

145534

**LANGUAGE, ORIGIN AND MIMESIS: A PARTICULAR READING OF THE  
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WORD AND IMAGE**

145534

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF  
GRAPHIC DESIGN

AND THE INSTITUTE OF FINE ARTS  
OF BILKENT UNIVERSITY

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF FINE ARTS


By

Çağrı Barış Kasap

December, 2004

“Here as elsewhere, to pose the problem in terms of choice, to oblige or to believe oneself obliged to answer it by a *yes* or *no*, to conceive of appurtenance as an allegiance or nonappurtenance as plain speaking, is to confuse very different levels, paths and styles. In the deconstruction of the arche, *one does not make a choice.*”

My italics - Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, p.62



“The work of art as world that gives birth only to itself...”


Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche- A fragment from the years  
1885-6.

I certify that I have read this thesis and that in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Fine Arts.




Assist. Prof. Andreas Treske

I certify that I have read this thesis and that in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Fine Arts.




Assist. Prof. Dr. Mahmut Mutman

I certify that I have read this thesis and that in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Fine Arts.



Assist. Prof. Dr. Murat Karamüftüoğlu

Approved by the Institute of Fine Arts



Prof. Dr. Bülent Özgüç, Director of the Institute of Fine Arts

## ABSTRACT

### LANGUAGE, ORIGIN AND MIMESIS: A PARTICULAR READING OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WORD AND IMAGE

Çağrı Barış Kasap

M.F.A. in Graphic Design

Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Andreas Treske

December, 2004

In the historical affinity of West, language has always been ‘erected’ as a construct of Idea (sign/presence/speech/logos). In this ‘logocentric teleology’ (Derrida), opposition between nature and institution, play of differences between symbol, sign, image etc. is a naïve conceptualization of representation, an uncritical opposition between sensible and intelligible, between soul and body proper and the diversity of sense functions. By the creative links found among various authors such as Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno, Gilles Deleuze, Philippe Lacoue- Labarthe, Jacques Derrida, and Jean-Luc Nancy, through the inscription of the below-mentioned keywords found in their numerous studies, this thesis is a theoretical survey of how the erection or the usage of language that has an absolute link with God’s logos that belongs to a particular history and time, can be deconstructed. As a prospect, it, further, will be promised that certain authors in the history of literature, who have been condemned according to their distance from the logos, instead of being rendered in passivity, can be studied by the pathway followed and developed by this thesis.

**Keywords:** repetition, difference, immanence/ image of thought, image, mimesis, dialectical thinking (whole and fragment)

## ÖZET

# DİL, ORİJİN VE MİMESİS: İMGE VE KELİME ARSINDAKİ İLİŞKİNİN BİR OKUMASI

Çağrı Barış Kasap

Graphic Tasarım Bölümü

Yüksek Lisans

Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Andreas Treske

December, 2004

Batı metafizik tarihinde, dil her zaman İdea'ya (işaret, şimdilik, konuşma/ses, logos) yakınlığı doğrultusunda kurulmuştur. Bu "logos-merkezci inşa"da (terim Jacques Derrida'ya aittir), kurumsallaşma ve doğa arasındaki terslik, sembol, işaret ve imge arasındaki farkların oyunu, temsil'i (representation) her zaman uslaştırılabilen ve hisedilebilen arasında saf, kritik olmayan, ve sorgulanmayan bir kavramsallaştırma olarak konumlandırmıştır. Bu konu üzerinde daha önce çalışmış olan Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe ve Jean-Luc Nancy gibi teorisyenlerin çeşitli çalışmaları arasında bulunan bağlantılar ile, bu tezde, logos'a yakınlığı doğrultusunda kurulan dilin, nasıl yapısöküme uğratılabildiğini ve bu dilin aslında belli bir tarihe ve zaman dilimine ait ve kısıtlı bir bakışa sahip olduğunu, üstte adı geçen teorisyenlerin çalışmalarına dayanılarak ortaya koyulmaya çalışılır.

**Anahtar Sözcükler:** tekrar, fark, içkinlik/ düşünce imgesi, imge, temsil, diyalektik düşünce (bütün/parça)

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I, highly, would like to thanks to my advisor Assist. Prof. Andreas Treske for his invaluable and unending support and intimate friendship all throughout my undergraduate and graduate years. Without feeling his practicality and trust, in the times of my uneasiness, I could never be able to write this thesis.

Especially would I like to thank to Assist. Prof. Dr. Mahmut Mutman for his preventataive advises and limitless help supporting and advocating my thesis without any returns or complim,ents. Perhaps, faced with the greatest man in my life, ineffable is my debt to him.

Particularly, I, also, would like to thank to Zafer Aracagök for his solemn heart of forgiving the most unforgivable, which, in return, has taught me indeterminable lessons.

I, also, owe thanks to all of my friends who, consciously or unconsciously, contributed many points to this thesis - especially the ones who listened to my long 'monologues'.

Last but not least, I feel especially debtful to my family for their life-time support and patience of waiting 'to make a man' out of me all along those twenty-four years.

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

*REAAW*: Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings

*AT*: Aesthetic Theory

*TMPP*: Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy and Politics

*DAR*: Difference and Repetition

*WIP*: What is Philosophy?



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>1. INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1. Research Problem and A Note on Authorship.....	1
1.2. Introduction to the Conceptual Framework.....	3
1.3. Related Terms and Concepts .....	4
1.4. Summary of the chapters and the Prospect.....	7
<b>2. THE STAG/E/ING OF LANGUAGE: THE WORD AS IDEA/IMAGE</b>	<b>12</b>
2.1. The Western Metaphysical Procedure: Idea as Erection, Fiction, Style and Signature .....	12
2.2. Onomatopoeia and the Difference/Similarity of Languages .....	23
2.3. The Move of Mimesis from the Same to the Similar .....	29
<b>3. THE RUPTURE: WHAT REPEATS, WHAT DIFFERS</b>	<b>32</b>
3.1 Telos: Adorno's Discourse on Mimesis and Art.....	33
3.1.1. Repetition: Myth and Self-Sacrifice / Self-Preservation .....	33
3.1.2. The Scene of Aesthetics: Mimesis from the Similar to the Same.....	36
3.2 Affirmation of the Excess: Deleuze's discourse on Mimesis and Art .	54
3.2.1. Image of Thought and Plane of Immanence .....	54
3.2.2. Difference for Itself and Repetition in Itself .....	63
<b>4. THE HETERO-TEXT WRITING ITSELF:</b>	<b>74</b>
4.1. Onto/Phenomeno/Typo/Ideo-logical Writing .....	74



4.2. Writing In General and the break of Idea/Word: “ <i>the play of the world...</i> ” .....	89
4.3 Shattering the Play of Articulations: Literary Communism and Compearance .....	97
<b>4. CONCLUSION</b>	<b>116</b>
<b>REFERENCES</b>	<b>125</b>



# 1. INTRODUCTION

## 1.1. Research Problem and A Note on Authorship

The aim of this thesis is a survey and a strategic reading of the given keywords through various authors of critical theory. The problems of language due to what we understand of it, what we do when we manipulate its reality and its idea/image and its relation with its idea as its origin, will occupy the scope of this inquiry. The intention of a 'subject' behind the language, approximated to truth and presence in originarity, who is supposed to use it as managed by the traditional view on language and how some recent critical theorists had tried to 'deconstruct' this tradition will be pursued further. In the long history of language as the constructive element of literature, there have been various writers that have not been analyzed through the theoretical pathways that will be given in this thesis. The pathway that is prospected to be opened by this thesis without a distinction of depth and surface here is also the pathway that is exercised by these authors. It is announced by leaving a crack in the text in order to avoid the matrix of any onto-pheno-epistemo-logy. Although the scope of this thesis will not let them be analyzed either, it will ask for a lot of future analyses to be done through this pathway.

The reason why this thesis itself is a gathering together of various authors' theories by a reading through the keywords and not a thesis that is in the claim of the possession of its own truth content is in itself what this thesis is already trying to problematize in its *archeological* genealogy (in the Nietzschean sense of the term). What has implied this strategy is not the hubris of the author of this thesis but on the very contrary, his very 'non-stance'. Resonated in Derrida's words; "Even before being determined as human (with all the distinctive characteristics that have always been

attributed to man and the entire system of significations that they imply) or nonhuman, the *grammé* –or the grapheme- would thus name the element. An element, whether it is understood as the medium or as the irreducible atom, of the arche-synthesis in general, of what one must forbid oneself to define within the system of oppositions of metaphysics, of what consequently one should not even call experience in general, that is to say the origin of *meaning in general*” (Derrida, *Of Grammatology* 9). The outcome effect of such a strategy of course had imposed to use long quotations. Another intention of this strategy has been to abandon the ‘presence’ of the author as much as possible, to be as objective as possible instead of a free ride with the object up until it would ‘resemblance’ the author (subject). One should wonder with what other intention, Walter Benjamin would ever think of writing a book that was composed of just quotations and nothing more. In other words, ‘this’ author has not chosen to be the slave of what he has been doing. However, it, also should be given here that it is never a superfluous emphasis on ‘objectivity’ which still is implacable in a metaphysical systemization, to be planned carefully but never reached at its limit.

The other main motive was inspired by Nietzsche and what he has written in his polemic against the long error of metaphysics in *The Twilight of Idols*: “the distinctive marks that have been considered as the real essence of things are the distinctive marks of non-being, *of nothingness*”. Caught up in laboriously constructing this nothingness, we do not notice that in the meantime language has become a planet of which we only see the dark side. And that the judgment we render upon it is nothing other than the *logos*, the reunion of the word and the thing that it stands for (which it only can ‘name’ as its ‘shadow’ or should, in fact, name as its ‘phantom’ in Plato’s lexicon). Moreover, becoming aware of its shadow, language immediately receives its own negation in itself

and in order to bridge the gap that used to separate it from criticism, it itself becomes the *logos* of its names and its shadow. This is what we usually name as the 'critical reflection' on language. In the modern epoch of language starting from its first ontological determinations in Plato's writings, it is the critical reflection that lays bare its own split, thus suppressing and rendering superfluous its own space.

## 1.2. Introduction to the Conceptual Framework

What appears to be the judgment of language – as that what we impose upon it to alienate it in its absolute otherness until it is caught and made familiar to our sameness - has led us to the radical alienation of language; even to the extent that 'nature' had been inscribed within this limit. Language has to turn into nature and nature has to be brought to the 'mimesis' of language as God's 'writing'. The attempt of the establishment of 'language of art' is probably guiltier in that respect than every other language. The term 'writing' belongs to Jacques Derrida; "For some time now, as a matter of fact, here and there, by a gesture and for motives that are profoundly necessary, whose degradation is easier to denounce than it is to disclose their origin, one says "language" for action, movement, thought, reflection, consciousness, unconsciousness, experience, affectivity etc. Now we tend to say "writing" for all that and more: to designate not only the physical gestures of literal pictographic or ideographic inscription but also the totality of what makes it possible; and also, beyond the signifying face itself. And thus we say "writing" for all that gives rise to an inscription in general, whether it is literal or not even if what it distributes in space is alien to the order of voice: cinematography, choreography, of course, but also pictorial, musical, sculptural "writing"" (original quotations – *Of Grammatology* 9).

### 1.3. Related Terms and Concepts

To escape from the alienation of language, a number of keywords have been detected for the purposes of this study. 'Immanence' is the interiorization process of the subject as the user of the language. In the dialectical process which is always made 'immanent to something' (the scope of which will be given by Deleuze), in order to establish the language, the subject, first of all, should alienate himself, keep its image (as that 'something') away to negate it, so that he can construct himself back. In the encounter that constructs this split of the subject, language always works for the identity construction. The 'wholeness' of language, that is its image, should be alienated from the subject in his 'fragmentariness' up until the fragment turns into an annihilation of the subject himself. The mediation of language with God's word (logos) is what counts for this as Walter Benjamin will tell us. What accounts for dialectical thought is that any attempt against the demolition of the 'originality' (grammar, signified face, sound-pattern) should be relinquished. In fact, its 'outside' is not just an extra term but in many accounts, a necessary ground for its investigation, a model according to which everything else should be negated down in order to construct its own *telos* and identity as its inmost self. To experience the language, the subject must first 'differ' himself and learn to 'repeat' ceaselessly the content of the language. To assize the language as an idea in its totality is his task, to understand the voice of his own soul ('phantom' for Plato or 'Absolute Spirit' for Hegel) and hear himself speaking is his objective meditation in order to construct his identity. The subject's identity is related to difference in three ways. It is opposed to difference in general, insofar as difference creates the disparity or exteriority of being-outside-the-self, or insofar as it posits that otherness with respect to which the identical pulls together from and upon it. Identity

while pulling itself together supposes and reabsorbs within itself the differences that constitute itself: both its difference from its other and its difference from itself in the movement of grasping itself. In this immanence to its other, identity *makes difference*. However, in the long error of philosophy to think in representations, Deleuze asserts that difference has always been thought as a *quality* whenever tamed in a symmetrical synthesis under the four iron collars of representation; 'identity in the concept', 'opposition in the predicate', 'analogy in judgment' and 'resemblance in perception', in all of which the irreducible difference (singularity) of the disparate elements of the 'whole' had always been tried to be excluded. In order to construct the orgiastic and infinite moral vision of the world as the 'image of thought', repetition is also figured as a matter of explaining the possibility of differences without concept and therefore must be defined in relation to the absolute identity. Thus, when defined under and in relation to the same concept, it has always been represented as the repetition of the same. The repetition of the same has always been 'represented' and mimed in 'time' by differentiating itself in the 'presence' of the present, and calling the future, the past and the 'present *as such*' from its self-localization.

If the subject cannot constitute its own identity through its use of language, in other words, if the identity cannot pass through the differentiation of the self, then as Hegel will tell us that he is forever to remain in a childish passivity. However, as Jean-Luc Nancy remarks:

"Passivity is not the state of an individuality constituted as identity. Passivity is individuality without identity, which is not the same as itself and cannot relate itself to itself. One can hardly say that a child is passive individuality: rather, it is individualized passivity, numerically detached as a distinct unity. But this unity "is" so to speak, only its detachment, only its being-detached; it is not yet even the same as itself, or it is so without entering into any relation with itself. Passive being is as much

being without difference as it is being completely different from itself, being disconnected in its being from its very being” (Nancy, *The Birth to Presence* 27).

Therefore the passivity of such a being is not a property of quality, or a form or state. It is the property of the absence of property, but this absence is not a lack either for the subject to return to itself after the contemplation of that lack. Nancy defines this property as an “interior individuality of the affective being” (27). However, this interiority is not to be the subject’s own interiority and thus not exterior to itself. Its *self* (where that interiority is conditioned) is a subject that differs from itself but that difference is not internal to the subject. This difference in the subject is not the difference of the subject and so it imposes *outside* the subject what is properly the subject’s interior. “The subject does not have this difference: it *is* this difference – in such a way, however, that the subject is not thus *its own, proper* difference but is, rather, different from that of which it is properly the subject” (28). Thus understood, the intention, here is not to call or underline passivity, either.

There have been certain authors who have turned themselves or have never ‘been born into subjectivity’; out of time, they had been investigated as the affective passive beings in the history of literature - William Burroughs, Jean Genet, Friedrich Holderlin, Stéphane Mallarme, John Keats – to give a few names. However, they are still cornered in a shelf of a library or scrutinized in traditional ways. Although the scope of this thesis will not let them be scrutinized either, hopefully by the theoretical path opened up by this thesis, it will further be promised that these studies could be developed.

#### 1.4. Summary of the Chapters and the Prospect

As a matter of consequence, where to start has also been another problem for this thesis. To construct one's 'plane of immanence' in order to make one's mind movement through an analytical methodology would always be the best way for academic purposes. However, as it has been shown by the referred authors of this thesis that mind, in fact, mind never works analytically, unless imposed from outside. Thus, in the first chapter of the study, Walter Benjamin's two essays 'On the Language as Such and On the Language of Man' and 'Mimetic Faculty' have been chosen as the theoretical orientation centers of this thesis. In his article Benjamin 'starts' with the problem of language in two theoretical declinations. These two theories of the language (the bourgeois and theological), for Benjamin, puts 'man' in a magically mediated alienation where the expression of his mental life only communicates his being as a mental construct but can unfortunately communicate nothing else. Overburdened with the task of naming, received from God's word (logos), man cannot cope or understand the language of music, sculpture etc., which are critical reflections in the constitution of nature. In the end, man is forever alienated from the nature as a topographic entity that should be constructed as an anti-thesis. However, man should also 'understand' nature, for he needs her reception; as much as he receives from her, he can construct such a language. Since that already constituted immediate mediation that makes man forever thrown from nature is concluded in the great sadness and mourning of nature where she is mute because named by man. However, even in the creation story of the Bible as the originary reference of the representation of God's word, given by Benjamin, in and through which nature's placement is also inscribed, it will further be discussed in this



thesis that Benjamin can never leave his ideas about the origin presupposed, constituted either as a 'whole' and unity against which the rescue of man can be found in the 'fragment'. Another article of Walter Benjamin, 'On the Mimetic Faculty' gives numerous other clues on this problematic. In this article, Benjamin's attempt is to discover microcosm through macrocosm (the fragment through the whole) and graphology as a 'positive science of linguistics' where the unconscious graft dropped on the paper by a person can be studied as an *icon*, a representation in the displacement of that person. Where the problematicity of Benjamin's argument lies, for the scope of this thesis is, his understanding of the graft as a 'similarity', a 're/presentation', as a 'mimesis' of the exemplary person. In other words, Walter Benjamin has always remained as a dialectician of immanence, a thinker of representation, entrapped in his mimesis (perhaps).

In the second chapter, a ruptured reading of the concepts of difference and repetition has been given. The aim of this chapter is to orient us to talk about the unanalyzed language of the authors who are in the claim of neither differentiating nor repeating themselves (or better; repeating themselves without the Sameness of a model). Another reference both affecting and affected by Walter Benjamin is Theodor Adorno, who himself has been an author who problematizes the concepts of difference and repetition. The aspect of this chapter will be Adorno's 'dialectically problematic' understanding of 'difference and repetition'. The concepts 'difference' and 'repetition' as two of the keywords of this thesis will help us later on to open up a space of the theoretical possibility of talking about a language that 'neither resembles itself nor its other as another language'; in other words, a language that neither repeats nor differs itself in the traditional sense.

Another significance of a reading of Adorno's *Aesthetic Theory* is to depict the exemplary attempt of how such languages of sculpture and music (of art, in general) can be employed and to where it might ever lead. Highly known to be the dialectician of super-negation, Adorno maintains a peculiar concept of 'becoming' at the end of his *Aesthetic Theory*, but by the problematical stance of this 'conceptualization', it will be shown that what Adorno, particularly, understands of 'becoming' inevitably falls back into the unconcealing or masking trap of dialectics. Moreover, it will be exposed that Adorno has never 'thought' of anything else than these points except the unthought in the thought, though rarefied, he has also, remained as a dialectician of metaphysics as much as Walter Benjamin, and has solely tried to employ an aesthetics that never breaks its links with the 'sublime' as idea/origin.

Another work of Adorno, co-written with Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* has been given in this thesis, in order to lay out the problematic view of Adorno and Horkheimer on 'difference' and 'repetition'. When the concepts of self-sacrifice and self-preservation of the modern bourgeois individual that has been lend down to us by the enlightenment thought as Adorno and Horkheimer claim, are seen through Deleuze's assertions on 'difference' and 'repetition', one will be able to see that the authors of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (including their various other works) should be seeing the subject as subjected to difference and repetition strictly in mimesis. The individual bourgeois prototype characterized in the example of Homer's Odysseus self-sacrifices in order to self-preserve himself according to a model which is given in their limit in the 'principle of equivalence', 'barter', 'cunning' or in the duality of the emancipation claim of enlightenment in opposition to the mythic world (the fundamental claims of both of which are in fact the same, as the authors try to show us),

the self-sacrifice which gives the endless and unbearable repetition of the self-preservation under the concept of the principle of equivalence etc. Although, the endless repetition that always works to preserve the self is what the authors of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* complain about, the scope of Deleuze's work will give the extension on how one can affectively and successfully repeat without the same concept or without the principle of equivalence that affix every value to the model of the Same, which always enjoys its tacit superiority.

In the fourth and the last chapter, the erection of the word as image in relation to the model will be deconstructed. In fact, Jacques Derrida, as the most well-known theoretician has already laid this out. In his peculiar concept of 'arche-writing', Jacques Derrida, criticizes Ferdinand de Saussure's 'science of linguistics' and asks for a science of grammatology (the legibility of which Derrida finds in de Saussure's work) that does not work by negation as a positivist science. "Writing is that forgetting of the self, that exteriorization, the contrary of the interiorizing memory, of the *Erinnerung* that opens the history of the spirit. It is this that the *Phaedrus* said: writing is at once mnemotechnique and the power of forgetting" (Derrida, *Of Grammatology* 24). Erupted as the 'outside' of the metaphysical tradition but as that which finds its roots in the model of that tradition as a 'parasite' (to use Derrida's word), it will further be pursued in this thesis that the unanalyzed authors have lived in the uncanniness of this break of the word as image and their usage of language have always already *become*. Later on, as will further be given in Jean Luc-Nancy's concepts of *compearance* and *literary communism*, these authors, has found their 'others' in themselves leading to shatter the sovereignty of the subjection and its presence and share the 'origin' (at-the-same-time-and-the-same-place) and paralyzed as unable to speak (or not understanding-oneself-

speak), have been breaching the play of articulations of words of language as images (in other words, as 'names'). As has been stated by Jacques Derrida;

“From the moment that there is meaning there is nothing but signs. *We think only in signs*. Which amounts to ruining the notion of the sign at the very moment when, as in Nietzsche, its exigency is recognized in the absoluteness of its right. One could call *play* the absence of the transcendental signified as limitlessness of play, that is to say as the destruction of onto-theology and the metaphysics of presence. It is not surprising that the shock, shaping and undermining metaphysics since its origin, lets itself be *named as such* in the period when, refusing to bind linguistics to semantics (which all European linguists, from Saussure to Hjelmslev, still do), expelling the problem of *meaning* outside of their researchers, certain American linguists constantly refer to the model of a game. Here one must think of writing as a game within language. (The *Phaedrus* condemned writing precisely as play *-paidia-* and opposed such childishness to the adult gravity [*spoudé*] of speech). This *play*, thought as absence of the transcendental signified, is not a play *in the world*, as it has always been defined, for the purposes of *containing* it, by the philosophical tradition and as the theoreticians of play also consider it [...] To think play radically the ontological and transcendental problematic must first be seriously *exhausted*; the question of the meaning of being, the being of entity and of the transcendental origin of the world –of the world-ness of the world- must be patiently and rigorously worked through, the critical movement of the Husserlian and Heideggerian questions must be effectively followed to the very end, and their effectiveness and legibility must be conserved. Even if it were crossed out, without it the concepts of play [...] will remain caught within regional limits and an empiricist, positivist or metaphysical discourse. The counter-move that the holders of such a discourse would oppose to the precritical tradition and to metaphysical speculation would be nothing but the wordly representation of their own operation. It is therefore *the game of the world* that must first be thought; before attempting to understand all the forms of the play in the world” (Derrida, *Of Grammatology* 50).

In the game of *this* world, to not become the *subjects* as entities of their own utterances, away from the phono-centrics-logics of logos; these authors, displaced by the *other* that, perhaps, they had found in themselves has lived in the *world* of that literal community and who cannot be regarded as authors in the classical sense of the term. To repeat: although the scope of this thesis will not let those authors be scrutinized, I am

hoping in my future studies to pursue this aim. Therefore, this study has to be regarded as a pre-conception of this pathway.

## **2. THE STAG/E/ING OF LANGUAGE: THE WORD AS EIDOS/IMAGE**

### **2.1. The Metaphysical Procedure: Idea as Erection, Fiction, Style and Signature**

In his article, 'On the language of Man and On the Language as Such', Walter Benjamin enjoins himself with the possibility and question of talking about a language and its theoretical understanding and more specifically with the possibility of talking about "[...] a language of music and of sculpture, about a language of justice that has nothing to do with those in German or English legal judgments are couched, about a language of technology that is not the specialized language of technicians" (REAAW 314).

For Benjamin, every expression of human mental life can be understood as a kind of language. Language acts when it communicates the linguistic being of things. However, for Benjamin, all language communicates *solely* itself. Like in the example of the lamp as the lamp in expression, the lamp in communication, there is a language of the lamp which does not communicate the lamp but the mental being of the lamp. Since the linguistic being of all things is their language which can even be described in the capacity for communication. In the medium language, all language communicates itself in itself.

For Walter Benjamin the mediation is the fundamental problem of linguistic theory, "[...] and if one chooses to call this immediacy magic, then the primary problem

of language is its magic.” (my underline - 316-7). At the same time, Benjamin finds another point in the magic of the language: its infinity.

“For just because nothing is communicated *through* language, what is communicated through *in* language cannot be externally limited or measured, and therefore all language contains its own incommensurable, uniquely constituted infinity. Its linguistic being, not its verbal meanings, defines its frontier” (original italics - 317).

In the realm of men, however, the linguistic being of men is their language. “Man communicates his own mental being *in* his language. [...] However the language of man speaks in words. Men therefore communicates his own mental being (insofar as it is communicable) by *naming* all other things” (317) However, for Benjamin, it is not only man’s language that names things, but rather just that we know no other language than that of man that names things. Therefore, it is the linguistic being of man to name things. However, undermines the point:

“To whom does man communicate himself? But is this question, as applied to man, other than as applied to other communications (languages)? To whom does the lamp communicate itself? The mountain? The fox? But here the answer is: to man. This is not anthropomorphism. The truth of this answer is shown in knowledge and perhaps also in art. Furthermore, if the lamp and the mountain and the fox did not communicate themselves to man, how should he be able to name them? And he names them: he communicates himself by naming *them*. To whom does he communicate himself?” (original italics- 317).

To reveal the bourgeois conception of language, Benjamin undertakes the belief in the view that man communicates his mental being through his language, because language does not happen through the names of things, that is, through the words by which he denotes a thing. Since the linguistic being of the language of man is what

defines the frontier of the language and not its verbal meanings, Benjamin concludes that when the language of man is ever put into the process of communication, it is the factual subject matter that can be communicated. And again, this is what the bourgeois view is:

“And the advocate of such a view can only assume that man is communicating factual subject matter to other men, for that does happen through the word by which he denotes a thing.[...] The other conception of language, in contrast, knows no means, no object, and no addressee of communication. It means: *in naming, the mental being of man communicates itself to God*” (original italics - 318).

Naming, as the sole basis of the language of man, communicates nothing, but only itself and – absolutely. Through the absolute wholeness of the language, “only there is the name, and only the name is there” (318). Through the difference and the comparison of human language where man is the namer and other languages, we recognize that through him pure language speaks. In Benjamin’s words: “Names as the heritage of human language therefore vouches for the fact *that language as such* is the mental being of man, alone among all mental entities, communicable without residue” (my underline - 318).

All nature communicates itself in language and so finally in man. Since God is the lord of nature and can give names to things, in this circular movement, the creation of God is completed; “when things receive their names from man, from whom in name can language alone speak” (319). To demonstrate this, by quoting from Bible Benjamin maintains that man deploys language, not as a means but as a ‘medium’ and thus, by calling the name as the absolute language, he speaks in name; “man is the speaker of language, and for this very reason its only speaker” (319).

Name, however, is not only the last utterance of language but also the true call of it. Thus in name appears the essential law of language, according to which to express oneself and address everything else amounts to the same. The mental entity of language only expresses itself purely where it speaks in name, that is, “in its universal naming” (319). Therefore, in name culminate both “the intensive totality of language, as the absolutely communicable mental entity” and “the extensive totality of language, as the universally communicating (naming) entity” (319). For this reason, the virtue of communicating the nature of language is also its universality, “language is incomplete where the mental entity that speaks from it is not in its whole structure linguistic, that is, communicable. *Man alone has a language that complete both in its universality and in its intensiveness*” (original italics -319).

After having stated these salient points, Benjamin, now, asks a question without any further risk of confusion. Benjamin’s concern now resides with the mediation and meaning of language. Since the mental state of being is identical with the linguistic, “then, a thing, by virtue of its mental being, is a medium of communication, and what is communicated in it is – in accordance with its mediating relationship- precisely this medium (language) itself.” (320). Within this tautology, actually, Benjamin makes his point to invalidate the bourgeois conception of language; if the mental being of things is already communicable, then the linguistic being of things cannot be identical with the mental. “*There is no such thing as a meaning of language: as communication, language communicates a mental entity, i.e., something communicable per se*” (original italics - 320).

The differences between languages (those of man’s and other languages) then varies due to media distinguished by their density of the two spheres of communication;



naming (communicating) and name (communicable). And yet, these two spheres are clearly distinguished but united and are found constantly interrelated in the language of man. The equation between the mental being and the linguistic being is of great metaphysical importance to linguistic theory, for it always produces a central concept: 'the concept of revelation', which always has waged a conflict between what is expressed and expressible and what is unexpressed and inexpressible. The more real and existent the mind, the more does it not let reveal the inexpressible. It also obscures the relation between mind and language. Its only formula is that the most rounded, definitive and therefore, the most existent entity ('word') is at the same time purely mental.

"Exactly this, however, is meant by the concept of revelation, if it takes the inviolability of the word as the only and sufficient condition and characteristic of the divinity of the mental being that is expressed in it. The highest mental region of religion is (the concept of revelation) at the same time the only one that does not know the inexpressible" (321).

In accordance with religion, through this conceptualization, the attention is only given to the highest mental being that rests solely on man and the language in him. However, objects Benjamin, that language is not only expressed in things themselves. This proposition also inaugurates that "the language of things are imperfect and dumb. Things are denied through by the pure formal principle of language - sound" (321). Things can be communicated through a more or less material community. For Benjamin, this community, like every other community, is immaterial and purely mental, "and the symbol of this [community] is sound" (321). The symbol of sound, which can only accord that purely mental and immaterial state of language, can only communicate itself through a less material community through its infiniteness and magic. Bible has already

expressed this: “when it says that God breathes his breath into man: this is at once life and mind and language” (321).

Two well-known arguments in Bible are (i) in the first chapter of Genesis; the first sentence above renders the language as “an ultimate reality, perceptible only in its manifestation, inexplicable and mystical” (322), (ii) the second version of the story of the Creation, also reports that through the God’s breath into man, “man was made from earth” (322), and is the only reference to the material in which God (Creator) expresses his will, “which is otherwise thought of as creation without mediation” (322). In the second story, the creation of man did not happen through word; God spoke and man got the *gift* of language and elevated above nature.

The phrase “He made” is open about the investigation of the creation out of material. But the rhythm by which the creation of nature is accomplished occurs through three phrases: “Let there be”, “He made (created)”, “He named”. The relation of the creative act to language is established by the two occurrences of the phrases “Let there be” and “He made” at the beginning (as ‘word’) and “He names” at the end (as ‘name’) of the first story of Creation. Therefore, language is both a creative and finished creation, it is both word and name. In God name is creative because it is word, and God’s word is cognizant in it through name. The absolute relation of name to knowledge exists only in God. Only there is the name, because it is inwardly identical with the creative word, which is “the pure medium of knowledge” (my underline -323).

In this tripartite rhythm of the creation of nature, language has different meanings. God did not create man from the word, and he did not name him. God did not wish to subject him to language, but set language in him. And this let man as the medium of creation “free to name” (323). It is this creativity that Benjamin mentions,

“relieved of its divine actuality, became knowledge” (323). Thus, through the same medium (that is, language), man is the knower/namer and God the creator.

“His [man’s] mental being is the language in which creation took place, and God’s linguistic being is the word. All human language is only reflection of the word in name. Name is no closer to the word than knowledge to creation. The infinity of human language always remains limited and analytical in nature in comparison to the absolutely unlimited and creative infinity of the divine word” (my underline - 323).

Thus, the theory of proper names (the names of man) is the theory of the frontier between finite (man’s) and infinite (God’s) language. Benjamin asserts that the “deepest image of this divine word” is the point where the infinitude of the pure word cannot become finite word and knowledge (323) since of all beings man is the only one who himself names his own kind, as he is the only one whom God did not name.

To destroy the concept of language of the mental being of man as an immaterial community where the things are denied by sound, Benjamin insists that through the word, man is always bound to material things. Thus the two views on the conceptualization of language fail. The first one is the ‘bourgeois view’ in the statement that a man names and that the word has an accidental relation to its object, “that it is a sign for things (or knowledge of them) agreed by some convention” (324). In fact, inserts Benjamin, “Language never gives *mere signs*” (original italics – 324). The second view as demonstrated by the examples from Bible is what Benjamin calls the ‘mystical linguistic theory’ and it maintains that the word is simply the essence of the thing. “This is incorrect”, maintains Benjamin, “because the thing in itself has no word, since it is being created from God’s word and known in its name by human word” (324).

The word of God is not creative in word but has aimed to give birth to the language of things themselves, “from which, in turn, soundlessly, in the mute magic of nature, the word of God shines forth” (my underline - 325). In this conceptualization and the spontaneous creation of the word, Benjamin reaches his main point; “language has its own word” and moreover, this conception is also enacted “by the nameless in names” (325). The question of translation intrudes in here, which for Benjamin is not a surprise to find at the deepest level of linguistic theory. The translatability of languages into one another can only be conceived “between media of varying densities” and passes through “continua of transformations” but “not abstract areas of identity and similarity” (325).

The translation of the languages of things into the language of man “is a translation of nameless into name”, “a translation of an imperfect language into a more perfect one” and can only add “knowledge” to it (325). The objectivity of translation is guaranteed by God, since he created things and named them later on, however, God’s name remains only as “an expression of the identity of the creative word” (325) and thus, a solution to the task of giving-names is alluded to man. Man does this task by receiving the soundless-nameless language of things and *naming* them with *sound*.

Otherwise, confusion would arrive, says Benjamin, to the extent that the same word had given birth both to the name-language of man and the nameless-language of God, would become the “communication of matter in magic communion” (325). Thus, in the previously mentioned contemplation of God’s naming (who names things but which are mute) and the naming of man (to make them sonic) is implied the communicating of the muteness of things (animals, nature) toward the language of man.

Thus, man cannot name things, make them sonic by himself unless God has already created them in muteness. The falling short of the naming act, and reciprocally, of the creative word of God, infers the multiplicity of human languages. Through translation, in which the passage of the language of things into the (language of knowledge, in other words, the language of man), man falls from the 'paradisiac' state "that knew only one language" (326). This paradisiac language was the perfect knowledge, but later, knowledge has been forced to differentiate itself in the multiplicity of languages "on a lower level as creation in name" (326).

The language-mind of men is blissful wherever it can state the muteness of nature. After God's word (logos) curses the ground, the appearance of nature changes. Its deepest sadness springs forth. "It is a metaphysical truth that nature would begin to lament if it were endowed with language. (Though to "endow with language" is more than "to make able to speak" (original parentheses - 329)). This proposition has two meanings, (i) she [nature] would lament the language; it would become speechless: "that is the great sorrow of nature (and for the sake of her redemption from the life and language of *man* – not only, as is supposed, of the poet – are in nature)" (original parentheses - 329). (ii) she would lament; "Lament, however, is the most undifferentiated, impotent expression of language; it contains scarcely more than the sensuous breath; and where there is only a rustling of plants, in it there is always a lament. Because she is mute, nature mourns" (329). When inverted into the essence of nature, Benjamin says that it is the sadness that makes her mute. To be named always resides mourning and what mourns always feels it thoroughly known by the unknowable.

It is God who called things into being by their proper names, thus their calls only have their proper names in God. However, in man, things are over-named. 'Over-naming' is the deepest linguistic reason for all melancholy and deliberate muteness. "To be named—even when the namer is Godlike and blissful- perhaps always remains an intimation of mourning" (330).

Then, Benjamin comes to his real and most prominent point; "There is a language of sculpture, of painting, of poetry" (330). His warning about this possible language of art is that it should not be a wholistic one, but fragmentary. If it would be wholistic, then this language would be a language of man where he again would start to name things. "For an understanding of artistic forms is valuable to attempt to grasp them all as languages and to seek their connection with natural languages" (330). However, the language of poetry is partly founded in the language of man, the language of painting and sculpture can likely be found in the language of things, in which "we find a translation of the language of things into an infinitely higher language, which may still be of the same sphere" (330). There are languages of art, of matter, of the nameless and of the mute.

If I am to remind what Benjamin said in the previous paragraphs; the communal communication of things in language is 'wholistic'. To grasp them in particularity, Benjamin alludes to seek their connection with natural languages. The best example is the "acoustic kinship" between song and the language of birds (331). In a dualistic analogy with previous example, Benjamin assigns the language of art with the doctrine of signs. Without this "original" and "fundamental" relationship, all linguistic theory would "fragmentary" (331). Moreover, this relationship also provides another antithesis. "For language is in every case not only the communication of the communicable but

also, at the same time, a symbol of the noncommunicable” (331). The symbolic side of language, which is what produces the mere signs, also, extends to judgment and name. And all of these aspects are what always renders language as communicable.

These propositions above, leave Benjamin with his very final (“purified”) conception of language, “even though it may still be an imperfect one”, to summarize all of his argumentation (331).

“The language of an entity is the medium in which its mental being is communicated. The uninterrupted flow of this communication runs through the whole of nature from the lowest forms of existence to man and from man to God. Man communicates himself to God through name, which he gives to nature (in proper names) to his own kind, and to nature he gives names according to the communication that he receives from her, for the whole of nature, too, is imbued with a nameless, unspoken language, the residue of the creative word of God, which is preserved in man as the cognizing name and above man as the judgment suspended over him”(331).

My concern with Benjamin’s essay is to take his last statements as my departure. Over it, I want to engage myself, first of all, with the problem of language as ‘idea’, what Benjamin refers as the mental being of man. Secondly, I want to lay problematical the statement of the mourning nature if ever constituted with language, which Benjamin, also rejects as a metaphysical truth but adds that she is sad because she is already named. What other kinds of mechanism are in work here? If nature has a language, what kind of a language would it be? Would we not always fall back to the trap of understanding nature through understanding oneself as a subject? And including nature within our subjectivity? Would it not be antropomorphic? Would be able to understand its radical otherness? Or would we treat it as a necessary topoi to construct the identity of the subject? And thus, is it ever possible to talk about a language of nature? Or could there be another view on language other than both the bourgeois and mystical theories that

would not let us engage nature either as *physis* or *topoi* at all? In short, Benjamin has asked questions that endure their telos in themselves, and leave the subject-matter still “pre-critical” when seen from Derrida’s point of view; because without constituting the nature/culture opposition, how could he even pose his question about the nature that is sad because it is named by man? And if such a constitution is ever done (surreptitiously), then how can he ever insert or ever repeat all those oppositions between nameless/ (in the) name, inexpressible/ expressible, muteness/sound, lower languages/higher languages, whole/fragment - although they all belong to metaphysics? If one can be permitted, in fact, this could be called (without the burden of equating calling and naming as one and the same thing) the ‘telostic’ view of Benjamin. Thirdly, I will ally with the concept of ‘mimesis’ in his entire outline of the theories of language, although, strangely, the word is not found in the essay. However, what Benjamin ever says about ‘mimesis’ is best draped in his essay ‘On The Mimetic Faculty’.

## **2.2. Onomatopoeia and the Difference/Similarity of Languages**

In an unsurprising manner, Benjamin opens his essay, ‘On the Mimetic Faculty’ with this sentence: “Nature creates similarities. One need only think of mimicry” (333). However, the highest capacity for producing those similarities is entailed to ‘man’, for Benjamin. Play is the fundamental trait of the history of this faculty and is clustered by two spheres; phylogenetic (related to the evolutionary development of history) and ontogenetic (related to the origin and development of the individual organism). To lighten an example, Benjamin alludes to children’s play, which is everywhere permeated by mimetic modes of behavior and the realm of this mimetic behavior is always limited



to imitation. However, in play, the child “plays at being not only a shopkeeper or teacher but also a windmill and a train” (333).

The historical view of the mimetic faculty that has been governed by the law of similarity, has ruled both microcosm and macrocosm. However, for Benjamin, this view is not enough to think of what we understand today and has changed within historical development. Although the ancients had different manners of using mimesis, we (moderns) have a canon that still enables us to create nonsensuous similarities; this canon is language. The role of mimetic behavior in language has been left without consideration; largely, it has been acknowledged under the name of onomatopoeia. If language is agreed to be not a system of signs (which Benjamin has already disproved in ‘On the Language as Such and On the Language of Man’), Benjamin’s reservations reside on the question whether the onomatopoeic mode of explanation could be developed and adapted to improve understanding.

Benjamin rejects the proposal that every word in the whole of language is onomatopoeic, for it is difficult to conceive in any detail the program that the proposition entails. If words mean the same thing in different languages, it must be shown what constitutes this similarity. And this relationship, for Benjamin, cannot be shown when stayed restricted to spoken words because they are equally concerned with the written word. The written word also illuminates a relationship with what it signifies in the sphere of nonsensuous similarity. This nonsensuous similarity not only determines the relation between the spoken and the signified but also “between the written and the signified, and equally between the spoken and the written” (335).

The exemplar phenomena where this relationship could be grasped best, for Benjamin, is graphology. The unconscious images created in the handwriting of the

writer expresses the utmost importance of the mimetic process involved. “Script has thus become like language, an archive of nonsensuous similarities, of nonsensuous correspondences” (335).

However, the scriptural aspect of language cannot be thought as isolated from its bearer; that is, its semiotic element. “Thus the coherence of words or sentences is the bearer through which, like a flash, similarity appears” (335). As a recourse to astrology, he states that the production of similarity is “limited to flashes. It flits past” (335). And this is why, for example, the rapid writing and reading can be considered as the fusion of semiotic and mimetic in the realm of language; “To read what was never written” (336). This proposition, for Benjamin, is the most ancient; “reading before all languages, from the entrails, the stars or dances” (336). This is so because writing is everywhere, all that has been written is driven to images in mimesis. That, again, is the reason why readings of hieroglyphs and of runes came into use to admit writing and language to the realm of mimetic gift. “In this way language may be seen as the highest level of mimetic behavior and the most complete archive of nonsensuous similarity: a medium into which the earlier [occult] powers of mimetic production and comprehension have passed without residue, to the point where they have liquated those of magic” (336).

Even though, Benjamin does not predict out any further points, in this article, one can detect the necessary points for the purposes of this study. For Benjamin, language is the highest level of mimetic behavior and nonsensuous similarity. He grasps writing as a representation here. Again, Benjamin’s assertions are still on the edge of oppositions such as macrocosm/microcosm, similarity/non-similarity. Further, while considering whether the graphology of a writing subject can still create a nonsensuous similarity of him(her)self, does he not fall into the trap of the same ‘teleological’ phenomena of all

writing? At the end, is this not a search for a similarity that at its limit would always reproduce the subject?

To demonstrate the constitutive relationship of 'idea' that Benjamin allies throughout the essay, I will go to the origin of the formation of language in Plato's *Cratylus*, for it is these relationships that Benjamin sees in his essay without saying. In the Greek expression for 'word' (onoma) means 'name' and especially 'proper name' - as the name by which something is called. A name is what it is because someone is called by it and answers back to the call. Thus, the word belongs to its bearer, to its being. What sets the background of Plato's *Cratylus* is the doubt of the philosophical inquiry whether the word can represent the thing that is substituting for it, or a talk about the unity of the word and the thing as the correctness of the words, be possible.

There are two different arguments that are present in *Cratylus*. One theory (one can call it the conventionalist theory or the 'bourgeois view' as Benjamin states) regards that the unambiguous linguistic usage reached by agreement and practice is the only sources for the meaning of words. The opposed theory holds that there is a natural agreement between word and object that is described by the idea of correctness. The following example given by Socrates is the case of 'special languages'. Children and lovers likewise have their own language, by which they communicate with each other in a world that belongs to them alone. It is not just because they have agreed on it but because a custom has grown between them even if it is a play world. Thus, the difference between two views is due to the production of the degree of the convention; for the first one, the agreement is the only source of meaning, whereas for the second one, the agreement is a natural bound. In any case, going with the lines of Benjamin so far, both of these theories start from the existence and instrumentality of words, 'as if'

we know the words 'fall' previously from an independent source. Thus, the limitation of the mimesis as looking for the similarity of the word and the thing is already clear in here. The word is correct only if it brings the thing to the presentation – if it is a representation (mimesis) itself. What is involved here is not just an imitative representation in the sense of a direct copy that depicts the visual or oral appearance of something, but it is the being that is to be revealed by the word. The word that names an object names it as what it is because the word itself has the meaning whereby the object intended is named, but that does not necessarily imply that the two should be mutually integrated as original and copy. The mere imitation (the Similar) or the *icon* always offers a starting point for reflecting the ontological gap between the copy and the original. Then, Cratylus must be right since he says that in as much a word is a word, it must always be 'correct' enough. A copy resembles the original but it is a different thing than what it itself represents. The truth of a word does not depend on its correctness but rather in its perfect intelligibility and absolute perfection as the manifestness which occurs in the sound that goes out of the mouth of the speaker. As copies, all words are true. As Socrates has put it that words unlike pictures, cannot be only correct but true. In Plato's writing, Cratylus is depicted to be almost a Sophist or as Socrates says as an excited youngsters who does not doubt enough, because he is unaware that the meaning of the words is not simply identical with objects named and furthermore less aware (and this is Socrates's superiority) that the manifestation of the things taking place in the word is something different from intending to contain what they are. It is the capacity of the dialectical procedure, in its discursiveness, to determine what is correct and true and what is false and wrong; or better to accept both of them but then choose the true one and exclude the false. Socrates's plenipotentiary is implemented by Plato's expel that the

adequate expression of a word is only used by the extent that it is used rightly or wrongly. This association is not just linked to the word but rather to the idea/model of the word (logos). As Benjamin has showed us, to name someone or something is to call (in the fall) that thing; for example, to name someone by a word Socrates is to call him Socrates.

Thus the relational ordering of logos is much more than mere correspondence of words and things as would also be deciphered when they are stated as copies. The truth contained in the logos is not the mere perception, not letting being appear, but rather it always places being in a relationship and assigns something to it. For this reason, it is not the word but the logos that is the bearer of truth. This is the conclusion that *Cratylus* is drawn into but it remains number of important claims for the concerns of this study.

If the sphere of the logos represents the sphere of the name, then the *word* becomes the mere sign that is defined and is pre-known. We are not starting from the thing and inquiring it into the being of the word. Rather, we are starting from the word as a means in itself and asking how it communicates to the person who speaks and uses it. By its very nature, the sign is plucked from its context and communicates its “self” to an “other”. It does not even need to have any similarity to its referent, which means again that its visible content is reduced to its minimum necessary function. The more a sign signifies, the more it gets to be a pure sign.

On the other side, within the lines of the copy theory that implies that words are *icons*, already copies of the Ideas, the situation is different. The copy implies the same contradiction between the being of a word and the meaning of a word, but it does so in such a way that it supersedes this contradiction within itself precisely by means of a resemblance. It does hold the function of representing the subject who uses it. As

Benjamin has already purported, it can never be a mere sign. For the thing copied is itself (re)-presented, caught by the tail and made present. That is why it can only be judged to the extent of a resemblance of the standard of a 'model', by and to which it makes present what is not present in itself.

However, the question whether a word is a 'pure sign' or something like a 'copy' or 'image' is what Cratylus discredits and against whom Socrates disputes. Although, Benjamin's starting point is to overturn this dialectical ban, so that one might be permitted to talk about a language of music and sculpture, when comprehended through the two theories laid out, once this language is ever established, would it not also turn into language of pure signs?

### **2.3. The Move of Mimesis from the Similar to the Same**

In other words, the struggle to capture the similarity of the words with the things that represent it or the similarity of the writing with the subject behind it, is what sets the *telos* of Benjamin's 'overturning'. Benjamin's attempt to haunt down this problem in the 'meditation of language' as its 'magic' still recurs to what Lacoue-Labarthe defines as the move of mimesis "always from similar to the same" (TMPP - 117). Even if that language of sculpture and music be established, would Benjamin be able to talk about it without recourse back to the fundamental 'mediation' of language? If this mediation of the language is not within Benjamin's study, how can he ever ask for a nonsensuous similarity to be found in the 'unconscious' of the writer dropped on the page as his script? In other words, does not the origin or the access to the origin-as-a-being always transfer a mediation? To repeat: the only method that had allowed Benjamin to disrupt the problem of the mediation of language was by integrating 'a symbol of the

uncommunicable' in the communicability of the language. This is, of course, done to abduct the nature from the relativity of judgment and the constant naming process of man. However, in this *telos*, nature is still a necessary *topoi* of the man/subject. In other words, although contrary to his starting point (that is, to break down the concept of language as the mental state of man), Benjamin stands pre-critical to 'usurp' nature as the 'necessary' origin from which the language of music and sculpture can form. To fasten a language of nature (which is prescribed definitely 'mute' for Benjamin) or of paintings and sculpture is still 'to see' them in a mimesis and imply its necessary representation.

For Lacoue-Labarthe, mimesis (representation) is always from the similar to the same. "For such is the law of representation – or of (re)presentation: [...] there is 'presented' in it what does not present itself and cannot present itself, that is, there is represented in it what has always already represented itself. This is why there is only one remedy against representation, infinitely precarious, dangerous and unstable: representation itself" (Lacoue-Labarthe 117). One can discern it from the first ontological differentiation that Socrates had established against Cratylus and what Benjamin repeats. Never really being able to leave nature off, moreover to reserve its end in itself away from the naming-language of man, establishing it as the *telos*, seeing it as the 'unexpressible' in the expressed as the trace of what is not given in the representation but which has always already been presented (and therefore has to be 'revealed') is still an approximation of what Lacoue-Labarthe calls the 'hyperbological mimetology'. In Lacoue-Labarthe's words; this is what "theatricality 'reveals'" (original quotations – 117) that always works to put on stage and to theatricalize it in order to try to catch it in the trap of an internalization process, to

agonize to make it the subject's own; "more rigorously, to mask and to reveal, regarding mimesis, to betray and to unveil: these are – as finally we could never hope to say better – to go *from like to the same*" (117). This means to determine the *icon* in a ratio to the eidetic model. Thus, even if such a language of nature would be established, nature would only be an *icon* in it for as has been seen that words as the constitutive elements of any language are already representations.

As the central concern of this thesis would imply that a path of abstraction always and ultimately would lead to the rational construction of an artificial language of 'music and sculpture' or 'nature'. Language and thinking about things are so bound together that it is an abstraction to conceive of the system of truths as a pre-given system of possibilities of being, that initiates a subject who is supposed to select the appropriate signs. A word is not a sign that one selects, a language is not a mere instrument that we construct, on the comeuppance of which one gives an ideality of meaning to make another thing 'visible' through it. Rather, the ideality of the thing lies in the word itself, every thing can always-already produce meaning without instituting its origin in itself because no origin is a pre-conceived 'being'.

As Lacoue-Labarthe maintains that mimesis always starts where the fear about the plasticity (fashioning, modeling and fictioning) arises with the imposition of the sign which marks that language is itself a fiction. Otherwise, it would fall into the absolute dream of philosophy; "absolute (in)sight, the subject theorizing its own conception and engendering itself in seeing itself to do so – the speculative" (127). In the original dependency of the subjection of the 'speaking-being' to maintain the relationship between the word and the thing that it represents, the subject is always engendered by the order of the *figure* or the *fictive* in general. For Lacoue-Labarthe, this limit which



does not hold a boundary, is where, “An entire Western *discourse* on the subject right away seems to find its limit here; a limit that would lie less [...] in *the necessary reversibility of the motifs of engenderment and of the figure, of conception and of the plastic*, or if you will, in this kind of reciprocal and insurmountable metaphorical (figural) exchange between concepts of *origin* and *fiction*” (127-8).

### 3. THE RUPTURE: WHAT REPEATS, WHAT DIFFERS

The significance of a reading of Adorno's *Aesthetic Theory* is to depict the exemplary attempt of how such languages of sculpture and music (of art, in general) can be employed and to where it might ever lead. As given in his book, that he is a follower of Benjamin's request on language of sculpture and music which would protrude from 'nature'. Although, a strange stance in opposition to his 'negative dialectics', Adorno's whole approach to art and his maintenance of a peculiar concept of 'becoming' towards the end of *Aesthetic Theory*, inevitably falls back into the unconcealing or masking trap of dialectics.

And the reason of a reading of Adorno's (together with Horkheimer) reading of the concepts of difference and repetition is to lay out the problem of their reading of these concepts under negation, according to their distance from the model, when reviewed later on, will give us the possibility of talking about the formation of a language that neither repeats nor differs; in short, a language that does not work on negation.

### **3.1. Telos: Adorno's Discourse on Mimesis and Art**

#### **3.1.1 Repetition: Myth and Self-Sacrifice/ Self-Preservation**

In *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Horkheimer and Adorno purport that the fundamental claims of enlightenment and mythology, far from the latter's unending attempt at the usurpation of the established hierarchy, are the same. In this fragmentary phenomenology of spirit, Horkheimer and Adorno find a potentially fatal flip in the early stages of Western Civilization. The flip occurs during the time of patriarchal myths. Myth modulates toward enlightenment in a phase, marked by Olympian and Hebraic religions, when 'bourgeois' society replaces nomadism, thought becomes independent, magic turns into rational praxis, and the human subject awakens to the world's rational domination. The book is a critical reading which is, neither, not just a celebration of mythology or mythic forces that underpin enlightenment and its entire project, nor to recover the content of the former to fling it over the latter. The task for Horkheimer and Adorno is to demythologize that deification. This, for Adorno and Horkheimer are done by stating that the bourgeois culture achieved by Enlightenment has always already been established, not thoroughly in nineteenth century but even previously in Homer's *Odyssey*.

The ultimate self-preservation of man is the domination over the nature and his own instincts. Man's being thrown from nature in the encounter with her as negated distinct entity results in the separation of subject and object, mental and physical labor, internal and external nature etc.

Given this constellation, myth is already enlightenment and enlightenment reverts to mythology. Whence substantive reason is reverted to instrumental reason in

the service of exchange for the principle of equivalence, it leads to the domination of nature for the exploitation of the capital. The *reason* destroys the humanity for the sake of self-preservation of 'individuality'. However, the preserved-self emancipated from myths can only employ himself in endless repetition and by the same token, pays the price in self-sacrifice. In short, the 'emancipated man' of Enlightenment sacrifices himself, his instincts and nature for the rubric of identity that always works for self-preservation and identity construction. In the absorbed repetition of the mythic thought which enlightenment never really knows how to elude, the emancipated man of enlightenment can only maintain himself in self-sacrifice. For Adorno and Horkheimer, the barter is the absolute principle of exchange and equivalence is the most secular form of sacrifice. The self-preserving subject of enlightenment thought by denying the mythology denies his internal nature, sacrifices himself in the exchange of a sacrifice with Gods.

The critical example used by Adorno and Horkheimer is the reading of Homer's *Odyssey* chapter. For the authors, in the separation between *mythos* and *epos* as two distinct genres implemented by Enlightenment, it is certain that the portrayed epic is a perfect depiction of the self-preserving/self-sacrificing subject trying to struggle with the mythic power; "[...] the hero of the adventures shows himself to be a prototype of the bourgeois individual, a notion originating in the consistency of self-affirmation which has its ancient pattern in the figure of the protagonist compelled to wander" (43). It is the plot, which connects all the fragments under the theme of Odysseus's struggle for self-preservation against all menaces. In each episode, by cunning, escape, danger of the self-sacrifice, Odysseus gains his identity and spills the union of his internality and externality. With each adventure, Odysseus loses himself in order to find himself. For

example, in the rejection of listening to the song of Sirens, which guarantees the happiness of the domination over nature, Odysseus pays the price by forever being discarded from home. Instead, he wills to be tied to the mast of his ship to lead to his own way. For Adorno and Horkheimer, Odysseus's self-sacrifice here recurs back to self-preservation by learning to dominate his *internal nature in the service of instrumental reason of the principle of equivalence.*

What must be paid attention here is what Adorno and Horkheimer understand 'repetition' and 'difference'. The bourgeois individual is the one who constructs an identity and makes a difference but he is forever to remain in the endless repetition of the same things. Therefore, for the authors, more difference (dissimilarity) creates more repetition. They also see both difference and repetition as mimesis itself or representation as a 'being' without forgetting that they are already copies. In other words, what is it that Adorno and Horkheimer mould in Odysseus's adventure of not being able to return home? According to their own method, it is for sure that Odysseus leaves his home, in the world governed by the principle of equivalence, he is going to establish a home somewhere else. However, is not this usurpation itself still can find its similarity in the question of searching for 'origin'? Or their attempt at the reading of enlightenment through myths, or establishing an untimely importance to 'magic' as the praxis of myths is an approximation of a meditation, magic a as an ultimate medium in its ideality to break down to a fragmentary state? If the fragment is a fragment, it is a fragment with its relation to the whole. Then instead of a search for the subject in the form of an example, which is, inevitably, always found 'in the mediation of magic' or 'under the principle of equivalence', could we talk about space (which is not a necessary

*topoi* for the subject's self-affirmation) where this subject could be deconstructed without a 'margin'?

### **3.1.2. The Scene of Aesthetics: Mimesis from the Similar to the Same**

Artworks' attempt to hold off the nonexistent within the existent is due to their attempt to assemble apparition (Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory* 83). "As figures of the existing, unable to summon into existence the nonexistent, artworks draw their authority from the reflection they compel on how they could be the overwhelming of the nonexistent if it did not exist in itself" (83). For Adorno, if the Platonic definition of art's semblance character against the omnipresence of being and idea was true then art would not ever be needed. Art negates the literal reality of its thematic content in its form as allied with the philistine blindness for the central element of art. The function of unsureness and lie labeled on art cannot be rubbed off art; "nothing can guarantee that it will keep its objective promise. Therefore, for Adorno, "every theory of art must, at the same time, be the critique of art" (83). Consequently, artworks are images as apparition, as appearance and not as a copy. The image character of artworks had passed into reality. What happens in art is no longer the unity and harmony but dissonance and contradiction. This paradox is what the artworks appropriate. If apparition is the illumination of the enlightenment's claim to vanish any residue of the mystery of them, art is the sole process of the transfixation of this evanescent instant. Adorno, here, refers to Benjamin's dialectic at a standstill and his dialectical image. "If, as images, artworks are the persistence of the transient, they are concentrated in appearance as something

momentary. To experience art means to become conscious of its immanent process as an instant at a standstill [...]” (84).

However, in his prolongation, Adorno will enunciate that artworks not only produce images that endure but do they become artworks as much through their ability to destruct that image. Thus, they are not just allegories; they are the catastrophic fulfillment of allegories. The result of the dissonant and contradictory forces that they carry in themselves is conjured out as the impossibility of bringing them to any equilibrium and to remain unsolvable in the reconciled world. “The instant in which these forces become image, the instant in which what is interior becomes exterior, the outer husk is exploded; their *apparition*, which makes them an image, always at the same time destroys them as image” (original italics – 85). In this rupture of *apparition*, the countertendency that Adorno finds is the occurrence of caesura that no longer permits the totality of appearance to be.

Thus, for Adorno, art is a refuge for mimetic comportment. In the realm of art, with various autonomy the subject [artist] exposes itself, to its other. The level of autonomy derives from the point that this other “is separated from the subject and yet not altogether separated” (53). However, this mimetic element of art can only be possible “in the midst of rationality, and that it employs means, it is a response to the faulty irrationality of the rational world as an overadministered world” (53). Then, in this world of rationality, since its sole aim is always to preserve the means of dominating nature in a capitalist society, art is registered to estimate its truth in a double sense; “it maintains the *image* of its aim, which has been obscured by rationality and it convicts the status quo of its rationality and absurdity ” (my italics - 54). In the disenchanted

world, what Adorno sees is a repression of the magic heritage of art and its usurped outcome as 'ideology'. For this reason, "the sentimentality and debility of almost the whole tradition of aesthetic thought is that it has suppressed the dialectic of rationality and *mimesis immanent to art*" (my italics - 54). In this cluster, the survival of mimesis, "the nonconceptual affinity of the subjectively produced with its unposited other", constructs art as a technical knowledge and to that extent 'rational'. In that respect, then, art is always posited as a 'telos of knowledge' and completes knowledge, which it had excluded. This is the ineliminable 'aporia' of art "pulled between the regression to literal magic or surrender of the mimetic impulse to thinglike rationality" (54). To gather its univocity, art, unable to fulfill its concept, acts as complementary to knowledge and complements what has been excluded by it; that is 'magic'. In the midst of the secularization, the process of art through the essence of magic "sinks to the level of a mythological vestige, to superstition" (54). The irreconcilability of these elements "must be imported into the idea of art as an *image* of reconciliation" (my italics -54). In the depth of this process, art can catch a glimpse of reconciliation, for no artwork can approach emphatically to its free forces. This is why "art is rationality that criticizes rationality without drawing from it; art is not something prerational or irrational, which would peremptorily condemn it as untruth in the face of entanglement of all human activity in the social totality. Rational and irrational theories of art are therefore equally faulty" (55).

The category of the new has produced a conflict between new and duration for Adorno. "Through duration art protests against death; the paradoxically transient eternity of artworks is the allegory of an eternity, bare of semblance. Art is the semblance of what is beyond death's reach" (27). At this conjecture, Adorno conjures mimesis to

artistic production. "Mimesis ties art to individual human experience, which is now exclusively that of being-for-itself. That there is no persevering at this subjective point is by no means only because the artwork forfeits that otherness in which the aesthetic subject is exclusively able to objectivate itself. Clearly the concept of duration –as ineluctable as it is problematic- cannot be unified with the idea that the subjective point is also a temporal one." (30). This amounts, for Adorno, that the artworks have no power over whether they endure, "it is least of all guaranteed when the putatively time-bound is eliminated in favor of the timeless" (27). Only when that temporal permanence is constituted, the timelessness and transience can take place in the specific context of the artwork. Consequently, Adorno's thesis is that "The new is the longing for the new, not the new itself. That is what everything new suffers from" (32).

Moreover, this suffering itself is the negation of utopia. What irrupts in this negation of the utopia is the 'image of collapse':

"In this image of collapse, all the stigmata of the repulsive and loathsome in modern art gather. Through the irreconcilable renunciation of the semblance of reconciliation, art holds fast to the promise of reconciliation in the midst of the unreconciled: This is the true consciousness of an age in which the real possibility of utopia – that given the level of productive forces, the earth could here and now be paradise – converges with the possibility of total catastrophe. In the image of catastrophe, an image that is not a copy of the event but the cipher of its potential, the magical trace of art's most distant pre-history reappears under total spell, as if art wanted to prevent the catastrophe by conjuring up its image. The taboo set on the historical telos is the single legitimation of that whereby the new comprises itself politically and practically: its claim to being an end in itself" (33).

Adorno, however, affirms that art is not replica of the artist (subject) but without saying it, he still inaugurates Hegel's criticism of the popular view that the artist must be more than his own work:



“[...] for not infrequently that he is less, the empty husk of what he objectivated in the work. It hold equally true that no artwork can succeed except to the degree that the subject gives it shape from out of himself. It is not for the subject, as the organon of art, overleap the process of divisive individuation that is imposed on him and not a matter of opinion or accidental consciousness. This situation therefore compels art –as something spiritual – to undergo subjective mediation in its objective constitution. The share of subjectivity in the artwork is itself a piece of objectivity. Certainly the mimetic element that is indispensable to art is, as regards its substance, universal, but it cannot be reached other than by way of the inextinguishably idiosyncratic particular subject” (41).

Estimated by the doctrine of normal bourgeois consciousness, art has never been able to break epistemologically through solipsism and “[...] was necessarily and directly “intersubjective” ” (original quotations - 42 ). Adorno calls for this epistemology to be reversed. “The former has the ability through critical self-reflection to destroy the spell of solipsism, whereas the subjective point of reference in art remains that which solipsism has merely feigned in reality. Art is the historicophilosophical truth of a solipsism that is untrue in-itself. In art there is no possible willful overcoming of the situation that philosophy has unjustly hypostatized. Aesthetic semblance is what solipsism extra-aesthetically confuses with truth” (42-3) The subject should manifest his own subjectivity by his surplus beyond what he wants to negate down and never forget to carry out the contradiction in himself. However, Adorno has a formula for the somewhat pertinent survival of art; “To date the only alternative to this has been the polemical intervention of the subject in the subjective reason by a surplus of the subject’s own manifestation beyond that in which it wants to negate itself. *Only by carrying this contradiction*, and not by its false resolution, can art somehow still survive” (my italics - AT 58). Even though, this is surreptitiously another ultimate subjectivization of *split of subject* in Hegel, Adorno will upkeep that “this incongruity is

not to be eliminated by adaptation: The truth, rather, is in carrying through their conflict. Conversely, the deaestheticization of art is immanent to art –whether it be art that unflinchingly pursues its autonomous order or art that sells off cheap- in accordance with the technological tendency of art, which is not to be halted by any appeal to a purportedly pure and unmediated inwardness”(58).

The determination of artworks as images result in their negation embedded in themselves as their telos; “the sudden unfolding of appearance disclaims aesthetic semblance” (85). In rejection to any historicism, Adorno maintains, that artworks are not beings “absolved from becoming” but rather they have their own development. The appearance in the artworks is their inner time and history is their content. Thus, to analyze them means to become conscious of the sediment of history in them. After the separation of knowledge into image and sign, the truth of them gets equalized with the truth. The reality that they embed is their content, however they should not be hypostatized - even historical images; “Aesthetic images are not fixed, archaic invariants: artworks become images in the processes that have congealed in them as objectivity become eloquent” (85). Even the bourgeois art-religion of considering the artworks as artist’s psychological repository representations fail in that respect. Because their inner historicity (including that of the individual-bourgeois artist) is experienced collectively. “Every language of artworks is, like every language, constituted by a collective undercurrent, especially in the case of those works popularly stigmatized as lonely and walled up in ivory tower: the eloquence of their collective substance originates in their image character and not in the “testimony” –as the cliché goes- that they supposedly wish to express directly to the collective” (original quotations -86). In this both static and dynamic affiliation, the result is their aim for the trajectory that they

traverse as *imago*. Although produced subjectively as not images of something and precisely collective to be mediated for experience, they are not fixation or forming as they are usually perceived; “artworks diverge from empirical reality; empiria through empirical deformation” (86).

Art is comportment and it cannot be isolated from expression and that expression cannot be without a subject. If Hegel was right and the very work of the artist was able to reach beyond his own stance, then he “[...] must in return pay the price that he, in contrast to the discursively thinking person, cannot transcend himself and the objectively established boundaries” (42). For Adorno even if one day the atomistic structure of society would be abolished, the social idea of art would still remain and under the most detained form where the ‘universal’ and the ‘particular’ diverge. “As long as the universal and the particular diverge, there is no freedom” (42). In that respect, for whoever would try to resist the collective force would be forced to hand to remain under the “veil of subjectivism” (42). Embedded deeply in that ‘veil of subjectivism’, named as the critical reflection of the subject, is the force of the subject; “the subject congealed as technology” (42), and if production would want to get rid of this force of congealed subjectivity and want to make itself autonomous, enclosed in the same trap, they still would have “[...] to correct themselves by the way of the subject” (42).

For Kant, artworks were purposive as dynamic totalities; in which every particular exists for the sake of the whole as the fulfillment or redemption through the negation of its elements. What is specific to artworks, then, is that the aesthetic success of their form could only be measured by whether the formed object is able to awaken the content [*Inhalt*] sedimented in the form. The hermeneutics of artworks is the degree of the translation of their formal elements into that content [*Inhalt*]. This content, however,

does not directly fall into the artworks. Constituted by a counter movement, only when stroked in distance, does the content process itself in the artworks.

“Artistic progress, to the degree that it can be cogently spoken of, is the epitome of this movement. Art gains its content [*Inhalt*] through the latter’s determinate negation. The more energetic the negation, the more artworks organize themselves according to an immanent purposiveness, and precisely thereby do they mold themselves progressively to what they negate” (140).

In his attempt at displacing the Kantian notion of a teleology of art modeled on organisms, rooted on the unity of reason of the artist’s fantasy and consciousness, Adorno infers that the purposiveness of art, free of any practical purpose, is its similarity to language; “its being “without a purpose” is its nonconceptuality, that which distinguishes art from significative language” (original quotations – 140). Artworks are related more to the idea of a language by their own language, which is formed by their disparate elements when better syntactically articulated, the more eloquent they become. The traditional aesthetics of teleology (Kant) misses the point of objectivity in the language of art; “it prejudices the relation of the whole and the part in favor of the whole” (140). The dialectics of the reflective power of judgment (Hegel), on the contrary, does not take the subordinating concept (which goes beyond and transcends them by virtue of their own need) as its starting point, for it is never given. “By the force of their dialectic, artworks escape myth, the blind and abstractly dominating nexus of nature” (140).

Adorno also makes a distinction between what he calls as virtual content [*Gehalt*] and content [*Inhalt*]. Adorno makes this distinction to differentiate himself from Hegel’s aesthetics but unfortunately falls into it. Virtual content is the artistic content. “Everything appearing in the artwork is virtually content [*Gehalt*] as much as it

is form, whereas form remains that by which the appearing determines itself and content remains what is self-determining” (145). To the extent that aesthetics achieved an energetic concept of form, it opposed the preartistic view of art by seeking what is specifically aesthetic by detecting the transformations of form. Not being able to bear the preartistic view of art that Hegel’s too easily called ‘end of art’ thesis tried to salvage, Adorno comes to terms with Hegel; “[...] Hegel is right that all aesthetic processes are bound up with content [*Inhalt*], just as in the history of the plastic arts and literature new levels of the external world constantly become apparent and are discovered and assimilated, whereas others perish, lose their artistic potential, and no longer excite even the worst commercial painter to grant them a brief eternity on canvas” (145). However, in the dialectics of whole and fragment, it is content [*Inhalt*] that always desires the whole, whereas the virtual (artistic) content [*Gehalt*] can remain fragmentary. The plight of form is manifested in artworks by their difficulty of coming to an end. This is why, artworks lose themselves in order to find themselves and “suffer from their mediated totality no less than their immediateness” (147).

Art always passes through universal alienation and thus through spirit. Art always oscillates between ideology and the domain spirit. For Adorno, through spiritualization as the radical domination of nature, “art corrects the domination of nature as the domination of an other” (113). Although by its objectivation, freeing itself from the aims of domination by continuing the totality of spirit in them and becoming the semblance of a blocked being-in-itself, art corrects conceptual knowledge in its complete isolation so that through a subjective act what is objective would be unveiled. However, what presents itself as the non-alienated in the artwork, also, establishes its fetish character, “what comports itself in the world as though it were unidentical nature

reduced all the more surely to the material of the domination of nature, to a vehicle of social domination, and thus is surely alienated” (113).

Expression is the tool that creates this alienation. “Expression, by which nature seeps most deeply into art, is at the same time what is not literally not nature, a memento of what expression itself is not, of what could not have become concrete through the *how* of that expression” (113). The insertion of expression in the artworks, which always leads to their spiritualization is what always makes everything relative and integrates a clumsy dualism between form and expression that orients the traditional aesthetics. “Expression is an phenomenon of interference, a function of technical process no less than it is mimetic” (114). Mimesis is the density of the technical procedure, whose immanent rationality seems to work in opposition to expression. This is what the paradox and enigma of art is; “to produce what is blind, expression, by way of reflection, that is, through form: not to rationalize the blind but to produce it aesthetically” (113).

Then Adorno hints one of his main points of his aesthetic theory, “all artworks are enigmas; since antiquity, this has been an irritation to theory” (120). The artworks say something and in the same breath conceal out and express their enigmaticalness through language. In coming to be a form, artworks gain their resemblance to language; “seeming at every point to say just this and only this and at the same time whatever it is slips away” (120). Constituting the enigmatical structure of the artworks leads Adorno to the derivation that it is impossible to explain what art is to those who have no feeling for it.

“Whoever seeks to understand artworks exclusively through the immanence of consciousness within them by this very measure fails to

understand them and as such understanding grows, so does the feeling of its insufficiency caught blindly in the spell of art, to which art's own truth content is opposed" (121).

The better an artwork is understood, the more puzzled it is and the more obscure its enigmaticalness becomes. The word 'enigma' that Adorno uses is not a glib synonym for 'problem'; artworks are problems that also contain their solutions in them. Every artwork is an enigma and ripens in creating a problem that has potential for solution but the solution is not given objectively. Artworks are vexations that for the observer to route. In his phenomenological circle, Adorno puts it this way:

"If a work opens itself completely, it reveals itself as a question and demands reflection: then the work vanishes into the distance, only to return to those who thought they understood it, overwhelming them for a second time with the question "What is it?" (121).

Adorno relates this enigmaticalness to the longing that the artworks endure. In fact, there is no artwork that can exist without longing. They transcend this longing by the neediness of their historical existence. They are not for-itself of consciousness but in-itself in want of an other; "the artwork is language of this wanting and the artwork's content [*Gehalt*] is as substantial as this wanting" (132). This is why, Adorno calls for the doctrine of imitation to be reversed: "Ultimately the doctrine of imitation should be reversed: in a sublimated sense, reality should imitate artworks" (132).

Then, in a surprising manner, Adorno tries to describe the 'being of an artwork' as 'becoming'.

"The artwork is a process essentially in the relation of its whole and parts. Without being reducible to one side or the other, it is the relation itself that is a process of becoming. Whatever may in the artwork be called totality is not a structure that integrates the sum of its parts. Even objectified the work remains a developing process by virtue of the propensities active in it." (my italics and underline - 178).

The parts are not pre-given to be the centers of energy that strain toward the whole. This is, also, the failure of history's verdict that asks for the unity of process and meaning. If an artwork is not fixed but a "becoming in motion", then the communication of the whole and its parts develop "in time", and therefore, can still keep the tendency to perish in the history. "If artworks are alive in history by virtue of their own processual character, they are also able to perish in it" (178). Though, Adorno warns that it is not the individual reactions towards the works that keep them changing. Such change is external to what transpires in them in the process of the unforeseeable dissolution of their layers due to their "emerging and increasingly distinct law of form", "the petrification of works that have become transparent" and "their falling silent" (178).

Artworks are both the result of the process and the process itself at a standstill. They are closed on one another, blind and yet in their hermeticism they represent what is external. This interpretation as the result of a process at a standstill approximates the thesis of monadological character of artworks. However, this thesis is also problematic for Adorno, for it leads to their immanent analysis inherited and developed in academic tradition. The monadological constitution of artworks always points themselves beyond themselves.

"If it is made absolute, immanent analysis falls prey to ideology, against which it struggled when it wanted to devote itself to the artworks internally rather than deducing their worldviews. Today it is already evident that immanent analysis, which was once a weapon of artistic experience against philistinism, is being misused as a slogan to hold social reflection at a distance from an absolutized art. Without social reflection, however, the artwork is not to be understood in relation to that of which it constitutes one element, nor is it to be deciphered in terms of its own content. The blindness of the artwork is not only a corrective of the nature-dominating universal, it is also its correlative; as always the blind and the empty belong together in their abstractness" (180).



In that abstractness, their spirit arises. However, their content is posited by their structure, it is not something added from outside. Their spirit necessarily appears as something in-itself and along with the objectivity of their spirit, they become something made. This reflection of them through their spirit is what is responsible for their fetish character. To this extent then, something art-alien, which art senses, is added to their structure. They organize what is not organized. This is their paradox; “[...] though they are dynamic themselves, they are fixated, whereas it is only by being fixated that they are objectivated” (184). That is, also, the system of irreconcilables that they are considered to be by Adorno; the more insistently they are observed, the more paradoxical they become.

The mimetic impulses that motivate the artwork fragile are that they are speechless expression. It is here that one can purport another resemblance of the muteness that Benjamin allies to nature and of the muteness that Adorno allies to artworks as fragments of nature. “They only become language through their objectivation as art. In art’s intentionless language, the mimetic impulses are bequeathed to the whole, which synthesizes them” (184). By their spiritual mediation, they enter into a contradictory relation, but at the same time, they, also, try to solve this contradiction. Their dynamism is inherited by what speaks in them; through spiritualization, they attain the mimetic impulses that their spirit subjugates. Although, the reference word ‘constellation’ is never used here, Adorno, as is well known, in accordance with the concept of constellation that he takes from Benjamin, says that; “The [mimetic] elements are not arranged in juxtaposition but rather grind away at each other or draw each other in: the one seeks or repulses the other” (brackets are my addition - 184).

The material unity of artworks are all the more illusory, the more its forms and elements are topoi and do not emerge from the complexions of the individual work. This is where, Adorno finds one aspect of the opposition of modern artworks; that is: their insistence on the real unity of unreal whence it no longer has a tolerance of universality in an unreflected immediacy.

“That the unity of the work does not, however, completely originate in the work’s individual impulses is not due simply to how these impulses are manipulated. Semblance is defined by these impulses as well. While gazing longingly and needingly toward the unity they could fulfill and reconcile, they always at the same time flee from it. The prejudice of the idealist tradition in favor of unity and synthesis has neglected this. Unity is motivated not least of all by the fact that according to their own propensity the individual elements seek to escape it. Dispersed multiplicity does not offer itself neutrally to aesthetic synthesis as does epistemology’s chaotic material, which, devoid of quality, neither anticipates nor eludes its forming. In the unity of artworks is also inescapably the violence done to multiplicity –symptomatic of which is the use in aesthetic criticism of expressions such as “mastery over the material”- multiplicity must, like the ephemeral and alluring images of nature in antiquity’s myths fear unity. The unity of logos, because it mutilates, is enmeshed in the nexus of its guilt” (186).

Moreover and yet, this unity is not binding; “an element of this bindingness is probably what is binding in all artworks” (187). As soon as unity becomes stable, it is already lost. Later, Adorno rigorously collaborates with the question of intensity to the extent that the unity and multiplicity internal to artworks can be grasped. For Adorno, intensity is mimesis achieved through unity and ceded by the multiplicity to the totality, although this totality is never immediately present as an intensive force; the power of the whole is accumulated in the details. Even in many of its elements, artworks become more intense and thicker and gives the impression of being an end in itself; the unities of composition and construction seem to exist only for the purpose of such an intensity. “Accordingly”, says Adorno, “contrary to current aesthetic views, the whole in truth exist

for the sake of its part -that is, its instant- and not the reverse; what works in opposition to mimesis ultimately seeks to serve it” (187).

To diverge about what has been said previously about the ‘true artworks’, only which have the power to destroy their own spirit, Adorno says that what is corrective in the fact is that there are no perfect works. “If they did exist, reconciliation would be possible in the midst of the unreconciled, to which realm art belongs” (190). In the unreconciled fragment of art, the rank of an artwork is defined essentially whether it exposes itself to or withdraws itself from the irreconcilable, otherwise, in perfect artworks, art would transcend its own concept, would want to be what it is not and nevertheless would want to be. Even in the formal aesthetics, there is always a wish of return to the content [*Inhalt*] refracted by their own law, otherwise, the dialectic of their form that implies depth would be ‘empty play’ as the philistine demand establishes. “Yet depth is not to be equated with the abyss of subjective inwardness, which is said to yawn wide in artworks; rather, it is an objective category of works; the clever chatter about the superficiality of depth is as sophistic as it is solemn praise” (190). In the superficial artworks, synthesis does not intervene in the heterogeneous elements to which it refers but rather runs parallel with them.

“Those works are deep that neither mask the divergent or antagonistic nor leave it unreconciled. By forcing it into appearance that issues from the unreconciled, they incorporate the possibility of conciliation. Giving form to antagonisms does not reconcile or eliminate them. By appearing and determining all labor in the artwork, they become something essential; by becoming thematic in the aesthetic image, their substantiality emerges with all the more plasticity” (190).

This is why Adorno finds the deepest antinomy of artworks as their irreconcilability by way of reconciliation where their constitutive irreconcilability at the

same time deprives them of reconciliation, too. Thus, what determines the rank or quality of an artwork is its historical articulation. History is immanent to artworks, not an external fate or fluctuating estimation. The articulated truth content objectivated by history is the correct consciousness in the artworks always forces them for the possible reconciliation. “Their truth content is unconscious writing of history bound up with what has been repeatedly vanquished”(192). Articulation is redemption of the many in the one that always works for the one. For artistic praxis, articulation means that for every specific form, the idea must be driven to its extremity. “The more articulated the work, the more its idea becomes eloquent; mimesis receives succor from its counterpole” (191). This pushes Adorno to say that; “The degree to which aesthetic unity is itself a function of multiplicity is evident in works that out of abstract enmity to unity seek to dissolve themselves into the multiplicities, to renounce that whereby the differentiated becomes something differentiated in the first place. Works that are absolutely in flux, whose plurality is without reference to unity, thereby become undifferentiated, monotonous and indifferent” (191). Thus their fluxing transformation cannot be prevented by their fixation in stone or canvas. What is fixated is a sign, a function and not something-in-itself; “the process between what has been fixated and the spirit is the history of works. If each work is a condition of equilibrium, each may yet once again enter into motion. The elements of the equilibrium are irreconcilable with each other. The development of artworks is the afterlife of their immanent dynamic” (193). What the artworks say ultimately affects their truth content. They may become mute, their quality may suffer and they may collapse into ideology, the extension of which is usually reckoned in the guarantee of survival in the neutralization of culture as a ‘reserve’. This is why, for Adorno, levels of form must be maintained. If works when

finished become what they are, it is because “their being is a process of becoming” (194). Their relation to past, for Adorno, today finds its repercussions in consciousness either in positive or negative transcendence; “the rest is nothing more than empty erudition” (194). The opposite of a genuine relation to the historical substance of artworks as their ‘essential content’ trembles as a rash into the subsumption to history, their assignment to a historical moment. However, Adorno’s ‘hope’ still endures; “only a liberated, reconciled humanity will someday perhaps be able to devote itself to the art of past without ignominy, without that famous rancor at contemporary art, and thus make amends to the dead” (194). In his search for the quality of artworks, what Adorno maintains is that artworks can only become what they are when unfolded historically; that is, when related to what came afterward and what preceded them, because Adorno perhaps finds a relation between quality and the process of perishing. Where that quality is found, for Adorno, is the aesthetic form of the sublime. The sublime that Kant had defined and reserved as nature has later turned into the arts and crafts. Kant has considered art as a servant. Art becomes human at the moment it serves for history. However, this is the moment when it also turns into ideology for Adorno; “it is loyal to humanity only through inhumanity toward it” (197). The sublime to be felt in the face of nature anticipates reconciliation with nature. Even in Kant’s formulation, it was tinged that in the face of sublime, man was to face his own nothingness and the fragile empirical individual who has to stand firm against death, was to negate this annihilation to transcend everything in his universal destiny to become absolute so that his spirit would be able to unfold. However, maintains Adorno; “He becomes comical. Advanced art writes the comedy of the tragic: Here the sublime and play converge” (198). Still Adorno cannot leave off Kant totally and establishes that there was something that resist

the objection that Kant reserved, because he has not yet been able to experience the great subjective art.

Nevertheless, unwittingly, Kant's doctrine of the sublime expresses that the sublime is incompatible with the semblance character of art. Yet, the idea that the sublime as semblance reserves its own absurdity and contributes to the neutralization of truth, for what is ever presented as evidence toward the subjective aesthetic experience is that the feelings are illusory. "Yet the feelings are real; the semblance is a quality of the aesthetic objects" (199). With his unquestioning of the concept of sublime but by just giving its definition as the 'purposiveness of purposelessness', he also succumbed to the complicity of domination, which just led to the setting up of the categories of powerful and powerlessness. The feeling of sublime does not correspond immediately with what appears;

"The legacy of the sublime is unassuaged negativity, as stark and illusionless as was once promised by the semblance of the sublime. This is however at the same time the legacy of the comic, which was always nourished by a feeling for the diminutive, the ludicrously pompous and insignificant and which, for the most part, shored up established domination. The nonentity is comic by the claim to relevance that it registers by its mere existence and by which it takes the side of its opponent; one seen through, however, the opponent –power, grandeur– has itself become a nonentity. Tragedy and comedy perish in modern art and preserve themselves in it as perishing" (199).

Although, all through his own preservations of the spirit of imagination against the annihilation felt in the face of sublime, Adorno, for the most part seems too 'naive'. Since the dialectical figuration of artworks is a procedure that Adorno cannot leave off, at the moment when he ever talks about the process of the becoming of artworks, he can only cope them in the form of 'time'. Although Adorno's motives, like Benjamin starts to save the content of language (of artworks) from the tyranny of the speculative

contemplation, to suspend their understandability in an enigmaticalness, without constituting a dialectics of content and form (even at the risk constructing a separation between *Inhalt* and *Gehalt*), a process of becoming in the historical timeliness of perishing and transience, in short, without grounding the determinateness of the indeterminate, Adorno, himself cannot make philosophy. This is for Deleuze, the biggest mistake of philosophy; “the history of the long error is the history of representations, the history of icons” (Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* 301).

### **3.2. Affirmation of the Excess: Deleuze’s discourse on Mimesis and Art**

#### **3.2.1. Image of Thought and Plane of Immanence**

A concept in philosophy, as Deleuze and Guattari defines it, is a “fragmentary whole” (Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* 35). The philosophy that introduces them always creates “a powerful Whole, while remaining open, is not fragmented” (35). This Whole can be considered as “a table, a plateau or a slice [...] the plane of consistency, the plano-menon” (35). The plane of immanence, though, should not be confused with the Whole that always includes all concepts.

“The plane of immanence is not a concept that is or can be thought but rather the image of thought, the image thought gives itself of what it means to think, to make use of thought, to find one’s bearings in thought. It is not a method, since every method is concerned with concepts and presupposes such an image. Neither is it a state of knowledge on the brain and its functioning, since thought here is not related to the slow brain as the scientifically determinable state of affairs in which, whatever its use and orientation, thought is only brought about. Nor is it opinions held about thought, about its forms, ends and means, at a particular moment” (37).

Since philosophy, for Deleuze and Guattari, is always a constructivism, it has two “qualitatively different” aspects: (i) the creation of concepts and (ii) the laying out

of a plane (36). The plane of immanence secures the conceptual linkages and concepts populate the plane with variable curves.

For Deleuze and Guattari, contemplating, reflecting or communicating are anything more than opinions held about thought at a particular time and in a particular civilization.

What constitutes the image of thought by rightful claims of thought is the infinite movement or the movement of the infinite. The movement of the infinite does not refer to spatiotemporal coordinates; the positions of a moving object, that experiences itself a subject from an objective, fixed reference point as the famous phrase 'to orientate oneself in thought' would imply. "Movement takes in everything, and there is no place for a subject and an object that can only be concepts. It is the horizon itself that is in movement: the relative horizon recedes when the subject advances, but on the plane of immanence we are always and already on the absolute horizon" (38). Infinite movement advances by coming and going and always moves back on itself. Infinite movement is double, "and there is always a fold from one to other. It is in this sense that thinking and being are said to be one and the same. Or rather, movement is not the image of thought without being also the substance of being" (38).

The image of thought has two facets; (i) Thought/*Nous* and (ii) Nature/*Physis*. Because of these two facets, many infinite movements fold in each other so that the plane of immanence is ceaselessly being woven. Even the negative, losing one's way while 'turning away', falling into error as much as avoiding it, springing passions while trying overcome them, these diverse and complex movements of the infinite, far from breaking the One-Whole of the plane of immanence works in benefit of its variable curvatures. These curves make the fractal character of the plane of immanence



(planomenon) infinitely different than every concept, turning back on itself, folding itself, allowing itself to be folded by them and creating retroaction, connections etc. The plane of immanence is always single but not the same in Greeks, in seventeenth century or today and neither is the image of thought or substance of being is the same. The plane is made the object of an infinite specification that the One-All is selected by movement.

However, in reality, elements of the plane are *diagrammatic features*, whereas concepts are *intensive features*. The *diagrammatic features* of the plane are movements of the infinite, *directions* fractal in nature; whereas the *intensive features* of the concepts are finite movements in which the infinite is the speed that keeps the volume. All of the metaphysical philosophemes that entail the development of the system on 'intuition' is justified if intuition is an envelop of infinite movements that constantly pass through the plane of immanence. However, the concepts are separated from the plane; in fact, they are distinctively constructed from the plane during when the plane is set up.

Since philosophy begins with the creation of concepts, then the plane of immanence may be regarded as prephilosophical wherein this state of being prephilosophical must not be understood as something preexistent to but rather "something *that does not exist outside philosophy*" (41). This is how Adorno writes his works, first constructing a pre-philosophical plane (the plane of immanence) from which he always derives or rather 'makes his own way' out of these. The principle of equivalence, cunning, barter are the concepts of the plane of immanence ('enlightenment') that they construct.

Concepts refer to a nonconceptual understanding in variance to the way the plane is constructed. Examples are; Descartes's subjective understanding presupposed by 'I think', Plato's virtual image (eidos) that doubles up everything as being already-thought,

Heidegger's preontological understanding of being. Through the internal conditions of being prephilosophical (that, eventually, means nothing exists outside of philosophy), Deleuze and Guattari finds the nonphilosophical to be closer to the heart of philosophy and thus is also addressed to nonphilosophers as well. The concept is the creation of philosophy but the plane is its institution. Both the concepts and the plane are always required since the plane "is clearly not a program, design, end or means: it is a plane of immanence that constitutes the absolute ground of philosophy, its earth or deterritorialization, the foundation on which it creates its concepts" (41).

The plane of immanence is a section of chaos and acts like a sieve, where chaos cannot just be explained by the absence of determinations but by the infinite speed. Chaos is not an inert, stationary state or chance mixture but undoes every consistency in the infinite impossibility of disconnection of one determination to the other, since all the determinations always appear in the disappearance of another one. The aim of philosophy is to have consistency without losing the infinite plane. Science determines chaos by defining it in coordinates, however, philosophy proceeds by implying the plane of immanence whose variable curves constitute the infinite movements turning back on themselves in incessant exchange.

Deleuze and Guattari, then, makes their reference to the Greekness of philosophy, If this plane/sieve is called the Logos, then the reason appended to it is not simple because it is a very impoverished concept that defines the plane. "In short, the first philosophers are those who institute a plane of immanence like a sieved stretched over the chaos"(43).

The question that Deleuze and Guattari impose is whether the entire history of philosophy could be presented from the viewpoint of plane of immanence. A plane of

confusion and concepts always occurs when immanence is trying to be made immanent “to” something, “so that the concepts become a transcendent universal and the plane becomes an attribute in the concept. When understood in this way, the plane of immanence revives the transcendent again: “it is a simple field of phenomena that now only possesses in a secondary way that which first of all is attributed to the transcendent unity” (44-5).

Although it is not very clear why immanence is so dangerous (engulfing gods and sages) but nevertheless determines the philosopher by the part played out by itself, immanence “[...] is immanent only to itself and consequently captures everything, absorbs All-One, and leaves nothing remaining to which it could be immanent. In any case, whenever immanence is interpreted as immanent *to* Something, we can be sure that this Something reintroduces the transcendent” (45). The treat of plane of immanence as field of consciousness starts with Descartes, following Kant and Husserl, where immanence is supposed to be immanent to a pure consciousness, to a thinking subject. Kant calls it ‘transcendental’ rather than ‘transcendence’ to make it a field of experience where nothing, the external as well as the internal escapes. “Kant objects to any transcendent use of synthesis, but he ascribes immanence to the subject of synthesis as new, subjective unity” (46). Thus, he can refine himself the luxury of denouncing transcendent Ideas, to make them the ‘horizon’ of immanent to the subject. “But in doing so, Kant discovers the modern way of saving transcendence: this is no longer the transcendence of a Something, or of a One higher than everything (contemplation), but that of a Subject to which the field of immanence is only attributed by belonging to self that necessarily represents such a subject to itself (reflection)” (46).

When immanence is ever made immanent to a subjectivity, the action of immanence is turned “to another self, to another consciousness” (47). This is what Deleuze calls as ‘communication’. Husserl and his followers discover in the Flesh or in the Other, the spy of the transcendent within immanence. Husserl evaluates immanence as “the flux lived by subjectivity” (47). However, this untamed flux, as is known, does not belong to the self, but something that is reestablished on the horizon of nonbelongings; (i) in the immanent or primordial world of intentional objects (ii) as the privileged transcendence of an intersubjective world by other selves (iii) objective transcendence of an ideal world of cultural formations and human community.

In this ‘modern’ moment, immanence is not satisfied by thinking immanence to a transcendent, “*we want to think transcendence with the immanent, and it is from immanence that a breach is expected*” (original italics, 47). We are not satisfied by tooling over immanence to the transcendent, we want it to be discharged, be reproduced and fabricated. And in its easiness, all that is required is “*for movement to be stopped*”. Transcendence enters as soon as movement of the infinite is stopped. It takes advantage of interruption to reemerge, revive, and spring forth again” (original italics, 47).

Deleuze defines three sorts of Universals –contemplation, reflection and communication- to the three eras of philosophy –Eidetic, Critical and Phenomenological- but are “inseparable from the long history of an illusion. The reversal of values had to go so far –making us think that immanence is a prison (solipsism) from which the Transcendent will save us” (47). When immanence is decaled to be anything other than itself, the right to speak of immanence is established. This plane does represent a flux that is immanent to a subject who belongs to itself but presents only events of possible worlds as concepts and other people (those that do not

belong to the subject) as expressions of possible worlds or conceptual personae. The 'event' does not relate the lived to transcendence where subject belongs to the self, but on the contrary, is related to immanent survey of a field without a subject. Empiricism knows only events and other people and as a greater creator of concepts, it defines the *habitus* of the subject; "a habit, nothing but a habit in a field of immanence, the habit of saying I" (48).

This plane is full of illusions. When we approach ourselves to the plane of immanence, to the absolute horizon (and it is indeed necessary in some part at least) that the illusions arise from the plane itself. There are four illusions: (i) *illusion of transcendence*: makes immanence immanent 'to' something and discovers the transcendence in the immanence; (ii) *illusion of universals*: confuses the concepts with the plane, necessitates the 'something' to which the immanence is attached and makes us think that the universal explains everything where else at first hand, it is itself that must be explained; therefore ensues a triple illusion: contemplation, reflection or communication; (iii) *Illusion of the eternal*: takes place when the concepts in need of creation are forgotten; (iv) *Illusion of discursiveness*: takes place when propositions are confused with the plane.

However, the reason why the history of philosophy puts forward so many and different planes, 'each' restoring transcendence is not due to the variety of illusions but due to the reason of each of them offering their own way of constructing immanence. "Each plane carries out a selection of that which is due to thought by right, but this selection varies from one plane to another. Every plane of immanence is a One-All: it is not partial like a scientific system, or fragmentary like concepts, but distributive – it is an 'each'. *The plane of immanence is interleaved.*" (original

quotations and italics, WIP 50)

It is not the variety of planes that matter but the way in which they are distributed. Otherwise, we would have the same image of thought from pre-Socratics to Heraclitus and Parmenides or from Plato to Descartes. It is always the question of multiplicity or oneness of the plane. “In the end, does not every great philosopher lay out a new plane of immanence, introduce a new substance of being and draw up a new image of thought, so that there could not be two great philosophers on the same plane? [...] When we find several philosophies in the same author, is it not because they have changed plane and once more found a new image?” (WIP 51).

There are also those philosophers (Deleuze and Guattari call them ‘functionaries’) who do not construct a new plane of immanence and unaware of the model. But how can a new philosopher construct his/her new plane of immanence when its layers sometimes knit together and sometimes separate? “That is why every plane is not only interleaved but holed, letting through the fogs that surround it, and in which the philosopher who laid it out is in danger of being the first to lose himself” (51).

This promiscuity is explained in two clusters; (i) thought is unable to stop itself from interpreting immanence as immanent to something, the great Object of contemplation, the Subject of reflection or the Other subject of communication; and within this transcendence always gets infixed inevitably, (ii) the unavoidability of transcendence is introduced because the plane has a claim of itself being unique; ‘being *the* plane’. Therefore, the whole choice is always between the chaos and transcendence.

In the classical image of thought, it is the confidence of “willing” (52) turned towards truth that maintains the relationship of the infinite movement of knowledge as diagrammatic feature. What changes from one plane of immanence to another is not the

positive or negative features but also the ambiguous features that threaten thought with the danger of becoming increasingly numerous. Every modern image of thought is always in horror. “No image of thought can be limited to a selection of calm determinations and all of them encounter something that is abominable in principle, whether this be the error into which thought continually falls, or the illusion within which it continually turns, or the stupidity in which it continually wallows, or the delirium in which it continually turns away from itself or from a god” (54). The Greek image of thought has established this by invoking “the madness of double turning-away” (54) that fling into infinite wandering. The first characteristic of the modern image of thought is to complete the relationship of truth as a creation of thought and all the positive or negative features of the plane of immanence.

It is the base of all planes, immanent to every thinkable plane that does not succeed in thinking it. “Is there a “best” plane that would not hand over immanence to Something = x and that would no longer mimic anything transcendent? We will say that THE plane of immanence is, at the same time, that which must be thought and that which cannot be thought. It is the nought within thought” (58). It is the most intimate within thought and yet the absolute outside – an outside more distant than any external world because it is an inside deeper than any internal world.

“It is immanence: intimacy as the Outside, the exterior become the intrusion that stifles and the reversal of both the one and the other” – the incessant to-ing and fro-ing of the plane, infinite movement. “Perhaps this is the supreme act of philosophy: not so much to think THE plane of immanence as to show that it is there, unthought in every plane, and to think it in this way as the outside and inside of thought, as the non-external outside and the not-internal inside – that which cannot be thought and yet must be thought, which was thought once, as Christ was

incarnated once, in order to show, that one time, the possibility of the impossible” (WIP 59-60).

### 3.2.2. Difference for Itself and Repetition in Itself

Deleuze suggests Plato’s thought to be turned upon a particularly important central distinction: the distinction between the original and the image and between the model and copy. The model is always to enjoy a spontaneous superiority because it is nothing other than what it is; whereas the copy is judged in terms of a derived internal resemblance. This is, in fact, when the difference is ever integrated into the system. Difference can only be understood in terms of comparative play of the two similitudes: the exemplary similitude of an identical original and the imitative similitude of a more or less accurate copy. Since difference is behind everything and there is nothing behind difference, each term of a series of differences, itself being only a difference, must be put into a variable relation with other terms, thereby constituting other series devoid of centre and convergence. For Deleuze, the prefix RE- in the word representation signifies this conceptual form of the identical which subordinates differences. The test imbrued to determine among the claimants, to hunt down the phantasms and simulacra has always been the task of philosophy. “The function of the notion of the model is not to oppose the world of images in its entirety but to select the good images, the icons which resemble from within and eliminate the bad images or simulacra. Platonism as a whole is erected on the basis of this wish to hunt down the phantasms or simulacra which are identified with the Sophist himself, that devil, that insinuator or simulator, that always disguised and displaced false pretender” (Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* 127). Moreover, this test takes place not between the original and the image but rather



between two kinds of images [*idoles*], of which [copies] are only the first kind, the other being simulacra [*phantasmies*]. The copies are always to be determined. To determine them is 'to make philosophy'. Copies are selected, justified and saved in the name of identity and their internal resemblance to the ideal model. Then for Plato, the determination of the images are due to subordinating difference to the supposedly initial powers of the Same and the Similar, and declaring the difference unthinkable in itself along with simulacra and sending it to the "bottomless ocean" of the model (127). The four figures of the Platonic dialectic are therefore: the selection of difference, the installation of a mythic circle, the establishment of a foundation and the position of a question-problem complex. Plato has given the establishment of difference as the supreme goal of dialectic. Things, themselves, are simulacra, which, in turn, are the superior forms and the danger involved in everything is to become their own simulacra. In the payoff of determination/subordination, before the deployment of the constituted logic of representation, what is installed first is a moral vision of the world; what Deleuze in other words calls as 'the image of thought'. This is a world that only Plato (the philosopher king) can make based upon his moral intuition. For Deleuze, this image of thought can be called a dogmatic, orthodox or moral image. This image is borrowed from the pure element of common sense. The philosopher derives his pre-philosophical presuppositions from this natural image of thought. Many philosophers have already started with the presuppositions of 'I think' and 'everybody knows' assuming that everybody really knows what it means to think and to know. In such an interlocution, the universal recognition of the philosopher and the good will on his part and an upright nature on his thought is implied. So that philosophy can start with the common sense as *Cogitatio natura universalis*. According to this image, thought has a pre-established

affinity with true, possesses and materially wants the true. “Thereafter, it matters little whether philosophy begins with the object and the subject, with beings or Being, as long as thought remains subject to this image which already prejudges everything: the distribution of the object and subject as well as that of Being and beings” (131). This is what we see with Adorno. Every time he thinks with his good will, he can make philosophy. This is why Adorno can never leave Hegel and the thought of carrying contradictions. In fact, what is contradictory is his ‘reservation’ and ‘ground’ of Hegel’s dialectics as not being able to solve the crisis of modernity, and moreover, even as an adversary, he had multiplied them.

For Deleuze, ideas are already multiplicities. In this usage of the word ‘multiplicity’, the utmost importance must be attached to the substantive form: multiplicity must not designate a combination of the many as such, which has no need whatsoever of unity in order to form a system. Multiplicity, which replaces the one no less than the many, is the true substantive, substance itself. Everything is a multiplicity as long as it incarnates an Idea. An Idea is an  $n$ -dimensional, continuous, defined multiplicity.

“That the one is a multiplicity is enough to reject back-to-back adjectival propositions of the one-many and many-one type. Everywhere the differences between multiplicities and the differences within multiplicities replace schematic and crude oppositions. Instead of the enormous opposition between the one and the many, there is only the variety of multiplicity, even the one, even the many, there is only the variety of multiplicity – in other words, difference. It is, perhaps, ironic to say that everything is multiplicity, even the one, even the many. However, irony itself is a multiplicity” (182).

There are three conditions which together allow us to define the moment at which an Idea as an  $n$ -dimensional multiplicity emerges: (i) the elements of multiplicity

must have neither sensible form nor conceptual signification, nor, therefore, any assignable function. They are not even actually existent, but inseparable from a potential or a virtuality. This is why, they imply no prior identity, no positing of a something that could be called one or the many. On the contrary, their indetermination renders possible the manifestation of difference freed from all subordination. (ii) These elements must, in fact, be determined, but reciprocally, by reciprocal relations which allow no independence whatsoever to subsist. Such relations are precisely non-localizable ideal connections, whether they characterize the multiplicity globally or proceed by the juxtaposition of neighboring regions. In all cases, the multiplicity is intrinsically defined, without external reference or recourse to a uniform space in which it would be submerged. Spatio-temporal relations no doubt retain multiplicity, which they replace by the identity of an 'I think' or something thought. However, internal multiplicity is a characteristic of the Idea alone. (iii) A multiple ideal connection, a differential *relation*, must be actualized in diverse spatio-temporal *relationships*, at the same time as its *elements* are actually incarnated in a variety of *terms* and forms. The Idea is defined as a structure. A structure or an Idea is a 'complex theme', an internal multiplicity – in other words, a system of multiple, non-localisable connections between differential elements which is incarnated in real relations and actual terms.

Deleuze dissects an Idea into two components: one encases the virtual and the real, while the other encases the actual and the possible. The determination of the virtual content of an Idea is called *differentiation* and the actualization of that virtuality into species and parts is called *differenciation*. For Ideas to be actualized, they have to be *differenciated*. In themselves, they remain completely undifferenciated, but *determinate* and *differenciated*. However, the attention must be paid to the totality of the system

which brings the Idea into play: the (indi)-different/ciation. It is as if everything has two dissimilar halves. This is how Deleuze understands the individuation; with its two dissimilar halves. However, this implementation is inscribed in order to save the Other from any physis systems. The Other is not reducible to the individuating factors implicated in the system, but it is made subject to representation and stand for them in a certain sense. “That the Other should not, properly speaking, be anyone, neither you nor I, signifies that it is a structure which is implemented only by variable terms in different perceptual worlds – me for you in yours, you for me in mine. It is not even enough to see in the Other a specific or particular structure of the perceptual world in general: in fact, it is a structure which grounds and ensures the overall functioning of this world as a whole. Notions necessary for the description of this world – such as those of form-ground, profile-unity of the object, depth-length, horizon-focus – would remain empty and inapplicable if the Other were not there to give expression to those possible worlds in which that which is (for us) in the background is pre-perceived or sub-perceived as a possible form; that which is in depth as a possible length etc” (281). In other words, for Deleuze, the Other should never be held phenomenal, which would always obtain it in representation or even in another representation to oppose the previous one.

For Deleuze, neither difference nor repetition can be ‘thought’ in itself, for both of them are subject to mimesis. Both of them can only be thought when tamed under the four collars of representation: (i) identity in the concept (ii) opposition in the predicate (iii) analogy in judgment and (iv) resemblance in perception. “These are the four roots of the principle of reason: the identity of the concept which is reflected in *ratio cognoscendi*; the opposition of the predicate which is developed in *ratio fiendi*; the analogy of judgment which is distributed in a *ratio essendi*; the resemblance of

perception which determines a *ratio agendi*" (262). Through these principles, the philosophy can erect its ultimate aim; to render representation infinite or orgiastic.

It is a question of extending difference too large (Hegel) or too small (Leibniz). What happens with Hegel is that the representation conquers the infinite because the technique dealing with the infinitely small captures the smallest difference and its disappearance and the contradiction pushes back difference to the limit but solely in order to make identity the sufficient condition for difference to exist and to be thought; only in relation with the identical and as a function of the identical, contradiction is the greatest difference. What happens with Leibniz is that the representation may become infinite but it does not acquire the power to affirm the divergence or decentring but requires a convergent and monocentric world. The ground or the principle of sufficient reason is nothing but a means of allowing the identical rule over infinity itself, allowing the continuity of resemblance, the relation of analogy and the opposition of predicates to invade infinity.

It might be correct to define metaphysics by recourse to Platonism but what matters more is the question of distinction and decision. The primary distinction established by Plato is the one between the model (Idea) and the copy. However, more than just an appearance, copy has an internal and ontological relationship with the model. The more profound distinction is between the copy and the simulacra. Simulacra are always failed due to, both, the test of the copy and the requirements of the model. The Platonic wish to exorcize simulacra is what institutes the content of difference. The model is defined by a positioning of identity as the essence of the Same and the copy by an auto-affection of internal resemblance as the quality of the Similar. Because the resemblance is internal, the copy must have an internal relation with being, true and

goodness as analogous to the model. Finally the copy is constructed by means of a method (dialectics) which attributes to the requirements of the model.

“In all these ways, copies are distinguished from simulacra only by subordinating difference to instances of the Same, the Similar, the Analogous and the Opposed. No doubt with Plato these instances are yet distributed as they will be in the deployed world of representation (from Aristotle onwards). Plato inaugurates and initiates because he evolves within a theory of Ideas which *will* allow the deployment of representation. In his case, however, a moral motivation in all its purity is avowed: the will to eliminate simulacra or phantasms has no motivation apart from the model. What is condemned in the simulacra is the state of free, oceanic differences, of nomadic distributions and crowned anarchy, along with all that malice which challenges both the notion of the model and that of the copy. Later, the world of representations will more or less forget its moral origin and presuppositions” (original italics - 265).

Representation is always a site of transcendental illusion which comes in four interrelated forms; thought, sensibility, the Idea and being. In effect, thought is covered up by an ‘image’ whose postulates distort its operation. These postulates culminate in the position of an identical thinking subject, which functions as a principle of identity for concepts ‘in general’, just as when the sameness of the Platonic model guaranteed by the Good and God, grounded as an originary concept in a thinking subject. Nevertheless, it is the moral vision of the world that is extended and presented in the subjective identity of *common sense (Cogitatio natura universalis)*. “When difference is subordinated by the thinking subject to the identity of the concept (even where this identity is synthetic), difference in thought disappears. In other words, what disappears is that difference that thinking makes in thought, that *geniality* of thinking, that profound fracture of the I which leads it to think only in thinking its own passion, and even its own death, in the pure and empty form of time (original italics, my underline - 266). To restore difference in thought is to untie this first knot which consists of representing difference through the identity of the concept and the thinking subject”. The second concerns the subordination

of difference to resemblance. Given the *matrix* of unequal as the difference, resemblance needs no longer to be just between the copy and the model. It is determined when the diverse is made sensible to itself. Difference gets to be cancelled in the quality which covers it, while the inequality tends to be equalized within the extension in which it is distributed. However, difference is intensive, indistinguishable from depth in the spatium where there is neither extension nor qualification and can lie neither in the quality that covers it nor in the extension by which it is explicated. Intensity, for Deleuze, is not the sensible but the being of the sensible, where different relates to different. To untie the second knot, then, is to restore difference within intensity. The third illusion is the manner of the negative in which it subordinates difference in the form of limitation and opposition. The power of affirmation is betrayed by the figures of quantitative and qualitative limitation and opposition. Limitation and opposition are surface effects, whereas depths are populated by differences without negation. The nature of the antinomies is as follows; once the nature of the problematic and the multiplicity which defines the Idea is misrecognised, once the Idea is reduced to the Same and to the identity of the concept, the negative occurs. However, for Deleuze, accepting that being is full positivity, and pure affirmation and undifferentiates the being without difference is to untie the third knot. The phrase “full positivity” means, here, positivity without any negation and “pure affirmation” as affirmation that is not the negation of negation to construe a synthetic unity. Thus, to restore the differential in the Idea as a problematic and let it remain as such until the pure affirmation flows from that restored difference is to break this holy bound. The fourth illusion is the subordination of difference to the analogy of judgment. Under the heading of the ultimate and primary concepts determined as indeterminate, the small and secondary concepts get started to be

constructed in terms of analogy. The difference of species and the large genera is the common example. However, it betrays the nature of difference. In terms of this distribution, the individual is rendered as that which bears difference in general and in fact, the greatest difference.

If difference is represented *in* the identical concept, repetition, by contrast, is represented *outside* the concept, as though it were a difference without a concept, but always with the presupposition of an identical concept. Thus, repetition occurs in numbers, that is, in space and time while, its concept remains the same. In the same movement, the identity of the concept in representation includes difference and is extended in repetition. Through this, repetition receives a negative explanation; it is a tool for explaining the possibility of differences without concept. Repetition, then, is explained in terms of relative limitation in our representation of the concept.

“*It* (language) repeats because *it* (the words) is not real, because there is no definition other than nominal. *It* (nature) repeats because *it* (matter) has no interiority, because it is *partes extra partes*. *It* (the unconscious) repeats because *it* (the Ego) represses, because *it* (the Id) has no memory, no recognition and no consciousness of itself – ultimately because it has no instinct, instinct being the subjective concomitant of the species as concept” (original italics and parenthesis – 270-1).

In short, things always repeat by virtue of what they are not or what they lack. Repetition, however, is not just related with the identical concept, it, also, represents it. In the classical dialectics, when the ultimate identity of the identical concepts fragments into multiplying instances of the same concept, the transcendental is fragmented into the materialization of the exterior matter and each fragment works for the sake of the whole (transcendental). That is why repetition is indistinguishable from matter understood as the fragmentation of the identical. Repetition, then, has a primary sense from the point of



view of representation, namely, the repetition of the same. This extrinsic model takes repetition as already accomplished and presents it to a spectator who contemplates it from without. Thus, it is still a sense understood in relation to a thought identity with the result that repetition remains a concept of reflection which ensures the transportation of the matter only within a representation and for a spectator who remains extrinsic.

For Deleuze, we must distinguish two forms of repetition found in the Idea. “Repetition must be understood in the pronominal; we must find the Self of repetition, the singularity within that which repeats. For there is no repetition without a repeater, nothing repeated without a repetitious soul” (23). In every case repetition is difference without a concept. But in one case, the difference is taken to be only external to the concept; it is difference between objects represented by the same concept, falling into indifference of space and time. In the other case, the difference is internal to the Idea; it unfolds as pure movement, creative of a dynamic space and time which correspond to the Idea. The first repetition is the repetition of the Same, explained by the identity of the concept or representation; the second includes difference, and includes itself in the alterity of the Idea, in the heterogeneity of an ‘a-presentation’. In the center of the Idea lies the difference and the Same is only on the periphery. Repetition in the formless being of all differences is the formless power of the ground which carries every object to its extreme form in which its representation comes undone. The ultimate element of repetition is the disparate, which stands in opposition to the identity of representation. Thus, the circle of philosophy (of difference and repetition), which is tied to the Same, “is a tortuous circle in which Sameness is said only of that which differs” (57).

In the great teaching of philosophy as *omnis determinatio negatio*, the philosophy of difference refuses the general alternative proposed by infinite

representation. Difference is seen as light, aerial and affirmative. To affirm is not to bear but, on the contrary, to discharge and to lighten. Negation is difference but difference seen from its underside, seen from below. “This proposition, however, means many things: that difference is an object of affirmation; that affirmation itself is multiple; that it is creation but also that it must be created, as affirming difference, as being difference itself” (DR 55). This is why, for Deleuze, it is not the negative, which is the motor of dialectic. Rather, there are differential elements that determine the genesis of both the affirmation and the affirmed difference. It is such that there is a genesis of affirmation that escapes us every time we put the determination in the negative. “Negation results from affirmation: this means that negation arises in the wake of affirmation or beside it, *but only as the shadow of the more profound genetic element-* of that power of ‘will’ which engenders the affirmation and the difference in the affirmation. Those who bear the negative know not what they do: they take the shadow for the reality, they encourage phantoms, they uncouple consequences from premises and they give epiphenomena the value of phenomena and essences” (original italics and quotation -DR 55).

Representation always fails to capture the affirmed world of difference. Representation has only one center and a false depth. It mediates everything but moves nothing. “Movement, for its parts, implies a plurality of centers, a superposition of perspectives, a tangle of points of view, a coexistence of moments which essentially distort representation” (DR 56). Paintings and sculptures are already such ‘distortions’ for Deleuze, for they force us to create movement, which might be combining a superficial and a penetrating view or ascend and descend within the space as we move through them. Although infinite representation includes infinity of representation, it has a center which gathers and presents all the other representations and makes all moments

properties of the same Self. “The prefix RE- in the word representation signifies this conceptual form of the identical which subordinates differences” (DR 56). The immediate meditation of the Self, defines as ‘sub-representative’ by Deleuze, therefore is not attained by multiplying representations and points of view. On the contrary, proposes Deleuze that “each point of view must itself be the object, or the object must belong to the point of view” (DR 56). Thus difference must be shown differing. “Every object, every thing, must see its own identity swallowed up in difference, each being no more than a difference between differences” (DR 56).

#### **4. THE *HETERO*-TEXT WRITING ITSELF:**

Jacques Derrida is also another critical theorist who has established an attitude against the ‘the thinking subject’. In his book ‘Of Grammatology’, he asks for a science of linguistics which does not work by negation as a positivist science, which does not swallow its ‘outside’ at the moment when produced by it. This position does not let Derrida to talk about a ‘simplicity of origins’. By naming his destruction of metaphysics ‘deconstruction’, Jacques Derrida calls the entire western notion of onto-phenomenology and structuralism *logocentric* and more specifically, by his criticism of Ferdinand de Saussure’s general linguistics, he calls any or most theories of linguisticity *phonocentric*.

##### **4.1. Onto/Phenomeno/Typo/Ideo-logical Writing**

Within Jacques Derrida’s program, in the pushed order of the *writing* to comprehend the language as the ‘signifier of the signifier’, in its accidental doubling and fallen secondarity, writing has been determined in the entire history of language studies, as an origin, in *presence* under the privilege of *phone*. “The privilege of the *phone* does

not depend upon a choice that could have been avoided. It responds to a moment of *economy* (let us say of the “life” of “history” or of “being as self-relationship”). The system of “hearing (understanding)-oneself-speak” through the phonic substance – which *presents itself* as the nonexterior, nonmundane, therefore nonempirical or noncontingent signifier- has necessarily dominated the history of the world during an entire epoch, and has even produced the idea of world, the idea of world-origin, that arises from the difference between worldly and the non-wordly, the outside and the inside, ideality and nonideality, universal and nonuniversal, transcendental and empirical etc.” (original italics – Derrida, *Of Grammatology* 7-8). In the playful world of writing once it enters into the game of affecting all the signifieds, a limit has been achieved in our present era for Derrida; a limit of ‘overwhelming’. In the three millennia of the history of writing, the confinement of writing as a secondary and instrumental function has tended toward its own *telos*; the emergence of the spokesman as the translator of full speech –the interpreter of an originary speech, present to itself, presented by logos, to its signified, to the other and to the very condition of presence in general. Derrida does not simply mean technics or ache-technics allocated to speech (representation), nor does he really believe that any notion of technics can clarify the notion of writing. “It is therefore as if what we call language could have been in its origin and in its end only a moment, an essential but determined mode, a phenomenon, an aspect, a species of writing. And as if it had succeeded in making us forget this, and *in willfully misleading us*, only in the course of an adventure: as that adventure itself. All in all, a short enough adventure. It merges with the history that has associated technics and logocentric metaphysics for nearly three millennia. And it now seems to be approaching what is really its own *exhaustion*; under the circumstances – and this is no more than one example among

others- of this death of the civilization of the book, of which so much is said and which manifests itself particularly through a convulsive proliferation of libraries” (original italics – 8).

In order to deconstruct such a narrow and reductionist approach towards writing, Derrida calls for an ‘interminable analysis’. All the metaphysical determinations of truth and signification are inseparable from the instance of logos or linked to a reason in the lineage of logos whether understood in the God’s infinite understanding, or Pre-Socratic, Pre-Hegealian or Post-Hegelian sense. Within these logoi, all through its history, the original and essential link has never been broken, perhaps, even from its first determination by Aristotle in his attachment of spoken words as mental experience and written words as the symbols of the spoken words. This is, for Derrida, the essentialist reason why “the voice, producer of *first symbols*, has a relationship of essential and immediate proximity with the mind” (11). As the producer of the first signifier, spoken words are not just any signifier among others, it signifies mental experiences which, then, reflect or mirror things by natural resemblance. Between being and mind, things and feelings, there would be a relationship of translation or natural signification; between mind and logos, a relationship of conventional symbolization. “And the *first* convention, which would relate immediately to the order of natural and universal signification, would be produced as spoken language. Written language would establish the conventions, interlinking other conventions with them” (11). In order to construct the stage of transparence, the feeling of mind - expressing things naturally- must constitute a sort of universal language which then should efface itself. Voice is always determined as closest to the signified and the written signifier is always technical, representative, has no constitutive meaning and is derivative with regard to what would wed the voice

indissolubly to the mind. “This derivation is the very origin of the notion of the “signifier”. The notion of sign always implies itself within the distinction between signifier and signified, even if, Saussure argues that they are distinguished simply as the two faces of one and the same leaf. This notion remains therefore within the heritage of that logocentrism which is also a phonocentrism: “absolute proximity of voice and being, of voice and the meaning of being, of voice and the ideality of meaning” (original quotations- 11-2). In such a determination, an entire system of phoneticization is constructed. The subject auto-affects itself and is related to itself by an element of ideality in the virtue of hearing (understanding)-oneself speak. Thus, this is what Derrida names as ‘logocentrism’, the determination of the being of entity as presence, “with all the subdeterminations which depend on this general form and which organize within it their system and their historical sequence (presence of the thing to the sight as *eidos*, presence as substance/essence/existence [*ousia*], temporal presence as [*stigmé*] of the now or of the moment [*nun*], the self-presence of the cogito, consciousness, subjectivity, the co-presence of the other and of the self, intersubjectivity as the intentional phenomenon of the ego, and so forth)” (12).

The difference between the signified and the signifier or rather the strange separation of their parallelism belongs in an implicit way to the totality of the great epoch of the history of metaphysics and in a more explicit way to the narrower epoch of Christian creationism and infinitism with the resources of Greek conceptuality. This great history of metaphysics conceptualizes, first and before, all the distinction between the sensible and the intelligible, not as the only, but as the most chief distinction. Then, to this epoch belongs all the other metaphysico-theological roots.

“The semiological or, more specifically, linguistic “science” cannot therefore hold on to the difference between signifier and signified –the very idea of sign- without the difference between sensible and intelligible, certainly, but also not without retaining, more profoundly and more implicitly, and by the same token the reference to a signified able to “take place” in its intelligibility”, before its “fall”, before any expulsion into the exteriority of the sensible here below. As the face of pure intelligibility, it refers to an absolute logos to which it is immediately united. This absolute logos was an infinite creative subjectivity in medieval theology: the intelligible face of the sign remains turned toward the word and the face of God” (13).

Derrida does not simply reject these notions, and in fact, confesses that they are necessary and nothing further is ever possible without them. It is not even a question of simply opposing them but marking their conditions, surrounding their medium and the limit of their effectiveness and to designate the intimate relationship of the crevice of the machine whose deconstruction they permit. Knowing that to drag out the meaning out of the sign has been an agonized tradition of the history of metaphysics, Derrida states that “it is not a question of doing so in terms of the instance of truth, anterior, exterior or superior to the sign, or in terms of the place of the effaced difference. Quite the contrary. We are disturbed by that which, in the concept of the sign – which has never existed or functioned outside the history of (the) philosophy (of presence)- remains systematically and genealogically determined by that history. It is there that the concept and above all the work of deconstruction, its “style”, remain by nature exposed to misunderstanding and nonrecognition” (original quotation - 14). So far these words explicitly state out what Jacques Derrida has tried to name as ‘deconstruction’ and perhaps, further, extends the precautions of its misinterpretations.

The exteriority of the signifier is the exteriority of writing. In fact, there has never been a linguistic sign before writing, otherwise, the whole concept of language

would collapse. Derrida does not simply declare the end of the epoch to move onto something else. In this epoch, the reading and writing, the production or the interpretation of signs, “the text in general” has always been confined within secondariness. They have been preceded by a truth which is constituted by logos. “Even when the thing, the “referent”, is not immediately related to the logos of a creator God where it began by being the spoken/ thought sense, the signified has at any rate an immediate relationship with the logos in general (finite or infinite), and a mediated one with the signifier, that is to say, with the exteriority of writing. When it seems to go otherwise, it is because a metaphoric mediation has insinuated itself into the relationship and has simulated immediacy; the writing of truth in the soul, opposed by *Phaedrus* to bad writing (writing in the “literal” and ordinary sense, “sensible” writing, “in space”), the book of Nature and God’s writing, especially in the Middle Ages; all that functions as *metaphor* in these discourses confirms the privilege of the logos and founds the “literal” meaning then given to writing: a sign signifying a signifier itself signifying an eternal verity, eternally thought and spoken in the proximity of a present logos” (original quotations - 15). The contradiction to which the attention should be given here, for Derrida, is that universal and natural writing, intelligible and nontemporal writing has been named by metaphor. A writing that is sensible is, thus, thought on the side of culture, technique and artifice, the ruse of a finite creature. As with the case of Platonic writing in the soul and its re-birth of rationalism in the seventeenth century, the writing has been understood in the metaphoric sense, as a ‘natural’, eternal, universal thing and the system of signified truth recognized in its dignity. The history of this metaphoricity is seen in the thematic of God’s book. The most decisive separation in the history of this treatment appears when the determination of absolute presence is constituted as self-



presence, as subjectivity. From then on, we have its turn into another form, the denouncement into its opposition: the non-self-presence.

In what Derrida calls as the “Rousseauist moment”, writing in the common sense is the dead letter, the carrier of death. It exhausts life. However, writing in the metaphorical sense, the natural, divine and living writing is ever venerated and therefore is immediately united to voice and to breath. In its repetitive gesture of Platonism, a question of choice is incurred between good and bad writing. The good (natural) writing is divine inscription in the heart and the soul while the perverse and artful writing is technique and exiled on the exteriority of the body. Therefore it is always the good writing that is comprehended by the subject; the beginning word is understood in the intimacy of self-presence, as the voice of the other and as commandment.

The reassuring evidence that Derrida allocates to the Western tradition is: “the order of the signified is never contemporary, is at best the subtly discrepant inverse or parallel- discrepant by the time of a breath- from the order of the signifier. And the sign must be the unity of a heterogeneity, since the signified (sense or thing, noeme or reality) is not in itself a signifier, a *trace*: in any case is not constituted in its sense by its relationship with a possible trace” (18). When one submits oneself to the originary question “what is a sign?”, the inevitable response to receive is that the essence of the signified is presence and the privilege of its proximity to the logos as *phoné* is, in fact, the privilege of presence. “The “formal essence” of the sign can only be determined in terms of presence. One cannot get around that response, except by challenging the very form of the question and the beginning to think that the sign is that ill-named thing, the only one, that escapes the instituting question of philosophy: “what is ...?”” (original quotations – 19). For Derrida, Hegel has summed up the entire philosophy of logos,

while Heidegger, although trying to break it, has remained as a captive of it. Against the *Aufhebung* (which is *the* concept of history and teleology for Derrida), the case of the nonphonetic writing (which can be produced by deaf mutes) has been given by Leibniz. Hegel, of course, has criticized this writing because what it betrays is life, the breath, the spirit and the history as the spirit's self-relationship with itself. "Cutting breath short, sterilizing or immobilizing spiritual creation in the repetition of the letter, in the commentary or the *exegesis*, confined in a narrow space, reserved for minority, it is the principle of death and of difference in the becoming of being" (25). Hegel, then, as the thinker of the irreducible and greatest difference or Leibniz as the thinker of the smallest difference, has always maintained writing as the reappropriation of difference, the retrieval of trace or the effacement of writing as absolute knowledge in the logos. Thus, what Derrida proposes as a science of science without scientificity should be understood in the line that (as will be clearer later) a writing that is neither on the outside or in the inside defining a field of science. "The science of writing should therefore look for its object at the roots of scientificity. The history of writing should turn back toward the origin of historicity. A science of the possibility of science? A science of science which would no longer have the form of *logic* but that of *grammatics*? A history of the possibility of history which would no longer be an archaeology, a philosophy of history or a history of philosophy?" (28). The positivist and classical sciences of writing always repress this sort of question and hold this repression necessary for the benefit of the positive investigation. Derrida's intention is not to weigh that somewhat facile and prejudicial question against the positivism that they hold, for many researches attached to that tradition already arranged around the problematics of beginning and end, that is to say, origin and definition.

For Jacques Derrida, the grammatologist that he proposes, least of all, should avoid asking the question of the essence of his object (word) in the form of origin. The question “what is writing?” inevitably will mean, “where and when has writing started?” And the answers usually come too quickly. “They circulate within concepts that are seldom criticized and move within evidence which always seems self-evident. It is around these responses that a typology of and a perspective on the growth of writing are always organized. All works dealing with the history of writing are composed along the same line: a philosophical and teleological classification exhausts the critical problems in a few pages; one passes next to an exposition of facts. We have a contrast between theoretical fragility of the reconstructions and the historical, archeological, ethnological, philosophical wealth of information” (28). Thus, the question of the origin of writing and the question of the origin are inseparable, according to Jacques Derrida. The main question that Derrida tries to allude is not just that grammatology has never asked for an assistance from linguistics that it has never looked for. In fact, for either better or worse or for productivity or blindness, it has been peacefully installed into the general science of writing as metaphysical presupposition to establish the link between speech and writing.

Therefore, for Derrida, Saussure’s making a ‘general science’ of linguistics of sign, distinguished yet united, as signified and signifier and working in a differential system without positive terms and maintaining that writing is the sole figurative representation of language that is centrally phonetic, meaning that it is only sounds that constitute words which themselves are unity, refers, besides the culture/nature opposition, to a supervening opposition between *physis* and *nomos*, *physis* and *techné* and the ultimate aim of such a systematization recurs “to *derive* historicity; and

paradoxically, not to recognize the rights of history, production, institutions etc., except in the form of the arbitrary and in the substance of naturalism” (original italics – 33). If the word always implies other divisions until it predicts out the indivisible thought-sound, then writing is constituted as phonetic, meaning that it is the outside, the exterior representation of language with the thought-sound at its centre and operates from the already constituted units of signification during the formation of which, it really has taken no part. Moreover, Derrida calls Saussure’s general science of linguistics a ‘model’ rather than a structure, for it is functioning properly but in ideality, which explicitly directs a functioning that is not entirely phonetic, and thus inevitably leaks out.

If writing is nothing but the figuration of language, then one has the right exclude it from the interiority of the system, which, surreptitiously, frames the inside of the system. For Derrida, to save the image without damage from the system of reality, Saussure proposes that writing is not related to the interiority of the system.

“External/internal, image/reality, representation/presence, such is the old grid to which is given the task of outlining the domain of a science. And of what science? Of a science that can no longer answer to the classical concept of the *episteme* because the originality of its field –an originality that it inaugurates- is that the opening of the “image” within it, appears as the condition of “reality”; a relationship that can no longer be thought within the simple difference and the uncompromising exteriority of “image” and “reality”, of “outside” and “inside”, of “appearance” and “essence” with the entire system of oppositions which necessarily follows from it. Plato, who said basically the same thing about the relationship between writing, speech and being (or idea), had at least a more subtle, more critical and less complacent theory of image, painting and imitation than the one that presides over the birth of Saussurian linguistics” (original quotations and italics – 33).

Thus, bearing the complexity of the complacency of Saussure’s linguistics about determining writing as an exterior phenomenon, exiled figuration, the outside, the double and repeating the gestures of Plato’s *Phaedrus* on writing as an artificial

technique, the eruption of the outside within inside, the living-presence of the soul within logos, has made him a captive of the entire Western tradition. All through the entire Western tradition, writing, the letter, the sensible inscription has always been considered as the body external to the spirit, to breath, to speech and logos or at its best, has only been perceived as clothing and image. "One already suspects that if writing is "image" and exterior "figuration", this "representation" is not innocent. The outside bears with the inside a relationship that is, as usual, anything but simple exteriority. The meaning of the outside was always present within the inside, imprisoned outside the outside and vice versa" (original quotations – 35). Therefore, as any other positivistic and Western science, Saussure's general science of linguistics, is found to be in the ultimate task of loading and recovering the 'natural', the originary and simple relationships between its concepts which always stand for an inside and an outside.

Saussure's general science of linguistics is erected upon its absolute youth, the purity of its origin, shortness of history and a fall which would have perverted the natural relationships with the break from the nature. The natural relationship between the outside and inside, the signified (concept or sense) to the phonic signifier would condition the natural relationship subordinating the writing (visible image) to speech. Thus, the original sin of writing, just like its repetition in the distraction of Adam before the innocence of the divine word, to usurp the superiority of speech to writing by giving in to ease that writing never takes place leads to the derivation that the natural movement could be thwarted, deviated or reversed. Therefore, Derrida accuses Saussure following the Western traditional auto-affectivity of speech being superior to writing and the usurpation of the latter in the intimate bound between the two. Writing is seen as a parasite that cannot be tolerated or confessed. Remaining just as an effect of speech and

phoné, writing, as the intertwining image or mirror inverting and perverting the representer, seems to usurp the natural relationship. Representation mingles with what it represents but only as a shadow or reflection of the representer. Seduced narcissistically, writing is a promiscuous and nefarious complicity of the reflection. Thus, in such a play of representation, the origin becomes ungraspable.

“In this play of representation, the point of origin becomes ungraspable. There are things like reflecting pools, and images, an infinite reference from one to the other, but no longer a source, a spring. There is no longer a simple origin. For what is reflected is split *in itself* and not only as an addition to itself of its image. The reflection, the image, the double, splits what it doubles. The origin of the speculation becomes a difference. What can look at itself is not one; and the law of the addition of the origin to its representation, of the thing to its image, is that one plus one makes at least three. The historical usurpation and theoretical oddity that install the image within the rights of reality are determined as the *forgetting* of a simple origin” (original italics – 36).

As Plato’s *Phaedrus* depicts, writing is a mnemotechnic means, supplanting good memory where spontaneous memory signifies forgetfulness because it is a mediation and departure from the logos. Writing is the dissimulation of the natural, primary and immediate presence of sense to the soul within the logos and the violence of which befalls the soul as unconsciousness. “Deconstructing this tradition will therefore not consist of reversing it, of making writing innocent. Rather of showing why the violence does not *befall* an innocent language. There is an originary violence of writing because language is first, in a sense, [...] a writing. “Usurpation” has always already begun” (original quotations - 37). For Derrida, Socrates, in *Phaedrus*, has declared the historical violence of a speech dreaming its full self-presence, living itself as its own resumption. Speech has been stated as alive, capable of helping itself as its own father and lifted above the writing, whereas writing has been condemned as orphan and born out of a

primary gap and expatriation, and thus it has been left to wandering, blindness and mourning. This self-proclaimed language actually can only proceed by expelling the other and especially its own other, throwing it outside and below as writing. However, writing can only exist because it has usurped speech, but such a thing as phonic writing does not exist for Saussure.

“Saussure confronts the system of the spoken language with the system of phonetic (and even alphabetic) writing as though with the telos of writing. The teleology leads to the interpretation of all eruptions of the nonphonetic within writing as transitory crisis and accident of passage, and it is right to consider this teleology to be Western ethnocentrism, a premathematical primitivism and a preformalist intuitionism. Even if this teleology responds to some absolute necessity, it should be problematized as such. The scandal of “usurpation” invites us expressly and intrinsically to do that” (original quotations – 40).

What all of these points determine, for Derrida’s reversal of them, is that Saussure’s linguistics is never ‘general’ as long as it distinguishes rigorously its inside and its outside. And the system of ‘writing in general’ is not exterior to the system of linguistics in general, unless it is granted that the division between the exterior and the interior passes through the exteriority of the exterior and the interiority of the interior until the alien forces of its ‘immanent’ system intervene. This is why writing is not an image or figuration of language in general, especially the image within the system, upon which the act of exclusion is reconsidered. “Writing is not a sign of a sign [that will mean to say “alphabet”], except if one says it of all signs, which would be more profoundly true. If every sign refers to a sign, and if “sign of sign” signifies writing [...]

What Saussure saw without seeing, knew without being able to take into account, following in that the entire metaphysical tradition, is that a certain model of writing was necessarily but provisionally imposed (but for the inaccuracy in principle, insufficiency

of fact and the permanent usurpation) as instrument and technique of representation of a system of language. And that this movement, unique in style, was so profound that it permitted the thinking, *within language*, of concepts like those of the sign, technique, representation, language” (my brackets, original quotations – 43). This epoch of speech produced the sense of being as presence and besides, in parenthesis, has, also, placed and suppressed all reflection on the origin of and the status of writing, except as a science of writing which is mere technology or the history of a technique, which leans upon mythology and comprehends writing as a metaphor. “It is this logocentrism which, limiting the internal system of language in general by a bad abstraction, prevents Saussure and the majority of his successors from determining fully and explicitly that which is called “the integral and concrete object of linguistics”” (original quotations – 43). Thus, at the moment, when Saussure closes the parenthesis on the science of grammatology, he, in fact, inevitably opens the field of it. Then, for Derrida, one can recognize the possibility of something which was never given and which is nothing other than writing which, without any exclusion, writes itself within the discourse of Saussure.

If one considers the totality of determined signs and writing as inscription and the durable institution of a sign, ‘writing in general’, for Derrida, covers the entire field of linguistic signs. And in that field, a certain field of signifiers, the “graphic” in the narrow sense, hence written, even if they are phonic, may appear. “The very idea of institution – hence of the arbitrariness of the sign- is unthinkable before the possibility of writing and outside of its horizon. Quite simply, that is, outside of the horizon itself, outside the world as space of inscription, as the opening to the emission and to the spatial *distribution* of signs, to the *regulated play* of their differences, even if they are “phonic”” (original italics and quotations- Derrida 44). The persistence upon the



distinction between nature and institution, of *physis* and *nomos* will invalidate its self-evident functioning. Then Derrida concludes that what both Hegel and Saussure has called as 'symbols', that are the 'natural' signs, escape semiology as grammatology. The thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign, accounts for a conventional relationship between the phoneme and the grapheme but irrevocably installs the latter to be an image of the former. What matters for Derrida is not that there is an ideographic filiation of the alphabet but that the synchronic structure and systematic principle of alphabetic writing has no relationship of natural representation, none of resemblance or participation be implied. "One must therefore challenge, in the very name of arbitrariness of the sign, the Saussurian definition of writing as "image" – hence as natural symbol- of language. Not to mention the fact that phoneme is the *unimaginable* itself, and no visibility can *resemble* it, it suffices to take into account what Saussure says about the difference between the symbol and the sign in order to be completely baffled as to how he can at the same time say of writing that it is an "image" or "figuration" of language and define language and writing elsewhere as "two distinct systems of signs" (original quotations and italics– 45). Derrida's proposal is that Saussure has never been able to think that writing was truly an image, a representation or a figuration of the spoken language, this is why he always needed these notions to decide upon writing as exteriority.

Writing is more exterior to speech, not being its image or symbol and more interior to speech, which is in itself, a writing. Therefore, Derrida defines his concept of *instituted trace*, common to all systems of significations. Even the unmotivatedness of the link between the signifier and signified implies that there is no simple natural attachment in-between and the choice of the signifier is entirely left to the speaker, what matters in here is the question of naturalness rather than its attachment.

“That is why the word “institution” should not be too quickly interpreted within the classical system of oppositions. The instituted trace cannot be thought without thinking the retention of difference within a structure of reference where difference appears *as such* and thus permits a liberty of variations among the full terms. The absence of *another* here-and-now, of another transcendental present, of *another* origin of the world appearing as such, presenting itself as irreducible absence within the presence of the trace, is not a metaphysical formula substituted for a scientific concept of writing. This formula, beside the fact that it is the questioning of metaphysics itself, describes the structure implied by the “arbitrariness of the sign”, from the moment that one thinks of its possibility *short of* the derived opposition between nature and convention, symbol and sign, etc. These oppositions have meaning only after the possibility of the trace. The “unmotivatedness” of the sign requires a synthesis in which the completely other is announced as such – without any simplicity, any identity, any resemblance or continuity- within what is not it. *Is announced as such*: there we have all *history*, from what metaphysics has defined as “non-living” up to “consciousness”, passing through all levels of animal organization. The trace, where the relationship with the other is marked, articulates its possibility in the entire field of the entity, which metaphysics has defined as the being-present starting from the occulted movement of the trace.” (original quotations and italics – 46-7).

#### 4.2. Writing In General and the break of Idea/Word: “*the play of the world...*”

The trace must be thought before the entity, for Derrida. The trace produces itself in self-occultation. However, this is not theological, either, which could only be a determined moment in the movement of the trace. The field of the entity, before being determined as the field of presence, is structured according to the possibilities of the trace. “The presentation of the other as such, that is to say, the dissimulation of its “as such”, has always already begun and no structure of the entity escapes it” (47). The unmotivatedness passes from one structure to another until the sign crosses the stage of the symbol. In what Saussure calls symbol, which does not interest semiology, there is no immotivation. The instituted trace, that Derrida names, also works within the same possibility, but without referring to a ‘nature’, it has always *become*. Then, Derrida

marks his point and says what Saussure does not say but has to be said: “there is neither symbol nor sign but a becoming-sign of symbol. [...] Thus, as it goes without saying, the trace whereof I speak is not more *natural* (it is not the mark, the natural sign or the index ...) than *cultural*, not more physical than physis, biological than spiritual. It is that starting from which a becoming-unmotivated of the sign, and with it all the superior oppositions between *physis* and its other, are possible” (47). In the becoming-unmotivated of the symbol, we are in the play where the transcendental signified is absent. However, this play should not be understood as a *play in the world*, rather, it is the *game of the world* that should be understood before attempting to understand all the forms of play in the world.

The reduction to phonic matter, the difference between language and speech has kept writing in the narrow sense or as a parasite. In fact, Derrida does not believe general writing to be the idea of a system to be invented, an hypothetical characteristic or a future possibility, on the contrary, that oral language also belongs to writing but only on one condition, “that the “original” or the “natural” language etc. had never existed, never been intact and untouched by writing, that it had itself always been a writing” (56). He calls the difference between speech and its other as writing, because difference cannot be thought without trace. Writing has always threatened the most formidable difference; it has threatened the desire for the living speech, has breached the living speech from the very beginning. Therefore, Derrida, proposes his concept of ‘arche-writing’ and calls it as such because it communicates with the vulgar concept of writing. This concept of arche-writing cannot and can never be recognized as the object of a science. It is that very thing which cannot let itself be reduced to the form of presence. It is at work not only in form or substance of the graphic expression but also in

those of nongraphic expressions. It also constitutes not only the pattern uniting form to substance, graphic or otherwise, but the movement of sign-function linking content to an expression to create a meaning, whether graphic or not.

“It is because arche-writing, movement of difference, irreducible arche-synthesis, opening in one and the same possibility, temporalization as well as relationship with the other and language, cannot, as the condition of all linguistic systems, form a part of the linguistic system itself and be situated as an object in its field. (Which does not mean it has a real field *elsewhere, another assignable site.*) Its concept could in no way enrich the scientific, positive and “immanent” description of the system itself” (original quotations, parenthesis and italics- 60).

Jacques Derrida believes to be a short-of and beyond of transcendental criticism.

In order for beyond to not return within is to recognize the necessity of the pathway.

That pathway must leave a track in the text. Without that track, the transcendental text will also resemble the precritical text. This is how Derrida mediates on that resemblance:

“What I call the erasure of concepts ought to mark the places of that future mediation. For example, the value of the transcendental arche must take its necessity felt before letting itself be erased. The concept of arche-trace must comply with both that necessity and that erasure. It is in fact contradictory and not acceptable within the logic of identity. The trace is not only the disappearance of origin- within the discourse that we sustain and according to the path that we follow, it means that the origin did not even disappear, that it was never constituted except reciprocally by a nonorigin. From then on, to wrench the concept of the trace from the classical scheme, which would derive it from a presence or from an originary nontrace and which would make of it an empirical mark, one must indeed speak of an originary trace or arche-trace. Yet we know that that concept destroys its name and that, if all begins with the trace, there is above all no originary trace” (61).

Even the concept of experience as originary presentation, in the reduced phenomenology of Husserl, cannot be explained without the thought of trace. And both of Saussure’s and Hjemslev’s linguistics, always work on oppositions as appearances

presupposed by an originary synthesis without absolute simplicity and differences to produce the reduction of phonic substance.

“Such would be the originary trace. Without retention in the minimal unit of temporal experience, without a trace retaining the other as other in the same, no difference would do its difference here, but rather, before all determination of the content, of the *pure* movement which produces difference. *The (pure) trace is difference.* It does not depend on any sensible plenitude, audible or visible, phonic or graphic. It is, on the contrary, the condition of such plenitude. Although it *does not exist*, although it is never a *being-present* outside of all plenitude, its possibility is by rights anterior to all that one calls sign (signified/ signifier, content/ expression etc.), concept or operation, motor or sensory. This difference therefore is not more sensible than intelligible and it permits the articulation of signs among themselves within the same abstract order – a phonic or graphic text for example- or between two orders of expression. It permits the articulation of speech and writing – in the colloquial sense- as it finds the metaphysical opposition between the sensible and the intelligible, then between signifier and signified, expression and content etc. If language were not already, in that sense, a writing, no derived “notation” would be possible; and the classical problem of the relationships between speech and writing could not arise. Of course, the positive *sciences* of signification can only describe the *work* and the *fact* of difference, the determined differences and the determined presences that they make possible. There cannot be a science of difference itself in its operation, as it is impossible to have a science of the origin of presence itself, that is to say of a certain nonorigin” (original quotations-62).

Therefore, for Derrida, difference should be regarded as the formation of form.

Saussure has retained the concept for the signified and the sound-image for the signifier.

The sound-image is different than objective sound, it is what is heard; not the sound itself but the being heard of the sound. Being-heard is phenomenal and belongs to an order that is dissimilar to the sound in the world. The structured appearance

[*l'apparaître*] of the sound, as sensory matter, lived and informed by difference is called the phonic image by Saussure. The word phonic is by all rights a reduction towards being in the world, marking the subject's place well in the distinction between the internal and

external lived experience. Therefore, it has been indispensable for Saussure to keep the difference between the appearing sound and appearing of the sound.

“These precautions taken, it should be recognized that it is in the specific zone of this imprint and this trace, in the temporalization of a *lived experience* which is neither *in* the world nor in “another world”, which is not more sonorous than luminous, not more *in* time than *in* space, that differences appear among the elements or rather produce them, make them emerge as such and constitute the *texts*, the chains, and the systems of traces. These chains and systems cannot be outlined except in the fabric of this trace or imprint. The unheard difference between the appearing and the appearance [*l'apparaissant et l'apparaître*] (between the “world” and “lived experience”) is the condition of all other differences, of all other traces, and *it is already a trace [...]* *The trace is in fact the absolute origin of sense in general. Which amounts to saying once again that there is no absolute origin of sense in general. The trace is difference* which opens appearance [*l'apparaître*] and signification. Articulating the living upon the nonliving in general, origin of all repetition, origin of ideality, the trace is not more ideal than real, not more intelligible than sensible, not more a transparent signification than an opaque energy and *no concept of metaphysics can describe it*” (original quotations, brackets and italics - 65).

The idea of physis imprint refers to the idea of articulation. Without the difference between the sensory appearing and its lived appearing [*l'apparaître*], the temporalizing synthesis, the chain of significations could not operate. The irreducibility of the imprint also refers to its passivity, which is also a relationship to an absolute past. That is what authorizes Derrida to call *trace* that does not let itself be summed up to any simplicity of present and obliges us to think of a past that can never be lived in the present, as present-past. “Since past has signified past-present, the absolute past that is retained in the trace no longer rigorously merits the name “past”. Another name to erase, especially since the strange movement of the trace proclaims as much as it recalls: difference defers-differs [*diffère*]. With the same precaution and under the same erasure, it may be said that its passivity is also its relationship with the “future”. The concepts of

*present, past, and future*, everything in the concepts of time and history which implies evidence of them –the metaphysical concept of time in general- cannot adequately describe the structure of the trace” (original quotations and italics - 67). It is no chance that the transcendental phenomenology of the internal time-consciousness, so careful to place cosmic time within brackets, live at a time that is accomplice to the time of the world. Perception, consciousness and the world are all on the same plane that does not even allow a rupture intrude between them. “It is in a certain “unheard” sense, then, that speech is in the world, rooted in that very passivity which metaphysics calls sensibility in general” (original quotations - 67), which runs in accordance with the idea that logos is imprinted and that imprint is the writing-resource of language under the noncreative, eternal and continuous full element of the divine word. “But it would mean a single step outside of metaphysics if nothing more than a new motif of “return to finitude”, of “God’s death” etc., were the result of this move. It is that conceptuality and that problematics that must be deconstructed. They belong to the onto-theology they fight against. Differance is also something other than finitude” (original quotations - 68).

The passivity of speech is also its relationship with language. And the relationship between passivity and difference cannot be thought without the relationship between unconscious of language (as the rootedness within language) and the *spacing* (pause, blank, punctuation etc.) as the origin of signification.

“*Spacing* (notice that this word speaks the articulation of space and time, the becoming-space of time and the becoming-time of space) is always the unperceived, the nonpresent and the nonconscious. *As such*, if one can still use that expression in a non-phenomenological way; for here we pass the very limits of phenomenology. Arche-writing as spacing cannot occur *as such* within the phenomenological experience of a *presence*. It marks *the dead time* within the presence of the living present, within the general form of all presence. The dead time is at work. That is why, once again, in spite of all the discursive resources that the former may borrow from

the latter, the concept of the trace will never be merged with a phenomenology of writing. As the phenomenology of the sign in general, a phenomenology of writing is impossible. No intuition can be realized in the place where ‘the whites’ indeed take on an importance” (original italics, my underlines - 68).

Writing, then, is always other than the subject and should never be thought under the category of the subject; “however it is modified, however it is endowed with consciousness or unconsciousness, it will refer, by the entire thread of history, to the substantiality of a presence unperturbed by accidents, or to the identity of the selfsame [*le propre*] in the presence of self-relationship. And the thread of that history clearly does not run within the borders of metaphysics” (69). In that history, the whites had always justified their language, chosen their own words within an historical strategy.

Spacing as writing is the becoming-absent of the subject. Otherwise, it would fall into the self-relationship of subject with its own death in the eddy of the constitution of subjectivity. That is to say, for all organizations of life; that constitution of subjectivity runs by the economy of death. The spacing cuts, drops and causes the subject drop within the unconscious, because for Derrida, the unconscious is nothing without this cadence and before this caesura and discontinuity. The spacing, then, marks the impossibility that a sign, the unity of the signifier and the signified, be produced within the plenitude of a present and an absolute presence. Arche-writing is spacing, as the possibility of the spoken word, the graphie in the narrow sense is the opening of first exteriority in general, the enigmatic relationship of the living with its other and of an inside and outside.

“The outside, “spatial” and “objective” exteriority which we believe we know as the most familiar thing in the world, as familiarity itself, would not appear without the grammé, without difference as temporalization, without the nonpresence of the other inscribed within the sense of the



present, without the relationship with death as the concrete structure of the living present [...] The presence-absence of the trace, which one should not even call its ambiguity but rather its play (for the word “ambiguity” requires the logic of presence, even when it begins to disobey that logic), carries in itself the problems of the letter and the spirit, of body and soul, and of all the problems whose primary affinity I have recalled. All dualisms, all theories of the immortality of the soul or of the spirit, as well as all monisms, spiritualist or materialist, dialectical or vulgar, are the unique theme of a metaphysics whose entire history was compelled to strive toward the reduction of the trace. The subordination of the trace to the full presence summed up in the logos, the humbling of writing beneath a speech dreaming its plenitude, such are the gestures required by an onto-theology determining the archeological and eschatological meaning of being as presence, as *parousia*, as life without a trace: another name for death, historical metonymy where God’s name holds death in check” (71).

The linearist concept of time is one of the deepest adherences of the modern concept of the sign to its own history. At the limit, it, indeed, is the very concept of the sign itself; between the signifying and signified faces, it is committed to the classical ontology. The reference to a signified thinkable outside of signifiers is dependent to the onto-theology that is underlined in Western metaphysics.

“It is thus the idea of the sign that must be deconstructed through a meditation upon writing which would merge, as it must, with the undoing of onto-theology faithfully repeating it in its *totality* and *making* it *insecure* in its most assured evidences. One is necessarily led to this from the moment that the trace affects the totality of the sign in both of its faces. That the signified is originarily and essentially (and not only for a finite and created spirit) trace, that it is *always already in the position of the signifier*, is the apparently innocent proposition within which the metaphysics of the logos, of presence and consciousness, must reflect upon writing as its death and its resource” (original italics - 73).

Then one can say that Derrida’s concept of arche-writing has already been announced back in Benjamin’s inference on ‘Mimetic Faculty’ that writing is everywhere. However, Derrida does not see writing at the limit of a perceptual map, in reserve as the unconscious of a writer behind for a possible inquiry.

Since Derrida does not leave a trace stabilized, because the trace is always-already becoming, is grammatology possible, then? Or is it impossible, which would retrace us to its very possibility. On what conditions could it be possible, if it even risks destroying the concept of science? Its very possibility is also its impossibility. Before all, it never should begin its inquiry with the instituting question of philosophy: ‘what is’, neither with the question ‘where and how has writing begun?’ Otherwise, it would reduce itself into the very thing it accuses of being reductionist as determining the moment and places of the first phenomena of writing. These are questions of origin and therefore, of essence and remain within the margins of metaphysics. However, the trace should teach us that there is no origin; that is to say; no simple origin.

#### **4.3. Shattering the Play of Articulations: Literary Communism and Compearance**

Then we are left without the simplicity of origins. How could this be put out or could it ever be possible to project that statement forward? Jean-Luc Nancy’ reading of entity (Being) and word-as-being gives a clue of the dissemination of the determination of ‘word’ (Being). Jean-Luc Nancy has defined a concept: ‘being singular-plural’.

“Being singular-plural: these three apposite words, which do not have any determined syntax (“being” is verb or noun; “singular” and “plural” are nouns or adjectives; all can be rearranged in different combinations), mark up an absolute equivalence, both in an indistinct *and* distinct way. Being is singularly plural and plurally singular” (original quotations – Nancy, *Being Singular Plural* 28). However, singular-plural also constitutes the essence of Being but it is a constitution that undoes every single and substantial essence of Being because there is nothing existing prior to the singular-plural; only what

exists exists. The co-implication of this existence is, also, co-existence, which means the sharing of a world. A world is not something exterior to existence, it is the coexistence that puts these existences together. Being singular-plural also means the essence of Being is only a co-essence. The co-essence or being-with (being-with-many) designates the essence of the *co-* (the *cum*) itself in the position or guise of an essence. The “with” that constitutes the being is not simply an addition to some prior being; instead it is at the center of being. Therefore, coessentiality signifies the essential sharing of essentiality, sharing in the guise of assembling. Indeed, what Nancy tries to propose is that for the whole of philosophy, any exposition does not prevent the deeply set order of reasons from being regulated by a co-originary. “Philosophy is, in sum, the thinking of being-with; because of this, it is also thinking-with as such” (31).

The singular-plural is in such a way that the singularity of each is indissociable from a plurality. The singular-being, which is not an individual, is the finite being. It does not proceed from the scene of form and ground, appearing and appearance to which the anesthetizing nihilism of the individualism always culminates. It is not subjected to a process of singularization, is not extracted, produced or derived and does not proceed from anything. It, also, is not the particular that can only present its difference from other particular as numerical difference. “Its birth does not take place *from out of* or as *effect of*: on the contrary, it provides the measure according to which *birth*, as such, is neither a production nor a self-positioning, the measure according to which the infinite birth of finitude is not a process that emerges from a ground or from a fund of some kind. The “ground” is itself, through itself and as such, already the finitude of singularities. It is a groundless “ground”, less in the sense that it opens up the gaping chasm of an abyss than that it is made up only of the network, the interweaving, and the

sharing of singularities [...]” (original quotations – Nancy, *The Inoperative Community* 27). The singular being does not emerge or rise up against the background of a chaotic or undifferentiated identity of beings or against their unitary or that of a becoming or will. Singular being *appears*, as finitude itself at the end or at the beginning with the “contact of skin (or heart)” of another singular being, at the confines of the *same* singularity that is always *other*, always shared, always exposed. The singular is plural. “In Latin, the term *singuli* already says the plural, because it designates the “one” as belonging to “one by one”” (original quotations – Nancy, *Being Singular Plural* 32). The singular is each one and, also, *with* and *among* all the others. This, also, offers the property of indivisibility, However, it is not indivisible like any particular is indivisible; “the singular is each time *for* the whole, in its place and in light of it. If humanity is *for* being in totality [...], then it is the exposing of the singular as such and in general” (32). A singularity is not lodged on the background of Being, it is Being itself or its origin. The essence of Being is the shock of the instant. Each time, Being is always an instant. “As a result, it is always an instance of “with”: singulars singularly together, where the togetherness is neither the sum, nor the incorporation, nor the “society”, nor the “community” (where these words only give rise to problems). The togetherness of singulars is singularity “itself”. It “assembles” them insofar as it spaces them; they are “linked” insofar as they are not unified” (original quotations - 33). Singular being is an ego, but not a subject in the sense of a relation of the self to itself. According to these conditions, then, Being as being-with can no longer be able to say itself in the third person. There would no longer be a point of view exterior to being from which it could be announced that ‘there is being’ because there is no longer the ‘I am’ that is subjacent to the announcement of ‘there is’.

The 'one' and the 'other' is neither 'by', 'for', 'in', 'despite' but 'with'. The 'with' is more and less than a bond or relation, especially if such a relation or bond presupposes the term upon which it relies. The 'with' is the sharing of time-space; it is at-the-same-time-in-the-same-place and in itself shattered. It does not indicate the sharing of a common situation any more than the juxtaposition of pure exteriorities. It is the instant scaling back upon the identity. Being is at the same time in the same place only on the condition of the spacing of an indefinite plurality of singularities. Being is with being; it does not recover itself but is near to itself, in touch with itself in the paradox of where distancing and strangeness are revealed. We are each time an other, each time with others.

To designate what the being-with of Being is the original situation of the West, the problem of the city, whose repetition has led to a sort of antinomy; on the one side of which lies the exposure of the world and on the other, the end of the representations of the world. "This means nothing short of a transformation in the relation [that we name] "politico-philosophy": it can no longer be a matter of a single community, of its essence, closure and sovereignty; by contrast, it can no longer be a matter of organizing community according to the decrees of a sovereign Other, or according to the *telos* of history. It can no longer be a matter of treating sociability as a regrettable and inevitable accident, as constraint that has to be managed in some way or another. Community is bare, but it is imperative" (original brackets, italics and quotations – 35-6). The laying bare of sovereignty presupposes one to take a certain distance from the political. "This distance is not taken in order to engage in a depoliticized thinking, but in order to engage in a thinking, the site of which is the very constitution, imagination and signification of the political, which allows this thinking to retrace its path in its retreat and beginning

from this retreat. The retreat of the political does not signify the disappearance of the political. It only signifies the disappearance of the philosophical presupposition of the whole politico-philosophical order, which is always an ontological presupposition” (36-7). The retreat of the political, in other words, signifies the ontological laying bare and uncovering of the being-with.

Being singular plural without punctuation or a mark of equivalence, implication or sequence; a single, continuous-discontinuous mark tracing out the entire ontological domain and its presuppositions and dealing a blow onto it, carries out another syntax in itself. None of the terms, in the so-constructed phrase ‘being singular plural’, precedes the other, each designates the coessence of the others. “This coessence puts essence itself in the hyphenation – “being-singular-plural”- which is a mark of union and also a mark of division, a mark of sharing that effaces itself, leaving each term to its isolation *and its being-with-the-others*” (original italics - 37).

More originary than individuality and essence of Being, Being is *with*, it is *as the with* of Being itself, so that Being does not identify itself *as such* but shows itself, exposes itself, gives itself, occurs, disposes itself (made event, history and world) as its won singular-plural *with*. It is no more a matter of an originary multiplicity and its correlation than it is a matter of an originary unity and its division. It is an increase or excess of origin in the origin. One is more than one, it is not that it divides itself, rather it is that one equals more than one, it is the ‘more’ of its exposition. It is an excess of unity, it is one-with-one, where Being in itself is copresent. The *co-* of copresence is not subject to a logical presentation. “Neither to be present nor to be presented (nor, as a result, “unrepresentable” in the strict sense), the “with” is the (singular plural) condition of presence in general [understood] as copresence. The *co-*presence is neither a presence

withdrawn into absence nor a presence *in* itself or *for* itself” (original parenthesis and brackets - 40). It, also, is not pure presence to itself or to others or to the world. In fact, none of these presences can take place, unless copresence can take place. In the classical ontology, a subject not only assumes its distinction from the object of its representation but also from all other subjects. Therefore, the ‘with’ is the supposition of the ‘self’ in general. This is presence-with. Being-many-together is the originary situation, it is even what defines a situation in general. “Therefore an originary or transcendental “with” demands, with a palpable urgency, to be disentangled and articulated from itself. But one of the greatest difficulties of the concept of the with is that there is no “getting back to” or “up to” this “originary” or “transcendental” position: the with is strictly contemporaneous with all existence, as it is with all thinking” (original quotations- 41).

The most fundamental requirement of ontology asking for a presupposition that it itself defines, cannot be assumed to be the simple singular that its name indicates. Its being singular is plural in its very being. Presence or rationality cannot be thought starting from something else, then it follows that “*not only must being-with-one-another not be understood starting from the presupposition of being-one, but on the contrary, being-one can only be understood by starting from being-with-one-another*” (original italics - 56). What happens, then, with the laying bare of the social is an act of symbolicity. It must be well understood of what is meant by this word symbol. It is making a connection or joining and giving a face to this liaison by making an image. However, that relation is not a representation of something real but the relation is nothing other than what is real in the relation, that is, its effectiveness and its efficacy. The symbol is the joint where the surface and the depth touch and always *become*. “The sole criterion of symbolization is exclusion or the debasement of the image, but instead

the capacity for allowing a certain play, in and by the image-symbol, with the joining, the distancing, the opened interval that articulates it as *sym-bol*: this word simply means “put-with” (the Greek *sun* equals the Latin *cum*), so that the dimension, space and the nature of the “with” are in play here” (original parenthesis and quotations - 58).

Therefore, when Jean-Luc Nancy speaks of social reality’s laying bare itself, he is, in fact, trying to talk about society “uncovered”, society no longer being the appearance of itself, no longer reduced to a background of signification (no community, no mystical body) but a society making a symbol of itself and its appearance by facing itself in order to be all that it is and has to be. “In this way, being-social is not reduced to any assumption of an interior or superior unity. Its unity is wholly symbolic; it is wholly of the with. Being-social is Being that is by appearing in the face of itself, faced with itself: it is *co-appearing*” (59). Co-appearance does not mean that subjects appear together. The word “together” always ends up in the dead end of metaphysics, where social is seen as a transitory phenomenon, which ends up in the hypostasis of the togetherness or common (communion or community) or to the hypostasis of the individual where the association of the Being is instrumentalized and related to something other than itself. Together and being-together are not the same. Together can only stand as the adverb of being-together. Togetherness is a substantive entity, a collection of the essence and of the origin. Together means simultaneity, that is, “at the same time”. Being at the same time and the same place, which is the determination of time as contemporary time, assumes that subjects share this space-time, share it between themselves, symbolize it at the same time-space. However, Nancy rejects that time-space is, first of all, the possibility of the “with”. Time is the succession of the pure moment without simultaneity. Time already implies “at the same time”. “Simultaneity immediately



opens space as the spacing of time itself. Starting from the simultaneity of “subjects”, time is possible, but above all, is necessary. For in order to be together and to communicate, a correlation of places *and* a transition of passages from one place to another is necessary. Sharing and passage control each other reciprocally” (original quotations and italics - 61). Therefore, the “together” remains to be an absolutely originary structure and determines that what is not together is in the no-time-no-place of non-Being. “Co-appearance, then, must signify – because this is what is now at stake – that “appearing” (coming into the world and being in the world, or existence as such) is strictly inseparable, indiscernible from the *cum* or the *with*, which is not only its place and its taking place, but also – and this is the same thing- its fundamental ontological structure” (61). The “with” as such is unrepresentable and presence is impossible without co-presence. What is proper to the community, then, is that, it has no other resource to appropriate except the “with” that constitutes it, its interiority without an interior. This is the *cum* of co-appearance, in which we do nothing but appear together with one another before no authority into the randomly contingent, exterior pure and simple with. “We are thus in a suspension of history where an enigma is gathering anew; we are contemporaries of ourselves, contemporaries of the stripping bare of being-in-common” (63).

Society sees itself or exposes itself bared to this common excess. Society knows itself bare when exposed to this common excess, commonality of origin or when it attains the knowledge of a “we”. The “we” neither says the “One” nor the togetherness of the ones and others but say the “one” in a singular plural way, that is, one by one and one with one. Opening to the other or occurring as the other, the self has its originarity in the loss of the self. Birth and death become the marks of point of origin and

destination within the other as a loss. My birth is only possible through the death of the other has been the gist of Western metaphysics (Hegel). The other for, Nancy, does not belong to the realm of “with”, it is nearer and further than every mode of being. “It does not accompany identity; it crosses through it, and transgresses it; it transfixes it. Within the discourse about alterity, a general mode of *trans-* (transport, transaction, transcription, transfer, transmission, transformation, transparency, transubstantiation, transcendence) continually runs alongside the mode of *cum-*, but it will never be able to eclipse it or replace it” (original italics - 78). The subject is born into its own intimacy, more interior than the interior. In this way, then, “solitude” appears and which is nothing but a Christian event, for Nancy. Consciousness of self is the solitude. The other has its moment of identity in the divine Other, which is also the moment of identity of everything and of the universal. For Nancy, “the Other is the place of *community as communion*, that is, the place of a being-self-in-other that would no longer be altered or where such alteration would be identification. In this world, the mystery of communion announces itself in the form of the *nearby*” (original italics - 79). The question of intimacy imposes the imperial of love; the hidden intimacy of the necessity of loving oneself in the other. What matters in the matter of love and deconstructing Western ontology, which is at the heart of Being is that; “it [love] designates itself at the heart of Being – in lieu of an *in* place of Being - and designates this relation, of one another, as the infinite relation of the same to the same as originally other than itself. “Love” is the abyss of the self in itself; it is “delectation” or “taking care” of what originally escapes or is lacking: it consists in taking care of this retreat and in this retreat” (original italics - 80). The measure of the nearby laid bare has been determined in Western ontology as indeterminate in order to designate an Other of the societal where the societal itself (the

commonness as a Being or as a common subject) would be made in itself or for itself and that it would be the very sameness of the other and the sameness as Other. “In contrast, being-with designates the other that never comes back to the same, the plurality of origins. The just measure of the with, or more exactly, the with or being-with as just measure, as justness and justice, is the measure of dis-position as such: the measure of the distance from one origin to another” (81).

The origin is something other than a starting point, it is both an appearing and a principle and repeats itself at each moment of what it originates. It is an incessant creation, *it becomes*. The world does not have an origin outside itself, it has its origin in itself and occurs at each moment of the world. “It is the *each time* of Being, and its realm is the *being-with* of each time with every [other] time. The origin is for and by way of the singular plural of every possible origin. The “with” is the measure of an origin-of-the-world *as such*, or even of an origin-of-meaning as such. To-be-with is to make sense mutually, and only mutually. Meaning is the fullest measure of the incommensurable “with”. The “with” is the fullest measure of (the) incommensurable meaning (of Being)” (original quotations, parenthesis and brackets - 83). The plurality of origins designates the Origin of the world, its springing forth everywhere, in each instant and simultaneously. This is how it comes to appear out of nothing and is created. Its creation must not be understood under the guise of some particular operation; “it is, insofar as it is, as created, as having arisen, come or grown; it has always already sprung from all sides or more exactly, it is itself the springing forth and the something of the “always already” and the “everywhere”. As such, each being belongs to the (authentic) origin, each is originary (the springing forth of the springing forth itself), and each is original (incomparable, underivable). Nevertheless, all of them share the originarity and

originality; this sharing *is itself* the origin” (original italics and parenthesis, my underline - 83). However, what is shared is not a unique substance in which each would participate; what is shared is what shares, what is constituted as sharing and what is called ‘matter’. Matter does not designate a substance or a subject, but designates what is divided of itself and remains impenetrable to the ‘spirit’, which is beyond the world. The ontology of being-with is the ontology of bodies, whether they be animate, inanimate, sentient, speaking, thinking, having weight etc. Body means the outside, it is the sharing of and the departure from the self and goes from itself to itself; “the nearby-to-self without which the “self” would not even be “on its own””(original quotations - 84).

Stoics have stated that language is the incorporeal. Saying is corporeal but what is said is incorporeal. Language is not in the world. “Language is not in the world or inside the world, as though the world were its body: it is the outside of the world in the world; it is not the eruption of an Other, which would clear away or sublimate the world, which would transcribe it into something else; instead, it is the exposition of the world-of-bodies as such, that is, as originally singular plural” (84). Language is the exposition of plural singularity. All of being is exposed as meaning, the originary sharing which relates a being to being as the circulation of meaning of the world which has no beginning or end where no presence is for oneself without being for others. This is also why the essential dialogue of polylogue of language (‘(understanding)-oneself speak’) is both the one in which we speak to one another and the one in which I speak to myself. At this point, the exigency of singularity exposes itself. “It is not individuality; it is each time, the punctuality of a “with” that establishes a certain origin of meaning and connects it to an infinity of other possible origins. Therefore, it is, at one and the same

time, infra-/intraindividual and transindividual, and always the two together” (85). This is why, there is no ultimate language but languages, words, voices; “an originally singular sharing of voices without which there would be no voice” (85). In the incorporeal position of language, all beings pass through humanity and exposes humanity outside of what is human, to the meaning of the world and therefore humanity remains as a concept. However, humanity is not the subject of the world; it does not represent the world, neither gives meaning to it. Exposed as gifted with language, it exposes the world itself as the condition of being-with-all-beings in the world. The Being exposes itself as *between* and *with* of singulars and is its own reason. It does not have another reason does not mean that it carries its own *telos* within itself. It says what can only be said (which is also called the ineffable), it is “what cannot be presented as a being among others, since it is the “among” of all beings (*among*: inside, in the middle of, with), which are each and every time among one another” (original italics, parenthesis and quotations - 86). Since Being is exposed in the incorporeality of the saying, this does not mean that Being is only a word. As soon as a word is spoken, it is resaid. Meaning does not occur in the transmission between a receiver and a speaker, but in the simultaneity of two origins: that of the saying and of its resaying. “For a word is what it is only among all words, and a spoken word is what it is only in the “with” of all speaking. Language is essentially in the with. Every spoken word is the simultaneity of at least two different modes of that spoken word: even I am by myself, there is the one that is said and the one that is heard, that is, the one that is resaid” (86). Meaning must return to me in order for me to be resaid by me, in this way, what comes back, also, becomes another origin of meaning. Meaning is the passing back and forth and sharing the origin at the origin as singular plural and the exposition of the foundation; “simply

the *with* of things as they are, insofar as they are. *Logos* is *dialogue*, but the end [or purpose] of dialogue is not to overcome itself in “consensus”; its reason is to offer, and only to offer (giving it tone and intensity), the *cum-*, the *with* of meaning, the plurality of its springing forth” (original quotations, italics and parenthesis - 87). It is enough, then, to oppose idle chatter to the authenticity of the spoken word as poetic distinction. It is a question, then, of understanding the imminent exhaustion of signification as a translation, in the sense of a stretching or spreading out from one origin of meaning to another. From the point of view of signification, language constitutes itself from out of “as” and presents one thing as another and itself, is a mere metaphor but from the point of view of meaning and truth, it presents the “as” *as such*. It presents the exteriority of the thing, its being-before and being-with-all-things (and not its being-elsewhere). “Every spoken word brings to speech this “as itself”, that is, the mutual exposition and disposition of the singularities of the world (of a world of singularities, of singular worlds, or world-singularities). Language is the element of the with *as such*: it is the space of its declaration. In turn, this declaration as such refers to everyone and to no one, refers to the world and to its coexistence” (original italics - 88).

Death, which does not take place for the subject but just for its representation, interrupts the totality of saying. Death, as such, like birth, takes place as language in and through being-with-one-another. As the “as” without quality, death “[...] is the very signature of the “with”: the dead are those who are no longer “with” and are, at the same time, those who take their places according to an exact measure, of the incommensurable, the appropriate measure, of the incommensurable “with”” (original quotations - 89). If one is born or dies as an origin of meaning, it follows then, one is never born alone or dies alone. The solitude of birth/death is no longer solitude but the

exact reverse of its sharing. Language, then, is not a diversion or an arrangement with the intolerability of death but the tragedy itself, that is to say, the destitution of meaning that grasps the origin as singular-plural. "Language exposes death: it neither denies it, nor affirms it; it brings it to language, and death is nothing but that, that which is essentially brought to language – and that which brings it there" (90). 'Literature' is language stretched out toward birth and death, striving toward address, understanding and conversation; it is multiple sharing without which there would be no "as" in general. Literature is the being-in-common of what has no common origin, but is originally in-common or with. Therefore, death cannot be defined as negativity because language does not know or practice negativity. "Before being spoken, before being a particular language or signification, before being verbal, "language" is the following: the extension and simultaneity of the "with" insofar as it is the *ownmost power* of a body, the propriety of its *touching* another body (or of touching *itself*), which is nothing other than its definition as body. It finishes itself there, where it is-with; that is, it comes to a stop and accomplishes itself in a single gesture" (original quotations, italics and parenthesis - 92). In this sense, then, "to speak with" is not speaking to oneself or to another, nor saying, nor proffering in order to bring forth meaning. "To speak with" is conversation and being-exposed, which exposes only the secret of its own exposition. It is an euphemism for saying or not saying nothing more than what 'wanting to say' means in many different ways; it says Being itself *as* communication and thinking. ""Language" is not an instrument of communication, and communication is not an instrument of Being; communication *is* Being, and Being *is*, as a consequence, nothing but the incorporeal by which bodies express themselves to one another *as such*" (original quotations and italics - 93).

It could be said that community is revealed through the death of others. It takes place through others and to others. It is not the communion that fuses the egos into an “Ego” or a higher “We”. It is the community of others and therefore it occupies a singular place that assumes the impossibility of its own ‘immanence’, and the impossibility of a communitarian being in the form of a subject is humanism or what Nancy defines as ‘immanentism’.

“Community means, consequently, that there is no singular being without another singular being, and that there is, therefore, what might be called, in a rather inappropriate idiom, an originary or ontological “sociality”, that in its principle extends far beyond the simple theme of man as a social being (the *zoon politikon*). For, on the one hand, it is not obvious that the community of singularities is limited to “man” and excludes, for example, the “animal” (even in the case of “man” and not also the “inhuman” or the “superhuman”, or, for example, if I may say so with and without a certain *Witz*, “woman”: after all, the difference between the sexes is itself a singularity in the difference of singularities). On the other hand, if social being is always posited as a predicate of man, community would signify on the contrary the basis for thinking only something like “man”. But this thinking would at the same time, remain dependent upon a principial determination of community, namely, that there is no communion of singularities in a totality superior to them and immanent to their common being” (original quotations, italics and parenthesis – Nancy, *Inoperative Community* 28).

In such a place of communion, there is communication. The singular being is not anything, neither a ground, nor an essence, nor a substance but appears, presents itself and exists as a communication. In order to designate this singular mode of appearing, which is more originary than any other and always shares itself as origin; for Nancy, “we would need to be able to say that finitude *co-appears* or *compears* [*com-parait*] and can only *compear*: in this formulation, we need to hear that finite being always presents itself “together”, hence severally” (original quotation, italics and brackets - 28). Communication consists before all else in this sharing and in this



compearance of finitude. Therefore, it is not a bond more originary than the bond. It does not set itself up, it does not establish itself and does not emerge among already given subjects. Only in this communication, singular beings are given, without a bond and without communion. In this communication, a like-being resembles me in that I myself resemble him; we resemble together. That means that there is no original or origin of identity. What holds the place of an origin is the sharing of singularities. “This means that this “origin” – the origin of community or the originary community- is nothing other than the limit: the origin is the tracing of the borders upon which or along which singular beings are exposed. We are alike because each one of us is exposed to the outside that we are *for ourselves*. The like is not the same. I do not rediscover *myself*, nor do I recognize *myself* in the other: I experience the other’s alterity, or I experience alterity in the other together with the alteration that “in me” sets my singularity outside me and infinitely delimits it. Community is that singular ontological order in which the other and the same are alike: that is to say, in the sharing of identity” (original quotations, italics – 33-4).

Where Nancy takes us is the community of interrupted myth, a community without a community or a communism without a community. This community is to come, in the sense that it is always coming incessantly; the becoming-community of community where the singular beings take the place of their taking place, without this place being a ‘topoi’, a place reserved for a subject, presence or sovereignty. “Community without community is *to come*, in the sense that it is always *coming*, endlessly, at the heart of every collectivity (because it never stops coming, it ceaselessly resists collectivity itself as much as it resists the individual). It is no

more than this: to come to the limits of compearance, to that limit to which we are in effect convoked, called and sent” (71).

There is the unworking of the works of the individuals in the community (writers) and the products of the unworking of the community (literature); its peoples, its towns, its treasures, its patrimonies, its traditions, its capital. These are the same unworkings, both of which belong to the other. However, what is exposed in the work or through works begins and ends infinitely within and beyond the work, where work is offered up to the infinite communication of community. The work or the community presenting itself as work must be offered up for communication. This does not mean that the work must be “communicable”; no intelligibility or transmissibility is required of it. That the work must be offered up for communication means that it must be offered, that is to say, presented, proposed and abandoned at the common limit where singular beings share one another. Then, the work becomes a work at the moment of its completion and must be abandoned at this limit. “And this can only happen if, by itself and for itself, the work does nothing other than trace and retrace this limit: in other words, only if it does nothing other than inscribe singularity/community, or inscribe itself as singular/common, as infinitely singular/common” (73). The work when offered up for communication does not pass into a common space; since there is no common place but the sharing of places and their spacing. Although the work might as well be a communal work, since constituted with “with”, one never works alone and writes alone and the singularity of the working being cannot be presented in isolated individuality. In its unworking, the work does not become back a common substance, does not circulate

in a common exchange, does not melt into the community itself as a work and does not function commercially in a society.

Then Jean-Luc Nancy poses his provisional phrase: “literary communism”. It can hardly be aligned with the idea of communism that communists or with the idea of literature that writers or critics have meant for an epoch of our history. What it stakes is the very articulation of community, which means “writing” as an inscription of meaning whose transcendence or presence is indefinitely and constitutively deferred. Community means, the presence of a being-together whose immanence is impossible except as its death-work. Thus, neither literary art nor communication can answer to the double exigency proposed by the phrase “literary communism”. Best articulated, it is which would be the sharing of sovereignty as an exposure to the outside, sharing of the unworking of the work. Literature as the interruption of myth communicates its communion; it is a communication as the passage from one to another, the sharing of one by the other. Fictioning is the subject of being and mimesis is the poesis of the world as true world of gods, of men and nature. And this is what provokes the interruption. Absolute community (myth) is interrupted by *literature*.

To write for others means in fact to write because of others. “The writer neither gives nor addresses anything to others; he does not envisage his project as one that involves communicating something to them, be it a message or himself. Of course, there are always messages, and there are always persons, and it is important that both of these – if I [Nancy] may for a moment treat them as identical- be communicated. But writing is the act that obeys the sole necessity of exposing the limit: not the limit of communication, *but the limit upon which communication takes place*” (original italics, my brackets - 67). This common limit is the place where we expose and where it

exposes us. What takes place on this limit is the interruption of myth. And moreover, it equally requires that the interruption make itself heard with its singular voice. This voice is like a cut or the imprint left by the interruption.

“It is each time the voice of one alone, and to the side, who speaks, who recites, who sometimes sings. He speaks of an origin and an end – the end of the origin, in truth- he stages them and puts himself on stage along with them. But he comes to the edge of the stage, to its outer edge and he speaks at the softest limit of his voice. Or rather, it is we who stand at the furthest extreme and who barely hear him from this limit. Everything is a matter of one’s practical, ethical, political – and why not add spiritual?- positioning around this singular eruption of a voice. You can always make a myth out of it again. But this voice, or another, will always begin interrupting the myth again – sending us back to the limit” (67-8).

Each writer inaugurates a work as community. There is, then, an irrepressible literary communism, to which belong anyone who writes or reads by exposing himself and not imposing himself. The communism here is inaugural, extended in the singular becoming of presence, it is not an end. It is not finished; it is made up of the mythic communion and communal myth. This does not mean that it is simply an ‘idea’, either. “The communism of being-in-common and of writing (of the writing of being-in-common) is neither an idea nor an image, neither a message nor a fable, neither a foundation nor a fiction. It consists, in its entirety – it is total in this respect, not totalitarian- in the inaugural act that each work takes up and that each text retraces: in coming to the limit, in letting the limit appear as such, in interrupting the myth” (68). The interruption of the myth of the writer is not the disappearance of the writer but the death of the last writer. The writer is always there at the moment when the myth is interrupted; “he is not the author, nor is he the hero, and perhaps he is no longer what has been called the poet or what has been called the thinker; rather, he is this singular

voice, this resolutely and irreducibly singular (mortal) voice, *in common*. In singularity takes place the literary experience of writing, of the voice, of a speech given, played, sworn, offered, shared, abandoned” (original italics and parenthesis - 70). This singular voice of interruption is not a voice without a courage. This courage is not the courage to say something dangerous to dare to proclaim.

“Of course, such courage exists, - but the courage of interruption consists rather in daring to be silent, or rather, to put it less summarily, it consists in *allowing to be said* something that no one – no individual, no representative – could ever say: a voice that could never be the voice of any subject, a speech that could never be the conviction of any understanding and that is merely the voice and the thought of community in the interruption of myth. At once, *an* interrupted voice, and the voiceless interruption of every general or particular voice” (original italics - 80).

## 5. CONCLUSION

If permitted, a reading of Benjamin’s proposal for a language of sculpture and music (“art in the narrow sense”), in other words, a language bereft of the centralization of sound, away from the practice of naming with human at the centre of humanization in an immaterial community and Adorno’s conclusive attempt at construing such a language through rendering them enigmatical in their becoming of transient neglected of the moment of both themselves and the artist as the producer behind or differentiation of content [into *Inhalt* and *Gehalt*] or both Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s attempt of seeing the enlightened man caught in the endless repetition, through Deleuze’s definition of ‘simulacra’, (re-reading difference and repetition), Derrida’s ‘differance’, ‘spacing’, ‘archi-trace (writing)’ and Nancy’s inept concept ‘being singular-plural’, the ‘co-presence’ at the very heart of presence, it will be revealed out that Benjamin’s and Adorno’s proposals and attempts, inevitably, leak out.

Adorno's attempt at rendering them enigmatical in becoming transient fail for he still places the cosmic time in brackets as a string of internal-time consciousness. From Derrida's point of view, Adorno still can acknowledge with determination what they will be when fixed at their limit at the end. The differentiation of content into *Inhalt* and *Gehalt* also fail due to their surrender of copying the model with the privilege of 'true' artistic intention.

If one is allowed to look back at Benjamin's proposition about the 'word' derived from God's word, one will see that he is already taking these in the presupposition of either infiniteness or finiteness and still looking for an infiniteness against the infiniteness of the supreme word. Or does he not believe that there is an interiority of the language that nature can or cannot mourn with or without a language and can this differentiation take place without the premier distinction between culture and nature? Does this not indicate enough to see that both of them remain to be seen as a captive of Western metaphysics?

One should say then, without any positive investigation here, that the object of linguisticity 'word' can never be presented in the form of presence neither by any concept that partially links to presence. The object of linguistics, 'word' disseminates. It cannot be differed to be scrutinized for any positive investigation. It is *differance* and 'no concept of metaphysics can capture it' in Derrida's words; for any moment of capturing it would always drop one into the matrix of structure and the endless definitions of antinomies defined according to their varying degrees of a model where the second concept is always determined as an image according to the varying degrees of lack of the first one; writing defined according its difference from the phoné, the nature defined according to the varying degrees from culture, mind/ body, West/East,

self/other, external/internal, image/reality, representation/presence. Any attempt to shape or define it, any judgment rendered upon it (as we have seen through Deleuze that a judgment would always imply an judger/philosopher who auto-affects himself by the approximation to the model) would be tyrannical. The word is not a being or entity in mimesis that awaits to be defined but always a co-being (being-with), and the philosopher who tries to define and capture it, forgets that the superiority of the presence that he enjoys by giving a definition is, in fact, a co-presence at the very heart of presence. Words are always already produced in mimesis and do not already present the presence of a subject as the translator of full speech (a philosopher or a linguist who can 'select' their appropriation in what approximation to the eidetic model that they yield and the degree of their differentiation) and do always already produce meanings. In simulacra, doubled onto the *immanence* of structure/model, they can be repeated without difference, without becoming signs. This is what should be understood by the word 'dissemination' here; 'without the simplicity of origins'. 'Dissemination' what Derrida has written about elsewhere do not infer the idea of dissemination without the model, but already acknowledge that the simulacra is not a mimesis but an addition to mimesis. Copies can only be reversed into simulacra. The production between the icon [mimesis] and simulacra are not the same, perhaps this is where both Benjamin and Adorno, themselves, are enigmatical; they see and in fact, force to render 'mimesis' as simulacra and bear the epiphenomena as phenomena. As it is very-well known that it is the bourgeoisie that has the claim of presenting the 'original', which can underline the reason of their attack. However, is not presenting another 'presentation' against the model also situate them in the claim that an 'simple originarity' can be proposed (a language that is not the language of technicians or artworks becoming transient in

enigmaticalness etc.), indeed, without forgetting that they are always already *re-*presentations. This proposition, here, inevitably, returns us to the complexity of origins.

Although remaining with his lines that are depicted in this thesis, Derrida will not tell us further about the state ‘without the simplicity of origins’, where this dissemination or the being singular-plural depicted by Nancy, can be lingered for Deleuze is art. Art is the simulacra, it reverses copies into simulacra. There are two types of games for Deleuze. The first one is the human games which are based on the pre-existing moral categorical rules that serve to determine the probabilities but never affirm the whole of chance. Every time the dice is thrown, they fragment it with sedentary distributions and produce the man as the subject of the game, who has all the hypothesis about the Good and Evil so that the game is an apprenticeship in morality. This conception of a game, indistinguishable from the practice of representation (mimesis), inscribed in the matrix of necessity and essence is completely different from what Deleuze calls a divine game.

“The divine game is quite different – that which Heraclitus, perhaps, speaks; that which Mallarmé evokes with such religious fear and repentance, and Nietzsche with such decisiveness – for us it is the most difficult game to understand, impossible to deal with in the world of representation. First, there is no pre-existent rule, since the game includes its own rules. As a result, every time, the whole of chance is affirmed in a necessarily winning throw. Nothing is exempt from the game [...] every time, the different throws are distinguished not numerically but *formally*, the different rules being the forms of a single ontologically unique throw are same across all occasions.[...] A pure idea of play – in other words, of a game which would be nothing else but play instead of being fragmented, limited and intercut with the work of men. (What is human game closest to this solitary divine game? As Rimbaud said: look for H, the work of art.) [...] This is the point at which the ultimate origin is overturned into an absence of origin [...] An aleatory point is displaced through all the points on the dice, as though one time for all times. These different throws which invent their own rules and compose the unique throw with multiple forms are [...] so many imperative questions subtended by a single response which leaves them open and never close



them. [...] It is a game on two tables. How could there not be a fracture at the limit or along the hinge between the two tables? And how can we recognize on the first a substantial I identical to itself, on the second a continuous self similar to itself? The identity of the player has disappeared, as has the resemblance of the one who pays the price or profits from the consequences. The fracture or hinge is the form of the empty time, through which pass the throws of the dice. On one side, nothing but an I fractured by that empty form. On the other, nothing but a passive self always dissolving in that empty form” (Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* 283-4).

The best time when the immaterial community that Benjamin criticizes is interrupted, given by Nancy is when literature emerges. Without a proposal of a different language of art, this is what Nancy had proposed by his provisional phrase “literary communism”, a community in which we are already living, where the privilege of sound working for the sovereignty (of the subject) is always shared.

Throughout the history of literature, some authors have lived as *differance*, shattering and sharing against the sovereignty as dead-alive, striving *between* death and birth, writing *without thinking*, marking the dead time in the nonpresence of nonconsciousness. This thesis has just adumbrated the outline of the pathway through which these authors can be seen and studied with the prospect of future studies.

Although the scope of this thesis has not let them be analyzed either I want to indicate one of them, William Burroughs and his intention with his cut-up technique. My intention, here, is not in any way to venerate Burroughs but to exercise the pathway and imply the study upon already existing authors who have already deconstructed the onto-phenomeno-logical literary theory of metaphysics. William Burroughs’s technique of cut-up is the ultimate form where the mentioned divine game is inscribed, treating ‘words’ as ‘text’ and ‘writing’ (in the Derridain sense), playing with their state of mimesis, reversing them into simulacra and co-being, shattering their uniqueness and the

judgments rendered upon them, was exactly what Burroughs was doing with his cut-up technique. The cut-up technique is a mechanical method of juxtaposition in which Burroughs literally cuts up passages of prose by himself and other writers and then pastes them back together at random.

In his own words, Burroughs has explained what he was trying to do in an interview:

“Pages of text are cut and rearranged to form new combinations of word and image. In writing my last two novels, *Nova Express* and *The Ticket That Exploded*, I have used an extension of the cut up method I call “the fold in method”. A page of text - my own or some one else's - is folded down the middle and placed on another page. The composite text is then read across half one text and half the other. The fold in method extends to writing the flash back used in films, enabling the writer to move backwards and forwards on his time track. For example I take page one and fold it into page one hundred, I insert the resulting composite as page ten. When the reader reads page ten, he is flashing forwards in time to page one hundred and back in time to page one. The *deja-vu* phenomena can so be produced to order. In using the fold in method, I edit, delete and rearrange as in any other method of composition. I have frequently had the experience of writing some pages of straight narrative text which were then folded in with other pages and found that the fold-ins were clearer and more comprehensible than the original texts. Perfectly clear narrative prose can be produced using the fold in method. Best results are usually obtained by placing pages dealing with similar subjects in juxtaposition. The cut-up method brings to writers the collage, which has been used by painters for seventy years. And used by the moving and still camera. In fact all street shots from movie or still cameras are by the unpredictable factors of passersby and juxtaposition cut-ups. And photographers will tell you that often their best shots are accidents . . . writers will tell you the same. The best writings seem to be done almost by accident but writers until the cut-up method was made explicit that all writing is in fact cut-ups. I had no way to produce the accident of spontaneity. You cannot will spontaneity. But you can introduce the unpredictable spontaneous factor with a pair of scissors”<sup>(1)</sup>

As Burroughs also explains that he uses texts that have similar contents.

On the level of the Similar, which has an ideal resemblance with the eidetic

---

<sup>1</sup> Lake. *The Purple Giltter – William S. Burroughs Cut-ups Page*. 2004  
<http://www.purplegiltter.com/poesy/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=25>

model, Burroughs re-arranges the texts where he already creates their Simulacrum. Only in this communication, the singularity of the beings of the texts of different authors are given, without a bond and without communion, their originality is shattered, where their singularity is exposed. In this communication, where a similar text resembles the other text; where they resemble together, there is no originality of the identity of the texts. Burroughs, tries to hold a plane where their singularity can be shared. And in this spontaneous sharing of the time and space of the texts, without the simplicity of origins, the origin is an added “with” onto the limit of the texts. Knowing that they are already produced, it is not a speculation to treat the texts in experiment as traces; where each and every time their being is turned in the becoming-form. Moreover, it is, also, an experience of the alterity of the Other without reserving the Other in Burroughs’s own psyche. Burroughs, neither rediscovers the other authors alterity in himself and recognizes himself in them, but through this experience, in fact, sets his singularity outside himself and infinitely delimits it.

And this is how he has defined his own method elsewhere:

“The method is simple. Here is one way to do it. Take a page. Cut down the middle. You have four sections: one, two, three, four. Now rearrange the sections placing section four with section one and section two with section three. And you have a new page. Sometimes it says much the same thing. Sometimes something quite different -cutting up political speeches is an interesting exercise- in any case you will find that it says something and something quite definite. Take any poet or writer you fancy. Say poems you have read over many times. Now take the poem and type out selected passages. Fill a page with excerpts. Now cut the page. You have a new poem. As many poems as you like. As many Shakespeare, Rimbaud poems as you like. Tristan Tzara said: “Poetry is for everyone”. And Andre Breton called him a cop and expelled him from the movement. Say it again: “Poetry is for everyone”. Poetry is a place and it is free to all cut up Rimbaud and you are in Rimbaud's place. Here is a Rimbaud poem cut up. Cut-ups are for everyone. Anybody can make

cut-ups. All writing is in fact cut-ups. A collage of words read, heard, overheard. What else? Use of scissors renders the process explicit and subject to extension and variation. Clear classical prose can be composed entirely of rearranged cut-ups. Cutting and rearranging a page of written words introduces a new dimension into writing enabling the writer to turn images in cinematic variation. Images shift sense under the scissors. Smell images to sound and sight to sound and to kinesthetics. This is where Rimbaud was going with his color of vowels. And his “systematic derangement of the senses”. The place of mescaline hallucination: seeing colors tasting, sounds smelling forms” (2)

As he explains, it is also a question of breaching their sovereignty, their origin is for and by way of the singular plural of every possible origin of each text and the presences of each author. First leaving a track in the first text, overturning their secondariness and laying out their supplementarity nature is done so that the transcendental text will not resemble the pre-critical one. It can be said that this is what Derrida has meant by ‘archi-trace’. Against the literary canon’s sovereignty, Burrough’s cut-ups definitely comply with the necessity of the erasure of the mimetic/representational stance of writing, which cannot be accepted in the logic of identity. In the cut-ups, the originarity of the first text does not disappear, what is shown is that their originarity is, in fact, constituted by their nonorigin because the end-product is a destroyed originarity, that is, it is never an origin in itself but a simulacra.

Holding them with the “with” that Nancy has defined was also the fullest measure of the incommensurable world. It all the time pluralizes the origin singularly, that is why each of the text of Burroughs can be treated as ‘being singular-plural’. Burroughs has been living, then, in the literary communism of the world where the last author has died and where the word is always and everywhere. Each text in the

---

<sup>2</sup> Lake. *The Purple G glitter – William S. Burroughs Cut-ups Page*. 2004  
<http://www.purpleglitter.com/poesy/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=25>

experiment is authentically original, (including the end-product) where the sharing is already the sharing itself as origin; the texts and nothing else. All of them are nothing but matter, away from the logos, affirmed without difference and repeated without the negation and without the mimetology of the presence of a subject.

I had given William S. Burroughs as the sole example among other authors that I had mentioned. This thesis obviously did not permit me to give a wider analyze neither any works of Burroughs nor other writers. I wished to underline their stance against the literary canon and the entire onto-phenomenology of Western metaphysics, which constructs the *immanence* of its system according to the approximation of a pre-supposed nonoriginal model. What at least Burroughs had done was not just a futile act of overturning but it definitely was pointing out to the continuity between literature and life, which, unless deconstructed, always works for the reduction of the trace for purification. I hope that I can develop to study those authors from this pathway that I had tried to develop or wish that future studies can be complemented by this study.

## REFERENCES

- Adorno, Theodor. *Aesthetic Theory*. Translated by C. Lenhardt. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984.
- . *Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic*. Translation, edition and foreword by Robert Hullot-Kentor. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969.
- . *Negative Dialectics*. Translated by E. B. Ashton. New York: Seabury Press, 1973.
- Adorno, Theodor and Max Horkheimer. *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. Translated by John Cumming. New York: Seabury Press, 1972
- Agamben, Giorgio. *The Man Without Content*. Translated by Georgia Albert. California: Stanford University Press, 1999.
- Artaud, Antonin. *The Theater and Its Double*. Translated by Mary Caroline Richards. New York: Grove Press, 1958.
- Aristotle. *Poetics*. Edited and translated by Stephen Halliwell. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press Cambridge, 1995.
- Benjamin, Walter. 'On the Language as Such and On the Language of Man.' and 'On the Mimetic Faculty.' *Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings*. Edition and Introduction by Peter Demetz. Translation by Edmund Jephcott. New York: Schocken Books, 1986.
- . 'Image of Proust' and 'The Task of the Translator' *Illuminations*. Edition and Introduction by Hannah Arendt. Translation by Harry Zohn. New York: Schocken Books, 1986.
- Deleuze, Gilles. *Difference and Repetition*. Translated by Paul Patton. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.
- Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Translated by Robert Hurley et. al., New York: Viking, 1978.
- . 'What is a Concept?' and 'The Plane of Immanence' *What is Philosophy?* Translated by Hugh Tomlinson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.

Derrida, Jacques. *Of Grammatology*. Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974.

---. *Dissemination*. Translated with an Introduction and Additional Notes by Barbara Johnson. The University of Chicago Press: Chicago and London, 1981.

---. *Writing and Difference*. Trans. Alan Bass, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978: 232-250.

---. 'Economimesis' *Diacritics* Vol 11.2 (Spring 1981): 2-25.

---. 'White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy' *New Literary History* Vol.6.1 (Autumn, 1974): 5-74.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg. *Truth and Method*. Translated by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald Marshall. New York: Continuum Publishing Company, 1996.

Girard, René. *"To Double Business Bound" Essays on Literature, Mimesis and Anthropology*. London: The Athlone Press, 1988.

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*. Trans. T. M. Knox. 2 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974, 1975.

---. *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Trans. A. V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.

Huhn, Tom and Lambert Zuidervaart. (Ed.) *Semblance of Subjectivity: Essays in Adorno's Aesthetic Theory*. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London and England: The MIT Press, 1997.

Jay, Martin. *Adorno*. Cambridge and Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1984.

Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Judgment*. Translated and introduced by Werner S. Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987.

Lacoue-Labarthe, Phillippe. *Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics*. With an introduction by Jacques Derrida. Edited by Christopher Fynsk, Linda M. Brooks and Editorial Consultant. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London and England: Harvard University Press, 1989.

Lake. *The Purple Glltter – William S. Burroughs Cut-ups Page*. 2004  
<http://www.purpleglitter.com/poesy/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=25>

Leibniz, George. *Discourse on Metaphysics; and, The Monadology*. Translated by George R. Montgomery. Buffalo, N.Y. : Prometheus Books, 1992.

- Lyotard, Jean-François. "Adorno as the Devil" *Telos* 19 (Spring 1974): 127-37.
- Murray, Timothy (Ed). *Mimesis, Masochism and Mime: The Politics of Theatricality in Contemporary French Thought*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997.
- Nancy, Jean-Luc. *Being Singular Plural*. Stanford and California: Stanford University Press, 2000.
- . *The Birth to Presence*. Translated by Brian Holmes and Others. Stanford and California: Stanford University Press, 1993.
- . *The Inoperative Community*. Translated by Peter Connor, Lisa Garbus, Michael Holland and Simona Sawhney. Edited by Peter Connor. Foreword by Christopher Fynsk. Minneapolis and Oxford: University of Minnesota Press, 1990.
- Plato. *The Collected Dialogues of Plato: Including the Letters*. Edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairn. Translated by Lane Cooper and others. New York: Pantheon Books, 1989.
- Saussure, Ferdinand. *The Course in General Linguistics*. London: Duckworth, 1993.
- Strachey James et al (Editor). "Psychopathic Characters on the Stage," (1905 or 1906) The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. London: Hogarth Press, 1953-74, v. 7: 305-10.