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RENAISSANCE TRANSFORMATION IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT

AS A PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION

A THESIS PRESENTED

BY

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TO

THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES IN

PARTIAL FULLFILMENT OF THE

REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF

MASTER OF SCIENCE

IN THE SUBJECT OF

POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCES


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
SEPTEMBER, 1990


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
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## ABSTRACT

The aim of this study is to analyze Renaissance Transformation in Western political thought as a paradigmatic transition. It is generally known that although the concept of paradigmatic transition was initiated by Thomas S. Kuhn, to describe the turning points in the development of the history of the natural sciences, scholars from various fields in social sciences also have used that term in different ways and for different purposes. That's why clarification of the terms paradigm, normal sciences, paradigmatic transition etc. constitutes the first part of the thesis. In the second part, Renaissance Transformation will be elaborated on the four dimensions which are considered main components of a paradigmatic transition. In this theoretical framework, Renaissance means in ontological level, a transition from theocentric conceptualization of the universe to the anthropocentrism; in epistemological level, a transition from religious rationality to the secular rationality; in axiological level, a transition from religious faithness to the secularism, humanism and individualism; and in the methodological level, a shift from deductive and qualitative way of explanation to the inductive and quantitative ones. So, as a result, all political categories including man, state, law etc. transformed into new ones similar to what Kuhn talk about as characteristics of a paradigmatic transition.

## ÖZET

Bu tez, Batı siyasal düşüncesinde önemli dönüm noktalarından biri olarak kabul edilen Rönesans dönüşümünü, 1960 sonrası gelişen bilim felsefesi tartışmalarının anahtar kavramlarından biri haline gelen paradigmatik geçiş kavramı çerçevesinde açıklamayı denemektedir. Paradigmatik geçiş kavramının mucidi T. S. Kuhn, bu kavramı doğal bilimlerin gelişim seyirini açıklamak amacıyla kullanmasına ve sosyal bilimlerin henüz paradigma oluşturabilecek düzeyde olgunlaşmadıklarını söylemesine rağmen, sosyal bilimlerin hemen hemen bütün dallarında yaygın bir kullanım alanı bulan sözkonusu kavramın Rönesans dönüşümüne uyarlanabilmesi için önce paradigma ve paradigmatik geçiş kavramları kısmen de olsa netleştirilmektedir. Daha sonra Aristo felsefesi ve Hıristiyan teolojisinin temel çizgilerini oluşturduğu geleneksel paradigma ile Rönesans sonrası güncellenen modern paradigma, ontolojik, epistemolojik, aksiyolojik ve metodolojik boyutlarıyla irdelenip, paradigmatik geçişi karakterize eden köklü ve karşılaştırılmaz (incommensurable) dönüşümler bir kaç örnekle somutlaştırılmaktadır. Buna göre Rönesans, ontolojik düzeyde tanrımerkezci bir evren tasavvurundan insan merkezci ve insanbilimci bir evren anlayışına; epistemolojik düzeyde, dinsel rasyonaliteden seküler rasyonaliteye; aksiyolojik düzeyde, tanrı-merkezli bir değer yargı sisteminden bireyci, seküler ve humaniter bir ahlak anlayışına; metodolojik düzeyde ise, tımdengelimci ve niteliksel açıklama biçiminden tümevarımcı ve niceliksel açıklama biçimine geçiş sözkonusudur.

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## INTRODUCTION

In the preface to the first edition of History of Political Theory, George H. Sabine says that, he has written that book "in the light of the hypothesis that theories of politics themselves are a part of politics. In other words, they do not refer to an external reality but are produced as a normal part of the social milieu in which politics itself has its being" (1961, p. v.). We will go further arguing that production of any kind of knowledge including artistic, scientific, philosophic etc. is a part of the social economic, cultural, and political reproduction of that society within the limits of civilization in which that society is taking a part.

In this context, the interpretations of the Renaissance presented by generation after generation, and within each generation by one historian after another, it is seen that the historian's reconstruction of the past is conditioned by the intellectual environment of his time and place and also by his own interests and experience. Even the way of using materials related to historical events; the scope and point of view of his enquiry; his choice of resources and the questions he would ask them, would all be influenced by the way in which these problems had been solved in the past or by the existing acceptable way of dealing with those kinds of issues.

For this reason, materials and interpretations about Renaissance are considered as a products of Modern Paradigm, that is, we are dividing history into different periods and elaborate those periods by staying within the intellectual limits of Modern Paradigm and making our choices according to criteria of our paradigm. But we know that, one can not interpret history without having a point of view and can not avoid from the necessity of arranging the various categories of historical activity in some order of relative importance. The problem mentioned above is the paradox of being later in the historical process, and in Modonald's words (1962), since "future historians will probably not refer to our age as we do" (p. 10), this problem will also continue to exist in the future.

In order to analyze Renaissance Transformation, there can be used many different conceptual frameworks. In this study, we will try to use conceptual schema of "paradigmatic transition" proposed by T. S. Kuhn for analyzing the changes in the history of natural sciences. Although the term paradigmatic transition is suggested by Kuhn for natural sciences, social scientists from various fields have engaged themselves in a paradigm research. That's why we will clarify our conceptual framework in the light of those discussions, although debates on this topic have not ended yet. After clarifying the conceptual framework, we will focus on the the nature of the Renaissance Transformation by

defining Medieval Paradigm and Modern Paradigm with their general tendencies and major characteristics in ontological, epistemological, axiological and methodological level. Of course, while doing this, changes in the social, economic and political structure of Renaissance period will also be taken into account bearing in mind that everything men do and inspire to the history of civilization is inevitably related to its social context.



## II. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

### 1. The Nature of the Scientific Activity: A Brief Summary

The standard conception of scientific rationality represented by Logical Positivism, Critical Rationalism and related views, claims that "scientific rationality does not change over time" (Tianji, 1985, p.409). At the end of the 1960s it has been generally agreed that there was something wrong with this conception. Several different lines of thought have emerged to overcome this "crisis". In one school studies have been focused on the scientific change, the nature of scientific community, and mutual relations between science and society. Of those works we can mention W. V Quine's "holistic network model for theories", Toulmin's "conceptual systems", Lakatos's "research programmes", and Thomas Kuhn's "paradigm". Among those, Kuhn's model of scientific change and the notion of paradigmatic transition have had so magnitude impact on almost all branches of science that "it would be impossible to understand contemporary theories of science... without considering his work in detail" (Elguea, 1985, p. 214).

The analyses proposed by Bohm, Feyerabend, Hanson, Toulmin and Kuhn gave attention to the idea that science is done from within a conceptual perspective which determines in large part of the questions that are worth to investigate and the sort of answers that are acceptable. Despite some differences this line

of thought agreed on following three theses: a) Observation is theory-laden (different theories will observe different things when they view the same phenomena). b) Meanings are theory-dependant (the principles of theory help to determine the meanings of such terms will vary from one theory to another, hence changes in theory result in changes in meaning). c) Facts are theory-laden (there is no neutral set of facts for assessing the relative adequacy of two competing theories). Those theses have been strongly debated and criticized but those discussions also have become a part of "paradigm of discussions of paradigm" (e.g Suppe, 1984).

## 2. What Does A Paradigm Mean?

There is no clear definition of the term paradigm in Kuhn's work. Masterman (1979), identified twenty-one different meanings of the term. According to her, paradigm covers following meanings in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: scientific achievements, myths, philosophy, constellation of questions, classic work, textbook, tradition, analogy, metaphysical speculation, model, pattern, tools, type of instrumentation, Gestalt figure, set of political institutions, standard, organizing principle, epistemological viewpoint, new way of seeing (pp. 61-65). She suggested that those different usages could be grouped as metaparadigms, sociological paradigms and construct paradigms (p. 65).

Although the term paradigm has ambiguity, it is widely used as a political solution (e.g. Wolin, 1980), as personal salvation (e.g. Friederichs, 1970), as moral model (e.g. Barbour, 1974) and as an esthetic standard (e.g. Ackerman, 1969), because of its widely acceptability with positive connotation in academic circles. In different studies it gains different meanings. For example, it is used as equivalent to "dogma" (Bechler, 1981, p. 79), "style" (Perry, 1977, p. 48), "Theory, frame of reference, conceptual schema" (Landau, 1972, p. 64), "generally recognized model for methodological and sociological point of view" (Yudin, 1981, p. 107) or "political society" (Wolin, 1980, p. 83). In his book The Nature Of Civilizations, Matthew Melko (1969) after citing M. Coulborn's contribution to clarify the concept of paradigm as " a body of doctrine accepted by almost everyone working within a given field" (p. 2), he declared that his work is an attempt to create a model of civilization aiming to be a paradigm in that field.

Under the light of all these different interpretations, paradigm can be defined as the harmonized totality of presuppositions, unquestionable believes and assumptions about the nature of existence, truth, knowledge and value; of the legitimate ways of knowing and cognitive framework which provides possibility of envisagement of men, society and universe; the implicit criteria of the aims and the meanings of human activity

supported by the historical and social experiences; and a specific and unique logic which surrounds all. In this definition, paradigm is not a concept with its intention limited only for the production of scientific knowledge, as in the narrow sense, but in the more general and broader sense, it is considered as an intellectual and social atmosphere necessitated for all kinds of knowledge, scientific, philosophic theoretical etc., to be produced by human being. In this sense, there are four important components of a paradigm which show us the clear differences between paradigms, and are usable to show what kinds of changes come about during the transition from one paradigm to another, in our case from Medieval Paradigm to Modern Paradigm. Those components are ontological, epistemological, axiological and methodological bases of a paradigm.

### 3. Paradigms and Social Sciences

It is very easy to see phrases implied Kuhnian notions in almost all branches of social sciences, in our cases political sciences; like " Liberal Theory Paradigm", " Modernization Paradigm", " Dependency Paradigm" (Elguea, 1985), "Eastonian Paradigm", "Rationalistic Paradigm" (Hold, R. T. and J. M. Richardson, 1970), "Extraordinary Paradigm" (Wolin, 1980), "Competing Paradigm" (Kahl, 1980), "Pluralistic Paradigm" (Landau, 1972), "Behaviorism Paradigm" (Euben, 1969), "Deductive Paradigm" (Mechan, 1968).

More specifically, the notion of paradigm has been applied, for example, to the sociology (e.g. Friederichs, 1970; Effrat, 1972; Martins, 1972; Philips, 1973; Urry, 1973; Lehman, T. and R. T. Young, 1974; Bottomore, 1975; Bryant, 1975; Ritzer, 1975; Perry, 1977; Esberg. D. and L. Hill, 1979; Colclough, G. and P. H. Moran, 1983), to the sociology of development (e.g. Bodenheimer, 1971; Foster-carter, 1976; Rogers, 1976; Elguea, 1985), to the sociology of religion (e.g. Barbour, 1980), to the evolutionary theory (e.g. Quadagno, 1979; Greene, 1980), To the political science (e.g. Almond, 1966; Easton, 1969; Euben, 1969; Wolin, 1969; Smolicz, 1971; Landau, 1972; Stephens, 1973; Westhues, 1976; Wolin, 1980; Schutte, 1989; Ke, 1990; Hankiss, 1990).

The literature of politics, as well as other fields of study, is confused, because of the varying interpretations of the term paradigm. Some scholars, such as Beardsley (1974), have been arguing that neither in the past nor in the present has a paradigm been established for political science. Others, like Truman (1965) and Almond (1966) see political science as a discipline acquiring a new paradigm. For Rogowski (1978), on the other hand, during the 1930s and 1940s the formal-legal assumptions of past century were replaced by the attention to the studies of psychology and coercion; during the 1950s behaviorism was in effect; during the 1960s the Parsonian social model with

the related theory of political culture and system dominated; and 1970s there was a shift, in Kuhnian sense, towards theories of rational choice in such areas as conflict and strategy, coalitions, participation and influence, institutions, collective choice and constitutional choice and legitimacy.

According to Wolin (1990), on the other side, if Kuhn's notion of paradigm was applied to the history of political theory; since each of them inspired a new way of looking at the political world; in each case their theories proposed a new definition what was significant for understanding that world; each specified distinctive methods for inquiry; and each of the theories contained an explicit or implicit statement of what should be counted as an answer to certain questions, Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke and Marx could be considered as "paradigm creators" (p. 175). Furthermore, to him, as an interesting extreme interpretation of the term paradigm, political society itself can be considered as a paradigm. Because, a politically organized society contains definite institutional arrangement, certain widely accepted way of understanding regarding the location and use of political power, certain expectations about how authority ought to treat the members of the society and about the claims that organized society can rightfully make upon its members (P. 183). For Wolin "a political society possess the basic

instrumentalities present in Kuhn's scientific community and employs them an analogous way" (p. 184).

#### 4. The Notion of Paradigmatic Transition.

There is a similarity between political revolution and paradigmatic transition. The individuals, in the nonrevolutionary situations, agree on the principles which are to govern the decision making process. But in a revolutionary situation, on the other hand, this agreement is broken down and an attempt to create a new framework for decision making is taken place. In the case of a transition from one paradigm to another, there will be a change in world view which means a change in our basic believes and attitudes, as a result, in our theoretical assumptions. When somebody moves from one paradigm to another he experiences a sudden change in the form of perception or the way of seeing the world. This change does not occur because the new paradigm is better than older one, but it occurs only because the old paradigm is increasingly unable to solve emerging anomalies and inconsistencies, while the new paradigm provides new achievements, a new set of problems and way of perceiving the world.

Paradigms provide, for a community, "a criterion for choosing problems that, which the paradigm is taken for granted, can be assumed to have solutions. To a great extent these are

the only problems that the community will admit as scientific or encourage its members to undertake. Other problems, including many that had previously been standard, are rejected as metaphysical, as the concern of another discipline, or sometimes as just too problematic to be worth in time" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 37). In most cases problems of old paradigm and its achievements are forgotten or kept only for historical records, mainly because with the new paradigm, old problems cease to be important or become nonsensical. In short, when there is a paradigmatic transition there is a change in ontological, epistemological, axiological and methodological understanding of given community, society or civilization.

From now on, we will try to see what happened during the Renaissance period by using this conceptual framework. For doing this we define two paradigms: Medieval Paradigm which was transformed with the Renaissance, composed of, mainly, scholasticism and Christian theology during the Middle Ages and Modern Paradigm which is an open ended process started with Renaissance and it is going on by reproducing itself with some modifications in the as contemporary western civilization. Our focus of attention will not be Medieval or Modern Paradigm but the period of transition, that is Renaissance. Since Renaissance is considered as a paradigmatic transition, we will try to look at the transformations on ontological, epistemological, axiological and methodological categories and their implications on political thought.



### III.

### RENAISSANCE TRANSFORMATION

#### A. Background

##### 1. The term Renaissance

A French writer, E.J. Deleuze (1781-1863) seems to be the first in using the term "La renaissance" to describe the impact produced by a dead Hellenic civilization on Western Christendom of a particular time and place, namely Northern and Central Italy in the late medieval period. The earliest English use of the term cited in O.E.D. is dated 1845. "Matthew Arnold started the practice of Anglicizing the word and writing 'renaissance'" (Toynbee, 1957, p. 241).

In its original and the narrowest usage "the Renaissance," which literally means rebirth (Burns, 1963, p. 515), refers to a complex of literary and artistic movement stimulated by the study of classical literature and art originated in Italy in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and eventually passed beyond the Alps into Germany, France, England and other parts of Europe. But since these movements have also been considered crucial to the formation of modern culture, the term Renaissance is used to designate "all those historical developments which are taken to mark the close of the Middle Ages and beginning of modern history" (Bouwma, 1974, p. 726).

Thus, the word Renaissance was expanded to comprise to

the source of all that was modern, and has gained more general significance and has pointed not only specific historical developments but also a turning point in the history of western thought.

## 2. The major characteristics of Renaissance

No historical epoch has been so difficult to characterize or has given rise to such extensive controversy as the Renaissance. For some scholars, Renaissance is the area of "rebirth" (e.g. Groethuysen, 1954) and for some others it is a "deviation" (e.g. Guenon, 1975). But it is generally accepted that with Renaissance there has been emerged a new way of seeing the world and the former way has been disappeared. The center of interest has been shifted from one method of research to another. Hence there has been a complete and radical change in the relationship between man and ultimate realities, man and things, man and institutions etc. And all of those changes have given way to a total change in man's attitude. For Garin (1973), these changes indicate the end of security and beginning of an age of ferment. "You who are neither a citizen of heaven nor a citizen of earth, neither mortal nor immortal, you are by yourself almost free and sovereign creator. You must shape and new yourself in an image" is a typical slogan of the man of Renaissance.

It is very obvious that, "the Renaissance, even in its narrower meaning of a classical revival, was a heterogeneous movement which contained many mutually antagonistic impulses" (Bush, 1974, p. 181).

Renaissance was not as a wholly distinct cultural epoch rather as a transition period between the medieval and modern ages in which old and new, religious and profane, authoritarian and individualistic principles and concepts existed side by side. In political sense, Renaissance is a starting point in emergence of national states; in economic spheres, it witnessed the development of early capitalism. These economic and political changes were a part of general transition in social structures, as well as in cultural and intellectual life.

In this transitional period, focus of attention and points of emphasis were so radically shifted that certain types of evolutions and concepts were found insufficient to interpret the changes brought about in social and individual life. For example, in thirteenth century Italy, "the fact was that the traditional medieval ideas no longer gave satisfactory meaning of life" (Groethuysen, 1954, p. 279).

As we mentioned before Renaissance was a total transformation, from social and economic life to the literature, philosophy and art. Since we will qualify Renaissance transformation as a "paradigmatic transition", it would not be

so easy to separate economy from polity and politics from philosophy. That's why we will analyze transformation in political thought bearing in mind that categorical transformations were the main factors in this transition.

Before analyzing nature of Renaissance transformation, it is better to give a brief outline of its period, geographical and cultural background.

### 3. Chronological limits of the Renaissance

Although the term Renaissance is well established in the writings of historians, its usefulness has been challenged. According to Gilbert (1967), this challenge is "simply an acute form of general problem of periodization in history" (p. 174).

Various events have been taken as marking the beginning of the Renaissance such as: the crowning of Petrarch as poet laureate of Rome in 1341; the short-lived triumph of Cola di Rienzi in setting up a Republican Rome in 1347; fall of Constantinople in 1453; the opening up new trade routes to the East etc. (Gilbert, 1967, p. 174).

Each choice represents the selection of a particular field, for example art, religion, politics or economics, as central in the periodization of the history.

Similar problems also surround the choice of an event to mark the end of the period of Renaissance as pointed out for

the date of its beginning. Any of the following might be selected as a date of ending: the sacking of Rome in 1527; the hardening of the Counter Reformation via the council of Trent in 1575; the burning of Bruno in 1600; or Galileo's setting the fundamentals of experimental physics around 1600 (Gilbert, 1967, p. 175). And again those kinds of dates do not reflect exact time for beginning or ending of a historical period since it is difficult to find a sharp break between conditions in, for example, 1300 and those in 1310 or 1340.

But, it is generally accepted that after 1300 the majority of the characteristic institutions and ideas of the Medieval Age had begun to decay. Chivalry, feudalism itself, the Holy Roman Empire, the universal authority of papacy, the guild system of trade and industry were gradually being weakened and would eventually disappear. The great age of the Gothic Cathedrals was practically over, the scholastic philosophy was beginning to be ridiculed and despised, and supremacy of the religious and ethical interpretations of life was being slowly but effectively undermined. In place of all these there gradually emerged new institutions and ways of thinking of sufficient importance to stamp the centuries that followed with the character of the different civilization.

The Swiss historian J. Burchardt was the first to describe this period, which extended from 1300 to approximately 1650 as a

unified culturally and politically distinct historical period (Cantor, 1970, p. 60). For him, in the fifteenth century, there was a fundamental change in man's outlook on life and the world and "the fifteenth century is that of the many-sided man" (Burchardt, 1974, p. 21). There is another thesis that the Renaissance is merely a continuation of the Middle Ages. "There is undoubtedly more truth in the compromise solution that the Renaissance was an age of transition" (Ferguson, 1948, p. 390).

#### 4. Geographical boundaries of the Renaissance

Social, political, economic, intellectual and artistic developments which are included in conception of Renaissance was started first in Italy. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries certain Italian scholars, historians and students of the classics and often local patriots began to display a remarkable new historical self consciousness. "They believed that their own time was a new age, at once sharply differed from the barbaric darkness which they imagined that preceded it and comparable in its achievements to Roman antiquity" (Bouwma, 1974, p. 726). Before passing to the intellectual climate, it is better to look at the socio-political structure of Italy at that time.

At the beginning of the Renaissance period Italy was divided into many small states. Most of them were independent city republics under the domination of the Holy Roman Empire. In the

course of their struggle for freedom, many of them had adopted some degree of democratic government. But during the turmoil of the Renaissance, all traces of this democracy disappeared. There were a political chaos and continuous struggle between those petty states. On the other hand, the cities of Italy which are strategically located between Levant and Western Europe, were the oldest and the wealthiest of the towns that helped to account for the leadership of Italy in the Renaissance. First of all, we must find the answer of the question why Renaissance started in Italy?

The culture of the Italian Renaissance was closely tied to the conditions in fourteenth and fifteenth century Italy. The wealth of Italy, the matrix of social relationships, the character of political life in the Italian city states, as it is mentioned above, and the more remote impact of Roman cultural traditions played important roles in shaping the character of the Italian cultural revolution. According to Cantor (1970), two aspects of Italian society that most clearly distinguished Italy from the rest of the Europe were wealth and political structure of city states. "By the latter part of the 13 th. century, Italy passed a money economy based on trade and finance. The late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries saw the rise of the great banking houses. The pope was the bankers' largest single customer in Europe since he needed an agency for the deposit

and transfer of vast Church funds" ( p. 74). In short, Italian cities were the main beneficiaries of the revival of the trade with the East.

So, the first reason is the wealth of Italian cities which separates Italy from other European countries. It is true that "riches accumulated by the merchants of Venice, Genoa, Milan and host of lesser places made possible Italy's political and cultural achievements (Bouwsma, 1974, p. 728).

Secondly, Italy had a strong tradition than any other country of Western Europe (Burns, 1964, p. 519).

Thirdly, Italian universities were founded primarily for the study of law or medicine rather than theology, and she had a more secular culture than most regions of Latin Christendom.

Lastly, Italian received the full impact of cultural influences from Byzantine and Saracenic civilizations (Burns, 1964, p. 519).

Germany was one of the first countries to receive the full impact of the Italian humanist movement, not only because of the proximity of the two countries, but also because of the large scale migration of German students to Italian universities. "In the cities of south, such as Augsburg, Nuremberg, Munich and Vienna there was a lively humanist movement imported from Italy during the 1450s, and by the beginning of the sixteenth century in the university circles this movement had rooted" (Burns, 1964 p. 520).



In the case of France, the humanist movement is resulted from the " French invasion of Italy in 1515, which gave the French nobility their first glimpse of the glories of the Italian Renaissance" (Gilbert, 1967, p. 175). Hundred Years' War (1337-1453), which aimed to expel the English from France and to break their commercial alliance with the Flemish cities, enabled the French kings to stamp out feudal sovereignty and led to the establishment of a consolidated state.

In this context, there is no comparable event that can be singled out for bringing the Italian Renaissance to England. Most of the philosophers of English Renaissance desired a simpler and mere rational Christianity and look forward to an educational system free from dominance of the medieval logic. Others were concerned primarily with individual freedom and correction of social abuses (Burns, 1964, p. 559).

##### 5. Political and Economic Bases of Renaissance

"The center of gravity of medieval society was the land, was the soil. With the Renaissance the economic and thus the social emphasis moves into the town: from the conservative to the liberal" (Martin, 1963, p. 1). In the Middle Ages, the interests had centered upon consumption. It was relatively impossible to loose or increase landed property, which is essentially static.

Agricultural productions had not been kept for long periods, and thus accumulation of values was impossible. But money economy has caused radical changes in social structures during the Renaissance period; because money bring the desire to save and accumulation of value started to become possible.

Medieval society was founded upon a static order of a state, sanctioned by the Church. Everyone was assigned to his place by nature or by God himself, and any attempt to break away from it was a revolt against the divine order. Everyone was confined within strictly defined limits, which were imposed and enforced by the ruling estate, the clergy and the feudal nobility. The king himself was bound to rule according to definite laws: he had to carry out his reciprocal obligations towards his vassals, he had to treat the Church according to the principles of justitia. Otherwise his vassals had a right of rebellion, and the Church denounced him who had strayed from his assigned position as a tyrannous.

In the mediaval time there was a strong sense of security, of belonging not in terms of physical but psychological security. Individuals belonged to a village, a guild, a town, a fellowship or an order.

On the other side, authority and tradition were able to dominate the mediaval economy. Guild organization with its prisefixing and compulsory corporization, had eliminated competition. In those days the individuals had been unfree but secure as in a family.

As the towns grew in sizes and wealth, their social and political organizations became more complex. In their small and often insecure beginnings, urban populations tended to be homogeneous and democratic. In the new structure, the conception of leadership was understood differently from men who had lived medieval period and dominated by Medieval Paradigm. "Peasants", for example, "attracted to the towns by the opportunity to perform even the most menial tasks, began to form a growing proletariat without political right" (Bouwsma, 1974, p. 730).

Nobles who were either old residents or resided in the towns for reasons of their own, constituted another special class. Merchants engaged in large scale commerce began to be differentiated by their greater wealth from lesser tradesman. Inequalities of wealth and power between these different classes resated in new social and political arrangements. " As the burghers became a power with the rise of a money economy, as the small artisan became the great merchant, we find a gradual emancipation from the traditional forms of society and the medieval outlook: there was revolt against those sections of the society which were most dependent upon this structure and upon these ways of thought, by virtue of which they exercised their authority " (Martin, 1963, p. 1).

There was a rising tension against the privileged clergy and the feudal nobility. "During the fourteenth century desperate

revolts of peasants and city proletarians burst out almost everywhere from England to the Balkans and from Tuscany to Flanders" (Lopez, 1974, p. 87). By revolting against the old domination, they also freed themselves from the old community ties which had been interval with it. Blood, tradition and group feeling had been the basis of the community relationships as well as of the old domination. While on the one hand, there were popular uprisings, local upheavals, and peasant revolts, on the other hand, "there were the heretical sects which clearly manifested a sprit of populism" (Ullmann, 1965, p. 162).

The democratic and urban spirit was destroying the old social forms and the natural and accepted divine order. By the end of the fifteenth century the democratic tendencies of the conciliar period had disappeared in both Church and state. The pope no longer able to claim supremacy in secular affairs. In the political world, "the tendencies toward nationality and monarchy were finally successful. The former idea of a United Europe under an imperial ruler had lost its significance. National distinctions were clearly marked, and separate states, secular in nature, stood forth under strong monarchs, who reduced the feudal assemblies to positions of unimportance" (Wanlass, 1953, p. 143).

Life in a traditional community was apt to produce a conservative type of thought, a religious way of thought which

orders the world in an authoritarian manner. Everything had a metaphysical dimension in that life. But the bourgeois world lost its magic. The liberal mode of thought became dominant. Thus communities became societies.

We have to bear in mind that, with those transformations, in the political sphere, the process of transition from the weak and decentralized feudal regime to the centralized rule of despotic princes had been taking place. There was also the destruction of the political power of the guilds and the absorption of their prerogatives of sovereignty by the national states.

#### 6. Causes of Renaissance

Since Renaissance is a complex transformation and a radical transition from one civilization to other, started in Italy and next spread out other European countries stamping its character to the Modern Paradigm; it is not so easy to catch its all real causes, its own logic or elements of its development. Because, what we say about cause-effect relation is to be creation of Modern Paradigm. Although it is strongly true that "The Renaissance was not known as such by those we now call Renaissance Men" (Modonald, 1962, p. 10), there are some events which can be taken as causes of Renaissance.

First of all, the Renaissance period was the "epoch of the Crusades, of the rise of the towns, and of the earliest

bureaucratic states of the West, it saw the culmination of Romanesque art and the beginning of Gothics; the emergency of the vernacular literatures; the revival of the Latin classics and of Latin poetry and Roman law; the recovery of Greek science, with its Arabic additions and of much of Greek philosophy; and origin of the first European Universities" (Haskins, 1974, p. 185). In a brief summary, following factors can be given as contributors to the occurrence of the Renaissance:

1. The influence of the Saracenic and Byzantine civilization.
2. The development of a flourishing commerce.
3. Rising of the local languages. Before thirteenth century the literary language was Latin and after this century local languages which was understood by the less literate and less educated, started to rise in the literature. Latin was quite adequate for learned treatises, for abstract thought, for mathematical scheme of logical and syllogistic deductions, but it was not the language of the ordinary people. Ordinary man thought in his own language, in his own vernacula, and his feelings could be expressed adequately in that language. For that reason, according to Ullmann (1965), "the incipient subjectivism in the thirteenth century, the orientation towards the individual, stood in closest proximity to the rapidly rising vernacular literature" (p. 165).
4. The revival of an interest in classical studies and the Roman

law in the Cathedral and Monastic schools which gave to the secular interests. "The study of the classics revived interest in the democracy of the Greek cities and in the Roman law of contract, as well as corporations Both attached the medieval idea of authority rested in a single head and laid emphasis upon the importance of many" (Warlass, 1953, p. 142).

5. The gradual escape from the other worldly and ascetic atmosphere of the early Middle Ages and the growth of naturalism in literature and art.

6. The expansion of the intellectual interests made possible by the rise of the universities. First time in Medieval Europe, the monopoly of the Church and clerics on learning was broken by the rise of the universities in the new towns.

7. The development of a spirit of scientific inquiry, exemplified in the work of Adelard of Bat, Galileo, Roger Bacon and Friederic II.

8. Crusades which diminished prestige of the papacy and helped to give the Italian cities a monopoly of Mediterranean trade.

9. Invention of printing. It made the dissemination of new kinds of knowledge possible. Thus "a new instrument of western knowledge was brought in use. The clergy had ceased to be almost the sole propagators of education, as they had been in the middle ages, and now lay knowledge entered upon its triumphal course in the west" (Mayer, 1970, p. 120).

10. Rise in population and growth of cities. It is clear that towns are more free than small closed communities and have royal character. "It was the towns which demanded increasing attention, for the large concentration of people within their walls facilitated and encouraged easy change of opinion and contract" (Ullmann, 1965, p. 163).

#### B. The nature of the Renaissance transformation

In this part, after clarifying our basic concepts and theoretical means that are ontological, epistemological, axiological and methodological transformation as main components of a paradigmatic transition, we will try to elaborate implications of those transformations on the conception of political categories respectively such as changes on the conception of the universe, human being, state, sovereignty, law and the position of the church and God. Then, at the end, we will discuss how they differ from Medieval to Modern Paradigm will be compared. In other words, we will try to make a comparison between the two paradigms concerning the way of perceiving those categories we mentioned above.



## 1. Ontological transformation

### a. Cosmology: God, Nature and Order.

Ontology is the knowledge about being itself. According to Kuhn (1970), "paradigms tell us different things about the population's behavior" (p. 103). This means that different paradigms use concepts that can not be brought into usual logical relations of inclusion, exclusion or overlap. Because "paradigms dictate their own ontology" (Suppe, 1974, p.205).

The Medieval Paradigm was mainly based on the ontology of Christendom. As far as Christian ontology is concerned, God, the absolute one, is before and above all the world's plurality, and is the sole source and the ultimate goal of every being. Whenever there is to be a particular or partial whole with some separate aim and object subordinated to the aim and object of the universe, the principle of the "Unity". "Everywhere one comes before the many" (Gierke, 1960, p. 9). In this ontology, all manyness has its origin in oneness. Every plurality which has a common aim and object must find source, norm and goal in a ruling unity. Because unity is the root of all, and therefore, of all social existence.

A vaster transformation of men's outlook upon nature was affected when the place of the earth in the solar system was determined by Copernicus in 1543. For more than a thousand years

the learned as well as the vulgar had accepted the Ptolemaic hypothesis, with the earth as the center of the universe. The Copernican theory of the daily rotation of the earth, and of its revolution and that of the other planet round the sun, was decisively confirmed by Galileo, with the aid of the new invention of the telescope. After these developments, "It was no longer possible to accept the Aristotelian distinction between the unchanging heavens and mutable sublunary world" (De Burgh, 1953, p. 487). A new dynamic conception of nature became prevalent, which left the scholastic world of static forms behind. "Space no longer comprises the world, for the idea of infinity of the cosmos evolved. The human world is merely a world among worlds" (Mayer, 1970, p.121). The nature, on the other hand, has completely lost its divine character. The modern conception of nature has become something at the disposal of man, either of his knowledge or will. It became "the mere object of investigation in the empirical and experimental sense, and storehouse of forces and materials for technological purpose. Nature is subject to man, man is its overlord" (Kroner, 1964, p.21).

"God-given order was overcome by the idea of a decentralized, infinite universe, a world in evolution" (Baron, 1974, pp.130-131). The medieval "hierarchical classification on priestly and lay also materially modified" (Groethuysen, 1954, p. 280).

In Medieval Paradigm, universe was designed by God and it had "inherent order" (Modonald, 1968, p. 141), but in new paradigm "world ruled by chance where everything was a continuous state of flux" (Groethuysen, 1954, p. 284). It became difficult or impossible to "assert that 'the earth was center of the universe' and the role of the theology in shaping scientific debate became more limited" (Cantor, 1970, p. 294). In short, "The Renaissance promoted the rediscovery of an unchristian cosmology" (Kroner, 1964, p. 15).

Parallel to the changes in conceptualization of the universe, nature and of their structure and relations, the conception of time has also changed during this transition and implications of this change on the social and political life was very obvious.

It was started to be realized that time was always short and hence valuable that one had to husband it and use it economically if one wants to become the "master of all things". Such an attitude had been unknown in the Middle Ages. During that area life had not been limited for individuals; life was the life of the community. Conception of time was changed and it was started to be seen as a value, as something which has utility, later on saleable in the market, in the Modern Paradigm.

b. Government: Power, hierarchy, State, Sovereignty and Law .

From the late Middle ages onwards political doctrines have been set forth by scholars, theoreticians, and philosophers. This was not the case before. From the fifth to twelfth century very few individual writers can be known as who have political thesis. No books, tracts, were written on those topics which formed the contents of political thought. "The governments themselves, the popes, kings and emperors, who by their governmental measures created, shaped and applied political ideas" Ullmann, 1965, p. 14).

St. Augustine in the fifth century had said that God distributed the laws to mankind through the medium of kings. And the thirteenth century St. Thomas Aquinas expressed the same idea when he said that power descended from God. "whatever power was found 'below', was derived from 'above', for, as St Paul said, 'there is no power but of God.'" (Ullmann, 1965, p.13). Within this thesis the people had no power other than it had been given from above. Delegation of power is the main concern. Every officer was appointed from above and not elected by a popular assembly. The supreme officer was responsible to God only.

Medieval political thought accepts as its starting point an order of rank in human society. In the twelfth-century John of Salisbury, for example, provides a complete statement of this social theory. The king, to him, is the head of the body of the commonwealth; the senate is the heart; the judges and governors

of provinces are the eyes, ears, and tongue; the officials and soldiers are the hands; the financial officers are the stomach and intestines; and the peasants 'correspond to the feet, which always cleave to the soil'. This organic theory of society, is a great favorite with those who oppose change. Obviously, since the foot does not try to become the brain, nor is the hand jealous of the eye; the whole body is at its best then each part does what nature meant it to do. The field worker, the blacksmith, the merchant, the lawyer, the priest, and the king himself all have been assigned a part of God's work on earth.

Medieval thought thus distinguishes among vocations, but it also insists on the dignity and worth of all vocations, even the humblest. It accepts the Christian doctrine of the equality of the all souls before God and holds that no man can be a mere instrument of another man. Even the humblest person on this earth could in the next world hope to enjoy a bliss as full eternal as any king's. Furthermore, medieval political theory is by no means opposed to all change on earth. Certainly medieval thinkers were not democratic in the sense of believing that the people have a right to make their own institutions. But they did not hold that, since god has arranged authority as it now is in this world, we should preserve existing conditions. If existing conditions were bad, it was a sign that originally good conditions had been prevented. What should be done was to try to restore the original good, God's own plan (Brinton.vd. 1955, p.287).

In dealing with problems of human relations medieval thinkers used a vocabulary that is different from that of modern thinkers.

To begin with the concept of state; before sixteenth century the word state was used to refer to the estates of the realm or to kingly office or dignity, but not a political community. Both the concept of "State" and of "political" are creation of modern thought. Instead of those, the concept of "government" was used and linked with the Roman term of laying down the law during the Middle Ages (Ullmann, 1965, p. 17). Its modern usage in the sense of body of politics first appeared in Italy in early part of the sixteenth century. The use of the term as a generic name for a body of politics, whether republican or absolute, was probably fixed by Machiavelli. He was largely "responsible for establishing this modern usage" (Benn, 1967, p. 6). According to Sabine (1954), the earliest use of the term state occurs in Thomas Starkey's book about Italian authorities written in 1538 and named England (p. 328). Of course our concern is not to make an etimological analysis of the term but pointed out the parallelism between the changes of the way of thinking with the changes of the meanings of the words. It is obvious that changing the meaning of a word or existence of some new words in the area of politics is one of the basic indicators of changes in the way of thought and in the perception of both political organization and political relations.

In Medieval Paradigm the state was considered as "part of the divine organization of the universe (Cantor, 1970, p. 84). According to medieval philosophers, the act of government was one aspect of god's administration of human affairs: the Church and its officers direct man forward spiritual salvation, which is eternal; the state looks after his physical well-being, which is temporal. Yet both branches of authority are subject to divine law. So, in political sense, "one law" and "one government" is natural result of conceptualization of universal Church as a universal realm both spiritual and temporal.

For Thomas Aquinas, for example, who can be taken as a representative of Traditional Paradigm, "temporal power is invested by God in the people as a whole, who delegate it to suitable persons. The state, then, whether monarchical, aristocratic, or democratic is not a power itself. It derives its authority from God, and it must exercise that power for Christian purpose and in a Christian manner (Greer, 1968, pp. 249-250). So according to Aquinas, state played a positive role in human affairs. More than a mere peace-keeper, it served the common good and thereby enabled men to live well. Positive law, that is, law enacted by men, was a partial manifestation of natural law, which was in turn temporal aspect of divine law. "Aquinas, thus, asserted a fundamental harmony between state and the divine" (Cantor, 1970, p. 84). Natural corollary of this type of

reasoning is that, "the world is one and the God who rules it is one and earthly rulers ought therefore to be one" (Modona, 1962, p. 9). Of course, the question that whether medieval practice was in contradiction with this doctrine described above, or not is open to the discussion. For Greer (1966), for example, it "seemed to contradict" and "deviations were explained away as the result of human frailty or error" (p. 250).

In the Modern Paradigm, on the other hand, state understood as "an independent, self sufficient, autonomous body of citizens which lived, so to speak, on its own substance and on its own law" (Ullman, 1965, p. 17). and is seen as an essentially secular institution whose independence from spiritual authority was essential to its well-being. In Machiavelli, for example, "the state was not a reflection of hierarchical order or theological principles; its appropriateness and durability depended not upon moral purpose but on the successful monopoly of power. The struggle for power was the essence of politics" (Cantor, 1970, p. 84). That's why Machiavelli most frequently used the word state as the power or apparatus of a ruler or ruling group.

In Modern Paradigm, "the medieval doctrines of limited government and the ethical basis of politics also rejected" (Burns, 1964, p. 517), "The politician began to calculate and politics were becoming rational" (Martin, 1963, p. 10).



Contrary to Medieval Paradigm, Machiavelli argued that state does not rest on any supernatural sanction. It provides its own justification, and it operates according to rules that have grown out of the facts of human nature. He thereby "removed politics from Christian ideology and placed it on a purely secular level" (Greer, 1968, p. 250). That's why "Machiavelli's book marks a sharp turning in western political thought" (p. 249).

Machiavelli's view of government have got general acceptance in European thought and practice. Largely through his influence the word "state" come into use to designate a sovereign political entity. And in practical level, evolution of European states from the sixteenth century onward moved in the direction suggested by Machiavelli. In several regions of Europe strong national monarchies were evolving concurrently with the decline of medieval institutions and ideas, and the doctrine of the state, as a unique authority in determining the form and content of civil law "served as a useful theory to explain the claims made in behalf of the monarchs" (Coker, 1954, p. 266).

In Modern Paradigm, the state started to be seen as a product of man's own needs and desires, and its authority was, therefore, justified in terms of both morality and self interest.

The medieval idea of a universal commonwealth under the sovereign authority of the Holy Roman Emperor or the Pope had no meaning at all for the political philosopher of Modern Paradigm.

Instead, in Modern Paradigm, it is argued that "every individual state regardless of its size should be absolutely free from external control" (Burns, 1964, p. 517).

The Middle Age, for Gierke (1960), regards the universe itself as a single realm and God as its monarch. "God is the monarch and all earthly lordship is a limited representation of the divine lordship of the world. Society was the collective sum of faithful people" (p. 72). Because of their hierarchical arrangement, the superior celestial entities governed the inferior, and in general the government of the universe was such that a given being had domination over those below it in the scale of creatures and served those above in the scale. That's why "the best form of government in the view of St. Thomas is monarchy, chiefly for the reason that the guidance of a multiplicity by a single holder of authority best ensures the benefit of peace. The bee have single queen, and in the universe as a whole one God is creator and Lord of all" (Mayer, 1970, p. 99).

What importance has the term value in Economics, the term sovereignty has the same in politics. It has somewhat various connotations in the different branches of politics, but it always signifies a highest governmental or legal authority. More specifically it denotes "a) the authority to make and amend law conferred by the rulers of a legal system; b) the political or

moral authority of the state; c) the offensive source of political or legal power; d) the independent legal or moral status of a community" (Marshall, 1965, p. 686). As Coker (1954) suggested that "within any independent political community there is a determinate sovereign whose commands and permissions—given directly or indirectly, explicitly or implicitly—establish the law and whose position is above the law" (p. 267). That's why discussions related to problem of sovereignty is not focused on whether its existence is necessary or not but on its form.

It is sometimes said that, as were in the case of the concept of state, the idea of sovereignty is peculiar to modern political and legal theory. In respect to a particular conception of legal sovereignty this statement has validity. In the "Medieval Paradigm" the state was not sovereign in the sense of being above law. The authority of customary, or unwritten, laws, embodying the dictates of gods or of a universal reason, ranked higher than that of the decrees of even highest governors of a state" (Coker, 1954, p. 266). Throughout most of the Middle Ages, the state was not generally the predominant organization within the community, and relatively few writers claimed that kind of position for it. But during the transition period "with the declining influence of customary forms of regulation as feudal and manorial ties, the guild, and the family, the state became an indispensable category for any kind of speculative thought

about society" (Benn, 1967, p. 7). We can briefly summarize the development of the content of sovereignty during the Renaissance period with three stages: First, under the domains of economic activity, mainly the commerce, the social energies of classes concentrated on the state rather than the local town, and the scale of the economic operations was correspondingly enlarged and deepened, as pointed out before. Secondly, this concentration caused the limits of the society to narrow from world-empire to the national or territorial state. Thirdly, as a result of both these tendencies, the authority shifted from the church to the civil government. Besides those developments, "against the claim of the pope to be sole divine source of power there was developed the theory of divine right of kings, and against the barons there was developed the theory of the absolute sovereignty of territorial monarch" (Randal, 1970, p. 181).

In Modern Paradigm, on the other hand, political system is envisaged as originating as a result of a contract between individuals or between rulers and ruled. Parties of this contract-individuals- using their free wills in their autonomous and independent decisions create a political authority which has sovereignty over a certain specified territory to make and enforce laws. In this line of thought, the source of power based on an abstract conceptualization of individual who somehow delegates power to the state without any connotations of

religion, class or status and it defined in terms of the basic traits of a human being.

Most proponents of such a view agreed that man could not live satisfactorily without the state and that the basis of its authority was the tacit or expressed agreement of men to enter into a society and establish a government. By establishing a sovereign, the individual surrendered a part of his freedom, but he received in return social order, security and justice in his relation with other men. Natural law provided the basis for such a society, and a contract between ruler and ruled provided the means by which men could enter it. Therefore the state was to become the central force of politics in modern times, as a law-maker itself subjecting both institutions and individuals to its will. Modern man thinks that law might be made by an authoritative will rather than, as were in case of medieval man, discovered by the understanding or known by tradition.

The basic difference between Medieval and Modern Paradigm, in terms of sovereignty is that; in Medieval Paradigm the source of power was God and he delegates his power, in some degree, to the human being but in Modern Paradigm the situation is very different. Now only man, no matter how he is defined, is considered as the source of political power.

c. Men.

In feudal society a man figured in a network of quasi-contractual relations in which his political rights and duties were closely linked to land tenure and fealty. He was lord's man and his king's man. The powers of kingship were only with difficulty distinguished from property rights.

In Medieval Paradigm, approach to human nature which dominated politics and political thought has the assumption that human nature was corrupted and thus man was incapable of making sound judgements and hence of right conduct. That means, if man were left to himself, his behaviour would be far from adequate. So there was a need to guide human behaviour. In this context, there are two relevant authorities; the spiritual power of the Church which was to devise the rules of conduct, and governmental power of the temporal authorities which was to organise proper way of life, at the end, in accordance with the Church's principles. In this sort of understanding of society and politics there was no place for a man who could decide for himself, and for his future. Because he was considered to be so corrupt that others were to decide for his fate.

During the Renaissance period there was a challenge to this dominant doctrine in connection to the human nature, and to argue that man is capable of shaping his own destiny.

The significance of this development was that physical man himself, the homo, and not the Christian or faithful person, was the object of investigation. This radical departure from the accepted way of thinking explained the emergence of a new class of scholars who joined the company of the theologians and philosophers as we mentioned in earlier parts. The focus of attention of this new scholars was the natural man as he was in nature and reality and not the so-called reborn man, new creature, the Christian, the baptized man. So the monopoly of the theologian and philosopher who considered exclusively the Christian was broken.

Thus in the Modern Paradigm, human being has been located in the center of the universe, and his positive capabilities were restored to a central place in politics. Now, man is not a passive receiver of God's will, but is an active agent in politics who uses his own reason to choose the best course of action among the alternatives. "The point of reference in the case of Christian was faith; in the case of the natural man it was humanity. The two-man and Christian- began from the thirteenth century onwards to correspond to different categories altogether" (Ullmann, 1965, p. 167).

The new anthropocentric and anthropomorphic imagination of the universe provided an atmosphere for secular conceptualization of man, society and knowledge which is opposed to the Medieval Paradigm.

#### d. Church:

According to Christian theology, if mankind is unique and if there can not be more than one state that comprises all mankind, that state can be nothing but the Church which is founded by God himself, and all temporal lordship can be valid only in so far as it is a part or a parcel of the Church. Therefore "the Church, being the one true state, has received by a mandate from God the plenitude of all spiritual and temporal powers" (Gierke, 1960, p. 11).

In Modern Paradigm theology was also moving away from the hierarchical conception of the government of the universe towards an absolutist theory of cosmic rule. This transition from the hierarchical to the absolutist conception of cosmic government was affected "not only in the theory of the macrocosm, or the universe at large, but also in the theory of microcosm, or little world of human body" (Mason, 1971, p. 32).

#### 2. Epistemological transformation

Epistemology is a philosophical discipline which deals with the set of questions concerning the nature, possibility, limits and sources of knowledge. In epistemological sense, for Kuhn, when paradigms change, there are usually "significant shifts in the criteria determining the legitimacy both of problems and of



proposed solutions" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 109). Furthermore, different paradigms "make us see things differently. Research works in different paradigms have not only different concepts but also different perceptions" (Szumilewicz-lachman, 1984 p. 274). In Kuhn's words, "scientists see new and different things when looking with familiar instruments in places they have looked before" (p. 111).

In this framework, a paradigm is like a language, determining both what you perceive and what you can think about. The terminology and the knowledge generated within a paradigm are governed by the rules specified in the paradigm itself and they neither can not be conveyed to nor evaluated from outside of that paradigm without distortion. Meanings of all concepts, both theoretical and observational, are determined by paradigms in which they are embedded. That means, any change in one paradigm will inevitably produce a change in the meaning of the concepts of that paradigm. For example, the concept of "dark age" was used by Christian writers to point out the period of pagan antiquity before Christianity. "By shifting the metaphor from sphere of religion to that of culture it was applied instead of pagan antiquity to the Christian Middle Ages" (Ferguson, 1948, p. 8).

There are two obvious ways in which a paradigmatic shift may bring about a shift "how we see things" in epistemological level. First, it will effect the way we describe the objects which are

the causes of our visual experience. Second, a shift in paradigm may influence not only how we describe what we see, but also where and how we look for things.

In Medieval Paradigm, everybody, every thing had its place in the divine order of creation, and the understanding of this divine order was really important. But "since sensory observation could in no case ultimately verify such order and purpose, such an observation tended to be unimportant" (McDonald, 1962, p. 12).

"If the medieval mind wants to know the nature or the reason of a thing, it neither looks into it, to analyze its structure, nor behind it, to inquire into its origin, but looks up to heaven, where it shines as an idea. Whether the question involved is political, social or moral, the first step taken is to reduce it to its universal principle" (Huzinga, 1967, p. 214). This means that every problem tended to be viewed in the context of metaphysics.

On the other hand, in Medieval epistemology, sources of knowledge were two kinds; revelation and reason. The world was rational and logical which can be thought out by and expressed by reason. But "reason must be divine and revelation and reason must be harmonized" (Bently, 1967, p. 45). This mode of thought can be called religious rationality.

In Aquines's formulation of this rationality is the best known one. He believed that God designed this earth as a fit

place for man, whom he created in his own image. Clearly, therefore no such important human activity as thinking could be contrary to God's design. All our thinking, if rightly done, merely confirms the truths of faith, and helps us in daily life to apply them. For him, there is no problem of contradiction between reason and faith, since there is no opposition between reason and faith, if they are rightly understood. "If a man put a series of arguments together and came out with a conclusion contrary to what orthodox Catholics believed, he was simply guilty of faulty logic, and the use of correct logic could readily show where he erred" (Brinton, C, J. B. Christopher & R. L. Wolff, 1955, p.286).

The writings of Aquinas and his contemporaries made a great influence on the medieval thought, as we mentioned before, but there are, of course, other schools in Christian theology. The attempt by Aquinas to argue from the natural to divine and thus reconcile Aristotelian metaphysics with the Christian concept of God found opponents. "St. Bonaventura and his followers rejected Aquinas' argument that man can arrive at a rational, if imperfect, knowledge of God by analogy from the natural world, arguing that knowledge of God comes from mystical communion with the divine and not from nature" (Cantor, 1970, p. 63).

On the other hand, the Christian follower of Averroes, argued that man's only sure knowledge comes from nature and that

consequently he can have no sure knowledge of God. But those views could not become dominant in Medieval Paradigm.

Medieval people lived in a world that was a world of essences. They perceive things as having inner natures or qualities characteristic of them and inherent in them. According to Hansen (1978), Aquinas notion of essential has been optimized as "the inner structure of existence, (operating) as the principle of form for each kind of being" (p. 489).

Such an ontology of essences supported a system of qualitative explanation. That is, to know what something is, or what virtue it has explains it.

Although, at least in principle, qualitative explanations need not exclude quantitative ones, in fact, it seems that they tend to preclude them.

In the Modern Paradigm, the nature of reasoning and the sources of knowledge has changed. "Men could now, live and understand himself without recourse to the traditional religious concept" (Groethuysen, 1954, p. 279). Every one had to rely upon himself in the knowledge that neither metaphysical concepts nor supra-natural forces of the community were backing him. The intellectual interest was centered on the study of physical fact, and the discovery of laws of nature. The other-worldliness of the Middle Ages had left its place to the desire to know man in his relation to nature, and nature in its relation to man. Men

were asking themselves new questions to which the medieval tradition gave no answer.

In the secularization process, the separation of speculation from revelation were promoted three historical events. The first one was the Renaissance; it made the original texts of Greek thought available. The second event was the Reformation, which generated a completely new conception of the Christian faith, the Christian creed, the Christian doctrine, and even the Christian institutions and Christian life, so that the relation between speculation and revelation also had to be revised. The third event was the establishment of modern science "which revolutionized the methods, as well as the results, of the investigation of the visible world" (Kroner, 1964, p. 15). All these innovations contributed to the downfall of the Medieval way of thinking.

The rationality was also shifted from religious to the secular one. The secular rationality was composed of "a cluster of ideas that add up to the belief that the universe works the way a man's mind works. When he thinks logically and objectively. Therefore man can ultimately understand every thing in his experience as he understands, for instance, a simple arithmetical or mechanical problem" (Brinton, 1963, p.82).

A new conception of truth arose which was founded upon the insight into the necessary and mathematically deducible order of

reality. This new rationalism has parallelism to the emergency of capitalism and it "tends to banish God and supernatural from the universe" (Brinton, 1963, p. 82).

Modern way of thinking, released from the authority of the Christian religion, of the church, of the dogmas and doctrines of medieval theology, enhanced the dignity and excellence of man to the point where man was placed at the center of the thought. "While pre-Christian Philosophy was cosmocentric and Christian philosophy was theocentric, modern philosophy was anthropocentric: man was the main problem of its speculative interest and endeavor" (Kroner, 1964, p. 18). The world and God took a secondary position in the hierarchy of knowledge. Since human being was the center of interest in Modern Paradigm, the sciences dealing with man were tremendously increased and enlarged their scope as sociology, economics, statistics, psychoanalysis, psychobiology, psychogenesis, and many medical sciences. Psychology, for example, gained an authority and significance it had never enjoyed before. While a special science dealing with the comparison of the human races was developing, cosmology and rational theology were neglected and pushed into the background.

Even the term cosmology was itself degraded to mean the empirical science of the constitution of worlds composed of stars and their constellations" (Kroner, 1964, p. 20). Even within the

philosophy, those branches were favored and flourished which were concerned with human activities like the theory of knowledge, logic, methodology, linguistics and semantics, the philosophy of language, of history, of culture, of religion. The humanistic nature of the Modern Paradigm will be elaborated more detail in a separate title later on.

When we come to the natural sciences it can be argued that they represent modern version of cosmology. They differ from ancient physics, which was never completely dissolved from metaphysics, and this separation took place in the modern era. The natural sciences are empirical resting upon experimental observation and investigation, at least in principle, while physics in the Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic or Epicurean sense was permeated by philosophic theories or presuppositions.

### 3. Axiological transformation

Axiological bases of a society does not change in a short time. But, when a community of human being enters into a new paradigm, system of value of that community radically changes; new sets of values and new patterns of behavior are started to be accepted and accordingly old ones are started to disappear.

Similar to political revolutions, in paradigm choice, there is no standard higher than the assert of that community in question. For Kuhn (1970), "like the choice between competing

- political institutions, that between competing paradigms proves to be a choice incompatible modes of community of life... When paradigms enter, as they must, into a debate about paradigm choice, their role is necessary circular. Each group uses its own paradigm to argue in that paradigm's defense" (p. 94). Although paradigms can compete with each other in the sense that they replace each other, it is impossible to compare or rationally appraise their relative advantages and disadvantages. If, as Elguea (1985) pointed out, "paradigms seem a sets of shared values" (p.218) and if each paradigm dictates its own axiological system, it will not be meaningful to talk about an inter-paradigmatic value system, or common paradigm in order to compare those different paradigms. In this sense, what is considered a common paradigm is, according to this line of thought, the dominant paradigm and competition between different paradigms does not mean, in Kuhnian framework, a rational struggle for better explanation of life, but it is a matter of incommensurable collision.

What happened to the value system in the Renaissance period, and were the changes in value system as sharp as in a paradigmatic transition?

First of all, the Medieval Paradigm was, in terms of both the social structure and thought, a rigidly graduated system.



"There was a pyramid of Estates as well as a pyramid of values" (Martin, 1953, p. 2). In the Modern Paradigm those pyramids are to be destroyed, and free competition is proclaimed as the laws of nature. God and blood, the main powers of Medieval Paradigm, are deposed, although they maintain some of their importance, their dominance is shattered. In Ferguson's words, the ethics of work in this transitional period can be described in one sentence: "In the name of God and profit" (Ferguson, 1974, p. 110). Perhaps this was the spirit of capitalism; it deprives the world of the divine element in order to make the world more "real" and tangible.

As were in the Medieval Paradigm, life in a primary community is apt to produce a conservative or a religious type of thought which orders the world in an authoritarian manner. But the bourgeois world is such a world that it has lost its magic and the liberal mode of thought attempts to control the outside world more and more consciously.

Renaissance is a transition from religious thought to, basically, humanism, secularism and individualism. The religious life which had been the main life force and the center of a traditional occidental community lost its meaning with the decline of those social groups which had upheld it. Parallel to the changes in social structure, the traditional value system transformed into a new and tremendously different one. In the new

world "the great bourgeois faced God as a business partner. Iannozzo Manetti saw God as the 'maestro, d'uno traffico' circumspectly organizing the world on the analogy of a big firm" (Martin, 1963, p. 17). Moral and political obligations were founded no longer on a universal scheme of divine providence, since God and nature, in the Modern Paradigm, declared to be two independent realities "God and man, man and nature, mind and body are distinct one from one another" (Bentley, 1967, p. 55). In this atmosphere, secularism, humanism and individualism found appropriate climate to flourish out.

#### a. Humanism.

The term humanism is ambiguous; it meant in its own day both a concern with the classics of antiquity and preoccupation with man in relation to human society rather than God. Humanists regarded themselves "as in rebellion against scholasticism, the intellectual discipline of the medieval schools, which they saw as concerned with logic and theology rather than with literature and secular studies" (Boas, 1974, p. 113).

The term humanism can be defined as "a view that puts man at the center of things and stresses man's creative, rational and esthetic powers" (Greer, 1968, p. 261), or "glorification of the human and the nature as opposed to the divine or otherworldly" (Burns, 1963, p. 216). This view was not a new one but, at least, as old as the Greeks. Although the word humanism was not used in

the classical age, for Greer, Cicero referred to humanitas as the quality of mind and spirit that distinguishes human beings from mere animal (p. 261).

According to Cantor (1970), the term humanism has been used to denote many kinds of ideas and activities, but it has two major meanings. First, there is a social humanism, which describes the outlook of the upper middle class in the Italian cities during the Renaissance. The upper bourgeoisie, glorying in its new political power, expressed its independence by placing emphasis on human autonomy and on the value and grandeur of the city-state. Social humanism, for him, inspired a passionate civic patriotism, a belief that all urban resources should be applied to the defense and beautification of the republican commune.

The second aspect of humanism was an intellectual movement, based on Neo-Platonic philosophy, which emphasized the primacy of the humanistic values and individual creativity over feudal and ecclesiastical traditions and institutions. In short, "humanists believed that the human mind to be capable of deciding for itself without reliance on traditional authority" (Cantor, 1970, p. 73).

Modern Paradigm centered in man. The Renaissance and the Reformation emphasized the central position of man in spite of the fact that the Renaissance went back to the cosmocentric speculation of the Greeks, and the Reformation went back to the theocentric faith of the primitive Christian community, as

mentioned before. In both cases, the autonomy of man was emphasized in opposition to the cosmologic principle of antiquity and to the theocentric principle of the Roman Church. Modern way of thinking located the man in the center of the world and assumed that he had to seek truth and guidance within himself. No other authority can be accepted as a place of responsibility for the individual, and man may be accepted as ultimate sources of all his decisions and norms of conduct. " In the judgement of the humanist mans nature was inherently good" (Burns, 1964, p. 571).

#### b. Secularism

The word secularism like the word religion is among the richest of all words in its range of meaning. The medieval Latin *saeculum* means "the generation" or "the age" and another ecclesiastical usage is found in term "secular clergy" meaning those priests not subject to monastic vows (Martin, 1969, p.48). Secularization is a process whereby "man's response to and control of his human and natural environment are increasingly governed by social and rational considerations" ( Lauer, 1973,

p.225). According to Harvey (1965), secularization is an irreversible historical process in which "society and culture are delivered from tutelage to the religious control and closed metaphysical world-views" (p. 20).

Axiological foundations of the Modern Paradigm were established by putting a secularized self-consciousness oriented philosophic views of antiquity through the studies of Ancient classics, in place of Christian view of life. That is to say, "Greco-Roman Philosophy thus transmitted to the Renaissance a comprehensive and thoroughly secularized view of life. This fact must be born in mind in any attempt to determine the relation of the Renaissance to Antiquity" (Groethuysen, 1954, p. 282).

Besides Ancient elements, some christological principles also were to a certain degree secularized. The world of man itself became transfigured. "Even the world and God were seen from the point of view of human knowledge and human needs" (Kroner, 1964, p. 18).

The sources of the values system were also changed during the Renaissance. The idea that man had guide himself by standard of right and wrong, and be able to represent and understand his existence without recourse to the concept of God or given traditional world view started to become dominant. "It was the work of Renaissance to awaken in man consciousness of his powers

and to give him confidence in himself; to show him the beauty of the world and the joy of life" (Sellery, 1950, p.5). So, the individualism was born in as a result of those developments.

### c. Individualism.

The term individualism, like socialism and communism is a nineteenth century word and, like many other concepts, it has very different meanings when used by different persons and in different situations. The Oxford Dictionary finds the first instance of its use in Henry Reeve's translation of de Tocqueville's De la démocratie en Amérique, in 1840. Reeve in a note apologizes for adopting the term directly from the French because he knows "no English word exactly equivalent to the expression" (Lindsay, 1954, p. 674).

Individualism can be defined, in general sense, as "denial of any principle superior to the individuality and, as a consequence, the reduction of civilizations in all its departments to purely human elements" (Guenon, 1975, p. 51).

Before coming to the point of the relationship between the Renaissance and individualism in terms of its role in the transition process from Medieval Paradigm to Modern Paradigm, different aspects of individualism will be, a little bit, elaborated.

Individualism can be categorized as political, economic, religious, ethical, epistemological and methodological individualism. As far as political individualism is concerned, the citizens constitute independent centers of consciousness. Citizens are "independent and rational beings, who are the sole generators of their own wants and preferences, and the best judges of their interest" (Lukes, 1973, p. 79). There are three components of this view: firstly, there have to be free elections based on universal franchise; secondly, political representation is not a representation of orders, estates, social functions or social classes, but of individual interests; and thirdly, the purpose of government is to enable individuals' wants to be satisfied, individuals' interests to be pursued and individuals' rights to be protected.

Second type of individualism is the economic individualism. It implies a consequent presumption against economic regulation whether by Church or state. Advocates of economic individualism believed that "actions of individuals will suffice to provide the principles of society's economic organization, seeks to realize social progress through the individual by allowing him all the scope for his free self-development which is possible" (Robertson, 1933, p. 34). In order to do this two institutions are necessary; economic freedom, that is, freedom of enterprise and private ownership. It can be said that, the system of

economic individualism is the system of free trade, perfect competition and of private ownership.

Third kind of individualism is the religious individualism which may be defined as the view that the individual believer does not need intermediaries, that he has the primary responsibility for his own spiritual destiny, that he has the right and duty to come to his own relationship with his god and by his own effort. For Troeltsch, cited by Lukes (1973), "the really permanent attainment of individualism was due to a religious and not a secular movement" (p. 94).

While in ethical individualism, which is the fourth kind individual is considered as the source of morality; in epistemological individualism it is claimed that "source of knowledge lies within the individual" (Lukes, 1973, p. 107).

Methodological individualism, on the other hand, is a doctrine about explanation which asserts that all attempts to explain social or individual phenomena are to be rejected unless they are couched wholly in terms of facts about individuals. According to this principle, the ultimate constituents of the social world are individual people who act more or less appropriately in the light of their dispositions and understanding of their situation. Every complex social situation, institution or event is the result of a particular configuration of individuals, their dispositions, situations, beliefs, and



physical resources and environment.

Those conceptualizations related to individualism were, of course, not occurred fully during the Renaissance transformation, but Renaissance was the starting point. According to Swiss historian Jacob Burckhardt who studied on Italian Renaissance and wrote a book in 1860 titled The civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, Renaissance fundamental vice was a condition of its greatness, namely, excessive individualism. The acceptance of individualism necessarily implies a refusal to admit any authority higher than the individual, as well as any faculty of knowledge superior to individual reason. In other words, "the modern outlook was bound to reject all spiritual authority in the true sense of the word, authority originating that is to say in the supra-human order, as well as any traditional organization based on essentially upon such authority, no matter what form that organization might take, the form varying naturally from one civilization to another" (Guenon, 1975, p. 57).

The dichotomy of the relation between "is" and "ought to", which is one of the basic problems of axiological ground of the Modern Paradigm, did not occurred in Traditional Paradigm. For example, there is no separation of "ought" and "is" in Aquinas's thought, because "the belief that there is an absolute dichotomy between value statements and factual statements is a

modern innovation" (Modonald, 1968, pp. 143-144). Because the Christian theology was against to any kind of departmentalization. "That one and the same human activity could be viewed from a moral and a religious and a political angle was not a way of thinking with which medieval man acquainted...Religion was not separated from politics not separated from morals, and so on." (Ullmann, 1965, p. 16). This shows us that there was a radical change in separating the statements from each other not only in terms of their contents, but also the natures and definitions of them, during the transition from Traditional to Modern paradigm.

### 3. Methodological Transformation

Since the paradigms are the ways of viewing the world, "each paradigm will be shown to satisfy more or less the criteria that dictate itself" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 148). Different paradigms contain different methods-intellectual as well as physical instruments of research- for setting up research and evaluating its results. This means that paradigms dictate their own methodologies as will be shown in the case of Renaissance transformation.

The methodology of Medieval Paradigm, basically, aimed to demonstrate accepted truth by the method of deduction. "All minds were closed to systematic empirical investigation" (Greer, 1968, p. 220).

The church was not merely the center of the intellectual life in the Middle Ages; it actually had a monopoly on formal education. For the first time in western society, there came to be a systematic, graded education under common control exercised by the Catholic church, with its numerous organs of education and administration.

The content of the education of the Medieval Paradigm, the formal thought of the age in theology, philosophy, political theory, and even natural science seems strange to someone in Modern Paradigm, even today, since great deal of medieval thought is unavoidably alien to him. As an example to show this point we selected a short passage from Dante's work:

"The question: Is water, or the surface of the sea, anywhere higher than the earth, or habitable dry land?"

Affirmative argument:

Reason 1. Geometrical Proof: Earth and Water are spheres with different centers; the center of the Earth's sphere is the center of the universe; consequently the surface of the Water is above than that of the Earth.

Reason 2. Ethical Proof: Water is a nobler element than Earth; hence it deserves a nobler, or higher, place in the scheme of the universe.

Reason 3. Experimental Proof: Based on sailors seeing the land disappear under their horizon when at sea.

Reason 4. Economical Proof: The supply of Water, namely, the sea, must be higher than the Earth; otherwise, as Water flows downwards, it could not reach, as it does the mountains, lakes, etc.

Reason 5. Astronomical Proof: Since Water follows the moon's course, its sphere must be eccentric, like the moon's eccentric orbit; and consequently in places be higher than the sphere of Earth.

Negative Argument: These reason unfounded.

I. Refutation by observation:

Water flows down to the sea from the land; hence the sea cannot be higher than the land.

II. Refutation by Reasoning:

A. Water cannot be higher than the dry land.

Proof: Water can only be higher than the Earth,

1. If it were eccentric, or
2. If it were concentric, but had some exorescence.

But since

- x. Water naturally moves downwards, and
  - y. Water is naturally a fluid body:
1. Cannot be true, for three impossibilities would follow:
    - a. Water would move upwards as well as downwards;
    - b. Water and Earth would move downwards in different direction;

- c. Gravity would be taught ambiguously of the two bodies.

Proof of these impossibilities by a diagram.

2. Cannot be true, for

- a. The Water of the excrescence would be diffused, and consequently the excrescence would not exist:

- b. It is unnecessary, and what is unnecessary is contrary to the will of God and Nature." (Brinton,

Christopher, Wolff, 1957, p. 283).

The deductive method of thinking illustrated by this excerpt from Dante is known as scholasticism which was dominant method of thought in Medieval Paradigm.

The rebellion against the clerical authority and the weight of tradition gave rise to idea that "men make their standards, make their truth and don't merely discover it" (Brinton, 1963, p. 107).

Petrarch, Boccaccio, and the others who collected classical manuscripts sought to create, from documentary remnants, accurate texts of the ancient authors. "Their intention was simply to reassemble old learning, but their method of doing so opened new paths of creative scholarships. Their textual analysis led to move critical attitude toward the written word and a greater attention to observed facts, while the downfall of scholasticism, with its system of truth based on authority and reason, freed

scholars to seek truth by empirical investigation" (Greer, 1968, p. 269).

Scholars, in Modern Paradigm, were beginning "to be proud to boast that they had mastered secrets of a craft, believing that knowledge would thereby be acquired such as was not to be found in books they repaid the debt by spreading knowledge of applied science" (Boas, 1974, pp. 115-116).

Observation had been recognized as the basis of the scientific conclusion after especially work of Robert Grosseteste, Galileo and Roger Bacon. They stressed the importance of sense perception and thus observation and experiment. Cassirer has characterized the essential foundation of methodological postulate of Galileo as "movement and even matter itself, regarded as objects of knowledge, possess ideality; for in each of them certain unchangable elements which always bear the same relationship to one another, and are therefore their real mathematical laws, reveal themselves. Experience was thereby raised to the level of exact knowledge for the first time" (Mayer, 1970, p. 119). Emphasis on observation, experience, experimental procedures and induction has secular and reactionary character in their natures, at least, at the beginning.

Bacon's monumental contribution to the philosophy was the glorification of the inductive method. He believed that all

seekers of truth in the past had stumbled in darkness because they were slaves of preconceived ideas or prisoners in the dungeons of Scholastic logic. He argued that in order to overcome these obstacles the philosopher should turn to the direct observation of nature, to accumulation of facts about things and the discovery of the laws that govern them. "Induction alone, he believed, was the magic key which would unlock the secrets of truth" (Burns, 1963, p.560). In Modern Paradigm "no law, no rule of nature can be formulated without mathematics" (Mayer, 1970, p. 118).

### C. A General comparison of Medieval and Modern Outlook

In the Middle Ages thought, change was accidental and random, not what we call, in Modern Paradigm, progress. No medieval person believed, or could believe, in progress in anything like our modern sense.

The Medieval intellectual, then assumed that the universe was static; modern intellectuals assumes that it is dynamic. The one assumed that laws for right human action had been, so to speak, designed by God in heaven, and that those laws were clear to good Christian. The other assumes that laws for right human action are in fact worked out in the very process of living, that no one can be sure of them in advance, and that new ones are constantly being created.

Medieval people was not a citizen who has right to elect his political leader, in modern sense, but a subject. They had not participated in political life. "The individual was reduced to a passive political status, in that, he had duties but no right" (Saybasılı, 1989, p. 172). While source of the sovereignty legitimized by divinity in Medieval Paradigm, popular sovereignty replaced it in the Modern Paradigm. "The rule of the people remained an ideological façade, a slogan for the masses" (Martin, 1963, p. 6).

The medieval man, tended to resolve his problem by an appeal to authority, the best or natural authority in which he had been



trained to put his faith. He turned to Aristotle if he was a schoolman, to the customary law of the land if he was a lawyer, to his father's farming practices if he was a farmer. And -this is very important- he usually believed that no perfectly satisfactory solution of his problem would be available until he went to heaven.

The modern man, on the other hand, tends at least to consult several different authorities and to compare them before he makes up his own mind. He may also try some experiments on his own. He usually feels that if he goes about it in the right way, he can in fact solve his difficulty. "The right way for the medieval man already existed, and had at most to be found; the right way for the modern man may have to be created" (Brinton, 1957, p. 290).

"Transcendentalism may well be regarded as a major characteristic of medieval thought" (Ferguson, 1948, p.396).

According to Modonald (1962), premodernity can be characterized as the transcendent community, natural law and formalism (p. 4). The most obvious example of the premodern transcendent community is the corpus Christianum, the Church viewed as the body of Christ on earth. The meaning of the concept sometimes seemed to imply a sharp opposition between this community and all secular communities as in the case of St. Augustine's city of God and City of Earth.

The essence of natural law is that man is a rational animal

and by the proper use of his reason, universally true propositions for the direction of life may be discovered. Of course, the "self-evidence" of natural law is not evident to all men automatically, but only after training and effort is bent in the proper direction. Belief in the validity of universal norms expressed in natural law implies a formalism, a fixity of structures, categories, and explanations that applied in many other ways.

Three elements, again for Modonald, would appear most relevant to political thinking in, what we call Modern Paradigm. They are experimental science, nation-state, and individualism (p. 10).

## CONCLUSION

One of the central requirements of a flourishing civilization is the existence of a widely shared set of beliefs about man's relationship with the natural world, with his society of fellow men, and with the Divine. Such a set of beliefs, a so-called world view, defines what is important in the civilization. It provides the foundation for predominant moral and aesthetic values and for common patterns of behavior. Of course, not all individuals or groups living at a given time and place will assert to the predominant world view, and in a given culture, not all of the elements of the predominant world view will be equally shared. But the notion of prevailing world views as crucial elements of civilization provide a way to understand those important and often hidden assumptions which underlie men's feelings, thoughts, and actions as well.

It is customary, on the other hand, to regard the course of history as a great river, with its source in small rivulet of the distant past, taking its rise on the plains of Asia, and flowing slowly down through the ages, gathering water from new tributaries on the way, until finally in our days it broadens majestically over the whole world. The paradox of this conception is that the understanding of "historical processes" or "historical events" is a humanly conditioned and constructed activity which may differ from one civilization to another that

they are taking place of that "great river" or from one paradigm to another within a civilization; and this "activity" creates, and also created by "historical process".

In this study, our hypothesis was that the Renaissance in western civilization is so radical transformation from one mode of life and thought to another that it might be named as a paradigmatic transition. If history is a great river the Renaissance is a point where the direction of the flowing of that river radically changed.

At the beginning, the Renaissance was a reaction against asceticism and otherworldliness, and turned men's minds to human life considering that this life is more important. "The essence of the Renaissance was enjoyment of this life and indifference to the supernatural" (Burns, 1964, p. 571). Then, as Brinton pointed out, it became the name of movement away from devoutness, caste-consciousness, otherworldliness and credulousness toward secularism, individualism, skepticism and materialism. Of course this does not mean that all individuals, scholars or artists of the Renaissance period suddenly left the medieval qualities and adopted modern ones, but it means there is a tendency moving away from old standards on the way of acquiring newer ones.

As were in all historical epoch, it is not possible and also necessary, in fact, to discover any single trait of either medieval or modern paradigm to which exception could not be

found. It is in the nature of historical process that each age will carry over a vast number of ideas, institutions and forms of behavior from the preceding age.

As we see in this study; in ontological level, Renaissance is a transition from geocentric and hierarchical classification of beings to the anthropocentric conceptualization of the universe; in epistemological level, it is a transition from religious rationality to secular rationality; in axiological level, it is a transition from religious faith to the humanism, secularism and individualism; and lastly in methodological level, it is a transition from deductive and qualitative way of explanation to the inductive method of reasoning, and empiricism and positivism. As a result, it can be stated that there are a great changes in man's outlook as far as emergence of Renaissance is concerned.

We can say that, as a conclusion statement, this type of a radical change in human's way of seeing and interpreting the world and himself can be called paradigmatic transition.

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