T.C.
ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY
GARDUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

ANALYSING POST-9/11 TRANSATLANTIC COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION

Ph.D. DISSERTATION

EDA BEKCİ ARI

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

ANKARA, 2019

T.C.
ANKARA YILDIRIM BEYAZIT UNIVERSITY
GARDUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

ANALYSING POST-9/11 TRANSATLANTIC COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION

Ph.D. DISSERTATION

EDA BEKCİ ARI

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Supervisor

ASSOC. PROF. DR. GİRAY SADIK

ANKARA, 2019

ONAY SAYFASI

Eda BEKCİ ARI tarafından hazırlanan "ANALYSING POST-9/11 TRANSATLANTIC COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION" adlı tez çalışması aşağıdaki jüri tarafından oy birliği ile Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalında Doktora tezi olarak kabul edilmiştir.

Unvan Adı Soyadı	Kurumu	İmza
Doç. Dr. Giray SADIK	AYBU/SBF/Uluslararası İlişkiler	
Prof. Dr. Birol AKGÜN	AYBU/SBF/Uluslararası İlişkiler	
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Bayram SİNKAYA	AYBU/SBF/Uluslararası İlişkiler	
Doç. Dr. Serhat ERKMEN	JSGA/Güvenlik Bil. Ens.	
Doç. Dr. Elif ÇOLAKOĞLU	JSGA/Güvenlik Bil. Ens.	

Tez Savunma Tarihi: 16.12.2019

Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalında Doktora tezi olması için şartları yerine getirdiğini onaylıyorum.

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Müdürü Doç. Dr. Seyfullah YILDIRIM

……...

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that all information in this thesis has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work; otherwise I accept all legal responsibility.

Name, Last Name : Eda BEKCİ ARI

Signature :

ABSTRACT

ANALYSING POST-9/11 TRANSATLANTIC COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION

BEKCİ ARI, Eda

Ph.D., Department of International Relations
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Giray SADIK
December 2019, 197 Pages

This research seeks to lend empirical support to the claim that the levels of the intra-alliance counterterrorism cooperation within NATO vary with the levels of the institutionalization of counterterrorism -as a specific issue area- since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). The aim of this dissertation is two-fold. First, it attempts to explore possible variations of the institutionalization of counterterrorism within the Alliance across the specific set of domains within NATO in the post-9/11 era by benefiting from the theoretical and methodological toolkits of new-institutionalist theories and by following an analytically eclectic approach. Second, this dissertation aims to explore the relationship between the intra-alliance counterterrorism cooperation and the institutionalization of counterterrorism within NATO in the post-9/11 era. To explore the variations of the institutionalization of counterterrorism within the Alliance, we have assessed the institutionalization of counterterrorism -as a specific issue area- within the specific set of domains namely; Capability Development, Intelligence Sharing and the Military Operations. To be more precise, the institutionalization of counterterrorism within NATO is assessed within these specific sets of domains separately to be able to measure the overall levels of the institutionalization of counterterrorism within NATO. The findings on the assessment of the institutionalization of counterterrorism within the Alliance suggest that the institutionalization of counterterrorism from its initial emergence in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks to its subsequent expansion, has accelerated specifically after the endorsement of the new Strategic Concept in 2010. Since then, the overall levels of the institutionalization of counterterrorism within the Alliance have been increasing. The effects of this increase on the intra-alliance counterterrorism cooperation analyzed throughout the research.

Keywords: Counter-terrorism, Institutionalization, Intra-alliance cooperation, NATO, Transatlantic Relations

ÖZET

9/11 SONRASI TRANSATLANTİK TERÖRLE MÜCADELEDE İŞ BİRLİĞİNİN ANALİZİ

BEKCİ ARI, Eda

Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı

Danışman: Doç. Dr. Giray SADIK

Aralık 2019, 197 Sayfa

Bu araştırma, 11 Eylül 2001 (9/11)'den bu yana NATO'nun ittifak içi terörle mücadelede iş birliği düzeyinin, terörle mücadelenin spesifik bir çalışma alanı olarak kurumsallaşması düzeyine göre değiştiği iddiasına ampirik bir katkı sağlamayı hedeflemektedir. Bu tezin iki temel amacı bulunmaktadır. İlk olarak bu tez, yeni kurumsalcı teorilerin kuramsal ve metodolojik araçlarından faydalanarak ve analitik anlamda eklektik bir yaklaşım geliştirerek, 9/11 sonrası dönemde İttifak içi terörle mücadelenin NATO'nun çeşitli etkinlik alanları içinde kurumsallaşma seviyeleri arasındaki farklılıkları ortaya çıkarmayı amaçlamaktadır. İkincisi, 9/11 sonrası dönemde NATO içindeki terörle mücadelede iş birliği ile terörle mücadelenin kurumsallaşması arasındaki ilişkiyi ortaya koymak amaçlanmaktadır. Bu tezde, NATO'nun terörle mücadele alanında kurumsallaşması Kapasite Geliştirme, İstihbarat Paylaşımı ve Askeri Operasyonlar gibi spesifik etkinlik alanlarında ayrı ayrı ele alınmıştır. Bu şekilde, NATO içinde terörle mücadelenin kurumsallaşma seviyeleri arasındaki farklılar değerlendirilmiştir.

Bulgular, terörle mücadelenin – spesifik bir görev alanı olarak – kurumsallaşmasının 9/11 terörist saldırılarından hemen sonra başlaması ve bunu takip eden genişlemesine kadar; özellikle 2010 yılında yeni Stratejik Konseptin kabul edilmesinden sonra ivme kazandığına işaret etmektedir. Bu zamandan itibaren bir görev alanı olarak terörle mücadelenin kurumsallaşması artış göstermektedir. Bu artışın ittifak içi terörle mücadelede iş birliğine etkisi araştırma boyunca ele alınmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Terörle mücadele, Kurumsallaşma, İttifak içi iş birliği, NATO, Transatlantik İlişkiler

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Writing my dissertation has been a wonderful experience with serious impediments including emotional and physical pain, but always supportive encouragement from my friends, my family, my supervisor and my committee members.

Foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Giray Sadık who encouraged me and offered his support from the very beginning. I would like to thank him for his priceless remarks on important stepping-stones of my research and for his patience.

Besides my advisor, my sincere thanks also go to the rest of my dissertation committee, Dr. Birol Akgün, Dr. Serhat Erkmen, Dr. Elif Çolakoğlu and Dr. Bayram Sinkaya for their insightful remarks.

I also would like to express my genuine thanks to Dr. Güliz Dinç and Dr. Bayram Sinkaya, not only for their insightful comments on my dissertation but also for their friendly support when I needed most and also to Dr. Yıldız Deveci Bozkuş and to Dr. Barış Özdal for their benevolent advice and friendly support during my process of nosce te ipsum.

Special thanks go to my dear friends, S. Buğrahan Bayram who is not only a valuable colleague but also a real friend, who speaks with emotions from a twisted mind and who always supported me, for our deep conversations, and for his remarks on my dissertation, and to H. Nur Cafoğlu -Yaşar the most inspiring person I have ever met, for her hospitality, for the stimulating discussions, for her comforting words, for the sleepless nights we were working together before deadlines and for all the fun we have had in the last five years.

I also would like to express my sincere thanks to Tuna Saral, not only a friend but also my partner in crime, for her priceless friendship, for her hospitality during the days that I was staying in her house and for her inspiring ideas about life and to Gökçe Yiğit, my dear friend, for listening to me for hours, for the days that we spent together in Ankara, for her ability to find the funniest parts of life even during the hardest times that made us laugh together for hours.

I also would like to thank Melissa Hauber-Özer & M. Onur Özer for their friendship and helpful comments on my dissertation.

I also would like to express my heartfelt thanks to Bilal and Mustafa Bekci, not only my brothers but also my best friends in all my life, to Öznur Bekci my dear aunt, my second mother whom raised me, and to my parents Pervin & M. Can Bekci for their support, endless love and care.

Last but not the least, my deepest gratitude goes to my beloved spouse to Dr. E. Sertaç Arı for his endless support, caring, and patience even during the hardest times. Without him I cannot reach even this far.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

ACO: Allied Command Operations

ACT: Allied Command Transformation

AJD: Allied Joint Doctrine

AJP: Allied Joint Publication

ASG: Assistant Secretary-General

ASG-IS: Assistant Secretary-General for Intelligence and Security

ANA: Afghanistan National Army

ANATF: Afghanistan National Army Trust Fund

ARTF: Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund

ASFF: Afghanistan Security Force Fund

AWACS: Airborne Early Warning and Control Systems

BI-SC: Both Strategic Commands (ACT &ACO)

CAX: Computer Assisted Exercises

CB: Capacity Building

CBRN Threats: Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Threats

CCOMC: Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre

CD: Capability Development

CMX: Crisis Management Exercise

COE: NATO Center of Excellence

COE DAT: NATO Center of Excellence-Defense Against Terrorism

COp: Combined Military Operation

COPD: Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive

CPG: Comprehensive Political Guidance

CPX: Command Post Exercise

CRO: Crisis Response Operations

CSO: Collaboration Support Office

CT: Counter-terrorism

CT-CD: Counter-terrorism Capability Development

CT-IS: Counter-terrorism Intelligence Sharing

CTC: Counter-terrorism Cooperation

CT-Mop: Counter-terrorism Military Operation

C3: NATO Consultation, Command and Control Taxonomy

DAT: Defense Against Terrorism

DAT-POW: Defense Against Terrorism Program of Work

DCI: Defense Capabilities Initiative

DCOS OPI: Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Intelligence

DV: Dependent Variable

EADRCC: Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre

E&T: Education and Training

ESCD: Emerging Security Challenges Division

EU: The European Union

FVEY: Five Eyes

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

HQ: Headquarters

IC: Intelligence Cycle

IED: Improvised Explosive Devices

ILU: Intelligence Liaison Unit

IO: International Organization

IR: International Relations

IRM&CM: Intelligence Requirement Management and Collection Management

IS: Intelligence Sharing

ISAF: International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan

ISIL: Islamic State of Iraq and Levant

ISIS: Islamic State in Iraq and Syria

ISRTA: New Technology for Intelligence, Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition

IV: Independent Variable

JALLC: Joint Analysis and Lessons Learning Center

JIAC: Joint Information Analysis Center

JISR: Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

JFC: Joint Force Command

JOp: Joint Military Operation

LIVEX: Live Exercises

MCDT: Military Committee Concept for Defense Against Terrorism

MCCT: Military Committee Concept for Counter-terrorism

MOp: Military Operation

NAC: North Atlantic Council

NATO: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCIA: NATO Communication and Information Agency

NIFC: NATO Intelligence Fusion Center

NSO: NATO Standardization Office

NRF: NATO Response Force

NURC: NATO Undersea Research Center

OAE: Operation Active Endeavor

OEA: Operation Eagle Assist

OSG: Operation Sea Guardian

PAP-T: The Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism

PfP: Partnership for Peace Consortium

PKK: Kurdistan Workers Party

PRT: Provincial Reconstruction Teams

RSM: Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan

RTO: Research and Technology Organization

SACEUR: Supreme Allied Commander Europe

SDI: Smart Defense Initiative

SHAPE: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

SPS: Science for Peace and Security

SG: Secretary-General

STANAG: NATO Standardization Agreements

STO: Science and Technology Organization

TRT: Turkish Radio and Television Corporation

TTIU: Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit

U.K.: The United Kingdom

U.S.: The United States

UN: The United Nations

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction

YPG: People’s Defense Unit

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF CHARTS

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The evident gap in the existing literature on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) policy and practice in counter-terrorism (CT), as a specific issue-area, is the absence of theory-based empirical analysis. Most of the research in this area, in fact, has been conducted in a policy-focused manner, while, exceptionally, some descriptive researches exist as well. Therefore, literature in this field remains under-theorized. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), NATO has been developing policies and practices based on the transnational character of this threat. Thus, to address this gap in the existing literature and in a period of increasing NATO involvement in the fight against international terrorism targeting transatlantic security, the conceptualization of CT within NATO may contribute to a better understanding of the consequences that have been generated by this issue-area including intra-alliance CT cooperation (CTC).

Relationally, based on the political guidance provided at the Prague Summit in 2002, and later the new Strategic Concept, which was acknowledged at the Lisbon Summit in 2010, NATO not only has sought to enhance the effectiveness of CT policies and practices but also to enhance intra-alliance counter-terrorism cooperation (CTC). The policy set out in NATO's policy guidelines on CT, which were agreed on in 2012, has combined assurance of intra-alliance CTC and a determination to make CT a permanent issue-area within NATO. Thenceforward, almost all Alliance policies, concepts, and doctrines have been reviewed and revised in consideration of the threat posed by terrorism (Mora-Figueroa 2005). The first-of-its-kind Alliance document, in this regard, was the Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism[1] in 2002 (MCDT), which was later superseded by the Military Concept for Counterterrorism (MCCT) in 2015, and defined NATO's role in transatlantic CTC. The MCDT and MCCT have recognized that NATO forces may be deployed whenever and wherever needed (MCCT 2016; NATO's military concept for defence against terrorism 2002)[2]. Other military concepts, doctrines, and plans have also been revised or elaborated in line with MCDT and MCCT. Practical support is

[1] MC 472

[2] MCDT is not available online in NATO's official web page but can be found at: https://web.arch_ve.org/web/20050610194942/http://www.nato._nt/_ms/docu/terror_sm.htm

also given to member countries, for instance, the Operation Eagle Assist (OEA) and Airborne Early Warning and Control Systems aircraft (AWACS) provided support to the United States (U.S.) forces in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Additionally, the Allies have also been working together in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan to assure that the country never becomes a safe haven for terrorist or extremist groups again.

In this regard, NATO has been working on enhancing intra-alliance CTC by developing policies, concepts, doctrines, and practices in the realm of CT. As a result, CT, as a specific issue-area, has been institutionalized within NATO since 9/11. Therefore, it represents a highly relevant, and so far, under-explored, case study for the understanding of the processes and the consequences of institutionalization in this issue- area. Webber et al. (2012, 39) observed this gap in the literature, noting that "institutionalization within the Alliance is variable and changing." They also pointed out:

> It is possible to aggregate all these various processes and to talk of the institutionalization of the Alliance as a whole, but equally, given the multi-functionality of NATO, it is also necessary to consider different sets of institutions within particular issue-areas and thus varying degrees of institutionalization. Such an approach not only accords with NATO's broadening agenda but also has the added benefit of allowing for a more fine-grained set of observations able to distinguish between different NATO activities (Webber, Sperling, and Smith 2012, 39).

Thus, this dissertation aims to explore the relationship between the institutionalization of CT as a specific issue-area within NATO and intra-alliance CTC since 9/11. The overarching argument of this dissertation is as such: embedded within the general framework of its post-9/11 political and military transformation[3] at the macro-level, institutionalization of CT as a specific issue-area at the micro-level – from its emergence in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 to its subsequent expansion – has affected NATO's intra-alliance CTC. This perspective explains how the institutionalization of specific issue-areas at the micro-level within NATO responds to macro-level challenges, such as keeping NATO as a strategically relevant actor in the post-9/11 era for its members.

[3]The term transformation described here is the reforms in NATO's policy and structure in the post-9/11 era without giving any reference to the theoretical debates on NATO's transformation and adaptation.

To put it in a nutshell, building on the assumption that intra-alliance CTC within NATO cannot be fully understood without taking the impacts of the institutionalization of CT as a specific issue-area, this dissertation posits that institutionalization of CT within NATO has affected intra-alliance CTC and that intra-alliance CTC in its own right is a marker of NATO's strategic relevance in the post-9/11 era. As Sadık (2016, 118) has noted,

> The rise of terrorist attacks throughout the Allied territories can be attributed to the lack of a NATO vision for Allied counter-terrorism cooperation. Having this vision is not only essential for the security of the Allies and their citizens, but also for NATO's survival as a strategically relevant actor for Allies' security, and in world politics.

Bearing in mind the overarching arguments above, this dissertation takes an empirical stand. To this end, we will, first, investigate the institutionalization of CT within NATO in the specific set of domains where NATO conducts most of its CT activities, namely, Capability Development (CD), Intelligence Sharing (IS) and Military Operations (MOps). As Peter Romaniuk (2010, 611) once has noted, since terrorist attacks of 9/11, "international institutions have played a prominent role in counterterrorism. Despite this break with the past, there remains variation in the institutionalization of counter-terrorism, both across domains and over time."

Thus, to be able to explore any possible variations within different domains where NATO's efforts on CT mostly takes place, we will examine the institutionalization of CT within these specific domains. As a result, the institutionalization of CT within NATO will be a combination of the institutionalization of CT within these specific sets of domains. Therefore, the third chapter (Chapter 3) of this dissertation will inspect these possible variations in the levels of institutionalization of CT within these domains.

Next, the empirical chapter of this dissertation (Chapter 4) will investigate the effects of the institutionalization of CT upon intra-alliance CTC within the domains of CD, IS and MOPs. In addition, although the intra-alliance CTC is the main case under investigation, the researcher has specified six distinct categories in which the Allies contribute to the intra-alliance CTC. These categories are; defense expenditures, force deployment to International Security Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) and Resolute Support Mission (RSM), financial contributions to the Afghanistan National Army Trust Fund

(ANATF), counterterrorism-related military exercises, activities funded by the Allies under the Science and Technology Organization (STO) and the activities conducted by the NATO Center of Excellence Defense Against Terrorism (COE DAT). Therefore, intra-alliance CTC within NATO becomes a combination of these categories. We will provide further clarification of these categories in the research design and methodology chapter (Chapter 2) along with other measurement and methodology issues.

Nevertheless, before starting the empirical investigation, it is essential to delve into some points including; the scope and the limitations of the research, definitions of main concepts such as terrorism, CT, CTC, and, intra-alliance CTC; a literature review; a contextual framework to understand the importance of intra-alliance CTC for NATO and a theoretical framework to clarify the relationship between the institutionalization of CT and intra-alliance CTC. Therefore, the flow of the following sections of the first chapter (Introduction) will be as follows:

1.1 Scope and Limitations
1.2 Definitions
1.3 Literature Review
1.4 Contextual Framework
1.5 Theoretical Framework

Thus, the following sections of this chapter will cover the above-mentioned issues respectively.

1.1 Scope and Limitations

The scope of this dissertation is limited in several ways. The first and foremost, this dissertation does not focus on the 'best' ways to countering the terrorist threat. To be more precise, this dissertation does not focus on the questions of how to counter the threat posed by terrorism or how to bridge the differences among the security cultures and/or perceptions of the Allies such as the divide between the Atlanticists and Europeanists on their approach to terrorism and CT.

Second, this research is neither about the debates on NATO's ambivalent approach to terrorism such as having no designated terrorist organizations/individuals lists nor about

the debates that NATO does not support Turkey on its long fight against terrorism, in particular, its fight against Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Additionally, the debates on NATO's has not been supporting Turkey in its fight against the People's Defense Unit (YPG), which is clearly affiliated with PKK as also acknowledged by the U.S. as a terrorist organization, while fighting with Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the southern flank of the Alliance is out of this dissertation's scope. As Sabri Ergen, the former Head of NATO's CT section once has noted; "fighting against terrorism is one of the priorities of Turkey" however, "the International Staff, are not working for Turkey alone; we are working for all NATO members" (Ergen 2011). Relationally, the Senior Advisor to the President of the Republic of Turkey, Gülnur Aybet, in a recent interview on TV (Turkish Radio and Television Cooperation [TRT World]) on Turkey's Operation Olive Branch which aims to secure Afrin from the YPG, stated that "NATO is the biggest security insurance policy in the world, but not all Allies agree on their national security priorities" and this is the first challenge to the cohesion of the Alliance (One on One: Interview with Gülnur Aybet 2019). She also pointed out that:

> Allied countries like Turkey feel that their security concerns are not taken seriously by some NATO Allies but this is really not the fault of the organization because the organization is made up of its member states, so this is more about the relations with member states rather than the organization. We know that Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary-General, has made statements very much in solidarity with Turkey's CT operations in Syria and he has underlined the fact that Turkey suffered more from terrorist attacks particularly from ISIS and the PKK (One on One: Interview with Gülnur Aybet 2019).

So, "in terms of the organization, it is not a problem" she stressed "but it is a problem about the relations between the Allies (One on One: Interview with Gülnur Aybet 2019).

Following Aybet's (One on One: Interview with Gülnur Aybet 2019) arguments cited above, in the broader context, this dissertation does not focus on the question that to what extent did the individual member states contribute to other members' 'individual' efforts in their fight against terrorism, specifically Turkey, rather on the questions of to what extent did the Allies make use of NATO's CT-related assets and how they have contributed to the Alliance's works in the realm of CT since 9/11?

Moreover, although this dissertation acknowledges the importance of above-mentioned debates, it is derived from a much more specific concern that is the individual

consequences of NATO's broader transformation in the face of threat posed by international terrorism and focuses on the questions of how NATO's work on CT since 9/11 can be conceptualized and what are the individual effects of NATO's work in the realm of CT upon intra-alliance CTC in the post-9/11 era.

Thus, this dissertation has offered an analytical perspective through the conceptualization of NATO's work in the realm of CT in the post-9/11 era by stating that CT has emerged as an institutionalized issue-area within NATO and, to be able to explore its relationship with intra-alliance CTC, this research expands on existing academic literature by combining empirical and theoretical insights of the new-institutionalism and intra-alliance cooperation. Perhaps more importantly, this research also seeks to expand the methodological literature on the institutionalization of NATO's issue-areas, CT in particular, by proposing an alternative set of criteria and the operationalization of these criteria on the institutionalization of CT within NATO. In addition, this research expands on the existing literature on intra-alliance cooperation within NATO, by offering a set of variables where one can measure the levels of the intra-alliance CTC within NATO.

During the analysis of the above-mentioned subjects, several limitations were encountered which are essential for consideration. First, methodologically, this dissertation presents an embedded-single case design and conducts a pattern-matching analysis. In this regard, the most identifiable limitation is that the findings of this dissertation might not be generalized to other cases since case studies are generally considered as unique and the findings of the case studies may not be generalized easily (Özkurt 2013, 315). Nevertheless, NATO must be considered as an important case since it is a unique international organization and has been at the core of a "panoply" of international organizations, along with the European Union (EU), that has been vital to the well-being and the cohesion of Transatlantic (Vinjamuri and Naselli 2019).

Second, due to the very nature of this study, that it mostly relies on NATO's official texts, much of the data on NATO's work on CT is limited due to the classification of the official texts. To be able to overcome this limitation, the researcher also used secondary data sources such as; published interviews of the NATO political and military officials and previous scholarly works.

Third, although it recognizes the importance of the conceptual debates on the definition of terrorism and other related concepts, this research prefers to use the definitions that are acknowledged by NATO since the focus of this research is NATO. Thus, these conceptual debates are beyond the scope of this research.

To put in a nutshell, the scope of this research is limited in the ways that NATO defines and applies CT both in theory and in practice and thus, it focuses on the existing practices, mechanisms and concepts in the realm of CT within the Alliance and their likely impacts upon CTC among the Allies within the Alliance. Therefore, ongoing disputes and splits within NATO that have emerged in the immediate aftermath of the recent developments in Syria and Turkey's incursion into northeastern Syria aimed at defeating YPG in the region which have resulted with some of NATO (and the EU) countries suspending arms sales to Turkey are beyond the scope of this research.

By recognizing the importance of the above-mentioned political debates, this dissertation rather puts emphasis on the effective use of NATO assets as the most concrete outcomes of the Alliance's work in the realm of CT. As Juliet Bird (2015, 68), the head of NATO Headquarters (HQ) CT section within the International Staff, once has noted; "NATO has untapped potential, which, given the scope of the terrorist threat, it would be wise of Allies to use it better and more often." Thus, the scope of this research in the broader context covers the questions of to what extent do the Allies contribute to the Alliance's objectives in the realm of CT and to what extent do the Allies make use of the Alliance's assets in face of the threat posed by terrorism such as the education and training, military exercises or other bodily sub-structures in the realm of CT? As Sean Key (1998, 146) once have argued, NATO can play a critical institutional role in Transatlantic security "only if its members choose to make its institutional character work".

Bearing in mind the above-discussed issues, the following section of this chapter will provide the definitions of the core concepts to better outline the main framework of this dissertation. Evidently, definitions are essential to provide any reliable deduction on the main research question(s).

1.2 Definitions

> "In the long history of humankind (and animal kind, too) those who learned to collaborate and improvise most effectively have prevailed" (Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species, 2012).
>
> "The beginning of wisdom is the definition of terms.[4]"

Although extensive academic research has been carried out on terrorism, neither the scholars nor the policymakers agree on the definition of terrorism. In other words, there is no consensus on the definition of terrorism in the literature. Nevertheless, as we have mentioned in the Scope and Limitations section of this chapter, these conceptual debates on the definition of terrorism are beyond the scope of this research. Yet, since this dissertation focuses on NATO, the researcher prefers to use the definition stated in the NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions. According to the Glossary, terrorism is:

> the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence, instilling fear and terror, against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, or to gain control over a population, to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives (AAP-06 Allied Administrative Publication NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions 2017, 113).

For the same purpose, NATO's definition for CT will be used:

> All preventive, defensive and offensive measures taken to reduce the vulnerability of forces, individuals and property against terrorist threats and/or acts, and to respond to terrorist acts. Note: In the frame of the NATO Comprehensive Approach, these measures can be combined with or followed by measures enabling recovery after terrorist acts. (AAP-06 Allied Administrative Publication NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions 2017, 31).

Before providing a definition for intra-alliance CTC within NATO, it is essential to define international cooperation. The oft-quoted definition of international cooperation was provided by the well-known institutionalist scholar, Robert O. Keohane (1984, 12), who argued that international cooperation consists of:

> Active attempts to adjust policies to meet the demands of others. That is, not only does it depend on shared interests, but it emerges from a pattern of discord or potential discord. Without discord,

[4]A much-quoted anonymous aphorism often attributed to Socrates that encapsulates the intrinsic thrust of his narrative.

> there would be no cooperation, only harmony. It is important to define cooperation as a mutual adjustment rather than to view it simply as reflecting a situation in which common interests outweigh conflicting ones.

This definition suits the purposes of this research since the researcher's emphasis is on intra-alliance CTC as a part of international cooperation within NATO. Additionally, this definition, due to its emphasis on discord as a component of international cooperation, especially useful when studying intra-alliance CTC since most of the existing literature on intra-alliance CTC disregards the extensive body of literature on international cooperation and has tended to focus on diverging views among the member states and disagreements on CT-related issues. In other words, by following Keohane's (1984) argument, disagreements on CT-related issues do not necessarily mean the absence of intra-alliance CTC, yet, in fact, are an essential part of intra-alliance CTC.

In addition, it is also useful to acknowledge that patterns of discord or potential discord do not necessarily mean the absence of intra-alliance CTC within the overarching institutional structure of the Alliance. Indeed, in most cases, discord among the Allies, to recapitulate Aybet's argument (One on One: Interview with Gülnur Aybet 2019), is a problem of the relations between the member states but not a problem of the organization itself. Perhaps more important, it would be unlikely to enhance the intra-alliance CTC, unless the Alliance allows its' member states, through a set of institutional re-arrangements or through a set of institutionalized patterns of cooperation, to solve the points of disagreements or discord among the members.

In a similar vein, Charles Kupchan (1988, 28) in his much-cited research titled "*NATO and the Persian Gulf: Examining Intra-alliance Behavior"* defines intra-alliance cooperation as "mutual accommodation among member states: active attempts to adjust policies to take the interests of other alliance partners into consideration". Deriving from Kupchan and other scholarly works on international cooperation, intra-alliance CTC this research refers to *a specific form of mutual accommodation among member states: the active attempts to adjust policies within the overarching organizational framework of NATO and the tendency of the member states to work together aimed at countering the threat posed by terrorism.*

Akin to the definition of intra-alliance CTC, it is crucial to identify its components so, as to able to measure its values. The important point to make here is, in contrast to the

existing literature, this research will not only focus on the defense spending levels of the Allies as the major component of intra-alliance cooperation but rather will identify a variety of distinct components including such as number of CT-related military exercises and number of CT-related projects which are conducted within the overarching institutional framework of the Alliance. Thus, in the research design and methodology chapter of this dissertation (Chapter 2), we will identify the components of intra-alliance CTC along with further methodological issues by utilizing the above-discussed definitions and the literature on intra-alliance cooperation within NATO.

Before embarking upon the research design and methodology chapter, there is a need to provide a literature review. Thus, the following section of this chapter will provide a literature review to answer the question of what we know and do not know about NATO's role in transatlantic CTC. Additionally, other concepts and terms related to this research such as institution and institutionalization will also be presented in the following sections of this chapter.

1.3 Literature Review

This part of this dissertation aims to identify what we know and what we do not know about NATO's role in transatlantic CTC and why it is much more important to examine the new patterns of cooperation now – almost twenty years after the terrorist attacks of 9/ 11, which have pushed international terrorism to the top of the transatlantic security cooperation agenda – in this relationship[5].

Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, NATO's role within transatlantic CTC has become a central issue in the literature, and there is a growing consensus that NATO's contribution to transatlantic CTC is essential for its strategic relevance in the post-9/11 era. Philip Gordon (2001), in his much-cited work titled "NATO after 11 September", stated that "while the anti-terrorism campaign changes NATO's character and carries many risks,

[5]Although a considerable amount of theoretical literature has been published on NATO's role as a collective security organization in Transatlantic, from a legal point of view NATO does not have principal responsibility for collective security in Transatlantic. The North Atlantic Treaty does not suggest such a role. Furthermore, the debates on the issue is beyond the scope of this research. Therefore, this term, 'security', is used in its' broader sense throughout the research without giving any further reference to the theoretical literature on the issue. Thus, security in this research refers to: "the state of being free from danger or threat" https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/security. For further research see for example: (Neocleous 2006, 363–84; Rothschild 1995, 53–98).

it also demonstrates NATO's continued utility and provides an opportunity to renovate and give new life to an alliance whose future was uncertain" (89). Christopher Bennett (2003) has also acknowledged the role of an effective CT strategy regarding the strategic relevance of NATO. Other works focusing on NATO's role in transatlantic CTC, such as NATO after Prague: Learning the Lessons of 9/11 (Rühle 2003), Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Europe, NATO and the European Union (Bensahel 2003) and Transatlantic Counter-terrorism Cooperation: The New Imperative (Rees 2007) have emphasized the possible contributions that NATO can deliver to transatlantic CTC.

However, most of these studies have either focused on inter-organizational CTC, such as the CTC between the European Union (EU) and NATO or the CTC between NATO and its non-member partners, without giving much emphasis to intra-alliance CTC within NATO. To be more precise, these works have not engaged with CTC among the members within the overarching framework of NATO to any significant degree. In addition, a vast portion of the literature has concentrated on policy while NATO's theoretical treatments on NATO were often included in broader studies of Transatlantic relations and Transatlantic security. (Bensahel 2006; Rees 2007; Rees and Aldrich 2005). As a result, theoretical treatments of NATO are often based on an attachment to mainstream international relations (IR) theories or their updated versions, while "innovative theoretical approaches" have not engaged with NATO to any significant degree[6] (E. Hallams, Ratti, and Zyla 2013a; Locatelli and Testoni 2010; Rynning 2005).

Besides, more recent research on NATO, including its role in transatlantic CTC, not only has neglected an extensive body of literature on intra-alliance cooperation, with few exceptions but also failed to relate their empirical findings to larger theoretical and methodological treatments[7]. Furthermore, recent theoretical research on NATO's work in the realm of CT, which particularly takes an institutionalist approach, has tended to consider CT within NATO as a unified body by neglecting possible variances of NATO's efforts in CT within different domains[8]. In support of this argument, Peter Romaniuk (2010, 611) noted that "since 9/11, international institutions have played a prominent role

[6]For an exception see, for example: (Johnston 2017).
[7]For these exceptions see, for example: (Becker 2017, 131–57; Oma 2012, 562–673; Zyla 2016, 5–22)
[8]See, for example: (Maness 2016).

in counter-terrorism. Despite this break with the past, there remains variation in the institutionalization of counter-terrorism, both across domains and over time."

Last but not the least, in contrast to the existing literature on measuring the levels of the intra-alliance cooperation, and intra-alliance CTC within NATO more specifically, the focus of this research will not only be on the defense spending levels of the Allies as the major criteria to assess whether the Allies cooperate in the realm of CT, rather, applies a results-oriented approach by focusing on a variety of allied contributions to intra-alliance CTC including, for instance, the number of CT-related projects led by the Allies within the overarching institutional framework of the Alliance.

To conclude, this research aims to fill these gaps in the literature in several ways. First, this research, in contrast to the literature on NATO's role in transatlantic CTC, puts emphasis on intra-alliance CTC within NATO. Second, by following an analytically eclectic approach, this research is an attempt to introduce new methodological insights to the study of the process of institutionalization of specific issue-areas in general and CT in particular. Third, this research also aims to contribute to the policy-based literature on NATO's work in the realm of CT by comparing its efforts on CT within different domains to examine the possible variances within them. Last, this research contributes to the literature on intra-alliance CTC within NATO through the specification of the distinct contributions of the Allies to the intra-alliance CTC. Such an examination may also contribute to NATO's future policy implications on intra-alliance CTC.

Therefore, the following section of this chapter will set out a contextual framework to understand the importance of intra-alliance CTC for NATO, and the subsequent section will set out a theoretical framework to establish the links between the institutionalization of CT and intra-alliance CTC.

1.4 Contextual Framework: Importance of Intra-Alliance Counter-Terrorism Cooperation for NATO

Transatlantic CTC has arisen in response to the threat posed by international terrorism, which has been growing since the terrorist attacks of 9/11. It has resulted in various forms of cooperation being drawn together, and NATO has become a framework for transatlantic CTC among the members. As noted by Rynning (2005, 170), the terrorist

attacks of 9/11 reassured the NATO member states that some threats -at least- are shared and that cooperation should be held within the overarching institutional framework of the Alliance, which subsequently set up a process of rearrangements to provide objective conditions for effective intra-alliance CTC.

However, as the terrorist threat has risen, the Allies have come to recognize that they must work together more systematically within the framework of NATO. In particular, after the 2015 killings at the Charlie Hebdo magazine office in Paris, the transatlantic region has been facing an increasing number of terrorist attacks, and this situation has accelerated the scholarly debates on the importance of intra-alliance CTC in keeping NATO as a strategically relevant actor for its members.

As a matter of course, central to the entire debates on the strategic relevance of NATO is the concept of intra-alliance cooperation since the 1950s. As the report, which was produced at the meeting of the "Committee of Three"[9] on December 13, 1956, introduced, new areas of cooperation in non-military fields among the member countries to improve and extend the intra-alliance cooperation are vital to develop greater unity within the Alliance (Pearson, Martino, and Lange 1956). The report found out that unless enhanced intra-alliance cooperation was achieved, "the very framework of cooperation in NATO, which has contributed so greatly to the cause of freedom, and which is so vital to its advancement in the future, will be endangered" (Pearson, Martino, and Lange 1956). The "Three Wise Men's" argument leads to a rational deduction that intra-alliance cooperation in the post-9/11 era should be improved through the new areas of intra-alliance cooperation to keep its strategic relevance, and CT, acknowledged by the Allies as an issue-area in the aftermath of 9/11, is no exception.[10]

In support of this argument, Giray Sadık (2016, 114) has emphasized that effective intra-alliance CTC within NATO is the key to maintaining NATO as a strategically relevant organization for member security, and this is more a question of 'how' than 'if'. He has pointed out that:

[9]The Committee on Non-Military Cooperation, more frequently referred to as the "Committee of Three" or the "Three Wise Men" comprised Lester B. Pearson, Foreign Minister of Canada; Gaetano Martino, Foreign Minister of Italy; and Halvard Lange, Foreign Minister of Norway (NATO - Topic: Report of the Committee of Three 2017; Pearson, Martino, and Lange 1956).

[10]As evidenced by the Christmas market attack in Berlin on January 19, 2016, terrorist groups continue to threaten the transatlantic region.

> Above all, such cooperation is essential for the security of NATO member states and their citizens. An alliance that fails to contribute to the security of its members is bound to head the way of strategic irrelevance for its members (Sadık 2016, 114).

More recently, at their summit in Brussels in 2018, the Allies also acknowledged the importance of intra-alliance CTC by stating that "cooperation within the Alliance can enhance Allies' national efforts and capacity to prevent, mitigate, respond to, and be resilient against acts of terrorism" (Brussels Summit Declaration 2018).

In fact, the common idea that the researcher pointed out above, that is, the importance of the intra-alliance CTC to keep NATO as a relevant actor for its members is generally recognized. One question that needs to be asked, however, is how to enhance intra-alliance CTC. Without failing to acknowledge that there can be different answers to the above-mentioned question, this research focuses on the likely effects of institutionalization of CT on intra-alliance CTC. Hence, the subsequent section of this research will set out a theoretical framework to establish the links between the institutionalization of CT and intra-alliance CTC.

1.5 Theoretical Framework

> The theory on its own does not tell us much about either the origin, content, or form of the institutions and beliefs that produce and sustain an equilibrium. To get at these factors, we need to turn to the specifics of the case. We need to offer a narrative that links the theoretical concepts. (J. Bowen and Petersen 1999, 168)

As Hallams et al. (2013b, 15) have argued, if empirical research lacks proper conceptualization of the terms and a proper theoretical basis, it will be meaningless. In this respect, the main question that this part of the research addresses is as such: What is the relationship between the institutionalization of CT and intra-alliance CTC within NATO? However, before embarking upon the above-mentioned question, it is essential to clarify a few more areas, including the importance of intra-alliance CTC to NATO, the importance of the institutionalization of CT to intra-alliance CTC, the core concepts, including *institution* and *institutionalization*, and the criteria of institutionalization.

Accordingly, the following part of this section is designed to answer the following questions:

- Why is it important to acknowledge an institutionalist approach when studying CT as a specific issue-are within NATO?
- What are the definitions of *institution*, *institutionalization*, and *institutionalization of CT*?
- What is the relationship between the institutionalization of CT and intra-alliance CTC?
- What are the criteria for the institutionalization of CT within NATO?

1.5.1 Why Is It Important to Acknowledge an Institutionalist Approach when Studying Counter-Terrorism within NATO?

There is no doubt that NATO has experienced an important political and military transformation process that changed its image and the nature of the organization as an international security actor (Terriff 2013). This transformation was largely induced by the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the rapidly changing international security environment that changed the way NATO acted externally in world politics. This process has engendered the debates that 9/11 has shifted prior to existing NATO paradigms and NATO's future has been described by terms either rise or decline. (E. Hallams, Ratti, and Zyla 2013b, 326). The vast amount of the broader literature on NATO in the post-9/11 era is either policy-focused or empirically based, but the studies on NATO are often considered under the broader studies of transatlantic relationships or Euro-Atlantic security (Bensahel 2006; Rees 2007; Rees and Aldrich 2005). Consequently, "theoretical treatments of NATO are often based on an attachment to mainstream IR theories or their updated versions", while "innovative theoretical approaches" have not engaged with NATO to any significant degree[11] (E. Hallams, Ratti, and Zyla 2013a; Locatelli and Testoni 2010; Rynning 2005). Some of these studies include evaluations of NATO's effort to adapt to shifting power relations and of soft-balancing as an alternative to the traditional balance of power behavior (Nevers de 2007, 36). Some others who have attempted to conceptualize NATO, either focused on its role as a global security actor (an active promoter of norms and values that can shape its members' actions and strategic preferences), its traditional role as a territorial defense alliance, the idea that NATO should go "back to basics", or its role as a

[11]As an exception see, for example: (Johnston 2017).

mere forum for consultations among the members on their security-related efforts[12]. Although a considerable amount of theoretical literature has been published on NATO's role as a collective security organization in transatlantic, from a legal point of view, NATO does not have principal responsibility for collective security in Transatlantic. The North Atlantic Treaty does not suggest such a role. Furthermore, the debates on the issue are beyond the scope of this research.

Since this research is derived from a much more specific concern, that is, to investigate the likely impacts of institutionalization of CT upon intra-alliance CTC within NATO, in contrast to the existing literature, we prefer to conceptualize NATO as neither a global security actor, a regional defense alliance, nor a mere forum but between these off[13]. Following Sadık's (2016, 119) argument that "an alliance that fails to provide the security of its members and their citizens is bound to open to debate its very existence", the main foci of this research are for whom NATO exists and that NATO's strategic relevance will depend on its ability to satisfy its member states. In other words, the main theoretical claim this study advances on the conceptualization of NATO is that NATO continues to find an institutional expression to provide the security of its members through expanding its works both in the military and non-military fields, and CT is no exception. (Johnston 2017, 16). As Kirchner (2018, 23) argues, NATO has to find a proper balance between its role as a global security actor and as a territorial defense alliance and should enhance its institutional structure in the realm of CT.

Moreover, according to NATO's policy guidelines on CT, it is clearly stated that no matter whether NATO plays a leading or supporting role in the realm of CT "the Alliance's capabilities represent an essential component of a potential response to terrorism and that the Alliance will maintain flexibility as to how to counter-terrorism" (NATO's Policy Guidelines on Counter-terrorism: Aware, Capable and Engaged for a Safer Future 2012).

Thus, further developing the global security actor vis-à-vis territorial defense alliance debates, this dissertation, by following an analytically eclectic institutionalist

[12]Although this dissertation acknowledges the importance of the recent debates, such as the questions of what NATO is for, i.e. whether it is a multilateral arrangement, a security community or a post-modern alliance, these debates are beyond the focus of this research. For further research, among others, see:
(Hoffman et al. 2016; Rougé 2011, 49–54; Snyder 1997).
[13]For a similar approach, see: (Gürcan 2018).

approach[14], rather puts emphasis on NATO's specific assets[15] in the realm of CT that enabled the practical implication of CT policies for the use of Allies. Hence, the extent to which NATO can enable the practical implementation of its CT policies for the use of Allies would create a meaningful impact to maintain its strategic relevance.

Bearing in mind the above argument, the main aim of this research is to conceptualize the development of CT policies and practices within NATO. Indeed, it is useful to follow an institutionalist approach when considering CT as a specific issue-area within NATO. Given the importance of the developments regarding NATO's multi-functional assets in the last two decades, this approach would allow the researcher to establish concentrated explanations for NATO's specific activities in general and CT in particular (Webber 2009).

Furthermore, although the impacts of NATO's institutionalized structure on its survival have been largely examined, from the early work of Celeste A. Wallander in the post-Cold War era, titled; "The Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War" (2000) to more recent works, such as Mark Webber et al.'s (2012) "NATO's Post-Cold War Trajectory: Decline or Regeneration" on its strategic relevance in the post-9/11 era, there is little research on the institutionalization of specific issue-areas such as CT and their likely impacts upon intra-alliance CTC in the post-9/11 era. Webber et al. (2012, 39) observed this gap in the literature by noting that "institutionalization within the Alliance is variable and changing." They also pointed out:

> It is possible to aggregate all these various processes and to talk of the institutionalization of the Alliance as a whole, but equally, given the multi-functionality of NATO, it is also necessary to consider different sets of institutions within particular issue-areas and thus varying degrees of institutionalization. Such an approach not only accords with NATO's broadening agenda but also has the added benefit of allowing for a more fine-grained set of

[14]There are several new institutionalist accounts (i.e.: historical institutionalism, rational choice or functional institutionalism and sociological institutionalism etc.). This research prefers to integrate these school of thoughts since the focus of these research is neither NATO's structure nor its's nature, rather, the CT within NATO as a specific and functional issue-area. Besides, for the most part, NATO has focused on the practical requirements of CT. Differing accounts in new-intuitionalism will be discussed in the following sections of this chapter. Other theoretical question we are not tackling here is the difference between institutions and organizations See : (Pierson 2000; Tolbert and Zucker 1996).

[15]Throughout this research, the term, "asset", although borrowed from the much-cited work of C. E. Wallander, The Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War (2000), refers to all the services, advantages and the resources provided by NATO to its members and partners in a wider context.

> observations able to distinguish between different NATO activities (Webber, Sperling, and Smith 2012, 39).

In order to fill this gap in the literature, following Webber's argument and regarding the development of CT as a specific issue area within NATO since 9/11, it would be proper to focus on the development of CT as a specific issue-area by following an institutionalist approach. More importantly, the broader literature, both on the military alliances and the IOs, has gradually shifted away from the question of whether institutionalization matters to investigate, instead, how and in what ways institutionalization differs and, essentially, how institutional structures affect intra-alliance cooperation (Sprecher and Krause 2006). However, although the argument that institutions are necessary components of any theory of international relations (IR) has more or less accepted, the more specific questions are still open, including what are the independent consequences of the institutionalization of specific issue-areas?

Therefore, this research locates the analysis in the institutionalist approach[16] (new institutionalism) in general and does not counter-pose among the theories of IR (i.e.: realism vs. institutionalism or rationalism vs. constructivism,). Instead, this dissertation investigates new institutionalism on its own terms by following an analytically eclectic approach to developing a set of theoretically based hypotheses, which are then examined empirically in the following chapters. To be more precise, instead of debating the merits and shortcomings of IR theories, the researcher, from an analytically eclectic point of view, prefers to integrate the theoretical tools offered by new institutionalism to employ empirical research on the impacts of the institutionalization of CT upon intra-alliance CTC. Analytical eclecticism is useful to demonstrate the practical relevance of and substantive connections among these schools of thought (Sil and Katzenstein 2010, 412). By following Levi (1999, 155) on analytical eclecticism, the theoretical basis of this dissertation denotes an effort to create interpretations of empirical events within an context appropriate for this analysis. Therefore, the next part of this section will first provide definitions for institutions, institutionalization, and institutionalization of CT. The section that follows will establish the links between the institutionalization of CT and intra-alliance CTC within NATO.

[16]The researcher prefers to use "new institutionalism" with reference to the three different analytical approaches within the institutionalist theory, namely: rational choice, historical and normative institutionalism. More detailed theoretical discussion will be presented in the subsequent parts of this chapter.

1.5.2 Institutions, Institutionalization, and Institutionalization of Counter-Terrorism

In the theoretical framework of this dissertation, *institutionalization* arises as to the most problematic issue. This is engendered by the fact that the term embodies a mixed bag of different concepts, which all reflect different meanings. This conceptual fog subsequently begets the difficulty of identification and measurement. In addition, without a proper understanding of institutional structures[17], it is hard to comprehend what institutionalization is. Hence, it is crucial to clarify the definition of an institutional structure before embarking on an exploration of the importance of the institutionalization of CT to the intra-alliance CTC.

The main ambiguity surrounding the definition of institutional structures and institutionalization is triggered by the fact that new institutionalism does not constitute a consolidated school of thought; rather, it includes at least three different approaches[18](Hall and Taylor 1996, 5). Following Jönsson and Tallberg (2001), this research distinguishes between rational choice normative and historical institutionalism, each of which has roots in the broader theory of new-institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996; Jönsson and Tallberg 2001). In addition, we will also benefit from the conceptual and methodological insights of a well-known scholar, Samuel P. Huntington's (1968; 1965, 1973) earlier works on institutionalization.

To begin with, rational choice institutionalism defines institutional structures as continuous and linked sets of formal and informal rules which regulate the roles of states and possible actions, and shape the expectations of states (R. O. Keohane 1988; March and Olsen 1984). Institutional structures, for them, are, in a sense, agreements about a structure

[17]The term "institution" sometimes referred as institutional structure. See, for example: (Ikenberry 2001, 3–19). For the purposes of this research, I prefer to use institutional structure since the main focus of this research is not international institutions but CT as a specific issue-area or within NATO. In other words, CT is embedded within NATO's overarching institutional structure.

[18]These schools of thought together are generally referred as "new institutionalisms" in the literature of IR. With an aim of retaining consistency throughout the research, we prefer to use "new institutionalism" with reference to three schools of thought. Additionally, normative institutionalism is sometimes referred as constructivist institutionalism, and rational choice institutionalism is sometimes referred as neo-liberal institutionalism or functional institutionalism in the literature. However, there are also works which treat functional institutionalism as a distinct school of thought. It is also important to note that there is an inconsistency in the more recent theoretical literature on the differences between these accounts. Yet, these theoretical debates are beyond the scope of this dissertation. For the purposes of this research, the researcher prefers to use rational choice, normative and historical institutionalism. For further research, see, for example: (Hall and Taylor 1996, 936–57; Levy, Young, and Zürn 1994, 267–330; Schmidt 2006, 2007; Underdal and Young 2004).

of cooperation (Shepsle 1983, 74). In addition, according to rational choice institutionalists, institutional structures are composed of a set of positions and sub-units. In contrast, normative institutionalists define institutional structures as socially constructed ideas that bound and shape states' actions. Institutional structures, for them, are overarching patterns of relations that define and reproduce the interests and actions of actors within any given institutional structure (Hall and Taylor 1996, 949). Additionally, rules may be replaced or modified over time through processes of selection and adaptation (Hall and Taylor 1996, 954). According to normative institutionalists, rules may be transmitted among actors through education, training, socialization, and habitualization (March and Olsen 2013, 487).

Historical institutionalist scholars, define institutional structures as the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and agreements embedded in the organizational structure of the polity and associate institutions with organizations and the rules or conventions promulgated by the formal organization (Hall and Taylor 1996, 938; Thelen 1999, 384). In contrast to this definition, there are also works within the historical account of new institutionalism, which argue that institutional structures comprise not only the existence of formal organizations but also the existence of rules and pre-defined roles for the actors involved in any given structure. Young (1980, 337), for instance, argued that institutional structures are not simply formal organizations but more broadly "recognized patterns of practices" among the actors. For historical institutionalists, in general, institutional structures are established in historically critical junctures (i.e.: 9/11) and have "path-dependent" characteristics, which means that proceeding steps in a direction induce further movement in the same direction[19]. (Ikenberry 2001, 16). In other words, path-dependency involves elements of both continuity and (structured) change (Thelen 1999, 384).

Some other works that have drawn upon historical institutionalism, on the other hand, put emphasis on the "process", regarding the development of institutional structures (Argomaniz 2009; Fligstein 2001; Tolbert and Zucker 1996). As noted in Zucker's (1977, 726) early research, which focused on the consequences of varying levels of institutionalization, institutionalization is not only a property variable but also a process. In

[19]The term "path-dependence" is defined in its broader sense. For more conceptual discussions, see, for example: (Pierson 2000).

the same vein, Samuel P. Huntington, in his earlier work titled *"The Political Order in Changing Societies"* (1973, 12), defined institutionalization as "the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability." For some scholars, the term *process* is defined as "a punctuated equilibrium, an 'episodic and dramatic' change based on crises usually emanated from the external environment that 'punctures' periods of institutional equilibrium and continuity" (Argomaniz 2009, 154).

It is important to note that, new-institutionalist theories contain contradictory notions of change (Hira and Hira 2000, 267). While some scholars have treated change as being episodic (radical) in nature, some others have argued that change may involve the elements of continuity (Argomaniz 2009; Ikenberry 2001; Pierson 2000). Discussions on this dichotomy are central to the conceptualization of institutionalization as a process that is used in this research as a guide to frame our analysis.

Episodic change, according to Weick and Quinn[20] (1990, 362), is infrequent and discontinuous and often involves the replacement of one strategy or program with another. In contrast, continuous change refers to an ongoing, evolving and incremental process (Wick and Quinn 1990, 362). The distinctive feature of "continuous change is the idea that small continuous adjustments, created simultaneously across units, can cumulate and create substantial change" (Wick and Quinn 1990, 375). To them, the contradiction between episodic and continuous change reflects differences in the perspective of the researcher (Wick and Quinn 1990, 362). Within a macro-level analysis, when a researcher examines the flow of events that constitute organizing, they see what looks like repetitive action, routine, and inertia punctuated with occasional episodes of revolutionary change. From a micro-level perspective, however, researchers suggest ongoing adaptation and adjustment (Wick and Quinn 1990). Even though "these adjustments may be small, they also tend to be frequent and continuous across units, which means they are capable of altering structure and strategy" (Wick and Quinn 1990, 362).

By following Weick and Quinn's arguments, since this research adopts a micro-level perspective that focuses on CT as a specific issue-area within NATO, the notion of the process comprises the elements of change and continuity which are ongoing, evolving

[20]Although their work is related to the organizations in the private sector, the discussions on these concepts (change & continuity) are also relevant to the IOs within the discipline of International Relations. See for example: (McKay 2019, 532–53).

and cumulative. It is also important to note that the notion of "change & continuity" sometimes referred as "continuous change". Thus, the concepts; change & continuity and "continuous change" are used interchangeably throughout the research.

Thus, by benefiting from these definitions, in this research, the institutionalization of CT within NATO refers to an *ongoing, evolving and cumulative process that comprises both the elements of change and continuity in policies, procedures, rules, and the establishment and/or re-use of sub-units which are recognized by the Allies as the patterns of CT practices since 9/11 through framing* CT in a different way to mobilize previously uninvolved issue or actors.

The integration of these definitions to define the institutionalization of CT within NATO is useful for two reasons. First, despite their differences, all these schools of thought agree that institutional structures are not only the existence of formal or informal organizations but also the development of specific policies, rules and/or agreements on any given issue-area. Second, the institutionalization of CT within NATO shares at least one aspect with each definition regarding the development of CT within NATO as a specific-issue area in the post 9/11 era. For example, it shares some aspects with historical institutionalism because CT as a specific-issue area emerged in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 (path-dependency) and has been developing as well as being embedded within NATO's overarching institutional structure. It also shares some aspects with the definition provided by the rational choice approach because NATO has developed continuous and linked sets of rules, agreements, and sub-structures, which regulate the roles of actors in the realm of CT that enabled the practical implication of CT policies for the use of Allies[21]. Additionally, it shares at least one aspect with the normative approach because CT policies have been replaced or modified over time through the processes of adaptation or transformation[22]. The following part of this section will further clarify the relationship between the institutionalization of CT and intra-alliance CTC by drawing upon new-institutionalist theories.

[21]For example; establishment of the ESCD, COE-DAT and the Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit (TTIU) among many others.

[22] For example, MCDT endorsed in 2002 has been superseded by the endorsement of MCCT in 2016.

1.5.3 The Relationship Between the Institutionalization of Counter-Terrorism and Intra-Alliance Counter-Terrorism Cooperation

Before embarking upon the relationship between the institutionalization of CT and intra-alliance CTC, it is important to note that the scope of this part is limited in several ways. First and the foremost, this research does not argue whether NATO as an institution -in its broader sense- promotes international cooperation, but rather to be able to provide a proper conceptualization of CT within NATO, examines the post-9/11 development of CT as a specific issue-area within NATO's broad range of missions by using the analytical toolkits of new-institutionalism.

Therefore, this part of the research is about neither the premises and problems of new-institutionalist theories nor the questions of how and why institutional structures are established. Instead of answering these overarching questions, since our aim is not to explain the causal relationship between the institutions and international cooperation, but, rather generate testable hypotheses that will guide the empirical analysis on the question of what the individual effects of the institutionalization of CT are upon intra-alliance CTC, we frame the propositions in a general way.

Second, this part of the research emphasizes the 'main effects' of the institutional structures rather than more complex relations among them. Given the level empirical and theoretical generality to which this dissertation aspires, these simplifying assumptions are necessary. Hence, we have chosen to focus particularly on those which can be identified theoretically as vital aspects of CTC within the Alliance and, also those varying in measurable ways.

It is also worth noting that these schools of thought are not ontologically distinct. Each of these accounts within the broader theory of new-institutionalism agrees on the claim that institutionalization promotes international cooperation. However, the main difference among their assumptions is their answers to the questions of how or in what ways institutionalization promotes cooperative action. In other words, what these institutionalist accounts argue about the relationship between institutionalization and international cooperation are not contradictory to one another in nature, yet, they are practical to guide this research in the way that they develop links between the empirical data and the theoretical assumptions.

Thus, the analysis offered in this part of the dissertation combines the elements of each account in ways that overcome traditional distinctions among these schools of thought and focus on specific contextual conditions (Thelen 1999, 370). To be more precise, this part of the dissertation integrates the basic assumptions of each account within new institutionalism, which will be used as a guide throughout the research with an aim to examine the likely impacts of the institutionalization of CT upon intra-alliance CTC within NATO.

Accordingly, this part will begin with a brief overview of the arguments on the relationship between institutional structures and international cooperation, and in the pages that follow, we will provide simplified and more specific propositions on the likely effects of the institutionalization of CT upon intra-alliance CTC within NATO. Focusing on the institutionalization of CT -as a specific issue-area- challenges a good deal of existing work, which tends to focus on the institutionalization of the Alliance as a whole. In addition, applying the theoretical tools of new institutionalism to a specific issue-area (CT), along with the use of a proper research method, this study will enhance existing literature on NATO's role in transatlantic CTC.

To begin with, rational choice institutionalists follow the "logic of consequences", which means that state actions are driven by the subjective assessments of outcomes of alternative courses of action (R. O. Keohane 1984, 959; March and Olsen 1984). This logic emphasizes states' self-interests and views institutional structures as the aggregation of states' preferences as rational actors through processes of bargaining, negotiation and coalition formation (Hellmann and Wolf 1993; R. O. Keohane 1988; March and Olsen 1984). By taking a functional view of the importance of institutional structures, rational choice institutionalists argue that the rules, procedures and information channels of institutional structures reduce the costs of cooperative behavior and increase the costs of defection (March and Olsen 2013; Wallander 2000). In other words, institutional structures are essentially functional and, thus, should be explained in terms of the problems they solve (Hellmann and Wolf 1993; March and Olsen 2013). Additionally, they assume, since states are rational actors, that each state is aware that other states' motivations are affected in the same way. Consequently, institutional structures enhance a state's capacity to predict the behavior of other states. Inasmuch as states regularly follow the rules and standards of institutional structures, they signal their willingness to continue patterns of cooperation and

therefore reinforce expectations of stability (R. O. Keohane 1988; McCalla et al. 1995; Wallander 2000). The core premises of rational choice institutionalists that link institutional structures to the promotion of international cooperation can best be summarized under three themes. First, policies and rules encourage an increased number of transactions among the members of any given institutional structure. Second, by providing a framework for a further agreement, which makes cooperation more profitable and attractive for the members. Third, institutional arrangements link issue-areas and create greater opportunities for the members both to exchange their capabilities and to balance the differences among their capabilities (Hellmann and Wolf 1993; R. O. Keohane 1984; March and Olsen 2013; Shepsle 1983).

On the contrary, normative institutionalism puts emphasis on the promotion of values and identity. They argue rules and norms which formulate an institutional structure and eventually affect the identities of actors (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002, 575–607). For them, identity-related variables such as shared values or shared threat perceptions are the main sources of international cooperation (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002, 575–607). They claim that institutionalization can help formulate and reformulate states' identities and preferences and thus, shape their preferences on their interests (Hall and Taylor 1996, 954). Normative account within the new-institutionalism follows the "logic of appropriateness" and assumes that members of an institutional structure follow rules not because they are rational actors but because these rules are perceived as natural and valid. Additionally, they argue, by contacting others and revealing experiences and information, rules are established and changed (March and Olsen 2013, 487).

Historical institutionalists stand between the rational choice and normative accounts of new institutionalism and offer four main premises. First, for historical institutionalists, rules and policies mediate state actions within any given institutional structure. In other words, through the rules and policies, actors within an institutional structure shape and constrain their goals and actions. They argue that institutional structures have an impact on actors' behaviors within any given institutional structure because rules and procedures limit the actions of actors. Hence, institutional structures become almost constitutional orders where actors would choose to cooperate because non-cooperative action is irrelevant (Ikenberry 2001, 16–17). Second, to understand how these institutional arrangements shape and constrain the actors' actions, the analysis must be

placed within a historical process. Historical institutionalists argue that the impacts of institutional structures should not be offered as complete explanations of outcomes, but rather tend to be assessed as they interact with other factors, such as national interests, critical junctures, and other policy areas that are significant to any given institutional structure under investigation (Hall and Taylor 1996, 936–37; Thelen 1999, 369–404). Third, institutional structures have path-dependent characteristics, which means that proceeding steps in a direction induce further movement in the same direction. According to historical institutionalists, institutional structures are established in historically critical junctures (i.e.: 9/11) and tend to persist until a later shock introduces a new issue-area for institutional change (Ikenberry 2001, 16). Besides, historical institutionalists, instead of focusing on 'why' types of questions, put emphasis on 'when' types of questions (Fioretos 2011, 369). To be more precise, to them, to be able to understand the outcomes of any policy change and make plausible explanations about the outcome, one should focus on the critical junctures in any given time period.

In short, despite the differences among their explanations for the ways that how institutional structures promote international cooperation and why the actors choose to cooperate, new-institutionalists would expect the degree of cooperation to correlate with the degree of institutionalization (Axelrod and Borzutzky 2006; R. O. Keohane 1984). Institutions create predictable and regular behavior that is necessary for the enhancement of cooperation. In the same vein, Ikenberry (2001, 3–18) argues that creating more institutionalized commitments and structures are the mechanisms through which the actors may be able to overcome their concerns on specific issues. argues, institutional mechanisms can also help mitigate these concerns "by creating a venue where the actors can voice and manage their concerns as well as provide more predictable routines for their interaction" (Wallace 2008).

Before turning to the case, it is important to clarify the fundamental concepts of identity-related variables, such as values and perceptions, which are implicit in the new-institutionalist theory. The main argument of this research is dependent on the institutional assets and opportunities and how they affect the strategic choices of the members. However, the argument does not require -and we are not arguing- that the objectives, values, beliefs, and perceptions of individual states are irrelevant to institutional adaptation. Yet, in the broader context, what this research argues is that the actual use of

the new policies and structures affect intra-institutional cooperation. Therefore, these studies together provide important insights into the main claim of this research that CT has emerged as an institutionalized issue-area within NATO's overarching institutional structure in the aftermath of 9/11. Besides, preliminary empirical evidence is also consistent with this assumption.

Relationally, NATO has established policies and doctrines to conduct CT practices and has revised CT policies, doctrines, and other sub-structures over time through the process of transformation. NATO has provided issue-linkage opportunities for the use of its members, which relates CT with NATO's other work by expanding the role of its old assets, such as education, training and military exercises with the inclusion of CT as a new mission[23]. Additionally, NATO's assets in the area of CT not only developed as a function of its military structure but were also triggered by the need for the practical implementation of CT policies and political cohesion over issues, such as intra-alliance CTC and the Alliance's contributions to transatlantic CTC in the broader context. These assets include both physical assets, such as the CT section within the Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESCD), the Center of Excellence (COEs) in general and the COE on Defense Against Terrorism (COE DAT); Intelligence Division, and immaterial assets, to name only a few, re-formation of its civilian and military structure in the face of emerging threats including CT. In addition, through the multiplication of its sub-structures, hierarchically and functionally, and through differentiation of specific sub-structures, NATO has provided diversified cooperation among the Allies on CT-related issues.

In sum, NATO has provided a framework for the use of its members through the institutionalization of CT, which, in turn, makes intra-alliance CTC more likely within the overarching institutional structure of the Alliance. Nevertheless, as Mattelaer (2011, 136) has pointed out, the Allies may not always agree on how to address any given security challenge, but NATO provides a platform for both members and non-members to address specific problems. In other words, NATO, through the institutionalization of CT, provides

[23]As it was pointed out earlier, this research does not focus on the question of why states choose to cooperate, rather, has a much more specific concern, which is the relationship between intra-alliance CTC and the institutionalization of CT. Hence, this part of research briefly overviewed the basic premises of the new institutionalist theories. For further research see, for example: (Dinev Ivanov 2010, 337–61; Hellmann and Wolf 1993, 3–43; Herbert 1996, 222–36; Kalligas 2006; R. O. Keohane 1988, 379–96; Wallander 2000, 705–35).

a proper institutional structure for the Allies to enhance intra-alliance CTC. This view does not necessarily mean that NATO has provided intra-alliance CTC on an Alliance-wide basis but has provided far deeper cooperation opportunities to the Allies to work together both within and outside of the overarching institutional structure of the Alliance (Mattelaer 2011, 136). Thus, the institutionalization of CT within the Alliance also engenders complementary policies being pursued by allies outside of the formal NATO setting.

In theory, it is expected that the institutionalization of specific issue-areas will further strengthen the tendency for NATO members to work together on particular issues. It is also anticipated that NATO can reduce the transaction costs of specific problems faced by the member states by acting as a facilitator, providing education and training facilities and establishing other mechanisms for the practical implementation of policies regarding any given issue-area that has been subject to the institutionalization process.

Turning now to the empirical evidence regarding the institutionalization of CT within NATO would reflect at least some of the following assumptions[24]:

- NATO has set out specific policies, concepts and doctrines, and, in turn, provided a framework for intra-alliance CTC and for further agreement in the realm of CT, making intra-alliance CTC more likely;
- NATO has revised CT policies and doctrines over time, which enabled the adaptation of the Alliance to the changing nature of the threat posed by terrorism and, thus, to preserve the members' interest in the Alliance,
- NATO has expanded the role of old sub-structures through modifying them and has provided issue-linkage opportunities for its members and, thus, makes intra-alliance CTC more likely in NATO's overarching institutional framework,
- NATO has established new sub-structures to facilitate the practical implementation of CT policies, which encourages an increased number of transactions among the members within the alliance.

Although it is important to provide a background information on NATO's work in the realm of CT to be able to clarify the assumptions above, the researcher, to avoid any tautology, prefers not to present such a background information since a detailed analysis on

[24]These assumptions are non-exhaustive and used for illustrative purposes only.

NATO's work in the realm of CT in the post-9/11 era will already be presented in Chapter Three.

Therefore, with these assumptions in mind, the empirical chapter (Chapter 4) of this research will further examine the individual impacts of the institutionalization of CT within a specific set of domains, namely; CD, IS and MOps upon intra-alliance CTC.

However, before starting the empirical analysis, there is a need to identify the criteria of the institutionalization of CT within NATO to be able to measure the institutionalization of CT. A single measure would be the simplest solution, one that defines institutionalization as 'present' or 'absent' yet, it would be misleading to use such a measure since it does not measure the levels of institutionalization as a process (Tolbert and Zucker 1996). The assessment of institutionalization as a process, as a matter of fact, is more than a concept and, therefore, it is required to develop some criteria to assess the extent of institutionalization. As Levy et. al. have pointed out, institutionalization "is not an all-or-nothing matter" but it may vary from one time period to another and from issue to issue (1994, 42). Required, then, is the clarification of the criteria of institutionalization to explore the variations in the levels of institutionalization since outcomes associated with any given institutional structure are likely to depend on the level of institutionalization (Tolbert and Zucker 1996). Therefore, the following part of this chapter will identify the criteria of institutionalization as a process to set out a criterion that is required for measuring the levels of the institutionalization of CT within NATO between 2001 and 2018.

1.5.4 Criteria of Institutionalization

Institutionalization is a multi-dimensional concept in which these dimensions are theoretically inter-related. Several criteria have been offered by different approaches, and most of these criteria have been applied in the discipline of political science. However, there is little research in the discipline of IR – if any – which offers specific criteria for the study of the institutionalization of specific issue-areas (as a process) within the overarching framework of institutional structures. This part of the dissertation presents a novel argument by proposing an alternative set of criteria to the measurement of the institutionalization of CT within NATO that is built on and extends the previous literature on the criteria of institutionalization. Accordingly, this part will briefly consider the

classical approach developed by Samuel Huntington (1965, 1968, 1973), a well-known scholar whose works are commonly cited or used by others, then, consider two more recent works, and finally, utilizing these approaches, a specific set of criteria through which we can assess the levels of the institutionalization of CT within NATO will be offered.

To begin with, one set of criteria for institutionalization was developed by Huntington (1973, 12), who argued that the level of institutionalization "can be defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of its organizations and procedures." He also noted that "the level of institutionalization of any particular organization or procedure can be measured by its adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence" (Huntington 1973, 12). According to him, "if these criteria can be identified and measured, political systems can be compared in terms of their values of institutionalization" (Huntington 1973). Additionally, the more important point in his work regarding the aim of this research is, on the possibility of measuring "increases and decreases in the institutionalization of the particular organizations and procedures within a political system"(Huntington 1973, 12).

According to Huntington (1973, 13), the first criterion "adaptability" emphasizes the extent to which an institution can adapt to changes in its environment or is incapable of shaping that environment. There are three ways one can measure the adaptability of an institution: chronological, generational and functional (Huntington 1973). Regarding chronological adaptability, he asserted that "the longer an organization or a procedure has been in existence, the higher levels of institutionalization" (Huntington 1968, 15). He argued that generational adaptability can be determined in the following way:

> So long as an organization still has its first set of leaders, so long as a procedure is still performed by those who first performed it, its adaptability is still in doubt. The more often the organization has replaced one set of leaders by another, the more highly institutionalized it is (Huntington 1968, 15).

As to functional adaptability, the third way to measure the levels of institutionalization is based on understanding that "an organization that has adapted itself to changes in its environment and has survived one or more changes in its principal functions is more highly institutionalized than one has not" (Huntington 1968, 16).

The second criterion, autonomy, "is the extent to which political organizations and procedures exist independently of other social groupings and methods of behavior"(Huntington 1973, 20). In other words, autonomy is described as the extent to which an institution is not dependent upon another institution or the members of that institution so that it became institutionalized. The autonomy of an institution can be measured by the extent to which it has its own interests and values distinguishable from those of other institutions and social forces (Huntington 1968, 20).

The third criterion of institutionalization, complexity, demonstrates that "the more complicated an organization is, the more highly institutionalized it is. The greater the number and variety of sub-units, the greater the ability of the organization to secure and maintain the loyalties of its members" (Huntington 1968, 18–19). For the fourth criterion, coherence, he suggested that the more coherent an organization is, the more institutionalized it is. He equated coherence with consensus and argued that "an effective organization requires, at a minimum, substantial consensus on the functional boundaries of the group and on the procedures for resolving disputes which come up within those boundaries" (Huntington 1968, 22).

These four criteria may help in the problematic task of measuring the levels of institutionalization. However, several of the above-discussed criteria are not directly applicable to this research. For example, autonomy, which was defined as the capacity of institutions to make and implement their own decisions, cannot be used as a criteria of the institutionalization of CT in this research since decision-making in NATO depends on the principle of consensus, which is applied at every committee level and implies that all NATO decisions are made by its members. So, any decision announced by NATO depends on its members so that even though there are sub-structures in charge of performing CT activities, they do not have the capacity to make or implement their own decisions.

Nevertheless, in some cases, autonomy may be assessed through the existence of leadership (for example, if there is an appointed high-level staff member). However, such an approach would still be misleading in NATO's case regarding the CT for the very same reason emphasized above. Even if there are appointed high-level staff members in charge of performing specific activities, the authority they would have would be little more than symbolic since they cannot implement their own decisions without the consent of the

member states; rather, they may play a role in coordinating and implementing the activities.

Complexity and adaptability, on the other hand, maybe purposive in this research as the criteria of the institutionalization of CT since they are measurable in empirical terms. Yet, for example, adaptability may be used to operationalize this criterion but not as a measure itself. To be more specific, through the examination of the continuous change (continuity) in CT policies and practices over time, we may measure the levels of the institutionalization of CT. Hence, clarification of these criteria is still essential to develop a more specific set of criteria for the institutionalization of CT within NATO.

Another work by Tolbert and Zucker (1996), which is much more applicable to this research, has identified three key dimensions for the stages of institutionalization, namely: 'habitualization', 'objectification' and 'sedimentation'. They defined habitualization as the development of patterned problem-solving behaviors and the association of such behaviors with an impetus towards the developments in the same direction (Tolbert and Zucker 1996). The next stage, which they have classified as objectification, is the development of general, shared social meanings attached to these behaviors, a development that is necessary for the movement of actions to contexts beyond their point of origination (Tolbert and Zucker 1996). The last stage in their classification is sedimentation, which has been defined as a process "that fundamentally rests on the historical continuity of structure, and especially on its survival across generations of organizational members" (Tolbert and Zucker 1996, 181–84).

According to Tolbert and Zucker (1996, 184), the process of habitualization involves the generation of new structural arrangements in response to a specific problem or set of problems and the formalization of such arrangements in the policies and procedures of a given organization. This process results in a stage which they classified as being at the 'pre-institutionalization stage'. The movement toward a permanent and widespread stage classified as the 'semi-institutionalization stage' rests on the next process, objectification, which accompanies the 'diffusion of structure' (Tolbert and Zucker 1996). Objectification includes the development of some degree of consensus among organizational decision-makers concerning the establishment of a structure and the increasing adoption by organizations based on that consensus (Tolbert and Zucker 1996). Examples of structures at this stage include team-based production, quality circles, and training programs, among

others. While such structures generally have a longer rate of survival in organizations compared to those in the pre-institutionalized stage, clearly not all persist indefinitely (Tolbert and Zucker 1996). They have argued that the last stage of institutionalization is ‘sedimentation’, which is characterized by both the complete spread of structures across the group of actors and the spread of structures over time. Therefore, it indicates both the 'width' and 'depth' dimensions of structures (Tolbert and Zucker 1996).

Although this set of dimensions developed by Tolbert and Zucker is much more applicable in this research for their work is specifically designed for measuring the levels of institutionalization, the model they presented reflects a sequential process in which the dimensions at the same time become the stages. In NATO’s case, however, the institutionalization of CT follows a non-sequential process[25]. Hence, their work is not completely applicable in this research but may be redesigned.

In more recent work, Koremenos Lipson, and Snidal (2001) identified five key criteria, namely; ‘membership rules’, ‘scope of issues covered’, ‘centralization of tasks’, ‘rules for controlling the institution’ and ‘flexibility of arrangements’. As the first criterion, they argue that the membership rule should be assessed through the question of whether the membership rules are exclusive, restrictive or inclusive (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001, 770). The scope of the issues as the second criterion, they argue, should be assessed through the extent to which the matters being discussed are narrow or broad. According to them, changes in issue-linkage over time indicate expansions in the scope of the issues within an institutional arrangement (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001, 771). The third criterion in their research is the centralization of tasks, in which they covered the concept of centralization in its broader sense, such as centralization to disseminate information or to enhance enforcement, which can be found at the international level (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001, 772–73). In the fourth criterion, which they categorized as the rules for controlling the institution, they focused on the voting arrangements within an international institution by asking the question of whether all the members have equal votes and whether a minority holds veto power (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001, 774). They argue that the last criterion, flexibility, should be assessed

[25]The term ,“non-sequential process”, is borrowed from computer science and connotes that the relationship between the elements of a process is a partial or non- ordering relation (Fernandez and Thiagarajan 1984, 171–96).

through the question of how institutional rules and procedures will accommodate new circumstances. They distinguish two types of institutional flexibility: adaptive and transformative. According to them, adaptive flexibility of the rules and procedures is a limited type of flexibility which is designed to deal with outlying cases; transformative flexibility, on the other hand, is a deeper type of flexibility involving clauses that allow renegotiation and ratification of the rules and procedures, within the treaties or arrangements of an international institution, for the institution to survive (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001, 773).

Admitting the importance of these criteria, they are not completely applicable to this research for several reasons. For instance, 'membership' is a broad and irrelevant category when measuring the levels of the institutionalization of CT within NATO. Additionally, their work primarily focuses on the IOs, which include formal organizations like the World Health Organization and the International Labor Organization, and they consider how these criteria vary in these institutions. To be more precise, they do not argue that these criteria are indicators of the levels of institutionalization, yet they are the indicators of variations among the institutional designs. Thus, their work would be ill-fitted to the study of the institutionalization of specific issue-areas as a process. Nonetheless, the scope of issues as a criterion within their work may be useful for the purposes of this research since, as they argue, expansions in the scope of issues, as a result of issue-linkage over time, allow the member states to overcome the obstacles on international cooperation (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001, 787).

Overall, these studies offer important insights into the problematic task of measuring the levels of institutionalization, and their offerings are– more or less – inter-related with each other. Although these scholars have used distinct concepts to identify the criteria of institutionalization, there are many commonalities among their points of view. Adaptability and flexibility, although their definitions are not identical, for instance, have been used to refer to similar circumstances as the ability of any given structure to regenerate itself to the needs of changing the environment. Additionally, these criteria also intersect with the premises of institutionalist theories, which were discussed in the previous section of this chapter.

Despite their important insights, studies on institutionalization as a process are still in their infancy. This is, first, because of the undefined characters of pre-institutionalized,

semi-institutionalized and fully institutionalized stages of organizational activity (Sillince and Barker 2012, 14). Second, which is much more common to these studies, whether these criteria are the tools that we can measure the levels of institutionalization or they are the measures themselves is inconclusive. To be more precise, it is not clear if these are the measurable extents of institutionalization for example, as they are length, breadth, depth, height or capacity of any particular kind, or if they are the tools that can be used to measure these extents. This means applying one of these methodological tools to this research would be inadequate for examining the levels and the assessment of the consequences of institutionalization (Sillince and Barker 2012, 15).

Therefore, by drawing upon the discussions above, including the assumptions of the new institutionalist theories discussed in the first part of this chapter, and by utilizing NATO's Consultation, Command, and Control (C3) Taxonomy[26], this research offers four distinct criteria specifically designed for measuring the levels of the institutionalization of CT within NATO. These criteria are:

1st- Rhetorical Recognition and Expansion: The initial acknowledgment of the relevance of different domains (CD, IS, MOps) to CT in rhetoric and its subsequent expansion.

2nd- Formalization, and revision of policies: The formalization of the rhetorical recognition through establishing more specific policies including, for example; strategic concept, military concepts, military and policy guidance texts along with other directives which relate the relevance of CT to each domain. This criterion indicates the spread of broader CT policies across the Alliance's more specific practices.

3rd- Expansion of old sub-structures**:** Expansion of the old sub-structures by linking CT to the previously established structures. To be more precise, this criterion includes the reuse or modification of old structures (i.e. the transformation of command structure), beyond their point of origination for the implementation of CT practices. This criterion indicates the spread of CT as a specific issue- area across the old structures. These structures may include both physical assets, such as military forces and NATO schools and

[26]A "taxonomy" is defined as a particular classification arranged in a hierarchical structure organized by super-type and sub-type relationships(Consultation, Command and Control Board (C3B) C3 Taxonomy Baseline 2.0 2016, 9–10).

other bodily structures or immaterial structures, such as education and training facilities, among many others.

4th- Practical Implementation: The establishment of new sub-structures aimed at countering the terrorist threat. This criterion indicates the spread of CT across the over-arching institutional structure of NATO through the establishment of new sub-structures specifically designed for the practical implementation of CT policies. These sub-structures may also include both the physical and immaterial structures.

Hence, these criteria are the measurable extents of the institutionalization of CT within NATO. Although these criteria are the primary means of the assessment process on the levels of the institutionalization of CT within NATO, we will also identify more specific indicators to measure the extents of these criteria within each domain separately.

The analysis developed above is the most applicable in this research, and there can be several implications for future empirical studies that draw upon institutionalist theories. In the empirical chapter of this research, each of these criteria will be considered within separate domains, namely; the CD, IS and MOps. For example, for the first criterion: the emphasis puts on CD, IS and MOps within the Summit Declarations since 9/11 as the relevant domains in terms of where and how to counter the terrorist threat.

The following chapter of this research (research design and methodology) will provide further clarification of operationalization and measurement issues of these criteria, and the last chapter of this dissertation will discuss the possible implications.

CHAPTER 2
RESEARCH DESIGN and METHODOLOGY

> "Theory, if not supported by adequate empirical and historical evidence fails to grasp the dynamics of complex processes and practices" (E. Hallams, Ratti, and Zyla 2013b, 325).

This dissertation is designed as exploratory research given the fact that the main question addressed is: What are the individual effects of institutionalization of CT within NATO upon intra-alliance CTC? In addition, methodologically, this dissertation follows a hypothesis-testing approach, meaning that the starting point of the research is theory, the hypotheses are derived from theory and that the theory guides the analysis (De Vaus 2001, 6). Therefore, the methodological approach of this research is deductive in nature since the hypotheses are derived from the new-institutionalist theories which pursue either to prove or disprove the validity of the theory (De Vaus 2001, 6).

As was argued in the first chapter, it is generally recognized that there is a positive correlation between the levels of institutionalization and international cooperation. Therefore, the main hypothesis of this research is:

H1: *As NATO-CT institutionalized, NATO's intra-alliance CTC increases.*

Accordingly, the institutionalization of CT is the main Independent Variable (IV) while intra-alliance CTC is the main Dependent Variable (DV) in this research.

However, as it is stated in NATO Glossary (AAP-06 Allied Administrative Publication NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions 2017, 113), CT within NATO differs in nature within different sets of domains. In this regard, the institutionalization of CT (main IV) should be analyzed within different sets of domains instead of analyzing it as a whole or as a unified body within NATO. In addition, given the variety of issue-areas that NATO has adopted in the post-9/11 era, it is vital to consider different sets of institutional structures and thus, varying degrees of institutionalization (Webber, Sperling, and Smith 2012, 18).

Therefore, the research process of this dissertation applies an embedded-single case design to examine the likely impacts of the institutionalization of CT upon intra-alliance CTC within three specific sets of domains: CD, IS and MOps. In other words, the

institutionalization of CT will be considered under each of these specific domains separately within separate sections. These domains at the same time become the separate sub-units of the research design. Hence, the institutionalization of CT becomes a combination of the institutionalization of CT within CD, the institutionalization of CT within IS and the institutionalization of CT within MOps.

The main reason for the selection of these domains is, as NATO Policy Guidelines on CT endorsed in 2012 indicates, CD and IS are the key areas where NATO can add its potential value to Transatlantic CTC (NATO's Policy Guidelines on Counter-terrorism: Aware, Capable and Engaged for a Safer Future 2012). Whilst, since 9/11, NATO has launched two CT-MOps and, as MCCT endorsed in 2016 recognizes, NATO can deliver a military contribution to CT with joint and combined MOps[27]. Further clarification on the measurement of the main IV within each domain will be presented in the following pages of this chapter because there are a few more areas that should be delved into to clarify the research design and the empirical analysis of this dissertation.

Empirically, the researcher will employ a pattern-matching technique within an embedded-single case design to examine the likely impacts of institutionalization of CT within NATO upon intra-alliance CTC. In addition, although the main DV of this research is intra-alliance CTC within NATO, its measurement requires refinement. Yet, before giving more detail on the related DVs, on the pattern-matching technique, and the related hypotheses of the research, there is a need to clarify the reasons for choosing an embedded-single case as the main research design of this dissertation.

According to John Gerring (2004, 341), a case study is defined as an "in-depth study on a single unit (a relatively bounded phenomenon) where the scholar's aim is to elucidate features of a larger class of similar phenomena." However, case studies have often been criticized on the ground that "context-independent knowledge is more valuable than context-dependent (concrete), practical knowledge" (Flyvbjerg 2006, 221). In opposition to such criticisms, Bent Flyvbjerg (2006, 224) argues that "concrete knowledge is of more value than the searching for predictive theories as well as universals because

[27]Joint Military Operations (JOps) refers to the military operations where at least two different military forces engage (i.e.: Naval and Air Forces), whereas Combined Military Operations refers to the military operations where at least two different member nations engage in the same military operation. Thus, a military operation may both be joint and combined or only joint or combined.

universal theories are not to be found in the study of human affairs." In support of this argument, Gerring (2004, 348) notes that the main advantage of the case study is that it offers an in-depth understanding of a phenomenon.

Although there are several different types of case studies, the one applied in this research is the type focusing on the variation within sub-units and over a period of time. In other words, it contains both temporal variation and sub-unit variation (Gerring 2004, 343). As this dissertation aims to examine a process over an eighteen-year period, it contains temporal variation. In addition, since we will analyze these variations within different domains (CD, IS and MOps), we will apply an embedded-single case design.

In embedded-single case designs, there are more than one sub-unit of analysis each of which is explored individually (Yin 2009, para. 2). The ability to look at sub-units that are situated within a larger case is powerful when you consider that data can be analyzed within the sub-units separately, between the different sub-units, or across all of the sub-units (Yin 2009, paras. 3–4). The ability to engage in such rich analysis only serves to better illuminate the case (Yin 2009, para. 4). As it was stated at the beginning of this chapter, there are three distinct domains where NATO's CT practices mostly take place. So, by using an embedded-single case design, the institutionalization of CT will be analyzed separately in each domain which constitutes the sub-units of the main case-design. This, in turn, will allow the researcher to compare the results across these sub-units.

In this sense, employing an embedded single-case design is useful since this type of examination creates an opportunity for a more detailed analysis of NATO's diverging CT policies and practices within different domains. Additionally, case-studies in general, including the embedded-single case designs, provide the researcher with limited data with an opportunity to construct in-depth analysis by using secondary sources (Yin 2009). For example, the data within the official NATO texts, such as; Allied Joint Publications (AJP), are limited since NATO works with sensitive information and limits access to individuals with proper security clearances (NATO- Declassified: For your eyes only 2016). Evidently, this is a limitation of this research. In order to overcome this limitation, we will use other secondary data sources such as; published interviews of the NATO political and military officials. Thus, case-studies including embedded-single case designs as the

principal means of investigation appear to be the most suitable research design regarding the nature and purpose of this dissertation.

The empirical analysis of this dissertation will employ a "pattern-matching" technique with a "non-equivalent dependent variables design". Although the term pattern is not explicitly defined in the literature, it is generally described as an "arrangement of occurrences, incidents, behavioral actions, or the outcomes of interventions that are apparent in the raw data" (Wiebe et al., 2009). Additionally, Robert K. Yin (2009, pattern matching section, para. 2) also notes that research may have multiple dependent variables "that is, a variety of relevant outcomes" and this pattern-matching design is labeled as a "non-equivalent, dependent variables design". According to Shadish et. al. (2002, 509), "a non-equivalent dependent variable is a dependent variable that is predicted not to change because of the treatment but is expected to respond to some or all of the contextually important internal validity threats in the same way as the target outcome." The main aim of using non-equivalent DVs is "to reduce the internal validity threats that they provide a robust but simple" tools for addressing the coherent empirical analyses (Coryn and Hobson 2011, 34). Thus, in our case, the pattern matching technique will be used with a non-equivalent DV design in which, each of these DVs will be measured through using different data gathering and analyzing methods (Yin, 2009).

According to Yin (2009, pattern matching section, para 4-5), when using non-equivalent dependent variables, the researcher should "specify multiple dependent variables represent the relevant outcomes based on an a priori proposition derived from theory, the literature, or the researcher's experience." Accordingly, each dependent variable might be assessed using different methods of comparison. Before stating expected patterns for each of the dependent variables, "the researcher should have stated an expected overall pattern that embraces all the variables that are examined." (Yin 2009 pattern matching section, para 5-6). Afterward, the pattern of the empirical findings can be compared to the expected one. Hence, in a research that has multiple non-equivalent DVs, pattern-matching occurs in the following manner: If for each outcome, the initially predicted patterns have been found, and at the same time alternative patterns of predicted values have not been found, strong causal inferences can be made (Yin 2009 pattern matching section, para. 5-6). So, if the results are as predicted, the researcher can reach a reliable conclusion about the effects of the main IV on each of the DVs made (Yin 2009

pattern matching section, para. 5-6). Yin (2009 pattern matching section, para. 5-6) points out that the pattern matching technique is the most desirable analytic strategy in case studies. He also notes on the pattern matching in a DV design that even if only one variable of the pattern does not behave as predicted the hypothesis is disconfirmed.

As we have mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the main DV of this research is intra-alliance CTC within NATO. Following Yin's above-mentioned arguments, we will now specify the components of the main DV as the non-equivalent DVs of this research, by benefiting from the literature on intra-alliance cooperation and intra-alliance CTC.

While many studies have dealt with intra-alliance CTC within NATO, only a few of them -if any- has attempted to specify distinct contributions of the Allies to measure the values of intra-alliance CTC. Regarding intra-alliance CTC within NATO, most of the literature has tended to address the problem of intra-alliance CTC within the general framework of burden-sharing debates within the Alliance. More precisely, the literature has focused on the burden-sharing debates by measuring the defense expenditure rates of the Allies, as a share of gross domestic products (GDP), as their preferences to share or not to share NATO burdens on intra-alliance CTC and their contributions to CT related issues. However, measuring defense expenditures as the foremost indicator of intra-alliance cooperation would be misleading in any case. As noted by former NATO Secretary-General (SG) Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (2008, 69):

> At NATO, a burden-sharing mechanism was developed to assess the manning commitments of nations for critical operational activities in relation to their gross national income. This sort of arithmetic has the merit of giving some indications on burden-sharing, but it has also showed that the burden-sharing issue cannot be fully captured in graphs and spreadsheets. How does one decide what is a fair contribution from a country of 50m people against a contribution from a country with a population of only 4m? How can you evaluate a contribution of light infantry against the provision of critical enablers such as helicopters or air-to-air refueling tankers? And over what time period do you make your calculations?

Although more recent burden-sharing debates in the last decade have awakened an interest in explaining contributions to distinct issues on intra-alliance cooperation such as; number of troops deployed in CT operations and fair risk-sharing, thus far, only a handful

of works have been published (Auerswald and Saideman 2009; Haesebrouck 2017; E. Hallams and Schreer 2012; Ringsmose 2010; Sandler and Shimizu 2014; Sperling and Webber 2009; Weitsman 2010). Regarding the works that focus on contributions to distinct issues, it is especially worth stating that the form of contributions made by the Allies specifically aimed at CT is understudied. So, most of the literature on intra-alliance CTC has failed to specify the distinct contributions of the Allies to intra-alliance CTC. When identifying these contributions, it would be misleading to focus solely on the defense expenditures of the Allies or the number of troops deployed in CT operations, because the empirical basis for determining the values of intra-alliance CTC "cannot simply be restricted to one form of contribution; other forms of contributions must be included since these, by necessity, require a dispersal of national and alliance efforts" (Sperling and Webber 2009, 503).

In the same vein, Jeffrey Rathke (2018) also argues,

> we need to measure results instead of inputs. The problem with fixating on defense spending levels is that it pays no attention to the outputs: ready forces with modern capabilities who participate in NATO operations, exercises, and missions. It is those forces and capabilities that manage crises, provide deterrence, and ultimately increase transatlantic security.

In this regard, these outputs may range from financial contributions to trust funds and the number of specific education & training activities led by the Allies specifically aimed at countering the terrorist threat. Such an approach would also be congruent with NATO's work in CT since, CT within NATO is not only subject to financial or military contributions of the Allies to NATO but also, other forms of contributions such as; civil and military education & training including military exercises, scientific projects,

Thus, by benefiting from previous literature on intra-alliance cooperation in general, and the literature on intra-alliance CTC within NATO, we have specified six distinct contributions: Defense Expenditures, deployed troops both in ISAF and Resolute Support Mission (RSM), the financial contributions to the Afghanistan National Army Trust Fund, CT-related military exercises, activities funded by the Allies under the Science and Technology Organization (STO) and the activities conducted by COE DAT. Therefore, these specific contributions at the same time become the "non-equivalent dependent-variables" as the outcomes of the main DV (intra-alliance CTC) in this research.

To be more precise, each of these contributions will be the related DVs of this research as the constituent parts of intra-alliance CTC (the main DV). So, this research combines 7 distinct DVs and thus, the main DV will be a combination of these 7 DVs each of which will be measured separately.

Accordingly, the related hypotheses of this research will be as follows:

- **$H1_1$:** As NATO-CT institutionalized (CD +IS + Mops), key Allies' defense expenditures grow.
- **$H1_2$:** As NATO-CT institutionalized (CD +IS + Mops), key Allies' deployed troops in ISAF + RSM increase.
- **$H1_3$:** As NATO-CT institutionalized (CD +IS + Mops), financial contributions to the Afghanistan National Army Trust Fund increases.
- **$H1_4$:** As NATO-CT institutionalized (CD +IS + Mops), the number of activities under the Science and Technology Organization (STO) increases.
- **$H1_5$:** As NATO-CT institutionalized (CD +IS + Mops), the number of COE DAT activities increases.
- **$H1_6$:** As NATO-CT institutionalized (CD +IS + Mops), the number of CT-related military exercises increases

In order to reduce any possible ambiguities, we will now present the definitions for each DV.

Defense Expenditures[28]**:** According to the NATO annual report on defense expenditures (Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2011-2018) 2019), defense expenditures means:

> defense expenditure as payments made by a national government specifically to meet the needs of its armed forces, those of Allies or of the Alliance. A major component of defense expenditure is payments on Armed Forces financed within the Ministry of Defense (MoD) budget. Defense expenditure includes contributions

[28] It is stated in a NATO Defense Expenditure report published in 2018 that; "In view of differences between both these sources and national GDP forecasts, and also the definition of NATO defense expenditure and national definitions, the Charts shown in this report may diverge considerably from those which are quoted by media, published by national authorities or given in national budgets. Equipment expenditure includes expenditure on major equipment as well as on research and development devoted to major equipment. Personnel expenditure includes pensions paid to retirees."(Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2011-2018) 2019)

> to eligible NATO-managed trust funds, and expenditure for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations (paid by MoD or other ministries), the destruction of weapons, equipment and ammunition, and the costs associated with inspection and control of equipment destruction are included in defense expenditures.

Thus, for the purposes of this dissertation, we prefer to use NATO's definition of defense expenditures. To be able to demonstrate the conformity between the levels of the IV and the levels in the defense expenditures as the first DV, we will use the annual defense expenditures of the key Allies.

Since we are interested in measuring the defense expenditures of NATO member states, we will obtain the data on defense expenditures from annual reports regularly published by NATO's Public Diplomacy Division and placed on the NATO official website.

In order to examine the defense expenditures, the researcher has selected five key member states. These member states are the U.S., the United Kingdom (U.K.), France, Germany, and Turkey. There are two main reasons for this selection.

First, according to recent data in 2019, these member states have the strongest military armies within NATO[29] ("The NATO Member States Ranked by Military Strength," 2019). Second, most of the recent academic and political debates on NATO's intra-alliance challenges (i.e.: the burden-sharing) primarily involve these five members (Cordesman 2018; D. Keohane 2017; Mehta 2018). We will use the phrase "the key Allies" to refer to these member states throughout this research.

Troops in ISAF and RSM: ISAF was established in 2001 as a U.N-mandated international force located in Afghanistan. On August 11, 2003, NATO took to lead the ISAF. From its creation in 2001 to 2015, it gradually expanded from northern Afghanistan to the south and from the west to the east. These expansions are also known as the stages or phases of ISAS, in which the expansion occurred in 4 stages (NATO Resolute Support | ISAF History n.d.). The first stage started with the expansion to the north, second to the west, third to the south and final stage to the east. At ISAF's height, there were more than

[29]Available at: https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing-nato-members.asp

130.000 troops from 51 NATO and partner nations (ISAF's mission in Afghanistan 2001-2014 archived n.d.).

At the end of the expansion on January 1, 2015, the ISAF command transitioned to NATO's RSM and RSM "focuses on training, advising and assisting the Afghan government and security forces in pursuit of a strong, stable Afghanistan"(NATO Resolute Support | ISAF History n.d.). Therefore, RSM is a training mission located in Afghanistan since 2015. Therefore, *troops in ISAF and RSM in this research refers to the troops (forces) provided by the key Allies between 2001-2018.*

It is important to note that -although it is expected that the number of troops increases as we have hypothesized above- there are also other factors that have affected the number of troops deployed in Afghanistan. For example, as a matter of course, the number of troops in ISAF decreased during the last stage of the expansion prior to the transition to RSM. We will specify other possible intervening factors that may affect the overall expected pattern of the analysis at the end of this chapter.

We will obtain the data on troops in ISAF and RSM from the factsheets published by NATO and placed on the NATO webpage. In addition, we will also compare these data with the other data in the official reports of the participating NATO nations. For the same purpose mentioned in the previous page, the data will only cover the key Allies.

Financial contributions to Afghanistan National Army Trust Fund[30]: According to an official factsheet released by NATO (2017), Afghanistan National Army Trust Fund (ANATF) is a "NATO-run funding stream used by the international community to channel its financial support to Afghanistan's security forces and institutions."

The ANATF was established in 200 and aims "to provide a mechanism for ISAF nations to support the transportation and installation of equipment donated by ISAF nations, to purchase equipment and services for ANA engineering projects, and to support in and out-of-country training" (NATO 2017). The scope of the ANATF was expanded over-time to also support the maintenance of the ANA and to support literacy and professional military education. NATO Allies have been supporting, "the training,

[30]Although Defense Expenditures include ANATF contributions, it is important to specify ANATF contributions as a share of total Defense Expenditures. In doing so, we aim to provide a more reliable analysis on the specific contributions aimed at CT and thus the intra-alliance CTC.

equipping, financing and capability development of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces" (NATO 2017).

Thus, financial contributions to ANATF, in this research, is defined *as 'the financial contributions provided by the Allies to ISAF nations and ANA.'* We will obtain the data on financial contributions to ANATF from the ISAF and RSM official websites, NATO media backgrounders and factsheets published by NATO Public Diplomacy Division and placed on NATO official website. Yet, it is important to note that, prior to 2010, these contributions were not placed on the NATO website and the official ISAF website is currently not in use. This is evidently a limitation to this research. To overcome this limitation, we will use the "Way-back Machine" which is a digital archive of the various information on the internet. In addition, for the same reasons emphasized in the previous page, we will examine the financial contributions to ANATF except the USA since, the USA is using its own funding sources (out of NATO assets) such as; Afghanistan Security Force Fund (ASFF), Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) among others. However, the researcher will add data on the U.S funding to Afghanistan to the data on ANATF to be able to project the results.

Activities under Science and Technology Organization (STO): Following a decision at the NATO Lisbon Summit in 2010, the STO was created through the incorporation of the Research and Technology Organization (RTO) and the NATO Undersea Research Center (URC), and became the main venue to deliver science and technology in NATO (Science and Technology Organization Annual Report: Supporting NATO Core Tasks 2012). The activities under STO are multi-nationally and commonly funded, which means that the NATO nations contribute individually and voluntarily to the activities under STO. As a result of the "smart defense initiative" endorsed at the Chicago Summit in May 2012, activities under STO are -mostly- funded through using member nations' own resources (Science and Technology Organization Annual Report: Empowering the Alliance's Technological Edge 2017, 16). Of particular importance here is that 'activities under STO are mostly funded through using members' own financial and/or human resources', because our aim is to specify the other types of the contributions made by the Allies to illustrate the patterns of overall intra-alliance CTC, in addition to the defense expenditures.

There are several types of science and technology activities including, lectures, technology development projects, workshops, symposia among many others. We prefer not to specify the types of activities as it is beyond the scope of this research.

Therefore, *activities under STO in this research refers to the activities (without giving any reference to the specific types of the activities) managed by and in collaboration with the STO*. We will obtain the data on STO activities from the annual reports published by the STO and placed on the STO webpage. The data on STO activities will cover the years between 2005-2017.

CT-related multilateral military exercises: According to NATO Glossary Terms and Definitions (AAP-06 Allied Administrative Publication NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions 2017, 44) an exercise is:

> military maneuver or simulated wartime operation involving planning, preparation, and execution. It is carried out for the purpose of training and evaluation. It may be a combined, joint, or single-service exercise, depending on participating organizations.

According to the Both Strategic Commands (BI-SC) education and training (E&T) directive (BI-SC Collective Training and Exercise Directive 2013);

> the aim of NATO exercises is to establish, enhance and display NATO's Military Capabilities across the Alliance's full mission spectrum and to ensure the integration of effective and interoperable partner forces for NATO-led Crisis Response Operations (CRO) and Deployable Forces (DF) missions.

NATO conducts hundreds (sometimes more than 200) of military exercises every year. Some of these exercises have been conducted since the 1950s (Ferrier 2017). There are 3 main forms of exercises: live exercises (LIVEX), in which actual forces are deployed, Command Post Exercises /Computer-Assisted Exercises (CPX/CAX), which actual forces are not deployed and Exercise Studies such as; map games, simulations, lectures and other training programs both for civil-military personnel and high-level commanders (SHAPE | Exercises & Training 2018). All exercises are scenario-based i.e.: hypothetical attacks and humanitarian crises.

In addition, the highest-level political-military exercise, which NATO has been conducting since the 1950s, is crisis-management exercise (CMX). This is the most

complex form of NATO exercises, yet; it is not a LIVEX, meaning, actual forces are not deployed. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the actual forces are not involved in a CMX. They are involved in the process but without actual deployment. A CMX may address both non-Art. V and Art. V scenarios, including hypothetical terrorist attacks and takes the form and content of high-level political-military exercises (Ferrier 2017, 150–52). However, the main aim of a CMX is "to practice Alliance consultation and consensus-driven crisis management procedures and arrangements in order to maintain and improve the ability of the Alliance to manage crises" (Ferrier 2017, 144). Therefore, typically, a CMX does not involve actual forces. (Deni 2017, 6). In addition, CMXs have been conducted annually since the 1950s and typically, all the Allies, the NAC and all crisis management committees as well as the BI-SC and the international staff participate in CMXs (Ferrier 2017, 154). Thus, it would not be rational to analyze the data on CMXs because all the Allies participate in CMXs and NATO has been conducting CMXs annually since the 1950s.

Additionally, NATO exercises also vary in terms of the types of the forces deployed, such as joint exercises (deployment of -at least- two types of forces in the same exercise i.e.: maritime and air forces or other combinations of the forces) and they may also vary in terms of the issues/threats they address. These exercises may also be combined (i.e. participation of the two (at least) forces of member and/or non-member partner nations in an exercise) or joint and/or joint and combined together. Furthermore, while most NATO exercises are military, the Alliance organizes civilian and political training events as well (Factsheet: Key NATO & Allied Exercises 2016).

Therefore, since our aim is to analyze the number of CT-related exercises, we will focus on LIVEXs and CPXs/CAXs. It is worth to note that, due to the confidentiality of the official documents, it is not possible to list all the scenarios of the military exercises conducted by NATO. Thus, retrieving data on the exact numbers of the military exercises aimed only at countering hypothetical terrorist attacks is not possible. However, some military exercises cover a wide range of missions including CT. Data will be collected through, in addition to the press-released military exercises factsheets and the annual reports of the SGs, official NATO web-archive by searching the keywords "exercises", "counter-terrorism military exercises", "hybrid scenario exercises", "defense against terrorism exercises" and "crisis response exercises" with an interval of 2001-2018.

Additionally, we will also use published books, newspapers, member states' ministry of defense websites, official strategic documents published by the member states (i.e. French White Papers) and other published articles on the issue.

Furthermore, to be able to compare the data on CT-related military exercises and the total number of the military exercises, we will also include other exercises aimed at 'humanitarian crisis management', military exercises based on hypothetical 'state-to-state threat scenarios' and the military exercises aimed at 'managing environmental disasters'. The data on CT-related military exercises will cover the years between 2002-2018. We will also present a non-exhaustive but illustrative list of the names and scenarios of the military exercises for the years between 2002-2018. It is also important to note that there is a distinction between NATO exercises and Allied national exercises. Allied national exercises are typically planned and led by the commanders of a member nation. Despite its name may imply, Allied national exercises may also be multinational in nature, meaning that the Allies also train together within multinational exercises (Factsheet: Key NATO & Allied Exercises 2016). However, we will not specify these exercises as such NATO exercises and Allied national exercises because both require dispersion of Alliance and national efforts.

COE DAT Activities: COE DAT is a NATO-accredited center of excellence located established in 2005 in Ankara and works in the area of defense against terrorism. COE DAT offers courses, lectures, workshops, conferences and publishes books on CT-related research and provides many other activities to train and educate military personnel from NATO nations and partners dealing with CT.

Therefore, *COE DAT activities in this research refer to all types of activities provided by COE DAT to NATO nations and partners dealing with CT.* The data on these activities will be obtained from the COE DAT webpage.

To put in a nutshell, the above-mentioned DVs are the non-equivalent DVs of this research, each of which will be analyzed separately. Thus, the following pages of this section will present the measurement and operationalization issues of the main IV.

The main IV of this research is the institutionalization of CT. As it was discussed in the last part of the previous chapter, there are four distinct criteria which we have specifically designed to measure the levels of the institutionalization of CT in this research.

These criteria are; rhetorical recognition and expansion, formalization, and revision of policies, expansion of old sub-structures, and practical implementation.

This research defines the first criterion, rhetorical recognition, and expansion, as the initial recognition of the relevance of different domains (CD, IS, MOps) to CT in terms of rhetoric and its subsequent expansion. The second criterion, formalization, and expansion of policies, as defined here, is the formalization of the rhetorical recognition through establishing more specific policies including, for example; strategic concept, military concepts, military and policy guidance texts and more specific doctrines which relate the relevance of CT to each domain. One important point to make here is that the difference between a policy and a doctrine. According to the Allied Joint Publication (AJP) dated February 2017, doctrine is defined as:

> Fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. The principal purpose of doctrine is to provide Alliance forces conducting operations with a framework of guidance to achieve a common objective. Operations are underpinned by principles describing how they should be planned, prepared, commanded, conducted, sustained, terminated and assessed. The principles of doctrine are defined by traditional, enduring capabilities proven by best practices while incorporating contemporary insights on how these principles are applied. Although doctrine has enduring principles, it is constantly reviewed for relevance and is therefore evolutionary in nature. Doctrine describes how Alliance forces operate but it is not about why they operate, which is the realm of policy. (AJP-01 (E): Allied Joint Doctrine 2017).

According to the same AJP, although "policy and doctrine are closely related but they fill fundamentally separate requirements" (AJP-01 (E): Allied Joint Doctrine 2017). While "NATO develops policy in response to the changing military-strategic environment, doctrine evolves in response to the changes in policy capabilities or force employment considerations" (AJP-01 (E): Allied Joint Doctrine 2017). Thus, typically, doctrine is directed by policy. However, rarely, "capabilities might exist within NATO that is not covered by a policy. These extant capabilities require a policy to be created first before they can be written into doctrine" (AJP-01 (E): Allied Joint Doctrine 2017).

Turning now to the third criterion, the expansion of old sub-structures is defined as the re-use of the old sub-structures by linking CT to the previously established structures.

To be more precise, this criterion includes the re-use of old sub-structures -beyond their point of origination- for the implementation of CT practices. These sub-structures may include both the physical assets such as; military forces, NATO schools, and other bodily sub-structures or other immaterial sub-structures such as; education and training facilities including military exercises among others. The last criterion, practical implementation, is the establishment of new sub-structures aimed at countering the terrorist threat. This criterion describes the spread of CT as a specific issue-are across the over-arching structure of NATO through the establishment of new sub-structures specifically designed for the practical implementation of CT policies. These sub-structures may also include both physical and immaterial sub-structures.

In short, we will examine these criteria within the specific domains; CD, IS and MOps. To be more precise, we will assess the levels of institutionalization of CT within these domains separately. These criteria will be operationalized through the guidance of more specific indicators both in each domain and each criterion. To be more precise, for example, in the third chapter of this dissertation, we will assess the institutionalization of CT within the CD. So, for example, for the first criterion (rhetorical recognition and expansion), in the third chapter, we will operationalize this criterion by using the following specific indicators:

- Whether the Allies have recognized the relevance of CD to CT,
- Whether the Allies have emphasized the possible involvement of new or previously un-involved issues or actors in the realm of CT-CD,
- Whether the Allies have emphasized further development in the realm of CT-CD,

Accordingly, each of these indicators will be re-formulated at the beginning of each section in the third chapter considering the requirements of each domain.

With the aim of quantifying the qualitative data, we will grade each expected change (the further movement induced by the previous change) as ‘10’, if change & continuity in the same direction exists, and as ‘0’ if there exists a counter-development that contradicts with an expected development. Based on the discussions provided in the previous chapter, each of the indicators will be assessed in terms of ‘continuous change’. The key elements of change described here are; changing issue definition, the involvement of new or previously uninvolved issues or actors and further movement in the same

direction induced by the previous change (James L., Jones, and Baumgartner 2006, 47; Pierson 2000). Continuity, on the other hand, is described here as an ongoing, evolving and cumulative process (Wick and Quinn 1990, 375).

The method introduced above is one whereby the researcher relies on the qualitative data but quantifies the analyses. That is, while the qualitative data is examined for patterns, methods of grading are used to quantify the analysis. By doing so, the researcher will be able to illustrate the findings on the assessment of the institutionalization of CT. Thus, the grading process is only aimed at quantifying the qualitative data and represents neither the exact values of the institutionalization of CT nor the criteria.

In short, to measure the levels of the main IV, we will examine how and to what extent the scope of NATO policies and practices have expanded to include CT within each domain between 2001-2018. To display the data and the findings on the main IV, the researcher will design a score-card which is widely used in the management and organization literature[31]. This scorecard will be re-designed in each section of the third chapter considering the requirements of each domain.

It is worth mentioning that, measurement of the main IV requires a detailed contextualization. For example, the key elements (continuous change) which we will use to measure the extents of each criterion of the main IV (institutionalization of CT), generally expressed either with different or interchangeable terms for example, "adjustment" instead of "change" within different contexts. In addition, for the first criterion, 'rhetorical recognition and expansion', we will assess the statements of the Allied leaders so, for instance, to be able to identify the continuity in this criterion there is a need to focus on the similarity among the statements in terms of the temporal domain. Therefore, the researcher will relate the patterns determined in the data to the criteria of the main IV. In other words, we will identify the indicators that may represent the relevant outcomes based on the theory and the literature. According to Lock, and Thelen (1995, 11) this process is defined as the "contextualized comparison", which is the comparison that the researcher "self-consciously seeks to address the issue of equivalence by searching for analytically equivalent phenomena even if expressed in substantively different terms across different contexts."

[31]Table 2.1 summarizes the discussions above.

Table 2.1 Illustrative Scorecard: Levels of the institutionalization of CT (main IV)

Criteria	Indicators	Years																
Rhetorical recognition and expansion	Measure: Continuous Change	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
	Continuity in I1																	
	Continuity in I2																	
	Continuity in I3																	
	Continuity in I4																	
	TOTAL																	
Formalization and revision of policies	Continuity in I1																	
	Continuity in I2																	
	Continuity in I3																	
	Continuity in I4																	
	TOTAL																	
Expansion of old sub-structures	Continuity in I1																	
	Continuity in I2																	
	Continuity in I3																	
	Continuity in 4																	
	TOTAL																	
Practical implementation	Continuity in I1																	
	Continuity in I2																	
	Continuity in I3																	
	Continuity in I4																	
	TOTAL																	
TOTAL BY YEARS																		

We will use secondary sources for data gathering. These sources will be official NATO texts including; the Summit Declarations, Communiques, The New Strategic Concept (2010), Policy Guidelines on Counter-terrorism, Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism (MCDT), Military Concept for Counter-terrorism (MCCT), Military Doctrines, NATO's Consultation Command and Control Taxonomies (C3), NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAGs), Allied Joint Publications (AJPs), Allied Joint Doctrines (AJDs) and other official NATO texts related to CT. Journal articles, reviews, research projects, and dissertations will also be used as the secondary sources of data gathering. It is worth mentioning that there is no prior data that the researcher can use to collect quantitative data. It is clearly a limitation for this research, however, in order to overcome this limitation, the researcher will make an extensive use of rich archival materials from NATO's official website to provide empirical evidence to the institutionalization of CT as a specific-issue area both through accumulation and expansion of specific CT policies and practices over time.

It is important to note that, due to the very nature of this research, sources for data gathering will also be considered as the data itself. For example, some of the NATO official texts (i.e.: MCDT or MCCT) themselves are the evidence of the institutionalization of CT within NATO -since they indicate the formalization of the policies- yet, they are also the sources which we can use to investigate both whether CT as an issue-are has been associated with the specific domains (CD, IS and MOps), and the matching of the patterns to examine the effects of the main IV within each domain upon the DV.

Before examining the effects of the institutionalization of CT within each domain on intra-alliance CTC, there is a need to explore the relationship between the institutionalization of CT and the domains of CD, IS and MOps. Thus, the following chapter of this research aims to assess the process of the institutionalization of CT within NATO within these separate domains. Identifying the relationship between each domain and institutionalization of CT (main IV), presenting the findings on the levels of institutionalization of CT within each domain will be the focus of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3

INSTITUTIONALIZATION of COUNTER-TERRORISM within NATO

> Since 9/11, international institutions have played a prominent role in counter-terrorism. Despite this break with the past, there remains variation in the institutionalization of counter-terrorism, both across domains and over time (Romaniuk 2010, 611).

Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, NATO has established policies and doctrines to conduct CT practices and has revised these CT policies, doctrines, and other sub-structures over time through the process of transformation. NATO has linked its efforts in the realm of CT with its' other works through the expansion of the role of its previous specific set of domains such as; CD, IS and MOps. In addition, through the multiplication of its sub-structures, hierarchically and functionally, and through differentiation of sub-structures, NATO has provided diversified cooperation among the Allies on CT-related issues in the face of the transnational and multidimensional character of the emerging threats including international terrorism. As a result, CT, as a specific issue-area, has been institutionalized within NATO's overarching institutional structure since 9/11.

However, the vast amount of the literature on NATO's involvement and further efforts in the realm of CT failed, with rare exceptions, to conceptualize this process yet. Even these exceptional studies ignored to consider different sets of domains such as CD, IS and MOps within the assessment of the institutionalization of CT within NATO. Thus, at a time of increasing NATO involvement in the fight against international terrorism within different domains, identification of the relationship between these domains and the institutionalization of CT within NATO may contribute a better understanding of the outcomes that have been affected by this issue-area including intra-alliance CTC.

By following Webber et al.'s (2012, 39) argument that "given the multifunctionality of NATO, it is necessary to consider different sets of institutions within particular issue-areas and thus varying degrees of institutionalization", this chapter aims to assess the varying levels of the institutionalization of CT within specific set of domains, namely; CD, IS and MOps. By doing so, we will be able to examine the effects of the institutionalization of CT within these specific domains on intra-alliance CTC.

In order to summarize the findings regarding the levels of the institutionalization of CT within each domain, at the end of each part under each of the main sections, we will present a scorecard, which was outlined in the research design and methodology chapter of this research It is important to note that, the scorecards will only be used to illustrate the "ongoing, evolving and cumulative" nature of the institutionalization of CT within each domain and the numeric values refer neither to the exact number of policies and sub-structures nor to the exact number of the revisions of these policies nor the number of the changes within each domain. The grading process to illustrate the institutionalization of CT within each domain will be presented at the beginning of each sub-sub section (assessment of the institutionalization of CT within CD, within IS and within MOps). Thus, each of the sub-sub sections of this chapter will cover the institutionalization of CT within each of these domains separately. This chapter includes three main sections: Institutionalization of CT within CD, Institutionalization of CT within IS and Institutionalization of CT within MOps. Each of these main sections will have sub-sections: Assessment of the Institutionalization of CT within CD, Assessment of the institutionalization of CT within IS and Assessment of the institutionalization of CT within MOps, as well as these sub-sections, will have sub-sub sections each of which covers the criteria of the institutionalization of CT separately. To be more precise, each criterion, which we have specified in the first chapter (Introduction) of this research, to assess the levels of the institutionalization of CT within NATO will be presented within separate sub-sub sections.

3.1 Institutionalization of Counter-Terrorism Within Capability Development

Embedded within its post-9/11 political and structural transformation process, the Alliance has been striving "to ensure that it has adequate capabilities to prevent, protect against and respond to" the threat posed by international terrorism (NATO - Topic: Countering terrorism 2018). As a consequence, CT has evolved as a major multidimensional, institutionalized specific issue-area within NATO's broader domain of CD. However, the more important question that one needs to ask is to what extent was CT institutionalized within CD? It is essential to address this question since the institutionalization of CT within CD would have varying degrees and thus, its likely effects on the intra-alliance CTC would depend on these varying degrees. Required, then, is to assess the institutionalization of CT within CD since outcomes associated with the

institutionalization of any issue-area are likely to depend on the level of institutionalization (Tolbert and Zucker 1996).

Before the assessment of the institutionalization of CT within CD, it is essential to identify the relationship between CD and CT so that one can be able to investigate the likely effects of the institutionalization of CT within CD toward the intra-alliance CTC. Accordingly, this section of this chapter will be guided through addressing the specific questions below:

- What are the definitions of CD, CT-CD, and the institutionalization of CT within CD?
- What is the importance of CD to CT for NATO in the post-9/11 era?

In the following parts of this section, we will assess the institutionalization of CT within CD to be able to determine its levels in terms of temporal variation through using the criteria which we have designed specifically for the assessment of the institutionalization of CT within NATO. To be more precise, we will use these criteria to assess the levels of the institutionalization of CT within each domain separately and in terms of temporal variation. Thus, the following pages of this section will first present the definitions of CD, CT-CD and the institutionalization of CT-CD along with the identification of the importance of CD to CT.

To begin with, CD within NATO is defined as "the process from political guidance through requirement identification and the subsequent planning steps, through acquisition, fielding, in-service management, and disposal. All these stages together form the through life-cycle of a capability"(Auditors 2015). In a report produced by the International Board of Auditors for NATO (IBAN) upon the NAC's request, it has been noted that:

> One example of a typical capability is the ability to deploy forces. Another is the ability to exchange information between NATO entities. To achieve such capabilities, NATO needs infrastructure, including physical infrastructure and technology-intensive communication and information systems. Other than these 'materiel' elements, a capability also includes doctrine, organization, training, leadership development, personnel, facilities, and interoperability. Capabilities may be developed individually by the Nations, by a group of Nations, or collectively by all Nations. Individual NATO Nations develop the great majority of the Alliance's capabilities. Compared to national capability development, collective efforts occur on a relatively

> small scale. Collective capabilities are based on the principle of "common funding". To be eligible for common funding, a capability must be deemed "over" the existing available capability and also "above" reasonable expectations of available national resources. Common funded capabilities relate to one or more NATO resource "pillars", the capital investment needed to enhance and update NATO's assets, the military and civil budgets and NATO's international workforce (Auditors 2015).

Hence, CD in NATO's case is not only limited to investing more on the material capabilities, but also includes the enhancement of immaterial assets such as education and training (E&T) including military exercises and science and technology projects. Therefore, CD, in this research, refers to a far-reaching domain where the Alliance aims to ensure, through investing more on both material and immaterial capabilities, that it has adequate capabilities to fulfill its full range of missions including to prevent, protect against and respond to the threat posed by international terrorism.

The role of CD aimed at countering the terrorist threat within this context is vital. As a matter of course, NATO's efforts to enhance its capabilities to carry out the "full range of its missions" would also contribute to the Alliance's efforts for countering the threat posed by international terrorism. As stated in NATO's official web page titled 'countering terrorism', "CD is a part of NATO's core business, and methods that address asymmetric threats including terrorism and the use of non-conventional weapons, are of particular relevance" (NATO - Topic: Countering terrorism 2018).

Indeed, the centrality of CD to CT, in terms of where NATO can contribute to Transatlantic CTC in an effective and meaningful manner, has been accepted from the very beginning. At the Prague Summit held in 2002, endorsement of the PCC was an important milestone aimed at improving the capabilities of the member countries' armed forces individually and collectively to fight against international terrorism. Furthermore, in NATO's policy guidelines on CT endorsed in 2012, CD has become one of the key domains where NATO can add its potential value to the overall efforts in Transatlantic CTC. As emphasized in the guidelines (NATO's Policy Guidelines on Counter-terrorism 2012):

> The Alliance will strive to ensure that it has adequate capabilities to prevent, protect against and respond to terrorist threats… It will do so by considering capability developments, innovative technologies and methods that address asymmetric threats in a more

> comprehensive and informed way, including through the Defense Against Terrorism Program of Work. NATO will also strive to maintain its operational capacity and capitalize on the lessons learned in operations, including experience gained through Special Operations Forces. Training, education, and exercises based on different threat scenarios will continue to improve interoperability by assimilating lessons learned and best practices. These capabilities may also be offered to Allies in support of civil emergency planning and the protection of critical infrastructure, particularly as it may relate to counter-terrorism, as requested.

To put in a nutshell, NATO promotes the development of the capabilities needed to counter the terrorist threat in an effective manner, either by providing guidance to the Allies on the development of their national capabilities and promoting multinational cooperation or by developing the capabilities collectively, which would otherwise be inaccessible to the members alone.

Thus, CT within CD in this research means, *developing material assets (i.e. physical infrastructures including the creation and the transformation of the military forces and other sub-structures including the command structures) and immaterial assets (i.e. policy and doctrine aimed at countering the threat posed by terrorism) and, these assets at the same time become the components of CT-CD.*

Therefore, the components of CT-CD in this research are:

- Capability Commitments,
- Action Plans,
- Initiatives,
- Creation and Transformation of the forces,
- Transformation of command structures,
- Policy and Doctrine,
- E&T facilities including military exercises,

Institutionalization of CT within CD refers to *the process embedded within its overarching political and structural transformation that comprises both the elements of change and continuity in expanding and revising NATO policies, procedures, rules, and the establishment and re-use of sub-structures which is recognized by the Allies as the*

patterns of CT-CD practices since 9/11 through framing CT in a different way to mobilize previously uninvolved actors or issues.

Regarding these definitions, it is important to note that, at first sight, the definition of CT-CD and the definition of the institutionalization of CT-CD may almost seem to be identical. However, as discussed in the first chapter, while the latter requires "continuous change", the former does not have to be described in such terms.

As discussed at the Research Design and Methodology chapter of this dissertation, the key elements of "change" described here are (a) Changing issue definition, (b) Involvement of new or previously uninvolved issues and actors (James L., Jones, and Baumgartner 2006, 47). Continuity, on the other hand, is described here as ongoing, evolving and cumulative and the "further movement in the same direction" induced by the previous change (Pierson 2000, 252; Wick and Quinn 1990, 375).

In addition, the main aim of this part is not to provide a detailed description of NATO's CT policies and practices within CD; but the focus is, instead, on the key changes both in policy and practice that have acted as milestones in the institutionalization of CT-CD within NATO between 2002-2018. Thus, key political decisions and institutional changes identified in this chapter as contributing to the institutionalization of CT within CD can be thought of as "change levers" (Buller and Mcevoy 1989).

3.1.1 Assessment of the Institutionalization of Counter-Terrorism within Capacity Development in the Post-9/11 Era

As discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation, the institutionalization of CT as a specific issue-area within CD will be assessed through using four distinct criteria: Rhetorical Recognition and Expansion, Formalization and Revision of the new policies, Expansion of the old sub-structures and Practical Implementation. Each of these criteria will be examined within separate parts. Thus, in the following parts of this section, we will assess the institutionalization of CT-CD by using these criteria in terms of temporal variation. The first part of this section will start with the first criterion; 'rhetorical recognition and expansion' and the rest of the criteria will be covered in the subsequent parts of this section. With the aim of quantifying the qualitative data, we will provide further clarification on the process of assessment and the measurement issues at the

beginning of each part. At the end of each part, we will present a scorecard specifically designed for measuring the levels of each criterion to summarize the findings within each criterion.

3.1.1.1 Rhetorical Recognition of the Importance of Capability Development to Counter-Terrorism and Its Subsequent Expansion

The NATO leaders acknowledged that countering terrorism in an effective manner requires a comprehensive set of measures and CD is no exception. As stated in the Prague Summit declaration (2002):

> Terrorism, which we categorically reject and condemn in all its forms and manifestations, poses a grave and growing threat to Alliance populations, forces, and territory, as well as to international security. We are determined to combat this scourge for as long as necessary. To combat terrorism effectively, our response must be multi-faceted and comprehensive.

To this end, after the invocation of the Art. V in response to the 9/11 attacks, the rhetoric of the Alliance has put more emphasis on CT and developing new capabilities. Therefore, I argue, the levels of institutionalization of CT within the first criterion; 'rhetorical recognition and expansion of the relevance of CD to countering the terrorist threat' indicate the emergence and subsequent expansion of the institutionalization of CT within CD in rhetorical terms.[32]

To measure the levels in this (first) criterion, we will use summit declarations, communiqués and the speeches given by high-level NATO officials such as; Secretary Generals, Assistant Secretary Generals, and other high-level senior NATO officials. According to the NATO webpage on the summits (2019), summits are often held at key moments in the Alliance's evolution and they are important junctures in the Alliance's decision-making process. Summits are used, for instance, to introduce new policies and launch major initiatives (NATO 2019). The decisions taken at summit meetings are issued in declarations and communiqués and these official documents explain the Alliance's decisions and reaffirm Allies' support for aspects of NATO policies (NATO 2019).

[32] As it was discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation, this research proposes four distinct criteria to the study on institutionalization of CT within NATO. The first criterion in this regard is the 'recognition of the relevance of the different domains (CD, IS and MOps) to countering the threat posed by terrorism.'

However, it is beyond the scope of this part of this chapter to analyze every summit declaration from 2002 to 2018 in every detail. Rather, the focus here is on some of the core aspects of the decisions regarding the rhetorical recognition and expansion of the relevance of CD to CT. Thus, this part of this section addresses the questions of how and to what extent NATO relates its work in CD with CT in rhetoric? More specifically, this criterion will be measured through the guidance of following specific indicators:

$I_{1:}$ Whether the Allies have recognized the relevance of CD to CT,

$I_{2:}$ Whether the Allies have emphasized the possible involvement of new or previously un-involved issues or actors in the realm of CT-CD,

$I_{3:}$ Whether the Allies have emphasized further development in the realm of CT-CD,

Each of these indicators will be graded as "10" if affirmative and will be graded as "0" if there exists a shift from previous rhetoric. As a matter of course, we will follow a chronological approach to be able to identify the change &continuity within this criterion between 2002-2018. Thus, even a 'change' does not exist in each year but there exists 'continuity' induced by the previous change; we will also grade each indicator within each related year as "10". Thus, at the end of each part of this section, we will present a score-card to illustrate the ongoing, evolving and cumulative nature of the institutionalization of CT-CD. It is important to note that, the grading process only aimed at quantifying the qualitative data and so, does not represent the exact numbers of the changes in each criterion.

Prior to 9/11, CD was far from being relevant to CT both in terms of policy and practice within NATO. As a response to the changing security environment, at Prague Summit held in November 2002, the heads of state and government declared that they are committed to "pursuing vigorously capability improvements" (Prague Summit Declaration 2002). The Prague Summit Declaration made an explicit link between the CD and CT. It was emphasized in the declaration that:

> Recalling the tragic events of 11 September 2001 and our subsequent decision to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, we have approved a comprehensive package of measures, based on NATO's Strategic Concept, to strengthen our ability to meet the

> challenges to the security of our forces, populations and territory, from wherever they may come. Today's decisions will provide for balanced and effective capabilities within the Alliance so that NATO can better carry out the full range of its missions and respond collectively to those challenges, including the threat posed by terrorism and by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery (Prague Summit Declaration 2002).

In order to overcome the defects of their operational capabilities, the Alliance leaders approved a comprehensive package of measures to improve their capabilities in four key areas including defense against terrorism. Within the comprehensive package of measures, the leaders of the Alliance also agreed to improve their capabilities through PCC, which was designed to replace the previous capability initiative plan, the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) endorsed in 1999 (Cornish 2004; Prague Summit Declaration 2002). The PCC was designed to ensure that the Alliance possesses the operational capabilities required to effectively deal with the new security threats including international terrorism. Another important milestone in NATO's history in terms of relating its work in CD with CT was the decision to create NRF, a fully-trained, certified and deployable force wherever and whenever needed to take its full range of missions including CT. As part of the package of measures agreed at the Prague Summit, the NATO leaders also endorsed the agreed on MCDT[33]. The NATO leaders stated in the Prague Summit declaration that "the concept is part of a package of measures to strengthen NATO's capabilities in this area, which also includes improved intelligence sharing and crisis response arrangements"(Prague Summit Declaration 2002).

At the Istanbul Summit held in 2004, the continuing efforts in the same direction have also been emphasized. It was stated in the Istanbul Summit Declaration that

> NATO is transforming its military capabilities in order to adapt to the changing strategic environment. The new command structure, the NATO Response Force, and the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Deference battalion are progressing. Together, they give NATO much stronger and faster military capabilities. But transformation is a process, not an event. We are therefore committed to continued transformation and to further strengthen our operational capabilities and procedures so that our forces are more deployable and usable. To this end, we invite the Secretary-General and the North Atlantic Council in permanent

[33] The content of MCDT will be discussed in more detail in the following part of this section.

> session to take the steps necessary to ensure that the transformation process is fully implemented, and to report to us at the next NATO Summit (NATO Press Releases 2006).

In addition, in the Final Communiqué of the Istanbul Summit, the heads of state and government reassured that they will continue to improve their capabilities through PCC and declared that they "decided to further the transformation of our military capabilities to make them more modern, more usable and more deployable to carry out the full range of Alliance missions"(Istanbul Summit Communiqué 2004). In the Istanbul Summit, NATO leaders have also decided to create the Defense against Terrorism (DAT) Program of Work (POW) which aims to develop technologies against terrorism and other asymmetric threats to reduce the technological shortfalls and capability gaps of the member states.

In the same vein, at NATO's 2006 Riga Summit, the Allies reaffirmed the goals of PCC. More importantly, at the Riga Summit the leaders of the Alliance agreed to approve a Comprehensive Political Guidance (CPG), which provides "a framework and political direction for NATO's continuing transformation, setting out the priorities for all Alliance capability issues, planning disciplines and intelligence for the next 10-15 years" (Riga Summit Declaration 2006). The decision on the approval of a CPG has particular importance to the rhetorical expansion of the institutionalization of CT within CD since it demonstrates a step forward from the initial recognition of the linkage between CD and CT. Thereby, beyond investing more in material capabilities, this decision highlights a tendency that the Allies are broadening their vision on the importance of CD to CT[34]. In the final communiqué of their Riga summit, NATO leaders declared their intention to continue building on what they achieved on capabilities in Prague and Istanbul Summits.

Preceding steps taken in the Riga Summit on expanding the CT-related works within CD proceeded in the same direction by the Bucharest Summit of 2008. In the Bucharest Summit Declaration, it was clearly stated that NATO will "continue to develop advanced capabilities to help defend against terrorist attacks, including through continuing development of new technologies" (Bucharest Summit Declaration 2008). Unlike the previous summits in Riga and Istanbul, the NATO leaders did not mention PCC, instead, they put more emphasis on CPG. As it was stated in the Bucharest Summit Declaration:

[34] We will analyze the scope of CPG in the next part of this section.

> We have already done much to transform our forces and capabilities in line with our political objectives, in particular, the priorities laid out in the Comprehensive Political Guidance, and our operational experience. We will continue this process to ensure the Alliance remains able to meet its operational commitments and perform the full range of its missions (Bucharest Summit Declaration 2008)

The important point to make here is that this difference does not indicate a unique break in terms of NATO's approach to the relationship between CT and CD. Rather, it indicates that NATO has aspired to develop further its works in the realm of CT-CD through "the coherent and comprehensive application of the various instruments of the Alliance to create overall effects that will achieve the desired outcome" (Compr. Polit. Guid. 2006 Article 17). In light of NATO's CT missions, the Allied leaders also underlined the pressing need for "acquiring specific capabilities such as strategic and intra-theater airlift and communications and pointed toward a possible future NATO missile defense system" (Bucharest Summit Declaration 2008; Ek 2008). By emphasizing so, the Allies, through the comprehensive approach, framed CT-CD in a different way by expanding the scope of their rhetoric on the relationship between CT and CD.

In its 60th anniversary, the NATO heads of state and government have gathered in Strasbourg and Kehl in the meeting of NAC and declared that they have initiated a "process to develop a new Strategic Concept which will define NATO's longer-term role in the new security environment of the 21st century." (Strasbourg / Kehl Summit Declaration 2009). Evidently, the statement on this decision demonstrates not only a vision on expanding CT-related works within CD but also an Alliance wide agreement on the importance of the multifaceted nature of new security threats including terrorism.

Besides, after the establishment of Afghan National Army Trust Fund (ANATF) in 2007 -the fund to provide a mechanism for Allied nations contributing troops to the ISAF to support the Afghan National Army services, and to support in and out-of-country training- the Allies have reaffirmed their commitment to support ANATF in the summit declaration on Afghanistan issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the NAC in Kehl and Strasbourg in 2009 (Factsheet: Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund 2019; Summit Declaration on Afghanistan 2009). Additionally, in Chicago, Wales and Warsaw Summits (2012,2014 and 2016 respectively), the Allies have decided to expand the role of the ANATF and committed to increase their

contributions steadily over-time. (Factsheet: Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund 2018).

At the next summit held in Lisbon on November 19, 2010, in accordance with the decisions taken at the previous summits, NATO leaders reaffirmed their "resolve to continue to provide the resources, including the forces and capabilities required to perform the full range of Alliance missions" (Lisbon Summit Declaration 2010). Additionally, the Allies agreed on the Lisbon package of NATO's "most pressing capability needs" (Lisbon Summit Declaration 2010). The most important decision taken at the Lisbon Summit, however, was beyond the reaffirmation of continuing efforts in developing the capabilities. At the Lisbon summit, the Allies adopted the new Strategic Concept, as the outcome of the process launched at the Strasbourg and Kehl Summits, which laid out the Allies' vision for the next decade (Lisbon Summit Declaration 2010). As it was stated in the Lisbon Summit Declaration, the New Strategic Concept underlines the Allied commitment "to ensuring that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety of our populations and the security of our territory" (Lisbon Summit Declaration 2010). In this regard, Lisbon Summit (2010) is one of the most important critical junctures in NATO's history not only in terms of CT-CD related decisions taken at the summit but also in terms of the degree of strategic consensus among the Allies that had become rather rare in other Summits (Noetzel and Schreer 2012).

At the summit meeting in Chicago in 2012, although it was not explained in detail in the Chicago Summit Declaration, the Alliance leaders addressed two major topics in relation to CT-CD. First, NATO leaders agreed to embrace a smart defense policy which aims to encourage the "Allies to cooperate in developing, acquiring and maintaining military capabilities to meet current security problems in accordance with the new NATO strategic concept " (NATO Review Magazine 2012). Through the smart defense policy, the Alliance aimed to encourage the establishment of multinational cooperation between the Allies in order to help them to reach their capability targets[35].

In addition, at the Chicago Summit, the leaders of the Alliance "started talking about expanding education, training, and exercises and introduced the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI)" (NATO - Topic: Exercises 2019). The introduction of the CFI was aimed

[35] The Smart Defense Policy will be further assessed in the next part of this section within the second criterion 'expansion and revision of the policies'

at ensuring “the high level of interoperability Allied forces gained during their operational experience in Afghanistan, Libya, the Horn of Africa and the Balkans, was maintained” (NATO - Topic: Exercises 2019).

Subsequently, at the Wales Summit in 2014, the Allies repeatedly emphasized the continuity of the previous steps taken in the realm of CT-CD. It was clearly stated in the Wales Summit declaration that the Allies;

> will continue to improve our capabilities and technologies, including to defend against improvised explosive devices (IED) and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats. We will keep terrorism and related threats high on NATO's security agenda (Wales Summit Declaration 2014).

However, the major theme of the Summit was not CT in general. Due to the Russian annexation of Crimea, the main emphasis in the Wales Summit was on the crisis in Ukraine and the Allies condemned Russia's illegal activities in Ukraine. This situation has accelerated the scholarly debates on NATO’s role in the transatlantic and some scholars have asserted that NATO is “shifting gears” and now “back towards territorial defense” (Webber, Hallams, and Smith 2014, 785).

Although the major theme was not CT in general at the Wales Summit, the Allies also emphasized to expand their commitment to provide and continue their efforts in developing the capabilities including through education and training activities. Thus, the Wales declaration not only identified territorial defense issue but also other issues that could potentially threaten the Alliance, the Allies and international security (Kfir 2015, 13). In addition, although it is directly related, not to CT-CD but to CT-MOps, it may worth to note that the decision on extending the remit of NATO’s only Article V operation, Operation Active Endeavor, clearly demonstrates that there is an Alliance-wide recognition on the importance of NATO’s role in the realm of CT to enhance international security (Wales Summit Declaration 2014).

Similar to the Wales Summit in 2014, the Alliance’s approach towards Russia was inevitably the central theme of the Warsaw Summit in 2016. However, this does not necessarily mean that the Allies favor a “back to basics approach” since, both the so-called new and old security threats require the same abilities; capability, readiness, and strength (Kfir 2015, 13).

Relationally, NATO defense ministers, at their meeting in Brussels on June 2015, declared that they are also "concerned about the growing regional instability to our South caused by a combination of diverse challenges and threats, including the threat posed by ISIL/DAESH" (NATO - Official text: Statement by NATO Defence Ministers 2015). According to the statement, "to address all these challenges to the East and to the South, NATO continues to provide a 360-degree approach to deter threats and, if necessary, defend Allies against any adversary" (NATO - Official text: Statement by NATO Defence Ministers 2015). The emphasis on the "360-degree approach" is in the context of the necessity that NATO should address the threats both posed by Russia and emanating from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) -primarily the threat posed by international terrorism (Ministers of Defence and of Foreign Affairs about the NATO and International Security during the Warsaw Security Forum 2015). Thus, the Allies did not abandon their emphasis on CT- related issues, including the importance of CD to CT, but rather, committed to being prepared to engage both in the "basics" and other tasks including terrorism simultaneously. As stated in the Warsaw Summit Communiqué, the Allies "renewed emphasis has been placed on deterrence and collective defense. At the same time, NATO must retain its ability to respond to crises beyond its borders, and remain actively engaged in projecting stability and enhancing international security" (Warsaw Summit Communiqué 2016).

Regarding CT-CD, in particular, NATO renewed its emphasis on the Smart Defense and introduced new initiatives in the area of CD such as the Combined Joint Enhanced Training Initiative (CJET) and the U.K-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), made up of high readiness, flexible, integrated forces from seven Allies and the UK-France Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF), which will enhance the Alliance's ability to respond rapidly to any challenge (Warsaw Summit Communiqué 2016).

It was also stated in the Warsaw Summit Communiqué that "multinational and national initiatives provide an important contribution to capability development and our strengthened posture" and that "NATO will continue to work as agreed, to ensure that the Smart Defense and other pooling and sharing initiatives are complementary and mutually reinforcing, and to support capability development"(Warsaw Summit Communiqué 2016).

To put in a nutshell, the NATO Summit declarations between 2001-2018 have made it clear that after the recognition of the linkage between CD and CT in the Prague

Summit for the first time, this trend was followed by further movements in the same direction in the next summits at least in rhetorical level. The Allies, through framing their rhetoric on CT-CD in an inclusive manner, have mobilized the further involvement of both new issues and new actors into the realm of CT-CD. The following scorecard illustrates the levels of the 'rhetorical recognition of the importance of capability development to counter-terrorism and its subsequent expansion'[36]. The following part of this section will further assess the criterion; the formalization and the revision of the policies in the realm of CT-CD.

Table 3.1 Illustrative Scorecard: Levels of the Rhetorical Recognition of the Importance of Capability Development to Counter-terrorism and its subsequent Expansion

Criterion	**Indicators**	2002	2004	2006	2008	2009	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Rhetorical recognition and expansion	I_1	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
	I_2	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
	I_3	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
	TOTAL	**30**	**60**	**90**	**120**	**150**	**180**	**210**	**240**	**270**	**300**

3.1.1.2 Formalization and Revision of the Policies in Counter-Terrorism Capability Development

Formalization and revision of the policies, as defined in research design and methodology chapter, is the formalization of the rhetorical recognition through establishing more specific policies including, for example; strategic concept, military concepts, military and policy guidance texts, which relates the relevance of each domain to CT and thus, in this case; the relevance of CD to CT. This criterion will also be assessed by considering 'continuous change' and through the guidance of the following specific indicators:

$I_{1:}$ Whether the Alliance have set out more specific policies regarding the CT-CD,

$I_{2:}$ Whether the policies have emphasized the involvement of new or previously un-involved issues or actors in the realm of CT-CD,

[36] The numeric values within this scorecard refer neither to the exact levels of the criteria nor the exact numbers of change. This scorecard is designed with the aim of quantifying the qualitative data and for illustrative purposes only. In addition, the researcher adopted a cumulative standpoint throughout the measurement process. Following a cumulative approach is necessary for the purposes of this research given the fact that the evaluation process is framed through focusing on 'change & continuity' and 'change & continuity' is defined in this research as: ongoing, evolving and cumulative.

$I_{3:}$ Whether the policies have set out the direction for further improvement or development in the CT-CD,

$I_{4:}$ Whether the policies have revised considering the new requirements of the CT-CD.

Each of these indicators will be graded as "10" if affirmative and will be graded as "0" if there exists a shift from the previous direction. As we have discussed in the previous part of this section, we aim to identify the change and continuity in each year and in each indicator. Thus, even a 'change' does not exist in each year but there exists 'continuity' induced by the previous change; we will also grade each indicator within each related year as "10". Thus, at the end of this part, we will present a scorecard to illustrate the "ongoing, evolving and cumulative" nature of the institutionalization of CT-CD. It is important to reiterate that the grading process only aimed at quantifying the qualitative data and so, does not represent exact numbers of the changes in each criterion.

To measure the levels in this criterion, we will use specific military concepts, strategic concepts, E&T directives, policy guidelines (i.e. NATO's policy guidelines on CT) along with other official NATO texts. As we have emphasized in the previous chapter (research design and methodology), due to the very nature of this research, the sources for data gathering will also be considered as the data itself. For example, some of the NATO official texts (i.e.: MCDT) themselves are the evidence of the institutionalization of CT within NATO -since they indicate the formalization of the policies- yet, they are also the sources which we can use both to assess whether CT as an issue-area has been associated with the specific domains (CD in this case). To be more precise, the existence of any policy document and/or official text -itself- will be used as an evidence demonstrating the institutionalization of CT within NATO; more important for the purposes of this research, answering whether CT has been associated with the specific domains (CD, IS and MOps). Only by considering so, one can assess the institutionalization of CT within each domain. For example, the sole existence of MCDT would not be noteworthy without considering the emphasis on the specific domains within MCDT. Thus, in the process of assessment within this criterion, the main foci will be on whether CT has been associated with the specific domains, and the specific domain handled in this section is CD. The assessment of this criterion will also consider temporal variation. However, of course, considering temporal variation does not necessarily mean that the researcher expects a 'change' in each

of the years between 2002-2018. Yet, considering temporal variation is necessary for the empirical analysis of this research presented in the next chapter (Chapter 4), and also for being able to demonstrate the "continuity".

So, the first of its kind document regarding the formalization of CT policies in general and the importance of CD to CT, in particular, is MCDT, which was endorsed and agreed by the Alliance leaders in 2002. The endorsement of MCDT demonstrates the initial emergence of the formalization of CT-CD policies since it gives clear definitions of terrorism-related concepts and issues. MCDT includes all possible military activities that NATO can work to combat terrorism, namely; 'anti-terrorism'; 'consequence management'; 'counter-terrorism' and 'military cooperation'. It is important to note that in MCDT NATO has made a clear distinction between, 'anti-terrorism' and 'counter-terrorism ', while the former specifies defensive measures, such as consequence management, intelligence sharing, and disaster relief, the latter combines offensive military actions. Although the establishment of MCDT is a significant development, it did not establish any principles or guidelines for CT.

MCDT which was endorsed in 2002 has been superseded by the endorsement of the new Military Committee Concept for CT (MCCT) in 2015. In this regard, the MCCT "establishes a framework, principles, and guidelines to ensure that provision for CT is reflected coherently over time in the revision process of policies and plans across the spectrum of NATO's activities, including doctrine, training, and material". Thus, MCCT became the doctrinal guide on how CD activities that aim to fight against terrorism will be performed. In other words, CT -as mission or as a key task- has been included in NATO's educations, individual and collective training, exercises and assessments at strategic, operational and tactical levels. The differences between MCDT in 2002 and MCCT in 2015 reflect the profound changes in the Alliance's definitions of CT, terrorist threat assessment and views on a military strategy to CT in the intervening years.

NATO Heads of State and Government in November 2006, Riga Summit have agreed on the CPG- another major policy document that has set out the framework and priorities for all Alliance CT-CD issues for the next decade. The Allies, through the CPG, have clarified NATO's broader vision on the threat of terrorism after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The threat of terrorism was described in the CPG as "increasingly global and more lethal in nature, with the risk of spreading WMDs to the terrorist organizations". More

generally, NATO Director of Policy Planning, Jamie Shea, in 2009, has stressed out that the CPG is "official doctrine for all non-Article V missions." The 2010 Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive (COPD) has systematized "a set of common principles to NATO operations planning and training" and "intended to enhance NATO's ability to incorporate non-military aspects into its planning process and to facilitate practical cooperation" with other international actors in the realm of CT (Webber, Sperling, and Smith 2012).

The Alliance's new strategic concept agreed in 2010 has set out "NATO's strategic priorities" and provided "an analysis of the strategic environment and a framework for all Alliance capability development planning disciplines and intelligence, identifying the kinds of operations the Alliance must be able to perform and setting the context for in which capability development takes place" (NATO Transformation : NATO Capabilities 2019).

The new strategic concept's overall purpose was to explain the Alliance's political objectives and a broader vision for the next decade. The Allies, through the new strategic concept, aimed to give political guidance on the Alliance's role, missions, and objectives including its role and objectives in the realm of CT. The strategic concept was followed by other policy documents (i.e. MCCT) endorsed by the Military Committee on the material and immaterial capabilities, other assets, and structures required to carry out the strategic objectives identified by the NATO leaders.

In general, the new strategic concept summarized NATO's purpose to provide the security of its members by using both political and military means. It set out the political and military path for the Alliance to follow in order to achieve its stated objectives in the NATO summits. In other words, the new strategic concept summarized and formalized the summit declarations, communiqués and other rhetorical decisions that have emerged since the previous strategic concept endorsed in 1999. Following this change in concept, came several structural reformations.

More specifically, regarding the relevance of CD to CT, the new strategic concept clearly states that the Allies will;

> enhance the capacity to detect and defend against international terrorism, including through enhanced analysis of the threat, more

> consultations with our partners, and the development of appropriate military capabilities, including to help train local forces to fight terrorism themselves. (Active Engagement, Modern Defence 2010).

In parallel with the new strategic concept, two years later, NATO pursued two major policies endorsed at Chicago Summit in 2012. The first, Smart Defense, aims to "develop, acquire and/or operate capabilities collectively rather than individually, thereby making more efficient use of scarce resources." In fact, the idea of Smart Defense was initially suggested by Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO Secretary-General between 2009-2014, in a keynote speech he addressed at the Munich Security Conference in 2011. He defined Smart Defense as a specific approach capable of "ensuring greater security, for less money, by working together with more flexibility" (as cited in Henius and McDonald 2012, 4).

The second, the Allies endorsed NATO's policy guidelines on CT at their meeting in Chicago in 2012 with an aim of further enhancing "NATO's ability to prevent, deter and respond to terrorism by identifying the initiatives" and "to enhance the terrorist threat awareness, capabilities, and engagement."(Chicago Summit Declaration 2012). According to NATO's policy guidelines on CT, "the key areas in which the Alliance will undertake initiatives to enhance the prevention of and resilience to acts of terrorism" are identified as the "improved awareness of the terrorist threat", "adequate capabilities to address it", and "engagement with partner countries and other international actors". (NATO's Policy Guidelines on Counter-terrorism: Aware, Capable and Engaged for a Safer Future 2012). The policy guidelines on CT identified the principles to which the Alliance adheres and considering the CD, put emphasis on the comprehensive approach through the "DAT POW, lessons learned in operations, including experience gained through Special Operations Forces (SOF), E&T and exercises based on different threat scenarios"(NATO's Policy Guidelines on Counter-terrorism: Aware, Capable and Engaged for a Safer Future 2012).

In parallel with the NATO's policy guidelines on CT, MCCT which was agreed in 2015 and superseded the previous MCDT agreed in 2002, established "a framework, principles and guidelines to ensure that provision for CT is reflected coherently over time in the revision process of policies and plans across the spectrum of NATO's activities,

including doctrine, training and materiel" (Military Committee Concept for Counter-terrorism 2016). Of importance to point out here is that MCCT identified potential military contributions to NATO's overall efforts in CT-CD. According to MCCT, the potential military contributions include "maintaining existing capabilities and expertise (including NATO Educational Training Facilities and NATO accredited Centers of Excellence and NATO Special Operations Headquarters [NSHQ]) applicable for use against the terrorist threat." (MCCT 2016). Thus, the MCCT has clearly emphasized the possible involvement of previously un-involved actors in the realm of CT-CD and set out a further military direction to the efforts on CT-CD.

In short, the Allies have formalized more specific policies on CT-CD and revised these policies in line with the actual requirements of CT-CD. Hence, considering this assessment, the following score-card illustrates the levels of the formalization and revision of the policies in CT- CD through the guidance of the indicators specified earlier. It can be argued that, through the constant revisions of the policies, the levels of the formalization and revision of CT-CD policies within NATO have increased since 2002. The following part of this section will assess the expansion of the old sub-structures in CT-CD.

Table 3.2 Illustrative Scorecard: Levels of the Formalization and the revision of the policies in Counter-terrorism Capability Development

Criterion	**Indicators**	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Formalization and revision of policies	I_1	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100	110	120	130	140	150	160	170
	I_2	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100	110	120	130	140	150	160	170
	I_3	0	0	0	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100	110	120	130
	I_4	0	0	0	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100	110	120	130
	TOTAL	**20**	**40**	**60**	**80**	**120**	**160**	**200**	**240**	**280**	**320**	**360**	**400**	**440**	**480**	**520**	**560**	**600**

3.1.1.3 Expansion of the Old Sub-Structures in Counter-Terrorism Capability Development

This criterion, as discussed in the previous chapters (Chapter One and Chapter 2) is defined as the re-use of the old sub-structures by linking CT to the previously established structures. To be more precise, this criterion includes the re-use of old sub-structures -beyond their point of origination- for the implementation of CT practices. These sub-structures may include both the physical assets, such as military forces, NATO schools, and other bodily sub-structures or other immaterial sub-structures, such as education and training facilities including military exercises among others. In addition, the broader structural transformation process of NATO in the post 9/11 era as well will be considered within the assessment of this criterion since this process is evidently induced by the requirements of the new security threats of the 21st century in general and international terrorism in particular.

To be able to maintain the consistency throughout the assessment process of the institutionalization of CT, this criterion will also be assessed in terms of 'continuous change' and through using the following specific indicators:

> $I_{1:}$ Whether bodily sub-structures in the domain of CD that exist prior to 9/11 have been re-designed concerning the CT,
> $I_{2:}$ Whether the immaterial sub-structures in the domain of CD that exist prior to 9/11 have been re-designed concerning the CT,
> $I_{3:}$ Whether the role of these sub-structures in the domain CD has been expanded concerning the CT.

As mentioned earlier, each of these indicators will be graded as "10" if affirmative and will be graded as "0" if there exists a shift contradicting with the previous steps taken. In addition, as discussed in the previous sections, even if a 'change' does not exist in each year but there exists 'continuity' induced by the previous change; we will also grade each indicator within each related year as "10". Thus, at the end of this sub-section, we will present a score-card to illustrate the levels of this criterion from 2002 to 2018. It is important to note that, the grading process only aimed at quantifying the qualitative data and so, does not represent the exact numbers of the changes in each criterion.

To measure the levels in this criterion, we will use official NATO factsheets, annual reports published by various NATO bodies, NATO documents placed on NATO web-archive, along with other academic articles, and web-sources. Hence, the following pages of this part will assess the institutionalization of CT within CD by using the criterion of the 'expansion of the old sub-structures'.

Although it is embedded within its broader transformation process and not specifically aimed at CT-CD, NATO defense ministers agreed on the simplification of the Alliance's HQ structure in 2003. As a result, the number of high-level strategic and operational HQs was reduced from 20 to 12, with the Alliance's Atlantic Command, based in Norfolk, Virginia, became Allied Command Transformation (ACT) designed to be the main responsible body for the recreation of the Alliance (NATO - Topic: Allied Command Transformation (ACT) 2018). The relevance between the transformation and CT-CD is clearly stated on NATO's webpage titled NATO Transformation: NATO Capabilities (NATO Transformation : NATO Capabilities 2019):

> NATO has been engaged in continuous and systematic transformation for many years to ensure that it has the policies, capabilities, and structures required, in the changing international security environment, to deal with current and future challenges, including of course the collective defense of its members. With Allied forces engaged in operations and missions across several continents, the Alliance needs to ensure that its armed forces remain modern, deployable and sustainable.

According to NATO Encyclopedia, the transformation of NATO Command Structure, resulting from the Chicago Summit in 2012, gave Allied Command Operations (ACO) the responsibility for planning and executing E&T activities, based on the actual needs of developing the capabilities of NATO and the member nations forces, but the individual E&T efforts, the scenario development, the integration of future trends in the exercises program remained as ACT's responsibility (Allied Command Operations 2015, 65–66).

ACO develops and maintains forces' standards; provides guidance on exercise programs and their assessment; identifies requirements related to training and force development capabilities (NATO 2018). ACO and ACT manage E&T, military exercise and assessment process since 2012. Within this context, ACO started to play an important role in the field of CT-CD through E&T. As a priority, NATO is ensuring that its

commands and multinational forces remain ready, responsive, adaptable and interoperable, despite differences in tactics, doctrine, training, structures, and language to a variety of security challenges including terrorism (NATO - Topic: Education and training n.d.). The establishment of ACT in 2003 represented an important step forward to enhance readiness and interoperability through the coordination of education and individual training with collective training and exercises(BI-SC Collective Training and Exercise Directive 2013). Thus, although NATO has been conducting collective E&T activities since 1949, over time, they have expanded both geographically and institutionally to become an integral part of NATO's ability to protect the security of its members.

At the Istanbul Summit, in 2004, NATO leaders also decided to create the Defense against Terrorism Program of Work (DAT POW), which aims to develop technologies against terrorism and other asymmetric threats to reduce the technological shortfalls and capability gaps of the member states. The program is based on common funding that member countries pool resources within a NATO framework to develop individual capabilities of the member states and advanced technologies that meet the needs of the member states in combating terrorism (NATO - Topic: Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work 2018). The establishment of DAT POW aimed to reinforce the Alliance's contribution to combatting terrorism demonstrates further progress regarding NATO's intra-alliance cooperation.

There are several bodies within NATO through which CT-E&T activities are implemented. Some operate under the direction of the Alliance and others are external but complementary to the Alliance's other structures. There are seven E&T facilities, NATO Defense College (NDC), The NATO School in Oberammergau (NSO), The NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre (NMIOTC), The NATO Communications and Information Systems School (NCISS) in Latina, Italy, The Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) in Stavanger, Norway, The Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) in Bydgoszcz, Poland and The Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) in Lisbon, Portugal (NATO - Topic: Education and training n.d.)

Although most of these facilities were established prior to the 21st century, the emerging threats of the new security environment, including international terrorism, induced them to adapt to meet these new challenges. NSO located in Germany, for instance, is the primary operational-level training center for students (NATO School

Oberammergau 2017). Operational-level training focuses on joint planning of NATO operations, operations planning, defense planning, logistics, communications, civil emergency planning, and civil-military cooperation (NATO School Oberammergau 2017). Due to the limitations of this research, it is not possible to present the exact number of CT related courses given by the above-mentioned facilities. However, NSO, for instance, offers hundreds of courses (resident and e-learning) and that are directly or indirectly related to CT and include terrorism within their learning objectives, such as Defense against Terrorism course, NATO Operational Education course and NATO Security course and the ISAF counter-insurgency Intelligence Course (NATO School Oberammergau 2017). NDC in Rome, Italy is NATO's primary strategic-level educational facility and includes areas of study, such as trends in the international security environment and their potential effects on NATO countries. NDC also offers several resident and on-site courses including modular short courses, such as Global Security Challenges course that primarily covers terrorism within its learning objectives (Academic Calendars, NATO Defense College n.d.). Thus, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 resulted in a process of expansion of the previously established NATO bodies through the inclusion of CT-related E&T activities.

ACT holds the leading responsibility for directing NATO schools as well as for the development of joint education, individual training, and associated policy and doctrine between NATO and Partnership Training and Education Centers (PTECs) (NATO - Topic: Education and training n.d.). Since July 2012, ACT has also been given the responsibility of managing collective training and exercises based on ACO's requirements (BI-SC Collective Training and Exercise Directive 2013, 185). Starting from specific requirements and analyses, ACT identifies and develops the most appropriate E&T solution for every discipline and it was designed to keep NATO fully aligned with rapid operational and technological changes (BI-SC Collective Training and Exercise Directive 2013, 185). Hence, this added function is specifically important in terms of the institutionalization of CT-CD as it demonstrates the relevancy of CD to interoperability of the forces to be able to fight against terrorism in a unified manner.

After the Chicago Summit, two central elements shaped NATO`s approach to E&T. In this respect, first, NATO "moved from a campaign footing such as; focusing on the ISAF, to a contingency footing which is more balanced, prepared and ready to conduct a wide range of missions as Allies recuperate and reconstitute" (BI-SC Collective Training

and Exercise Directive 2013). Secondly, NATO changed its vision in terms of testing the means and capabilities to conduct the full range of missions, from most dangerous to most likely (BI-SC Collective Training and Exercise Directive 2013).

As the Secretary General's Annual Report (Rasmussen 2012) stated, "education is a key agent of transformation and NATO's E&T programs have been expanded." Since 2010, E&T activities also provide a means for the Allies and partners to collaborate on how to build, develop and reform educational institutions in the security, defense, and military domain (Rasmussen 2012).

According to NATO BI-SC Collective Training and Exercise Directive, NATO's activity in the realm of E&T has four main criteria: education, individual and collective training, exercises and their respective assessment (BI-SC Collective Training and Exercise Directive 2013, 12). Since 9/11, through E&T activities, NATO aims to enhance the "knowledge and skills of its military forces and to develop NATO's capabilities to encounter a variety of challenges" including terrorism. Thus, E&T activities are embedded into CT to imply stronger operational capabilities. Additionally, NATO's E&T activities support the continuing process of transformation (BI-SC Collective Training and Exercise Directive 2013, 12).

Furthermore, NATO also has started to provide E&T through NATO-led operations such as RSM in Afghanistan. RSM is a NATO-led mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces and institutions, launched on 1 January 2015 (RSM: Key Facts and Figures Troop Contributing Nations 2018). The establishment of RSM was part of the broader engagement of the international community in Afghanistan to ensure that Afghanistan is never again a safe haven for terrorism. Additionally, NATO established a partnership with Iraq in 2012, which includes cooperation in the areas of political dialogue, education and training, response to terrorism, defense institution building and border security, among others. The activities conducted under this partnership was held in Jordan until 2017. In January 2017, the NATO Training and Capacity Building program in Iraq began to train the Iraqi military officers within the territories of Iraq (NATO - Topic: Countering terrorism 2018).

In addition to civil E&T activities, military exercises are the foremost for maintaining, testing and assessing the readiness and interoperability of the Allies, partners

and other non-NATO entities. They evidently help to develop the capabilities of NATO and the Allies' national forces in the realm of CT (NATO - Topic: Exercises 2019). Military "exercises take collective training a step further by testing acquired knowledge" either through LIVEXs or CAXs. Hence, through the constant adaptation of its courses, training events and the introduction of new concepts and capabilities, NATO is using the military exercises as a venue for ensuring the Alliance's ability to respond to emerging security challenges including terrorism. Military exercises generally involve many participants including the members and non-member partner countries. As they are the principal means of maintaining, testing and evaluating the readiness and interoperability of the Allies, and partner countries, military exercises represent the highest and the most complex form of E&T activities (NATO - Topic: Exercises 2019). The broader aim of NATO's military exercises is to establish, enhance and display NATO's military capabilities across the Alliance's full mission spectrum and to ensure the integration of effective and interoperable partner forces for NATO-led Crisis Response Operations (CRO) and other deployable force missions. Through the military exercises, the Allies are developing the capacity to work closely together to respond to a hypothetical terrorist attack.

The Alliance's first exercises were conducted in 1951 and in 1953, there were approximately 100 exercises of various kinds conducted by NATO commanders. Until the 1990s, NATO maintained a very active exercise program to train forces in as many demanding scenarios as possible (NATO - Topic: Exercises 2019). Throughout the Cold War, military exercises were considered a vital part of the Alliance's deterrence posture and helped to ensure that forces were prepared for potential aggression from the Soviet Union. Yet, since 9/11, NATO has begun to extend the scope of military exercises both through the re-use of previously established sub-structures beyond their point of origination and through the establishment of new sub-structures to conduct CT-CD activities.

According to a report published by Joint Analyses and Lessons Learned Center (JLLC), "the number of exercises and their location may contribute to NATO's efforts to deter a potential aggressor and therefore also to NATO's efforts to assure its Allies" (Lazell and Hunter 2017, 144). It was stated in the same report that "likewise, the change in the type of exercises being conducted over the last five years showcases NATO's resolve and

commitment as well as its capabilities, not only to the Allies but, perhaps more importantly, to any potential aggressor" (Lazell and Hunter 2017, 144). Moreover, increasing participation of the newer NATO Nations in exercises demonstrating their resolve and commitment to the Alliance may also indicate increased interoperability ensuring Alliance-wide readiness demonstrating Alliance cohesion (Tschakert et al. 2011).

NATO defense ministers endorsed plans to revitalize NATO's exercise program in February, 2013 that set the course for a more rigorous multi-year training schedule to ensure NATO and partner forces retain the ability to work efficiently together (SHAPE | Exercises & Training 2018). The range of exercise scenarios has been broadened and the frequency and the level of ambition of exercises have been increased (SHAPE | Exercises & Training 2018). According to the official SHAPE web-page, by doing so, the Alliance aimed to allow the member nations to continue to develop their operational compatibility and provide an opportunity to test and validate concepts, procedures, systems, and tactics (SHAPE | Exercises & Training 2018). Although NATO does not directly emphasize counter-terrorism as a source of these developments, most of them are related to the emerging threats of the 21st century including international terrorism.

However, following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO leaders, at their Summit in Wales, made a pledge to increase the focus on collective defense scenarios. Following the summit in Wales, at the Warsaw Summit in 2016, NATO leaders agreed on a strengthened deterrence and defense posture that draws upon all the tools at NATO's disposal, including military exercises. Prior to 2014, the principal focus of NATO military exercises was centered primarily on crisis response and cooperative security efforts with partners to address the requirements of the post-9/11 CT and COIN imperatives (Martinho 2019, 5). Yet, the Russian annexation of Crimea "refocused Allied attention to collective security and defense priorities at home" (Martinho 2019, 5). Of particular importance to point out here is that the "refocused Allied attention to the collective defense" does not necessarily demonstrate a counter-development in terms of the institutionalization of CT-CD because both the new and old security threats require the same abilities; capability, readiness, and interoperability (Kfir 2015, 13)

Regarding the role of science and technology in CT, based on the 2010 Strategic Concept, the Science for Peace and Security (SPS) program has been embedded in the Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESCD) to align the SPS activities to address the

new security challenges of the 21st century including terrorism (The NATO SPS Programme: Annual Report 2013). Through spanning across these new security challenges, the SPS Program attempts to bring together scientists, experts, and policymakers from NATO and partner nations to address these emerging security challenges (The NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme 2015). In this regard, the expansion of the role of the SPS Program is another important example to indicate the institutionalization of CT within the broader CD activities of the Alliance.

In addition, the far-reaching transformation of NATO Command Structure and its sub-structures resulted from the decisions taken in the Lisbon Summit in 2010 was followed by the launching of the NATO Science and Technology reform (Science and Technology Organization Annual Report: Empowering the Alliance's Technological Edge 2017). The main purpose of this reform was to "make science and technology activities more accessible for senior NATO leadership, and to better link multi-nationally funded science and technology activities with common funded ones" (Science and Technology Organization Annual Report: Empowering the Alliance's Technological Edge 2017). In order to achieve these goals, in June 2011, Defense Ministers managed the creation of a new NATO Science & Technology Organization (STO), integrating the functions of the former Research & Technology Organization (RTO) and NATO Undersea Research Centre (NURC). The STO is governed by a newly established Science & Technology Board (STB), provides unified governance of NATO science and technology activities, and oversees the work of the Collaboration Support Office (CSO), formerly the RTA, the Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (CMRE) and the NURC.

To put in a nutshell, these developments in the 'expansion of the old sub-structures', demonstrate that NATO's work in the domain of CD has been expanded through the inclusion of CT as a mission or as a key task. However, due to the Russian annexation of Crimea, the focus of the military exercises has shifted from non-traditional threats including terrorism to the traditional threats. However, as discussed above, this shift of focus from the threat posed by terrorism to Russia should not necessarily be considered as a shift from the previous developments in the broader context of CT-CD and thus, might not be regarded as a decrease in the levels of the institutionalization of CT-CD considering the fact that the Alliance did not abandon CT-related practices in the broader domain of CD. However, this shift is evidently to have implications for intra-alliance CTC, a more

important matter for the purposes of this research. The likely effects of this shift will be discussed in chapter four. The following part of this section will assess the last criterion; practical implementation, regarding the institutionalization of CT-CD.

Table 3.3 Illustrative Scorecard: Levels of the Expansion of the old Sub-structures in Counter-terrorism Capability Development

Criterion	**Indicators**	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Expansion of old sub-structures	I_1	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100	110	120	130	140	150	160
	I_2	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100	110	120	130	140	150	160
	I_3	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100	110	120	130	140	150	160
	TOTAL	**0**	**30**	**60**	**90**	**120**	**150**	**180**	**210**	**240**	**270**	**300**	**330**	**360**	**390**	**420**	**450**	**480**

3.1.1.4 Practical Implementation within Counter-Terrorism Capability Development

This criterion, as discussed in the previous chapters, is defined as the establishment of new sub-structures aimed at countering the terrorist threat. This criterion indicates the spread of CT across the over-arching institutional structure of NATO through the establishment of new sub-structures specifically designed for the practical implementation of CT policies. These sub-structures may also include both the physical and immaterial structures. Thus, this criterion will be assessed by using the following specific indicators:

$I_{1:}$ Whether the Allies have established new bodily sub-structures to conduct CT-CD activities including, E&T, military exercises,

$I_{2:}$ Whether the Allies have established new forces not only aimed at military operations but also for cooperation in CT- E&T and military exercises,

$I_{3:}$ Whether the Allies have established initiatives aimed at CT- E&T with non-member partners

With the aim of quantifying the qualitative data, we will grade each expected change (the further movement induced by the previous change) as '10', if change & continuity in the same direction exists, and as '0' if there exists a counter-development that contradicts with an expected development. Thus, even a 'change' does not exist in each year but there exists 'continuity' induced by the previous change; we will also grade each indicator within each related year as "10". At the end of this part, we will present a scorecard to illustrate the levels of this criterion between 2002-2018. To reiterate, the grading process only aimed at quantifying the qualitative data, so, does not represent either the exact values of the institutionalization of CT or the values of the criterion. Thus, the following pages of this part will further assess the practical implementation of CT-CD policies by using the abovementioned indicators.

One of the important decisions taken during the Prague summit was the establishment of a "Strategic Command for Transformation" in the US and it will be responsible for the transformation of the military capabilities and interoperability in the organization (NATO Press Release (2002) 133, November 21, 2002). Therefore, the meeting was presented as NATO's 'transformation summit'. One major reform is the formation of NATO Response Force (NRF). Proposed by US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and agreed to at the Prague Summit in 2002, this force has 25,000 troops ready

to be deployed with five days' notice and can engage in all manner of military and relief operations. This means that NATO has established a military component that is not intended for static defense, but, for peace-keeping missions, crisis management, or as an advance force of large-scale military operations. Although it was originally designed for military operations, as it is stated on NATO web page, NRF can also be used for greater cooperation in education and training, increased exercises and better use of technology (NATO - Topic: NATO Response Force 2019).

Additionally, the establishment of new institutional mechanisms, such as Center of COE DAT and ESCD, also demonstrates the extension of the scope of CD. For instance, with the establishment of ESCD, NATO started to provide a coordinating role in protecting the Allied nations and managing the Alliance's efforts in various fields including CT. In this way, NATO aimed to add value to the Transatlantic forum for exchanging information and practices in CT, raising awareness and harmonizing national approaches to critical infrastructure protection as well as providing advice and training to improve preparedness to a potential terrorist threat and to build resilience. Besides, the SPS within ESCD is focused on key priorities linking science and technology to NATO's core activities, and, thus, making it more relevant to Allies. (Shea, 2013, 4) In addition, evidently, the establishment of these agencies is a part of the Alliance's ongoing transformation process geared towards remaining strategically relevant.

According to a report published by European Security Review (ISIS Europe Briefing Note 2010); "NATO's new institutionalized approach to emerging security challenges should have the full backing and support of Allies if it is to be successful and add value." The establishment of ESCD demonstrates that NATO is "tackling these challenges in a coherent, sustained and capital-supported fashion" (ISIS Europe Briefing Note 2010). In this respect, NATO's vision on CT training, education and support for CD became consistent with its objectives and priorities. In parallel with this new approach, NATO has utilized various CD activities not only to develop the capacities of its members and partners but also to enhance its role in the fight against terrorism through Education and Training (E&T) -including military exercises- and Science & Technology Cooperation (STC).

The other E&T entities, which have a relationship with NATO but typically administered individually, are open to participation by personnel from member and

partner countries and may sometimes accept individuals from other organizations. These entities are; Centers of Excellence (COEs), Partnership Training and Education Centers (PTECs) and Partnership for Peace (PfP) Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institute. All these entities have various E&T programs and a wide range of courses. However, beyond the number of the activities and courses conducted by them, the establishment of these entities itself demonstrates the practical implication of the change in NATO's approach to CD and the integration of CT component in CD.

The establishment of COE DAT, in this regard, represents the most relevant example of the institutionalization of CT-CD. Although there are 24 COEs that offer specialized courses to military and civilian personnel within their field of expertise, COE DAT is the venue that NATO performs E&T activities and it especially aims to contribute to NATO's CT efforts. Thus, COE DAT is an important mechanism serving one of NATO's objectives, i.e. being able to meet the challenges of CT (Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism n.d.).

While COEs are the entities that offer expertise and experience to the benefit of NATO in support of transformation, COE DAT provides "support to NATO decision-makers to find realistic solutions to the challenges of terrorism and counter-terrorism" (Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism n.d.) COE DAT offers, conferences, courses, research and studies, workshops and workshop reports that cover terrorism-related issues (Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism n.d.)

From its establishment in 2005 to 2016, COE DAT offered 151 courses including; Defense Against Terrorism Course, Defense Against Suicide Attack Course, Terrorist Use of Cyberspace Course, Terrorism and Media Course, Critical Infrastructure Protection from Terrorist Attacks, Terrorist Use of Weapons Mass Destruction Course and Border Security, Refugees and CT Course. In addition to the residential training courses in Ankara, COE DAT also runs mobile education and training in the form of advanced training courses (Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism n.d.). These courses are orientated specifically towards the needs of NATO Command Structures, NATO Force Structures, NATO nations or partner nations who request them. (Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism n.d.). Additionally, in accordance with the principles the Allies set at the Chicago Summit on enhancing CTC through E&T activities, practical

implementations were reflected in the decision to extend the ISAF mission and resume contributions of the Allies to RSM.

To conclude, regarding the assessment of the four criteria in this section, the levels of the institutionalization of CT within CD is increasing continuously through the constant developments within each criterion. The initial indication of the institutionalization of CT-CD is the recognition of the relevance of CD to CT by the NATO leaders at their Summit meeting in Prague in 2002. Specifically, the institutionalization process within the realm of CT-CD has accelerated after the Lisbon Summit and the endorsement of the new Strategic Concept in 2010. A number of structural and doctrinal developments followed up to the endorsement of the new Strategic Concept. Therefore, the likely effects of the increasing levels of the institutionalization of CT-CD, since 9/11, on intra-alliance CTC will be examined in the fourth chapter of this research.

The following section of this chapter will assess the institutionalization of CT within IS since 9/11 through the guidance of the same criteria used within this section, yet, we will reformulate the indicators in regard to the requirements of the IS as a specific domain within NATO.

Table 3.4 Illustrative Scorecard: Levels of the practical implementation in CT-CD

Criterion	**Indicators**	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Practical implementation Ct-cd	I_1	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100	110	120	130	140	150	160
	I_2	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100	110	120	130	140	150	160
	I_3	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100	110	120	130	140	150	160
	TOTAL	**0**	**30**	**60**	**90**	**120**	**150**	**180**	**210**	**240**	**270**	**300**	**330**	**360**	**390**	**420**	**450**	**480**

3.2 Institutionalization of Counter-Terrorism Within Intelligence Sharing

> NATO will ensure shared awareness of the terrorist threat and vulnerabilities among Allies through consultations, enhanced sharing of intelligence, continuous strategic analysis and assessments in support of national authorities (NATO's Policy Guidelines on Counter-terrorism 2012).

Generally, it has been supposed that intelligence is a specific and highly sensitive aspect of state activity. Yet, the changing international security environment and the new set of risks and threats to international security have triggered the IS cooperation among states pursuing to integrate and share information to be able to deal with current and future challenges (Gruszczak 2018). NATO's transformation has illustrated the growing importance of IS in managing to deal with international terrorism due to its multidimensional and transnational character. Due to this growing importance, NATO started to implement a more coordinated approach to IS. Embedded within NATO's post-9/11 political and structural transformation and through the improvements in its organizational structure, the IS mechanism within the Alliance has been linked into the broader CT efforts. As a result, CT has emerged as an institutionalized issue-area within the domain of IS. Yet, despite the evident importance of the institutionalization of CT- IS, the existing literature has limited interest in the assessment of the institutionalization of CT within IS with some rare exceptions.[37] Therefore, to address this gap in the literature, this section of this chapter aims to assess the institutionalization of CT within IS to be able to measure its levels in terms of temporal variation. Such an assessment is also necessary given the purposes of this research which aim to explore the relationship between the institutionalization of CT within specific domains and the intra-alliance CTC within NATO in the post-9/11 era. Accordingly, this part of the research will mainly address the question of to what extent has CT been institutionalized within the domain of IS in the post 9/11 era?

Before measuring the levels of the institutionalization of CT within IS, it is essential to identify the importance of IS to CT so that one can be able to investigate the likely effects of the institutionalization of CT within IS towards the intra-alliance CTC.

[37] See for example; Peter Romaniuk, Institutions as swords and shields: Multilateral counter-terrorism since 9/11, Review of International Studies, 2010, 36 (3), pp. 591-613

Accordingly, this section of this chapter will be guided through addressing the questions below:

- What are the definitions of IS, CT-IS, and the institutionalization of CT within IS?
- What is the importance of IS to CT for NATO in the post-9/11 era?

In the following parts of this section, we will assess the institutionalization of CT within IS to be able to determine its levels in terms of temporal variation through using the criteria which we have designed specifically for measuring the levels of the institutionalization of CT within NATO. Thus, the following pages of this section will first present the definitions of IS, CT-IS and the institutionalization of CT-IS along with the identification of the importance of IS to CT. However, before presenting the definitions and identifying the importance of IS to CT, it is important to categorize the levels of intelligence.

In the broader sense, there are four levels of intelligence: strategic-level intelligence which also sometimes referred to as political-strategic level intelligence, operational level intelligence, tactical-level intelligence, and comprehensive intelligence. Strategic intelligence is "political intelligence and large-scale forecasting on possible antagonist or hostile governments and is usually delineating and generalizing current and expected political developments" (Korkisch 2010, 14). In addition, strategic level intelligence also includes "military strategy level" intelligence, which focuses on "WMD, force postures and their capabilities and other powers, and their probable involvement in a given crisis or conflict" (Korkisch 2010, 14). According to Korkisch (2010, 14), operational intelligence is "current intelligence" and he has pointed out that intelligence is

> tailored to the need of deployed forces, it includes all aspects of forces, like leadership, force organization, dislocations, readiness, mobilization, foreign suppliers and possible technical capabilities, and is needed for an operational estimate on enemy forces and other data needed in the planning and force deployments; it is geographically covering the whole operation area, will include political, social and cultural aspects, and is usually prepared by military and civilian experts (2010, 14).

The third level of intelligence, tactical intelligence is; "present actual intelligence", needed and produced by deployed troops during tactical operations in various types of war (Korkisch 2010, 14). In addition, tactical intelligence combines;

> operational information and tactical combat data and developments, including data on guerrilla forces, counterinsurgency requirements, local civilian attitudes, terrorism and gang warfare, but also looks out for new threats, gaps in blue force defense, and red force tactical misjudgments, local political and ethnic developments, and nation-building problems (Korkisch 2010, 14).

Comprehensive intelligence, on the other hand, includes the specifics of the operations during "pacification, occupation, nation-building/civilian support, withdrawal of blue forces" (Korkisch 2010, 14). Comprehensive intelligence requires a comprehensive approach, supporting civil-military cooperation (Korkisch 2010, 14). With these definitions on the four levels of intelligence in mind, the evolution of NATO's intelligence structure and IS procedures in terms of policy and doctrine will be the focus of the following sub-sections.

Turning now to the definition of IS, for the purpose of this dissertation, it is important to use the definitions acknowledged by NATO. According to the NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, intelligence is "the product resulting from the directed collection and processing of information regarding the environment and the capabilities and intentions of actors, in order to identify threats and offer opportunities for exploitation by decision-makers" (AAP-06 Allied Administrative Publication NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions 2017). Although there is an agreed definition of intelligence, IS has not been defined by NATO directly. Yet, the term 'intelligence cycle' (IC) which is comprised of four phases 'direction', 'collection', 'processing' and 'dissemination' has been defined as:

> The sequence of activities whereby information is obtained, assembled, converted into intelligence and made available to users. This sequence comprises the following four phases: Direction - Determination of intelligence requirements, planning the collection effort, issuance of orders and requests to collection agencies and maintenance of a continuous check on the productivity of such agencies. Collection-The exploitation of sources by collection agencies and the delivery of the information obtained to the appropriate processing unit for use in the production of intelligence. Processing - The conversion of information into intelligence through collation, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation and, Dissemination - timely conveyance of intelligence, in an appropriate form and by any suitable means to those who need it" (AAP-06 Allied Administrative Publication NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions 2017).

Accordingly, the definition of IC seems to be relevant since it highlights how NATO collects and converses the raw information into intelligence and the definition of the term 'dissemination' seems especially relevant insofar as it emphasizes how the intelligence can be used and transferred to the stakeholders.

Even though the importance of IS widely acknowledged regarding the CT, there is no distinct definition for CT-IS. Yet, within the NATO's policy guidelines on CT, IS is defined as the key aspect to increase the consultations on terrorism and terrorism-related issues among its members, as well as with non-member countries (NATO's Policy Guidelines on Counter-terrorism 2012). It is stated in the guidelines that:

> NATO will ensure shared awareness of the terrorist threat and vulnerabilities among Allies through consultations, enhanced sharing of intelligence, continuous strategic analysis, and assessments in support of national authorities. This will enable Allies and the Alliance to prepare effectively and to take possible mitigating action in the prevention of and response to terrorist attacks. NATO will also promote a common understanding of its counter-terrorism role as part of a broader international effort through engagement and strategic communications (NATO's Policy Guidelines on Counter-terrorism 2012).

Therefore, it is possible to define the CT-IS as*; all the activities performed within the intelligence cycle from collecting the raw data to the assessment and timely dissemination of the intelligence aimed at countering the terrorist threat.*

The role of IS in CT within this context has become vital in the post-9/11 era. The 9/11 attacks illustrated the importance of IS in Transatlantic CTC and proved the need for timely IS cooperation among the Allies (NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement: analysis and recommendations of the group of experts on a new strategic concept for NATO 2010). For instance, Chris Clough (2004, p. 609) noted that international terrorism is not only multinational in its nature but also in its effect. Hence, IS aimed at CT lends itself to cooperation (Clough 2004). The argument that the Allies have need of IS cooperation in the post-9/11 era was not only acknowledged by academics but also by NATO civil and military officials. As Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) pointed out in the report titled "Strategic Vision: Military Challenge"(Jones & Giambastiani, 2004):

> Intelligence collection, analysis, dissemination, and sharing will be critical to anticipating and, possibly, preventing or containing

> conflicts. A full understanding of the operational environment and a proactive approach in the earliest stages of emerging crises will be required. This assessment will support increased situational awareness for decision-makers and will be supported by a secure information network for enhanced intelligence sharing and collaboration in rapidly evolving situations. Improvements in all aspects of the decision cycle must be made so that the time between the anticipation of risk or threat, and the definition and execution of a course of action can be shortened (Jones & Giambastiani, 2004).

Thus, in the post - 9/11 era, the domain of intelligence has comprised the new security challenges including terrorism, and the Allies have realized that IS cooperation among the Allies should be the norm (Ballast, 2017, p. 4**)**. The recognition of the importance of IS aimed at countering the terrorist threat was explicitly demonstrated at the Istanbul Summit in 2004, when the Allies agreed to enhance a set of measures to strengthen the transatlantic CTC including, "improved intelligence sharing between our nations, including through our TTIU and a review of current intelligence structures at NATO Headquarters" (Istanbul Summit Communiqué 2004). As Arndt Freytag von Loringhoven (2017), NATO's first Assistant Secretary-General for Intelligence and Security, pointed out:

> In today's globalized, hyper-connected, multipolar world, NATO must simultaneously monitor and assess a multitude of different threats: conventional military, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, hybrid warfare, cyber-attacks and international terrorism to name but a few of the most difficult. Geographically, NATO has begun to look more broadly, from central Africa to North Korea and from the Arctic to the Middle East. The provision of relevant intelligence must match the frantic pace of change.

Although it is widely acknowledged that intra-alliance CTC requires improved IS, IS within NATO and the progress in IS cooperation among the Allies has been impeded by the structural constraints existing within the system related to different procedures, databases, and capabilities. All these constraints ipso facto demonstrate the importance of the institutionalization of CT-IS to the intra-alliance CTC.

Thus, institutionalization of CT within IS refers to *the process embedded within its overarching political and structural transformation process that comprises both the elements of change and continuity in expanding and revising NATO policies, procedures, rules, and the establishment and re-use of sub-structures which is recognized by the Allies*

as the patterns of CT-IS practices since 9/11, through framing CT-IS in a different way to mobilize previously uninvolved actors or issues.

Hence, in the following parts of this section, we will further assess the institutionalization of CT-IS within NATO in the post 9/11 era. At the end of each part under this main section, with the aim of quantifying the qualitative data to illustrate the continuity in each criterion, we will present a scorecard in accordance with the measurement and grading process, which was discussed in the research design and methodology chapter (Chapter 2).

3.2.1 Assessment of the Institutionalization of Counter-Terrorism Within Intelligence Sharing

In order to maintain the consistency in the flow of this chapter, we will assess the institutionalization of CT within IS in the post -9/11 era through using the four distinct criteria specified earlier. Accordingly, each of these criteria will be the separate parts of this sub-section. In addition, each of these criteria will also be assessed considering the 'continuous change'. More specifically, the 'continuous change' within each criterion will be assessed through the guidance of specific indicators which will be defined at the beginning of each part. Thus, in the following pages of this sub-section, we will assess the institutionalization of CT within IS in the post - 9/11 era through using the criteria of institutionalization of CT: Rhetorical Recognition and Expansion, Formalization and the Revision of the new policies, Expansion of the old sub-structures and Practical Implementation respectively.

3.2.1.1 Rhetorical Recognition of the Importance of Intelligence Sharing to Counter-Terrorism and Its Subsequent Expansion

The NATO Heads of State and Government, at their summit in Prague, in 2002, acknowledged that fight against international terrorism requires a comprehensive set of measures and the importance of IS to CT is no exception. MCDT endorsed in the Prague Summit, although not only aimed at CT-IS, included the enhancement of IS in the face of the threat posed by international terrorism. To this end, after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Allies have put more emphasis on the importance of the improved IS to CT, at least in rhetorical terms. Thus, we argue, the levels of the institutionalization of CT within the first

criterion; rhetorical recognition and its subsequent expansion indicate the institutionalization of CT within IS in terms of rhetoric. To measure the levels within this criterion, we will use the summit declarations, communiqués, speeches addressed by the high-level NATO officials along with other academic sources.

However, as mentioned earlier, we will not analyze every summit declaration in detail since it is beyond the scope of this research. Rather, the focus in this part will be on some of the key aspects of the decisions regarding the rhetorical recognition and expansion of the relevance of IS to CT addressed by the Allies. Thus, this part of the research addresses the questions of how and to what extent did NATO leaders relate NATO's work in IS with CT in terms of rhetoric? More specifically, the levels within this criterion will be measured through the guidance of following specific indicators:

$I_{1:}$ Whether the Allies have recognized the relevance of IS to CT,

$I_{2:}$ Whether the Allies have emphasized any possible involvement of the new or previously un-involved actors and/or issues in the realm of CT-IS,

$I_{3:}$ Whether the Allies have emphasized any further development in the realm of CT-IS,

With the aim of retaining the consistency throughout the measurement process of the institutionalization of CT in general, each of these indicators will be graded as "10" if affirmative and will be graded as "0" if there exists a shift from the previous rhetoric. It is important to note that the aim of this part is not to discuss or analyze the problems on IS within the Alliance since it is beyond the scope of this research. The main aim of this part is rather to explore the patterns of the institutionalization of CT-IS considering the criterion of 'rhetorical recognition of the CT-IS and its subsequent expansion'. Thus, we will further assess the institutionalization of CT within IS in terms of rhetorical recognition of the importance of IS to CT and its subsequent expansion in the following pages of this part.

Prior to 9/11, NATO and the Allies were relied on the Five Eyes (FVEY)[38] regarding the intelligence (O'Neil 2017, 529). The intelligence originated from the FVEY was exchanged subsequently among the intelligence facilities of NATO. However, as many authors argue, due to the mistrust among the Allies and insecure dissemination and

[38]The Five Eyes (FVEY) refers to an IS alliance based on a bilateral agreement signed between the UK and the US in 1946, and evolved into a multilateral IS cooperation facility comprising the US, UK, New Zealand, Canada and Australia and dominated by the US and the UK.

storage facilities, the intelligence would not be easily shared within the Alliance (Ballast 2017; Maras 2017; Seagle 2015). In addition, intelligence as an issue area within NATO was primarily dealt with individually by the member states (Ballast 2017; Maras 2017; Seagle 2015). More precisely, it was widely acknowledged that national authorities should have actual control over intelligence and that intelligence was not an issue area where the member states were eager to cooperate. Although some intelligence has been shared bilaterally on political and military issues, national-level intelligence agencies have preferred to cooperate on an ad-hoc basis with a limited number of selected partners rather than larger groups of states (Romaniuk 2010). However, due to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Allies have realized that IS within the Alliance should be enhanced through a set of structural and political reformations.

The initial recognition of the importance of IS to CT was reflected at the Prague Summit in 2002, when the Allies agreed on the "Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism" (PAP-T), which focused on; "intensifying consultations and information and intelligence sharing". The PAP-T was "intended as a framework through which Allies and partner countries could work to improve cooperation in the fight against terrorism, through political consultation and a range of practical measures" (NATO - Topic: The Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T) 2016). Although the PAP-T did not emphasize the importance of IS within the broader framework of the Alliance and among the Allies, the plan evidently reflects the change in the Alliance's vision on the importance of IS to CT.

The recognition of the importance of IS aimed at countering the terrorist threat was explicitly demonstrated at the Istanbul Summit in 2004, when the Allies agreed to enhance a set of measures to strengthen the transatlantic CTC including, "improved intelligence sharing between our nations, including through Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit (TTIU) and a review of current intelligence structures at NATO Headquarters" (Istanbul Summit Communiqué 2004).

In the same vein, the NATO Heads of State and Government, at their meeting in Riga, in 2006, declared that "we call upon Allies to continue to develop and fully implement their national capabilities in this important area, and to strengthen the Alliance's ability to share information and intelligence on terrorism, especially in support of NATO operations"(Riga Summit Declaration 2006). In continuation of this rhetoric, the Allies have declared that they remain committed to enhancing the Alliance's ability to

share intelligence on terrorism specifically in support of NATO operations. (Bucharest Summit Declaration 2008).

Two years later, the NATO leaders, at Lisbon Summit, in 2010, declared the reform on IS structures along with improved arrangements on IS (Lisbon Summit Declaration 2010). The most important decision taken at the Lisbon Summit, however, was beyond the reaffirmation of continuing improvements in the realm of CT-IS. As an outcome of the process launched at the Strasbourg and Kehl Summits, the Allies have adopted the new Strategic Concept and it was stated in the Lisbon Summit Declaration that "in accordance with the Strategic Concept, we will continue to enhance both the political and the military aspects of NATO's contribution to deter, defend, disrupt and protect against this threat including through advanced technologies and greater information and intelligence sharing" (Lisbon Summit Declaration 2010).

At the next summit held in Chicago in 2012, the NATO leaders declared that they have tasked NAC to "prepare an action plan to further enhance NATO's ability to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism by identifying initiatives to enhance the terrorist threat awareness" (Chicago Summit Declaration 2012). In accordance with the decision taken at the Chicago Summit, the Alliance launched the Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JISR) initiative. Although it was not stated in the Chicago Summit declaration, according to the NATO webpage titled "Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance", the Allied leaders expressed their ambition to provide NATO a permanent JISR capability (NATO - Topic: JISR 2018).

The NATO heads of state and government, at their summit meeting in Wales, in 2014, reconfirmed that NATO "will support ongoing bilateral efforts of Allies and partners by soliciting and coordinating, on a voluntary basis, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance assets" (Wales Summit Declaration 2014). It was also stated in the Wales Summit declaration that the "Allies will seek to enhance their cooperation in exchanging information on returning foreign fighters" (Wales Summit Declaration 2014). Therefore, previous steps taken aimed at enhancing IS capabilities in CT remained a high priority for the Allied leaders. Furthermore, followed up to the commitments made at Chicago and Wales Summits, the Allied Defense Ministers, in February 2016, declared the initial operational capability for the JISR initiative (Statement by Defence Ministers on the

declaration of the initial operational capability for Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 2016).

In accordance with the decisions taken at the Chicago and Wales Summits on providing a permanent JISR capability within the overarching institutional framework of NATO, at the Warsaw Summit in 2016, the NATO leaders expressed their "intention to promote intelligence sharing beyond JISR, by using and optimizing NATO and other multinational platforms and networks" (Ballast 2017, 8). It was stated in the Warsaw Summit Communiqué that the Alliance's "ability to understand, track and, ultimately, anticipate, the actions of potential adversaries through JISR capabilities and comprehensive intelligence arrangements is increasingly important" (Warsaw Summit Communiqué 2016). The emphasis on the "comprehensive intelligence arrangements in increasingly important" clearly demonstrates the subsequent expansion of the previous rhetoric on the recognition of the importance of IS to CT. In other words, by stating so, the Allies have recognized that he enhancement of CT-IS requires efforts beyond investing more on the technical assets in the realm of CT-IS, which includes a set of arrangements in terms of policy and doctrine. This stated intention can be regarded as a part of a comprehensive approach to CT-related efforts agreed at the Riga Summit in 2006.

Additionally, according to a factsheet on Warsaw Summit's key decisions, the Allies agreed to provide direct support to the counter-ISIL coalition (Factsheet: Warsaw Summit Key Decisions 2017). The AWACS aircraft, which have been providing air surveillance to counter-ISIL coalition forces since October 2016, has been increasing the situational awareness of the Coalition forces. According to the factsheet, this additional support clearly demonstrates "NATO's resolve to tackle terrorism" through using IS assets and procedures (Factsheet: Warsaw Summit Key Decisions 2017).

To put in a nutshell, the initial recognition of the importance of IS to CT was followed by further expansion of the rhetoric; from "intensifying consultations and information and intelligence sharing" in 2002 to "comprehensive intelligence arrangements is increasingly important" in 2016. Thus, the rhetorical expansion on the importance of IS to CT can be demonstrated by the differences between these two statements. While the former put emphasis on consultations without giving any further reference to possible future developments, the latter clearly demonstrates the recognition of a need for arrangements both in policy in practice. No matter NATO's work on IS aimed not only at

CT, similar to its other works in other issue areas, most of the developments within the realm of IS have been engendered by the fact that CT requires a comprehensive approach, which also includes enhanced IS among the Allies within the broader framework of the Alliance. As it was stated in NATO's policy guidelines on CT, "NATO's response to terrorism has been largely shaped by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, which prompted Allies to initiate various capability and institutional changes". So, enhancement of intelligence exchange through a set of political and structural changes is an indivisible part of NATO's role in the realm of CT. In short, declarations made by the Allied leaders at NATO summits were followed by the formalization and revision of the policies. Thus, as illustrated in the following table, the Allies have continued their rhetoric regarding the importance of IS to CT. The table illustrates the continuity of the rhetorical recognition of the importance of IS to CT and its subsequent expansion between 2002-2018. Since we have defined the institutionalization process as "ongoing, evolving and cumulative", we graded each indicator starting from "10" and from a cumulative standpoint, we graded the following years. The following part will assess the formalization and revision of the new policies in CT-IS.

Table 3.5 Illustrative Scorecard: Levels of the Rhetorical Recognition of the Importance of Intelligence Sharing to Counter-terrorism and its subsequent Expansion

Criterion	**Indicators**	2002	2004	2006	2008	2009	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Rhetorical recognition and expansion CT-IS	I_1	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
	I_2	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90
	I_3	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
	TOTAL	**20**	**50**	**100**	**140**	**180**	**220**	**260**	**300**	**340**	**380**

3.2.1.2 Formalization and the Revision of the New Policies in Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Sharing

Formalization and revision of the policies, as defined in the research design and methodology chapter of this dissertation, is the formalization of the rhetorical recognition through establishing more specific policies and doctrines including, for example; strategic concept, military concepts, military and policy guidance texts and military doctrines, which relate the relevance of each domain to CT and thus, in this case, the relevance of IS to CT. This criterion will also be assessed by considering a 'continuous change' and will be guided through following specific indicators:

> I_1: Whether the Alliance have set out more specific policies and doctrines regarding the CT-IS,

$I_{2:}$ Whether the policies have expanded through an emphasis on the involvement of new or previously un-involved issues or actors in the realm of CT-IS,

$I_{3:}$ Whether the policies have set out the direction for further improvement or development in the CT-IS,

$I_{4:}$ Whether the policies and doctrines have revised considering the new requirements of the CT-IS.

We will follow the same grading process. Thus, each of these indicators will be graded as "10" if affirmative and will be graded as "0" if there exists a shift from the previous direction that contradicts with an expected development. As discussed in the previous part of this section, we aim to identify the 'continuous change' in each year and in each indicator. Thus, even a 'change' does not exist in each year but there exists 'continuity' induced by the previous change; we will also grade each indicator within each related year as "10". Thus, at the end of this part, we will present a score-card to illustrate the levels of this criterion. It should again be kept in mind that the grading process only aimed at quantifying the qualitative data and does not represent either the exact values of the institutionalization of CT nor the exact values of this criterion.

To measure the levels of this criterion, we will use specific military concepts, strategic concepts, policy guidelines (i.e. NATO's policy guidelines on CT) along with other official NATO texts. As we have emphasized in the previous chapter (research design and methodology), due to the very nature of this research, the sources for data gathering will also be considered as the data itself. Thus, in the process of assessment within this criterion, the focus will be on whether CT has been associated with IS. The assessment of this criterion will also consider temporal variation. However, of course, considering temporal variation does not necessarily mean that the researcher expects a 'change' in each of the years between 2002-2018. Yet, considering temporal variation is necessary both to demonstrate the "continuity" and for the empirical analysis of this research, which will be presented in the next chapter (Chapter 4).

Hence, the following pages of this part will further assess the formalization and revision of the policies and doctrines regarding the CT-IS in the post-9/11 era. However, in contrast to the previous part of the previous section (formalization and revision of the policies in the institutionalization of CT within CD), the focus of this section will not only be on the policies in the realm of CT-IS but also on the doctrine development. Because,

unlike CD, NATO develops more specific doctrines that address the question of how to conduct IS activities within the overarching institutional framework of the Alliance. This is a matter of course since a doctrine "describes how Alliance forces operate" (AJP-01 (E): Allied Joint Doctrine 2017). This is not the case regarding CD since, CD, as discussed earlier, is a broader domain that also includes doctrine development.

In 2002, at the Prague Summit, the Allies agreed on the PAP-T, which focused on intensifying consultations and information and intelligence sharing. The PAP-T was overtaken by NATO's policy guidelines on CT. The PAP-T was intended as a framework through which Allies and partner countries could work to improve cooperation in the fight against terrorism, through political consultation and a range of practical measures (NATO - Topic: The Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T) 2016).

MCDT endorsed in 2002 was the first of its kind document regarding NATO's role in the realm of CT, in general, from a broader point of view, stated that the Alliance requires better intelligence-gathering capabilities. In addition, MCDT identified four roles where the Alliance could add a military contribution to CT: Anti-Terrorism; Consequence Management; Counter-Terrorism; and Military Cooperation (NATO's military concept for defence against terrorism 2002).

In MCDT, anti-terrorism was defined as the use of defensive measures, whereas CT referred to the use of offensive measures. In addition, MCDT addressed two broader roles for NATO's involvement in CT operations: CT operations NATO in the lead and CT operations NATO in support. Regarding the CT – NATO in lead; the concept stated that "in order to carry out successful CT operations NATO must have adequate Command and Control and intelligence structures" (NATO's military concept for defence against terrorism 2002). Furthermore, along with establishing a link between "offensive CT" and IS, the concept has also stressed out that the Alliance's "defensive anti-terrorist" actions could "include sharing of intelligence". Thus, from the very beginning of the Alliance's involvement in the realm of CT, the policies and concepts relate IS both to offensive and defensive measures in the fight against international terrorism. However, as MCDT superseded by MCCT in 2016, the Alliance abolished the difference between the CT and anti-terrorism and CT-IS became an integrated part of NATO's role in CT. Hence, the policies on CT-IS within NATO have been expanded through the revision of the military concepts.

In 2012, as set out in the aim of NATO's policy guidelines on CT, the CT efforts of the Alliance have focused on three main areas: Awareness, Capabilities, and Engagement. Regarding the importance of IS to CT, the paragraph within the guidelines on "awareness" states that:

> NATO will ensure shared awareness of the terrorist threat and vulnerabilities among Allies through consultations, enhanced sharing of intelligence, continuous strategic analysis, and assessments in support of national authorities. This will enable Allies and the Alliance to prepare effectively and to take possible mitigating action in the prevention of and response to terrorist attacks. NATO will also promote a common understanding of its counter-terrorism role as part of a broader international effort through engagement and strategic communications (NATO's Policy Guidelines on Counter-terrorism: Aware, Capable and Engaged for a Safer Future 2012)

In MCCT, which, in accordance with the new strategic concept adopted in 2010, superseded MCDT in 2016, it is stated under the title of "awareness" that NATO's military contributions to IS will include:

> providing terrorism-related information, intelligence and assessments regarding terrorism in order to enhance NATO's overall situational awareness, sharing relevant CT-related information with key outside actors, where appropriate and when it is militarily relevant, maintaining a system of terrorism indicators and warnings to facilitate early detection and promoting, through engagement and strategic communication, a common understanding of this CT concept and NATO's potential military contribution to CT as part of a broader international effort. (MCCT 2016).

In line with the "comprehensive approach" adopted at Riga Summit, a "knowledge development concept" was implemented by the Alliance "to support the planning, implementation, and assessment of operations, which provides a broad overview of all operational dimensions" (Jose Mendes Rego 2018, 137). Later, in 2007, the "Bi-SC Pre-doctrinal Knowledge Development Handbook" was published by the Alliance, which outlined the future implementation of the knowledge development concept (Jose Mendes Rego 2018, 137). The Bi-SC Knowledge Development Handbook has been revised several times from its initial publication in 2007 to its latest updated version in 2011(Jose Mendes Rego 2018, 137). The implementation of "knowledge development concept" aimed at

enhancing the comprehensiveness and effectiveness of intelligence have provided a linkage between civil-military cooperation in the realm of CT-IS.[39]

In addition, since 9/11, NATO has constantly revised the doctrines in the realm of IS and most of these revisions are engendered by the fact that "change from state-versus-state conflict to multiple smaller scale intervention and counterinsurgency operations" (AJP-2 (A): Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Security 2016) NATO Standardization Office (NSO) approved the first AJD on IS in 2003, with the publication of the AJP-2 Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence & Security Doctrine. Following the initial publication of the AJP-2, the Alliance adopted its subsequent editions in 2014 AJP-2, and in 2016 AJP-2 (A), the latter being the version currently in use (Jose Mendes Rego 2018, 146). Subsequent editions of AJP-2 from 2003 to 2016 considered "the more complex operational environment and the increasing number of factors that affect contemporary intelligence operations" (AJP-2 (A): Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Security 2016). AJP-2 series, in general, is the "capstone publications that serve as a guideline for the development of all NATO joint doctrine on intelligence"(Jose Mendes Rego 2018, 148).

The application of AJP-2(A) aims to facilitate a "single intelligence environment within which intelligence structures across the Alliance interface and operate" (AJP-2 (A): Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Security 2016). The emphasis on "a single intelligence environment across the Alliance" clearly demonstrates the institutionalization of IS in general as well as the institutionalization of CT-IS since this development on establishing a single intelligence environment induced by the requirements of CT. In addition, AJP-2(A) also introduced the Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Concept (JISRC) and a revision of NATO intelligence requirement management and collection management (IRM&CM) functions (AJP-2.7: Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 2016).

At the operational level, Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Procedures (AJP-2.1) and Allied Joint Doctrine for Reconnaissance and Surveillance (AJP-2.7) and their revised

[39] The conceptual discussions on the differences between knowledge development and intelligence are beyond the scope of this research. For further research: Jose Mendes Rego, Nelson. 2018. "Intelligence in Nato : Contextualising a Doctrinal and Structural Clash." *Revista De Ciencias Militares* VI(November 2017): 135-61. Available at: https://www.Ium.Pt/Cisdi/Index.Php/En/Publications/Journal-Of-Military-Sciences/Editions.%0arevista

versions are primarily intended for NATO forces and provide an authoritative basis for intelligence procedures to support NATO operations. The first AJP-2.7 was published on July 7, 2009, and its revised version was published on July 11, 2016. While AJP-2.1 provides more detail on the intelligence management process, AJP-2.7 serves as the foundation for other Allied publications as well as evolving subordinate publications such as the Allied intelligence publication. (AJP-2.7: Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 2016).

As a matter of course, AJP-2.7 of 2016 on JISR was published after the declaration of the operational capability for NATO's JISR initiative. According to the statement by Defense Ministers on the declaration of the initial operational capability for JISR, "this achievement follows up to the commitments that our nations made at the Chicago Summit and subsequently reaffirmed at the Wales Summit"(Statement by Defence Ministers on the declaration of the initial operational capability for Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 2016).

Despite the formalization and revision of IS procedures within the Alliance, all forces, no matter whether the forces are operating under a national force commander or a NATO commander, remained largely under the control of the national political authorities (Korkisch 2010). According to Korkisch (2010, 6), from 2001 to 2010, NATO had identified some weak areas in the realm of IS and implemented a number of reformations to improve IS practices within the Alliance. Although the "proposals were analyzed, formalized and introduced" through the lessons learned from military operations and specifically from the operations in Afghanistan, standardized procedures have not been changed in a meaningful manner (2010, 6). The main reason behind this 'unsuccessful formalization' is the existence of "national caveats to the standard NATO Rules of Engagement (ROE), operational and tactical procedures, logistics and replacements" (Korkisch 2010, 9–10).

However, particularly after the endorsement of the New Strategic Concept in 2010, NATO, through setting out more specific policies, concepts and doctrines has provided a framework for CT-IS activities within the Alliance and through the constant revisions of these policies and doctrines have paved the way for a set of structural reformations within the realm of CT-IS. Furthermore, as it is stated in JLLC Handbook, the incorporation of the new procedures into "training for new staff and communicated to current staff through

newsletters and bulletins" is a part of the institutionalization process[40]. (The NATO Lessons Learned Handbook 2016, 3).

In short, as illustrated in the following table (Table 7), starting from 2002, the Allies have formalized and revised more specific policies in CT-IS. The table illustrates the continuity of the formalization and revision of the policies between 2002-2018. Since we defined the institutionalization process as "ongoing, evolving and cumulative", we graded each indicator starting from "10" and in each following year from a cumulative standpoint. The following part of this research will assess the criteria of 'expansion of the old sub-structures' and 'practical implementation' in CT-IS.



Figure 3.1 Hierarchical organization of NATO doctrine on Intelligence

[40]The figure below (Figure 1) is derived from Friedrich W. Korkisch (2010) and redesigned for the purposes of this research to summarize the hierarchical organization of NATO doctrine on IS procedure. In addition, it is important to note that there are more Allied Joint Publications on intelligence, yet, due to the limited scope of this chapter, it is not viable to present all of these publications. Besides, Allied Joint Publications are classified documents, so, it is not possible to access the documents' details. Therefore, above-mentioned publications are non-exhaustive but an illustrative list of NATO's doctrine on IS.

Table 3.6 Illustrative Scorecard: Levels of the Formalization and the revision of the policies in Counter-terrorism Intelligence Sharing

Criterion	Indicators	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Formalization and revision of policies CT-IS	I_1	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100	120	130	140	150	160	170	-
	I_1	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100	120	130	140	150	160	170	-
	I_1	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100	120	130	140	150	160	170	-
	I_1	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100	120	130	140	150	160	170	-
	TOTAL	**40**	**80**	**120**	**160**	**200**	**240**	**280**	**320**	**360**	**400**	**440**	**480**	**520**	**560**	**600**	**640**	**-**

3.2.1.3 Expansion of the Old Sub-Structures & Practical Implementation in Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Sharing

As a matter of fact, the very multifaceted nature of IS structures within NATO makes it very difficult -if not impossible- to assess the expansion of the old sub-structures in CT-IS. Furthermore, in contrast to the reforms and structural changes in the realm of CT-CD, the structural reforms in CT-IS within NATO has followed a non-sequential process. To be more precise, for example, unlike CT-CD, NATO has followed up the establishment of new sub-structures in the realm of CT-IS, which were emerged in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 with the expansion of the roles and re-designing of these sub-structures. Therefore, the two criteria: ‘expansion of the old sub-structures’ and ‘practical implementation’ (establishment of new sub-structures), which this research proposed to measure the levels of the institutionalization of CT within NATO, should be assessed together. Therefore, unlike the previous part on the expansion of the old sub-structures and practical implementation of CT-CD, this part of this section will address the two criteria together. By doing so, we will also be able to maintain analytical simplicity.

Therefore, the third criterion; the expansion of the old sub-structures as discussed earlier, was defined as ‘the re-use of the old sub-structures by linking CT to the previously established structures.’ In other words, this criterion includes the re-use of old sub-structures -beyond their point of origination- for the implementation of CT practices. Thus, these sub-structures referred to in this part are the sub-structures within the domain of IS that are associated with CT. The last criterion, practical implementation, on the other hand, was defined as the establishment of new sub-structures aimed at countering the terrorist threat. In addition, the broader structural transformation process of NATO in the post- 9/11 era will also be considered within the assessment of this criterion since this process is, evidently, induced by the requirements of the new security threats of the 21st century including international terrorism.

To be able to maintain the consistency throughout the assessment process of the institutionalization of CT, these criteria will also be assessed in terms of 'continuous change' and through using the following specific indicators:

$I_{1:}$ Whether the Allies have established new bodily sub-structures to conduct CT-IS activities

$I_{2:}$ Whether the Allies have established initiatives aimed at improving the CT-IS

$I_{3:}$ Whether the sub-structures in the domain of IS that exist prior to 9/11 have been re-designed concerning the CT,

$I_{4:}$ Whether the role of these sub-structures in the domain of IS has been expanded concerning the CT,

$I_{5:}$ Whether the material assets (capabilities) in the domain of IS has been used concerning the terrorist threat.

As mentioned earlier, each of these indicators will be graded as "10" if affirmative and will be graded as "0" if there exists a shift from the previous steps taken that contradicts with an expected development from an institutionalist point of view. In addition, as discussed in the previous sections, even if a 'change' does not exist in each year but there exists 'continuity' induced by the previous change, we will also grade each indicator within each related year as "10". Thus, at the end of this part, we will present a score-card to illustrate levels within these criteria between 2002-2018. There is a need to reiterate that the grading process only aimed at quantifying the qualitative data and so, does not represent either how many times a change occurred within each criterion or how many sub-structures there are but, for illustrative purposes only to demonstrate the ongoing, evolving and cumulative nature of the institutionalization of CT-IS within NATO since 9/11.

To measure the levels in these criteria, we will use the official NATO webpage and NATO web archive, annual reports published by various NATO bodies along with other academic articles, and web-sources. Hence, the following pages of this part will assess the institutionalization of CT through using the criteria of the 'expansion of the old sub-structures' and 'practical implementation' within the domain of IS since 9/11 considering the temporal variation.

Before starting the assessment, it is important to note that IS within NATO is divided into two main categories: political-strategic level intelligence and operational level intelligence (Ballast 2017, 8–9). While the political-strategic level intelligence refers to the IS practices in NATO HQ, operational level intelligence refers to IS practices among the commanders and military staff of NATO forces. There is also an additional type of intelligence generally referred as tactical intelligence which also includes operational intelligence.

To begin with, the transnational character of the terrorist threat and the Alliance's engagement in military operations aimed at countering terrorism resulted in the growing importance of IS within NATO to CT. In consequence, in 2003, Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit (TTIU) was created at NATO HQ and followed by the creation of a joint IS - Intelligence Liaison Unit (ILU) for the exchange of information with non-member NATO partners. Consequently, at their summit meeting in 2004 in Istanbul, the NATO heads of state and government decided to implement a reform process of existing intelligence structures.

Concerning the decision on carrying out "a review of current intelligence structures" at NATO HQ in 2004 at Istanbul Summit, the mandate was given to TTIU and TTIU became permanent and extended to include analysis of terrorist threats as a whole in addition to those more specifically aimed at NATO. Additionally, NATO assets and capabilities such as AWACS, the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) and the Multinational CBRN Defense Battalion have been made available to member countries requesting assistance in dealing with terrorist threats (NATO Handbook 2006, 26).

In addition, the role of the independent office in the International Staff responsible for ensuring the coordination and implementation of security standards throughout NATO has been extended to responsibility for the overall coordination of security for NATO among member and non-member partner countries and NATO civil and military bodies, "for the implementation of NATO security policy throughout the Alliance, and for the evaluation and implementation of counter-measures against terrorist and intelligence threats" (NATO Handbook 2006, 83–84). The main functions of the independent office in International Staff are; "policy oversight, security intelligence, and protective security" (NATO Handbook 2006, 83–84). Regarding security intelligence, which deals with

counter-intelligence policy throughout the Alliance, "providing threat-related information to NAC and the other principal decision-making bodies in NATO as well as to the NATO Military Committee, through the TTIU. " (NATO Handbook 2006, 83–84).

Despite the agreement on "a review of current intelligence structures" at the Istanbul Summit in 2004, until the appointment of NATO's first Assistant Secretary-General for Intelligence and Security (ASG-I&S), Arndt Freytag von Loringhoven in 2016, intelligence in political-strategic level based in Brussels at NATO HQ was divided between civilian and military pillars (Ballast 2017, 9). In addition, until 2016, strategic level intelligence embedded in the International Military Staff (IMS), NATO international civilians (NIC) and IS structure at the strategic level serve the political and military staff but also support national intelligence and security services & staff requirements (Korkisch 2010). At the operational level, "national intelligence serves on the strategic level as a gap-filler" (Korkisch 2010, 10). So, official NATO structures in the realm of IS and the national intelligence and security services of the member states were largely acting independently, apart from a single IS mechanism within the Alliance (Ballast 2017, 9).

In 2010, the national intelligence and security services of the member states joined together in the Civilian Intelligence Committee (CIC, formerly known as NATO Special Committee), whereas the national military intelligence and security services joined in the Military Intelligence Committee (MIC, formerly known as the NATO Intelligence Board) (Ballast 2017; NATO-Topic: International Military Staff (IMS) 2017; NATO's Military Intelligence Community meets in Ottawa 2019).

IS structures, at the strategic level based in Brussels, were connected to SHAPE. Accordingly, SHAPE started to provide guidance to its sub-structures, including its Joint Force Commands (JFC) and multinational units on NATO's eastern flank (Ballast 2017, 9). The Intelligence Division (J2) of SHAPE, reporting to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Intelligence (DCOS OPI), is tasked with operational intelligence production and contributing to the development of ACO's intelligence policy as well as providing intelligence & counter-intelligence and security advice to SACEUR. In 2012, J2 became an integral part of the Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre (CCOMC) (Ballast 2017, 9). Thus, J2 started to contribute to the comprehensive assessments for strategic awareness provided by CCOMC (Ballast 2017, 9).

Between 2001 -2006 NATO has also developed additional technical capabilities in CT-IS. Among these capabilities, the most salient is "New Technology for Intelligence, Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition of terrorists" (ISRTA of Terrorists), which is generated from the fourth biannual Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) defense against terrorism program in 2005 (Kriendler 2006, 3; NATO Press Release - 133 2005). The main goals of ISRTA of terrorists were described as; "to obtain a detailed understanding of how to determine characteristic features of terrorist organizations, to develop methods and tools for early warning identification of terrorist activities, and to identify promising future research areas" (Kriendler 2006, 3).

At the operational level, based on the decisions taken at Prague Summit of 2002, NATO Intelligence Fusion Center (NIFC) that allows member states to jointly develop, fuse and share information was created in the U.K, in 2006, with the U.S as the framework nation (sponsored by the U.S.). It became a NATO military body with International Military HQ status under the operational command of SACEUR. Achieved full operational capability in 2007, NIFC's main purpose is to fill potential gaps in ACO's intelligence support to NATO operational and strategic requirements for out-of-area operations, i.e. NATO operations in Afghanistan (Kriendler 2006). Although it is beyond the scope of this research, it may worth to note that NIFC produces "non-agreed all-source intelligence" (Ballast 2017, 7). NIFC integrates intelligence input from member states and shares the products with all of the NATO members (Ballast 2017; Kriendler 2006).

In a similar vein, aimed at supporting NATO operations through IS, NATO has established NATO Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System (BICES) Agency. Additionally, Admiral Gregory G. Johnson (2004) once has argued that the creation of Joint Information and Analysis Centre (JIAC) by Joint Force Command (JFC) in Naples as to bring together intelligence collected from NATO operations to provide and integrated intelligence product, and JIAC "brings together intelligence collected from all our operations to give us an integrated intelligence product, not only for the benefit of SFOR and other Balkan commands but also for missions such as OAE in the Mediterranean" (Jhonson 2004).

Furthermore, ESCD's Strategic Analysis Capability, in the domain of IS, evolved into another HQ assessment asset through drafting reports based on open source, diplomatic reports and intelligence (Ballast 2017, 6). Furthermore, since 2010, open-source

intelligence (OSINT) has also been shared at ACT and among its sub-structures (subsidiary units) like NATO JALLC[41] (Ballast 2017, 10). Finally, intelligence information shared at ACT has been coordinated through the NATO COE on Human Intelligence in Romania, COE DAT in Turkey and COE Cooperative Cyber Defense in Estonia since the establishment of these COEs (Ballast 2017, 10).

As mentioned in the previous parts of this section, based on a decision taken at the Chicago Summit of 2012, the NATO leaders launched JISR initiative. Later in 2016, at Warsaw Summit, the Allied leaders agreed to create the position of ASG-I&S. Following the agreement, Arndt Freytag von Loringhoven was appointed as NATO's first ASG- I&S. In 2017, ASG-I&S started to transform NATO's intelligence structure and the new Joint Intelligence and Security Division was created at NATO HQ.

The creation of JISD was the most important reform in NATO's history of intelligence. Through its creation, the previous division between the civil and military pillars within NATO intelligence at the strategic level became integrated. In other words, the civilian and military pillars of strategic level intelligence have been merged through the creation of JISD. Currently, JISD has two main pillars: intelligence (civil-military together) and security. The aim of JISD is to create a holistic approach to intelligence through using both classified and open sources among others while producing strategic, operational and tactical intelligence. JISD, besides advising ASG- I&S on intelligence issues, supports decision-making in NATO -both NAC and Military Committee (De Graaff 2017, 6).

Regarding JISD's security pillar, the ASG- I&S, Freytag von Loringhoven stated that terrorism is an essential area of concern. He also emphasized that "as NATO's role in countering terrorism is expanding, the Alliance needs deeper situational awareness in this field" (Von Loringhoven 2017). Accordingly, with the aim of supporting situational awareness in the field of CT, a new Terrorism Intelligence Cell (TIC) focusing on

[41] OSINT is a technique for gathering intelligence, through gathering and analyzing the information from publicly available sources, such as traditional and digital media. In addition to OSINT there are several intelligence gathering techniques including, for instance, Human intelligence (HUMINT), Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) and Financial Intelligence (FININT) among many others. Since it is beyond the scope of this research, we will not discuss these techniques in detail. However, if necessary, the researcher may define some of these techniques in the following parts of this section.

delivering strategic intelligence across the world was established within JISD (Von Loringhoven 2017).

To put in a nutshell, in contrast to the developments in CT-CD, the creation of the new sub-structures in the domain of IS to deal with the threat posed by international terrorism showed up before the expansion of the existing sub-structures prior to 9/11. Following the establishment of TTIU in 2003, a number of 'new' sub-structures have been established at all levels of intelligence (strategic, operational, tactical). Afterward, by extending the roles of these newly established sub-structures, CT-IS became an integral part of NATO's IS practices. The below-presented table illustrates the continuity in the expansion of the sub-structures in the domain of IS and the practical implementation of CT-IS policies through the establishment and expansion of these sub-structures.

Table 3.7 Illustrative Scorecard: Levels of the Expansion of the old Sub-structures & Practical Implementations in Counter-terrorism Intelligence Sharing

Criteria	**Indicators**	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Expansion of old sub-structures & Practical implementation CT-IS	I_1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80
	I_2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80
	I_3	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100	110	120	130	140	150	160
	I_4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70
	I_5	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100	110	120	130	140	150	160
	TOTAL	**0**	**20**	**40**	**60**	**80**	**100**	**120**	**140**	**160**	**200**	**240**	**300**	**350**	**400**	**450**	**500**	**550**

3.3 Institutionalization of Counter-Terrorism Within Military Operations

The invocation of Article V in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the "subsequent operations demonstrated the Alliance's resolve to deal with this threat." (NATO's military concept for defence against terrorism 2002). The Allies have acknowledged the relevance of military operations (MOps) to 'defense against terrorism' through the endorsement of MCDT in 2002 at the Prague Summit. MCDT identified four different roles for military operations: "anti-terrorism, force protection, consequence management, counter-terrorism, and military cooperation" (NATO's military concept for defence against terrorism 2002). Since then, the role of MOps in dealing with the terrorist threat has evolved within the Alliance through a set of political and structural reforms. As a consequence, CT has emerged as an institutionalized specific issue-area within NATO's broader domain of MOps. Of particular importance here is the question to what extent was CT institutionalized within MOps? Thus, this chapter aims to assess the institutionalization of CT within MOps since the terrorist attacks of 9/11.

Yet, before starting the assessment, it is essential to identify the relationship between CT and MOps so that one can be able to investigate the likely effects of the institutionalization of CT within MOps toward the intra-alliance CTC. Accordingly, this section of this chapter will be guided through addressing the specific questions below:

- What are the definitions of MOps, CT-MOps, and the institutionalization of CT within MOps?
- What is the importance of MOps to CT for NATO in the post-9/11 era?

3.3.1 Assessment of the Institutionalization of Counter-Terrorism Within Military Operations

In the following parts of this section, we will assess the institutionalization of CT within MOps to be able to determine its levels in terms of temporal variation through using the same criteria which we have used in the previous sections of this chapter. Thus, the following pages of this section will first present the definitions of CD, CT-MOps and the institutionalization of CT-MOps along with the identification of the importance of MOps to CT. Next, we will assess the institutionalization of CT within MOps within separate parts under this main section.

NATO, within the Glossary of Terms and Definitions, does not define what a military operation is but defines the term ‘campaign’ as: “A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective”(AAP-06 Allied Administrative Publication NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions 2017). Therefore, a military operation is a part of a broader set of military activities, which may include offensive or defensive measures. There is a wide range of military operations that NATO undertakes including, for example, non-combat humanitarian operations aimed at disaster relief or conflict and crisis management and other operations aimed at collective defense and cooperative security. Thus, to be able to grasp the relationship between CT and military operations, there is a need to define NATO’s core principals; ‘collective defense’, ‘crisis management’, ‘cooperative security’, introduced by NATO’s new strategic concept in 2010. It is important to note that collective defense and crisis management are the founding principles of the Alliance since the very beginning of its foundation, however, the principle of cooperative security has been introduced in the new strategic concept adopted in Lisbon Summit in 2010.

To begin with, 'collective defense' is the "very heart of NATO's founding treaty" and refers to that "an attack against one Ally is considered as an attack against all Allies" (North Atlantic Treaty 1969 art. V). In accordance with Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, the new strategic concept identifies NATO's role in collective defense as follows:

> NATO members will always assist each other against attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. That commitment remains firm and binding. NATO will deter and defend against any threat of aggression, and against emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole (Active Engagement, Modern Defence 2010).

Crisis management, according to the NATO Glossary, is "the coordinated actions taken to defuse crises, prevent their escalation into an armed conflict and contain hostilities if they should result" (AAP-06 Allied Administrative Publication NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions 2017). The new strategic concept identifies NATO's role in crisis management as follows:

> NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises – before, during and after conflicts. NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts; to stop ongoing conflicts where they affect Alliance security; and to help consolidate stability in post-conflict situations where that contributes to Euro-Atlantic security (Active Engagement, Modern Defence 2010).

In addition to the already existing crisis management and collective defense principals, the new strategic concept in 2010 has introduced the principle of cooperative security and the Alliance's role in cooperative security is identified as follows:

> The Alliance is affected by and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organizations; by contributing actively to arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO's standards (Active Engagement, Modern Defence 2010).

Turning now to the NATO-led military operations, the important point to make here is that military operations, in general, should serve at least one of these core principals. In

addition, it is also important to note that NATO's military operations aimed at countering the terrorist threat are not defined under a title of 'counterterrorism military operations', rather, NATO generally stresses that the operations aimed at CT are supporting the Alliance's three core tasks: collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security" (NATO - Topic: Operations and missions: past and present 2019).

Therefore, it is possible to define CT-MOps as the military actions -joint and combined- to counter the terrorist threat in line with the principles and frameworks established by the strategic and military concepts along with other official policies and doctrines (Ajp-3 (B) Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations 2011; MCCT 2016; NATO's military concept for defence against terrorism 2002). In addition, as the changes in the issue definitions within MCDT adopted in 2002 and MCCT in 2016 demonstrated, it is worth highlighting here is the evolution of NATO's vision on the military contributions to CT. In regard to this evolution, CT-MOps has been institutionalized within NATO through the broader process of transformation both in terms of policy and practice.

Therefore, it is possible to define institutionalization of CT-MOps as; the *process embedded within its overarching political and structural transformation that comprises the elements of continuous change through the expansion and revision of NATO policies, procedures, rules, and the establishment and re-use of sub-structures which is recognized by the Allies as the patterns of military missions aimed at contributing to CT since 9/11 through framing CT in a different way to mobilize previously uninvolved actors or issues.* With this definition in mind, the following parts of this section will further assess the institutionalization of CT within MOps by using the criteria of institutionalization of CT.

With the aim of avoiding any tautology, this section of this chapter and the following parts of this section will not cover the measurement and grading process in detail. Nevertheless, it is necessary at least to touch upon the grading process that aims quantifying the qualitative data. The indicators of each criterion will be presented at the beginning of each part and each indicator in each part (criterion) will be graded as "10" if affirmative and will be graded as "0" if there exists a shift from previous steps taken that contradicts with an expected development from an institutionalist point of view. We will follow a chronological approach to be able to identify the change & continuity within each criterion between 2002-2018. Thus, even a 'change' does not exist in each year but there

exists ‘continuity’ induced by the previous change; we will also grade each indicator within each related year as “10”. Thus, at the end of each part of this section, we will present a scorecard that we have designed to summarize the findings of the assessment process. However, there is a need to reiterate that the grading process will be conducted from a cumulative standpoint and only aimed at quantifying the qualitative data and so, represents neither the exact values of the institutionalization of CT nor the exact values of the criteria. The main reason for choosing a cumulative standpoint is to illustrate the “ongoing, evolving and cumulative” nature of the institutionalization process of CT.

Therefore, each of the following parts will start by presenting the indicators of each criterion and next, we will assess each criterion through the above-mentioned process. It is also important to note that the main aim of the following parts is not to describe NATO’s military operations in general, rather, the focus will be on the ISAF and Operation Active Endeavor (OAE). This is because OAE was NATO’s only Article V CT mission (later transitioned to a non-Article V mission) and the ISAF is directly related to NATO’s military contribution to the broader efforts in the international fight against terrorism.

3.3.1.1 Rhetorical Recognition of the Importance of Military Operations to Counter-Terrorism and Its Subsequent Expansion

This criterion will be assessed through the guidance of the following indicators concerning the continuity of each indicator between 2002-2018:

$I_{1:}$ Whether the Allies have recognized the relevance of MOps to CT,

$I_{2:}$ Whether the Allies have emphasized the possible involvement of new or previously un-involved issues or actors in the realm of CT-MOps,

$I_{3:}$ Whether the Allies have emphasized further development in the realm of CT-MOps,

Thus, the following pages of this part will assess the rhetorical recognition of the importance of MOps to CT and its subsequent expansion.

To begin with, along with the initial decision taken in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on launching the Alliance’s first-ever military operation against terrorism in response the request of the U.S Operation Eagle Assist (OEA), NATO decided to launch its second CT operation, OAE, which includes the “elements of NATO's

Standing Naval Forces are sent to patrol the eastern Mediterranean and monitor shipping to detect and deter terrorist activity, including illegal trafficking" (NATO - Topic: Countering terrorism 2018).

Afterward, prior to the Prague Summit on November 2002, NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson, in a speech delivered in Vienna on June 14, 2002, stated that "we agreed that NATO should be ready to deploy its forces "as and where required" to carry out such missions" (Robertson 2002). Thereafter Lord Robertson's speech delivered in Vienna, at the Prague Summit on November 2002, the heads of state and government declared that they are "determined to deter, disrupt, defend and protect against any attacks" and "NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed to sustain operations over distance and time" (Prague Summit Declaration 2002).

Relationally, at their meeting in Reykjavik, in 2002, the foreign ministers of NATO decided that the "Alliance would operate when and where necessary to fight terrorism" These statements clearly illustrate that NATO has recognized the relevance of military operations to CT by giving an end to the debates on the "out-of-area" missions. As stated on the official NATO webpage, "this landmark declaration effectively ends the debate on what constituted NATO's area of operations and paves the way for the Alliance's future engagement with the ISAF" (NATO - Topic: Countering terrorism 2018).

At the Istanbul Summit, in 2004, the NATO leaders stated that NATO's "fight against terrorism will continue to be multifaceted and comprehensive, including political, economic, diplomatic even military means if necessary since the last bombings have shown terrorism pose a threat around the world" (Istanbul Summit Communiqué 2004). In the same vein, at the Istanbul Summit, NATO also declared its decision on expanding the ISAF mission including the decision on adding several more provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan. (The Istanbul Declaration: Our security in a new era 2004). It is of utmost importance to mention here is that the decision on expanding the ISAF mission clearly demonstrates the subsequent expansion of rhetorical recognition regarding NATO's military missions in the realm of CT.

In the Riga Summit declaration of 2006, the statement on the relationship between the security and development clearly demonstrates the emphasis on previously un-involved

issues and the continuity of the decisions taken in the previous summits. As stated in the declaration (Riga Summit Declaration 2006):

> There can be no security in Afghanistan without development, and no development without security. The Afghan people have set out their security, governance, and development goals in the Afghanistan Compact concluded with the international community at the beginning of the year. Provincial Reconstruction Teams are increasingly at the leading edge of NATO's effort, supported by military forces capable of providing the security and stability needed to foster civilian activity.

In a similar vein, the statements on NATO's only Article V military operation, OAE, in the Riga and Bucharest Summit Declarations clearly indicate the continuity of the recognition of the importance of military operations to CT. The NATO leaders at the Riga and Bucharest Summits declared that "the Alliance continues to provide an essential transatlantic dimension to the response against terrorism. Operation Active Endeavour continues to make an important contribution to the fight against terrorism" (Bucharest Summit Declaration 2008; Riga Summit Declaration 2006).

In addition, as brought up before, the Allies at the Bucharest Summit set out a vision on developing a comprehensive approach. Regarding the relationship between NATO's Comprehensive Approach and the ISAF -as an example of NATO's CT military missions-, the following statement is worthy of note:

> Neither we nor our Afghan partners will allow extremists and terrorists to regain control of Afghanistan or use it as a base for terror that threatens all of our people. With our ISAF partners, and with the engagement of President Karzai, we will issue a statement on Afghanistan. This statement sets out a clear vision guided by four principles: aim and shared long-term commitment; support for enhanced Afghan leadership and responsibility; a comprehensive approach by the international community, bringing together civilian and military efforts (Bucharest Summit Declaration 2008).

Although not only aimed at CT military missions, the Comprehensive Approach through the emphasis on civil-military cooperation to address the "security challenges of today and tomorrow" might be regarded as a demonstration of the involvement of new actors in the realm of CT-MOps (Bucharest Summit Declaration 2008).

In the similar vein, regarding the possible involvement of new issues, at their next NATO Summit in Lisbon of 2010, the Allies not only reiterated the previous statements on CT-MOPs including the statement on OAE, but also introduced the "Political Guidance on ways to improve NATO's involvement in Stabilization and Reconstruction" (Lisbon Summit Declaration 2010). Based on the Political Guidance on NATO's involvement in Stabilization and Reconstruction, approved in 2010, the Allies stated in the Lisbon Summit Declaration that:

> the Alliance must, therefore, have the ability to plan for, employ, and coordinate civilian as well as military crisis management capabilities that nations provide for agreed Allied missions. To improve NATO's contribution to a comprehensive approach and its ability to contribute, when required, to stabilization and reconstruction, we have agreed to form an appropriate but modest civilian capability to interface more effectively with other actors and conduct appropriate planning in crisis management, as addressed in the political guidance mentioned above (Lisbon Summit Declaration 2010).

Thus, the statement on NATO's future involvement in "stabilization and reconstruction in fragile, conflict and post-conflict states" clearly indicates that the Allies emphasized further development in the realm of CT-MOps that is induced by the previous steps taken (Political Guidance on ways to improve NATO's involvement in Stabilisation and Reconstruction 2011). To be more precise, the Allies, following the declaration on developing the Comprehensive Approach at the Bucharest Summit in 2008, expanded their rhetoric through stressing out the possible involvement of previously un-involved issues, which, in this case, is the stabilization and reconstruction.

In continuation of their rhetoric at the previous summits on the recognition of the importance of military missions to CT in general, and the ISAF in particular, the Allies, at the Chicago Summit in 2012, declared that they "have taken further important steps on the road to a stable and secure Afghanistan and to our goal of preventing Afghanistan from ever again becoming a safe haven for terrorists that threaten Afghanistan, the region, and the world" (Chicago Summit Declaration 2012).

However, in contrast to the previous declarations regarding OAE, the Allies have declared that "OAE is our Article 5 maritime operation in the Mediterranean which contributes to the fight against terrorism. We are reviewing strategic options for the future of this operation" (Chicago Summit Declaration 2012). This statement signaled the future

transition of OAE from being only a CT MOp into a broader maritime security operation. Nevertheless, this statement should not be regarded as a break with past decisions in terms of CT-MOps. As a matter of fact, the decision that signals the transition of OAE as a part of NATO's continuous efforts to adapt to meet the evolving security challenges (Madeleine Moon 2016, 11).

Although the Allies signaled the future transition of OAE, the decision on the transition was taken not at the Wales Summit of 2014, but at the Warsaw Summit of 2016. It was stated at the Wales Summit declaration that "Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean will continue to adapt to meet evolving security risks in an area of essential strategic interest to the Alliance" (Wales Summit Declaration 2014). According to the website of OAE, "as the Alliance has refined its counter-terrorism role in the intervening years, the operation's mandate has been regularly reviewed and its remit extended" (Allied Maritime Command - Operation Active Endeavour n.d.). Thus, the decisions on extending the remit of OAE demonstrate an Alliance-wide recognition of the relevance of the operation to CT and that there is an Alliance-wide recognition on the importance of NATO's role in the realm of CT to enhance international security (Wales Summit Declaration 2014).

At the Warsaw Summit, the Heads of State and Government approved the transition of OAE as a non-Article V military operation and it was renamed Operation Sea Guardian (OSG) (Warsaw Summit Communiqué 2016). It is important to note that the Alliance did not withdraw the operation's authorization to perform CT yet and authorized the operation with seven different tasks including CT (Madeleine Moon 2016, 11). In addition, according to a report published by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, "counter-terrorism tasks will likely grow as non-state armed groups continue to expand their abilities" (Madeleine Moon 2016, 12).

Another important point to make here is that, according to the same report, the above-mentioned seven different tasks are:

> supporting situational awareness, maintaining freedom of navigation, conducting interdiction operations, combatting the proliferation of WMD, protecting Allied critical infrastructure, supporting maritime counter-terrorism operations, and contributing to maritime security capacity building (Madeleine Moon 2016, 12).

As the variety of these tasks clearly demonstrate, NATO has been expanding its role in the realm of CT-MOps by linking different issue-areas to CT-MOps. From an institutionalist point of view in general, linking different issue-areas are at the very heart of institutionalization. Thus, regarding the transition of OAE, as a concrete example of the practical implementation of CT-MOPs, into a broader maritime security organization by giving it permission to perform a number of different tasks including supporting maritime, CT operations might be regarded as an example that demonstrates the increasing levels of the institutionalization of CT-MOps. Finally, at their summit in Brussels in 2018, NATO leaders emphasized that they are "mindful of the need to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism" (Brussels Summit Declaration 2018). In addition, they underlined that NATO's role in the realm of CT is "an integral part of the Alliance's 360-degree approach to deterrence and defense and projecting stability" (Brussels Summit Declaration 2018). It is noteworthy here is that their emphasis on NATO's role in the fight against terrorism "contributes to all three core tasks" of the Alliance: collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security (Brussels Summit Declaration 2018).

To make a long story short, the Allies not only have recognized the importance of MOps to CT but also have expanded this recognition through their emphasis on the involvement of new issues, new actors and further development in the realm of CT-MOps. Thus, it would not be wrong to argue that the 'rhetorical recognition and its subsequent expansion', the first criterion, as one of the measurable extents of the institutionalization of CT-MOps, has increased since 9/11 through the continuation of the rhetoric in the same direction. The following part of this research will further assess the formalization and revision of the policies in CT-MOps. The following table illustrates and summarizes the discussions above.

Table 3.8 Illustrative Scorecard: Levels of the Rhetorical Recognition of the Importance of Military Operations to Counter-terrorism and its subsequent Expansion

Criteria	Indicators	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Rhetorical Recognition of the Importance of Military Operations to Counter-terrorism and its subsequent Expansion	I_1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80
	I_2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80
	I_3	0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100	110	120	130	140	150	160
	TOTAL	**0**	**10**	**20**	**30**	**40**	**50**	**60**	**70**	**80**	**110**	**140**	**170**	**200**	**230**	**260**	**290**	**320**

3.3.1.2 Formalization and Revision of the Policies in Counter-Terrorism Military Operations

This criterion will be assessed through the guidance of the following indicators concerning the continuity of each indicator between 2002-2018:

$I_{1:}$ Whether the Alliance have set out specific policies and doctrines regarding the CT-MOps,

$I_{2:}$ Whether the policies & doctrine have expanded through an emphasis on the involvement of new or previously un-involved issues or actors in the realm of CT-MOps,

$I_{3:}$ Whether the policies have set out the direction for further improvement or development in the CT-MOps,

However, the main aim of this part is not to describe NATO policies on military operations in detail, but rather the focus will be on the policies concerning the ISAF and OAE. As mentioned earlier, this is because OAE was the only NATO Article V CT mission (later transitioned to a non-Article V mission) and the ISAF is directly related to NATO's military contribution to the broader efforts in the international fight against terrorism. To be more precise, NATO's broader policies on military operations will be assessed through the consideration of OAE and the ISAF. Nevertheless, NATO doctrine on military operations will not be assessed by taking account of OAE and the ISAF. As a matter of course, NATO doctrine does not give reference to specific missions and operations in the name. So, the focus will be on the terrorism and CT-related statements throughout the assessment of NATO doctrine.

Therefore, the following pages of this part will further asses the formalization and revision of the policies and doctrines in the realm of CT-MOps starting from 2002 to 2018. We will start by assessing the broader policy texts such as; CPG, NATO's Policy Guidelines on CT, the new Strategic Concept of 2010. Next, we will assess military concepts and doctrines such as; MCDT, MCCT and the Allied Joint Publication -01 (AJP-01) and Allied Joint Doctrine-3 (AJD-3) for the conduct of Allied Joint operations at its revised versions.

According to Webber, Sperling and Smith (2012, 50), CPG is the most notable document regarding the institutionalization of MOps within the Alliance. CPG of 2006 has

emphasized that possible future challenges in the context of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty will likely involve un-conventional threats including terrorism (Compr. Polit. Guid. 2006). Therefore, CPG suggests that future military operations should "focus on the most likely operations, being responsive to current and future operational requirements, and still able to conduct the most demanding operations" (Compr. Polit. Guid. 2006).

In 2010, NATO has adopted Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive which includes "a set of common principles to NATO operations and planning and training". As stated in the directive; it "provides a common framework for collaborative operations planning when defining NATO's Contribution within a comprehensive approach philosophy" (Allied Command Operations: Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive: COPD Interim V1.0 2010, paras. 1–3). According to Webber et. al. (2012, 51), the main aim of the directive is to integrate non-military aspects into NATO's military operations and to enhance both practical intra-alliance and inter-organizational cooperation with other organizations such as the U.N. and the EU. The important point to make here is that the directive was in line with CPG of 2006 and should not only be regarded as a continuation of NATO policy regarding CT-related Mops as it also demonstrates the spread of NATO's so-called post- 9/11 vision from the broader texts into the texts aimed at the implementation of CT policies in practice demonstrated in the AJPs. In addition, the new Strategic Concept of 2010 at the Lisbon Summit has also confirmed the same themes in CPG of 2006.

Turning now to the doctrine, as it is stated in AJP -01 (C) published in 2007:

> The primary objective of AJP -01 is to provide 'capstone' doctrine for the planning, execution, and support of Allied joint operations. Although AJP-01(C) is intended primarily for use by NATO forces, the doctrine is instructive to and provides a useful framework for, operations conducted by a coalition of NATO, Partners, non-NATO nations and other organizations (AJP-01 (C): Allied Joint Doctrine 2007).

Since 9/11, the Alliance published three editions of AJP -01 as the edition B, C, D and E in 2002, 2007, 2010 and 2017 respectively. As it is stated in the editions of C and D under the title of "A Single Doctrine for Operations":

> The Alliance has a single doctrine for operations: there is no difference in doctrine at the level of philosophy and principles due

> to differing mandates or types of operation. Such differences may become evident at the lower doctrinal levels of practices and procedures, but these are below the level of this publication" (AJP-01 (C): Allied Joint Doctrine 2007; AJP-01 (D): Allied Joint Doctrine 2010, xii; x).

In addition, although the Alliance publishes revised editions of AJP on military operations, it is clearly stated that the AJP-01 "provides a framework of understanding for the approach to all Allied operations and no distinction is made between types of operations unless important" (AJP-01 (C): Allied Joint Doctrine 2007). All these additions emphasize that "operations are operations" by stating that:

> all operations can fundamentally be approached in the same manner because NATO forces must expect to perform a wide range of potentially simultaneous activities across a spectrum of conflict, from combat action to humanitarian aid, within short time frames and in close proximity (AJP-01 (C): Allied Joint Doctrine 2007; AJP-01 (D): Allied Joint Doctrine 2010; AJP-01 (E): Allied Joint Doctrine 2017, xii; x; ix).

However, these editions generally reflect the changes within the Alliance's policy and structure induced by the evolving nature of the threats. The AJP-01 (C), which was published in 2007, as the revised edition of AJP-01 (B) of 2002, stated that "it reflects the changes to the Alliance" following the summits in Prague and Istanbul (AJP-01 (C): Allied Joint Doctrine 2007). According to AJP -01 (C) of 2007, it is "more generic and abstract in nature than its predecessor, focusing on the underlying philosophy and fundamentals of joint operations at the operational level" (AJP-01 (C): Allied Joint Doctrine 2007).

In reference to the Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty, it is stated in the C, D and E editions of AJP- 01 that " Alliance security should also take account of the global context" and emphasized the threat posed by terrorism by adding that "Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature including acts of terrorism" (AJP-01 (C): Allied Joint Doctrine 2007; AJP-01 (D): Allied Joint Doctrine 2010; AJP-01 (E): Allied Joint Doctrine 2017).

Furthermore, based on the Political Guidance on NATO's involvement in Stabilization and Reconstruction, the (E) and (D) editions of AJP -01 have expanded in scope through the incorporation of new procedures regarding the "transition from combat

operations to multi-agency stabilization operations". (AJP-01 (D): Allied Joint Doctrine 2010; AJP-01 (E): Allied Joint Doctrine 2017). Although neither the doctrine nor the guidance explicitly refers to CT-related operations, the central issue here is that these editions put emphasis on the possible involvement of new actors and new issues into the broader domain of MOps, as the Political Guidance on NATO's involvement in Stabilization and Reconstruction suggests (Political Guidance on ways to improve NATO's involvement in Stabilisation and Reconstruction 2011):

> the guidance should also be used to inform and guide the conduct of current operations. It should also contribute to and complement the work on the response to the tasking by Heads of State and Government to report at their next Summit on further progress with regard to the implementation of the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan and NATO's ability to improve the delivery of stabilization and reconstruction effects as part of the international community's efforts and NATO's intrinsic contribution to a civil-military approach.

Therefore, it is clear that the guidance and the doctrine also incorporate CT-related operations as the above-mentioned statement suggests "the guidance should also be used to conduct of current operations". Additionally, it is also clear that the Alliance has established the links between the broader policies and more concrete doctrine. By doing so, the policies on CT have spread across the Alliance's more specific practices. The doctrinal changes discussed above also get reflected throughout the implementation of CT-MOps.

The next part of this section will further assess the expansion of the old sub-structures along with the establishment of new sub-structures in the domain of MOps in response to the threat posed by terrorism.

Table 3.9 Illustrative Scorecard: Levels of the Formalization and the revision of the policies in Counter-terrorism Military Operations

Criterion	**Indicators**	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Formalization and revision of policies CT-MOps	I_1	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100	110	120	130	140	150	160	170
	I_2	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100	110	120	130	140	150	160	170
	I_3	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100	110	120	130	140	150	160	170
	TOTAL	**30**	**60**	**90**	**120**	**150**	**180**	**210**	**240**	**270**	**300**	**330**	**360**	**390**	**420**	**450**	**480**	**510**

3.3.1.3 Expansion of the Old Sub-Structures & Practical Implementation in Counter-Terrorism Military Operations

To be able to maintain the consistency throughout the assessment process of the institutionalization of CT, these criteria will also be assessed in terms of 'continuous change' and through using the following specific indicators:

I_1: Whether the Allies have established new bodily sub-structures to conduct CT-MOps

$I_{2:}$ Whether the sub-structures in the domain of MOps that exist prior to 9/11 have been re-designed concerning the CT,

$I_{3:}$ Whether the role of these sub-structures in the domain of MOps has been expanded concerning the CT,

$I_{4:}$ Whether the material assets (capabilities) in the domain of MOps has been used concerning the terrorist threat.

Thus, in the following pages of this part, we will assess the expansion of the old sub-structures and the establishment of the new sub-structures within the overarching NATO framework that was aimed at countering the terrorist threat.

Evidently, the most important development regarding the evidence on the change of NATO's vision on military operations is the transformation of its military commands and the establishment of new force structures. Thus, the institutionalization of NATO's MOps in countering the terrorist threat not only manifested in the declarations and the policies but also in practice as the creation of ACT demonstrates. The establishment of ACT has provided a forum for enhancing the interoperability of Allied forces and inter-linked the civilian-military capabilities of the Allies for the purposes of the Alliance (Webber, Sperling, and Smith 2012). As part of the transformation, the number of headquarters was reduced from 20 to 11, and the number of Combined Operation Centers (CAOCs) reduced from 10 to 6.

Due to the limited scope of this dissertation, it is not possible to discuss the transformation of NATO's command structure. Nevertheless, the establishment of ACT and ACO, as mentioned earlier, is important in the process of the institutionalization of CT within the overarching institutional structure of the Alliance for a number of reasons. First,

the transformation is induced by the changes in the new security environment of the 21st century as demonstrated by the 9/11 attacks. Second, the transformation of the military commands, in its own terms, has a special importance to the institutionalization of CT as its definition suggests: institutionalization of CT is an *ongoing, evolving and cumulative process that comprises both the elements of change and continuity in policies, procedures, rules, and the establishment and/or re-use of sub-units which are recognized by the Allies as the patterns of CT practices since 9/11 through framing CT in a different way to mobilize previously uninvolved issue or actors.*

Another important milestone in NATO's history of involvement in the realm of CT is the establishment of Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ). According to the official NATO web-site, NSHQ is a hybrid sub-structure which involves a diverse set of activities, such as NATO Special Operations Forces (SOF) policy, doctrine, education and training (NATO - Topic: Special Operations Forces 2015). In addition, NSHQ supports SOF involvement in NATO military operations as well as complements other existing mechanisms of the Alliance such as NRF and CFI (NATO - Topic: Special Operations Forces 2015). In the NATO AJD for Special Operations, Special Operations are defined as the "military activities conducted by specially designated, organized, selected, trained and equipped forces using unconventional techniques and modes of employment" (AJP-3.5(A) (1): Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations 2013). The definition continues to specify that "these activities may be conducted across the full range of military operations, to help achieve the desired end-state" (AJP-3.5(A) (1): Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations 2013).

According to a report published by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Defense and Security Committee in 2018, Special Operations are the "political weapons of choice" to conduct "small CT and counter-insurgency operations in complex security environments" (Madeline Moon 2018). The report goes on to stress that, however, policymakers should avoid of the overuse of Special Operation Forces (SOFs) since it may cause a mismatch between the longer term-term policy-making strategy and overreliance on these forces. Nevertheless, the establishment of NHQS is specifically important to the institutionalization of CT within MOps because it evidently demonstrates that the Alliance has developed practical means in the fight against international terrorism.

As the Alliance refined its CT role over the years, as discussed earlier in this section, the Alliance's very first Art. V operation OAE's remit was extended and the operation was transitioned from being a short-term CT operation to a broader maritime operation in the Mediterranean and named as OSG after the agreement at the Warsaw Summit in 2016 (Operation Active Endeavour 2018). Thus, the Alliance sought to extended the role of OSG to perform its full range of missions in the maritime security including CB and situational awareness (Operation Active Endeavour 2018).

There are two main points that we should note here; first, the termination of OSG clearly demonstrates that the Alliance implements its CT policies in practice, which is specifically important to the institutionalization of CT-MOPs. Second, the Alliance has linked CT-MOps as a specific issue-area to other issue areas such as CB and IS.

In terms of the material assets that have been used in the realm of CT-MOps, the AWACS are specifically important. The AWACS which have provided air support to the U.S forces in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 have also been used by the Allies in the fight against ISIL to support the Global Coalition.

Table 11 below summarizes the findings on the levels of the expansion of the old sub-structures and the practical Implementation in CT- MOps. As the table illustrates, the Alliance has expanded the role of previously established sub-structures by linking CT as a new issue-area and has established new sub-structures to implement CT practices in the broader institutional framework of the Alliance since 9/11. The numeric values show the constant developments since 2002 in the realm of the CT-MOps regarding the third and the fourth criteria.

Table 3.10 Illustrative Scorecard: Levels of the Expansion of the old sub-structures & Practical Implementation in Counter-terrorism Military Operations

Criterion	**Indicators**	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Expansion of the old sub-structures & Practical Implementation	I_1	-	-	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100	110	120	130	140	150
	I_2	-	-	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100	110	120	130	140	150
	I_3	-	-	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100	110	120	130	140	150
	I_4	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100	110	120	130	140	150	160	170
	TOTAL	**10**	**20**	60	100	140	180	220	260	300	340	380	420	460	500	540	580	620

To put in a nutshell, as discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation, CT has become an institutionalized issue area within NATO since 9/11. In this chapter, the institutionalization of CT within the domains of CD, IS and MOps have been assessed separately. Considering the assessment of the institutionalization of CT within these domains, we can argue that the levels of the institutionalization of CT within the domain of

CD are the highest whereas the lowest levels of the institutionalization of CT are within the domain of MOps. This is mostly because of the fact that Mops are the least wanted option for the Allies in dealing with the terrorist threat. Not only the scholars but also some of NATO officials agree with the idea that CD is the most suitable domain where NATO can add its potential value to the international fight against terrorism. In line with these views, by NATO's investing more in CT-CD such as enhancing E&T activities and military exercises, the institutionalization of CT within CD has ended up with higher levels.

In the domain of IS, the levels of the institutionalization of CT have also increased since 9/11. Although IS is one of the most problematic domains in terms of an Alliance-wide agreement on its concepts and practices, the appointment of the ASG-I&S, the establishment of the new sub-structures and the re-use of the old sub-structures in this domain have ended up with a constant increase in the levels of the institutionalization of CT within IS.

In the case of Mops, on the other hand, the evidence suggests that the levels of the institutionalization of CT are at its lowest levels. This is due to the fact that there is no Alliance wide agreement on the offensive measures in fighting with international terrorism. Thus, CT-MOps became the least institutionalized domain within the Alliance.

Regarding the criteria of the institutionalization of CT, the highest level is in the criterion of the formalization and revision of the policies and the lowest level is in the rhetorical recognition and its further expansion. However, this is because of the fact that analysis conducted in this criterion is only comprised of the years; 2002, 2004, 2006,2008,2010,2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018 since these were the years when NATO Heads of state and government summits held in. However, the rest of the criteria are comprised of the years between 2002-2018 and thus, over an eighteen-year period. Therefore, in interpreting the findings, it would not be accurate to take this criterion where the lowest levels exist. Yet, we may argue that the lowest levels are shown in the criterion of the practical implementation which was defined as the establishment of new sub-structures in the realm of CT. This is because NATO's previously established bodies and sub-structures have been modified and redesigned concerning the requirements of an effective CT policy. Thus, the Alliance has preferred to re-use the previously existing mechanisms and assets in dealing with the threat posed by international terrorism instead of establishing new ones

except when and where needed.[42] In sum, the levels of the institutionalization of CT within the Alliance have been increasing steadily since 9/11. The chart presented below (Chart 1) displays the increasing levels of the institutionalization of CT-CD, CT-IS, and CT-MOps together since 2002.

Table 3.11 Summary of the Key Findings on the Levels of the Institutionalization of CT (by each criterion)

Criteria	**Years**								
Rhetorical recognition and expansion	**2002**	**2004**	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**	**2012**	**2014**	**2016**	**2018**
	50	110	190	260	330	470	540	610	680
Formalization and revision of policies	60	300	560	880	1200	1520	1840	2160	2480
Expansion of old sub-structures	0	120	280	440	600	790	1010	1240	1460
Practical implementation	10	130	290	450	610	800	1020	1240	1460
TOTAL BY YEARS	120	660	1320	2030	3140	3580	4410	5250	6080

Table 3.12 *Summary of the Key Findings on the Levels of the Institutionalization of CT (by each domain)*

Domains	**Years**								
Institutionalization of CT within Capability Development	**2002**	**2004**	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**	**2012**	**2014**	**2016**	**2018**
	50	240	450	680	940	1230	1400	1630	1860
Institutionalization of CT within Intelligence Sharing	60	210	380	540	740	940	1170	1390	1570
Institutionalization of CT within Military Operations	50	180	320	500	660	820	1040	1220	1450
Total	**160**	**630**	**1150**	**1720**	**2340**	**2990**	**3610**	**4240**	**4880**

[42]Table 3.11 and Table 3.12 summarize the discussions above. The numeric values -neither the values on the tables nor the values in Chart 1- do not represent exact values of the institutionalization of CT. The values are only for illustrative purposes.

CHAPTER 4
FINDINGS and ANALYSIS

As we have discussed in the previous chapter; NATO has set out specific policies, concepts, and doctrines, as well as has revised CT policies and doctrines over time, which enabled the adaptation of the Alliance to the changing nature of the threat posed by terrorism. Moreover, has expanded the role of old sub-structures through modifying them, and has established new sub-structures to facilitate the practical implementation of CT policies. Thus, CT has been institutionalized as a specific issue area within the overarching institutional framework of the Alliance.

Findings on the institutionalization of CT suggest that CT has become an institutionalized issue area within NATO since 9/11. In the previous chapter, the institutionalization of CT within the domains of CD, IS and MOps was assessed separately. Considering the assessment of the institutionalization of CT within these domains, we can argue that the levels of the institutionalization of CT within the domain of CD are the highest whereas the lowest levels of the institutionalization of CT are within the domain of MOps. This is probably because of the fact that the MOps in dealing with the terrorist threat are the least wanted option for the Allies. In addition, military operations (combat operations) are the least used means in countering the terrorist threat. As a result, CT-MOps became the least institutionalized domain within the Alliance.

NATO's bigger investment in CT-CD such as enhancing the E&T activities and military exercises has resulted in higher levels of institutionalization of CT within CD than of CT-IS and CT-MOps. However, this is not the only reason behind this variation. Due to the wider scope of the CD within NATO, which, for instance, includes a number of components including education, training, and exercises, for instance, the levels of the institutionalization of CT within CD became higher than it is within other domains, the IS and the MOps. To be more precise, the scope of the IS and MOps are limited in nature in comparison to the scope of the CD. Therefore, the higher level of the institutionalization of CT within CD, as opposed to others, occurred naturally.

In the domain of IS, the levels of the institutionalization of CT have also increased since 9/11. Although the IS is one of the most problematic domains in terms of an

Alliance-wide agreement on its concepts and practices, the appointment of the ASG-I&S, the establishment of the new sub-structures and the re-use of the old sub-structures in this domain have ended up with a constant increase in the levels of the institutionalization of CT within IS. In the case of MOps on the other hand, as the evidence suggests, the levels of the institutionalization of CT are at its lowest levels. Possible reasons behind the variations in the levels of the institutionalization of CT within these domains, albeit important, are beyond the scope of this research.

Thus, despite the existence of the variations among the levels of the institutionalization of CT within the domains, it is evident that CT as a specific issue-area has been institutionalized within the Alliance since 9/11. Chart 1 presented below illustrates the findings on the levels of the institutionalization of CT (CD + IS +MOps) in the period of 2002-2018. As Chart 4.1 demonstrates, the levels of the institutionalization of CT increased constantly from 2002 to 2018.



Chart 4.1 Total levels of the Institutionalization of CT[43]

[43]It is calculated by aggregating the values in each domain.

Consequently, this chapter of the research will present the findings on the effects of the institutionalization of CT within the domains of CD + IS + MOps upon intra-alliance CTC within NATO in the post- 9/11 era. In other words, the projected impact of the institutionalization of CT upon intra-alliance CTC will be empirically analyzed. In theory, as we have briefly discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation, it is expected that the institutionalization of CT within NATO will further strengthen the tendency for NATO member states to work together in the realm of CT.

So, this chapter aims to provide empirical evidence to the claim that the institutionalization of CT is positively associated with intra-alliance CTC within NATO (the main hypothesis outlined in Chapter 2). This empirical chapter will analyze the relationship between the institutionalization of CT and intra-alliance CTC by applying a pattern-matching technique. The term pattern is a characteristic of qualitative analysis that is identified as a holistic analysis rather than atomistic (Hak and Dul 2012, 81). In other words, the analysis does not focus on the constituents of the research but rather on the overall pattern (Hak and Dul 2012, 81).

Thus, we will compare the overall patterns of the IV and each DV to determine whether they match or not. Essential to pattern matching is that the expected pattern is clearly specified before the matching takes place (Hak and Dul 2012, 81). So, as we have discussed in Chapter Two, it was expected that the greater the levels of the institutionalization of CT, the greater the levels of the intra-alliance CTC within NATO.

As we have mentioned in Chapter One and discussed in Chapter Three, NATO has set out specific policies, concepts, and doctrines, and, in turn, provided a framework for intra-alliance CTC as well as has revised CT policies and doctrines over time, which enabled the adaptation of the Alliance to the changing nature of the threat posed by terrorism and, thus, to preserve the members' interest in the Alliance. Also, NATO has expanded the role of old sub-structures through modifying them, provided issue-linkage opportunities for its members, established new sub-structures and expanded the roles of the previously established ones to facilitate the practical implementation of CT policies. Thus, as we have outlined in the research design and methodology chapter (Chapter 2), the main hypothesis of this research is:

H_1: *As NATO-CT institutionalized (CD + IS + Mops), NATO's intra-alliance CTC increases.*

Accordingly, the institutionalization of CT (within CD, IS and MOps) is the main IV while intra-alliance CTC is the main DV in this research. Nonetheless, given the increasing importance of the measurement of the outputs in the study of intra-alliance CTC, we have specified six related- non-equivalent DVs to be able to measure the levels of intra-alliance CTC within NATO.

These non-equivalent related-DVs are:

1) defense expenditures of the key Allies,
2) deployed troops both in ISAF & RSM,
3) the financial contributions to ANATF,
4) activities funded by the Allies under STO,
5) the activities conducted by COE DAT and,
6) CT-related military exercises.

The selection of these DVs is important not only because they demonstrate the distinct contributions of the Allies to the Alliance's work in the realm of CT but also important because they represent the concrete outcomes of the institutionalization process of CT within the Alliance. Establishment of COE DAT, the STO, the ANATF and the inclusion of CT-related projects into the STO activities, for instance, are the most specific outcomes of this process. Therefore, these contributions are specifically important to the empirical analysis of the relationship between the institutionalization of CT within the Alliance and the intra-alliance CTC. More precisely, these contributions would demonstrate not only to what extent do the Allies contribute to the Alliance's work in the realm of CT, once the process of institutionalization of CT has revealed these outcomes, but also to what extent do the Allies make use of the Alliance's assets -the most concrete outcomes of the institutionalization of CT- in the realm of CT? It is important to note that intra-alliance CTC, in fact, goes far beyond the mere measurement of the defense expenditures of the key Allies. As Cordesman (2018) pointed out such calculations give no credit for the fight against terrorism in and outside the NATO area. Thus, when analyzing the role of the institutionalization of CT in intra-alliance CTC, it is not only the amounts of Dollars one needs to consider but also the untapped potential of other areas where the

Allies cooperate in the realm of CT. Such kind of consideration is likely to contribute more to the literature on intra-alliance CTC.

In this regard, this chapter will examine the likely effects of the institutionalization of CT within NATO on the defense expenditures of the key Allies, deployed troops of the key Allies in ISAF and RSM, the financial contributions to ANATF, activities funded by the Allies under STO, the activities conducted by COE DAT and CT-related military exercises respectively.

To begin with, given the importance of the defense expenditures of the Allies to the well-being and the cohesion of the Alliance and thus intra-alliance cooperation, it can be expected that institutionalization of CT within the Alliance would play an important role in influencing the defense expenditures of the Allies. Theoretically, it is expected that higher levels of the institutionalization of CT will be associated with an increase in the levels of the defense expenditures of the Allies. Thus, as we have presented in the research design and methodology chapter, the first related-hypothesis of this research is:

> **$H1_1$:** As NATO-CT institutionalized (CD + IS + Mops), key Allies' defense expenditures grow.

Thus, defense expenditures of the key Allies became the first related-DV of the first related-hypothesis. In order to test this hypothesis, raw data on defense expenditures of the key Allies were withdrawn from NATO reports on the defense expenditures of the Allies published by NATO's Public Diplomacy Division and released on the NATO official website. Nevertheless, the researcher converted local currencies to Euros based on the exchange rates of each related year. Each value each year indicates the total defense expenditures of the five key Allies: the U.S., the U.K, Turkey, France, and Germany. As it was noted in the SG's Annual Report (Stoltenberg 2018, 120);

> NATO collects defense expenditure data from Allies on a regular basis and presents aggregates and subsets of this information. Each Allied country's Ministry of Defense reports current and estimated future defense expenditure according to an agreed definition of defense expenditure. The amounts represent payments by a national government actually made during the course of the fiscal year to meet the needs of its armed forces or those of Allies (Stoltenberg 2018, 120).

In addition, it is also stated in a NATO Defense Expenditure report published in 2018 that;

> In view of differences between both these sources and national GDP forecasts, and also the definition of NATO defense expenditure and national definitions, the Charts are shown in this report may diverge considerably from those which are quoted by media, published by national authorities or given in national budgets. Equipment expenditure includes expenditure on major equipment as well as on research and development devoted to major equipment. Personnel expenditure includes pensions paid to retirees. (Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2011-2018) 2019).

Therefore, the data on the defense expenditures of the Allies are estimated. In addition, the data on the defense expenditures comprises only the 'key Allies' namely; the USA, the UK, France, Germany, and Turkey. As we have noted earlier in the second chapter of this dissertation, there are two main reasons for this selection. First, according to recent data in 2019, these member states have the strongest military armies within NATO[44] ("The NATO Member States Ranked by Military Strength," 2019). Second, most of the recent academic and political debates on NATO's intra-alliance challenges (i.e. the burden-sharing) primarily involve these five members (Cordesman 2018; D. Keohane 2017; Mehta 2018). It is important to note that, since this research does not focus on the burden-sharing disputes among the Allies, we will neither consider the differences among the burden-sharing preferences of the key Allies nor compare their defense spending levels (i.e. whether do they reach the 2% of GDP to defense spending goal) rather, our approach to measuring intra-alliance CTC relies on the data in which we can observe the amount of the change in the key Allies' defense expenditures over an eighteen-year period.

Chart 4.2 illustrates the findings on the defense expenditures of the key Allies (the first related-DV). When interpreting these findings, it is important to focus on the presence or absence of parallel trends to estimate the effects of the institutionalization of CT within NATO on the defense expenditures of the key Allies in the post-9/11 era. As we have presented in Chart 4.1 at the beginning of this chapter, the values of the institutionalization of CT increased steadily from 2002 to 2018. So, one can expect that the higher values of the institutionalization of CT will be associated with an increase in the defense

[44]Available at: https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing-nato-members.asp

expenditures of the key Allies. It is important to note that, while institutionalization of CT is not the only factor influencing defense expenditures of the Allies, institutionalization has important policy implications for intra-alliance cooperation. In support of this argument, Mattelaer (2011, 136) has noted that institutionalization provides far deeper cooperation opportunities to the Allies to work together both within and outside of the overarching institutional structure of the Alliance. Furthermore, the Alliance's institutional structures can raise the level of alliance cohesion independently from external factors (Tuschhoff 1990, 151). Thus, the institutionalized CT within the Alliance expected to be positively associated with the defense expenditures of the key Allies.



Chart 4.2 Defense expenditures of the Key Allies

The empirical evidence suggests that, even though a regular increase of the defense expenditures of the key Allies on a yearly basis cannot be observed, an overall upward tendency is clear as illustrated in Chart 4.2. So, as the major trend in Chart 4.2 that displaying the defense expenditures of the key Allies, we may argue that there is a positive association between the defense expenditures of the key Allies and the institutionalization of CT within NATO in general. In other words, the hypothesis is confirmed for almost all of the period analyzed.

When interpreted separately, from 2002 to 2010 for instance, the institutionalization of CT and the defense spending levels of the key Allies (the U.S, the U.K, Turkey, France, and Germany) are positively associated. Thus, the hypothesis once again confirmed for this period of analysis. However, the results are inconsistent for the

period between 2010-2014. The relationship between the institutionalization of CT and the defense expenditures of the key Allies during this period was negative. So, the hypothesis for this period is disproved.

Nevertheless, after 2014 the defense expenditures of the key Allies increased consistently. Therefore, during this period the relationship between the institutionalization of CT and the defense expenditures of the key Allies was positive. Once again, for this period, the hypothesis of a positive association between the institutionalization of CT and the defense expenditures of the key Allies is proved. So, we may conclude that there is a limited influence of the institutionalization of CT within CD + IS + MOps on the defense expenditures of the key Allies. However, since the analysis focuses on the overall patterns of the DV, one can clearly observe that the expenditures of the key Allies have almost doubled since 9/11. So, even though unmatched patterns exist on a yearly basis, the overall pattern of the first related-DV and the expected pattern do match.

Nonetheless, the limited influence of the institutionalization of CT on the defense expenditures of the Allies needs to be carefully analyzed to weigh the underlying internal and external reasons. Does this limited influence imply that the institutionalization of CT is not important for intra-alliance CTC? If not, what are the other intervening factors that interact with the defense expenditures of the Allies? We will briefly discuss the possible reasons behind this limited influence at the end of this chapter. However, before then, it is important to test the rest of the related-hypotheses of this dissertation.

In this regard, another contribution one should consider when analyzing the effects of the institutionalization of CT on intra-alliance CTC is the number of deployed troops both in combat and non-combat military missions. The ISAF and RSM in Afghanistan, in this sense, represent important cases both in terms of NATO's transformation and adaptation to the new security challenges and intra-alliance CTC. Thus, as we have hypothesized in the second chapter, it was expected that an increase in the levels of the institutionalization of CT, in general, would be associated with an increase in the numbers of the deployed troops in ISAF and RSM. So, the second related hypothesis of this research is:

> **H1**$_{2:}$ As NATO-CT institutionalized (CD +IS + Mops), key Allies' deployed troops in ISAF and RSM increase.

As we have expected, the evidence demonstrates that an increase in the levels of the institutionalization of CT has resulted in an increase in the number of deployed troops in the Alliance's CT missions namely the ISAF and RSM. Although this projection is not given for each year, the charts below (Chart 4.3 and Chart 4.4) clearly demonstrate that there is a positive association with the institutionalization of CT and the numbers of the troops deployed in ISAF and RSM in general.



Chart 4.3 Number of troops in ISAF (Total Number of the Key Allies)[45]

As observed in Chart 4.3, the number of deployed troops in ISAF continued to increase for the period between 2002-2011. So, this period confirmed the second related-hypothesis ($H1_2$). In the period between 2011-2014, while the levels of the institutionalization of CT increased constantly, the number of deployed troops decreased considerably. Namely, the hypothesis did not hold for this period. However, we may argue that the main reason behind this decrease in the given period is the agreement at the Lisbon Summit in 2010 to end the military presence in Afghanistan. So, the slight decrease in the

[45]Raw data for each country for the years between 2002-2014 was collected from: "International Security Assistance Force." https://web.archive.org/web/20130401045950/http:/www.isaf.nato.int/troop-numbers-and-contributions/index.php (November 3, 2019). The calculation is based on the sum of the raw data on the number of the deployed troops of each key Ally.

numbers of the deployed troops in Afghanistan starting from 2011 is, in fact, a natural result of the decision to withdraw the combat troops from Afghanistan.

To be able to better illustrate the relationship between the institutionalization of CT and the number of deployed troops in Afghanistan we should also consider the number of troops in RSM. The below-presented chart illustrates the findings on the number of deployed troops in RSM after 2014. As we have mentioned earlier in the third chapter of this dissertation, after the withdrawal of the combat troops in Afghanistan the ISAF has transitioned to RSM a non-combat military mission focusing on training, advising and assisting the Afghan government and security forces (NATO Resolute Support | ISAF History n.d.). Following the agreement on sustaining the presence of RSM in Afghanistan beyond 2016, the number of troops has slightly increased. For the period between 2015-2018, the relationship between the institutionalization of CT and the number of deployed troops in Afghanistan is positive. In other words, for the period 2015-2018, the second related-hypothesis of the research did hold. Considering the general trend in the second related-DV, the relationship between the institutionalization of CT and the number of deployed troops in Afghanistan is positive. Thus, as expected, the overall relationship between the second related-DV and the IV is positive.



Chart 4.4 Number of Troops in RSM (Total Number of the Key Allies)[46]

[46]Raw data were collected from NATO fact-sheets on RSM placed on official RSM web-page. The total number of deployed troops in RSM of the key Allies was calculated by the researcher by aggregating the number of the deployed troops of each key Ally for each year.

As we have discussed in detail in Chapter 3, at the NATO Summit in Chicago in May 2012, the Allies reaffirmed their commitment to support the financing and developing the Afghan army beyond 2014. In light of this re-commitment, the ANATF "has been adapted to make it more flexible, transparent, accountable and cost-effective, and to include measures against corruption." At the Warsaw Summit in 2016, the Allies agreed to continue their financial support for the sustainment of the Afghan security forces until 2020 (Factsheet: Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund 2019). In addition, at the Brussels Summit in 2018, the Allies again re-confirmed their commitment to continue supporting financially the Afghan security forces through 2024 (Factsheet: Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund 2019). In this regard, not only the establishment of the fund but also the Allies' continuous rhetoric on their commitment to support the fund illustrate an important example of the institutionalization of CT. Therefore, it was expected that an increase in the levels of the institutionalization of CT would result in an increase in the levels of the Allied contributions to ANATF. The third related-hypothesis of this research (as we have outlined in Chapter 2) is then:

> **H1$_3$**: As NATO-CT institutionalized (CD +IS + Mops), financial contributions to the Afghanistan National Army Trust Fund increase.

The data on the financial contributions to ANATF were derived from and incorporated various sources including, NATO fact-sheets and Quarterly Report(s) to the U.S Congress for Afghanistan Reconstruction by Spoko (2014) and Nizkor (2017). In addition, the data also include non-member NATO partners. It is important to note that France did not contribute to ANATF and that the U.S is out of the ANATF framework and it has been using its own funding mechanisms regarding the funding of the Afghanistan National Army. However, NATO oversees the daily management of the fund, and "the U.S. collects NATO contributions and merges NATO funds into the U.S. Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) and manages the distribution of funds to meet ANA requirements" (Nizkor 2017, 36). In light of the above-mentioned fact, the data on ANATF also include the financial contributions made by the U.S. Additionally, the data for the years between 2007-2010 are not available separately. More precisely, data for the period 2007-2010 displays the total amount of the contributions from 2007 to 2010.

The contributions to ANATF are specifically important in analyzing the intra-

alliance CTC because, as a first of its kind fund, ANATF has deviated from the common funding principle of the Alliance and allowed member nations to contribute voluntarily. In addition, the ANATF has in fact "generated more funds than what is available on a yearly basis in NATO's budget" (Díaz-Plaja 2018).

Chart 4.5, below, illustrates the findings on the third related-DV of the research, namely, the financial contributions to ANATF. Considering the trend in the third related-DV, one can observe the considerable increase in the financial contributions to ANATF specifically after 2014. This trend is parallel with the findings on the IV of this research, i.e. the institutionalization of CT within CD, IS and MOps. Furthermore, it is also worth noting that the contributions to ANATF started to spike up at the start of the RSM in 2014. For the period between 2010 to 2014, on the other hand, the hypothesized relationship is not confirmed. For this period, the relationship was negative as was the case in the previous hypothesis. Not surprisingly, this period displaying a slight decrease is in parallel with the period when the Allies decided to withdraw their combat missions from Afghanistan. Thus, we should also consider the fact that a slight decrease in this period was generated from this decision. In other words, this does not necessarily mean that the institutionalization of CT has no effect on the financial contributions to ANATF. Considering the general trend from the inception of the fund in 2007 to 2018, the linear line displays a significant increase in the financial contributions to ANATF. So, it is not difficult to attribute the increase in the financial contributions to ANATF to the institutionalization of CT with regard to the overall period from 2007 to 2018. Besides, the overall pattern of the findings on the fifth DV also suggests that the overall patterns of the IV and the DV do match, confirming the third related-hypothesis of the research.



Chart 4.5 ANA Trust Fund Contributions (By Years)

Another mechanism where the Allies can cooperate in the realm of CT is provided by NATO STO. Following a decision at the NATO Lisbon Summit in 2010, the STO was created through the incorporation of the Research and Technology Organization RTO and the NATO URC and became the main venue to deliver science and technology in NATO (Science and Technology Organization Annual Report: Supporting NATO Core Tasks 2012). The activities under STO are multi-nationally and commonly funded, meaning that the NATO nations contribute individually and voluntarily to the activities under STO. As a result of the "smart defense initiative" endorsed at the Chicago Summit in May 2012, activities under STO are -mostly- funded through using member nations' own resources (Science and Technology Organization Annual Report: Empowering the Alliance's Technological Edge 2017, 16). Of particular importance here is that 'activities under STO are mostly funded through using members' own financial and/or human resources' because our aim is to specify the other types of the contributions made by the Allies to illustrate the patterns of overall intra-alliance CTC, in addition to the defense expenditures and other related DVs presented in this research.

There are several types of science and technology activities including, lectures, technology development projects, workshops, symposia among many others that are

conducted under the STO. The researcher preferred not to specify the types of these activities as it is beyond the scope of this research. The raw data on CT-related activities under STO were obtained from the annual reports published by the STO and placed on the official STO webpage. In addition, data on the STO activities cover the years between 2005-2017. Therefore, data on STO activities also include the activities conducted under RTO and URC which were the sub-structures existed prior to the establishment of the STO. For analytical simplicity, we preferred to refer to these as the STO activities. Therefore, the fourth related- hypothesis of this research is:

H1$_4$: As NATO-CT institutionalized (CD +IS + Mops), the number of activities under the Science and Technology Organization (STO) increases.



Chart 4.6 *STO PoW Activities*

The STO was established within the broader framework of the SDI which was introduced by the Allies in 2012 geared towards more efficient use of resources, together with enhanced multinational cooperation. In order to align collective requirements and national priorities, the Allies have agreed to enhance cooperation in the realm of science and technology development within the broader institutional framework of the Alliance. With this aim, "the SDI has built around the way that NATO allies spend money, focused on improving operational effectiveness and delivering economies of scale without questioning directly their level of defense expenditures"(Gobbi 2013).

In this regard, the establishment of STO within the broader framework of the SDI represents another important example of the institutionalization of CT within the Alliance. Yet, what more important for the purposes of this research is the question of "to what extent do the Allies make use of the STO?" Put differently, what is the relationship between the institutionalization of CT in general with the quantity of the activities conducted under STO?

Chart 4.6 displays the findings on the numbers of the STO Program of Work activities between 2005 and 2017. It is important to note that the data for the 2001-2005 period and for the year 2018 were missing. One can clearly observe in Chart 4.6 that the fourth related-hypothesis of the research is confirmed for all the period under scrutiny. The number of STO activities, as the linear trend line displays, almost doubled in 2018 compared to the numbers in 2005. Such confirmation, as predicted, associated an increase in the levels of the institutionalization of CT associated with an increase in the number of activities under STO. Thus, the relationship between the institutionalization of CT and the quantity of the activities under STO is positive. In support of the findings on the fourth related-hypothesis, in a report published by STO it has been noted that "only within the STO's trusted collaborative environment could 16 members from eight different NATO and Partner Nations jointly execute these technical demonstrations" (Science and Technology Organization Annual Report: Empowering the Alliance's Technological Edge 2017, 64).

Another NATO asset that provides a variety of activities in which the Allies can cooperate in the realm of CT is COE DAT. COE DAT is a NATO-accredited center of excellence established in 2005 in Ankara and works in the area of defense against terrorism. COE DAT offers courses, lectures, workshops, conferences and publishes books on CT-related research and provides many other activities to train and educate military personnel from NATO nations and partners dealing with CT. Thus, consideration of the COE DAT activities in measuring the levels of the intra-alliance CTC is important for a better illustration of the relationship between the institutionalization of CT and intra-alliance CTC. So, the fifth related-hypothesis of this research is:

> **H1**$_5$: As NATO-CT institutionalized (CD +IS + Mops), the number of COE DAT activities increases

The data on these activities were obtained from the COE DAT webpage. The below-presented chart (Chart 4.7) displays the data on the number of COE DAT activities between 2005- 2018. The data does not cover the years prior to 2005 since COE DAT was established only in 2005. Chart 4.7 displays the findings on the number of COE DAT activities that is the fifth related-DV of the research. It was expected that the institutionalization of CT would increase the number of COE DAT activities.

The linear line in the chart illustrates the overall increase in the period of 2005-2018. The moving average trend line, on the other hand, illustrates the patterns on a yearly basis. Since our research was designed to conduct a pattern-matching technique, the constituent parts of the data are not important to the findings of this research. In other words, the overall pattern of COE DAT activities confirms the research's hypothesized pattern. So, the fifth related-hypothesis ($H1_5$) of the research is also confirmed.



Chart 4.7 COE DAT Activities 2005-2018

As we have argued throughout the research, when analyzing the role of the institutionalization of CT in intra-alliance CTC, it is not only the amounts of dollars one needs to consider but also the untapped potential of other sub-areas where the Allies may cooperate in the realm of CT. Such kind of consideration is likely to contribute more to the literature on intra-alliance CTC. With regard to these contributions, the last sub-area of cooperation in the realm of CT that we have identified is the CT-related military exercises.

As Jamie Shea (2013, 198) once has noted on the importance of the military exercises to intra-alliance CTC:

> Exercises are useful to identify and fix the weaker spots in NATO's political procedures and military capabilities and to discern issues that may not always surface in normal political consultations. They not only pinpoint institutional weaknesses but also expose national positions and disagreements, which can be hidden in more theoretical debates. Exercises are also a good way of obliging nations to clarify, which capabilities they are prepared to make available to NATO in a crisis and how ready for use those capabilities are.

Therefore, as we have outlined in the research design and methodology chapter (Chapter 2) of this dissertation the sixth and the last related-hypothesis is:

> **$H1_6$**: As NATO-CT institutionalized (CD +IS + Mops), the number of CT-related military exercises increases.

Thus, the sixth related DV of the research is the number of CT-military exercises. The data on the military exercises collected through, in addition to the press-released military exercise factsheets and the annual reports of the SGs, official NATO web-archive by searching the keywords "exercises", "counter-terrorism military exercises", "hybrid scenario exercises", "defense against terrorism exercises" and "crisis response exercises" with an interval of 2001-2018. Additionally, published books, the Turkish Ministry of National Defense website, official strategic documents published by the member states (i.e. French White Papers) and other published articles on the issue were also used. It is worth to note that, due to the confidentiality of the official documents, it is not possible to list all the scenarios of the military exercises conducted by NATO. That is why retrieving data on the exact numbers of the military exercises aimed only at countering hypothetical terrorist attacks is not viable. However, some military exercises cover a wide range of missions including CT. Therefore, data on the CT-related military exercises do not represent the exact numbers but only the estimated ones.

In addition, the data on CT-related military exercises covered the years between 2002-2018. We will also present a non-exhaustive but illustrative list of the names and scenarios of the military exercises for the years between 2002-2018 in the appendixes. It is also important to reiterate that there is a distinction between NATO exercises and Allied national exercises. Allied national exercises are typically planned and led by the

commanders of a member nation. Despite its name may imply, Allied national exercises may also be multinational in nature, meaning that the Allies also train together within multinational exercises (Factsheet: Key NATO & Allied Exercises 2016). However, we will not specify these exercises as such NATO exercises and Allied national exercises because both require dispersion of Alliance and national efforts.

Chart 4.8 illustrates the findings on the sixth related-DV; the numbers of the CT-related military exercises. As one can clearly observe, there are two major trends in the eighth chart. First, prior to 9/11, none of the military exercises were conducted with the aim of countering the terrorist threat. Yet, for the 2002-2012 period, the spike in the moving average trend line in the eighth chart is conspicuous.



Chart 4.8 Number of NATO and Allied Military Exercises and CT-related Military Exercises between 2001-2018[47]

Second, as we have discussed in the third chapter of this dissertation, due to the Russian annexation of Crimea, the focus of the Alliance has naturally shifted from CT to the threat posed by Russia. In parallel with this shift and as observed in the moving

[47]Data derived from: (Factsheet: Key NATO & Allied Exercises 2015; Factsheet: Key NATO & Allied Exercises 2016; Factsheet: Key NATO and Allied Multinational exercises 2018; NATO Archives Online n.d.; NRDC-ITA Exercises 2011; SHAPE | Exercises & Training 2018; The Transformer 2015; Ferrier 2017; Kather and Gemballa 2009; Martinho 2019; Tschakert et al. 2011).

average trend line in Chart 4.8 above, the number of CT-related military exercises reduced significantly.

Nevertheless, as can be seen in the linear trend line, a comparison of the numbers of the CT-related military exercises in 2002 and in 2018 depicts the match in the overall patterns of the IV and the sixth related-DV. Therefore, albeit the existence of contradictory trends on a yearly basis, the sixth related-hypothesis of the dissertation is also confirmed.

Taken together, all of the related-hypotheses of the research are confirmed. Thus, it would not be wrong to argue that there is a strong positive relationship between the levels of the institutionalization of CT and the levels of the intra-alliance CTC. Therefore, high-level institutionalization may also consolidate mutual trust between the member states, enabling very frequent interactions between the members by means of routinized cooperation arrangements (Xu 2016, 1227). According to British Lieutenant-General Graeme Lamb (as cited in Xu 2016, 1228):

> You have to have an institutionalized framework for a special relationship to work and develop. It allows constant exchange and builds trust and a close relationship. Without an institutionalized framework, the special relationship will just wither. Remaining in touch and exchanging ideas while struggling together to deal with complex problems reinforces the special relationship.

Thus, the findings of this research, in general, suggest that the degree of institutionalization of CT correlates with the degree of intra-alliance CTC. In short, we may argue that as the Alliance creates more institutionalized commitments and sub-structures and links different issue-areas, the Allies become eager to cooperate in the realm of CT within the overarching institutional framework of the Alliance.

However, the fact that parallel trends of the institutionalization of CT and increasing levels of the intra-alliance CTC, in general, confirmed the hypothesized positive relationship for most of the post-9/11 era neither means that the institutionalization of CT is the only determinant in enhancing the intra-alliance CTC nor that such effect occurs in isolation of other national and international developments. Threat assessment discrepancies for instance, in terms of contradictory prioritization based on the perceived level of threat, may negatively affect intra-alliance cooperation to an important extent. As the multiplication of crises including mass migration and Russian foreign policy and as the

Alliance's internal disputes intensified due to rising populism and Euroscepticism in recent years, the divide between the Atlanticists and Europeanists deepened within the Alliance.

For these reasons, the diverse nature of the intra-alliance cooperation, in general, and thus the external and internal factors need to be kept in mind when analyzing the effects of the independent variable on any of the dependent variables.

To begin with, external factors, let us remind the comments of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, Dennice C. Blair (as cited in Mazetti 2009) delivered to the Congress depicting the global financial crisis of 2008 "as the primary near-term security concern". His comments were interpreted as "striking" both among scholarly and policy publications because the comments were delivered as a part of threat assessment to Congress which was mainly focused on terrorism. Françoise Melese (2009) for instance, has noted on Blair's speech that "the economic crisis has replaced terrorism" by adding that the global financial crisis has affected the Alliance with "an impending drop in defense spending". He also noted; most of the NATO members saw their "already modest" defense expenditures constrained and for the Allies, defense expenditures became an "unaffordable luxury" (Melese 2009).

Additionally, the international security environment should also be considered as an intervening factor in analyzing the Allies' defense expenditure behaviors. For Nordhaus et. al (2012, 512–13) for instance; the threat of international conflict is much more influential on defense expenditures than the danger of potential adversaries. Their research on the effects of the international security environment on national military expenditures is specifically important considering the increase in the defense expenditures of the key Allies after 2014 in the immediate aftermath of the Russian annexation of Crimea. As demonstrated at the NATO Summit in September 2014, the Allied leaders made a pledge to devote 2% of their GDP to defense and 20% of their defense budget to major equipment procurement within the next decade and in fact, many of the Allies have announced to increase their defense spending levels after the Summit. (Petersson and Vosman 2015, 7). According to Peterson and Vosman (2015, 7) the main stimulus, in this case, has been the perceived threat posed by Russia. Relationally, as Stephen M. Walt (2019) points out in a recent article, "logically, a country should spend more when threats are increasing and spend less when the world is more independent of whether its economy is expanding or not"

Relationally, it is also crucial to consider the divergent threat perceptions of the Allies. To illustrate this point, Kunertova (2018, 85) has noted that "although an absence of external threat to the Alliance is very unlikely, the future risk will lie […] in a lack of common perception of those threats". Thus, "terrorism, for instance, cannot constitute NATO's defining threat" (Kunertova 2018, 85). With Eastern European members expressing their concerns on the threat emanating from Russia, these divergences have increased in recent years and exposed growing divisions within the Alliance over the priority that ought to be (Berdal and Ucko 2009, 68)**.**

Furthermore, at the internal-political level, rising populism both in Europe and in the U.S should also be considered as an intervening factor that interacts with the intra-alliance cooperation as more recent events illustrate. According to recent research sponsored by NATO ACT which conducted through a series of focus groups within NATO and an online survey, the most probable cause of weakening intra-alliance cooperation is the crisis of political leadership in NATO nations. (Kunertova 2018, 86). For example, many agree that the U.S. President Donald Trump's statement that NATO is "obsolete" in 2017 or more recently, on November 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron's statement on the Alliance that it is experiencing "brain death by a lack of coordination and by the unpredictability of the U.S. President Donald Trump" may weaken the solidarity within the Alliance (DW News: French President Macron calls NATO "brain dead" 2019). Furthermore, Chancellor Angela Merkel (also NATO's current SG Jens Stoltenberg) refused to accept Macron's criticisms on NATO and called his words as "drastic"(Erlanger 2019). However, ironically, a short while ago, many policymakers and scholars agreed that France and Germany would like Europe "to take its defense planning into its own hands" and do not necessarily see NATO as the main provider of security in transatlantic, as the updated military cooperation signed by France and Germany on January 2019 demonstrated (Apps 2019). However, as Peter Apps (2019) has argued, "tying together the diplomatic resources" of Germany and France does not mean that "significant differences of the agreement will not often remain" as the above-mentioned recent events illustrate.

Nevertheless, no matter the existence of discord among the Allies as Keohane asserts "without discord, there would be no cooperation, only harmony"(R. O. Keohane 1984, 12). To be more precise, it would be unlikely to enhance the intra-alliance CTC, unless the Alliance allows its' member states, through a set of institutional re-

arrangements, to solve the points of disagreements or discord among the members. Hence, in order to solve these points of disagreements, what necessary is to enhance the institutionalized patterns of the CTC within the overarching institutional framework of the Alliance.

Albeit important, the above-mentioned intervening factors require the consideration of other IR theories. As noted in the first chapter of this dissertation, this research did not counter-pose among the theories of IR (i.e.: realism vs. institutionalism or rationalism vs. constructivism,). Instead, this dissertation investigated new-institutionalism on its own terms by following an analytically eclectic approach and developed a set of theoretically based hypotheses, which were examined empirically in this chapter. Because each of these intervening factors is a combination of variables, future work may include them both in independent and dependent variable designed research.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS and POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This research offered four distinct criteria to measure the levels of the institutionalization of counterterrorism within the Alliance. These criteria are rhetorical recognition and expansion, formalization and revision of the policies, expansion of the old sub-structures and practical implication. Each of these criteria was measured through the guidance of a more specific set of indicators re-formulated one by one regarding the requirements of each domain. In addition, each of these indicators was assessed by focusing on 'continuous change'. The 'continuous change' was defined here as; evolving, ongoing and cumulative. More precisely, with the aim of quantifying the qualitative data, each of these indicators has been graded as '10' if there exists a 'continuous change' and as '0' if there exists a counter-development, i.e. a 'shift from the previous direction' that contradicts with an expected development from an institutionalist point of view.

At the end of the assessment process, scorecards, each of which was designed to illustrate the levels of the institutionalization of CT within each of the specific domains and each of the criteria in terms of temporal variation; were presented. The researcher adopted a cumulative standpoint throughout the process of the measurement of the institutionalization of CT within each domain. By doing so, it has been possible to differentiate and illustrate both the possible variations across the domains and the variations over-time from 2001 to 2018.

The findings on the assessment of the institutionalization of CT within the Alliance suggest that from its initial emergence in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks to its subsequent expansion, the institutionalization of CT has accelerated specifically after the endorsement of the new Strategic Concept in 2010. Since then, the overall levels of the institutionalization of CT within the Alliance have been increasing. In addition, as expected, the levels of institutionalization of CT vary across the domains; the highest within the CD and the lowest within the MOps. This is mostly because of the fact that the MOps in dealing with the terrorist threat are the least wanted option for the Allies. Not only the scholars but also some of NATO officials agree with the idea that CD is the most suitable domain where NATO can add its potential value to the international fight

against terrorism. In line with these views, NATO, by investing more in CT-CD such as enhancing the E&T activities and military exercises, the institutionalization of CT within CD has ended up in higher levels.

In the domain of IS, the levels of the institutionalization of CT have also increased since 9/11. Although the IS is one of the most problematic domains in terms of an Alliance-wide agreement on its concepts and practices, the appointment of the ASG-I&S, the establishment of the new sub-structures and the re-use of the old sub-structures in this domain have resulted with a constant increase in the levels of the institutionalization of CT within IS. In the case of MOps on the other hand, as the evidence suggests, the levels of the institutionalization of CT are at its lowest levels. This is due to the fact that there is no Alliance-wide agreement on the offensive measures in fighting against international terrorism. Thus, CT-MOps became the least institutionalized domain within the Alliance.

Regarding the criteria of the institutionalization of CT, the highest level is in the criterion of the formalization and revision of the policies while the lowest level is in the rhetorical recognition and its further expansion. However, this is because of the fact that analysis conducted in this criterion is only comprised of the years; 2002, 2004, 2006,2008, 2009, 2010,2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018; the ones when NATO Heads of State and Government Summits held in. Yet, the rest of the criteria are comprised of each year between 2002-2018 and thus, over an eighteen-year period. Therefore, in interpreting the findings, it would not be accurate to take this criterion where the lowest levels exist. We may argue, though, the lowest levels are shown in the criterion of the practical implementation-defined as the establishment of new sub-structures in the realm of CT. This is because NATO's previously established bodies and sub-structures have been modified and redesigned concerning the requirements of an effective CT policy. Thus, the Alliance has preferred to re-use the previously existing mechanisms and assets in dealing with the threat posed by international terrorism instead of establishing new ones except when and where needed. In short, it is evident that CT as a specific issue area has been institutionalized within the Alliance since 9/11.

Next, the empirical investigation of this research further examined the effects of the institutionalization of CT within NATO upon intra-alliance CTC between 2002-2018. More specifically, the effects of the institutionalization of CT within NATO upon specific types of contributions made by the Allies to the Alliance, namely, defense expenditures of

the key Allies, troops deployed in ISAF & the RSM, financial contributions to ANATF, counterterrorism-related military exercises, activities funded by the Allies under the STO and the activities conducted by the NATO COE DAT, were examined. These contributions have been used to indicate the values of the intra-alliance CTC. These six distinct contributions of the Allies became at the same time the related (non- equivalent) DVs of the main DV; the intra-alliance CTC within the Alliance.

Thus, the data on the values of the first two DVs covered the key Allies, namely, the U.S., the U.K., France, Turkey, and Germany. For the rest of the DVs, financial contributions to ANATF, counterterrorism-related military exercises, activities under the STO and the activities conducted by COE DAT, the researcher did not consider the key Allies, rather, considered the overall numbers of the exercises and the activities. It was expected that an increase in the levels of the institutionalization of CT within NATO in general, would be associated with an increase in the values of these specific types of contributions made by the Allies and an increase in the levels of the military exercises and the other activities. Overall, the values of the six related DVs indicate the levels of the intra-alliance CTC.

The findings of this research suggest that there is a strong positive association between the institutionalization of CT within NATO and the intra-alliance CTC in general. More precisely, the findings suggest that there exists a positive relationship between the main IV (the institutionalization of CT within the domains of CD + IS + MOps) and the six of the related DVs the defense expenditures of the key Allies, counterterrorism-related military exercises, activities under STO, activities conducted by the NATO COE DAT, deployed troops in ISAF & RSM and the financial contributions to ANATF. Hence, we may argue that as the Alliance creates more institutionalized commitments and sub-structures and links different issue-areas, the Allies become eager to cooperate in the realm of CT within the overarching institutional framework of the Alliance.

In addition to that, a strong association between the institutionalization of CT within NATO, in general, does exist, this trend is also given regarding the institutionalization of CT within the specific set of domains; CD, IS and MOps separately. In other words, the results obtained from the examination of effects of the institutionalization of CT separately in each domain upon each of the DVs may also be meaningful in exploring the relationship between each domain and each of the DVs

separately. In fact, there can be multiple theoretical and methodological implications of the institutionalization of CT within each domain separately.

The criteria of institutionalization of CT would likely yield additional themes. More refined or additional questions, for example, might clarify the criteria of the process of the institutionalization of specific issue-areas. Additionally, measurement of the institutionalization of CT and the operationalization of the criteria of the institutionalization of CT may as well be applied to the studies on the institutionalization of specific issue-areas in future works from a micro-level perspective. In sum, this research analyzed the effects of the institutionalization of CT on intra-alliance CTC within NATO in the post-9/11 era and explored the variations in the levels of the institutionalization of CT within the specific set of domains; CD, IS and MOPs. Future work may also include analyses to explain the variations among these domains. In other words, possible reasons behind variations in the levels of the institutionalization of CT as a specific issue area within these specific domains remain inconclusive. So, future work may include the "why" type of questions.

To conclude, the policy implications from this study indicate that, intra-alliance CTC is specifically important for the overall Alliance cohesion. More precisely, the Alliance should allow its' member states, through a set of institutional re-arrangements, to solve the points of disagreements. Thus, to solve these points of disagreements, what necessary is to enhance the institutionalized patterns of the CTC within the overarching institutional framework of the Alliance. Otherwise the Allies are likely to be more polarized.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

AAP-06 Allied Administrative Publication NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions. 2017. Edition 20.

"Academic Calendars, NATO Defense College." http://www.ndc.nato.int/education/courses.php?icode=16 (September 11, 2018).

Active Engagement, Modern Defence. 2010. http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120203_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf.

AJP-01 (C): Allied Joint Doctrine. 2007. NATO Standardization Agency.

AJP-01 (D): Allied Joint Doctrine. 2010. NATO Standardization Agency.

AJP-01 (E): Allied Joint Doctrine. 2017. NATO Standardization Office.

AJP-2.7: Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. 2016. NATO Standardization Office. https://standards.globalspec.com/std/10031247/AJP-2.7 (August 11, 2019).

AJP-2 (A): Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Security. 2016. NATO Standardization Office. https://nso.nato.int/nso/nsdd/_CommonList.html (August 11, 2019).

AJP-3.5(A) (1): Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations. 2013. NATO Standardization Agency.

AJP-3 (B): Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations. 2011. NATO Standardization Agency.

Allied Command Operations: Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive: COPD Interim V1.0. 2010. SHAPE.

"Allied Command Operations." 2015. *NATO Encyclopedia*: 65–68.

"Allied Maritime Command - Operation Active Endeavour." https://mc.nato.int/missions/operation-active-endeavour.aspx (August 18, 2019).

Apps, Peter. 2019. "With 'brain Death' Comments, Macron Highlights Europe's NATO Fears." *Reuters*. https://www.reuters.com/article/apps-nato-column/column-with-brain-death-comments-macron-highlights-europes-nato-fears-peter-apps-idUSL8N27N8SD (December

3, 2019).

Argomaniz, Javier. 2009. “Post-9/11 Institutionalisation of European Union Counter-Terrorism: Emergence, Acceleration and Inertia.” *European Security* 18(2): 151–72. doi: 10.1080/09662830903460103%0ATo.

Auditors, International Board of. 2015. NATO *Summary Note to Council on the Need to Improve NATO ’ s Capability Package Process*.

Auerswald, David P, and Stephen M Saideman. 2009. “‘NATO at War: Understanding the Challenges of Caveats in Afghanistan.’” (January 2009).

Axelrod, Robert, and Silvia Borzutzky. 2006. “NATO and the War on Terror: The Organizational Challenges of the Post 9/11 World.” *Review of International Organizations* 1(3): 293–307.

Ballast, Jan. 2017. September Research Division – NATO Defense College *Trust (in) NATO Th e Future of Intelligence Sharing within the Alliance*. http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1085 (October 8, 2018).

Becker, Jordan. 2017. “The Correlates of Transatlantic Burden Sharing: Revising the Agenda for Theoretical and Policy Analysis.” *Defense and Security Analysis* 33(2): 131–57.

Bensahel, Nora. 2003. *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the European Union*. Santa Monica, Arlington, Pitsburgh: RAND Corp. http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1746.html.

———. 2006. “A Coalition of Coalitions: International Cooperation Against Terrorism.” *Coastal Management* 29(1): 35–49. http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=uter20 (October 24, 2018).

Berdal, Mats, and David Ucko. 2009. “NATO at 60.” *Survival* 51(2): 55–76. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330902860793.

BI-SC Collective Training and Exercise Directive. 2013. NATO.

Bird, Juliette. 2015. “NATO’s Role in Counter-Terrorism.” *Perspectives on Terrorism* 9(2): 61–70.

Bowen, Joh, and Roger Petersen. 1999. “Critical Comparisons in Politics and Culture.” In

Critical Comparisions in Politics and Culture, eds. John R. Bowen and Roger Petersen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 152–72.

Brussels Summit Declaration. 2018. PR/CP(2018)074 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm.

Bucharest Summit Declaration. 2008. (2008) 049 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm (July 26, 2019).

Buller, Paul F., and Glenn M. Mcevoy. 1989. "Determinants of the Institutionalization of Planned Organizational Change." *Group & Organization Management* 14(1): 33–50.

"Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism." http://www.coedat.nato.int/index.html (January 29, 2019).

Chicago Summit Declaration. 2012. Press Release (2012) 062 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_87593.htm?selectedLocale=en (August 18, 2019).

Clough, Chris. 2004. "Quid pro Quo: The Challenges of International Strategic Intelligence Cooperation." *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 17(4): 601–13.

Comprehensive Political Guidance. 2006. Comprehensive Political Guidance https://www.nato.?nt/cps/en/natol?ve/off?c?al_texts_56425.htm? (November 5, 2018).

Consultation, Command and Control Board (C3B) C3 Taxonomy Baseline 2.0. 2016. AC/322-D(2016)0017.

Cordesman, Anthony H. 2018. *NATO and the Claim the U.S. Bears 70% of the Burden: A False and Dysfunctional Approach to Burdensharing*. https://www.csis.org/analysis/nato-burden-sharing-need-strategy- (February 24, 2019).

Cornish, Paul. 2004. "NATO: The Practice and Politics of Transformation." *International Affairs* 80(1): 63–74. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3569294%5Cnhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3569294.pdf?acceptTC=true.

Coryn, Chris L.S., and Kristin A. Hobson. 2011. "Using Nonequivalent Dependent Variables to Reduce Internal Validity Threats in Quasi-Experiments: Rationale, History, and Examples From Practice." In *Really New Directions in Evaluation: Young Evaluators' Perspectives.*

New Directions for Evaluation, ed. Sandra Mathison. Jossey-Bass, 31–39.

Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2011-2018). 2019. PR/CP(2018)091 https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_03/190314-pr2018-34-eng.pdf (August 2, 2019).

Deni, John R. 2017. *NATO and Article 5: The Transatlantic Alliance and the Twenty-First-Century Challanges of Collective Defence*. Rowman & Littlefield.

Dinev Ivanov, Ivan. 2010. "The Relevance of Heterogeneous Clubs in Explaining Contemporary NATO Politics." *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 8(4): 337–61. http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rjts20 (October 24, 2018).

"DW News: French President Macron Calls NATO 'Brain Dead.'" 2019. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k_aTptPJPes (December 2, 2019).

Ek, Carl W. 2008. CRS Report for Congress *NATO ' s Prague Capabilities Commitment*.

Ergen, Sabri. 2011. "Interview with Sabri Ergen, Head of Counter Terrorism Department, ESC about Terrrorism and NATO Priorities." https://www.nato.nt/cps/ua/natohq/opnons_81112.htm?selectedLocale=en (November 4, 2018).

Erlanger, Steven. 2019. "Merkel and Macron Publicly Clash Over NATO." *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/23/world/europe/nato-france-germany.html (December 3, 2019).

Factsheet: Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund. 2018. www.nato.int (April 14, 2019).

———. 2019. www.nato.int.

Factsheet: Key NATO & Allied Exercises. 2015. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_05/20170510_1705-factsheet_exercises_en.pdf (May 11, 2019).

———. 2016. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_05/20170510_1705-factsheet_exercises_en.pdf (August 5, 2017).

Factsheet: Key NATO and Allied Multinational Exercises. 2018. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_02/1902-

factsheet_exercises_en.pdf (December 1, 2018).

Factsheet: Warsaw Summit Key Decisions. 2017. NATO Public Diplomacy Division https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_02/20170206_1702-factsheet-warsaw-summit-key-en.pdf.

Fernandez, C, and P.S. Thiagarajan. 1984. "D-Continuous Causal Nets: A Model of Non-Sequential Processes." *Theoretical Computer Science* 28: 171–96. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/82669326.pdf (July 3, 2019).

Ferrier, Ilay A. D. 2017. "NATO Strategic Level Political Military Crisis Management Exercising – History and Challenges." In *Military Exercises: Political Messaging and Strategic Impact*, NATO Defense College 'NDC Forum Papers Series, eds. Beatrice Heuser, Tormod Heier, and Guillaume Lasconjarias. DeBooks Italia, 141–63.

Fioretos, Orfeo. 2011. "Historical Institutionalism in International Relations." *International Organization* 65(2): 367–99.

Fligstein, Alec Stone Sweet; Wayne Sandholtz; Neil. 2001. *The Instituionalization of Europe*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Flyvbjerg, Bent. 2006. "Five Misunderstandings about Case-Study Research." *Qualitative Inquiry* 12(2): 219–45.

Gerring, John. 2004. "What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?" *American Political Science Review* 98(2): 341–54. http://people.ucalgary.ca/~nmstuewe/CaseStudy/pdf/whatisacasestudy.pdf.

Gobbi, Francesco Pontiroli. 2013. *NATO in the Aftermath of the Financial Crisis*.

De Graaff, Bob. 2017. "NATO Intelligence At the Crossroads of Informal Intelligence Sharing and Institutional Streamlining." *Atlantisch Perspectief* 41(6): 4-5–6. https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/374924 (August 16, 2019).

Gruszczak, Artur. 2018. Global Security Organization *NATO's Intelligence Adaptation Challange*. Krakow. www.globsec.org (October 24, 2018).

Gürcan, Metin. 2018. "NATO's Relevancy in the Southern Flank: Myth or Reality?" In *Hub or Spoke? NATO's Role in Allied Projecting Stability Effforts on the Southern Flank*, , 15–16.

Haesebrouck, Tim. 2017. "NATO Burden Sharing in Libya: A Fuzzy Set Qualitative

Comparative Analysis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61(10): 2235–61.

Hak, Tony, and Jan Dul. 2012. "Pattern Matching" eds. Albert J. Mills, Gabrielle Durepos, and Elden Wieb. *Encyclopedia of Case Study Research*: 80–82.

Hall, Peter A., and Rosemary C.R. Taylor. 1996. "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms." *Political studies* 44(5): 936–57. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00343.x/full.

Hallams, Ellen, Luca Ratti, and Ben Zyla. 2013a. "Conclusion – 9/11: A Systemic or Paradigm Shift for NATO? Conclusion – 9/11: A Systemic or Paradigm Shift for NATO?" In *New Security Challanges Series: NATO beyond 9/11 The Transformation of the Atlantic Alliance*, ed. Ellen; Luca Ratti; Benjamin Zyla Hallams. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hallams, Ellen, Luca Ratti, and Benjamin Zyla. 2013b. *New Security Challanges*.

Hallams, Ellen, and Benjamin Schreer. 2012. "Towards a 'post-American' Alliance? NATO Burden-Sharing after Libya." *International Affairs* 88(2): 313–27. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41428608.

Hellmann, Gunther, and Reinhard Wolf. 1993. "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO." *Security Studies* 3(1): 3–43.

Hemmer, Christopher, and Peter J. Katzenstein. 2002. "Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism." *International Organization* 56(3): 575–607. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3078589.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A2a5c5781aa58c92aa8de8b148114efae (March 2, 2019).

Henius, Jakob, and Jacopo Leone McDonald. 2012. *Smart Defense: A Critical Appraisal*. Rome. http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=378.

Herbert, Anne L. 1996. "Cooperation in International Relations: A Comparison of Keohane, Haas and Franck." *Berkeley Journal of International Law* 14(1): 222–36.

Hira, Anil, and Ron Hira. 2000. "Contradictory Notions of Change." *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 59(2): 267–82. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3487905%5Cnhttp://about.jstor.org/terms.

Hoffman, Bruce, Kévin Jackson, Bruce Hoffman, and Tim Lister. 2016. "Terrorism Challenges

for the Trump Administration." 9(11).

Huntington, Samuel P. 1965. "Political Development and Political Decay." *World Politics* 17(3): 386–430.

———. 1968. Yale University *Political Order in Changing Societies*. http://www.brandonkendhammer.com/challenges_of_democratization/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Huntington-1968.pdf (May 1, 2019).

———. 1973. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. 7th. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/gov2126/files/huntington_political_order_changing_soc.pdf (February 8, 2019).

Ikenberry, G John. 2001. "The Problem of Order." In *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 3–19. http://catdir.loc.gov/catdir/samples/prin031/00034681.pdf (April 21, 2019).

"ISAF's Mission in Afghanistan 2001-2014 Archived." https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69366.htm (August 4, 2019).

ISIS Europe Briefing Note. 2010. European Security Review *NATO's New Division: A Serious Look at 'Emerging Security Challenges' or an Attempt at Shoring up Relevance and Credibility?*

Istanbul Summit Communiqué. 2004. NATO https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm (January 29, 2019).

James L., True, Bryan D. Jones, and Frank R. Baumgartner. 2006. "Punctuated Equilibrium Theory and Environmental Policy." In *Theories of the Policy Process*, Manchester University Press, 41–64. http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&btnG=Search&q=intitle:Punctuated+Equilibrium+Theory+and+Environmental+Policy#0%5Cnhttp://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&btnG=Search&q=intitle:Punctuated+equilibrium+theory+and+environmental+policy#0.

Jhonson, Gregory G. 2004. "Examining the SFOR Experience." *NATO Review* (winter): 3–5. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issue4/english/art4.html (August 15, 2019).

Johnston, Seth. 2017. Modern War Institute *No Longer Obsolete: How NATO Endures in the Twenty-First Century*.

Jones, J L; Giambastiani, E.P. 2004. *Strategic Vision: The Military Challenge*. Norfolk. http://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/events/2009/mfp/StrategicVision2004.pdf (January 29, 2019).

Jönsson, Christer, and Jonas Tallberg. 2001. "Institutional Theory in International Relations." In *Institutional Theory in Political Science*, eds. Guy Peters, Jon Pierre, and Gerry Stoker. http://portal.research.lu.se/portal/files/6355177/625444.pdf (May 19, 2018).

Jose Mendes Rego, Nelson. 2018. "Intelligence in Nato: Contextualising a Doctrinal and Structural Clash." *Revista de Ciencias Militares* VI(November 2017): 135–61. https://www.ium.pt/cisdi/index.php/en/publications/journal-of-military-sciences/editions.%0ARevista.

Kalligas, Kouris. 2006. "A Historical Institutionalist Analysis of the Security and Defence Policy of the European Union." University of Warwick. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/31195/PN07.018634.pdf (May 19, 2018).

Kather, Roland, and Hans-Joachim Gemballa, eds. 2009. "Deployable Joint Staff Element." *The Observer*. www.nato.int/lahd.

Keohane, Daniel. 2017. "The Anglo-German Addiction to American Defense - Carnegie Europe - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace." https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/71447 (February 23, 2019).

Keohane, Robert Owen. 1984. Princeton University Press *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

———. 1988. "International Institutions: Two Approaches." *International Studies Quarterly* 32(4): 379–96.

Key, Sean. 1998. *NATO and the Future of European Security*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Kfir, Isaac. 2015. "NATO's Paradigm Shift: Searching for a Traditional Security–Human Security Nexus." *Contemporary Security Policy* 36(2): 219–43.

Kirchner, Magdalena. 2018. Istanbul Policy Center *Hub or Spoke? NATO's Role in Allied Projecting Stability Efforts on the Southern Flank.*

Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. "The Rational Design of International Institutions." *International Organization* 55(4): 761–99.

https://doi.org/10.1162/002081801317193592 (October 24, 2018).

Korkisch, Friedrich W. 2010. IAS Reader: Center for Foreign and Defense Policy *NATO Gets Better Intelligence : New Challenges Require New Answers to Satisfy Intelligence Needs for Headquarters and Deployed/Employed Forces*. Vienna.

Kriendler, John. 2006. "NATO Intelligence and Early Warning." *Conflict Studies Research Centre* 6(13): 1–8. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/39988/06_Apr.pdf (January 29, 2019).

Kunertova, Dominika. 2018. "An Alliance Divided ? Five Factors That Could Fracture NATO." *Military Review* (January-February). https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2018/An-Alliance-Divided-Five-Factors-That-Could-Fracture-NATO/ (May 3, 2018).

Kupchan, Charles A. 1988. "NATO and the Persian Gulf: Examining Intra-Alliance Behavior." *International Organization* 42(2): 317–46.

Lazell, Jodie, and Elizabeth Hunter, eds. 2017. *15 Years of the JALLC*.

Levy, Marc A., Oran R. Young, and Michael Zürn. 1994. "The Study of International Regimes." *European Journal of International Relations* 1(3): 267–330.

Lisbon Summit Declaration. 2010. https://www.nato.int/cps/em/natohq/official_texts_68828.htm.

Locatelli, Andrea, and Michele Testoni. 2010. "Intra-Allied Competition and Alliance Durability: The Case for Promoting a Division of Labour among NATO Allies." *European Security* 18(3): 345–62.

Locke, Richard M., and Kathleen Thelen. 1995. "Apples and Oranges Revisited: Contextualized Comparisons and the Study of Comparative Labor Politics." *Politics & Society* 23(3): 337–67. https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329295023003004.

Von Loringhoven, Arndt Freytag. 2017. "Adapting NATO Intelligence in Support of 'One NATO.'" *NATO Review Magazine (Online)*. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2017/also-in-2017/adapting-nato-intelligence-in-support-of-one-nato-security-military-terrorism/EN/index.htm (October 13, 2018).

Maness, Austin. 2016. Unpublished Thesis , Master of Arts "NATO's Post-Cold War Relevance in Counter Terrorism." University of Kansas.

Maras, Marie Helen. 2017. “Overcoming the Intelligence-Sharing Paradox: Improving Information Sharing through Change in Organizational Culture.” *Comparative Strategy* 36(3): 187–97. https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2017.1338477.

March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 2013. “The Logic of Appropriateness.” In *The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy*, ed. Robert E. Goodin. , 478–89.

March, James G, and Johan P Olsen. 1984. “The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life.” *The American Political Science Review* 78(3): 734–49.

Martinho, Lara. 2019. Defence and Security Committee (DSC) Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities *NATO Exercises – Evolution and Lessons Learned*.

Mattelaer, Alexander. 2011. “How Afghanistan Has Strengthened NATO.” *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 53(6): 127–40. http://iiss.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=tsur20 (October 25, 2018).

McCalla, Robert B et al. 1995. “NATO’s Persistence after the Cold War.” *Independent International Organization* 8(3): 445–75.

MCCT. 2016. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_01/20160817_160106-mc0472-1-final.pdf (January 28, 2019).

McKay, James. 2019. “How Transatlantic Is the Trump Administration?” *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 17(4): 532–53.

Mehta, Aaron. 2018. “What Countries Hope to Get out of the NATO Summit.” https://www.defensenews.com/smr/nato-priorities/2018/06/12/what-countries-hope-to-get-out-of-the-nato-summit/ (February 24, 2019).

Military Committee Concept for Counter-Terrorism. 2016. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_01/20160817_160106-mc0472-1-final.pdf (May 19, 2018).

Ministers of Defence and of Foreign Affairs about the NATO and International Security during the Warsaw Security Forum. 2015. “We Want the NATO to Adapt toward 360° Approach.” *Casimir Pulaski Foundation*. https://pulaski.pl/en/we-want-the-nato-to-adopt-toward-360-approach-ministers-of-defence-and-of-foreign-affairs-about-the-nato-and-international-

security-during-the-warsaw-security-forum/ (August 18, 2019).

Moon, Madeleine. 2016. NATO Parliamentary Assembly Defence and Security Committee *NATO and the Future Role of Naval Power*. www.nato-pa.int (December 3, 2019).

Moon, Madeline. 2018. NATO Parliamentary Assembly Defence and Security Committee *Nato Special Operations Forces in the Modern Security Environment*. www.nato-pa.int (December 3, 2019).

Mora-Figueroa, Dagmar de. 2005. "NATO's Response to Terrorism." *NATO Review* 3(Autmn). https://web.arch?ve.org/web/20060913143531/http://www.nato.?nt/docu/rev?ew/2005/?ssue3/engl?sh/art1.html (April 4, 2018).

NATO- Declassified: For your eyes only. 2016. "NATO - Declassified: For Your Eyes Only." https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/declassified_138449.htm (February 24, 2019).

"NATO-Topic: International Military Staff (IMS)." 2017. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_64557.htm? (August 16, 2019).

NATO's Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism. 2002. NATO https://web.arch?ve.org/web/20050610194942/http://www.nato.?nt/?ms/docu/terror?sm.htm (July 28, 2019).

NATO's Policy Guidelines on Counter-Terrorism: Aware, Capable and Engaged for a Safer Future. 2012.

NATO's Policy Guidelines on Counter-Terrorism. 2012. NATO-Official Text https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/index.htm (November 8, 2018).

NATO. 2017. "Afghanistan National Army Trust Fund." www.nato.int/factsheets (August 29, 2018).

———. 2018. "NATO - Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work." https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/topics_49206.htm# (May 21, 2018).

———. 2019. "NATO, Summit Meetings." *Professional Engineering*. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50115.htm# (July 27, 2019).

"NATO - Official Text: Statement by NATO Defence Ministers." 2015. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_121133.htm (August 18, 2019).

"NATO - Topic: Allied Command Transformation (ACT)." 2018.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52092.htm (August 10, 2019).

"NATO - Topic: Countering Terrorism." 2018. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_77646.htm?selectedLocale=en (January 29, 2019).

"NATO - Topic: Defence Against Terrorism Programme of Work." 2018. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50313.htm (August 10, 2019).

"NATO - Topic: Education and Training." https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49206.htm (August 10, 2019).

"NATO - Topic: Exercises." 2019. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49285.htm (August 10, 2019).

"NATO - Topic: JISR." 2018. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_111830.htm (August 14, 2019).

"NATO - Topic: NATO Response Force." 2019. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49755.htm (August 10, 2019).

"NATO - Topic: Operations and Missions: Past and Present." 2019. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52060.htm (August 11, 2019).

"NATO - Topic: Report of the Committee of Three." 2017. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_65237.htm (July 21, 2019).

"NATO - Topic: Special Operations Forces." 2015. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_105950.htm (November 18, 2019).

"NATO - Topic: The Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T)." 2016. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50084.htm (August 11, 2019).

"NATO ' s Military Intelligence Community Meets in Ottawa." 2019. *NATO Newsroom- news*. https://www.nato.int/cps/ie/natohq/news_155071.htm?selectedLocale=en (August 16, 2019).

NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement: Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO. 2010. The Group of Experrts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2010_05/20100517_100517_experts

report.pdf (January 29, 2019).

“NATO Archives Online.” http://archives.nato.int/ (December 6, 2019).

NATO Handbook. 2006. Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division.

“NATO Member States Ranked by Military Strength.” 2019. https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing-nato-members.asp (February 23, 2019).

“NATO Press Release - 133.” 2005. https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2005/p05-133e.htm (August 17, 2019).

“NATO Press Releases.” 2006. https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/index.html (July 26, 2019).

“NATO Resolute Support | ISAF History.” https://rs.nato.int/about-us/history/isaf-history.aspx (August 4, 2019).

“NATO Review.” 2017. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2017/Also-in-2017/adapting-nato-intelligence-in-support-of-one-nato-security-military-terrorism/EN/index.htm (July 28, 2018).

“NATO School Oberammergau.” 2017. https://www.natoschool.nato.int/ (September 18, 2018).

“NATO Transformation : NATO Capabilities.” 2019. *NATO Multimedia Library*. https://natolibguides.info/transformation (August 8, 2019).

Neocleous, Mark. 2006. “From Social to National Security: On the Fabrication of Economic Order.” *Security Dialogue* 37(3): 363–84. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010606069061.

Nevers de, Renée. 2007. “NATO’s International Security Role in the Terrorist Era.” *International Security* 31(4): 34–66.

Noetzel, Timo, and Benjamin Schreer. 2012. “More Flexible, Less Coherent: NATO after Lisbon.” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 66(1): 20–33. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10357718.2011.637451.

North Atlantic Treaty. 1969.

“NRDC-ITA Exercises.” 2011. https://www.nato.int/nrdc-it/exercises/index.htm (December 6, 2019).

O’Neil, Andrew. 2017. “Australia and the ‘Five Eyes’ Intelligence Network: The Perils of an Asymmetric Alliance.” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 71(5): 529–43.

https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2017.1342763.

Oma, Ida M. 2012. “Explaining States’ Burden-Sharing Behaviour within NATO.” *Cooperation and Conflict* 47(4): 562–73. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0010836712462856 (October 24, 2018).

“One on One: Interview with Gülnur Aybet.” 2019. https://www.trtworld.com/video/compass/one-on-one-interview-with-gulnur-aybet-senior-advisor-to-turkish-president/5a6991f79e7a1c7449ddd51b.

“Operation Active Endeavour.” 2018. https://www.globalsecur?ty.org/m?l?tary/ops/act?ve-endeavour.htm (November 6, 2018).

Özkurt, Fatma Zeynep. 2013. “The Impact of EU Conditionality on Democratisation in Turkey: Institutional Transformation and Policy (Re)Formation of Minority Rights, Freedom of Expression, the Military and the Judiciary.” University of Nottingham.

Pearson, Lester B., Gaetano Martino, and Halvard Lange. 1956. *Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO*. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17481.htm (July 21, 2019).

Pierson, Paul. 2000. “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics.” *American Political Science Review* 94(2). http://urban.hunter.cuny.edu/~schram/Grad American/Overviews & Syntheses/Pierson.Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and Study of Politics.pdf (April 24, 2019).

Political Guidance on Ways to Improve NATO’s Involvement in Stabilisation and Reconstruction. 2011. NATO Public Diplomacy Division https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_09/20111004_110922-political-guidance.pdf (May 15, 2019).

Prague Summit Declaration. 2002. Press Release (2002) 127 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_19552.htm? (July 27, 2019).

Rasmussen, Anders Fogh. 2012. *Secretary General’s Annual Report*. https://www.nato.int/docu/sg_report/2012/sg_annual_report_2012_mob_en.html (December 9, 2019).

Rathke, Jeffrey. 2018. “NATO: Measuring Results, Not Dollars, in Transatlantic Security.” https://www.csis.org/analysis/nato-measuring-results-not-dollars-transatlantic-security

(November 13, 2019).

Rees, Wyn. 2007. *Transatlantic Counter-Terrorism Cooperation: The New Imperative*. e-book. New York: Taylor & Francis e-Library.

Rees, Wyn, and Richard J. Aldrich. 2005. "Contending Cultures of Counterterrorism: Transatlantic Divergence or Convergence?" *International Affairs* 81(5).

Riga Summit Declaration. 2006. Press Release (2006) 150 http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm (July 26, 2019).

Ringsmose, Jens. 2010. "NATO Burden-Sharing Redux: Continuity and Change after the Cold War." *Contemporary Security Policy* 31(2): 319–38.

Robertson, Lord. 2002. *Speech by NATO Secretary General*. Vienna. https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020614a.htm (August 15, 2019).

Romaniuk, Peter. 2010. "Institutions as Swords and Shields: Multilateral Counter-Terrorism since 9/11." *Review of International Studies* 36(3): 591–613. http://journals.cambridge.org.ubproxy.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=7832788&fulltextType=RA&fileId=S0260210510000653%5Cnhttp://journals.cambridge.org.ubproxy.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/action/displayFulltext?pageCode=100101&type=.

Rothschild, Emma. 1995. "What Is Security?" *Deadalus* 124(3): 53–98.

Rougé, Guillaume de. 2011. "The Future of the Alliance: Toward a Transatlantic 'Hub'?" In *Perceptions of NATO and the New Strategic Concept*, eds. Luís Nuno Rodrigues and Volodymyr Dubovyk. Amsterdam: IOS Press BV, 49–54.

RSM: Key Facts and Figures Troop Contributing Nations. 2018. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_09/20180903_2018-09-RSM-Placemat.pdf (July 15, 2019).

Rühle, Michael. 2003. "NATO after Prague: Learning the Lessons of 9/11." *Parameters* Summer: 89–97. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/Parameters/.

Rynning, Sten. 2005. *NATO Renewed: The Power and Purpose of Transatlantic Cooperation*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Sadık, Giray. 2016. "How Can Counter-Terrorism Cooperation Contribute to NATO's Strategic

Relevance." In *Selected Papers Terrorism Experts Conference (TEC)*, Ankara: Center of Excellence-Defence Against Terrorism, 114–28.

Sandler, Todd, and Hirofumi Shimizu. 2014. "NATO Burden Sharing 1999–2010: An Altered Alliance." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 10(1): 43–60. https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2012.00192.x.

Scheffer, Jaap De Hoop. 2008. "Towards Fairer Burden-Sharing in NATO." *Europe's World* Summer(9): 68–73.

Schmidt, Vivien A. 2006. "Give Peace a Chance: Reconciling (Not Three) 'New-Instituionalisms.'" In *National Meetings of the American Political Science Association*, Philadelphia, 1–37. http://sws.bu.edu/VSCHMIDT/documents/givepeaceachancefinal.pdf.

———. 2007. "Comparative Institutional Analysis." In *Handbook of Comparative Politics*, eds. Todd Landman and Neil Robinson. SAGE Publications, 125–43.

Science and Technology Organization Annual Report: Empowering the Alliance's Technological Edge. 2017. www.sto.nato.int.

Science and Technology Organization Annual Report: Supporting NATO Core Tasks. 2012. http://www.onr.navy.mil/Science-Technology.aspx.

Seagle, Adriana N. 2015. "Intelligence Sharing Practices Within NATO: An English School Perspective." *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 28(3): 557–77. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08850607.2015.1022468 (October 24, 2018).

Shadish, William R, Thomas D Cook, and DT Campbell. 2002. *Experiemental and Quasi-Experimental for Generalized Designes for Generalized Causal Lnference*. Boston - New York: Houghton Mifflin Company.

"SHAPE | Exercises & Training." 2018. https://shape.nato.int/exercises (August 3, 2019).

Shea, Jamie. 2013. "How Is NATO Dealing with Emerging Security Challenges?" *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 14(2): 1–6. http://www.ies.be/files/private/14) Shea - NATO Emerging Challenges.pdf.

Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1983. Formal Political Theory of the American Political Science Association *Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Instituions*. Chicago. http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/5498/institutional equilibrium and

equilibrium institutions.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y (April 24, 2019).

Sil, Rudra, and Peter J Katzenstein. 2010. “Analytic Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics: Reconfiguring Problems and Mechanisms across Research Traditions.” *Perspectives on Politics* 8(2): 411–31. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25698610.

Sillince, John A.A., and James R. Barker. 2012. “A Tropological Theory of Institutionalization.” *Organization Studies* 33(1): 7–38.

Snyder, Glenn H.. 1997. *Alliance Politics.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Sperling, James, and Mark Webber. 2009. “NATO : From Kosovo to Kabul.” *International Affairs* 85(3): 491–511.

Sprecher, Christopher, and Volker Krause. 2006. 43 Journal of Peace Research *Alliances, Armed Conflict, and Cooperation: Theoretical Approaches and Empirical Evidence*.

Statement by Defence Ministers on the Declaration of the Initial Operational Capability for Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. 2016. Press Release (2016) 018 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_127831.htm?selectedLocale=en (August 15, 2019).

Stoltenberg, Jens. 2018. *The Secretary General’s Annual Report*. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20190315_sgar2018-en.pdf (November 3, 2019).

Strasbourg / Kehl Summit Declaration. 2009. Press Release (2009) 044 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_52837.htm?mode=pressrelease (July 28, 2019).

Summit Declaration on Afghanistan. 2009. Press Release (2009) 045 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-39BCF687-70559886/natolive/news_52836.htm (July 28, 2019).

Terriff, Terry. 2013. “Déjà vu All over Again’?1: 11 September 2001 and NATO Military Transformation.” In *New Security Challanges Series: NATO beyond 9/11 The Transformation of the Atlantic Alliance*, , 91–117.

The Istanbul Declaration: Our Security in a New Era. 2004. NATO Press Release (2004) 097 https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-097e.htm (October 12, 2018).

The NATO Lessons Learned Handbook. 2016. Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre 3rd ed.

The NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme. 2015. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_12/20151218_151218-sps-eng.PDF (November 13, 2019).

The NATO SPS Programme: Annual Report. 2013. http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/SPS-Annual-Report-2014.pdf.

"The Transformer." 2015. 11(1).

Thelen, Kathleen. 1999. "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics." *Annual Reviews Political Science* 2: 369–404. www.annualreviews.org (April 24, 2019).

Tolbert, Pamela S., and Lynne G. Zucker. 1996. "The Institutionalization of Institutional Theory." In *Handbook of Organization Studies*, eds. S. Clegg, C. Hardy, and W. Nord. SAGE, 175–90. r: http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/423.

Tschakert, Andreas, Fernando Maçana, Hendrik Ensink, and Kyle Christensen. 2011. *Strategic Assesment of NATO Exercise Programme*.

Tuschhoff, Christian. 1990. "Alliance Cohesion and Peaceful Change." In *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions Over Time and Space*, eds. Helga Hafterndorn, Robert Keohane, and Celeste A Wallander. Oxford University Press, 151.

Underdal, Arild, and Oran R. Young, eds. 2004. *Regime Consequences*. Springer: Science+Business Media, B.V.

De Vaus, David A. 2001. *Research Design in Social Research*. London-Thousand Oaks- New Delhi: SAGE Publications.

Vinjamuri, Leslie, and Jason Naselli. 2019. "Brexit Makes NATO Even More Important for the Atlantic." https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/brexit-makes-nato-even-more-important-atlantic (October 24, 2019).

Wales Summit Declaration. 2014. Press Release (2014) 120 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm (August 18, 2019).

Wallace, Geoffrey P.R. 2008. "Alliances, Institutional Design, and the Determinants of Military Strategy." *Conflict Management and Peace Science*.

Wallander, Celeste A. 2000. "Institutional Assets and Adaptability : NATO after the Cold War." *International Organization* 54(Autumn 4): 705–35.

Walt, Stephen M. 2019. “Restraint Isn’t Isolationism and It Won’t Endanger America.” *Foreign Policy*. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/22/restraint-isnt-isolationism-and-it-wont-endanger-america-offshore-balancing-quincy-institute/ (December 2, 2019).

Warsaw Summit Communiqué. 2016. Press Release (2016) 100 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm (August 8, 2019).

Webber, Mark. 2009. “Thinking NATO through Theoretically.” In *ECPR Joint Sessions: Theorizing NATO*, Lisbon.

Webber, Mark, Ellen Hallams, and Martin A. Smith. 2014. “Repairing NATO’s Motors.” *International Affairs* 90(4): 773–93.

Webber, Mark, James Sperling, and Martin A. Smith. 2012. *NATO’s Post-Cold War Trajectory: Decline or Regenaration*. London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan UK.

Weitsman, Patricia A. 2010. “Wartime Alliances versus Coalition Warfare: How Institutional Structure Matters in the Multilateral Prosecution of Wars.” *Strategic Studies Quarterly* Summer: 113–36. http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA520747.

Wick, Karl E, and Robert E Quinn. 1990. “Organizational Change And Development.” *Annual Reviews Psychology* 50: 361–86. http://eujournal.org/index.php/esj/article/view/7939.

Xu, Ruike. 2016. “Institutionalization, Path Dependence and the Persistence of the Anglo-American Special Relationship.” *International Affairs* 92(5): 1207–28.

Yin, Robert K. 2009. SAGE *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. 4th ed. London: SAGE Publications.

Zucker, Lynne G. 1977. “The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence.” *American Sociological Review* 42(5): 726–43. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2094862 . (October 10, 2018).

Zyla, Benjamin. 2016. “NATO Burden Sharing: A New Research Agenda.” *JIOS* 7(2): 5–22.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of The Members of NATO

"Strategic Concept
For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation"

Adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon

Active Engagement, Modern Defence

Preface

We, the Heads of State and Government of the NATO nations, are determined that NATO will continue to play its unique and essential role in ensuring our common defence and security. This Strategic Concept will guide the next phase in NATO's evolution, so that it continues to be effective in a changing world, against new threats, with new capabilities and new partners:

- It reconfirms the bond between our nations to defend one another against attack, including against new threats to the safety of our citizens.
- It commits the Alliance to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilize post-conflict situations, including by working more closely with our international partners, most importantly the United Nations and the European Union.
- It offers our partners around the globe more political engagement with the Alliance, and a substantial role in shaping the NATO-led operations to which they contribute.
- It commits NATO to the goal of creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons – but reconfirms that, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance.
- It restates our firm commitment to keep the door to NATO open to all European democracies that meet the standards of membership, because enlargement contributes to our goal of a Europe whole, free and at peace.
- It commits NATO to continuous reform towards a more effective, efficient and flexible Alliance, so that our taxpayers get the most security for the money they invest in defence.

The citizens of our countries rely on NATO to defend Allied nations, to deploy robust military forces where and when required for our security, and to help promote common security with our partners around the globe. While the world is changing, NATO's essential mission will remain the same: to ensure that the Alliance remains an unparalleled community of freedom, peace, security and shared values.

***

Core Tasks and Principles

1. NATO's fundamental and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Today, the Alliance remains an essential source of stability in an unpredictable world.

2. NATO member states form a unique community of values, committed to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The Alliance is firmly committed to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and to the Washington Treaty, which affirms the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

3. The political and military bonds between Europe and North America have been forged in NATO since the Alliance was founded in 1949; the transatlantic link remains as strong, and as important to the preservation of Euro-Atlantic peace and security, as ever. The security of NATO members on both sides of the Atlantic is indivisible. We will continue to defend it together, on the basis of solidarity, shared purpose and fair burden-sharing.

4. The modern security environment contains a broad and evolving set of challenges to the security of NATO's territory and populations. In order to assure their security, the Alliance must and will continue fulfilling effectively three essential core tasks, all of which contribute to safeguarding Alliance members, and always in accordance with international law:

    a. ***Collective defence***. NATO members will always assist each other against attack, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. That commitment remains firm and binding. NATO will deter and defend against any threat of aggression, and against emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole.
    b. ***Crisis management***. NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises – before, during and after conflicts. NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts; to stop ongoing conflicts where they affect Alliance security; and to help consolidate stability in post-conflict situations where that contributes to Euro-Atlantic security.
    c. ***Cooperative security***. The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organisations; by contributing actively to arms control, non-

proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies that meet NATO's standards.

5. NATO remains the unique and essential transatlantic forum for consultations on all matters that affect the territorial integrity, political independence and security of its members, as set out in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. Any security issue of interest to any Ally can be brought to the NATO table, to share information, exchange views and, where appropriate, forge common approaches.

6. In order to carry out the full range of NATO missions as effectively and efficiently as possible, Allies will engage in a continuous process of reform, modernisation and transformation.

The Security Environment

7. Today, the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low. That is an historic success for the policies of robust defence, Euro-Atlantic integration and active partnership that have guided NATO for more than half a century.

8. However, the conventional threat cannot be ignored. Many regions and countries around the world are witnessing the acquisition of substantial, modern military capabilities with consequences for international stability and Euro-Atlantic security that are difficult to predict. This includes the proliferation of ballistic missiles, which poses a real and growing threat to the Euro-Atlantic area.

9. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and their means of delivery, threatens incalculable consequences for global stability and prosperity. During the next decade, proliferation will be most acute in some of the world's most volatile regions.

10. Terrorism poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of NATO countries, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly. Extremist groups continue to spread to, and in, areas of strategic importance to the Alliance, and modern technology increases the threat and potential impact of terrorist attacks, in particular if terrorists were to acquire nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological capabilities.

11. Instability or conflict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance security, including by fostering extremism, terrorism, and trans-national illegal activities such as trafficking in arms, narcotics and people.

12. Cyber attacks are becoming more frequent, more organised and more costly in the damage that they inflict on government administrations, businesses, economies and potentially also transportation and supply networks and other critical infrastructure; they can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability. Foreign militaries and intelligence services, organised criminals, terrorist and/or extremist groups can each be the source of such attacks.

13. All countries are increasingly reliant on the vital communication, transport and transit routes on which international trade, energy security and prosperity depend. They require greater international efforts to ensure their resilience against attack or disruption. Some NATO countries will become more dependent on foreign energy suppliers and in some cases, on foreign energy supply and distribution networks for their energy needs. As a larger share of world consumption is transported across the globe, energy supplies are increasingly exposed to disruption.

14. A number of significant technology-related trends – including the development of laser weapons, electronic warfare and technologies that impede access to space – appear poised to have major global effects that will impact on NATO military planning and operations.

15. Key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs will further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations.

Defence and Deterrence

16. The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The Alliance does not consider any country to be its adversary. However, no one should doubt NATO's resolve if the security of any of its members were to be threatened.

17. Deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our overall strategy. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.

18. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.

19. We will ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations. Therefore, we will:

- maintain an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces;
- maintain the ability to sustain concurrent major joint operations and several smaller operations for collective defence and crisis response, including at strategic distance;
- develop and maintain robust, mobile and deployable conventional forces to carry out both our Article 5 responsibilities and the Alliance's expeditionary operations, including with the NATO Response Force;
- carry out the necessary training, exercises, contingency planning and information exchange for assuring our defence against the full range of conventional and emerging security challenges, and provide appropriate visible assurance and reinforcement for all Allies;
- ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies in collective defence planning on nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces, and in command, control and consultation arrangements;
- develop the capability to defend our populations and territories against ballistic missile attack as a core element of our collective defence, which contributes to the indivisible security of the Alliance. We will actively seek cooperation on missile defence with Russia and other Euro-Atlantic partners;
- further develop NATO's capacity to defend against the threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction;
- develop further our ability to prevent, detect, defend against and recover from cyber-attacks, including by using the NATO planning process to enhance and coordinate national cyber-defence capabilities, bringing all NATO bodies under centralized cyber protection, and better integrating NATO cyber awareness, warning and response with member nations;
- enhance the capacity to detect and defend against international terrorism, including through enhanced analysis of the threat, more consultations with our partners, and the development of appropriate military capabilities, including to help train local forces to fight terrorism themselves;
- develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines, cooperation with partners, and consultations among Allies on the basis of strategic assessments and contingency planning;
- ensure that the Alliance is at the front edge in assessing the security impact of emerging technologies, and that military planning takes the potential threats into account;

- sustain the necessary levels of defence spending, so that our armed forces are sufficiently resourced;
- continue to review NATO's overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance, taking into account changes to the evolving international security environment.

Security through Crisis Management

20. Crises and conflicts beyond NATO's borders can pose a direct threat to the security of Alliance territory and populations. NATO will therefore engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilize post-conflict situations and support reconstruction.

21. The lessons learned from NATO operations, in particular in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, make it clear that a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management. The Alliance will engage actively with other international actors before, during and after crises to encourage collaborative analysis, planning and conduct of activities on the ground, in order to maximise coherence and effectiveness of the overall international effort.

22. The best way to manage conflicts is to prevent them from happening. NATO will continually monitor and analyse the international environment to anticipate crises and, where appropriate, take active steps to prevent them from becoming larger conflicts.

23. Where conflict prevention proves unsuccessful, NATO will be prepared and capable to manage ongoing hostilities. NATO has unique conflict management capacities, including the unparalleled capability to deploy and sustain robust military forces in the field. NATO-led operations have demonstrated the indispensable contribution the Alliance can make to international conflict management efforts.

24. Even when conflict comes to an end, the international community must often provide continued support, to create the conditions for lasting stability. NATO will be prepared and capable to contribute to stabilisation and reconstruction, in close cooperation and consultation wherever possible with other relevant international actors.

25. To be effective across the crisis management spectrum, we will:

- enhance intelligence sharing within NATO, to better predict when crises might occur, and how they can best be prevented;

- further develop doctrine and military capabilities for expeditionary operations, including counterinsurgency, stabilization and reconstruction operations;
- form an appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability to interface more effectively with civilian partners, building on the lessons learned from NATO-led operations. This capability may also be used to plan, employ and coordinate civilian activities until conditions allow for the transfer of those responsibilities and tasks to other actors;
- enhance integrated civilian-military planning throughout the crisis spectrum,
- develop the capability to train and develop local forces in crisis zones, so that local authorities are able, as quickly as possible, to maintain security without international assistance;
- identify and train civilian specialists from member states, made available for rapid deployment by Allies for selected missions, able to work alongside our military personnel and civilian specialists from partner countries and institutions;
- broaden and intensify the political consultations among Allies, and with partners, both on a regular basis and in dealing with all stages of a crisis – before, during and after.

Promoting International Security through Cooperation

Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation

26. NATO seeks its security at the lowest possible level of forces. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation contribute to peace, security and stability, and should ensure undiminished security for all Alliance members. We will continue to play our part in reinforcing arms control and in promoting disarmament of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, as well as non-proliferation efforts:

    - We are resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in a way that promotes international stability, and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all.
    - With the changes in the security environment since the end of the Cold War, we have dramatically reduced the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and our reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. We will seek to create the conditions for further reductions in the future.
    - In any future reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement to increase transparency on its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate these weapons away from the territory of

NATO members. Any further steps must take into account the disparity with the greater Russian stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons.

- We are committed to conventional arms control, which provides predictability, transparency and a means to keep armaments at the lowest possible level for stability. We will work to strengthen the conventional arms control regime in Europe on the basis of reciprocity, transparency and host-nation consent.
- We will explore ways for our political means and military capabilities to contribute to international efforts to fight proliferation.
- National decisions regarding arms control and disarmament may have an impact on the security of all Alliance members. We are committed to maintain, and develop as necessary, appropriate consultations among Allies on these issues.

Open Door

27. NATO's enlargement has contributed substantially to the security of Allies; the prospect of further enlargement and the spirit of cooperative security have advanced stability in Europe more broadly. Our goal of a Europe whole and free, and sharing common values, would be best served by the eventual integration of all European countries that so desire into Euro-Atlantic structures.

    - The door to NATO membership remains fully open to all European democracies which share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and whose inclusion can contribute to common security and stability.

Partnerships

28. The promotion of Euro-Atlantic security is best assured through a wide network of partner relationships with countries and organisations around the globe. These partnerships make a concrete and valued contribution to the success of NATO's fundamental tasks.

29. Dialogue and cooperation with partners can make a concrete contribution to enhancing international security, to defending the values on which our Alliance is based, to NATO's operations, and to preparing interested nations for membership of NATO. These relationships will be based on reciprocity, mutual benefit and mutual respect.

30. We will enhance our partnerships through flexible formats that bring NATO and partners together – across and beyond existing frameworks:

    - We are prepared to develop political dialogue and practical cooperation with any nations and relevant organisations across the globe that share our interest in peaceful international relations.
    - We will be open to consultation with any partner country on security issues of common concern.
    - We will give our operational partners a structural role in shaping strategy and decisions on NATO-led missions to which they contribute.
    - We will further develop our existing partnerships while preserving their specificity.

31. Cooperation between NATO and the United Nations continues to make a substantial contribution to security in operations around the world. The Alliance aims to deepen political dialogue and practical cooperation with the UN, as set out in the UN-NATO Declaration signed in 2008, including through:
    - enhanced liaison between the two Headquarters;
    - more regular political consultation; and
    - enhanced practical cooperation in managing crises where both organisations are engaged.

32. An active and effective European Union contributes to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Therefore the EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO. The two organisations share a majority of members, and all members of both organisations share common values. NATO recognizes the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence. We welcome the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, which provides a framework for strengthening the EU's capacities to address common security challenges. Non-EU Allies make a significant contribution to these efforts. For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, their fullest involvement in these efforts is essential. NATO and the EU can and should play complementary and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security. We are determined to make our contribution to create more favourable circumstances through which we will:

    - fully strengthen the strategic partnership with the EU, in the spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity and respect for the autonomy and institutional integrity of both organisations;
    - enhance our practical cooperation in operations throughout the crisis spectrum, from coordinated planning to mutual support in the field;
    - broaden our political consultations to include all issues of common concern, in order to share assessments and perspectives;
    - cooperate more fully in capability development, to minimise duplication and maximise cost-effectiveness.

33. NATO-Russia cooperation is of strategic importance as it contributes to creating a common space of peace, stability and security. NATO poses no threat to Russia. On the contrary: we want to see a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia, and we will act accordingly, with the expectation of reciprocity from Russia.

34. The NATO-Russia relationship is based upon the goals, principles and commitments of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration, especially regarding the respect of democratic principles and the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states in the Euro-Atlantic area. Notwithstanding differences on particular issues, we remain convinced that the security of NATO and Russia is intertwined and that a strong and constructive partnership based on mutual confidence, transparency and predictability can best serve our security. We are determined to:

    - enhance the political consultations and practical cooperation with Russia in areas of shared interests, including missile defence, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, counter-piracy and the promotion of wider international security;
    - use the full potential of the NATO-Russia Council for dialogue and joint action with Russia.

35. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace are central to our vision of Europe whole, free and in peace. We are firmly committed to the development of friendly and cooperative relations with all countries of the Mediterranean, and we intend to further develop the Mediterranean Dialogue in the coming years. We attach great importance to peace and stability in the Gulf region, and we intend to strengthen our cooperation in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. We will aim to:

    - enhance consultations and practical military cooperation with our partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council;
    - continue and develop the partnerships with Ukraine and Georgia within the NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Georgia Commissions, based on the NATO decision at the Bucharest summit 2008, and taking into account the Euro-Atlantic orientation or aspiration of each of the countries;
    - facilitate the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans, with the aim to ensure lasting peace and stability based on democratic values, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations;
    - deepen the cooperation with current members of the Mediterranean Dialogue and be open to the inclusion in the Mediterranean Dialogue of other countries of the region;
    - develop a deeper security partnership with our Gulf partners and remain ready to welcome new partners in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

Reform and Transformation

36. Unique in history, NATO is a security Alliance that fields military forces able to operate together in any environment; that can control operations anywhere through its integrated military command structure; and that has at its disposal core capabilities that few Allies could afford individually.

37. NATO must have sufficient resources – financial, military and human – to carry out its missions, which are essential to the security of Alliance populations and territory. Those resources must, however, be used in the most efficient and effective way possible. We will:
    - maximise the deployability of our forces, and their capacity to sustain operations in the field, including by undertaking focused efforts to meet NATO's usability targets;
    - ensure the maximum coherence in defence planning, to reduce unnecessary duplication, and to focus our capability development on modern requirements;
    - develop and operate capabilities jointly, for reasons of cost-effectiveness and as a manifestation of solidarity;
    - preserve and strengthen the common capabilities, standards, structures and funding that bind us together;
    - engage in a process of continual reform, to streamline structures, improve working methods and maximise efficiency.

An Alliance for the 21st Century

38. We, the political leaders of NATO, are determined to continue renewal of our Alliance so that it is fit for purpose in addressing the 21st Century security challenges. We are firmly committed to preserve its effectiveness as the globe's most successful political-military Alliance. Our Alliance thrives as a source of hope because it is based on common values of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and because our common essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of its members. These values and objectives are universal and perpetual, and we are determined to defend them through unity, solidarity, strength and resolve.

Appendix 2: MC Concept for Counter-Terrorism

NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE
COMITÉ MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

6 January 2016 MC 0472/1 (Final)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

FINAL DECISION ON MC 0472/1

MC CONCEPT FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM

1. On 21 Dec 15, under the silence procedure, the Council approved the new Military Concept for Counter Terrorism (CT). PO(2015)0733-AS1 refers.

2. This document supersedes MC 0472, 6 Dec 02.

FOR THE MILITARY COMMITTEE:

N. VÄLI
Major General, ESTAR
IMS Director
Plans and Policy Division

for Sir Christopher Harper
Air Marshal
Director General
International Military Staff

NOTE. This Final Decision Sheet is attached to MC 0472/1 as the top sheet. Page numbering of the complete document when this decision is attached is as follows:

MC 0472/1 (Final)	- Page 1
MC 0472/1 (Military Decision)	- 1 page
MC 0472/1	- 9 pages

Distribution: SDL Z, IS/OPS, IS/DPP, IS/ESC, Defence Against Terrorism CoE

NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE
COMITÉ MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

4 December 2015 MC 0472/1 (Military Decision)

SECRETARY GENERAL, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION

MILITARY DECISION ON MC 0472/1

MC CONCEPT FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM

1. On 3 Dec 15 the Military Committee endorsed MC 0472/1, MC Concept for Counter-Terrorism, a copy of which is attached at enclosure. MC 0472/1 is forwarded to the North Atlantic Council for their approval.

2. This document clears IMSWM-0424-2015, and all SDs thereto.

FOR THE MILITARY COMMITTEE:

Sir Christopher Harper
Air Marshal
Director General
International Military Staff

Enclosure:

1. MC 0472/1, MC Concept for Counter-Terrorism.

Copy to: SDL Z, IS/OPS, IS/DPP, IS/ESC
Action Officer: Cdr Kutka, P&C (5679) (TTE 151809)

MC 0472/1

MILITARY COMMITTEE CONCEPT

FOR

COUNTER - TERRORISM

Table of Contents

LIST OF REFERENCES

A. MCM-0080-2015, Strategic Commands' Update on Counter-Terrorism, 17 Jul 15.
B. PO(2015)0219, 2015 Joint Threat Assessment (JTA), 23 Apr 15.
C. A/RES/60/288, The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 20 Sep 06.
D. C-M(2012)0027-AS1, NATO's Policy Guidelines on Counter-Terrorism, 17 Apr 12.
E. PO(2014)0329-AS1, Action Plan for Implementation of NATO's Policy Guidelines on Counter-Terrorism, 30 May 14.
F. MC 0472 (Final), NATO Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism, 6 Dec 02.
G. AAP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, 29 Apr 14.
H. MC 0458/3 (Final), NATO Education, Training, Exercises and Evaluation (ETEE) Policy, 3 Sep 14.

PART I - INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

1. Reference A notes that terrorism poses one of the most immediate and asymmetric threats to the Alliance and its Members. Weak and failing states allow terrorist organisations to establish zones of instability along NATO's borders. Transnational terrorism not only poses a threat to the Alliance, but also creates long-term consequences for global peace and stability. Those consequences are increasingly the result of two main developments: instability in a number of weak states; and the prolific use by terrorist organisations of the Internet and social media to inspire fighters and supporters as well as to maintain a global terrorist network (Reference B).

2. The firm resolve of the international community to strengthen the global response to terrorism was highlighted at Reference C. In 2012, NATO agreed Policy Guidelines on Counter-Terrorism (CT) at Reference D. These Guidelines provide strategic direction for NATO's CT activities and identify key areas within which the Alliance should implement initiatives to enhance the prevention of and resilience to acts of terrorism. The focus will be on awareness, capabilities and engagement with partners.

3. The Action Plan for implementation of NATO's Policy Guidelines on CT (Reference E) was approved on 30 May 14. That Action Plan called for the development of a new military concept for CT to reflect the Policy Guidelines. This MC document is the result. It supersedes the Military Concept for Defence Against Terrorism (DAT) (Reference F) which was agreed in 2002 to provide guidance for a military response to terrorist attacks on NATO nations. That document set a framework for NATO's role in leading and supporting the full spectrum of operations for DAT, but its contents are no longer coherent with Reference C.

AIM

4. To provide an MC Concept for CT, focusing on underlying principles and potential initiatives in relation to Awareness, Capabilities and Engagement to enhance the Alliance's prevention of, response and resilience to acts of terrorism.

SCOPE

5. This concept establishes a framework, principles and guidelines to ensure that provision for CT is reflected coherently over time in the revision process of policies and plans across the spectrum of NATO's activities, including doctrine, training and materiel. It complies with Reference D and should be read in conjunction with other NATO concepts (including the Strategic Concept and Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence Concept) and other documents impacting on NATO's response to new security challenges (e.g. the Readiness Action Plan).

6. This document will be reviewed and revised as required by changes to the threat, political guidance and / or the introduction of new concepts or capabilities.

KEY DEFINITIONS

7. For the purposes of this concept, the terms Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism are defined as follows, with the latter being established as a new overarching term for all efforts related to preventing and fighting terrorism:

a. Terrorism. The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence**,** instilling fear and terror, against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, or to gain control over a population, to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives.

b. Counter-Terrorism. All preventive, defensive and offensive measures taken to reduce the vulnerability of forces, individuals and property against terrorist threats and/or acts, to respond to terrorist acts. In the frame of the NATO Comprehensive Approach, this can be combined with or followed by measures enabling recovery after terrorist acts.

8. These definitions are not NATO agreed and differ from those terrorism-related definitions in Reference G. A submission has been made to the NATO Terminology Office to update NATO terminology in line with Paragraph 7.

PART II – NATO'S MILITARY ROLE

PRINCIPLES

9. This Concept for CT is founded on three key principles:

a. Compliance with International Law. NATO will continue to act in accordance with International Law, the principles of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, International Conventions and Protocols against terrorism and relevant UN Resolutions provide the framework for all national and multilateral efforts to combat terrorism, including those conducted by the Alliance (Reference D).

b. Support to Allies. Although individual NATO members have primary responsibility for the protection of their own populations and territories against terrorism, cooperation within NATO can enhance Allies' national efforts to prevent, mitigate, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism. NATO, upon request, may support these efforts (Reference D). As an international organization, it has unique assets and capabilities to offer in support of Allies' CT efforts.

c. Non-Duplication and Complementarity. NATO will seek to avoid unnecessary duplication of the existing efforts of individual nations or International Organizations (Reference D) as it develops its own contribution to CT in a manner that complements those efforts.

10. Based on these three principles, the Alliance will focus coordinated and consolidated contributions to CT in three main areas: awareness; capabilities; and engagement.

AWARENESS

11. Awareness is an essential enabler for the planning, preparation and execution of all CT activities. NATO's military contributions will include:

a. Providing terrorism-related information, intelligence and assessments regarding Terrorism in order to enhance NATO's overall Situational Awareness.

b. Sharing relevant CT-related information with key outside actors, where appropriate and when it is militarily relevant.

c. Maintaining a system of terrorism indicators and warnings to facilitate early detection.

d. Promoting, through engagement and strategic communication, a common understanding of this CT concept and NATO's potential military contribution to CT as part of a broader international effort.

CAPABILITIES

12. NATO has unique military training, means and expertise which can contribute to global Counter-Terrorism efforts. Potential military contributions include:

a. Sharing best practice, expertise and information relating to capabilities relevant to CT. For example, NATO's work on airspace security, air defence, maritime security, Special Operations, response to CBRN, non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and protection of critical infrastructure is well established and may be useful to an effective CT response by the Alliance, international organizations and individual nations.

b. Maintaining existing capabilities and expertise (including NATO Educational Training Facilities (NETF) and NATO accredited Centres of Excellence (COE) and NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ)) applicable for use against the terrorist threat.

c. Ensuring that CT threat analysis, lessons learned and best practices are reflected in identifying and assessing requirements for emerging and future security challenges and in the update of present Capability Codes and Statements (CC&S).

d. Thereafter, ensuring that appropriate CT-relevant capabilities are developed and maintained in the short, medium and long term.

e. Developing standardized doctrinal work on CT in order to provide efficiency and interoperability in CT.

f. Maintaining advance planning activities related to this domain to facilitate potential NATO early commitment.

ENGAGEMENT

13. Optimal application of CT measures will require internal, interagency and international collaboration to ensure that overall effects are complementary, mutually supportive and synchronized.

14. Furthermore, NATO can support national and international efforts to counter terrorism via existing cooperation mechanisms[1]. Initiatives should concentrate on developing and implementing programs directed towards:

a. Assistance and advice to progress Defence and Security Sector reform and aid capability development.

b. Building Defence Capacity**,** implementing the guidelines of the NATO Security Force Assistance Concept, and providing Military Assistance as appropriate.

c. Providing education, training (Reference H) and opportunities for participation in exercises.

d. Promoting interoperability, including sharing of standards.

PART III - CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

CONSIDERATIONS

15. NATO's delivery of a military contribution to CT in line with the principles and framework established by this Concept will be facilitated by:

a. Wide understanding that military action alone will not be enough to counter the terrorist threat and that military operations must be implemented in a manner coherent with diplomatic, economic, social, legal and information initiatives.

b. Recognizing that military CT efforts are joint and combined operations.

c. Promoting internal coordination through the designation of dedicated CT Points of Contact (POCs) in NATO's Command and Force Structures' (NCS and NFS) key assigned activities.

d. Ensuring that military contributions receive timely support in the form of external expertise, knowledge and analysis, as required.

16. In order to provide an effective military contribution to CT efforts, NATO must be capable of delivering a wide spectrum of CT-related capabilities across the different domains (physical, virtual and psychological) and operating environments, including those relevant to Hybrid Warfare, Protection of Critical Infrastructure, CBRN, Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED), Counter Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Cyber Defence, Special Operations etc. NATO may play either a leading or a supporting role, as required. Allies' capabilities will represent an essential component of potential CT responses. Maintaining flexibility will be key to an effective response.

[1] Such as Partnership Interoperability Initiative (PII)/Interoperability Platform (IP), Enhanced Opportunities Partners (EOP) and Defence and related security Capacity Building (DCB) initiative

CONCLUSIONS

17. This overarching concept establishes a framework, principles and guidelines necessary for the holistic and coherent development of NATO's potential contribution to CT across the spectrum of Alliance activities. That contribution is founded on three key principles: compliance with international law; support to Allies; and non-duplication and complementarity. It focuses on three main areas: awareness; capabilities; and engagement and recognizes the need for flexibility.

18. The concept must be reflected in policies, plans and doctrine as required across NATO that are relevant to counter-terrorism as those documents are reviewed and revised for comprehensiveness, coherence and completeness.

19. Internal coordination of CT functions and capabilities must be improved by designating CT POCs in key functional areas of NCS and NFS, and continuing to facilitate and foster existing efforts to enhance coordination and cooperation with external state and non-state actors.

20. As reflected in Reference E, NATO must continue work to improve threat awareness and preparedness, develop capabilities appropriate in a CT context and enhance engagement with partner countries and other international organisations.

21. This concept supersedes Reference F. It will be reviewed and revised, as required by changes to the threat, political guidance and / or the introduction of new concepts or capabilities.

Annex:

A. List of Abbreviations

ANNEX A TO
MC 0472/1

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CCS	Capability Codes and Statements
C-IED	Counter Improvised Explosive Device
CT	Counter-Terrorism
COE	Centres of Excellence
DAT	Defence Against Terrorism
DCB	Defence and related security Capacity Building
EOP	Enhanced Opportunities Partners
IP	Interoperability Platform
JTA	Joint Threat Assessment
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NCS	NATO Command Structure
NETF	NATO Educational Training Facilities
NFS	NATO Force Structure
NSHQ	NATO Special Operations Headquarters
PII	Partnership Interoperability Initiative
POC	Point of Contact
RAP	Readiness Acton Plan
UN	United Nations
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

Appendix 3: NATO and Allied Military Exercises

ILLUSTRATIVE LIST - NATO AND ALLIED MILITARY EXERCISES			
EXERCISE NAME	YEAR	SCOPE	FORM
Exercise Strong Resolve	2002	Crisis Response	LIVEX
Exercise Dynamic Mix	2002	Crisis Response, Collective Defence, Humanitarian	Comp Assist. LIVEX
Exercise Light Ship	2002	Art V. Peace Support Humanitarian Crisis	LIVEX
Exercise Allied Action	2003	Crisis Response (out-of-area scenario beyond the territories)	LIVEX
Exercise Dacia	2003	Crisis Response (direct emphasis on CT)	CPX (no actual forces deployed)
Exercise Sharp Dagger	2003	Assimetric Threats	CPX (no actual forces deployed)
Exercise Allied Warrior	2004	Crisis Response CBRN	CPX (no actual forces deployed)
Exercise Eagle Blade	2006	Crisis Response, Hybrid Scenario (regional conflicts & non-state threat)	LIVEX
Steadfast Jaguar	2006	Hybrid Scenario, Crisis Response, Out-of-Area	LIVEX
Excercise Noble Manta	2006	Submarine direct emphasis on defense against terrorism	LIVEX
Steadfast Jackpot	2007	Out-of-Area, Hybrid Scenario	CPX (no actual forces deployed)
Excercise Noble Manta	2007	Submarine & direct emphasis on defense against terrorism	LIVEX
Exercise Eagle Recce	2008	Out-of-Area, CT	CPX (no actual forces deployed)
Loyal Ledyer	2009	Hybrid Scenario & wide variety of missions anywhere in the world	CPX (no actual forces deployed)
Loyal Mariner	2009	Hybrid Scenario & wide variety of missions anywhere in the world	CPX (no actual forces deployed)
Excercise Noble Manta	2009	Submarine & direct emphasis on defense against terrorism	CPX (no actual forces deployed)
Exercise Noble Light	2010	Crisis Response & Hybrid Scenario	LIVEX
Exercise Noble Manta	2010	Submarine & direct emphasis on defense against terrorism	LIVEX
Steadfast Jazz	2013	Crisis Response, Hybrid Scenario	LIVEX
Trident Juncture	2015	Hybrid Scenario	LIVEX
Trident Juncture	2016	Hybrid Scenario	LIVEX
Trident Jucture	2017	Hybrid Scenario	LIVEX
Trident Jucture	2018	Hybrid Scenario	LIVEX