

**MECHANISMS FOR THE BOURGEOIS HOLD OF STATE POWER
AND
THE CASE OF TURKEY**

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ABSTRACT

MECHANISMS FOR THE BOURGEOIS HOLD OF STATE POWER AND THE CASE OF TURKEY

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This thesis attempts to stress the decisiveness of armed force for the capitalist hold of state power and that only if a multi-level analytical framework is adopted a fuller account of the reality can be given with reference to the capitalist hold of state power. After laying the methodological and theoretical grounds for a multi-level analysis along with the privilege of armed force as the factor enabling the state power, it concretizes the multi-level analytical framework in the context of Turkey. It drives the attention to the co-existence of micro and macro level factors influential over state practices. The mafia forces are also proposed to be integrated to the analysis of the capitalist state on account of the considerable economic and armed means they hold. The Weberian approach describing the state in terms of its monopoly of legitimate use of force is proposed to be replaced by an alternative one not holding the consent of the inhabitants as an unconditional necessity for the presence of the state. The class struggle process is held to take place at a site embracing the interplay of associative and communal relationships in a micro-macro range. The routes of tendential multiplicity and totality are attempted to be explored at least partially. Also the importance of strategy and tactics are stressed and some threats waiting the forces longing for a world without exploitation and domination are underlined.

Keywords: Bourgeoisie, State, State Theory, Consent, Force

ÖZ

DEVLET İKTİDARININ BURJUVA TUTULUŞU VE TÜRKİYE ÖRNEĞİ

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Bu tez, devlet iktidarının burjuva tutuluşu açısından silahlı gücün belirleyiciliğine ve ancak çok-düzlemli bir çözümleme çerçevesi içinden gerçekliğe nispeten yakın bir analiz yapılabileceğine dikkat çekmeye çalışmıştır. Çok-düzlemli bir çözümleme çerçevesinin ve devlet erkini olanaklı kılan etken olarak silahlı gücün ayrıcalığının yöntemsel ve kuramsal temellerinin atılmasının ardından, önerilen yaklaşım, Türkiye örneğine uyarlanmıştır. Tezde, hem mikro hem de makro etkenlerin devlet faaliyetleri üstünde etkili olabileceğinin altı çizilmiştir. Hatırı sayılır iktisadi ve silahlı gücü nedeniyle mafyanın, kapitalist devleti çözümlerken gözden kaçırılmaması gereken bir faktör olduğu vurgulanmıştır. Silahlı gücün meşru kullanımı üzerinden devleti tanımlayan Weberci yaklaşıma alternatif olarak, ülke üzerinde yaşayanların rızasını, devletin varlığı açısından koşulsuz bir zorunluluk olarak ele almayan bir yaklaşım önerilmiştir. Sınıf mücadelesi sürecinin, mikro-makro silsilesi içinde, cemiyet ve cemaat ilişkilerinin karşılıklı etkileşim içinde bulunduğu bir sahnede yer aldığına işaret edilmiştir. Eğilimsel çeşitlilik ve bütünlük rotalarını keşif yönünde bazı adımlar atma çabasına girilmiştir. Sınıf mücadelesi sırasında benimsenen strateji ve taktiklerin önemine dikkat çekilmiş, sömürünün ve hükümlanlığın olmadığı bir dünya özleminde olan güçleri bekleyen bazı tehlikelerin altı çizilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Burjuvazi, Devlet, Devlet Teorisi, Rıza, Zor

Dedicated to my brother Ali Aydın Selçuk

Our dialogue became the primary factor in the formation of my cognitive structure.

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Until the summer of 2006, what I preferred was escaping from academic discussions as much as possible and underlining the similarities rather than the differences with several Marxists in the thesis. Then, on my supervisor's request, I had to write down some differences from Foucault along with certain Marxists when less than two months was left to the examining committee meeting. In that process, what appeared were some formula-like pages in the Appendix and a process of re-encoding the previous text. That was not a formal discussion, but I was quite happy with the re-encoding process. Not surprisingly (but I was surprisingly surprised), no member of the committee liked those pages and unfortunately none of them shared my happiness (I suppose, in the original version of the thesis, there was more theoretical elaboration and perhaps contribution –along with its errors-, but admittedly not in the form of a formal academic discussion, which I do not like at all). In a way, I was lucky, since if the academic committee members were less tolerant, they would have certainly rejected the thesis presented in such a format, and I am thankful to them for that. In the meeting, I was asked to revise the text and make some formal academic discussions. Although I believe that if the nineteenth century authors had wasted their time with the academic discussions of modern standards, today, there would have been no such classical theoretical texts (neither Marx and Engels texts nor Weber texts) to be made reference to by contemporary academicians, and although I believe that the iron cage of academy surrounded by strict rules and standards restricts critical/creative thinking and obstructs the process of further release of the mind, and although I believe that academic discussions especially in the Marxist terrain have been quite merciless; I had to make several formal discussions. I had less than six months when I started rearranging/rewriting the thesis and when I had to enter in a number of discussions. Therefore, here I have to underline that I must have made many mistakes in those pages. The words and expressions I used may be far from what I really intend to mean. There may be inconsistency in the employment of

certain words. There may be errors and vagueness in the propositions I wrote there. More importantly, there will always be errors in my writings. The process of re-encoding and changing the propositions I make always continues. I acknowledge that this thesis has several errors. And I acknowledge that today, not only approval of the theses written at universities, but also finding the opportunity to put one's ideas in circulation in the academic world generally requires formal academic discussions and I acknowledge that most probably I will continue to obey those rules for some more time.

There is a further point I would like to make on reading and interpreting the words of the thesis. It is that, there is a huge discrepancy between my mother tongue and the language I had to use throughout the text. While I am not a native speaker of English and have never been to an English-speaking country (the opposite of the latter would not have been a solution, either), the words of the text had to be in English. For that reason, it is better for the reader to keep in mind that the words I selected may not refer to what I really intend to mean. That is something to be very seriously considered. As regards language, I would like to thank Assist. Prof. Dr. Nil Demet Gngr (Atılım University) and Assist. Prof. Dr. Ali Aydın Seluk (Bilkent University) for checking some words and expressions in English I was not sure of. Nil helped me checking the words in my translation of an excerpt on 'Bloody Sunday' and my brother Aydın helped me for several times to find a better word in English when I asked him.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

DLP	Democratic Left Party
DP	Democrat Party
EU	European Union
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JDP	Justice and Development Party
JP	Justice Party
LCIC	Latent Class Interest Community
LPT	Labor Party of Turkey
MCIC	Manifest Class Interest Community
MÜSİAD	Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association
NAP	Nationalist Action Party
NOP	National Order Party
NSP	National Salvation Party
PDP	People's Democratic Party
RPP	Republican People's Party
RTÜK	Higher Council of Radio and Television
SPP	Social Democrat Populist Party
TESEV	Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation
TİSK	Turkish Employers' Confederation
TOBB	Union of Turkish Chambers and Stock Exchanges
TPP	True Path Party
TÜSİAD	Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association
WB	World Bank
WP	Welfare Party

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Who would read who would write
Who would unravel this knot
Sheep would walk with the wolf
If thoughts did not differ

(from 'Your Beauty is Utterly Worthless', an *Aşık Veysel*
poem/song)

Until today, there have been a variety of approaches analyzing the issue of the state from different perspectives. In spite of this theoretical diversity, there has been a consensus in social theory that the state has a profound impact on modern individual's life, except from those who have asserted that state does not exist at all. The state debate has a history of thousands of years. Philosophical writings on state can be traced back to the ancient Greek times (for example Plato, 2000; Aristotle, 2000). Although a number of the earlier texts focused mainly on ethical questions such as the desired and undesired types of government, ruler or administrator, some analyses moved beyond this. For example, as Morrow (1998) suggests, although Plato's analysis focused on the ideal state, Aristotle's analysis attempted to explore "the relationship between different forms of political order and the differing socioeconomic bases of various communities" (p. 23). For over four thousand years, hundreds of standpoints have become a part of the state debate. Yet, although there are already a variety of theoretical perspectives and empirical studies on the issue of state, there is still much to discuss. Analysis of the state offers not only a better understanding of the past and today's social relations, but also exploring the future possibilities of a peaceful world. Nevertheless, today, several researchers take the state for granted rather than analyzing it thoroughly while those who focus on the problematic of state constitute only a minority of the entire social scientist population.

Yet, as Vincent (1987) suggests, although a number of non-Marxist sociologists has taken the 'states' for granted in their research; Marx and Engels' and Weber's elaborations have had deep impacts on a number of relatively recent state theories (p. 220).

Therefore, with different emphases and perspectives, until today, the analysis the 'state' has led to challenging standpoints in social theory, a few of which will be briefly considered in the following chapters. Among these approaches, Marxist approach presented a powerful toolkit for analyzing the class character of the state. The essential feature of Marxist state analysis can be considered as its acknowledgement that those holding the private ownership of means of production and exploiting the labor of those deprived of means production have to hold some state power for their class interests as against the exploited class' interests. Yet, since Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels pointed out different dimensions of the state in different texts rather than providing a systematic work on state theory, there have been serious disputes in the interpretation of Marx and Engels texts. Besides, a number of Marxist studies developed further dimensions without restricting themselves to Marx and Engels texts. Hence, a rich Marxist literature appeared with novel dimensions introduced and different emphases made concerning capitalist state. A few of the influential Marxist approaches on the analysis of the capitalist state are evaluated in Chapters 2-4 of the present thesis.

In the domain of Marxist state theory, the 1960-1980 era can be considered as the one marked by the rise of Althusserian structuralism (see for example Althusser, 1971; Poulantzas, 1975a; 2000). Yet, there were also studies which remained outside this current (e.g. Miliband, 1969). Meanwhile, in the course of 1970s, several Marxist studies on capitalist state (e.g. Altvater, 1979; Blanke, Jürgens, & Kastendiek, 1979; Braunmühl, 1979; Gerstenberger, 1979; Habermas, 1973; Hirsch, 1979) focused on the functions and/or form of the state. The early 1980s saw the rise of post-structuralist analysis in the (post-)Marxist terrain (e.g. Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). As for the post-1990 era, several studies critically evaluating capital and state (e.g. Bellofiore, 1999; Brunhoff, 1999; Carchedi, 2001; Hirst & Thompson, 1996; Jessop, 1997; 2002) focused on the geographical dimensions of the question especially with reference to capital flows, capital accumulation regimes/strategies, and/or

forms/functions of the capitalist state. In the second half of the 20th century, except from a few works (e.g. Anderson, 1976), the interest of several Marxist theorists analyzing the capitalist state (e.g. Aglietta, 1987; Althusser, 1971; Altwater, 1979; Blanke, Jürgens, & Kastendiek, 1979; Braunmühl, 1979; Gerstenberger, 1979; Habermas, 1973; Hirsch, 1979; Jessop, 1997; 2002; Offe, 1993; Poulantzas, 1975a) remained on predominantly the economic and/or ideological dimensions of the question rather than the means of violence. As for Turkey, until today, there have been a number of researches concerning the relationship between bourgeoisie and state, whether inspired by Marxist terminology (e.g. Boratav, 1991; Gülalp, 1993; Keyder, 1993; Öncü, 2003; Öngen, 2003; Sönmez 1992; Şen, 1992; Tabak, 2002; Yalman 2002) or not (e.g. Alkan, 1998; Buğra, 1997; Çemrek, 2002; Gülfidan, 1993; Şahim, 1993). Meanwhile, several with Marxist traces (e.g. Boratav, 1991; Gülalp, 1993; Keyder, 1993; Sönmez, 1992; Şen, 1992) did not focus on the question of mechanisms of holding state power; while a number of others (e.g. Öncü, 2003; Öngen, 2003; Tabak, 2002; Yalman, 2002) dealt with this question with a concern on hegemony.

However, in general, the strategies pursued by capitalists and relatively micro-range factors influential over state practices received very little attention except from the studies undertaken with (neo)pluralist or (neo)elitist orientation (e.g. Dahl, 1956; 1961; Domhoff, 1967; 1970; 1983; 1990; Dye, 1986; Mills, 1956; Soloway, 1987; Truman, 1959; Useem, 1984) despite that several of them did not formulate the question in the form of the capitalist hold of state power (see Chapters 3). As for the Marxist front, especially the works of Miliband (e.g. Miliband, 1969; 1988) have approached the question of identifying the channels enabling and/or facilitating the bourgeois hold of state power from a multi-level perspective (see Chapters 2 and 3). However, his work has been labeled by several Marxists (e.g. Clarke, 1991; Poulantzas, 1969) with the claim of falling in the trap of bourgeois social science. Since the author of the present thesis thinks that this line of stigmatization retreats the critical analysis of the capitalist state considerably, in Chapter 2, it will be discussed that there have been no strong persuasive theoretical arguments to consider Miliband's works in the terrain of bourgeois social science.

The major concern of the present thesis is to stress the decisiveness of armed force for the capitalist hold of state power and that only if a multi-level analytical framework is adopted a fuller account of the reality can be given with reference to the capitalist hold of state power. In this respect, Chapters 2 and 3 will lay the methodological and theoretical grounds for a multi-level analysis along with the privilege of armed force as the factor enabling the state power. In Chapter 4, the multi-level analytical framework will be concretized in the context of Turkey, with a focus on the controversy about the degree of privilege to be attributed to force with reference to means of violence and consent in making the capitalist society possible. Since the major concern of the present thesis is the capitalist hold of state power, several possible other holds of state power will not be included in the analysis. Therefore, although the possibility of a combination of holds, exercises, and partnerships with reference to state power in a time spectrum with varying contents and durations is acknowledged to exist, only the capitalist hold of state power will be examined only in a way to stress the possibility of a multi-level analysis via elaborating on a few factors in a micro-macro range rather than in a way to analyze all its dimensions, which would have been apparently an impossible task to be fulfilled in a doctoral thesis of this kind. In this work, several factors and several dimensions of the included factors are excluded from the analysis while the included ones are selected mainly on the basis of the availability of secondary data from Turkey. Meanwhile, since the main concern of the thesis is to analyze some micro-macro factors enabling and/or facilitating the 'capitalist' hold of state power, the factors enabling and/or facilitating other possible types of hold of state power are not examined. In this respect, factors concerning the hold of state power by those other than the category of 'capitalist' such as the ones widely categorized as gays, feminists, women, human beings with XX, self-employed, occupational groups, and ethnic groups among others will not be included in the analysis. Yet, the theoretical framework of the thesis hopefully provides some clues for analyzing further types of hold of state power.

As for the standpoint of the present thesis vis-à-vis the existing theoretical standpoints, it is somehow difficult to locate it under any of the dominant categories. Yet, it can be evaluated as closest to the Marxist approach among others, which also led its author to locate the Marxist state debate to the centre of the thesis. However, she has no claim that the approach she pursues in the present thesis is a version of

Marxism or any type of Marxism at all. Nevertheless, she insists that, given her world view radically critical about exploitation and domination, her work is not in the terrain of bourgeois social science, while the claim that this thesis is a pro-capitalist one would be rejected by at least the pro-capitalist social scientists themselves. In this respect, Domhoff's ironic point concerning the categorization of his work in academic texts and questioning the use of the ritualistic academic categorization tradition is worth suggesting. He wrote:

...the taxonomists of the 1980s insisted that everyone had to be put in one category or another. One textbook in political sociology had me listed as a Marxist ..., another decided that I was an institutional elitist ... Alford and Friedland had me down as an elitist in an early version of their manuscript, then decided that I was a class theorist who worked at the individual level of analysis ... (Domhoff, 1990, pp. 1, 2)

Despite that the author of the present thesis is also critical about classifying all theories under pre-determined domains, it was not possible for her to escape fully from the traditional expectations of the academy, as a result of which she had to categorize a number of works and enter in discussions vis-à-vis a number of standpoints for justifying the analytical approach she pursued in the thesis. Thanks to the theoretical elaboration process, since the very beginning, the biggest discussion became the internal one, enabling to radically question her own taken for granted beliefs. Consequently, in her search for theoretical coherence and analytical power, a number of concepts were (re)constructed, the assumption that masses' consent to capitalism must be present in the absence of strong anti-capitalist rebellions was held to be incorrect, the use of implementing a three-dimensional conception of power was stressed, some corridors in a micro-macro range were opened, the routes of tendential multiplicity and totality were at least partially explored. In this process, all what she suffered was the disadvantage of academic compartmentalization. While grounding the assumptions on human nature requires inputs from the so-called natural sciences (which are absent in the present thesis), the separation of psychology and sociology makes a solid elaboration on human behavior/action (which is relevant with the so called agent-structure relationship) impossible. Regardless of the black boxes used as theoretical bricks, several boxes were attempted to be opened during the analysis.

In Chapter 2, pursuing an anti-reductionist methodology is argued to be useful for its virtues of enabling a multi-level analysis. A number of concepts (re)constructed for the analysis are introduced and theoretical foundations of the thesis are constructed to some extent. In the chapter, the discussion on conceptual issues starts with an elaboration on rationality, while two basic types of rationality; ‘physical rationality’ and ‘emotional rationality’ are offered to be treated as among the components of the ‘rationality of being’. Then the conceptual elaboration continues with the reconstruction of the concept ‘social class’ while the approach to class analysis, class interests, and class struggles is also discussed. Subsequent to this, it is stressed that the power of the Mafiosi should be included in the analysis of the contemporary capitalist societies with a number of examples attempting to indicate that the Mafioso (capitalist) lords/madams possess a potential/actual power worth considering. Lastly, communities are elaborated with reference to class interests, and two analytical tools useful for understanding the transmission belts between class interests and community networks are introduced: Manifest class interest community and latent class interest community.

In Chapter 3, theoretical foundations of the thesis continue to be elaborated. The necessity of determining the conceptual boundaries of the state is discussed and a new definition of the state as an alternative to the Weberian understanding of the state is introduced. After defining the state, which is the kernel of the present thesis, capitalist state is defined. Then, the approach of the present thesis with reference to the distance to liberal and Marxist standpoints is clarified. It is proposed to implement a three-dimensional conception of power for the analysis of the state. Four hypothetical cases are introduced to open theoretical corridors between the micro and macro levels of hold and exercise of state power. The approach of the present thesis is further clarified with reference to the conceptualization of the individual (whether with free will or not) and with reference to how to treat the state: As a thing, subject, social relation, or a construct. Three categories (‘active voluntary action’, ‘passive voluntary action’, and ‘involuntary action’) for the action types of state elements (‘state elements’ refer to the incumbents of state positions in state networks) are introduced to stress that the state element’s consent and/or approval to the conditions to what she/he does may be present or absent with varying degrees and concerns as she/he performs a particular state practice. Besides, some instances indicating the

determinacy of armed force are mentioned in a way to draw the attention to the possible pro-capitalist threats waiting the forces with pro-worker collective long-term projects (and specifically the forces led by Morales in Bolivia among others in Latin America). For this purpose, the instance of the bloody Pinochet coup d'état and Allende's fall in Chile is presented.

In Chapter 4, the multi-level approach, the theoretical foundations of which are discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, is applied to the context of Turkey, with a number of instances and examples introduced, providing the ground for the concretization of the approach and for further theoretical discussion. As against the emphasis on consent, following Perry Anderson, the determinacy of force with reference to means of violence as the enabling factor of the capitalist hold of state power is underlined. However, unlike Anderson, the need to subsume the state and civilian armed elements under different categories is also asserted. Meanwhile, the micro-macro range analysis is undertaken with reference to the capitalist action capacity and actions of state elements, means of mobilizing state and civilian armed elements, and shaping the actions of the masses. While the mechanisms of opinion formation and material resources are exemplified in a way to display the interplay of the *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, this is followed by a discussion on the decisiveness and limits of armed force with reference to calling in physical rationality and shaping the channels of opinion formation. All through the chapter, the importance of the strategy and tactics (the voluntary side of action) is emphasized while the mode of analysis in search for (almost automatic) objective structural coincidences –the Althusserian legacy in Marxist theory- is rejected.

In Chapter 5, the necessity for further elaboration on the analysis of the capitalist state is underlined and the arguments of Chapters 2-4 are summarized. Lastly, for the purpose of reducing the problems stemming from the division of academic departments, a few ways of overcoming the disadvantages of academic compartmentalization and isolation of the academy are proposed.

CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGICAL AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

Lord saying smile has given two eyes
Don't know should I cry or shouldn't I
Hold and hold I became flood saints
Don't know should I fall or shouldn't I

(from 'Don't Know Should I Cry,' an *Aşık Mahzuni Şerif*
poem/song)

2.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to focus on certain methodological and conceptual issues which might be important for theorizing the capitalist state although it does not cover all relevant problems. It elaborates especially on the line of argument stigmatizing those analysts integrating the individual to the theory as being 'bourgeois theorists'. It is argued in section 2.2 that excluding the individual from the analysis of the state gives only a partial but possibly misleading picture of the 'reality'. As against the identification of methodological abstractionism with Marxist methodology and presentation of Marxism as science; in the present thesis, regardless of Marxism's important contributions for demystifying the capitalist society and despite that the closest approach to the standpoint of this thesis is Marxism; neither Marxism is held as the possessor of the infallible knowledge/methodology nor integrating the individual to the analysis is theorized as falling in the trap of 'bourgeois social science'. The present thesis holds an anti-reductionist methodology and proposes to make the analysis of the social in a micro-macro range.

The chapter argues that 'the escape from the individual syndrome' renders the social analysis incomplete and makes it suffer from misleading outcomes, which might be

overcome only by a multi-level approach. It also holds that ‘conceptual fetishism’ would end in unfruitful discussions. In order to make the theoretical discussions more fruitful, words denoting particular relations are proposed to be treated as arbitrary signifiers and the domain of the relations signified by particular conceptual tools is proposed to be specified as precise as possible, demarcating the denoted social relations from others as much as possible. Precision of the concepts, theoretical coherence, and explanatory power of the theory are comprehended to be among the important ingredients of theoretical progress.

As for the conceptual devices central to or newly (re)constructed for the analysis of the capitalist state; they are evaluated in three subsections of section 2.3. In its first subsection, the approach of the present thesis on rationality is explained with reference to ‘physical rationality’ and ‘emotional rationality’ as parts of the ‘rationality of being’. In its second subsection, the present thesis’ approach to ‘class analysis’ is elaborated especially with reference to the capitalist and working classes. Besides it is argued that the Mafiosi should not be overlooked in the analysis of the capitalist state, with the potential to even challenge the power of those capitalists not commanding armed forces. In the third subsection of section 2.3, communities are theorized to make up a significant part of the social relations, while the *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* are theorized to exist side by side, in interplay with each other. Furthermore, communities are categorized into two –with reference to the openness to the defense of collective long-term antagonistic class interests- as the ‘manifest class interest community’ and ‘latent class interest community’.

2.2 In Between Methodological Abstractionism and Individualism

In theorizing the state, as in any field of social analysis, methodological preferences diverging on such issues as to what extent and how individual/collective subjects and structures regulating/reproducing/transforming the social life should be integrated into the analysis and in which manner they should be theorized have remained among the points of departure. As will be discussed in the following pages, Althusserian structuralists have had an inclination to subsume several works not underestimating the individual motives/action and micro/middle-range networks under the category of bourgeois sociology regardless of the anti-capitalist worldviews held by their authors.

In discussing this attitude, the levels of analysis adopted in the present thesis will be also clarified.

Actually, with respect to the levels and modes of analysis, a number of standpoints have been already evaluated in several texts. For example, having considered the ontological position underlying the metaphor in Mandeville's *Fable of Bees* as social atomism; "the notion that society is reducible to, and has no existence apart from, the individuals that make it up" and having called the methodological stance generated by this position as methodological individualism (Efaw, 1994, p. 103), Fritz Efaw (1994) has addressed two lines of thought developed for modern science: While the first one is the empiricist tendency inspired by Vico and Montesquieu "looking for law-like regularities in the variety of known historical and contemporary societies" (p. 106), the other is the tendency giving growth to social atomism from the track of rationalism that "derive laws of social behavior from the formal model of atomistic individuals" (p. 106).

As for the categorization of Norman Barry (1989), he called "those who try to explain power in society by repeated observations of decision-making in the political system" 'positivist' regardless of their other differences "in that they restrict knowledge in the social sciences to that which is empirically verifiable" (p. 18). Barry suggested that the liberal rationalists' claim of positivism rests upon their claim "that they eliminate values from formal social science, but emphatically reject the central tenet of the positivist epistemology which claims that the purpose of social science is to discover empirical regularities in the social world" (p. 18). According to him, liberal-rationalists' attitude of resting the theory upon deductions from the axioms based on human nature with the claim of universality of 'laws of economics' on the basis of an unchanging concept of man lead to explanations entirely in individualistic terms. According to this line of analysis, social processes have to be handled as reconstructions out of individual actions while the statements containing such collective words as 'class', 'state', or 'society' can be considered as meaningful only if they are translated into statements about individual action, an example of which can be seen in the case of interpreting the actions of the 'state' as the actions of individual officials operating under certain rules, since collective concepts such as 'state' do not describe observable entities. Even though Barry conceded that the liberal individualist

social theory based on a fragmented view of the human being may work well enough in explaining the regularities of the market, he nonetheless underlined its inadequacy elsewhere and criticized liberal-rationalism on account of its difficulty to explain collective institutions since it has avoided conceding the political significance of ‘common purposes’ with the assumption that “the diversity of human values and purposes precludes the existence of sufficient agreement about social ends which would validate an extensive role for the state” (p. 24).

As for Roy Bhaskar (1979), according to him, the primal problem of the philosophy of the social sciences is the question of to what extent society can be studied in the same way as nature. In this respect, he distinguished two opposing traditions: the ‘naturalistic tradition’ with positivist principles based on the Humean notion of law; and its rival ‘anti-naturalist tradition’, which is hermeneutics recognizing a radical distinction between the methods of natural and social sciences that can be traced back through Weber and Dilthey to Kant’s transcendental idealism. He considered the dispute between the so-called ‘dialectical materialists’ on the one side and Lukacs, the Frankfurt school, and Sartre on the other as a parallel dispute in the Marxist camp. In addition to these two mainlines, Bhaskar also made a distinction between four standpoints denoting further paths of social analysis; the utilitarian empiricist/individualist standpoint, Weber’s neo-Kantian/individualist standpoint, Durkheim’s empiricist/collectivist standpoint, and Marx’s realist/relational standpoint. In addition, he also identified four models of the society and person relationship: The Weberian stereotype ‘Voluntarism’; the Durkheimian stereotype ‘Reification’; the Bergerian ‘Dialectical’ conception, and the transformational model of social activity that is the one of which Bhaskar is an advocate. As Bhaskar suggested, while from Weber’s point of view, “social objects are seen as the results of (or constituted by) intentional or meaningful human behavior”; for Durkheim “they are seen as possessing a life of their own, external to and coercing the individual” (p. 117). As for Peter Berger’s schema that sees the society as “an objectivation and externalization of man” who “is an internalization or re-appropriation in consciousness of society” (p. 119), Bhaskar considered this model as misleading with the acknowledgment that it makes more justice to both the coercive power of social facts and subjective aspects of social life. He considered it as misleading, because, according to Bhaskar, people and society are neither dialectically related nor two

moments of the same process, but are radically different kinds. Meanwhile, having pointed out the Durkheimian reification error, Bhaskar conceded that the Bergerian model is correct in asserting that society would not exist without human activity, but held that it is still wrong to say ‘men *create* the society’. According to him, the correct statement should have been “They *reproduce* or *transform* it” (p. 120). Bhaskar suggested that the transformational model stresses that objectivation can only *modify* the society for it always pre-exists men: “Society does not exist independently of conscious human activity (the error of reification). But it is not the product of the latter (the error of voluntarism)” (p. 120).

In conceptualizing the *transformational model* of social activity, Bhaskar (1979) adopted the Aristotelian paradigm of “a sculptor at work, fashioning a product out of the material and with the tools available to him” (p. 121). He argued that mechanisms generating social activity are social structures which cannot be empirically identified independently of the activities they govern. Actually, the Aristotelian paradigm adopted by Bhaskar and his point on ‘transformation’ as against ‘creation’ are solid arguments. However, his way of reasoning with an overemphasis on social structures runs the risk of underestimating the neuro-physiological mechanisms (non-social parameters) that process the natural and social inputs (that is the material of the sculpture) and that produce the human action, since, according to Bhaskar “social activity must be given a social explanation, and cannot be explained by reference to non-social parameters (though the latter may impose constraints on the possible forms of social activity)” (p. 122). Bhaskar’s insistence that social activity must be given a social explanation is correct, but if it is taken in relative, not absolute terms. Nevertheless, a potential problem seems to exist on account of his reduction of non-social parameters (that would include at least some part of instincts and desires with the acknowledgement that they may be in some part socially constituted) to only constraints, since this approach runs the risk of missing/underestimating possible non-social factors. As a matter of fact, an approach in search for a fuller account of what exist should not underestimate the motives (which are only in some part social) of individuals in explaining the social phenomenon. On the contrary, an integrative approach should not hesitate to integrate the non-social aspects to the analysis in a non-underprivileged manner, that is, not only in terms of constraints but also in terms of pushing dynamics, since they do play part in the reproduction and transformation

of the social. What should be considered in social analysis is the interplay of structures, of motives of individual psyche (only partially socially constituted), and of structures and individual psyche; each of which do shape and are shaped (if not create and are created).¹

For the sake of concretizing this point, a point on motives, which will be discussed in the following pages, must be briefly mentioned here. This point is on the very fact that certain motives behind certain types of reason *are* influential in shaping social actions as in the case of non-rebellion on account of physical rationality (with a motive to protect the physical being) even though there may be no consent to be ruled.² Although this is not to suggest to adopt an exclusively methodologically individualist model; it is to suggest that the under-treatment of motives (or non-social part of the motives) giving rise to certain types of reasons and relative irrationalities (both of which embody the social and non-social parameters) renders the analysis incomplete running the risk of social-structural determinism on the one hand and discursive reductionism on the other. The intentional underestimation of the individual can be detected in Marxist state theory, especially in Nicos Poulantzas's approach in his reduction of the individuals to merely the bearers of objective structures and instances; the idea which was expressed in a very clearly stated manner especially in his criticism of Ralph Miliband (see esp. Poulantzas, 1969, p. 70). Actually, the Miliband-Poulantzas debate that appeared mainly in the pages of *New Left Review*³ will be returned back and evaluated in further detail since it offers an invaluable opportunity to clarify the approach of the present thesis in terms of its methodological and theoretical standpoint. But for now, another debate, which is specifically on methodology, will be considered. This debate appeared mainly due to the adaptation of the Rational Choice Model to Marxism; between Alan Carling and Ellen Meiksins Wood; in *New Left Review*.

¹ On sociological analysis and its relevance to individual psychology; cf. Adorno (1967; 1968); Durkheim (1964); Weber (1978a).

² Cf. the approach to tacit consent in Locke (2005, pp. 36, 37) and Rousseau (1762, p. 51).

³ Chronologically Poulantzas (1969); Miliband (1970; 1973); Laclau (1975); Poulantzas (1976).

As for the debate, it came to the agenda on account of Wood's criticism of rational choice version of Marxism in 'Rational Choice Marxism: Is the Game Worth the Candle?' (Wood, 1989), which included the criticism of Carling's (1986) 'Rational Choice Marxism' among others. Wood started her critique by tracing the origins of the game-theoretic rational choice approach to social theory. According to her, its origins can be found in the rebirth of rightwing thought, especially in the texts of such writers as James Buchanan, Anthony Downs, Mancur Olson and Gary Becker. Although she acknowledged that, rather than having a rightwing orientation, Rational Choice Marxism (RCM) may be, in part, a reaction to the Althusserian structuralism "and the excesses of its attacks on conceptions of human agency in favor of structural explanations from which the human subject was 'rigorously' expelled" (Wood, 1989, p. 44), she did not hesitate to criticize RCM for its reductionist approach. Her primary criticism was against its breaking down of 'macroprocesses' into their 'micro-foundations', that is the actions of individuals. According to her; the RCM "can 'explain' structures or 'macroprocesses' only in terms of individual motivations whose very presence must be deduced from the structures themselves" (Wood, 1989, p. 49). In this respect, Wood's criticism of methodological individualism can be considered parallel to Bhaskar's (1979) criticism of methodological individualism which held "that society is irreducible to persons" (p. 111). It is possible to detect the essence of Wood's criticism of RCM from the following piece:

... since the context in which 'rational choices' are made must always be specified first (and the model cannot help us to arrive at that specification), if the model is to be used at all in the explanation of social and historical processes, then all the real work—the historical and structural analysis—needs to be done before the model can be inserted. In such a case, the model is, again, largely rhetorical or persuasive. If that is so, we really have to ask whether the game is worth the candle. What rational being would choose RCM if the pay-off is so incommensurate with the effort? (Wood, 1989, p. 75)

Although Wood's criticism of RCM perfectly makes sense, except from her point on the necessity to deduce the motivations from merely structures (see Wood, 1989, p. 49), in a similar (if not the same) manner to Bhaskar's treatment of non-social parameters only as constraints, both of which reflect a cautious attitude towards the neuro-physiological side (non-social instinctual aspects) of the individual; Alan

Carling's (1990) 'In Defence of Rational Choice: A Reply to Ellen Meiksins Wood' also makes sense on account of his point on the prejudiced attitude ready to label all those employing rational choice method with bourgeois methodology. He wrote:

At one point, Wood admits that 'the striking resemblance between RCM and [a] liberal-empiricist ideal-type [of theory] does not, of course, guarantee that all, or any, RCMists must subscribe to the relevant political doctrines; but the analogy is suggestive. It is a pity that in her polemics against RCM she proceeds by ignoring the absence of her guarantee, and attributes positions to members of the school that she apparently feels they ought to have adopted, if only they could have had the nous to follow through the logic of the bourgeois philistinism inherent in their apology for a general approach. (Carling, 1990, p. 105)

Although Carling (1990) conceded that "rational-choice explanation often does not explain either the preferences or the social context of the actor" (p. 98), he did not hesitate to label Wood's criticism with 'everythingism' on account of her alleged point that rational-choice explanations do not explain anything. According to him, "(e)verythingism is an unfortunate strain of Marxian thought which seems to hold, roughly, that you need a complete explanation of something before you can have any explanation of something" (Carling, 1990, p. 98). Not unexpectedly, in her reply, Wood (1990) refused the label of 'everythingism' in her 'Explaining Everything or Nothing?'; once more asserting the necessity for social explanations centering on rational agency to specify and explain the social structures setting the terms of the reasonable and preferable in any given context and to illuminate "the different criteria of reasonableness or eligibility established by different systems of social relations" (pp. 116, 117). Regardless of the correct points in Wood's criticism of Rational Choice Marxism, Carling's point on the prevalent Marxist tendency ready to label a work focusing on individual choice with bourgeois methodology is worth considering. Indeed, several Marxist authors, and thus a substantial part of the academicians in search for the construction of a classless world, seem to have suffered from 'the escape from individual syndrome' for decades.

As Levine, Sober, and Wright (1987) argue in 'Marxism and Methodological Individualism', the traditional Marxist interpretation of Marxism as scientific and materialist, bourgeois theory as ideological and idealist; Marxism as holistic,

bourgeois theory as individualistic; Marxism as anti-empiricist and anti-positivist; bourgeois theory as empiricist and positivist often rests on the assumption that “Marxism embodies distinctive methodological doctrines which distinguish it from ‘bourgeois social science’” (p. 67). Not surprisingly, Marxist state debate could not escape from being the scene of war of such labels, either. An unpleasant example of this mode can be found in the comments, considering Miliband’s analysis as remaining in the borders of bourgeois terrain (e.g. Poulantzas, 1969) or bourgeois sociology (e.g. Clarke, 1991, p. 20).

While labeling those works explicitly critical about class societies by being infected by bourgeois science is a common and exhausting jargon within the Marxist camp, it should be recognized that neither reformism nor adventurism is inherent in, if not irrelevant with, the methodological standpoint. Since Levine, Sober, and Wright’s (1978) essay drew the attention to this mode of labeling, it is worth mentioning. In the essay, they remind a point made by a current –which is sometimes called ‘analytical Marxism’- that has rejected those claims for Marxism’s methodological distinctiveness. Jon Elster, John Roemer, Adam Przeworski and G.A. Cohen who can be considered as belonging to this current have argued that the distinctive aspect of Marxism is not its methodology, but its substantive claims about the world. This point is also shared by Levine, Sober, and Wright. As Levine, Sober, and Wright (1978) rightfully suggest, “Marxian claims to methodological distinctiveness, generally, are misleading at best and harmful at worst” (p. 84).

However that is not to suggest that anti-capitalists in search for a world with neither exploitation nor domination should never criticize each another. On the contrary, as Trotsky had argued in a number of texts (see esp. Trotsky, 1924; 1975), the correct analysis of the concrete is crucial for the formulation of correct strategies; and thus, criticism is crucial for relatively accurate analysis and relatively successful steps. But still, there can be no justifiable grounds of labeling an anti-capitalist piece as ‘bourgeois’. That piece may generate reformist, adventurist, or counter-revolutionary outcomes, and therefore it can be considered as reformist, adventurist, or counter-revolutionary; but as long as its content is against capitalism there is no legitimate ground of labeling it as ‘bourgeois’, especially on account of methodology. After all, who possesses the magic formula of correct analysis, in other words, scientific

analysis? And after all, what makes a methodology belong to the ‘worker’ but not the ‘bourgeois’ camp?⁴ Clearly, it is hardly possible to be (if not claim to be) in the possession of the error-free knowledge of the ‘reality’ with infallible solutions and to be the sole and genuine bearer of the ‘working class ideology’ (cf. Engels, 1880; Marx, 1848; Marx, 1875) or the ‘vanguard party of the working class’ (cf. Lenin, 1902; 1917) with the miraculous key to the classless world. The belief in the magical scientific character of the theories proposed by a good number of Marxists, ready to condemn the other side as ‘bourgeois’ unfortunately possesses the danger of generating historical disasters such as the Stalinist cleansing operations at worst; and an exhausting unpleasant atmosphere among anti-capitalist/utopist academicians, theorists, and activists at the least. As was stated before, in Marxist state theory, this sort of exhausting mode of labeling can be best detected from the Miliband-Poulantzas debate, which has also substantial implications for the theoretical standpoint of the thesis. Although, the standpoints of Miliband and Poulantzas will be further elaborated in the coming chapters, a review of the labels stuck on their works as regards their methodological standpoint during their debate would be helpful to further clarify the standpoint of the present thesis.

Actually, the Miliband-Poulantzas debate started with Poulantzas’s (1969) critique of Miliband’s (1969) book *The State in Capitalist Society*, short after his critique (Poulantzas, 1967) the ‘Marxist Political Theory in Great Britain’ where labels of historicism and subjectivism were put on Perry Anderson and Tom Nairn for their approach on social classes. As for Miliband’s book *The State in Capitalist Society*, in

⁴ Meanwhile, this is not to deny that there may be different world views in terms of the structural locations of social classes. On the contrary, the exploiting and dominating classes/sectors may intentionally or unintentionally produce world views in a way to justify their exploitation and/or domination. For example, what Colletti (1974) pointed out as regards the bourgeois point of view in the analysis of the relationship between capital and wage labor perfectly makes sense (see esp. pp. 234, 235). As a matter of fact, the classes’ world views may involve not only the distortion of the reality (the theme of distortion/inversion of the reality can be found in Marx and Engels texts as in the case of the metaphor of *camera obscura* in Marx & Engels, 1846; and fetishism of commodities in Marx, 1867), but also very different values, opinions, tastes, and life styles (as put forward in the *Preface of Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Marx, 1859). This problem has been discussed in a variety of texts with reference to ideology within the Marxist camp (for the approaches as regards these positive and negative conceptions of ideology see especially Callinicos, 1983; Eagleton, 1991; Larrain, 1979; 1991; on Marx’s conception of ideology see also Nordahl, 1985, esp. p. 247; Geras, 1971, esp. pp. 75-81; Mephram, 1972, esp. p. 14; Rossi-Landi, 1990, esp. p. 28).

'The Problem of the Capitalist State', Poulantzas (1969) criticized it mainly due to the methodology pursued and Miliband's approach to social classes. This critique was for the most part on account of Miliband's alleged neglect of differences and relations between the fractions of capital, his conceptualization of economic elites, and his method of analysis trying to show "that the *social origin* of members of the 'summit' of the State apparatus is that of the ruling class," and "that *personal ties* of influence, status, and milieu are established between the members of the ruling class and those of the State apparatus" (p. 72). According to Poulantzas, the relation between the bourgeois class and state was an objective one, meaning that; because of the *system* itself there has been an *objective coincidence* between the function of the state and interests of the dominant class, while state has to be seen as "*the factor of cohesion of a social formation and factor of reproduction of production of a system*" (p. 73). In this article, Poulantzas also claimed that Miliband's work placed itself on the *terrain of bourgeois ideologies* in attacking them since it analyzed the concrete without dealing with the Marxist theory of the state, without making explicit the epistemological principles of treating the concrete, and without submitting the bourgeois ideologies to the critique of *Marxist science*. According to Poulantzas, concepts had to be opposed by other parallel concepts situated in a different problematic while old notions can be confronted with 'concrete reality' only by means of those 'new concepts' (p. 69; cf. Durkheim, 1964, on abandoning commonsense preconceptions and employing scientific concepts).

In response to Poulantzas's assertion that Miliband's book lacked a 'problematic' that would situate the concrete data and that his book was vitiated by empiricist deformations making the analysis placed in the bourgeois terrain, Miliband (1970) argued that Poulantzas's criticism does not go far beyond a general point on which concept to use. He also criticized Poulantzas's approach in the *Political Power and Social Classes* (Poulantzas, 1975a) for imprisoning the state elite totally in objective structures and for its 'structural super-determinism'. Miliband continued his criticism in his 'Poulantzas and the Capitalist State' (Miliband, 1973). This time, Miliband pointed out the difficult language used in Poulantzas's book and once more criticized its abstractionist (rather than the concrete) mode of analysis attributing these shortcomings to the legacy of Althusserian reading of Marx, Engels, and Lenin's texts with its attempt of theorizing rather than commenting or interpreting those texts.

Besides, according to Miliband, in the 'Political Power and Social Classes', there was no reference to any actual capitalist state. Due to this abstractionist mode of analysis (in that, all the 'structures' and 'levels' that Poulantzas's analysis rested on have very few points of contact with the historical or contemporary reality), Miliband added the epithet of 'structuralist abstractionism' to his charge of 'structural super-determinism'. Miliband also criticized Poulantzas's treatment of the 'class' as distinct and autonomous with reference to its 'pertinent effects' –that is the reflection of the place in the production process on other levels (political and ideological levels) as a new element- without explaining when and how such pertinent effects appear. Miliband correctly stated that Poulantzas's 'structural super-determinism' "makes him *assume* what has to be *explained* about the relationship of the state to classes in the capitalist mode of production" (p. 89). Following Miliband's criticism of Poulantzas's abstractionist approach, Ernesto Laclau (1975) intervened in the debate in his 'The Specificity of the Political: The Poulantzas-Miliband debate', suggesting that their debate was mainly methodological. Laclau agreed with Poulantzas's judgment that Miliband's analysis relied on bourgeois notions, but shared Miliband's criticism of Poulantzas for his structuralism and abstractionism, and his treatment of ideological state apparatuses as if everything contributes to the cohesion of the social formation. Laclau also pointed out the presence of a sort of formalism in Poulantzas's theoretical work.

In turn, Poulantzas (1976) once more argued that theoretical problematic is absent in Miliband's writings and that Miliband's labels "such as 'abstractionism', 'structuralism' or 'super determinism', remain extremely vague and imprecise in his usage" (p. 64). He then put the label of 'empiricist' and 'neo-positivist' on Miliband's work and asserted that Miliband confused his "eschewal of the illusion of the evident with what he calls 'total lack' of concrete analysis" in his work (p. 65). Nonetheless, in reply to Laclau, he conceded the presence of some extent of theoreticism and formalism in his former work, but also held that he made the necessary corrections in his books *Fascism and Dictatorship* (Poulantzas, 1980) and *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism* (Poulantzas, 1975b). As for Miliband's accusation of super-determinism concerning the problematic of subject, Poulantzas refused the label of structuralism. Although Poulantzas put an end to his polemic with Miliband in 'The Capitalist State: A Reply to Miliband and Laclau' (Poulantzas, 1976), the traces of this debate can be

detected even in his last book, *State, Power, Socialism* (Poulantzas, 2000), which was first published in 1978, employing a mode of analysis less formalist, more vivid and dynamic. According to Clarke (1991, esp. pp. 17, 18) and Thomas (2002, esp. p. 74), there had been a shift in Poulantzas's latter works with a focus on class struggles (cf. Barrow, 2006 – who argued that in his 'Political Power and Social Classes', Poulantzas made reference to class struggles several times⁵). Although the abstractionist mode considerably lost its predominance as Poulantzas's analysis became more concrete and explanatory, touching a number of problematic issues in the 'State, Power, Socialism' (Poulantzas, 2000), an interesting comment came from Stuart Hall (1980), in a way reflecting the ritualistic expectations of the academia (though in a sympathetic way) as regards the completeness of a work, which first appeared in *New Left Review*, and then as the 'Introduction to the Verso Classics edition' of *State, Power, Socialism* (Poulantzas, 2000). In his comment on the book, Stuart Hall wrote:

It should be clear, by now, that *State, Power, Socialism* is a profoundly unsettled, and therefore unsettling book. Its incompleteness throws up far more than Poulantzas was ready to secure within the framework of a coherent and integrated argument. The book opens up a series of Pandora's boxes ... This produces a real theoretical unevenness in the book. Yet, this very unevenness also constitutes, by its reverse side, the stimulus of the book, its generative openness. Poulantzas's earlier books gained much of their force precisely from their completeness and consistency which contributes to a certain impression of premature closure, of dogmatism and orthodoxy. He leaves us with a book which is, in many ways, clearly coming apart at the seams; where no single consistent theoretical framework is wide enough to embrace its internal diversity. It is strikingly *unfinished*. It offers us a picture of one of the most able and fluent of 'orthodox' Marxist structuralist thinkers putting himself and his ideas at risk. This is Poulantzas adventuring... (Hall, 1980, pp. 68, 69)

Indeed, Poulantzas's latter work has put several issues on the operating table. In several respects, this work is closer to the approach of the present thesis (e.g. more emphasis on armed force) and to Miliband (e.g. more emphasis on class struggles)

⁵ For implicit or explicit reference to class struggles (including within class struggles) in his earlier work, see Poulantzas (1975, esp. pp. 58, 130, 189, 209, 239, 262, 265, 266, 276).

than his *Political Power and Social Classes*. Regardless of a number of points different from Poulantzas's approach (a few of which will be discussed in the following lines and chapters), his works have become among the leading analyses, inspiring some further leading works (e.g. Jessop, 1990; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). As for the Miliband-Poulantzas debate; there are different viewpoints on its fruitfulness. For example, while according to Levine (2002), it has generated fruitful discussions and has broken the theoretical impasse within Marxist political theory as "a major turning point in Marxist theorizing on the capitalist state and social class" (p. 170), according to Aronowitz and Bratsis (2002) it has generated "a caricature of Miliband's and Poulantzas's true positions, offering no substantive insight into a theory of state" p. xii). Regardless of the degree of fruitfulness of the debate, it has revived some methodological questions in the context of Marxist state theory.

According to Aronowitz and Bratsis (2002), the Miliband-Poulantzas debate is no more than the revival of the Lenin-Luxemburg debate since while Miliband's approach is closer to that of Lenin in his alleged treatment of the state as an instrument of the capitalist class which requires the organization of the revolutionary party to capture the state power; Poulantzas's approach is closer to Luxemburg's approach in her claim that state apparatuses are by function bourgeois which require self-organized and autonomous working-class movements (p. xiii). Although the degree of its closeness to the Lenin-Luxemburg debate is questionable, Barrow's point on the relevance of methodological line repeated in the Miliband-Poulantzas debate to Marxist methodology is worth mentioning. According to Barrow (2002), "(a)lthough Miliband has often been chastised by structuralists for allowing bourgeois social science to set the methodological terms of his analysis, Poulantzas was responding to a parallel intellectual context" (p. 8). In this respect, Barrow pointed out that Talcott Parsons, David Easton, Gabriel Almond, David Apter, and Karl Deutsch were among the authors whose works Poulantzas made frequent recourse. Furthermore, Barrow (2002) correctly called the attention to the irony that "Miliband-Poulantzas debate came to revolve around the question of *Marxist* methodology when there was nothing peculiarly Marxist about either author's *methodological* approach" (p. 9, cf. the point made on *Marxist* methodology by Levine, Sober, & Wright, 1987; Carling, 1990 mentioned above).

Barrow's comments on Miliband's approach also perfectly make sense. In his evaluation of Miliband's work, Barrow (2007) shared Domhoff's argument that instrumentalism is an *artificial* polemical construct put on those who analyze the state in capitalist society historically and empirically,⁶ and that if Block's (1977) definition of instrumentalism⁷ is to be considered which institutionalized Poulantzas's label as a part of the state debate, it would be impossible to consider Miliband as an instrumentalist. Barrow correctly considered the aspects present in Miliband's work as overlooked by those who alleged that Miliband cannot transcend the framework used by the pluralists (e.g. Gold, Lo, & Wright, 1975a, p. 34)⁸ and that Miliband does not add anything to the Marxist state analysis (e.g. Jessop, 1990, p. 30), while Miliband's work in fact employed a multi-level analysis. As for Barrow's (2006) rejection of labeling Poulantzas's approach as 'structural super-determinist' or 'structural abstractionist' and his proposal to replace them by 'historical structuralist' (or class struggle) due to Poulantzas's very real differences and polemic with Althusser; rather than Barrow's comment, Miliband's comment on Poulantzas seems to be more accurate due to the insistent emphasis made in Poulantzas's works for excluding individual motives and psyche from the analysis, regardless of his actual

⁶ Domhoff (1990) held that; Miliband's *The State in Capitalist Society* "was defamed and distorted in a widely cited review by French structural Marxist Nicos Poulantzas as claiming the opposite of what is actually said" (p. 190) while Poulantzas did "not present any empirical evidence for his claim that the governments without capitalist in them do best by capitalists, nor have any of those who quote him" (p. 190).

⁷ According to Block (1977), "A number of writers have characterized the orthodox Marxist view of the state as a simple tool or instrument of ruling-class purposes." (p. 8). According to him, instrumentalists neglect the ideological role of the state as long as they see the state has to appear as neutral for maintaining the legitimacy of the social order (p. 8).

⁸ According to Gold, Lo, and Wright (1975a), although empirical work of the instrumentalists has largely successfully confronted conclusions of the pluralists and has made several important contributions to Marxist state theory, this perspective "failed to transcend the framework that the pluralists use" (p. 34). The authors also argued that the instrumentalist perspective is inadequate for analyzing the state in advanced capitalist societies, because it is impossible to explain the complex apparatus of the state on the basis of ruling class' class-conscious manipulations (Gold, Lo, & Wright, 1975b, p. 36) while the "state policies which cannot easily be explained by direct corporate initiatives but which come from within the state itself" can be explained only with reference to "a logic of the capitalist state, both in terms of its relations to civil society and in terms of its internal operations" (Gold, Lo, & Wright, 1975a, p. 35). However, according to the authors (Gold, Lo, & Wright, 1975b), structuralist and Hegelian-Marxist perspectives are also inadequate, because while the structuralist alternative fails to explain the social mechanisms generating class policies compatible with the needs of the system, the Hegelian-Marxist perspective is too abstract to analyze a particular historical situation while its emphasis on ideology and consciousness erodes the materialist basis of Marxist theory (pp. 36, 37).

references to them. Actually, Poulantzas insisted to evaluate the individuals merely as the bearers of the structures they occupy and escaped from dealing with the issue of subject not only in his 'Political Power and Social Classes' (Poulantzas, 1975a, see esp. pp. 111, 123-129, 189), but also in his 'State, Power, Socialism' (Poulantzas, 2000, see esp. p. 31), although it is possible to argue that there is a lesser degree of abstractionism in his latter work while in 'State, Power, Socialism', Poulantzas (2000) suggested that the expanded reproduction introduced by capitalism "entails that, at the very level of the reproduction process, a strategic calculation is made by various fractions of capital and their bearers"⁹ in contrast to the pre-capitalist societies "that exhibited only simple, repetitive and, ... blind reproduction" (p. 90, cf. Jessop, 1990, on blind (co-) evolution, esp. pp. 103, 327, 331).

However, ironically, although Poulantzas criticized Miliband for his alleged reduction of the analysis to motivations and behaviors of the individuals, he could not escape from including the 'individual psyche' in his own analyses. For example, in 'Political Power and Social Classes' (Poulantzas, 1975), for several times, he referred to *power fetishism* (see esp. pp. 244, 339, 355, 356) and in 'State, Power, Socialism' (Poulantzas, 2000) he made even a more critical point as he gave reference to the *mechanisms of fear* (p. 83; cf. physical rationality below), which inevitably entail reference (whether implicit or explicit) to human psyche and psychological motives. Actually, regardless of the efforts for escaping from the individual psyche and for putting the emphasis on the objectivity and/or externality of social facts/structures (e.g. Durkheim, 1964, on social facts; Engels, 1880; and Marx & Engels, 1846 on materialist conception of history; Marx, 1861, on the domination of *capital*); individual psyche has been referred to in a number of collectivist texts even if the referred state of mind was mainly explained in structural terms (see for example, Durkheim, 1897, on suicide; Marx, 1844a, on religion and sigh of the oppressed; Marx, 1844b, on alienation; Marx, 1867, on fetishism of commodities), which somehow denote the employment of the method of 'interpretation' since a process of empathy is implied when such motives or states of mind as desire for control/power, anomie, egoism, loneliness, powerlessness, meaninglessness, and delusion are

⁹ Meanwhile, as Jessop (1990) argued, "Poulantzas resorts to what one might call a *strategic* causality which explains state policy in terms of a process of strategic calculation without a calculating subject" (p. 257).

referred to (cf. *verstehen* sociology of Weber, 1978a). One step moving beyond such sort of structural and interpretive explanations would be the acknowledgment of the neuro-physiological processes (e.g. instincts, needs, and desires; which may be partially socially constituted) and particular types of reasons reacting to numerous social inputs. Implicitly or explicitly, reference to the individual is existent in several texts of methodological collectivism.¹⁰ However, whether individualist or collectivist, structuralist texts have to explain why individuals occupying similar structural positions may act in different ways and which factors are in effect giving rise to such differences. Actually, the search for a fuller account of social analysis ends in the so-called field of psychology, the separation (from sociology and other social sciences) of which has rendered several academic disciplines orphans.¹¹ Today, interests and rational/irrational preferences of individuals are taken for granted in mainstream sociology and economy. However, adding the individual motives and psyche, and the lying logics behind them, that is, adding further micro dimensions to relatively macro-levels of social analysis is likely to develop rather than harm the analysis, increasing the interconnections between the levels of analysis insofar as reductionist and functionalist tendencies are avoided. As a matter of fact, those macro-level analyses that under-represent or tend to exclude the relatively micro-level factors run the risk of overlooking some possible influential factors and making false generalizations in the analysis. For example, overlooking the drive for survival (the instinct of living) may end in such a generalization and false conclusion that ‘when the rulers insert more violence over the dominated, the consent of the dominated decreases, and this gives rise to rebellion; so for giving rise to a strong rebellion what the rebels have to do is to force the rulers insert more violence over the dominated’, as in the case of proponents of certain guerilla strategies provoking the state armed forces to attack the demonstrators or the dominated, who would then supposedly fight against the attackers (state armed forces). In social sciences, false generalizations run the risk of not only defective theoretical works, but also disastrous outcomes ending in millions of death. Alas, Marxism is no exception, despite its all claims of infallible knowledge, genuine scientificity, and ultimate truth.

¹⁰ However, not all structuralist or structural functionalist explanations are collectivist; see, for example, Spencer (1972).

¹¹ Cf. Adorno (1967; 1968); Durkheim (1964); Weber (1978a) on separation of sociology and psychology.

Therefore, in search for the reality (that is scientific exploration), namely, in search for the relatively correct description of relations (that is analysis), the escape from either the relatively micro or relatively macro (that is not completely irrelevant with the attempts of integrating the findings of the so-called natural sciences into the so-called humanities and social sciences) would turn the analysis into an orphanage house. Unfortunately, today, due to the already formed academic compartments, the division of labor in universities, and the limited time that an individual has; it is almost impossible for a social scientist to acquire knowledge in biology, physics, chemistry, and medicine and integrate them to the analysis carried out in the departments of humanities and social sciences. Therefore, unfortunately, the analysis made here also lacks the findings of the so-called natural sciences and even psychology, which could have helped to understand the mechanisms other than the social ones underlying the common and different features of human beings as the source of action, which could in turn help to give a fuller account of the 'reality'. Such kind of an analysis would have provided the opportunity to elaborate on the rationality and relative irrationality types; mechanisms of empathy (which to a certain extent may account for such feelings as compassion and anger), cognition, and calculation, which may all to a certain extent account for successful and unsuccessful rebellions. Although such kind of an elaboration is impossible in the present thesis, it is still possible to make sense of the empirical data, and, in part, draw the mainlines of the mechanisms underlying the social phenomenon; yet which would inevitably be incomplete, and which would, in turn, run the risk of being partially or fully defective. Even so, since, for now, knowing all the variables in effect is impossible for any researcher, and given the limited capacity of the mind and the limited time, any full analysis is impossible; the scope of any analysis remains quite limited; and any analysis is inevitably founded upon particular postulates, which appear as the explicitly declared or implicitly assumed presence of particular reasons or mechanisms in the terrain of social compartment of so-called sciences.

Now, it is necessary to clarify the standpoint of the present thesis in its treatment of individuals, rationality, social collectivities, and structures further. As a beginning, the evaluation of four categories formulated by Levine, Sober, and Wright (1987) as regards the question 'What is explanatory of social phenomenon' would provide the

grounds for clarification. These four categories are ‘atomism’, ‘radical holism’, ‘methodological individualism’, and ‘anti-reductionism’. As the authors argue, a line should be drawn to distinguish atomism from methodological individualism although “defenders of methodological individualism depict anti-reductionists as radical holists, and defenders of anti-reductionist positions sometimes regard methodological individualists as atomists” (p. 69) . However, whereas according to the atomists, the relations between individuals or between social entities are not explanatory (p. 70), methodological individualists insist that “only relations among individuals are irreducibly explanatory” (p. 72); while both atomists and methodological individualists argue that social explanations are ultimately reducible to individual-level explanations (p. 71) as their common point. As for radical holism, about which the atomist and methodological individualist approaches are critical, it holds that macro-social categories such as capitalism, the state, class relations are unaffected by micro-level processes, that is, “social facts explain social facts directly without individual-level mechanisms playing any autonomous explanatory role” (p. 73). In this respect, Althusserian tradition in Marxism can be considered in the category of radical holism according to which “structures cause structures and individuals are only ‘supports’ of social relations” (p. 74), which has also had impacts over Poulantzas’s approach in state theory. According to Levine, Sober, and Wright (1987), radical holism may end in “teleological reasoning in the theory of history, extreme formulations in arguments for structural causality, and what can be termed ‘collective agency’ arguments” (p. 73). As for what the authors call anti-reductionism; that approach “acknowledges the importance of micro-level accounts in explaining social phenomena, while allowing for the irreducibility of macro-level accounts to these micro-level explanations” (p. 75). This standpoint is close to the approach adopted in the present thesis, given that on the one hand the irreducibility may not cover all macro-level accounts while on the other hand certain micro-level accounts may have an existence of their own, as in the case of instincts and certain drives of human beings giving rise to particular modes of reasons. At least, given the limited time and brain capacity of the human being, for now, anti-reductionism seems to be logical.

In discussing the distinguishing characteristics of anti-reductionism, Levine, Sober, and Wright (1987) gave reference to a useful distinction between types and tokens:

‘Tokens’ are particular instances: for example, a particular strike by a group of workers in a particular factory or an idea in the head of a particular individual. ‘Types’ are characteristics that tokens may have in common. Thus a particular strike –a token event- can be subsumed under a variety of possible ‘types’: *strikes, class struggles, social conflicts*, etc. Similarly, being rich is a type of which Rockefeller is one token. Types are general categories that subsume particular events or instances. (Levine, Sober, & Wright, 1987, p. 76)

Both methodological individualists and anti-reductionists concede that type-concepts referring to individuals have explanatory power; although, while according to methodological individualists, it is possible to reduce the type-concepts to type-concepts referring only to individuals; according to anti-reductionists this is generally not possible (p. 76). Levine, Sober, and Wright (1987) further argued for the importance of micro-foundations for macro-social theory. What they mean by ‘micro-foundations’ is made clear in the following lines:

There are four possible explanatory connections between social phenomena and individuals’ properties: first, individuals’ properties can explain social phenomena; second, social phenomena can explain individuals’ properties; third, individuals’ properties can explain individuals’ properties; and fourth, social phenomena can explain social phenomena. The critique of radical holism implies that the fourth of these explanatory connections is legitimate only when the causal chain in the explanation involves combinations of the first two. That is, social phenomena explain social phenomena only insofar as there are linkages –causal mechanisms- that work through the micro-individual level. Social structures explain social structures via the ways they determine the properties and actions of individuals which in turn determine social structural outcomes. (Levine, Sober, & Wright, 1987, p. 79)

Nevertheless, the critique of radical holism by anti-reductionists does not mean to suggest that it is possible to reduce all macro-explanations to micro-mechanisms, as in the case of theory of evolution –implying the existence of numerous micro-mediators and micro-mechanisms through which different instances of fitness are realized-, which is not possible to reduce to any causal law operating at the level of micro-mechanisms (p. 79), while resorting to micro-foundational analysis is equal to neither rational strategic actor models nor methodological individualism, since there

are many kinds of micro-foundations for social phenomena such as the theories of socialization or psychoanalytic theories of unconscious (p. 83). According to Levine, Sober, and Wright (1987) the anti-reductionist standpoint holds that both relations among individuals are explanatory and properties of and relations among aggregate social entities are irreducibly explanatory (p. 70) while according to the author of the present thesis, it would be wise to open corridors in a micro-macro range as much as possible once the limited cognitive capacity of the individual is considered, with the acknowledgement that unless all knots between what exist are solved, being stuck in either reductionism or holism may generate errors in the analysis. It is in this latter sense that the methodology of the present thesis is an anti-reductionist one.

Hence, anti-reductionist standpoint is different from that of Max Weber (1978a) who argued that “for the subjective interpretation of action in sociological work ... collectivities must be treated as *solely* the resultants and modes of organization of the particular acts of individual persons” (p. 13). As Swingewood (1999) suggests, Weber pursued ‘methodological individualism’ as against ‘methodological collectivism’ (pp. 55, 56). However, apart from Weber’s insistence for the reduction of analysis to the individual level, Weber’s insistence on *understanding* the ‘motives’ of the individual for analytical purposes is extremely important (cf. Durkheim, 1964, on treating the social facts as things). If the individual psyche is integrated into the analysis of the macro aspects in a mode that does not neglect the relatively institutionalized relations and structural locations tending to constrain the field of individual/collective action and triggering particular reasons as motives, there would be hardly any drawback of explicitly recognizing particular reasons and interests with reference to those particular reasons (and thus, structures as among the triggering factors of those reasons).

The mode of analysis adopted here attempts to escape from functionalist and teleological accounts. It focuses on the analysis of the factors that can be considered among the forces pushing, enabling, and/or facilitating pro-capitalist state practices. In doing this, it adopts a multi-level analysis that excludes neither macro accounts nor micro accounts. Structural positions occupied are treated as forces granting potential capacities to and constraining the individual cognition and action; which transform

other structures and individual actions and are transformed by them.¹² The individual action, which is to a certain extent shaped by structural aspects, is treated as a force gaining the impetus from not only social relations but also from neuro-physiological mechanisms¹³ processing the social and non-social environmental and internal stimuli, as a result of which the produced outputs are not necessarily in conformity with the short and/or long term interests of the element as regards her position in the theoretically privileged social structure.¹⁴ Methodological issues with reference to the individual/structure problematic will be continued to be elaborated in the present and coming chapters, especially with reference to social class and state elements

As for the major problematic of the thesis; it is relevant to the question ‘how and why the individuals act in the ways they do’; that is, here, ‘what are the mechanisms enabling and/or facilitating the capitalist hold of state power?’ This type of analysis requires the analysis of the relations between macro-level units; between macro-level units and micro-level units, and between micro-level units, rather than the analysis of structures and individuals in isolation from each other. This type of analysis should necessarily focus on the potentialities, activation, and operation of structures and individuals with reference to their reproductive and transformational orientation. In doing this, the approach of the thesis does not hesitate to resort to motives/drives and reasons/rationalities when necessary (which are inevitably treated as black boxes), since discussion on consent and violence as regards state theory has until now required implicitly or explicitly (but generally implicitly) resorting to such notions.

¹² Cf. Laclau & Mouffe (1985); and see the criticism of their approach for their reductionist tendency in Mouzelis (1988, esp. pp. 113-116) and Jessop (1990, esp. p. 298).

¹³ This (neuro-physiological mechanisms) is inevitably treated as black box because of the already mentioned lack of knowledge on account of the compartmentalization of the academy, limited time and limited processing capacity of the mind. This acknowledgment means that there is no reason to celebrate the division of the so-called social sciences from the so-called natural sciences, and further divisions within each branch insofar as sometimes similar problematic issues occur in any branch of science (e.g. the dilemma of reductionism and holism in physics). Besides, there is always the possibility for any paradigm in any branch of the academy to be undermined by even a single overlooked or undiscovered factor. Therefore any proposition mentioned in the present thesis is formed in the context of cognitive in addition to other constraints. Even though it will cover a number of major tone statements such as the ones on violence and consent, they will be inevitably formulated on the basis of the interpretation of the relations at micro and macro levels in a constrained context of information and processing capacity/opportunities.

¹⁴ Cf. the relationship between id, ego, and superego in Freud (1962).

Now then, for grounding further discussions on ‘capitalist hold of state power’ on firmer basis, two basic types of rationalities derived from the ‘rationality of being’¹⁵ will be assumed to exist (in addition to possible other types of rationality), which are ‘physical rationality’ and ‘emotional rationality’, both of which are in interplay with each other in terms of hindering, shaping, and sometimes even giving an end to the physical being. Since the acknowledgment of physical rationality has the potential to radically question the bases of those arguments that take the consent of the masses for granted for the existence of capitalist state or capitalist hold of state power or that hold the equation that ‘if the consent of the masses decreases the masses would rebel’ or that ‘if the masses do not rebel that must be because of the power of bourgeois ideology’,¹⁶ this issue will be at least briefly evaluated in a separate section, below.

2.3 Conceptual Devices

While the present thesis treats the social with an existence of its own and as a valid object of research (cf. Bhaskar, 1979), since major tools of social scientific inquiry are the concepts used in making analysis (cf. Weber, 1978a, on ideal types; Durkheim, 1964, on scientific concepts), the boundaries of at least the major analytical tools have to be drawn and at least some of the major concepts of analysis have to be elaborated.¹⁷ Conceptual clarification is a requirement to achieve a common understanding between the author and reader insofar as it is possible; relatively fixing the meaning and laying the foundation of the theoretical building. Conceptual tools are important not only for reaching a relatively common

¹⁵ ‘Being’ here refers to ‘existence’, that is not only physical survival, but which includes physical survival, but which may sometimes challenge physical survival. ‘Rationality of being’ embodies several types of reasons each of which may be the combination of several others, each of which within and between themselves may be conflicting as regards the consciously recognized/unrecognized orientations/goals and/or relative time (term-relevance). A number of Marxist state theoretical analyses could have given a fuller account of the relations formulated in them if ‘human nature’ were not treated as neutral and the state of ‘being’ were not overlooked, both of which gave rise to theorizing individuals as merely the bearers of their structural positions and/or society effects (including discursive practices).

¹⁶ See for example Gramsci (1989, esp. p. 239); Jessop (1997, p. 574; cf. 1990, p. 76); Marx (1844a, p. 9); Miliband (1969, p. 272; 1983, p. 66); Poulantzas (1975a, pp. 223, 317; 2000, p. 28).

¹⁷ Even in natural sciences the change in conceptual definitions (formulas, e.g. the formula of ‘energy’) has the power to end in a change in the way theory is constructed.

understanding on what the author means as she/he writes, but also because *definitions* of scientific inquiry at the same time may refer to the *analysis* of relations, which becomes especially crucial for those concepts which have a commonsense daily life usage as in the case of the ‘state’, ‘economy’, and ‘politics’. Therefore, in constructing the foundations of a theoretical structure, if the theorist fails to establish correct relations in defining the content of her/his analytical tools (e.g. attributing an essential legitimacy characteristic to the conceptual tool ‘official authority’ or ‘state’) or fails to clarify the major assumptions lying behind the way he/she uses the concept (e.g. concept of ‘economy’ based on ‘utility’ or ‘use-value’), then she/he may find herself/himself in a theoretical impasse (e.g. integrating the consent of the masses to the definition of the state, ending in the impasse of the following equation ‘when there is no consent of the masses, then there is no state’) or he/she may end in employing contradictory and arbitrary criteria in the usage of the concept (e.g. analysis of ‘economic activities’ in a contradictory manner with the defined content of the ‘economy’). Therefore for improving the present interpretations of the ‘social’, one has to return back to foundations of the theoretical building, change its problem-creating aspects, and redefine the analytical tools if the newer ones give a clearer and better understanding of the analyzed social relations (as in the case of the shift of the definition/formula of ‘energy’ in physics). Conceptual foundations are important not only for reducing the probability of facing possible theoretical incoherence and impasses, but also for escaping from any type of conceptual fetishism (from which the author of the present thesis can little escape), which, here, refers to attributing a meaning to a particular word with a claim of monopoly in an essentializing manner, ending in such discussions on what the *real* meaning of ‘working class’, ‘mode of production’, and ‘capitalism’ is.

Therefore, here, clarification of some core concepts of the current analysis is necessary for understanding what the author means as she uses them in analyzing the capitalist hold of state power in the rest of the thesis. However, although for ‘social class’ the author of the present thesis gives her definition (what she means as she uses the concept) in an attempt to escape from conceptual fetishism, she insists on the exclusion of certain aspects from the definition of the ‘state’ as she believes several (not all) other conceptual formulations of the ‘state’ are likely to end in establishing

false cause and effect relationships with their not only descriptive but also mistakenly established explanatory content.¹⁸

Although it is impossible to clarify all the excluded and included concepts of the analysis due to the limited scope of the thesis, here, only those vital or those newly (re)constructed (here, what is meant is ‘content construction’, not ‘words’ as arbitrary signifiers) as analytical tools will be clarified. In this respect, firstly, the approach to rationality and rationality types will be evaluated, since this clarification is vital for understanding not only the presence of the ‘state’ but also the ‘capitalist hold of state power’ in terms of both challenges to it and the mechanisms acting as counter-forces against these challenging factors/forces. Secondly, the approach to social classes and class interests will be briefly explained since that conceptual construction is a vital one in analyzing the question of ‘hold of state power’ and in constructing further analytical devices such as the definition of community types on the basis of class interests. In this respect, also the definition of a class (and capitalist mode of production), embodying certain characteristics of but not identical with the capitalist class (and mode of production) will be introduced (that is the Mafioso capitalist lord/madam class), since this class has been appearing as a significant force in the economic and political scene for some time. Thirdly, the approach to communities will be elaborated, with two newly introduced community types, since they are then going to be integrated to the analysis of the capitalist hold of state power along with other mechanisms for the hold of state power. Meanwhile, since the discussion of the approach to the ‘state’ and ‘state power’ requires a deeper elaboration, that question will be discussed in a separate chapter.

2.3.1 On Rationality

The question of ‘rationality’ has become a central theoretical interest among especially liberal circles since 18th century, mainly due to the concern for determining the criteria of responsibility of the individual before the law. In this context, David

¹⁸ For example, in the absence of mass rebellions, treating the ‘consent’ of the masses to the holders of the so-called monopoly of violence as taken for granted and making problematic claims of ‘legitimate monopoly of violence’ (problematic explanatory content); treating ‘legitimate monopoly of violence’ as a characteristic of the ‘state’ (descriptive content on the basis of problematic explanatory assumptions), holding that ‘without mass consent to the holders of monopoly of violence, there would be no state’ (problematic explanatory content).

Hume's approach to rationality has become a widely resorted one. Rather than drawing an antagonism between passion and reason;¹⁹ in *A Treatise on Human Nature*, Hume (2000) argued that reason alone cannot be a motive to action of the will and that reason cannot oppose passion in the direction of the will (p. 7). According to Hume (2000), "(r)reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them" (p. 9). He argued that reason does not cause but only direct the impulse while the aversion or propensity towards any object arises from the prospect of pain or pleasure; "and these emotions extend themselves to the causes and effects of that object; and they are pointed out to us by reason and experience" (p. 8). Therefore reason is capable of calculating the causes and effects. As for the typologies developed for rationality in sociological analysis, Weber's elaboration on action types is worth mentioning. According to him, it is possible to evaluate social action in four categories: instrumentally rational action, value-rational action, affectual action, and traditional action:

- (1) *instrumentally rational (zweckrational)*, that is, determined by expectations as to the behavior of objects in the environment and of other human beings; these expectations are used as 'conditions' or 'means' for the attainment of the actor's own rationally pursued and calculated ends;
- (2) *value-rational (wertrational)*, that is, determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behavior, independently of its prospects of success;
- (3) *affectual* (especially emotional), that is, determined by the actor's specific affects and feeling states;

¹⁹ Contrast Humean notion of rationality, for example, with that of Spinoza who located passion/emotions vis-à-vis reason, who nevertheless made a connection in that; "passions foster sociability; sociability rationality; and rationality utility" (Bull, 2005, p. 34). Richard Badham (1984) pointed out the differences among the Enlightenment philosophers on the nature of reason despite their agreement on its importance and value. According to him, on the one hand, there is the empiricist conception of reason which perceived the human mind as "an 'empty cabinet' or a sheet of 'white paper'" (p. 9) while "knowledge was perceived to be of instrumental value in control of nature" (p. 9). He considered the "experimental and deductive method of Bacon, the empirical psychology of Locke, and the skepticism of Hume" (p. 9) within this tradition. On the other hand, according to him, there is the conception of reason "based on the rationalism of Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza" (p. 9) which sees the reason "as embodying a form of self-reflection or self analysis capable of providing a rationally grounded intuitive insight into the universal and self-evident principles of human conduct" (pp. 9, 10).

(4) *traditional*, that is, determined by ingrained habituation. (Weber, 1978a, pp. 24, 25)

According to Weber, as the societies move from the pre-industrial to industrial, there is also a movement from the value-rational action to the instrumentally rational action, with the acknowledgment that in reality, any concrete pattern of action can be interpreted in terms of more than one type (Fulcher & Scott, 2003, p. 41). According to Weber (1978a), among the examples of pure value-rational orientation, there are those actions that put into practice the convictions of the persons as regards “what seems to them to be required by duty, honor, the pursuit of beauty, a religious call, personal loyalty, or the importance of some ‘cause’ no matter what it consists”, *regardless of* possible cost to themselves (p. 25). As for instrumentally rational action, Weber considered an action as instrumentally rational “when the end, the means, and the secondary results are all rationally taken into account and weighed” (p. 26), which “involves rational consideration of the alternative means to the end, of the relations of the end to the secondary consequences, and finally of the relative importance of different possible ends (p. 26; cf. Bentham, 2000, on rational agency and the intention with regard to the consequences of the act; Hume, 2000, on reason as a calculating agent). According to Weber, determination of action in affectual or traditional terms is incompatible with the instrumentally rational action although he held that value-rational action may be related to instrumentally rational action in different ways as in the case of those actions in which the value-rational manner determines the choice between alternative and conflicting ends and results, making the action instrumentally rational only in terms of the choice of means. Another example is the action in which the person decides in order of urgency for the satisfaction of his/her needs; simply taking the alternative and conflicting ends as given subjective wants and arranging them in a scale of consciously assessed relative urgency rather than deciding between those ends in terms of a ‘rational’ orientation to a system of values. However, from the standpoint of the instrumental rationality, value-rational action is always irrational while “the more the value to which action is oriented is elevated to the status of an absolute value, the more ‘irrational’ in this sense corresponding the action is” (p. 26).

Although Weber's account of action types are quite helpful in distinguishing particular types of action, in practice, it is quite difficult to draw the boundaries between instrumental rationality and value rationality, since an action mainly driven by values of 'duty' or 'honor' may pass through an assessment of alternative ends and possible consequences in addition to the appropriate means in a conscious and/or unconscious manner and come into effect as a resultant of what Weber calls instrumental rationality, value rationality, emotions, and traditions/habits. Actually, Weber was well aware of this intermixed character of social action and, as was mentioned above, he conceded that it is almost impossible to find concrete cases of social action oriented in purely one of those ways, while he also underlined that the formulation and classification of the modes of orientation of action do not exhaust the possibilities of the field, but are useful for purposes of sociological investigation.²⁰

In this section, two 'reason types' will be elaborated for understanding, at least in part, why capitalism still prevails and which micro-level factors are in effect for the 'capitalist hold of state power'. These are 'physical rationality' and 'emotional rationality', which are treated as among the major reasons for understanding why sometimes people give their consent to be exploited and dominated; why sometimes they stay still but not give their consent; and why sometimes they rebel. Although there is no claim that only these two reasons exist as basic types of rationality, here, they are held to be important factors underlying social action. As was mentioned in the previous section, all rationality types can be subsumed under the 'reason of being', which can be considered as a processor of the physical, emotional, and cognitive interests of the being, all of which are somehow linked to the neuro-physical structure of the person. Since the compartmentalization of sciences do not allow integrating the analysis of neuro-physical aspects to the present analysis, in this

²⁰ For example, having developed Weber's distinction between instrumental rationality and value-rationality (that is, in Raymond Boudon's translation, 'axiological rationality'), Boudon directed considerable criticisms towards Rational Choice Model that argues "that human action should be analyzed as guided by the principle of maximizing the difference between benefits and costs to the subject of alternative lines of action –in other words, choosing the action with maximum expected utility" (Boudon, 2000, p. 24). However, although he severely criticized the utilitarian notion of rationality and proposed a Cognitive Model of Rationality for explaining the social mechanisms without black boxes, his insistence on methodological individualism seems to render his approach reductionist. Meanwhile, in the theories of 'bounded rationality'; that is those "theories that incorporate constraints on the information-processing capacities of the actor" (Simon, 2000, p. 6), the cognitive framework is also considered to be an important factor for making choices.

thesis, the assumed motives and reasons will inevitably have an axiomatic character. In this respect, physical rationality that refers to conscious and/or unconscious calculation for 'physical survival and health' is assumed to be a basic (but not always primary) type of rationality (cf. hierarchy of needs in Maslow, 1970), the components of which internally and externally confront with contradictory reasons. As for 'internal contradiction', the example of 'a worker who has cancer on account of not using gloves as he works with chemicals because he feels uncomfortable for his hands sweat' reflects the internal contradiction between long-term physical rationality and short-term physical rationality, where the latter becomes irrational from the former standpoint (the classical utilitarian short-term/long-term dilemma). As for 'external contradiction', any sub-orientation/reason of emotional rationality challenging physical survival or health can be given as an example as in the case of 'a person preferring to kill himself because he finds physical survival simply meaningless (which can be interpreted as an outcome of boredom)' or 'because he thinks that would be in the interest of his community (for example a suicide bomber with the motive of 'duty' and 'honor')'. Now then, it is apparent that there is no claim that physical rationality can never be challenged and that physical survival is a non-contradictory homogeneous instinct. On the contrary, physical rationality is composed of multi-reasons (each with multi-sources, orientations, and dimensions) with the potential to simultaneously or consecutively contradict one another. But still, it is held to be a basic type of rationality which has implications for motives pushing the person to both obedience and rebellion.

In this respect, Len Doyal's philosophical derivation of physical survival and health as human needs is worth mentioning. According to him:

Without physical survival, individuals can clearly do nothing whatever. Reduced physical health disables social participation hindering the scope of action and interaction. The specific ways in which this can occur are described by the physical consequences of diseases catalogued by the biomedical model. Those suffering from severe heart disease, for example, are objectively more impaired in social participation than those who are not. It is from this fact that the necessity of physical survival and health as basic human needs is philosophically derived. (Doyal, 1993, p. 115)

Nevertheless, physical rationality does not have an absolute privilege over other reasons. Although physical rationality is attributed a general (but not absolute) priority, as long as human beings are at the same time emotional creatures, emotional rationality –comprising such sources as feelings of aversion, hate, anger, serenity, revenge, compassion, love, and power- can become the major reason of a particular action while the conscious and/or unconscious calculation of the mind may be oriented towards the reduction of stress, experience of pleasure, or escape from pain. It is apparent that, emotions and rationality should not be theorized on opposite poles (cf. Hume, 2000; Weber, 1978a). Needless to say, components of emotional rationality are internally and externally open to contradictions and challenges in a simultaneous and/or consecutive manner. Not only physical rationality, but also emotional rationality is important to understand obedience and rebellion. Nevertheless, since this is a dissertation not in philosophy, but in sociology, for the moment, acknowledgment of the presence of physical and emotional rationalities seems to be sufficient to continue the process of construction.

2.3.2 On Class Analysis, Class Interests and Class Struggles

Today, mainstream academic circles tend to discard the concept ‘social classes’, and instead, replace it by groups, individuals, and divided personalities. In contrast to the years of Cold War, those interested in class analysis seem to suffer a considerable decrease in number even in the dissenter camp. The collapse of former (once)worker states has created a state of disappointment and helplessness among the exploited and oppressed, discarding the possibility of a classless world as a feasible project among the alternatives, although this state of mind has recently been challenged by the rise of socialist movements in a number of Latin American countries including Brazil, Argentine, Venezuela, and Bolivia. Besides, workers’ mobilizations and resistances against privatizations, decline in wages, and the so-called flexibilization of the labor law continue to take place in several countries. Therefore, the question of analyzing these events remains on the agenda. But, here, the question is, with which analytical concepts should these events be analyzed? Are these actions performed by predominantly the members of the nonexistent classes (classless or *déclassé* people), by the members of classes that do not have any structural conflict with the capitalist class, or by those individuals with a plurality of identities among which the working

class identity is only an ordinary one? In the present thesis, the answers of such questions are mainly (if not unconditionally) negative.

Although Marx and Engels did not form a coherent theory of social classes and the meanings attributed to the concepts shifted from one text to another as in the case of the concept 'middle class' or 'proletariat', this thesis holds a similar position to certain Marx and Engels texts for conceptualizing social classes with reference to the polar structural position (loaded with some degree of structural antagonism regardless of some possible coinciding interests) as a subset of the set of locations occupied in the production process, exploitation, and ownership of means of production. As a matter of fact, the majority of those making the analysis with reference to social classes are generally influenced by Karl Marx and/or Max Weber. As for those making the analysis with reference to the ownership of means of production (e.g. Mandel, 1982; 1991), production of use-value (e.g. Poulantzas, 1975b), or process of proletarianization (e.g. Braverman, 1974), they can all be considered as influenced by various points (not necessarily identical points) in classical Marx and Engels texts (e.g. Marx, 1857; 1867). As for those defining the concept of class in terms of authority relations (e.g. Dahrendorf, 1965; though not without any Marxist influence) or lifestyle and market positions (e.g. Goldthorpe, 1979; 1987; 1988), they can be considered as belonging to mainly the Weberian tradition (see capitalism, social classes, and status groups in Weber, 1958; 1978a, 1978b). There are also combinations of Marxist and Weberian approaches inserting the 'control' of means of production, of production process, and/or 'domination' in the production process into a Marxist framework of analysis rising on the basis of 'ownership' of means of production and 'exploitation' in production process (e.g. Callinicos & Harman, 1994; Wright, 1982; 1984; cf. 1989).

It is apparent that meanings attributed to 'social classes' vary from one theoretical standpoint to another. Although the modes of defining the 'working class' and 'capitalist class' do not necessarily end in a particular way of conceptualizing the state power and state character/type; in several instances those modes do constitute important bricks of the theoretical wall. Therefore, the approach to social classes becomes among foundational conceptualizations shaped by the interest of the theorist. In escape from any 'conceptual fetishism', and with the acknowledgment that it is

possible to define social classes in miscellaneous ways, only for the purpose of differentiating certain domination and exploitation relations shared by a considerable number of people from others as regards the distance to private/collective ownership of means of production and the antagonistic conditioning on account of their structural bipolar locations in the production process, the position adopted here can be considered as mainly (if not exclusively) in the Marxist terrain.

Here, the *precondition* of ‘class relationship’ is conceptualized as the exploitation relationship between the exploiter and the exploited at the instance of production where the means of production is *owned* not by the exploited, but by the exploiter who at the same time appropriates some part of the output (goods/services) produced by the exploited (cf. Poulantzas, 1975a; 1975b). The approach of the present thesis holds that ‘class’ is an analytical category useful for analyzing the nature of production relations and power relations only in some part, conceding that there are, in fact, miscellaneous types of economic positions and power relations denoting inequality and oppression other than those that can be explained by ‘class categories’ conceptualized here, since a non-class member can be even poorer than the exploited class member and a non-class power relation may be even more oppressive than the oppression of the exploited class member. However, if the category of ‘class’ is reduced to all economic positions or power relations, it loses all its analytical power, making the analysis of at least a few of the macro aspects of the production and power relations along with the *structurally antagonistic economic interests* (this has also to do with the content of the demands to be formulated for mobilizing the exploited class members against exploitation) impossible. Then, if the status of self-employed is to be addressed as ‘class’, the status of wage-worker in relative (if not absolute²¹) structural antagonism to the capitalist should not be addressed as ‘class’, which may assume any name other than the class. In the present thesis, it is held that, the set of production relations locations includes several subsets, some of which have intersection fields with each other. Those positions denoted with the term ‘class’ constitutes only one subset of the broader set of production relations locations, while the latter includes further positions such as the self-employed and rentiers among others.

²¹ Not absolute, because sometimes their structural interests may coincide.

In the present thesis, it is held that a link does exist between the ‘potential capacity of the capitalist category/class’ and ‘political projects favoring capitalist mode of production’; and a link does exist between ‘the potential capacity of the wage-worker category/class’ and several ‘political projects of abolishing capitalism’. It is also held that the working class is *structurally* located in antagonism to the capitalist class (cf. Jessop, 1990; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985), with the acknowledgment that their interests may also sometimes coincide in capitalist mode of production (whether the dominant mode or not) where production means is owned by the capitalist whose main source of profit is the unpaid part of wage-worker’s labor (cf. Balibar, 1977).

This definition implies that those property owners who do not occupy structurally polar locations in the production process as against the worker may be considered as the elements of the broader ‘category’ of capitalist, but *not* as the elements of the capitalist ‘class’. In this respect, those, for example, who are *pure rentiers*,²² not exploiting wage-worker labor for profits in the means of production they own, whether rich or not, do not denote a class position in this thesis’ terminology, as in the case of richer or poorer self-employed that do not denote class positions given that even a self-employed can be richer than a capitalist class element. Here, both the *appropriation* of a part of the goods/services produced by the laborer in the *production process* and the *de facto ownership of means of that production* are treated as the prerequisites of the category of ‘exploiter class’, while the *de facto ownership* here refers to the actual control over what to do with the means of production on such issues as who to give or sell them, which is distinct from the *de jure ownership*. For example if a dependent peasant’s product is in part appropriated by the landlord in the tax form as the landlord owns the land or has determinant control over the decisions of the peasant as regards what to do with the land, then, here, that peasant is considered as a class member, while if that peasant has the possession of the land and has the power to decide about what to do with the land (give, sell, burn, whatsoever), here, that peasant is considered as a member of the ‘exploited peasant category’, but not ‘class’ (cf. Balibar, 1977; Poulantzas, 1975a).

The distinction made here is useful not only because certain exploiting class members may appoint particular individuals as the legal owners of their means of production

²² For a discussion on rent and monopoly, see Wallerstein (1988).

for purposes of tax reductions or escape from other legal sanctions (as several Mafiosi do), but also for distinguishing the class status of the executives and ordinary wage-(including the salaried-)workers in state positions (including state enterprises) from those in non-state sectors. Since the class character of state elements can give rise to further questions as regards how to theorize the state (e.g. the Poulantzas-Miliband debate; or the debate on the class character of bureaucracy in ex-Soviet Union²³), the approach to ‘capitalist class’ and ‘working class’ has to be clarified in any theoretical work on ‘the capitalist state’.

The concept ‘bourgeoisie’, to which a number of different meanings have been attributed in relation to its members’ world view, life-style, social origin, and location in the production process,²⁴ is, here, used as synonymous to ‘capitalist class’, regardless of the word ‘bourgeoisie’s etymological and other associated meanings. In the thesis, the working class and capitalist class are defined in terms of their location in the production process vis-à-vis each other. As for the capitalist class, its members own the means of production while the unpaid part of the labor of the wage-worker is a major source of their profit. As for the capitalists’ (whether as a member of the ‘capitalist *class*’ in particular or the ‘*category* of capitalist’ in general) tendential (not fixed, absolute, or unchallenged) common point on account of their structural location in the economy, it covers both their anti-anti-capitalist motive (including anti-communist motives) and their motive of securing the profit. Yet, apparently, the capitalist class is far from being a homogeneous entity in spite of the characteristics, structural constraints, and motivations its members share. Therefore, several Marxists have given reference to the presence of various fractions of the capitalist class in their analyses (e.g. Aglietta, 1987; Jessop, 1990; Poulantzas, 1975a; 1975b; 2000). However, especially Miliband (1969) –whose approach on the analysis of the capitalist state comprises extremely important clues for the present thesis approach– preferred to put the emphasis on the cohesion of the capitalist class rather than the differences, perhaps because, as Jessop (1990) argued, his writings were principally

²³ For different theoretical standpoints on the class character of the bureaucracy in the Soviet Union, see Cliff (1955) on state capitalism; Grant (1949) on Bonapartist proletarian state; Mandel (1982), Moreno (1998), Trotsky (1936; 1942) on worker states; Wright (1984) on state bureaucratic socialism.

²⁴ For a critical evaluation of the concept ‘bourgeoisie’, see Wallerstein (1988); Poulantzas (1967).

against the distortions and mystifications of the pluralist approach (pp. 29, 30). However, it would be unjust to consider Miliband as claiming an absolute homogeneity of the capitalist class. It is true that, according to Miliband (1969) “(s)pecific differences among dominant classes ... are safely contained within a particular ideological spectrum, and do not preclude a basic political consensus in regard to the crucial issues of economic and political life” (p. 46) while the economic elites in a capitalist society constitute “a dominant economic class, possessed of a high degree of cohesion and solidarity, with common interests and common purposes which far transcend their specific differences and disagreements” (p. 48).

However, here, for analytical purposes, a distinction is to be made between the short-term and long-term interests of class members;²⁵ while although there may be also individual long-term interests,²⁶ when long-term interests are mentioned in the thesis, it refers to the collective long-term interests. As for collective long-term class interests, this category refers to those interests of the class members in abolishing or restoring a mode of production in line with their relatively collective long-term *economic* interests, giving rise to class conflict/struggles on long-term interest basis. As for short-term class interests, here, this category refers to those interests that favor any possible combination of elements of a particular class/category in terms of increasing the share from production at the expense of the interests of particular members of the same or different class/category without an intention to restore or abolish the mode of production they are in (that includes harming particular class’ elements’ individual economic interests or survival). In the light of the distinction between short-term and collective long-term interests of a particular class, now, Miliband’s point that holds that ‘capitalist class members tend to unite on crucial issues of economic and political life in spite of their specific differences and

²⁵ Meanwhile, this short-term and long-term distinction is made purely for analytical purposes and for classifying class struggles as regards different sources of conflict. There are times when realization of short-term interests requires steps for realizing long-term interests. And that is why the wage-worker category is considered to be a privileged one as regards the project of expropriating the means of production. Therefore, the distinction made between short-term and long-term interests in no way means to defend a distinction between minimum and maximum programs. On the contrary, this distinction is made in conformity with Trotsky’s proposal of a transition program (Trotsky, 1938) and the strategy of permanent revolution (Trotsky, 1931).

²⁶ For example, becoming a richer capitalist may be in the interest of an individual wage-worker.

disagreements' can be better understood, since his assertion does not exclude the presence of within class struggles, which is here conceptualized with reference to short-term interests.

As for within class struggles, they may take the form of either clash of short-term interests or clash of short and collective long-term interests, while the latter case may be called 'term-relevant' within class struggles. As for antagonistic class struggles, they may take the form of both short-term and collective long-term interest conflicts. Besides, there may be also struggles between non-antagonistic social classes on again short-term and collective long-term basis. Meanwhile, what makes a struggle class struggle is the fight for interests of class members due to their structural location in the production process rather than the presence of class members in the fight. Another point is that, when 'class struggle' is referred to here, it covers those in the wider 'category' to which a particular class belongs. For example, the 'working class struggle' refers to the struggle concerning the interests of the 'wage-worker category' while the 'capitalist class struggle' refers to the struggle concerning the interests of the 'capital-holder category'. The difference of 'category' and 'class' is elaborated in the following lines.

As for the working class' and capitalist class' antagonistic interests (which does not mean to claim that their interests never coincide), it is necessary to make it clear what is meant by these classes. First working class is going to be defined with reference to its structurally antagonistic position as against the structural being of the 'capitalist class'. As for the working class, as was argued before, there are already a variety of different analytical standpoints concerning its scope (e.g. Braverman, 1974; Callinicos & Harman, 1994; Dahrendorf, 1965; Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992; Goldthorpe, 1979; 1987; Poulantzas, 1975b; Wright, 1984; 1989) which are conceptualized in parallel to the theoretical interests of each author. Here, again for analyzing the character of class struggles, class alliances, class capacity, and state elements' class character; the preferred conceptualization method is to draw the boundaries of the relevant concept as much as possible with the purpose of decreasing the vagueness in the meaning and increasing the analytical power of the concept. Therefore, in the present thesis, the *category* of 'wage-worker' signifies only 'those producing goods or services, deprived of the ownership of means of production they

work with, who, more or less regularly, have to sell their labor power in return for the wage promised or received, predominantly on account of economic coercion' (cf. Mandel, 1991, pp. 38, 40). The wage-worker *category* is referred to as 'working class', in case the means of production that the worker works with is owned by the capitalist. In case the ownership belongs to the state or the workers of the enterprise, here, those workers are considered as belonging to the 'wage-worker category', not 'class' unless particular individuals or groups of people vis-à-vis wage-workers' polar side do not turn their control over the means of production (in/with which the considered wage-workers work) into a regular source of private income/privileges through exploiting the workers' labor, in other words, appropriating a part of the output (or a part of the return to the output) produced by the wage worker on a regular basis. If the latter case is considered, then, both those wage-workers whose labor is exploited for private gain and their exploiters can be subsumed under 'classes'.

This conceptualization implies that with the expropriation of means of production, the category of 'wage-worker' may not automatically fade away, while expropriation of means of production is considered among the pre-requisites if not the mere condition of eradicating the status of 'wage-worker class/category' in a collective manner. In the present thesis, eradicating the status of 'working class' in a collective manner in a way with lesser (includes zero) degree of exploitation is encoded as the working class' long-term collective interests.²⁷ Meanwhile, in the thesis, there is no assertion that there is no possibility for a wage-worker to eradicate her status of wage-worker in a way to be better off in economic terms (in its narrow sense) without the expropriation of means of production. Actually she can do that if she can find the opportunity to be a well-off self-employed or exploiting class element, although this does not invalidate the presence of some collective working class interests which is in antagonism with both short and long-term interests of the capitalist class. As for the antagonistic class struggles between the capitalist class and working class forces on short-term basis, it mainly takes the form of struggle for taking more shares from the output (goods/services) produced by the worker in the course of the production process (denoting a structural antagonism) or redistribution process (subsumed under

²⁷ As stated before, when long-term interests are mentioned, it is used as synonymous to long-term *collective* interests, while it has been also acknowledged that, in some cases, there might be also individual long-term interests.

the struggle among a variety of positions occupied by class members, segments, and non-class categories).

Before elaborating on the theoretical standpoint of the thesis on the ‘state’ and ‘state power’ in Chapter 3, another issue is to be made clear here. It is that, in the present thesis, neither democracy nor the separation of the capitalist class and top state ranks is seen as the essential feature of capitalist state. Since it had been possible for the ‘slave state’ to assume forms of both limited democracies (denoting an amalgam of steering positions of the state and exploiting class elements) and monarchies/oligarchies/dictatorships (denoting an externality vis-à-vis the dominant exploiting class elements except from a few), today, there is no reason to identify capitalist state with forms of democratic regime and treat such regimes as fascism, military dictatorship, or monarchy as pathological (exceptional) or transitory forms of capitalist state, whether the incumbents of top state (armed/non-armed) positions are exclusively colonized by capitalists or not (cf. Poulantzas, 1975; 2000, esp. p. 28; Jessop, 1990, esp. p. 43). Representative democratic form has been a historically specific instance of class struggles especially in the West coinciding with the development of capitalism,²⁸ meaning that democratic regimes in capitalist societies may be replaced by other forms even on long-term basis as long as consent of the masses is not essentialized as the prerequisite of (capitalist) class rule.

Meanwhile, with the precaution that the following statement is not held as an essential characteristic of the bourgeoisie, it must be stated that, today, many capitalists do not hold the direct command of armed forces (in the thesis, they will be called conventional capitalists/bourgeoisie) in several capitalist societies. Yet, this state of being non-armed (at least the lack of direct command) cannot be generalized to all capital holders while there is a rising exploiting class, deriving revenues mainly by its direct command of armed forces, which has entered also in capitalist production (production for markets exploiting the labor of wage-workers working under mainly economic coercion). Since these exploiting class elements have a substantial share in the economic domain and their considerable power has implications (negative and positive) for the capitalist hold of state power, they will be briefly evaluated in a

²⁸ Although with different trajectories. For an evaluation of different paths of development of democracy in West, see Therborn (1977).

separate section; given that several Marxist analyses of the capitalist state have largely overlooked the presence of this powerful exploiting class, the Mafioso capitalists, if not the class struggles (e.g. Blanke, Jürgens, & Kastendiek, 1979; Hirsch 1979; Jessop, 1990; Miliband, 1969, except from p. 19; 1988; Offe, 1993; 1996; Poulantzas, 1975a; 2000).

2.3.2.1 Mafioso (Capitalist) Lords/Madams

There has been a sweeping analytical interest in illicit business especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Several authors directed their interest to Russia, especially following the implementation of Jeffrey Sachs's shock therapy there.²⁹ Whether the chaos and poverty was attributed to mainly (if not exclusively) the transition to market economy (e.g. Burawoy, 1999; Gowan, 1995; Holmstrom & Smith, 2000) or the so-called 'red legacy' of the 'communist regime' (e.g. Anderson, 1995; Dempsey & Lukas, 1998), there has been a consensus on the substantial share of the illicit business in the post-collapse Russian economic and social life. Inspired by the chapter on 'primitive accumulation' in *Capital Volume One* (Marx, 1867),³⁰ Holmstrom and Smith (2000) associated this process with 'primitive accumulation', calling it 'gangster capitalism'; as a necessary phase for transition to capitalism.³¹

²⁹ Jeffrey Sachs's 'shock therapy' is best summarized in his 'What is to be done?' (Sachs, 1990), in which he argued for the necessity of rapid transition to private ownership and market system in Eastern Europe.

³⁰ For an evaluation of 'primitive accumulation' with reference to the progressive understanding of history and the theme of sacrifice of the innocents in Marx and Engels texts, see Jeffrey Vogel's (1996) 'The Tragedy of History'.

³¹ Meanwhile, although in a different context, an interesting argument seeing 'primitive accumulation' not as a phase of transition to capitalism, but as a permanent aspect of it is made by Samir Amin (2000). According to him, while the transition to the mercantilist or first phase of capitalism can be analyzed in terms of what Marx called primitive accumulation "characterized by the violent dispossession of producers ... necessary for the creation of 'free' labor force" (p. 617) (a part of proletarianization), in the second phase of capitalism, with the rise of oligopolies, unequal exchange became one of the main forms of the permanent primitive accumulation (p. 618). Meanwhile, according to Amin, the third phase of capitalism is characterized by the "ongoing scientific and technological revolution, computerization and robotics, decentralization of productive systems ..., tertiarisation and quarterisation of economic life and the decline of industrial manufacturing" (p. 618). Interestingly Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri also made a similar point with Amin, on the growth of information technologies, but this time, associating this process with 'primitive accumulation'. According to Hardt and Negri (2000), informational accumulation plays a central role in the process of

Reminding the presence of mafioso capitalists, Holmstrom and Smith concluded that Sachs's program has had considerable responsibility for the creation of the criminal capitalists, while the privatization process in Russia was drafted essentially criminally by the underground mafiosa, the nomenklatura, top managers of certain industries, and segments of the intelligentsia. As for Burawoy (1999), having reconstructed Karl Polanyi's argument in *The Great Transformation*, he analyzed the destructive consequences of market economy in Russia, calling the process in effect 'economic involution'. Rather than seeing the process as a stage of transition to further industrialization, he called the attention to the return to barter economy and de-industrialization process in Russia, which according to him, implies a future possibility of neo-feudalism. According to him; the Russian case of "*primitive disaccumulation* will turn out to have been no less destructive than original *primitive accumulation*" (p. 9). As for those liberal arguments attributing the chaotic atmosphere in Russia to the legacy of 'red' bureaucratic control rather than the market economy; the solution they propose revolve around the so-called 'liberal governance' with the tasks of 'prevention of harm and the protection of property rights' (Dempsey & Lukas, 1998) or the 'rule of law' and 'reducing the illegal markets produced by the communist economy' (Anderson, 1995).

Regardless of different approaches evaluating the process in ex-Eastern Bloc countries of the post-Cold War era, the growing wealth and strength of Mafioso capitalists give the impression that the Mafioso mode of production is likely to last longer than anticipated by several Marxist and liberal academicians who, whether in this or that way, see the stage in temporary, rather than relatively permanent terms. As a matter of fact, the substantial Mafioso power, (as will be discussed below) which is in no way restricted to the ex-Eastern Bloc, makes one think that there is a considerable probability that the next stage the human race will face will be commemorated by the brutal mafia practices. Although what comes next will most probably depend on the course of struggles (in case the human race does not come to an end due to nuclear, environmental, or any other possible disaster), there is no reason to be optimistic about the future unless the growing destructive capacity of the power holders is destroyed. Now, although in the coming chapters the Mafia mode of

'postmodern primitive accumulation' while "(a)s we pass from modernity to postmodernity, the process of primitive accumulation do indeed continue" (p. 258).

production is not elaborated in depth, but only given reference to as a threat against which the conventional capitalist sectors try to take measures via state power, since such practices are thought to be among the signs of prospective bigger conflicts, the growing power of the Mafiosi will be briefly considered below, with cases and numbers from different parts of the world.

To begin with, it should be made clear that; profit, in capitalist societies, is not always derived from legal businesses, while economic activity does not necessarily have an ethically positive content; meaning that the production and consumption of a good or service may challenge the mainstream norms although it may be at the utility of even a single individual's temporary/permanent 'unethical' need/desire. Those, who produce, transport, or sell illegal services or goods can also make profits from those activities, the extent of which have already been considered especially by those who study the so-called 'informal economy'. In certain instances, the illegal characteristic of the goods/services can make the profit bigger than the case that particular good/service were legal. For example, the price of producing, transporting, or selling of heroin would have been much lower if heroin were a legal product. This type of business makes up a huge part of the world economy. An important number of entrepreneurs are engaged in this kind of illicit business.³² For example the main source of the unofficial revenue of Afghanistan -a big opium producer country- is the drugs trade (Goodhand, 2000, p. 267). Besides, Russian organized crime is estimated to control around fifty percent of the Russian economy (Jamieson, 2001, p. 381; Lindberg, Petrenko, Gladden, & Johnson, 1998a, p. 240). A United Nations report in

³² Certain authors (for example Donais, 2003, p. 372; Lindberg, Petrenko, Gladden, & Johnson, 1998a, pp. 223, 224; Shelley & Picarelli, 2002, p. 308) prefer to call the legal business as legitimate business implying the illicit business is illegitimate business. Similarly, Granville (2003) makes a comparison and suggests that the Russian billionaire 'oligarchs' and the 19th century American 'robber barons' are no way like each other as the former "made fortunes not by creating new enterprises that increased their country's wealth, as did Carnegie (steel), Rockefeller (oil), Ford (automobiles), and Morgan (finance)" (p. 324). However, conceptualizing the legal business as legitimate business may result in seeing the profit not as a type of exploitation of labor (thus, illegitimate), but as the rightful gain of capital. Thus, in this thesis; the concept of 'illicit business' will be used to address the 'criminalized business'. On the other hand, defining the illicit business is not much easy. Actually, an important number of capitalists violate the labor law, occupational health and safety regulations, commercial law, and tax law during the production process and become a part of the informal economy. Their activities are partially illegal. However, what is meant by 'illicit business' is the business of producing, transporting, or selling the illegal goods or services rather than the illegal procedures followed in the production, transportation, or sale of the legal goods or services.

1995 estimated that about 3 million organized criminals were employed in about 5,700 gangs in Russia (Shvarts, 2003, p. 376). As for only one gambling racket in Chicago, New York and Houston in the US, its illegal profits were estimated to be around \$11.5 million between 1974 and 1990 (Lindberg et al., 1998a, p. 223). Actually, crime rates have increased dramatically in many countries between 1985 and 1998 such as Estonia, Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania in Eastern Europe; and Belgium, Italy, Greece, Norway, and the United Kingdom in Western Europe (see the tables in Lotspeich, 2003, pp. 73, 76).

Illicit business occupies an important part of the world economy. Those who are engaged in this sort of business can be organized or not. For example if a person steals something on his/her own in an unorganized fashion, then this is his/her own illegal individual business just like the individual street vendor's legal individual business. If this action is planned and/or carried out by a group of people in an organized manner, this refers to illegal organized business just like the legal business of organized street vendors. This may be also called as organized crime.³³ Organized crime covers such activities as illegal gambling, prostitution, pornography, narcotics, racketeering and extortion, public corruption, auto theft, financial and document frauds, smuggling, money laundering, and contract killings. The organized criminal groups have entered even in the healthcare industry and stock manipulation. Thus, the organized crime sector amounts to billions of dollars. As Jamieson (2001) suggests on the basis of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) figures "around one billion dollars of crime proceeds are transferred through the world's financial markets every day –between \$300 and \$500 billion each year" (p. 379).

As for the Mafioso (capitalist) lords/madams, their activities should be mainly (but not exclusively) evaluated as regards this illegal organized business (while all exploiting class members engaged in this illegal organized business cannot be considered as Mafioso (capitalist) class elements, since several of them must be considered as elements of the conventional bourgeoisie, deprived of the direct command of armed forces). The major distinguishing feature of the Mafioso

³³ For the definitions of organized crime see Lindberg et al. (1998b, p. 48); Donais (2003, p. 364); Rush and Scarpitti (2001, p. 529). Also see Dishman (2001, p. 45); Jamieson (2001, pp. 378, 379); and Shelley and Picarelli (2002, p. 306) for a comparison between organized crime (specifically the transnational criminal organizations) and terrorism.

(capitalist) lords/madams is their command of armed force. Although organized crime is generally accompanied by armed force, armed force is not the prerequisite of all organized criminal activities. For example, smuggling can be done in an organized manner without the hold of any arms. However, the Mafioso (capitalist) lord/madam does command armed forces. Direct command of armed forces is the essential feature of a Mafioso group. Just like many lords of the feudal era, there might be a hierarchy of wealth and power in a Mafioso group, with the acknowledgment that several mafia groups run their business in an autonomous fashion. Again, just like the serfs of the feudal era, the carriers of the illicit business –such as the workers in a heroin factory, or the transporters or the street sellers of heroin- are the laborers of this illegal activity.³⁴

Actually, many Mafioso lords/madams resemble bourgeoisie for they generally attempt to sell-barter the goods/services produced by the laborers they exploit in the market.³⁵ However, there are also several differences, which makes one think that those differences may be the indicator of the presence of a distinct (if not everywhere the dominant) mode of production. First of all, the Mafioso lords/madams widely use violently forced or semi-forced labor during the production process. Actually, it is not as easy for a laborer employed in a mafia business to quit the job as it is for a worker employed in a conventional capitalist business. While the former is under the threat of even being killed in case he/she quits the job or tells the police what is going on, the latter works principally on account of the economic coercion rather than threat of physical violence (this resembles not only the exploitation terms of the serfs but also slaves). Secondly, the Mafioso lord/madam is the commander of an armed group just

³⁴ Although just like the wage-workers which are considered both as a category and as a class subsumed under that category, all laborers (the concept ‘laborer’ should not be attributed an essentially positive meaning) of the mafia business are not evaluated as a part of the mafia laborer class. However, rather than subsuming them under a vague category of ‘lumpen proletariat’ (see Marx, 1846; 1852) or ‘underclass’ –whether defined in terms of structural or behaviorist terms- which denotes a category mainly rising on the basis of ‘poverty’ in addition to ‘exclusion’, ‘unethical way of life’, or ‘lack of integration’, mafioso laborers should be treated as a distinct category/class without making any theoretical discrimination on account of the ‘unethical’ content of their job. For an evaluation of the concept and debates on ‘underclass’; see especially Gans (1996); Mingione (1996); Morris (1996).

³⁵ Meanwhile although capitalists aim to sell-barter the goods/services produced by the wage-worker in the market; all of those exploiting elements orienting the production (the means of which they own) towards exchange in the market are here not considered as capitalists (cf. Wallerstein, 1979).

like those feudal lords/madams commanding their own army. Whereas the conventional bourgeoisie does not make profits via using (or using the threat of) armed forces that they directly command in a way to move beyond legal rules (in this case all owners of legal ‘security’ companies are not considered as Mafioso (capitalist) lords/madams), the Mafioso (capitalist) lords/madams privately own and/or directly command armed groups, which become the major source of their revenues. That is why the conventional bourgeoisie has to seek strategies to control the state’s armed power not only against possible worker or anti-capitalist rebellions but also against the directly armed elements of the society.

For those exploited laborers of the Mafioso business, a proper name denoting the core of their exploitation terms can be ‘violently forced laborer’; meaning that she works *not* on account of *mainly* economic coercion in the Mafioso business *but because* otherwise she (or those whom she cares about) would be physically wounded or killed by Mafioso forces.³⁶ However, the members of the Mafioso (capitalist) lord/madam class/category seem to resort to several exploitation terms; for example, provided that the Mafiosi is the *owner* of the means of production (for example a brothel, whether that brothel is legal or illegal, meaning that even if the Mafioso enters in legal business the exploitation terms may still be that of the Mafioso mode) and the laborers (or those people whom the laborers care about) are *physically threatened* by the Mafiosi’s forces to make those laborers work in the enterprise; (i) if the Mafiosi appropriates the whole revenue and then returns back a part without any pre-fixed terms, the exploited laborers of the production process can be considered as slaves (as in the case of slaves of antique *civilizations*); (ii) if the Mafiosi appropriates a pre-determined amount of the revenue at the end of the production process (for example 30 percent of the day’s revenue), the laborers of the job can be considered as serfs (but different than the feudal mode of production of the Middle Ages in the sense that the production process³⁷ in the Mafioso business is today oriented mainly towards the

³⁶ With the acknowledgment that the wage-worker in antagonism to the capitalist also sometimes, but not mainly, work under direct physical threat as in the case of several workers who were forced to return back to their workplaces due to the armed threat of state forces subsequent to the September 12th military takeover in the early 1980s Turkey.

³⁷ Although production process is mainly oriented towards the market in the contemporary Mafioso business, there are also Mafioso strategies for accumulating wealth without being

market, and the taxes collected are not in kind, but in money; but similar to feudal mode of production in another way, as sometimes the laborers are forced to serve the exploiter without receiving any money as in the case of the forced labor in feudal lord's estate); (iii) if the Mafiosi appropriates the whole revenue and then returns back a part in the wage form (for example 1 lira to the laborer everyday and/or premiums in terms of piecework), the laborers of the job can be considered as dependent wage-workers (dependent, in the sense that, they are physically forced to stay in the enterprise, and different than those wage-workers exploited by the capitalist who sell their labor-power mainly on account of *economic coercion*; meaning that, those who sell their labor-power for wages mainly on account of *economic coercion* in a brothel have to be evaluated as wage-workers; while if the laborer works on his own, then that is to be considered in the self-employed status). These features listed above illustrate few of the possible forms the Mafioso mode of production can assume.

Although the Mafiosi's major source of wealth is the production of illegal goods and services under the protective umbrella of their armed gang, she/he can also make investments in the legal sectors and derive profits from the labor of the wage-worker under mainly economic coercion; which becomes a factor to evaluate them as a sector of the capitalist class when they do so since that denotes the amalgamation of two different but not structurally antagonistic class positions (with the acknowledgment that this fusion can denote a separate class formation). For example, today, the Sicilian and Calabrian mafia families are engaged in gaining public contracts (Paoli, 2004, p. 28). Another example is the organized criminal gangs that control or own 40,000 businesses including 2,000 in the state sector in Russia (Volkov, 1999, p. 747). Thus, as Jamieson (2001) illustrates, there are close ties between the illicit and legal businesses (p. 380). Shelley and Picarelli (2002) suggest it is "hard to detect where criminal funds end and the legitimate funds begin" (p. 308). Lindberg et al. (1998b) put forward two reasons of infiltration into the so-called legitimate business: Firstly, for the "investment of the vast resources it has accumulated" and secondly, as "a means to launder the profits from illegal activities" (p. 51). Consequently, the Mafioso (capitalist) lord/madam's power grows further via entering in legal businesses (and/or further illegal businesses) that do not require the direct command

engaged in any production (for example killing and taking the money of an individual) which recall Marx's conceptualization of primitive accumulation.

of armed forces, the source of profit of which is derived mainly by the wage-worker's unpaid labor in the production process who works mainly on account of *economic coercion* and is physically (if not economically) free to quit the job; making the class position occupied by such Mafioso (capitalist) lords/madams intersect with the class position occupied by the bourgeoisie; while in the present thesis the term 'Mafioso capitalist (or Mafioso bourgeoisie)' denotes that intersection point.

Meanwhile, new technologies also provide opportunities for increasing the wealth of the Mafioso (capitalist) lords/madam.³⁸ As Lindberg et al. (1998a) suggest, "(t)he growth of technology has enabled emerging organised crime to operate on a world-wide scale at a time when law enforcement agencies are under resourced, ill-equipped and staffed, and lacking in expertise" (p. 253). Especially the internet provides new opportunities for the organized criminal sectors.³⁹ About 1,800 internet gambling sites worldwide are estimated to generate a total of \$4.2 billion which also cover various illegal types of gambling and enable money laundering and fraud (Albanese, 2004, pp. 15, 16). Indeed, "(i)nternet-based businesses could make a perfect 'front' for moving money all around the world through phony transactions that are difficult to track and difficult to document" (Lindberg et al., 1998b, p. 52).

Just like the legal conventional bourgeoisie, the Mafioso (capitalist) lords/madams also have international links. Mafioso business also transcends the national boundaries. As Jamieson (2001) states there have been a number of partnerships and meetings between mafia groups from different nations. For example the formal agreements between the Colombian narcotics traffickers and Russian Mafia groups date back to 1988. Besides, the police and intelligence circles have found out a series of meetings between major criminal groups (with different countries of origin) in Warsaw (in 1991), Prague (in 1992), and Berlin (in 1993). Furthermore, in 1994, a meeting was organized between the representatives of the Italo American Gambino family, the Japanese Yakuza, and the Colombian, Russian, Chinese mafia bosses in France (pp. 380, 381). Therefore, it is apparent that international strategic alliances occur among Mafioso (capitalist) lords/madams.

³⁸ For the opportunities provided by the information technology, see Shelley and Picarelli (2002, pp. 309-311).

³⁹ For the computer crime and Russian mafia see Serio and Gorkin (2003).

As for Turkey, there are also considerable mafia activities which have come to the agenda with especially the scandals of the post-1990 era. Actually, the post-1980 political and economic atmosphere has provided a convenient setting for the growth of Mafioso groups in Turkey. In the first place, the armed conflict between PKK and Turkish state created a suitable environment for the illegal trafficking of weapons and narcotics. Besides, the neo-liberal economic policies increased the number of public contracts awarded, pushing some capitalists to resort to Mafioso power. Furthermore, the need for foreign exchange has also led certain chief exercisers of state power to overlook the Mafioso activities.⁴⁰ Therefore, the Mafioso power has grown stronger in the course of 1990s.

As for the Mafioso activities in contemporary Turkey, it is quite rich. A common type is the collection of money, checks and bonds by means of violence. This type of activity is mainly dominated by the *Ülkücüs* who were once a part of the anti-communist paramilitary forces having close relations with the police, but several of who were arrested subsequent to the September 12th military coup d'état in 1980. Another type is the threat or use of violence for awarding the contracts to the bidder employing the Mafiosi. Some politicians also take place within the contract Mafia. As for the purchase of certain lands via Mafioso power, similar methods are implemented. Protection rackets constitute another common activity. Mafioso gangs are organized even in prisons, the places under presumed strict state control and discipline. There are also widespread activities of illegal trade of human, uranium, antiques, weapons, and narcotics. The trafficking activities have international links while not only the Turkish mafia but also the Kurdish mafia has had a considerable market share (Bovenkerk & Yeşilgöz, 2000, pp. 47-96).

⁴⁰ Bovenkerk and Yeşilgöz (2000) point out an instance that very well fits this tendency. It is the Prime Minister Özal's visit to Shakalarchi, the worldwide master of money laundering, in 1989, in the Grand Dolder Hotel, Zurich, allegedly for persuading him to shift his activities to Turkey. It is reported that although Özal asked Shakalarchi whether he would like to be a Turkish citizen or not, his answer was 'no minister'. Except from this instance, Özal also forgave the economic crimes for once. This was interpreted as an activity for encouraging the investments for money laundering (pp. 94, 95). As for the estimates of the share of narcotics money distributed inside Turkey and the international links of narcotics trade over Turkey; see especially İnce (2002).

The Mafioso capital has grown so much that these groups have made huge investments in the legal economic sector. Although it is not easy to estimate the exact figures, an incident that reveals the extent of Mafioso capital is the *Türkbank* bidding process indicating that even a single mafia boss possesses the financial means sufficient to buy a bank. On the basis of the parliamentary, police, court, and telephone records, Şener (2004) explains the mafia, business and state relationship in this process as such: In the course of 1990s, some Mafiosi wanted to buy a bank that would help in monetary operations. In this respect, Alaattin Çakıcı, a very powerful mafia boss, got in touch with the businessperson Korkmaz Yiğit and supported him in the awarding process. This included threats and assassination plots against other bidders. Although MİT (the national intelligence organization) informed the Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz of the phone calls between Çakıcı and Yiğit and explained the State Minister Güneş Taner that Çakıcı had threatened Yiğit's rivals, the government took no measures. *Emniyet's* (police force) report sent to the Central Bank President Gazi Erçel did not set him into action, either. On August 4th, 1998, Korkmaz Yiğit won the bidding. However, short after the Republican People's Party MP Fikri Sağlar's presentation of the Çakıcı-Yiğit phone calls tape in a press conference on October 13th, 1998, the government fell.

The intricate relations between the chief exercisers of state power and Mafioso groups were best revealed in the incident known as the *Susurluk Scandal*. In Susurluk, a district of Balıkesir, a car crashed into a lorry on November 3, 1996 while three of the four traveling in the car died. A police chief (Hüseyin Kocadağ), a Mafiosi (Abdullah Çatlı with a fake identity card with *Mehmet Ağar's* real signature on it), Çatlı's girl friend (Gonca Us), and an MP from the True Path Party (Sedat Edip Bucak, the leader of a large tribe in South East Anatolia) were in the car. Only Bucak could survive. Subsequent to the crash, it was reported that registered and unregistered weapons were found in the car. Then, the MP and police chief's relationship with the Mafiosi who was accused of narcotics trafficking and murder of leftists has long been questioned. The photographs and documents printed and broadcasted in the media revealed further relations between Çatlı and chief exercisers of state power. However, the parliamentary commission for investigating the allegations made little progress on account of the difficulties in reaching certain documents. Besides, on December 8, 1997, the Reporter of the *Parliamentary Commissions for Imaginary Exportation*,

Perpetrator Unknown Political Killings, and Susurluk Investigation; Judge Akman Akyürek and on November 22, 1999, the *Parliamentary Commission for Susurluk Investigation* member, Virtue Party MP; Bedri İncetahtacı died of traffic accidents while Fikri Sağlar, the member of the same commission, declared that all commission members' lives were under serious threat.⁴¹

However, the story is much deeper than this. Eymür's Second MİT Report (in Ünlü, 2001a) gives an idea about the extent of these relations as it suggested that a special criminal team was established in *Emniyet* to fight against PKK and Dev-Sol, the organizations the state authorities consider as terrorist. The report claims that this team is mainly composed of former *Ülkücüs* who then got involved in threatening, racketeering, extortion, narcotics trafficking, and murders. The more crucial point in the report was the allegation that this team was directly linked to the Chief of Police Mehmet Ağar⁴² and was directed by the Consultant Chief of Police Korkut Eken.⁴³ The MİT report suggested that *Emniyet* provided police identity cards and green passports to this group while its members traveled to Germany, Holland, Belgium, Hungary, and Azerbaijan under the guise of 'fight against terrorism', but made narcotics trafficking. The report continued with details and further names (pp. 151-156). A number of other studies also indicated that the state's measures against the socialist and Kurdish movement included illegal operations in which Mafioso groups

⁴¹ See the interviews in Düzel (2002, pp.119-174); and the Susurluk Chronology in Türk (2002).

⁴² Following his career in the police, Ağar became a True Path Party (TPP) MP in December 1995. In the Motherland- TPP coalition government he served as the Minister of Justice while he became the Minister of Internal Affairs in the Welfare Party-TPP government. He had to resign from office subsequent to a conflict with Erbakan, the WP leader. After the *Susurluk Scandal* he also had to resign from TPP. Also, his immunity as an MP was lifted. In the April 1999 and November 2002 general elections he was elected as an independent MP while in December 2002 he became the leader of TPP. For further information on Mehmet Ağar see <http://www.kimkimdir.gen.tr/kimkimdir.php?id=423>

⁴³ Korkut Eken started his career in the army. In 1978, he was appointed to the Special War Department's Special Union Commandership (*Özel Harp Dairesi Özel Birlik Komutanlığı*). After 1980 he trained the Special Teams (*Özel Harekat Timleri*). In 1987 he resigned from the army as a lieutenant colonel. He started to work in MİT as the Vice-President of the Security Department, but retired in 1988. Eken worked in *Emniyet* between 1993 and 1996 on Ağar's invitation while he participated in a number of operations. For further information on Korkut Eken see <http://www.kimkimdir.gen.tr/kimkimdir.php?id=1>

were employed.⁴⁴ These studies also indicated that some chief exercisers of state power were involved in Mafioso activities even in the pre-1980 era⁴⁵ while the post-1980 period witnessed a greater growth.

Actually, 1990s were the years of the growing Mafioso threat over other capitalists. A number of businesspeople were threatened, killed or kidnapped.⁴⁶ Many businesspeople grew uneasy about the rising Mafioso power. They started to express this problem and make policy proposals against this trend. For example, the prosecutor Antonio Di Pietro (the national hero for his inquiry against corruption in Italy) was invited to make a speech in the TÜSİAD General Council Meeting in 1995 (Alkan, 1998, p. 315). After then, the capitalists pronounced this problem in further meetings, conferences, and publications. Demands for democratization and transparency became the major concern of those, feeling the actual or potential threat of Mafioso (capitalist) lords/madams.

In this process, some sectors of the state also started to take measures against the Mafioso gangs. This may be due to both the rival groups in the state and the rising opposition. It was shortly before the *Susurluk Incident* when the state armed forces' operations started. For example as Türk (2002) suggests an operation was done against the gang known as *Söylemez Kardeşler* on June 11, 1996. Among this gang's alleged crimes, an assassination plot against Mehmet Açar took place. An important number of gang members were from the police or army. On May 27, 1997, Meral Akşener, the Minister of Internal Affairs stated that between 11 June 1996 and 3 November 1996, except from those in *Susurluk*, the police caught nine gangs of which 21 members were from *Emniyet* and 6 members were from the army (pp. 40, 54). However, it was after the *Susurluk Incident* when these operations gained a momentum. Mafioso leaders and members were arrested one after another in 1997

⁴⁴ For example see Bovenkerk and Yeşilgöz (2000); Gökdemir (2002); Şener (2004); Türk (2002).

⁴⁵ For example Mumcu (1998) pointed out a case about Kudret Bayhan, a NAP senator, engaged in narcotics trafficking who was caught with 146 kilograms of base morphine in Menton, a small town in the Italy-France frontier, in 1972 (p. 81). A similar case also took place in 1979 when the NSP senator Halit Kahraman was sentenced to eight years due to narcotics trafficking in Germany (Bovenkerk & Yeşilgöz, 2000, p. 202).

⁴⁶ See Bovenkerk and Yeşilgöz (2000); Gökdemir (2002); Şener (2004); Türk (2002); Ünlü (2001a).

and 1998. Due to the extensive scope of these arrests, the operations were called the ‘1997 Gang Operations’. Also in the years 2000 and 2001, a series of operations took place. While some Mafiosi were arrested, an important number of the chief exercisers of state power who were alleged to be the part of these gangs survived with little or no penalty.⁴⁷ This amalgamation of state elements and Mafioso power has very important implications over the prospects concerning the ‘capitalist state’.

In the light of all the presented figures and instances, it has been clarified that the Mafioso (capitalist) lords/madams should be considered as an actually or potentially significant factor in analyzing the state power in several countries including Turkey, since they hold something the legal conventional bourgeoisie lacks, and that is; the direct command of armed forces. Therefore, the less the conventional bourgeoisie holds the direct command of the armed forces, as will be discussed in the following chapters, the severer it becomes to appeal to ideological means and material resources to control state armed forces for realizing short and/or long-term capitalist interests.

2.3.3 Communities With Reference To Class Interests

In the previous sections, such issues as ‘rationality’, ‘social classes’, ‘class struggles’, and ‘mafioso formations’ have been elaborated. As for the last conceptual device to be evaluated in this chapter; it will be on the categorization of communities in terms of closeness/openness to collective long-term antagonistic class interests. As for other conceptualizations of communities, while it is not possible to evaluate all here, two among the classics will be briefly evaluated: The approaches of Tönnies and Weber.

The classical period of sociological work witnessed a common categorization of social entities in terms of the pre-modern/modern dichotomy. The growth of the complexity and division of labor with the rise of capitalism (specifically with the growth of the urban/industrial) had pushed several 19th and early 20th century social analysts understand the major dynamics of the transformation/differentiation process and the mechanisms of ‘order’. As for a reflection of this dualism as regards

⁴⁷ See Bovenkerk and Yeşilgöz (2000); Gökdemir (2002); Şener (2001), Şener (2004); Ünlü (2001a).

communities,⁴⁸ among the leading categorizations of the era, Ferdinand Tönnies's (2000) distinction between the *Gemeinschaft* (community) and *Gesellschaft* (society/association) has occupied a distinguished part; the former generally associated with the 'traditional'; and the latter, with the 'modern'. For understanding this distinction, Tönnies's reference to rationality should be mentioned, although, according to him, the question was not to contrast the 'rational will' with the 'nonrational will', since intellect and reason belong to both natural will and rational will. He wrote:

... intellect in natural will attains its fruition in the creative, formative, and artistic ability. And works and in the spirit of the genius. This is true even though in its elementary forms natural will means nothing more than a direct, naïve, and therefore emotional volition and action, whereas, on the other hand, rational will is most frequently characterized by consciousness. To the latter belongs manufacturing as contrasted with creation; therefore, we speak of mechanical work referring to forging plans, machinations, weaving intrigues, or fabrications which are directed to the objective of bringing forth the means, the exclusive determination of which is that of producing the outward effects necessary to attain our desired ends. (Tönnies, 2000, p. 303)

From this conceptualization, a similarity (if not equivalence) can be drawn between the dichotomy in Weber's 'instrumentally rational action' and his 'other' remaining action types and the dichotomy in Tönnies's 'rational will' and 'natural will', although Weber's presentation of the distinction between the 'community' and 'association' is not as dichotomous⁴⁹ as Tönnies's conceptualization of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. Tönnies (2000) called "all kinds of association in which natural will predominates *Gemeinschaft*, all those which are formed and fundamentally conditioned by rational will *Gesellschaft*" (p. 304). According to Tönnies, in the *Gemeinschaft* the population is smaller, personal relationships are closer, and there are strong emotional bonds, which can be found in estates, kinship groups, and village communities among others; while in the *Gesellschaft*, conscious, rational, impersonal, and interest-seeking actions are predominant, which can be found in social classes,

⁴⁸ This dualistic approach was then challenged in a number of studies on urban life (e.g. Fischer, 1975; Gans, 1968; 1995).

⁴⁹ See Weber (1978a, pp. 41, 60, *note* 24).

cities, and nation states among others (cf. Cooley, 1962, on primary and secondary groups). In this respect, Tönnies contrasted the bourgeois society (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*) with *Gemeinschaft*, mainly by its *individualism* as against cooperation.

As for Weber's approach on communal and associative relationships, similar to Tönnies, he made the categorization in terms of the orientation of action. If the orientation of the social action is "based on a subjective feeling of parties, whether affectual or traditional, that they belong together" (Weber, 1978a, p. 40), he called that social relationship 'communal' (*Vergemeinschaftung*). If the orientation of the social action "within it rests on a rationally motivated adjustment of interests or a similarly motivated agreement, whether the basis of rational judgment be absolute values or reasons of expediency" (Weber, 1978a, pp. 40, 41), he called that social relationship 'associative' (*Vergesellschaftung*). While that associative type of relationship is generally (if not always) held to rest on a rational agreement by mutual consent; either value rational-belief in one's own obligation or the instrumentally rational expectation that the other party will live up to it may be the main orientation of the corresponding action. Weber held that the meaning he gave to *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* differed from that of Tönnies, since Tönnies's was more specific than his. According to Weber, among the purest cases of 'associative relationships'; rational free market exchange, pure voluntary association based on self-interest, and voluntary association motivated by a devotion to a set of common absolute values other than emotional and affective interests (with the acknowledgment that the last one seldom occurs in its pure type) can be mentioned (Weber, 1978a, p. 41). As for the 'communal relationships', Weber's conceptualization and exemplification is crucial for understanding the intermixed character of social relations. That is why the relatively long, but explicatory excerpt from Weber is put below:

Communal relationships may rest on various types of affectual, emotional, or traditional bases. Examples are a religious brotherhood, an erotic relationship, a relation of personal loyalty, a national community, the *esprit of corps* of a military unit. The type case is most conveniently illustrated by family. But the great majority of social relationships has this characteristic to some degree, while being at the same time to some degree determined by associative factors. No matter how calculating and hard-headed the ruling considerations in such a social relationship –as that of a merchant to his customers–may be, it is quite possible for it to involve emotional

values which transcend its utilitarian significance. Every social relationship which goes beyond the pursuit of immediate common ends, which hence lasts for long periods, involves relatively permanent social relationships between same persons, and these cannot be exclusively confined to the technically necessary activities. Hence in such cases as association in the same military unit, in the same school class, in the same workshop or office, there is always some tendency in this direction, although the degree, to be sure, varies enormously. Conversely, a social relationship which is normally considered primarily communal may involve action on the part of some or even all of the participants which is to an important degree oriented to consideration of expediency. There is, for instance, a wide variation in the extent to which the members of a family group feel a genuine community of interests, on the other hand, exploit the relationship for their own ends. The concept of communal relationship has been intentionally defined in very general terms and hence includes a very heterogeneous group of phenomena. (Weber, 1978a, pp. 41, 42)

To return back to Miliband's approach for analyzing the capitalist state for a moment; now, parallels can be drawn between Weber's point on the intermixed character of social relations as regards communal and associational orientation and Miliband's inquiry of social relationships in terms of state elements' pro-capitalist orientation as regards communal sentiments stemming from a wide range of collectivities (imagined and/or real) from friendship to the nation. Now, once more Weber on communities, Weber held that the feeling of 'belonging' is at the heart of communal social relationships, which nonetheless does not simply exclude coercive relations. Meanwhile, associative relationships often (if not always) rest on compromises although "outside the area of compromise, the conflict of interests, with its attendant competition for supremacy, remains unchanged" (Weber, 1978a, p. 41).

The present thesis also holds that the distinguishing characteristic of community is the feeling of 'belonging' to a real and/or imagined collectivity, which may range from dyads to world community insofar as that 'belonging' criteria is met. However, here, collectivities with whether emotional or material interest seeking orientation (which may themselves be intermixed), whether defined membership or not are treated as communities as long as that criteria is met. Certainly, this is not to identify the crowd with community. But it is the acknowledgment that, there may be even *ad hoc* or momentary communities as a part of relatively planned/unplanned shorter/longer

lasting relationships containing such feelings of solidarity, distinctiveness, and belonging. In this respect, a parallel can be drawn with Sartre's example of bus passengers in his *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, in which he argued that even an inert gathering like bus passengers can be transformed in an instant with the recognition of its common interest 'by the flash of a common *praxis*', while the individuals in seriality who run from a common threat may turn into an active totality whose spontaneous unity, then dissolves when there is no longer that common threat (for Sartre's point, see Bull, 2006, pp. 14-17). In the present thesis, it is also held that, as long as there is a feeling of belonging to the collectivity whether the identity is constructed on momentary or longer term basis, communal relations and communities constitute a substantial part of the social life, by means of which several interests, including the class interests can be sought to be realized and which are actually or potentially divided by psychological/physical interests of its elements.⁵⁰ As for the categorization of communities in terms of representation of interests; Weber's distinction of 'open and closed relationships' would be helpful. He wrote:

A social relationship, regardless of whether it is communal or associative in character, will be spoken as 'open' to outsiders if and insofar as its system of order does not deny participation to anyone who wishes to join and is actually in a position to do so. A relationship will, on the other hand, be called 'closed' against outsiders so far as, according to its subjective meaning and its binding rules, participation of certain persons is excluded, limited or subjected to conditions. Whether a relationship is open or closed may be determined traditionally, affectually, or rationally in terms of values or of expediency. (Weber, 1978a, p. 43)

⁵⁰ However, it should be also acknowledged that a common perceived threat, which can be considered as a possible way of constituting a 'we' feeling, may not always give rise to community solidarity even under a very real common threat. For example, the police attacking the demonstrators may create both a 'we' feeling enhancing the community solidarity and a desire for 'individual' physical wellbeing dissolving the community solidarity. This dual concern emerging from a common threat can be best detected from several demonstrators' attitude of even running over those who fall down (even over those whom they knew and cared about before) in running from the police panzers, and some others' attitude of stopping and helping those who fall down (even those whom they did not know and care about before) to make them stand up and run. Therefore, a perceived common threat does not always end in enhancing the community feeling, while the perceived common threat may sometimes even dissolve the community in favor of narrower community sentiments or purely individual physical/psychological interests.

Here, similar to (if not identical with) Weber's criteria of openness and closeness, communities will be categorized on the basis of openness and closeness to collective long-term class interests of antagonistic poles. For this purpose, here, two analytical categories are offered: 'Manifest class interest communities' and 'latent class interest communities'. Although the terms 'manifest' and 'latent' are not novel to sociological literature; since they are totally arbitrary signifiers, here, they are given a meaning different than the meaning given by Merton, while Merton (2000) himself also used the terms in a different context than used by Freud (while before Freud, Francis Bacon used the terms 'latent process' and 'latent configuration' as regards the processes below the threshold of superficial observation). As for Merton, he used the terms 'manifest functions' and 'latent functions' as against the common identification of 'motives' with 'functions' while "the distinction between manifest and latent functions was devised to preclude the inadvertent confusion ... between conscious *motivations* for social behavior and its *objective consequences*" (pp. 107, 108). Here, the terms 'manifest' and 'latent' are used in a different context; as stated earlier, 'manifest class interest community' and 'latent class interest community' are given the meaning vis-à-vis the degree of structural closeness to the collective long-term antagonistic class interests. Therefore, this distinction is based on structural closure. This categorization is of great help for understanding the structural susceptibility and resistance to the long-term collective interests of social classes which involve the interests concerning the establishment, maintenance, restoration, or destruction of a particular mode of production. This categorization indicates that, not only modern class organizations, but also several communal relations with pre-industrial origins are exposed to contemporary class conflicts, while their structural inclinations shape the defense and realization of class interests in different degrees. Besides, this categorization helps not only to question the category of 'vanguard party', but also understand the self-organizations of workers with reference to the degree of their closure to capitalist/worker collective long-term interests; with also implications for the strategies and tactics of those who fight for collective long-term working class interests and/or for a classless world.

Now then, the concepts of 'manifest class interest community' (MCIC) and 'latent class interest community' (LCICs) have to be evaluated briefly and concretized as regards a few examples. In capitalist societies, some communities exclude the

representation of working class' collective long-term interests and predominantly serve capitalist class' interests such as business associations and certain bourgeois political parties (MCICs); while some other communities constitute a base potentially or actually open to the struggle for both capitalist and working classes' long-term interests such as several religious communities, ethnic/national communities, kinship communities, and certain bourgeois political parties (LCICs). Therefore, for a community to be called a MCIC, it should be closed to the propaganda of collective long-term economic interests of one side of the class antagonism and defend the other side's short and/or long-term interests.⁵¹ Nevertheless, the borders of MCICs and LCICs can get sometimes blurred and one type may even turn into the other. Meanwhile, both may have modern or traditional origins. As for the examples, although those business associations comprising the 'we' feeling which can be considered as MCICs are the products of modern societies, Masonic organizations, several of which resemble (if not identical with) MCICs rather than LCICs⁵² are claimed to have their roots in pre-capitalist times⁵³ although the emergence and

⁵¹ With the acknowledgment that a manifest class interest community may embrace more than one social class' long-term interests as against its antagonistic side. For example a political party may be closed to the long-term interests of those exploited by the capitalist class and Mafioso (capitalist) lord/madam class while it may defend both of those exploiter classes' short and/or long term interests. Apparently, the same logic can be pursued also for several latent class interest communities. For example the national community is open to not only the defense of antagonistic class interests of the capitalist and working classes, but also that of the exploiter and exploited sides in the Mafioso mode of production. Besides, there may be further combinations. For example a bourgeois manifest class interest community (e.g. bourgeois political party) may at the same time be open to the long-term interests of the exploited side of the Mafioso business. Or a latent class interest community for particular antagonistic long-term interests may be a manifest class interest community with reference to another pair. For example a labor union which is a latent class interest community vis-à-vis the capitalist and working class interests may at the same time be open to the representation of long-term interests of the exploited Mafia laborers as against the long-term interests of the Mafioso (capitalist) lord/madam class. Needless to say, any latent or manifest class interest community may be at the same time open to other preferences or other interests than class interests.

⁵² Freemasonry recalls a MCIC rather than a LCIC with its emphasis on belief in God, obedience, and order, and with its doors closed to proletariat in the most part if not entirely, at least during the 20th century. Yet, the relatively liberal French version of Masonry adopting the 1738 dated Anderson constitution as the reference point permitted the atheists to join the Masonry networks unlike the British version of Masonry dating back to 1753 (see Bachmann, 1970, pp. 7, 8). Although the attitude and elitist class composition of especially the Anglo version of Masonry have been far from challenging capitalism at least in the 20th century, it is important to note that, throughout history, there have been Masons who were even socialist revolutionaries as in the case of Masons participating in Paris Commune.

⁵³ There are different claims for the origins of Masonic networks such as the network of guilds or network of Knights Templar (for different claims see Soysal, 2004, pp. 139-166). Yet the

development of relatively modern Freemasonry have had close links with the bourgeois political forces, a number of which took considerable parts in bourgeois revolutions, nationalist struggles, and realization of imperialist interests⁵⁴ (for the examples, see Koloğlu, 1991; Soysal, 2004).

As for LCICs, the case is similar. For example although several national communities⁵⁵ have grown in the soil of the market economy, a number of religious communities have origins in pre-capitalist societies. But still, in several national and religious communities, it is possible to propagate both pro-capitalist and pro-worker long-term economic interests. Yet, this does not mean that all religious communities are LCICs. In some religious communities, the doors to the propaganda of collective ownership of means of production are totally closed. Sometimes, the prerequisite of being a particular religious sect member is seeing capitalism as legitimate. In that case, that sect should be evaluated as MCIC rather than LCIC.

However, the degree of closeness to antagonistic class struggles is not equal to being exempt from within class struggles and clashes of different strategies for the same class interests. Therefore neither MCICs nor LCICs are exempt from within struggles. For example in a business association comprising a 'we' feeling (a MCIC), individual

transition to and development of Speculative Masonry, the modern Masonry, which took its shape with the unification of four lodges in London to form the Grand Lodge of London and Westminster in 1717 (Bachmann, 1970, p. 4) seem to coincide with the development of capitalism.

⁵⁴ However, this is not to say that all Masons were against feudalism. For example, as Koloğlu suggests (see the interview in Cevizoğlu, 2004, p. 66) in French Revolution, there were Masons both on the side of the king and against the king.

⁵⁵ Here, nation is defined as territorially concentrated groups with a claim of national (not dynastic) sovereignty over that land, which is similar to Hechter's (2000) approach that defines 'nations' as "territorially concentrated ethnic groups", the concentration of which enables these groups to consider that land as the homeland with a possible strong threat of attaining sovereignty (p. 14) and that defines 'nationalism' as "collective action designed to render the boundaries of the nation congruent with those of its governance unit" (p. 15). Meanwhile, it is also important to underline that nation is a type of community where its members may not have the chance to know every member all through their lives. Therefore, Benedict Anderson's (1991) point on calling 'nation' as an 'imagined community' is illuminating: "It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (p. 6) and "it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship" (p. 7).

or sectional capitalist economic interests may clash with each other (that is within class struggle for short-term capitalist interests). Similarly, in a church community devoted to liberation theology (a LCIC), there may be a struggle among those who fight for a democratic capitalist state as a step for worker state and who directly fight for worker state (that is clash of strategies for collective long-term working class interests).

Yet, in spite of being exposed to struggles, community networks promise a degree of solidarity among its members in this or the other way. However, just like other social formations, communities are also subject to change; sometimes they continue to exist but in a transformed form and/or essence, and sometimes they disappear via splitting into new communities or being replaced by others. Whether with pre-capitalist origins or not- communities constitute considerable channels for holding state power and realizing capitalist interests. Some communities are smaller and members know each other personally, while some other communities are larger and members do not know every member personally. Yet, each community promises a degree of solidarity. It seems that the more the community sentiments appeal to emotional rationality; the more the community can resist the counter-forces acting upon them, as in the case of several religious and national communities. In contrast to the classical dualistic approach asserting that modern communities replace the pre-modern ones in the course of historical progress, today, it is quite apparent that not only communities with modern origin but also communities with traditional origin constitute substantial network bases of social relations, presenting opportunities for the utilization of state power for social classes.

Therefore, several (if not all) communities are both the site and means of class struggles. Besides, community sentiments often become a point of reference as regards obedience, mobilization, and indifference concerning pro-capitalist interests. As regards the state power; the importance of community sentiments and networks that might be based on friendship, kinship, neighborhood, ethnicity, political preferences/activities, professional activities, class organizations, and leisure time activities among others have been taken into consideration in a number of analyses

mainly with versions of (neo)elitist or (neo)pluralist standpoints⁵⁶ (e.g. Dahl, 1956; 1961; Domhoff, 1967; 1970; 1983; 1990; Dye, 1986; Mills, 1956; Soloway, 1987; Truman, 1959; Useem, 1984). Especially those studies focusing on pressure/interest/attitude groups provide rich data regardless of their further theorization of or assumptions about the political system.⁵⁷ However, only a few Marxist studies (e.g. Miliband, 1969; 1988) have elaborated on this aspect of hold of state power, which then faced with severe criticisms of other Marxists for remaining in the field of bourgeois sociology (see section 2.2 for the labels put on Miliband). Nevertheless, the distant attitude towards the integration of communities and personal relations to the analysis, probably with a motive of remaining in the framework of ‘Marxist science’ or not entering the area of ‘liberal analyses’, has not ended in a total neglect of their presence. Indeed, even Poulantzas blaming Miliband for his ‘bourgeois methodology’ for several times made reference to nation, political parties, and so-called ideological state apparatuses (e.g. Poulantzas, 1975; 1980; 2000), some of which denote an implicit reference to communities and community sentiments. Nonetheless, his major focus remained on the relations between structures, functions of the state, and structural aspects of isolation and discipline. As for Jessop, regardless of his more sympathetic attitude to ‘subject’ (Jessop, 1990, esp. pp. 243-246) and his acknowledgment of the presence of several transmission belts/networks (Jessop, 1990, esp. p. 300), his major interest remained on the effects/functions and/or forms of the state (e.g. Jessop, 2002; Jessop, 2003), rather than those transmission belts themselves. Although several other studies have also conceded the importance of such belts (e.g. Gramsci, 1989; Habermas, 1973; 1987), again the focus of several Marxist works have remained on the functions and/or form of the state (Altvater, 1979; Blanke, Jürgens, & Kastendiek, 1979; Braunmühl, 1979; Gerstenberger, 1979; Habermas, 1973; Hirsch, 1979; 1993; Offe, 1993). Although all these works

⁵⁶ Since sometimes the boundaries of the neo-pluralist and neo-elitist standpoints may get blurred, the examples of relevant sources are congregated in the same parentheses.

⁵⁷ See for example Castles (1967) and Ehrmann (1964), which provide data based on country studies. Those studies focusing on specifically business organizations also provide clues for the strategies employed by the bourgeoisie and its sections for holding state power in terms of increasing their class capacity and/or their relation to state elements (lobbying, participation in policy process, and other relations). See for example Becker (1990); Coleman and Grant (1988); Coleman and Jacek (1983); Garrity and Picard (1991), Kochanek (1987). There are also studies on business organizations that contribute in understanding the impact of governmental forms or state institutions over the representation of business interests (e.g. Coleman & Grant, 1985; Coleman, 1990).

contribute in developing an understanding about the emergence of particular state forms and the effects of state practices with all their implications over class struggles, they tell little about class struggle strategies with reference to community networks, mass/centralized means of opinion formation, and armed forces (with the acknowledgment that 'forms of state' do have implications over all these aspects).

Today, what is to be done seems to be elaborating on the mechanisms of 'holding' the state power, and once more, asserting the importance of personal ties, networks of relations, and communities in holding state power in a micro-macro range, with the assertion that no analyst against exploitation and domination (whether Marxist, anarchist, or any possible other) can be considered as 'bourgeois analyst'. Claims of theoretical infallibility would at the best stagnate the analysis, and at the worst turn it into a religious dogma with its sacred texts and ritualistic jargon to be followed.

2.4 Summary

In the present chapter, it has been argued that, given the multiplicity of the unraveled knots between the positivities (a great many of which are possibly yet undiscovered) located in a micro-macro range, the biggest failure of a theory would be its claim to theoretical infallibility. This was held to be crucial especially for Marxist theory, since it is not only a framework for analysis, but also a guide for action. However, not only the Marxists, but any theorist with some intention to change the world into a more desirable place without exploitation and oppression were recommended to be vigilant about the danger of turning the theory into a ritualistic dogma. Relatively correct analysis was held to be a key (if not the guarantor) of a relatively correct strategy. As for the abstractionist mode of analyzing the state, it was criticized for its insufficient analytical devices for understanding the social relations in general, and the transmission belts, obedience, and rebel in particular; on account of its entrapping the theory into a frame of objectively coinciding structures and reducing the individuals to merely the bearers of structures. Despite that the chapter acknowledged that the individuals are conditioned and constrained to a certain extent by the structures they occupy, they were not held to be robots or passive agents. They were held to be partial conformists and partial rebels, made up of concrete neuro-physiological networks, not necessarily identical in every individual and at every age.

As any living thing, the human being was theorized to have a strong inclination towards survival but which might be challenged by even the same individual's emotional and/or physical needs/desires. The 'rationality of being' was held to be the major calculator (whether conscious or unconscious) of the human action. Therefore, reducing the social analysis to only structures or only individuals was stated to be vulnerable to serious theoretical defects. Given the limited time and brain capacity of the human being, an anti-reductionist and multi-level analysis was held to embrace, on the contrary, a strong potential to reduce such theoretical defects at least to some extent, and at least for today. In constructing a social theory, it was also seen wise to ground the assumptions on human nature as much as possible (during which the findings of the so-called natural sciences can be benefited from), the opposite of which might feed undesirable theoretical knots and impasses. In this respect, the separation of psychology and sociology was also held to give rise to negative outcomes, from which the present thesis also suffers.

Another point made in the chapter was the necessity to clarify and demarcate the borders of the concepts used in the analysis as much as possible for the purpose of reducing, at least to some extent, the vagueness of the analysis. Assumptions on the presence of structural interests (e.g. class interests) with reference to the structural positions occupied (e.g. class position) were not hesitated to be made insofar as they were seen of some analytical help in explaining tendential orientation of desires and action (e.g. short and long term interests of the working and capitalist classes), which would enable further theorization of ensemble of social relations (e.g. manifest and latent class interest communities). As for the (re)constructed conceptual tools to be used in explaining the factors influential over and challenges to the capitalist hold of state power, the ones introduced in the present chapter were the following: Rationality of being (comprising physical and emotional rationalities), capitalist and working classes/categories, Mafioso mode of production, manifest and latent class interest communities.

While the physical needs/desires were held to be strong motivators of the individual action, emotional (conscious and/or unconscious) calculation and orientation were also held to constitute a strong reason in the form of a steering hub of the human action. Material resources were held to be non-exceptional (if not exclusive) inputs

for the satisfaction of physical and emotional needs/desires of the individual to some extent (given that, that 'some' extent may vary with reference to time, personal temperament, structural social positions occupied, and cultural context among others). Despite that social class positions were not held to be the mere positions located in production relations and power relations, they were theorized in a way to denote some degree of structural antagonism in the form of a constraining and conditioning force (among possible other positive and negative forces) pushing, for example, many workers to fight for further material resources as against the capitalist interests in a relatively collective form. However, it is here acknowledged that, the factors time, temperament, culture, and other structural positions occupied may also positively or negatively act upon this class instinct while the form of the affiliated organizations (e.g. revolutionary trade union versus the Japanese type of enterprise union) and communities (e.g. manifest working class interest political party versus the latent working class interest political party) might also matter, among possible other factors.

As for the communities, the 'we' feeling which might have even a momentary basis was theorized to be among the factors steering the human action. Regardless of the spread of the associative relationships in the modern society, the communal relations and associative relations generally exist side by side, in an intermixed form, and in interplay with each other, which can be dissolved, regressed, or enhanced by other communal and/or individual orientations. As for the instinct of physical survival, it was held to be the axiomatic foundation of arguing for the privilege of strong enough pro-capitalist armed force for the capitalist hold of state power. In this respect, consent was not held to be an unconditional necessity for obedience (if not for rebel), since the threat or actual use of violence is likely to trigger the concern for the individual's physical survival/well-being along with the concern for those who may suffer from that violence whom the individual cares about for emotional and/or physical reasons. The privilege attributed to means of violence was seen with some explanatory power for not only understanding the factors facilitating or enabling the conventional capitalist hold of state power but also challenges to it. In this respect, the Mafioso (capitalist) lords/madams, with their substantial power in a number of countries, were proposed to be treated as a considerable potential threat to the ascendancy of the conventional bourgeoisie deprived of the direct command of armed forces.

CHAPTER 3

THE STATE, STATE POWER, AND CAPITALIST STATE

Many and so many feed on the poor
How the heart can stand seeing that
Brave has fallen in need of dry onion
Don't know should I say or shouldn't I

(from 'Don't Know Should I Cry', an *Aşık Mahzuni Şerif*
poem/song)

3.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on a few of the theoretical problems in state theory. Among the focused problems, the conceptual boundaries of the state, the criteria for the class character of the state, the conceptual boundaries of the capitalist society with reference to state practices, and the problem of power bloc take place. Besides, the distance of the present thesis' standpoint with reference to different standpoints (e.g. liberal, Marxist, state-centered, anarchist approaches) is also drawn. Although the closest standpoint is identified to be the Marxist approach mainly on account of its class analysis, there are both differences and similarities with it, a few of which are discussed with reference to the six points identified in classical Marxist texts on the state. The present thesis also develops three analytical typologies for discussing the different types of action pursued by state elements, in a way neither to underestimate behaviorist accounts nor the individual capability of making choice. Therefore, the individual is portrayed to be neither a passive agent nor with full freedom to make choices.

The 'definition of the state' developed by the author of the present thesis constitutes its kernel. As against those accounts holding the consent of the masses as an

indispensable part of the state, the present thesis shifts the emphasis to the opposite pole, holding that consent of the masses is not always necessary for the existence of the state while means of violence (whether defined in state positions or not) have privilege when compared to the means of consent on account of its power to call in the physical rationality and push people to obedience in several instances. Rather than treating the state in an abstractionist mode in search for structural objective coincidences, a three-dimensional power is proposed to be applied in a micro-macro range for the analysis of the state. The four hypothetical cases presented in this chapter concretizes how this micro-macro range can work in the analysis while it also acknowledges that pro-capitalist state practices may exist with or without the capitalist 'hold' of state power. In this chapter, it is also discussed that it is not as easy to draw the threshold of the so-called 'power bloc' as it is generally assumed to be while the search for such a threshold may seriously hinder a dynamic analysis of the state. Besides, the theoretical grounds for essentializing 'citizenship' or 'nation' with reference to the 'capitalist state' is also questioned, reminding that it has only been a few centuries since the first capitalist states emerged and that there might be several other possible trajectories that the form of the capitalist state might assume not only in the East but also in the West. Lastly, the state is considered to be a non-neutral thing while its elements are (if not the state itself is) theorized to be the 'subjects' of action and not simply the bearers of the structural positions they occupy. The determinacy of armed force for the capitalist hold of state power is emphasized with an instance presented from Chile.

The sections of Chapter 3 are respectively the following: 'The Question of Conceptual Boundaries of the State and Capitalist State', 'Approaches to State Power With Respect To Two Reference Points: Liberal Standpoint and Marxist Standpoint', 'Exercise and Hold of State Power: A Multilevel Hold', 'State: A Thing, Subject, Social Relation, or a Construct?'. Similar to the previous chapter, this chapter also asserts that adopting particular (if not all) conceptual and methodological instruments developed and/or used by pro-capitalist theorists does not necessarily end in making 'bourgeois science' while it particularly emphasizes that as long as such tools as the bourgeois conceptualization of 'profit' are demystified, neither making reference to individuals nor applying the psychological conceptualization of power to the state renders the analysis essentially 'bourgeois'.

3.2 The Question of Conceptual Boundaries of The State and Capitalist State

Meanings attributed to the 'state' have changed considerably both in time and with reference to its definer. The concept has been filled with both descriptive and explanatory meanings. Quentin Skinner's (1989) survey provides an understanding for not only the change in the meanings attributed to the state but also the conceptual evolution ending in the concept 'the state'. He showed, for Western Europe, while earlier concepts used in place of the state were oriented towards a personal view of power, the modern usage of the state started to denote impersonal state apparatus distinct from not only the ruler but also the ruled. He wrote "the acceptance of the state as both a supreme and an impersonal form of authority brought with it a displacement of the more charismatic elements of political leadership" (p. 124) although those charismatic elements of political leadership "had earlier been of central importance to the theory and practice of government throughout Western Europe" (pp. 124, 125).

As for today, among the most widely referred definitions of the state is that of Weber. Even the Marxist camp has been influenced by Weber's definition, while its footprints can be traced especially in those works treating the presence of legitimacy as taken for granted especially at times of non-rebellion, or non-intense class struggles. This influence, as will be discussed in the next chapter, has had crucial implications over the conceptualization of consent and violence vis-à-vis the state power. Weber's writings on politics, which have had a profound impact over the 20th century state theory, occupy an important place in his analyses. As Badie and Birnbaum (1983) suggest, "the state is a central feature of Max Weber's work" (p. 17). Since Weber's definition of the state still make echoes in contemporary studies, it will be evaluated briefly in the following lines. However, before elaborating on his definition of the state it would be illuminating to mention his definition of 'political community'.

According to Weber (1978b), the 'political community' is more than an economic group "as it possesses value systems ordering matters other than the directly economic disposition of goods and services" (p. 902) and refers to "a community

whose social action is aimed at subordinating to orderly domination by the participants a 'territory' and the conduct of the persons within it, through readiness to resort to physical force, including normally force of arms" (p. 901). In parallel to this definition, Weber (1978a) described the 'state' in terms of its monopoly of legitimate use of force (see esp. pp. 54, 65). As for the characteristics of the modern state, he listed them as follows:

It possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation, to which the organized activities of the administrative staff, which are also controlled by regulations are oriented. This system of order claims binding authority, not only over the members of the state, the citizens ... but also to a very large extent over all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory organization with a territorial basis. Furthermore, today, the use of force is regarded as legitimate only so far as it is either permitted by the state or prescribed by it. ... The claim of the modern state to monopolize the use of force is essential to it as its character of compulsory jurisdiction and of continuous operation. (Weber, 1978a, p. 56)

Hence, for Weber, although legitimately monopolizing the means of violence was the essential characteristic of the state, territoriality, administrative staff and laws were among other features of the modern state. However, Weber (1978b) also suggested "the monopolization of legitimate violence by the political-territorial association and its rational consociation into an institutional order is nothing primordial but a product of evolution" (pp. 904, 905) and claimed that it is not much possible to discern a special political community where economic conditions are undifferentiated (p. 905). He listed the basic functions of the modern state as follows:

the enactment of law (legislative function); the protection of personal safety and public order (police); the protection of vested rights (administration of justice); the cultivation of hygienic, educational, social welfare, and other cultural interests (the various branches of administration); and last but not least, the organized armed protection against outside attack (military administration). (Weber, 1978b, p. 905)

However, as Helliwell and Hindess (1999) pointed out according to Weber "compliance is unlikely to survive for long unless it is accompanied by a belief in the legitimacy of the leader's power" (p. 81). Actually, this problem-generating equation

was embraced by several Marxist (especially the neo-Gramscian) and non-Marxist (especially liberal structural functionalist) theorists, while, as will be discussed in the next chapter; some others questioned its validity (e.g. Perry Anderson, 1976). This legitimacy, according to Weber, which is also important for the state's monopoly over the means of violence, can be obtained on three grounds:

1. Rational grounds –resting on a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands (legal authority).
2. Traditional grounds –resting on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them (traditional authority) ...
3. Charismatic grounds –resting on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him (charismatic authority). (Weber, 1978a, p. 215)

Meanwhile, as Sayer (1991) suggests, Weber saw the rational-bureaucratic state as a *sine qua non* for rational capitalism (p. 140). As for Marx and Engels's treatment of the capitalist state, it will be elaborated mainly in the next section, in discussing a few of the approaches concerning state power. However, it should be mentioned that, as Miliband argued (1969), "Marx himself ... never attempted a systematic study of the state" (p. 5) which has much to do with the very diverse approaches of later Marxists. As regards the definitions of state in the Marxist camp, here, only two will be mentioned; that of Miliband and Poulantzas, as the polar sides of an exhausting but influential debate.

As for Miliband, in his definition of the state, his major insistence was on the necessity to distinguish the government and state, while he pointed out that when Weber spoke of the state with the claim of monopoly of legitimate force, it was the government, not the state he spoke about. He held that:

... 'the state' is not a thing, that it does not, as such exist. What 'the state stands for is a number of particular institutions which, together, constitute its reality, and which interact as parts of what may be called the state system. (Miliband, 1969, p. 49)

As for the parts of the state system, he suggested that “the government, the administration, the military and the police, the judicial branch, sub-central government and parliamentary assemblies” are the institutions “which make up ‘the state’, and whose interrelationship shapes the form of the state system” (Miliband, 1969, p. 54). Miliband also stressed that the state system is *not* identical with the political system, since the latter includes several further institutions such as parties and pressure groups as well as a number of non-political institutions such as giant corporations, Churches, and the mass media (p. 54; cf. Althusser, 1971, on ideological state apparatuses). So unlike Althusserian accounts (and unlike the Gramscian integral state, that is conceptualization of the state as political society plus civil society), Miliband tried to demarcate the state and non-state via distinguishing the state from the broader ‘political’. His insistence of defining conceptual boundaries is in full conformity with the approach of the present thesis.

As for Poulantzas, he alleged that the purely instrumental conception of the state, which equalizes the state with political domination, reduces the state apparatus to state power (Poulantzas, 2000, p. 12) as if “there is a free-standing state power which is only afterwards utilized by the dominant classes in various ways” (Poulantzas, 2000, p. 13). He stressed the necessity to conceptualize the state as a ‘relation’, while in his refusal of applying the concept of power to the state, he claimed he distinguished himself from those who:

account for the relative autonomy of the State in terms of the group made up of the agents of the State and in terms of the specific power of this group, as those conceptions which apply the concept of power to the State invariably do: the bureaucratic class (from Hegel via Weber to Rizzi and Burnham); the political elites (this is Miliband’s conception ...); the techno-structure (power of the ‘business machine’ and the State apparatus, etc. (Poulantzas, 1976, pp. 73, 74)

However, as will be discussed in the following section, Poulantzas’s refusal of the application of concept of power is no more than the rejection of a thorough analysis of the forces acting in and upon the capitalist state positions, and paradoxically, than a

reduction of the state to class struggles.⁵⁸ Poulantzas's error is his identification of a particular use of the concept power with 'bourgeois approach'. Besides, using the concepts 'bureaucratic class' or 'political elites' is one thing; applying the concept power is another thing.⁵⁹ As was argued in the previous section, what makes an allegedly scientific analysis 'bourgeois' or 'non-bourgeois' is not the concepts (if not their possible explanatory content) used and not necessarily the level of analysis. In an analysis with pro-capitalist normative standpoint, there may be very useful conceptual and methodological contributions for understanding the 'reality' in addition to its distorting and blurring propositions, while in an analysis with anti-capitalist conclusions, there may be insufficient or misleading conceptual and methodological ingredients pushing the analyst away from the 'reality' in addition to its possible contributions highlighting the links between the individual/social phenomenon. Nonetheless, Poulantzas insisted that a Marxist (as the holder of the key of infallible magical scientific method) should not apply the conceptual devices widely used or developed by what he called bourgeois science (e.g. the concept 'elite') and, when used, insisted to locate them in a non-bourgeois theoretical problematic (e.g. nation), and held that, in a similar mode with Marx who treated 'capital' as a social relation, he also treated the state "as a relation, or more precisely as the condensate of a relation of power between struggling classes" in order to "escape the false dilemma entailed by the present discussion on the State, between the State comprehended as a Thing/instrument and the State comprehended as Subject" (Poulantzas, 1976, p. 74). Since the question of how to comprehend the state will be returned back in a separate section through the end of the chapter, for now, it is sufficient to point out that any 'social' is 'relational', while what is to be done is to give an expansion of those relations (if the state is defined in terms of 'class struggles', for example, then expanding those 'class struggles'), in that, if any social is a resultant of relations, identifying the forces and their magnitude acting upon the

⁵⁸ According to Poulantzas (2000), "(t)he State is a class State not only insofar as it concentrates power based on class relations, but also in the sense in which it *tends* to spread through every power by appropriating its specific mechanisms" (p. 44).

⁵⁹ Furthermore, although the present thesis does not employ the concept 'class' with reference to bureaucracy, as was suggested in the previous chapter, one should escape from conceptual fetishism as much as possible, especially in those concepts which can be considered to be descriptive. Indeed, the author of the present thesis could have used the *word* 'class' in place of the *word* 'category', and the *word* 'category' in place of the *word* 'class'. After all, they are arbitrary signifiers. What is important is to demarcate particular entities from others, whether with this word or that word. Which word to use does not matter.

social element (the social element which is never neutral, since once it emerges, it gains an existence of its own, though in a necessarily biased form) –that is identifying the factors in a micro-macro range with different degrees of privilege to be attributed– should be the path to be followed to understand the character and the determinant(s) of the resultant with respect to understanding its specific bias(es) (if not all its dimensions). However, regardless of Poulantzas’s contributions in terms of mainly macro effects, he insistently refused to integrate the micro dimensions into the analysis, labeling those who tried to do this with being infected of ‘bourgeois science’. For his latter works following *Political Power*, he claimed that he modified and rectified certain of his analyses, but in an opposite of Miliband, in a way to “emphasize the primacy of the class struggle as compared with the State apparatus” (Poulantzas, 1976, p. 74).

As for the present thesis, although its author’s preference is on the side of a world without any type of domination or exploitation, she does not believe that analytical tools used or developed by particular pro-capitalist theorists should not be used because they are developed by ‘bourgeois scientists’. Insofar as they are of some use to understand and analyze the social relations, they should be used. Nevertheless, this is not the defense of an eclectic mode of theoretical incoherence. On the contrary, not only the theory’s analytical power, but also its coherence is held to be very important, since the employment of arbitrary criteria that results in theoretical incoherence is, here, seen as nothing more than a source (among other sources) producing symptoms of incoherence indicating the presence of possible pathologies embodied at the roots of the theory. That is why –in contrast to the belief that defining such concepts as the ‘state’ or ‘consent’ should be left to philosophers (cf. Barry, 1989)- specifying and clarifying what is meant by particular concepts as much as possible are, here, seen as central to the analysis, which otherwise may end in severe analytical fallacies and/or theoretical problems.

As for the standpoint of the thesis on the definition of the state, the state is defined mainly by its legal form, which necessarily has a selective character since the state’s laws (written or unwritten) favor particular interests as against others (cf. Jessop, 1990), while the content of those interests is (generally) not restricted to class interests (cf. Poulantzas, 1975a; 2000). The state, with its legally defined positions, is

seen as both a site (denoting partial internality) and object (denoting partial externality) of struggles. The following is the definition proposed by this thesis, with the acknowledgment that the concept ‘state positions’ can be replaced by a prevalent equivalent concept depending on the era analyzed (e.g. king’s men, servants of the crown, whatsoever, but a specific concept of demarcation):

State is a set of networks/institutions (operated by empowered agents);

(1) with the official authority to make (1a) laws that at the same time define state positions and (1b) arrangements through the legally defined state positions;⁶⁰

(2) deriving its official authority from its power to set the rules and claim of sovereignty over a particular territory; (2.1) that becomes possible only by the presence of people commanding strong/successful enough armed force⁶¹ who enable the practice of making laws and arrangements through the legally recognized state positions (2.1a) in favor of particular group(s) of people via defending their interests within and outside⁶² the territory⁶³ (2.1b) as against other armed and non-armed forces and interests of group(s) of people within and outside that territory⁶⁴ (2.1c) with no unconditionally necessary consent of those living on the territory except from some degree of consent of the determinant exercisers and/or steerers of armed power;

(3) with the officially recognized state positions (3.1) some of which are granted the authority to collect taxes from the elements on that territory; the taxes that can be transferred or used by the legally defined positions in state networks for (3.1a) legal or (3.1b) illegal practices;

⁶⁰ Meanwhile, ‘for whose interests’ and ‘on account of which intentional determinant efforts’ this official authority is activated are relevant to the question of ‘hold of state power’.

⁶¹ *Not necessarily composed of armed elements defined in any state positions.*

⁶² If there is any outside.

⁶³ Which may at the same time require the defense/shrinking/enlarging the territory over which sovereignty is claimed where those particular groups do not necessarily denote those living on that territory.

⁶⁴ Where ‘group’ in 2.1a and 2.1b refers to ‘any possible combination of individuals’, including the ‘class’.

(4) the incumbents of which can make (3.2a) legal or (3.2b) illegal arrangements through their officially assigned authority.

This definition constitutes the kernel of the standpoint of the thesis with regard to its approach to consent and violence, which will be discussed further in next chapter. This definition is linear (explanatory) as well as descriptive. From this definition, it can be detected that not consent of the masses (unlike the definitions influenced by ‘social contract’ or Weberian accounts), but the means of violence (which, unlike the Weberian accounts, is not necessarily conceptualized as a part of the state networks) is seen as the enabling source of the state (the linear part of the definition). While those ‘strong enough armed people’ may cover even the whole society studied (all inhabitants armed), they may also be comprised of a group of outsiders. While the interests of the people considered may denote an exclusively inner conflict, the favored interests may also denote a conflict between the interests of the inhabitants and any possible outsider interests. However, in practice, generally these elements are found in the form of combinations of the elements of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. As for its descriptive features, similar to Weberian accounts, there is territoriality. Meanwhile, its distinguishing feature is the official authority granted by armed force; and its law-making capacity and legally defined state positions. Although state elements are restricted to the incumbents of those legally defined state positions, state practices are held to be not restricted to legal practices. Therefore, the present thesis’ standpoint moves beyond the legalist-formalist accounts; providing the opportunity to draw the line between the state practices and non-state practices; the state elements and non-state elements; which becomes crucial especially in answering such questions as how to categorize the status of the illegal armed forces; how to conceptualize the status of the state element’s illegal practices; and where the state ends and where it begins. Drawing the conceptual borders is of extreme use for continuing the discussions on the relationship between the non-state and state in general, and the mechanisms of holding the state power with reference to capitalist interests in particular. Now, next section will evaluate the state power with reference to the ‘liberal’ and ‘Marxist’ standpoints.

3.3 Approaches to State Power With Respect To Two Reference Points: Liberal Standpoint and Marxist Standpoint

As Heywood (1994) suggests, “mainstream political analysis is dominated by the liberal theory of the state” (p. 39). Although this tradition is closely related with the social contract theorists such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, it is not possible to evaluate all these social contract theorists as liberals. However, the common point among them is the assumption of the presence of a society where once upon a time people were living in a state of nature prior to transferring some of their rights to a political sovereign by means of a social contract. Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987) suggest, “(s)ocial contract theorists explore what kind of fundamental agreement between people might lead to the creation of a state, and what principles of justice would make it legitimate” (p. 84). Yet, the characteristics of the state of nature, the reasons for making a social contract, and the ways of transition to the state societies are formulated in a different manner by each philosopher. For example, whereas Hobbes (1651) drew quite a pessimistic picture of the human nature and described the state of nature as an era where individuals were in eternal conflict, for Locke (2005), human beings were not that much war-prone and for Rousseau (1997) the men had the natural virtue of compassion. But still, for each theorist, the social contract represents a transfer of authority. As Wolff (1996) suggests, all the major social contract theorists believed the individual gives his/her tacit consent when he/she quietly enjoys the protection of the state (p. 46). However, the liberal tradition is not influenced only by social contract theorists. Utilitarianism that justifies the state on the basis of utility (see Wolff, 1996, pp. 53-60) also has had a major impact on the liberal tradition.⁶⁵ As for the economic premises of liberalism, this approach owes much to the theory of Adam Smith.⁶⁶ Roskin, Cord, Medeiros, and Jones (2000) consider Adam Smith as the founder of liberalism while they define liberalism as the

⁶⁵ Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill are among the most well-known proponents of utilitarianism whose ideas are still influential on today’s world. In this respect, see especially Bentham’s (1997) formulation of the ‘principle of utility’ (pp. 685, 686) and Mill’s (1997) defense of the ‘representative government’ (pp 996-1006).

⁶⁶ See especially Smith’s (1997) ‘The Wealth of Nations’.

ideology that keeps the government out of economy⁶⁷ (p. 94). The liberal theory portrays the state as an umpire or a referee equipped with the power to protect the citizens. Therefore, the state is visualized as a neutral entity rather than an instrument of a certain social class or strata (Heywood, 1994, p. 39).

As Waldron (1987) argues, liberalism is based on the concern for defending and justifying certain social arrangements, with an emphasis on respect for individual capacity and freedom (p. 128). Kymlicka (1990) suggests the liberal tradition separates the public power of the state from the private relationships of the civil society and sets strict limits on the state's ability to intervene in private life (p. 171). Meanwhile, as Phillips (1991) points out, the liberal tradition deliberately evaluates the individuals as *abstract beings*, while this is a key feature of liberalism. The liberals' category of *citizen* indicates that the citizens are to be treated the same whatever their actual differences are (pp. 141, 142). Thus, the notion of neutrality of the state secured by the *free* choice of individuals who are equalized as *citizens* in terms of the legal rights and liberties is central to liberal approach.

However, liberalism has passed through a process of change in time. Above all, in the late 19th century, Thomas Hill Green influenced liberal theory much on the issue of 'freedom' when he pointed out the positive role the state may play. As Ebenstein and Ebenstein (2000) suggested, Green did not see "freedom only as 'freedom from' governmental interference", but "in largest part as 'freedom to' engage in certain activities, to be a certain person" (p. 761). According to Green, the government had to intervene to guarantee the freedom at an adequate level (Roskin et al., 2000, p 96). Green's formulation of freedom has had a considerable impact on 'democratic approach' which focuses on the individual's right to participate in democratic decision-making processes as against classical liberalism's focus on limiting state

⁶⁷ Roskin et al. (2000) also noted that this ideology (liberalism) became conservatism in the United States (p. 94) while they defined conservatism as the "ideology of keeping the system largely unchanged" (p. 95). However, they also made a distinction between modern conservatism and classic conservatism and called the ideas of Edmund Burke that were published in the late 18th century as 'classic conservatism'. According to Burke, things might change, but gradually, by giving people time to adjust. As for modern conservatism, it is a revival of the classic liberalism, Adam Smith's original doctrine of minimal government. It also has a concern for tradition, especially in religion and, in this respect, borrows from Edmund Burke. Thus, it is a combination of Adam Smith's economic ideas and Edmund Burke's traditionalist ideas. In Europe, modern conservatives are still called liberals or neo-liberals (Roskin et al., 2000, pp. 95-97).

power. Thus, “as against the liberal view of ‘negative freedom’ (‘freedom from’), the democratic idea propagates a positive view (‘freedom to’)” (Schwarzmantel, 1987, p. 21).

As for ‘pluralism’, it is a mixture of the liberal and democratic approaches. It is derived from the liberal idea of state and attempts to combine the aim of a limited state with the fulfillment of the democratic aim (Schwarzmantel, 1987, p. 28). For the pluralists, individuals are the constitutive units of both organizations and the society. Individuals’ different values and preferences result in different actions and formation of different groups to which they join (Alford & Friedland, 1992, p. 35). Pluralists claim that in a pluralist democracy political power is dispersed among various social groups. Thus, notion of diffusion of power is central to pluralist theory (Heywood, 1994, p. 40).

The pluralist approach argues that, there is no single group that is able to exercise systematic and pervasive control over more than one range of issues in a pluralist democracy. On the contrary, there are a variety of interest and pressure groups countervailing each other such as the ‘producers’ and ‘consumers’, or the ‘employers’ and ‘workers’. The existence of the countervailing forces in a society prevents the concentration of power in few hands, since the elected bodies have to take into account a variety of forces under the democratic system. Another feature of pluralism is the methodological separation of the economic from the political power as against the Marxist view of interconnectedness of economic and political powers. According to pluralists, the universal suffrage disintegrated state power and owners of productive resources through introducing the category of ‘citizenship’ and giving citizens the right to vote.⁶⁸ As for the elected parties, they have to take into account a variety of different groups’ interests to be elected again, while the state has to supervise and regulate the social antagonisms.⁶⁹ The pluralist tradition sees the liberal-democratic systems as comprising a plurality of ideas, without a dominant ideology. For them, politics is a process of choice and competition while the democratic institutions, and especially the elections, guarantee the accountability of

⁶⁸ Cf. Poulantzas (1975a) on the ‘effect of isolation’.

⁶⁹ Cf. Poulantzas (1975a) on the conceptualization of the state as the unifier of the ‘power bloc’, and cf. esp. p. 300f.

the power holders and result in the exercise of power by consent (Schwarzmantel, 1987, pp. 23-28).

However, the pluralist approach also has its variants. For example, Held (1987, p. 204) and Heywood (1994, p. 40) have made a distinction between its classical and neo-pluralist versions. According to the classical pluralists, elected politicians accountable to citizens and a variety of organized interests are indispensable from the liberal democratic state. The open, competitive political system guarantees this accountability and equality of opportunity for different organized interests in order to have access to the government. The elected representatives are portrayed to be superior over any non-elected state body including the civil service, judiciary, army or police that are supposed to act strictly impartial to the citizens. At the same time, “pluralists believe that a rough equality exists amongst organized groups and interests in that each enjoys some measure of access to government and government is prepared to listen impartially to all” (Heywood, 1994, p. 40). Thus, there is no single center of power that may be dominant over others in the classical version of pluralism. The power is dispersed throughout various sources of pressure (Held, 1987, p. 190). In this respect, Truman (1959) and earlier works of Dahl (1956; 1961) can be considered to belong to this category.

However, there are also pluralist studies that question the equality of opportunity to have access to political power. These studies’ recognition of inequality of opportunity has resulted in a slightly more explanatory approach. Indeed, neo-pluralist social theorists concede that the state is not as responsive to the popular pressures as the classical pluralist model suggests (Heywood, 1994, p. 41). For example, Charles Lindblom (1977; 1988) and in his later works, Robert Dahl (1985; 1989) acknowledged that business corporations have a stronger power over the state and that the business interests are secured by the state much more than other groups in the society.

Pluralist ideas have had a considerable impact particularly over the power and politics literature of the contemporary social theory. However, the pluralist conception and/or project of state could not escape from criticism. One critique, and perhaps the softest

of all, came from the ‘new right’⁷⁰ that started to gain ground during the 1970s and became popular in the post-1980 era. Particularly the neo-liberal wing of the ‘new right’ insists on the need for limiting the state power with the claim that it has become a self-serving monster for a long time. The ‘new right’ approach asserts that “the democratic process encourages politicians to outbid one another by making vote-winning promises to the electorate, and encourages electors to vote according to short-term self-interest rather than long-term well-being” (Heywood 1994: 41).

A severer criticism came from the elitist circles with the belief that the pluralist conception of power is nothing but a myth. According to the elitists, the presence of a group of ‘ruling elite’ totally contrasts with the pluralist myth of dispersion of power. It is possible to trace the elitist tradition to Plato. However, Mosca, Pareto and Michels are known to be among the most prominent authors of the classical elitist approach. The classical elitists claim that popular power and socialism are merely myths impossible to realize and that the rule of the majority by a small minority is an absolute fact for all societies. In contrast to the Marxist notion of the economic basis for political power, the elite theory makes the emphasis especially on the political, organizational or psychological factors. According to them, the elite rule of the society is a sociological law (Heywood, 1994, pp. 41, 175; Schwarzmantel, 1987, pp. 64-87). Indeed, Mosca’s (1939) claim that “(i)n all societies ... two classes of people appear – a class that rules and a class that is ruled” (p. 50) as well as Pareto’s (1968) assertion that “(e)xcept during short intervals of time, peoples are always governed by elite” (p. 36) summarize the classical elite standpoint of the inevitability of the elite rule. As for the modern elitists, their assertion of the elite rule is based on the concrete

⁷⁰ Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987) use the label ‘new right’ “to designate a set of theorists whose intellectual origins lie in the mainstream traditions of Western liberal and conservative philosophy” and who mounted “a developed social-science based critique of pluralism” (p. 72). Nevertheless, they also acknowledge the presence of a wide range of groups covered by the current usage of ‘new right’ such as the intellectuals with libertarian orientation, the defenders of the reactionary values, the political movements that demand a cut in welfare state expenditures, or the religious fundamentalist currents that declare a sort of ‘moral crusades’. For an evaluation of the ‘new right’ see also Barry (1987), Held (1987, pp.243-254), and Gray (1993). For an evaluation of the ideas of Hayek who is perhaps the most prominent scholar of this tradition, see Gamble (1996) and Nafissi (2000).

analyses of certain societies such as C.W. Mills' (1956) 'power elite' in the US⁷¹ and Michael Useem's (1984) 'inner circle' in the UK and US.⁷²

Therefore, the elitist formulation of the state generally hold that, whether desirable (e.g. Mosca, 1939; Pareto, 1968) or not (e.g. Mills, 1956), the elite rule is inevitable.⁷³ In this respect, Weber (1978b), having asserted that the minority rule is inevitable (p. 985), can be also considered to belong to the elitist category (Held, 1987, p. 143). For Weber (1978b), the actual ruler in a modern state is not the bourgeoisie but the bureaucracy (p. 1393) while he located the legitimate monopolization of means of violence at the heart of his conceptualization of state. As his other opinions, Weber's state theory has also inspired a number of theoretical lines, and primarily the contemporary state centered approaches (e.g. Block, 1987; Skocpol, 1979; 1985) that consider the state as an entity with a structure of its own; the actions of which cannot be reduced to the responses given to pressures of social classes and groups.

Meanwhile, both the classical and modern elitists are critical about the pluralist premise of the openness of power to all members of the society. As for the other criticisms of pluralism; anarchism and Marxism can be mentioned. As for the anarchists, their stance is critical about any attempt of justifying the state while, as Heywood (1994) suggests, they turn the social contract theory on its head (p. 28). According to them, the state is the cause of the anti-social behavior rather than its remedy (Wolff, 1996, p. 33) and the cause of the social chaos rather than its solution. Besides, they argue that the governments generally protect the interests of those who are privileged and powerful (Marshall, 2003, p. 878). Anarchists are also against the parliamentary institutions for these institutions decide in place of the individual

⁷¹ C.W. Mills' (1956) approach on the 'power elite' assumes a partnership model. According to him, three interrelated groups of elite, namely the military elite, the business elite, and the political elite rule the majority of the people in the US (see esp. pp. 3-29, 269-297).

⁷² Michael Useem's (1984) 'inner circle' suggests that certain business elites who have relations with multiple corporations may take political action together to influence the state and that they have an increasing political power in the UK and US. According to him, this is an aspect of institutional capitalism where the class-wide network of owners and top executives of large companies have a vital importance in expressing the class-wide political concerns (see esp. pp. 3-25, 59-75).

⁷³ As for the author of the present thesis, she personally believes that elite rule is not inevitable. However, this does not mean to deny the power of the elites in class societies.

(Woodcock, 2001, p. 38). For the anarchists, nobody has the right to rule, neither the minority nor the majority and no individual can represent the other in its real sense (Marshall, 2003, p. 52). Thus, their argument is that it does not matter whichever form the state takes, for these are only the insignificant versions of the same repressive phenomenon. However, this is also a key premise that distinguishes the anarchist approach from the Marxist one as Marx had carefully analyzed and categorized the features of the different regime types and their political implications (Thomas, 2000, pp. 382, 383).

As for the approach to the state in classical Marxist texts, Jessop (1990, pp. 26-28) identified six different usages of it. The first one is the treatment of the state as a *parasitic* institution with no essential role in economic production and reproduction, and which oppresses and exploits the civil society on behalf of particular groups.⁷⁴ The second approach is the one that treats the state as the *epiphenomena* or surface reflections of the material relations of production and class struggles stemming from the system of property relations.⁷⁵ The third approach is the one that treats the state as the *factor of cohesion*, as a regulator of the struggles with repression and concession and reproducer of the dominant mode of production, defining the state in functional terms in a manner to include every institution contributing to cohesion.⁷⁶ The fourth approach identified by Jessop is the one that allegedly sees the state as an *instrument* of class rule.⁷⁷ As for the fifth approach, it is the one that treats the state as *a set of institutions* without assumptions about its class character, and seeing it as a public

⁷⁴ For example, see ‘Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right’ (Marx, 1844a) for Marx’s evaluation of nineteenth century Prussian state. Jessop (1990, p. 26) also notes although this approach disappeared in Marx’s later analyses to a great extent, it can still be found even in those later analyses of Asiatic mode of production, Oriental despotism, and Asian state. Nevertheless “although the idea that the modern state is essentially parasitic is still held in anarchist circles, it was not long retained by Marx himself” (Jessop, 1990, p. 26).

⁷⁵ Jessop (1990, pp. 26, 27) notes, this approach can be found also largely in Marx’s earlier writings, while from time to time, it also occurred in his later writings. While Marx’s comments on law constitute a good indicator of this approach, it can be also detected from the *Preface* of his *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (Marx, 1859).

⁷⁶ Jessop (1990, p. 27) notes, this approach can be found in the classic texts such as that of Engels, Lenin, Bukharin, and Gramsci, despite that it is commonly associated with Poulantzas.

⁷⁷ Jessop (1990, p. 27) notes, this approach can be found especially in Marxist-Leninist accounts.

power that emerges at a certain stage of division of labor.⁷⁸ Lastly, the sixth approach sees the state as a *system of political domination with specific effects on the class struggle*, with a focus on the forms of political representation and state intervention, examining them with reference to the long-term interests of a particular class or class fraction.⁷⁹

According to Jessop (1990), while the second approach runs the risk of reducing “the impact of the state to a simple temporal deformation of economic development ... and of economic class struggle” (p. 27), the third approach “fails to specify the nature of the state as a factor of cohesion and/or to identify the means through which the state realizes its function” (p. 27). Therefore, as Jessop states, seeing the state as the factor of cohesion cannot explain the class nature of the state; and, “unless one can specify the mechanisms of cohesion and its limitations, it becomes difficult to explain the emergence of revolutionary crises and the transition from one epoch to another” (p. 27). As for the fourth approach, Jessop claims that seeing the state as an instrument means to assume that it is neutral, which can be used by any class or social force with equal facility and effectiveness, while “(t)his approach also encounters difficulties in situations where the economically dominant class does not actually fill the key positions in the state apparatus” (p. 27) as in the case of landed aristocracy of the nineteenth century Britain and encounters difficulties also in those instances when “the state acquires a considerable measure of independence from the dominant class” (p. 27) as in the case of Louis Bonaparte’s Second French Empire and Bismarck’s German Reich (p. 28). The fifth approach, according to Jessop, tends to end in epiphenomenalism, institutionalism, and/or descriptive accounts on account of the absence of conjunctural analyses while this approach “implies that the functions, effects and class nature of the state cannot be determined *a priori*, but depend on the relations between its institutional structure and the class struggle” (p. 28). As for the sixth approach, Jessop sees this approach as the most fruitful in case it is

⁷⁸ Jessop (1990, p. 28) notes, this approach can be found in both the works of Engels and Lenin. See especially *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (Engels, 1884) and *The State and Revolution* (Lenin, 1917).

⁷⁹ Jessop (1990, p. 28) notes, this approach is best illustrated in Lenin’s (1917) remark considering the democratic republic as the best possible political shell for capitalism and that the change of persons, institutions, or parties cannot shake the rule of capital once the democratic form of state is established. This approach, Jessop notes, can be also found in the discussions on Paris Commune.

accompanied with the institutional definition of the state and if it is supported by the concrete analysis of the institutions (p. 28), which would otherwise end in sophisticated attempts of establishing “theoretical guarantees that the state in a capitalist society necessarily functions on behalf of capital” (p. 29). As against Offe’s argument that the state’s function of reproducing capital is ensured by the internal organization of the state, Jessop (1990) insists that “state power can be more or less capitalist depending on the situation” (p. 29).

As for the standpoint of the present thesis as regards these six points identified by Jessop, it is as such: As for seeing the state as *parasitic*, here, it is held that any institution hindering further liberty of the human is parasitic to a certain extent, including the state; denoting a parallel with the anarchist accounts that conceptualize the state as a parasitic institution. But this does not follow that any non-state is non-parasitic. On the contrary, any institution hindering human beings’ survival and self-development (without harm to the survival and self-development of others who do not harm that of others; with the acknowledgment that this echoes utilitarian principles) is seen as parasitic. Besides, not only institutions, but also social collectivities such as exploiting social classes or individuals hindering the survival and self-development are seen as parasitic. Therefore, seeing the state as a parasitic institution does not follow that the market (as a part of the realm of the non-state) or the institutions embodied in the so-called ‘civil society’ (with reference to its meaning excluding the state) are non-parasitic. On the contrary, the state of being parasitic is embodied in social relations again in a micro-macro range. Thus, although there is no sympathy to any version of liberalism (whether its pluralist or anarchist versions) based on the defense of the market economy, here, there is some degree of closeness to anarchist accounts for their skepticism concerning the embodied relations of domination, despite that the author of the present thesis sees the hold of the state power by anti-class forces as a necessary phase of transition to non-state societies (cf. the anti-anarchist accounts of Lenin, 1917; Marx, 1875; Marx & Engels, 1848).

As for the second approach Jessop identified on treating the state as *epiphenomena* or not; here, it is held that once state is produced by non-state and/or other-state elements, its form, rules, and elements themselves become among the ‘material transforming forces’ rather than the simple secondary mental phenomena caused by

and accompanying the economy without any casual influence itself. In this respect, a parallel can be drawn with the state centered approaches that consider the state as an entity with a structure of its own; the actions of which cannot be reduced to the responses given to pressures of social classes and groups; with the acknowledgment that bureaucracy, here, is not treated as a social class with interests of its own and the state is not treated as an institution engendering special common interests stemming from its structural location in the society (cf. the criticism of state-centered approach in Jessop, 1990; Miliband, 1983).

As for the third approach that Jessop identified as the state as the *factor of cohesion*; if cohesion is not conceptualized as synonymous to harmony or the consent of the masses, the state may be seen as a factor of cohesion (among other factors of cohesion); since, insofar the official authority (whether a monarch or the alleged representative of the nation) continues to exercise the power with a claim of sovereignty over a particular territory, regardless of the presence/lack of consent of the masses, a *degree* of success in holding the elements of the society *in the territory* can be assumed to exist on the part of those whose collective long-term interests the state practices favor as against their antagonistic sides. However, if ‘cohesion’ is conceptualized as uniting the elements of the society by means of mainly consent through concessions and ideological processes; then, this thesis does not hold the state as a necessary factor of cohesion. Unlike the theories assuming a state of ‘tacit consent’⁸⁰ with reference to residence or benefiting the services provided by the state in a whether so-called ‘free state’ or not (Locke, 2005, pp. 36, 37; Rousseau, 1762, p. 51; cf. Hume, 1777, p. 203); the presence of individuals living in a country without active protests, with majority of ‘yes’ votes in a referendum for constitution, and even votes to pro-capitalist political parties are not necessarily seen as the indicators of consent of the inhabitants to the capitalist (dis)order. Actually, there is not much alternative for an individual discontented with a current state, but continue to live in a particular society; since although that particular individual may prefer living in a classless society for example, she may simply not see it as a viable alternative in the short or long run and may prefer a lesser evil among the alternatives she sees viable or may simply stay silent. Actually, in a world divided by country borders, the control over the borders is itself a force over the majority of the people pushing them to live

⁸⁰ For a discussion on ‘tacit consent’ see Wolff (1996).

in a particular society. Besides, even if there were no borders, still the question remains: 'Is there a place in perfect conformity with the desires of the person where she can move?' If the answer is negative, cohesion, in its consent-loaded meaning, is seen not as a necessary attribute, but as a partial, tendential, and non-necessary characteristic of the capitalist state. As for the apparatus unity of the state, it is held to exist only to the extent that there is some degree of conformity of its elements parallel to the biased selectivity of the state, which is structured by the *de jure* or *de facto* binding rules pushing its elements towards particular paths of action (cf. Jessop, 1990, on state's structural selectivity, its tendential substantive institutional unity, and its function of maintaining social cohesion).

As for the fourth approach that Jessop identified as the state as an *instrument* of class rule, unlike Poulantzas's (2000) claims that this means to see the state as external and unlike Jessop's (1990) claims that this means to see the state as neutral; not all those claimed to be instrumentalist treat the state as they are alleged to do. Besides, there are hardly any references in the works of Poulantzas and Jessop which prove that Miliband, for example, saw the state as exclusively external or absolutely neutral. As long as the laws are treated as non-neutral (as Miliband did) and the state networks (including the state form) are considered to be structured by the laws in effect to some degree, how can it be possible to claim that Miliband has treated the state as neutral? To return back to the question of whether to treat the state as an instrument or not, regardless of this legal biased form, a number of examples (some of which will be mentioned in the next chapter) indicates that state positions (and even some top positions) can be, in part, occupied by those defending working class' collective long-term interests in a capitalist society, and sometimes state-power can be used to favor the anti-capitalist forces. Therefore, here, the present thesis holds that insofar the state is structured by its legal arrangements in a biased way (whether those laws are enforced by a monarch or representative assembly), it is in no way neutral. However, to the extent that its power is open to the hold of those relatively not-favored and favored (in terms of the existing legal structure), among its other features, the state, with its legally defined positions, can be treated also as a *non-neutral instrument*, or better, an entity composed of non-neutral instruments, the incumbents (if not necessarily the laws) of which endow it a contradictory character. This issue will be

elaborated in the below sections further with reference to the micro-macro link and hold of state power.

As for the fifth approach that Jessop identified as treating the state as *a set of institutions*, here, with respect to the class character of those institutions, it is held that, only to the extent that the laws favor a particular class (and its particular short and/or long term interests), institutions of the state structured by those laws reflect the class character of the state. Other factors moving beyond those laws (meanwhile those laws themselves may have –and they generally have- a contradictory character) are treated as reflecting the subjective, not the institutional side (meanwhile that institutional side is generally contradictory and the institutional side can be considered as the legalized subjectivity) of the state’s class character (e.g. communist practices of the army commanders in a capitalist society). Although the need for regulating the complex social relations in a society with its increasing division of labor may require the presence of coordinating and intervening hubs, theoretically, there is no need for that coordination to take place exclusively in the legally defined state positions, even in capitalist societies. For example, the function of the ‘central bank’, ‘licenses’, ‘public works’ can be undertaken by those enterprises, organizations, or networks in non-state positions, which may be still exposed to legal regulations. But still, the present thesis holds that the state’s major distinguishing characteristic is its legally defined state positions, which at the same time make up its institutions, while, similar to Miliband, the political system and relations are not seen as restricted to the state and the state positions/institutions. Therefore, the state of being exposed to ‘not-directly economic’ class struggles or being exposed to state regulations or public law does not make an institution necessarily a part of the state. For example, although the institution of ‘family’ may be exposed to utilization for capitalist interests (in addition to possible other interests), and even though it is exposed to the regulation of the state, it is not conceptualized as state apparatus. The conceptualization of the state in an opposite direction renders the borders of the concept ‘state’ vague and blurred, stripping it of its analytical power; making it almost impossible to properly identify the state and non-state, ending in a loss of meaning, and the inability to demarcate particular sets of institutions/relations from some others which have some major distinctive characteristics despite their shared ones with that of the state.

Lastly, as for the sixth approach, which is seeing the state as a *system of political domination with specific effects on the class struggle*, although here, state is seen as a privileged site of political domination on account of its power to influence social relations and structures on a wide spectrum (including the class struggle), ‘political domination’ is not conceptualized to be restricted to the ‘state’ or ‘state positions’. This is not to deny the crucial impact of different state forms over the organization capacity, interests, and struggles of social classes; since as Trotsky (1971) argued in his *The Struggle against Fascism*, the state form (e.g. the state in a parliamentary republic granting the citizens bourgeois constitutional liberties, the state ruled by fascists in a mono-party regime with active mass support) does make change in providing opportunities and imposing constraints over class forces, with vital implications over struggle strategies. Besides, the state form does have impact over the perceptions of many people as regards the way they perceive the state. Yet, all those forms are still, legal forms, made possible by armed force (provided by the state and/or non-state armed elements). Therefore, still, what is unique to ‘state’ as against other armed and/or political institutions, is again its official authority, granted by laws, taking its power from the armed forces strong enough to impose that official authority over the territory. Therefore, the state is seen as a unique (not exclusive) form of political domination in addition to its other features.

Having clarified at least a few points with respect to the six points raised by Jessop, now, a few further characteristics of the state will be elaborated with reference to Marx and Engels texts. This will enable to further clarify the length of the distance from the very classic texts of Marxism. First, the materialist conception of history is going to be briefly evaluated. In ‘Socialism: Utopian and Scientific’, Engels (1880) explained the materialist conception of history as such:

The materialist conception of history starts from the proposition that the production of the means to support human life and, next to production, the exchange of things produced, is the basis of all social structure; that in every society that has appeared in history, the manner in which wealth is distributed and society divided into classes or orders is dependent upon what is produced, how it is produced, and how the products are exchanged. From this point of view, the final causes of all social changes and

political revolutions are to be sought ... not in the *philosophy*, but in the *economics* of each particular epoch. (p. 35)

In 'The German Ideology', Marx and Engels (1846) also wrote:

This conception of history depends on our ability to expound the real process of production, starting out from the material production of life itself, and to comprehend the form of intercourse connected with this and created by this mode of production (i.e. civil society in its various stages), as the basis of all history; and to show it in its action as State, to explain all the different theoretical products and forms of consciousness, religion, philosophy, ethics, etc. etc. and trace their origins and growth from that basis; by which means, of course, the whole thing can be depicted in its totality (and therefore, too, the reciprocal action of these various sides on one another). (p. 17)

Thus, Marx and Engels evaluated the state with reference to the social relations rooted in the material relations of production,⁸¹ rather than treating the state as a separate institution with ends and means on its own beyond class struggles unlike the state-centered approaches that, as was mentioned before, treat the state as an entity with a structure of its own and the actions of which cannot be simply explained as a response to the interests of social classes or groups.⁸² In this respect, Marx and Engels's society-centered approach, and their location of the production relations and the class struggles (derived from production relations) to the heart of social phenomenon have a strong analytical power. Indeed, the system of production of goods and services, and especially the social domain comprising the exploitation of the majority by the minority⁸³ requires the penetration into several other cross-cutting

⁸¹ For Marx's standpoint on the issue of relationship between the state and civil society also see 'On the Jewish Question' (Marx, 1843, esp. pp. 16, 17).

⁸² The state centered approach can be considered to be coming from the Weberian tradition and can also be evaluated in the category of the institutionalist approach which has a number of variations. Meanwhile, according to Thelen and Steinmo (1992) "Institutional analyses do not deny the broad political forces that animate various theories of politics: class structure in Marxism, group dynamics in pluralism. Instead, they point to the ways that institutions structure these battles and in so doing, influence their outcomes." (p. 3).

⁸³ Meaning that, those social classes which involves the exploitation of those laborers by an approximately equal number of exploiters (e.g. exploitation of house-laborers by house lords/madams or house bosses, the more concrete example of which is the thousands of years

domains in a relatively centralized manner, accompanied with relatively centralized means of violence. Due to this characteristic of the relatively centralized *the minority exploiter versus the majority exploited class relations* as in the case of the slave owners and slaves; feudal lords and serfs, capitalists and wage-workers; values, ideas, beliefs, institutions, and cultural/political coordination/regulation bodies may become exposed to the relatively centralized intervention of the exploiting minority class interests stemming from their structural location in the production process. Besides, since the material means, to a certain extent, has the power to meet the physical and emotional needs/desires of the individuals, their hold results in their relative (if not absolute) satisfaction, while their relative lack along with the relatively centralized domination relations may radically challenge the individual's physical and emotional well-being.⁸⁴ Nevertheless, insofar the means for survival do not always require being a member of an exploiting class, an exploited class member may be contented with even the feeling of survival, and therefore may not enter in any protest. However, since individuals are at the same time emotional beings and since, at the same time, their physical/emotional desires may move beyond the threshold of physical survival, individuals (and primarily the exploited class elements) may be involved in revolt with the expectation of further material resources for themselves (or for those who/which they care about, which may include as specific as those with kinship ties or as abstract as the 'future generations' or the 'humanity') and/or with such feelings as justice, revenge, freedom, or power. And structural class positions both put constraints and offer opportunities for the realization such desires (stemming from physical and/or emotional motives, which generally are found as the intermixture of both). Therefore, the present thesis treats the 'state' as the epiphenomenon of the production relations to the extent that the exploiting minority class is in need of

exploitation of women's domestic labor by men, with the acknowledgment that this generalization does not cover all men and women) may not have as much macro-political centralized effects as those social classes which emerge on the basis of exploitation of the majority by the minority, since while the latter one requires repressive measures in a more centralized form, repressive measures in the former one may be in effect in a relatively dispersed manner when resorted to (e.g. violence at home).

⁸⁴ Indeed, not only the individual's relative material deprivation, but also the suffering (physical or emotional) of those whom she cares about because of lack of material means may push a person to rebel. For example a worker may go on a strike not only because she may want more directly for herself, but also because she may want more for her children (e.g. better health services, education, food for them), with the acknowledgment that the latter is again for the satisfaction of the desires of the worker herself since it is an outcome of her emotional motives.

relatively centralized means of intervention to exploit, while the state power present an invaluable opportunity for this intervention to continue its exploitation, even if the state is not the mere means of intervention. This, nevertheless, does not exclude the possibility of, for example non-capitalist state elements acting on behalf of the, for example capitalist, class interests on account of their physical/emotional needs/desires.⁸⁵ To the extent that the social institutions, the cognitive framework and the motives of the individuals are influenced by production relations (as an outcome of the class forces' intentional practices and/or as the side effects of the production relations themselves),⁸⁶ production relations are treated among the factors steering the individual actions. And actually, they are seen as among the two central factors (if the other central factor is seen as the neuro-physiological mechanisms) if the economy is conceptualized in its inclusive sense (which is discussed in the footnotes). Therefore, this thesis employs materialist accounts with reference to the structural position occupied in the production process which provides the material means⁸⁷ for the satisfaction of physical and emotional needs/desires only in relative (but privileged) terms, acknowledging the importance of conditioning for material resources with reference to the opportunities and constraints imposed by the structural position occupied in the production process (loaded with some degree of behaviorism), but in a way providing some space for the explanation of individual differences among the incumbents of identical economic structural locations (e.g. a capitalist becoming anti-capitalist).

To return back to Marx and Engels once more, in their texts, although the material relations of production (in the way they load the meaning) constitute the central aspect, they are treated generally as the privileged variable, rather than the mere variable for structuring the social. This emphasis on decisiveness can be detected from their classical 'the last resort' emphasis as in the 'Ludwig Feuerbach and the

⁸⁵ E.g. for receiving money, for becoming a part of the government, for serving the common good, for serving the interests of those perceived as powerful/powerless in addition to numerous other motives.

⁸⁶ E.g. the motive of individual competition enhanced by the capitalist market economy; motives shaped/triggered by the produced goods/services, their advertisement, and the symbols primarily designed to signify them with the potential to impregnate further motives; the motive of controlling or taking more share from the production process.

⁸⁷ Here, 'production' is loaded with its narrow meaning and what is referred to is *not* the 'production in general', while 'production in general' includes the ideas themselves.

End of Classical German Philosophy’ where Engels (1886) stressed that “the state is not an independent domain with an independent development, but one whose existence as well as development is to be explained in the last resort by the economic conditions of life of society” (p. 30), with the acknowledgment that this ‘last resort’ emphasis has a very strong potential to end in reductionist accounts as the following excerpt from Engels indicates:

... all political struggles are class struggles, and all class struggles for emancipation, despite their necessarily political form — for every class struggle is a political struggle — turn ultimately on the question of *economic* emancipation. Therefore, here at least, the state — the political order — is the subordination, and civil society — the realm of economic relations — the decisive element. (Engels, 1886, p. 29)

Although, here, there is a reduction of all political struggles to class struggles and the question of economic emancipation (quite different than the conceptualization and approach of the present thesis), still there are several Marx and Engels texts escaping from this reductionism. For example, in the ‘Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts’ (Marx, 1844b), it was written that; “... private right, morality, family, civil society, state, etc., continue to exist, but have become moments and modes of human existence which are meaningless in isolation but which mutually dissolve and engender one another. They are moments of movement.” (p. 104). In this excerpt, Marx’s analysis is far from being reductionist and mechanical, relating the social phenomenon to modes of human *existence*. Yet, since the realm denoting the ‘economy’ is treated in a restricted way in Marx and Engels texts,⁸⁸ it must be conceded that Marx and Engels’s emphases on the determinacy of production relations (in the way they conceptualize the production relations)⁸⁹ over other social

⁸⁸ In contrast to the inclusive conceptualization of the economy as the realm of the production and distribution process of goods and/services which meet or which are thought to meet individual or relatively collective short/long term desires, whether perceived to be ethical or unethical, whether tangible or intangible, whether they actually meet those desires or not.

⁸⁹ For example, contrast Marx’s approach to Lourdes Beneria’s (1981) conceptualization of economic activity criticizing the conventional definitions of economic activity and labor force concepts via suggesting to make a distinction between use value and exchange value (as Marx did) and to consider the labor engaged in the use value production as ‘active labor’. Beneria’s leading work’s critical approach has much contributed to later discussions on the mainstream (that is malestream as several feminist economists have argued) conceptualization of the economy. However, in case the treatment of the use value as restricted to tangible goods is

relations or values and ideas gave rise to reductionist accounts in several Marxist texts. Regardless of this reductionist tendency, the virtues of their privileged treatment of production relations, and their point on the interconnectedness of the economic and political outweigh the defects of their approach, especially because their approach highlighted the reflections of production relations over several fields of the social (and perceptions of the individuals) as against the shallow accounts reducing equality to the legal realm and those liberal accounts conceptualizing the liberal state as a neutral entity in defense of the common good. Revealing a number of mechanisms generating several forms of subjection with reference to production relations via moving beyond appearances is the virtue of their critical approach, which is evident in several Marx and Engels texts with realist accounts,⁹⁰ and in particular those against idealism.⁹¹

Now, as for the other point to draw the distance from Marx and Engels texts, it is the mode of representation of class interests in the state apparatus with reference to the degree of multiplicity and unity. Actually, Marx and Engels saw the capitalist state as

also put away; then the conceptualization of economy and the treatment of economic activity/relations would arrive at further theoretical coherence. Indeed, if not only the production of tangible goods, but also services with market orientation are treated as a part of the economic realm in the mainstream economy, there is no legitimate theoretical grounds to exclude the non-commodity forms of goods and services from the realm of the economy insofar 'utility' is the major criteria, while the criteria of scarcity is itself a matter of question (for example consider the activity of a person talking with his only friend once a year). Besides, except from market orientation, if both the slave working for cleaning the house of his owner and the slave cultivating the land of his owner are seen as being engaged in economic activity; and also if a person cultivating his own land not for the market but for self-subsistence is considered to be engaged in economic activity, then there would be again no legitimate theoretical grounds of excluding a woman's (or a man's) labor spent for cleaning the house or cooking the meal (whether only she benefits or also others benefit from that activity) from the category of economic activity.

⁹⁰ For example, the 'camera obscura' metaphor in 'The German Ideology' (Marx & Engels, 1846, p. 9) that approaches the 'ideology' as 'the inversion of reality' implying the idea that sometimes the appearances refer to illusions and the distorted forms of realities. Also in those Marx and Engels texts that mention about 'class consciousness' (for example the 'class for itself' in Marx, 1857, p. 98) and the 'disparity between reality and appearance' (for example on 'fetishism of commodities' in Marx, 1867, pp. 29-35), the realist approach is again apparent. For a realist theory of science see especially Bhaskar (1978); for the relevance of realism to Marx's approach also see Keat and Urry (1978, esp. pp. 96-118); Ollman (1993).

⁹¹ For example Engels's (1886) criticism of Hegel in 'Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy' for remaining hung up on appearances and seeing "in the state the determining element, and in civil society the element determined by it" (p. 29) and his stress that the case is just the opposite (p. 30).

the representative of the whole bourgeoisie, which is subject to political struggles, and which may be dominated by a particular faction or coalition at the disadvantage of others. However, their emphasis was more on the unity than dispersion. For example, as for the emphasis on general class interests, the following excerpt from ‘Communist Manifesto’ is the most famous one: “The executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie” (Marx & Engels, 1848, p. 5). ‘Socialism: Utopian and Scientific’ also illustrates the state as the “official representative of capitalist society” (Engels, 1880, p. 41) as against the challenges not only from workers but also individual capitalists:

... the modern State, again, is only the organization that bourgeois society takes on in order to support the external conditions of the capitalist mode of production against the encroachments as well of the workers as of individual capitalists. The modern state, no matter what its form, is essentially a capitalist machine — the state of the capitalists, the ideal personification of the total national capital. (Engels, 1880, p. 42)

There are also several texts where factional struggles striving for state power are recognized, but which end in the emphasis on the representation of the general capitalist interests. For example, the following excerpt from ‘The Civil War in France’ is an indicator of the acknowledgment of both the dispute among rival factions of ruling classes and the concentration tendency as against the working class movement (expressed as the growth of antagonism between capital and labor below):

During the subsequent regimes, the government, placed under parliamentary control — that is, under the direct control of the propertied classes — became not only a hotbed of huge national debts and crushing taxes; with its irresistible allurements of place, pelf, and patronage, it became not only the bone of contention between the rival factions and adventurers of the ruling classes; but its political character changed simultaneously with the economic changes of society. At the same pace at which the progress of modern industry developed, widened, intensified the class antagonism between capital and labor, the state power assumed more and more the character of the national power of capital over labor, of a public force organized for social enslavement, of an engine of class despotism. (Marx, 1871a, p. 33)

Also in ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon’, again, both the existence of general class interests and particular factional interests are realized (the co-existence of dispersion and concentration tendencies):

The parliamentary republic was more than the neutral territory on which the two factions of the French bourgeoisie, Legitimists and Orleanists, large landed property and industry, could dwell side by side with equality of rights. It was the unavoidable condition of their common rule, the sole form of state in which their general class interest subjected to itself at the same time both the claims of their particular factions and all the remaining classes of society. (Marx, 1852, p. 58)

Regardless of the recognition of the representation of both factional and general capitalist interests, it is possible to detect that their focus remained on unity rather than within class struggle of the bourgeoisie in several Marx and Engels texts. Poulantzas (1975a) has also noted that there is a contradictory treatment of the ensemble of factions in Marx and Engels texts. According to him, while one usage refers to ‘fusion’, implying the “expressive totality composed of ‘equivalent elements’” (p. 237); the other usage refers to their non-equal treatment with an implication of the hegemonic fraction.⁹² This confusion, Poulantzas argued, owes to the lack of the concept ‘power bloc’, which “does not constitute the expressive totality of equivalent elements, but a complex contradictory unity in dominance” (p. 237). According to Poulantzas:

This is how the *concept of hegemony* can be applied to *one* class or fraction within the power bloc. This hegemonic class or fraction is in fact the *dominant* element of the contradictory unity of politically ‘*dominant*’ classes or fractions, forming part of the power bloc. (Poulantzas, 1975a, p. 237)

Therefore, according to Poulantzas;

(i) the power bloc constitutes a contradictory unity of *politically dominant* classes and fractions *under the protection of the hegemonic fraction*; (ii) the class struggles,

⁹² As Poulantzas (1975a) argues, both types of handling the congregation of the dominant fractions can be detected in Marx and Engels texts especially with reference to the big landowners, financial bourgeoisie and industrial bourgeoisie. For example, see ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire’ (Marx, 1852); ‘The Class Struggles in France’ (Marx, 1850).

the rivalry between the interests of these social forces, is *constantly present*, since these interests retain their specific character of antagonism. (Poulantzas, 1975a, p. 237)

Here, Poulantzas's insistence on the constant rivalry of social forces is extremely important, denoting the dynamic, rather than the static side of the ensemble of class fractions. However, Poulantzas further made a distinction between the concept of power bloc and alliance for denoting different modes of unity, with a number of implications for the analysis of the capitalist state. According to Poulantzas (1975a), while *alliance* can take place between the elements (classes and fractions) both within and outside the power bloc; the *power bloc* establishes a threshold beyond which the contradictions between the elements of the power bloc can be clearly distinguished between those elements and the other allied classes or fractions. The other point of departure between power bloc and alliance is, according to Poulantzas, that; while the power bloc offers a *relative* unity at all levels of the class struggle (economic, political, and ideological), alliance generally functions only at one level as in the case of the political alliance between the power bloc and petit bourgeoisie regardless of the intense economic struggle against the latter (p. 241). Poulantzas further argued that power bloc should not be confused with long-term alliance (p. 242) and that displacements of the threshold between the power bloc and alliance may or may not end in a shift in the form of state, although it generally happens to be so "when these displacements are due to a combined transformation of the factors producing the power bloc" (p. 243). Meanwhile, it is even possible for the hegemonic class or fraction to be absent from the political scene (p. 249). The party of an element of the power bloc, for example, may be defeated in the elections, but it may still remain in the power bloc (pp. 248, 249). What unifies the power bloc, according to Poulantzas, is the state. According to him, the state "is the *unifying factor* of the power bloc" while the unity of the state is derived from the "plurality of dominant classes and fractions, in so far as their relation is incapable of functioning by means of a share-out of power and needs the state as the organizational factor of their strictly political unity" (p. 300). Poulantzas (2000) further argued that the state is the representative and organizer of the long-term political interests of the power bloc, composed of a number of bourgeois fractions in addition to possible dominant classes from other modes of production present in the capitalist social formation (p. 127) although "(t)he

State concentrates not only ... power bloc, *but also the relationship between that bloc and dominated classes*” (p. 140) while “popular struggles traverse the State from top to bottom” (p. 141).

Now, a brief evaluation of Poulantzas’s distinction between the power bloc and alliances, and the conceptualization of the state as the organizer of the power bloc (but at the same time as the site of class struggles) will provide the opportunity to explain, at least partially, the present thesis’ author’s approach concerning the limits of unity. To start with, Poulantzas’s point in his ‘State, Power, Socialism’ approaching the capitalist state as the representative of the long-term interests of the constituents of the power bloc is a useful one, if that characteristic is not attributed to only the state, and if the state is not seen as the necessary or mere organizer of those interests (since there may be a number of individuals, associations, communities, and combinations defending/representing the long-term interests of a bloc as against the interests of their rival/antagonistic side). However, without specifying what the ‘other’ or the ‘common threat’ is, it is quite difficult to draw the boundaries of the bloc. Since, although the concept ‘power bloc’ denotes a positive capacity to realize particular interests; it also denotes a threshold (as Poulantzas suggests) separating the ruling classes/sections from the relatively ruled (whose, for example, long-term interests are excluded from the predominant legal structure of the state).

However, in practice, it is not much easy to draw this line. Long-term interest criterion is, indeed, a useful one for this end. Therefore, perhaps, a generalization can be made as such: As against those forces attacking the private ownership of means of production in general, the exploiting propertied classes are likely to unite as against this common threat. However, when such a common threat is weak or perceived to be insignificant, it becomes quite difficult to fix the threshold. For example, while Mafioso power may be a significant one, the elements of which at the same time hold substantial state power, the laws and form of the state may seem to favor the not-directly armed bourgeoisie (conventional bourgeoisie), outlawing the mafia business and bands.⁹³ In such a case, to claim that the power bloc is composed of the

⁹³ With the acknowledgment that such laws may have both a positive and negative side for the Mafiosi: Positive; in the sense that an outlawed illegal act may sometimes bring more material

conventional capitalists and Mafioso (capitalist) lords/madams would be quite difficult, especially if large segments of the conventional bourgeoisie try to defeat, rather than collaborate with the Mafia gangs. But in such a case, it would be also hardly claimed that the power bloc is restricted to the segments of the conventional bourgeoisie in the face of the real power the Mafiosi possesses. Besides, there are further difficulties in demarcating those in and out the power bloc especially when the cement of the power bloc is claimed to be ‘ideology’.⁹⁴ Indeed, both the dominant and the official ideology in a country may be communism and there may be a *de jure* ban over the private ownership of means of production, but the *de facto* ownership of certain legal and illegal enterprises may belong to certain state elements (see Chapter 2). It is true that the state structure is biased especially on account of the laws defining the state positions, granting opportunities and putting constraints over the interests/actions of those inside (and sometimes even outside) the country occupying different positions (whether a dictator or a representative assembly makes those laws). However, although official laws generally constitute an important aspect regulating and intervening in social life, the *actual* power holders may, at least partially and sometimes to a considerable extent, challenge this structural *de jure* selectivity regardless of –as will be discussed in below sections- the vitality of the laws generally and considerably (if not always and absolutely) shaping the actions of the state elements. Analyzing the *de facto* power structures without restricting the analysis to the structural *de jure* selectivity of the state would make the effect of ultrasound, providing the opportunity to detect further lines of power structures and the factors enabling and threatening further hubs of power. Even if the examined question is the *relative* (and/or contradictory) unity, a focus on the questions ‘who hold how much power on account of which factors in which context’ in a manner to move beyond the examination of the state’s structural selectivity and state effects would enable a more thorough analysis, and enable to highlight the concrete

gains, and negative; in the sense that the state elements empowered to implement those laws constitute a constant threat to the survival/relative freedom of the Mafiosi and mafia business.

⁹⁴ Meanwhile, it should be conceded that Poulantzas made a distinction between those within the power bloc and outside the power bloc in this respect. He wrote: “The general interest represented vis-à-vis the dominant classes by this hegemonic fraction depends in the last analysis on the place of exploitation which they hold in the process of production. The general interest represented vis-à-vis the ensemble of society (and therefore vis-à-vis dominated classes) by this fraction depends on the ideological function of the hegemonic fraction” (Poulantzas, 1975a, p. 240).

phenomenon in further precision, with the opportunity to draw conclusions for action strategies in a relatively solid way. Shifting the focus of the analysis to also the factors acting upon the conflict and alliance generating motives would give further details of the picture, with again implications for strategies to handle those motives, rather than remaining at the level of overgeneralizations in strategy formation.

Therefore, the present thesis is in conformity with the classical Marxist accounts in that; in the face of the rising power of those forces with the aim of eliminating the private ownership of means of production, the elements of the exploiting classes, which privately own the means of production are likely to unite (though in a contradictory way as Poulantzas suggests) due to the perceived common threat. For example, as against the communists; feudal lords, capitalists, and Mafioso (capitalist) lords/madams may make alliances while this alliance may also include those forces defending the short-term interests of non-exploiting categories (e.g. associations of the self-employed, some labor unions). However, it is also possible for the pro-capitalist forces and pro-worker forces to unite against a common perceived threat as in the case of alliances made between various forces on the side of short and/or long-term interests of the conventional (not directly armed) capitalist sectors and wage-workers (in addition to possible other non-class sectors) as against the rising Mafia power.

As for the bourgeois democratic regimes (which is, here, not treated as the essentially 'normal' state form in capitalist societies, regardless of its prevalence in the contemporary world); generally the concentration and dispersion tendency take place simultaneously with respect to the interests of the capitalist elements. For example, in such regimes, the laws regulating competition, prohibiting bribery, and obstructing the amalgamation of those running private businesses with salaried state positions can be interpreted as the pro-capitalist attempts of setting and enforcing standards and rules binding individual capitalists on account of capitalist competition through forcing individual state elements to obey the *rule of law*, although those standards are at the same time exposed to erosion on account of again capitalist competition itself; that is within capitalist class struggles. Actually, in bourgeois democratic regimes, antagonistic/within/other class/category struggles can be held responsible for giving rise to a patchwork picture alongside a picture of centralization concerning state

power while for the tendency of centralization the partial responsibility of attempts of setting standards and rules binding individual capitalists on account of capitalist competition (which are at the same time exposed to erosion on account of again capitalist competition) should be conceded (that is the co-existence of the concentration and dispersion tendencies). In the following two sections, how it is possible to theorize both the dispersion and concentration of power side by side within state networks in capitalist societies will be discussed in a micro-macro range. As for section 3.4, as against the pluralist claims of impossibility of regular concentration of power in a few hands at the expense of other groups in liberal democracies; in line with the Marxist accounts, it will be asserted that talking about the capitalist class as the ruling class when it holds *the* state power is possible. But at the same time, the possibility of a micro-macro level hold of state power will be also acknowledged, denoting some degree of dispersion not only concerning social classes, but also other groups in the society. The method in doing this will be again specifying the borders of the 'hold' of power, rather than refusing to apply the concept of power to the state. Next section will start with an elaboration on conceptualization of power.

3.4 Exercise and Hold of State Power: A Multilevel Hold

Although in the above pages, the closeness and distance to pluralist, elitist, state-centered, anarchist and Marxist accounts have been clarified to a certain extent; still, there is a tension between the tendential multiplicity and tendential unity as regards the hold of state power, since although the pluralist accounts asserting the lack of domination over state power by a single group is, here, held to be incorrect, the classical Marxist accounts reducing the political struggles to exclusively class struggles and the hold of state power exclusively to the owners of means of production is also quite distant to the standpoint of the present thesis. For discussing the possibility and limits of making totalizing statements in terms of hold of state power (and such statements will be made), first, what is meant by 'state power' has to be clarified.

Actually, there are different conceptualizations of power in social theory. In this respect, Hindess and Helliwell (1999) identified three meanings among several others

in the *Oxford English Dictionary* as the ones used in discussions of social life. The first one is the conceptualization of power as the ‘possession of control or command over others’, which is the one most sociologists mean by ‘power’, while the second one refers to the ‘legal ability, capacity or authority to act; especially delegated authority’. The third one is the one which has become popular in contemporary sociology with Foucault’s elaboration while the definition is the ‘ability to do or affect something or anything’. While the first two denote “one’s *capacity* to exercise control or command over others”, the third one refers “to one’s ability to ‘make a difference’ in the world” (p. 74).

Hindess and Helliwell (1999) further mentioned about Lukes’s argument that there are three aspects or dimensions of power:

1. the dimension which operates to determine the outcome of direct conflict
2. the dimension which operates behind the scenes so as to exclude certain interests from direct public conflict in the first place
3. the dimension which operates on people’s thoughts and desires. (p. 76)

It is argued that the ‘liberal’ view of power is ‘one-dimensional’ in the sense that it focuses on only the first-dimension, while the ‘reformist’ view focuses on the first two; making it the ‘two-dimensional’ one. The third one, which Lukes and several Marxists hold, is the ‘three-dimensional’ or ‘radical’ view of power, holding that the socialization processes constitute a part of the exercise of power (Hindess & Helliwell, 1999, pp. 76-78).

The present thesis also shares Lukes’s three-dimensional conceptualization of power. As for whether to define the power as ‘one’s *capacity* to exercise control or command over others’ or ‘one’s ability to ‘make a difference’ in the world’; while power is seen as the capacity to make a difference (to make work), the first one is associated with the ‘hold of power’ requiring a distinction between the ‘exercise’ and ‘hold’ of power; the distinction which Foucault raises an objection. The following excerpt on power is quite explanatory of Foucault’s standpoint. He wrote:

Now, the study of micro-physics presupposes that the power exercised on the body is conceived not as a property, but as a strategy, that its effects of domination are attributed not to 'appropriation', but dispositions, manoeuvres, tactics, techniques, functionings; that one should decipher in it a network of relations, constantly in tension, in activity, rather than a privilege that one might possess; that one should take as its model a perpetual battle rather than a contract regulating a transaction or the conquest of territory. In short this power is exercised rather than possessed; it is not the 'privilege', acquired or preserved, of the dominant class, but the overall effect of its strategic positions – an effect that is manifested and sometimes extended by the position of those who are dominated. Furthermore, this power is not exercised simply as an obligation or a prohibition on those who 'do not have it'; it invests them, is transmitted by them and through them; it exerts pressure upon them, just as they themselves, in their struggle against it, resist the grip it has on them. This means that these relations go right down into the depths of society, that they are not localized in the relations between the state and its citizens or on the frontier between classes and that they do not merely reproduce, at the level of individuals, bodies, gestures and behaviour, the general form of the law or government; that, although there is continuity (they are indeed articulated on this form through a whole series of complex mechanisms), there is neither analogy nor homology, but a specificity of mechanism and modality. Lastly, they are not univocal; they define innumerable points of confrontation, focuses of instability, each of which has its own risks of conflicts, of struggles, and of an at least temporary inversion of the power relations. The overthrow of these 'micro-powers' does not, then, obey the law of all or nothing; it is not acquired once and for all by a new control of the apparatuses nor by a new functioning or a destruction of the institutions; on the other hand, none of its localized episodes may be inscribed in history except by the effects that it induces on the entire network in which it is caught up. (Foucault, 1977, pp. 26, 27)

As Scott (1995, pp. 183-187) argues, Foucault's development of a de-centered concept of social reality was influenced by Althusser's attempts of developing a de-centered concept of structure, although Foucault's rejection of holistic, functionalist and systemic conceptions of social and cultural phenomena also included the rejection of the Althusserian idea of the 'totality' structured in dominance. In Foucault's view, the material phenomena of power and the cultural phenomena of discourse are interdependent elements of social life, while although they are not seen as structural wholes, each are the 'structured' and 'structuring'. Unlike the Weberian conception of

power,⁹⁵ the idea of casual role of active individual subjects is rejected in Foucauldian terms, while according to Foucault; the individual should not be treated as the fundamental unit of social analysis. According to him, social processes are not the result of individual action; on the contrary, the individuals are the product of the social practices rooted in particular forms of discourse while they are the bearers and results of power relations. Foucault held that the bio-power in modern societies, which operates through norms and technologies shaping the human body and mind, is a form of power/knowledge with the processes of administration and discipline, and specifically with the administrative practices of surveillance and regulation subjecting populations to disciplinary practices with the processes of exclusion and confinement inserting direct control over bodies. According to Foucault, power may seldom crystallize in such larger structures as ‘class’ or ‘state’ relations, while it circulates through particular networks of institutions, organizations and discourses.

Foucault’s point on disciplinary techniques and specific discourses shaping the individuals is explanatory if the analysis is not reduced to these factors. As was discussed in the previous chapter, individuals should not be treated as merely the bearers of structures or specific discourses, although they are in part structured by them. Unlike Foucault, in the present thesis, depending on the context, the individual is treated as both the *subject* of the action and *object* of the structures, discourses, and the individual’s mind processes (the mind process is seen as a resultant of the neuro-physiological mechanisms, the structural location in social/economic networks/relations, and the specific forms of discourse among possible other factors), while it is held possible to identify the privileged determinants of a particular action in a micro-macro range without rejecting the presence of possible other forces acting upon the action of the individual. Therefore, neither the microscopic (e.g. neuro-physiological mechanisms) nor the macroscopic (e.g. social class, state) factors are theorized to be excluded from the analysis.

As for specifically the above excerpt from the ‘Discipline and Punish’, although there is not much to object to Foucault’s point on the necessity to consider the dispositions,

⁹⁵ Weber (1978b) understood “by power the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a social action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action” (p. 926).

maneuvers, tactics, techniques, functionings, strategic positions, battles, and discursive practices constituting the individual (if taken in relative terms); concerning the analysis of power, his rejection of the conceptualization of *possession* of power is not shared by the author of the present thesis. As for this question of whether power can be possessed or not; the present thesis considers power as the capacity that can be not only exercised, but also held. As for ‘state power’, from the standpoint of the thesis, it is subject to struggles and (similar to the third meaning attributed to power in the *Oxford English Dictionary*) is defined as ‘*the capacity to make arrangements (that includes ‘to execute arrangements’) through state networks via legal or illegal means, which covers the capacity to perform a wide range of practices from laws to violence, while there is always the possibility of the presence of arrangements contradicting others*’.

In case, certain elements steer the exercisers of state power in line with their own interests, on account of their intentional practices (not side effects), and with a privilege of determinacy, then they can be read as holders of state power, which is in some ways similar to the first meaning attributed to power in the *Oxford English Dictionary*. For a further analytical clarity between the ‘exercise’ and ‘hold’ of state power, the examination of the following four hypothetical cases would be illustrative as regards establishing links in a micro-macro range. While Case 1 and Case 2 are based on the micro scale, in Case 3 and Case 4, there are corridors between micro and macro scales; while, here, the *micro scale* refers to the analysis of the relatively individual (analysis without reference to social classes, communities, institutions) and the *macro scale* refers to the *relatively* collective (analysis with reference to social classes, communities, institutions), while the micro-macro is held to exist in a continuous scale and conceptualized only in relative terms. Each case represents a different variation of exercise and hold of state power. The following are the hypothetical cases:

The propositions of the first hypothetical case (Case 1) are the following: *Alice* is a senator. *Alice* smuggles on her own, intentionally, and only for pleasure. The red passport given to *Alice* for her senator identity facilitates her act of smuggling. *Alice* uses the capacity that enables the execution of the arrangement for going in and out without customs examination that is granted to her as an element of the state network.

Then, in this particular instance, it is Alice who exercises the mentioned state power. Since Alice uses this capacity totally for her pleasure and due to her intentional efforts, at the micro scale, the determinant is Alice. Then, it is again Alice who holds the mentioned state power.

The propositions of the second hypothetical case (Case 2) are the following: *Fatma* is a senator. *Fatma* smuggles because *Boris* threatens her. *Boris* earns money on account of *Fatma*'s smuggling. Without the presence of *Boris*'s intentional efforts for making *Fatma* smuggle, *Fatma* will not smuggle. The red passport given to *Fatma* for her senator identity facilitates her act of smuggling. *Fatma* uses the capacity that enables the execution of the arrangement for going in and out without customs examination that is granted to her as an element of the state network. *Then, in this particular instance, it is Fatma who exercises the mentioned state power. Since Fatma uses this capacity in line with the interests of Boris and due to Boris's intentional efforts, without which she would not smuggle, at the micro scale, the determinant is Boris. Then, it is Boris who holds the mentioned state power.*

In hypothetical Cases 1 and 2, it has been acknowledged that state power can be both exercised and held even individually, given that the steering force is the holder with relevance to the intentionality, interests, and determinacy (being the *sine qua non*). Now, in the third hypothetical case (Case 3), an extension to macro scale will be presented. The propositions of Case 3 are the following: All propositions of Case 2, plus: *Boris* is a part of a gang (*The Purple Gang*) involved in smuggling. *The Purple Gang* struggles against communists. A group of anti-communist state officials (*The Savior Group*) make the necessary arrangements to protect *The Purple Gang* from being caught because *The Purple Gang* struggles against communists. The major motive that pushes *The Savior Group* to make the necessary arrangements to protect *The Purple Gang* from being caught is to maintain the order inside the country. The order is the capitalist order (in addition to possible other orders). Communism requires the collective ownership of means of production. In case of a communist revolution, it is certain that it would harm the status of holding the private ownership of means of production and its protectors (in addition to possible others which are yet not certain). What pushes *The Savior Group* to have those anti-communist motives is the value/opinion realm recognizing the private ownership of means of production. At

that time, there are two social classes that hold the ownership of means of production in the social field (includes the world scale): the bourgeoisie; and landlord class. In condition that there were no intentional strategies followed by the bourgeoisie for the reproduction, production, and spread of these values/opinions emphasizing the inviolability of private ownership of means of production, *The Savior Group* would not have been anti-communist. *Then, in this particular instance, it is The Savior Group that exercises the mentioned state power. Since The Savior Group uses this capacity in line with the capitalist interests and due to the intentional efforts of the bourgeoisie, without which The Savior Group would not protect The Purple Gang, at the macro scale, the determinant is the bourgeoisie. Then, it is the bourgeoisie who holds the mentioned state power.*

While the hypothetical Cases 1 and 2 acknowledged the possibility of a micro scale exercise and hold of state power, hypothetical Case 3 presented the possibility of a relatively macro scale exercise and hold of state power. And lastly, hypothetical Case 4 will continue from Case 3's propositions: All propositions of Case 3, plus: A state official (*Ali*) arrests *The Savior Group* for *The Savior Group's* protection of *The Purple Gang*. The major motive that pushes *Ali* to make the necessary arrangement to arrest *The Savior Group* is the feeling of obedience to the officially assigned duty. *Ali* obeys whatever duty is officially assigned (even if the assigned duty is killing the person he loves most, including himself). What pushes *Ali* to have the feeling of obedience to the officially assigned duty is the value/opinion realm emphasizing the sacredness of state duty. In condition that there were no intentional strategies followed by the bureaucracy for the reproduction, production, and spread of the value/opinion realm emphasizing the sacredness of state duty, *Ali* would not have arrested *The Savior Group* at that particular instance. *Then, in this particular instance, it is Ali who exercises the mentioned state power. Since he uses this capacity in line with the feeling of obedience to the officially assigned duty and due to the intentional efforts of the bureaucracy, without which he was not going to arrest The Savior Group, at the macro scale, the determinant is the bureaucracy. However, since Ali's particular act does not denote shorter or longer-term interests of bureaucracy (where there is the possibility that bureaucracy may not have any interests at all); neither the bureaucracy nor Ali holds state power according to the given*

propositions. Holder(s) must be sought elsewhere and/or bureaucracy's interests must be defined to find out the holder(s).

Therefore, there are instances where both the *hold* and *exercise* of state power can be tendentially identified at particular levels of abstraction (as in Cases 1-3), and where not the *hold* but only the *exercise* of state power can be distinguished (as in Case 4). Then, the question remains; if power is so dispersed, how is it possible to make such major tone statements asserting a social class' hold of state power which can be measured in years, decades, centuries, or millenniums which makes the statement 'Class X held *the* state power for that year/decade/century/millennium' possible? The method proposed here is again to try to determine the limits of the statement. In this respect, three statements will hopefully illustrate that it is possible for both a particular social class (for example the capitalist class) and a community/group/category other than the social class (for example the communists) to hold *the* state power for a particular period of time.

Firstly, what makes the statement 'The bourgeoisie holds *the* state power'⁹⁶ possible for a particular period is; the 'exercises of state power sufficient for securing the conditions of existence of the bourgeoisie; favoring the bourgeoisie more than any other propertied social *class* (exploiting class); and predominantly as against forces aiming to eradicate the capitalist mode of production, provided that strategic determinant practices of the bourgeoisie for holding state power are present' (e.g. the United States of 2005). *Secondly*, what makes the statement 'The communists hold *the* state power' possible for a particular period is the 'exercises of state power sufficient for starting the process of removing the conditions of existence of the bourgeoisie and any other exploiting class; provided that the private ownership of means of production is removed in major economic sectors and strategic determinant practices of communists are present' (e.g. the Soviet Russia of 1923). *Thirdly*, what makes the statement 'The communists hold *the* state power' and 'The bourgeoisie holds *the* state power' possible for a particular country and period is the co-existence of the 'exercises of state power sufficient for securing the conditions of existence of

⁹⁶ Here bourgeoisie refers to the category of capitalist, including, but not restricted to the 'capitalist class', in other words, it includes, for example, also the rentier capitalists who are not engaged in a class relationship with the wage-workers.

the bourgeoisie; favoring the bourgeoisie more than any other propertied social *class* (exploiting class); and as against forces aiming to eradicate the capitalist mode of production, provided that strategic determinant practices of the bourgeoisie for holding state power are present' and 'exercises of state power sufficient for starting the process of removing the conditions of existence of the bourgeoisie and any other exploiting class; provided that the removal of private ownership of means of production in major economic sectors has started and strategic determinant practices of communists are present' (e.g. the Chile of 1971; a form of dual power while in this thesis all states of dual power are not conceptualized to be restricted to the 'hold of the *state* power').

As for the questions of defining the 'capitalist (bourgeois) society' and 'capitalist (bourgeois) state', here comes another statement that will again hopefully help to illuminate the present thesis' standpoint: What makes it possible to talk about the presence of the 'capitalist society' within a particular country border is 'the presence of the exercises of state power sufficient for securing the conditions of existence of the bourgeoisie; favoring the bourgeoisie more than any other propertied social *class*; and predominantly as against forces aiming to eradicate the capitalist mode of production, *whether* those state practices are present on account of the determinant strategic practices of the bourgeoisie *or not*, where there is capitalist mode of production (along with the presence of possible other modes of production)'. In the thesis, the state in capitalist society is called the 'capitalist state' or 'bourgeois state'. This definition indicates that whether there is a *bourgeois* subject with intentional pro-capitalist practices determinant in making the state a capitalist one or not, a state can be called capitalist, while the capitalist state can be established or run even by non-bourgeois elements without the presence of any determinant⁹⁷ strategic bourgeois practices at all. For example, theoretically, even a strong enough armed wage-worker group may demolish a feudal state and establish a capitalist one, just because they admire the capitalist state in another country.

Now then, unlike some post-modernist accounts, it is clear that the author's recognition of a degree of dispersion of power does not keep her from making major tone and totalizing statements such as the definition of the 'capitalist society' and as

⁹⁷ Admittedly estimating determinacy is hard in analyzing a concrete case.

‘The bourgeoisie holds *the* state power’. Besides, it is also clear that the author implies an antagonism not only between capitalist class and working class but also between the capitalist class and those forces on the side of the working class’ economic interests, which cover certain socialist, communist, and anarchist groups among others. As for the socialists and communists (which are used interchangeably) with pro-worker long-term projects; in the text, they only signify those that aim at capturing the state power, abolishing capitalism, and expropriating the ownership of means of production; while anarchists with pro-worker long-term projects signify only those that aim at abolishing capitalism, and assuring the collective ownership of means of production without capturing the state power. As was discussed in the previous chapter, the struggles between pro-capitalist and socialist forces are read as the antagonistic class struggles between the capitalist and wage-worker poles in the present thesis.

As for the approach to ‘state power’ in Marxist state theory, again only two will be considered briefly in this section: That of Miliband and Poulantzas; while Jessop’s approach will be evaluated in the next section. As for Miliband (1969), he made a major distinction between government and state, and therefore between governmental power and state power, since the government constitutes only one among other institutions of the state. According to him, ‘state power’ lies in the hands of those who occupy the leading positions of the state, such as presidents, prime ministers, ministers, high civil servants, other state administrators, top military officers, judges of the higher courts, some leading members of parliamentary assemblies (who are generally the senior members of the political executive), who constitute, the ‘state elite’ (in the present thesis they are called the chief exercisers of state power). Miliband saw those outside the state system with the power to affect the incumbents of state positions while he held that the repositories of state power were the state elite. According to him, it is necessary to treat the state elite as a separate distinct entity in analyzing the relationship of the state to the economically dominant class. He wrote:

For the first step in that analysis is to note the obvious but fundamental fact that this class is involved in a *relationship* with the state, which cannot be *assumed*, in the political conditions which are typical of advanced capitalism, to be that of principal to agent. It may well be found that the relationship is very close indeed and that the

holders of state power are, for many different reasons, the agents of private economic power – that those who wield that power are also, therefore, and without unduly stretching the meaning of words, an authentic ‘ruling class’. (Miliband, 1969, p. 55)

Since, in his analysis, Miliband considered the bourgeoisie’s hold of state power in a micro-macro range, his analysis can be considered as comprising the three-dimensions of power suggested by Lukes. Among the themes considered in Miliband’s analysis of the capitalist state in advanced countries; education, nepotism, ties of kinship, friendship, class origins, social origins of selection and promotion, chances of upward movement, conservatism of top civil servants, political parties, donations to political parties, textbooks sponsored by businesspeople, exploitation of national sentiments throughout mass media and education can be mentioned.

As for Poulantzas, as was discussed in the previous chapter, he was very skeptical about the mode of analysis that Miliband employed, and, following the Althusserian tradition, he focused on the structural aspects, and especially state effects emphasizing that, the relation between the bourgeois class and state is an objective one, in the sense that; because of the *system* itself there is an *objective coincidence* between the function of the state and interests of the dominant class (Poulantzas, 1969, p. 73), while he argued that he attempted to break with structuralism in his latter texts (Poulantzas, 1976, p. 73). He wrote:

What disappears, when one artificially allows this tendency to contaminate Marxism, is the primordial role of classes and the class struggle by comparison with structures–institutions and organs, including the State organs. To attribute specific power to the State, or to designate structures/institutions as the field of application of the concept of power, would be to fall into structuralism, by attributing the principle role in the reproduction/transformation of social formations to these organs. Conversely, by comprehending the relations of power as class relations, I have attempted to break definitely with structuralism, which is the modern form of this bourgeois idealism. (Poulantzas, 1976, p. 73)

Therefore, as Poulantzas (1976) suggested, he intended to shift his focus to class struggles in his latter texts rather than treating the structures/institutions as holding/wielding power “with the relations of power between ‘social groups’ flowing

from this institutional power” (p. 73) while he insisted that the capitalist state represents the political unity of the power bloc and that not applying the concept of power to the State apparatus does not necessarily end in denying the relative autonomy of the capitalist state (which, according to him, is irreducible to immediate and direct expression of the strict economic interests of the constituents of the power bloc), the institutional specificity (the alleged separation of the political and the economic) of which stem from and is the resultant of the contradictory relations of power between different social classes, in the analysis of which one should break with what he called “naturalist/positivist, or even psycho-sociological conception of power (‘A brings pressure to bear on B to make the latter do something he would not have done without pressure from A’)” (Poulantzas, 1976, p. 73). However, the escape from the application of power to the State apparatus, with a motive of escaping from the so-called ‘bourgeois science’ only results in the impasses of overgeneralization, since expanding what Poulantzas calls the ‘resultant’ necessarily ends in the analysis of the micro-macro range phenomena, including (if not restricted to) the application of what Poulantzas calls the psycho-sociological conception of power. Indeed, if one attempts to specify the forces ending in that ‘resultant’, the analysis would end in the examination of the power relations in a scale, from the individual ties to the forms of organization; from the individual motives to the micro/macro mechanisms triggering those motives.

As for the class relations, power, and the state; in his *Political Power and Social Classes*, Poulantzas (1975a) suggested that “(c)lass relations are no more the foundation of power relations than power relations are the foundation of class relations” (p. 99) and that by power he designated “*the capacity of a social class to realize its specific objective interests*” (p. 104). Having equating the *state power* with the *power of the determinate class*, Poulantzas wrote:

Just as the concept of class points to the effects of the ensemble of the levels of the structure on the supports, so the concept of power specifies the effects of the ensemble of these levels on the relations between social classes in struggle. *It points to the effects of the structure on the relations of conflict between the practices of the various classes in ‘struggle’.* In other words, power is not located in the levels of structures, but is an effect of the ensemble of these levels, while at the same time characterizing each of the levels of class struggle. The concept of power cannot thus

be applied to one level of the structure. When we speak for example of *state power*, we cannot mean by it the mode of the state's articulation and intervention at the other levels of the structure, *we can only mean the power of a determinate class* to whose interests (rather than to those of other social classes) the state corresponds. (Poulantzas, 1975a, pp. 99, 100)

The above paragraph again reflects an overgeneralization tendency. As Jessop (1990) stated, Poulantzas had real difficulties in dealing with those power relations without immediate class character. Therefore, in 'State, Power, Socialism', he conceded that there may be a non-correspondence between relations of power and class relations, although "he side-stepped the issue by insisting that non-class relations always have a class relevance" (p. 238). Meanwhile, regardless of Poulantzas's rejection of applying the psycho-sociological conception of power to the State, when the instances of those class struggles (which according to Poulantzas results in the correspondence to state power) is put on the analytical table, it becomes impossible to escape from inclusion of the psycho-sociological analysis of power.

As for the present thesis' approach to state power, as was stated in the above sections, in contrast to Poulantzas's approach, the state is conceptualized mainly by its distinguishing legal positions, the power of which lies in (if not caused by) its legal positions, which derives its very being from the presence of some sufficiently strong armed forces (which may, yet, have some contradictory orientations). Therefore, for the present thesis, what the crucial question about capitalist state is; 'how those strong enough armed elements in a relatively active or passive manner protect the capitalist order in a capitalist society, and in which ways the armed and/or non-armed state elements act enhancing or opposing particular interests of elements of the society, and in this case, the capitalist short/long-term interests'. Meanwhile, neither power nor state power is equated with class power or class struggles; holding that the logic in the distinction between the exercise and hold of state power can be applied to various social elements in addition to the social classes.

As for the bureaucracy, Poulantzas held that bureaucracy cannot play a principal role in the constitution of a form of state, since it is neither a class nor a class fraction. The state form stems from the ensemble of factors in the class struggle. However, in his

opinion, bureaucracy is a specific category, possessing a relative autonomy and unity while it is commonly not a social force. Even it constitutes a social force depending on the concrete conjuncture, “it possesses a role of its own in political action: *but this does not confer on it a power of its own*” (Poulantzas, 1975a, p. 358). Although not defining the bureaucracy as a class or class fraction is in line with the conceptualization of the present thesis (despite this is so on different grounds and despite it is held that the incumbents of state positions may hold particular interests individually or as a group, if not as the ‘bureaucracy’ as a totality), there is still a problem in Poulantzas’s approach and it is the underestimation of the power of armed state elements. The problem in his approach is the exclusion of the possibility of the (top) military elements to turn into capitalists through forcibly becoming the owners of the non-military (conventional) capitalists’ means of production regardless of his acknowledgment of the possibility of authoritarian forms of capitalist state. Another equivalence established by Poulantzas in an essentializing mode is the nation state and capitalist state. He held that, in contrast to the pre-capitalist states which witnessed a mythical discourse of revelation that “tended to fill through narration the gap between the beginnings of sovereign power and the origins of the world”; “the capitalist State does not base its legitimacy on its origins: it permits of repeated legitimations on the basis of the sovereignty of the people-nation” (Poulantzas, 2000, p. 58). The problem, here, is not about what has happened until now in a majority of (mainly Western) capitalist societies, but that, what the present and future possibilities are for the forms that the capitalist state might assume. For the capitalist social formation, his essentialization of the nation-state, in addition to his exclusion of the possibility of resting upon a ‘mythical discourse’ not based on the people-nation, would theoretically exclude a number of possible forms that the capitalist state might assume (e.g. theological or monarchic capitalist states not based on the idea of ‘nation’ and ‘citizenship’), which would end in treating those forms which deviate from the conceptualized normal form of the capitalist state (with citizens and a discourse based on people-nation) as pathological forms. Yet, it should be considered that it has only been a few centuries since the first capitalist states emerged (with the possibility that it might impregnate several other forms different than the already-emerged ones even in the ‘West’), while this very fact should be contrasted with the slave societies that had prevailed for thousands of years with very different forms of state such as the ancient monarchic states of Mesopotamia, restricted democracy of

Athens, and the Pax Romana era of the Roman Empire. Although there might be forms of state almost incompatible with the ascendancy of a particular mode of production such as the incompatibility of a democratic form of all-embracing citizenship (including the slaves) with ancient-slave owning mode of production; this does not follow that, for example, a theological-dynastic state form is incompatible with a dominating capitalist mode of production.

As for the extent of state power being ‘capitalist’, the present thesis’ standpoint is similar to (if not same with) Jessop’s (1990) argument holding that “state power is capitalist to the extent that it creates, maintains or restores the conditions required for accumulation in given circumstances and is non-capitalist to the extent that these conditions are not realized” (p. 117), which, according to Barrow (2006, p. 12), echoes Poulantzas’s (1975a, p. 104) conceptualization of power. In terms of not seeing the capitalist state’s power as exclusively capitalist, this thesis pursues a similar standpoint with that of Jessop. As Jessop (1990) suggested, capitalist reproduction should not be treated as if it is guaranteed (p. 138). In the present thesis, rather than the *actual* success of realization of those conditions required for accumulation (which may be hindered by several internal and external factors); this extent of being capitalist is conceptualized with reference to the laws and state elements’ practices that *aim to* realize them and/or that *permit* (includes the non-intervention to) the existence of capitalist class (and therefore the capitalist mode of production, whether the dominant mode or not).

Meanwhile, here, even though the presence of ‘capitalist state’ denotes ‘the presence of the exercises of state power sufficient for securing the conditions of existence of the bourgeoisie; favoring the bourgeoisie more than any other propertied social *class*; and predominantly as against forces aiming to eradicate the capitalist mode of production, *whether* those state practices are present on account of the determinant strategic practices of the bourgeoisie *or not*, where there is capitalist mode of production (along with the presence of possible other modes of production)’; the possibility of the presence of a range of holds and exercises of state power (including the possibility of partnership of those in and out a particular state position and those within state networks) as regards a variety of different interests is also acknowledged (conceding the presence of a certain degree of dispersion of power).

3.5 State: A Thing, Subject, Social Relation, or a Construct?

Points of departure on how to theorize the state and state power (some of which are discussed in the above sections) are evaluated as the following by Bob Jessop:

Among many questions which provoke debate (vapid or not) are the following sets. Is the state itself best defined by its legal form, its coercive capacities, its institutional composition and boundaries, its internal operations and modes of calculation, its declared aims, its functions for the broader society or its sovereign place in the international system? Is it a thing, a subject, a social relation, or simply a construct which helps to orientate political action? Is stateness a variable and, if so, what are its central dimensions? What is the relationship between the state and law, the state and politics, the state and civil society, the public and the private, state power and micro-power relations? Can the state be studied on its own; should it be studied as part of the political system; or indeed, can it only be understood in terms of a more general social theory? Does the state have any autonomy and, if so, what are its sources and limits? (Jessop, 1990, p. 339)

And, echoing Poulantzas, he concludes; “(a)nswers to such questions can clearly vary from one set to another but viewing the state as a social relation provides a relatively coherent solution to most of them” (Jessop, 1990, p. 339). Although until now, the author of the present thesis has discussed her standpoint concerning how to view the state and state power in general, there are further questions to be answered such as the ones raised by Jessop. Although giving the answers of all such questions is an impossible task to be met in the present thesis due to its limited scope; in the next chapter, at least some further issues will be discussed again in a way to integrate the relatively micro and macro factors to the analysis; for example with reference to laws, state intervention in community relations, and the relative power of communities steering state practices regardless of legal prohibitions. Therefore, the following chapter will provide the opportunity to elaborate on the above questions further, at least partially. However, there is a question to be answered in this section, since it has become the major axis of a theoretical debate in the course of especially 1970s. That question is about how to evaluate the state; as ‘a thing, a subject, a social relation, or a construct’. In this respect, Jessop’s answer to the question provides insight. Jessop not

only handled the state as a relation, but also identified some of its distinguishing characteristics, and, unlike Poulantzas's subjectless analysis, Jessop underlined the presence of *calculating subjects* operating "on the strategic terrain constituted by the state" which "are in part constituted by the *strategic selectivity* of the state system and its past interventions" (Jessop, 1990, p. 262).

As was discussed before, any 'social' is an ensemble of 'relations'. Therefore, distinguishing a social entity embodying several sets of relations from others requires expanding those sets of relations denoted by the concept. The first step of this expansion should be to fix and demarcate the borders of the concept used in a way to denote particular sets of relations; while its further steps should be to expand the components of the relations defined in the borders of that particular concept; via identifying the relatively privileged elements, the forces enabling or acting upon those elements, and implications of those elements over the analyzed social entity.

As for the question whether the state is a construct helping to orientate the political action; if not exclusively defined so, that is so: It is partially a construct while any social has a partially constructed side. However, despite this constructed side, the state is a social institution (embodying and regulating several sets of social relations), and has an existence of its own, constraining and influencing the ways the individuals feel, think, and act; which should be handled in a similar vein with what Durkheim means by 'social fact'. The question is what the distinguishing characteristics of the state are; with the acknowledgment that while that demarcation necessarily becomes a constructed tool of cognition, this does not change the fact that the relations themselves denoted by the concept are real, with an existence of their own. As for the state, if there are particular relations and regular outcomes of those relations (characteristics) different than others; for example if 'the people recruited by the legally defined state army in the name of protecting the country' embodies different sets of relations than 'the armed people employed by a private company to control the entrances and exits to the company', and if both of them are different than, for example, 'a man with a gun protecting the land he owns in the village he lives in'; whatever concept we use to denote each set of relations, those relations *are* 'real' with an existence of their own, independent of human thought. For example whether a schizophrenic conceptualizes the 'hospital security guards' as the otherworldly angels

or not, those hospital security guards are *not* angels while their specific role as hospital security guards embody a number of relations different than other people such as the actions oriented towards restoring the order in the hospital or prevent the patients to harm themselves and others. Besides, even if the whole world including the ‘hospital security guards’ themselves think that ‘hospital security guards’ are otherworldly angels, while this conceptualization (mythical belief) may have a number of impacts over real life situations, still, those security guards are not angels and having real life impacts is not equal to being ontologically real. To put it more concretely, the distinguishing characteristics of the ‘hospital security guardianship’ such as the task of restoring the hospital order may not be equal to further roles attributed to ‘hospital security guards’ and *meanings* associated with the concept ‘hospital security guard’. Indeed, the ‘hospital security guards’ may restore the hospital order, and, for restoring the hospital order, may even use the false-belief (also shared by themselves) that they are angels, while this does not change the very fact that, whether they are believed to be angels or not, their distinguishing characteristic in the context of hospital is the protection of the hospital order in a way different than the hospital doctors, hospital cooks, hospital patients among others.

Therefore, regardless of the meanings associated with the ‘state’ (for example, ‘the state’ as sacred; as the protector of all citizens/subjects of the country; as the protector of the nation/a particular ethnic group; as the protector of the capitalist class, or whatsoever), if there are particular distinguishing regular sets of actions collective rather than individual in origin performed by those people recruited as ‘state elements’ in officially defined state positions; then what is to be done is to first, give a description of the distinguishing characteristics of the realm referred to as the ‘state’ (for example the state, as different than the hospital); that is, drawing the line between the ‘state’ and other realms (such as the village, the family, the restaurant, the hospital) in a way that enables not only demarcation but also determining its subsets (e.g. state hospital) and fields of intersection with other realms (e.g. semi-state committees such as the ‘legal minimum wage commission’ embodying the state officials, employer and employee union representatives); and then dig and try to identify the relations giving rise to or enabling the ‘state’, the mainlines of relations embodied in the realm of the ‘state’, and the relation of these relations, and the meanings associated with particular concepts, and the realm denoted by those

concepts (including the state) to (in terms of the process of transforming and being transformed) other relations in the field of different realms. While in this chapter the demarcation process is fulfilled by defining ‘the state’ and the ‘capitalist state’; the relation of certain relations (e.g. sets of relations signified by the concepts community, mass media, formal education, bribery), and of certain meanings associated with particular concepts (e.g. the image of the state as sacred, the image of the national community as holy) to the state with reference to making possible and/or facilitating the capitalist hold of state power vis-à-vis the short and long-term capitalist interests will be analyzed in the next chapter. While it is impossible to analyze all such relations and attributed meanings in a single work, the ones selected (inevitably in accordance to the availability of the secondary data) will hopefully illustrate some of the privileged factors influential on pro-capitalist state practices in a micro-macro range. To return back to Poulantzas’s point that the capitalist state’s presence owes to the structure itself rather than the colonization of the top state positions by the bourgeoisie or by those coming from bourgeois families; as against his stress on the structure, the point echoed generally in neo-elitist circles should be mentioned: ‘You can never know that!’.

Although this thesis does not hold that state practices are pro-capitalist exclusively at the behest of the capitalists; it does not follow that it rejects the possible importance of the capitalists’ strategic practices to realize their short/long-term interests in a given context. But there is one thing the author of the present thesis holds certain: If some strong enough armed power is present to steer social practices including the state practices; even the mode of production can change; while that mentioned state of being ‘strong enough’ depends on the balance of forces as well as the orientation of individual actions. While this does not mean that the non-armed state elements rule directly at the behest of armed elements, it means that if a strong *enough* armed group (whether the incumbents of state positions or not) intends to steer the non-armed elements, they would most probably have the power to do so. If there are challenges between the armed and non-armed elements of the state, and if the civilian governments act in the opposite direction of the will of those armed elements and manage to stay in power, this would be on account of the fact that whether those armed elements believe in the relative legitimacy of the civilian government’s challenge (e.g. legitimacy of democratic procedures) or those armed elements not

holding that idea are whether involuntary to take further steps of intervention or they are not strong enough as against other armed elements (e.g. other groups in the army, sectors of the police, other countries' armed forces, possible armed insurrection of the people among others). The issue of decisiveness of armed force enabling a particular form of state –if not always directly steering state practices- will be discussed further in the next chapter with reference to Turkey.

Now, before continuing with the discussion of the points raised by Jessop, it would be wise to make reference to a point which Perry Anderson persistently and solidly underlined. The point is that even in advanced capitalist countries, the ultimate determinant of the power system is 'force' and that "(t)his is the law of capitalism, which it cannot violate, on pain of death" (Anderson, 1976, p. 44). Missing to realize this very apparent fact has brought serious defeats to the forces dreaming a classless world and even to those who could move very close to defeating pro-capitalist forces. At the eve of the 21st century, a number of Latin American countries witnessed strong mass movements against the capitalist (dis)order. In Brazil, Lula's Workers Party, a latent working class interest community rose to government (although its pro-worker collective long-term project gradually left its place to the implementation of the IMF/WB policies offered by the pro-capitalist forces). In Argentina, subsequent to the country-wide rebellion following the 2001 crisis, forces with pro-worker collective long-term projects came very close to destroying the pro-capitalist armed machine and the capitalist (dis)order with hubs of dual power all through the country (factory committees, unemployed workers organizations, neighborhood assemblies), but for the sake of gaining further 'consent' of the masses, they avoided to capture the state power and became contended with establishing a democratic constituent assembly, calling for elections opening the way to restore the capitalist (dis)order. In Bolivia, despite the pro-capitalist armed terror and all the snipers shooting activists in mass protests, the forces with pro-worker collective long-term projects could succeed in rising to government, in a mode recalling the Allende government in many respects. That is why, today, it is extremely crucial to put away the abstractionist and functionalist mode of analysis and to make the concrete analysis of the concrete situation without underestimating the possible threats and prospects waiting the forces dreaming a world that would be the scene of neither exploitation nor oppression.

Today, it is extremely important to re-evaluate the lessons of the past experiences. And it is extremely important to remember the very concrete strategies followed by the pro-capitalist forces for defeating the Allende government and the cost it brought to millions of people in Chile on account of not taking the necessary steps on time. In Chile, Allende's socialist government was elected in 1970 and was overthrown by the pro-capitalist coup d'état of Pinochet in 1973. The essence of the strategies of the pro-capitalist forces has been very clearly revealed in an official report written by the authorized US state elements. It is the US Senate's report based on the review of documents of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of State and Defense, the National Security Council, and on testimony by officials and former officials; making it public that the US pro-capitalist covert action in Chile necessitated millions of dollars spent in addition to several other sorts of support. In the report, it was written that:

Covert United States involvement in Chile in the decade between 1963 and 1973 was extensive and continuous. The Central Intelligence Agency spent three million dollars in an effort to influence the outcome of the 1964 Chilean presidential elections. Eight million dollars was spent, covertly, in the three years between 1970 and the military coup in September 1973, with over three million dollars expended in fiscal year 1972 alone.

...

What did covert CIA money buy in Chile? It financed activities covering a broad spectrum, from simple propaganda manipulation of the press to large-scale support for Chilean political parties, from public opinion polls to direct attempts to foment a military coup. The scope of "normal" activities of the CIA Station in Santiago included placement of Station-dictated material in the Chilean media through propaganda assets, direct support of publications, and efforts to oppose communist and left-wing influence in student, peasant and labor organizations.

In addition to these "routine" activities, the CIA Station in Santiago was several times called upon to undertake large, specific projects. (United States Senate, 1975)

The report then continued with a detailed list of support activities and expenditures for anti-communist items such as anti-communist propaganda activities, political

parties, mass media, bosses' protests, kidnappings, and armed force/operations. The process in Chile indicated that not only offering but also withdrawing material resources became a method resorted to by the capitalists for the purpose of holding the state power. Indeed, after the Allende government started nationalizing copper mines in 1971 and making a number of other expropriations that were accompanied with growing workers' control and assertiveness in factories; both the Chilean and non-Chilean capitalists started to take measures, including the measure of creating economic difficulties in the country. In this process, the US state and World Bank cut off lending to Allende government⁹⁸ (with the exception of US support to pro-capitalist Chilean military and IMF's –approximately- \$90 million during 1971 and 1972) in addition to a number of other strategic actions of the bourgeoisie that brought about shortages and 'bosses strike' (including the truck drivers strike), paralyzing the economy further. Nevertheless, such economic measures could not succeed in weakening the anti-capitalist movement; while in 1973 the socialist votes reflected an increase rather than a decrease in the electorate support (see Birchall, 2003; Fourcade-Gourinchas & Babb, 2002, p. 544; Shawki & D'Amato, 2000; Spalding, 1994, esp. p. 9;⁹⁹ United States Senate, 1975). Yet, the moment determining the destiny of the movement came with the fatal blow of the strong enough armed force with effective tactics/strategies. Indeed, soon after the socialist Allende government started expropriations, it was removed from power by the pro-capitalist coup d'état of Pinochet, during which anti-capitalists were considerably defenseless, since pro-worker forces were to a great extent disarmed and the Allende government was extremely unprepared to the non-surprising pro-capitalist military intervention led by Pinochet.

As for the interpretation of Allende's defeat by the most effective Marxist state theorists in academic circles, unfortunately the two sides of the state debate marking the trajectory of the mainstream academic Marxist state analysis searched the problem not in the underestimation of the pro-capitalist armed threat but in the lack of further consent of the masses to Allende government. As for Miliband, he wrote:

⁹⁸ Economic loans and aid were restored after Pinochet's military takeover.

⁹⁹ Although that document is not numbered originally, p. 9 is the pdf file's page number.

The one case where the partnership between a government of the left and dominant class interests *was* broken was that of Salvador Allende's government in Chile. Given that break, the government's only hope of obviating the dangers which it faced was to forge a new partnership between itself and the subordinate classes. It was unable to achieve this, or did not sufficiently strive to achieve it. Its autonomy was also its death warrant. (Miliband, 1983, p. 66)

Therefore, for Miliband, the decisive problem was not the on-time intervention of Allende government for equipping and mobilizing the anti-capitalist forces to crush the pro-capitalist armed forces, but the lack of partnership between the government and subordinate classes. As for Poulantzas, similar to what Buci-Glucksmann (1984) later echoed on the democratic transition to socialism and anti-passive revolution – with the acknowledgment that Poulantzas (2000) conceded that “the democratic road to socialism will not simply be a peaceful changeover”- he also searched the problem in the insufficient consent of the masses. He wrote:

It is possible to confront this danger through active reliance on a broad, popular movement. Let us be quite frank. As the decisive means to the realization of its goals and to the articulation of the two preventives against statism and the social-democratic impasse, the democratic road to socialism, unlike the ‘vanguardist’ dual-power strategy, presupposes the continuous support of a mass movement founded on broad popular alliances. If such a movement (what Gramsci called the active, as opposed to the passive, revolution) is not deployed and active, if the Left does not succeed in arousing one, then nothing will prevent social democratization of the experience: however radical they may be, the various programmes will change little of relevance. A broad popular movement constitutes a guarantee against the reaction of the enemy, even though it is not sufficient and must always be linked to sweeping transformations of the State. That is the dual lesson we can draw from Chile: the ending of the Allende experience was due not only to the lack of such changes, but also to the fact that the intervention of the bourgeoisie (itself expressed in that lack) was made possible by the breakdown of alliances among the popular classes, particularly between the working class and the petty bourgeoisie. Even before the coup took place, this had broken the momentum of support for the Popular Unity government. In order to arouse this broad movement, the Left must equip itself with the necessary means, taking up especially new popular demands on fronts that used

to be wrongly called 'secondary' (women's struggles, the ecological movement, and so on). (Poulantzas, 2000, pp. 263, 264)

How broader the movement did Poulantzas expect to be in Chile to prevent the fall of Allende from government? Regardless of all the intimidating practices and all the strategies followed by the pro-capitalist forces, masses preserved their support to Allende government, which can be also detected from the election results and mass movement against the pro-capitalist strategies and actions. In the face of all those people killed, tortured, imprisoned relentlessly under the dictatorship of Pinochet, which further active consent would save the socialists from being neutralized and annihilated? Was the question really the failure in the so-called anti-passive revolution strategy or the very simple fact that Allende government did not crush the pro-capitalist armed forces on time and that it was extremely unprepared against the very likely pro-capitalist military intervention? Regardless of Poulantzas's claim that "theoretical research has been widely distorted because of the errors of Trotsky's analyses and in particular because of the ideological rubbish churned out by his successors" (Poulantzas, 1975, p. 325) (with the acknowledgment that Poulantzas's attitude towards Trotskyists seems to be more sympathetic in his later works), there is still much to learn from Trotsky (regardless of his possible errors) and from the lessons of October Revolution (an intervention on time) and Spanish Civil War (a fatal defeat on account of the Stalinist strategy of disarming the anti-capitalists and initiating a search for alliance on a wider spectrum). Among others, the biggest lesson that can be derived from Trotsky's texts is the vitality to make the correct analysis of the concrete situation, formulate correct strategies, and take the necessary steps on time (neither earlier nor later).

As for the Latin America of today, there is much to learn from the struggle between pro-worker forces under the leadership of Hugo Chavez and the pro-capitalist forces in Venezuela. Actually, the very similar scenario to that of Allende's Chile was attempted to be put into operation in Venezuela. To remember once more what happened in Chile, the process developed as such: In 1973 a military coup d'état took place for protecting capitalist interests (the one which will be probably recognized among the bloodiest of all in the world). The Pinochet coup d'état was against the democratically elected socialist Salvador Allende government. First Allende

government was drawn into economic difficulties and then the brutal coup d'état was organized with the help of CIA. In the Chilean case, as in several other cases, anti-communist paramilitary forces accompanied the mobilization of the state's military forces against those defending working class interests.¹⁰⁰ As for Venezuela, similar to Allende's Chile, after Hugo Chavez came to power by winning 56 percent of the votes in the presidential elections of December 1998, both the domestic big capitalists and the US pro-capitalist forces tried to overthrow him. In this respect, the Venezuelan capitalists, the top US state elements, and the trade union bosses made an alliance and resorted to a number of methods. A method to overthrow Chavez was creating economic difficulties which gave rise to a workers' strike in the oil sector supported by this alliance. At the same time, this alliance tried to overthrow Chavez by means of insurrections and military coup. However, Chavez succeeded in overcoming the intrigues and staying in power (for the Venezuelan case, see Harnecker, 2004; Petras, 2002). Chavez's victory over the pro-capitalist armed interventions became possible only with his direct control over some armed force and his successful tactics. Therefore, it was again the on-time intervention and the military tactics/means that proved to be vital for the fate of the struggle.

Actually, not only in Chile, but also in several other countries of the world, numerous pro-capitalist disasters have been experienced in similar modes since the beginning of the bloody Cold War.¹⁰¹ Unfortunately, in Colombia, the leftist activists still face with the threat of death under the dark shadow of the pro-capitalist state and non-state armed terror. Meanwhile, such measures as assassinating the undesired politicians and destroying undesired governments have been among the very commonly resorted methods not only at the national level, but also at the international level.¹⁰² Today, in Bolivia, there is no logical ground for Morales not to be prepared against possible pro-capitalist armed methods which have already brought disasters in a number of countries (including Chile) to those fighting for a classless society.

¹⁰⁰ For further information on this coup d'état, see Hitchens (2001, pp. 68-88); Oltmans (2002, pp. 86, 87).

¹⁰¹ For such examples, see Blum (2003); Hitchens (2001); Oltmans (2002).

¹⁰² For the CIA led assassination attempts and unlawful US led military operations, see Blum (2003); Hitchens (2001); Oltmans (2002); Pilger (2003).

Now, to return back to the question raised by Jessop, whether the state is a thing or a subject; the answer depends on how the concepts 'thing' and 'subject' are defined. The thesis does not hold that the incumbents of the state have some common interests on account of being elements of the state. So here, the state, unlike the state-centered accounts, is not conceptualized as a structure with interests of its own as a collective subject. However, it is held that, in the way a physical 'thing' has an existence of its own, the state is a 'thing' with an existence of its own as a valid object of sociological inquiry ('social fact' in Durkheimian sense, with the acknowledgment that a social fact may not be explained exclusively by social facts), although unlike the neutrality (neutrality meaning not to have positive or negative character) of the 'physical things', the state as a 'social thing' is a 'non-neutral thing' (embodying constant chemical reactions, which may even give rise to radical changes in its form), displaying a biased character mainly on account of the way the laws structure the state; which is in some ways similar to what Jessop (1990) meant by the 'structural selectivity of the state' meaning "that it is not a neutral instrument equally accessible to all social forces and equally adaptable to all ends" (p. 148).

Now, in this section, one issue is left to be clarified theoretically, and it is the nature of the incumbents of state positions; namely whether those incumbents have any will at all, or not; and if yes, how can that 'will' be theorized. First of all, as was discussed in the previous chapter, individuals are not seen as puppets; meaning that, unlike the behaviorist approach theorizing the individual deprived of the capability to make choice, a parallel can be drawn with rationalist accounts (whether liberal or not) which hold the individuals as capable of making choices though in a constrained environment and cognitive capacity. Here, this choice is held to be in line with the considered individual's 'rationality of being', which is commonly (but not always) in the most part (if not exclusively) shaped by several structural positions occupied, with the acknowledgment that some positions may be privileged over others, depending on the context. Therefore, this approach does not deny the presence of some degree of conditioning in human action (which nevertheless is thought to comprise at least some degree of unconscious calculation, rather than being equal to automatic behavior without any calculation). To understand the standpoint of the thesis on this question, elaborating on the difference between the behaviorist and liberal rationalist

approach would be of great use. Concerning the liberal rationalists' methodological individualism, Norman Barry wrote:

The concept of man that underlies the methodological individualist's model is based on a very few simple propositions about human nature: that men act so as to put themselves in a preferred position (though this does not have to be understood in purely monetary terms), that they prefer present to future satisfactions, and that they can have only a limited knowledge of the world around them. This information about men is available to us all by what is called the method of 'introspection'. It is assumed that men are pretty much the same throughout the world and that by examining ourselves we can have knowledge of how others will act ... (Barry, 1989, pp. 19, 20)

Barry (1989, pp. 18-24) suggests; behaviorists hold that in the same way that animals are conditioned, the system of rewards and punishments conditions the individual to behave in a socially accepted way; while, in contrast, the liberal rationalist accounts hold that individuals act in a socially accepted way because of observation and internalization of the rules. According to liberal-rationalists when the participants of a social practice understand the rule as indicating the right or wrong way of doing things; that means that the rule is internalized. Liberal rationalists see the rules as entailing the idea of choice, for humans may disobey rules in contrast to the well-trained animals. According to them, the presence of sanctions as against the minority of rule-breakers cannot replace internalization to guarantee regularized behavior, since in the other case there would have been a large police force to impose the sanctions while it would have been hardly possible to ensure the obedience of the police. While the rules (whether they are moral, legal, or political) are normative and prescriptive; they must be distinguished from predictions. Obedience to rules is not based on the prediction of possible sanctions if they are broken. Internal obligatoriness of a rule cannot be verified by external observation, while order is a consequence of individuals following and internalizing the rules.

Liberal rationalists' point that individual action is a matter of choice is to a certain correct, but only to a certain extent. It is true that some norms are internalized, but, not in the way the structural functionalist accounts portray the question, but in the way formulated by generally symbolic interactionist accounts; the norms and roles

ruled by such norms are *interpreted* by the individual, while the roles are made with some place to improvisation rather than passively taken. However, this interpretation depends not only on the context (including the structures occupied and cultural environment), but, most probably, also the individual neuro-physiological processes and differences (inevitably treated as the black box as was discussed in the previous chapter). On the other hand, there is not much reason to treat human beings radically different from animals as a distinct group, while those which are considered as animals themselves do have several different characteristics. Although the liberal rationalists hold that *humans* are different than *well-trained animals*, it is not possible to claim that all animals can be trained by individuals in behaviorist terms, while, at the same time there may be always a sort of conditioning in animal behavior in term of being oriented toward rewards and punishments. Therefore, although it would be hard to claim that there is no choice for individuals for they are either exclusively constituted by the structures they occupy or exclusively constituted by the discursive practices; it is possible to argue that there is some degree of conditioning in living things while it is an outcome of previous and present conscious and/or unconscious calculation. Meanwhile, most probably, neither making choice nor being conditioned is unique to humans. As long as it is certain that there is always the possibility for a bear conditioned to dance and which has danced for years due to the training process implemented by its human trainer may rebel one day (e.g. may kill its trainer after long years of dancing, even though this is not a common behavior), it would be hard to claim that conditioning even in those ‘well-trained’ animals case is an outcome of non-choice. Nevertheless, this does not change the fact that the bear’s dancing when it hears the music is on account of conditioning, and it is, most probably, not because of the internalization of the rule. It simply may not question its alternatives, or may remain involuntary to act for realizing its alternatives. Similarly, for the humans, it cannot be argued that ‘learned helplessness’ (depending on the context in general, and culture in particular) has nothing to do with a state of non-rebellion. If over and over, the rebels are severely punished (e.g. imprisonment, wounding, killing), this may create a state of conformity without any necessary consent to particular rules.

Making this point clear is important, because this point, although recognizing some degree of choice, makes the idea that ‘if rules are not broken or if there are no strong protests, then masses must have internalized the dominant rules or then this can be

taken as an indicator of consent' highly suspicious. Indeed, conformity under conditions where one makes choice is in no way a one-to-one indicator of the presence of value-consensus or consent. Actually, even when there is direct implementation of violence there might be still a choice, since for example even under torture one can choose to 'talk and live' or 'not to talk and continue to be tortured (or die, or any possible other alternative)',¹⁰³ while 'choice to obey a rule' cannot be taken as an indicator of consent in every case (cf. Hoffman, 1995). The opposite way of reasoning generally ends in the underestimation of determinacy of violence (whether actually applied or not) in analyzing domination relations in general, and the state in particular. As Domhoff (1990) suggests on the basis of Michael Mann's arguments, although "(m)ilitary power was central to the theorizing of many nineteenth century social thinkers", it "has been neglected of late in social theory" (p. 3). Alas, this neglect is not restricted to liberal circles. And that is why this thesis spends so much effort to put the violence in general, and armed force in particular, in its place. The relationship between consent and violence deserves far more attention than it actually receives.

Now, having made clear that making choice on the side of obedience to rules cannot be considered as a reliable indicator of internalization of rules or presence of consent, now, actions of state elements will be subsumed under three broad categories, varying in terms of the degree of voluntarily performing a particular state practice with reference to protection of capitalist interests: 'Active voluntary action', 'passive voluntary action', and 'involuntary action'. It is possible for any of these action types intentionally (or unintentionally) to work at the advantage or disadvantage of capitalist short/long term interests. As for the first type of action, the 'active voluntary action' can be divided into two: The first one is the action motivated mainly by material gains (such as electoral victory, promotion, bribe; other than an already-received regular salary/wage/status) (similar to instrumentally rational action), and the second one is the action motivated mainly by a strong belief in the value-correctness of the action (similar to Weber's value-rational action). As for the second

¹⁰³ Although it is possible to interpret the preference of dying in torture as the 'consent to die', it cannot be interpreted as an indicator of consent to the conditions that force the person to make the choice. Therefore, while there might be 'no consent to be tortured', there might be 'the consent not to talk but to die under torture'. Similarly, 'the preference to work in a job under economic coercion' does not necessarily indicate that there is consent to capitalism, if, for example, that working person desires a society where there is neither the rich nor the poor.

type of action, the ‘passive voluntary action’ the individual performs a particular state practice without much questioning the value-correctness or the possible material advantages or disadvantages (except from the concern for the regularly received salary/wage/status), but performs it because it is given as a duty, without even theorizing the sacredness of duty (similar to Weber’s traditional action). A possible questioning of the individual may end in the first or third type of action. As for the third type of action, the ‘involuntary action’ ends in the performance of a particular state practice with a strong belief that the action is not correct while it is somehow performed in order not to be dismissed or because of a conflicting value-orientation. Here, except from the ‘strong belief type of active voluntary action’, none of these action types are seen as necessarily indicating the presence of consent in performing that particular state practice, while except from the ‘involuntary type of action’, none of these action types are seen as the necessary indicator of lack of consent. Yet, whatever the orientation of the action is, state elements are considered to be the *subjects* of the action, with or without consent. Consequently, in the present thesis, even though the state as a collective is not treated as a subject; the incumbents of its positions, namely the state elements are held to be subjects.

3.6 Summary

The present chapter argued in favor of pursuing an analytical framework that would work in a micro-macro range; that would grant to the means of violence its deserved privilege; that would not equate the means of capitalist domination with the means of the state, that would treat the state as a non-neutral thing, that would treat the incumbents of state positions as subjects with some degree of choice, and that would divert its focus from the search for unity with reference to a power bloc to the relatively stable and fluid moments in state networks in a given time. In doing this, the definition of the state proposed in the present thesis became also its kernel. Regardless of the parallels which can be drawn with the Weberian conceptualization of the state such as the reference to territoriality; unlike Weberian accounts, the present chapter held that official authority of the state is granted by some successful enough armed force not necessarily enjoying legitimacy. And, while the present thesis theorized the state mainly by its legal form, its standpoint has also moved beyond the legalist-formalist accounts, which is crucial especially in answering such questions as

how to categorize the status of the illegal armed forces, how to conceptualize the status of the state element's illegal practices, and where the state ends and where it begins.

In the present chapter, it has been also discussed that the expansion of the class struggles necessarily includes the application of power to the state in the analysis. Therefore, the Althusserian legacy in general, and Poulantzas's equation of giving reference to what he saw as the bourgeois conceptualization of power and his equation of including micro-level aspects in the analysis with 'bourgeois approach' are seen as seriously obstructing a dynamic analysis and at the same time keeping those analysts with anti-capitalist stance from making thorough analysis on account of their concern for not making 'bourgeois (non)science'. The present thesis adopted a three-dimensional conceptualization of power and insisted on the necessity to apply it at a micro-macro range in analyzing the capitalist hold of state power. It neither excluded the theoretical possibility for the hold of state power by the bourgeoisie nor the possibility of partnership model from the analysis while it acknowledged the possibility of the presence of pro-capitalist state practices even without the capitalist hold of state power.

Meanwhile, although the state was not theorized to be a 'subject' with interests of its own or a 'thing' as a neutral instrument, the incumbents of state positions were theorized to be subjects who might at least pursue three possible paths (among possible other paths) of action in line with whether the capitalist interests or not: 'Active voluntary action', 'passive voluntary action', and 'involuntary action'. Meanwhile, the individual was theorized as a being both open to conditioning to some extent and capable of making choice to some extent, while obeying a particular rule was not theorized as necessarily the internalization of that particular obeyed rule. In other words, the individual was theorized as both a conformist and a rebel. In analyzing the capitalist hold of state power, the focus of the analysis was proposed to be put on the mechanisms of holding the state power in a micro-macro range via granting privilege to armed power (with the acknowledgement that the state form does matter). And that is the major problematic of next chapter.

CHAPTER 4

CAPITALIST HOLD OF STATE POWER FROM A MULTI-LEVEL PERSPECTIVE WITH A FOCUS ON CONSENT AND VIOLENCE

My Mahzuni Şerif relieve your pain
Get your remedy from some pains
Like the Pir Sultans¹⁰⁴ to gallows
Don't know should I go or shouldn't I

(from 'Don't Know Should I Cry', an *Aşık Mahzuni Şerif*
poem/song)

4.1 Introduction

The manner of taking for granted the presence of consent of the masses has given rise to a number of theories in search for legitimacy of the rulers at times of absence of mass rebellion. This has been the assumption underlying a number of texts not only in liberal theorizing but also in Marxist theorizing. Social contract theorists' assumptions on 'tacit consent' have already been discussed and their criteria such as non-rebellion, staying in a country, or receiving the benefits of the state are held to be not sufficient for treating them as the necessary indicators of the presence of consent of the masses. Besides, it is also held that even the voting procedures in a representative democracy do not constitute the necessary criteria of consent. A person may vote for a candidate representative (e.g. candidate political party or person) for one offered policy while, in the meantime, she may disagree with the voted candidate's other policy proposal. Therefore, her vote to a particular candidate does not necessarily indicate her consent to the program defended by the candidate. Actually, even referendums cannot be taken as the necessary indicator of the consent

¹⁰⁴ Pir Sultan Abdal is a 16th century *Alevi* rebel who was executed by the Ottoman state, who then became a symbol of struggle for Alevis and several leftists in Turkey.

to the voted policies as long as the agenda and the formulation of the voted proposal are not set in consensus by those who vote. Besides, if the voted proposal embodies more than one proposal such as particular laws or constitutions, still, what is assented and what is not cannot be detected from the 'yes' or 'no' vote. Furthermore, the motive of giving a 'yes' vote or 'no' vote may be other than the voted proposal itself, while, for example, the motive of giving a 'yes' vote to the constitution may be even the desire to get rid of a military government regardless of the constitutions' articles. While assessing the presence of consent is highly problematic in social theory – widely discussed especially with reference to the dichotomy of direct/participatory and representative democracy among political philosophers-, the mainstream social theory of the 20th century has largely treated the consent of the masses in the absence of challenging mass rebellions as given. While several Marxists have emphasized the decisiveness of armed force, the assumption remained: 'If masses do not rebel, then that must be on account of their consent owing to the success of ideological processes'.

As for Marx and Engels, both have emphasized the determinacy of armed force in a number of texts. Several excerpts indicate the recognition of the centrality of armed power for class rule and state in their texts. In a letter written by Engels (dated April 18, 1883, London) to P. Van Patten (New York), the following statements make this point clear:

Since 1845 Marx and I have held the view that *one* of the ultimate results of the future proletarian revolution will be the gradual dissolution of the political organisation known by the name of *state*. The main object of this organisation has always been to secure, by armed force, the economic oppression of the labouring majority by the minority which alone possesses wealth. With the disappearance of an exclusively wealth-possessing minority there also disappears the necessity for the power of armed oppression, or state power. At the same time, however, it was always our view that in order to attain this and the other far more important aims of the future social revolution, the working class must first take possession of the organised political power of the state and by its aid crush the resistance of the capitalist class and organize society anew. This is to be found already in *The Communist Manifesto* of 1847, Chapter II, conclusion. (Engels, 1883)

For Marx, the case was also similar: armed power was of central importance. Indeed, in 'Capital', Marx (1867) mentioned about "...the disgraceful action of the State which employed the police to accelerate the accumulation of capital by increasing the degree of exploitation of labor" (p. 469). In also 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon' he wrote, "... the parliamentary republic, in its struggle against the revolution, found itself compelled to strengthen the means and the centralization of governmental power with repressive measures" (Marx, 1852, p. 74). Marx (1871b) also gave reference to the use of means of violence in a letter (dated April 12, 1871, London) he wrote to Dr Kugelmann concerning the Paris Commune and recalled a point he made in 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon' which was that "the next attempt of the French revolution will be no longer, as before, to transfer the bureaucratic-military machine from one hand to another, but to *smash* it, and this is essential for every real people's revolution on the Continent". Besides, not only the 'Eighteenth Brumaire' but also his other works on France (Marx, 1850; 1871a) emphasized the centrality of the armed force. Yet, despite this decisiveness emphasis, Marx and Engels did not exclude from their theory the necessity of the consent of the masses for class rule. For example, concerning the importance of ideas, specifically the presentation of particular interests as the general interest, and creation of a sense of fraternity among masses, in the 'Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', Marx argued:

No class of civil society can play this role without arousing a moment of enthusiasm in itself and in the masses, a moment in which it fraternizes and merges with society in general, becomes confused with it and is perceived and acknowledged as its general representative, a moment in which its claims and rights are truly the claims and rights of society itself, a moment in which it is truly the social head and the social heart. (Marx, 1844a, p. 9)

Therefore, regardless of the decisiveness of armed force, the consent of the masses along with the armed force was held to be the *sine qua non* of the class rule in Marx texts. The treatment of the 'consent of the masses' and 'force concentrated by the state' as the necessary components of the modern society have most effectively been theorized by Weber in his political writings on state and legitimate authority as presented in the previous chapter. Weber's influence in social theory has not been

restricted to the liberal circles. On the contrary, several Marxists treated consent of the masses as a necessary element of the capitalist societies. This mode of interpreting the consent of the masses can be found also in Gramsci's 'Prison Notebooks' regardless of the contradictory points he made concerning force and consent. Gramsci has become perhaps the most celebrated theorist by those currents searching democratic ways of transition to socialism. In this respect, Perry Anderson's critical evaluation of Gramsci's treatment of force and consent has to be briefly evaluated, since in the present thesis, a very similar (if not the same) approach to that of Anderson is adopted in theorizing the determinacy of means of violence in capitalist societies.

In 'The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci', Perry Anderson (1976) showed how Gramsci's conception of hegemony shifted in his 'Prison Notebooks'; denoting predominantly cultural supremacy on the one hand, and a combination of force and consent on the other. He indicated that, through a metamorphosis, the emphasis of Gramsci on military struggle in his earlier writings turned into an emphasis on consent. Machiavelli's Centaur (half-animal and half-human) appeared in Gramsci's notes vis-à-vis force and consent in the following way; Gramsci wrote:

Another point which needs to be defined and developed is the 'dual perspective' in political action and in national life. The dual perspective can present itself on various levels, from the most elementary to the most complex; but these can all theoretically be reduced to two fundamental levels, corresponding to the dual nature of Machiavelli's Centaur –half-animal and half-human. They are the levels of force and of consent, authority and hegemony, violence and civilisation, of the individual moment and of the universal moment ('Church' and 'State'), of agitation and of propaganda, of tactics and of strategy, etc. Some have reduced the theory of the dual perspective' to something trivial and banal, to nothing but two forms of 'immediacy' which succeed each other mechanically in time, with greater or less 'proximity'. In actual fact, it often happens that the more the first 'perspective' is immediate' and elementary, the more the second has to be 'distant' (not in time, but as a dialectical relation), complex and ambitious. In other words, it may happen as in human life, that the more an individual is compelled to defend his own immediate physical existence, the more will he uphold and identify with the highest values of civilization and of humanity, in all their complexity. (Gramsci, 1989, pp. 169, 170)

As Perry Anderson (1976) suggested, in contrast to Machiavelli's emphasis on 'force' and 'fraud', Gramsci's emphasis was put on the opposite pole while Machiavelli's *The Prince* and Gramsci's *The Modern Prince* became the distorting mirrors of each other. Although "Gramsci adopted Machiavelli's myth of the Centaur as the emblematic motto of this research ... where Machiavelli had effectively collapsed consent into coercion, in Gramsci coercion was progressively eclipsed by consent" (p. 49). Most probably, on account of his great disappointment with the defeat of the socialist movement and Mussolini's ascendancy in the Italy of 1920s, and on account of his life under the highly isolated tough conditions of the prison, in time, Gramsci's emphasis gradually shifted to the consent pole noticeably. As Perry Anderson stated:

Gramsci wrestled throughout his imprisonment with the relations between coercion and consent in the advanced capitalist societies of the West. But because he could never produce a unitary theory of the two—which would necessarily have had to take the form of a direct and comprehensive survey of the intricate institutional patterns of bourgeois power, in either their parliamentary or their fascist variants—an unwitting list gradually edged his texts towards the pole of consent, at the expense of that of coercion. (Anderson, 1976, p. 49)

As for today, the 'dual perspective', which Gramsci had complained for its banal and trivial treatment, is far from being trivial, although the academic circles have largely handled it with its one pole 'consent' rather than its 'violence' dimension, most probably because several academicians perceive the latter phenomena as somehow contaminating or unpleasant to deal with. But still, the major problem is not only the predominant privileged treatment of consent in the academic circles of the 'West' or the 'East'. Actually, the problem is the 'dual perspective' itself. As long as strong theoretical foundations are not laid for the necessity of consent of the masses to the conditions to be ruled or unless what should be consented to by certain categories is/are not specified as the necessary factors, it should have been hardly possible for one to treat the 'consent of the masses to the capitalist order' unconditionally as the necessary factor for ruling the masses in a capitalist society. Therefore, in the mainstream state theory, the problem is not only the underestimation of violence in general, but also the unconditional treatment of consent of the masses to the capitalist order as the necessary component in the absence of mass rebellion. It is quite clear

that the presence of something does not always denote its necessity for another thing. And; the presence of some degree of consent among masses to particular state practices does not denote necessarily the presence of consent of the masses to capitalism. Although it is less problematic to detect the presence or absence of some consent from the case of rebellion since there should be lack of some consent as regards what the individual manifestly or latently protests; in the case of non-rebellion, it is extremely hard to identify the presence or absence of consent since it is highly ambiguous to which aspects of the rulers' policies there is consent and, furthermore, whether there is any consent to the rulers' policies at all or not.

This chapter mainly focuses on the relationship between consent and violence, mechanisms of consent and violence, and some possible factors ending in non-rebellion with reference to the capitalist hold of state power by discussing some examples and instances in the context of Turkey. In doing this, however, it is acknowledged that motives other than consent to particular conditions may be in effect when the people do not protest or rebel actively against the pro-capitalist exercisers of state power or against capitalism. As Anderson suggested, factors other than consent and violence should be taken into consideration in analyzing masses' obedience in a capitalist society. Concerning Gramsci's analysis, he wrote:

The dualist analysis to which Gramsci's notes typically tend does not permit an adequate treatment of economic constraints that act directly to enforce bourgeois class power: among others, the fear of unemployment or dismissal that can, in certain historical circumstances, produce a 'silenced majority' of obedient citizens and pliable voters among the exploited. Such constraints involve neither the conviction of consent, nor the violence of coercion. ... Another mode of class power that escapes Gramsci's main typology is corruption—consent by purchase, rather than by persuasion, without any ideological fastening. Gramsci was, of course, by no means unaware of either 'constraint' or 'corruption' ... However, he never intercalated them, to form a more sophisticated spectrum of concepts, systematically into his main theory. (Anderson, 1976, p. 41f)

Indeed, generally, a multiplicity of factors is in effect ending in the obedience of the masses in capitalist societies. In this chapter, some of the possible factors influential over the obedience of the masses to the pro-capitalist state practices are analyzed with

reference to not only mass means of opinion formation¹⁰⁵ but also community networks and violence. Besides, since the present thesis theorizes the determinant factor as the armed force, a few of the factors mobilizing the armed elements in line with the capitalist interests are evaluated in a separate section. Besides, since pro-capitalist state practices are not theorized as necessarily requiring the consent of the masses to capitalism, means utilized in line with the capitalist interests for steering the incumbents of state positions will be also evaluated in a separate section, with the acknowledgment that the factors influential over the masses may be also (and are commonly so) influential over the state elements. Lastly, the decisiveness of and limits to armed force will be discussed with reference to examples and critical instances in Turkish political history. The analyses will be carried out in a micro-macro range far from celebrating an abstractionist mode of analysis; with the opportunity to discuss the theoretical standpoint of the thesis with reference to a few issues raised in the previous chapters. Among the points discussed in addition to the decisiveness of armed force; also, the interplay of the *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, the critique of the conceptualization of ‘power bloc’, and non-restriction of armed force to state networks take place. In the present chapter, also, the Mafioso mode of production is theorized to be a considerable threat to the conventional bourgeoisie. Meanwhile the capitalist class’ biggest advantage for holding the state power is theorized to be the material resources its members hold. Regardless of the points different than Miliband’s approach, in the following pages, Miliband’s multi-level and non-abstractionist mode of analysis is celebrated as against those accounts equating the analytical inclusion of the interpersonal relations with empiricism and bourgeois sociology.

All through the chapter, the analysis is made under the constraint of the extremely limited secondary data (conceding that what should be considered as primary and secondary is a matter of question). A choice had to be made concerning the characteristic of the data; either on the side of treating the relatively primary data or on the side of using the already treated secondary data. If primary data were to be used, the analysis would have been restricted to only one dimension of the capitalist hold of state power such as social origins, interpersonal relations, curriculums, or the news on television; running the risk of disabling a multi-level analysis and the

¹⁰⁵ In the following pages, the word ‘opinion’ is used in a way to cover also ‘value’.

discussion of the factors enabling and/or facilitating the capitalist hold of state power, and of the relationship between violence and consent. On the other hand, if secondary data were to be used, the analysis would not have been restricted to a specific aspect of the capitalist hold of state power, enabling an analysis at a micro-macro range and enabling the discussion of the phenomena at different levels, but running the risk of inadequate elaboration on a single dimension and being sentenced to the material presented by the already made studies. In the present chapter, the choice is made on the side of the secondary data since the motive pushing the author to write this thesis was to reassert the need to make a multi-level analysis and the determinacy of armed power for the capitalist hold of state power.

4.2 Opinion Formation and Material Resources in a Micro-Macro Range: The Interplay of the *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*

In this section, unlike the abstractionist mode of analysis employed by the Althusserian school, the dynamics of the opinion/value formation that might be to a certain extent (if not totally) responsible from the non-rebellion of the exploited and from the pro-capitalist practices of the state elements will be evaluated in a rather concrete manner without holding an empiricist standpoint, in a similar mode with Miliband's analysis in his *The State in Capitalist Society*. However, for Miliband, most probably since he studied the economically advanced capitalist societies, there was plenty of available data which he could use in his analysis, covering a range of issues such as education, nepotism, ties of kinship, friendship, class origins, social origins of selection and promotion, chances of upward movement, conservatism of top civil servants, political parties, donations to political parties, textbooks sponsored by businesspeople, exploitation of national sentiments throughout mass media and education. Unfortunately, in the case of Turkey, the relevant available treated data is quite limited, hindering a thorough analysis. However, given the purpose of the present study, the critical use of secondary data (rather than restricting the analysis to such qualitative or quantitative research techniques as discourse/content analysis, interviews, or questionnaires) has been obligatory for the micro-macro range analysis, since restricting the analysis to one such technique would impregnate highly misleading and/or inadequate results. Indeed, for example, when a state element or a capitalist who declares that he/she has done something for national interests, it cannot

be concluded that he/she necessarily is motivated by the national interests, or he/she has done that particular action for his/her own material gains via exploiting the national sentiments. What can be detected from such kind of a statement is at the most that; 'national sentiments might be an important motive for the people or for the subject of the action since that particular action is said to be done in the name of the nation'. Besides, for example, utilization of national sentiments constitute only one possible (if not an essential) dimension of the capitalist rule. There might be several further possible factors contributing in the capitalist rule such as the individual motives of winning an electoral victory, becoming richer, or fulfilling religious obligations among others, the presence and influence of which all depends on the person and the context. The evaluation of even a few components of this multi-dimensionality makes it impossible to focus only on a single issue such as focusing merely on bribery or social origins, since here, there is no claim that any is the sole determinant of the capitalist hold of state power (except from the privileged treatment of armed power as will be discussed in section 4.3). Apparently, reducing the analysis to a single instance or to a single component of this multi-dimensionality would not serve the analytical purposes of the thesis. The analysis of the capitalist hold of state power cannot be restricted to a specific instance (e.g. military coup d'état of September 12th) or a single factor (e.g. social origins). In this section, the analysis covers the use of secondary data presenting examples and instances from the capitalist Turkey, in a way to make it possible to detect particular modes of utilization of opinion formation means and material resources concerning the capitalist hold of state power from the available data. Unfortunately, despite its advantages, the biggest defect of such type of a secondary-data analysis is the restricted character of the available material to be shaped by the analyst. Even the very standard primary data analyses on a range of issues which would have been useful for discussing the relationship between social classes and state power are absent in Turkey. Therefore, throughout the research, the availability and absence of treated material fitting the purpose of the research have imposed itself as a constraint over the process of selecting the analyzed aspects in addition to locating the relevant features and cases to the selected aspects. Yet, the advantages have outweighed its disadvantages.

As for the content of the present section, the examples presented below will provide the opportunity to discuss the interplay of the *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* (the

concept 'community' is used with the meaning loaded in Chapter 2) with reference to the hold of state power vis-à-vis the short-term and long-term capitalist interests. It will be shown that the sentiments of community from that of friendship to nation are among the aspects motivating the social action although the so-called associational relations are also among important aspects motivating individual behavior. However, what generally exist in practice are the intermixture and interplay of both. Indeed, while several communities are actually or potentially exposed to the realization of material interests of social class members (among others) with different closure levels (e.g. manifest class interest communities and latent class interest communities); several associational hubs/bases may develop communal relations (e.g. business associations embodying a number of communal relations) or may make reference to community sentiments (e.g. mass media making reference to national sentiments) as they operate. However, there may be also instances where there is no reference to community but to only particular ideals (e.g. salvation) or material interests (e.g. making money). Meanwhile, the state structure and the legal framework may also grant opportunities to and put constraints over the realization of particular interests (e.g. laws outlawing socialism). Nevertheless, the tighter the community relations are and the stronger the solidarity is (e.g. particular religious communities, friendship communities), the more resistant the individual might grow against the counter-forces acting upon those communal relations and sentiments when compared to the resistance of the relatively associational networks (e.g. business associations, labor unions) and mass means of opinion formation (e.g. mass media, formal education) against state's sanction of abolishing them. A good example for that kind of communal resistance is the religious *tariqats*¹⁰⁶ surviving in Turkey despite the state's outlawing of the *tariqats*; while at the individual level, those motivated with particular ideals rather than immediate material gains with strong devotion to those ideals can be also considered as relatively resistant to central state intervention (e.g. socialist teachers, religious militants). In this process, the capitalists possess the

¹⁰⁶ In Islam, *tariqat* refers to the path to follow for reaching the God and God's will. The principles of this path are to purify the fleshly cravings, to improve morals, and to live Islam (Bulut, 1995, p. 399). Although *tariqat* members belong to the same community mainly for religious purposes, the community solidarity and sentiments also constitute a basis for making political choices such as considering capitalism as legitimate or not, attacking communists or not, voting for this political party or that political party among others. The solidarity among *tariqat* members also paves the way for establishing close relations between the economic and political elite of the same community. Meanwhile, not only Islamic communities, but also non-Islamic religious communities' may become significant channels to state power.

advantage of providing material resources to make use of those means with the potential to influence the opinions/actions of the masses and state elements. Besides, the state of richness itself may be perceived as a symbol of success and may become an object of appreciation (with the acknowledgment that there is always the possibility to trigger opposite motives). As for the case of Turkey, various examples indicate that the community (real and/or imagined community) ideals and networks provide invaluable channels for the realization of both the short and long term capitalist interests although they also constitute some degree of threat to those interests. Whatever the regime type and intensity of class struggles have been, one thing is certain: The capitalists have made use of those community ideals/networks and they used their material resources in a way to realize their particular interests. The subsections of section 4.2 below present an evaluation of a few factors contributing in the pro-capitalist state practices in a micro-macro range, while section 4.3 discusses the determinacy of the armed power as the major factor that makes the capitalist state possible.

4.2.1 The Capitalist Action Capacity and the Actions of State Elements

This section will discuss the capitalist action capacity and actions of state elements with reference to capitalist interests/demands on the basis of available examples from Turkey. A good example of associational congregations based on capitalist material interests is the business organizations, maintaining a basis for collective action for both particular short-term and collective long-term capitalist interests. While capitalism is a system of intense competition; the bases gathering the capitalist elements provide invaluable opportunities to increase their relatively collective action capacity. However, regardless of their common long-term interests, differences in terms of short-term interests along with interests stemming from their other identities end in a fragmented picture of business associations. Despite their strong associational character, traces of communal identities even differentiating one association from the other, and a combination of short-term capitalist interests and communal motivations giving rise to factional struggles within business associations can be detected from a number of instances. The co-presence of tendencies of unification and dispersion vis-à-vis capitalist interests can be best detected from the

analysis of business organizations as perhaps the purest sites of those alliances/congregations and struggles.

As for Turkey, Öniş and Türem listed four major business associations in Turkey with reference to each one's distinguishing characteristic as the following:

Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TÜSİAD), a key voluntary association of big business interests in Turkey; the Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (MÜSİAD), a voluntary business association with an explicit Islamist orientation whose membership is made up primarily, if not exclusively, of small and medium-sized firms; the Union of Turkish Chambers and Stock Exchanges (TOBB); a semi-official business association whose membership is obligatory for all registered business units in Turkey; and the Turkish Employers' Confederation (TİSK), a voluntary business association with an explicit focus on wage bargaining issues *vis-à-vis* labor unions. (Öniş & Türem, 2001, p. 95)

TOBB was established in 1950 while the foundation of TİSK dated back to 1961. TOBB and TİSK can be considered to be the widest business organizations with a predominant associative character. TÜSİAD was established in 1971, but this time, as the representative of the big business interests, again on associational basis, despite that most probably in the larger associations TOBB and TİSK, the 'we feeling' may be in effect only at times of perceived common threat, while in TÜSİAD, the 'we feeling' may be somehow relatively strong than the larger TOBB and TİSK. Meanwhile as will be discussed in further paragraphs of this section, in a number of business associations with predominantly associational character, the belonging feeling has been attempted to be enhanced by a number of strategies. As for MÜSİAD, it was established in 1990 and despite its associational character, its relatively distinguishable community character with reference to especially *Sunni* Muslimhood makes it somehow different than the other three. All these organizations have sometimes represented sectional; sometimes represented more collective interests of the bourgeoisie. These organizations represent some collectivity, increasing the action capacity of the capitalist class and groups, although they have never been exempt from the dispersion tendency which can be read as the capitalist within struggles.

Meanwhile, in Turkey, the number of business associations has increased considerably during the post-1980 period spreading to almost every city of Turkey (for the examples, see Tabak, 2002, p. 97). Today, including those established at an earlier date, there are a variety of business organizations, several of which at the same time embody communal relations despite their predominant associational character. For example, different segments of the bourgeoisie have got organized in terms of the economic activity they make (for example the associations of the exporters such as the ‘Union of Exporters’; the organizations based on work branches such as the ‘Union of Textile Employers’), in terms of the enterprise size (for example the organizations of the owners of the small and medium sized enterprises such as ‘KOSİD’ – *Küçük ve Orta Ölçekli Sanayi İşletmecileri Derneği*; the bigger capitalists’ organizations such as TÜSİAD), in terms of their religious or political preferences (such as ‘MÜSİAD’ that is the religious Muslim capitalists’ association; ‘CUSİAD’ - *Cumhuriyetçi Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği*; DEMSİAD – *Demokrat Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği*), in terms of age (for example associations of the young businesspeople such as TÜGİAD), in terms of region (for example those business associations with geographical basis such as the ‘Karadenizli Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association’, the ‘Malatya Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association’), and in terms of leisure activities or hobbies (for example those business associations with members from certain sports club supporters such as the Galatasaraylı Managers and Businessmen’s Association). There are also business organizations that congregate and unite different segments of the bourgeoisie such as TOBB and TİSK. All these organizations can be considered as headquarters for pro-capitalist action congregating the capitalists, where in addition to these business organizations’ other activities, the congregation may itself become a channel for information and alliance, increasing the action capacity. Nevertheless, apparently, there are also other means utilized by the capitalists to increase information and solidarity within them, provided that an absolute solidarity is never possible as long as they are in competition with each other.

The more the ‘we’ feeling in an association is, the more it can be considered as a community along with its character of association. Several business organizations (that is their empowered bodies) not only provide information but also try to develop some sort of solidarity among their members with the opportunity to increase not only

their members' information on economy and politics (and therefore to increase the capacity for making analyses and formulating strategies for manipulating state practices among others), but also the alliance capacity within the organization (and therefore their collective action capacity) and the 'we' feeling. Since –despite the competition among their members- MÜSİAD and TÜSİAD have embodied slightly more solidarity when compared to the larger business association TOBB with compulsory membership, both MÜSİAD and TÜSİAD can be considered as examples of the manifest class interest communities (MCICs). Now, in the following few paragraphs, the solidarity building and informative activities in MÜSİAD, TÜSİAD, and TOBB will be exemplified to show that there is no automatically emerging collective capitalist action. On the contrary, there are concrete strategies followed by calculating individuals to achieve the pursued goals with a variety of methods employed, the common points of which can be attributed to what Poulantzas meant by being the bearer of the structure (in the thesis, that is 'structural conditioning') while the differences in their motifs can be attributed to not necessarily the class positions/interests in particular, but, in general, the individual differences, value-orientations, traditions, and emotions among others. Generally, the business associations embody an intermixture of all such motifs along with the defense of general/partial capitalist interests, with a predominant orientation towards what Weber meant by instrumentally rational action.

As for the methods for increasing information and establishing solidarity among the members of the business organizations, the following activities can be mentioned among others. As for MÜSİAD, in addition to its educative activities such as seminars and publications, it also carried out such activities as sharing of hobbies, picnics, and *umre* travels to Saudi Arabia to foster cooperation and solidarity among its members (Çemrek, 2002, p. 191). For its members, MÜSİAD also arranged meetings in significant dates, particularly at times of religious holidays (Aysöndü, 1998, p. 61). Similarly, TÜSİAD arranged meetings in every third Wednesday of the month in which it provided economic information for its members. In addition to its educative activities such as seminars and publications, TÜSİAD also promoted dialog among its members via arranging nights in certain significant dates including the national holidays (Aysöndü, 1998, pp. 56, 57). As for TOBB, because its membership is obligatory, it covers a big number of capitalists (for 2005, over 1 million 200

thousand firms were registered to TOBB units¹⁰⁷). Therefore, publications have had a primary place in TOBB's intra-communicative activities at the country level. Besides, its member chambers' activities at local levels have also become important ingredients of congregating the capitalists.

Business organizations' publications (middle-level factor) have become among the activities to increase the action and competition capacity of their members. However, their publications have also become among the factors of influencing the state elements' practices in line with their own interests. During the last few decades, the endeavors of the business organizations for directly or indirectly influencing the decisions of the chief exercisers of state power have become quite discernible. Publications, specifically the reports have become a major activity of these organizations. Such activities have been carried out not only by the business associations, but also foundations and institutes financed by the bourgeoisie.¹⁰⁸ The reports of bourgeois organizations have become an ingredient of the opinion formation process both at the national and international levels.¹⁰⁹ Among the publications from Turkey, that of the business associations TÜSİAD, TOBB, MÜSİAD and the foundation TESEV (*Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı – Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation*) can be considered among the most influential ones. The following paragraphs will briefly evaluate their publication activities and specifically the reports they have published.

As for TESEV, this foundation was established in 1994. It is the continuation of the 'Economic and Social Studies Conference Committee' (*Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Konferans Heyeti*, established in 1961). Its stated aim is making research for

¹⁰⁷ See <http://www.tobb.org.tr/tobbhakkinda/yapisi.php>

¹⁰⁸ This tendency is not restricted Turkey. For example, Susan George (1998) suggests, neo-liberal ideological influence owes much to such institutions like the American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the Hoover Institute, the Cato Institute, the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research inside the US as well as the ones like the Centre for Policy Studies, the Institute for Economic Affairs, the Adam Smith Institute, the Mount Pelerin Society outside the US (pp. 2, 3).

¹⁰⁹ For example, Güney's (2002) research suggests that the World Bank reports contributed in enthroning the neo-liberal perspective in Turkey. However, it is not to say that only the publication activities of World Bank enthroned the neo-liberal standpoint. As will be considered later in this chapter, the credits and credibility promised by the IMF and WB also became important factors among others.

establishing a link between scientific findings and political resolutions. As for 2000, the TÜSİAD members Feyyaz Berker, İshak Alaton, and Bülent Eczacıbaşı were among those who provided the biggest amount of financial support to TESEV (Bali, 2002, p. 89). In line with its mission, it has published a number of research studies in order to intervene in the opinion and policy formation processes. As for October 2005, these publications were categorized under three headings in TESEV's website:¹¹⁰ 'Democratization', 'Good Governance', and 'Foreign Policy'. The category of 'Democratization' had six subheadings: 'Democratic Horizons in Security Politics', 'Internal Displacement', 'Religion-State-Society Relations', 'Constitutional Citizenship and Minority Rights', 'Islam and Democracy', and 'Right to Information'. The category of 'Good Governance' had five subheadings: 'Public Administration', 'Transparency', 'Local Governments', 'Audit', and 'Corruption'. The category of 'Democratization' had three subheadings: 'European Union', 'Cyprus', and 'Middle East'. As can be detected from these categories, the TESEV publications cover a wide range of topics from the laws to foreign policy issues. The systematic activities of TESEV (as well as other business organizations) reveal the bourgeoisie's assertiveness for pushing certain policies and administration types; and therefore their intentional efforts for holding state power.

As for TÜSİAD, it is perhaps the most well-known business association for its series reports. The TÜSİAD reports¹¹¹ cover so many issues that it reminds one almost a governmental activity. Although all members do not always share all points made in the reports,¹¹² a number of these reports have had some repercussions in the mass media. Until now, TÜSİAD has published more than a hundred reports. Although an important number of these reports were written with a focus on economy, an important number of others covered such issues as public administration, political system, education, and foreign affairs. As for the topics of the economic reports; competition, economic development, institutional arrangements, national economic analysis, sector analysis, social security, workforce, customs, foreign trade, and

¹¹⁰ The website of TESEV is <http://www.tesev.org.tr>

¹¹¹ These reports are available at TÜSİAD's website <http://www.tusiad.org.tr>

¹¹² For example, as Kıraç (2004) points out, TÜSİAD reports on education, constitution, RTÜK practices, National Security Council, and Cyprus policies have resulted in noteworthy disputes among TÜSİAD members (p. 221).

international economic relations have been among the issues elaborated. As for the issues covered in the reports on public administration and political system, some are as the following: local governments, political parties, election systems, democratization, judiciary, rights, liberties, and gender inequality. TÜSİAD has even published reports on education. This can be interpreted as its growing awareness on the importance of education both in the opinion formation process and as an input of the qualified workforce. Some issues covered in these reports are science, technology, university education, occupational training, and preschool education. TÜSİAD has published even course books; for example the ones on history, geography, and philosophy. These publications indicate the degree of TÜSİAD's assertiveness in the opinion formation process. As for the topics of the reports on the foreign political and economic affairs, the EU process, proposals for Northern Cyprus, relations with the United States and Russia can be mentioned. As a matter of fact, an important number of TÜSİAD reports have covered the EU-related legislative, social, political and economic issues. As for the policy proposals, they have become an indispensable part of the TÜSİAD reports not only on the EU-related issues, but also other issues.

As for the TOBB reports and books, their number is over 1200. Also their topics cover a great many issues. However, the majority is on economic issues. An important number of them are focused on sector analyses, regional analyses, investments, manufacturing, commerce, agriculture, finance and banking, small and medium sized enterprises, foreign trade, economic relations with other countries, European integration, social security, consumer behavior, legislation, privatization, and income distribution. As for the political and social issues, TOBB has again had its focus on their economic dimensions. On the issue of education, for instance, TOBB publications have been concerned with specifically occupational training rather than broader questions. Nevertheless, there are also reports concerning broader political and social issues such as the *Proposal on the Political Parties and Election Laws* (TOBB, 2000a) and *Constitution 2000* (TOBB, 2000b), which offer a wide range of amendments and proposals for change. However, it seems interesting that there are hardly any TOBB reports published on democracy or democratization until now. Unlike TÜSİAD, democracy does not seem to constitute a central motive of TOBB publications. Nevertheless, when TOBB's report *On The Eastern Question* (Ergil, 1995) was published, it had significant repercussions. Alkan (1998) interpreted the

publication of this report as the government's response against TÜSİAD's increasing demands for social and political reforms and criticisms regarding the 'South East' question. He suggested that by means of this report and chief state elements' speeches in a TOBB meeting, the government tried to create the impression that its solution went beyond armed measures. In line with the government's stance, the proposals in the TOBB report covered principally the economic dimensions rather than political and social ones¹¹³ (p. 292). Whatever the essential goal of this report was, it had serious repercussions. Alkan (1998) considered this report as the start point of the TOBB report series. According to him, some TOBB reports were written against TÜSİAD's stance such as the one on privatization¹¹⁴ (p. 292). Although from time to time TOBB has become assertive on the issues other than economy, even such reports could not escape a technicist discourse. Whatever the major concern was, the TOBB publications and press releases proved to be a part of the inputs of the opinion formation process that can be also detected from the TOBB related articles in the press.¹¹⁵

As for MÜSİAD, it also has had some publication activities. For example, similar to TÜSİAD and TOBB, MÜSİAD has periodicals.¹¹⁶ Besides, it has also published an important number of reports and books especially on the economic issues of Turkey and other countries.¹¹⁷ However, the reports of MÜSİAD are not as comprehensive as that of TÜSİAD and TOBB, as MÜSİAD is a relatively young association. But still, all these organizations' publication activities have become elements of the opinion formation process.

¹¹³ It is important to note that this report (Ergil, 1995) did not totally exclude the social and political aspects. But still, its major emphasis was on the economy

¹¹⁴ Alkan (1998) suggests that in its publications, TÜSİAD established a link between the privatization process and a proposed middle-term stability program which was to be supported by an industrialization strategy although TOBB approached the problem at a more technical level with no reference to the points emphasized by TÜSİAD (p. 292).

¹¹⁵ For example, see TOBB (2006).

¹¹⁶ TOBB, TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD have periodicals which are distributed not only to their members but also to those who carry out intellectual or political activities. Information on these periodicals and some issues of them are available at these organizations' websites.

¹¹⁷ Some of these reports are available at MÜSİAD's website www.musiad.org.tr

Whether enhanced by the publications or meetings, although the business associations' congregation of individual capitalists cannot provide an absolute solidarity, it creates some degree of unity to enable a degree of common base for action. Even that much solidarity, in turn paves the way for further action for holding state power via resorting to such means as televisions, newspapers, magazines, reports, press releases, appointments with chief exercisers of state power, meetings, and seminars among others.¹¹⁸ But still, disputes on political and economic (in this chapter and almost all through the thesis, 'economy' has been used with its narrow meaning) issues continue to exist in these organizations on account of mainly the very competitive essence of the capitalist mode of production in addition to possible other factors. Meanwhile, although since the very beginning, capitalists have utilized a variety of networks for the realization of their interests, business organizations have constituted perhaps the purest form for their representation in a relatively collective manner. Nevertheless, regardless of the laws securing the private ownership of means of production and all strategies to increase the collective action capacity of the capitalists, it is still very difficult to identify the threshold of a so-called power bloc and a hegemonic fraction as the so-called dominant element of the so-called contradictory unity of the power bloc. The following examples will indicate this difficulty. Contrary to Poulantzas's (1976, p. 73) arguments, the examples will also indicate that the expansion of class struggles requires the application of the concept power to the state in the sense that 'A brings pressure to bear on B to make the latter do something he would not have done without pressure from A' (which the pluralists do not refrain to implement especially with reference to their analysis of the lobbying processes) with the acknowledgment that the present thesis does not hold a one-dimensional conceptualization of power and does not propose to reduce the concept of power and class struggles to this definition.

Indeed, the elements engaged in class struggles are calculating subjects, while they pursue concrete strategies for the realization of their projects. As was argued in the previous chapter, in 'State, Power, Socialism', Poulantzas (2000) also suggested that the expanded reproduction introduced by capitalism "entails that, at the very level of the reproduction process, a strategic calculation is made by various fractions of

¹¹⁸ For the examples for such activities see Çemrek (2002, pp. 175-197); Gülfidan (1993, pp. 76-78); Şahim (1993, pp. 71-83), some of which are also evaluated later in this chapter.

capital and their bearers” (p. 90), while as Jessop (1990) suggested what Poulantzas resorted to was “a *strategic* causality which explains state policy in terms of a process of strategic calculation without a calculating subject” (p. 257). However, as the below examples suggest, the state elements (if not the state itself) are subjects, with the ability of calculation and with some space to prefer this or that policy. Besides, capitalists cannot be simply treated as the bearer of structures, since the projects pursued by particular capitalist elements may have dimensions other than the class interests, which may even sometimes hinder or give harm to their own material interests (e.g. a religious capitalist donating his wealth to a religious political party). Poulantzas’s treatment of the capitalists as merely the bearer of the class structure overlooks those voluntary aspects. For example, although as Buğra (1998) suggests, MÜSİAD’s interpretation of Islam does not hinder making profits (see esp. p. 531), it can hardly be argued that the only way or path to be followed for representing the interests of the middle-sized business in Turkey is to resort to Islamic sentiments since what MÜSİAD embodies is a unique intersection of particular religious communal and capitalist associational relations (under the latter one’s dominance), which in no way can be reduced to the MÜSİAD members’ class positions. Now, having acknowledged that, in the present thesis, the capitalist elements are not reduced to the structural class position they occupy (although this structural position is acknowledged to be a motivator with priority in a way to enable a number of generalizations), the business associations which enable to trace the strategies of particular capitalist combinations/fractions in a relatively observable mode will be evaluated with a few examples with reference to their elements’ actions for steering the state elements in line with their relatively particular and collective interests (that is, vis-à-vis the capitalist hold of state power).

One example is related with the central right Justice Party governments’ policies in the course of 1960s. It is about governmental incentives. The incentives, made available for the industrialists and specifically the Law No. 933 that arranged the conditions for credits and investment incentives, met with the reaction of merchant capitalists, which in turn triggered a power struggle in TOBB.¹¹⁹ In turn, the strong

¹¹⁹ However, in 1969, when the Constitutional Court invalidated the major articles of the Law No. 933, this time, the opposition of the big industrialists such as Koç and Sabancı arose (Alkan, 1998, p. 196).

opposition of the Chambers of Commerce engendered an increased assertiveness of certain industrialists. Especially the bigger industrialists started to make strategic demands such as incentives for export production rather than import substitution. As for the smaller Chambers of Commerce and Industry, they also got more organized in this process. Besides, their candidate (Erbakan) became the TOBB president.¹²⁰ Yet, this did not remain without consequences and met with the opposition of bigger Chambers. Moreover, the Justice Party government took countermeasures to intimidate the new TOBB management as a result of which Erbakan established the rightwing National Order Party, with a predominant Islamic identity (Alkan, 1998, pp. 187-195). This is a typical example of the struggle of capitalists with different short-term relatively collective interests (e.g. merchant capitalists, bigger industrialists, elements of smaller Chambers of Commerce and Industry) in TOBB, as a stage for influencing state practices as regards the Law No. 933. However, as can be seen from this example, the struggle against a common perceived threat (bigger industrialists and Justice Party) contributed even to the formation of a separate community (with the 'We' feeling) predominantly with associative orientations. And that was the National Order Party, which embraced both associative and communal relations in its body, with its strong Islamic orientation, and at the same time, as a means of increasing the action capacity of particular capitalists.

Other examples to which the concept power (in its one-dimensional meaning) can be implemented in explaining the process of the capitalist hold of state power with reference to within capitalist struggles are the following ones once the efforts spent by the bourgeoisie for influencing state practices are considered. One dispute was between different bourgeois organizations on the governmental wage policies. Regardless of the structural antagonistic locations of the working class and capitalist class especially on account of the mutually exclusive collective long-term interests of each other, the short-term interests of the wage-workers and particular capitalist elements/fractions may coincide, engendering controversies between different capitalist elements as happened in the dispute between TOBB that covers the largest group of capitalists and TÜSİAD that covers some elements of the bigger bourgeoisie

¹²⁰ This case became an indicator of the fact that the smaller capitalists *can* get organized and be influential even in key bourgeois institutions, as against the implications of the theories of state monopoly capitalism.

on wage increases. In early 1970s, whereas TÜSİAD supported the wage increase in the public sector, as this would increase the consumer demand, TOBB strongly opposed to this policy on account of the high inflation and increasing costs to influence the governmental policies to block the wage increases as against TÜSİAD and labor unions' demands (Alkan, 1998, pp. 206, 207). As for the conflicting interests with regard to the relatively open and protected markets, one occurred in the Ulusu government era, which was established subsequent to September 12th. Although the relations with the bourgeoisie were good in general, the small and medium sized enterprise owners along with certain big industrialists criticized the way January 24th Decisions¹²¹ were implemented to change the state practices. However, the TOBB management supported these policies strongly. Consequently, Turgut Özal, responsible from this neo-liberal program,¹²² along with two ministers resigned from the cabinet in July 1982. The newcomers made certain rescue operations for the companies in crisis and took measures that calmed down those who opposed the strict implementation of the program. While TÜSİAD played an important role in the resignation process, the TOBB management did not become

¹²¹ Actually, the initiator of the neo-liberal policies in Turkey was the January 24th Decisions of 1980 that was prepared in collaboration with the IMF and World Bank. However, it was not possible for the bourgeoisie to implement this program prior to the September 12th military takeover. For more information on the January 24th Decisions see Başkaya (1986); Çölaşan (1983); Çölaşan (1984); Sönmez (1992).

¹²² According to Ercan (2002), when it was 1970s, the Turkish economy experienced an insufficiency of capital accumulation, which manifested itself as the crisis of foreign exchange. At this instance, the demands of the international capital for moving to an outward-oriented accumulation strategy coincided with the demands of the domestic capitalist groups which grew stronger. The 1980 military coup d'état further integrated the country to world economy while an alliance necessary for the internationalization process occurred between the large scale capital; state and political structures; WB and IMF (pp. 24-27). The post-1980 period became the period of neo-liberal policies. In addition to financial liberalization –the turning point of which, as Sinan Sönmez (2003) suggests was the Decree No. 32 of 1989, which as Yeldan (2003) suggests, totally liberalized the foreign exchange regime, leaving the balance of payments vulnerable to the speculative movements of the international finance capital-; liberal arrangements in the service, industry and commerce sectors were carried out. Agricultural sector also got its share from this process. The liberalization process and its effects in Turkey are critically evaluated in Doğruel and Doğruel (2003), Sönmez (2003b), Şenses and Taymaz (2003), while the liberalization of specifically the agricultural policies is critically evaluated in Oyan (2002). According to Öngen (2003), the post-1980 neo-liberal policies have had implications for the relationship between the bourgeoisie and state. Öngen suggests, in this era, the state's 'collective capitalist' character has been eroded while it increasingly acted in line with the sectional and individual interests of the bourgeoisie (p. 174). This observation may be correct in relative terms. However, the examples presented in this chapter indicate that bourgeoisie has never been exempt from within conflicts with traces also on state power.

much happy about the change (Alkan, 1998, pp. 238-241). These examples can be explained neither without resort to the application of power to the state (with its meaning used by the pluralists, namely with its one-dimensional meaning) nor calculating subjects in state positions. Especially the second example clearly indicates that the expansion of the instances of class struggles has to include that application which Poulantzas refused to implement: 'A brings pressure to bear on B to make the latter do something he would not have done without pressure from A'. After all, there is no guarantee that the Ulusu government would have implemented the same policy if TÜSİAD had not resorted to any sort of lobbying (pressure), while, at the same time, there was also the possibility for the Ulusu government composed of calculating subjects not to implement that policy in any case either.

Concerning the business capacity in influencing state practices (even though three-dimensional conceptualization of power is implemented to the analysis), it should be mentioned that what we are faced with is a sort of partnership model in analyzing several (if not all) concrete cases, reminding the state-centered approaches' standpoint insisting not to reduce the state elements' practices to the pressures of non-state groups and social classes. Indeed in 1983, when the central rightwing Motherland Party became the ruling party and Turgut Özal, the Prime Minister, the government's economic policies, specifically the high interest rates met with the reaction of industrialists and especially TÜSİAD, trying to change those policies. And this time, the government strived to neutralize the opposition via seeking support from the TOBB management, in a way to unite against TÜSİAD (Alkan, 1998, pp. 245, 246). A number of other examples also suggest that at least the top state elements' practices have a highly voluntary side and some space for relatively free action, which can be detected from their policy *preferences*, which cannot be simply treated as the resultant of the strategies of class forces in the course of class struggles, especially when the military governments are considered, which are relatively free to choose this or the other side, regardless of the side(s) they actually chose, and regardless of the support they receive prior to their rise to government. There are a number of instances verifying this relatively free space of action. For example, in the early 1960s, the tension experienced between TOBB and the National Unity Committee (established subsequent to the May 27th (1960) military intervention) is this type of an example. Subsequent to May 27th, the employers felt worried about the legal arrangements

about which they thought would give harm to their pockets such as the Income Tax Law and Corporate Tax Law. They made statements against these practices and blamed the ministers of acting in line with the soldiers' wishes. Similarly, the practices of the government established following the March 12th (1971) military intervention, the 1st Erim government, did not satisfy the bourgeoisie and met with serious criticisms, subsequent to which, a government more sympathetic to the interests of the bourgeoisie, the 2nd Erim government, was established (Alkan, 1998, pp. 174-201). These instances subsequent to two (May 27th and March 12th) military interventions respecting capitalist mode of production reveal that there is no automatic mode of realization of short-term capitalist interests even if the exercisers of state power are against pro-worker collective long-term projects. Another example indicating the presence of the relatively free space against the wishes of the capitalists, with footprints of clash of antagonistic class' relatively short-term interests, occurred between the social democrat Ecevit government and bourgeoisie when the TOBB management increased the dose of its criticism against the statist economic policies of 1979. But, this time, the government's reaction was far from being mild. It took serious measures such as inspecting TOBB's accounts and making public the names of those capitalists who were arrested due to stockpiling. However, this ended in stronger bourgeois opposition (Alkan, 1998, p. 227). Meanwhile, those practices of the Ecevit government can be explained neither with reference to an abstract formulation of the state as the regulator nor as the resultant of class forces, since the expansion of the strategies of the elements of the class forces and class struggles always include a voluntary side which cannot be simply reduced to the structural positions occupied.

As for an example on the tensions between the industrial bourgeoisie and government in the course of 1980s' rightwing Motherland dominance, those days, many big industrialists and chambers of industry strongly criticized the government because of the high interest rates and inflation as well as the economic uncertainty.¹²³ In the course of 1980s, certain industrialists even claimed that the governments' policies

¹²³ As a matter of fact, economic uncertainty has almost always been a major problem mentioned by the capitalists of Turkey in a good many instances. For these examples, see Buğra (1997).

were in support of the foreign capital and commerce¹²⁴ rather than industrial development. Yet, Motherland's reaction was also strong. For example, it reduced the customs taxes for many imported goods. Besides, the governmental authorities made the big domestic industrialists' huge profits public via mass media and accused them of not paying their taxes. The government even initiated an official investigation against TÜSİAD's president in 1990 with the claim that he made politics (Alkan, 1998, pp. 260-265). This instance also indicates the dynamic relationship between state elements and capitalists; and that, while the big bourgeoisie is not a homogeneous group and its elements are not omnipotent, some of its elements' interests can be even radically challenged by pro-capitalist state elements, where this challenge may even include judicial measures (as in the case of official investigation against TÜSİAD's president). Besides, this is not an exceptional case. The big industrialists' criticisms towards governmental practices were not only limited to Motherland governments. The rightwing True Path Party's coalition with social democrats could not escape from criticisms and tensions, either. Particularly TÜSİAD criticized the monetary policies, public deficits, new tax law, and draft law on job security severely in 1992. The reaction of Süleyman Demirel, the Prime Minister of the day, was similar to that of the Motherland government: To remind the profits made by the big industrialists and to warn them to avoid making politics (Alkan, 1998, pp. 287, 288).

Further examples indicating the relatively free space possessed by those in government cover also instances from the interplay of the business organizations (with predominantly, if not exclusively, associative character) and political parties (with both associative and communal character), recalling a partnership model and displaying the non-stable character of policies pursued by the state elements as

¹²⁴ As for the foreign capital and domestic capital in Turkey, Önder (2003) suggests, the foreign capital in collaboration with the domestic capital has had a major role in shaping the economic policies that resulted in an inefficient industrial structure except from the statist period of 1930s. In 1947, the Decree No. 13 permitted the foreign capital to enter and make investments in Turkey, as well as the transfer of profits outside Turkey under the conditions determined by the Council of Ministers. In the course of 1950s, the legal arrangements permitted the foreign capital to make investments in any sector the domestic capital could invest. In 1958, Turkey made a serious devaluation due to the pressure from the IMF. After 1960, relatively protectionist policies were adopted in line with the import substitution model. Although the State Planning Organization (*Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı* – SPO) was established with the 1961 constitution and published Five Year Development Plans, these plans did not become binding decisions for the bourgeoisie (pp. 270-284).

regards realization of the short-term capitalist interests and certain capitalists' shifting preferences for supporting political parties. For example, short after the Motherland's search for support from TOBB, a struggle indicating this dynamic interplay emerged between the capitalists supporting or affiliated to different political communities. It took place between the pro-Motherland and pro-True Path Party cliques at the end of which Motherland supporters dominated the TOBB management for a few years. However, following the True Path Party's success in the 1990 TOBB elections, the bourgeois alliance against the Motherland government grew more extensive. Yet, this alliance did not last long. It was undermined on account of certain industrialists' hope for economic gain from the opportunities that were expected to become available due to the government's active attitude during the Gulf War 1991 (Alkan, 1998, pp. 252-270). This instance indicated the changing character of political preferences of capitalist elements concerning communities with pro-capitalist projects, on account of their shorter-term economic interests. Indeed, even though political party affiliation indicates relatively entrenched communal relations (in terms of the 'we' feeling), the motive of further material gain pushed some True Path Party supporters to the Motherland Party side on account of the expectations for material gain from the war.

Such shifts can be easily observed in the short-term interest oriented alliances between the capitalists. While a number of (if not all) alliances may be accompanied by a distinct sense of identity (whether on momentary or longer term basis, as was discussed with reference to Sartre's example on bus passengers in Chapter 2), the interest-seeking motives can easily break that distinct sense of 'we', in a mode uniting and dissolving, or uniting and evolving the 'we'. For example in TÜSİAD, despite its relatively cohesive character when compared to TOBB, a rapidly shifting fragmented picture occurred as regards attitudes towards Motherland governments. While several of those who benefited from the opportunities provided by the government maintained their sympathy and support to the Motherland, those who could not much benefit from Motherland's practices remained either distant or dissent to the government. All such attitudes gave rise to particular groupings but in a shifting and evolving manner, since the names belonging to those groups changed in the course of time. For example, in the beginning, certain big capitalists such as *Koç* and *Çukurova Group* were distant to Özal government, while some other big capitalists such as *Eczacıbaşı*, *Yaşar Holding*, *Çarmıklılar*, and *Doğuş Group* were strictly dissent.

Certain big construction companies such as ENKA as well as a great many foreign trade groups established close relations with the government. However, in the course of time, some of these big capitalists moved closer while some others moved remoter to the government. Especially after September 1987, when the political ban on the pre-1980 political party leaders was lifted by a referendum, Süleyman Demirel appeared as a more active figure on the political scene which also changed many capitalists' political stance (The case was similar for also the TOBB chambers. While some continued to support the government, some others grew increasingly critical). In TÜSİAD, an instance of such groupings became somehow evident when a report on the analysis and forecast of foreign debts that criticized governmental practices was published. While the anti-Motherland TÜSİAD members asked others to defend the report, the pro-Motherland TÜSİAD members saw the report as mistakenly over-critical (Alkan, 1998, pp. 256-259).

Now, in the light of all the above examples indicating the shifting character of the bourgeois alliances and the relatively free space that the governments possess with some substantial power to prefer this or that policy; the problem of 'power bloc' may be discussed in a more concrete manner with reference to Poulantzas's opinions. There are two major questions to be answered: Firstly, where is the threshold demarcating the so-called power bloc? Is it so easy to determine the line between the so-called power bloc and others? And secondly, how can we detect the so-called hegemonic fraction of the so-called power bloc? Is it so easy to identify them in the face of the rapidly changing bourgeois alliances and rapidly shifting governmental economic preferences? For example, is it really possible to call the post-1970 era as the era of the *hegemony* of the big bourgeoisie? If this is the case, then how can we explain the very different policies (with reference to the attitude towards big bourgeoisie) pursued by the 1970s governments such as the Ecevit, 1st and the 2nd Erim governments among others, and the very serious dispute between several TÜSİAD members and the 1980s Motherland governments? On which criteria shall we draw the line? After all, what are the determinants of being the hegemonic fraction vis-à-vis other fractions? When all such shifts and the very real and serious tensions experienced by the sectors/elements of the bourgeoisie and governments are considered; wouldn't it be a hindsight bias to conclude that 'In the era X, these and those policies favored this or that section of the bourgeoisie more than others, then it

must be the hegemonic fraction'? For example, in the light of all the tensions between TÜSİAD elements and governments, and in the light of the different orientations within TÜSİAD vis-à-vis the Motherland governments' policies, is it really possible to consider the post-1970 era as the era under "the hegemony of the big bourgeoisie that started at the beginning of 1970s and still continues" (Şen, 1992, p. 39)? Meanwhile, the problem is not restricted to only hindsight. Those studies attempting to detect the so-called 'hegemonic fraction' from a number of practices performed by the capitalist elements rather than the state practices are not devoid of problems, either. For example, according to Tabak (2002), "by means of TÜSİAD, the big bourgeoisie has successfully located the image of having the concern for social problems and has worked systematically for becoming a hegemonic power" (p. 87) while he interpreted TÜSİAD's systematic efforts for publishing reports and their effective presentation in the mass media in this respect (p. 87). After all, is it really possible to derive the conclusion that TÜSİAD has really reached that considerable success in creating that image? If yes, on the basis of which criteria? The problem about the search for hegemony in a number of studies is based on the presupposition that there is the consent of the exploited outside the power bloc to be exploited unless they do not strongly protest their exploiters in a society; while the search for hegemonic fraction is based on the presupposition that a power bloc with a dominant element really exists where it is possible to demarcate it whether the party in government supports that hegemonic element or not. However, if these presuppositions are correct, and for example, if the tensions between the elements of the big bourgeoisie and particular governments (e.g. the 1st Erim government, the 1970s Ecevit governments, the 1980s Motherland governments, 1990s True Path Party governments) are no more than shallow phenomenon –since Poulantzas (1975a) suggested the party in power may not be the same with that of the hegemonic fraction-; then where is the accurate criteria to detect the line demarcating the so-called power bloc and hegemonic fraction? Actually, if Poulantzas's abstractionist approach is employed, it would be very hard to find the answer of this question except from that 'because of the *system* itself there is an *objective coincidence* between the function of the state and interests of the dominant class' and that 'all it depends on the class struggles although those class struggles' relevance to the state should never ever be explained with applying the (psycho-sociological) concept of power to the state'. Once the tensions and the rapidly changing instances concerning

the capitalist fractions and governments are examined, and once the non-existence of strong anti-systemic movements are not treated as the indicator of the will of the inhabitants; the recognition of the very unstable and volatile character of the relationship between the capitalist elements/fractions and the governments would enable more thorough analyses avoiding at least partially possible hindsight bias or spurious conclusions, while this is not to reject the presence of relatively favored capitalist sectors (which can be to a certain extent detected from the economic policies/plans/programs and their implementation), but to reject the search for a unified (whether contradictory or not) power bloc and a necessary hegemony (by a particular class/fraction) based mainly on the consent of the masses. Although the empirical data may not necessarily be the indicator of theoretical correctness or incorrectness; the failure to give a satisfactory theoretical explanation of what empirically is observed or experienced may result in orienting the scientific inquiry on the basis of some taken for granted beliefs with highly suspicious character. Regardless of its merits, remaining in the theoretical framework drawn by Poulantzas remains insufficient to demarcate the so-called power bloc and securely identify the so-called hegemonic fraction. As was discussed in the previous chapter, this threshold problem becomes even severer when the Mafioso (capitalist) lords/madams hold significant economic and state power despite the efforts of the not-directly armed (conventional) bourgeoisie and the legal framework outlawing the mafia business.

As was stated in Chapter 2, the Mafioso business grew considerably especially in the post-1980 Turkey. And, perhaps the first considerable opposition of the TÜSİAD bourgeoisie against the growing mafia power appeared through mid-1990s. It was 1994 when Turkey experienced an economic crisis and a big devaluation and when TÜSİAD intensified its criticisms demanding early elections. By then, on account of the growing uneasiness about the corrupt political practices, the demand for a 'Clean Hands Operation' just like the one in Italy was also raised. Yet, in spite of the tension between TÜSİAD and government, the government succeeded in preserving the True Path Party oriented TOBB managements' and certain Aegean capitalists' support (Alkan, 1998, pp. 314, 315). Now, in this specific case, can the mafia power which even gave rise to reactions of TÜSİAD be considered in the power bloc? If yes, then which is the hegemonic fraction, still the big bourgeoisie? Can the subsequent series of police and gendarme operations (e.g. the ones in 1997, 2001, 2006) directed

towards Mafioso (capitalist) lords/madams be interpreted as the indicator of the hegemony of the big bourgeoisie? If yes, then should we exclude the Mafioso (capitalist) lord/madam class/category from the power bloc regardless of the actual power it holds? And if no, then should that be interpreted as the contradictory unity of power bloc which is somehow unified by the state on account of its very function? Indeed, where is the threshold demarcating the power bloc?

Actually, despite that the legal framework more or less determines the state form –as was discussed in Chapter 3- there are several ways in which the state elements may act. It is because individuals are *subjects* with some degree of *will*; in analyzing those ways and why the state elements act in the way they do, functionalist presuppositions should be avoided. Therefore, without analyzing the concrete strategies followed by the exploiting class members and pro-capitalist elements in the course of class struggles to steer the state practices including the application of the concept power to the state (covering but not restricted to its one-dimensional meaning); the reference to the so-called state apparatuses, disciplining institutions (e.g. factory, school, hospital, and prison) or the legal categorization of all class and non-class elements including the exploited as citizens (the effect of isolation) would remain to be inadequate (cf. Poulantzas, 1975a, 2000). In the following paragraphs of this section, mainly (if not exclusively) the strategies followed by capitalists themselves (e.g. individual capitalists, business organizations –their empowered bodies), the entities not necessarily composed of capitalist elements but in defense of capitalist interests (e.g. the political parties, IMF/World Bank, foreign capitalist state empowered bodies/elements), and the material resource advantage of the capitalists will be evaluated with reference to holding (the) state power.

To begin with, the individual strategies for pressing or persuading the state elements to act in particular ways will be evaluated. That is, we will begin with the micro/middle level. The major focus will be on the contacts of the bourgeoisie and chief exercisers of state power. It will cover examples of both formal and informal personal and organizational contacts. In addition to these contacts, the bourgeoisie's congregations with social strata and working class will also be briefly evaluated with reference to the persuasion of wider population that would in turn become a channel for the bourgeois hold of state power. As for the informal contacts, face-to-

face interaction is a common form; while semi-formal or formal personal/organizational contacts commonly take the form of formal correspondences, visits, meetings, panels, conferences, congregations in ceremonies, international business travels, and etc.

As for the personal contacts, Gülfidan's (1993) research indicates that the TÜSİAD members have widely utilized this method to solve their problems. It was found out that the ordinary TÜSİAD members mostly contacted the bureaucracy, the Advisory Council's members preferred to contact the ministers, and the members of the executive contacted both the bureaucracy and the ministers with the same frequency (p. 74). As for the contacts with the MPs, the TÜSİAD members appeal to such tactics as arranging appointments at the offices of the MPs, writing letters to the MPs, and approaching the MPs during the social affairs like international fair openings, official dinners, and seminars. The TÜSİAD members reported that the tactics may change according to the personality of the MP. Sometimes they arranged private meetings together with a friend close to the MP at for example a dinner or lunch, and sometimes they visited the MP with a mutual friend at his office. In Gülfidan's research, the tactics of the TÜSİAD members for contacting the MPs are listed as such in rank: Appointment in the office of the MP, letter, social affair, send a constituent to see him/her, get cabinet member (legislator) to contact, and other. The tactics used by the TÜSİAD members to contact the Prime Minister is slightly different from the MPs and are listed as such in rank: Appointment in the office of the Prime Minister, social affair, sending a prominent member to see him/her, telephone call, and other (pp. 78, 79). However, in its early ages, "the first activities of TÜSİAD members mainly consisted of organizing short introductory trips to their own factories for the politicians and top bureaucrats to convince them about the significance of industry in the economy" (Aydm, 2001, p. 53). In 1974, according to TÜSİAD, these trips were providing the opportunity to show the MPs 'the real truth' about the industrialists who were presented as self-interested by 'some leftist print media' (Alkan, 1998, p. 215). Actually organizing trips to the factories still seem to be a widely resorted tactic as it provides the opportunity to express the problems experienced and impress the chief exercisers of state power with the investments made.

As for other examples of contacts, in his memories, Sadi Koçaş¹²⁵ (1978), the Deputy Prime Minister in the 33rd government,¹²⁶ wrote about the existence of several people who contacted the government in line with the interests of particular capitalists. For example, against a possible governmental resolution on the reduction of medicine prices, the representatives from medicine firms got appointment from Koçaş, sympathetic to the resolution. They further contacted the president of the republic. Their growing opposition then gave rise to a governmental crisis (pp. 398-401). Also, from the biographies and memories of the capitalists, it is possible to detect some clues concerning the degree of closeness and the intentions during the contacts with the chief exercisers of state power. For example, in his book ‘Kuşaktan Kuşağa’, Nejat Eczacıbaşı (1982), one of the richest capitalists of Turkey, refers Celal Bayar (the president of the republic from 1950 to 1960) as his father’s close friend (pp. 86, 106). He also mentions about the names of Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes (the Prime Minister between from 1950 to 1960) while writing about the opening ceremonies of his factories (pp. 96, 97, 105, 106). The memories of Kadir Has, another rich capitalist, provide some clues, too. In his book ‘Vatan Borcumu Ödüyorum’, just like Eczacıbaşı, Has (2002) also mentions about the friendship of his family with Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes (pp. 87-90). A number of ceremonies to which Kadir Has and Süleyman Demirel (the Prime Minister for several times, and the president of the republic between 1993-2000) invited each other as the major figures also gives the impression of a close relationship (pp. 432-457). The giant capitalist Sabancı family’s experiences also illustrate the widespread contacts established with the chief exercisers of state power. Indeed, the book on the life of Hacı Ömer Sabancı (Arzık, year unidentified), Sakıp Sabancı’s father, clearly reveals these relations as it is written that Sabancı’s villa in Emirgan witnessed the visits of numerous politicians and heads of the state including the DP’s leading figures Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayar. Actually, Sabancı were aware of the importance of establishing good relations with the chief exercisers of state power. Therefore, later,

¹²⁵ After retirement as a colonel, Sadi Koçaş became a senator in the assembly (July 7, 1962 – October 22, 1969), and then was elected as an MP from the RPP list in 1969. Then he served as the Deputy Prime Minister in the 1st Erim government until his resignation from office on April 12, 1971. For further information on Koçaş, see <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1998/01/13/haber/iht.html>

¹²⁶ The 33rd government (March 26, 1971 – December 11, 1971) was established following the March 12th military memorandum and consisted of several technocrats.

Hacı Ömer Sabancı did not hesitate to contact with those who overthrew the DP government. Subsequent to the 1960 coup d'état, he arranged a contact with General Cemal Gürsel, the head of the May 27th military junta and showed Gürsel his factories in Adana (pp. 9-13). In his memories, Sakıp Sabancı (2004) also wrote that his father did establish good relations and arrange friendly, informal contacts with the military commanders in Adana (pp. 163-165). Contacts with the chief exercisers of state power seem to have preserved their importance even in the course of 1990s for the Sabancı family as indicated by Güler Sabancı's invitation of Mesut Yılmaz, the president of the Motherland Party, to a party in her house during which certain industrialists and TÜSİAD members expressed their choice for a Motherland and TPP coalition government (Alkan, 1998, p. 309). The memories of another big capitalist of Turkey, Vehbi Koç (1973), also indicate that personal contacts do turn out to be influential for solving some problems. Actually, Koç suffered serious problems with the chief exercisers of state power during the rule of the DP as he was a member of the RPP until 1960. Yet, his personal contacts with Adnan Menderes definitely provided the opportunity to express and solve the difficulties he experienced. After his resignation from the RPP, he continued to express his opinions to the governments whether orally or written (p. 110-151). For example, three weeks after the September 12th military intervention, Vehbi Koç wrote a letter conveying his opinions and demands to Kenan Evren, the head of the junta. The letter covered many proposals such as the one on the need for relentlessly suppressing terror and separatism rather than repeating the May 27th junta's error of being lost in details. After one week, Kenan Evren received Koç. During his visit, Koç gave a five pages note to General Kenan Evren and General Haydar Saltık listing the points that the military government has to take into consideration such as the ones on the need for struggling against anarchy, separatism, and militant trade unionism, the need for strengthening the police force, watching the activities of the Turkish Communist Party in East Berlin, removing the disputes with Greece, and keeping Turgut Özal in state institutions. The note also covered proposals on energy problems, tax law, and employees' seniority payments (see Alkan, 1998, pp. 236, 237). As for other examples of contacts, in his memories, Can Kırac (2004), the bridegroom of the Koç family, and a former top executive of Koç Holding, wrote about a contact for solving a business-related issue. In this incident, he utilized an old friendship tie with a chief exerciser of state power. The issue was that, during the rule of the first rightwing

national front government (1975-1977), in order to manufacture a new model of automobile, a decree was to be signed by the government. Despite the Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel's approval, the Deputy Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan was insistent on not signing the decree. Therefore, for days, Kıraç had to visit the ministers one after another. Yet, these contacts did not suffice to solve the problems. At last, he visited the Minister of State Seyfi Öztürk, his primary school friend, whose authority sufficed to solve the problem on account of his position in the government (pp. 57, 58). Therefore, at many instances, informal ties along with formal contacts with the chief exercisers of state power have become among the widely resorted channels for solving the problems of the capitalists. The commonness of informal ties with state authorities is also illustrated by various incidents mentioned in the memories of Salih Binbay (2004), a notable capitalist of the health sector engaged in particularly the trade of medical products (see esp. pp. 20, 58, 70, 82, 84).

Indeed, there is no automatic mode of class struggles, and no objectively coinciding structures. If businesspeople resort to such contacts so often, can this be really treated as only a trivial or shallow phenomenon? As for the group or organizational contacts, there are also a number of incidents that indicate the commonness of these contacts. It seems that the business organizations arrange such contacts to create a ground for influencing the opinions and practices of the chief exercisers of state power. The interviews in Gülfidan's (1993) research demonstrate that although the TÜSİAD members solved their individual problems either via TOBB or through their personal connections with the ministers, undersecretaries, bureaucrats, and Prime Minister (p. 73), the TÜSİAD Secretary-Generals Güngör Uras (before 1980) and İhsan Özol (after 1980) saw the publicity campaigns as the most effective method; and the contacts with bureaucracy (for Uras) and Prime Minister (for Özol) as the second effective method for solving the issues they deem important. The interviews also indicate that the TÜSİAD executives saw the contacts with the chief exercisers of state power as an important means of solving the problems (pp. 68, 69). Although for contacting the chief exercisers of state power the TÜSİAD members benefit from personal connections such as the family, school, local and social ties (Gülfidan, 1993, p. 76), as an organization, it also organizes meetings, dinner parties, seminars, symposiums, conferences, and panel discussions to which they invite the chief exercisers of state power along with their other guests (see the examples in Aysöndü,

1998, p. 80; Gülfidan, 1993, p. 77; Şahım, 1993, p. 79). From time to time, a TÜSİAD delegation has also visited the Prime Minister (Gülfidan, 1993, p. 77) and attended the international trips of the Prime Minister and the president of the republic, which have enabled a vivid contact with the chief exercisers of state power¹²⁷ (Aysöndü, 1998, p. 58; Gülfidan, 1993, p. 77). Subsequent to the 1995 general election, TÜSİAD's attitude in favor of a left-supported Motherland-TPP coalition government constitutes a good example of contacting with the chief exercisers of state power. For persuading the party leaders, Rahmi Koç met with the Motherland leader Mesut Yılmaz, Halis Komili visited the RPP leader Deniz Baykal, and a delegation composed of predominantly TÜSİAD members met the TPP leader Tansu Çiller and discussed the issue (see Alkan, 1998, pp. 326, 327).

As for MÜSİAD, it has also adopted similar tactics for contacting the chief exercisers of state power. In his research on MÜSİAD, Çemrek (2002) suggests that in addition to visiting the media organizations, MÜSİAD also gives importance to visit the President, ministers, governors and high-level bureaucrats as a means of influencing the decision-making circles and developing public opinion. The *iftars* (Muslims' dinners during the month of Ramadan) organized by MÜSİAD has become a traditional ground of contact with the leaders of especially rightwing political parties, mayors, high-level bureaucrats, and sometimes cabinet members such as the Prime Minister (p. 192). MÜSİAD has also invited the MPs and other chief exercisers of state power to its meetings, conferences and seminars (see the examples in Aysöndü, 1998, pp. 72, 73, 82). Çemrek (2002) suggests, in a period of nine years, MÜSİAD

¹²⁷ Actually, there are also instances of formal, group contacts in which the chief exercisers of state power of Turkey try to influence the practices and policies of other countries' chief exercisers of state power in line with the interests of the bourgeoisie of Turkey. These contacts sometimes take the form of trips abroad that include also the capitalists of Turkey. In this respect, Turgut Özal's visit to Japan in 1981 constitutes a good example. This visit was arranged to establish business links and validate the Japanese credit of 85 million dollars that was to be given within the framework of an OECD aid. Short after the visit that witnessed tough bargains and negotiations, the credit was made available under better conditions. Those who participated in this international visit may give an idea on the nature of this meeting. Along with other names, those from Japan included also the Minister of Foreign Affairs while those from Turkey also included the chief exercisers of state power Nazif Kocayusufpaşaoğlu (the Secretary of Treasury), Zekeriya Yıldırım (the Foreign Exchange Director General), Rahmi Gümrükçüoğlu (the Economic Affairs Assistant of Secretary General of Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and the following names from the private sector: Mehmet Yazar, Cahit Kocaömer, Şarkı Tara, Jak Kamhi, Ali Koçman, Nurettin Koçak, Mehmet Turgut, Rahmi Koç, Özdemir Sabancı (Çölaşan, 1984, pp. 165-169).

has organized 450 panels on different economic and socio-political issues as well as conferences and traditional weekly Friday meetings that have offered forums for networking hosting the prominent politicians, high-ranking bureaucrats, consulates, ambassadors, and foreign ministers along with others (pp. 190, 191).

As for TOBB, it is the biggest business organization of Turkey providing rich examples of organizational contacts with the chief exercisers of state power. Alkan's (1998) research presents several instances of such contacts. For example, subsequent to the May 27th coup d'état, the bourgeoisie entered in a state of anxiety on account of their unmet expectations and the government's distant attitude. Therefore TOBB representatives decided to visit the president of the republic, Cemal Gürsel, and present their demands. At the end of this visit, TOBB received a promise from the president. Yet, the government's practices continued to be anxiety-generating and many capitalists were worried about the possibility of moving towards a socialist regime. Therefore TOBB increased the degree of its criticisms in the meetings it had organized. Besides, the executives of the Chambers attempted to influence the government and assembly via establishing contacts with the officers, specifically with the ones closer to their standpoint in the NUC and whom they thought would be influential on civil authorities. In this respect, they organized a meeting to which they invited the NUC member Colonel Sami Küçük and presented their demands to him. However, as these contacts did not satisfy the bourgeoisie, TOBB grew more and more assertive in intervening in the opinion formation process through such means as mass media and publication of brochure series whereby they publicized their worries. Furthermore, the İzmir Chamber of Commerce once again contacted all political party leaders in the parliament by means of sending them a letter with the threat of explaining the situation to the public opinion in case they disregard their warnings regarding the economic stagnation due to not establishing a government. As for the period of 1962-1968, the regular meetings held with the government provided the opportunity of direct contact with the chief exercisers of state power. Yet, these contacts only offered a ground for the expression of proposals, not a guarantee for the realization of demands. Indeed, although the regular meetings started with the initiative of the government, TOBB management remained quite unsatisfied and

disappointed about the steps taken by the government.¹²⁸ TOBB management once again suffered frustration when the 1st Erim government selected and invited some individual capitalists to the meetings it organized rather than contacting the TOBB management. The government's refusal of organizational contact with TOBB management made the executive boards seek other ways of contact. In this respect, Chambers' representatives visited and gave a declaration of demands to the president of the republic, Cevdet Sunay, as a result of which the government organized a summit after a month. However, once again, the government selected the names of the individual capitalists and institutions rather than taking into consideration the proposals of the TOBB management. Hence, the summit turned out to be a meeting of expression of individual demands rather than a forum of sharp criticism of the governmental economic policies. As a result, TOBB management remained discontented¹²⁹ (pp. 175-199).

Therefore, as other channels, neither personal (micro-level factor) nor organizational (middle-level factor) contacts are absolute guarantees for steering the exercisers of state power in line with capitalist interests. As was discussed before, the relationship between the capitalist elements and state elements is a dynamic one. Another instance

¹²⁸ On the basis of the TOBB publications in 1963 and 1964 (*İlgili Bakanlarla Özel Sektör Temsilcileri Arasında Yapılan Toplantıların Bilançosu* and *İlgili Bakanlarla Özel Sektör Temsilcileri Arasında Yapılan Önceki Toplantıların Bilançosu* - 'The Balance Sheet Of The Meetings Held Between The Private Sector Representatives and Concerned Ministers'), Alkan (1998) reports that in 1963, among the 104 issues presented to the government, 37 were the ones that the bourgeoisie complained about the insensitivity of the government while only 29 were brought to a conclusion, 18 of which resulted in a negative consequence. As for 1964, among the 143 demands presented to the government, 35 of them brought positive, 17 of them brought negative results, while 85 of them were reported to be either suspended or approached negatively (p. 183).

¹²⁹ Following this disappointment, TOBB started to adopt a more assertive strategy. For example, a report sharply criticizing the draft law on mining was given to the government. Besides, as a result of the increasing criticisms of the bourgeoisie, agricultural sector, and JP, eleven bureaucrats resigned from their office in the cabinet (Alkan, 1998, p. 200). In a similar fashion, TÜSİAD expressed its expectations from the 2nd Erim government with a report (Alkan, 1998, p. 204). Also, the 1980s ANAP governments' preference for the relations with the individual capitalists rather than TÜSİAD as an institution resulted in the worries about governmental practices that would favor certain capitalists and punish some others. TÜSİAD endeavored to push the government to determine common principles rather than arbitrary policies. In 1986, the president of TÜSİAD became Sakıp Sabancı who was to improve the relations with the government on account of his close dialog with the Prime Minister Turgut Özal (Alkan, 1998, pp. 250, 251). However, this dialog did not last long, and TÜSİAD sharpened the degree of its criticisms after its General Assembly in early 1987 (Alkan, 1998, pp. 253, 254).

of this dynamic relationship came to the agenda when even the pro-capitalist JP remained reluctant to realize the demands of TÜSİAD, despite TÜSİAD's several messages for establishing a JP-RPP coalition government following the October 1973 general election. By then, the big capitalists continued to develop a number of initiatives on account of their worries about the economic policies. Vehbi Koç and Nejat Eczacıbaşı visited Prime Minister Ecevit, the big industrialists invited the MPs to their factories, TÜSİAD invited the parliamentarians to its meetings and so on. Yet, they did not receive the degree of interest they expected especially from the RPP members. Thus, the big bourgeoisie decided to resort to more systematic methods for expressing its standpoint. In the December 1974 issue of TÜSİAD's periodical 'Devir' (this was short before the establishment of the coalition government), the need for TÜSİAD to allocate the necessary financial, organizational and human resources for expressing its views in the form of a scientific discourse (with the use of scientific research and in comparison to European countries) was underlined.¹³⁰ Eventually, the big bourgeoisie became aware of the insufficiency of the contacts for manipulating the practices of the chief exercisers of state power in the opinion formation process. Actually, they were not wrong in reaching that conclusion. Sometimes, there have been even instances at which chief exercisers of state power turned back the capitalists' requests of contact. In 1973, for instance, although TÜSİAD invited Ecevit to a seminar, he did not attend it with the excuse of his plane's delay. What is more, in 1974, Ecevit did not accept TÜSİAD's request of appointment on the grounds that there were so many associations in the country that it would be impossible for him to accept all such requests (Alkan, 1998, pp. 208-215).

However, Ecevit's attitude became an exception rather than the norm considering the Turkish governments' relations with the capitalists. Yet, for several times, the relations they established with the capitalists occurred in a relatively arbitrary manner. For example, Alkan (1998) suggests, in 1990, the Motherland government excluded TÜSİAD and TOBB from the decision making processes and returned to its classical attitude of selecting and establishing relations with the individual capitalists

¹³⁰ Similarly, in 1987, Nejat Eczacıbaşı stated in his speech at the General Assembly of TÜSİAD that the proposals and reports based on serious data would be influential over the executive organs of the state even if they are in conflict with the governmental policies. He also claimed that TÜSİAD has to express its views not only to the Prime Minister and the close circle around him/her, but also to the technocrats and the opposition political parties' experts (Alkan, 1998, p. 253).

(p. 267). As for the Welfare Party, in 1997, it developed closer relations with MÜSİAD and also sought to establish good relations with the Sabancı Group as against the opposition of Koç Group (p. 352). Actually, as capitalism is a mode of production in the essence of which there is competition, such reflections are not surprising. Whatever the manner of the governments, the capitalists, individually or collectively have strived to manipulate the state practices; and contacts have become among the most resorted channels of influence, whether with some success or not.

Therefore, sometimes personal, sometimes organizational contacts as well as other means are utilized for steering the practices of chief exercisers of state power. In case the governmental practices do not satisfy capitalist elements, they may seek to influence other elements of the state as in the case of their contact with Sunay, the president of the republic, in the era of Erim government.¹³¹ Yet, still, even such contacts do not become absolute guarantees of success. Therefore, sometimes the bourgeoisie attempts to activate larger groups of people to realize its individual or collective political interests. In this respect, as will be evaluated in another section of this chapter, mass media offers a great opportunity. Sometimes, the capitalist class or its sectors try to locate other social classes and strata in a mainly pro-capitalist struggle position or seek alliances with them as in the case of the mobilization of the people following the *Susurluk Incident* (*Susurluk Incident* was mentioned in Chapter 2). The Economic and Social Council (ESC) established in 1995¹³² can also be interpreted as the basis for a broader network of contact, promising a potential compromise (not guaranteed or not actual compromise) of at least certain sectors of the capitalist, self-employed and wage-worker categories on at least a few issues. However, sometimes, more direct means for steering the exercisers of state power can be utilized as in those cases where capitalists themselves become chief exercisers of state power. Especially being a part of the government is a familiar way of direct penetration into state networks, which will be exemplified in the following

¹³¹ A similar method was resorted to also in 1996 when the industrialists of the automotive sector submitted a report to President Süleyman Demirel to veto the Decree on Free Import of Automobiles. However, in spite of the strong press, Demirel did not veto the decree (see Alkan, 1998, p. 341).

¹³² TOBB, TİSK, TESK, TZOB, TÜRK-İŞ, HAK-İŞ, DİSK, KAMU-SEN and certain government representatives are stated as the members of the ESC in Law No. 4641 (enacted on April 11, 2001) which arranged the legal framework of the ESC.

paragraphs. Whether direct or indirect penetration is the case, both contacting with the chief exercisers of state power and representatives of mass organizations become among the factors in steering the exercisers of state power in a way to serve individual/collective capitalist interests, even in an already capitalist state like the Turkish state.

As for the direct penetration into the state networks, the capitalists' presence in political parties has been an important means. However, not only becoming members of the political parties but also the relations established by political parties have become important for steering the state elements. Indeed, political parties have become central ingredients of the Turkish political system for over a century. In the late Ottoman times, the major axis of different political routes was having a pro or con attitude toward capitalism and West-inspired modernization reforms. Nevertheless, even those who favored a capitalist route were divided. They established different political parties on the basis of such disputes as being more liberal or less liberal (path of capitalist development, with relevance to within class struggles especially as regards geographical coordinates). There were also disputes concerning the extent of reforms on modernization, democracy, and religion between the political parties and factions during the late Ottoman period.¹³³ As for the republican times, major disputes arose concerning the path of capitalist development and reforms of modernization. Until 1945, the Republican People's Party (RPP) dominated the Turkish political system except for two unsuccessful trials for the transition to a multi-party regime. As for the post-1946 era, it became the multi-party regime era, though with changing election laws and military interventions. During the mono-party era, there were different cliques within the party, including those with socialist orientation. Especially the leftist interpretation of Kemalism became a ground for the propaganda of collective long-term working class interests, making the RPP a LCIC bourgeois political party. As for the era after 1950 (until mid-1990s), the political parties in government were predominantly bourgeois MCICs, with the exceptions of certain governments with RPP and SPP. Therefore, the Turkish parliament has experienced the dominance of the bourgeois political tendencies since

¹³³ See Tunaya (1984; 1986; 1989).

the very beginning.¹³⁴ Almost all political parties in the parliament have adopted a pro-capitalist route of development (with the exception of LPT members elected in 1965 parliamentary elections). Akgün's (2001) estimation for the number of effective political parties in Turkish politics ranged from 1.4 to 4.8 for the period 1950-1999 (see Table 3, p. 83). Even in the mono-party era, the pro-capitalist route dominated the RPP while the socialist tendencies could never become the leading path.

Given the importance of political parties in the Turkish political system, since the very beginning, capitalists have either become parts of the political parties or supported them from outside. Kırac (2004), the bridegroom of the Koç family and a former top executive of Koç Holding, suggested that the Turkish businesspeople have always tried to secure themselves via influencing political parties (p. 132). For example, one of the richest capitalists of Turkey, Kadir Has (2002), wrote in his memories that he had supported the DP and then the JP until their closure. After 1980, he supported either the TPP or the Motherland while he kept his close relations with Demirel during both his Prime Ministry and Presidency (pp. 91, 92, 371, 438). Probably, he also received some benefits in return for his support such as Prime Minister Demirel's help for him in taking the permission for the trademark Fanta (p. 174). From Has's memories, it is also understood that, the Has family sometimes proposed MP candidates, and sometimes made lobbying for particular cliques in the parties they supported (pp. 89-92, 371). It seems that prominent executives of the firms have become MPs and even ministers such as Ahmet Dallı, the ex-president of Akbank's board of directors who in 1969 became a JP MP and then the Minister of Commerce (p. 102). However, since capitalism is by nature competitive, the within class struggles also have had implications over the relations with political parties. Besides, as Sabancı (2004) (another capitalist among the richest) suggests, for the businesspeople, there are also risks of becoming an active part of a particular political party (pp. 95, 96). Indeed, the RPP member Vehbi Koç (one of Sabancı's biggest rivals) experienced really hard times during the DP rule, as he eventually had to resign from the RPP in March 1960 due to the continuous pressure from the DP circles (see Koç, 1973, pp. 82-150).

¹³⁴ For the distribution of votes see Turan (2004).

There are also instances where associations/communities other than political parties actively support particular pro-capitalist MPs or political parties (a middle-level issue). As will be exemplified in section 4.2.3, this is the case for several *Sunni* Islamic communities of Turkey. Another community network which may have implications for the capitalist hold of state power is Freemasonry, for it embraces a community gathering several elite of the society with a strong promise of brotherhood and solidarity. Although, in Turkey, the strong brotherhood in the lodges did not prevent within conflicts, they could not undermine the relatively strong solidarity either.¹³⁵ As for 2002, the number of Masons in Turkey amounted to 14,300 (Koloğlu,

¹³⁵ In the case of Turkey, Masonic organizations sprinkled in the late Ottoman times. Twenty Eight Çelebizade Sait Çelebi, İbrahim Müteferrika and Humbaracı Ahmet Paşa are known to be the first Turkish Masons. There were also a good number of well-known Masons in the late Ottoman times such as Sultan Murad V, Prince Selahattin Efendi, Şeyhülislam Musa Kazım Efendi, Şeyhülislam Mahmut Esad Efendi, The Grand Viziers –Keçecizade Fuat Paşa, Mithat Paşa, Ahmet Vefik Paşa, Tunuslu Hayrettin Paşa, İbrahim Hakkı Paşa, the ambassador to Berlin –Sadullah Paşa, Şinasi, Ziya Paşa and Namık Kemal (see http://www.mason.org.tr/en_unlutr.htm). During the last few decades of the Ottoman Empire, certain Masonic lodges such as the one in Thessalonica, Macedonia became the organizational bases for the revolutionary activities of Unionists, who were among pro-capitalist forces of the late Ottoman, as will be mentioned in section 4.2.3. The matriculation list of the Macedonia Risorta Lodge, the Thessalonica Orient for 1901-1923 indicates that this lodge had brought many chief exercisers of state power and capitalists together in the late Ottoman times (see Iacovella, 1998, pp. 57-62). Actually, if not all, many prominent Unionists such as Talat (Paşa), Cavit, Manyasizade Refik, Mithat Şükrü, Naki, Kazım Nami, Cemal (Paşa), Hüseyin Muhittin, Faik Süleyman (Paşa), and İsmail Canbolat were Masons (see Koloğlu, 1991, p. 45; Soysal, 2004, pp. 235, 236). A number of authors (Apak, 1958; Dumont, 2000; Koloğlu, 1991; Soysal 2004) suggest that Masonic lodges helped in the organization of the Unionists prior to 1908 although there is not a consensus among them on the meaning and degree of importance the Unionists attributed to these lodges. As for the republican times, Masonic lodges were legal until 1935. In 1935, on account of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's decision of closing the lodges, the Grand Lodge of Turkey decided to cease its activities. In the early republican times, the anti-Mason circles attacked especially the international character of Masonry accusing the Masons of having their roots abroad. This seems to be in part due to the fears of being colonized by the West. The sleeping period lasted for 13 years (Koloğlu, 2004; Soysal 2004). This incident has constituted another example for the dynamic and intricate relationship among state elements, since there were also Mason elements at those days' RPP that decided to close the lodges. This decision may owe to the tactics of certain (not all) RPP strategy formulators for neutralizing or weakening possible rival or dissent elements (and their organizational grounds) that are perceived as threats to their own political/economic political projects. In harmony with the atmosphere of relative freedom during the multi-party regime, Freemasons restarted their activities in 1948. However, they divided into two and got organized in different associations following a dispute on Süleyman Demirel's Masonic identity (Koloğlu, 2004; Soysal 2004). In 1964, when Süleyman Demirel was running for the leadership of JP, a book listing the Masons of Turkey including Demirel's name was distributed to the party delegates and a document on his registration to the Masonic lodge was leaked to the press. Those days, being a Mason was a sort of stigmatization especially in the eyes of the religious people. In order not to lose the conservative delegates' votes, Demirel asked the lodge to give a document writing that he was not a Mason. On Demirel's request, the pro-Anglo-American Master Mason Necdet Egeran arranged a document writing that

2004, p. 255). For the elite congregation of the Freemasonry, Soysal's (2004) list of the names of certain civil and military chief exercisers of state power including the MİT undersecretaries, politicians, university professors, opinion leaders, lawyers, and capitalists is illustrative (see pp. 5-35). The extent of this list indicates that the Masonic organizations have provided not only a basis for the bourgeoisie to contact with the chief exercisers of state power, but also with the opinion leaders who in turn have the potential to influence the opinions of the wider masses and state elements, with critical implications for the incumbents of top state positions. Actually, brotherhood and mutual help among brothers (Masons) are essential in Freemasonry, weaving relatively strong communal ties. Theoretically, when a member (brother) asks help from another member (brother), he is obliged to help his brother as long as that help does not violate the community's basic rules. This principle is also stated in an article of the Master Mason Kazım Nami Duru, the responsible director of *Büyük Şark*, the official publication of the Masonic organization in 1931. In this article, in addition to his point on obligatory mutual help, Duru also wrote that the prerequisite for being a Mason is to be able to look after his family, at the same time confessing that, in the most part, only the bourgeoisie and well-off people can become Masons (for a section from this article, see Koloğlu, 2004, pp. 111, 112). Therefore, in Turkey, masses deprived of property cannot become Freemasons. It would be impossible for a worker earning the legal minimum wage to be Freemason and ask for help from a capitalist brother or from a chief state power exerciser brother. However, as Koloğlu (2004) illustrates, every member of the bourgeoisie is not accepted to Freemasonry. For example, bigotry is not an accepted value; therefore bigot capitalists are theoretically excluded. Yet, from time to time, even the members of the political parties which have attacked Masonry with a religious discourse included Mason members such as the candidate mayor from the Welfare Party, Settar Dinler (p. 214). But still, it would not be wrong to conclude that the Muslim capitalists with fundamentalist inclinations would have an inclination to resort to Islamic community networks rather than Masonic networks, which will be discussed in section 4.2.3. Besides, the rise of other networks such as political parties and business organizations may have also eroded the vitality of Masonry for the bourgeoisie in contemporary

Süleyman Demirel's name did not exist in the register. This then brought about serious discussions that resulted in a split of the lodges (see the interview with Necdet Egeran in Cevizoğlu, 2004, pp. 49-59; Koloğlu, 2004, pp. 155-161; Soysal, 2004, p. 391-446; Türkiye Büyük Mason Mahfili, 1966).

Turkey. Moreover, there are also other social networks that congregate the capitalists and chief exercisers of state power. Yet, it continues to constitute a good example for the elite networks, increasing the action capacity of the bourgeoisie for holding some state power (and vice versa, for candidates of top state positions to hold office), embodying both communal and associative relations in an interestingly mystic way.¹³⁶

Now to return back to the associations/communities supporting the pro-capitalist MPs, in Turkey, sometimes, also, the business associations have become active agents for making their members MPs from bourgeois political parties (for a few names backed by TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD, see Asyöndü, 1998, pp. 58-62). Business organizations' relationship with political parties represents relatively collective preferences when compared to the individual capitalist's relationship. However, certain political parties in government may prefer closer relations with individual capitalists, rather than business associations (their formal representatives) as in the case of 1980s' Motherland governments. Alkan's (1998) research provides several examples of those who became MPs from political parties who were either capitalists or from the top ranks of capitalist enterprises; with or without the support of business associations. In the 1984 Özal cabinet, of the 20 ministers, 16 had worked in the private sector, while four of them were from the Enka and Sabancı groups. Also, Ersin Faralyalı and Mehmet Batallı who came from the top ranks of the TOBB hierarchy were made ministers from the TPP wing of the TPP-SPP (Social Democrat Populist Party – *Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti*) coalition government (pp. 245-274).

As for the governments established following the military interventions (these governments were composed of selected individuals approved by the army commanders), several businesspeople (capitalists and top managers of capitalist enterprises) succeeded in becoming cabinet members. For example, two people from business circles, known to be close to two rival finance capital groups (Sait Naci Ergin from the Yapı Kredi Group and Mesut Erez from the Akbank Group) assumed ministerial posts in the 1st Erim government, established immediately after the March 12th military memorandum while Ergin was appointed from outside the assembly as

¹³⁶ This mysticism and ritualistic character of the Freemasonry may have helped in its hundreds of years of survival, although, in contemporary Turkey, it seems to make it exposed to be the target of especially religious fundamentalists.

the Minister of Finance (Koçaş, 1978, pp. 395-397). Also the Ulusu government of the September 12th junta welcomed businesspeople to the cabinet such as Fahir İlkel from Koç Group (Alkan, 1998, p. 238).

As for the capitalists' biggest advantage in holding state power, it is the material resources they possess. As for the capitalist grants to political parties, an example is from Vehbi Koç's life. In his biography, Koç (1973) wrote that he financed both the DP and RPP for the general elections of 1954 and 1957 (pp. 142, 143), which in some ways resembles Bechtel's political party strategy of financing not only Republicans (59 percent) but also Democrats (41 percent) in the US.¹³⁷ In Turkey, the beginning of 1960 also saw donations for the DP (a MCIC bourgeois political party), amounting to 3 million 385 thousand Turkish Liras, made mainly by capitalists (Altun, 2004, p. 178), although, several capitalists had already grown critical about DP policies since mid-1950s (for example in 1955 the Freedom Party was established with a more liberal political stance). As for the times of intense antagonistic class struggles, big donation campaigns for the rightwing political parties became a part of the political scene. An example of such campaigns was the one organized by the NAP (a MCIC bourgeois political party, with militants physically assaulting leftists in general, communists in particular) in 1976. Having decided to establish closer ties with the bourgeoisie, the NAP started a donation campaign named 'one thousand liras from ten thousand people'. It is reported in *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi* (1988) that, during this campaign, the NAP received big donations from the capitalists, much exceeding 'one thousand' (p. 2217). Political contributions to bourgeois political parties can be interpreted as the means utilized with the expectation of not only the realization of particular short-term capitalist interests, but also longer-term ones, as in the case of financing those bourgeois political parties with anti-communist militants (for example NAP) and financing any bourgeois political party that aims to reproduce capitalist mode of production (for example RPP; DP; NAP). However, it would be misleading to conclude that all capitalists make donations to political parties. Actually, some capitalists present a relatively distant attitude on this issue such as Nejat Eczacıbaşı (1982) who rejected a JP parliamentarian, explaining his disapproval on the employers' financial assistance to

¹³⁷ See U.S. Labor Against the War (USLAW) (2003).

political parties (pp. 119, 120). Yet, for the bourgeoisie, the method of funding the political parties has been far from being exceptional.

Likewise, not only the political parties, but also voluntary capitalist funding of the state networks is a common method. Although this type of attitude may be interpreted as only being philanthropic, some places chosen for donations imply that a substantial amount is reserved to the enhancement of those state agencies (with pro-capitalist chief exercisers of state power) crucial for the survival of the capitalist mode of production. Naturally, the bourgeoisie tends to finance the guardians rather than the gravediggers of capitalism. As for the examples of such donations, Kadir Has's donations to the Turkish armed forces (Has, 2002, p. 450) and Sakıp Sabancı's donations to the police force (Parlar, 2005, p. 255) can be mentioned while a relatively collective donation form is the one made by bourgeois associations such as the periodical donations of the chambers of commerce and industry to the police force (Parlar, 2005, p. 256). There are also donations made by several capitalists such as Kadir Has and Sakıp Sabancı for constructing state health and education institutions among others. Although the taxes collected already finance state networks; such capitalist donations might help to create the 'supportive philanthropic human image' of the capitalist, increasing the positive sentiments of not only several state elements, but also wider masses (who are not strictly anti-capitalist, or who are not strictly anti-particular capitalists such as being not anti-capitalist in general, but being against Islamist bourgeoisie, secularist bourgeoisie or other bourgeoisie as regards the identity impression of the donating capitalist) towards the bourgeoisie in general, and individual capitalist elements in particular, which might in turn help in the realization of capitalist interests through state networks. But still, there is not any statistical data to verify the increase in pro-capitalist sentiments on account of such donations, while it is also hardly possible to assess the degree of feelings of philanthropy for helping people and strategic intentionality for steering state elements as regards financing state networks. Nevertheless, as capitalist donations to state networks and bourgeois political parties are more common than capitalist donations to revolutionary pro-worker organizations and political parties, they must have some relevance to the bourgeois hold of state power; whether financing those organizational networks crucial for holding state power and realization of capitalist interests (for example state armed forces and bourgeois political parties, if not hospitals and schools, which may

have also some relevance to tax reductions) is relevant to only structurally conditioned capitalist motives or strategic capitalist actions in their developed form.

As for another example for the material resources, which is an advantage of the richer capitalists when compared to the middle and lower income people; an individual (micro-range) capitalist strategy for realizing some short-term benefits is ‘bribery’, widely categorized under the heading ‘corruption’.¹³⁸ Indeed, bribery is a means commonly resorted to by individual capitalist elements,¹³⁹ for steering the exercisers of state power in line with their capitalist interests, whether in their country of origin or not. As for Turkey, bribe giving and corruption constitute a frequently resorted method for utilizing the state power.¹⁴⁰ Actually, there are a good number of studies providing various examples of corruption in the Turkish context.¹⁴¹ These studies indicate that bribes are offered by not only the bourgeoisie of Turkey, but also foreign capitalists. They also indicate that bribery and other types of corruption are not unique to modern times. Even in the Ottoman times, there were a good number of state elements receiving such rewards. This continued also in the republican Turkey, where neither the mono-party nor the multi-party eras became exceptions,¹⁴² while several studies indicated the presence of widespread practices of bribery and corruption especially in the post-1980 era; that is the era with neo-liberal policies and

¹³⁸ As Miers (1983) suggests “corruption typically connotes abuse of public office for personal gain” (p. 24). For the definitions of corruption see also Johnston (2001); Khan (1998, p. 18); Caiden (2001, pp. 19-22); Rose-Ackerman (1999, p. 91).

¹³⁹ There are various examples from not only the economically poorer countries, but also richer countries. For example see Bhargava and Bolongaita (2004, pp. 140, 141); Doig and Theobald (2000, pp. 4-11); Girling (1997, pp. 14-19); Jain (2001, p. 3); Yates (2001); Olowu (2001, pp. 111, 112). Besides, bribe paying can be utilized in political systems both with and without democratic procedures. As Rose-Ackerman (2001) states “(d)emocratic elections are not necessarily a cure for corruption. Instead, some electoral systems are more vulnerable to special interest influence than others” (p. 57).

¹⁴⁰ Although there is no reliable statistical data for the extent of corruption, there are certain statistics on the ‘perceived corruption’ in Turkey. Those who are interested in ‘perceived corruption’ might see Adaman, Çarkoğlu, and Şenatalar (2001; 2003); Kurtzman, Yago, and Phumiwasana (2004, p. 13); Transparency International (2001, p. 5).

¹⁴¹ For example Aktan (1992); Altun (2004); Gören (2005); Kelkitlioğlu (2001); Saner (2000); Şener (2001; 2002); Tuşalp (1990). Generally, gift giving and bribery aim to influence those who already hold a state office. However, sometimes this also targets at possible future positions in state ranks.

¹⁴² See Altun (2004); Şener (2001).

export-led growth model.¹⁴³ As the Enka Holding owner Tarık Şara and another holding leader, Lokman Kondakçı pointed out (in Oh & Varcın, 2002); today, bribery and paying illegal fees to the state have become usual practices in business-state interactions (pp. 719, 720). However, since the offered bribe commonly results in favoring certain capitalist elements at the expense of others, several capitalist elements might also grow critical about such practices. It is apparent that the capitalist elements' economic competition might result in offering bribes for a particular state practice also in a competing fashion, as a result of which only one element among others might be favored at the expense of others on account of bribing the correct element and/or at the sufficient level. This means additional costs for those who lose the competition, without the chance of spreading these additional costs to all rival capitalist elements. Meanwhile, those who do not bribe at all may not be favored by particular state elements as much as the briber capitalist elements, in case they cannot utilize efficient strategies other than the bribe. On account of not being specially favored by the state elements due to not bribing them at all, at a sufficient level and/or the correct state element in addition to possible other concerns, a strategy pursued by several capitalist elements in Turkey has been to take action against bribery and corruption. In this respect, a number of business organizations such as TESEV, ATO, and İTO among others have published materials on corruption and transparency.¹⁴⁴ Meanwhile, the study 'Turkey Anti-Corruption and Integrity Framework' (SIGMA, 2004) indicates that particularly since 1999, meetings organized by business circles and legislative activities to tackle corruption have increased considerably. Therefore, some elements of the capitalist class, the elements of which appeal to bribes, at the same time, push the state to fight against corruption. The police and gendarmerie operations against corruption (as a result of which it became apparent that corrupt activities have also fed the Mafioso groups) that, according to a number of published material,¹⁴⁵ have gained an impetus since late 1990s might be at least in part, relevant

¹⁴³ For example see Altun (2004, pp. 204-294); Aydın (2003, pp. 62-68); Şener (2001, pp. 66-80).

¹⁴⁴ For example the researches of Adaman, Çarkoğlu, and Şenatalar (2001; 2003); Atiyas, Dedeoğlu, Emil, Erdem, Hürcan, Kızıldaş, Konukman, Sayın, Sevinç, and Yılmaz (2000); Cingi, Tosun, and Güran (2002); Korkmaz, Erkal, Minibaş, Baloğlu, Yılmaz, and Çak (2001) published by business organizations.

¹⁴⁵ For example see Aydın (2003, pp. 11-33); Şener (2001, pp. 119-170); Ünlü (2001b, pp. 79-106).

to the capitalist elements' strategic practices against corruption. As for the legal arrangements concerning favoritism and bribery, they seem to have different dimensions. For example, the arrangements on public servants' membership to political parties probably aim to prevent them from becoming members of not only the anti-capitalist political parties, but also any bourgeois political party which may end in favoring that party's individual bourgeois supporters at the expense of others.¹⁴⁶ However, such laws reproducing the capitalist mode of production in capitalist societies, at the best serve the need for regulating capitalist competition to a certain extent, with an attempt to block a few of the channels to state power to all capitalist elements; while despite all such arrangements, bribery in Turkey continues to constitute a widely resorted channel to state power.

Just like bribery, the employment of chief exercisers of state power –who once exercised substantial state power and commanded several state elements- in private

¹⁴⁶ The study 'Turkey Public Service and the Administrative Framework Assessment' lists a few arrangements on favoritism and bribery as the following: "According to article 68 of the Constitution, public servants and other public agents (except labour contractees) are forbidden to belong to political parties. This prohibition also applies to judges, prosecutors and members of parliament (article 76 of the Constitution) or of a municipal council. Public servants must resign in advance to be able to run for election to parliament or to a local administration council. If the former civil servant is not elected, he has the right to be reinstated in his position. These legal limitations are meant to preserve the objectivity and impartiality of the behaviour and decisions of civil servants, which are considered to be compromised when a civil servant has already expressed his political preferences while running for election" (SIGMA, 2005, p. 10). As can be seen from the listed arrangements, the concern presented as the motive of such laws is 'impartiality'. However, it must be stated that, although such legal arrangements make the emphasis on 'impartiality', 'impartiality' can never mean real 'equality' in capitalist societies; since, on account of the class positions and market positions there would always be 'actual economic inequalities', the 'impartial' treatment of which would at the best reproduce the already existent inequalities and exploitation relations, while on account of class struggles (that includes not only within but also antagonistic in addition to a number of possible other class struggle positions), it is already impossible to realize 'impartiality' in absolute terms. Meanwhile, in addition to the above legal arrangements concerning 'favoritism' and 'corruption', there are also articles that directly prohibit and aim at punishing the corrupt activities of civil servants. For example, article 29 of Law 657 clearly forbids the civil servants to receive and ask for gifts for benefits and to ask for loans from the businesspeople. (Law 657 is available at <http://www.memurlar.net/documents/library/657.htm>) The study 'Turkey Public Service and the Administrative Framework Assessment' lists some further arrangements as the following: "The Penal Code (articles 247-254), as amended by Law 5237 entered into force on 1 June 2005, describes several crimes having to do with the corruption of public servants, such as bribery and embezzlement. The special Law on Anticorruption (Law 3628 of 4 May 1990, as amended by Law 5020 of 26 December 2003) sets out the procedure to be followed and specifies that public servants accused of corruption-related offences cannot benefit from the special immunity-lifting procedure established for other crimes or misdemeanors and, if found guilty, shall be immediately dismissed from public service." (SIGMA, 2005, p. 11).

enterprises, is a privileged channel for the capitalists for utilizing state power in a relatively individual manner, which makes it again an aspect of the micro-level analysis. However, since the future possibility of living a financially more satisfactory life through employment in private enterprises may integrate more chief exercisers of state power than those who actually become employed, this method can be estimated to have a higher impact than the actual number employed. As for the MPs (MPs are not in the status of ‘civil (public) servant’ in Turkey), there is no legal restriction for the capitalists to be MPs or MPs to be capitalists. In the previous paragraphs, it has been already illustrated that there has been a number of firm or holding executives who were themselves capitalists or took the support of capitalists when they were elected to the parliament. However, the situation is more intricate for the civil servants. There are a number of legal arrangements preventing the direct amalgamation of the private owners of means of production and incumbents of bureaucratic ranks. Actually, the laws in Turkey do not let the civil servants to be employed in the private sector or run private businesses for the time of hold of office. Besides, there are also some restrictions after their retirement.¹⁴⁷ Such arrangements concerning the civil servant’s state position probably aim at regulating capitalist

¹⁴⁷ Arrangements controlling and restricting the private gains of civil servants are summarized as follows in ‘Turkey Public Service and the Administrative Framework Assessment’: “Those entering the public service are obliged to submit an asset declaration, the frequency of which is to be determined by law (article 71 of the Constitution). Public servants cannot have any other economic activities or employment outside the administration or be partners in companies, except in limited or joint stock corporations (article 28 of Law 657), but they can be members – and members of the managing boards – of construction or consumer co-operatives. Law 2531 of 6 October 1981 determines the economic activities that are forbidden to civil servants after leaving office (either voluntarily or upon retirement). These activities are all those related to the civil servant’s responsibilities while he was in office. This prohibition lasts for the first three years immediately following resignation or retirement (article 2 of Law 2531). Law 657 forbids public servants from performing activities that according to the Turkish Commercial Code could be considered as those of a merchant or tradesman mercantile agent, etc. Public servants whose spouses or children are engaged in activities that are forbidden to public servants must disclose this information, within 15 days, to the head of the administrative institution employing them.” (SIGMA, 2005, p. 10). The essence of such laws can be interpreted as the aim to prevent both the public servants from favoring individual capitalists and the direct fusion of individual capitalists with state power at the expense of others on long-term basis. Meanwhile, why such laws do not cover some (not all) elected state elements such as MPs might be on account of the factor that, unlike civil servants, the state elements elected for a pre-specified period (if that specification is not a lifelong one or if it is not specified in terms of age such as ‘retirement after age 70’) exercise state power only for that period in case they fail to become a part of the state network through being reelected. However, for those who occupy state positions on long-term basis such as civil servants, the case is more controversial. Indeed, a general or a tax inspector who at the same time runs his/her own business or is a manager in a private firm may very well appeal to his/her state power when his/her enterprise is in need of that.

competition among possible other factors. However, subsequent to the end of occupation of a particular state position after resignation, retirement, or dismissal (for civil servants); except from the three years of prohibition decreed by Law 2531, there are no significant restrictions that prevent the state elements from owning or working in capitalist enterprises. On the other hand, even after leaving office, the ex-state element, whether a civil servant or not, might possess some information and relations with the potential to activate particular incumbents of state networks for the realization of particular capitalist interests.

As for the examples for the employment of ex-top-state elements, Sakıp Sabancı's (2004) memories provide rich data on ex-chief exercisers of state power employed in his enterprises. From his biography, it is understood that Sabancı had employed several retired army commanders in his firms such as the employment of the Chief of General Staff Semih Sancar in Akbank's board of directors; General Vecihi Akın in the insurance group's board of directors; and General Suat Aktulga in Lassa's board of directors. There were also civil chief exercisers of state power employed in Sabancı enterprises such as Medeni Berk, the minister and Deputy Prime Minister in Menderes governments, who afterward became the Akbank General Manager. Besides, Turgut Özal, the Undersecretary in the State Planning Organization who also worked in the World Bank, then served the Sabancı Holding under various executive titles such as the Holding General Coordinator and Akbank Chairperson. Afterwards, in 1980s, Turgut Özal became the prime minister for several times and died as the president of Turkey in 1993. Another prominent chief exerciser of state power, Naim Talu, after holding various positions in state such as his position as the Central Bank Governor, minister, and prime minister, also became a member of Akbank's board of directors, and then, in 1976, its chairperson (for the mentioned chief exercisers of state power and further chief exercisers of state power in Sabancı enterprises, see Sabancı, 2004, pp. 165-172). Definitely, not only the Sabancı Group, but also other capitalist groups have employed the ex- chief exercisers of state power in private sector such as the employment of the retired General Kemal Yavuz in Koç Holding and the retired General Ahmet Çörekçi in Park Holding (Gören, 2005, pp. 184, 185). It would be also illustrative to mention Sinan Aygün's, the President of Ankara Chamber of Commerce, list of those whom he called 'Power Spies' for denoting those chief exercisers of state power using their network in state after leaving their

office in favor of particular individual capitalists' private gains. In this sense, in a Panel organized by the Chamber in 2000, he gave a list of certain civil servants who started working in private enterprises despite the prohibition decreed by the article 2 of Law 2531. The list is as the following:

Engin Aras resigned from office on 15.10.1997 while he was working as the Bank and Foreign Exchange General Director, and started working as the Yurtbank Deputy General Manager and member of board of directors on 24.12.1997.

Bayram Eser resigned from office on 31.3.1997 while he was working as the Chairperson of the Treasury Undersecretary's Banks Certified Public Accountants Council, and the next day became the Yurtbank Deputy General Manager and member of board of directors.

Mustafa Kırallı retired from office in August, 1998 while he was working as the Chairperson of the Treasury Undersecretary's Banks Certified Public Accountants Council, and started working in Yurtbank on September 1st.

Mustafa Selçuk resigned from office on July 16, 1997 while he was working as the Ziraat Bank Deputy General Manager, and started working in Kentbank on August 1, 1997.

Ekrem Aydemir resigned from office on 16.6.1999 while he was working as the Ziraat Bank Deputy General Manager, and the same day, he started working as the Interbank Deputy General Manager.

Salih Şevki Doruk resigned from office on January 16, 1998 while he was working as the Ziraat Bank Acting General Manager and chairperson, and the same date, he started working as finance coordinator in Ceylan Holding, to which he had unlawfully given bank loan.

Yener Dinçmen quitted his job on 4.5.1995 while he was working as the Prime Ministry Treasury Undersecretary, and started working as Toprakbank chairperson in June 1995.

Tevfik Altınok quitted his job on 1.3.1993 when he was the Treasury and Foreign Trade Undersecretary, and the same day, started working as the Koçbank chairperson.

Ahmet Mahir Barutçu quitted his job on 8.2.1994 while he was working as the Undersecretary of Energy and Natural Resources Ministry, and started working in Bayındır Holding in 1.1.1995.

Mehmet Savaş quitted his job on 5.1.1996 when he was the Halkbank Deputy General Manager and Ziraat Bank Deputy General Manager, and started working as the General Manager of İhlas Finans, owned by İhlas Group, with which he had had some bank loan relations.

Fehmi Gültekin quitted his job in April 1997 when he was the Vakıfbank General Director, and became the Finance Coordinator in Bayındır Holding, with which he had had some bank loan relations.

Hasan Kılavuz quitted his job on 10 March, 1998 when he was the Vakıfbank General Director, and started working as a member of the Kent Leasing board of directors, Kentbank board of directors, and as Süzer Holding Deputy Chairman of board of directors, with which he had had some bank loan relations. (Aygün, 2001, pp. 11, 12)

In a similar fashion, Gören (2005) also mentions some names; the names of top military officers who, after retirement, were employed in a number of banks, which were then accused of being engaged in corrupt practices. Among the names he listed; the following names became members of the board of directors of the following banks: General Teoman Koman in Cavit Çağlar's Interbank; Admiral Vural Beyazıt in Dinç Bilgin's Etibank; and General Muhittin Fisunoğlu in Hayyam Garipoğlu's Sümerbank (p 185). As the above examples illustrate, there are several chief exercisers of state power from both the military and civil networks of the state who, after retirement or resignation, became employed in the private sector.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁸ However, it would be misleading to conclude that all chief exercisers of state power approve having close relations with particular capitalist enterprises after resignation. As Gören (2005) suggests, there are a good number of army members who strictly oppose such relations (pp. 186, 187). It seems that their understanding of justice is not compatible with favoring individual capitalist interests at the expense of others through the use of state power (however,

Meanwhile, material resources that the bourgeoisie holds also have influence in holding several means influential in the opinion formation process at the macro level. Mass media is an example of this; while several Marxist authors suggest “media ownership is a key element in the mental domination of the bourgeoisie over the public” (Wheeler, 1997, p. 241), the extent of its effect is a controversial issue. Although the main purpose of several big privately owned televisions may not be ideological indoctrination, they are widely used for these ends in several instances as will be discussed in section 4.2.3. As for the material resources aspect of the mass media, as in other sectors of the market economy, there has been a capital concentration process also in the media sector of Turkey.¹⁴⁹ Indeed, during the past few decades, Aydın Doğan has become the biggest media boss whose media enterprises passed through a vertical and horizontal integration. As for the earlier years of the media sector in the 21st century, Doğan owned news agencies, newspapers, publication and printing houses, television channels, film production companies, Internet companies, advertising companies, and marketing and

this does not mean that they are totally impartial as in the case of the distant attitude of the army commanders towards Islamist capitalists). As a matter of fact, this understanding is in line with the official discourse and legal arrangements of the state, which may be attributed to the success of the opinion formation process. Actually, not only the state, but also certain business organizations have put restrictions to prevent possible state favors to individual capitalists at the expense of others. For example, in 1999, TÜSİAD made an amendment in the ‘Principles of Work Ethics’ that was integrated into its regulation in 1996 (full text of the TÜSİAD regulation is available at <http://www.tusiad.org/tuzuk.htm>). Since then, TÜSİAD members’ obedience to these rules has been required. This amendment decreed that: “The members, their companies, their subsidiaries, their partnerships, and the companies and institutions with which they are affiliated or in which they have executive tasks cannot employ the public employees and members of the parliament active in office; they cannot assign them any jobs in their executive, supervisory and any other bodies ... They cannot make use of their employees’ relations with political parties for their commercial interests and they cannot try to derive individual and institutional interests from these relations.” (in Şener, 2001, pp. 102, 103). These TÜSİAD rules can be interpreted as the giant capitalists’ attempts of putting standards to competition within themselves. However, such rules are always exposed to violation, since the competitive nature of capitalism does not permit the full realization of such standards. As a matter of fact, there have already been a number of TÜSİAD members who were sued or put in jail for their part in unlawful actions in the banking sector. For instance, TÜSİAD expelled Kamuran Çörtük from membership because he was accused to be engaged in the unlawful Türkbank awarding (Şener, 2001, p. 103). Besides, not only the big business, but all types of enterprises have the potential to be enticed by the intense competition present in the nature of capitalism to break the rules put by the pro-capitalist legislation itself.

¹⁴⁹ The conglomeration tendency is experienced also in a number of countries. For the extent and examples of this conglomeration see Curran (2000, pp. 130, 131); Golding and Murdock (2000, pp. 78, 80); Goldsmiths Media Group (2000, pp. 33-38); Vivian (1999, pp. 19-28).

distribution companies. Some of these companies had international links. In addition to his investments in the media sector, Doğan also owned companies in the finance, energy, industry, commerce, and tourism sectors (Sönmez, 2003a). The last decade has witnessed the growth of also other big media groups; for example that of Dinç Bilgin, Cem Uzan, and Mehmet Emin Karamehmet, who had investments also in finance, energy, industry, commerce, and tourism sector (Karalı, 2005, p. 109). However, subsequent to the banking operations of 1999-2002 whereby the Banking Regulation and Supervision Board (*Bankacılık Düzenleme ve Denetleme Kurumu - BDDK*) transferred several banks to the Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (*Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu – TMSF*), Turgay Ciner joined the list of media bosses while Uzans were removed from the list (Sönmez, 2003a).¹⁵⁰

Meanwhile, material resources can be utilized by the bourgeoisie at the macro level through also relatively institutional arrangements. Especially the international loans and economic aid offered in return for securing the interests of capitalist class in general, and foreign capital or its segments in particular can be evaluated as a means of macro level of hold of state power. Such loans are offered by the already formed

¹⁵⁰ In time, several media bosses developed an anti-Doğan stance. This can be also detected from the news and comments in their print and audio-visual media. In their media, Doğan and anti-Doğan sides criminalized each other at varying degrees. Each side blamed the other for cheating the nation and state, driving the people into hunger and poverty, and using media for political ends. In this respect, Mehmet Emin Karamehmet's statement on the extent of media and politics is worth mentioning. In an interview of Tavşanoğlu with Karamehmet (in Haskebabçı, 2003, pp. 131-150) that was held four months after BDDK's confiscation and transfer of Karamehmet's *Pamukbank* to TMSF in 2002, Karamehmet mentioned about the rising threat of "the oligarchy composed of bureaucracy, the dirty politics amalgamated with media bosses" as well as the media bosses' huge power that became even capable of overthrowing a government and forming a new one (Haskebabçı, 2003, p. 135). Especially Uzans used demonizing adjectives in encoding the news concerning their rivals. An article that called the Doğan Group as Doğan terror organization is an example of this attitude. Another article that called Prime Minister Erdoğan as treacherous also reveals this aggressive style (for the examples and background of this war of words see Karalı, 2005, pp. 137-153; Sönmez, 2003a). It is apparent that the bourgeois media power is used not only for the legitimization of the capitalist regime, but also as a weapon that capitalists may use against each other. Indeed, mass media is a considerable power for influencing people's opinions and state policies. Therefore, struggle between capital groups for holding this power is not surprising. Actually, even the Mafioso sectors attempt to capture this power. For example, Korkmaz Yiğit—who had close relations with the Motherland Party leader Mesut Yılmaz and the Mafioso (capitalist) lord Alaattin Çakıcı—bought a number of television channels and newspapers in 1998. He also made an agreement to buy one of the biggest newspapers of Turkey, *Milliyet* while this agreement was annulled short after the disclosure of Yiğit's close relationship with Alaattin Çakıcı (Sönmez, 2003a, pp. 73-78; Şener, 2004, pp. 248-251). Whatever the impacts of the rivalry among different capital groups are, vertical and horizontal integration of the media organizations has ended in the concentration of power in a few hands.

pro-capitalist institutions, such as the IMF/World Bank or capitalist state authorities. As for the character of conditional economic aid and loans, the letter from the US Council on Foreign Relations member millionaire Nelson Rockefeller to President Eisenhower, January 1956 is revealing as regards state practices securing capitalist interests in different countries. In the letter, it was written that:

In Asia our efforts were far less successful... the conception of force was too nakedly shown, too much stress was laid on the military side, while we largely ignored the importance of preliminary economic preparations for the alliances we wished to make. But the same military measures will often be found unobjectionable if the way to them is paved with economic aid...

The most significant example in practice of what I mean was the Iranian experiment with which, as you will remember, I was directly concerned. By the use of economic aid we succeeded in getting access to Iranian oil and we are now well established in the economy of that country. The strengthening of our economic position in Iran has enabled us to acquire control over her foreign policy and in particular to make her join the Bagdad Pact. At the present time the Shah would not dare even to make any changes in his cabinet without consulting our Ambassador...

For us to have in Asia, Africa and other under-developed areas a political and military influence as great or greater than we obtained through the Marshall Plan in Europe. It is necessary for us to act carefully and patiently, and in the early stages confine ourselves to securing very modest political concessions in exchange for our economic aid (in some exceptional cases even without any concessions in return). The way will then be open to us, but at a later stage, to step up both our political price and our military demands...

In this case governmental subsidies and credits may take the form of military appropriations. The hooked fish needs no bait. At the same time economic support for those strata of the local business community which are ready to co-operate with the US should be increased and the necessary conditions would be created for businessmen of this type to be put in key economic positions and accordingly for their political influence to be increased.

...the main emphasis in economic assistance as regards government subsidies and credits should be on creating conditions in which eventually the economic relations

established by us would work for and make it natural for these countries to join military pacts and alliances inspired by us. The essence of this policy should be that the development of our economic relations with these countries would ultimately allow us to take over key positions in the native economy... By this means we can hope to divert the foreign policy of these countries in a more desirable direction...

...

Extensive economic aid... should always be presented as an expression of a sincere and disinterested desire on the part of the US to help and co-operate with them. (in Mitchell, 2003)

Rockefeller's letter, making a number of propositions for securing the US capitalists' interests in the international arena by means of economic aid, constitutes a good example for the utilization of material resources for the hold of state power at the international level. Meanwhile, in his analysis of Turkey, Doğan Avcıoğlu (1976) also gave reference to this letter to Eisenhower and evaluated Turkey in the category to which Rockefeller referred as 'the hooked fish' (p. 1067). Rockefeller's letter also revealed Marshall Plan's pro-capitalist political and military character, when he proposed the spread of such gains as obtained from Marshall Plan to underdeveloped areas. It seems that the IMF and WB loans have succeeded in serving this goal for the most part in subsequent years, although in a way to set 'economic conditions' to governments, but which essentially require political decisions on the distribution and redistribution of output as regards class interests (within/antagonistic/other class interests). Meanwhile, Marshall Plan became perhaps the most explicit example of the strategy of offering economic resources in return for the realization of the economic resource offering countries' capitalist elements' interests, which might also intersect with the offered countries' capitalist elements' interests (whether sectional or collective, short-term or long-term).

As for the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan that constitute good examples for the pro-capitalist essence of the international economic aid offered to anti-communist governments; they are relevant to the Truman-Eisenhower foreign policy that started "from the position that the Soviet Union is the enemy" (Aptheker, 1962, p. 15), which have to be analyzed in the context of international antagonistic class struggles

(meanwhile, in general, international class struggles –antagonistic, within, other class struggles- are in some ways interconnected with the country’s class struggles). At the end of 1946, all major proposals of the US chief exercisers of state power acknowledged that eliminating the Soviet challenge would cost money while the three possibilities revolved around were to: “build up America’s own military resources; send military aid to threatened nations; give economic and technical assistance to needy peoples” (Ambrose, 1993, p. 77), which were all strategies for the same pro-capitalist political project of defeating the forces with collective long-term pro-worker projects. Those days, also Truman’s strategy was formulated. On the basis of a speech made by Truman (March 12, 1947), Ambrose (1993) summarizes the Truman Doctrine as such: “Whenever and wherever an anti-Communist government was threatened, by indigenous insurgents, foreign invasion, or even diplomatic pressure (as with Turkey) the United States would supply political, economic, and, most of all, military aid” (p. 82). On March 18, 1948, Truman asked from the Congress the enactment of the Marshall Plan (Aptheker, 1962, p. 72). The Marshall Plan was given to Truman on March 31 while it appropriated only \$4 billion of the \$6.8 billion requested. Marshall Plan, a pro-capitalist strategy intersecting with the Truman Doctrine’s understanding, included a massive American aid to Europe to revive its economy for economic and military reasons (Ambrose, 1993, p. 92). Meanwhile, Turkey’s participation in Marshall Plan aid was approved in July, 1948. It was made conditional upon altering Turkey’s fundamental development strategy: The aid had to be spent chiefly for the growth of agriculture, transportation network, and extraction of ores and minerals, and particularly chrome that was seen as vital for the United State’s security. Until June 30, 1950, the economic aid amounted to \$183 million including the tractors which first arrived in 1949 while the aid in the form of military equipment totaled \$200 million (Singer, 1977, p. 59). Therefore, the Marshall Plan aid offered for Turkey was a conditional one, not only financing the pro-capitalist government of Turkey against a possible Soviet threat, but also asking for economic policies in line with those years’ some US capitalists’ interests that require the cheap supply of the agricultural and mineral goods, which recalls Rockefeller’s point on access to Iranian oil by means of economic aid. Those US capitalists’ interests had several intersection points with the domestic capitalists of Turkey; while standing against the Soviet threat was relevant to the common long-term capitalist interests, interests of the capitalists financed by the US economic aid somehow intersected with

the interests of those capitalists (including the US, Turkish, and possible other countries' capitalist elements) that required cheap supply of agricultural and mineral goods from Turkey.

Conditional loans offered to state networks, the conditions of which essentially end in political preferences which favor particular capitalist interests at the expense of others (other capitalist/other class/and any possible position who would be harmed by those conditions), have become active agents in steering the state elements of Turkey for decades. As for today's conditional loans offered to the Turkish state, the stand-by arrangements constitute a good example while as Karahan (2002) suggests, in the stand-by arrangements, conditions concerning the structural policies had increased considerably in the course of 1990s (pp. 139, 140), although, obviously, conditionality is restricted to neither the IMF/WB nor the republican Turkey (for the conditional foreign loans offered in the late Ottoman times; see Kiray, 1990). Yet, it would be misleading to think that republican Turkey has always been dependent on external funding. Actually, until World War II, it was not a common practice for the state to appeal to foreign aids and loans. However, afterwards, this picture changed noticeably. In 1950s, there was considerable foreign funding. Meanwhile, the US economic donations exceeded the loans, which can be interpreted as an outcome of closer relations established with the US (Kepenek & Yentürk, 2000, pp. 101-103). Geopolitical considerations in external funding (those concerns arising from capitalist short/long-term interests as regards geographical coordinates) continued also in subsequent decades. For example, the major concern behind the external funding of 1979 was the fear from Soviet influence while Turkey was seen as a key element of the NATO's southern flank (Öniş & Kirkpatrick, 1998, p. 128). Indeed, after 1960, Turkey's search for external funding continued. Especially after 1975, foreign loans grew substantially. Meanwhile the borrowings started to reflect mainly the daily concerns for the foreign trade deficits, rather than funding the long-term projects. Besides, the increased financial need pushed the state elements to seek further external funding which increasingly made Turkey open its markets to foreign capital. Although 1960-1980 saw a falling rate of the lender governments' credits that had high donation levels, 300 of the 500 million dollars received from the US took the form of donations in 1981-1982, which were the years of anti-communist military rule and neo-liberal agenda (which can be analyzed as regards international/country;

antagonistic/within class struggles with several intersecting and clashing interests). Meanwhile, 1980s and 1990s became the years of growing external debts. Whereas the proportion of Turkey's external debt to its national income was 27.4 percent in 1980, it rose to 44 percent in 1995¹⁵¹ (Kepenek & Yentürk, 2000, p. 171-505).

As for the IMF, Turkey is a member of the IMF since 1947.¹⁵² Meanwhile, each agreement with the IMF has introduced new conditions, which have become active elements in shaping the Turkish economy; while the implemented economic policies have signified political preferences. The content of the conditions changed in line with the changing international political-economic conjuncture. Actually, the original reason for the establishment of IMF and WB was in part, to regulate the economy and prevent economic chaos, which could be devastating for the bourgeoisie. As Sönmez (2005) states, it was the Bretton Woods Conference of July 1944 that led to the establishment of the IMF and WB, in which the weight of the votes has been parallel to the financial power of the contributors. During the Cold War era, the roles assumed by these institutions were seen as crucial for the economic cooperation and arrangements within the capitalist bloc. Until 1970s, these institutions had proposed mainly the import substitution growth model to the underdeveloped countries. However, due to such factors as economic stagnation and external debt crisis; since 1980, the neo-liberal route has been adopted (pp. 301-327). As for 1990s, it seems that the dissolution of the Soviet Bloc has decreased the capitalists' anxiety about anti-capitalist threats, making the IMF programs' conditionality increasingly assertive

¹⁵¹ Actually, in this process, not only the external debt but also the domestic debt has grown substantially. Whereas the ratio of the sum of Turkey's external and domestic debts to its GNP was about 32.5 percent in 1985, it rose to 119 percent at the end of 2001 (Ekzen, 2003, pp. 658, 659, see also p. 635 for the change in the domestic debt stock/GNP between 1985 and 2001).

¹⁵² As for the relations with the IMF, Turkey became a member of the IMF in 1947 following the 53.6 percent devaluation in 1946. In 1958, the pressure from the IMF resulted in 69 percent devaluation. In January 1961, the first stand-by arrangement was signed with the IMF. Until 1970, every year witnessed a stand-by arrangement. The eight years break of 1970-1978 was followed by the one-year stand-by arrangements in 1978-1980. In 1980, a three-year stand-by arrangement, and then in 1983, a one-year stand-by arrangement was made. This was followed by a ten years break. Although Turkey made a stand-by arrangement in 1994 that had lasted for about a year, this was again followed by a break of five years. Then, the 17th stand-by arrangement was signed for 1999-2002. The 18th stand-by arrangement that was signed in 2002 ended in 2005. A new three-year stand-by arrangement that would end in 2008 became the 19th. In 43 years until 2005, Turkey used 39 billion dollars of the IMF credits totaling 47 billion dollars (Doğan, 1987; "Kriz Olmadan İlk Stand-By" 2004; Uzunoğlu, 2004).

in line with particular capitalist economic interests. Especially after 1990, with the Washington Consensus, a wide range of reforms have been offered to those economies presented as in trouble (originally for Latin America) in the name of economic stability and development. These reforms have covered detailed arrangements including ‘fiscal discipline’, ‘reordering public expenditure priorities’, ‘tax reform’, ‘liberalizing interest rates’, ‘competitive exchange rate’, ‘trade liberalization’, ‘liberalization of inward foreign direct investment’, ‘privatization’, ‘deregulation’, and ‘property rights’ (Williamson, 2002). Today, securing the debt service and the interests of the capitalists of the IMF’s biggest voters¹⁵³ are among the major concerns of the structural adjustment and stability programs.¹⁵⁴ All these arrangements set as conditions of economic loans are relevant to class struggles not only at the inter-country but also country level, with several intersecting and clashing interests. It seems that the retreat of international struggles for working class’ collective long-term interests have relaxed the bourgeoisie of especially rich capitalist countries, which must, in some part, account for the increased assertiveness and intervention in other countries’ economies in line with their own shorter-term interests where this interference must also have some relevance to the intensifying capitalist competition (within capitalist struggles).¹⁵⁵

As for the willingness of the chief exercisers of state power in Turkey for meeting the conditions dictated by IMF in 2001, their performance can be detected from the Letters of Intent, dated July 25, 2003 (in IMF, 2003, pp. 59-69) and April 26, 2005 (in

¹⁵³ For the relationship between the biggest companies of the world and the programs of the IMF and WB, see Civelek and Durukan (2002, esp. pp. 122, 123).

¹⁵⁴ In this respect, the website of Independent Social Scientists provides rigorous evaluations, revealing the essence of the WB and IMF policies for Turkey (for example see, Bağımsız Sosyal Bilimciler, 2003; 2004; 2005).

¹⁵⁵ An excerpt from the public release by the IMF authorities following the Executive Board discussion on Turkey, on May 15, 2001 would be illustrative for the extent of this assertiveness and intervention. After the Executive Board discussion, Stanley Fischer, the First Deputy Managing Director and Acting Chairperson said: “The Fund commends the depth and breadth of the new economic program. The emphasis on banking reform is appropriate, especially given the structural weakness in this area that were seen during the recent crises. The elimination of public sector banks’ large overnight exposure, their full recapitalization and the overhaul of their governance structure will go a long way to strengthen the financial sector. In addition, measures to privatize key companies and reform major domestic markets, including the telecommunications, electricity, natural gas, tobacco, and sugar markets, and to enhance governance and improve transparency, are essential elements of the program.” (in IMF, 2001).

IMF, 2005, pp. 85-87). This willingness seems to owe much to the key of the material resources the IMF and WB hold. A failure in reaching an agreement with the IMF and WB would mean not only the possibility of the withdrawal of the funds offered by these institutions, but also a diminishing credibility in the international markets, which may bring a decrease in foreign direct investments, higher interest rates, and economic instability.¹⁵⁶ It seems that the retreat of the struggle for working class' collective long-term interests, the ongoing within capitalist struggles, and the increasing economic volatility¹⁵⁷ have paved the way for the increased assertiveness of the IMF and WB. Conditional economic aid and loans continue to be the major devices for utilizing the state power in line with the lender countries' several capitalists' interests at the international level, but with several intersection points with the interests of several domestic capitalists. The conditional international loans constitute an example to the privilege of the capitalists for holding some state power (steering state practices in line with their own interests) at the very macro level.

The examples presented in this section display various strategies pursued by the capitalists and pro-capitalist associations (e.g. business organizations, bourgeois political parties), communities (e.g. Masonic lodges), international monetary institutions (e.g. the IMF and World Bank) for steering the state power. The micro-macro range of analysis makes it possible how the co-presence of individual ties and institutional arrangements might side by side be influential over the direction of state practices, while since class struggles are carried out by concrete subjects with some degree of arbitrary and unstable character, directing the focus of the research to the search for a unified power bloc or a hegemonic fraction may hinder a dynamic analysis of the changing combination and within conflicts of the propertied class members exploiting in a relatively centralized manner (minority versus the majority, see Chapter 3). This micro-macro range analysis in a manner to expand the 'resultant'

¹⁵⁶ As Kepenek and Yentürk (2000) suggest, after 1978, not only the US economic aid but also loans from private banks have been made dependent upon the implementation of the IMF program (pp. 274, 275).

¹⁵⁷ 'Economic volatility' is relevant to the capitalist structural interests in the same way that 'being employed' is relevant to the working class interests: Economic volatility threatens the majority of capitalists, but at the same time becomes an opportunity for several other capitalists in the same way that dismissals threaten the majority of workers –including the already unemployed, but at the same time present opportunities for several workers in case there is space for being employed.

appearing in the form of particular state practices and the legal framework does not deny the structural constraints which may be influential over the decisions of the pro-capitalist chief exercisers of state power such as the need for tax revenues for financing their activities (cf. Offe, 1993; Skocpol, 1985) or the possible counter-effects of hindered capital accumulation over employment (cf. Lindblom, 1982). However, as Domhoff (1983) suggests “it is not only political leaders who face the possibility of losing their positions when the economy is in distress” (p. 78) while “(i)n such situations, the business leaders may need government to protect their private property” (p. 78). Besides, there is nothing essential for the chief exercisers of state power to become dependent to the revenues and employment provided by the capitalists, since a government would receive material resources and would create employment opportunities via state enterprises both in capitalist and non-capitalist societies. For example if a certain political community comes to power and decides to expropriate the means of production, they can very well manage without the presence of capital accumulation process. But for such a case to be possible, again the armed power plays the decisive role. Therefore, the question is why several state elements prefer to favor particular exploiting class elements’ long-term interests as against their counter-side, and why they favor particular short-term interests at the expense of others. Don’t such preferences have any relevance to micro-range phenomena at all? For example, if personal ties and contacts are to be treated as only a shallow phenomena, why do the TÜSIAD members widely utilize the method of establishing personal contacts to solve their problems especially as regards their short-term interests? Besides, even though the preference of the leaders of a military coup d’état may owe to, for example, the education they receive in fighting against communists more than, for example, a letter written by a capitalist asking their support, is there any guarantee that the curriculum proposed in military education has nothing to do with personal contacts (e.g. the impact of personal ties over those influencing the pro-capitalist stance of the US army commanders who are influential over the orientation of the US army, which is influential over the military education in Turkey)? As regards these questions, the analysis proposed to be made in a micro-macro range here underlines the necessity to expand the relatively influential possible factors acting upon particular preferences of the state elements (the preferences treated as the ‘resultant’ of the class struggles by Poulantzas in an over-generalizing mode) and to understand why, in several cases, there is not that strong-enough armed force

enabling the socialists to hold *the* state power in addition to implement possible other radical policies within or outside capitalism. In the following section, how the armed elements can be mobilized in a pro-capitalist way will be discussed again with reference to the micro-macro range factors.

4.2.2 Mobilizing Armed Elements: State and Civilian

All of the above (and below) factors in addition to several others (which could not be included in the present thesis on account of not only its limited scope, but also the absence of secondary data) influential over the state elements' practices can be influential also over arming the people and mobilizing the already armed state and civilian elements in line with the capitalist interests. First of all, insofar as the laws are shaped in a way to protect the capitalist long-term interests, even the passive voluntary action type (see Chapter 3) of the incumbents of state armed positions in a way to obey the existing legal arrangements that hold them responsible for protecting order (which is a capitalist (dis)order) becomes a macro-level mobilizing factor in steering the armed state elements to protect the capitalist long-term collective interests. Secondly, the communities/associations (e.g. political parties, Masonic lodges, Islamic tariqats) that the (state or civilian) armed elements belong to or support may be also influential over their actions. Thirdly, as a number examples indicated in the above sections, the close ties with a number of capitalists and the employment opportunities in private enterprises after retirement may also become among factors influential over the state armed elements' actions. Besides the capitalist funding/donations for particular political parties (which may in turn steer armed elements in line with capitalist interests) and state institutions can be also among the factors influential directly or indirectly over the armed elements for the defense of particular capitalist interests.

However, before continuing to elaborate on such factors, one thing has to be made clear. It is the question, whether armed forces are restricted to state networks or not. Its answer is held to be negative in the present thesis, while Gramsci's position is supported as against Perry Anderson's position of equating the armed elements with state networks. According to Perry Anderson, Gramsci is wrong in not restricting violence to the state alone. He wrote Gramsci commits an error:

For coercion is precisely a legal monopoly of the capitalist State. In Weber's definition, the State is the institution which enjoys a monopoly of legitimate violence over a given territory. It alone possesses an army and a police—'groups of men specialized in the use of repression' (Engels). Thus it is not true that hegemony as coercion + consent is co-present in civil society and the State alike. The exercise of repression is juridically absent from civil society. The State reserves it as an exclusive domain. This brings us to a capitalist social formation. There is always a *structural asymmetry* in the distribution of the consensual and coercive functions of this power. Ideology is shared between civil society and the State: violence pertains to the State alone. In other words, the State enters twice over into any equation between the two. (Anderson, 1976, p. 32)

Therefore, according to Anderson, because Weber's definition of the state holds that the state has a monopoly of legitimate violence, which according to Anderson is essential for capitalist social formation, even though there may be armed elements not defined legally in state networks such as the military squads organized by the fascists in the 1920-1922 Italy, they should be treated as a part of the state because, for example, "the *squadristi* could only assault and sack working-class institutions with impunity, because they had the tacit coverage of the police and army" (Anderson, 1976, p. 32). Although Anderson (1976) acknowledged the presence of several armed elements outside the state in footnote 58, he insisted on the marginal character of such phenomena as "semi-legal organizations of private violence, such as the American goon-squads of the twenties and thirties" (p. 32f) while according to him "(t)he state's monopoly of the means of coercion may be legally drawn at the line of automatic weapons than the hand-guns, as in the USA or Switzerland" (p. 32f). His insistence on emphasizing the concentration of means of violence in the state may be relevant to his point that "an insurrection will only succeed if the repressive apparatus of the State itself divides or disintegrates—as it did in Russia, China or Cuba" (p. 77) while "(t)he consensual 'convention' that holds the forces of coercion together must ... be breached" (p. 77).

Perry Anderson's insistence on the disintegration of the repressive apparatus of the state may be correct for several instances, and the author of the present research holds a very similar view to that of Anderson on the centrality of armed force/power in

capitalist rule, which can be detected from the entire thesis. However, as Trotsky had argued in a number of texts (esp. in Trotsky, 1924; 1975), the correct analysis of the concrete is crucial for the formulation of correct strategies, meaning that no strategy has to be held as essential. Therefore, despite Anderson's very accurate criticism of the understanding of hegemony putting the emphasis on consent in analyzing the capitalist domination, this does not follow that a real phenomena has to be distorted because a particular concept by definition treats that phenomena as such. To put it more concretely, it would not be a correct analysis to treat the armed elements outside the state positions within the state just because Weber's definition of state holds that the state has a monopoly of legitimate violence. If the reality challenges the content of the definition of a concept, what is to be done is to change the definition; that is the relations formulated by the concept (as is done in this thesis) rather than stretch the reality in a way to fit the concept. Perry Anderson's argument for overlooking the civilian armed elements seems to have two grounds: Firstly, they are marginal (e.g. the mafia of the US in 1920s and 1930s) and secondly, those that are not marginal are supported by the state (e.g. the squads of fascist Italy).

First of all, all the examples provided in a separate section 2.3.2.1 have already indicated that the armed power of the mafia is far from being marginal while it has created even scenes of major battle in, for example, Italy, for several times. Besides, their power is growing in a number of countries (including Turkey), at the same time driving the attention of even the academicians in universities (where, commonly, the study of more 'sympathetic' issues such as consent or ideology is encouraged rather than the very unpleasant issue 'violence'). And secondly, taking the support of the state elements is one thing, being a part of the state is another. For example, even if an adult feeds a baby while the baby cannot survive without that adult's support; we still cannot call the baby as the adult because the former survives on account of the support of the latter. They are ontologically two separate entities. Therefore, even though the state elements feed the fascist squads, we cannot identify these two unless the latter is legally defined in the state networks (according to the definition of state proposed by the author of the present thesis). This is not to deny the support provided by state elements to fascist paramilitary forces in a number of capitalist societies. An example of this instance is very clearly revealed by a member of the most powerful fascist party of Turkey of the 1970s (the Nationalist Action Party, NAP) when he told

about a massacre organized against the leftists in Turkey. That is the statement made by Yaşar Okuyan (the former NAP General Secretary who became a Motherland MP in the post-1980 era) in a personal encounter with Ahmet Kahraman. About the massacre known as the ‘Bloody Sunday’¹⁵⁸ that took place on February 16, 1969, Kahraman (1993) reports, Okuyan said:

By then, I was a student in Istanbul. The managers of the National Turkish Student Union and the Association for Struggle against Communism were our friends, elder brothers. We were very close. The events prior to the Bloody Sunday were no secret. Everything happened in plain view. Its preparations were made openly. For instance, sticks were brought to the National Turkish Student Union by trucks. The trucks were unloaded in front of passersby. Then they were to be distributed to those who were going to fight.

All sort of preparations were made for the big fight. Blue ribbons were distributed in order not to make mistake, not to give harm to each other, and enable the police to distinguish and help the friendly forces. Those who put on the blue ribbon were considered to be from friendly forces. As a matter of fact, these ribbons proved to be very useful. The police did not bother our guys. However, those who accidentally dropped their ribbons were abruptly taken away by the police. We immediately intervened in such incidents and rescued our guys. (p. 148)

Okuyan’s statement on the Bloody Sunday strikingly reveals the collaboration of the fascist civilian militants with state armed forces and the protection of the former by the latter. However, this does not mean that all of those fascist militants are state elements in the same way that the protection of socialist militants by the leftwing police should not end in the proposition that those socialist militants are a part of the state because certain state elements protect them. Actually, the state is only one (although generally a privileged one) among other entities comprising the armed elements in the society. And despite its privilege, it is not the only one. Making a distinction between the state and civilian armed elements is of extreme importance since the other way would end in a conceptual chaos, blurring at the same time the

¹⁵⁸ On February 16, 1969, a huge anti-imperialist mass protest took place. Around 30,000 people marched towards Taksim protesting the 6th Fleet of the US that had arrived Turkey. The fascists attacked the demonstrators with knives and sticks, as a result of which two revolutionary workers died. Further information on ‘Bloody Sunday’ is available at <http://users.westnet.gr/~cgian/1000-ops.htm>

analyst's mind. The analytical approach proposed here is the recognition of the presence of both state and civilian armed elements and draw the boundaries. This analysis would also help in identifying the armed formations that cover state elements but transcend them.

As was argued in Chapter 3, the state elements can be engaged in both legal and illegal actions by means of the authority emerging from the state position they occupy, which enables them to make arrangements through state networks. The case of Turkey verifies the presence of such actions. As Mehmet Eymür, a former MİT (MİT is the Turkish intelligence service) executive stated, in extraordinary situations, MİT sometimes uses or employs even those people engaged in illegal affairs such as Mahmut Yıldırım, better known with his code name *Yeşil* (see the interview with Eymür in Hakan, 2001, pp. 21-23). A gendarmerie intelligence officer's confessions published in the newspaper *Evrinsel* in 21.06.1996 also reveal that in South East Anatolia, where Kurdish population is quite dense, the state *security* forces have been involved in many illegal actions such as rape, torture, and execution without trial (in Gökdemir, 2005, pp. 284-287). Formations and sets of practices interrelated with, but transcending the legal networks of state¹⁵⁹ are also acknowledged by Hüsametdin Cindoruk, a rightwing politician who for several times became an MP (see the interview with Cindoruk in Taşkın, 2006, pp. 328-331) and by Mahir Kaynak, an academician who worked for MİT as a secret agent, spying the socialists in the pre-1980 era (see Mete & Kaynak, 2006, esp. pp. 113-129). Süleyman Demirel (the Prime Minister for several times, the president of the republic for once) and Bülent Ecevit (the Prime Minister for several times) among others also made similar statements acknowledging the presence of the state elements' practices beyond their legally assigned duties.¹⁶⁰ Yet, while those formations are not always restricted to state elements, civilian armed elements can be treated in state networks only if they are

¹⁵⁹ That can be encoded as an intersection field between state elements and non-state elements for illegal practices, meaning that formations and practices covering not only state positions and arrangements made through state positions, but also cooperation and/or fusion with non-state positions and arrangements for realizing particular projects; these formations may include what is popularly addressed as 'Deep State' in Turkey, gang formations, or possible other formations fitting the definition, which can be categorized further in terms of the projects they have, which might be a topic for future research.

¹⁶⁰ For Demirel's statements, see Donat (2005), for Ecevit's statements see Dündar (2005, pp. 20, 21, 78, 79).

employed (temporarily or permanently) and paid by state funds/allocations by legally defined arrangements (e.g. money to be used in MİT operations).

Large segments of armed state elements in Turkey are generally (if not always) easily distinguishable while the ‘state security forces’ of modern Turkey include the ‘Turkish Armed Forces (the army)’, ‘National Intelligence Organization (MİT)’, ‘General Policing Organizations (such as the Turkish Police Organization, Gendarmerie, and Village Guards)’, and ‘Special Policing Organizations (such as the Municipal Police, and Customs Enforcement Control Officers)’ (Metin & Eraslan, 1994, pp. 13-19). As for the civilian armed elements, except from the unorganized individuals with guns; several mafia gangs, tribal communities, and illegal political armed organizations (whether with legal wings or not) can be considered in that category.

Now, to return back to the question of the main purpose of this section, as was argued at the start of this section, any factor discussed in the previous section and that will be discussed in the next section (in addition to the non-discussed ones)¹⁶¹ may be influential in arming particular people and steering the already armed people towards acting in a pro-capitalist way. As was mentioned earlier, even the obedience to the already existing legal rules of the capitalist society in a passive voluntary way means much for the reproduction of the capitalist (dis)order. However, several (if not all) state elements act in the way they do because they think that is the correct way. In this respect, the way the teachers in police schools and the police chiefs approach the issue of ‘security’ gives some clues about their motives for their pro-capitalist practices (with the acknowledgment that what is manifested may not coincide with their real opinions or motivations).

¹⁶¹ Actually, only a few of a great many of the factors directly or indirectly influential over the capitalist hold of state power are discussed in the present text. For example further interaction instances/structures, from, for example, friendship, family, classroom practices; the encouraged ways of life and habits, for example, with reference to consumerism, paparazzi programs, and isolating space designs such as individualizing housing, city plans, and non-mass transportation among others; and any factor that obstructs empathy such as the robotizing practices in the military among others may be influential in this process. Among others, even the impact of several legal arrangements could not be examined in the thesis. However, due to the limited scope of the thesis and due to the unavailable secondary data for further elaboration, this thesis could unfortunately cover only a very few of such factors.

The articles written by certain police elements (those articles written by the ones referred to in the following lines) give the impression that the authors of those articles can hardly identify class domination in the society. Although their proposals are not identical with each other, almost all of them are formulated in the name of the ‘state’ or ‘public peace and security’. They seem far from questioning the inevitably discriminatory exercises of state power in terms of class positions in capitalist societies. Their perception or at least the presentation of their perception of the society seems to overlook the class conflicts. Several of them formulate the healthy society as a harmonious one, the peace of which is under the threat of ‘anarchy’ and ‘terror’ that stem from the actions of individuals deceived by the organizations under foreign influence. They attribute the police the mission to assure and restore the ‘order’. For example, according to Halil İbrahim Kavgacı (1997), a Police Academy teacher, the problems disturbing the ‘public peace’ have at the same time laid the ground for ‘disorder’ and ‘anarchy’. Therefore, whatever he proposed as solution is formulated in the name of attaining a peaceful society (see esp. p. 119). Besides, ideological actions are also detached from their content. For example, the Police Chiefs Arda and Çalışkan (1998) defined the ‘ideological actions’, as those events in which “the extremely dedicated” and “usually gullible and young activists take place” (p. 39) while they grounded their proposal of preventing the social events on the ultimate goal of “restoring the law and order” (p. 40). However, again for the sake of ‘order’, another Police Academy teacher, İbrahim Cerrah (1998) adopted a different approach. He suggested that during the social events “the tension accumulated against the system is ensured to be purged in a healthy way” and therefore proposed to give legal permissions for such events easily (p. 221). Consequently, regardless of their attitude and strategies they proposed concerning ‘social protests’ and ‘ideological actions’, what a good number of police educators and chiefs seem to have in mind is the problem of ‘restoring the order’ without questioning the degree of the possibility of a genuine ‘public peace’ in the presence of an inequality, conflict and crisis generating capitalist (dis)order. They also seem far from questioning the class character of the state while several (*not* all who use the discourse of ‘state’) seem to act in the way they do because they think that is for the sake of the ‘state’. Interestingly, even the non-violent proposals take a ‘state goal’ form. For example, Aytaç (1998), another police academician, suggests that several terrorists could have been won *for* the ‘state’, if the ‘state’ had provided an adequate education for them

and looked after them in a proper way (p. 255). Here, again, the state is treated as a separate institution above and beyond class conflicts, without any reference to capitalist domination. The ‘image of state’ seems to be a powerful motivating factor, steering the state elements for making pro-capitalist arrangements. This image may be the resultant of any combination of the elements of the political socialization process in addition to the motive of an individual to be in conformity with particular ideas/values that are dominant in a particular community (e.g. family, friendship community, religious group, political party, nation) to which the individual attributes major importance or that are propagated by the opinion leaders whose ideas the individual respects considerably (e.g. brother, journalist, friend, religious community leader, political party leader). Although all the factors influential over the state of ‘brain conformity’ (which seems to be considerably widespread not only among pro-capitalist forces but also anti-capitalist forces) must be integrated into the analysis since ‘brain conformity’ appears to be a crucial micro-level factor making several state elements act in a pro-capitalist way, it will be inevitably treated as a black-box on account of the factors discussed in Chapter 2. In the present thesis, unfortunately, only some possible means of disseminating particular ideas with some possibility to be influential over the minds of the individuals will be examined with reference to mainly the available secondary data regardless of its limits.

Among such means, the opinions disseminated by the reference books and the commanders/chiefs/educators of the armed state elements can be considered. In the texts of several authorized state armed elements, a number of pieces indicate that the actions to be undertaken are formulated in the name of the ‘nation’ and ‘state’. For example, in the book ‘Gendarmerie Ethic: The Professional Morals’ (*Jandarma Etiği: Meslek Ahlakı*, 2001), the principles that the gendarmes are to obey ethically are formulated on the grounds of such concepts as ‘nation’, ‘motherland’, ‘patriotism’, ‘state’, ‘law’, and ‘interests of the society’ (see esp. pp. 104-107). The presented image of the society signifies a society that is a coherent whole comprising common, general, national interests rather than a divided one by antagonistic classes. Also in the State Planning Organization’s Specialization Commission Report on Effectiveness in Security Services (*Güvenlik Hizmetlerinde Etkinlik Özel İhtisas Komisyonu Raporu*, 2001), the proposals made by the representatives of the state security forces indicate a similar approach. For example, in the Report, the

representative of the Gendarmerie General Commandership lists certain problems viewed as harmful because they constitute threats to the 'state's inner order', 'national unity and integrity', and 'social legal order' in addition to others (see esp. p. 12). Therefore, once again, the society is formulated as a cohesive entity, the order of which is under the threat of destructive forces that should be fought against while class conflicts and capitalist domination are given no reference to. Similar emphases on especially 'state' and 'nation' can be found also in a number of books published by the army (for some excerpts from these books, see Şen, 2005). All those formulations can be considered among the practices with some influence over the state armed element to feel/think she/he does the 'right' and 'just' thing when she/he uses violence against those challenging the existing order. In a book published by the counter-terror department of the police force (Alkan, 2000), among the 'harmful' publications listed, Marx's 'Capital' is given a special emphasis, defining it as the book, which, still, the world cannot get rid of its influence (pp. 102, 103). The author of that book's attitude can be considered as an active voluntary orientation derived by high 'ideals' of the state and nation, which unfortunately equates the well-being of the nation with the existing class society, where millions of people suffer from pain and poverty while he, without questioning his taken for granted beliefs, decreed that Marx (who in fact aimed at a world without exploitation and domination) is among the biggest harms for the 'nation' whom the world cannot get rid of.

However, as was mentioned before in the previous section, it seems that among the factors leading the state armed forces to act in a pro-capitalist way, the opinion formation process has had a substantial part. In particular, the formal training process which has also international links (which can be considered as a macro-level factor) has been utilized widely. For example, after joining the NATO, in the course of the Cold War, thousands of army, police, and intelligence members received training in the United States. In this respect, between 1950 and 1979, 19,193 Turkish citizens as state elements received training in the 'Military Support Program' and 'International Military Education and Training Program' (Ganser, 2005, p. 403). Until now, the Turkish army elements and especially commanders have assumed an anti-communist attitude in the most part. Officially, the army has addressed 'communism' as a non-national, alien ideology (Bora, 2004, esp. p. 174), and even the voluntary passive orientation of the state elements' actions towards the official rules can be considered

as sufficient to end in practices contributing in the defense of the long-term capitalist interests. This is also valid for the police force in Turkey.¹⁶² In Law 2559, the main task of the police is defined as maintaining “the public order, the public, individual, and possession safety, and the dwelling immunity” as well as protecting “the people’s honor, life, and property”, and assuring “the public repose” (Metin & Eraslan, 1994, p. 20). As can be detected from this legal definition, the rights to be protected by the police are formulated in a bourgeois way. Sacredness of private property is taken for granted. Besides, the emphasis on the ‘maintenance of order’, that is naturally in harmony with the task of policing, ends in the attempts for the ‘maintenance of capitalist order (disorder)’ of the capitalist society, for especially those police in conformity with the official rules.

There may be also certain aspects that may be influential at least over the passive voluntary action (oriented towards the protection of the capitalist order) of the army officers with reference to the material resources as regards the income they derive formally.¹⁶³ For decades, the army has been making investments in the capitalist market in a relatively collective way. Integration of the armed state armed elements with the capitalist economy in terms of the *collective* solutions improving the material well-being of the army members through market economy has been on the agenda from the beginning. For example, the Turkish National Import and Export Joint-Stock Company (*Türkiye Milli İthalat ve İhracat Anonim Şirketi*), encouraging the officers to buy its shares was established in 1922. This company made investments in several sectors of the economy from operating factories to construction contracts (Parlar, 2005, p. 95). It can be considered as the predecessor of OYAK (Army Mutual Assistance Association), established in 1961, which has introduced a sort of compulsory shareholder structure to the army members. As for the investments of OYAK, the OYAK investments much exceeded that of its predecessor. OYAK is a member of TÜSİAD and has developed partnerships with several big capitalist

¹⁶² In Turkey, the police force has entered in a process of centralization since the 19th century and France was taken as a model for the centralized and coercive style of policing (Aydin, 1997, p. 117; Ergut, 2004, pp. 42, 43).

¹⁶³ Meanwhile, the relatively poor resources that the army members/commanders receive in comparison to other sections of the society and other countries’ army members/commanders may have part in the uneasiness among the army members, which might have also contributed to the formation of the pre-1960 clandestine groups in the Turkish army.

groups. Today, OYAK, one of the biggest capitalist groups of Turkey has investments in several sectors of the economy, from the industrial to the financial (for the structure, capital, and investments of OYAK, see Parla, 2004; Parlar, 2005, pp. 107-130; Şen, 2005, pp. 172-188). In this respect, the presence of OYAK can be considered as a part of the mechanism of material resources, linking the heart of the state power; armed forces with the market economy in a collective mode.

Meanwhile, there is probably nothing inherent in human beings necessarily pushing them to act in the way they find it useful for the people, or the group they are in. Therefore, it is highly doubtful what the major motive of the state elements or armed elements (state or civilian) is as they act in a pro-capitalist way. However, especially concerning the active voluntary pro-capitalist practices of the state elements, several (if not all) of those elements' motive of acting as such may be, as Miliband (1969) suggested, the commitment to the national interests (see esp. pp. 72-76, 129) rather than the material gains provided by the bourgeoisie or investments in the capitalist market. Probably, this is also the case for several civilian armed pro-capitalist forces. As for the 1970s Turkey, in the course of intense class struggles, especially the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) militants were in the front scene attacking the worker actions, leftwing protests and people. In addition to the strong party indoctrination of a fascistic ideology with an anti-communist corporatist program and a racist (with reference to Turkish nationalism) discourse, its solidarity building practices in the party branches and camps weaving community ties among its members seem to be among the major factors in steering its militants against the leftist activists.¹⁶⁴ Meanwhile, not only Turkish nationalism, but also religious sentiments were resorted to in mobilizing (and arming) civilian people against the leftist activists. Indeed, as Tuşalp (1994) illustrated, the religious circles were used in violent actions against leftist people for several times since 1960s (see pp. 225-232). Among the themes of anti-communist propaganda reproduced through religious networks in addition to a

¹⁶⁴ However, armed training for anti-communist extreme nationalists started before the establishment of NAP. For example, commando training received by the Republican Peasant Nation Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi* – RPNP), the predecessor of the NAP, came to the agenda after 1967 (Parlar, 2006b, pp. 475, 476). On August 6, 1968, in a statement made by Türkeş to Haber Ajansı (H.A.), the anti-communist mission of the RPNP militants was publicized. Türkeş's statement included the following words: "The Youth Branches ... are also taught judo. The communists cannot dominate the streets and think that the country is ownerless. The country-nationalist young men who would speak in the way they do are present" (in Parlar, 2006b, p. 476).

number of other channels, the following can be mentioned: ‘Communists are Godless’; ‘Communists swear at Islam and prophet Muhammed’; ‘Communists are going to rape your sisters and mothers’; ‘In communism, you are going to share your wives with other men’. All these propaganda themes against communism can be considered among the motives triggering the emotional rationality of the individuals against communism. Actually, along with mass means of opinion formation such as the curriculums prepared for the schools of formal education and mass media, community ties, sentiments, and ideals seem among important steerers of action of both the civilian and state armed elements, as a part of the masses (as for the state armed elements, the curriculums prepared for the military/police students have had specific targets in terms of mobilizing them in line with the capitalist interests among others as will be mentioned in the next section). The next section will discuss the issue of shaping the actions of masses (and when relevant, armed elements) with reference to the capitalist hold of state power.

4.2.3 Shaping the Actions of Masses

In the republican Turkey, there have been two major ideals (among possible others) that have been widely utilized by the pro-capitalist forces: national sentiments and religious sentiments. While national sentiments stem from the image of a national community which is a latent class interest community (meaning that it is open to the defense of long-term interests of both the capitalist class and the working class); the religious sentiments stem mainly from the belief (rather than the community) in a prophet who received the revelation and transmitted the God’s words, with the acknowledgment that their spread, reproduction, and transformation have been predominantly (if not exclusively) through community networks (while today the mass means of opinion formation such as education and mass media also constitute important means), the class character of which will be discussed below. In Turkey, the predominant form of nationalism has been Turkish nationalism and the predominant utilization of religion became Sunni Islam. Although the attitude of the chief exercisers of state power towards religion have been controversial from the beginning, the well-rooted religious community networks displayed a highly resistant character in the face of the counter-forces, while sometimes they were also utilized by Turkish pro-capitalist nationalists whether in state positions or not. The political

scene in Turkey with reference to the chief exerciser's treatment of nationalism and religion is presented below, since it will be resorted to in the following pages.

Development of world capitalism had had impacts on the pre-capitalist Ottoman lands since the 18th century. During the 18th and 19th centuries, Ottoman Empire steadily lost power. This pushed certain sultans to carry out reforms. Certain reforms were undertaken by the independent initiative of the reformist sultans while some others were imposed by the European powers. Yet, the reformist endeavors met with resistance from especially conservative circles. In 1876, constitutional monarchy was proclaimed. However, the constitution was lifted in 1878.¹⁶⁵ Especially during the late 1800s and early 1900s, Ottoman Empire's political and economic structure passed through important changes.¹⁶⁶ The Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention of 1838 created a relatively open market and accelerated the erosion of the guild system. Meanwhile, many nations seceded and established their own states. The independence movements resulted in nationalistic currents also among Turks. However, prior to the spread of Turkish nationalism, Ottomanism became popular. In 1889, a group called 'Young Turks' emerged and carried out activities for the establishment of a constitutional government.¹⁶⁷

The Young Turks led a revolution in 1908 at the end of which Constitutional Monarchy was restored. They became the leading figure of the modernization reforms. By 1908, there were three major political currents active in Ottoman politics: conservatives, liberals, and Unionists. The conservatives were in support of the old economic and political system. The *ulema* (religious functionaries), the *alaylı officers* (the army members without modern education who were promoted in accordance to their loyalty to the sultan), and certain palace members constituted the skeleton of the conservative wing. They located Islam to the heart of their political discourse. As for the liberals, they were in favor of the *laissez-faire* policies. The big bourgeoisie, especially those sectors that were engaged in the finance business and international trade supported the liberals. Several high civil and military bureaucrats besides

¹⁶⁵ For the political developments of the era, see Akşin (1990).

¹⁶⁶ For the transformation process see Akşin (1990, pp. 154-185); Pamuk (1993, pp. 114-198); Toprak (1990); Tunçay (1990, p. 27-36).

¹⁶⁷ For the activities of the Young Turks, see Akşin (2001).

several of the well-educated and wealthy constituted the skeleton of the liberal wing. In many instances, the liberals did not hesitate to manipulate religious sentiments. However, they had a pro-Western, pro-modernization attitude. As for the Unionists, they also supported modernization and were in favor of the economic, political and cultural reforms. However, they supported protectionist economic policies rather than free-market capitalism. The artisans, small and middle bourgeoisie as well as the lower and middle ranked officers with modern military education constituted the skeleton of the Unionists. The components of their discourse were Ottomanism, Islam, and nationalism. After five years of power struggle in the parliament, the Unionists won the battle. They stayed in government until the end of World War I. In the days the Unionists were in power, the predecessors of the republican Kemalist reforms were implemented. Yet, despite the Unionists' attempts of building a national economy, industry was not much developed prior to the republican era, specifically until 1930s (Ahmad, 2000, pp. 31-51; Tunçay, 1990, pp. 30-52).

At the end of World War I, Ottomans were defeated. The empire had to sign an armistice. Subsequent to this armistice, many Unionist leaders fled to Europe. This resulted in a political vacuum. However, the sultan filled this vacuum immediately. Then the Ottoman lands were occupied by victorious powers. This engendered a nationalist resistance movement and the organization of resistance groups in Anatolia and Eastern Thrace. After three years of independence war, which was led by Mustafa Kemal who came from the Unionist tradition, national struggle succeeded. The Turkish Republic was established in 1923. Although some parts of the conservative notables and nascent bourgeoisie supported the national struggle, the basics of the republican state were formulated by mainly the military and civilian bureaucracy that constituted the skeleton of the Kemalist movement. This group made a bourgeois revolution from above (Ahmad, 2000, p. 48-56; Trimberger, 1978, pp. 14-24).

Except from the two trials for passing to a multi-party regime,¹⁶⁸ the period 1923-1945 can be regarded as the mono-party era. The ruling party was the Republican

¹⁶⁸ For the trials of the multi-party regime and information on the Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası* - PRP) (November 1924-June 1925) and Liberal Party (*Serbest Fırka*) (August 1930-November 1930) see Ahmad (2000, pp. 57-60), Koçak (1990, pp. 97-108), Zürcher (1998, pp. 175-187). As for the first trial, almost all the opposition united against the ruling Kemalist clique under the PRP roof. Despite its liberal

People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası* – RPP) and until 1938 the president of the republic was Mustafa Kemal. Since its early days, the Kemalist RPP carried out a series of reforms aiming to replace the Ottoman subject identity with the Turkish citizen identity and to establish a capitalist system with a secularist and pro-modernization perspective.¹⁶⁹ Meanwhile, the Turkish identity was constantly emphasized as against the Kurdish identity which went hand in hand with the state sponsored academic studies for writing a glorified Turkish history and developing Turkish language.¹⁷⁰ In the course of the 1930s, Kemalism was adopted as an

economic program, it widely used a religious discourse. The reason for its closure by the state was its 'exploitation of the religious feelings of the people'. Indeed, it was the PRP's leaders who were held responsible for the 1925 Kurdish Rebellion that primarily adopted religious demands and discourse. The Liberal Party shared a similar fate as it, in a very short time, received support from religious circles. Indeed, the reactionary Menemen Incident that took place only one month after the closure of the Liberal Party, made many secularists seriously worried about the power of the Islamic discourse. This led them think that they should strengthen *the secularist Turkish identity* even more so as to get rid of the fundamentalist threat.

¹⁶⁹ Among these reforms; unity of education (*Tevhid-i Tedrisat*, 1924), abolishment of caliphate (1924), abolishment of religious courts and the unification of the judiciary (1924), shutting down of the *tekkes* and *zaviyes* (dervish brotherhoods) and abolishment of tariqats (1925), Hat Law that outlawed fez (this was targeted at the abolishment of any hat-like wear that would be associated with traditions and Islam, 1925), adoption of the Western calendar and clock (1925), new civil, commercial, and penal codes based on European models (1926), first systemic census (1927), adoption of international numbers (1928), shift from the Arabic script to Latin script (letter revolution, 1928), annulment of the article that put the religion of Turkish Republic as Islam (1928), adoption of international measurement units such as meter, kilogram, liter (1931), abolishment of the wear of certain garments (especially those loaded with religious associations, 1934), giving the women the right to vote and hold office (1934), law of surnames (1934), addition of the 'principle of secularism' into the constitution (1937) can be mentioned. For an evaluation of the Kemalist reforms see Ahmad (2000, pp. 72-101); Koçak (1990, pp. 111-116); Zürcher (1998, pp. 194-203).

¹⁷⁰ The critical years for the construction of the official language and history theses were 1930s. Firstly, the 'Turkish History Thesis' was developed. According to this thesis announced in 1932, Turkish history was not limited to the Ottoman experience. Rather, Turks were white (not yellow) and clean human beings who originated to Central Asia and migrated to such places like China, Europe and Middle East. Then, Turks established the civilizations of the world including the Anatolian, Egyptian and Aegean civilizations. However in time, many Turks had to battle with those Turks who had forgotten their Turkish identity. In a similar fashion, the 'Sun Language Theory' claimed all languages of the civilized world in fact originated to Turkish. According to these theses, even the Hittite and Sumerian civilizations were proto-Turkish civilizations. It was not a coincidence that the state banks such as *Sümerbank* (Sumerian Bank) and *Etibank* (Hittite Bank) were given the names of these Anatolian civilizations. Such practices corresponded to the efforts to support the Turkish History Thesis that suggested that the Turkish civilization had a thousands of years of past and played an important role in the formation world's greatest civilizations while Turkish Republic was the continuity of the Anatolian civilizations. It is obvious that these theses had lots of contradictions and inconsistencies both in itself and with the historical facts

ideology by the announcement that republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism, and revolutionism/reformism were the fundamental and unchanging principles of RPP. In 1937, these principles were incorporated into the constitution.¹⁷¹

Changes in the balance of power in 1945 resulted in the transition to multi-party regime. In 1946, the Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti - DP*) was established with the support of several big landowners and capitalists. The government recognized further space for political freedom. Yet, the regime remained authoritarian with constant censorship and restriction over freedom of thought and expression. Indeed, there was considerable governmental repression against any kind of opposition. Nevertheless, the DP grew in size and power soon, with its emphasis on the rights and liberties as well as its reference to the traditions and Islam. In 1950, the Democrats won an electoral victory. For ten years they stayed in power. However, they did not realize their promises for further democratization. This time, the turn for implementing censorship was theirs. This resulted in discontent among RPP supporters and a split within the DP. In 1955, the Freedom Party (*Hürriyet Fırkası*) was established. As the economic difficulties magnified the political problems, the DP government resorted to the exploitation of Islamic sentiments further. Its measures against the opposition grew also more repressive. Besides, it decided to set up a committee to investigate the

(Banguoğlu, 2002, pp. 102-105; Kürkçüoğlu, Bozkurt, Güneş, Taşdemirci, Çağan, Ergun & Genç, 1997, p. 56; Olcaytu, 1998, p. 108; Yücel, Feyzioğlu, Giritli, Mumcu, İlhan, Renda & Gönübol, 1989, p. 7; Zürcher, 1998, p. 199). It seems that one of the most important targets of the history and language studies of the early republic was to strengthen the nation-building process. However, if one target of these theses was to strengthen the belief in a common history and ancestry via glorifying the Turkish national pride, the other important aim was to deny the Kurdish identity. Indeed, the claim that Kurds were in fact mountain Turks who had forgotten and changed their language originates to the unscientific 'Turkish History Thesis' and 'Sun Language Theory'. These theses absolutely denied the existence of a separate Kurdish ethnic identity and Kurdish language. Besides, until recently, systematic efforts for wiping Kurdish language in Turkish Republic continued to take place in such practices like changing the names of the places, not opening a Kurdish course in the Faculty of Language and History-Geography, destroying the documents related to Kurdish history that would in turn weaken the Kurdish collective memory. At some instances, these practices included even fining the Kurdish peasants for using Kurdish in such places like the bazaar or city centers (Başkaya, 1991, pp. 55-66; Kirişçi, 1998, p. 239). As for today, in part on account of the adaptation to the European Union standards, several reforms that recognize the Kurdish identity have taken place. However, the future of this conflict is far from being predictable given the developments and the changing conjuncture at not only the country level but also the international level.

¹⁷¹ For the Kemalist approach and mono-party era in Turkey see Ahmad (2000, pp. 52-101); Eliçin (1996); Koçak (1990, pp. 85-141); Köker (1993, pp.125-229); Öz (1992).

opposition's alleged activities accused for instigating a military revolt. This met with mass protests, especially from the university circles and critical others. Finally, a military junta overthrew the Menderes government on May 27, 1960.¹⁷² The DP leaders were tried in Yassıada. At the end of the Yassıada trials, 15 people including the ex-Chief of General Staff (Rüşdü Erdelhun) and ex-president (Celal Bayar) were given death penalty. However, only three of the accused were executed (Menderes, Zorlu, and Polatkan). An important factor in the ratification of these death penalties was considered as the pressure from the lower and middle ranked officers (Ahmad, 2000, p. 102-137; Akyaz, 2002, pp. 167-169; Eroğul, 1990; Timur, 1994).

The May 27th coup owes much to the activities of 60 officers from Ankara and Istanbul. Those who organized the military intervention attributed themselves the responsibility to protect the Kemalist principles and reforms. However, as the questions of who will be in power and how to rule were not answered prior to the coup, this resulted in new coup attempts engendering further struggles and purges (Akyaz, 2002, pp. 130, 390). The military junta called itself the National Unity Committee (*Milli Birlik Komitesi* - NUC). NUC, a coalition of various factions, established an interim government, which was legalized by the professors with a provisional constitution on June 1960 (Ahmad, 2000, pp. 126, 127). Meanwhile, the May 27th coup d'état and the subsequent conflicts became an indicator of the determinant feature of the armed force. The armed force removed the civilian elected government, militarily-legally killed the civilian politicians, and eliminated the rival cliques within the army.

In the course of 1960s, Kemalism was resorted to by several pro-capitalist chief exercisers of state power for reducing the clashes between especially the non-elected state elements in pro-capitalist way. For example, after mid-1960, the army adopted an officially approved version of Kemalist discourse, though not in a systematic fashion.¹⁷³ However, *Atatürkçülük* (Kemalism) was adopted as a discourse by both

¹⁷² As Daldal (2004) suggests, there are contradictory views on the ideological axis of the coup (p. 76). This may be in part, due to the heterogeneous composition of the leading officers of the junta.

¹⁷³ For example, although the curriculum of the military schools of the land forces was revised in 1965-1966, there was almost no considerable change on the 'history of republic' while no

those commanders seeking to restore hierarchy within the army against factions and the interventionist organizations in the military (Akyaz, 2002, pp. 389-393). As for the transition to the civilian regime, it was not without hitches. The new constitution prepared during the military rule was accepted by only 61.5 percent of the total votes cast in 1961. Despite the constitution's relatively democratic characteristic, the anti-propaganda of the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi* – JP) that claimed 'the 'Yes' vote would bring the communists in and legitimize the May 27th military coup' had substantial repercussions. Whatever the major motive was, over 35 percent of the voters rejected the constitution albeit the army's support to the new constitution (Ahmad, 2000, p. 129; Akyaz, 2002, pp. 166, 167).

As for the first general elections after May 27th, it was held on October 15, 1961. In spite of the junta's expectations for a RPP government, the RPP could win only 173 seats (less than the absolute majority) and had to make a coalition with the JP that won 158 seats in the parliament. The JP was the continuation of the DP and became a major political actor between 1960 and 1980. Although the JP was reluctant to establish a coalition government with the RPP, on account of the possibility of a new military intervention, it decided to make collaboration. In the period between 1961 and 1971, after the transition to the civilian regime, seven governments came to power while between October 1965 and March 1971, the JP governments led by Süleyman Demirel stayed in power without any coalitions. The 1960s witnessed the growth of the workers movement and radicalization of the left.¹⁷⁴ On March 12, 1971, the army commanders gave a memorandum pointing out the insufficient practices of the parliament and government to prevent the socio-economic problems and

course on Kemalism was added. Besides, those days, the National Security courses taught in the civil schools by the officers did not mention about Atatürk (Akyaz, 2002, p. 394).

¹⁷⁴ In Turkey, workers' rights including the right to unionize were severely restricted for decades. In 1952, when the 'Confederation of Trade Unions of Turkey' (*Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu* - TÜRK-İŞ) was established, its management acted in line with the official state policies. However, the rapid industrialization and workers' rising militancy resulted in challenging the collaborationist policies of TÜRK-İŞ. Consequently, in 1967, the 'Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey' (*Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu* - DİSK) was established. Another development in the course of the 1960s was the foundation of the Labor Party of Turkey (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi* – LPT) in 1961.

‘anarchy’.¹⁷⁵ The army commanders used a Kemalist discourse for justifying its intervention.¹⁷⁶ The two subsequent governments composed of bureaucrats and technocrats took the support of both generals and majority of members of the parliament. The period was marked by intensified pro-capitalist state measures against socialists. The period of 1971-1980 witnessed sharper antagonistic class struggles. Among the eleven governments of this period, the two rightwing national front governments were among the most repressive. As for the political parties of the era, JP was on the right of the center ever since it was established. JP supported the growth of big industrial and commercial capital in the cities and the agricultural bourgeoisie in the rural areas.¹⁷⁷ As for the RPP, it moved to the left of the center in the early 1970s and became a social democrat organization after then. Under Ecevit’s leadership, it assumed a social democratic mission.¹⁷⁸ As for the socialists, the legal Labor Party of Turkey (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi – LPT*) won seats in the parliament in 1965 as a result of which its members met even the JP MPs’ physical assaults. LPT

¹⁷⁵ This intervention was a sort of semi-coup. However, prior to this intervention, there were several orientations and junta formations within the army as a result of which purges were carried out. Among others, there were three main approaches: domination of the civilians by the army; early general elections; and promulgation of extensive martial law (For the different approaches in the military, see Akyaz, 2002, esp. pp. 301-311).

¹⁷⁶ Akyaz (2002) suggests the military memorandum stated that reforms for maintaining the order were to be carried out with an *Atatürkçü* (Kemalist) approach. Yet, the content of this perspective was not specified. The civil and military academicians started formulating and systematizing Kemalism as a doctrinaire ideology short before March 12th. By then, civilians saw Kemalism as ‘ideology’, while the military refrained from using this term, emphasizing that ‘*Atatürkçülük*’ was a ‘system of ideas’ and a ‘world perspective’ rather than an ideology. In the course of 1970s, the importance and emphasis on *Atatürkçülük* constantly increased including the courses on National Security. In 1976 and 1977, the education programs for the army and the military schools were revised, and courses on ‘*Atatürkçülük*’ that systematized this perspective were added. The program revised in 1979 indicated that the emphasis given to *Atatürkçülük* was even more enhanced (pp. 395-401). Thus, *Atatürkçülük* was seen as a remedy for steering military state elements in the pro-capitalist from-above dictated route.

¹⁷⁷ For further information on the JP ideology and politics see Demirel (2004). JP was a bourgeois political party that can be considered as a MCIC.

¹⁷⁸ For more information on the RPP ideology, politics, and its transformation see Bila (1999), Güneş-Ayata (2002). Since, during the rule of Ecevit in the course of 1970s, there was some place for the propaganda of long-term economic interests of the working class within RPP, for that period, RPP can be considered as a LCIC rather than a MCIC. Besides, from time to time, a number of socialist elements made the propaganda of long-term working class interests also before and after Ecevit rule, including the mono-party era. Nevertheless, from the beginning, RPP remained as a bourgeois political party. Meanwhile, since mid-1990s, on account of mass purges in RPP (including the purge of socialists, with mainly leftwing Kemalist discourse), RPP has turned into a MCIC in the most part, if not exclusively.

was closed by the constitutional court in July 1971.¹⁷⁹ As for the extreme rightwing political parties, there were two major parties. One of them was the Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* – NAP), which evolved from the Republican Peasant Nation Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi* - RPNP). NAP was led by Türkeş who indoctrinated a fascistic ideology similar to Mussolini's anti-communist corporatist program. This political party's main discourse was Turkish nationalism while it had branches that trained militants against the left. Socialist activists called these militants *commandos* while the NAP militants preferred to call themselves *Ülkücü*.¹⁸⁰ The other extreme rightwing political party was the National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi* - NSP), which evolved from the National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi*- NOP) that was closed in the May of 1971 on account of its anti-secularist activities. Its leader was Erbakan. This political party used an Islamic discourse and assumed the mission of defending the interests of several small and

¹⁷⁹ The LPT was a Marxist political party, which grew rapidly in a short time. Its program included the defense of long-term economic interests of the working class. Paradoxically, the closure of the LPT accelerated the radicalization of the left, increasing the number of the illegal socialist parties. For the LPT history and evaluation of its policies, see Aybar (1988), Eroğul (2002), Tayanç (2002). LPT can be considered as a worker political party and at the same time as a MCIC.

¹⁸⁰ For more information on the NAP history, ideology, organization, and activities see Bora and Can (2000), Çınar and Arıkan (2002). Throughout its history, the NAP has been a bourgeois political party that can be considered as a MCIC, rather than a LCIC, although in its discourse, there have been some themes against big bourgeoisie, and especially against those whom its militants address as non-Muslim and non-Turk. In the post-1980 era, and especially under Bahçeli's leadership, there has been a reform process that somehow softened its official discourse, but ended in several within party conflicts. NAP's discourse in 1970s was quite similar to Mussolini and Hitler's earlier party programs with anti-big bourgeois themes, which were then, revised coinciding with the support they received from rich exploiting class members in their rise to power. However, unlike the fascist Italy and Germany, in Turkey, not a mass movement of fascist militants in 1970s (although there was widespread fascist terror those years), but a military coup d'état fulfilled the pro-capitalist work of destroying pro-worker forces in 1980. Meanwhile, in some ways similar to the within elimination and neutralization of fascist militants insistent on the implementation of party programs after Mussolini and Hitler's rise to power, several fascist militants and leaders with NAP affiliation were also neutralized and even tortured during the pro-capitalist September 12th junta. Meanwhile, similar to the 1970s Turkey, even today, the NAP still has a strictly anti-communist and Turkish nationalist orientation, with militants ready to attack those whom they address as 'enemy', while several of them still congregate and are trained in their youth centers *Ülkü Ocakları* (Hearts of Ideal), the headquarters rooted in several cities and hundreds of neighborhoods.

middle sized businesspeople.¹⁸¹ Until 1980, workers' movement and socialist movement got further organized growing stronger which met with not only pro-capitalist state countermeasures but also rightwing paramilitary terror (Özdemir, 1990, pp. 206-248, *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, 1988).

In spite of all countermeasures, civilian governments could not control the pro-worker movement. Besides, economic difficulties may have further challenged the patience of the bourgeoisie and the pro-capitalist state elements. The state signed a new structural adjustment program that adopted a neo-liberal road map in January 1980. Yet, it was impossible to implement this program in the presence of strong labor movement. In 1980, the September 12th military coup emerged as a salve to the survival of capitalist class (and their profits) and as a nightmare to the working class. The September 12th junta straightaway banned the strikes, halted the activities of DİSK, crushed the resistance, and started to implement the neo-liberal program. In 1982, a new constitution was adopted.¹⁸² In 1983, the military regime handed its power to a civilian government. On the other hand, the post-September 12th legislation curtailed the civil liberties in many areas and severely restricted the rights to organize and protest. Meanwhile neo-liberal policies, employers' anti-union practices, pro-capitalist state oppression, anti-democratic laws, and bureaucratic centralist policies of the trade unions dragged the labor movement into an impasse, making Turkey famous for its cheap labor. The socialist movement was defeated with mass arrests and torture. September 12th coup d'état became a turning point in the Turkish political history. For pacifying the people further, Turkish nationalism was amalgamated with a moderate version of Islam. Besides, pro-capitalist version of Kemalist discourse was more systematically adopted to steer the masses and the components of the military towards a pro-capitalist route.¹⁸³

¹⁸¹ For more information on the NOP and NSP background and ideology see Çalışlar (1995, pp. 21-45). Meanwhile, both of them were bourgeois political party that can be considered as a MCICs, rather than LCICs.

¹⁸² The new constitution was prepared under the control of the junta. It was approved by the 91.37 percent of those voted while the participation rate was 91.27 percent. The strong participation and 'yes' vote can be evaluated as the desire for the transition to the civilian regime rather than giving consent to the anti-democratic 1982 constitution.

¹⁸³ Actually, as Akyaz (2002) states, efforts of the army for teaching *Atatürkçülük* consistently increased in the course of 1980s. The National Security course books taught in the civil schools by the military that were prepared by the General Staff gave more emphasis to

The relatively protectionist economic policies of the 1960s were replaced by the relatively open market policies of the 1980s. Neo-liberal policies were started to be implemented under the umbrella of state repression.¹⁸⁴ Exposed to the disastrous effects of September 12th, the trade unions remained silent for seven years. Then some strikes and protests emerged. Meanwhile, the civil servants (public employees) started to organize and demand legal guarantees for unionization, strike, and collective agreement. Besides, DİSK won the lawsuit in 1991 and restarted its activities.¹⁸⁵ In the course of 1990s, the public employees' struggle for legal guarantees besides the labor unions' struggle against neo-liberal policies determined the agenda of the working class that faced with mass unemployment and poverty. Economic troubles and crisis also became a central issue of the governments. The rise of Kurdish nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism became other challenges of the post-1980 era. The relations with the European Union (EU) became another central issue, which brought about reforms in the political, economic, and legal structure of Turkey. These challenges continue to occupy the centre of the political scene.

As for the political parties in the post-1980 period, the Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*)¹⁸⁶ dominated the 1980s parliament with its neo-liberal policies, while it brought the patronage relations back to politics. Over time, high inflation rates besides the scandals of political corruption weakened the support to the Motherland Party. Finally, with the 1991 elections, the one-party dominance of the Motherland left its place to coalition governments. The major political parties of the 1990s were the following, some names of which changed in time: The social democrat political

Atatürkçülük. It was the 1980-1983 era when the official *Atatürkçülük* was introduced with a campaign (pp. 400, 401).

¹⁸⁴ However, according to Öniş (2006), although neo-liberal reforms have been in progress since 1980, full capital account liberalization occurred in 1989, while a gradualist approach rather than a shock-treatment approach would better characterize the Turkish neo-liberal experiment (p. 244).

¹⁸⁵ However, in the post-1980 period, DİSK could not be as militant as it was once. It even changed its name while translating it into English as the *Confederation of Progressive (not Revolutionary) Trade Unions of Turkey*.

¹⁸⁶ For an evaluation of the transformation of the Motherland Party, see Kalaycıoğlu (2002). Until today, Motherland Party has been a bourgeois political party, which can be considered as MCIC.

parties were the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – RPP*)¹⁸⁷ and the Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Parti – DLP*)¹⁸⁸; the central rightwing political parties were the True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi – TPP*)¹⁸⁹ and the Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*)¹⁹⁰; the political party locating Islam to the centre of its discourse was the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi – WP*)¹⁹¹; the extreme Turkish nationalist political party was the Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi – NAP*)¹⁹², the Kurdish nationalist political party was the People's Democratic Party (*Halkın Demokrasi Partisi – PDP*)¹⁹³. Through the end of 1990s, Kurdish movement

¹⁸⁷ In the early 1990s its name was the Social Democratic Populist Party (*Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti*), which can be considered as a LCIC bourgeois political party in those years. As for today, many of its middle age or older members have a RPP origin, while several of them were expelled from the RPP for their relatively leftwing discourse in addition to other factors.

¹⁸⁸ The nationalist elements are more dominant in the DLP discourse when compared to the RPP discourse. Although the DLP's leader has been Ecevit for long years, his discourse turned out to be less radical when compared to his leadership of the pre-1980 RPP. For this transformation see Altundağ (2002); Dibek (2002); Doğan (2001). See also Kınıklıoğlu (2002) for an evaluation of the politics and structure of DLP. DLP has been a bourgeois political party, which can be considered as MCIC in the most part, if not exclusively, since although there have been a few elements making the propaganda of long-term working class interests, purges of rival cliques (whether rightwing or leftwing) has become among usual practices of the ruling clique.

¹⁸⁹ Although the TPP comes from the JP tradition, it had adopted an increasingly Turkish nationalist discourse since mid-1990s until at least the first few years of 2000s. However, in the 2002 general elections, neither the Motherland Party nor the TPP could pass the 10 percent threshold and win seats in the parliament albeit their relatively widespread party organization. For the political stance and evolution of the TPP, see Cizre (2002a). DLP has been a bourgeois political party, which can be considered as MCIC.

¹⁹⁰ As will be suggested in the following pages, the Motherland Party and TPP experienced a serious competition within TOBB, the largest business association of Turkey, in the course of 1990s.

¹⁹¹ Its name then became the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*) and the Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi*). This political party amalgamated an economic program encompassing social democratic motives with Islamic discourse via proposing a 'just order'. Its practices were closely monitored by the military for being a threat to the secular republic. For more information about its organization, ideology, and activities see Çakır (1994); Çalışlar (1995); Şen (1995). These political parties have been bourgeois political parties, which can be considered as MCICs.

¹⁹² However, in the course of 1990s and 2000s, especially under the leadership of Devlet Bahçeli, this political party experienced considerable changes and renewed its image taking more steps towards the political center. For an evaluation of these changes see Gözükcük (2001); Şahbudak (2001); Teazis (2001).

¹⁹³ Then its name changed for many times. Once it became the Democracy Party (*Demokrasi Partisi - DEP*), and then the People's Democracy Party (HADEP) (for their political stance see

met with an upsurge in Turkish nationalism and an increase in nationalist votes. As for the 2000s, the economic crisis of 2001 resulted in bankruptcies, mass unemployment and poverty. In this conjuncture, The Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* – JDP) that is known for its Islamic tendency came to power in 2002 leaving the RPP the opposition seats. The JDP government continued to implement neo-liberal policies and the program to enter the EU.

Now, after this brief presentation of the political scene, it will be easier to discuss the nationalist sentiments and religious sentiments with reference to the utilization of capitalist interests in the context of Turkey. First, religious sentiments and networks will be evaluated. Actually in Turkey, there are two major sects concerning Islamic communities, in addition to a number of smaller groupings. They are *Alevi*s and *Sunnis*. As for the *Alevi* communities, which make up the minority of the Muslim population in Turkey,¹⁹⁴ their situation has been quite controversial for the bourgeois hold of state power, as, for decades, a good number of *Alevi*s has become leftists in Turkey.¹⁹⁵ However, especially in the post-1990 era, *Alevi* capitalists started to become more discernible in terms of their both economic and political activities. Unfortunately, data on such activities is yet untreated in the most part, making an analysis impossible for this section of the thesis. Nevertheless, as the major state practices have been pro-Sunni and the majority of the population has been Sunni in Turkey, in the imprisonment of the available data, Sunni communities and reference to Islamic sentiments will be considered with reference to shaping the opinions of the

Güney, 2002). Later, its name became the Democratic People's Party (*Demokratik Halk Partisi* – DEHAP). As for, the summer of 2006, many Kurdish nationalists were members of the Democratic Society Party (*Demokratik Toplum Partisi* – DTP). In the course of 1990s, these political parties have been bourgeois political parties, which can be considered as LCICs, while several socialist elements were neutralized or expelled especially after 1999.

¹⁹⁴ In Turkey, the majority of Muslims are Sunnis while it is estimated that around 15 million *Alevi*s constitute the largest heterodox community (Kehl-Bodrogi, 1997, p. XI).

¹⁹⁵ Çamuroğlu (1997) suggests that, in the course of the 1970s, at times of intense class conflicts, the majority of *Alevi*s turned into socialism while socialism lost its former importance for many *Alevi*s after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc (pp. 25, 26). As for contemporary Turkey, the research studies organized both in the pre and post 2002 general election periods indicated that the respondents with sign(s) of *Alevi* orientation are more likely to vote for RPP than rightwing political parties (Çarkoğlu, 2005, pp. 286, 287). Although RPP is a bourgeois political party, it seems that the *Alevi*s' choice in bourgeois politics has been relatively leftwing that implies a relatively high opportunity for a leftist radicalization when compared to the religious Sunnis of Turkey.

masses in a pro-capitalist way or a way to set the priority of the non-capitalist individual not as the fight for further material gains or not for establishing a classless society.

Religious sentiments and communities may become important channels to state power whether they originate to capitalist or pre-capitalist societies; since, still, in contemporary capitalist societies, religions constitute important templates and filters in encoding and interpreting the watched phenomena. It was asserted that religious networks prove to be important for the bourgeois rule for a number of reasons. Firstly, in case a particular religion emphasizes the worthlessness of material needs and the concrete world we live in; then, this may create a sense of indifference to economic interests among pious workers (this point will be exemplified in this section with reference to an Islamic publication's assertions). Secondly, if a particular religion recognizes private property, this may again become a factor for pious workers to stay away from fighting for collective long-term working class interests and to respect the religious community's pro-capitalist leaders' formulation of economic realm, and may also become a factor for religious state elements to treat private property as sacred and to respect the religious community's pro-capitalist leaders' formulation of economic realm (these will be exemplified in this section with reference to certain Muslim capitalists' way of treatment of their workers and an Islamic leader's points on wealth). Thirdly, in case that a particular religion has no tolerance to atheism, this may become a factor for pious workers to stay away from or harm those atheists fighting for working class interests (this point is already mentioned in the previous section and will be re-evaluated in this section).

Actually, some degree of consent for or indifference to capitalist mode of production among the masses is of some importance for not only multi-party, but any type of bourgeois regime for especially its *smooth operation* (if not for its survival), since all such factors may contribute in the bourgeois hold of state power as retarding forces over the movement for working class interests (as in the case of dissemination of Turkish-Islamic synthesis by the September 12th junta, that will be discussed with reference to 'education' below). In section 4.2.1, it was mentioned that, religious networks may also constitute a basis for the bourgeoisie to develop solidarity with and influence opinion leaders and state elements with the potential to directly or

indirectly influence the exercise of state power in pro-capitalist ways (solidarity between state elements and capitalist elements from the same Islamic community is exemplified in this section). Furthermore, although Islamic *tariqat* (Islamic order) members belong to the same community mainly for religious purposes, the community solidarity and sentiments also constitute a basis for making political choices such as considering capitalism as legitimate or not, attacking communists or not, voting for this political party or that political party among others (links of Islamic communities with bourgeois political parties is exemplified in this section). The relations in Islamic communities constitute a good example for the interplay of the *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*.

In Turkey, each Islamic community has its own way of living Islam while although tariqats were abolished in 1925 legally, they continued to survive until today. Although the manifest goal of major Sunni Islamic communities of Turkey is far from securing capitalist interests, several, if not all, have resembled bourgeois manifest class interest communities (MCICs in the sense that they have been closed to the defense of the collective long-term interests of the working class) during the republican times, especially with the growth of the economic power of religious Muslim capitalists. Many Sunni Islamic communities have considered commerce and private property as legitimate for Muslims in the most part and their manifested worldview has been far from favoring a classless world (although there is no explicit rejection of collective ownership of means of production). Prophet Muhammed and his family were themselves engaged in trade. However, there is also a facet of several (not all) Islamic communities that makes them resemble latent class interests communities (LCICs meaning that they are open to the defense of collective long-term interests of both the capitalist class and working class): For those Islamic communities that do not explicitly denounce collective ownership of means of production, theoretically, there is a possibility of antagonistic class struggles on long-term economic interest basis since there is no explicit denunciation of collective ownership of means of production in Islam. For example, although in Koran, presence of slavery is recognized and is not abolished, since there is no statement prohibiting the abolishment of slavery either by prophet Muhammed or Koran, today, several (not all) Muslim community elements are against slavery. This instance is similar to the absence of any statement abolishing the collective ownership of means of production

by prophet Muhammed or Koran; making several Islamic communities (not all; only those that do not abolish the collective ownership of means of production) resemble LCICs.

Meanwhile, the class composition of Islamic communities is heterogeneous; they are open to the presence of different social classes and strata including the antagonistic class elements. Unlike Masonic communities, they do not cover only the elites.¹⁹⁶ They generally cover both the rich and the poor; both the capitalists and the workers; both the top and the ordinary state elements. But still, most do not constitute a challenge to capitalism as in the case of the powerful *İskenderpaşa* community from the *Nakşibendi* order (for this community's economic standpoint, see Çakır, 2002, p. 50). In this respect, their influential ex-leader Zahit Kotku's comment on profit is revealing who argued that "the search for profit in the service of the Muslim umma is on an equal level, in terms of religious practice, with praying and fasting" (in Yavuz, 2003, p. 95). Zahit Kotku's treatment of profit as legitimate has implications for not only the *İskenderpaşa* community's working class, self-employed, and capitalist elements, but also state elements. Probably those (including the state elements) respecting Kotku's statements would see at least the Muslim capitalists' profits as legitimate (and thus, at least stay away from expropriating their property), which has direct and indirect implications for the bourgeois hold of state power, since this would lead to indifference to or support for particular capitalist interests at the expense of several interests of not only working class in general, but also those capitalists not seen as religious Muslims (including the non-Muslims) by *İskenderpaşa* members.

However, the relationship between *tariqat* elements and state elements is an intricate one, since there may be a multiplicity of ways of religious sentiment utilization. It is also a dynamic one, since the mobilization of religious sentiments may even give harm to those who once supported them and since regardless of their prior support, particular state elements may even take measures against particular religious communities or a particular way of utilizing religious sentiments. Indeed, even in the Ottoman times, although the chief exercisers of state power had officially used a

¹⁹⁶ However, Mardin (1991) establishes a similarity between Masonry and Islamic *tariqats* and suggests that the perpetuation of mystic fraternities of *tariqats* "in a continuously changing frame provides the setting for the secret-society aspect of *tariqat* which may be the Ottoman equivalent of Freemasonry" (p. 135).

discourse based on Sunni Islam and although the sultans had financed several *tariqats*,¹⁹⁷ they also tried to control these *tariqats* and took measures against them (Bayramoğlu, 2001, pp. 223-229). As for the republican times, the relationship between the state and Islamic communities has become even more controversial on account of the adoption of a secularist path.¹⁹⁸ Especially in its earlier decades, the republican state took a number of measures in the name of secularism (for these measures see Toprak, 2006, pp. 27-29). However, religious networks have a history of thousands of years, which, whether with pre-capitalist origins or not, continue to exist even today. These networks are well-entrenched and deep-rooted in also capitalist Turkey, which could not be eradicated even by the strict measures of the mono-party regime. Religion has been a controversial issue for several state elements in the Turkish Republic.

According to Özdemir and Frank (2000), the Turkish state has tried to establish a monopoly over religion while those Islamic leaders who are not incumbents of state positions continued to exist either informally or underground (pp. 195, 201). Similarly, Saeed (1994) also points out the coexistence of secularist policies and Islamic tradition, and suggests that the state's policy of secularism could not succeed in excluding religion from entering the public domain while religion still affects many aspects of the life (p. 196). As Tapper and Tapper (1991) illustrates, there are a good number of examples for the juxtaposition of the republican and Islamic concepts (pp. 67-71). Several studies indicate that Islamic communities are still important networks, influencing the social relations in various ways.¹⁹⁹ They have been important networks for also politics. Hence, several political parties, particularly those with rightwing orientation, have sought their support and covered prominent names from these communities.²⁰⁰ Besides, from time to time, even the chief exercisers of state power with no primary religious identity have resorted to the dissemination of Islamic

¹⁹⁷ For information on the brief history and characteristics of different Islamic tariqats in Turkey, see Kara (1994).

¹⁹⁸ A number of studies (e.g. Bulut, 1995; Tank, 2005) indicated that, although from time to time the Turkish army commanders resorted to the manipulation of Islamic sentiments (as in the case of spread of Turkish-Islamic synthesis), they also had a precautious attitude.

¹⁹⁹ For example Çakır (2002); Mardin (1991); Mardin (1992); Vergin (2000).

²⁰⁰ For some examples, see Atacan (2006); Mardin (2006).

sentiments for pacifying the masses and stripping them off their socialist orientation as had happened following September 12th. Therefore, from time to time, religion has been resorted to for justifying pro-capitalist state practices. According to Turan (1991), “Turkish state, while not viewing religion as giving direction to its policies and actions, continues to treat it as a resource which may be mobilized for ‘purposes of state’ whenever it is found useful or necessary” (p. 42). As Tuşalp (1994) illustrates, the religious circles were even used in violent actions against leftist people for several times since 1960s (see pp. 225-232).

Meanwhile, several Islamic communities do promise strong group solidarity and they claim priority over other concerns/sentiments, with the potential to push their members away from fighting for working class interests. In this respect, the imposition of the centrality of Islamic identity in a *Nakşi* magazine, *Ribat* constitutes a good example although its interpretation of Islam can be considered as marginal. This magazine suggested that:

... the household head should remember that his responsibility is first to God and only then to his family. He should force (for there is use of force in Islam) those under his authority to live and practice Islam thoroughly: wife, children, sons who disobey should be rejected and sent out of the house at once. The believer should recognize that those who live Islam in society are extremely few. This requires that neighbours and relatives be approached with caution; when such people drop by for a visit, the believer should not hesitate to shut the door and send them away. In establishing relations, the principle is ‘believers first’. Similarly, young men are instructed to be ready to abandon half-hearted parents when this is required by the Islamic cause. (Ayata, 1991, p. 232)

Thus, certain religious communities claim priority over other concerns and interests, and even over the family community. Although their level of success may be questionable, many seem to have the potential to steer at least some pious workers and self-employed in line with capitalist interests in the name of Islam. Indeed, a Muslim religious worker who perceives profit as lawful and permissible in Islam would hardly name profit as the unpaid part of labor and fight against capitalism (although this is not to claim that seeing profit as the unpaid part of labor or unjust necessarily results in fighting against capitalism). Consequently, this viewpoint helps

in reproducing capitalism, with the opportunity to pacify potential rebels. Nevertheless, this does not imply that religious workers do not struggle against capitalist interests, but rather that; certain (if not all) religious sentiments may sometimes become counter-forces over the conditioning of workers against capitalist interests. As Bulut (1997) suggests, in several enterprises, the Islamist capitalists pray (*namaz*) side by side with their workers, which enhances the religious community solidarity at workplace. Also many prefer to give religious alms (*zekat*) in religious holidays rather than regular premiums to workers (pp. 374-376). The potential power of Islamic communities for pacifying large groups of their members deprived of property is something that the Masonic networks lack.

As for the religious Muslim capitalists in Turkey, their economic power has increased substantially since 1980s. Several members of this group have had close relations with the Saudi finance capital and received support from provinces while based in metropolises. This group is composed of capitalists from a variety of Islamic communities and *tariqats*. They have grown considerably under state patronage via establishing close relations with rightwing bourgeois political parties, especially during the times of Motherland governments which filled the state departments with Islamists. The religious Muslim capitalists even challenged the TÜSİAD bourgeoisie in 1988 in TOBB and finally established MÜSİAD in 1990 (Bulut, 1997, p. 277). Bulut's (1997) research on what he calls the *tariqat capital* shows that there are a variety of cases that religious Muslim bourgeoisie benefit from Islamic community networks. The relationship between Islamic *tariqats*, politics and capital is also analyzed in several articles of Uğur Mumcu (see Mumcu, 1999). As was discussed in section 4.2, religious communities may provide opportunities for capitalists to locate their supporters in state networks and steer state elements in line with capitalist interests. Now, this will be exemplified with reference to a few Islamic communities.

The case of *Nakşibendi Tariqat* would be a good illustration of *tariqat* and political party relationship. *Nakşibendi Tariqat* is one of the most rooted Islamic *tariqats* of Turkey. It is well established in the *İskenderpaşa Cami Dergahı* in the *Fatih* neighborhood of Istanbul. The *Nakşi Tariqat* is not homogeneous and covers many Islamic communities such as the *Işıkçıs*, *Nurcus*, *Mahmut Efendicis*, and *Sami Efendicis* (see Bulut, 1997, p. 278). As for the *İskenderpaşa Dergahı*, Çakır (1994)

states Mehmet Zahid Kotku, its ex-sheikh had both approved and encouraged the establishment of NOP. However, not only that group, but also other *Nakşi* groups and some other *tariqats*, including an important section of the *Nurcus* supported the NOP (MCIC religious bourgeois party). Until the establishment of NOP, these *tariqats* had supported mainly the RPP's (LCIC bourgeois party) strongest rightwing rivals (MCIC bourgeois parties) (p. 21). There are also other instances concerning the close relationship between *İskenderpaşa Dergahı* and politics. For example, the Özal family, specifically Turgut Özal, Korkut Özal, and Yusuf Bozkurt Özal were *Nakşibendis*. Turgut Özal and Korkut Özal became chief exercisers of state power for various times. As for Turgut Özal, both before and after 1980 he performed important tasks in determining the economic policies of the state. Bulut (1997) considers him as the brain of the Muslim religious group in the State Planning Organization of the day (p. 278). He was also an architect of the January 24th Decisions, the neo-liberal strategy of 1980. During the military regime of September 12th, he had close relations with the junta. In the civil regime period, he headed the 45th (12.12.1983-21.12.1987) and 46th (21.12.1987-09.11.1989) Motherland governments. Then in 1989, he became the president of the republic, which ended in April 1993 with his death. Both before and after 1980, he had close relations with the capitalist class. As for Korkut Özal, his Islamic identity seems more assertive when compared to his elder brother, Turgut Özal. Before 1980, he served as the Minister of Agriculture in the NSP-RPP coalition government and as the Minister of Internal Affairs in the 2nd National Front government. Those days, he was an MP from the NSP (MCIC religious bourgeois party) list. He employed many *tariqat* members, but especially the *Nakşibendis* in his ministry. Although he said he renounced politics subsequent to September 12th, he could reach and contact even the most important chief exercisers of state power through his brother, Turgut Özal. Besides, similar to Korkut Özal's practices in 1970s, also during Turgut Özal's Prime Ministry and Presidency, the ministries and particularly the police force were staffed with Islamists, which speeded up further when the *Nakşi* Abdülkadir Aksu served as the Minister of Internal Affairs. Meanwhile, it was even claimed that a formation resembling an 'Islamic Junta' emerged within the police force. Individuals from different Islamic communities occupied key points in the Motherland Party governments²⁰¹ (Bulut, 1997, pp. 278, 279).

²⁰¹ Bulut (1997) claims that the Motherland governments were, in a sense, the coalition of

Now then, it is clear that there have been a good number of Islamist chief exercisers of state power. As for the capital, the strength of Islamic capitalists has grown considerably in the post-1980 era. Bulut's (1997) rigorous research provides rich data on Islamist capitalists and their growing economic activities in Turkey. A good example of what Bulut calls the *tariqat capital* is the joint investment of the Özal and Topbaş families in the finance sector; Al Baraka-Türk, established in 1983. International Islamic capital also became a partner of this enterprise. After then, they established a number of other enterprises in various sectors. Also Server Holding, considered to be *Nakşi* capital, had close relations with the Motherland Party governments. Another example is the ex-NSP MP Salih Özcan, considered to be a *Nurcu*, who became a shareholder of an Islamist finance capital enterprise; Faisal Finans Kurumu, another shareholder of which was the religious Ülker family. Actually, *Nurcus* had traditionally supported the DP and JP route, though with no political unity. They became even more divided after the rise of the Motherland Party. As for the *Fetullah* circle, they have also had close relations with especially rightwing political parties. Many *Fetullahçıs* have been engaged in investments in different sectors including the education and mass media sectors. As for İHLAS Holding, a big capital group, its owner is known to be from *Işıkçıs*. It has investments in the finance and media sectors in addition to other sectors. All these names give an idea on the economic power of the religious Muslim capitalists of Turkey. Although, it is not possible to cover all names here,²⁰² it seems that several of them have had the opportunity to establish close relations with the chief exercisers of state power from their own community on the basis of their religious community ties in addition to a number of possible other factors (see pp. 282-425).

All these instances suggest that Islamic community ties have been influential over not only the state elements favoring short-term interests of especially Muslim capitalists,

tariqats and that, in 1990, the Motherland had the following composition: 23 *Nakşıs*, 8 *Süleymançıs*, 6 Kurdish sheikhs (religious/feudal), 6 *Milli Mücadelecis*, 1 *Işıkçı*, and 1 *Nurcu* as MPs; 22 Islamist and 8 newly-Islamist governors; 14 Islamist police chiefs as well as a good number of other nationalist-religious governors and police chiefs (p. 279).

²⁰² Bulut's (1997) research provides a list of substantial Islamist capital groups, the sectors they invest in, and the sizes of their enterprises (pp. 395, 396) as well as the list of the richest 100 Islamist capitalists' names (pp. 413-417).

but also over long-term interests of capitalists in general. While communal relations and associational relations have appeared in an intermixed form in several religious communities; regardless of all legal prohibitions, even the tariqats –which constitute only one form of religious community among others- succeeded to survive, with even members at the very top positions of the state. As for the masses with Islamic sentiments and a feeling of belonging to specific tariqats or Islamic communities; even though several of the Islamic community members may have voted bourgeois political parties mainly because they thought that would be good for their community or religious ideals/practices (or to be protected against any perceived threat such as atheism or communism which would harm their religious way of life) it is not certain that they did so because they saw capitalism or wealth as legitimate, but still, they have contributed in the reproduction of capitalism in some way (if not necessarily by means of consent to capitalism) while several of them actively attacked those challenging capitalist interests whom they perceived as enemy to what they saw as sacred.

Now, mainly in relation to religion and nationalism (the sentiments of which are transmitted through community networks along with mass means of opinion dissemination and which embody particular community ideals), how the formal education can be utilized in a pro-capitalist way will be discussed below by giving examples from Turkey (though, again, within the limits of the available secondary data) since formal education networks have had the power to reach millions of people. Actually formal education in capitalist societies is a substantial means of pro-capitalist opinion dissemination process as regards not only masses in general, but also state elements in particular, for the reason that state-controlled education provides the opportunity for the bourgeois ideology to penetrate into individuals' minds since they are very young. Indeed, as several Marxists have argued,²⁰³ curriculums prepared for formal education institutions of capitalist societies hardly challenge the capitalist interests while they can be considered among important factors of indoctrination. Actually, the curriculums prepared in line with the interests of bourgeoisie or segment(s) of bourgeoisie can be considered among the paths to

²⁰³ For an evaluation of the Marxist approaches on education, see Kellner, available at <http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/kellner/papers/marxed.htm>; and on curriculums, see Liston (1986). See also Apple (1990; 1995) for the curriculums and teachers in the education process.

state power, being a potentially substantial factor in the formation of minds of individuals, regardless of the fact that there is always the possibility of becoming aware of and rejecting the indoctrination by either the students or teachers themselves. As will be indicated in the next section, several dissident currents challenging the formal goal of particular education policies could survive in the schools including the democratic or socialist movements of the students and the teachers. As Aronowitz and Giroux (1986) argued, there is much to consider in the radical school movements which contrast the mainstream Marxist functionalist interpretations of education in the following sense:

Almost nowhere in Marxist education theory and critique can one find a discussion of *counterhegemony* as a category for enabling students, parents, and teachers to wage political struggle within schools. Marxist education theorists have spent little time discovering the internal contradictions within prevailing school knowledge, disruptions that could provide a basis for a real educational movement. The discourse of demystification prevents the question of internal, counterhegemonic moments within school knowledge being asked. (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1986, p. 6)

As an alternative, Aronowitz and Giroux (1986) drew parallels between Gramsci and Dewey (with the acknowledgment about their substantial differences) since for both “the dialectic between education as the transmission of cultural values and knowledge and the new knowledge produced by the creative acts of the people themselves is the guiding educational principle” (p. 12). Although Aronowitz and Giroux’s (1986, p. 10) celebration of the Gramscian perspective on commonsense –which is thought to be disseminated by the everyday life (the so-called civil society) distinct from the economic or political life- holding the active or passive assent of the general population as necessary for hegemony (which is hypothetically necessary for class rule) is not in line with the present thesis’ theoretical standpoint since non-rebellion against capitalism is not seen as a sufficient indicator of the presence of active or passive consent/assent to capitalism as was discussed in the previous chapters with reference to the state elements’ action types and human motives/reasons, the thesis shares their rejection of functionalist theorization of education since there is always the possibility for the human beings to reject particular values/ideas imposed to be the ‘norm’ or interpret them in a way different than the dominant way. Nevertheless, as was mentioned before, formal education institutions of the 20th century republican

Turkey have been an important means to reach millions of people since they are very young, and have become among the major policy tools of the governments.

Overt or covert pro-capitalist indoctrination in the schools can be considered among the factors influencing the priorities, values, and opinions of an unknown number of people, including some prospective state elements. Therefore, reproduction of capitalist mode of production may owe in part to the pro-capitalist compulsory education, the curriculum of which is set by the capitalist state (but which is transmitted from the teachers' filter,²⁰⁴ and received by students with the ability to interpret, partially/fully approve or reject). The following paragraphs will mainly focus on the arrangements concerning the dissemination of support/indifference-generating opinions with the potential to contribute in the realization of capitalist interests through state-controlled education, with the acknowledgment that the disciplining organizational arrangements of the education institution may also contribute in generating obedience to pro-capitalist power-exercisers/holders in capitalist societies. Again, with the acknowledgment that the aspects and examples analyzed in this section do not cover all relevant aspects and examples on the question (since the whole chapter is destined to the limited presence of the secondary data), in the following paragraphs, it will be shown that 'nationalist discourse' has become an important ingredient of the Turkish education for the realization of particular capitalist interests²⁰⁵ ('capitalist interests' include interests of elements of both domestic and foreign bourgeoisie in terms of *citizenship* as regards geographical coordinates) as against other capitalist and exploiting class' interests and as against working class' collective long-term interests. In this process, state-controlled education have especially contributed in the dissemination of 'nationalist sentiments' and in providing the support of masses and state elements for particular pro-capitalist projects in the name of the 'national community', while the selected themes and the meanings they were loaded in nationalist discourse changed with reference to the

²⁰⁴ Meanwhile, the future of the computerization in formal education may include the possibility to remove teachers' presence at schools or even the presence of schools one day, which would have also (positive and/or negative) implications over the interpretation of the knowledge receivers' (students') filter.

²⁰⁵ Besides, the image of the Turkish nation has also had relevance to ethnic and gender conflicts among others, but as they are not relevant to the research question of the present thesis, they will not be evaluated here.

goals set, formulators/implementers of strategies, and class struggles. It will be also shown that, 'religious sentiments' and 'religious discourse' (the selected themes and the loaded meanings of which changed again with reference to the goals set, formulators/implementers of strategies, and class struggles) also became subject to manipulation in education practices for the realization of capitalist interests²⁰⁶ as against other capitalist interests and as against working class interests. Both the nationalist and religious aspects (in addition to a number of possible others not evaluated here) in state-controlled education practices have become subject to class struggles, while their pro-capitalist manipulation have become potential channels facilitating the bourgeois hold of state power in line with individual or collective capitalist interests.

As was displayed in the presentation of the Turkish political scene at the beginning of this section, the major chief exercisers of state power have adopted a nationalist discourse and have had a pro-capitalist stance since the foundation of the republic. The roots of this attitude can be found in the Young Turk movement, including their education policies since both the Unionists and early republican Kemalist clique took the capitalist West as a model with its nationalist movements and capitalist economies (regardless of the lack of an imperialist orientation in Kemalist policies). A quotation from what Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) said a few years before the 1908 Young Turk revolution reveals very clearly that Kemalist reforms of the republican era were far from being unintended:

The sultanate should be demolished; the state structure should depend on a homogeneous element. Religion and state should be separated; we have to transfer our identity to the Western civilization by setting it free from Eastern civilization. We have to establish a new social order via removing the differences between women and men. We have to get rid of the script that prevents us joining the Western Civilization and choose an alphabet of Latin origin; we have to adapt ourselves to the

²⁰⁶ Considering religious sentiments mainly with reference to the capitalist interests does not mean to deny its relevance to several other interests and conflicts. It is only because of the focus of the present thesis that their relevance to capitalist interests is focused. However, inevitably, a particular state practice relevant to religion may not only aim at securing particular capitalist interests but at the same time have a number of other purposes such as defeating/eroding particular nationalist/religious movements, enhancing/eroding male-dominant practices among others.

Westerners with all our features including our garments. Believe all these will happen one day. (in Ozankaya, 1999, p. 435)

Intentions for discovering a Turkish nation on the basis of language and creating a nationalist mythology via history-writing were already existent through the end of the 19th century (Atasoy, 1998, pp. 130, 131). Nevertheless, the idea of radical reform was not much widespread in the late Ottoman era. In addition to other factors, the quantitative dominance of *medreses* –the schools based on religion- over civil *mekteps* also accounted for the poor development of those days’ nationalist practices (Atay, 1968, pp. 256, 257). Late Ottoman era was the period of transition. Therefore, state practices comprised highly contradictory dimensions while pro-capitalist orientation was also present. As for the education policies of the early republic, they had an explicit pro-capitalist orientation. Kemalist state elements decided to construct the Turkish identity on secular basis that would remove religious associations of the old regime and develop capitalism. They intended to neutralize all religious elements that would constitute any threat to the new regime that aimed to eradicate the pre-capitalist regime and favor particular capitalist interests at the expense of others.²⁰⁷ Education was no exception. Former regime’s education institutions were replaced by new ones, and those opponent elements’ (both rival pro-capitalist and anti-capitalist elements’) discursive themes were sought to be neutralized through state-controlled education practices in addition to other measures.

In this respect, firstly, arrangements increasing the pro-capitalist RPP government’s control over education practices came to the agenda, and then, one by one, rival elements were sought to be neutralized. In this respect, the mono-party regime presented a suitable texture for the radical practices of the government. On March 3, 1924, *Tevhid-i Tedrisat* Law was enacted with the aim of forming a ‘national education system’. Prior to this law, education was fundamentally based on religion. On the one hand, there were foreign and missionary schools; on the other hand there were Islamic *medreses* (connected to the *vakıfs*- religious foundations). The late Ottoman state also established *mekteps* due to the inadequacy of the qualified workforce. This gave rise to a huge disparity between the worldviews of the *medrese*-

²⁰⁷ See the point of Şen (1992, p. 39) on the Turkification and Muslimification of the Ottoman bourgeoisie. For a more detailed analysis of the capitalist segments raised and/or favored in the early republic, see Boratav (2003).

graduates and *mektep*-graduates.²⁰⁸ Although several Union and Progress members intended to make reforms for removing this discrepancy and introducing secularized education (which would have become another step for realizing their pro-capitalist pro-modernization project and at the same time would eliminate the *medrese*-graduates' support to their opponents), they could not succeed. Proclamation of the republic and the 1924 Constitution created a convenient basis for reforms. The 1924 Constitution made the primary school education compulsory to all Turks (both male and female). With the *Tevhid-i Tedrisat* Law, educational unity was maintained and schools were put under the control of Education Ministry. This law enabled a close state supervision over educational practices. It also granted state the authority to shut down those schools seen as discordant. On March 11, 1924, Education Ministry abolished the *medreses* (Koçak, 1990, p. 111; Kürkçüoğlu et al., 1997, pp. 46, 47; Olcaytu, 1998, pp. 78, 79).

Therefore, the early practices of the Kemalist clique mainly intended to erode the primacy of religious communities and sentiments associated with the former regime, and enhance the image of the national community. Religious instructions were also put under state supervision. In 1924, Theology Faculty was established in Istanbul University. However state's close supervision did not let the faculty develop much. Its 224 students in 1924 decreased to 20 in ten years' time. In 1928, the secularist constitutional amendment tightened this control even further. With the university reform of 1934, Theology Faculty was shut down and instead, Islamic Research Institute was established. All *imam hatip schools* (imam and preacher schools) were closed down in 1930-1931, leaving the education system with no single religious school based on Islam for over ten years (Başgöz, 1995, p. 79).

Although, the major objective of the *Tevhid-i Tedrisat* Law was eliminating Islamic education, it was *not* limited to this. Other sorts of religious instruction were also perceived as problematic. Actually, non-Muslims were quite strong in economy. Elements of non-Muslim domestic and foreign bourgeoisie tried to extend their power through various means including the cultural ones while the new regime sought

²⁰⁸ In 1924, there were 479 *medreses* that had almost 18,000 students in Turkey (however, most of these students are said to have registered so as to escape from the military service) while there were 7,000 students in the secondary and high schools and 3000 students registered to the universities (Yücel et al., 1989, p. 64).

strategies in order to weaken them. Education was also among these strategies. State control over foreign -Christian- schools increased considerably in the early republican era. As Başgöz (1995) mentions, in 1927, in Turkey, three Muslim female students in an American school changed their religion into Christianity. This incident triggered some measures against foreign schools²⁰⁹ including the authority to shut down the ones that do not obey the Education Ministry's regulation.²¹⁰ Kaplan (2002) suggests that Kemalists made a continuous emphasis on being against international education and the necessity to follow a *nationalist* education policy (pp. 134-180). In fact, this concern is understandable. Their efforts can be interpreted as the fear from being colonized by the West, which, can be at least in part considered as an outcome of the conflict between certain sections of the indigenous and foreign bourgeoisies. It was not long ago when a good number of chief exercisers of state power called for the mandate of any big Western power rather than establishing an independent republic. Therefore, it is no surprise that Kemalists sought cultural measures in addition to economic ones against non-Muslims, in line with their project of Turkification/Muslimification of the bourgeoisie and independence from other countries.

State education has become an important contributor for the implementation of the nationalist capitalist dimensions of the Kemalist project. As was mentioned in the previous paragraphs, with the 1924 Constitution, primary school education was made compulsory for both male and female citizens, and with the *Tevhid-i Tedrisat* Law, state supervision over educational practices became stricter. As for the curriculums, course books of the previous regime were replaced by pro-republican books.²¹¹

²⁰⁹ The removal of the saints' pictures from the course books and taking off the cross from the walls of the schools can be mentioned among such measures (Başgöz, 1995, p. 80).

²¹⁰ Başgöz (1995) quotes from this regulation: "Not even a word or expression against Turks will take place in the course books, there will be no sentence disparaging Turk's past and today. Not even a small mistake on Turkish history and geography is allowed. Turkish lands will not be shown as a part of another country. All foreign schools are obliged to give five hours of Turkish language, Turkish history and geography lessons in a week. The instructors of these courses are going to be Turkish and will be appointed by the Education Ministry. In the schools, all kinds of religious propaganda are abolished. Neither of the school books will contain any symbols inculcating religion" (p. 81).

²¹¹ Although there was not a state monopoly over writing, publishing and distributing the course books in the republic's first decade, the state held the power to control and approve the written books. Theoretically, not a single course book could be used at schools without the

Course schedules were also radically reformed. Those courses considered to be threat or unnecessary were removed from the program. Substantial changes in primary and secondary school programs took place especially in 1926, 1931 and 1935 (Başgöz, 1995, p. 107).

In 1927, Education Ministry removed ‘Religion’ courses from the curriculums.²¹² It also removed ‘Arabic’ and ‘Persian’ courses from the secondary and high school programs due to the concern that they could be associated with Islam (and therefore with the Ottoman feudal regime loaded with religious associations). Kemalists thought that ‘Religion’ courses were contradictory with the secular Turkish Republic’s Constitution. The place evacuated with the removal of the course ‘Religion’ seems to be filled by ‘Turkish History’ lessons. Although there was not a considerable change in the hours share of history lessons, course books reveal the high degree of significance attributed to these lessons. While until 1930s there was not a systematic research on Turkish history,²¹³ with the formation of the ‘Society for the Study of Turkish History’ in 1931, the four volume high school book was published, reflecting the official ‘Turkish History Thesis’²¹⁴ (Karal, 1965, pp. 98, 99).

Another important shift took place in the official ‘Targets’ part of the education program. In the 1920 National Assembly, prior to the establishment of the republic, the aim of ‘making education *religious* and national’ took place among other listed targets (İnan, 1983, p. 153). In 1935, the ‘Targets and Principles’ part of the primary school curriculums were changed in accordance with the RPP’s principles of

permission of the Education Ministry. But still, this could not hinder arbitrary practices (Başgöz, 1995, pp. 107-113).

²¹² Although religion courses were removed from the programs of the primary and secondary schools in the cities in 1927, they were removed from the village primary school programs in 1940 (Kaplan, 2002, p. 224). Meanwhile, although for that time the Education Ministry permitted the ‘Religion’ courses to be present in the curriculums of the village primary schools; they were taught only one hour a week. Besides, their content was decided not to move beyond the historical facts. The instruction would cover only general information on Islam and common principles of morals (Başgöz, 1995, p. 79).

²¹³ In 1926 the well-known Turkish nationalist Ziya Gökalp’s book ‘History of Turkish Civilization’, and in 1928-1929 H.G. Wells’ book ‘The Main Lines of World History’ were selected as course books.

²¹⁴ ‘Turkish History Thesis’ and its complementary ‘Sun Language Theory’ have been already evaluated in a previous footnote.

republicanism, nationalism, secularism, populism, statism and reformism (Başgöz, 1995, p. 109). These Kemalist principles advocated the development of a *national bourgeoisie* (denoting predominantly those Muslim and Turkish-speaking citizens living in Turkey with reference to Kemalist encoding) rather than contradicting the basics of capitalism. Although the concern for appealing to people's entrenched values changed the pro-capitalist state practices on religion after 1945 considerably (with the start of Cold War in the world and multi-party regime in Turkey) on account of election-related competition, within capitalist struggles, and antagonistic class struggles; no significant change in the pro-capitalist and pro-nationalist orientation occurred in the education system. In 1949, RPP made religion courses available for the fourth and fifth year primary school students. Students could attend these courses with the permission of their parents. In 1950, under the DP rule, these courses were incorporated into the program, but remained as elective. In 1956, this course again became elective in secondary schools' first and second years. In 1948, RPP reopened *imam hatip schools* in the form of ten-month courses in ten city centers. RPP also established a Theology Faculty in University of Ankara in 1949. *İmam hatip schools* gained the status of secondary schools under the DP rule in 1951. By then, their number was seven, which constantly increased in subsequent years (Kaplan, 2002, pp. 223, 224).

As was stated before, although policy shift on religion owed much to the concern for appealing to people's traditional values on account of multi-party competition, in many instances, religion was also resorted to as a salve to communist propaganda. As Kaplan (2002) suggests especially the DP government programs were strictly anti-communist. This was totally in harmony with the propertied classes' Cold War psychology. Therefore, education policies also had a clear anti-communist character, emphasizing the need to equip the people with national and traditional moral sentiments (pp. 216-226). Besides, these were the years that Turkish state moved closer to the US rather than Europe in terms of both military education²¹⁵ (Akyaz, 2002, pp. 43-56) and non-military education. As Güven (2000) suggests, in this period, bureaucrats with pro-US inclination replaced the ones sympathetic to the

²¹⁵ After joining the NATO in 1952, American doctrine replaced the German doctrine in Turkish army (Akyaz, 2002, p. 55). Perhaps different understandings among officers may be in part related to the impacts of these doctrines in terms of the degree of sympathy towards US and Germany. This is relevant to also section 4.2.2.

understanding in continental Europe in the education sector (p. 98). Furthermore, a number of American educators were recruited as assistants or consultants. Institutions such as Ford Foundation and Rockefeller Foundation also contributed to the replacement of European approach with American approach (p. 114). This shift can be in part (if not exclusively) interpreted with relevance to the clash of interests of the bourgeoisies of different countries of origin in their fight for the reduction of production costs and realization of profits via educating future state elements that would make arrangements favoring particular countries' capitalists more than the others. In addition to this, there is also another motive that seems more stimulating for this instance. That is the fear from communism. This policy shift seems to owe much to the coinciding interests of the US and domestic capitalists leading to an alliance for defeating those forces with pro-worker collective long-term projects, once the presence of Soviet Union and rising working class struggles in the world are considered.

As for the years of upsurge in socialist and working class struggles in Turkey (1960-1980), pro-capitalist state elements resorted to Kemalism (*Atatürkçülük*) in general and nationalism in particular among those themes aiming to weaken the forces with pro-worker collective long-term projects or with militant strategies for pro-worker short-term projects. Nationalism once again became a popular motive of education programs regardless of the parties in power. Military juntas' similar attitudes on indoctrinating nationalism are worth mentioning. İnal's (2004) content analysis of the course books for the periods subsequent to May 27th (1960-62) and September 12th (1980-83) shows that themes of nationalism, enemy, and national solidarity were widely used while some were re-written immediately after the coups²¹⁶ (p. 327-336). After 1960, not only the military, but also the civil governments emphasized the need to teach nationalist sentiments and culture. Governments with social democrat parties were no exception although the pure rightwing ones stressed this in more precision such as the national-front and JP governments' emphasis on the need to rescue the education from the destructive, internationalist and Marxist influences, by teaching nationalist moral sentiments (Kaplan, 2002, pp. 227-262).

²¹⁶ After May 27th, the course book 'Citizenship Information', and after September 12th, the course book 'Religious Culture and Moral Information' were re-written (İnal, 2004, p. 336).

Until recently, religion has been utilized as another theme against communism also through education institutions. In the post-1980 period, the number of *imam hatip schools* continued to increase²¹⁷ and their status was made equivalent to high schools in 1983. Legal arrangements granted the *imam hatip high school graduates* the right to enter any department in universities that in turn increased the number of Islamist governors, kaimakams, police chiefs and university professors (Kaplan, 2002, pp. 269, 270). The 1982 constitution made religion courses compulsory in primary (fourth and fifth years) and secondary schools. It was the post-1980 era when the Turkish-Islamic synthesis started to dominate education programs. Actually, this synthesis was in full conformity with the aspirations of the September 12th junta. As an antidote to communist movement, national and religious motives were presented in the amalgam form of *Atatürkçülük* and Islam. This amalgam was thought to provide the obedience of the masses. Soon after the implementation of repressive and ideological measures of September 12th, communist movement lost its strength (though, most probably, on account of the repressive measures). Islam was also utilized as a salve to Kurdish nationalism. Mesut Yılmaz's Motherland government program of 1991 that explicitly defined Islam as the plaster of national integrity and that underlined the need to increase the weight of religious instruction constitutes a good example of this trend (İnal, 2004, pp.119-144; Kaplan, 2002, pp. 305-323).

As for the education policies with reference to the clashing bourgeois interests, approaches of TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD on compulsory basic education is worth mentioning even though covering its all dimensions is not possible in a few lines. As for TÜSİAD, a speech delivered on September 19, 2003 by Muharrem Kayhan, the Chairperson of the High Advisory Council is quite illustrative. In the speech, he pointed out the need to increase the compulsory and uninterrupted education period to twelve years and the benefits that would be provided by the extension.²¹⁸ Actually, for decades, this period was only five years while it was the Law No. 4306 issued in August 1997 that extended it to eight years.²¹⁹ However, MÜSİAD's attitude about this extension became just the opposite of TÜSİAD. Due to a speech delivered on

²¹⁷ For statistical data on the number and graduates of *imam hatip schools*, see Çakır, Bozan, and Talu (2004, esp. p. 16).

²¹⁸ See www.tusiad.org/haberler/konusma/duyuruno366.pdf

²¹⁹ See www.meb.gov.tr/Stats/apk2002ing/apage29_48.htm

October 4, 1997 by Erol Yazar, the president of MÜSİAD, the State Security Court (*Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemesi* – DGM) sentenced Yazar to one year of imprisonment with the allegation that he called ‘uninterrupted education’ (*kesintisiz eğitim*) as ‘unreligious education’ (*kesin dinsiz eğitim*).²²⁰ In fact, both the extension of compulsory education period and the DGM sentence to MÜSİAD president were in full conformity with the February 28th Decisions that decreed that the duration of basic education was to be increased to eight years and measures should be taken against Islamic currents. All these clashes can be interpreted as clashing strategies with pro-capitalist projects as regards both the themes employed and clash of short-term capitalist interests. Even if there are struggles on account of those policies other than the directly economic (economic, in its narrow sense as it is all through the chapter and in most part of the thesis) ones such as state’s education policies, but that in turn have implications over capitalist economic interests (for example if those education policies open or close the way for bringing the implementers of particular strategies in state networks who would then have the opportunity to exercise their power in line with the economic interests of a part of the bourgeoisie at the expense of others), then, those struggles are to be read as ‘within class struggles’ with the acknowledgement of the possibility that the clashing policies might at the same time denote a number of other struggles which somehow intersect with the dimensions of clashing short-term capitalist interests. In this respect, as long as different pro-capitalist strategies favor individual/sectional capitalist economic interests at the expense of others, the clashes of those strategies on account of those interests are to be considered as within class struggles. Therefore, in this case, since extending the uninterrupted compulsory education to eight years would at the least weaken the *imam hatip* graduates’ presence in state ranks, whose exercise of state power is more likely to favor religious bourgeoisie at the expense of others, the fight over eight years education has relevance to within capitalist struggles as regards holding state power.

All these examples show how communal sentiments and ideals may become the object of class struggles. Not only through networks with some degree of solidarity such as business associations and political parties (whether in government or not), but also through relatively central means such as formal education institutions and mass

²²⁰ See www.milliyet.com.tr/1998/05/25/haber/hab05.html and www.radikal.com.tr/1999/04/22/turkiye/mus.html

media, religious sentiments and national sentiments become objects of class struggles. However, the well-rooted communities embodying a way of life and a number of ideals might be quite resistant against central manipulations of the state as in the case of survival of religious communities and tariqats regardless of the intimidating practices of the RPP of the mono-party era, implying that, for a substantial number of people (if not all), motives of belonging to a community and trying to realize the community ideals are quite important, which may have priority over other motivations. This means that insofar as people feel they belong to particular communities in a hierarchy of priorities (while those priorities may be exposed to a continuous change); some may even risk their physical survival due to an emotional orientation towards those community ideals. Those communities and ideals may be that of a particular class, religion, nation, or the humanity among others encoded vis-à-vis the imagined and/or real common ‘threats’ (for example other classes, other religions or encoded threats by the affiliated religion, other nations, factors threatening the survival/development of human race among others). That is why, class forces resort to community sentiments and mobilize elements of the communities in the name of that particular community –whether the elements of class forces believe in those ideals or not- to realize the class interests in several (if not all) instances. And this will most probably continue to be so unless elements of the society are isolated from each other in a manner of extreme individualism as if they are narcotized or as if they are driven primarily by the very primitive self (or Freudian id) whether in a socially approved way (e.g. acting in line with the social norms giving priority to individual competition or not-towards-community-oriented self-realization) or a disapproved way (e.g. acting in the way that the extreme drug addicts do), with the acknowledgment that the detachment from community orientation have existed as a considerable tendency which have given rise to all such discussions on *Gesellschaft* (e.g. Tönnies, 2000; Weber, 1978), instrumental-rationality (e.g. Weber, 1978), or organic solidarity (e.g. Durkheim, 1947) with the rise of industrialization since 19th century, along with more recent discussions in the face of more recent developments.²²¹ However, on account of the continuing motive of a great number of people to belong to particular communities (e.g. belonging to the friendship

²²¹ Today, there are further challenges to longer-run (or relatively stable in contrast to momentary) communal identities, on account of the developments in electronics/computer technology and spread of narcotics/drugs.

community, family community, political party community, union community, religious community, national community), resorting to communal sentiments for the realization of capitalist interests is common but not identical with (although it generally covers) making the elements of particular communities believe some particular capitalist interests are at the interest of the community. Actually, even the priority setting vis-à-vis the encoded common threat may be crucial for the smooth operation of the capitalist dis(order).²²² For example, a person may not have any consent to the capitalist order while his priority may be to be a good Islamic believer as against the threats encoded by his (or his leader's, or his community's) interpretation of Islam rather than fighting against capitalism, while this can be considered as neither passive nor spontaneous consent to capitalism.

This is also the case for national community, which has come to the agenda of the people in Turkey slightly more than a century ago. However, in Turkey, due to the rise of nation state, reference to the national interests has become among the most widely resorted ways of attempting to justify particular class policies via presenting them as the general interest (which is widely referred to as hegemonic practices from the Gramscian perspective) and to mobilize the people in the name of the nation against anti-capitalists among others.²²³ Now, with reference to mass media, examples for the presentation of the particular capitalist interests as the general interest will be evaluated. Mass media, with its power to reach masses from a relatively centralized source, has been a widely resorted means in the dissemination of values/ideas along with its unintended practices of value/idea dissemination. In addition to the state-controlled education, the 20th century has also witnessed the growing penetration of mass media messages/products into people's lives. First, print, and then audio-visual media took their place among the components of the opinion formation process. As was discussed before, capital concentration and conglomeration processes are experienced in the media sector in Turkey, undermining the possibility of equal

²²² However, it should be acknowledged that individual priorities do not always occur as against an encoded (real and/or imagined) threat (e.g. against the time, death, bacteria/viruses, the bourgeoisie, mafia, communists, neighbor nations, imperialists, unethical behaviors, global warming). As was mentioned before, realization of individual desires may also become a priority without explicit and/or implicit reference to the perceived threats.

²²³ This is not to claim that the national community is made reference to only for realizing capitalist interests. On the contrary, here, it is considered to be a latent class interest community in addition to its relevance and openness to other interests.

opportunity of disseminating ideas and having access to information. Big media companies' opportunity to set the agenda, their opinion leaders, and the shape they give to news contribute in the spread of bourgeois ideology and become among important potential channels to state power. With the opportunity to have access to even the infants' minds, mass media continues to be a considerable means that the pro-capitalist forces resort to for disseminating sympathy and/or indifference to capitalism through pro-capitalist media-shaped news, ideas, values, life style, and expectations. Regardless of the disputes on the degree of effect of especially television over the audience, mass media proves to be an important potential channel to state power, which is at the same time subject to class struggles, including the within and antagonistic ones. As for the different conceptualizations of the audience; Fenton (1999) suggests, while the media effects research of 1950s and 60s (which is commonly associated with the stimulus-response learning theory) saw the audience as powerless, the active audience research which became widespread from especially the late 1970s onwards (which is commonly associated with the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies –directed by Hall- and which continued with the postmodern accounts) holds both the audiences have the capability of deciding about the meaning of the media text and the texts are polysemic with the potential to take multiple meanings. However, regardless of the disputes, both sides agree that media is important in our daily lives (pp. 310-313). In interpreting the power of the mass media messages, Stuart Hall's approach has been important especially because it drew the attention to the ways meaning could be decoded and the possibilities of rejecting the dominant code.²²⁴ However, as James Curran (2006) suggests, although Stuart Hall's Gramscian perspective held that not only coercion but also active consent maintains the social order while "(i)n hegemonic societies, this consent is secured through the cultural leadership of the dominant social grouping" (p. 132), the reinterpretation of the Gramscian perspective throughout the 1980s gave rise to representation of the media as open fora similar to the liberal pluralist conception of the media. As for Curran's viewpoint on this shift, he argued whatever the gains the post-1980s media research brought such as the rise of feminism and the emphasis on audience autonomy, the accusations of reductionism have discouraged many researchers (in Britain if not in the US) from studying radical political economy in

²²⁴ Hall (2002) identified four codes: Dominant or hegemonic code; professional code; negotiated code; oppositional code.

media research (pp. 139, 140). The author of the present thesis also shares Curran's criticism of the neo-liberal influence over media studies. As was mentioned in the section on the capitalists' action capacity (in section 4.2.1), concentration of capital in the mass media sector is seen as an advantage of the capitalist class along with its other advantages on account of the material resources its members hold. Now, in this section, with the acknowledgment that audience is not passive or powerless, a few examples provided by the available secondary data on the way certain news is encoded in newspapers and television channels will be presented with reference to their potential to serve capitalist interests, with the assumption that messages transmitted by mass media is in some way influential over several (if not all) people's daily lives.

Perhaps on account of its advantages in opinion dissemination, in Turkey, since the very beginning, governments have tried to establish control over mass media not only in terms of favoring particular class interests as against others, but also in a way to enhance their exercise and partial hold of state power. In the pre-1960 era, the governments implemented a strict control and censorship over mass media that became an important tool of both making opposition and staying in power. The atmosphere of relative freedom provided by the 1961 constitution was followed by a series of repressive measures. After September 12th, a number of legal arrangements were introduced that curbed the press freedom further. 1990s also witnessed the violation of basic liberties including the freedom of expression and press (for an historical evaluation of censorship and other repressive measures, see Topuz, 2003; Şahhüseyinoğlu, 2005). The relatively centralized character of the mass media has made the state intervention (as a relatively centralized form of intervention) easier when compared to more dispersed means of opinion formation (such as community networks) although never ever an absolute state control has been possible over the legal and illegal mass media.²²⁵ There are also newspapers, magazines, Internet sites,

²²⁵ As a matter of fact, the age of print media in Turkey is older than a century. The first newspapers in Turkish were published in the early 19th century. Some of them were *Vakayi-i Misriye* (1828), *Takvim-i Vakayi* (1831), and *Ceride-i Havadis* (1840). The first leftist newspapers were published after the proclamation of the Second Constitutional Monarchy. Some of them were *Amele* (1909), *İştirak* (1910), and *İdrak* (1919). After the establishment of the republic, the media sector witnessed a proliferation. Until 1960, the major axis of clashes had been to be for or against the government. In that era, closing the newspapers and censorship became among ordinary practices. As for the socialist press, it displayed a cautious

and radios that disseminate anti-capitalist political tendencies all over Turkey. However, the number of people reading or listening to these resources is quite limited.

As for the examples on the pro-capitalist encoding of the news, Çiler Dursun's (2001) research that analyzed the news on privatization in 460 news bulletins of four privately-owned television channels (ATV, SHOW TV, KANAL 6, STAR TV) between September 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994 can be considered. Findings of Dursun's research showed that the bourgeois television channels have presented the partial interests of the bourgeoisie as the interests of the whole people. Especially presenting the themes with a scientific discourse was held to have part in presenting the bourgeois ideology as the objective truth. Dursun found out that the most repeated five themes considering privatization were respectively the following: 'deficits, debts, and loss of the state economic enterprises (SEEs)'; 'incapacity of the state in giving its fundamental services such as education, health, and justice'; 'the ongoing corruption, bribery, illicit profits, and loots in state institutions and banks'; 'burden of the SEEs on the state, economy, treasury, and budget'; and 'the payment for the loss of SEEs by the people and wasting the country's revenues'.

Two other examples also illustrate the way bourgeois mass media attempts to contribute to the formation of pro-capitalist values and opinions. One example is from print media while the other is from audio-visual media. The first example is based on

attitude in its early years. With time, it grew more and more assertive (see Topuz, 2003; Şahhüseyinoğlu, 2005). Meanwhile, the press became a mirror image of the class struggles. As for the audio-visual mass media, state control has also existed in these sectors. Actually, until 1990, there had been a state monopoly over radios and televisions. Although after then the privately-owned radios and televisions multiplied in number, the state control continued to exist. In 1994, the Higher Council of Radio and Television (*Radio ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu - RTÜK*) was established for the purpose of supervision while it turned out to be an institution of censorship and penalty-distribution (Sönmez, 2003a, p. 33; Karalı, 2005, pp. 71-87). Nevertheless, as the Turkish state practices have been pro-capitalist in the most part, the state-owned and state-controlled bourgeois radios and televisions have contributed to the formation and reproduction of the pro-capitalist values and ideas since their early days. Meanwhile, anti-capitalist publications and broadcasts could never escape from repression although in differing doses. Repression relevant to Kurdish conflict also appeared in mass media sector. There have been censorship and state supervision even over mainstream bourgeois media. As for the clashing values of the Islamist bourgeoisie and secularist bourgeoisie, the state sanctions have generally been at the advantage of secular values. Especially following the February 28th Decisions, media organizations labeled as reactionary were severely punished along with other measures that were strongly supported by the mainstream bourgeois media (see Karalı, 2005; Topuz, 2003; Şahhüseyinoğlu, 2005).

Yıkılmaz's research findings, which is about the legitimization of the September 12th military takeover. Her research examined the news on this pro-capitalist coup in two big newspapers; *Hürriyet* and *Cumhuriyet*. Although neither of these newspapers is anti-capitalist, general political stance of *Hürriyet* can be considered to be central right while that of *Cumhuriyet* can be considered to be central left. Yıkılmaz's research findings suggested both in *Hürriyet* and *Cumhuriyet*, the most widely stated three *reasons* for the military takeover were the following: 'The threatened security of life and property'; 'the threatened unity and integrity of the country'; and 'the divisive and separatist ideologies'. As for the *results* of the coup d'état, again a justifying discourse was adopted. The most widely stated three outcomes in the same newspapers were the following: 'Ensuring the security of life and property'; 'arresting the *terrorists*'; and 'establishing the democratic order'. As for the *concepts* utilized in the justification process, they were as the following: 'Atatürk'; 'protection of the Turkish Republic, unity and integrity'; 'the state authority'; 'human rights'; 'the great Turkish Nation'; 'protection of life and property'; 'the brave army'; 'divisive ideology'; 'saving and reinstalling democracy' (Yıkılmaz, 2002, pp. 279-322). Actually, the military coup rescued the capitalist system and interests rather than working class interests. The junta crashed the socialist movement and labor unions relentlessly. Nevertheless, the mainstream media presented the coup not as the enemy of the working class but as the rescue operation of the basic rights, democracy and order. The news and comments in major newspapers contributed to present the capitalist interests as the interests of the whole nation.

Yıkılmaz's research has clearly indicated the role performed by the bourgeois newspapers at critical turning points. Although the following example is not as specific as the news on September 12th or privatization process, it is quite important as it examines how the mainstream media encodes crime. This case is based on Arslan's research that analyzed the discourse of 'crime' and 'criminal activities' in the news bulletins of TRT 1 (a state-owned television channel), SHOW TV (a privately-owned television channel), and CNN Türk (a privately-owned television channel with foreign partner) for three weeks between November 2000 and January 2001. The research findings indicate that the criminalized poor, left opposition, Kurds, women, and homosexuals were excluded from the desired conception of the society. In the news, the discourse of crime was tied to the presentation of the state as

the mere legitimate representative of the social formation of the citizens and the nation. At the same time, this state discourse was equipped with such themes as the ‘unitary regime’, ‘nationalism’, ‘modernism’, ‘secularism’, and ‘economic liberalism’. The research suggests that all protests without legal permission, particularly the leftist ones were criminalized and even demonized. Especially the leftist protests were commonly encoded in isolation from their political context although at times of intense conflicts, this de-politicization mode transformed into an over-politicization mode with the help of the theme of the ‘state/nation enemy’. Despite the fact that leftist protests were presented as state enemies, the case was not the same for the crimes of exploiting class, namely the organized/mafia crimes,²²⁶ the misuse of authority in banking and credit procedures, and the corruption in bidding processes. As for the presentation of state crimes, in the news bulletins, state authorities were not ‘convicted’ but ‘alleged’ to make certain practices. Presentation of state crimes appeared in a justifying mode, especially with reference to the threat of political crimes and the need for state intervention. In other words, the criminalized and demonized dissidents were presented as if *they* were calling for the human rights violations of the state (Arslan, 2001, pp. 34-132). Consequently, although such problems as corruption and human rights violations were presented as relatively minor issues; the pro-worker alternatives were criminalized and even demonized that might in turn be perceived as ‘objective facts’ by the audience of the news bulletins. In this respect, as Duran (2000) suggests, the attitude of the privately-owned TV channels is hardly different from the state-owned TV channels on the issues such as the workers’ protests, Kurdish question, and Turkish foreign policy (p. 26). It seems that the mainstream media is a considerable channel for the formation, reproduction, and dissemination of pro-capitalist opinions, and at the same time a channel for the bourgeois hold of state power.

Mass media has been also widely utilized by the business organizations (an example of the utilization of a macro level factor by a middle level factor). Several TESEV

²²⁶ Meanwhile, if more recent studies on mafia crimes are carried out, most probably, what the researcher would face with would be a contradictory picture; on the one hand, reflecting the fear of conventional bourgeoisie (especially in news bulletins), and on the other hand, the praise of mafia heroes as a part of the rising values/ideas (especially in films and series).

and TÜSİAD reports have had repercussions in the mass media.²²⁷ Especially the TÜSİAD reports on democratization, the series that started with the one prepared by Bülent Tanör, *Democratization Perspectives in Turkey* (TÜSİAD, 1997) succeeded in engendering an extensive discussion in Turkey, with repercussions also in Europe. Journalists, politicians, labor and business organizations discussed the issue and clarified their pro and con attitudes about the points made in the report (see TÜSİAD, 1999, pp. 29-37). Although it is difficult to assess the degree of TÜSİAD's success in influencing people's opinions, its reports did become important ingredients of the agenda setting process. In addition to the publications of the capitalist organizations, their press releases witnessed the effective use of mass media by the business organizations. The content and assertiveness of their press releases can be detected from the websites of TESEV²²⁸, TÜSİAD²²⁹, MÜSİAD²³⁰ and TOBB²³¹. Their publications and press releases were sometimes also assisted by other means such as the advertisement campaigns, which sometimes have had more striking impacts. In this respect, TÜSİAD's practices constitute a good example. Before 1980, TÜSİAD had resorted to advertisement campaigns for at least two times. As stated in Gülfidan's (1993) research on TÜSİAD, the first one took place abroad to convey the state's views about the arms embargo following Turkey's 1974 military intervention in Cyprus (p. 84) while the other one took place in 1978 in Turkey's three major newspapers and a weekly news magazine, accusing the Ecevit government of paralyzing the economy (p. 90). In the ads of 1978, TÜSİAD made the following statements:

Turkey...is faced with shortages which are observed only in 'poor' countries...Every 14 people out of 100 who can work are unemployed....The attitudes of the trade unions and ill-advised economic policies of government are aggravating this problem...And the horrible inflation, which is running at 60 percent a year continues to gnaw at our social and economic fabric...Where is Turkey going?

²²⁷ Repercussions of TESEV can be detected from www.tesev.org.tr

²²⁸ www.tesev.org.tr

²²⁹ www.tusiad.org.tr

²³⁰ www.musiad.org.tr

²³¹ www.tobb.org.tr

Who are responsible for the crisis? Why are there shortages in our country which has the potential to be included among the wealthy nations of the world? Turkey is not the only country who cannot help herself a time of such crisis...But she must not be the only country who cannot help herself at a time of such crisis.

The pace of inflation should now be slowed down...The State, which should be the protector of the value of money the people earn, should seek other means instead of issuing fiducial bank notes. The Ministry of Finance should reduce the level of tax evasion to a minimum by implementing corrective measures. This is possible. It is the historical duty of our Parliament to tax the untaxed sectors of the society.

Foreign credits which we badly need are closely related to our economic system. We can neither find our right place in the Western world, nor sufficient amount of credits and the necessary foreign capital for investments, by an understanding which is gradually deviating from the market economy. We should now realize that the basic productive power...of our democratic society is the private sector...The real reason of the prevailing crisis is the extreme interventionist and confidence-shaking mentality which strangles our economy by a prohibitive net of procedures, discouraging private initiative...The true path of working harder, producing more and hence, reaching prosperity is to encourage the individual in a competitive system. Production cannot be increased through forceful and protective measures. At the very most the economic structure becomes distorted and gradually the system deteriorates.

The weakening of the private sector is the weakening of Libertarian democracy...The elimination of the private sector means the destruction of democracy along with all democratic institutions... (in Gülfidan, 1993, pp. 90, 91)

The advertisement campaign²³² against the Ecevit government has been significant in two respects: First of all, it has indicated how much assertive TÜSİAD could be to steer state practices. Secondly, it has indicated how TÜSİAD tried to present its partial interests as the general interest of the people through locating them in the

²³² This campaign has generally been interpreted as TÜSİAD's endeavor to overthrow the Ecevit government. However, Can Kırac (2004) opposes this point of view and claims the message of these ads was that "the primary power which would bring welfare to our country within a libertarian democracy was in the hand of Free Enterprise" (p. 221).

context of the country's economic well-being and democracy. Actually, as was mentioned earlier, during the past ten years, TÜSİAD has systematically located 'democracy' as a central discourse in defending its interests and making policy proposals. As Aydın (2001) suggests, TÜSİAD once again resorted to ads to call for the coalition government of the TPP and Motherland Party following the 1995 general election²³³ (p. 61). Although it is very well known that TÜSİAD does not hesitate to resort to advertisement campaigns to back its demands, from time to time also other capitalist organizations resort to this method as in the case of İTO's (İstanbul Chamber of Commerce's) ads in the newspapers on the attitude of Ecevit government toward private sector in 1979, criticizing Ecevit's statements that hold the private sector responsible from the crisis (see Alkan, 1998, p. 227). All these business organizations' practices are examples of capitalists' intentional efforts for influencing the masses' opinions which would then help to directly or indirectly steer the exercisers of state power in line with their own interests.

Consequently, whether through community networks or mass means of opinion formation, pro-capitalist values and ideas are transmitted through various means of formal and informal communication. However, not only the pro-capitalist values and ideas with some potential to contribute in forming the active or passive consent of the masses to capitalism, but also priorities that do not harm the collective and/or particular capitalist interests with no necessary consent to capitalism help in reproducing the capitalist (dis)order. However, as discussed previously, the individual is neither a totally passive receptor of the ideas/values nor a passive bearer of the structural positions she occupies, regardless of a general inclination towards conformity to the norms of the communities she belongs to (with the acknowledgment that those norms may contradict with each other in several instances). Therefore, for the individual, there is the possibility to both reject/interpret the inputs she is exposed to and act somehow differently than the ways she is conditioned structurally. However, as a living thing, the human being has a very strong natural, instinctual inclination to individually survive although for several times it may be challenged by other motives (e.g. some emotional motives, and perhaps, sometimes the motive of survival of the human race). Therefore, threats to

²³³ In addition to these ads, a delegation of prominent TÜSİAD members also visited the party leaders and opposed to any solution that would include Welfare Party (Aydın, 2001, p. 61).

its individual survival may both push the individual to struggle and obedience. Besides, since the individual is an emotional being, the threatened values/ideas and people that/whom she cares about may also push the individual to struggle and obedience. That is why the hold of armed power and means of violence is so determinant in several (if not all) instances for the class rule (especially when the exploiting class constitutes the minority and the exploited class constitutes the majority), although the operation of neither the threat/use of most powerful armed force nor dominant values/ideas is omnipotent since the human being is both a conformist and a rebel, depending on the context (in other words depending on the neuro-physiological structure of the individual, the cultural context, historical context, and the social structures occupied among others).

4.3 Decisiveness and Limits of Armed Force: Calling in Physical Rationality, Intervening in the Channels of Opinion Formation and Actions of State Elements

Threat/use of means of violence can be considered as a determinant factor in several instances for class rule especially when the minority exploiting the majority is considered. As for Turkey, the ‘defense’ expenditures have received a huge share from the budget²³⁴ (Günlük-Şenesen, 2004, esp. p. 273, Table 1), with its over 100 thousand officers and noncommissioned officers²³⁵ (İnsel, 2004, p. 47). This share has been so huge most probably not only due to the concern of being protected from the perceived foreign threats. Until now, except from a few instances (e.g. operations in Cyprus and Northern Iraq among others), the military has been active more in domestic rather than foreign politics. In section 4.2.3, a synopsis of the political scene of Turkey with its two military coup d’états (27 May 1960 and 12 September 1980) and two serious interventions (12 March 1971 and 28 February 1997) was already mentioned. These instances revealed the clash of power points between the armed and non-armed sectors of the state, indicating the decisiveness of armed force. In 1969, Süleyman Demirel, the Prime Minister of the day, mentioned his growing uneasiness with a possible military takeover and asked the support of army, pointing out the

²³⁴ Some figures are as the following: 17.7 (in 1980), 17.6 (in 1985), 16.7 (in 1990), 17.9 (in 1995), and 16.8 (in 2000) percent of the non-interest budget (Günlük-Şenesen, 2004, p. 273).

²³⁵ Insel (2004) reports, in 1997, the Minister of Defense stated that there were 39,150 officers; 71,200 noncommissioned officers; 615,000 privates; and 12,420 civilian officials and workers in the Turkish Armed Forces (p. 47).

impossibility of sustaining a regime without the support of armed forces (Akyaz, 2002, p. 306). This can be interpreted as the awareness of a civil state element about the decisiveness of armed force. Actually, the three military interventions (27 May 1960; 12 March 1971; 12 September 1980) were all critical about the civilian governments of the days, which were not welcome by the parties in government.²³⁶ Although the civilian governments prior to these military interventions were strictly pro-capitalist and central right, these military interventions that contributed in the reproduction of capitalist mode of production received either covert or overt support from several capitalist elements. Meanwhile March 12th and especially September 12th interventions were savior operations of rescuing capitalism, immediately after which not only stricter measures for crushing socialist forces were introduced, but also labor and several other laws were revised in a way to decrease the working class' action capacity. As for the 1990s, pro-worker forces have weakened considerably while the bourgeoisie has grown wealthier and more fragmented, presenting more observable within class struggles. Especially, the rising religious bourgeoisie has been seen as a threat by the relatively secular and rooted big bourgeoisie. When the religious Welfare Party became a partner of the coalition government, the military commanders also grew uneasy about the Islamic activities of the government and gave a sort memorandum on February 28th, 1997, in the National Security Council meeting. This memorandum is known to be the February 28th Decisions. It covered the evaluation of and the measures to be taken against the fundamentalist Islamic activities both within and outside the state. The memorandum also gave reference to the financial dimensions of Islamic movement, which coincided with the concerns of the more rooted big bourgeoisie. February 28th Decisions became an illuminating case concerning the possible clashes between the armed and non-armed ingredients of the state, and between pro-capitalist strategies with different themes and different capitalist elements favored.²³⁷ A few months after the February 28th Decisions, in June 1997, the coalition government of TPP and WP fell.

²³⁶ For the evaluation of these military interventions and civil governments see Cizre (1999); Cizre (2002b); Harris (1988); Karpat (1988).

²³⁷ For some interpretations on power struggles and background of this memorandum (February 28th), see Aksoy (2000); Orakoğlu (2003).

There has been no unity in state ranks as these interventions took place. For several times, the armed intervention has had considerable part in physically neutralizing (via intimidating, imprisoning, torturing, and/or killing) the leaders, opinion producers/disseminators, and activists/supporters and crushing the organizations (e.g. associations, unions, parties) of the 'threats' as perceived and/or encoded by the stronger intervening clique of the army. In decisive instances such as the military coup d'états, what on the scene have been the state forces (with their legal or illegal practices through the use of their legally defined state positions) while what part the non-state armed elements and illegal formations including state elements played behind the scene has always been a matter of question. As for the state armed bodies, three institutions; the army, the police, and the intelligence service have been among strong elements.

As for the police force, there are several methods that the pro-capitalist police have utilized to assure the 'public safety' as their legally assigned task, which has become the 'capitalist safety' rather than the people's well-being especially at times of challenged capitalist order. For the purpose of prevention and elimination of the anti-capitalist threat, in addition to the surveillance and armed techniques, the police has also employed the techniques of agitation and propaganda (opinion formation means) as in the case of 'psychological operation' methods used especially against the organized groups challenging the existing order (for the 'psychological operation' techniques, see Alkan, 2000). Actually, even special units for fighting communism have been established within the state 'security' forces. The Special War Department (*Özel Harp Dairesi*) that has been widely identified with the counter-guerilla is one of these organizations. The official authorities of the state armed forces had long stayed silent about this department, while on December 3, 1990, a briefing given in the General Staff Headquarters ended this silence. In the briefing, the Brigadier General Kemal Yılmaz and the Lieutenant General Doğan Beyazıt explained that the 'special war', the method adopted by this department, has had three aspects: 'psychological war', 'stability operation', and 'unconventional war'. Meanwhile Doğan Beyazıt stated that although the major focus of the department was to stand against the Soviet threat during the Cold War, its tasks have not been restricted to fighting against communism (in Mercan, 2004, p. 15, 16).

Despite that all these armed institutions were established legally by the state, anti-communist measures have violated even the bourgeois laws. Some figures on torture and human rights violations which made socialists suffer among others would give an idea about the extent of these violations.²³⁸ The statistics below summarizes some military junta practices following the September 12th coup d'état that was a strictly anti-communist one.²³⁹

During this period, 650,000 people were detained for political reasons. Trials were launched by courts martial against 210,000 of those detainees. 65,000 of them were convicted to various sentences. The death penalty was recommended for 6,353 people, the number of the death penalties passed exceeded 500 while 50 people were executed. Hundreds of people were registered in the police documents. 388,000 people were banned from receiving passports. Martial law commanders removed 4,891 civil servants from office while 4,509 civil servants were sent into exile. The number of the civil servants who were pensioned off by force, forced to retire or who had to resign was more than 20,000. The number of those who fled or had to flee abroad reached 30,000 and of those who were deprived of citizenship was 15,000 ... Newspapers, journals were closed down for definite or indefinite periods. Journalists and writers were sentenced to heavy imprisonment terms. Ten thousands of books were burnt. 937 films were banned. All political parties, 23,667 associations, trade unions or similar organizations were closed down. (Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, 1996, p. 19)

Besides, the torture figures, an indicator of the armed state violence, are also striking while even the official authorities recognized the existence of torture. For example, the figure pronounced by the Chief of General Staff for those who died of torture in the prisons was 55 in 1985, while 19 of them were already officially proved (Gökdemir, 2005, p. 189). However, torture is not restricted to the post-1980 era. Also before 1980, hundreds of leftists were claimed to be tortured by state authorities (see Gökdemir, 2005; *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, 1988).

²³⁸ However, the police cannot be treated as homogeneous. There are also police who are against torture. On the issue of human rights violations, see, for example, the approach of Ahmet Hamdi Aydın (1998), a Police Academy teacher, who is against torture, but not necessarily against capitalism. Meanwhile, POL-DER's emergence also confirms the possibility of the emergence of formations, critical about capitalism in a capitalist society.

²³⁹ However, these figures are rough ones in the sense that they cover not only the leftists, but also the rightwing militants and Kurdish nationalists among others.

Among the names alleged to be tortured, even the officers such as the General Staff Colonel Talat Turhan (2001), an anti-imperialist revolutionary officer who reported that he was detained and tortured in the July of 1972 took place (see esp. pp. 327-375). Besides, disappearances and deaths in detention have remained on the agenda for decades (Gökdemir, 2005; Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, 1996, p. 19).

Consequently, the state *security* forces, the mission of which covers the protection of life and honor of the citizens have been far from protecting the dissenters' health and lives. Once again, Marx's critical approach on the bourgeois legal system and armed power proves to be right. However, it would be misleading to assume that violence against communists is only resorted to by state armed forces. The non-official armed forces have also been important ingredients of the anti-communist terror, which in some instances have had links with the state armed forces. Although the available documents concerning the pro-capitalist illegal formations are in extreme scarcity, one of them concerning the NATO armies is of tremendous value giving an idea about how the very few (but well-trained, organized, and equipped) armed elements may become influential in intimidating the masses (if not necessarily in winning their consent) with tactics disregarding even the non-dissenter people's lives. In Daniel Ganser's book (2005); 'NATO's Secret Armies; Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe', there is valuable data especially on the basis of the Pentagon Field Manuals 30-31 (FM 30-31)²⁴⁰ that propose strategies to the host countries' secret services for fighting against communism, including several tactics such as bombing, killing, torturing, terrorizing, and making election frauds, but in a way without much attracting the attention of the people. Ganser wrote that FM 30-31 also addresses the close relationship of the US and Turkish secret services as the *major* factor for the US influence over Turkey. It is also written that the retired colonel Talat Turhan blamed the US for encouraging several violent actions in the 1970s Turkey, since the Special War Department, counter-guerilla, and MİT were established in collaboration with the US, the members of which were trained in line with FM 30-31. Among the strategies proposed to pro-capitalist armed forces in FM 30-31, also the ones recommending the secret army elements to organize terrorist actions and to blame the 'communist enemy' for those actions are listed. Ganser also wrote, in FM 30-31, this

²⁴⁰ In Ganser's book it is written that the full version of FM 30-31 is present in the Appendix of Regine Igel's book 'Politik zwischen Geheimdienst und Mafia'.

proposal is grounded on the concern for spreading a state of fear and alarm among people as well as pressing the reluctant governments to take more serious measures and mobilizing both the conventional and counter-guerilla forces in peace times against communism, whether through using the communist organization as an instrument for terrorist actions (for example by means of leaking into its leadership or by means of overlooking its action plans) or without that kind of manipulation (for example organizing terrorist actions directly by secret army elements) (see esp. pp. 402-411). All those tactics proposed to fight against communism indicate that the pro-capitalist armed techniques can take very intricate forms targeting at communist forces both directly (by means of killing their elements, or by means of torturing their elements for forcing them to inform them of other elements/activities of anti-capitalist forces and/or for intimidating them) and indirectly (by means of discouraging people from joining communist forces through spreading fear and horror among them, or by means of steering governments for further anti-communist action). Besides, these tactics also indicate that even a communist organization can be used for anti-communist ends.²⁴¹ Another point that FM 30-31 reveals is the dimension of international antagonistic class struggles, which, in this case appeared in the form of the alliance between the US and Turkish pro-capitalist armed forces. As for the form of the pro-capitalist anti-communist forces, again intersection points between state elements and non-state elements are implied (since 'secret army elements' refers to not necessarily state armed elements), which also fits the case of collaboration of NAP militants and police elements in 'Bloody Sunday' (see section 4.2.2).

Actually, what happened in 1970s concerning pro-capitalist armed strategies for defeating pro-worker forces seems to fit very well to the tactics proposed to NATO members by the US pro-capitalist forces in the Cold War Era. As a result of the perpetrator known and unknown political killings and massacres, thousands of communists and leftist-democrats were physically destroyed (for these political killings and massacres, see Gökdemir, 2005; Parlar, 2006a; 2006b, esp. pp. 566-686; *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, 1988). It became possible for the

²⁴¹ This means that for defeating capitalism in a way to realize the working class' collective long-term interests, it would be wise for the communist organizations and other groups with utopian projects to refrain and stay away from organizing terrorist actions detached from masses as much as possible, since terrorism detached from masses would only result in the spread of fear and horror among the oppressed and exploited, and help the capitalist class and pro-capitalist forces inadvertently.

capitalists to keep their ownership of means of production and to continue to utilize several channels to hold state power only by means of armed force, which meant the physical elimination of several leading anti-capitalists or democrats opening channels for the socialist hold of state power. Besides, the horror spread by means of violent massacres and terrorist actions organized by pro-capitalist forces also contributed in spreading the feeling of fear among the individuals triggering the concern that the people they care about or the individual itself can be physically harmed if they become pro-worker activists. That horror and feeling of fear, probably, also contributed in leading several people to a search for authority that would put an end to the violence on streets. On the other hand, if that pro-capitalist physical violence had not defeated the pro-worker forces and if socialists could have hold *the* state power; then, those channels such as the bourgeois political parties, bourgeois media, and capitalists' money to offer state elements among others would have been blocked to a great extent.

Although mechanisms of fear have been widely resorted to in the capitalist era in a way not restricted to state armed forces; the exploiting class and state elements' method of resorting to non-state armed forces against those perceived as threat has not been unique to the capitalist era. The Ottoman era is also full of such cases: For example, using and sometimes even giving official titles to some of the bandits especially during the fight against other bandits was a quite common practice. This method was also utilized for disarming the peasants who, from time to time, were again armed by the state authorities for similar reasons (for the examples, see Ergut, 2004, pp. 86-104, 304-308). Therefore, resorting to non-state forces by the state armed forces is not novel to capitalism. As for the capitalist era, especially the nationalist and religious discourses have become important motives for mobilizing the militants against communism. In this respect, the use of RPNP and NAP militants against communist forces can be considered as the example of this tendency.²⁴² However, in the post-1980 era, many militants who were once affiliated to NAP started to be involved in mafia, whose violent means and orientation were resorted to

²⁴² It is true that the armed and juridical power of the state was used against certain NAP militants especially subsequent to the September 12th coup. However, this can be interpreted as the diminished need for the paramilitary forces in the presence of a pro-capitalist military government. Also the junta's concern for giving a supra-party image might have become an important factor.

against Kurdish nationalism especially throughout 1990s. Meanwhile, as the Mafioso power amalgamates the direct command of armed forces with the private ownership of means of production, this situation constitutes a potential and/or actual threat to the conventional bourgeoisie. Perhaps, that is why the growing assertiveness of the Mafioso forces is frequently addressed as a growing threat by the conventional bourgeoisie. And perhaps that is also why the situation seems to grow even more alarming as the Mafioso forces penetrate the state parliamentary, bureaucratic and armed networks. And perhaps that is also why certain parts of the state armed forces are mobilized against Mafioso (capitalist) lords/madams both within and outside the state networks. It seems that the Mafioso groups denote a considerably strong formation covering both armed/non-armed state and non-state elements in Turkey.

As for the means of opinion formation with reference to the impact of armed force; the threat and/or use of armed means has had considerable success in shaping or repressing the relatively central means of opinion dissemination, if not the well-entrenched community networks. As for the mass media for example, censorship and closing the dissident media companies have been among the widely resorted sanctions which became possible only with the utilization (if not direct implementation) of armed force. Besides, Yıkılmaz's research mentioned in the previous section on the attitude towards the military coup September 12th in two big newspapers indicate that all those news were published under both auto-censorship and state censorship in the shadow of the guns. Indeed, as Yıkılmaz (2002) suggested, the Turkish Armed Forces immediately organized a meeting with press members and asked them not to make any negative comments about the coup. Therefore, such meetings as well as the military orders must have steered many journalists into a sort of auto-censorship. From time to time, even the journalists of the mainstream media were warned by the armed forces. Actually, the exercise of state power mainly rested in the hands of the martial law commanderships. Under the rule of the military junta, 237 books were banned, 796 journalists were sued, and 218 of them were given prison sentences. The investigated journalists were forced to stay away from press. Meanwhile many journalists of the mainstream media continued to attempt to justify the military intervention. As was mentioned in section 4.2.3, even under civil governments' rule, the state censorship over mass media has not been exceptional in Turkey. Even though the adaptation process to the EU has loosened the state control over the mass

media to a certain extent, the material resources for disseminating opinions, values, and life style is still congregated in the hands of the bourgeoisie, which is yet, a non-omnipotent means.

As for the education practices, as was mentioned in section 4.2.3, there has been again strict (civil or military) governmental control equipped with means of violence over the formal educational practices, especially with reference to religion, nationalism, and Kemalism. Except from those examples mentioned in section 4.2.3, an instance that indicates how even certain formal education institutions can be perceived as threat to the existing capitalist order and how they can be intervened to centrally with armed threat is revealing. The example is the ‘village institutes’. In 1940, village institutes were established by the RPP government whereby intelligent and healthy village youth would be trained who would then return back to their villages and educate their people. Actually, major aims of village institutes were to develop rural areas, and to equip the peasants with useful information and skills along with nationalist values. This was thought to turn the peasants into loyal citizens that would contribute to the construction of a trustworthy basis for Turkish Republic. In a few years time, village institutes proved to be fruitful: Teachers returned back to their villages and educated village children without being seen as the ‘other’ or ‘stranger’. Besides, most of them performed their jobs eagerly as if they were the missionaries of the young republic. Practical knowledge they taught such as information on agriculture or hygiene increased their authority in the eyes of the peasants. However, having seen the rising awareness of peasants and the increasing power of teachers, big landowners and other notables started a relentless opposition against these institutes. They were accused of training communist teachers. Against the growing power of village institutes, firstly the government changed their form and curriculum. Then they were shut down in 1954 by the DP government (Ahmad, 2000, p. 83; Başgöz, 1995, pp. 221-249; Katoğlu, 1990, pp. 405, 407). This instance indicated how an institution established by the pro-capitalist forces can give rise to serious unintended consequences challenging the intended ones and how the state can intervene in that process in a relatively centralized manner. However, although the state can intervene in such processes even by shutting down the institutions, it has also its limits since it is not as easy to shape the individual minds and preferences as it is to shut down the institutions.

Dissident currents with working class projects have always occurred in state-controlled schools although in many instances, they faced with juridical measures of the state. Contrary to the visualization of functionalist accounts (whether liberal or Marxist), formal education institutions have been the site of class (along with other) struggles while official education policies have never been omnipotent. Especially, the post-1960 era witnessed a vivid student movement and establishment of active teacher organizations. Leftist primary, secondary, and high school teachers first established the Turkish Teachers Union (*Türkiye Öğretmenler Sendikası – TÖS*) (1965-1971) and then the Allied Teachers Unity and Solidarity Association (*Tüm Öğretmenler Birleşme ve Dayanışma Derneği - TÖB-DER*) (1971-1980). However, these organizations became subject to pro-capitalist state repression. Nevertheless, leftist and democrat teachers continued to organize even after September 12th. The Educators' Association (*Eğitimciler Derneği – EĞİT-DER*) established in 1988 brought about the formation of some trade unions after 1990. In 1995, the teachers' unions EĞİT-SEN and EĞİTİM-İŞ merged to form EĞİTİM-SEN that then became an active figure of labor movement (Güneş & Güneş, 2003, pp. 161-164).²⁴³ Therefore, despite all measures to inculcate bourgeois values and ideology, pro-capitalist state power exercisers could never establish an absolute control over all elements of the education institution, since, as was discussed in the previous section, individuals do have relatively free will, and individuals may even risk their careers, shorter/longer term physical wellbeing, or longer term emotional wellbeing for realizing the motives arising from physical or emotional needs/desires. For decades, there have been thousands of teachers with anti-capitalist tendencies who have disseminated their own values and ideas. There have been also thousands of anti-capitalist students who have become active participants of the working class struggle. Although class and other struggles have made the practices of the bourgeoisie and pro-capitalist forces non-omnipotent, the pro-capitalist indoctrination has dominated the education practices since the republic's early days while the juridical and armed forces have contributed much to this process. Finally, it is also important to underline that the state-controlled education has become a battlefield of not only antagonistic classes, but also competing segments of the bourgeoisie as in the case of TÜSİAD

²⁴³ Also see www.egitimsen.org.tr/egitim/EgitimEmekcileriTarihi.doc

and MÜSİAD conflict which is very well illustrated in the dispute on the basic education period (see section 4.2.3).

Universities, an arena more difficult to establish state control, have also become the battlefield of class struggles, along with other struggles. Since the very beginning, there have been academicians with leftwing orientation. Some of them were socialists. In several instances, the pro-capitalist top state elements' response against these tendencies has been purges. For example, a year after the 1946 University Reform, a number of professors were expelled including the president of University of Ankara. Soon after the May 27th coup, 147 academicians seen as dissident were purged. Subsequent to the March 12th intervention, universities' administrative autonomy and the academic staff's freedom of joining political parties were removed from the constitution. Also, the Law No. 1750 that emphasized the need to educate nationalist intellectuals loyal to the motherland was enacted. Although this law had articles that enabled the foundation of the Council of Higher Education (*Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu*, YÖK) that would mean a tighter control over universities, they were invalidated by the constitutional court in 1975.²⁴⁴ September 12th military coup revived YÖK with substantial powers by Law No. 2547, undermining the university autonomy to a great extent. Legal arrangements following the coup decreed that universities should give students nationalist education that would enhance national unity, make students proud of being Turkish, and loyal to Turkish culture and traditions. Besides, Martial Law No. 1402 initiated a big purge of leftist academicians (Timur, 2000, pp. 249-346). In spite of all repressive measures, both university students and personnel succeeded in establishing several associations and unions, some of which became influential hubs of socialist politics.²⁴⁵

Several anti-communist interventions enabled by armed power have indicated that the use of armed forces have become quite successful in neutralizing (intimidating, purging, imprisoning, torturing, killing) the effective anti-capitalist dissenters within and outside the state, while regardless of the threat and actual use of armed force over

²⁴⁴ The statement of reasons and the decision of the constitutional court is available at the website of the constitutional court:
<http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/KARARLAR/IPTALITIRAZ/K1975/K1975-023.htm>

²⁴⁵ For a list and brief information on the organizations of university students and personnel, see (Hatipoğlu, 2000, pp. 417-457).

the dissenters, newer and newer ones have appeared on the political scene with anti-capitalist tendencies. Nevertheless, after stronger pro-capitalist armed interventions as in the case of the September 12th, anti-capitalist forces have been to a great extent neutralized, subsequent to which strong protests withered away from the political scene, mainly probably not because of the active or passive consent to the rulers, but because of the physical rationality called in among a great many of those who watched what has happened to several activists and those who physically suffered from the negative effects of the armed force. While the pro-capitalist armed forces could not succeed in eliminating all anti-capitalist opposition, they have definitely succeeded in marginalizing it. Although the tactic of purging those whom the dominant exercisers of state power in general and armed power in particular perceive as threat has been a means of facilitating or opening the way to implement the strategies of the dominant cliques in state as against the strategies supported by the purged; the non-omnipotence of such practices gives some hope about the future changes, given that why people rebel in a way to risk their income/wealth, careers, what/whom they love, and even life (and especially those rebels who attempt to do this in a way to attempt to escape from brain conformity and leadership) is analyzed correctly, since it is extremely crucial for exploring the possibilities of a world with neither exploitation nor oppression.

As for the non-omnipotence of the dominant cliques in state ranks, several cases indicating the possibility of fragmentation of the state armed forces in certain circumstances also implies that it is possible for the dissenters to capture the state power without the consent and active voluntary actions of the masses. Regardless of Buci-Glucksmann's (1984) assertion that "(t)he hegemonic strategy of the working class in the conquest of majority consent can only be an 'anti-passive revolution' based on active consent" (p. 121), there is not only one way of moving to a classless social formation while the dream of democratic transition to socialism is a highly dangerous and risky one with the potential to call in a devastating defeat (cf. Buci-Glucksmann, 1984, p. 126). Although if a classless social formation is possible, arriving at that instance would most probably require a process of permanent revolution that would operate not only at the macro but also at the middle and micro levels; while this process would also require not to hesitate to *capture* the state power when convenient, since any hesitation to do that on the accurate time may end in

disasters ending in the annihilation of dissenters by armed forces. Increase in the implementation of violence by the dominant state forces does not necessarily trigger further rebellion. On the contrary, as had happened subsequent to the September 12th, in such instances, democratic and socialist forces may suffer from very serious injuries very difficult to recover in the future. Therefore, when there is strong enough armed force, hesitating to capture the power in the name of further active consent of the people would most probably pave the way for a relentless defeat, while when that force is not strong enough, the outcome would still be the same. In support of Perry Anderson's insistence on the disintegration of the repressive apparatus of the state for a successful socialist revolution, a number of cases from not only the capitalist era but also the pre-capitalist Ottoman Empire²⁴⁶ indicate that the dominant elements of the repressive apparatus can be challenged and even displaced by elements motivated by material gains and/or ideas/values such as justice, religion, nationalism, and socialism. To make this point clearer, a few examples of fragmentation of state armed apparatus will be presented in the context of Turkey (and late Ottoman Empire).

As capitalism started to develop in the late Ottoman era, a number of power clashes had shaken the state, again with the decisiveness of strong enough armed elements with better strategies than the rival armed elements. Also before the spread of capitalist relations in the empire, when the empire started to lose power; very serious within struggles among the state armed elements took place especially when certain sultans' attempted to modernize the army and state structure. Particularly certain sultans' attempts to reform the army met with resistance, producing instances displaying the decisiveness of armed strength and tactics. The Janissaries' resistance was of this kind. Indeed, when Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) attempted to reform the army and establish a new army called *Nizam-ı Cedid*, the Janissaries made an alliance with the religious functionaries and conservative state elements to organize a rebellion against the reformist sultan. Their rebel was successful, which managed to

²⁴⁶ As for the pre-capitalist Ottoman times, the conflicts that sometimes arose between the religious authorities and sultans constitute a good example. By then, the *Şeyhülislams*, the heads of the religious authority, gained so much power for steering armed elements that they could even intervene in enthroning and dethroning the grand viziers and sultans who commanded substantial armed power. Yet, there had been also cases of sultans who took action against religious functionaries. Actually, several *Şeyhülislams* were removed from the office by the sultans while some of them were even put to death (for the examples see Bulut, 1995, pp. 26, 27). The clash of power centers within the state with the capacity to mobilize armed elements is not restricted to the capitalist society.

overthrow Sultan Selim III. Janissaries' discourse was predominantly weaved by Islamic motives. As a matter of fact, not only the traditional sectors of the army, but also other state elements resorted to religious discourse since the predominant ideological orientation of state elements was Islam. The examples of this sort continued until the collapse of the empire. For example, another reformist sultan, Sultan Mahmut II (1808-1839), took a *fetwa* from the *Şeyhülislam* for disbanding the Janissary corps. His strategy was to back his practice by the word of the Islamic religious authority. As for the rebels, *Kuleli Case* became another incident. It was an unsuccessful attempt of coup d'état organized by the conservative sectors of the army in alliance with the conservative state elements, religious functionaries, and students against the Sultan Abdülmecit (1839-1861) reforms imposed by the pro-capitalist European state elements (imperialists). Likewise, the overthrow of Abdülaziz (1861-1876) was attempted to be justified on the basis of Islam, with a *fetwa* from *Şeyhülislam* (Bulut, 1995, pp. 33-39). Meanwhile, the 1908 constitutional monarchy, which was made possible only by the strong enough armed intervention with successful tactics, became a turning point in the Turkish political history, and gave an impetus for the development of capitalism with a pro-modernization (Westernization) perspective as mentioned in section 4.2.3. However, this time, the reforms carried out by the *Committee of Union and Progress* faced with anti-Unionist activities and an insurrection equipped with Islam demanding the restoration of *Sharia*, the religious law of Muslims. Although a wider range of groups were involved in the insurrection including some liberals, traditionalists-conservatives, and religious functionaries, it could not succeed while it was crashed by again armed forces. In this process, several Unionists became aware of the way Islam could be used for political ends and the need to take measures against the use of Islam by rival political currents (Ahmad, 2000, pp. 34-36). However it would be misleading to conclude that the Unionists never resorted to religious symbols. Actually, they attributed importance to religion as an ingredient of their exercise and hold of power. First of all, the symbols of the *Committee of Union and Progress* that were the pistol, Koran, and flag included Islamic elements. Secondly, they took *fetwa* from the *Şeyhülislam* by threat for dismissing Sultan Abdülhamit. Thirdly, they registered many notable religious men as members to the organization. Fourthly, allegedly, they recruited Said-i Nursi –one of the most important religious authorities of the era- in the Ottoman secret service, *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* (Bulut, 1995, pp. 51, 52). These examples indicate that versions of

a particular discourse as well as the claim to be its true representative can be utilized by those with different interests to mobilize the state armed elements (this is also relevant to section 4.2.2), although this does not mean that such Islamic signifiers' relative oscillation corresponds to a state of an absolute free-float. This has also been the case for the Kemalist discourse in the republican era.

In the republican era, an ongoing power struggle became an indispensable part of the state networks, again with instances determined by the stronger armed force and/or more superior armed tactics. During the republican times, there were struggles not only among the non-armed state elements,²⁴⁷ but also in the military network. For example, before 1960, there were a variety of cliques and clandestine organizations with different political orientations embedded within the military network.²⁴⁸ In the mono-party era, certain military students joined the communist organizations. Several of them were accused of communism and were tried in the military courts. Most of them were purged from the army,²⁴⁹ which can be interpreted as an aspect of pro-capitalist measures in the course of antagonistic class struggles. The fragmentation of the armed forces had also further dimensions. During World War II, impressed by the strength of the German army, certain young officers initiated clandestine organizations some of which aimed to overthrow the İnönü government. As for the multi-party era, when the DP was in opposition and had to accept the results of the fraudulent 1946 elections, new pro-DP clandestine groups were established. On the other hand, certain groups continued to support İnönü, while some others preferred to preserve their relations both with the opposition party (DP) and the government party (RPP). Yet, neither of them had anti-capitalist programs. The 1950 elections, which carried the DP to government and gave an end to the 27 years of RPP rule, also sharpened the polarization. Right after the 1950 elections, certain generals made a

²⁴⁷ Even in the mono-party era, there were different cliques within the party, and thus within the state. By then, there was a struggle between the liberals, conservatives, and leftists within the party, all with traces of interests of different classes and class elements among others (Ahmad, 2000, pp. 52-71).

²⁴⁸ Yavi's (2003) book 'İhtilalci Subaylar' provides various examples of clandestine interventionist organizations within the military for the period 1905-1962. These examples are based on historical documents, witnesses, and memories.

²⁴⁹ This can be interpreted as the pro-capitalist chief state elements' decisiveness in excluding anti-capitalist forces. Yet, all conflicts within the army were not restricted to being communist or anti-communist.

meeting in Ankara and proposed İnönü to cancel the election results. Yet, this proposal was rejected by İnönü. Meanwhile, the coup d'état plans against Menderes government continued. However, a colonel informed Adnan Menderes of these plots. This led the Menderes government launch a swift operation to eliminate the suspected disloyal commanders in 1950. In a few months, 16 generals and 150 colonels were retired. The government took the support of the pro-DP clique within the army. During the DP rule, the struggle within the state continued (Akyaz, 2002, pp. 42-118). These clashes can be, *in part*, interpreted as the outcome of clash of different strategies for pro-capitalist projects with different emphasized themes (for example, religious themes by DP, secularist themes by RPP, nationalist themes by both). More importantly, all they denote turning points with decisions bringing defeat or victory. For example, in 1950, despite İnönü's rejection of canceling the election results, if the pro-RPP army commanders had intervened and announced that they had canceled the results, it would have been very hard to claim that those 16 generals and 150 colonels would still have been retired. Most probably, the retired ones' names would be that of the rival side. However, the armed elements' belief in the legitimacy of the authority of İnönü pushed them obey his word and not cancel the results, at the end of which they found themselves retired.

In 1960, the May 27th military coup happened. New divisions and coup attempts followed this takeover. The decade following the intervention witnessed a variety of clandestine organizations within the army, once more, verifying the decisiveness of correct strategies in eliminating the rival ones. Among others, a major division occurred between the *Radicals* and the *Moderates*. The colonels and the officers hierarchically lower than the colonels constituted the skeleton of the *Radicals*, while the generals constituted the skeleton of the *Moderates*. Yet, no ideological unity existed within each wing (Akyaz, 2002, esp. pp. 140-148). A case verifying the vitality of strategic steps in the success and failure of political projects appeared in 1962. Certain colonels planned an intervention and demanded to stop the discharges in the army. However, they did not detain those who initiated the discharge process although they had the opportunity to. This instance became a turning point in Turkish politics, since the leading members of the plot could have succeeded if they had launched the intervention on time. Yet, their late intervention ended in failure and the elimination of the plot leaders on February 22, 1962. The plot leaders were removed

from the office via retirement.²⁵⁰ It is important to note that, the coup d'état attempts of early 1960s were quite different than the ones in the late 1960s in the sense that ideological polarization had more influence on the later ones. In the course of 1960s, many junta organizations emerged both with rightwing orientation and leftwing orientation. Therefore, the top-ranked pro-capitalist officers attempted to re-install the military hierarchy. For restoring the discipline and hierarchy, the Armed Forces Union (*Silahlı Kuvvetler Birliği* – AFU) was established.²⁵¹ After 1963, the hierarchy-enhancing activities increased considerably. In this respect certain legal arrangements were introduced including the one on the status of the General Staff. Also OYAK (the Army Mutual Assistance Association) that increased the benefits of the army from the market economy was established (Ahmad, 2000, pp. 128-131; Akyaz, 2002, pp.137-332).

However, although the efforts for establishing the top-down hierarchy continued, the officers' actions outside the military hierarchy spread further. The late 1960s witnessed the socialist officers' visits to the peasant and worker houses for making revolutionary propaganda. The young naval officers also handed out political leaflets and made protests via placing wreaths at the monuments (strategic actions for a pro-worker project against capitalism). Meanwhile the rightwing and reactionary officers participated in the Friday prayers collectively (strategic actions for a pro-capitalist project with at least different themes than that of the top military). In 1970, another purge was launched against a possible plot, forbidding the officers to visit other units

²⁵⁰ Yet, Talat Aydemir, the leading figure of the February 22nd plot, continued to organize for a new takeover both inside and outside the army subsequent to his retirement. Initially, there were three major groups that planned this. They tried hard to unite but could not succeed due to the disputes on the question of leadership. Thus, on May 21st, 1963, the group led by Talat Aydemir launched an unsuccessful initiative without the support of other groups. He was supported by some young officers in certain military schools, the Unit of Cavalrymen in the Presidential Group of Guardsmen, and a few officers in the air forces. The forces in support of the government defeated Aydemir's coup d'état attempt in a few hours' time. Following this attempt, the martial laws commanderships started to arrest the people whom they thought participated in the plot. Totally, 151 people (106 from Ankara, 45 from Istanbul) were arrested and tried. This time, the punishments were heavy. In addition to many years of imprisonment, seven people were given death penalties while only two of the capital punishments were executed (Akyaz, 2002, pp. 214-231).

²⁵¹ Although this organization's manifested goal was to withdraw the army from politics, just the opposite happened (see Akyaz, 2002, pp. 150-164).

and retiring over 500 colonels²⁵² (Akyaz, 2002, p. 307). After the September 12th takeover, a stronger pro-capitalist hierarchy was established within the military with a continuous chase against any active or potential dissent. The officers and military students sympathetic to socialism and Islam were one after another expelled from the army. As against those with pro-worker projects and with different pro-capitalist strategies, *Atatürkçülük* (Kemalism) was resorted to as a mobilizing discourse. Some military course books established parallelism between *Atatürkçülük* and Islam, praised celestial religions in general and Islam in particular, and suggested the need to refrain from fundamentalisms and the need to appeal to modern, rational thought. Nevertheless, even after 1980, Islamic groups' efforts to organize in the army continued, targeting specifically the military students for indoctrination. Yet, these efforts met with further purges (Bulut, 1995). Except from these, even today, military network is subject to power struggles. Many journalists frequently make reference to two wings in the army as 'hawks' and 'pigeons' whereas, not surprisingly, the army commanders declare these divisions to be false with an emphasis on the coherence and strength of the Turkish army.²⁵³ Besides, not only relatively collective, but also individual rivalries, some of which are perhaps linked to deeper conflicts, appear to be a common part of the military scene.²⁵⁴ Although the content of the fragmentation has changed throughout time, it is certain that there has been always fragmentation in the Turkish army. Yet, the more the top-down hierarchy became well-entrenched, the less the outside-hierarchy clandestine groups moved closer to capturing the power, while the on-time purges became a protective shield for the dominant cliques eliminating the rival armed elements.

Non-exceptional heterogeneity of the state military network is apparent. However, it would be misleading to think that these power struggles took place without any links to non-state elements. In this respect, Turkish political history presents a number of interesting cases such as the leftwing Madanoğlu junta which failed to capture the

²⁵² Akyaz (2002) suggests that although initially the figures for the purged were presented as 700 colonels in the press, then it was declared that the real figures were 56 generals and 516 colonels (p. 307).

²⁵³ For the arguments and counterarguments regarding the divisions within the army see Dumanlı (2004); Ocaktan (2003); "Özkök: TSK Tek Vücuttur" (2003).

²⁵⁴ For the examples of such power struggles, see Mercan (2004).

state power.²⁵⁵ Yet, it is already apparent that even the part of the state where hierarchy is most well established is not a homogenous entity and is subject to class struggles and other strategic clashes. Meanwhile, the clash of power sources within the state armed networks is not limited to the army. For example in the course of 1970s, when the struggle against capitalism reached its peak, there had been a division even between the leftwing and rightwing police with traces of antagonistic class struggles. By then, the leftwing (including socialist) policemen/women were organized in the association called POL-DER while the rightwing policemen/women were organized in the association called POL-BİR. In certain events, they assaulted each other even physically. The members of POL-BİR were accused of getting involved in massacres against leftwing activists and Alevis (*Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, 1988). Therefore, the 1960-1980 period witnessed a serious division within the police located in the opposite poles of the antagonistic class struggles. As for the post-1980 period, the police force is still not exempt from divisions, but this time not between the left and right poles. Actually, after 1980, there have been continuous pro-capitalist Islamic activities to organize in the police, which achieved also some success (Bulut, 1995, pp. 79, 263-275). The police force became also divided on account of other political orientations with pro-capitalist configuration. Meanwhile, as was mentioned in Chapter 2, some police officers became a part of the Mafioso organizations and some others struggled against this.

In Turkey, there have been also tensions between the elements of the army, police (*Emniyet*), and intelligence organization (MİT, *Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı*) (while there have been also formations covering elements of any combination of the three and clashing with each other), with traces of different strategic pro-capitalist and/or pro-Mafioso lord/madam preferences, and sometimes of institutional rivalries. Mehmet Eymür, a retired MİT executive, reveals these tensions with a variety of examples in

²⁵⁵ As for the 1960s, the junta led by Madanoğlu constitutes a good example of the civilian-military cooperation. It was a leftwing junta aiming at making a revolution. This junta was led by certain discontented leaders of the May 27th junta and was an outcome of the unification of several clandestine organizations. In 1969, the civilian wing of the junta grew considerably with the newcomers. Certain civilian socialists, namely the group which published the magazine *Devrim (Revolution)* with a Kemalist discourse tried to establish links with the army and in 1969, they succeeded in doing so. Then a smaller group of officers became a part of this alliance. Their common aim was to undermine that day's parliamentary order and to establish a government composed of the civilian and military intellectual people. However, this formation could not succeed in capturing the state power (Akyaz, 2002, pp. 272-294).

his website.²⁵⁶ Also the book ‘Eymür’ün Aynası’ (Ünlü, 2001a) indicates even a person employed by MİT can be tortured by *Emniyet* as Mahmut Yıldırım (people in Turkey know him as *Yeşil*) is claimed to have experienced in 1995 (pp. 53-59). In the book, Eymür also mentions an unsuccessful operation against the PKK (*Kurdish Workers Party*) leader Abdullah Öcalan that was to take place with the cooperation of MİT and army while MİT was left on its own shortly before the operation date (pp. 61-67). Similarly, Hanefi Avcı, a high ranked police officer who performed important tasks in the intelligence department, acknowledges the presence of rival groups in *Emniyet*, MİT and the gendarmerie intelligence agency (some people call this agency JİTEM) such as the one between Ağar from *Emniyet* and Eymür from MİT (p. 39). Alaattin Çakıcı who is known to be an *Ülkücü* mafia boss and once worked for MİT also acknowledges these rivalries in his testimonies revealing the power struggle within MİT and among different groups within the state, in relation to the rival political parties, chief exercisers of state power, and businesspeople (see Şener, 2004). Ünlü’s (2001a) book also reveals that both Ağar and Eymür cliques have had elements in different state units, with extensions over non-state elements.

Nevertheless, whatever the fragmentation is on, the ongoing struggle within state armed elements indicates both the limits to and the capacity of the dominant cliques. Although a great many armed elements have remained behind the scene only obeying the legally/officially empowered superiors’ orders whether voluntarily or involuntarily, whether passively or actively regardless of the clique represented at top positions; those armed elements who have remained or who captured the top positions have been determinant in crushing the organizations of those whom they perceived as threat or rival in many instances. For example while the DP leaders were perceived as threat and punished severely by the May 27th junta, the victorious generals’ clique’s preference for the transition to the civilian regime ended in the elimination of cliques led by especially radical colonels who were once active in removing the DP from power by force and effective tactics. Meanwhile, since the preference of the victorious clique of the generals was in favor of a rapid transition to a civilian regime with a relatively democratic constitution, what they saw as legitimate also had some unintended consequences. For example, the relatively democratic constitution of 1961 –which as Yalman (2002) suggested “had provided the legal framework for the

²⁵⁶ His website is <http://www.atin.org>

dominated classes to establish their own economic and political organizations, albeit within certain limitations” (p.34)- facilitated the organization of the worker unions and socialist parties while the successors of the DP could also organize and gain a great many votes in the post-1960 civilian regime. The answer to the question whether it would have been a similar case or not if those radicals led by the colonels rather than the moderates led by the generals had captured the state power and eliminated their rivals on time is unlikely to be positive. The decisive instance became the generals’ armed success bringing a quick transition to the civilian regime regardless of the absence of an active pressure from the masses. As for March 12th, if the Madanoğlu junta which allied with the *Devrim* group could have succeeded (the failure of which owed much to the MİT’s spy activities in the group, again indicating the success of armed networks’ tactics) and also if the other leftwing groups within the army were not purged and had captured the power on time, most probably, Turkey would have faced with a very different trajectory rather than the pro-capitalist terror following the March 12th and September 12th. All those instances indicate that there may be more than one possible way for the socialist forces to hold the state power. However, as the elimination of Madanoğlu junta indicated, those socialist groups detached from the masses are quite fragile to the state spying activities, with the acknowledgment that mass movement is not claimed to be a miraculous antidote since masses can be also intimidated by arresting, torturing, and killing their leaders in a systematic manner and with the blind violent practices disseminating fear and calling in the physical rationality as the post-1970 fascist terror and September 12th pro-capitalist armed practices have indicated. The transition to the civilian regime in Turkey, until now, depended on the leading junta leaders’ will to do that rather than on mass protests. Until now, what they saw as legitimate have been determinant at the instances of those transitions. This has also been the case at times of civilian regimes. For example, even though several army commanders have made declarations against joining the EU in the post-1990 era, they did not make military coup d’états either because they have not been strong enough in the army or (most probably) they have believed in the legitimacy of democratic procedures to a certain extent regardless of their power to militarily intervene. Therefore, until now, what the strong enough armed elements have believed in have proved to be vital for not only remaining in the borders of the capitalist society but also as a safety valve preventing the army commanders to embezzle the property of the capitalist civilians. And especially it is

this sense that the bourgeois ideology can be considered as quite successful in holding the wills of the major elements of the military within the borders of the predominant capitalist order respecting the capitalist elements' property who do not directly command armed elements in general and respecting the prevention of the state elements to run private businesses in particular, given that the degree of its success in taking the masses' consent is doubtful since there is no reliable data to detect it or a strong theoretical reason to assume it to be present but only problematic assumptions on tacit consent. As for the police force, the pre-1980 division of the police force enabling the socialists to gain considerable power in the police turned into the opposite direction subsequent to the fatal defeat in September 12th.

Where the socialists went wrong in the pre-1980 period is a question still widely discussed among the activists. However, whomever the perceived enemy has been (socialist, fascist, Mafiosi), the tactics neutralizing the enemy armed elements have proved to be quite important in several instances while the stronger armed force has generally (if not always) won. Even though there are two armies with equal forces, the one with better tactics would win the war, while in the case of socialist and pro-capitalist forces in Turkey, the forces have never been equally equipped and strong. The socialist forces have always been weaker. Yet, as several historical evidences indicate; forces with weaker equipment may also succeed, depending on the tactics followed. This has been best displayed with a few instances employing mass passive resistance tactics as in the cases of independence movement led by Gandhi in India and the civil rights movement led by Martin Luther King in the US (with the acknowledgment that there are several other instances where they failed and essentializing passive resistance would most probably bring defeat in a number of instances given that, for example, without the civil war in the US even slavery may not have been abolished). Nevertheless, concrete situations require the formulation concrete strategies based on the analysis of the concrete situation, and even strong passive resistance strategies may call in disastrous defeats in many instances if that is not the correct strategy for a particular instance. However, given that the weight of tactics adopted by two parties is equal, strength of the armed force can be said to be the determinant factor.

As for the armed state networks of the post-1980 Turkey, the clash among the armed elements within the state networks seems to have covered mainly the operations disarming/eliminating the gangs (with state and non-state elements) engaged in mafia activities in addition to the standard purges of the perceived threat with ‘unacceptable’ political orientations (such as the purge of Islamist elements from the military). Meanwhile, especially the post-1990 gang operations give the signals of the failure of the non-armed bourgeois ideas/values for those who have become part of such gangs. The rising opposition of the TÜSİAD bourgeoisie against corruption and mafia formations can be considered as the forerunner of a serious line of future conflict, including the future possibility for the Mafioso mode of production –which has already penetrated even in the intelligence networks of the state- to become the dominant mode. Most probably, the path of struggles with clashing forces, tactics and strategies will determine the future of the direction of the class and other conflicts.

4.4 Summary

The major focus of this chapter has been on the mechanisms enabling and/or facilitating the capitalist hold of state power with an elaboration on consent and violence. For the analysis, the examples from Turkey were examined. Examples presented in the chapter enabled to expand particular instances of ‘class struggles’ as regards pro-capitalist strategies and capitalist advantages in steering the actions of state elements in line with short or long term capitalist interests. The analysis was carried out in a micro-macro range, in a way neither to underestimate the micro-level personal ties nor the macro-level opinion formation means. In the chapter, it was argued that the determinant factor has been ‘violence’ in many instances and that the bourgeois ideology can be seen as successful in that the determinant armed elements in state positions respect and even protect the conventional capitalists’ property. Meanwhile, although it was seen as difficult to assess the degree of consent of the masses to the capitalist order, the capitalists were argued to be equipped with a number of advantages to steer not only the incumbents but also the non-incumbents of state positions on account of mainly the material resources they hold.

Among the resorted strategies of the capitalists for holding some state power, it was indicated that contacting the chief exercisers of state power has been a common one

especially among the richer bourgeoisie while their richness seemed to grant them an advantage to contact even the top state elements. Especially for the short-term capitalist interests, resorting to bribery has become a quite common form of utilization of state power, but, at the same time, against which, several capitalists could take action. In the chapter, it was pointed out that the material resources that the capitalists hold has also been an advantage for them to have access to elite communities such as Freemasonic lodges that enable a ground for contact and solidarity with the chief exercisers of state power and opinion leaders, which was thought to be of some advantage to hold some state power. The capitalists' advantage of funding the bourgeois political parties with the power to implement pro-capitalist policies, to disseminate pro-capitalist opinions, and to mobilize some people against those challenging the capitalist interests was also exemplified with reference to particular capitalists (with the acknowledgment that it could not be generalized to all capitalists and that it might also bring certain disadvantages especially if the funded political party does not exercise governmental power). The capitalists' material resources were also held to provide opportunities to have advantages in possessing the opinion formation means such as the mass media. Furthermore, the already shaped pro-capitalist institutions such as the capitalist state or the IMF/WB were also held to have several advantages on account of the material resources they possess. The capitalists' advantage with reference to the material resources they and certain pro-capitalist institutions hold was exemplified in a micro-macro range.

Meanwhile, several instances mentioned in the present chapter also indicated that all exercisers of state power are not the passive servants of the capitalist class. Even the bourgeois politicians could seriously challenge many capitalists' short-term interests while several other state elements could even move to the anti-capitalist camp. Throughout the chapter, it has been also indicated that the class struggle process (including the within class struggles) takes place at a site embracing the interplay of associative and communal relationships, again in a micro-macro range. Even a primary school friendship tie could be utilized to solve a problem of a big capitalist while the very macro level opinion formation means such as the mass media and formal education programs also provided advantages to the capitalist class especially in making reference to the religious and national community sentiments in a way to protect (or at least not to challenge with) the capitalist interests. It was shown that

especially making reference to community identity and utilizing community ties in a way to serve short-term and long-term capitalist interests (whether the community members have consent to the capitalist order or not) have been of some help for the capitalist hold of state power in Turkey. For example, *Sunni* religious communities not only provided bases for attracting some votes to bourgeois political parties, but also constituted a ground of contact between the chief exercisers of state power and capitalist elements (constituting a ground of contact has been also the case for the Masonic communities). Several examples also indicated that, for steering the actions of the state and non-state elements, the reference to perceived 'high' ideals and sentiments which commonly (if not always) have had a community dimension have also become a widely resorted method for enabling and/or facilitating pro-capitalist state practices.

As for the associations increasing the capitalists' capacity for holding state power, especially the business organizations were held to be important bases for capitalist cooperation and action. Also, bourgeois political parties embodying both associative and communal relationships, and at the same time articulating a number of interests and preferences were held to be among the factors increasing the capitalist action capacity with reference to the hold of state power. However, the relationship between the capitalists and political parties (and several other communities) was held to be a dynamic one. The examples presented in the chapter displayed that especially the relationship between the capitalists and governments has had a highly dynamic and intricate character. The analysis of the relationship between the capitalists and state elements has also indicated that the three-dimensional conception of power explains the pro-capitalist state practices more strongly than implementing only a single dimension. Besides, it has also been indicated that it is not as easy to demarcate the threshold of the so-called power bloc and the so-called hegemonic fraction as it is generally assumed to be.

All through the chapter, rather than the consent of the masses, the strong enough armed elements' consent to the capitalist order was held to be the necessary factor enabling the capitalist hold of state power. Given that several top armed state elements see the current capitalist order as legitimate, regardless of the possible other factors influential over those elements such as the material resources they can derive

from the current capitalist order, their reluctance to seize the private property of the conventional bourgeoisie was attributed to the success of the conventional bourgeois ideology, since they do not attempt to do that despite the potential power they possess. Several instances from the political history of Turkey have also indicated that state armed networks present a fragmented picture while the weaker the hierarchy especially in the army was, the more out of hierarchy armed groups moved closer to the heart of the state power. A number of instances also indicated that there has been an ongoing struggle between the state armed elements while at particular turning points, the on time intervention and correct strategy have been decisive to neutralize or to defeat the rival side. It was indicated that neither class nor other struggles have had a predetermined or automatic character. Several instances from power struggles in state armed networks revealed that even the timing (taking a particular step not earlier or later than the correct timing) has had a decisive importance. It was stressed that essentialization of a strategy without making the correct analysis of a concrete context has been likely to bring defeat, with the acknowledgment that a party can be defeated also on account of possessing weaker forces. Armed force was attributed a privilege mainly on account of its advantage of calling in the physical rationalities of the elements of the weaker party and its power of physical neutralization of the active elements of the rival party when successful intervention is undertaken as in the success of the pro-capitalist September 12th military coup d'état. Especially psychological operation techniques of the state and non-state armed elements aiming to intimidate the masses by spreading fear indicated that the living things' very primitive but strong motive of survival (with reference to both the individual and its offspring) in the short-term has been effectively utilized by the pro-capitalist armed forces. Yet, the very same motive might have to do with also the rebellion against exploitation and oppression; triggering the motive of the individual survival (and physical wellbeing) and/or the human offspring's survival (and physical wellbeing). In the chapter, it was attempted to be indicated that armed force has become both an advantage and threat to the conventional capitalist hold of state power, not only on account of the possibility of a strong enough armed rebellion of those forces in defense of the collective long-term working class interests, but also on account of the possibility for the armed elements (whether Mafioso or not) to take the property of the conventional bourgeoisie by violence.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

We'll walk hand in hand some day
We shall live in peace some day
Deep in my heart I do believe
We shall overcome some day

(from 'We Shall Overcome', a Civil Rights Movement
song)

After all the theoretical discussions and examples presented in previous chapters on the capitalist hold of state power, lastly, it would be wise to recall Perry Anderson's emphasis on force as the ultimate determinant of the power system even in advanced capitalist countries. Even a single instance from Chile (presented in Chapter 3) indicated how disastrous the outcomes can be when the destructive potential of the pro-capitalist armed forces is underestimated and when correct tactics/strategies are not implemented by those who long for a world without exploitation and domination. Until today, pro-capitalist forces have spent much on developing strategies at national and international levels in a way to secure particular capitalist interests. In this process, it is true that they have spent much for the dissemination of ideas/values which were thought to be at the benefit of securing particular capitalist interests. But this has not been the whole story. In the academic departments, foundations, and institutes, much work has been undertaken for also developing effective military strategies including psychological operation techniques while much has been spent for also understanding the human behavior/action. As for those who are critical about the capitalist domination, except from a very few academicians such as Perry Anderson, James Petras, and William Domhoff, much of the academic work has focused on the analysis of ideology and discourse rather than paying attention to the hold/exercise of armed power. Meanwhile the integration of human psyche to the

analysis has been neglected by a majority of critical state theorists. However, the analysis of real life instances indicates that several factors have been influential over the capitalist hold of state power in a micro-macro range while the military tactics/means have been determinant in a number of instances. And that is why a multi-level analysis in a way to put the violence back in its place has been undertaken in this thesis. While Chapter 4 elaborated on the case of Turkey with various examples and instances in a way to concretize the multi-level approach proposed and in a way to discuss the limits and privilege of armed force; Chapters 2 and 3 laid the theoretical grounds for the proposed multi-level analysis and the privilege attributed (and limits) to armed force.

In the previous chapters, it has been argued that, in a capitalist society, consent to the capitalist order cannot always be treated as the prerequisite of obedience, while lack of consent to certain given conditions can be assumed to exist for many (if not all) of those who rebel against the capitalist order. What a great many people have deep in their heart may be a world without wars, with no rich and poor, although they may not rebel either due to the needs/desires decreed by their physical/emotional reasons or simply because they do not believe that a peaceful world is possible given the existing human material. Although an elaboration on such needs/desires and exploring the possibilities of a peaceful world requires data from not only such departments as sociology and political science but also from such departments as psychology, biology, medicine, chemistry, and physics, at least the rebellions of the past century indicate that the physical/emotional reasons of a great many people must have been so radically challenged by the capitalist (dis)order that, millions of people rebelled at the expense of their lives, what they possessed materially, and even the people whom they cared about. Therefore, even the living things' very strong motive of survival can be challenged on account of mainly (if not merely) emotional impulses. However, the strong motive of physical survival and wellbeing/satisfaction should not be underestimated, either. Theoretical approaches taking for granted the success of the bourgeois ideology in the absence of strong anti-capitalist rebellions in capitalist societies may trigger two dangerous tendencies: The first one is the belief that the more the people face with pro-capitalist violence, the more they tend to rebel against capitalism (as if they have no motive of physical wellbeing and as if people have a dominant motive of revenge –superior to all other motives- conditioning the

people towards fighting against those who insert violence over them). The second one is the belief that when the exploitative and oppressive characteristic of capitalism is propagated to the people, they become ready to rebel against capitalism (as if what many people long for is not a world with no rich, poor, and wars; as if people have no motive of physical wellbeing; as if people have nothing to care about except from further material gains; as if people are engaged in only capitalism-relevant exploitation and oppression relations; as if knowing about certain factors possibly influential over the enslavement of the individual is sufficient for starting to fight against them; as if sometimes rebellion does not radically harm particular physical/emotional interests of the rebel). With the expectation to steer the masses towards anti-capitalist rebellion; while the first tendency runs the risk of generating isolated terrorizing practices without the will of the masses, the second tendency runs the risk of being stuck in ideological demystification practices. Although exploring the possibilities of a world without exploitation and oppression requires far more attention and theoretical elaboration than decreed by several Marxist state theorists, until now, it has been so easy for many Marxists to put the label of 'bourgeois' over a number of works critical about capitalist domination without any hesitation.

In this respect, Chapter 2 focused on certain conceptual and methodological issues and argued that although several Marxists decreed that analysts integrating micro-dimensions to the analysis of the capitalist state remain in the terrain of 'bourgeois science' regardless of their worldview; adopting particular (if not all) conceptual and methodological instruments developed and/or used by pro-capitalist theorists does not necessarily end in making 'bourgeois science' while provided that such tools as the bourgeois conceptualization of 'profit' are demystified, neither making reference to individuals nor applying the so-called psycho-sociological conception of power to the state renders the analysis essentially 'bourgeois'. In Chapter 2, also class positions were defined in terms of the polar structural positions in the production process vis-à-vis the ownership of means of production and exploitation relations, denoting some degree of antagonism due to the assumed presence of potential antagonistic conditioning, with the acknowledgment that the interests of the two poles may sometimes coincide and that there may be various forces in effect over the individuals other than the class positions they occupy. Besides, it was stressed that class positions are encoded as only a (not the mere) subset of the production relations locations set

and that the wage-worker class members can be considered to have a privileged feature on account of the structural potential conditioning of being mobilized against the capitalist class members interests. It was acknowledged that the wage-worker class members' realization of the short-term interests may sometimes require steps to realize their long-term collective interests. It was also conceded that the wage-worker class members are not exempt from within class struggles and that the wage-worker class members may have also long-term *individual* interests which may be satisfied within the capitalist society in terms of being a better-off self-employed, capitalist, or occupying any better-off economic position except from the wage-worker class position.

In Chapter 2, both the presence of short-term and collective long-term interests of class positions were assumed to exist, which were then used to categorize communities/associations with reference to the degree of actual/potential closeness/openness to such interests. In this respect, two categories were introduced: manifest-class interest communities and latent-class interest communities which were elaborated with reference to the capitalist/wage-worker poles. The categorization of communities in terms of class interests provided the opportunity to open corridors between the communal and associative relations at least in part. In Chapter 2, the presence of a potentially/actually strong economic location; the Mafioso (capitalist) lord/madam category was also highlighted, pointing out that its members owe their wealth to mainly the direct command of armed force. Its members were considered as a potential/actual threat to the conventional bourgeoisie deprived of direct command of armed forces. The Mafiosi was proposed to be integrated to the analysis of the capitalist state. In Chapter 2, also two types of reasons/rationalities were proposed to be integrated to the analysis for developing a better understanding of obedience and rebellion in a capitalist society: Emotional rationality and physical rationality. As a living thing, the human being was assumed to have a strong motive of survival and physical satisfaction/wellbeing while emotional motives were also held to be important steerers of action, vital for especially rebellion against exploitation/oppression (here, it should be acknowledged that empathy, compassion, and mercy can be considered among the virtues of the human being, denoting the possibility of a world without exploitation/oppression). In Chapter 2, given the limited cognitive capacity and time of the individual, for analyzing the capitalist state,

an approach open to integrating the available microscopic and macroscopic variables to the analysis was recommended, and an analysis of a micro-macro range was proposed to be made.

In Chapter 3, in making analysis the need to demarcate the borders of the concepts (e.g. 'state') and to define the limits of the propositions (e.g. 'capitalists hold *the* state power') was stressed. In this respect, the state was redefined in a way to set its distinguishing characteristic as its legal form, to exclude an unconditional necessity of legitimacy from the analysis, and to enable the acknowledgment of the possibility of the presence of state elements' illegal practices. Although some practices portraying partial interests as the general interest were conceded to exist, their success in making the individuals perceive them as such was held to be questionable, while making particular choices was not held to be a necessary indicator of the presence of consent to particular conditions in which the individual makes her/his choice. In Chapter 3, problems with the conceptualization of the so-called power bloc and hegemonic fraction were also stressed. The state was held to be a non-neutral thing with some institutions, the incumbents of which were proposed to be treated as subjects rather than passive agents. The possibility of a multi-level hold of state power was conceded with some degree of dispersion, making it possible to understand several changing combinations not restricted to class positions; while at the same time the possibility of making such totalizing propositions for social classes as 'the bourgeoisie holds *the* state power' and the possibility of some degree of closure for such definitions as 'the capitalist society' were also acknowledged. In Chapter 3, also a distinction between the exercise and hold of state power was made, pointing out the possibility of hold of state power in a micro-macro range, of the presence of instances where it is not easy to detect who holds state power, and of the presence of cases where partnership model may fit to the analyzed instance. However, in discussing the exercise/hold of state power, unlike class positions, the bureaucracy was not encoded as an entity with common interests. Meanwhile, a three-dimensional conceptualization of power was considered to be useful in analyzing the capitalist hold of state power. Individuals were held to be both exposed to some degree of conditioning and capable of making choices under the pressure of shorter/longer-term physical and emotional needs/desires in a context with structural positions occupied and culture exposed to. Actions of state elements were presented in a way to stress that performing a

particular action does not unconditionally necessitate consent to it, that is, the individual may disapprove what she/he does as the action is performed. The structures occupied were held to be granting opportunities to, constraining, and/or conditioning the individual, who at the same time holds some degree of (if not absolute) free will.

In Chapter 4, within the limits of the available data, the proposed multi-level analysis was applied to the case of Turkey with an elaboration on consent and violence, with the acknowledgment that there have been several non-analyzed aspects influential over the capitalist hold of state power. Since several conventional capitalists do not directly command armed forces, some degree of consent of a combination of strong enough elements holding/commanding means of violence was acknowledged to be important for the realization of particular capitalist interests, although the consent of the masses to the capitalist (dis)order was not held as unconditionally necessary for its reproduction. Although the individual's active protest was held to be a relatively (if not absolutely) reliable indicator of detecting the presence/absence of consent with reference to what is demanded or protested, it was underlined that it is not much easy to detect what is consented to in case of obedience. A micro-macro range of analysis was applied to the mechanisms of opinion formation and offering/withdrawing material resources, while at least a few of the factors influential for mobilizing armed elements (who were not seen as restricted to state positions) in line with capitalist interests were attempted to be identified. Meanwhile, factors possibly influential over particular state elements' practices were approached in two respects: Firstly, as the forces potentially/actually influential over the state elements' practices in line with particular/collective capitalist interests; and secondly, the forces potentially/actually influential over the masses' or non-state elements' practices that would in turn influence the state elements' practices by means of contributing to non-rebellion against and/or approval to particular/collective capitalist interests. Factors/strategies challenging particular/collective capitalist interests were considered as counter-forces with the potential to relatively/absolutely obstruct the realization of those interests for a particular time. While the pro-capitalist threat/use of armed force was attributed a privilege for its strong potential of calling in the physical and emotional rationalities of the potential rebels for their concern for the physical/emotional wellbeing of themselves and those whom they care about for a given time (with shorter/longer term concerns), it was not portrayed as omnipotent.

In the analysis, the interplay of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* was exemplified with reference to the capitalist interests, communities/associations, and mass means of opinion formation. The capitalist class was attributed a privilege with reference to the material resources its members (and especially its richer members) possess when compared to those occupying several other production relations locations in contemporary Turkey. The biggest vulnerability of the conventional bourgeoisie was portrayed to be its deprivation from the direct command of armed force, making it exposed to the possibility for state and non-state armed elements to forcibly become the owners of their means of production. In the sense that a combination of strong enough armed elements has defended the interests of a combination of conventional capitalists in Turkey for decades, those values/ideas/material resources influential over that armed combination were considered to be successful in mobilizing them in line with particular capitalist interests. Several presented instances which can be considered among the turning points of the political history of Turkey highlighted the vitality of not only the threat/use of means of violence but also correct tactics employed for holding state power. However, since the individuals were portrayed as potential rebels in addition to their inclination towards some degree of conformity, no pro-capitalist practice was claimed to be omnipotent. All through the chapter, rather than treating the capitalist hold of state power as an outcome of automatic structural coincidences; at least a few micro-macro range strategies and factors possibly influential over the orientation of the individual action were elaborated with reference to the capitalist hold of state power. The analysis of concrete strategies and factors was held to be important, given that this thesis has been written with the purpose of contributing to the process of exploring the possibilities of a world that would be the scene of neither any hunger nor any kind of domination.

Today, the humankind is in a state of collective insanity. Narcotics are handing out death. Organs of the poor are stolen and sold to the rich for transplantation. The flesh of children, men, and women is put on the market for money. All in that play, the Mafiosi assumes the leading role. As for the conventional capitalists, the short-term orientation of the profit has been warming the globe. The concern for market advantages has been killing thousands of people. In the race of arming, the destructive capacity of the power holders has been steadily increasing. Today, not only the poor,

but the humankind is under the threat of the greediness of human being. Unless the destructive capacity of the power holders is destroyed, the prospect is not only a state of global insanity but also the extinction of the human species. Given the extremely gloomy prospects of the humankind, wouldn't spending some time be worth analyzing the capitalist and Mafioso hold of state power? Although this is not to propose to miss the analysis of further exploitation and oppression relations such as the ones from which the women, gays, and ethnic groups among others suffer; this is to propose to pay the sufficient attention to the disastrous capitalist and Mafioso power all over the world. Unraveling the knot not only requires the macro-level analysis of the social, but also the very micro-level analysis of the human nature, behavior, and action. This process needs an interdisciplinary elaboration not only among the departments of social sciences and humanities, but also between philosophy, arts, the so-called social and natural sciences in addition to possible others. As a beginning, organizing not only interdisciplinary workshops sharing knowledge produced by different academic disciplines, but also brain storming sessions covering those both in and out the academic circles would be wise. Above and beyond, unraveling this knot requires a strong resistance to the taken for granted labels put by several Marxist academicians over the anti-capitalist but non-Marxist analysts and a radical inquiry through the roots of the taken for granted beliefs of well-established theories.

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APPENDIX

TURKISH SUMMARY

Devleti inceleme konusu edinen çalışmaların geçmişi binlerce yıl öncesine dayanır. Bugün ise, yaklaşım farklılıklarına rağmen kuramcılarının önemlice bir kısmının, devletin, günümüz bireyinin yaşamını derinden etkilediği konusunda hemfikir olduğu söylenebilir. Varolan kuramlar değerlendirildiğinde, Marxist yaklaşımın esas üstünlüğünün, devletin sınıf karakterini incelemeye yardımcı olacak hayli güçlü çözümlene araçları olduğu görülmektedir. Bu tezde benimsen yaklaşımın Marxist kurama yakınlığı da, Marx ve Engels metinlerinde bulunan sınıf analizi çerçevesine yakın bir çerçeveden analiz yapmasından kaynaklanmaktadır. Öte yandan bu tezin Marxist olma gibi bir iddiası yoktur. Tezde geliştirilen kuramsal yaklaşımın daha önce varolan herhangi bir sınıflandırma içine sokulması zordur.

Tezin temel derdi, zor kuvvetinin, devlet iktidarının sermayedar tutuluşunu olanaklı kılan belirleyici unsur olduğunu vurgulamak, ve devlet iktidarı konusunun ancak ve ancak çok-düzlemli bir çözümlene çerçevesi içerisinde gerçekliğe nispeten yakın bir biçimde incelenebileceğine dikkat çekmektir. Tezin yöntemsel ve kuramsal temelleri ikinci ve üçüncü bölümlerde az çok atılmış, dördüncü bölümde ise, kullanılan ikincil verilerle sınırlanmış olmakla birlikte, geliştirilen yaklaşım, Türkiye örneğine uyarlanmıştır. Dördüncü bölümde, ayrıca, rıza ve zor arasındaki ilişki tartışılmış, zor kuvvetinin (şiddet/zorbalık tehdidinin/kullanımının) kapitalizmin devamı açısından belirleyiciliğine dikkat çekmeye çalışılmıştır. Tezde, kuramsal tutarlılığı ve çözümlene gücünü artırma arayışı içinde bir dizi kavram (yeniden) inşa edilmiş, birçok devlet kuramının temelinde yatan sözsüz rıza varsayımına şüpheyle yaklaşmış, gücün üç-boyutlu kavramsallaştırılmasının faydası üstünde durulmuş, mikro-makro silsilesi içinde kuramsal koridorlar açma yönünde ve eğilimsel çeşitlilik-bütünlük arasındaki etkileşimi keşif yönünde bir iki adım da olsa atma çabasına girilmiştir. Tez boyunca karşılaşılan en büyük zorluk, akademik uzmanlaşmanın getirdiği bölünmüşlük olmuştur. İnsan doğasıyla ilgili varsayımların sağlamlığı doğa bilimleri içinde değerlendirilen bölümlerden verileri gerektirirken (ki

bu eksiklik tezin belki de en önemli zayıflığıdır), psikoloji ve sosyoloji arasındaki bölünme, insan davranışı/eylemi konusunda ayakları sağlamca yere basan bir analiz yapmayı olanaksızlaştırmıştır.

Tezin giriş bölümü olan birinci bölümde, egemen akademik kültürün, yapılan akademik ve/veya bilimsel çalışmaları illa ki de verili kalıplar içine sokma gayretiyle sınıflandırmaya çalışmasının işe yararlığı sorgulanmış, öte yandan egemen akademik kültürden kaçmanın şimdilik zor olduğu kabul edilerek, tezde, birçok çalışmanın benzer bir yaklaşımla değerlendirilmek durumunda kaldığı belirtilmiştir. İkinci bölümde ise bazı kavramsal ve yöntemsel meseleler üstünde durulmuştur. İndirgemecilik-karşıtı bir yöntem benimsenmesinin, bilinmeyen oranının oldukça yüksek olması ihtimali göz önünde bulundurularak, en azından bugün için, özellikle çok-düzlemli bir çözümlemeyi olanaklı kılması açısından faydalı görüldüğü kabul edilmiştir. Bir dizi kavram, yapılacak olan çözümleme için (yeniden) inşa edilmiş, tezin kuramsal temellerinin en azından bir kısmı atılmıştır. Bir kuramın en büyük hatasının, kuramsal yanılmazlık iddiası olabileceği üstünde durulmuştur. Yanılmazlık iddiasının ne gibi olumsuzluklar doğurabileceğini, çözümleme çerçevesinin yanı sıra eylem kılavuzu da sunan Marxist analizcilerin ciddiyetle değerlendirmesi gerektiğinin altı çizilmiştir. Ayrıca, sadece Marxistlerin değil, dünyayı, sömürü ve zulmün olmadığı bir yere çevirmeye çalışan her kuramcının, kuramı törensel bir dogmaya dönüştürme durumunun ne kadar tehlikeli olabileceğinin farkında olması gerektiği vurgulanmıştır. Nispeten doğru çözümlenin, nispeten doğru stratejinin teminatı değilse de anahtarı olduğu ifade edilmiştir. Devleti makro-soyutlamacılık üzerinden çözümleme yaklaşımı; genel olarak toplumsal ilişkileri, bilhassa da iletim kayışlarını, itaati, ve isyanı kavrama noktasında hayli eksik, kimi zaman da yanıltıcı çözümleme aracı sunması, bireyi, işgal ettiği makro-yapısal konumların salt taşıyıcısı olarak ele alması, ve kuramı nesnel olarak (neredeyse hasbelkader) çakışan makro-yapılar çerçevesine hapsetmesi gerekçeleriyle eleştirilmiştir. İkinci bölümde, bireylerin, bir dereceye kadar işgal ettikleri makro-yapılar tarafından koşullanma ve sınırlanmaya maruz kaldıkları kabul edilmiş olmakla birlikte; robot veya pasif temsilci konumuna indirgenmemeleri gerektiğinin de altı çizilmiştir. İnsan, gayet somut nöro-fizyolojik ağlardan müteşekkil (ki her bireyde ve yaşta bu ağlar tamamen aynı olmayabilir), kısmen konformist kısmen de asi bir varlık olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Her canlı gibi insanın da fiziksel varlığını koruma (hayatta kalma) yönünde güçlü bir eğilime sahip

olduğu varsayılmış; öte yandan, bireyin duygusal ve/veya fiziksel ihtiyaçlarının/arzularının bu eğilime meydan okuyabileceği de kabul edilmiştir. Kavramsal meselelerle ilgili tartışma, ussallık ile başlamış, iki temel ussallık biçimi tanımlanmıştır: ‘fiziksel ussallık’ ve ‘duygusal ussallık’. Bu ussallık biçimleri ‘varoluş ussallığının’ bir parçası olarak değerlendirilmiştir. ‘Varoluş ussallığı’ insan eylemini yönlendiren bilinçli ve/veya bilinçsiz ana hesaplayıcı (ölçüp biçici) olarak kabul edilmiştir. Toplumsal çözümlemeyi salt toplumsal-makro yapılara veya salt bireylere indirgeme neticesinde, kuramın, ciddi hatalarla malul olma tehlikesiyle karşı karşıya kalabileceğinin altı defalarca çizilmiştir. İnsan ömrünün ve beyninin sınırlılığı göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, en azından bugün için, indirgemecilik-karşıtı bir yöntemin ve çok-düzlemlerli bir çözümleme çerçevesinin, kuramsal kusurları en azından bir dereceye kadar azaltma noktasında güçlü bir potansiyel taşıdığı ileri sürülmüştür. Toplum kuramı inşa edilirken, insan doğası ile ilgili varsayımları olabildiğince temellendirmenin akli-selim bir davranış olacağına (ama böylesi bir temellendirmenin, doğa bilimleri diye adlandırılan bölümlerde üretilen verileri gerektireceğine), aksi yönde atılacak adımların ise, kişiyi, er veya geç kuramsal açmazlarla ve çözülmesi güç düğümlerle karşı karşıya bırakabileceğine dikkat çekilmeye çalışılmıştır. Ayrıca beşeri/toplumsal bilimlerdeki bölünmenin (sınırlı beyin kapasitesi ve zaman göz önünde bulundurulduğunda bazı getirileri olduğu teslim edilmiş olmakla birlikte) olumsuzluklarına değinilmiş, bilhassa da psikoloji ve sosyolojinin bölünmesinin olumsuz sonuçlarına bu tezin de maruz kaldığının altı çizilmiştir.

İkinci bölümdeki kavramsal (yeniden) inşa süreci, oluşturulan ussallık kategorilerinden sonra, ‘toplumsal sınıf’ kavramıyla devam etmiştir. Çözümleme sırasında karşılaşılan bulanıklığı ve belirsizliği en azından bir dereceye kadar azaltmak için, kullanılan kavramların sınırlarını belirginleştirmenin ve sınırları mümkün mertebe net bir biçimde çizmenin gerekliliği üstünde durulmuştur. Toplumsal ilişki kümelerini anlamlandırmaya bir faydasının dokunduğu ve insan arzularının/eyleminin eğilimsel yönelimini açıklamada çözümleyici bir yardımcı olduğu düşünüldüğü noktalarda, ‘yapısal çıkarların’ varlığı ile ilgili kabullerde bulunmaktan kaçınılmamıştır. Örneğin sınıfsal konuma binaen bazı sınıf çıkarları olabileceği varsayımı yapılmış, kısa ve ortak uzun dönem sınıf çıkarlarından ne anlaşıldığı açıklanmış, bununla ilintili olarak, ‘açık sınıf çıkarı cemaati’ ve ‘gizil sınıf

çıkarcı cemaati' adlarının verildiği iki cemaat türü tanımlanmıştır. Açık sınıf çıkarcı cemaatlerinde, karşıt sınıfsal konumları işgal eden taraflardan birinin ortak uzun dönem çıkarlarının temsilinin dışlandığı, gizil sınıf çıkarcı cemaatlerinde ise (fiilen olsun olmasın) potansiyel olarak karşıt sınıfsal konumların ikisinin de ortak uzun dönem çıkarlarının temsilinin dışlanmadığı kabul edilmiştir. Bir cemaatin diğerine dönüşebilme ihtimali de teslim edilmiş; bazı cemaatlerin ise, kategorik sınırlarının bulanıklaşabilmesi nedeniyle, iki cemaat kümesine de bire bir uymayabileceği belirtilmiştir. Sadece gizil değil, bazı açık sermayedar sınıf çıkarcı cemaatlerinin bile kapitalizm öncesine uzanan köklerinin olabileceği kabul edilmiştir. Cemiyet ve cemaat ilişkilerinin birçok durumda yan yana, iç içe, ve karşılıklı etkileşim içinde bulunabileceği vurgulanmıştır.

Fiziksel ihtiyaçlar/arzular bireyi harekete geçirme noktasında güçlü güdüleyiciler olarak kabul edilirken, bilinçli ve/veya bilinçsiz duygusal ölçüp biçme de, insan eylemini yönlendirme noktasında önemli bir hesaplama merkezi olma niteliğine sahip kuvvetli bir us olarak ele alınmıştır. Maddi kaynaklar, fiziksel ve duygusal ihtiyaçları/arzuları 'bir dereceye kadar' tatmin etme noktasında, biricik olmasa da, çok kenarda köşede de sayılamayacak, kayda değer kaynaklar olarak değerlendirilmiş; buradaki 'bir dereceye kadar' olma durumunun ne dereceye tekabül ettiğinin ise zaman, kişisel mizaç, işgal edilen toplumsal yapısal konumlar, ve kültürel bağlam gibi etkenlere bağlı olarak değişebileceği kabul edilmiştir. Sınıfsal konumlar, üretim ilişkileri konumları kümesinin bir alt kümesi olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Sınıfsal konumlar, üretim ilişkileri eksenindeki belirli bir kutupsallık biçimi üzerinden tanımlanmış, sınıfsal konumlar kümesine (ki bunun da alt kümeleri olduğu varsayılmıştır) dahil olmanın önkoşulu ise, üretim araçlarına sahip olanlar ve bu araçlarla çalışmakla birlikte onlara sahip olmayanlar arasındaki bir sömürü ilişkisi bağlamında ele alınmıştır. Sömürü ise belirli bir zaman aralığında üretilenin/üretilecek olanın (veya üretilenin karşılığında alınanın veya alınacak olanın) bir kısmına, onu üretmeyen tarafından karşılığını tam olarak vermeden el koyma durumu olarak tanımlanmıştır. Sınıfsal konumlar, üretim sürecindeki kutupsal durumlarının, üyelerini, karşıt koşullanmaya itme potansiyeli üzerinden, (kimi zaman çatışan değil çakışan çıkarlara sahip olabilecekleri kabul edilmekle birlikte) bir dereceye kadar yapısal (potansiyel) karşıtlık barındıran konumlar olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Öte yandan, potansiyel karşıtlığın gerçekleşmiş karşıtlık anlamına

gelmediği, zaman, mizaç, kültür, işgal edilen diğer yapısal konular, ve örgüt/cemaat aidiyeti gibi etkenlerin de işçi-sermayedar zıtlaşması üstünde olumlu veya olumsuz etkide bulunabileceği kabul edilmiştir. Böylece, bir yandan bizzat sermayedarların bile kapitalizme karşı olabileceği ihtimali kabul edilirken, bir yandan da bugüne kadar, birçok durumda (her durumda olmasa da), sermayedar sınıfı üyelerine kıyasla, neden daha çok işçi sınıfı üyesinin kapitalizme karşı olduğunu kuramsal olarak açıklama imkanı doğmuştur. Üretim araçlarının mülkiyetinin kamulaştırılması, sömürü ve iktidar ilişkilerinin ortadan kalkmasının yeter koşulu olarak değerlendirilmemiş olmakla birlikte, bu durum, sermayedar sınıfın ortak uzun dönem çıkarlarıyla bağdaşmaz, işçi sınıfının ortak uzun dönem çıkarlarıyla ise bağdaşabilir (sömürü koşullarının bir önceki duruma göre daha ağır olmaması halinde) olarak ele alınmıştır.

İkinci bölümde, cemaatler de değerlendirilmiş, toplumsal ilişkileri çözümlerken bir faydası olabileceği düşünüldüğü için, daha önce de bahsedildiği üzere, cemaatler, sınıf çıkarları bağlamında kümelere (başka olası kümelerin varlığı ve cemaatler kümesinin alt kümelerinin alt kümeleri ve her birinin kesişim kümeleri olabileceği kabul edilerek) ayrılmıştır. Cemaat kümesinin sınırları, 'biz' duygusunun olduğu, iki veya ikiden fazla insanı kapsama hali üzerinden çizilerek, anlık cemaatlerin dahi olabileceği kabul edilmiştir. Günümüz toplumunda cemiyet ilişkilerinin yaygınlaştığı kabul edilmekle birlikte, cemiyet ve cemaat ilişkilerinin çoğu kez iç içe geçerek karma bir görünüm sergilediği, belirli cemiyet ve cemaat ilişkilerinin bireysel yönelimler ve/veya diğer cemaat ilişkileri tarafından sağlanılabileceği, geriletilebileceği, veya çözülebileceği öne sürülmüştür. Aynı zamanda bu bölümde, fiziksel olarak hayatta kalma güdüsü, yeterince etkin sermayedar-yanlısı silahlı güce bir ayrıcalık atfetmenin belitsel temeli olarak alınmıştır. Bu bağlamda, zor tehdidinin veya kullanımının, bireyin, fiziksel selamet içinde olma yönündeki kaygısını ve/veya bireyin, fiziksel selametini istediği insanlara zarar gelmesi ihtimali karşısında fiziksel ve/veya duygusal gerekçelerle hissedebileceği endişeyi tetiklemeye yatkın olmasından ötürü, rızanın, bireyin itaat etmesi için (isyan için olmasa da) koşulsuz bir zorunluluk olarak ele alınması gerektiği görüşüne karşı çıkmıştır. Şiddet araçlarına atfedilen kuramsal ayrıcalık sayesinde, devlet iktidarının geleneksel (silahlı ögelere doğrudan kumanda etmeyen) sermayedar tutuluşunu olanaklı kılan veya kolaylaştıran etkenleri anlamak, yorumlamak kolaylaşmıştır. Bu sayede, geleneksel sermayedarlara

olası bir tehdit olarak ele alınabilecek mafyacı (sermayedar) ağlarının/hanımlarının potansiyel gücünü kavramak da mümkün olmuştur.

Tezin üçüncü bölümünde, kuramsal temel atma işlemi devam etmiştir. Esaslı bir çözümleme yapabilmek için, devletin kavramsal sınırlarını çizmenin gerekliliğine işaret edilmiş, Weberci anlayışa alternatif bir tanım önerilmiştir. Devletin tanımı yapıldıktan sonra, sermayedar devleti (kapitalist devlet) ve sermayedar toplumu (kapitalist toplum) tanımlanmıştır. 'Devlet iktidarının burjuva tutuluşu' veya 'X'in devlet iktidarını tutması' ifadeleri ile kastedilenin, mikro düzeyde, anlık ve noktasal olarak dahi devlet iktidarının tutulabilecek olduğu (devrim içinde, farklı zaman dilimlerinde tutuluşlar barındıran, çok düzlemli, ve çok boyutlu bir tutuluşlar bileşiminin varlığı olduğu), 'burjuvazi veya X devlet iktidarını tutmaktadır' ifadesi ile ise belirli bir zaman dilimi için, (devrimler barındıran tutuluşlar bileşiminin yanı sıra) nispeten sabit, makro düzeyde bir iktidar tutuluşunun kastedildiği belirtilmiştir. Belirli bir öznenin devlet iktidarını (nispeten kısa veya uzun süreli, kısmi veya ortak çıkar doğrultusunda) tutmasından bahsedildiğinde, ilgili erki tatbik eden devlet çalışanının eyleminin, erki tutan öznenin, kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda gerçekleştirdiği kasti stratejik belirleyici eylem(ler)e bağlı olarak ve o çıkarlar doğrultusunda gerçekleşmesi gerektiği kabul edilmiştir (diğer bir deyişle bir olmazsa olmazlık koşulu öne sürülmüştür). Bu konuyla ilgili (mikro-makro silsilesi içinde çeşitlemeler barındıran) dört farazi örnek sunulmuştur. En nihayetinde, iktidarı tutanın ve tatbik edenin mikro-makro silsilesi içinde yer alan farklı düzeylerde tespit edilebileceği durumların var olduğu kabul edilmekle birlikte, tutandan ziyade salt tatbik edeni tespit etmenin mümkün olduğu durumların varolabileceği de teslim edilmiştir.

Tezde benimsenen yaklaşımın duruş noktasının, liberal ve Marxist duruş noktalarına olan mesafesi çizilmiştir. Devleti tarafsız bir hakem gibi resmeden liberal bakış açısındaki hatalara dikkat çekilirken, Marx ve Engels metinlerinde de varolan, devletin tarafsızlıktan uzak olduğunun altını çizen yaklaşımlara yakın durulmuştur. Öte yandan, sayıca azınlıkta olan seçkinlerin çoğunluğu yönetme durumunun kaçınılmaz olmayabileceğine dair beslenen inançtan ötürü, tezdeki yaklaşımın, seçkinci kuramsal yaklaşımdan ayrı düştüğü de kabul edilmiştir. Devlet-merkezli kuramsal yaklaşımdan ise, devletin veya bürokrasinin kendine ait çıkarlarının tezde

kodlanamamış olması gerekçesiyle uzak durulmuştur. Yine de, bu yaklaşımın; devlet erkinin tatbikçilerinin, devlet dışı unsurlar karşısında edilgen varlıklar olarak görülmemesi gerektiğinin altını çizmesinden ötürü isabetli noktalara parmak bastığı da teslim edilmiştir. Marx ve Engels metinlerinde devlet konusunun çelişkilere mahal verecek bir biçimde ele alınmasının, Marxistlerin, ilgili metinlerdeki farklı noktaları ön plana çıkararak yorumlarda bulunmasını beslediği belirtilmiştir. Jessop'ın, klasik Marxist metinlerde saptamış olduğu altı farklı nokta üzerinden yapılan tartışmayla, bu tezde benimsenen yaklaşım, bir nebze daha açıklığa kavuşturulmaya çalışılmıştır. Klasik Marxist metinlerde Jessop'ın olduğunu öne sürdüğü noktalar şunlardır: Devletin asalak bir kurum olarak resmedilmesi (örneğin Asya tipi üretim tarzı tartışmalarında); devletin üretim ilişkilerinin yüzeysel bir yansıması olarak ele alınması (örneğin Ekonomi Politığın Eleştirisine Katkı'nın önsözünde); devletin birleştirici bir unsur olarak değerlendirilmesi (örneğin Engels, Lenin, Bukharin, ve Poulantzas metinlerinde); devletin sınıf yönetiminin bir aracı olarak görülmesi (Marxist-Leninist birçok metinde); devletin bir dizi kurumdan müteşekkil olarak ele alınması (örneğin Engels ve Lenin metinlerinde); devletin sınıf mücadeleleri üstünde belli etkilere sahip siyasi bir hakimiyet sistemi olarak görülmesi (örneğin Lenin'in Devlet ve İhtilal'inde ve Paris Komünü üstüne varolan bir dizi metninde). Üçüncü bölümde, bu altı noktaya hangi açılardan yakın hangi açılardan uzak durulduğu ortaya koyulmuştur. Ayrıca Marx ve Engels metinlerinde yer alan tarihsel maddeci yaklaşımla da mesafe az çok belirlenmiş, üretimi, salt maddi üretim olarak ele almamak gerektiği, öte yandan maddi araçların, bireyin fiziksel ve duygusal ihtiyaçlarını/arzularını karşılama noktasında kayda değer bir öneme de sahip olduğu teslim edilmiştir. Üçüncü bölümün bazı dipnotlarında, iktisatçılar tarafından benimsenen keyfi kriterlere de dikkat çekilmiş, iktisat kuramının gözden geçirilerek gerekirse yeniden inşa edilmesi gerektiği ima edilmiştir. Devlette temsil edilen çeşitlilik ve bütünlük konusunda ise, Marx ve Engels metinlerinde (grupsal çıkarların da devlette temsil edilebileceğine dair ifadeler bulunmakla birlikte) esas vurgunun ortak sınıf çıkarlarının temsiline yapıldığının altı çizilmiş, bütünlük vurgusunun kimi zaman devlet faaliyetleri kombinasyonundaki çeşitliliği ve devinimi anlamakta güçlük çıkarabileceği vurgulanmıştır. Tezde, yer yer, toplumsal (ve hatta bireysel) olanda gözlemlenen eşzamanlı ve/veya ardışık bir yoğunlaşma ve dağılma eğilimine dikkat çekilmiştir (örneğin cemaat ve sınıf çıkarlarının temsili gibi konuların geçtiği yerlerde).

Üçüncü bölümde, ayrıca, Lukes'un üç-boyutlu güç kavramsallaştırmasını devlet çözümlemesine uyarlama önerisinde bulunulmuştur. Bu boyutlardan birincisi, doğrudan çatışmanın sonucunu belirleme noktasında işerliktedir. İkinci boyut, sahne arkasında, belirli çıkarları doğrudan açık çatışmadan ilk elde uzak tutacak biçimde işlemektedir. Üçüncü boyut ise, insanların fikirleri ve arzuları üstünde etkili olacak şekilde işlemektedir. Genellikle liberallerin, gücü, birinci boyutuyla ele aldığı, reformistlerin ilk iki boyutu göz önünde bulundurduğu, birçok Marxistin ise üç-boyutlu kavramsallaştırmayı tercih ederek toplumsallaşma süreçlerini de iktidar tatbikinin bir parçası olarak değerlendirdiği belirtilmiştir. Lukes'un yaklaşımının faydaları üstünde durulduktan sonra, üçüncü bölümde, tezdeki yaklaşımın, devleti, bir 'şey mi, özne mi, toplumsal ilişki mi, inşa mı' olarak gördüğü; bireyi ise, 'özgür iradeli mi olarak, yoksa işgal ettiği toplumsal konumlar ve maruz kaldığı toplumsal etkenler tarafından güdülen bir robot olarak mı' resmettiği hususunda açıklık getirilmeye çabalanmıştır. Belirli bir eylem içinde olmanın, zorunlu olarak o eylemi onaylamak ve/veya o eylemin yer aldığı koşullara rıza göstermek anlamına gelmediğinin altı çizilmiştir. Bu doğrultuda, devlet öğelerinin eylem biçimlerini sınıflandırmak üzere üç kategori önerilmiştir: 'Etken gönüllü eylem', 'edilgen gönüllü eylem', 'gönülsüz eylem'.

Üçüncü bölümde, devlet kuramı oluştururken, mikro-makro silsilesi içinde işleyebilecek bir çözümleme çerçevesi benimsemenin ve şiddet araçlarına hakkettiği ayrıcalığı atfetmenin faydasından bahsedilmiştir. Sermayedarın egemenlik araçlarını ve devletin araçlarını tamamen aynıymış gibi ele almaktan kaçınmak gerektiğinin altı çizilmiştir. Tezde benimsenen yaklaşım, devleti, çeşitli kurumları bünyesinde barındıran, yasa yapma yetkisine sahip, bîtaraf-olmayan bir 'şey' olarak ele almış; devletin kendisini özne olarak görmese de devlet makamlarını işgal eden 'bireyleri' bir nebze de olsa seçme yetisine sahip 'öznelere' olarak değerlendirmiştir. Devlet çözümlemesi ile uğraşan kuramcılarının ve araştırmacılarının, ilgilerini, bir iktidar bloğuna binaen varolduğu varsayılan bir birlik arayışından, devlet ağlarında belirli bir zaman dilimi içinde bulunan nispeten sabit ve akışkan momentlere kaydirmalarının biraz olsun derin bir analizi olanaklı kılacağından bahsedilmiştir.

Tezde geliştirilen devlet tanımı, tezin özünü oluşturmaktadır. Bu tanım, Max Weber'in yaklaşımıyla bazı paralellikler taşısa da (örneğin topraksallık konusunda), devletin varolması için meşruiyetinin önşart olduğunu varsayan yaklaşımdan kökten farklılaşmaktadır. Tezde geliştirilen tanıma göre, devlete, sahip olduğu resmi otoriteyi ve yasa yapma yetkisini bahşeden, o ülkede yaşayan kitlelerin gözünde bir meşruiyete sahip olsun olmasın, (sahip olduğu donanım ve/veya izlediği taktiklere bağlı olarak) yeterince başarılı olan silahlı kuvvetlerdir. Tezde, yasalıcı-biçimci izahatlara saplanıp kalmamaya çalışılmış olmakla beraber, devlet, esas olarak yasal biçim üzerinden kuramlaştırılmıştır. Geliştirilen yaklaşım, silah kuvvetine sahip olanların tamamını devlet kategorisinin altında değerlendirmemiş, devlet içi ve devlet dışı silah sahiplerini farklı kümeler altında değerlendirmiştir. Devlet içindekilerin ve dışındakilerin yasal ve yasadışı eylemlerde bulunabileceği ihtimali göz önünde bulundurulmuştur. Devlet kavramının sınırları mümkün mertebe çizilerek, devlet dışı toplumsal ilişki kategorilerinden ayırt edenleri az çok netleştirilmiş, bu yolla, kavramın analiz gücü artırılmaya çalışılmıştır. Kullanılan kavramların sınırlarındaki olası muğlaklıkların, çözümlemesi yapılan ilişkileri anlamlandırma ve tarif etme noktasında ciddi sorunlar doğurabileceği vurgulanmıştır.

Buna ilaveten, üçüncü bölümde, genel olarak Althusserci miras, bilhassa da Nicos Poulantzas'ın, gücün burjuva kavramsallaştırması olarak gördüğü yaklaşıma başvuruda bulunan ve meselenin mikro düzlemde yer alan yönlerini ele alan çözümlemeleri 'burjuva yaklaşımı' olarak damgalayıvermesi (dinamik bir analizi ciddi olarak engelleyebileceği ve çözümleme yapan birçok kapitalizm-karşıtını, 'burjuva' etiketlemesinden çekinmeye itebileceği için) eleştirilmiştir (birçok Marxistin diğerlerine kolayca yapıştırdığı 'burjuva' etiketi konusu ikinci bölümde de tartışılmıştır). Tezde, gücün üç-boyutlu kavramsallaştırmasından yararlanılmış olduğu için, Poulantzas'ın psiko-sosyolojik güç kavramsallaştırması olarak adlandırarak kullanmayı reddettiği boyut da analize katılmış, devlet iktidarının sermayedar tutuluşunu analiz ederken gücün mikro-makro silsilesine uyarlanması gerektiği noktasında ısrarcı olunmuştur. Devlet iktidarının burjuvazi tarafından tutulabileceği kabul edilmiş olmakla birlikte, ortaklık modelinin geçerli olabileceği durumlar da kuramsal olarak yok sayılmamıştır. Kuramsal olarak, sermayedar-yanlısı devlet politikalarının, devlet iktidarının sermayedar tutuluşu olmaksızın dahi varolabileceği kabul edilmiştir. Devlet, kendine ait çıkarları olan bir 'özne' olarak da, bîtaraf bir

‘şey’ olarak da resmedilmemiştir. Öte yandan, daha önce de bahsedilmiş olduğu gibi, devlet makamlarında bulunan bireyler, ‘özne’ olarak ele alınmış, gönüllülük düzeyi/biçimi ile ilintili olarak üç eylem biçimi tanımlanmıştır. Birey, hem bir dereceye kadar koşullanmaya açık hem de bir dereceye kadar seçim yapma yetisine sahip bir varlık olarak resmedilmiş, liberal-rasyonalistlerin tersine, bireyin, belirli bir kurala uyuyor olması, uyulan kuralı zorunlu olarak içselleştirmiş olmasına yorulmamıştır. Yani, birey, hem bir konformist hem bir asi olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Devlet iktidarının sermayedar tutuluşu çözümlenirken, silah kuvvetine bir ayrıcalık teslim etmek kaydıyla, mekanizmaların, mikro-makro silsilesi içinde ele alınmasının faydasının altı çizilmiştir. Bu konu, dördüncü bölümün de temel eksenini oluşturmuştur.

Dördüncü bölümde, ikinci ve üçüncü bölümlerde kuramsal temelleri az çok atılmış olan çok-düzlemlili yaklaşım, Türkiye örneğine uyarlanmıştır. Bölümde sunulan örnekler, geliştirilen yaklaşımı az çok somutlamak ve kuramsal meseleleri bir miktar daha tartışmak için zemin oluşturmuştur. Kapitalist toplumlardaki sermaye düzeninin tesis edilmesi ile ilintili olarak vurguyu rızanın üstüne koyan yaklaşımın tersine, Perry Anderson’ın zorun belirleyiciliği vurgusu paylaşılmış, silahlı gücün, devlet iktidarının sermayedar tutuluşunu olanaklı kılan unsur olduğunun altı çizilmiştir. Öte yandan, Anderson’dan bir noktada ayrı düşülmüş, silahlı öğelerin zorunlu olarak devlet kategorisine ait olarak değerlendirilmemesi gerektiği vurgulanmıştır. Mikro-makro silsilesinde yer alan çözümlenme; sermayedar eylem kapasitesi ve devlet öğeleri, devlet içi ve dışı silahlı öğeleri harekete geçirme araçları, ve kitlelerin eylemlerini şekillendirme konuları üzerinden vücut bulmuştur. Kanaat oluşturma ve maddi kaynak mekanizmaları, cemiyet ve cemaat ilişkilerinin iç içeliğini ve karşılıklı etkileşimini sergileyecek biçimde örneklendirilmiştir. Bunu, silahlı gücün belirleyiciliği ve sınırlılıkları tartışması izlemiştir. Bu tartışma, fiziksel usallık ve kanaat oluşumu kanalları üstünden şekillendirilmiştir. Dördüncü bölümde yer alan tartışmalar, Marxist kuramdaki Althusserci mirasa mukabil, insan eyleminin iradi yönünü ve benimsenen strateji ve taktiklerin önemini vurgulayarak yürütülmüştür. Bu bölümde, kapitalist bir toplumda kitlesel isyanların olmadığı durumlarda kitlelerin kapitalizme rızasının olduğunu varsayan kuramsal yaklaşımların son derece sorunlu kabuller üzerinden yükseldiğinin altı çizilmiştir. Sayıca azınlıkta olan bir kombinasyonun sayıca çoğunlukta olan bir kombinasyonu sömürmesinin mümkün

olması için, illa ki de sömürülen çoğunluğun sömürülme durumuna rızasının zorunlu olmayabileceğinin, dolayısıyla kısmi çıkarları genel çıkar gibi gösterme noktasında sayıca azınlıkta olan sömürücülerin veya bu kombinasyonun egemen olduğu varsayılan grubunun, kendi çıkarlarını, çoğunluğa illa ki de genel çıkar olarak yutturma noktasında başarılı olmasının gerekmediğinin üstünde durulmuştur. Kapitalist toplumlarda kitlelerin itaatini sağlayan unsurların çeşitlilik gösterebileceği vurgulanmış, bunlardan en azından birkaç tanesi, kitle kanaat oluşturma araçları, cemaat ağları, ve zor kuvveti ile bağlantılı olarak ele alınmıştır. Öte yandan, yapılan çözümlemenin esas hedefi analizi mikro-makro silsilesi içinde yürütmek gerektiğini vurgulamak olduğu için, birincil veri kullanımından ziyade işlenmiş ikincil veriler tercih edilmiş, bu ise tek bir örnek olay üzerine yoğunlaşmayı engellemiştir. Ayrıca ister istemez bölüm, ilgili konularda yapılmış olan çalışmaların hamuru ile şekillendirilmiştir. Yine de çözümlemenin esas hedefi göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, ikincil veri kullanımının getirisinin, götürüsünden daha fazla olduğu kabul edilmiştir.

Dördüncü bölüm boyunca sunulan örneklerden, sınıf mücadelelerinin belirli kesitlerinin ve yönlerinin açılımının yapılması noktasında yararlanılmış, sermayedar cephesinin stratejileri ve avantajları kısmen de olsa keşfedilmeye çalışılmıştır. Çözümleme, mikro düzey öğeleri de makro düzey öğeleri de dışlamamış, kişisel ilişkilerden kitle iletişim araçlarına kadar uzanan bir dizi veçheyi analize dahil etmeye çalışmıştır. Çoğu durumda zorun belirleyici unsur olduğu ileri sürülmüş, burjuva ideolojisinin ise devlet içindeki belirleyici silahlı öğelerin, geleneksel sermayedarların mülküne saygı göstermeleri ve hatta korumaları noktasında başarılı addedebileceği vurgulanmıştır. Kitlelerin sermaye düzenine rızasının ne derece olduğunu saptamanın zorluğu kabul edilmiş olmakla beraber, sermayedarların, sadece devlet kademelerinde yer alanları değil, devlet kademelerinde yer almayanları da yönlendirme konusunda bir dizi avantaja sahip olduğunun altı çizilmiştir. Sermayedarların bu avantajı, esas olarak, ellerinde tuttıkları maddi kaynaklara bağlanmıştır.

Sermayedarların devlet iktidarını tutma yönünde izlediği stratejiler değerlendirildiğinde, devlet erkinin tepe tatbikçileri ile irtibat kurma yönteminin, bilhassa zengince sermayedarların sıklıkla başvurduğu bir yöntem olduğu görülmüştür. Zenginliklerinin, birçok sermayedara, en tepedeki devlet öğeleri ile bile

oldukça rahat irtibat kurma olanağı tanıdığı saptaması yapılmıştır. Kısa dönemli kapitalist çıkarların gerçekleştirilmesine yönelik olarak ise rüşvet vermenin, devlet erkinden faydalanmanın hayli yaygın bir biçimi olduğu vurgulanmıştır. Sermayedarların sahip olduğu maddi olanakların, onlara, bazı seçkin cemaatlerine giriş kolaylığı da tanıdığı ileri sürülmüştür. Seçkin cemaatlerine üyelik, birçok sermayedara, devlet erkinin tepe tatbikçileri ve kanaat önderleriyle irtibat ve dayanışma olanağı sunmaktadır, ki bu durum da devlet iktidarının tutuluşunu kolaylaştıran etkenler arasında değerlendirilmiştir. Sermayedarların burjuva siyasi partilerine parasal destek vermesinin devlet iktidarının tutuluşu açısından önemli unsurlar arasında sayılabilecek bu kitle araçlarından daha etkin faydalanmalarının önünü açtığı belirtilmiştir. Burjuva siyasi partileri (hükümette olsun olmasın) önemli dayanışma ağları, sermayedar yanlısı kanaat yayma odakları, ve sermayedarların çıkarları aleyhine faaliyet yürütenlere karşı insanları harekete geçirme potansiyeline sahip oluşumlar olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Öte yandan, sermayedarın tek bir siyasi partiye bağlanmasının, bu siyasi partinin hükümette olmaması halinde bir dizi olumsuzluğa gebe olabileceği de teslim edilmiştir. Belki de bu nedenle, birçok sermayedarın, birden fazla siyasi partiye destek vermeyi veya hiçbirini açıktan desteklemeyi tercih ettiği belirtilmiştir. Yine de örnekler göstermiştir ki burjuva siyasi partilerine sermayedarlar tarafından destek sunulması, istisnai bir durum olmaktan uzaktır. Sermayedarların sahip olduğu maddi gücün, kitle iletişim araçlarına erişim ve yönlendirme noktasında da onlara bir üstünlük sağladığı vurgulanmıştır. Kitle iletişim araçlarını elinde tutan gruplara bakıldığında, sermaye yoğunlaşmasının bu sektörde de yaşandığı gözlemlenmiştir. Makro düzeye bir derece daha çıkıldığında ise, halihazırda sermayedar yanlısı olan kapitalist devlet, Uluslararası Para Fonu, ve Dünya Bankası gibi kurumların sahip olduğu maddi kaynakların da sermayedarların kısmi/ortak çıkarlarının gerçekleştirilmesi konusunda fayda sağlayabileceği ortaya koyulmuştur. Tezin dördüncü bölümünde, sermayedarların ve sermayedar yanlısı birçok unsurun sahip olduğu maddi kaynak üstünlüğü, mikro-makro silsilesi içinde örneklenmiştir.

Dördüncü bölümde sunulan örnekler, devlet erkinin tatbikçilerinin sermayedar sınıfının emre tâbi sadık hizmetkarı olarak genellenemeyeceğini de ortaya koymuştur. Sermayedar yanlısı siyasetçilerin dahi kimi zaman birçok sermayedarın kısa dönem çıkarları karşısında hareket edebileceği, ayrıca bazı devlet öğelerinin sermayedar-

karşıtı cephede bile yer alabileceği gösterilmiştir. Tüm bölüm boyunca, sınıf mücadelesi sürecinin (ki bu süreç sınıf içi çatışmaları da kapsamaktadır), cemiyet ve cemaat ilişkilerinin (yine mikro-makro silsilesinde) karşılıklı etkileşim içinde olduğu bir sahnede yer aldığına işaret edilmiştir. Bir ilkokul arkadaşının bile büyük bir sermayedarın devlet kademelerinde karşılaştığı bir sorunu çözmeye belirleyici olabileceği, aynı zamanda, kitle iletişim araçları ve örgün eğitim programları gibi makro düzey kanaat oluşumu araçlarının da sermayedar sınıfa, özellikle dini ve milli cemaat hislerine sermayedar çıkarları doğrultusunda (veya en azından bu çıkarlarla çatışma oluşturmayacak biçimde) göndermede bulunarak fayda sağlayabileceği gösterilmiştir. Cemaat üyelerinin sermayedar düzenine rızası olsun olmasın, kısa ve/veya uzun dönem sermayedar çıkarlarına hizmet edecek doğrultuda cemaat kimliğine göndermede bulunmanın ve cemaat bağlarından yararlanmanın, devlet iktidarının sermayedar tutuluşuna bir nebze de olsa fayda sağladığına işaret edilmiştir. Örneğin bazı dini cemaatlerin, burjuva siyasi partilerine kitlesel destek sağlama potansiyeli taşıdığı ve sermayedarlarla devlet erkinin tepe tatbikçileri arasında irtibat kurma açısından zemin oluşturabildiği ortaya koyulmuştur. Sunulan bir dizi örnek, 'yüce' olarak algılanan ülkelere ve değerlere –ki çoğu kez (her zaman olmasa da) bunların bir cemaat boyutu vardır- sermayedarların işine yarayacak bir biçimde göndermede bulunmanın, sermayedar yanlısı devlet faaliyetlerini olanaklı kılmak ve/veya kolaylaştırmak noktasında sık sık başvurulan bir yöntem olduğunu göstermiştir.

Sermayedarların devlet iktidarını tutma kapasitesini artıran cemiyetlerle ilintili olarak ise işveren örgütleri, sermayedarlar arası işbirliğini ve faaliyet kapasitesini artırma potansiyelleri nedeniyle önemli üsler olarak addedilmiştir. Bunun yanı sıra, burjuva siyasi partileri de, hem cemiyet hem cemaat ilişkilerini cisimleştirmeleri, ayrıca farklı çıkarları ve tercihleri bir araya getirmeleri dolayısıyla, sermayedarların eylem kapasitesini yükseltici araçlar arasında sayılmıştır. Bununla beraber, sermayedarlar ve siyasi partiler (ve diğer birçok cemaat) arasındaki ilişki, dinamik bir ilişki olarak ele alınmıştır. Dördüncü bölümde sunulan örnekler, sermayedarlar ve devlet/hükümet üyeleri arasındaki ilişkinin de hayli girift ve hareketli bir seyir izlediğini göstermiştir. Ayrıca, sunulan birkaç örnek bile, Marxist analizcilerin sıklıkla varlığından bahsettiği 'iktidar bloğu'nun eşliğini ve bu iktidar bloğuna ait olduğu varsayılan 'egemen kesimi' belirlemenin hayli zor olduğunu ortaya koymuştur.

Dördüncü bölümde de, kitlelerden ziyade, yeterince etkin silahlı ögelerin sermayedar düzenine rızası, devlet iktidarının sermayedar tutuluşunu olanaklı kılan zorunlu unsur olarak ele alınmıştır. Devletin tepesindeki birçok silahlı ögenin varolan sermaye düzenini meşru olarak gördüğü göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, bu ögelerin geleneksel burjuvazinin (yani doğrudan silahlı kuvvetlere kumanda etmeyen burjuvazinin) mülkiyetine el koyma potansiyellerine rağmen bunu yapma noktasında gönülsüz davranmalarının, geleneksel burjuva ideolojisinin başarısına bağlanabileceği ileri sürülmüştür. Türkiye'nin siyasi tarihinden aktarılan birçok kesit, devletin silahlı ağlarının parçalı bir resim sunduğunu göstermiştir. Bilhassa orduda hiyerarşinin zayıf olduğu dönemlerde (örneğin 1950'ler ve 1960'lar Türkiye'sinde), hiyerarşi dışı silahlı grupların devlet iktidarının merkezine nispeten yaklaşabildiği görülmüştür. Sunulan kesitler, devletin silahlı ögeleri arasında kimi zaman mücadeleler olabileceğini göstermiştir (1960'larda gerçekleşen darbe girişimlerinin ve 1970'lerde Pol-Der ve Pol-Bir arasındaki çekişmenin gösterdiği gibi). Sunulan örnekler, belirli dönüm noktalarında zamanında müdahale etmenin ve doğru strateji izlemenin karşı tarafı etkisizleştirme noktasında belirleyici olduğunu da ortaya koymuştur (1960'larda radikaller ve ılımlılar arasındaki mücadelede olduğu gibi). Sınıf mücadeleleri de dahil olmak üzere birçok mücadelenin, otomatığe bağlanmışçasına seyir izleyen bir doğaya sahip olmadığı gösterilmeye çalışılmıştır. Zamanlamanın dahi mücadelenin seyri açısından belirleyici bir öneme sahip olabileceği vurgulanmıştır. Somut bir durumun doğru analizini yapmaksızın bir stratejiyi genelleştirmenin ve o stratejiyi tüm bağlamlara uyarlamaya çalışmanın, bunu yapan tarafın er geç yenilgisini çağıracağıın altı çizilmiştir. Öte yandan, yenilginin, nispeten zayıf kuvvete sahip olma gibi son derece basit bir nedenden kaynaklanabileceği de teslim edilmiştir. Silahlı ögelere, (12 Eylül darbesinde olduğu gibi) etkin bir müdahalede buldukları noktada, zayıf tarafta bulunan ögelerin fiziksel ussallığını çağırabilme ve zayıf tarafın etkin ögelerini etkisizleştirebilme yetileri açısından bir belirleyicilik ayrıcalığı atfedilmiştir. Kitleleri sindirme ve korku yayma noktasında devlet-içi veya dışı silahlı ögelerin benimsediği psikolojik operasyon teknikleri göstermiştir ki sermaye yanlısı silahlı güçler, neredeyse her canlıda bulunan, kısa dönemli de olsa son derece güçlü sayılabilecek hayatta kalma (kendisinin ve/veya dölünün hayatta kalması) güdüsünü ustalıklarla kullanmıştır. Öte yandan, yine aynı güdünün sömürü ve zulme karşı isyanla da ilgisinin olabileceği kabul edilmiştir. İsyan edenlerin bir kısmını güdüleyen

unsurun, kendilerinin ve/veya insan dölünün hayatta kalmasını ve fiziksel سلامتini istemek ile ilintili olabileceğinin göz önünde bulundurulması gerektiğine dikkat çekilmiştir. Dördüncü bölümde, geleneksel sermayedarlar (silahlı öğelere doğrudan kumanda etmeyen sermayedarlar) açısından, silahlı öğelerin iki tarafı keskin bir kılıca benzediği vurgulanmıştır. İşçi sınıfının uzun dönem çıkarlarını savunanların yanı sıra (mafyaçı olsun olmasın) genel olarak silahlı öğelerin geleneksel sermayedarların mülküne zorla el koyma ihtimalinin, geleneksel sermayedarların çıkarlarını koruyacak etkinlikte silahlı öğelerin varlığının geleneksel sermayedarlar için hayati önem taşıdığına işaret ettiği belirtilmiştir.

Tezin sonunda, önceki bölümlerde yer alan savların bir özeti sunulmuştur. Empati, insaf, ve merhamet gibi erdemlerin, sömürünün ve zulmün olmadığı bir dünyanın mümkün olabileceği ümidini verdiği ileri sürülmüştür. Açlığın, savaşların, ve tâbiyetin olmadığı bir dünyanın mümkün olmasının önündeki en önemli engellerden birinin ise insanların açgözlülüğü olduğu vurgulanmıştır. İnsanlığın topyekûn bir çılgınlığa sürüklendiğinin altı çizilmiş, insanlığın sonunu getirecek bir düzen(sizlik)in hükmettiği bir dünyada yaşadığımız vurgulanmıştır. Bu tezin kaleme alınmasının temel nedeni de, insanın insanı ezmediği bir dünyanın nasıl mümkün olabileceğini keşfetme yolundaki çabalara karınca karınca katkıda bulunmak olmuştur. Tezin çeşitli bölümlerinde, kapitalist bir toplumda itaatin önşartının kapitalist düzene rıza göstermek olmayabileceğinin altı çizilmiştir. Öte yandan, kapitalist düzene karşı isyan edenlerin tamamı için olmasa da, çoğu için, verili bazı koşullara dair bir rıza eksikliği durumunun varsayılabileceği ileri sürülmüştür. Birçok insanın gönlünden geçenin, savaşların da, zengin ve yoksulun da olmadığı bir dünya olduğunun göz önünde bulundurulması gerektiğine işaret edilmiştir. Buna mukabil, birçok insanın isyan etmemesinin, fiziksel/duygusal us tarafından hükme bağlanan ihtiyaçlar/arzular ile ilintili olabileceğinin, hatta sadece ve sadece verili insan malzemesiyle barışçıl bir dünyanın ihtimal dahilinde olduğuna inanmamak gibi bir nedene dayanabileceğinin dikkate alınması gerektiği vurgulanmıştır. Barışçıl bir dünyanın mümkünüğünü keşfetme çabasında olan bir incelemenin, sosyoloji ve siyaset bilimi gibi bölümlerle sınırlı kalması halinde, gerçekliğin ancak yarım yamalak ve muhtemelen de hatalarla dolu bir resmini sunacağı; resmin, nispeten az hatalı bir biçimde tamamlanmasının ise psikoloji, biyoloji, tıp, kimya, ve fizik gibi bölümlerden veri gerektireceği kabul

edilmiştir. Tez, insanlığın durumuyla ilgili bazı hususlara temas ederek son bulmuştur. Temas edilen birkaç nokta şöyledir:

Geçen yüzyılda yer alan isyanlar şunu göstermiştir: Birçok insanın fiziksel/duygusal usları sermaye düzen(sizlik)i tarafından öyle bir zorlanmış olmalı ki milyonlar, yaşamları, madden sahip oldukları, ve kendileri için son derece önemli olan insanlar pahasına isyan etmiştir. Öyle anlaşılmaktadır ki, canlıların hayli güçlü hayatta kalma güdüsüne duygusal itkiler meydan okuyabilmektedir. Yine de çözümlene yaparken, fiziksel açıdan hayatta kalış, selamet, ve tatmin güduları de yabana atılmamalıdır. Kapitalist toplumlarda kapitalizm karşıtı güçlü isyanların olmadığı durumlarda burjuva ideolojisinin başarısını veri kabul eden kuramsal yaklaşımlar iki tehlikeli eğilim barındırmaktadır: Birincisi, sermayedar yanlısı şiddetle karşılaştıkça insanların, kapitalizme karşı ayaklanmaya itilecekleri yönündeki kanaattir (sanki insanların fiziksel selamet yönünde bir yönelimleri yokmuş gibi ve sanki insanların, diğer tüm yönelimlerine üstün gelecek bir intikam güdüsü varmış gibi –ki bu intikam güdüsünün de insanları, kendi üzerlerinde şiddet uygulayanlara karşı mücadeleye koşullandırdığı varsayılmaktadır). İkinci eğilim ise kapitalizmin sömürücü ve baskıcı doğasını teşhir edici propaganda yaptıkça, insanların, kapitalizme karşı ayaklanmaya hazır hale geleceği yönündeki kanaattir (sanki birçok insanın özlediği zenginin, yoksulun, savaşların olmadığı bir dünya değilmiş gibi; sanki insanların fiziksel selamet gibi bir yönelimleri yokmuş gibi; sanki insanlar sadece kapitalizmle bağlantılı sömürü ve baskı ilişkilerine muhatapmış gibi; sanki birey, kendini köleleştiren olası etkenlerden haberdar olur olmaz onlara karşı hemen mücadeleye girişecekmiş gibi; sanki isyan kimi zaman isyancının belirli fiziksel/duygusal çıkarlarına büyük zarar vermezmiş gibi). Kitleleri kapitalizm karşıtı bir isyana sürüklenme beklentisi içinde; birinci eğilim, kitlelerin istemi dışında yalıtılmış tedhişçi faaliyetlere meydan verme tehlikesi taşıırken, ikinci eğilim, ideolojik örtüyü kaldırma faaliyetlerine saplanıp kalma tehlikesini beraberinde getirmektedir. Sömürü ve zulmün olmadığı bir dünyanın ihtimallerini keşif, çoğu Marxist devlet kuramcısının hükme bağladığından daha fazla alakayı ve kuramsal incelemeyi hakketse de, bugüne kadar birçok Marxist, kapitalist egemenliğe eleştirel bakan bir dizi çalışmaya, bir an bile tereddüt etmeksizin ‘burjuva etiketi’ni yapıştırıvermiştir.

Yaşadığımız dünya öyle bir dünyadır ki, yoksulların organları çalınıp zenginlere satılmaktadır. Uyuşturucu ölüm saçmaktadır. Çocukların, kadınların, erkeklerin eti para için pazara konmaktadır. Mafyacılarsa bu oyunun başrolünü üstlenmiş görünmektedir. Geleneksel sermayedarlara gelince, onların verdiği zarar da yabana atılır değildir. Kısa dönemli kâr hırsları küreyi ısıtmaktadır. Pazar üstünlüğü sağlama kaygıları binlerce insanın ölümüne yol açmaktadır. Silahlanma yarışı, muktedirlerin yok etme kabiliyetini devamlı surette artırmaktadır. Mafyacıların ve sermayedarların devlet iktidarını tutma mekanizmalarını araştırmak, insanlığın geleceği açısından hayati öneme sahiptir. İnsanlığın karşı karşıya olduğu düğümü çözmek, toplumsalın salt makro düzey çözümlenmesiyle sınırlı kalınması halinde çok da olası görünmemektedir. İnsan doğası, davranışı, ve eylemi ile ilgili inilebildiği kadar mikro düzeye de inilmeli, mikro ve makro düzeyler arasında mümkün mertebe bağlantılar kurulmalı, koridorlar açılmalıdır. Başlangıç olarak akademik disiplinler arası atölye çalışmaları yapmak, akademi içindekilerle dışındakileri beyin fırtınası toplantılarında buluşturmak, ve oturmuş kuramların köklerine giden bir sorgulama sürecine girişmek akli-selim görünmektedir.

CURRICULUM VITAE

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TEACHING AND RESEARCH INTEREST

- Sociology and Political Science: state theory, comparative politics, political structure of Turkey, industrial relations, labor unions, informal sector, social classes, child labor, gender.

EDUCATION

2000- 2007	PhD in Sociology, Middle East Technical University PhD thesis title: Mechanisms for the Bourgeois Hold of State Power and the Case of Turkey
1999-2000	Scientific Preparation Program in Sociology, Middle East Technical University
1997-1999	MSc in Labor Economics and Industrial Relations, University of Ankara MSc thesis title: Labor organizations in the informal sector
1990-1995	BSc in Political Science and Public Administration, Middle East Technical University

AWARDS

2005	‘The Young Social Scientist Award’ <i>for the book</i> “Örgütsüzlerin Örgütlenmesi: Enformal Sektörde İşçi Örgütleri” (Organizing the Unorganized: Labor Organizations in the Informal Sector) The Turkish Social Science Association
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EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

- 09/2000 –** **Instructor (full time)**, Atılım University, Faculty of Management, Ankara.
- Undergraduate courses taught:**
- | | |
|----------|-------------------------------|
| SOC 101 | Introduction to Sociology |
| INT 101 | Introduction to Politics |
| PSYC 102 | Introduction to Psychology |
| BY 241 | Social Psychology |
| COM 204 | Research Methods |
| INT 203 | Political Structure of Turkey |
| INT 216 | History of Political Thought |
| INT 310 | Comparative Politics |
| PR 308 | Social Structure of Turkey |
- 09/1999 – 06/2000** **Lecturer (part time)**, Atılım University, Faculty of Management, Ankara.
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| COM 102 | Communication I |
| COM 201 | Communication II |
| COM 202 | Public Opinion Research |
| COM 204 | Research Methods |
| BY 241 | Social Psychology |
- 09/1998 – 05/1999** **Researcher**, Fişek Institute Science and Action Foundation for Child Labor, Ankara.
- 07/1996 – 09/1998** **Freelance Translator**
- 01/1996 - 06/1996** **Specialist**, Güriş Holding, Department of Finance, Ankara.

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