

EUROPE AND ITS OTHERS: IMMIGRANTS AND NEW RACISM IN EUROPE

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

YAĞMUR ÖZKAN

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

MAY 2007

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Sencer Ayata
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Assoc. Prof. Sibel Kalaycıođlu
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Prof. Dr. Meyda Yeđenođlu-Mutman
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Assoc. Dr. Mesut Yeđen (METU, SOC) _____

Prof. Dr. Meyda Yeđenođlu-Mutman (METU, SOC) _____

Prof. Dr. Rařit Kaya (METU, ADM) _____

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last Name: Yağmur Özkan

Signature:

ABSTRACT

EUROPE AND ITS OTHERS: IMMIGRANTS AND NEW RACISM IN EUROPE

Özkan, Yağmur

M.S., Department of Sociology

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Meyda Yeğenoğlu-Mutman

May 2007, 86 pages

There is no doubt about the fact that Europe has become home for millions of ex-colonials, guest-workers, refugees, asylum-seekers. However, these new Europeans are not acknowledged to be Europeans but instead they are mostly perceived as *not belonging*. Being deprived of political and social rights and exposed to economic exploitation make them the European “apartheid”. Within this present conjuncture, this thesis aims at a modest discussion on ever-rising racism in Europe. It focuses on European racism and in particular the new racism in Europe which has been on the rise since the 1970s and 1980s. It examines European new racism via three exemplary cases (France, Britain and Germany). Out of different histories, economies and out of different racisms, this thesis searches for similarities. In fact, it claims that Europe has a *traditional racism* which is claimed to be one of the outcomes of the European self-construction process. Therefore, the other point of focus that this thesis engages in is the process through which Europe constructs its identity. It intends to discuss what Europe is and how Europe constructs itself via its Others. It claims that Europe identify itself on the negation of its Others. Hence, this thesis attempts to discuss the connection between racism in Europe and European self-construction/ self-identification process. In other words, this thesis intends to clarify that the self-construction/ self-identification of

Europe, which has depended mostly on the negation of its Others, has resulted in racist-thinking and racism which has always existed in Europe despite the changes in different periods and different contexts forming a *racist tradition* in Europe.

Keywords: New racism, Europe, the Other, identity

ÖZ

AVRUPA VE DİĞERİ: AVRUPA'DA GÖÇMENLER VE YENİ İRKÇILIK

Özkan, Yağmur

Yüksek Lisans, Sosyoloji Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Meyda Yeğenoğlu-Mutman

Mayıs 2007, 86 sayfa

Avrupa bugün hiç kuşkusuz, milyonlarca konuk işçiye, mülteciye, sığınmacıya ve eski sömürgelerinden gelenlere ev olmuştur. Fakat bu yeni Avrupalılar Avrupalı kabul edilmek bir yana çoğunlukla Avrupa'ya ait görülmemektedirler. Politik ve sosyal haklardan mahrum olmaları ve ekonomik sömürüyle yüzleşmeleri onları, Avrupa'nın "apartheid"ı haline getirmektedir. Bu tez, bugünkü konjonktür içerisinde, Avrupa'da sürekli artan ırkçılığı mütevazı bir şekilde tartışmayı amaçlamaktadır. Tez, Avrupa'daki ırkçılığa, özellikle de 1970'ler ve 1980'lerden itibaren yükselişte olan yeni ırkçılığa odaklanıp; bu yeni ırkçılığı Fransa, İngiltere ve Almanya örnekleri üzerinden incelemektedir. Farklı geçmişler, farklı ekonomiler ve farklı ırkçılıklar arasında, bu tez benzer olanı aramaktadır. Daha doğrusu, Avrupa'nın kendini oluşturma sürecinin bir sonucu olarak *geleneksel bir ırkçılığa* sahip olduğunu iddia etmektedir. O halde tezin diğer odak noktası Avrupa'nın kimliğini oluşturma sürecidir. Bu tez Avrupa'nın ne olduğu ve kendini Diğerlerinden nasıl kurguladığını tartışmayı da amaçlamaktadır. Avrupa'nın kendini Diğerlerini olumsuzlayarak tanımladığını iddia etmektedir. Dolayısıyla bu tez Avrupa ırkçılığı ve Avrupa'nın kendini tanımlama, kurgulama, yaratma süreci arasındaki ilişkiyi tartışmaya teşebbüs etmektedir. Diğer bir deyişle, bu tez çoğunlukla Diğerlerini olumsuzlamaya dayanan Avrupa'nın kendini tanımlama,

kurgulama ve yaratma sürecinin Avrupa'da hep var olmuş olan, farklı dönemler ve farklı bağlamlardaki değişimlere rağmen *ırkçı bir gelenek* oluşturan ırkçılıkla sonuçlandığı iddiasını açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Yeni ırkçılık, Avrupa, Diğeri, kimlik

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First of all I want to thank Prof. Dr. Meyda Yeğenoğlu-Mutman for being my thesis supervisor. She cannot even imagine how much honour I felt when she said she was impressed by my thesis as I am an admirer of her academic presence. I also want to thank the committee members, Assoc. Dr. Mesut Yeğen and Prof. Dr. Raşit Kaya for their valuable comments and criticisms.

I also cannot thank Saime Ünlüsoy enough for the incredible amount of time and energy she has given me not only during my thesis but she has always with me since I have started to graduate programme at METU. This thesis would not be the same but neither would I be the person who I am now without her support and criticisms.

Lastly, I want to thank sincerely my family and my friends for their invaluable emotional support and patience throughout this mostly depressing process. I do not have enough competence in writing to express how much I feel lucky for having them.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ÖZ	vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	ix
CHAPTERS	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. EUROPE’S OTHERS IN TIME.....	6
2.1 Europe in Antiquity.....	8
2.2 Europe in the Middle Ages.....	12
2.3 Europe in Modernity.....	16
2.4 Europe in the Cold War Era.....	20
2.5 Europe in the Post-Cold War Era.....	21
3. EUROPEAN RACISMS.....	26
3.1 Classical Racism in Europe (Biological Racism).....	28
3.2 Neo-Racism in Europe (Cultural Racism).....	34
4. THREE CASES OF NEO-RACISM: A GENERAL OVERVIEW... ..	44
4.1 The French Experience: A Brief History of French Immigration.....	46
4.2 Patterns of French Neo-Racism.....	49
4.3 The British Experience: A Brief History of British Immigration	52
4.4 Patterns of British Neo-Racism.....	55
4.5 The German Experience: A Brief History of German Immigration.....	58
4.6 Patterns of German Neo-Racism.....	61
5. DISCUSSION: WHAT WILL BECOME OF EUROPE?.....	64
6. CONCLUSION:.....	70
7. BIBLIOGRAPHY:.....	78

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“It seems to her such nonsense
–inventing differences,
when people, heaven knows,
were different enough without that.”¹

Europe has been in an ever increasing indulgence with two contradictory developments. One of them is that which was discussed in the Lisbon Agenda². According to this agenda, it was claimed that the European Union should encourage immigration because Europe is face to face with “the problems of an aging European population, sectoral skills shortages and a lack of vitality”³. Indeed, apart from the present shortage in terms of skilled labour in some sectors, illegal migrants have an important role in the informal sectors in Europe; a fact that cannot be denied. The other development that contradicts this clear need for migrant labour is the increasing rise of racism and xenophobia which threatens Europe without exception. The success of the extreme right in France (Front National), Germany (Republikaner), Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs) etc... and the increasing violence against immigrants especially in Germany and Britain rightly generates anxieties across Europe. Unfortunately, however, this trend which causes uneasiness is so strong that even anti-discriminatory laws which were enacted both by national governments and the EU remain inadequate.

¹ Virginia Woolf, *To the Lighthouse* (London & NY: Routledge, 1994), 7.

² European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index (2005).

³ *Ibid*, 3.

The diffused and widespread racism/xenophobia which started in the 1980s coincided with the economic recession of European economy in general. This economic decline affected mostly the working classes in Europe and caused the decrease of wages, unemployment and housing problems. Therefore, in such a context, racism flourished and continued to increase in intensity in 1990s and in the new millennium. On the other hand, although the nation-states put additional restrictions on the entrance of immigrants due to these economic conditions and due to the rising oppositions in the public, migration is also on the rise. Despite the strict measures taken by national and international bodies, migration into Europe continues in illegal ways. The inevitable human tragedies accompanying this situation have now become commonplace all throughout Europe. This widespread racism in Europe serves the right-wing parties – which base almost all their policies and discourses on anti-immigration– as their scapegoat for all the economic and social ills in their countries.

Having mentioned that the right-wing parties have been on a gradual rise since the 1980s in a context of economic decline, their taking advantage of this situation and further exploitation is no wonder considered as part of their cruel and antidemocratic political agenda by anti-racists and minority rights activists. Meanwhile, each country considers this very same problem not in similitude but in discreteness and so each case becomes “distinct” from the other which in turn creates more problems. What I intend to clarify, however, is the fact that racism is racism no matter what and that regardless of different contexts and times racism has always been in existence in Europe since time immemorial.

Therefore, in this thesis I hope to discuss that although there are differences between countries in Europe in terms of the “types of racism”; racism is one of the components of Europe even before it emerged in modernity under the notion of racism. As opposed to the common belief, racism in Europe did not end after the World War II with the end of Nazi regime in Germany and Fascist regime in Italy. Nor did racism restrain itself in the ex-colonies outside European territories. Instead, it transformed from emphasis on biological differences to focus on incompatible cultures. In other words, it renewed and

adjusted itself to the new conditions. And in the current context, racism turned its face to the new immigrants *of* Europe⁴.

Consequently, it is necessary to contextualize racism, to relocate it in its new context against its ahistorical representation in order to be able to reveal its nature. A search for the contextualization of racism in Europe therefore necessitates a search for the identity formation of Europe which I shall try to argue as the main motive behind European racism. It is my intention to show that the search for the identity formation of Europe will lead us to the European racism and will clear the way to discuss what Europe shall become or should be in a few decades.

In line with this aim, the purpose of the second chapter is to discuss what Europe is and how Europe constitutes itself via its Others. Europe is not considered as essentially a unified entity but rather treated as a discursive and mythical construct. This kind of identification is thought to avoid probable criticisms on essentialism and thought to open a space to discuss Europe as an entity in the process of “becoming”. In so doing, the history of Europe shall be outlined in five sections, in each of which the Others of Europe will be examined. Subsequently, Europe is discussed in relation with its Others in antiquity, the Middle Ages, modernity, Cold War era, and post-Cold War era.

The third chapter intends to find an answer to the question whether racism is an accident/exception in European history or whether racism emerges within the very nature of the idea of Europe or through its core values so long as defining Europe as a discursive and mythical idea that constructs itself via the existence of the Others brings this question on the fore. As the racism/xenophobia is on the rise in Europe, whether this rise is related to the process of self-construction and reconstruction of Europe or not is

⁴ The choice to use the expression “immigrants *of* Europe” instead of “immigrants in Europe” is a conscious one. This usage of “*of*” intends to imply two important issues: The first one is the claim that these immigrants who became the “derelicts” of Europe did not come to Europe independently. On the contrary, the circumstances which pulled these immigrants have been created by Europe consciously or unconsciously, directly or indirectly. For example, the guest-worker phenomenon or the economic unrest in Africa and Asia as a result of the global causes to name just a few. The second issue, on the other hand, is the claim which I shall propose in the discussion: Europe should take the responsibility for its immigrants if Europe is the cradle of human rights, legality and civilization.

the main question. It is my belief that racism is not an exception or accident in the history of Europe; on the contrary, it is one of the fundamental components or causes of the European self-identification, self-construction process which has been formed/reformed through and within its inherently exclusivist history.

In the fourth chapter, three European states –France, Britain and Germany- will be discussed in terms of their immigration and neo-racist histories as the examples of European racism. Although these three countries have different immigration histories and different policies in dealing with the immigration issue, it is believed that they reveal the similitude of Europe in terms of its attitude towards racism. Indeed, racism in Europe can only be discussed as a *tradition*, a tradition that emerges out of the very heart of Europe itself, out of its self-identification. Therefore, in order to be able to argue this tradition, it is necessary to engage with the issue of racism in the present context. It is also necessary to reveal the similarities in European racism within the particularities between states.

The purpose of the discussion part is to discuss these questions: Will Europe become “stranger to itself”⁵, will it be able to live harmoniously and humanely with other cultures and civilisations that do not share the defining features of the Christian Latin West without “labelling” them and therefore enrich itself or will it close itself within the “fortress Europe”? Will Europe continue its tradition to make the stranger its Other/enemy as the compulsory component of its identity or will it compromise with it as its “hidden face”⁶ by breaking down the walls of prejudice?

⁵ Julia Kristeva, *Strangers to Ourselves* (NY: Colombia University Press, 1991).

⁶ Ibid.

CHAPTER 2

EUROPE'S OTHERS IN TIME

The main concern of this chapter is a discussion of the process of the formation of the notion of Europe in order to find an answer to the question “What is Europe?” The imagined unity of Europe is tried to be deconstructed in order to reveal the existence of the Other within the heart of Europe since time immemorial. Contrary to the general view, Europe was and still is far from being a complete unity. Indeed, it is this lack of unity that makes the Other so important for the identity of Europe. This chapter intends to demonstrate that throughout its history, Europe has fantasized its unity by inventing Others. Therefore, the unity of Europe and the notion of Europe itself turn out to be an invented notion depending on the existence of at least one Other or more.

Undoubtedly, there can be no single definition of Europe however hard one may try to find, and as a result, the answer to the question what Europe is can only be an interim, provisional answer. Since the word process which entails the notion of Europe as an idea and as a discursive and mythical construct is taken for granted as the basic assumption, the notion of Europe as such becomes contextual because different elements have been emphasized in different contexts. In other words, the definitions of Europe change in different times and in different places according to different peoples. In addition to the changing character of the notion of Europe, its frontiers have also been exposed to several changes throughout its history from the ancient times until today and seem to continue to change while we are witnessing the expansion of the EU. In this sense “each generation has its own Europe”.⁷ What has been included and what has been excluded in

⁷ Anssi Paasi, “Europe as a Social Process and Discourse: Considerations of Place, Boundaries and Identity,” *Europe and Regional Studies* 8, no.1 (2001), 10.

special contexts is the core of the issue of what Europe is and the ongoing debates surrounding it.

Conceivably then, a search for the definition of Europe should be necessarily historical because of this contextuality of the notion. Apart from this, a search for the identity of Europe should include the historical Others of Europe since Europe has constructed and reconstructed its identity by opposition to these Others, by inventing/reinventing them through its history. Therefore, the process of self-(re)construction, self-identification of Europe also refers to the history of (re)invention of Others which is also contextual. Before starting this anthropologizing attempt to understand the workings of this process, it will be appropriate to clarify what Europe means as an idea and as a discursive and mythical construct.

Europe as an idea is not solely an intellectual endeavour but a substantial reality. As a “discursive practice”, the attempts to create the European reality can be seen very basically in its ever changing frontiers. According to Foucault, discourse in contextuality as the most important feature regulates practice.⁸ Similarly, in my inquiry, it will be observed that Europe as a discursive practice has been deliberated upon and in due course came into existence as a concrete reality. This concreteness, in my opinion, can be seen in the fact that the geographical definition of Europe has changed several times since antiquity. What I want to emphasize, on the other hand, is the fact that the attempts to show Europe as a self-contained entity is a discursively constructed myth in the service of the hegemony (Europe) in asserting its power over its Others. While Europe defines itself as self-evident, it cannot realize that the argument falls apart by the very existence of the Other within its very existence. Furthermore, continual attempts to prove its “self-evidence” also fall apart as the very meaning of “self-evidence” should require no proof other than itself.

⁸ Stuart Hall, “Foucault: Power, Knowledge and Discourse” in *Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader*, eds. M. Wetherell, S. Taylor and S. J. Yates (London: Sage, 2001), 72-73.

Europe, in order to define itself, defines what it is not. It differentiates itself from its so-called Others, which are also part of Europe; in other words, the so-called Others are its own invention throughout the ages. It draws frontiers; it constructs borders which are not and which certainly cannot be defined according to neutral, objective or disinterested criteria. Therefore, only by separating itself from the Others can it assert itself as a unified and self-contained entity. The role of the Others within the core of the European existence will be highlighted in this chapter by deconstructing this self-identification process of Europe in an attempt to “revalue” the excluded.

The importance of the everchanging Others in the formation of a “Europe” lies both in the fact that the Others fed Europe with their culture, technology, science, labour and raw materials and they became Europe’s “mirror image”, common enemy, irreconcilable Abel⁹ as well. China, with its technological and scientific advancement, had influenced the West as early as the seventeenth century. Apart from the Far East, Islam also played an important role in the civilisation of Europe due to its higher level of development while Europe was living in the dark ages. Indeed, the Middle Ages witnessed the higher level of civilisation and intense influence of China and the Islamic world over Europe. Moreover, their wealth became a motivation or stimuli for Europe to explore unknown lands. However, the contributions of these wealthier and more advanced societies were hardly acknowledged within the Eurocentric world view. It was to Europe’s advantage to see itself as a unified entity free from outside influences.

The claims about the Ancient Greece as the foundation of European civilisation should be viewed in this context. All Asian and African bonds of Greece had been ignored while Greece was put in the very core of European civilisation as a ready-made, self-generated civilisation although the Greeks themselves had acknowledged the fact that

⁹ Abel is one of the two sons of Adam and Eve and was killed by his brother Cain.
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cain>

they owned their material and spiritual civilisation to eastern civilizations especially to Egypt.¹⁰

Since the times of colonisation, Europe began to exploit the Rest. It exploited the labour force and raw materials of its colonies. The movement of labour force and raw materials from the colonies to Europe has continued ever since. Europe has never had any worries about exploiting other peoples. Europe always found this or that “rational excuse” for this purpose. Indeed, in its hegemonic discourse it was Europe’s duty to administer and take the “savages” under its power.

Apart from these material contributions, the encounter with different societies and civilisations gave Europe the opportunity to define itself and shape its identity. It became its “mission” to set and invent irreconcilable contrasts with its Others in order to be able to invent its own identity amidst the created, exaggerated, emphasized differences with Others. In order to be able to discuss all of these in detail, I shall briefly present five stages in the history of Europe and investigate the related hegemonic discourses in these stages.

2.1 Europe in Antiquity

In Antiquity, there was no such hegemonic notion of Europe that could assert itself as a dominant discourse. The Greek city states which were located around the Mediterranean had more contact with Asia than with Europe as the continent we refer today. However, the notions of Europe as Europa and the Orient first appeared in Greek mythology. In Greek mythology, Europa comes into being as a Phoenician semi-goddess who was seduced by Zeus. Although these myths are vulnerable to be seen as imaginary histories on supernatural beings, they also served well as the reference for the differentiation of “us” from “them” until new *histories* were to replace them as they were mostly perceived as true accounts by the Greeks at that time.

¹⁰ Wilfried Nippel, “The Construction of the Other” in *Greeks and Barbarians*, ed. T. Harrison, (NY: Routledge, 2002), 281.

These *histories* about the imaginary beings are not solely the products of a storyteller with an exceptional imagination but the first historical texts based on the real contacts of a society with other peoples. They reflect the society's mentality, the dominant ideologies and discourses prevailing at that time. On the other hand, these myths are certainly not the objective and neutral echoes of the reality, but are filtered from the eyes of the author who lives within the circumstances of his day and of his community. Therefore, these myths are the products of Greek communities that came face to face with other societies through wars, colonisation, travels and commerce. The relation of the myths with the truth is as Lactantius says: "The poets, then, did not invent the subject matter of their sagas but merely coloured the existing facts".¹¹

Otherness in ancient times, which is embraced by the fantasy of the myth, emerged as the polarity between the Greek and the non-Greek. While the city and the citizenship of the city had been the focus of the identity for the Greeks, a common sense of identity became possible due to the encounters with the non-Greeks -especially wars- which are the subject of these mythological stories favouring the Greeks against the Barbarians.¹² In other words, while individual city-states had been competing with each other, they called each other's help in the face of a threat from the non-Greeks which grounded a common Greek identity within the multiplicity of city-state struggling with each other for supremacy over trade routes and for the exploitation of lands. Therefore, the notion of the Barbarian as the first otherness was born in antiquity. The discourse on the Barbarian as the Other, as the enemy, fed the sense of belonging to a community which in turn weakened the role of the city in the Greek identity formation. With this consciousness, the foreigner who had been a citizen of another city once upon a time became non-Greek as the Barbarian. Moreover, the Olympic Games were important in the formation of Greek identity as they excluded the non-Greeks. In these Games, the

¹¹ Herbert Jennings Rose, *A Handbook of Greek Mythology* (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1965), 182.

¹² Robert Browning, "Greeks and Others: From Antiquity to the Renaissance" in *Greeks and Barbarians*, ed. T. Harrison, (NY: Routledge, 2002).
Wilfried Nippel, "The Construction of the Other".

identity (being Greek) was the first requirement in order to be involved. Moreover, these Games invented stereotypes of the barbarians as opposed to the Greeks as uncivilized and incompetent in athletic skills.¹³

In ancient Greece, since the 6th Century BC, the most threatening Other was the Persians who conquered and held Asia Minor under their dominion for centuries.¹⁴ The struggle against the constant threat of these “Orientals” led to military alliances between Greek city-states which nevertheless continued fighting with each other.

This more general other, the non-Greek in the name of the Barbarian was strengthened in the Hellenistic period.¹⁵ Owing to geographical expansion under the rule of Alexander of Macedon, a sense of superiority on the part of the Greeks over the Persians which had not existed before emerged.¹⁶ The opposition between them was established on the difference of the political organizations of these two societies which became stereotypes in the process of othering: a libertarian Greece and a despotic Persia.¹⁷ Apart from the political organization of civilizations, blood relations, language, religion and customs were invented as the markers of identity and as the differentiating features from the Barbarians.¹⁸ The generalisation of the Barbarian in this way was in no way synonymous with modern racism. However, the notion of *genos*, which served the justification of slavery at that time and which is the etymon of the notion of race, emerged. On the other hand, the Hellenistic period witnessed the intertwining of the cultures of Greece and of the East in all spheres of life which apparently makes the

¹³ J. Stevenson, *The History of Europe* (NY: Facts On File, Inc. 2002).

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Browning, “Greeks and Others: From Antiquity to the Renaissance”.

¹⁶ Nippel, “The Construction of the Other”.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Browning, “Greeks and Others: From Antiquity to the Renaissance”.

claims on the independence of the Greek culture free from outside influences impossible.¹⁹

The position of the Romans, on the other hand, was ambiguous within the Greek identity. While the Greeks were establishing a more general and homogenous culture transcending the city, the Romans had been both the barbarians and the Romans until the world domination of the Roman Empire led to the identification of the Greeks with the Roman identity. Once the world domination of the Roman Empire was maintained, the Greeks embraced the Roman identity. After the fall of the Western Roman Empire, peoples in Europe were liberated in a sense from the domination and threat of this great empire only to fight each other for power and material sources. Europe at that time consisted of multiple successor states set up and protected by various barbarian groups and ruled by Roman land-owning elites.²⁰ While new imperial empires emerged out of these groups such as Carolingian Empire, no unity could be established.

The notion of Europe also took ambiguous meanings in antiquity. It should be noted that the notion of Europe had no political or cultural connotation at the time; it merely had a geographical denotation which emerged in modern antiquity. I had previously mentioned that the notion of Europe which meant other lands than Greece in classical antiquity became more concrete due to the encounter mostly with the Persians. The othering of the Persians served for the differentiation of Europe as a geographical entity from Asia and paved the way for numerous other successive “barbarian” Others.²¹ However, what is interesting is that Latin identity and western Christianity, which are now seen as the foundations of Europeanness, stood in direct opposition to Greek identity which internalized the Roman identity. Although Rome was founded by Romulus of Trojan and Latin blood according to the legends, the Romans were at constant war with the Latins till the fall of the Roman Empires.²² Europeans bore the barbarian characteristics

¹⁹ Stevenson, *The History of Europe*.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Nippel, “The Construction of the Other”.

²² Stevenson, *The History of Europe*.

according to the Greeks at that time. Indeed, the stereotypes of the Latins were so deplorable (arrogant, greedy, untrustworthy, cruel...) and the Latins' stereotyping as enemy were so strong that the Romans would certainly prefer Muslims to the Latins.²³ Moreover, the Christianization of the Roman Empire put new distinctions with the Latin West whose Christianity was condemned as not being the real Christianity.²⁴

2.2 Europe in the Middle Ages

What led to the more or less unification of Europe was the rise of Islam especially in the 7th Century. The growing expansion of Islam deeply affected the notion of Europe whose centre moved from the east to the inner part of the continent.²⁵ The Barbarian Other as the biggest threat at times of Greek and Roman civilizations left its place to the Muslim Other who started to become a threat as of the 5th Century. The encounter between these two religions is very important for the European identity. The notion of Europe was no longer the "other lands than Greece" but increasingly the land of the Christian faith due to the existence of this new irreconcilable and infidel enemy.

In brief, the emergence of Europe not only as a geographical area but as a more or less united society within the multiplicity of kingships occurred as a result of the Christianisation of the continent which established a central authority and a legitimation for the territorial expansion in Rome. The Christianization of Europe in general occurred with the help of the cultural and political prestige of Latin Christians especially those of the northern parts. However, the Christianization of the Mediterranean could only be realized by force as the Mediterranean was the cradle of the ancient and deep-rooted civilizations as opposed to the illiterate and superficial societies of the north.²⁶ Rome,

²³ Browning, "Greeks and Others: From Antiquity to the Renaissance".

²⁴ Nippel, "The Construction of the Other".

²⁵ Gerard Delanty, *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1995).

²⁶ Robert Bartlett, *The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization, and Cultural Change* (Princeton & NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

due to the decline of the Roman Empire and the rise of the central feudal states, was no more the centre which, as I have already mentioned, moved toward the northern west part of Europe especially at times of the High Middle Ages that witnessed “the widening bounds of Latin Christendom” which evolved from the city-based Roman Christianity to a institutional hierarchy.²⁷ The Christian was the category for the self-description of the western Europeans (the Latins) against the Muslims and Slavs. Indeed, Christianity was so significant that it was used instead of the word “Europe”.²⁸ Crusaders after the Christianization of the continental Europe turned their face to other lands towards Palestine, Syria and Iberian Peninsula for colonization with the justification of the holy war to expand the boundaries of the Church under the authority of the Pope against the barbarians. Therefore, Christianity came to be the explanation and legitimation for the territorial expansion of the church and the growing power of the feudal lords. The importance of the Crusaders lies in their bringing the lands other than Europe into focus so a more sharply confrontation with “barbaric” Islam occurred.

It will be a must here to remark that Christianity’s becoming the focus of European identity was the result of the Islam’s becoming the focus of hostility.²⁹ Since the emergence of Islam in the 7th Century, the Muslims looked westward and began to advance toward Europe while the West was advancing toward the East by Crusaders. Indeed, Muslim Arabs’ existence within Europe goes to the beginnings of the 8th Century, so does the hatred towards them. Therefore, Islam, by being a challenge and a threat, by being the uncompromising Other due to the Muslim expansion especially between the 12th until 15th centuries, served the identification of Western Europe as a “single family or civilization – ‘the West’”.³⁰ Europe is created against the East – Islam-

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Liam O’Dowd and Thomas M. Wilson, “Frontiers of Sovereignty in the New Europe” in *Borders, Nations and States: Frontiers of Sovereignty in the New Europe*, eds. L. O’Dowd and T. M. Wilson (Aldershot: Avebury, 1996).

²⁹ Delanty, *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*.

³⁰ Stuart Hall, “The Question of Cultural Identity” in *Modernity and Its Futures*, eds. S. Hall; D. Held and T. McGrew (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992).

and therefore thanks to Islam, the “Europeanization” of Europe occurred in the Middle Ages.³¹ Especially towards the end of the Middle Ages, the supremacy of the Ottoman Empire and its settlement on the territory of Europe by conquering Istanbul was so terrifying that a sense of a European identity against this common enemy was intensified. Moreover, the victory of the Muslim Ottoman Empire resulted in the fact that Europe began to look westward which started the age of discovery. Islam, hence, made possible a cosmopolite ideal and a mythical unity for Europeans with the legitimation of Christianity under the conditions of war, famine and multiplicity of local loyalties.³² Therefore, as Delanty claims, Christianity not only served as a legitimating myth but also as a unifying myth of several separated groups in the face of a common enemy.³³

A word of warning must be entered here. Although the idea of the Crusades seems to unite the kings and lords of Europe with a popular support due to the spiritual promises, the unification of these kingdoms and the unification of the Eastern and Western Churches did not happen.³⁴ Indeed, under this seeming unification against the Muslim world, two churches and the crusading armies continued to fight and distrust each other.³⁵

The Middle Ages were times of lasting clash of the Latin Christians in the name of crusaders not only with the Muslim Arabs but with the Orthodox Slavs as well.³⁶ The

Jxrgen S. Nielsen, “Muslims in Europe into the Next Millennium” in *Islam in Europe: The Politics of Religion and Community*, eds. S. Vertovec and C. Peach (NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1997).

³¹ Bartlett, *The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization, and Cultural Change*.

³² William C. Jordan, “Europe in the Middle Ages” in *The Idea of Europe From Antiquity to the European Union*, ed Anthony Pagden (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

³³ Delanty, *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*.

³⁴ Stevenson, *The History of Europe*.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Lila Leontidou, “The boundaries of Europe: deconstructing three regional narratives,” *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power II* (2004), 593-617.

establishment of the western forms of Christianity was followed by the establishment of the Slav forms across east-central Europe which was another reason for the rapprochement of the Latin and Greek identities.³⁷ Apart from Islam, the Orthodox Slavs, long before communism, had played an important role in the self-awareness of Europe by being invented as an irreconcilable, different Other. Indeed, the Slavs were seen so different that the term “West” was used instead of Europe in order to be able to distinguish Europe from the “East”.³⁸ Even a Crusade was organized against pagan Slavs in the mid- 12th Century in order to “kill them all, ... [so that] God sort them out”.³⁹ This differentiation between the West and the East which was intensified with communism continues even today. Although the Balkan states entered the EU, the stereotypes and hostility towards their peoples remain fresh.

As the prevailing ways of thinking, concepts and images which mediate them, do not change all at once, they are not abandoned immediately and new ones do not emerge out of the blue. No idea can be ready-made; rather ideas evolve on a background. For example, the understandings dominant in the ancient times continued with new interpretations during the Middle Ages. Indeed, we witness the continuity of the notion of the “barbarian” and stereotypes throughout Europe’s history of becoming. We see the Barbarian Kingdoms of Europe, barbarian Arabs, barbarian savages, barbarian communists, barbarian Slavs, barbarian Orthodoxes, barbarian Turks; the list continues for centuries on end. Furthermore, the notion of the barbarian of the ancient times did not disappear in the Middle Ages but continued to be used in another context; it was used for the non-Christian, the infidel. The Muslim Other as the barbarian was the most dangerous barbarian at that time. The notion of the barbarian was also used for the European Christians who had different cultural and political organizations than feudalism and commercialism and the Roman law. The pagan self of the antiquity

Bartlett, *The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization, and Cultural Change*.

³⁷ Bartlett, *The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization, and Cultural Change*.

³⁸ Jan Ifversen, “The Crisis of European Civilization After 1918” in *Ideas of Europe Since 1914: The Legacy of the First World War*. Menno Spiering and Michael Wintle, eds (NY: Palgrave Macmillan Ltd, 2002).

³⁹ Stevenson, *The History of Europe*.

became the barbarian Other in the Middle Ages. The dichotomy of Christian/non-Christian was intensified by the older dichotomy of civilized/barbarian. The Christianity, therefore, was not only a religion but included the whole social and political order of European societies so as to differentiate itself from its “primitive” and “wild” others which was a difference that would increasingly continue in time.

2.3 Europe in Modernity

The invented unity of European subservience to Christianity as the dominant ideology against Islam freed itself from the domination of this religious discourse and began to construct itself against new Others in modernity. After the Middle Ages ended, the notion of Europe gained its freedom from subordination to Christianity and gained an autonomous meaning. Christianity was still important, especially in the legitimation of the conquests but was no more the only focus of identity. Rather Europe started to be used interchangeably and ambiguously with the notion of “the West” which pointed to very different meanings than religion. After a relatively closed era of the Middle Ages, Europeans confronted with new societies in the so-called colonial era which started with the discovery of the Americas in 1492. With the overseas expansion, Europeans’ confrontation with the non-Europeans brought “the whole question of *difference*”.⁴⁰ From then on until the end of the colonial era, the significance of Islam was lessened as the *significant other* for the European self-identification. At that time, the newly discovered and conquered regions drew the special interest of Europe. Moreover, the decrease of the Muslim power in the 18th and 19th Centuries led to this decreasing importance of Islam in the European identity formation. The decreasing significance of Islam in the identity formation of Europe does not mean that Christendom was now out of fashion in the colonial era. On the contrary, Christendom was one of the measures that served the differentiation of Europe (now as the West) from the new barbarians. Moreover, it was one of the values that were imposed on the “savage” in order to facilitate keeping them under the rule. However, the encounter with new societies

⁴⁰ Dorinda Outram, *The Enlightenment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

needed new parameters for stereotyping. Racial stereotyping provided by anthropology, travel narratives and fiction served for the political domination and economic exploitation of the newly discovered lands. Christian sanctity was replaced by the “colonial superiority and arrogance” as these ideals lessened the role of religion in new nation states.⁴¹ With the colonization, the racial stereotyping was verbalised by these words such as the *savage*, *uncivilized*, *barbaric*. Now in lieu of the infidel, the noble savage gained the *honour* to be the *other* of Europe. “Unknown lands” now became the possessions of Europe and served as the “mirror-image” as *uncivilized*, *undeveloped*, *savage*, *exotic* subjects of the *self* to bloat up Europe’s ego. Europe’s self-consciousness and self-esteem now depended on the humiliation of Others in terms of these categories of differentiation. Europe, after a defensive stand in front of the Muslim power of the Middle Ages, turned to be a superior entity. Europe was now indisputably the centre of the world. In other words, Europe had never felt so confident as the centre of the world “in the wake of modernity”.⁴²

Within this context of increased confidence of the superiority and uniqueness of Europe, the Enlightenment ideals by putting the *man* at the centre and glorifying reason, had an important role. Europe, on the one hand, exploited the nature and its exotic subjects and found scientific justifications with the help of anthropology and evolutionism, and scientific racism to its “cannibalism and savagery” in its colonies. On the other hand, it compared itself with societies of these new worlds; therefore, positioned itself at the centre as a unique and the most advanced civilization.⁴³ However, the categories of this comparison were under the domination of the West itself: the notions of progress and civilization inaugurated by the Enlightenment served for the differentiation of cultures again as the reference points and for the justification of colonialism. Europe put itself as

⁴¹ Leontidou, “The Boundaries of Europe: Deconstructing Three Regional Narratives”.

⁴² Ibid.

Iftikhar Haider Malik, *Islam and Modernity: Muslims in Europe and the United States* (London: Pluto Press, 2004).

⁴³ Andrew Apter, “Africa, Empire, and Anthropology: a Philological Exploration of Anthropology’s Heart of Darkness,” *Annual Review of Anthropology*. 28 (1999), 577-598.

Hall, “The Question of Cultural Identity”.

“the model, the prototype and the measure of social progress”.⁴⁴ With the help of this self-comparison of Europe with other societies, the Enlightenment heritage became one of the cornerstones of Europeanness. In other words, these Enlightenment ideals started to be perceived as the core values of the European civilization.⁴⁵ It was in the 19th Century when the notion of Europe became the name of the “civilization” and when the myth of “the West” or “the West” as the myth which was to be identified with capitalism and the nation-state emerged. Moreover, in this sense of unity as the most advanced civilisation on earth, which was invented by asserting the role of primitiveness to other cultures, the notion of race became the core component in the European identity.⁴⁶ Enlightenment values aiming at the human emancipation from dogmas and unfair administrations and aiming at the welfare and a better future for the humanity stayed valid for the peoples of “the West”. Because of the racialised categorisation, other peoples were thought as lacking the “necessary human characteristics” so they should be corrected. Therefore, the cruelties of the white man against these peoples living harmoniously with nature did not seem controversial to the Enlightenment values. On the contrary, imposing these values upon the people under their rule became the “white man’s burden”. However, while these values of the white man spread to the world his draconian measures, it became hard to hold the colonies under their dominion.

Europe in the colonial era motivated by a “drive for gold and the Catholic dream of converting the world to the Christian faith”, established unbreakable bridges with Americas and with other colonies⁴⁷. Even long after the colonies formed independent states, economic interdependence of these ex-colonies continued. In fact, decolonization brought about new dependencies on both parties. In the context of dependence, Europe was wrong in believing that it would manage somehow to withdraw its existence and

⁴⁴ Stuart Hall, “The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power” quoted in “Europe’s mirror: civil society and the other”, Julie Fieldhouse (Vancouver: The University of British Columbia, 1997), 53.

⁴⁵ Ifversen, “The Crisis of European Civilization After 1918”.

⁴⁶ Delanty, *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*.

⁴⁷ Hall, “The Question of Cultural Identity”, 283.

leave the colonial experience behind.⁴⁸ While in the colonial era raw materials, precious metals and people were brought into Europe, free citizens of Europe's newly established nation-states migrated into the colonies to administer these *uncivilized* lands. Hence, strong ties were established between the colonizer and the colonized states. Therefore, after decolonization, unplanned migration flows occurred in such numbers Europe could never have imagined. Economic, political and environmental causes in their home countries pushed lots of people to the centre of the world following the bridges created in the era of colonialism. For example, large numbers of "legal and illegal" Arabs and Africans migrated from Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) and from Senegal and Zaire into France.⁴⁹ This heritage of colonialism continues even today. Indeed, today's ethnic-minority enclaves or "apartheid" are the products of this period in Europe's history.

Interdependence is a characteristic feature of the colonized and the colonisers. No wonder that European states invited labour from their ex-colonies in the 1950's's in order to close their labour shortage appeared with the economic recovery after 1945.⁵⁰ However, as the economic rejuvenation slowed down through the 1960s and the 1970s, the guest-worker programs common in European states were needed to be turned down but these workers who were supposed to be temporary did not go back to their home countries and instead they settled down. Therefore, these guest-workers, who were needed mostly for unqualified jobs, were started to be recognized as burdens and became scapegoats for economic difficulties. Although they did not occupy the jobs that the nationals competed for, although they did the jobs that the nationals did not prefer, they became the target for the projection of the evil. Racial thinking penetrated in the mind of the white men revived and spilled over in this context, and the hatred turned to the stranger inside as the cause of the whole social and economic problems. These

⁴⁸ Stuart Hall, "The West and The Rest: Discourse and Power," in *Formations of Modernity*, eds. S. Hall and B. Gieben (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 306.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 207.

⁵⁰ Esra Özyürek, "The Politics of Cultural Unification, Secularism, and the Place of Islam in the New Europe," *American Ethnologist*. 32 no.4 (2005).
Nielsen, "Muslims in Europe into the Next Millennium".

immigrants who were mostly Muslims became the focus of exclusion which would be the characteristics of the European identity in the post-war period.

2.4 Europe in the Cold War Era

In the Cold War era, Europe (the West) confronted with one of its most powerful and fearful others: the Communist Block. During this period, it was not hard to invent the Other for the West. The Soviet Union was the embodiment of the opposite values of Europe by being communist, non-democratic, barbaric etc. as opposed to the capitalist, liberal, democratic, advanced Europe. Indeed, the Soviet Union was perceived as so irreconcilable with Europe that it was seen non-European more than its forefathers - Russia of Czars- who were then seen as “pro-Europe-minded”.⁵¹ Hence, during the Cold War period, the European identity seemed relatively stable within the context of this bipolar world.

The Eastern Europe, the Balkans despite being “geographically attached to Europe” was perceived as non-European in its culture, economic and social system and mind.⁵² All negative and opposite characteristics of Europe was saddled with the communist other, the enemy. According to Todorov, the Balkans was not discursively constructed “as the alien and exotic other like the Orient but more like an incomplete version of the self and it served as a ‘repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory image of the “European” has been constructed’”.⁵³ The Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Soviet Union were depicted as the embodiment of evil. The Cold War made them the “second world” and the enemy. Rescuing Europe from this enemy became the USA’s top priority mission. With the help of the economic assistance of the

⁵¹ Anssi Paasi, “Europe as a Social Process and Discourse: Considerations of Place, Boundaries and Identity,” *European Urban and Regional Studies* 8 no.1 (2001), 7-28.

⁵² Helle L. Rytönen, “Europe and Its “Almost-European” Other: A Textual Analysis of Legal and Cultural Practices of Othering In Contemporary Europe” (PhD diss., Stanford Uni., 2002), 10.

⁵³ *Ibid*, 10.

USA through the Marshall Plan, Europe entered a process of economic recovery. However, these negative attitudes did not end with the end of the Cold War. Indeed, as Debeljak claims all former communist societies are still seen from this negative standpoint, and are identified with negative stereotypes, “with its walls, barbed wires, mine fields, and trigger-happy guards” outside Europe’s “civilizational habitus”.⁵⁴

Moreover, it is known that the collapse of the Wall triggered a new wave of mass migration into Western Europe.⁵⁵ Muslims coming from the Balkans would create Islamic Diasporas and would be the new *other* or enemy in circumstances in which otherwise without them the EU’s Europe would be deprived of enemy, which is intolerable for Europe.

However, the Communist Block was not the sole other for Europe. From then on, the USA with its mission to eradicate communism and its hegemonic discourse of “democracy” becomes another Other. Ironically, the USA which is admired due to its economic power and aggressiveness but hated due to its cultural degeneracy became the mirror-image of Europe. Although, the notion of Europe was used interchangeably with the notion of “the West”, this reciprocity was ambivalent in this sense. For example, Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America* is a good example of the othering of America.⁵⁶ In his book, Tocqueville, by studying American society, focuses his attention on the political character of the USA (democracy) shaping the whole society’s way of life and turns his interest into his own society (Europe and in particular France) comparing it with the USA. Putting it as the “mirror- image” of Europe, Tocqueville makes suggestions for European societies in order for them to catch it up.

2.5 Europe in the Post-Cold War Era

⁵⁴ Alex Debeljak, *The Hidden Handshake: National Identity and Europe in the Post-Communist World*. (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2004), 94-97.

⁵⁵ Nielsen, “Muslims in Europe into the Next Millennium”, 272.

⁵⁶ Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000).

After the Cold War, with the collapse of communism, the borders did not fade away as it was expected. The increasing intensification of the borders accompanied by the ever-emerging minute nations after the death of the communist Other can be thought awkward. However, Europe along with the United States did not stop to find (or create) another enemy. The increasing anti-Islamic and anti-immigrant rhetoric today is the product of this conjuncture.

The border issue became more and more important with more rigid norms which can be seen in the discussions of the “fortress Europe”. The rise of the “fortress Europe” corresponds with the rising number of immigrants because Western Europe, as it is mentioned before, witnessed a re-industrialization since the early 1960s which led to a rising demand of labour. This labour shortage was provided firstly by European states such as Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Greece and then by the Third World Muslim countries from the Middle East and South Africa.

Post-Cold War era witnessed the emergence of the European Community (1957) which was to evolve into European Union in 1992 by the Maastricht Treaty. Therefore, European identity entered a new phase within the unification process. In that time, as Europe was removing the barriers between the member states, frontiers of Europe were hardened. While more and more people are trying to escape from the ongoing warfare conditions and economic difficulties in their home countries, and while they see the metropolitan countries as the only way to rescue their lives, Europe unquestionably wanted to close its borders to these unwanted have-nots. Within this context, the stereotypes whose origins can be traced back to ancient times were reformed/reinvented under new circumstances. The death of the communist Other far from lessening the importance of the borders caused new and bigger problems for Europe: Europe, after the loss of its most threatening enemy, found itself without an enemy. However, as Said claims in *Orientalism*, it needs enemies/others in all circumstances.⁵⁷ If the Other does not exist, it should be invented. The lack of an external threat combined with existent

⁵⁷ Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (NY: Vintage Books, 1979).

internal divisions after the two wars that converted Europe into a ruin made it a difficult task “to be Europe”.⁵⁸ Therefore, to invent new enemies, those Others *threatening* European civilization became compulsory for the European elites aiming at a unified Europe. As the former enemy disappeared, it was now the time for Europe to look for a new scapegoat which was not difficult to find. Immigrants as the inner bigots and Islamic fundamentalism as the external threat were pointed out not only by European political elites but also by the USA.

It should be noted that the immigrants of Europe, as mentioned before, were settled there mostly due to the policies implemented by Europe. The colonization of almost the whole world by the Europeans and the policies European states employed after the decolonization, such as granting French citizenship to the colonial nationals, resulted in the growing numbers of foreign populations within Europe. However, Europe was now expressing a growing fear against the crimes conducted by immigrants and growing anxieties against the clandestine immigration. For Europe, “porous borders... may prove even more threatening ... than organized communism and the Soviet threat could ever be” although these cries against organized crime and clandestine immigration are only exaggerations.⁵⁹

Alongside immigration, Islam was once more on the stage as the new enemy. Apart from newly coming immigrants who are also mostly Muslims, people from ex-colonies most of whom had also attained the citizenship of their new country long ago started to be seen as threats in the eyes of the nationals who readily accepted Islam as a strange and incompatible religion with western values.⁶⁰ Islam became a counterpoint to Europe in terms of which Europe reinforces its “Judaean-Christian values” by inventing the

⁵⁸ O’Dowd and Wilson, “Frontiers of Sovereignty in the New Europe”.

⁵⁹ Liza Schuster and John Solomos, “Rights and Wrongs Across European Borders: Migrants, Minorities and Citizenship,” *Citizenship Studies*. 6 no.1 (2002).
Malcolm Anderson and Eberhard Bort, *The Frontiers of EU* (NY: Palgrave, 2001).

⁶⁰ Jocelyne Cesari, “Islam in France: The Shaping of a Religion Minority” in *Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens*, ed. Yvonne Y. Haddad (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

differences between Islam and Europe.⁶¹ Therefore, these Muslim citizens although most of them have been living there since their birth and/or educated there became *étrangers* and started to be seen as a “social problem”.

This invented threat from immigrants and Islam had to be convincing because “raison d’être” of the EU is “blurred”.⁶² This threat were to be the “raison d’être” of the union. Muslim immigrants in Europe became the new “Others within” of Europe. Therefore, with this massive *influx* of Muslims into Western Europe from the Mediterranean and Middle East, there occurred a visible shift in the locus of exclusionary ideologies from 'race' to culture.

Racism adjusted itself to these new circumstances and “partially” ridding itself of its biological connotations of the colonial era, developed and renewed itself towards a “new” cultural racism which will be discussed in the next chapter. As this relatively new Europe depends on the exclusion of some others, the most utilitarian exclusion mechanism would be the notion of “citizenship” in this context. Indeed, citizenship has been an exclusionary mechanism from the establishment of the nation-state. However, with the new “European citizenship” it gained surplus exclusiveness. As the notion of citizenship is equated to nationality in nation-states, non-citizens are also excluded as non-nationals. Moreover, with the notion of “European citizenship”, merely an attempt to close the democracy gap within the EU and an attempt to gain public support, these non-nationals started to be recognized as non-Europeans. Therefore, the exclusion of immigrants was doubled and accentuated.

Apart from this remark, I should like to clarify a theoretical presupposition implicit in what I have been arguing so far. Identities, as they are not settled entities, are constructed by realizing the differences with others. Indeed, it is argued that it is this

⁶¹ Gabriele Marranci, “Multiculturalism, Islam and the Clash of Civilizations Theory: Rethinking Islamophobia,” *Culture and Religion*. 5 no.1 (2004).

⁶² Ludger Kühnhardt, *Constituting Europe: Identity, Institution-building and the Search for a Global Role* (Germany: Nomos Verlags Gesellschaft Baden-Baden, 2003), 12.

sense of difference that determines cultural identities and ideas about Europe in particular.⁶³ Therefore, the boundaries positioned between the Self and the Other become compulsory in this sense. It may be helpful to conceptualise this with the help of the metaphor that Saussure uses: there would be no “day” without the “night” because it is the “night” that gives the meaning to the “day” by showing the “day”’s being different from itself.

⁶³ Paasi, “Europe as a Social Process and Discourse: Considerations of Place, Boundaries and Identity”.

CHAPTER 3

EUROPEAN RACISMS

The negated contributions of Europe's Others in the formation of the idea of Europe and in the formation of a European identity have been presented in the second chapter. It is concomitantly agreed that Europe has done its best to base its identity on a unique heritage of Greece, Rome, Christianity, Renaissance and the Enlightenment and to represent it as a self-evident unity. However, when Europe's self-identification process is thoroughly investigated, it reveals that the European *civilization* was a recipient of knowledge and technology the roots of which can be traced back to Egypt, China and the Middle East. In other words, other cultures, which were represented as backward, despotic, savage, etc... by the European *civilization*, emerge out of this apparent unity when it is mined a little. Despite the various material contributions (in terms of technology, labour, raw materials etc...) of these Others; however, Europe made other peoples as its Others so as to be able to define itself on their negation.

In this third chapter, Europe's self-identification process continues to be problematized and the relationship between the process of self-identification and racism will be discussed. Especially, the recent rise of anti-immigrant position of European states will be emphasized. In so doing, I shall contextualize racism in order to be able to show that what Europe believes to be her identity is by no means composed of *essential* qualities of Greekness or Christianity but of *accidents* of history. Therefore, the main concern in this third chapter will be European racism(s). As racism is a historically very complex

phenomenon⁶⁴, explanation and categorization for the implications of racism appear as an obligation.

In her chapter on racism in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Hannah Arendt defines ideologies as “systems based upon a single opinion that proved strong enough to attract and persuade a majority of people and broad enough to lead them through the various experiences and situations of an average modern life”.⁶⁵ She also points out that among various opinions which “...fought each other to win the consent of public opinion”, two main ideologies; namely “race-thinking” (racism) and “class-thinking” (Marxism); seemed to have won the competition.⁶⁶ Indeed, according to Arendt, these two main ideologies were so strong that they even gained the support of the states which pronounced “themselves as official national doctrines”.⁶⁷ Racism, as Arendt claims, became so powerful in public opinion that it led to the Holocaust, one of the biggest crimes against humanity. However, even long after the crimes of Nazism were condemned, xenophobia against people coming from other cultures who are still recognized as essentially different from and incompatible with European *civilization* continues to exist. Furthermore, while Marxism lost its power to persuade most of the working-classes and as a result lost its power to influence the world politics, the prevalence of “growing racist tendencies that affect most European countries” has been observed by most scholars.⁶⁸ The right-wing parties, which depend their policies on anti-immigration and anti-Islam for the sake of protecting their national identities, have been gaining great public support all over Europe. Although racism was condemned long before, cultural differentialism; namely, discrimination based on cultural differences (perceived/ invented as essential differences) has emerged as the new kind of racism. In other words, racism is not only a phenomenon from the past but a current phenomenon

⁶⁴ Etienne Balibar, *Politics and the Other Scene* (London & NY: Verso, 2002).

⁶⁵ Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (NY: Brace & Word, 1966).

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, 159.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 159.

⁶⁸ Michel Wieviorka, “Racism in Europe: Unity and Diversity” in *Racism, Modernity and Identity on the Western Front*, eds. Ali Rattansi, and Salie Westwood (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994).

as well. Therefore, racism calls out for clarification. What will be problematized is that European racism(s) are deeply embedded in the Western self-identification and self-construction processes. In order to achieve this aim, I shall discuss European racism both as past and current phenomena. These phenomena are by no means different or separable from each other. On the contrary, they constitute a long established tradition as I hope to explain and argue in full detail in my thesis since I firmly believe that unless we trace back this tradition to its roots we cannot be able to destroy this evil. To this aim, I shall discuss racism under two categories as *classical racism* and *neo-racism*.

3.1 Classical Racism in Europe (Biological Racism)

Although classical racism has its roots deep in antiquity, it is an outcome of the period of colonialism starting in the late 15th Centuries and intensified in the 18th and 19th Centuries. In other words, racism as a “full-fledged ideology” and an ideology with scientific justification coincides with modernity and the birth of imperialism.⁶⁹

As it has earlier been discussed in the first chapter under the title of **Europe in Modernity**, with the discovery of new lands, Europe faced with the question of “difference”.⁷⁰ After Europe encountered new lands with indigenous peoples living on their own, it started exploiting these peoples and their lands for centuries to come. European expansion, colonialism and the enslavement of the newly discovered lands was the context in which classical racism emerged and became the strongest ideology of not only that century but for centuries ahead by adjusting itself to the new conditions.⁷¹ This age of imperialism was also the age of migration between the coloniser and the colonized states. While Europeans migrated to the colonised lands with administrative and military missions, the indigenous peoples were brought to Americas and to Europe as slaves. Christianity was the perfect justification for this exploitation with its mission to convert everybody on earth to Christianity. The state of degeneracy of the colonized

⁶⁹ Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (NY: Brace & Word, 1966).

⁷⁰ Dorinda Outram, *The Enlightenment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

⁷¹ David Theo Goldberg, “Racil Europeanization,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. 29 no.2 (2006), 331-364.

was believed to end with their conversion to Christianity as the religion of the civilized men. However, as Christian discourse was abandoned in modern Europe with the Enlightenment, Christianity, as a justification for European expansion and exploitation of new lands, left its place to the idea that indigenous peoples were lacking civilization so they should be administered and educated by the Europeans for their own sake. A necessary justification for this exploitation, therefore, came from the stereotyping of indigenous peoples as savages inferior in almost all spheres from the modern Christian white men. The depiction of these peoples as childlike inferiors was the ideology that served the idea that savages should be administered and should be converted to civilized human beings. In other words, racism was a necessary invention of European imperialism “as the only possible explanation and excuse for its deeds”.⁷² In that sense, racism is a “modern discovery” or rather it is one of the inventions of the *modern* men.⁷³ The 19th Century was the formative period of disciplines which were absorbed in the question of difference which started with the discovery of alien cultures. These new disciplines, motivated by the Enlightenment “dare to know” enthusiasm, were obsessed with the idea of superiority of European *civilization*⁷⁴ thereby giving scientific justification to racism in the service of imperialism.

Popkin agrees with the claim that racism is a modern invention in Europe but he traces its beginning a little earlier than the age of discovery and dates “modern racism” back to the 15th Century.⁷⁵ He argues that modern racism began in Spain in the 15th Century against the Jews who were converted to Christianity and who gained “power, wealth and influence ... in the society”⁷⁶. In order to take advantage in the struggle of power and wealth which were mostly in the hands of the Jews, the Spaniards used the weapon of

⁷² Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*.

⁷³ Ashley Montagu, *Man's Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race* (Walnut Creek, London & New Delhi: Altamira Press, 1997).

⁷⁴ J. Nederveen Pieterse, “Unpacking the West: How European is Europe?” in *Racism, Modernity and Identity on the Western Front*, eds. Ali Rattansi and Sallie Westwood (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994).

⁷⁵ Richard Henry Popkin, “The Philosophical Bases of Modern Racism” in Craig Walton and John P. Anton eds. *Philosophy and the Civilizing Arts* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1974).

⁷⁶ *Ibid*, 127.

racism and invented criteria such as the “purity of blood” to exclude those with Jewish ancestry from education, jobs, state affairs and even from religious activities.⁷⁷ According to Popkin, this racial theory and its criteria evolved and developed with the discovery of Americas. Evidently, racism became the justification and the strongest mechanism for the “conquest and rape of America” and then for “the enslavement of Africa”. Therefore, according to him, racism was invented to gain advantage over the Jews “*converses*” in the fight for power and wealth and then was improved in the colonisation of Americas and Africa.⁷⁸

In addition to this assertion about the origins of racism, Popkin also mentions the fact that discrimination against some groups of people was not non-existent before the 15th Century. Prior forms of discrimination were based on the “differences in religion, culture, politics or class but never on biology”.⁷⁹ Indeed, the history of discrimination is as early as that of slavery. In antiquity, Aristotle made justifications for slavery in his *Politics*. According to him, some people are naturally born to be slaves. Christianity served another justification for slavery: it was not for the benefit of the master but for the good of the slave’s soul to be a slave. It was not until the latter part of the 18th Century that the discrimination began to be based on biological grounds. As Popkin claims, earlier discriminations allowed the conversion of the inferior; in other words, they allowed the inferior to leave his inferior position by internalizing the values of the civilized man.⁸⁰ However, discrimination in the age of modernity was based on racial differences which cannot be changed; rather they were assumed as fixed and permanent. *Classical* racism was based on three co-existent criteria: physical traits, mental capacities, and the ability to achieve a higher level of civilization.⁸¹ The physical appearance of a human being (whether these inferior races are humans or not was

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Montagu, *Man’s Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race*.

another debate at that time) was assumed to determine his mental capacities which in turn determined his ability to progress and enabled him to reach the higher level of civilization. The capacity to progress determined by physical traits was of course a matter of interpretation. That is why *savages* were divided into two as “noble” who inherently had the capacity for progress but lacked civilization and “innoble” who lacked civilization and also insufficient for progress. So the “educator/civilizer” was able to justify its inhumane behaviour to these nobles. Racism in the Enlightenment was ambivalent in this sense.⁸²

These supposedly essential differences of the peoples of the newly discovered lands according to the Europeans were certain but they were uncertain as to whether these creatures were living in paradise/in an ideal society or in a state of constant ignorance; whether these lands were “earthly paradise[s]” or Utopias or lands of sinful sexuality; whether these peoples were humans like us or “pre-Adamites”. They were equally not sure whether the present conditions of the Indians which were mostly defined as degeneracy could be changed by giving them European education and by converting them into Christianity or whether their degeneracy due to their nature was fixed/permanent or not.⁸³ In other words, whether these savages should be taken as humans with potentials to progress and treated more accordingly or whether there was no need to treat them as human as there was no possibility to change them was a matter of dispute. Despite these ambivalences in racial-thinking in the Enlightenment, “the marvellous racist possibilities of the [racist] theory began to emerge during the Enlightenment” as Popkin claims.⁸⁴ This was a racism which was mostly free from Biblical explanations and depended on science as undoubtedly the most powerful medium of persuasion at that time.

Modernity can also be seen as a European effort of self-(re)definition. With modernity a new era in Europe’s history began. Europe was now the *civilized* and the sole reference

⁸² Outram, *The Enlightenment*.

⁸³ Popkin, “The Philosophical Bases of Modern Racism”.

⁸⁴ *Ibid*, 142.

point to judge other cultures under its rule of imperialism. Europe defined itself as the representation of “humanity against barbarism, reason against ignorance, objectivity against prejudice, progress against degeneration, truth against superstition, science against magic, rationality against passion”⁸⁵. The Enlightenment was marked by the emphasis on reason. Indeed, it was called the “age of reason”.⁸⁶ This was an era with an insistent “demand for clarity, sobriety, utility, civility and humanity”⁸⁷ which could only be achieved by Western civilization with free thinking. The Enlightenment ideals of reason, and progress led to the assumption of Europe as the most advanced society, as the highest civilization and as the model, the measure of progress which led to the recognition of European man as “the pinnacle of human advancement”.⁸⁸ This representation of European men was further nourished by the representation of indigenous peoples as less advanced, uncivilized and even sub-humans in a world which was organized according to the *universals* of the European *civilization*. Thanks to these savages, Europeans now felt themselves as the centre of the world, felt so confident as they had never felt before and they had no doubts about who they were in the strict contraposition they placed themselves against the savage. This is why Balibar and Wallerstein claim that the Enlightenment and racism occupy the same place.

Modernity, on the other hand, was the age of the emergence of capitalism and of the nation-state in Europe. According to Robert Miles, racism was a necessary result of and a response to the contradictions inherent in this new mode of production: the capitalist mode of production.⁸⁹ Capitalism with unequal class relations, commodification and sharp differences between the living standards of different classes it creates, needed an ideology which would help to sustain the domination of the exploited by claiming a

⁸⁵ Zigmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989) quoted in *Racism, Modernity and Identity on the Western Front*, eds. Ali Rattansi and Sallie Westwood (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994).

⁸⁶ Lewis White Beck, *18th Century Philosophy* (NY: The Free Press, 1966), 2.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ Stuart Hall and Bram Gieben, eds. *Formations of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press. 1992).

⁸⁹ Robert Miles, *Racism*.

natural order. Above all, according to Miles, racism in Europe was made possible with its invention of capitalism. In a world of unequal relations and of exploitation, racism was needed to solve the contradictions between the humanistic claims of European *civilization*, on the one hand, and its exploitation and social inequalities it caused on the other. Hence, the exploitation of some people by other people became natural due to their racial inferiority. Apparently, this idea saved Europe from the contradictions mentioned above.

Similarly, Fenton in *Ethnicity, Racism and Culture*⁹⁰ relates racism and capitalism. According to him, capitalism coincided with colonialism which started with the enthusiasm of discovery and “expeditions in search of the treasures of the earth”. This led to the establishment of trade bridges between lands in order to transport raw materials and maintain wage labour.⁹¹ Fenton claims that in the period between 1526 and 1870, more than 20 million Africans were taken to the New World as slaves. This context of colonialism and capitalism which brought the categorical thinking between the inherently inferior and inherently superior Europeans was the stimulus for European racism. Indeed, Europeans made lots of money by using slave labour in plantations and in industry which was perfectly justified via the *myth of race*. Moreover, Fenton claims that the development of capitalism brought forth the development of racism.⁹² Therefore, European racism as an ideology or as a myth found fertile soils in the context of slavery, colonial brutalities and capitalist inequalities/exploitation.

During the second half of the 19th Century, the nation-state emerged out of this new kind of economic system to guarantee the benefits of national capitalists so that capitalism could evolve further. The modern nation-state, in order to become a central power, needed two conditions: nation and territory. Therefore, within its borders, states implemented “centralizing and homogenizing policies” such as the education system.⁹³

⁹⁰ Steve Fenton, *Ethnicity, Racism, Class and Culture* (London: Macmillan Press, 1999).

⁹¹ *Ibid*, 71.

⁹² *Ibid*.

It was this trait of the nation-state (homogenization and nationalization of peoples) which led to the exclusion of some ethnic groups under the name of “national interests” not only in Central and Eastern Europe but in Western Europe as well. These groups would either be assimilated into the dominant ethnic group or forced to migrate. Philipp Ther categorizes three main periods of ethnic cleansing in Europe, all of which coincided with the state formation processes.⁹⁴ In the beginning of the 20th Century in south-eastern Europe and Turkey; in the mid-20th Century in Central and Eastern Europe; and at the end of this century in the south-eastern Europe as the consequence of the break-up of Yugoslavia, the continent experienced “ethnic cleansing” causing millions and millions of people to become homeless.

Therefore, the process of nation-state formation was not a natural process but led to wars, expulsions and expatriations which resulted in millions of people of other ethnicities becoming refugees. Apart from these processes, the modern state brought forth the invention of “citizenship” as a mechanism of equality between citizens. The subjects of the empires of the past became “citizens” of the modern state with some duties and rights. Citizenship, however, was also a mechanism of exclusion. It was supposed to be equal with “nationality” which means the exclusion of non-nationals.⁹⁵ It was this equation/articulation of citizenship and nationality that caused exclusion and lessened “the progressiveness ideals” of nationality and gave way to its articulation with racism.

3.2 Neo-Racism in Europe (Cultural Racism)

As it has been mentioned above, there occurred a rise of racism in Europe after the 1960s and 70s. For some, the attacks on immigrants and the electoral triumph of right-

⁹³ Philipp Ther, “The Spell of the Homogenous Nation-State: Structural Factors and Agents of Ethnic Cleansing” in *Diasporas and Ethnic Migrants: Germany, Israel and Post Soviet Successor States in Comparative Perspective*, eds. Rainer Münz and Rainer Ohliger (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003).

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Etienne Balibar, *We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship* (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004).

wing parties in most European countries should not be exaggerated because they were exceptions. For some others, on the other hand, this rise of racism was and still is a terrifying phenomenon in a continent that experienced Nazi fascism with millions of victims. According to Nora Rathzel, for example, racism should not be viewed as “a marginal phenomena” but should be placed in its right place as a part of political as well as everyday life in western nation-states.⁹⁶

Nevertheless, there is a consensus on the rise of racism(s) in Europe since the 60s and 70s. This racism(s) was “new” in that it no longer depended on the biological differences but depended on cultural differences. That is why some, such as Taguieff and Balibar, calls it “cultural racism” or “le racism différentialiste” or “racism without race”⁹⁷. Classical racism, which was sometimes considered as a phenomenon experienced “elsewhere, outside of Europe, so thought to be the history properly speaking not of Europe”, was “re-imported into” Europe against the immigrants who are accused of having *culture* inferior than and incompatible with the European *civilization*.⁹⁸ Indeed, this re-imported and renewed racism after the 1960s and 1970s seemed to quit the notion of race in its classical meaning and replaced it with the notion of culture. The black versus the white dichotomy accompanying the uncivilized/savage versus civilized was replaced by the dichotomy of Islam versus Europe coupled with culture versus civilization.

As Talal Asad claims, the notion of civilization has returned onto the stage.⁹⁹ Similarly, Balibar proposes that there have been shifts in doctrine and language but the structure remains the same, so does the practice.¹⁰⁰ Indeed, the racist discrimination has been

⁹⁶ Nora Rathzel, “Developments in Theories of Racism,” in *Europe’s New Racism: Causes, Manifestations and Solutions*, ed. Events Foundation (NY: Berghahn Books, 2002).

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Goldberg, “Racil Europeanization,” 336-337.

⁹⁹ Talal Asad, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity* (California: Stanford University Press, 2003), 165.

against the Muslim immigrants under the stereotyping of Islam as threat and enemy, as a culture unable to civilize. “[T]he category of *immigration*” became the “substitute for the notion of race”.¹⁰¹ This stress on cultural differences of immigrants in general as incompatible with the *European civilization* brought the idea of the impossibility of integration of these immigrants. This incompatibility, Wieviorka claims, led to the emergence of the “exclusion, rejection, expulsion, or –in the last resort- destruction”, as different from classical racism because classical type of racism emphasized inclusion for the justification of the exploitation of the migrants.¹⁰² Although today’s immigrants are also the victims of economic exploitation and serve the economy in Europe, the racism which they encounter is based on exclusion rather than inclusion.

Despite historical specificities, this neo-racism depended once again on a common European conjuncture.¹⁰³ It is argued that this new conjuncture or “grand mutation” led to the rise of racism in Europe.¹⁰⁴ Europe after the Second World War entered a process of reconstruction and relative peace. The two world wars turned Europe into a ruin which enabled the elites to work on the recreation of a new and more peaceful Europe. The money coming from the U.S. due to the Marshall Plan and reindustrialization gave a momentum to the economy in Europe. However, the war destroyed most of the population in Europe most of whom were at the productive age. Therefore, Europe, apart from the economic and material deficits which were to be supplied by the Marshall Plan, suffered from a “serious deficiency of population” as well.¹⁰⁵ It was in this period (1950s) when most European states invited workers from non-European countries and

¹⁰⁰ Etienne Balibar, “Is There a ‘Neo-Racism’?” in *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, eds. Etienne Balibar and Immanuel M. Wallerstein (London & NY: Verso, 1988).

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 20.

¹⁰² Michel Wieviorka, “Race, Culture, and Society: The French Experience with Muslims” in *Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture, and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization*, eds. Nezar AlSayyad and Manuel Castles (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002), 139.

¹⁰³ Etienne Balibar, *Politics and the Other Scene*. (London & NY: Verso, 2002).

¹⁰⁴ Michel Wieviorka, “Racism in Europe: Unity and Diversity” in *Racism, Modernity and Identity on the Western Front*, eds. Ali Rattansi and Salie Westwood (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994).

¹⁰⁵ Derek Howard Aldcroft, *The European Economy: 1914-1990* (London & NY: Routledge, 1993).

also from the peripheral European countries such as Italy and Greece in order to fill their labour shortages in the economic recovery. However, with the economic crisis in the late 1960s and 1970s, the economy was shaken. The result was a growing unemployment. This economic crisis was one of the reasons of the beginning of new racism.¹⁰⁶ In other words, as Miles argues, “the crisis of accumulation” in the early 1970s was the first structural change that Europe underwent within its “grand mutation”.¹⁰⁷ The recession of 1974-5 led to rising unemployment and inflation which caused the changes in government policies.¹⁰⁸ The welfare states were affected severely from this economic crisis and became unable to afford their social expenditures. The social and economic rights which had been gained as the triumph of the working-class movement and which had been influential due to the existence of the Soviet Union began to be lost gradually. States could not afford to maintain their social welfare policies such as unemployment compensations and health and housing programs due to the economic crisis and began to give priority to more urgent problems, such as the control of inflation.

This decline of the welfare state with the rising unemployment resulted in increasing feelings of insecurity and the disintegration of society.¹⁰⁹ In such a conjuncture, the collapse of the real socialism at the end of the 1980s had additional impact. The Balkans entered a state of war in the name of “ethnic cleansing” causing the rise of fears and sentiments of insecurity in Europe. Moreover, it caused millions of refugees who escaped from death to gorge into Europe. As Schlogel (2003) claims, the 20th Century is sometimes called “the century of refugees”. In these circumstances, racism was once more accentuated in the absence of another ideology as offering a *possible solution*.¹¹⁰ The decline of the working-class movement and of the trade unions both of which used to compensate the social disturbances by offering hopes to the working classes and by representing them to demand additional rights from the governments coincided with the

¹⁰⁶ Wieviorka, “Racism in Europe: Unity and Diversity”.

¹⁰⁷ Robert Miles, *Racism* (London & NY: Routledge, 2003).

¹⁰⁸ Aldcroft, *The European Economy: 1914-1990*.

¹⁰⁹ Wieviorka, “Racism in Europe: Unity and Diversity”.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

flow of people migrating into the metropolitan countries due to the unrest in their home countries and due to economic necessities.

The states, unable to control the flow of capital and goods, put additional restrictions on the entrance for non-Europeans which contradict the very basics of capitalist production which needs cheap and flexible labour. The states found themselves transferring their functions to trans-national entities, such as the EU, due to the effects of globalization and regionalization, which is a contradictory phenomenon to the modern nation state in terms of resulting in “crisis of autonomy and crisis of legitimacy”.¹¹¹ However, although the nation-states had concerns about the loss of their sovereignty, they could not prevent this tendency: “an incipient and partial denationalization of domains” as Sassen calls.¹¹² In its “increasing marginalization” as a result of these processes, the states became one of the central actors in the articulation of racism because they concentrated their actions on immigration and asylum as the signs of sovereignty. By the same token, nationalism separated from its progressive roots in the French Revolution, “such as *liberté, égalité, and fraternité*” and articulated with racism for the sake of national identity.¹¹³

The nation-state is not the only institution which has experienced a crisis of legitimacy. The EU, while almost terminating economic integration and while being on the move to political integration, certainly a more difficult task to achieve than the former, has been experiencing a legitimacy crisis because it is unable to create feelings of belonging of the peoples of Europe in its way toward a more intense integration. National-identities are still dominant for Europeans while European identity is an “abstraction” designating “the EU’s ideological deficit”.¹¹⁴ However, a common European identity transcending

¹¹¹ Lydia Morris, “Globalisation, Migration and the Nation-state: the Path to a Post-National Europe?” *Brit. Jnl. Of Sociology*, 48 no. 2 (1997), 192-209.

¹¹² Dominic Boyer, Welcome to the New Europe. *American Ethnologist* 32 no.4 (2005), 521-523.

Saskia Sassen, “Spatialities and Temporalities of the Global: Elements for a Theorization” in *Globalization*, ed. A. Appadurai (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2001), 265.

¹¹³ Ther, “The Spell of the Homogenous Nation-State: Structural Factors and Agents of Ethnic Cleansing”, 82.

more or less particular national identities is important for the stability of the EU¹¹⁵. In order to be able to overcome this problem, the EU has introduced symbols and flags to strengthen the feelings of belonging during the 1970s and 1980s.¹¹⁶ According to Blaise Pascal, faith can be cultivated externally meaning that if a person prays everyday, religious sentiment will follow.¹¹⁷ By the same token, EU elites must have thought that introducing flags and other symbols could create a sense of belonging. However, these policies did not suffice without a common myth. Consequently, “Fortress Europe” was invented by the elites of the EU to this aim. By demonizing immigrants and Islam and by exaggerating immigration, they created a so-called unity.

Since the early 1990s, a more exclusivist system of migration and harmonization of states’ immigration and asylum policies began to be implemented against the imagined threat from the immigrants of the Third World.¹¹⁸ With the acceptance of the Balkan countries into the EU, new borders were drawn as strictly as before to exclude the migrants from the Middle East and the North Africa.¹¹⁹ What is common for the nation-states in Europe and the EU is the need to invent and feed the feelings of anxieties and paranoia against the threats coming from Islam and immigrants because such feelings among the population will ease the way both to control, to persuade them in the policies implemented and to create and maintain myths about the common cultural heritage and unity.

It was in this context that immigrants and Islam became the scapegoats. Remaining the only Others, racial hatred turned to Muslims “within”. As I have earlier argued in the

¹¹⁴ Phil Marfleet, “Europe’s Civilizing Mission” in *New Ethnicities, Old Racisms*, ed. P. Cohen (London: Zed Books, 1999).

¹¹⁵ Nezar AlSayyad and Manuel Castles, “Introduction: Islam and the Changing Identity of Europe” in *Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization*, ed. N. AlSayyad (Berkeley: University of California, 2002).

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Alex Debeljak, *The Hidden Handshake: National Identity and Europe in the Post-Communist World*. (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2004), 100.

¹¹⁸ Marfleet, “Europe’s Civilizing Mission”.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

second chapter, Islam once again became the focus of hostility after the *death* of the communist enemy with the collapse of the Iron Curtain. In that sense, “the East” has remained the focus of European hostility but moved southwards to include Islam.¹²⁰ Islam is the oldest Other of Europe as of the 7th Century as has already been discussed in the second chapter.

Within the history of Europe, Islam kept returning onto the stage as the “quintessential Other”¹²¹ of Europe whenever the conditions are favourable. For example, it re-emerged in the 17th Century as Orientalism.¹²² Said, in his book *Orientalism*, argues that the “West” creates itself on the perpetual opposition to the “East” claiming it to be anti-Western, anti-Capitalist, anti-democratic and so uncivilized. Therefore, due to this dichotomization, the “West” creates itself as the superior civilization. Within the present context of Europe, *civilization* once again is the criterion but in another context and with a different emphasis (religion) with the mission of excluding new Others. The myth of European *civilization*, which has been used against the savage once upon a time, was now renewed against the Muslims within Europe as well as outside its frontiers who were supposedly a homogenous group with all their traditions and institutions and stereotyped extremist, fanatic, and terrorist faith.¹²³

Immigrant workers from the ex-colonies and from the peripheries of Europe who were invited by the European states in the 1950s and the refugees from the Eastern countries are the main victims of xenophobic culture. The states, while inviting these workers, did not plan that these peoples would settle down in their countries. The states and also the workers themselves thought that they would be temporary in the host countries and would return their homes. It was because of this that these peoples were called “guest-workers”. However, their existence in Europe turned to be permanent. Moreover, they

¹²⁰ Marfleet, “Europe’s Civilizing Mission”, 22.

¹²¹ Sohail Daulatzai, “Prophets of Race: Race, Nation, Islam and the Cultural Politics of Identity” (PhD diss., University of Southern California, 2003), 21.

¹²² Said, *Orientalism*.

¹²³ Marfleet, “Europe’s Civilizing Mission”, 24.

brought their family members (family unification). It is argued that the migration of families of the immigrant workers was more important¹²⁴ because not only did it increase the migrant population in the host country but meant that these workers were becoming permanent settlers.

It is clear that the European states did not take into account the fact that these workers were human beings and that they were affected by several factors. For example, they found their home country changed a lot when they returned after living a while in the host country. They also confronted with insults and even hatred by their own people in their home country. Therefore, even if they wanted to return, they could not and so continued living in the host country. However, all guest-workers were not treated in the same manner. Immigrant workers from the other European member states, such as Italy, Portugal, Spain and Greece, were more easily accepted due to the belief that they could integrate into the host country more rapidly than those from non-EU countries. Moreover, these workers gained European citizenship after the establishment of the EU, so they had many social and economic rights, such as freedom of movement and work in another EU country. On the other hand, those from non-European states encountered exclusion with the justification of cultural incompatibility, especially due to their religion.

Refugees from the Balkans and Africa, on the other hand, who had been welcomed as “heroic freedom-fighters” and on whom big amounts of money had been spent¹²⁵ in time of the threat of communism, now began to be perceived as burdens upon the European states who were discussing the “Fortress Europe” against the *attacks* from unwanted have-nots. Refugees (from Central and Eastern Europe, from Africa, the Indian subcontinent and South-East Asia¹²⁶) had been used as a weapon against communism once upon a time. However, when the threat of communism was over, refugees, the

¹²⁴ Robert Miles and Dietrich Thranhardt, “Introduction: European Integration, Migration and Processes of Inclusion and Exclusion,” in *Migration and European Integration: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion*, R. Miles, and D. Thranhardt eds. (London: Pinter Publishers, 1995).

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

number of whom increased markedly due to the collapse of communist-states and due to the economic and political unrest both in Central and East Europe and Africa, began to be debated under the logic of exclusion and under the excuses of economic considerations. Since the mid-1980s, harmonization of immigration controls has been implemented in order to prevent these people from coming.

However, not only the “guest-workers” and refugees were exposed to xenophobic attacks and sentiments but settlers from ex-colonies with mostly citizenship rights (Algerians in France, Indians in Britain, etc.) also became targets of the neo-racist sentiments. Migration between the European states and their colonies was common in the colonial era. This did not end with the decolonization due to the bridges which had been built between the colonizer and the colonized countries; for example, between France and Maghreb and the francophone countries of Africa; between Britain and Indian subcontinent the Caribbean; between the Netherlands and Surinam; between Spain and Morocco, etc. Scholars would later call this phenomenon as the “colonial model”.¹²⁷ Although the migrants from the former colonies acquired citizenship, this would not prevent them from becoming the targets of neo-racist attacks in the 20th Century. They began to be labeled as “undesirable” in the increasing racialization of Europe. These settlers, most of whom are black and Muslim, have been excluded on the basis of colour and religion

These “Others within” were attacked on four grounds which are interconnected (on the grounds of economic, cultural, identity and security issues). They were accused of sharing the resources that naturally belongs not to them but to the nationals. Therefore, they were thought to decrease the “living standards” and caused unemployment and housing problems.¹²⁸ They are thought to be a threat to the economy of the host country. However, the reality is the opposite. The immigrants work in jobs that mostly nationals do not want to work.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Balibar, *Politics and the Other Scene*.

Another accusation is cultural. Cultural differences between Europeans and foreigners make it impossible to live together.¹²⁹ Especially Muslim immigrants are supposed to be inassimilable in Western societies due to Islam's being depicted as incompatible with Western civilization. Therefore, they are represented as cultural others and as threats against the culture of the host society.

Migrants' being culturally different is closely connected with the identity issue. Due to their unchangeable differences, they pose a threat to national identity.¹³⁰ They cause the destruction of traditional identities of European nationals. European nationals will either be able to continue their national identities or Islam will replace them.¹³¹

Lastly, they are thought to pose a security problem. They are a threat to "public order".¹³² It is claimed that they raise the crime rates. However, arguments on security do not account for the fact that these immigrants live in a state of constant poverty. Moreover, they are exposed to discrimination and exclusion. These conditions can lead them to commit crime but do not specifically cause crime. On the contrary, these arguments are exaggerations.

In my fourth chapter, I shall discuss neo-racism in three major European states (France, Britain and Germany) in order to be able to argue the existence of the racist tradition in Europe within multiplicity of Europe(s) and of racism(s). Then, I shall try to explain how neo-racism as the revival of a tradition has emerged out of Europe's colonial history and modernism and out of Europe's self-definition and gained power all over Europe.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Marfleet, "Europe's Civilizing Mission".

¹³² Ibid.

CHAPTER 4

THREE CASES OF NEO-RACISM: A GENERAL OVERVIEW

What this chapter aims to serve is a brief outlook of European neo-racism in the current European context with the help of three exemplary countries –France, Britain and Germany, all of which, I believe, share a common racist tradition. France, Britain and Germany are thought to be the representatives of Europe and hence appropriate for the expansion and exemplification of the previous chapter because of their historical specificities. For one thing, these three countries –France, Britain, and Germany- have significant Muslim populations and partly as a result they experience a rise of racism. Although, the events that led to the existence of these immigrants and “measures” that have been taken to cope with the *problems* are different from each other, these countries often execute “harsh, often violent, reactions” against the immigrants.¹³³ For another, they boast about their European past and high level of civilization. However, they seem to sacrifice some universal values, which they claim to possess, for the sake of the “purity” of their so-called culture and civilization. Showing the similarities and the differences between these countries in terms of immigration and racism issues will be of service to my purpose.

France, Germany and Britain seem to follow three different approaches in dealing with their immigration problems. I shall briefly explain these three approaches before I move onto their actual implementation in the aforementioned countries. The first approach that I shall deal with is the *assimilationist approach*. It is based on the idea that the immigrants should detach themselves from their culture so as to integrate into the host

¹³³ Thomas F. Pettigrew, “Reactions Toward the New Minorities of Western Europe,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 24 (1998).

society. Otherwise, they are only threats to social order of the host country. Against the threat of miscegenation, the erosion of the national and cultural values, the assimilation of the foreigners is obligatory. On the other hand, the second approach, *multiculturalism*, enables the immigrants to preserve their culture and to perform their cultural practices. Therefore, cultural and religious rights are discussed under the principle of “tolerance”. The third approach is *differential exclusionism* which results in the inclusion of the immigrants into the labour market and their sharing of the economic burden while excluding them from the social and political rights and from the welfare implementations.¹³⁴ As I proceed with the discussion of these approaches and their implementation in France, Britain and Germany, I hope to be able to show that all the three approaches articulate similar effects, namely, they all reproduce neo-racism stemming from the traditional racist-thinking of Europe.

France, in this context, is seen as the exemplary case for the discussion on the *assimilationist doctrines* as it is “a classical country, perhaps *the* classical country of assimilation”¹³⁵. Britain, on the other hand, is discussed as following an opposite approach with its *multicultural doctrine*. However, multiculturalism is discussed not as a non-racist doctrine in opposition to (racist) assimilationism. On the contrary, it can turn into a kind of racist thinking as I shall try to argue in this chapter. Germany, finally, is different from these two countries in the sense of its colonial past –virtually, it has no colonial past- and hence, its immigration history because while France and Great Britain were two great imperial powers, Germany completed its integration rather late, so started its colonialist struggles later with no success. Therefore, it experienced a different process of immigration, which I shall name as *installed colonization* that led to *differential exclusionism*.

As I have mentioned, Muslim populations in France and Britain are the outcome of their colonial histories. As France and Britain had similar economies based on colonialism

¹³⁴ Stephen Castles, “How Nation-States Respond to Immigration and Ethnic Diversity” in *Migration and Social Cohesion*, Steven Vertovec, ed. (Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999).

¹³⁵ Rogers Blubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge: Mass, 1992).

and had similar decolonization experiences, their immigration experiences were also similar. Both France and Britain gave their immigrants citizenship owing to the Code National in France which is based on “jus soli” and to British Dependent Territory Citizenship in Britain. Their policies on immigrants’ integration into their societies were different from each other, however. Two seemingly contradictory implementations based on the “republican philosophy”¹³⁶ of France and philosophy of *multiculturalism* / “race relations” of Britain were at work. This is not the case for Germany, due to its lack of overseas colonies, implemented guest-worker programs by installing colonies within its own territory. Different from France and Britain, Germany did not grant citizenship to these *installed colonies*. Owing to its national citizenship understanding (based on blood), immigrants in Germany were deprived of social and political rights which I have named as *differential exclusionism*.

It is therefore important to review briefly the immigration histories of these three countries before discussing their approaches toward immigration. Only by revealing the racist tendencies of these three approaches can we discuss whether a *racist tradition* exists or not. Thus, my discussion will continue with an overview of the history of immigration into France, Britain and Germany respectively and their patterns of neo-racism.

4.1 The French Experience: A Brief History of French Immigration

The migration history of France started with the immigration of colonial officers in the ex-colonies.¹³⁷ After the colonies gained their independence from France, officers who would not be even registered as migrants, returned home. Moreover, non-national colonials were welcomed as well and they were also granted citizenship readily in order to encourage their return.¹³⁸ It is noteworthy that this decolonization process coincided

¹³⁶ Adrian Favell, *Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain* (NY: Palgrave, 2001).

¹³⁷ Fassmann and Münz, “Patterns and Trends of International Migration in Western Europe”.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

with the immigration of refugees and displaced people following the Second World War. With the post war economic boom, North Africans migrated to France and were guaranteed “access to French nationality” and “security of settlement”.¹³⁹ Since these immigrants were perceived as temporary, their assimilation was not an issue to worry about. Among these, Algerian immigrant workers were the most privileged because they were given citizenship and the right to travel and settlement. These rights granted to the Algerians were, on the whole, part of the policy of the French government which wanted to maintain political and economic ties with Algeria.

Apart from these developments, in order to close its labour shortage, France made bilateral agreements firstly with European countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal to invite workers in the 1960s, and then with Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and on a small scale with Turkey by the end of the 1960s.¹⁴⁰ Algerians and Tunisians enjoyed special privileges owing to the colonial experience. There were hierarchies between ex-colonials’ residents (coloured and Muslims) and European immigrant workers due to the latter’s being white, European and Christian. Owing to these features of European immigrants, they were thought as assimilable and so perceived as harmless. European immigrants, in this context, were more desirable.

However, this does not mean that immigrants from Poland, Italy and Spain have never been exposed to xenophobia and racism. On the contrary, they were hated especially on the eve of the World War II but the war changed their condition: because in war conditions, French people and immigrants united against the Nazis.¹⁴¹ The economic recovery following the war reinforced this situation. Moreover, the implementation of European citizenship gave excessive rights to these European immigrant workers, some of whom had already returned back to their countries of origin following the entrance of

¹³⁹ Patrick Weil and John Crowley, “Integration in Theory and Practice: A Comparison of France and Britain” in *Migration and Social Cohesion*, ed. Steven Vertovec (1999), 114.

¹⁴⁰ Fassmann and Münz, “Patterns and Trends of International Migration in Western Europe,” *Population and Development Review* 18 no.3 (1992).

¹⁴¹ Patrick Weil and John Crowley, “Integration in Theory and Practice: A Comparison of France and Britain”.

Spain and Portugal to the EU in 1986 as this development made some improvements in the economies of these countries. Due to the continental integration, European worker immigration slowed down which forced France to recruit workers from especially Algeria and Morocco. However, their biological and religious differences make them more conspicuous and so vulnerable to discrimination more than the European immigrants.

In the 1980s, France experienced flows of political/economic refugees from Eastern Europe, Africa and the Middle East.¹⁴² While refugees and asylum-seekers were from ex-colonies –Indochina- in the early cold war period, the 1980s saw an increase in the numbers of refugees and asylum-seekers from the third world countries and especially from Africa.¹⁴³

In summary, it can be said that France has three different immigrant groups. One of them is the European immigrant group (from Italy, Spain and Portugal) enjoying European citizenship rights. This group is the most advantageous group in terms of rights they enjoy and they are rarely the target of discrimination and racial violence. The other group is composed of the immigrants from Africa (Maghreb and Sub Saharan Africa). These people are the victims of racial violence and discrimination in employment and educational spheres.¹⁴⁴ The last group of immigrant communities of France is from Eastern Europe (Turkey, Romania, The Baltic States and Russia). These immigrants are mostly asylum seekers and workers. As most of the countries in Eastern Europe entered into the EU (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia joined the EU in 2004 and Bulgaria and Romania in 2007), the people from these countries now enjoy European citizenship. although the negative stereotyping in public has not changed overnight, their status is much better now.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Christopher Rudolph, *National Security and Immigration: Policy Development in the United States and Western Europe Since 1945* (California: Stanford University Press, 2006), 146.

¹⁴⁴ Isabelle Chopkin, Janet Cormack and Jan Niessen, eds. *The Implementation of European anti Discrimination Legislation: Work in Progress* (Brussels: MPG, 2004).

France is the country where an extreme-rightist/populist/xenophobic party enjoys the biggest electoral success in Europe. The French National Front (FN) gained its major success in 2002 presidential elections with 17.9 % of the votes.¹⁴⁵ However, the growing success of the French National Front (FN) in the elections since the early 1980s is not the only sign of racism in France. Foreigners, apart from being exposed to prejudices and humiliations by civil society, constitute the majority of victims of police brutality.¹⁴⁶

4.2 Patterns of French Neo-Racism

The approach of France towards the immigration issue is based on its “republican philosophy” which is allegedly composed of four main components: “universalism, unitarism, secularism and assimilation”.¹⁴⁷ The republicanism of France is put as a universalism based on the principles of “liberté, égalité, fraternité”.¹⁴⁸ Citizenship in France is granted on the basis of this republican ideology. Moreover, contrary to the German citizenship based on common ethnic origin, French citizenship is granted on soil –according to the principle of “jus soli”. This means that a person born on French territory and accepting to be assimilated in French society and accept to learn French language can get French citizenship. The commitment to these four principles (universalism, unitarism, secularism and assimilation) is the basis for French citizenship. Therefore, the existence of foreigners is only acceptable if these *étrangers* volunteer to be assimilated into French culture -to speak French basically. Immigrants are tolerated if they are considered to have been assimilated. This understanding of assimilation ensures fact that immigrants are liberated from their cultural specificities and identities.

¹⁴⁵ <http://www.irr.org.uk/europe/>

¹⁴⁶ <https://www.irr.org.uk/cgi-bin/news/open.pl?id=7509>

Cathie Lloyd, “Racist Violence and Anti-Racist Reactions: A View of France” in *Racist Violence in Europe*, eds. Tore Björge and Rob Witte (NY: St Martin’s Press, 1993).

¹⁴⁷ Randall Hansen, “Migration, Citizenship and Race in Europe: Between Incorporation and Exclusion” *European Journal of Political Research* 35 (1999), 418.

¹⁴⁸ Jane Freedman, “Secularism as a Barrier to Integration? The French Dilemma” *International Migration* 42 no. 3 (2004).

This stress on the assimilation of the foreigners into French culture was not an issue till the 1980s. There are two reasons for this fact. Firstly, until the economic recession and following unemployment, these immigrants were on high demand. Moreover, as they were thought to be returning their home, there was no need to assimilate them. Secondly, with the economic recession, their being unassimilated gave a cause for the French right advocating that these immigrants sought to be repatriated. After all, they were impossible to assimilate (this is an argument that the French right still advocates).¹⁴⁹ Therefore, the assimilation came to the centre of political debate in the 1980s with the rise NF led by Jean-Marie Le Pen. NF converted the leftist claim and started to propagate “the right to be different” (*le droit a la difference*) in a context of economic recession and unemployment. Moreover, Muslims were considered as inassimilable in France due to the stereotyping of Islam as a “monolithic”¹⁵⁰ religion incompatible with Western values (secularism, democracy, tolerance, *laïcité*). In spite of the fact that most of these Muslims have French citizenship owing to the colonial past of France and that they were *invited* by the French state in the 1950s due to the economic needs, their becoming *unwanted* is justified by the discourse of their unassimilability.

The negative stereotyping of Muslims in France was also affected by the Algerian War of Independence. While Britain had been experiencing a smooth decolonization, France, contrary to Britain, entered in a bloody war with Algeria in order not to lose its “territories”. This war had severe influences on domestic politics and led to discussions in the country. As Algeria was not seen as a dominion but as part of the main land, its struggle for independence was seen as a betrayal.

There are two main reasons for Islam’s becoming the main target of cultural racism: Firstly, the impossibility of the Muslims to be assimilated into a secular country and secondly the insistence of the universalism of the French culture. French republican ideology recognizes French culture as universal and does not acknowledge other

¹⁴⁹ Patrick Weil and John Crowley, “Integration in Theory and Practice: A Comparison of France and Britain”.

¹⁵⁰ Bassam Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).

cultures. As it has been mentioned above, French citizenship is based on assimilation of immigrants to the French society and culture. As a result, Islam by being represented as insurmountable and inassimilable becomes a threat both to the national identity and to the universal values.¹⁵¹

Although citizenship is a claim on equality between individuals, it is exclusivist in nature. Not only does it exclude immigrants living and working in France without citizenship, but it also excludes the notion of minority and the rights specific to these groups.¹⁵² Contrary to the multiculturalist approach which defends the minority rights, French citizenship addresses only to those individuals who are seen as the “same”. It excludes differences between individuals and makes them same with each other.

The doctrine of laïcité puts another burden on Islam and makes it uncompromisable with French universals once again. In line with this doctrine, the headscarf issue which started in 1989 is one of the most controversial issues in France.¹⁵³ This debate is one of the chief issues within the debates on the incompatibility of Islam with Western values and with French universals. The doctrine of laïcité is claimed to protect the “equality” principles by overcoming differences and “liberty” principles by controlling religious fundamentalism and the liberation of Muslim Women by saving them from the oppression of Islam. The claim on this oppressed position of Muslim women is the second theme on this issue and the headscarf is perceived as the symbol of the oppression of the Muslim women within Islam.

As I have previously mentioned, this argument propagated by the new right in France succesfully “reversed” the leftist doctrine of the “right to be different”. This age-old doctrine was now translated as the right of the French to protect its culture against the invasion of Islamic culture. The new right insists that French nationals have the right to

¹⁵¹ Wiewiorka, “Race, Culture, and Society: The French Experience with Muslims”.

¹⁵² Mairead Nic Craith, “Culture and Citizenship in Europe: Questions for Anthropologists” *Social Anthropology* 12 no. 3 (2004).

¹⁵³ Molokotos L. Liederman, “Religious Diversity in Schools: the Muslim Headscarf Controversy and Beyond” *Social Compass* 47 no. 3 (2000).

be different, to protect their unique national identity against the threat of miscegenation, mixing of cultures. In this sense, as Pierre-André Taguieff claims, racism both “biologizes[s] the cultural, [and] ... acculturates the biological”¹⁵⁴. It is curious to note once more how the biological and cultural arguments within racial-thinking overlap.

4.3 The British Experience: A Brief History of British Immigration

Similar to the French case, Britain also witnessed the overlapping of the issues of immigration and colonization/decolonization. In other words, colonial and postcolonial policies in both Britain and France directly affected immigration. Similar to the existence of the Algerians in France, Britain accommodated people coming from its ex-colonies –the Caribbean and Indian subcontinent. These people had British Overseas citizenship or the citizenship of Commonwealth countries, very much like the case in France.¹⁵⁵

Indian labour was especially important for the imperialist Britain. In several colonies, Britain employed the Indians rather than the indigenous populations.¹⁵⁶ With the end of the Second World War, colonialism apparently ended for the European countries but its legacy would never end. Therefore, with decolonization, Europe ceased to be an emigration continent; instead it became an immigration continent. By the 1950s and 1960s, like many other European countries, the economic recovery led Britain to receive immigrants from ex-colonies due to the “labour scarcity situation”.¹⁵⁷ Britain turned to its ex-colonies in the Caribbean, and then Commonwealth countries in the Indian subcontinent, immigrants who were granted British and Commonwealth citizenship. Before the 1950s and 1960s, Africans and Indians had already immigrated to Britain but in

¹⁵⁴ Pierre-André Taguieff, “The New Cultural Racism in France” in *Racism*, eds. Martin Bulmer and John Solomos (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 209.

¹⁵⁵ John Rex, *Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State: Working Papers in the Theory of Multiculturalism and Political Integration* (NY: Macmillan Press, 1996).

Fassmann and Münz, “Patterns and Trends of International Migration in Western Europe”.

¹⁵⁶ Fenton, *Ethnicity, Racism, Class and Culture*.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

small numbers and they mostly returned back to their *home*. Consequently, they did not become an issue of concern. However, before turning to its ex-colonies for a solution to labour shortages in the context of post-war reconstruction, Poles and Italians were recruited alongside with displaced Jews who were exposed to oppositions.¹⁵⁸ In the 1940s, a statesman claims: “immigration on a large scale ... could only be welcomed ... if [they] were ... not prevented by their religion or race from intermarrying with the host population and becoming merged in it”.¹⁵⁹ It should be remembered that the Irish was the *first* labour supplier of Britain.¹⁶⁰ Apart from the European workers and the Irish worker who is the traditional labour supplier, workers from ex-colonies were also admitted. Besides, they were granted citizenship to encourage their arrival as had been in the case of France. These colonial workers were not a problem at first because they themselves thought that they would return. When they became stable in Britain and other European countries, they started to be perceived as a threat. Apart from the Indians, the Pakistanis also migrated into Britain followed by the refugees who escaped from the economic and political unrest in their home countries in Africa and Asia.¹⁶¹

Apart from these external others (Other(s) of the Other(s)), internal others, such as Jews and the Irish people who dwell in Britain exposed to hostility and racism although they are both white and European. Despite the fact that there exists a hierarchy between immigrants, the white immigrants are advantaged in this sense thanks to the existence of culturally and biologically different ones.

The immigrant population in the UK constitutes 7.9% of the total population.¹⁶² The largest ethnic group is Indians (1.8% of the foreign population). Other ethnic minorities

¹⁵⁸ Paul Iganski and James Jacobs, “Racism, immigration and migrant labour” in *Britain in Europe*, ed. Tony Spiby (London: Routledge, 1997), 147-160.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 149.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁶¹ Steve Fenton, *Ethnicity, Racism, Class and Culture* (London: Macmillan Press, 1999).

are Pakistanis, Black Caribbeans, Black Africans, Chinese and Bangladeshi. The group who is the most discriminated is the people from Bangladesh. However, almost all ethnic minorities are disadvantaged in education, employment, housing etc...¹⁶³

The increasing xenophobia and racism, pronounced by the right wing parties, resulted in sanctions and restricting measures against immigration. However, the number of Muslim immigrants did not decrease, on the contrary, due to family reunification programs and due to high fertility rates, Muslim population increased.

According to the Human Rights Watch, Britain has “the highest levels of racially motivated violence and harassment”¹⁶⁴, although extreme-right parties did not succeed as they did in France or Germany.¹⁶⁵ Increasing racism in terms of violence and xenophobia is directed against the Muslim immigrants within Britain similar to other parts of Europe.¹⁶⁶ Racist attacks on Afro-Caribbeans and Asians which started after the end of the World War I became more and more serious after the World War II.¹⁶⁷ As Gordon narrates, Notting Hill riots in 1958, for example, were one of the most serious attacks on black people because hundreds of white people attacked blacks on the streets and even at their homes.¹⁶⁸ The 1960s and 1970s also witnessed racist attacks; however it was not until 1981 that the British government did acknowledge the seriousness of the fact. Moreover, the racist attacks, which continued to increase in the 1980s and 1990s,

¹⁶² Barbara Cohen, “United Kingdom” in *The Implementation of European anti Discrimination Legislation: Work in Progress*, eds. Isabelle Chopkin, Janet Cormack and Jan Niessen (Brussels: MPG, 2004).

¹⁶³ Ibid, 83.

¹⁶⁴ Human Rights Watch, 1997. Available online at <http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/update.html>.

¹⁶⁵ <http://www.irr.org.uk/europe/>

¹⁶⁶ Daulatzai, “Prophets of Race: Race, Nation, Islam and the Cultural Politics of Identity”

¹⁶⁷ Paul Gordon, “The Police and Racist Violence in Britain” in *Racist Violence in Europe*, eds. Tore Björge and Rob Witte (NY: St Martin’s Press, 1993).

¹⁶⁸ Ibid, 167.

were perceived as a fault of the black people and the engagement of the police in racial violence was not even recognized¹⁶⁹.

4.4 Patterns of British Neo-Racism

Immigration patterns of Britain were as I have said similar to the French case; however, unlike the French assimilationist doctrine, Britain implemented a *multiculturalist regime*, called “race relations”. This doctrine was a combination of a leftist and liberal view as opposed to the conservatives’ insistence on assimilationist doctrine. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the conservatives in Britain claimed that race relations doctrine would lead to violence and even to civil war, and unless they adopted the assimilationist doctrine, the strife would continue.¹⁷⁰ According to them, as there are too many people to be assimilated, immigration must be stopped and repatriation must be encouraged.¹⁷¹ In spite of the British conservatives’ insistence on assimilation, *multiculturalism* remained the main policy in Britain on the immigration issue. Multiculturalism is the mirror image of the assimilationist doctrine which is reversed in the sense that multiculturalism is based on the acknowledgment of the fact that people from different backgrounds, different ethnicities and different religious affinities should live together by respecting the differences between them.¹⁷² Under the name of “race relations”, multiculturalism in Britain claims to give different rights and to implement different policies for different ethnic groups. This approach maintains that different ethnic groups need different policies. Although multiculturalism is mainly viewed as a leftist doctrine due to the egalitarian and emancipatory promises through tolerance, diversity and

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Patrick Weil and John Crowley, “Integration in Theory and Practice: A Comparison of France and Britain”.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Sami Zemni, “Islam, European Identity and the Limits of Multiculturalism” in *Religious Freedom and the Neutrality of the State: The Position of the European Union*, red. W. A. R. Shadid and P. S. Van Koningsveld (Leuven: Peeters, 2002).

pluralism; it can be viewed as a doctrine belonging to the right because of its exclusivist nature.

Multiculturalism policies in Britain have been unable to solve the problems of racism prevailing in this society, but to the contrary, it seems to have reproduced racism. The implicit definition of identity within the multiculturalist view is one of the reasons of the above claim. Identity, in this approach, reveals itself as a homogenous, fixed and unchangeable thing. Moreover, particularistic group identities, such as ethnicity or religion, become individual's fix and single identity.¹⁷³ This kind of belonging excludes other identities of the individual and promotes only one out of many. It does overlook individual's other identities and stress his/her ethnic identity. It divides "people according to ethnic origin", that is according to differences which are thought to be self-evident, unchangeable and fixed. "Communities" that individuals are thought to belong according to multiculturalism are necessarily exclusive. Communities in this approach are thought to be "self-contained, closed totalities".¹⁷⁴ This construction of difference between cultural communities is justly placed within the racist-thinking with its exclusiveness.

Moreover, "tolerance" for other cultures, as the plea of multiculturalism, is not a neutral and innocent concept because it implies the inferiority of other *cultures* and superiority of the European *civilization*. "Tolerance" strongly implies that the tolerated –Muslim immigrant- does not belong to Europe; (s)he cannot make Europe his/her homeland. On the contrary, Europe belongs to Europeans. They are the true owners of the European lands and non-Europeans *in* Europe can only be tolerated by the real Europeans –by the true owners of Europe.¹⁷⁵ In other words, these immigrants "*are not those whose home is Europe*"¹⁷⁶ so the foreigners at home can either be tolerated or gotten rid off.

¹⁷³ Christian Joppke, "Multiculturalism and Immigration: A Comparison of the United States, Germany, and Great Britain," *Theory and Society* 25 no.4 (1996).

¹⁷⁴ Taguieff, "The New Cultural Racism in France" in *Racism*, 210.

¹⁷⁵ This is why to use *of* for the Muslim immigrants *of* Europe connotes a different meaning. As these people belong to Europe, they do not have to be tolerated in order to live there.

European civilization is still the reference point and the one which will decide to tolerate or not to tolerate its inferiors, the one which will decide who will stay there. Therefore, it can be claimed that *tolerance* is the alibi of racism.

A concrete example of the racist tendency within the *multiculturalist approach* in Britain is about the funding of Islamic schools by the state. This issue is not a concern in France due to the policy differences between the two states: while France has been discussing the headscarf issue, Britain continues to *worry about* funding community schools. It is argued that although the state provides funds for Jewish, Anglican, and Roman Catholic schools, it can refuse to fund Islamic schools. This is perceived as a discrimination against Muslims.¹⁷⁷ While this issue of funding Islamic schools by the state became a national debate in Britain, headscarf issue did not become a big concern and passed over under the principle of religious tolerance until recently.¹⁷⁸

Conceivably then, although multiculturalism aims at giving and protecting cultural and group rights of the “historically disadvantaged and discriminated groups in society”¹⁷⁹, it is as much a racial thinking as assimilationist view.¹⁸⁰ It is claimed that even though multiculturalism aims at equality within the society, it does not change unequal power relations which continue to subjugate immigrants in terms of this neo-racism.¹⁸¹ It does not advocate the integration of the Muslims in the society but, on the contrary, it differentiates them as another cultural community bringing about the ghettoization of the

¹⁷⁶ Michael J. Wintle, *Culture and Identity in Europe: Perceptions of Divergence and Unity in Past and Present* (Aldershot: Avebury, 1996).

¹⁷⁷ Lina Molokotos Liederman, “Religious Diversity in Schools: the Muslim Headscarf Controversy and Beyond,” *Social Compass* 47 no. 3 (2000).

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁹ Christian Joppke, “Multiculturalism and Immigration: A Comparison of the United States, Germany, and Great Britain”.

¹⁸⁰ Bassam Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder*.

¹⁸¹ Daulatzai, “Prophets of Race: Race, Nation, Islam and the Cultural Politics of Identity”

Muslims.¹⁸² This differentiation and ghettoization of the Muslim immigrants of Britain is certainly the result of the fact that *multiculturalist philosophy* views the immigration issue as “a problem of race relations/public order”.¹⁸³

4.5 The German Experience: A Brief History of German Immigration

France and Britain have important Muslim immigrants within their territories owing to their colonial histories, whereas Germany has installed itself a colony in its own territory. Germany is different from France and the UK in terms of its immigration history because it has no colonial immigrants as it entered the colonialist struggle rather late and had no overseas colonies.¹⁸⁴ France and Britain formed “privileged relations with” their ex-colonies and therefore their immigrants are mostly from these lands. This means that the immigrants in France and Britain not only have citizenship but more importantly they are familiar with the culture and language of the host country. However, the immigrants of Germany are mostly ethnic Germans who have no common culture with Germans in Germany except for their ethnicity. Apart from the ethnic Germans, Germany has a significant Muslim immigrant population (most of which are Turks) due to its “guest-worker” programme. Hence, although Germany had no overseas colonies, it gained a colony within its borders by employing guest-workers. Furthermore, Germany is different from France and Britain in terms of its understanding of citizenship rights. As opposed to the “civic nationalism” prevailing in other Western countries, Germany has adopted “ethno-nationalism”.

Between 1949 and 1961, West Germany accommodated the largest numbers of immigrants, mostly ethnic Germans (Aussiedler) and refugees from the GDR

¹⁸² Bassam Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder*.

¹⁸³ Hansen, “Migration, Citizenship and Race in Europe: Between Incorporation and Exclusion”.

¹⁸⁴ Heinz Fassmann and Rainer Münz, “Patterns and Trends of International Migration in Western Europe,” *Population and Development Review* 18 no.3 (1992).

(Übersiedler). This continued till the 1990s.¹⁸⁵ These ethnic Germans most of whom did not even speak German, were granted citizenship immediately as German citizenship is based on *suj sanguinis*; that is, based on ethnic origin. In this sense, citizenship in Germany is the contrary of French citizenship which is based on the commitment to French society. This maybe the biggest difference between Germany and other Western European states especially between France because as German citizenship is based on the principle of *suj sanguinis*, German identity becomes unchangeable. Christopher Rudolph¹⁸⁶ argues that Germany in the post-World War II period, commits itself to distancing itself from the Nazi past and to convince the whole world of its new liberal regime. However, Rudolph argues that this did not end with the changing of ethnic nationalism or of the citizenship regime, on the contrary, during the postwar period as a result of “the total collapse of the state, massive expulsion of ethnic Germans from eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and the imposed division of Germany”, the principle of *suj sanguinis* and the related sense of identity was consolidated.¹⁸⁷ The New Germany, therefore, found another solution to change its representation as a liberal Western state: it employed the most extreme and unique law of refugee/asylum: it opened its borders to all persecuted people seeking asylum.

Until the first foreign-labour agreement with Italy in 1955, Germany met its labour shortage by the ethnic German refugees and expellees immigrated to Germany. These new Germans provided highly skilled labour force in Germany.¹⁸⁸ However, in a rapid economic expansion, ethnic Germans could not compensate for the labour shortage. Therefore, Germany in order to close this gap made arrangements with countries like Italy and Turkey and invited workers. Many workers came to Germany to work via these bilateral arrangements. These workers have been called “guest-workers” as they were

¹⁸⁵ Helma Lutz, “The Limits of European-ness: Immigrant Women in Fortress Europe,” *Feminist Review* 57 (1997).

¹⁸⁶ Christopher Rudolph, *National Security and Immigration: Policy Development in the United States and Western Europe Since 1945* (California: Stanford University Press, 2006), 87-91.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 87.

¹⁸⁸ Christopher Rudolph, *National Security and Immigration: Policy Development in the United States and Western Europe Since 1945*.

thought to be returning back their home after they accomplish their *mission*. The “guest-worker” programme did not end with these bilateral arrangements but continued with “family reunification” process in the 1970s. Germany introduced provisions about family unification as “a humanitarian gesture”¹⁸⁹ but they were also intended to close the gap for the labour shortage which has still been a fact.

The economy of Germany, like other European states, was affected by the oil crisis in 1973. Its economy entered into a recession period. In this period, German policymakers acknowledged that foreign workers in Germany were not willing to return due to the economic circumstances in their home countries. Christopher Rudolf claims that the most unwilling foreign population to return back was the Turkish population.¹⁹⁰ Although the guest-worker programme was stopped in 1973 by the German government, the foreign population did not decrease; on the contrary, the numbers of these workers increased and became more visible. In 1979, Heintz Kuhn claimed in his report that these guest-workers were no longer temporaries but immigrants.¹⁹¹ 1982 was the year of the new “foreigner policy” based on encouraging repatriation, restricting further inflows of migrants and the stress on the integration of the new settlers.¹⁹²

In the late 1980s and the early 1990s Germany came face to face with new flows of people. These were the asylum seekers from the Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Unlike other European states which implemented strict restrictions on asylum seekers, Germany implemented the most liberal policy on this issue presumably as penitence for its notorious Nazi past.¹⁹³ In response to this influx, and the economic burden they caused, new provisions were implemented to restrict the number of asylum

¹⁸⁹ John Bendix, *Importing Foreign Workers: A Comparison of German and American Policy* (NY: Peter Lang, 1990), 45.

¹⁹⁰ Christopher Rudolph, *National Security and Immigration: Policy Development in the United States and Western Europe Since 1945*.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

seekers in the country. The early 1990s saw that 90% of asylum seekers were rejected which, in turn, caused illegal stays of these persons. Indeed, the immigration of displaced people in Germany occurred in two waves. The first one was before the construction of the Berlin Wall and the second is after its collapse.

In order to avoid immigration becoming a problem especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s, new policies were needed. The German state tried to solve the domestic foreigner problem by encouraging firstly return migration and then as this was unsuccessful, by encouraging naturalization. In 1999, for the first time in the history of Germany, jus sanguinis principle of German ethnic citizenship was loosened.¹⁹⁴ Accordingly, children born in Germany from immigrant parents were granted citizenship. On the other hand, new restrictions upon the asylum seekers were implemented including the safe third country principle. Although there is great discontent both from the public and the government against guest-workers, asylum-seekers, ethnic Germans, the economic conditions make it necessary to look for new *workers*. Ironically enough, the need for immigrant labour continues in the 2000s. Because of the economic restructuring in the world (the moving of the heavy industry to the third world countries where labour is cheaper and increasing knowledge and technology production in the centre with the development of service sector there), Europe is now in need of skilled labour. Parallel to these economic requirements, skilled labour from the non-EU countries can gain residents' permit but with the measures of the naturalization and integration of these newcomers. What future problems lie ahead are alas unknown.

4.6 Patterns of German Neo-Racism

Patterns of neo-racism in Germany are different from France and Britain. As I have mentioned before, ethnic nationalism in Germany allowed ethnic Germans from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to gain citizenship while excluding other ethnicities from citizenship rights. This is what Stephen Castles calls as “differential exclusion”:

¹⁹⁴ Ibid, 112.

introducing the immigrants into the labour market while excluding them from other areas of the society at the same time.¹⁹⁵

However, according to Christopher Rudolph, in order to be able to get away from its Nazi past, Germany implemented the most liberal asylum policies in Europe unlike other European states. Moreover, Germany granted settlement rights to immigrants who were excluded from German citizenship. In spite of these relatively liberal and humanitarian approaches, the existence of immigrants was accepted as temporary; so their existence caused racist sentiments in the public when they became more conspicuous and permanent. These sentiments in the late 1980s and early 1990s turned into violent attacks against foreigners and increased sharply in number and intensity.

In line with this belief on the temporality of the guest-workers, Germany did not take any actions to integrate these people. However, it is a fact that these guests settled down and have grown in number. Due to the belief that guest-workers would leave Germany, immigrants were dealt with according to the differential exclusionism. This approach led to the ghettoization of the Muslim immigrants who cannot join the public sphere. The hierarchies between the guest-workers exist in Germany also. While European guest-workers such as Italians and Spaniards are also exposed to racial hatred, the existence of Muslim immigrants who attract a higher portion of the “hatred” surely facilitates the life of these European guest-workers as their integration according to the Germans is easier than that of the Muslims. Moreover, as a result of the ethnic origin criterion of German citizenship, second and third generation Turks, although they are able to speak German fluently, are not granted citizenship and seen as “outsiders”.¹⁹⁶

Although the French and German citizenships “civic nationalism” and “ethnic nationalism” seem to be controversial with each other, they both promote the dominant culture and exclude Muslim immigrants in different ways. As Craith claims, both

¹⁹⁵ Stephen Castles, “How Nation-States Respond to Immigration and Ethnic Diversity”, 4.

¹⁹⁶ Mairead Nic Craith, “Culture and Citizenship in Europe. Questions for Anthropologists,” *Social Anthropology* 12 no. 3 (2004).

doctrines emphasize the majority culture and put it as “the norm”¹⁹⁷ and despite the differences between approaches, racism continues as the common component of European countries.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid, 291.

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION: WHAT WILL BECOME OF EUROPE?

“Being comes to know itself only through what it takes itself not to be, to non-being”.¹⁹⁸ A huge amount of literature on the identity issue is based on the presupposition that identity is created in the face of an “Other”. This argument may not be problematic in itself. However, I think that, the way of seeing another identity as Other can be problematic. Does identity really need to demonize, negate or hate its Other(s) in order to know itself? As I have argued in the second chapter, Europe, as a “being”, as an identity as well as an idea or myth, hates its Other(s). This kind of “being” or “becoming”, however, is problematic in the sense that it leads to racism. A racism embedded within the identity itself. This is the *racist tradition* of Europe which came into being during her process of becoming. It is a component of the being in the becoming. In other words, what led to the *racist tradition* in Europe is the othering based on hatred, negation, and demonization. It is a tradition in the sense that it can revive in the appropriate conjunctures such as the European context after the 1960s and 1970s in times of economic recession, for instance. This kind of racist tradition is controversial to the European universalistic claims. It is based on the Eurocentric view of Europe’s being the centre and the only model of progress.

By the 1970s, Europe witnessed the renewal of racism and by the 1980s increasing politicization of the immigrants as a reaction. Since the 1980s and throughout the 1990s, European right-wing parties which committed themselves to the segregation of the population in terms of race, religion and culture have gained representation in politics

¹⁹⁸ Goldberg, “Racil Europeanization”, 348.

and hence a significant public support. These parties which were once regarded as radicals and known to be supported by only a minority became more and more powerful in time. What is more dangerous, in my opinion, is that contrary to popular belief, central parties have also advanced similar politics in terms of anti-racism and xenophobia. They trade on these issues in their discourses directly or indirectly, which makes matters worse, and confuses the minds of ordinary people.

That there is a continuing existence of hatred against foreigners is without doubt a fact. Within this continuity, there are changes of course in time; the targeted population may change as I have argued in the second chapter, the grounds on which racial-thinking is based may change as I have argued in the third chapter, the intensity of racism may vary from discrimination to racist attacks ending with deaths. However, there is one thing in the history of Europe and of the three countries that I have discussed in the fourth chapter that does not change: the existence of Other(s) who are hated. I conceptualized this continuing insistence of European racism as *European racist tradition*.

The Cold War period was the period of binary opposition in the European self-construction between democratic, liberal and civilized Europe (West, including the US) and the communist enemy. The end of the Cold War caused the elimination of the Other who is the necessary component of European identity as I have discussed. After the disappearance of the communist Other, the immigrants *of* Europe started to be created as the Other. The Other has come into the home of the Self and constituted the “Other within”. Especially with the European integration, these “Others within” substituted for the communist Other. Although the immigrants were desperately needed for the economies of the European states, these new settlers became to be perceived as a problem of security. During the post-Cold War period, with the end of the external threat, the notion of threat targeted the foreigners inside in terms of a threat against the national identity. These foreigners posed a threat to national identity and European values due to their different “culture” (mostly due to their religion) and so proved to be incompatible with European values. The construction of the fortress Europe under the

European integration had additional effects on the existence of the foreigners within. Cultural others are now the new component of Europe and of the European identity.

What is intended by the concept of *European racist tradition* is that the European self-identification, self-(re)creation via the negation of its Other(s) has always been the core of European racism and its revival and renewal in the appropriate conditions is only a recurring theme in this respect. Therefore, the “new racism” which has been on the rise since 1980s is not “new”. On the contrary, it is the revival of an old *tradition* which renewed itself and which adjusted itself to the new context. As I have earlier discussed, cultural differences replaced biological differences as inherent, fixed, and unchangeable gaps in a world where the concept of “race” has become ‘politically incorrect’. However, when we take a closer look, it appears that culture has no different connotation than race in the European context which at the same time claims to promote human and group rights.

Culture, as it is already been indicated in the second chapter, has been translated as racial differences so has replaced the concept of *race* in the new context of Europe. At that point, no big transformation has been experienced in terms of racism in Europe. Europe is still making boundaries within and outside itself. Indeed, boundary creation is more intense than it has ever been. Racism, as Taguieff claims “can be articulated in terms of culture, mindsets, traditions and religions”. Moreover, it can exploit all kinds of differences no matter what these are. Racism creates differences and then hates the different. It does not matter that this difference is created in terms of race or culture, skin colour or religion. Even if Europe seems to get rid of “race” and even if Europe acknowledges that “race” does not exist, racism does not end but continues as the oldest *tradition*, a tradition of constructing the self in opposition of a threatening other.

However, as David T. Goldberg rightly puts, today’s cultural racism which directed all its “energies” to the immigrants of Europe who are mostly Muslims seems to be perceived not as racism.¹⁹⁹ Europe seems to close racism on silence because, according

¹⁹⁹ Goldberg, “Racil Europeanization”.

to Goldberg, racism has been defined as Nazism and so must be condemned. There is a powerful sensitivity in Europe towards racism against the Jews (anti-Semitism). At that juncture, Goldberg claims that this overemphasis on racism as anti-Semitism or this match of racism with anti-Semitism leads to the overlooking of the fact that Nazism did not only target the Jewish people but the communists, the gypsies, the disabled people as well. These people too suffered as much as the Jews. Moreover, this kind of definition leads to the overlooking of racism which is now at the verge of creating a “European apartheid”.²⁰⁰ Goldberg claims that this kind of handling racism (to see racism as a phenomenon of the past which was condemned and so which was buried into the past) leads to the denial of and the silence on today’s racism. The Muslim stereotyping as “hostile, aggressive, engaged for religious purpose in constant jihad against Europe...”²⁰¹ and their hyper-concentration in the most excluded, in the poorest peripheries of the metropolises as the unwanted, as the “apartheid” is more than obvious.

Thus, we face the impossibility for Muslims of Europe to be represented as Talal Asad argues.²⁰² He claims that “the discourse of European identity is a symptom of anxieties about non-Europeans” who are now Muslim immigrants included economically but excluded socially and politically.²⁰³ Racism is the invention of unchangeable, immutable, uncompromised, and essential differences between “us” and “them”. European attempts to create a Europe have evolved into this kind of racism. In order to be Europe, Europe has invented differences as such between its Others, it has invented its identity in opposition to its invented Others. In that sense, today’s new racism in Europe targeting the immigrants is the renewal of this tradition. This kind of racist self-identification cannot allow the “representation of Muslims” as Talal Asad claims. Invented and essentialized differences make immigrants *of* Europe immigrants *in*

²⁰⁰ Etienne Balibar, *We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship*.

²⁰¹ Goldberg, “Racil Europeanization”, 344.

²⁰² Talal Asad, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity* (California: Stanford University Press, 2003).

²⁰³ *Ibid*, 161.

Europe. Whereas one could as well argue that in reality it is the very existence of the Other that makes Europe Europe.

In order to open a *space* for Muslim immigrants to live humanely, to be represented or to be included, Balibar claims that the “borders” should be democratized. Indeed, according to him, the issue is more crucial for Europe because the existence of Europe is conditioned to this mutation (democratization of borders).

With Balibar’s illuminating discussion, it can be argued that the borders between the Self (Europe) and the Other (its Muslim immigrants) should be more democratic so that the self-identification processes of the Other as well as the Self can become more democratic. As Europe has been creating and recreating itself at the expense of its Others who have been replacing one another since antiquity, as Europe while creating its identity makes Others its inferior/contrast/mirror-image etc., Others with the unequal power relations with Europe, cannot find the opportunity to represent themselves, or more vital than this, cannot find the opportunity to live without being the “apartheid”. This fits into what I call the *racist tradition of Europe*.

It is because of the fact that racism in Europe is the necessary outcome of its self-identification process that anti-racist and anti-discriminatory measures taken by both the EU and national governments and struggles conducted by anti-racists do not effectively work and racism continues to exist in all spheres in Europe. This is why anti-racism is in a crisis in France and in the UK as well.²⁰⁴ Traditional racism has successfully reversed the leftist arguments and utilized them for its own use. For example, the right to be different had turned into a racist discourse. It is now the justification or the pretext for the *smooth* deportation of the immigrants. If Europe decides to abide by its universals and decides to base its identity on these fundamental first principles rather than the particulars; it should problematize its way of self-identification. A new and fresh deconstruction of the European self-(re)creation which will reveal the Others within the

²⁰⁴ Cathie Lloyd, “Racist Violence and Anti-Racist Reactions: A View of France”, 259.

heart of Europe is needed. However, this re-deconstruction of its self-identification/becoming process would not suffice. Europe should change its way of making itself, way of becoming. It should find a new way other than its racist self-identification to exist as Europe which seems impossible without “another heading” without resorting to essentialization.²⁰⁵ For a Europe which is “... responsible for itself, for the other, and before the other...” Europe needs to escape from the “... egocentrism destructive of oneself and the other”,²⁰⁶ which is only possible, in my opinion, on condition that the traditional self-identification is gotten rid of and a novel “heading/capital” is adopted.

²⁰⁵ Jacques Derrida, *The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe* (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1992), 14.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid*, 15-16.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This thesis aims at to locate the rising neo-racism in Europe into its historical context. Neo-racism is perceived as the continuation of the *racist tradition* of Europe. Throughout this thesis, it is claimed that racism, as a discursive and mythical construct, has a tradition in Europe resulting from its self-construction process. This self-construction/becoming operate in such a way: Europe has formed itself on the negation of some imagined Others. It is in opposition to these Others that Europe has become Europe. It is therefore exactly this process of othering/demonizing the Others within the *becoming* of Europe that results in the *racist tradition* of Europe. So strong a tradition it is that it adjusts itself to new contexts but it is not easily overcome.

In search of the aim to reveal the dependency between the European self-identification process and racism (in particular neo-racism) in Europe, firstly Europe's Others are investigated in the history of Europe in the second chapter. Under 5 periods from Antiquity till today, second chapter examines different Others of Europe as the necessary components of the European identity and of the construction of Europe. Secondly, two types of racism prevailing in Europe were dealt with in the third chapter. Racism is discussed under two types: classical racism and neo-racism which are perceived not as totally different phenomena but as two faces of the *racist tradition* of Europe. Therefore, the evolution of classical/biological racism toward neo-racism is discussed by showing differences and similarities between them. In the fourth chapter, relatedly, neo-racism is illustrated via three exemplary cases: France, Britain and Germany. By over-viewing neo-racism in these three countries, it is claimed that in spite of the differences, neo-racism in these three countries shares similarities. More

importantly, neo-racism in these three countries targets the Muslim immigrants of Europe who become the new Other for Europe. Lastly, the discussion part claims that overcoming today's racism targeting the new Others is only possible by Europe's transcending its traditional way of self-construction, becoming. Europe should change its "heading" if it wants to claim its universals and its reputation as the cradle of human rights, legality and civilization.

Europe has formed itself, its identity via Others. The cultural, technological, scientific and material contributions/influences of both *more advanced* and *less advanced* societies constitute only one face of the matter. But more importantly, the encounter with different societies has been the key for the Europe's identification itself.

Since Antiquity, Europe has defined itself in opposition to the Others, with reference to their created, exaggerated, emphasized differences. The *barbarian* lack of civilization was the first Other in the history of Europe. Then, the barbarian turned into the *infidel* or Islam in the Middle Ages. Indeed, since then, Europe started to represent itself as a single civilization against the Islamic world. Modernity was the era when the focus of hostility distanced from Islam and turned to *the savage* in the newly discovered lands. Modernity did not only witness Europe's becoming a single/unified civilization as in the Middle Ages, but Europe's becoming *the* civilization in the whole world and the centre of the world in the face of the savage to be ruled/administered. This was the time when the notion of race became the core component of the European identity. The racial-thinking which emerged in this context would continue to prevail in the post-Cold War era with a renewed emphasis of the difference, a renewed focus of hostility: the Muslim immigrants in Europe. However, before Europe closed itself within its borders, it experienced a period of hating the Communist Other as its most powerful and fearful other. This was a period of relative stability in the European self-identification history due to the belief on Communism's being the indisputable opposite of Europe. The Eastern Europe's and the Balkan's being the Other would continue till their entrance into the EU. The death of the Communist Other was followed by a new rhetoric of othering in the process of European becoming: anti-Islamism and anti-immigration has been on

the rise in Europe since the 1970s and looks like to continue in the new millennium. While Europe has been unified under firstly the EC and then the EU, it increasingly excludes its Muslim immigrants and remains indifferent to their ghettoization as the “apartheid” of Europe. More importantly, the emergence of a European “apartheid” composed of Muslim immigrants is not perceived as contradictory to universal values of Europe. This is what I want to stress. Due to its *racist tradition*, Europe does not think that its humanitarian values should target its Others too. Again, what I want to stress is that this way of self-identification, self-construction, becoming of Europe results in a long established *racist tradition*. Therefore, the targeted populations of European racism may vary in different contexts. This is a fact that I discussed under two categories: classical racism and neo-racism; while the first one discriminated the savage in terms of his skin colour, the second one adapted itself to new conditions and based its discriminatory ideology on culture rather than biology. While the first one discriminated the uncivilized living in the colonies, the second one advocates the repatriation of the immigrants. However, as Balibar claims and as I have discussed throughout my thesis, this is only a “tactical adaptation”.²⁰⁷

Racism and cultural chauvinism, invented/created by the European encounter of the worlds, namely Africa and America, became the handmaiden of the myth of a unified Europe of the Middle Ages in modern times. In the multiplicity of cultures, religions, languages, Europe created itself as a unity against the Islamic threat in the Middle Ages. *Classical* racism replaced Islam with the savage/racially inferior and sustained the myth of Europe. This classical racism was a way for Europe to identify itself as “Europe”. It created/identified itself as “Europe” by differentiating people in terms of race. What emerged out of this differentiation of peoples is the Eurocentric universalism, the belief that European values are universal and not the other way round. The contradiction is that modernism with its Enlightenment values contrary to its claims about universalism led to a particularism of a special kind which I shall name as *Eurocentric particularism*:

²⁰⁷ Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities* (London & NY: Verso, 1988), 17.

racial and cultural chauvinism. This Eurocentric particularism is embedded in the identity of Europe which has turned into a tradition, “a way (or ways) of thinking, a way(s) of living”.²⁰⁸

Recently however, Europe began to question the identity it has established over centuries. Because in a world of European dominance of the colonized and in a world of strict dichotomy of the Cold War, there were no doubts what Europe is and who Europeans are. However, the context and circumstances have changed and have left Europe without enemy. It was in this context that Islam again due to the existence of Muslim immigrants in Europe, was placed in the contradiction of Europe. Europe re-identified its old enemy, Islam, in strict opposition. Islam, under the name of Muslim immigrants, began to be re-depicted as opposed to European “secularism, humanism, individualism, libertinism” as “collected, radicalized, masculine” and most importantly as unable to civilize.²⁰⁹

In this opposition, immigrants in Europe functioned in similar ways the savages had functioned for Europe’s self-identification. Racism did not end in Europe but, on the contrary, it is still on the stage in the service of Europe’s self-creation/identification.²¹⁰ I believe that, unless Europe problematizes her process of “becoming”/its manner of “becoming”, it will not be able to “democratize the [its] borders ...”.²¹¹

Having discussed that racism in Europe evolved from a purely biological thinking to a cultural-biased essentialism, it is only reasonable to assert that Europe has entered a new phase in her history of racism. Culture has become to be seen as an essential, fixed identity and so become the key notion of racist-thinking. This shift from biological racism to a culture-based racism is conceptualized by Philomena Essed via the concepts

²⁰⁸ Goldberg, “Racil Europeanization”, 337.

²⁰⁹ Ibid, 346.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Balibar, *We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship*, 10.

of “Eurocentrism” and “Europism”²¹² Philomena Essed argues that there occurred a shift from Eurocentrism, from the discourse/belief of the indisputable superiority of Europe – a belief that emerged and evolved in the context of European colonialism and of the Enlightenment- to “Europism” –a “discourse of constructing a ‘pure Europe’”²¹³ which should be purified from the uncivilized, fundamentalist Muslim Others. Following decolonization, which ended mostly in bloody wars²¹⁴, Europe while leaving its overseas territories closed herself off. The notion of “Fortress Europe” derives from such an attempt. In this new European context, racism is no more an ideology prevalent in the remote colonies but an ideology strongly felt toward the foreign populations in Europe which have been growing in number. Europism means to save Europe from these “unwanted invaders”.

Although European states put strict limitations on immigration since the early 1970s, family unification and illegal migration of refugees who escaped from the conflicts/disasters prevailing in their home countries there is a resulted in the growth of migrant population in Europe.²¹⁵ Meanwhile, new migration patterns flourished. As Phil Marfleet claims, “although Fortress Europe is essentially a racist construction, it does not exclude all people of “non-European” status.²¹⁶ While the entrance of the qualified labour is much easier, the entrance of non-European unqualified labour and asylum-seekers is not allowed although they serve the economy as much as the non-European qualified labour.

²¹² Philomena Essed, quoted in Lutz, “The Limits of European-ness: Immigrant Women in Fortress Europe”.

²¹³ Lutz, “The Limits of European-ness: Immigrant Women in Fortress Europe”.

²¹⁴ For example the Algerian War of Independence. Nancy Gallagher, “Learning Lessons from the Algerian War of Independence” *Middle East Report*. No. 225 (2002).

²¹⁵ Morris, “Globalisation, Migration and the Nation-state: the Path to a Post-National Europe?”.

²¹⁶ Marfleet, “Europe’s Civilizing Mission”, 32.

The “new” rise of racism in Europe which has been built on the idea “of defending ‘our’ home, space, territory against ‘disturbing’ others (immigrants, asylum seekers, ethnic minorities)”²¹⁷ is a fact that can be observed on many grounds. A rising violence against immigrants occurs all over Europe. Parallel to this, far-right parties which advocate getting rid off these foreigners has been on the rise since the 1980s all over Europe. Moreover, racism is no longer under the monopoly of the far-right but central and even left parties also share the racist and xenophobic approaches of the far-right. In fact, the issue of immigration has become one of the central concerns of these parties all over Europe. The threat of immigration and the presence of immigrants in Europe are shared by a growing number of people from different backgrounds. As much as the extreme right, liberals for example share the idea of a Muslim “essence”²¹⁸ which they believe to be a threat to Europe and European intellectual and economic values. Therefore, the issue of immigration with racist and xenophobic connotations -implicit or overt- is presently the central issue in politics and everyday life in Europe. This is the point where Europe once again falls into its traditional contradiction with its *universalistic* claims.

In my attempt to contextualize European racism, I briefly presented the immigration histories of the three countries and their approaches related to the immigration issue. I briefly present an overview of European history of immigration since this historical context is often overlooked or misconceived. Immigrants in Europe did not come out of the blue. On the contrary, the “legacy of postcolonial migration to former colonizing metropolises”, refugee migration “from global trouble spots, and guest worker programmes”, prepared today’s existence of immigrants in Europe. Some of these people mostly followed the route that European states themselves had built. After decolonization the linkages between the colonizers and the colonized states did not end. The relations between them continued in terms of bilateral agreements on immigration or in terms of the fact that citizenship of the colonizer states was granted to the colonized nationals etc. It is because of these linkages that Magrebis live in France and

²¹⁷ Helma Lutz, “The Limits of European-ness: Immigrant Women in Fortress Europe”.

²¹⁸ Talal Asad, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity* (California: Stanford University Press, 2003), 165.

the Indians in the UK for instance. The colonial linkages were and still are important in the migration patterns. The ex-colonies are familiar with the language and way of life of the colonial state. Some immigrants, on the other hand, migrated into Europe mostly by the call of European states, that is, by *invitation*. In 1950's during the Cold War period, most European states signed agreements to employ guest-workers and so started this new kind of immigration because there was not enough labour force. Therefore, these guest-workers and colonial workers were mostly welcomed in the past as they served the European nation-states' economies. Moreover, as they were thought to be temporary and as they would return home after working a while and saving some money, they were not an issue of concern. In fact, they were welcomed by most of the European states until they realized that they are no longer temporary but permanent settlers of Europe and that their numbers were growing due to the family reunification programmes in the 1970s and due to high birth rates.

Apart from these mostly Muslim worker immigrants with their families and descendants, the influx of asylum seekers and displaced people from the areas where economic and political unrest and wars prevail, from Africa and Asia as well as from the eastern part of Europe (especially due to the War of Yugoslavia) in the 1980s and 1990s became a reality difficult to cope with. Therefore, Europe, whose migration history was characterized predominantly by emigration until 1945, became an immigration continent in the years that followed.²¹⁹ As Goldberg pronounces, "... the empire came home to the metropolises increasingly from the 1960s on"²²⁰ and then the discussions on immigration started especially with the European economic decline. These immigrants most of whom are Muslims were the scapegoats for every bad occurrence in Europe; crime, unemployment, decline of wages, housing problems and the like.

This is the context to which European *racist tradition* adjusted itself and evolved into neo-racism. This racism emerged with new emphasis in the new context. The Muslim

²¹⁹ Heinz Fassmann and Rainer Münz, "Patterns and Trends of International Migration in Western Europe" *Population and Development Review* 18 no. 3 (1992).

²²⁰ Goldberg, "Racil Europeanization", 344.

immigrants of Europe became the target of racism. Although the approaches against the immigration issue that different countries implement are different from each other, the outcome is the same: racism of the immigrants of Europe and their ghettoization. In that sense, there are no differences between France, Britain and Germany, because they all share European *racist tradition* in the last analysis.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aldcroft, Derek Howard. *The European Economy: 1914-1990*. London & NY: Routledge, 1993.

AlSayyad, Nezar and Manuel Castles. "Introduction: Islam and the Changing Identity of Europe." In *Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization*, ed. N. AlSayyad. Berkeley: University of California, 2002.

Anderson, Malcolm and Eberhard Bort. *The Frontiers of EU*. NY: Palgrave, 2001.

Apter, Andrew. "Africa, Empire, and Anthropology: a Philological Exploration of Anthropology's Heart of Darkness." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 28 (1999): 577-598.

Arendt, Hannah. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. NY: Brace & Word, 1966.

Asad, Talal. *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity*. California: Stanford University Press, 2003.

Balibar, Etienne. "Is There a 'Neo-Racism'?" In *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, eds. Etienne Balibar and Immanuel M. Wallerstein. London & NY: Verso, 1988.

Balibar, Etienne. *Politics and the Other Scene*. London & NY: Verso, 2002.

Balibar, Etienne. *We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship*. Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004.

Balibar, Etienne and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*. London & NY: Verso, 1988.

Bartlett, Robert. *The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization, and Cultural Change*. Princeton & NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993.

Bauman, Zigmunt. *Modernity and the Holocaust*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989.
Quoted in *Racism, Modernity and Identity on the Western Front*, eds. Ali Rattansi and Sallie Westwood. Cambridge: Polity Pre, 1994.

Beck, Lewis White. *18th Century Philosophy*. NY: The Free Press, 1966.

Bendix, John. *Importing Foreign Workers: A Comparison of German and American Policy*. NY: Peter Lang, 1990.

Blubaker, Rogers. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge: Mass, 1992.

Boyer, Dominic. "Welcome to the New Europe." *American Ethnologist* 32 no.4 (2005), 521-523.

Browning, Robert. "Greeks and Others: From Antiquity to the Renaissance." In *Greeks and Barbarians*, ed. T. Harrison. NY: Routledge, 2002.

Castles, Stephen. "How Nation-States Respond to Immigration and Ethnic Diversity." In *Migration and Social Cohesion*, ed. Steven Vertovec. Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999.

Cesari, Jocelyne. "Islam in France: The Shaping of a Religion Minority." In *Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens*, ed. Yvonne Y. Haddad. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Chopkin, Isabelle; Janet Cormack and Jan Niessen, eds. *The Implementation of European anti Discrimination Legislation: Work in Progress*. Brussels: MPG, 2004.

Cohen, Barbara. "United Kingdom." In *The Implementation of European anti Discrimination Legislation: Work in Progress*, eds. Isabelle Chopkin, Janet Cormack and Jan Niessen. Brussels: MPG, 2004.

Craith, Mairead Nic. "Culture and Citizenship in Europe: Questions for Anthropologists." *Social Anthropology* 12 no. 3 (2004).

Daulatzai, Sohail. "Prophets of Race: Race, Nation, Islam and the Cultural Politics of Identity." PhD diss., University of Southern California, 2003.

Debeljak, Alex. *The Hidden Handshake: National Identity and Europe in the Post-Communist World*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2004.

Delanty, Gerard. *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*. London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1995.

Fassmann, Heinz and Rainer Münz, "Patterns and Trends of International Migration in Western Europe." *Population and Development Review* 18 no. 3 (1992).

Favell, Adrian. *Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain*. NY: Palgrave, 2001.

Fenton, Steve. *Ethnicity, Racism, Class and Culture*. London: Macmillan Press, 1999.

Freedman, Jane. "Secularism as a Barrier to Integration? The French Dilemma." *International Migration* 42 no. 3 (2004).

Geddes, Andrew and Niessen, Jan. *European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index*. Brussels: British Council, 2005.

Available online at

www.britishcouncil.org/brussels-european-civic-citizenship-and-inclusion-index.pdf -

Goldberg, David Theo. "Racil Europeanization." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 29 no.2 (2006), 331-364.

Gordon, Paul. "The Police and Racist Violence in Britain." In *Racist Violence in Europe*, eds. Tore Björger and Rob Witte. NY: St Martin's Press, 1993.

Hall, Stuart. "The Question of Cultural Identity" In *Modernity and Its Futures*, eds. S. Hall; D. Held and T. McGrew. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992.

Hall, Stuart. "The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power." Quoted in *Europe's mirror: civil society and the other*, Julie Fieldhouse. Vancouver: The University of British Columbia, 1997.

Hall, Stuart. "The West and The Rest: Discourse and Power." In *Formations of Modernity*, eds. Stuart Hall and Bram Gieben. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992.

Hall, Stuart and Bram Gieben, eds. *Formations of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press. 1992.

Hansen, Randall. "Migration, Citizenship and Race in Europe: Between Incorporation and Exclusion." *European Journal of Political Research* 35 (1999).

Ifversen, Jan. "The Crisis of European Civilization After 1918." In *Ideas of Europe Since 1914: The Legacy of the First World War*, eds. Menno Spiering and Michael Wintle. NY: Palgrave Macmillan Ltd, 2002.

Iganski, Paul and James Jacobs, "Racism, Immigration and Migrant Labour" In *Britain in Europe*, ed. Tony Spybey. London: Routledge, 1997.

Joppke, Christian. "Multiculturalism and Immigration: A Comparison of the United States, Germany, and Great Britain." *Theory and Society* 25 no.4 (1996).

Jordan, William C. "Europe in the Middle Ages." In *The Idea of Europe From Antiquity to the European Union*, ed. Anthon Pagden. NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Kristeva, Julia. *Strangers to Ourselves*. NY: Colombia University Press, 1991.

Kühnhardt, Ludger. *Constituting Europe: Identity, Institution-building and the Search for a Global Role*. Germany: Nomos Verlags Gesellschaft Baden-Baden, 2003.

Leontidou, Lila. "The Boundaries of Europe: Deconstructing Three Regional Narratives." *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power* II (2004).

Liederman, Molokotos L. "Religious Diversity in Schools: the Muslim Headscarf Controversy and Beyond." *Social Compass* 47 no. 3 (2000).

Lloyd, Cathie. "Racist Violence and Anti-Racist Reactions: A View of France." In *Racist Violence in Europe*, eds. Tore Björge and Rob Witte. NY: St Martin's Press, 1993.

Lutz, Helma. "The Limits of European-ness: Immigrant Women in Fortress Europe." *Feminist Review* 57 (1997), 93-111.

Marranci, Gabriele. "Multiculturalism, Islam and the Clash of Civilizations Theory: Rethinking Islamophobia." *Culture and Religion*. 5 no.1 (2004).

Marfleet, Phil. "Europe's Civilizing Mission." In *New Ethnicities, Old Racisms*, ed. P. Choen. London: Zed Books, 1999.

Miles, Robert. *Racism*. London & NY: Routledge, 2003.

Miles, Robert and Dietrich Thranhardt. "Introduction: European Integration, Migration and Processes of Inclusion and Exclusion." In *Migration and European Integration: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion*, eds. R. Miles, and D. Thranhardt. London: Pinter Publishers, 1995.

Molokotos Liederman, Lina. "Religious Diversity in Schools: the Muslim Headscarf Controversy and Beyond." *Social Compa* 47 no. 3 (2000).

Montagu, Ashley. *Man's Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race*. Walnut Creek, London & New Delhi: Altamira Press, 1997.

Morris, Lydia. "Globalisation, Migration and the Nation-state: the Path to a Post-National Europe?" *British Journal of Sociology*, 48 no. 2 (1997), 192-209.

Nielsen, Jxrgen S. "Muslims in Europe into the Next Millennium." In *Islam in Europe: The Politics of Religion and Community*, eds. S. Vertovec and C. Peach. NY: St. Martin's Press, 1997.

O'Dowd, Liam and Wilson, Thomas M. "Frontiers of Sovereignty in the New Europe." In *Borders, Nations and States: Frontiers of Sovereignty in the New Europe*, eds. L. O'Dowd and T. M. Wilson. Aldershot: Avebury, 1996.

Outram, Dorinda. *The Enlightenment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Özyürek, Esra. "The Politics of Cultural Unification, Secularism, and the Place of Islam in the New Europe." *American Ethnologist*. 32 no.4 (2005).

Paasi, Anssi. "Europe as a Social Process and Discourse: Considerations of Place, Boundaries and Identity." *Europe and Regional Studies* 8, no.1 (2001).

Pettigrew, Thomas F. "Reactions Toward the New Minorities of Western Europe." *Annual Review of Sociology* 24 (1998).

Pieterse, J. Nederveen. "Unpacking the West: How European is Europe?" in *Racism, Modernity and Identity on the Western Front*, eds. Ali Rattansi and Sallie Westwood. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994.

Popkin, Richard Henry. "The Philosophical Bases of Modern Racism." In *Philosophy and the Civilizing Arts*, eds. Craig Walton and John P. Anton. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1974.

Rathzel, Nora. "Developments in Theories of Racism." In *Europe's New Racism: Causes, Manifestations and Solutions*, ed. Events Foundation. NY: Berghahn Books, 2002.

Rex, John. *Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State: Working Papers in the Theory of Multiculturalism and Political Integration*. NY: Macmillan Press, 1996.

Rose, Herbert Jennings. *A Handbook of Greek Mythology*. London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1965.

Rytönen, Helle L. "Europe and Its "Almost-European" Other: A Textual Analysis of Legal and Cultural Practices of Othering in Contemporary Europe." PhD diss., Stanford University, 2002.

Rudolph, Christopher. *National Security and Immigration: Policy Development in the United States and Western Europe Since 1945*. California: Stanford University Press, 2006.

Said, Edward W. *Orientalism*. NY: Vintage Books, 1979.

Sassen, Saskia. "Spatialities and Temporalities of the Global: Elements for a Theorization." In *Globalization*, ed. A Appadurai. Durham & London: Duke University Press, 2001.

Schuster, Liza and John Solomos. "Rights and Wrongs across European Borders: Migrants, Minorities and Citizenship." *Citizenship Studies*. 6 no.1 (2002).

Stevenson, John. *The History of Europe*. NY: Facts On File, Inc. 2002.

Stuart, Hall. "Foucault: Power, Knowledge and Discourse." In *Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader*, eds. M. Wetherell, S. Taylor and S. J. Yates. London: Sage, 2001.

Taguieff, Pierre-André. "The New Cultural Racism in France" in *Racism*, eds. Martin Bulmer and John Solomos. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Ther, Philipp. "The Spell of the Homogenous Nation-State: Structural Factors and Agents of Ethnic Cleansing." In *Diasporas and Ethnic Migrants: Germany, Israel and Post Soviet Successor States in Comparative Perspective*, eds. Rainer Münz and Rainer Ohliger. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003.

Tibi, Bassam. *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.

Tocqueville, Alexis de. *Democracy in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000.

Weil, Patrick and John Crowley. "Integration in Theory and Practice: A Comparison of France and Britain." In *Migration and Social Cohesion* ed. Steven Vertovec. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1999.

Wieviorka, Michel. "Race, Culture, and Society: The French Experience with Muslims" in *Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture, and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization*, Nezar AlSayyad and Manuel Castles eds. (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002), 139.

Wieviorka, Michel. "Racism in Europe: Unity and Diversity." In *Racism, Modernity and Identity on the Western Front*, eds. Ali Rattansi and Salie Westwood. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994.

Wilfried Nippel, "The Construction of the Other." In *Greeks and Barbarians*, ed. T. Harrison. NY: Routledge, 2002.

Wintle, Michael J. *Culture and Identity in Europe: Perceptions of Divergence and Unity in Past and Present*. Aldershot: Avebury, 1996.

Woolf, Virginia. *To The Lighthouse*. London and NY: Routledge, 1994.

Zemni, Sami . "Islam, European Identity and the Limits of Multiculturalism." In *Religious Freedom and the Neutrality of the State: The Position of the European Union*, ed. W. A. R. Shadid and P. S. Van Koningsveld. Leuven: Peeters, 2002.