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**MASS MEDIA IN THE POLITICS
OF A DEVELOPING MUSLIM SOCIETY
PAKISTAN: 1970-1990**

**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
THE MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY**


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
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
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



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ABSTRACT

**MASS MEDIA IN THE POLITICS
OF A DEVELOPING MUSLIM SOCIETY
PAKISTAN: 1970-1990**

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This thesis analyzes the nature and the role of 'arrested media discourse' in Pakistan in the overall 'immobility syndrome' wrought under the impact of 'parasitic landlordism'-- an anachronistic political basis created during the colonial period. The thesis argues that land possession and land ownership constitutes the basis of Pakistan's political culture. It means that he who owns the land deserves to rule it, and he who rules the land must own it. Through statistical analysis of 112 responses to a detailed questionnaire addressed to the ulama, journalists and university teachers in Pakistan, and through discourse analysis of media texts (about 1300 press clippings from four Pakistani newspapers) related to eight epoch making political events which occurred during 1970-1990, the thesis demonstrates that the role and place of the mass media, politics

and religion is defined by the ruling elite and they remain subservient to their interests. The cultural ethos of parasitic landlordism and the socio-political system founded on it, has been strengthened and perpetuated through an informal alliance between the Landlords, the Military, and the Civil bureaucracy. The alliance has been often supported by the traditionalist Ulama who share their interest of resistance to change. The latent forces of change which consist of the modernists, the religious revivalists, and the merchant/ industrialists have failed to assert themselves in any meaningful way, so far. The mass media and the intellectuals are called the 'free floaters' of the polity whose middle and lower middle class interests lie with the agents of change, but in the face of overwhelming power of the agents of status quo they find their immediate interests better served by siding with the ruling elite.

The thesis makes theoretical contribution by questioning adequacy of the prevalent media theories to account for a situation where media discourse is 'arrested', media is denied existence as an 'independent entity', and promotes political discourse of subservience at the cost of its own identity and entity.

The thesis develops a sociological analysis of political events, and the role of mass media in shaping the contours and the dynamics of these events; how the media played its self-assumed role of the 'fourth estate'; how internal and external

constraints determined their political output; how in the absence of well founded democratic norms and due to relatively weak institutional basis, different regimes have influenced, manipulated, pressurized, and controlled the process of political discourse in the media. Within this framework, the processes, relationships, and structures of political mass communication have been brought out. To illustrate this point a brief comparative account of mass media in cross cultural context has been given, showing how the Turkish, American and Pakistani newspapers are different because of difference in political culture.

Keywords: Pakistan, Mass Media, Politics, Religion, Discourse Analysis, Parasitic Landlordism, Immobility Syndrome, Agents of Status quo, Forces of Change.

Science Code: 211.03.01

ÖZET

GELİŞEN MÜSLÜMAN TOPLUMUN POLİTİKASINDA

KİTLE İLETİŞİMİ

PAKİSTAN: 1970-1990

Shakil Akhtar

Doktora, Sosyoloji Bölümü

Danışman, Prof.Dr. Bahattin AKŞİT

Eylül, 1994

623. Sayfa

Bu tez -sömürge döneminde yaratılmış politik temel- 'asalak toprak sahipliği'nin olan etkisi altında işlenmiş 'hareketsizlik sendromu' içindeki Pakistan'da iletişim söyleminin doğasını ve rolünü incelemektedir. Tez, toprağa hakim olmanın ve sahip olmanın Pakistan'ın politik kültürünün temellerini oluşturduğunu öne sürmektedir. Bu, toprağa sahip olanın, onu yönetmeye hakkı olduğu ve toprağı yönetenin de ona sahip olması gerektiği anlamına gelir. Bu tez Pakistan'daki ulemaya, gazetecilere ve üniversite öğretmenlerine yöneltilen ayrıntılı bir ankete verilen 112 yanıtın istatistik çözümlemesi, ayrıca 1970-1990 arasında meydana gelen ve dönemlerine damgalarını vurmuş sekiz politik olayla ilgili iletişim metinlerinin (dört Pakistan gazetesinden yaklaşık 1300 alıntı) söylem çözümlemesi yoluyla incelenmesi sonucunda kitle iletişimnin, politikanın ve dinin rol ve yerinin yöneten seçkinlerce belirlendiğini, bu kurumların o seçkinlerin çıkarlarına aşırı saygılı kaldıklarını gösterir. Asalak toprak sahipliğinin ve onun üzerine kurulu sosyo-politik sistemin kültürel

özellikleri toprak sahipleri, askeri idare ve sivil idare arasındaki gayriresmi güçbirliği sonucunda kuvvetlenmiş ve süreklilik kazanmıştır. Bu güçbirliği çoğu zaman onların değişikliğe karşı düşüncelerini paylaşan gelenekselci ulema tarafından da desteklenmiştir. Orta ve alt orta sınıf çıkarlarının sahip kitle iletişim araçları ve entellektüeller, statükonun 'serbest değişkenleri' olarak adlandırılırlar; fakat onlar da mevcut düzenin ezici üstünlüğü karşısında kısa süreli çıkarlarının yöneten seçkinlerin tarafında olduklarında daha iyi karşılandığının farkındadırlar.

Bu tez iletişim söyleminin sıkıştığı, iletişime bağımsız bir varoluş tanınmadığı ve iletişimin yetkeye aşırı saygılı politik söylemini kendi kimliğini ve varlığını kaybetme pahasına teşvik ettiği durumları açıklayan yaygın iletişim kuramlarının doğruluğunu sorgulayarak kuramsal katkıda bulunmaktadır.

Tez politik olayların toplumbilimsel çözümlemesini ve kitle iletişimin bu olayların sınırlarını ve yönünü şekillendirmedeki rolünü irdelemektedir. Tezde irdelenen konular; iletişimin kendine yüklediği 'dördüncü alan' rolünü nasıl oynadığı, iç ve dış engellerin onların politik ürününü nasıl belirlediği, temeli iyi oluşturulmamış demokratik normların ve göreceli olarak zayıf kurumsal temelin değişik rejimlerin iletişimdeki politik söylem sürecini nasıl etkilediği, yönettiği, baskı altında tuttuğu ve kontrol altına aldığıdır.

Bu çerçevede, süreçler, ilişkiler ve politik kitle iletişiminin yapıları ortaya çıkarılmıştır. Bu noktayı örneklendirmek üzere kültürler arası bağlamda kitle iletişimin

kısa, karşılaştırmalı bir incelemesi verilmiştir. Burada Türk, Amerikan ve Pakistan gazetelerinin politik kültürden dolayı nasıl farklılaştığı gösterilmiştir.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Pakistan, Kitle iletişim, Politika, Din, Söylem Çözümlemesi, Asalak Topraksahipliği, Hareketsizlik Sendromu, Statüko Etmenleri, Değişiklik cephesi.

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TO MY MOTHER

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
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CHAPTER 1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This study is an attempt to analyze the role of the mass media in representing, reproducing, and transforming political discourse in Pakistan. This major question entails a number of supplementary questions like what are the cultural contours of Pakistani politics; how to identify and theorize Pakistani cultural ethos; and then to examine through discourse analysis how politics, religion and mass media, as cultural products, have dual praxis with one another; what has been the role of religion (Islam), and religious leadership (ulama), in the construction and 'structuration' (Giddens, 1979) of political culture and media discourse.

The triangular relationship between politics, religion and mass media have been studied through the discourse analysis of media texts, and statistical analysis of responses given by Pakistani intellectuals/ opinion makers to a questionnaire. It has

been argued that mass media, politics, and religion are 'culture patterns' and 'extrinsic sources of information' (Geertz, 1973:92, 363) whose proper sociological study is to be located in the cultural context. Thus, to understand politics and religion in a given society, and how the two have been reflected and constructed through the mass media over a period of time, calls for placing them in a broad socio-historical perspective.

The mass media are culture specific and historically determined. Therefore, the mass media "can be analyzed and interpreted only *within* their concrete, historical specificity, and... such an analysis can never be separated from questions and debates concerning the balance of social power and the nature and future of the polity within which that analysis takes place" (Collins 1986:1).

Such an enquiry, in the context of a developing Muslim society like Pakistan, is an attempt to disentangle a web of social change, which has been wrought, primarily under the impact of the West over the last about two centuries, and has its roots in a historical process stretching back to a few thousand years. The impact of colonialism has brought about a unique disruption of historical process, which has created a hiatus almost in every aspect of thought and practice in the Third World societies, particularly in the Muslim societies, which continues to defy a clear comprehension. The role of mass media in the politics of developing

countries, especially that of the Muslim societies (Pakistan in our case), seems to oscillate between the two poles of the 'fourth estate'¹ and a willing tool in the hands of the establishment.

The present research tries to comprehend the political sociology of mass media in Pakistan through discourse analysis of eight epoch making political events which unfolded themselves between 1970 and 1990. It develops a sociological analysis of the political events, and the role of mass media in shaping the contours and the dynamics of these events; how the media tried to play its self-assumed role of the 'fourth estate'; how the 'internal constraints' determined 'the political output of media' (Curran, et al. 1987:271); how in the absence of well founded democratic norms and due to relatively weak institutional basis, different regimes have tried to manipulate, influence, pressurise, and control the process of political discourse in the media. Under the circumstances how fairly the press has been able 'to create images of social reality by which the public may structure their views of the world' (Wade, 1973:347). An attempt has been made to bring out, within this framework, the processes, relationships, and structures of political mass communication. To illustrate this point occasional references have been made to those societies where mass media is relatively more effective and under lesser influence of the government. A brief comparative account of mass media in cross cultural context has been given in chapter six.

Theoretical Perspective

Research in social sciences has undergone a qualitative change in recent times, particularly in the field of mass media. The study of mass communication, dealing with mass mediated messages and their conditions of productions and reception, is shifting from content analysis to a more sophisticated discourse analysis of media texts. Emphasis has shifted from unified approaches employed in conventional linguistic studies (analysis of individual words, phrases, and sentences), to the analysis of structures and functions of actual forms of language. The study of language beyond the surface of the given text in its socio-cultural context is called discourse analysis. It is a macrolinguistic approach and tries to correlate the linguistic phenomena with non-linguistic facts, which may not have been stated in the text but are very much relevant in the context. Discourse as an interdisciplinary approach has developed at the expense of 'formal rigor' and theoretical subtleties in respective disciplines. To investigate the relationship between politics, religion, and mass media in Pakistan, the researcher has studied media as discourse, within the theoretical framework developed by Michel Foucault (1976, 1977), Coulthard (1977) van Dijk (1980, 1983, 1988), Tim Dant (1991), Brown and Yule (1983), Duranti (1985), Fowler (1991), Stubbs (1983), Kress (1985) and Schiffrin (1987), and employed by Edward Said (1978, 1981, 1993) and van Dijk (1993).

Media express and represent the political ethos of a given society in cultural and ideological terms as a mode of discourse. This discourse is supported by institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, and civil and military bureaucracies (Said, 1978:3). Without examining the triangular relationship between media, politics and religion as a discourse one cannot understand the complex network of interests and threats, whereby the South Asian Muslims found an identity and continuously reproduced it politically, sociologically, ideologically, and imaginatively during and after the colonial rule. How this came about forms the background of this research plan; how, and to what effect, this complex network unfolded itself in the media during the 1970s and 1980s is what the researcher has tried to demonstrate.

In this broad based, multidisciplinary media study effort has been made to bring out the interrelations between society, history, ideology, politics, and textuality. How a particular set of vocabulary, at a given point of time, is legitimized, with ulterior motives by presenting an assumption as a fact through a set of representative figures or tropes.

The theory of media discourse is a step further from linguistic and semiotic studies, it is different from empirical, behaviorist media studies, and differs from all previous approaches which treated media message as an unanalyzed variable between

production and reception processes. 'Discourse is not simply an isolated textual or dialogical structure but rather a complex communicative event that also embodies a social context, featuring participants as well as production and processes' (Ulku, 1992). Discourse is part of the speaker's (or say reader's or writer's) cultural construction of reality. It is an interdisciplinary osmosis which relates parts of the text (sentences, paragraphs etc.) to each other, and to its socio-cultural context (Duranti, 1985:197, 220, 223).

According to Schiffrin (1987:2) discourse 'has its intellectual roots not only in linguistics, but in the social sciences and in philosophy. It began within linguistics through the works of Harris (1951, 1952),... within anthropology through the works of Malinowski (1930), Hymes (1974,)), and Gumperz (1982), and in sociology through de Saussure, Simmel, Goffman, and Schutz, and within philosophy through Austin, and Searle'. van Dijk (1985) traces the origins of discourse analysis back to the Classical rhetoric. It developed in modern times through Sociolinguistics, which put more emphasis on dialectical and sociolectal variations in language use; through Cognitive Psychology, which formulated cognitive dimensions of discourse interpretation; and through Anthropology, by giving rise to structural analysis of narratives. This interdisciplinary osmosis focusses attention 'not only on surface structure but also on all systematically assessable dimensions of messages. This has led to change of concern in the

analysis of discourse from the syntactic and semantic properties of isolated sentences to textual structures within the framework of cognitive processing in linguistics' (Ulku, 1992).

Trend toward multidisciplinary approach in the study of mass media discourse started taking shape in the decade of sixties, developed in the seventies, and got acceptability and currency in the late seventies and through the eighties. The disciplines which first evolved and employed this approach included, anthropology, linguistics, Sociolinguistics, semiotics, poetics, psychology, sociology, and the fledgling discipline of mass communication research. This shared interest in various social phenomena of language, texts, conversational interaction etc. soon became well integrated under the common label of Discourse Analysis (van Dijk, 1985:xi vol.1)

Theoretical and descriptive approaches in this new development are varied: for example, the study of narrative in a number of disciplines mentioned above, the attention paid to natural forms of language use in the social context in Sociolinguistics, the experimental or computer-simulated study of text processing in psychology and artificial intelligence, the construction of text grammars in linguistics, the ethnography of speaking in anthropology, as well as the continued attention paid to the analysis of style, rhetoric, argumentation, and persuasive communication in several branches of the humanities and the social sciences (van Dijk, 1985).

Being a sort of persuasive communication, and an interdisciplinary field of study, the mass mediated messages of political nature can be studied within the framework of discourse analysis. In its full scope, discourse analysis involves all the levels and methods of analysis of language, cognition, interaction, society and culture. This means that 'integral discourse analysis' (Ince, 1993), requires to make specific choices among the many available methods, depending on the aims and objectives of the study. In the present study discourse analysis is employed at social and cultural levels.

Discourse is both a social process and a linguistic structure; the two can not be separated, yet it is possible to highlight one more than the other. The present research has, therefore, emphasized discourse more as a social process, than as a linguistic structure. Thus discourse is to be perceived in a broad socio-cultural perspective 'as it relates to and is constructed by particular aspects of social organization and the speaker's (reader's or writer's) cultural construction of the world' (Duranti, 1985). The relations the researcher has tried to establish are textual and cognitive, but with more attention to sociological context. This approach is imperative, because 'unless we present texts in terms of the circumstances under which they were obtained, from whom they were taken, and the social and psychological characteristics of their narrators, we are in danger of selecting concordant features from disparate accounts and

producing a logically satisfactory synthesis which would perhaps be unintelligible to most members of the indigenous culture' (Turner, 1974:159).

It is a fallacy to assume that the swarming, unpredictable, and problematic mess in which human beings live can be understood on the basis of what the texts say; to apply what one learns out of a written text literally to reality is to risk folly or ruin. Yet it seems a common human failing to prefer the schematic authority of a text to the disorientations of direct encounters with humans (Said, 1978:93). The reader resorts to a text sometime because he does not know or does not comprehend the reality he wants to understand, at other times he would read and believe the text because it has been approved by many other readers. It is here that the reality described and constructed by the text acquires a greater authority and use, even than the actuality it describes. There is a rather complex dialectic of reinforcement by which the experiences of readers in reality are determined by what they have read in a text, and this in turn persuades the writer to take up subjects described in advance by reader's experiences. These texts can create and construct not only knowledge but also the very reality they describe. In time such knowledge and reality produce a tradition, or what Michel Foucault calls a discourse, whose material presence or weight, not the originality of a given author, is really responsible for the texts produced out of it (Said, 1978:94).

It is assumed that written as well as spoken texts are constrained by society , by cultural traditions, by worldly circumstances, and by stabilizing influences like schools, libraries, and governments. Moreover the texts are never free, but are limited in their imagery, assumptions, and intentions; and finally the scientificity, objectivity, and impersonality of the social sciences, is more qualified than the social scientists and journalists would like to admit (Said 1978:202). My thesis is that the essential aspects of Pakistan's political theory and praxis can be understood better as a set of structures inherited from the past (particularly the immediate colonial past), evolved and reinforced, among other factors, by the mass media through the kaleidoscope of ideology, as articulated and determined by the establishment.

The approach has a number of inherent limitations which one needs to be aware of. Insistence on qualitative data, if used to the exclusion of quantitative data, is likely to create some distortions in the outcome. By removing limits of time and space on the scope of discourse analysis, the researcher would find it difficult to determine the contours of his project; it is hard for any one to say that a particular study has taken into account all elements influencing the text; there is no criterion to question the validity of an input or output, which remain subjective to a great extent. To ward against these limitations the research has included empirical data to supplement discourse analysis, and has narrowed the focus on political discourse as socio-cultural process

in Pakistan over a period of two decades. All embracive pretensions, and subjective nature of discourse analysis might not enable it to comprehend all the influences and ingredients of a text but it is certainly more wide in scope, and makes amends for the arbitrary nature of quantitative approach. It might not be the best and the ideal approach but it is certainly the best available.

The study of 'ideology' and 'hegemony' (Gramsci) is the next step in the discourse framework of this research. Pakistan has been described as an ideological entity as against historical entity of other states. Ideology tends to impose a static vision of social reality, while society continues to move ahead in time with its own internal dynamics, without much regard to the ideology. Individuals and societies have often preferred to conjure up ideological visions of reality so as to make sense of the complex social scene in the given frame of time, and/ or to manipulate the socio-political situation to the advantage of the powerful through ideological interpretation which casts the given reality into the preconceived mould. To be able to cope with changing social realities, and to keep pace with the march of time ideology needs to make occasional self adjustments. Ideology is thus selective and partial, but because of various political and social constraints it very often pretends to represent the total social reality in time and space. In such a situation it imposes a hegemonic control over the given social order and obstructs the process of adjustment between time and ideology. If this obstructionist attitude

continues over a long period of time the given society becomes an anachronism. Man made systems of thought, 'discourses of power, ideological fictions-- mind-forg'd manacles-- are all too easily made, applied and guarded' (Said, 1978:382). A society can not break through these 'magian overlayings' (Iqbal, 1977), as Gramsci would say without 'doing a bit of violence' to its sanctified, fossilized assumptions. This is the task for any socio-political researcher on Pakistan.

Methodology

The researcher needs to follow qualitative preference in the proposed discourse analysis of newspaper texts, to establish dynamic relationship between media, politics, and religion, all studied as cultural products in the Pakistani context. Politics, religion, religious leadership, ideology, and the mass media are the key variables, whose mutual relationship is to be studied, on the basis of newspaper texts, in broad socio-cultural perspective; particularly the potential of the discourse theory is to be explored in explaining the continuous and so far virtually unchallenged hegemony of the ruling triumvirate-- the landlords, the military, and civil bureaucracy in the national polity of Pakistan. A brief description of research methodology is given here, for details of methodology, terminology and definitions reference may please be made to chapter three below.

An analysis of four newspapers texts related to eight important political events has been done to determine the role of media in Pakistan. Important political events with reference to which political discourse has been studied include the followings: General elections 1970, when the first free general elections were held and had ideological overtones, also when religious leaders had their first taste of electoral politics; Separation of East Pakistan 1971 in a civil war; the making of the Constitution 1973; The anti-Qadiani agitation 1974 and the second Constitutional amendment whereby the Qadianis were declared non-Muslims; General elections 1977 and the subsequent mass agitation which led to the imposition of Martial Law; non-party general elections 1985; General elections held after the death of President Zia-ul-Haque in 1988, and the general elections held after the dismissal of Benazir government in 1990 and won by a motley alliance supported by the ulama and the establishment. These are some of the most significant political developments which brought internal political contradictions and complexities to the surface, and also each event has left its indelible mark on the subsequent political developments.

Discourse analysis of media texts is given in chapters six, seven and eight. Before starting the analysis of media messages related to each event, an effort has been made in chapter six to identify the peculiar character of Pakistani newspapers which distinguish them from newspapers produced under different cultural

ethos. For this purpose a comparative study of American, Turkish and Pakistani newspapers has been presented, in which Pakistani journalism has been identified as 'statement journalism' as a unique product of the cultural ethos of parasitic landlordism (Moore, 1967:316). 'Statement journalism' refers to the practice of the Pakistani newspapers of carrying most of news stories based on statements issued by various news actors. This practice imposes a sort of self-censorship on the media, and also enables the analyst to read the mind of the news actor as well as the media which reproduce it without exercising their professional discretion, which under the circumstances limits itself only to the decision about the size and place of display and choice of headlines and lead sentence (for details see chapter six below).

More than 1300 press clippings obtained from about 650 copies of newspapers have been analyzed in chapters seven and eight. Newspaper clippings have been obtained from four leading national newspapers of Pakistan, which include two English dailies- The Pakistan Times and The Dawn, and two Urdu dailies-- the Jang and the Nawa-e-Waqt (for detailed information about the selected four newspapers please see chapter three on methodology, and chapter six on the nature and dynamics of media discourse under parasitic landlordism). The four newspapers have been the leading dailies of the period under study with highest circulation among the English and the Urdu readership. Discourse analysis has been based on the

study of contents and display of news stories, feature articles, editorials, and news photographs. Among the aspects given special attention in discourse analysis of media texts include, background of the event, comparison of the display and contents of a particular item in different newspapers and in the same newspaper under different situation, lexical choices and their cultural and linguistic implications.

Discourse analysis has been preceded by statistical analysis of responses given to a detailed questionnaire by 112 respondents, including 50 ulama, 30 journalists and 32 academics. The respondent ulama represent all the three local schools of thought and the two Figahs (Sunni and Shia); the working Journalists represent both the Urdu and the English press, the academics represent, primarily the University teachers. To give a fair representation to all the four provinces of Pakistan and all the ethnic groups the questionnaire was distributed in the four provincial headquarters (Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar and Quetta) and other big cities like Multan, Rawalpindi, Gujranwala, Faisalabad, Jhang, Dera Ismail Khan, and Hyderabad.

The religious edicts (fatwas) issued from time to time against various means of mass communication and the new political ideas and system, have been obtained to ascertain under what circumstances those edicts were issued and how those 'un-Islamic' inventions and practices have been accepted without rescinding those edicts. This

contradiction in words and deeds has been brought out in the questionnaire addressed to the ulama and other opinion makers.

Significance of the Study

1. The thesis makes theoretical contribution by questioning adequacy of the prevalent media theories to account for a situation where media discourse is 'arrested', media is denied existence as an 'independent entity' within the socio-political structure and historical process, and promotes political discourse of subservience at the cost of its own identity and entity.

2. Theoretical significance of the proposed study lies in the fact that no research has been undertaken to study politics, religion and the mass media in Pakistan through the discourse analysis. Hence it is a pioneering work.

3. The triangular relationship between politics, religion, and the media has not been studied systematically in Pakistan. The existing studies are mostly from conventional political scientist's or generalistic point of view. Almost all the studies have ignored the role of the mass media in constructing and reflecting the political discourse in Pakistan.

4. Identification and theorization of Pakistan's cultural ethos as 'parasitic landlordism' and its permeation through all segments of the ruling elite is an original contribution.

5. The researcher's claim that the traditionalist ulama are the 'reserve force of the ruling elite against the agents of change' is also a new addition to the existing literature on Pakistan. This is expected to be controversial; as the ulama are likely to take exception to it.

6. The assertion that in Pakistan the media discourse is 'arrested in the immobility syndrome' under the smothering weight of the establishment is another original contribution to the media study in that society.

7. Cross cultural comparison of media text led the researcher to label Pakistani genre of journalism as 'Statement Journalism' which is a new description for the Pakistani media and links this type of journalism to the 'immobility syndrome' inflicted by the 'parasitic cultural ethos'.

8. On the whole the study is a humble contribution in promoting an understanding of Pakistani society in its full socio-cultural richness, and might, thereby, raise new questions to be answered by better qualified scholars.

Limitations of the Study

The study has a number of limitations which must be kept in view. It studies only political discourse and that too on the basis

of media texts with reference to arbitrarily selected eight events. It excludes the study of humorous political discourse, oral or written, which is an integral part of media political discourse. Next, Urdu and regional literature, particularly poetry, is full of political messages but has not been included here. Unlike the mass media, poetic and literary discourse does not seem to be subservient to the interests of the ruling elite. Yet another limitation of the study is that it concentrates on internal politics only. In the case of external affairs the media discourse seems to be more subservient to the interests of the establishment than in internal politics. Limitation of the research to twenty years period may also pose problem in understanding the historical process through which the mass media has evolved. Therefore, for a more comprehensive understanding of the mass media in Pakistan there is need to have a more wide ranging research undertaken by a team of scholars. -

There are certain deficiencies on the side of statistical analysis as well. The questionnaires were distributed and responses collected on the basis of availability of the respondents. Keeping in view the small size of the frame no sampling plan was designed/used for the selection of experimental units. Also in the statistical analysis of data a more restricted approach has been used and kept upto the level of computing association measures only. Although more sophisticated techniques like statistical modelling are available but have not tried here. However, since the

raw data is available more in-depth statistical studies can be undertaken subsequently.

An Outline of The Presentation

i. **Identification and Theorization of Cultural Ethos:** After elaborating theoretical perspective and methodology for the dissertation in chapters two and three, respectively, effort has first been made to identify and theorize the cultural ethos of Pakistan in chapter four. It has been argued that talking of the politics of the South Asian Muslims, under the colonial rule, means talking of their religious identity. Pakistan had been demanded and created on the basis of two-nations theory, whereby it was claimed that the Muslims of British India constituted a 'nation' in contemporary sense of the term, and were therefore, entitled to the right of self determination and statehood. Thus religion formed the *raison d'etre* of the nationhood and statehood, and thereby amalgamated the boundaries of politics and religion. The ideological basis of the state has been interpreted variously by different regimes and scholars. Interpretation of the ideology has been the most important determinant of one's political leanings. Politicians, journalists, and scholars, all have been labelled, the rightists, leftists, liberals, progressives, and conservatives, primarily on the ground how one chose to interpret the 'ideology of Pakistan'. It, therefore, becomes inevitable to study the politics of Pakistan, and the role of mass media therein, with reference to

its ideological basis. From this point of view the decades of the 1970 and the 1980 provide a glaring contrast: the 1970s saw the rise to power of the leftists and the liberals who claimed that religion had been invoked in the making of Pakistan as a matter of convenience only, and not as a commitment to the attainment of the ideals of Islam; the founding fathers, they claimed, wanted to see Pakistan a liberal, secular, democratic, and Islamic-Socialistic state; from the late 1970s and through the 1980s rose to power the rightists, conservatives and religiously oriented leadership, which claimed that Islam constituted the basis of the new state as a matter of collective commitment to Allah, and, added that the Muslim masses of British India had lent their support to the Pakistan Movement because they visualized the new country as a model Islamic state.

These ideological differences, mostly among the middle class and lower middle class intellectuals, are subsumed (even made irrelevant) under the hegemony of the ideology of the ruling elite which is informed by the cultural values of 'parasitic landlordism' (Moore, 1967:316), which constitutes the cultural ethos of Pakistan. To identify the cultural ethos of Pakistan all the seven prevalent approaches have been discussed and rejected, in favor of the claim that parasitic landlordism constitutes the cultural ethos of Pakistan which has grown out of land ownership and land possession. The seven approaches viz. the Islamist approach, the Two-nation Theory approach, the Indo-Muslim Culture approach, the

Unitary approach, the Regional/ Ethnic approach, the Marxist approach, and the Global Society approach have been rejected because each approach has been evolved in a peculiar ethnic, religious, ideological and/or political background and motives. They cannot serve as a 'sensitizing device' (Giddens, 1989:294) for an objective inquiry unless one subscribe to the ideological and political motives of the particular approach.

Identification of parasitic landlordism as the basis of Pakistan's cultural ethos is a new contribution to the study of that society. This approach is more comprehensive and all embracing, as against partial nature of the previous approaches, Moreover it is objective enough to serve as a sensitizing device in the advancement of this research and possibly the others (for details see Chapter four).

Under this approach it has been hypothesized that in Pakistan there exist two world views, one, the dominant view anchored in traditionalism and conservatism, represented with a tinge of modernity by the ruling elite and occasionally supported by the ulama for conservative religious reasons; and the other, subordinate view devoted to change, represented by the industrialist/ business class, the professionals, the academics, and the religious revivalists. Their commitment to change is prompted by their exclusion from the highest levels of decision making in the establishment. In the context of political power

structure the former is called the status quo group, the latter the latent agents of change. The media and the intellectuals are termed the 'free floaters' of the polity. Their middle and lower middle class origin impels them to support the agents of change, but in the face of overwhelming power of the status quo group they find their immediate interests better served by supporting the ruling elite. Therefore, the role and place of mass media in the parasitic cultural ethos has been called 'the arrested media discourse in the immobility syndrome'.

It has been further argued that democracy, and freedom of press are antitheses of the cultural ethos of parasitic landlordism, whose values have been imbibed by all the constituents of the ruling elite. The ruling elite accepts and permits democracy, education, and industrialization only to the point where it does not harm its class interests. In this background it has been maintained that in Pakistan attempts have been made to foist democracy on a socio-economic structure evolved to promote and protect British imperialism through parasitic landlordism, the civil bureaucracy, and the military. The land relations, administration, and security arrangements remain, by and large, unchanged. The ruling triumvirate has gradually enhanced mutual cooperation to protect their class interests against democratic aspirations of the people, which can be actualized only at the expense of the ruling elite.

The landlords constitute the political front, with military and civil bureaucracy moving into the background or coming to the fore as required by political expediency. To ward off democratic forces the landlords have sought to fortify their position with the help of the military, the civil bureaucracy, and the traditionalist ulama. In the process the main stream mass media has played the role of a spectator or at best a well wisher critic. In the power structure of Pakistan the traditionalist ulama, as distinct from the revivalists (often called fundamentalists), are brought in occasionally only to give an aura of religious sanctity when there is need to justify the ways of the elite. The relationship between the elite and the ulama is not one of harmony; they often collide, especially on questions of modernization, but do make a common cause against any structural change. They want to keep the patterns of land relations, politics and culture unchanged.

The nascent industrialist class, merchants, professionals, the academics, and the Islamist revivalists are regarded as the latent forces of change. They are not actively engaged in a struggle for change, in fact, their interests are well served if they get a bigger share in the existing system. The industrialists, the traders, (whom Garzedi (1991:52) calls the bazaar bourgeoisie), the professionals, the academics, and the religious revivalists are dependent on the ruling elite for their survival and prosperity. They are modern educated and urban based. Together they form part of the middle and lower class, which has a sense of distrust and

insecurity vis-a-vis the tax collectors, and the administrators. The Islamists are modern educated, urban dwellers, mostly from the lower middle class who have been left out of power. They preach Islamic revolution but often end up making compromises with the elite. The forces of change are so weak, and the power of the ruling elite so overwhelming that instead of striving for change they look up to the elite for survival and protection. They are latent and contained, not active and effective forces of change.

The Intellectuals and the mass media are viewed as free floaters; they look upto the forces of status quo for survival and prosperity, and subscribe to the ideals of the agents of change to show their desire for change. They support modernization, democracy, social justice, rule of law, land reforms etc. but few dare express their views in a manner which offends the ruling elite. The Muslim mass media of British India remained subservient to political views and interests of the contending political forces in the Muslim politics. With the creation of Pakistan there came a significant change in the role and place of the mass media. Within few years of independence (particularly after 1958) the Government assumed the monopoly of politics and by the same logic the monopoly of mass media. The contending political forces of the British Indian Muslims were replaced by Military dictatorship, supported by landlords, and the top bureaucrats. The Government adopted a number of financial and administrative measures to prevent the media from publicizing the non-governmental views, and to curb their trend to

assert themselves as the fourth estate. This one way political street, along with some other factors, made the mass media discourse subservient to the establishment.

Subscription to Islamic ideology (with diverse interpretations) is the common feature among the three categories, which they need to establish discourse with the masses, and thereby seek legitimacy (for details see chapter four).

ii. **Empirical Support for Discourse Analysis:** Chapter four explores the nature of the cultural ethos of parasitic landlordism in the context of political power structure in Pakistan. It identified the dominant forces of status quo, the dominated latent agents of change, and called the media and the intellectuals the free floaters. Overall the situation is described as 'the arrested media discourse in the immobility syndrome'. Chapter four presented a critical, and essentially, a subjective survey of Pakistan's body politic, based on secondary data. To test this hypothesis empirically, at purely intellectual level, with the first hand data, a detailed questionnaire, related to the media, religion and politics in a developing Muslim society, was prepared and distributed among the ulama, the journalists, and the academics, (collectively referred to as Intellectuals/ Opinion makers) in Pakistan.

Chapter five analyzes the raw data obtained from the three categories of intellectuals/ opinion-makers (the ulama, the journalists, and the academics) in Pakistan and tests various assumptions about the state and society in that country. A statistical analysis of these responses helps in determining the validity or invalidity of our hypothesis that the 'dominant forces of status quo' have perpetuated 'immobility syndrome' and are responsible for the 'arrested media discourse' in Pakistan, and that the 'latent forces of change' have failed to assert themselves, in any meaningful way.

Statistical analysis and sociological explanations confirmed our assumption that there exist two world views in the Muslim society of Pakistan, which occasionally converge at questions like the state ideology, and the need to interpret Islam for contemporary political, scientific, and social requirements. But they diverge and collide on the role and place of Islam in the national polity. Their interpretation of Islam in the context of contemporary challenge of modernity is diverse, often opposite of each other. They have fundamental differences on the mechanism of interpretation of Islam in the modern world.

The questionnaire had two parts-- opinions, and socio-biographical questions. The first part had ninety-seven questions and covered areas like Media and Politics, Freedom of Press, the West and the Muslim Society, Religious Revivalism, Politics and the

Ulama, Social Status and the Education of the Ulama, and the Religious Factor in the Pakistan Movement. The second part had thirty seven questions related to age, income, education, place of residence-- urban or rural, socio-political environment, political preferences etc.

Two sets of mainly identical questionnaires were distributed, one in the Urdu language for the ulama, and the other in English for the journalists and the academics. Some questions, related to the religious status of photographs, television images, and the role and status of women in an industrial, mass society were addressed only to the ulama. Another few questions related to the role of print media in Pakistan were addressed only to the journalists and academics. Among the 112 respondents there are 50 ulama, 30 journalists and 32 academics. The respondent ulama represent all the three local schools of thought (Deobandi, 48%, Brelvi 23%, and Ahle-Hadith 29%) and the two Fiqahs (Sunni 98%, and Shia 2%); the working Journalists represent both the Urdu and the English press, the academics represent, primarily the University teachers (74%) who have been occasionally contributing to the newspapers. To give a fair representation to all the four provinces of Pakistan and all the ethnic groups the questionnaire was distributed in the four provincial headquarters (Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar and Quetta) and other big cities like Multan, Rawalpindi, Gujranwala, Faisalabad, Jhang, Dera Ismail Khan, and Hyderabad.

For convenience in statistical analysis the journalists and the academics have been merged as modernists, because they are all educated in modern system of education and are engaged in non-religious professions-- journalism and university education-- created under the impact of modernism. The ulama have been called the traditionalists, because their source of inspiration, the system of education, and professional engagement is steeped in tradition-- tradition as opposed to modernity. This intellectual, academic and professional difference has created two parallel world views, which influence political orientation, religious outlook, and media understanding.

Religion being an integral part of the basis of the state chapter five takes up the role and place of religion and the ulama in Pakistan's polity, and discusses ideological differences between modern educated opinion makers and the ulama. The Pakistan Movement had been launched, led, and brought to fruition by the 'modernist' Muslims who were well versed in the modern Western thought processes, and spoke and understood the Western idiom; the Movement had been opposed by the religious leadership who chose to remain ignorant of modern Western concepts, because, as they presupposed, they were against Islam. They also opposed and/ or shunned new technology, including the means of mass communication like, the loud speaker, the camera, the celluloid film, the radio, the television, the video, and now the satellite transmission². They opposed the Pakistan Movement, because they were suspicious of the

modernist Muslims, whom they viewed as the agents of the colonial powers. On the creation of Pakistan, after some initial reluctance, they decided to struggle for political power in the new state, and convert it into 'a truly Islamic state'. This debate attained strong overtones in the real politics of the country in the elections of 1970 which paved the way for the debacle of East Pakistan, and brought Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party to power, on the slogan of 'Islamic Socialism' which promised to provide 'bread, clothing and shelter' for every one. The liberal, leftist policies of the new government invited a concerted reaction from the ulama, who declared once again that 'Islam is in danger' because of the godless socialism. The second phase of this ideological war starts with the removal of Bhutto and the 'Islamization' of the country from 1977 to 1988, under the military regime of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haque. This shift not only brought religion into the front lines of day to day politics but also moved the ulama into the thick of politics, an area traditionally shunned by them. It has been assumed that the ulama have been reacting with a sense of fear and suspicion to the modern ways of politics, education, communication and organization but have been accepting them practically without rescinding their previous rejectionist edicts. This approach of initial rejection and late acceptance has, practically, made the ulama an ally of the conservative parasitic landlordism and a retrogressive force. To test this hypothesis empirically, at purely intellectual level, with the first hand data, a detailed questionnaire, related to the

media, religion and politics in a developing Muslim society, was prepared and distributed among the ulama, the journalists, and the academics, (collectively referred to as Intellectuals/ Opinion makers) in Pakistan. Whose results have been discussed through crosstabs and frequency tables made with the help of Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) in chapter five. The results by and large substantiate our assumptions; the response, however, differ with our assumptions in some important aspects. The younger generation, born after independence in 1947 is less negative about the ulama than the older generation; second the ulama are conscious that they have not been able to understand the modern age and its technological advancements, but continue to remain rejectionist about the issues like photographs and films (for a detailed discussion please see chapter five).

A contest for political power between the liberal-leftists, and the conservative-rightists was about to leave the Ulama out of the political process (except Maulana Maudoodi's 'fundamentalist' Jamaat-e-Islami), when for the first time they declared their intention of contesting parliamentary elections, which they had, earlier, declared unIslamic and stayed away from it. They made similar reversals on the use of mass media, as well. They stopped taking exceptions to press photographs, and the use of television. Instead, they started vying for more pictorial, press and T.V. coverage. The victory of liberal-leftists further galvanized the Ulama's appetite for political power. The Bhutto regime set its own

agenda, and by and large the media followed it, but this time there were more instances of divergence in the unofficial media than before. The ulama continued their struggle against the Bhutto regime and finally brought it down through a combination of electioneering and street agitation. The making of Constitution, the second Constitutional amendment (whereby the Qadianis were declared a non-Muslim minority after an agitation led by the Ulama), and the general elections of 1977 are three important events of the decade which helped the ulama assert their political power. Purely political and secular issues like demand for re-elections after the wide spread allegations of electoral rigging and the subsequent mass agitation were turned into religious controversies. The Opposition media drummed up religious frenzy, and brought the ulama forward to trounce the Bhutto regime.

By the end of 1970s the ulama had become well entrenched in the national politics. The Martial Law regime sought legitimacy through Islamization. The mass media was forced to follow the new agenda or face elimination. The ulama and their idiom steeped deep into the national polity during the next decade. Even the Opposition had to resort to the 'Islamized idiom' to question the motives of Islamization process and its rationale. This trend had been further strengthened by the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, which was resisted with Islamic zeal and the American largesse.

iii. **The Nature and Dynamics Political Media Discourse Under Parasitic Landlordism:** Chapter six tries to explain the nature of government-media relationship to provide a perspective for the subsequent discourse analysis of eight important political events between 1970 and 1990. It is argued that the perception of mass media in the cultural ethos of parasitic landlordism is pre-modern. Attitude toward media is informed by the values of the time when there was no mass media. Since claim to leadership, political power, and social status are proportionately linked to the quantity and quality of landownership, landlordism and the cultural ethos evolved under it do not view the mass media as the fourth estate, and as an independent entity. For them media is "theirs" as the land and the tenants are theirs as instruments/ appendices of their political power. In the parasitic mind the mass media is the modern equivalent of the herald, the drum beater used as instrument to inform others. Media in their minds is a one-way traffic, not a battle ground of contending ideas. Like electoral system and constitution, mass media is also a new instrument which should help perpetuate and legitimize their power. All the three components of the establishment (the landlords , the military and the civil bureaucracy), nurtured under the same cultural ethos, have, as a whole, similar approach toward mass media and democracy. Approach toward media and democracy has not been fundamentally different under any regime-- civil or military-- in Pakistan.

iv. 'Statement Journalism' In Cross- Cultural Perspective: It is almost an accepted truth of the contemporary world that democracy and freedom of the press rise and fall together. A careful look on the front page of a newspaper would reveal whether it has been produced and processed under a free democratic ethos according to professional values, or it has been influenced and dictated by undemocratic non-professional considerations. A newspaper produced and processed under democratic ethos would carry most of the important stories either wholly done by professional journalists as exclusive stories, or publish important news events of the day, shared by all but interpreted and explained by the professionals of each newspapers, giving a distinct touch to each story.

On the contrary, newspapers produced and processed under undemocratic ethos (parasitic landlordism in our case) would carry almost identical news stories on any given day, particularly on subjects like politics and religion (the area of present research) mostly based on statements made by the big news actors like the head of state/ government, ministers, leaders of Opposition; often displayed and reported with a slant in the latter case. Often these statements are carefully prepared by civil servants or party officials and are reproduced without interpretation, explanation, historical background etc. by the newspapers. Most of the news reports in Pakistani newspapers are based on statements, which have produced a unique journalistic genre-- 'statement journalism'. A

cross-cultural comparative study of the contents and display of news on the front pages of Pakistani, Turkish and American newspapers explains the point further.

Four newspapers have been selected from each country: *Jang*, *Nawa-e-Waqt*, *The Pakistan Times* and the *Dawn* from Pakistan; the *Hurriyet*, *Milliyet*, *Sabah* and *Zaman*, from Turkey; and the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Christian Science Monitor*, and *International Herald Tribune* from the United States. Newspapers have not been selected on the basis of any empirical test but because they are among the leading newspapers, have national, or as in the case IHT, international, instead of regional or ethnic readership, and represent diverse political inclinations.

Pakistani press does not have a single lead story, which is exclusive, as compared to 100% exclusive lead stories in both the Turkish and the American press. It is lack of initiative and shows passive character of the Pakistani press, which has put itself at the receiving end, waiting for the news to come to them, in contrast to active and aggressive attitude of the Turkish and the American press to reach out to dig up news, and compete with each other in providing the readership with more and more in-depths exclusive stories. The latter are following the free-market principle of improving the product and winning over the customer. This can be contrasted with the attitude of Pakistani media, which is comparatively passive, and because of considerable state control

on financial resources, does not have its first priority to satisfy the readership. Their collective first consideration in the satisfaction of the Government; satisfaction of the readership is a secondary consideration. They are often trying to appease the government or at least not to annoy it.

v. Political Media Discourse From Martial Law To Martial Law (1970-1977): Chapter seven takes the period from 1970 general elections held by the Martial Law regime of General Muhammad Yahya Khan, which eventually led to the separation of East Pakistan. This was followed by the lifting of Martial Law and the induction of the first popularly elected government, which held the next the general elections in 1977 and led to the imposition of the longest Martial Law. In this chapter discourse analysis of media text related to five important political events has been undertaken which include, the general elections 1970, the separation of East Pakistan 1971, the making of the Constitution 1973, the anti-Qadiani agitation 1974, and the general election of 1977 and the subsequent agitation which led to the imposition of Martial Law four months later. Discourse analysis done in the theoretical and methodological background of the preceding chapters and the statistical analysis of the questionnaire shows the extent, the nature and the method of the 'arrested media discourse in the immobility syndrome'. There is a discernible pattern of the media discourse of subservience to the person and party in power in most of the cases, and a cautious dissension in a few instances. It has also been demonstrated how

the ruling elite thinks and behaves towards the media. There is typical behavior based on the cultural ethos of parasitic landlordism, which demands complete subservience of the media and all other institutions and channels of political discourse. This demand for subservience is the direct outcome of the cultural ethos which emerges from the land ownership. In the mind of the landowner, he has total and inalienable control of the land and what ever exists on it; by the same token when he assumes the rulership of the country he wants to exert proprietary rights on every thing within his jurisdiction. This attitude has osmosed all segments of the ruling elite, whether their power emanates from landownership or from the institutional strength of the military or civil bureaucracy.

vi. Political Media Discourse From Martial Law To Democracy (1985-1990): Chapter eight takes up the partyless general elections of 1988 which is viewed as an experiment in controlled democracy. Between 1979 and 1985, the media was literally under the thumb of the military regime and had little or nothing to say without express approval of the regime. Voices of dissent were silenced by crude force. This suppression relaxed to some extent in 1985 when owing to internal and external pressure the military had been forced to acquire a semblance of democratic setup. This chapter analyses three elections each held under different circumstances, and showing some signs that the media and democracy were likely to have a chance, as the options for the establishment are shrinking,


partly because of population explosion, and ever increasing ethnic, and religious polarization of the society at vertical and horizontal levels. The 1988 elections which the military regime held without the political parties were opposed and criticized by all the independent newspapers, only the state owned *Pakistan Times* approved of them. Keeping in view the level and nature of media discourse in the preceding decades this is the first sign of serious dissension. Although subservience remains the hallmark of the media during this period as well, but there are more instances and signs of well informed criticism than ever before, since 1958 when the first military regime came to power. The general elections of 1988 were held on party basis after the death of President Zia-ul-Haque. The media discourse continues to play the second fiddle to the establishment but seeing that the military did not, or could not reimpose martial law it took a cue and tried to take its role a bit more seriously. The 1990 general elections were held after the dismissal of the elected government of Benazir Bhutto. Dismissal of the elected government reaffirmed the strength of the establishment against any potential agents of change, but could not blow out the democratic process, however rigged and limped it might be. The mainstream media, the focus of analysis here, is by no means defiant nor it has acquired an independent entity of its own, not only because the establishment wants to keep them like that but also because their personal interests are better served under the media discourse of subservience. This is one reason that the mainstream print media is now losing out to the new newspapers, in

circulation, which are more possessive and covetous of their professional independence.

Notes

1. The term has its origin in the British political history and refers to a group of people other than the lords, the commons and the clergy, who influence a country's politics. It has been commonly used to refer to the role of the media in political discourse.

2. For a detailed account of the response of the Ulama to modern technology please see Mufti Muhammad Shafi's *Aalat-e-jadeeda kay Sharai Ahkam* (Ijunctions of the Shariah about Modern Instruments), wherein recording of the Quran on gramophone, recitation of the Quran from the radio, making of a movie or still picture, use of loudspeaker during the namaz have either been outrightly rejected or accepted with reluctance and with a number of reservations as an inevitability. While recording of the Quran on gramophone has been declared against Islam, recording on a tape recorder has been approved, because the gramophone is meant only for hedonistic purposes but not the tape recorder. Similarly transfusion of blood has been approved only as a last resort and with the condition that a Muslim gets blood from a Muslim, because blood from a 'kafir' donor is likely to influence the habits and behavior of a Muslim recipient adversely.



CHAPTER 2

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

Introduction

A sociological study of mass media in the backdrop of politics and religion, is, in essence, an undertaking to comprehend the cultural ethos of the given society. Mass media, politics, and religion are "culture patterns-- ordered clusters of significant symbols", and "extrinsic sources of information"¹ (Geertz, 1973:92, 363). They have a dual praxis with society-- as systems of symbols (culture patterns) they give meaning, that is, objective conceptual form, to social and psychological reality both by shaping themselves to it, and by shaping it to themselves (Geertz, 1973:93).

In everyday life-- in homes, offices, markets, factories, farms etc.-- the cultural, the social, the psychological, the political, and the religious, all remain interfused and overlapped.

Life--individual or social-- is, in fact, a jumbled up, indistinguishable whole; however, for human comprehension-- at artistic, scientific, or practical level-- and for formal investigation of the social phenomena, we need to distinguish (without isolating) diverse patterns of life, at individual and/ or collective levels, and try to analyze them. Understanding the politics, and religion of a society, and how the two have been reflected and constructed through the mass media, over a period of time, calls for placing them in a broad cultural-historical perspective.

If culture "denotes an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitude toward life" (Geertz, 1973:89), then, mass media, politics, and religion, produce, reproduce and transform within it.

(i) Mass Media

The mass media are cultural specific and historically determined. They are "always contingent and specific historical examples of a range of institutional means by which, in any society, symbolic forms, and the meanings they create and carry, are produced, distributed and consumed. These institutions will differ from society to society and from one historical period to an

other with differing, but crucial, effects on social structure and action in general...It follows that any analysis of the mass media must be based, if only implicitly, upon general theories as to the nature of social and cultural structures and, in particular, as to the effectiveness of symbolic forms in the maintenance or change of those structures". The mass media "can be analyzed and interpreted only *within* their concrete, historical specificity, and.... such an analysis can never be separated from questions and debates concerning the balance of social power and the nature and future of the polity within which that analysis takes place" (Collins 1986:1).

Since the rejection of the nineteenth century elitist version of culture, adumbrated in the 1930s, and brought to fruition in the 1960s, mass media has become the focus of cultural studies. There has been a shift of emphasis from the study of elite culture and its nurtured and cultivated aesthetics to the study of mainstream culture of newspapers, magazines, films, and television. Culture has become identified with folkways; life as it is being lived at all levels. The study of mass media has taken up the various social processes surrounding the production of culture-- the organizations and institutions which manage and control these organs of culture. Cultural studies have increasingly paid attention to the interpretation of *meaning* of cultural products. These meanings which are produced, among others, by the mass media, and consumed by so many members of the society are treated as a significant

representation of culture as a whole-- they are taken to embody the values and concerns of society, or at least identifiable subsections of it. (Dant, 1991:2).

Such an enquiry, in the context of a developing Muslim society like Pakistan, is an attempt to disentangle a web of social change, which has been wrought, primarily under the impact of the West over the last about two centuries, and has its roots in a historical process stretching back to a few thousand years. The impact of Colonialism has brought about a unique disruption of historical process, which has created a hiatus almost in every aspect of thought and practice in the Third World societies, particularly in the Muslim societies, which continues to defy a clear comprehension.

(ii) Politics

One thing that everyone knows but no one quite thinks how to demonstrate is that a country's politics reflect the design of its culture. At one level, the proposition is indubitable-- where else French politics could exist but France? Yet, merely to state it is to raise doubts... Between the stream of events that make up political life and the web of beliefs that comprises a culture it is difficult to find a middle term. In politics everything looks like a clutter of schemes and surprises; in culture, like a vast geometry of settled judgements. What joins the chaos of politics to

the cosmos of culture is extremely obscure, and how to formulate it is even more so (Geertz, 1973: 311). Politics of a country may reflect the cultural ethos of that society in many ways. A number of countries may profess to follow similar political system yet each would have its own distinct mark on it. This distinction comes from the differences in cultural ethos and historical experience. Parliamentary form of government is in vogue in the U.K., Pakistan, India, and Turkey; yet the same form of government is practiced with a different spirit and color in each country.

It is easy to observe cultural diversity in political patterns, but hard to find a theoretical basis for such an analysis. Culture, as compared to politics, is a continuity in time and space with gradual changes and adjustments. Culture never breaks itself from the past in toto. Politics on the other hand many a time make the people believe that they have "buried the past". Such a politically motivated cultural hiatus (or say revolution) is always short lived. These breaks are more in rhetoric and symbols and less in substance. The "buried past" reappears sooner than later, though in a modified form. In order to relate political immediacy and expediency with relatively more enduring cultural conceptions and practices, we need to view politics "as informed by a set of conceptions--- ideals, hypotheses, obsessions, judgements--- derived from concerns which far transcend it, and to give reality to those conceptions by seeing them as having their existence not in some gauzy world of

mental forms but in concrete immediacy of partisan struggle. Culture, here, is not cults and customs, but the structures of meanings through which men give shape to their experience; and politics is not coups, and constitutions, but one of the principal arenas in which such structures publicly unfold" (Geertz, 1973: 312).

How intricately the production of knowledge is intertwined with politics; and how it represents the cultural ethos of the given society at a particular point in history, has been remarkably demonstrated by Edward Said in "*Orientalism*" (1978), and "*Culture And Imperialism*" (1993).

According to Anthony Giddens (1985:5) means of mass communication constitute one of the four 'institutional clusterings' of the modern nation-state. The four 'institutional clusterings' are-- capitalist enterprise, control of the means of violence, managerial systems of production, and hyperextensive surveillant and information channels. If this is so then, to study mass media is to study politics and culture as they unfold in a particular milieu at a particular time.

Political impact of mass media have played a formative part in guiding the direction of mass communication research ever since its inception (Gurevitch, 1987:270). The media provide the informational building blocks to structure views of the (*political*)

world...from which may stem a range of actions (Blumer, 1977:24). Although media is neither the only nor the most important determinant of an individual's political views and attitude (as believed a few decades ago), it is no doubt the most important source of political (and other) information. This information, selected and processed differently in every constituent of the mass media in a given society, forms a vital part of the contemporary political systems. Political strategies, therefore, include media strategies, as well.

We aim at studying the political sociology of mass media in Pakistan, in a broad historical perspective, with primary focus on the decades of the 1970s and 1980s, when two contending versions of the 'ideology of Pakistan' came to the top of the political agenda, in quick succession. A sociological analysis of epoch marking political events, would be attempted. We shall analyze the role of mass media in shaping the contours and the dynamics of these events; how the media tried to play its self assumed role of the 'fourth estate'; how the 'internal constraints' determined 'the political out put of media' (Curran, 1987:271); how in the absence of well founded democratic norms, and due to relatively weak institutional basis, different regimes have tried to manipulate, influence, pressurize, and control the process of political communication. Under the circumstances how fairly the press has been able to create images of social reality by which the public may structure their views of the world.

(iii) Religion

Religion, in its essence-- as an integral part of the human psyche-- is universal; but in its manifestations, significance and role it is cultural/ historical specific. The same religion has different roles, variant practices, divergent symbolic meanings, and dominance of different forms and themes in the same society at different times. Religion can be studied from a number of perspectives: historical, cultural, philosophical, anthropological, sociological, political, theological etc. Or it can be viewed from a believer's and follower's perspective. This study views religion from the perspective of a social scientist. We shall study how religion is related to the structure and processes of society, and how it reflects and affects stratification systems in society, its polity, levels of integration and conflict, and the course of social change (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1986: 16: 539).

Sociologically stated, the essence of religion is embodied in its symbols (i.e. myths), which express the basic qualities of social reality (Levi-Strauss 1970). Religion should, therefore, be considered in terms of the beliefs and practices by means of which a group designates its deepest problems of meaning, suffering and injustices; specifies its most fundamental ways of trying to reduce those problems; and seeks to deal with the fact that, in all efforts to eliminate them, meaninglessness, suffering and injustice continue. (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1986: 16: 540).

Religious "symbols synthesize a people's ethos-- the tone, character, and quality of their life, its moral and aesthetic style and mood--- and their world view--- the picture they have of the way things in sheer actuality are, their most comprehensive ideas of order. In religious belief and practice a group's ethos is rendered intellectually reasonable by being shown to represent a way of life ideally adapted to the actual state of affairs the world view describes, while the world is rendered emotionally convincing by being presented as an image of an actual state of affairs peculiarly well-arranged to accommodate such a way of life". Thus "religion is a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic" (Geertz, 1973: 89-90).

The study of religion, in our context, will be sociological, cultural and political. We shall take religion as a cultural system; and how it informs, formulates and legitimates national politics. The emphasis will be on religion as being lived and practiced in Pakistan in political, ideological and cultural discourses. Islam will not be studied on the basis of authentic texts like the Quran, the Sunnah, or scholarly interpretations thereof. We shall be primarily, though not exclusively, concerned with the practical, the ritual, and the mundane, and not with

theoretical, dogmatic, and ideal forms of religion. In short, Islam as reflected and constructed in the politics and the mass media of Pakistan as a part of the national polity.

Theory of Culture

As media, politics, and religion are part of the cultural ethos we need to elaborate the concept of culture. There is no single undisputed definition of "culture"; each definition is "a site of convergent interests rather than a logically or conceptually clarified idea (Hall, 1986:35). Anthropologists were the first to elaborate the concept of culture and to claim that culture formed the basis of human behavior and thought in society. They variously defined culture as "learned behavior", "ideas in the mind", "a logical construct", "a statistical fiction", "a psychic defense mechanism" and so on. All these definitions have been propounded, debated, questioned and rejected or modified, in time (White, 1961) (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1986: 16: 925).

Society preceded culture; in the sense that society as the interaction of living beings, for security and self-procreation is coextensive with life itself. Man's immediate prehuman ancestors lived in societies, like all other living creatures, but did not have culture. Development of the faculty of symboling made culture

possible. Symboling is a peculiar human attribute, "consisting of assigning to things and events certain meaning that cannot be grasped by senses alone". Articulate speech-- language-- is a good example. "The introjection of symboling into primate social life was revolutionary. Everything was transformed, everything acquired new meaning; the symbol added a new dimension to primate- now human- existence.-An axe was no longer merely a tool with which to chop; it could become a symbol of authority. Mating became marriage, and all social relations... became moral obligations, duties, rights, and privileges. The world of nature, became alive and conscious spirit. The anthropoid had at last become a man" (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1986:16:927). Shakespeare refers to the same faculty when he says "And as imagination bodies forth/ The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen/ Turn them to shapes, and gives to airy nothings/ A local habitation and a name" (*A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act 5, Scene 1). When the Quran says "And He taught Adam the names of all things" (II.31), and then established Adam's superiority over angels, and by implication over all other creatures, due to his faculty of giving names to things, (II.32-34), does it not refer to the human quality of symbolizing?

When this faculty is put to practice it begets culture in all its manifestations. Culture, thus, is a man made environment, brought into existence by the ability to symbol. One view is that when things and events are considered in the context of their relation to the human organism, they constitute behavior; when they

are considered not in terms of their relation to human organism but in their relationship to one another, they become culture. Once established culture has a life of its own, that is, it is a continuum of things and events in a cause and effect relationship; it flows down through time from one generation to another. The function of this external, man made environment, is to make life secure and enduring for the society of human beings living within the cultural system (White, L.A. 1949. Encyclopedia Britannica 16:925:2b; 926:2b).

For a scientific study of culture we have to go beyond the faculty itself, and concentrate on its practical manifestations, in different times and different societies. A journey through the inner recesses of human psyche, will not be of great help in a sociological understanding culture. Proper study of culture, then, is the study of sociocultural systems. Every human society has its own sociocultural system, which distinguishes it from other groups: "O mankind! We created you from a single pair of a male and a female; and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other" (XLIX.13).

All sociocultural systems have similar basic technological, sociological, ideological and linguistic components; but they vary in their structure and organization. These differences grow out of their peculiar historical experiences, geographical and physical locale, natural resources and the human effort to harness them (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1986:16:927).

Gramsci has made the useful analytic distinction between civil and political society in which the former is made up of voluntary (or at least rational and non-coercive) affiliations like schools, families, and unions, the latter of state institutions (the army, the police, the central bureaucracy) whose role in the polity is direct domination. Culture, of course, is to be found operating within civil society, where the influence of ideas, of institutions, and of other persons works not through domination but by what Gramsci calls consent. In any society not totalitarian, then, certain cultural forms predominate over others, just as certain ideas are more influential than others; the form of this cultural leadership is what Gramsci has identified as hegemony, an indispensable concept for any understanding of cultural life. (Said, 1978:6-7).

Since the ascendancy of nation state system culture has come to be identified with national boundaries. But there are cultural frames which transcend national frontiers, and there are cultures within national limits: Egyptian culture extends into Arab culture, Islamic culture, African culture, even, the Mediterranean culture; and then, Pakistani culture has within it, Punjabi culture, Pakhtoon culture, Baluch culture, and Sindhi culture; these four, in turn, having their extensions beyond the geographical frontiers of the country into India, Iran and Afghanistan-- overlapping can be baffling at times.

In fact, all boundaries--- geographical, intellectual, or cultural--- are arbitrary, in the sense that they always overlap. But then, comprehension of social or physical phenomenon, in its totality, is impossible for the human mind. Therefore, resort to abstraction and division of the phenomenon into parts, small enough to be analyzable by the tools of human intellect, becomes inevitable. Human endeavor, therefore, to delineate boundaries, as neatly as possible, goes on ceaselessly. When we take society and culture as coterminous with nation-state boundaries we are being arbitrary; but we have to be. An awareness of the arbitrariness of the boundaries, we have drawn for our convenience, is likely to make people less aggressive, and less self-righteous about their vocations and identities. It is this inherent human limitation which has forced us to limit our research to Pakistan, and in that, take mass media, politics, and religion as representatives of its cultural ethos.

(i) 'ORDINARY' OR 'MAINSTREAM' CULTURE

Almost all the pioneering culture theorists of the nineteenth century studied "primitive cultures" among tribes and clans in the farthest corners of the world, to draw conclusions about the modern man. Their invaluable contribution to the advancement of knowledge is highly admirable, but their approach had serious limitations. They, invariably, viewed the "primitive man" and his culture as fossilized remains of the early stages of evolution of which modern

European societies were the most advanced stage. This ethnocentric view of social evolution was also unilinear on which all human societies were to be fitted to illustrate their version of social evolution. From the romanticism of the pre-French Revolution period, in the eighteenth century, which glorified the "noble savage", the late nineteenth century cultural anthropology and its concept of social evolution was the 'scientified' reflection of imperialistic egocentricity-- "White man's burden". After all, this was a time when lines between physical and cultural anthropology were not so clear, and the concepts of race and culture were interfused. Cultural anthropology was in its infancy, then!

In the 1930s the concept of culture became wide spread in the U.S. and discovered "inescapable interrelatedness of... things", so that culture could no longer be considered what Mathew Arnold had meant--- the knowledge of the highest achievements of men of intellect and art through history--- but rather reference to "all the things that a group of people, inhabiting a common geographical area, the ways they do things, and the ways they think and feel about things, their material tools and their values and symbols" (Lynd, R.S., 1967:16-19, quoted by Susman 1984:153).

In England, F.R. Leavis wrote, in 1930: The split between high and popular culture, the culture of the gentry and that of the working class, has widened since the Renaissance but become a yawning divide with the development after 1880 of the mass media,

first the popular press, then cinema, radio, and television. (quoted by Easthope, 1992:256). Writing the year after the Great Crash of 1929, conscious both of the threat of Soviet Marxism and the working-class movement in his own country, Leavis defines a binary opposition between high and popular culture and calls on the canon and an elite able to respond to it as the only means to defend an increasingly embattled culture. (Easthope, 1992:256).

According to Susman it was during the same decade that the idea of culture was domesticated, in America, with important consequences. Americans then began thinking in terms of patterns of behavior and belief, values and life style, symbols and meanings. Expressions like "American Way of life", and "The American Dream"-- -- something shared collectively by all Americans; yet something different than the vision of an American Mission, the function of the organized nation itself (Susman 1984:154).

Cultural anthropologists have since, moved from an elitist and atomistic definition of culture to one "which emphasizes pattern and configuration...It now includes 'all those historically created designs for living explicit and implicit, rational, irrational, and non-rational, which at any given time serve as potential guides for the behavior of men'. Traits, elements, or better, patterns of culture in this definition are organized or structured into a system or set of systems, which, because it is historically created, is therefore open and subject to constant change" (Hoijer 1953, quoted by Lado, 1987:111).

Contemporary view of culture, as opposed to the earlier elitist view of culture, is what R. Williams calls 'ordinary culture', and Tim Dant terms 'mainstream culture'--- the culture of newspapers, magazines, films and television. The study of these mass media have addressed the various social processes surrounding the production of culture-- the organizations and institutions which manage and control these organs of culture. But cultural studies have increasingly paid attention to the interpretation of the meaning of cultural products. As Cowell (1959:5) says "the quest for culture is the search for meaning and value". These meanings which are consumed by so many members of society are treated as a significant representation of culture as a whole-- they are taken to embody the values and concerns of society, or identifiable sub-sections of it. Whether it is because society is seen as determining of or determined by the media, its cultural products are treated as a summation of the common knowledge: knowledge which is potentially available to every one in the society (Dant, 1991:2).

"Culture is not artifice and manners, the preserve of Sunday best, rainy afternoon and concert halls. It is the very material of our daily lives, the bricks and mortar of our most commonplace understandings" (Willis, 1979 quoted by Turner, 1990:1). What we wear, hear, watch, and eat; how we see ourselves in relation to others; the function of everyday activities such as cooking or shopping; all of these have attracted the attention of cultural

studies. Emerging from a literary critical tradition that saw popular as threat to the moral and cultural standards of modern civilization, the work of the pioneers in contemporary cultural studies breaks with that literary tradition's elitist assumptions in order to examine the everyday and the ordinary: those aspects of our lives that exert so powerful and unquestioned an influence on our existence that we take them for granted. The processes that make us-- as individuals, as citizens, as members of a particular class, race, or gender-- are cultural processes that work precisely because they seem so natural, so unexceptional, so irresistible. Contemporary cultural studies have established the consideration of popular culture-- from the mass media to sport to dance crazes-- on an academic and intellectual agenda from which it had been excluded (Turner, 1990:1-2).

This view of culture tends to obliterate distinction between culture and non-culture on the one hand and refuses to admit any special treatment for those forms of culture which come under art and aesthetics, and which were "the culture" for almost all the early cultural theorists. Edward Said tries to make amends for this, and says that culture means two things: "First of all it means all those practices, like the art of description, communication, and representation, that have relative autonomy from the economic, social, and political realms and that often exist in aesthetic forms, one of whose principal aims is pleasure. Included, of course, are both the popular stock of lore about distant parts

of the world and specialized knowledge available in such learned disciplines as ethnography, historiography, philosophy, sociology, and literary history'

'Second, and almost imperceptibly, culture is a concept that includes a refining and elevating element, each society's reservoir of the best that has been known and thought, as Mathew Arnold put it... Arnold believed that culture palliates, if does not altogether neutralize, the ravages of modern, aggressive, mercantile, and brutalizing urban existence. You read Dante or Shakespeare in order to keep up with the best that was thought and known, and also to see yourself, your people, society, and tradition in their best lights. In time, culture comes to be associated, often aggressively, with the nation or the state, this differentiates "us" from "them" almost always with some degree of xenophobia. Culture in this sense is a source of identity, and a rather combative one at that, as we see in recent "returns" to culture and tradition. These "returns" accompany rigorous codes of intellectual and moral behavior that are associated with the permissiveness associated with such relatively liberal philosophies as multi-culturalism and hybridity. In the formerly colonized world, these "returns" have produced varieties of religious and nationalist fundamentalism. In this second sense culture is a sort of theater where various political and ideological causes engage one another... Now the trouble with this idea of culture is that it entails not only venerating one's own culture but also thinking

of it as somehow divorced from, because transcending, the every day world.... Culture conceived in this way can become a protective enclosure: check your politics at the door before you enter it". (Said, 1993:xii- xiii- xiv).

Social Theory And Cultural Studies

(i) Culturalist and Structuralist Paradigms

Since the 1960s there has been a shift of emphasis in social theory away from the attempt to sum up the whole of society in an explanatory framework into which any empirical data of different types would fit, toward an interest in philosophy, language, history, and anthropology. Three different trends have been identified in social theory during the same period: methodological shift towards qualitative methods, increasing significance of 'mainstream' 'ordinary' culture, and piecemeal borrowing of social theory, replacing specialization of disciplines with interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary approach; social theory has, thus, come to be influenced less by sociologists and more by linguists, anthropologists, historians, and philosophers (Dant, 1991:2, Dijk, 1988).

In contemporary approaches to culture, Stuart Hall (1986) has identified two major paradigms: "The Culturalist Paradigm" represented by R. Williams, E.P. Thompson and R. Hoggart; and "The Structuralist Paradigm" enunciated by Levi-Strauss and Althusser.

R. Williams has two ways of conceptualizing culture: culture as ideas and culture as a whole way of life. The first relates culture to the sum of the available descriptions through which societies make sense and reflect their common experiences. This concept of culture is based on the old view of culture as ideas; but it has been democratized and socialized. It rejects Mathew Arnold's view of culture as 'the best that has been thought and said'. Even art is now defined as only one special form of a general social process: the giving and taking of meanings: a common culture: 'culture' in this special sense 'is ordinary'. The art is there, as an activity, with the production, the trading, the politics, and the raising of families. 'Since our way of seeing things is literally our way of living, the process of communication is in fact the process of community: the sharing of common meanings, and thence common activities and purposes; the offering, reception, and comparison of new meanings, leading to tensions and achievements of growth and change'. To study the relations adequately we must study them actively, seeing all activities as particular and contemporary forms of human energy.

In the second, instead of ideas, Williams takes up social practices as the focus of attention: 'culture as a whole way of life'. The two are integrated, as there is active and indissoluble relationships between elements or social practices normally separated out. It is in *this* context that the theory of culture is defined as 'the study of relationships between elements as a whole

way of life'. 'Culture' is not a practice; nor is it the simply descriptive sum of 'mores and folkways' of societies. It is threaded through *all* social practices, and is the sum of their inter-relationship. The 'culture', then, is those patterns of organization, those characteristic forms of human energy which can be discovered as revealing themselves... within or underlying *all* social practices. The analysis of culture is, then, 'the attempt to discover the nature of the organization which is the complex of these relationships'. It begins with 'the discovery of patterns of a characteristic kind'. One will discover them, not in art, production, trading, politics, the raising of families, treated as separate activities, but through 'studying a general organization in a particular example'. Analytically, one must study the relationships between these patterns'. The purpose of the analysis is to grasp how the interaction between all these practices and patterns are lived and experienced as a whole, in any particular period. This is 'the structure of feeling' (Hall, 1986:39).

Culturalist paradigm defines culture as *both* the meanings and values which arise amongst distinctive social groups and classes, on the basis of their given historical conditions of existence; and as the lived traditions and practices through which those 'understandings' are expressed and in which they are embodied. It reads structures of relations in terms of how they are 'lived' and 'experienced'. This explanation so totally absorbs 'definitions of experience' into 'our ways of living', and both into indissoluble

real material practice-in-general, as to obviate any distinction between 'culture' and 'not-culture' (Hall, 1986:39 in Collins).

According to Hall (1986: 39-40) there is a sense of 'cultural totality'-- of the whole historical process-- in this paradigm "which over-rides any effort to keep the instances and elements distinct. Their real interconnection, under given historical conditions, must be matched by a totalizing movement 'in thought', in the analysis. Although this position, especially in its more concrete historical rendering, is the very opposite of a Hegelian search for underlying Essences, yet, in its tendency to reduce practices to *praxis*, and to find common and homologous 'forms' underlying the most apparently differentiated areas the movement is 'essentialising'.

Structuralist paradigm, was first developed by Claude Levi-Strauss in cultural anthropology, and by the semiotics in linguistics; and later, elaborated on Marxist lines by Althusser around the concept of 'ideology'. In Levi-Strauss the term 'culture' and its ramifications are central, and 'ideologies' only 'secondary rationalizations'. In Althusser, on the other hand, 'ideology' is pivotal. Levi-Strauss conceptualized 'culture' as the categories and frameworks in thought and language through which different societies classified out their conditions of existence-- above all the relations between the human and the natural worlds. Next he outlined the manner and practice through which these

categories and mental frameworks were produced and transformed, largely on an analogy with the ways in which language operates. He identified this operation as the 'production of meaning': they are above all *signifying* practices. Finally, he concentrated on the *internal* relations within signifying practices by means of which the categories of meaning were produced. (Hall: 1986:41).

Structuralism is a leading approach in the contemporary linguistics, psychology, and anthropology. It has been introduced in the study of linguistics by Ferdinand de Saussure and N.S. Trubetzkoy, in psychology by Wilhelm Wundt and Edward Titchener, and in cultural anthropology by Levi-Strauss, through the twentieth century (Nisbet, Robert. A., 1986) (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1986: 27: 374: 2b).

Generally speaking Structuralism has sought to identify facts or objects that suggest the character of a system or structure underlying the broad spectrum of phenomena, a system of which the members of a society maintain only a dim awareness through the use of myths and symbols (Encyclopedia Britannica: 1:446:3b). Structuralism views cultures as systems and analyzes them in terms of the structural relations among their elements. Universal patterns in cultural systems are the product of invariant structure of the human mind. Structure refers exclusively to mental structure, although Levi-Strauss finds evidence of such structure in his far-ranging analyses of kinship, patterns in mythology, art,

religion, ritual and culinary traditions. For Levi-Strauss all forms of social life represent the operation of universal laws regulating the activities of the mind. He suggested that the elementary structure, or unit of kinship, on which all systems are constructed, is a set of four types of relationships which are organically linked: brother/sister, husband/wife, father/son, and mother's brother/sister's son. (Encyclopedia Britannica: 11: 326).

Under the influence of structural linguistics, Levi-Strauss developed his focus on unconscious infrastructure as well as an emphasis on the relationship *between* terms, rather than on terms as entities in themselves. He maintains that an unconscious "metastructure" emerges through the human mental process of pairing opposites. The human mind is viewed as a repository of a great variety of natural material, from which it selects pairs of elements that can be combined to form diverse structures. Pairs of oppositions can be separated into singular elements for use in forming new oppositions (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1986: 11: 326).

Like the Culturalists, Levi-Strauss also worked not at the level of correspondences between the *contents* of a practice, but at the level of their forms and structures. But the manner in which they were conceptualized were altogether at variance with the 'Culturalism' of Williams. This divergence is obvious in three different ways. First, Levi-Strauss conceptualized 'culture' as the categories and frameworks in thought and language through which

different societies classified out their conditions of existence-- the relations between the human and the natural worlds. Second, he thought of the manner and practice through which these categories and mental frameworks were produced and transformed, largely on an analogy with the ways in which language itself-- the principle medium of culture-- operated. He identified what was specific to them and their operation as the 'production of meaning': they were, above all, *signifying* practices. Third, after some early flirtation with the Durkheim and Mauss's social categories of thought, he largely gave up the question of the relation between signifying and non-signifying practices-- between culture and not-culture, to use other terms-- for the sake of concentrating on the internal relations within signifying practices by means of which the categories of meaning were produced. This left the question of determinacy, of totality, largely in abeyance. The causal logic of determinacy was abandoned in favor of a Structuralist causality-- a logic of *arrangement*, of internal relations, of articulation of parts within a structure (Hall, 1986: 41-2).

Each of these aspect is also positively present in Althusser's work, and that of Marxist structuralists. Althusser's formulation of 'ideology'-- defined as the themes, concepts and representations through which men and women 'live', in an imaginary relation, their relation to their real condition of existence-- we can see the skeleton outline of Levi-Strauss' 'conceptual schemes between praxis and practices'. 'Ideologies' are here being conceptualized,

not as the contents and surface forms of ideas, but as the unconscious categories through which conditions are represented and lived. (Hall, 1986:41-2). Althusser's structuralistic interpretation of Marx, however, runs the risk of departing from due emphasis on the *historical* substance of Marxian materialism (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1986: 20: 560: 1b).

(ii) Strengths of Structuralism

The great strength of Structuralism is its stress on 'determinate conditions'. They remind us that, unless dialectic can really be held, in any particular analysis, between both halves of the proposition-- that 'men make history.. on the basis of conditions which are not of their making-- the result will inevitably be a naive humanism. Structuralism does enable us to think-- as Marx insisted-- of the *relations* of a structure on the basis of something other than their reduction to relationship between 'people'. This was Marx's privileged level of abstraction: that which enabled him to break with the obvious but incorrect starting point of 'political economy'-- bare individuals (Hall, 1986:43).

Another contribution of Structuralism is its recognition not only of the necessity of abstraction as the instrument of thought through which 'real relations' are appropriated, but also of the presence of a continuous and complex movement *between different levels of abstraction*. It is, of course the case that in historical

reality, practices do not appear neatly distinguished out into their respective instances. However, to think about or analyze the complexity of the real, the act of practice of thinking is required; and this necessitates the use of the power of abstraction and analysis, the formation of concepts with which to cut into the complexity of the real, in order precisely to reveal and bring to light relationships and structures which can not be visible to the naive naked eye, and which can neither present nor authenticate themselves (Hall, 1986:43).

Structuralism has a third strength in its conception of 'the whole'. It represents an advance over Culturalism in the conception it has of necessary *complexity* of the unity of a structure. It has the conceptual ability to think of a unity which is constructed through the *differences* between, rather than the homology of, practices. Marx has demonstrated 'how it is possible to think of the 'unity' of a social formation as constructed, not out of identity but out of *differences*' (Hall, 1986:44).

(iii) Critique of Structuralism

Structuralism in the social sciences is closely related to the theory of social system. It has been observed that there is nothing new about the root concepts of Structuralism--- they may be seen in one form or other throughout Western thought. Basically, Structuralism is a reaction against all tendency to deal with human

thought and behavior atomistically-- that is, in terms of simple, discrete units of either thought, perception, or overt behavior (Nisbet, Robert. A., 1986) (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1986: 27: 374:2b).

Structuralists contend that no element can be examined or explained outside its context or the pattern or structure of which it is a part. Indeed it is the patterns, not the elements, that are the only valid objects of study. Structuralism, thus, focuses more on society as an indivisible social organism than on society as an interrelation of individuals, as the functionalists claim. (Nisbet, Robert. A., Encyclopedia Britannica; 1986: 27: 374: 2b). Thus, If Culturalist approach has a sense of 'cultural totality' (Hall, 1986) Structuralism also tends to eliminate the individual, or 'agency' as Giddens would say.

Structuralism is, therefore, viewed as a threat to personal existence, as it analyzes in terms of highly abstract structural relationships. Structural anthropology of Levi-Strauss is accused of eliminating man. Man's real behavior is analyzed according to a logical model of what the Structuralist perceive to be his collective unconscious, a kind of cybernetics, or logical control system, presiding over the thought of all individuals and the functions of all groups. The result is that the individual ceases to exist in it. There is, in fact, need to recover the individual consciousness from axiomatic systems that attempt to overwhelm or

reduce it. Philosophical anthropology affirms that in the last resort each human being--- despite the multiple temptations of the world and of other men, and despite all internal and external influences--- must assume the responsibility of his own existence. (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1986: 25: 568: 1a).

In some cases structuralists have taken this proposition to its extreme. Because, thought is impossible without 'the power of abstraction', Structuralism has confused this with giving an absolute primacy to the level of formation of concepts: Theory with capital 'T' then becomes judge and jury. The *method*, whilst of course taking place in thought, rests not on the simple exercise of abstraction but on the movement relations which the argument is constantly establishing between *different levels* of abstraction. (Hall, 1986:44).

By talking about light-wave refraction, pigmentation, and color spectrum, science annihilates sunset, paintings, and rainbows, by trying to be scientific, structuralists annihilate prose and poetry; by computer-analyzing the structure of the New Testament, Biblical scholars annihilate faith and worship. Such reason has its own usefulness, particularly in seeking *explanations* in terms of general laws. In providing such explanations, the scientific attitude towards the object is one of standing over and against the object. This attitude is inappropriate for understanding the object. The Husserl-Gadamer thesis is that

understanding requires treating the object in its particularities (Nuyen, 1990: 437).

If Phenomenology, and Hermeneutics find Structuralism too 'scientific', others reject it for not being scientific enough. It has been argued that the theory can neither be tested nor proved, and that its lack of interest in historical process is a serious shortcoming. Levi-Strauss, however, argues that structural similarities underlie all cultures and that an analysis of the relationships among cultural units could provide insight into innate and universal principles of human thought. (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1986: 11:326).

Tim Dant (1991: 103-4) has observed that Levi-Strauss's 'Structuralist method' may not be rejected but its epistemological basis need to be called into question. His importation of a Structuralist method from linguistics creates a problem of what is to count as 'cultural anthropology'. What is it a study of and to what end? The Structuralism that Levi-Strauss applies in cultural anthropology seems to be asking the question 'what does it mean?'-- a very different problematic from that of structural linguistics. But whose meaning, that of the Structuralist or of the participants? Or is it a universal meaning that is potentially available to all but in practice is available only to the Structuralist?

Levi-Strauss's version of Structuralism is built on linguistics, but the connection between the two is not so neat: Linguistics may study language but it is not a study of meaning in language, rather of language that can be meaningful. Also, kinship systems are not analogous to language in the sense that they are not meaningful systems through which messages or communications are exchanged (Dant, 1991: 103-4).

Structuralism's insistence that thought does not reflect reality, but is articulated on and appropriates it, is a necessary starting point. An adequate *working through* of the consequences of this argument might begin to produce a method which takes us outside the permanent oscillation between abstraction/ anti-abstraction and the false dichotomies of Theoraticism vs. Empiricism which have both marked and disfigured the structuralism/ culturalism encounter to date (Hall, 1986:44). This 'working through' is attempted by Anthony Giddens in his theory of Structuration.

From Structuralism To Structuration

Giddens takes a step forward and tries to improve upon Structuralism, integrate strong points of previous and current theories, and answer the questions raised by them. He tries to accommodate----

(i) Agency (individual) as knowledgeable agent-- a recognition that he is competent. (Although, Parsons separates cognitive from 'Cathectric' symbols in his scheme, his actors are not capable knowledgeable agents).

(ii) Structure as formed, reformed (structured/ restructured/ transformed) not only constraining but enabling one.

(iii) Time and space, taken account of in the process of Structuration.

The theory of 'Structuration' is an attempt to move beyond the apparent opposition between perspectives which emphasize structure and perspectives which emphasize action; it is an attempt to think through the ways in which actions and structures are interwoven in the ongoing activity of social life. Giddens's key conceptual innovation in this regard is to argue that we should cease to conceive of 'structure' as a kind of framework, like the girders of a building or the skeleton of a body, and that we should conceptualize it instead as the 'rules and resources' which are implemented in interaction. In interacting with one another, individuals draw on the rules and resources which comprise structure, in much the same way as an individual draws on the rules of grammar in uttering a well-formed speech act. Like the rules of grammar, structure is both 'enabling' and 'constraining': it enables us to act as well as delimiting the courses of possible action. By focusing on the generative character of rules and resources, we can see that structure is both constitutive of

everyday action and, at the same time, reproduced by that action-- a phenomenon that Giddens refers to as the 'duality of structure' (Giddens, 1979; Held, 1989; Gregson, 1989).

From this perspective it can be argued that individuals know a great deal about the structural features of the social world of which they are part, just as the speakers of a language know the rules of that language, even if they can not formulate them discursively. But the accounts that agents are able to give of their own action, and of the structural features of the social world more generally, are limited or 'bounded' in various ways, and it is part of the task of the social sciences to examine the aspects and processes of the social world which lie beyond the immediate grasp of the agents implicated in them. Giddens rejects the view that there is no room in the social sciences for objectivistic concepts like 'cause'. He also agrees with the traditions of hermeneutics and interpretative sociology, on one key point: that the social sciences stand in a 'unique' and reflexive relation to their subject matter. For the social sciences are not alone in seeking to analyze the social world and interpret action: these are activities which are also carried out routinely by the individuals who make up the social world. Unlike the natural sciences, the social sciences are characterized by a 'double hermeneutics'. The results of the social sciences are in principle available to the individuals who comprise the social world, and are also potentially critical of the beliefs, concepts and action

frameworks of lay members (Held, Thompson, Wright, 1989).

Structuration theory 'should be utilized only in a selective way in empirical work and should be seen as a sensitizing device than as providing detailed guidelines for research procedure' (Giddens, 1989: 294).

The theory sounds convincing at intellectual level, but provides a little guidance to abstract and analyze one particular aspect of the social phenomenon in a particular time and space. Its formulation is too fluid to be grasped, by a researcher in the course of work. Giddens seems to be aware of its weakness in guiding empirical research; he therefore calls it a "sensitizing device" only. Theory of Discourse provides a better (though more subjective) understanding of social phenomenon and serves as a methodology, as well. As we shall see below, the theory of Discourse, despite certain limitations, is more suitable for the study of mass media.

Theory Of Discourse: Qualitative Turn

(i) EMERGENCE OF DISCOURSE THEORY

Discourse is exchange of meaning among human beings in a social context which has been structured in time and space. Discourse theory emerged as a new transdisciplinary field of study between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s. It flows from Levi-Strauss'

anthropology, ethnography, early semiotics, micro-sociology, cognitive and social psychology, poetics, rhetoric, stylistics, structural linguistics, pragmatics of communication, hermeneutics, and other disciplines in the humanities and social sciences interested in the systematic study of the structures, functions, and processing of text and talk, and critique of ideology. Structuralism paved the way for the growth of 'discourse theory' in the writings of Lacan and Foucault. It developed by way of psychoanalytical concepts, in case of Lacan, and in Foucault it is a return to the concrete analysis of particular ideological and discursive formations, along with the sites of their elaboration. According to Hall (1986) the theory may be seen as an attempt to fill that empty space in structuralism, where, in early discourses, 'the subject' and subjectivity might have been expected to appear, but did not appear. The theory of discourse, by way of the Freudian concepts of the unconscious, and the Lacanian concepts of how subjects are constituted in language, restores the decentered subject, the contradictory subject, as a set of positions in language and knowledge, from which culture can appear to be enunciated. (Hall, 1986; Dijk, 1985b; 1991:108; Dant, 1991; Brown and Yule, 1983).

Discourse is a macro-linguistic approach which tries to correlate the linguistic phenomena with non-linguistic facts, which may not have been stated in the text but are very much relevant in the context. Thus discourse 'is not simply an isolated textual or

dialogical structure but rather a complex communicative event that also embodies a social context, featuring participants as well as production and processes' (Ulku, 1992). Discourse is part of the speaker's (or say reader's or writer's) cultural construction of reality. It relates parts of the text (sentences, paragraphs etc.) to each other, and to its sociocultural context. (Duranti, 1985A:197, 220, 223).

According to Turner (1990) discourse refers to socially produced groups of ideas or ways of thinking that can be tracked in individual texts or groups of texts, but that also demand to be located within wider historical and social structures or relations. Textual analysis is much more socially coded, because it now takes account not just of signs and signification but of their combinations, in particular, culturally specific discourses. In this formulation, history is included more explicitly than by others. It meets Halls' objection that Discourse tends to be ahistorical, at last in Lacan.

The term Discourse is used in a variety of contexts to describe how certain kinds of understandings are created and perpetuated within various institutions in society. The discourses are about ideas and meanings which are made apparent through the use of communication. Whilst the word originally referred to patterns of speech, it is now used to refer to patterns of communication processes in education and mass media: exchange of

meaning among human beings. "As we negotiate with those who share our views and dispute with those who disagree, we do it through language. We talk, we write, we argue, we communicate--- we even represent ideas in pictures, music, dance and movement, in material forms including sculptures, architecture, and tools. All of these forms of cultural communication can be treated as discourse in the sense that they involve human beings exchanging meanings about the world in which they live" (Dant 1991:1; Akhtar, 1991; Dimbleby, 1992).

The well-formedness of discourse is highly dependent on context, while the grammaticality of sentences is not dependent on context at all. The sentence structure determines only a fraction of what is communicated, and context plays a crucial role in the interpretation of discourse. The context and the intentions of the speaker/ writer play as important a role in communication as the linguistic stimulus itself. Dant (1991:7), however, adds that intentionality marks the exchange as meaningful but, does not constitute the meaning of discourse. It is only one among many elements of discourse. According to Blass (1990: 9-13) by context we do not mean the real world or the co-text (the preceding or following text of discourse); rather context is a set of assumptions retrieved or derived from memory or acquired by perception, and used in the interpretation process. The same utterance may have different implications in different contexts: that is, when different background assumptions are used. The

consistency of structural features of discourse is deeply embedded in social context: the processes of power, the presuppositions that underlie discourse, the connotative references to other discourses and other social processes obscured by taken-or-granted participation in discourse (Dant, 1991:7).

Discourse refers to the set of norms, preferences, and expectations relating language to context, which language users draw on and modify in producing and making sense out of language in context. Discourse knowledge relates language to psychological as well as social contexts and allows language users to produce and interpret discourse structures such as verbal acts (e.g. requests and offers), conversational sequences (such as questions and answers), activities (such as story-telling and arguing), and communicative styles (such as women's speech). Competent language users (e.g. politicians and media men) know the formal characteristics of these structures, the alternative ways of forming particular structures, and the contexts in which particular discourse structures are preferred and expected. They vary their language according to their perception of the cognitive states of interlocutors. In fact, all children come to know that language is a tool not only for representing the world but also for constituting and changing that world (International Encyclopedia of Linguistics 1992: 358).

(ii) Structural Linguistics: Signification To Discourse

Traditional linguistics have been the study of the mechanics of a language-- grammatical rules, lexicon, phonology, graphology etc. It was assumed that meaning were conveyed through correct application of linguistic rules by the users. Saussure broke with the tradition and tried to study the structure of language. By studying the structure of the elements of language Saussure dispenses with the tie between meaning and the exercise of formal rules. Instead, he links meaning and linguistic structure through a concept of the sign in which the signified (the meaning) is only arbitrarily related to the signifier (the phonological or graphological form of the sign):

Signified (concept)
Signifier (sound-image)

The 'signifier' is what we draw on a paper 't-a-b-l-e'--not the thing but the concept. This queer piece of drawing-- a word-- 'signifies' or 'represents' the 'signified'-- the thing itself, on which we put down a book or a cup of coffee. 'Signified' plus 'signifier' constitutes the 'sign'. Its algebraical form is 's/S'. The arbitrary link between forms and meaning is the radical center of Saussurian linguistics (Dant, 1991:100; Inglis, 1990:94-5). This approach views meaning as a social phenomenon, realized not in the individual act of speaking, but 'only by virtue of a sort of contract signed by the members of a community'.

The structuralists adopted Saussure's conception of an analytical object, language, as structured in itself and not reducible to any external structures. Structural anthropology and Semiology (Levi-Strauss and Barthes, respectively) took on the study of the structural form of meaningful systems. But they did not stop at the analysis of the system of meanings, they used this analysis as a basis for recovering 'hidden' meanings-- for *interpreting* what they were studying. The structuralists looked at meaningful systems within their social context and analyzed meaning as structured in a way analogous to language (Dant, 1991: 101; Inglis, 1990: 94-5).

The structuralist category of 'discourse' refers to an empirical phenomenon; the concrete utterances by which human individuals exchange meaning. It is not a function of some other level such as consciousness, universal conditions of existence (i.e. universal truths), or even the material conditions of existence (the economic base). As a theoretical category 'discourse' does not do the same work as the category of 'knowledge' or 'ideology' but it does describe an empirical phenomenon where knowledge and ideology are effectively produced. The development of structuralism in anthropology (Levi-Strauss) and semiology (Barthes) borrowed a method of analysis from structural linguistics. In application, however, the method has been changed from an attempt to understand the system by which meaning is

exchanged (i.e. language) to an attempt to understand the meaning being exchanged (Dant.1991:192-5).

"The transformation of the object of study from the system of signification to the process of discourse involves a critique of the sign and of structure. (Dant, 1991:101-2). "Structural linguistics shifts from the study of *conscious* linguistic phenomena to the study of their *unconscious* infrastructure... It does not treat *terms* as independent entities, taking instead as its basis of analysis the *relations* between terms... It introduces the concept of *system*.... And finally, structural linguistics aims at discovering general laws, either by induction or...by logical deduction, which would give them absolute character' (Levi-Strauss 1968:33).

(iii) Foucault's Discourse Of Power

Foucault (1977) views discourse as will to power. His phrase, 'the discourse of power' means that *all* arguments as to truth are driven by the will to power. To make a truth-claim is to make a power-claim in the same breath. Knowledge is therefore never 'disinterested'. To possess, reveal or create knowledge is to do the same for a form of power. Foucault saw the field of a discourse like the physicists see the electromagnetic field. It is defined, not by its will to truth, but by its will to power. A discourse seeks power, and that is what marks out its range.

Moreover, its quest is always historical-- it is at work in specific times and places, its field of force accumulates. Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*, show how to identify the dominant land marks of the discourse and their historical contours (Foucault 1977; Inglis, 1990: 107-8; Said, 1978: 3, 94).

Foucault sees the advent of medicine, psychology, pedagogy, criminology, law, all of them the great intellectual products of Enlightenment's determination to light progress on its road by human reason, as being mere instruments of state repression. Each discipline marks out an area of body and mind for its control. First, the mad and the sick, then the children and the criminals, then the domestic life and its great untameable, sex. Each is brought under the terrible domination of language, the discourse of power. Such modern 'policy sciences' as management theory, time-and-motion study and industrial relations, are all discourses of power written out and given their charter in order to control, without its even noticing, an increasingly passive, docile society (Foucault 1977; Inglis, 1990: 107-8).

Foucault grounds the formation and regularity of discourse in social practices, both exterior to it (the institution) and interior to it (discursive practices) and so generates a social determination account of the process of knowledge. It is the role of power, both within society and within discourse, that is used to describe the regularity of discursive formations. Foucault,

however, does not concentrate on the power of social institutions (the sites of accumulated power); nor on its accumulation but on its effects (Dant, 1991:130).

Foucault, rejects the historicist theories of history that seek some essential dynamic of development. The domination of the study of history by chronology is replaced by a variety of time series reducible to no particular origin. For the new history of ideas there is no single, linear schema but series that are juxtaposed to one another, that overlap and intersect. Gone are the themes of origins and consciousness, of spirit and, most importantly, the aspiration to any form of absolute truth. Foucault makes the discourse he studies contingent on the social context in which it occurs. (Foucault, 1972:5; Dant, 1991:121-122).

For Levi-Strauss and the early Barthes structural linguistics seemed to promise a technical solution to the problems of interpretation; once the structural relations could be revealed then the code of meaning could be unravelled. But for Foucault and Derrida, any interest in structuralism was not with the promise of a technical solution. They both began analysis of the object clarified by the structuralists' discourse, using whatever techniques disturbed a taken-for-granted reading of its meaning. Their aim was not interpretation in the sense of laying bare the truth behind the utterances in language. Their analyses attempted to reveal the contingent nature of discourse, contingent not on a

real, stable, natural world represented in discourse but on an historical and social world, fluid and changing. Contingent also on the process and human practice of discourse; the need to make sense, to show cause and demonstrate rationality (Dant, 1991: 120).

Foucault's position is closely related to structuralism, but according to Hall, he "has followed the path of 'difference' through into a radical heterogeneity". He has made possible a welcome return to the concrete analysis of particular ideological and discursive formations, and the sites of their elaboration. Foucault and Gramsci between them account for much of the most productive work on *concrete analysis* now being undertaken in the field. The problem is that Foucault 'so resolutely suspends judgement, and adopts so thoroughgoing a skepticism about any determinacy or relationship between practices, other than the largely contingent, that we are entitled to see him, not as an agnostic on these questions, but as deeply committed to the non-correspondence of all practices to one another. From such a position neither a social formation nor the State, can be adequately thought (Hall 1986:47).

That which Foucault treats as discourse is an apparently amorphous mass of statements in which the archaeologist discovers a regularity of 'dispersion' rather than a hidden system of knowledge underlying it. The horizon available to orient and unify analysis is not then one of truth or meaning, of historical

continuity or scientificity - merely a pure description of discursive events. (Foucault 1972:27) (Dant.1991: 129).

Shortcomings detected in individual exponents of discourse theory notwithstanding, the theory has come to occupy a very significant place in the study of social phenomenon. It provides theoretical orientation as well as a methodology in social sciences and humanities.

The relevance of discourse to cognitive structures and processes has emerged in studies of information flow changes in the cognitive status of knowledge as language is produced and comprehended through time. The study of language as a vehicle of social interaction has led to the growth of sociolinguistics; and conversation analysis in ethnomethodology, in gender studies, and acquisition of language competence among children, which is a branch of discourse analysis. Many anthropologically oriented studies of discourse have been pursued under the heading ethnography of speaking, where speaking is seen as one of the principal elements of culturally determined behavior, particularly in the works of Becker (1979), Friedrich (1986), and Tedlock (1983). Because, discourse studies aim at an understanding of language in its great variety of natural settings, a number of discourse studies have looked at language use during interactions between clients and the practitioners of various professions. Discourse analysts also concern themselves with language in such

domains as education, politics, and advertising (International Encyclopedia of Linguistics 1992: 357).

(iv) Discourse Analysis: A Liberating Challenge

Discourse analysis refers to the ways to identify the elements in the communication processes of a particular medium. It is usually used to refer to the analysis of the output of mass media and how the audience interact with that output (Dimpleby, 1992). Such an analysis would approach mass communication as a cultural *practice*, in which issues of power, identity, and social structure are negotiated (Jensen 1991:18). Discourse has thus both linguistic and non-linguistic properties. Discourse analysis can, therefore, not be a purely linguistic matter; nor it can be dealt with in a purely linguistic way. Unless context and the psychological mechanism underlying it are at the base of our theory, no adequate explanation of the interpretation process, and more generally the structuring of discourse, can result (Blass, 1990: 9-13).

The New Critical tradition served to highlight language as the concrete vehicle of literary communication. Semiology, similarly, focused scholarly attention on the formal properties of discourse. The New Criticism and Semiology, together, drove home the point that language is not a transparent means of access to reality, and that linguistic details have important implications for the

communicative functions of texts. The two schools, however, tended to concentrate on monologic, aesthetically complex texts, leaving aside the use of language in daily conversation and a multitude of other everyday practices, including mass media (Jensen 1991: 33-34).

Discourse analysis of everyday conversation and the mass mediated messages has been taken up by Linguistic discourse analysis. In charting this extremely complex area of inquiry, Linguistic discourse analysis has identified three main levels of analysis. First, the most fundamental elements of discourse analysis are utterances or statements of various types, what are referred to as *speech acts* (Austin 1962; Searle 1969). Each statement is defined literally as an instance of linguistic action. Language does not simply, or even primarily, work as a descriptive representation; through language, people perform a variety of everyday acts. Among the obvious examples are rituals (a marriage ceremony) and other institutionalized procedures (a sentence pronounced in a court of law), where the very pronouncement accomplishes a socially binding act. In addition, by uttering promises, questions and answers, and arguments, people also perform speech acts (Jensen 1991: 34).

At a second level, language serves to establish a mode of *interaction between communicators*, most clearly in the case of interpersonal communication, such as interviewing. Both parties introduce and develop particular themes while closing off other

aspects of the discursive universe. In negotiating a form of common understanding with the interviewer, respondents can be seen to build semantic networks that are indicative of their world views. Also observational studies establish complex forms of interaction which lend themselves to linguistic analysis. For both observational and interview studies, mass communication research may draw on linguistic research about everyday conversation and classroom interaction (Jensen 1991:34).

Third, it is at the level of *discourse* that the various linguistic categories can be seen to come together as a coherent structure, a text with a message to be interpreted. Both respondents and historical sources tell stories and develop arguments in forms which are comparable, in many ways, to literary or rhetorical genres (Jensen 1991:35): (the idea is further elaborated below in the section "Mass Media Discourse: Myths and Narratives").

Tim Dant adds Sociology of Science to the landmark developments which led to the study of Mass Media as Discourse. He says: While the philosophical rumblings of critical theory and structuralism generated an object of study in 'discourse', the empirical and academic traditions of linguistics and the sociology of science developed techniques of inquiry that are appropriate for the analysis of the interactive features of everyday speech, media messages, and major debates at the frontiers of knowledge.

Interpretation of discourse by looking beyond just the content, draws on three contextual settings which contribute to the construal of meaning:

(1) the structural context (the way language is used to convey meaning)

(2) the wider discursive context (what is uttered before and after and in other discourses)

(3) the social context (the power relations embodied in and realized by the discourse) (Dant. 1991: 7-8).

Discourse analysis is, then, both a social process and a linguistic structure: the two can not be separated, yet it seems possible to highlight one more than the other. We would, therefore, analyze discourse more as a social process, than as a linguistic structure. Thus, discourse is to be perceived in a broad sociocultural perspective 'as it relates to and is constructed by particular aspects of social organization and the speaker's (reader's or writer's) cultural construction of the world' (Duranti, 1985). The relations we will try to establish are not just textual or cognitive, but sociological. This approach is imperative, because 'unless we present texts in terms of the circumstances under which they were obtained, from whom they were taken, and the social and psychological characteristics of their narrators, we are in danger of selecting concordant features from disparate accounts and producing a logically satisfactory synthesis

which would perhaps be unintelligible to most members of the indigenous culture' (Turner, 1974: 159).

Discourse, thus conceived in structuralist terms, is at once an empirical phenomenon recognizable without a particular theory, and at the same time a theoretical object that is amenable to analysis. As an object, discourse is available on two levels. Firstly, to a participant (in a discourse, in a kinship system) for whom the object has a reality that can be described and understood. Secondly, to an analyst (of discourse, of a kinship system) for whom the object has structural features that enable it to be understood in relation to other, similar structural forms. The analyst describes features that the participant need not necessarily be aware of. Awareness of these features may even impair the participant's practice but they are features that enable the analyst to understand, in a more general way, what participation involves (Dant. 1991: 99).

The structure of discourse is that of a network of differences between meaningful elements (the sign, the statement) that constitute knowledge through the process of exchange. It is the differences at the level of meaning rather than the differences at the material level of language that are constitutive of discourse as the object of analysis. The exchange of meanings involves transforming meaning elements through a series of exchanges in which one replaces another, establishing a pattern of connection

through equivalence or similarity. The exchange may also include negative elements which specify a lack of similarity (Dant, 1991: 208).

The object of discourse study ranges from the single utterance, to the text, to the episteme but all are related to each other as constituting "discourse". The social practices surrounding the generation, dissemination, acquisition, review and criticism of knowledge all take place as discourse. The whole gamut of social knowledge, as it is shared by people, exists as discourse. Knowledge becomes and is available for sharing when it is uttered; either spoken or written down. While discourse analysis need not debate the truth or falsity of knowledge, it can provide a critique of it by analyzing its origins in structuralism, wider discursive and social contexts (Dant, 1991: 8). One may recall that Giddens (1989: 288-93) has identified four levels of critique for social sciences-- intellectual, practical, ideological, and moral. This critique (particularly moral and ideological), is not just assessing the logical nature of critique in social sciences, but formulating practical programs of social intervention. In terms of political theory, "we must break free from the 'class reductionism' and 'capitalism reductionism' of Marxist theory and practice".

Discourse analysts tend to be driven to understand how naturally occurring language is determined by, and in turn determines, the ways in which knowledge is acquired, stored, and

used by the human mind-- as well as how language shapes and is shaped by the ways in which people interact with one another within their social and cultural contexts. Discourse can be studied in terms as varied as are the forces and functions responsible for language itself. Discourse constitutes the area of language most subject to influence from psychological and social factors. Major areas of research have included the extension of grammar beyond the boundaries of the sentence; the use of discourse to illuminate psychological structures and processes; and the study of discourse as a way of gaining insights into social interaction (International Encyclopedia of Linguistics, 1992:357).

The diversity of discourse linguistics reflects the richness of its subject matter. Increased understanding of language in actual use calls for the examination of a maximally wide range of data, as well as free access to an unrestricted arsenal of methods and theoretical approaches. Discourse provides a focus and meeting ground for all investigations of language as it really is. Its diversity, reflecting as it does the diversity of language and the human mind, offers a liberating challenge to a linguistics freed of the bonds of parochial concerns (Chafe, 1992: 358; in International Encyclopedia of Linguistics).

Today much of qualitative work employs the concept of discourse to refer to any use of language, or other semiotic systems, in social context. Crucially, discourse now is said to

include everyday interaction and its categories of consciousness, thus constituting the medium of the social construction of reality (Berger and Luckman, 1966) (Jensen, 1991: 19).


Culture, Discourse, And Ideology

A brief elaboration of the concept of 'ideology' is necessary for two reasons: -one, because knowledge, discourse, and media messages themselves can be ideological; and second because Pakistan is regarded as an 'ideological entity' as opposed to a 'historical entity'. It may also be added that 'ideology of Pakistan' is synonymous with its nationhood which is based on religion. To that extent the term 'ideology' is not pejorative in our context. The word 'ideology' has been used in Pakistan, independent of its meaning and historical development in the West, where collapse of religion is viewed as the beginning of the intellectual emancipation of mankind.

The word 'ideology' first appeared at the time of the French Revolution. It was coined by Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836), a French philosopher, and it meant to him 'the science of ideas'. This was science in the Baconian sense-- science with a mission, to serve man, even save him, by ridding his mind of prejudices and preparing him for the ultimate sovereignty of reason.

Since the rise of Napoleon, after the French Revolution, word ideology has acquired a pejorative sense-- a sort of false

Figure 1



Adapted from : DISCOURSE ACROSS CULTURES
[1987, Smith, L.E.(ed.)]
Article by : Candlin, C.N.

consciousness, promoted and foisted by the vested interest-- as a conscious or unconscious effort. Marx, Weber, and Mannheim, and their adherents of diverse shades subscribe to this interpretation. Traditional Marxist account viewed ideology as obscuring contradictions in social relations, which serves interests of the dominating class. Contemporary theory of ideology, which has come up in the wake of cultural studies, defining culture as 'ordinary', however, takes a less derogatory view of ideology.

In a general sense ideology means any kind of action-oriented theory or any approach to politics in the light of a system of ideas. In a strict sense the word has five basic characteristics: (1) it contains an explanatory theory of a more or less comprehensive kind about human experience and the external world; (2) it sets out a program, in generalized and abstract terms, of social and political organization; (3) it conceives the realization of this program as entailing a struggle; (4) it seeks not merely to persuade but to recruit loyal adherents, demanding commitment; (5) it addresses a wide public but may tend to confer some special role of leadership on intellectuals (Cranston, 1986).

These two views cover almost every conceivable system of ideas and practice as ideology: science, reason, religion, Positivism, and all the 'isms' which appeared in the last about two centuries. That all these 'isms' emerged since the 19th century suggests that

ideologies are no older than the word itself-- they belong essentially to a period in which secular belief has increasingly replaced traditional religious faith (Cranston, 1986).

For most 'modern' thinkers the collapse of religion as a unifying and overarching system of knowledge is an important event in the development of the human sciences. With the loss of god's perspective as a unitary and unifying view of reality, accounted for and elaborated by the institutional structures of religions, comes the possibility of competing accounts and a knowing subject more amenable to empirical analysis. This is true about the white, western cultures, but not necessarily about the rest of the world. The northern hemisphere may have become increasingly secular during the twentieth century, with their focus on the needs of 'Man' (that is, the needs of some men) rather than the will of god to orient values, drive political decisions and give meaning to many individual lives. But within these cultures, religions have survived and adapted. They have retained an enormous cultural influence both through involvement in key institutions (the education and political systems, the services of the welfare state) and through continued statements within a cultural discourse of 'morality'. While the influence of religion as a system of knowledge has not only survived but reasserted itself in the West; in the rest of the world it is less clear if it ever ceased to be a dominant mode of knowledge (Dant, 1991: 230). This point will be elaborated below in the context of Pakistan.

The contemporary theory of ideology describes a process of socially contingent values, interpretations and taken-for-granted knowledge that is necessary for the operation of society. In this formulation, ideology is cast not as the bogey of false knowledge to contrast with the purity of science as truth, but as a process that is intertwined with all other social processes including science. The analysis of ideology demonstrates that cultural forms which obscure the concrete relations between human beings do not do so wilfully by following the conscious intentions of particular humans. Although some early accounts treated ideology as obscuring a "true" version of circumstances which waited to appear once the ideological cloud was lifted, recent accounts take a more complex view. (Dant. 1991:5-6).

A modern analysis of ideology recognizes that the repair and concealment of contradictions in the concrete form of human relations is necessary if those relations are to be lived. The acceptance of ideology as a characteristic of social being does not preclude transformation either of the lived or the imaginary relations of existence. But the achievement of liberation from domination does not follow from a neat epistemological solution or even from a transformation of the level of consciousness. What the modern theory of ideology does suggest is that through a critique of the process of ideology, the process can, at least partially, be made accessible to the will of human beings rather than contingent on the extant conditions of existence (Dant, 1991:6; for details on

Social Sciences as Critique see Giddens, 1979, 1982, 1989).

The developments, particularly in the work of Althusser, Habermas, and critical theory, have articulated a non-reductive relationship between ideology and social structure. Knowledge produced within the theory of ideology does not claim a transcendent or scientific status but is founded in 'critique' and the emancipation from domination (Dant, 1991: 188).

For both Althusser and early Habermas, the human subject as an individual knowing subject is a product of the form of ideology and the contents of ideology are managed by the apparatuses of the modern capitalist state. The form of ideology is no longer treated as false consciousness associated with a false (i.e. idealist) philosophy as it was with Marx and Lukacs. Instead it describes the form of knowledge that is available to human beings (Dant, 1991: 189).

Insofar as the term 'ideology' no longer refers to a form of thought associated with the interests of one class, Habermas drops it. In both Althusser's theory of 'levels' of social formation and the process of 'overdetermination', and in Habermas's distinction between system and 'lifeworld', there is a sense of relationism in that a reduction to either the level of concrete reality or the level of ideas is resisted. Knowledge is relational to the material context of social being and is partially determined by it. Habermas refers to 'culture' as the store of knowledge from which those

engaged in communicative action draw their interpretations. "The theory of ideology has informed or developed into an analysis of discursive forms or communicative action" (Dant, 1991: 190).

The media, using existing narrative conventions and "maps of meaning" (Hall, 1981), construct reality to conform to those maps, and assign meanings to new realities. It is here that the "ideological effect" (Hall, 1977) is perceived: "Ideology is not a collection of discrete falsehoods, but a matrix of thought firmly grounded in the forms of our social life and organized within a set of interdependent categories, which constitute a network of established "given" meanings embedded in the "assignment" of events to the "relevant" contexts within these pre-established cultural "maps of meaning" (Morley, 1981: 371). The prevailing maps of meaning have come to be perceived as "natural" and "common sense", blinding us to the fact that even "common sense is culturally derived" (Geertz, 1983; Bird 1988:81).

Knowledge tend to reinforce what is, rather than open the way to what might be and in this sense it is ideological. This tendency is achieved by smoothing over contradictions to produce a unitary account so that the lived experience (of most) people seems rational. The mode in which knowledge/ideology operate is discourse. It is through challenging the presuppositions and extant meaning about the given phenomenon and transforming them through a critical exchange of meanings that perspective and knowledge about

it is changed. Knowledge, ideology and discourse are different aspects of the same phenomenon (Dant, 1991: 185).

In *Mythologies* (1973) Barthes analyzed a variety of everyday phenomena (advertisements, popular films, sports events, etc.) and showed that they hold two kinds of meaning: one which is immediately understood, and another which is "carried" by the first meaning. To exemplify, the image of a black soldier saluting the French flag on the front page of the *Paris Match*, on the one hand, means just that: "black:" "soldier," "military salute," and so forth. On the other hand, this, as it were, "cultural" or, to be precise, "ideological" message. When read within its socio-historical context of consensual concepts and values. The *Paris Match* cover becomes a sign of "French imperialism" (Larsen 1991:125).

In later works, Barthes used the linguistic terms "denotation" and "connotation" to refer respectively to the "natural" and "ideological" meaning of a text. Emphasizing the ideological character of connotation even further, he argued that, even while texts may vary in terms of their signifiers, connotation holds all its signifieds in common; the same signifieds are to be found in the written press, the image or the actor's gestures. This common domain of the signifieds of connotation is that of ideology, which cannot but be single for a given society and history, no matter what signifiers of connotation it may use (Barthes, 1984a: 49,

Larsen 1991: 125).

The mass media represent an important institution-to-think-with; by analogy to the anthropological, Levi-Straussian concept of object-to-think-with (Schudson 1987: 56). Science and mass communication, in different ways, serve to place reality on a public agenda; both institutions operate through social practices that presuppose a degree of consensus regarding interpretive procedures. Whereas the specific institutional hierarchies, admittedly, differ, both are important agents, increasingly so, in maintaining the political, cultural, as well as material structures of society (Galbraith 1967). At the same time, clearly, the interpretive communities of mass communication - the demographically and culturally specific audience groups - are more diverse, complex, and, most important, inclusive. In principle, mass communication serves to establish a cultural forum (Newcomb and Hirsch 1984) which includes everybody and which, again in principle, may address any issue of power or social structure. Because they may, but frequently do not, fulfill this function, mass media institutions and discourses have become central sites of social conflict (Jensen 1991: 41-42).

Mass Media Discourse: Myths And Narratives

The field of mass media research has been undergoing two interrelated developments in recent decades; the rise of

qualitative approaches as methodologies with an explanatory value in their own right, and the convergence of humanistic and social-scientific disciplines around this 'qualitative turn' (Jensen 1991: xiii). In the words of James Carey (1989:64), the field thus has entered into "a process of making large claims from small matters; studying particular rituals, poems, plays, conversations, songs, dances, theories, and myths and gingerly reaching out to the full relations within a culture or a total way of life". To analyze mass media in broad cultural context we need to go for "thick description" (Geertz, 1973: 3).

The rise of discourse analysis is a part of larger development which has emerged with the dislodgement of positivist, quantifiable methods in social sciences, and the popularity of qualitative, interdisciplinary approaches. And qualitative approaches are being seen as a scientific means of coping with a new form of social reality, what has variously been called the postindustrial society, the postmodern age, and the information society. The erosion of traditional social patterns and the rise of mass communication as a primary source of social cohesion in many regions of the world are twentieth century trends which have accelerated over the last few decades, prompting a search for new theories and methods to comprehend social and cultural complexity and change. Fragmentation of the social setting is being met with integrative, contextual modes of understanding in theory an methodology. (Jensen, 1991: 2).

The emphasis that is given to language and experience as constitutive elements of social practices and institutions is, indeed, a common denominator for different traditions of qualitative analysis. A related focus is found in the so-called linguistic turn of twentieth-century philosophy, which has taken everyday language as its point of access to inquiries into the structure of reality and the conditions of knowledge. Symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology, have further noted the importance of everyday conceptual categories for social analysis, and semiotics, as developed in linguistics, literary theory, and other fields, has proposed to study manifold social phenomena as signs with reference to their uses in cultural, political, and religious practices. Each tradition of inquiry, in different ways, can be said to explore the stuff that social reality is made of (Jensen, 1991: 2-3).

Historical and literary research has noted that genres, in particular, bear witness to the changing social uses of communication. Thus, for example, the novel form, the news genre, and the encyclopedia, in different ways, contributed to constructing the modern social order. The novel, for one, while depending on the rise of the middle class as literary entrepreneurs, also owed its success to the development of a new realm of privacy and leisure in which that same social group became readers in search of narratives that could suggest appropriate standards of private conduct, as well as filling a new social space

and time with entertainment (Watt 1957). Equally, the discourses of news in the early press implied a redefinition of individuals, their economic rights, and their participation in political life, hence suggesting standards of public conduct with other citizens (Habermas 1989; Schudson, 1978). The encyclopedia, finally, served to publish the contemporary range of certified knowledge in a comprehensive, but accessible form, which gave it practical, economic, and political relevance for entrepreneurs and citizens alike (Eriksen 1987:118-29) (Jensen 1991:22).

Mass media express and represent the political ethos of a given society in cultural and ideological terms as a mode of discourse. This discourse is supported by institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, and civil and military bureaucracies (Said, 1978:3).

It is a fallacy to assume that the swarming, unpredictable, and problematic mess in which human beings live can be understood on the basis of what texts say; to apply what one learns out of a written text literally to reality is to risk folly or ruin. Yet it seems a common human failing to prefer the schematic authority of a text to the disorientations of direct encounters with humans (Said, 1978: 93). The reader resorts to a text sometime because he does not know or does not comprehend the reality he wants to understand, at other times he would read and believe the text because it has been approved by many other readers. It is here that

the reality described and constructed by the text acquires a greater authority and use, even than the actuality it describes. There is a rather complex dialectic of reinforcement by which the experiences of readers in reality are determined by what they have read in a text, and this in turn persuades the writer to take up subjects described in advance by reader's experiences. These texts can create and construct not only knowledge but also the very reality they describe. In time such knowledge and reality produce a tradition, or what Michel Foucault calls a discourse, whose material presence or weight, not the originality of a given author, is really responsible for the texts produced out of it (Said, 1978: 94).

Journalists, as members of a particular culture, are bound by the "culture grammar" (Colby, 1975) that defines rules of narrative construction, a realization that changes the notion of an "objective" transposing of reality. Seeing news as narrative representing culture thus allows us to study it as a symbolic, mythical model of cultural values (Corrigan, 1984; Bird, 1988:76).

Barthes (1973: 11) has shown the "naturalness" with which newspaper, art, and common sense constantly dress up a reality which, even though it is the one we live in, is undoubtedly determined by history. Just as words represent concrete things in the world and the relationship between words in an utterance refers to a relationship between concrete things, so cultural artifacts

refer back to the history of culture. The meaning of myths can be unravelled by paying attention to the structure of signifying elements and interpreting from cultural context constituted by history.

(i) News As Mythological Narrative

Since the mid-1960s, narratology (the study of narratives) has been one of the most fertile fields of semiological research. Reworking traditional literary theory and drawing on Russian Formalism, French scholars such as Barthes, Genette, Todorov, and others developed a set of concepts and analytical procedures which became a major source of inspiration for qualitative media studies (Larsen 1991:126).

News is part of an age-old cultural practice, narrative and story-telling, that seems to be universal (Rayfield, 1972; Scholes, 1982; Turner, 1982). As narrative, news is orienting (Park, 1944), communal (Dewey, 1927), and ritualistic (Carey, 1975). The orderings and creations in narrative are cultural, not natural; news, like history, endows past events with artificial boundaries, "constructing meaningful totalities out of scattered events" (Ricoeur, 1981: 278). So, rather than considering the "accuracy" of facts and their correspondence with an outside reality, we can consider them as contributing to the narrative, as elements in a human ordering of elements (Bird, 1988-70).

One of the most productive ways to see news is to consider it as myth, a standpoint that dissolves the distinction between entertainment and information. By this we do not mean to say that individual news stories are like individual myths, but that as a communication process, news can act like myth and folklore (Bird, 1987). News is 'factual' but the considerations which determine the 'news worthiness' of an event; the method of its construction and presentation all reflect the over all structure of the given society. News reports despite being 'factual', through various devices helps reinforce, reproduce and transform the social, moral, religious, and political structure-- cultural ethos. Bascom (1954), and Malinowski (1974) think that through myth and folklore, members of a culture learn values, definitions of right and wrong, and sometimes can experience vicarious thrills - not all through individual talks, but through a body of lore. Frye (1957) adds that myth reassures by telling tales that explain baffling or frightening phenomena and provide acceptable answers; myth does not necessarily reflect an objective reality, but builds a world of its own.

For news, too, is a way in which people create order out of disorder, transforming knowing into telling. News offers more than fact-- it offer reassurance and familiarity in 'shared community experiences' (Mead, 1925); it provides credible answers to baffling questions, and ready explanations of complex phenomena such as unemployment and inflation (Jensen, 1977). Consuming the news has

been compared to religion (Gerbner, 1977), ritual activity (Carey, 1975), celebration (Capo, 1985), and play (Glasser, 1982; Stephenson, 1964). For through the ritualistic narrating of tales (including news) myths are acted out, transformed, and re-created in a "ritual process" (Turner, 1969). As a symbolic system, myth and news act both as a model of and as a model for a culture (Geertz, 1973; Bird, 1988-70-71).

For example, myth outlines the boundaries of acceptable behavior by telling stories. Thereby impressing such individuals with the undesirability of improper behavior and alerting them to the punitive consequences of further misconduct. So, when media report crime and deviant behavior, it is not just to inform; the average reader does not remember names dates and details of all or most crime stories. Such stories re-emphasize the normative contours of a society; it informs us about right and wrong (Cohen & Young, 1981: 431).

Myth has meaning only in the telling; cultural themes and values exist only if they are communicated. Obviously there is no single myth or narrative that is merely repeated, yet to continue to have power, myths must be constantly retold. Much of the mythical quality of news derives from such "resonance" the feeling that we have written or read the same stories over and over again. The principle of consonance (Galtung & Ruge, 1965) ensures that events that may actually be different are encoded into frameworks

that are already understood and anticipated. News "conveys an impression of endlessly repeated drama whose themes are familiar and well understood" (Rock, 1981: 68; Bird, 1988:72-73).

So, in tracing the story-telling patterns in news, we must be aware that journalists are not only drawing on those patterns, they are also actively reshaping them, constantly "repairing the paradigm" (Bennett, 1985). It is a process that is more complex than either a consensual model or a manipulative model, which assigns all the control to the media, and sees media as somehow outside of, yet affecting, culture. Rather, media are very much part of culture, but with a particular kind of privileged status within it. The media's narrative reshaping will be most successful when this can present new information in such a way that it accords with readers' existing narrative conventions, and can be accommodated within them. The media cannot create mythology out of nothing, but it is more than the "passive transmitter" of myth that has been suggested (Gans, 1979: 294). Such media-shaped perceptions may then become part of the common cultural framework, to be drawn on again by journalists in a continuing dialectical process (Bird, 1988: 81).

In news making, journalists do not merely use culturally determined definitions, they also have to fit new situations into old definitions. It is in their power to place people and events into the existing categories of hero, villain, good and bad, and

thus to invest their stories with the authority of mythological truth. Thus Hall (1975) agrees that news writing is a "social transaction"; and Eason (1981: 27) calls it an "interactive process" that picks up on existing cultural conventions (Bird 1988:80).

Even chronicle updates in newspapers, like routine visits, weather forecast, prayer timings, information about places to visit, births and deaths, time and fare table, may not be *stories* in accepted sense of the word yet they are culturally determined. For example a Pakistani newspaper would enlist prayer timings both for the Sunnis and Shias, a Turkish daily would omit the Shias and an Iranian the Sunnis. Chronicles help sustain the myth by assuring the reader that things are going as normal. Thus through chronicle, the overall structure of the myth is emphasized. Moreover judgements of what deserves to be chronicled change over time—simply tracing the changes in news chronicles can tell us a great deal about a culture and its dominant values.

Traditional division of news between "hard" versus "soft," "important" versus "interesting" (Gans, 1979), "news" versus "human interest" (Hughes, 1968), and "information" versus "story" (Schudson, 1978); popularized by journalists, has hampered discussion of news as narrative in two ways. First, it has hindered us from seeing news as a unified body that exhibits clear themes

and patterns that have little to do with important/ interesting splits. Second, this assumption blinds us to the structural qualities of individual stories. It is accepted that "hard" news is informative and factual, while "soft" news is diverting, and entertaining. This split is supposed to be intrinsic to the event itself- certain types of news simply "are" hard, others soft. This perception blinds us to the way narrative devices are used in all news writing, maintaining the illusion that the structural devices used in hard news are merely neutral techniques that act as a conduit for events to become information, rather than ways in which a particular kind of narrative text is created (Bird, 1988:68-9).

To understand what news as narrative is and does, we must put aside the important/interesting dichotomy and look at news stories as a whole - both as a body of work that is a continuing story of human activity, and as individual stories that contribute to that continuing one. Considering news as narrative does not negate the value of considering news as corresponding with outside reality, as affecting and being affected by society, as being a product of journalists or of bureaucratic organization, but it does introduce another dimension to news, one in which the stories of news transcend their traditional functions of informing and explaining. The news as narrative approach does not deny that news informs; of course readers learn from the news. However, much of what they learn may have little to do with the "fact", "names" and "figures" that journalists try to present so accurately. These details both

significant and insignificant all contribute to the larger symbolic system of news. The facts, names, and details change almost daily, but the framework into which they fit the symbolic system is more enduring. And it could be argued that the totality of news as an enduring symbolic system "teaches" audiences more than any of its component parts, no matter whether these parts are intended to inform, irritate, or entertain (Bird, 1988:69).


Analysis of the mythic character of mass media helps in understanding the ongoing discourse at various levels in society, being produced, reproduced, and transformed over a period of time. That is how knowledge is socially constructed as discourse. Discourse, thus conceived does not mediate transcendent essence, the essence of 'Man' or even of human being. It is the material form of a level of social interaction that, like the labor process, has a dynamic and social context much greater than the immediate situation. For this reason discourse is an appropriate object for sociological analysis; it is a form of social practice through which social cohesion and continuity is maintained. It is in the flow of discourse, the continuous exchange of meanings, that we as people, not only as sociologists, find our knowledge (Dant. 1991: 235-236).

Notes

1. "Extrinsic" according to Geertz (1973:92) means "that-- unlike genes, for example-- they lie outside the boundaries of the individual organism, as such in that intersubjective world of common understanding into which all human individuals are born,

in which they pursue their separate careers, and which they leave persisting behind them after they die." By "sources of information" he means "that-- like genes-- they provide a blue print or template in terms of which processes external to themselves can be given a definite form".





CHAPTER 3

CHAPTER 3

DISCOURSE AS MEDIA RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

A theory is only a 'sensitizing device' according to Giddens (1989), similarly a methodology can never be the blueprint for a machine into which you feed your data, turn the handle, and receive your conclusions. A methodology offers guidance as to dangers to be avoided and points to be taken into consideration. Such guidance is based on very broad prejudgments about the nature of the subject matter to be investigated. Methodology must also rest on presuppositions as to the nature, scope, and limitations of human knowledge. The goal must be a positive combination of methods; resulting in as much rigor as we can manage (Rickman, 1990:314).

Despite all elaboration and details worked out before hand methodology actually unfolds itself as the process of investigation proceeds. It is like a war plan which provides a guideline to the probable course of action, and yet no war has ever been fought exactly according to the plan made before hand. But this does not

mean that there should be no war plan and no military exercises in peace time. It only indicates that there is a good level of autonomy of theory and research. Theoretical thinking needs in substantial part to proceed in its own terms and cannot be expected to be linked at every point to empirical considerations. The more encompassing or generalized a set of Theoretical notions is, the more this is the case. Empirical work, on the one hand, cannot proceed in the absence of abstract concepts or Theoretical notions, but these are necessarily drawn upon selectively and cannot be ever present. Research responds to contextualized enquiries, and one of the errors of those who formulated canons of research under the aegis of logical empiricism was to regard the only 'authentic' work as that which sets up specific hypotheses, derived from theory, and proceeds to seek to test them. The 'how?' and 'why?' questions which social research answers are too variegated too be subsumed within so neat a scheme (Giddens, 1989:294-5).

Although the discourse approach in mass media research has now become more or less accepted as an alternative or addition to classical content analyses (Krippendorff, 1980), the number of systematical discourse studies of mass media messages is still limited. The applications of discourse analysis in media research are as varied as the very fields of discourse studies and mass communication themselves. Much work has a linguistic orientation, such as the early stylistic studies of Leech (1966) and Crystal and Davy (1969), and the later critical linguistics approach of Fowler

et al. (1979), Fowler (1991), Kress (1985), and Chilton (1985); 1988), among others. Much of this work, as well as recent work on social semiotics (Hodge and Kress, 1988) has been influenced by Halliday's systemic grammar (Halliday, 1978; 1985) (van Dijk, 1991:109). And in case of Pakistan there is not a single research available based on discourse analysis of mass media texts. The present study is going to be a pioneer study in the area, which has all the disadvantages of being the first and the only one on an untreaded track.

Better known in mass communication research, and equally diverse in orientation, is the critical work of the Glasgow University Media Group (1976; 1980) on the media representation of industrial disputes, the contributions in Davis and Walton (1983), and the cultural studies approach of the Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies (Hall et al., 1980). While also dealing with language, discourse, and images, these approaches are not part of linguistics proper, but pay special attention to ideological and political dimensions of media messages. Despite the theoretical and ideological diversity of these and other current approaches, we witness increasing interaction of linguistic, semiotic, and discourse-analytical approaches (van Dijk, 1985a; Hartley, 1982).

Discourse Analysis Methodology in the Print Media

The study of print media is one of the major tasks of discourse-analytical media research. Most of our social and political knowledge and beliefs about the world derive from the dozens of news reports we read or see every day. There is probably no other discursive practice, besides everyday conversation, that is engaged in so frequently and by so many people as news in the press and on television (van Dijk, 1991: 110).

One of the characteristics of discourse analysis is that it describes text and talk in terms of theories developed for the several levels or dimensions of discourse. Thus, whereas classical linguistics and semiotics made overall distinction between the form (*signifiants*) and meaning (*signifies*) of signs, current discourse analysis recognizes that text and talk are vastly more complex, and require separate though interrelated accounts of phonetic, graphical, phonological, morphological, syntactic, micro-and macro-semantic, stylistic, superstructural, rhetorical, pragmatic, conversational, interactional, and other structures and strategies. Each of these levels has its characteristic structures, which may be interpreted or function at other levels, both within and outside the traditional linguistic boundaries of the sentence, as well as in the broader context of use and communication (van Dijk, 1991:110).

Such a complex analysis of discourse is not limited to "textual" analysis, but also accounts for the relations between structures of text and talks, on the one hand, and of their cognitive, social, cultural, or historical "contexts" on the other hand. Also textual production and comprehension processes, interactions among language users, and the societal or cultural functions of discourse are important objects of research in such a transdisciplinary approach (van Dijk, 1991: 110-11).

Text Semantics: Local And Global Coherence

Both discourse analysts and ordinary language users are primarily interested in meaning: what is this text or talk about, what does it mean, and what implications does it have for language users? Part of the answer to such questions is given in text semantics, which formulates interpretation rules for words, sentences, paragraphs, or whole discourses. One important semantic notion used to describe meaning is that of proposition, which may be roughly defined as the conceptual meaning structure of a clause (van Dijk, 1977; 1991: 111-112).

One of the important notions studied in text semantics is that of the *local coherence* of the text; how are the subsequent propositions of the text bound together? One of the major conditions of such local coherence of texts is that their

propositions refer to facts that are related, for instance, by relations of time, condition, cause, and consequence (van Dijk, 1991: 112).

Our shared, social knowledge of such scripts provides the numerous "missing links" between the concepts and propositions of the text, which is, so to speak, a semantic iceberg of which only the tip is actually expressed, whereas the other information is presupposed to be known by the readers. This dependence on world knowledge and beliefs also may make coherence subjective and ideological: what is coherent for the journalist may not be so for all readers (van Dijk, 1991: 112).

Besides this kind of *referential* local coherence, propositions may also be *functionally* coherent: for instance, when the second proposition has the function of a Specification, Paraphrase, Contrast, or Example, relative to the first propositions. Propositions in news reports are often connected by a relation of Specification: more general propositions are followed by more specific ones that give further details (van Dijk, 1991: 112).

It is a crucial property of discourse that it is not only locally but also globally coherent. Beyond meaning relations between subsequent sentences, a text also has over all semantic unity. This *global coherence* is described by what we all intuitively know as themes or topics. Topics conceptually summarize

the text, and specify its most important information. In theoretical terms such topics can be described as semantic macro-propositions, that is, as propositions that are derived from sequences of propositions in the text: for instance, by macro-rules such as selection, abstraction, and other operations which reduce complex information. The hierarchical set of topics or macro-propositions forms the thematic or topical structure of the text. Language users employ such macro-structures in order to understand globally and to summarize a text. In news discourse, the top of this macro-structure is conventionally expressed in the headline and the lead paragraph. In order to derive such topics (macro-propositions), we need vast amounts of world knowledge (van Dijk, 1991: 112-113).

Implications

One of the most powerful semantic notions in a critical news analysis is that of *implication*. Much of the information of a text is not explicitly expressed, but left implicit. Words, clauses, and other textual expressions may imply concepts or propositions which may be inferred on the basis of background knowledge. This feature of discourse and communication has important ideological dimensions. The analysis of the "unsaid" is sometimes more revealing than the study of what is actually expressed in the text. There are various types of implication: entailments, presuppositions, and weaker forms, such as suggestion and

association (van Dijk, 1991: 113-114).

Many ideological implications follow not only because too little is being said, but also because too many, irrelevant things are being said about news actors. The well-known example in news reports about minorities is the use of irrelevant ethnic or racial labels in crime stories (van Dijk, 1991: 114).

Superstructures: the News Schema

Topics are usually organized by an abstract schema, consisting of conventional categories that specify what the overall function is of the topics of the text. Such a schema is called a superstructure (van Dijk, 1980). Just like stories or argumentations, news reports follow a hierarchical schema, consisting of such conventional categories as Headline, Lead (together forming the Summary), Main Events, Context, History (together forming the Background category), Verbal Reactions, and Comments. Typical for news stories is that these categories, as well as their global semantic content, are expressed discontinuously, as "installments", throughout the text: of each category the most important information is expressed first, a top-down strategy which assigns a so-called relevance structure to the text (van Dijk, 1991: 114-115).

In this study discourse analysis would first present general characteristics of the event and the way it has been reported in the selected four newspapers, followed by structural analysis of selected stories, giving an analysis of the headlines, the lead sentences/ paragraphs; then giving schematic structure of the news texts, followed by news syntax, local and global coherence of news, lexical choices, and style and rhetoric of news writing. Social cognition of each event as reported in the press would be discussed with reference to ideology, script and textual understanding.

Style And Rhetoric

Style is the textual result of choices between alternative ways of saying more or less the same thing by using different words or a different syntactic structure. Such stylistic choices also have clear social and ideological implications, because they often signal the opinions of the reporter about news actors and news events as well as properties of the social and communicative situation, and the group memberships of the speakers, for instance that a specific journalist is white, male, or middle-class. Thus, the use of "mob" and "rentamob," instead of "crowd" and "demonstrators"; the use of epithets like "terrorists" "militants" and "extremists" for the same or similar actors may be interpreted as signaling the ideological position of the reporter, and portraying them in colors chosen by the reporter/ editor, to manufacture the consent of the reader (Herman and Chomsky, 1988).

Such a choice of words also shows a cultural dimension of news language, which varies from newspaper to newspaper. In sum, at various levels of analysis, those of local and global semantics, news schemata, and style, we find a consistent pattern of discursive features that imply or signal the ideological position of a news media (van Dijk 1991: 116).

Social Cognition And Sociocultural Context

Discourse analysis of news is not limited to textual structures. These structures express or imply various "underlying" meanings, opinions, and ideologies. In order to show how these underlying meanings are related to the text, we need an analysis of the cognitive, social, political, and cultural context, which is the main focus of attention in the present study. The cognitive approach is premised on the fact that texts do not "have" meanings, but are assigned meanings by language users, or, to be precise, by the mental processes of language users. In other words, we need to spell out the cognitive representations and strategies of journalists in the production of the news report and those of the reader when understanding and memorizing it (van Dijk, 1988a; and 1991: 116-17; van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983).

A few theoretical notions are necessary to explain what mental structures and processes are involved here. First in textual understanding, the meaning of the text itself is gradually and

strategically constructed and represented in memory as a *text representation*. Second, language users, and hence journalists and readers, have a unique, personal representation of the news events referred to by the text. This knowledge representation in memory is called a (situation or event) *model*. A model represents what a language user has understood of the event that the text is about, and we have understood a text if we have been able to build a mental model of that event (van Dijk, 1991: 117).

This model not only features the information which is expressed through the text representation; it also contains much other information about this event. This information is not expressed in the text, because it is assumed to be known by the readers, or because it is found irrelevant by the reporter. Some of this presupposed information is derived from the *scripts*. Such scripts are culturally shared, conventional knowledge representations about well-known episodes of social life. Thus, whereas models may feature personal and biographically unique information, scripts are general and social (van Dijk, 1991: 117).

Similarly, people also have a specific mental model of the present communicative context, a so-called *context model*, which features information about the goals of the discourse, its communicative acts, and the properties of the audience. It is this context model that controls what information from the event model will be found communicatively relevant for inclusion in the text.

For instance, as we shall see below the West Pakistan press, which is being analyzed here, shared the common prejudices of the establishment against political aspirations of the people of East Pakistan, and projected electoral victory of the Awami League as a threat to the integrity of the country. This negative image of the Bengali type helped the military regime launch its military operation to eliminate the political victory of the people of East Pakistan. 'It is the context model that manages this interactional, communicative aspect of discourse and which relates discourse with social situations and structures' (van Dijk, 1991: 117-118).

We have seen, then, that even models in memory not only feature knowledge, but also opinions or evaluative beliefs about events and their participants. If a news report is "biased" this is usually because the mental model of the journalist has features, structures, and opinions which favor a specific ideological perspective on an event. Hence, critical analysis of the meaning of discourse in fact often involves the tentative reproduction of the beliefs in the underlying models of the speaker/writer (van Dijk, 1991: 118). Belief in the underlying models based on script, which prejudice a community, or a minority, will come out more clearly in the discourse analysis of the general election 1970, the separation of East Pakistan 1971, and the anti-Qadiani agitation 1974, to be analyzed below.

In the same way that models feature instantiated (specified) knowledge from scripts, they embody specific opinions that are derived from general, socially shared opinion structures such as attitudes. More generally, then, we say that models are based on *social representations or social cognition* (van Dijk, 1991: 118).

If social cognition about different social groups and social events are similar, we say that they are being monitored by the same fundamental interpretation framework, that is, by the same *ideology*. Such an ideology features the basic norms, values, and other principles which are geared towards the realization of the interests and goals of the group, as well as towards the reproduction and legitimation of its power (van Dijk, 1991: 118).

Thus, if we say that a particular news report is "ideological" we thereby mean that the structures and meanings expressed in it, first, reflect the structures and contents of the specific mental model of this individual reporter about this specific event, but that this model, second, may be based on general social-cognitive schemata (prejudices) about the event, and that such schemata are finally monitored by underlying group-based ideologies. Hence, an ideological analysis requires a complex description not only of the text, but also of the intricate cognitive representations and strategies used in the production and comprehension of the text (van Dijk 1991:118-119).

In critical semiotics, in linguistics, and discourse analysis, and in mass communication research, such a cognitive analysis is often neglected, or given only in very superficial and intuitive terms, such as "consciousness" or "meaning production". However, it is precisely through a detailed account of social cognition that we are able to relate discourse and speakers with social structure and culture, that is, through the representations that language users have about social structures (van Dijk 1991: 119).

Assumptions of Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis involves a set of assumptions about the theory and the phenomenon. Deborah Schiffrin (1987) has enlisted the following key assumptions:

1. **Language always occurs in a context:** cultural context consisting of shared meanings and world views; social context, through which both self and others draw upon institutional and interactional orders to construct definitions of situations and actions; and cognitive contexts in which past experience and knowledge is stored and drawn upon.

2. **Language is context sensitive:** Language not only occurs in a context but also reflects that context, because it helps to constitute the context.

3. Language is always communicative: Language is always directed toward a recipient (immediate or eventual) and/or because it is attended by a recipient.

4. Language is designed for communication: Language is designed to reflect its communicative basis; it always takes recipient's current information and state into account.

A few other assumptions, to be included, are that

5. Mass mediated messages can be studied better under an interdisciplinary approach, because the media messages (politico-religious messages in our case) stand in an inseparable multi level relationship with the producer, recipient and the society.

6. The global analysis of the discourse of the mass mediated political messages deals with higher level structures which extend beyond the surface of the text.

7. The study has tried to demonstrate that schematic structures depend on thematic structures.

8. Semantic ordering of the media messages is not primarily determined by a conditional structure of facts but rather by the 'functional coherence' (Dijk, 1985) based on relevance.

Indicators of Discourse Analysis

A number of manifestations of political, social and religious discourses in Pakistan have been studied through the following indicators:

1. Relation of politics, religion and education in the 'civil society', (how they are perceived in popular wisdom under parasitic cultural ethos).

2. Social status of the religious leaders, the journalists, and the teachers at local level, where the landowner is the boss.

3. Economic status of the religious leaders in urban, rural, and tribal societies of Pakistan. The mosque and 'madressa' as a source of tax free, unaccountable income.

4. Cultural values of 'parasitic landlordism' (Moore, 1967:316) and the intellectual leadership of the ulama, the journalists and the teachers.

5. Routine functions of a religious leader in small communities (rituals, alms collection etc.).

6. Modern and traditional educational systems as determinant of intellectual outlook and the socio-economic status.

7. Political status of the religious leaders at national and local levels in different parts of the country.

(These seven indicators provide background information for the main part of the dissertation and have been studied on the basis of second hand data from the published material).

8. Media image of religious leaders: the image of traditional religious scholars and the politicized ulama.

9. Religion, (and by implication the ulama) a political requirement of the modernist political leadership.

10. Internal conflicts among the religious and political leadership, and their search of support in each other's camps.

11. Modernization reforms and resistance from religious quarters: introduction of mass communication, legal reforms, population control, changing status of women etc.

12. Ulama's commitment to politics: is it total or a ruse to protect/ promote, self/ class interest.

(the last five indicators have been studied on the basis of responses obtained from the ulama, journalists, and intellectuals in the form of a questionnaire, and then, of course the newspapers

texts related to eight important political events, which took place between 1970 and 1990).

Important Political Events

An analysis of the texts of four newspapers, related to eight important political events, is to be done to determine the role of media in Pakistan. Important political events with reference to which political discourse is to be studied include the followings: (1) General elections 1970, when the first free general elections were held and had ideological overtones, also when religious leaders had their first taste of electoral politics; (2) The Separation of East Pakistan 1971 in a civil war; (3) the making of the Constitution 1973; (4) The anti-Qadiani agitation 1974 and the second Constitutional amendment whereby the Qadianis were declared non-Muslims; (5) General elections 1977 and the subsequent mass agitation which led to the imposition of Martial Law; (6) Non-party general elections 1985; (7) General elections held after the death of President Zia-ul-Haque in 1988, and (8) the general elections held after the dismissal of Benazir government in 1990 and won by a motley alliance supported by the ulama and the establishment. These are some of the most significant political developments which brought internal political contradictions and complexities to the surface, and also each event has left its indelible mark on the subsequent political developments.

Without examining the triangular relationship between media, politics and Islam as a discourse one cannot understand the complex network of interests and threats, whereby the South Asian Muslims found an identity and continuously reproduced it politically, sociologically, ideologically, and imaginatively during and after the colonial rule. How this came about forms the background of this research methodology; how, and to what effect, this complex network unfolded itself in the media during the 1970s and 1980s is what the researcher would try to demonstrate.

The Four Newspapers

The four newspapers selected here for discourse analysis constitute the mainstream press of Pakistan. The two newspapers viz. the *Jang* and the *Nawa-e-Waqt* are the leading newspapers of the Urdu press and are the oldest among the existing newspapers. The two English dailies viz. *The Dawn* and *The Pakistan Times* are the leading newspapers among the English readers (*The Pakistan Times* with severe loss of circulation since the late 1980s is no more a leading newspaper). They too are the oldest existing English dailies. All the four newspapers were founded during the 1940s and except for the *Jang* had been launched to support the Muslim League in its struggle for Pakistan. A brief introduction to these newspapers may help in following the discourse analysis of these dailies.

1. **Daily the Jang:** The *Jang* started publishing in 1941 as a news-sheet, reporting the latest developments in World War II, monitored on radio. Mir Khalil then based in New Delhi wrote virtually the whole newspaper, and its name, which means "war" reflected the news-sheet's function. After partition, Khalil moved to Karachi, the first capital of the new state and the *Jang* filled the vacuum for a newspaper in newly independent Pakistan's capital (Haqqani, 1985). The *Jang* is now published simultaneously from Karachi, Rawalpindi, Lahore and Quetta. In addition, an international edition for overseas Pakistanis is published in London. Like most Pakistani newspapers the *Jang* is family owned and run (Haqqani, 1985).

The *Jang* is known for not having any political commitment except supporting the party in power and than drifting away to the other group with the same speed as the power of the party erodes¹. Being an independent newspaper, in the sense that it is not state owned like *The Pakistan Times*, it has continued to enjoy high circulation (often the highest). It has been the most successful business venture in the media market of Pakistan. Its support for the government has not been at the cost of business interests and erosion of credibility. As Haqqani (1985) has observed 'unlike other countries where long spells of arbitrary rule have led to an almost complete erosion of the media's creditability, Pakistani newspapers continue to be read and most have increased their circulations during the past eight years. One explanation of the

phenomenon is that the government has not allowed restrictions to make the media dull, shrewdly distinguishing between "harmless" and threatening criticism'.

This encouraged newspapers like the *Jang* to survive even flourish by extending political support to the government and catering to non-political needs of the general public by printing special color editions on subjects like films, television, and showbiz; special weekly editions of human interest on subjects like interior decoration, house keeping, coverage of religious occasions and day-to-day religious practices, introducing gossip columns, literary pages, youth edition etc. The *Jang* is more widely read, but its editorial are not taken seriously because they avoid expressing opinions.

The daily has an estimated circulation of 500,000 copies.

2. Daily The *Nawa-e-Waqt*: The *Nawa-i-Waqt*, on the other hand, is read for its editorials, and it speaks for the nation's conservative Muslim constituency. Its weight is in its opinions (Haqqani, 1985).

It started as a weekly on the day The Pakistan Resolution was passed in a historic session of the Muslim League in Lahore on March 23, 1940. Its founder editor/ owner late Hameed Nizami was actively involved in the Pakistan Movement. The daily has a strong political commitment to Islam as state ideology, advocates strong

central government, and ethnically a supporter of the Punjabi interests in the establishment. It sometimes faced retaliations from the government for its political commitment. It has the reputation of being the newspaper of the Opposition. This image was strong during the military regime of Ayub Khan and then in the Bhutto era. It has been opposed or reluctant to employ innovative devices to increase circulation at the cost of ideological commitment. But its conservative politics has not stopped it from following the technical and professional innovations used successfully by others.

After resisting, protesting and criticizing today's *Nawa-e-Waqt* has special color editions, gives prominent coverage to showbiz and carries photographs of women, once a taboo for the daily. According to Haqqani (1985), Nizami has resisted suggestions to make *Nawa-e-Waqt* more competitive by following *Jang's* bold, liberal style and the newspaper remains comparatively bland despite the inclusion of color pages and supplements. "*Nawa-e-Waqt* is not a commercial venture alone" Nizami asserted "we represent a commitment to the ideology of Pakistan. Our tradition is to stand up for causes we believe in and it is a tradition we intend to keep".

The daily has an estimated circulation of 400,000 copies.

3. *Daily The Pakistan Times: The Pakistan Times*, was originally owned by Mian Iftikhar-ud-Deen, a communist landlord of Lahore, who was also a member of the Muslim League and actively worked for the Pakistan Movement. He founded a group of media publications under the name of Progressive Papers Limited (PPL) based in Lahore. The PPL published *The Pakistan Times*, in English and the *Imroze* in Urdu. During the first decade of the birth of Pakistan the two dailies were among the highest circulation newspapers among a vast readership in the Punjab. They enjoyed fairly high level of credibility among the readers, and established promising professional standards. The PPL papers supported the leftist progressive causes and had an anti-imperialist stance. With the imposition of Martial Law in 1958 the PPL along with a number of other newspapers were taken over by the government ostensibly with a view to promote healthy journalism and to improve professional standards (Shahab, 1988, Gauhar, 1994). The National Press Trust (NPT) was founded to bring all the 'nationalized' newspapers under one umbrella, which placed journalism under the bureaucratic control of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. *The Pakistan Times* retained a tinge of its traditional character and a toned down leftist stance for a few years, but gradually withered under bureaucratic control and lack of professionalism. It lost its character and credibility and became a mouth piece of the government. With increased competition in the media market, particularly since 1988 the NPT papers have lost heavily in circulation, and retain little influence in the

media discourse. The NPT papers started suffering with the lifting of Martial Law after the 1985 elections and today their presence is not felt in the market. Despite that the NPT journalists are among the best paid journalists. The estimated circulation of *The Pakistan Times* is around 20,000 copies per day, and official figures put its circulation at 150,000 copies. Today's *Pakistan Times* is working as an official organ with little professional, financial and/or administrative autonomy.

4. **Daily *The Dawn*:** *The Dawn* had been founded and financed by the Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, as part of his struggle for Pakistan during the 1940s. The masthead of the daily carries Jinnah's name as founder of the paper. Today, *The Dawn* is owned by the Karachi based Haroon family who have diverse business, industrial, and political interests. But unlike the *Jang* and the *Nawa-e-Waqt* the family does not run *The Dawn* or other publications of the Dawn Group. The family has little overt interference in the professional matters. Since *The Dawn* is based in Karachi, which is Pakistan's financial and economic capital, it carries more economic news and views than any other national daily in the country. *The Dawn* is the first Pakistani newspaper which started a special eight page weekly supplement on financial and economic matters. The supplement is published in pink color, the color of *The Financial Times*. Being an English language daily *The Dawn* has an elitist readership and character. Since it is not read by the common people the establishment has traditionally shown greater tolerance of

criticism from the English press. And *The Dawn* has made good use of this tolerance to maintain professional integrity, a certain level of sobriety and to promote the discourse of dissent. *The Dawn* has not openly defied the establishment but more often than others voiced its dissenting views.

The daily has an estimated circulation of 100,000 copies.

Terminology

1. **Politics** in this study has been defined as those views and activities which are related to the central government, and national political parties. This definition excludes the role of Judiciary, civil and military bureaucracies, and local self government from the definition of politics. Arbitrary though it may seem, this definition has been adopted to narrow down and specify the research field.

2. **Religion and Ideology** have been viewed as interchangeable in our context. As religion is the basic determinant of the Two Nation theory, on the basis of which the Pakistan Movement was launched, it is the state ideology. Religion is considered relevant only so far as it impinges upon politics, as defined above.

3. **Politicization of Religion** refers to a historical process whereby religious leaders came into the thick of politics, and used

their religious status and learning to further political interests. This process added new political vocabulary to their religious idiom, e.g. the concept of nationalism, political parties, party manifestoes, electioneering etc.

4. **Religionization of Politics** is also a historical process whereby politicians, with modern education, and Western political style and idiom, found it imperative or expedient to use religious vocabulary, either to win over the ulama (as in last phase of the Pakistan Movement), or to preempt their offensive (Islamic Socialism is the case in point).

5. **Religious Leadership**, refers to those persons who have been trained and educated in theological disciplines, informally or in exclusive religious schools, and are now actively engaged in politics, either individually or through a political party/ group. They may also include those persons who did not receive theological education but form a part of those political parties or politically motivated groups which are led by 'religious leadership'.

Unlike the ulama the spiritual leaders (Pirs) have almost always been active in Pakistani politics. Almost all of them are big land owners, and their spiritual ancestry is only an instrument to perpetuate and legitimize their high social and economic status. With a few exceptions they have not been to religious schools (*madressa*), instead they received modern school education. Their

social conduct, political behavior, and economic interests are in harmony with that of the 'state class'. This category of the religious leadership, therefore, does not, as a whole, form part of the religious leadership, we have under reference. They will be taken into account only when they collide or coalesce with the ulama or actively support or oppose some measures related to religion in politics.

6. **Mass media** is a very vast term, but we have chosen a rather restricted register for them. Most conspicuously, television is not included here, mainly because it became available to a large population only in the late 1970s and through the 1980s (though it had been started in 1964 in Pakistan); secondly, it is still a state monopoly and fails to reflect political culture outside the official agenda.

Newspapers with nation wide circulation, both in Urdu and English, constitute the data base for the present research proposal. For this purpose two Urdu dailies, namely the *Jang* and the *Nawa-e-Waqt*, and two English dailies, namely *The Pakistan Times*, and *The Dawn*, will be analyzed.

Yet another limitation on the mass media will be that only those news items and editorials would be selected which are directly related to 'politics'. Those stories and articles which have only indirect political implications (writings on women,

education, morality, economy, etc.) are excluded, without denying their political significance.

7. Parasitic Landlordism: When we say that the cultural ethos of Pakistan is parasitic landlordism it does not mean that all the constituents of the ruling elite/ establishment are landlords; it only means that the cultural values evolved under the parasitic landlordism have permeated all segments of the establishment, and form the basis of their political and social behavior.

8. Establishment/ Ruling Elite: The words Establishment and the Ruling Elite have been used interchangeably. The establishment is a permanent fixture which embodies the cultural ethos of parasitic landlordism. One group of parasitic landlords or the military or the civil service may come to power and go, but the establishment stays. It refers to those values and forces (not individuals or groups) which have ruled the country without any let or hindrance. Collectively it refers to the landlords, the military, and the civil service who have ruled Pakistan since the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan's first Prime Minister.

Notes

1. The researcher was leading a team of under training government officers in 1984 which had a meeting with owner/ editor-in-chief Mir Khalilur Rahman of the Jang group, in Karachi. When explained that the team would like to know about the policy of the newspaper, he said, 'What policy? You tell me what should be the policy. You make the policy, we only follow it. There cannot be a policy? How there can be?' And then he made a long and a rather angry speech about the undemocratic and repressive policies of

the Bhutto regimes which had smothered freedom of press in Pakistan. He was not equally forthcoming about the Martial Law regime of that time.





CHAPTER 4

CHAPTER 4

ARRESTED MEDIA DISCOURSE IN THE IMMOBILITY SYNDROME

The previous chapter discussed how a sociological study of mass media in the backdrop of politics and religion, is, in essence, an undertaking to comprehend the cultural ethos of the given society. It has been seen why a proper study of the triangular relationship between the media, religion and politics needs to be placed in broad cultural-historical perspective. In this chapter we try to identify Pakistan's cultural ethos-- 'the distinctive habitual character and disposition of an individual, group or a system' (Chambers, and Oxford English Dictionaries)-- and see, in a broad cultural-historical perspective, how the "dual praxis" (Geertz, 1973:93) between society on the one hand, and media, religion and politics, as "culture patterns" (ibid) on the other, have been influencing one another.

Pakistani culture has its roots in the Indus Valley Civilization which flourished, about five thousand years ago, in

and around Harappa and Mohenjodaro, and extended far beyond the geographical frontiers of today's Pakistan: from the foothills of the Himalayas to Kathiawar, and from Quetta to Rajputana. At the same time, there are specific cultures of the various regions of Pakistan that present a picture of rich diversity. It is not without problems to speak of a culture of Pakistan in the singular. The contemporary cultural ethos of Pakistan society has been enriched by three known world religions-- Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam. Ethnically speaking the Dravidians, the Aryans, the Greeks, the Arabs, the Turks, and within the limits of their imperialist involvement the British, all contributed, in their own ways, to the growth and nourishment of this culture (S.Hasan, 1977:66; Jalibi, 1987:67-8; Dani, 1967:v.1:29; Encyclopedia Britannica, 1986(6)302; and (25)388).

The following seven approaches can be identified to the study of Pakistani culture, each influenced by its peculiar ethnic, religious, and/or political background.

1) The Islamist approach claims that Pakistan was created in the name of Islam, and the same should be the basis of its cultural identity; all that was before the dawn of Islam in this area is "Jahiliya" and should be disowned. Their definition of Pakistani culture is based, less on what it is, and more on what they think, it should be. All ideas and practices which are not compatible with Islam need to be discarded from the body politic of the Islamic

Republic. They want to disown the history and culture which existed before the inception of Islam in this area. They want to see Pakistani culture as a pure Islamic culture which has its roots in the history of Islam and owes nothing to the pre-Islamic period of the area. In recent times, this approach has been inspired primarily by Islamist scholars like Maulana Abul A'la Maudoodi, Amin Ahsan Islahi, Abul Hasan Ali Nadvi and elaborated by their followers and admirers like Naeem Siddiqui, Khursheed Ahmad, Maulana Salahuddin, Abdul Hamid Siddiqui et al.

This approach has been criticized for two reasons; one, for ignoring the day to day manifestations of pre-Islamic culture in the eating habits, dress, implements, architecture, wedding rituals etc. in today's Pakistan; two, that the Pakistani culture is dissimilar, in many ways, to the culture of any other Muslim/ Islamic society-- past or present. In the face of this dissimilarity in which mould are we going to cast our culture? And is it any way possible to cast a given culture into a ready made mould? The Islamists have replied that what has been accepted in ideas and practices from pre-Islamic era, and is not incompatible with the teachings of Islam, should be regarded as Islamic. In their views dance, music and sculpture and many aspects of modern media are unIslamic, and therefore need to be discouraged. They, however, have chosen to eschew a square explanation to the second objection.

The Islamist approach is relevant, even necessary, to any socio-political study of Pakistan. It is a perspective which helps in explaining the political history of the South Asian Muslims. As such it is more a subject of study than a tool of analysis. This approach is too broad to be used as a "sensitizing device" (Giddens, 1989).

2) The Two-Nation theory approach claims that the Pakistanis are the inheritors of the Indus Valley Civilization identified with Mohenjodaro and Harappa which has always been distinct from the Ganges Civilization, identified with Hinduism and inherited by India. Thereby they tend to exclude or at least down play the influence of Hinduism and assert their identity on the basis of a selective study of history which marginalizes the birth of Hinduism in this area. They want to disown every thought and practice which has its origins in India. They plead that Pakistan has been created on the basis of two-nation theory and this should be the criterion of our view of history and culture.

These theorists are mostly from the Punjab, and are from amongst the so-called "sons of the soil". This view of culture has serious repercussions in the civil and military bureaucracy, and the politics of the country. This theory gained currency particularly after the separation of East Pakistan in 1971, because earlier it was difficult to justify the inclusion of East Pakistan as part of the Indus Valley Civilization (S.Hasan, 1987:7-8).

Its exponents ignore the fact that Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam first flourished in this area and then spread southward. Their sanctification of geographical boundaries, of a country created on the basis of ideological (religious) identity, and which did not exist on the map of the world till 1947, goes a bit too far. Their view of knowledge and history puts pre-conceived notions of national interest above objectivity.

3) The Indo-Muslim Culture approach to the study of Pakistani culture is based on the view that Pakistan is the inheritor of the culture which evolved during one thousand years of the Muslim rule in India. This culture has Islam as its basis and accepts all those practices which have been adopted by the Muslims while living with the Hindu majority. Their view of Islam is based on the ways it is being lived by the Muslims of this land and not on the way it should be. They insist that Pakistani culture is not bound by its geographical frontiers which have been drawn only few decades ago. They say that states are created, expanded and contracted more frequently, and easily, while cultural ethos evolves over centuries and cannot be dictated by political expediencies. It is the cultural ethos of the given society which defines its political culture and not vice versa. They say that the culture which evolved during the Muslim rule and after, and whose manifestations we see in our language, literature, architecture and fine arts, whether, they are in Pakistan or in India, today, form an integral part of Pakistani culture: Taj Mahal and Mirza Ghalib are as much ours as

Badshahi Masjid and Allama Iqbal. The exponents of this theory are almost all from amongst those who migrated to Pakistan from Muslim minority areas in India, known as Mohajirs, and have a nostalgic feeling about their Indian past. Important writers among these theorists include Jamil Jalibi, Intizar Hussain, Nasir Kazmi, Waqar Azeem, and Ibadat Brelvi.

Apart from its flaws as a theory, its overt ethnic linkage is so obvious that its acceptance would amount to studying Pakistani culture from the Mohajir perspective. There would have been no harm even in that, provided the theory itself had been sound. With the creation of Pakistan the history of South Asian Muslims took an unprecedented new turn, which has brought new cultural adjustments in its wake. It is impossible to think that the creation of Pakistan is only a *political* event which does not affect 'Indo-Muslim culture'. Culture and politics have a continuous praxis, wherein it is not possible to determine what comes first in chronological terms. Culture determines politics, and politics influences culture: determining their order of precedence, at a theoretical level, is the egg and chicken question.

4) The Unitary approach is partially linked with the second and the third approach; and its exponents are found both among the "sons of the soil" and the Mohajirs (migrants from India). They see Islam and the Urdu language as the basis of Pakistani culture. Pakistanis are bound together by one religion (Islam), one language

(Urdu), and one culture (Pakistani). They own the "Indo-Muslim Culture" but only up to the time of Partition, before which all the South Asian Muslims were members of the same state. They ignore all regional cultures and languages in Pakistan, and hope they will be amalgamated them into one Pakistani culture.

These theorists support strong central government and have been more vocal and influential after the West Pakistan had been merged into One Unit and East and West Pakistan became two federating units of the Republic bound by one religion, one language, and one culture. This approach is variously depicted among writers like Maulavi Abdul Haq, Syed Abdullah, Ashfaq Ahmad, Mumtaz Mufti, Qudratullah Shahab, Hakim Saeed and Ghulam Hussain Zulfikar. (After the debacle of East Pakistan the emphasis shifted from religion and language to the Indus Valley Civilization approach).

Political expediency is so overt in this approach, if not the minds of the exponents certainly in the approach of its propagators, that it has to be considered with caution. It might merit serious academic consideration in on long term projection but has little practical relevance to the existing political reality. At present it is useful, as a subject, to understand the mind of the political elite of the country.

5) The Regional/ Ethnic approach to culture is that since Pakistan is a federal, multi-ethnic state its cultural identity should be based on the cultures of the four federating units and ethnicities. They say that the mosaic of regional ethnic languages and cultures makes up Pakistani culture. Without individual identity of regional/ ethnic cultures Pakistani culture is non-existent. They insist that regional identity supersedes national identity. Their logic is that the people of today's Pakistan have been Sindhis, Punjabis, Pakhtoons and Baluchis for the last about four thousand years, Muslims for the last one thousand years and Pakistanis since 1947 only. These theorists are supporters of a weak center and strong provinces. The exponents of the theory are regionalist and take pride in their own cultures, languages and social values.

This approach gained more appeal when in an attempt to thwart numerical superiority of East Pakistan in the federal legislature, it was decided to give equal representation to the the eastern and the western wings, and to achieve that four provinces in the western wing were clubbed into One Unit under the 1956 Constitution. Punjab being the only province to support the move, and whose numerical strength in the military and civil bureaucracy was to benefit most from the new arrangement became the target of criticism from the smaller provinces in the West Pakistan, and the East Pakistan. Strong feelings against the Federation developed during the One Unit period (1956-69), and culminated in the debacle

of East Pakistan in 1971. Some of the important leaders/ ideologues in this group include G.M. Syed, Ghulam Mustafa Shah, Sheikh Ayaz (Sindh); Altaf Hussain, M. Ali Siddiqui (Mohajir), Wali Khan, Ajmal Khatak, (Frontier Province), Akbar Bugti, Sher Muhammad Mari, (Baluchistan), Masood Khadarposh, and Taj Muhammad Langah (Punjab).

Most of these theorists ignore multi-ethnicity of their own provinces. The situation is particularly serious in Sindh where Mohajirs and Sindhis are struggling to survive at each other's expense. No two theorists in this group would agree on the number and composition of ethnic groups, but, altogether, there are nine ethnic groups in Pakistan-- Punjabi, Saraiky, and Potohary (in Punjab), Pakhtoon, and Hindko (in the Frontier Province), Sindhi, and Mohajir (in Sindh), Baluchi, Pakhtoon, and Brahvi (in Baluchistan).

The theory lacks uniformity in outlook as it is the product of conflicting regional ethnic interests. It does not help study Pakistan as a nation state. It, nevertheless, brings out the precariousness of Pakistan's federal structure.

6) **The Marxist approach** neither accepts the State nor its federating units as the basis of cultural identity. They also reject Islam as the basis of culture. They want to study Pakistani culture on the basis of its class structure: the culture of haves and have nots. They allege that both the centrists and the

regionalist are promoting the culture of upper classes at the expense of the dominated classes. They allude to the fact that the leading champions of the strong center, and the advocates of more provincial autonomy are big landlords; they stand for a strong center when in power and lend support to regionalists when out of power. The latest version of this approach is the dependency theory which sees the upper classes as the agents of the metropolitan capitalism and the dominated classes as its victims. Some of the more prominent Pakistani ideologues of this approach are Faiz Ahmad Faiz, Muhammad Ali Siddiqui, Hasan Gardezi, Abdullah Malik, C.R. Aslam, Major Ishaq, Mutalabi Faridabadi, Shaukat Siddiqui, and Salahuddin Haider.

This approach provides some useful tools of analysis in its study of class structure, and the 'colonial factor' (Gardezi, 1991:4) in Pakistan's political-economy, but its anti-religious stance does not enable us to study Islam as a positive force behind Pakistani nationalism, and its current political discourse. Its cynical approach to religion, however, helps in understanding how the ruling elite has been exploiting Islam to perpetuate its rule.

This approach has never been popular with the establishment nor among the masses. Socialist forces were most effectively harnessed by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, only to be incarcerated after his coming to power.

7) The Global Society approach subscribes to Modernism and 'Global Village' theory and sees a global culture of science and technology binding the whole world into one culture. This 'brave new world' renders all regional and national cultures only marginally relevant. Under the impact of industrialism and mass consumption cultural diversity is being replaced by uniformity. The articles of daily use (clothes, foods, household and office gadgetry), the agricultural implements and inputs (chemical fertilizers, seeds, watering and harvesting devices), the patterns of work (routines in offices, schools, assembly plants, and large bureaucratic organizations), the means of transportation and communication (automobiles, aeroplanes, telephones, print and visual mass media), the means and ways of entertainment (upbeat music, films, dramas, sports), and finally the globalization of knowledge, all point to the same direction of universal uniformity. The more important among its exponents are Farman Fatehpuri, Sibte Hasan, A.B. Ashraf Muhammad Ali Siddiqui, and Saleem Akhtar.

These theorists do not represent any particular ethnic or ideological group, in Pakistan, nor do they have any overt political motives. They are not very influential politically but generally tend to identify themselves with progressive and modernist forces.

This approach does not help in the study of a particular national or ethnic culture. Its global outlook is at the expense of

specificity. It is futuristic in nature. It does not address the question of imbalance in the production and dissemination of global culture and economy. It ignores the 'colonial factor' (Gardezi, 1991:4) in the making of today's Third World societies.

A Critique of Cultural Approaches

These approaches are not adequate to identify Pakistan's cultural ethos and attempt its sociological analysis with reference to its politics, religion and mass media for the following reasons:

1) Most of these approaches have been propounded to achieve a particular political objective, and not to analyze Pakistani culture as such. Some of them have come up only as a reaction to the given political situation, and can not be taken seriously as tools of impartial social analysis.

2) Except for the Marxists, Islamists and the Global Society theorists, all others delineate Pakistani culture from an ethnic point of view, and then try to apply it to the whole country.

3) At the same time they are not of much help in analyzing social and political power structure of Pakistan, which is the focus of our study.

4) Some of these approaches ignore geography, while others do away with history. We need an approach which can balance the two.

PARASITIC LANDLORDISM¹: PAKISTAN'S CULTURAL ETHOS

A jocular expression goes: 'Pakistani culture is agriculture'; taking it a little more seriously in the post-modernist fashion of 'juxtaposition of diverse images' (A. Ahmed, 1992:25)², we can ascertain how Pakistan's agrarian economy and land relations have determined its social structure, political power distribution, the space and the role of religion, and the *arrested flow* of the mass media discourse. A careful analysis of 'agricultural culture' would reveal the nature and methods of the *immobility syndrome* of the Pakistani polity.

An old Hindi saying that 'farming is the best, business is next and service is the worst'³ reveals how intimately the people of South Asia⁴ have been attached to the land. Legally speaking, the land remained property of the state under the Mughal rule, but it was only the big title holder (*mansabdar*) who was affected by this law. The farmers lived on the same tract of land, as a *baradari* (patrilineage or brotherhood) for centuries. These brotherhoods lived in 'self-sufficient villages' with their own group of menial workers, artisans, and entertainers, collectively known as *kamins*. Since land was not a commodity to be sold, mortgaged, or exchanged, it did not matter much to the farmer, to

whom the land belonged-- state or the title holder, so long as he was the cultivator and lived on it (Gardezi, 1991:44-46; Encyclopedia Britannica, 1986(25):382, 386; Thorburn, 1971:229). The brotherhood, therefore, had a sense of land proprietary derived from their prolonged stay on it and its cultivation, though not from legal ownership. The brotherhoods were very rarely evicted from *their* lands. Migration took place, mostly because of natural disasters, like drought, and sometime for security reasons. The Settlement Policy of the British undermined "the self-sufficient village system" of the Punjab (Gardezi, 1991:46).

Social organization revolved (and still does) around brotherhood rather than caste. Marriages take place within the brotherhood, preferably with father's brother's daughter. The lineage elders constitute a council that adjudicates disputes within the brotherhood and acts on their behalf with the outside world-- for example, in determining electoral alliances (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1986(25):386).

This centuries old land relations and social organization determined the people's attitude toward state and society. The Hindi saying quoted above encapsulates this psychological make up. Farming is the best because it is permanent, involves minimal risk, and is a perpetual source of security and pride. It is the land which constitutes one's individual and collective identity-- the roots. Commerce and service uproots a man, he loses his identity;

he has no point of reference on the earth. Commercial profit and official status are all ephemeral, land is eternal.

Penetration of the capitalist mode of production, and direct imperialist rule in South Asia, disrupted the historical process, uprooted the socio-economic structure, and eliminated the political system to an unprecedented level. The colonizers created new land relations and through this a new class of land owners, who owed their existence and well being to the new dispensers. They introduced new political, administrative and security systems attuned to imperialist objectives of ensuring the supply of cheap raw material for industrial centers in England, and to keep the colonies open for the finished products from the industrial centers. The system worked efficiently to achieve the imperialist goals, but lost its relevance and efficiency after political independence. It found itself in conflict with the democratic aspirations of the new state. The conflict worsened when the new state found the old system well entrenched among the landlords, civil bureaucracy, and the military. Democratic aspirations, search for economic progress, and the quest for new identity confronted the biggest challenge from the colonial outposts within the new state. This conflict is the hallmark of Pakistani polity (Gardezi, 1991:23-30; Ramay, n.d.:9-10).

The thesis for this chapter is that in Pakistan we have been trying to foist democracy on a socio-economic structure evolved to

promote and protect British imperialism, through 'parasitic landlordism' (Moore, 1967:316), the civil bureaucracy, and the military. The land relations, administration, and security arrangements remain, by and large, unchanged, and have been playing the game of the world capitalism for their survival and prosperity. The triumvirate has gradually enhanced mutual cooperation to protect their class interests against democratic aspirations of the people, which can be actualized only at the expense of the ruling elite.

The cultural ethos of Pakistan is parasitic landlordism, created by the Britishers under the Permanent Settlement, starting from 1793 which grew from the grant of ownership rights to the "loyal subjects" (Thorburn, 1904), or the "collaborators" (Moore, 1967:346) who "maintained custodial armed detachments on behalf of the colonial authorities... and who in some instances were ruthless enough to indenture masses of laborers to dig a canal or build a strategic road" (Gardezi, 1991:24-25). The landlords constitute the political front, with military and civil bureaucracy moving into the background or coming to the fore as required by political expediency. To ward off democratic forces the landlords have sought to fortify their position with the help of the military, the civil bureaucracy, and the traditionalist Ulama. In the process the main stream mass media has played the role of a spectator or at best a well wisher critic.

On the surface, Pakistan appears to be a very unstable country. In just forty-seven years, there have been three military dictators, twelve Prime Ministers (four in 1993 alone), three wars, six constitutions (three permanent, three interim), four major and numerous localized uprisings, and breaking away from the federation of the more populous half of the country. Given so remarkable a record of instability, one would imagine Pakistan to be a rapidly changing society; quite the opposite. Pakistan has combined an extremely unstable superstructure of government and politics with a highly stable infrastructure of power, property, elite privileges, and external dependency. For example, military dictators and parliamentary governments have had identical policies toward the large landowners of Pakistan. Three land reforms introduced by military and civil governments have proved less than token in practice. No government has imposed agricultural income tax in this largely agrarian economy. State power in Pakistan has been rigged in favor of the elite classes who alone enjoy access to it. It is thus that some 6-7% of the population owns an estimated 80% of the nation's wealth, and 10% consume no less than 70% of its resources (E.Ahmad, 1990:11-12).

In the power structure of Pakistan, the landlords, the military, and the civil bureaucracy, constitute the ruling elite. Together with the traditionalist Ulama and the rural Imams they make up the forces of status quo. The Ulama are brought in occasionally only to give an aura of religious sanctity when there

is need to justify the ways of the elite. The relationship between the elite and the Ulama is not one of harmony; they often collide, especially on questions of modernization, but do make a common cause against any structural change. They want to keep the patterns of land relations, politics and culture unchanged.

The nascent industrialist class, merchants, professionals, and Islamist Revivalists are regarded as the latent forces of change. They are not actively engaged in a struggle for change, in fact, their interests are well served if they get a bigger share in the existing system. The industrialists, the traders, (whom Garzedi (1991:52) calls the bazaar bourgeoisie) and the professionals are dependent on the ruling elite for their survival and prosperity. They are modern educated and urban based. Together they constitute the middle class, which has a sense of distrust and insecurity vis-a-vis the tax collectors, and the administrators. The Islamists are modern educated, urban dwellers, mostly from the lower middle class who have been left out of power. They preach Islamic revolution but often end up making compromises with the elite. The forces of change are so weak, and the power of the ruling elite so overwhelming that instead of striving for change they look up to the elite for survival and protection. They are latent and contained, not active and effective forces of change.

The Intellectuals and the mass media are viewed as free floaters; they look upto the forces of status quo for survival and

prosperity, and subscribe to the ideals of the agents of change to show their desire for change. They support modernization, democracy, social justice, rule of law, land reforms etc. but few dare express their views in a manner which offends the ruling elite.

Subscription to Islamic ideology is the common feature among the three categories, which they need to establish discourse with the masses, and thereby seek legitimacy (See figure 2).





Figure 2

A: THE FORCES OF STATUS QUO

1. The Making of the Landlords

i. **The Mughal Agrarian Bureaucracy:** In the pre-Muslim⁵ India (A.D.300-1200), administration and revenue collection was decentralized, which developed a feudatory pattern, termed as Indian feudalism by many. Although the system was not identical to classical feudalism in the western Europe, it had a number of similarities to justify the use of the term. Even in this period land was not a commodity to be bought and sold on the market, or used otherwise for private gain. The Muslim conquerors established an agrarian bureaucracy or an Asian version of royal absolutism (Moore, 1967:315). A system of large scale cash payments was introduced, which loosened the direct control of the landed intermediaries over the peasants. The Mughals, introduced measures to prevent their official aristocracy from developing strong property rights in land. It was the British land settlement which gave strong property rights to the landlord, and transformed land into a commodity. The Mughal '*mansabdar's*' (title holder)

appropriation of revenue was only in lieu of the services rendered to the court, and not as a right of land ownership. At death his property reverted to the state and his descendants had no hereditary right in it. The '*mansabdars*' were also transferred periodically to different administrative districts and connected

'jagirs' (land grant) to weaken their ties with the land and its cultivators. Unlike the European feudal lords the Mughal 'mansabdar' did not live on his jagir, nor could he develop a strong local power base, which could ensure him a measure of autonomy from the central authority. He was typically an absentee who had maximum interest in appropriating the revenue but neither cultivated the land nor lived on it. In a few select features they did resemble the European lords, such as the obligation of 'mansabdars' to provide military contingents at the time of war (Sharma, 1965; Encyclopedia Britannica, 1986 (21):48-9; Gardezi, 1991:39-45).

This system was 'rational' in the Weberian sense, which worked very efficiently when the Sultanate and the Mughal Empire were at their zenith. Its weaknesses emerged with the decline of the empire, and the rulers were not far sighted enough to modify it. As early as the seventeenth century Auregzeb, the last Great Mughal Emperor wrote "this system is advantageous no doubt, but can we deny its injustice and cruelty?" (quoted by Moore, 1967:323). This system had a sovereign who ruled, an army which supported the throne, and a peasantry which paid for both (Moreland, quoted by Moore, 1967:317). Under this 'predatory system' the *mansabdars* did not have any permanent interest in the land, they paid little attention to its improvement or increase in land revenue, on long term basis. Their only interest was maximization of revenue, in the shortest period of time with minimum expenditure. This led to

economic decline and ultimately the fall of the Mughal Empire (S. Hasan, 1977:281-90; Moore, 1967:327).

ii. **Permanent Settlement and Land Alienation:** Prior to the introduction of "Permanent Settlement" in Bengal by Lord Cornwallis, in 1793, the *zamindar* (landlord) was a tax collector; his money proceeds were not referred to as 'rent' but as '*jamias*' (collection). The Settlement Act and subsequent regulations transformed the zamindars into a class of private land owners, and the land into commodity which could be bought, sold, mortgaged and sublet. This had far-reaching political, social and economic consequences. It created innumerable hardships for the peasantry as well as for the *zamindars* who failed to raise the fixed revenues (Gardezi, 1991:44-45). It started a whole process of rural change, which intensified the problem of 'parasitic landlordism'. After the Settlement 'the foreign conqueror, the landlord, and the money lender absorbed and dissipated the economic surplus. Hence economic stagnation continued through out the British era and indeed into the present day (Moore, 1967:344).

S.S. Thorburn (1971:229) a colonial administrator in the Punjab says, before the settlement in the Punjab "the village community, not the individual was the occupying unit. In Hindu and Mughal times the state had been the universal overlord, and appropriated all the profits of cultivation. In our turn we reestablished the old view of state rights in land, limited our

demand to the estimated value of an average crop, and exacted payment on fixed dates, whether the yield had been good, bad, or nothing".

The British pitched the assessments too high and turned out those landlords who failed to bring in the revenue. As a result many *zamindars* (landholders) lost their lands to be replaced by the 'collaborators'. 'The new landlords were a storm anchor for the British power'. The Imperialist authority rested heavily on the landed upper class. The native bourgeoisie, especially the manufacturer, felt cramped by the British policy (Moore, 1967: 316, 346).

The present day landlords of Pakistan were created by the British colonial policy and administration in essentially four ways: a) grant of land titles as a reward for military assistance to the East India Company during the 1857 revolt, b) awards of land titles to heads of the prominent lineage groups, c) awards of land titles to individuals who were ruthless enough to use their kinship and other connections to round-up large bodies of laborers to work on irrigation canals and other public work projects, d) accumulation of private land holdings by individuals through a combination of the use of the usurer's capital and manipulation of the colonial civil courts to acquire the lands of proprietor-cultivators who fell in heavy debt (Gardezi, 1991:46).

The landlords, collectively known as the *zamindars* in Punjab, the *waderas* in Sindh, the *Khans* in Sarhad and the *Sardars* in Baluchistan have historically shared a similar parasitic function in the political economy of the region which has a distinct feudal imprint. Following the example of the colonial state, whose creation they were, in the first instance, they contented themselves with the position of collectors of fixed rent. Not required to cultivate their land by necessity of their livelihood, they were not interested even in exercising managerial functions over their land; not to speak of entrepreneurial function of capitalist farming by reinvesting some of their money proceeds back into improved production. The foreign rulers not only guaranteed their property rights but showered them with honorary military ranks, colors of regiments and imperial titles. They took to a life of absentee landlordism with no productive function in the economic life of the community (Gardezi, 1991:46-47). This characteristic has been acquired by other members of Pakistan's ruling elite.

iii. Reading the Parasite's Mind: Apart from the changes brought about by the Settlement and the subsequent developments in the socio-economic and political structure, it wrought some equally significant changes in the minds of the newly created big land owners. Three things are important here, one they were new-- the collaborators-- and two, for the first time this class got the inalienable legal right of land ownership, three, land became a commodity. Ownership and commodification of land made 'parasitic

landlordism' what it is today-- a retrogressive monolithic structure, which has chained a nation in the immobility syndrome.

The social psychology of the Parasitic mind resulting from the land ownership and land commodification can be studied with reference to the following indicators: politics, land, education, religion, work ethics. We give a brief explanation of these indicators, not based on empirical research (because there is none), but on the basis of historical and sociological evidence which can be borne out from a study of Pakistani literature, folk tales, politics, religion and mass media.

i. **Politics:** Landlords view politics as a way of receiving favors in exchange for offerings of allegiance to the government and tribute to its officers. They are sensitive to their immediate interests as they perceive them, but they are not disposed to concern themselves with the larger issues of public policy. They contest elections as a new and approved way of conducting factional conflicts. Their dominance in their area has been confirmed through a modern agency. They have become part of the governmental system and thus obtained a new standing from which to demand favors (Syed, 1992:9).

Their attitude toward politics is that of an absolute ruler; the ruler is the owner of the land, and the owner is to be the ruler of the realm, the two have always been the same in the Indian

history. Politics (wielding power) is the prerogative of the land owners. The fall of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1993 can be attributed, to a very great extent, to the fact that the landlords never accepted him as a leader because he did not hail from the landed aristocracy. The politics and discourse of Z.A. Bhutto can be understood better from this perspective. Khalid B. Sayeed, Shahid J. Burki, Lawrence Ziring and many Pakistani commentators relate Bhutto's political style to his feudal ethos. We see this ethos of Bhutto at work when we turn to his dispositions and practices related to his pursuit of personal power. His tolerance of factionalism within his own party, intolerance of criticism, arbitrariness, harassment of opponents, and the expedient shifting of alliances are easily understood in the feudal context. It would even explain his neglect of institutions. The feudal disposition prefers force, because reasoning together is not only slow and tiring, it implies equality of status among the participants (Syed, 1992: 258). His "feudal arrogance" was his tragic flaw; he could not play politics with Ziaul Haq, because it was too much for him to accept his hand picked 'simple soldier', who did not belong to the landed aristocracy, as the most powerful man. The difficulties faced by the first Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan stemmed from the same source. Although he was a landlord but at Partition his land was left in India, hence his claim to leadership in Pakistan was dubious in the eyes of the native landlords. They accepted Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, with lot of reluctance, because he was from a business community, and did not belong to the areas which

were to constitute Pakistan. In fact Jinnah's only supporters in the Punjab proved to be a handful of urban-based men, most of them opposed to the landlords, and with no landholding worth the name. Fazl-i-Husain and Sikander Hayat Khan, two big landlords of Punjab and the linchpins of the pro-British Unionist Party, warned Jinnah, in the thirties, to 'keep his finger out of the Punjab pie'. And finally in 1947 the League's success in the Punjab owed much, perhaps all, to the decision of the landlords to switch allegiance from the Unionist Party to the Muslim League (Jalal, 1985:21, 144).

The modernist Muslims led and articulated by the Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah and Allama Iqbal, found it impossible to affect a change in the Muslim politics without eliciting support from the landlords. Iqbal, the idealist was not ready to compromise with the landlords, whose loyalty to the Raj was above every other political consideration, but Jinnah the pragmatic politician was quick to realize that he would have to enter into a compromise with the landlords, so as to add weight to his claim that he and the Muslim League represented the Indian Muslims at All-India level. Iqbal was convinced that the League would now have to decide 'whether it will remain a body representing the upper classes of Indian Muslims or the Muslim masses who have so far, with good reason, taken no interest in it'. The real issue as Iqbal saw it, was: 'how ... to solve the problem of Muslim poverty? And the whole future of the League depends on the League's activity to solve the question.' The 'only way to solve the problem of bread for Muslims' was to enforce

the 'Law of Islam' (Jalal, 1985:42). Iqbal's reservations and protest notwithstanding Jinnah went ahead to forge a loose alliance with the landlords in Punjab.

The Muslim League could not even begin to set up a plausible facsimile of a social program to eradicate Muslim poverty since such support as it possessed came from vested landed and business interests at the apex of society (Jalal, 1985:43). To get the Muslim masses involved, the League had to resort to Islam as a slogan, without delineating it as a socio-political system, or incorporating it as such in its manifesto. This, along with a number of other factors-- Jinnah's charisma, integrity, eloquence and political acumen being on top-- soon made him 'the sole spokesman' of the Indian Muslims, and the League a mass political party. Since the landlords, the most formidable political force in the area, remained loyal to their British benefactors to the last moment, and continued to resist the League's penetration into their domains, left the organization of the League very weak. Jinnah's nimble hands were able to weave diverse political interests of the Muslim masses, the landlords, the regionalists, and religious sensibility into one texture, without bringing about a genuine reconciliation.

It is only natural that the politics of landlords would be conservative. And **Conservatism**, as we know in Pakistan, is the product of fear, the product of the dangerous changes necessitated

by recognition of the failure of one ideal and its replacement by a newer reality, that they fear (Susman, 1984:72). 'It is the creed of those who believe in the value of conserving the present order as much as possible... It is not so much a political proposal as an attitude toward political proposals (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1986:3:554). This is the attitude, shared by all segments of the ruling elite, which has perpetrated an **immobility syndrome** on Pakistan.

Whatever the government, civil or military, it consists of the same people; no matter how many time elections are held members of the same families are returned. The reason is that they virtually own the constituencies. It is only in the 32% urban areas where new faces are introduced in almost every next election, the 68% rural areas see no change⁶.

ii. **Land:** In the Urdu language there is one word-- *zemin*-- both for land and the earth; at the subconscious level the owner of a piece of land happens to assume the ownership of the earth: the king was the owner of the land, thereby the ruler of the realm and thereby the shadow of God. The concept of land ownership, nurtured through the history, is in absolute terms: the landowner assumes proprietary rights over everything on his land-- the crops, the water, the minerals, and the people who live on it. Intervention in any of these areas has been resisted and resented.

iii. **Authority:** The Parasitic Landlord's attitude towards authority should be explained at two levels-- attitude towards those who are superior in authority, and toward those who are inferior in authority. 'Superior in authority' means the state authority exercised by the state functionaries, and the authority of more powerful landlords. 'Inferior in authority' means all those whose coercive power is inferior to that of the given landlord.

Landlords are in awe of superior force and contemptuous of its lack. In factional conflict they make alliances and seek the patronage of a higher authority, the overlord of all factions, be it a king or, closer to our own time, the men who control the central and provincial governments. But their alliances and allegiance are transient, shifting from one overlord to another as their power and authority appear to be ascendant or declining (Syed, 1992:9).

The level and nature of relationship between the landlord and bureaucracy, particularly district administration, can make or mar a landlord. Government functionaries can enlarge or limit, within the law or outside it, the individual landlord's access to irrigation water, credits, arms licenses, appointive or elective offices. They may side with him or against him in his disputes with other landlords. Above all, they may open or close his access to themselves. His power and prestige will diminish if it becomes known that he no longer has the ear of the civil and police

officials in his area (Syed, 1992:8).

By and large these landlords fall into the category of the Authoritarian Personality⁷. Their attitude toward the superior-in-authority' can be categorized as 'authoritarian submission', and toward the 'inferior in authority as 'authoritarian aggression'. **Authoritarian submission** is a submissive, uncritical attitude towards the idealized moral authorities of the group with which he identifies himself. **Authoritarian aggression** is a tendency to be on the look-out for and to condemn, reject and punish people who violate conventional values. As a consequence they become 'anti-intracception' i.e. opposition to the subjective, the imaginative and the tender-minded (Dixon, 1976:258). This psychological makeup produces submission to the authority of the in-group, and arouses aggression on to an out-group. By these means 'the status-keepers'⁸ achieve their goal, for the relativity of status depends upon the existence of an underprivileged out-group (Dixon, 1976:260).

This helps explain their abject servility to the British Colonial authority, their opposition to the spread of literacy, their indifference to the liberation movement, the Pakistan Movement and their uneasiness with the leadership of M.A.Jinnah⁹ (See Jalal 1979:82-125, and Anjum, n.d. pp 21-27). After the independence, they remained reluctant to submit to the authority of the new state, until they succeeded in assuming control of its leadership.

iv. Education and Knowledge: One fact which is obvious even to a casual visitor to Pakistan is its low literacy rate, which stands at 26%, and is lower than in Bangladesh (33%), Sri Lanka (86%) and India (41%); it is only higher than Nepal (21%), and Bhutan (18%), in the region; if that is any consolation¹⁰. How strongly the landlords have resisted the opening of educational institutions in and around their lands is documented in a number of reports in the Departments of Education, and the Offices of District Administration¹¹. It is an obvious fact that the bigger the land holdings, the lower the literacy rate. Literacy rate is the lowest in the Saraiky areas of Punjab, interior Sindh, and Baluchistan, which are dominated by the landlords. Literacy rate is the highest in Karachi, where landlords are non-existent. In their scheme of things knowledge is dangerous, because it is likely to tell the student that the landlord is not the lord of the realm. They receive education for themselves in exclusive elitist schools, which is more an exercise in socialization among the rich than a quest for knowledge: a Bhutto, a Daultana, or a Wazir Agha are among the exceptions.

v. Religion: Landlords' attitude towards religion is closely linked with their attitude towards politics, and education. Since the landlord does not countenance the autonomy of any private or state agency on the land he owns, he tries to minimize the interference of state authority, religious dissemination and education on his estate. The interference of state authority is

minimized through socialization with civil servants particularly at the district level, through bribing and sending them gifts, and if required, through intimidation of state functionaries.

Religion like state provides security to the landlords upto a point beyond which the landlord would resist religious penetration. The religious leaders, known as *Maulvi* or *Imam*, preach good morals and a pre-deterministic view of life in the areas dominated by the landlords. Unlike his urban counterparts, the rural Mullah does not dare question the given set up. The *Maulvi* is, generally, landless and lives off the dole and largesse from the land owners. In the areas dominated by the landlords of spiritual lineage (*Sajadanashins*) saint worship is widely practiced, and the donations received from the 'followers' of the saint (*mureeds*) constitute a major source of income for the *sajadanashin*. They discourage any serious pursuit of religious scholarship, and themselves assume religious authority.

vi. **Work:** The amount of work one needs to, or does not need to do for a living, is a determinant of social status. The more one works with one's own hands the lower the status, and vice versa. The most desirable form of work is supervision-- overlordship. This attitude has permeated all strata of the society. Income and status are not to be attained by hard work, that is the way of the have nots. Trading and industry are held in contempt among the landlords, big and small, because they have to work for it: Jinnah,

and Nawaz Sherif are two cases in point. Every government servant, civil or military, wants the lower in rank to work for him. Depending on rank every civil and military officer has one or more personal servants, paid for by the government.

There is a whole class of people, men and women, boys and girls, who do not work at all. They do not do their own laundry, cook, or clean, do not make their beds, do not even wash themselves¹². Their schools bags, office files, bats and balls, even guns for personal security are to be carried by someone else. The wealthy American and European works very hard at becoming and remaining rich. They put in time, labor, and effort at exploiting others, and at accumulating surpluses. Here, the surplus seems to get accumulated for them. The people produce the surplus; the state accumulates it; and the elite consume it (E.Ahmed, 1990:15).

2. The Military: From Subordination To Authoritarian Clientelism

Pakistan had been created as a result of political struggle, in which the military had no role to play. At the time of independence, says the first military ruler of Pakistan, the Pakistan Army 'inherited a great tradition of loyalty, patriotism and complete subordination to civil authority' (A.Khan:1967). Yet this 'great tradition' did not deter General Muhammad Ayub Khan from staging the first military coup, banning political activity, banishing politicians, and running the country like a military cantonment, for over ten years. Despite the fact that 'Hindus and

Muslims in the officers corps remained remarkably free of pro or anti Pakistan sentiments' (Cohen, 1987), Pakistan has seen military or quasi-military rule for twenty five years since 1947, and today it is the strongest power broker in the country.

The long rule of the military and its position as the strongest power broker indicates both that the armed forces have attained an entrenched position in the political structure of the country, and that it has been exceptionally difficult to combine this position with the recognition of civilian political forces within the generally acceptable constitutional structure (Rizvi, 1985:201). This recognition has always come from the 'parasitic landlords', who have never been out of power. As a witty landlord put it: It is unfair to accuse us of changing political loyalties; our party is the party in power, and we have always been loyal to it.

This relationship has promoted 'authoritarian clientelism' in Pakistani politics. In authoritarian clientelism 'the institutionalization of a military regime depends on its capacity to acquire civilian allies who are willing to accept subordination to military leadership in exchange for some share in running the state and especially some share in the benefits which it provides. The essential element in the transaction is the military's capacity to attract subordinates who are on the one hand sufficiently influential to make their support worth having, and on the other

insufficiently strong and independent to threaten the military itself' (Calpham, 1985:12-13). The rise and fall of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and Mian Nawaz Sharif can be better analyzed in this perspective.

Military rule in Pakistan has been a joint enterprise of the feudal-bureaucratic-military oligarchy. There are many pointers to this partnership: (i) All coups d'etat in Pakistan were encouraged and supported by prominent representatives and significant portions of the bureaucratic and feudal-political elite. (ii) Many prominent politicians, including Z.A.Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, owed their political careers to martial law regimes. (iii) The programs, structures, and splits of most political parties have been defined by their collaboration with military governments... In other words, in matters of personnel and policy, continuity not change has been the characteristic feature of the transitions from democracy to dictatorship and vice versa (E. Ahmad, 1990:9).

Aysha Jalal (1990) Gowher Rizvi (1985) and Eqbal Ahmad (1990) have argued that military interventions have been precipitated not by a failure of parliamentary democracy, as generally argued, but the desire of civil-military elites together with a faction of unrepresentative politicians (mostly landlords) to control decision making power. The military and bureaucracy railed and eventually broke down the political system to ward off challenges to which the state, dominated by these non-elected institutions, was still

vulnerable. It was in the first few years of Pakistan, when the state was being constructed, that the institutional balance of power shifted in favor of the military and the bureaucracy. Through skilful manipulation of international connections, military-bureaucratic dominance within the state structure had already been achieved by the time of the assassination of the first Prime Minister in 1951¹³. From then on positions within the non-elected institutions of the state, rather than bases of support in society, became the key to exercising political power in Pakistan.

The rules of the game were developed by the first military ruler General Ayub Khan, and have been followed by almost mechanical precision by his successors. Minor occasional splits within the triumvirate, notwithstanding, the ruling elite has shown a remarkable sense of unity and cohesion. Rizvi's explanation is: The military, the bureaucracy, and the unrepresentative politicians have one thing in common: the fear of the masses (1985:223). On the one hand this fear keeps them united, on the other, induces them to let more and more power groups benefit from the spoils, without letting them appropriate it. This carrot approach is used to bribe and divide the agents of change as they compete for bigger share. The elite's subscription to Islamic Ideology, also, stems from the same source, they talk of Islam when they need popular support to win a separate homeland, to fight a war (1948, 1965, 1971, and the proxy war in Afghanistan), to prolong a political agitation (PNA's Movement against the Bhutto regime) and, of course, to legitimize their own rule.

The growing strength of the army and the weakening of political parties has made the army the prime political force in the country. It can be said of Pakistan as it was of Bismarck's Prussia that it is a state within the army and not an army within the state. The struggle for power between the bureaucratic-military power elite and the feudal-political elite summarizes the history of the state. The outcome is that the feudal-political elite has agreed to a subservient role in the power-sharing arrangements (Burki & Baxter, 1991:73-74).

3. Civil Bureaucracy: A Differentiated Elite

F.W. Riggs (1964) while discussing the role of bureaucracy in developing societies argued that in transitional societies there exists an imbalance in political power between representative and bureaucratic institutions which favors bureaucracy; and that such bureaucratic power works against the development of representative institutions and leads to bureaucratic inefficiency and irresponsibility.

Riggs argues that the role of bureaucracy is determined by the nature of the political system. Dividing all political systems into two categories, balanced and unbalanced politics, Riggs observes that when a reasonable stable balance of power exists between a bureaucracy and the political system we may refer to the resultant form of government as a 'balanced polity'. An 'unbalanced polity' may be a party-run polity, or it may be a

bureaucratic polity dominated by its civil service. In a bureaucratic polity the bureaucracy tries to control the powers of the political system. In this type of system bureaucracy exercises the preponderant role in policy-making and in policy execution. Riggs observes that there exists in transitional societies an imbalance between "political policy-making institutions and bureaucratic policy-implementing structures," such an imbalance typically favors bureaucracy. The political function "tends to be appropriated, in considerable measure, by bureaucrats". Such regimes are "bureaucratic polities". The existence of a strong modern bureaucracy in a political system characterized by weak representative institutions hinders political development that in such a system bureaucracy cannot be effective and responsible, and that administrative reforms cannot be carried out (quoted by Chowdhry, 1988:210-211). The role of bureaucracy in Pakistan can be analyzed in this perspective.

The Civil Service of Pakistan is a legacy of the British Indian Civil Service. It not only inherited but also maintained the traditions and attitudes of its predecessor. The British system of administration was designed mainly to maintain law and order and to collect taxes from the people. The system depended heavily on Indian subordinates who collected taxes and maintained law and order, but the trust accorded to them was minimal. Another characteristic of the Indian Administrative Service was that it was a "self-regulating corps". The members of the Indian Civil Service were given the power to act as guardian, that is, to meet the needs

of the system without supervision. British officials did not fully trust their Indian subordinates and maintained close supervision over these officials. As a result, the pattern of authority developed in India differed fundamentally from that in England. A pervasive reliance upon threats and punishments impeded the "growth of identification of subordinate workers with the agencies of government" (Misra, 1977; Heginbotham, 1975:44).

Native civil servants were put through a process of cultural alienation. They were sent to exclusive academies in the subcontinent and in England, where instruction ranged from observance of British table manners and horse-riding to techniques of maintaining law and order. A basic mechanism of maintaining law and order was to impress upon the people that the higher administrator was a superior being. He not only knew the routine of his office, but was initiated into the folkways of the ruling aliens and was thus entitled to the same deference and respect. His psychic and cultural distance from the people was maintained by providing him with retinues of attendants dressed in courtly costumes of the Mughal kings. While the landed gentry and the professional classes were relatively free to maintain contact with the people, the senior administrators had few such opportunities. They were inbred in exclusive 'Civil Lines': colonies well removed from the fret and struggle of the common man's life. With rare exceptions the senior civil servants of Pakistan continue to maintain this life style (Gardezi, 1991:25).

There are occasional, and minor, exceptions to this rule. The bureaucracy, being more differentiated, has been regarded as the junior partner. It is also more the target of public discontent. As such, it has been the object of occasional escape goating. Dictatorships as well as civilian governments have, harassed it (E.Ahmad, 1990:11-12).

The level of administrative development in Pakistan has been quite high compared to its level of political development. Pakistan bureaucracy is over-developed compared to its political institutions. Representative institutions failed to impose adequate controls on the bureaucracy. As a consequence functions typically exercised by elected political elites tended to be monopolized by the bureaucracy. This was clearly apparent in the case of budget formulation. The weakness of the legislature also stemmed from the ineffectiveness of the electoral system, the weakness of political parties, and the absence of strong interest group organizations. Political parties failed to aggregate the interests of various groups. They also failed to educate the public on critical issues. Politics was focussed upon personalities rather than issues. Moreover, the legal system, yet another colonial legacy, gave enormous discretionary powers to the bureaucracy, to curb political activity. For example, Section 54 of the Criminal Procedure Code gave the district magistrate discretionary powers to control public meetings, and to confiscate leaflets or pamphlets which contained writings hostile to the government of the day. Finally, the advent

of the military in politics in 1958 reduced the power of politicians and increased the power of civil servants. Meanwhile, the absence of strong, effective interest organizations also increased the power of the bureaucracy. Business and industrial interest groups, in particular, failed to impose controls on the bureaucracy; rather, the bureaucracy has been able to control these groups in various ways (E.Ahmad, 1990; Chowdhry, 1988:212-216).

Recruitment into the bureaucracy and the officers' corps is relatively open. This openness helps to broaden their base of support, for they offer an entry point and the chances of social mobility to a few educated middle class youth. The phenomenon has so far cushioned both the army and the bureaucracy from becoming pointed target of public discontent. But it does not allay their conservative institutional commitments, authoritarian outlook, and callous disregard of public interest (E.Ahmad, 1990).

In today's Pakistan civil servants go through rigorous programs of training and probation, like their native predecessors during the Raj. The new recruits are socialized into the culture and ethos of their services, and of the Establishment as a whole. The socialization process has so far been remarkably successful, although it is noteworthy that among the few reformists of Pakistan, former bureaucrats of middle class background predominate-- a fact which suggests that a certain amount of differentiation in outlook and patterns of individual behavior

exists in the bureaucracy. While its institutional interests are entrenched, its ideological and political preferences might be more fluid (E.Ahmad, 1990).

4. The Traditionalist Ulama:¹⁴ Elite's Reserve Force

The study of Islam and the role of Ulama in the Muslim history of South Asia¹⁵ can be divided into three periods-- first, the **Classical period**, which terminated with the decline of the Mughal Empire, and is marked by the emergence of Shah Waliullah (1702-1762)-- a revivalist in the classical tradition of Ghazali and ibn Taymiya. In this period revival and reform in Islam, in India as elsewhere in the Muslim world, had been appearing as a recurring phenomenon, inspired by the internal dynamics of the Muslim society. Second, the **Modern period** marked by the penetration of the capitalist mode of production, starting with the fall of Bengal (1757), and culminating in the end Muslim rule (1857). This period evoked two different responses among the Indian Muslims--Liberal/Modernist response, with Syed Ahmed Khan, Amir Ali and, to some extent, Iqbal as its main exponents; the Traditionalist response, identified with the Ulama of Deoband, Ahle Hadith, Brelvi, and Nadwatul Ulama. Third, the **Post-Modernist period**, marked with the creation of Pakistan, and identified with a distinct intellectual movement, and political activism to create a "modern Islamic state". This is the phase which has been dubbed as the rise of 'fundamentalism'¹⁶ (the term has been used more for journalistic convenience than for its actual description, we would, instead, use

the terms Islamism-- referring to the fact that during this period Islam re-emerged as a self contained socio-political system, another 'ism' in the age of many 'isms'). We take up classical and modern periods in this section and discuss the post-modernist period separately.

Traditionally, the 'ulama', in Islamic history, have been the custodians and the interpreters of canon law and theology. They, thus as a general body, represented and voiced the Agreement (*ijma*) of the Muslim people, and that Agreement was the foundation of Islam. In consequence they came to have, in a wide and vague fashion, the ultimate decision on all questions of constitution, law and theology. Whatever the *de facto* government might be, they were a curb upon it, as a surviving expression of the Agreement and of the right of the Muslim people to govern themselves. In this capacity, most of them, came to occupy different official positions, or they shunned official status and kept the government in a certain awe, due to the respect they commanded among the people and scholars (Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam, by Gibb and Kramers).

The role of the ulama varies in nature and strength from one state to an other in the Muslim world (Kechichian, 1986:53). This variance is prominent in Pakistan for two reasons: one, unlike, the other Muslim empires, a vast majority of the subjects in the Mughal Empire was non Muslim; two the state, with few exceptions, did not

promote proselytization, nor claimed to be an Islamic polity (like the Ottomans, for example). The Hindus lived in the central parts of the Empire, and always maintained their numerical superiority in and around the capital city. The Muslims formed majority in the eastern and north-western peripheries (today's Bangladesh and Pakistan). Propagation of Islam was carried out by the Sufis, most of whom came to India in the wake of the Muslim conquests. The ulama did have some influence in the Mughal court but little on the people in the Muslim majority areas, which under the sway of the Sufis. Keeping in mind the historical divergence between the Ulama and the Sufis, coupled with religious and geographical divide in India, it is easy to understand why politico-religious discourse in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is not decisively influenced by the ulama.

Therefore, Pakistan in 1947, possessed little by way of first-rate intellectual productivity and much more of Sufi orders. Indeed, in the countryside of Pakistan-- and even in many of its towns orthodox learning become widespread only after independence. Perhaps this premodernist relative intellectual poverty in Pakistan largely explains its current situation in the field of general intellectual development, both religious and nonreligious (Rahman, 1984:45). This intellectual poverty has been perpetuated by the landlords, particularly those with spiritual lineage, and has become almost a state policy under the triumvirate elite.

The Sunni Ulama are universally regarded as subservient creatures of the government (Gibb, 1960). In the early centuries of Islam when the Ulama found it impossible to overthrow the *de facto* order they accorded it *de jure* recognition¹⁷. The Ulama have been used by the rulers to promote their imperial political interests. King Akbar who tried to amalgamate all existing religions and give his own version of a new religion, and King Aurengzeb who was a staunch Muslim and tried to implement Shariat Law in India, both, used the Ulama to strengthen their grip on power. Akbar used them to sanctify his multiple marriages, (with nine, mostly Hindu, women at a time) to declare himself 'the dispenser of justice', 'the master of time' (*Sahibuzman*), and the promised Messiah. He thereby qualified himself to be the founder of a new religion- 'Deen-e-Ilahi' which ultimately drove all those Ulama out who refused to follow the new religion or objected to the King's religious authority. King Auregzeb promoted the traditionalist Ulama and used their support to execute his brothers, who claimed their right to the throne (M. Ali, 1994).

The ulama were not as influential in the Mughal Empire as they were in the Ottoman, Abbaside, and Umayyad Empires, primarily because, unlike others the Mughal empire was not an Islamic empire. They gained more importance when the Empire started declining, and the ulama interpreted it as the consequence of weakness in faith. Shah Waliullah was the first revivalist whose teachings inspired, in later years, the spirit of *jihad* against non-Muslim rulers. A

number of other movements were launched in the leadership of the ulama, but none could achieve the aim of restoration of the Muslim rule¹⁸. They, nevertheless, sharpened religious identity of the Muslims. With aborted War of Independence (1857) the colonial grip became very strong. In the new legal, educational, political, and organizational setup the ulama had no place. They were thrown out of their jobs, lost prestige, and state patronage. They had no choice but to withdraw in sullen impotence against the heavy odds, and concentrate on learning in their seminaries. The new situation prompted two opposite responses from the Indian Muslims-- Traditionalist response from Deoband, Ahle Hadith, and Brelvis¹⁹ and Modernist response from Aligarh.

The mainstream of Waliullah's school came to be represented by the Deoband seminary (although Deoband proved to be much less broad and interpretive than Waliullah himself). The syllabus in Deoband was modelled on Waliullah's syllabus designed for '*Madrissa Rehimiya*', in the 18th century. It also followed the syllabus designed by Mullah Nizamuddin in the previous century, known as *dars-e-Nizami*. The subjects included grammar, rhetoric, Arabic, literature and language, Islamic History, Logic, Greek and Islamic Philosophy, Kalam (philosophy of theology) Greek medical science, Islamic Jurisprudence, Hadith, and Tafsir. Logic and philosophy were later dropped. The study of modern disciplines, European languages, or the contemporary state of Islamic and Greek sciences was conspicuously left out (M. Ali, 1994; Jalibi, 1987).

Deoband followed the medieval Muslim concept of knowledge, which according to Gibb was not a reaching-out to the unknown but a mechanical process of amassing the 'known'. The known was not conceived of as changing and expanding but as 'given' and eternal. And according to Fazlur Rahman medieval Islamic scholarship was not 'regarded as an active pursuit, a creative "reaching-out" of the mind to the unknown-- as is the case today - but rather as the passive acquisition of already established knowledge'. This way of describing knowledge links up with the unchangingness of human life (quoted by Watt, 1989:14).

According to the Deoband movement, the primary cause of the decline and fall of Mughal empire was their lack of devotion to their religion. In brief Allah had abandoned them because they had abandoned Islam. This diagnosis suggested the obvious prescription of following the teachings of Islam more strictly and preserving their faith and social order against the British and Hindu encroachments. For effective administration of this prescription the precautions included total abstinence from the English language, English (*farangi*) ideas, dress, food, knives and forks and the use of chairs and tables; in later days all means of mass communication were to be viewed as proliferation of the same evil. Mufti Muhammad Shafi an excellent scholar and a brilliant theologian of the Deoband school said "The use of loudspeaker during *Namaz* is not proper. It should be avoided. The way of the Sunnah is the most propitious and without evil whereby the voice of

the leader of the prayer is repeated by a number of successive human voices within audible distances from each other so as to reach the large congregation. This is the practice to be followed" (quoted by Jalibi 1987:182-83). For the traditionalists, it seems, the West does not exist except as an evil, human thought has not developed since Ghazali, and the evolution of species is a lie²⁰. As 'Muhammad Arkoun indicated, they know of no philosophy since Averroes, and are completely unaware of the new challenges to religious belief produced by men like Hume and Feuerbach, not to mention our twentieth-century philosophers' (Watt, 1989:5).

In short this was the escapist reaction of a siege mentality whereby the Traditionalists wanted the Muslims to opt out of the new political and educational system and remain ignorant of new social scientific ideas coming from the West, because they were evil. This siege mentality developed after the Muslims had failed to throw out the British in armed struggles. Despite all the good intention and hard work this movement could not give new ideas to cope with the new situation (Jalibi, 1987:145-46).

The ulama gradually lost prestige and socio-political relevance. 'The loss of power by the ulama, in the field of education, has been spectacular. Everywhere, except perhaps in Saudi Arabia, the ulama are aware that they now have a position of much less importance than formerly in their community. Most are consequently filled with a strong desire to regain something of

their power and importance. To achieve this they have encouraged and fostered a reassertion of Islamic fundamentalism among the masses; and even some of the better educated people have for various reasons been swept into this movement (Watt, 1989:43). It is an irony that bulk of the ulama opposed the Pakistan Movement and today they are the champions of Islamization in a country which they claim had been created to establish an Islamic state. The ulama, thereby, 'have not necessarily recovered much of their lost ground, but they have certainly increased the domination of the traditional world-view over the minds of Muslims' (Watt, 1989:43).

The fall of the Empire and ascendancy of the British affected the ulama in the following ways, which influenced their ideological bearings.

1. With the advent of the British rule the ulama had been left out of the new structure, and deprived of state patronage. They had no place to work except mosque and madrassah which depended on donations from private sources. So there was need, not only to increase the number of the followers. but also to keep them committed. This necessitated the highlighting of sectarian difference among the Muslims (M.Ali, 1994:88).

2. Since donations come from the well-to-do followers, it obliged the ulama to play down the social and economic issues which had been impoverishing the Muslim masses. This made them supporters

of the status quo. This, in fact, has been continuation of their old habit of subservience to the de facto regime (M.Ali, 1994:88).

3. Dependence on donation also reduced their social prestige. In rural areas they are equated with 'menial workers' (*Kamins*), and in urban areas they have been a little better: first, because cities are more differentiated than villages, two, the 'bazaar bourgeoisie' can not exercise the same control over local religious leadership as the landlord does, three, not being the owner of the land-- an eternal source of livelihood-- nor having the spirit of an entrepreneur the 'bazaar bourgeoisie' is more dependent on the prayers and blessings of the religious leader.

4. Donations are not auditable by an independent agency. This leaves a margin for the donation collectors to appropriate some money for their personal needs. To justify continuous donations they keep on expanding their activities in construction of mosques and madrassahs.

5. The fall of the Mughal rule deprived the Muslim people of a legitimate authority towards which they could turn for expert opinion and guidance in day-to-day matters. The ulama had official designation of *qazi* and *muftis* under the Mughal system to decide such matters, now they assumed this authority without state sanction and started issuing *fatwas* (religious edicts) without any institutional arrangement. They assumed a new authority of

declaring their opponents as *kafirs* (non-Muslims). Modernist Muslims, and leaders and followers of the opponent sects have been their prime targets.

Most of the Muslims, who could afford it, went for modern education system of Aligar and prepared themselves to occupy jobs in the British Indian government and take new occupation in the fields of law, literature, business and manufacturing. The graduates from the Deoband and other religious institutions, were neither willing, nor equipped to take up new jobs in the new system. While modern educated Muslims found new jobs rather easily, the religious educated men found no place for themselves in the state structure. Staying out they had no option but to make religion the source of livelihood. They became professionals and as professionalism has its own demands, they deliberately created religious polemics, made religious practices more tedious, and added new rituals (these additions were predominantly made by the Brelvis) which made them relevant for the ignorant masses. Since they had opted out of active politics, the British government gave them a free hand to pursue their class and professional interests. Strangely enough, the ulama have blamed the Colonial rulers for the proliferation of religious sects to weaken Muslim unity (M. Ali, 1994).

The ulama have succeeded in maintaining the old tradition of learning but failed to contribute any thing new to meet the

contemporary challenges. Their gradual, often unwilling, many a time unwitting, and always belated entry into the modern party politics, education, mass media etc. has been by default. They gained first taste of modern politics only when the Indian National Congress used their influence on the Muslim masses to launch civil disobedience movement and coupled it with the issue of Khilafat in Turkey. *Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e-Hind* was founded in 1919 and worked enthusiastically to support the Khilafat Movement. This 'sinister design' of the Congress as Hamza Alvi calls it weakened the modernist Muslim leadership, and temporarily at least, pushed the Muslim 'salariat' (Alvi's comprehensive term for Muslim modernists) into the background, and made the ulama the real leaders of the Indian Muslims (quoted by M. Ali 1994:95). Later the same organization helped the Congress to cast doubt on the Islamic credentials of the modernist leadership of the Pakistan Movement. At this stage modernist leadership of the Muslim League decided to pay back in the same coin and helped organize *Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e-Islam*, to counter *Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e-Hind*, *Majlis-e-Ahrar*, and *Khaksar Movement*²¹, and to strengthen its own religious credentials.

In today's Pakistani politics, three groups of traditionalist ulama are represented by three²² political parties viz. *Jamiat-ul-ulama-e-Islam* consists of Deobandis; *Jamiat-ul-ulama-e-Pakistan*, consists of Brelvis, and *Jamiat-e-Ahl-e-Hadith*, consists of Ahl-e-Hadith, known as Wahabis. *Jamiat-ul-ulama-e-Islam* has its pockets of influence²³ in Baluchistan and Frontier. *Jamiat-ul-ulama-e-*

Pakistan, does not have such pockets of political influence, its candidates are returned on the basis of their personal influence. Like *Jamaat Islam*, it used to have some influence among the Mohajir community in Karachi, but it has been swept away by a strong tide of ethnic identity among the Mohajirs, spearheaded by the Mohajir Quomi Movement. *Jamiat-e-Ahl-e-Hadith*, has no single pocket of influence from which it could win a seat in the Assembly. As a whole ulama have never been anywhere near electoral victory in the political history of Pakistan, nor they are likely to be. They have a nuisance value of creating law and order situations. Since the modernists have not been able to provide religious leadership the masses continue to look up to the ulama for guidance in religious matters. The ulama have used this lever quite effectively to humble local administration and the government on the spurious basis of Islam being violated, ridiculed or endangered. The creation of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan provided them an opportunity to assert their religious authority in the political mainstream, not as popular leaders but as the guardians of Islam, which happens to be the basis of the statehood and nationhood.

If the results of the general elections are any indications to go by, the ulama and their parties have no place in national politics. Their share of seats in the National Assembly has been decreasing continuously. In the last election in October 1993 they have taken a nose dive, (see table-1 and figure-2). 'A nationwide shift towards right of center has diminished the religious parties'

appeal for a large mass of uncommitted voters who used to opt for them in preference to left-radical options. The gains the religious lobby has extracted from successive regimes since 1970 has blunted its rhetoric somewhat. Many argue that after the Islamization carried out by General Ziaul Haq and Nawaz Sharif the religious parties had no agenda left before them (monthly the "Newsline" Karachi, October, 1993). In a polity dominated by 'parasitic landlordism' and a society led by modernists in all walks, electoral victory, for the ulama, has never been on the horizon. Their unchallenged importance lies in their self-assumed role of the guardians of Islam.



National Assembly Seats Won By The
Religious Parties In General Elections*

	1993	1990	1988	1970**	
1. Jamiatul Ulama-e-Islam (Deobandi school)	4	7	8	7	
2. Jamiatul Ulama-e-Pakistan (Brelvi School)	0	3	3	7	
3. Jamaat Islami (Revivalists/ Fundamentalists)	3	8	6	4	
4. Muttehidda Deeni Mahaz (Deobandi School)	2	N.E. (non existent)	N.E.	N.E.	
Total	9	18	17	18	98


* Source Pakistan Election Commission and Newspaper reports.

** Total number of seats in 1970 was 138, and 204 thereafter.

Table 1

Figure 3

Decline in the religious parties seats.



B: THE LATENT FORCES OF CHANGE

In the existing socio-political system the forces of status quo are so overwhelming that the forces of change are only latent, not active and manifest. They are either too weak to exert themselves or have been so tamed by the status quo group that they have lost their credibility. The Liberals/ Modernists, the Muslim Revivalists, and the Merchant/ Industrialists are not the forces of change in the sense that they are struggling to replace the current order with a new one. The triumvirate of the ruling elite with occasional help from the Traditionalists have so successfully deflected, suppressed or absorbed the forces of change that they pose no immediate threat to them. Cultural ethos of 'parasitic landlordism' has permeated not the agents of status quo but the forces of change as well.

1. Muslim Liberalism/ Modernism²⁴

Syed Ahmed Khan, a religious scholar (*alim*) and a deeply religious man started a modernizing movement among the Indian Muslims after the aborted war of Independence in 1857. He advised the Muslims to accept the British rule as it is and try to improve their lot within it. Unlike the traditionalist ulama who saw no middle course between the holy war and the siege, Syed Ahmed advised the Muslims to learn the English language, seek jobs in the British Indian government and be their loyal subjects. At philosophical level Syed Ahmed was a rationalist-utilitarian and

interpreted the Quran and the Sunnah accordingly. He took the 19th Century Victorian society and its ideals as a model worth emulating by the Muslims. His main emphasis was on modern education and efforts to gain social advancement and political strength under the British rule. Syed Ahmed Khan strictly limited himself to the interest of the Indian Muslims and did or said nothing about the Muslim Ummah as such which has been concern of most other Muslims thinkers and reformers (Jalibi, 1987:146-50).

Syed Ahmed Khan, not only encouraged the Muslims to take up jobs with the Britishers but also advocated for the adoption of European culture and language, and encouraged them to increase their social contacts with them. His diagnosis was that the Muslim had lost power because they did not have modern and superior means to compete with the Europeans, who had better knowledge, and superior culture. The prescription was to adopt rationalist-utilitarian values and culture (M. Ali, 1994).

It is the liberal modernist tradition which has supplied the leadership of the Muslim societies in almost all spheres of activity (except the religious). Not only they have staffed most of the educational institutions, virtually constitute the major professions, write a great many of the books, edit major newspapers, and man the government of almost every Muslim state. The question remains if the liberals are so strong, why is liberalism weak. This ideology of liberalism, though impressive, has in fact proven neither contagious and inspiring, nor even

sustained. It seems that however frequently and closely related, it does not seem to have been much integrated with the faith. It has not yet been formulated in such a way as to envisage its dynamic truth within the central structure of the Islamic faith (Smith, 1959:67,72).

The **Modernist** did not develop traditional Muslim thought from the inside to supply an adequate basis for the new values and institutions. The early Muslim Modernists, the starting point of whose Modernism lay in Westernism, almost deified liberalism, and sought to impose its categories upon Muslim society. The result was that, when their message penetrated into the interior of the society, it was vehemently rejected. Since Muslim modernists essentially were representatives of Islamic liberalism, their activity involved individual thought; unlike fundamentalism, it did not take the form of a popular movement (Rahman, 1970:649; 1981:28).

It is obvious, however, that pure Westernism, i.e., the projection of the West into the Muslim society, could not and cannot succeed unless it creates for itself a moral and cultural basis within Muslim society. This means that there must be a process of integration and assimilation of the new forces, and adaptation of their institutional embodiment to the moral-cultural heritage of Islam and vice versa. This vital function is yet to be performed by Muslim Modernism. But Muslim Modernism, after its initial launching by thinkers like Muhammad 'Abduh, Syed Ahmad Khan

and Syed Amir Ali, unfortunately, underwent a rapid transformation, and degenerated, on the one hand, into pure apologetics, and on the other, developed into a more or less purely secular Westernism (Rahman, 1970:P-647-48).

These intellectual causes of weakness of Muslim modernism have their roots not only in the intellectual heritage, but also in the social, economic, and political structural relations. In a society like Pakistan where literacy has been declining, where freedom of expression is curbed sometime in the name of state ideology (Islam) and sometime in the name of state security, it is vain to expect a genuine discourse-- modernist or otherwise-- among various segments of society. Modernists entered into compromises with retrogressive landlords, and obscurantist traditionalists, to win and keep Pakistan. The rise of civil and military bureaucracies to the highest offices of the state and virtual monopolization of state machinery smothered all hopes of liberal discourse. The cultural ethos of 'parasitic landlordism' is in direct opposition to modernist ethos-- a product of the West²⁵.

2. Muslim Revivalism/ Islamism: A Post-Modernist Response

The failure of liberalism/ modernism to lead the Muslim nations to the promised level of development and progress, and the disappointment with the traditionalists to be able to defy the 'evils' of the West and to do without them, paved the way for the rise of another phenomenon in the postmodernist period. For the

traditionalist there is no new age in the real sense of the word. For him, the Quran has no other meaning than what his tradition has determined. His tradition, in fact, is the only mirror through which he can see the message of the Quran. It is against this that the early, premodernist revivalist (e.g. Ghazali, Ibn-e-Taymiya, Shah Waliullah, and Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab) had risen in revolt, and against this that the contemporary neo-revivalist (e.g. the Egyptian Brotherhood, and the Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan) has arisen in challenge (Rahman, 1981:32).

From this perspective, then, like the premodern revivalist movements, the neo-revivalism is a liberating force, freeing the mind both from centuries of tradition and from the intellectual and spiritual domination of the West. But on the question of ijtehad (a fundamental element of Islamic revivalism) the actual performance of neo-revivalism has been considerably poorer than that of the earlier revivalism. The basic reason for this intellectual poverty is that neo-revivalism came as a reaction to modernism and to what was perceived as the excessively pro-Western orientation of most modernists. So long as the central feature of neo-revivalism remains reactionary, it will not generate positive intellectual results, no matter how much it may talk of ijtehad (Rahman, 1981:33).

The Islamic Revolution in Iran, and the upheavals in its wake in Egypt, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Syria, provide

concrete evidence that dramatic changes are under way in the Muslim world, and that these developments are not entirely anti-Western in nature or spirit as they have been widely interpreted by certain Western analysts and journalists (Kechichian, 1986:53). Revivalism is an old Islamic tradition; and the current wave is a continuation of the same. Like all previous revivalist movements this too has stemmed from the internal dynamics of the Muslim society. It is an outcome of the tension between tradition and modernizing influences in Muslim societies. Since the Iranian Revolution, however, when the revivalists realized the extent of their power and the vulnerability of the West, its anti-Western bias has further accentuated. A new aspect in the current phase of revivalism is that its sources lie both within and outside the Muslim world. The West, and what it stands for, is increasingly upper most in the writings and activities of the neo-revivalists.

According to Bertrand Russell (1960: 107-9) intolerance has been a persistent characteristic of Europe which distinguished it from the East. And Fazlur Rahman (1984) has pointed out that the neo-revivalists are being intolerant to a level unprecedented in the Muslim history. Ghazali chose to rebut abstract philosophies and their highly unorthodox metaphysical views but neither he nor any other revivalist preached intolerance leading to persecution. The reform movements which burst upon the Muslim world during the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries exhibit a common characteristic, that they bring into the centre of attention the

socio-moral reconstruction of Muslim society. Because of their very nature, therefore, these movements strengthened, in varying degrees, the activism and the moral dynamism which had been characteristic of pristine Islam. Contemporary revivalist movements, in most cases, have opted for political activism at the cost of moral dynamism (Rahman, 1970:636-637; 1984:34).

Jamaat Islami has often indulged in the politics of intolerance: supporting military regimes, raising militant youth organizations, and trying to silence dissenting voices. A careful study of Maudoodi's writings would reveal a gradual drift toward intolerance of difference of opinion. Today, it is hard to place *Jamaat Islami* on a higher moral plank than other political parties in Pakistan. That is a serious loss they have suffered over the last four decades. Is this intolerance the result of their increasing engagement with the West?

A basic factor in this situation is undoubtedly the colonial experience of Muslim societies which appears to have created a psychological hiatus in the Muslim mind. The shaken self-confidence balks at a mildly innovative idea, yet in the precolonial age Muslims have sometimes expressed ideas far more radical than those over which a storm would arise today (Rahman, 1981:34).

The pet issues with the neo-fundamentalist are the ban on bank interest, the ban on family planning, the status of women (contra

the modernist), collection of zakat, and so forth- things that will most distinguish Muslims from the West. They are much less vocal on the elite dominated, decadent economic and political system in their own societies. Social practices which hinder any healthy movement on the egalitarian principles of Islam are considered secondary to the threat from the West. Their approach is that once the West and its allies within the Muslim societies have been defeated (there is a little emphasis on reform and understanding, particularly since the Iranian Revolution) the internal imbalances can be corrected²⁶. Thus, 'while the modernist was engaged by the West through attraction, the neo-revivalist is equally haunted by the West through repulsion. The most important and urgent thing to do from this point of view is to "disengage" mentally from the West and to cultivate an independent but understanding attitude toward it, as toward any other civilization. So long as Muslims remain mentally locked with the West in one way or the other, they will not be able to act independently and autonomously' (Rahman, 1984:136-137).

The neo-revivalist has undoubtedly served as a corrective not only for several types of excesses in classical modernism but above all, for secularist trends that would otherwise have spread much faster in Muslim societies. That is to say, neorevivalism has reoriented the modern-educated lay Muslim *emotionally* toward Islam. But the greatest weakness of neorevivalism, and the greatest disservice it has done to Islam, is an almost total lack of

positive effective Islamic thinking and scholarship within its ranks, its intellectual bankruptcy, and its substitution of cliché mongering for serious intellectual endeavor. The traditionalist ulama, if their education has suffered from a disorientation toward the purposes of the Qur'an, have nevertheless built up an imposing edifice of learning that invests their personalities with a certain depth; the neorevivalist is, by contrast, a shallow and superficial person-- really rooted neither in the Qur'an nor in traditional intellectual culture. The essence of the matter is that the neorevivalist has produced no Islamic educational system worthy of the name (Rahman, 1984:137). Among all the active revivalists today, there is not a single *alim*; Imam Khomeini being an exception.

A ruthless exploitation of Islam for party politics and group interests that subjects Islam not only to politics but to day-to-day politics; Islam thus becomes sheer demagoguery. Unfortunately, the so-called Islamic parties in several countries are the most blatantly guilty of such systematic political manipulation of religion (Rahman, 1984:140). *Jamaat Islami* supported a women candidate, Mohtarama Fatima Jinnah, against President Ayub Khan in 1965 presidential elections, as a 'lesser evil'. The Traditionalists led by *Jamiat-al-Ulama-e-Islam* opposed her because of her gender. In 1988 *Jamaat* questioned the election of Benazir Bhutto as Prime Minister on religious grounds; the Traditionalists maintained their position. Benazir's reelection in 1993 has not

been objected to. Both, the Revivalists and Traditionalists entered into 'electoral understanding' (a euphemism for formal electoral alliance) with Benazir, and have been supporting her government. The Traditionalists have accepted provincial ministerial post in the Frontier province in alliance with Benazir's Pakistan Peoples Party.

For intellectual understanding of revivalism in Pakistan we need to examine the ideas of Maulana Maudoodi-- a pioneer revivalist. Maudoodi was a journalist at the beginning of his practical life. He was a self-educated scholar, who maintained that he was not among the Ulama. He did not have formal religious education, and went to a modern school only upto the tenth class (Saulat:1979; Afaq, 1971). Maudoodi is a liberal/ modernist for the traditionalist conservative ulama, and a conservative reactionary for the modernist intellectuals. He does not subscribe to the fundamental principle of Western civilization which according to him is godless and materialist. He claims to carry Iqbal's mission of reinterpretation of Islam in modern times (Saulat, 1979). But it is easy to find out that he is very different from Iqbal. He stands for "pure Islam" (non-historic Islam) which is the only answer to the troubles of modern times. He accepts need for Ijtehad but does not elaborate enough to make it viable. He refuses to institutionalize it in any form. Ijtehad remains an individual effort which can be recognized as ijtehad by others only in retrospect. As he puts it, Ijtehad is to be done, not to be claimed

by an individual. Similarly democracy is acceptable but with a good number of qualifications. Freedom of thought is subject to ideological considerations. Segregation of sexes is a must, women have to cover their faces and have no life outside their houses. Maudoodi's major problem is his static vision of time and history. He believes that Islam has not grown, evolved or changed over time. It is therefore possible to bring the pristine pure Islam of the time of the Prophet and of the righteous Companions back to modern times (Jalbi, 1987:162-63).

The most significant constituent of Maudoodi's position has been the gradual and continual elaboration of an impressive system of ideas. Maudoodi would appear to be much the most systematic thinker of modern Islam; one might even wonder whether his chief contribution, in the realm of interpretation, has not been for good and ill his transforming of Islam into a system-- or, perhaps more accurately, his giving expression to a modern tendency so to transform it (Smith, 1959:236).

The content of the particular system that he has been elaborating owes much, of course, to previous Islamic history, from whose flow he abstracts for his static pattern. It owes something, however, also to modern concepts and potentialities, so that he differs significantly from the unaccommodating traditionalists. Despite the consequent vitality, his movement is in this matter rather a compromise and adaptation than a creative vision. Its position has been neither modern enough to win many from the

advanced sections of the bourgeoisie, nor familiar enough to enthuse the masses (Smith, 1959:237).

Like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Maudoodi sees the ulama as specially to blame for the 'critical revolution' through which the Islamic world is passing: "Much of the blame for this dangerous situation must be accepted by our leaders of religion. It was their duty, right at the outset of the revolution, to bestir themselves and try to comprehend the principles and essential features of the new civilization of the West, and to go out to the Western lands to study the intellectual and scientific foundations on which the edifice of that civilization was being raised. With the help of ijtehad they should have striven to persuade the Muslims to accept and press into service the useful practical knowledge and scientific discoveries that had enabled the Western nations to achieve such remarkable progress. And they should have sought to fit these new instruments of progress, in keeping with the principles of Islam, into the educational system and social life of the Muslims" (Maudoodi, 1966:11, quoted by Watt, 1989:56-57).

The last two sentences here suggest that Maudoodi is in favor of reforms which will lead to a more satisfactory application of the Shari'a in today's conditions. At an earlier point he had suggested that the Muslims had forfeited their supremacy in a large part of the world because they had 'lost their ability to interpret

the Sharia in the changing conditions'. Despite this apparently forward-looking approach by Maudoodi to social questions, the actual program of reform supported by the Jamaat was slight. Indeed, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that Maudoodi's remarks were little more than pious aspirations. There was never sufficient elaboration of detail to enable them to become matters of practical politics. The result has been that the main achievement of the Jamaat in Pakistan has been to strengthen the hold of the traditional world-view and self-image (Watt, 1989:56-57).

It seems that Maudoodi's decision to transform *Jamaat Islami*, from a party of reform (*islah*) and preaching (*tabligh*), into a formal political party, in February 1957²⁷, forced him to enter into intellectual compromises. His stress on the need for *ijtehad* in the early 1940s did not make a headway in later years. Political acceptability seemed to have weighed heavily on his mind, therefore on questions of substance, he tried to stay as close to the traditionalists as possible. Maudoodi did not show a deep understanding of the dynamics of capitalist mode of production and its ramification. He opposes interest based banking system, but does not account for inflation, currency devaluation, the role of promissory currency notes, international finance, free market economy etc. His vision of Islamic economic system is free of all these 'evils' (for details see Maudoodi's 'Sood' (Usury) 1968). Similarly his Islamic Democracy does not allow the Parliament to

overthrow Islam, but then who is going to interpret Islam for the Parliament is not clear (for details see Maudoodi's '*Islami Riyasat*' (The Islamic State, 1965)).

Jamaat Islami has its support among those discontents of the lower middle class who are educated in the modern system of education and do not subscribe to any of the three Traditionalist groups. They have some appeal for the idealist youth in the universities, and intellectuals. They have little support in the rural areas where seventy per cent of the country's population lives, and have no standing in the areas dominated by the Landlords and the Tribal Chiefs. They have not been able to get a strong foothold among the industrial labor. They are influential in the mass media and at intellectual level, but have not been able to establish a discourse with the illiterate masses. They do not have the benefit of possessing the mosques network, from where the Traditionalist ulama reach the masses in oral discourse. Despite their high profile in the media they get very low votes and win even lesser number of seats. The Jamaat has never been able to get more than six percent of votes, and has never secured more than eight seats from the total of 207 seats. They won only 6% votes and got 4 seats in the National Assembly in 1970. In the 1988 and 1990 general elections their vote percentage is not clear because they were part of a multi-party alliance; they, however, got 6 and 8 seats, respectively. In 1993 election they adopted populist approach and felt very confident of emerging as the 'third option'

and decided to contest on their own; they touched the nadir, securing 3 seats with 3% votes (for comparison see the chart). Jamaat's performance in election shows that they are not likely to affect a change through the ballot box. Their strength lies in their well knit organization, a cadre of committed workers, and disproportionate influence in the media and among the intellectuals. 'In a situation of demoralization it has thus exhibited enthusiasm and an even sacrificial vigor in striving for such ideals as it professes' (Smith, 1959:237).

3. The Merchants/ Industrialists

The business class, i.e. entrepreneurs with a productive and relatively autonomous role in the economy, is still a nascent group in Pakistan which exercises negligible influence on decision making, and none at all in defining the political culture of this country. From time to time it has displayed dynamism, but has been held back by feudal cultural ethos, bureaucratic controls and corruption. During the 1960s when the Military played a modernizing role, it brought forth a class of merchants and industrialists. The system worked on trickle down theory and soon led to big imbalances in income distribution at regional and class levels. In the late sixties there was a strong public demand for a more just distribution of income. A severe blow was dealt to the infant industrial class by Z.A. Bhutto whose nationalization policy augmented the powers and perquisites of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy. General Muhammad Zia-ul Haq built on this inheritance by

significantly militarizing the economy and the bureaucracy (E. Ahmad, 1990).

An overview of Bhutto's strategy of dealing with the class question would suggest that he set himself the contradictory task of balancing the power of the dominant classes, while he was quite ambivalent towards giving any effective voice to the dominated classes in his government. He filled the ministerial positions in his cabinet and other high government offices with the big landlords. His nationalization programs, mixed with his public rhetoric, did undermine the pampered status of the bourgeois classes but he also defended their positions from any radical challenge from the dominated classes. These were the policies which earned Bhutto the reputation of a Bonapartist (Gardezi, 1991:25-26).

When the British established their foothold in the sub-continent, they found the area rich in raw materials and manufactured goods. The raw material soon became a major source of supply for the industries in England, but indigenous industries and commerce were seen as impediments in capturing the local market for manufactured goods coming from England. Thus, throughout the eighteenth century and the early part of the nineteenth century, local commercial and manufacturing activity was undermined, first through outright plunder and later by calculated neglect and the use of discriminatory tariff restrictions (Gardezi, 1991:25-26).

By the 1920's, as a result of systematic depletion of agricultural revenues and almost total lack of major indigenous commercial and industrial activity, government revenues had declined to the point where the administration of India was no longer profitable. In 1920, for example, India's net annual exports by sea amounted to 16,613,490 pounds sterling, while during the same year 17,532,298 pounds sterling were paid toward the Secretary of State's bill in the India Office in England. As a result, the British belatedly started paying attention to the industrial and commercial development of the subcontinent. The 1930's witnessed the emergence of a sizeable class of local industrialists and entrepreneurs whose mode of production and related social philosophies were imported ready-made from England (Gardezi, 1991:25-26). This class of industrialists and entrepreneurs was non-existent in the Muslim majority areas. At independence Pakistan had no industry worth the name and almost all trade was in the hands of the non-Muslims, who migrated to India. Industrialization began in the 1950s with the Korean war, and took a leap forward in the 1960s when under Ayub Khan's dictatorship the military played a modernizing role and created a small class of industrialists. Industrialization did not transform Pakistan into an industrial society, partly because the landlords' interests represented by Bhutto in the garb of Islamic socialism, did not want a potential rival in the power game. The industrial class was virtually eliminated by nationalizing private industry, jailing industrialists on corruption charges, in the 1970s. The same story

has been repeated in 1993 when the landlords ganged up against a Prime Minister who represented the business interests and tried to replace the 'parasitic ethos' of the political-economy by the 'industrial-capitalist ethos' by introducing privatization, free market economy, and construction of infrastructure through foreign investments.

In addition to the dominant and dominated classes in Pakistan's peripheral capitalist mode of production, there has grown in size and significance a somewhat heterogeneous middle stratum. Its recent growth, to a large extent, is the result of uneven and distorted developments in the political economy of Pakistan. A remarkable feature of these developments is an enormous increase in money supply and cash flows, without a concomitant growth in a solid self-sustaining base in industrial production. Neither is this growth in money supply a result of export of a single primary commodity, such as oil in the case of the Middle East. Home remittances from workers exported abroad, supply of armed personnel and services to the Arab States, stepped up U.S. aid to Pakistan's latest military during the Afghan war, enormous expansion of trade in illicit drugs and guns boosted by Pakistan's involvement in the Afghan civil war, have all combined to produce an unprecedented rise in circulation of money and consume goods since the late 1970s. With this circulation have increased the numbers and fortunes of a middle class of retail and wholesale merchants, import and export traders, contractors, renters, real

estate agents, traders in contraband goods and smugglers (Gardezi, 1991:52-53).

The Landlords, the Military and the Civil Bureaucracy, are the real losers if the industrial-commercial ethos replaces the 'parasitic ethos', as it calls for higher level of literacy and differentiation, needs technicians, managers and wage earners in place of tenant peasants, and integrates society into world capitalism more thoroughly, and lets the state penetrate more effectively into the civil society through a complex network of infrastructure, wider circulation of information, tax collection, administration, market regulations, economic management; leaving little room for landlord's traditional autonomy, military's overlordship, and bureaucracy's manipulations.

Thus with the end of the Afghan war and the military rule in Pakistan the business class in collaboration with military threw up a new leadership which did not have its origin in the traditional ruling elite. The leadership was the product of the military rule but because of different class origin their interests were to clash ultimately. In the 1990 elections this new urban based business class, emerged at the helm of national politics, having tacit support of the Establishment, landlords' reservations notwithstanding. Soon after coming into power the new leadership tried to tilt the structural balance in its favor, so as to have more resources at its disposal without being obliged to the elite. Policy

of denationalization, encouragement of private sector, relaxation of bureaucratic grip on the business interests and institutions, introduction of foreign investments in high profile infrastructure programs, threatened to deprive the civil servants and military officers of their share of cushy jobs and opportunities of making money, and the landlords of their political leadership. The Establishment struck back before the new leadership could introduce irreversible changes. Nawaz Sharif was eased out before he could become the Ozal of Pakistan.

C: MASS MEDIA DISCOURSE²⁸

The *status quo* group has been riding the neck of the Pakistani mass media and intellectual discourse like the proverbial old man who, when offered by a young man to ferry him across the river, sat crossed legged on his shoulders and refused to get off, till after many days the young man intoxicated him with a drink, unlocked his thin legs and smashed his head with a heavy stone²⁹. Having understood the nature, extent, and mechanism of cultural ethos of 'parasitic landlordism' it is easy to realize why media and intellectual discourse is arrested. Speaking on the role of the intellectuals as a class, W.C. Smith (1959:230) says 'perhaps it would be more precise to speak of the absence of their role. Pakistan has conspicuously suffered from a lack of effectual ideas. It is the task of the intellectuals in a society to supply the ideas with which the society may effectively and truly handle the

problems with which it has to deal. The failure here, since the death of Iqbal, has been sad. It is not merely that individual members of the intelligentsia often did not tackle their tasks in the realm of thinking with the vigor, honesty, and courage that were ruthlessly needed. In addition, the society as a whole seemed not to recognize how central and responsible a task that of the intellectuals was (Smith, 1959:230).

It is impossible to find an intellectual in Pakistan who is living off the earnings of his pen. They are either employed in the government or work in a newspaper, none of which is conducive to independent intellectual pursuit. Educational institutions where most of the intellectuals are to be found are not only under government control, they are continuously subjected to administrative interference. Their jobs, even personal security is threatened if they happened to annoy the government or a political party which has strong presence among the students. The same is true about the media which is either directly owned by the government or constantly live under financial and administrative threat from the government. In fact it is the middle class which constitute the economic political and intellectual backbone of a society. In Pakistan there is no middle class worth its name. The society is divided between the educated rich and illiterate poor. The middle class is the weakest and smallest and the most fragmented. Since intellectuals are mostly from the middle class they have not been able to exert themselves as an independent force in the polity (Jalibi 1987: 202-203).

Without intellectual basis politics becomes the pursuit of personal interests and naked power. A consciously conceived, pursued and inculcated political ideology makes political activities relevant to national objective, whose pursuit lifts the individual above immediate personal gains. This very basis is missing in Pakistani politics. Politics has long been played within the Establishment where ideology and people are brought in, occasionally, only to stamp the latest edition of the Establishment's interest.

A detailed analysis of 'arrested media discourse' would be attempted in the following chapters, here we identify the means and methods of this arrest, at the official level. Unlike democratic societies press-government relationship in Pakistan is not adversary relationship; it is a compromise of mutual interests, at the expense of the people's interests. This is more true about the mainstream national press which has a wide readership, and has flourished through official patronage. This compromise is affected through governmental control on the import of newsprint, distribution of official advertisement, and grant of permission to publish a newspaper or journal-- known as declaration³⁰. The leading newspapers have to toe the official line to survive; even those newspapers and journals which are apparently against the government have to draw a bottom line beyond which they are in danger of retaliation.

1. Newsprint and Circulation Figures

The Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC), headed by a Director in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, is responsible for determining the circulation of newspapers and journals, on the basis of which they are granted permits to import duty-free newsprint and get government advertisements. Under an agreement between the government and the newspapers, circulation figures are kept secret. Secrecy opens doors to favoritism and outright corruption. Newspapers exaggerate their circulation figures and demand more advertisement and newsprint quota than their due by offering to support the government or threatening to blackmail it. Favoritism and blackmail is a two way traffic between the government and the media. Government turns a blind eye to the exaggerated figures and in turn seeks favorable press coverage. Since circulation figures are secret, it helps the newspapers owners cook their books twice over: inflated figures for the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, and deflated figures for the Income Tax Department.

At one stage the Income Tax Department approached the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, invoking its powers to counter check the income tax returns, submitted by the tax payers, from different sources. The Income Tax Department asked the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting to reveal the circulation figures of different newspapers so as to determine their income, and tax them accordingly. The Ministry of Information wrote to the All Pakistan

Newspapers Society (APNS) and the Council of Newspapers Editors (CPNE), and asked for their views. The two organizations strongly opposed the idea of revealing circulation figures; they conveyed their opposition verbally and refused to be on record: an indication of mutual mistrust and perhaps, guilty conscience! The top bosses in the Income Tax Department were asked 'discretely' not to press for revelation of circulation figures.

2. Government Advertisements

State monopoly on the distribution of advertisements, from the government and semi-government organization, is another instrument to chastise the dissenting newspapers and to patronize the favorites. All Government and semi-government advertisements are to be released through the Ministry of Information & Broadcasting, where in the light of instructions from the political bosses, a small group of officials determine the rate and quantity of advertisements for each newspaper. A system which lacks public accountability leaves a fair bit to the discretion of the concerned officials to manipulate the situation in favor of the government or their own. In principle advertising is a commercial proposition, whose rate and quantum is determined on the basis of circulation audited by the ABC. Knowing the working of ABC it carries little credibility. In the absence of a strong private commercial sector government advertisements are the biggest source of revenue for any newspaper. It is, therefore, easy to force dissenting voices out of the media market by cutting off the

official advertisements. Many a newspaper has been forced to close since the sixties, when the system was first introduced; most others have made good money by getting advertisements lot more than their entitlement. They get undue number of advertisements by showing loyalty to the government, or by greasing the palm of the concerned official(s). One reason, certainly not the only reason, for not allowing the private sector to flourish is to keep the media under control, and to keep more and more jobs in the hands of the government to be doled out to the favorites.

3. Declaration policy

To start the publication of a newspaper or a journal one has to obtain prior approval from the Government. This approval is called 'declaration'. Government retains the power to cancel the declaration if it feels the publication is violating some principle, rules, or laws. The courts do have the power to set aside the official decision but it does not stop the Government agencies from doing the same again. Or if a certain person or group has been denied the declaration it can not be demanded as a matter of right through the court; this is despite the fact that freedom of expression has been guaranteed under the Constitution. This has been the situation till 1988, when after the departue of the Zia regime a number of anti press laws were rescinded. Now, at least, declaration can be demanded as a matter of right, and the power has been devolved to the district level administration. Government still has the power to revoke the declaration.

Under such a system of media control it is easy to understand what risks are involved in exercising the constitutional right of the freedom of expression. The consequences of this arrested discourse between 1970 and 1990 are to be taken up in the last chapter. Before that we analyze how the journalists, academics and the Ulama view the arrested media discourse in the immobility syndrome from their perspective.

NOTES

1. The term has been coined by Barrington Moore Jr. in "*Social Origins Of Dictatorship And Democracy*" (1967), to describe the land relations created by the British. The researcher would prefer to use the term 'Feudalism' because to say that feudalism existed only in Europe at a certain stage of history and no other land relations, unless identical should be referred to as feudal, is arbitrary. Unless markedly different land relations should be referred to as feudal, when the landlord has absolute authority over the land (its sale, purchase, exchange and mortgage, or any other form of land disposal or appropriation), is entitled to a fixed share in the produce, has a measure of adjudicational authority over those who live on his land, (so long as this authority is successfully exercised, it is immaterial whether it is recognized by the state law or not), when conjugal relations and rites among the tenants are subject to, tacit or express approval of the landlord (this is particularly relevant where the landlord assumes spiritual leadership as well), and has a customary right (not necessarily recognized by the state) to receive the votes of his tenants in an election, and a violation of these *rights* entails reprisals in the form of eviction, confiscation of movable property, even abduction of female members of the tenants (all in violation of the law). To illustrate the point it may be added that the form of government in the U.K., India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Turkey is Parliamentary, but are they identical? Is Turkish parliamentary system derived from the British tradition? Unlike Pakistan and India how many times does the Speaker of the Turkish Parliament refers to British practices to decide a point in the house? And still all these forms are referred to as Parliamentary. On the same analogy land relations in Pakistan should be referred to as feudal, at least, upto the reforms introduced by the Bhutto regime in the early 1970s, which made the landlord contribute 50%

in the inputs. Till a final decision by the better informed theorists, it has been decided that the term 'feudal' be avoided in the text wherever possible, in some places however, it has been retained where it appeared in a quotation and could not be replaced without changing the sentence structure.

2. Akbar S. Ahmed, in *Postmodernism and Islam* says, "Postmodernism allows, indeed encourages, the juxtaposition of discourses, an exuberant eclecticism, the mixing of diverse images... It is this juxtaposition which allows POSTMODERNISM to subvert traditional images in the most startling and unexpected manner... Such is the postmodernist pursuit of information, however trivial, irrelevant, or irreverent..." (1992:25).

3. Transliteration of the Hindi saying would be 'uttam khaitee, matdham beopar, nakhidh chakaree'

4. Discussion in the following paragraphs primarily concerns with the structural dislocations and fragmentations wrought in the Muslim majority areas of India which were to constitute Pakistan, in 1947, and not with the entire India.

5. Islam entered India in 711 A.D. when an Arab expedition led by Muhammad bin Qasim conquered Sindh and Multan-- comparatively a small part of the vast Subcontinent. For the next few hundred years the Muslim rule did not penetrate further in the South Asia, till Mehamud of Ghazna launched a series of attacks (1001-1027) from Afghanistan in the north and included Punjab in his vast empire. The Ghurids dynasty founded by Sultan Muhammad of Ghur, rose on the ashes of the Ghanza Empire and established formal Muslim rule in India known as the Sultanate of Delhi. It is customary among the historians to date the Muslim rule of India from the A.D. 1200 with the rise of Qutb-bu-Din Aybek, to the throne of Delhi and the foundation of an Indian Muslim state.

6. Data has been obtained from Encyclopaedia Britannica, Book of the Year 1993.

7. The type had been developed in the psychological study of Nazi minds at Berkeley, USA. The researchers originally belonged to the Institute of Social Psychology, Frankfurt, before it was suppressed by the Nazis. Norman Dixon (1976) has applied this type to the study of Anglo-Saxon military psyche, to explore the sources of military incompetency. In our study we are making a very selective use of this research to identify the authoritarian traits among the ruling elite of Pakistan.

8. Norman Dixon has analyzed these findings in the context of the American middle class where the offsprings are made into 'status-seekers'. In our case they are not the seekers of a new status but the 'keepers' of the attained status. Since both the 'status-seekers' and the 'status-keepers' are conservatives in out-look, they are swapped here. In the context of Norman Dixon the out-group is the Jews for the Nazis and the Blacks for the American, in our context it is not an ethnic group but the have-nots of the society.

9. See Chapter Three in Aysha Jalal's 'the Sole Spokesman' wherein it has been proved that relationship between Jinnah's Muslim League and the Muslims majority provinces was extremely complex and the League's hold on the landlords was very weak.

Also see Wakil Anjum's 'Siyasat kay Firoan' (pp. 21-27), wherein he has reproduced two 'addresses' one collectively signed by the landlords of Punjab and submitted on the occasion of the coronation ceremony of King Edward VII, the other submitted by the spiritual landlords, on the transfer of the Lieutenant Governor of Punjab in 1919. These addresses show the level of abject servility to which these people had stooped to eulogize the British colonial rule. King Edward has been referred to as 'the most just' ruler, and the Turkish freedom fighters have been dubbed as ill advised and shortsighted people. The Quranic verses have been quoted in four places to support their servility and the benevolence of the colonial rulers, to condemn 'the crazy mistakes' made by anti-colonial forces, to criticize the Turkish decision to fight against the Allied Forces, and to praise the graciousness with which the victorious British Forces are expected to treat the Turks.

10. This information is obtained from Pcglobe, (1990), Inc. Tempe. Az. USA, a world database program for personal computers. Pakistan had been claiming literacy rate at 36% till a few years ago, now it is around 27%. Pakistan is perhaps, the only country where literacy has been declining over the years.

11. Qudratullah Shahab, a former Deputy Commissioner (district administrator) in his autobiography *Shahab Nama*, (1988:535-537) has narrated his personal experiences in Jhang district about a perveted approach of the landlords to education. The story is about a landlord who wanted to "harm" his rival by getting a school started in the rival's village. The landlord offered financial assistance to open the school. Before the plan could be implemented the rival landlord came protesting the plan, which he took as a sign of displeasure of the Deputy Commissioner. When

told that it was not the angry Deputy Commissioner but his rival landlord who had made the proposal and offered financial assistance for it, he made his offer to open a school in the rival's area. Before the schools could be started 'perhaps the better sense prevailed and none of them turned up ever again to harm his rival by promoting education'.

12. An extreme, and perhaps unusual case has been narrated by Qudratulla Shahab in *the Shahab Nama* (1987:107-122) about the Maharaja of Kashmir who would need a team of workers to wash his bottoms after defecation.

13. Although there has never been a conclusive investigation into the assassination, yet there are indications to suggest who was behind it. The assassin was on the payroll of Pakistan intelligence, and had been sitting hardly eighteen yards away from the Prime Minister in a row of policemen on duty, from where he fired his two deadly shots. This was despite the instructions that no 'suspicious character' should come within thirty to forty yards of the Prime minister. The assassin had been overpowered by a volunteer guard when a police officer shot him dead. Rizvi (1985:202) claims that the Prime Minister had antagonistic relations with the provincial politicians (almost all of them landlords) and army officers.

14. 'Ulama' is the plural of Arabic word '*alim*', one who possesses the quality of '*ilm*'-- knowledge, learning, science in the widest sense.

15. 'Ulama' and Islam in our context refer to the Sunni ulama, and Islam; because bulk of the population has always been Sunni, and the Shias played a peripheral role in the national polity of Pakistan or the imperial polity of the Mughal Empire. Being a minority they always preferred to side with liberal and secular forces, because Islamic Law, in Pakistan means Sunni law. It has been only after the Iranian Revolution that the Shias of Pakistan have started taking part in the national politics on the basis of their religious identity; demanding to be governed by their own *fiqh*.

16. 'Fundamentalism' refers to a conservative movement in American Protestantism arising out of the millenarian movement of the 19th century and emphasizing as fundamental to Christianity the literal interpretation and absolute inerrancy of the Scriptures, the imminent and physical Second Coming of Jesus Christ, the Virgin Birth, Resurrection, and Atonement. Fundamentalism came into its own in the early 20th century in

opposition to Modernist tendencies in both American religious and secular life (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1986(5)51).

This term can not be applied to the revivalist phenomenon in Muslim history, one, because it has a peculiar background in the Western-Christian history without a parallel in the Islamic history, two, because revivalism has deep roots in Islamic history, its current phase is only partly a response to the Western/ Modern tendencies, three, because the 'fundamentalists' of Islam do not insist on literal understanding of the Quran, instead they demand *ijtehad* to develop a fresh understanding on what has been said and done before; that they fall short of their claims is a different question. Islamic 'Fundamentalists' can be better described as Islamists (emphasizing their political activism) or neo-Revivalists, as Fazlur Rahman calls them.

17. Historically speaking, after the first four righteous Caliphs, the rulers of the Muslim world assumed hereditary Kingship, though they always called themselves Caliphs, continued to seek 'bay't' for legitimation, and theoretically remained answerable to the people, yet there was no political mechanism to judge the gap between theory and practice. Imam Abu Hanifa, first of the four jurists who founded four schools of law (*fiqh*), did not extend *de jure* recognition to the rulers. He not only declined to accept an official position, there are reports that he had been supporting the dissidents who had been working to overthrow the government and promised to replace it by a God fearing regime. Later jurists argued that since it was not possible to overthrow the government without causing a serious rift in the Ummah and bloodshed in the process, the rulers should be accorded *de jure* recognition if they are effectively in control and are not overtly working against Islam. From then on the ulama either became subservient to the government or remained aloof from political process and concentrated on academic pursuits (for details see Shibli Naumani's '*Seerat-e-Nauman*', Gibb's '*Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam*' and Schacht's '*The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence*').

18. Haji Shariatullah (d.1840) and Titoo Meer (d.1831) organized such movements among the Muslim peasants in Bengal. They organized illiterate landless Muslim peasants and pitted them against the oppressive Hindu landowners. As the movements became militant they were crushed by the British. Syed Ahmed Shaheed launched an armed struggle against the Sikh rule. These movements sharpened religious sensibility of the Muslims. Hindu revivalism further strengthened Muslims belief as a separate entity. These movements aimed at uniting the Indian Muslims and achieving result from collective strength, their failure led to

proliferation of religious sects which further divided the Muslims. This need was later fulfilled by the modernist Muslim leadership (M. Ali, 1994:83-85).

19. The Ahle Hadith and Brelvi have not been discussed in any detail because they were not politically effective during the Raj, nor intellectually prolific till late. The Brelvis are not well organized, one because the *sajadahnashins* (heir of the Saints) are mostly rich landlords and align themselves with the 'Parasite Landlords', two because the Brelvis have not propounded a system of ideas nor a course of action; thus they only justify and sanctify the folkways in reaction to juristic thinking of the Deoband school.

Similarly the Ahle Hadith have not been influential politically because their number is very small, and they have been maligned in the eyes of the people because of their uncompromising, puritanical views on Islamic faith and practices, repudiation of Sufiism, and because Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab had been a source of inspiration for the Mujahideen who fought against the Sikh regime and had plans to take on the Britishers. The last element made them a fearsome creature for the British administrators.

20. Among the Traditionalists, and the Revivalists Abul Kalam Azad is the only prominent *alim* in South Asia who seems to have accepted the evolution of species as a scientific truth. In his elaborate commentary on the *Surah Fatiha* (first chapter of the Quran), in his book '*Ummul Kitab*' he uses jargon of the evolution theorists to explain how meticulously and carefully Allah Almighty planned human evolution to make him the best of His creations. Others, including Maudoodi, who is not a Traditionalist, at least to begin with, deny that evolution took place, not because there is a scientific evidence to the contrary, but because it goes against the *apparent* meanings of the Quran, and it is likely to harm moral and divine orientation of man. Its implied philosophy, 'survival of the fittest' would drive human society to cut-throat-competition, as we see in the godless, amoral Western societies (for details see Azad's '*Ummul Kitab*', and Maudoodi's *Tafhimul Quran* (commentary on the Quran) Lahore. 1975:V.2:504).

21. *Majlis-e-Ahrar* and the *Khaksars* were not friends of the Congress, like the traditionalist Ulama of *Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e-Hind*, but their strong opposition to Pakistan Movement, practically threw them into the same camp. The *Khaksar* Movement

was not led by a traditionalist; their leader was Allama Inayatullah Mashraqi, a modern educated, brilliant mathematician, and 'an eccentric' politician (Jalal, 1990:142). Same was the case with *Majlis-e-Ahrar*, though it was led by a traditionalist *alim*, Ataullah Shah Bukhari, a great orator and tempestuous by temperament. Both parties were inconsistent in their political behavior. For details about their hostility to the Pakistan Movement and Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah see *Quaid-e-Azam aur un ka Ehad*, (pp.314-340) by Rais Ahmad Ja'fery, Maqbool Academy, Lahore.

22. There are two other religious political parties viz. Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqha-e-Jafaria, a by-product of the Iranian Revolution, demanding separate law for the Shia community; and Anjuman Sipah-e-Sahaba, a counterweight to the former, vowing to fight those who do not respect the Companions of the Prophet (meaning the Shias). The two have not been mentioned here because they are new entries on the scene and have not won any seat in the National Assembly, nor they have played any important role in the national politics of alliances and intrigues. But their organizational setup and determination to fight for sectarian causes, and their ability to disrupt law and order should be a cause of concern to every one.

23. 'These pockets of influence' of the ulama are limited to non-agrarian rural areas away from the areas dominated by the Landlords and Tribal Chiefs, and far away from the urban centers.

24. The term *modernist* has been used, here, to describe those Muslim thinkers and reformers who studied the modern Western thought and found certain aspects of its thought and practices compatible with Islam, and proposed that it was necessary to accept and adopt them. We should use the term *liberal* instead, because modernism is essentially a Western enterprise and has a chronological connotation. Liberalism can be founded in the history of Islam. W.C. Smith (1959:62) says 'a trend flourished in the next phase of Islamic evolution, about the turn of the present century, that we may, perhaps not ineptly, designate *Islamic liberalism*. There are two major elements from within the past Islamic tradition from which a contribution to liberalism could be draw: Philosophy and Sufism. The resurgence of classical Islam involves, in fact, a newly invigorated repudiation of these two liberating forces (Smith, 1959:62).

25. According to Krishan Kumar, says in *The Rise of Modern Society*, (1988:3) 'modernization is a continuous, long-term, and open-ended process... The work of modernization is never done.

There is a dynamic principle built into the very system of modern societies. Modern societies never settle'. Here the term has been used in its literal meaning. We are using the term modernism as a phenomenon in human history which arose in the West, and according to many has now passed into post-modernism. Anthony Giddens in *The Consequences of Modernity* (1990:174) poses question 'Is modernity a Western project?' and his answer is unequivocal 'Yes'. We are using the term in this sense and the way it influenced the Muslim world.

26. This difference in emphasis often incurred the allegation from the opponents that they are agents of the status quo. Jamaat-e-Islami of Pakistan refused to endorse land reforms on the ground that an Islamic government can not put a limit on the extent of private ownership. Later, seeing the mood of the electorate and the adverse publicity and reaction the idea received they decided to put a limit on land ownership in their election manifesto of 1970 (for details see Jamaat's 1970 election manifesto, and for earlier stand see Maudoodi's "*Mas'ala Milkiyat-e-Zemin*" (the Issue of Land Ownership)).

27. For details see *Jamaat's* monthly magazine *Aieen* special issue on the 50th anniversary of the *Jamaat* (October 1991:(29) 85-95). The decision was taken a decade after the creation of Pakistan, and a year before the first general elections were due, under the 1956 Constitution. The decision proved to be controversial and led to the resignation of a number of eminent intellectuals like Maulana Ameen Ahsan Islahi.

The decision brings home two important points, but before that one needs to know Maudoodi's position on the creation of Pakistan. He was opposed to the Pakistan Movement, and questioned the ability and intentions of the Muslim League leadership to create an Islamic state. Though he lent support to the Two-Nations Theory, and criticized the pro-Congress ulama of the *Jamiat-al-Ulama-e-Hind*, for trying to prove that the concept of territorial nationalism was Islamic. For details see '*Musalman aur Majooda Siasi Kashmaksh*' (the Muslims in the Present Political Confusion) in three volumes written in the early 1940s.

The decision to contest elections indicates that in Pakistan the *Jamaat* saw an opportunity to create an Islamic state whose creation they had opposed under the modernist leadership, and there is no way to visualize that Pakistan could have been created after the departure of the British, under the leadership of "a group of true Muslims" (*jamaat-e-saleheen*), as Maudoodi had proposed. Most other Ulama were opposed to the very idea of Pakistan, because they were suspicious about the modernist Muslims, and were unable to understand the new concept of nationalism which had emerged in the West in the wake of the


Reformation, and the end of multi national empires (of which they knew nothing).

The second point is that the *Jamaat* was the first religious party to decide to contest elections and hoped to form a government, and thereby transform the country into a truly Islamic state. Other religious parties were to follow suit in the 1970 general elections. This was a crucial decision because the Ulama and their parties never before had declared intention of forming the government. This opportunity had been provided to them under democratic order to which they remained opposed.

28. Mass Media discourse in our case refers only to the print media. Television and Radio Broadcasting is state monopoly. Autonomy of the national electronic media is almost zero. This monopoly has been seriously breached by the Urdu Service of the BBC, and now by the satellite telecasts of the CNN, India and Hong Kong based TV channels. Newspapers have a relative autonomy whose limits are defined by the state, through indirect financial and administrative controls, and direct punitive measures.

29. The Urdu proverb is '*Pir-e-tesma-pa*' literally meaning the old man with legs like a shoe-lace (referring to his unusually thin long legs) and is used to refer to those old hands who perpetuate in power and control long after they have lost their utility and have become a liability, instead. The expression gained currency from Mir Ammen Dehlavi's classic Urdu narrative *Qissa Chahar Dervesh* (The Tale of Four Derveshes).

30. There is no published material available on the actual working of the government agencies and their formal and informal relationship with the newspapers, because it is shrouded in secrecy and works to the mutual benefit of the parties. Any overt reference to the actual working is a cognizable offense. The only time Government of Pakistan went public on the government-media relationship was in 1978, when "White Paper On The Misuse of Media: December, 1971-July, 1977" was published to discredit the Bhutto regime. The story in the White Paper is not peculiar to the Bhutto regime; it is the same story, with different characters, being repeated under every government. The White Paper has not been quoted or referred to directly, because it has a specific context and purpose. The facts stated in this section have been culled from the White Paper, omitting names and dates, so as not to blame one government or the other.



CHAPTER 5

Chapter 5

TWO WORLD-VIEWS IN DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE (A Statistical Study of Intellectual Discourse)

The basic hypothesis of this research is that in Pakistan there exist two world views, one, the dominant view anchored in traditionalism and conservatism, represented with a tinge of modernity by the ruling elite and occasionally supported by the ulama for conservatism; and the other, subordinate view devoted to change represented by the industrialist/ business class, the professionals and the religious revivalists. The previous chapter explored this hypothesis in the context of political power structure in Pakistan, wherein the former is represented by the status quo group, the latter by the latent agents of change. Calling it 'the arrested media discourse in the immobility syndrome' the chapter presented a critical, and essentially, a subjective survey of Pakistan's body politic, based on secondary data. To test this hypothesis empirically, at purely intellectual level, with the first hand data, a detailed questionnaire, related

to the media, religion and politics in a developing Muslim society, was prepared and distributed among the ulama, the journalists, and the academics, (collectively referred to as Intellectuals/ Opinion makers) in Pakistan.

This chapter analyzes the raw data obtained from the three categories of intellectuals/ opinion-makers (the ulama, the journalists, and the academics) in Pakistan and tests various assumptions about the state and society in that country. A statistical analysis of these responses would help determine the validity or invalidity of our hypothesis that the 'dominant forces of status quo' have perpetuated 'immobility syndrome' and are responsible for the 'arrested media discourse' in Pakistan, and that the 'latent forces of change' have failed to assert themselves, in any meaningful way.

The questionnaire had two parts-- opinions, and socio-biographical questions. The first part had ninety-seven questions and covered areas like Media and Politics, Freedom of Press, the West and the Muslim Society, Religious Revivalism, Politics and the Ulama, Social Status and the Education of the Ulama, and the Religious Factor in the Pakistan Movement. The second part had thirty seven questions related to age, income, education, place of residence-- urban or rural, socio-political environment, political preferences etc.

Two sets of mainly identical questionnaires were distributed, one in the Urdu language for the Ulama, and the other in English for the journalists and the academics. Some questions, related to the religious status of photographs, television images, and the role and status of women in an industrial mass society were addressed only to the ulama (Appendix-II). Another few questions related to the role of print media in Pakistan were addressed only to the journalists and academics (Appendix-I). Among the 112 respondents there are 50 ulama, 30 journalists and 32 academics. The respondent ulama represent all the three local schools of thought (Deobandi, 48%, Brelvi 23%, and Ahle-Hadith 29%) and the two Fiqahs (Sunni 98%, and Shia 2%); the working Journalists represent both the Urdu and the English press, the academics represent, primarily the University teachers (74%) who have been occasionally contributing to the newspapers. To give a fair representation to all the four provinces of Pakistan and all the ethnic groups the questionnaire was distributed in the four provincial headquarters (Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar and Quetta) and other big cities like Multan, Rawalpindi, Gujranwala, Faisalabad, Jhang, Dera Ismail Khan, and Hyderabad.

For convenience in statistical analysis the journalists and the academics have been merged as modernists, because they are all educated in modern system of education and are engaged in non-religious professions-- journalism and university education-- created under the impact of modernism. The ulama have been called

the traditionalists, because their source of inspiration, the system of education, and professional engagement is steeped in tradition-- tradition as opposed to modernity. This intellectual, academic and professional difference has created two parallel world views, which influence political orientation, religious outlook, and media understanding.

No conscious effort has been made to balance our respondents on the gender basis. The gender column was not included in the socio-biographical part of the questionnaire, because there is no known woman among the Ulama; and among the journalists and the academics women's representation is extremely low. More than that the nature of the questionnaire was not gender specific; except 13 questions (from question 42 to 52 and 62 to 63), addressed only to the Ulama, were about economic and political rights of women and their role in the electronic media (Appendix-II). Since, primarily only the ulama have been objecting to women's participation in politics, economic activity, and appearance on TV screen, as a matter of principle, these questions were not addressed to the journalists and the academics.

THE TWO PARALLEL WORLD VIEWS

As stated above modernists and traditionalists constitute two parallel world views in the contemporary Muslim society which despite agreement on the fundamental questions of faith disagree

with each other on most important questions in politics, sociology, philosophy, mass media and the role, place and interpretation of religion. To test this hypothesis against empirical data a detailed questionnaire was prepared and distributed among the Journalists and the Academics and the Ulama in Pakistan in August/ September 1993. The journalists and the academics were taken as representatives of the modernism and the Ulama as representatives of traditionalism.

Sixty two modernist respondents (journalists 30, academics 32) were lumped together and placed against 50 traditionalist (ulama) respondents. Frequency tables and cross tables were obtained using SPSS/PC+ (version 4.0.1; 1990) Microsoft Corp. The responses in original questionnaire were obtained in six columns: column 1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=undecided, 4=agree, 5=disagree, and 6=no answer. While making frequency tables and crosstabs columns one and two were collapsed into one, as 1=disagree, and columns four and five collapsed into one, as 2=agree, and columns three and six were collapsed into one, as 9=missing value. In interpreting the frequency data 'valid percentage' has been used in preference to 'percentage' and 'accumulated percentage'. Two dimensional crosstabs were obtained placing the responses in two horizontal columns: 1=disagree, and 2=agree. The two categories of the respondents (the modernists and the ulama) were placed in vertical columns, the modernists in column one and the ulama in column two. In interpretation 'column total percentage' (response

of the two categories) has been generally given first, followed by 'row percentage' giving separate percentage of the two categories.

To determine the level of relevance between the respondent and the response Chi-square test has been used and significance level fixed at 10% or below. Gamma test has been used to see the nature of relationship between the respondent and the responses. Concordant or positive relationship meant that number one and two in the vertical columns (1=modernists and 2=ulama) and one and two in the horizontal column (1=disagree and 2=agree) corresponded with each other; and discordant or negative relationship meant that number one and two in the vertical columns did not correspond with number one or two in the horizontal column.

1. Political Discourse

While formulating the questionnaire it was assumed that the ulama have been accepting modern ways of politics and mass media after rejecting them first on religious grounds. This acceptance comes quietly and practically, without repudiating the previous religious edicts. It further shows that this belated acceptance is only half-hearted, as something unavoidable, but at the level of principle their position remains unchanged. This dichotomy in belief and practice breeds intellectual hypocrisy which is harmful for a constructive discourse in society (see endnote #1 in chapter 1). To test this assumption empirically it was said in the

questionnaire that the ulama had rejected Western style political institutions when they were first introduced by the British, (Appendix-III, Q0 by Q3) in column total 91% agreed, with the modernists at 95% and the ulama at 85%. When stated that later the ulama started taking part in politics by making political parties and contesting elections (Appendix-III, Q0 by Q4); in column total 93% expressed agreement, with the ulama at 88% and the modernists at 97% in row percentage. To the question that thereby the ulama seem to have accepted Western style politics and institutions (Appendix-III, Q0 by Q5), only 66% agreed in column total, with the modernists at 72% and the ulama at 60% in row percentage. For the three questions Chi-square test showed the level of significance at 08%, 07% and 23% respectively. Gamma test showed discordant relationship at $-.54$, $-.61$ and $-.25$; meaning that the ulama disagreed more than the modernists.

Comparatively lower percentage (66%) of agreement in column total, and even lower percentage (60%) among the ulama in row percentage to the third question, points to the recurring phenomenon of resistance and rejection first, followed by belated half-hearted acceptance in practice, without changing the rejectionist stance in principle. The attitude is further confirmed to another question, addressed only to the ulama, that Western style politics and institutions remain incompatible with the tenets of Islam, but have been accepted in practice because there is no proper Islamic alternative available-- 70% of the ulama agreed.

Responding to the question that the ulama started taking part in politics because they came to realize that they were losing socio-political relevance and importance in the society (Appendix-III, Q0 by Q8), in column total 74% of the respondents in the two categories agreed; with the ulama at 68% and the modernists at 79%. Chi-square showed no significance, and the Gamma test showed discordant relation. Deep down this attitude of first rejection and half hearted late acceptance is a reflection of the static view of time/history, which makes many Muslims think (primarily under the influence of the ulama) that the best has been in the past and the effort should be made to bring that golden period back. There is a difference in seeking inspiration and guidance from a given point of time, and trying to bring it back as if nothing has happened since, and assuming that whatever has happened can be thrown out of the window. Belated acceptance without rescinding original rejectionist stance means that a new practice has been accepted as something unavoidable but not desirable-- things would have been better without it. This approach breeds escapist and rejectionist behavior which harms the ability to face a given challenge squarely and encourage innovative thinking. It may, however, be added that the phenomenon is not peculiar to the Muslims or the ulama alone, it has its repercussions in other systems of thought and practices, and has hindered many societies in meeting new challenges.

When asked if Islam is the inalienable part of Pakistani politics (Appendix-III, Q0 by Q1), 90% respondents in column total

agreed, with the modernists at 88% and the ulama at 92% in row percentage. But when asked whether Pakistan had been demanded to create an Islamic state (Appendix-III, Q0 by Q26) the column total dropped to 77%, with the modernists at 78% and the ulama at 76%. Relatively lower percentage of agreement in the second question points to the historical process through which the modernist-led Muslim League raised the slogan of Islam as a last resort to win popular support, without making it a part of its manifesto. After demanding a separate state on the basis of religion the modernists were not sure where to draw the line between Islam as the basis of Two Nation Theory they championed, and Islam as a socio-political system. This ambivalence of the modernists toward Islam as a polity has led to difference of interpretation among various shades of political analysts and activists to determine the place of Islam in Pakistan. Hence, while almost all (90%) agree that Islam is the inalienable part of Pakistani politics, the equal strong percentage is not sure that it had been demanded to create an Islamic state. Gamma magnitude is $-.08$ and $-.07$, respectively, which shows a negative relation between the two categories-- ulama disagreeing more than the modernists. Chi-square test does not show good level of significance between the respondents and their responses.

It was assumed that the ulama's entry into active politics had been prompted by their fear of being left out of the historical process and being rendered irrelevant in politics and society. With this background they have not been able to make a positive

contribution in articulating Pakistan's political ethos. Instead they have become a negative force with enhanced nuisance value. In frequency table 77% of the ulama disagree to the statement that pursuit of active politics has enhanced their respect, and 62% of them agree that they have become a source of nuisance. Among the modernists 53% believe that the ulama have not been able to make a positive contribution in articulating Pakistan's political ethos by entering active politics (Appendix-III, Q0 by Q11), while 58% of them agree that the ulama have become a nuisance. Chi-square test shows a high level (01%) significance between the respondents and their responses about the question that the ulama have made a positive contribution in politics, and the Gamma test shows discordant (negative) relationship between them. Chi-square test shows no significance (64%) about the question that politics has enhanced the ulama's nuisance value and the Gamma test shows concordant (positive) relation (.09).

The interesting result here is that the modernists seem to be more positive about ulama's political role than the ulama themselves. It is even more interesting to know 57% of the ulama respondents were active in politics as student, and 62% of them received their education in those institutions where the academic atmosphere was politicized. The result needs further investigation to determine the causes of their disillusionment, or at least lack of enthusiasm in politics. It may be argued that the ulama feel that they have not been able to achieve in politics what they

wanted to-- acquisition of political power, and turning Pakistan into a truly Islamic state as they visualized. This failure is verified by their performance in elections (see Table-1, and Figure-3 in Chapter-4). Coupled with lack of success at the ballot box is the loss of esteem they used to enjoy in society before entering active politics. When they became active in politics they were treated by the media and the people like any other politician. Their image changed from 'holy men' to worldly men craving for political power and ready to compromise on principles. Loss of the aura of holiness and the failure to achieve political power, mainly because of parasitic cultural ethos, in any meaningful way, may be the only explanation for the ulama's feeling that they have lost respect by entering politics¹.

This point can be further elaborated by analyzing responses to the question that the ulama are not as important in the state structure and social organization as they used to be in the Ummayyad, the Abbaside, and the Ottoman Empires. In column total 87% agree to it, with the modernists at 78% and the ulama at 98% in row percentage (Appendix-III, Q0 by Q60). Chi-square test shows very high level of significance at 00%, and Gamma magnitude stands at +.84 with concordant (positive) relation, meaning that the ulama agree more to the question than the modernist. The note worthy point is exceptionally high percentage of the ulama who agree as compared to the modernists; there is a difference of 20%. This may help explain that the ulama are feeling left out in the socio-

political process, despite their best efforts to stay relevant. They seem to think that they were better off as a subordinate group in the Muslim Empires, when they had secure jobs, and access to the rulers who needed their support to further their political ends, than today, when they are independent political force, are more vocal than ever before, but lack job security, are ill-equipped to take up any important assignment in the state structure, and do not command respect they used to have. This age of democracy, mass society, mass media and capitalism has proved too much for them. They lost job security and esteem of the imperial age and have not been able to carve a niche in the new structure.

The ulama are almost evenly divided (51% yes and 49% no) on the question that the present Pakistani Constitution is Islamic. This is despite the fact that all the religious parties in the Parliament-- the Islamists and the traditionalists alike-- are signatories to the this Constitution.

2. Mass Media Discourse

i. **The Ulama and The Media:** Some socio-biographical questions, and opinion questions about the religious status of television and photographs were addressed only to the ulama. When asked if they had television in their homes 38% ulama replied in the negative. When asked if they considered TV/ film un-Islamic, 41% replied in affirmative, while among their parents 71% regarded television/ film against Islam. The percentage of those regarding television/

film against Islam, among religiously oriented families seems to be dropping from the old to the new generation. When asked about television, film, photographs and cartoons all together, 50% said these things were un-Islamic in themselves, disregard of their practical use (Appendix-II, Q.56). But at the same time 82% see no harm in watching informative and news programs on television (Appendix-II, Q.60); 62% approve of watching T.V. plays of social nature and entertainment programs as well (Appendix-II, Q.61). They, however, object (75%) to the women's appearing in the T.V. plays or entertainment programs (Appendix-II, Q.62). At the same time they strongly approve (85% yes) that in this age of global media the Muslim people must compete with others to project their point of view, and make efforts to attract the global audience (Appendix-II, Q.64). They also approve at 69% that the students in the religious institutions should be provided with television and radio (Appendix-II, Q.67).

Related to the same is the question about the religious status of photographs, about which 84% said they got themselves photographed out of necessity and not fondness. One respondent who had got himself photographed out of fondness at the young age of twelve regrets that he made this mistake.

There is an obvious contradiction in the ulama's responses which betrays their ambivalence toward the usefulness of an essentially 'un-Islamic' invention. They are not clear in their

minds what to do with a medium which has been virtually thrown at them from the West. Unlike the printing press which has become integral to their thinking because it is seen as a continuation of the literate tradition of Islam, the medium of television and camera still remain alien in their scheme of thought. There is also a gradual acceptance of television among the religious families, from parents to children.

There used to be no picture in most of the magazines and newspapers owned and run by the Muslims in the forties and before, partly because it was expensive, but more because it was not approved from religious point of view. Then gradually they started giving photographs related to news, care was however taken to publish only male photographs. A little later female faces also started appearing, this time the precaution was taken not to publish the pictures of glamorous women particularly from the showbiz. That too has changed now. Almost all leading newspapers and magazines, with few exceptions, publish photographs, many of them carry special editions on showbiz and compete in publishing color photographs of attractive women to increase or maintained their circulation. To illustrate this point today's *Daily Nawa-e-Waqt* and *Weekly Takbeer* may be compared with the *Nawa-e-Waqt*, and the *Zamindar* of the forties. Since there is no such study available it would make a good research project to study changing patterns of photo and cartoon printing in the Muslim owned publications in South Asia.

The Muslim people have been reluctant and apprehensive about the human images being produced as photographs in a still camera, in a movie film, or on television screen. It is a common belief among the Pakistani Muslims that the angels of blessing (*rehmat*) do not visit the places which have pictures/photographs of living beings, particularly that of human beings. One cannot pray in a room which has a picture. These common beliefs have their source in the religious edicts issued by the ulama declaring films and photographs un-Islamic. When stated that the ulama failed to perceive the future importance and usefulness of these scientific inventions when they issued *fatwas* against photographs and films (Appendix-III, Q0 by Q35); in column total 70% of the respondents agreed to it, and in row percentage the modernists are at 85% and the ulama at 48%. Chi-square test shows very high level of significance with 00% and the Gamma test magnitude is .72% with a discordant relationship. The important thing is that the ulama who had 100% agreement among them when these '*fatwas*' were issued are now almost evenly divided, with 52% of the ulama disagreeing with the question and 48% agreeing to it. It is, however, difficult to understand how it can be claimed that the ulama had visualized future utility of pictorial inventions and still prohibited it as 52% of the ulama want us to believe. And if the edicts had been issued knowingly why the present generation of the ulama is apparently "violating" these edicts. Having opposed pictorial news coverage the ulama today vie with each other to get better T.V. and Press coverage. It needs to be further investigated whether these

ulama are committing a sin, from their point of view, by appearing in newspaper photographs and television footage.

Almost identical result has been obtained to the question that by opposing pictorial coverage the Muslims have lagged behind in effective projection of their point of view (Appendix-III, Q0 by Q36). In column total 66% agree, but in the row percentage the modernists are at 78% and the ulama at 51%. The ulama are again evenly divided, with the modernists taking a relatively clearer position. This pattern of behavior again confirms the assumption that the ulama have been accepting things after rejecting them first, but only in practice without changing their position in principle. This attitude of caution and apprehension naturally keeps the community lagging behind those who accept them earlier and more willingly. It is a common observation in Pakistan that many of those having banking, filming, and photography as their profession feel uncomfortable about the religious status of their source of livelihood. Though the number of such uncomfortable souls is decreasing but is easy to imagine how this would affect one's performance.

Enlarging the perspective it was observed that this approach of first rejection and late acceptance has inhibited the urge to invent and innovate among the Muslims (Appendix-III, Q0 by Q37). The result is not much different from the first two questions. In column total 63% agreed, and in row percentage the modernists are

at 76% and the ulama at 47%. The ulama are again almost evenly divided, with 47% yes and 53% no. Chi-square test shows very high level of significance at 00% and the Gamma shows discordant relationship at .56 magnitude. It is significant to note that almost half of the ulama are conscious of the negative effects of their media edicts. When and how this encouraging consciousness would lead to a break with the past tradition, is difficult to visualize.

There were three questions about the freedom of expression and their results show the difference of approach between the modernists and the ulama. When stated that freedom of expression was a prerequisite for democracy (Appendix-III, Q0 by Q55), in column total 96% of the respondents agreed, with the modernists at 98% and the ulama at 94% in row percentage. Another 94% agreed in column total when stated that freedom of expression was guaranteed in Islam (Appendix-III, Q0 by Q56), with the modernists at 91% and the ulama at 98%. When suggested that freedom of expression should be subject to review by the ulama (Appendix-III, Q0 by Q57), in column percentage 67% opposed the idea, but in row percentage 65% of the ulama supported it, as against 12% modernists. This despite the fact that 94% ulama agreed that freedom of expression was a prerequisite for democracy and 98% said that Islam guaranteed freedom of expression. It is obvious that the ulama see no contradiction in democracy, freedom of thought and their review by the ulama. The ulama would not agree to it but seems they support

a kind of 'Vilayet-e-Faqih²'.

The point that the ulama want to restrict freedom of thought is further demonstrated by their response to the question that if freedom of thought is made subject to review by the ulama it would empower them to impose a virtual censorship (Appendix-III, Q0 by Q58). Here in total column 65% of the respondents agreed, with the modernists at 79% and the ulama at 44% in row percentage. This means that 56% of the ulama see no harm in making freedom of expression subject to review by the ulama. Another noticeable point is that after supporting ulama's review power by 65%, their percentage drops to 56% when they say that review by the ulama would not amount to censorship. It seems 9% of them either changed their minds or contradicted themselves in the two questions. May be this change is because of the negative connotations of the word 'censorship'?

The ulama have an elitist approach toward knowledge, whereby they rightly assume to know better: Say (unto them O Muhammad) Are those who know equal with those who know not? But only the men of understanding will pay heed (Al-Quran, 39:9)³. They also refer to a Hadith to claim that they are heir to the Holy Prophet as interpreters of Islam. They tend to have the same elitist approach toward politics, which they evolved during the period of the Muslim Empires. When the ulama started lending support to the rulers in all their political deeds and misdeeds the Sufis and dissident

ulama resisted and criticized them. Particularly the Sufis became closer to the people and the poor, in their passive resistance or indifference to the political powers of the time. This difference in approach is especially significant in Pakistan where the spread of Islam owes to the Sufis. The ulama's elitist politics has an inherent disdain for democracy wherein majority is the authority. They tend to suspect the people, and despite the fact that there is no clergy in Islam they have a professional interest in not according recognition to those learned individuals who acquire knowledge on their own or hail from a different school'. Coupled with this is the ulama's thinking, as noted above, that they were better off in days of the Muslim Empires. This breeds inevitable disdain for democracy. They do not seem to have reconciled themselves with the demise of the Empires and the arrival of a democratic regime. It is here that the interests of the Pakistani ruling elite and that of the ulama coincide.

ii. **Government And The Media:** A set of questions on the government media relation and the role of press in Pakistan was addressed only to the working journalists and the academics. When stated that the press, and particularly the Urdu Press played with religious sentiments of the people and projected the ulama as true spokesman of Islam and the Two-Nation Theory (Appendix-I Q40), the journalists agreed at 63% and the academics at 52%. The working journalists who know the inside story of the working and planning of the newspapers should be given more weight, here, than the

academics. The academics have, obviously, based their opinion on the contents of the newspapers and are not expected to be aware of the haggling which goes into the writing, placing and display of a news story. It is therefore reasonable to ascertain that our respondents believe that the press did play with the religious sentiment and unduly portrayed the ulama as a spokesman of Islam.

Now the logical next question would be why the press did that. Was this decision taken independently on the basis of professional criteria or it was some external pressure which forced the press to do that. It was stated in the questionnaire that the ruling elite exploited religious feelings of the people to further their own political ends; the press and the ulama proved only instrumental in the process (Appendix-I Q41). To this statement 94% of the academics and 93% of the journalists agreed. The overwhelming agreement among the intellectuals whom we have called the free floaters in the body politic of Pakistan, exposes the severe limitation, imposed on the press and demonstrates the ability of the ruling elite to manipulate Islam, the ulama and the media to further their interests.

If it be so where does the much cherished role of a free press stand in Pakistan; has not the press "by and large failed to play its role as the fourth estate"⁵ (Appendix-I Q42). To this question 81% of the journalists and 81% of the academics agreed. To make the point clearer it was stated that under the circumstances 'the press

has been a willing or unwitting tool in the hands of the ruling elite. This statement was endorsed by 92% of the academics and 70% of the journalists.

These responses from the opinion makers of the country speak for themselves. It must be added that since the respondents are working journalists and academics, it does not indicate how the owners (who are mostly the chief editors or executive editors of the newspapers) and the ruling elite feel about it. It needs to be further investigated whether the ruling elite and the owner-editors feel differently. The ruling elite often complain that the press is a bit too free in Pakistan and does not toe the line. This is obvious in the administrative measures taken against the press and pressmen, in the form of discontinuation of government advertisement, (a major source of income for the newspapers); discriminatory implementation of the rulers on the import of newsprint and cancellation of declarations. The last phenomenon was recurring most frequently in the Bhutto regime of the 1970s, and outright censorship, a familiar method of military regimes. The military governments despite excessive control on the press have always complained of too much press freedom: President Ayub Khan and President Zia-ul-Haque are two case in point. Ayub Khan, used to say 'even an ordinary medical dispenser would need training and a license before he can use a syringe on a patient, but these pressman who inject curious ideas into the heads of the people, everyday, need no training no permission" (Shahab, 1988:799-800).

Despite these limitations, one might think the press must have made efforts to play its due role. It was stated that 'despite undemocratic regimes the press has played its due role' (Appendix-I, Q45). Only 59% journalists, and 41% academics endorsed the statement. It may be inferred from this response that the working journalists and academics are not convinced that it is only the ruling elite which is to be blamed for the situation; they seem to blame the media men for not making a serious effort to assert themselves. The desire for freedom of press and democracy asks for struggle and sacrifice and that is where Pakistani politics and media have failed. The press has been faced with the choice of 'extinction or survival' and always chose for 'survival' and entered into compromises. It was stated that this preoccupation with 'survival' made the main stream press subservient to the interests of the government (Appendix-I, Q47). To this observation 94% academics and 67% of the journalists agreed. In the preceding questions the academics are more critical of the press than the journalists. This may have two reasons, one, they don't have professional interest in wishing for a positive image of their profession, two they are not aware of the pressure and threats the journalists brave to make do with the existing modicum of the freedom of press.

How to break this stranglehold of the ruling elite on the freedom of press? Through sustained political struggle which is often in low key or dormant in Pakistan, or through long term wide

ranging changes in the economic structure, which might better ensure democracy and freedom of the press? Since most of the time government exerts pressure through financial measures, in the form of discriminatory policy in the distribution of government advertisements and the import of newsprint, it is more important to relax official financial hold on the press. Administrative and legal restriction can be taken care of subsequently. Without economic autonomy, freedom of thought cannot be realized. It was therefore stated that the financial hold of the government "can be relaxed only if trade and industry flourish in the private sector". It was added that this was one reason why "the ruling elite does not want an industrial society, nor the resultant free press in Pakistan". To the first question 93% in both categories agreed, and the second point was endorsed by 66% journalists and 76% academics. This difference points to the fact that while the ruling elite is averse to an industrial society and the resultant differentiation and freedom in society, but this is not the only reason that Pakistan has not been able to strengthen its industrial base. Metropolitan capitalism coupled with the interests of the ruling elite has only made the industrial progress more difficult. In societies like Turkey and Malaysia, where only the global capitalist factors have been obstructing the emergence of industrial society the situation is better than in Pakistan, both with regard to economy and freedom of press. Turkish press and television have become lot more free and assertive with the growth of private trade and industrial sector. By the same token democracy

has become more secure because the economic forces unleashed during the eighties have strengthened the middle class, whose interest the Turkish establishment represents. Economic management has become so complex that short of a total economic/political collapse military and other sources of threats to democracy are not likely to intervene. In Pakistan the military, the civil bureaucracy and the landlords continue to hold the economic forces in the palm of their hands and manipulate them easily.

3. The Western Challenge And The Muslim Response

The challenge posed by the West to the Muslim East is more serious and far reaching than any challenge (Greek thought or Mongol invasion) faced by the Muslim world before. A detailed survey of this challenge and response is beyond the scope of this study, but as it impinges upon every aspect of life and thought-- media, politics and religion in Pakistan in our case-- it was inevitable to give it some place in this research. A set of questions was addressed to Opinion-makers in Pakistan, which gives some interesting results. When asked that the ulama's traditional prestige declined in the Muslim societies mainly because they **did not study and refute the Western thought** as they had done during the Greek challenge (Appendix-III, Q0 by Q63). To this observation 74% of the respondents agreed in column total; in row percentage the result is not different-- academics at 75% and the ulama 73% agreed to the statement.

This agreement shows the two sides realize that the ulama did not live up to their name and failed to provide guidance at a crucial juncture of the Muslim history. One reason was that the ulama were not prepared to face the challenge. As pointed out by Ghulam Kibria (daily the 'Dawn' Dec.27,1991) even a sage like Shah Waliullah did not realize in the eighteenth century that a new challenge was in the making. He makes no reference to the West in any of his writings. In column total 78% agreed that the Western onslaught was so intense and unexpected that it caught the ulama unprepared; in row percentage 82% of the ulama and 75% of the modernists agreed to it. They also agreed (column total 71%) that the ulama have still not recovered from this lag; row percentage on this point is again close, 70% modernists and 74% ulama. The higher percentage among the ulama may be interpreted as an indication that they are acutely aware why did they decline in esteem and how they failed to face the new challenge. This trend is different from the previous attitude of ignorance, wherein the ulama just wished the West disappear. The problem however remains that this awareness has not produced any tangible result in their ideological and practical approach. They remain undecided and confused about the status of women in an industrial differentiated society, the role and requirements of mass media, the rules of political game, the question of nation state (the contemporary field of Muslim discourse) and the Ummah (the ideal field of Muslim discourse), the study of modern physical and social sciences, and the emergence of an industrial society with pluralist democracy. Even this awareness

of lagging behind and having been off the mark is an encouraging sign. May be in due course it leads to a comprehensive answer to the above questions. Is time waiting for the birth of an Al-Ghazali.

It is believed that innovative thinking is conversely related to inhibition and caution. Among the South Asian Muslim intellectuals Iqbal is the only eminent exception who exhorted the people to shed their inhibitions and think afresh and anew.⁶ His admiration for courage and exaltation of individual and collective ego is in stark contrast with the inhibitive, cautious, evasive and escapist approach promoted by the traditionalist ulama, particularly with the advent of colonialism. When asked that, 'instead of considering the practical benefits of modern scientific inventions, the ulama are still debating whether to accept or reject the big strides made by the West in knowledge, science and technology, on religious grounds' (Appendix-III, Q0 by Q68), in column total 67% agreed, and in row percentage modernists agreed at 79% and the ulama at 52%. When the attention was drawn to the consequences of this inhibitive, cautious thinking whereby the Muslims, particularly the ulama, tend to react to any new idea, or practice, or invention with prompt rejection, followed by belated acceptance. In column total 85% of the respondents agreed, and in the row percentage 72% ulama and 95% modernists approved of it.

It was further pointed out that due to this approach (1) the Muslims as a whole do not initiate and invent any more, they only react (Appendix-III, Q0 by Q73), (2) and thereby they have placed themselves at the receiving end (Appendix-III, Q0 by Q72). To the first part of the question 75% respondents agreed in column total, with the ulama at 61% and the modernists at 86%, in row percentage. To the second part of the question in column total 82% respondents agreed in column total, and in row percentage the modernists stand at 93% and the ulama at 68%. The the modernists overwhelmingly (86% and 93%) seem to blame the ulama for the current state of affairs, at the intellectual level at least. But the level of agreement (61% and 68%) among the ulama is also worth noticing. This reaffirms what we have stated earlier that the ulama are now aware of their weaknesses and negative points. The question which needs further investigation is why this awareness is not being reflected in new thinking? An investigation into this question may provide clues to the prevalent confusion and tension in the Muslim soul.

4. *Ijtehad*

*Ijtehad*⁷ and *Ijma*⁸ are the two juristic devices which ensure that the Muslim ummah never lags behind time and meets all challenges by exerting their individual and collective judgement in the light of the teachings of the Quran and the Sunnah. The Islamic concept of the finality of prophethood is, in fact a liberating challenge to mankind that they have to exert their own power of judgement to decide a point of law without waiting for divine

intervention through a prophet. The irony is that the Muslims have turned this liberating force into an impediment, for the last five hundred years, by denying themselves the right to evolve their own opinion through *Ijtehad* and *ijma*⁹. According to Iqbal the ultimate spiritual basis of all life, as conceived by Islam, is eternal and reveals itself in variety and change. A society based on such a conception of Reality must reconcile, in its life, the categories of permanence and change. It must possess eternal principles to regulate its collective life; for the eternal gives us a foothold in the world of perpetual change. But eternal principles when they are understood to exclude all possibilities of change which, according to the Quran, constitute the greatest 'signs' of God, tend to immobilize what is essentially mobile in its nature. The failure of European in political and social science illustrates the former principle, the immobility of Islam during the last 500 years illustrates the latter. What then is the principle of movement in the structure of Islam? This is known as '*ijtihad*'. 'The word literally means to exert. In the terminology of Islamic law it means to exert with a view to form an independent judgement on a legal question. The idea, has its origin in the Quran and the tradition of the Holy Prophet (Iqbal, 1975:147-148).

The theoretical possibility of first degree of IJTIHAD¹⁰, (which means complete authority in legislation which is practically confined to the founder of the four schools) is admitted by the

Sunnis, but in practice it has always been denied ever since the establishment of the schools, in as much as the idea of complete IJTIHAD is hedged round by conditions which are well nigh impossible of realization in a single individual. Such an attitude seems exceedingly strange in a system of law based mainly on the ground work provided by the Quran which embodies an essentially dynamic outlook on life' (Iqbal, 1975:149).

Here, we are not concerned here with the juristic implication of ijtehid, nor with the details of its modalities. Our concern is only at the level of broad principle and how it can be carried out. In the questionnaire it was stated that *Ijtehad* can be exercised by the Muslims (Appendix-III, Q0 by Q86), to which in total column 92% respondents agreed, in row percentage the ulama approved it at 80% and the modernists at 96%. They also agreed (86% in column total, with 88% ulama and 86% modernists in row percentage) that the ulama of Islam had practically chosen to close the doors of *Ijtehad*, yet the Muslim society has been changing with the passage of time, and a number of new ideas and practices are being accepted or rejected without *ijtehad* support of the ulama (Appendix-III, Q0 by Q87). The following question stated, as a result of closing the doors of *Ijtehad* 'the ulama have been losing their traditional prestige which they used to enjoy because of their learned status and the prerogative of *Ijtehad* (Appendix-III, Q0 by Q88), to this statement 86% agreed in column total, with the ulama at 81% and the modernists at 90% in row percentage. It seems the ulama and the

modernists think alike on the need for *Ijtehad*. Their differences emerge when the question is asked how to exercise this right.

In column total 53% of the respondents rejected the idea that a parliament elected by the Muslim voters can exercise the right of *Ijtehad* (Appendix-III, Q0 by Q90), in row percentage, 57% of the modernists, however, approved of it, and 66% of the ulama disapproved. The narrow margin of agreement and disagreement indicates the difference of opinion is not sharp. When observed that only the ulama, and the not elected parliament is empowered to exercise *Ijtehad* (Appendix-III, Q0 by Q91), the position was evenly divided at 50% in column total, in row percentage, however, 66% of the modernists opposed the idea and 72% of the ulama supported it. Here is position in more clear between the two categories. Opinion between the two categories converged when observed, in line with Iqbal's proposal that an elected parliament can exercise *Ijtehad* in the guidance of the ulama (Appendix-III, Q0 by Q92), in column total 82% respondents approved, and in row percentage the ulama approve at 88% and the modernists at 77%. Higher percentage of approval from the ulama may be interpreted as an indication that they are eager to be made a part of the modern system with a distinct identity, the same idea is perhaps responsible for relatively lower percentage from the modernists who are wry of guidance from the ulama. Though the ulama have still not resolved the issue of nationalism and ummah, yet they approve of the idea that Muslim nation-states are free to exercise the right of *Ijtehad*

in matters related to their country (Appendix-III, Q0 by Q93). In column total 84% approved of the idea, with the ulama at 81% and the modernists at 86% in row percentage. The question, however, remains why despite lower level of difference of opinion and willingness from both sides to exercise *Ijtehad* nothing much has been achieved on important questions of law and culture. This calls for yet another research project to find out where lies the hindrance.

5. Status And Role Of Women

It has been observed above that the ulama and the modernists have a fairly reasonable level agreement on the questions of principles, but they stand apart when it comes to specifics, particularly with reference to modern inventions, ideas, and practices. In the case of mass media there was a high level of contradiction among the ulama, and wide difference of opinion between the two world views. This self-contradiction among the ulama speaks even loudly about the status of women in a contemporary Muslim society: in frequency table 96% of the ulama agree that Islam gives women the right to engage in economic activity (Appendix-II, Q42); 61% also agree that with modern means of mechanized mass production women's economic activity cannot be limited to their homes (Appendix-II, Q43); so 70% agree that women can work in the industrial units away from their homes (Appendix-II, Q44), yet 72% maintain that a women cannot travel alone in or outside the country (Appendix-II, Q45).

The same self contradictory pattern is visible in their responses to the question about the acquisition of scientific and technical knowledge by women: in frequency table 90% of the ulama approve that women should acquire modern scientific and technological knowledge (Appendix-II, Q46), however, when pointed out that modern research and quest for knowledge is a full time job at advanced level and this might not let the women perform all the domestic duties they have been performing traditionally (Appendix-II, Q47), the approval rate went down to 60%. Under the circumstances 54%, revising their first opinion agreed to the statement that 'women should not be allowed to learn modern scientific and professional disciplines, indiscriminately' (Appendix-II, Q48). According to a tradition from the Holy Prophet acquisition of knowledge is a duty of every Muslim (male or female) therefore the 90% Ulama found it difficult to debar women from acquisition of knowledge in the first place. They are, nevertheless, ready to restrict and discriminate acquisition of knowledge on the basis of gender if it is likely to compromise women's traditional role in the house. It can be concluded that acquisition of knowledge has been made subservient to the women's duties in the house.

The ulama accept at 62% in frequency table that women have a right to vote in a general election (Appendix-II, Q49) but they are opposed to women's candidacy (69%) in elections (Appendix-II, Q50), their right to participate in the running of the government (67%);

(Appendix-II, Q51) and their right to get elected as head of state or government (71%) (Appendix-II, Q52). Once again the problem of intellectual contradiction becomes obvious. As stated in the previous chapter *Jamaat Islami* supported a women candidate, Mohtarama Fatima Jinnah, against President Ayub Khan in 1965 presidential elections, as a 'lesser evil'. The Traditionalists led by *Jamiat-al-Ulama-e-Islam* opposed her because of her gender. In 1988 *Jamaat* questioned the election of Benazir Bhutto as Prime Minister on religious grounds; the Traditionalists maintained their position. Benazir's reelection in 1993 has not been objected to. Both, the Revivalists and Traditionalists entered into 'electoral understanding' (a euphemism for formal electoral alliance) with Benazir, and have been supporting her government. The Traditionalist *Jamiat* has accepted provincial ministerial post in the Frontier province in alliance with Benazir's Pakistan Peoples Party. It may be added that majority of the respondents among the ulama here are the Deobandis who are represented in the *Jamiat-al-Ulama-e-Islam*.

6. The Type Of Education

	Type of Education				
	Traditional Education	Modern Education			
Ulama	54%	46%	Early Education		
	57%	43%	Higher	"	"
Academics	nil	100%	Early	"	"
	nil	100%	Higher	"	"
Journalists	nil	100%	Early	"	"
	nil	100%	Higher	"	"

Table 2

Among the journalists 84% and among the academics 85% received university education in Pakistan; 16% journalists and 15% academics had higher education abroad, of which 8% journalists and 11% academics attended European or American Universities, the rest attended universities in the Third World countries. This difference in academic background between the religiously educated Ulama and the modern educated journalists and academics is bound to reflect in their political and religious ideas, which we shall see below.

With a view to determine whether a particular type of education-- Traditional vs. Modern-- has any significance in influencing the responses, the two types of education have been analyzed against 57 questions. There are two education systems in Pakistan one modern, which was introduced under the Western influence and promoted by Syed Ahmed Khan, the other religious/traditional which has its roots in the history of Islam. Discussion between modernist and traditionalist intellectuals is heavily influenced by the type of education. Among our respondents journalists, and academics are 100% educated in modern schools, while 57% of the ulama had their higher education in traditional institutions, and the rest had modern education. On the one hand it shows that modern type of education is far more common among the intellectuals than religious education, and on the other it shows that modern education is not necessarily devoid of religious content (as claimed by many critics). Modern education system as practiced in Pakistan remains conducive to religious orientation; and the proof is that 43% ulama had their higher education in modern education institutions.

It may be evident by now that the results obtained from the preceding crosstabs, with Intellectuals (modernists vs. traditionalists) as independent variable, are going to be identical to the results obtained here with Education (modern vs. traditional) as independent variable. A look at table-1 above would show that the modernists (journalists and academics) have

zero representation in the traditional education category; while the ulama have above 40% percent representation in the modern education category. This dichotomy makes the variable traditional education in the present crosstabs identical to the variable ulama in the preceding crosstabs. The identical nature of result with virtually identical independent variables (traditional education represents only the ulama, and modern education represents all three types of intellectuals) in two crosstabs is further evident from a comparison of the two out puts. A quick glance at the column total or row percentage in the two cross tables would confirm identical results. Similarly chi-square test also shows 26 identical levels of significance. Because of these reasons there no need to explain the results, because it would mean repeating what has been stated in the explanation of the preceding crosstabs.

The comparative chart below shows identical results in the two cross tables. Crosstab-1 column gives the results with Intellectuals as independent variable, and Crosstab-2 column gives the result with Education as independent variable. Every tenth, or the nearest available dependent variable has been selected as sample (see table 3 below).

Dependent Variables	Crosstabs-1 column total	Crosstabs-2 column total
1	90%	90%
10	60%	59%
20	98%	98%
30	73%	71%
39	95%	94%
51	45%	42%
60	87%	86%
71	85%	86%
81	84%	83%
91	50%	50%

Table 3

It is evident that Education as independent variable has produced the same result as with Intellectuals as independent variable. Traditional education studied against modern education means studying the ulama against the modernists, which has been done in the preceding section.

7. Income Satisfaction/ Dissatisfaction

Crosstabs, Chi-square and Gamma tests have shown the least relevance between the level of satisfaction/ dissatisfaction with income of the respondents and their responses. In the Chi-square test only 3 instances have been reported where

satisfaction/dissatisfaction with income is significantly related to their responses. When studied in broader context it has been felt that there could not be any genuine relation of income satisfaction/ dissatisfaction with these questions. The first significantly related question was, 'the ulama confronted the rulers, only when they felt that he had deviated too far, e.g. Ahmed Sirhindi's revolt against Akbar'. Chi-square test reported 01% significance. The next significantly related question is, 'when 'fatwas' against films and photographs were issued, the ulama had failed to perceive the future importance and usefulness of these scientific inventions'. Chi-square test reported 03% significance. The third question is, 'making freedom of thought subject to review by the ulama would amount to giving them power to impose virtual censorship'. Chi-square test reported 08% significance. It is difficult to give a plausible sociological explanation for a genuine relationship between satisfaction/ dissatisfaction of the middle and lower middle class respondents and their responses to these three questions. It seems that satisfaction/ dissatisfaction with income has little relation with responses to the questionnaire, for a number of reasons discussed below.

The division of society into classes is primarily based on the level of surplus value appropriation i.e. income. The respondents in this survey are presumably all from the middle or lower middle class, and as compared to the ruling elites are among the have-nots. The income level of a working journalist, a university

teacher, or a religious scholar, in a developing country like Pakistan, is lower than the income of a civil servant, a military officer, a landlord, or the income of a merchant/ industrialist. The real difference between the two groups is not income alone, more important than that is the difference in social prestige, which is directly related to the coercive power of members of the ruling elite. A new university teacher, and a new civil servant are in the same National Pay Scale and get the same salary, but the difference comes with the perquisites and fringe benefits, coupled with power to harm and grant favors, and the opportunities to make money through informal channels. Needless to say the intellectuals-- the journalists, the academics, and the ulama in our case-- have little share of coercive power and the means of increasing their income through informal channels. The cultural ethos of parasitic landlordism, as explained earlier, works against intellectual pursuits and has little premium on ideas, knowledge, information, and innovation.

This places our respondents in the lower middle class or more appropriately a sort of white collar workers, who have to work continuously to keep up appearance, with little opportunity of increasing their real income. Among the ulama 76% have no source of income other than their emoluments as religious teachers. Among the academics 70% have no income other than their regular salary or pension as teachers. The remaining 30% have additional income from agricultural sources, urban property and or publications. Similarly

among the journalists 65% have no source of income, other than their salary or pension. Of the remaining 35%, 10% have additional income from agriculture, equal percentage has income from business, and 13% earn some more money as royalty from their publications.

This helps in explaining the real level of income among the respondents, and the reason why it is not significantly related to their responses. Almost all the respondents come within the same income bracket and have identical influence on their responses. Moreover, since vast majority (90% to 80%) of the respondents expressed satisfaction with their earnings there is not much difference in their responses and in relation to their satisfaction/ dissatisfaction with income.

When asked to describe their level of satisfaction with their current income a high percentage in the three categories expressed satisfaction with their income level. Ulama top the list with 90%, the academics are next with 86% and the journalists at 80%. In a poor country which according to the Human Development Report-1994¹¹ ranks 132 in a list of 173 countries, in Human Development Index Ranking, where per capita income is \$ 380¹², where there are over thousand persons per physician and per hospital bed, where per capita electricity consumption is 319 kilowatt-hours, where per capita petroleum consumption is 0.4 barrels, where the ruling elite has been robbing the state of its wealth so mercilessly, where politics is only a rich man's game being played among the same

families, where a small number of people are multi-millionaire in dollar terms, have real estate in Europe and America and maintain secret Swiss bank accounts and travel to Paris and London for shopping, live in palatial houses with scores of retinues; is not this high level of satisfaction, among the middle and lower middle class people, rather, surprising?

It means that the intellectuals, who are mostly from the middle or lower middle stratum of society may be expressing satisfaction for two reasons-- ideological, and social. In a conservative society like Pakistan, where conservatism is, primarily, a joint enterprise of the Parasitic Landlordism and religious traditionalism, it is ideologically and morally more acceptable to be satisfied with what you have than being dissatisfied for what you don't have. By the same token, socially speaking, struggle and desire for a more equitable distribution of wealth and effort for higher level of income should not be made public, lest it betrays your dissatisfaction with the status quo-- the primary determinant of the norms of social conduct. It may be noted that satisfaction level is the highest among the ulama at 90%, and the lowest among the journalists at 80%. The ulama are also the highest (76%) among those who have no supplementary source of income, and the journalist are the lowest (65%) who have no source income other than their profession. It shows the ones who have more sources of income and presumably higher level of income, as well, are relatively more dissatisfied. This means satisfaction/

dissatisfaction, in this case, is more strongly related to ideological reasons than to the real level of income or the level of satisfaction/ dissatisfaction. The ulama's higher level of satisfaction, and the journalists relatively lower level of satisfaction with income should, therefore, be related to ideological reasons. The ulama are, apparently, closest to the religious-conservative ethos, and the journalists the farthest, which has been reflected in their satisfaction/ dissatisfaction with income. It also shows that overall the society lacks enterprising spirit which prompts and incites people to strive for higher income and better standard of living.

It seems fair to conclude that the level of income and satisfaction/ dissatisfaction with it have little relation with responses to the questionnaire, for the reasons explained above. The reasons may be restated as follows: one, because the respondents have expressed a very high level (90% to 80%) of satisfaction with income, for ideological reasons, which has lopsided the balance between the two categories. Two, because all respondents are roughly in the same income bracket. The moneyed people merchants, traders, industrialists, or the members of the ruling elite the civil servants, military officers, the landlords, are not included among the respondents.

8. The Age Group: A Study Of Generation Gap

To analyze how far the age factor influenced the respondents,

crosstabs have been prepared and Chi-square and Gamma tests applied. Chi-square test showed 17 responses had been significantly (below 10%) influenced by the age factor. Gamma test showed concordant relationship with 37 responses and discordant relationship with 20 responses. Age had been divided into two categories upto 45 years and above 45 years. This age categorization divides our respondents between those born after the creation of Pakistan in 1947 and those born before it. The creation of Pakistan is the most important watershed in the recent history of South Asian Muslims. It created the most serious ideological and geographical divisions between the Indian Muslims, and at the same time brought about an unprecedented level of mass movement and unity of purpose among them. The aftermath of the creation of Pakistan particularly ethnic bloodshed, migration of millions of refugees, economic distress, administrative chaos, and political uncertainty in the first few years seem to weigh heavily on the minds of those who witnessed it as kids, or who were old enough to participate in it. The generation which was born and brought up after the creation of Pakistan neither experienced the fervor of the struggle for Pakistan nor suffered the harsh realities of the struggle and the birth of a new state. It is assumed that the two age groups have different perceptions on a number of issues. To test this assumption empirically the two age groups have been examined against 57% dependent variables in crosstabs.

The ulama's age group, ranges from 21 years to 72 years, with median age coming to 47-- majority being in the forties and the fifties. In the case of the journalists and the academics minimum and maximum age is 22 years to 76 years, with median age of 51. It shows the respondents not only have academic information but also have personal experience of seeing political vicissitudes of the country.

Age Group And The Number Of Respondents

	Upto 45 years	Above 45 years
Academics	22%	88%
Journalists	41%	59%
Ulama	47%	53%

Table 4

It seems the older generation has higher representation among our respondents in all the three categories; the academics are most severely imbalanced, and the ulama are the most balanced.

Over the last few decades it has been assumed that the ulama and Islam are on the rise in the Muslim societies. Pakistan owes its creation and existence to Islam; but at the same time it was a modernist leadership which brought it about, the traditionalist ulama failed to appreciate the implications of the idea and

remained opposed to the Pakistan Movement. This paradox has always strained the ideologues to determine the role, place and interpretation of Islam in the state and society. It is, however, assumed that the pre-independence generation, which witnessed the ulama's opposition to Pakistan, and later saw them becoming the champion of the Ideology of Pakistan, would not be so sympathetic to them. The post-independence generation did not experience the ulama's opposition to the Pakistan Movement. It came under the influence of sustained and systematic propagation of Islam as a socio-political system in the Pakistani universities by the revivalists particularly Maulana Maudoodi and his *Jamaat Islami*. The younger generation also felt intellectual necessity to rationalize the state on the basis of an ideology, because it is not an historic entity. This generation is, therefore, expected to have a more positive, or at least less negative attitude toward the ulama. This trend may also be linked with the ideological realignment underway in the Muslim world as a whole. This trend has its roots in the disenchantment with the modernist, secularist pretensions of the early post-colonial era.

Response to the question that Islam is the inalienable part of Pakistani politics (Appendix-III, BQ1 by Q1) indicates that the older generation is more inclined to agree with the statement. In column total 90% respondents agreed, but in row percentage the post-independence generation agreed at 82% and the pre-independence generation at 95%. Prima facie it may be concluded that the older

generation being closer to the Pakistan Movement is perhaps more emphatic about the role of Islam in Pakistani politics. But this inference is not borne out by response to other questions. When stated that 'Pakistan had been demanded to create an Islamic State' (Appendix-III, BQ1 by Q26), in column total 74% respondents agreed to the statement, in row percentage 72% from the pre-independence generation and 76% for the post-independence generation endorse the statement. Chi-square test does not show any significance (72%) here, and the Gamma test indicates discordant relation at .09. Here the percentage among the younger generation is slightly on the higher side, which reverses our inference in previous question that the older generation is more emphatic about the role of Islam in the Pakistani politics. It seems that while answering the first question the respondents had in mind the contemporary political scenario. Here the question is more specific in time and probably evoked a more specific response, which overrides the age factor, leaving a negligible difference of 4% here and a small difference of 13% in the first question.

A clearer situation emerges in response to the observation that, "Pakistan was not conceived as an Islamic State; Islam had been used to win popular support" (Appendix-III, BQ1 by Q27). In column total only 42% respondents in both age groups agreed to the statement, in row percentage the post-independence generation agreed at 56%, and the pre-independence generation at 33%. It may be inferred that the younger generation is relatively more

skeptical about the Islamic origins of the state. It seems the older generation believed more sincerely in the Muslim League's claims about Islam, made towards the end of the Movement. All respondents being from the middle and the lower middle class are not expected to be aware of the intentions and games of the ruling elite. The older generation might have lent support to the Movement genuinely believing that it was going to be an Islamic state. The younger generation is approving the statement with little over fifty percent. It means unlike the older generation they are almost evenly divided. Since both the young and the old believe that Islam is an inalienable part of Pakistani politics, and it had been created to form an Islamic state, it is difficult to conclude that the younger generation is not enthusiastic about Islam in Pakistan. It may be added that being farther from the time of the Pakistan Movement, they are in a better position to make a judgement in the light of new literature on the history of Pakistan Movement. The old generation was directly involved and too close to the event to take a distant view. Being from the middle and lower middle class the old generation respondents lent support to Pakistan Movement when was presented in Islamic terms, without having a chance to study it objectively; they took it at its face value. In any case, before reaching a definite answer on the generation gap with reference to Islam and Pakistani politics, a more comprehensive research is required.

To the question that 'the approach of initial rejection and late acceptance of new inventions and practices has inhibited the urge to invent and innovate, among the Muslims,' (Appendix-III, BQ1 by Q37) in column percentage 64% respondents in all age groups agreed, but in row percentage the pre-independence generation agrees at 52% only as against 71% among the pre-independence generation. Chi-square test shows significance at 07% and Gamma test shows concordant relationship at +40. It can be argued that relatively lower percentage (64%) of agreement shows that a good number of the respondents (44%) either do not blame the ulama or think that the approach of initial rejection and late acceptance is not the major reason for inhibition of innovative thinking. Low approval rate (52%) among the younger generation, as compared to high approval (71%) among the old generation may be taken as an indicator that the older generation is more acutely aware of the negative role of the ulama in this regard. The younger generation, perhaps, because of greater exposure to the world seems to think that rejectionist approach of the ulama is not the only reason for inhibition of innovative thinking, its sources lie outside the Muslim world, in the neo-capitalism? The same trend of not blaming the ulama, with a small margin though, is evident in answer to the question that primary reason for decline in the importance of the ulama in state and society is that they could not offer a viable alternative to the Western ideas and technology. In column total 78% agreed, in row percentage the younger generation agreed at 67% and the older generation at 85%; a difference of 18%! Chi-square

test showed significance at 04% and Gamma test showed concordant relation at 50+.

When asked that, 'instead of considering the practical benefits of modern scientific inventions, the Ulama are still debating whether to accept or reject the big strides made by the West in knowledge, science, and technology, on religious grounds (Appendix-III, BQ1 by Q68). In total column percentage 69% respondents agreed, but in row percentage the older generation agreed at 85% while the younger generation agreed at 46%. Chi-square test shows a very high level of significance at 00%, and the Gamma test shows percentage relation at .74 +. To the statement that, the ulama's first reaction is prompt rejection, followed by acceptance, which often comes late (Appendix-III, BQ1 by Q71), in column total 85% respondents agreed, but in row percentage the old generation approved at 91%, while the younger generation approved at 74%, a difference of 17%. Chi-square test shows significance of relation at 04%, and the Gamma test shows concordant relation at .53 +. When stated that this approach has put the Muslim societies, permanently, at the receiving end (Appendix-III, BQ1 by Q72), in column total 86% agreed to the statement, with the younger generation at 73% and the old generation at 91% in row percentage. Chi-square test shows significance at 04% and Gamma test shows concordant relation at .53+. To the statement that the the Muslims no more initiate and invent, they only react (Appendix-III, BQ1 by Q73), in column total 78% respondents agreed, with the younger

generation at 60% and the older generation at 90% in row percentage. Chi-square test shows significance at 00% and Gamma test shows concordant relation at .69+. Once again the trend of holding the ulama responsible is stronger (85%, 91%, 91%, 90%) among the old generation and weaker (45%, 74%, 73%, 60%) among the younger generation.

When stated that declining prestige forced the Ulama to enter politics (Appendix-III, BQ1 by Q8), in column total 65% respondents agreed, in row percentage the post-independence generation stands at 50% and the pre-independence generation 74%. Chi-square test shows significance at 04% and Gamma test shows concordant relation at .46+. Here too the younger generation seems to be comparatively more positive about the ulama's entry into active politics.

To the question that, 'in an Islamic state, freedom of expression should be subject to review by the Ulama' (Appendix-III, BQ1 by Q57), in column total only 32% agreed, with the post-independence generation at 48% and the pre-independence generation at 23%, a good difference of 25%. Chi-square test shows significance at 01% and Gamma test shows discordant relation at .51+. When stated that 'this would empower the Ulama to impose a virtual censorship' (Appendix-III, BQ1 by Q58), in column total 67% agreed, with the pre-independence generation at 73%, and the post-independence generation at 54%. Chi-square test shows significance at 08% and Gamma test shows concordant relation at .40-. It is

evident that the younger generation supports review of the freedom of expression by the ulama at 48%, meaning they oppose the idea by a 52% only, as against 77% among the old generation. They are also less concerned (54% against 73%) with the apprehension that it would amount to virtual censorship.

This apparent trend of the younger generation of being soft and less negative toward the ulama calls for a more thorough investigation. In addition to what has been stated before it may be added that this trend is the outcome of a reaction against the misdeeds of the ruling elite, which has often betrayed the people.

One more point needs to be explained. The preceding chapter has shown a sustained low percentage of parliamentary seats for the religious parties, and their share went record low in the last general elections in 1993. How the rising sympathy for the ulama among the younger generation can be explained in the light of reverse trend in the election results. One possible explanation is that the respondents in this research do not speak for the general public, 70% of whom live in the rural areas, 74% of whom are illiterate. To that extent the intellectual discourse is uneven and limited to a small urban class. Moreover the cultural ethos of parasitic Landlordism does not allow the intellectual discourse to influence and guide the public opinion. Secondly, being soft or less negative on the ulama does not necessarily mean that the

younger intellectuals are in favor of bringing the ulama to power. Their reaction can be better described as a balancing act.

9. Urban/ Rural Divide And Intellectual Discourse

Migration from rural areas to urban centers and small towns has been a worldwide phenomena since the Industrial Revolution, and is closely related to capitalism. In the third world societies urban to rural migration took an unprecedented new turn with the penetration of capitalist mode of production and industrialization. A host of pull and push factors have been identified in inducing people to leave their rural abodes and settle in urban centers or small towns. The study of causes and consequences of urban-rural migration is beyond the scope of this research, but we do need to know how far this shift has influenced, our respondents in their responses.

It is commonly believed - by the poets and sociologists alike - that the rural people are more conservative religiously oriented and closely identified to community as compared to the urban folks who tend to be relatively liberal, rational and individualistic. To test this assumption empirically the respondents have been divided into two groups-- urban and rural; the place of residence is further linked with age, those who lived in urban/rural areas before the age eighteen are grouped separately from those who lived in urban/rural areas after the age eighteen.

Urban/ Rural Divide Among Intellectuals

		Upto age 18 (category-A)	After age 18 (category-B)
Academics:	Urban	69%	100%
	Rural	31%	00%
Journalists	Urban	64%	96%
	Rural	36%	4%
Ulama	Urban	39%	60%
	Rural	61%	40%

Table 5

As shown in the table above there is a continuous trend of migration from rural to urban areas, in all categories of respondents. Among the Ulama 61% were born and brought up in the rural areas, and after the age of eighteen, 40% were living in the rural areas. On the contrary among the academics 31% were born and brought up in rural areas and 100% of them are now living in urban centers. Similarly 36% journalists lived in the rural areas before eighteen years of age and now 96% of them are in the urban centers. It means the rural area, in the data is represented almost exclusively by the ulama. But at the same time, it must be noted that the nature of the questions under analysis is such that the urban-rural divide can only a marginal influence on the ideas of a person, particularly the ulama. The ulama, belong to one sect or

the other, and they all follow their leaders, who are mostly in the urban areas. A rural 'alim' may be less educated, and more conservative in his day to day behavior, but when it comes to a theological problem, or a political issue he would follow the sectarian line. So the influence of rural residence on the thinking of a religious leader is marginal when it comes to our questionnaire, which mostly covers those areas of thought having a long historical background and serious theological repercussions, which are beyond the rural-urban divide. A rural 'alim' may be more averse to television and photographs than his urban counterpart, but on the question of principle they would think alike, along the sectarian lines.

Relatively larger concentration of the ulama in the rural areas leads to two inferences, one, that they are relatively less under pressure to migrate to the cities for better living, because the rural areas continue to offer them job opportunities. Unlike the universities, and the big newspapers a number of prestigious religious seats of learning are located in the rural areas, e.g. in Akorakhatak in the Frontier, and in Kabirwala in Punjab, but it is impossible to find a university or a newspaper based in the rural areas. Two the ulama are closer to the folks in the rural areas and establish a rapport with the illiterate masses through oral discourse. The academics and journalists are geographically away from the rural folks and do not have an opportunity to establish oral discourse with them. That's why the academics and the

journalists have much less influence on the rural people, or 74% illiterate population. But better oral discourse between the ulama and the rural masses cannot be translated into political influence because of the cultural ethos of parasitic landlordism. Therefore, the ulama have their small pockets of political influence in those rural areas which are away from the areas dominated by landlords and/ or tribal chiefs.

The academics and journalists are supposed to be more differentiated and individualistic in outlook; but when they are put against the traditionalist ulama their responses are also pre-cast in the modernist die, which is ignorant of the tradition. They don't follow a leader, or a sectarian line as in the case of the ulama, but they do have typical biases, which go beyond the urban/ rural divide. Another point is that state ideology has far greater influence on the intellectuals than urban/ rural divide.

Lastly, the questionnaire was not designed, essentially, to measure the influence of the place of residence on the ideas of the respondent. There are many examples but two may be enough to illustrate the point. The first question that 'Islam is the inalienable of Pakistani' politics' and the 5th question that 'ulama seem to have accepted Western style politics and its institutions' cut across all consideration and evokes identical response against every independent variable.

In the cross tabs, done by SPSS-PC+ and the Chi-square test applied to it we see only 10 cases of significance with regard to the place of residence before the age of eighteen, and 22 cases of significance after eighteen years of age. To the question that 'now the ulama are in active politics, because, they feel that by rejecting modern ways of politics they had been losing their traditional importance in state and society' (Appendix-III, BQ16 and BQ17 by Q8) in column total in both categories (before and after age 18) agreed at 77%. However in row percentage in category A, 85% among the urbanites and 68% among the ruralites agreed. Here the Chi-square test shows significance percentage at 06 and Gamma test magnitude is discordant at .44-. But in category B the row percentage of the ruralites goes up to 72% (a rise of 4%) agreed, and the urbanites come down to 78% (a drop of 7%) agreed. A few points are to be noted here, one, according to chi-square test there is significant relationship between the place of residence and response in category A (before age 18), but no significance in category B (after age 18); two, there is higher percentage of agreement to the question among the urbanites than the ruralites. It means majority of the ruralites in both categories (68% in A, & 72% B) and even bigger majority among the urbanite (85% in category A, and 78% in B) agree that the ulama entered politics for fear of losing importance. Only a minority (relatively higher percentage among the ruralites 32% in A and 28% in B, and lower percentage among the urbanites 15% for A., and 22% for B) believe that ulama's entry into politics has been prompted for reasons other than fear

of losing self-importance. The result confirms traditional belief that the people in rural areas have relatively higher reverence for religious leaders. It also shows a more sympathetic understanding of the ulama's role in politics among the urbanites, if we judge by the decrease noticed among the urbanites from category A to B. This point can have an other explanation as well, that the balance might have been tilted (agreed from 85% in A to 78% in B) because larger number of people from rural areas (with high reverence for the ulama) migrated to urban areas.

When observed the, because of feudal and tribal systems religious leaders do not command respect, worthy of an 'alim', (Appendix-III, BQ16 and BQ17 by Q16) in column total 80% respondents agreed in both categories; in row percentage however, the urbanites in both categories seem to agree less than the ruralites: percentage of agreement for the urbanites is 75% in category A and 77% in category B, as compared percentage for the ruralites 86% in category A and 94%. This seems to explain that while there is a high percentage of agreement (80%) that feudal and tribal system is inimical to respect for the learned (alim), but the ruralite seem to feel the pinch more because they are directly exposed to the landlords and the tribal chiefs, than the urbanites, who either never lived in the rural areas or migrated to urban centers and escaped the pressure of the landlords. Another noteworthy point is that those who are in the rural area after the age 18 feel it even more strongly. What needs to be investigated

further is how the tribal chiefs and the landlords feel about it.

To the observation that the students in religious institutions live on charity, which breeds a sense of inferiority among them (Appendix-III, BQ16 and BQ17 by Q17); both the categories in column total agree at 88%, in row percentage, however, the urbanites in both categories agree relatively more than the ruralites. The urbanites, most of whom have not been to religious schools where the students live on charity, agree at 94% in category A and at 92% in category B in row percentage. While the ruralities' level of agreement is relatively lower at 80% in category A and 74% in category B-- 14% and 18% less than the urbanites, respectively. Chi-square test shows significance level at 03%, in both categories, and Gamma magnitude shows discordant relation at .61- between responses and the division of respondents into the urbanites and the ruralites. While a very high percentage of the respondents (80%) endorse the statement, the reason for higher rate of approval among the urbanites (big majority of whom are the modernists) and lower among the ruralites (almost all of whom are the ulama), may be that the ulama, who are mostly the products of religious schools, do not feel that they suffer any inferiority complex, and the urbanites endorse it because, theoretically living on charity should breed inferiority complex. Responses from both categories only reflects how the respondents feel about it, but it cannot be taken as a conclusive answer whether the students in religious schools develop a sense of inferiority or not. To

establish that there is need for a separate research. For the purpose of this research it is enough to know that a big majority (80%) of the respondents, both from urban and rural areas, agree that living on charity does breed a sense of inferiority.

When stated that modern Western thought should not be taught in religious schools, until its proper Islamic critique has been developed, like the one put forth by Imam Ghazali and others in the case of the Greek thought (Appendix-III, BQ16 and BQ17 by Q22). The response is again identical in column total in the two categories (55% agree, 45% disagree). Unlike previous questions here the respondents are not very clear in their minds about teaching Western thought in religious schools, though the majority, with a 5% edge, rejects the idea that we should wait for refutation of Western ideas before teaching them in religious. In row percentage the ruralites seem to support the statement (Western should not be taught) more than the urbanites (43% in category A and 33% in category B, as opposed to 47% among the urbanites in the two categories). Statistically there is no significance in Chi-square test, but sociologically this response is important. It is important less for what the 55% majority says and more for what the 45% minority holds. It has two implications, one that the Western ideas are dangerous and should be avoided, and two what is dangerous for religious school students is okay for students under modernist system of education. Yet another enigma is if the students are not exposed to these 'dangerous' ideas how they are

going to refute them. A Ghazali has to know the dangerous Greek philosophy to come up with its refutation. Are they (the urbanites and ruralites, the modernists and traditionalists) expecting the modernists, who are not immersed in the traditional religious thought to develop a critique from the Islamic point of view, or the idea is that a religious scholar, who has not been exposed to Western thought would one day develop an Islamic critique. The two traditions seem to be as far apart as they have been for the last at least two centuries.

When stated that 'Pakistan had been demanded to create an Islamic State' (Appendix-III, BQ16 and BQ17 by Q26), in column total 77% in category A, and 76% in category B agree, with a relatively higher percentage among the ruralites in row percentage: 80% in category A and 90% in category B, as compared to the urbanites who agree at 74% in category A and 73% in category B. The result only confirms that as compared to the urbanites, the intellectuals with rural background are more supportive of religious ideas and the Islamic ideology of the state. By the same token the question that Pakistan had not been conceived as an Islamic state, rather Islam had been used to win popular support (Appendix-III, BQ16 and BQ 17 by Q27), is rejected, by 62% in column total in the two categories. In row percentage the ruralites reject it at 56% in category A, and 74% in category B, and the urbanites reject it at 68% in category A, and 59% in category B. The noticeable point is relatively lower percentage (62%) of

rejection, here, as compared to higher percentage (77% and 76%) of approval in the previous question. The other point is comparatively lower percentage (56% and 74%) of agreement among the ruralites, here, as compared to very high percentage (80% and 90%) of agreement among the ruralites in the previous question. The pattern of acceptance and rejection is similar among the urbanites but the difference is relatively smaller: 74% and 73% in the previous question and 68% and 59% in the latter.

Two things are to be noted, one that in absolute terms Islam is accepted as the basis of state and thus inalienable part of political discourse in Pakistan, as a given fact, two, when it comes to the question whether Islam had been used as a political ploy to win popular support, the disagreement percentage does not commensurate with agreement percentage in the previous question, meaning, perhaps, no matter when, how, and by whom Islam had been used as a political ploy it definitely constitutes the basis of the state and hence its polity.

To the question that 'when the 'fatwas' against films and photographs were issued, the ulama had failed to perceive the future importance and usefulness of these scientific inventions' (Appendix-III, BQ16 and BQ17 by Q35). In column total 71% in the two categories agree, but in row percentage intellectuals of rural origin seem to agree less than their urban counterparts. The row percentage is 63% in category A and 41% category B among the rural

based intellectual, against 77% in both categories among the intellectuals of urban origin. To the statement that 'by opposing pictorial coverage, first in the print and later in the visual media, the Muslims lagged behind in effective projection of their point of view; in column total 65% of the respondents in both categories agreed, but in row percentage the intellectuals of rural origin agreed at 57% in category A, and at 39% in category B, as compared to the intellectuals of urban origin at 72% approval in category A, and 71% in category B. Responses to both these observation reconfirm that the intellectuals of rural origin are more supportive of the ulama and tend not to find fault with them. The change from 57% to 39% agreement in the second question can be explained with reference to the fact that more of the ulama live rural areas after age 18.

When stated that Pakistani newspapers are biased against the Ulama and do not portray them in a positive light (Appendix-III, BQ16 and BQ17 by Q51). In column total 45% in category A and 46% in category B agree, while in row percentage it has been observed that the intellectuals of urban origin agree less at 40% and 39%, and the intellectuals of rural origin agree more at 51% and 76%, in categories A and B, respectively. This is the first case where the intellectuals of two different origins disagree with a clear majority. The intellectuals of rural origin seem to be more in sympathy with the ulama and think that the press, manned by the modernists, is unsympathetic toward them, and the urbanites think

the press is fair to the ulama. Chi-square test shows no significance in the category A and a very high significance at 00%, in the category B. A similar urban-rural divide is to be seen in response to the question that 'in an Islamic state freedom of expression should be subject to review by the Ulama; in column total only 37% and 36% of the intellectuals agree in the two categories, but in row percentage the intellectuals of rural origin support the idea with 52% in category A and the 74% in category B, as against 22% and 26% approval by the urbanites in the two categories. Chi-square test shows very high level of significance at 00%, between the place of residence of the intellectual and the response. The Gamma test shows concordant relations at .77 and .58 for the A and B category, respectively.

To the observation that instead of considering the practical benefits of modern scientific inventions, the Ulama are still debating whether to accept or reject the big strides made by the West in knowledge, science, and technology, on religious grounds' (Appendix-III, BQ16 and BQ17 by Q68); in column total 68% respondents agreed in both categories, with the rural intellectuals showing lower percentage of agreement at 61% in category A and 53% in category B in row percentage, as compared to the intellectuals of urban origin whose percentage is at 74% and 72% for A & B categories, respectively. It only shows that while majority of the rural intellectuals, who are mostly pro-ulama in our case, and the urban intellectuals, who are mostly modernists, do realize that the

ulama have not been approaching the issue of modern inventions from practical point of view, but it may be noted that those who think that the ulama are doing the right thing in being suspicious and reluctant about new inventions are at 47% among the ruralites in category B-- a fairly big number to effectively resist and thwart the acceptance and entrance of scientific inventions in the society. Response to the question that 'in this regard, their first reaction is prompt rejection, followed by acceptance, which often comes late, gives similar result as above question: the rural intellectuals agree, but their percentage is lower than their urban counterparts. Column total is 85% agreed, and in row percentage the rural intellectuals agree at 74% and 65% in two categories, as against 90% among the urban intellectuals in two categories.

The statement that 'a Parliament elected by the Muslim voters can exercise the right of *Ijtehad*' (Appendix-III, BQ16 and BQ17 by Q90) has been approved only by 47% in column total in both categories. Meaning, either disapproval of the concept of *Ijtehad* or the competence of the parliament to do that. The intellectuals of both categories, and origins have approval/ disapproval percentage between 47% and 53%. This means the situation is not clear, and it is difficult to determine what is the position on the issue. There is however higher percentage of agreement in total column percentage on the observation that a Parliament elected by the Muslim voters may exercise the right of *Ijtehad*, in the guidance of the Ulama (Appendix-III, BQ16 and BQ17 by Q92). Here

the rural based intellectuals are more keen (88% in A and 95% in B categories) to have the process of *Ijtehad* restarted through a modern institution, as compared to the intellectuals of urban origin (76% in category A and 78% in category B). Relatively lower percentage among the urbanite intellectuals (most of whom are modernists) about *Ijtehad* in the guidance of the ulama can be explained in three ways: one they are not well aware as to what such an arrangement would lead to, two, they may be apprehensive of a greater share of political power for the ulama if *Ijtehad* is introduced, and three, they do not trust the ulama's judgement on issues of contemporary relevance.

Statistical analysis and sociological explanations confirm the existence of two world views in the Muslim society in Pakistan, with occasional convergence like the state ideology, and the need to interpret Islam for contemporary political, scientific, and social requirements. The difference is more strong on the mechanism of doing it, where class interests, and ideological differences between the two types of intellectuals collide.

This conclusion is further confirmed by statistical analysis of favorite political and religious leaders in the twentieth century. The Ulama overwhelmingly (80%) selected the Ulama as their favorite leaders: 48% opted for traditionalist Ulama, like Shabbir Ahmed Usmani, Husain Ahmed Madni, Ahmed Raza Brelvi et al. 30% selected those Ulama who had studied modern western thought, like

Shibli Naumani, Abul Kalam Azad et al., and only 2% selected Islamist revolutionary/ revivalist leaders like Imam Khomeini, and Maudoodi. Only 20% of them included Muslim modernist leaders like Jinnah, and Iqbal among their favorite leaders.

Among the journalists and the academics the situation is quite the opposite: 88% selecting Muslim modernists like M. A. Jinnah, Field Marshal Ayub Khan and Z. A. Bhutto as their favorites; Jinnah leading at 55% and Ayub and Bhutto at 8% each. Muslim secularists like Ataturk and Gamal Nasir were selected by 4%, and an equal percentage went for revolutionary revivalist leaders like Imam Khomeini and Maulana Maudoodi. With regard to religious leaders the journalists and the academics have mostly selected religious revivalists and revolutionaries like Maudoodi and Khomeini with Maudoodi at 25% and Khomeini 6%. Next (24%) are those ulama who studied modern Western thought, like Shibli Naumani; with only 8% opting for traditionalist ulama, like Ashraf Ali Thanvi and Shabbir Ahmad Usmani. It may be noted that the journalists and the academics had given very low marks to Maudoodi as a political leader, but put him at the top as a religious leader. This explains partly the Muslim tradition which took shape after the establishment of orthodoxy in the first two countries of Islam when the Ulama appeared as a separate entity, as jurists and theologians who were not to involve themselves directly in the power game, or try to assume political leadership. With the creation of 'parasitic landlordism' in the British India the ulama lost their traditional

juristic and advisory prestige, and became religious functionaries whose only job was to lead prayers, maintain mosques and *madrassas*, and conduct birth, conjugal and death rites. The Muslim historical tradition coupled with 'parasitic landlordism' created a virtual secularism in the Muslim polity. That is how despite the fact that traditional ulama and revivalists command a certain level of respect in society, they are not deemed fit to assume political leadership.

Notes

1. It may be noted that the ulama had opted for isolationist political policy till 1919, when the *Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e-Hind* was founded to further the cause of the Khilafat Movement. From 1919 to 1970 the ulama had been active in politics only as a pressure group, in line with their traditional and historical role to persuade and influence the political powers to abide by the teachings of Islam. In the British India they either sided with the Congress or the Muslim League, or pursued their own agenda without ever contesting elections, or running for political offices. Till 1970 they were not trying to assume political power for themselves. In the 1970 general elections all the religious parties fielded candidates for the first time. One important reason being that the revivalist Jamaat Islami had decided as early as 1957 to struggle for political power through the ballot box, and was likely to emerge as the most vocal advocate of Islam in active politics in the forthcoming elections. (for details see endnote 26 in the previous chapter).

2. The idea has been propounded by Imam Khomeini in his book "*Al-Hukumat-ul-Islamia*". The idea has its roots in the Shia thought and cannot be placed in a Sunni context (as in Pakistan) without problems. Its Western equivalent can be found in Plato 'philosopher king'. The term has been used here only to illustrate a point with reference to an idea which has become more familiar since the Iranian Revolution, otherwise there is no place for 'Vilayet-e-Faqih' in the Sunni jurisprudence and

political thought.

The idea of 'Vilayet-e-Faqih' revolutionized the static Shia political thought, which has decided long ago lie low till the arrival of the Hidden Imam (a sort of return of the promised Messiah). Imam Khomeini said that the ulama (Faqih in his term) have a responsibility toward Allah and the Muslim people to establish an Islamic order in the world now and there. Waiting for the arrival of the hidden Imam is not a justification to show the responsibility to striving for the cause of Islam.

3. English rendering the Quran by Pickthall, in the Personal Computer program "Alim 1.5".

4. For details on this point please see Mubarak Ali's, 1994. *Ulama aur Siyasat* (Urdu) (1994). Lahore: Fiction House; I.H. Qureshi's, *Ulama in Politics* (1974) Karachi: Maarif Ltd. and Fuad I. Khuri's *Imams and Emirs- State, Religion, and State in Islam*. (1990) London: Saqi Books.

5. The term has its origins in the British political history and refers to a group of people other than the lords, the commons, and the clergy, who influence a country's politics, meaning the press.

6. Syed Ahmed Khan and Ameer Ali were the first Muslim modernists in India, and they encouraged the Muslims to shed their inhibitions and follow and cooperate with the West. This approach is apologist, and replaces blind following of one tradition by an other. This approach lacked the ability to introduce innovation and inspiration in the Muslim minds.

7. IJTEHAD means the exerting of one's self to the utmost degree to attain an object and is used technically for so exerting one's self to form an opinion (*zann*) in a case (*kadiya*) or as to a rule (*hukm*) of law. This is done by applying analogy (*kiyas*) to the Quran and the Sunnah. Its result is always fallible opinion (*zann*); it does not involve inerrancy. Only the combined IJTEHAD of the whole Muslim people led to *ijma*, agreement, and was inerrant. Some Muslim theologians believe that exertion of one's self to form an opinion is binding for every Muslim and *taklid* (follow, imitate) does not furnish a saving faith. But all canon lawyers have been for centuries *mukallids* (followers, imitators). The founders of the four legal schools of the Sunni Islam, and some of their contemporaries, have come to be regarded as the *mujtahids* of first rank. They had a right to work out all questions from the very foundation, in the light of the Quran, and the Sunna. They were thus absolute *mujtahids*. Next in rank are those who came after the founders, played the same part but within the given school. Third in rank are those who came still later and had a right only by their knowledge of previous decisions to answer specific questions submitted to them; these were called legal opinions. In this generally accepted position

there have a few learned individuals who claimed for themselves the right to form their own opinion from first principles. Ibn Taymia, Suyuti, and Shah Waliullah are three eminent mujtahids in this category. Shah Waliullah did not expressly claimed to be a Mujtahid, he has been accorded this status by the succeeding generations of ulama (Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam, H.A.R Gibb and J.H. Kramers, 1960:158)

8. Ijma (literally "agreeing upon") is one of the four *usul* from which the Muslim faith is derived and is defined as the agreement of the mujtahids of the people (i.e. those who have a right, in virtue of knowledge, to form a judgement of their own) after the death of the Prophet (s.a.v.), in any age, on any matter of the faith. As this agreement is not fixed by council or synod and is reached instinctively and automatically, its existence on any point is perceived only on looking back and seeing that such an agreement has actually been attained; it is then consciously accepted and called an *ijma*. Thus the agreement gradually fixed points which had been in dispute; and each point, when thus fixed, became an essential part of the faith, and disbelief in it an act of unbelief. Each agreement, that is, became a *hujjdja* (evidence, proof) for its own and for all succeeding periods. It could be expressed in speech, or in action, or by silence regarded as assent. It is especially excluded that it means the agreement of the masses... Ijma is in virtue of a divine protection against error which inheres in the Muslim people. The basis of this agreement principle is a tradition from the Prophet (s.a.v.) "My people will never agree in error". In consequence there is in the thought and working of the people as a whole a power to create doctrine and law, and not simply to stamp with approval that which has otherwise been reached. By means of Ijma what was at first an innovation (*bid'a*) has been accepted and has overridden the earlier sunna. It is thus regarded, by many, as a powerful instrument of reform; the Muslim people, they assert, can make Islam whatever they, as a whole, please (Gibb 1960:157-158).

9. For details see Muhammad Iqbal's 'Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam' (1975:145-180).

10. For the definition of first degree *ijtehd* see endnote number 7 above.

11. Human Development Index (HDI) is a newly introduced concept to measure the standard of living on a more comprehensive basis than per capita income. According to the 1994 report Human Development is a process of enlarging people's choices. In principle, these choice can be infinite and change over time. But at all levels of development, the three essential ones are for people to lead a long and healthy life, to acquire knowledge and to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of

living. And it is a minimal measure.

Human Development Report is a UN sponsored document, released through the United Nations Development Program.

12. The information has been obtained from PC GLOBE 4.0, 1990. Inc. Tempe. Az. USA., and Encyclopedia Britannica Book of the Year 1993.





CHAPTER 6

Chapter 6

Political Media Discourse: Its Nature and Dynamics Under Parasitic Landlordism

The last two chapters identified and elaborated the cultural ethos of Pakistani society which has permeated all social classes and walks of life with varying degrees. Its foremost requirement is to maintain the status quo created under the colonial rule. The latent forces of change have been overwhelmed by the forces of status quo and have therefore failed to assert themselves in a meaningful way. The intellectuals and the mass media are the free floaters in the body-politic of Pakistan, which means they do not have an independent entity, a well defined sphere of existence, a certain level of autonomy whereby they survive, thrive and fall with their internal dynamics. Their level of autonomy has been restricted through various financial and administrative policies, to be discussed below. Ideological and class affiliation of the media men and intellectuals has to be with the forces of change representing the middle and the lower middle class, but to survive

and flourish in the cultural ethos of parasitic landlordism, they need to curry favor with the ruling elite-- the military, the civil bureaucracy and the landlords. This chapter would try to explain the nature of government-media relationship in the first few pages to provide a perspective for the subsequent discourse analysis of eight important political events between 1970 and 1990.

Mass Media In Parasitic Cultural Ethos: One Way Traffic

The perception of mass media in the cultural ethos of parasitic landlordism is pre-modern. Attitude toward media is informed by the values of the time when there was no mass media. Since claim to leadership, political power, and social status are proportionately linked to the quantity and quality¹ of landownership, landlordism and the cultural ethos evolved under it do not view the mass media as the fourth estate², and as an independent entity. For them media is "theirs" as the land and the tenants are theirs as instruments/ appendices of their political power. In the parasitic mind the mass media is the modern equivalent of the herald, the drum beater. Like electoral system and constitution, mass media is also a new instrument which should help perpetuate and legitimize their power. All the three components of the establishment (the landlords , the military and the civil bureaucracy), nurtured under the same cultural ethos, have, as a whole, similar approach toward mass media and democracy. Approach toward media and democracy has not been fundamentally

different under any regime-- civil or military-- in Pakistan.

Media discourse has to be one way traffic. Media is there to inform the people about the beneficence and benevolence of rulers, and to defend their weak points through "mutual understanding". The extent to which media 'deviates' from this ideal is either because the establishment is split and is using the media for cross purposes, or the media men have been impelled by their middle and lower middle class origins to criticize the establishment, and/ or the people want to know about the obvious misdeeds of the government, failing which the paper will not sell on the market. A comparative study of the Pakistan media would show a gradual increase in the level of 'deviation' over the last four and a half decades but it continues to depend heavily on the establishment for its survival. In brief establishment continues to be the prime definer of media discourse. Before proceeding further an analysis of 'statement journalism'-- a unique genre of journalism in Pakistan-- may help understand the peculiarities of mass media under the cultural ethos of parasitic landlordism.

'Statement Journalism' In Cross-Cultural Perspective

It is almost an accepted truth of the contemporary world that democracy and freedom of the press rise and fall together. A careful look on the front page of a newspaper would reveal whether it has been produced and processed under a free democratic ethos

according to professional values, or it has been influenced and dictated by undemocratic non-professional considerations. A newspaper produced and processed under democratic ethos would carry most of the important stories either wholly done by professional journalists as exclusive stories, or publish important news events of the day, shared by all but interpreted and explained by the professionals of each newspapers, giving a distinct touch to each story.

On the contrary, newspapers produced and processed under undemocratic ethos (e.g. parasitic landlordism) would carry almost identical news stories on any given day, particularly on subjects like politics and religion mostly based on statements made by the big news actors like the head of state/ government, ministers, leaders of Opposition; often displayed and reported with a slant in the latter case. Often these statements are carefully prepared by civil servants or party officials and are reproduced without interpretation, explanation, historical background etc. by the newspapers. Most of the news reports in Pakistani newspapers are based on statements, which have produced a unique journalistic genre-- 'statement journalism'. A cross-cultural comparative study of the contents and display of news on the front pages of Pakistani, Turkish and American newspapers explains the point further (See Table 6).

Four newspapers have been selected from each country: *Jang*, *Nawa-e-Waqt*, *The Pakistan Times* and the *Dawn* from Pakistan; the *Hurriyet*, *Milliyet*, *Sabah* and *Zaman*, from Turkey; and the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Christian Science Monitor*, and *International Herald Tribune* from the United States. Newspapers have not been selected on the basis of any empirical test but because they are among the leading newspapers, have national, or as in the case IHT, international, instead of regional or ethnic readership, and represent diverse political inclinations.

All newspapers are of Sunday, June 12, 1994. This date has been selected at random, keeping only one considerations in mind that no news event of global or national significance has taken place, which could have forced itself on the front pages of all newspapers, leaving little choice to the news editor. *The Christian Science Monitor*, however, is not of Sunday, June 12, because it does not appear at the weekends. The nearest available issue of Monday, June 13, has therefore been included.

While comparing the contents and display of the front-page news stories, the news items falling in the category of chronicles have been excluded for two reasons: one because there is no uniform approach among the selected nine dailies about the placement of the chronicles on the front page; two, because the chronicles are neither 'statement stories' nor they can be presented like one. They are different from written statements issued for the media, or

the speeches made by important news actors, or the stories investigated, covered, produced, and written by the staff reporters.

Similarly news events, unfolding in remote parts of the world are most of the time reproduced on the basis of news agency reports or stories carried by big news organization owned and manned by the developed world. This leaves little room for the editors in the developing countries (Turkey and Pakistan, here) to give a local/personal touch to the story, by adding new information, explaining and interpreting the story on day-to-day basis. Therefore, international stories, reported through the world news organizations have also been excluded from the comparative scheme. The International Herald Tribune is the only exception here, because it is published in different countries and claims not to have a local/national character. In any case, there are few (not more than two) stories, on the front pages of the selected dailies which could be termed as international news stories.

Looking at the Cross-Cultural Comparison Table (Table 6) some of the significant results may be interpreted as follows: Pakistani newspapers lead with a very big margin in publishing virtually unedited statements (without interpretation, explanation, comparison, historical background etc.) as news stories. An other dubious distinction is that no Pakistani newspaper has a single lead-story³ as an exclusive report or interpretative news item. All

lead stories are statements. In Pakistani dailies 65% news stories are statements, the remaining 30% are agency stories, reports like 'Sindh Assembly budget session begins today' or 'National Assembly Budget debate today', 'selection of candidates for the Senate by-election, and crime and accident reports. All the lead stories are 100% shared news, consisting of statements. Three dailies have published Prime Minister's statement as the lead story. The headlines are as follows: "Opportunists bent to (sic) disrupt fragile democracy: PM" (*The Pakistan Times*); "Opposition's campaign against the President is unconstitutional and immoral: Benazir" (*Jang*); "Special courts to be abolished next month: Benazir" (*Nawa-e-Waqt*). *The Dawn* is the only newspaper to ignore Prime Minister's statement and to publish, a statement by the Chairman of the Federal Anti-Corruption Committee (FACC) as the lead story, "Nawaz will have to face court, says Qasim". One thing is very obvious that all the four lead stories are against the leader of the Opposition, based on the statements made by the government-- Prime Minister, and Chairman Anti-Corruption Committee. Only the *Dawn* seems to have selected a lead story on the basis of its news worthiness-- serious charges of financial corruption against the leader of the Opposition who was Prime Minister till a year ago, with the declared intention of the government to take him to court and the possibility of his being arrested. Such a story would merit high-key treatment, but in a more democratic atmosphere, where the press is not under constant threat of administrative retaliation, and where professional standards are high, one would expect the

reporter and the editor to place the news in a broader perspective to give more information and better understanding of the implications of such a development, and seek the point of view of the other party, or say that the other side was not available for comments or declined to comment.

A comparison with the headlines of the lead stories in the Turkish and the American newspapers (being produced under a democratic ethos) brings home how difference in cultural ethos influences, nay determines, the nature of media discourse. Since such a cross-cultural comparison is not the focus of the research, only the headlines of the lead stories are given with a very brief analysis to give an over view of the extent and the nature of the arrested media discourse, before proceeding for a detailed discourse analysis of the Pakistani press. **The Turkish newspapers:** *The Hurriyet*: 'Unarmed Flights Over the Aegean' (exclusive story in the context of Turco-Greek dispute on the Aegean). *The Milliyet*: 'Don't Go Too Far' (President Demirel's warning to Prime Minister Ciller on foreign relations, in an exclusive interview with the daily). *The Sabah*: 'Greco-PKK co-operation is here' (exclusive story on a special report submitted to President Demirel regarding Greek support for the terrorist, secessionist organization PKK). *The Zaman*: 'State in the Thick of Usury Business' (exclusive story based on interviews with three top economists on the state of Turkish economy). **The American newspapers:** *The New York Times*: 'New York Climbing out of Recession' (exclusive story on the US

CROSS-CULTURAL COMPARISON OF NEWS CONTENTS AND DISPLAY ON A SINGLE DAY *

PAKISTANI NEWSPAPERS				TURKISH NEWSPAPERS				AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS						
News-papers	Total Domestic News **	State-ments	Inter-preted State-ments	Lead Story, Exclusive or Shared	News-papers	Total Domestic News	State-ments	Inter-preted State-ments	Lead Story, Exclusive or Shared	News-papers	Total Domestic News	State-ments	Inter-preted State-ments	Lead Story, Exclusive or Shared
Jang	34	22	Nil	Shared Statement.	Hurriyet	10	1	1	Exclusive	New York Times	7	Nil	Nil	Exclusive
News-e-Maqd	26	19	Nil	Shared Statement.	Milliyet	8	1	1	Exclusive	Washington Post	6	Nil	Nil	Exclusive
Pakistan Times	10	6	Nil	Shared Statement.	Sabah	9	1	1	Exclusive	Internat-ional Herald Tribune	7	Nil	1	Exclusive
Dawn	7	3	Nil	Shared Statement.	Zaman	5	Nil	1	Exclusive	Christian Science Monitor	3	Nil	Nil	Exclusive
Total	77	50 65%	0%	100% Shared	Total	32	3 9%	4 12%	100% Exclusive	Total	23	0%	1 4%	100% Exclusive

* All Newspapers are of Sunday, June 12, 1984, except the Christian Science Monitor which does not appear at the weekends; its date is Monday, June 13, 1984.
 ** Since Pakistani and Turkish dailies do not have a good number of overseas correspondents, therefore only the domestic news have been selected; IHT being an exception, due to its global character.

Table 6

economy). *The Washington Post*: 'A Boy's Cry for Help, the Ardent Defense of a Teacher' (exclusive story on molestation allegation against a teacher, and voices in support of the teacher). *The Christian Science Monitor*: 'US to Propose Phased Sanctions Against North Korea' (though another story on sanctions against N. Korea is given on the front page of the *New York Times*, as well, the sources for both the stories are different, one based on meeting/conversation with the officials in the Administration, the other from sources in the UNO. Both stories have been written in different styles, with different slant. Therefore the story can be termed as exclusive, though the subject is the same). *The International Herald Tribune*: 'US backs Russian Bid For North Korea Talks' (the subject is again North Korea and its nuclear program, but the story has a different focus, another source, with distinct style and slant. To that extent it too can be termed as exclusive). As compared to 65% 'statement news stories' on the front pages of Pakistani newspapers, the Turkish dailies have 9% and the American press 0% statement stories.

While Pakistani newspapers do not have a single interpreted/explained/ rewritten 'statement news story', the Turkish dailies have 4 (12%) and the US press 1 (4%). In the four American newspapers there is one interpreted 'statement story' in the *International Herald Tribune* about Bosnia. The story carries the statement of the Commander of the UN forces in Bosnia, and, then to

give a wider perspective to the reader quotes two other sources, to explain the situation. In the Turkish press *The Zaman* carries one interpreted 'statement story' wherein three different statements obtained by the daily (not issued by the news actors on their own) have been put in one story to give an analysis of Turkish economy. *The Milliyet* has an exclusive interview with President Suleyman Demirel (again a statement obtained by the daily at its own initiative and not received on the teleprinter or in a news conference). Its display and arrangement has an obvious slant which smacks of serious differences between the President and the Prime Minister.

Pakistan press does not have a single lead story, which is exclusive, as compared to 100% exclusive lead stories in both the Turkish and the American press. It is lack of initiative and shows passive character of the Pakistani press, which has put itself at the receiving end, waiting for the news to come to them, in contrast to active and aggressive attitude of the Turkish and the American press to reach out to dig up news, and compete with each other in providing the readership with more and more in-depths exclusive stories. The latter are following the free-market principle of improving the product and winning over the customer. This can be contrasted with the attitude of Pakistani media, which is comparatively passive, and because of considerable state control on financial resources⁴, does not have its first priority to satisfy the readership. Their collective first consideration in the

satisfaction of the Government; satisfaction of the readership is a secondary consideration. They are often trying to appease the government or at least not to annoy it.

Although this situation does not leave much room for the newspapers to play their due role of the fourth estate in the polity yet there is one benefit of 'statement journalism'; its discourse analysis is as much a study of the media as an insight into the soul of the establishment. In the arrested media discourse of 'statement journalism' the editors use their professional discretion primarily in arranging the headlines, writing the lead sentences/ paragraphs, placing the story, and adjusting its size to the available space on the paper or in deciding not publish a story. They use the editorial columns to express their views but there again the official media managers try to keep them on a tight leash. In editorial comments and feature articles, however, the newsmen may choose to express their difference of opinion with the government. There is however a difference "the government is more tolerant towards the English-language newspapers because of their limited readershipGiven the relatively limited influence of the English-language media it is allowed greater liberty than the Urdu language newspapers. Although the English-language media have declined in size, it remains the major exponent of liberal ideas and social dissent... (They) support causes such as women's liberation, opposition to religious censorship and modernization" (Haqqani, 1985). The English dailies are mostly read by a small

group of senior civil servants, military officers, educated politicians who have to be landlords; in brief the establishment. The Urdu, or other regional newspapers, which were rather contemptuously known as 'vernacular dailies' during the Raj, have traditionally been closer to the people, in whose language they communicate. Although this closeness to the people is severely limited by low literacy rate of 26% and even lower purchasing power of the readers, yet the Urdu press has always been monitored more closely and administered more strictly than the English dailies. The reason is that they are more likely to 'inject curious ideas into the heads of the people' (see page 11 above) which would take political discourse of dissent out of the small group of the English knowing ruling elite.

Another curious feature of Pakistani newspaper, particularly the Urdu press, is their keenness to put the very high number of news stories on the front page with bare minimum detail. There are 35 stories on the front page of the *Jang*, out of which 22 are statements, including the lead story. On the front page of the *Nawa-e-Waqt* there are 26 stories of which 19 are statements. Among the other dailies, selected for cross-cultural comparison, the *Hurriyet* leads with 10 stories on the front page, all others have less. This trend is the outcome of the pressure from those who make these statements and want to see their stories on the front page, and equally the result of the willingness of the newspapers to please them at the cost of professionalism. This reflects upon the

shallow professionalism, which does not care to give details and in-depth information to its readers. It may also be interpreted as the result of casual interest of the readers who do not want to know details, nor want to look inside the paper.

Judged in a cross-cultural perspective in the contemporary context Pakistani media seems to be meek, normative and pro-status quo; particularly when compared with the newspapers in democratic societies. Difference in the contents and display of news in three different countries, is indicative of the level and strength of the democratic ethos: it's the weakest in Pakistan and strongest in the US. However, if we judge the Pakistani press in a historical perspective and compare today's print media with that of the previous decades, particularly since the sixties, we see its growing strength, assertiveness and independence. Better educated and better trained young men and women, from fairly well to do families, are opting for journalism as a profession. This trend is especially conspicuous among the English weeklies, monthlies and dailies e.g. *The Dawn*, *The Muslim*, *The Frontier Post*, *The Nation*, *The News*, *The Herald*, and *The Newslite*. The Urdu press has also proliferated and improved both in the quality of contents and the quality of printing. A number of dailies and periodicals have braved financial blackmail and administrative oppression of the powers that be. But this betterment and improvement is only relative within the arrested media discourse of Pakistan. Compared with many other developing countries, particularly those with

stronger democratic culture, and with traditions of defiance it is an improvement by default: population explosion (over 3% growth), political instability, slow economic growth, and the resultant accumulation of huge socio-economic problems. The dilemma of the parasitic elite is that to perpetuate their reign they need to satisfy at least some of the basic needs of a rapidly growing population, and their needs cannot be fulfilled without introducing structural changes in a system which has kept them in power so long. The result of this dilemma is greater disunity among the ruling elite which has created political instability and has thereby further deteriorated the socio-economic situation. The media has benefitted to some extent from this situation but the problem with the mainstream media is that their non-professional interests are being served well in the existing system. For example the employees of the National Press Trust whose newspapers have the lowest credibility and the lowest circulation are the best paid journalists. (For details on daily circulation of newspapers in Pakistan see Tables 7, and for details on daily circulation of newspapers in Turkey see Tables 8).

Circulation of Pakistani Newspapers

National/ Regional Dailies with more than 100,000 circulation.

1. The Jang	500,000
2. The Nawa-e-Waqt	400,000
3. The Pakistan	185,000
4. The Khabrain	150,000
5. The Dawn	100,000
6. The Awami Akhbar	100,000
7. The Kawish	100,000
Total	1,535,000

National/ Regional dailies with less than 100,000 circulation.

8. The News	90,000
9. The Mashriq	80,000
10. The Frontier Post	60,000
11. The Wafaq	50,000
12. The Ibrat	50,000
13. The Juraat	45,000
14. The Shamal	44,000
15. The Muslim	40,000
16. The Zamana	30,000
17. The Nation	25,000
18. The Pakistan Observer	25,000
19. The Baluchistan Times	15,000
20. Sind Express	5,000
21. Baluchistan Express	6,000
Total	565,000

Grand total 2,100,000

Total Population of Pakistan: 120 million

Total Newspaper Circulation: 2 million

One Copy of Newspaper for 60 persons

1. Source: Since circulation figures are kept secret under an agreement between the Ministry of Information and the All Pakistan Newspapers Association, disclosure of the source of information would violate the relevant agreement.

2. Source for population figures: Budget Document 1994, Government of Pakistan.

Table 7

Circulation of Turkish Newspapers

National Dailies with more than 100,000 circulation.

1. Sabah	748,983
2. Hurriyet	490,353
3. Turkiye	331,751
4. Milliyet	319,495
5. Zaman	285,375
6. Foto Mac	219,739
7. Spor	204,186
8. Gun	122,418
Total	2,722,300

National dailies with less than 100,000 circulation

9. Bugun	76,766
10. Meydan	70,814
11. Cumhuriyet	61,002
12. S.P.Tan	51,799
13. Foto Spor	42,248
14. Milli Gazete	21,557
15. Y. Gunaydin	15,460
16. Ortadogu	14,239
17. Vakit	13,740
18. Yeni Asya	5,776
19. Turkman	3,473
Total	376,874

Estimated circulation of the eveningers and the dailies published in each of the 76 provinces. 700,000

Grand Total 3,799,174

Total Population of Turkey: 64 million
Total Newspaper Circulation: 3.8 million
One Copy of Newspaper for 17 persons

1. Source for newspapers circulation: Hurdagitim: A Turkish Organization of Newspapers Distribution.

2. Source for population figures: "Turkey" (1993), Directorate General of Press and Information, Government of the Republic of Turkey.

3. Source for eveningers and city newspapers: Directorate General, Press Information Department.

Table 8

Economic Dependency and the Self-Censored Media Discourse

Media discourse in 'statement journalism' is self-censored in the sense that the reporter/ correspondent is not investigating a given issue, nor digging up a news story. They are reproducing what has been "handed out"⁵ to them in the form of a statement. The media is thus absolving itself of the moral and professional responsibility of bringing new and true information to the reader in investigated exclusive stories, placed in proper perspective-- a perspective evolved on the basis of professional criteria not manipulated and engineered by the government, and knowingly accepted by the media. Thus the self-censored media avoid the responsibility of sticking out their necks on a particular issue at a particular point, nor balances reports by including the "other side" of the story.

This attitude of reproducing what has landed in the newspaper's office makes the media relatively passive in political news reporting. They become an appendage to the establishment. They voice the feelings of the forces of change only when they have become too vocal and too obvious to be ignored. One evidence of this attitude is the high percentage of audience who listen to BBC (Urdu service), and other foreign media sources to get authentic news about Pakistan, which often go unreported or under-reported in Pakistani media. "In times of political crisis Pakistanis turn to

foreign radio broadcasts for news of events in the country. English educated Pakistanis subscribe to foreign news magazines and even daily newspapers in unusually large numbers, and issues containing stories on Pakistan sell better on book stands... The foreign media are generally respected for their independence and objectivity in coverage of the political opposition. Barred from the local media, opposition leaders go out of their way to cultivate foreign journalists, while the government's information machinery-trained to bully, rather than befriend the local press, is slow to react and give its side of the picture. The Information Ministry in Pakistan does little to inform and then they complain of one sided reporting (Haqqani, 1985).

In the 1971 war the world media was reporting the retreat and then surrender by the Pakistani forces, while the official spokesman was saying "we are winning the war"⁶ less than 24 hours before the military command in East Pakistan signed the surrender document. No newspaper in Pakistan dared to report the real situation on the front till the story of surrender came as a rude shock. Similarly the 1965 war was projected as a victory which was a draw at the best. When the reality came out in the shape of Tashkent Declaration the military regime of Ayub Khan found it hard to sell it to the people. It is a common practice among the Pakistani newspapers to reproduce summarized versions of foreign media reports about Pakistan. Thereby they absolve themselves of reporting a story on their own and can "blame" some one else for

telling the truth. "Opposition activities are sometimes covered indirectly, through the publication of summaries of foreign broadcasts and overseas media reports. Both *Nawa-e-Waqt* and *Jang* lift stories from the foreign press and maintain a monitoring unit to cover the South Asian services of international networks" (Haqqani, 1985). Yet another example of the attitude of eschewing professional responsibility and thereby escape the ire of the establishment, is the practice followed by some of the leading newspapers in Pakistan, between 1977-86, of first getting a story published in some obscure, dummy newspaper and then reproducing it on its pages, with reference to that. This practice stopped when the media bosses in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting threatened to take 'appropriate action'.

The extent to which one absolves oneself of responsibility, to that extent one ceases to be, or to say the least ceases to be relevant in the given milieu. To take the argument a little further, it may be added, when you compromise your 'ego', as Iqbal would say, you lose your identity and cease to be. In that sense Pakistani media does not have a separate, independent entity of its own, as for example, the Turkish media has come to acquire in the recent years as an economic force, an intellectual power, a political interest group, and as a social agent, not dependent on the good will of the government and state for survival and strength. The Pakistani press (particularly the main stream press) does not have a locus standi of its own, in that sense. Its

economic viability and professional independence remain doubtful because of weak industrial and mercantile base in the private sector which provides economic support through advertisements and subscription, and provide better assurance for professional independence through greater differentiation, higher literacy rate and better awareness. The establishment continues to wield high influence on the economic well being of the press. "Advertising is the major source of revenue for Pakistani newspapers, and government advertising accounts for 30% of total print-media advertisements" (Haqqani, 1985). Discontinuation or curtailment of official advertisements, strict implementation of the rules of import and distribution of newsprint, and other arbitrary favors (like allotment of commercial and residential plots, duty free importation of machinery, luxury cars etc.), make the print media dependent on the government. It is not possible to substantiate this otherwise well known practice of the media's economic dependency and blackmail, there is however, one report, published in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* of September 19, 1985, by Husain Haqqani saying: Altaf Hussain, Bengali editor of the country's largest English language newspaper, *Dawn* was made industries minister under Ayub and the newspaper's owners the Haroon family benefited from government generosity when expanding their already vast industrial empire. The Urdu-language daily *Jang* now the country's largest daily, also acquired new technology and real estate on concessional terms in return for editorial support for Ayub⁸. This economic dependency makes media discourse subservient

to the establishment's agenda. Coupled with economic dependency is a web of state laws which empower the state functionaries to impose censorship, impound a particular issue, arrest a journalist for reporting something which may be true.

Economic dependency on the state impinges upon professional quality of the newspapers more acutely in Pakistan because the editors-in-chief are also the owners of the newspaper: it's a sort of family business. This makes professional quality and intellectual independence more directly and clearly dependent on the economic factor. The *Jang* and the *Nawa-e-Waqt* are family concerns at financial, administrative and professional levels. The *Dawn* is also a family enterprise but the family does not exercise direct control on professional matters. But this situation seems better only in comparison with the other two. Altaf Gauhar an editor-in-chief of the *Dawn* was forced to resign when the Bhutto government put pressure⁹. *The Pakistan Times* is a state owned organ with no professional, administrative, or financial independence.

This dependency syndrome is evident in the analysis of every political news event. In case of political news coverage, as we shall see below, the media lets itself carried away by the sweep of the event, quickly tailoring its coverage according to the needs and mood of the establishment. The state owned National Press Trust caters only to the demands of the establishment and has little credibility and no intellectual substance which would separate its

identity from the government. The privately owned dailies walk the tight rope of public demand, professional objectivity and the agenda of the establishment. They have professional requirements and demand of the readership in mind but they are not allowed to run counter to the agenda of the establishment; not for a long time. *Nawa-e-Waqt* did put up resistance against the military regime of Ayub Khan and the 'feudal democracy' of Z.A. Bhutto, but it paid the price, and then had to draw the bottom line beyond which its existence could have been threatened. A study in the discourse of resistant media and the bottom line each one had to draw for survival or opted out of existence than compromise would unfold an un-researched area of political media discourse in Pakistan.

This whole network of economic dependency, the fear of legal action, and harassment through informal channels makes the media self-censored, cautious, and timid-- an antithesis of democratic ethos, but perfectly in line with the cultural ethos of the parasitic landlordism. A comparison of media between the two developing Muslim countries viz. Pakistan and Turkey, one under the ethos of parasitic landlordism and the other under a nationalistic-democratic ethos would bring home the point of economic dependency and arrested media discourse more clearly. Turkish media has attained economic independence with great increase in economic activity in the private sector, which generates almost its entire revenue (big newspapers often refuse to publish official advertisements because of low rates). Total circulation of national

and big regional Pakistani dailies is over three million copies in a total population of 130 million; as compared to three million copies of Turkish newspapers in less than half (60 million) the population. This means in Pakistan there are 65 persons per newspaper copy, as against 20 persons per newspaper copy in Turkey. The main reason for this gap is difference in the literacy rate between the two countries: 26% in Pakistan and 81% in Turkey¹⁰. As noted above higher literacy rate is a threat to the political and social hegemony of the parasitic landlordism, and a basic requirement for a society engaged in a collective struggle toward industrial, mercantile and democratic ethos. There are more than a dozen private T.V. channels, hundreds of private radio stations, thousands of monthlies, weeklies and dailies on the Turkish media market. They are all generating revenue and making good profit from private industrial and commercial sources. They are paying exorbitant salaries to high profile media men. A good journalist is earning a lot more than any other salaried person in Turkey. The media has attracted new talent from amongst the best educated and trained young people.

'WORD POLITICS'¹¹ OF COVERAGE AND COVER-UP

The word 'coverage' is used by the journalists when they report a news event. It is a comprehensive expression which implies that a complete account of the event has been provided, and the report is impersonal and objective. As discussed in chapter two

this claim is one of the long cherished and much adored 'media myths', which has more often covered-up the objective truth than 'covered' it. This chapter attempts to measure, through the methodology of media discourse analysis, the distance between the objective reality, and the subtle, and not so subtle, ways in which the Pakistani newspapers have tried to cover-up the truth by building myths into realities, and by 'covering truth with falsehood'¹². Our assumption is that the media has done this under the impact of the cultural ethos of parasitic landlordism, and to please, or at least not to annoy the establishment. This need not create the impression that the researcher is in possession of the truth which evaded the media, or is on a superior moral plank than the media men. Discourse analysis is an attempt, on the one hand, to juxtapose the claims of the media with their actual performance (again, not to pass a moral judgement but just to place the claim and performance against each other), and on the other it tries to show how the media has, more often than not, tried to curry favor with the ruling elite and promoted their agenda: sacrificing truth at the altar of parasitic ethos-- here for personal gains, there without knowing it.

Discourse analysis of media messages, therefore, in the present research, is a study of news as public discourse at three levels-- (i) micro and macro structure of news text, (ii) the process of news production, and (iii) the process and dimension of social cognition (for details see chapter 3 on methodology). This

chapter would try to show, through media discourse methodology, how the free-floaters of the parasitic cultural ethos promote the interests and agenda of the overwhelming forces of the status quo, and sometime drift towards the latent agents of change. The assumption is that Pakistani print media most of the time toes the line of the status quo group, one, because their survival and success depends a great deal on the goodwill of the establishment, and two because the overall intellectual discourse is heavily informed in favor of the parasitic ethos. However, since bulk of the newspapers readership is outside the ruling elite, among the 26% literate section of the society, mostly in the urban centers, and secondly because the working journalists are from the middle and lower middle class the print media is sometimes impelled to deviate from the line of the status quo, and get closer to the agents of change, and voice the feelings and demands of the general public. This attitude of 'desiring this man's scope and that man's gift' (T.S. Eliot) makes the media, free-floaters in the body politic of Pakistan.

Edward Said has argued (from four different perspectives in his four books *The Question of Palestine*, *Orientalism*, *Covering Islam*, and *Cultural Imperialism*) how the West has created images of the Orient, particularly the Middle Eastern Muslim world according to its preconceived ideas, and has thereby distorted a complex phenomenon to suit its ulterior imperialist motive-- making knowledge subservient to political power. This approach has created

fictions, and ideological labels which in no really significant way have a direct correspondence with the complex and varied phenomenon, spread across time and space in diverse societies, states, histories, geographies or culture, (Said 1981:x). Whatever intellectual distortions the Western media and scholarship have caused about the Oriental discourse, it nevertheless speaks of a dynamic, aggressive, assertive, and a curious force, prompted both by the lust of naked power, and ideological self-righteousness. The case of Pakistani media (scholarship, creative arts and literature are not part of the current research), which is comparatively passive in political discourse is slightly different in some important ways. They do not reach out to the political phenomenon, nor try to analyze it even according to their preconceived ideas and ideological labels; they always look upto the establishment for a cue, and more often than not follow it. The researcher has consciously made use of the Edward Said's employment of discourse analysis technique, particularly in his book '*Covering Islam*' but has kept in view the difference between an active, and a passive media.

The Scheme Of Discourse Analysis

Starting from the general elections of 1970, the study would analyze eight important political events in the next two decades: (1) the general elections 1970, (2) the separation of East Pakistan, (3) the making of the Constitution 1973, (4) the Qadiani

agitation 1974, (5) the general elections 1977, and the imposition of Martial Law, (6) the general elections 1985, (7) the general elections 1988, and (8) the general elections 1990.

In the next two chapters discourse analysis would first present general characteristics of the event and the way it has been reported in the selected four newspapers, followed by structural analysis of selected stories, giving an analysis of the headlines, the lead sentences/ paragraphs; then giving schematic structure of the news texts, followed by news syntax, local and global coherence of news, lexical choices, and style and rhetoric of news writing. Social cognition of each event as reported in the press would be discussed with reference to ideology, script and textual understanding.

Notes

1. In the parasitic cultural ethos quality of landownership is as important as the quantity of landownership. The expression 'quality of ownership' has been used here to refer to the attitude of landowners whereby they inflate their egos in proportion to the length of time they have been in possession of the land from their ancestors. This 'qualitative difference' is protected through a complex web of legal protection and social customs, woven since the Raj for various Political reasons which have little relevance today. These protective measures ensure that the landlords' club remains exclusive.

The law of pre-emption prevents a non-resident and/or a person who is not in the immediate neighborhood of the land, from acquiring it by any legal means. A local resident and/or the immediate neighbor has a legal right to prevent the purchase of land by a non-resident and/or non-neighbor. Thereby more powerful landlords have often forced small landowners to sell their lands to them at throw away prices and have also prevented the entry of new members to their exclusive club. Thus, while land has become

a commodity since the British rule, it is not available to every bidder.

2. The expression has been used in the British tradition, referring to a group of people other than the Lords, the Commons and the Clergy, who influence a country's politics. Traditional it meant the press, and today it includes all forms of mass communication and discourse.

3. The major story displayed at the top of page one.

4. The 'White Paper on the Misuse of Media' published by the Martial Regime in 1978, to malign the deposed Prime Minister Bhutto and his government contains information on the nature and methodology of media control, and coercion which was by no means peculiar to the Bhutto regime. Those involved in the media business in Pakistan know that it has been the same before and ever after, with no change on the Government side, but some improvement on the other side.

On the state control of the financial resources of the media the 'White Paper' said the following: (Please change the past tense with present perfect continuous tense, and also replace the proper names with any other proper names, to make it relevant for all times since 1958, when the first military rule was imposed) "Newsprint and advertisements were the two main instruments, which Mr. Bhutto used both to chastise the dissenting papers and to patronize People's party organs and other pro-PPP papers. The Government had a monopoly of newsprint and through its denial it could hit a paper very badly. Moreover, with large-scale nationalization of industries, banks and insurance, the Bhutto regime acquired a stranglehold on the life-blood of newspaper industry.

"Considering the forbidding cost of producing a modern newspaper, no paper could really sustain itself for long, in the absence of Government advertisements, on the basis of circulation alone. The only exception was that of the daily *Nawa-i-Waqt*, which managed to stay afloat despite being ostracized from the entire gamut of Government and semi-Government advertising, first in a spell of 11 months in 1973-74 and again of 14 months in 1976-77 (White Paper, 1978:85).

5. The Press Information Department, uses the expression 'handout' for the news stories it issues to the media. Here the expression has been used to indicate the passive character of the press.

6. See daily the *Dawn* December 16, 1971.

7. No date or specific reference can be mentioned because the whole affair was, as usual, through verbal communication and whatever is on record in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting is classified, though known to many in and out side the Ministry.

8. According to daily *The Muslim* (September 23, 1985) the All Pakistan Newspapers Society (APNS), at that time headed by Hameed Haroon, Managing Director the Dawn Group of Publications, 'severely criticized' the 'grossly inaccurate' Review report making 'certain libellous accusations against certain newspaper managements which can only be described as partisan slander'. The Review report is 'libellous' and 'slanderous' because the correspondent was not in a position to defend himself with facts and figures which had been supplied to him 'unofficially' by the Zia regime. The irony is that the Government, the APNS and the Review's correspondent all know 'what is truth of the matter' but all prefer to engage in shadow boxing, than divulge the truth face it. This is one example of the permanent engagement of the media and the government in hiding the truth and mixing truth with falsehood. Can it be called a 'conspiracy' of the establishment and the media against the people, the nation and the truth?


9. The "White Paper On the Misuse of Media" issued by the Martial Law regime in 1978 says: "(Altaf Gauhar) was the first journalist to be thrown behind the bars after Mr. Bhutto's ascendancy to power. He was hauled up on 5th January 1972 under Martial Law Regulation 78. On 20th April 1972, he was ordered to be released by the Supreme Court at its session in Peshawar but was re-arrested immediately and detained under the Defence of Pakistan Rules by the Sindh Government. (He) was released on 7th December, 1972, following decision by a Division Bench of the Sindh-Baluchistan High Court allowing the writ petition filed on his behalf by his wife. The court held his detention to be unlawful. (He) was arrested the second time in Karachi on 15th February 1973 under the Defence of Pakistan Rules. The Pakistan Special Police Establishment had instituted a case in the Special Court of Pakistan, Islamabad against Altaf Gauhar under Martial Law Regulation 59 on April 14. On 2nd July 1973, Mr. Altaf Gauhar resigned his position as Editor-in-Chief of the Dawn Group of newspapers" (White paper, 1978:4-6).

10. Encyclopedia Britannica, 1993 Book of the Year.

11. The phrase has ben taken from the title of the book *Word Politics: Strategy Among the Superpowers* (1971) by Thomas N. Frank and Edward Said; Oxford: University Press.

12. The Quran says, "And cover not truth with falsehood nor conceal the truth when ye know (what it is) (Al-Quran, 2:42).





CHAPTER 7

Chapter 7

POLITICAL MEDIA DISCOURSE: FROM MARTIAL LAW TO MARTIAL LAW (1970-1977)

1. General Elections 1970

The General Elections of 1970 have proved to be a watershed in the history of Pakistan in many ways; it was the first general election held on the basis of adult franchise and one-man-one-vote since the creation of Pakistan, and it has been believed to be the most fair general elections so far. Its most important aftermath was the rise of national consciousness among the people of East Pakistan, primarily because they felt that with the derailment of political process they had been deprived of their due share in the politics, economy, and administration of the country, and they were continuously being exploited by the West Pakistan, particularly the Punjab, which dominated the military, and the civil bureaucracy and headed the parasitic landlords¹. It is beyond the scope of this

research project to go into the causes, and consequences of these feelings of deprivation and discrimination, and the consequent rise of separate nationalism, the politico-cultural scenario would however be analyzed in the light of the media messages, as they emanated in the West Pakistan. A more comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon would need to include the media discourse in East Pakistan, as well. This section would look at the situation only in the context of the ideological bearings of the ruling elite, which happened to be in the West Pakistan, and how the media followed, criticized, analyzed, eschewed or defied the ideological dominance of the elite.

Pre-election media discourse is dominated by ignorance of the real situation in East Pakistan where the Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, was bound to sweep election because it had successfully articulated the sense of deprivation and discrimination among the masses, and promised a 'golden Bengal', if they could get rid of the exploitative ruling elite of West Pakistan. The element of hatred was dominant in the Awami League campaign. For the first time the East Pakistan was likely to its say in the national polity because of its numerical superiority. The ruling elite led by military under General Yahya Khan accepted ethnic diversity of West Pakistan and did away with One Unit. The Martial Law regime also conceded the principle of one-man-one-vote and abolished the principle of parity between East and West Pakistan, introduced under the 1956 Constitution to give the two

wings of the federation an equal weight. It was a foregone conclusion that the West Pakistan based ruling triumvirate would be confronted with a parliament dominated by East Pakistan, where majority of the people lived.

The media did not address the implications of this emergent situation at the practical level, but accorded prominent coverage to the declared intentions of the military rulers that power would be handed over to the majority party. How blindly the media believed the military junta and its supporters is obvious from an editorial comment of the daily *Jang* (March 30, 1970) under the caption: THE SPEECH. It makes the following points. (1) President General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan had promised in his previous speech that he would present an interim legal framework order by March 30. The President has fulfilled his promise. (2) The President has not only explained the salient features of the interim legal framework order, and the future Constitution, he has also pointed to the destination which is the real objective of the nation. (3) He has also demarcated the path of the caravan of Islam and Democracy in such a manner that it would protect it from going astray. He has marked the dangerous points here and there which can save the nation from falling into dangerous caves. (4) The President has also delineated the features of those anti-state elements who are in fact robbers masquerading as leaders, and have sneaked into our collective lives.

Having summarized the salient points the editor makes the following observations: (1) Like the first three speeches the fourth speech of the President has greatly impressed the people of the country. It has enhanced their (people's) confidence and courage, and they are now certain that under the leadership and guidance of President Yahya Khan, they will be able to achieve the objective for which this country had been created. The country will get an Islamic democratic order which would guarantee economic and social justice, and under which a satisfied and prosperous society will come into being. (2) All the measures taken by the government of President Yahya Khan during the last one year fully represent the longings and aspiration of the people. (3) Now (after this speech) (i) The Islamic ideology will have to be protected in the constitution of Pakistan, as the ideology constitutes the basis of this country. (ii) The constitution shall guarantee the independence, territorial integrity, and national stability. (iii) It will be a democratic constitution, enshrining the basic ingredients of democracy. (iv) It will be a federal constitution in the real sense.

From this the editor draws the following conclusions: (i) In our opinion if a volunteer body of non-partisan constitutional experts could prepare a draft constitution, it would expedite the process of constitution making. (ii) For the election and restoration of democracy it is necessary to strengthen the hands of President Yahya Khan and his government.

These are the views of the largest circulation newspaper of Pakistan, based in the largest city. The views expressed here are un-inhibited and clear expression of the subservience of the press to the government. The other newspapers expressed their opinion more or less on the similar lines, but shied away a bit in showering uninhibited praise on the military regime and its leadership. This editorial may be compared with the addresses presented by the landlords and the spiritual leaders of the Punjab in honor of the 'benevolent' rule of the British (see endnote no.8 in chapter 3). The *Jang* is not owned by the government like the *Pakistan Times*, it is supposed to be an independent daily. There is an improvement in the political discourse if this editorial is compared with the two addresses presented by the landlords to their British godfathers. But the improvement is quantitative not qualitative. Subservience to the government remains intact, it is only the toned down vocabulary, which has made the quantitative difference. The assumption is that the government of the time knows best what is good for the people and the state. Government's sincerity of purpose and honesty in dispensation remains above board. Government is the best leader, guide, protectors and guarantors of the well being of the state and society.

The second important feature of this editorial is total oblivion of the situation on the ground. This oblivion is compensated by the unqualified trust in the government and the amorphous ideology of the state being articulated and protected by

the Chief Martial Law Administrator President General Yahya Khan. The election campaign of 1970 was marked by two questions and they proved decisive in the election result, and later dismemberment of the country. In the West Pakistan, Z.A. Bhutto was champion of the cause of the poor, and promised them to provide, bread, clothes and shelter (*roti, kapra, aur makan*) to everyone, by enforcing economic equality through Islamic socialism. In the East Pakistan, the whole campaign revolved around the question of provincial autonomy, which would give them control over their financial resources, and administration.

Both these issues have been camouflaged in the assurances of the President, who has no political locus standi, and in the Ideology of Pakistan which is rather irrelevant on the question of provincial autonomy, and should have nothing against economic justice. The people of Pakistan are supposed to have been heartened by this speech of the President, against the onslaught of the two currents of provincial autonomy, and socio-economic justice. As if the two issues are no more than the mischief of the few, and the masses are aloof from it. They are looking upto the military regime to articulate the 'wishes and aspiration, of the people' and bring about the 'Islamic democratic system for which the country had been created'. And it is clear by implication that the Islamic democratic system to be enforced by the Chief Martial Law Administrator is superior to the Islamic Socialism of Bhutto's People's Party, and the provincial autonomy agenda of Mujib's Awami

League. No effort is made to feel the reality not because it is hidden and is not obvious to the editor, but because the rulers know the reality and have the best solution, which need not be questioned.

Oblivion, ignorance and subservience are the labels to be attached to this media discourse. To illustrate the point further reference may be made to another editor of the same daily of September 25, 1970, wherein postponement of elections from October to December has been defended because "this decision had been taken in the light of certain real difficulties, and the people of East Pakistan and West Pakistan have accepted it with an open heart, and there is no trace of discomfort and disturbance among them". And those who question the validity and genuineness of these decisions are 'irresponsible' and 'rumor mongers'.

The editorial asks all political element in the country "not only to 'train' the people in casting their vote but also impress upon them the importance of vote, and inform them about the requirements of democracy". The people are ignorant, they don't know how to cast their vote in the ballot box, they are not aware of the importance and requirements of democracy. It is for the government, the Election Commission to train them to inform them. Had the masses been so oblivious of their rights and the value of democracy how they could have overwhelmingly voted for provincial autonomy in East Pakistan and socio-economic justice in West

Pakistan. The people are not expected to know what is their best interest, and how it can be realized. It is for the government to do it, and for the editor to say how wholeheartedly the people have accepted the decision of the government. On the one hand they are ignorant of their rights, and on the other they are sagacious enough to fully appreciate the implications of the decision of the government to postpone elections by two months. It is only the 'irresponsible element' who have failed to appreciate it.

This trend in the mainstream Pakistani media² which eventually meant West Pakistani media indicated that they supported the martial law regime, as the protector of the status quo, against the forces of change led by Mujibur Rehman in the name of greater autonomy for East Pakistan, and by Z. A. Bhutto to provide socio-economic justice through Islamic Socialism. The Ulama opposed the two forces of change and condemned them for preaching Socialism in the name of Islam, and pitting Muslim brethren against each other in the name of provincial autonomy. It does not mean that the Ulama were wrong ideologically and theoretically, the thing is that once again they failed to appreciate the dynamics of political situation, and threw their weight behind the status quo group.

i. Post-election Media Discourse

Party position after the elections held in December 1970 was as follows:

Awami League:	167
People's Party:	85
Pakistan Muslim League:	18 (all factions)
Jamat-e-Islami:	4
Pakistan Jamhoory Party:	1
National Awami Party:	5
Jamiat-al-Ulama-e-Islam:	6
Independents:	17

Source: daily *Nawa-e-Waqt* December 10, 1970.

Reaction to the decade long dictatorial rule of Field Marshal Ayub Khan had led to mass agitation and the rise of another Martial Law, which promised to hold general elections and handover power to the elected representatives. For the first time under popular pressure the ruling elite had conceded the principle of one-man-one-vote giving East Pakistan long denied numerical superiority in the parliament. The Chief Martial Law Administrator promised to hold elections, convene the constituent Assembly to draft a constitution, and hand over power to the majority party. The regime fulfilled its first promise of holding fair elections, whose results sent shock wave in the establishment. They refused to convene the Constituent Assembly, fearing the Awami League with its clear majority will be able to make a constitution on the basis of its six-point program, which would weaken the center, ensure provincial autonomy, and thereby rid East Pakistan, as the Awami League saw it, of the exploitative West Pakistan. "To patriotic

West Pakistanis, such feelings were incomprehensible, or betrayed deep rooted treachery that could never be accepted" (Wolpert, 1993:135). The status quo group led by Chief Martial Law Administrator General Yahya Khan, and the political force of change led Z.A. Bhutto, himself a big landlord, gradually made a common cause against the resurgent forces of change in East Pakistan. The West Pakistan based mainstream media reflected and supported the establishment against the impending change.

The Pakistan Times (December 20, 1970) reported:

CONSTITUTION ONLY ON 6-POINT BASIS

MUJIB FOR WHITE PAPER ON RELIEF

Lead:³ Sh. Mujibur Rehman, the Awami League Chief, today reiterated that there could be no Constitution except on the basis of the Six-Point Program.

The media treatment of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the leader of the majority party is couched in negative vocabulary. He is projected as an 'intransigent' and 'obstinate' person, who insists 'constitution only on 6-point basis'. Though it is his democratic right, as a victorious party to say that the future constitution would be based on the program which has won him majority, yet the an analysis of the text of the news story and its context would show that the headline is misleading. The newspaper claims the story is based on a 'policy statement', made by the Awami League

and yet in a three column news item of 13 paragraphs, only three paragraphs (No.5, 11 and 12) are about the mandate. The 'policy statement' has only one paragraph (No.5) about the six-point program the other two paragraphs are not part of the 'policy statement', they have been picked up from Mujibur Rehman's earlier address to party workers. The fifth paragraph which has called for a three column headline has only one sentence wherein the phrase 'six-point program' is mentioned and that too 'thanking the people for giving verdict in the favor of six-points'. Once the people have given a verdict in favor of a manifesto what else a political leader is expected to say except reiterating that there can be no constitution except the one based on this program.

The first paragraph is general and ends on an optimistic note saying, 'we may look forward to a better future'. There are two paragraphs about the general amnesty announced by the President; six paragraphs about the cyclone, relief work, demand for a white paper on it, and the looming danger of famine; three paragraphs on the six-point program; and the last paragraph is about the warm welcome Mujibur Rehman received. The main thrust of the text is on the looming danger of famine, poverty of the people, the devastation of the earlier cyclone and the following administrative and financial mismanagement of relief work. But the editor chose to put the last sentence of a lone paragraph as the headline, as if this was the story. The headline, thus, deflects attention from the issue of cyclone, relief work and impending famine, which is placed

as a sub-headline.

The editor may be within his right to decide what is the most important aspect of a given story which should be placed in the headline, but this does not absolve him of the consequences. The West Pakistani reader was perhaps more interested in Mujib's views on the future constitution than on floods and famine in East Pakistan. When the editor went by the expected interest of the reader he only confirmed the worst misgivings of the people of East Pakistan that the West Pakistan and its ruling elite had been using their province as a colony, and had little interest in the problems and the difficulties of the people.

The Pakistan Times (December 22, 1970) reported:

QUANTUM OF AUTONOMY BY MUTUAL ACCORD

FORCE OF MAJORITY NO SOLUTION

BHUTTO STRESSES SHARING OF POWER

Lead sentence: 'Mr. Z.A. Bhutto, Chairman of the Pakistan People's Party, declared in Lahore on Monday that his party stood for maximum provincial autonomy for all the Provinces, the quantum of which, he added, could only be determined in the context of national solidarity.'

After accepting the principle of one-man-one-vote, now the emphasis is on 'mutual accord' (as if trying to bring the parity

principle back), as if this was not enough the sub-headline makes their intention, explicit-- force of majority no solution; the second sub-headline says: Bhutto stresses sharing of power. Meaning victory of the Awami League won at the ballot box is no solution. Majority is a 'force' (a negative thing) and will not lead to a 'solution' (the desirable thing). That can come about only through 'mutual accord' between 'President Yahya, the Awami League, and the People's Party'. The party with 167 seats can be allowed to enjoy the fruits of its majority only if the party with 85 seats, (with majority in the two provinces identified with the status quo group), and the President (with no popular political mandate) are allowed to have a veto. This amounts to nullifying what the establishment had granted under popular pressure. "All provinces in the country were entitled to enjoy maximum autonomy but it would be genuine only if it was determined in the context of national solidarity and with the blessings of the representative of all the provinces". Those who have won election on the basis of greater provincial autonomy were to be brought into the context of national solidarity, to be defined by the minority party and the military junta. Prior-agreement, outside the Constituent Assembly between the President, the Awami League and the PPP, is a pre-requisite to arrive at a consensus on the determination of the quantum of autonomy. "In case there was no agreement among the three, the Awami League and the People's Party could agree on a formula, although in that case there could be *some difficulty* in seeing it through. But if the two political parties failed to come to an

understanding the situation would get out of control. In no case, he said, the solidarity of the country could be compromised." The message is a threat to the majority party if you ignore the two of us (the President, the PPP) there will be 'some difficulty' for you, if you leave me (PPP) out 'the situation would get out of control'. To Bhutto's biographer once again "professing faith in democracy, Zulfi had no intention of accepting a decision taken by a "simple majority" of Bengalis. (Wolpert, 1993:149-50)

When the Western press said that the majority party would form the government and the minority party would sit in the Opposition, it is termed 'as a sinister idea' and a 'conspiracy against the people of the country'. 'The People's Party (the minority party) cannot be forced (by the majority party) to sit in the Opposition.' This is democracy landlord-military style! What could be a greater mockery of democracy. It may be noted that all this is coming barely fourteen days after the elections.

The Pakistan Times (February 12, 1971) reported:

PPP TRYING TO EVOLVE FORMULA
WORKABLE, DURABLE CONSTITUTION
ALL-OUT BID TO END CRISIS

Lead sentence: 'Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Chairman of the Pakistan People's Party said here today that his Party was making an all-out effort to end the constitutional crisis facing the

nation.'

The establishment led by the President, and supported by modernist/ socialist forces of change headed by Bhutto are gradually joining hands to preserve 'national solidarity'. The implication is the Awami League and its six-points program are not in line with national solidarity. When a politician pointed a finger at this evolving 'common front' against the Awami League saying "Mr. Bhutto was trying to open a West-Pakistan-based front against East-Pakistan", the spokesman of the PPP "termed the statement as most irresponsible and uncalled for." Bhutto's biographer says, "Zulfi Bhutto.... viewed Mujibur Rahman and most of his Bengali followers as little better than traitors... Like Yahya Khan,, he was willing to give them more posts in the higher services, even in the army, and a more equitable share of the foreign exchange that their jute exports earned the world over. He had no objection, Moreover, to their speaking, reading, and taking civil service examinations in Bengali, but what more did they want? (Wolpert, 1993:135). The parasitic landlord may agree to grant concessions under threat but cannot relinquish or handover power which in his scheme of things means giving up the land ownership-- an eternal, inalienable right. For the rulers nurtured in the cultural ethos of parasitic landlordism power which grows out of the land ownership and possession cannot be handed over even briefly. Democracy is antithesis of parasitic landlordism. This was the crisis in the aftermath of the 1970 elections: how to reconcile

the prospects of handing over power to those who did not 'own' the land, with the 'eternal right' of the landowners.

Compare the 'Constitution Only On 6-Point Basis' (Dec.20,19970) with the headline "Quantum of Autonomy by Mutual Accord (Dec.22,1970) and "PPP trying to Evolve Formula (Headline), 'Workable, Durable Constitution (sub-headline), and 'All-out bid to End Crisis' (second sub-headline) (February 12, 1971). Mujib is portrayed as unimaginative and intransigent as compared to the man who is 'trying to evolve a formula' and is making 'all-out bid to end crisis'. When the majority party wants to frame the constitution according to the manifesto which won him election it amounts to creating 'a crisis'. The man to face this crisis is Bhutto, who is now the leader of West Pakistan, and a political counterpart of the East Wing. All out efforts are being made to arrest the political discourse and channel it back into the old course, failing which political issues will be settled as before, through the military might. The message is either toe the line or face the bullet.

2. Separation Of East Pakistan 1971

The parasitic ruling elite had made it quite clear to Mujib, the undisputed leader of East Pakistan that power will not be handed over to his party unless he would come to terms with them. Z.A. Bhutto, had gradually transformed (say re-transformed) from an

agent of change and voice of the have-nots to an ally of the establishment against the looming common threat of 'Bengali majority'.

Their threat perception has its roots deep in history and the psychological make-up wrought under the impact of colonialism. Under the racist ideology of the Raj, the military and civil elite, perhaps honestly, did not deem the Bengalis fit to be a 'martial race'. Physical standards fixed by the British suited the Punjabis and the Pakhtoons who were taller and broader than the Bengalis. It took them twenty three years before they "lowered" physical standards for military recruitment⁴. There has been a contempt for the short stature and dark complexion of the Bengali male, among the relatively tall and brown colored Aryans of West Pakistan, as against romanticized image of the long haired, slim, Bengali female, who has been associated in folk tales with the 'magic of Bengal⁵'. Hungry Bengali (*bhooka Bengali*⁶) has been a contemptuous expression for a stingy, unreliable person, and/or a peevish, grumpy fellow. The Bengali intellectual was quarrelsome and querulous, its politicians agitators. The media and folk image of the Bengalis was that they were too close to the Hindus and untrustworthy. Some of the media stereotypes which strengthened this image said that they had the same script and language as the Hindus of West Bengal; they liked and appreciated Rabindranath Tagore, a Hindu Bengali poet, but could not read and understand the national poet-- Iqbal who wrote in Urdu and Persian; their

women wore saris and donned "bindi" on their forehead as the Hindu women did, they had bigger number of Hindus amidst them particularly in the Universities; historically they were people who produced a traitor like Jafer who sided with Lord Clive in the battle of Palasi and paved the way for the British onslaught (conveniently ignoring that Sirajudollah who fought against the British also belonged to the same soil). Their political leadership did not have an aristocratic background which comes with big land holdings. In the minds of the West Pakistanis, therefore, the Bengalis could not be trusted with the affairs of the state. They could neither be trusted with state secrets and policy making nor allowed to rule themselves. They were fit only to be ruled⁷.

This image had created the mentality of "them" and "us". The West Pakistan based ruling elite-- the military, the civil service and the landlords-- had been nurtured in the imperialist tradition, and continued with the same after independence. This colonial attitude further aggravated when the West Pakistan based civil and military officials found themselves ruling in a land far away from their homeland whose language and culture was alien to them: a perfect setting for a colonial rule, but without the trappings, organizational strength and efficiency of an imperialist power.

The parasitic ethos developed a self-blinding attitude toward the Bengalis. Now when they had won their political battle, and were set to rule Pakistan on their numerical strength, the

parasitic elite first tried to persuade them to compromise their position, when this didn't work they tried to sabotage the popular mandate, first by refusing to convene the constituent Assembly, then not allowing the West Pakistani members of the Assembly to attend the session, and finally launching military operation to solve a political problem, which was threatening to deprive the ruling triumvirate of its power. "Bhutto and the People's Party have suddenly started striking postures issuing pronouncements, which reveal a tendency to subvert the constitutional processes by obstructing the normal functioning of the National Assembly. "Mujib told the press in a special release on 24 February....It is unfortunate that Bengalis have in effect been dubbed as 'enemies,' in whose midst the representatives from West Pakistan would feel themselves 'hostages'. Unwarranted aspersions were cast on Bengali members of the National Assembly when the Assembly was termed a 'slaughter house'. All these extravagant charges were made only because the session of the National Assembly had been called at Dacca". (Wolpert, 1993:147). The military action wreaked havoc in East Pakistan, and India found an excuse to invade and "liberate" Bangladesh. With the beginning of the military operation Bhutto said, "By the Grace of God Pakistan has at last been saved". Clearly, Zulfi agreed with Yahya and Tikka's "final solution" to their Bangladesh "problem" (Wolpert, 1993:155)

How the denouement of this bizarre drama had been projected in the media is worth analyzing here. Only a day before the fall of

Dacca a military Spokesman, when asked by a foreign correspondent, as to who was winning the war, had said, "We are winning the war". And the banner^a headline of daily *The Dawn* (December 16, 1970) read:

SITUATION IS CRITICAL

the sub-headline read:

ENEMY CLOSES IN ON DACCA

the first lead sentence said: "THE SITUATION IN EAST PAKISTAN HAS BECOME VERY CRITICAL, ACCORDING TO THE LATEST REPORT RECEIVED HERE TONIGHT".

Lt. General M.A.K. Niazi, the leader of the eastern command surrendered to the Indian Commander in the afternoon on December 16, 1970 and the same evening the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator addressed the nation on Radio. The next morning daily *The Dawn* (17.12.1970) flashed a banner headline:

WAR TILL VICTORY

the sub-headline said...

Yahya's pledge

The next morning (18.12.1970) it ran another streamer⁹:

YAHYA ORDERS CEASEFIRE

the sub-headline read:

step in interest of peace

Rarely before the distance between "victory" and 'ceasefire' had been covered so fast. *The Dawn* (17.12.1970) ran an editorial on

this speech, under the caption: "The torch of resistance shall not be extinguished", and made the following points. .1)

"The present crisis has been thrust upon by an unscrupulous and hostile neighbor's lust for aggrandizement. 2) "In the vastly unequal fight with the invading hordes, our armed forces in East Pakistan have written new chapters of glory in defending their country.

3) "But inspired by faith and selfless dedication to their righteous cause, "these Ghazis of Islam held out for months against a perfidious and ruthless enemy, massively equipped and backed by a super-power.

4) "The overwhelming weight of the world community has shown itself clearly on the side of Pakistan and against the Indian aggression.

5) "This nation will not cease to strive in the name of Allah. 'The torch of resistance', to quote the President's stirring words again, which has burned so fiercely in East Pakistan shall never be allowed to be extinguished. It shall pass from hand to hand throughout the length and breadth of Pakistan'.

6) "We are confronted by a predatory aggressor's design for the dismemberment of our country.

7) "The President declared that simultaneously with the struggle to stamp out the aggression, 'we shall continue to march towards representative government, which the Indian attack sought to thwart'. The constitution will be announced as scheduled on December 20, thus furnishing the framework for maximum autonomy to

East Pakistan consistent with the concept of one Pakistan. This will be followed by the establishment of representative governments at the Center and thereafter in the provinces".

The crisis erupted when the long entrenched establishment decided to reverse an overwhelmingly popular mandate, first through persuasion and threats, then by refusing to convene and attend the constituent Assembly, unless "you" compromise on 'our' terms, and finally by launching military operation. On the one hand it is distortion of facts to say 'the present crisis has been thrust upon us', on the other it speaks of a level of helplessness where one develops self-pity expressed in an emotional outburst of being wronged by a more powerful wicked enemy. And when you know the enemy is wicked and unscrupulous what else do we expect him to do except fish in the troubled waters.-- that is the "right" of the "more powerful, wicked, unscrupulous and hostile neighbor". The media and the chief perpetrator of the "wrong" think alike that they are "right" and have been right in doing what they did, it is only the wicked enemy which did us a grievous wrong. The third point is that the emotional outcry, couched in moral vocabulary, is a psychological device to suppress your own conscience, which seems to be protesting against your 'unscrupulous and hostile' attitude toward your own countrymen. Aren't "we"-- the media, the establishment-- trying to externalize an internal psychological and political conflict on to a hostile enemy, who did play a role in fomenting the trouble, and later when the situation was "ripe"

(more because of "our" lust and self-blinding selfishness" than because of the 'hostile unscrupulous neighbor') it quickly moved in (international laws notwithstanding) to pluck the fruits of its long cherished desires and sustained efforts.

To build a war psychosis it is necessary to trivialize the enemy and glorify one's own forces, but when trivialization goes to a point where the leaders and commanders become convinced of the trivialization of the enemy and glorification of the self it is self destructive. This is what the "bull" the 'bully' and 'bullshit' are all about (Dixon, 1976:176). A well equipped, well trained modern army which has just defeated you with superiority in number and weaponry is trivialized as 'the invading hordes' against 'our armed forces' 'inspired by faith and selfless dedication to their righteous cause'. One wonders if "these Ghazis of Islam", and 'the soldiers of Islam' were inspired by their 'righteous cause' how their moral superiority and higher level of morale and motivation failed them 'against a perfidious and ruthless enemy, massively equipped and backed by a Super-power'. Aren't we saying that better equipment and ruthlessness are a better guarantee of success than motivation, morale and morality. Is it an attempt at 'rationalization' (if not self-delusion) of our defeat. To reverse the argument we are saying that the enemy had all the weaponry but no scruples and morality, and we had little or no weaponry and ruthlessness, but all the morality.

The whole idea is to divert attention from the real problem of "our" refusal to hand over power to the elected representatives of East Pakistan. After the army has surrendered to the 'perfidious enemy', in a territory cut off from "us" by land, air and sea, now occupied by the "invading hordes" and inhabited by a hostile and alienated population, there is still room for "announcing" the Constitution and 'furnishing the framework for maximum autonomy to East Pakistan? Consistent with the concept of One Pakistan(?) Self-delusion couldn't go farther! Within less than 24 hours of this "stirring" speech 'Yahya orders ceasefire' and takes 'step in interest of peace'. Does not it mean that the stirring speech of yesterday was wrong to the extent that it was not a step in the direction of peace? The President who launched military operation to solve a political problem and vowed to continue 'war till victory' (soon after the commander in East Pakistan signed the surrender document) now says, "I have always maintained that war solves no problem". The ceasefire had been ordered in response to the offer made by India-- the ruthless aggressor, unscrupulous and perfidious enemy. "In accepting the India's offer of cease-fire on the Western front, Pakistan has once again demonstrated its unalterable commitment to the principles of peace and its abhorrence of all avoidable bloodshed and misery in the resolution of disputes between nations" (The Dawn editorial December 18, 1971).

After high speed journey between "WAR TILL VICTORY" and 'YAHYA

ORDERS CEASEFIRE, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ghazis of Islam had to step down and handover power to the Z. A. Bhutto, the only available civilian leader who had political mandate, in the remaining Pakistan. The self-deluded media and the misinformed, misled people continued to hope to live in "One Pakistan". When Mujib was released unconditionally and flown to London where he addressed his first press conference, before reaching Dacca, the daily *Jang* (9.1.1972) ran a streamer:

WE CANNOT LIVE WITH PAKISTAN: Mujib declares
and three days later the same daily ran a six column headline saying:

MUJIB SEVERS ALL TIES WITH PAKISTAN

In both the headlines the blame for dissociation and separation from Pakistan is laid on Mujibur Rehman. As if he Mujib could still make Pakistan one country, when he was living in a capital still occupied by 'the liberating forces of India'. And suppose he wanted to live in 'One Pakistan', what terms and conditions he would have been offered. Would the parasitic ruling elite of West Pakistan have accepted his six-points, and his right to the leadership of "One-Pakistan". How he would have treated 'our armed forces in East Pakistan' who had surrendered and taken prisoners, and how "we" would have liked it. How those who had launched the military operation eliminate traitors, and to save Pakistan could have accepted Mujib the 'traitor' as their Prime Minister. It was the

worst kind of delusion the media, the people and to a extent the establishment lived with. Having played in the hands of the ruling triumvirate and realizing the painful fact after the event *The Dawn* (December 21, 1971) said in its editorial: "We shall be failing in our duty if do not point out here that the grave situation the country faces today is in no small measure due to the persistent denial of the freedom of expression. The public platform and the mass communication media including the national press, have long been operating under serious inhibitions and constraints. They have not been allowed to exercise their judgement freely and express opinion without fear or favor. Thus when the country was required to make a very fateful decision concerning the preservation of its territorial integrity and sovereignty, the people were often kept in the dark regarding the real issues that were at stake, the options that were open and the profit and loss that each particular course of action offered. The people were only told about what the rulers thought-- their assumptions and their prescriptions. They were kept ignorant of the inner dialectic of the alternatives that could be considered. We sincerely believe that the country has paid a very heavy price for allowing the democratic process to be suspended and freedom of expression smothered".

On these hopes and good wishes Eqbal Ahmed (1990) observed about two decades later, "The propertied and power elite of this country evince an extraordinary indifference to the fate of this nation. This was dramatically demonstrated during the protracted

crisis which led to the secession of East Pakistan. The import of the developments, which unravelled from March 1971, were not difficult to discern. The Army's intervention in East Pakistan was manifestly self-defeating, politically as well as military. Morally, it became increasingly repugnant. Yet, no more than a dozen citizens raised their voices in warning or protest; half of those were expatriate intellectuals. More crucially, even the leaders of the largest and professedly progressive political party supported the military's murderous mission in East Pakistan from an excess either of indifference or opportunism.... In the aftermath of defeat and dismemberment a more or less organized effort was made to cultivate collective amnesia of the most fateful and instructive event in our history" (Eqbal Ahmad, 1990).

3. The Making Of Constitution 1973

The quantum of provincial autonomy and the place of Islam as state ideology have been the two sticking point, in constitutional history of Pakistan. The ruling elite always stressed the need of a strong center, and the regional political representatives always argued in favor of greater provincial autonomy. As stated before the landlords, by and large, favor strong center when in power, and advocate for greater provincial autonomy when out of power. Separation of East Pakistan was the direct result of the conflict between the two forces-- centrist ruling elite, and regionalist have-nots (often dubbed, as secessionists, traitors and the agents

of foreign powers by the media at the behest of the ruling elite). Islam represented both by the traditionalist Ulama and the revivalists has been mostly used as an argument against the regionalist have-nots: this country has been created in the name of Islam on the basis of two-nation theory. We have one country one nation, one culture, one language (for details see chapter 3 above).

After the secession of East Pakistan the minority party became the majority party and the centrist ruling elite having successfully thwarted the regionalists attempt to assume power in the center were all set to give a constitution which supported their version of a federal state. With the trauma of the debacle of East Pakistan so closely haunting every one, the politicians, the ruling elite and the media alike did not want to impose a constitution which did not have support from all the federating units. The task was much easier now in 1973 than in 1970. The basic reason being that the centrist ruling elite hailed from Punjab which was now the most populous province and, therefore had more seats in the National Assembly than all the three provinces put together. Political leadership provided by Z.A. Bhutto, brought the second most populous province in line with the political aspirations of the Punjab. Punjab and Sind together represented almost all the parasitic landlords of Pakistan, and bulk of the civil and military top brass¹⁰. However, the military after suffering humiliating defeat, with several thousand prisoners of

war still in the hands of India was not in a position to assert itself. For the first time the game was being played according to political rules, by the politicians in the elected forum. However, with Punjab as the most dominant single group in the Constituent Assembly, it was impossible to make a constitution on the basis of the demands of the regionalists, as it had seemed imminent with the victory of the Awami League in 1970.

A small but vocal and intellectual minority in the PPP viewed their electoral victory as the triumph of the "proletariate". But Bhutto who belonged to the landlord class, had acquired political leadership, economic well being and social preeminence due to his background as a landlord, had only flirting relationship with socialism. He quickly sorted out the socialists and projected himself as a social democrat. In the "new Pakistan" as the PPP government called the remaining Pakistan, Z.A. Bhutto emerged as the only charismatic leader with following in the two most populous provinces.

In this background the business of constitution making was taken up earnestly. An editorial in the *Dawn* (March 3, 1973) epitomized this mood: Constitution Making-- hopes and fears. The caption of editorial is preceded by a Persian couplet (an unusual thing for an English daily). The couplet said: "Speak now in joy or anguish, in dissent or protest" and the editorial note concludes saying "Let us all pray that hope triumphs over fear". With the

traumatic experience of the debacle of East Pakistan and the collaborative role of the media in it, had first prompted the daily to stress the need for freedom of thought and expression, and access to information in its editorial note of December 21, 1971 (see above) and now (March 3, 1973) when "mono-partyism and the use or abuse of emergency powers acquired in November, 1971 in a real war situation are casting lengthening shadows across the land" and when the ruling party has "virtually adopted the position of being the only political party capable of articulating the wishes and requirements of the nation at large" and when "there are charges that the (draft constitution) Bill institutionalizes the cult of personality and will herald an era of dictatorship" and when the newspaper sees "a dangerous polarization of political forces and a total break down of communication between the government and the Opposition", the media does not seem to be in a mood to passively at the receiving end or be an active collaborator. It has to "speak out". The Persian couplet establishes a link between the past and present, and implies that "speaking out" is the categorical imperative and has always been so, in hours of trial. On the basis of the past the media is asserting its right to "dissent or protest". On the one hand media has become conscious of its due roll, and on the other a democratic era is about to dawn after a long night (1958 to 1971) of military dictatorship. The editorial warns "no Constitution given by a single individual or by a lone political party, however massive its majority in the constitution-framing body, can be immune from

future challenges or possess an insurance against subversion". The media seems to be moving away from the shadows of the status quo group, and trying to find a locus standi of its own. This is more true about the *Dawn* and *Nawa-e-Waqt* than about, *The Jang* and *The Pakistan Times*.

What came out of this assertive posture and search of identity ? The editor who had been arrested twice before writing this editorial was finally forced to resign four months after this editorial (for details see endnote 8 above). The cultural ethos of parasitic landlordism remains irreconcilable to democratic ethos.

The Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) which had been swept to victory in two most populous provinces of West Pakistan, on the basis of "Islamic Socialism" and had a good number of those politicians and intellectuals who stressed the importance of diverse regional cultures and provincial autonomy now come in favor of "one culture" based an "ideology". Speaking in the National Assembly PPP's Law Minister "ridiculed the members who talked of nationalities" and added "Pakistan had always been one country and it was not correct to argue that in the Federation of Pakistan the federating unit, had conceded some of their rights to the Federation. In fact it was the other way (*Dawn* March 9, 1973). The said Law Minister having been thrown out of power in 1977 military coup is now a champion of confederation in Pakistan and speaks for the rights of "smaller provinces". The Minister for Information

Kauser Niazi said "The division of the nation on the basis of regional languages and local culture, sought by some opposition parties had no validity and was against the basic interest of Pakistan. Cultures", he said "are created ideology and faith are eternal and Pakistani nation has one ideology and faith" (*Dawn* March 3, 1973). Islam is now coming handy to exert the rule of the central government over all the provinces and those who think otherwise are against the ideology and faith (Islam) of the state and its culture. The news report uses the expression like "the most eloquent speech" "backed by forceful arguments" "The Information Minister exploded the myth of four nationalities" and thereby lends full support to news actor. This is an indication that both the main stream media and the party in power are converging on one state ideology and one culture".

The opposition led by a regional leader, Abdul Wali Khan made an "impassioned appeal to the members of the National Assembly.... to ensure the constitution making ends in an atmosphere of mutual confidence.... like brothers". He argued that "for its survival the country today must be given a constitution, making the federating units feel confident of protection under the constitutional provisions" (*The Dawn*, March 6, 1976). This news item is given under the headline "Wali, Kasuri, Mufti, criticize draft constitution in NA". Compared to Mujibur Rehman the regionalist majority leader in 1970 election, Wali Khan, who had supported Mujib's demand for greater autonomy, is getting more sympathetic or

at least much less hostile coverage in the Pakistan media.

Bhutto's political dexterity, coupled with support of the establishment, was finally able to give the nation a virtually unanimous constitution. His carrot stick policy worked effectively: "Bhutto deplores threat, while consensus on constitution is sought" (*Dawn* March 21, 1973); Bhutto again seeks cooperation in constitution making" (*Dawn* March 3, 1973). The headline implies that Bhutto the dispenser and deliverer, the leader of majority party is condescending to seek cooperation of those in minority, and that too "again" and "again". The text of the story refers to Bhutto's "resolve" to "crush conspiracies" and to have a "consensus constitution. This was the approach which finally led to the long awaited banner headline:

CONSTITUTION ADOPTED

UNANIMOUS PASSAGE AFTER BOYCOTT BY OPPOSITION ENDS

(*Dawn* April 11, 1973)

Another streamer on April 13 reads:

CONSTITUTION AUTHENTICATED

Let the people protect it, says President

Solemn but simple ceremony

(*Dawn*, April 13, 1973)

A six column headline in a very large script in the *Jang* (April 11, 1993) says:

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ADOPTS PERMANENT CONSTITUTION OF PAKISTAN

To accommodate the opposition's point of view
7 articles amended at the last minute'

Compare this six column headline with the banner headline of the *Jang* (April 6, 1973) which said:

PRESIDENT BHUTTO ANNOUNCES HIS DECISION ON
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

The kicker¹¹ reads: "Constitutional Dialogues Between the Ruling Party and Opposition end: National Assembly to Resume Its Work on Saturday".

The sub-head line is "the issue of elections is political and not a constitutional matter: election may be held within, after, or before six months after the adoption of constitution".

This is followed by four more sub-headlines.

The two headlines of the *Jang* (April 6 and 12) indicate what is the big story for the daily, not the unanimous adoption of the constitution but the President Bhutto's announcement of His decisions. The story on President Bhutto's decisions is a banner headline, with one super imposed headline and six sub-headlines (it may be a record). As against this the story of the adoption of the constitution is given in six columns, with no super imposed

headline and four sub-headlines. This is an indication of personality cult promoted by the Pakistani media. It is not the institution (Assembly) or the document (Constitution) which is important, but the person who announces His decision and gets things moving. By professional standards and democratic norms unanimous adoption of the constitution should have been regarded a far bigger development than President Bhutto's "decisions' and "concessions" to the opposition, which did not end Opposition's boycott nor led to any other substantial development in the Constitution making.

Only a two column story carries the Opposition's reaction to the passage of the constitution under the headline:

"Efforts to Further Improve the Constitution Will Continue"

'Now Political Issues Confronting the Country should
be solved: Executive Committee of the Front Meets'

(*Jang*, April 11, 1973)

It may be added that the PPP had agreed to remove the words 'socialism' and Islamic Socialism from the Constitution (*Jang* April 9, 1973) to please the religious elements and dissociate itself with the potential agents of change. Bhutto also agreed to remove the nondemocratic stipulation that two-third majority would be required to for the passage of any no-confidence motion tabled in the National Assembly during the first fifteen years of the constitution's life. Zulfi now offered to reduce it to show that

there was no desire of the majority party or any person to perpetuate one party or one man rule. But in return he demanded an end to get the opposition's boycott of the National Assembly, insisting that all members get back to work and stay there till, the Constitution is framed (Wolpert, 1993:213). While Bhutto agreed to amend seven controversial articles in deference to the Opposition's demand, he, as M.A. Mansuri reports (*The Dawn*, April 16, 1973) also threatened to hold an early referendum on the Constitution after its passage from the Assembly if the Opposition continued with its boycott.

To mark the occasion and to highlight its historic importance elaborate programs were made and prominently covered by the media. The adoption of constitution was the first important event since the debacle of East Pakistan to reinforce the self-confidence of the people. Newspapers announced in five to six column front page headlines the festive mood and the confidence seeking measures.

In this whole process President Bhutto was projected as the dispenser and the deliverer and the Opposition the spoiler who was repeatedly resorting to 'boycott'. The media played down the negative implication of the removal of the Governors in the two smaller provinces, where the Opposition was in power, dismissal of Baluchistan government and the resignation of the Frontier government. *The Pakistan Times* owned by the state openly and strongly defended the government while others did not give it due

importance. Now when the Constitution is adopted it is Bhutto's constitution and the Opposition was relegated to a secondary position. The Opposition only confirmed this impression by saying "carnival celebration were unnecessary on the adoption of the Constitution when our prisoners of war were in the hands of India". The festive mood of the nation and its importance as an occasion to reinforce the lost confidence overrides the reservations of the opposition. The media reflected the situation primarily as it was viewed by the party in power.

The Opposition, which comprised the regionalists and the Islamists was covered in lead news stories mostly with reference to its boycott policy. Its objections to Bhutto's draft constitution bill, its complaints that they were being harassed and projected as anti-state elements, firing by the security forces on a public meeting organized by the Opposition killing about a dozen persons, attempts to implicate the Opposition in an arms catchment in the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad, all received low key publicity, particularly in the *Jang* and *The Pakistan Times*; the *Nawa-e-Waqt* remained more favorable towards the Opposition and suffered for it in curtailment of advertisements and newsprint quota¹². Some of the headlines in the *Jang* and *The Dawn* about the Opposition and the Government are as follows:

A six column lead story in the *Jang* (March 21, 1973) reads:

OPPOSITION ADOPTS NEW STRATEGY ON CONSTITUTION MAKING

the sub-headline reads:

If President does not intervene within next
two days Opposition might boycott.

the next sub-headline goes

Article regarding powers of the
Prime minister to be taken up today

The text of the story begins by saying: Political circles in the capital have expressed the apprehension that unless President Bhutto makes some dramatic intervention within the next two days the Opposition will boycott the constitution making process.'

A five column lead story in the *Jang* (March 24, 1973) says:

OPPOSITION ANNOUNCES BOYCOTT OF CONSTITUTION MAKING

Both the lead stories project a negative image of the Opposition which is resorting to boycott. Why they were likely to boycott is not at all mentioned in the first story. The second story is based on a press conference addressed by leaders of the Opposition where they gave full account of their reasons for boycott. The headline and the three sub-headlines are quiet about the reasons of boycott, which are reported in the text.

The first sub-headline says:

Members of the Front who attend the Assembly will be

expelled, Pir Pagara.

Members of the Jamiat who violate will be taken to task,
Mufti Mehmood.

The second sub-headline reads:

The President has chosen a way for himself; No use of
participating in the Assembly.

The third sub-headline is:

Meet the people campaign to continue, Public meeting will be
held in all corners of the country, Announcement by the
President of the Front.

With the Opposition out of the House the newspapers reports
about the constitution making were one sided and low key. *The Dawn*
reports were mostly two to three columns. Some of he headlines
read:

Clauses on punishment for subverting Constitution passed
(March 14, 1973)

One-fourth of the constitution passed by N.A.
(March 21, 1973)

Third reading of the Constitution Bill from today
(April 8, 1973)

The *Jang* however continued to build Bhutto as the sole arbiter. Two
five columns lead stories on April 11 and 13, 1973, read as
follows:

PRESIDENT BHUTTO TO ADDRESS THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TODAY

PRESIDENT BHUTTO TO AUTHENTICATE THE CONSTITUTION TODAY

The occasion is to mark the unanimous adoption of the Constitution and the celebration related to it, but for the editor the news of the day is that the President will address the Assembly, and will authenticate the Constitution. The body of the story gives Bhutto's time of arrival in the Assembly, and the details of celebration. There is no indication that the President was to make some important announcement on the occasion which prompted the editor to put it as the lead story. Nor in the second story does it mention anything about the importance of Constitution and the celebration without referring to Bhutto. It seems the newsworthy occasion is not passage of the Constitution and the celebration about it but what President Bhutto was scheduled to do on that day in this regard. The Constitution has not been adopted it has been given by President Bhutto, and is to be authenticated by him. President Bhutto's expected speech, without any indication of its contents, and his scheduled act of authentication in themselves are the stuff for a five column lead story.

4. Anti-Qadiani Agitation 1974

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was stalking the political scene of the 'new Pakistan' in his Bonapartist style¹³ with confidence and little opposition. He had travelled a long way to reach the pinnacle of political power. He had struggled against the military rule of Ayub Khan, maneuvered against the 'secessionist designs' of Mujibur

Rahman, the Martial Law of Yahya Khan. He had a subdued military after its surrender in East Pakistan. He had acquired the powers to appoint, promote and dismiss civil servants at will. He reached the highest point of his political ascendancy by convening the Second Summit Conference of the Organization of Islamic Countries in February 1974. He projected himself as the Pride of Asia (Fakhr-e-Asia), the Leader of the People (Quaid-e-Awam) and the leader of the Muslim world, and finally the Leader of the Third World. He had defeated the Islamists and traditionalist religious political forces in elections, and tamed them in the Constitution making. At this time and height Bhutto felt a pinch when an old but dormant volcano of theological polemics erupted suddenly, and caught him unprepared. Bhutto had been brought up and educated in the Western liberal secular traditions: 'I remain this strange mixture of Asia and Europe. I have a layman's education and a Muslim's upbringing. My mind is Western and my soul Eastern (Fallaci, 1976:202). His liberal education had taught him little about a complex theological issue like the finality of Prophethood. Once the volcano erupted it 'spread like a prairie fire' throughout the country and secularist Bhutto was forced to set out on a mission of deciding a theological question.

The anti-Qadiani agitation of 1974 can be studied at two levels-- political and media. At political level the Qadiani issue had been a recurring phenomenon used by the ulama to embarrass the governments and to push themselves into active politics with

varying success. The first anti-Qadiani agitation of 1953 was led by Majlis-e-Ahrar whose vehement opposition to Jinnah and Pakistan Movement had rendered them politically bankrupt after the creation of Pakistan. They also became 'short of ideas on how to go about acquiring political prominence... in Pakistan, the Ahrars reverted to their favorite hobby-horse- reviling the Ahmediya community for its unorthodox approach to Islam and demanding that they be declared a minority' (Jalal, 1990:151). With a mixture of ambivalence and active connivance from the educated sections of society, the field was left wide open for an agitation.

The 1953 agitation eventually went against the ulama and those modernist political leaders who had sympathy for them. The judicial enquiry commission severely criticized the Ulama both on political and religious grounds. The Chief Minister of Punjab, under whose guidance the Punjab Muslim League had passed a resolution in support of the ulama and demanded that the Constituent Assembly should take up the issue was forced out of office by the military, when the local commander imposed Martial Law in Lahore, 'apparently entirely on his own'. Prime Minister Kh. Nazimuddin who was a deeply religious person and had been reluctant to be tough with the agitators was dismissed a few months later (Aysha Jalal 1990:153, 177). According to Altaf Gauhar (1994:103-106) the ulama had lost whatever political influence and credibility they had in 1953 when they launched a politically inspired agitation against the Ahmedis in the Punjab. The report of the judicial enquiry commission

conclusively demonstrated that the ulama did not have an agreed answer to any of the fundamental questions like the rights and status of a citizen, the role of the people in the political process, nor indeed did they have any clear understanding of the concepts of sovereignty or state. The court acknowledged the agitational prowess of the ulama and conceded "that provided you can persuade the masses to believe that something they are asked to do is religiously right or enjoined by religion, you can set them to any course of action regardless of all considerations of discipline, loyalty, decency, morality, or civic sense"¹⁴. The report of the court of enquiry noted: "What is Islam and who is a Momin or a Muslim? We put this question to the ulama and we shall presently refer to their answers to this question. But we cannot refrain from saying here that it was a matter of infinite regret to us that the Ulama, whose first duty should be to have settled views on the subject, were hopelessly disagreed among themselves... Keeping in view the several definitions (of a Muslim) given by the ulama need we make any comment except that no two learned divines are agreed on this fundamental. If we attempt our own definition as each learned divine has done, and that definition, differs from that given by all other, we unanimously come out of the fold of Islam¹⁵".

The anti-Ahmediya riots of 1953 are a stern reminder of the devastating effects of doctrinal differences on urban society. Instead of becoming the melting pot for popular and doctrinal

Islam, Pakistan's urban centers were being turned by orthodox and fundamentalist groups into powder kegs of religious extremism. Islam far from acting as a cement for national integration was assisting cultural fragmentation (Jalal, 1990:289).

In 1974, the 'Islamic socialist' government of Z.A. Bhutto, was not in a position to suppress the mass agitation by force, one, because the agitation was more wide spread than in 1953, two the debacle of East Pakistan had demoralized the military to a point where it could ill afford another mission of suppression, three, by 1970s the religious elements had recovered from the political losses suffered due to their opposition to the Pakistan Movement, and had transformed themselves into the champions of its Islamic ideology, during the same period the liberal/ secular forces had weakened themselves by using Islam for political ends and by entering into compromises with the ulama. The first popularly elected government led by a charismatic liberal politician had little room to suppress and shelve the issue: it had to be addressed politically and solved.

The Qadianis (also called Ahmediyas or Mirzais) were a closely knit sect who had deviated from one of the fundamental precepts of Islam by according their spiritual leader, Mirza Ghulam Ahmed (1835-1908), a status comparable to the Prophet Muhammad, and therefore, considered "heretics" by orthodox Sunnis. The high level of education that prevailed among Qadianis, however, helped them

attain position of disproportionate power and prominence in Pakistan's civil, military, and diplomatic services. Their wealth and power aroused the envy of poorer Pakistanis, and most fundamentalist mullahs and maulanas reviled them as "non-Muslims" or "traitors" to Islamic law (Jalal, 1990:151; Wolpert, 1993: 238). Socio-economic strength combined with their political ambition of having a state of their own in Kashmir (Shahab, 1988:358-389) or capturing the state of Pakistan from within had made them the target of envy, hatred and fear among the Ulama and the lower middle class conservative urbanites who have always followed the ulama more than any other section of the society.

When Bhutto returned from an official visit to Bangladesh and found the Punjab in so volatile a state, he moved swiftly to defuse the problem. He appealed directly over radio and television for immediate restoration of "order" alerting the army and announcing his appointment of Justice Samadani of Lahore High Court to serve as one-man committee of inquiry into the Rabwah "incident", which had sparked the agitation. Bhutto refused to make an executive decision on the religious status of the Qadianis and declare them non-Muslims, as demanded by the Opposition. He did not want to create an impression that he could be forced to accept demands through agitation. Despite agitational pressure Bhutto said that only the National Assembly could take up the issue and decide it. He also said that as party leader he would not use the whip on the members to take a certain position. On 10 September the Assembly

unanimously declared the Ahmadis a minority, thereby barring individual members from attaining either the prime ministership or presidency of Pakistan under the Constitution. The action was viewed as a major victory for Prime Minister Bhutto because many hitherto anti-PPP fundamentalists crossed over the assembly lobbies in Punjab and Islamabad to the PPP (Wolpert, 1994:239).

The media discourse at this point remained heavily under the influence of the government, which in turn had opted for a course of least resistance under public pressure. The most prominent aspect of media coverage of this event is total black out of the Qadiani point of view. They do not seem to exist even, if one goes by the media image of this period, neither as citizens nor as humans. They were only an imperceptible evil force. At a point where the Government, the Opposition and the people took a common stand against the Qadiani the media went with the sweep and proved once again that the media was being led by forces outside the profession. Once the establishment indicated that it would accept the demands of the Ulama and declare the Qadiani's non-Muslims, the media saw no reason to provide a balance coverage to the events by reporting the Qadiani point of view or by highlighting the loss of life land property suffered by them. Instead the media chose to treat the Qadiani's as non-existent as a citizens, even as human being. They were quickly transformed into a non-human network of evil bent upon destroying Islam and hijacking the state. This was again almost all based on the statements issued by the Ulama and

the government. The media talked about the civil and human right, of the Qadiani's only after the National Assembly unanimously declared the Qadianis non-Muslims, and the Prime Minister made a statement to this effect. To guard against the possibility of the media fomenting sectarian tension the government imposed a ban on the publication of news and comments of sectarian nature.

A six column lead story in the *Jang* said:

PUBLICATION OF NEWS AND COMMENTS ON SECTARIAN ISSUES BANNED

To dilute the negative effect of this lead, the first sub-headline said:

Decision Taken At Governor's Conference To Enable Full House Special Committee of National Assembly to take Up Ahmadiya Issue Without Prejudice.

The second sub-headline read:

Material Related To Ahmadiya Issue Will Have To Be Submitted To the Concerned Officials For Sifting before Publication.

The next sub-headline said:

Press Would Bear With Temporary Difficulties By Cooperating, Government hopes.

From then on only the official news about the proceedings of the full House special Committee of the National Assembly were to appear. Since the Special Committee was meeting in camera, the

official news stories mentioned only in broad outline, without being specific on the business taken up by the Committee. Some of the headlines reveal the nature of media discourse of this period.

A six column lead story in the *Dawn* (July 1, 1974) says:

LEGISLATORS TAKE UP QADIANI ISSUE

Its kicker is:

N.A. TURNS INTO SPECIAL COMMITTEE

The three column sub-headline, in two lines reads:

Study in Camera: Motion By Opposition To Be Considered

The second sub headline goes:

No room for agitation: Pirzada

A six column lead story in *Jang* (July 5, 1974) goes:

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CONSTITUTES TWELVE MEMBER STEERING COMMITTEE

A two column story in the *Dawn* (July 15, 1974) is:

Brisk Progress by N.A. body on Qadiani Issue

the first sub-headline says:

Decision within very reasonable time

The second sub-headline in two lines is:

Steps so far unanimous:

Resume of work given

The text of the story, based on the statement made by the Law Minister in a press conference, does not include the words 'brisk progress' which seem to have been used here to allay the impatient agitators through positive expressions and to give the impression that the Special Committee had been working very hard.

The statement gives only procedural details of the proceedings with a view to apprise the public that their representatives were busy doing their job. The newspaper takes such a routine press briefing as a "disclosure". After the lead paragraph the story begins "Disclosing this at a press conference...". The Law Minister had also appealed to the people that while the highest democratic institution in the country was seized of the matter they should not allow themselves to be influenced by voices being raised in isolated quarters to build pressure or asking for a boycott of the Qadiani community as, he said, this would be totally unjustified, against the principles of natural justice and the Constitutional provisions which guaranteed fundamental rights equality of all citizens, and against the spirit of Islam. Besides, this course of action would also damage the national image abroad". The negative side of the story that if fundamental human rights of the Qadianis are violated it would be against Islam, the law of the land and tarnish the national image abroad-- find no place in the headline, sub-headlines or the lead paragraph. Why? Because prominent coverage to this aspect would give the impression that the Government was sympathetic towards the Qadianis. The Minister made the statement, apparently, only to be on record, and the newspaper

got the hint and fudged it in the body of the news. Being an English daily *The Dawn* could afford to place this statement just after the lead paragraph, the Urdu dailies of the same date down played it even further.

A four column lead story in the *Dawn* (August 5, 1974) reads:

Deliberations on Ahmadi issue to end by September 7

The kicker reads:

Prime Minister's call to N.A.

A four column story headline in the *Jang*, (July 15, 1974) says:

Statements By the Leaders of Qadiani and Lahori Groups to Be Recorded on July 22

An eight column banner headline in the *Jang* (August 1, 1974) is:

DECISION ON FINAL DATE FOR QADIANI ISSUE
PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO CONVENES IMPORTANT MEETING

The newspaper has chosen to drum up the Prime Minister only for 'convening a high level meeting in Quetta to fix a final date for the resolution of the Qadiani issue'. And when the Prime Minister made his announcement at a "grand public meeting", the audience welcomed it "with enthusiastic clapping". The headline is giving the impression that a decision on the Qadiani issue was imminent, and it was the Prime Minister who was keen on it. Such a news story, under similar circumstances would not have merited more

than three or four column front page story or at best a four or five column lead story. But here the purpose is not to publish a news on professional merit, but to make the point that the Prime Minister's statement needs to be given a banner headline treatment, because he was addressing a "grand public meeting" (Azeem-u-shan Jalsa-a-Aam), in a far-flung area and the decision to convene the meeting had been "welcomed by enthusiastic clapping". The words already indicate what the decision was going to be. Once again the idea is to project the person not the idea or the issue or the institution, which are all trailing behind him.

When on September 7 'An historic decision' (title of the editorial in the *Dawn* September 10) and 'a national decision' (in Prime Minister's words) was taken unanimously the *Jang* chose to give a six column lead story as compared to eight column streamer of August 1, 1974 when the Prime Minister announced that had convened a high level meeting to fix a final date for the decision on the issue. The news for which the people had been agitating since May 29, and waiting since June 30, is covered in a six column lead story. The reason is that here it's "only a news" which has come from a committee and an Assembly and has not been disclosed by some important personality like the Prime Minister. Personality is more important than the news. Prominent coverage given to the statement made by a person entails a personal obligations, and can be shown to the powers that be as an act of favor which calls for return of favors. Exceptionally high key coverage accorded to an

institution, a procedure, a process, does not have a personal reference, nor likely to accrue personal benefits. Therefore "impersonal" news stories are played down, and 'personal' stories played up.

Against this the *Dawn* (September 8, 1974) has covered the story under banner headline:

QADIANIS DECLARED MINORITY"

The first sub-headline is:

Preaching against finality of prophethood by Muslims made punishable

The second sub-headline goes:

Second constitutional Amendment Bill unanimously passed by National Assembly, Senate

What is conspicuously missing on September 8, and the following days is any news item about the reaction of the Qadianis to the decision. There is only one single column news in the *Jang*, (September 26, 1974) which carries a statement by the Law Minister made in response to an earlier statement (not reported in the press) by a Qadiani leader Chaudhry Zafarullah Khan. The Minister in his response has defended the right of the Parliament to decide religious status of a community.

The *Jang* (September 19, 1974) carries another banner headline:

PRIME MINISTER ORDERS RELEASE OF THOSE

ARRESTED ON SECTARIAN ISSUE

The first sub-headline says:

Instructions issued to the four Chief Ministers: Prime Minister's decision in the light of legislature's decision and the discipline shown by the masses

Once again it is not release of the detainees, it is the Prime Minister's decision to this effect which makes news and merits a streamer treatment.

After the decision of the Assembly to declare the Qadianis non-Muslims the press followed the line of the establishment and dished out only that what the readers wanted to read. The *Jang* and the *Dawn* report about 130 individuals praising the decision. The *Jang* published four two-column stories on Sept. 9, 10 and 11, about reaction from "political, religious and social circles" and as the newspaper puts it from "the representatives of all schools of thought". In total sixteen stories in the *Jang* carry the names of 114 individuals and one Organization viz. the Lahore Bar Association, all of whom have "welcomed the decision whole heartedly". The *Dawn* of Sept 9 and 10, carries two column and one column stories and quotes 16 individuals welcoming the decision. There is not a single voice of dissent or caution or reservation. There are liberals in Pakistan who do not agree with the contention that National Assembly should determine the religious status on its citizens, but they are not represented here. Nor the views or

reaction of the Qadiani's is given.

It is only natural that a newspaper would elicit the views of both the parties at opposite ends of the dispute. A newspaper does have a right to overplay the views of the overwhelming majority and downplay the views of the minority who has lost a case, but total obliteration of the minority point of view cannot be justified. Whatever the reason for this imbalance and distortion (fear of negative public reaction or government reaction), the fact remains that the Pakistani media is content with carrying statements only, and that too of those who are either part of the establishment. The media trails behind the establishment. When the establishment and the people are on one side (as in this case) the press gets carried away by the sweep of the event. Therefore, its role in the formation of public opinion, as an independent entity, through more comprehensive coverage of a given event is negligible if not non-existent.

It may be interesting to look at some of the headlines of news stories published after the Parliamentary decision.

A two column story in the *Dawn* (September 9, 1997):

Full Satisfaction Expressed

One column story the *Dawn* (September 10, 1974)

Decision reflects Aspiration of Millet

Two column story in the *Jang* (September 10, 1974):

With the solution of Qadiani issue Prime Minister
Bhutto has solved all the national problems

Two column story in the *Jang* (September 10, 1974):

Decision of the National Assembly will be written
in golden letters in history of Islam

Two column story in the *Jang* (September 12, 1974):

Solution of the Qadiani issue is a proof of Prime
Minister Bhutto's love for Islam.

Editorial Comments

It was only when the Prime Minister in the Parliament said: "it is our moral and sacred, indeed, our Islamic duty to protect the rights of every citizen of Pakistan. We will not tolerate any form of vandalism or humiliation or insult to any community of this country" that the newspapers made the point in their editorial notes. Earlier they remained content with reporting the statements of the Prime Minister and Ministers expressing their resolve to protect the life and property of every citizen.

The *Jang* editorial captioned "Courageous and Right Decision" and the *Dawn* editorial entitled 'An historic decision' (September 10, 1974) repeat Prime Minister's words and called upon everyone to

live upto the glorious Islamic tradition of tolerance and respect for the brotherhood of all mankind". Not only the two editorials mention about the protection of minorities only when the Prime Minister has said it and almost in his words, the order in which this point has been made is the same as in the prime Minister's statement. The Prime Minister made this point in the middle of his speech and then elaborated it in his concluding remarks. The two editorials also mention this point in the last paragraph. The *Dawn* however takes cue from this consensus to add "the manner in which the decision was taken augurs well for the growth of democracy in the country".

5. General Elections 1977

The general elections held on March 7, 1977 proved as cataclysmic as the election held seven years before. The 1970 election held by the Martial Law regime led to the dismemberment of the country and the following election brought the longest and the severest martial law in its wake. Pakistani media, always under the heavy influence of the government of the time, had to adjust its sails more quickly than ever before to the changing winds of politics.

Two largest circulation Urdu newspapers-- the *Jang* and the *Nawa-e-Waqt* will be analyzed below to comprehend the fast changing political kaleidoscope and its direct effect on the vocabulary and

meaning, and the display and projection of news stories and editorials.

Four days before the formal announcement of general elections the *Nawa-e-Waqt* (January 3, 1977) wrote an editorial entitled "Elections and National stability". It took a non-partisan position and expressed the confidence on behalf of "all the patriotic circles" (editors and politicians alike tend to monopolize patriotism) that the Prime Minister would be able to live up to his commitment of holding elections under the Constitution at proper time. The editorial also expressed the hope that 'the forthcoming elections would be truly free and fair, and dispel the old misgiving that in Pakistan fair elections cannot be held under political regimes'. Writing about the fragmented Opposition, which had announced to form a united front against the ruling party, the editorial doubts if this united front would stand united. It warns that 'if instead of providing alternate leadership the Opposition's sole objective is to dislodge the rulers then the apprehension that it might increase political chaos does not remain a mere hypothesis'.

It is noticeable that in the 1970 elections the *Nawa-e-Waqt* had opposed Bhutto and his party because of its socialistic pretensions. During his six years rule Bhutto had virtually abandoned the socialists and sided with the forces of status quo, and since declaring the Qadianis non-Muslims had seen the

ascendancy of the rightist, pro-religious forces in the party. "Islamic fundamentalists now had gained greater power inside both Bhutto's government and party, several of his closest early comrades in starting the "People's Revolution" dropped out. J.A. Rahim was replaced as minister for production and commerce by Rafi Raza in July. Finance Minister Mubashir Hasan was let go in October, and Minister of Health Khurshid Hasan Meer was out of the cabinet before year's end. If any trio represented the early revolutionary ideals of the PPP, it was Rahim, Hasan and Meer. Meer still remained deputy secretary-general of the party but now saw his influence over his Quaid-i-Awam "slipping" as Bhutto turned his face from the left to right wings of his kitchen cabinet" (Wolpert, 1993:239). Maulana Kausar Niazi, who was a leader of revivalist Jamaat-e-Islami in the sixties and led the religious right in the PPP emerged as a powerful minister in Bhutto's cabinet. His detractors within the party often called him 'Maulana Whisky' (Wolpert, 1994:239) for his opportunistic, contradictory personality which held socialism, liberalism and conservative Islam all together.

Moreover, fragmented Opposition did not inspire much confidence at this stage, therefore the daily has chosen to be soft on Bhutto, and dropped its hostile posture. This editorial seems to have a balanced approach toward the ruling party and the Opposition, but a careful analysis reveals it is full of warning and misgiving about the Opposition and optimistic about the ruling

party. About Prime Minister Bhutto's declared intentions of holding elections the editorial says "it is a praiseworthy commitment and a heart felt desire and prayer of all the patriotic circles that may Allah keep him steadfast in pursuit of his noble cause". (How this optimism and support evaporated within the next few weeks will be analysed below). About the Opposition the editorial has only warnings and misgivings lest they further increase the existing political 'anarchy'.

The word 'anarchy' and the Bhutto regime had been made synonymous by the rightist conservatives in the media. The editorial takes it for granted that there exists a political anarchy which practically means pseudo-socialism of Bhutto and his party's pretension of changing the balance of power from the establishment to the people. The editor is worried lest the fragmented Opposition increase this political anarchy and hopes by implication that keeping in view the record of the ruling party it would turn toward the forces of status quo more strongly and put an end to this 'anarchy'. The leaders of Opposition are advised to be 'realistic and sensible' and 'not to devote their entire energy only in opposing the Government. They should rather give importance to the measures to be able to articulate (the aspirations of) the nation and to serve it better. The difficulties they have in their way are not un-understandable but major part of these difficulties has been created by them'¹⁶.

Z.A. Suleri, a former editor-in-chief of the state owned *The Pakistan Times* who had been dismissed by Bhutto, dilates upon the theme of 'anarchy' in an article in the *Nawa-e-Waqt* (February 5, 1977). He says: "In no small measure the present anarchy of thought is due to our lack of knowledge about the Quaid-e-Azam. This must be made up. The job before the Opposition is in fact no less than to chart out the pathway to our destiny. It can be done only with clarity of vision and tenacity of conviction". Here we see no optimism about the ruling party which introduced 'anarchy of thought'. Now it is the Opposition alone which can and should deliver. The editor-in-chief of *Nawa-e-Waqt* was to take this position in editorial notes, after the election when the Opposition proved its strength of unity and the PPP started losing nerves after allegation of election fraud.

The *Jang* (January 9, 1977) continued its tradition of according banner headline coverage to news items "announced" or "disclosed" by individual leaders and giving low key coverage to the similar stories emanating from institutions. The paper splashed a streamer to report Bhutto's speech and announced:

ELECTIONS FOR NATIONAL ASSEMBLY IN MARCH 7 AND FOR
PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES ON MARCH 10

The kicker says:

National Assembly to be dissolved on January 10
and Provincial Assemblies on January 13. The current

National Assembly did an unprecedented service for the people:
Prime Minister Bhutto.

First sub-headline is:

Elections will be highly disciplined in a free and impartial atmosphere. Law and order to be maintained at all cost:
Prime Minister's address to the National Assembly.

The second sub-headline reads:

We are not scared of going to the people, nor averse to electoral battle.

The third sub-headline goes:

Other parties will have to cooperate in holding impartial elections.

The fourth sub-headline says:

Opposition's walkout is regrettable. Agricultural reforms to benefit hundreds of thousand of people.

The story opens with the name of the Chief Executive saying:

Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto announced this evening in the National Assembly that general elections will be held on March 7...". The same paragraph adds, "Holding elections does not mean that somebody should try to create anarchy and think that law has ceased to be effective".

On January 12, 1977 there is only a two-column news to announce:

Nine Opposition Parties Form An Alliance

The sub-headline says:

Joint candidates to be fielded; Will have common electoral symbol

The *Jang* (January 26, 1977) splashed an other streamer when Chairman Zulfikar Ali Bhutto announced his party manifesto, with six sub-headlines and one kicker. The Prime Minister made this announcement at a 'crowded press conference'. Its being crowded proves how popular he is and how keen the media are to listen to him. The press conferences of the opposition leaders was not reported 'crowded' by the *Jang* till after the elections. It does not mean anything if a press conference address by the Prime Minister at the time of election is crowded. It is arranged by the Press Information Department, state-owned media (T.V., Radio, official news agency, and media officials and photographers of various government agencies) have to be there, all newspapers and foreign media are represented. This is almost a routine drill for all the journalists (official and independent) to 'crowd' the press conference of the Prime Minister. The Opposition leaders address a press conference without official media and thereby their press conference are not crowded. When the Chief Election Commissioner announced the validity of unopposed election of the Prime Minister the press conferences was again 'crowded'. Chief Election Commissioner's press conferences at other occasions were seldom reported 'crowded'.

By January 19, the last date to file nomination papers for

National Assembly elections no candidate had filed nomination papers against the Prime Minister in his home constituency in Larkana, Sindh. Chief Minister Sindh, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi issued a statement when the Opposition alleged that its candidate had been abducted by official agencies to stop him from filing nomination papers. The Chief Minister's statement is carried as a lead story in six column in the *Jang* (January 22, 1977) says:

PAKISTAN PEOPLE PARTY IS SUPPORTED BY AN OVERWHELMING
MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE: Jatoi

The kicker is:

The Opposition is Resorting To All Kinds Of Tactics To Obtain A Few Votes, But The People Have Become Aware And They Cannot Be Misled

The first sub-headline is:

The Allegation That Jan Muhammad Abbasi Had Been Sent For By the Superintendent of Police Is An Utter Lie. The Leader of the Jamat-i-Islami Had Talked To Newsmen On January 18 And the Next Day Filed His Nomination Papers From Nawab Shah.

The second sub-headline says:

If Jan Muhammad Abbasi had been abducted how he could have filed his nomination papers

The third sub-headline reads:

Unopposed victory of Chairman Bhutto from Larkana has

bewildered the Opposition: Chief Minister's press conference

The statement made at a "crowded press conference" is published without making any reference to what the Opposition has to say, nor there is any mention of earlier press reports on the subject, filed by the correspondent of the daily, or other sources. No attempt is made to investigate the allegations and counter allegations, to find out the other side of the story or to balance it by incorporating the Opposition's point of view. Why? because, displaying "truthful" statement of the Chief Minister beside the Opposition's "false allegations" on the same day, on the same page, or combining the two versions by rewriting the story, would, in the eyes of the landlord turned Chief Minister, amount to encroach upon the "piece of land (or space on the page of a newspaper) which the landlord owns". Now by virtue of his Chief Ministership his 'ownership' extends all over Sindh and his writ covers everything existing on this land. He has a right under the law of pre-emption to foil attempts (by a non-resident landlord, or a non-landowner) to buy a piece of land (or space in the newspaper, or time on airwaves) next to him. Since the land ownership is eternal like the land itself any change in ownership even beyond the borders of the land possessed is perceived as a threat. This mentality has ruled the high political offices in Pakistan and is duly endorsed by the media through connivance and collaboration.

Thrust of Jatoi's statement, and its display show that the PPP

has overwhelming majority support and the Opposition does not matter. It is a foregone conclusion that "we" are going to "win". The government, and thereby the land, the people, and the election, belong to us. Therefore, the Opposition, in deference to the tradition of landlordism, should not try to acquire land ownership next to us, or they can be pre-empted. The real issue, the abduction of the Opposition candidate is mentioned only in passing, the emphasis is on the overwhelming majority support the Prime Minister and his party enjoy. The newspaper 'endorses' the statement by according it wide coverage.

The story of abduction of the Opposition candidates and unopposed elections of the Prime Minister and all the PPP Chief Minister's damaged credibility of the election even before they could be held. It was known to the newsman how the Opposition candidates had been stopped from filing their nomination papers, but the mainstream print media, by and large, gave only subdued coverage to the event. The *Nawa-e-Waqt* being less favorably inclined to the ruling party gave better coverage, but put everything into the mouth of the one Opposition leader or the other.

Another five column lead story based on the decision of the Election Commission published in *Jang* (Feb. 14, 1977) says:

UNOPPOSED ELECTION OF THE PRIME MINISTER DECLARED VALID because the complainant could not provide enough evidence in

support of his contention. In the same decision unopposed election of the Chief Minister of the Frontier Province has been declared valid.

The White Paper (1978: 265-266) says: The media literally went into raptures and the Information Minister gleefully reported on his performance to the Prime Minister on 20th January with an accompanying set of newspaper clippings that "the national press has reacted to the happy tidings by paying glowing tributes to the Prime Minister as the undisputed, peerless and supreme leader of the country who is carrying the entire nation along with himself in the right direction of stability and progress".

The White Paper adds: "The entire reaction was however stage-managed. After carrying out the Ministry's instructions, the Press Information Department in a report submitted on the morning of 20th January said: "The Principal Information Officer called senior correspondents of both the national wire services in his office and briefed them personally with regard to the drafting of their reports on the event. The correspondents were asked to link up the Prime Minister's unopposed election with his massive popularity and highlight in their reports the services of the Prime Minister to the people of his constituency, the Province of Sindh and the nation as a whole; various reforms introduced by him to establish an egalitarian socio-economic order in the country; and his family tradition of philanthropy and service to the people. For this

purpose, necessary background material was supplied to them. The drafted reports of both the correspondents were approved by the PIO" (Principle Information Officer).

"The national Press was advised to publish these reports prominently on front page. The newspapers were further advised to publish the latest official portrait of the Prime Minister in the center of their front pages in 3 columns x 8" size, with the caption: "The Supreme Leader; The Undisputed Leader, The Great Leader" (White Paper, 1978: 266).

Nawa-e-Waqt (March 2, 1977) in its editorial said "in this regard the case of those Returning Officers needs attention against whom this unforgivable charge has been made that they did not give equal treatment to candidates at the time of the filing of nomination papers, which was their official and moral duty, and thereby paved the way for unopposed election of some of the candidates from the ruling party. Apart from these Returning Officers no legal action has been initiated against those administrative functionaries who stopped the candidates, their proposers and endorsers, held them under unlawful custody, harassed and intimidated their wives, children and the relatives, and persisted with these unlawful activities which have come to the knowledge and observation of everyone... The fact that the officials who violated the rules have not been taken to task is in itself a great tragedy". The editorial did not dare question the

Election Commission but did point out a serious lacuna in the procedure, which puts the civil servants, practically, above accountability. All these administrators and police officers who 'helped' the ruling party's big candidates in winning elections 'unopposed' by not letting any candidate reach anywhere near the Returning Officers were not made accountable, till the Martial Law regime started its own victimization. Even in this editorial the ruling party and its landlord leaders have not been criticized who have been the real perpetrators of these unlawful practices and the protectors of those state functionaries who enabled them to get elected "unopposed". This is despite the fact that these unlawful activities have come to the knowledge and observation of everyone. The editor may call for the accountability of the civil servants-- the junior and weaker partners in the ruling triumvirate-- but would not dare say the same thing about the landlords and military leaders, so long as they are in power.

Another editorial in *Nawa-e-Waqt* (February 26, 1977) ten days before the election day shows how the paper has shifted more clearly in favor of the Opposition, now united as Pakistan National Alliance, dominated by religious political parties led by the Ulama (traditionalists and fundamentalist) with liberals like (Asghar Khan) and regionalists like Begum Nasim Wali Khan prominently in the fold. The daily's direct opposition to the ruling party remains guarded but its cautious supported to the fragmented opposition of January has now, in late February, become vocal and more

unequivocal.

It says since Islam was the basis of the Pakistan Movement, "it was incumbent upon us to enforce Islamic criminal law and rules and regulations without wasting any time; had we started seeking guidance from Islam at that time to build our economic structure with sincerity and a sense of sacrifice, today we could have got a stable economic structure, after passing through experimented stages". The reference is obviously to the supposedly un-Islamic socialistic policies of the PPP regime. To make his disapproval of the people's decision to vote for Islamic Socialism in 1970 election, clear the editor adds: "Although the Muslim masses have been confused by misleading terminologies, yet they have never revoked Islam". As if there was a real danger of "the Muslim masses" revoking Islam. "Now for the first time in pursuance of the aspirations of the nation an alliance of different political parties has raised the slogan of the enforcement of Islam. The masses have responded to the call enthusiastically by coming to the processions and public meetings of the National Alliance in hundreds of thousands. This enthusiasm of the Muslim masses is due to Islam alone". The editor conveniently ignores the fact that the PNA was eliciting its support primarily from the urban population, the middle and the lower middle classes who had suffered because of nationalization policy of the PPP and whose middle class social and moral values had been challenged and flouted. It not fair to say that the Muslim masses (constituting 97% of the population) were

supporting the PNA.

i. Post Election Agitation and the Drift of the Media

On the election day *Jang* (March 7, 1977) in its editorial note said, 'although we fully believe that the result of the election will be in favor of Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Mr. Bhutto will get majority in the Assembly and form the central government yet the Opposition is going to be fairly strong this time". Apart from the fact why and how an editor should proclaim victory for one party without any empirical evidence (like opinion polls etc.) it nevertheless concedes that the ruling party is not likely to maintain its previous level of majority. Four days after the National Assembly election wherein the PPP bagged 75% seats, and a day after the Provincial Assembly election, wherein the PPP had got a walk-over due to PNA's boycott, the *Jang* (March 11, 1977) wrote, "As we had stated before in these columns that there could be no doubt about the People's Party's second victory and its chances of staying in power for the next five years, because it was necessary for this party to stay in power for the sake of national stability as well as for the consolidation with confidence of the reforms, the party had introduced.... Thus the election results have expressed greater confidence than before in the leadership of Mr. Bhutto". The editor does not question his own judgement of March 7, that "the Opposition is going to be fairly strong this time". The editorial adds: "unusual success.... Mr. Bhutto is not only the leader of the People's Party, he is the leader of all the

Pakistanis and should have cooperation of all Pakistanis, whatever their leanings or for whatever reason they have misgivings"-- what an understatement for a massive protest against an equally massive electoral rigging! The PNA is advised to adopt "a constructive and positive attitude in post election period". The editor finds it regrettable that "the National Alliance should accuse the ruling party of rigging, malpractices and irregularities, and refuse to accept election results". Soon after the military takeover the editor was to condemn the party for defrauding the nation at the polling booth.

As the post election agitation gained momentum the *Jang* increased the space of coverage for the PNA and *Nawa-e-Waqt* become less fearful of retaliation by the party in power. To begin with the *Jang* played safe by publishing official press notes only on the country-wide strikes, processions and protests against electoral rigging. The day Karachi had been paralysed by a strike in response to an appeal by the PNA the *Jang* (13.3.1977) ran a six column lead story saying:

200 PEOPLE ARRESTED IN KARACHI ON CHARGES OF CREATING
DISTURBANCES.

The sub-headline said:

Situation Fully Under Control. Administration Determined To
Provide Protection To Peaceful Citizens: official press

note.

It goes without saying that those who have been protesting against electoral rigging, in line with their fundamental political rights are not peaceful citizens, they are only the mischief makers.

Another headline in the *Jang* (March 11, 1977) runs:

National Assembly Elections Have Been Rigged, Claims Khan
Qayyum

Mark the word 'claim' and in the text it says "as he said the national Assembly polls were rigged"; the newspaper is being extra careful to dissociate itself from the 'claim'. It did not take similar dissociative measure while publishing official press notes. Can it not be 'claimed' that the daily is 'associating' itself with the Government point of view?

A story in the *Jang* (March 13, 1977) reads:

Baton Charge By Police To Disperse An Unruly Mob; official
press note.

Headline gives no clue to the political nature of the 'unruly mob'. While 'people' and 'citizens' are good guys, 'mob' is bad and negative in democratic political discourse, and when the 'mob' becomes 'unruly' police have no choice but to 'baton charge' and 'disperse' them. The words of the headline treat the news event as almost a 'non-event' because it does not mention any thing news worthy about the 'unruly mob' except putting a negative unspecified

label on them and then assuring the 'people' and the 'citizens' that they have been 'dispersed'.

With the rising tempo of agitation for re-election the *Nawa-e-Waqt* is expanding space allocation to the PNA, and the *Jang* is reducing space of coverage for the ruling party. Both continue to adhere to the statements of the news actors. The *Jang* (March 14, 1977) carries a six column lead story to saying:

PRIME MINISTER OFFERS DIALOGUE TO THE LEADERS
OF NATIONAL ALLIANCE

In the light of past experience one can imagine that had the situation been the same as prevailing before the election the daily would have splashed this statement of the Prime Minister as a streamer. Now the public opinion (in this case the urban public opinion where the newspaper sells, and where the PNA was strong) has turned against the government more strongly, and above all the government has put itself on the defensive, it is safe to reduce coverage by two column.

The *Nawa-e-Waqt* (March 18, 1977) gives a banner headline to the PNA demand:

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY POLLS SHOULD BE HELD AGAIN
UNDER AN IMPARTIAL ADMINISTRATION, National Alliance.

Increasingly tough position of the Alliance is expressed in the sub-headline:

No Negotiation With The Government On Bargaining Of Seats:
Asghar Khan

The same trend continues in the two newspapers till the beginning of dialogue between the PNA and the Government, and then the imposition of Martial law. They are increasingly favoring the PNA and reducing space for the Government. The *Jang*, however gave support to the Government in its editorials. An editorial (May 18, 1977) which might have been written under pressure from the Government, says: "Political, social and religious circles, throughout the country have enthusiastically welcomed the announcement by Prime Minister Bhutto to hold referendum". One wonders how easily the editors choose to speak for the entire country, all schools of thought and circles in support of their views. Who are these "circles", how did the editor gauge their opinions remain unknown. "They (who?) have said (where?) that this decision of the leader of the people (Quaid-e-Awam) is a courageous step and it is the only democratic way of solving the current political crisis. Ordinary citizens have also expressed their satisfaction at this (offer)". This "only democratic way" was to be closed the next day when the PNA turned down the offer as a diversionary tactic. And the 'satisfied ordinary citizens' were still on streets shouting for re-election and had brought the country to a grinding halt through continuous agitation. Yet the editor thinks, and wants others to believe that the ordinary citizen are happy with this 'courageous step'.

The *Nawa-e-Waqt* remained apparently committed to the Opposition's cause but always took care to cover its flanks against official retaliation and gave the impression (by not blaming the PPP or the PM for rigging) in its editorial (March 30, 1977) that rigging was not the doing of the Prime Minister nor his party but that of the bureaucracy who had been trying to be more loyal to the king than the king himself. The newspaper registered continuously soaring circulation, during his period, due to its wide coverage of the agitation and the news related to the Opposition but in editorial it remained cautious not to rub the government the wrong way. It does not clearly endorse PNA's demand for re-election and calls for a "settlement" in the same spirit which the PPP had displayed in bringing about an unanimous Constitution in 1973. The editorial also omits any reference to the PNA demand that re-election should be held under an impartial administration.

ii. Imposition of Martial and Fractured Media Discourse

With the imposition of Martial Law the mainstream newspapers quickly adjusted their sails to the new wind blowing from the GHQ. They took a complete U-turn and started blaming the Bhutto regime for the crisis. To describe this abrupt and total change in the media approach we have chosen to call it a 'fractured media discourse', not experienced since the 1958 Martial Law.

When the draft accord, agreed upon between the three member PNA team and the government, was rejected by the other components

of the nine party Alliance, and the Prime Minister refused to accept new demands without delay, the Military High Command seems to have concluded that the political process had reached a dead end and decided to take over in the early hours of April 5, 1977. Maulana Kausar Niazi (1988:208), a member of the PPP negotiation team, says that Bhutto addressed an hour long press conference starting thirty minutes before midnight, and announced his readiness to accept all demands of the PNA. But, perhaps, it was too late. It appears from the account given by Lt. Gen. Chishti (1991), the commander in charge of the operation in the capital, that the decision to takeover had been finalized by that time. If it be so, it was difficult for the Military High Command to reverse the ultra-Constitutional 'Operation Fair Play', without running serious personal risk; because Article 6 of the Constitution says: "Any person who abrogates or attempts or conspires to abrogate, subverts or attempts or conspires to subvert the Constitution by use of force or show of force or by other un-constitutional means shall be guilty of high treason". Any person aiding or abetting these acts shall also be guilty of high treason.

Both the *Nawa-e-Waqt* and the *Jang* supported the military takeover and expressed the confidence that the military would hold free and fair elections within ninety days, as the Chief Martial Law Administrator Gen. Muhammad Zia-ul-Haque had promised in his first address to the nation on radio and television.

Judging by the allocation of space to a news item, *Nawa-e-Waqt* seemed more enthusiastic than the *Jang* in supporting and believing the promise of fair and free elections. Gen. Zia-ul- Haque's address to the Federal Secretaries on July 6 a day after the take over is reported under a banner headline by *Nawa-e-Waqt*, and in a six column lead story by the *Jang*. The *Nawa-e-Waqt* (July 7, 1977) reports:

ORDER ISSUED TO SPEED UP PREPARATIONS FOR ELECTION

The first sub-headline reads:

Men of Character and Impartial Members for New Election Commission (the implication is that the previous members were neither men of character non impartial).

The second sub headline says:

Ninety Day Operation Underway To Put Country
Back On Path Of Democracy

The opening paragraph of the story says, "The Chief of Army Staff and the Chief Martial Law Administrator General Muhammad Zia ul Haque has impressed upon the government servants to work for the greater welfare of the common man without having party prejudices in their hearts. The civil service, he said, which provides stability to the Administration should not have party prejudices". It may be recalled that the *Nawa-e-Waqt* has been continuously

blaming the civil service (bureaucracy) for all the malpractices in the elections, and here again its lead story opens with its favorite subject.

Military's promise to hold fair and free elections within ninety days is emphasized with the maximum force available to the newspaper through an extra-large streamer and careful choice of words which convey the command of a military general. The headline reads like a marching order issued by a commanding officer to its regiment. It tries to remove any doubt or ambiguity about the Chief Martial Law Administrator's (CMLA) intentions of holding elections. It is an attempt to reinforce the confidence of the reader in the military regime.

A brief analysis of the text of the story reveals a few more interesting aspects of the fractured discourse. In his address to the Federal Secretaries the CMLA had made six points and as the story puts it, "General Zia ul Haque expressed his views on many subjects but basically his topic of address remained national economy and law and order". These "many subjects" include the following: i) Economy ii) Law and order (the two main subjects of the focus of address), iii) outdated secretarial system, iv) Efforts to remove red-tapism, v) Instruction to the Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs to accelerate their work on the preparation of procedures and rules and regulations for the general elections and to submit recommendations for the creation of a new

Election Commission. vi) Protection of civil servants against any arbitrary or vindictive action.

From a fifty minutes long speech whose main topic was economy and law and order, as the newspapers puts it, and whose next focus of attention was to tell the civil servant, that they were living under an outdated secretarial system, where red-tapism needs to be removed and above all the address meant to assure the civil servants that they will not be subjected to arbitrary and vindictive action (as they had been under the Bhutto regime) and thereby the CMLA was making an effort to win cooperation of the civil servants. Why CMLA would bring all the top civil servants together at one place just after one day of his takeover except to assure them that they were in safe hands and thereby expect them to extend their cooperation to the military regime. In this regard he needs their cooperation to improve the economic situation which had been damaged so badly during four months of agitation and strikes, and to maintain law and order at the ground level where only the civil servants have got institutional access. Out of such a speech why a newspaper would select a banner headline which gives the impression that the CMLA's top priority was elections.

There can be two explanation for it: one professional the other self-interest, both creating a distorted picture of the situation, to suit the interests of the regime and the newspaper. It can be argued that the readers were keen to know whether the

General was going to hold elections or not. Anything said and done about the elections by the regime would make a headline. So, keeping in view the readers expected interest (not the reality on the ground as in this regard the main focus of address is not elections but economy, law and order, the civil servants and their outdated system) the headline picks up a minor point from the context and displays it as *the news*. The text of the story as reported by the daily says that the CMLA had asked the relevant Ministry to prepare rules and regulations for the election and submit recommendation for the creation of new Election Commission. Now compare this with the 'ORDERS ISSUED TO SPEED UP PREPARATION FOR ELECTION'. The emphasis in the headline is on order and speed. The text does not warrant the words order and/ or speed, which collectively gives a sense of urgency and immediacy. Apart from the language of the headline its size--- streamer in extra large script-- combined with its dark background with white words attracts the readers attention with a strong magnetic pull. It is simply not possible for the unwary readers not to be influenced by the headline and have a positive image of the CMLA's intention.

The *Jang* carries the story in a six-column headline saying:

PREPARATION OF RULES AND REGULATIONS ORDERED
FOR NEW ELECTIONS IN THE COUNTRY

This story has all the distortions mentioned above which selects 'elections' as the subject of headline and ignores the

actual focus of the speech. But at the same time its choice of words, size of headline (six-column large letters) and normal display (black letters on the usual white background against the contrived black background with extra large letters in the *Nawa-i-Waqt*). This headline is subdued as compared to the one in the *Nawa-e-Waqt* and would also evoke a relatively weaker response. It does not give a sense of urgency and immediacy about preparation for elections, nor tries to create a strong positive impression about the intention of the military regime to hold elections. The difference between the two headlines is quantitative only, qualitatively the two are the same. Both create the impression that the regime is actively pursuing the goal of holding elections within ninety days while the fact is that this was not the theme of the CMLA's speech. Both the newspapers report what the readers want to read and not what the speaker actually meant in that context at that occasion.

If full text of the speech is given to a person other than these newsmen, and asked to make a precis of it in one or two paragraphs it is highly unlikely that the "election story" would be mentioned prominently. The speech would be judged from the actual text without having the expectations of the readers or overall interests of the regime and newspaper in mind. While speaking to the top civil servants the target is different, while recasting the speech for the readers in general the interests are different: The newspaper wants to give a saleable headline, and the regime wants

the people (not necessarily the top bureaucrats) to believe that elections will be held soon.

One more point about this story is that the newspapers don't have the original full text of the speech, they have been given the story from the official news agency (Associated Press of Pakistan--APP) and a semi-official news agency (Pakistan Press International--PPI), both of whom believably prepared their story according to the instructions from the official media managers. This makes the story twice removed from reality. At the end what the reader gets, is not the substance of the speech but a story about.

In the coming days the *Jang* rapidly shed its reluctance and started giving full support to the military regime. This support touched new heights when the CMLA asked them to "cancel my last announcement"¹⁷ and postponed the elections so as to have accountability first, as he said later to ensure "positive" election results. The two newspapers made the following observations on their editorials pages, and competed with each other in supporting military regime.

More than two and a half months before the promised elections and three weeks after the military takeover the *Jang* (July 26, 1977) wrote a leaderette under the title "Accountability" and said "Martial Law Administrator Zone C has ordered investigation into the corruption and malpractices of the former representatives of

people. For this purpose he has created a special cell..... The Martial Law Administrator has taken a very appropriate step. This action should have been taken earlier..... This decision is in the interest of the country, people's representatives and the authorities as well, because the present situation is such that with the removal of the fear of former regime the people have started speaking out". (Isn't the daily referring to its own sense of fear under the previous regime, without mentioning its sense of new fear under the military regime which was to be mentioned, as we shall see below, in the next regime.) "The things people were not revealing without having the fear of being jailed or abducted, are now being expressed absolutely without any fear". Aren't we really supposed to be 'absolutely without any fear' at gunpoint under a military regime? That is the art and price of survival of the mainstream media. The motto of the *Nawa-e-Waqt* is a saying of the Holy Prophet (SAV), "The best Jihad is speaking the truth to the face of a tyrant Sultan". Keeping in view the character of the mainstream media it can be added, "Yes , provided you check with the Sultan first what is the truth".

A leader¹⁸ in the *Jang* (August 8, 1977) entitled "Elections and Democratic Government", says "The action which the Armed Forces took at the beginning of the last month had become inevitable because the country had reached the brink of disaster. And had this action been delayed it would have become impossible to control the situation.....Had the Armed Forces not intervened on

July 5, the situation would have become so grave which, God forbid, could have endangered the very existence of the country. The way the Military Council has rapidly taken steps, in a short period of five weeks since July 5, to organize political process on the correct lines (emphasis added), could not have been expected by many people". It takes a General to tell the politician how political process can be organized (yes, organized, no nonsense) on "the correct lines" (the man in power always knows best what are the correct lines). The leader dismisses the misgivings expressed by the PPP circles about the impartiality of the military regime, because "the fact is that there exists no concrete proof for this impression".

An editorial in the *Nawa-e-Waqt* (August 16, 1977) assures "the countrymen" that they "should have no doubts and misgivings with regard to the holding of elections on time according to the program. Now, when thanks to the military leadership, general elections are coming nearer there is a great desire among the countrymen to have hundred percent fair elections." For this purpose, among other things, it is "essential that the real face of the candidates be presented before the nation, so that they don't make a mistake in election of the candidates; failing this they will remain in the dark and due to ignorance may cast their vote for those candidates whose not being in the parliament is in the interest of the country and the nation". The editor wants 'the real faces' of the candidates to be shown to the people because the

people are ignorant, they are in the dark and cannot see for themselves. How on earth can you trust such a lot to decide who were the best to govern the country. Isn't the message clear enough! "The nation (the nation or the editor?) expects the Martial Law Administration not to be reluctant in exposing (the sentence uses the Quranic expression *alam-nashrah*) corruption and malpractices (of the previous regime) which have come to their knowledge during recent investigations. If the Martial Law Administration can bring forth this information indiscriminately, before the nation, the people will be able to use the national trust (vote) in a better way after seeing the real faces of the candidates of the parties".

It does not need to be reminded that this investigation was conducted only against the PPP and its candidates, and they are the target of this exposition. But the editorial is quick to say that "this does not mean character assassination of anyone". Where do we draw a line between 'exposing the real faces of the corrupt politicians' (who were in power till recently) and 'character assassination'. It seems the military regime did not want to hold election and the press was preparing the public opinion for that.

The editorial also notes that "freedom of press in any case has to be subservient to the ideological foundations (which have always remained undefined) of the nation and the country. The freedom of press should not mean to put in doubt the national

beliefs and ideology of life nor create ideological confusion (remember the alleged "anarchy of thought" wreaked by the PPP regime). Nor propagation of alien ideas in the country should be taken as the freedom of press". The 'alien Ideas' are wrong and dangerous not because they have been studied and analyzed as such but because they are alien. The editor is following the line of the traditionalist Ulama who ignored and refused to study/ teach and refute Greek thought in the past (till Imam Ghazzali took it upon himself to the chagrin of most of the Ulama, to study and refute the Greek thought) and the Western thought and practices in modern times. (See the preceding chapter for the Ulama's response to the questions on this point). This is exactly the model of freedom of thought and expression which was to be followed in the coming years of Martial Law regime. Isn't it wise to check with the tyrant Sultan first to know the truth!

As expected by now, the elections were postponed to have accountability and Islamization first. In the subsequent period the media supported the decision of postponement of elections and demanded, as the military regime wanted them to demand, accountability and Islamization first, elections after.

The second general elections, to be held in 1979, were cancelled because major political parties had refused to get themselves registered as the military junta wanted, and their 'non-cooperation' did not guarantee 'positive' outcome of the elections.

The Martial Law regime was further helped in pursuance of its agenda by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979. International situation gave the generals a free hand in suppressing the media and democratic political discourse. The press was not allowed to publish anything which was not approved by the regime. If discourse is exchange of meaning there was no political media discourse as such; it was a long uninterrupted monologue. At least till 1985 when after eight years the military regime made its first experiment in controlled democracy.

Notes

1. Big landholdings (jagirs) granted by the British had been abolished in East Pakistan in the early fifties. The volume and number of these landholdings was smaller in East Pakistan than in West Pakistan, therefore these landlords were not in a position to monopolize the political scene, nor could they evolve the cultural ethos of parasitic landlordism.
2. The party newspapers did a commendable job in informing and influencing the masses on the question of provincial autonomy in East Pakistan, and by championing the cause of poor, and the oppressed against the landlords and the industrialists in West Pakistan. The role of this part of the print media has not been analyzed here, one because it proved to be a temporary affair, two the forces of change were soon engulfed by the forces of status quo, in both wings of the country: the change remained illusive. Since it was a temporary affair almost all those dailies (e.g. the *Musawaat*) have disappeared. This period was the re-run of high hopes of the Pakistan Movement, and the great betrayal which followed it.
3. An introductory sentence or paragraph of a story; a tip which may lead to a story. It also refers to the news story of greatest interest usually placed at the beginning of new broadcast or displayed most prominently on the front page of newspaper; commonly known as 'lead story'.

4. Norman Dixon (1976) himself a former British General, has exposed the absurdity of the glorification of fine physique and muscular strength in military leadership. Two chapters are of especial interest viz. 'Bullshit', and 'Anti-Effeminacy', wherein he has shown that most of the great commanders were not paragons of physical excellence.

5. There are innumerable accounts of the fondness of the West Pakistanis for Bengali women; of particular interest are those diaries, reports, and news stories which appeared in the world media during the military operation. Maskerni has a Pakistani journalist wrote a series of articles and news reports in British newspapers during the military operation, and Siddiq Salik a public relations officer of the Pakistan Army gives an eye witness account in his *Witness To Surrender* (1977) of the military operation and narrates a few incidents giving some detail of the fondness of Pakistani officers for Bengali women.

6. It refers to the 1936 famine of Bengal which made the misery of the Bengalis proverbial, and later identified all the ills related with hunger and deprivation with the image of an ordinary Bengali.

7. For full appreciation of these images and biases one has to be familiar with the travelogues and short stories of West Pakistan based Urdu writers (e.g. A. Hameed); attitude of the military command in the East Pakistan toward Bengali men and women, particularly after the military operation, recruitment policy of the Military, and how difficult it had been for the military high command to "lower" physical standards to enable the Bengalis to join the Armed Forces, attitude of the military and civil bureaucracy towards Bengali Prime Ministers, Ministers, diplomats and politicians. Removal of Kh. Nazimuddin as Governor General, and later his dismissal as Prime Minister at the hands of a Punjabi Governor General, the policy of always having a West Pakistani civil servant as Chief Secretary (the most powerful man in the bureaucratic hierarchy) in East Pakistan, occupation of all senior military and civil posts by the West Pakistanis because no Bengali officer was senior enough. As Aysha Jalal (1990) points out there was no Bengali civil servant above the rank of a joint secretary till 1956.

8. A headline stretching across all columns of a newspaper. Also known as streamer.

9. A headline stretching across all columns of a newspaper. Also known as banner.

10. Sind rural was heavily represented among the parasitic landlords but had much less representation in the civil and military top brass, primarily owing to lack of literacy. In the military and civil services the Frontier Province had better

representation than rural Sind, primarily due to relatively higher literacy rate, more egalitarian tribal social set up, and weaker agricultural base.

11. Overline over a headline written in letters smaller than the headline letters. Also called eyebrow.

12. Read the following with endnote #4 in the preceding chapter.

Bhutto referring to Shorish Kashmiri's plea to him that 'we should reconsider the various restrictions we have placed on (the) *Nawa-e-Waqt* wrote on December 7, 1973, 'I told him that we have repeatedly been magnanimous to Mr. Majid Nizami (the owner/editor) of *Nawa-e-Waqt* and repeatedly Majid Nizami has broken promises made to us... We are not intimidated by the poison of *Nawa-e-Waqt*; we can take care of *Nawa-e-Waqt*".

How the daily has been trying to give wider coverage to the Opposition and also please the Government, has been described by the Information Secretary, '*Nawa-e-Waqt* has been following its time-honored formula of giving fairly wide coverage to reports about the Opposition in its news columns, but supporting the Government in power in its editorial columns from time to time.' In deference to Bhutto's wishes the Secretary proposed that '*Nawa-e-Waqt* may be persuaded to drastically reduce the coverage of Opposition news and views in its columns. The protagonists of this policy believe that the *Nawa-e-Waqt* should be brought in line with the other newspapers...'

Sometime later Bhutto observed, 'We have been taken for a long ride by *Nawa-e-Waqt*. For the last four years, we have been misled by the promises of Majid Nizami.... This newspaper has done our Government the greatest damage and yet it gets the maximum advertisements..... What is the logic behind this brutal discrimination? What explanation can we offer to *Daily Jang* and other important dailies who co-operate with us..... I have mentioned only the advertisements, which is a very big favor in itself... We must have a clear-cut policy. The policy of appeasement and inducement has failed...' (White Paper, 1978:10, 11, 15, 17, 18).

13. The term Bonapartism has been used by a number of scholars to describe Bhutto's 'populist autocratic' style of governance, Khalid bin Sayeed (1980), Anwar H. Syed (1992) and Hasan Gardezi (1991) are among them. Gardezi (1991:96) says 'Bhutto... set himself the contradictory task of balancing the power of the dominant classes, while he was quite ambivalent towards giving any effective voice to the dominated classes in his government. He filled the ministerial positions in his cabinet and other high government offices with members of his own class, the big landlords, although occasionally he also subjected them to public humiliations. His nationalization programs, mixed with his public rhetoric, did undermine the pampered status of the bourgeois

classes but he also defended their positions from any radical challenge from the dominated classes. These were the policies which earned Bhutto the reputation of a Bonapartist'.

14. Report of the Court of Enquiry into Punjab Disturbances of 1953, Government Printing Press, Lahore, 1954, p.210.

15. Report of the Court of Enquiry into Punjab Disturbances of 1953, Government Printing Press, Lahore, 1954, pp.205 & 218.

16. How the daily has been trying to give wider coverage to the Opposition and please the Government as well see Information Secretary's remarks in endnote #19 above.

17. Chief Martial Law Administrator abbreviated as CMLA came to be known in the social circles as Cancel My Last Announcement, when Gen. Zia kept on breaking his promises on elections.

18. The leading editorial article in a newspaper.





CHAPTER 8

Chapter 8

POLITICAL MEDIA DISCOURSE: FROM MARTIAL LAW TO DEMOCRACY (1985-1990)

1. General Elections 1985

The non-party general elections held on February 2, 1985 was an experiment in controlled democracy. General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haque had imposed Martial Law, because, as he and his colleagues saw it, the country had reached the brink of a civil war (Chishti, 1991:35). The Chief Martial Law Administrator, starting from his first broadcast speech repeatedly promised to hold free and fair elections within ninety days and hand over power to the elected representatives. The first promised elections, to be held in October 1977, were cancelled because the regime wanted to have accountability first. The second general elections, to be held in 1979, were cancelled because major political parties had refused to get themselves registered as the military junta wanted.

When a number of internal and external developments forced the Martial Law regime to acquire a semblance of democratic legitimacy, and they decided to hold election without political parties, the mainstream press showed a measure of independence in criticizing the military regime. This critical stance was partly the result of calculated tolerance shown by the military regime and partly a reaction to the longest and severest spell of suppression of freedom of thought and expression. The induction of a partially civilian elected government, after the partyless elections encouraged the media to shed their cautious style and increase opposition coverage and editorial criticism of the regime of President Zia-ul-Haque. But the country's strict press laws remained to curtail freedom of the press arbitrarily (Haqqani, 1985).

As a first step the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator got himself elected as President for five years through a referendum. Next step in the same process was general elections which the President had promised to hold before March 1985. In the preceding year President Zia-ul-Haque had introduced a number of laws and practices to Islamize the state and society. His Islamization drive had been viewed by many as an excuse to prolong the military rule, and criticized for not having a real positive impact on state and society. The *Nawa-e-Waqt* (January 1, 1985) one of the most enthusiastic supporter of Islamization during the early years of the Martial Law observed: "It is a bitter truth

that we talk of Islam as a fashion, while our deeds are miles apart from Islam". President Zia viewed party politics as un-Islam and had won support from the Council of Islamic Ideology to this effect. The *Nawa-e-Waqt*, in the same editorial opposed the idea of non-party elections and said that "an Assembly elected through non-party elections would prove to be the proverbial 'tower of Babel'. When there will be no party, no party leader, how it would be disciplined? Every member would be returned on the basis of his personal manifesto".

Having seen through the real intent of the regime's Islamization-- prolongation of its rule-- the daily seems to be distancing itself from it without going on a collision course. The editorial adds: "The Islamic system is the right system, but to run the affairs of the state and government, and particularly to make the people feel participating in the (State) affairs in this age of popular sovereignty, a system and procedure is needed which is in line with Pakistan's peculiar circumstances, traditional temperament and consciousness of the Pakistani people, and their habits and characteristics of Islamic traditions, and also inevitably fully takes into account the contemporary requirements. Elaborating the 'contemporary requirements' it says "According to our circumstances party politics is not only necessary it is inevitable. And there is no alternative to it... The vacuum created by banning political parties can not be filled by administrative machinery".

At the beginning of Martial law and Islamization, the daily had said that active politics should be open only to those who subscribe to the state ideology of Islam, and freedom of thought be made subservient to it (see *Nawa-e-Waqt*, August 16, 1977 above). Now after eight years of the supremacy of state ideology, which was being used to banish politicians and political parties it only says "The corrupt and dishonest, and those who hope to succeed through the dint of their riches should not be allowed to enter the Assemblies, nor the politics of '*biradari*'¹ and 'caste system' should be permitted". The approach seems to be relatively more democratic and less restrictive. Although the very idea of giving authority to the government to decide who should and should not take part in politics without due process of law and conviction/acquittance by the court of law, is anti-thesis of democracy. But then old habits, and ways of thinking die hard.

Three days later the *Nawa-e-Waqt* (January 4, 1985) wrote another editorial "Political Parties are Better or Small Groups" and argued that "political parties, play an important and positive role in the rise and growth of discipline, organization, continuity, politeness and sense of responsibility in politics". Quoting examples from the military rule of Ayub Khan in support of his contention, it says that political parties are inevitable and can not be banished from politics for good. The editorial however demands that subscription to the Islamic Ideology of the state be made a pre-condition for every political party. The last point

caters to the requirement of the regime as well as the point of view of the paper.

Another editorial in the *Nawa-e-Waqt* (January 11, 1985) a day before the formal announcement of non-party elections reverts to the paper's position of August 16, 1977 and demands that arrangements should be made to ensure that commitment to the Ideology of Pakistan, and qualities like sincerity with the enforcement of Islamic System, sense of service and moral character are made part of qualification of the candidates. It adds, "impartiality of the government is necessary in its place, but this should not mean that those who are reputed to be corrupt and are of bad character be allowed to contest elections without scrutiny. Such a carefully 'screened' candidates would bring in those people who would prove good for the country, stabilize the country and face the external dangers. "This is the only way to make these elections a starting point for the better and bright future of the nation and the country". Whatever the daily had said on January 1, is reversed and the paper goes back to its type. Could it be that between the first two editorials (January 1 and 4) and this editorial the editor has been duly "briefed" and "advised" by the media bosses of the Martial Law regime, or there was some ulterior motive behind this shift. The truth can be known from the files in Ministry of Information & Broadcasting provided they are declassified and made available to researchers. The editor has stopped criticizing the government for insisting on holding non-

party elections, and instead focuses an "screening of candidates". How an Election Commission, or a court of law can pre-judge a candidate for his commitment to the ideology of Pakistan, and sincerity in the enforcement of Islamic system, sense of service, morality and character". Who would sit on judgement? and who would judge the judge. The paper takes two steps to distance itself from the regime than takes three steps to get closer to them.

The *Jang* (January 12, 1985) is happy to note that the Government is sticking to its commitment of completing the whole electoral process by March 23. It is also gratifying to observe that in Sindh there has been a change in the thinking and strategy of two prominent leaders of the defunct Peoples Party, and one former office bearer of National Democratic Party and his numerous associates. They are now fully co-operating with the administration. It is important and urgent that the President announces the election schedule. "The President has been steadfast right from the beginning from August 12, about his program for the restoration of democracy. He is determined to complete this program at all costs. The moment electoral schedule is announced by him the whole dust would settle and the things start moving. We hope President Zia-ul-Haque would regard our request (to announce the schedule) worthy of serious consideration. And no further delay will be permitted in the announcement of electoral schedule". Could it be a coincidence that the editorial demanded (or requested?) for the election schedule the same day when it was to be announced by

the Government? One would suspect that official media managers might have played a role in it.

The *Jang* (January 13, 1985) carries the news of the announcement of electoral schedule in a six column lead story:

The headline says:

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS ON FEBRUARY 25 AND
PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES ON FEBRUARY 28.

The kicker reads:

General elections to be on the basis of adult franchise, non-party and separate electorate: Announcement by the President General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haque.

The first sub-headline is:

Provincial Assemblies to elect the Senate in mid-March: First joint session of the 'Majlis-e-Shoora' comprising National Assembly and the Senate to be held on March 23, 1985.

The second sub-headline reads:

Elections to be free and fair under the supervision of Election Commission according to the established procedure: President's address to the Nation on Radio and Television.

The third sub-headline says:

Assemblies will be fully empowered within their jurisdiction

The fourth sub-headline goes:

Government to be completely impartial: All candidates will be equal.

There is no slant in the choice of words and the arrangement of the headlines. Prominent display (six column lead story, with four sub-headlines) of the news, carefully choosing the exact words of the official announcement to compose the headlines, endorses the Government position by default.

Contrary to the editorial note and display of the announcement, Irshad Ahmad Haqqani, a high profile political columnist of the *Jang* (January 15, 1985), writing on the third day of the announcement of election schedule, took a critical stance. He says "the conditions for disqualification of candidates announced by the President make it obvious that the government is determined to keep the *undesirable elements* (emphasis in original) out of the political process". The additional conditions laid down for the candidates "are so ambiguous, and unspecified that it would be possible to screen out anybody who has escaped the sweeping net of other disqualification clauses. Therefore the worst apprehensions of those who have been calling it a selection are likely to come true".

The editorial is written by the owner, who also happens to be the Chief Editor, therefore it has to be more in tune with the

official line of argument. So that the editor can argue with the authorities that his pen is at their service but the same can not be guaranteed for the columnists who enjoy a certain level of autonomy. Under pressure from the government the owner/ editor can always ask the columnist to go slow in his criticism of the regime or face the consequences, including dismissal, as had been done in a number of cases in the high noon of Martial Law (1977-1984). But, now in times of low risk there is a real benefit in the dual policy of speaking with two voices. When editorial caters to the demands of the government, and the columnists projects the Opposition it keeps the government in good humor, and prevents the reader from losing faith in the paper. It may, however be added that Haqqani had been, more or less, consistent in his criticism of the Zia regime since the 1985 and thereby acquired a certain level of respectability for his views.

Commenting on the "Contours of the new system" announced by the President the *Dawn* (January 14, 1985) said, "We in the past argued in these columns in favor of party elections... The only way to work a political system in this imperfect world, with a fair degree of popular participation in the system, is to have political parties... In our conditions political parties, in spite of their known weaknesses have shown a remarkable capacity to transcend divisions of class, tribe, clan, *biradari* (lineal brotherhood) and other narrower loyalties and to mediate contradictions and conflicts between regions and ethnic communities. Ayub Khan who

started by professing a settled aversion for political parties ended up joining one of them... The old established parties remain relevant in any political system we may try to establish-- at least in the foreseeable future-- unless, of course, that system rests on naked dictatorship deriving its legitimacy from the sheer possession and invocation of the apparatus of coercion... The fact of the political parties relevance should be recognized from the practical as well as philosophical points of view... Their induction and full absorption into the system will contribute to its strength and durability. On their part, the Opposition parties must take cognisance of the situation on our borders which does not permit of a policy based on a confrontation with the Government... Politics being the art of the possible, a compromise solution offers the only hope of a smooth transition to a viable political system based on the strength of permanent institutions and the binding character of democratic conventions". One may not question honesty of the editor but it is hard to see how you can have a 'compromise solution' to a categorical question like having political parties not having them: either you have them in politics and elections or you don't have them. A 'compromise solution' like the one the government finally came up with was no solution as the government continued to insist on not having political parties in the elections.

As a 'compromise' perhaps, when the government decided to lift ban on the members of national and executive committees of those

political parties which had refused to get themselves registered in 1979, allowed political office bearers of the previous regime to contest elections, and also permitted those 74 politicians disqualified for active politics by the Election Tribunals to join the election race, all the newspapers continued to argue that political parties should be allowed to contest elections directly. It is appreciable in the Pakistani context that the media persistently refused to buy the official line of declaring political parties un-Islamic as an institution and thereby making them outlawed.

Yet there is a tacit and discreet support for the partyless election as the Martial Law regime wanted. In their argument while demanding that political parties should be allowed to contest elections the press was supporting the Government for being generous in lifting bans, thereby making the elections political in character, leaving a difference of label only; and also warning the parties to join in on the terms and conditions offered by the regime or face yet another cancellation of election. This practically meant that the political parties should accept partyless elections, and should not appeal for boycott of the elections.

The 'generosity' of the Martial Law regime more an outcome of fear of failure than love of participative form of government. The fear of the regime was that if all the restrictions were kept in

place it would leave all the important local and national leaders out of elections. In a society where voters are influenced more by the individual candidates than by an amorphous institution like the government or party there was a real danger that the call for boycott would have a strong appeal if large number of individual politicians are debarred from election. Therefore it was a calculated move on the part of the regime to allow almost all the leaders to contest election on individual basis. Thus, it was a position of weakness from which the regime made these 'concessions' and finally succeeded in attracting good number of candidates without parties and a credible number of voters' turnout on the election day, rendering the boycott ineffective. Instead of seeing the move as a well meditated political ploy to make the elections credible in the eyes of the public and the foreign powers, particularly the USA which had been pressing for a democratic set up, the newspapers are advocating a 'compromise solution' (the *Dawn* January 14) or warning politicians of a possible cancellation of elections (the *Jang* January 19), or saying that 'now there is a difference of label only' and an 'unnecessary obstinacy' (the *Nawa-e-Waqt* January 22), or advising the politicians 'not to miss this opportunity' (the *Jang* January 20).

The *Jang* (January 18, 1985) said in an editorial note, "In our opinion the Government should look into the question that the forthcoming elections be held on party basis instead of non-party basis. Because now (after removing these restrictions) practically

the forthcoming elections will have political status". The *Jang* (January 19, 1985) adds "It is beyond doubt that all these measures will be conducive in creating an atmosphere of greater understanding and remove, to a great extent, the objections of those who are calling for boycott of the elections. It is also the duty of the Opposition elements to adopt the course of understanding, so as elections could be completed with mutual cooperation. Failing which, if the policy of confrontation continues then to quote Jamal Said Mian "the government would reassess the situation".

The *Nawa-e-Waqt* (January 22, 1985) says that after removing all restrictions and disqualifications 'Now It's The Issue Of A Label Only', because "now these elections are almost on party basis". In the editor's opinion there is little difference between the official stand and the view point of the 'angry politicians'. "Now the government's insistence on holding elections on non-party basis is an unnecessary obstinacy". The Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD) cannot claim to have the position of the National Alliance or the United Front formed against Ayub Khan. Performance of most constituents of the MRD was not impressive in the 1970 elections. Moreover there is only one big party (PPP) in the MRD, whose leadership is out of the country (Benazir was in UK at that time). "When this is the situation what is the harm in allowing political parties to participate on party basis?... If the MRD does not accept the Government's stand let the Government accept the

MRD's stand, and this would make no big difference". The government should hold elections on party basis.

The *Jang* editorial (January 20, 1985) is entitled "Do Not Miss This Opportunity". The thrust of the argument is that the Martial Law regime has offered an opportunity (an act of condescension) to the politicians to restart the political process. It is a "wise step" because thereby "the Government has accepted the need for understanding in politics". This opportunity should not be missed and "those elements who want to sabotage these elections or want to postpone them to attain their nefarious designs, should not be allowed to have a free hand". What are the elements desiring to sabotage or postpone the elections, what are their 'nefarious designs'; there is no indication, no explanation. Is it not a rhetorical threat to the political parties to accept whatever has been offered or lose even that. The same line of argument and approach is followed in a number of subsequent editorials and comments in the two Urdu dailies with the highest circulation.

Both the *Jang* and *Nawa-e-Waqt* are creating the impression that the Government is being conciliatory and has 'accepted the need for understanding in politics', by removing restrictions on the terms and conditions for individual candidates to contest elections. The regime's persistent refusal to let the political parties was a carefully calculated move. By allowing political parties to join in the regime would have run the serious risk of facing National and

Provincial Assemblies united under two or three political parties, and thereby undermining the regime's position of the sole arbiter. These aspects are ignored by these newspapers. The newspapers fail to address the real issues squarely. MRD's demand was not just holding elections on party basis, the real sticking points were the status of 1973 Constitution, the powers and status of the National Assembly, the powers of the President and the Prime Minister. They only mention the less significant of the objection and create the impression that is the whole story. Thus the image is created that MRD is not insisting on a point of substance, particularly after 'conciliatory' and 'concessional' steps taken by the Government.

The *Dawn* (January 24, 1985) faces the issue relatively more squarely and says, "But what are we going to get at the end of the present elaborate exercise? We are going to get legislatures all right-- legislatures each of which is a congeries of elected representatives. But returned in non political elections from which most of those who proved their electoral standing in the past elections kept away, these representatives will not be able to boast of possessing a political mandate from their constituents or a political following... It is clear that election without the participation of most of those ranged in the Opposition will not facilitate the Government's task of building a system which is presumably its objective in undertaking the exercise. (the editor is does not embrace the stated intentions of the regime at face value, and hence 'presumably')... The crucial point of concern is

that the Government may end up creating a non-system... The Government, which holds the initiative, could make the first move by announcing its willingness to enter into a dialogue with all the major political leaders without any pre-conditions". Other dailies have been taking the situation as given and did not suggest any move like demanding the regime to offer 'unconditional dialogue' with political leaders. The regime is not likely to accede to this proposal because it does not want to confer legitimacy on any political leader or party which in their scheme of things do not exist.

The editorial grapples with the basic question and says: "The broad and fundamental question to be sorted out straightaway is that of the constitutional status and jurisdiction of the legislature, to which question is also closely linked the issue of the power equation between the President and the Prime Minister. If the elections are to be meaningful and are to be part of the process of building the edifice of a viable political system, the issue cannot be left dangling in the air... This is the real point at issue and if it is settled the question of whether the elections are to be on the basis of parties or without parties need not present an insuperable difficulty".

The *Jang* (February 4, 1985) seems to adopt a more critical stance gradually, it says 'these elections are non-political' earlier (January 18) it had said 'forthcoming elections will have

political status' and its leading columnist Irshad Ahmad Haqqani says on the election day (February 25, 1985) the non-party elections may be termed as "semi-political and semi-democratic experiment". Addressing the 'fundamental question' the columnist argues for restoration of 1973 Constitution and allowing the forthcoming National Assembly to decide what amendments may be necessary in the Constitution in the light of past experiences.

Here the writer is clearly siding with the political parties and democratic forces which have been kept out of political process. He apparently suggests that the all powerful military rulers should hold election and hand over power to the elected Assembly who would (presumably) independently decide what constitutional amendments were to be made. This defiant posture of demanding virtually unconditional transfer of power is only a prelude to the concluding paragraph which says, "At the most the Government should put its Constitutional (amendment) proposals in the form of a resolution before the Assembly" and let the House have the last word. This is what the martial regime finally did. The Martial Law regime announced its constitutional proposals and put it before the House, making it otherwise clear that failure to accept them would mean continuation of Martial Law, and termination of "the semi-democratic, semi-political experiment". The last paragraph is closest to the Government's ultimate position. It is the foregoing paragraphs which help create the impression that the column is defiantly critical of the regime.

Election day editorial in the *Nawa-e-Waqt* (February 25, 1985) does not mention anything about the desirability of election on party basis which has been its stand. It is siding with the Military regime by urging upon the voters to take part in the election and ignore the boycott call given by the political parties for holding elections on non-party basis. The approach of the editor seems to be that something is better than nothing in democratizing the political scene, and it is good thing that elections are being held, and nothing should be done (like boycott) to fail the elections. This was exactly the agenda of the Military regime. Recalling elections and promises of elections since March 1977 it says, "General elections were held in March 1977, but they fell victim to the malpractice and rigging by the ruling People's Party. The Armed Forces, after taking over the country's administration on July 5, announced re-election and also made arrangements for them but were postponed for the sake of "first accountability then election". Thereafter, elections were announced for November 1979, but this process too could not be completed, and elections were postponed once again indefinitely. (The Junta is not held responsible for scuttling the political process, and revoking its commitment to hold elections. The March 1977 elections fell victim to the rigging of the ruling party, but it not clarified who was responsible for not holding elections for the next eight years). "In August 1983, the editorial adds, "the President announced elections and transfer of power to the people's representatives by March 1985. It is gratifying to note that this

determination and announcement proved firm and elections are being held according to the program announced in late February 1982". The editorial then says, "It is rightly expected that the voters would not only reach the polling stations in maximum numbers and thus play a positive role in making the election credible" but also elect honest and able representatives. "The people have got the opportunity of electing their representatives after a very long time, therefore they will have to elect representative who are able, virtuous and full of passion for service..."

An editorial in the *DAWN* on the same day (February 25, 1985) well comes elections but does not forget to mention that the election is going to create an imperfect representative system, and it would have been better with political parties. The editorial does not advocate boycott, as the political parties wanted, but does bring out all the weaknesses and inherent dangers of the non-party election and the merits of party based elections, which the military regime would not like to hear on the election day. It says: "The elections are expected to lead to some form of representative government-- however imperfect it might be-- and pave the way for the withdrawal of martial law... If organized political forces had been involved, they would have been able to present before the voters the different alternatives available to the country in grappling with the many and varied issues of national concern, thus raising the level of popular awareness and enabling the electors to give a clear mandate to the winners. On

the other hand, tribe, clan, sect and ethnicity are factors that appear to be serving as frames of reference for the voters in today's electoral contest. Electioneering has for the most part focussed on local issues which are more normally the concern of representatives of municipal bodies rather than the legislature who is expected to make laws for the entire country. Thus one missed a debate on national issues which are of great relevance to Pakistan today such as the question of putting together the elements necessary for building a political stability.

"If the election had conformed to the universally accepted norms and principles of securing popular representation, the present exercise would have contributed to a great leap forward in the sphere of national political development... The old forces which have been kept out, or have chosen to stay out, will continue to influence the course of events. They cannot be indefinitely bypassed (as perhaps, the military hoped)... Concluding the editorial warns the Military rulers about the serious repercussions of the non-party election when it says, "The political forces that are now trying to be born will be far less committed to national unity and social harmony than the old established ones".

The *Dawn's* editorial comes out even more dignified and sober when contrasted with an editorial in the *Pakistan Times* (February 26, 1985) which is almost a verbatim reproduction of what the President has said in this context. The editor does not seem to

have an opinion of his own, he only agrees with what the President says; because, the assumption of arrested media discourse is that the person in power knows best. Describing the blessings of non-party elections after quoting the President in more than two third space of the editorial, the writer goes farther than the President when it calls political parties the forces of disruption. It says, "For the first time in the history of our national elections... the agitational and disruptive forces have been kept in check. An atmosphere of peace and decency has been provided. (As if the previous election were neither peaceful no decent). For the first time also the Government is not a party to the elections. It has no candidates of its own, it is completely neutral and strictly impartial and it has no vested interest in its results. (The Government is not a party because it considers itself far above the political riff raff, and not because they want to be impartial, as the editorial argues. They have no 'vested interest in the results' because their power base is the military might and not the ballot box, they only want a democratic cover, not democracy). The previous elections were organized, by people who wanted to grab power or hold on to it by hook or by crook. The present Government has no such motive". Does the editor mean to say that the present rulers are not interested in staying in power? Neither by hook nor by crook?

Describing the post election situation an editorial in the *Pakistan Times* (March 3, 1985) says, "The mass participation of the

people in the elections-- an average of 55 percent which is comparable with the best turnout anywhere-- has resulted in the total isolation of the proponents of negative politics which have done immense harm to democracy and the political process in the country in the past". Relatively heavy turnout was definitely a plus for the regime because they allowed every one to contest individually, and local political rivalries played a big role in ensuring big turnout, but to interpret it as a vote against political parties is unfair. Soon after the appointment of the Prime Minister the treasury benches had to join the Muslim League for better discipline in the House. The editor claims, "the 1985 elections will be remembered for reversing some negative trends in national politics and establishing a new healthy precedent". The new healthy trends were first reversed by making a political party in the House and then eventually dismissal of the Assembly and the elected government.

"The election had no purpose other than to take forward the process of Islamization with the co-operation of the people's elected representatives". This may be the unstated objective of the regime, confided in the editor, but it has not been part of election discourse, which remained primarily concerned with local issues and seldom took up serious and bigger national issues. Islam, democracy, Martial Law, economy, foreign affairs etc. did not constitute part of electioneering. These elections reduced national politics to municipal level. Some of the observation made

by the editor are so patently wrong and contradictory to the obvious facts that it hardly need any analysis to conclude that they are lies. Some of the claims include: (i) ...candidates belonging to the professions and middle classes decisively defeated representatives of feudal families. The elections also cut across class and 'biradari' and put a premium on personal merit and youth. (ii) With the polls a new era of consensus politics had begun in the country. It was a new kind of elections- positive and free from rancor and bitterness. (iii) With its constituents elected on non-party basis, it won't unnecessarily waste its time over party politicking.

An editorial in the *Nawa-e-Waqt* (February 11, 1985) quotes a leftist intellectual Hanif Ramay who has been associated with the PPP and at occasions severely criticized by the *Nawa-e-Waqt* for his socialistic ideas. Here he is quoted to open the editorial note because he is a 'realist' when he says, "the politicians, should accept the popular verdict and accord due recognition to the elected members of the Assembly without delay. They should not only seek their co-operation, but also help them in putting an end to Martial Law, and the restoration of democracy and political parties". Thereby the editor is trying to support the regime even when it does not approve of the method. Heavy turnout is also taken as a reason to 'take the non-party elections seriously' and by implication condone the impropriety of non-party elections.

The editorial, however, reiterates the argument, that even after the partyless elections, "it is not possible to run the House without parties and therefore asks the rulers to realize that democratic system can not function without political parties... Even the (promised) democratic system won't last long without political parties... The rulers should accept the new realities which have emerged from these elections, as soon as possible. The most important and fundamental new reality is that Parliamentary democratic system, which is being restored, can not function without political parties. In this regard insistence on experiment for experiment sake would not only create difficulties for the Prime Minister and Chief Ministers but would also create such a chaos that God forbid on one black day the President might have to announce that 'this experiment has also failed'". And fail it did.

2. General Elections 1988

May 2, 1988, was the foreboded 'black day' on which President Zia-ul-Haque announced three years after the first non-party election that 'this experiment has also failed'. A hand picked Prime Minister was expected to remain subservient to the President. Muhammad Khan Junejo, an old Muslim Leaguer, a low profile, light weight politician and a landlord from Sind was appointed as Prime Minister apparently on the recommendation of the Pir of Pagara Sharif, the president of his own faction of the Muslim League.

Junejo proved too much for the ruling Junta simply because he insisted on going strictly by the rules, not to let the President dictate him in the areas of his competence, and tried to rein the generals who had become used to absolute power, over the last eight years. Invoking his enhanced powers acquired through the eighth Constitutional amendment, as a price for lifting Martial Law, President Zia dismissed the Prime Minister and his government and dissolved the National Assembly on May 29, on charges of corruption, inefficiency, and slowing and ignoring the Islamization process.

The *Nawa-e-Waqt* (July 6, 1988) published a feature article by Assad Jafary under a broad heading of "The Nation wants honest people and new leadership", right under the heading is a single column portrait of the dismissed Prime Minister, who enjoyed enviable reputation of being honest, and was also new figure in the political high office. Even the Zia regime did not dare to accuse him personally of any dishonest omission or commission. The feature article implies that since the nation wants honest and new leadership, Junejo is disqualified, who had been dismissed on charges of inefficiency and corruption among his colleagues. The caption also implies that the dismissal was justified for the same reason. Why the photograph of a gentleman like Junejo, who could not be personally accused of any moral or financial corruption is in dark glasses. It is obvious to everyone that in most of the feature films it is the villain, who wears dark glasses. It is rare

for a hero to wear dark glasses. The reason is perhaps that by covering them with dark glasses the villain tries to prevent his eyes from betraying his bad intentions. This innocent looking caption and photograph are mischievous, once we analyze them carefully. The text of the article proposes that now when the American pressure is growing for holding elections, and with the Afghanistan issue behind us Pakistan will not get the same preferential treatment from the American government it is better that "Junejo is thrown out of the party and the writ petition be filed in court to restore the dismissed Assembly". The article dares to predict that "if the Muslim League files such a writ petition it is possible that the court decides in its favor. This would restore the dismissed Assembly and solve the problem of (new) election". Since the whole dispute was between Zia-ul-Haque and Muhammad Khan Junejo, therefore the solution is to "throw Junejo out of the party". Only Junejo can be thrown out because you can not hope to throw Zia-ul-Haque out, nor dare prove him wrong.

An editorial in *Nawa-e-Waqt* (July 7, 1988) five weeks after the dismissal of Junejo government says that using his Constitutional powers the President did away with the modicum of democracy on May 29. Referring to the completion of 'eleven years of Zia's personal rule' the editorial says that it will be better for the nation if the policy of adhocism is discontinued, and instead of going for new experiments every now and then, the 'federal, parliamentary, democratic, Islamic system' on the basis

of which this country had been created and had been supported by the founders of the country, is restored. The editorial then refers to all the organized political forces-- the leadership of the dismissed government, MRD , the multi-party alliance, and other political parties, which are unanimously demanding for new elections. Thereafter the editorial concludes that 'the government must announce new election schedule without any delay'. The noticeable point in this editorial is that it stops short of saying clearly that new elections should be held on party basis.

Two editorials in the *Jang* and *Nawa-e-Waqt* (July 8, 1988) are based on "assurances" given by the President at a reception that election will be announced within a fortnight. The *Nawa-e-Waqt* says, "It appears that the government is not in a mood at the moment to hold elections... However the President has assured in a clear cut manner that elections will be held. It is hoped that his would put an end to the atmosphere of uncertainty and doubts, and with the election of new Assembly the stage of restoration of democracy will be completed decently". On two consecutive days (July 7, 8) the editor seems to have 'forgotten' to mention that as a policy he would like to see the next election being held on party basis. Could this 'forgetfulness' be in deference to the known views and wishes to the President? Or has the paper changed its policy without mentioning it?

The *Jang* (July 8, 1988) is more explicit in justifying President's action against the Junejo government. When it says, "there may be difference of opinion whether this step was needed or not, but in any case this step can not be considered unconstitutional". The editor praises the President 'for not touching the constitution, nor did he take steps which God forbid, could create the apprehension that Martial Law was imminent. By the grace of God the Constitution is completely safe, political freedom is intact, and there is no restriction on the newspapers. As instructed by the President, the Election Commission is earnestly fulfilling all its obligation to hold general elections. All the necessary arrangements are being made, and seeing these arrangements there is no room for doubt about the election to be held". The editor asks the President to bring the corrupt in the previous government to book. This step is inevitable or the next Assemblies will not be clear of these "undesirable elements". Delay in this (cleansing) will create doubts and suspicions among political circles, therefore, the government should complete this job as a top priority. And so far the promise of the announcement of election schedule is concerned, we think now (when the President has promised to make announcement in ten to fifteen days) the political circles should be rest assured". Knowing Zia-ul-Haque's unenviable record of promised elections and accountability the editor wants the military regime to take up the process of cleansing as its top priority and naturally everything else, including election schedule, as lower priorities. (In 1977, the

word was 'ihtisab' in Urdu and 'accountability' in English, after eleven years the expression is "na pasandeeda anasir say pak' 'cleansing of undesirable elements'). The editor seems to be toying with the idea that may be this time too the President would not hold elections. Thus is his effort to be more loyal to the king than the King himself, the idea is floated to take up the "extremely inevitable" accountability of corrupt elements so as to cleanse the body politic of the country of the undesirable elements".

President announced his election schedule (without cleansing of the undesirable elements) on July 20, (fifty one days after dismissal of the government and dissolution of the Assemblies) and fixed November 16, as the election date. It was seventy days later than the constitutionally stipulated period of Ninety days within which elections are to be held after the dissolution of the National Assembly. His reasons for "deviation from and violation of the Constitution were, as follows: one, the fourth week of August, (when the 90 days period complete) coincides with the first ten day of Islamic month of Muharem, two, because of the monsoon there would be heat, humidity and flood, three, about eighty to ninety thousand citizens were to be out of country on Haj, four, the Constitution demands redistribution of the constituencies which would take two to three months. Apart from these "practical difficulties" there was a stronger ideological reason for this deviation and violation. Zia-ul-Haque is on record to have often

said that 'Constitution is not a holy scripture' which can not be changed, amended or replaced. It is 'a piece of paper' and should not be revered. In deviating from the constitutional stipulation the President made a point that he did not take the Constitution seriously; it remained a piece of paper for him. He had ruled for eleven years through personal decrees and did not care a fig for the Constitution. Now, in 1988, when he does not have the cover of Martial Law, he continues to place himself above law-- nay 'the piece of paper'. In the face of practical difficulties he did not deem it necessary even to ask the Senate (which is a perpetual body and cannot be dissolved) to grant him a waiver. This would have made him subject to law, which went against his ideology of autocratic rule.

No newspapers has brought forth this aspect of the reason for deviation from the supreme law. All of them accepted the date as given and persuade the political forces to go ahead with electioneering, without even knowing whether elections, were to be on party-basis or non-party basis.

The *Nawa-e-Waqt* (July 21, 1988) thanks the President for announcing the date, and does not see anything wrong with this deviation from the Constitution. It advise the political parties "to be realistic" and not to "waste time" in legal complexities. Instead, they should organize themselves and take their manifesto to the people, in the extra period they have got". As if it is a

good thing for the political parties that 'the benign dictator' has granted them extra time to do their job better. 'If the elections had been suddenly imposed upon the political parties they would have had hardly thirty, thirty five days to complete all the formalities. Such a "hectic" "marathon" would not only have been difficult but impossible for the political parties, urges the editor. The irony is that participation of the political parties in the election is still not clear.

The *Jang* (July 22, 1988) says, "though a few" political leaders have termed President's announcement of election date as unconstitutional and a delaying tactic, yet "generally" the President's announcement is being welcomed. The announcement of schedule answers the most fundamental question about the elections. Now it has become possible for the political parties and the individuals who want to contest elections to chalk out their program and fully concentrate on their preparation for elections". The message is forget about violation of the Constitution as state by 'a few' and go by 'the general' trend (which the editor always seems to know best) and prepare themselves for the elections. Because as stated by the President in view of our peculiar political temperament and circumstances, despite "a little bit" delay what is fundamentally important is holding free and fair elections... And the reasons for delay, as stated by the President are not altogether irrelevant and unjustifiable... Moreover the political parties can make use of this period in their favor" by

organizing themselves better and reaching out to the people'. "Instead of wasting time in unnecessary things" (Like deviation from the Constitution) "the challenge of the circumstances should be accepted and faced with manliness" (*mardana var*). Knowing that the leader of the most powerful political party was a woman (Benazir) the editor betrays his male chauvinism and implies that politics is not the field for women because it calls for facing "the challenge with manliness".

Most of the points raised by the editors of the two most prominent Urdu dailies in defence of the President are identical. There is strong reason to suspect that these editorials have been written in line with 'off the record' briefing by government officials. The 'suspicion' may or may not be correct in this particular case but it is a known and accepted practice in Pakistani media circles to write editorials on internal and external affairs according to official briefings. It is not common for the mainstream media to defy the official line.

An editorial in the *Dawn* (July 22, 1988) says, "Quite a few politicians have alleged that the President had "deviated" from and "violated" the Constitution by delaying the polls beyond 90-days period. Compare 'quite a few' here with 'a few' in the *Jang* (July 22) editorial above, for the same event. The same number is 'quite a few' for one, who is more critical of the regime and only, "a few" for the other who is more supportive of the government.

Commenting on the question of non-party elections it says, "the results of non-party elections of 1985 are before us. In fact, no one felt more disappointed with the performance of the originally "party-less" Assembly than the President himself... If such a mistake were to be repeated, would the House repose its confidence in a Prime Minister without party?" The *Dawn* terms non-party election 'a mistake' and the *Nawa-e-Waqt* (July 22) called boycott of those election 'a mistake'.

The *Nawa-e-Waqt* (July 22, 1988) continues to create the impression that election were going to be on party basis and all political parties should get ready for it. In an editorial , captioned "Participation in coming elections: A National requirement", the political parties are advised "not to repeat the mistake of 1985" (election) and "demonstrate better sense and wisdom" by avoiding the "non-political politics" of "boycott"... It augurs well that the leader of the Peoples Party Benazir Bhutto has announced that they would participate in elections whether they are on party basis or non-party basis."

Before this editorial could reach the reader the President Zia had already announced that elections would be held on non-party basis. Political parties could support their individual candidates, but had to stay in the background. The *Jang* (July 23, 1988) wrote an editorial on this announcement and said, "Although the political leaders who are opposed to the government have criticized the

decision, yet, it is gratifying to note that they have not announced to boycott election and have also said that they won't leave the field open for anyone... Now when the election schedule has been announced it is not unfair to expect the political parties to participate in election, even though they differ with the procedure of election. They can change it, through constitutional means once they reach the House... We would appeal to those political circles who are talking about challenging the Presidential decision in the Supreme Court, to avoid it. Because legal hair splitting would hinder elections, and if the case goes to the Supreme Court postponement of elections would become inevitable... All political parties should now gladly prepare themselves to contest elections and do their best to maintain peaceful atmosphere". Thrust of the editorial is, as before, to willingly and gladly accept whatever has been offered by the man at the top. It is not advisable to struggle against the powers. Therefore it is gratifying (*itmeenan ki baat*) that political parties should accept the rule of the game, because the election schedule has been announced. As if announcement of election schedule is the last word and nothing can be done now. Political parties should adopt the Constitutional method to change the constitution, after reaching the House; the President is not questioned for deviating from the Constitution and the legal stipulations which demand elections on party basis. The politicians are advised not to move the Supreme Court, or elections will be postponed. It is assumed that the carrot of elections is so

attractive for the politicians that they would not risk postponement of elections, with or without political parties.

The next day the *Jang* (24-7-88) published a 'special edition' on election, with feature article by Zia Shahid. The feature article advances the same arguments. Display, size and placement of photographs of political leaders has also been used to strengthen the impression that all politicians and political parties are passively at the receiving end, and President Zia is the sole, undisputed arbiter. At top of the page Zia's photograph is placed in three columns. He is sitting and leaning forward as he talks to someone. He seems to be explaining something, apparently counting points with the tip of the index finger of the right hand placed on the tip of the ring finger of the left hand which is open and the fingers stretched. Pictorial arrangement shows that Zia is the most dominant and confident person among the eleven leaders whose pictures appear in one or two columns below Zia-ul-Haque's photograph. Dismissed Prime Minister Junejo's photograph is given in two columns. He is looking downward apparently depressed and without future prospects. Benazir is looking upward and bit worried and uncertain about her future. Technically the photograph is placed in four column, below Zia's picture, but than more half of space is taken by half a dozen mikes and she is squeezed in one and a half columns. All other photographs are put in one column, spread across the whole page, below Zia's three column photograph dominating scene.

The article does not anywhere question the legality or political wisdom of non-party election its topic say, "Non-party Election: How, why and when the decision was taken?" The next prominent heading given in the middle of the page reads, "Will the new Assembly after the election amend the Constitution to approve Presidential system?" The heading is spread across four columns, and introduces a new diversion in the political discourse. It was known that Zia-ul-Haque personally preferred Presidential form of government and his advisors and well wishers often described Presidential system as nearer to the Islamic political ideals. There are ten more small single-column boxes which give high lights of the feature article, all of them taking it for granted that election will be held and all political parties participate, "staying in the background" as the President desired.

Against the "advice" and "good wishes" of the media the
MRD REJECTS NON-PARTY ELECTIONS
reports the *Jang* (July, 23, 1988), in a five column lead story.

The first sub-headline reads:

Supreme court to be approached for holding elections on party basis: Public meetings will be held, to increase public pressure: Benazir Bhutto's press conference

The second sub-headline is:

Election Commission Will Have To Hold Elections On Party

Basis

With almost all the political parties and vast majority of the political leaders demanding elections on party basis, only a small minority of less-significant politicians did not object to non-party elections , and a few intellectuals and journalist supported the idea . It was clear, by the end of July, that political forces were overwhelmingly in favor of party based elections and Zia-ul-Haque and his regime had been politically alienated, after the failure of the first (1985) experiment in non-party election. In this political atmosphere the *Jang* (July 30, 1988) ran more than a page long special article based on face to face discussion between two lawyer politicians one in favor of party based election other advocating for non-party election and politics without political parties. The feature article, bedecked with two photographs of the two participants each in three columns; with the pictures of Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah and Allama Iqbal in the top corners of the page. Liaquat Ali Khan the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, and Zia-ul-Haque , the longest serving military dictator of Pakistan are placed beside each other in equal size photographs. Three equal size, single-column photographs of Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani, Maulana Maudoodi, and Maulana Mufti Mehmood are placed in the lower half of the page. A look at the photographs creates the impression of all persons being equal in their own categories. Jinnah and Iqbal are of the same stature, as founding fathers, and are shown in equal size of photographs in the two top corners. The two

discussants are equal and are juxtaposed in equal size picture. The three religious scholars representing three religious political parties are put beside each other in equal size photographs. No one would take exception to this equal treatment of personalities. But all those photographs prepare the viewer to treat Liaquat Ali Khan and Zia-ul-Haque at par as they too are juxtaposed in equal size single-column photographs. These two photographs are physically nearest to each other than any other set of photographs. They are placed between the two discussants, with Zia on the side of Rafiq Bajwa (the advocate of non-party elections, and politics) and Liaquat Ali Khan placed on the side of Khursheed Mehmood Kasuri (the supporter of party based elections and politics). The message of equality (and hence fairness) is so strong that a casual reader would place Zia and Liaquat at equal level in his sub-conscious. The same equality and fairness is shown in the text of the article which allocates equal space to the opposite arguments. With all political forces clearly in favor of party based election and Zia-ul-Haque and his junta the only advocate of partyless election, equal treatment of the two views make the point that the two have equal validity and justification. Zia-ul-Haque and the supporters of his non-party poll, are treated at par with others because they are in power and not because their idea is of equal validity. A four-column photograph is placed at the bottom of the page showing a queue of people, apparently at a polling station. The placement of the picture indicate that the people, waiting in a queue at the bottom of the page, with the contending political forces above

their heads, are a helpless lot, at the bottom, at the receiving end.

It has been seen above that Pakistani editors and columnists are very fond of speaking for the nation, the people, even for the Ummah. This national spokespersonship is adopted often to propagate controversial ideas, which serve interests of the ruling elite. When "President General Muhammad Zia Ul Haque described the forthcoming elections on a non-party basis as enjoying the nation's total acceptability" the editor of the *Pakistan Times* (August 17, 1988) has no doubt that this is "The nation's choice" (caption of the editorial). It says, "Finally when we make a dispassionate analysis keeping all pros and cons of the situation in view the pendulum swings in favor of partyless elections. And this is not only the President's but also the nation's choice". The President might have some doubt how far his choice could be the nation's choice but the editor has no doubt in his mind that this is "The nation's choice."

President Zia-ul-Haque died in a mysterious plane crash on August 17, 1988. Chairman Senate Ghulam Ishaq Khan a trusted lieutenant of Zia-ul-Haque succeeded him. All the newspapers expressed their full confidence in the new President and hoped that free and fair elections will be held. The old theme that "Those in power know best what is in the interest of the nation" and that "the man at the top should be believed without entertaining any

doubt about his intentions", emerged immediately, only replacing Zia-ul-Haque's name with that of Ghulam Ishaq-- the man who was to have the dubious distinction of dismissing two elected governments.

The *Nawa-e-Waqt* (September 2, 1988) strongly defends continuation of the provincial interim governments, which were allowed to continue in power because they dissociated themselves with Prime Minister Junejo, to whose Muslim League they belonged and showed allegiance to President Zia, and whose dismissal was being demanded by all the political parties. The *Nawa-e-Waqt* (September 16, 1988) proves that the new President in reversing the policies of Zia-ul-Haque. 'A great deal has changed now, and Ghulam Ishaq Khan also has the power to change a lot more. If political parties also display a sense of responsibility, and do not assume that the Armed Forces have decided finally and irrevocably to stay away from (political) power, then we can be sure that the November 16 election will prove to be the (harbingers) of the revival of the political democratic era". It is assumed, as the establishment does, that political parties are irresponsible and they have come to believe, prematurely that the Armed Forces have finally withdrawn to their barracks. The editorial wants the President to 'tackle a more important issue' and announce clearly that the coming elections will be held on party basis, as demanded by all the political parties.

After Ghulam Ishaq Khan "categorically" stated to the Council of Pakistan Newspapers Editors (CPNE) that elections would be held as scheduled, and political parties play a vital role in it, an editorial in *The PAKISTAN TIMES* (September 25, 1988) said: It can be said with authority that the next general elections will be held on time and that they would be free, fair and impartial. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan has allayed all fears, and removed all doubts, in this respect..." With such an assurance coming from the highest authority-- the Head of State-- it is now for the political parties to get along with their election campaigns without any fear or doubt". It is for the political parties to do their homework and do some footwork. Because in the scheme of the establishment political parties have always lagged behind.

There is "unfettered freedom to the press" under the present government and yet "nothing would be acceptable which is contrary to the ideology of the country or in anyway hurts the sentiments and feelings of the people". The question remains who is going to define and interpret the state ideology. Keeping in view the amorphous nature of the ideology and the people's interest it seems its implementation will not be affected through the court of law but by the administrative hand of the establishment. Authoritarian and dictatorial regimes are always more vociferous than others about the defence of state ideology and the people's/ national interests, and have a tendency to monopolize the two. This monopolistic control help them draw an ever shifting arbitrary line

between 'unfettered freedom of press' and the undefinable state ideology and the 'sentiments of the people'.

To further qualify and fetter the 'unfettered freedom of press' by indeterminate and vague expressions it says: "Democracy is a battle of ideas in which newspapers play a crucial role. Besides providing information, they have also to enlighten and educate public opinion. ('battle of ideas' and 'information' give the impression of 'unfettered' and unrestrained discourse, which is immediately qualified by an ideologically loaded expression of 'to enlighten and educate' to be defined by the state) By giving unfettered freedom to the Press the Government has proved that it has complete faith and trust in it. Let it live up to that trust. (As before the Government has always done its job-- giving freedom and reposing confidence in the press-- but the press and the political parties have yet to prove their credentials.) Carrying unconfirmed reports which could lead to creating doubts in the minds of the people would be most irresponsible journalism and go (sic) to harm the country... (In the authoritarian context unconfirmed report means a report not cleared by the Government-- the sole repository of truth, ideology and patriotism. And any report creating doubt in the innocent and impressionable minds of the people about the ideology, national interest is irresponsible journalism and harmful to the country) At this crucial stage of our history a great responsibility devolves upon the Press and its duties have increased manifold. (In undemocratic political ethos

every stage is crucial and critical; because a sense of permanent crisis is conducive to the augmentation of powers of the rulers, and help in asking for greater sense of responsibility and sacrifice from the people and the media.) It has to play a positive role, channelize people's thinking on the right lines, promote national unity and protect (the editor, perhaps, means protect) the ideology of Pakistan. A Press which claims to be patriotic cannot be other wise". (Note the vague expressions like 'positive role' 'right lines' 'national unity' 'protect the ideology' and 'be patriotic', all which are to be 'defined' and 'interpreted' by the benign government which has granted 'unfettered freedom'.

The *Nawa-e-Waqt* (September 26, 1988) says that the earlier assurances given by the President that free and fair election will be held on schedule, "had been welcomed by all strata of society, and now when he has reiterated his assurances it should be expected that the forthcoming election would be free and fair in all respects". The following day (September 27, 1988) an other editorial entitled "Conducive electoral atmosphere: The duty of the Government and the Politicians", says: "On the one hand anti-state elements and their agents are indulging in rowdyism and breaking the laws to create doubts about the holding of general elections, on the other almost all the political parties are ignoring the assurances given by the government and are busy in pushing for demands which would only result in increase of confusion". The editor takes exception to the politicians who express doubts about

the assurances given by the President and asks them not to insist on the removal of caretaker (provincial) governments. They are advised to concentrate on reaching to the people and win their support for election.

The *Jang* (September 30, 1988) adopts a similar line of argument, putting the President's intentions above doubt and suspicion. It however chooses to keep quiet on the issue of interim governments, in its editorial, while its leading columnists have been demanding the removal of the interim provincial governments.

The *Jang* (October 10, 1988) praise the Chief Election Commissioner for his "determination" to hold free and fair election, the law Minister for "assurances" to this effect and the President for emphasizing all along to "make the election free and fair in real terms". "All these things indicate toward a very healthy change in the political atmosphere of the country". The editor had not called into question the implied unhealthiness of the election system in force before this day, but it does report the new healthiness of the electoral system.

The *Pakistan Times* (October 11, 1988) had been advocating for non-party election, in deference to the wishes of the late President, and now when the Supreme Court has ruled in favor of party based elections it said, 'It is after a long time that we are in a position to have true democracy in the country'. The verdict

of the court and decision of the Cabinet to implement it would be 'welcomed throughout the country and receive the approval of all' Earlier the editor had the temerity to claim that non-party elections were "The nation's choice".

As compared to unqualified praise for the Election Commission and the President by the *Jang* and *The Pakistan Times* , *The Dawn* (October 10, 1988) is cautious, objective and serene when it says, "Given our extraordinary circumstances, (like the *Pakistan Times* it does not give a sense of crisis at the current stage, and the expression 'extraordinary circumstances' refers to the continuation the checkered political history and not the present 'crucial stage') the Election Commission has naturally a very delicate and complex responsibility to fulfill. How it acquits itself in this onerous task will make all the difference between whether the mid-November polls are to be a major step towards the nation's political and democratic consolidation or the whole exercise is to deepen the crisis the country has been struggling to get out of". Compare it to the impression created by other newspapers that the Election Commission and the President have already done the best, their intentions and efforts are above all doubt; it is for others to prove that they are also capable of living up to the challenge of the hour.

A statement by the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Mirza Aslam Beg that "Political leadership, Judiciary and the Armed Forces and basic ingredients of national unity and their proper performance is the need of the hour", is picked up for editorial note in the *Jang* (October 14, 1988) under the title "Expectations from the Politicians". The COAS is reported to have said that the Armed Forces and the Judiciary have played a positive role in regard to November 16 elections "now it is the responsibility of the politicians to fulfill their obligations". The editor says, "this statement by the COAS is very timely and appropriate. He has reminded the politicians their obligations at a time when they are deeply involved in preparation for the proposed elections". It takes a General to remind the politicians their due obligations because they are too deeply involved in elections and must have forgotten their responsibility. The editorial reinforces the cliché that the politicians are irresponsible and the General are a responsible lot who not only remember their own duty but also remind the politicians about their responsibilities. "A Timely Reminder" is the caption of an editorial in the *Jang* (October 28, 1988) and praises President Ghulam Ishaq Khan for "reminding" the politicians that "Political Contest, should not be turned into perpetual confrontation; this world not only be against the spirit of elections, but also against the teachings of Islam". As always the President has said the right thing at the right time.

i. Re-emergence of the Pakistan People's Party

During the Zia regime the name and pictures of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had been eliminated from the newspapers. PPP was not referred to in positive terms. With the lifting of Martial Law in 1985 and the return of Benazir Bhutto from exile in 1986 during the Junejo government the PPP and its leadership started emerging from the dark clouds. But the mainstream media remained reluctant in projecting Benazir or her party prominently. With the sudden death of President Zia-ul-Haque the most formidable impediment in the way of Benazir's political ambition was removed, but the mainstream media remained unsure about the attitude of the new President-- a trusted comrade of Zia-ul-Haque, towards the PPP and its leadership. It was after few weeks of the election campaign when the PPP started emerging as the most prominent contender for power that the media shed its inhibitions and started giving them high key publicity. The *Nawa-e-Waqt* has been traditionally critical of the PPP and its leadership, but the *Jang* and the *Dawn*, among the four newspapers under study here, gave them a favorable coverage, but only when they realized that the PPP was likely to win and the establishment was ready to accept them as such.

The *Jang* (November 2, 1988) published a special addition on elections, which is the reverse of special editions of July 24 and 30, 1988 (analyzed above). The first page of the edition carrying 30 photographs of politicians, old and new, with Zulfikar Ali

Bhutto as commanding and prominent as Zia-ul-Haque was in the July 24 edition. Here Zia-ul-Haque is juxtaposed with Ayub Khan, the first military of Pakistan, in July 30 edition Zia had been placed beside Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan. The first page has 27 one-column photographs of politicians representing different ares of the country and the period of national history. Junejo, who had been dismissed by Zia and wore a depressed look in July 24 edition, here he is shown looking up and speaking with clinched right hand and the stretched left arm. His picture is spread on three columns. Next to him in two columns is Nawaz Sharif then Chief Minister of Punjab. The most prominent and domineer picture is the full six photograph of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto; he is walking, and waving with the raised right arm. His shalwar-Kameez (common Pakistani dress which Bhutto wore in Public meetings) indicates that he may be in a public meeting. He is shown walking forward, toward the reader, which emphasizes the rebirth of the PPP. After accusing Bhutto and his party for rigging 1977 election for more than a decade, the newspaper now says in 1977, "According the results announced by the Election Commission, the Peoples Party had won a thumping majority but the National Alliance refused to accept the result and accused the ruling party of wide spread rigging. Boycotting the provincial Assembly elections they launched a country wide movement as a result of which Martial Law was imposed on July 5, 1977". The PPP is shown as totally innocent in the whole affair. It was not the PPP which rigged or won election but the Election Commission (the highest constitutional

body on elections) which gave them thumping majority. In the face of the results announced by an impartial body like the Election Commission it was refusal of the National Alliance to accept the results and it were they who launched a country wide movement which led to the imposition of Martial Law. Instead of putting the PPP against the PNA it juxtaposes the Election Commission with the PNA which makes the PPP appear a neutral and innocent participant in the elections, and is exonerated of any wrong doing. In fact if one believes that there was something wrong with the election results, its responsibility lies with the Election Commission, which arranged election and announced its result and not with the PPP.

As if to balance this tilt in favor of the PPP, the *Jang* (November 9, 1988) published an other special edition on the election, exactly a week later and puts the ruling persons more prominently in picture and words. Zia-ul-Haque appears in top right corner in two columns juxtaposed with two photographs of President Ishaq Khan and COAS Mirza Aslam Beg in the left corner, the two of them covering three columns; the Chief Election Commissioner is shown, a little lower in the middle of the upper half of the page. Having put the establishment at the top it has lined up four politicians in equal space beside each other almost in the middle of the page covering its entire width: two leaders, Altaf Hussain and Professor Ghafoor from Urban Sind, and two leaders, Benazir and Jatoi from rural Sind. Here Benazir is shown as a leader of rural Sind and not as a national leader which was (and is) her

rightful claim. There is nothing to suggest that Benazir and her party are anyway better poised for electoral victory than Jatoi and Ghafoor. At the end of the page eight leaders are placed across its entire width. They include former Prime Minister Junejo, and Begum Nusrat Bhutto. This shift between the two special editions, within a week's time typifies the oscillation of the media between their support for the agents of change and the forces of status quo. Their support for the agents of change has to be approved, or at least not disappointed by the forces of status quo.

News display on the front pages of the newspapers during the last week of election campaign, gave mostly two to three column coverage to the statements made by various political leaders. The *Nawa-e-Waqt* tilted in favor of the Islamic Democratic Alliance, (IJI) led by Nawaz Sharif, with the fundamentalists and traditionalists prominently in the fold. The *Jang* tried to keep a balance in allocation of space to the PPP and IJI, with occasional tilt in favor of the PPP. The *Dawn* remained balanced in space allocation and comments. The *Pakistan Times* continued to play up the statements and activities of the caretaker government. It remained hostile or indifferent to the PPP. In all the newspapers the news stories emanating from the Government sources have been given more prominent coverage than the stories based on the statements of the politicians and electioneering. A five-column story in the *Jang* (November 12, 1988) reads:

ORDERS ISSUED TO GET CONFRONTATION STOPPED
AMONG POLITICAL PARTIES

The first subheading says:

Election Commission takes serious notice after written complaints by a number of candidates for National and Provincial Assemblies; Instructions also issued to investigate incidents of vandalism with banners and posters

The story is only a reiteration of the known election rules and unspecified instructions for investigation into charges of vandalism with banners and posters by supporters of rival candidates. The text of the story say "Election Commission has taken a serious notice of confrontation among political groups in some areas". The headline uses the words 'Political Parties' and the text says 'Political groups in some areas'. The text says the Commission , after receiving written complaints from candidates has asked the Deputy Commissioners to investigate the charges and submit their reports to the Commission at the earliest. It is factually incorrect that the Election Commission ordered all political parties to stop confrontation, as implied by the headline, it only ordered investigation in some areas. The word confrontation (*mahaz araii*) gives the impression that a gun battle has been going on, and the Commission has ordered a ceasefire. The headline conveys a negative image of the political parties who are at each other's throat. The body of the text refers to political

groups in some areas which means the story is about rivalry among candidates and vandalism in certain constituencies. It does not implicate the first rank political leadership as implied by the headline. When it is said that the the 'orders' are addressed to political parties it inevitably means the top leadership of political parties. While the text says it is confrontation among candidates at the local level, which is normal in any election campaign. The idea behind this distortion is again to portray the establishment in positive light and those out of it in need of intervention, guidance, and protection by the establishment.

Democracy is marked by difference of opinion, it is 'battle of ideas' (see *The Pakistan Times* September 23 above) and tolerance for it. The establishment in Pakistan has always demanded that politicians should evolve "national consensus" and put their differences aside. Military interventions have always been justified on the ground that politicians could not agree on the solution of a certain issue(s). *The Pakistan Times* (November 14, 1988) took up a statement by the Chief of Army Staff for its editorial comments, two days before the election wherein the General "expressed the hope that the verdict of November 16, will be accepted by the political parties as well as individual contestants, with dignity and good grace..." The editorial adds, "Pakistan is turning a new page in its history and everyone is striving for true democracy in the country... The crucial stage is after the elections are over and the results announced". At the

time of this crucial test "A national consensus has to be created for the purpose of government formation".

At the end of 1988 election PPP emerged as the leading (not majority) party with 92 seats and the IJI got 54 out of 205 seat of the National Assembly. Four days after election a four column headline in the *Nawa-e-Waqt* (November 20, 1988) reads:

THERE IS NEED TO FORM A BROAD BASED GOVERNMENT
WITH CONSENSUS

Here the assumption is that differences are bad and consensus is good. Politicians and democracy, by implication, are bad because they promote differences as against consensus. Military is better organized and more efficient because its chain of command leaves little room for difference of opinion. If politicians can not evolve consensus they being selfish and petty.

The *Pakistan Times* (November 21, 1988) speaks of the establishment when says, "Politics is the art of the possible and democracy means accommodation and understanding (no more battle of ideas). In view of our past history it is all the more necessary that angularities, exclusiveness and intolerance are avoided so that the plant of democracy can grow strong. After all, there is no difference between various political parties on the basics-- the good of the people and the country. All are working towards the same aim. If this remains the spirit, the next phase of government

forming will also be completed peacefully and in the best interest of the country". The *Dawn* (November 21, 1988) does not plead for consensus as demanded by the establishment instead it says, "the results should be welcomed as an opportunity for all parties to demonstrate the workability of the democratic system, whatever the composition of coalitions. In fact, in our present state of democratic evolution, this is a picture much more desirable than that of stifling uniformity which often results from monolithic control of the House by a ruling party commanding an overwhelming majority. The party positions being what they are, the task will demand judicious compromises and, in some cases, delicate adjustments. The victorious political parties must now show magnanimity and make arrangements and negotiate coalescing deals in a true democratic spirit party.

3. General Elections 1990

Benazir Bhutto's coalition government had barely completed a year in power when the press (presumably at the behest of the more powerful ones in the establishment) started talking about mid term elections. In Parliamentary democracy it is the prerogative of the party in power to decide for early elections. Eight months before Benazir's unceremonious dismissal by President Ishaq Khan the *Jang* (January 13, 1990) carried a feature article by Azher Suhail, under the heading:

WHAT WILL BE JUNEJO'S ROLE IN THE NEW ELECTIONS

The heading takes it for granted that new elections are about to be held, the only question which needs to be explored is 'what role Junejo would play'. It apparently seems that the idea has been floated by the President's men to gauge reaction to the idea of bringing Junejo back into power, may be because, he had the image of a clean person and a thorough gentlemen. The writer questions the fairness of 1988 elections, which brought Benazir to power in the center and her arch rival Nawaz Sharif in Punjab. And then claims, "No one will at least be able to say about the election to be held this time that they have been manipulated". It is a foregone conclusion that the general impression about the impartiality and fairness of the coming elections will be of fundamental importance, because it has been "repeatedly stated during and after the last election that they were not free and fair". Here the writer is referring to a statement by Benazir that the elections which had brought her to power had been rigged in Punjab, where her rival IJI had won majority under Nawaz Sharif. The allegation (which the writer does not think is an allegation but a fact) is now turned against both Prime Minister Benazir, and Chief Minister Nawaz Sharif to argue in favor of 'new , fair and free elections'.

"Another proposal, says the article, in circulation is that the situation should be reverted back to the point from where the

malpractice (*bud unwani*) of the present era started and which has been termed mala fide by the courts". The writer is referring to the dismissal of Junejo by Zia on May 29, 1988, which, after Zia's death, was termed an act of mala fide intention by The Supreme Courts. The Court, however, did not order restoration of Junejo's government because new party based elections were already afoot. The writer is misinterpreting the Court's decision when he suggests that "Prime Minister (does not use the epithet 'former') Muhammad Khan Junejo be brought back as caretaker Prime Minister and asked to hold free and fair election". As if Prime Minister is not the Chief Executive but an ordinary state employee who is to be hired and recruited by the President against a temporary post. The impression that Junejo is likely to replace Benazir is "strengthened after Junejo's meeting with the President, after which he adopted a hard attitude towards Nawaz Sharif" (who happens to be from Junejo's party). His criticism of Nawaz Sharif and his opposition to Benazir qualifies him to be the next Prime Minister. What a trivialization of Prime Ministership and democracy.

The writer has the temerity (if it is not His Master's Voice) to propose "If the President initiates elections he can say both the Federal and Provincial Governments have not shown a mature outlook nor acted in democratic ways, over the last one year and a quarter, therefore both have been sent home and an undisputed Prime Minister is being given an opportunity to move things forward". President Ishaq Khan who had no public life as a politician, no

popular mandate, and reached the pinnacles by serving the interests of the Martial Law regime, is best suited to judge the maturity of outlook and democratic behavior of the popularly elected governments. The writer shows total ignorance of Constitution, or it may be a deliberate misinterpretation, when he says that an elected government can be "sent home" for not being mature and/ or not being democratic. Article 58 of the Constitution provides only two reasons for dissolution of the Assembly and dismissal of the Government by the President. One when the Prime Minister has lost majority in the House, and two when the Government of the Federation cannot be carried on in accordance of the provisions of the Constitution. It is implied that the people were wrong to return immature leadership, which does not behave in a democratic manner. The President needs to sent this wrong, right.

Eighteen days after this speculative story (provided we believe the story was not fed by the President's men) the *Nawa-e-Waqt* (January 19, 1990) carries an "analysis" by Anwar Kidwai on

THE ECHO OF MIDTERM ELECTIONS

with a subheading:

It is not something unusual in democratic politics

Another highlighted heading says:

It seems electioneering has already started

yet another highlighted caption reads:

People's court is held only through general elections.

Personal power has been consolidated instead of democratic

institutions.

A highlighted sentence toward the end of the article says:

Elected institutions should be allowed to complete their term

The article opens by saying, "Prime Minister and co-chairperson of People's Party Begum Benazir Bhutto's interview with the BBC, wherein she stated that she will be ready for mid term elections if the Combined Opposition (COP) increases pressure", and than says, 'midterm election is not unusual in democratic politics and history, in fact it is a part of democratic political system. When the governments or opposition feel that they need a popular mandate on an important issue they appear in the "People's Court". The article does not indicate what 'important issue' is at stake which warrants renewal of popular mandate after only 14 months. Opposition leaders are quoted as saying that "Peoples Party and Islamic Alliance (IJI) should be allowed to govern according the popular mandate. The Prime Minister has not offered mid-term polls, she has only hinted at such a probability in case "the Opposition increase pressure"; which should be interpreted as a statement of principle and not an offer. When neither the Government nor the Opposition want early election then who is third party interested, except the President who has support of the Armed Forces and the Civil Service. To absolve the President of the allegation that he was interested in mid-term polls or manipulating the situation, and also to indicate the need for early election, the article adds,

without quoting any source, "although President Ghulam Ishaq Khan is very hopeful and he says that the two parties would sort out things across the table. Under the circumstances this last democratic option may be resorted to only when the two wheels of the vehicle of democracy can not go together. Then mid-term elections should be hold so that the people can give their verdict". Note the hiatus between the two sentence, the President 'hopeful' but then without saying when and how his hopes have not been realized it concludes that the circumstances may call for mid-term election.

Having said all this, the second last paragraph refers to 'a circle' in the country which is opposed to mid term polls. Then it quotes the Opposition sources which want the elected government to complete their tenure. The President is 'hopeful' that difference would be solved. This leaves only the Prime Minister who could be keen for mid-term election only after being one year in power. The writer has tried to give the impression that it is the Prime Minister who wants or is at least willing to hold mid-term polls. After playing the game, the last paragraph pleads that "elected institutions should be allowed to complete their tenure".

The article has published President's photograph at the top in two columns, with Jatoi the leader of Combined Opposition in the middle. Is it sheer coincidence that Mr. Jatoi was to take over as caretaker Prime Minister, in August after Benazir's dismissal?

Abdul Sattar Afghani takes up Prime Minister's interview with the BBC (quoted above) in his article in the *Jang* (January 23, 1990) under the caption:

Indication of Mid-term Polls

Afghani also "blames" the Prime Minister for offering mid-term polls, when she said that it was the Opposition which wanted to get the Assembly dissolved, and accused them of spreading disturbances to provide a justification for such a step. The writes say, "By accusing the Opposition of trying to get the Assemblies dissolved, the Prime Minister is not only being highly unjust but is also leveling unwarranted allegations". He too quotes leader of the COP as having said that the Opposition had never demanded dissolution of the National Assembly and mid-term election". All the President's men are out to take Prime Minister statement out of context and then distort it to suit their purposes, and still 'blame' her for "leading to lot of speculations with this proposal".

Another article in the *Jang* (February 6, 1990) entitled:

Mid Term Election

says, "Politicians are of the opinion that after the no-confidence motion (in fact, after the failure of no-confidence motion) it seems the Government has made a program for mid-term election, which has been announced already". Here the 'indication' and 'proposal' of mid-term election by the Prime Minister has become an "announcement" in pursuance of which the party in power has already

chalked out a program. Paradoxically it adds that Pakistan is a poor country and can not afford election every now and then. At the same time it claims circumstances had been highly in favor of the ruling party but it could not make use of them, and now favorable circumstances shifting from party in power to the Opposition". If it goes on like this, "there is no reason why the Opposition should not succeed". Succeed in what and where? The opposition had already failed to dislodge the Government through a vote of no-confidence. Now, how and where they are going to succeed, except in mid-term polls. But for that Prime Minister is to be blamed for proposing such an idea.

There is a spate of articles on the prospects, even inevitability of mid-term polls. What was speculation, indication, and probability in January became inevitability in February. As things are becoming more transparent day by day, *Nawa-e-Waqt* (February 7, 1990) carries an article by Malik Muhammad Muazzam , under the title:

Why General Elections Are Inevitable In 1990

There is only one voice in the *Dawn* (February 16, 1990) which is opposed to the idea of mid-term elections. The caption

Mid-term polls are no panacea

is the reverse of what all other articles have been implying. Against 'nothing unusual' of *Nawa-e-Waqt* (19-1-90) the *Dawn* says, 'mid-term elections are not a regular feature of Parliamentary

democracies". The writer does not dare analyze the arguments of the other camp yet it argues his own case in clear words: "The object of elections is to give the country a stable government and not to destabilize an already stable government which has been elected by the people. With all its lapses and shortcomings on which a party in the opposition can cash in the next elections the COP cannot deny the party that has a majority in the National Assembly its right to govern the country for the five-year term for which it has been elected. The country already burdened with financial liabilities cannot afford the luxury of a mid-term re-election. It can only make the present confusion worse confounded."

Manipulation of public opinion (among the 26% literate population at the most) continued more or less on the same style till August 6, 1990, when the President dismissed the Prime Minister Benazir and her government, dissolved the National and Provincial Assemblies and ordered new polls to be held on October 24. The Jang (August 11, 1990) quotes , the President, the Caretaker Prime Minister Jatoi (who has been leader of the Opposition and apparently opposed or indifferent of mid-term polls), and the Military sources to say that election will be held on time and they will be free and fair, and then concludes, "In our pinion now (with "solid assurances") all political circles should concentrate on preparation for election, and try to create such an atmosphere in the country that no where law and order situation is created". As usual the argument is that those in power

have done their best now it is for others (who are out of power) to reciprocate and do their bit.

The *Nawa-e-Waqt* (August 12, 1990) in an editorial argues in favor of screening and elimination of the 'corrupt elements' from the electoral process (the establishment has always wanted to remove the corrupt before election and not through election). The President has initiated investigation against the previous government and vowed to bring the culprits to book. (Within less than three years the 'arch culprit' Benazir's husband Asif Zardari was sworn in as a Minister by the same President when he had dismissed the second Prime Minister). The editor pleads for elections on schedule but does not want the corrupt to escape the net.

Most of the feature articles, editorial etc. continued to put the President above criticism and asked the PPP to contest elections which they assured will be free and fair. A feature article in the *Jang* (13-8-90) argues 'it is in the interest of the PPP to avoid agitation and go for elections'. The article by Hanif Khalid is entitled:

THE CARETAKER GOVERNMENT

Will They Be Able To Hold Election On Schedule?

and then it say, "Apparently it is not easy to hold elections on October 24, because the situation and events are so complicated that it calls for great courage and lot of time to disentangle

them". Is the writer preparing ground for the Government to postpone elections, if necessary . President's decision to dismiss the Government and the Assemblies is "a historic decision". His address to the nation (in which he announced dismissal) was "undoubtedly the voice from the heart of a patriot, a compassionate man and a visionary, which represented the wishes of the people". Ghulam Ishaq Khan would not have written a better eulogy for himself. This is in praise of a man who is the archetype of civil bureaucracy in Pakistan-- smooth sailor through the 'cunning passages' of history and 'contrived corridors' of power, 'guided by vanities' and 'whispering ambitions'². He followed in the footsteps of his predecessors Ghulam Muhammad, Iskandar Mirza, and Zia-ul-Haque in dismissing an elected government and dissolving assemblies. The feature article in spread across a full page of with three photographs, Caretaker Prime Minister Jatoi, (in three columns) and Chief Minister Nawaz Sharif and Governor of Punjab Mian Azhar (in two columns). All three are shown talking and looking upwards. Benazir is conspicuously absent.

The caretakers and the President's men created the impression that by holding election within the constitutionally stipulated period of 90 days the Government was doing something exceptional and great and the Election Commission has not been doing its duty but a favor or sacrifice for the nation. The state owned *The Pakistan Times* (August 14, 1990) quoting the Chief Election Commissioner said, " By working day and night, the Election

Commission of Pakistan will certainly accomplish this important national task in the wake of the specific Presidential order. The Election Commission officers are working on war footing, staying in office till late at night and also attending office on holidays. It is now the duty of the political parties to extend their full cooperation to the Government by preparing themselves for the coming elections".

An article in the *Jang* (August 20, 1990) by Dr Rahim-ul-Haque argues against the process of 'accountability' and says, "In the eyes of the people or the world public opinion accountability by the next elected government would be proper and lawful. Accountability process initiated by caretaker government is not likely to get wide acceptability, instead it might lead to the danger of postponement of elections". It quotes examples from the political history of Pakistan to show that accountability like this one has always proved counter productive. This is one of the few articles, placed in less conspicuous columns of the newspaper, which criticize the ruling elite. This helps the newspaper justify its claim of printing and representing all views and make the reader believe that the newspaper is not sold out to the government.

An editorial in *Jang* (August 20, 1990) entitled:

Need for Healthy Electoral Atmosphere

says "an unfortunate tradition of deceiving the voters by making

false promises and impracticable claims has been taking roots in our country. It is absolutely necessary to eradicate this tradition to provide the country a correct and healthy political system. And we understand the politicians are utmost responsible for this". It may be mentioned here that it was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his Peoples Party which had promised equality of opportunity and status to all, and promised 'food, clothing and shelter' for everyone; which was obviously hard to realize. Since 1970 when the PPP swept the traditional political heavy weights aside when Bhutto offered "Islamic socialism" that the forces of status quo have been blaming him for "making false promises and winning votes by deceiving the people". The target of this editorial criticism is indirectly the PPP.

An editorial in the *Nawa-e-Waqt* (August 28, 1990) persuades the PPP not to raise unnecessary objections in the creation of special Tribunals to investigate the Party and try its members on charges of corruption and malpractices, and not to make it an excuse to boycott election. It however "warns" the caretakers not to be complacent in the hope that PPP would boycott elections and they would get a walkover. As a supporter of the Muslim League-- an opponent of the PPP-- the daily asks the IJI to get united to defeat the PPP. Seeing disarray in the ranks of IJI it observes that 'under the circumstances PPP can not be defeated nor stopped from re-entering the corridors of power. Therefore all the leaders should sit together chalk out a strategy and without wasting any

time, should take the nation into confidence. The nation is not ready to tolerate the current situation of anarchy any more". It seems that the "nation" is behind the IJI , it is only because of their internal differences that the PPP is likely to win. By itself PPP is not a popular party. This unjustified assumption is the basis of this editorial.

An article in the *Jang* (August 24, 1990) by Yusuf Ali Khan dilates upon the

Strategies of Prime Minister Jatoi

and says, that the caretakers would do their best to block the PPP's return to power in the promised elections. "Jatoi's statements and steps indicate that first of all he wants to remove his biggest political rival-- Peoples Party-- out of his way. For that purpose he is giving top priority to accountability; therefore propaganda for 'accountability first , elections after' is also in the top gear". Although collection of evidence and material against the PPP has been ordered at all levels yet, "the practical steps in this direction indicate that so far only threats are being used so as to put psychological pressure on Benazir Bhutto, Asif Zardari and Begum Nusrat Bhutto and scare them out of politics and make them leave the country quietly... There has been reports that the caretaker Government had offered Benazir Bhutto that if she leaves the country, cases of corruption would not be constituted against her and her husband. As this thing became known before hand both Benazir Bhutto and the caretaker Government denied it". In the

meanwhile "a week ago the name of Benazir Bhutto and her husband were top of the exit-control-list and it had been supplied to airports immediately. Now (caretaker Prime Minister) gives the good news that there is no restriction on them if they want to go out of the country. What a change within a week? has the hard rock of accountability melted? Were they really corrupt till a week ago and now they are clean?... It may be concluded from these erratic moves that complete accountability which the nation expects will not take place. The sword (of accountability) will be kept hanging over the heads a few rebel politicians so as to ensure "supplies" for "horse trading".³

Thrust of the agrument is against the caretaker Prime Minister and his government. It exposes their intentions and by the standard of the newspaper it is one of the few courageous articles. But there are two things to be noted. One that the prime mover of the whole process of dismissal and accountability-- President Ishaq Khan is not mentioned in the article. Accountability was his idea and he had ordered the collection of evidence and initiation of criminal cases against the PPP leadership. The caretakers were only political cover for the real intentions and planning of the establishment. The author shows the caretaker Prime Minister os all powerful and doing and undoing things on his own. It is (and was at that time) a known fact that all activities against the dismissed were being initiated and carried out by and through the President's men. There is however, a one column picture of the President which

gives the reader an idea that this man is also involved. The second point is that the writer may unwittingly be creating doubts about Benazir declared intention that they would contest election and not leave the country. The reader does get the impression that may be the Bhutto family leaves politics and the country. This, impression is strengthened by referring to Nusrat Bhutto 's departure for London, Benazir's getting passports for her children and Jatoi saying that she is sending her children abroad, removal of Bhutto family's names from the exit-control-list, and the caretaker Prime Minister also saying Benazir and her husband are free to leave the country.

Two editorials in *The Pakistan Times* (September 8 and 23, 1990) take (by now) the familiar approach of opening the column with a statement by the President, Prime Minister, Chief Election Commissioner or Chief of Army Staff about preparation and arrangements of election and the good intentions of the government to ensure free, fair and on time election in a peaceful atmosphere. This (normally) takes more than two third of the space and is followed by (again the familiar approach) reminding those who are out of power their responsibilities to enable the good Government implement its good intentions. The editorial of September 8 quotes the Chief Election Commissioner that elections will be free, fair and on schedule, and then concludes, "It is now for the political parties to come out with their manifestos and embark upon electioneering in a healthy manner. The ball is in their court".

The next editorial (September 23, 1990) is on the announcement of the code of conduct by the Election Commissioner and concludes with the remarks: As the polling dates draw closer emotions run high and the exuberant party workers are liable to get out of hand. It is the responsibility of their leaders to keep them in check and ensure that they do not indulge in any activity which could disturb the law and order situation in the country.

In contrast to this an editorial in the *Dawn* (September 14, 1990) discusses political strategies, prospects and internal problem of the two main rivals-- The Islamic Democratic Alliance (IJI) and The Peoples Democratic Alliance (PDA). Welcoming the formation of alliances as a health development it says, "A two-party system is the envy of most democracies. While what we have in Pakistan is not, in the strict sense of the word, a two-party system, it is becoming something quite close to it". It criticizes the alliances saying, "Still even though the formation of the alliances makes it easier for voters to make up their minds, they really are in the dark about what exactly the alliances stand for. The desire for power is apparent on both sides of the divide but precious little else, since both alliances so far have been remarkably discreet about where they stand on the various issues facing the country". Having analyzed the existing political scene which essentially remains unchanged and fails to contribute to any structural change of the established order it says, "The conclusion can be drawn that while the coming elections (again , provided that

nothing interferes with their taking place) promise to be keenly even fiercely contested, on present evidence it is extremely doubtful whether they will contribute in any significant way to improving the understanding of the electorate".

On the election day the *Nawa-e-Waqt* (October 24, 1990) praise the President in its editorial comments on the election day for three things: Living up to his promise of holding elections on the given date, despite doubts and rumors about his intentions. Now (today on the election day) "all these misgivings and rumors have died and the entire nation is busy preparing itself to use its right to vote". Second, the President has not only kept his promise of holding elections on time but has also taken steps to prevent any malpractices by making it compulsory for every voter to produce national identity card before casting vote. Third, "to quell misgivings, spread at national and international levels, about the future, the President has promulgated an ordinance to amend the Act of Floor Crossing , whereby he has made one more attempt to clean the electoral and democratic process of many a filth. This ordinance will prevent sale and purchase of the members. Thus the President delivered the responsibility well which he had assumed by taking the measure of August 6. The editor took the opposite view when three years later the same President dismissed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on charges similar to the one levelled against Benazir. Unlike the *Dawn*, the *Nawa-e-Waqt* takes it for granted that dismissal of Benazir's government and all the subsequent step are

good for democracy and the country.

On the same day the *Jang* (October 24, 1990) says, "Pakistan is not only a country of the Muslims but it has been created in the name of Islam. Therefore, only they deserve to lead the Muslims of Pakistan who take pride in seeking guidance from the Quran and the Sunnah, and have declared intentions of establishing the supremacy of the Islamic system". And who else could they be except the good Muslims of the Islamic Democratic Alliance!

The *Dawn* (October 24, 1990) observes on the election day, "It is true that the caretaker governments were not exactly models of impartiality: they bent the powers of incumbency as much as they could to their advantage. But the important thing remains that, contrary to the fears of many people, the elections are being held and nobody has been prevented from taking part in them... There are, however, still doubts being expressed in some quarters about whether the powers that be will accept the verdict of the people that is, if it goes against what are generally thought to be their preconceived notions... Hopefully, we have seen the sun setting on authoritarianism in Pakistan. But we still have to make a success of our rendezvous with democracy. That all is not hopeless in this connection is shown by the fact that elections are being held and, unless foolish notions prevail, their results will be respected... This is a sensitive juncture in our history and needs all the patience, tolerance and goodwill that can be mustered for it to be

successfully crossed. Some of these qualities must come from the political parties. But some of them have also to come from the forces subsumed under the generic title of the establishment. Both must work in tandem and both must respect the verdict of these polls. The first thing is to hand over power as quickly as possible, and without the least show of reluctance, to whichever party comes out on top. Once that is done, other steps can follow."

And that is where the Pakistani politics continues to falter under the unrelieved pressure of the cultural ethos of parasitic landlordism, always exercised by the establishment under different names, with thinly veiled intentions.

Notes

1. Literally meaning lineal brotherhoods, traditionally living together in extended family systems, often led by an informal leadership of the elders, who have a final say in deciding political affiliations and social relations.
2. From T.S. Eliot, in 'Gerontion'.
3. The expression "Horse trading" is used as a derogatory term for buying and selling the support of the members of National and Provincial Assemblies. The term was coined and became popular when the Opposition moved its no-confidence motion against Benazir's government, and the two sides allegedly paid huge sums of money to buy votes in the House.



CHAPTER 9

Chapter 9

CONCLUSION

The following few pages are neither a summary of the thesis nor a rephrased reiteration of the points raised in the foregoing sections of the dissertation. It is an attempt to conceptualize the thesis evolved and to evaluate it at theoretical level, and then present some recommendations for theoretical and methodological improvement, and political action, without which sociological research and analysis of political systems remains a scholastic pursuit.

This research has been an attempt to study Pakistani society from within and evolve an approach to the identification and theorization of local cultural ethos. The dissertation has tried to identify the situations out of which media texts arose in a specific time frame, and interpreted and analyzed them to establish a political discourse between the cultural ethos and the given set of media texts. Discourse analysis of the media texts in cultural

backdrop showed that, by and large, the media had been promoting the discourse of subservience under the impact of the cultural ethos of parasitic landlordism.

Cultural approach was adopted for the study of relationship between media, politics and religion; and culture was defined as 'ordinary' or 'mainstream'. While identifying and theorizing the Pakistani culture seven prevalent approaches to culture were analyzed and rejected for being inadequate to comprehend Pakistani cultural ethos at abstract level. The major common weakness of these approaches was their preconceived political objectives and ideological commitment, to which the definition and identification of Pakistani culture was bent. These theories could be used as 'sensitizing devices' (Giddens 1988) only if one subscribed to their political objectives and ideology.

This study identified Pakistan's cultural ethos as 'parasitic landlordism' a term used by Barrington Moore (1967) in a somewhat different context. Parasitic landlordism does not refer only to the political culture of the big landowners who constitute the biggest single group in any political set up in Pakistan, but to the values and patterns of behavior which grew out of land ownership and land possession, primarily under the colonial rule which created this class, and has roots in the centuries old history of the area. These values and patterns of behavior have osmosed all segments of the ruling elite, whether they are land owners or not. Parasitic

landlordism has so deeply permeated the political culture of Pakistan that to quote Hanif Ramay (Daily the *Jung* 28-8-1993) even an industrialist Prime Minister like Nawaz Sharif tends to behave like a landlord: personalizing everything and concentrating power in his own hands. The same is true about military rulers and bureaucrat rulers, whose power base is institutional though, at least to begin with, yet their political behavior is only marginally influenced by their institutional background. As Anwer Syed (1992) has observed, 'many politicians in Pakistan are... landlords. They carry their traditional lifestyle, including their ways of dealing with adversaries and unyielding subordinates, to political office. Since they dominate legislatures and the political parties, their political culture... (constitutes the basis of) Pakistani politics with which even those who are not landowners must come to terms (Syed, 1992:6). Even exceptionally well educated and brilliant political leaders, like Mumtaz Daultana and Z.A. Bhutto who were well aware of anachronistic and inhibitive nature of the system, did not try to transcend the parasitic ethos, instead they chose to strengthen it.

The life style and behavior of a typical landlord has been delineated in a report of 1948 known as the Hari Committee Report on land tenants in Sindh. The report noted that the landlord "has lived a life of leisure for generations. Working for a living is beneath his station. When he wants to be active, he hunts, and he maintains large portions of his land as hunting preserves... The

typical Sindhi *zamindar* (landlord) has many servants, fine horses, and a large supply of weapons. He is fond of pomp and show, keeps expensive cars, goes after women, drinks excessively, and entertains lavishly. He replenishes his dwindling purse by swindling his *haris* (tenants) and by protecting and patronizing robbers and cattle-lifters. He bribes civil and police officials who reciprocate his attention by over looking his atrocities. He makes a show of his high living, official connections, and command of gangsters to overawe other *zamindars* (landlords)" (quoted by Syed, 1992:7). For the power seekers, the usurpers, and the rulers (with a few insignificant exceptions) this has served as a model, at least at personal and practical levels, if not at ideological and moral levels. They have all been trying, in divergent ways and with different levels of commitment to establish their landlordism all over the country. It may be added that since 1948 there has been some quantitative change, due to land distribution in inheritance, and rapid increase in population, but qualitatively the landlords remain the same. In fact, in some cases like patronage of gangsters, and gun running the situation has deteriorated.

The attitude of parasitic elements towards politics, land, authority, education, work, and religion has been analyzed to understand their behavioral patterns. It has been argued that for them politics is a search for personal power to overawe the factional opponents and a tool to get favors from superior

political authority in exchange for allegiance; election is a modern mean of endorsement of their traditional overlordship; land possession and land ownership is absolute, it gives them inalienable right to claim proprietary rights on everything and everybody that is on *his* land; attitude toward authority is informed by authoritarian submission to the superior authority, and authoritarian aggression toward the inferior in authority. Authoritarianism also makes them anti-intrceptive. By the same token they are opposed to education and acquisition of knowledge, especially by those who are lower in status¹; work is not to be done, it is to be got done. Religion like state provides security to the landlords upto a point beyond which its penetration is resisted. In case of landlords with claim to spiritual lineage, religious leadership extends their authority to the worldly and otherworldly lives of the people. They use time as an instrument of authority when they keep others waiting, and deliberately avoid being on time, which is an attribute of the subordinates, the inferiors;². Abiding by law is a sign of weakness, its violation and circumvention is sign of strength (see chapter four for details).

Parasitic cultural ethos based on land possession and land ownership has inflicted 'arrested media discourse' in the overall 'immobility syndrome'. The perception of mass media in the cultural ethos of parasitic landlordism is pre-modern. Attitude toward media is informed by the values of the time when there was no mass media.

For them media is not the 'fourth estate' it is "theirs" as the land and the tenants are theirs as instruments/ appendices of their political power. In the parasitic mind the mass media is the modern equivalent of the herald and the drum beater. Like electoral system and constitution, mass media is also a new instrument which should help perpetuate and legitimize their power. All the three components of the establishment nurtured under the same cultural ethos, have, as a whole, similar approach toward mass media and democracy. Approach toward media and democracy has not been fundamentally different under any regime-- civil or military-- in Pakistan.

Media discourse has to be one way traffic. Media is there to inform the people about the beneficence and benevolence of the rulers, and to defend them through "mutual understanding". The extent to which media 'deviates' from this ideal is either because the establishment is split and is using the media for cross purposes, or the media men have been impelled by their middle and lower middle class origins to criticize the establishment, and/ or the people want to know about the obvious misdeeds of the government, failing which the paper will not sell on the market. A comparative study of the Pakistan media would show a gradual increase in the level of 'deviation' over the last four and a half decades but it continues to depend heavily on the establishment for its survival. Despite a relatively greater self-awareness among the media about their role in the polity, they remain obliged to limit

themselves to the political discourse of subservience. In brief establishment continues to be the prime definer of media discourse.

Islam, modernism, democracy, socialism-- some of the causes espoused by the different political leaders and regimes at different times, have not been able to affect a meaningful change in the monolithic structure, because all of them were subsumed under the cultural ethos of parasitic landlordism. Only a handful of middle class and lower middle class intellectuals tried to espouse these causes as ideologies, and showed some level of commitment, but they were quickly sorted out: Socialists of the Bhutto regime and the Islamists of the Zia regime are cases in point.

Ideologies, institutions, charisma all have remained subservient to the parasitic cultural ethos. Any attempt to study media, politics and religion in Pakistan with reference to ideology (Islam) or institutions (political parties, parliament, military, civil bureaucracy etc.) or personal/ institutional charisma fall short of grasping the basics of the polity which is parasitic landlordism and which overrides every ideology, institution and charisma. 'Pakistani political culture is a neglected subject in the social sciences, but politically relevant themes have figured in Pakistani poetry, fiction, and plays with increasing frequency. Political leadership is a favorite target in satire (Syed, 1992:5). But few attempts have been made to identify and theorize Pakistan's

political culture scientifically.

There have been attempts to analyze Pakistani political culture through the colonial heritage approach-- the Viceregal model; through the neo-colonialism approach-- a continuation of colonial heritage approach placed in global context as part of the Cold War period; through the patrimonial approach used to study domineering leaders like Bhutto, and through praetorianism to study the dominance of military in Pakistani politics.

Attempts to study Pakistan's political culture and society in the context of colonialism and neo-colonialism (e.g. Gardezi, 1991) put the entire blame on the capitalist societies for keeping Pakistan and other third world countries poor and backward, and ideologically confused. While there is truth in what has been stated in this approach it tends to put the Third World societies passively at the receiving end and practically absolves them of any responsibility.

Patrimonial approach³ which revolves around one dominant ruling personality overshadowing institutions and ideologies, has been employed by Maliha Lodhi (1980) to study the Bhutto era. This approach has a measure of relevance to study Bhutto's personality and his period, but cannot be applied in the analysis of other regimes with equal ease.

Similarly praetorianism is relevant to study the role of military in transforming the political culture of Pakistan, but military as a political force is a comparatively recent phenomenon. The dominance of military, as an institution, in Pakistani politics is a post-independence development, and cannot be traced back to the colonial and the Mughal periods. Praetorianism cannot be applied to grasp the cultural ethos which evolved over centuries in the colonial and pre-colonial era, when there was no praetorianism.

To comprehend the cultural ethos of Pakistan beyond ideology, personality, institution, and colonial or neo-colonial context, there is need to reach the fundamentals of the existing socio-political values and behavior. The researcher has demonstrated through discourse analysis of media text and statistical analysis of a detailed questionnaire that it is the cultural ethos of parasitic landlordism which as a heuristic tool can lead to proper and comprehensive understanding of Pakistani culture and the way it has influenced and shaped religious political and media discourse.

Mass media, Islamic ideology, political system, intellectual discourse, democracy, social set up, status of women, institutional weakness, lack of social differentiation, economic and industrial development or lack of it, leadership, and education can be explained and understood with reference to parasitic landlordism, which, in case of Pakistan, is the predominant ingredient of all of them. Patrimonialism, praetorianism, and colonialism can also be

subsumed under the cultural ethos of parasitic landlordism. The neo-colonialism approach however can not be brought squarely under the rubric of parasitic landlordism, because, basically it tries to grasp local cultural reality from without, in a global context. The present study, on the other hand, has attempted to explain and understand Pakistani culture and society from within and has referred to the links of the establishment with the capitalist metropolitan only in passing.

Patrimonialism or Bonapartism of Z.A. Bhutto, or praetorianism of Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haque, either directly grew out of the political cultural ethos of parasitic landlordism, or got influenced by it. Ayub's modernism and liberalism, Bhutto's Islamic-socialism and Zia's Islamization all succumbed to the overwhelming weight of the parasitic cultural ethos.

A number of writers (Gardezi 1991, 1983; Sayeed 1980, 1968; M. Ahmed, 1982, T. Ali, 1979, 1970; Alvi 1989; and Lodhi, 1980) have analyzed Pakistani society from the perspective of colonialism and neo-colonialism and have argued that the military, the civil bureaucracy and the landlords, the three last colonial outposts, have been following the political culture of their colonial masters in ruling the country. There was a set tradition, a tested model successfully implemented by the colonizers which could be followed. While there is little doubt in the validity of this argument, it fails to explain political overlordship of the military and civil

bureaucracy in the post independence period, and the tendency among the rulers to acquire absolute power without responsibility and accountability. Secondly, it does not account for the divergent course of development in India and Pakistan, both of whom inherited the same colonial tradition and model. In fact, India should have been more prone to follow the colonial model than Pakistan, because she donned the mantle of the colonial power in trying to attain preeminence in the region. In broader context Pakistan was only a break away part of the Indian subcontinent. Why, then Pakistan followed the so called colonial model of rulership, and India followed the democratic path-- also a colonial heritage. It only indicates that the roots of Pakistan's political culture are to be traced beyond the colonial heritage.

Penetration of the capitalist mode of production and the impact of direct colonial rule came much later to the Pakistani parts of the Raj (Punjab was the last to fall in 1849). Also, these areas were on the frontiers of the Empire, and for security reasons on the border areas the colonizers did not want to disturb the existing system beyond a certain point. Their traditional tribal, feudal ways were not uprooted, as in southern and eastern parts for integration into the capitalist mode of production. Their economies were not transformed into mercantile and industrial economies; nor did there grow an educated urban class of merchants and professionals, as it did in the big business and commercial centers in other parts of India. The members of this class became well

versed with the ways of capitalism, and developed political consciousness when they suffered in uneven competition with the industrialized England, or when they flourished as retailers of British industrial products⁴. The sense of business competition, social differentiation, economic deprivation and affluence, and political awareness, experienced by the traders, merchants, and industrialists in the big commercial/ industrial centers, under the direct impact of capitalism was not shared by the dominant class of the landlords or the dominated class of the peasants in the Pakistani areas. In the Pakistani areas the colonial power strengthened land relations by granting proprietary rights, mostly to a new class of landlords, and transformed land into a commodity. This gave full control to the landlords and tribal chiefs over the local affairs and the people. It also generated a strong sense of loyalty among the landlords toward the Raj. It is not an accident that on the eve of independence Punjab was the only province where pro-Raj Unionist Party, an exclusive club of the Punjabi landlords, was in power. So in one sense at least it was not penetration of capitalist mode of production, and the colonial rule, rather the lack (not absence) of it which strengthened parasitic landlordism.

Under the colonial rule the spheres of military and civil authority were clearly defined, and separated from each other. Military remained under civilian control, except for the early period of the British East India Company rule, when the same person was appointed to administer political and military affairs.

Military organization and professional matters were left to the military, with the civilians performing audit functions and controlling military expenditure. The separation of powers, with the civil authority exercising overall control, worked almost without any serious problem. There was only one instance when the Commander-in-Chief Kitchner demanded that the post of the Military Member of the Viceroy's Council be abolished, because, the member who used to be junior in rank to the Commander-in-Chief could over rule him as member of the Council. This was more a procedural dispute than a substantive one. When it was decided by the Home Government in London, in favor of Kitchner, Viceroy Curzon resigned. With this one exception, ultimate civilian control of military was always exercised without problem. Referring to this President Ayub Khan, the first military ruler of Pakistan has proudly mentioned in his autobiography (1967) that the Pakistan Army "inherited a great tradition of loyalty, patriotism and complete subordination to civil authority." Talking about the non-politicization of the Army Ayub said, the Muslim officers had "an instinctive sympathy" for Jinnah and Pakistan, and yet, adds Stephen Cohen, "Hindus and Muslims in the officers corps remained remarkably free of pro or anti Pakistan sentiments until partition, when likelihood of Pakistan became a certainty". In this background it is not easy to blame the colonial and neo-colonial heritage for praetorianism in Pakistan.

Similarly civil bureaucracy despite its vast powers, lack of

accountability to political leadership and a sort of advisory political role, did not assume political leadership and decision making which remained the prerogative of the Viceroy, or the elected government in London. The civil servants in Pakistan became Governor Generals (post-colonial equivalent of the Viceroy), and Presidents without facing the electorate. Instead of following the democratic elected governments, in the British tradition, they often dismissed them, and reshuffled them like a pack of cards.

The Viceroy who is supposed to be a model of patrimonialism did not enjoy absolute power as desired and exercised by many of the post-colonial rulers in Pakistan. The Viceroy's purse was controlled by the Secretary India Office in London; he could be forced to resign by the elected government (as Curzon did in 1905). It is hard to find a parallel example in the political history of Pakistan. The Viceregal authority and pomp must have inspired a sense of awe in the minds of the people and the local political leaders. The Viceregal model influenced the leadership style in Pakistan and led it toward undemocratic way. The same did not happen in India, because their leadership did not have the cultural ethos of parasitic landlordism to support patrimonial version of Viceregal model. Sovereign Pakistan had parasitic landlordism at the basis of its political culture on which Bonapartism and patrimonialism of Bhutto and praetorianism of Ayub and Zia could be built. This base was weak in India and whatever influence it had was wiped out through land reforms. Hence, patrimonialism,

Bonapartism and praetorianism are only the trappings of parasitic cultural ethos, which has thwarted all efforts to introduce any meaningful land reforms, or impose agricultural income tax. Land possession and ownership is so deep in the psyche of the people of Pakistan that the claim to political leadership has to be in proportion to the quantity and quality of landownership. He who rules the land, owns it, and he who owns the land must rule it.

This traditional background gives a sort of legitimacy to political leadership of the landlords. In those area of Pakistan (e.g. central Punjab) where the quantity of land ownership has reduced through successive land distribution in inheritance, a differentiated political culture has failed to take roots, because the parasitic ethos is still influential. Nawaz Sharif a modern industrialist rose to power but could not maintain it because his mercantile industrialist ethos came into conflict with the parasitic cultural ethos of the bureaucrat President and the land owner members of the Parliament. He tried to evolve a style of leadership which imbibed negative aspects of parasitic ethos, like personalization of every decision, but could neither convince the old guards of the parasitic ethos that he was one of one them, nor he could assert his differentiated mercantile/ industrial ethos sufficiently enough to affect a change in the structural balance.

Traditions weigh heavily in favor of the landowners. It is a matter of everyone's observation that in the 28% urban centers

political leadership has always changed hands among diverse personalities and families. But in the 68% rural areas dominated by the parasitic landlords political leadership has never been effectively challenged by a person other than the landlord. In the rural areas democracy and elections have been a contest for power among the selected few families and in many cases among the members of the same family. The pattern has remained uninterrupted right from the time the idea of election was introduced by the colonized masters in early twentieth century. It is virtually impossible for a 'non-landlord' to convince the voter not to vote for the landlord. Because in the scheme of the ordinary rural voter it is the landlord who protects him against the state functionaries (mostly police), and the local rivals. A 'non-landlord' will not be able to ward off the state functionaries, or help him against his enemies. In many cases the landlord uses his contacts with the police, first to harass the landless or small landowners, and then pretend to come to their help after they have fallen in line. This stage managed network of reward and punishment forces the voter in the rural areas to opt for one landlord or the other, but not for the 'non-landlord'. It is not just the negative aspect of reprisals and harassment which wins vote for the landlord, he is also supported by the tradition which accords more respect to the landowner than to the landless. This makes the big landowner a 'natural' leader of his tenants, and smaller landowners. There is also a sense of community among the landowners and the voters which has evolved over a long period of time by living together in the

same place, which cannot be challenged by a non-resident or a non-landlord.

Like politics, religion or say state ideology is also subservient to parasitic landlordism. In the overall political lordship of the landowner it is not possible for any opinion leader the *Maulvi* or the teacher (who are mostly landless) to emerge prominently. Restriction on literacy is the first step in arresting intellectual discourse. Religion which generates ideas of liberty and equality of mankind, which calls for political action, which questions the existing socio-political structure is not allowed to spread in the areas under the direct control of the landlord. Religion in the parasitic ethos is part of the folkways which reinforce the tradition of landownership. In many cases where the landlord also has a spiritual lineage, particularly among the *syeds* (descendants of the Holy Prophet), secular political power and religious leadership are combined into one. As Kurin (1985) observed, "The *Maulvi*, and even the revered *pirs* (spiritual leaders) are not central, in specific ways, to practical village affairs. Islam, Kurin adds, is an expression of identity, an idiom of morality, and a source of legitimacy. It is viewed as a core symbol, not as a theology, a philosophy, or a body of practices, moral injunctions, or legal doctrines, and certainly not as a social order promulgated by the current government" (Zia regime). The scholastic and politicized religion is limited to the urban area among the middle and lower middle classes.

Without going into details the researcher wants to raise a hypothetical questions and then give a speculative answer which may be investigated in subsequent researches. Suppose Pakistan tries to become a truly Islamic state, or a real socialist/ communist state, or a genuinely capitalist state with free market economy; who suffers and who gains? My speculative answer is that under any of these systems the parasitic establishment is likely to lose and would resist the efforts to transform the existing structure in any way other than the existing one.

It has been argued in the preceding chapters that the ruling elite has imposed an "immobility syndrome" because any structural change is likely to affect the establishment adversely. When we say that the parasitic interests of the ruling elite are being served best under the existing system and any structural change, whether brought in deliberately or forced in by default, would affect them adversely, does it mean the establishment is running out of options? Whether this immobility syndrome indicates that the establishment is running out of options or is likely to reach the dead end in the near future is not clear, what is obvious, however, is that the grip of the establishment is not likely to relax anytime soon, at least not by will and design. There is a real danger that the structure might collapse under the ever increasing weight and appetite of the parasite and correspondingly depleting energy and resources of the soil and society. The longer it has lasted the more difficult it is becoming for them to change the

structure. As Dixon says, "An inability to admit one has been in the wrong will be greater, the more wrong one has been, and the more wrong one has been, the more bizarre will be subsequent attempts to justify the unjustifiable (Dixon, 1976:166).

Leadership nurtured in the parasitic cultural ethos need large number of illiterate masses on whom they can rule, who can fulfill their parasitic needs, who can vote for them, who can follow them and who would seek their help and favor for their daily needs. But there is a danger that 3.2% population growth among 120 million people might engulf the whole system and push the situation to a dangerous course. Population control follows greater differentiation, more education, free market economy and modernity as it has happened in the Western capitalist societies. A similar trend has been witnessed among the those Turkish families who are living in differentiated urban centers and are actively involved in a competitive free market economy syndrome. These families find it difficult to have more than one or two children because they fear losing out in the race for better living. But then, short term parasitic interests are at odd with differentiation, education, free market economy and modernity. It is therefore not likely that the trend in population increase would be reversed any time soon. Hence unchecked population increase is a potential source of change, but also a real threat to the resources of the country and its future socio-economic progress.

The same is true about political stability. An elected government which has to face the electorate after a given period of time would need to bring change, however spurious, in favor of the people. If this system stabilizes successive elected governments would vie with each other in promising more and better for the masses, and would try to achieve it however unwillingly. But a stable democratic order would eventually harm the interests of the parasitic elite by changing the existing structure, gradually. So instability of democratic order suits the narrow selfish interests of the establishment by preventing any change.

Political stability under an electoral system, calls for institution building, which in turn leads to following procedures and processes. 'Institutions, by their very nature, function as systems of constraint upon the ruler who would act outside the established law and procedure. (Such a leader) does not, therefore, want to allow the institutions he has built or inherited to gather strength enough to restrain him (Syed, 1992:4). This goes against the parasitic ethos of absolute power concentrated in one individual who owns the land, and is entitled to manage it without any interference. Since landlord is the absolute owner of the land nothing can be allowed to exist on that land which is above the landowner. An institution, a procedure, a law, or a system which exists above the landowner, and which he is obliged to follow is an affront to his landlordism. He would follow it only if he can not help it, as for example under the colonial rule. His authoritarian

personality follows the superior authority, but, given a chance he is always keen to trample over anything which interferes with his inalienable proprietary rights.

Civil bureaucracy and military are the two institutions which the colonial masters had built to run the colony effectively and efficiently. Today these two institutions are neither in a position to ensure law and order, nor run the system efficiently and effectively. Their institutional strength and efficacy to perform their institutional role has declined. Even a military ruler, or a bureaucrat ruler does not or cannot run the country within the institutional ethos. He too wants to personalize the institution when he assumes political power and tends to assert his proprietary rights on the institution and the country. To substantiate this hypothesis reference can be made to the rule of Ishaq Khan, Zia-ul-Haque, Ayub Khan, Sikandar Mirza and Ghulam Muhammad, all of who harmed and maligned the civil and military institutions from which they hailed.

Not only that old institutions have declined and no new institutions have been built under the cultural ethos of parasitic landlordism, a sense of community and nation has weakened over the years. Today's Pakistan is divided on ethnic and sectarian lines at the expense of community and nation. Charisma and statesmanship of Jinnah was enough to galvanize a community, awake a sense of nationhood and win a sovereign nation state but the leadership

which followed him could not institutionalize the sense of community and nationhood. The basic questions like federal structure, national language and the place of religion in the polity were not faced squarely, nor settled even after the break up of the country and the adoption of a unanimous constitution.

If experience of the last eight years (1987-1994) is anything to go by, the ruling triumvirate remains well entrenched. Despite some increase in autonomy and freedom since 1985 (more by default than by design) the press and democracy continue to live in the 'intensive care' under the watchful eyes of the ruling triumvirate. Dismissal of three elected governments (Junejo 1988, Benazir 1990, and Nawaz Shairf 1993, when the latter was re-instated by the Supreme Court he was 'persuaded' by the Armed Forces to resign 'voluntarily') in the post Martial Law period shows continuous strength of the establishment. But frequent resort to dismissals also betrays a veiled sense of frustration in their efforts to secure their interests under an elected democratic set up. So despite overwhelming weight of the establishment there is potential for change in the society, which may come in through unexpected ways. Unchecked population growth is one such factor, but it should be viewed more as a danger to the socio-political than a positive agent of change.

Commenting on the 'voluntary resignation' of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and President Ishaq Khan on the 'persuasion' of the

Army generals in 1993, Lawrence Ziring (1993:1175) said that the resignation of President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, a personification of the establishment, indicates that Pakistan has entered the second phase of its political history, by marking an end to the predominance of the establishment. He thinks, "The elections of 1988, 1990, and 1993 were initiated by and a consequence of administrative fiat but their cumulative impact set a course for Pakistani politics that now cannot be reversed by the self-proclaimed guardians of the country's fundamental interest."

"The intervention by the Pakistan Supreme Court, Ziring adds, "through its order that the Nawaz government be reinstated somewhat neutralized the President's extraordinary powers under the Eighth Amendment. When the court ruled that the President had acted outside his constitutional prerogatives and ordered the reinstatement, the judiciary not only displayed unusual courage but also gave still another sign that the steel frame of civil-military administration had been hollowed out and that it no longer commanded the country's decision-making processes. Moreover, while the court judgement might have exposed Benazir to ridicule as a crass opportunist, the force of the tribunal's order fell more heavily on the bureaucracy and its preeminent representative President Ghulam Ishaq..... Nawaz symbolized the new political forces unleashed in the country, and those forces demanded a fundamental rearrangement of political institution that could only be achieved with the diminution of the traditional role played by

the civil-military bureaucracy.

"Even more than Nawaz Sharif's resignation Ghulam Ishaq's decision to step down signified the further weakening of a rusted steel frame that could only be saved by political renovation. It also raised the interesting possibility that Pakistani Viceregalism had become dysfunctional."

Be it as it may, Ziring's optimism seems a bit exaggerated. Struggle for power is still remains within the establishment, and the popular will remains marginal. Benazir and Nawaz have been swapped by the establishment, and not by the internal dynamics of a democratic system. It was military, the most powerful segment of the establishment, which persuaded Ishaq Khan to resign only when Nawaz Sharif made his 'voluntary' resignation conditional with simultaneous resignation of Ishaq Khan. Both Benazir and Nawaz Sharif were forced out when they tried to change the structural balance, not because of any better morality but because they were expecting to go back to the electorate, and this prospects required them to do some homework. In case of Nawaz Sharif his background as an industrialist/ businessman made an additional difference in favor of structural change. Now Benazir is in power with the overt support of the same elements who had brought Nawaz Sharif to power, viz. the military, the civil bureaucracy, the landlords, and the ulama-- the reserve force of the establishment.

"The steel frame⁵" of the ruling triumvirate has not been "hollowed out" nor it is "rusted" as yet, as Ziring (1993:1178) believes but it does seem to have got more restricted options now than ever before to maintain its grip on the power structure. Recurrent resort to the same tactics for the last more than four decades (1951-1993) has exposed the real selfish intent of the ruling triumvirate, at least to the educated minority, mostly in the urban and semi-urban centers. A combination of historical experience, economic stagnation, and above all demographic explosion are, apparently, proving too much for the establishment to continue with the same for a long time to come. There is a likelihood of transformation of the "administrative state structure" first adumbrated in the emerging discourse of dissent in the Pakistan media since the end of the last military regime in 1988. The press continues to depend on state patronage to flourish, but over the last few years Pakistani press has attained a certain level of autonomy; and its discourse is showing encouraging signs of movement towards acquiring a locus standi of its own. This assertion need not give the impression that the power structure has transformed or is in the process of transformation, it is only likely to transform, for good or for worse, depending how the conflicting interests of the agents of the status quo and the forces of change unfold themselves in the coming years.

Before concluding this chapter the researcher would like to make some observations about the theoretical-methodological

approach employed in this thesis, and then look at the options available, at the present moment, to the agents of status quo and the forces of change.

At theoretical-methodological level it is proposed that the cultural ethos of parasitic landlordism, which forms the basis of social, religious, political and media discourse may be explored further to look into the possibility of subsuming the neo-colonial approach in the study of Pakistani culture and society, or some approach may be evolved to amend for this flaw.

To comprehend the cultural of Pakistan in a larger perspective the discourse analysis of media texts alone is not enough. There is need to study the poetic and literary discourse, as well, both in Urdu and in the regional languages, where I think the discourse of dissent is more vibrant. There is no mass media equivalent of Iqbal and Faiz.

The ruling elite or the status quo group remains the ultimate force in the socio-political discourse, but its options are being restricted by a number of factors. The failure of Pakistani politics lies above everything else in the failure of leadership. In the absence of any visible and effective political movement and intellectual discourse of change it is expected that the leadership in the foreseeable future would continue to emerge from within the parasitic cultural ethos. One may hope against hope that a

proponent of the agents of status quo with exceptional qualities of leadership would one day either reconstruct the establishment, or be able to convince them to transform themselves by making them aware of their larger and long term class and individual interests attached to change and than to the status quo. In view of the past experiences this is rather unlikely. It is like waiting for the promised Messiah.

There is a more mundane option, which is also more practicable, to let the economic forces in the private sector assert themselves in tapping the human and material resources for economic and human development. In case of economic transformation the example of Turkish polity and society may be found relevant, with some reservations, of course. The principles of free market economy, would act as a catalyst for stronger democracy, greater freedom of thought and expression, and create greater economic dependency of the federating units, and thereby strengthen the federation. Economic interests, supplemented by state ideology can generate greater national cohesion than long speeches by political leaders. Without referring to the results of our survey it is an obvious fact that the basic problem of the people in Pakistan is economic, and not social or ideological. Once a beginning is made in addressing this problem, not through lofty promises of party manifestoes, but through the self propelled activity of the private sector, the people would find higher personal stakes involved in the system. It is also obvious that state cannot run the economy

efficiently, nor it can act as a model by launching its own projects first, and then let the private sector follow it. Because the public sector, instead of becoming a leader and a model grows into a vested interest and smothers private incentive of profit. The state should provide only security of life and property to the investor, and build infrastructure; the rest can be taken care of by the forces generated by the private sector. Stronger private sector would need more and better educated and trained people and invest in education, as well. Greater economic activity would attract the young into those sectors where they can prove their talent, earn more and live better. It would detract them from seeking naked power through the state controlled systems and organizations like the military and the civil services. The trend among the youth to prefer engagement in productive economic activity in the private sector to seeking jobs in civil and military establishments is evident in the fast developing Muslim countries like Turkey and Malaysia, and the developed countries of the West and Japan.

To do this the first step is to treat agricultural sector at par with business and industry. Agricultural land should be managed as a viable, profitable business concern and not as a source of social and political control. When subjected to income tax etc. only then the landlord would make effort to maximize his agricultural out put, by improving agricultural machinery, seeds, water management and human development. This would force them to

utilize state subsidies and loans to attain better and higher farm yield, and not to waste them on guns, banglows, and women.

At intellectual level we need to get rid of the 'magian overlayings'⁶ (Iqbal, 1976) of history which support dictators and de facto rulers, clings to dysfunctional traditions because it serves the interests of certain classes.

The establishment has long 'monopolized the entire system of representation' (Said, 1993:25), both political and intellectual it is time that the free floaters of Pakistani polity assert themselves and forget about their petty selfish interests being served under parasitic landlordism. As opinion leaders they should become the 'apostles of radicalism and intellectual insurgency' (Said, 1993:26). Will they??

Notes

1. It is an obvious fact that the bigger the land holdings, the lower the literacy rate. Literacy rate is the lowest in the Saraiky areas of Punjab, interior Sindh, and Baluchistan, which are dominated by the landlords. Literacy rate is the highest in Karachi, where landlords are non existent. In their scheme of things knowledge is dangerous, because it is likely to tell the student that the landlord is not the lord of the realm.

2. Writing about a sophisticated, otherwise well mannered and modern educated urbane landlord, Oriana Fallaci (1976:185) says, "Or else Bhutto making people wait for hours in a courtyard in Hala; the city notables are there but he lingers in his room-- he is writing. It is night when he finally arrives advancing like a prince on the beautiful carpets, and like a prince he sits down. Thus seated, he receives in audience members of his party, governors, separatist, one by one, with a haughty signal of his

finger".

3. G. Roth and A. Zolberg (1968) are among the first scholars to use this term and it has been applied to the study of Pakistan with reference to Bhutto era in a doctoral dissertation submitted by Maliha Lodhi (1980), at the London University.

4. This class today constitutes the backbone of Indian middle class. Barbara Crossette, author of "India Facing Twenty First Century", said in an interview with the CNN Business Asia on April 15, 1994, that India would have a middle class of two hundred and fifty million people by the early twenty first century. Which is more than double the size of Pakistan's total population, today. The same class is, to an extent, responsible for the continuation of democratic process.

5. The expression has been often used to refer to the role and structure of the British Indian Civil Service (ICS), and the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), which ran colonial and then neo-colonial administration with remarkable efficiency. They perpetuated undemocratic regimes, maintained law and order, without public participation, and kept the specialists and experts under their control in a 'generalist' version of administration. For details please see Carnelius Report-1969 on public administration in Pakistan.

6. Iqbal has used this expression to separate the pristine purity of Islam, as it was revealed and practiced among the Arabs, from the Scholastic Islam as it was interpreted and practiced by the non-Arabs (especially the Persians).

Abdullah Yusuf Ali has translated the Quranic expression (22:17) '*al-Majus*' as 'the Magians'. In his Commentary of the Quran, he says, "This is the only place where the Magians (*Majus*) are mentioned in the Quran. Their cult is a very ancient one. They consider Fire as the purest and noblest element, and worship it as a fit emblem of God. Their location was the Persia and Median upland and the Mesopotamian valley. Their religion was reformed by the Prophet Zardusht (date uncertain, about BC 600?). Their scripture is the Zend-Avesta, the bible of the Parsis. They were "the Wise men of the East" mentioned in the Gospels.



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Appendix-I

**Questionnaire (English) For The Journalists/
Academics In Pakistan**



APPENDIX - I
Questionnaire for the Journalists/Academics in Pakistan

Mass Media in the Politics of a
Developing Muslim Society:
Pakistan.
Questionnaire
For Journalists in Pakistan

POLITICS:

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Answer
1. Islam is the inalienable part of Pakistani politics.	01 ()	()	()	()	()	()
2. There is, however, a difference of opinion between the Ulama and the modern educated leaders and intellectuals, on the interpretation and the role of Islam, in Pakistan.	02 ()	()	()	()	()	()
3. The Ulama had rejected Western style political institutions, when they were first introduced by the Britishers.	03 ()	()	()	()	()	()
4. Later, however, they started taking part in politics, by making political parties, contesting elections etc.	04 ()	()	()	()	()	()
5. The Ulama, thereby, seem to have accepted the Western style politics and its institutions.	05 ()	()	()	()	()	()
6. The Ulama had never strived to assume political leadership and power in the Muslim Empires.	06 ()	()	()	()	()	()
7. They confronted the ruler only, when they felt that he had deviated too far e.g. Ahmed Sirhindi's revolt against Akbar.	07 ()	()	()	()	()	()
8. Now they are in active politics, because, they feel that by rejecting modern ways of politics they had been losing their traditional importance in state and society.	08 ()	()	()	()	()	()
9. At the same time they have come to realize that modern political system offers an opportunity- they never had before- to contend for the highest political office.	09 ()	()	()	()	()	()
10. Ulama's active role in politics has, only, enhanced their nuisance value.	10 ()	()	()	()	()	()
11. Their role in active politics has, made a positive contribution in articulating Pakistan's political ethos.	11 ()	()	()	()	()	()
12. Growing political strength of religious leaders, has restricted freedom of thought and action, for the journalists and intellectuals.	12 ()	()	()	()	()	()
13. Freedom of thought and action has been curtailed more by the ruling elite than by the politicization of the Ulama.	13 ()	()	()	()	()	()

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Answer
14. Politicized religion has been foisted, more by the ruling elite than by the Ulama.	14 ()	()	()	()	()	()
15. With a view to divert public and media attention from the real political and economic issues.	15 ()	()	()	()	()	()
Imam's Social Status and Education:						
16. Because of feudal and tribal systems religious leaders do not command respect, worthy of an 'alim'.	16 ()	()	()	()	()	()
17. Students in religious institutions live on charity, which breeds a sense of inferiority among them.	17 ()	()	()	()	()	()
18. The Ulama meet a part of their expenses on political activities from the charity income.	18 ()	()	()	()	()	()
19. It is unfair to spend charity income on political activities.	19 ()	()	()	()	()	()
20. The students in religious educational institutions should be familiar with modern social and physical sciences, as well.	20 ()	()	()	()	()	()
21. This would detract them from their religious vocation, they should, therefore, concentrate on their traditional disciplines, only.	21 ()	()	()	()	()	()
22. Modern Western thought should not be taught in religious schools, until its proper Islamic critique has been developed, like the one put forth by Imam Ghazali and others in the case of the Greek thought.	22 ()	()	()	()	()	()
23. The government should have similar control over the curricula and finances of religious educational institutions, as it has over all other, public and private educational institutions.	23 ()	()	()	()	()	()
24. The government should have no control, on the curricula of any educational institution.	24 ()	()	()	()	()	()
25. Government financial control should be limited, only to those educational institutions which receive government assistance.	25 ()	()	()	()	()	()

PAKISTAN MOVEMENT: THE RELIGIOUS FACTOR.

- 26. Pakistan had been demanded to create an Islamic state. 26 () () () () () ()
- 27. Pakistan was not conceived as an Islamic state. Islam had been used to win popular support. 27 () () () () () ()
- 28. Islam as a state ideology has been invented after the creation of Pakistan. 28 () () () () () ()
- 29. The use of religious idiom and the Ulama (both by the Congress and the Muslim League) in the Independence Movement led to the Ulama's entry into modern politics. 29 () () () () () ()
- 30. Religionization of politics and politicization of religion is the logical outcome of the Two Nations Theory. 30 () () () () () ()
- 31. The Two Nations Theory had been opposed by most of the Ulama but today they pose to be the true guardians of the Ideology of Pakistan. 31 () () () () () ()
- 32. They had to change their approach because they understood the implications and meanings of the Two Nations Theory after the event. 32 () () () () () ()
- 33. They had to change their approach because they found their class interest better served by championing the cause of Islam as state ideology. 33 () () () () () ()

Mass Media:

- 34. Today's newspapers carry more pictures and statements by the Ulama than they used to have in the forties and the forties. 34 () () () () () ()
- 35. When the 'fatwas' against films and photographs were issued, the Ulama had failed to perceive the future importance and usefulness of these scientific inventions. 35 () () () () () ()
- 36. By opposing pictorial coverage, first in the print and later in the visual media, the Muslims lagged behind in effective projection of their point of view. 36 () () () () () ()
- 37. This approach of initial rejection and late acceptance of new inventions and practices has inhibited the urge to invent and innovate among the Muslims. 37 () () () () () ()
- 38. In this age of global communication it has become virtually impossible to protect our children against the effects of global media. 38 () () () () () ()

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Answer
39. The protection of our children against ever growing violence and obscenity in the world media, lies in better training and education of our children, and not in state censorship.	39 ()	()	()	()	()	()
40. The press, particularly the Urdu newspapers, played with religious sentiments of the people and projected the Ulama as the true spokesmen of Islam and the Two Nation Theory.	40 ()	()	()	()	()	()
41. The ruling elite exploited religious feelings of the people to further their own political ends; the press and the Ulama proved only instrumental in the process.	41 ()	()	()	()	()	()
42. The press, thus, by and large failed to play its role as the fourth estate.	42 ()	()	()	()	()	()
43. The press has been a willing or unwitting tool in the hands of the ruling elite.	43 ()	()	()	()	()	()
44. The alleged failure of the press is more due to long dictatorial rule than its being a willing or unwitting tool in the hands of the ruling elite.	44 ()	()	()	()	()	()
45. Despite undemocratic regimes the Press has played its due role.	45 ()	()	()	()	()	()
46. Faced with the choice of 'extinction or survival' the press had to be cautious, in playing its due role.	46 ()	()	()	()	()	()
47. This preoccupation with 'survival' made the main stream press subservient to the interests of the government.	47 ()	()	()	()	()	()
48. Even under democracy, despite relaxation in administrative control, the Government retains financial control over the newspapers, through the distribution of advertisements.	48 ()	()	()	()	()	()
49. This hold can be relaxed, only if trade and industry flourish, in the private sector.	49 ()	()	()	()	()	()
50. The ruling elite, therefore, does not want an industrial society, nor the resultant free press in Pakistan.	50 ()	()	()	()	()	()
51. Pakistani newspapers are biased against the Ulama and do not portray them in a positive light.	51 ()	()	()	()	()	()
52. This bias is particularly strong in the English press.	52 ()	()	()	()	()	()
53. The press has accorded unbiased coverage to the Ulama.	53 ()	()	()	()	()	()
54. In editorials, however, the press has, generally, expressed its reservations about the Ulama's political ambitions.	54 ()	()	()	()	()	()

- 55. Freedom of expression is a prerequisite for democracy.
- 56. Freedom of expression is guaranteed in Islam.
- 57. In an Islamic government, freedom of expression should be subject to review by the Ulama.
- 58. This would empower the Ulama to impose a virtual censorship.
- 59. Freedom of expression should be subject only to the statutory laws to be interpreted by the courts, alone.

THE WEST AND THE MUSLIM SOCIETY:

- 60. The Ulama are not as important in the state structure and social organization, today, as they used to be in the Umayyad, Abbaside, and Ottoman Empires.
- 61. Primary reason for this decline in importance is that the Ulama could not offer a viable alternative to the Western ideas and technology.
- 62. The Ulama had studied and refuted the Greek thought, when it posed a challenge to the Islamic thought.
- 63. The same tradition has not been followed in the study and refutation of the Western thought, in modern times.
- 64. The Western onslaught was so intense and unexpected that it caught the Ulama unprepared.
- 65. And they have still not recovered from this lag.
- 66. The Ulama have been opposed to modern education.
- 67. But could not put forth an alternative to cope with challenge from the West.
- 68. Instead of considering the practical benefits of modern scientific inventions, the Ulama are still debating whether to accept or reject, the big strides made by the West in knowledge, science, and technology, on religious grounds.
- 69. The Ulama have been accepting modern means of mass media and the rules of modern politics after rejecting them first on religious grounds.
- 70. This acceptance came about only when they felt that they were being left out of the main stream of the society.

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Answer
55 ()	()	()	()	()	()	()
56 ()	()	()	()	()	()	()
57 ()	()	()	()	()	()	()
58 ()	()	()	()	()	()	()
59 ()	()	()	()	()	()	()
60 ()	()	()	()	()	()	()
61 ()	()	()	()	()	()	()
62 ()	()	()	()	()	()	()
63 ()	()	()	()	()	()	()
64 ()	()	()	()	()	()	()
65 ()	()	()	()	()	()	()
66 ()	()	()	()	()	()	()
67 ()	()	()	()	()	()	()
68 ()	()	()	()	()	()	()
69 ()	()	()	()	()	()	()
70 ()	()	()	()	()	()	()

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Answer
71. In this regard, their first reaction is prompt rejection, followed by acceptance, which often comes late.	71 ()	()	()	()	()	()
72. This approach has put the Muslim societies, permanently, at the receiving end.	72 ()	()	()	()	()	()
73. They no more initiate and invent, they only react.	73 ()	()	()	()	()	()
74. The Ulama have lagged far too behind to be able to contribute anything positive in the evolution of a Muslim society in modern times.	74 ()	()	()	()	()	()
75. They should, therefore, be ignored in the process of national development.	75 ()	()	()	()	()	()
76. Despite their inability to understand the modern world the Ulama are still influential, and can not be ignored.	76 ()	()	()	()	()	()
77. Their advice and cooperation should be sought, or we would suffer a total break with the past.	77 ()	()	()	()	()	()
78. The best option would be a situation, wherein the educational schism between modern, traditional and religious education is bridged.	78 ()	()	()	()	()	()
79. The Ulama have always discouraged innovative thinking.	79 ()	()	()	()	()	()
80. With the decline of Muslim power and the rise of the West their attitude has become more negative than ever before, about every new idea and practice.	80 ()	()	()	()	()	()
RELIGIOUS REVIVALISM:						
81. The Islamic Revivalist Movement, dubbed as fundamentalism by the West, is a response to Western hegemony.	81 ()	()	()	()	()	()
82. Religious revivalism is an old Islamic tradition, and the current revivalist movement is continuation of the same.	82 ()	()	()	()	()	()
83. It is both a response to Western hegemony, and the result of internal dynamics of the Muslim history and society.	83 ()	()	()	()	()	()
84. Ijtihad had been declared practically closed because the Ulama feared it would be abused in the time of Muslim decline.	84 ()	()	()	()	()	()
85. As compared to the days when Ijtihad had been declared closed, the situation of the Muslim people has improved.	85 ()	()	()	()	()	()

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	No Answer
36. Ijtehad can, therefore, be exercised.	86 ()	()	()	()	()	()
37. Although the Ulama have chosen to keep Ijtehad closed, yet the Muslim society is changing with the passage of time, and a number of new ideas and practices are being accepted or rejected without 'Ijtehad' support of the Ulama.	87 ()	()	()	()	()	()
38. Under the circumstances the Ulama have been losing their traditional prestige which they used to enjoy because of their learned status and the prerogative of Ijtehad.	88 ()	()	()	()	()	()
39. Declining prestige forced the Ulama to enter politics.	89 ()	()	()	()	()	()
30. A Parliament elected by the Muslim voters can exercise the right of Ijtehad.	90 ()	()	()	()	()	()
31. Ijtehad is the prerogative of the Ulama alone, therefore, an elected Parliament can not exercise the right of Ijtehad.	91 ()	()	()	()	()	()
32. A Parliament elected by the Muslim voters may exercise the right of Ijtehad, in the guidance of the Ulama.	92 ()	()	()	()	()	()
33. The Muslim Ummah has been divided into different nation states and they follow policies which best suit their national interests. Under the circumstances each Muslim state is free to exercise Ijtehad in matters relating to that country.	93 ()	()	()	()	()	()
34. So long as the Muslim people remain divided along national boundaries, they can not claim the right to Ijtehad.	94 ()	()	()	()	()	()
35. The concepts of Ijtehad and Ijma are relevant only in the context of the Ummah, and not in nation states.	95 ()	()	()	()	()	()
MISCELLANEOUS:						
96. Which is the number one problem of Pakistan, today, in the following fields:	96.					
1. Economic						
2. Social						
3. Political						
97. Which country can be taken as a good model for Pakistan; or there is none?	97.					

98. Please mark six of the following factors which have been inhibiting your objectivity, as a professional writer/newsman. The most important one may be marked as No.1 and the least important as No.6.

98.

- A. State ideology.
- B. State laws.
- C. Foreign policy.
- D. Policy of the newspaper/publisher.
- E. Reaction from religious leaders.
- F. Threat to personal security from government sources.
- G. Threat to personal security from other sources.
- H. Personal ideological leanings.

99. The following space may please be used to express your opinion on any subject, relevant to this research program.

99.

Part Two

Some Socio-Biographical Questions

01. Name and address: (leave it blank if you wish)
02. Age:
03. Education:
 1. The institution(s) attended for school education.
 2. The institution(s) attended for higher education.
04. Your highest academic degree is:
 - i. Ph.D. ii. Master iii. Bachelor iv. Intermediate
 - v. Matric vi. Munshi Fazil vii. Other
05. You were active in politics as a student? Yes. No.
06. Profession:
07. When did you enter this profession.
08. Your profession is---
 1. the only source of income
 2. the major source of income
 3. a supplementary source of income
09. Other sources of income include:
 1. Agriculture 2. Urban property 3. Shares/ bonds etc.
 4. Publications 5. Pension 6. Other
10. Which of the followings you, your wife or the children own:
 1. House 2. Shop 3. Office 4. Car
 5. Shares/Bonds 6. Telephone 7. Photo copier 8. Fax
9. Air conditioner 10. Movie camera 11. Agricultural land

11. Did you change profession? Yes. No
12. If yes, what was the reason(s):
 1. Economic 2. Social 3. Aptitude
13. What is your area of academic/ professional interest.
 1..... 2..... 3.....
14. Names of the institutions where your children are or have been studying. (give at least two names)
15. Your interest in politics is--- (mark one)
 1. Practical (seeking a public office)
 2. Professional
 3. Academic (serious, but not required by profession)
 4. Casual
16. Where did you spend most of your life till 18 years of age.
 City.....Town.....Village.....
17. Where did you spend most of your life after 18 years of age.
 City.....Town.....Village.....
18. Were you allowed to go to cinema, when you were growing up?
 Yes. No.
19. Were you allowed to have photographs, when you were growing up? (up to 18 years of age).
 Yes. No.
20. Are you leading a more affluent life today, as compared to the life you lived before the age of eighteen.
 Yes. No.
21. How far you are satisfied with your present income.
 1. Highly satisfied 2. Somewhat satisfied 3. Dissatisfied

22. Your friends, up to the age of 18, were mostly---
1. Highly religious
 2. Somewhat religious
 3. Not very religious
 4. Not religious
23. Your friends, after the age of 18, have been mostly---
1. Highly religious
 2. Somewhat religious
 3. Not very religious
 4. Not religious
24. In your growing age your father was---
1. Highly religious
 2. Somewhat religious
 3. Not very religious
 4. Not religious
25. In your growing age your mother was---
1. Highly religious
 2. Somewhat religious
 3. Not very religious
 4. Not religious
26. Your friends, up to the age of 18, were mostly--
1. Highly politicized
 2. Somewhat politicized
 3. Not very politicized
 4. Not politicized
27. Your friends, after the age of 18, have been mostly----
1. Highly politicized
 2. Somewhat politicized
 3. Not very politicized
 4. Not politicized
28. Up to the age of 18 you were----
1. Highly religious
 2. Somewhat religious
 3. Not very religious
 4. Not religious
29. At present you regard yourself---
1. Highly religious
 2. Somewhat religious
 3. Not very religious
 4. Not religious

30. You regard yourself a---- (mark one or more)
- | | | |
|--------------------|-----------------|------------------|
| 1. Rightist | 2. Leftist | 3. Centrist |
| 4. Liberal | 5. Conservative | 6. Revolutionary |
| 7. Social Democrat | 8. Socialist | 9. Communist |
| 10. Secularist | 11. Other | |
31. If, in the above question, your answer is "Other" would you like to name your "Other" political identity?
32. What type of political system would you, personally, prefer for Pakistan. (mark more than one)
- | | | |
|------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| 1. Parliamentary | 2. Presidential | 3. Martial Law |
| 4. Multi Party | 5. Single Party | 6. Unitary |
| 7. Federal | 8. Other | |
33. Please give names of three political leaders, in the 20th century, whom you admire.
34. Please give names of three religious leaders, in the 20th century, whom you admire.
35. Please identify three individuals, like parents, teachers, friends, etc. who influenced you most.
36. Generally you write in-----
- | | | | |
|---------|------------|------------------------|----------|
| 1. Urdu | 2. English | 3. A Regional language | 4. Other |
|---------|------------|------------------------|----------|
- and read in---
- | | | | |
|---------|------------|------------------------|----------|
| 1. Urdu | 2. English | 3. A Regional language | 4. Other |
|---------|------------|------------------------|----------|
37. What is your position/ designation in the place of work. (if retired the last position/ designation held).

Appendix-II
Questionnaire (Urdu) For The Ulama
In Pakistan



Questionnaire (Urdu) For The Ulema In Pakistan

بالکون غلط کوئی جواب نہیں
بالکون درست درست معلوم نہیں غلط

سوال نامحکم
ہر لے عملائے کرام

سیاست

1. علماء کرام نے مسلم علماء اور مسلمانوں کے زمانے میں سیاسی اقتدار کی کوشش نہیں کی تھی۔
 () () () () () 1
2. وہ سیاسی گروہوں سے فائدہ کر صرف اپنے مسلم اور تشیع کے دلچسپ حکمرانوں پر اثر انداز ہوتے رہے۔
 () () () () () 2
3. انہوں نے علم لوگوں سے ہر ادارہ صرف اُس وقت ہی جب ان کے خیال میں مگر اللہ سے بھلائی کے واسطے ضرورت مند لوگوں کی خدمات کر کے عملی طور پر
 () () () () () 3
4. علماء کرام نے مسلم لوگوں کی وقتی سیاست اور اسکے سیاسی اداروں کو اس لیے متروک کیا تھا کہ وہ اسوں کی ضروریات سے مبالغہ کرتے تھے۔
 () () () () () 4
5. مزبورہ زمانے میں علماء کرام اپنی سیاسی بااختیار سیاسی گروہوں میں ہر ادارہ دست و پا کرتے تھے۔
 () () () () () 5
6. یہ ادارہ مسلمانوں کے مفاد کے حصول کے لیے کوشش کرتے تھے۔
 () () () () () 6
7. اس میں سیاست باہر اور صرف جہاد کے لیے تھی۔
 () () () () () 7
8. پاکستان میں رائج جماعتی سیاست، انتخابات، اور ضرورتوں اور مسائل کے لیے کامیابی سے کامیابی سے
 () () () () () 8
9. یہ ضروریات اس وقت سے کامیابی نہیں کرتے تھے۔
 () () () () () 9
10. جمہوریت اور جمہوریت کے علمائے اسلام، گروہوں اور مسلم لیگ کی حمایت میں بنائی
 () () () () () 10
11. سچے سیاسی حقیقتیں سے کوئی تعلق نہ تھا۔
 () () () () () 11
12. علماء کرام نے جمہوریت اور جمہوریت کے علمائے اسلام سے بڑھ کر ان کی سیاسی اور معاشرتی اپنی جمہوریت کو بڑھ کر
 () () () () () 12
13. علماء کرام نے جمہوریت اور جمہوریت کے علمائے اسلام سے بڑھ کر ان کی سیاسی اور معاشرتی اپنی جمہوریت کو بڑھ کر
 () () () () () 13
14. اب علماء کرام نے جمہوریت کے اصولوں اور اداروں کو بڑھ کر ان کی سیاسی اور معاشرتی اپنی جمہوریت کو بڑھ کر
 () () () () () 14

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15. اُن کے خیال میں جوہر مزمل لائق سیاست اور اسکے اداروں کے ذریعے بھی پاکستان کو اس صفحہ پر لیتا ہے۔ () () () () ()
16. حبیب اللہ بڑی فزولہاں نظام کے تحت مہذبہ لبرل سائنس اور اسکے اداروں کو مستحکم کرنا چاہتا تھا اور وہ انہیں ہمارے آئندہ سائنس دانوں کے لئے میدان بنا رہے تھے۔ () () () () ()
17. حبیب اللہ سائنس کے فزولہاں اور اداروں کو ترقی دینے سے پہلے ہی کے نتیجے میں مسلمانوں کی مقامی الیٹے لوگوں سے جوڑنا چاہتے تھے۔ () () () () ()
18. باجوڑ کے سائنس دانوں کو بھی اہم کی گئی اور انہیں سائنس کے اہلکاروں میں اتنی سیاسی شہرت حاصل نہیں ہو سکی کہ وہ ان کی کوئی حد تک پالیسی میں اثر پڑھ سکیں۔ () () () () ()
19. پاکستان کا سوچا ہوا آئین اس وقت تک نہیں لایا جاسکا ہے۔ () () () () ()
20. اگر مریض کو دل کا امراض ہو جائے تو انہیں کوئی دوائی دینے کو اس وقت چاہنا ہی نہیں ہے۔ () () () () ()
21. موجودہ دور میں ریاست قوت کا سب سے بڑا سرچشمہ اور سائنس کے کامیاب ترین ادارہ ہے۔ () () () () ()
22. ایسے ہیں جہاں ایسا وسیع و بے انتہی شعوری کے ذریعے ہی بہتر استعمال کر سکتے ہیں۔ () () () () ()
23. اس کے لئے شعوری ہی ہے کہ سائنس دانوں میں براہ راست عملدرآمد ہو۔ () () () () ()
24. پاکستان کا سائنس دانوں کو سائنس میں لایا جائے گا۔ () () () () ()
25. پاکستان کو سائنس دانوں کو سائنس میں لایا جائے گا۔ () () () () ()
26. موجودہ دور میں سائنس اور سائنس دانوں کو سائنس میں لایا جائے گا۔ () () () () ()
27. سائنس دانوں کو سائنس میں لایا جائے گا۔ () () () () ()

تعمیر پاکستان

23. پاکستان کا سائنس دانوں کو سائنس میں لایا جائے گا۔ () () () () ()
24. پاکستان کو سائنس دانوں کو سائنس میں لایا جائے گا۔ () () () () ()
25. پاکستان کو سائنس دانوں کو سائنس میں لایا جائے گا۔ () () () () ()
26. موجودہ دور میں سائنس اور سائنس دانوں کو سائنس میں لایا جائے گا۔ () () () () ()
27. سائنس دانوں کو سائنس میں لایا جائے گا۔ () () () () ()

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28. تحریک اہلبیت دین و دار و قوم سے اسدوں رداہت ہی ہے۔ مؤثرہ تحریک بھی اسی افسوس ہے۔ () () () () () ()
29. تحریک اہلبیت دین و دار و قوم سے اسدوں رداہت ہی ہے اور اسدوں ہی تاریخ اور سوشل کی زندگی کو گھیرتا ہے۔ () () () () () ()
30. علیؑ طبریز اہلبیت کے دوران سے اس لیے بند کر دیے گئے کہ وہ کو فوج تھا کہ سبھی ان کے زمانہ اور سرور ہی کے دور میں اہلبیت کے ساتھ استعمال کیا جاتا تھا۔ () () () () () ()
31. آج سبھی ان کے حالات اس کے ہیں جس جہ اہلبیت کو ملتا ہے نہ کہا گیا تھا۔ () () () () () ()
32. اہلبیت کی مردم برداری کے باوجود سبھی حاضر وقت کے ساتھ ساتھ عمل نہ رہے اور ہیبت سے اٹھا کر اہلبیت کے ساتھ ہی اہلبیت اور ہیبت کے بغیر نہ تھا شرف میں رہا یا قبول کیے جا رہے ہیں۔ () () () () () ()
33. ایسے میں سبھی کو ملتا ہے انہی وہ رداہت اہلبیت کو رہے ہیں جو ان کو رہی اور اہلبیت ہیبت میں حاصل تھی۔ () () () () () ()
34. معاشرے میں اپنی اہلیت اور ہیبت کی کمی نے سبھی کو سبھی ہیبت سے محروم کیا۔ () () () () () ()
35. مسلمان رہنے رہنے رہنے ان کی منتخب کردہ پارلیمنٹ اہلبیت کو رکھی ہے۔ () () () () () ()
36. اہلبیت اور سبھی سبھی کے حضور میں ہے اہلبیت منتخب شدہ پارلیمنٹ اس کا استعمال نہیں کر سکتی۔ () () () () () ()
37. مسلمان رداہت و عبادت کی منتخب شدہ پارلیمنٹ سبھی کی رہنمائی نہیں کر سکتی ہے۔ () () () () () ()
38. اہلبیت سبھی سبھی کے حضور میں ہی ہے اور اگر سبھی میں ہی ہے اور اگر سبھی میں ہی ہے تو سبھی رداہت کے ساتھ ہی رہا ہے ایسے میں سبھی سبھی کو اہلبیت اور سبھی کے ساتھ ہی رہے ہیں۔ () () () () () ()
39. جب تک کہ دنیا کے مسلمان تو ہیں رہا سبھی میں ہی رہے ہیں اور اہلبیت اور سبھی میں ہی رہے ہیں اور سبھی میں ہی رہے ہیں۔ () () () () () ()
40. اہلبیت اور سبھی کے تصور سبھی سبھی ان اہلبیت کے واسطے ہی ہوتی ہے۔ وہ تو ہی رہے ہیں۔ () () () () () ()
41. اہلبیت اور سبھی کو سبھی سبھی میں ہی رہا ہے اس لیے میں ہی رہے ہیں اور سبھی میں ہی رہے ہیں۔ () () () () () ()
42. سبھی سبھی میں ہی رہا ہے اور سبھی میں ہی رہا ہے اور سبھی میں ہی رہا ہے اور سبھی میں ہی رہا ہے۔ () () () () () ()
43. سبھی سبھی میں ہی رہا ہے اور سبھی میں ہی رہا ہے اور سبھی میں ہی رہا ہے اور سبھی میں ہی رہا ہے۔ () () () () () ()
44. اہلبیت اور سبھی میں ہی رہا ہے اور سبھی میں ہی رہا ہے اور سبھی میں ہی رہا ہے اور سبھی میں ہی رہا ہے۔ () () () () () ()
45. اہلبیت اور سبھی میں ہی رہا ہے اور سبھی میں ہی رہا ہے اور سبھی میں ہی رہا ہے اور سبھی میں ہی رہا ہے۔ () () () () () ()

46. اردوں کے ساتھ ساتھ مسلمان فرائض بھی صیغہ میں نہیں اور نبی معلوم حاصل کر سکتی ہیں۔
47. رسمی رقیہ پڑھنے والے درجہ تقیم بچپن کے مصلوں کی ضرورت میں فرائض اپنے وہ نفاذ کرنا نہیں گوارا کرتے ہیں۔
48. ایسا فرائض کو بند استیاء اور شرم کے حدیں سے بھی اور بڑھتی معلوم اقتضا کرنے کی اجازت نہیں ہونی چاہیے۔
49. فرائض کا عام انتخاب میں حق رائے دہی اسلام کے مطابق ہے۔
50. عام انتخابات کے ذریعے فرائض کے ذمہ دار بننے کا حق ہی اسلام کے مطابق ہے۔
51. مسلم ممالک کی نفاذہ منتقف بڑے کی حیثیت سے یا حکومت کی طرف سے فرائض کی صورت میں ہونی چاہیے۔
52. اگر مسلم ممالک کی حالت حاصل ہو تو عورت دہشت یا حکومت کی سربراہ بھی بن سکتی ہے۔

ذرائع ابلاغ عام

53. فلم، ڈراما، ٹیلی ویژن وغیرہ ذرائع ابلاغ عام کے نہایت متحرک اور لائزہ میں حصے بن چکے ہیں۔
54. یہ چیزیں بہا بہتہ پھر اسلامی نہیں ہیں۔
55. ان کا عمل استعمال ہی ان کو جائز بنا دیتا ہے۔
56. نبی کی شخصیت اور اصناف کے ڈراموں کا روضہ دینی نقطہ نظر سے ہی امتحان کیا جائے۔
57. زندہ انسانوں یا جانوروں کی لاشیں تصویریں۔ ایسا بہت پر اسپی ہیں۔
57. فنوں اور تصویر کشی کے طریقے خود سے طوری کرتے وقت مستحق ہیں ان کا بنیاد یا رات کے کلچر انڈیا اور تصویریں استعمال کا اور ک تصویریں لگانا۔
58. اصناف میں تصویریں کی اشاعت اور فلم کی ویڈیو کو شہرہ کو شہرہ اسٹیج پر لے کر ہفت سہانہ جہانہ ذرائع ابلاغ پر کھڑے کھڑے ہیں چاہیے۔
59. ایسا میں مخالفت اور ہمدردی میں حال قبولیت کے اس وقت کے بنا کر ہرگز مسلمانوں میں پھیلنا اور تبلیغ کا محور ہے۔
60. ریڈیو، ٹیلی ویژن اور پبلک کے ذریعے نہیں یعنی اور مسلمانوں پر کرامت دیکھنے میں کوئی حرج نہیں۔
61. مسلمانوں کو ذرائع اور تواریخ پر کرامت بھی دیکھنے چاہئے۔

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79. ایک دھرم ہے کہ تین قیمتی اداؤں کی تقسیم طلبہ کو اس قابل نہیں بنانا کہ وہ سرکردہ اور نجی عملہ تھیں 79 () () () () ()
 ایک نئے کتابچہ پر مبنی۔
 80. برقی قبضی اداروں کے طلباء اور افسانہ چینے کی توہم پر پوز تاجیے اس کی وجہ سے طلبہ کے اندر ایک ایسا لہجہ ہے () () () () ()
 لگ کر ہی پیدا ہو رہا ہے
 81. جاگیرداروں اور شاہی نژادوں کے ہاٹ میں بیٹھے لوگوں کو صدمت اور ہراسہ نہیں دینا اور ایک مسلم زینت 81 () () () () ()
 مہی ہے۔
 82. کہیں کاروبار، صنعتی یا زرعی زمین سے مستقل ذاتی آمدنی نہ ہونے کے باعث طلبہ کو کراہی اور ایسا ہی 82 () () () () ()
 سرگرمیوں کے لوازمات، ایک طرف جذبہ سے ہونے والی آمدنی سے پورا کرتے ہیں۔
 83. اس میں شرتی، معاشرتی اور تعلیمی پس منظر کے باعث حکمران طبقہ طلبہ کی سیاسی سرگرمیوں کو ناپس 83 () () () () ()
 کر رہا ہے۔

تمہیں زیب و غریب اور مسلم ہمارا شرہ

84. ریاست اور صدارت میں مسلمانوں کو کراہی کی آج وہ حقیت نہیں ہے جو کہ سلطنت عثمانیہ میں مسلمانوں اور اس میں 84 () () () () ()
 میں تھی۔
 85. طلبہ کو مذہبی اپنی کی حیثیت میں کسی کی بڑی وجہ ہے کہ مسلمانوں اور ان کی تعلیمی زندگیوں کے 85 () () () () ()
 مفاہیم میں کوئی قابل منہاد نہیں ہے۔
 86. قدیم دور میں جب یونانی فلسفے کا مروجہ نہیں آیا تو مسلمانوں نے اس کا مطالعہ کیا اور اس کا رد کیا۔ 86 () () () () ()
 87. لیکن یہی مروجہ میند سوسائٹی کے لوجیب ہی شکل اور نئی صورت کے ساتھ سامنے آیا تو مسلمانوں نے اپنی 87 () () () () ()
 صلاحیت کو نہیں سمجھا۔
 88. زبان آج آج مسلم سوسائٹی کی ترقی و تنمید اور منہاد کا نئے پرستیوں اور تہذیبی نا اہل اس قدر نشہ اور 88 () () () () ()
 پیہوشیہ مع قہار مسلمانوں اور اس کے مفاہیم سے لہجہ پرانہ ہو چکے۔
 89. وہ آج جس افسانہ اور تعلیم کی مخالفت کی۔ 89 () () () () ()
 90. مسلمانوں کو نہ جہنم پر تعلیم کی مخالفت کی۔ 90 () () () () ()
 91. لیکن کوئی ایسا سوال ہی نہیں ہے کہ یونانی تہذیب و مروجہ کے مروجہ کے مروجہ کے مروجہ کے مروجہ کے 91 () () () () ()
 92. نبرد اور مسلمانوں کے لیے جہنم میں شہید ہونے کی بات کی جہنم میں ہی نبردوں کو سرنگوں کرنے کے بجائے مسلمانوں کو 92 () () () () ()
 پہلے جہنم میں شہید کرنے کی سائنسی اور عقلی ترقی اور اس کا اہل کے ممکن اور نا ممکن ہیں۔

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()	()	()	()	()	()	93
()	()	()	()	()	()	94
()	()	()	()	()	()	95

93 اس درجے کے تین ہفت مسلم معاشرہ سیرت کا حکم معمول بن کر رہ گیا۔

94 مسلم معاشرہ ایمان و اقرار کی بجائے صرف روکلنا ہی کرنا ہے۔

95 یہ روکلنا ابتداً تو عموماً عدم اعتقاد اور استہراہ بنا ہوتا ہے لیکن وقت کے ساتھ ساتھ یہ حال تبدیلیت کی شکل اختیار کر لیتا ہے۔

متفرق

96 آپ کی رائے میں اس وقت پکتن کن سے سب جڑا ستر لیا ہے۔

1. سیاسی سطح پر
 2. معاشرتی سطح پر
 3. معاشی سطح پر
- 97 دنیا کو کن مسائل پکتن کن کہلے مثال بن سکتا ہے۔

1. ملک بنام
2. کوئی نہیں

98 کسی ایسے تہذیبی مولانا پر تمہیں کیا احوال اس سے لانا ہے جسے یہ گناہوں کا انبار و خزانہ کی دولت ہے۔

(تعمیراتی نیشنل ایجنسی) کے ذریعے

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(تعمیراتی نیشنل ایجنسی) کے ذریعے ...

تعمیراتی نیشنل ایجنسی

- 34. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 34
- 35. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 35
- 36. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 36
- 37. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 37
- 38. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 38
- 39. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 39
- 40. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 40
- 41. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 41
- 42. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 42
- 43. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 43
- 44. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 44
- 45. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 45
- 46. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 46
- 47. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 47
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- 49. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 49
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- 51. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 51
- 52. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 52
- 53. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 53
- 54. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 54
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- 56. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 56
- 57. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 57
- 58. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 58
- 59. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 59
- 60. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 60

- 30. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 30
- 31. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 31
- 32. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 32
- 33. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 33
- 34. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 34
- 35. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 35
- 36. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 36
- 37. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 37
- 38. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 38
- 39. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 39
- 40. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 40
- 41. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 41
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- 47. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 47
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- 49. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 49
- 50. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 50
- 51. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 51
- 52. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 52
- 53. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 53
- 54. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 54
- 55. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 55
- 56. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 56
- 57. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 57
- 58. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 58
- 59. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 59
- 60. : 20 سالوں کے بعد : 60

Appendix-III
Selected Crosstabs



Selected Crosstabs

Q0 by Q1

Q0	Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct	Q1		Row Total
		1	2	
1	7	52	59	
	11.9	88.1	54.6	
	63.6	53.6		
	6.5	48.1		
2	4	45	49	
	8.2	91.8	45.4	
	36.4	46.4		
	3.7	41.7		
Column Total	11	97	108	
	10.2	89.8	100.0	

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	.40085	1	.52665
Continuity Correction	.09835	1	.75382
Likelihood Ratio	.40698	1	.52351
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	.39714	1	.52857
Fisher's Exact Test:			
One-Tail			.38051
Two-Tail			.75095

Minimum Expected Frequency - 4.991
 Cells with Expected Frequency < 5 - 1 OF 4 (25.0%)

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	.20459	.31572	.64402	
Number of Missing Observations: 4				

Q0 by Q3

Q0	Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct	Q3		Row Total
		1	2	
1	3	58	61	
	4.9	95.1	56.5	
	30.0	59.2		
	2.8	53.7		
2	7	40	47	
	14.9	85.1	43.5	
	70.0	40.8		
	6.5	37.0		
Column Total	10	98	108	
	9.3	90.7	100.0	

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	3.14414	1	.07620
Continuity Correction	2.06893	1	.15033
Likelihood Ratio	3.15069	1	.07590
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	3.11503	1	.07757
Fisher's Exact Test:			
One-Tail			.07559
Two-Tail			.09897

Minimum Expected Frequency - 4.352
 Cells with Expected Frequency < 5 - 1 OF 4 (25.0%)

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	-.54373	.25358	-1.69351	
Number of Missing Observations: 4				

Q0 by Q4

		Q4			
		Count		Row	
Q0		Row Pct		Total	
		Col Pct			
		Tot Pct			
			1	2	Total
1		2	60	62	55.9
		3.2	96.8		
		25.0	58.3		
		1.8	54.1		
2		6	43	49	44.1
		12.2	87.8		
		75.0	41.7		
		5.4	38.7		
Column		8	103	111	
Total		7.2	92.8	100.0	

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	3.32896	1	.06807
Continuity Correction	2.11695	1	.14568
Likelihood Ratio	3.38568	1	.06577
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	3.29897	1	.06932
Fisher's Exact Test:			
One-Tail			.07297
Two-Tail			.13521

Minimum Expected Frequency - 3.532
 Cells with Expected Frequency < 5 - 2 OF 4 (50.0%)

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	-.61435	.26166	-1.73555	
Number of Missing Observations: 1				

Q0 by Q5

		Q5			
		Count		Row	
Q0		Row Pct		Total	
		Col Pct			
		Tot Pct			
			1	2	Total
1		15	38	53	52.5
		28.3	71.7		
		44.1	56.7		
		14.9	37.6		
2		19	29	48	47.5
		39.6	60.4		
		55.9	43.3		
		18.8	28.7		
Column		34	67	101	
Total		33.7	66.3	100.0	

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	1.43554	1	.23086
Continuity Correction	.97479	1	.32349
Likelihood Ratio	1.43667	1	.23068
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	1.42132	1	.23319

Minimum Expected Frequency - 16.158

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Significance
Gamma	-.24806	.19913	-1.20177	
Number of Missing Observations: 11				

Q0 by Q10

		Q10		Row Total
		1	2	
Q0	1	25 42.4 59.5 24.0	34 57.6 54.8 32.7	59 56.7
	2	17 37.8 40.5 16.3	28 62.2 45.2 26.9	45 43.3
Column Total		42 40.4	62 59.6	104 100.0

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	.22390	1	.63609
Continuity Correction	.07371	1	.78601
Likelihood Ratio	.22437	1	.63573
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	.22174	1	.63771

Minimum Expected Frequency - 18.173

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	.09546	.20061	.47486	
Number of Missing Observations: 8				

Q0 by Q11

		Q11		Row Total
		1	2	
Q0	1	31 52.5 46.3 29.2	28 47.5 71.8 26.4	59 55.7
	2	36 76.6 53.7 34.0	11 23.4 28.2 10.4	47 44.3
Column Total		67 63.2	39 36.8	106 100.0

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	6.50831	1	.01074
Continuity Correction	5.51510	1	.01885
Likelihood Ratio	6.67690	1	.00977
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	6.44691	1	.01111

Minimum Expected Frequency - 17.292

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	-.49444	.16321	-2.67775	
Number of Missing Observations: 6				

Q0 by Q26

		Q26		
		Count		Row
Q0		Row Pct		Total
		Col Pct		
		Tot Pct		
1	1	13	47	60
		21.7	78.3	55.0
2	1	52.0	56.0	
		11.9	43.1	
2	2	12	37	49
		24.5	75.5	45.0
		48.0	44.0	
		11.0	33.9	
Column		25	84	109
Total		22.9	77.1	100.0

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	.12162	1	.72728
Continuity Correction	.01434	1	.90468
Likelihood Ratio	.12133	1	.72759
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	.12051	1	.72848

Minimum Expected Frequency - 11.239

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	-.07943	.22690	-.34743	
Number of Missing Observations: 3				

Q0 by Q35

		Q35		
		Count		Row
Q0		Row Pct		Total
		Col Pct		
		Tot Pct		
1	1	9	51	60
		15.0	85.0	58.8
2	1	29.0	71.8	
		8.8	50.0	
2	2	22	20	42
		52.4	47.6	41.2
		71.0	28.2	
		21.6	19.6	
Column		31	71	102
Total		30.4	69.6	100.0

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	16.31854	1	.00005
Continuity Correction	14.59940	1	.00013
Likelihood Ratio	16.43253	1	.00005
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	16.15856	1	.00006

Minimum Expected Frequency - 12.765

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	-.72350	.11332	-4.11800	
Number of Missing Observations: 10				

Q0 by Q36

		Q36		Row Total
		1	2	
Q0	1	13 22.0 36.1 12.3	46 78.0 65.7 43.4	59 55.7
	2	23 48.9 63.9 21.7	24 51.1 34.3 22.6	47 44.3
Column Total		36 34.0	70 66.0	106 100.0

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	8.44176	1	.00367
Continuity Correction	7.28487	1	.00695
Likelihood Ratio	8.48611	1	.00358
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	8.36212	1	.00383

Minimum Expected Frequency - 15.962

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	-.54453	.15080	-2.95935	

Number of Missing Observations: 6

Q0 by Q37

		Q37		Row Total
		1	2	
Q0	1	14 24.1 36.8 13.6	44 75.9 67.7 42.7	58 56.3
	2	24 53.3 63.2 23.3	21 46.7 32.3 20.4	45 43.7
Column Total		38 36.9	65 63.1	103 100.0

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	9.27705	1	.00232
Continuity Correction	8.06544	1	.00451
Likelihood Ratio	9.33509	1	.00225
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	9.18698	1	.00244

Minimum Expected Frequency - 16.602

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	-.56444	.14592	-3.12262	

Number of Missing Observations: 9

Q0 by Q56

		Q56		
		Count		Row
Q0		Row Pct		Total
		Col Pct		
		Tot Pct		
			1	2
1	1	5	52	57
		8.8	91.2	54.8
		83.3	53.1	
		4.8	50.0	
2	2	1	46	47
		2.1	97.9	45.2
		16.7	46.9	
		1.0	44.2	
Column		6	98	104
Total		5.8	94.2	100.0

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	2.09182	1	.14809
Continuity Correction	1.04815	1	.30593
Likelihood Ratio	2.31558	1	.12808
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	2.07170	1	.15005
Fisher's Exact Test:			
One-Tail			.15361
Two-Tail			.21831

Minimum Expected Frequency - 2.712
 Cells with Expected Frequency < 5 - 2 OF 4 (50.0%)

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	.63121	.33508	1.54535	
Number of Missing Observations: 8				

Q0 by Q57

		Q57		
		Count		Row
Q0		Row Pct		Total
		Col Pct		
		Tot Pct		
			1	2
1	1	53	4	57
		93.0	7.0	55.3
		76.8	11.8	
		51.5	3.9	
2	2	16	30	46
		34.8	65.2	44.7
		23.2	88.2	
		15.5	29.1	
Column		69	34	103
Total		67.0	33.0	100.0

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	38.99290	1	.00000
Continuity Correction	36.40542	1	.00000
Likelihood Ratio	42.24808	1	.00000
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	38.61433	1	.00000

Minimum Expected Frequency - 15.184

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	.92261	.04493	7.37482	
Number of Missing Observations: 9				

Q0 by Q58

Q0 by Q58

		Q58		
Q0	Count	1	2	Row Total
	Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct			
1	12	45	57	
	21.1	78.9	59.4	
	35.3	72.6		
	12.5	46.9		
2	22	17	39	
	56.4	43.6	40.6	
	64.7	27.4		
	22.9	17.7		
Column Total	34	62	96	
	35.4	64.6	100.0	

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	12.65629	1	.00037
Continuity Correction	11.15768	1	.00084
Likelihood Ratio	12.70453	1	.00036
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	12.52445	1	.00040

Minimum Expected Frequency - 13.813

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	-.65829	.12978	-3.64481	
Number of Missing Observations: 16				

Q0 by Q60

		Q60		
Q0	Count	1	2	Row Total
	Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct			
1	13	47	60	
	21.7	78.3	57.7	
	92.9	52.2		
	12.5	45.2		
2	1	43	44	
	2.3	97.7	42.3	
	7.1	47.8		
	1.0	41.3		
Column Total	14	90	104	
Total	13.5	86.5	100.0	

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	8.19594	1	.00420
Continuity Correction	6.61568	1	.01011
Likelihood Ratio	9.90969	1	.00164
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	8.11713	1	.00438

Minimum Expected Frequency - 5.923

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	.84488	.15153	3.34152	
Number of Missing Observations: 8				

Q0 by Q63

		Q63		
Q0	Count			Row Total
	Row Pct	Col Pct	Row Pct	
	Tot Pct	1	2	
1	12	36	48	
	25.0	75.0	50.0	
	48.0	50.7		
	12.5	37.5		
2	13	35	48	
	27.1	72.9	50.0	
	52.0	49.3		
	13.5	36.5		
Column Total	25	71	96	
	26.0	74.0	100.0	

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	.05408	1	.81610
Continuity Correction	.00000	1	1.00000
Likelihood Ratio	.05409	1	.81609
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	.05352	1	.81705

Minimum Expected Frequency - 12.500

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	-.05405	.23202	-.23263	
Number of Missing Observations:	16			

Q0 by Q68

		Q68		
Q0	Count			Row Total
	Row Pct	Col Pct	Row Pct	
	Tot Pct	1	2	
1	12	46	58	
	20.7	79.3	55.8	
	35.3	65.7		
	11.5	44.2		
2	22	24	46	
	47.8	52.2	44.2	
	64.7	34.3		
	21.2	23.1		
Column Total	34	70	104	
	32.7	67.3	100.0	

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	8.58515	1	.00339
Continuity Correction	7.39621	1	.00654
Likelihood Ratio	8.63028	1	.00331
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	8.50260	1	.00355

Minimum Expected Frequency - 15.038

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	-.55692	.15121	-2.98007	
Number of Missing Observations:	8			

Q0 by Q72

		Q72		
		Count		Row
Q0		Row Pct		Total
		Col Pct		
	Tot Pct			
1	1	4	54	58
		6.9	93.1	56.9
		22.2	64.3	
		3.9	52.9	
2	2	14	30	44
		31.8	68.2	43.1
		77.8	35.7	
		13.7	29.4	
Column		18	84	102
Total		17.6	82.4	100.0

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	10.69257	1	.00108
Continuity Correction	9.04648	1	.00263
Likelihood Ratio	10.90985	1	.00096
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	10.58774	1	.00114

Minimum Expected Frequency - 7.765

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	-.72603	.14446	-3.19500	
Number of Missing Observations:	10			

Q0 by Q73

		Q73		
		Count		Row
Q0		Row Pct		Total
		Col Pct		
	Tot Pct			
1	1	8	51	59
		13.6	86.4	54.6
		29.6	63.0	
		7.4	47.2	
2	2	19	30	49
		38.8	61.2	45.4
		70.4	37.0	
		17.6	27.8	
Column		27	81	108
Total		25.0	75.0	100.0

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	9.07783	1	.00259
Continuity Correction	7.78277	1	.00527
Likelihood Ratio	9.19439	1	.00243
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	8.99377	1	.00271

Minimum Expected Frequency - 12.250

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	-.60298	.15280	-3.04632	
Number of Missing Observations:	4			

Q0 by Q86

Q0 by Q86

		Q86		
		Count		Row
		Row Pct		Total
		Col Pct		
		Tot Pct		
Q0		1	2	
1		2	55	57
		3.5	96.5	65.5
		25.0	69.6	
		2.3	63.2	
2		6	24	30
		20.0	80.0	34.5
		75.0	30.4	
		6.9	27.6	
Column		8	79	87
Total		9.2	90.8	100.0

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	6.40183	1	.01140
Continuity Correction	4.57913	1	.03236
Likelihood Ratio	6.07144	1	.01374
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	6.32825	1	.01188
Fisher's Exact Test:			
One-Tail			.01830
Two-Tail			.01830

Minimum Expected Frequency - 2.759
 Cells with Expected Frequency < 5 - 1 OF 4 (25.0%)

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	-.74603	.18898	-2.11834	
Number of Missing Observations: 25				

Q0 by Q87

		Q87		
		Count		Row
		Row Pct		Total
		Col Pct		
		Tot Pct		
Q0		1	2	
1		9	49	58
		15.5	84.5	58.6
		64.3	57.6	
		9.1	49.5	
2		5	36	41
		12.2	87.8	41.4
		35.7	42.4	
		5.1	36.4	
Column		14	85	99
Total		14.1	85.9	100.0

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	.21834	1	.64031
Continuity Correction	.03045	1	.86148
Likelihood Ratio	.22129	1	.63806
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	.21613	1	.64200

Minimum Expected Frequency - 5.798

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	.13884	.29393	.47589	
Number of Missing Observations: 13				

Q0 by Q88

		Q88		Row Total
		1	2	
Q0	1	6	51	57
		10.5	89.5	57.6
		42.9	60.0	
		6.1	51.5	
2	8	34	42	42
		19.0	81.0	42.4
		57.1	40.0	
		8.1	34.3	
Column Total		14	85	99
		14.1	85.9	100.0

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	1.44619	1	.22914
Continuity Correction	.82951	1	.36241
Likelihood Ratio	1.42823	1	.23205
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	1.43158	1	.23151

Minimum Expected Frequency - 5.939

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	-.33333	.25941	-1.16713	
Number of Missing Observations:	13			

Q0 by Q90

		Q90		Row Total
		1	2	
Q0	1	23	31	54
		42.6	57.4	55.1
		44.2	67.4	
		23.5	31.6	
2	29	15	44	44
		65.9	34.1	44.9
		55.8	32.6	
		29.6	15.3	
Column Total		52	46	98
		53.1	46.9	100.0

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	5.29222	1	.02142
Continuity Correction	4.39745	1	.03599
Likelihood Ratio	5.35491	1	.02066
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	5.23822	1	.02210

Minimum Expected Frequency - 20.653

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	-.44534	.16858	-2.37258	
Number of Missing Observations:	14			

Q0 by Q91

		Q91		
		Count		Row
Q0		Row Pct		Total
		Col Pct		
		Tot Pct	1	2
1		38	20	58
		65.5	34.5	59.8
		77.6	41.7	
		39.2	20.6	
2		11	28	39
		28.2	71.8	40.2
		22.4	58.3	
		11.3	28.9	
Column		49	48	97
Total		50.5	49.5	100.0

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	12.98753	1	.00031
Continuity Correction	11.53778	1	.00068
Likelihood Ratio	13.33403	1	.00026
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	12.85364	1	.00034

Minimum Expected Frequency - 19.299

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	.65732	.12792	3.86565	
Number of Missing Observations: 15				

Q0 by Q92

		Q92		
		Count		Row
Q0		Row Pct		Total
		Col Pct		
		Tot Pct	1	2
1		14	47	61
		23.0	77.0	59.2
		73.7	56.0	
		13.6	45.6	
2		5	37	42
		11.9	88.1	40.8
		26.3	44.0	
		4.9	35.9	
Column		19	84	103
Total		18.4	81.6	100.0

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	2.01743	1	.15550
Continuity Correction	1.34998	1	.24528
Likelihood Ratio	2.10719	1	.14661
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	1.99784	1	.15752

Minimum Expected Frequency - 7.748

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	.37583	.24279	1.50142	
Number of Missing Observations: 9				

Gamma	.13884	.29393	.47589	
Number of Missing Observations: 13				

Q0 by Q93

		Q93		
Q0	Count	1	2	Row Total
	Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct			
1	8	47	55	
	14.5	85.5	56.1	
	50.0	57.3		
	8.2	48.0		
2	8	35	43	
	18.6	81.4	43.9	
	50.0	42.7		
	8.2	35.7		
Column Total	16	82	98	
	16.3	83.7	100.0	

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	.29107	1	.58953
Continuity Correction	.06977	1	.79167
Likelihood Ratio	.28934	1	.59065
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	.28810	1	.59144

Minimum Expected Frequency - 7.020

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	-.14634	.26793	-.53380	
Number of Missing Observations:	14			

BQ1 by Q1

		Q1		
		Count		Row
BQ1		Row Pct		Total
		Col Pct		
		Tot Pct	1	2
B	1	6	27	33
		18.2	81.8	37.5
		66.7	34.2	
		6.8	30.7	
B	2	3	52	55
		5.5	94.5	62.5
		33.3	65.8	
		3.4	59.1	
Column		9	79	88
Total		10.2	89.8	100.0

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	3.63882	1	.05645
Continuity Correction	2.38462	1	.12253
Likelihood Ratio	3.50966	1	.06101
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	3.59747	1	.05787
Fisher's Exact Test:			
One-Tail			.06336
Two-Tail			.07449

Minimum Expected Frequency - 3.375
 Cells with Expected Frequency < 5 - 1 OF 4 (25.0%)

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	.58779	.24408	1.71699	
Number of Missing Observations: 24				

BQ1 by Q26

		Q26		
		Count		Row
BQ1		Row Pct		Total
		Col Pct		
		Tot Pct	1	2
B	1	8	25	33
		24.2	75.8	37.9
		34.8	39.1	
		9.2	28.7	
B	2	15	39	54
		27.8	72.2	62.1
		65.2	60.9	
		17.2	44.8	
Column		23	64	87
Total		26.4	73.6	100.0

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	.13164	1	.71674
Continuity Correction	.01261	1	.91058
Likelihood Ratio	.13264	1	.71571
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	.13013	1	.71830

Minimum Expected Frequency - 8.724

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	-.09170	.025149	.36692	
Number of Missing Observations: 25				

BQ1 by Q27

		Q27		
BQ1	Count	1	2	Row Total
	Row Pct			
	Col Pct			
	Tot Pct			
1		15	19	34
		44.1	55.9	39.5
		30.0	52.8	
		17.4	22.1	
2		35	17	52
		67.3	32.7	60.5
		70.0	47.2	
		40.7	19.8	
Column Total		50	36	86
		58.1	41.9	100.0

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	4.54267	1	.03306
Continuity Correction	3.63979	1	.05641
Likelihood Ratio	4.54401	1	.03303
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	4.48985	1	.03410

Minimum Expected Frequency - 14.233

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	-.44565	.18217	-2.15338	
Number of Missing Observations:	26			

BQ1 by Q37

		Q37		
BQ1	Count	1	2	Row Total
	Row Pct			
	Col Pct			
	Tot Pct			
1		15	16	31
		48.4	51.6	37.3
		50.0	30.2	
		18.1	19.3	
2		15	37	52
		28.8	71.2	62.7
		50.0	69.8	
		18.1	44.6	
Column Total		30	53	83
		36.1	63.9	100.0

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	3.21319	1	.07305
Continuity Correction	2.42231	1	.11962
Likelihood Ratio	3.18198	1	.07445
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	3.17448	1	.07480

Minimum Expected Frequency - 11.205

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	.39623	.19898	1.77431	
Number of Missing Observations:	29			

BQ1 by Q57

		Q57		
BQ1	Count	1	2	Row Total
	Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct			
1	16	15	31	
	51.6	48.4	36.9	
	28.1	55.6		
2	41	12	53	
	77.4	22.6	63.1	
	71.9	44.4		
	48.8	14.3		
Column Total	57	27	84	
	67.9	32.1	100.0	

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	5.94407	1	.01477
Continuity Correction	4.82229	1	.02809
Likelihood Ratio	5.85104	1	.01557
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	5.87331	1	.01537

Minimum Expected Frequency - 9.964

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	-.52416	.17650	-2.39111	
Number of Missing Observations:	28			

BQ1 by Q58

		Q58		
BQ1	Count	1	2	Row Total
	Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct			
1	13	15	28	
	46.4	53.6	35.4	
	48.1	28.8		
2	14	37	51	
	27.5	72.5	64.6	
	51.9	71.2		
	17.7	46.8		
Column Total	27	52	79	
	34.2	65.8	100.0	

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	2.89381	1	.08892
Continuity Correction	2.11171	1	.14618
Likelihood Ratio	2.85027	1	.09136
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	2.85718	1	.09097

Minimum Expected Frequency - 9.570

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	.39219	.20815	1.66721	
Number of Missing Observations:	33			

BQ1 by Q68

		Q68		
		Count		Row
		Row Pct		Total
		Col Pct		
		Tot Pct		
BQ1	1	18	15	33
		54.5	45.5	38.8
2	8	44	52	
		15.4	84.6	61.2
	30.8	74.6		
	9.4	51.8		
Column		26	59	85
Total		30.6	69.4	100.0

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	14.58192	1	.00013
Continuity Correction	12.79581	1	.00035
Likelihood Ratio	14.55608	1	.00014
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	14.41037	1	.00015

Minimum Expected Frequency = 10.094

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	.73684	.11874	3.84075	
Number of Missing Observations:	27			

BQ1 by Q71

		Q71		
		Count		Row
		Row Pct		Total
		Col Pct		
		Tot Pct		
BQ1	1	8	23	31
		25.8	74.2	36.9
2	5	48	53	
		9.4	90.6	63.1
	38.5	67.6		
	6.0	57.1		
Column		13	71	84
Total		15.5	84.5	100.0

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	4.00816	1	.04528
Continuity Correction	2.85425	1	.09113
Likelihood Ratio	3.86332	1	.04935
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	3.96044	1	.04658

Fisher's Exact Test:

One-Tail	.04747
Two-Tail	.06203

Minimum Expected Frequency = 4.798

Cells with Expected Frequency < 5 = 1 OF 4 (25.0%)

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	.53908	.22131	1.84410	
Number of Missing Observations:	28			

BQ1 by Q72

		Q72		
		Count		Row
		Row Pct		Total
		Col Pct		
		Tot Pct		
BQ1	1	8	22	30
		26.7	73.3	35.7
2	5	49	54	
		9.3	90.7	64.3
		38.5	69.0	
		6.0	58.3	
	Column	13	71	84
	Total	15.5	84.5	100.0

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	4.46746	1	.03455
Continuity Correction	3.23583	1	.07204
Likelihood Ratio	4.27558	1	.03866
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	4.41428	1	.03564
Fisher's Exact Test:			
One-Tail			.03813
Two-Tail			.05635

Minimum Expected Frequency - 4.643
 Cells with Expected Frequency < 5 - 1 OF 4 (25.0%)

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	.56175	.21395	1.92201	
Number of Missing Observations:	28			

BQ1 by Q73

		Q73		
		Count		Row
		Row Pct		Total
		Col Pct		
		Tot Pct		
BQ1	1	13	19	32
		40.6	59.4	37.2
2	6	48	54	
		11.1	88.9	62.8
		31.6	71.6	
		7.0	55.8	
	Column	19	67	86
	Total	22.1	77.9	100.0

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	10.16873	1	.00143
Continuity Correction	8.52629	1	.00350
Likelihood Ratio	9.92665	1	.00163
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	10.05049	1	.00152

Minimum Expected Frequency - 7.070

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	.69106	.14709	3.00435	
Number of Missing Observations:	26			

Q16 by Q8

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Q16	Count	Q8		Row Total
		1	2	
1	7	39	46	
	15.2	84.8	51.1	
	33.3	56.5		
	7.8	43.3		
2	14	30	44	
	31.8	68.2	48.9	
	66.7	43.5		
	15.6	33.3		
Column Total	21	69	90	
	23.3	76.7	100.0	

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	3.46451	1	.06270
Continuity Correction	2.59866	1	.10924
Likelihood Ratio	3.51140	1	.06095
Fantel-Haenszel test for linear association	3.42602	1	.06118

Minimum Expected Frequency = 10.267

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	-.44444	.20074	-1.98745	

Number of Missing Observations: 22

BQ16 by Q16

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BQ16	Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct	Q16		Row Total
		1	2	
1	13	38	51	
	25.5	74.5	53.7	
	68.4	50.0		
	13.7	40.0		
2	6	38	44	
	13.6	86.4	46.3	
	31.6	50.0		
	6.3	40.0		
Column Total		19	76	95
		20.0	80.0	100.0

Chi-Square

Value

DF

Pearson	2.07442	1
Continuity Correction	1.39970	1
Likelihood Ratio	2.12445	1
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	2.05259	1

Minimum Expected Frequency = 8.800

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value
Gamma	.36842	.23519	1.48120

Number of Missing Observations: (17)

Q16 by Q17

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Q16	Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct	Q17		Row Total
		1	2	
1	3 5.6 25.0 3.0	51 94.4 58.0 51.0	54 54.0	
2	9 19.6 75.0 9.0	37 80.4 42.0 37.0	46 46.0	
Column Total	12 12.0	88 88.0	100 100.0	

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	4.61682	1	.03166
Continuity Correction	3.38545	1	.06577
Likelihood Ratio	4.73557	1	.02858
Fisher's Exact Test for Linear Association	4.57065	1	.03252
Minimum Expected Frequency	5.520		

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	-.61053	.21978	-2.11255	

Number of Missing Observations: 12

BQ16 by Q22

Q22 Page 1 of 1

BQ16		Q22		Row Total
		1	2	
1	Count	28	25	53
	Row Pct	52.8	47.2	55.8
	Col Pct	53.8	58.1	
	Tot Pct	29.5	26.3	
2	Count	24	18	42
	Row Pct	57.1	42.9	44.2
	Col Pct	46.2	41.9	
	Tot Pct	25.3	18.9	
Column Total		52	43	95
Total		54.7	45.3	100.0

Chi-Square Value DF Significance

Pearson	.17590	1	.67492
Continuity Correction	.04490	1	.83219
Likelihood Ratio	.17608	1	.67477
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	.17405	1	.67654

Minimum Expected Frequency = 19.011

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	.08696	.20636	-.42000	

Number of Missing Observations: (17)

BQ16 by Q26

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BQ16	Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct	Q26		Row Total
		1	2	
1	14	40	54	54.5
	25.9	74.1		
	60.9	52.6		
	14.1	40.4		
2	9	36	45	45.5
	20.0	80.0		
	39.1	47.4		
	9.1	36.4		
Column Total	23	76	99	
Total	23.2	76.8	100.0	

Page	Chi-Square	SPSS/PC+ Value	DF	Significance
49				5/17/77
	Pearson	.48329	1	.48693
	Continuity Correction	.20814	1	.61820
	Likelihood Ratio	.48699	1	.48627
	Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	.47841	1	.48914
	Minimum Expected Frequency	10.455		

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	.15657	.23581	.70263	

Number of Missing Observations: (13)

Number of Missing Observations: 14

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BQ16 by Q27

Q27

Page 1 of 1

BQ16	Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct	Q27		Row Total
		1	2	
1	36 67.9 59.0 36.7	17 32.1 45.9 17.3	53 54.1	
2	25 55.6 41.0 25.5	20 44.4 54.1 20.4	45 45.9	
Column Total	61 62.2	37 37.8	98 100.0	

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Chi-Square

Value

DF

Significance

Pearson	1.58435	1	.20814
Continuity Correction	1.10173	1	.29389
Likelihood Ratio	1.58422	1	.20915
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	1.56318	1	.21047

Minimum Expected Frequency = 16.090

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	.25764	.19617	1.26228	

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Number of Missing Observations: 14

BQ16 by Q35

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BQ16	Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct	Q35		Row Total
		1	2	
1	12	39	51	55.4
	23.5	76.5		
	44.4	60.0		
2	13.0	42.4		44.6
	15	26	41	
	36.6	63.4	44.6	
	55.6	40.0		
	16.3	28.3		
Column Total	27	65	92	100.0
	29.3	70.7	100.0	

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	1.86845	1	.17165
Continuity Correction	1.29184	1	.25571
Likelihood Ratio	1.86253	1	.17293
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	1.84814	1	.17400

Minimum Expected Frequency = 12.033

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	-.30435	.20933	1.36151	

Number of Missing Observations: 20

Number of Missing Observations: (12)

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BQ16 by Q51

Page 1 of 1

BQ16	Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct	Q51		Row Total
		1	2	
1	30	20	50	
	60.0	40.0	53.8	
	58.8	47.6		
2	32.3	21.5		
	21	22	43	
	48.8	51.2	46.2	
	41.2	52.4		
	22.6	23.7		
Column Total	51	42	93	
	54.8	45.2	100.0	

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Chi-Square

Value

DF

Significance

Pearson	1.16318	1	.28031
Continuity Correction	.75611	1	.38455
Likelihood Ratio	1.16448	1	.28054
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	1.15067	1	.28341

Minimum Expected Frequency = 19.419

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
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Gamma	.22223	.19363	1.09352	
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Number of Missing Observations: (19)

BQ16 by Q68

Page 1 of 1

BQ16	Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct	Q68		Row Total
		1	2	
1	13 26.0 41.9 13.5	37 74.0 56.9 38.5	50 52.1	
2	18 39.1 58.1 18.8	28 60.9 43.1 29.2	46 47.9	
Column Total	31 32.3	65 67.7	96 100.0	

Chi-Square Value DF Significance

Pearson	1.88922	1	.16929
Continuity Correction	1.33640	1	.24767
Likelihood Ratio	1.89343	1	.16982
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	1.86954	1	.17153

Minimum Expected Frequency 14.854

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T value	Approximate Significance
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Gamma -.29320 .20193 1.38198

Number of Missing Observations: 16

BQ16 by Q90

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BQ16		Q90		Row Total
		1	2	
1	Count	25	22	47
	Row Pct	53.2	46.8	52.8
	Col Pct	53.2	52.4	
	Tot Pct	28.1	24.7	
2	Count	22	20	42
	Row Pct	52.4	47.6	47.2
	Col Pct	46.8	47.6	
	Tot Pct	24.7	22.5	
Column Total	47	42	89	
Total	52.8	47.2	100.0	

Page 154

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	.00585	1	.93005
Continuity Correction	.00000	1	1.00000
Likelihood Ratio	.00584	1	.93007
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	.00578	1	.93009

Minimum Expected Frequency = 19.820

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	.01626	.21261	.07646	

Number of Missing Observations: 23

BQ16 by Q92

	Count	Q92		Row Total
		1	2	
BQ16	Row Pct			
	Col Pct			
	Tot Pct			
		1	2	
1	12	38	50	
	24.0	76.0	53.2	
	66.7	50.0		
	12.8	40.4		
2	6	38	44	
	13.6	86.4	46.8	
	33.3	50.0		
	6.4	40.4		
Column Total	18	76	94	
Total	19.1	80.9	100.0	

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	1.62364	1	.20259
Continuity Correction	1.02324	1	.31175
Likelihood Ratio	1.65555	1	.19820
Nantel-Haenszel test for linear association	1.60636	1	.20500

Minimum Expected Frequency = 8.426

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	.33333	.24450	1.36097	

Number of Missing Observations = 18

BQ17 by Q8

Page 1 of 1

BQ17	Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct	Q8		Row Total
		1	2	
1	16	57	73	
	21.9	78.1	80.2	
	76.2	81.4		
2	17.6	62.6		
	5	13	18	
	27.8	72.2	19.8	
	23.8	18.6		
	5.5	14.3		
Column Total	21	70	91	
	23.1	76.9	100.0	

Page 22	Chi-Square	SPSS/PC+ Value	DF	5/17/90 Significance
	Pearson	.27933	1	.59714
	Continuity Correction	.04675	1	.82382
	Likelihood Ratio	.27044	1	.60304
	Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	.27625	1	.59917
	Fisher's Exact Test: One-Tail			.40186
	Two-Tail			.75516

Minimum Expected Frequency - 4.154
 Cells with Expected Frequency < 5 - 1 OF 4 (25.0%)

Page 23	Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	5/17/90 Approximate Significance
	Gamma	.15619	.29145	.50292	

Number of Missing Observations: (21)

BQ17 by Q16

Q16 Page 1 of 1

BQ17	Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct	Q16		Row Total
		1	2	
1	18 23.1 94.7 18.8	60 76.9 77.9 62.5	78 81.3	
2	1 5.6 5.3 1.0	17 94.4 22.1 17.7	18 18.8	
Column Total	19 19.8	77 80.2	96 100.0	

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	2.82833	1	.09251
Continuity Correction	1.83227	1	.17586
Likelihood Ratio	3.52416	1	.06048
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	2.79887	1	.09433
Fisher's Exact Test: One-Tail			.08010
Two-Tail			.11202
Minimum Expected Frequency -	3.563		
Cells with Expected Frequency < 5 -	1 OF	4 (25.0%)	

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	.67213	.29153	2.28997	

Number of Missing Observations: (16)

age 33

SPSS/PC+

5/17/94

BQ17 by Q17

Page 1 of 1

	Count	Q17		Row Total
		1	2	
BQ17	Row Pct			
	Col Pct			
	Tot Pct			
		1	2	
1	7	75	82	
	8.5	91.5	81.2	
	58.3	84.3		
	6.9	74.3		
2	5	14	19	
	26.3	73.7	18.8	
	41.7	15.7		
	5.0	13.9		
Column Total	12	89	101	
	11.9	88.1	100.0	

Page	Chi-Square	SPSS/PC+ Value	DF	Significance
34				5/17/94
Parson		4.65730	1	.03092
Continuity Correction		3.11400	1	.07762
Likelihood Ratio		3.90262	1	.04821
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association		4.61127	1	.03176
Fisher's Exact Test:				
One-Tail				.04633
Two-Tail				.04533

Minimum Expected Frequency = 2.257
 Cells with Expected Frequency < 5 = 1 OF 4 (25.0%)

Page	Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
35					5/17/94
	Gamma	-.58562	.21483	-1.62606	

Number of Missing Observations: (11)

BQ17 by Q22

BQ17

	Q22		Row Total
	1	2	
Count	41	37	78
Row Pct	52.6	47.4	81.3
Col Pct	77.4	86.0	
Tot Pct	42.7	38.5	
	2	6	18
	66.7	33.3	18.8
	22.6	14.0	
	12.5	6.3	
Column Total	53	43	96
	55.2	44.8	100.0

Chi-Square

Value

DF

Asymptotic Significance

Pearson	1.17622	1	.27918
Continuity Correction	.67506	1	.41129
Likelihood Ratio	1.20045	1	.27329
Fisher's Exact Test for Linear Association	1.16397	1	.28034

Minimum Expected Frequency = 8.063

Statistic	Value	Asymptotic	Exact	Significance
Gamma	.28696	.25190	1.11285	

Number of Missing Observations: (16)

BQ17 by Q26

Page 1 of 1

	Count	Q26		Row Total
		1	2	
1	22	59	81	81.0
	27.2	72.8		81.0
	91.7	77.6		
	22.0	59.0		
2	2	17	19	19.0
	10.5	89.5		19.0
	8.3	22.4		
	2.0	17.0		
Column Total	24	76	100	
	24.0	76.0	100.0	

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	2.33462	1	.12659
Continuity Correction	1.51172	1	.21868
Likelihood Ratio	2.68367	1	.10139
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	2.31128	1	.12844
Fisher's Exact Test:			
One-Tail			.10533
Two-Tail			.14910
Minimum Expected Frequency -	4.560		
Cells with Expected Frequency < 5	1 OF 4 (25.0%)		

Statistic	Value	Asym	T-value	Approximate Significance
Lambda	.52033	.28739	1.84932	

Number of Missing Observations: (12)

BQ17 by Q35

67

Q35 Page 1 of 1

BQ17	Count Row Pct Col Pct Tot Pct	Q35		Row Total
		1	2	
1		17	59	76
		22.4	77.6	81.7
		63.0	89.4	
		18.3	63.4	
2		10	7	17
		58.8	41.2	18.3
		37.0	10.6	
		10.8	7.5	
Column Total	27 29.0	66 71.0	93 100.0	

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	8.96096	1	.00276
Continuity Correction	7.27894	1	.00698
Likelihood Ratio	8.22629	1	.00410
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	8.86461	1	.00291
Fisher's Exact Test:			
One-Tail			.00459
Two-Tail			.00605
Minimum Expected Frequency =	4.935		
Cells with Expected Frequency < 5 =	1 OF	4 (25.0%)	

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	-.66432	.15769	-2.55344	

Number of Missing Observations: (19)

age 72

SPSS/PC+

5/17/94

BQ17 by Q51

Page 1 of 1

BQ17

	Count	Q51		Row Total
		1	2	
1	47	30	77	
	61.0	39.0	81.9	
	92.2	69.8		
	50.0	31.9		
2	4	13	17	
	23.5	76.5	18.1	
	7.8	30.2		
	4.3	13.8		
Column Total	51	43	94	
	54.3	45.7	100.0	

age 73

SPSS/PC+

5/17/94

Chi-Square Value DF Significance

Pearson	7.89428	1	.00496
Continuity Correction	6.45529	1	.01105
Likelihood Ratio	8.11946	1	.00478
Fleiss-Haenszel test for linear association	7.81030	1	.00510

Minimum Expected Frequency - 7.777

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
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Gamma	.67168	.16951	2.81232	
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age 74

SPSS/PC+

5/17/94

Number of Missing Observations: (18)

Q17 by Q68

Page 1 of 1

Q17

	Q68		Row Total
	1	2	
Count	22	56	78
Row Pct	28.2	71.8	90.4
Col Pct	71.0	84.8	
Tot Pct	22.7	57.7	
2	9	10	19
Count	9	10	19
Row Pct	47.4	52.6	19.6
Col Pct	29.0	15.2	
Tot Pct	9.3	10.3	
Column Total	31	66	97
Total	32.0	68.0	100.0

Chi-Square Value DF Significance

Pearson	2.58021	1	.10821
Continuity Correction	1.77419	1	.18286
Likelihood Ratio	2.46104	1	.11648
Fleiss-Haenszel test for linear association	2.55361	1	.11004

Minimum Expected Frequency = 6.072

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
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Gamma	.39227	.22162	-1.48705	
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Number of Missing Observations: 15

BQ17 by Q90

Page 1 of 1

BQ17	Count	Q90		Row Total
		1	2	
1	39	33	72	80.0
	54.2	45.8		
	81.3	78.6		
	43.3	36.7		
2	9	9	18	20.0
	50.0	50.0		
	18.8	21.4		
	10.0	10.0		
Column Total	48	42	90	100.0
	53.3	46.7		

Chi-Square	Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	.10045	1	.75126
Continuity Correction	.00279	1	.95787
Likelihood Ratio	.10029	1	.75143
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	.00933	1	.92263

Minimum Expected Frequency = 8.400

Statistic	Value	ASE1	Z value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	.08333	.26188	.31605	

Number of Missing Observations: 22

BQ17 by Q92

Page 1 of 1

	Count	Q92		Row Total
		1	2	
BQ17	1	17 22.1 94.4 17.9	60 77.9 77.9 63.2	77 81.1
	2	1 5.6 5.6 1.1	17 94.4 22.1 17.9	18 18.9
	Column Total	18 18.9	77 81.1	95 100.0

Page 160

Chi-Square	SPSS/PC+ Value	DF	Significance
Pearson	.259339	1	.61731
Continuity Correction	1.62911	1	.20183
Likelihood Ratio	3.21763	1	.07285
Mantel-Haenszel test for linear association	2.56609	1	.10917
Fisher's Exact Test:			
One-Tail			.00416
Two-Tail			.17980
Minimum Expected Frequency =	3.411		
Cells with Expected Frequency < 5 =	1 OF 4 (25.0%)		


Page 161

Statistic	Value	ASE1	T-value	Approximate Significance
Gamma	.05616	.00325	2.15625	

Number of Missing Observations: 17

Appendix-IV

**Photo Copies Of The Front Pages Of
Twelve Newspapers Used For Cross Cultural
Comparison**



FOUNDED BY QUAID-I-AZAM MOHAMMAD ALI JINNAH

DAWN

Vol. XLVIII, No. 157, Karachi, Afghanistan 1, 1415, Sunday, June 12, 1994 22 PAGES Rs. 60

Miscellaneous advertisement for 'MISC' featuring a car wheel and text: 'MOST ECONOMICAL AND DEPENDABLE', 'VENTILATING EXHAUST FAN', 'METAL CARPENTRY (PVT) LTD.'

Miscellaneous advertisement for 'DENTONIC' featuring an image of a person's face and text: 'اکل دنتونیک کابل', 'DENTONIC'

Inside

KMC Chief: ADMINISTRATION OF KMC... Swift action: FOUR SENIOR officials of the South Punjab... Unprecedented: THE NUMBER of candidates appearing in the 1994 local... President's appeal: PRESIDENT Farooq Ahmad... Editorials: The Punjab budget... 'Disastrous': IMPOSITION of heavy duties... Balochistan PA... Tribunal: TRIBUNAL and opposition... Aid for Palestine: INTERNATIONAL coalition... Kislinger's preview: SOCCER which is... US upset: BRAZILIAN women's... Disapproval: AMBRY businessmen... Plus... BOOKS

NWFP budget today

Bureau Report: PESHAWAR, June 11: The NWFP budget for the next financial year 1995 will be presented in the Provincial Assembly today... The province has been relying much about 45% of the revenue budget on the federal government...

Bank accounts fraud charge Nawaz will face court, says Qasim

From Nasir Malik: ISLAMABAD, June 11: The Federal Anti Corruption Committee (FACC) said here on Saturday that it had found evidence against opposition leader Nawaz Sharif and his two brothers of manipulating false entries in the bank accounts... The committee also announced that it would file a criminal case against them...



Members of a British engineering firm serving with British UN forces in central Bosnia, gently removing grenades, after being called to investigate mines at a check point near Vitez, AFP

Ceasefire holding in Bosnia

SARAJEVO, June 10: UN peacekeepers reported a "breakdown in activity" on Friday after a 10-hour ceasefire between government and separatist Serb forces... The UN said that the ceasefire was fragile and could break down at any time...

Speedy courts to be abolished next month: PM

ISLAMABAD, June 11: Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto said here on Saturday that she would abolish the 'speedy courts' next month... She said that the speedy courts were established during the military rule and were not in line with the rule of law...

Shaikh Rafiq's son shot dead

Bureau Report: LAHORE, June 11: The latest news according to the provincial capital reached the centre, the leadership on Saturday, when the son of Shaikh Rafiq Ahmad was shot dead in a head-on collision with a truck... The incident took place in the vicinity of the Shaikh Rafiq Ahmad's residence...

ANP, PML to boycott session

From Ahmad Hassan: PESHAWAR, June 11: A joint press conference of the ANP and PML leaders here on Saturday declared to boycott the session of the Provincial Assembly...

Punjab seeks 'share' in NFC award

Bureau Report: LAHORE, June 11: Punjab Finance Minister Malik Mahmood Ahmad said here on Saturday that the province would fight for its rightful share in the National Finance Commission award... He said that the province had contributed significantly to the national economy and deserved a larger share...

President briefed on law, order

By Our Staff Reporter: KARACHI, June 11: President Farooq Ahmad Khan Sarfraz was briefed on law and order matters in South and Sindh on Saturday... The President, who was briefed by the Home Minister, discussed the current situation in the provinces and the measures being taken to maintain law and order...

US, South Korea agree on sanctions

Foreign Minister Kaji Kishore, and followed by the announcement of Israeli overflight by US Secretary of State Warren Christopher... The US and South Korea agreed to impose sanctions on North Korea for its nuclear activities... The sanctions include a ban on the export of high technology goods and a freeze on North Korean assets...

President briefed on law, order

By Our Staff Reporter: KARACHI, June 11: President Farooq Ahmad Khan Sarfraz was briefed on law and order matters in South and Sindh on Saturday... The President, who was briefed by the Home Minister, discussed the current situation in the provinces and the measures being taken to maintain law and order...

Advertisement for 'INTEGRATED DEVICES' featuring a diagram of a telephone exchange system and text: 'THE MOST EFFICIENT RANGE OF TELEPHONE EXCHANGES IN PAKISTAN', 'VITAL LINK', 'TELE LINK', 'WISE LINK', 'PHONE LINK', 'PHONE LINK', 'VOICE LINK'.

THE PAKISTAN TIMES

National English Daily with the largest circulation - Published simultaneously from Islamabad & Lahore

Islamabad, Sunday, June 12, 1994. Muharram-ul-Haram, 1415 A.H.

Head No. 11001 XLVII No. 123

Price Rs. 5.00

Speedy courts to go in July

Opportunists bent to disrupt fragile democracy: PM


Attacks on President unlawful

By Khawaja M. Ihtisham

ISLAMABAD, June 11: Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has said that she is least bothered by the Opposition's attacks on her but that she is quite unfortunate that the President of Pakistan is being made target of criticism on bases and unfounded allegations.

She said that she is not bothered by the Opposition's attacks on her but that she is quite unfortunate that the President of Pakistan is being made target of criticism on bases and unfounded allegations.

She said that she is not bothered by the Opposition's attacks on her but that she is quite unfortunate that the President of Pakistan is being made target of criticism on bases and unfounded allegations.



90-year-old Pakistani Abanul Aswad Khan, his daughter Saira, and his wife, are seen in a court case in Islamabad. The court has ordered the release of the couple. Photo: AFP

Special role assigned to private sector

Leghari for boosting domestic production

KARACHI, June 11: President Farooq Khan Leghari on Saturday called for aggressive production, boosting production and increasing the role of the private sector in the economy.

He said that the government would be taking steps to encourage the private sector to invest in the country and to produce more goods and services.

He also said that the government would be providing incentives to the private sector to encourage investment and production.

Misappropriation, bank fraud

FACC to register cases against Sharif brothers

ISLAMABAD, June 11: The Federal Anti-Corruption Commission (FACC) has found serious irregularities against leader of the National Assembly and his brothers Shaukat Sharif and Abbas Sharif as they failed to repay loans of Rs. 688 million to the National Bank through fake entries.

The FACC has also found that the Sharif brothers had misappropriated funds from the National Bank and had used the money for personal purposes.

The FACC has decided to register cases against the Sharif brothers for misappropriation of funds and bank fraud.

President, PM, others condole

Sh. Rafiq's son shot dead

LAHORE, June 11: Sharif family members and other officials of the Sharif family have expressed their condolences over the death of the son of the late Sh. Rafiq Ahmad, a prominent leader of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP).

The death of Sh. Rafiq's son was a great loss to the PPP and the people of Pakistan. The family members and other officials of the Sharif family have expressed their condolences to the family.

Call to maintain peace during Muharram

ISLAMABAD, June 11: President Farooq Khan Leghari and Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto have called for peace and harmony during the Muharram festival.

They said that the Muharram festival is a time for reflection and prayer, and that it is important to maintain peace and harmony during this time.

Girl student gang-raped

KARACHI, June 11: A 17-year-old girl student was gang-raped by a group of men in a public place in Karachi.

The girl was taken to a hospital and is recovering from her injuries. The police are investigating the case and have arrested several men in connection with the crime.

China for complete ban on N weapons

ISLAMABAD, June 11: China has expressed its support for a complete ban on nuclear weapons.

China has said that it is committed to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and that it will continue to work towards this goal.

Joint defence measures likely to counter Indian N-threat

NEW DELHI, June 11: India and other countries in Asia are discussing joint defence measures to counter the nuclear threat from Pakistan.

The discussion is taking place in the context of the recent developments in the nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan.

Sindh PA budget session begins today

KARACHI, June 11: The Sindh Provincial Assembly has begun its budget session today.

The session will continue for several days and will focus on the provincial budget for the current year.

ainatın Efendisi, ilimlerin varıp idisine davandı, tîmai ve iktisadi itîin problemlere e bulan müstesna bir kabiliyet.

O, fetanetle yöğrulmuş harikulade bir istidat, eşi emsali olmayan bir mürebbi ve terbiyeci.

O, müsfik bir aile reisi, Bir baba, Bir dede, Ve O, veygane LİDER...

Peygamber Efendimiz (S.A.V)'i tüm yönleri ile anlatı selahiyetli kalem, ülkemizin mümtaz şahsiyetlerinden M. Fethullah Gülen Hocaefendi'nin "SONSUZ NUR" adlı kıymetli eserinin tahlil yazısı araştırmacı yazar Latif Erdoğan'ın kaleminden... Yorun ZAMAN

AKADEMİ her zaman dopdolu

ZAMAN

İkramlarınız İçin TÖNBEK Kakaolu Meyveli Kek Saray'da Bakkal, Market ve Toptancı.

izden kurtulmak için faizlerin sıfırlanması gerektiğini belirten Başbakanlık eski Başdanışmanı Prof. Veysi Se

Devlet tefeci ağında



FAİZLER SIFIRLANSIN
Başbakanlık eski Başdanışmanı ve Vergi Hukuku Uzmanı Prof. Dr. Veysi Sevil, Türkiye'nin "böyle faiz kısıt döngüsü"nden kurtulabilmesi için Ajantın pabı faiz oranlarını sıfırlaması gerektiğini ve ülkemin bununla kurtulacağını söyledi. Sevil, "Türkiye'de bugün devlete borç veren 250 bin kişi değil bir tefeci grubu mevcut. Hatta bin 200 kişinin faiz başına devletin 27 milyar lira absojüsü var. Hali hazırda, ülkemin kurtulduğu için bin 250 bin kişiye faiz ödeyip, faiz oranlarını sıfırlanmalıdır. Ülke bu yolla kurtulacaktır. Ajantın bile böyle kurtulduğum" dedi.

Merkez Bankası eski Başkanı Rüüdü Sarıoğlu: **Tarihin en ağır krizini yaşıyoruz**



TÜSİAD Yönetim Kurulu Başkanı Halis Komili: Ekonomi depresyon geçiriyor

TÜRKİYE'Yİ BATILILAR BORÇLANDIRIYOR
Dış Borçlanmanın Türkiye'nin ekonomik ve siyasi bağımsızlığını tehlikeye düşürerek serbestçe gelişimine engel olduğunu belirten Veysi Sevil, "Batılılar eğer bir ülkeyi yok edip kaymaklarını korumak istiyorsa en ufak devamlı borçlandırmıyor. Böylece ekonomik ve siyasi yeniden bağımlı hale geliyorlar. IMF'nin veteceği borç karşılığında Kıbrıs'ı komünizme vargettiler. Güneydoğu'da da aynı için bir cadıyı paraları arzularını istemesi tesadüf değildir. Batılılar binlerce milyar dolarlık seferleriyle yapıyorlar, şimdi para çoğunluğuyla yapıyor, istemesinden başka borç değil" dedi.

ÖZGÜRLÜKLER KISITLANACAK
Merkez Bankası eski Başkanı Rüüdü Sarıoğlu, Türkiye ekonomisinin, tarihinin en ağır krizini yaşadığını belirtti. En büyük endişesinin gündemde olan ekonomik özgürlüklerin kısıtlanması olduğunu kaydeden Sarıoğlu, "Bunları da siyasi özgürlüklerin kısıtlanması takip edeli" dedi. Sarıoğlu, "Türki Cumhuriyeti'nin 'El ekonomik transformasyon' diye adlandırıldığı süreçte Türkiye'nin çok çabuk geçerek, laza ilerlediğini, ancak çabuk yorulduğunu ifade etti

MUHSİN AYDIN / EKONOMİDE

ÖRNEK TÜRKİYE'YE NE OLDU ?
TÜSİAD Yönetim Kurulu Başkanı Halis Komili, Türk ekonomisinin bir depresyon yaşadığını söyledi. Komili, ülkenin içinde bulunduğu durumu sebebiyle yaşadığını herkesin dilinde bulduğunu söyledi. "Bu soruların dolayısıyla anlatarak 'Su anda herkes böyle yaşıyor, ne oldu bize? diye birbirine soruyor. Bir süre önce Türk vatandaşlarına, 'İşte işkabalıklı bedeliniz' diye tehdit eden ülkeler ne oldu? 80 milyar doların üzeri bütünü imzaladık IMF, neden yeniden yurtemizimize müzaker olmaya başladık? Neden geçen süre içinde birimler olarak göçtünüz? nere gered kendinize güvenerek iş çevrelerinizde dolayarak, şimdi yitkin bir çevrelerle oturuyoruz?" dedi.


Y. ULUSOY / İ. BASHMIK - EKONOMİDE

İslami örgütte (!) cevapsiz sorular

İZMİR'DE İslamın asılları bir şakayınan İslamın kâğıtla yazılmadığını, aslında yaşayan bir din olduğunu, aslında bir inanç olduğunu söyleyen Abdullah Yıldızoğlu, "Komünizmin asıllarından farklı olarak İslamın asılları yazılmadık, aslında yazılmadık" dedi.

1. İlk vahiyde, ne yazmıştı vahiyde bu emir parçasını hatırlıyor musunuz? İslamın asılları yazılmadık, aslında yazılmadık" dedi.
2. Allah'ın vahiyde yazdığı emirleri hatırlıyor musunuz? İslamın asılları yazılmadık, aslında yazılmadık" dedi.
3. Allah'ın vahiyde yazdığı emirleri hatırlıyor musunuz? İslamın asılları yazılmadık, aslında yazılmadık" dedi.
4. Kur'an'da yazılmadık, aslında yazılmadık" dedi.
5. Allah'ın vahiyde yazdığı emirleri hatırlıyor musunuz? İslamın asılları yazılmadık, aslında yazılmadık" dedi.

Kore için savaş senaryoları



YAPTIRIMLAR GÜNDEMDE
Küçük Kore yönetiminin müddet tesislerini denetim altına alması konusunda ABD ile olan ilişkiler iyileşerek gidiyor. ABD'de yeni bir Kore savaş senaryoları üretmeye başlandı. Sarayın politik vermesi durumunda kimin kazanacağı konusunda değişiklik tahminler yapılırken, herkesin üzerinde birleştiği bir nokta, çın kaybının çok yüksek olacağı. Bu arada Güney Kore Devlet Başkanı Kim Young-Sam, Japon Dışişleri Bakanı Koji Kakizawa ile Küçük Kore'ye uygulanacak yaptırımlar konusunda Seul'de bir araya geldiler.

DIŞ HABERLERDE

Sivilleşme bir başka bahara

RAFA KALKTI
Anayasa değişikliği çalışmaları parlamenter madanıyla büyük sivilleşme sebebiyle, gündeme gelmesi beklenen "sivilleşme" tartışmaları parlamentonun Genel Kurulunda Bakanlar'ın Milli Savunma Bakanları'na başlaması. Yüksek Askerî Şura'nın kararı denetimine alınması ve Milli Güvenlik Kurulu'nun yapışması gerektiğini bir gündeme tartışılmaya başlandı.

Rusya dünya silah pazarında

ESKİ GÜCÜNE KAVUŞMA ÇABASINDA
Rusya, SSCB'nin dağılmasından sonra kaybettiği pazarların yeniden kazanması ve yıllık silah ihracatını 50 milyar dolara yükseltmeyi hedefliyor. Rusya şu anda dünya silah pazarının yüzde 17'sini elinde tutarken, ABD'nin pazar payı yüzde 40'ı buluyor. Rusya SSCB'nin pazar payı ise 1987 yılında 22.6 milyar dolarlık satışla yüzde 16'ı buluyordu.

GÜNDEM

Yine diploma sorunu
Okuldan mezun olan öğrencilerin çoğuna taahhütname kâğıdı. Bu yasa ile, aile hakları korumak için son sınıf öğrencilerinin taahhütname kâğıdını 11 maddelik bir kâğıda toplamak ve bu kâğıdın bir kısmını devlet memurları için kullanmak isteniyor. Bu yasa ile, aile hakları korumak için son sınıf öğrencilerinin taahhütname kâğıdını 11 maddelik bir kâğıda toplamak ve bu kâğıdın bir kısmını devlet memurları için kullanmak isteniyor.


Türk Birliği Bosna yolcusu



18 HAZİRAN'DA ÇIKACAKLAR
Hosna-Hersek Türk Birliği Gücü Güney Kıbrıs'ta ilk kez bir toplantı düzenleyecek. Bin 260 ton silah ve mühimmat ile birlikte 18 Haziran'da Drincen Limanı'ndan deniz yoluyla Bosna-Hersek'e hareket edecek. Birlik personelinin büyük bir bölümü ise 24-27 Haziran tarihleri arasında hava yoluyla Ankara'dan hareket edecek. Spil'e ulaşıncak.

Ege'de silahsız uçus

Genelkurmay Başkanı Güreş, Ege'ye çıkan Türk jetlerine silah yüklenmeden havalanma emri verdi. Yunan jetleri ise Ege'de silahlı uçuşa devam ediyor.



Orgeneral Güreş'in bundan iki buçuk ay önce sessizce bu emri verdiği ve halen yapılmakta olan Deniz Kürdü tatbikatı sırasında bile uçakların silahsız uçuşu ortaya çıktı.

ABD devreye giriyor Ancak Atina, Türkiye'nin bu jestini gömmedi ve Yunan jetleri Ege'de silahlı uçuşa devam etti. Bu konu ile ilgili ABD Dışişleri Bakanı Christopher tarafından Yunan Dışişleri Bakanı'na tel edildi. Christopher "Yunan jetleri de silahsız uçuşun" dedi.

Papandreu'dan ret Christopher'ın bu mesajına cevap, dün Yunanistan Başbakanı Papandreu'dan geldi. Papandreu, "Tava sahahımızda uçan Yunan uçaklarının nasıl uçacağı konusunda kimin direktif vereceği, Ancak Türk savaş uçakları Yunan hava saldırısına liberal olarak yaklaşmaz, Yunan uçakları silahsız uçuşa devam ediyor" diye konuştu.

Yarın kritik gün Papandreu'nun bu sözlerinden sonra gözler Türk Deniz Kuvvetleri'nin Ege'ye yemekte olduğu Deniz Kürdü tatbikatına çevrildi. Tatbikatın yarınki bölümüne Demirel ile Güreş de katılacak. Bu sırada Türk jetlerinin yavaş silahsız uçuşu da merakla bekleniyor.

Demirel'den jest Demirel ise NATO zirvesine katılan Yunan Dışişleri Bakanı Papulyas aracılığıyla Cumhurbaşkanı Karatoprak'a bir mesaj gönderdi. Demirel Türkiye ile Yunanistan arasında bir düşük anlaşması yapılmasını önerdi. Bu arada Orgeneral Güreş, Yunan Genelkurmay Başkanı'na yaptığı davetiyeyle, **23. sayfada**

BİZİMLİKLER SİLİHSİZ UÇUYOR Silahsız Türk F-16 ve Fanionlar'ı, her gün Ege Denizi üzerinde devriye uçuşları yapıyor. Türk jetleri belli belirsiz uçuş yapıyor. Kızıl Yılan Yunan jetleri ise silahla uçuş yapıyor. Türkiye'nin bu güzel jestine karşılık Yunanistan aynı cevabı veriyor. Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Doğan Güreş, iki ülkenin genelkurmay başkanlarının daha yakın ilişkiler içinde olmasından yana...



GOZYASLARINI TUTAMADILAR Bir kölnünde annesi Zekye Zafar, bir kölnünde eşi Perihan Savaşla hastaneden çıkan Yılmaz Zafar'ın sevindi gözlerini dinlemedi. Annesi ile karşı karşıya sevinçten göz yaşları... (Fotoğraf: HAZİR KİNAZ)



DEP'liler köpek değil ki seveyim

Zahireler eklen köpeğine yazdığı silife günün sonunda Ankara'ya DGM Başsavcısı Nusret Demirel, DEP'li Sedat Yurttaş'ın, insanlara da böyle davranm" diyen mesajına cevap verdi...
Kimsesizdir. DEP'liler köpek değil ki. Ben görevimi yapıyorum. Devlette karşı suç işleyenlere böyle hısıl yaklaşılmaz. Yanlış olur.
Devletin loperaklarını bölmeye çalışan, devleti il boğun kan geline getirmeye ve bir de melimime ortamı içinde görün kişilere elbette ki Gold'ye gösterdim özerki göstermem.

■ Oya ARMITÇU'nun Pazar Sohbeti 12. sayfa

Komili: Bina çökerse herkes altında kalır

TÜSİAD Başkanı Komili, ekonomiyi çökmek üzere olan bir binaya benzettili, "Hor ve keyfi kullanım için için kemirdiği bir binanın dışını boyayarak gerçeği gözden saklamaya çalışılmayalım. Tesisi altı elden geçirelim. Yoksa enkazın altında kimin, nasıl çıkacağını kimse bilmez" dedi.



Aziz Nesin'e özel mezar kararname

Bakanlar Kurulu, ölü yazur Aziz Nesin'in, öldüğü zaman İstanbul-Catalca'daki Nesin Vakfı'nın bahşesine gömülmesini için özel bir kararname çıkarıyor. Nesin, "Cenaze töreni ve mezarının yerini belli edecek herhangi bir ücret istemiyorum. Zaten, bütün organizasyonu bağışlayacağım" dedi. **22'de**



Çocuklarını döven İngiliz karı-koca İstanbul'da yakalandı

Çocuklarını dövdükleri için Interpol tarafından kırmızı biletlerle aranan İngiliz çift, İstanbul'da yakalandı ve tutuklanarak Mithatpaşa Cezaevine gönderildi. Çiftin İngiltere'ye lade edileceği bildirildi.

Joanne Goodvin ile Roger Astill hakkında, Joanne'in ilk eşinden olan ilk çocuğu ve feci şekilde dövdükleri gerekçeyle dava açılmıştı. Astill, ülkesinde işledikleri bir suç yüzünden yakalanmalarına çok şüphilirdi. **22. sayfada**

Uzlaşma sinyali

Çiller Hükümeti'nin zamanında tedbir alınmadıkça suçlu olan TÜSİAD Başkanı Komili, bu arada ilk defa itibarlı sinyali vererek, "Siyasi tüm kesimlerin beraberce omuzlamak zorunda olduğu bu yakınlaşma süreci başlatmak için uzlaşma ve güven ortamı yaratmalıdır" diye konuştu.

Devlet küçülsün

Komili, Türk ekonomisinin 3 yıl sürecek durgunluk dönemine girip gireceğini belirtti, böyle dedi. "Türkiye son dönem büyük borularla ıslaklık tehlikesiyle yüz yüzdür. Devleti küçültüp ülkeyi güçlendirilmelidir. **Ekonomi'de**

Mucize dönüş



SEVDİ, ÖPÜ, KOKLADI Hastaneden eve geliren Zafar, hayatı dönmek için ağlayan oğlu Sarp Savaş'a sarılarak Yılmaz Zafar, özür hisselti, sevdi, öpü, kokladı... **22'de**

25 ay önce derin komada halindeki hastaneye kaldırılan Yılmaz Zafar, sağlığını kaybederek evine döndü. Afaklar arasında le burcu edilen Zafar, eve varır varmaz, 4 aylık oğlu Sarp'a sarıldı, uzun sürüp öpüdü. Zafar, üç gün önce Perihan Savaş'a karşı Zafar'ın kollarında hastane merdivenlerinden inerek omuzlarına kavuştu. Zafar için babası Burhan Elçin ki kaç karaban etti. Doktorlar, Zafar'ın yürümeye ve konuşmaya başlamasını zaman alacağını belirttiler. Zafarın kızıları tanıma, yemek yerme, giyinme gibi duşuncelere payalı faaliyetleri yapıyor. Yavaş yavaş yürümeye başlıyor. **22'de**

Polis: kızıp kendilerini ateşe verdiler
203 155 - İstanbul Mahkemelerinde
148 573 - Ankara
107 004 - Samsun
64 333 - Adana
179 529 - Frankfurt
894 861 - Adli Başkanlık
FİYATLARI 15.000 LİRAYA

GÜNÜN YAZISI
Okıyın EKS
Bakan bir şeyler yapıyor...
ANKARA'da önemli bir olay var. İlan "Büyük bir yolda gelmekte. Çabalarla başarımlar. O yolda başarımların sızdırılmasına katkı vermeyenler, burada barınan ülkelerin başka hiç bir şey yapamazlar." dediğini siyasi partiler var ya... TBMM Başkanı Hüsamettin Cindoruk'un hem görevlerine hem de konuşmasına çok uygun bir tavırla yaptığı müdahale sonucu bir araya geliyor ve Anayasa'nın hiç değilse 14 maddesini değiştirmeye amacıyla çalışmaya başlıyorlar.

İlk lojmanı Müsteşar aldı

Başbakanlığın sağda sunulan ilk konuşma müsteşarı Hazine Müsteşarı İman Birsen, annesi Nihal Birsen ile saat 11'de, Diyar İrkan 1 milyar 506 milyon liraya satışlar, Anne Birsen ilk ihalede alıcı çıkmayan daireye 1 milyar 507 milyon liraya sahip oldu. Birsen, lojman kanununu çıkarsay, o ardubu bir alt katkılı lojmanı da satın alıp annesiyle 48'i öltülü olurmaya planlıyordu.

Çocuklarını döven İngiliz karı-koca İstanbul'da yakalandı

Çocuklarını dövdükleri için Interpol tarafından kırmızı biletlerle aranan İngiliz çift, İstanbul'da yakalandı ve tutuklanarak Mithatpaşa Cezaevine gönderildi. Çiftin İngiltere'ye lade edileceği bildirildi.

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POLİTİKA

Ertuğrul ÖZKÖK

Demokrasi romantikliğini kaybediyor mu?

Orgeneral Güreş'in yanında çok ilginç bir makale durgun. Makale, 17 Şubat 1994 tarihinde *Time* Dergisinde yayımlandı. Yazarı Michael Kinsey. Başlığı da "Demokrasi Romantikliğini Kaybediyor mu?" Güreş'in etrafı çevreyi satıyor, bir süredir dön yazılı sızan demokrasi ile ilgili çok ilginç bir tartışmanın ilginç çekişmelerini veriyor. En ilginç olan Türk ekvânin altında çizildiği bu satılır ilginç. Mesela "Yaşayın bir çözümler" "Sevmedim demokrasiler" ensonda çözümler son bulacaktır. **23'de**

Çiller'e ikinci fren yolda

Anayasa Mahkemesi, Çiller'in süper yetkilerini durdurun kararını, TBMM'nin bu kararın enmiş konuma yıldı devri yapamayacağı" gerekçesiyle dayandırdı. Bu durumda, üç ay önce çıkarılan özelleştirme yetkisinin de iptali gündeme geldi. **23. sayfada**

BAHİSÇİLİKTE SÜPERSENSEL NİZMETTE SÜPERSENSEL

40 YIL

YAKIN BANK

Ünlü kasadan neler çıktı



Türkes yıllardır tartışılan Menderes'in kaşası ile ilgili hakimlerin tuttuğu zabitleri yarın açıklıyor

Her bölümü olay yaratan Firtinalı Yıllar'ın yarın inanılmaz bir skandal var. İhtilal sırasında darımadığın edilen Başbakanlık binasındaki kasalardan çıkan ve görüneni hayretler içinde bırakan belgeler.

Başbakanlık Müsteşarı Ahmet Saffih Korur'a askı mektubu yazan ve imza yerine ruju bulaştıran İzzet Zeki'nin DP'li milletvekilinin eşi.

Öntülü ölenekleri dağıtılan paraların listesi.



28 Mayıs 1960'teki gelişmeler ihtilalciler daha ilk gün birbirine düştü

Türkes'in anılarının bu örnekteki gibi, her günün bir günün parçesi olayları anlatıyor. İhtilal sırasında Menderes'in sonuna kadar iktidardan çektiler ve bir günün bir günü (Cumhuriyet) "Haydi çocuklar, ben buradan çekiyorum" diye yazdığı mektuba "Öğünün ölümsüzü" diyeceği oraklık buzdukları (Cumhuriyet) üzerine "Ya diyor bu adam yahud" demeyi (Cumhuriyet) 19. sayfa

Türkiye'nin en iyi gazetesi

SABAH

12 HAZİRAN 1984 PAZAR SADECE 10.000 LIRA

İste Yunan-PKK işbirliği

Hedef Türk turizmi

1. Yunanistan'ın PKK'ye destek verdiğini iddia eden Yunanistan'ın dış bakanlığı, Yunanistan'ın PKK'ye destek verdiğini iddia eden Yunanistan'ın dış bakanlığı...
2. Bu gelişmeden sonra Yunanistan'ın Konya'da PKK'nin birleşim yeri olduğunu iddia etti...
3. Yunanistan'ın PKK'ye destek verdiğini iddia eden Yunanistan'ın dış bakanlığı...
4. Ekim 1993'te Yunanistan'ın PKK'nin birleşim yeri olduğunu iddia etti...

Cumhurbaşkanı Demirel'e verilen rapor, çirkin işbirliğini somut belgelerle apaçık ortaya koyuyor

Türk işbirliği birliğinde hazırlanan raporda, Yunanistan'ın Türk turizmini baltalamak için PKK'ye büyük destek verdiğini belirtildi. Demirel bu raporun açtığı Yunan Cumhurbaşkanı Karanfilis'e bir uyarı mektubu yolladı. Demirel mektubunda, PKK'nin Avrupa'da terörün öngörü olarak bilindiğini belirterek Yunanistan'ın desteğini çekmesini istedi.

Ancak Karanfilis, mektuba hala cevap vermedi. Yunanistan'ın PKK ile işbirliği reddetmesine rağmen, Yunanistan'ın terörün öngörü olarak bilindiğini belirterek Yunanistan'ın desteğini çekmesini istedi.

"Eniştemi çok severim"

Az Şener, "Eniştemi (Demirel) her sabah bir defa görürüz. Bir gün beni görmeye için sanat etmez" diyor. Şener, söylediği kadar zorunlu olmadıkça, azma eniştemiyle daha fazla görüşmüyor...

"Bay Ozer Çiller gölge Başbakan"

Türkiye'nin First Lady'si, Cumhurbaşkanı Süleyman Demirel'in eşinin kardeşi Ali Şener "Ozer" için (Gölge Başbakan) ifadesinde kaleme aldı. Şener, "Bay Ozer'in her sabah, bu baybaba yakın hisler yaşadığım bir insan."

Nurye AKMAN'ın raporu 14'te

SABAH'ın icinden

Kuran yorumu

Yılmaz Zafer taburcu

SHP'den Kürt TV

Honda'nın yatırımı

TÜSİAD: Fatura birlikte ödenecek

TÜSİAD Başkanı Hulusi Kamil, Türkiye'nin bugün ekonomik olarak istikrar paketi uygulamaları başka çare olmadığını belirterek "Sistem çözülmeye ve her birine bir fatura ödenmektedir. Bunun toplama adımlarımız" dedi.

"Herkes elele verelim"

Kamil, Türkiye'nin ciddi bir kriz ortamında geçtiğini, bu krizi aşabilmek için her kesimin uzlaşması gerektiğini söyledi. "Sistem çözülmeye ve her birine bir fatura ödenmektedir. Bunun toplama adımlarımız" dedi.

"Vergi reformu adaleten yoksun"

TÜSİAD Başkanı Hulusi Kamil, Türkiye'nin bugün ekonomik olarak istikrar paketi uygulamaları başka çare olmadığını belirterek "Sistem çözülmeye ve her birine bir fatura ödenmektedir. Bunun toplama adımlarımız" dedi.

Bebeğe Aslan Sütü!

Özellikle bir aslanlık, Aslan Aslan'ın bu halde varlığını hiç görmemiştir. Anımsadığı da Philadelphia'da hayatını kaybeden Aslan Aslan'ın bu halde varlığını hiç görmemiştir. Anımsadığı da Philadelphia'da hayatını kaybeden Aslan Aslan'ın bu halde varlığını hiç görmemiştir.

SABAH DÜN

İstanbul... 282 208
Ankara... 126 115
İzmir... 124 100
Adana... 93 515
Antalya... 31 400
Yazın... 30 500
Tatlı... 300 200
Adem basılmıyor

Bugün istemeyi unutmayın

Put ve heykel

Kennan Sultan Süleyman döneminde, Mısır'dan gelen demirler, Macar Krallığı hazinesinden İstanbul'a üç heykel getirilmiştir: Apollo'nun, Herkül ve Diana heykelleri. Süleyman'ın eşi Fatma Hanım, bu heykelleri Sultanahmet'teki Aslan Aslan'ın Meydanı'na taşıtı ve onları dikdirdi.

Dünya'nın en büyük heykelleri, Aslan Aslan'ın Meydanı'na taşıtı ve onları dikdirdi.

GÜNER GYAOĞLU 25'te

İran'da kadınlara tebessüm yasası

İran'da kadınlara tebessüm yasası çıkarıldı. Kadınlara tebessüm yasası çıkarıldı. Kadınlara tebessüm yasası çıkarıldı.

Weather

Today: Partly cloudy, warm, possible thunderstorms. High 81. Low 69. Wind westerly 16 mph.
 Monday: Partly sunny. High 87. Low 72. Wind westerly 8-16 mph.
 Yesterday: Temp range 62-82. AQI: N/A. Details on Page 12.

JUN 25 1994

MARINEAN KOTHMANESI

The Washington Post

Sections

- A National News
- B Metro
- C Classified
- D Sports
- E Travel
- F Style
- G Sunday
- H Business
- I Employment

117th Year No. 189

SUNDAY, JUNE 12, 1994

\$1.25

Accord Near On N. Korea Sanctions

U.S., Others Hope To Persuade China Not to Use U.N. Veto

By E. R. Reid
 Washington Post Staff Writer

SEOUL, June 11 — The United States, South Korea and Japan appeared in reach general agreement today to phase in political and economic sanctions against North Korea to punish Pyongyang for its refusal to submit to international inspection of its nuclear program, officials said.

The three nations also agreed that they must keep trying to persuade China, which has veto power in the U.N. Security Council, to agree to sanctions. China, South Korea's last major ally, has opposed sanctions up to now — at least publicly. Japanese Foreign Minister Kotaro Kakizawa is scheduled to visit Beijing on Sunday to make a direct appeal to the Chinese on the sanctions question.

Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff and Kakizawa both came to this morning capital to discuss strategy with South Korean President Kim Young Sam.

Shunji Yanai, the Japanese diplomat who negotiated with the U.S. and South Korea in Washington last week, said in an interview that there were some differences among the three nations on the timing of economic sanctions. The United States and South Korea were talking about a cutoff of cash flows from Japan as the first step of sanctions, Yanai said, but the Japanese wanted to adopt milder steps first and move on to the monetary restriction in a later phase.

"The U.S. wants to apply sanctions faster than we do," he said, but he said the differences were expressed "simply in the sense of discussing various options," rather than as a clear Japanese objection to American plans.

After his meetings here with South Korean officials, Tarnoff, the American diplomat, seemed to set a more gradual approach. In a conference with South Korean reporters, he said the situation call for "stern but phased in sanctions according to local media reports."

The Japanese foreign minister told the South Korean president today not to be misled by "irresponsible

A Boy's Cry for Help, the Ardent Defense of a Teacher

By Tamara Jones and Patricia Davis
 Washington Post Staff Writers

He was young and vibrant, with a touch of irreverence, the kind of favorite teacher people remember for a lifetime. Within the tiny universe of Robert Frost Middle School, 31-year-old Paul Luetkenmeyer was the perfect son.

When a child needed lunch money or a ride home, when an overweight girl sat crying by herself after school, "Mr. Luke" was there with an extra dollar or a kind word.

When mothers and fathers were too busy for a soccer match by Little League game, Mr. Luke was there to cheer instead. When the Annandale school closed for snow days, Mr. Luke pulled restless boys into his yellow truck to go sledding in the park. When children sent out invitations to birthday parties or bar mitzvahs, Mr. Luke was high on the guest list.

He was surrogate father, big brother, best friend — all in one.

And then late one December afternoon, a 12-year-old boy asked his mother to come upstairs. He had something to tell her. He pulled her into a darkened bedroom and wouldn't let her turn on the lights. Then he sobbed out a terrible secret.

"My teacher touched me . . ."

Those four simple words changed everything in this well-ordered Fairfax County enclave of lawyers, executives and military officers. The accusation ate its way into their schoolyards and hallways, into their grocery stores and

What a 12-year-old had to say about his favorite teacher sent a shock wave through Annandale.



Paul Luetkenmeyer's many admirers could not accept that he might have molested one of his students.

community clubs and family rooms, into their souls.

Not guilty, they cried. Not Mr. Luke.

"He's brought charges to kids' lives that parents will forever be indebted for," said Mary Darr, whose 12-year-old son, David, considers Mr. Luke "my best friend."

So after Paul Luetkenmeyer was charged with three felony counts of aggravated sexual battery and placed on unpaid leave, hundreds of parents, teachers and children did what came naturally in an affluent suburb of the nation's capital. They mounted a campaign against their common enemy. The little boy.

They called it a "fight for truth and justice." There were subcommittees, fires, T-shirts, petitions, a protest march and a candlelight vigil on Christmas Eve. The students held a dance to raise money for his legal defense and classroom before a video camera. "We miss you! We love you! We believe in you!" Some printed an obscene underground newsletter on a home computer, ridiculing the charges against their teacher. They drummed the accuser out of school.

But there would be no winners in this fight. Not the child, who even now is vilified as a sissy, a liar, "a fat." Not the teacher, who last month pleaded guilty to reduce charges, but the still contends were missed.

And not the many people whose lives were forever changed by Paul Luetkenmeyer, who are tormented by questions that won't go away: Was Luetkenmeyer the real victim? Or was a community's soul?

See TEACHER, A18, C-1

Kelly Makes Reelection Bid Official

D.C. Mayor Tells Supporters She's 'Tough Enough to Deal' With Critics

By James Ragland
 Washington Post Staff Writer



Mayor Sharon Pratt Kelly and her husband, James R. Kelly III, walk down U Street NW with supporters after she officially declared her candidacy.

D.C. Mayor Sharon Pratt Kelly formally began her campaign for reelection yesterday, offering a bold but emotional defense of her record and asking for another four-year term in office.

With polls showing that her popularity with voters has dropped dramatically since her Election Day victory four years ago, Kelly told a crowd of 1,200 supporters at the historic Lincoln Theater that she is ready to fight to keep her job.

"I am not a career politician, but I am asking you for four more years," said Kelly, 50, a former utility company executive who ran for elective office for the first time in 1990. "We're not going to get sidetracked in this campaign. We're going to stay on the upbeat in this campaign, because we have a good story to tell."

But Kelly, who swept into office on a promise to reform D.C. government, has a much more complex story to tell this year and a far different political climate than in 1990. No longer the outsider, she must defend a record of reform while fighting off two politically entrenched rivals, D.C. Council members John Kay (D-At-Large) and Marion Barry (D-Ward 8), as well as several other challengers.


And if she was the Democratic nomination in the Sept. 13 primary, she likely will face another strong competitor, Bill Liebman (D-At-Large) in the November election.

See KELLY, A22, C-1

Sen. Charles S. Robb (D-Ia.) hopes for a big margin in Tuesday's primary. Page B1

Frantic Scramble To Change a Bill

Republicans Get Lots of Help Drafting Health Care Changes



The office of the House Ways and Means Committee chairman, above. The door to the nearby committee chamber was walled off yesterday after a reporter was sighted.

By Dana Priest
 Washington Post Staff Writer

The deep marbled hallways of the Longworth House Office Building were dark yesterday, most of the Capitol Hill guards gone, the X-ray security machines still. But inside Room 1100, the grand Ways and Means Committee chamber, the Republican opposition and its business and health care industry allies were working furiously to change the health care bill they will have to debate this week.

Having been given a scant 72 hours — 48 of them on the weekend — to submit amendments to the bill proposed last week by acting Chairman Sam Gibbons (D-Fla.), the Republicans "went into crisis mode," according to a participant in yesterday's meeting who described their efforts to write alternatives.

Scores were set on hand to help out. The health and pharmaceutical lobbies. The Alzheimer's people. The cancer people. The insurance industry. The real estate. The medical association and specialty society experts. The Chamber of Commerce, The Business Roundtable. The American Dental Association. The managed care folks. The self-insurance people. The 200 health care people. Smart people who want to work for important legislative committees, and most work for important Washington law firms.

"It was an open invitation for everyone and anyone," said Edward Grossman Jr., vice president of The Upjohn Co.'s Washington office, who showed up, like many of the 20 people present.

See HEALTH, A8, C-1

'Impotent' Montgomery School Integration Plan Assailed

By Lisa Jeff
 Washington Post Staff Writer

The issue of school desegregation has been allowed to drift off the agenda in Montgomery County, producing a school system blemished by racial and ethnic isolation despite its substantial financial resources, Harvard University researchers have concluded.

In a 43-page draft report, a team of government and education scholars questioned Montgomery's stated commitment to racially mixed classrooms — and with it the county's reputation as a bastion of progressive social policies.

They were particularly critical of Montgomery's mag-

net school program, which uses special courses in the arts, to recruit in languages and science to draw white students to ethnically minority neighborhoods. There are no magnets — that bring minority students to predominantly white schools.

With at least 17 of Montgomery's 165 schools composed almost entirely of either white or minority students, the magnets have proved "ineffective and unfelicitous" as a desegregation tool, they wrote.

Montgomery Schools Superintendent Paul L. Vance, who was interviewed by the Harvard team during its research, did not respond to two Washington Post requests for comment last week. But other school officials criticized the Harvard report for focusing exclusively on inte-

gration and ignoring the system policies that foster high student achievement.

In recent years, the Montgomery Board of Education has shifted money and staff to reduce the disparity in academic performance among whites, Asians, blacks and Latinos wherever they are enrolled, school officials said.

The report, which was given to school officials Wednesday and obtained by The Post, blamed the imbalances on the voluntary nature of Montgomery's desegregation plans. Without an outside monitor to set enforceable guidelines, apathy and apportionment have rendered the Board of Education's policies "impotent," the researchers wrote.

See DESEGREGATION, A18, C-1

Baseball Faces Strike, Again

Owners Want Salary Cap, Revenue Sharing; Players Say Game's Finances Are Sound

By Richard Justice
 Washington Post Staff Writer

Baseball has been down this road so many times that stopping play seems almost inevitable. Once again, the owners say they're going bank and that the system is broken and must be fixed with, among other things, a salary cap that would set limits on player earnings. Once again, they want to be determined to test the players and their union.

Once again the players are saving money. They're saying they won't start paying back the gains they've earned through the courts, and collective bargaining during the past 22 years, they've seen no over-

haul problems, that they've heard the same idea as all the previous negotiations, and that this dispute, like the others, is about power and control.

And there is a strong possibility that the game will be shut down for the eighth time in 22 years. "We've heard rumors that some owners want to shut down the industry for a year and a half or more," said Donald Rubin, executive director of the Major League Players Association.

Rubin said the players — fearing the owners will declare a legal impasse and unilaterally institute their proposed new system over the winter — perhaps as early as Thursday will call a strike date. That date could be in the first week of August, a time when the owners have the need to lose in terms of revenue from national television and the playoffs, which would begin in October.

INSIDE

Season of Challenges For Clinton Presidency

The president faces crucial tests on several fronts in the next few months — juggling the domestic agenda, foreign policy and questions of character.

Many see the passage of health care legislation as the lens through which his domestic success or failure will be viewed. Meanwhile North Korea and Haiti remain potential flash points, and the Park Geun-hye lawsuit under scores doubts about Clinton's personal life. With midterm Congress could elections around the corner, observers say the pressure is on for Clinton to prove himself.

NATION, Page A16

Risks in Haiti

The administration's get-tough posture with Haiti's military rulers has triggered a stalled policy, but it also reduces the possibility of a U.S. military intervention. Additionally, the administration appears to have left itself little room to back down should economic sanctions fail and Haiti continue to defy President Clinton.

NATION, Page A9

A car bomb outside a Guadalajara, Mexico, luxury hotel yesterday killed five and left extensive damage, including a wrecked bus. Police cited a possible link to drug traffickers. Story on Page A28.



U.S. Backs Russian Bid For North Korea Talks

Moscow Says It That 'Cannot Tolerate' Violation of Nonproliferation Treaty

WASHINGTON Post Service
ISTANBUL — Seeking to secure Moscow's backing for a tough sanctions resolution, the United States dropped its earlier opposition and endorsed on Friday a Russian proposal for an international conference on North Korea's quest to become a nuclear power.

China was fearful of any measure that could destabilize the regime of the North Korean strongman, Kim Il Sung, and cause chaos on its doorstep. Beijing has been extremely discreet about being isolated in the UN Security Council and has not exercised its veto right in more than two decades.

Bosnia War End in Sight to UN General

SARAJEVO, Bosnia-Herzegovina — United Nations officials predicted here Friday that a temporary cease-fire that took effect at noon would mark "the beginning of the end" of the war here.

positions on Friday near Modrica, west of Brcko, enclaves warring a civilian, Muslim-controlled Sarajevo, said Serbs shelled Muslim positions outside of Brcko.

how to partition the former Yugoslav republic, 70 percent of which is under Serbian control.



Nuclear Club Distressed by China's Test Of H-Bomb

China Races to Update Its Nuclear Weaponry Before Talks on Ban

By Patrick E. Tyler
BEIJING — China exploded a hydrogen bomb Friday as part of a series of underground tests designed to modernize its nuclear forces before test ban negotiations are concluded by 1996.

Moscow Accepts Partnership and 'Strategic Cooperation' With NATO

By William Drozdiak
ISTANBUL — Dispelting months of doubt about Russia's intentions, Foreign Minister Andrei V. Kozyrev said Friday that he would soon travel to NATO headquarters in Brussels to sign agreements on military cooperation and a new strategic relationship with the alliance.

brought together foreign ministers from NATO's 16 member states and their former Communist adversaries.

Even though Mr. Kozyrev disappointed some Western officials by not specifying a date for his trip, senior U.S. officials said they expected that it would take place before the summit meeting of industrialized democracies to be held in Naples, Italy, next month.

Mr. Kozyrev expressed satisfaction with a NATO statement issued Thursday which said "talks about both the Partnership and an individual program."

Mr. Kozyrev said he would visit Brussels very soon so that he can quickly activate both parts.

Clinton Tightens Sanctions on Haiti

President Bill Clinton tightened sanctions against Haiti on Friday, including a ban on all commercial airline flights, thereby putting new pressure on the country's military leaders.



WAYS AND MEANS — Dan Rostenkowski, right, the Illinois Democrat under indictment for corruption, greeting the U.S. trade representative, Mickey Kantor, before House Ways and Means Committee hearings before on the World Trade Organization. Mr. Rostenkowski pleaded not guilty to the charges Friday, Page 4.

Quebec Separatist Passions Flare Anew

Anger Rises on Both Sides as Election Approaches

By Charles Truchant
TORONTO — The newly serious possibility that Quebec may vote to secede from Canada as early as next year has widened the gulf between the French- and English-speaking Canadians, provoking a level of anger and resentment not heard in nearly a generation.

with indignation, Alberta's leader called Mr. Bouchard's mission "reprehensible," and Saskatchewan's premier described it as "a con job."

Quebec separatists have used some harsh language, too. Jacques Parizeau, chief of the separatist Parti Quebecois and the likely next premier of Quebec, all but called for a boycott of the Bank of Montreal last week after its chief economist predicted "a great deal of loss" in financial markets if the party took power in Quebec.

As Terror Spreads, Yeltsin Declares War on Moscow Gangsters

By Michael Specter
MOSCOW — People here take misery in stride: Gangland slayings, daylight robberies, bribery of officials have all become part of life in the new Russia.

But the mafia, for the first time, one of modern terror's most deadly instruments — the car bomb — has appeared in Moscow, introduced by gangsters who seem to become more brazen and willful every day.

Calling Russia a crime "superpower," President Boris N. Yeltsin has declared that he will make law and order his top priority. On Thursday, Mr. Yeltsin's cabinet sent to Parliament a tough new crime bill that would make it far easier to prosecute organized crime leaders.

because the power of the gangsters is far greater than the resources committed so far by the government.

country's largest car dealership, came at rush hour on Tuesday evening. Somehow, only six pedestrians in the heavily congested area were hurt.

Earlier on the day of the attack, the director of a small investment company lost his right leg, blown off by a bomb planted in his car.

Table with 2 columns: Dow Jones, S&P 500. Values: Dow Jones 3,773.45, S&P 500 112.51.

Table with 2 columns: The Dollar, Yen. Values: The Dollar 20.31, Yen 103.525.

Table with 2 columns: Newsstand Prices, U.S. Dollar. Lists prices for various international publications.

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VOL. 86, NO. 135

US Cars Add Right-Hand Drive To Increase Sales in Japan

By Cameron W. Barr

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

TOKYO

IT'S like seeing someone wearing bell-bottom jeans or catching a clip of Sonny Bono in a spangly outfit. There is something eerily familiar, something reminiscent of the 1970s, about the way the Ford Motor Company is selling its imports in Japan.

The Fords are priced slightly lower than competing Japanese cars. Sales people, working hard

'[US] imports will start with occupying niche segments in Japan.'

— Takahiro Fujimoto, economics professor

to counter American cars' reputation for poor quality, stress distinctive features not found in domestic automobiles. Ford and other United States carmakers tout their new responsiveness to

their foreign customers.

It's the same approach that Japan's big automobile companies used to pitch their products to American consumers in the early 1970s, back when the Toyota Corolla was named "Lemon of the Year." Ford even pushes the better fuel economy of some of its models.

But all this is no accident.

Konen Suzuki, a former Toyota Motor Corporation executive who helped Toyota escape its cheap-car image and begin the Japanese drive toward huge US sales, has been president of Ford's Japanese subsidiary since February 1991.

Can he beat Japan's carmakers at their own game and sell enough Fords in Japan so the company won't have to measure its market share here in a fraction of a percentage point?

Self-confidence is one of Mr. Suzuki's strong suits. "The guy

See AUTOS page 4



ROBERT HARBISON - STAFF/FILE

Fishermen Hit by Shortage of Salmon
Canada imposes a stiff fee on US fishing boats in Canadian waters, contending they take more than their share of salmon. Here, Larry Carlson aboard "Halo" in Warrenton, Ore. PAGE 7.

WASHINGTON ABUZZ

Echoes From Oval Office Reveal Earful on Clinton

By Marshall Ingwerson

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

WASHINGTON

PRESIDENT Clinton returned from abroad last week to a town that had been talking about him.

Veteran reporter Bob Woodward, who helped bring down the Nixon presidency, was promoting a new book that portrays the first-year Clinton White House in "complete chaos," as well as of a president who threw profane tantrums, couldn't make a decision, and had little confidence in his economic program.

Mr. Clinton had not been riding high lately anyway. His D-Day speech last week in Normandy won strong reviews, but his low public approval ratings remained unmoved. The day Clinton returned to town, the political director of the Democratic Party admitted to a reporter that some Democratic candidates would be better off putting distance between themselves and Clinton.

See CLINTON page 20

US to Propose Phased Sanctions On North Korea

Gradual action could keep door to dialogue with North open and avoid Beijing veto

By Lucia Mouat

Special to The Christian Science Monitor

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y.

THOUGH major hurdles and risks still lie ahead, the US is pressing forward with its plan to persuade the United Nations to impose sanctions on North Korea for refusing to open nuclear sites to international inspection.

The United States proposal, which will be submitted to the UN Security Council this week, is expected to begin gradually with curbs on cultural exchanges and UN technical assistance, and a possible arms embargo.

Though Council action may be weeks away, US officials in Washington and at the UN say they are confident of ample support. They expect China, despite its protests that sanctions may aggravate the crisis, to abstain rather than veto the proposal. (China's 'positive' role, Page 4.)

Tougher economic sanctions

affecting China's oil exports to North Korea and the export of hard currency from North Korean workers in Japan to relatives back home would come into play only later, if North Korea continued to defy nuclear inspectors.

The US has been getting broad input for its resolution in bilateral talks here with Security Council member nations and overseas. Diplomats from the US, South Korea, and Japan held talks in Washington a week ago and in Seoul this past weekend. Russia also is closely involved. Its proposal for an international conference on the issue will be mentioned in the resolution.

The aim of the graduated sanctions is less to punish North Korea than to try to keep it a com-

SCUFFLE OVER SANCTIONS

plying member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Both the US and Pyongyang want to launch a long-awaited third round of negotiations, taking up such issues as economic aid and diplomatic recognition. Yet US Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright says certain conditions must be met first. The talks cannot be a "freebie" for North Ko-

rea, she says.

The move to sanctions carries risks. North Korea has said that any embargo would amount to a declaration of war. Pyongyang has threatened dire consequences.

See SANCTIONS page 4

COVER STORY



Off Broadway Baby

New York theater, which influences drama around the country, draws more inspiration these days from Off Broadway.

9

LEARNING

Year-Round Schooling

A voluntary program in Virginia wins praise from students, teachers.

12



Curriculum Vitae

Shakil Akhtar was born in Okara, Pakistan on February 2, 1952. He received his Master's degree in English Literature from the University of Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan, in 1973. Worked as Lecturer in English Literature from October 1975 to March 1977. He passed the Central Superior Services Examination in 1977 and joined Civil Services Academy, Lahore as probationer officer in March 1977. From 1978 to 1983 he worked as Information Officer in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Islamabad. He taught Mass Communication and Journalism as Instructor at the Information Service Academy, Islamabad between 1983 and 1986. He served as Press Attache, Embassy of Pakistan, Ankara, from 1986 to 1990. He has been on study leave since then to earn his Ph.D.