yılında Addis Ababa'daki ilk Afrika ofisi açılışı ile birlikte, Etiyopya'nın ikili ilişkileri çeşitli stratejik alanlarda daha da yoğunlaştı. Bu açıdan, Türkiye'nin Etiyopya'nın büyük altyapı projesine yönelik kalkınma kredisi söz etmeye değer. Etiyopya ile Türkiye arasındaki ikili ticarete, 1994 yılında 10 milyon dolardan az olan ve 2016'da 500 milyon dolardan fazla olan artış, iki devletin stratejik ortaklığının önemli bir göstergesi olarak görülüyor. Mal ticareti ile birlikte, Türk sağlık turizmi sektörünün patlaması, Türkiye'yi ziyaret eden Etiyopyalıların sayısını artırdı.

Türkiye'nin Etiyopya'ya yatırımı, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde önemli bir artış gösterdi. Yaklaşık 3 milyar \$ 'lık sermayesi olan birçok Türk firması çeşitli sektörlere yatırım yapmaktadır. Bu, 50.000'den fazla Etiyopyalı için kalıcı ve geçici iş fırsatlarının yaratılmasıyla sonuçlandı. Bu bakış açısıyla, yatırımları Etiyopya'nın sürdürülebilir kalkınması ile uyumlu hale getirmek için, Türkiye'nin yerel iş çevrelerinin meşgul olmadıkları alanlara odaklanması gerekmektedir.

Uzun ömürlü politik ve diplomatik ilişkiler, Etiyopya ve Türkiye'nin ekonomik işbirliğini sağlamlaştırmaktadır. Ankara ve Addis Ababa, 19. yüzyılın son 10 yılına dayanan



diplomatik bir ilişki sürdürdüler. 1926'da Türkiye, Addis Ababa'daki büyükelçiliğini açtı. Etiyopya tarafından buna, 1933'te Ankara'daki büyükelçilik açarak karşılık verildi.

Üst düzey ziyaretler, parlamenter dostluklar, siyasi istişareler, güvenlik ve diplomasi, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde Etiyopya-Türkiye arasındaki ilişkileri siyasi alanla özdeşleştirdi. İkili ilişkilerin dışında, Ankara ve Addis Ababa da, özellikle Somali'de yaşanan sorunlu Afrika Boynuzu'nda barış ve istikrarın sağlanmasında işbirliği yapıyorlar. Türkiye tarafından alınan çeşitli sosyo-ekonomik ve diplomatik önlemler, Afrika Boynuzu bölgesinde sürdürülebilir barış ve güvenlik sağlama taahhütlerini gösterdi. Türkiye, IGAD ve AMISOM gibi bölgenin önemli devlet ve devlet dışı aktörleri ile işbirliği yapmaktadır. Bu bakımdan Yemen'deki kriz, Afrika Boynuzu'ndaki jeo-stratejik açıdan önemli bir bölgeyi, bölgesel ve bölgesel olmayan birçok güç arasında yeni bir rekabet merkezi haline getirmiştir. Zaten istikrarsız bölgedeki gerilim askeri üslerin kurulmasıyla daha da tırmandı. Bu, Etiyopya gibi bölgesel güçlerin ekonomik ve politik güvenliğini olumsuz yönde etkiledi. Bölgedeki varlığını güçlendiren ana paydaş olarak Türkiye, bölgesel ve bölgesel olmayan güçler arasında diyalog ve müzakereleri örgütlemek ve böylece gerginliği rahatlatmak için girişimde bulunmalıdır.

Dahası, dış politika hedeflerine ulaşmak için Etiyopya'nın Afrika Boynuzu ülkeleriyle ticaretini ve ekonomik ilişkilerini geliştirmesi gerekiyor. Böylelikle, Addis Ababa, başta Somali olmak üzere bölgede sürdürülebilir barış ve güvenliği sağlamak için çalışan Ankara dahil olmak üzere bölgesel ve bölgesel olmayan güçlerle işbirliği yapmak zorunda. Etiyopya ve Türkiye Somali'deki bağılıklarını uyumlu hale getirmelidir. Böyle yaparak, iki devlet tek taraflı kararların yol açtığı anlaşmazlıkları ve rekabeti ele alabilir.

Türkiye'nin Afrika politikasını ve sürdürülebilir kalkınmanın güçlendirilmesi için yeni ortaklık modeli ve Addis Ababa'nın diplomatik önemi (Afrika Birliği'nin merkezi olarak) iki devletin siyasi ilişkilerini daha da sağlamlaştırdı. Bu bağlamda, Türkiye'nin, TİKA'nın Addis Ababa'daki ilk Afrika bürosunu açma ve 2008'de İstanbul'daki İlk Türkiye-Afrika Ortaklık Zirvesi'nin eş başkanlığına Meles'in aday gösterilmesi kararı, uygun belirtilerdir.

Genel olarak Afrika ve özellikle Etiyopya bölgesinin ve Afrika Boynuzu'nun sosyo-ekonomik ve diplomatik ilişkilerinin yükselmesi göz önüne alındığında, Ankara,

Etiyopya'daki diplomatik temsilciliğini daha da ileri götürmelidir. Bunun nedeni, Afrika'nın başkenti olan Addis Ababa'nın, Afrika ülkeleri ve yabancı ortakları arasında çeşitli müzakereler için bir merkez olarak hizmet vermesidir. Hem geleneksel hem de yeni ortaya çıkan küresel aktörler, diplomatlarını Etiyopya'da kullanıyorlar. Bu nedenle, Afrika'ya diplomatik erişimini artırmak için, Türkiye, Etiyopya'daki diplomatik misyonunun boyutunu ve çeşitliliğini arttırmalıdır.

Sosyo-kültürel işbirliği, Soğuk Savaş sonrası Etiyopya-Türk ilişkilerini de karakterize ediyor. 2004 yılında Addis Ababa ve Ankara, kültür, eğitim, bilim, medya, gençlik ve spor alanında işbirliği konusunda önemli bir anlaşma imzaladılar. Diğer yardımlarla birlikte bu anlaşma, Etiyopya'nın Türkiye'nin Teknik ve Mesleki Eğitim ve Öğretim (TVET) alanındaki deneyimlerinden faydalanmasını ve sanayicilerin sanayileşme ve tarımsal dönüşüm çabalarını desteklemesini sağlamıştır. Ayrıca, Türkiye'nin sağladığı burs olanakları, Etiyopya'nın insan sermayesine de yardımcı olmuş ve böylece ekonomik kalkınmasını güçlendirmiştir. Son dönemlerden beri, Afrika tarihi, Afrika ekonomisi ve Afrika uluslararası ilişkilerinde uzmanlaşmak isteyen Türk öğrenciler Addis Ababa Üniversitesi'nde eğitime devam ediyor. Bununla birlikte Ankara'nın Yunus Emre Enstitüsü'nün şube ofisini Addis Ababa'da açma çabası önemli bir adımdır. Bu, çeşitli Etiyopya üniversitelerinde Türk dili, kültürü, sanatı ve edebiyatının derslerinin verilmesinin sağlanmasının önünü açıyor. Bu da, bu iki halkın sosyo-kültürel ve tarihsel arka plan bilgisini geliştirir ve böylece bu iki toplumun toplumsal ilişkilerine taşır.

Etiyopya ile Türkiye arasındaki kültürel ilişkiler, iki egemen devlette bulunan çeşitli kültürel gruplar arasında diyalogu ve deneyim paylaşımını teşvik etmektedir. Bu da, Etiyopya'nın farklı kültürel ve tarihi mirasını Yumuşak gücün para birimleri olarak kullanma yolunu açıyor ve böylelikle ulusal çıkarlarını destekliyor. Türkiye'nin Harar'daki Osmanlı Konsoloslugu, Wuqro'daki El-Nejaşi Camii gibi Etiyopya'nın farklı yerlerinde bulunan kültürel ve tarihi mirasları koruma çabaları, iki ulusun kültürel diplomasisini daha da güçlendirecektir.

Genel olarak, Etiyopya ile Türkiye arasındaki yukarıda belirtilen çok boyutlu ilişkiler, çeşitli sosyo-ekonomik ve politik faktörlerden etkilenmiştir. Bu bağlamda, Türk Hava Yolları'nın Addis Ababa'ya doğrudan uçuşunun başlangıcı en önemli değişkenlerden biridir. Türk Hava Yolları 2006 yılında Addis Ababa'ya uçuşlar başlattı. Her gün

İstanbul'dan Addis'e uçuyor ve dönüş yolculuğuna çıkıyor. Yolcu sayısı yıldan yıla artıyor. Doğrudan uçuşlar çok sayıda Etiyopyalı ve Türk vatandaşının ticaret, turizm ve eğitim vb. farklı amaçlarla ülkelere seyahat etmesini sağlamıştır. Etiyopya ve Türk vatandaşları dışındaki çok sayıda yolcu da bu hizmetlerden faydalanmaktadır. İkincisi, Anadolu Ajansı'nın Addis Ababa'daki ofisi açıldı. Addis Ababa'daki Anadolu Ajansı ofisi, Etiyopya, sosyal ve kültürel, iş ve ekonomi, siyaset ve diplomasinin tüm yönleri hakkında bilgi vermektedir. Buna göre, Türk halkı, şirketler ve devlet memurları Etiyopya hakkında çok miktarda bilgiye kolaylıkla erişebiliyorlar. Üçüncü olarak, Türk STK'larının aktif rolü. Hükümet ilişkilerine ek olarak, Etiyopya ve Türk sivil toplum örgütleri arasındaki işbirliği, uzun süreli ilişkilerin sürdürülmesi için özel bir öneme sahiptir. Bunun nedeni, sivil örgütler arasındaki işbirliğinin rejim değişikliklerinden pek etkilenmemesidir. Dördüncü olarak, Türk mezunlarının Etiyopya'daki rolü. Türkiye'den mezun olan tüm Etiyopyalı öğrenciler iki ülke arasında güçlü bir köprü oluşturmaktadır. Türk mezunlarının birçoğu Etiyopya'da farklı hükümet ve sivil toplum örgütlerinde çalışmakta ve böylece Etiyopya-Türk ilişkilerinin güçlendirilmesinde vazgeçilmez bir rol oynamaktadır.

## Appendix B: CURRICULUM VITAE

### CURRICULUM VITAE

#### 1. PERSONAL INFORMATION

**Full Name:** Dr. Muzeven Hawas Sebsebe

**Date of Birth:** 06/10/1977 GC

**Place of Birth:** Addis Ababa

**Nationality:** Ethiopian

**Marital Status:** Married

**Address:** Etlik Mahallesi, Incili sok.: 27/1 Kecioren/Ankara

**Mobile (+90)5515507372**

**E-mail** [muzevenseb@gmail.com](mailto:muzevenseb@gmail.com)

#### 2. EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND

- 2012-2017** Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, PhD in International Relations, Turkey.  
**Thesis Title:** Diversification of Ethiopia's Foreign Policy and Post-Cold War Ethio-Turkey Relations.
- 2007-2008** Addis Ababa University, Master of Arts Degree (MA) in Social Anthropology, Ethiopia.
- 1999-2002** Bahir Dar University, Bachelor of Education Degree (BEd) in History, Ethiopia.

#### LANGUAGE SKILLS

##### International

Language	Speaking	Writing	Reading	Listening
- English	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent
- Turkish	Good	Good	Good	Good
- Arabic	Average	Average	Average	Average

##### Ethiopian

- Amharic                      Excellent      Excellent      Excellent      Excellent

### 3. EMPLOYMENT

**April-May 2017      African Expert at Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies.**

**2010-2012                      Lecturer at School of Social Science and Humanities,  
Department of Anthropology, Dilla University.**

**2009-2010                      Lecturer at Faculty of Social Science, Department of  
Anthropology, Gonder University.**

**2004-2006                      Teacher of History, Civic and Ethical Education and  
Social Science at Donbosco Catholic School.**

**2003-2004                      Teacher of History and Civic and Ethical Education at  
Bure Nicholas Bohm Senior Secondary School.**

### 6. VOLUNTARY ACTIVITIES

**HaKID                      Habeshistan Development and Cooperation Association-  
Founding and board member.**

**HASS                      Horn of Africa Strategic Study Center/ Think Tank-  
Founding Member.**

**MGİET                      Model Graduate Initiatives In Education and Training-  
Voluntary Member.**

### 7. RESEARCH AND PUBLICATIONS:

- **Ethiopia and the Rising Powers: A Case Study on the Post-Cold War Era Ethio-Turkish Relation.**
- **Globalization and Its Impact on the Post-Cold War Era Ethiopia's Foreign Policy.**

 **Short Analysis**

- ✓ **Towards a Multidimensional Turkey-Africa Relations**

- ✓ **Will the Yemen Crisis be a new Challenge for IGAD's Regional Peace and Security?**
- ✓ **U.S. Defense Secretary Visit of the Horn of Africa and its Possible Outcomes**

#### **8. REFERENCES:**

- **Prof. Dr Mustafa Sıtkı BILGIN, Head of the Institute of International Relations and Strategic Studies and Lecturer at Yıldırım Beyazıt University email: [bilgin.ms@gmail.com](mailto:bilgin.ms@gmail.com).**
- **Prof. Dr Birol Akgün, Head of the Department of International Relations, Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University, email: [birol.akgun@hotmail.com](mailto:birol.akgun@hotmail.com)**
- **Amb. Ayalew Gobeze, Honorable Ambassador of Ethiopia- Turkey, email: [ayagob4@yahoo.com](mailto:ayagob4@yahoo.com) .**

## Appendix C: PHOTOCOPY PERMISSION FORM

### ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

### YAZARIN

Soyadı : Sebsebe

Adı : Muzyen

Bölümü : Uluslararası ilişkiler

**TEZİNADI (İngilizce): Diversification of Ethiopia's Foreign Policy and Post-Cold War Ethio-Turkish Relations**

**TEZİN TÜRÜ :** Yüksek Lisans  Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.

2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.

3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

**TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ :**