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"A COMPARISON OF EGYTIAN REVOLUTIONS: 1952 and 2011"

MUHAMMET MUSA BUDAK

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"A COMPARISON OF EGYTIAN REVOLUTIONS: 1952 and 2011"

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Approval of the Institute of Social Sciences

Assc. Dr. Seyfullah YILDIRIM

Manager of Institute

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Prof. Dr. Birol AKGÜN

Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Prof. Dr. Mustafa Sıtkı BİLGİN

Supervisor

Examining Committee Members (first name belongs to the chairperson of the jury and the second name belongs to supervisor)

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Muhammet Musa BUDAK

ABSTRACT

"A COMPARISON OF EGYTIAN REVOLUTIONS: 1952 and 2011"
Muhammet Musa BUDAK
PhD, Department of International Relations
Supervisor: Mustafa Sıtkı BİLGİN
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States which are structured in Middle East after World War I especially by western powers' intervention has not met basic necessities of people they may wait from governments. Demands such as equality before laws, economic means to live with dignity, political participation did not get any response from governments. These kind of demands for rights came with different forms like revolutions with wide social support, military coups or power struggles inside the ruling elites.

In this regard during 1950's there were revolutions and military coups in middle eastern countries, especially Egypt was pioneer throughout the region. Mentioned demands were main motivation of these social events. But generally lead by minor social segments with Arab nationalistic and socialist motives and did not meet people's expectations at the end. At the beginning western powers were very reluctant to approach this revolutionary regimes, then interest base cooperation had established.

People's demands for basic rights and freedoms in the region countries in recent years from 2011 and onwards increased without any or minor responses from governments, which become insufferable stage. This situation championed social pressures for change. "Revolutions" in region's countries and their outcomes again questioned whether it is progress or deterioration like outcomes of 1950's revolts.

In this thesis, revolutions in these two different time period will be comparatively examined, reasons for social revolts underlined and future study proposals offered. Egypt has chosen as a case study, although many countries in the regions go through similar processes, as it is most populated and more influence in the region as whole. This study aims to contribute to the historical comparative studies in international academic discipline as well.

Keywords: The Middle East, Egypt, Revolution, Nasser, Arab Uprisings

ÖZET
"MISIR DEVRİMLERİNİN KARŞILAŞTIRILMASI: 1952 ve 2011"
Muhammet Musa BUDAK
Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Mustafa Sıtkı BİLGİN
Eylül 2018, 215 sayfa

Birinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra özellikle Batı güçlerinin müdahalesi ile Ortadoğu'da yapılandırılmış olan devletler, insanların temel ihtiyaçlarını karşılayamamıştır. Kanun önünde eşitlik, onurlu bir yaşam sürmeyi sağlayacak ekonomik imkân, siyasal katılım gibi talepler hükümetlerden herhangi bir karşılık bulmamıştır. Anılan hak talepleri, geniş toplumsal destekli devrimler, askeri darbeler veya iktidardaki elitler içindeki iktidar mücadeleleri gibi farklı biçimlerde ortaya çıkmıştır.

Bu bağlamda 1950'lerde Ortadoğu ülkelerinde pek çok darbe ve devrim hareketlerine şahit olunmuştur. Özellikle de Mısır bölge genelinde öncü olmuştur. Söz konusu talepler bu sosyal hareketlerin temel sebepleridir. Fakat genel olarak Arap milliyetçiliği ve sosyalist görüşleri benimseyen dar gruplar tarafından yönetilen bu hareketler ve insanların beklentilerini karşılayamadı. Başlangıçta bu devrimci rejimlere yaklaşmakta oldukça isteksiz olan Batılı güçler, bu yönetimler ile zaman içerisinde menfaat temelli bir işbirliği mekanizması kurdular.

Mısır'da insanların temel hak ve özgürlüklere yönelik artan taleplerinin hükümetlerde herhangi bir karşılık bulmaması durumu dayanılamaz bir aşamaya getirdi. Bu sosyo-politik durum değişim taleplerini harekete geçiren uygun bir ortamı meydana getirdi. Bölge ülkelerindeki "devrimler" ve sonuçlarının bir ilerleme mi yoksa bir bozulma mı olduğuna ilişkin 1950'lilerdekine benzer bir sorgulamayı beraberinde getirdi.

Bu tezde, bu iki farklı dönemdeki devrimler incelenecek, altta yatan toplumsal nedenler ve gelecek çalışmalara ilişkin öneriler sunulmaya çalışılacaktır. Bölgede pek çok ülke benzer süreçlerden geçmesine rağmen, bölge genelinde en fazla nüfusa ve daha fazla nüfuza sahip olması nedeni ile Mısır bir vaka çalışması olarak seçilmiştir. Bu çalışma aynı zamanda uluslararası ilişkiler disiplinlerdeki tarihsel karşılaştırma çalışmalarına da katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ortadoğu, Mısır, Devrim, Nasır, Arap Ayaklanmaları

To my dear father Yakup Budak…

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ALCSP   Arab League Common Security Pact

CIA   Central Intelligence Agency

EEAS   European External Action

EU   European Union

ICG   International Crisis Group

NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDP   National Democratic Party of Egypt

RCC   Revolutionary Command Council of Egypt

RIA   Russian International News Agency

SCC   Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt

UAE   the United Arab Emirates

UN   United Nations

USA   United States of America

USSR   United Soviet Socialist Republics

INTRODUCTION

The 2011 Arab uprisings across the Arab world directed the attention of the international community to the Middle East once again. Millions of people took to the streets to demonstrate against their autocratic regimes. This was an important indication of the Arab people's desire for change, along with an opportunity to restore their dignity. Although over time these movements weakened, it brought back discussions of politics, economy, social organisms and civil-militia relations. To understand this phenomenon, various theories, including revolutionary ones started to be discussed.

"The Arab Uprisings" were not only significant for the Arab World, but regional and international actors with investment in the region were also carefully following the developments. As expected, the ousting of the 23-year long autocratic leader of Tunisia (Ben Ali) and with the influence of the mass demonstrations, fundamental changes across the region occurred (Rose, 2011). The ousting of an Arab leader in Tunisia through mass uprisings triggered opposition movements in other Arab countries, and an increasing expectation that the fundamental changes that occurred in Tunisia could be repeated. With this growing sentiment in the region, the events that took place in Tunisia were repeated in countries such as Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Syria.

Egypt is distinguished from the other countries because of its leader character in the Arab world and its significant role in international politics (Hamid, After Tunisia, 2011). Due to Egypt's history, social and military structure, its long-standing close diplomatic affairs with the West, particularly the United States, and the concerns of western and regional countries regarding the dangers that may arise with the new governance, the anti-Mubarak protests

that started in Egypt on January 25, 2011 attracted significant curiosity at the global level (Mudge, 2011).

World leaders and the media followed the demonstration by hundreds of thousands of people at the Tahrir Square cautiously. The future of Egypt and whether Hosni Mubarak – the oppressive ruler of Egypt for over 30 years – backed by the army and the US will be ousted as in the case of Bin Ali of Tunisia was taken as a salient debate on the agenda of world leaders and the public. As the initial debates on Mubarak's future were being intensified, the end of the US support and the Egyptian army's stance towards the establishment resulted in the toppling of the Mubarak regime. However, the toppling of the Egyptian regime and the change of power in Egypt is not similar to the Tunisian case as the significance and impact of a power change in Egypt is much more concerning and important.

There are various reasons as to why the events in Egypt signaled a greater concern for the region and the world. First of all, the large population of Egypt, with over 80 million people makes it the most populous country amongst all of the Arab countries. Furthermore, the historical background of Egypt, in terms of its political, military and cultural elements, has allowed Egypt to serve as the leader of the Arab world. It has been argued that a democratic transition in Egypt after Mubarak would also greatly influence other Arab countries due to Egypt's leader role and soft power within the Arab states. Others have gone further to state that without Egypt, democratization in the Arab world is impossible (Hamid, Egypt: The Prize, 2011). Another important element to consider when examining Egypt is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Egypt plays a vital role in the peaceful settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and provides stability in the Middle East. This is due to Egypt's (along with Jordan and Saudi Arabia) close relationship with Israel and the US. The geographical location of Egypt makes it the pathway for Palestinians to connect with the rest of the world providing with Egypt key geostrategic importance as well.

Taking the salience of Egypt into consideration, it is imperative that the uprisings in Egypt be examined, particularly how they developed, their possible future trajectory and the consequences of it on the country and the region. To understand the "Arab Uprisings" it is critical to comprehend and analyze the important political waves in the region from the breakup of the Ottoman Empire to the present day. In order to better understand the "Arab Uprisings", the Arab Revolutions of the 1950s and 1960s in the Arab countries of the Middle East is valuable to study and apprehend as well. This could provide essential knowledge for our understanding of the "Arab Uprisings" and its future direction.

The end of the Pax-Ottamana by the First World War (1914-1918) created political turbulence in the Middle East, particularly impacting the Arab countries (Şahin, 2011). After a century since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the fragile political structures in the region continue to exist. Originally, the Arab leaders in the region had the assumption that they were going to gain full independence with the decisions taken at the 1919 Peace Conference and the 1920 San Remo Conference. The Arab Rebellion led by nationalist leaders and backed by France and Britain against the Ottoman Empire did not produce the expected results.[1] Therefore, the results of the first rebellion were not as the Arab leaders desired. It was in fact the initial stages of the construction of a new Middle East. As the political structures of the Middle East were reshaping, the Arabs were not able to achieve their independence.

The newly formed Arab states were either under the direct mandate of France, Britain, or under the control of other patronage states. France and Britain were in power in the political structures of the region and did not only define and shape the boundaries of the physical borders of the area but also selected the governor elites of the region. The political order that was established in the Arab Middle East continued until the Second World War.

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[1] For more discussions on Ottoman Arabs during pre-World War I period; Budak (2010), M. M. US-Syrian Relations in Framework of Two Gulf War. Unpublished master's thesis. Ankara University

The transformations that occurred in the post-Second World War Middle East indicates the second phase of major political changes for the region. The dominant post-World War One status quo started to dissolve during the 1940s and 1950s, and it culminated with the Arab Revolutions in the 1960s (Bradley, 2011). Through this process several monarch regimes of the region collapsed (such as 1952 Egypt, 1958 Iraq, 1969 Libya) to be replaced by republics (such as 1952 Egypt and 1958 Iraq) (Lenczowski, 1980).

To fully understand the developments in the region and particularly in Egypt it is important to study revolution theories. Due to the fact that revolutions take place throughout a long and complex causal relationship, it is and has always been difficult to understand the causes of revolutions (Brinton, 1965). Numerous social scientist has examined cases around the world to explain revolutions and have utilized various data sets along with an examination of the conditions of the period to produce research methods to elucidate revolutions. The development and expansion of technology, transformation of power relations, economic innovations, global interactions and social changes have all played a role at different periods of revolutions around the world (Davies, 1962). The new revolutionary environments that emerged due to the conditions mentioned above necessitated new analysis according to the spirit of that particular period. Looking at the English Revolution with relatively weak communication networks, the role of the radio in the Filipino Revolution to the limited transport facilities in the French Revolution or the Russian Revolution where the railway was intensively used, all revolutions to a certain degree exert new and unique elements (Levine, 2013).

Focusing on the revolutionary context enables us to understand the causal processes that gives rise to revolutions which is ultimately more useful than concentrating on fixed and deterministic point in history in the hopes of finding clues about the rise and fall of revolutionary factors. Furthermore, not taking into consideration the environment and spirit of the time means lacking an examination of the structural causes of revolutions; such as the integration of a country into the world system and how it functions within this system (for

example its reaction to the Structural Adjustment Policies - SAP) or the impact of the internal structure of the state and its role in international politics. Many theories of revolution also focus on economic conditions, social expectations and demographic changes in a country. Tilly (1978) explains that, "The basic theory predicts action from interests. Some are assuming interests and dealing with the political processes which lead from organized and conflicting interests to revolution." (Tilly, 1978, p. 191). Revolution theories than provides us with an understanding of phenome of revolutions, how they surface, their network links and their interactions. The theories did not only try to explain and understand the motivation of the actors rebelling but to also comprehend the timing and success of revolutions. Beining and Vairel (2011) add to this by emphasizing that the puzzle lies in understanding courage "in the absence of opening opportunities" for mass mobilization. Examining the processes instead of only outcome allows the researcher to include in their analysis the stories of the people involved in such events.

This thesis employs Egypt and the "1952 Nasser Revolution" as a case study to better understand and compare with the "Egypt Revolution of 2011". The central research questions this thesis attempts to answer are: What are the reasons for the social movement/revolutions that (re)occur in the Middle East; and what are the causes that drove this movement? Furthermore, it aims to explore the role of leaders and structures that led to the movements in the 1952 and in 2011. What are the similarities and differences between the two uprisings? This thesis realizes that as in every revolution the Egyptian revolutions also have their own characteristics according to the context of the time. Within this framework and in light of revolution theories, similar mass mobilization occurrences in Egypt at different periods will be evaluated and compared. Although there are historical studies on such mass uprisings, a gap exists in the literature regarding comparison between the 1952 and the 2011 events. The two uprisings, this thesis focusses on have previously been extensively studied by historians and regional experts. A large and rich literature exists for researchers to employ in an attempt to make a novel contribution based on previous accumulation of evidence. This is an ideal situation for the social scientist who will inevitably draw from secondary sources such as research monographs and synthesis of works already published by the relevant historical or cultural specialists. The comparative

historians task and original scholarly work does not lie in revealing new data about large time periods or diverse spaces surveyed in comparison, but rather the value lies in establishing the interest and prima facie validity of an overall argument regarding the causal regularities across various historical cases (Neuman, 2011, pp. 464-506).

It is not feasible nor realistic for a comparativist researcher to undertake primary research for each of the cases being examined as this would entail immense time and diverse ray of skills. Instead, the comparativist must aim to examine and systematically investigate specialists' publications and works that deal with the particular case and issue with the theoretical and logic of the comparativist method. It is the job of the comparativist to seek out and define works of specialists with an analytical and critical lens to figure out how these fit into the originally envisioned project of the research. Most importantly throughout a comparativist study, the researcher must be as systematic as possible when searching for information in all the cases involved keeping in mind that the works of specialists will usually concentrate on various topics of the same issue. Clearly, the work of the comparativist only becomes practicable after large amounts of primary research has been accumulated regarding the relevant topic(s) of investigation and the issue he/she is attempting to research and develop (Skocpol, 1979).

Within this framework, this study aims to examine the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 in light of the discussions on the basic tenets and characteristics of the revolution that took place in 1952. It is understood that the Egyptian Revolutions, similar to other revolutions in the region, has its own defining characteristics and differs from the previous ones depending on the zeitgeist.

In this respect, the first chapter of this thesis will review the literature related to the theories and historical analysis that explains revolutions with a critical perspective. The assumptions and findings from theoretical discussions used in the study of previous revolutions will be highlighted and it will be examined to see if the elements in these previous revolutions are

congruent in the explanations of the revolutionary movements in Egypt. Having said that, it is important to keep in mind that although some similar elements such as methods, procedures, actors and dynamics may be seen, generally they show variance according to the particular time and place of revolution. Due to these differences, an approach that may have explanatory power in one example may not be fit or functional in explaining another instance. This research employs such literature to develop a background for the creation of new theoretical contribution in the field of sociological revolution theories.

Through the course of the examination of the Egyptian revolutions, this study aims to understand the context, causes and processes that lead to revolutions and to contribute to the revolution studies by identifying what elements and actors are influential throughout the revolution processes. Although many analyses have been made regarding revolutions throughout history, an in-depth investigation of each revolution according to the conditions of their particular time and place is vital to understand civil uprisings, ousting of governments, transformation of ideologies and the role of actors in revolutions. The Egyptian revolution exemplifies many new elements regarding the manner in which it emerged, the instruments employed and the actors involved. Therefore, the study of the Egyptian revolution becomes particularly salient for revolution studies because it exemplifies the relationship between internal and external actors and impacts in terms of socioeconomic causes and ideological foundations that motivate revolutions and social events. This study particularly tries to explore how appropriate it is to classify these social events in the category of "revolution".

To understand the revolution process in Egypt, this research also benefits from explanations of theorists such as Theda Skocpol, Fred Halliday, Thomas H. Greene and Jack A. Goldstone who emphasize the structural elements in revolutions. The extensive works of John Foran (1997) on revolutions in third world countries will be employed in this study in making comparisons between the Egyptian case and other similar examples.

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The revolution studies within the framework of international relations discipline and its contributions will be examined in this research. The significance of social revolutions does not only apply at the national level but in certain instances they give rise to models and ideals of great international impact as well, especially when the transformed societies are deemed geopolitically important or are an actual or potential Great Power.

Proceeding the review of the literature on the sociological theories of revolutions and its evaluation are considered through the lens of international relations, the study will move forward to examine the recent uprisings in Egypt. By employing the insights gained from the theoretical approaches and the historical analysis, this research will continue in the next chapters by examining the elements behind the 1952 and 2011 revolutions through an analysis of the socio-economic causes, the attitudes of international actors through the revolutionary process, dominant figures who carry out the revolutions and the ideological motivations and foundations of the revolutions. It will attempt to explain in detail how the revolutions unfolded by looking at the socio-economic reasons behind the revolutionary process in Egypt with a focus on the role of international actors, the social structures that gave rise to such movements and the ideological foundations that are adopted by the leaders of the revolution. It is important to evaluate and examine this literature because it enables us to develop the building blocks to be able to in the next section examine the similarities and differences between the 1952 and the 2011 revolutions that took place in Egypt.

The following chapter (fourth) will focus in on an examination of the similarities and differences between the two revolutions to advance knowledge about the Middle East politics in general and sociological theories in particular. The goal is to employ social theories of revolutions to advance knowledge in the discipline of International Relations by examining the two revolutions in Egypt. The 2011 Revolution in Egypt proved that a revolutionary takeover emerges when the constant exclusion of opponents from the political system through oppressive means is combined with chronic economic difficulties and widespread social injustice. Under the rule of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, there were severe pressures on opposition groups and a growing income injustice which eventually led to the

uprising of the social masses culminating in all out rebellion. This point in the revolutionary process is explained by Antonio Gramsci as, "the process of reviving the masses has been initiated by removing the political passivity and moving to the active position and expressing their demands in a collective way" (Gramsci, 1971, p. 210). In other words, the popular uprising that was mobilized as a constituent part of the revolution has been initiated by a mass movement in a sudden and spontaneous manner containing groups from all segments of society – this exemplifies a traditional definition of the revolution as accepted in the literature (Telci, 2017). However, when looking at the Free Officers Revolution in 1952 we notice that the methods used and the leading figures are different than the uprisings in 2011 even though similar issues gave rise to it.

The salience of including an analysis focused on Middle Eastern politics and international relations is due to the fact that similarities and differences between the two periods – the main aim of this study- can provide an insight into the future of Egypt and the region. The mere realization that the revolutions have causal factors that are both internal and external (Halliday, 1990) makes it inevitable to include an analysis within the framework of international relations. The internal causes that emerges during the two periods show resemblances to one another. These include the unstable political repression, the advent of economic problems, the reality of structural social injustice and the growth and persistence of pessimism amongst the youth along with the corruption within the political system (Sowers & Toensing, 2012). In comparing the period of 1952 to 2011 we see that the conflictual environment created by the global political structure and the international hegemonic powers are different but are assessed to be similar due to the similar imperial motives in both periods from the superpowers. In addition to the mentioned direct factors that impact revolutions, the expansion of globalization and the increased interaction this has brought by the development of communications technologies has decreased the importance of physical space and brought the local and global close to each other. Although all these factors in some manner impact and shape the revolutions in both periods, the most significant difference between the 1952 and the 2011 revolutions lie in the cadres that dominate the revolutions and the ideological basis and influences of the two revolutions.

1. REVOLUTION THEORIES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The 2011 Arab Uprising has led to the rethinking about topics within the social sciences, such as revolutions, social movements, revolts, military coups and resistance. The phase of rethinking about such concepts also impacted and influenced theories of revolutions. During the initial stages of these mass mobilizations, the media was quick to label these movements in the umbrella category as the "Arab Spring" (Keating, 2011). In contrast to the preceding periods, the rethinking process of revolutions took into consideration the role of militaries, popular social movements, the politicization of youth and the proliferation of social media use by the public.

The Tunisian and Egyptian cases reveal the importance of developing theories regarding the revolutionary processes that can assist in our understanding of the way in which revolutions emerge, the factors leading to demands for change socially and politically, the emergence and actions of actors and the driving ideologies behind such mass movements. These areas of study enable the researcher to better understand the rise, success/failure and outcome of these sorts of major social movements. It also helps in the understanding of political and social change that may or may not occur due to revolutions. More importantly, these factors and their study highlights the gaps in theories of revolutionary processes such as the lack of importance given to circumstances and conjunctures.

The goal of this chapter is to explore the analytical tools provided by theories of revolutions and to employ these tools to understand the Egyptian Revolutions of 1952 and 2011. The chapter underlines the utility in the revolution theories, but puts forth the need to develop new theorizing about these uprisings to add to the literature on revolution theories to better recognize the new elements of revolutions.

1.1.   Revolution Theories

A review of the literature reveals a variety of definitions of revolution[2]. The word "revolution" has its roots in Latin which was used in the field of astronomy for a very longtime with no connection to the contemporary meaning. Since the 17th century it has acquired its meaning in the political and social sphere to denote upheavals. Therefore, the use of the concept "revolution" also raises an important task to examine its sociological and political reference (Kafkasyalı, Devrimler, 2011).

In terms of defining a revolution, many revolutionary theorists proposed different definitions of their own. The defining characteristics of revolution involves the nature of violence during its time-spam, the individuals and segments of society who carry out the revolution and the duration the revolutionaries hold on to power (Foran, 1997).

Another important characterization of revolutions or rebellions are the legitimacy crisis in society that provides an initial foundation for them. Although sociologically revolutions naturally point to a legitimacy crisis in society, its definition in contrast defines revolutions as, "non-constitutional overthrow of an established government" and "using power in an unlawful way" (Johnson, 1982, pp. 88-118). During and proceeding revolutions, the

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[2] For different definition and discussions about "Revolution" see Goldstone, J. A. & Useem, B. (1999). **Prison Riots as Microrevolutions: An Extension of State-Centered Theories of Revolution**. *American Journal of Sociology*, 985-1029. Halliday, F. (1990). **'The sixth great power: on the study of Revolution and International Relations.** *Review of International Studies*, 207-221. Stinchcombe, A. L. (1999). **Ending revolutions and building new governments**. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 49-73. Schock, K. (2005). ***Unarmed insurrections: People power movements in nondemocracies.*** Minnesota: University of Minnesota Pres. Tilly, C. (2006). ***Regimes and Repertoires.*** Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

established order no longer becomes legitimate in the eyes of the mass public, and therefore, a search for a new legitimate government and a constitutional arrangement is sought after. This process and conflicting goals by the established power holder who wants the status quo to continue and the revolutionary forces who try to breakdown the existing power structure to replace it with a new one. This conflicting era is normally seen in the pre-revolutionary period-typically described as a revolution pretext or condition: when an established order (state) of power and a revolutionary power force exists (Güngör, 2007).

The conceptualization and definition of revolution in western sources and linguistic terms corresponds to a specific area. For example, according to Merriam Webster dictionary (2017) revolution refers to a "fundamental change in political organization; especially: the overthrow or renunciation of one government or ruler and the substitution of another by the governed" or "activity or movement designed to effect fundamental changes in the socioeconomic situation". Oxford Dictionary defines revolution as, "A forcible overthrow of a government or social order, in favor of a new system". The Cambridge Dictionary further defines it as a "change in the way a country is governed, usually to a different political system and often using violence or war". Looking at the definitions of revolution from western sources exemplifies how it is viewed by the west as a means to a radical change which occurs in the political and social arena in a violent way. The reason for such definition in the west is understandable as the initial revolutionary movements were mostly experienced in the western world and often violently (Kafkasyalı, Devrimler, 2011).

The modern forms of revolutions, especially the first examples experienced within the western political structures have also started to be experienced in eastern societies in the 20th century. The initial history of revolutions in the West dates to the Dutch Uprising of 1566. This event can be classified as the beginning of revolutionary movements. It had all the defining elements such as economic crisis, social tensions, revolutionary alliances and the role of the clergy – all elements that were also visible in the in the revolutionary movements in the following years. The revolutionary tradition in the West continued during the proceeding periods with the British Revolution of 1649, the American Revolution of 1763-

91, the French Revolution in 1789-99, the 1848 Revolution and the Russian Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Examining and exploring these revolutions, throughout the 20th century sociologists, historians, psychologists, political scientists and international relations researchers have developed in-depth analysis and literature in this area of study. The researchers tried to pinpoint what it is about revolutions that are unique in comparison to other forms of political and social change. Most commonly the answer to this question involved the act of violence that accompanies change, the rapidness and the intensity and depth of change brought forth by revolutionary uprisings (Tilly, Giugni, & McAdam, 1999).

Research and studies on revolutions/ social movements/ uprisings are more in line with historical analysis and explanations due to their complexity and context specific elements. These studies generally examine social factors that contribute to regime change which is usually carried out by means of violence (Foran, 1997; Skocpol, 1994; Tilly, Giugni, & McAdam, 1999). Some of the most discussed issues (Zorlu, 2016) have been: group formations within these mobilizations (Sotirakopoulos & Sotiropoulos, 2013), policing responses of power (Grinberg, 2014), "collective identity creation" in the squares (Castells, 2012), "direct democracy practices" (Dhaliwal, 2012), "democracy from below" (Porta, 2014), interconnectedness of global struggles (Sotirakopoulos & Sotiropoulos, 2013) and economic prosperity and regime support (Magaloni & Wallace, 2008; Lynch, 2012).

Ted Robert Gurr (1971) identifies the basis of revolutions in his book *"Why Men Rebel"*. Gurr claims in his book that the foundation of every revolution is the elements of "organized political violence". According to the Political Scientist Samuel Huntington (1986), revolution denotes "the changing of the values and myths of a society, political institutions, social structures and the administrators in a sudden, fundamental and violent way". Huntington in defining revolutions emphasizes, as with Gurr, the word "violent". The sudden change of the social and political structure of a society with at movement from the base" one can see that there is no place of violence. Revolutionary historian Charles Tilly (2006) defines revolution as, "the supremacy of the group that is supported by a significant segment of the society in the struggle of the two different groups who are struggling to seize the

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government of the state". Python Sorokin (1925), taking a psychoanalytic approach shows that when pressure on the administration becomes unbearable people try to carry out a revolution and this is the primary cause of revolutions. Sorokin argues that a revolution may take place as a result of both psychological and physical constraints on individuals and the public; these include freedom, hunger, poverty and other forms of economic strains which cause negative effects on broad segment of the society but does not have to include all of society (Telci, 2017).

The traditional definition of social revolutions to which the French, Russian and Chinese mass movements adhere to are defined by Skocpol (1994): "Social revolutions are rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below". Within this framework, a theoretical debate emerges as to who the actors of these radical changes are and to what extent do they matter in our characterization of events as 'revolution'. This aspect of the theoretical deliberation might be the only one that is inspired by the region, particularly from the 1923 changes in Turkey and the 1952 revolution in Egypt (along with Peru and Japan). Ellen Kay Trimberger (2003) argues that there may be two categories of revolutions which is dependent on the actors and the method they employ to reach their aims. Trimberger further states that deep and radical transformations do not necessarily come from below and they do not have to involve acts of violence. Revolutions could also be carried out by top-down through elites rather than the mass public – Turkey and Egypt are examples that can be grouped into this category of revolutions. Overall, Timberger found that "there cannot be a general theory of revolution (or social change) applicable to all societies at all times" (Akder, 2013).

Revolution studies in the social sciences developed through various kinds of approaches and traditions. It is this literature developed through the years and shaped according to the experiences of numerous revolutions that is being researched by prominent experts of revolutionary studies. The theories of revolution developed by researchers can be divided into three major groups.

Researchers such as George S. Pettee (1938) and Crane Brinton (1965) examine different revolutionary processes to try and find commonalities and similarities. The first type of approaches involves a historical perspective where revolutions are compared through a general typography to highlight the similarities between them. The descriptive studies (circa 1900 and 1940) aimed to identify and determine the impact of different revolutionary processes and the accompanying demographic and social change during the distinct stages of the revolution.

In a contrary fashion, disregarding the processes entirely, the second approach (circa between 1940 and 1975) aimed to explain revolutions through an investigation of the degree of social strain in each society. This approach is structural and emphasizes the structural elements of the revolutionary process. Writers such as Chalmers Johnson (1982), Ted Robert Gurr (1971), Charles Tilly (1978) and S. N. Eisenstadt (1978) explain that sociological unrest, social injustice, conflict, and modernization are psychological processes which impact revolutions.

The novel situation and elements which emerged through the revolutions in Iran, the Philippines and some of the countries of Eastern Europe resulted in the revolutions theorists turn to actor-based analysis. From about 1975 onwards, a third tradition began to dominate the field with an emphasis on holistic and comparative analysis that was intended to explain the causes as well as the diverse results of revolutions. The actors' explanations and perspectives which suggested that revolutions are part of the social movements which are the product of human action, emphasizing the need to examine actors to fully understand revolutions. Skocpol (1979) has been the prominent figure articulating the third generation of theories of revolution. According to Skocpol, regardless of the role of marginal elites throughout the revolutionary process, the major factors that make revolutions possible are structural and systemic variables of states and the international system. This approach views regime stability as the normal condition and any breach of this status quo because of conflict is understood to be an abnormal condition (Goldstone, 1980). Therefore, this theoretical

approach aims to identify the factors and conditions that undermine the stability of the regime and the factors that lead to popular mobilization.

Nevertheless, Goldstone argues that after 20 years and with the incidences of other revolutions, Skocpol's argument was insufficient in explaining this social phenomenon adequately. Goldstone divided modern revolutions into two categories which resemble the political versus the social distinction, but took the argument beyond that to classify them as "the color revolutions and the radicalizing revolutions". Color revolutions refer to the revolutions that occur in industrialized countries with relatively moderate economic disparity and are usually founded on a wide alliance which results in the change of political elites and regime type but are not considered to result in radical social changes. Radical revolutions in contrast take place in societies with great economic disparity and gaps between the classes. These revolutions tend to be violent through the revolutionary processes and may include civil and international conflicts that further radicalize the actors and consequently lead to authoritarian structures and regimes (Goldstone, 2001).

Contingency theory assumes that society is in the state of peace as its in normal condition. According to this theory, collective political violence and its radical form such as revolutions are not in the normal category of political competition. Thus, this train of thought adopts the idea that revolutions do not belong to the normal social conditions and furthermore, revolutions are explained as accidents within the political and social structure (Güngör, 2007).

In direct opposition to contingency theory, inherency theory assumes that the political man is in a constant search for power not peace. The fundamental aim of individuals is to increase and maximize their influence and power over decisions. Hence, this theory suggests that collective violence is a natural reaction to conventional conditions. Both the relative deprivation theories of revolution and the system level theories of revolution examine revolutions in the context of contingency.

Contingency theories of collective violence are based on the notion of systemic breakdown where the relatively stable interdependent elements at some point start to provide negative entropy or the dissolution of that order. Inherency theories claim that revolutions need to be seen as a continuum of revolutionary processes. The typical defining characteristic of inherency theory is that it depends on the conceptualization that revolutions occur when the conditions are met and mature. For inherency theory, the central problem takes place around what prevents extreme conflict as compared to contingency theory's consideration of what causes it (Bal, 2014).

Another argument is raised by McAdam et al. (2001) who claims that despite its important contributions, the general structural framework of the third-generation approach, in which structural weaknesses of regimes were considered as the basic prompts of revolutions, lacked providing a detailed analysis or did not provide significant weight to actors; their roles, strategies and interactions with one another. Many scholarly works on revolutions started to identify this theoretical deficit. Goldstone (2001, p. 139) highlights the requirement for a fourth generation of revolution theories that would move away from the stability as the departure point and give greater importance to the role of group identification, leadership, networks, coalitions, ideologies, foreign powers and elite interaction in the process of producing revolutions. As with Goldstone and around the similar time, McAdam et al. (2001) recognized and pointed to the need for a fourth generation of revolutionary theories as well.

Yet, McAdam et al. (2001) stated that even with the corrective contribution of the new approach with a more cultural focus, which "grants more attention to the role of human agency and cultural construction in the emergence of revolution" (p.194), this theory still did not avoid some of the similar drawbacks of the third-generation theories of revolution. Comparable to the third generation of scholarly work, the researchers who employed the novel approach concentrated too heavily on social revolutions and negated the analysis of the "transformative mechanisms that produce revolutionary outcomes out of revolutionary

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situations" (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001). Thus, these researchers ignored the elements mentioned by Goldstone (2001), between successful social revolutions and failed ones and between social movements, rebellions and series of protests.

McAdam et al. noted that there is an inclination to mix revolutionary origins with revolutionary processes or trajectories (the course of action after a revolutionary context rises) as a common weakness of the fourth-generation revolution theories. Although the fourth-generation theory provided increased attention to agency, it failed to properly analyze these critical interactions and connections between agency and revolutions. To overcome the weaknesses of the revolution theory, McAdam et al. (2001) articulated a more refined perspective termed the 'contentious politics'. They contended that the concept of contentious politics is applicable to a wide spectrum of collective movements that are contentious in nature. These movements included revolutions, rebellions, nationalism movements and social movements. It is an exploratory model that seeks to identify mechanisms and processes in different episodes of contentious politics (Bal, 2014).

The categorization and classification of revolutions in the last three hundred and fifty years have led to the development of various theoretical approaches and paradigms. All these theories bring new and different interpretations on the causes of revolutions, their formation and development along with the consequences because of revolutions. These theories can be groups as:

- Natural history,

- Social System,

- Modernizations,

- Player centered,

- Structural and

- Marxist and relative deprivation theories, aggregation is possible under six main headings (Kafkasyalı, Devrimler, 2011)

Each of the theories mentioned examines different factors of revolutions with varying perspectives and faces and evaluates it with a critical lens.

Marxist and Relative Deprivation Theories

According to Karl Marx – one of the most cited scholars of revolutionary studies – the revolutionary process takes place between the dialectical forces of the working class and the bourgeoisie. Marx further states that the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is intensified with the increase in the number of working class individuals and this, as Marx claims leads to class conflict. Marx argues that the seized rights of the working class in a capitalist economic order, where the proletariat are greatly disadvantaged, will lead to revolutionary movements through a political organization (Gurr, 1971). In this respect, the working class will rebel and try to overthrow the capitalist world system through their struggle with the bourgeoisie or the capitalist elites.

Marx further deepens his analysis by arguing that revolutions are likely to take place when the existing political and social systems and elites interfere with the economic structure and development. Karl Marx traced such economic development through various stages from feudalism to capitalism to socialism and eventually to communism. As the means and modes of production changes with the development of technology and economic changes in an industrialized capitalist society, a conflict develops between the new urban industrial working class and the ruling bourgeoisie class. Marx claims that the significance of labor will eventually supersede that of money or ownership of capital. While the bourgeoisie tries to maintain its control of the government and economy, the working class becomes frustrated and with the growing levels of exploitation leads the working class to revolution. Following the working-class revolution is what Marx posited as the dictatorship of the proletariat which mean the control of the government. Many different version of Marxist theory developed

over the years but they all postulated the need for a revolution at certain times in economic history (Defronzo, 2015)

The basic elements of Marx's theory can be identified easily but it is important to remember that the elements of Marxist theory are open to interpretation. Marx understood revolutions in terms of a class-based social movements growing out of systemic and structural contradictions that develop historically and in a conflictual manner. For Marx societies are defined by their mode of production or a combination of socioeconomic forces of production and class relations of private ownership and surplus accumulation. The relations of production are of outmost importance. The generation of an emerging mode of production within the confines of an existing one of capitalism within feudalism; of socialism within capitalism creates a dynamic basis for the growth of the unity and consciousness of each proto-revolutionary class through ongoing struggles with the dominant class. Thus, leading up to the European bourgeois revolutions "the means of production and of exchange, on whose foundation bourgeoisie built itself up, were generated in feudal society. (Skocpol, 1979).

Revolution, according to Marx, is accomplished when the self-conscious class rises to become the revolutionary class. The revolutionary class, as it could be the case with others as well, could have allies during the rise-up. For example, the working class may coalesce with the peasantry, however, these collaborations are not fully class conscious nor politically organized at the national level. Revolution in the Marxist sense, if successfully achieved would mark the transition from one mode of production to another which marks the transformation of the old order with that of the new social relations of production, new political and ideological forms and ultimately the triumph of a new revolutionary class which Marx sees as progression within society. Marx than views revolutions as founded on class-conflict and the modes of production that creates these conflicts ultimately through revolutions transforming one mode into another (Skocpol, 1979).

Inspired by the works of Marx and Tocqueville, Gurr and James Davies developed the theory of relative deprivation. Relative deprivation theory of revolutions also includes unusually collective violence. Gurr's theory (1971) of relative deprivation revealed through his work within the framework of revolution theories can be considered as follows: Relative deprivation theory is a social psychology model that neither puts the relationship between leaders and followers or the psychological characteristics of the leaders themselves as the source of revolutions. Rather, this theory concentrates on the establishment of a relationship between the expectations of people and what they actually receive. This sort of an approach explains how groups react to structural and systemic conditions. More specifically it explains revolutions as the result of the collective expectations of a group, community or society and the frustration of not meeting those expectations due to structural obstacles. It can be better explained by imagining how personal depression may lead to suicide while the collective anomie, depression or frustration of a community to revolution. Sudden and great changes put people in positions never exposed too previously which creates novel ideas in people and drives them into taking on new roles resulting in a collective shock effect. This shock effect, without proper integration and treatment leads to chaos and social violence.

Relative deprivation is defined as the difference between the value expectations of the players and the value capacities. The emphasis here is on the role of poverty within a society. Relative deprivation theory explains revolutionary activity as the unfulfilled expectations of people which causes frustration and consequently aggression. The revolutionary process from this perspective is seen to be focused on the rapid economic and social change that people experience. However, destructive relative deprivation happens at the breaking points defined as the J curve which takes place when revolutions happens. The growing accumulation of reluctant violence is the environment in which revolutionary violence can emerge. But this accumulation is not a result of natural flow. It means, it is a development is a process, not inevitability, but a possibility (Gurr, 1971).

Furthermore, relative deprivation theory suggests that revolutions are the explosion of society caused by the elimination of peaceful politics under abnormal conditions. However,

even when accepting this explanation for revolutions, this theory lacks to explicate the consequences of revolutions. Due to the rigid focus of this theory on expectations and capacities, a revolutionary action is at all times in motion but without bringing forth an actual revolution. This entails that the theory is built on a probability factor and that revolutions are an accident.

Relative deprivation theory explains revolutionary phenomenon as events that bring about a collapse of the system, unlike evolutionist approaches which claim changes arise as part of the normal functioning of a society within a system. The state of revolution is the collapse of the state of peace. To clarify further, it is the distribution of society that leads to the state of war. Gurr classifies revolutions in two categories: political violence and civil war (Güngör, 2007). Other theories try to explain revolutions through examining the psychology of the players involved which is discussed further below.

Player-Centered Revolution Theory

Player-centered revolution theory is based on an investigation of the psychological behavior of the actors involved and attempts to seek answers for questions such as "Which type of individuals or groups tend to participate in a revolutionary act and their reason for doing so. The player-centered approach breaks down the psychology of revolutionary behavior into two levels of analysis. The first level is aimed at the revolutionary individual while the second level of analysis take as its referent object the mass/group psychology (Güngör, 2007). The foundations of the player-centered revolutionary theory is traced back to Freud's ideas. Freud finds that the structure character of all groups is based on the neurotic relationship between leaders and their followers.

Researchers' studied various revolutionary leaders within the framework of the first level of analysis (the revolutionary individual) and tried to identify common factors in the political structural psyche of revolutionary leaders. For example, in a study of the biographies of revolutionaries such as Lenin, Trotsky and Gandhi, researchers found that all three leaders

showed common psychological elements. The generalizations made to answer the questions of "how revolutionary personalities form" and what type of people become revolutionary leaders and why" are not definite and convincing. However, the revolutionary leaders father-son similarities and common illnesses that both have experienced through their psychological development are cited, such as the Oedipus complex, but these explanations have been intensely criticized and rebutted. (Gurr, 1976).

At the level of social psychology, which is the second level of analysis, individuals or community expectations have been taken as the sources, and the fact that the expectations which have not been met has been presented as the core source of revolutionary movements. The revolution is thought to be result of the disappointment and aggressiveness that occur due to these unfulfilled expectations (Greene, 1990). In fact, Marx and Engels' theory of revolution was based on this. They claimed that the increasing misery of the industrial working class would eventually reach the point of despair and rebellion will become inevitable. Davies (1962) and Gurr (1971, 1976), who see the unfulfilled expectations of society as the most important reason to explain the revolution, have studied various revolutions, moving from the basis developed by "relative deprivation theory" which is inspired by Marx and Tocqueville (Kimmel, 1990). This model was applied to the 1776 American, 1789 French, 1917 Russian revolutions successfully and revealed the relationship between revolution and poverty. However, this model, which was applied to the revolutions based on deprivations was criticized for not being able to explain the revolution processes as a whole (Kafkasyalı, Devrimler, 2011) .

Natural History Theory

Natural history theorists (Edwards, 1927; Pettee, 1938; Brinton, 1965) believe that revolutions are continuous, varied and have examined the 1640 British, 1776 American, 1789 French, and 1917 Russian revolutions to find that there are common processes that all revolutions must pass through. Natural historians who advocated that the basic features of

the development of an appropriate environment for the emergence of a revolution, the realization of a revolution and the new system to be born after the revolution are the same and the turning point between these three are as follows:

"1-A society's intellectuals, most of whom once supported the existing regime, turn against it.

2- The old regime tries to save itself from revolution by tempting reforms that ultimately fail to protect the old order.

3-The revolutionary alliance that eventually takes power from the old government is soon torn by internal conflict.

4-At first the post-revolutionary government is moderate.

5-When moderate revolutionaries fail to full expectations, more radical revolutionaries gain control.

6-Radicals take more extreme actions to full revolutionary aims, employing coercive methods against those who resist or threaten the fulfilment of revolutionary goals.

7-Eventually pragmatic, moderate revolutionaries replace the radicals." (Goldstone,1986, pp. 2-4)

Social System Theory / Functionality Theory

Social system or functionalist theory is based on the social structure of human society and emphasizes that the social structure is a system which operates in accordance with the needs of the society. Social organization develops on its own and produces order and harmony within it, thus, situations of conflict, chaos and disorder are explained as expressions of anomalies (Kimmel, 1990). Revolutions from this perspective occur when the social system cannot meet the needs of its participants and is incapable of providing them with the basic needs and tasks. The belief that the social system is a functional system and revolution can only be brought by violence that breaks this structure. If changes within the social system

are forced through violence than this is classified as a revolution; therefore, revolution here is considered as phenomena that is brought forth with violence. Hence, revolution should be examined in light of the theory of radical change which states that it cannot be carried out without violence (Greene, 1990).

The systemic analysis of revolutions asserts that revolutions are based on two groupings of reasoning (Johnson, 1982). The first one is the pressure created by the unbalanced social system; a society must be built on changes for its continual existence. Within an unbalanced society; weaknesses of government can only directly contribute to the revolution. This means that the integration of the system is based on the application of force increase during a period of change. The second reasoning is what society should do with the talents of its legitimate leaders; thus if leaders are not able to develop policies that will keep the confidence of the actors (non-pervasive) within the system, then the loss of authority will follow (Kafkasyalı, Devrimler, 2011).

Once the authority is lost, the use of force by leaders will no longer be considered legitimate (Güngör, 2007). Whether or not leaders can successfully use the army in order to prevent unrest within society could lead to the possibility of the third cause. Revolution is generally seen as an act of influence acceleration that deprives leaders to use their powerful weapon which is the army. The uprising within the army which makes governments unable to use one of their most powerful instrument causes the escalation of revolutionary processes. Consequently, the social system / functionalist approach formulates the analysis of the revolution as follows: "Power weakness + Loss of authority + Accelerator = Revolution" (Johnson, 1982, p. 109).

According to system theory, society is free from revolution as long as it's a culture (set of beliefs and attitudes) and its realities are in harmony. When a society is homeostatic in balance, it must always receive an animator from its members or from the outside continuously, which causes the necessary adjustments to the division of labor and culture

structure. As a system continues with its culture and its surroundings simultaneously, it continues to make necessary changes without risk of revolution. Social systems that were once in equilibrium can move out of the order in certain ways. The revolution, in particular, refers to the form of changes that took place in France in 1789, Russia in 1917, and China in 1949. The only reason why revolutions erupted within these societies is that the non-revolutionary changes have already been unsuccessful; thus, revolution is not the same as ordinary social change; but it is a form of social change as well. The radical changes in the United States during the New Deal, the process of shifting Japan from a feudal society to a modern state, and the changes that the British government has undergone in response to industrialization have all been achieved without revolutionary situations (Güngör, 2007).

Again, it is important to highlight that conflict and radical changes are not inherent components of a functioning social system. Therefore, conflict in all its form, revolutionary or not, are seen as problems that needs to be fixed or opposed. The emergence of modern revolutions is seen as an unprecedented or novel developments and transformations in contrast to natural or inevitable changes (Güngör, 2007).

The theory of social systems, also called the theory of extrema, views society as being in a state of peace. According to this approach, collective political violence and its extreme forms such as revolutions, are not normal or natural decisions of political expression or competition. Therefore, from this train of thought revolutions do not belong to a normal social condition, rather it is an outburst of an abnormal condition. Hence, revolution is only possible by an accident due to the lack or elimination of peaceful options (Skocpol, 1994).

Furthermore, system theory of revolution, unlike Marxist theory, is considered to be more of a general approach that does not view revolution in the manner of a progressive historical development due to technological advancement and economic structures. Systems theory makes the assumption that revolutions are a possibility when the preceding structures fail to perform the necessary functions regardless of other causes and the success or failure of the

revolution. Vital functions are not only limited to economic and administrative duties but socialization of the members of a given community to a culture that supports the upholding of the existing social system is also extremely important.

Modernization Theory

The second half of the 1960s and the 1970s saw the rise of another contemporary theory of revolution - modernization theory. According to this theory, modernization is an idea that must be achieved by societies and that must be constructed by the practical ideas of modernism. Modernism is perceived as development and progress. Thus, revolutions should help societies to achieve modernization. Within the hierarchical social class structure of society, the state is an arrangement of institutions that can prevent conflicts and determine social priorities. Over time, all societies are faced with forces that promote change. These forces threaten the institutions against modernization such as patterns of sociality, thought and behavior. Modernization generates new social components that are inactive. These components are faced with the resistance of traditional structures while demands from the state are increasing. The revolution takes place when the state cannot respond to these demands (because of reluctance or failure) and the modernization movement prevails over the traditional components and views (Greene, 1990).

According to the theory of modernization, the potential of revolutions will increase under the following conditions:

a) "When the spread of modernization increases,

b) When the effects of modernization are identified by a foreign enemy or imperialist culture,

c) When the status of social mobility is higher than the speed of economic development,

d) When the advantages accompanied by modernization are distributed unjustly among various social classes and groups,

e) When the effects of modernization support the existing cultural divisions,

f) When the traditional agricultural sector is rapidly commercialized,

g) When the peasants became independent (relatively) from the landlords and established a strong tradition of solidarity,

h) When modernization is initiated by the central state bureaucracy, instead of being decreased by the initiative of the social classes from below,

i) When demands of political representation and participation oppressed by the state,

j) When state fails to fulfill social welfare functions, which were previously carried out by traditional social structures,

k) When political participation opportunities increase faster than the institutional capacity of the state,

l) When civilian political elites can use official authority over the army." (Greene, 1990, pp. 190-191)

Samuel Huntington (1968), one of the most prominent figures of modernization theory, sees modernization as both a cause and a consequence of revolutions. According to Huntington, the causes behind political and social confusion is the lack of modernity and the struggle to modernize and change. Modernization itself is a source of inversion. From the perspective of modernization theory, revolution is demarcated as the extreme example of the explosion of political participation. Therefore, it is seen as an explosion but also as part of the political participation process and revolutions cannot be understood without a comprehension of this explosion. However, a complete revolution is linked to a second phase, which is the creation of a new political order and its institutionalization. A successful revolution combines rapid political participation and rapid political institutionalization (Huntington, 1968).

Huntington (1986 pp.39-47) further divides revolutions into two categories: the "Western Revolution" and the "Eastern Revolution". The initial phase of the Western Revolution is the collapse of the old regime. The collapse opens gaps for new groups to enter into the realm of politics and new political institutions are formed. Therefore, an analysis of revolution from the Modernization lens focusses on the political, economic and social conditions present in the old regime that gives rise to revolutions. The French, Russian, Mexican and Chinese revolutions resemble the conditions mentioned in the first phase of Huntington's classification. In the Western Revolution, action from insurgents are not deemed necessary to overthrow the older regime. The revolution in this sense is not the outcome of a powerful new force or actor but is the awareness by citizens that the state no longer exists. Following this collapse of the state an absence of authority rises which is filled by revolutionary forces and the order is restores in a state. In Western revolutions a definite date can be given for the actual or symbolic fall of the old regime. Such as 14 July 1789, 10 October 1910, 25 May 1911 and 15 March 1917.

Dissimilar to Western Revolutions, the Eastern Revolution starts with the active participation of new groups within politics and the creation of new political institutions. Most commonly in Eastern Revolutions the result is the violent backfire from the old regime apparatuses. The distinctive character of Eastern Revolutions is the long duration of a period of dual or multi power juncture. However, through this period an effective government that maintains administration exists while revolutionary forces expand their own institutions and power. Within the "Western Revolution", the actual fight is amongst the revolutionaries, and in the "Eastern Revolution" this fight is between the revolutionaries and the established order. In the "Eastern Revolution" it is impossible to give a definitive date for the beginning of the revolutionary process, but a definite date can be given for the end of the revolutionary process. This is because the exact date of the fall of the regimes' capital is at least a symbolic finalization. January 31, 1949, January 1, 1959 (Huntington, 1968).

Modernization theory resembles Marxist theory in some aspects. It associates revolution with technological and economic changes. However, it differs from the Marxist theory

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because it does not hypothesize a set of economic sequences of stages and does not reveal which economic group will be the major actor in the revolutionary action. Rather, modernization theory views technological and economic change as a source to mobilize new groups by providing them with an opportunity to realize their economic aspirations and their political desires to participate. Revolution in this sense occurs when those in power are not able to meet or unwilling to meet the rising demands of groups brought together by the idea of modernization.

Structural Theory

Structural theory defines revolution from a broad perspective; it views the state not solely as its internal structure but also includes the international system (Calvert, 1996). This approach deals with revolutions from an international context and attaches importance to geopolitical competition and the capitalist world economy (Boswell, 1989; Wickham-Crowley, 1997). Structural theorists view revolutions as a result of a confrontation between states that are operating with different economic and technological systems (Güngör, 2007). According to them, modern revolutions have shown 350 years of accumulation of revolutionary research since it started with the English Revolution of 1640, revolutions related to two central transformations that have been taking place in the world and deeply affecting social construction. The first is capitalist industrialization and the second is the centralization of the state (Kimmel, 1990). Revolutions always develop in response to the dynamics of industrialization and the reaction of the state's centralization process. On the other hand, the revolution is made by people who believe that uncontrolled progress of the combination of capitalist industrialization and state centralization will cause much lost to them (Wickham-Crowley, 1997).

Skocpol (1979) and Trimberger (2003) were amongst the scholars who developed the most prominent and influential structural theory. It is in agreement with Marx's approach in that a revolution is not the sole product of the subjective features of a community such as the shared cultural values or the social and economic expectations, it is rather dependent on the particular objective realities of the conditions existent in the political or social structure

outside of the socially constructed world. Nevertheless, Skocpol's and Trimberger's articulation differ from Marx's traditional perspective in various ways. Firstly, it sees the state as an expression of the social organization that has a combination of administrative and military functions and collects resources from society to keep social stability to compete with other states in the areas of economy and military. Secondly, in opposition to original Marxist paradigm which see the driving force of revolutions as technological and economic factors, the structural approach saw revolution as part of a broader phenomenon caused by conflict between nations at different levels of technological and economic development stage (Trimberger, 2003).

Skocpol and Trimberger argues that the main objective conditions of revolution occur in agrarian and technologically lesser developed states because they were confronted with the strong and powerful militaries and economies of the advanced nations. Incompetence to fight off the foreign aggression destructed the perceived legitimacy of the pre-revolutionary regimes which were also undermined by sharp divisions within the elite populous due to the disagreements on how to deal with the threat coming from external states. Government in these conditions attempted to ease of the foreign pressure by increasing state resource such as increase on taxes where the people are already poor and this in turn create mass discontent with governments. From the structural lens, the goal of and the result of such revolutionary movements was mainly political. The aim was to establish a new system of government – one that could more efficiently utilize resources to fight of the external threats from developed nations (Defronzo, 2015).

Theories and Egypt

When the social movements in 1952 and 2011 of Egypt is evaluated in the context of Natural History approach, protests in both periods were against the power structures which were able to carry out their administration with the support of the imperial states and oppression policies rather than the social consensus. It was observed that in 1952, the UK and in 2011 the US had lifted their support for the regime. Egyptian army that was the most important supporter of the regimes in two periods took a stand against the administration. These are

first steps of revolutions according to Natural History Theory. According to this approach, especially during the 2011 period, the regime wanted to make various reforms to restore the situation. A clear example is when Hosni Mubarak stated that he would not be a candidate again in the next elections. Moreover, conflicts between the various factions were experienced in both periods, as anticipated by Natural Historical approach. However, a structure emerged after the 1952 which consolidated the revolution but in 2011 there was counter-coup d'etat against the revolutionary movement. The details could be seen in the next two chapters that the processes of pre and post-revolutionary events and the revolutionary transformation processes predicted by the theory of natural history revolution overlap. As will be pointed out in the next two chapters, both the development that took part before, during and after revolutionary movements in both periods are match with developments anticipated by Natural History Theory of Revolutions.

As it will be explained in the next two chapters, that emerged developments in the Egyptian society and the state structure and the demand for modernization and the inadequacy of the regimes to meet this demand in two periods of 1952 and 2011 have been explained as processes that emerged as the reasons for the revolutions within the scope of Modernization Theory. It is understood that emerging demands which modernization theorists anticipates as the reasons of revolution, such as enrichment, industrialization, the increase of social rights, the expansion of political representation emerged in Egypt were overlapped.

According to the Structural Theory approach, the developments in both periods of Egypt, as the approach anticipate, emerged not only as a response to the structure of the country's administration but also as a demand for reaction and demand of change in the structure of the international system in general. In 1952, it was reaction against the British imperialism and external intervention to the Arab world, which would affect the not only domestic issues of country but also regional and international power structures. In 2011, it was clearly displayed as a reason of protests that the country became a satellite of the imperial powers. In both periods, as anticipated in the Structural theory approach, protest of centralization in

the power sharing in administration came forwards as it will be seen in the forthcoming chapters.

As it was evaluated Social System Theory / Functionality Theory section, this approach focus on the social structure of the human on one hand, and on the other hand the social structure as a system that works in accordance with the needs of the society. According to this approach revolution occurs if the social system cannot meet the needs and cannot fulfill its duties. Thus change occurs through violence. Accordingly the discontent increases over the years and when it reaches a certain maturity, it erupt as explosion when it is not overcome. If social movements in Egypt evaluated according to this approach, it is seen that in both periods, the state mechanism can no longer perform its function and change occurs against the will of the current regime. Thus created certain violence in both periods, that created legitimacy crises for the regimes. Internationally; inability of imperial powers to continue their support to regime and domestically; Egyptian Army's participation to movements against the regimes have created the accelerating effect as anticipated by Social System Theory / Functionality Theory and ensured the revolutions in both periods. In this approach, it is predicted that oppression and violence are within the nature of revolutions. As explained in the next two chapters, it will be seen that the policies implemented by the regimes in these two periods coincide with this prediction.

Although all of this literature concentrates on trying to explain revolutions, the salient issue here is that there is no single definition and explanation of revolutionary processes that is agreed upon by scholars of revolutionary studies. Many different definitions and causes of revolutions exist, from ideological differences to systemic factors to class conflict. It is therefore important to employ multiple theories and concepts to comprehend a revolution. One important aspect that should not be overlooked while trying to understand revolutions is the issue of analyzing every aspect of the revolutionary stage. This is in fact true to analyze any revolution, by narrowing the aspect of study in some cases to achieve more accurate and precise results (Davies, 1962).

One way to achieve this narrowing down is to focus on one or only a few aspects of a revolution. Analysis from a historical perspective or comparative analysis focuses the study on actors and most often in the literature purpose of revolutions are studied. In this respect, looking at the literature it is noticeable that more focus is on the causes of revolutions or revolts and these issues are much more written about than other matters. Also, a wide range of literature exists on actors and their roles during revolutions.

Indeed, political scientists, sociologists, psychologists and historians have been interested in how, why, and by whom the revolutions arise. So in this study the socio-economic causes of the revolution processes, the desired change, the international atmosphere and the actors who take part in the revolution will be detailed in both 1952 and 2011 periods within this mentioned framework.

An important point that needs to be underlined here is the mistake of seeing "success" as a criterion in defining revolutions. The perception that exists in this direction is both misleading and incorrect. Indeed, the revolution is a process in itself. A social disorder that cannot be "successful" in overthrowing the regime and establishing a new political order cannot be described as "not revolutionary" only because of this initial result. Because, the revolutionary regime changes may sometimes happen in a short time frame or it may in other cases take decades to see if the revolutions are successful. From here it is necessary to define the changes in Egypt as a revolution, since it is possible to characterize the political processes that have succeeded in changing the political power and have entered into the struggle for power in the following period with a sudden popular movement.

The revolution should not be implicated with the coup d'état. In fact, the coup usually means that a part of the state revolts and takes over the administration by overthrowing the existing government. A coup d'état is in the literal sense of the word a replacement of the executive machinery of a state with another form of leadership (Skocpol, States, 1979). Skocpol's definition forces a concentration upon the question of did this change in leadership

fundamentally transform the society. The government does not relate to the social and economic structure of the impulse society; however, it seems that there is no direct intervention in the socio-economic structure, but it can cause great negative consequences. Of course, historians and people of the time weren't necessarily working from any kind of strict definition, or from definitions that would comply with our contemporary popular definitions. As with many complicated questions, the answer is "it depends". When we look at outcomes and processes in leadership changes is a much more productive means to analyze events and whether or not they meet the criteria that marks a revolution. The aim of the revolution is to change the fundamental social and economic structure of society, these include; the government status, rights and order, and its cultural structure.

In regards to the Egyptian case, social movement in 1952 started as coup d'état and evolved to the revolution but in 2011 social movements emerged as revolution but be ended by coup d'état as detailed in next two chapters. Accordingly, social movements that took place in 1952 and 2011 which ended the authoritarian regimes of decades and introduced many radical changes in society; matched post-revolutionary struggles that are discussed in the revolutionary literature. The alliances, segregations, conflicts, competitions, factionalism are components which are often encountered within the theories of revolution. At the same time leaders of both movements persistently identified the actions they took as "the revolution". So the term of revolution will be used for describing social movements for both eras of 1952 and 2011 in Egypt.

1.2.   Revolutions and International Relations

As discussed in the previous section, revolutions have both internal and external causes. Among these internal causes we can count the unbearable political oppression, the chronic economic problems, social injustice, pessimism about future of young generation, and the corruption of politics as extremely important. As external causes we can consider factors such as the international environment created by the global political system and the conflicts

between international hegemonic actors, as well as the increasing globalization breaking down barriers within different nations, the development of communication tools and the reduction of distance between the local and the global as salient elements.

When we examine the revolutionary process, certain existential components cannot be disregarded, such as the "international" element. 'International' cannot only be confined into the realm of geopolitics and it has a relationship not only with states but also with people (Halliday, 1990). Undeniably, the diffusion of upheavals in Egypt is a testament that foreign dimension in revolutions is not to be limited to only the diplomatic activities and intelligence agencies. Revolutions, as Halliday insisted, are international events and the Middle East revolutions and revolutionary situations are no exception. Egypt's 1952 and 2011 revolutions were directly related with the international events taking place preceding the revolutions. The two revolutions in Egypt have been inspired by regionally and internationally circulating ideologies, intervened by foreign powers and observed carefully by the international community. As such they demonstrate the need to be treated not as domestic events but as international events because today's modernization process is not bounded to the domestic sphere alone (Akder, 2013).

The study of revolutions is not placed comfortably in any single discipline of the social sciences, however, it has received greater attention within the field of sociology and history. Nevertheless, even in these two fields of study they have tended to study revolutions with limited reference to the international dimension of the phenomenon of revolutionary movements, changes and outcomes. Most sociological studies, until Skocpol's work *States and Social Revolutions*, treated revolutions as a domestic occurrence that happened within a discrete and closed national political entity (Halliday, 1990).

Theda Skocpol (1979, 1994) is a theorist who emphasizes the role of external actors in the revolution process. Skocpol thinks that the developments in the international system have a great impact on the creation of revolutionaries and revolutions. He confirmed it by testing it

on the cases in France, Russia and China. According to him, in the emergence of the revolution, external developments played a role in the three phases. In the first phase, international powers actions led to the creation of a revolutionary crisis. Secondly, international factors such as power relations supported the established government or order to create chaos just before the revolution. After playing these two important roles by the International factors the state or the regime starts to collapse. By describing these processes in an interlinked manner, Skocpol emphasizes military fights among international actors as affecting the revolutionary processes.

Then, how are social revolutions to be explained? Where are we to turn for fruitful modes of analysis on their causes and outcomes? According to Skocpol, the existing social-scientific theories of revolution are not adequate to explain revolutions. For this purpose, the main aim of this chapter is to introduce, defend the principles and methods of analysis that represent the alternatives to those shared by all (or most) existing approaches. Skocpol purport that we should aim to explain the revolution by using the currently prevalent theories of revolutions. Social revolutions should be examined from a structural approach with a careful attention to the international environment and context. Thus, he claimed that the historical analysis is the most insightful way to explain revolutions and to develop it which can be historically grounded and generalizable beyond unique cases. (Skocpol, 1979).

Fred Halliday (1999) is one of the academicians who emphasizes the role of external actors in the revolutionary process. When Halliday describes the role of external actors in the revolutionary process he exemplifies the support of France during the American Revolution and the contribution of Germany during the Bolshevik Revolution by helping Lenin pass through Switzerland to Russia during the Russian Revolution. By this example, Fred Halliday exemplifies his position about his theoretical approach. Halliday claims that, although the foreign factor does not have any influence before the emergence of a revolution, he claims that it has a significant role in the revolution itself.

We need to briefly mention the importance of revolutions in the international system: in the sixteenth century, the ideological and political upheavals of the Reformation, itself is a case of transnational linkage and ideological interaction; in the seventeenth century, the wars and revolutions of the 1640s, when no less than six European countries saw upheaval in the same year, 1648; in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the 'Atlantic Revolution' of 1760-1800 (Palmer, 2014, pp. 7-13). In the twentieth century the importance of revolution has been immense. The Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 makes a fundamental fissure of this century's international relations, one that, on the basis of two competing and distinct socio-political systems, has dominated and contributed to the frictions of the inter-war period and of the postwar world. In the four decades since 1945, this has already constituted a divide and has been compounded by, and interacted with, the spate of third world revolutions whose very enumeration is that of the major postwar crises in China, Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, and in the late 1970s and 1980s, Cambodia, Angola, Ethiopia, Iran, Nicaragua, Afghanistan (Defronzo, 2015). It has created tensions in the International arena. This creates a path of revolution in the third world countries, which led the US presidents giving their name to "doctrines". Likewise, it has become a challenge for the third world countries and they oppose the decisions of the US president as Truman, Johnson and Carter. The decrease of the hegemony of the US in the 1960s was to a considerable extend as a result of Vietnam. The history of the postwar world is largely, but not exclusively, that of the response of the international system to revolution. Up to the late of 1980s in this four decades' revolutions provided the historical foundations for the bipolar system. It has fueled the nuclear arms race, provided issue after issue for the great power to compete among them, and threatened the domestic political stability of major powers. If the world of the late 1980s appeared safer it was at first because of the (debatable) belief that "regional issues", most of them revolutionary, were now being resolved. There then followed the upheavals in Eastern Europe of 1989, which dealt a mortal blow to the bipolar world that had subsisted since 1945 (Halliday, 1990).

However, there is an uneasy relationship between the discipline of International Relations and revolutions. When we look at the history of the twentieth century we see that this century was shaped by wars and revolutions, within the institutionalized framework of research and

teaching on International Relations it is striking now. These two historically formative processes need to be treated differentially. Journals, departments and institutes on war are plentiful. The academic study of International relations includes war, history, strategic and ethical dimensions, along with policy analysis. By contrast revolutions enjoy a marginal existence within the field. Standard textbooks and theoretical explorations give limited space for their study. There is no single reason for this marginalization, it is diverse and historical in the sense that the realist dominance in the study of international relations left little room for the study of internal factors such as revolutions or domestic social movements.

In the tradition of the American and British Political Science and International Relations there were severe neglects in terms of studying revolutions. The literature commonly viewed it as breakdown or a regular process in national and international society- not giving it much importance or value (Halliday, 1990). The issue of definition and the historical role of revolution are pivotal for any debate or study of these sorts of activities within the international context. The discussion of revolutions from an International Relations perspective was much broader and lose, usually concentrating on events such as coups and the outbreak of violence (civil war). The literature on revolution within International Relations assumes that revolutions are breaking points rather than points of transition or transformation, and the defining characteristic of these sorts of moments in history are violence in opposition to stable but repressive regimes of states which are not violent. Although various International Relation paradigms and theories consider and analyze revolutions to a certain extent, the analytical basis of these examinations differ greatly, producing findings that are at odds with each other. This is not the consequence of conceptualization differences but it is also majorly the result of the way in which revolutions are defined and viewed by the different approaches in International Relations.

The rise of behavioral studies forced the study and research of revolutions into the spectrum of violence and internal war, denying analysis that are historically based. The Neo-realism approach in its Waltzian form, produced the thought that all references to internal and transitional processes as a reductionist argument, and choked debates that would consider

the relationship and interaction between the international and internal that gives rise to change. The emphasis was put on splitting to two spheres as different arenas of politics and as if they were two distinct areas not impacted by one another (Waltz, 1979). Other factors of this lack of importance and diversity when studying revolution in International Relations is the dominance of realism. Realists discuss revolutions but not a specific referent objects study. It is discussed to prove the pressures of conformity, the socialization, and the constraints of the system that imposes pressure on event most deviant or revisionist of states.

Other streams of thought in the 1970s and 1980s also allow little space for revolutionary upheavals; for example, international political economy studies and liberal interdependency research are concerned with the capitalist world system and on the developed capitalist parts of the world, without concerning themselves with the lesser developed, poorer revolutionary states because they were not deemed important within the capitalist world system. Very limited attention was given to the social and political conflicts taking place in the Third World, that, far from constituting another, secondary, dimension of the Cold War, have been central to it and a major catalyst of the nuclear arms race itself. In terms of the shaping of the world in the postwar era, guerilla tactic of war and its revolutionary and counter - revolutionary types have been influential as much as nuclear weapons, yet it is hardly given the same attention and importance within the strategic studies of IR (Halliday, 1990).

There are three areas where the neglect has not been absolute and where the elements of revolution and International Relations interact. There is firstly a body of literature within the field of International Relations that has openly focused on the analytic and comparative issues identified by revolutions: these include the works of scholars such as Kissinger, Rosecrance, Wight, Rosenau, Kim and Calvert. Despite the fact that this literature is a few decades old, it is valuable in that it has made a careful reading and assessment which has stood the test of time to yield important knowledge on issues of revolution faced today.

Second point regarding International Relations and its interaction with revolutions is the disguised form of revolution present in International Relations. Topics that may not directly deal with revolutions can be re-read and reconstituted in a manner that may become relevant to understand and analyze revolutions. For example, this is true about the works of transnational linkages discussed by Rosenau (1964), of the works on intervention and in a less obvious manner the literature on terrorism all show how scholarly works can be re-read to yield information of revolutions (Halliday, 1987).

Thirdly, the area of cognate social science is also relevant and useful for the development of an International Relations deliberation of revolutions. This is seen in certain historical studies that emphasize international aspects of revolution (Palmer, 2014; Rude, 1964; Hobsbawm, 1962; on the late eighteenth century, Carr, 1973; Liebman, 1975; Deutscher, 1984; Harding, 1981; on the Bolshevik revolution). It is even more relevant with the "third wave" of sociological works on revolution that highlight the role of interstate competition as one of the causes of revolution and the structural formations of the post-revolutionary states. As with International Relations writing on revolutions, the sociological analysis and examinations of revolutions are limited but the analytical and theoretical inferences gained by them are considerable and for all that matters extremely salient.

According to Halliday (1990) The place of revolutions in the field of International Relations can be broken into three general areas of study. The first area is the historical one that locates the place of revolutions in International Relations in history of the development of the international system and the international environment that is formed in the twentieth century.

The second area of the place of revolutions in International Relations is the enquiry of descriptive. This refers to the investigation of the international dimensions of revolutions to expose regularities and commonalities of political behavior. The existing, mainly the dominant realist theory of International Relations, makes the claim that it has already stated

what they regularities are and accepts the objective reality with the foundations on anarchy and power-driven states as the regularities of the international system.

The third and most foundational area of study concerns theory-that is what theoretical issues the examination of revolutions poses for International Relations in general. This in turn questions and challenges how far the International Relations theories can cope with and explain revolutions without disrupting their theoretical paradigms and assumptions. In some cases, theories may need to be revisited to considering events that challenge the central tenets of a particular theory. However, the interaction with theory should be a two-way one that goes beyond the domain of IR; it should not only examine how revolution impact IR theorizing but how the international context and environment can pose questions for the established sociological and political explanations of revolutions (Halliday, 1990).

A concise overview of how the three mentioned paradigms treat revolutions will make the understanding, distinction and similarities much clearer. For realists, revolutions often tend to be viewed as part of the changing foreign policy actions and priorities of states, such that in their view revolutions constitutes a revisionist, dissatisfied or unbalancing factor in the international system and must be controlled because revolutions are an interruption in an orderly world system. In this sense, the realist explanation neither requires and explanation or a historical contextualization of revolutions because the explanation they provide is ahistorical and valid in all cases (Kissinger, 1973).

For behaviorists, such as Rosenau (1964, pp. 45-92), revolutions are part of the framework of violence and are like diseases that can spread transnationally to other areas. However, the violence from this point of view is seen from psychological terms which is developed by the social cause or international context. Again, as with realism it is seen in contrast to a non-violent stable alternative.

Historical materialism and its variants in International Relations provides much more attention to revolutions and views them as formative, transitional and change oriented. In contrast to the realists and behaviorists, historical materialists regard revolution as a positive driving for within society. They look at the international factors and its relationship to revolutions. For example, they would look at the capitalist world system, mechanisms of imperialism amongst other factors to locate and understand specific revolutions. Marx criticized the heavy concentration on the Great Powers stating that the nineteenth century order of the five powers would be ousted by the sixth one – revolution. The hardship historical materialism faces are its lack of explanation in why revolution are specific to certain countries and exhibit characteristic that are nationalistic and usually national. Although the regional spread and impact of revolutions today are moving away from the state specific revolutionary ideas (Halliday, 1990, p. 212).

A summary of the three areas of enquire mentioned above - historical, descriptive, theoretical - may help understand these anomalies more clearly. Revolutions are international events rather than solely national ones and their causes and outcomes do not have a homogeneity. Investigating older revolutions and generalizing cannot be a substitute for theoretical examination, but it may provide as a useful tool to shed light on the problems that theoretical work itself poses. Halliday (1990) after examining revolutions found that there are at least two areas in which such generalizations may be examined in.

International factors play a salient and manifold role in giving birth to revolutions, but most importantly it is because of the second factor – weakening states – that it may cause or contribute to change. This weakening could be the result of defeat in war, through international economic changes and crisis that destroys the status quo, by provoking conflict between states and societies because of the states' mobilization of resources to pursue international competition, through removal of guarantees by hegemonic powers. In other words, while states may use international dimension and resources to consolidate their position at home may result in weakened internal structures as an outcome of international activity.

The foreign affairs of a revolutionary state are an enormous area in of itself, various literature focusses on the ideological basis and unconventional action in the foreign policy of revolutionary states. However, the ideological issue to the norms of international behavior is a secondary issue; ideology and interference also plays a part in the foreign policy of status quo powers; therefore, revolutionary states have a unique foreign policy because they have different aims not only different method. Historical analysis shows that nearly all the revolutionary states, have at some point in time propagated for revolutions in other states. The challenge is not that they pose a problem for the international system in terms of new ways of doing diplomacy but it is their aim to alter the social and political relations in a distinct manner and make this altering in other state their major foreign policy goal.

Even further, the interaction of revolutions and the global system raises important questions not only for revolutions themselves but also for International Relations as a discipline. By way of eliciting these implications, it is possible briefly to outline three areas in which, by placing revolutions more centrally in the picture of International Relations, some broader theoretical rethinking may follow. (Halliday, 1990). It is conceivable to briefly outline three areas where revolutions take place more centrally within the framework of International Relations.

Firstly, revolutions force us to challenge the central realist assumption that there is a divide between the internal/domestic structures and the study of the international. An investigation of how revolutions have contributed to international conflict and war exemplifies how the interaction and relationship between the domestic and the international operate as a central feature of the coming about of these wars. The relationship and contribution of revolutions to war does not need to be underlined as both the way war can cause revolutions and revolutions wars. The wars of the 1760s contributed to the French Revolution which resulted to the Napoleonic wars. The First World War paved the way for the Bolshevik revolution which determined Russia's role in World War II and beyond, Iranian revolution lead Iran-Iraq War. Because of interstate competition and its impact on society, changes occur that

then lead to further interstate conflict. This is the formative interaction that has shaped so much of international history (Halliday, 1990).

Revolutions are mainly about states, however, an issue in International Relations is the growing contestation of the concept of state itself. With the growing challenge on the state, International Relations needs to develop theories and conceptualizations that needs to make this clearer. As much as other developments in International Relations and the social sciences, revolutions compel introduction of a new, second concept of the state, a sociological category of the state as an administrative-coercive entity, in addition to the legal-political one normally used in International Relations. The conventional concept of the state used (rarely defined) in International Relations precludes examination of precisely those processes that make revolutions international: the effects of interstate competition on state-society relations, the weakening of state-society links by the impact of revolutions in other states, the determination of revolutionary foreign policy by the state-society conflicts of post-revolutionary periods. The second, more restricted concept of the state enables us to see states in their Janus-like character, as the two-faced entities that look both inwards, towards the society they seek to dominate, and externally, towards other states and/or societies with which they interact with the goal of strengthening their own internal positions. With this two-faced concept of the state it also becomes possible to re-examine a feature of the international system that conventional theory takes for granted but to which it supplies tautological or axiomatic replies, namely why states compete. The conventional answers, in terms of maximization of power in the international arena, leave out the domestic determinants (Halliday, 1990, p. 217).

States are not isolated units: they exist in an international context, and their practices, constitutions, social and economic orders derive reinforcement from the fact that other states behave like them. Nor is this a recent development, as the literature on 'interdependence' too easily implies. Capitalism and the modern state arose in an international context, not the other way around. This points to the idea that the international dimension is central to

explanation not only of the destabilization of states when there is heterogeneity, but also to the stability of political and social orders when there is homogeneity.

The next chapters of this thesis will examine and asses the international dimension of the 1952 and the 2011 revolutions in the wider region. A quick investigation of the revolutionary situation and outcome showed that a stronger theory that explains and examined the revolutionary process is needed within the literature. In viewing the international component, we see that at the beginning of the 21st century we need to go beyond the traditional paradigms of geopolitics to incorporate multiple levels of analysis. An innovative approach in this direction should also have a more critical lens and deepened understanding of the imperialist mechanisms that have been at play in the region in general and the Middle East for over a century.

Historical Sociology in International Relations (HSIR) has the potential and the analytical conceptualization tools to produce the type of theory mentioned above. It is explained by most prominent scholars (Hobson, Lawson, & Rosenberg, 2010);

> *Historical sociology is as much a part of world history and comparative politics as it is a subsection of Sociology or International Relations. Historical sociology, therefore, has necessarily porous borders – it is the prototypical open society. For HSIR, this is especially important. In its broadest sense, historical sociology aims to unravel the complexity that lies behind the interaction between social action and social structures (understood as relatively fixed configurations of social relations). Hence, for advocates of HSIR, international factors are juxtaposed, conjoined and interrelated with domestic processes with the aim of finding patterns that explain important historical processes including the general and regional crises that provoke revolutions, wars, processes of state formation, varieties of capitalist development, forms of imperialism and so on.*

However, it is still too early to what historical sociology in International Relations will mean for the developments in the Middle East.

2. 1952 NASSER'S "REVOLUTION"

Recent history of the Middle East is littered with examples of strikes, opposition movements, and revolutions. In such chaotic turmoil region, Egypt has never been away from revolts. Therefore, to understand revolutions in 1952 and 2001, It should be noted that neither of them the first nor the last revolt in Egyptian history. Resistance against imperialist powers are main cause of such events. On the other side the modern Egyptian state was not founded on the flimsiest notion of constitutionalism or the rule of law. So there was no social contract that tied people and their rulers. It was a state that had repeatedly failed its citizens, was inherently despotic, mainly had supported and oriented by foreign powers and suffered from a foundational legitimacy crisis. For the past 200 years, Egyptians did not revolt only against foreign invaders, be they French or British, they also resisted this domestic Leviathan.

In 1821, and in the wake of higher taxation, more frequent forced labor levies, a monopolies policy and, above all, an unprecedented conscription policy, Egyptian peasants revolted in a massive popular uprising in the south. In 1844, another large uprising erupted in Menoufia in the Delta, where government warehouses were set on fire and the pasha's agents taken hostages. There were also cases where peasants were reported to have uprooted cotton plants from their fields, despite the fact that cotton was one of the world's most valuable commodities. Destroying it would have cost farmers dearly. Then 1863 saw a large uprising erupt in the south of Egypt, in the same area of the 1821 rebellion (Fahmy, 2015).

In 1879-1882, people from across Egyptian society rose in a nationwide revolt under military officer Ahmed Urabi (1841-1911). Urabi revolt was a series of political and military events which resulted in the occupation of Egypt by British forces in September 1882. Urabi headed a movement aiming to subject the Egyptian military state to constitutional rule, one that

would define the rights and responsibilities of the *khedive*, who was under control of French and British influence. In short, Egyptians sought to put limits on their monarchical ruler's unlimited power so on the foreigners'. The chain of events started when Urabi led a protest movement against discrimination toward ethnic Egyptians in the military ranks. Urabi organized and led a protest movement within the army rank and file. His protest against the institutional favoritism of the Ministry of War almost led to his arrest, yet with the support of other officers he was set free. Backed by progressive political forces, the officers' movement requested the nomination of a new constitutional government from Tawfiq. Following threats of Anglo-French intervention, the new government aggravated the situation by nominating Urabi to the position of Ministry of War. With the threat of foreign intervention and a political deadlock, in June 1882 riots broke out in Alexandria and many foreign nationals and businesses were attacked. These events prompted the British and French to intervene militarily. The revolt was on the cusp of succeeding, but on 11 July 1882 the British bombarded Alexandria and defeated Urabi's troops, inaugurating a military occupation that would last 70 years (Cole, 1999).

The British occupation of Egypt was significant colonial encounters in modern era which effect in economic development and political field. The impact in political field which lead change the leadership those focused on anti-imperial nationalist movement. It is bitter truth that Egypt was a place of geostrategic important for all empire in that case the British aim was not only to secure the Suez Canal but not to govern it. The British occupation dissipated Egyptians' revolutionary energies. Occupied Egypt had to fight for constitutional rights and for independence at the same time. Two and a half decades after the defeat of Urabi's army and the landing on Egyptian soil of British troops, Egyptians rose in one massive revolution in 1919 asking for both independence and a constitution. The insurrection began when four leaders of the Egyptian national movement were arrested on 9 March 1919. They were then exiled to Malta for insisting that the Egyptian delegation (*Wafd*) to the Versailles Conference be recognized, so that it could demand that Egypt be accepted as an independent national state. This revolt was having international importance because it was the result of thirty years of European domination, and its resolution would be likely to affect all western colonial empires (Goldberg, 1992).

The much-anticipated independence, however, fell far short of revolutionary expectations, for in 1922 the British handed Egypt a truncated independence that allowed British troops to stay on Egyptian soil, and deprived Egypt from the right to shape its own foreign policy. More seriously, the British interfered in the constitution-writing process, tilting the 1923 Constitution toward the palace, giving the crown powers that enabled it to dominate parliament. The period between 1923 and 1952 is often called the golden age of liberal Egypt, but it was neither golden nor liberal. The British continued to maintain their grip over Egypt. The monarch continued to use a constitutional license allowing him to dissolve parliament at will (Fahmy, 2015).

The British domination in the Kingdom of Egypt was the cause of instability within the kingdom, corruption and other social injustice in. These troubles were the reasons for persistent protest and disorder within the army. As a direct response to these disorders within the army, an organization was established secretly by a group of Egyptian officers with the name of "Free Officers". Jamal Abdul Nasser took the leadership of the movement due to his ability and personal leadership skills. According to Nasser, the first organization of this movement was rooted during the 1930s (Bilgin, 2007).

On the other hand, Egypt had been affected by another disturbing factor by 1948; this was the establishment of the State of Israel in Palestine territory on May 14, 1948. Israel is seen on the eyes of most Arabs as an alien that Westerners established to dominate Arabs' Lands. Egypt, who saw itself as a leader of Arabs' world saw the establishment of Israel as a problem in the region and this was the same for all Arab countries (Hopwood, 2002).

The first war between Israel and Arab countries started the day after the declaration of Israel's independence. Countries like Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria attacked Israel till the ceasefire was declared by UN on June 11, 1948. The ceasefire was a challenge but Israel evaluated well buy putting the untrained units of its army in the meantime. These units gained weapons from outside and pushed the Arab armies from the surrounding territories

in the period after the ceasefire. The UN Embassy in Rhodes host the ceasefire negotiations on January 1949, Egypt was the first country to sign the agreement; Israel territory was expanded by 21% (Best, Hanhimäki, Maiolo, & Schulze, 2004). On the other hand, Egypt expanded its territory to the Gaza strip; this was a problem on the side of Egypt. As it lost esteem on the side of other countries because of corruption and lack of well-organized plan during the preparation of the army (Lenczowski, 1980; Bilgin, 2007).

As many Egyptians, Young Officers suspected that King Faruq was collaborating with Britain's imperialists during the establishment of Israel and devastation of Palestine. In addition, inequality increased between businessmen and workers and between landowners and peasants. A secretly organized group within the army, "Free Officers", led by Colonel Jamal Abdul Nasser, initiated overthrowing the monarchy and establishing a republic. The revolutionary leaders proclaimed the goals of anti-imperialism, anti-feudalism, social justice, breaking up with business monopolies, strengthening the army, and democratic government. Nasser and his supporters, however, believed that one-party system was necessary to achieve the revolutionary goals and their plans for Arab socialism and unity for all Arabs states. Thus, Egypt became an authoritarian republic (Defronzo, 2015). The revolution of January 25th, 2011 had its origins in the revolution that had removed King Faruq of Egypt and brought the Free Officers and Nasser to power in 1952.

2.1. Socio-economic Causes of Revolutions

As a result of the revolts that started in 1919 and spread to the country with the participation in a large part of the society, Britain granted the status of the independent state to Egypt in 1922. However, it does not abolish the British presence in Egypt and the total dependence of foreign relations; although it allows them to make their own decisions on their internal affairs (Tignor, 1977). Although Egypt gained its independence in 1923, British influence continues and many locals can no longer act independently. This situation continued until the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty signed with the British Kingdom in 1936, to end the British military presence. With this agreement, England ended its military presence, with the

exception of the military outfit responsible for protecting the Suez Canal, and transferred the administration to Egypt. Full independence was gradually achieved through the 1930 customs reform, the 1936 tax reform and the 1949 judicial reform (Hansen, 1991; Bilgin, 2007).

With the rise of nationalistic voices and the revolution of 1919, three important institutions emerged. Egypt Bank (Bank Misr) in 1920, Egyptian Industrial Federation in 1922 and General Agricultural Union of Egypt in 1921 were established. These institutions, which were established to protect national interests, such as the development of indigenous industry; the reduction of dependence on foreign capital, and the increase in profitability in agricultural production, were the basis for policies that emerged in the years to come. Although the revolution of 1919 had a wide social base, it acquired the greatest landowners. Landowners who achieved great gains both in a political context and in economic terms played a major role in shaping policies in this period. In the three great institutions established after the revolution, a misconception has been made in the leadership of these families. These institutions, which emerged with a nationalist approach, also served to protect the interests of the landowners and the rich (Tignor, 1976).

Although Egypt gained its independence in 1922, the influence of the British and Western states in general in the country's politics and economy continued to persist. Despite this influence, efforts for national development have also begun to appear. Following the establishment of Bank of Egypt in 1920, resources to provide local investment opportunities have been introduced and local industry developed. In this period, the idea of developing Egypt with the resources of Egypt gains power in the land. In this context, a national industrial, financial and trade bourgeoisie has begun to emerge along with the politics of 'grazing' strengthened in the 1930s. Due to the economic depression of 1929, customs tariffs started to be applied for the first time since 1930 in the period of Mohammad Ali. Consumer goods competing with the internal market are taxed at between fifteen and twenty percent (Zaaluok, 1989).

In post-independence parliamentary monarchy in Egypt, when it came to the middle of the 1930's, "party politics-parties" began to be used synonymously with corruption and personal interest. Opposition organizations and movements with different socio-political visions started to gain support from the people and when they came to the 1940s, "revolution" voices rose on the streets.

During the Second World War, Cairo was a popular Middle East city and supply center for British Army soldiers and civilian personnel. The Axis states, which knew why Egypt was important for the British to carry out the war, also targeted the country. The Axis forces also carried out constant air strikes in the Port of Alexandria and tried to infiltrate their political institutions with the Egyptian armed forces. Both this and other wartime developments had affected the course of Egypt's political and economic life. Inflation had risen, and basic food items were so inadequate that in 1942, bread revolts began in Cairo. In the area of politics, the events brought by the war have ignored all the institutions, monarchy, parliamentary government and the Vafd Party that have ruled Egypt since 1923 and started a political paralysis that will last until the 1952 revolution. At the beginning of the war, Ali Maher who was a close friend of Egypt made a coalition cabinet and became a close adviser to King Faruq. When Maher resigned in 1940, a series of unstable coalitions went into operation, trying to keep Egypt's future diplomatic options open by maintaining proper relations with Britain. In the winter of 1942, the ruling coalition disbanded and the government resigned (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009; Armaoğlu, 1989)

In order to prevent the formation of a pro-German public in the country, Britain intends to end displeasure by bringing Vafd back to power in Egypt. King Faruq did not want to provide to Nahhas Pasha a post of Prime Minister and on February 4, 1942 the British ambassador gave King Faruq an ultimatum, saying that he would have to leave the country if he did not appoint Nahhas Pasha as Prime Minister. The tactics used by Britain's Ambassador Sir Miles Lampson during February 4th events emphasized once again Britain's control on Egypt's interior affairs, which has exacerbated nationalisms. It also accelerated the collapse of the already weakened parliamentary system of Egypt. The King was humiliated just as a Vafd

government in 1936 signed the Treaty of Independence on condition that British presence in Egypt continued, due to this the party seems ready to abandon its nationalist principles and to cooperate with Britain for political power. Over the next decade, Vafd would have had the consequences of being in power in 1942 under the protection of British tanks (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009).

Between 1923 and 1952, when the parliamentary monarch dominated, the economic approach dominant in Egypt could be summarized as a balanced strengthening of the two sectors, giving equal emphasis and mutual benefit to the agriculture and industry sectors in general (Tignor, 1977). Particularly after the Second World War, the influence of nationalist movements has gained the importance of the struggle against foreign capital and the nationalization philosophy. Striving to create national capital instead of basic economic policies such as growth and struggle with poverty came to the forefront. Some of the policies as the nationalization of foreign companies gained popularity, land reform, which was the most important for the revolution, were ignored. During this period, agricultural export promotion and import substitution policies emerged; it was a period in which liberal policies and economic development were targeted in terms of capital and trade. In terms of economic policies within this period, private sector had given advantages and the public sector had been more limited, that policy continued in the transition period until 1955, even after the revolution in 1952 (Hansen, 1991).

All the sufferings take place in Egyptian society were seen as the influence of the Western powers on Egypt in the pre-revolution period. Watching western-oriented politics in Egypt's foreign policy harmed the Egyptian community rather than its effects. Egypt needed to increase its economic and military capacity in a region where Israel was empowered. The socialist and nationalist movements, which found themselves in the face of these developments, began to redefine and promote themselves. This desire can only be created with an Egypt independent of all the effects (Bilgin, 2007). Egyptians believed that the British policy in Egypt was directed by three factors. First, the British would never allow people movement to bring down the king they brought on the throne. Secondly, the work did

by British in Egypt whatever the way of acting was for the interest of Britain not for Egypt and finally, a government could remain in power as long as it was supported by the British, and the cabinet would fall into that support (Marsot, 1985).

Within the agenda of political debates, we can easily recognize the issue of Palestine in the Middle East; the Palestinian issue had created divisions among parties. The defeat in the Arab-Israeli War of 1948-49 created a turning point in the strengthening of the role of the army in Egypt, Syria and Iraq, leading to a new shaping of Arab nationalism and creating a turning point that has shaped a new form of Arab nationalism. This is why we can say that in Egypt the most important issue that emerged the movement of the Free Officers and the demised monarchy was the Arab-Israeli war. The loss of the war had affected the political atmosphere in all Arab's countries particularly in Egypt and as a direct reaction, an organization led by Nasser attracted young military officers who were not satisfied by the army's situation (Diriöz, 2012). After losing the war, survivors of the war started an initiative in Cairo and established a committee with revolutionary council and around 1950 Jamal Abdul Nasser was officially elected chairman of this secretly operating committee (Bilgin, 2007).

Vafd Party which was still in the Parliament until 1952; participated in the elections of 1950 and wined the majority of votes. Political instability and conflict between Vafd and King Faruq increased confusion in day by day which determined the revolutionary resolutions of Free Officers (Armaoğlu, 1989).

From October 1951, the Suez Canal region attacks against the British had been started and resistance continued with increased violence. The tensions were escalated and the Egyptian nationalists were putting pressure to destroy the monarchy. The Nile River was also the cause of tensions between Egypt and England; due to this the King Faruq was furious and talk about Sudan's future and Suez did not bring any solution. The 1936 British- Egyptian Treaty was terminated by the Prime Minister Mustafa Nahhas led by the Vafd Party on October 8,

1951 which demanded withdraw of England from the Suez. The nationalist groups began their fights against England through Suez. England declaration that they will not withdraw from canal deepened chaos in the country (Bilgin, 2007; Armaoğlu, 1989).

In this environment on July 23, 1952, A group of young officers calling themselves "Free Officers"; requested the King to nominate a Prime Minister they wish and the removal of high ranking officials of the army according to the Constitution 1923 as they claimed. Four days later, the king was exiled to Italy but the government kept in on duty. However, General Mohammad Najeb was tempted to be nominated as the new Prime Minister by the army officers in September due to incomprehension between the army and civilians within the Government. By January 1953, all political parties were suspended by the constitution and martial law was declared for a three year transition period (Gordon, 1992).

It can be said that among the declared objectives of the 1952 Revolution was to realize economic and social justice within society. According to sources, in 1945, 75 percent of the total population was comprised of poor peasants and did not gain land, only approximately 36, 9% of the land was owned by 0,5%. Due to this, land reform was a priority for the new regime, and government regulated land distribution status; as a direct consequence a maximum ownership of land was fixed to 50 feddans and the excess confiscated by compensation. This confiscation was in favor of the landless ones; we can say that Nasser tried to establish a welfare state. He expanded the medical services, electricity and potable water, which were mainly a priority of urban areas and to rural areas (El-Ghonemy, 2004).

Before the revolutionary era, Britain had total control over the allocation of Egyptian revenues and the wielding of political authority. Foreigner mostly Britain (27%) was controlling 87,4% percent of all Egyptian cotton piece-goods market. Their strategy to make Egypt even more dependent upon the sale of long-staple cotton in the world market and upon foreign capital to finance a further expansion of domestic cotton cultivation. (Davis, 1983) Actually this situation exposed major weaknesses in Egypt's economy. It demonstrated the

vulnerability of an economy which depended so fundamentally upon the export of a single crop-cotton-and on substantial European financing for the marketing of this product. Any declined in the value of the cotton was causing huge sufferings in the living standard of Egyptians (Clawson, 1978).

On the other side Egyptian industry was essentially controlled by foreign capital; in 1933, 77 percent of the assets of manufacturing and commercial corporations were in companies with foreign participation. When the Egyptian Federation of Industry was established in 1922, the eleven directors all lived in Egypt but only three were Egyptian citizens (Clawson, 1978).

Egypt was transformed by Cromer into a monoculture (single product agriculture) and as the years of depression became more pronounced, had an explosion in cotton production from 1923 to 1926. The Parliament was dominated by few landowners who gave very little to small farmers and industrial workers. Half of the existing land was in possession of 22.016 large landowners which is of 2% of total population and rest 300 feddans (1 feddan = 0.42 hectares) was in possession of 61 % of population. When Fuad came to the throne, the amount of soil under his possession was 800 feddans (1feddan=0.42 hectares), which was a modest amount. When his son Faruq was forced to relinquish the throne in 1952, his royal possessions had been removed up to 100 thousand in different ways. Rich landowners and British's cooperation transformed Egypt into a monoculture because this enriched them; at the same time, they were largely connected to Britain while it was difficult to meet the demands of cotton main buyer who was about to ruin. Naturally; this economic link with Britain is reflected in political relations between the two countries, and it explains the Egyptian politicians' a version to over compressing the British government (Marsot, 1985).

Nasser, though the absolute state monopoly of land and commerce was later dissolved and private ownership and free enterprise were permitted, crushing taxation withheld from the Egyptian farmer the fruits of his labor. Foreign business, which under the system of

privileges known as the Capitulations operated free from all taxation, easily dominated the emerging Egyptian commercial class. The banking system that had been established at the time of Khedive Ismail was designed to serve only the interests of the vested class. Farmers were compelled to deal with jobbers who strained their scanty resources. With the end of the First World War, however, there came a remarkable rise in the prices of agricultural products, and this enabled the farmers to repay part of their debts and cultivate different sorts of crops which could be disposed of more easily. Nonetheless, with the coming of the next world war, 1.751.587 Egyptian farmers owned less than one acre, and 571.133 farmers owned from one to five acres. A great mass of the agricultural population owned nothing. Nor did this state of things improve noticeably in the next ten years. In 1950 there were 618.860 owners of parcels of land from one to five acres in size, an increase of only some 47.000 (Nasser, 1955).

2.2.   International Actors and Nasser's Revolution

In the Cold War environment, following World War II, the United States, as articulated through the Truman administration, began to develop its policies towards the Middle East according to its interest. Its main concern was instability in the area that would create opportunities for the USSR, enabling it to establish a foothold in the Middle East by means of an association with the growing leftist movements that had been identifying themselves with an anti-Zionist and anti-West platform. Truman's Point Four for technical assistance program and the Mutual Security Program was designed to foster a more stable and pro-West political environment through the carrots of military and economic aid. Consequently, because of the requirements of the Cold War and time shortness, the West decided to establish stable political-economic environment led by someone who has a western' vision not the eastern one, in other words pro-west leaders were preferred regardless of his/her tendency for liberal democratic capitalism (Bilgin, 2017).

The reform that was implemented by Egyptian leaders seemed to be necessary in the eyes of the USA. They acknowledged the productive utilization in the industrial and commercial

sectors and also engendering market oriented economic growth and stability. Washington accepted that the broken status of the King Faruq regime, especially after the crushing defeat to the new state of Israel in 1948, could create a threat to Egyptian stability in the future. It is better to deal with this new regime rather than waiting disorder will be increased in the region and this could be an advantage for both internal and external communist forces. In this sense, the United States was not at all displeased with the events of July 1952. As some sources indicated Washington may have played a role in at least encouraging, if not sanctioning, the Free Officers' putsch. Some of the Free Officers had been negotiating with CIA before the revolution. Kim Roosevelt, the director of the CIA mission in Iran, came to Cairo before the events and met with King Faruq and suggested that he should deal with the situation using measures such as land reform. The army was the choice of US after losing hope from the royal leadership (Lesch D. W., 2004).

The expulsion of King Faruq which followed the revolution was met as kind of pleasing by Washington; as sources of the Middle East makes this region very valuable and should be protected against the Soviet threat. It was driving policy priority to the US administrations of Truman and Eisenhower at the beginning of the 1950s. In 1956, US Ambassador in Egypt said, "It is difficult to throw ourselves back in this period." The relation between the Soviet and Egypt before the revolution was a threat for the US, so it was in need of administration with the attention of having cooperative and stable relations with the West. It was obvious that royal administration has no powerful and stable relations with the West (Burns, 1985; Bilgin, 2007).

The revolution had revealed the positions of new leaders of Egypt that they were against communism and not in favor of England, then they showed sympathy on the US and the US Ambassador in Egypt at the time has increased its preeminence. The Revolution was also the cause of conditions imposed on the public related in their relationships with the West. On 18 September 1952, Mohammed Nacib sent a message to the US Ambassador Jefferson Caffery, in which the new regime had a message completely supporting the United States and reported that they were unchangeable opposition to communism (Ginat, 2004). Due to

this, closer relations were established between US Ambassador in Cairo, Jefferson Caffery, with General Najeb and Jamal Abdul Nasser as he was respected as a leader of the sub-group officers, which showed a real power in the shadow of Najeb. So Caffery reported that new administration has potentials for the West (Burns, 1985).

Within the days following the coup, embassies of western countries in Egypt received a commitment from General Najeb that he is about to establish an unofficial committee that will combat communists' actions and propaganda. He suggested that US and France Embassies' representatives take place in this committee. So this anti-communist approach of new leadership was very hopeful news on the side of US (Rüstemoğlu, 2008).

The US administration was influenced by suggestions from the US Ambassador Caffery and supports the new regime. In fact, a million dollar for military materials was offered to new administration by the US through an agreement that had been signed on November 25,1952. Nasser and his colleagues aimed to make the US government through Caffery feel that their lost will cause inevitable extreme left wing, Using the word 'My Boys' pleased Caffery while talking about the officers of revolution's council (Dikerdem, 1977).

The revolution caused the start of Anglo-Egyptian negotiations which were interrupted under Faruq governance. On the side of the US, dealing with a military dictatorship government or a transitional authoritarian regime is preferable for the sake of regional stability till when the order will be restored by implementing democratic institutions. Indeed, this was the discourse of the Free Officers themselves for not reinstituting a parliamentary system immediately. They thought that Egypt was not ready for it and any premature return could compromise the revolution itself (Beattie, 1994).

On her part, US had provided diplomatic and technical support for the new regime in Egypt. As it is stated by Beattie (1994), the US through its ambassador in Cairo strived to legitimize

the Nasser government and thereby promote its regional interest, i.e. containing the spread of communism in Egypt and the surrounding region. For the sake of supporting new regime, CIA assisted the establishment of Egyptian Intelligence (The GIA) so that transitional administration could deal with opposition groups, especially communists. Relationship with the new regime, particularly with Nasser, in working level seem to be established. As its indicated by the US ambassador Caffrey, the new regime "had done more for Egypt in two years than all their predecessors put together before them" (Beattie, 1994).

The incentive for American interests regarding the socioeconomic constitution of the revolutionaries was that the Free Officers were not only avowed anti-communists, but also apparently willing to work with the United States in the development of its Cold War strategic designs for the region. They were also not being held in London. Therefore, Washington, despite overall cooperation with the UK regarding containment of the USSR, could again push their European associate aside and fill another emerging gap between power, as had already happened in Iran in 1946, in Israel in 1948, and, in the case of the Truman Doctrine, in Greece and Turkey in 1947.

It can be argued that British and American objectives did not comply with the nationalist aspirations; which was the agreement for participation in a pro-western regional defense set. Arab World was in general hope when Eisenhower came to power in January 1953; they thought that American policies will become favorable to them. This hope was related to Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John Foster Dulles who was motivated by the foreign policy in the Middle East. On the other side, the increase of oil reserves in the Middle East was one of the causes of their interests. Furthermore, the position of the Middle East was also strategic for NATO base that bordering the south-central regions of the USSR. And with requirements of the so called new foreign policy guiding the American perceptive to the need of the construction of a regional defense system in the Middle East gained immediate urgency. (Lesch D. W., 2004)

However, after the revolution, Nasser was seen by some people as a friend of the US and other as an enemy in the policy makers. This distinction was reflected in the roller-coaster policy formulations emanating from various administrations, which ran the scale from cooperation to confrontation and seemed to be inversely proportional to Nasser's relationship with the USSR. It also reflected a typically reactionary to the U.S. foreign policy that bounced up against Nasser's own policy ideas, which were ultimately based upon the need to stay in power and the pursuit of his interest based on nationalist aspirations.

The sequence of events that followed the Gaza raids and the formation of the Baghdad Pact is well known. During this range of events between 1954 and 1956, Nasser had been tuned in the eyes of Washington from a potential friend to an outright foe of the West. Despite the Eisenhower administration's pressure on the tripartite invaders in 1956, which in fact saved Egypt and allowed Nasser to survive much more, the Egyptian president's anti-Baghdad Pact, anti-Israeli, and neutralist position had recreated a new kind of relationship with the United States. Ultimately, the strategic interests in the United States vis-à-vis the Cold War could not be reconciled with Egyptian nationalist interests and Nasser's own regional aims. (Lesch D. W., 2004)

However, the United States and Jamal Abdul Nasser's Egypt relationship had been fluctuated and changed from one US administration to another. Nasser governance was not clear in the eyes of Washington and it could never figure out whether Nasser was for American interests or not for its Middle Eastern policy. From initial optimism that he was the leader of a new regime in Egypt that could be the pioneer of American Cold War strategic designs and economic modernization theories in the region, he was soon seen as a willing and unwilling Soviet puppet through whom the Kremlin would advance its own interests in the Middle East. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, particularly during the Kennedy administration, Nasser was again seen by the White House as a valuable strategic partner in the Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union. However, after a while he was relegated again to a position characterized as obstreperous, obfuscating, obstructionist, someone who was beyond the pale of reasonable diplomacy, pro-Soviet encroachment, too deeply embedded

in the Arab-Israeli dispute. At the end Washington was confused that who Nasser really was (Vatikiotis, 1978).

On the other hand, the Soviets were working to balance the domination of the West in Egypt and other parts of the Middle East. In doing so, the Soviets opened their door to any potential actor in the region. They regarded the Free Officers in Egypt as US's agent who collaborate to maintain the imperialist interest of the West in the region. As Haykal (1965) noted the July 1952 Revolution in Egypt was orchestrated by the West which aim to bring governmental power on the hands of those who protect the economic and political interest of the West.

Thus Soviet regarded The July Revolution as another attempt by the West to replace a government that would serve Western interests in better ways. This revolutionary movement was seen nothing more than the rivalry between the USA and the UK for domination in the Middle East. So they believed that there was a connection between the Free Officers and the USA that assure strengthening the US influence. So this initiative was a part of strategy to increase the possibility of Egypt's planned inclusion in a Western alliance politically as well as militarily (Haykal, 1965). Free officers were seen as a group of actors under the wing of the Western power and bourgeois nationalists; this was until the death of Stalin. Due to this, they were considered by Moscow as the US agents and Nasser was named as a fascist dictator.

The relationship between US Embassy in Egypt and the Free Officers before and after the revolution was not secret to Soviets. Thus, the Soviets started to have a negative approach to Egypt with high esteem due to the above relation which was a problem to them. Indeed, soon after the revolution, American influence in Egypt increased significantly and new regime's leaders were not shy to show their sympathy towards the US. In presenting the affiliations of the new regime in Egypt towards the US, Podeh (1995) commented that "On September 18, 1952, Mohammad Najeb delivered a message to Jefferson Caffery, the

American ambassador to Cairo, conveying the new regime's complete support for the United States and unalterable opposition to communism".

When we look at the Soviets from the new regime's point of view, Colonel Jamal Abdul Nasser was neither a Soviet nor a communist sympathizer. He was against the western intervention in Egyptian politics and his goal was to create a powerful Egypt with a strong army (Kreutz, 2007).

It was the end of 1952 the Egyptian security forces took measures against communism and communists. In March 1953, the intelligence department of the Egyptian army, G-2, brought out the main cells of the Egyptian Communist Party in Cairo and more than twenty people were arrested. In July 1953, Nasser announced that a special military unit was established for the questioning of people accused of communist activity. Moreover, he said that under the Egyptian law, communist activity was a criminal offense, and that was represented a beginning of an operation to send all active communists behind bars (Ginat, 2004).

Late in 1953, Nasser adopted policy of neutralism in order to manipulate both American and Soviet interest. This was due to the inability of Free Officers' to achieve their own agenda of the liberation of Egypt, and this was also his own strategic ability to further Egyptian foreign policies. In fact, since late 1953 the vision of Egyptian independence from two sides came into Nasser's mind; he believed that the support that Egypt was gaining from the US or the Soviets put Egypt on a low position directed by domination intent. Thus according to him, Egypt must search for new sources of political and diplomatic support. Before the Bandung Conference, Nasser had held several meetings with the chief proponents of neutralism such as Indian leader Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Yugoslav leader Josef Tito. They had convinced him of the soundness of their "third way" of nonalignment (Ginat, 2004).

Ginat (2004) explains the improvement of two countries after Nasser neutralist action and stated that "a result of Egypt's policy of neutralism, its relations with the Soviets significantly improved. The Soviets were prepared to furnish arms to Egypt by way of new barter agreements, and many economic agreements between the two countries were concluded. Moreover, a high level of mutual understanding and cooperation found expression in the UN." (p.232-233)

As a result of this political approach, Nasser sent Deputy Minister of War Hassan Rejeb on a tentative tour of the Soviet bloc countries in December 1953, in order to bring the West to heel. Together with other issues the visit aimed to secure economic cooperation and arms supply from the Eastern Bloc countries. Furthermore, Nasser also aimed to accelerate Britain's evacuation from Egypt and thereby further relations with the US including privileges in trade, arm supplies and aid.

Soviet leaders saw that Egypt was the best tool to organize the Middle East and thereby to block Western initiatives. Moreover, the Egyptian leader was an inspiration and symbol that could serve the Soviet people in their own way, regardless of where the Arab nationalist world was. And after the death of Stalin, Nasser was seen that he could play an important role within the policy adopted by the new Soviet leadership. Nasser suddenly became a patriotic nationalist leader who defended his people's rights against the imperialists. In fact, the decision to use Arab nationalism as a way of entering the Middle East led the Soviet leaders to follow a line that supports all elements in the region (Campbell, 1958).

This policy, which has changed against the new regime of Soviets, can be explained by many factors; these include, the death of Stalin, the revival of the Soviet foreign policy against the third world, the support of the bourgeois nationalist regimes, and their non-allied politics revealed the connections in the Arab World. Moreover, it copes with Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence policy which occurred after Stalin. (Kreutz, 2007) .

Benefiting with this new policy of Soviets, Nasser implemented another plan on the framework of policy of confronting the United States against the USSR and vice versa which was the construction of the Aswan High Dam. The Soviets had already made a good offer to the Rejeb delegation during their visit to Moscow in 1953-54's winter, to support construction of the dam. It was part of their efforts to fill the economic vacuum occurred in Egypt's relations with the West. In June 1955, The Soviets made another attractive proposal. This time offer was covering engineering services and financial assistance in addition to supply equipment for the project (Ginat, 2004).

While developing his relations with the Soviets Nasser never turn his back to the USA as a result of his balancing policy. Although there was stuck in the US-Egyptian relations due to Baghdad Pact, Nasser contacted Dulles for concluding arms negotiation in April 1995 (Ahmed, 1993). Anyhow Nasser had signed major arms deal with Czech in 1955 and negotiations were going in track with the Soviets for new arm deals which concluded in September 1955 granting very important arm resources for Egypt (Ginat, 2004).

In his statement to the Sunday Times on June 1962, Nasser explained his version of the July 1952 Revolution as motifs of communism approaching:

"In my early years, I had various opportunities to join the communist party. However, I have studied the Marxist doctrine and I read Lenin's work with sympathy. I have seen two basic barriers. I understand that it can never come over. First communism is atheist in its own, but I have always been a sincere Muslim. We only seek refuge in Allah. To me, being a good Muslim and being a good communist at the same time is impossible. Secondly, I understand that communism has emerged from certain sources of the Moscow-based communist party, which I could never accept and approve" (Murat, 2012, pp. 83-84).

Ginat (2004) categorized Egypt-Soviet relations of the early revolutionary period into two main sections. The first stage that continues till the late 1950s was characterized by ideology-free relations. Mostly based on economic benefits. Despite Nasser's operation against

internal communism, there was not any interference from the Soviets side. The next stage from 1958-1961, however, featured by ideological rivalry induced by the formation of the UAR and Iraq's connection with the Soviets. As Nasser was expecting Iraq to join after Qassem's having government. But this expectation ended by disappointment as Qassem approaches communists in Iraq to create new alliance for the cost of the UAR. This was interpreted by Nasser as an interference of international communism in Arab states internal affairs.

2.3.   Leaders of Revolution

In 1952, the Republic of Egypt was declared by Free Officers Movement through a military operation. Some of the issues were on the agenda of free officers, and these include state oriented development policies for social welfare, education progress and securing women's rights. The 1936 agreement that authorized the presence of England in Egypt was abolished by the Prime Minister Nahhas who wanted to promulgate independence of Egypt after the second World war. Because of British declaration to uphold Egypt, demonstrations started with the uprising of the people and the bloody conflicts between the police forces and the British military units escalated at the beginning of 1952. This caused the spread of violence throughout the country. Free Officers get benefited this chaotic atmosphere. Motivations for the need of change, believing that can be realized by people's pressure and only choice is seizure of power by the organization of free officers.

The period following the World War II was featured by the eruption of war between Israel and Egypt; loss of Arab powers and raised confrontation between British backed monarch and nationalists. There is some contradiction among people on the date of establishment of free officers; according to sources their founding was after the agreement of 1936 in Egypt. Free Officers within the organization were almost friends who graduated and worked together in the army. Some policies were on the agenda of the organization since its establishment, and were conducted secretly. Social groups were founded in order to enable newcomers to follow the path that was established during the creation of the organization.

At the beginning of 1950, the Vafd Party formed a government that gave hope to the people and military officers that political conditions will improve political conditions in Egypt. However, in 1951, people were disappointed due to the incomprehension of government. This incomprehension pushed the members within the organization to identify themselves as revolutionaries that want to save people of Egypt. The withdrawal of Prime Minister Nahhas by the pro-British King led to a revolutionary transformation for Egyptian society by seizing control of Nasser and his friends on July 22, 1952, benefiting from the chaos that emerged with the resignation of the new prime minister.

The organization constantly increased its power, until the revolution takes place and ultimately reached its goal with the revolution of Free Officers in 1952. King Faruq was removed from the throne on the days following the Revolution although he accepted all the conditions of the revolutionaries. The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) came to power led by the General Mohammed Najeb secretly orchestrated by Nasser in the Revolution of July 1952. The RCC seemed to fit the bill on many ways. Free Officers[3] declared themselves as true Egyptians which takes power after the 2500 year in Egyptian history (Marsot, 1985).

The organization of Free Officers, which began to be established within the Egyptian army during the transition period after 1936, has constantly felt the effects of the period of establishment. Two cases are highlighted in this process of strengthening the organization; these include a sociological cause; in 1936 conditions of entry in the army schools changed

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[3] The Free Officers was a group of generally junior officers who had been accepted by the Military Academy during the 1930s, after the annulment of certain restrictions on entry to army schools. Until then, the Academy had closed a military career to all but well known rich and landlord families; this created a professional career institution than a military. These junior officers were very pragmatic army officers, not intellectuals who would understand discussions such as the need for new weaponry, the establishment of military alliances, and so called communist threat. The Free Officers were against corruption, which had so personalized in King Faruq's administration and the feudalist-styled party structures characterized by the Vafd Party.

and the entry of young people from the Egyptian middle class into these schools was facilitated. A significant proportion of middle-class youth influenced by socialist movements at the same time with affecting of European-modern education they had, and because of "nature of the class" they belong began to see themselves as "liberators who acted in the name of the people". It is suggested that the change of class origin in the Egyptian army was important. It is seen that the class structure of the army command, to a certain extent, may be effective, as in the case of Egypt, while the army is present as a "driving force" in the process of "authoritarian modernization" of underdeveloped countries (Ansiklopedi, 1988).

The role of the state in the development / modernization projects of the Third World was emphasized, while in the Third World countries the structure of the state was assessed along with the ideological orientations of the "political elites" to equalize "syndrome of progressiveness" or underdeveloped social formation to modern Europe. In Egypt too, the state has found meaning as more within the military cadres.

The 1952 movement initiated by lower-ranking officers which formed the largest group of Free Officers from its establishment, so it was generally called as colonels revolution, note that officers who formed the Free Officers movement came mostly from the poor families. They are experienced in their personal lives and at the beginning of their military experience feelings of degradation and dishonor from the foreign occupation of the countries and the Palestinian defeat, many of whom were taken into custody during their youth days and remained in prisons. Güler points out the ideological and classical backdrop of Nasser's intervention in such a way as to make sense of the "nature" of the revolution. Within the same work, the author stated the role of the army in the third world is evocative of "oriental despotism". "The fact that the relatively weak capitalism and limited modern middle classes, which are common in the Middle East countries and that differs the political culture from the Western examples, had created an appropriate structure for the military to be most powerful organization within the society and for military interventions" (Güler, 2004, pp. 119-120).

Members of the Free Officers movement were mostly from economically middle or lower classes and at the same time they were belongs to very varies social groups of Egyptian society. The movement encouraged its members to actively participate in their social groups and by this way aimed to increasing their social acceptance. In this framework participation in groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood[4] was seen as appropriate by the Free Officers. It even claimed that Nasser and other prominent leaders of the movement was member of the Brotherhood (Helbawy, 2010, p. 76). The Brotherhood supported the movement for the sake of gain more ground in social and political life of Egypt which was limited by monarchy regime. In fact, in its early years the Brotherhood has not shown a moderate stance to colonial regime of British Egypt but an aggressive attitude towards the imperial order of time. So it was very important to have approval of such groups like the Brotherhood for Free Officers as they had little popularity among Egyptian society (Marsot, 1985)

Another important issue that Free Officers gained power was that because of the reluctant attitude of King Faruq during the Arab-Israeli war. Active involvement of Free Officers in the war against imperialist power caused participation of a considerable number of officers to the organization in the post war period.

The executives of Free Officers took delivery of the generals by raiding the Army's Headquarter on July 23. General Najeb read the first declaration of revolution from the Cairo

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[4] The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 by Hasan El-Banna (1906-1949), a teacher who aims to transform society according to Islamic principles by social and political reforms. Sunni Islamic movements active in politics in the Arab world has inspired from this most fundamental Islamic movement of the twentieth century and Brotherhood become a model with various branches in the region. For more details about Muslim Brotherhood see Richard P. Mitchell, 1969, **The Society of the Muslim Brothers,** Oxford University Press, London; M. M. Qadban 2016, **Müslüman Kardeşler, Seyyid Kutub ve Gelecek**, Pınar Yay. İstanbul; H.El - Banna 2016, **Müslüman Kardeşler Teşkilatı**, Özgü Yay. İstanbul. For more details about Hassan al-Banna see Brynjiar Lia, 1998, **Society of Muslim Brotherhood, The Rise of Islamic Mass Movement 1924-1948, Ithaca** Press, New York; Naguib, S. 2009, **The Muslim Brotherhood: Contradictions and Transformations**. In N. S. Hopkins, *Political and Social Protest in Egypt* (pp. 155-174). The American University in Cairo Press, Cairo; A.E. Dağ, 2006, **Hasan El Banna,** İlke Yay. İstanbul

Radio on the morning of July 24 and the months after the free officers took the power was period that political ambiguity dominates the country. The challenge was there was little knowledge about the new leaders and their political motivations, accordingly their agenda for the economy. The early days of the new regime, which seem to be uncertainty both for internal and external powers, contain two important facts that show how the new regime will go. These are; bloody suppression of the first reaction to Nasser's power in 1952 during the strike of Kafr el-Avvar yarn factory and the "First Land Reform", which was called "the most radical reform of Nasser" in 1952. With this reform; it was desired to break the economic power of Egypt's large landlords and prevent them from making political pressure on the new regime. These two phenomena, which emphasized more political messages than concrete effects, also pointed out where the Nasser regime would stand. Most of the socialist and nationalist movements were constantly claiming that they were true revolutionaries, that is, they were the only ideologies to initiate social transformation. The entry of this such ideas and ideology to Egyptian society gave the opportunity to Free Officers to initiate this "revolution". Therefore, the role that Arab nationalism played during the Free Officers revolution in Egypt must be assessed (Beattie, 1994).

If we consider the policies set, we will see that the revolution was focusing to break the British imperialism; in other words, it is the way of breaking British's social, economic and military influence. The implementation of practice such to reduce Egypt's economic and political dependence on the British by a minimum measure represented a very important policy which needs motivations. For this purpose, the ideology that was effective in the realization of the revolution was deeply appropriate for being a source of this interest. The Egyptians were mobilized to break the addiction, thus, domestic policies used started to be used within foreign policies as well, but some challenges existed; the mobilization calls for an examination of the way of implementation.

With Jamal Abdul Nasser, who emerged as the leader of the country following the 1952 Revolution, Pan-Arabism became an official doctrine in Egypt. Acting on the basis of historical links and common enemies among the Arab countries; Nasser tried to spread his

views to other Arab countries and pioneered the way of the Arab Union. In order to provide support for his ideas, he put forward Arab socialism, which he regards as a policy instrument favorable to social equality (Taylor, 1988). In fact, Nasser's struggles were directed to the Arab Union as a political goal; this with the support from the policies of the Soviet Union. Pan-Arab ideology-based nationalism is the most important political instrument that Nasser could seriously consider, note that Egypt has become the leading political instrument aimed at promoting the position of the leading country in the region (Hammond, 1972; Bilgin, 2017).

Nasser was born in a mud-brick house on an unpaved street in Alexandria, where his father was a post officer. Then he went to live in Cairo to live with an uncle who had just been released from a British prison. Constantly in trouble with schoolteachers, some of them British, Nasser took part in many anti-British street demonstrations. In one he received a blow on the forehead that left a lifelong scar. After secondary school he went to a law college for several months and then entered the Royal Military Academy, graduating as a second lieutenant. Nasser, who emerged as the mighty leader of the revolutionary period, was at war with British imperialism, and his main argument was to ensure that everyone living in the region should be united against the imperialism (Trimberger, 2003). In this way the massive legitimacy of the military government will be ensured by using the charm of nationalism. Free officers presented themselves to the Egyptian people as an organization that ended up British imperialism and after spending so many years of foreign dominance in Egypt and they took Egyptian to govern Egypt.

For officers it was unacceptable to be victims of a problem that once not resolved could destroy all dreams of the people. Nasser expressed this situation in his own language in the following way: "Before July 23, I thought that the entire nation was ready, expecting the pioneers to attack in the first place, and that the main goal would came after that. The main duty would be to achieve by masses in the future. Even my dreams deceived me for a moment; I walked towards the target and I felt like we could hear footsteps of these masses… I have relied so much on the physical reality that I believed that I was lost... They have made

the preliminary appointments... Faruq is thrown out and then they pause; they waited for the ranks of the masses to move towards the real big goal… Endless crowds came from behind us. But the reality is far from imaginary! The incoming masses were unconventional groups... We needed to regulate, but we could not find anything other than confusion behind us. We were in need, but there was nothing but contempt." (Ateş, 2012, p. 13) For a strong future the problem must be solved and the obstacles overcome; due to this the organization empowered the sovereignty of the state bureaucracy. They later forbade former mass groups and Islamic (Muslim Brotherhood), centurion Vafd, and leftist (Communist Party) movements (Trimberger, 2003). However, these policies were not sufficient for Nasser and should have been made much more; thus, Nasser preferred to follow a policy that would appeal to wider masses.

Nasser was aware that the success of the revolution would be in the extent of good organizational members to participate in this important event. Nasser, himself and some of his friends might have been ascenders, in the eyes of some, but there were few or no people who could be described as such in all. Nasser had chosen both officers who were sincere in his intention and key positions. His secret society consisted of these officers, we know that the issue of coup was not the discipline, but he applies discipline. What was planned before the coup was not something to bring a power to seize power; this secret plan was to gradually shift officers from their political beliefs to key positions. This definition reveals an important framework about the politics that the organization pursues in the pre-coup period (Gordon, 1992).

But in these revolutions, full confidence in the ideological defense of Nasser could not be achieved within the Arab world. In the source of this doubt, there was the belief that Nasser used Arab nationalism as an instrumental tool in Egypt's interests. This was seen when Nasser was engaged in Yemen and after the war the idea of Arab nationalism that was the key term of Nasser lost its importance and confidence. Ahmet Abul Fath, a good friend of Nasser, describes this situation as follows; "Nasser never had a respect for the Arabs, For Nasser, Arab nationalism did not go beyond instrumentalism, and for it money, oil and a

large mass could be used for Egyptian interests" (Vatikiotis, 1978, p. 226). Nasser's attitude can be seen as a sneaky show of self-expression between what he expresses and what he feels. In this respect, Nasser "shows that the Egyptian interests are the only real target of Nasser", as Egypt's claim to be the only country to lead Arab nationalism, given the experience of social and cultural achievements (Vatikiotis, 1978).

Arab nationalism was the most radical and anti-Western thought that dominated this region in the 1850s. Because of its geographical, natural and cultural location, it Egypt was seen as the center of Arab nationalism. Egyptian developed cinema, music and education level were quite high in this context. Michael Aflaq, one of the founders of the Baas Party, revealed how important Egypt is in the Arab world. He said that "there will be no Arab Union without Egypt".

In the geography where such a social mobilization emerged, there would be some policies that Nasser had followed, and these policies had to be announced to all segments of Arab society. At such a point, Nasser's use of the technology blessings of the period was a very important policy in terms of the conjuncture of the time. He had very well analyzed the conditions of the time, and in this respect he aimed at creating a field of dominance over media organizations. However, it was possible to provide an effective foreign policy while maintaining the safety and continuity of this regime. Nasser provided control of the media organizations in Egypt primarily when he was in power. Due to this, Mahmoud Abu al-Fath, head of the largest publishing organization in Cairo, former head of the Vafd Party, Al-Mısri, and his critically acclaimed Nasser from his brother, gave control over the media more quickly. In 1955, with the decision taken by the government, all the broadcasting organizations were gathered under very strict authority. This new organization, all anti-revolutionary anti-counterfeiting publications were blocked. Nasser made use of radio in Egypt to make the radio a powerful propaganda weapon and succeeded in announcing the voice to the entire Arab geography. In this way, Nasser provided the support of Arab societies and was one step closer to the dream that he had established. The role of the Egyptian "cloaked" was so internalized by the societies that even now Egyptian society has

come to believe that the fate of Arab societies is in Egyptian hands. Using Nasser's ideology of Arab nationalism effectively in foreign policies, he has also provided strong support at an unbelievable level on Arab societies. Nasser's policies and wishes started to be accepted by Arab leaders; So much so that Arab nationalism has become a political doctrine and a strategic imperative for communities living in this geography. However, this ideology eventually led to a major rift within the Arab world. Monarchs had further increased their dependence on the West in order to protect their own country from the revolutionary side of the ideology (Ateş, 2012).

As it is argued by Cook (2011, p.72), "Nasser of Egypt was perceived as the big brother of the Arab World. As contentious movements against the colonial powers were on the agenda, he became the face of the Arab cause". Even after the loss of Six Day War, he was respected and loved by many in the Arab World.

In the period from 1952 to 1967, Jamal Abdul Nasser was the one who built a new society for the bright Arab future with determined, independent, and liberated from the past of the empire (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009). The fact that Nasser takes radical decisions such as the nationalization of state resources and his strong personality has made him the leader of the Arab Union project, making him the charismatic leader of the Arab world. The collapse of the Arab Union projects and the failure of the second Arab-Israeli war, which took place in 1967, produced the end of Nasser (Kiremitçi, 2012).

2.4.   The Ideology of Revolution and its Effects on the Middle East

During the period of the monarchy, Arab nationalism and its unity were generally less talked; besides, the different historical background of Egypt and its culture that differentiates it from other Arab societies has affected relations with the its "neighbors". "We are all Arabs" was the most important word of Nasser, while coming to power after the Revolution. The initiatives prevailed with the revolution were as follows; the centralization of the

government, the abolition of the old party and parliamentary structure in Egypt which linked to King Faruq and England, the implementation of land reform, the isolation of the effect of the Muslim Brotherhood on the regime and ending British occupation on the Suez Canal (Primakov, 2009). On the other hand, Arab nationalism has found its voice in foreign policy of Egypt within the struggle against imperialism. Based on these, the nationalist ideas that Nasser sincerely defended become an important tool used for the attainment of goals and overcome obstacles against the regime (Gordon, 1992).

Egypt tried to make all Arab World commit that Egypt is pioneer of Arab nationalism and the natural leader of Arabs; and Nasser believed that the leadership should be use for social revolution of the all Arab world. Mohammed Hasaneyn Haykal, who is the editor of Al Ahram newspaper and Nasser's close friend described Egypt's mission; "Egypt as a state and Egypt as a revolution; as a state, Egypt recognizes borders between other states, but as a revolution Egypt shall overcome to obstacles of these artificial borders and deliver the mission to the all Arab states and unite them under a single roof." In this context, revolution should reach to all Arabic speaking countries which are suffering from imperialism (Davişa, 2004). Moreover, it is the only way for Arab countries survival. These ideas later on described as Nasserism.

"Nasserism" gained sympathy in all Arab countries' public circles in even if it was in a short period of time. Nasser's personality, the victory of the Suez Crisis in 1956, the continuation of Aswan Dam construction even there is an economic shortage and promising strong leadership for defending the Palestinian cause brought hopes in the Arab World. Hope that has been brought could be fully attained that united Arab nation can be realized and this union will be one of the important powers in the World. Unlike other Arab leaders Nasser used radio as a weapon for propaganda. Nasser discourse deepened problems between Arab leaders but spread among Arab public. Arab nationalist movements gain popularity in almost all Arab countries especially within Palestinian exiles. The ideology of socialism and Arab nationalism, which Nasser used in his politics used during early years of his governance throughout the 1960s, began to dominate the region (Podeh & Winckler, 2004).

However; the idea of Arab Socialism is not well known obviously no socialist theorist has emerged in the Arab World. There are many types of socialism such as "Maoist" extreme leftist to "British Labor" moderate left. Anyhow expansion of the public sector and public ownership was the positive consequence of Arab Socialism. In fact, in Egypt, the beginning was more nationalistic rather than socialist; this approach showed itself in the nationalization of the Suez Canal, the sequestrations of French and British property during the Suez War of 1956, and the subsequent 'Egyptianization' of foreign-owned companies. Egypt tried during the fifties to handle increasing foreign cooperation difficulties by physical controls that from the outset was expedients measures adopted in emergency situations; this was the way used by most of the underdeveloped countries, but the problem mentioned above was the challenge (Hansen, 1975).

Moreover, the centralization of power in Egypt is not a surprising phenomenon. The accession of Nasser to power, aimed at the establishment of a new revolutionary order, he tended to increase the centralization of both political and economic power. Such a revolution for the modernization of Egyptian society was incompatible with notions of diffused power (Vatikiotis, 1966).

The new regime was confused for contestation; thus, the parliamentary system was a target hard to be reached, despite the fact that the military intervention was conducted with the popular support of the people. Meanwhile, political parties banned and labor activists such as Mostafa Khamis and Mohammad Hasan el-Bakary were executed for being responsible of factory strikes. According to (Cook, 2011) the Muslim Brotherhood and the Vafd were the only groups to survive oppression, while the administration was trying to build trust on the grounds. In the early days of the revolution, it was unclear how the politics of Egypt would take shape under control of the movement.

There was general agreement between Vafd, the Muslim Brotherhood or other leftist groups and Free Officers in general issues such as the complete removal of Britain from Egypt, the reform of the parliamentary system, and the abolition of poverty. However, there was no consensus on how to do all this, how the parliamentary system would take shape, or how to prevent poverty (Cook, 2011). There was no full consensus among the officers who took control of the administration. The system was practiced with a trial and error method. The establishment of political parties was first endorsed by the Revolutionary Command Council. At the beginning of 1953, all political parties were closed and their assets were confiscated (Sela, 2004).

In 1956, a single political organization, the National Union, was established and on June 23, the Constitution was adopted with 99.8% of the votes, while Nasser was elected as the president with a rate of 99.9%. The Constitution, which gave broad authority to the president, was prepared for a transition period of three years (Kassem, 2004).

Before the 1952 revolution Egypt's economy was highly privatized. Important sectors such as trade, banking, transport, industry and agriculture and public utilities like water and electricity were at the hands of private owners. As it was estimated by Mead (1967) only 13 percent of the GDP owned by the public sector. The government focused on infrastructure investments (mainly in irrigation systems) and social services. Decisions in the first years of the revolution did not against the private sector but had the intention to have more say in the economy. One of the first important actions of the revolution was the 1952 land reform. Although only 7.5% of the total cultivated land has been handled by the state and the distribution of these lands to the peasants has taken a long time, the land reform has been carried out in a way that the revolution is not directly opposed to private property, was presented as a demonstration (Tür, 2009). Nasser's regime with a Soviet-style planned economic program pursued a land reform policy that was of benefit for peasants, with work security which prevent job givers to abuse workers (Cook, 2011). There was no fond of strikes. As Kandil (2012) stated, free education, employment in an expanding public sector,

affordable healthcare, cheap house rent and other forms of social protection, in return for obedience was the consensus of the regime. (Zorlu, 2016)

Although the new government planned to establish several projects, including steel and iron factory, the implementation was far from the expected. Together with other challenges, widespread corruption and mismanagement were the main factors. On the other side, since the early 1960s, the state started to nationalize major business and financial enterprises and industries. As Bal (2014) commented the government issued mixed economic system "with a large public sector (including all foreign trade) and with the remaining private economic activities subject to various kinds of direct control" (Bal, 2014, pp. 40-41). The administration ruled harsh control system on the allocation of resources, production and prices.

Although the unity which was the notion of the region seems to decrease and separations among societies were observed. The policies that were used once for separation and management of communities during colonial time, have been updated due to the discovery of petrol in the Gulf and the emergence of Israel as an artificial country. People are controlled by the monarchs due to their power gained from petrol incomes. Thus, the presence of Israel in the Middle East was one of the reasons of the unity of Arabs' countries. Some changes happened also in the region due to struggles within international systems after the World War II. As stated above, due to problems that international systems faced, Nasser evaluated both Arabs' countries and the international system then he came with the idea that best foreign policy for Egypt's interest was an international detachment policy free from certain ideological approaches (Podeh & Winckler, 2004).

Nasser as a revolutionary leader; he created his own policies to run the country and put aside all policies of the previous regime, but one policy was useful for him during his period. This policy was called ALCSP (Arab League Common Security Pact), this was based on the independent defense tool for Arab states. However, Nasser's goal was to increase relations

among Arabs' countries and gain supports of pushing English to leave Egypt. Thus, Nasser gained support for implementing policies and became an icon among Arab countries after his national speeches.

Once Nasser gained success to implement his ideological and political agenda, aimed to expand it throughout the Arab World. He found ready masses in Arab people of the region. Improvement of education level and spread anti-imperialist course increased support to him. Issues such as puppet regional Arab leadership, hostile Israeli policies were hot topics discussed by educated youths for a long. Long waited expectations in the region created very large room for Nasser to play. Tough cold war environment also contributed a lot for implementation of the Pan-Arab socialist-nationalist ideology of Nasser to fight against western imperialism.

Nasser has got influence and became the powerful man as he fights against all western world just during the Suez Crisis; also the construction of the Aswan Dam which was an important issue for energy and agriculture in Egypt. The construction of the Dam required financial support of around one billion of dollars, thus, the US firstly promise to provide but later on call of the offer due to new foreign policies adopted by Egypt. The response of Egypt was very severe. On 26 July, at the fourth anniversary of revolution speech Nasser announced the nationalization of the Anglo-French company which operates the Suez Canal. The Suez Canal shall be operated as previous. But this insurance was not enough as the canal was close to Israeli ships since the 1948 war. Another unminimis reason was annual revenue from the canal which was around $100 million. (Sancak, 2013)

Strong reactions from England and France erupted after the nationalization of the canal. After negotiations for common ground started at the UN with no consent, two countries decide to use power to solve the problem with the excuse of banning Israel to access the canal since 1948. Thus, Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula and British and French started their operations by bombing Egyptian airports. Egypt's casualties were very high. The

USSR's reaction to issue was very menacing as it threatened to use missiles which could lead to another world war. Two powers assumed that the USSR was not able to deal with the issue due to problems in Europe. As the reaction to the USSR's statement, the US ordered two countries immediate withdraw from Egypt as she was afraid of expanding Soviet dominance in the Middle East (Bilgin, 2007; Armaoğlu, 1989).

Nasser, supported by the USSR, got the full control of the Suez Canal after the crisis, which strengthened relations with Soviets and him as a leader. This resulted in an increase of radicalism and nationalism within the internal policies (Kassem, 2004). In 1953, Egypt under Nasser with the aim to play an active role in the Arab World, signed an agreement with Britain on Sudan to give her its autonomy which was under British rule. On the other hand, during the civil war in Yemen, he sent Egyptian forces to the country, just to play a leadership role in the Arab World (Sancak, 2013).

The role played by Nasser during the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956, on the Israeli problem in 1955 and reaction to Baghdad Pact which was led by Nuri Saif of Iraq in 1955 to 1958 was positively received by not only in Egyptian society but also all Arabs' societies. Egyptian started believe that "leading Arab World is the destiny of country". Such leadership will provide a future without appeal to imperial forces and security from their invasions. Thus they will decide their future on their own.

Another fast and absolute way to have the concrete leadership of Arab World was winning the war against Israel. Egypt and Syria saw an opportunity to attack Israel as the US was very busy with the Vietnam war, which may create a weakness to its support. At the same time, these two countries gained huge military supports from the USSR since 1956. The threat of Israel against El-Fatah which based in Syria due to its attacks created an intense atmosphere in the region (Sancak, 2013).

The mutual threatening of both side Egypt and Israel increased the tension. The effort by the US and the USSR to prevent a potential Egypt-Israeli war was not enough. The first attack came from Israel as it was expected by Arabs. But it was not like as they assume. On the morning of June 5, 1967, an Israeli airstrike destroyed almost entire military planes in Egyptian bases as well as in Jordan and in Syria, a total lost was 400 military aircraft. Absolute air control of Israel gained motivations to tropes on the ground and Israel made progress. On the evening of 7 June, the Israeli forces were occupying the Sinai Peninsula and the Eastern shore of the Suez; thus force Egypt to request for ceasefire. The battle was concluded in 4 days, a ceasefire was signed between Syria and Jordan on June 10 with the intervention of the USSR. During the war, Egypt lost 80% of its military equipment, three-quarters of the air force and 12.000 soldiers. This was a devastating challenge for Nasser's leadership and personality that he gained before the war (Marsot, 1985; Cleveland & Bunton, 2009).

If we try to discuss on the situation of Arabs especially on the regional policies of Nasser, we will have a challenge in critical evaluation of his decisions and policies; and the talent he used for getting support from his people. Nasser used the notion of nationalism as a weapon to convince Arab societies, this could be an important point of critical evaluation of his patrimony; thus, Pan-Arabism and the Palestine problem have been explained in different ways through Nasser's vision. According to Nasser, the Israel and imperialist aggression in Egypt for Suez in 1956 were the reasons for his Pan-Arabism vision and the revolution that kicked out colonialism. On the other hand, Ali Sabri, a former prime minister and central member of the Free Officers, explained the foreign policies of the regime in terms of establishing an international stature and influence. According to Sabri, such stature was a prerequisite for making Egypt attractive for the United States and the USSR to provide with economic as well as military aid which is necessary for its social and economic development. Through a historical perspective, the revolution of Nasser is not a clear socio-political organization nor ideology; thus, the development of internal and foreign policies was a system of "error and trial" due to negative circumstances, and opportunities.

Under the regime of Free Officers, Egypt was better known by its opposition to foreign domination and also the notion of the settlement of Arabs unity especially with the Egyptian leadership during the mid of the 1950s. As stated above, first successes gained by regime and commitment to the idea of Pan-Arab nationalism make it expand in Fertile Crescent more than Egypt itself (Sela, 2004).

It is obvious that Nasser achieved a significant success in challenging the political order both in and among Arab countries, particularly in the Fertile Crescent, by releasing strong social sentiments that had been in a process of revolutionary transition. At the end of the day, however, while he may have helped boost those sentiments, it is questionable whether his own goals had been served by the popular uprising. Nasser became a hero of the people, but actually had he ever possessed control of those people? Even when he succeeded in "exporting the revolution," to what extent did it serve his proclaimed Pan-Arab goals, was it for solidarity, unity for Arabs, or confirmed foreign policy? And to what extent were those revolutionized regimes willing to fallow Egypt? (Sela, 2004)

3. "ARAB UPRISINGS" and EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION

Over the last eight years, many articles/studies started with a reference to Mohammad Bouazizi, a 26-year-old pitchman from Sidi Bouzid in Tunisia. He set his body on fire on 17th of December 2010 as opposed to his desperation to the municipal police but in general against the unjust and corrupt system that had governed Tunisians for decades. This desperate act of a street vendor against corrupt governance and oppression was taken as the milestone for the uprisings that affected almost the whole region. The demands and slogans were copied from one country to another, and the demonstrators in countries tried to size their city squares. While some were brave and some were hesitant the protests initiated with one thing in common; non-violence. The words that spread out from country to country was; "esshaab yurid iskat en-nizaam" means "the people want to bring down the regime".

While the spontaneous of the demonstrations was one of the hottest debates in 2011, Salamey and Pearson (2012) underlined that the outbreaks were not unexpected outcomes. The writers pointed out the fact that apart from the historical complaints of particular societies based on their economic, social, cultural or tribal inequalities, one key factor was the learning process that came with the demonstrations, globalization, new forms of communication, and the influence of rights-based non-violent uprisings (Pearson & Salamey, 2012). The common sentiment shaped by the popular uprisings that expressed at the city centers and from all of the squares of the Arab Middle East that were on the agenda on 2011, Tahrir Square where the popular protests led to Mubarak's removal in 18 days.

The people removed administrators in some Arab countries. In the Middle East, the uprisings achieved the unpredictable; they succeed the particular objectives that removed the rulers of Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and Libya and surely challenged the authorities in all regional

countries. The movement started from the Arab countries with the desperation of masses against their regimes have inspired in many social demonstrations around the World. Movements like the Chile Student's Protests, Rose Revolution, Occupy, without certain leadership, targeted occupying squares, and reach specific aims shared similarities with the Arab Uprisings.

3.1. Economic and Social Reasons

The demand that arose from the masses during the Egyptian uprising was unanimous: resignation of then-president Hosni Mubarak. City squares were full all over the country with people from different social, political and economic backgrounds as the demonstrations took place. In just 18 days this demand was met even though there was no clear leadership aside from slogans about freedom, dignity, livelihood and social justice. It was simply the common will of the people along with solidarity that made this possible. Of course accumulating these common goals were grass-rooted over time.

One enormous problem was a political injustice. Though the opposition gained a twenty percent representation in People's Assembly, which was a significant progress, the deliberalization took place within the next decade removed those openings in the political system. This brought in the suppression of opposition, removal of civil rights, oppression on the press and several other restrictions on liberties that were introduced before 1990 (Kienle, 1998). Political deliberalization introduced in the form of additional limitations on liberties, moving back in the civil society rights, restrictions on freedom of the press, recruitment of military courts to judge civilians and attempts to evacuate political opposition parties, particularly the Islamic movement from the parliament. Many freedoms that were applied before 1990 became subject to significant limitations (Brownlee, 2002).

After the deliberalization wave in the 1990s, Mubarak regime's approach to political reform had been inconsistent. The NDP, headed by Hosni Mubarak, became a privileged party as it

never received less than eighty percent vote in any election and dominated the parliament. This dominance has made the norm by Mubarak by creating a licensing process for political parties. Licenses were granted by the Political Parties Committee, led by members of NDP and did not allow Islamic parties to function. (Abdelnasser, 2004) As the head of the state was also the head of the majority party, the separation of executive and legislative powers simply vanished. Legislation became a sub-function of execution due to the extraordinary powers granted to the president such as the ability to assign the prime minister and the cabinet at will, dissolve parliament any time, declare a state of emergency and rule by decrees as well as pass laws when the parliament was not in session (Springborg, 2003). Mubarak regime's election history demonstrates the regime's decisiveness to dominate and bar any opposition to gain any political power (Korany, 1998).

As shown by Fahmy (2002), between 1990 and 1996 cabinet or its members never even attempted to pass a vote of no confidence, suggesting that People's Assembly ceased to function as the control mechanism of the executive branch. Fahmy asserts that, given that there has been no disagreement between the Prime Minister and the President during Mubarak regime, the cabinet simply functioned as the execution mechanism of the state for the decisions taken at the top level and expanding the bureaucracy (Fahmy, 2002).

Ottaway (2003) argues that, regarding the election history, though the government manipulation caused the opposition to gain a low representation in the National Assembly, this could not be the sole reason as the weakness of the opposition parties and their inability to create a medium to attract popular appeal was also evident. Therefore, key characteristics of the Mubarak-ruled political system in Egypt were the personal authoritarian rule, dominant executive branch and weak political opposition. Liberalization policies were simply responses to domestic and international pressures to buy more time and eventual survival of the existing regime. Those liberalization policies were even said to act to disguise extended patronage networks and symbolize the regime's commitment to reform and nothing more (Kassem, 2004). Since there was no true transparency in elections, the opposition never

gained the effective power to pressure the government to follow on its promised political reforms (Jung, 2006).

Political injustice was similarly prominent in the November 2010 elections. Rigging and thuggery incidents widely reported during the elections, and the following boycott created a parliament with no opposition representation. An Egyptian diplomat commented on the January 25 protests and stated that if the past months had been managed in a better fashion, the situation could be contained because if the opposition had been denied their voices in the Assembly, it is only natural for them to take to the streets. The elections seemed to close any openings in an attempt to prepare the basic structure for Jamal to succeed his father. After 29 years of being ruled by the same person who increasingly became more rigid and realizing that the situation will only get worse if the son succeeded, rigged elections was the last straw that triggered Egyptian Revolution (ICG, 2011).

Besides political injustice and non-transparent election system another fury issue for the public was the corrupt justice system. Egyptian constitution articles 165 and 166 asserts judicial independence, but the article 173 identifies the president as the head of the Supreme Judicial Council, which contradicts the principle of Judicial Independence. Judiciary law of Egypt article 44 grants the president the authority to appoint judges. President's intervention was most evident in the creation of Special Courts. So much so that, there have been cases where up to half of the members of the special courts appointed were not professional judges trained in law but people outside the judicial system (Ajami, 1995).

The presidential authority to select the president and the members of the Supreme Constitutional Court has been problematic. In more than one cases, Supreme Constitutional Court adopted double standards and ruled in favor of the ruling NPD by making contradictory decisions. Mubarak frequently used the judicial system to give his questionable political actions some kind of legitimacy. Aly's (2012) assessment in a report states that judiciary struggle to gain independence as well as to obtain independent budgeting

has risen in years, particularly last few of the Mubarak's rule and became a kind of small uprising. Due to the lack of judicial supervision required, SCC ruled that the election to the People's Assembly in years from 1984 to 2000 were illegal (Cook, 2011; Aly, 2012). Cook (2011) argues that as Mubarak considered judiciary a threat to his rule, he increasingly used State Security Courts and Military Courts to carry on with the oppression as well as to override the independence of the judiciary.

Other issues in addition to general dissatisfaction as well as oppression, corruption and the perception of Mubarak having his son Jamal to succeed him disturbed Egyptians. Chief among them was the Emergency Law that was in effect since Six Day War in which Israel defeated Egypt and other Arab states singlehandedly. The Emergency Law granted the rights to the government to suspend basic constitutional rights of citizens, limit street protests, execute censorship, detain people without any charges and spying on personal communications (BBC, 2012). By using the excuse of fighting against terrorism or national security, this law has extensively been used to the limit by the Mubarak regime to determine who could run for the office or prevent elections in a democratic manner. One of the claims of the April movement was the removal of this law as it prevented creating a truly democratic republic (Defronzo, 2015).

The ongoing emergency law that has been in effect since the assassination of Sadat in 1981, further hampered the democratization process in Egypt. Parliament, with its majority of NDP members, extended the duration of emergency law every three years, for the last time in 2008 despite the vehement objections expressed by opposition parties and human rights organizations. Mubarak ruled under the constant protection of the emergency law throughout his presidency and exercised his powers in full (Lesch A. M., 1995). Amended by some other laws and regulations such as Anti-Terror Law 97 of 1992 and the Penal Code, together, these laws allowed the president and the government to arbitrarily violate basic human rights and freedoms including forbidding meetings, banning publications, forbidding the movements of the citizens under the guise of national security (Kausch, 2009). Many people have been reportedly imprisoned for years without being charged and many others were denied of their

right to being judged by a civilian court and instead tried by military or state security emergency courts (Springborg, 2003). Law enforcement and security forces were given powers to arrest and monitor citizens and search their premises as deemed necessary. Human rights activists could also be prosecuted due to some articles in Penal Code because of a threat to national security (Gohar, 2008).

Authoritarian regimes lack a base of legitimacy and support of society given through traditional, democratic or religious institutions. Therefore, they depend on coercive power extensively (Bermeo, 1990) and as a result, their budget allocations for security functions are large compared to those of non-authoritarian regimes even under dire economic conditions. Qassem (2004) argues along the same lines and argues that authoritarian regimes exercise coercion in the political arena extensively. Both assessments are valid for Egypt as the regime employed a very large army and a huge security function in the form of separate police and intelligence organizations. As of 2009, Egypt's police force was 850,000, consisted of 450,000 paramilitary Central Security Forces (CFS) personnel and 400,000 members of the State Security Investigations Services (SSIS) (Brumberg & Sallam, 2012). Military manpower was about 310,000 conscripts and 375,000 reservists with its annual budget of $US4.56Bn in 2010 (Sharp, 2011). The exact number of security people employed was unknown but estimates run as high as two million people compared to a total population of 83 million during Mubarak's last decade (Kandil, 2012).

Mubarak era was marked also by the significant growth in internal security and intelligence while Egypt transformed into a police state. All protesting actors experienced police brutality (Sowers & Toensing, 2012) but as Ghobashy (2012) asserted that none of them managed to shift the resources for their benefit due to the peculiarities of the opposition. The US Government sources indicated that police brutality was routine and pervasive (Harding, 2011) and lower and middle-class Egyptians feared that. Torture was systematic and applied indiscriminately to anyone ranging from criminals to Islamic movements, critics and bloggers. Egyptian Human Rights Organization in 2007 claimed documented cases of torture 567 resulted in 197 deaths since 1993 (BBC, 2007) and one alleged police brutality case

caused the creation of a Facebook page that turned into a prominent organizing tool on social media that led to the uprising.

In 2010 the descent has reached a peak and the killing of a boy named Khaled Said in June while under police custody ignited the fuse. Ahmed Emad Hamdy, a resident of Alexandria, stated in an interview regarding the case that:

> "*Khaled Said was someone that everyone had a sympathy too. He was one of us. He was killed when trying to reach home, and the government lied about him. They said he took drugs but later we learned that he was tortured to death. His death was one of the reasons I joined the protests.*" (Zorlu, 2016)

Salwa Ismail (2006) conducted an ethnographic study in Cairo and made an observation along the same lines: "the quotidian encounters between people and agents and agencies of the state that tell us about the effects of practices of the rule in the everyday life of residents of lower-income urban neighborhoods" (p.130). Arbitrary harassment of citizens by police officers based on the excuse of suspicion and investigation generated enmity and aversion against police and the state. Mistreatment of people in police stations left many humiliated and injured, as Ismail (2006) states: "the encounters with the state destabilize their masculine constructs and necessitated a renegotiation of their masculinity". Thus, an overview of ruling strategies, key institutions and their mechanisms can be helpful to understand the dynamics of the society that led to the Tahrir Revolution of 2011.

Egyptian people were also not happy due to their governments' perceived collaboration with Western foreign policies. First and foremost, people believed that, regardless of public statements, Arab governments including Mubarak regime in Egypt as well as Saudi Arabian monarchy have abandoned the Palestine State. Second, even though some Arab regimes supported or contributed to the war against Iraq that was led by the United States, Egyptian

people opposed such military actions of their governments. Due to this diametrically opposite point of view of their government's policies against another Arab state, most Arabs opted to support democratization efforts (Lynch, 2012). In a democracy, people would have a say in politics that could enable them to end actions against Iraq and prevent support to Western policies. In addition, Mohammad's (PBUH) cartoons in 2005 and 2006 led to protests against West and Israel, and created a sense of solidarity and also raised a public opinion against inactivity of Arab governments. Foreign policies of Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia that supported Israel against its war with Hezbollah in Lebanon (2006) and in Gaza War (2008 - 2009) enraged people against their regimes (Rosiny, 2012).

Culture is defined as common beliefs, art, customs, and in general, a way of life accepted and shared by the people of a particular society (Webster, 2017). People's protests in the Middle East are a product of their culture helping them to get liberation and freedom. It is a well-known fact that imperialism is not only economic and political, but it is also cultural. Therefore, the Western imperialism pushed into the Middle East is not part of the region's culture. This is just colonization of the intellect. Cultural globalization caused to a negative influence on people within the Arab world. Therefore, it is necessary to begin a cultural battle on the Arab streets to form the sense of happiness. It is obvious that a culture without faith is not attainable, and although culture is not faith, the standard values ought to be galvanized to the new generation of the Arab world to not lose their social identities (Yazıcı, 2014).

Several Arab countries are divided by disagreements particularly in spiritual, identity and cultural tensions. It is indisputable fact that the majority individuals typically discuss concerning the role of the spiritual reference, what is more this issue triggers intellectual debates like cultural, religious, and identity-related. This issue is simply overall social categories like secularists, atheists, and believers. Thus, the hate to the West existed even before the colonial amount. It resulted in an ambiguous relationship that's the civilization attracts the general public within the region however on the opposite hand, their conscience

rejects that culture. As François Burgat states, the favored contradictions must be taken into thought so, they will cause liberation movement (Ramadan, Islam, 2009).

Apart from Mubarak's collaboration with Western Powers and also the fraud elections with the beginning of the 2000s, Egyptians began to mobilize in city squares. Yet, the 'new era' in Egyptian politics can be followed back to 2004 once the primary series of demonstrations below the Kefaya (Enough) Movement go off. This was united with the crucial strikes of 2004 rising in 2005 in number to 202, 222 in 2006 and 614 in 2007 (Naguib, 2011)

Presence of thousands of protests prior to the public uprising of February 2011 Revolution points to the fact that the underlying causes were not new. As a matter of fact, usually in the form of strikes and walk-offs, demonstrations amounted to more than a thousand between 1998 and 2004, 250 protests have taken place only in 2004 as a reaction to economic liberalization, protests increased after 2005 elections to 222 in 2006, 580 in 2007, 400 in 2008 with the participation of hundreds of thousands of workers; prior to parliamentary elections in 2010 political protests were profound (Ottaway & Hamzawy, 2011). Therefore, once it is looked at the history of protests, political reasons play as big a role as economic reasons. In fact, in addition to economic problems, many unresolved political issues formed the underlying reasons that led to the Egyptian people's uprising against Mubarak regime (Koçak, 2013).

Though there have been slogans for their Arab fellows, Mubarak, and therefore the regime wasn't the direct target. Within the 2000s, social movements blossomed in Egypt. Kefaya was crucial because it gathered completely different opposition teams along starting from leftist, pro-Nasser teams, Islamic movements and liberals. It used the strategy of direct action and visited the squares while not taking permission from the officers. As Shehata underline the gang protested, musical slogans denouncing "the president, his family, and therefore the security establishment" (Shehata, 2010) however did not involve the tipping of the regime. The Intifadah, war on Iraq were the main events that united Egyptians to demonstrate and

categorical themselves on public spheres focusing at their deprivations likewise (Ottaway & Hamzawy, 2011).

Second of the indirect causes that played a major role in Egyptian revolution was increased usage of internet and social media, thus enable the anti-Mubarak youth of Egypt to be more aware of regional and global developments. Though it could not be the direct cause of the revolution, the spread of the internet and the satellite TV channels caused a proliferation of information sources and allowed the public to be fed in terms of news. Another important factor was the use of internet and social media as an instrument in realizing the revolution. Most important of these instruments has been the social sharing site, Facebook. Egypt, one of the most populous countries in the Middle East had only one million users in 2008 but the number of Egyptian users has rapidly increased by the introduction of Arabic version on March 2009. In Egypt, Facebook was used by 2.2 million in 2009, 4.2 million in 2010 and 9.8 million by 2011. It can be said that the Egyptian youth fed up with Mubarak regime and looking for ways to get rid of political oppression were led to use technologies like Facebook. Facebook page of Halid Said who was killed as a result of police brutality in Alexandria reaching thousands of followers and becoming the meeting place of regime opposition is a clear evidence for this. Photos of Said who became unidentifiable and anti-regime posts of group members led to the creation of a society around a common goal. This trend increasingly continued in the following times and social media allowed the masses gathered in Tahrir Square on January 25, 2011 to connect with each other and with the rest of the world rapidly (Telci, 2017).

Since the protests in Egypt began and spread across the Arab world, the media have assumed a big role. What is more, some international journalists referred to as these protest movements as internet revolutions. Notably new method of communication like the net and also the smartphones were very effective that they were able to choke folks on the streets. Since all national TV channels were controlled by the regimes, the protesters had to use the internet to contact with others to share the newest problems (Ramadan, Radical, 2009).

It is right that the web, social networks, and smartphones were major driving forces behind the demonstrations within the Arab world. Actually they are typically controlled by some governments and international companies. Within this context, it is an error to contemplate that the Arab world upraise with no political or economic reason. It is additionally an error to believe that the web or social networks will guarantee the liberty and autonomy of any country. As clearly known they are the property of international corporations and their first goal is to earn, grow and compete. Therefore, they never leave their interests and that they will do business with any dictators and also they will generally ignore individual rights and solely look after profit instead of democracy.

On the other hand, people can change the history into an advantage by realizing the historical opportunities. Thus it would be thought-about that the mass movements within the Arab world didn't seem simply thanks to the external powers or their media. Most of them are able to protest their leaders to own their own freedom and human rights and as soon as they had an opportunity to be living like folks in developed countries, they rush into the streets while not caring something since they need nothing to lose (Yazıcı, 2014).

Al-Jazeera was extremely effective notably on the uprisings in Egypt. Within the region Al-Jazeera reported even minute developments during the uprisings. At this context, the Guardian wrote that Al-Jazeera broadcasting the Arab uprisings achieved a really crucial duty also as CNN did throughout the Gulf War (Plunkett & Halliday, 2011). What is more, even supposing variety of individuals within the world saw Al-Jazeera as a trustable source of knowledge, Egypt's Ministry of Information closed the channel blaming it as one-sided, that wasn't entirely true (AlJazeera, Egypt, 2011). One of the most popular Al-Jazeera journalists, Mohyeldin, before he was arrested in Cairo in 2011, covered events showing clearly that they were against the dictatorial regime (AlJazeera, Journalist, 2011).

Although the general public says that they admire and approve of Al-Jazeera, the governments in Egypt express strong disapproval of the channel since they notice it

selective. What is more, some Arab and Western columnists assumed that the channel followed an ideological line under the press freedom. International channels and politicians around the world praise Al-Jazeera so it created a large contribution to global TV broadcasting enjoying an important role in supporting the general public movements in Egypt. However, it is completely necessary to boost questions on its role in regional affairs additionally as alternative channels like CNN and the BBC. It is clear that although Al-Jazeera supported the principles of philosophy and open dialogue on the contrary to the Arab world, the channel became the target of the Bush government because it failed to present a similar version of the global war on terror with the US (Blog, 2011).

Apart from political and social issues the main reason for the mass discontent in Egypt was the economy. The Egyptian economy was growing from four percent in 2004 to seven percent in 2008 however over forty percent of Egyptians were living on but 2 dollars a day. As Jack Shenker (2011) states the wealthy got richer in Egypt whereas the life within the shanty cities was dreadful with the deprivation of one of the foremost basic needs; water.

Of the direct causes of the Egyptian revolution is the social unrest caused by the reaction to the neo-liberal policy carried out by the government in the country during the 2000s. Ahmet Nazif, who came to power in 2004, and the privatization wave that his technocratic government has launched in the country has attracted public reaction. Increasing basic food and transportation prices have also boosted inflation in general terms, rising unemployment due to privatization makes the Egyptians more difficult to fight against poverty. The reasons for poor working conditions, low minimum wage and the desire to monopolize the regime's trade union structure caused the workers' movement to become much more active during this period. The mobilization of the workers' movement in this sense constituted the core of the revolutionary core. This mass mobilization, which has increased especially in the 2000s, has become the most serious threat to the Mubarak regime in the pre-2011 period.

In order to clarify the economic reasons behind the uprising in Egypt, it would be useful to remember the "bread crisis". In 1977, with the rise of basic food prices, especially bread, the public was poured into the streets. In the demonstrations, as a result of the hard intervention of the security forces, 70 people lost their lives. The demonstrations that took place in April 2008 were described as "second bread crisis". At that time, experts say that the upheaval, which was escalated due to rising prices and low wages, shook the government but did not threaten it seriously, as there was no strong opposition (BBC, 2008).

Despite the increasing number of poor population, another important issue was the change in the perception of poverty. Between 2000 and 2008, although it had grown in terms of consumption, there was a decrease in household level. On the other hand, studies show that income distribution and poverty perception change in low-income areas and that they identify themselves as sub-classes. It is the dominant view that their welfare is diminishing and regressing. Poverty and increasing food prices become more vital than demands such as freedom and politics. Sensitivity to income distribution increased in all groups, but it was highest particularly in the low income group. Rather than the announced national income per capita, the social classes gave attention to real income distribution. Although continuous economic growth experienced between 2000 and 2009, it does not reflect on the household level. The relative loss of welfare compared to a privileged class, the change of expectations, the increased attention to economy and development created the high perception of injustice in income distribution (Verme, 2014).

One of the causes of the unexpected upheavals was the region's demographic balance and also the educated unemployed youngsters. Maloney (2011) underlined that the population in the Middle Eastern countries has been in on the increase. Moreover, in most countries young population rate is extremely high, that's why Arab countries under the pressure of open new job opportunities particularly within the private sector to employ numerous trained candidates. Egypt's rural population declined gradually till 1986, then it began to increase, reaching some fifty-three percent proportionately. This urbanization process created the shortage of capacities in urban areas, such as education, health, employment opportunities

and security. At the same time this kind of fast urbanization is absolutely positively correlated with demands of political participation, as a reflection of the economic growth and broader political awareness (Gurr, 1971). More than seventy-five percent of jobs created was unregistered sector, which means that job holders did not have any security of tenure, to mention nothing of no pensions and low remuneration. High-tech production export rate is another indicator of Egyptian poor economic productivity. It is only one percent that rate is among the bottom in lower middle income countries. Labor productivity has stagnated in Egypt, as has real GDP per capita (Springborg, 2011).

Egypt's comparatively high birth rate led to an alleged youth bulge, with over half of the population under twenty-five (CIA, Africa : Egypt, 2018). Therefore, the economy has not grown quick enough to supply employment to young adults, except at low-income jobs. The adoption of neoliberal economic policies in Egypt restricted the number of government jobs that formerly absorbed the country's university graduates. This has meant that tens of thousands of young adults with high education diplomas found it tough to find jobs within the professions they get an education for. The unemployment rate for young Egyptian university graduates was calculated at nearly 10 times that for persons with primary educations (Noland & Pack, 2011). Discontent generated due to high unemployment and extreme poverty was heightened by the perception that some elites in Egypt had become multimillionaires through political connections and corruption while a lot of their country people might barely get enough food to live.

Moreover, the Egyptian government, either completely or partly, had sold off 209 of the 314 public sector firms under name of privatization by 2005. The sale of the general public sector firms has been followed by huge lay-offs, termination of job security and a downwards on wage and advantage rates for Egyptian employees. Woman employees particularly became the victim of unemployment, as formerly public corporations become privatized (Joya, 2011).

The very slow rate of economic development and profoundly inadequate industrialization have left Egypt with a weak middle class sandwiched between a vast number of impoverished and marginally employed peasants, and a relative handful of millionaires. Although a national income growth declared in many years prior to the revolution, it is not at the level expected to be reflected in the welfare of the society. It is noteworthy that unemployment rate is very high among higher educated young people, especially those who have graduated from higher education. Given that socio-cultural and economic development has prompted more political participation, it is easier to understand why those who organize uprisings are educated and unemployed young people. As a consequence of high unemployment rate, it is very natural that income per capita remains low. Another indicator that is as important as the low average income per capita is the ratio of people living below the poverty line to the population. From this point of view, it is possible to say that there are economic problems behind the popular uprisings in Egypt. According to 2011 data, the proportion of those who earn less than two US dollars a day in Egypt corresponds to 40% of the population, which is higher than in other countries in the region (ADBg, 2011).

On the other hand, it is known that in the process of transition to privatization and free market economy accelerated in the 1990s, the ruling elite in the country won dominance and immunity over economic resources. The cartels created by the bureaucrat, the material interest-oriented man, the corruption and the mafia, etc. had a significant part of the economy and remained in a monopoly during Mubarak era. The privatization activities, which the carried with no transparency and therefore often targeted by corruption allegations, have both led to an increase in the economic power of the ruling elite and also to the protection of the political power of the regime. Indeed, Blaydes, examined composition of regime and relations within it during Mubarak's era, argued that the "regime" consisted of Mubarak and elites who had established a relationship of interest with him (albeit not with an official duty and responsibility) and that these elites had been in support of Mubarak regime in exchange for privatization privileges (Blaydes, 2010). In Transparency International's 2011 Corruption Perception Index, Egypt ranks 112 out of 182 countries and that is an important factor in establishing the concrete reason for public support to uprisings (TransparencyInternational, 2011).

The businesspeople emerged as politicians in the 2000s and figures like Mubarak's son Jamal became an example of inequality within the country. The freshly appointed wealthy businessmen parliamentarians like Ahmed Ezz, owner of the most large-scale steel company of the country was inflicting frustration within the Egyptian society. In distinction to previous Egyptian born Nasserist ideology that glorified being Egyptian and allocated lands and secured jobs for its people, the injustices were becoming a daily implementation. The emergence of those new elite groups did not satisfy the military, either, because the privatization process sometimes endangers their economic advantages (Shehata, 2011).

3.2. International Reactions

The revolutionary movement that began in Egypt on January 25, 2011 caught many internal as well as external actors unaware. External actors that have influenced the country's political arena for a very long time suddenly couldn't know what kind of policy to follow. Global actors such as United States, European Union and Russia as well as regional actors including Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar had to react cautiously against revolution demonstrations. As a matter of fact, size of the unexpected protesting masses seemed like an indication of the unwanted, by some, the revolutionary direction the revolution movement was taking. In such an environment, willing to continue the oppressive regime harbored many risks while siding with uprising masses could damage short- and long-term benefits considerably.

The United States has always been the most serious external actor of contemporary Middle East. Especially during the bipolar global politics that emerged after WWII, USA began to fill the void left behind by the other western countries. US politics of Egypt during Mubarak rule promoted autocracy rather than democracy. Washington supported the autocratic regime in Egypt in order to protect the US interests in the Middle East and for the security of its regional ally, Israel, provided $US1.3Bn of military aid to Egypt each year. As Jason

Brownlee (2002) rightfully stated, the autocratic regime in Egypt has established during the rule of Anwar Sadat, expanded in Mubarak's rule and reinforced with the US support.

As soon as the uprising began, impacted by the uncertainty of the final outcome, Washington's daily statements constantly shifted directions in order to seem both supporting the masses while trying hard to maintain the ties with its long-time and loyal ally in power. Within three weeks, the regime was stabilized; calls for reform and dialogue between the masses and the government have been issued in order to ensure a successful transition and the movement was deemed triumphant. Regardless of the reasons, be it trying to protect both internal and external interests, or trying to adapt to the realities of a constantly changing Egypt, Washington's lack of a consistent policy during these times were remarked as a good example of political indecisiveness (ICG, 2011).

Even though the US tendency to promote democracy was evident since WWI, in the Middle East such efforts only began early in the 2000s. In time, US has established good relations with the rulers of Arab Middle East, who had very pro-Western and pro-American views but were also very authoritarian leaders. Therefore, democracy promotion would run the risk to undermine the authority of these leaders. In addition, liberalization might lead to a stronger opposition that already has a critical point of view against US policies of Middle East (Carothers, 2004). On the other hand, US has re-evaluated their Middle East policies after 9/11 and considered promoting political reforms throughout the region. These facts created a critical dilemma and the policymakers of the United States needed to find the answer to the question of whether the Islamic movements would act against US interests if the US were to promote democracy in the region (Sharp, 2006).

Though the fact of how much "Arab Spring" and consequent uprisings have been promoted by the US is unclear, the policy of promotion of democracy in the Middle East has been in place since George W. Bush. Tariq Ramadan (2012) had been trying hard to dismiss the claims about his US-supported rise in politics. The United States has been marketing

democracy worldwide for a long time, claiming that adopting their sense of democracy is the key to prosperity and peace (Almond, 2012).

The key factor in the Arab Uprisings is whether it will be supported or disowned by powerful players such as the United States. It seems this depends on the Arab country and the size of the movement. Bush administration had been promoting democracy throughout the world, especially in the Middle East, while the same administration provided more support and assistance to dictatorial leaders in the Middle East just because they promised to fight Al Qaeda. In March 2004, Bush administration adopted what was called "The Greater Middle East Project". The specific objective of the project was encouraging political, economic and social reforms in the Arab Middle East, in addition to Turkey, Israel, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Then, the US vision of this project can be classified into two main pillars; the first one is to reshuffle and reorganize the Middle East after seizing control of the World Political Order, after the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the second one is largely based on the concept of improving the image of the US in the Middle East as a reconstructive attitude after the negative image of US caused by the war in Afghanistan and invasion of Iraq (Wittes, 2004).

Even so, the project was a failure and did not bear any fruit; other terms and projects like the "New Middle East" project followed initiated by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in 2006. The new project came along with a new promise of "constructive chaos". In the article of Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya entitled "Redrawing the Middle East: The Project for a "New Middle East", defines constructive chaos as "*generates conditions of violence and warfare throughout the region- would in turn be used so that the US, Britain and Israel could redraw the map of Middle East in accordance with their geo-strategic needs and objectives*" (Nazemroaya, 2006).

In this perspective it is clear why the United States has helped strengthen many Arab dictatorships and followed oppressive policies against Iraq and Palestine if it really favored

democratization. Therefore, at least from an Arabic point of view, the US do not honestly seem to want people of Middle East to elect their own leaders (Defronzo, 2015).

As a result, indecisiveness in the US statements has been taken very seriously neither by the protestors nor by the regime, which, ironically, constantly denounced protestors as the US-backed provokers for a long time, even though its major supporter was the United States itself. This stance by both sides of the uprising prevented the US to have a significant role during the uprising and the following transition phase. Of course, the western powers will have some influence in the process but their realization that they may have limited power to shape events as they please were critical during this process. As admitted by a senior the US official, even though the US is aware of their influence and popularity, they'd rather express ideas and suggestions and have them flourish in time by themselves than pushing a certain agenda and preferences of Washington, because the latter would be micromanaging and would be perceived negatively regardless of the intent or the final outcome. Western powers would be better off to be sending messages about the principles such as inclusive democracy, fair elections or condemnation of governmental violence than giving prescriptions on policies, which can, and inevitably do, change (ICG, 2011).

The United States seemed to genuinely support the revolutionary uprising that was taking place in Al Tahrir square because removing Mubarak regime as they thought they could continue supporting and tutoring Egyptian military in terms of equipment provisioning, logistical support and training and that this would be enough to maintain the long-standing relationship. However, their sincerity was not necessarily for total democratization but for only certain roles and professions, as evidenced by the statement of Hillary Clinton, then Secretary of State, that the US military aid of $US1.3Bn to Egypt would continue to be provided while the events were taking place (Springborg, 2011).

One of the most influential countries in the history of Egypt is the United Kingdom. However, nationalistic uprisings against British governance and increasing influence of the

US in the region following the WWII diminished London's impact on Cairo. On the other hand, both the elites close to the regime as well as opposition groups such as Muslim Brotherhood established important connections in the UK and by developing economic relations, caused the political connection between London and Cairo to resume. The USA and the UK, usually acting in parallel in their foreign policies, effectively used Cairo for their benefits in the region.

British reaction to the revolutionary movement in Egypt was considered as an important reference of how the Western countries perceive the wave of rebellion in Cairo. Besides, rebelling masses in Egypt were expecting the UK to support them since they were aware of the British influence on global politics and democracy promotion. However, as was the case with many other countries, when faced with an unexpected uprising in Egypt, the UK failed to act swiftly to determine the policy it will follow. So dire was the situation that, a report prepared by the British parliament emphasized that the UK was caught unprepared against the uprising in Egypt and experienced difficulties in creating a foreign policy (Telci, 2017).

Beginning from January 25, 2011, official reaction by the UK against events taking place in Egypt was a low-key reaction against Mubarak regime. Statements from London included calls for refraining from violence for both sides and an offer to the regime to initiate an "orderly transition process" for a more democratic system. It would be wrong to state that the UK had a "direct intervention" policy against Arab Springs in general and Egyptian Revolution in particular. However, it should also be stated that London acted in accordance with the USA and the EU and indirectly supported counter-revolutionary movements in order to protect its benefits in the region.

The EU followed a wary strategy when the protests broke out in Egypt on January 25, 2011. The EU historically had close ties with the Mubarak administration, but the uprisings asking for political change and expulsion of administration induced an underlying disarray amongst the EU leaders. Therefore, the EU authorities remained quiet for a couple of days, but as

dissents developed they mindfully raised their fear about dissidents' entitlement to the flexibility of gathering and articulation and police savagery barring standing up to the Mubarak regime (Butler, 2011).

Catherine Ashton, - the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the Commission - called for a peaceful talk in Egypt as protests in opposition to the Mubarak regime continued. She stated that open and peaceful dialogue needs to take place in Egypt and that the EU will be ready to help in establishing the rule of law and constructing the democracy all the time as it has been in the past (AlJazeera, EU, 2011). The EU authorities in the beginning believed that establishing a democracy through dialogue under Mubarak. Since a controlled transition under the existing regime was more preferable than an uncontrolled process, they refrained from voicing any criticism against Mubarak until they realized the resolution of the protesting masses, upon which the EU distanced itself from Mubarak regime. The EU Council on Egypt issued a statement on February 4 (EU, 2011), that condemned the violence and Egypt and called the government to listen to the people of Egypt, which helped establish the EU's stance towards the events but still did not call for Mubarak's resignation (Schumacher, 2011).

After Ashton's visit to Egypt on March 8, 2011 the European Commission presented a "Partnership for Democracy" statement that claimed the EU was undergoing changes in its policies regarding the partners willing to realize measurable reforms. The document admits the risks dealing with shifts in Arab states and emphasizes the EU's responsibility to support the struggle to obtain the values and principles it enjoys in these states. The document also specifies that the EU must not remain passive and create an incentive-based program that promises greater rewards to the states that promote change in accordance with agreed plans (EEAS, 2011).

Russia, whose political influence on Egypt has diminished after the strategic collaboration days of Nasser era, kept a distant relationship profile with Cairo during Envar Sadat and

Hosni Mubarak regimes thus could not be much influential on this country that was in close contact with the US. Anwar Sadat's deportation of 20 thousand Russian military experts and counselors in 1972 and the subsequent signing of Camp David agreement removed Egypt from the influence of Russia for a very long time. On the other hand, considering Russia's aim to increase its influence in the Middle East and North Africa in the 21st century, the importance of uprisings for Moscow can be seen clearly. Therefore, uprisings in Egypt, one of the most important countries in the region, has been closely followed by Russia (Trenin, 2011).

Russia's official reaction to the demonstrations that started on January 25, 2011 closely resembled those of Western states. Dimitry Medvedev, then President of Russia stated that a peaceful and smooth transition must take place and the decision makers must be Egyptian people. With this statement, Medvedev emphasized that external actors should not intervene with Egypt. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Sergey Lavrov, in a similar way, expressed that a peaceful solution must be found to the events in Egypt. It is notable that in these statements Russia clearly refrained from demanding Hosni Mubarak to step down (Katz, 2011). However, Konstantin Kosachev, Head of International Relations Committee of Russian Parliament, Duma, stated that Hosni Mubarak's resignation would lead to dangerous results and such a scenario must be prevented (Interfax, 2011).

At the end of the first week of the demonstrations, a first official statement from Russia about the uprising in Egypt was made. As reported by the Russian RIA Novosti News Agency, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov stated that Egypt is the key country in the Middle East and a strategic partner, and added "We are closely interested in what is going on there as well as Egypt's transformation to stabile, developed and democratic country. We wish that the present socio-economic and political problems can be resolved in a peaceful manner as soon as possible." Lavrov also emphasized that Egyptian politicians and people must determine how this should be handled and they think that an external intervention or ultimatum would not be beneficial (Novosti, 2011).

Even though Russia has changed much since 1849, Vladimir Putin considers regime change as a threat, especially after revolutions in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine, allegedly sponsored and definitely cherished by Washington. China has the same aversion to change. Interestingly, these two powers who have been milestones of revolution at the beginning of the twentieth century have become roadblocks to a revolution at the beginning of the twenty first, so much so that they voted to block intervention to protect the existing regimes in the UN Security Council. Just like Stalin's boycott of the Security Council in 1950, Russia's abstention in Libya in 2011 was an exception and considered a mistake that should not be repeated.

The reasons behind the positive attitude of Russia against Mubarak regime may be listed as Mubarak's policies that were beneficial to Russian interests such as securing the status quo in the region and prevention of extremist groups as well as positioning his country as an important trade partner for Russia. On the other hand, one of the disturbing results of the possible scenario of Hosni Mubarak's stepping down was the possibility of creating a domino effect and leading to overthrowing of Bashar al-Assad of Syria, which is the most important partner for Russia in the Middle East. This also has been evident in Russia's efforts in the following times in keeping the Assad regime in power. Moreover, uncertainties that could be caused by the changes and concerns about the US being more influential during this process and for Russia will result to be excluded from the regional politics were the main reasons of Russia's anti-change stance. Preferring managing the structures representing status quo in the region instead of administrations in search of a new order, Russia sought to increase its influence by offering itself as an alternative to the west to the regimes that were having difficulties to continue their existence. Finally, the reason behind Moscow's perceiving Egypt's transition to democracy as a dangerous option is the possibility of movements with large societal support such as Muslim Brotherhood rising to government and establishing a regime that would harm Moscow's interests in the region. Therefore, Russia's approach to revolution in Egypt has been, in essence, "preservation of status quo that will protect regional interests" (Katz, 2011).

What influenced the political reforms in the Arab Middle East most was the end of the Cold War. Ruling regimes in the region were constantly pressurized by international communities, as the democracy became a widely accepted form of governance and they could not remain passive after some point; early 1990s saw partial openings in most of the Arab regimes' political systems. However, in less than a decade most of these reforms were either scrapped or suspended due to the fact that they created risks for the sovereignty of the ruling elite (Karakır, 2012).

Saudi Arabia, one of the most important allies of Egypt in the Middle East, was also one of the countries that fallow the protests closely. The basis for Saudi Arabia's policy during this process was the continuation of Mubarak regime. There are mainly three reasons behind this: First, the danger of Arab Uprisings that was initiated in Tunisia and moved to Egypt creating that may cause a domino effect and reach Gulf Countries and Saudi Arabia (Dreyfuss, 2011). In order to prevent such a scenario, Saudi decision makers wanted to take measures and financially supported the authoritarian leader of Tunisia, Ben Ali. When he had to escape, they provided asylum to him. Riyadh, aware of the growing concerns, considered overthrowing of Hosni Mubarak as a development that could endanger its security. This was not a case that concerned only Egyptian Revolution, but rather a broad stance against Arab Spring.

Another reason why Saudi Arabia preferred Mubarak rule to continue was their wish to keep Egypt as Washington's satellite and prevent her to be a stronger actor in the region. Riyadh administration, due to the environment created by a weak and uninfluential Egypt, could have applied its policies in the Middle East and could have protected its own interests better. Another reason for Saudi Arabia preferring to have Mubarak in the rule was to prevent the possibility of Muslim Brotherhood's succession to power, who was perceived as a barrier to Wahhabism spreading into Egypt (Telci, 2017).

The United Arab Emirates administration, realizing the increasing influence of Muslim Brotherhood in the country since 1990 and considering this a threat, applied anti-Muslim Brotherhood policies on a regional scale as well. Within this context, Hosni Mubarak, with his secular identity and serious anti-Muslim Brotherhood policies, have always been supported by the UAE. One of the prominent reasons behind the UAE's support to Cairo's policy of preventing Islamic movements to gain momentum was to attempt to minimize the possibility of threat against their power.

The UAE was one of the most concerned states when the demonstrations began in Egypt on January 25, 2011. Even though members of Muslim Brotherhood were not at the stage at the beginning of the protests, the possibility of Muslim Brotherhood succeeding to power seriously disturbed Abu Dhabi. As the potential government of Muslim Brotherhood could have initiated transformations with a wider scope in the region that has been shaking by Arab Uprisings, the UAE administration took a stance against such a possibility (Hellyer, 2014).

Following the beginning of uprising on January 25, 2011, Abu Dhabi administration clearly objected to overthrowing Mubarak and ventured to keep the regime in the rule in spite of public reaction. The UAE has been the only country that officially visited Egypt while anti-Mubarak demonstrations took place. A few days before Mubarak resigned; the UAE Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Bin Zayed visited Egypt and expressed his support to Mubarak. However, even these undertakings could not stop Hosni Mubarak from being overthrown.

Qatar's policy of Egypt during this period took place as a part of politics of Arab Uprisings in a broader scale. During anti-Mubarak demonstrations, Qatar followed a different policy by using different instruments instead of taking a direct stance by making an official statement. Undoubtedly most important of these instruments has been the Al-Jazeera TV channel. Broadcasting in Arabic and English, the channel aired the developments in Egypt uninterrupted beginning from the moment the demonstrations began on January 25, 2011,

communicating to the entire world as well as Arab geography. Al-Jazeera's anti-Mubarak stance as well as broadcast policy that glorified the protestors pleased the masses in the streets but faced backlash of Mubarak administration.

Türkiye, as it supported Tunisian protesters, also supported the revolutionary movement by taking an anti-Mubarak stance. Even though Ankara was caught unaware against the protests, it preferred to follow a scrupulous policy by positioning itself with the masses in the streets. Moreover, Türkiye, due to its importance and influence in the Arab world, had been especially interested in the regime change in Egypt and believed that this was important for a wider scale regional political transformation (Uysal, 2016).

3.3.   Leading Figures of Revolution

In the Egyptian Uprisings of 2011 the success came from the actors that were consisted of organized teams however mainly the people, not a one opposition class against the regime. Labeled as new social movements, these movements delegitimized violence (Durac, 2013). The various groups may come together and unite with the legitimacy that the non-violent protest continued. This was evident from many participants of uprisings said that the success of "the protests came from abolishing of all varieties of sectarian violence and harassment" (Noshokaty, #1, 2011).

Once the Egyptian Revolution is evaluated in the context of internal actors, dominant social classes, it can be said that only one side of the struggle tangible which is regime and Mubarak as a person. There was no other person to be targeted. There was a struggle between the group consisted of the working class, the poor urban and the peasant and the ruling class spread throughout the entire regime. One of the most important reasons for such anger against ruling elites as explained before that decades long sufferings of oppression politics, human rights violations and economic injustices which bring all these groups together. The

large masses living in difficult conditions in the big cities, the young unemployed people living in the cities and peasant whom the regime did not offer any services, initiated uprisings against the Mubarak regime. What should be emphasized here is that none of these social classes has domination to one another during whole demonstration process. Recognizing that the overthrowing regime was possible only by creating a large-scale revolutionary coalition, and actors of the coalition have taken steps in this direction, and they have made it possible for growing large participated street demonstrations to continue from the first day.

The "new era" in Egyptian unrest politics can be followed back to 2004 once the initial series of demonstrations by the Kefeya Movement go off. Egypt then and during the uprisings has been a highly mobilized country. As mentioned earlier, the gatherings of the 2000s contributed to the creation of such new actors. Particularly the youth movements that Lynch defines 'self-aware and self-identified' actors became a completely novel class for political analysis (Lynch, 2012).

As stated by one participant of uprisings Ramy Fakhr about the Egyptian experience: "There were individuals from all walks of life: older men with their families, middle aged men and ladies, teams of girls, Muslims, Christians, rich, poor and also the majority were youth' whereas another witness Amr Alim was stating that 'the Muslim Brotherhood is very present, however so are all political parties" (Noshokaty, #4, 2011). Brown (2012) also mentioned that state officials dominantly participated in the protests.

Hellyer (2011), on the other hand, underlined that with everybody from trade unionists to ultraconservative Salafists joining in, the protest failed to have one path however the "revolutionary youth" and "wise men" became the actors that led the negotiations with the regime. As can be understood from their declarations, the traditional parties weren't certain to be part of the protests as Tagammu Party issued an announcement the day before the protests declared that it would not participate Police Day, an inappropriate date for a mass protests. In the way, Vafd Party was hesitant to participate. Although the Muslim

Brotherhood was not participating in the protests as well its youth was really active from day one and asking for different organizations like 6th April and the Revolutionary Youth to participate in the protests. Those new actors triggered the bravery within the Egyptian uprising (Hellyer, 2011).

When we look at the political parties, civil society organizations or social organizations that have mobilized masses in the demonstrations that overthrew the Mubarak government. The movements seemed to be a supra-party situation and moreover the parties were under pressure so their movement areas were very limited. Therefore, masses composed of youth groups like the Kefaye Movement, the April 6 Movement and more organized unregistered groups such as Muslim Brotherhood were much more effective in the process. Some of these groups are established for long ago, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, while many are very new and emerged in the 2000s.

One of these effective groups in the demonstration was Kefaya Movement that officially founded in 2004, a group of Egyptian intellectuals from numerous political leanings, who were gravely worried with the conditions within the Middle East region (the time of second Palestinian rebellion and also the Occupation of Iraq) and in Egypt, determined to create a brand new political initiative (Shorbagy, 2007) . The Kefaya not only focused on internal issues, but also attracted attention to problems such as Sudan and Palestine that concern Egypt. The demand of political, economic and social reforms under Egyptian identity was movement's priority. The central agenda of the movement was aimed to increase public awareness against the potential succession situation of Jamal Mubarak in place of his father as the future president of Egypt. Kefaya's message was effectively expressed in one word, Kefaya, meaning 'enough' in informal Arabic, was well received among Egyptians (Shahin, 2005).

At the beginning of the 2000s Kefaya Movement tried to create umbrella structure named "National Dialogue" to collect all opposition groups together. Despite the fact that they

conducted many discussions with different groups before the 2005 elections, this effort was failed especially because Tagammu and the Muslim Brotherhood could not meet together. Kefaya Movement boycotted the 2005 presidential elections, but some members of it supported Ayman Nur in this election. The Movement boycotted the 2010 elections and accused Muslim Brotherhood and other movements which participated in the elections for legitimizing the corrupt system. When the demonstrations started in 2011, members of Kefaya Movement actively involved and leader of the movement, George Ishaq, tried to influence the developments in the streets (Ayhan, 2012).

The Kefaya Movement did not look for official approval from the regime asked for demonstrations or press releases. The Kefaya believed in the power of demonstrations and protests in public spaces. The small protesters in which Mubarak, his family and the security apparatus were condemned and challenged, the Kefaya Movement broke a taboo in opposition politics. The peaceful protesters conducted by the Kefaya received intense of national and international attention. Soon after, Kefaya could carry out protests by itself in 25-26 Egyptian provinces with the participation of thousands of protesters (Shehata, 2011). Out of many, three important contributions of Kefaya to the opposition policy of the in Egypt can be underlined;

First, Kefaya destroyed the taboo of directly challenging Mubarak and his family and helped the public to overcome the fear barrier against the regime. Second, Kefaya modeled a new frame of oppositional movement with different ideological ways and ease organizational structure. Through that Kefaya succeeded in getting people from different ideological tendencies together and with a untight organizational structure; avoided strict government control over institutional frameworks. The founding members of the Kefaya did not decide for any particular leader and adopted a consensus-based decision-making process. The movement organized protests and demonstrations with expectancy to form future platforms that consist Egyptians from many different ideological backgrounds (Shorbagy, 2007). Third, Kefaya has the ability to attract Egyptian youth and create new movements such as

"Youth for Change". The Kefaya Movement as successfully added young Egyptians to politics by protests.

As part of Kefaya, Youth for Change joined in many of the demonstrations in 2005 and at the same time conducted independent events focused on youth demands. However, government pressures on opposition movements and parties after the election of 2005, youth participation began to decline in 2006 (Shehata, 2011). After the presidential elections in 2005, in which Mubarak received 88.6 percent of the votes, the Kefaya and Youth for Change began to lose its dynamism (Shorbagy, 2007). However, by challenging the brutal regime in a direct manner that was not seen until then, Kefaya is stated milestone in the contemporary political history of Egypt. As a result of Kefaya's withdrawing from political life, Shehata (2011) argued that youth activists turned their attention to online platforms and wrote blogs as a new field of opposition politics.

It was the 6th of April Movement which organized social networking sites on the internet and used it effectively for its actions that has an important place in the Egyptian Uprisings. A few numbers of young, by using internet blogs and social media, aimed support and promote for Mahalla Al-Kubra strikes held on 6th of April 2008 organized by trade unions for economic demands of workers. Efforts of these youth had gained huge success in a short time. Facebook page named 6th of April Youth Movement formed by Ahmed Maher and Israeli Abdel Fattah on 23th of March, 2008 reached 3000 members on the next day and 40,000 at the end of the month and on the day of 6th April 70.000. Later on, the group actively contributed other demonstrations. Of course, this situation did not escape from eyes of the Mubarak regime and its members were arrested many times and oppressed by police during Mubarak's resignation process. The group, which did not advocate a certain political opinion, adopted an attitude that would be summarized as "demanding change without resorting to violence" and cooperated with other opposition movements to end the repressive administration (Ottaway & Hamzawy, 2011).

Another group, organized on the internet and had enormous influence on 2011 Egyptian Revolution, was the "We are all Khalid Said". Halid Said was an Egyptian young from Alexandria who was taken into police custody on 7 June 2010, tortured and killed by police during custody. Authorities first rejected allegations of violence, but eyewitnesses reported that the photographs were subjected to severe torture, and protests began in Alexandria and spread nationwide (Ayhan, 2012). A Facebook group page on his name opened 19th of July 19, 2010 by Egyptian youth. The group initially expressed their demands for human rights and protest against police brutality later on become more active and shared ideas on political rights and demands on free and transparent elections. After a while beginning of 25th of January demonstrations, the group supported this protests and started to share for Mubarak's departure and after his resignation continued its sharings demanding more democracy, human rights, fair trial, etc. (We are all Khalid Said, https://www.facebook.com/elshaheeed.co.uk). The founder of the group, nicknamed as "Alshaheed", later announced by Time as one of the 100 most influential people of 2011, was an Egyptian activist Wael Ghonim (Giglio, 2011).

There is no doubt that one of the major actors of the January 25 Revolution is the Muslim Brotherhood. It is unthinkable for such an organization, which has a very old and wide base, a strong position among NGOs, and which has been under the pressure of the administration for years, to be excluded from these movements. However, in the early stages of the demonstrations, in particular, the Muslim Brotherhood took great care for not to be seen as the main institutional actor of the demonstrations, but to strive to be one of the ordinary actors in the demonstrations, not the leaders. Since the Muslim Brotherhood was the most important and most institutionalized Islamic organization, it contributed to the civil society in Egypt. It was accepted as the largest and most influential component of civil society in Egypt. There was always substantial support behind the Brotherhood, and for this reason it had the potential to influence the political atmosphere in Egypt.

As mentioned previous chapter the Muslim Brotherhood had played vital role socio-political life of the Egypt and had inspired many fundamental Islamic movements of the twentieth

century in the region. Undoubtedly, the views of Sayyid Qutub[5] influenced the direction of the Brotherhood's ideology. According to Qutub, "attempts to bring about change from within the existing repressive Muslim political systems were futile, and that jihad was the only way to implement a new Islamic order" (Shahin, 2007). The Muslim Brotherhood supported the overthrow of the monarchy by the free officers in 1952, but the relations between the new military leaders of Egypt were distressed and the Brotherhood members were subjected to a heavy suppression of the regime. An unsuccessful assassination attempt against Jamal Abdul Nasser was imprisoned with a few Brotherhood members and the organization went underground for a while (Sharp, 2006). In the early 1970s, the Muslim Brotherhood rejected violence and after Hosni Mubarak's succession to power, it was allowed to participate parliamentary elections by collaborating with other opposition parties (Qadban, 2016).

Candidates participated in parliamentary elections under the banners of other opposition parties, while official restrictions against the Brotherhood continue to prevent candidates from competing for elections under their flag. In other words, although the Muslim Brotherhood was not legally recognized, it has adopted various strategies to address legal restrictions such as nominating independent candidates and entering coalitions with legalized parties. The Brotherhood allied with the Vafd Party in 1984, which challenged the parliamentary elections that year and entered the parliament for the first time (Ibrahim, 1999). During the parliamentary elections in 1987, the Brotherhood formed an alliance with the Labor Party and the Liberal Party, and won a considerable number of seats in the People's Assembly (Korany, 1998). Despite widespread fraud and police interventions, the Muslim Brotherhood independent candidates could win seats in the parliamentary elections, which constituted the biggest opposition bloc in parliamentary elections of 2000 (Shahin, 2007). The Muslim Brotherhood independent candidates participated in the elections for the first time without establishing an alliance to any other political party. After elections of 2000 regime tolerance is over for the Brotherhood. Mubarak regime took repressive measures

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[5] Sayyid Qutub (1906-1966) is an Egyptian writer and intellectual, who joined the Muslim Brotherhood in early 1950s, and whose ideas have been a significant source of inspiration for various groups in Muslim World. For more details on Qutb's views see F. Altun 2006, **Seyyid Kutup**, İlke Yay. Ankara.

against prominent political actors from the Brotherhood, many arrested and detained those accused without any trial of planning to overthrow the government (Brownlee, 2002).

Gerges (2015) explains the Muslim Brotherhood position as "a reactionary, ultra-conservative social movement" that participated the uprisings with delays and to reinforce its power in Egypt and elsewhere. The Brotherhood was the most active group in the January revolution. Despite being banned officially in 1954, it grew among the different classes of the population in Egypt and it went ideological transformation during Envar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak era as Egypt returned multi-party election system. Returned to the multiparty elections.

Professional associations and trade unions were the strongest units of civil society in Egypt. Although these registered institutions are known to be contradictory to the Mubarak regime, they still had relative independence from the government, especially when compared to advocacy groups. However, after the success of the Muslim Brotherhood in controlling these organization, the government has led to new legislation aimed at expanding control over them. Pro-Mubarak and his afflicted people started to take control and contained the Brotherhood from professional associations and trade unions and (Gohar, 2008). The main reason behind the Muslim Brotherhood's gaining control over these institutions was their access to funds that are not subject to state control which create an advantage for them over secular groups. The Egyptian state had strict control over NGO's financial resources, such as direct government funds, foreign funds, income-generating activities or public grants. Although NGOs have been investigated by the government for funding they are receiving, donations made to religious organizations like mosques were not subject to any official approval. There have also been numerous donations from sympathizers to Islamic NGOs that have contributed to the Brotherhood ability to organize and present various welfare networks to enhance its influence (Abdelrahman, 2004).

In the early 1990s, the Mubarak administration allowed more space for the Brotherhood to distinguish itself from. The Muslim Brotherhood in this permitted space, get the ability to perform its mobilization and organizational capacity. For example, in the terrible earthquake of October 1992, the Brotherhood organized a charity campaign for victims of earthquakes which was more effective than the government's campaign (Korany, 1998). Saadeddin Ibrahim's interpretations of the Brotherhood's performance on remedying the damages in 1992 are: "During crises such as the Egyptian earthquake in October 1992, Muslim Brotherhood-controlled professional unions go beyond the secular counterparts and beyond the state. This welfare network fills the gap arising from the regime inability to respond to the evolving needs of the people." (Ibrahim, 1999)

The growing success of the Brotherhood triggered Mubarak administration and led to a series of government restrictions to prevent the growing impact of the Muslim Brotherhood. New legislation like Unified Law of Professional Syndicates of 1993 to control these institutions was one of these measures. Another measure was the suppression of the Brotherhood members by the state during November 1995. Almost eighty Brotherhood members were arrested by the Supreme Military Court. 54 of them were sentenced to three to five years in prison by military courts although civil courts have decided to dismiss these charges. The oppression policies of Mubarak regime against a non-violent mainstream moderate group of the Muslim Brotherhood created an arena for extremists to strengthening their bases in the late 1990s (Naguib, 2009).

With all its consistencies and inconsistencies, the Brotherhood has been an important political and social force in Egypt for over 70 years. It is clear that the weakness of the secular political opposition, provides more political space for the Muslim Brotherhood due to their is a moral message that can affect many in Egyptian conservative society and their ability to offer most needed services such as healthcare and education. The Muslim Brotherhood was assumed that implemented non-violent methods and has shown so far the motivation to play a political role in the democratic process. The success of the Brotherhood

was dependent on the effective organization and the ability to mobilize a wide range of social base (Ottaway, 2003).

The historical background of the Brotherhood, ideology and radical movement will be analyzed in detail to see how the social and political entities over time have transformed into a moderate movement. Apart from the Muslim Brotherhood, the Vasat Party will be briefly mentioned as part of political opposition as a moderate Islamic group in the civil society context in Egypt.

The Brotherhood due to its experiment of both delegitimizing processes and political actor in parliamentary processes during the 2000s gained the ability to survive and make coalitions with different groups. It is a fact that the softening position of the Muslim Brotherhood made possible to form an alliance with liberals against the regime and that was the fundamental stance for the uprisings' success. It should be noted that, the Muslim Brotherhood began to join the protest institutionally after 28th of January, after realizing possibility to overthrow Mubarak (Cook, 2011). The Brotherhood established the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) after the demonstrations. The party also added Rafiq Habib, a Copt and some 1.000 women as founding members (Anani, 2011). In fact, through FJP, the Brotherhood became the most influential and the best organized political entity in Egypt.

Like other revolutions, young educated people played a significant role in organizing the demonstrations and declaring the goals of the removal of Mubarak and the establishment of the new democratic system. However, the tools they used included smartphones, internet and social media sites like Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook etc. Internet blogs allowed a freer environment for expressing their ideas and condemnations. Blogs of youth used brave language against Mubarak, his family and other affiliated public officials. The use of cartoons videos and pictures reinforced their messages. Through personal blogs, violations of human rights, the brutality of the security forces were distributed to a wider audience.

Youth blogs contributed to the growing awareness of the state's ruthlessness. In addition, opposition movements use blogs to explain their events and activities.

Social media was one of the platforms where protestors took action. The Internet has emerged as a contributing tool to mobilization. Social media sites such as Facebook Instagram and Twitter were used as alternative communication tools. While street protests are dangerous for individuals under authoritarian rule, social media has created "safer areas" and forums for demonstration and discussions. This new media led to the creation of more independent actors. As mentioned above three important movements, Kefaya, 6th of April and We are all Khalid changed the course of events, mainly emerged on the internet (Kirkpatrick, 2011).

Khaled Said was an Egyptian Bouazizi, but his sudden death did not cause mass protests. However, an instantly Facebook page named after him encourage thousands of Egyptian to take actions and that turned him into one of the driving forces of the January 25 Uprising. On 18th of January 18th, an Egyptian young Esma Mahfouz, uploaded a video to YouTube and spoke to other Egyptians:

> *"Four Egyptians have set themselves on fire so that maybe we can have a revolution like Tunisia; maybe we can have freedom justice honor and human dignity. I, am a girl, and I am going down to Tahrir Square, and I will stand alone. We want to go down to Tahrir Square on January 25th. If you still want to live in honor, we have to go down and demand our rights, our fundamental human rights."* (Mahfouz, 2011)

3.4.   Ideology and Effects of Revolution

There has been still debated about what was the driving ideological motivation behind the uprisings in the Middle East particularly in Egypt. As it has explained in the previous section, it was not just revolution of any particular class or sect, but the fact that the people who

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belong to different groups of thought and opinion from all levels of the society realized the revolution. Therefore, it makes very difficult to identify the ideology behind the revolution. However, after all events that can be labeled as the restoration of the international capitalist system. In other words, it is possible to see all of this as a self-renewal of a diseased organ that causes pain to the body. The important point here is that maybe the process did not emerge or develop according to desires of the West, on the contrary, the global capitalist system managed to have result of the restoration by itself. That is why initially the West was shocked when revolutionary movements started.

According to this framework, the question may be asked: Are these revolutions made only against authoritarian regimes? The answer is a definite; No. The most important goal of the revolutions is the demand of new fair structure of the international global system. In other words, the revolutions somehow were kind of rebellions against the policies of the West protecting the dictators of the Middle East. From this point of view, they can be characterized as actions to achieve transnational socio-economic justice. On this basis, it can be argued that the West would not allow revolutionary-radical changes in the administrations of the Middle East.

After all of the events, what is most notable about Arab Uprisings at the beginning is what they weren't. They were not lead by army leaders, planned from abroad, supported by a strong organization, or equipped with a concrete vision and leadership. After all, they were not violent. The excitement caused by these initial revolutionary moments owed so much what they did not possess. The absence of these qualities was what allowed many people that self-generated demonstrations about to translate into open, liberal, democratic societies (Brown, 2012).

Revolutions firstly devour their children. The ones that are patient, decisive and pursuing a certain goal to achieve are rewarded. Revolutions are almost certainly short-lived events, burning energy that destroys on their way, including ideas and people that initiated them. It

was the same with Arab Uprisings. It brought radical changes. It strengthens new forces and marginalizes others. But young activists rushing to the streets tend to lose it in the first incident. The general public may be grateful that they achieved. They often admire them and keep them with high respect. But they did not feel they are one of them. The ordinary situation of a revolution should be drawn to an edge (Agha & Malley, 2011).

In Egypt, after the revolution, secular liberals were disappointed by how the majority of people voted for when the street protests of the people produced democracy. There were obvious victory of religious parties and the absolute majority of candidates from the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi groups secured in the Egyptian parliamentary elections and Mohammad Morsi in the presidential elections in June 2012. However, this picture should not be assessed as Islamic motivated groups were the ideological driving force behind the revolution. This is one of the most important evidence of the coalition's efforts to obtain all sections of the Muslim Brotherhood, especially electoral victories.

When we look at the influence of the revolution, even before the dust settled on the dramatic transformation of Egypt, the protests spread to Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen, and Iraq. People felt a new sense of strengthening and the opposition were galvanized, convinced that they can be successful and that their regime was much more fragile than had been assumed. As stated by Middle East analyst "the principal strength of most Middle Eastern regimes has been that their people have no idea how weak they are." (ICG, 2011)

There are also wide similarities between regional regimes. Many of the features that underpin Egyptian uprisings exist in the region: lack of effective politic representation; unaccountability and non-transparency; vicious security measures; widespread corruption; vast inequalities; privatization of public goods by members of the elite; state humiliation to ordinary citizens; and to the abandonment of national purposes in the regional scene. For the

most part, these regimes were used to relatively passive societies, which made them bland, lethargic, and poorly equipped to cope with a popular re-awakening (ICG, 2011).

However, differences must also be taken into consideration. A key characteristics of the Egyptian case – the tipping point - was that the debate bridged and mobilized different political, social and generational groups. As stated by the ex-Lebanese minister, Ghassan Salame; "Insurgencies today have an essentially moral, ethical dimension." These are expressions of challenge against governance that defy any kind of justification. In other words, they are based on the commonly shared feelings that regime privileges cannot easily be exacerbated. Aspiration in Tunisia takes place in the form of a simple call – "dégage"; it was "irhal" in Egypt; both actually mean "clear off". Regime inadequacy to mobilize loyal sympathizers or institutions was equally striking. Most of the security forces, neither the important elements of the society were willing to fight against. An Egyptian diplomat said: "Especially in the last few years, Mubarak's regime has even excluded those who are staunch supporters". (ICG, 2011)

The wide consensus that characterizes the Egyptian examples was not everywhere. Regimes can try to exploit and manipulate sectarian and ethnic divisions by trying to divide and marginalize protesters. In the same way, the failure of mobilizing loyalists cannot be easily repeated. Some, depending on their ethnic or religious divisions, can rely on security devices that can vigorously resist any regime change that may threaten their assets. Moreover, while oppositions in the region are inspired by Egyptian experience, regimes also learned lessons. And they learned in so many different ways. Some have made announcements designed to unload or place of demonstrations in advance. Yemen's President said that he would not stand for another term, nor would his son; Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said he would not seek a third term; Jordan's King Abdullah fired the government and reached the Islamic opposition; Algeria said that it would soon take emergency state management in the nineteenth year; and Syrian citizens started using Facebook and YouTube. Others (and in some cases the same) strongly oppressed the protesters, believing that the fates of Mubarak were sealed when they perhaps failed. In Bahrain and especially in Libya, security forces

fired at demonstrators, who showed remarkable determination despite the brutal and bloody pressure (ICG, 2011).

The destiny of the Egyptian uprising will also be important. As seen in Egypt, public opinion can change quickly and often in contradictory forms. If Egypt is experiencing a very difficult, painful or unbalanced stage or experiencing socioeconomic complaints that are very dissatisfied, then most people in the region may look like something that happened earlier - a second less appropriate. Disappointment can also be contagious. (ICG, 2011)

Different goals brought together various people in the Arab revolutionary movements. Some wanted to get rid of a particular dictator. But at the same time, not just a dictator, but the backing of the entire repressive regime, which forms the basis of the dictatorship and where the democracy is superseded, is united behind its goal. Many protesters have not used the slogans demanding the end of the dictatorship regime only to overthrow a certain government. The secularists supported democracy because they wanted a free political system, political participation and protection of human rights. Many Islamic movements supported democracy for the same reasons and at the same time they thought they could win free elections. Another unifying cause in some rebellions was anti-imperialism. The monarchies and the Mubarak regime in Egypt were widely perceived as co-operating with the US and British foreign policies, which, as mentioned earlier, oppose the vast majority of the Arabs. Thus, the transition to democracy was a way of fighting imperialism (Defronzo, 2015).

The Arab revolution halted to a great extent because the world's permit window was closed by an international counter-revolution under Saudi Arabia's leadership. The Saudi royal family as they control a nation of about 27.5 million, including about ten and a half million expats (CIA, Middle East : Saudi Arabia, 2018), is afraid of spreading democracy because it undoubtedly threatens their absolute wealth and power. Supported and armed by the United States, Saudi Arabia and other pro-American monarchs indirectly supported the

counter-revolutions. The International Institute for Strategic Studies reported that Saudi Arabia was the world's fourth at military spending after the United States, China and Russia (Reuters, 2014).

The uprisings recreated the Pan-Arabic sentiments with the hope that the Arab dictatorships could be gotten rid of by a democratic revolutionary wave. But at the end, in fact, the results of the Egyptian revolution were much less than the participant's expectations towards success. In the more populated Egypt, the Mubarak regime was overthrown at the end of demonstrations. Elections took part. But the leaders of the established economic, government and military elites did not lose ground. As they were first revolutionaries and owner of the old regime, old guards were afraid of the policies of the new regime. As a result, the army seized power and imprisoned democratically elected president. The pre-revolutionary Mubarak system is almost untouched and protected by the military dictatorship, only without Mubarak (Doran, 2011).

4. SIMILARITIES and DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 1952 and 2011

Comparing Egyptian Revolutions of 1952 and 2011 which discussed in detail in the previous two chapters, there seem to be some similarities in terms of economic and social demands. However, there are considerable differences, especially in regard to the leading figures who carried out the revolution and their ideological motivations. But perhaps the most important point as Kandil (2012) had summarized is the differences between the 1952 revolution and the 2011 uprising as:

> *"…what happened in 1952 in fact had been revolutionary legitimacy, because the Free Officers carried out the revolution and seized power. Now we have a different situation, where those who revolted on January 25, 2011 were not the ones who seized power.*"

The developments in the Arab Middle East during the 1950s can be termed as the second-phase of political restructuring in the region. Because the Arabs renewed their political struggle for independence after Second World War, which they could not achieve in the intervening years since the First World War. The political battle was simultaneously fought on two fronts: against the foreign powers and the governing elite, who were often seen as minions of the imperialist forces by the people.

The political upheavals of the 1950s in the region had many similarities if we disregard the minor differences. In fact, a thorough analysis of the local and international actors involved, the grievances and the ideologies that led to these movements paints a cohesive picture of the various factors that fomented the uprisings during that period (Karpat, 2001).

The revolution which emerged in January 2011 and changed the regime in Egypt caused new political turmoil in the Middle East. The events shook the political, social and intellectual foundations of the Middle East. This domino affected Arab popular movement take placed in countries one by one and resulted in political redesigning in those countries and new political repositioning in neighboring countries and international actors (Oğuzlu, 2011). Like other great social uprisings, Arab popular movement was long in the making, and born of many intertwined causes. Starting from the very beginning of 1950s Arab Revolutions, each passing year brought developments that made new uprisings that much more likely. Economic, social, political, juridical and diplomatic problems contributed to a furious sense of injustice across the Arab world that finally boiled over in the 2011 (Pollack, 2011).

After the 2011 January Revolution, there was hot debate among Egyptians that if the revolution of 2011 was against 1952? Or do they complement one another? Did revolutionary wave which removed Mubarak really break with the history of Egypt or it should be read as unfolding development of one historical process? (Shokr, 2012)

4.1. Socio-Economic Demands

The Arab uprising in 2011 is often viewed as an unprecedented event in the Arab world. The revolution is often compared to the European revolution of 1848 and the series of protest that ultimately led to the demise of the Soviet Bloc in 1989. But one does not need to go that far away and back in time to conjure up the peculiar characteristics of the revolt. The events of 2011 were very much akin to the political upheaval that shook the Arab world in the 1950s and 60s.

Back in the 1950s and 60s, similar rage was palpable in the Arab World. Ineffective state institutions, uncontrollable corruption, inequality in wealth distribution and the usurpation of power by a small elite, along with the slavish attitude towards their colonial masters all

these factors contributed to the rise of Arabs. The most lacerating among them was shameful loss of Palestine and the leaders' inability to redress the situation. The same slogans of freedom, independence and dignity were raised back then.

There were two main goals of the Egypt Revolution in this era; one was political other was sociocultural. The first political goal of all revolutions in the country was securing national sovereignty and integrity against western imperial and colonial hegemony. Secondly Revolutionary comrades had considered present governors as a collaborator of western powers and main obstacles of the modernist development program. Therefore, they aimed direct or indirect change of current governors (monarchs) or at least taken them under control. Accordingly, after revolution 1952; the monarchy government collapsed down. (Karpat, 2001)

Like aforesaid second aim of the revolution in 1952 was sociocultural. It means, in general, there should be actions taken to realize development and modernist progress. As mentioned before revolutionary comrades they focused on cultural and moral changes in society rather than economic, scientific and technological one. Their apparent aim was to create a modern, dynamic and progressive society based on moral values of high global humanistic spirit and authentic national culture. In short, the most prominent aim of nationalist, progressive and revolutionary leader elites was establishing independent, modern nationalist state and creating social structure based on accepting language, culture, ethnicity, history and future prospects as the most important parts of inner harmony. In other meaning, because of their education, revolutionary comrades want to create society by taking western society as a model. They chose top down the program to realize this aim. But the result was not like they expected. Authoritarian state structure emerged instead of powerful society (Karpat, 2001).

According to its result, it is now very clear that this revolution in Egypt is failed. As mentioned before revolutionary comrades had two essential targets: eliminate the influence of foreign powers in their countries. This influence never eliminated totally, it was reduced

in some cases because of nature of era but it can be argued that this influence expended more. The second target was the abolishment of monarchy regimes and establishment of administrations based on people's wills, like republic systems. But after revolutions new administrations emerged as only their names were a republic. People's wills did not find any place in these governments. Moreover, collapsed regimes were less bad and authoritarian in some cases. In Egypt absolute authority of some limited elites, even only some family members established.

In its early years, the Egyptian Revolution of 1952 was built as a response to the problems of colonial modernity. With a commitment grounded in social reformism and nationalism, Egypt began its quest to establish a nation-state. That required some fundamental steps to be taken like the integration into the world economy, empowering the state's authority over the populace and sorting out the questions of identity and cultural difference. With these objectives in mind, which was a mixture of several ideas, the new regime succeeded in bringing about a revolutionary political imagination which attracted broader popular appeal. Its leader was secular nationalist who anchored its legitimacy in programs of anti-imperialism, economic development and social justice. But from the very beginning, the vision had its flaws. Marred by repressive security practices seen as necessary for squashing counter-revolutionary elements. It is not surprising that Egypt fell into a dictatorship with empty rhetoric and ineffective sloganeering. In fact, the country's failure to stand on its own with the ideology that promised so much to the people became to define the legacy of the country. But the collective memory of the people for an uprising against colonialism remained steadfast. People to this day celebrate the national narrative of popular heroism against foreign invasion. The sense of resistance to foreign interference was always alive among the masses. So revolution was never an alien concept. It was always present in Egypt (Shokr, 2012).

One of the most important factors behind the utter failure of these revolutionary comrades was their inability to deliver on lofty promises. They promised that the solution to all their problems lie in pursuing a robust nationalist ideology. The manifesto, no doubt, attracted

massive support from the people. But once these nationalists got hold of the government their weakness became exposed. They were bad administrators. Most of the times, the country was kept under emergency rule. And eventually, with time, the rulers moved away from the ruled. In other words, the nationalists become authoritarian regimes with bleak economic prospects and an inefficient system. These weaknesses translated into slavish foreign policy. Then they lost the war against Israel, which further enraged the people, resulting in more draconian domestic policies to muzzle opposition. The Arab uprising of the 1950s did win freedom from the colonial masters but the new rulers soon became the new masters with no vision for the people but the sole purpose of continuing their hold on power. So material colonization was terminated but intellectual colonization gains ground.

Back in the days, the military elites of Egypt were the main vanguard of the revolution. But in 2011, the case was different. Although, the emotions of hopelessness that stoked the 1950s revolution were the same in 2011. But the failure of Arab Unity in the past had lost its luster to the young Egyptians who took to the streets this time. Socialism too was a flop. However, the call for unity could be heard but within each country (Wihda Wataniya) for Pan-Arab unity (Wihda Arabiya) and social justice, as well as attacks against crony imperialism for socialism and it was also easy to hear echoes from the past in today's calls for change (Agha & Malley, 2011).

The elements that unified the socially heterogeneous protests was nevertheless ethical and moral in principle, above all dignity (karamah), justice (adalah), freedom (hurriyah) and respect (ihtiram). The demonstrators' calls included;

- o *"that the authorities respect their rights as citizens rather than arrogantly infantilizing them as subordinates;*

- o *a life of dignity rather than one defined by humiliating condescension and oppression by the security forces and public authorities;*

- *equality in access to resources and opportunities instead of clientelistic rewards for compliance;*

- *rule of law in place of both despotic rule and special privileges for the elites; and finally,*

- *the right to participate in the global trend toward prosperity, progress, education and democratic participation"* (Rosiny, 2012).

As mentioned above, the dominant call in the uprising was an eagerness to establish a new political system based on more equality, justice and pluralism. So the demands were the same as 1952, these people ask for more right to participate in the political and economic system and live their life with dignity.

Another important aspect that some deep analysis carried on is the changing role of the Egyptian Army over the years between 1952 and 2011. The massive influence of Army in Egyptian society cannot be overstated. Not only the army plays a role in the political life of the country, but also in the socio-economic arena of Egyptian society, the institution wields tremendous power. So it is no surprise that the military did play a complex role in changing power during the revolutionary era. What's interesting is the shifting role of the institution in two different historical periods in the country's history. Egypt has the world's 10th largest army with approximately 468.000 soldiers (Sayigh, 2011). The institution enjoys its influence in wider society since the 1952 revolution, which was led by Free Officers. Ever since Nasser's rule from 1956 to 1970, the military solidified its place in the top brass of the economic and political elite in the society.

The army controls an economic empire which it often uses to curry favors from a dedicated network of a loyal officer of the corps. During the transition period in 2011, one of the red lines that the army laid down was that its economic clout in the country will not be questioned in any way. No matter what constitutional changes the civilians bring forth, the

army will be exempted from making its accounts public. As it was estimated, the Egyptian army owns property that worth about 20-30 billion dollars. But exact numbers are difficult to ascertain as the powerful establishment often ignore calls from the parliament to make its budget public. But Demmelhuber (2011) added that the military has stakes in the real estate sector, the production of household appliances and subsidized bread. According to his conservative estimates, the military's business empire make up to 20 percent of Egypt's annual economic production (Zorlu, 2016).

As argued by Sayigh (2011), "whether armies support the peaceful transition, revert to repression, or fragment will be key to their ability to maintain or develop professional, corporate identities" (p.391). The role militaries play in these times of crises is fundamentally connected to the overall buildup of the revolutions. On every step of the way, the army pulls the strings from behind, ensuring that their interests are safeguarded. These conniving stratagems can take the shape of crucial defections, at important turning points of the movements. The factor a powerful military plays can be as important as the mass mobilization of the public and bring to fore new insights into the theoretical paradigms of studying social movements and revolutions (Akder, 2013). As the elite force, which is both dreaded and connected to the other important segments of Egyptian society, the military played a very important role to identify the center of power in Egyptian politics (Sayigh, 2011).

Nassif noted that in 2011, the officer corps of the Egyptian armed forces were divided along generational lines: the mid-ranking and junior officers stood with the people, while their superiors favored the status-quo. The reluctance of the mid-ranking and junior officers to repress civilians in order to keep the Mubarak regime in power limited the military elite's power to hold onto the status-quo, despite their loyalty to Mubarak (Nassif, 2014). Since the beginning of the revolution, the army picked a sweet spot for itself as the arbiter between the regime and the people. It portrayed itself as the guarantor for stability which the people of Egypt readily accepted. As one could witness that from chants like "army and people hand to hand" and the Committee of Wise Man's efforts to negotiate with army rather than

Mubarak or his government (Durac, 2013). Hazem Kandil (2012) argues that the armed forces chose not to defend Mubarak because the police had exalted itself to that duty thus the army backed off from supporting the regime.

Another difference in the revolutions that took place in 1952 and 2011, use of communication tools. The increasing use of internet and new communication technologies played substantial role in the realization of the Egyptian revolution in 2011. As mentioned in the third chapter, the internet has been used as a common tool in the revolutionary process. In this context, social media applications such as Facebook, Twitter and Blogger, which have become common in parallel with internet technologies, have had a serious impact on the revolutionary process. Many writers have argued that the new 'internet culture' has brought about the rebel citizen among the Egyptian youth, enabling them to mobilize popular sentiment and thus attracted more and more people on the streets. The role of internet culture cannot be underestimated in the 2011 revolution (Karakır, 2012). But to say that it has solely brought the regime down is an overstatement. Communications technology did play a crucial role in the saga, but the revolution was brought by a combination of factors and not the internet culture alone.

When we look at the influence of globalization on the Arab popular movements, it is noteworthy that criticism spreading through TV is, not against to the west, but against to the Arab world. The media organs in the Arab countries provided publishing as a kind of protocol journalism media, functioning to create public opinion with herd psychology and unconditional support for what authoritarian administrations which is a very different approach once compared to Qatar-based Al-Jazeera television. The Arab peoples trapped between the protocol media and the foreign media in their countries have a different perspective with Al-Jazeera. Al-Jazeera has also been extremely effective when we considered the level of watching television as being effective on the people and in direct proportion. According to a Gallup survey in 2002, Arab peoples believe that Al-Jazeera publications are neutral, comprehensive, and courageous, and with this belief, Al-Jazeera has achieved very high rates of visibility in Arab countries (Saad, 2002). Before the

beginning of popular movements Al-Jazeera eradicated oppressive governments by showing the world to the Arab peoples through the eyes of the Arabs. Moreover, Al-Jazeera provided protesters with an important advantage by publishing public opinion against oppressive administrations to the whole world without public control. This coverage by the Al-Jazeera satellite television network played a significant role in the spread of the revolution in Egypt (Sancak, 2013).

4.2. Approach of International Actors

In order to understand the internal dynamics of the Egyptian revolution one has to closely look at the international response to the crisis it set off. As Salami and Pearson point out that "the prioritization of Middle Eastern stability over democratic transformation" in the international atmosphere powered the ability for authoritarianism to exist (Pearson & Salamey, 2012). It is common knowledge that as a warden for authoritarian regimes for decades, the West has cultivated enough strength to mobilize opposition movements and impact the domestic politics of the country. Also, to understand the western policies towards Egypt one also have to analyze how western countries allowed dictators to thrive ignoring their excesses on their own people.

The issue of foreign intervention has always been discussed in the academia. It is not a new issue for the region. One only needs to go back to the grand Eastern Question of the 19th century to see how the study of regional politics is closely linked to the study of modern imperialism (Anderson, 2001). As Halliday (2009) had argued "a recognition of the role of external powers, accurately and proportionately analyzed, can provide the basis for a more measured account of the modern international relations of the region."

One of the important determinations of the Egyptian revolutions of 1952 and 2011 concerns the intervention of foreign actors during the revolutionary process. As revolution theorists have emphasized that the revolution occurs in the sudden and spontaneous form and by the

participation of local actors which is realized in both Egyptian revolutions of 1952 and 2011. The masses triggered by the regime's pressure and many other reasons have supported the revolutionary movement.

Another dimension of the revolution process is related to the expectations of revolutionary actors from Western democracies. The ordinary Egyptians who flocked to Tahrir Square in the early days of the revolution hoped that the whole world would support them. They wished to hear from the world public the support for their peaceful demonstrations in Egypt and to have statements from western capitals to Mubarak's step down. However, these expectations have been wasted. Western democracies and actors in the Middle East were silent in the face of the demands of the revolutionary masses.

Countries such as the US and Israel, which are in close relations with Mubarak regime in Egypt, have been caught up in unprepared to this revolution and have had difficulty producing policies in the first place. This situation did not last long and there was a stage where foreign actors landed on stage. In the period following the first months of the revolution, these countries and other regional and global actors have significantly influenced the course of the revolution. These external actors, who provided logistical and political support to the actors who were not satisfied with the results of the revolution and the supporters of the old regime, completely changed the course of the revolution. In this respect, the Egyptian revolution began with the internal actors, but later on, it was a counter-revolutionary stage, deviating from its orbit by the intervention of external actors (Telci, 2017). The emergence of the revolutionary movement in a sudden and spontaneous way as well as the common use of the new instruments of the 21st century, such as Al-Jazeera, social media and communication technologies were also influential in the revolutionary process.

It should be stated that the foreign powers are involved after a while in the movement that the Egyptians started. The fact that the military supported the Mubarak opponents and that the revolution had become not purely civilian enterprise and the "silent coup" of the military

was covered reason the resignation of Mubarak and determination of the International Crisis Group in its report dated 24 February 2011 (ICG, 2011) that "the popular uprising has resulted in a military coup" are also possible claims to participate (Koçak, 2013).

The actors, such as the US and Israel, who have been influential for many years in Egyptian politics, throughout the Hosni Mubarak reign, although his oppression and human rights abuses records and the Western actors who have remained silent for many years to authoritarian regime in the country have remained in serious dilemma with this revolutionary movement. These countries, which entered the struggle to position themselves at the beginning of the revolutionary struggle, were in a position to prefer the continuation of status quo rather than to support democratic demands.

It is evident that policymakers in the West, especially the US, have always strived to protect its interest in the region and these interests have remained pretty much unchanged since the second half of the 20th century. And they are very clear - first and foremost, to ensure an uninterrupted flow of oil at a stable price; then protecting Israel by all means; preventing any threat to its interest in the region and encouraging democratic reform in a way that helps the US further entrench its hold in the region. However, it seems that ultimately no uprising/revolution for democratic demands will be allowed if it endangers the interest of the USA or its allies in the Middle East.

Both King Faruq and Hosni Mubarak have been regarded as friends by the West (England and the United States respectively), although how oppressive, cruel and degenerate they were (Byman, 2001). The main reason why the West, in particular the US, favored the choice for "stable dictatorship" rather than "democratic regime" was regimes' policies to protect the interests of the West and marginalized the independence groups from the political sphere. The West's traditional approach to the Middle East has been shaped by the fact that Arab countries cannot transform a western-style democracy and democratic cultures settlement in these countries may take hundreds of years (Indyk, 2012). However, the public support for

the overthrow of the collaborative regimes has become a question of the validity of this orientalist view of the West. However, this does not mean that the revolutions in Egypt are completely independent of the external influence, and that it is only a result of the people's claim for democracy (Koçak, 2013).

As of now the Egyptian revolution has been successfully halted by a clever counter-attack by developed western countries. The countries that are reliant on the region's energy resources even do not want to allow the Arab people to have saying in their government as it may risk their share in the region's wealth (Defronzo, 2015).

Several key variables came into play in the overall culmination of the uprisings, they include, the behavior of the ruling elites, their allegiance to the cause, the international response and last but not least, the resistance displayed by the people of these respective countries. The people during the uprisings remained peaceful despite attempts made by the government to spark violence. It was widely reported that police and thugs were doing their best to provoke the protestors. But they held their nerves. The army meanwhile called for reconciliation so did the global capitals. And at last, the United States had to choose between the Egyptian army and Mubarak. It went with the former for the sake of securing state rather than the regime.

In his book The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of the World Order (1996), Huntington offers a very incisive look into the minds of the conservative political pundits who play a pivotal role in devising American foreign policy. He categorically states, "The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization of whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power" (p.276). He argues that the war between the West and Islam is inevitable. In another of his book, Who Are We (2004), Huntington claims that America is a White Anglo Saxon Protestant country. Huntington tends to make sweeping statements without providing substantial evidence for his claims. For instance, he writes,

"When Osama bin Laden attacked America and killed several thousand people, he also did two other things. He filled the vacuum created by Gorbachev with an unmistakably dangerous new enemy, and he stressed on America's identity as a Christian nation" (Huntington, 2004, pp. 357-361). For Huntington Islam is America's foremost enemy in this century, because according to him, there is an irredeemable gap between the intrinsic American civilization, which he calls Christianity and Anglo-Protestantism and Islam. Interestingly enough, he claims that "Americans do not see Islam, its people, its religion, or its civilization as its enemy, it is the Islamic militants, both religious and secular, who consider America, as Islam's enemy" (p. 358).

Huntington (1996) predicts that "in this new world the most dangerous conflicts will not be between social classes, rich and poor, or other economically defined groups, but between peoples belonging to different cultural entities. Tribal wars and ethnic conflicts will occur within civilizations. As an example, he points out that in the Yugoslav conflicts, Russia helped armed the Serbs while Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, and Libya helped the Bosnians with funds and money. Such allegiance or loyalty was not based on any ideological basis but simply on cultural kinship. He warned that the most volatile conflicts will be along the fault lines between major civilizations." (p.28). Huntington (1993) argues that the Muslims compare the West's invasion of Iraq with its failure to protect Bosnians against Serbs and generally the West's lax attitude towards Israel, when the Jews state violates the U.N. resolutions. However, he concedes that the world is full of double standards as people tend to apply one standard to their kins and a different standard to others (Yazıcı, 2014) .

Is Huntington correct about the clash of civilizations? Mohammed Ayoob claimed that in order to understand American policy vis e vis the Middle East, the civilizational affinity between Christianity and Judaism has to be taken into account. Or else, one cannot reach comprehensive understanding of the issue. According to Ayoob, Huntington is correct in analyzing American policy toward the Middle East, when it comes to Israel. He states that one of the greatest achievements of the Jewish lobby in America has been the transformation of the idea that the US is a nation based on Christian Anglo-Saxon civilization, into one of

a common Judeo-Christian civilization. Ayoob, says that the American policies towards Israel, be it the Palestinian issue or Iran, both have been largely affected by that perceived affinity based on a claimed common civilization. He also notes that the Arabs are viewed by the majority of the American public as belonging to an alien civilization. Pointing out an interesting fact, Ayoob shows that the largest recipient of the US aid in the region Israel, manages to influence American policy in the region more than the largest arms buyer Saudi Arabia. The same set of double standards can be seen in America's policy towards Iran. While Israel is the only country in the Middle East with nuclear weapon, the US threatens Iran from making the deadly weapon, practically ignoring Israel's illegal access to nuclear (Ayoob, 2012).

The same kind of double standard was seen when the US had to take a side between Turkey and Israel. The raid on the Mavi Marmara in May 2010 is the case in point. The US went out of the way to support Israel, displaying the special relationship it enjoys with the Jewish nation. It was hardly any surprise that the US blamed Turkey for the incident while Israeli soldiers attacked and killed some Turkish people.

Richard Falk argues that the USA has a history of manipulating public opinion (Griffin, 2004), especially when it comes to issues of war and peace. Citing a series of incidents from history, Falk shows that the US has historically baffled the American public to garner support for unpopular policies. For instance, the explosion of the USS Maine to legitimize the attempt for the Spanish-American War (1898); to enter the unpopular World War II, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor; in order to extend the Vietnam war to the north, the White House choreographed the Gulf of Tonkin incident of 1964 and the most recent is bluff of weapons of mass destruction it used to invade Iraq (Yazıcı, 2014).

Falk says that scholars have not objectively investigated the official claims made by the US on historic issues like the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki or the assassination of President John F Kennedy. Falk says that the American establishment has broken the trust

of the people in a number of times and so the official account of 9/11 should also not be treated as sacred. Griffin, in his book The New Pearl Harbor, drew the comparison of the Japanese attacks with 9/11. According to him, just like the Pearl Harbor, the attacks on September 11 was orchestrated to call into action American's military might just like Pearl Harbor. The 9/11 attacks have become the basis of a worldwide war on terror led by the United States, with the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the book, Griffin stated that American foreign policy is now condemned more severely than the Vietnam adventure. He claimed that the media has failed to do its duty regarding 9/11 and the official approach of 9/11 has been used as the legitimizing the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, that resulted in the deaths of thousands of soldiers and innocent civilian people (Griffin, 2004).

In his book Griffin castigated the media for being lenient with President George Bush. He questioned as to why the media was less inquisitive about the circumstances of 9/11. He compares the complicity of the press about a real issue like 9/11 to the private life of Bill Clinton, which the media scrutinize exhaustively. The Former National Security Adviser Brzezinski, talks in detail about the U.S. plans to secure Central Asia as a way to the control Eurasia, and along these lines the development and combination of worldwide U.S. authority, unhindered by potential adversaries, like Russia and China. Brzezinski considers Russia and China as the two most imperative nations whose interests may undermine the U.S. He additionally notes that any country that may wind up dominating in Central Asia would simply control oil assets in the Persian Gulf (Brzezinski, Chessboard, 1997).

In his famous book of The Grand Chessboard, Brzezinski (1997) explains the real motivation behind military activities that were arranged before the assaults of September 11, 2001. The book makes it clear that the Bush administration was planning to invade Afghanistan well before the 9/11 terrorist attack. As expected the terrorist attack led swung public opinion in favor of war exactly the same way as the public opinion was calibrated after the sham Japanese assault on Pearl Harbor.

Following the psychological win over the American people, President Bush set the stage for the new world and announced the "War on Terror", an expression he used for the first time. He said that war on terror starts with Al Qaida, yet it doesn't end there. It won't end until the point when each and every terrorist in the world is captured and crushed (Bush, 2001). However, Brzezinski does not agree with Bush, he claims that the war on terror will not define the ideological challenge of this century. He believes, global politics will be dominated by three grand changes in the twentieth century. First is the political awakening at a global scale. Brzezinski says that for the first time in human history, the people are aware of the political happenings in their lives, and this is a dramatic shift from previous centuries. Secondly, the power shift in the world order, as the global power base shifts from the Atlantic to the Far East. And the third is the basic challenges of injustice, poverty and climate change. He predicts that American's place in the world will be decided on how the country faces these three main challenges (Brzezinski, Scowcroft, & Ignatius, 2008).

In the frame of this regional foreign policy shaped the US approach towards a revolution in Egypt. Months after rising expectations, the Arab revolution took a back seat in the international discourse and was brutally repressed in the country as the world took its eyes away from the uprising. With the help of Saudi Arabia, which was the closest country in contact with the US, Washington began to support counterrevolutionary movements and continue its support for other monarchies in the region.

The Obama administration had no qualms about the fall of the Tunisian dictator. But the case of Mubarak was different altogether. Because Egypt is the most populous Arab nation and shares borders with America's staunchest ally Israel. Historically, Egypt has cooperated with the US and Israel in pursuing American foreign policy objectives in the region. Finally, when Mubarak's fall became imminent, the US pushed the Egyptian military to conduct an election which was won by Morsi. The Saudi regime however did not like Mubarak's bowing out, as he was one of the closest allies of the Saudis in the region. Instead of supporting the rebels, as it did in Libya and Syria, Washington chose to back and remain allied with the Gulf monarchies. Once the Egyptian army overthrew the elected President Mohammad

Morsi in July 2013, the US hardly pressed Egypt's military for democratic reforms and passively let the movement get captured by the new dictatorship.

Washington assumed that this new regime emerged after uprisings along with long-standing rivals may create the resistance bloc which endangers the interest of the US in the region. The bloc might slowly gather strength with the vision to expel the United States' influence from the Middle East and cutting off the pernicious role of its allies across the region. In a sense, such bloc represents the biggest threat to U.S. interests in the region. The resistance bloc in the Middle East maybe not as powerful as Nasser once managed to build. But it has the potential to remain a constant headache for Washington in the region. So much so, that the influence of the bloc can lead the US to rethink its aggressive policies in the region and retreat into containment as it did during the Cold War against the Soviet Union. The US might strike against an establishment kind of international coalition by engagement of other nations with the rising influence of Russia and Iran. Such bloc has proved its capability to mount a resistance against American ambitions aims in the region and should not be underestimated. It has successfully defied Washington's pressure on several occasions in the past eight years. Although the overall impact of its struggle for regional hegemony can be gauged in the coming months and years, but there is little doubt that the conflicts will hurt Washington's position in the region. If the US wants to sail through the turmoil smoothly it has to remain focused, bearing in mind that its hegemonic ambitions cannot be sustained in the long run by the use of force. It has to accept the emergence of new players and devise a plan with the realization that the dynamics of Middle East has changed over the course of time. Yet the US should keep in mind that driving forces behind all turmoil and uprisings in the region particularly in Egypt was a reflection against its hegemonic struggle in the region.

Claims for international actors' influence on Egyptian Revolution through internet, social media and some international NGO's needs elaborate approach as well. It should be noted that only Egyptians with access to internet connection and an interest in activities of international NGOs were aware of the fate of anti-Mubarak web-based protest groups. When foreign NGOs landed in Egypt with the aim of training anti-regime activists, helping them

devise propaganda like they previously did in Milosevic's Serbia before 5 October 2000 or Shevardnadze's Georgia in 2003, they only welcomed only by the western educated, secular activists generation (Alexander, 2011). But there were many other anti-Mubarak factions within the uprisings, who were critical about the presence of western NGOs from day one.

The crisis that brewed between Cairo and Washington in February, 2012 over the detention of foreign activists working in Egypt without permission was grave, but it also explains the restriction of such support to even street protest's level. It was even more striking to note that Tahrir Square, the space for recurrent demonstrations, did not see any widespread protest against the detentions of American and other foreign activists. In fact, when transitional-era Minister Fayza Aboul Naga allowed the foreign activists to leave the country, there was a severe backlash against the decision, which goes onto show that the general public was not happy with the way these foreigners were let go – effectively bypassing the legal process of the post-Mubarak Egypt. (Almond, 2012)

4.3.   Leaders

One of most significant characteristics of revolution emerged in 1952 was it has dominant leaders from the very beginning. Such revolutionary comrades were belonging to military bureaucracy and intellectual groups named as modernist elites. At the same time these revolutionary comrades educated at vocational institutions which were specialized staff training for special government services. Based on the education they get from these institutions revolutionary leaders were ideologically against not only to foreign occupation and imperialism but also to superiority of families of urban wealthy merchants, feudal leaders and large landowners in their countries. Mentioned revolutionary comrades aimed at national restructuring in their societies. They believed that the most important obstacle to reaching their aim was the military and political presence of imperial powers in the region and its influence on local social culture and religious identity. Therefore, many leaders considered that westerner's power relied on their political institutions and education rather

than their economy and technology. Consequently they choose the way to imitate the west (Karpat, 2001). The ideological perspective of revolutionary comrades urged them to the restructuring of society from above under coercion.

Administrative (Hidivship) format of government began in Egypt during the time of Mohammad Ali Pasha in the early in the nineteenth century as a part of efforts to create modern state in the country. And further reforms to modernize the state were carried out when the British were at the helm from 1882 to 1923. So when Egypt won formal independence in 1923, it was no longer a traditional Muslim society, but a new country with relatively solid bureaucratic structure in place and largely Westernized legal system. The political hierarchy may have remained in place, but a legal-rational state structure had already become a reality of political life well before July 1952. So the socio-economic basis for political change existed in Egypt before the Free Officers came to power. The success enjoyed by the military regime in muscling its control and offer relative stability was made possible by a system that had been evolving politically and socially since 1820 (Vatikiotis, 1966).

More than bad governance and a lagging economy or even the repressive policies of the government, the Arab regimes had lost their credibility in the eyes of the people. The rulers that took over the country in the prime of Pan Arabism had proved to be fraudulent. Because the people could see that they had for long began treating the country as their personal property and pursue policies that not only serve foreign interests but hurts Arab dignity. When such a view develops, it naturally makes the populace edgy so when the time comes, it does not take much to provoke the barrage of rage that had been bottled up inside for decades (Eğri, 2017).

An important finding that can be made from the Egyptian revolution in 2011 is that from its emergence to progressing no class structure dominated on the contrary many different social groups have acted simultaneously, especially in the emergence of the revolution. In other

words, the Egyptian revolution was based on not any particular class such as the workers, farmers, bourgeois or aristocracy, but in the different form than the traditionalist revolutionary approach, but in the movement of many different classes, as experienced in some social upheavals in the 21st century.

The Egyptian revolution was certainly bloodless. It was purely a domestic movement that began with a natural wave of protests and reached its crescendo with the fall of Mubarak. The progress of the movement had proved Lenin's theory of revolution wrong. Because the Russian leader had argued that for a revolution to be successful, there has to be a structured political party, a powerful leadership and a vivid objective that would define its course. But like the Tunisian movement, the Egyptian revolution had none of that. It was neither well organized, nor did it had any leader at the helm. And the agenda of the movement was also not clearly defined (Shokr, 2012).

Perhaps the most notable aspect of the Egyptian movement was its lack of structure and identifiable leadership. Since the beginning of the protests, especially in Cairo, the movement was not led by any political faction. In fact, it was a loosely connected network of faceless groups that organized the protests using ad hoc communication methods. The lack of any specific agenda can be explained by the fact that the people came out on the street of sheer exhaustion rather with any clear-cut plans for the future. The exhaustion was borne out of a sense of hopelessness that accumulated over the decades living under an oppressive regime that was corrupt and mostly defunct. The nation found a collective purpose in fighting the status quo without any clear vision as to what lies ahead. During the course of the protest, the events of circumstantially began to favor the opposition. The internet and, even more so, Al-Jazeera became the preferred channel of communication and, in some cases, mobilization (ICG, 2011). As protest leader commented: "No wonder the regime took Al-Jazeera off the air. It was the most important tool we had". The organizers, she said, were coordinating with the Al-Jazeera, giving them to time venue of every protest than it gets broadcasted. But in hindsight it seems that the protestors went with the flow of

events rather than pursuing a thought course of action. However the protestors aggressively against the regime, never allowing the state a clear rival to take down (Kirkpatrick, 2011).

This was a lesson learned from decades of state oppression. As one protest leader with a long experience of anti-regime activism said, "If the snake has a head it can be cut off" (ICG, 2011, p. 19). There were no particular leaders to be prisoned or centers that could be shuttered. As registered NGOs are subject to restrictions according to the law[6] which executes criminal penalties on "engaging in political or union activities", the form of the uprising that spread in January 2011 was decentralized, both in its start and development.

The question of movement's leadership arose several times but was never properly addressed. It especially came up when the regime wanted to negotiate its way out of the crisis on February 6. But the attempts failed as there seemed to have been no agreement on the issue of representation. A committee of "Wise Men" was set up to negotiate with the regime but soon it became apparent that they don't have the full mandate of the protestors. It was not only that the people did not accept the committee, those at the helm were also divided on the finer details of the negotiation. the movement had set out its own agenda and many simply rejected the idea of representation (ICG, 2011) .

Therefore, it is clear that popular movements in 2011 were unlike 1950s leader oriented uprisings, dominated by masses that came together through new technological tools like Twitter and Facebook. So 2011 popular movements could be described as leaderless movements. This situation brings advantages and disadvantages at the same time. It is negative side is leaderless masses could reach result in a long time and there most likely be direction problems. The positive side is everyone participated this popular movement can

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[6] More detailed information about restrictions on NGO in Egypt; "Egypt: Margins of Repression: State Limits on Nongovernmental Organization Activism", Human Rights Watch, 3 July 2005.
https://www.hrw.org/report/2005/07/03/egypt-margins-repression/state-limits-nongovernmental-organization-activism

openly share his/her ideas. Society will have the opportunity not to come together in the one-man side.

It was the sheer number of the protestors on the street and their resilience that transformed the uprising into a movement which finally led to the revolution. The protestors organized themselves in massive numbers and marched together for weeks to make it a success. They banded to compose songs and slogans and kept their hopes high and remained adamant. All these ad hoc efforts came together to make the revolution possible. To categorize the protestors is also hard because they don't neatly fall into any specific group. As Tilly also points out at various times, same people represent themselves as workers, residents, women, citizens, partisans and members of other categories that distinguish them from other parts of the population (Tilly, Conclusion, 1999).

The relationship between the young protesters and the more traditional political parties who opposed the regime was tenuous at best. It was not clear if there was any connection between the two. Once the battle on the street was won by the young protestors, the more organized political parties swiftly stepped in to fill the leadership void. Parties like Muslim Brotherhood and others came into the view and tried to muscle out the unorganized groups.

Arguably, the most distinctive feature that differentiates the revolution of 2011 from 1952 was lack of an identifiable leadership. And that proved to be a major setback for the movement in 2011. Because the protestors failed to create a united front, which is called "cooperative differentiation" in the social movements literature, that defined as, "maintaining a public face of solidarity towards targets of movement" (Futuh, 2012). Such a front makes it possible for diverse groups with different leanings and class interests to come together for a common purpose. So in 2011, the absence of leadership was palpable. Because the opposition parties were not prepared to replace the regime in a short time. They simply did not have the organizational capacity to do that (El-Bishry, 2011), or as Ghobashy further underlines, none of the groups in the fray came close to dedicate their terms, so the

post revolution stalemate persisted throughout (El-Ghobashy, 2012). The claims that the 2011 Egyptian revolution was "leaderless" at all has been controversial matter in some cases. So a better way to put it would be to say that the revolution had several leaders, with conflicting opinions on all the major issues in hand.

The Arab Uprising can be summed up as a set of three battles coming together as one: people against regimes; people against people; and regimes against other regimes. The first one comprised of a conflict between the regime and the spontaneous protesters. Because the demonstrators were only political in the broadest sense of the word. They were riled up by the innocent emotion of being exhausted of living under a repressive system. Most of them did not have a clear picture of the future but were united by the common desire in what they did not want. A situation like this becomes very difficult for the regime to tackle. Because if the regime employs force then it only bolsters the view that the state is repressive and if the state wants to negotiate - offers favor or buy allegiance - there has to be a leadership to cox them at the first place. In this case both the possible tactics were not unworkable.

The revolutionary demonstrators refuse to back down and eventually, find success in bringing down the regime. The socio-economic instability that began with the protests continued after the fall of the regime. The general public soon became worried about their safety as anarchy reigned on the streets. The young demonstrators challenged the status quo and brought a revolutionary with a spirited effort, making the redistribution of power possible. But their raw passion for change could not replace the lack of organization and political acumen. In fact, their strength on the street became toxic after the revolution. The same jest eventually led to their undoing. Although they were at the forefront of the battle, their faces became the face of the revolution. But once the regime fell, the real action was taking place somewhere else. Therefore, the ultimate result of the fight which the young protestors won was not determined by them. The protestors were a welcome sign of change, but they could not dictate the end because society in times of utter crisis fall back on the available structure. The Egyptian society is made up of traditional communities often

organized along tribal and kinship, where religion plays a central role and foreign invasion is a constant (Brown, Egypt's Failed Transition, 2013).

The question of guardianship remained a contentious issue after the fall of the regime. Who gets to call the shots after Mubarak exited? The uprising was massive so there seem to have been no single group that can lay claim to the revolution. It was without doubt one of the most successful movements in the history of the country. The protests were insistent so who could be declared as the rightful organizer of the movement? Only they deserved to be up to the saddle. On January 27, the Muslim Brotherhood publicly announced their support for the protests and asked their members to join the demonstrations after the Friday prayers. Up to that point it was obvious that the protests were against the economic hardships, police brutality and the urge to win greater political freedom (Mekhennet & Kulish, 2011). There was no religious angle to the protests. Therefore, it appealed to people from every walk of life; liberal, religious, secular and Coptic Egyptians who were Christians participated the uprisings. The support of the Brotherhood certainly boosted the numbers as it is one of the largest political organizations in the country with a loyal and disciplined following. So, after the endorsement, its followers joined the protest in large numbers (Naguib, 2011).

Muslim Brotherhood was the largest single political entity everywhere in the country and arguably the best organized. It is also the most seasoned group, that endured some the of worst political oppression in the country. They learned their lessons well, because the life of oppression taught them the art of survival in bad times. The patience was their most important asset and strategy. They also had a program that was unsullied because it was untested as they were ceased power in Egypt. Their religious rhetoric also resonated well with most parts of the population in the conservation nation. So Brotherhood message touched a chord and the people responded (Durac, 2013).

However Muslim Brotherhood also knew that they inspire dread in the western capitals and among the Westernized elite in the country. Since they had witnessed the hatred and even

paid a heavy price for that in the past. In the early 1990s, when the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front was on its way to a resounding electoral triumph, the army intervened. The world stood aside as mere spectators. A civil war and tens of thousands of casualties later, Algeria's Islamic movement is still recovering from the afflictions of that era. In 2006, when Hamas won the parliamentary elections, Palestine was ostracized by the world and Hamas was prevented from governing a mandate they rightfully won (Agha & Malley, 2011).

Since coming to power in mid-2012, the Brotherhood was the strongest force in the parliament. And Morsi was the democratically elected president of Egypt. Brotherhood engaged in delicate balancing policy; maintain continuity in a possible way to secure international approval and protect their coalition while initiating change to realize the promises they gave to Revolutionary Egypt. The outcome was as it has emerged; reluctant (Shokr, 2012). However, Brotherhood never got a chance to exercise its mandate. As Morsi won the polls, the parliament was declared unconstitutional. Brown (2013) observes that the SSC's rule terming the elections unconstitutional was a ploy used by the erstwhile structure to hold legitimacy and sustain its political power.

Other factors that contributed to the continuation of authoritarianism in Egypt was the sly politicking of the deep state. The Muslim Brotherhood's short-lived governance combined with the military 's quest for taking over the central executive miserably failed the people's aspiration for a democratic Egypt. When the Brotherhood failed to take an inclusive route, the old guards of the state successfully polarized the movement, poisoning the debate with sectarian passions (Nassif, 2014).

4.4.   Changes in Ideologies

Well before the days of 24/7 television and social media, in the 1950s a young army man captured the imagination of millions of Arabs injecting in them the pride of the nation and boosting their hopes for the future. He aroused the same passion one saw in 2011. That was in 1952 and the man was none other than Jamal Abdul Nasir. Championing freedom and the message of modernity, he took over as the ruler of Egypt. The wave of excitement that swept through Egypt is during Nasser's era is an important precedent but more than that it was a cautionary tale. Nasir's rule was more of an experiment with various waves of thought prevalent in Egypt back in the days. During his time, a blend of secular Arab nationalism competed with western liberalism and different variants of Marxism in the country. Soon the Marxism were pushed to the margins and suppressed before they could have an impact on the society. They were accused of being foreign agents and crushed. Nasser also flirted with the Islamic movements. But soon concluded that they are threat to his power. So they were hounded and eliminated and the groups were forced to go underground amid state pressure (Agha & Malley, 2011).

So what basically proved lasting was a loose coalition of the army and different secular nationalist movements. At the end result was a repressive authoritarian that claimed to hold the ideology of modernism, Pan-Arabism, and abused the cliché of socialism to the core. The country was run by repressive security practices like the much dreaded Mukhabarat; a culture of squashing dissent and favoring pro-state social groups like merchants, peasants, industrialists, and state officials became the order of the day. Politics meant to be done by a tiny clique of rulers. For the rest it became a criminal activity.

The experiment failed terribly. As happens with security oriented states, wealth was collected in the hands of the few and corruption rampant. People who welcomed the new regime with great excitement, especially those from the rural working class sections of the society never felt included in the system. The promises made were never kept and the hopes

were brutally dashed. The new regime had promised actual independence but on the international or regional policies, the Arabs seemed silent. On critical issues like Palestine, Sudan or Iraq the rulers issued lofty statements but never delivered on the ground. The government's words were taken without gravity. And as the millennium approached, the Arab world continued to live under that constant culture of fear and broken promises (Podeh & Winckler, 2004).

The consequence of pro-Arab Nationalist ideology, revolutionary groups were way more sensitive towards the Palestinian issue and was more anti-Israel in attitude. So their motto at that time was more "Arab Culture", "Arab Soil", "Arab Interest", "Arab Geography" and "Arab Nationalism" rather than their own countries. This approach was a far more inclusive as the Arabs faced similar problems they thought that they would deal with them as a nation and not separate countries.

The myth around Nasser's persona was way more exaggerated than his actual achievements. His only discernable success was the building of a coalition against imperialism. He managed to do that by manipulating forces in other Arab countries that were operating independently. Nasser realized early that tearing down a government structure was way easier than building one from the scratch. His grand idea of pan Arabism fell flat soon after the imperialist forces left the country. Even Syria, a country he directly controlled soon became disenchanted under his dominion. Within four years of the UAR, Syria denounced Nasser and decided to opt out of the agreement. For the next decade, the Arab world reeled under an unstable and chaotic politics never witnessed in its modern history. Nasser's revolution promised unity. But it only brought division and angst among Arab nations.

Looking for political legitimacy neither in class relations nor in open parliamentary functioning, Nasser chose an over-class "solidarity-nationalist" rhetoric and appropriate economic practices in certain periods of late modernizing nations. Nasser quickly became the "savior of the Arabs" because of his "solidarity-nationalist" discourse. Although the

content cannot be clarified, Nasser's power is called "populism" or "Bonapartism" (Ansiklopedi, 1988, p. 1302). It is needed to translate these headings into the meaning of the content of political regimes called "populism" here:

- o *"Socialism emerged in the underdeveloped countries faced with the problems of modernization.*
- o *The ideology of rural people threatened by emerging industry and finance capital.*
- o *It is a rural movement seeking to achieve traditional values in a changing society.*
- o *It is the belief that the ideas of the majority are controlled by a minority.*
- o *Populism admits that popular will is superior on its own to any other standard values.*
- o *It is a political movement that has won the support of the self-employed workers and the peasantry, but not as a result of the autonomous organizational power of these two sectors."* (Allcock, 1971)

In the search for the legitimacy of the Nasser regime, it seems that the reforms towards peasants are effective. It can be said that the Nasser regime, which calls for a wide range of societies including the peasants and the urban middle classes, seeks out sources of legitimacy outside of Egypt with the emphasis of "Arab Unity" and "One Arab Nation". "United Arab Republic" is the most popular of the regime's symbolic projects, although it does not find concrete counterparts other than a brief "unification" with Syria (1958-1961) (Güler, 2011).

In the socio-economic arena, the Nasser's ideas had an overwhelming effect. His policies lend tremendous power to the State. And among his priorities as the creation of a socialist and democratic structure with a massive industrial economy represented as a justification of these implementations. Nasser's slogans of securing social justice and democratic political system that found its echoes in latest Egypt's uprisings (Vatikiotis, 1966).

So 1952 revolution's ideology can be identified as nationalist, modernist and progressive. This approach was new to the Middle East political and social field. In political means, the transition from kingdom to republic and banishment of old guards of former administration from the government were most important steps to realize modernism according to their belief. But after a short while these revolutionary comrades become governor elite group and nationalist, modernist and progressive ideology turn to a tool to secure and legitimize their administration. Revolutionary group and their supporter bureaucratic elites moved away from society that they govern, as they lose nationalist impulsion of beginning. Nationalist, modernist and progressive ideology was initially very useful to get the support of masses, but by the time they lose its effects as it did not respond economic, political, cultural and social expectations of masses. Moreover the ideology of revolutionary group clashed with the conventional culture of masses by time and consequently, these group moved away from society day by day (Karpat, 2001).

Revolutions take place in this era has characteristics of its time like all eras. Revolutions of this era were based on nationalism.[7] In other words it takes legitimacy and power from Arab Nationalism. Therefore, Arab nations easily backed revolutions like in the example of Nasser. Another characteristic of those revolutionary groups was their obvious opposition against the West. So that, Revolutionary groups struggled against not only the Western powers to gain independence of their countries but also against collaborator of the western powers inside ruling elites and monarchs.

But in 2011, the ideological lines were not clearly drawn. The 2011 movement did not present itself as a socialist, liberal or Islamic, but rather as uprisings against a rotten system and it duly gained support for that. There was no elite leadership at the forefront; they were supported far more by social networks with flat hierarchies. Instead of charismatic leaders,

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[7] For more information about Arab Nationalism: Adid Davişa (2004). Arap Milliyetçiliği: Zaferden Umutsuzluğa, çev. Lütfi Yalçın, İstanbul, Literatür Yay.

the movement produced "heroes" such as the blogger Khalid Said, who was beaten to death by Egyptian police in summer 2010, exemplifying the brutal image of the repressive state (Rosiny, 2012).

The Arab Uprising bucks the trend of major revolutions of last two centuries in one very peculiar way. Political upheavals that gripped countries like Vietnam, Russia, China or Mexico and tripped their respective governments were led by highly charged political parties with well laid out objectives. But in the case of Arab Spring, it is very evident that those with the revolutionary motivation were first of all not organized well. But the particular way it differed from the rest stemmed from the fact that they did not have any clear political plan to implement after the regime's fall. Although, there is no doubt that the revolutionaries wanted Mubarak to go but their collective wish ended just there. Nobody really thought of the logical step that will have to be followed next. Such incoherent political approach that we saw in Egypt has its merits and demerits but they still unfolded and largely unexplored in the academia (Levine, 2013).

The old ways of defining groups in categories like "leftists", "secular" or "religious" only distort the real picture. Because these groups are not easily identifiable. Not only groups, even leadership can behave differently at different times, given the political expediency at hand. One can find the best example in the role of political elites in the independence and first "revolutionary" generations (e.g., Sa'd Zaghlul, Nasser, Abd El Qassem, or Hafez al-Assad) compared with the 'leaderless' revolutions of 2011. Therefore, we can only explain political subjectivity as the manner in which people recognize themselves in relation to one or more political contexts. It is often considered more accurate to use the word "identity" as Paul Amar explains, "identity" is easier to compartmentalized, "forcing people into (precisely) the kind of boxes". The term aptly explains the subjective and somewhat fluid relationship among citizens, those who chose to come out of their shell and stand together with his/her fellow compatriots. Such political subjectivities actually exist at the very point where personal identities and political conflict and/or collaboration come together (Levine, 2013).

Equally, the absence of a clear political agenda actually brought protestors with various political leanings together. They were united in what they do not want as opposed to what they want. Their main objective was the demise of Mubarak's regime and that's where their interests met and ended. Such a situation actually left a roster of crucial questions unanswered. However, on the issue of the demise of the regime, they remained united. The ambiguity proved to be a strength that helped the movement spread. Western writers were obsessed about the potential "contagion" effect across national borders, but a far more crucial process began taking place within Egypt, between people from various socioeconomic backgrounds and different shades of opinion (ICG, 2011).

One of the oldest tricks employed by dictatorial regimes when faced by the opposition is to divide and defame them. It is now clear that the 2011 movement had to clear agenda when it began. It was neither Islamic nor secular. In fact, one cannot categorize the movement under any set objective apart from the fact that its only aim was to dethrone Mubarak. But the regime deliberately began calling it a conspiracy hatched by Muslim Brotherhood, just to spread panic among powerful western nations. In the process, they sullied an organically spreading movement into something sinister (at least for the west). However, the regime failed to produce any evidence that Brotherhood was behind the uprising.

Unlike 1952, movements in 2011 emerged without certain ideological agenda. Unsatisfied social groups, which differ in each country, (youth organizations, liberals, leftists, ignored minority and religious groups) participated in the popular movements. Only one idea, all these different groups came together was to change dictators who were possessing administration for decades. In this context, dominant groups came together not on the basis of ideology but on the basis of democratization of current administrations.

2011 popular movements had differences with 1952 in their characteristics as well. In 1952 Nasser revolution had modernist/progressive/secular and nationalist characteristics but

meantime 2011 Arab popular movement had references such as democracy/pluralism/human rights/participant democracy which are commonly estimated that originated from the west. At the same time these popular movements highlighted local/conventional values. Depending on this Islamic movement which suppressed over decades get the opportunity to conspicuous figures of political and social life. Once world revolutions history considered, Arab Spring is a movement which adverse secularism progress, like Iran Islam Revolution in 1979.

Unlike 1952 revolution/leaders which created one elite group based on one ideology, 2011 popular movements are supporting the emergence of pluralist ideas and new administrative elites with more obvious Islamic identity. According to dominant groups' manifestations in 2011 popular movements, they are against foreign/western interventions for change in their countries but they are in favor of western type economic, social and political systems.

Although the Pan-Arab fervor of Nasser's time and the political unrest of 2011 are similar, there are at least two obvious differences. first, the dominant ideology of Nasser's revolution, Pan-Arabism, focused on external threats: gaining independence from imperialism and confronting Israel. In contrast, 2011's revolutionary wave is driven by domestic demands: for jobs and political representation. Second, the political upheaval of the 1950s had a leader, Nasser, who guided -or appeared to guide- events, whereas today's unrest has so far been an exercise in synchronized anarchy.

The crucial undercurrents of the revolutions were pretty similar. People hardly disagreed on some of the premises that were prevalent. For instance, that a very small elite has risen over the decades which is now a corrupt clique sucking on the resources of the country. In the 1950s, the popular belief was that those ruling Egypt were basically serving the interests of foreign powers - an extension of imperialism. But in 2011, the problem rose out from within the country.

But the rentier nature of the state, it is often argued with strong empirical studies, is a strong factor in the reluctance for democratization as these states have access to significant natural sources. One can argue that the rentier nature of the state often plays a part in determining the nature of its political outlook. As a country with limited resources, Egypt relies heavily on Strategic Rents (i.e. foreign aids, first from the USSR and later from the US). Also from the remittances sent from expats working in rich Arab countries. Therefore its reliance on such "rents" can be a factor in the determination of the political path it adopts (Sadık, 2011).

As discussed in details fallowing table will try to show main similarities and difference of both revolutionary period;

Table 1: Similarities and Differences of 1952 and 2011

	Similarities	Differences
Socio-economic	* Bad Governance * Common Corruption * Foreign Domination * Extreme Poverty * Privatization Processes	* More educated people * Corrupt election system * Emergence Law
International Actors	* USA / Russia * Imperialist motivations	* New emerging regional actors (Turkey, Qatar, UAE, Saudi) * Timing of foreign intervention to revolutionary processes
Leaders/Groups	* Muslim Brotherhood	* More concentrated elite group in 1952

		* Leaderless masses in 2011
		* Use of media
Ideologies	* Social legitimacy *Need for change	* In 1952, direct references of nationalism & socialism * In 2011, no ideological references

CONCLUSION

The anti-regime civil uprisings experienced in Egypt has been, perhaps the most important one among Arab countries after it started in Tunisia. As explained in the third chapter, the reasons that appear to be lying behind the revolution initiated by youth on 25th January and which gathered all the anti-regime opponents as a single body against Mubarak. Driving sources for such attempts were in general; the state of emergency that has been in implementation in the country since 1950s, the country's transformation into a police-state, uncovered and excessive corruption of the circles/people close to the government, cropping up of poverty and unemployment in the country, destitution of natural necessities of shelter and nutrition, handicaps in the freedom of thought and expression, civilian movements being subjected to violent repression, being silent against the Israel-centered problems in the Middle-East in the wake of the interests of the USA.

The cause of larger civil uprisings is often not the triggering event itself; rather the inability of the masses, who have come to a disadvantageous position due to the politics followed by the administration, to see a future for themselves within the institutions and rules (ICG, Tunisia's Way, 2011). When we look at the uprisings against the country's administration, similar reasons can be seen in the two periods (1952 and 2011) in Egypt. The distress of the people for the practices of the government like oppression and corruption will be seen as the reason for these events. The policies of administration for years are also among the main reasons for worse socio-economic conditions of these countries (ICG, Popular Protest, 2011). In spite of showing progress in the field of economic development, Egypt has failed to create jobs for the young population and to ensure any crucial improvement in the lives of most of its people (ICG, 2011). Demands of the young people after overlapping with wider masses' demands have procured supporters in huge numbers and have come to the point of being able to threaten the administration (Gün & Koçak, 2012).

Political elements along with the socio-economic elements have played a very important role in the periods of 1952 and 2011. In both the periods, even if the economic reasons are prominent generally, political unrests, which are, at least, as important as economic reasons, have been overlooked sometimes. Youth unemployment, corruption, the decline in living standards, economic crises have been experienced intensively in both the periods. Despite all of the above mentioned, to say that the uprisings are essentially originating from the economy is misleading. Even if separating political reasons from socio-economic reasons is very difficult, it can be said that the political factors (even if there is no democracy, at least "honor" and "freedom") are more overpowering (Dalacoura, 2011). This demand while being against the colonial powers in 1952, it has been against the oppressive administration of the country in 2011. In both periods, the most salient feature is them appearing as the puppets of the West due to the foreign policy of the administrations.

In spite of the fact that the reasons lying behind the uprisings seem so similar to each other, the different profiles of the groups dominating these movements is an important reality. In 1952 a secular, progressive, supporter of the West and a more concentrated/undiluted military group had set wheels in motion. When it comes to 2011 people who started the protests in the beginning can roughly be identified as leaderless: ones who were calling people for an uprising against the oppressive regime for more freedom using social media like Twitter and Facebook and the youth groups who did not have certain leaders. That's the reason it ensured approval and active support of people in huge numbers. Especially in 2011 the violence used by the government to the protestors had not only failed to curb the protests but also prompted people to protest more and escalated the tension (Rosiny, 2012).

Once 1952 era considered, some Egyptians today say that Nasser's rule with anything but authoritarian in nature. As a political system, Nasserism signified the rule of a centralized party, a protector of the revolution, free from the limitations of the multiparty system. However, few will disagree that Nasserism had transformed the Egyptian society. It uprooted the old landed class and the foreign community that was sitting on Egypt's resources. The

system also redistributed the wealth of the nation and extended educational opportunities to all Egyptians. Nasserism also managed to eradicate the rigid class structure that separated landlords from peasant, expedited a transition to industrialism, and gave Egypt sovereignty over its wealth. Ideas of the past like Pan-Arabism, anti-imperialism and nonalignment transformed the way Egyptians looked at themselves and their neighbors. Egypt under Nasser became the leader of the Arab world, a pioneer for salvation from colonialism and monarchy administrations (Gordon, 1992).

Nasser's administration achieved some historical developments. With tight planning and price control, for a few years, the sustained economic growth, generated increasing in total income and income per capita, coupled with poverty reducing policies in 1952–70, did have lasting impact. However, measures taken for social justice reforms were actually implemented for redistributing the income and property rights in favor of poorer groups. Despite some uneven development results of huge nationalization, the model of development established during the Nasser administration has brought achievements, during the 1990s, in terms of investment on human capital. Life expectancy had risen continually, reaching 65 in 1999, that was, 41 in 1952 (El-Ghonemy, 2004).

However, as a general rule, political freedom comes before the process of democratization begin. Because that freedom leads to openness in public spaces and helps swell participation (Moore, 1994). Anyhow it does not mean that freedoms always lead to democratization. Especially in the case of Arab countries, there seem to be an exception. Because in the Arab countries, we see that these concepts are used as a mere tool by the governing elite to solidify their position in power. Arab rulers often employ populist sentiments like socialism and political freedom to entice the population but they never let these ideas take root in the society. (Zambelis, 2005). Abandonment of liberalization processes first initiated in Egypt during early 1970s had led to a reverse process that is to deliberalization. Even more oppression politics are used to silencing popular demands for more freedoms and political participation.

When it comes to 2011, it is clear that the revolution was also not able to reach its goals as well. Many factors were mentioned in previous chapters that how the process led to this result. However, the one which comes in the forefront is the approach of international players. Some of the Arab countries' regimes remained silent in the coup against the revolution and even gave their support by providing financial assistance that can be explained as their fear about being subjected to similar uprisings in their countries in the future. The Western countries that apparently gave support to the revolt of the people in the process called "Arab Uprising" and supported the overthrow of dictators, remained silent over the coup against the revolution. The general conviction is that Western countries are concerned that they would follow policies that contradict the interests of Islamic movements. The steps taken by the Western states in the name of democratization in the region are actually turning them into a process with interventions as a continuation of the post-industrialization period. This process is a continuation of the colonization of the Middle East by the West (Fromkin, 1989).

Since Egypt is the most populous country in the region, ideas that develop and take root in that society would eventually proliferate to other countries. And the opposite is also true. As the Arab Uprising fails to bring any discernable change in Egypt then the whole region will remain deprived of the fruits of this potential moment (Traub, 2011). So the Muslim Brotherhood had an enormous challenge in their hand. It was one of the best organized opposition parties in the country that endured the worst oppression, but then they became at the helm. The flipside of their being in opposition was that they never got to govern. They had no experience of running the government. Their knowledge about economics was rudimentary. And they had to fill shoes that were too big for them, as expectations were mounting in post-revolutionary era (Agha & Malley, 2011). When compared, the Tunisian example was relatively successful where authoritarianism failed, because the process of political transition remained within the inclusive processes of the constitution making. In Egypt, however, there was a marked decrease in the number of voter turnouts in the elections. This situation was closing to demanded democratization transformation in Egypt (Durac, 2013).

When taken up within the scope of revolution theories; it would be the point to determine these basic evaluations regarding the 2011 Egypt Revolution:

1) It took place in relatively weaker country in the sense of revolutionary expectation;

2) The use of new telecommunications and the social interaction tools as the main instrument of the revolutionary period;

3) The fact that the masses which made the revolution possible consisted of people not only from a certain class but had actors from all the sections of the society;

4) The shaping of the beginning in an independent style without any interference from the outside actors;

5) In the course of events, being a stage for a period of time where global and regional actors were directly involved in the process (Rosiny, 2012).

But it is important to note that developments that have emerged will not be fully understood through the social revolution theories. Because at the base of modern sociology lies the historical and social changes of the Western societies. According to Marx, the most important theoretician in this regard, the distinguishing features of societies which are dependent on the property relationships of the society which talk about the existence of classes as an outcome of the property relationships. This dialectic between the classes takes a conflicting approach and this also allows progress. In this way transition to a new social order can be discussed. As there has not been such a class separation in the Middle-East, Marx saw this history as one-society model and presented it to us as the reflection of a despotic discourse. Marx's approach is not related to the structure of the government rather it is related to the portrayal of the Eastern world by West's Orientalism. Identifying the economic aspects of the problems that lead to the revolutions based solely on class struggle and making the concept analysis according to these determinations is no longer valid for today's conditions.

As discussed the relationship between social movements and revolution is always worth investigating. Placing economic societies at the root of all social practices is to universalize the economic model of production developed by Marx and the social model of the West, and to position it on a historical scale (Sunar, 2012). However, when we look at the revolutions that took place in western history, it is seen that especially the religious elements are influential at a very high level with the economy. Revolution is explained as upsetting of order by violent means and establishing order with a new leaders whereas social movements mean that a considerable number of people make an organized effort to change one of the main characteristics of society (Marshall, 2005; Biesanz & Biesanz, 1973).

Anyhow movements in the Middle East can be explained in this context as revolutions. Because there is a social organization present in this popular movement, and the social structure is not totally shaped by capitalist practices and relations. These uprisings were not done to change a certain characteristic in society like protest. On the contrary, it was changing the political power by the use of force. This kind of change of political power in the Middle East means that there will be changes in cultural and economic sense as well. Perhaps these movements can be explained in a different way than in the Western literature, because as Turner state that claim of "right to political resistance belongs to the Western revolutionary tradition" is no longer valid, especially in a postmodern period (Turner, 1984, p. 125). The concept of revolution described in the Western literature can be redefined as the revolution of the silent masses in the Arab Uprising. In a speech Khomeini made to a group of outer suburb settlements in southern Tehran, he says: "All the significance of Islamic Revolution, owe it to the efforts of this class." (Bayat, 2008, p. 69). The revolution that took place in Iran is the Islamic Revolution as a result, but Islam is a propelling force in popular movements of all Middle Eastern countries. So one of the most dominant groups were belonged to Islamic movements. The Islamic movement reflected silent screams of masses who have been exploited by the regime for many years. And so, this silent screams has become a revolutionary structure in the Arab Uprisings (Palabıyık, 2016).

The distinction clearly revealed in the work of Trimberger, who has grouped the revolutionary works, comes out to be an important difference between the two periods in Egypt. As the 1952 uprising can be defined as "revolution from above," and the uprising of 2011 as "revolution from bottom-up." The Revolution of 2011 also challenged researchers and experts in another way. The changing ways of mass mobilizations and social movements began mostly from the below in the social ladder. So it was in a way a new phenomenon. In the Arab world, where such uprisings are frequent but such a massive mobilization is unprecedented and the success in achieving immediate demands were very rare. The characteristics of the new social movements and the level of continuity and change between the past mass mobilizations deserve more research and fresh conceptualizations (Beinin & Vairel, Social Movements, 2011). In fact, to explain some of the concepts, several new terms had been coined.

For the sake of understanding the phenomena, it can be argued that, with Smith's (1974) conceptualization, the 2011 Egyptian Revolution present a "linear and vectorial transformation" that underlined a chaotic structural change. It was a structural change in a kind that the revolution changed the processes and operational characteristics of the social structure of Egyptian society, that was identified as consist of social entities (sets of units) and social processes (sets of relations). However, once the erupted political crisis and societal tension that occurred before and after the military coup on July 3, 2013, this structural change, which was concurrently a cause and a results of the Revolution, had not been institutionalized yet. The nature of the relations and participation processes between the state and society have been changed; but, as clarified by Bailey (2001) "for post-revolutionary situations individuals and societies need time for the new system to be institutionalized." (Bal, 2014).

Nevertheless there is now a rising tide of criticisms from the academician and experts of the region, who say that the prevalent discourse on social movement theory hindered their capacity to predict and comprehend the rising protest in the Middle East (Tadros, Arab

uprising, 2011). The core of the argument is that the paradigm rested on theoretical constructs that were not relevant or were outdated in the Middle East politics.

The success of a future uprising would depend on some of the key aspects of the Egyptian revolution that failed to achieve its desired objective in 2011. First, various groups (liberals, leftist and religious groups) which may have different political goals, should create common platform to gain enough strength to overthrow the dictators. They should have the ability to act as together to rebuilt the country after overthrowing the authoritarian regime. If these various groups keep fighting each other instead of collaborating against guards of the old regime, such uprisings will be squashed again, as experienced. They must learn the lesson that solidarity in their ranks is essential for strength. Or else those in power will brush them away as they managed in 2013. Because the old guards of the regime often seek to find weaknesses in the ranks of the opposition and try to use it to disintegrate a united voice.

Secondly, revolutionary governments could fail because of political, social, economic crisis that mounted for a long time in the region. Expectations of people usually remain high and patience run out because people set off such political movement with huge sacrifices and endure much suffering. So the time required to move from the old to the new system makes them frustrated opening a window of opportunity for the old guards to invest on that period for their own interest. So a slight mistake by the new government can lead to the loss of faith. No matter how much a new set up try to quell such frustrations, a minor foible offers a huge benefit to the old guards. And people lose their trust in a short time. Thus may lead counter-revolution of old guards to secure authoritarian regime. As it has seen very clearly in Egyptian case.

The third obstacle stems from the revolution's lack of institutional relations with the other parts of the world. Such institutional politic and economic relations may lead countries to transform. Anyhow this kind of relations especially with western power may lead to reverse effect for demanded transformation. As experienced in the history western countries'

imperialist background affects their approaches in the region and they always prioritize their selfish interests. So they have different approaches in each country of the Middle East. Thus these countries generally back the groups which may maximize their interest. So rival external forces of the Middle East are another challenge for new governments.

Another problem that arises in the post-revolutionary period is the lack of a functional economic system which includes all classes of the people in the Arab Middle East. The absence of a thriving middle class is a huge obstacle because they are the segment that turns popular movements into real revolution and deepens it. Thus new governing elites should pay their effort to create a new middle class on which they can be based.

To secure the revolutions successfully, the Arab world has to transform its society. Keeping a holistic approach, the Arabs have to rethink their lives and introduce education back to their communities. The state of education in the region is insufficient to fulfill its needs. Thus the education infrastructure should be improved. With the help of education, the Arab world then have to learn tolerance. They have to begin by respecting cultural differences. In order to secure cultural satisfaction steps should be taken for respecting languages, historical memories, and also developing ways to integrate ethnic groups. One of the worst impacts of globalization in the Arab world is the myopic view of "other" it has helped develop creating ethnic and sectarian fissures. So an inclusive culture policy has to proactively pursue. In short, the cultural liberation would be the harbinger for an actual socio-economic liberation of the region (Yazıcı, 2014).

Culture also refers to the holistic memory of the nation. It's the overall understanding of people's identity which naturally comes into the equation as to how they perceive the challenges of today. The Arab world needs a constructive awakening of creativity and a new burst of imagination to resolve their regional and global problems. Ramadan (2009) argues that the Arabs need to explore themselves in order bring that awakening. They have to strive for the intellectual and cultural liberation. To fulfill this task, they have to work hard on

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developing a fired up imagination. And that is only possible if they allow themselves to excel in the fields of arts, literature and science. The most important issue for Arabs is that the Arab world is in an intellectual crisis. The minds of the people are in shackles. So a true Arab spring will only topple the tyrants but it also must break the chains that do not let the people of the region progress in science, knowledge, and art. He also argues that the Arabs should turn to their spiritual base in order to their place in this world. As the spiritually contains all the antidote that can help them achieve political, economic and welfare autonomy. Educational and cultural reforms generally take a long time to give fruit. And that is the only possible way to build a better tomorrow. So it may take a while but education is the only way one can be assured that the Arabs can change their fate. It is only through the cultural, economic, and political reconciliation brought forward by new ideas that Arabs can drive forward. As Ramadan states, it is crucial to generating new ideas/ideologies because a society without ideas is like an animal which does not know how to live or survive.

Tariq Ramadan (2009) argues that the Arab countries have to liberate themselves from the economic domination of the world powers for actual change. Because unless they do that there will be no real change no matter how much they protest. Because of the world powers, their own vested interests come first. For instance, the US and Europe backed the uprisings in Libya, but they ignored them in Syria and they also backed the monarchs in Saudi Arabia and Bahrein. The same is true about Russia and China, while they silenced on the external intervention in Libya they willingly supported Assad for their own interests. So Ramadan pointed out that to be really independent, the Arab countries have to envisage way to the future through independent economic order because the Western and other great power prioritize their own interest than democratization processes of the region. With sustainable long term goals, Arab countries should strive to build independent institutions since ethical reform is crucial for luring investment in the economy. The people in the Middle East cannot be independent unless they are secured economic and political rights by their own administrations.

The emergence of a new economic order might provoke some radical reaction from the West. Because the Arab world has been considered as "other" and the region was always treated as a colony and subjugated so far. But anyhow the transformation in the world changing historic center of gravity so Muslim countries should realize that the world order is in a transition, as new powerful players entering the fray, Muslim states should proactively take initiative for the new multi-polar world that lies in the near future.

(Bilgin, BOP, 2004)

(Copeland, 1995)

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VITA

MUHAMMET MUSA BUDAK

mmbudak@hotmail.com

EDUCATION

Ankara University, Social Sciences Institute	2010
Masters of International Relations, Ankara (MSc)	
"The US-Syrian Relations in Framework of Two Gulf Wars"	
Anadolu University, Business Administration, Eskisehir (BSc)	2005
College of Arabic Teaching for Non-speakers,	2005
Damascus, Syria	
Rand African University, Visiting Student,	2003
Johannesburg, South Africa	

WORK EXPERIENCE

Prime Ministry; Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities,	
Expert	2011-
Prime Ministry; Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency,	
Expert	2009-2010
Cansuyu Charity and Solidarity Organization (NGO),	
Director of International Relations	2006-2009

LANGUAGE SKILLS

- English (Fluent)
- Arabic (Fluent)
- Turkish (Mother tongue)

TURKISH SUMMARY

Arap Dünyasında 2011 yılında meydana gelen ayaklanmalar uluslararası toplumun dikkatini bir kez daha Ortadoğu'ya yöneltmiştir. Milyonlarca insan otoriter rejimlerini protesto etmek üzere sokaklara çıktı. Bu hareketler, Arap halklarının değişim isteğinin yanı sıra onurlu bir hayat talebini gerçekleştirme fırsatının da önemli bir göstergesiydi. Her ne kadar bu hareketler zamanla zayıflasa da, politika, ekonomi, sosyal gruplar ve sivil-asker ilişkileri üzerine tartışmalar arttı. Gerçekleşen bu hadiseleri anlamak için başta devrim teorileri olmak üzere teorik tartışmalar yeniden gündeme geldi.

"Arap Ayaklanmaları" sadece Arap Dünyası için değil, bölge ile geçmişten beri sıkı ilişki içerisinde bulunan diğer bölgesel ve uluslararası aktörler içinde önem taşıyan ve dikkatle takip edilen hadiseler olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Tunus'ta 23 yıllık otoriter rejimin başındaki Bin Ali'nin gerçekleştirilen kitlesel gösterilerin etkisi ile ülkeyi terk etmesi tüm bölgeyi etkisi altına alan bir değişim dalgasını başlatmıştır. Tunus'ta otoriter bir liderin bu şekilde kitlesel ayaklanmalar yoluyla devrilmesi, diğer Arap ülkelerinde de muhalefet hareketlerini tetikledi ve Tunus'ta meydana gelen temel değişikliklerin tekrarlanabileceği yönünde artan bir beklenti oluşturmuştur. Bölgede artan beklentiler ve değişim talepleri, Tunus'ta yaşanan olayların Mısır, Yemen, Libya, Ürdün ve Suriye gibi ülkelerde de ortaya çıkmasını sağladı.

Mısır, Arap dünyasındaki liderliği ve uluslararası politikadaki önemli rolü nedeniyle diğer ülkelerden ayrılmaktadır (Hamid, After Tunisia, 2011). Mısır'ın tarihi, sosyal ve askeri yapısı, Başta ABD olmak üzere batı ülkeleri ile uzun süredir devam eden yakın ilişkileri, ülkede ortaya çıkabilecek yeni yönetime yönelik endişeler taşıyan Batı ve bölge ülkelerinin yaklaşımları, 25 Ocak 2011'de Mübarek'e karşı başlayan bu hareketliliğin küresel düzeyde ilgi çekmesine sebep olmuştur.

Tahrir Meydanı'ndaki yüzbinlerce insanın katıldığı gösterileri dünya liderleri ve medya dikkatle izledi. ABD ve Mısır ordusunun desteği ile 30 yıldan beri baskıcı bir şekilde ülkeyi yöneten Hüsnü Mübarek'in, Tunus'ta Bin Ali gibi devrilip devrilmeyeceği, anılan desteklerin devam edip etmeyeceği geniş bir tartışmayı da beraberinde getirdi. Mübarek'in geleceği ile ilgili artan tartışmalar, ABD'nin desteğini çekmesi ve ordunun Mübarek'in devamı yerine rejimin devamını tercih etmesi Mübarek yönetiminin son bulmasına yol açtı. Ancak rejiminin devrilmesi ve iktidar değişikliği Tunus'tan farklı olarak Mısır'ın ekonomik, siyasi ve uluslararası konumu gibi sebepler ile çok daha fazla ilgi çekmekte ve önem taşımaktadır.

Mısır'daki olayların bölge ve dünyada yakından izlenmesinin çeşitli sebepleri bulunmaktadır. Her şeyden önce, Mısır 80 milyondan fazla nüfusu ile Arap dünyasının en kalabalık ülkesidir. Dahası, siyasi, askeri ve kültürel unsurları bakımından tarihi, Mısır'ın Arap dünyasının lideri olarak görülmesine imkân sağlamaktadır. Mübarek'ten sonra Mısır'da demokratik bir geçişin, Mısır'ın Arap ülkelerindeki lider rolü ve yumuşak gücü nedeniyle diğer Arap ülkelerini de büyük ölçüde etkileyeceği iddia edilmiştir. Mısır çalışmalarında dikkate alınan bir diğer husus Filistin-İsrail çatışmasıdır. Mısır, Filistin-İsrail çatışmasının barışçıl çözümünde hayati bir rol oynamakta ve Ortadoğu'da istikrar sağlamaktadır. Mısır'ın ABD ve İsrail ile yakın ilişkileri bu konumunu güçlendirmektedir. Mısır'ın coğrafi konumu itibari ile de Filistinlilerin dünyaya açılan kapısı durumunda olması da jeostratejik önemini artırmaktadır.

Ortadoğu'da meydana gelebilecek gelişmelerin anlaşılabilmesi için, anılan yapısı göz önünde bulundurularak Mısır'da meydana gelen devrim hareketinin, nasıl geliştiği, Mısır'ın gelecekteki muhtemel yörüngesini nasıl etkilediği ile ülke ve bölge üzerindeki sonuçlarının incelenmesi kaçınılmazdır. "Arap Ayaklanmaları"nı anlamak için, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun dağılmasından günümüze dek bölgedeki önemli siyasi dalgaları analiz etmek önem arz etmektedir. "Arap Ayaklanmaları"nın daha iyi anlaşılabilmesi, Ortadoğu'nun Arap ülkelerinde 1950 ve 1960'ların Arap Devrimlerini çalışmak ve kavramak

bir gerekliliktir. Bu, "Arap Ayaklanmaları"nı ve gelecekteki yönünü anlamamız için gerekli bilgileri sağlayabilir.

Pax-Ottamana'nın Birinci Dünya Savaşı (1914-1918) ile sonlanması, Ortadoğu'da, özellikle Arap ülkelerini etkileyen siyasi istikrarsızlık sürecinin başlamasına sebep olmuştur (Şahin, 2011). Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun çöküşünden bu yana bir asırdır bölgedeki kırılgan siyasi yapı devam etmektedir. Başlangıçta, bölgedeki Arap liderler, 1919 Barış Konferansı ve 1920 San Remo Konferansı'nda alınan kararlarla tam bağımsızlık kazanacakları varsayımına sahiptiler. Milliyetçi liderlerin önderlik ettiği ve Fransa ile İngiltere'nin Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'na karşı desteklediği Arap İsyanı beklenen sonuçları vermedi. Orta Doğu'daki değişiklikler sadece Arapların yöneticilerini değiştirdi (Mansfield, 2000). Dolayısıyla, bu isyanın sonuçları Arap liderlerinin umduğu gibi olmadı. Aslında bu süreç yeni bir Ortadoğu'nun inşasının başlangıç safhalarıydı. Ortadoğu'da politik yapıları yeniden şekillendikçe Arap ülkeleri tam bağımsızlıklarını elde edemediler.

Yeni kurulan Arap devletleri ya Fransa ya da Britanya'nın manda himayesi altında kaldılar. Bölge ülkelerinde siyasi yapıları kontrol eden İngiltere ve Fransa bölge ülkelerinin sınırlarını çizmekle kalmamış, aynı zamanda bölgenin yönetici seçkinlerini de belirlemede etkin olmuşlardır. Arap Ortadoğu'sunda kurulan bu siyasi yapı İkinci Dünya Savaşı'na kadar devam etmiştir.

İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında Ortadoğu'nun dönüşüm ve siyasi değişiminin ikinci aşamasına geçilmiştir. Birinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra bölge ülkelerinde kurulan siyasi yapı 1940'larda ve 1950'lerde çözülmeye başlamış ve 1960'larda Arap Devrimleriyle sonuçlanmıştır (Bradley, 2011) . Bu süreçte bölgedeki krallık yönetimleri (1952 Mısır, 1958 Irak, 1969 Libya gibi) yerlerini cumhuriyet yönetimlerine (1952 Mısır ve 1958 Irak gibi) bıraktılar (Lenczowski, 1980).

Bölgede ve özellikle Mısır'da meydana gelen gelişmeleri tam olarak anlamak için ayrıca sosyal hareketlilik ve özellikle devrim alanında yapılan çalışmalardan faydalanılması önem arz etmektedir. Uzun ve karmaşık nedensel ilişkiler örgüsü nedeniyle ortaya çıkan devrim hareketlerinin tam sebeplerini teşhis etmek her zaman bazı zorlukları beraberinde getirmiştir. Birçok sosyal bilimci, devrimleri açıklamak için dünyanın farklı bölgelerinde ortaya çıkan devrim hareketlerini inceleyerek devrime yol açan koşulları genel olarak açıklayacak ortak verileri oluşturmaya çalışmışlardır. Teknolojinin gelişimi ve genişlemesi, güç ilişkilerinin dönüşümü, ekonomik yenilikler, küresel etkileşimler ve sosyal değişimler, farklı dönemlerde farklı devrim hareketlerinde rol oynamıştır. Anılan sebepler nedeniyle ortaya çıkan yeni devrimci ortamlar, gerçekleştikleri dönemin ruhuna göre yeni analizleri gerekli kılmaktadır. Göreceli olarak zayıf iletişim ağları olan İngiliz Devrimi'nden, telsiz kullanımının yaygın olduğu Filipin Devrimi'ne, sınırlı ulaşım imkânları olan Fransız Devrimi'nden, demiryolunun yoğun olarak kullanıldığı Rus Devrimi'ne kadar her bir devrim kendisine has hususiyetleri ortaya çıkarmıştır (Telci, 2017).

Devrime götüren faktörlerin ortaya çıkışı ve yaygınlaşması sürecine odaklanmak, devrime yol açan nedensel süreçlerinin, yükseliş ve alçalma trendlerinin anlamlandırılması açısından devrim tarihindeki sabit ve deterministik noktaya odaklanmaktan çok daha faydalı olacaktır. Ayrıca, devrimin gerçekleştiği ülkenin uluslararası sisteme entegrasyonu, sistemle ne derece başarılı bir etkileşim halinde olduğu, devlet yapısının etkinliği ve ülkenin uluslararası politikadaki rolü gibi çevresel ve zamansal değerlendirilmelerin yapılmaması devrimin nedenlerinin ve yapısının tam olarak anlaşılmasını engellemektedir. Birçok devrim teorisi, bir ülkenin ekonomik koşullarına, sosyal beklentilerine ve demografik değişimlerine de odaklanmaktadır. Tilly (1978) temel teorinin eylemlerin çıkarlara göre öngörülebileceğini savunan bir iddiası olduğunu belirtir. Buna göre politik sistemle ilintili çatışan ve örgütlü olarak ortaya konulan çıkarların varlığı devrimleri doğurmaktadır (Tilly, 1978, p. 191). Devrim teorileri, devrim olgusunun, nasıl ortaya çıktığını, etkileşim ağ bağlantılarını ve bu etkileşimlerin yapısı hakkında bir anlamlandırma uğraşını araştırmacılara sunmaktadır. Teoriler sadece aktörlerin isyan etme sebeplerini açıklama ve anlamaya yönelik değil, aynı zamanda bunların zamanlaması ve hangi durumlarda başarıya ulaştığı hususlarını da kavramsallaştırma çalışmaktadır. Beining ve Vairel (2011), "bilmecenin bütün olumsuz

şartlar ve imkânsızlıklara rağmen kitlesel başkaldırı güdüsünü oluşturan motivasyonu anlamakta yattığını" belirtmektedir. Bu çerçevede sadece sonuçlar yerine süreçleri incelemek, araştırmacının analizlerine bu tür olaylarda yer alan kişilerin hikâyelerini dâhil etmesini ve kavramsallaştırmanın daha rasyonel olmasını sağlar.

Bu tez, 2011 yılında meydana gelen "Mısır Devrimi"ni daha iyi anlamlandırabilmek adına bu devrim ile yine bu ülkede 1952 yılında başlayan "Nasır Devrimi"ni karşılaştırmaya çalışacaktır. Bu tezin cevaplamaya çalıştığı başlıca araştırma soruları şunlardır: Ortadoğu'da meydana gelen sosyal hareketlerin / devrimlerin nedenleri nelerdir? Bu devrimleri ortaya çıkaran sebepler neler? 1952'de ve 2011'de hareketlere yol açan aktörlerin ve yapıların rolleri ve etkileri nelerdir? İki ayaklanma arasındaki benzerlikler ve farklılıkları ortaya nelerdir? Bu tez, her devrimde olduğu gibi, Mısır devrimlerinin de zamanın bağlamına göre kendi özelliklerine sahip olduğunu göz önüne almaktadır. Bu kapsamda devrim teorileri ışığında Mısır'da farklı dönemlerdeki benzer sosyal olayları değerlendirilecek ve karşılaştırılacaktır. Bu tür kitlesel isyanlarla ilgili tarihi çalışmalar olsa da, literatürde 1952 ile 2011 olayları arasında bir karşılaştırmaya yönelik çalışmalar nadirdir. Bu tez tarafından ele alınacak her iki devrimde daha önce tarihçiler ve bölge uzmanlar tarafından ayrı ayrı kapsamlı olarak incelenmiştir. Bu çerçevede elde bulunan geniş ve zengin literatür, karşılaştırma çalışması açısından oldukça önemlidir. İncelenecek iki döneme ilişkin tarih ve uluslararası ilişkiler uzmanları tarafından hali hazırda yayınlanmış eser ve analizlerin zenginliği daha çok ikincil kaynak kullanımı gerçekleştirilen karşılaştırma çalışmaları açısından oldukça ideal bir çalışma sahası oluşturmuştur. Karşılaştırma yapan araştırmacıların görevi ve orijinal bilimsel çalışmaları, geniş zaman dönemleri veya incelenen çeşitli alanlarla ilgili yeni verilerin açığa çıkarılmasından daha ziyade karşılaştırma yapılan tarihsel süreçlerdeki nedensel örüntüyü ortaya çıkarma, incelenen tüm dönemler için geçerli genel bir argümanın olup olmadığı ve varsa ortaya konulacak bu argümanın benzer durumlarda tekrarlanma olasılığının olup olmadığını açıklamaktır (Neuman, 2011, pp. 464-506).

Karşılaştırma yapan bir araştırmacının, incelenen vakaların her biri için kapsamlı birincil araştırma yapması mümkün veya gerçekçi olmayabilir. Çünkü böyle bir çalışma çok büyük

bir zaman dilimi ve farklı yetenekler dizisi gerektirecektir. Bunun yerine, karşılaştırma yapan araştırmacı, ele alınan konularda bu alanda yapılan yayın ve çalışmaları karşılaştırmalı yöntemin kuramsal mantığı ile sistematik olarak incelemeyi amaçlamalıdır. Araştırmanın başlangıçta öngörülen hedefleri çerçevesinde bu alanda daha önce ortaya konulan çalışmaları analitik ve eleştirel bir mercekle araştırmak ve tanımlamak karşılaştırma yapan araştırmacının görevidir. En önemlisi karşılaştırmalı bir çalışma boyunca, araştırmacı, uzmanların çalışmalarının genellikle aynı konunun çeşitli yönlerine yoğunlaşacağını göz önünde bulundurarak, tüm vakalarda bilgi ararken mümkün olduğu kadar sistematik olmalıdır. Açıkçası, karşılaştırma yapan araştırmacının çalışması, araştırılmak istenilen konu(lar) ile ilgili yüksek miktarda birincil yayın ve araştırma yapıldıktan sonra uygulanabilir hale gelmektedir (Skocpol, 1979).

Bu çerçevede, bu çalışma, 2011 Mısır Devrimi'ni, 1952'de meydana gelen devrimin temel ilkeleri ve özellikleri üzerine tartışmalar ışığında incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Mısır Devrimlerinin bölgedeki diğer devrimlere benzer olduğu anlaşılmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, tüm diğer devrimlerde olduğu gibi, kendine has karakteristik özellikler ve zamanın ruhuna bağlı olarak değişen farklılıklar taşımaktadır.

Bu bağlamda, bu tezin ilk bölümünde devrimleri eleştirel bir perspektiften açıklayan teoriler ve tarihsel analizlerle ilgili literatürü gözden geçirilmiştir. Önceki devrim çalışmalarında kullanılan kuramsal tartışmalardan elde edilen varsayımlar ve bulgular belirlenerek bu devrimlerdeki unsurların Mısır'daki sosyal hareketlerin tanımlanmasında kullanımının uyumlu olup olmadığı incelenecektir. Bununla birlikte kullanılan metotlar, geçilen süreçler, aktörler ve dinamikler gibi bazı benzer unsurların görülebilmesine rağmen, genel olarak devrimlerin geliştikleri zamana ve yere göre farklılık gösterdiklerini akılda tutmak önemlidir. Bu farklılıklar nedeniyle, bir örnekte açıklayıcı olabilecek bir yaklaşım, başka bir örneği açıklamakta uygun olmayabilir veya işlevsel olmayabilir. Bu araştırma, sosyolojik devrim teorileri alanında incelenen ülke ve dönem bazında yeni kuramsal katkı oluşturulması için bir arka plan geliştirmeyi de hedeflemektedir.

Mısır devrimlerinin incelenme süreci boyunca, bu çalışma devrim süreçlerinde hangi unsurların ve aktörlerin etkili olduğunu tanımlayarak devrimlere yol açan bağlamı, nedenleri ve süreçleri anlamaya ve devrim çalışmalarına katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Tarih boyunca devrimlerle ilgili birçok analiz yapılmış olmasına rağmen, her bir devrimin belirli bir zaman ve mekân koşullarına göre derinlemesine bir soruşturması, sivil ayaklanmaların, hükümetlerin devrilmesinin, ideolojilerin dönüştürülmesinin ve devrimlerin aktörlerin rolünün anlaşılması için hayati önem taşımaktadır. Mısır Devrimleri, ortaya çıktığı dönem, kullanılan yöntemler ve aktörler gibi birçok hususta kendine has özellikler barındırmaktadır. Mısır devrimlerinin incelenmesi, iç ve dış aktörler ile etkileri, sosyoekonomik nedenler ve devrimleri ve sosyal olayları motive eden ideolojik temeller arasındaki ilişkiyi örneklendirme açısından devrim çalışmalarında öne çıkma potansiyeline havidir. Bu çalışma, özellikle meydana gelen sosyal olayları "devrim" kategorisinde sınıflandırmanın ne kadar uygun olduğunu ortaya koymaya çalışmaktadır.

Bu çalışmada, Mısır'daki devrim sürecini anlayabilmek için devrimlerdeki yapısal unsurları vurgulayan Theda Skocpol, Fred Halliday, Thomas H. Greene ve Jack A. Goldstone gibi teorisyenlerin açıklamaları da yer almaktadır. John Foran'ın (1997) üçüncü dünya ülkelerindeki devrimler üzerindeki kapsamlı araştırmaları bu çalışmada Mısır'daki benzer örnekler arasında karşılaştırma yapmak için kullanılmıştır.

Bu araştırmada uluslararası ilişkiler disiplini çerçevesinde teorik devrim çalışmalarına ve bu teorik çalışmaların disipline katkılarına da değinilmiştir. Toplumsal devrimlerin önemi sadece ulusal düzeyde sınırlı kalmayarak çok büyük uluslararası etkilerin ve ideolojilerin ivme kazanmasına yol açabilmektedir. Özellikle jeopolitik olarak önem taşıyan veya büyük güç olma potansiyeline sahip ülkelerde meydana gelmesi muhtemel benzer hareketlerin etkileri global olarak hissedilebilmektedir.

Devrim kuramları ve toplumsal hareketliliklerin değerlendirmesiyle ilgili literatürün uluslararası ilişkiler disiplini çerçevesinde gözden geçirilmesinden sonra çalışma Mısır'daki

devrim hareketlerinin incelenmesi bölümlerine geçilmiştir. Teorik yaklaşımlardan ve tarihsel analizlerden edinilen bilgiler ışığında, bu çalışma, 1952 ve 2011 devrimlerinin sosyoekonomik nedenlerinin, uluslararası aktörlerin tutumlarının, devrimleri yürüten iç aktörlerin ve devrimlerin ideolojik motivasyonlarının analiz edildiği iki bölüme yer verilmiştir. Mısır'da devrime giden süreçlerdeki sosyoekonomik koşullar, uluslararası aktörlerin yaklaşımları, devrimleri sürükleyen sosyal gruplar ve devrimin önde gelenleri tarafından benimsenen ideolojik fikirler ayrıntılı olarak açıklanmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu iki dönemi kapsayan literatürün ele alınması bir sonraki bölümde 1952 ve 2011 devrimleri arasındaki benzerlik ve farklılıkların analizi açısından önem taşımaktadır.

Takip eden dördüncü bölümise, genel olarak Ortadoğu siyaseti ve özellikle sosyolojik teoriler hakkındaki literatüre katkı sağlama açısından iki devrim arasındaki benzerlik ve farklılıkların incelenmesine odaklanmaktadır. Bu çerçevede Mısır'da iki devrim süreci incelenerek uluslararası ilişkiler disiplini ve devrim teorileri açısından alandaki bilginin geliştirilmesine katkı sağlanmaktadır. Mısır'daki 2011 Devrimi, muhaliflerin siyasal sistemden baskıcı yollarla sürekli dışlanmasının, kronik ekonomik zorluklar ve yaygın sosyal adaletsizlikle birleştiğinde, devrimci bir değişim sürecinin ortaya çıktığını kanıtlamıştır. Mısır'da Hüsnü Mübarek'in yönetimi altında, muhalif gruplar üzerindeki şiddetli baskılar ve artan gelir dağılımı adaletsizliği nihayetinde devrimle sonuçlanan toplumsal kitlelerin ayaklanmasına yol açtı. Devrimci süreçteki bu nokta, Antonio Gramsci tarafından şöyle açıklanmaktadır: "Kitlelerin taleplerini ortak bir şekilde ifade etmesini sağlayarak politik bir pasiflik halinden yeniden canlandırma sürecine geçilmesi devrimler açısından dönüm noktasıdır." (Gramsci, 1971, s. 210). Başka bir deyişle, devrimin kurucu bir parçası olarak, toplumun tüm kesimlerinden gruplar içeren, ani ve kendiliğinden bir biçimde, kitlesel olarak harekete geçen halk topluluklarının bu sosyal hareketlenmesi daha önceki bölümlerde üzerinde durduğumuz geleneksel olarak kabul edilen devrimin tanımını örneklendirmektedir (Telci, 2017). Ancak, 1952'deki Nasır Devrimi ile karşılaştırdığımızda, benzer sosyoekonomik sorunlar devrimin ortaya çıkmasını sağlarken, devrim metodu ve devrimlerde öne çıkan liderlerin tamamen farklı olduğunu görülmüştür.

Bu çalışmanın temel amaçlarından olan iki döneme ilişkin benzerlik ve farklılıkların değerlendirilmesinde Ortadoğu siyaseti ve uluslararası ilişkilere odaklanmış bir analizin dâhil edilmesi Mısır ve bölgenin geleceğine yönelik bir bakış açısı sunma açısından önem taşımaktadır. Devrimlerin iç etkileri ve etkenleri olduğu kadar dış etken ve etkilere sahip olması (Halliday, 1990), uluslararası ilişkiler çerçevesinde bir analiz yapmayı kaçınılmaz kılmaktadır. İki dönem boyunca ortaya çıkan iç nedenler birbirine benzemektedir. Bunlar arasında, siyasi baskılar, artan ekonomik sorunlar, yapısal sosyal adaletsizlik ve özellikle genç nüfus açısından geleceğin ümit var olmaması, siyasi sistem içindeki artan yolsuzluk sayılmaktadır (Sowers & Toensing, 2012). 1952 ve 2011 dönemlerini uluslararası sistem açısından karşılaştırdığımızda; her ne kadar küresel politik yapının oluşturduğu çatışma ortamı ve uluslararası hegemon güçler farklı olsa da, bu hegemon güçlerin her iki dönemde de benzer emperyal güdüleri taşıdıkları görülmektedir. Devrimleri etkileyen söz konusu doğrudan faktörlere ek olarak, küreselleşmenin gelişen etkileri ve iletişim teknolojilerinin gelişmesinin getirdiği artan etkileşim, fiziksel alanın önemini azaltmış, yerel ve küresel yakınlaşmayı getirmiştir. Bu çerçevede her ne kadar belirtilen faktörler her iki dönemde de devrimleri etkiliyor ve şekillendiriyor olsa da, 1952 ile 2011 devrimleri arasındaki en önemli fark, devrimleri domine eden kadrolarda ve iki devrimin ideolojik temelleri ve etkileri olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır.

Tunus'ta başladıktan sonra hemen hemen tüm Arap ülkelerini etkisi altına alan "Arap Baharı" sürecinin en önemli ülkesi Mısır olarak kabul edilmektedir. Tüm bölgede kendisini hissettiren ve 25 Ocak 2011'de Mısır'da başlatılan devrim hareketinin arkasında yatan nedenler genel olarak şu şekilde öne çıkmıştır; ülkede 1950'lerden beri uygulanmakta olan olağanüstü hal, ülkenin bir polis devletine dönüşmesi, hükümete yakın çevrelerin açık ve aşırı yolsuzlukları, artan yoksulluk ve işsizlik, geniş bir halk kitlesinin temel beslenme ve barınma ihtiyaçlarının dahi karşılanamaması, düşünce ve ifade özgürlüğünün engellenmesi, sivil hareketlerin şiddetli baskıya maruz kalması, ABD'nin çıkarları doğrultusunda Ortadoğu'daki İsrail merkezli sorunlara karşı sessiz kalması. Ama esasen büyük sivil isyanların nedeni genellikle tetikleyici olayların kendisi değil; yönetimin izlediği politikalardan dolayı dezavantajlı bir konuma gelen kitlelerin cari kurumlar ve kurallar içinde kendileri için bir gelecek görememeleridir (ICG, Tunisia's Way, 2011).

Mısır'da her iki dönemde (1952 ve 2011) de ortaya çıkan devrim hareketlerinin nedenlerine bakıldığında benzerliklerle karşılaşılmaktadır. Uzun yıllardır devam eden baskı ve yolsuzluk gibi uygulamalar ve halkın büyük çoğunluğu açısından gittikçe kötüleşen sosyo-ekonomik durum geniş kitleler için artık tahammül sınırını geçmiştir (ICG, Popular Protest, 2011). Ekonomik kalkınma alanında görece ilerleme kaydedilmesine rağmen, genç nüfus için istihdam oluşturmadaki başarısız olunmuş ve halkının çoğunda yaşamsal bir iyileşme sağlanmamıştır (ICG, 2011). Başta gençler olmak üzere geniş kitlelerin örtüşen taleplerinin karşılanmaması yönetime karşı ortak muhalefetin sayısını ciddi bir tehdit oluşturma boyutuna taşımıştır (Gün & Koçak, 2012).

Anılan sosyoekonomik unsurlarla birlikte politik unsurlar da hem 1952 hem de 2011 devrimlerinde çok önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Her iki dönemde de ekonomik nedenler genel olarak belirgin olsa da, en azından ekonomik kadar önemli olan siyasi nedenler bazen göz ardı edilebilmektedir. Genç işsizliği, yolsuzluk, yaşam standartlarındaki düşüş, ekonomik krizler her iki dönemde de yoğun bir şekilde yaşanmıştır. Yukarıda belirtilenlerin hepsine rağmen, devrimlerin nedenlerin sadece ekonomiden nedenlerden oluştuğunu söylemek yanıltıcı olacaktır. Siyasi nedenleri sosyoekonomik nedenlerden ayırmak zor olsa da, politik faktörlerin (demokrasi olmasa bile, en azından "onur" ve "özgürlük") öne çıktığı söylenebilir (Dalacoura, 2011). Bu talepler, 1952'deki kolonyalist güçlere karşı iken, 2011'de ülkenin baskıcı yönetimine karşı ortaya çıkmıştır. Her iki dönemde de karşılaşılan en belirgin özellik rejimin dış politikasının Batının menfaatleri ekseninde yürütülüyor olmasıdır.

Ayaklanmaların ardında yatan sosyoekonomik ve siyasi nedenlerin birbirine benzediği realitesi yanında bahse konu devrim hareketlerini gerçekleştiren grupların profillerinin çok farklı olduğu da bir gerçektir. 1952'de, seküler, ilerlemeci ve yoğunlaşmış daha dar bir askeri grubun devrim hareketini yürüttüğü anlaşılmaktadır. 2011 yılına gelindiğinde ise başlangıçta protestoları başlatanların, baskıcı rejime karşı insanları Twitter ve Facebook gibi sosyal medya üzerinden ayaklanmaya çağıran, daha çok informal gençlik gruplarının olduğu görülmektedir. Bu geniş kitlenin oluşturduğu yapının kabaca "lidersiz" olarak tanımlanması

mümkündür. Aslında bu lidersizlik durumu sayıca çok daha fazla insanın bu faaliyetleri tasvip etmesi ve katılımını da sağlamıştır (Rosiny, 2012). Bunun yanında 2011'de hükümetin protestoculara uyguladığı şiddet protestoları durdurmamış bilakis çok daha fazla insanın bu harekete katılmasını teşvik etmiştir.

1952 dönemi göz önüne alındığında, bugün birçok Mısırlı, Nasır'ın otoriter olmaktan başka bir özelliği olmayan bir yönetim tarzını benimsediğine inanmaktadır. Siyasi bir sistem olarak Nasırizm, çok partili sistemin denetim sınırlamalarından kaçınarak, gerçekleştirilen devrimin koruyucusu olan merkezi bir partinin egemenliğini simgeledi. Fakat bunun yanında Nasırizmin Mısır toplumunu köklü bir şekilde dönüştürdüğü de bir gerçektir. Mısır'ın kaynaklarını elinde bulunduran sınırlı seçkin zümre ve yabancıların egemenliğine son verilmiştir. Yeni rejim ülke zenginliğinin paylaşılmasında yeni bir sistem getirmiş ve tüm Mısırlılar için eğitim imkânlarını genişletmiştir. Nasır, toprak sahipleri ve köylüler arasındaki katı sınıf sistemini kaldırmış, sanayileşmeye geçişi hızlandırmış ve Mısır'a zenginlikleri üzerinde egemenlik kazandırmıştır. Pan-Arabizm, anti-emperyalizm ve tarafsızlık gibi yaklaşımlar Mısırlıların kendilerine ve soydaşlarına bakış açılarını değiştirmiştir. Nasır yönetimindeki Mısır, Arap dünyasının lideri, sömürgecilik ve monarşi yönetimlerinden kurtuluşun önderi olmuştur (Gordon, 1992).

Nasır'ın yönetimi ekonomik alanda da bazı tarihi gelişmelere şahit olmuştur. Sıkı planlama ve fiyat kontrolü ile sürdürülebilir ekonomik büyüme sağlanmış, toplam ve kişi başına düşen gelir artırılmış, 1952-70 arasında uygulanan yoksulluğun azaltılmasına yönelik politikalar ile ekonomide belirgin bir gelişme olmuştur. Uygulanan sosyal adalet reformları ve alınan önlemler ile gelir ve mülkiyet konularında az gelirli gruplar lehine transferleri artırmıştır. Geniş çaplı millileştirmenin bazı kötü sonuçlarına rağmen, Nasır yönetimi sırasında başlatılan kalkınma modeli 1990'larda özellikle insan sermayesine açısından olumlu neticeler vermiştir. Beklenilen yaşam süresi sürekli artmış ve 1952'de 41 yaş iken 1999'da 65 yaşa ulaşmıştır (El-Ghonemy, 2004).

Bununla birlikte, genel bir kural olarak, siyasal özgürlük ortamı demokratikleşme sürecinin başlangıç aşamasıdır. Çünkü bu özgürlükler, kamusal alanlarda şeffaflığa ve politik katılımın artmasına vesile olur (Moore, 1994). Buna rağmen belli özgürlüklerin sağlanması daima demokratikleşmenin gerçekleşebileceği anlamına gelmemektedir. Özellikle Arap ülkeleri örneğinde bu hususta bir istisna olduğu görülmektedir. Çünkü Arap ülkelerinde, bu kavramlar iktidardaki elitlerin konumlarını sağlamlaştırmak için kullanılan bir araç olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Arap yöneticiler genellikle popülist yaklaşımlarla sosyalizm ve politik özgürlük gibi kavramları kullanarak halkın genel onayını almaya çalışırken bu fikirlerin toplumda kök salmasına asla izin vermemişlerdir (Zambelis, 2005). Mısır'da 1970'lerde başlatılan liberalleşme süreçleri daha sonra terk edilmiş, süreç tam tersi bir istikamette ilerlemiştir. Toplumun daha fazla özgürlük ve politik katılım talepleri uygulanan siyasi baskılar politikaları ile susturulmuştur.

Bölgenin en kalabalık ülkesi olduğu olan Mısır'da gelişen ve kök salan fikirler peyderpey bölgedeki diğer ülkelere de yayılmaktadır. Bunun tersi de doğrudur. 2011'de gerçekleşen devrim tam olarak hedefine ulaşmadığı ve beklenen değişimi oluşturmadığı için, tüm bölge bu potansiyelin olası faydalarından mahrum kalacaktır (Traub, 2011). Bu çerçevede devrim sonrası yönetime gelen Müslüman Kardeşler çok büyük bir sınavdan geçmiştir. Uzun süren baskı rejime karşı varlığını devam ettiren ve belki de ülkedeki en örgütlü muhalif grup olarak öne çıktılar. Uzun dönem muhalefette olmanın en büyük dezavantajı hiç yönetimde bulunmamış olmalarıydı. Ülke ekonomisine yönelik politikaları test edilmemişti. Devrim sonrasında ortaya çıkan çok büyük beklentiler, Müslüman Kardeşler açısından karşılanılması güç sorumlulukları beraberinde getirmiştir (Agha & Malley, 2011). Tunus ile karşılaştırıldığın görece daha başarısız sayılmalarının en büyük nedeni siyasi katılımın en yüksek seviye sağlanması gereken anayasa yapım sürecinde nerede ise yalnız kalmış olmalarıdır. Benzer şekilde seçimlerde oy kullanım oranlarındaki belirgin bir azalma önemli bir sorun oldu. Bu durum Mısır'da talep edilen demokratikleşme sürecinin uzun soluklu olmamasına neden oldu (Durac, 2013).

2011 yılına gelindiğinde ise devrim hareketinin hedeflerine de ulaşamadığı açıktır. Daha önce de belirtildiği üzere süreçte bu sonuca götüren birçok faktör bulunmaktadır. Ancak uluslararası oyuncuların yaklaşımı da ön plana çıkmaktadır. Arap ülkelerinde rejimlerin bir kısmı devrim karşıtı darbeye sessiz kaldılar ve hatta gelecekte ülkelerinde benzer ayaklanmalara maruz kalmaktan duydukları korkudan dolayı darbe sonrası oluşan yönetime mali imkân sağlayarak destek verdiler. Devrim hareketinin başlamasından bir müddet sonra halkın taleplerine ve diktatörlerin devrilmesine görünüşte destek veren Batı ülkeleri, devrim karşıtı darbe karşısında sessiz kaldılar. Batı ülkelerinin bu yöndeki tutumlarına ilişkin genel kanaat devrim sonrası ülkede yönetime gelen İslami hassasiyetleri ön plana çıkan yapının Batı ülkelerinin çıkarları ile çelişen bir siyaset takip edeceğinden endişe duymaları olarak açıklanabilir. Bölgede demokratikleşme adına atılan adımları desteklemekten geri durmaları, Batı ülkelerinin bölgeye ilişkin sanayileşme sonrası geliştirdikleri politikalardan vazgeçmediklerinin bir göstergesidir. Bu süreçte Batı'nın tutumu emperyalist menfaatleri doğrultusunda şekillenmiştir (Fromkin, 1989).

Devrim teorileri kapsamında ele alındığında; 2011 Mısır Devrimi'ne ilişkin temel değerlendirme noktaları şu şekilde olmuştur:

1) Devrim, bu yöndeki beklentilerin zayıf olduğu bir ülkede gerçekleşmişti;

2) Modernleşme kapsamında küreselleşmenin getirdiği yeni iletişim ve sosyal etkileşim araçlarının süreçte temel araçlardan birisi olmuştur;

3) Devrimi mümkün kılan kitlelerin, yalnızca belirli bir sınıftan değil, toplumun tüm kesimlerinden aktörlerden oluşmasıdır;

4) Başlangıçta, dış aktörlerin müdahalesi olmaksızın bağımsız bir tarzda şekillenmiştir;

5) Devrim sonrasında, küresel ve bölgesel aktörlerin sürece doğrudan dâhil olduğu bir süreç yaşanmıştır (Rosiny, 2012).

Ancak ortaya çıkan gelişmelerin, toplumsal devrim teorileri ile tam olarak anlaşılamayacağını belirtmek önemlidir. Çünkü modern sosyolojinin temelinde Batılı

toplumların tarihsel ve sosyal değişimleri yatmaktadır. Bu bağlamda en önemli kuramcı olarak kabul edilen Marx'a göre, toplumların ayırt edici özellikleri toplumun mülkiyet ilişkilerine bağlı olarak ortaya çıkan sınıfların varlığına bağlıdır. Sınıflar arasındaki çatışma süreçte toplumun ilerlemesini sağlamaktadır. Yeni bir düzene geçiş ancak bu şekilde bir sınıflar arası çatışma ile mümkün olabileceği kabul edilmektedir. Ortadoğu'da böyle belirgin bir sınıflar ayrımı olmadığından, Marx'ın tarihi bir toplum modeli olarak ortaya koyduğu bu yaklaşımın ele aldığımız dönemleri tam olarak açıklayabilmesi mümkün değildir. Marx'ın bu yaklaşımı, hükümetlerin yapısına bağlı değildir. Bu yaklaşım daha çok Batı'nın Doğu'yu oryantalist bir tasviri olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Sadece sınıf mücadelesine dayanan devrimlere yol açan sorunların ekonomik yönlerini tanımlamak ve bu tespitlere göre kavram analizini yapmak günümüz koşullarında artık geçerli değildir.

Toplumsal hareketler ve devrim arasındaki ilişki her zaman araştırmaya değer olagelmiştir. Ekonomik güdüleri tüm sosyal pratiklerin köklerine yerleştirmek, Marx'ın ve Batı'nın sosyal modeli tarafından geliştirilen ekonomik üretim modelini evrenselleştirerek tarihsel bir düzleme yerleştirmektir (Sunar, 2012). Ancak, tarihte batıda gerçekleşen devrimlere baktığımızda, özellikle dini unsurların ekonomik unsurlar kadar yüksek düzeyde etkili olduğu görülmektedir. Devrim, şiddet yoluyla yerleşik düzenin değiştirilmesi ve yeni bir liderler eliyle yeni bir düzenin kurulması olarak açıklanırken, toplumsal hareketler, önemli sayıda insanın toplumun temel özelliklerinden birini değiştirmek için düzenli bir çaba harcaması anlamına gelmektedir (Marshall, 2005; Biesanz & Biesanz, 1973). 2011 Mısır örneğinde hem sosyal hareketlerin tanımlayan ögelere hem de devrimi tanımlayan ögelere rastlanılmaktadır. Devrim tanımlarının getirdiği düzen değişimi gerçekleştirilmiştir fakat şiddetten ziyade toplumda önemli bir kesiminin bu yöndeki ortak irade beyanı ile ortaya çıkan güçle gerçekleşmiştir.

Ortadoğu'da meydana gelen bu hareketleri devrim çalışmaları bağlamında "devrim" olarak tanımlanmak mümkündür. Bu halk hareketlerinde ortaya sosyal bir organizasyon çıkmıştır ve bu sosyal yapı tamamen ekonomik talep ve ilişkiler tarafından şekillendirilmemiştir. Bu hareketler sıradan bir protesto gibi toplumda belirli bir özelliği değiştirmek için

yapılmamıştır. Aksine, güç kullanarak siyasal iktidarın değiştirilmesi hedeflenmiştir. Burada belirtilen güç toplumun önemli bir kesiminin belli bir ortak irade ile hareket edebilme gücüdür. Ortadoğu'daki bu şekildeki siyasi iktidar değişikliği, kültürel ve ekonomik anlamda da değişimlerin olacağı anlamına gelmektedir. Turner'in da belirttiği gibi "siyasal direniş Batılı devrimci geleneğe aittir" iddiası çerçevesinde bu devrimin Batı literatürün de farklı şekillerde açıklanması muhtemeldir fakat özellikle post-modern bir dönemde bu tür iddialar geçerli değildir (Turner, 1984, s.125). Batı literatüründe anlatılan devrim kavramı, Arap Ayaklanmasındaki sessiz kitlelerin devrimi olarak yeniden tanımlanabilir. Humeyni'nin Güney Tahran'daki bir gecekondu yerleşiminde yaptığı bir konuşmada şu şekilde seslenmiştir; "İslam Devrimi kendisini bu sınıfın çabalarına borçludur." (Bayat, 2008) İran'da gerçekleşen devrim sonunda bir İslam devrimi olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Benzer şekilde İslam, Ortadoğu ülkelerinde benzer halk hareketlerinin itici gücüdür. Mısır'da devrim sürecinde en baskın gruplardan birisi de İslam'ı referans alan hareketlerdir. İslami hareket, uzun yıllar rejimin sürdürdüğü baskıcı politikalara karşı sessiz kitlelerin temsilcisi olmuştur. Bu sessiz kitleler Arap Ayaklanmalarını devrimci bir yapı haline getirmiştir (Palabıyık, 2016).

Devrim çalışmaları gruplayan Trimberger'in (2003) çalışmasında açıklanan ayrım, Mısır'daki iki dönem arasında önemli bir farkı ortaya koymaktadır. Trimberger'in çalışması göz önüne alındığında, 1952'deki devrim, "tepeden inmeci devrim" olarak tanımlanabilecekken ve 2011'in "aşağıdan yukarıya doğru devrim" olarak tanımlanması uygun olacaktır. 2011 Mısır Devrimi, araştırmacı ve uzmanlara farklı araştırma konuları ve çalışma alanları çıkarmıştır. Son dönemde politik sahada yaşanan sosyal hareketlerin çoğunlukla sosyal merdivende aşağıdan yukarıya doğru gerçekleşmeye başlamıştır. Ortadoğu'da sıkça sosyal hareketlilikler yaşanmasına rağmen bu hareketlerin öncelikli taleplerinin bu kadar kısa sürede elde edilmesine nadiren rastlanılmaktadır. Bu durum bölge açısından da yeni bir olgudur. Yeni toplumsal hareketlerin özellikleri ve geçmiş kitle hareketleri ile arasındaki süreklilik ve değişim düzeyi daha fazla araştırmayı ve yeni kavramsallaştırmayı hak etmektedir (Beinin & Vairel, Social Movements, 2011). Aslında ortaya çıkan bu durumun kavramsallaştırılması için birkaç yeni terim ortaya konmuştur.

Olayları anlamak açısından Smith'in (1974) kavramsallaştırmasıyla, 2011 Mısır Devrimi sosyolojik olarak "doğrusal ve vektörel dönüşüm"ün gerçekleştiği kaotik bir yapısal değişimin örneğidir. Devrim, Mısır toplumunun sosyal grup ve sosyal ilişki süreçlerinden oluşan sosyal yapısının özelliklerini değiştiren bir tür yapısal değişikliğe yol açmıştır. Ancak genel olarak devrimlerden sonra görülebileceği üzere, Mısır'da 3 Temmuz 2013'teki askeri darbe öncesi ve sonrasında meydana gelen siyasi kriz ve toplumsal gerginlik bahse konu bu yapısal değişimin kurumsallaşmasının önüne geçmiştir. Devlet ve toplum arasındaki ilişkilerin ve politik katılım süreçlerinin doğasının değişmesine rağmen değişimin sürekliliğini sağlayacak zaman bulunamamıştır. Bailey (2001) tarafından açıklandığı gibi "devrim sonrası durumlar için bireyler ve toplumlar yeni sistemin kurumsallaşması için zamana ihtiyaç duyarlar" (Bal, 2014). Buna rağmen tüm bu süreç devrim teorilerinde devrimlerin olağan süreçleri içerisinde zikredilmektedir.

Tüm açıklamalarla birlikte bölge uzmanları ve akademisyenler devrim ve toplumsal hareket teorilerinin Ortadoğu'daki yükselen başkaldırıyı tahmin etme ve kavrama kapasitesinin sınırlı olduğuna yönelik eleştirilerini artırmışlardır (Tadros, Arab Uprising, 2011). Tartışmanın özü, ortaya çıkan olgunun, Ortadoğu siyaseti açısından uygun ya da güncel olmayan kuramsal yapılarla açıklama çabasıdır.

Gelecekte yaşanması muhtemel benzer sosyal hareketliklerin başarısı, 2011'de istenen hedeflere ulaşmayı başaramayan Mısır Devriminden alınacak derslere bağlı olarak değişecektir. Birincisi, farklı siyasi hedeflere sahip olan değişik grupların (liberaller, solcular veya dini gruplar) otoriter yönetimleri sonlandıracak gücü elde edebilmek için ortak bir platform oluşturabilme kapasitelerini geliştirmelidirler. Otoriter rejimi devirdikten sonrada ülkenin yeniden inşa sürecinde asgari müştereklerde birlikte hareket etme yetenekleri olmalıdır. Eğer bu farklı gruplar işbirliği yapmak yerine birbirleriyle savaşmaya devam ederlerse, benzer şekilde ortaya çıkacak bir teşebbüste eski rejimin işbirlikçileri tarafından yeniden dağıtılacaklardır. Gücü elde tutabilmenin esasının dayanışmadan geçtiği anlaşılmalıdır. Ya da, iktidardakiler 2013 örneğinde olduğu gibi bu grupları dağıtacaktır.

Çünkü rejim muhafızları, muhalefet saflarında zayıf noktaları bulma ve işbirliğini bozma yönünde deneyimlerini artırmıştır.

İkinci olarak, devrim sonrası oluşturulan hükümetler bölgede uzun süredir var olan siyasi, sosyal ve ekonomik kriz nedeniyle başarısız olabilir. İnsanların beklentileri genellikle yüksek ve sabırları sınırlı olmaktadır. Çünkü insanlar bu tür politik hareketleri büyük fedakârlıklar ile sürdürmekte ve çok acıya katlanmaktadırlar. Bu yüzden eski sistemden yeni sisteme geçmek için gereken zamanda oluşan hayal kırıkları eski rejim taraftarlarına yeni sistemi meşruiyeti sorgulatmak için olanak sağlamaktadır. Dolayısıyla yeni hükümetler tarafından yapılacak küçük hatalar bile büyük destek kaybına yol açabilir. Yeni yönetim bu gibi hayal kırıklıklarını bastırmaya çalışsa bile eski rejim taraftarları tarafından faydalanılacak argümanlar geliştirilmesinde kullanılacaktır. Bu durum insanlar kısa sürede güvenlerini kaybetmelerine yol açabilmektedir. Mısır örneğinde net olarak görüldüğü üzere bu süreçlerden faydalanan eski rejim taraftarlarının karşı devrim gerçekleştirebileceği akıldan çıkarılmamalıdır.

Üçüncü engel ise devrimin uluslararası ilişkilerde kurumsal ilişkilerin eksikliğinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Uluslararası kurumsal politik ve ekonomik ilişkiler ülkeler için değişim imkânları sağlayabilmektedir. Bununla birlikte bu tür ilişkiler, özellikle Batı ülkeleri ile olanlar, istenen dönüşümüm tam ters etkiye yol açabilmektedir. Tarihte birçok kez deneyimlendiği gibi, batılı ülkelerin emperyalist geçmişleri, Ortadoğu'ya yaklaşımlarını kendi çıkarları ekseninde etkilemektedir. Bu nedenle bu ülkeler Ortadoğu'nun her ülkesinde farklı politika ve yaklaşımları benimsemektedirler. Batılı güçler genellikle menfaatlerini en üst düzeyde sağlayabilecek grupları desteklemektedirler. Dolayısıyla Ortadoğu'da oluşabilecek yeni yönetimler açısından bu güçler dikkat edilmesi gereken bir zorluk olarak belirmektedir.

Devrim sonrası dönemde ortaya çıkan bir başka sorun da Arap ülkelerinde tüm halk sınıflarını içeren işlevsel bir ekonomik sistemin olmamasıdır. Gelişmekte olan bir orta sınıfın

yokluğu yeni rejimler açısından büyük bir engeldir. Çünkü orta sınıf bu tür sosyal hareketlerin gerçek bir devrime dönüşmesini ve derinleşmesini sağlayan sosyal katmanlardır. Bu nedenle yeni yöneticiler dayanabilecekleri bir orta sınıf oluşturma çabası içerisinde olmalıdırlar.

Devrimleri başarılı bir şekilde devam ettirilebilmesi için Arap toplumlarında da bir dönüşümün sağlanması gerekmektedir. Bütüncül bir yaklaşımla eğitim bu toplumlarının yeniden inşasında gereken yere taşınmalıdır. Bölgedeki eğitim durumu, beklenti ve ihtiyaçlarını karşılama açısından yetersizdir. Bu nedenle eğitim altyapısı geliştirilmelidir. Eğitim sayesinde, Arap dünyası kültürel farklılıklara saygı göstererek kendi aralarında barışı geliştirebilecektir. Kültürel doyumun güvence altına alınması için farklı dil, tarihi aidiyetlere saygı gösterilmeli ve etnik grupları bütünleştirmeye yönelik adımlar atılmalıdır. Küreselleşmenin Arap dünyasındaki en büyük etkilerinden biri, etnik ve mezhepsel çatlaklar oluşturmaya neden olan "öteki" bakış açısıdır. Bu ayrışmaya meydan vermeyecek kapsayıcı bir kültür politikası proaktif bir şekilde takip etmelidir. Unutulmamalıdır ki kültürel bağımsızlık bölgede gerçek sosyo-ekonomik bağımsızlığında habercisidir (Yazıcı, 2014).

Kültür ayrıca milletlerin bütünsel belleğini de ifade etmektedir. Bu, doğal olarak bugünün zorluklarını nasıl algıladıklarına ilişkin insanların kimliklerini oluşturan genel anlayışında tezahürüdür. Arap dünyası, bölgesel ve küresel sorunlarının çözümü için farklı yol ve yöntemlerin geliştirilmesine ve bu yönde fikir üretilmesine ihtiyaç duymaktadır. Tarık Ramazan (2009), Arapların bu uyanışı sağlayabilmeleri için kendilerini keşfetmeleri gerektiğini savunmaktadır. Entelektüel ve kültürel kurtuluş için çaba gösterilmesi zorunluluktur. Bu görevi yerine getirmek için düşünce dünyasında şiddetli bir geliştirilmenin sağlanması gerekmektedir. Bu hedefe ancak sanat, edebiyat ve bilim alanlarında üstünlük sağlamaları durumunda ulaşılabilecektir. Burada en önemli konu Arap dünyasının entelektüel bir krizde olmasıdır. Halkın ve aydınların zihni prangadadır. Dolayısıyla gerçek bir Arap Baharı sadece otoriter yönetimleri devirmekle kalmamalı ve fakat aynı zamanda bölgedeki insanların bilim, bilgi ve sanatta ilerlemesine izin vermeyen zincirleri de kırmalıdır. Ramazan, Arapların bu dünyadaki onurlu yerlerini kazanabilmeleri için manevi

zemine dönmeleri gerektiğini savunmaktadır. Bu manevi zemin politik, ekonomik ve kültürel bağımsızlıklarına ulaşmalarına yardımcı olabilecek tüm panzehirleri içermektedir. Eğitim ve kültür reformları genellikle meyve vermek için uzun zaman almaktadır ancak bu daha iyi bir yarın inşa etmenin tek yoludur. Bu yüzden biraz zaman almasına rağmen eğitim, bölgenin kaderini değiştirebilmesinin tek yoludur. Kültürel, ekonomik ve politik alanda toplumsal uzlaşmayı sağlayacak fikirlerin gelişmesi bölge milletlerinin ilerleyebilmesini sağlayacaktır. Ramazan'ın belirttiği gibi, yeni fikirler / ideolojiler üretmek çok önemlidir, çünkü fikirleri olmayan bir toplum nasıl yaşanacağını ve nasıl hayatta kalacağını bilmeyen bir varlık gibidir.

Tarık Ramazan (2009), Arap ülkelerinin gerçek değişim için kendilerini uluslararası güçlerin ekonomik egemenliğinden kurtarmak zorunda olduklarını da savunmaktadır. Bunu gerçekleştirmedikleri sürece, ne kadar protesto ettikleri önemli olmaksızın gerçek bir değişim olmayacaktır. Çünkü bu güçler için kendi çıkarları her zaman önce gelmektedir. Örneğin ABD ve Avrupa, Libya'daki ayaklanmaları desteklerken, Suriye'de olanları görmezden geldiler bunun yanında Suudi Arabistan ve Bahreyn hükümdarlarını desteklediler. Aynı durum Rusya ve Çin için de geçerlidir. Bu ülkeler Libya'daki dış müdahaleye ses çıkarmazken Esad'ı kendi çıkarları için desteklediler. Dolayısıyla Ramazan, gerçekten bağımsızlık için Arap ülkelerinin bağımsız ekonomik düzeni öngörerek planlar yapması gerektiği işaret etmektedir. Çünkü Batı ve diğer büyük güçler, bölgedeki demokratikleşme süreçlerinden ziyade kendi çıkarlarına öncelik vermektedirler. Arap ülkelerinin sürdürülebilir uzun vadeli hedeflerle ekonomik alanda etik reformlar yaparak güçlü bağımsız kurumlar oluşturmaları hayati önem taşımaktadır. Ortadoğu'daki insanlar, kendi yönetimleri tarafından ekonomik ve siyasi hakları sağlamadıkça tam bağımsız olamayacaklardır.

Bu çerçevede yeni bir ekonomik düzenin ortaya çıkması, Batıda bazı radikal tepkilere neden olabilir. Çünkü Batı İslam dünyasını "öteki" olarak kabul etmiş, bölgeyi bir koloni olarak ele almış ve bugüne kadar bölge yönetimlerini bu duruma boyun eğdirmiştir. Ne var ki, dünyadaki dönüşüm tarihi güç merkezini değiştirmektedir. Bu nedenle Müslüman ülkeler,

dünya düzeninin bir geçiş sürecinde olduğunu kavramalı, yeni güçlü oyuncuların başat güçler olarak sisteme girdiğini görmeli ve proaktif bir şekilde yakın bir gelecekte oluşacak çok kutuplu dünyada insiyatif sahibi olmalıdırlar.