A CONSTRUCTIVIST CRITICISM OF NEO-REALIST CONCEPTION OF "STATE" IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: TURKEY'S FIVE MOTIONS ON MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN IRAQ (2003–2007)

ALTAN APAR

SEPTEMBER 2009

A CONSTRUCTIVIST CRITICISM OF NEO-REALIST CONCEPTION OF "STATE" IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: TURKEY'S FIVE MOTIONS ON MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN IRAQ (2003–2007)

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

ALTAN APAR

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN THE DEPARTMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SEPTEMBER 2009

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences.

—————————————————
Prof. Dr. Sencer Ayata
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

—————————————————
Prof. Dr. Meliha Benli Altunışık
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

—————————————————
Assist.Prof.Dr.Zana Çıtak Aytürk
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Nuri Yurdusev   (METU, IR)   —————————————

Assist. Prof. Dr. Zana Çıtak Aytürk (METU, IR)   —————————————

Prof. Dr. İlhan Uzgel   (ANKARA, IR)   —————————————

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last Name :

Signature   :

ABSTRACT

A CONSTRUCTIVIST CRITICISM OF NEO-REALIST CONCEPTION OF "STATE" IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: TURKEY'S FIVE MOTIONS ON MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN IRAQ (2003–2007)

Apar, Altan

Msc., Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Zana Çıtak Aytürk

September 2009, 142 pages

The thesis makes a constructivist criticism of neo-realism's particular conceptualization of state through a comparative analysis of Turkey's five motions (2003-2007) on military involvement in Iraq. Firstly, neo-realism and constructivism with regards to the concept of state are explored. Then, through the lights of the theoretical discussion, Turkey's five military motions are examined. In the case study, parliamentary minutes are used as the primary historical evidences. In the parliamentary discussions, three themes appeared significant-"institutional identity", "legitimacy" and "interest"- which provided the ground for a constructivist criticism of neo-realist understanding of state. These three themes obtained from the discussions are tapped under four major topics which have been the main issues for the constructivists: "agency", "norms", "identity" and "interest". Thesis argues that foreign policy behavior is a political product and "state" is a social actor whose behavior can only be understood from the social, cultural and historical context in which the state-society relations are embedded. Hence, for the purpose of making a structural analysis, separation of the domestic and the international realm of state is a fallacy with which neo-realism is badly plagued. Constructivism, on the other hand, has the potential to bridge this gap and understand the foreign policy behavior of states more accurately since it gives credence to the inner diversity of states through problematizing the ideational elements in foreign policy making and in international politics.

Key Words: Constructivism, Neo-realism, State, 1 March, Political Culture

ÖZ

ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER KURAMINDAKİ NEO-REALİST DEVLET
ANLAYIŞININ KONSTRÜKTİVİST BİR ELEŞTİRİSİ: TÜRKİYE'NİN IRAK'A
ASKERİ MÜDAHALE KONULU BEŞ TEZKERESİ (2003–2007)

Apar, Altan

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Yardımcı Doç. Dr. Zana Çıtak Aytürk

Eylül 2009, 142 Sayfa

Bu tez, Türkiye'nin Irak'a askeri mudahale konulu beş tezkeresi (2003-2007) üzerinden karşılaştırmalı bir analiz yaparak uluslararası ilişkiler kuramındaki neo-realist devlet kavramının konstrüktivist bir eleştirisini yapmaktadır. Öncelikle, neorealizm ve konstrüktivizm, devlet kavramı açısından tanıtılmaktadır. Ardından, teorik tartışmanın ışığında, Türkiye'nin söz konusu beş tezkeresi incelenmektedir. Tezin vaka incelemesi kısmında, parlamento tartışmaları ve tutanakları temel tarihsel veriler olarak ele alınmaktadır. Parlamento tartışmaları kapsamında üç temel temanın- "kurumsal kimlik", "meşruiyet" ve "çıkar"- belirgenleştiği görülmektedir. Parlamento tartışmalarından elde edilen bu üç tema, daha sonra konstrüktivistler açısından dört önemli sorunsalı oluşturan "amillik", "normlar", "kimlik" ve "çıkar" başlıkları altında detaylandırılarak işlenmektedir. Bu tezin temel iddiası, devletin, ancak devlet ve toplum ilişkilerinin gömük olduğu sosyal, kültürel ve tarihsel bağlamında ele alınarak anlaşılabilecek sosyal bir aktör olduğu ve dış polikanın bir siyasal ürün olduğudur. Bu anlamda, yapısal bir analiz yapmak isteyen neo-realizm, devletin iç ve dış alanlarının birbirinden ayrılması konusunda ciddi bir yanılgı içerisindedir. Konstrüktivizm, diğer yandan, karar ortamı açından ve uluslararası politika bağlamında düşünsel elementleri sorunsallaştırması neticesinde devletlerin iç zenginliğine önem vermesi ile bu geleneksel ayrımın kapatılabilmesi ve uluslararası alandaki devlet davranışının daha düzgün anlaşılabilmesi açısından önemli bir potansiyele sahiptir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Konstrüktivizm, Neo-realizm, Devlet, 1 Mart, Siyasi Kültür

To My Dear Mother,

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Not long before, constructivism swept the field of international relations (IR) with the fundamental arrows of criticism that it revealed against the mainstream theories of IR. It has been widely discussed that a constructivist turn emerged in 1990's and the agenda changed direction toward a more sociological approach dealing with the social construction of IR. Basically, it has provided an opening niche for discussions on such fundamental concepts as structure, agency, norms, identity and interest. Today, constructivism still attracts much attention despite the suspicion as to whether it can provide a lasting challenge to political realism remains an open question. Neo-realist theory could not yet digest constructivist challenges to its very foundational acceptances while constructivism has received severe criticism stemming from misty grounds of the constructivist body of knowledge. However, the importance of constructivism is visible and it has acquired a considerable place in IR study. This significance can be more easily shown than its defining characteristics among the intellectual diversity of the work that are marked as constructivist. However, constructivism's emergence in the IR discipline is an undeniable reality and has day by day grown its snowdrop in IR theorizing. Today, increasingly more scholars concern about the social construction of the concepts involved in the study of IR and such basic issues come under the focus of studies with a claim to be in a constructivist vein.

Across the spectrum of the social sciences, a variety of theorists in different disciplines have directly or indirectly studied the "state". Nevertheless, the "state" is mostly central to the study of international relations and likely to remain so into the foreseeable future. In IR discipline, states external behaviors are still the most common object of analysis. Beyond that, in practical world, states also appear to be the main actors, for example, which decide to go to war or choose whether and at what level to establish environmental standards. They also remain chief actors in

producing and implementing international law. They enter into international agreements, and choose whether to abide by their provisions. Even scholars who give prominence to non-state actors cannot totally dismiss the role of states in IR. State-centric or not, IR theories do still heavily depend on the concept of "state" and at least need a notion of "state" even if it is not located at the center of the analysis.

In this respect, even though state behavior in international realm has attracted considerable attention of many scholars and has been subject to numerous studies, a particular area herein seems to be only slightly touched upon, which in fact signifies a serious gap in the literature on "state" and "international relations". Mostly building on the mainstream traditions of IR theories, these existing studies take the "state" as a monolithic entity having *a priori* interests and identity, and that the domestic sphere is rigorously separated from the international one by disregarding influences of the sub-national factors in the context of foreign policy making, subsequently leading to deaf speeches on diplomacy, power politics, and the issues of war and peace. These studies also have a tendency to dismiss the importance of the national legal framework according to which foreign policy decisions are taken and actual foreign policy action is implemented. They also generally dismiss the role of international norms in shaping state behavior. This reveals how the neo-realist understanding of IR has dominated foreign policy analyses and has restricted the ground for understanding the nature of states' foreign policy actions more accurately. Even tough the concept of "state" still remains the most important element in IR discipline, literature on IR dominantly seems to evaluate it as a given entity without going deep into how actually state actions are formed and are implemented.

Hence the aim of this thesis is to address this gap and to bridge traditionally separated international and domestic spheres of state, and to bring inner dynamics of the political system into the international relations theorizing trough a constructivist study on the internal variables that Kenneth Waltz recognized but nevertheless neglected in his neo-realist theory.

After identifying the promise of constructivism in understanding state's international behavior, this thesis tries to elaborate the concept of state in constructivist theory and questions the "neo-realist conception of state" through a comparative case study on five Turkish military motions respectively dated 6 February 2003,1 March 2003, 20 March 2003,7 October 2003 and 17 October 2007.

All of these motions are related with Turkish military involvement in Iraq and one of them that of 1 March, was rejected while all others were accepted in the parliament.

Four of these motions which took place in 2003 point at one of the most discussed issues in recent Turkish politics. They are related with the rapid and determined American intervention in Iraq. As the intervention is contested worldwide, any possible Turkish involvement in Iraqi territory also created much discussion and repercussion in Turkish politics. Famous 1 March motion did not pass in the parliament and had severe consequences for American-Turkish relations in the following years.

As it is widely known, after 9/11 attacks, the United States of America (USA) adopted its new national security concept on September 20, 2001 and named as "Bush doctrine" which declared that the USA would not hesitate to use pre-emptive strike to prevent a *security* threat. Within the context of an international atmosphere of alarm resulted from 9/11 attacks, American operations in Afghanistan practically started American struggle with international terrorism. This pre-emptive war on terrorism continued with the invasion of Iraq. It has been widely contested and repudiated by many countries on the grounds of illegality of the intervention according to international law.

In such an environment, before the invasion, following the negotiations with American officials, Turkish government prepared a motion about sending Turkish troops abroad and deployment of foreign forces in Turkish territory. This motion was widely contested in Turkish opinion and rejected on March 1, 2003 by Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). Single party government's desire to get involved in Iraq was not accepted and the government despite having an overwhelming majority in the parliament could not succeed in acquiring the legal authorization for the proposed foreign policy action.

Rejection of 1 March motion triggered discussions in different circles and out of these discussions different answers and explanations came out. Some pointed at ethnic diversity of Justice and Development Party (AK Party) members of the parliament (MPs), some other emphasized the discontent and dissidence within AK Party higher echelons, and some other indicated AK Party's failure to take a group decision before the parliamentary voting. However, besides all, in this thesis an examination of the five motions reveals that there is something different peculiar to

Turkish political culture and institutional framework, which can best be articulated and understood within a constructivist framework.

On the other hand, 17 October 2007 motion is striking from the perspective that the parliament sweepingly accepted government's proposal to send troops and make operation in Northern Iraq in 2007. Despite a serious time lag of almost four years, 17 October 2007 motion was included to analysis because it represents a test case for the thesis. From the discussions regarding the motions of 2003 what have been analytically inferred as three themes, "institutional identity", "legitimacy" and "interest" are consistent with the discussions regarding the last motion. Thus, it is possible to say that the inferences from other four motions are validated by the discussions taken part in the parliament on October 17, 2007. In addition, examination of the last motion added a new element to the analysis which appears to support the constructivist dimension of the thesis in general.

METHODOLOGY

Since Kenneth Waltz is the most prominent proponent of neo-realism, his influential work *Theory of International Politics* (1979) is taken as the main neo-realist reference point for the thesis. However, when neo-realist conception of state is discussed different neo-realist approaches namely John Mearsheimer[1] and Robert Gilpin's approaches are briefly introduced. These names are taken into account since their approaches to state significantly differ from Waltz and bear importance in terms of the case study under the focus of the thesis.

Similarly, given the great diversity among constructivism, constructivism has been taken into account in a lump-sum manner and, rather than going into details of different studies of different constructivists, main tenets of constructivism is discussed. However, complying with Christian Reus-Smit's typology about constructivism, this thesis acknowledges a distinction between systemic, unit-level and holistic constructivism and problematizes the "corporate identity" which was

---

[1] Offensive realism which is popularized by Mearsheimer is generally depicted as a distinct theory from that of Waltz on an axis of offensive-defensive debate. In this thesis offensive realism is considered as a variant of neo-realism. This is because offensive realism is a structural theory which takes its starting principles from the anarchic order of the international poiltics and states' survival motives. Thus, offensive realism is considered in a continuity within the vein of the neo-realist theory since Mearsheimer uses the same basis which Waltz begins with but reaches different results.

indicated but left aside by Alexander Wendt's systemic constructivism. In this respect, this thesis comes closer to a unit-level approach, as it wants to excavate in domestic internal dynamics including identity and norms. Besides, the thesis not only unmasks the domestic determinants of state behavior, it shows also international and domestic normative structural constraints on state behavior and how this normative structure constructs the reality as a domestic determinant of state behavior as well. Hence, the thesis takes into account the domestic and the international spheres of state as a whole similar to the holistic approach. In this respect, for this thesis, explaining the construction of the reality about the international in the domestic realm and showing how ideational factors do matter are crucial. The main goal of the thesis, then, is to show how state behavior is consequently shaped.

Main resources of the study are primary resources. Parliamentary minutes, specifically speeches and statements made by the political party members about these motions in the parliament are taken as the historical evidences which are used for questioning the neo-realist conceptualization of "state". The main guide of the thesis is constructivist criticisms raised against neo-realist accounts of international relations.

Norms, identity and interest linkage appears to have a central importance for this thesis' methodology and purpose. Besides, the thesis makes a brief historical-sociological inquiry into normative and institutional structure of the Republic through the lenses of the parliamentary discussions concerning military involvement abroad. Similarly for the same purpose, political parties' peculiar positions and socio-political attitudes about state and society in Turkey are also included to the analysis. By this way, inner dynamics of the state are taken into account by the insertion of the historical and sociological dynamics of the state-society complex and the limiting attitude of neo-realism is addressed.

In its essence, this thesis tries not only to examine neo-realism's particular approach to state as an international actor with the constructivist criticisms but also to operationalize these criticisms in a comparative case study in which parliamentary motions from 6 February 2003 to 17 October 2007 are examined in detail. Particular emphasis given to the parliament in this thesis does not mean that the parliament is taken into account as the primary agent in foreign policy making in Turkey. Rather, it appears significant since, the parliament is given a democratic leverage power on

the government regarding the foreign policy issues related with the conditions set by the Article 92 of the constitution. In other words, this thesis does not overemphasize the parliament by claiming the superiority of the parliament over the government in foreign policy making in general. Rather it tries to underline that with regards to specific examples of these five motions at hand, the role given to the parliament in the final decision to authorize the government's proposed motions demonstrates that decision environment can not be merely associated with rational considerations but also there appears other elements interfering in decision environment. In addition, what is desired to be done here is not to propose that foreign policy decisions are immune to realist considerations and realism has no explanatory power, rather, this thesis claims that ideational factors should also be taken into account in order to understand state behavior more accurately. Because, the case study of this thesis shows that there are situations in which some other variables are influential in decision environment. Ideational factors are ignored by neo-realists and this thesis actually tries to emphasize the importance of those factors in shaping foreign policy behavior.

ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS

After the introduction, a theoretical discussion chapter takes part. In this chapter, firstly a brief history of realism in IR theorizing is introduced. Then, neo-realist theory of Kenneth Waltz is explored in general and then the place of "state" in neo-realist theory is explained. Waltz's theory is the most important theoretical guide on thesis' handling of neo-realism. However, in explaining the concept of state in neo-realist theory, Mearsheimer and Gilpin's approaches are also emphasized. Secondly, constructivist theory is explained in a lump-sum manner with its main premises without going into detail of different constructivist studies. However, three approaches, specifically, Alexander Wendt, Peter Katzenstein, John Gerard Ruggie and Friedrich Kratochwil's particular ways of constructivism, are shortly introduced in order to put forward the problematique of the thesis. Afterwards, the novelty of constructivism on the concept of "state" is laid down with regards to particular important points that this thesis' case study highlights.

After the theoretical discussion, firstly, a brief descriptive narrative regarding American intervention in Iraq and its domestic repercussions in Turkey are given. Then, motions are respectively introduced and discussions that took place in the parliament concerning these motions are evaluated from the lenses of three themes. These themes, "institutional identity", "legitimacy" and "interest", are detected significant from the discussions by a constructivist reading. In order to make the thesis considerably achievable, some discussions are chosen and some are not presented. This actually means that parliamentary discussions provide ample evidences for a constructivist analysis and a pay-off is purposively made.

The fourth chapter lays down the conceptual framework for a constructivist criticism, which tries to combine the findings from the theoretical discussion and the case study of this thesis. In this chapter, findings from the discussions which are organized under three themes are further tapped under four topics, "agency", "identity", "norms" and "interest", which have taken important place in constructivist agenda from constructivism's emergence as an important theoretical approach to IR study.

Lastly, the thesis concludes with a final analysis which tries to put light on the issue of the domestic and the international separation. Finally, theoretical assessment of the thesis' case study shows that state is a social actor whose behavior is best understood with social, cultural and the historical context in which it is embedded.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL DISCUSSION: "STATE" IN NEO-REALISM AND CONSTRUCTIVISM

IR discipline was born in the immediate aftermath of WW1 and the studies on the international have grown with a rapid pace in a missionary zeal. Political idealism was a product of a normative approach to security concerns, which tried to form a shield designed to make world politics immune from the old practices of Europe, which then declared as the sole enemy of international peace. Fundamental controversy of the academics of the time focused on offering practical and normative solutions to threats to international security environment defined in a Wilsonian agenda.

The destruction in the battlefields of the WW1 without doubt was an appalling breaking point for the policy-makers and produced a tide of reactions. First, the guilt of war was personified; shame of the great destruction was assigned to Kaiser of Germany. Germany was made subject to a harsh treatment embodied in shackles of the Versailles treaty. Beyond the fact that Germany condemned to moral responsibility, more importantly traditional practices of international relations were also despised and declared culpable. Politicians mostly Americans and the British mobilized efforts for changing the system to prevent its recurrence. Correspondingly, taking their basic premise from the priorities of the devastation caused by the war, scholars buttressed political discourse of the time with a strong academic tone.

During the inter-war period what early "realists" called "utopians" disdained balance of power politics, armament, the use of force in international affairs, as well as the secret treaties of alliance that preceded WW1. Instead, they stressed international legal rights and obligations, a natural harmony of interest in peace-reminiscent of Adam Smith's invisible hand- as a regulator for the preservation of international peace, heavy reliance on reason in human affairs, and confidence in the peace building function of world public opinion (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001:

65). Luring behind these understanding was the assumption that surrounding circumstances shape human behavior and such factors can be altered for the purpose of changing the patterns of human behavior. Utopianism holds that human kind is perfectible or at least capable of significant improvement. Practically diagnosis and prescription after the WW1 were concerned with the domestic politics. According to Wilsonian idealism, people do not want war; war comes about because people are led into it by militarists or autocrats, or because their legitimate aspirations to nationhood were blocked by undemocratic and multinational imperial system. Here the answer was promoting the democratic liberal systems, that is liberal democracy based on the national self-determination principle. The rationale was that if all regimes were national and liberal democratic, there would be no war (Brown, 2005: 21).

Wilsonian idealism's basic thesis here was that pre-1914 international institutional structures undermined the prospects for peace. Secret diplomacy led to alliance system, which was not limited by the Parliaments or assemblies. In this respect, there was no control over the use of power except balance of power. At the international level, the political environment can be transformed by the new institutions that are conducive to the development of peace. By the establishment of norms of conduct, political behavior can be altered. Ones such standards are set forth, it will be possible to create educated electorates and leadership capable of accepting and promoting those standards (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001:66). According to this understanding, the aim of the League of Nations would be to provide security that nations aspired to, unsuccessfully, through the old, balance of power system. Balance of power was based on private commitments of assistance made by specific parties; however, the League would provide public assurances of security backed by the collective will of all nations- hence collective security (Brown, 2005:22).

As WW2 hit a deadly blow to idealist premises of the interwar period, political realism gained the pioneering and the steering role in the direction of how international relations took shape. In an ideologically polarized political architecture, realism put a bible in front of political leaders without any references to ethical values and norms. Realism offered a rationalist agenda that dominated the field for years in a form of an unchallenged triumph filled with pragmatic, inductive approach and a simple tool package for use.

Although roots of political realism can be traced back to ancient Greek philosophy and medieval Europe, in the writings of Thucydides and Machiavelli, its classical form carries a number of key thinkers, most significantly Edward Hallet Carr and Hans Joachim Morgenthau. As with other theories and approaches, classical realism as developed by these thinkers emerged out of a historical context characterized by the instability of interwar period between 1919 and 1939 or "the twenty years crisis" called after Carr's famous book.

It was E. H Carr, quasi-Marxist historian, who published his book Twenty Years Crisis in 1939 as a heavy critique of the political idealism of post WW1. Even though during the inter-war years radical American theologian and critic Reinhold Niehbur conveyed realist messages emphasizing that it was unrealistic to acknowledge human capacity for good can be harnessed to the goal of international peace under such organizations as the League of Nations, Carr's critique of post-WW1 politics offered crucially a new vocabulary to the theory of international relations. Carr named the dominant position of international relations as "utopianism" and compared it with his approach, which he named as realism. According to Carr, liberal doctrine of harmony of interest hides the real sources of conflict, which is between the "haves" and "have-nots". The central feature of the world is scarcity and those who have the things want to keep them, and therefore promote "law and order" policies, and attempt to outlaw the use of force. On the other hand, "have-nots" do not have such respect for the law that keeps them where they are, which is under the thump of the "haves" (Brown, 2005:26). Analyzing the inter-war period, Carr concludes hat "the inner meaning of the modern international crisis is the collapse of the whole structure of utopianism based on the concept of harmony of interests". According to his understanding, utopian theory of the era merely justified the interest of the dominant English speaking status-quo powers, of the satisfied versus unsatisfied, and of the "haves" versus "have-nots" (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001: 67). Carr sees the politics not as a function of ethics, but rather ethics as a function of politics, accordingly, theory does not create practice but practice forms theory (Donnely, 2000:8). It is realistic to recognize that the essential conflict between the "haves" and "have-nots" should be managed rather than wished away. It is utopian to imagine that international bodies such as the League of Nations

can have real power. Realist works with the world as it really is, whereas utopians as they wish it to be (Brown, 2005:26).

After 1945, realism became the dominant theory of IR and became the common sense on international relations for the academicians and diplomats alike. Although Carr remained influential since he continued his carrier on USSR history, the post war dominance of realism owed more to the works of other writers. In Britain Martin Wight, in United States Reinhold Niehbur and Nicholas Spykman and the diplomat George Kennan were influential. However, the key realist of the time was Hans J. Morgenthau whose book titled as *Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace*" published in 1948 significantly laid the foundations for a realist agenda. According to John Vazquez, Morgenthau's work was the single most important vehicle for establishing the dominance of the realist paradigm in the study of international relations especially in the United States (Vasquez, 1983:17).

Morgenthau's conceptualization of political realism is predicated upon the assumption that mainspring of realism as lying not in scarcity, a product of human condition but in sin, a product of human nature. The aggressive power seeking nature of states stems from the imperfect human material of which they are constructed (Brown, 2005:29). In his systematized realism, Hans Morgenthau gives a list of six principles of political realism (Morgenthau, 1978:4-15)

First, politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature which is unchanging: therefore it is possible to develop a rational theory that reflects these objective laws.

Second, the main signpost of political realism is the concept of interest defined in terms of power which infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible. Political realism stresses the rational, objective and unemotional.

Third, realism assumes that interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid but not with a meaning that is fixed once and for all. Power is the control of man over man.

Fourth, political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. it is also aware of the tension between moral command and the requirements of successful political action.

Fifth, political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. It is the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves us from the moral excess and political folly.

Sixth, the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere. He asks "How does this policy affect the power of the nation?" Political realism is based on a pluralistic conception of human nature. A man who was nothing but "political man" would be a beast, for he would be completely lacking in moral restraints. But, in order to develop an autonomous theory of political behavior, "political man" must be abstracted from other aspects of human nature. Political actions must be judged by political criteria but not other moral understandings (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001:77).

As it is seen, key to Morgenthau's theory is the understanding that politics is governed by the objective laws rooted in human nature according to which political units think and act in terms of interest defined as power. In power struggles, nations follow policies designed to preserve the status quo, to achieve imperialistic expansion, or to gain prestige. In Morgenthau's view, domestic and international politics can be reduced to one of three basic types, a political policy seeks either to keep power, to increase power or to demonstrate power (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001:77).

Morgenthau does not believe that interest desire to have power changes according to the context. For him, it is the essence of politics unaffected by the circumstances of time and place. What can change is only the content of power and the means to be employed to achieve it. Thus, the meaning of power is not fixed and dependent on the political and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated. Morgenthau defines international politics as a constant struggle for power. In that regard, domestic politics and international politics are perceived as having the same objective: amassing power. Furthermore, state interests are fixed to power which is relative since the amount of power that a state possesses is always compared to the power of others. Thus, power in absolute terms does not have much relevance in international relations rather the power of a state is significant when compared to the power of other states.

2.1. NEO-REALISM

While Morgenthau's 1948 text dominated the post-WW2 IR theory, contemporary IR is fixated on Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* (1979). Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* constitutes the central text of contemporary realism and presents an excellent example of structural realism. In fact, by his study, not only realism is revised but also the behavioralists were given a structural response. In the 1960's it was said that IR theory constituted a debate between Morgenthau and his critics; in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s the name of Waltz should be substituted for that of Morgenthau. (Brown,2005:40).

Kenneth Waltz can be said to have shaped the IR theory more than anyone. He developed a structural realism which gives importance to systemic analysis. Waltz's agenda is to redress the realist understanding with a more scientific posture through adopting structure level concerns. Behavioral critics of realism did not focus on state centric analysis but on realist usage of *a priori* assumptions depending on human nature which were not cable of being testified with observation. On the other hand, In Waltz's realism, anarchic structure and its effects on state behavior receive a particular focus. He constructs a neat linkage between anarchic structure in international environment and the uncertainty and insecurity among states: it is this structure that makes states confront a severe problem for survival. His explanation of the causes of wars and conflicts focuses on the security dilemma of states which simply emerges from a fear of being torn apart by other states. Structural realism changed the basic premises of classical realism so that the causation concerning the international behavior should be sought at the systemic level or at the international political level rather than at the individual or the state level. International system, like all social systems has a structure and interacting units. The structure of the system which is composed mostly of states influences the interacting units, and the international structure acts as a constraint on state behavior; as a result, only states whose outcomes fall within an expected range of behavior survive.

According to Waltz, international state system has three distinctive characters. First it is anarchic. Second, states are unitary and functionally undifferentiated. Third, the differences in distribution of the capabilities describe the shape of the system. Waltz privileges systemic effects on national policy and anchors

the motivations which inform that policy in the pressures coming from a feeling of insecurity which is a product of an anarchical structure. Shifts in the balance of relative capabilities are regarded as the main determinant of international system which shapes the state behavior. In other words, neo-realism deals with the international system as the structure that shapes the political relationships taking place among its parts. Within this vein, international politics is more than the summation of the foreign policies and the behavior of states. Waltz offers patterned relations among states in a system of anarchy in which the actors have horizontal way of conduct in a platform of equal sovereignty. According to Waltz, states are unitary actors, who, at a minimum seek their own preservation and at a maximum strive for universal domination (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001:80-93)

According to Waltz, theories of international politics that concentrate causes at individual or national level are reductionist; theories that conceive of causes operating at the international level as well are systemic. In the reductionist approach, the whole is understood by knowing the attributes and the interactions of its parts (Waltz, 1979:19). Such analyses are sufficient only where systems-level effects are absent or are weak enough to be ignored. It will be insufficient and a systems approach will be needed if outcomes are affected not only by the properties and interconnections of variables but also by the way in which they are organized. According to him, a system is defined as a set of interacting units. At one level, a system consists of a structure and the structure is the systems level component that makes it possible to think of the units as forming a set as distinct from a mere collection. At another level, the system consists of interacting units. In international politics, system level forces seem to be at work (Waltz, 1979:39-40). According to Waltz, those who attribute their studies as systemic studies are in a methodological misunderstanding since their approaches do not represent the system level element, "structure" rather they focus on the characteristics of the "state" and their interactions, and lack the systemic effects on the units. In this respect, these studies are reductionist and the level of analysis stays in state level rather than the system level. Structure is what is missed in these analyses and it is the system level which is the operating characteristic of a political system. Political scientists, whether traditional or modern in orientation, reify their systems by reducing them to interacting parts. Once the system is reduced to its interacting parts, the fate of the

system can be determined only by the characteristics of its major units. It is not possible to understand world politics simply by looking inside of states. If the aims, policies and the actions of states become matters of exclusive attention, analysis is forced back to descriptive level, and from descriptions no valid generalizations can be logically drawn. Central concern with inside of the state designates another unit-level variable as a cause. Waltz asks: if the changes in international outcomes are linked directly to changes in actors, how can one account for similarities of outcome that persist or recur even when actors vary? One who believes that he can account for changes in international politics must also ask how continuities can be explained. (Waltz, 1979:60-65).

Despite vide variations in attributes and in the interactions of states and other international actors Waltz is impressed by the striking sameness in the quality of international life through the millennia. According to him, since the variety of actors and the variations in their actions are not matched by the variety of outcomes, it appears that systemic causes are in play. Variations in the characteristics of the units are not linked directly to the diversity in the outcomes of their behavior produces, nor variations in patterns of interaction match with the variations at the unit level. According to his understanding, why the range of expected outcomes falls within certain limits, why patterns of behavior recur, why events repeat themselves including events that none or few actors may desire is because the structure of the system acts as constraining and disposing force and it is the system theories that explain and predict continuity within a system (Waltz, 1979: 69). Structure selects by rewarding some behavior and punishing others; so the outcomes cannot be inferred from intentions and the behavior. Structure limits and molds agents and, hence, their behavior despite their aims and efforts vary (Waltz, 1979: 74). These similarities, he argues, arise from the persistent structure of international anarchy.

According to Waltz, defining political structures requires understanding how units stand in relation to one another, how they are arranged and positioned. Interactions among the units take place at the level of the units, on the other hand, the way they are arranged or positioned is a property of the system. A system is defined by the arrangement of its parts and the structure, which is an abstraction, defined by the arrangement of the system's parts. According to him, political structures are first

distinguished by their ordering principle, second the character of the units and, third, by the distribution of capabilities (Waltz, 1979:80).

Domestic systems are centralized and hierarchic; some units are entitled to commend, and others are required to obey. The parts of the domestic political systems stand in hierarchical relations, in contrast international politics characterized by the absence of government. There is no supreme government over states or an orderer. In the absence of agents with system wide authority, formal relations of super and subordination fail to develop (Waltz: 1979:88). International anarchy is the structural ordering principle from which state behavior seems to flow. The behavior of actors in a system depends on how they are organized. Waltz gives two types of organizational principles which are hierarchy and anarchy. Hierarchy describes how politics is organized within states which has the monopoly of legitimate violence and characterized by a division of labor among diverse branches of government. Anarchy is the way how international politics is organized where there is no center of power giving way to states adopting self-regarding strategies for survival. This self-regarding strategy is based on the conditions of self-help since some states may at any time use force and therefore all states must be prepared to do so or live at the mercy of their militarily more vigorous neighbors. Among states the state of nature is a state of war. This meant not in the sense that war constantly occurs but in the sense that with each state deciding for itself whether or not to use force, war may at any time break out (Waltz, 1979:102). He characterized this phenomenon by saying "Anarchy is permissive of war" in his *Man, the State and War* (1959). Thus, anarchy is the concept denoting a lack of an orderer and anarchy prevails even when there is some kind of an order in the system which is spontaneously formed by the self interested acts of the units. Self-help behavior then appears to be the invisible hand of the international anarchy similar to micro-economic explanations of the foundations of the market behavior, which results in a market equilibrium. According to Waltz international structures are defined in terms of the primary political units, be they city states, empires or nations; structures emerge from their coexistence, namely their self-help behavior by which states seeks to ensure their survival (Waltz, 1979:90-92).

Secondly, Waltz argues that definition of a political structure is related with the character of the units, which Waltz describes from the perspective of the

functions the units perform. Hierarchy entails relations of super and subordination among a system's parts, and that implies their differentiation (Waltz, 1979:93). In anarchic orders however, Waltz argues, each state is separate, autonomous, and formally equal political unit that must count ultimately on its own resources to realize its interests. The states that are units of international political systems are not formally differentiated by the functions they perform. Anarchy entails coordination among them and ensures their sameness. So long as anarchy endures, states remain as like units. In anarchy, each unit's incentive is to put itself in a position to be able to take care of itself since no one else can be counted on to do so (Waltz,1979:107). All important functions thus must be performed by each and every state. He actually clims that there is little international division of political labor, therefore, no sharp differentiation of functions among states (Donnely, 2005:17). States are alike in the task they face and the difference among them is not the function but the ability to do it. States perform tasks that are common to all and international politics consists of like units duplicating one another's activities (Waltz, 1979:95-97).

Thirdly, political structures are defined by the distribution of capabilities across units. If all international orders are anarchic and there is no significant differentiation of functions among states, international political structures can be distinguished from one another simply by the distribution of capabilities among actors. Historically this means that international political structures are defined as the changing fates of great powers. In other words, international orders vary according to the number of great powers. Waltz emphasizes the difference between bipolar systems, dominated by two superpowers, and multipolar systems where there are three or more great powers (Donnely, 2005:17). The structure of the system changes with changes in the distribution of the capabilities across the units. And changes in the structure change expectations about how the units of the system will behave and about the outcomes their interactions will produce (Waltz, 1979:97). States are deemed similar in terms of needs but not in capabilities for achieving them. The positional placement of states in terms of abilities determines the distribution of capabilities. The structural distribution of capabilities then limits cooperation among states through fears of relative gains made by other states, and the possibility of dependence on other states. The desire and relative abilities of each state to maximize relative power constrain each other, resulting in a 'balance of power',

25

which shapes international relations. It also gives rise to the 'security dilemma' that all nations face. According to Waltz, balance of power politics will prevail whenever two or more states co-exist with no superior agent to come to the aid of states or to deny to any of them the use of whatever instruments they think will serve their purposes (Waltz, 1979:118). States are forced to look after themselves and their interests, and the overriding interest of a state is to survive –to carry on being a state. Waltz argues that they are the unitary actors who at a minimum seek their own preservation and at a maximum drive for universal domination (Waltz, 1979:118). States use means available to achieve these purposes. A self-help system leads states behave rationally towards the creation of balance of power since if states could not look after themselves or do less effectively relatively to others open themselves to dangers and suffers. Fear of such consequences leads states for the creation of balances of power and to emulate others who are more efficient to do so.

Structure does not directly influence the behavior within the system, it does so rather indirectly. The effects are produced in two ways: through socialization of the actors and through competition among them (Waltz, 1979:74). Socializing logic of anarchy makes states emulate successful practices of the leading states and behave in the same way.

In *Theory of International Politics*, Waltz constructs a structural theory which uses the micro-economic analogies as the basis. Structure of the system appears as the system level principle that makes states to adopt patterned relations among them. Self-help is the element that makes states somehow ensure an order in the system through the balance of power practices. Microeconomic analogies are imported from the discipline of economy for explaining the existence of an order without an orderer or a supreme government in international area.

John J. Mearsheimer, on the other hand, lays out his theoretical approach to the study of international politics – 'offensive realism'- in *Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (2001) and seeks to demonstrate that this approach succeeds in explaining the key causes of war and peace. The book constitutes a major contribution to the realist cannon with an offensive pattern attributed to state behavior. According to Mearsheimer, the principle motive behind great-power behavior is survival. Offensive realism is based on the inherent fears for survival that arise in the anarchic international environment. In other words, the way international system is structured

26

causes state show aggressive behavior to ensure their survival (Mearsheimer, 2001: 30-32). According to Mearsheimer, the disposition to aggression is not intrinsic to states, but is instead the product of the constant search for survival in a world of uncertainty, offensive military capability, and a changing distribution of power. Offensive realism holds that states seek to achieve maximum gains in their power relative to other states to maintain a margin of security. The ultimate example of such a state is the hegemon which has little to fear from other states (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 2001:93). In fact, Mearsheimer agrees with Morgenthau in assuming that states (or major states) seek to accumulate as much power as possible for themselves, but it accepts Waltz's view that the reason they do so lies in the structure of the international system rather than in the human lust for power. In his offensive theory, the anarchic nature of the international system, the desire for survival, and the inability to be sure of other states' intentions ultimately lead states to pursue regional hegemony. Since global hegemony is an unattainable goal; instead, a state which has achieved the level of regional hegemony works to prevent the development of peer competitors in other regions .As Mearsheimer puts, states quickly understand that the best way to ensure their survival is to be most powerful state in the system. Although the logic of offensive realism suggests that great powers seek global hegemony, there are severe obstacles to attaining it. In fact, he claims that there has never been a global hegemon and it is unlikely that one emerges as a global hegemon in the future. The reason is geography what Mearsheimer calls the "stopping power of water" (Mearsheimer, 2001:41).

On the other hand, Robert Gilpin, in his influential *War and Change in International Politics* (1981), claims that actors establish international system because they enter into social relations and create structures to advance their interests. The individuals or group of people use their power to create social and political institutions in order to advance their interest (Gilpin 1981:9). Economic, technological, military innovations and developments promise significant relative gains and loses to social actors. When interests or the relative power of individuals change, they become the instruments for change and make pressure for changing the international system (Gilpin, 1981:81). In other words, as the dominant interests change over time, actors who will benefit from a change in the system will seek to change the system itself to get a more favorable distribution of benefits. An

international system is in a condition of equilibrium to the extent that its major actors are satisfied with territorial, political and economic status quo (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001:81). The propensity of states or other actors to seek to extend their territorial control, political influence, and economic domination is said to be a function of their power. Such a process continues until the marginal costs of further change equal or exceed the marginal benefits. A system in which the cost of expansion equals or exceeds its perceived benefits is said to be in equilibrium. The equilibrium, ones reached is itself subject to change because there is a tendency for the economic costs of maintaining the status quo increase faster than the economic capacity to support it (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001:81). To put differently, equilibrium is achieved when no one will gain from changing the system and actors attempt to change it if expected benefits exceeds the expected costs. States continue expansion as long as the marginal benefit is more than the marginal cost. One the equilibrium is reached its difficult to sustain because the dominant power's capacity to meet the cost of sustaining the status quo rises slower than to do otherwise. Faced with the challengers, the dominant power tries to generate more resources and direct them towards maintaining its position or reduce its commitments. If the state of disequilibrium is not resolved peacefully, hegemonic war is likely to occur. Gilpin suggests that the primary means by which the issue of disequilibrium has been resolved through out history has been war, the result of which has usually been a redistribution of power between the victorious and the vanquished (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001:85). As far as the factors which cause states attempt to change the system are concerned, Gilpin lists three factors namely the environmental, international and the domestic. Gilpin tries to explain the change in the system through the interaction between these three factors.

2.2. STATE IN NEOREALISM[2]

Given the basic assumptions of neo-realism above, here a brief evaluation will be made in order to identify the understanding of state in neo-realist paradigm.

---

[2]Under this heading unless mentioned, assumptions made about the international politics are related with Waltz's neo-realism.

It is a general criticism that in Waltzian theory, although the state appears to be central, the possibility of a theory of state is denied and basically overlooked in favor of a systemic theoretical understanding. When reading the *Theory of International Politics,* state emerges only as a subject of the international anarchic environment and as an actor which adapts to the anarchic requirements of the system. As Hobson puts, in Waltzian theory, international agential power of states are minimum and the domestic agential power is maximum which in turn give way to black-boxing of the state (Hobson, 2000:30)[3].

As mentioned before, there is continuity in the international politics through the millennia that be they empires, city states or nation-states, actors struggle with each other. Since the structural level constraints are ontologically prioritized to domestic level variables, domestic level is omitted and international anarchy is taken as the sole explanatory element of the theory. Since texture of international politics remains the same, patterns recur and events repeat themselves endlessly in international politics and indefinite domestic variables- economic, social, technological, ideological, political etc.- which are constantly changing are excluded. Hence, the actors of the system are homogenized including not only the present ones but also anachronistically those that long passed away.

Since the ordering principle is anarchy, states are like units performing similar functions. They have difference among themselves; however the system level element -structure- forces them to behave similarly. In this respect states' internal variables do not have explanatory value in Waltzian understanding. Due to socializing effect of anarchy, their particular differences do not enter into definition of the international political structure. This is the way "how billiard ball" metaphor comes into existence. Like the billiard balls, states clash constantly and again like the billiard balls, their inside property does not influence the outcome in the international sphere. By the socialization logic of anarchy, in this respect anything variable, familiarity in ideology for instance, other than "power" is dismissed.

Waltz's statement about the impossibility of a firm theory in micro-economics is striking in terms of state's ontological inferiority against the anarchic

---

[3] According to Hobson, international agential power is the ability of a state to make foreign policy and shape the international realm free of international structural requirements or the interests of international non-state actors. Domestic agential power is to make domestic or foreign policy as well as to shape the domestic realm free of domestic social structural requirements or the interests of non state actors (Hobson,2000)

structure of the system. According to him, in economics what is important is the systemic conditions, invisible hand of competition, making firms behave according to same patterns. Similarly, in international politics anarchy makes the systemic condition appear, invisible hand of self-help, and shape state behavior in line with recurring patterns of constant regularity. Only possible difference among states that influence the political structure is the distribution of capabilities among them. States being aware that their capabilities for self-help differ, anarchy and power differentiation lead them to focus relative rather than the absolute gains. In this respect, states are confined to relative positions and calculate the prospective positions of the other concerning the cooperative action.

Such a strong theoretical commitment to anarchic structure and underemphasized domestic variables bring to surface an implicit reliance on a domestically homogenous power source which, in fact, implies a state relatively independent from the society and inner dynamics of policy making and implementation. In this respect, as Hobson puts, states have high domestic agential power and are not constrained by domestic social actors. The most fundamental institutional means that underpin adaptive behavior is the sovereignty of state, in which the state has high or absolute domestic agential power (or institutional autonomy from the society). This means, state is free of external and internal interference to decide for itself how it will cope with external challenges (Hobson, 2000:24). As noted before, it is the emulation and balancing that states give as adaptive responses to the systemic effects. Successful conformity enhances a states' position internationally; failure to conform leads either to the decline of the great power, its vulnerability or its extinction.

Then, neo-realism is constructed over the assumptions imported from micro-economic theory. As Price and Reus Smith argue, three such assumptions stand out. First political actors, be they individuals or states, are assumed to be atomistic, self interested and rational. Actors are treated as pre-social in the sense that their identities and interests are autogenous. Actors are self-interested and concerned primarily with the pursuit of their own interests. And, they are rational, that is, capable of establishing the most effective and efficient way to realize their interests within the environmental constraints they encounter. Second, actors' interests are assumed to be exogenous to social interaction. Individuals and states are thought to

30

enter social relations with their interests already formed. Social interaction is not considered an important determinant of interests. Third, society is understood as a strategic realm in which individuals or states come together to pursue pre-defined interests. Actors are not therefore social; they are not products of their social environment merely atomistic rational entities that form social relations to maximize their interests (Price and Reus Smith, 1998:259).

Thus, what characterized IR under the realist package is the focus on state as sovereign, territorially based unit where state elites enjoyed substantial autonomy in both domestic and foreign affairs (Waisova, 2003:59-61). The state is understood as the main referent subject of security and its existence was threatened only by military means. In such an understanding, security is taken into account as an extension of state power. If state is powerful enough to defend itself or has the ability to build a security structure against military aggression, security is established (Ülger, 2002:85).

Simply, state interest has been perceived through a material understanding giving way to a military conceptualization, which defines security threats as military aggressions and gives it a defensive paradigm with a paranoid astir stature in an anarchic environment. Physical understanding of international relations prioritizes the military dimension and identifies state security with defending the borders from military attacks and overcoming the threats of wars emerging from other states. Other contexts of identity and social implications of identity formation are subjected to the goals of defensive military understanding of the neo-realist package.

In this respect, as Hobson states, Waltzian state is passive and adaptive to the requirements of the anarchic structure of international political environment. He summarizes Waltz's adaptive theory of state as:

> The sovereign positional state, imbued with high degree of agential power follows its national interest or survival imperative, but has no international agential power and must adapt (i.e.) to the short-term anarchical requirements of the inter-state system (via emulation and balancing), which in turn unintentionally functions to reproduce the anarchical state system (Hobson,2000:30).

According to Mearsheimer, it can be said, although his theory is related with the great powers, his assumptions are about more than great power behavior and he makes propositions which are valid for all states in the international system. Firstly,

states seek to maintain their territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order. Survival dominates all other motives and any state bent on survival must be at least suspicious of other states and reluctant to trust them (Mearsheimer, 2001:31). States in the international system also aim to guarantee their own survival and states operating in self-help world almost always act according to their interest. According to him, apprehensive of the ultimate intentions of other states, and aware that they operate in a self-help system, states quickly understand that the best way to ensure their survival is to be the most powerful state in the system (Mearsheimer,2001:33). For Mearsheimer's offensive realism, state strategies for survival are intentionally offensive since state can not be sure about the behavior of the other in a systemic anarchy. Offensive neorealist seeks security by building substantially greater capabilities than its enemies can amass. The overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gaining power at the expense of others. States pay close attention to how power is distributed among themselves and pay special effort to maximize their share of world power (Mearsheimer, 2001:34).

The structure of the international system forces states which seek to be secure nonetheless to act aggressively toward each other. The structure of the system causes states to fear one another. Given this fear states recognize that the more powerful they are relative to their rivals, the better the chance of their survival. The best guarantee of survival is to be a hegemon, because no other power can seriously threaten such a mighty power (Mearsheimer, 2001:3). All states not only look for opportunities to take advantage of one another, also work to ensure that other states do not take advantage of them. States fear about being conquered, and they work to check the aggressor states from gaining power at their expense, this inexorably leads to a world of security competition (Mearsheimer, 2001:35). Mearsheimer contrary to Waltz claims that states are power maximizers in the sense that their strategies are offensive and prone to being the hegemon. In Waltz, on the other hand, states appear to be motivated by their survival priority and they are the security seekers rather than power driven agents. Thus they seek to protect their respective positions rather than maximizing their relative power in the international system. For this reason, Mearsheimer calls Waltzian theory as defensive realism.

As far as Gilpin is concerned, it should be said that Gilpin poses a very different understanding about state. In Gilpin's understanding, states' preferences are formed by domestic competition, but once the preferences are formed, states behave like individual utility maximizers. According to Gilpin, objectives and foreign policies of states are determined primarily by the interests of their dominant members or ruling coalitions (Gilpin, 1981:19). The distribution of power among domestic coalitions may change over time, and accordingly the mixs of interests or objectives of foreign policy of states are altered (Gilpin, 1981:22). Economic, political and technological forces escape from the control of the systemic effects, both at the domestic and international level that change does take place. System has a control on the states and groups, however, it does not totally dominate them and change can be occurred (Gilpin, 1991:28-29). According to him, calculations of the costs and the benefits of the system are highly subjective and psychological in nature. The benefits and the price to be paid depend ultimately to the perceived interests of the ruling elites and coalitions in the society. The most important determinant of this perception is the historical experiences (Gilpin, 1981:51). However, these subjective calculations are influenced by the objective materials and givens. Whether to move to change the system is profitable depends on economic, military and technological factors as well as domestic and international factors (Gilpin, 1981:52). Gilpin categorizes these factors as the environmental, international and the domestic. He states that the material environment and the international balance of power create an incentive or disincentive for a state to attempt to change the international system. Whether or not state makes this attempt depends on domestic factors such as the interests of groups, classes and others in the society (Gilpin, 1981:55). In this respect, both the structure of the international system which is influential in shaping state behavior and the domestic conditions are primary determinants of states' foreign policies (Gilpin, 1981:87). The structure constrains the behavior of states and imposes cost on any behavior that seeks to change the international status quo. Similarly, redistribution of interstate capabilities may decrease and increase the cost of changing the international system (Gilpin, 1981:96). On the other hand, state's domestic arrangement of their social systems gives states capacity to adapt itself to specific environmental changes and opportunities. If state's domestic arrangement does not adapt to changes in

international system, it produces disadvantage under the new set of environmental conditions (Gilpin, 1991:102-103).

Gilpin accepts that the structure of the international system has an important effect in shaping state behavior. However, his understanding from the structure does not match with Waltz's characterization and its effect on states. Gilpin uses the structure as one of the different determinants of state behavior and gives credence to domestic variables as well as other material elements. According to him, environmental changes which appear to be basically technological and economic cause redistribution of power both at the domestic and the international level. A disjuncture between the system and the perceived interest of the dominant groups in the state transforms into state's attempts to change the system. Gilpin, actually, describes a set of variables which interact with each other and becomes influential in shaping state's behavior. International system is anarchic and state's main goals are power maximization and survival. However, state appears to be instrumental for the dominant groups within the polity. In this respect, Gilpin shows a break off from neo-realist fallacy of dismissal of the domestic realm. However, as Hobson puts, still his theory is structural in the sense that either state's responses are adaptive or maladaptive to the systemic effects. It can be said that in Gilpin's case, Waltz' notion of black-box state is relaxed and the domestic realm of the states are brought to the surface. Nevertheless, his theory is strictly material and does not offer a comprehensive tool to bridge the gap between the separated realms of the domestic and the international in answering that why similar states in material characteristics do give difference responses to same or very similar systemic pressures. [4]

---

[4] Although Gilpin points out that state behavior has both international and domestic determinants, he establishes his theory on the principle of cost and benefit calculations and utility maximisation. The main principle in his theory indicates that states domestic sphere is an area of competition and the ruling groups or coalitions follow their interest mainly through the agency of state in international politics. In this respects, he connects the international and the domestic realm of the state in a manner which claims that state is instrumental for the dominant groups or coalitions within the society. By this way, he loosens the absolute authority ascribed to state in Waltzian theory, however, his theory is structural and material in its esence, disregarding the role of ideational factors in foreign policy making. Domestic variables are not taken in a comprehensive manner and they are undertood from economic/material concerns of the dominant group/groups in the society. He falls short of understanding the diversity in domestic characteristics of the state and takes the society from merely the perspective of the material interests.

2.3. CONSTRUCTIVISM

Here under this heading, briefly general characteristics of constructivism will be given then three different approaches which are regarded as instructive in terms of the case study of this thesis will be explained.

End of the Cold War was the turning point, which unleashed a productive intellectual impetus in the field of IR theory since mainstream theories were proved to be inadequate to explain the rapid but bloodless collapse of the Cold War. The fact that a nuclear world war was dropped from the agenda and the multiplicity of problems caused by the collapse of USSR, and the conditions triggered by globalization enforced the intellectual productivity in IR theory (Tanrısever, 2005:107-125). Scholars having a critical perspective thought of new dimensions that are out of reach of the political realism. In the post-Cold War era, IR studies have their focus on some issues that actually existed in the Cold War period but not became apparent as in its aftermath. Critical theories questioned the epistemological assumptions of positivist mainstream theories of Cold War unfolding the instrumentalist nature of the theory building. Theory and practice separation is criticized and theory is located in an historical and social platform where both the theory and the practical problems can be evaluated from the same perspective. In other words, the hidden normative character of theories is unfolded. According to critical studies, different worldviews and political philosophies deliver different views and discourses about what IR means; knowledge about IR is organized and some kind of practices are filtered, privileged and some are inhibited or marginalized (Bilgin,1999:33).

Beyond the epistemology of IR, constructivism emerged as a strong critique of IR's ontology. It offered an alternative account of IR taking its source from a more sociological perspective, which puts forward the importance of ideational world, targeting the ontological premises of mainstream IR theories. Constructivism offered a critique of static material assumptions of traditional IR and hence emphasized the social dimensions of international relations through the possibility of change.

Although constructivists came to develop increasingly sophisticated arguments about core themes in global politics, constructivism's impact on international relations is more visible than what it really means. Basic question about

who is the constructivist remains unresolved since constructivism in international relations still means different things to its diverse proponents and critiques alike. As Maja Zehfuss pointed, the significance of constructivism within IR is underlined by the claim that the debate between rationalists and constructivists either currently is, or is about to become, the most significant one in the discipline. In an alternative representation constructivism is thought to occupy the "middle ground" between rationalism and more radical approaches, often called the reflectivist and relativist. It is no surprise than the field has been described as having undergone a "constructivist turn" (Zehfuss, 2002:2).

To begin with, the term constructivism is used in social epistemology, where it similarly refers to a philosophical position stressing the role of the human mind in the construction of the "facts" and similarly, constructivism in IR refers to the idea that IR is the construction of human agents and it is mind-dependent. It was Nicholas Onuf who first introduced the term constructivism to IR. With *World of Our Making (1989)*, Onuf presented the first constructivist theory of IR. In his Introduction, Onuf stated

> …the point of this book is to reconstruct a self consciously organized field of study or discipline, called International Relations. To do so necessarily involves reconsideration of international relations as something to study. I use the term reconstruct deliberatively, both because my goal is ambitious and because I am committed to a philosophical position…which I call constructivism. In my view, people always construct, or constitute, social reality, even as their being, which can only be social is constructed for them. (Onuf, 1989:1).

Therefore, from the start, IR constructivists share the basic premise that human beings actively make the world they live in. More specifically, while constructivists disagree among themselves about epistemology and methodology (variously categorized as modern versus postmodern or, alternatively, positivist versus post-positivist divide), they nevertheless accept basic ontological position which stresses the intersubjectivity and the mutual constitution of structures and agents. Constructivists of various persuasions agree upon intersubjective ontology – ideas, norms, rules constitute meanings which frame actors' identities, interests and actions (Weaver, 1997:24-25). Constructivism is characterized by an emphasis on the importance of normative as well as material structures, on the role of identity in shaping political action, and on the mutually constitutive relationship between agents and structures (Reus-Smit, 2001:209). Constructivism is the view that the manner in

which the material world shapes and shaped by the human and interaction depends on dynamic, normative and epistemic understanding of the material world (Adler, 1997:323). Thus, underlining the importance of ideational factors, notion of an objective reality that can be explained by universal law like generalizations is rejected.

Similarly, constructivist IR theory focuses on how social processes of collective meaning help form (construct) identities and interests, which in turn define situations as calling for certain actions. Rejecting the rationalist precepts of neo-realism and neo-liberalism, constructivists advance a sociological perspective on world politics, emphasizing the importance of normative as well as material structures, the role of identity in the construction of interests and action and the mutual constitution of agents and structures (Price and Reus Smith, 1998:1).

Constructivism particularly gives emphasis on identity, which is a reflection of a return to the "differences" among states. For constructivism, different states behave differently toward other states depending on the identities of each. Beyond typical identities, such as north, south, great power, constructivism promises to explain many other communities of identity. Moreover, ideational structures are the medium by which states understand and evaluate the behavior of other states, opposing to the realist premise of pre-given identities and interests. In other words, constructivism takes the ideational factors important as the media which make actors known both to themselves and others by creating a sphere of conduct among states depending on a shared intentionality (Ruggie, 1998:869-871). Social structures are the main dynamics of international arena which are subjects to change by social practices of the actors giving way to a change in norms and way of conduct.

The basic argument of the constructivist approach is that the "interests" of states are not determined by material factors alone, as realists believe (or by "economic rationalism," as liberals suppose); rather, international and domestic "cultural environments" influence the behavior and identity of states. Concretely, according to constructivist approach, cultural or institutional elements of states' environments shape the national security interests or directly the security policies of states; cultural or institutional elements of states' global or domestic environments shape state identity; variations in state identity or changes in state identity affect the national security interest or policies of states; configurations of state identity affect

interstate normative structures, such as regimes or security communities (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein,1996:52). Constructivist approach inserts norms and identities into IR studies, which accordingly broaden its basis by pulling the interest and security perceptions of the state on a foundational ground by giving crucial importance to identity of it.

Hence, above discussion about constructivism leads us to three ontological propositions of constructivism about social life and their impact on world politics. Firstly, constructivists assert the importance of normative or ideational structures as well as material structures. The environment in which agents take action is social as well as material so that systems of shared ideas, beliefs and values also have structural characteristics, and they exert powerful influence on social and political action. Systems of meaning define how agents interpret their material environment. In this respect, material structures, beyond certain biological necessities, are given meaning only by the social context through which they are interpreted. According to Alexander Wendt, material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded (Wendt, 1995:73). To give example, it is not weapons themselves that matter. After all, the United States worries very little about the large quantity of nuclear weapons held by the British; however, the possibility that North Korea might come into possession of even one or two generates tremendous concern. Ideas about identity, the logics of ideology, and established structures of friendship and enmity lend the material balance of power between Britain and the USA and the North Korea and the USA radically different meanings.

According to constructivists, ideas have structural characteristics that inform agents' behavior, rule governed action and "logic of appropriateness" prevails. Such logics involve reasoning by analogy and metaphor and are not about ends and means. Under them, agents want to understand what kind of situation is and what should be done. Norms helps to supply these answers (Checkel, 1998:326). In this respect, ideas are understood more generally as collective knowledge, institutionalized in practices, are the medium and propellant of social action; they define the limits of what is cognitively possible or impossible for individuals (Adler, 1997:325). Constructivism shows that even our most enduring institutions are based on collective understandings, that they are reified structures that were once upon a time

conceived *ex nihilio* by human conciousness; and that these understanding were subsequently diffused and consolidated until they were taken for granted (Adler, 1997:323). Non-material structures affect what actors see as the realm of possibility: how they think they should act, what the perceived limitations on their actions are, and what strategies they can imagine, let alone to entertain, to achieve their objectives. Institutionalized norms and ideas thus condition what actors consider necessary and possible both in practical and ethical terms (Reus-Smith, 2001:218).

Second, constructivists argue that understanding non-material structures which condition actors identities is important because identities inform interests and, in turn actions (Reus-Smith,2001:217).Understanding how interests are constituted is the key to explaining a wide range of international phenomena that rationalist misunderstood or ignored. As Wendt puts it, identities are the basis of interests (Wendt, 1992:398). From this perspective, the content and sources of state interests are of great concern for constructivist agenda. Constructivists accepts the notion that there is a real world outside. However, as Adler puts, it is neither solely material nor socially created; rather the material world is socially emergent. More important, they believe that identities, interests and behavior of political agents are socially constructed by collective meanings, interpretations and assumptions about the world (Adler, 1997:323). Ideational structure depends on the intersubjectiveness of reality. Intersubjective reality exists and persists thanks to social communication. The social world is intersubjective because agents live in it. Intersubjective meaning is not a aggregation of beliefs of individuals; rather they exists as collective knowledge that is shared by all who are competent to engage in or recognize the appropriate performance of a social practice or range of practices (Adler,1997:327). The ideational structure gives the agents a media through which they find the referents to attach meaning to not only the material environment but also meaning to the behavior of "ego" and the "alter".

The third, may be the most important characteristics of constructivism, is the assumption that agents and structures are mutually constituted. Constructivism is interested in understanding how the material, subjective and intersubjective worlds interact in the social construction of the reality, and rather than focusing only on how structures constitute agents' identities and interests, it also seeks to explain how individual agents socially construct these structures by practice. Following Anthony

Giddens' theory of structuration, social structures are taken as routinized discursive and physical practices that persist over an extended temporal spatial domain. Wendt argues that we create and instantiate the relatively enduring social structure in terms of which we define our identities and interest (Wendt, 1992:406). For the constructivist understanding, structure is not a mere material entity, and non-material social side of the structure have an effect on determination of the reality in agents cognition and the identity and hence the agent's action. The structure is not immutable and is subject to change through social practices. Structures are, hence, transformable by the agents' behavior. According to Wendt, institutionalized ideas and norms define the meaning and identity of the individual actor and patterns of appropriate economic, political, and cultural activity engaged in by those individuals. It is through reciprocal interaction that we create and instantiate the relatively enduring social structures in terms of which we define our identities and interests (Wendt, 1992:406). Thus, the social structures would not exist if there were not knowledgeable practices of actors.

Beyond these common understandings among different constructivist studies, given the diversity within the constructivism, it is possible to talk about three different approaches that Chris Reus-Smit identifies. For the purpose of this study, I would follow his typology and make brief introduction to these different types of constructivisms, and underline their promises about the subject of the thesis.

The reason that constructivist divisions are given importance under this heading is related with the methodology of the thesis. Since the purpose the thesis is to bridge the gap between traditionally separated international and domestic spheres of the state by the mainstream neo-realists and bringing the inner dynamics of a political system into the international relations theorizing, domestic socio-political structures and its interaction with the international system bear importance. In this respect, the focus is on the interaction between internal and external aspects of the state, and domestic determinants of the international behavior. Here I am going to make brief introduction into the issue of "corporate identity" and explore this aspect in different constructivist approaches in Chris-Reus Smit typology, and underline the promises of constructivism in my study.

Systemic constructivism is the path that Alexander Wendt has adopted through the use of a third image perspective, focusing solely on the interaction

between unitary state actors. Although Wendt believes, like other constructivists, identity of the state informs its interests and in turn the behavior, he draws a distinction between the corporate and the social identities of states.[5] He deals with the social sources of identity and leaves the corporate identity neglected in favor of a systemic understanding. He deals with how structural contexts, systemic processes and strategic preferences produce and reproduce different sorts of state identity (Reus Smit, 2001:220). Things that exist or occur within the domestic sphere are ignored and an account of world politics is derived by theorizing how states relate to one another in the international domain. Corporate identity comprises internal human material, ideological or cultural factors that give state an intrinsic, self organizing quality. Corporate identities form the states' identity prior to social interaction and for Wendt, collective identity among state emerges endogenously at the systemic level. As Reus Smith claims, for the favor of a systemic theory, state's social identity is taken as the key element for the explanation and corporate identity is left aside (Reus Smit, 2001:221). States have histories but these do not concern Wendt; a theory of states system does not need such a concern. Wendt proposes a state-centric structural theory, like Waltz. Wendt proposes that as other constructivists that the international relations is socially constructed rather than trans-historically given. Structure does not exist apart from the process which is the practices of the actors. At this point theory of structuration appears to have a central importance for Wendt's constructivism. Although Wendt claims that international relations is socially constructed, he agrees with Waltz in the sense that international system is characterized by anarchy and self help. However, his defining of international system points that self-help is a social institution developed and sustained through process of social interaction. According to him, firstly, people act on the basis of meanings that objects and other actors have for them. These meanings are not inherent in world but developed in interaction (Wendt, 1992:403). Conceptions of security, for him, under the condition of anarchy do not have to produce self-interested self-help behavior. State behavior is influenced by intersubjective rather than material structures and based on collective meanings through which actors acquire identities (Wendt, 1992:397). Identities provide the basis for interests which are defined in the process

---

[5]see Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State", *American Political Science Review*, vol 88,No 2,1994.

of conceptualizing situations. Identities are not only developed and maintained in interaction with others they also crucially determine what kind of anarchy or security environment will prevail (Wendt, 1992:398-400). According to Wendt, what matters is whether and how far social identities involve identification with the fate of the other. The nature of identification in each situation shapes how boundaries of self are drawn. If there is no positive identification, the other is relevant to the definition of interests only insofar as it may be used for the purpose of the self. Collective identity on the other hand refers to positive identification such that the other cognitively becomes the part of the self and its welfare is of concern (Wendt, 1994:386). Thus, it is the social interaction in international realm and identity formation in international realm appear to have the central importance in Wendt's constructivism.

Unit level constructivism, contrary to systemic constructivism, concentrates on the relationship between domestic, social and legal norms and identities and interests of states. Katzenstein's writings about Germany and Japan's national security are representative. In explaining why two states which have similar WW2 and post war experiences have adopted very different internal and external national security policies, Katzenstein stresses the importance of institutionalized regulatory and constitutive national, social and legal norms. Katzenstein draws attention to internal, domestic determinants of national policies. Unit-level analysis goes into socio-historical context of the society from where the state's corporate identity emerges. Katzenstein argues that systemic theory is inadequate not least because it black boxes state and fails to examine the complex relations within the state structure itself, as well as important state-society linkages and state-transnational linkages. State differs internally in their make-up and, crucially, that this impacts upon their behavior in the international system (Hobson, 2000:166-167).For example, Japan's growing economic power did not transform into a military one because domestic normative structure made this unlikely. Katzenstein tries to explain this peculiarity by focusing on the normative and cultural context in which Japanese security policy making is embedded. He argues that two factors in particular have made Japan averse to the use of force. The first is a broad conception of national security embracing not only military defense, but also a broad range of other issues such as economic development and social stability. The second is the absence of a societal consensus on the legitimacy of the use of force in realizing state interests. Following

Japan's defeat in the Second World War, this new culture of non-violence became institutionalized in the formal legal institutions governing the Japanese police and armed forces, and has become a constitutive feature of Japan's post-war national identity. These culturally grounded understandings continue to set the parameters for Japanese security policy today (Berger, 1997: 184). His conceptualization of the domestic normative structure in three categories, economic security norm, external security norm and internal security norm informs state policy choices and gives shape to Japan international security behavior (Hobson, 2000:166-167).

Holistic constructivism of John Gerard Ruggie and Fredrich Kratochwil, tries to bridge between the international and the domestic domains. To accommodate the entire range of factors conditioning the identities and the interests of states, they bring the corporate and the social together into a unified analytical perspective that treats these domains as the two faces of a single social and political order. With this perspective, Ruggie and Kratochwil study and explain international change in different subject areas: the former focusing on grand shifts between international systems, the latter on recent changes within the international system (Reus-Smit, 2001:219-221).

Ruggies's criticism of neo-realism focuses on sovereignty as an institution that invests states with exclusive political authority in their territorial spaces, which he sees as crucial in the construction of state identity. The institution of sovereignty also regulates state behavior through norms and practices of mutual recognition, non-intervention, and self-determination-which in turn help reproduce state identities. According to Ruggie, the second structural characteristic of Waltz' anarchic analysis misses the reality and misconceives the historical evolution of the state system. It is missing change because he drops the second component of political structure, differentiation of units, when discussing international system (Ruggie, 1983:279). Ruggie says that "differentiation" should refer to the "principles on the basis of which the constituent units are separated from one another and the modern international system is based on a principle of differentiation characterized by concepts of property rights and sovereignty. Those concepts are deeply embedded in our institutions and without them international politics would not be the same as we see today. When the concept of differentiation is properly defined, the second structural level of Waltz's does not drop out. According to him, it stays in and serves

to depict the kind of the institutional transformation illustrated by the shift from medieval to the modern international system; by the extension of the argument, it serves as a possible future transformation from the modern to a post modern international system (Ruggie,1983:279).

On the other hand, Kratochwil's constructivism problematizes the normative character of human behavior criticizing that positivist explanation starts from antecedent condition which adopts a notion of rationality as instrumental means. He asserts that international politics must be analyzed in the context of norms properly understood (Kratochwil, 1991: 10-12). The constructivist approach enters into his analysis, since he uses game metaphor defined by rules and norms as a starting point for his analysis. His counter position to neo-realism is formulated by basing the analysis of world politics on conventions, which are constitutive and regulative of state practices. He elaborates on the international politics with the metaphor of a game which is constituted by rules and norms, and the political action is understood as a meaningful rather than purely instrumental action. According to him, international politics is a game and the norms and the rules are constitutive of the international game in that they determine who the actors are and what rules they have to follow. According to his constructivism, for example, the revolutions of 1989 changed the rules governing superpower conflict and, thereby, the norms underpinning the international system. This constructivist perspective systematically links domestic and international structures with political practice and shows that international systems consist of ensembles of social institutions. These institutions change in response not only to shifting distributions of capabilities but also to redefinition of actors' identities as well as changes in state-society relations. He puts that transformations of the international system occur when political practices change and therefore fail to reproduce the familiar international "structures." Since state has a variety of tasks whose organizations domestically create a whole hosts of international externalities, domestic orders of states have international influences (Kratochwil, 1993:79).

Kratochwil's criticism's of neo-realist thinking focuses on the fact that academic exponent of realism had cut themselves off some of the most significant insights realism as practice to offer. According to him, attempt to turn realism as a practice into scientific theory by applying the scientific method is misconceived and

the unchanging or cyclical nature of international politics substituted for the investigation of actual processes and decisions. Whole sectors of international reality become marginalized, such as considerable amount of cooperation, the importance of common conventions for sustaining international systems and the links between domestic order and efforts of institutionalizing international interactions (Kratochwil, 1993:64). He points that state has a variety of tasks whose organizations domestically create a whole hosts of international externalities; the organization of force is only one, and sometimes not even the most salient dimension (Kratochwil, 1993:79). During absolutism neither ideologies nor public opinion contested the particular linkages that had emerged domestically and internationally among these ensembles of practices.

2.4. STATE in CONSTRUCTIVISM

As we have briefly demonstrated, constructivism to a large extent seems to define itself on the grounds of criticism, which is primarily oriented towards neo-realist treatment of the state. Although different divisions in constructivist body focus on different processes through which state is constituted as an international actor, it is the nature of state from which IR constructivism take its basic premises.

Constructivism within IR theory focuses on how social processes of collective meaning help to construct identities and interests, which in turn define situations as calling for certain actions. Rejecting the rationalist precepts of neo-realism and neo-liberalism, constructivists advance a sociological perspective on world politics, emphasizing the importance of normative as well as material structures, the role of identity in the constitution of interests and action, and the mutual constitution of agents and structures. In this respect, constructivism in contrast to neo-realism, emphasizes the importance of the social interaction and rejects the idea that states are immune to the intersubjective frame by which the world is given a meaning. For this approach, states do not know *a priori* what their interests are and they are constrained by the social normative structures. Here, in other words, neo-utilitarian perspective on state is rigorously rejected. While the rationalists claim that states know exactly what their interests are, and they know how to realize them, constructivists rejects the profit calculator attributions of state

and claims that states' identities are shaped by the normative structures. In this respect, state identity and interests are not pre-given concepts which are malleable depending on historical, cultural, political and social context. Whereas rationalism presupposes the fixity of state interests and fails to problematize identity, constructivism claims that identities are multiple and interests are constantly changing as identities change in line with the normative structural changes. Thus, the ideational does matter and has a role in shaping state behavior. That's why constitutive norms channel state behavior in ways that are often not consistent with any power maximizing interest on the part of states. Thus, as Hobson argues, "the logic of consequences" that rationalists implicitly focus on is replaced with a "logic of appropriateness" in which norms prescribe the range of state behavior deemed to be appropriate (Hobson, 2000:148).

This concern with ideational structure and specifically shaping role on states identity offers a return to differences among states. Identities offer each state an understanding of other states, its nature, motives, interests, probable actions, attitudes and role in a given political concept. Thus, political behavior is diversified toward similar incidents by similar states, which in turn gives way to diversity in international politics rather than recurrence and patterned relations.

Concern with identity also gives way to return of culture and domestic politics to international relations theory. Constructivism provides a promising approach for uncovering those features of domestic society, culture and politics that should matter to state identity and action in global politics (Hopf, 1998:195). Thus the black-boxed neo-realist state is transformed to one having its own internal dynamics and freed from a mechanical action-reaction cycles of international action.

As briefly mentioned, according to constructivism state identity in world politics is partly the product of the social practice that constitute that identity at home, which is identified and neglected by Wendt as corporate identity. In this way, ideational structures at home also constrain and enable state identity, interest and actions abroad. For example, as Hopf points, within domestic realm, there might exist areas of cultural practice that are sufficiently empowered through institutionalization and authorization, to exert a constitutive or causative influence on state policy (Hopf, 1998:195). Thus, identifying the domestic structural constraints and determinants becomes important for understanding the nature of state behavior in

international realm since domestic practices are basically the significant extension of inner dynamics existing within a state society complex. Those practices are the representations which reveal the corporate identity of a state. Exclusion of domestic variables from the analysis significantly reduces explanatory value, and causes of states' international behavior are missed if domestic variables are operational.

Wendt focuses on social origins of state identity and does not deal with the domestic determinants of it. On the other hand, Katzenstein deals with the domestic normative structures and tries to explain the international behavior of the state from the perspective of the domestic structural variables which curtail or allow certain state behavior. His approach gives explanatory value to socio-historical dynamics of the units in international politics anchoring them to their own socio-historical contexts. Specific cultural variables are taken into analysis as inherent and characteristics of a particular state-society complex. Kratochwil blames the neo-realist academics and calls the neo-realism as the science of international politics without politics, while claiming that domestic and the international are intertwined and the domestic structures and the domestic aspects of the states carry internationally emergent externalities. International politics is a game constituted with identified rules and communicative moves, hence, the international relations is an area of ensembles of institutions and practices of the states which have also domestic determinants. Ruggie, like Katzenstein deals with differences on the unit level and proposes that Waltz's second characteristics of the international structure, differentiation of units, is a historical misconception and at the unit level there are differences which allows understanding change within the international system. On the other hand, he rejects recurrences with saying that even *American* hegemony is different than American *hegemony* (Ruggie, 1998:863).

Besides effects of the international social structures and social interaction on state identity and interests, constructivism, as Katzenstein shows, domestic normative structure has an important say in shaping states' behavior in international realm and state's international dimension is open to domestic interferences. State is not purely derived from the international conditions of interaction, but it is the domestic cultural determinants which have normative and institutional underpinnings influencing states' behavior and shaping the international sphere through the agency of state. In this respect, state-society relations and institutional structures within

domestic realm bear importance as well as state-transnational relations. Hence, a major ontological reconfiguration of the nature of states is offered by constructivism since more variables inside the state are framed out. It recognizes that domestic and international structures are social in nature and help construct identity and behavior of states. It is recognized that states are not solid, mechanic and reactive things; rather they have a complex substance inside characterized by the social and historical background and by the dynamics of the society. Constructivist accounts of state, then, by giving importance to co-constitution of state and the international realm, as Ruggie and Kratochwil point, also opens the discussion of mutual and interactive constitution of the domestic and international realms. Therefore, conceptualization of states is given the chance to include domestic differences among states and domestic dynamics to shape the foreign policy action and, in turn, the international realm.

Constructivism thus reveals that international relations cannot be understood by omitting the impact of domestic realm from the analysis. On the contrary, by problematizing the origins of agent's interests and introducing both domestic and international normative aspects of structures and corresponding reflection in identities of them, constructivism seriously lays the ground for bridging the gap between the domestic and international spheres of the state. It not only takes into account of the social interaction in international system but also the domestic determinants by pulling the inner dynamics of the state into question.

CHAPTER 3

MOTIONS and DISCUSSIONS

This chapter will examine the parliamentary discussions of the five motions related to the Turkish involvement in the Iraqi War in 2003 and in Northern Iraq in 2007. The discussions reveal in a striking way the fallacies of neo-realism in understanding of the state in foreign policy making as a unitary, homogenous entity having pre-determined interests. This chapter will demonstrate this neorealist misrepresentation of state by focusing on three themes that overall stand out fine the articulation in the parliamentary discussions. While these themes are interrelated and it is hard to analyze them separately, nevertheless for the purpose of this thesis, an analytical classification around these three interdependent themes will help us to formulate the basis for a constructivist critique, which will be better analyzed in the following chapter.

Concerning Iraqi War, government presented four proposals to TGNA. Three of them gained the necessary affirmative vote except the one rejected on 1 March 2003. In this thesis, concerning year 2003, firstly and mainly the proposal that was rejected will be taken into consideration. However, the examination of the parliamentary discussions concerning Iraqi involvement in 2003 reveals that discussions taking part in the parliament show common significant elements. Therefore, they are considered to be the representation of the parliamentary attitude on Iraqi involvement that year. In this respect, parliamentary discussions of 2003 are taken as the subject of the analysis in this thesis. Thus, discussions for these four motions are all together regarded as the representation of general view of the parliament which was presented as a "no" vote to 1 March but "yes" to other government proposals. In other words, for understanding the parliamentary position, several discussions in the parliament when the Iraqi intervention was at the top priority of Turkish foreign policy agenda are analysed in terms of showing parliament's attitude on foreign policy making which, in fact, showed a consistency

from the perspective of identity and interest nexus. Discussions in the parliament about these four government proposals were mainly realized around the same axis giving clues for a constructivist understanding of the international relations and the nature of a unit level action. In fact, these five motions and the related discussions present a continuity which is significant from a constructivist perspective. We see the existence and evolution of three themes from the first one to the last, as it will be discussed below. It can be said that, in fact, the 5th motion (2007) can even be considered as a test case for demonstrating this continuity despite the time lag about four years between the first and the last.

As a control case for the gatherings from the discussions taking place in 2003, the parliament's decision to send troops to Iraqi territory in 2007 is taken into focus of the study. Parliament's attitude in 2007 shows consistency with constructivist account of 1 March 2003 case and adds a new constructivist element to the analysis: in the second case, it is very apparent that state interest is not a pre-given concept rather it appears to be a result of a process of articulation from a diversity of interest options proposed by different political views existing in the parliament. In other words, the parliament represents the place where the state interest is formed from the diversity of interest descriptions of different political parties having the claim to be the representative of the will of the nation.

For the main purpose of the thesis, building on this relationship between the 2003 and 2007 cases, it is possible to analyze the parliamentary discussions along three major themes: "legitimacy" both at the domestic and international level, "institutional identity" and "interest". These themes allow us to organize the findings from the empirical data and construct a constructivist criticism of the neo-realist understanding of the state.

Within this vein, in this chapter, first historical background will be given as to set the context in which these five motions were discussed. Secondly, the five government motions will be introduced and briefly described for establishing the linkage between the historical background and the parliamentary discussions which are taken as the data for the study. Then, the parliamentary discussions will be examined under three major themes, as to establish the basis for a constructivist critique.

3.1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Keeping previous theoretical discussion in mind, this chapter will give a historical background of the Iraqi War. Firstly, the Bush Doctrine, and its relevance to Iraq will be explored. Then, developments concerning Iraqi intervention and immediate repercussions in Turkey will be briefly analyzed as to locate the theoretical debate in a socio-historical context.

3.1.1. BUSH DOCTRINE AND THE WAR ON TERROR

With the end of the Cold War, as the world reconfigured and political environment re-mapped, foreign policy agenda of states has also begun to require new concepts and new elements. In parallel, new subjects entered into the U.S. foreign and security policies. The George Bush administration coincided with the rapid and unpredicted collapse of Soviet Russia, and to a large extent, Bush's security policy was constructed on Ronald Reagan's period's policy principles. However, Bill Clinton administration's basic foreign policy strategy was formed in 1993 immediately after the end of Cold War (Arslan and Arı, 2004:167-170). Foreign policy of Clinton included new elements and it was implemented with its post-Cold War foci which were new to American security understanding. According to this new understanding, the basic threat to the USA was described as coming from those regions whose interests were conflicting with American interests. The second major point was about the condition of threat depicted as stemming from proliferation of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. In fact, the real understanding behind was the high probability of regional powers having access to these weapons and the resulting threat against the USA. Leslie Aspin, Secretary of Defense, underlined, in his Defense Counter-Proliferation Initiative that USA would be confronting with a real threat if rogue states, which were more dangerous than USSR, possessed nuclear weapons and facilities since these threats are not tractable and knowable. In this mindset, it was the regional powers and the proliferation of mass destruction that was given much attention (Arslan and Arı, 2004:171).

After the end of Cold War, the USA stayed as the sole power which was unrivaled, but also relatively aimless compared to international political conditions of

51

the Cold War. 9/11 was a real source of concern and it not only signified a paradigmatic shift but also new mission to the George W. Bush administration with the "War on Terror". Although the post–Cold War conditions changed significantly, post-Cold War threat and enemy conceptualization and description was not so different from those during the Cold War. 9/11 was a real challenge to American security understanding and it was a breaking moment in American history as the one occurred in 1945. After 9/11, for the USA, terrorism and terrorist attacks were not any longer distant phenomena occurring in distant regions such as Chechnya or the Middle East. During the 1990s, perhaps the enemy hitherto described as a diverse and dispersed one has reached a concrete materiality and become an immediate reality. 9/11 concretized the enemy, which in fact had taken its place in American Security discourse long before, in a visible security threat. George W. Bush administration included terrorism to American security agenda as a new dimension while the existing security preparations were insufficient to the requirements of the new warring order which the USA was totally unprepared for (Record, 2003:2).

Defining the situation as multi-dimensional, George W. Bush stated that Cold War mentality, namely containment and deterrence were unsustainable and, in that respect, new measures were required for new representations of security threats. His new understanding was reflected under the so-called Bush Doctrine which advocated the anticipatory self-defense. He was saying that "If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long.... Our security will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action."[6]

The Bush doctrine made a description of the new security threat, coined by the advance of technology, radicalism, religious extremism and their combination with the easy accessibility of weapons of mass destruction. According to George W. Bush,

> The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology-when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons.[7]

---

[6]President George W. Bush's speech at U.S. Military Academy (West Point), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/01/international/02PTEX-WEB.htm

[7]President George W. Bush's speech at U.S. Military Academy (West Point).

In that respect, according to George W. Bush, the threat was two-folded: first, the rogue states might transfer those weapons to terrorist allies but keeping them to themselves. Worse and second, the threat was undeterrable and requiring a swift response since the threat was imminent, multifaceted and potentially calamitous by virtue of combination of its destructiveness and immunity to deterrence. By implication, such a threat demanded a new response and that was the destruction of the first strike capacity of the enemy for which George W. Bush used the metaphor of mushroom cloud by saying that he did not want the smoking gun to become a mushroom cloud (Record, 2003:3).Thus, after the 9/11, President Bush declared that he would not be waiting the so called murderers obtaining the weapons of mass destruction and the time was not on their side. For this purpose, first attack capacity of the enemy should be destroyed without waiting the immediate danger arises.

This kind of an asymmetrical threat perception representing the possibility of inflicting severe losses on great powers made the USA change its security strategy towards a pre-emptive strike aiming at destroying the first-strike capacity of the enemy. Pre-emptive strike was representing that terrorism was taken as top priority and the supportive states were described as the "axis of evil", and Bush administration in different platforms stated to fight against it without any tolerance (Arslan and Arı, 2003:232-243).

3.1.2. INVASION OF IRAQ

Operation Iraqi freedom was launched on March 20, 2003, which was the second American engagement to a foreign territory after 9/11 events following the *Operation Enduring Freedom* launched in Afghani territory in 2001. The goal of this operation was declared by the George W. Bush as to remove Saddam Hussein's regime, and destroy its ability to use weapons of mass destruction or to make them available to terrorists. The longer-term objective was stated to be more altruistic: helping Iraqis build "a new Iraq that is prosperous and free."[8] In October 2002, Congress had authorized the President to use force against Iraq to "defend the

---

[8] "George W. Bush's Address to the Nation, March 17, 2003," the televised speech that included a 48-hour ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and his sons, available at
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html].

national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq," and to "enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq (CRS Report, 2008a:Summary).

The USA's post-Gulf War policy was shaped along the lines the 687 resolution of United Nations Security Council which created an order of a sanctions regime. Iraqi sanctions included no fly zones, trade embargo and removing of weapons of mass destruction and related facilities. The northern "no fly" zone and Operation Northern Watch were designed to protect the Iraqi Kurdish population in Northern Iraq and providing international humanitarian relief efforts there. Operation Southern Watch was designed to protect the Shiite Arab population in Southern Iraq. Concerning the financial and commercial measures, an embargo was imposed and there was a freeze on all financial assets of Iraq abroad (Polk, 2007:176-178).

Containment measures especially concerning the weapon investigations were disturbed by the occasional non-compliant behavior of Iraq. In December 1998, the Iraqi government declared that because of the hard conditions of sanctions, it would no more co-operate with the weapon-inspectors of the International Atomic Agency. Consequently, in December 1998, the United States and the United Kingdom launched the *Operation Desert Fox* (Lobel, 1999:127).

9/11 attacks heightened general concerns that weapons of mass destruction might fall into the hands of terrorists. Reflecting those concerns, Bush Administration's first National Security Strategy, as mentioned above, highlighted the policy of pre-emptive strike to forestall hostile acts by adversaries, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. In this context, throughout the year 2002, the Bush Administration assertively sought Iraqi compliance with U.N. Security Council Resolutions concerning the inspections regime, while explicitly revealing the possibility of a preventive strike if Iraq did not comply. In September 2002, addressing the U.N. General Assembly, President Bush stated that: "The Security Council Resolutions will be enforced ... or action will be unavoidable."[9] President Bush also presented a list of conditions that Iraq must meet if it wanted to avoid retaliatory action, which included giving up or destroying all

---

[9] President Bush's Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002, New York, NY, available at the White House website [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html].

weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles; ending all support to terrorism; ceasing persecution of its civilian population; accounting for all missing Gulf War personnel and accepting liability for losses; and ending all illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program (CRS Report, 2008a:8)

On November 8, 2002, the U.N. Security Council issued Resolution 1441 holding Iraq in "material breach" of its obligations under previous resolutions and saying that the Security Council decided to afford it a "final opportunity to comply" with its disarmament obligations in line with Resolution 687. By the unanimous adoption of Resolution 1441 (2002), the Council ordered inspections are resumed and recalled, in that context, that the Council had repeatedly warned Iraq that it would face "serious consequences" as a result of continued violations".[10]

According to Resolution 1441, Iraq was in material breach of the ceasefire terms presented under the terms of Resolution 687. Iraq's breaches related not only to weapons of mass destruction, but also the known construction of prohibited types of missiles, the purchase and import of prohibited armaments, and the continuing refusal of Iraq to compensate Kuwait for the looting conducted by its troops during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

Although this language was heavy in terms of U.N. standards, it was not enough to be considered to imply "automaticity" for an UN authorized response under Chapter VII as an exchange for a possible Iraqi non-compliance. While the Iraqi government eventually provided a large quantity of written materials, the Bush Administration deemed Iraqi compliance to be insufficient. The Administration chose not to seek an additional U.N. Resolution explicitly authorizing military action and decided to use of force against Iraq (CRS Report, 2008a:8).

Bush Administration's intent to take military action against Iraq was formally made public on March 17, 2003. President Bush issued an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq within 48 hours. The Administration's short-term goal for *Operation Iraqi Freedom* was regime removal. President Bush stated on March 17, 2003, "It is too late for Saddam Hussein to remain in power…We will tear down the

---

[10]Security Council Resolution 1441(2002) available at [http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2002/sc2002.htm]

apparatus of terror ... the tyrant will soon be gone….Their refusal to do so would result in military conflict."[11]

The visible launch of *Operation Iraqi Freedom* took place on March 20, 2003, shortly after the expiration of President Bush's ultimatum. Following first air strikes, coalition ground forces crossed the line from the Kuwaiti desert into Southern Iraq. In the north, on March 26, 2003, considerable amount of soldiers parachuted into northern Iraq. This was because the initial coalition plans for crossing into Iraq from a northern front was canceled and was revised following the TGNA's rejection of the government proposal to do so. The army which would enter Iraq from Northern front began entering Iraq from the south on April 12, 2003 (CRS Report, 2008:22-23).

On April 9, 2003, the statute of Saddam Hussein in Firdos Square in Baghdad was toppled and this scene was world widely broadcasted as a symbol for the American victory and Iraqi people's embracement of American offensive against Saddam's regime.

On May 1, 2003, President Bush, standing aboard the U.S. Abraham Lincoln, declared an end to major combat operations in Iraq. He stated, "In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed."[12].

Saddam Hussein was captured later, on December 13, 2003, outside Tikrit, his hometown. His trial began on November 19, 2005 and sentenced to death on December 5, 2006. He was executed on March 21, 2007.

3.1.3. THE ROAD TO 1 MARCH GOVERNMENT MOTION

Opening a northern front to Iraq from Turkey was envisaged in the USA's military operation plans which were prepared during the last months of 2001. the USA for this purpose began demanding support from Turkey since 2002 and it is

---

[11]President Bush Address to the Nation, March 17, 2003, available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html] .

[12] "President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended," May 1, 2003, at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030501-15.html].

understood from Deniz Bölükbaşı's memories written in 2008 that American demands were very assertive[13] (Bölükbaşı, 2008:18).

It was March 2002 when American demands started first when vice-president Dick Cheney visited Ankara for negotiating the possible ways of support that Turkey could provide for the U.S. military forces. Coalition government[14] which was severely weakened after subsequent economic crises was, at the time, in a state of turbulence due to highly publicized Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit's health problems. Consequently, DSP got chattered and the New Turkey Party was formed. On July 7, 2002 Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit conforming to Devlet Bahçeli's[15] pressures accepted to go ahead with early general elections. After TGNA decided on 31 July, 2002 that elections would be held on the following November 3, Turkish politics entered into an election atmosphere. Although early correspondence was held between American and Turkish representatives, for the Americans, elections should be waited for a strong decision to be made on Turkish commitments alongside with the U.S. on the Iraqi issue.

However, it was in August 2002 that Prime Minister Ecevit, Minister of Foreign Affairs Şükrü Sina Gürel and Chief of Military Staff Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu focused on American demands on Iraq. On July 2002, Foreign Ministry and the Military Staff established a commission and prepared a report regarding different scenarios concerning American intervention. This commission identified different policy options for Turkey under each scenario which later known to be the famous "red lines" policy of Turkey. According to Fikret Bila, Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed the fortification of Iraqi border and strengthening the military existence of Turkey in Northern Iraq. In other words, crossing the border with a strong foothold was proposed before a possible American intervention (Bila, 2003: 163).

According to Deniz Bölükbaşı, redlines policy of Turkey was constructed over three pillars and it was presented to the U.S. officials during the negotiations. According to him, the red lines policies which were pursued in the negotiations as

---

[13]Deniz Bölükbaşı was a prominent foreign service officer charged by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for heading the negotiations with USA on military issues on behalf of Turkey. He has been known in the Ministry as a tough negotiator.

[14] 57th Government of Turkish Republic formed by Democratic Left Party (DSP), Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and Motherland Party (ANAP) under the presidency of Bulent Ecevit between 3 May 1999 and 18 November 2002.

[15] President of MHP.

the guidelines were as follows: First, after the end of Saddam Hussein's regime, territorial integrity of Iraq must be preserved. Iraq's dismemberment along ethnic differences must be prevented. Reconstruction of Iraq along ethnic and religious lines would be severe threat to peace and stability of the region. Second, rights of Turcoman population which are identified as one of the constitutive elements of Iraqi people must be protected and they must be given opportunity to have a say in determination of Iraq's future. Mosul and Kirkuk, which are the traditional settlement areas of Turcoman, must not be given to Kurdish authority and control. The fact that natural resources of Iraq belong to the Iraqi nation as a whole must be recognized and must be bound to legal and political securities. Third, PKK which poses direct threat to Turkish security must not allowed nesting on northern Iraq. With an efficient struggle, the region must be cleaned from PKK elements and terrorist elements should be expelled from the region (Bölükbaşı, 2008:66).

Shortly after the report was presented to the Government, The Undersecretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Uğur Ziyal went to the USA to present the red line policy of Turkey and to learn American demands in more detail. One month after Ziyal's visit, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gürel went to Washington and participated in several meetings with Vice President, Dick Cheney, Secretary of State, Collin Powell, and National Security Counselor, Condoleezza Rice and was given briefings about the forthcoming war on Iraq. According to Bila, he was given the impression that the USA was planning to enter Iraq from Turkey and would not prefer Turkish military in Iraq without an accompaniment by the U.S. soldiers. Upon his return, the minister exchanged his impression with the National Security Council and pointed to the necessity of Turkish involvement before an American operation (Bila, 2003:171). In December 2002, new Chief of Military Staff Hilmi Özkök went to the USA and he discussed preliminary information about the place and roles of northern front with U.S. officials. Meanwhile, early contacts were initiated about the financial support which would be made so as to alleviate the war's possible negative effects on Turkish economy (Bölükbaşı, 2002:28). These preliminary contacts were being held but at the same time the Turkish side always made it explicit that any decision for such a commitment could be only made after the elections, that is, with the newly elected government.

After the elections of December 3, 2002, Turkey's 58th government[16] was established under the presidency of Abdullah Gül. The newly elected cabinet found the problematical issue of Iraq as an unexpected guest requiring sensitive care and emphasis. A committee including Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz made a visit to Prime Minister Abdullah Gül on December 3. The U.S. envoys also met with Foreign Minister, Yaşar Yakış, Chief of Military Staff, and Hilmi Özkök and with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, head of AK Party. After the end of this long day, Yaşar Yakış declared that "we do not desire an operation but if it is indispensable we can open our fly-zone and military facilities to our ally the USA". Besides this declaration, Wolfowitz's meeting with Erdoğan was more promising for the USA since a roadmap for investigation on military facilities were determined. This was revealed by the famous paper napkin incident.[17] These developments were appalling to Ministry of Foreign Affairs since the bureaucracy was trying to strengthen their position against the American side in the negotiations (Bila, 2003:185). After this meeting, Erdoğan went to the USA on December 10, 2002 before the Copenhagen Summit of European Union to be held December 12. He met with Bush, Cheney and Rice and was given briefings in Pentagon about Iraqi War plans. When Bush and Erdoğan met, Turkey was demanded to give a decision about American demands.

Meanwhile, at the bureaucratic level, on November 19, 2002, American military demands were officially transmitted to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and it was November 21, 2002 when final demands were presented to Prime Minister Abdullah Gül (Bölükbaşı, 2008:28). Turkish side gave a partial affirmative response on November 23, after a large Iraqi summit was held with the participation of different related government bodies in Turkey. Yaşar Yakış stated that "at this moment permission for using the military facilities may be given. However, Turkey should be in a position of giving direction to events for her own interests". Similarly, Ziyal presented Turkish position to the U.S. envoys by saying that "Turkey would

---

[16] 58th government of Turkish Republic was formed under the presidency of Abdullah Gül by AK Party between 18 November 2002 and 14 March 2003.

[17] Paul Wolfowitz met with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the residence of Robert Pearson,U.S. ambassador to Ankara for a dinner. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was accompanied with his advisers Cüneyd Zapsu, Ömer Çelik and Egemen Bağış. After the meeting, Erdoğan's adviser gave a briefing to the journalists in Hilton Hotel and during the briefing in front of Cuneyd Zapsu there was a paper napkin over which a detailed schedule of American reconstruction of the military sites and deployment of American troops were written. A journalist from the *The Weekly Standart* copied the schedule and made it public. Paper napkin incident revealed that Wolfowitz and Erdoğan had agreed on the schedule during their dinner meeting (Bila, 2003:187).

not make the USA deprive of the northern option, as soon as a *modus operanti* is signed investigations could be made. We have a positive attitude towards the construction in line with the number of the military personal to be brought." (Bölükbaşı, 2008:29).

Despite this partial affirmative response, the American side was not satisfied and on January 13, 2003, sent an official paper having the details of the prospective operation from the northern front. Also, the U.S. ambassador Robert Pearson met with Abdullah Gül and requested from him giving the permission for possibility of a northern front be included to the negotiations immediately.

On January 31, 2003 National Security Council convened, and, after a long meeting, published a notice which was not negative. In the notice, National Security Council declared that in line with the Article 92 of Turkish constitution, conditional on realization of international legitimacy, it advised the government to take the necessary steps to bring into force the military measures which are deemed necessary on a scheduled basis, totally for the purpose of protecting Turkey's interests.[18] This notice was important in the sense that National Security Council did not reject an opening a northern front nor sending troops to Northern Iraq.

Having understood the decisiveness of the Bush administration and coming to an end of preliminary negotiations, the Turkish government tried to pursue a strategy for gaining time; which, in time, divided Turkish commitments. Meanwhile, besides partial affirmative response, Prime Minister Abdullah Gül intensified his diplomatic efforts which started with his visit to Syria and continued with Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Following his Middle East Tour comprising visits to neighboring countries of Iraq, and other Middle East countries, foreign Ministers of Turkey, Iran, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia convened on January 23, 2003 in Çırağan palace under the auspices of Prime Minister Abdullah Gül (Radikal,24/02/2003).[19]

However, on February 5, 2003, a government proposal was prepared and presented to the TGNA. It was discussed in a closed session and accepted in the parliament. After the proposal was accepted on 8 February, a Memorandum of

---

[18]www.mgk.gov.tr

[19] Available at [http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=63933]

Understanding between Turkey and the USA was signed; Americans began to deploy personnel and the artillery to pre-determined military sides (Bölükbaşı, 2008:34).

According to Bölükbaşı, between January and February 2003, comprehensive negotiations were held between the two sides, out of which came an agreement on three documents on military, political and economic issues (Bölükbaşı, 2008: 18). In line with this development, on February 25, 2003, AK Party Government demanded authorization from TGNA for deploying foreign forces within Turkish territory and sending Turkish troops abroad according to Article 92 of Turkish Constitution. However, government proposal was discussed in a closed session and rejected by the TGNA on March 1, 2003.

On 10 March 2003, President Bush made a telephone talk with the new Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan and declared that military plans were revised accordingly as Turkey did not commit to contribute and, that without a total cooperation with the USA, they would not let Turkey go into Iraq by herself. Also, his official letter which arrived on 13 March 2003 stated that NATO members opened their fly zones to coalition forces and that Turkey was the only single NATO member who did not yet give such assistance. In addition, George W. Bush's letter officially stated that given the non-cooperative situation with the USA, Turkey would not be allowed any military movement on her own in Iraqi territory (Bölükbaşı, 2008:96-98)

As mentioned above, American and British troops began to bomb Iraq officially on March 20, shortly after the expiration of George W. Bush's ultimatum. On that day, TGNA discussed and accepted the third government proposal concerning Iraqi War so that government obtained the required authorization for opening Turkish fly zone to American and British Military. This third government proposal was regarded in Turkish public opinion as a result of Turkish attempts to compensate for 1 March rejection of American demands.

After the invasion of Iraq, Turkey received a questionnaire from the USA inquiring what Turkey could do for the reconstruction and maintenance of stability in Iraq (Erhan, 2006:74). Several correspondences held between the two parties. Turkey, as a result, answered to the questionnaire by confirming its commitment to the prospective stability force and additionally in such issues as restructuring the education and health services, training of Iraqi army and police force as well as infrastructure. In sum, Turkey clearly confirmed Turkish troops would be sent to Iraq

(Yetkin,2004:213-216).After these correspondences, a new government proposal was prepared and dispatched to the parliament which was accepted in a closed discussion on November 7.

3.1.4. FROM 1 MARCH 2003 TO 17 OCTOBER 2007

After 1 March, Turkey and the USA which have been referred to as "strategic partners" and allies for almost a half century seemed to confront each other in Northern Iraq. Turkey's belated "no" response disappointed American expectations and led to American military to change its war plans. Since northern front was not opened, American military entered into Iraqi territory from the south and toppled Saddam Hussein's regime. However, Americans' military success against Iraqi army was shadowed by the resistance in Iraqi society against the invasion. Sunni groups and Shiite unions initiated local resistance movements and gave Americans severe losses. From this perspective, Turkey's assistance by opening Turkish fly zones to coalition forces was not regarded as cooperative as it should be since there was a general tendency in American high officials to link these severe losses with the unavailability of the northern front upon Turkish rejection (Vatan,08/04/2009)[20]. In these highly tensioned days, on July 4, in the independence day of the USA, American soldiers made a surprise assault on Turkish intelligence bureau in Suleymaniyah and captured eleven Turkish soldiers including a lieutenant among them. The USA's taking of Turkish military personnel into custody in a diplomatically improper way visible to Suleymaniyah community created a severe discontent in Turkey. This incident was called as "*çuval* incident" in Turkish public opinion and deteriorated American-Turkish relations which had been very delicate since 1 March 2003. Although the *çuval* incident was a symbolic representation of the soured American-Turkish relations, Americans' treatment of PKK and their tolerant way of conduct with the Kurdish establishment in Northern Iraq were the real source of disturbance for the Turkish authorities and people alike.

Concerning PKK, since 1991 despite official declarations that there was a common understanding and mutual cooperation between Turkey and the USA,

---

[20] Available at [http://www9.gazetevatan.com/haberprint.asp?Newsid=232263&tarih=&Categoryid=1]

during its operations, Operation Northern Watch activities was a source of real concern in Turkey since Operation Northern Watch was claimed to be supporting PKK by throwing aid material and assistance to wounded PKK terrorists by its helicopters (Oran, 1998:108,122). However, the Operation Northern Watch allowed Turkey's hot-pursuits and cross border military operations with the USA's deliberatively overlooking them (Altunışık, 2006:184).

It was 1999 when the USA captured PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and sent him to Turkey. This was a very important moment for Turkish-American relations that created a positive contribution to the perception of the USA in Turkey. Öcalan's capture started a period of inaction on PKK side after PKK forces stepped out Turkish territory. However, American invasion of Iraq changed the dynamics and PKK decided to finish its inactivity in 2004 and increased its movements and terrorist activities towards Turkey.

As we understand from Deniz Bölükbaşı's memories, on the negotiation table Turkey was apprehensive of PKK's possible efforts to benefit from the possible power vacuum after the American intervention. It therefore pushed for deploying Turkish troops in northern Iraq for eradicating PKK and hence preventing an emergence of a separate Kurdish State. Turkish military was to cross over Iraqi border and would create a secure zone, and a corridor would be opened for the U.S. military but the parliament's rejection of giving an authorization turned every thing upside down. In fact, in the negotiations, Turkish demands were so adamant that the USA, despite Turkey's negative attitude, had accepted Turkish existence in Northern Iraq.

After the Iraqi war, from 2004 up to 2007, more than 500 people died and more than 1000 people got injured in PKK attacks (Bölükbaşı, 2008:170-171). Certainly, this increased activity instigated a trauma in public opinion. Since PKK inactivity ended and activities heightened with a rapid pace after Iraqi intervention, a critical atmosphere *vis a vis* the USA became visible in Turkey. The bitterness of the public opinion reached a level where a necessity of a Turkish intervention in Iraq came on the agenda. Simply, great losses given in PKK attacks after almost six years of PKK inactivity shattered Turkish political climate and the public began to blame the USA and Kurdish establishment in Iraq for their permissive attitude against PKK activities with demands for sending troops northern Iraq.

According to the Congressional Research Service, Turkey has sought to have PKK leaders in northern Iraq arrested, camps that shelter the PKK closed and PKK offices in the country shut down permanently as PKK intensified its movement since 2004. While Ankara mainly addressed Bagdad, Washington was held responsible and demanded action. On such an environment when Turkey highlighted its demands from the USA and fortified its southern borders, the Bush administration responded to Turkish messages by appointing retired general John Ralston as special envoy for countering PKK. Similarly, a Turkish envoy was charged, the retired General Edip Başer. However, despite this mechanism regarded as a positive development, soon the Turkish public opinion turned to negative as this mechanism was increasingly perceived as an American strategy for playing time against Turkey. Prime Minister Erdoğan in January 2007 declared that the coordination mechanism did not yield any concrete results and finally, The U.S. Department of State confirmed that Ralston resigned. According to the Department of State, his appointment succeeded only in preventing Turkey from acting against the PKK for one year and Turks believed that this was his sole purpose (CRS Report,2008b: 13).

On August 7, at the invitation of the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri al Maliki visited Ankara to sign a memorandum of understanding on countering terrorism, including the PKK. However, Maliki noted that the parliament had to approve an agreement and action; he was unable to implement the memorandum of understanding without the cooperation of the Kurdish Regional Government in northern Iraq. The Iraqi Kurds were noticeably absent from Turkish diplomatic moves because Kurdish Regional Government President Massoud Barzani's language regarding Turkey was sometimes inflammatory as he admitted that he supports the PKK while Turkish officials asserted that they will not deal with the Iraqi Kurdish administration until it acts against terrorism (CRS Report,2008b:14). Meanwhile, on October 17, 2007, TGNA passed a resolution giving the authorization to government for sending Turkish troops to northern Iraq.

Fearing an invasion would destabilize Iraq, president Bush invited prime Minister Erdoğan to the White House on November 5, when he referred to the PKK as "our enemy" and promised "real time" and "actionable" intelligence. Subsequently, Turkish air forces conducted targeted air strikes against the PKK.

Following a massive attack by PKK on outpost in Dağlıca (a small village in Hakkari) and the kidnapping of 8 Turkish soldiers which created tremendous discontent in Turkish public opinion; on February 21, 2008 Turkish land forces crossed the Iraqi border and entered into northern Iraq. Despite its assistance in terms of intelligence given, the USA immediately called for withdrawal and operation of the land forces lasted for eight days. The troops withdrew almost immediately after American statements, provoking a heated controversy in which the nationalist political opposition charged that the military and government had followed orders from Washington and the Chief of the Military Staff responded in kind (NCR Report,2008b:15).

3.2. MOTIONS
3.2.1. First Motion: 6 February 2003

The first government proposal related with involvement in Iraqi War was discussed on 6 February in the 58th government period which was established under the presidency of Abdullah Gül. The president of the TGNA was Bülent Arınç and the composition of the parliament was as the following: 365 AK Party seats, 177 Republican People's Party (CHP) seats, 8 independent deputies. In the ballot held on 6 February, the government managed to pass the motion with 308 affirmative votes to 193 counter votes. [21]

The proposal was titled as "Motion issued by the Office of the Prime Minister of Turkey as per Article 92 of the Constitution for permitting the presence of the technical and military personnel of the United States of America in Turkey for three months for carrying out maintenance, improvement, construction and extension works in U.S. military base and facilities as well as the ports in Turkey (3/177)"[22] and clearly demanding the authority to modernize the military facilities and allow the U.S. military to settle in Turkish territory for this purpose. The government proposal

---

[21] The loss AK Party gave in the ballot calculated to be 50 votes and, 30 of them were making their pilgrimages and absentees, thus it was calculated that the second motion would pass without any hesitation (Balbay,2007:123).

[22] "Türkiye'deki askerî üs ve tesisler ile limanlarda gerekli yenileştirme, geliştirme, inşaat ve tevsi çalışmaları ile altyapı faaliyetlerinde bulunmak amacıyla, Amerika Birleşik Devletlerine mensup teknik ve askerî personelin 3 ay süreyle Türkiye'de bulunmasına, Anayasanın 92 nci maddesi uyarınca izin verilmesine dair Başbakanlık tezkeresi (3/177)

was a result of its efforts to gradually commit Turkish contribution to American intervention in Iraq. As the American side pushed for a decision, the government wanted to distinguish between making infrastructural preparations for the intervention and the final commitment through opening a front from the north of Iraq, and possibly sending troops to Iraq.

In the proposal, the government was stating that there was a state of urgency and turbulence since Iraq was non-compliant with the regime which was established by the UN Resolutions after the Gulf War. The UN declared this situation a serious threat to international peace and security, and it was decided, in the UN Security Council, that ensuring the compliance of Iraq was important for the protecting international peace and security. This non-compliance, especially on the issue of weapons of mass destruction, made the situation very sensitive, and influenced Turkey in a negative way, giving floor to a very important security risk. The territorial integrity of Iraq was mentioned as an important element for Turkey's security since the environment was sensitive and dismemberment of Iraq would be a source of instability. In this context, being prepared for any possibility if a peaceful solution could not be reached was seen as necessary for the protection of Turkish interests. For that purpose, it was proposed by the government that, in order to ensure that Turkish interests were protected, the military facilities should be reconstructed and the U.S. military personnel should be permitted to stay in Turkey for three months.[23]

Two points stand out in the parliamentary discussions of the 6 February 2003 motion: First, the government made it clear that it was to continue the discussion in the parliament in a closed session. Secondly, the opposition made it swiftly explicit that there was a suspicion in the public opinion against the government' handling of the Iraqi issue with USA, and, blamed the government for maintaining the negotiations in secrecy.

3.2.2. Second Motion: 1 March 2003

The second motion was discussed in 1 March 2003 in the parliament and it could not pass since the absolute majority which was the condition to do so

---

[23] Available at [www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem22/yil1/bas/b032m.htm]

according to the internal of TGNA could not be achieved. On 1 March, 533 MPs were present in the parliament and the AK Party preferred not taking a binding group decision before the ballot. Soon after the discussions ended, the president revealed that there were 264 "yes" and 250 "no" votes and 19 abstentions.

The title of the proposal was "Motion issued by the Office of the Prime Minister of Turkey as per Article 92 of the Constitution stipulating the deployment of Turkish Armed Forces in foreign countries and permitting the presence of the Armed Forces of foreign states in Turkey for six months as well as making relevant legislative arrangements concerning the movement of foreign warring elements off the boundaries of Turkey (3/189)"[24]. Although it was dispatched to the parliament on February 24, it first appeared in TGNA agenda on February 27 and that day, deferred for only one time to March 1 because the government members were not present at the parliament. This deferral made people claim that government was not determined in its course of action, Turkish military did not agree with the government and there were some problems in the negotiations with the Americans (Bila, 2003:212-218). Actually, It was a real test for the government since the USA was awaiting a definite reply, positive or negative, in a context where international public opinion was not persuaded for military intervention in Iraq and, where according to public opinion polls, Turkish public opinion was against such an intervention by 85,9% to 94 % (Oran, 2004:54-60).

The government proposal was demanding an authorization for a temporary deployment of foreign military on the Turkish territory and of sending Turkish troops abroad. In the motion, the government, after briefly mentioning the situation in Iraq, which was getting worse to the extent that Iraq might get dismembered any time along ethnic and religious lines, stated that NATO will support Turkey with missile defense systems and give protection for biological and chemical weapons. Referring to the experiences of a massive human flow from Iraq and to terrorist elements' gathering there, the government drew attention to security threat this situation posed for Turkey. The necessity for the decisiveness of the international society for solving the problem in Iraq was recognized as crucial. Then, it was stated that deploying

---

[24] Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin yabancı ülkelere gönderilmesine, yabancı silahlı kuvvetler unsurlarının altı ay süreyle Türkiye'de bulunmasına ve muharip unsurların Türkiye dışına intikalleri için gerekli düzenlemelerin yapılmasına Anayasanın 92 nci maddesi uyarınca izin verilmesine ilişkin Başbakanlık tezkeresi (3/189)

foreign military forces in Turkey would carry out a crucial and efficient function as a collateral pressure element within the scope of deterrence measures against Iraq. In addition, in the worst scenario, Turkish military would be sent to Iraq and, in such a case, authorization was crucial for the government to pursue polices to protect Turkish national interests against a non-compliant Iraq.

Rejection of the government proposal by the parliament was an unpredicted surprise for Turkish and international public opinion alike. When he heard that the government proposal was rejected, George W. Bush said to drop the folders in his hand and say " The Turks have done what?" with the a astonishment he lived (Vatan, 08/04/2009).[25]

According to Deniz Bölükbaşı, he and the undersecretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Uğur Ziyal were present in the parliament for making an explanatory speech for the memorandum of understanding they had prepared with American representatives. However, the substance of the memorandum of understanding could not be explained in the parliament, since they were not given the floor to speak (Bolükbaşı, 2008:86-87).

On 1 March 2003, the discussions mainly revolved around the legitimacy of government proposal and the measures to be taken with it. Since the president of the parliament applied the internal law of the TGNA in a flexible manner, preliminary discussions made open the public and the opposition found the chance to open discussions about the substance of the government proposal.

3.2.3. Third Motion: 20 March 2003

On March 20, bending before the pressures coming from the USA, the parliament discussed the third government proposal and passed a resolution authorizing the sending of Turkish troops to Northern Iraq and opening the Turkish fly zone. The government motion was titled as "On condition that its requisition, scope and the time are determined by the government which is accountable against the Grand National Assembly for ensuring the national security and preparing the armed forces for the defense of the country as per Article 117 of the Constitution, Motion issued by the Office of the Prime Minister of Turkey as per Article 92 of the

---

[25] Available at [http://www9.gazetevatan.com/haberdetay.asp?Categoryid=1&Newsid=232263]

Constitution stipulating the deployment of the Turkish Armed Forces in Northern Iraq; within the framework of the procedures to be established, permitting the use of these armed forces in Northern Iraq in order to sustain the deterrence, allowing the government to make necessary legislative arrangements so as to permit foreign air forces use Turkish airspace within the framework of the procedures and rules to be established by the Turkish authorities in a possible military action for six months (3/221)"[26]. It was signed by the new Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who established the 59th government of the Republic. The proposal was discussed on 20 March 2003 and it was accepted by 332 to 202 votes in the parliament.

In the proposal, government stated that Turkey was confronted with war conditions which would make Iraqi territory a total war field and these conditions were making the situation more delicate for Turkish security and interests. Then, given the conditions of an oncoming war in Iraq, several security concerns were openly listed and the measure for alleviating these concerns was recognized as deploying Turkish troops to northern Iraq. Opening fly zones to coalition forces was mentioned as a measure for compliance with NATO behavior that was recognized and accepted by all NATO members. In this context, firstly, increasing PKK efforts to benefit from the turbulent situations in Iraq were presented as an important security threat. Secondly, it was mentioned that Iraq was about to dismember along ethnic and religious lines since such activities were intensified. And, in such a situation, other groups would be threatened in a potential environment of insecurity. Thirdly, there was a possibility of a refugee flow towards Turkey, which should be stopped in a secured place to meet the dislocated people's humanitarian needs. Basing the security of Turkey on these three issues, the government demanded authorization for taking the necessary measures, including deployment of Turkish troops whose duty would only be realization of these three basic goals in northern Iraq for securing Turkish interests. Turkish troops, it was added, would not go into open combat with Iraqi forces if they were not forced to do so and, and by this way,

---

[26] "Gereği kapsamı, sınırı ve zamanı Anayasanın 117 nci maddesine göre millî güvenliğin sağlanmasından ve silahlı kuvvetlerin yurt savunmasına hazırlanmasından Yüce Meclise karşı sorumlu bulunan hükümet tarafından belirlenecek şekilde, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin Kuzey Irak'a gönderilmesine; etkili bir caydırıcılığın sürdürülmesi amacıyla Kuzey Irak'ta bulunacak bu kuvvetlerin, gerektiğinde, belirlenecek esaslar dairesinde kullanılmasına ve muhtemel bir askerî harekât çerçevesinde yabancı silahlı kuvvetlere mensup hava unsurlarının Türk hava sahasını Türk makamları tarafından belirlenecek esaslara ve kurallara göre kullanmaları için gerekli düzenlemelerin hükümet tarafından yapılmasına Anayasanın 92 nci maddesi uyarınca 6 ay süreyle izin verilmesine ilişkin Başbakanlık tezkeresi (3/221)"

other national groups existing in Iraq would also be secured in such an environment of instability. Then, the government touched upon opening Turkish fly zone to coalition forces by saying that numerous countries, including NATO members, gave the permission, and that it was increasingly important to re-evaluate the newly emerged situation.

This motion was known in the public opinion as the "light tezkere"[27]. However, with the "light tezkere", Turkey opened its fly zone to coalition forces giving the coalition the chance to both directly attack Iraq by air forces and deploy several airborne troops to northern Iraq. However, what was striking was that the Turkish parliament gave the decision to send Turkish military to northern Iraq despite its rejection on March 1. Technically and militarily difference was about not opening Turkish territory to land forces of the coalition and not allowing them crossing to Iraqi territory from a northern front.

3.2.4. Fourth Motion: 7 October 2003

On October 7, 2003 after the Saddam Hussein regime was toppled, TGNA passed another resolution which gave authority to the government for sending Turkish troops to Iraq as a part of the stabilization efforts after demands came from the USA. The government proposal related to Turkish contribution for the stabilization force was prepared and dispatched to the parliament within the confines of the prior correspondence made between Turkey and the U.S. side. The proposal was titled as "On condition that its requisition, scope and the time are determined by the government, Motion issued by the Office of the Prime Minister of Turkey as per the Article 92 of the Constitution allowing the government to make necessary arrangements for the deployment and use of Turkish Armed Forces in Northern Iraq in order to contribute to the peace and stability in the region for one year (3/361)"[28]. It was discussed in a closed session and accepted by the parliament by 358 affirmative to 183 privative votes.

---

[27] It was compared with the one that was discussed on 1March and characterized in the public opinion as a lighter one, and called as "*light* tezkere" whose wording, half English and half Turkish, reflects the belief that the origin of these motions was USA.

[28] Gereği, kapsamı, sınırı ve zamanı hükümet tarafından belirlenecek şekilde Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri unsurlarının Irak'ta güvenlik ve istikrara katkı yapmak amacıyla Irak'a gönderilmesine ve bu kuvvetlerin görev ve kullanılmasına ilişkin gerekli düzenlemelerin hükümet tarafından yapılmasına Anayasanın 92 nci maddesi uyarınca bir yıl süreyle izin verilmesine ilişkin Başbakanlık tezkeresi (3/361)

The proposal was a relatively long but a clear one in its substance. Accordingly, the government stated its intentions that stability in Iraq was described as having utmost important for the security interests of Turkey. The main referents which government listed were the UN Resolution 1483 welcoming the member states to contribute to the establishment of stability and security conditions in Iraq, establishing a democratic and institutionally strong Iraqi state embracing all ethnic groups within its territory and helping to create ultimate security environment in Iraqi territory. Besides, the government made direct reference to the linkage between Iraq's stability and PKK activity posed towards Turkish territorial integrity by implying that Turkish existence would help to the people of Iraq to establish the stable institutional and political structures which would result in a security environment in Iraq. In addition, the government proposal had a delicate wording since it clearly listed security problems concerning Turkey and, then, it stated that Turkish existence in stability forces was decided to be the best possible measure for the removal of these security threats for Turkey given the current situation in Iraq. In addition, the scope of the Turkish military mission was stated to be only for humanitarian purposes and for embracing the Iraqi people as a whole rather than being a tool for maintaining the invasion conditions. It was clearly underlined that Turkish existence would be for the sake of Iraqi people rather than assisting the USA in its efforts for war on terror. It was also mentioned that Turkish forces would not be warring units and would be under the command of Turkish military official.

3.2.5. Fifth Motion: 17 October 2007

After almost four years, on October 17, 2007 TGNA took a decision for sending Turkish soldiers to Northern Iraq after the PKK intensified its terrorist activities in Turkish territory resulting in a very significant number of military and civilian losses. Turkish political agenda hence focused on USA's and northern Iraqi regional authority's permissive attitudes against PKK, which the Turkish public opinion blamed for PKK's increased activities after five years of inactivity. The government increasingly stated that the Turkish patience has a limit when Turkish territorial integrity was increasingly subject to terrorist separatist attacks.

In such a political climate, on October 17, 2007 TGNA discussed a military offensive in Iraqi territory to prevent PKK attacking Turkey. A resolution was passed

for giving authorization to government for sending Turkish military forces to Northern Iraq. The title of the proposal was "In order to get engaged in a cross border operation and intervention, Motion issued by the Office of the Prime Minister of Turkey as per Article 92 of the Constitution allowing the Turkish Armed Forces to be deployed to the northern part of the region and to adjacent fields where the PKK terrorists of Iraq are densely nesting in order to dispose the terrorist threat and attack targeting our country from the northern Iraq (3/199)"[29]

The Government proposal signed by the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was clearly written and the message given was very neat. According to the government proposal, Turkey was faced with PKK terrorist attacks against its territorial integrity, national unity and security, its people's well-being, prosperity and security. It was mentioned that Turkey had been striving to curtail PKK's existence and activities in Iraq with intense diplomatic and political initiatives for a long time, but, that these efforts did not yield any desired outcomes. In this respect, government was demanding an authorization for military operations in Northern Iraq.

On 17 October, in the parliament, AK Party talked about their intentions in 1 March 2003 motion and, then, referred to Turkish history and international law as the basis for their motivation for 17 October proposal. On the other hand, terrorism appeared as a common reference point which political parties resorted to, except Democratic Society Party (DTP) and Freedom and Solidarity Party (ÖDP). Basing their claims on the concept of self defense, CHP and MHP demanded more serious measures that would be directed towards Regional Kurdish Authority of Northern Iraq which they blamed for being the real source of PKK terrorism.

3.3. DISCUSSIONS: INSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY, LEGITIMACY AND INTEREST

Basing on the debate between neo-realism and constructivism which was touched upon in the theoretical chapter, a reading of the parliamentary minutes revealed some important points which can be tapped with a constructivist

---

[29] Gereği, kapsamı, sınırı ve zamanı hükümet tarafından belirlenecek şekilde Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri unsurlarının Irak'ta güvenlik ve istikrara katkı yapmak amacıyla Irak'a gönderilmesine ve bu kuvvetlerin görev ve kullanılmasına ilişkin gerekli düzenlemelerin hükümet tarafından yapılmasına Anayasanın 92 nci maddesi uyarınca bir yıl süreyle izin verilmesine ilişkin Başbakanlık tezkeresi (3/361)

understanding of the state. In the parliamentary discussions some themes appeared significantly as inter-subjectively known referents for understanding what kind of situation was faced or for attaching meaning to the proposed actions by the government.

What is striking is the responses given by the government to large extent also bear the same reference points which in fact were verified with the discussions made in 17 October 2007 in the parliament. While the references made by the opposition was clearly reflecting the historical and sociological contextual basis from where the germ of the criticism emanates, in 17 October 2007 government party representatives talk within the same conceptual framework verifying that this basis is knowable to and used by all in Turkish political discourse. One thing which the government appears to detach itself from in 2003 seems to be the issue of legitimacy and its linkage with the international law. However, in 2007, the legitimacy basis of the action was shared by the opposition parties except DTP and was explicitly declared by the government as the reason for the proposed action. In 2003, since the discussions in the parliament largely were maintained by the opposition party and the government tried to pull the discussions to closed session, the overall view of the government is less easily understandable than the discussions in 2007. In 2007, AK Party representatives talked about the developments in 2003 and revealed that AK Party acted in a strategic manner on 1 March 2003 in order to be closer to the consequences of the forthcoming war and to manipulate the situation according to Turkish interests.

In the parliament, first criticism was on the issue of secrecy, which went against the parliamentary role and tradition in the foreign policy making. The parliamentary discussions depicted the foreign policy tradition in the parliament as the principle of taking ownership of foreign policy issues and restricting the personal initiatives on behalf on the nation without getting authorization from the parliament. This was showing how the history of Turkey shaped the institutional framework of major decisions for international behavior at the constitutional level such as waging war, accepting or sending troops. In the discussions, the parliament was defined as the sacred place where the will of the nation is represented and it was attributed an active agency in foreign policy vis a vis the executive by stating that this role was the outcome of the bitter experiences the nation faced because of the irresponsible

behavior of the executive. Similarly, the Kemalist principle of peaceful international relations was pointed as the protective historical synthesis Turkey has reached in accordance with mutual recognition of sovereign rights of states. Article 92 of the constitution appears to be the extension and a representation of this kind of a traditional understanding on foreign policy making which was shaped by the socio-historical realities of the Turkish state society complex. Given the examples of the traumatic events in Ottoman-Turkish history, such as the *93 Harbi*, the First World War, the Sarıkamış Disaster, the Korean War, foreign policy issues seem to be regarded as a sensitive area requiring democratic treatment as a parliamentary norm. In this respect, discussions taking place in the parliament for all five motions show similarities since the discussions were made consistently on an axis of the parliamentary tradition that questions the transparency and the accountability of the executive in foreign policy making.

Secondly, another criticism appears on the issue of legitimacy both in the international and domestic realm. Since Article 92 concretely demands the action should be along international law, the issue of legitimacy according to international law always came to fore fronts in the discussions. Both the discussions in 2003 and in 2007 appear to bear significant references made to international law. In addition, in line with the debate about whether proposed actions are legitimate or not, there are also references made to how other states reacted in a similar situation, reflecting the fact that there is a "logic of appropriateness" operating in determining the right action *vis a vis* the situation that is in question.

Thirdly, the concept of "interest" became one of the main issues that the discussions revolve around. In 2003, the Kemalist tradition of having peaceful orientation in international affairs seems to be the main ground on which the opposition based its claims and questioned whether or not Turkey would benefit from military involvement in Iraq. More importantly, in 2007, a new element which can be an important ground for a constructivist analysis emerges. In the parliamentary discussions of 2007, we see that regarding the actions subject to article 92 of the constitution, interest identification is a social process in which the parliament operates as a place where different interest definitions clash and the foreign policy action is determined according to institutionalized procedures of this articulation process.

Significantly, it should also be noted that as the tensions grew about the American invasion of Iraq and Turkish involvement, the formulation of the government proposals came to accommodate these criticisms. The way the proposals were formulated evolved compliant with the nature of arguments made in the parliament on these three fundamental issues which the opposition based its criticisms. The reading of the government proposals along these three themes shows that the proposals became more informative, limited in mission definition, and interested concretely in security concepts of Turkey rather than drawing open-ended missions without clear definitions of Turkish interests. Also, in the proposals we began to see high dependence on international law as the basis for the proposals. This testifies how my handling of the parliamentary discussions is appropriate, or at least not defective in discerning the ideational frame of references which appears in the parliamentary discussions. The evolution of the formulation of the motions reflect the fact that government happened to be more sensitive on intersubjectively shared elements of understanding within the parliament, which appear to be referents of the valid language for getting access to parliaments' affirmation for a measure within the scope of Article 92. Therefore, in the following section, I will not confine the analysis to the discussions only, but also use the government's proposal texts in furthering my discussion.

Here, it is appropriate to refer to three themes as "institutional identity", "legitimacy" and "interest". Although such points are difficult to be explained separately from each other since they are intertwined, for analytical purpose, it is argued that the discussions could be examined under three reference points. However, a chronological narrative of the discussions and motions, albeit without deliberation, is still kept, since these themes also seem to appear one by one.

3.3.1. INSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY

While reading the parliamentary minutes, one having the familiarity with a constructivist understanding of international relations can easily get struck by the nature of the discussions focusing on the parliamentary traditions and the particular kind of identity attributed to the parliament. The discussions point to intersubjectively known and accepted elements of socio-historical context of Turkish

politics that give a framework to the attempts in the parliament for understanding the situation in Iraq and giving the meaning to the proposed actions by the government. The transparency and accountability of the foreign policy behavior of the executive before the parliament appear as a historically accumulated knowledge of Turkish Parliament that gives an active role to the parliament which was institutionally supported by the constitution in foreign policy making. This shows us that despite the 1982 Constitution's favoring of the executive *vis a vis* the parliament, how the parliamentarism is internalized in Turkish politics with regards to major foreign policy behavior as an historical outcome. In addition, as a domestic legitimacy condition, the constitution gives such important decisions to the will of the nation through the parliament with a purpose to allow the realization of the will of the nation in such important policy behavior.

On 06 February, 2003, when the reading of the government proposal was just finished, the president[30] informed the parliament of a request calling for a closed session. The government proposal was about the reconstruction of the military facilities and deployment of relevant American personnel in Turkish territory for three months. The president ordered all personnel except those who were responsible for writing down the parliamentary minutes leave the assembly. But the opposition immediately reacted to it, questioning the reason for hiding the discussion from the "nation".[31] The opposition very strongly questioned the government's demand to make the discussions in a closed session.

This criticism was basically on the grounds that the parliament is the unique place where the nation's will is manifested and the authority given to government is responsible to the nation itself. Voices were heightened between the deputies and some bullied one another as usual. The president responded in a calm manner that the demand for a closed session was in line with internal law of TGNA. Consequently, the discussion was made closed to public and the government proposal was accepted so that the motion passed. However, what has been said by one main opposition party MP before the closure of the TGNA TV, was impressive. "You are not on the court of TV, but on the court of history."[32]

---

[30] Bülent Arınç; Lawyer, Deputy of Manisa from AK Party.

[31] Stated by Kemal Anadol;Lawyer,Deputy of İzmir from CHP.

[32] Stated by Kemal Anadol.

This statement was the summary of the reason why there was a dispute on that day when the government proposal about reconstruction of military sites was discussed. After the president ordered the closing of the session, the opposition began to raise its voice, accusing the government of hiding the truths from Turkish people about the ongoing negotiations with the USA on a possible joint war in Iraq. The nation is recognized as the source from where the authority emanated and delegated to the government for using on behalf of the nation itself according to the Turkish Constitution of 1982.[33] It was striking that the government was accused by making politics despite the nation and escaping from it.[34] The opposition blamed the government for pushing politics out of the reach of the people from whom the government acquired its power through the popular vote [35] and they argued that government was afraid of the Turkish people with a reference made by the deputies that the nation's will is the real source of legitimacy and state power. Discussions revealed that the parliament was considered as that entity to where the nation delegates its power and will. Each representative under TGNA, who were to make a very historical decision, was implied to be the bearer of the national will, which is also emphasized in the Turkish constitution.[36]

This first official authorization demand for a possible involvement with Iraq was discussed in an atmosphere the opposition accused the government of creating a "state of secrecy" by hiding the negotiations from the nation, escaping from it or making the politics despite the nation. The opposition's allegations were about a hidden content about the negotiations and this was revealing how an "information asymmetry" in the public opinion was existent. How this atmosphere of secrecy was determining in shaping the parliament's reactions was revealed soon in the discussions that took place on 1 March and 5 March 2003 which were basically demonstrative of the fact that there is a particular kind of self-identification in the parliament about the foreign policy issues.

---

[33] **Article 6**. Sovereignty is vested fully and unconditionally in the nation. The Turkish Nation shall exercise its sovereignty through the authorised organs as prescribed by the principles laid down in the Constitution.
The right to exercise sovereignty shall not be delegated to any individual, group or class. No person or agency shall exercise any state authority which does not emanate from the Constitution.

[34] Stated by Canan Arıtman;Doctor of Medicine; Deputy of İzmir from CHP.

[35] Stated by Hüseyin Bayındır; former Bureaucrat; Deputy of Kırşehir from CHP.

[36] **Article 80.** Members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly represent, not merely their own constituencies or constituents, but the Nation as a whole.

On 1 March, another government proposal was discussed. Since the president ordered for broad implementation of the international law of the parliament, preliminary talks were made open the public. On March 1, after the government proposal was read, the president of the parliament announced that there was an opposition proposal for examining whether or not the conditions for an Article 92 situation was existing. Opposition's demand was procedural and not related with the substance. As a result, an open session was to be made to talk about the resolution open to the public. The president made a brief explanation about his understanding of the internal law of the parliament and stated his decision to make a broad interpretation which in fact provided the opposition enough space to discuss the proposal in length by touching the substance of the proposal. President's flexible attitude gave a chance to opposition members to talk before the closure of the discussions and the opposition used this opportunity to talk more about the content rather than the procedural issues. While explaining why he was to make a flexible interpretation, it was striking how the president underlined that TGNA was under great responsibility and would make a very important decision so every deputy should be given the chance to make his/her voice heard in a democratic manner. In addition, it was also noteworthy that during the discussions, president with an implication that there are ordering principles in TGNA, made references to the parliamentary traditions and history, by which TGNA was depicted to be a sacred place where the War of Independence was directed from.

Significantly and similarly, the opposition talked about what they implied as the anti-imperial traditions of the TGNA by calling it as the Gazi Assembly which resisted and defeated any encroachment coming from external forces.[37]

> In this issue, we are under a great responsibility; primarily the government party, opposition party and all members of the parliament are under great responsibility. As I mentioned at the beginning of my words, TGNA is the first parliament which took this war into its agenda in the world. *TGNA assembly is a Gazi assembly, which managed to defeat and resist any encroachments, it represents the national will. Let's leave all differences, economic, class and ideological differences* among ourselves aside against the *"Tek Dişi Kalmış Canavar"* which is the description of Mehmet Akif Ersoy, member of the first parliament and the Poet of our National Anathema. Friends, let's be on the side of the rightfulness, justice and of the Right. Let's give decision on the side of the Right. (Italics by the author)

Since the war of independence was technically directed from the first Turkish parliament and showed the characteristics of a *de facto* resistance movement against

---

[37] Stated by Kemal Anadol.

imperial forces, lying behind this understanding was the notion that even discussing a support for the American invasion of Iraq was a challenge to what they perceived as the TGNA's noble history and noble identity. According to this understanding being on the side with the USA would be being on the side with an aggressive monster which was depicted in Turkish National Anthem and it would not be along the rightfulness.

Soon after government proposal was rejected on 1 March, in the following days, the parliament witnessed very important dialogues pointing at how the parliament has a peculiar kind of self-identification about foreign policy issues. On 5 March, one deputy from the opposition party[38] took the floor and made a speech which touched upon the historical traditions of the parliament with different examples taken from different moments of modern Turkish history. His speech was also represented the key sources of opposition's concerns about government position *vis a vis* the American demands.

Mentioning the nature of negotiations taking place between Turkey and the USA, this opposition MP stated that what commitment was given to the USA behind the closed doors was not known and this kind of secretive foreign policy making was certainly out of fashion in modern times. He added that today considering foreign policy as an area of mystery and a play ground for an elite community is an old phenomenon of history and modern understanding of foreign policy making is completely different. Modern foreign policy understanding, he continued, recognizes that foreign policies are the results of democratic processes and established on such democratic principles of openness and inclusiveness, and hence in modern world domestic politics and foreign policy are not separated. More importantly, according to him, what Turkish tradition about foreign policy making was Turkish parliaments' tradition of taking ownership and responsibility on foreign policy issues. With his words;

> Respectful Members of the Parliament, we don't know what commitments the government party gave to Americans behind closed doors. However, those times when the foreign policy was counted as a mysterious realm, and when it was assumed as a game which is played by a closed circle of a foreign policy community have passed down in history long ago. Contemporary foreign policy understanding is such foreign policy making which is open, inclusive, participatory, formed through democratic processes and which is strengthened over the shoulders of the nation and the parliament. *Domestic and foreign policies are undivided,*

---

[38] Ahmet Sırrı Özbek,Lawyer; Deputy of İstanbul from CHP.

they are whole. Especially, our tradition is our parliament's tradition of taking ownership of the foreign policy issues. Dear deputies, behind TGNA, there is the tradition of taking ownership of and being the major and real agent in foreign policy issues. This tradition has a history of 126 years. (Italics by the Author)

According to him, Turkish parliaments were pro-active against the executive and always questioned the foreign policy decisions when necessary. He gave example from Turkish history by saying that in the parliaments, there were times when a foreign minister had to say "please don't do this; I am here for three days standing, I am giving answers to your questions; I am totally exhausted".[39] Also, he underlined, this tradition showed us such parliaments which admonish the executive by saying "you can not degrade us to a listener position" or by saying "foreign policy issues are de facto nation's issues and we are the representatives of the nation, we are then de facto seizing the power" and, according to him, they made so.

On March 5, CHP representative continued by underlining that Turkish history had abundant examples testifying this tradition and gave more concrete examples. The opposition desk cherished when they heard the story of Mersin Ferry during *93 Harbi*[40]. In the year 1877, during the famous Russo-Ottoman war, discussion of foreign policy issues in Meclis-i Mebusan started with the ferry incident. In Black Sea, Mersin Ferry was attacked and destroyed by Russian forces. According to him, Deputy of Aydın, Yenişehirli Ahmet Zade Efendi asked to Minister of Navy about this incident. Minister answered by saying that "in fact that ship was very antiquated and useless". Yenişehirli Ahmet Zade Efendi said in a dignified manner "I did not ask the ship in deed, but our flag on it". Establishing a linkage between this event and the 1 March rejection of the government proposal he stated:

> I remember Ahmet Efendi with respect and god's mercy. I congratulate you, Members of the Parliament who constitute the 22nd Assembly of the Republic, being one of whom I am proud of, for maintaining this tradition with the decision you put forward in this Saturday. (Italics by the Author)

Other example was given from Turkish involvement in WW1. It was attacking of Ottoman Navy at Odessa and Sevastopol which made Ottomans officially enter into World War and these Ottoman offensives have been known to be occurred by the orders of Enver Pasa without getting authorization from Meclis-i

---

[39] "yapmayın, etmeyin; üç günden beri buradayım ve ayaktayım, suallerinize cevap veriyorum; bitap düştüm"

[40] Russo-Ottoman War which took place between 1877-1878 and resulted with the Berlin Treaty.

Mebusan. Sevres Treaty, he implied, came out as a devastating result of such an understanding of unilateral and personal making of foreign policy decisions, and being offensive. After highlighting the dignity of protecting Turkish people from devastation of the WW2 by the non-involvement policy, he congratulated the parliament for maintaining TGNA's tradition of taking responsibility and being active in foreign policy issues in line with peace and Kemalist principle of being peaceful unless basic sovereign rights are breached. According to him, Kemalist understanding of peace was not an empty and abstract concept; rather, he argued, peace was regarded as a great humanitarian ideal including mutual respect, mutual understanding of equal rights, and mutual respect for sovereignty. For Kemalist understanding, he implied, unless these are breached, peace should be maintained. According to him;

> Today, for our country we must protect and desire peace; otherwise, there is the danger to see inevitable bitter ends at any time. Rejecting a rational and honorable peace always bore serious consequences. When you look up to deep pages of our history, it is possible to see too many bitter examples…Honorable Members of the Parliament, history is not written to let it recur, rather it is written and taught in order to derive lessons from it. Then, we should derive lessons. Our history is replete with documents to take lessons from. In the 2nd World War in which more than 100 000 000 civilians died, when our environment was turned to blood bath, none of our citizens' nose bled, not a single tear was shed from our mothers' eyes. I commemorate those state men who did not make people live those sufferings with respect and God's mercy. I conclude my words with Erasmus of Rotterdam by saying "War is sweet to those who have never experienced it". I hope that TGNA maintain its determined attitude against this dirty, shameful and dark-ended war.

This reference made to parliamentary tradition of taking ownership in foreign policy issues was also explicit in one of CHP representative's[41] speech made on March 11. According to him, during the War of Independence, while Aegean region was totally captured, and the Greek army was getting closer to Ankara (even the voices of howitzers were being heard in the parliament), the TGNA interrogated Supreme Military Commander Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and made him give account on what was going on for hours, even in such a desperate situation. However, he said, today, this parliament was rendered unauthorized, impotent and uninformed and the parliament of that day stayed straighter than today's parliament before the ongoing developments. According to him,

> Now, my dear friends, in 1921 and in 1922, this glorious parliament questioned commander in chief Mustafa Kemal Atatürk even when the National independence war was being fought,

---

[41] Engin Altay, Primary School Teacher; Deputy of Sinop from CHP.

when Greek Army invaded all Aegean Region, came closer to Ankara. Commander in chief Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, for hours gave account before this noble assembly, even when the enemy was 80-90 kilometers far away from Ankara. *This Parliament is such sensitive, responsive, and self-respected… My dear friends, that parliament stayed straighter than today's parliament on those days. Those while staying in rooms for 24 people and eating halvah and bread only,* carried out the National Independence War against imperialism and made the Commander in chief gave explanations in this chair. *This parliament, on the contrary, issued its visa to executive branch to bypass the legislative branch. I do not want to go down in history as a member of the first parliament in the world which made itself bypassed in such an issue.*   (Italics by the Author)

What was highlighted was revealing the historical tradition of an active parliament on foreign policy issues with the argument that the parliament is the place where the will of the nation is represented. The examples from Turkish history were the source where such a tradition was derived from since the country had faced severe consequences of decisions made secretly and personally about foreign policy issues. Kemalist principle of "Peace at home, Peace abroad" was stated to be the protective guide of the Turkish foreign policy behavior as an historical outcome of the bitter consequences of the Ottoman-Turkish past. Here, we have two references: First is the restrictive role of the parliament on the government and the second, the principle of peaceful manner of international conduct, both of which in fact visibly stand out in the Article 92 of the constitution.

On 17th October 2007, on behalf of AK Party group, one of AK Party deputies[42] took the floor and firstly, he made explicit, after a long lecture about the adventurers in Ottoman-Turkish history, government proposal was not a representation of a pursuit for adventure but an issue of self-defense and AK Party knew how such adventures in Turkish history resulted in negative consequences for Turkish people. He gave the siege of Vienna, Ottoman's entering into WW1 and Sarıkamış incident as such examples of adventures which made Turkish nation pay great tolls for impossible ambitions. According to him, it was Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who had shown that international politics was an art of possibilities during and after the Independence War, when for example, Thessaloniki and Mousul, both left outside the new republic with rational calculations, in the Treaty of Laussanne. This politics of possibilities, he implied, was that ground on which Turkish State and politics was constructed.

---

[42] Nihat Ergün, Economist; Deputy of Kocaeli from AK Party.

My dear friends, these are adventurers who made our nation pay heavy tolls. Even these adventurers showed such a blindness that they gave consent to German Generals to command our armies during the 1st World War. *These will be of course judged by the history. However, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk who knew the conditions of the time very well and who knew that politics is an art of possibilities clearly manifested to us this that politics is an art of possibilities by very important diplomatic and military moves he made during and after the National Independence War...*[Mustafa Kemal Ataturk] with the Lauzanne Treaty guaranteed that Turkish Republic is recognized in the international community and more importantly, tried to *operate the principle of peace as the most important procedure and established the roots of this strong Turkish Republic, which we encounter today and which we came to see, by using the politics as an art of possibilities* (Italics by the Author).

Government presentation of an action that is strategically formed for gains by aggression as "exceeding the possibilities" or "adventure" is similar to the criticisms that were directed towards the government's motivation for having an active involvement in the Iraqi War. What is important here is, despite different wordings such as "Peace at home, Peace abroad" or "art of possibilities", government accepts that Turkish history has abundant examples for deriving the lessons and these experiences shaped the current structure of Turkish politics, and it was Mustafa Kemal who left a legacy for today's Turkish political leaders. This, in turn, shows that the governing party uses the same socio-historical context as the referent for explaining the reason, orientation or the meaning of the proposed behavior and for defining its intention by making references to this broadly shared socio-historical framework. Whether or not the government sincerely shared and internalized this common framework is not important, rather, what is striking here is that it uses the language the parliament uses in foreign policy issues and this framework seems to be a structural frame shared in the parliament to define the situation and give the meaning to the proposed action. In other words, this language appears to be the key to make the proposed action understandable by the parliament and initiate the discussion with the common referents that are known by a group of people who are bestowed with a cultural and institutional framework that make itself visible in the Article 92 of Turkish Constitution.

3.3.2. LEGITIMACY

Deriving from the discussions about to the first motion to the last, one can observe an emphasis given on the issue of international legitimacy. However, in the second motion (1 March 200) which was rejected, international legitimacy stands out as a contested concept between the government and the opposition. The opposition

seems to put a strict connection between the use of force in international realm and the UN regime, which, in turn, makes the opposition seek the legitimate use of force in UN Security Council decisions. On the other hand, the government considers the international law rather a fluid sphere of human conduct and search the legitimacy of a foreign policy action within the domestic realm. Yet, the discussions made clear references to the issue of legitimacy as a basis for foreign policy action. On the one side, the legitimate source of action appears to be international law, and on the other side, the source of the legitimacy emerges as the interest of the state itself. In addition, in 2003, besides international legitimacy, the parliament evaluates the government proposals from the perspectives of the parliamentary traditions and the Kemalist legacy. Thus, domestic legitimacy also appears as an important issue which the criticism focuses on the parliamentary and the Kemalist roots for foreign policy action. Rather, in the 2007 case, different policy views interfered and different political visions were reflected to the parliament. However, the main reference for action appears to be being "legitimate" in terms of the international law. Even depending on the fact that Turkey has the legitimate right to take measures according to self-defense conditions, very severe measures were proposed in the TGNA against Kurdish Regional Authority of Northern Iraq as the real target.

In the Turkish Constitution, waging war, sending troops abroad or deploying foreign troops within territory are subject to Article 92[43]and according to this article, these are only possible with a parliament's authorization in such circumstances which are valid in terms of international law. In Article the 92, the executive is limited with a dual legitimacy which is respectively derived from compliance to international law and compliance to the will of the nation through TGNA. Although 1982 constitution has a tendency to increase the power of the executive, Article 92 creates a policy space for interest articulation and negotiation in the national assembly, giving way to the play of liberal democratic premises in vital foreign policy issues.

---

[43] **ARTICLE 92.** The Power to authorise the declaration of a state of war in such cases international law recognize as legitimate and except where required by international treaties to which Turkey is a party or by the rules of international courtesy to send Turkish Armed Forces to foreign countries and to allow foreign armed forces to be stationed in Turkey, is vested in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. If the country is subjected, while the Turkish Grand National Assembly is adjourned or in recess, to sudden armed aggression and it thus becomes imperative to decide immediately on the deployment of the armed forces, the President of the Republic can decide on the mobilization of the Turkish Armed Forces. (Translation by the Author)

The article is, in fact, a remnant of the Article 66 of 1961 constitution which had given the authority clearly to the legislative branch based on the lesson of the Korean War when the relevant article of the 1924 Constitution was broadly interpreted and Turkish troops were sent to Korea by a single cabinet decision. The purpose of the way Article 66 was formed was to prevent the recurrence of a similar event (Emiroğlu, 1999:63). In the House of Representatives while the article was being discussed, one of the commission members, Fahri Belen had taken the floor and stated that the article was the result of the lessons derived from Turkish history. In his speech, after mentioning the alliance with Germany before the WW1 which was realized by the decision of four officials, he underlined and pointed at that decision for sending Turkish troops to Korea taken in a closed meeting and through a cabinet decision was a clear *fait accompli* for the parliament. This way of policy making, Belen claimed, was wrong and very dangerous (Öztürk, 1966:2315). In the original form of the article, there was the statement "in compliance with international law principles". However, National Unity Committee had changed it as "in such situations international law recognizes as legitimate". The commission accepted this change since the latter was considered to reflect the general spirit of the article as well as the Turkish Republic's rather negative approach to war from its foundation (Öztürk, 1966:2322-2329).

Predicating their arguments on the dual legitimacy which Article 92 stipulates, on 1 March 2003, the opposition alleged the illegitimacy of a possible intervention in Iraq since no UN resolution was passed ordering a military measure and inspections were still continuing in Iraq. UN decision was mentioned as the *sine qua non* for a legitimate use of force in international realm. Opposition highlighted that there was yet not a concrete sanction ordered according to the process stipulated by international law[44]. Article 92 was portrayed by the opposition as an extension of the Kemalist understanding "peace at home, and peace abroad" and it was argued that the article was formulated deliberatively in that character in order to prevent the political authority from engaging any illegal war[45]. The UN was pointed out as the only legitimate agent for "use of force" in the situation in Iraq and it was emphasized

---

[44] Stated by Önder Sav,Lawyer; Deputy of Ankara from CHP.

[45] Stated by Kemal Anadol.

that previous Turkish military involvements abroad have been always in compliance with the international law.[46] According to him,

> *66th Article of 1961 and 92nd Article of 1982 Constitutions are the constitutional forms into which Ataturk's "peace at home, peace abroad" principle transforms. Thus, constitutional reflection of Ataturk's principle of "peace at home, peace abroad" says to TGNA that "do not enter any illegitimate war" and constitutes a mandatory provision…*Then, Assembly has to exactly implement this Article 92 and does not have the right to interpret, change and reach a decision according to way it wishes. The Article 92 is as open as not to leave a place for hesitation with this mandatory provision. As a matter of fact, practices are likewise: those decisions taken in the parliament on 5.9.1990, or the decisions to send troops to Somalia, extend the duration of the Operation Northern Watch, and sending troops to Afghanistan are all were given in the Parliament based on the UN Security Council decisions. In the Cyprus Peace Operation, once again, following international law, based on the London and Zurich Agreements and with the title of guarantor state, this Assembly passed the decision. (Italics by the Author)

On the other hand, government directly challenged the very nature of international law implying that international law was not an established and stabilized sphere of human conduct.[47]

> …when we look at to international practice, unfortunately, international law is not a settled law. Now, look, year of 1986 is the "year of peace", however, in 1986 there are   wars in 42 regions; if this law branch is such settled, if the UN Security Council has, truly, worked such effective, in any way, there should be no place for today's disputes and this confused and disorganized environment in the world…

The very source of the international law was criticized and UN resolution 541[48] is given an example to Turkish denial of UN resolutions in a different context.[49] Thus, it was argued that the source of international legitimacy was not the UN or any other international organization but rather the Turkish Constitution.[50] According to AK Party representative,

> … I would like to recall it: while discussing whether or not the motion is compliant to international law, it has been said by Mr. Sav that "the basis of this fact is UN Security Council decision". However, if this is true then we should, all together with our nation, forget the resolution of UN Security Council numbered 541. This resolution repudiates Northern Cyprus Turkish Republic. Does such a state exist? Of course, it exists. Do you count this decision legitimate since UN Security Council ordered and gave decision as such? AK Party does not count this resolution legitimate. *In addition, AK Party, accepts Turkish Constitution*

---

[46] Stated by Kemal Anadol.

[47] Burhan Kuzu, Professor on Constitutional Law; Deputy of Istanbul from AK Party.

[48] After the Turkish Cypriots declared the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) - an independent state in the northern territories of Cyprus - on Nov. 15, 1983, UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar without delay called the Security Council for an urgent and special meeting. A resolution passed and ordered that attempt to create a "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" is invalid, and will contribute to a worsening of the situation in Cyprus.

[49] Stated by Salih Kapusuz,Tradesman; Deputy of Ankara from AK Party.

[50] Stated by Salih Kapusuz.

and TGNA as the primary source of international law. Therefore, we say that binding the source of international law directly to some international organizations' some decisions extremely puts Turkish Republic in a state of distress and this can not be acceptable... (Italics by the Author)

In addition, government representatives drew attention to Turkey's cross-border operations and argued that "nobody agrees other than Turkey if international legitimacy is delegated to international organizations or the discretion of other states". According to AK Party Representative[51]

Friends…did not the Army of Turkish Republic make cross border operations in its struggle with terror? Did not it conduct operations in the Northern Iraq in the pursuit of terrorists? Then, I am asking, if you associate this with the international legitimacy, does not everybody stay against you? Did not everyone stay silent before us in the issue of struggle with terror? (Italics by the Author)

The government asked referring to UN Resolution 541 whether or not the opposition accepts the non existence of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Thus, the government claimed to draw the legitimacy of an international action on national territory and within national politics. Consequently, Article 117[52] of the constitution which is related to government duties and responsibilities was brought to discussion as the very basis of the legitimacy by implying that nothing was required beyond this article.[53]

Therefore we clearly say that: 117th Article of the Constitution is manifest…Yes, our government is responsible from our safety and security; in this case all the responsibility and the authority belong to Government of the Turkish Republic.

Besides the legitimacy of the intervention, the government declared that its ultimate aim was to protect the interests of Turkey and that they had no fear from any state or anyone including the USA. Also it was added that what AK Party government was doing were totally in line with the constitution and internal law of TGNA. According to the government, the proposal, the way the proposal was

---

[51] Stated by Salih Kapusuz.

[52] **ARTICLE 117.** The Office of Commander-in-Chief is inseparable from the spiritual existence of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and is represented by the President of the Republic. The Council of Ministers shall be responsible to the Turkish Grand National Assembly for national security and for the preparation of the Armed Forces for the defence of the country. The Chief of the General Staff is the commander of the Armed Forces, and, in time of war exercises the duties of Commander-in-Chief on behalf of the President of the Republic. The Chief of the General Staff shall be appointed by the President of the Republic following the proposal of the Council of Ministers; his duties and powers shall be regulated by law. The Chief of the General Staff shall be responsible to the Prime Minister in the exercise of his duties and powers. The functional relations and scope of jurisdiction of the Ministry of National Defence with regard to the Chief of the General Staff and the Commanders of the Armed Forces shall be regulated by law.

[53] Stated by Salih Kapusuz.

dispatched to TGNA and the closed discussions were all in line with the law and no illegality could be found in government actions. Also, the government denied the opposition's depiction of the motion as a "pro-war" authorization and argued that categorization made along the lines of "pro-war" and "anti-war" was extremely detrimental. Within this vein, "Operation Northern Watch"[54] was given as an example for developing the argument that Turkey passed such resolutions before and they were not different in substance.[55]

> Dear friends, there is also another issue; we don't have such an understanding as "we did it". All things we do are compliant to the Constitution, Internal Law of the Parliament and the Law. It is impossible for us to admit any other approach than this. This session, the motion, discussion of the motion, and the closed discussions are all in line with the law, and they are the actions and practices made according to the law and according to existing rules. Hence, existence of any illegally in our activities is out of question. Because, this is not the first time this motion is presented to the parliament. This motion was several times presented to the parliament; it was discussed, accepted or rejected according to these procedures in this Great Parliament. However, what is important here in its essence is that it is presented to the parliament, and it is being discussed according to the procedural requirements. In this respect, there is no other exceptional practice than this way. My dear friends, this motion is not a declaration of War. The acceptance or rejection of this motion is not either pro-war or anti-war attitude. I don't find such approaches as "with this motion, it is the first time, foreign troops will be stationed in the territory" correct.

In another AK Party representative's[56] speech, government changed the direction of discussions from whether or not such an action is legitimate toward the issues of interest and self defense by emphasizing that what was important was not the legitimacy of the action in terms of international law but whether or not such an act was for Turkey's interests. It was implied that the current regime of international law has been under UN influence and the UN Charter was permissive of use of force under the self-defense conditions according to Article 51 of the UN Charter. Thus, according to him, the government proposal seemed to be defense-based one rather than being an act of aggression so that the subject of the discussion should be the "appropriateness" in terms of Turkish interests. If the government proposal were "offensive", then, the motion would be counted as illegitimate according to international law but that was not the case. In other words, according to him, since

---

[54] Operation Northern Watch, the successor to Operation Provide Comfort, was a U.S. European Command Combined Task Force (CTF) charged with enforcing its own no-fly zone above the 36th parallel in Iraq. Operation Provide Comfort and Provide Comfort II were military operations by the United States and some of its Gulf War allies, starting in April 1991, to defend Kurds fleeing their homes in northern Iraq in the aftermath of the Gulf War and deliver humanitarian aid to them.

[55] Stated by Salih Kapusuz.

[56] Speech of Burhan Kuzu, Professor on Constitutional Law; Deputy of Istanbul from AK Party.

the motion was not offensive, it is an act of self-defense and what was to be discussed was whether such an action was in line with Turkish national interests. As he stated;

> …now, let's think that, we gave a joint decision with the USA, and it is possible to enter war directly with the USA, I admit that this will be against [the law], however, I genuinely say, according to what I understand from this motion, that this event seems to be totally self defense based one, I mean Turkey's self defense…I try to perceive the existence, deployment and passing by of foreign soldiers from the perspective of national self defense and in this value and magnitude. If you think, otherwise, the motion is offensive, of course it must be illegitimate from that moment…According to my view, what should be discussed here is whether or not such an action is for the interest of Turkey rather than the legitimacy of the action. What should be discussed is whether such an action is right or wrong considering the conditions of Turkey; what happens if war does occur or does not occur; this supreme Assembly should talk about these and should think these issues when making a decision.

On March 1, based on the parliamentary discussions, one could observe that the government's representation of international law was devoid of what international law is all about. It seemed to be lacking a clear understanding or awareness of international law. Although Burhan Kuzu tried to pull government's approach closer to international law, he could not succeed since the motion was closer to being offensive rather than being defensive one concerning Turkey's position *vis a vis* Iraq. The text was formulated in such an international atmosphere that the so-called deterrence measures were not defense-based but could be labeled rather as offensive since the new strategy of pre-emption was regarded as open-ended and illegitimate by the international society to which the proposal text was also referring to.

On the other hand, opposition claimed that the source of international legitimacy rests with UN and that time, the UN did not order any action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary or restore international peace and security. However, government chose to repudiate the authority of the UN and relocate the source of legitimacy within the Turkish constitution. Thus, the UN was not recognized as a source of international law by the government in the answers given to the criticisms. Actually, the government seemed to think in a paradoxical terms since the constitution itself was making reference to international law by Article 92 which was pushing the source of legitimacy out of the constitution and the domestic politics towards the international law and the resulting legitimacy. What was discernible was that AK Party depicted international law epiphenomenal similar to realist

understanding of international relations and gives no credence to international law other than describing it as tools state pursues their interests through.

Regarding the case in 2007, the parliament solidly touched on international legitimacy as the most important element as a buttress for an offensive on Iraq. The principle that not allowing one's territory for being used for an offensive against other's territory was presented as a legitimate reason for use of force in international realm. According to AK Party MP[57];

> There is a terrorist attack to our country's integrity, prosperity and solidarity, there are threats and attacks to our country from beyond our borders. We have rights coming from international law against these attacks. We demand authorization from you to allow Turkish Military Forces' cross border operation and its intervention in Northern Iraq using these rights in order to remove these threats directed to our Country in line with the Article 92 of the Constitution.

Besides AK Party which depicted the proposal as an issue of self-defense, the opposition parties, especially CHP and MHP, rigorously underlined that Turkey has the right and the reason to take all the necessary measures to prevent its territory being attacked by from another state's territory. According to a MHP representative,[58] Turkey should form a strategy including military measures to cope with PKK threat. Since PKK militias were penetrating to Turkish territory and Turkey's outposts were attacked from northern Iraq, Turkey was under severe security threat and de facto terrorist militia attacks. According to him, the USA and Barzani who was using PKK as a tool seemed to be distant from stopping these terrorist activities, and hence, under these conditions Turkey has the right to resort to measures of self-help and take all possible measures to protect its national security for these increased terrorist activities and offensive with a deterrence strategy including military measures. Nobody in the parliament except DTP representative claimed contrary to this understanding and nobody questioned the legitimacy of such an action. DTP representative[59] claimed that what Turkey called as cross-border was the territory of the Iraq and if a military action was taken, Turkey would fall into a position of "warring state". All other speakers agreed on the issue that Turkey had a

---

[57] Cemil Çiçek,Lawyer-Minister of State and Spokesperson for the Government; Deputy of Ankara from AK Party.

[58] Ahmet Deniz Bölükbaşı,Retired Diplomat; Deputy of Ankara From MHP.

[59] Selehattin Demirtaş, Lawyer, Deputy of Diyarbakır from DTP.

legitimate right of intervention since PKK nested to northern Iraq and attacked Turkey from there.

Despite such an agreed reference to international legitimacy, different views were reflected about the measures to be taken and different party members, those of DTP and ÖDP, offered different solutions and proposed that measures should not be taken in the cross border area but within Turkish territory in terms of the democratic progress.

Hence, here we see that the government uses international law as the reason for its proposed action and the parliament accepts that Turkey is in a state of self-defense which is both a necessary and sufficient condition for legitimate use of force in international realm. The parliament supported the government proposal with an overwhelming majority, and major opposition parties pushed for more efficient measures, such as that the deterrence strategy should not be directed towards PKK solely but also the Kurdish Regional Authority in Northern Iraq which they describe as the supporter of PKK . Thus, it is noteworthy that unlike the 1 March 2003 case, the parliament showed completely a different attitude and even pushed for aggressive deterrence measures. Here, it appears, the main difference between two cases is clearly the legitimacy in terms of international law.

3.2.3. INTEREST

One other important element significantly deserving attention is the concept of "interest". In the discussions we see that state interest appears to be a central concept which presents the basis on which the government and the opposition establish their claims about the foreign policy action in question. However, what is striking in our case study is that government changed its position from an empty using of state interest concept to a more loaded and detailed one by pulling the interest of Turkey to the "red lines policies" concerning Iraq. On the other hand, in the 2007 case, identification of state interest appear to be a result of political articulation in which different groups offer their policy options and their own definitions to influence the policy outcomes. In other words, with regards to our specific example, state interest seems to be derived from a social process through the selection made along the procedures of the parliament. The prescriptive rules of

parliamentary decision making allows the interest definitions of different political views clash and turn into state policy through the selection made from the diversity in the parliament. In addition, the evolution of the government position from a shallow usage of the concept to a more complicated and detailed usage has another meaning in our study in terms of verifying our understanding of the concept of state interest which is socially determined. Since the government changes its position relatively to reconcile with the parliament, this evolution signifies a social process rather than a pre-given accepted state identity and interest.

On 6 February, in the proposal text, the Turkish interests were mentioned in a generic way without giving any detail as to why the Iraq's non-compliance was a risk for Turkey in the near-future and why American personnel was a necessity for protecting the national interests of Turkey. As the negotiations were being made between American and Turkish officials and public opinion was suspicious about what was going on, and the TGNA showed a similar reaction and made it explicit that people were eager to know the intentions of the government and the negotiation process in general. The government motion was not explanatory and did not give much explanation to satisfy public opinion. However, after Deniz Bölükbaşı who was the head of the negotiation team of Turkey wrote his memoirs, it was revealed that American demands were assertive, but they were broken down so that the final formulation of the memorandum of understanding was not as bad as the opposition depicted.

On March 1, besides the legitimacy of American intervention, concerning Turkish involvement, a sarcastic analogy was made by the opposition implying that Turkey was being used for American interests and consequent compliant action with American demands would surprise Turkish government.[60]

> Wolfowitz says that "we with or without Turkey, we can reach our goals". Then, let them go, and see they reach their goals without Turkey. Let's release Americans free, but you are not making so ! You will see sooner in agony that Americans eat the toffee-apple and rest is left to Turkey. I have seen a very accurate slogan in an anti-war demonstration. I want to repeat and make it recorded in the meeting minutes. It says "don't scare from the USA but be afraid of the God, be afraid of the God".

In fact, such an approach carried the implications that the negotiations were not being conducted according to Turkish interests, such that, rather Turkish soldiers

---

[60] Stated by Onder Sav

would be used as an instrument for American interests. More strikingly, the opposition touched on the promised American credit to Turkey and the government was called for being on the side of law and legitimacy rather than being on the side of material interests. In other words, for the opposition, the dangerous game the Turkish government was playing was one of "exchanging American credit for Turkish soldiers' blood". According to a CHP representative[61];

> If you say after all of these rightful cautions, "we did it, it happened", we have to say much. Even one of the most intelligent, foxy, skilful experts of "we did it, it happened" understanding, Talleyrand says that "you can do anything with bayonets except sitting on them". Please do not sit on bayonets; do not be deceived by 5-6 billion dollars of the U.S. credit; please do not hurt the internal and international law by being seized by these credits. Please heed the voice of our people who are against such an intervention in Iraq by 90%; otherwise, tomorrow you will encounter these words of your children: "did you stand along the justice, law, and the people, and the Muslims; or along the USA and the U.S. dollars?"

On the other hand, the opposition underlined the government's pro-American attitude, they argued that it was thought-provoking because no other parliament anywhere in the world would take a decision supporting the USA bullying towards Iraq.[62] Opposition referred to anti-war demonstrations world-wide for international legitimacy for such an intervention and the public arousal's about the world's future *vis a vis* the USA's open-ended pre-emptive war strategy.

On March 1, given the negotiations were being maintained inter-governmentally within the bureaucratic sphere, the text of the motion was self evident since the public was not informed about what was actually being negotiated. The general atmosphere of a "state of secrecy" was visible in the government proposal. In the text, the threat was described as coming from non-compliant behavior of Saddam Hussein rather than any other security concern of Turkey. For example, a possible emergence of a Kurdish state in Northern Iraq was not mentioned. It is meaningful here to point that it was the USA which declared Iraq as a rogue state as a security threat and despite concerns about Iraq's non-compliance, no other country did so. In this respect, while government proposal was presenting the ultimate aim of demand for authorization as protecting the interests of Turkey, it was emphasizing that, for this purpose authorization for sending Turkish soldiers abroad was crucial and it was necessary to deter Iraq by accepting the U.S. troops

---

[61] Stated by Önder Sav.

[62] Stated by Önder Sav.

within Turkish territory. Thus, the second government proposal text was as ambivalent as the first giving floor to perceptions and criticisms of hiding the reality or the existence of a hidden context behind prospective government actions regarding Iraq. Turkish security understanding was not reflected in the government proposal. Nevertheless, it was at that time dauntingly imposed on American negotiators by the Turkish negotiating team (Oran, 2004:54-60). It was later made public that the American side was very disturbed by the Turkish sides' hard-liner attitude on famous red-lines during the negotiations. However, official security concerns of Turkey were not existent in the government proposal and proposal was dependent much on the deterrence measures to be posed against Iraq rather than Turkish security principles defined as red lines policies. It was configured in such a form that was distant with Turkey's immediate realities and more akin to the U.S. security concerns rather than Turkey. Hence, the government's understanding of interest was not given in detailed manner and state interests were represented as an objective reality, knowable to every one. Deterrence against Iraq with American soldiers might not be understandable for the Turkish public opinion and Turkish interests might not be so clear as to explain the reason behind involvement in Iraq. More importantly, opposition's allegations about government's material concerns were also very important since government did not give a reasonable reply in the parliament. In that respect, the link between the "interest of government" and "state interest" seems to be broken down since the public opinion was suspicious about the negotiations concerning financial issues. Belated negotiations grew annoyance in Turkish public opinion and this annoyance among the public grew visibly after appearances of the belly dancer caricatures and American high officials' resembling of Turkey's position in the negotiations to a horse-sale (Oran, 2004:54-60)

In fact, the proposal text was misrepresentative when compared to the original memorandum of understanding which was firstly made public by Fikret Bila in 2003.[63] It was establishing a direct link with Turkish interests and Iraq's non-compliant behavior. The interest description was not clear and the deterrence measures were equated with the Turkish position towards Iraq. Hence, the subject of Turkish security seemed to be defined in a way in line with Washington demands on

---

[63] See Fikret Bila, *Ankara'da Irak Savaşları: Sivil Darbe Girişimi ve Gizli Belgelerde 1 Mart Tezkeresi*, ÜmitYayıncılık, 2003.

Iraqi government, which were despised and criticized world wide. To recall, those were the days, deterrence measures were the immediate concerns of the USA, not of Turkey. Any deterrence measure against Iraq was not among top concerns of the public opinion and of Turkish foreign policy orientations. Still Turkey was paying great attention to the effects of recent economic crisis and the increased relations with the EU. Besides, the economic loss of Turkey after the Gulf War had created a serious concern in Turkish public opinion and involvement in Iraq was being considered from the perspective of these severe economic loses.

When 20 March Motion is considered, difference in the formulation of the motions of March 1 and March 20 was very significant since the rejected former was very ambivalent in wording and was open to the opposition claim of secret commitments made to the USA. The latter was soundly written and systematically linking deploying Turkish troops in northern Iraq to three basic security concerns of Turkey in line with Turkish red lines policy. Also, it was more clearly formulated listing the reasons of the proposal and drawing a limit to Turkish military's responsibilities and duties rather than generating an open-ended mission. The PKK threat, concerns over the Turcoman population (despite implicitly mentioned), the possibility of the dismemberment of Iraq along ethnic and religious lines and a possible refugee flow similar to one Turkey faced in 1991 were all listed as the security concerns of Turkey. For these purposes, Turkish troops should be deployed to Northern Iraq so as to protect Turkey's interests rather than taking deterrence measures against Iraq unlike with 1 March government proposed in line with American discourse about the war on terror. This motion more specifically described Turkish interests and did not fix the target as the Saddam Hussein's regime. In addition, the reason for opening fly zone to coalition forces was predicated on NATO measures and implied that all other NATO members including those who claimed the illegitimacy of American intervention gave such permission to coalition forces.

Although the discussions in 20 March were completely closed and nothing can be inferred from the preliminary talks, the formulation of two texts implies that the government was affected by the previous criticisms made before about the secrecy about the negotiations, and hence prepared a more understandable and clear text specifying both the reasons and limits of the measures to be taken. Also, the logic of appropriateness was visible in the proposal text since opening of fly zone

was supported by a similar policy on the part of the other. Here, unlike the discussions made on 1 March, the government was more sensitive to the principle of collective action at the international level rather than locating the legitimacy of the action within the national territory and domestic framework.

With regards to 17 November 2007 discussions which were made open to public, all speakers, except those of DTP and ÖDP clearly emphasized that combat with terrorism was above political considerations. For example CHP and MHP showed a more hawkish attitude and described terrorism as a state issue that needs to be discussed without any political considerations.

CHP representative[64] underlined that there was an asymmetric war Turkey was facing and asymmetric wars could not be won by trying to address the paramilitary forces of the enemy; what should be done instead was to address the countries and power foci which accommodate and support terrorism. The real source of the problem was defined as the Kurdish authority in Iraq, which supported PKK.

Very similarly, MHP representative[65] in his speech rigorously criticized the government for not having a strategically formed northern Iraq policy and argued that the government was playing for political gains by making references to a northern Iraqi involvement but not taking a decisive measure for eliminating PKK existence there. He proposed Turkey should form a deterrence strategy composed of different measures from different policy areas including military which should be oriented not only towards PKK but the peshmerga of northern Iraq who he blamed for their support given to PKK militias. Thus, basing his proposal on the fact that Turkey has legitimate right to take measures within the concept of self-defense, Kurdish Regional authority was depicted as the real target of the deterrence measures Turkey should take.

Similarly, AK Party representative[66] made it clear that combat with terrorism was a state issue by saying the following:

> ..in this issue what I am going firstly to present is as follows: struggle with terrorism is a state issue and the policies implemented are state policies. I especially underline this fact. If we do not agree with this; discussions drag on, of course from this fact, terrorist organization

---

[64] Mustafa Şükrü Elekdağ, Retired Diplomat; Deputy of İstanbul from CHP.

[65] Ahmet Deniz Bölükbaşı, Retired Diplomat; Deputy of Ankara From MHP.

[66] Cemil Çiçek, Lawyer-Minister of State and Spokesperson for the Government; Deputy of Ankara from AK Party.

benefits, terrorist organizations benefit…specially, the motion which is presented to you, is prepared as a result of a state policy and a state demand, while this motion was being written, and it is not written in haste without deliberation. States concerned bodies come together and what is needed for the success and what international law gives permission are in detail articulated and with this framework this motion came to your presence.

Besides this peculiar kind of description of terrorism, according to another AK Party representative[67], what government was proposing is about self defense and along with Turkish interests rather than being an act of adventure. Since American invasion of Iraq was a turning point which changed important things and increased the terrorist activity, Turkey only watched the developments as a bystander. It was a missed opportunity, he stated, that Turkey should have not watch Iraqi invasion as a bystander with distancing itself to the situation and that Turkey should have actively involved in controlling what was going on. By this policy, Turkey lost its opportunity to stand at attention to happenings in post-invasion period. He continued that after the invasion of Iraq, government chose to wait and this waiting of Turkey was not a fault or blindness; rather it meant giving no credence to popular pressures by preferring to resort to diplomatic way of conduct. However, Turkish patience had a limit. Confirming that government was not pursuing a policy of adventure, another AK Party representative underlined:[68]

> My dear friends, this problem is a matter of state. This is not a matter of me or a part of the friends present here. This issue is the issue of all of these deputies sitting under this roof and all of our people's national issue. We have the obligation to consider this issue from this perspective. If we perceive this way we can solve it. From this trouble and from this issue, it is not possible to derive a political gain. It is not possible. No-one should expect such a gain from this issue. Politics should not be made over blood; no political gain should be derived from it.

On that day, what DTP representative[69] touched upon was about a possibility of a political solution to Kurdish issue through opening democratic channels of dialogue with the Kurdish people rather than considering the issue from a military perspective. DTP voice was implicitly proposing, the interest of the people of this country would not be along military measures but along peace and democratic ways of conduct within the country which would address the real sources of the problems causing PKK activity. In this respect, what was appropriate for the interest of the

---

[67] Stated by Nihat Ergün.

[68] Ülkü Gökalp Güney,Doctor of Medicine and Scholar; Deputy of Bayburt from AK Party.
[69] Selehattin Demirtaş, Lawyer, Deputy of Diyarbakır from DTP.

people was not approaching to the situation by a military perspective but recognizing the diversity within the population by communicating with the inner dynamics of the society and establishing a solid environment of democracy. According to him, Turkey had differences and different policy orientations;

> This repressive approach which is to make 549 deputies vote for "yes" as if there is no one in Turkey against a cross border operation is in fact is a political attitude which dismisses the will of the nation. If this place is the Assembly of the Nation, on that occasion, diverse voices in the nation should be reflected here, and they should be tolerated and should be evaluated within the framework of the democratic customs. If we, all together, are going to say "yes", how the voices of those members of Turkish intelligentsia, who say that they believe, cross-border of operation will not provide any benefit, can be reflected in the parliament, and those are to a large extent not DTP supporters. If, here only DTP says "no" to this cross-border operation, these differences and these diverse voices will not be properly reflected to and presented in the parliament.

Similarly, the ÖDP deputy[70] made a speech and claimed that solution to terrorism was not in cross-border area but within Turkish territory and policies to establish peace should be sought in politics and democracy rather than through military engagements. Understanding the issue from national security issue deteriorated the situation and a solution could not be reached. Thus, peaceful techniques and social measures should be taken in line with the diversity in the social fabric of Turkey. According to him;

> … political parties should not serve to the culture of violence and conflict. Because, during the motion discussions, political parties which use a language increasing the tension in the society, they develop the environment of conflict in the society, deliberatively or not. For conducting diplomacy, invoking in the military methods is incorrect… it is clear that for the solution of Kurdish question and establishing peace in the society, steps to be taken are within our territory not outside of it…since the issue was taken as a security issue, for years what has been done for solving the problem proved nothing positive for reaching a lasting peace…there is the need to peaceful methods and social measures rather than steps for violence and terrorist activities which are to increase polarity and deadlock in the society… thus we say that we find this motion out of the interest of our country…it is exactly to maintain and support the policy of " peace at home and peace abroad".

Here from the discussions taking place on 17 November 2007, we infer four fundamental issues. First, it is confirmed that parliament is where the people represents its will and, hence, different political views are represented to influence the policy outcomes, and directly diversity in the populace and the differences in political orientations are represented in the parliament through an interest articulation process. Second, differences in political orientations may have different interest

---

[70] Mehmet Ufuk Uras, Scholar-Assistant Professor on Political Science; Deputy of Istabul from ODP.

descriptions and propose divergent policy proposals according to these different descriptions. Third, AK Party revealed its attitude for the rejection of the 1 March 2003 Motion and presented its motivations for being involved in Iraqi War. It is possible to say that in the case of 1 March 2003, we have witnessed a strategically moving government for gaining advantage by manipulating the consequences of the war in Iraq according to their evaluation of the situation and consequent interest definition. However, as showed above, the government's discourse came closer to the parliamentary criticisms and shifted its position, at least in appearance by using the same language and the common reference framework through which the parliamentary criticisms were made. Fourth, on 17 October, in the parliament there is a significantly shared understanding about terrorism that is being described as "state issue being out of politics." Thus, the motion is sweepingly accepted in the parliament.

On the other hand, in the 17 October discussions, it became clear that the thesis does not misunderstood and flawedly attributes the opposition's views to the whole of the parliament, rather the historical examples given about foreign policy issues reflects a parliamentary tradition and a commonly shared discourse on this tradition. Hence, the last motion appears to be test case for the findings from the discussions that took place in 2003.

CHAPTER 4

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR A CONSTRUCTIVIST CRITICISM

The aim of this chapter is to link the theory and case study. The second chapter of the thesis had introduced what the concept of state means for neo-realist paradigm and the novelty of constructivism with regards to the concept of state. This chapter will try to make sense of the themes that have been revealed by the study of the case with a constructivist criticism.

In the previous theoretical discussions, I claimed that neo-realist paradigm depicts the state as a monolithic entity (or totally instrumental in Gilpin's case) and handles it as passive/adaptive and reactive units which form the international system with no analytical explanatory value in a structural analysis. On the other hand, in constructivist studies, while it is difficult to handle it as a homogenous unity, it has been showed that there is a significant concern with identity and that this identity is constructed by the social structures formed through social interaction within the international and domestic realms. Here, it is accepted, as Katzenstein points out, that state is a social entity and its characteristics have roots in international social interaction and domestic peculiarities. Within this vein, the main argument of this thesis is that constructivism offers to the actors at a unit level a considerable amount of inner world diversity and that this diversity makes similar or identical actors develop different behaviors in very similar, even identical, situations contrary to neo-realist understanding. With constructivism's problematization of state identity, constructivism opens states' two spheres, the international and the domestic, to the discussion that they may both determine states' behaviors realized in international realm. Certainly, this approach has a corrective effect on traditional separation of the domestic and the international and even leads to the idea that the domestic and the international are co-constitutive and mutually interdependent.

This chapter will try to establish a conceptual framework under the light of both the theoretical discussions and the main three themes that stand out in the

examination of the parliamentary discussions of five motions. The conceptual framework of this chapter, in turn, will be based on four main topics around which a constructivist critique could be based: agency, identity, norms and state interest. These four topics provide the ground on which the discussions for the previous chapter under three themes become clearer. In the previous chapter, three themes were used to organize the empirical data for a constructivist evaluation. In this chapter what has been gathered through these three themes will be tapped under the following four topics which lay the ground for a constructivist analysis.

However, it should be noted that there might be reasons other than those mentioned here in explaining the rejection of one motion and acceptance of other motions. For example, those deputies having Kurdish origin might give privative votes to the motion, as it is generally discussed in Turkish public opinion. However, what is being done here is to show that in analyzing the foreign policy behavior, taking into account of mere rational considerations would not be adequate for a proper understanding and that deductions should be also made along identity, norms and interest discussions. Within this vein, while referring to states as international actors, realist perspective has the potential to lead to inaccurate explanations.

4.1. AGENCY

While state-centricism of neo-realism might be inaccurate, given the plurality of different actors in international relations, even the critiques of such state-centricism would not deny that state are the main actors in international realm. However, in a more detailed fashion, questioning the characteristics of the state behavior in international realm is a rather more complicated issue. For this, Turkish case of sending troops abroad constitutes a very good example.

Who make the decisions that influence international politics? First answer is basically the government. Article 117 of the Turkish Constitution is in line with it and accordingly, the government is responsible for providing security of the country. It would not be incorrect to guess that government is the body which takes foreign policy decisions and ensures their implementation. However, peculiar to the cases of our study, if we accept Clausewitz on his claim about the fact that wars are indeed the continuation of foreign policy, in Turkey, may be the most important foreign

policy decisions are left to the authority of the parliament, not to the government. In other words, major foreign policy decisions such as waging war, sending troops abroad and accepting troops within Turkish territory are left to the legislative body, not to the executive. This clearly breaks up with the neo-realist imagination of state acting with rational considerations, as passively compliant with the requirements of the anarchic ordering of the international politics. The actor which is assumed to take rational decisions is exposed to such abnormal issues as power balances within the parliament, different identity and different interest descriptions and normative conceptualizations, which cause different decisions to be taken. In this respect, cultural-institutional context interferes into the decision making environment. On the other hand, it can also be said that individual should be taken into consideration along the institutional practice that the Article 92 prescribes. Inclusion of individual into analysis means that explanations should also consider social interaction. Hence, beyond it, intersubjective definitions of meaning should receive attention. After all, in the parliament, a group of individuals gather, discuss and give decisions about the issue which is in the parliament's agenda.

One of the five motions which are opened to democratic discussions in the parliament was rejected and others were accepted. While it might be argued, correctly, that the government was not very determined in passing the 1 March 2003 motion, the important thing was that the government proposal was not accepted in the parliament. In this respect, it is possible to talk about different bodies within state which might have clashing evaluations with contradictory effects on each other about the same problem at hand.

On the other hand, another view may claim that the parliament was more rational than the government *vis vis* the situation in Iraq, which immediately raises the following question: which body within the state is more rational? If it is possible to say that parliament was more rational, it can be still said that "utility" is not quantifiable and could be assessed differently according to different parameters applied. Besides, it can be said that actors within state make totally different calculations and even different state bodies make incorrect assessments. As Katzenstein says, rational actor or utility maximization issue is in fact constructed; hence it is possible to say that decision environment is not free from norms and rules (Katzenstein, 1996:27). In this sense, the parliament might have acted according to

its conceptualization in a rational manner. However, such ideational issues as identity and norms interfere into the process.

The rational actor model description of state departs the actor from its social, cultural and institutional context and confines it to an ahistoric, asocial and anomic environment. Accordingly, one should keep in mind that states' foreign policy behavior clearly is a socially embedded political product. This thesis tries to demonstrate that state foreign policy decisions and foreign policy behavior are embedded in the society. As Kratochwil puts, realist scholars sacrificed real decision making procedures and actual processes in foreign policy issues, and misconceptualized the history with their desires to become more scientific (Kratochwil, 1993:64). As he illustrates in the example of containment policy during the Cold War, the USA's containment efforts were not totally related with the international realm. Rather, it was constituted on the pressures to be put on the USSR to influence its domestic dynamics. Hence, the practitioners of realism did not cut themselves off the realities but the academic neo-realist did so.

Again, acceptance of different motions might be associated with conjectural differences; but it has been seen that the government shifted its position vis a vis the parliament with coming closer to the criticisms which took place in the parliament in order to ensure to acquire the necessary affirmative vote to pass the motions. In this sense, foreign policy action has been developed within a social process. While staying inactive in 2003, there was no obstacle in 2007 for a military involvement in northern Iraq. Therefore, associating the motions with conjectural evaluations will lead to an insufficient analysis and including other variables into the analysis is important, as they will be discussed below.

But, at this point, it will be proper to elaborate on the issue of rational action. John Elster's definition of rational choice is as follows:

> Rational choice theory appeals three distinct elements in choice situation. The first element is the feasible set,i.e., the set of all courses of action which (are rationally believed to) satisfy various logical, physical ,and economic constraints. The second is (set of rational beliefs about) the causal structure of the situation, which determines what course of action will lead to what outcomes. The third is a subjective ranking of the feasible alternatives, usually derived from a ranking of the outcomes to which they (are expected to) lead. To act rationally, then, simply means to choose the highest-ranked element in the feasible set (Elster, 1986:4)

In the parliamentary discussions, it seems that three distinct characteristics of rationality assumptions disappear from the scene. In the discussions, we see a demonstration of a normative position against the government's proposed actions rather than the existence of a decision set in which different preferences are listed. In this context, regarding five motions, many efforts existed in the parliament to understand whether or not the actions are appropriate. Significantly, this sense of appropriateness seems to be set by international norms and the domestic socio-political structure. The criticism directed against the government about the "secrecy", in fact, indicates the absence of any decision set in front of the decision makers and confirm that they do not have the knowledge about what they are positioned by the government to give decision about. Therefore, in 2003, we see a normative approach in a group of people, who do not know what they were deciding rather than making a preference among different choice variations. Secondly and more importantly, there is serious imperfect information about what action leads to what consequences. In other words, there is no clear information and knowledge in the parliament about the consequences of the proposed actions and, hence, the parliament tries to understand and clarify the possible outcomes. That's why, such issues as the behavior of United Nations or the positions that other states took against Iraqi War came to the fore front in the discussions. In this sense, evaluation of decision environment solely within the framework of the rational actor model seems rather inaccurate regards to the case study of this thesis. American intervention in Iraq emerged in Turkish public opinion as an open-ended subject whose consequences could not be anticipated. Hence, the "Iraqi Swamp" metaphor was largely used in Turkish public opinion. Thirdly, the issue of comparison between the amounts of the utility gains between different choice sets appears to be writings on the air in an environment where the consequences are not known. This leads to generic, closed descriptions and interpretations of state interest by the government in 1 March motion. Because of this reason, the interest description on 1 March goes parallel to American descriptions and it is depicted to be an objective reality knowable to all. Besides, in the parliament in an environment where the unknowns about the final decision were maintained, discussions revealed the importance of norms, identity and interest, as they were loaded heavily with a tone reflecting a sense of history. These discussions become influential in the shaping of the decision.

On the other hand, Waltz assumes uniformity in preferences and motivations, and attributes differences in behavior to differences in the international system. Structure affects behavior through socialization and competition which make actors behave reasonably along perceived policy options and survive. According to Kahler, realist assumption of state rationality depends on an implicit argument of natural selection: states that are unable to behave in at least a crudely rational manner is selected out through intense international competition. In this respect, the polity is treated as a unitary actor, with coherent and stable values, well grounded beliefs, and a capacity to carry out its decisions (Kahler, 1998:922). In this respect, the parliamentary discussions point at the logic of "appropriateness" which is derived from the normative structure and from the issue of what other states do in an environment of imperfect information and unknowns about action-outcome rather than pointing to a homogenizing socialization effect of the anarchic structure on states. As Ruggie argues, Waltz misrepresents international politics because the socialization in his system is realized only the way his model prescribes. According to Ruggie, Waltz has the *actual states* becoming socialized to *his model* of the international system, not to the more variegated world of actual international relations (Ruggie, 1998:865).

Similarly, Thomas Berger argues that by themselves international systemic requirements are underdetermining. In his case of Germany and Japan, he points that while pressures from international system may influence state actors, the signals it sends are ambiguous, even contradictory, and a multiplicity of plausible solutions is available. Under such circumstances states are likely to be guided in their decision making by their own internal sets of preferences and beliefs about the international system (Berger, 1996:325). This approach in fact emphasizes the importance of the inner dynamics of the state primarily including the identity and cultural-institutional structure within the state. In, 1 March 2003 case, as Berger puts, the signals received from the international realm were ambiguous and in all aspects, there was an information asymmetry in the parliament.

At a more basic level, it is possible to say that rational actor model is an extension of neo-utilitarian understanding of the international relations based on assumptions about individual and state preferences specifically of a self-interested homo economicus (Kahler, 1998:935). Treating the human behavior in such a

manner misses the place of mindset of the decision makers from the decision environment. In such a condition of information asymmetry, the parliament was guided by its own conceptualization of international politics and its understanding of the norms, and above all its own understanding and self-identification. Hence, the norms and implications of identity appeared to be guidelines for the decisions to be taken.

On the other hand, constructivist accounts of international relations argue against the rational agents as a basis. Rather, they argue that be it the individual or state, the agent is shaped profoundly by institutional environment. The environment constitute the characteristics of the agents, shape the interest and the behavior of them in a direct or unmediated way, which is difficult to reconcile with the rational choice model. Here at this point, it is meaningful to continue with identity discussion.

4.2. IDENTITY

In this thesis, the case study reflects that identity bears importance. In the previous chapter "institutional identity" theme represented that how importantly parliament showed a self-identification and influenced shape of the decision. As it is discerned from the parliamentary discussions, the parliament has a peculiar kind of self identification and that it defines itself responsible in foreign policy making processes. The importance given to the historical developments and parliaments' position *vis a vis* government in foreign policy issues unmasks important clues about the Turkish political structure. This phenomenon points at the importance of the framework of identity in foreign policy making processes.

With regards to constructivist studies, as mentioned before identities are attributed to states. Nevertheless, in these studies the source of the state interest appears to be either social interaction in international realm, as in Wendt, or the domestic specific characteristics, as in Katzenstein. Actually, identity is the term which comes from social psychology, where it refers to the images of individuality and distinctiveness held and projected by an actor. The identities come, more precisely, in two basic forms-those are intrinsic to the actor and that are relationally defined within a social structure (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996:58). In

this sense, international and domestic environments shape state identities. According to Katzenstein, the state is a social actor. It is embedded in social rules and conventions that constitute its identity and the reason for the interests that motivate actors. In addition history is more than a progressive search for efficient institutions that regulate property rights. History can not be reduced to a perpetual recurrence of sameness, conflict, and balancing. History is a process of change that leaves an imprint on state identity. The historical evidence compels us to relinquish the notion of states with unproblematic identities. The identities of states emerge from their interactions with different environments, both the domestic and the international (Katzenstein, 1996:23-24). Neorealists, on the other hand, conceive environment as epiphenomenal in terms of distribution of material capabilities. Materialist understanding treat cultural factors epiphenomenal or at least secondary as a "superstructure" determined in the last instance by the material base (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996:38). Katzenstein makes a clear point about the issue. According to him, some studies seek to explain aspects of national security with reference to social facts. But they tend to do so in a manner that subordinates the causal force of social facts to materialist or rationalist view of the world. In this view, for example, identities and norms either derivative of material capabilities or are deployed by autonomous actors for instrumental reasons based on the assumption that rationality is a natural rather than a constructed concept (Katzenstein, 1996:27).[71]

Thus, thesis takes the issue of identity, from the perspective of institutional traditions and institutional identity since the main actor appears to be the TGNA in the cases of motions. Although references were made in the parliament to a broader context touching upon "historical and Kemalist legacy" as a basis to the Turkish political culture, more specifically, this study takes the issue of identity in a limited manner in order to keep the analysis plausible and feasible in emphasizing the

---

[71] In fact, According to Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, international and domestic environments include cultural and institutional elements and therefore can not be captured by materialist imagery like the balance of power or bureaucratic politics. Cultural environments affect not only the incentives for different kinds of state behavior but also the basic character of states' identity. The someone has the identity (and associated interest) of a "student" for example has no meaning outside of a particular institutional environment that also defines related identities, like "professor" (with its associated interests). A similar argument can be made about the identity of some states as "sovereign", which presupposes a system of mutual recognition from other states with certain competencies. In both cases the properties of an actor, as well as its behaviors, depend upon a specific social context. The identities that states project, and the interest they pursue can therefore be seen as partly constructed by their environments (Jepperson,Wendt and Katzenstein,1996:42).

particular self-identification of the TGNA *vis a vis* the foreign policy issues. This means that parliamentary discourse about itself in foreign policy making can be considered as a subset of the broader context of Turkish political culture.

In this content, Thomas Berger's study on Japan and Germany puts light on parliamentary traditions and institutional identity issue. Berger claims that German and Japanese antimilitarism depends on looking beyond structural constraints of international system and that explanation of such patterns requires examining the domestic cultural and institutional context in which defense policy is made. He uses the term political culture as the cultural and institutional context which affects the foreign policy decisions as an ideational factor shaping the national identities and the interest and security conceptualization of the two states. His definition of political culture is cultural beliefs and values that shape a given society's orientations toward politics. "Political-military culture" in turn refers to the subset of the larger political culture that influences how members of a given society view national security, the military as an institution and the use of force in international relations (Berger, 1996:325-326.)

Similarly, this study also regards the parliamentary discourse about its self-identification as a sub-set of Turkish broader political culture and evaluates it from Berger's perspective. As mentioned before, TGNA shows an assertive attitude about foreign policy issues. Because of Article 92 of the constitution is formulated as an extension of the lessons gathered from Turkish history, TGNA's peculiar kind of self-identification exhibits an important and influential ideational element in decision making processes in foreign policy making. This self-identification influences the foreign policy decisions as a part of the domestic cultural and institutional context in a practical sense. As an important inscription of history on Turkish institutional structure, the consequence of the executive's giving unilateral foreign policy decisions led to an understanding of an active parliament in foreign policy making as an institutional practice. Finally, the idea of an active parliament was transformed into a constitutive norm with an article inserted in the Turkish Constitutions.

The fact that the government changes its position after the rejection of the 1 March motion might be seen in this sense, as the affirmation of the role of the parliament in foreign policy making. In other words, a "normative" parliament rejected the government which appeared to be moving strategically in 2003 and that

parliament overwhelmingly agreed with the government in 2007 by describing terrorism generally as a state issue[72]. This demonstrates how different bodies within a state may have different assessments and different approaches which clash with each other *vis a vis* certain developments and events, while they may overlap in other instances. On the other hand, Waltz claims to derive state interest from an argument about how the logic of anarchy produces "like units". His argument however takes the self-interested and sovereign character of states as given, and in practice his neo-realist "structuralism" ends up focusing how structure conditions the behavior of given state actors. However, as demonstrated, to argue that state acts responsively to systemic effects as a unified body would be misrepresentation of the actual process. Besides, the parliament showed a normative approach deriving from both the international and domestic normative structure about the use of force in international realm with a peculiar self-identification of the parliament in foreign policy issues.

Furthermore, since the parliament is described as the place where the nation is represented, it constitutes inevitably the place where social differences within society are also reflected. Hence, the parliament signifies an area of social interaction where different interest groups represent their will and try to influence state policies. 2007 motion discussions show how different political parties presenting different interests presented different identity descriptions with regards to proposed foreign policy actions.

4.3. NORMS

In the cases of five motions explored in this thesis, it is seen that according to Article 92 of Turkish Constitution, the proposed action by the government should be compliant to International Law. In this respect, as it was demonstrated in the previous chapter under the theme of "legitimacy", the parliament has been the scene of severe discussions about the issue of legitimacy in 2003. Because the parliament designated to be the responsible body to give the decision within the scope of article 92, the will of the nation is characterized as the highest authority to give the decision

---

[72] At this point, one can question the changing architectural structure of the parliament. But, the point is that in 2003 AK Party was the majority against CHP only. However, in 2007, opposition is composed of diverse parties and shows more pluralistic structure. More importantly, in 2007 in the Parliament more severe measures are proposed and government was criticized for not being decisive anough to handle the issue.

about the most serious foreign policy measures. Thus, need for parliamentary assessment and its assent on the proposed action emerges as a legitimacy requirement in the domestic sense. This was the actual reason that the opposition could make harsh criticism of the government about maintaining the negotiations in a secret manner. As mentioned before, Article 92 puts forward the dual legitimacy issue as a rule structure in foreign policy making. This rule structure emerges as an extension of the bitter foreign policy experiences of Ottoman-Turkish past embedded in an historical socio-cultural context.

According to Katzenstein, norms describe collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity. In some situations, norms operate like rules that define the identity of an actor, thus having constitutive effects that specify what actions will cause the relevant others to recognize a particular identity. In other situations, norms operate as standards that specify the proper enactment of a defined identity. In such circumstances, norms have regulative effects that specify standards of proper behavior. Norms, thus, either define (constitute) identities or prescribe (regulate) behavior or they do both (Katzenstein,1996:5).

Katzenstein argues that behavior is shaped not only by goals, alternatives, and rules of maximization or sacrificing central to rationalist models of politics, but it also shaped by roles and norms that define standards of appropriateness. Improvision and strategic behavior are embedded in a social environment that constitutes the identity of actors and their interests. This social environment shapes the norms which also help to define interests (Katzenstein, 1996:28). Neo-realism assumes that the international system has virtually no normative content. The international system constrains national security policies directly without affecting conceptions of state interest (Katzenstein, 1996:25).

On the other hand, realist accounts of international regimes present regimes as products of power. Power shapes international regimes and regimes function as a constraint on state, substantially affecting how governments calculate their behavior. However, this kind of understanding is criticized by Kratochwil and Ruggie. According to them, rationalist understanding of normative structure of international regimes is misleading and dismisses the fact that political actions of state are shaped by collectively held norms (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986: 753-75). In this respect,

norms have a constitutive effect on states and international regimes have an explanatory value for how state is shaped by and shapes the international system.

In fact, concerning the mechanical instrumental functions of the rules, one might say that Article 92 regulates the foreign policy action of Turkish Republic. However, what renders this thesis' case study interesting is its ability to make it possible to use Kratochwil's game metaphor which he derives from Witgenstein in understanding the Article 92 as a constitutive rule in terms of the major foreign policy issues. Kratochwil's game metaphor stands for a methodological tool for reaching deductions within the scope of this thesis and leads to emergence of connections with the domestic and the international realm. In other words, Kratochwil's usage of game metaphor opens up the possibility of examining the significance of the issue of legitimacy, and more specifically, Article 92 of the constitution in a novel manner.

According to Kratochwil, first, rules and norms reduce the complexity of the choice situations in which the actors find themselves. Rules and norms are therefore guiding devices which are designed to simplify choices and impart "rationality" to situations by delineating the factors that a decision-maker has to take into account. Secondly, human action is generally rule-governed, which means that human action becomes understandable against the background of norms embodied in conventions and rules which give meaning to an action. Within this vein, while the actor makes reference to norms when he/she makes a decision, but the observer must also understand the normative structure underlying the action in order to interpret and appraise choices. Thus, norms appears to be not only the guiding devices but also the means which allow people to pursue goals, share meanings, communicate with each other, criticize assertions and justify actions (Kratochwil, 1989:10-11). Norms not only establish certain games and enable the players to pursue their goals within them, they also establish inter-subjective meanings that allow actors to direct their actions towards each other, communicate with each other, appraise the quality of their actions, criticize claims and justify choices (Kratochwil, 1993:76).

Hence, Kratochwil argues, there are two kinds of rules that govern human action. Regulative rules are constraining in that they order to adopt certain behavior and usually can be expressed as imperatives, for example as "you shall not kill". However, constitutive rules are different from the regulative rules that they create

institutional practices and the institutional facts which can only be explained by constitutive rules (Kratochwil, 1989:26-27).[73] He claims that language of brute observation and the world of institutional facts are completely different. Only if institutional rules which have constitutive effects on human practices used, the institutional facts can be explained. According to him, institutional facts[74] are those who have the meaning within the society apart from the brute facts which physically exist without being dependent on the social meanings ascribed to them (Kratochwil, 1989:25-28).

As far as the case in this thesis is concerned, I maintain that Article 92 of the constitution represents an example of a constitutive rule in Turkish politics since it clearly describes the use of force conditions and puts forward a reasoning process for the decision to be taken. In this respect, Turkish military involvement abroad within Article 92 can only be understood from the perspective of the dual legitimacy which makes such an action possible or available for the government, at least understandable within the body of the parliament. The parliamentary discussions reflect this and show clues about how the Article 92 is understood in Turkish politics.

Firstly, as mentioned before Article 92 only accepts the use of force in such situations which are counted as legitimate in terms of international law and the authority to take this decision is left to the parliament. The way the article is formulated is an illustration of how socio-historical context of the state-society relations produces institutional structures. In every motion which has been taken into analysis, the parliamentary discussions significantly make references to bitter experiences of the Ottoman-Turkish history. Hence, the article appeared to be a product of an institutionalization of a shared inter-subjective frame of referents about

---

[73] For example, threatening the king in chess game by announcing "check" means something only with references to the underlying rules of the game thus the meaning of the move and its explanation crucially depend on the knowledge of a rule structure (Kratochwil,1989:26-7). For example, concerning the provision of Article 2.4.of U.N. charter on prohibiting the use force, which is a regulative rule, if someone resorts to force the specification of the action can be given without reference to the existing regulation. However, it is difficult to understand, give meaning and explain the situation of "goal", "offside" or "corner" without knowing the rules of a football game.

[74] Kratochwil derives the concept from John Searle who makes a distinction between the brute facts, social facts and the institutional facts. Institutional facts are social facts which depend for their existence on social institutions. For example, marriages, businesses, property, and governments are institutional facts. Brute facts are opposed to institutional facts, in that the former do not require the context of an institution to occur. For instance, the fact that a certain piece of paper is money cannot be ascertained outside the institution of money in a given society. And that piece of paper will only be money as long as the members of that society believe that it is so. Being money is an institutional fact. On the contrary, being a piece of paper is a brute fact. See John Searle, *The Construction Of Social Rality*,1995.

foreign policy decisions. Hence, the Article 92 is socially embedded in Turkish history and Turkish politics. When a military engagement is realized through the parliamentary process, then, this should be understood from the perspective of the references made to the Turkish socio-historical background from which the idea of legitimacy of that military engagement emerges. Only this legitimacy *vis a vis* the socio-historical background make the proposed action available before the parliament as a policy option.

Secondly, in the parliamentary discussions in 2003, the discussions were realized in a way questioning the procedural characteristics which focused on whether the conditions for an Article 92 intervention were existent. While CHP seemed to be completely adherent to the UN regime of use of force, AK Party depicted a more strategically formed approach which tried to pull the legitimacy of using force in international politics to the domestic realm. However, what was common was that both sides alleged that their own way of describing legitimacy was valid.

Thirdly, in the parliament, the foreign policy action is described by making references to a predetermined rule structure which prescribed the nature of the action by setting the conditions necessary for a decision or the actor who would take the decision. The socio-historical references were the indicators of the fact that the rule structure was not only derived from the constitutional framework but also the legacy of the past which appeared to be the constitutive of the Turkish Parliamentary identity and the Turkish political culture in general. In the Turkish case, regarding the foreign policy action within Article 92, use of force can not be explained without making references to the existing constitutive norm structure. Thus, the meaning of the move and its explanation are crucially dependent on the knowledge of the rule-structure behind it, which is constituted by the legacy of Turkish history as well as its constitutional extension. Hence, the social embeddedness of the Article 92 of the constitution reflects the existence of a constitutive rule structure in a sense that Kratochwil uses in his analysis. As he says, this approach does not exclude the material influences. Material resources do matter to the extent that they shape the perception of the respective decision makers. However, their influence has to be carefully studied since the norms are the part of the decision environment. Kratochwil's game metaphor enables us to go beyond our conventional

understanding of the foreign policy towards a socialized system of meaning and inter-subjectively known rule structure which makes a behavior available *vis a vis* the systemic pressures coming from the international sphere. In the cases subject to this thesis, we have seen that the offensive behavior in 2003 was not available given the conditions of the rule structure in the parliament. In 2007 case, on the other hand, the offensive was available to the government since the proposed action was available within the rule structure defining the conditions for a military offensive. Given the prescriptions of the Article 92, when a military engagement taken by Turkish military, it can be only meaningfully understood by the underlying legitimacy requirement before the international law and its legitimacy before the parliamentary norm of foreign policy making. Hence the legacy of the bitter Ottoman-Turkish history should take its place in an analysis made for Turkish military engagement abroad. As Kratochwil claims as brute facts can be understood with observational methodology, observation misses the reality concerning the socially embedded policy decisions and formulations. Hence the material conceptualization of neo-realism which is constructed over an understanding of the regularities in state behavior as patterned recurrences misses the institutional practices of the states which are made along the normative structure that underlies a decision environment.

In Berger's case, contrary to so-called aggressive variants of neo-realism, which sees states as power maximizers, Germany and Japan did not seek to develop military capabilities commensurate with their burgeoning economic power (Berger, 1996:321). In the case observed in this thesis, Turkey did reject an involvement in Iraqi War and misses the opportunity to deploy its troops in northern Iraq where later the PKK activism emanates and inflicts great loses to Turkish military in the following years. Despite knowing that a military engagement would make Turkey to an extent acquire an upper hand in Northern Iraq *vis a vis* PKK, Turkish parliament defied the government's strategic move to do so. Thus, the relative power that Turkey gains against its terrorism problem with visibly questioning the legitimacy of the action was not tapped and similarly reflects a non-aggressive behavior in its region contrary to Mearsheimer descriptions of state behavior as naturally aggressive.

According to Berger, cultural differences are not merely subjective reflections of objective reality but two individuals or groups with different cultural background are likely to behave differently in identical situations. In state actions, two states behave in very different way because different cultural background with different norms and values regarding the military and the use of force (Berger, 1996:326).

4.4. STATE INTEREST

In the previous chapter, the "interest" theme showed us that the concept of state interest is woven with parliamentary identity and norms as an implication of a historically accumulated consciousness, based on the parliamentary discussions. On the other hand, in 2007, different political views presented different policy options and different state interest definitions are proposed. In this sense, in the discussions of 2003 and 2007, state interest appeared to be embedded in a social process and does not reflect a pre-given character. In addition, in the parliament, the role of historical and social dynamics in this process in general and in shaping the nature of the decision became apparent.

As Katzeinstein puts, state interests do not exist to be discovered by self interested, rational actors. Interests are constructed through a process of social interaction (Katzenstein, 1996:2). In this thesis, on the issue of whether such an interaction occurs in the international or domestic level, domestic sources of state interests appeared to be more influential with regards to the cases explored.

Historical examples given in the parliament are illuminative to understand state interest concept as they shed lights on the concepts of identity and norms. In all motion examples examined in this thesis, the emphasis made on state interest was not separable from the importance given to identity and norms. The parliament witnessed the representation of state interest concept intertwined with the norms and identity descriptions. In the parliament, it was not depicted in a self-help condition *vis a vis* the systemic pressures of the international anarchic order. Accordingly, government tried to use more loaded and open descriptions of interest by distancing itself to generic and empty usage of the term in 6 February and 1 March 2003 motions along the criticism made in the parliament. By this way, government began to emphasize the legitimacy of the proposed actions and make references to redlines

policies of Turkey which seemed to be an inter-subjectively known framework in terms of Turkish security understanding.

While this study has not dealt with the red-lines policy and its possible origins in the Turkish political culture, what can be said here is that the government, after receiving severe criticisms in the parliament, came closer to construct the motions in a form which says more about the nature of the proposed action including the reason, goals and the limits of the action with implying the international legitimacy of it. Thus, red lines policy appears to be part of a language which government uses to escape from parliamentary criticisms.

Parliament's demands to be given more information about the government's considerations about the foreign policy behavior and showing an institutional identity in this issue indicate that government's conceptualization of the state interest was not a reified fact knowable to all. If neo-realist arguments were valid in our example, the interest description of a socialized state before the systemic effects would be knowable to people related with the decision environment. On the contrary, in the examples explored, the motions using generic form of the term instigated severe discussions. In the parliament there seems to be made a differentiation between the "government interest" and "state interest" regarding the actions proposed by the government. In this respect, who makes the definition of state interest with what considerations bare important.

On the other hand, concerning the motion in 2007, different identity and interest descriptions by political parties and their presentation of different policy options as state interest demonstrate that interest is a product of a social process of interaction. The proposed policy options do influence the decisions according to respective weight of the political parties in the parliament. This fact should not conceal that existing policies are actually proposed policy options, which are ratified by the parliament. In this vein, in 2007 if the parties who opposed to such an intervention reached the necessary number, the intervention would not have occurred and the state's foreign policy would have been realized differently. If the government was formed by the party or parties who oppose the intervention, such a government proposal would not even have reached to the parliament. Thus, state policies including foreign policy should be evaluated as a political product rather than the resultant physical outcomes of pressures coming from the international system or

domestic system. Although Gilpin gives credence to domestic determinants, he defines state as mere instrument for the dominant group/groups in the society. In this respect, I claim that he does not escape from the billiard ball metaphor of Waltz since he describes the state behavior reactively adaptive or maladaptive to systemic requirements. He puts forward a state which acts according to benefit calculations of the dominant actors in their attempts to pursue their material interests. Thus, Gilpin, indeed, does not escape from structural determinism of Waltz but points to the quality of the behavior in accordance with the interest definition of the ruling group in the society.   As mentioned before, in neo-realism, for the purpose of creating a more scientific theory, realpolitics is separated from politics and the real decision processes are excluded from the analysis .This separation is made actually between the domestic and the international spheres of the state. In the next chapter, this separation will be taken into consideration. However, it is meaningful to briefly mention Audie Klotz's study on apartheid which seems to be important for this thesis before passing to the next topic.

According to Klotz, the U.S. Congress performed an impulsive force in the process through which norms did change the American state interest on the question of rational discrimination. Transnational anti-apartheid activist generated pressures in the congress for a policy overtly and substantively in support of racial equality in South Africa. According to her, the discourse of racial equality framed discussion of policy toward South Africa, both motivating congressional demands for sanctions and constraining the executive's power in formulating foreign policy (Klotz, 1995: 459-462).

As we know, the United States Congress is the bicameral legislature of the federal government of the USA, consisting of two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives. Both senators and representatives are chosen through direct election. Therefore, in understanding the nature of state interest, the norms and their effects, the importance of democracy and leverage of elections should be taken into consideration. As in Klotz'z study, in this thesis it is seen that parliament appears to be repulsive force which carries the will of the populace towards the government including the criticisms, different preferences and different policy options. In other words, political authority is exposed to the effects of the society through the social processes of interest articulation and the political representation. Differences in the

117

society, different identities and different understandings about the international relations and about state's position against happenings in the international area seem to be articulated in the parliament and put pressure in government and shaping the interest of the state before a foreign policy action is taken.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, it has been showed that, with regards to the cases explored, foreign policy behavior of the state is a political product which is embedded in a historical, social and cultural context. The foreign policy decision is shaped by the normative structure which makes the behavior available and meaningful before the decision makers. The normative structure, in addition, is reflective of this context the foreign policy behavior is embedded. Besides, it is intertwined with the identity and the interest definitions which are directly influential in shaping the decision environment and the outcome. On the other hand, as it has touched upon that neo-realism has a fallacy in understanding the foreign policy behavior of the state accurately because it severely dismisses the social dimensions of the state by separating the domestic and the international for the purpose of making a structural, rational or, as Kratochwil calls, a scientific analysis.

According to Kratochwil, to view international politics as distinct from domestic politics, and thus to argue for an autonomous discipline, is based on mistaking the historically brief period of the balance of power for a paradigm of international politics in general (Kratochwil,1993:78). He claims that academic exponents of realism had prided themselves on giving greater precision, depth and above all, scientific respectability to realism, but they cut themselves off the practical realism which in fact identified linkages between domestic and international change. The unchanging or cyclical nature of international politics substituted for the investigation of actual processes and decisions. (Kratochwil, 1993:64).

Within this vein, it is possible to say that in neo-realism, the embeddedness of states foreign policy actions in a historical, social and cultural context, and state's being a social actor are rejected. Waltz answers to his critiques are as pragmatic as its theory proper: what his theory explains is important rather than what it does not. He accepts that he does not intent to have a theory of state and domestic politics (Waltz,

1986)[75]. *Theory of International Politics* is a monument but it misses the very important points about the state which appear to be the main agent which links the individual, society and international realm to one another while trying to explain the state behavior solely from the perspective of the dynamics of the international realm. His and his followers' perception of state behavior as simple physical happenings puts limits to understanding the foreign policy actions of state as purposive actions directed towards both international and domestic realm. In this sense, domestic underpinnings of state's frame of reference are neglected. As Bruce Andrews puts, when the state behavior is treated as resultants rather than purposive actions, the policies underlying them and the state apparatus begin to take on asocial existence. Thus, the representation of state as a monolithical entity as a billiard ball is not surprising in a mindset where the state is thought in an asocial structure. However, as it is demonstrated in this thesis, state does not reflect asocial, ahistorical and anomic characteristics in its foreign policy decisions. Rather, in the cases explored, it is exactly a social process which is woven by ideational factors of which the decisions are made.

First, in the cases we explored, state did not move as a homogenized unit. In the year 2003, between the parliament and the government there was a clear difference in perceiving the war in Iraq and despite government's pushs, the motion of 1 March 2003 was rejected. In 2007 case, the parliament passed the decision approving the government, and, military intervention in Iraq was made possible. Therefore, government does not appear to be an actor making foreign policy decision in a free-floating way. In addition, since the authority is left to the parliament within the scope of Article 92, major foreign policy decisions are opened to the influences of domestic dynamics. For this purpose, foreign policy decisions are not solely resultant physical outcomes before the systemic pressures rather they are socially embedded political products which are directly influenced by domestic political considerations.

Second, the concept of identity constitutes a considerable part of the discussions and these discussions were realized to large extent intrinsic to the Ottoman-Turkish history. Besides references made to Turkish political culture in

---

[75] See Kenneth Waltz, "A Response to my Critics",in *Neorealism and its Critics*,1986.

general, specifically, the identity descriptions made in the parliament were concerning the parliament itself. Thus, identity discussions emerged to be a historical legacy of the past with regards to the Turkish state society complex. Therefore, it seems impossible to detach the state from its historical and social context in understanding the foreign policy behavior of states. For this reason, it would not be incorrect to propose, within the scope of this thesis, that states' foreign policy behavior is in part influenced by the identity descriptions which are constituted and shaped by the domestic dynamics.

Third, in the Article 92, international law receives a direct reference and the most important foreign policy decisions are left to the parliament. By this way, not only is international law upgraded to a supreme position but also the perceptions in the parliament about identity and norms are given a determinative role in foreign policy decisions. Therefore, parliament's own description of norms about itself, concerning foreign policy, gains pivotal importance. This, in turn, leads to an understanding that cultural and institutional structure has an important role in states' foreign policy formulations. In addition, constitution's reference to international law also bears importance in terms of the regime discussions. As Kratochwil says, the provision 2.4 of the UN Charter about the prohibiting use of force on international relations represents a regulative rule since the action exists without making reference to the mentioned rule. Article 92 represents an indirect reference to the UN Charter since the International Law is under the influence of the UN regime. This was reflected in the parliament and created a severe discussion between AK Party and CHP during the discussion of 1 March Motion. Thus, a regulative rule in international realm seems to be transformed into a constitutive rule regarding the use of force in the body of Article 92 of Turkish constitution. Although the reference was made to international law in general, the regime effect as an inter-subjectively understood rule structure was apparent within the parliament. This interaction represents an example of how international regimes and the rule structure even when regulative and not pursued by a global sovereign gain a constitutive character and leads to a rule following at the state level. In turn, this reveals how the separation between the domestic and international is artificial.

Fourth, concept of state interest in fact can not be separated from the concept of norms and identity. In the parliamentary discussions, identity, norms and interest

were emphasized in a close interaction with each other. The issue of interest develops in the discussions related to a social context. The parliament is the place where the will of the people is embodied and differences within the society inescapably are reflected. Different interest descriptions also stemmed from different world and political views. Thus, parliamentary democracy fundamentally challenges neo-realism's structural deductions. As Kratochwil states, the account of the wars has to be given to people in the modern world and modern foreign policy went beyond the old games of a closed groups of diplomats and sovereigns. Thus, while Waltz tries to explain the systemic effects on states and their responsive recurrent patterns, he seems to fall into a historical fallacy in applying these pre-modern patterns of behavior of those absolute authorities with their own descriptions of identity and interest to modern democratic states and sets the state on an anomic, ahistorical and asocial model.

With regards to state interest issue, we should touch upon Gilpin. As we stated before, Waltz's structuralism differs in Gilpin's case in the sense that Gilpin gives credence to the domestic political system. He appears to have a notion of domestic system and domestic politics. However, interest pursuing behavior of dominant group/groups emerges to be the lenses that Gilpin sees the domestic social dynamics. Hence, he does not attribute a relative autonomy of state from political competition within the domestic realm. Thus, in his understanding state appears to be instrumental in the pursuit of the ruling group or groups' material gains. The cost-benefit calculations take the core in his theory and domestic system is given a role for state's capacity to adapt to the requirements of the system. Thus, if the domestic political system has the capacity to adapt, state forms successful policies to pursue its interests, indeed dominant groups' interests. In his theory, state disappears from the scene in the sense that it is devoid of relative autonomy from the society and became transparent *vis a vis* the systemic effect of the international realm. Thus, although Gilpin seems to be different than Waltz's understanding of the structure and unit relations, what Gilpin does is to relax the black-box of Waltzian understanding but maintaining the structural analysis in a fashion which dismisses the rich diversity of the domestic realm of the state. He confines state's internal dynamics to an economic cost-benefit analysis of the social groups which pursue their material interests. Thus, he falls short of understanding the ideational dimensions of the state's domestic

122

dynamics and continues with a material conceptualization as Waltz does. In this respect, although Gilpin seems to be relevant to this study, his theory falls short of reflecting highlighted issues in our cases. His interest definition is primarily material and does not reflect the importance of the ideational factors operates in decision environment. Hence, his theory does not link the domestic and the international in a comprehensive manner to reflect the inner diversity of state and its effects on foreign policy behavior.

Moreover, it appears from the discussions that foreign policy is regarded as a political act and a part of the politics which takes its legitimacy from the will of nation and its consent. Examples given in the parliament both from the opposition and the government from Ottoman-Turkish history are confirmative of this diagnosis. The discussions in the parliament represent that foreign policy issues are defined in a continuous historical process of identity formation. Intrinsic to this process, it is underlined that foreign policy decisions should be ratified by the will of the nation through its representative, the parliament. Hence, the parliament should be fully informed about the foreign policy considerations of the government. Therefore, the international behavior of the state is directly shaped and checked by the parliament which has domestic roots, responsibilities and self conceptualizations.

For all of these reasons, proposing the existence of a passive/reactive state and a domestic sphere which is defined apart from the international would lead to defective conclusions about states' international behavior. On the other hand, in the cases we have explored in this thesis, the signals coming from the international realm transform into state behavior through a distillation in the parliament which claims to be acting on behalf of the nation, rather than through an agency of a closed state elite who receives the signals, assesses and develops compliant behavior. Here, rather than a physical action-reaction compliance, what should be emphasized is the fact that the signals are turned into state behavior by both subjective and inter-subjective evaluations in the parliament. This is definitely what the neorealist paradigm evades to say. Thus, the cases we explored show how domestic and international are intertwined and how domestic elements determine foreign policy behavior in a decision environment in which the authority is left to the parliament.

The operation of democratic principles in the parliament puts forward the necessity of taking into account of different elements in the analysis. For example, an

MP's ethnic identity or his/her individual election or economic considerations might be taken into the analysis. However, to repeat, what is proposed here is to engage in a more comprehensive approach than neo-realist paradigm rather than explaining every element interfering in foreign policy action. Therefore, I argue that contrary to neo-realist understanding differences within states do matter and this fact is significantly a rule rather than being an extraordinary exception. Attribution of differences in the international system to distribution of capabilities, as in Waltz case, or material interest of different political groups, as in Gilpin case, seems to be confining states' inner diversity to narrowing arguments of a generalizing model. Gilpin at this point seems to avoid successfully neo-realist failure of dismissing the inner dynamics of the state. However, he himself stands short of understanding the real sources of diversity among the states and confines himself a systemic cost-benefit analysis which offers a patterned behavior applicable to all states.

With regards to Mearsheimer, in the cases, we have seen that Turkey did not show a power seeking behavior in its region although a possible dismemberment of Iraq meant a security threat in the parliament both in 2003 and 2007 discussions. Rather, its policy orientation seemed to be shaped by the normative considerations and identity attributions. Thus, offensive behavior attributed to state seems to be not explanatory in the cases explored.

Moreover, parliament's engagement in foreign policy making means democracy performs a transmitting function under the framework of people's sovereignty understanding. In other words, with the institutionalization of parliamentary democracy and taking its modern shape, the traditional patterns of foreign policy making, which was elitist and exclusionary, was also changed and replaced with a more inclusionary form. As the foreign policy issues entered into ordinary citizens' life through broad means of communicative tools, the international realm of the states became a legitimate ground of intervention for the ordinary citizens. One might reject this by claiming that such an example was peculiar to Turkish case but in all circumstances it is possible to say that Turkish normative structure regarding those actions listed in Article 92 was constructed in way that the foreign policy behavior is shaped by the peculiar identity of the parliament constructing the interest of the state *vis a vis* developments in international relations. That is what constructivism points at: states have differences within and these

differences take their roots from the dynamics of both the domestic and the international. Nevertheless, there are different examples also that authority to wage war and sending troops abroad are left the parliament in different countries.[76]

At this point, mainstream neo-realist assumption about states' high relative autonomy from the society emerges to be inaccurate. Passive ontological status ascribed to states *vis a vis* the international system indicates that relative autonomy of states from the society in giving responses to systemic pressures is totally or strongly independent. However, in Turkish case, the parliament's role in giving the most serious foreign policy decisions symbolizes an example of how social dynamics are rendered active in foreign policy making.

State is not a homogenous blackbox giving compliant reflexes to the imperatives of the international realm. In democratic systems, it is difficult to claim that the state is a kind of an institution which is formed and operates apart from the people and diverse interests prevailing among the society. Principle of interest articulation is the fundamental basis over which democratic systems are framed. Therefore, modern state does not show the characteristics of a monolithic entity concerning its actions in international realm. Democratic regimes show simultaneously the clash and the reconciliation of diverse interests existing within the society. In this respect, executive power's relative autonomy from the society and legal and institutional structure regulating this autonomy are critical for foreign policy action. In democratic regimes, state appears to be a process of continuous interest articulation, decision making and implementation of the decisions taken according to the way the legal framework prescribes. In this respect, what state represents is closely connected with the way the state's operating principles are constituted. In our example, the constitution is the *grund norm* which shapes all other legal and institutional framework. In this respect, the spirit behind the constitution is crucial to define the characteristics of a state. The motivations when writing the constitution and level of autonomous position from the society determine the characteristics of the way state operates. These facts are related with the historical and social context of the society and both describe the social embeddedness of the state's actions and the quality of state-society dialogue.

---

[76] See Baran Kuşoğlu, *Asker Gönderme Tezkereleri: 1 Mart Tezkeresi Örneği,* TBMM Uzmanlık Tezi,2008.

On the other hand, with regards to international agential power of states, it can be said that international behavior of states are shaped along what the parliament regards appropriate rather than a systemic resultant behavior. Thus, neo-realist description of the fixed behavior is differentiated through the shape it takes within the framework of the linkage between the domestic and international politics. Thus, international agential power of states does not fit the neo-realist propositions. In the cases explored in this thesis, there is no such a systemically imposed patterns of behavior on the actor in a neo-realist sense. Ironically in the discussions, parliament gave emphasis on certain kinds of behavior which appeared to be based on a normative structure both in domestic and international realm, which Waltz misses from the scene.

In this thesis, it is argued that state's international agency seems to be considerable and state has the power to resist the international realm's imperatives and shape it under circumstances in which international norms are supporting state's actions. In this respect, norms do matter and issue of legality in the international realm gives states a buttress for action and a policy space to shape its foreign policy relatively unbidden by external pressures. Actor's relative position in international realm is not passive/adaptive but it is in a manner which assesses the signals and identifies the appropriate behavior. The appropriate behavior appears to be a very complicated process to which norms, identity and cultural elements interfere.

On the other hand, international norms do have a naked power if the state's decision-making procedures are accorded to the international norms setting. In this respect, interaction between international and domestic norms is very important for state's foreign policy action. According to international law, states raise international legal responsibility of other states, organizations and other international persons with different legal ways and measures. However, a non compliant state can only be punished by the use of force as the final resort. If international norms penetrate to domestic normative environment, as we briefly underlined in this thesis, international norms acquire the power in directly shaping behaviors of states. Hence, I argue that international realm has a disciplinary power on states rather than forcing them adapt passively to systemic requirements. In this thesis, international norms have a function in shaping the state behavior since they constitute partly the normative structure which underlies the proposed state action and constitute the identity which is

strongly showed by the parliament. A regulative rule for not using force in international realm transforms into a constitutive rule in normative structure in Turkey with the affirmation of socio-historical legacy derived from the Turkish history and, of formally, the constitution. In addition, other states' responses to specific incidents have a meaning for a state's international action. International realm appears to be a social environment in which states desire to act along with other states since the outcomes for the decision can not be seen before. Definition of the right and the wrong comes along with consideration or examination of the way the other states behaved.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS AND ARTICLES

Adler, Emanuel, "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics",*European journal of International Relations*,Vol (3)3,1997

Altunışık, Meliha Benli, "Turkey's Iraq Policy: The War and Beyond", *Journal of Contemporary European Studies***,** Vol.14, No.2, (2006)

Ashley, Richard K. "The Poverty of Neorealism". *International Organization,* 38,1984

Andrews, Bruce, "Social Rules and the State as a Social Actor". *World Politics* 27,1975

Arı,Tayyar, *Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorisi: Çatışma ,Hegemonya, İşbirliği*, (İstanbul: Alfa, 2001)

Arslan,Okan and Arı,Selçuk, *Amerika Özgürlük Havarisi mi? yoksa Günah Keçisi mi?*, (Ankara: Platin, 2004)

Balbay, Mustafa, Irak Batakliğinda Türk Amerikan Ilişkileri,(Istanbul:Cumhuriyet Kitapları, 2007)

Berger, Thomas, "Norms,Identity and National Security in Germany and Japan", in Peter Katzenstein, (ed.),*The Culture of International Relations:Norms and Identity in World Politics.(New York:Columbia University Press,1996)*

Berger, Thomas (et al), "Book Reviews",*Survival,*39:3,1997.

Bila, Fikret, *Ankarada Irak Savaşları Sivil Darbe Grişimi ve Gizli Belgelerde 1 Mart Tezkeresi,(Ankara:Güncel,2007- original publication in 2003)*

Bilgin, Pınar, "Security Studies:Theory and Practice", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Volume 12, Issue 2,1999

Bölükbaşı, Deniz, *1 Mart Vakası Irak Tezkeresi ve Sonrası*,(İstanbul:Doğan Kitap,2008)

Brown, Chris, *Understanding International Relations***,** (Basingstoke**:** Palgrave Macmillan, 2005)

Burchill, Scott (et al), *Theories of International Relations* (New York : Palgrave, 2001)

Checkel, Jeffrey*,"* The Constructivist Turn in International Relations"*,World Politics,*50,1998

Congress Research Service Report for Congress, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress,2008a

Congress Research Service Report for Congress, *Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy*, 2008b

Donnelly, Jack, *Realism and International Relations*,(Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2000)

Dougherty, James and Pfaltzgraff, Robert, *Contending Theories of International Relations*, (Logman Publishing Group,2001)

Elster, John, "Introduction", in John Elster (ed.) *Rational Choice*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1986)

Emiroğlu, Hüseyin, "Türk Dış Politikasının Oluşturulma Sürecinde Yasama-Yürütme İlişkileri", *A.Ü. SBF Dergisi,* C.54, No.3, 1999

Eralp, Atila (ed.) *Devlet, Sistem ve Kimlik: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Yaklaşımlar*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 1996)

Eralp, Atila (ed.) *Devlet ve Ötesi: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Kavramlar*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2005)

Erhan, Çağrı, *Bizim Kırmızı Çizgilerimiz Vardı*, (Ankara: Siyasal Kitapevi,2006)

Gilpin, Robert, *War and Change in World Politics*,(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981)

Hobson, John, *State and International Relations*,(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000)

Hopf, Ted, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations", *International Security,* Vol 23, No 1, Summer 1998

Jepperson, Roland, Peter Katzenstein and Alexander Wendt*,"*Norms,Identity and Culture in National Security"*, in* Peter Katzenstein (ed.),*The Culture of International Relations:Norms and Identity in World Politics.(New York:Columbia University Press,1996)

Kahler, Miles, "Rationality in International Relations", *International Organization*, 52, 1998

Katzenstein, Peter (ed.), *The Culture of International Relations:Norms and Identity in World Politics.(New York:Columbia University Press,1996)*

Katzenstein, Peter, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security", in Peter Katzenstein, (ed.),*The Culture of International Relations:Norms and Identity in World Politics.(New York:Columbia University Press,1996).*

Keohane, Robert (ed), *Neorealism and its Critics*,(New York: Columbia Univesity Press:1986)

Keskin, Funda, *Uluslararası Hukukta Kuvvet Kullanma: Savaş, Karışma ve Birleşmiş Milletler*, (Ankara: Mülkiyeliler Birliği Vakfı Yayınları,1998)

Klotz, Audie," Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions Against South Africa", *International Organization,*Vol 49,No 3, 1995

Klotz, Audie and Lynch, Cecelia, *Strategies for research in Constructivist International Relations*,(New York: Sharpe, 2007)

Kratochwil, Friedrich, *Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the conditions of Practical and Legal reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs*,(Cambridge: Cambridge university Press:1989)

Kratochwil, Friedrich, "The Embarrassment of Changes: Neo-Realism as the Science of Realpolitik without Politics", *Review of International Studies*, vol. 19,1993

Kratochwil, Fredrich and Ruggie, John Gerard, "International Organization: A State Of The Art On The Art Of The State," *International Organization*, vol. 40, 1986

Kuşoğlu, Baran, *Asker Gönderme Tezkereleri: 1 Mart Tezkeresi Örneği,* TBMM Uzmanlık Tezi, 2008.

Kowert, Paul, "The Peril and Promise of Constructivist Theory," Ritsumeikan Kokusai Kenkyu (Ritsumeikan Journal of International Studies) 13, 3,2001

Lobel, Jules; Ratner, Michael, "Bypassing the Security Council:Ambiguous Authorizations to Use Force, Cease-Fires and the Iraq Inspection Regime", *American Journal of Law*, vol:93,1999

Mearsheimer, John, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*,(New York: Norton and Company,2001)

Morgenthau, Hans J, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Fifth Edition, Revised, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978)

Onuf, Nicholas,*World Of Our Making : Rules And Rule In Social Theory And International Relations,*(Columbia, S.C. : University of South Carolina Press,1989)

Oran, Baskın, "Türkiye Kabuk Değiştirirken AKP'nin Dış Politikası",*Birikim*, Sayı184-185,2004

Oran, Baskın, *Kalkık Horoz: Çekiç Güç ve Kürt Devlet* (İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1998).

Öztürk, Kazım, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası*, (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1966)

Pazarcı, Hüseyin, *Uluslararası Hukuk Dersleri,* Cilt 1,(Ankara: Turhan Kitabevi,1997)

Price, Richard and Reus-Smit, Christian, "Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism" *European Journal of International Relations.* Vol. 4(3),1998

Record, Jeffrey, "The Bush Doctrine and War with Iraq," *Parameters*, vol. 33, No. 1, Spring, 2003

Reus-Smit, Christian, "Constructivism" in Scott Burchill (et al) *Theories of International Relations* (New York : Palgrave, 2001)

Ruggie, John Gerard, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis", *World Politics,* 35 , January 1983

Ruggie, John Gerard.John, "What Makes theWorld HangTogether? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge", *International Organization*, 52,4,1998.

Searle, John. *The Construction of Social Reality*, (New York: Free Press,1995)

Tanrısever, Oktay, "Güvenlik"in Atilla Eralp (ed.) *Devlet ve Ötesi:Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Kavramlar*,(İstanbul:İletişim,2005)

Ülger, İrfan, "Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikasının Arkaplanı, Oluşumu ve Temel Anlaşmazlık Konuları" in Rafet Y. İnanç and Hakan Taşdemir (eds.) *Uluslarası Güvenlik Sorunları ve Türkiye,*(Seçkin Yayınları.,2002)

Waisova, Saika, "Human Security- the Contemporary Paradigm?", *Perspectives. The Central European Review of International Affair*s, Prague: Summer, Iss. 20, 2000

Waltz, Kenneth, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia Press, 2001- original publication in 1959)

Waltz, Kenneth, *Theory of International Politics*, (New York:Random House,1979).

Waltz, Kenneth "A Response to my Critics",in Robert Keohane (ed), *Neorealism and its Critics*,(New York: Columbia Univesity Press:1986)

Wendt, Alexander,*"Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics"*, International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 ,Spring, 1992

Wendt, Alexander, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State", *American Political Science Review*, vol 88,No 2,1994

Wendt, Alexander, "Constructing International Politics", *International Security,* Vol. 20, No.1, 1995.

Vasquez, John, The Power of Power Politics: A Critique (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1983)

Yalvaç, Faruk, "Uluslararası İlişkiler Kuramında Yapısalcı Yaklaşımlar" in Eralp, Atila (ed.) *Devlet, Sistem ve Kimlik: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Yaklaşımlar,* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1996)

Yalvaç, Faruk, "Devlet", Atilla Eralp (ed.) *Devlet ve Ötesi: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Kavramlar,*(İstanbul:İletişim,2005)

Yetkin, Murat, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü,*(İstanbul: Remzi,2004)

Zehfuss, Maja, *Constructivism in International Relations: Politics of Reality,*(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002)

PARLIAMENTARY MINUTES

TBMM, "32nd Meeting-06.02.2003",*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Dönem 22,Cilt 4,Yasama Yılı 1

TBMM, "38th Meeting-27.02.2003",*TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Dönem 22,Cilt 4,Yasama Yılı 1

TBMM, "39[th]Meeting-01.03.2003", *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Dönem 22,Cilt 6,Yasama Yılı 1

TBMM, "41st Meeting-05.03.2003", *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Dönem 22,Cilt 6,Yasama Yılı1

TBMM, "51st Meeting-20.03.2009", *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Dönem 22,Cilt 8,Yasama Yılı 1

TBMM, "43[rd]Meeting-11.03.2003", *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Dönem 22,Cilt 4,Yasama Yılı 1

TBMM, "3rd Meeting-07.10.2003", *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Dönem 22,Cilt 26,Yasama Yılı 2

TBMM, "8th Meeting-17.10.2007", *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Dönem 23,Cilt 2,Yasama Yılı 2

INTERNET RESOURCES

"George W. Bush's speech at U.S. Military Academy (West Point)", available at [http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/01/international/02PTEX-WEB.html]

"George W. Bush's Address to the Nation", March 17, 2003, the televised speech, available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html].

"George W. Bush's Address to the United Nations General Assembly", September 12, 2002, available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html].

"George W. Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended," May 1,2003, available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030501-15.html].

<www.anayasa.gov.tr>

<www.hurriyet.com.tr>

<www.milliyet.com.tr>

<www.gazetevatan.com.tr>

<www.radikal.com.tr>

<www.sabah.com.tr>

<www.tbmm.gov.tr>

<www.yenisafak.com.tr>

<www.zaman.com.tr>

APPENDIX A: 6 FEBRUARY 2003 MOTION

Türkiye'deki askerî üs ve tesisler ile limanlarda gerekli yenileştirme, geliştirme, inşaat ve tevsi çalışmaları ile altyapı faaliyetlerinde bulunmak amacıyla, Amerika Birleşik Devletlerine mensup teknik ve askerî personelin 3 ay süreyle Türkiye'de bulunmasına, Anayasanın 92 nci maddesi uyarınca izin verilmesine dair Başbakanlık tezkeresi (3/177)

<div align="center">Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Başkanlığına</div>

Irak'ın, 1990 Körfez Savaşı sonrası Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi kararlarının çerçevesini çizdiği yaptırım ve denetim rejiminden kaynaklanan yükümlülüklerini tam olarak yerine getirmemesinden kaynaklanan sorunların sürmesi bir gerginlik ve kriz ortamının ortaya çıkmasına yol açmıştır. Bu durum, Türkiye'yi olumsuz yönde etkilemekte ve ciddî güvenlik riski oluşturmaktadır.

Kitle imha silahları konusundaki son gelişmeler sonucu gergin ortam giderek ağırlaşmış ve Irak sorununda nazik bir aşamaya gelinmiştir.

Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi bu konuyu uluslararası barış ve güvenliğe karşı süregelen ciddî bir tehdit olarak ele almış ve Irak'ın Körfez Savaşı sonrası resmî ateşkesin şartlarını ve bunun için üstlendiği yükümlülüklerin gereklerini bütün unsurlarıyla yerine getirmesinin sağlanmasının uluslararası barış ve güvenliğin korunması için elzem olduğunu kararlaştırmıştır.

Son gelişmeler kritik bir aşamaya girilmekte olduğunu göstermektedir.

Irak'ın toprak bütünlüğünün ve siyasî birliğinin korunması ve içinde bulunduğumuz hassas bölgede bir istikrar unsuru olarak varlığını sürdürmesi Türkiye için büyük önem taşımaktadır.

Türkiye bu sorunun uluslararası askerî müdahaleye gerek kalmadan barışçı yollarla çözüme kavuşturulmasını samimiyetle istemektedir. 58 inci Cumhuriyet Hükümeti tüm imkânları kullanarak bu yöndeki çabalarını sürdürmektedir.

Barışçı çözüm için tüm imkânlar seferber edilirken, Türkiye'nin her durumu ve ihtimali de göz önünde bulundurması ve barışçı bir çözümün şartlarının oluşamaması durumunda karşısına çıkacak her gelişmeye karşı hazırlıklı olması da hayatî önem taşımaktadır. Türkiye'nin temel hak ve çıkarlarına ve uluslararası sorumluluklarına uygun, etkili bir siyaset izlemesi ve gelişmelerin seyrine göre gerekli tedbirlerin zamanında ve etkili biçimde alınabilmesi için hazırlıkların buna göre yürütülmesi bir zarurettir.

Bu mülahazalarla, gerekli bütün hazırlıkları yapmak ve güvenlik tedbirlerini almak amacıyla, gelişmelerin seyrine göre, Türkiye'nin sorumluluklarına, temel hak ve menfaatlarına uygun, etkili bir politika izlenmesine imkân sağlamak üzere, Türkiye'deki askerî üs ve tesisler ile limanlarda gerekli yenileştirme, geliştirme, inşaat ve tevsi çalışmaları ile altyapı faaliyetlerinde bulunmak amacıyla Amerika Birleşik Devletlerine mensup teknik ve askerî personelin 3 ay süreyle Türkiye'de bulunmasına, bununla ilgili gerekli düzenlemelerin hükümet tarafından yapılmasına, Anayasanın 92 nci maddesi uyarınca izin verilmesini arz ederim.

<div align="right">Abdullah Gül
Başbakan</div>

APPENDIX B: 1 MARCH 2003 MOTION

Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin yabancı ülkelere gönderilmesine, yabancı silahlı kuvvetler unsurlarının altı ay süreyle Türkiye'de bulunmasına ve muharip unsurların Türkiye dışına intikalleri için gerekli düzenlemelerin yapılmasına Anayasanın 92 nci maddesi uyarınca izin verilmesine ilişkin Başbakanlık tezkeresi (3/189)

Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Başkanlığına

Irak konusundaki endişe verici gelişmeler çok hızlı bir seyir izlemekte ve kriz ortamı giderek ağırlaşmaktadır. Sorunun barışçı yollarla çözümü yönündeki çabalar bugüne kadar ümit edilen sonuçları vermemiştir.

58 inci Cumhuriyet Hükümeti, gelişmeleri başından beri yakından ve hassasiyetle izlemiş, barışçı çözüme katkıda bulunmak amacıyla yoğun çaba harcamıştır. Bu amaçla, başta bölge ülkeleri olmak üzere, ilgili tüm ülkelerle ve uluslararası kuruluşlarla temas ve istişarelerde bulunmuştur.

Irak'a ilişkin gelişmeler 6 Şubat 2003 tarihli kapalı oturumda Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi tarafından değerlendirilmiş ve her ihtimale karşı gerekli güvenlik tedbirlerinin alınması ve hazırlıkların yapılması amacıyla hükümete yetki verilmiştir. Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, bu çerçevede, Türkiye'deki askerî üs ve tesisler ile limanlarda gerekli yenileştirme, geliştirme, inşaat ve tevsi çalışmaları ile altyapı faaliyetlerinde bulunmak amacıyla Amerika Birleşik Devletlerine mensup teknik ve askerî personelin 3 ay süreyle Türkiye'de bulunmasına, bununla ilgili düzenlemelerin hükümet tarafından yapılmasına Anayasanın 92 nci maddesi uyarınca izin verilmesini kararlaştırmıştır.

Hükümet, gerekli hazırlıkları buna uygun olarak sürdürmüş ve bu faaliyetlerin hukukî ve teknik çerçevesini belirleyen mutabakat muhtırası ABD ile 8 Şubat 2003 tarihinde sonuçlandırılarak altyapı çalışmaları başlatılmıştır.

Öte yandan, Türkiye için güvenlik riski oluşturan olumsuz gelişmelerin yoğunluk kazanması üzerine, NATO Antlaşmasının 4 üncü maddesi çerçevesinde gerekli istişareler başlatılmış ve NATO Savunma Planlama Komitesi, 19 Şubat 2003 tarihinde, Türkiye'ye NATO desteği verilmesini kararlaştırmıştır.

Bu kapsamda, Türk hava sahasının bütünlüğünün korunması ve gözetimi için, savunma amaçlı olarak, NATO havadan erken ihbar uçakları ile NATO harekat alanı füze savunma sistemlerinin Türkiye'de konuşlandırılması ve kimyasal ve biyolojik silahlara karşı koruma desteği sağlanması kararlaştırılmıştır.

Bugün gelinen noktada, bölgede hüküm süren krizin bir çatışmaya dönüşmesi ihtimali giderek güçlenmektedir. Ağırlaşan ortam ve şartlar karşısında Türkiye'nin güvenliğine yönelik tehdit ve risklerin ciddî boyutlar kazandığı bir sürece girilmektedir.

Türkiye'nin millî birliğini ve toprak bütünlüğünü hedef alan terör unsurlarının bölgede yuvalanmaları, Irak'taki durumun Türkiye için teşkil ettiği güvenlik tehdidinin çok önemli bir boyutunu oluşturmaktadır.

Aynı şekilde, Irak'ta, etnik, din ve mezhep temelinde bir parçalanmaya yol açabilecek gelişmeler de çok ciddî bir endişe kaynağıdır.

Bunun yanı sıra, geçmişte yaşanan müessif tecrübeler, Kuzey Irak'tan ülkemize toplu göç hareketi ihtimaline karşı da hassas ve hazırlıklı olunmasını gerekli kılmaktadır. Bu amaçla, sınır bölgelerimizde muhtemel yığılmaları önlemek ve insanî mülahazaları da dikkate alarak, bu göçün, sınırlarımızın mümkün olduğunca ilerisinde uygun bir bölgede durdurulmasını sağlamak için gereken tedbirlerin alınması kaçınılmaz olacaktır. Bu konuda başlatılan hazırlıklar sürdürülmektedir.

Türkiye, Irak'ın toprak bütünlüğünün ve millî birliğinin korunmasına ve sorunun barışçı yollarla çözüme kavuşturulmasına büyük önem vermektedir. Kuvvet kullanımı son çare olarak görülmelidir. Giderek tırmanan krizin bir savaşa dönüşmeden çözümü için zaman giderek azalmaktadır. Savaşın önlenebilmesi için Irak yönetiminin tam ve etkin silahsızlanma konusunda Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi kararlarında yer alan yükümlülüklerini tüm icaplarıyla yerine getirmesi kaçınılmaz hale gelmiştir.

Irak'ın, durumun vahametini idrak etmesi ve sorunun barış ortamı korunarak çözümünün önünü açması için, uluslararası toplumun kararlı tutumunu sürdürmesi büyük önem taşımaktadır.

Avrupa Birliği üyesi ülkeler ile aday ülkelerin 17-18 Şubat 2003 tarihlerinde Brüksel'de yaptığı ve Türkiye'nin de katıldığı zirve toplantısı ortak bildirisinde de vurgulandığı üzere, bu konuda sergilenecek kararlılık ve dayanışmanın yanı sıra somut ve fiilî askerî caydırıcılık tedbirlerinin alınması, Irak'ın bu konuda ikna edilebilmesinde çok etkili bir vasıta olacaktır.

135

58 inci Cumhuriyet Hükümeti, bu olumsuz gelişmelerin karşımıza çıkarabileceği bütün risklere ve ihtimallere karşı Türkiye'nin temel hak ve menfaatlarını korumak amacıyla, gereken bütün güvenlik tedbirlerini almakta ve uygulamaya koymaktadır.

Irak'a karşı askerî caydırıcılık tedbirleri kapsamında yabancı silahlı kuvvetler unsurlarının Türkiye'de geçici olarak konuşlandırılması için Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisinin izin ve yetki vermesi, bugünkü kriz ortamında munzam bir baskı unsuru olarak çok önemli ve etkili bir fonksiyon icra edecektir.

Aynı şekilde, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin, en kötü ihtimale karşı hazırlıklı olarak zamanında ve süratle hareket etmesini ve gerekli tedbirleri almasını sağlamak bakımından Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin yabancı ülkelere gönderilmesi konusunda Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisinin izninin alınması, hükümetin etkili bir siyaset izlemesini sağlamak açısından büyük önem taşıyacaktır.

Bu kuvvetlerin, gelişmelerin seyrine göre gerektiğinde kullanılmaları, hükümetin belirleyeceği esaslara ve bu konuda yapılacak düzenlemelere bağlı olacaktır.

Bu mülahazalarla; gereği, kapsamı, sınırı ve zamanı hükümetçe belirlenecek şekilde,

1- Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin yabancı ülkelere gönderilmesine ve bu kuvvetlerin gerektiğinde belirlenecek esaslar dairesinde kullanılmasına,

2- Uluslararası meşruiyet kuralları çerçevesinde, en fazla 62 000 askerî personelin ve hava unsurları olarak 255 uçak ve 65 helikopteri aşmamak kaydıyla yabancı silahlı kuvvetler unsurlarının, hükümetin tespit edeceği mücavir bölgelerde geçici olarak konuşlandırılmak üzere 6 ay süreyle Türkiye'de bulunmasına; bu amaçla Türkiye'ye gelecek yabancı kara kuvvetlerinden destek unsurları dışındaki muharip unsurların geçici olarak konuşlandırıldıkları bölgelerden Türkiye dışına intikallerinin en kısa sürede tamamlanması ve yabancı hava ve deniz kuvvetleri ile özel kuvvetler unsurlarının muhtemel bir harekâtta kullanılmalarını sağlayacak şekilde konuşlanmaları ve yabancı silahlı kuvvetlere mensup hava unsurlarının Türk hava sahasını üst uçuş amacıyla kullanmaları için gerekli düzenlemelerin yapılmasına; bu yabancı silahlı kuvvetlerin Türkiye'ye gelişiyle ilgili hazırlıkların yürütülmesine, Türkiye ülkesinde tabi olacakları statü ve Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleriyle işbirliği esas ve usullerine ilişkin düzenlemelerin hükümetin belirleyeceği esaslar çerçevesinde yapılmasına,

Anayasanın 92 nci maddesi uyarınca izin verilmesini arz ederim.

Abdullah Gül

Başbakan

APPENDIX C: 20 MARCH 2003 MOTION

Gereği kapsamı, sınırı ve zamanı Anayasanın 117 nci maddesine göre millî güvenliğin sağlanmasından ve silahlı kuvvetlerin yurt savunmasına hazırlanmasından Yüce Meclise karşı sorumlu bulunan hükümet tarafından belirlenecek şekilde, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin Kuzey Irak'a gönderilmesine; etkili bir caydırıcılığın sürdürülmesi amacıyla Kuzey Irak'ta bulunacak bu kuvvetlerin, gerektiğinde, belirlenecek esaslar dairesinde kullanılmasına ve muhtemel bir askerî harekât çerçevesinde yabancı silahlı kuvvetlere mensup hava unsurlarının Türk hava sahasını Türk makamları tarafından belirlenecek esaslara ve kurallara göre kullanmaları için gerekli düzenlemelerin hükümet tarafından yapılmasına Anayasanın 92 nci maddesi uyarınca 6 ay süreyle izin verilmesine ilişkin Başbakanlık tezkeresi (3/221)

Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Başkanlığına

Irak konusunda yaşanan gelişmeler ve hızla tırmanan gerginliğin Türkiye'nin karşısına çıkarması muhtemel güvenlik riskleri Yüce Meclisimiz tarafından hassasiyetle izlenmekte ve değerlendirilmektedir. Son dönemde Irak'a ilişkin gelişmeler, iki kez TBMM'nin gündemine gelmiş ve bütün yönleriyle tezekkür edilmiştir.

Bu çerçevede, TBMM'nin 6 Şubat 2003 tarihinde yapılan kapalı oturumunda, yaşanan olumsuz gelişmeler ışığında her ihtimale karşı hazırlıklı olunması bakımından gerekli güvenlik tedbirlerinin alınması amacıyla hükümete yetki verilmiş ve Irak'a karşı muhtemel bir askerî harekâtta kullanılabilecek askerî üs ve tesisler ile limanlarda altyapı geliştirme çalışmaları için Amerika Birleşik Devletlerine mensup teknik ve askerî personelin 3 ay süreyle Türkiye'de bulunmasına, Anayasanın 92 nci maddesi uyarınca izin verilmesi kararlaştırılmıştır.

Bunu takiben, 58 inci Cumhuriyet Hükümetinin sürdürdüğü hazırlık ve çalışmalar ile alınan tedbirler hakkında 25 Şubat 2003 tarihli ve 3/189 esas numaralı Başbakanlık tezkeresiyle Yüce Meclisimize bilgi sunulmuş ve tezkerede yer alan gerekçelerle Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin yabancı ülkelere gönderilmesine ve yabancı silahlı kuvvetlerin 6 ay süreyle Türkiye'de bulunmasına Anayasanın 92 nci maddesi uyarınca izin verilmesi Yüce Meclisimizin takdirlerine arz edilmiştir.

TBMM'nin 1 Mart 2003 tarihinde yapılan 39 uncu Birleşiminde Başbakanlık tezkeresi görüşülmüş, ancak yapılan oylamada, Anayasanın 96 ncı maddesinde öngörülen karar yetersayısı için gerekli salt çoğunluk sağlanamamıştır. Hükümetin bu konudaki talebi bu anlamda sonuçlandırılamamıştır.

Irak'a yönelik askerî müdahale konusunda yaşanan son gelişmeler artık geriye dönüşü imkânsız bir noktaya gelindiğini göstermektedir. Birleşmiş Milletler sürecinin de tüketilmesiyle barışçı çözüm çabaları sonuçsuz kalmış, askerî müdahale kaçınılmaz hale gelmiştir. Bugün gelinen aşamada Türkiye, Irak topraklarının topyekûn bir askerî harekât alanına dönüşeceği savaş durumu şartları ile karşı karşıyadır. Bunun sonucu Türkiye'nin güvenliğine yönelik tehdit ve riskler endişe verici boyutlar kazanmış ve ciddî biçimde ağırlaşmış bulunmaktadır.

Bu çerçevede, Kuzey Irak'ta barınmakta olan silahlı PKK/KADEK militanlarının kriz ortamından yararlanmak amacıyla faaliyetlerine hız verdikleri ve yeni tertipler içine girmeye çalıştıkları görülmektedir.

Bunun yanı sıra, Irak'ın etnik temelde parçalanmasına yol açacak siyasî oluşumlara zemin kazandırmak amacıyla sürdürülen çabaların yoğunluk kazandığı görülmektedir. Bu durum Irak'ın toprak bütünlüğünün ve millî birliğinin tehlikeye düşmesi ve bölgedeki diğer millî grupların güvenliğini de tehdit edebilecek bir istikrarsızlık ortamının ortaya çıkması riskini de beraberinde getirmektedir.

Öte yandan, Irak'a muhtemel askerî bir müdahalenin ortaya çıkarması beklenen Türkiye'ye yönelebilecek toplu nüfus hareketlerinin sınırlarımızın ötesinde insani destek toplama bölgelerinde durdurulması, yerlerinden edilmiş kişilerin insanî yardım ihtiyaçlarının yerinde karşılanması ve harekât sonrası geldikleri bölgelere geri dönmeleri için gerekli tedbirlerin zamanında ve etkin biçimde alınması büyük önem taşımaktadır. Büyük sayıda göçmen ve sığınmacının Türkiye'ye yönelebileceği göz önünde bulundurularak bu konudaki ihtimaliyat planlaması yapılmış ve kriz yönetimi mekanizmalarının süratle harekete geçirilmesi için gerekli son hazırlıklar da tamamlanmıştır.

Türkiye'nin güvenliği için ciddî bir tehdit potansiyeli taşıyan bütün bu olumsuz gelişmelere karşı etkili bir caydırıcılığın sürdürülebilmesi evvelemirde Kuzey Irak'taki fiilî askerî mevcudiyetimize bağlı olacaktır. Aynı şekilde, göçün önlenebilmesi için ileri bir hatta gerekli tedbirlerin alınabilmesi de bölgede askerî mevcudiyetimizi gerekli kılmaktadır.

Türkiye'nin Kuzey Irak'taki caydırıcı askerî mevcudiyetinin amacı ve fonksiyonu bu temel hedeflerin gerçekleştirilmesiyle sınırlı olacaktır. Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri unsurları mecbur kalmadıkça Irak Silahlı Kuvvetleriyle bir çatışmaya girmeyecek, bölgede buna uygun olarak konuşlandırılacaktır. Aynı şekilde, bölgedeki

geçici askerî mevcudiyetimiz Kuzey Irak'taki millî grupların güvenliği için de munzam bir teminat teşkil edecektir.

Öte yandan, Irak'ın Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi kararlarına uygun olarak silahsızlandırılması için askerî harekâta katılacak ülkelere sağlanacak destek ve kolaylıklar konusunda bir karar alınması da önem ve müstaceliyet kazanmıştır. Bu çerçevede, başta NATO üyesi ülkeler olmak üzere birçok ülke, müttefik hava kuvvetleri unsurlarının millî hava sahalarını bu amaçla kullanmalarına izin vermiş bulunmaktadır.

Şartların süratle değiştiği dinamik bir süreç sonrası gelinen bugünkü aşamada ortaya çıkan fiili durum ve yeni şartlar ışığında, yeni bir değerlendirme yapılması kaçınılmaz hale gelmiştir. 59 uncu Cumhuriyet Hükümeti, bu yeni durum ve şartlar karşısında, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin Kuzey Irak'a gönderilmesi ve bu aşamada yabancı silahlı kuvvetler hava unsurlarının, muhtemel bir askerî harekât çerçevesinde Türk hava sahasını kullanmalarına izin verilmesinin Yüce Meclisimiz tarafından tezekkür edilmesinin yerinde olacağı sonucuna varmıştır.

Bu mülahazalarla; gereği, kapsamı, sınırı ve zamanı Anayasanın 117 nci maddesine göre millî güvenliğin sağlanmasından ve silahlı kuvvetlerin yurt savunmasına hazırlanmasından Yüce Meclise karşı sorumlu bulunan hükümet tarafından belirlenecek şekilde Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin Kuzey Irak'a gönderilmesine; etkili bir caydırıcılığın sürdürülmesi amacıyla Kuzey Irak'ta bulunacak bu kuvvetlerin gerektiğinde belirlenecek esaslar dairesinde kullanılmasına ve muhtemel bir askerî harekât çerçevesinde yabancı silahlı kuvvetlere mensup hava unsurlarının Türk hava sahasını Türk makamları tarafından belirlenecek esaslara ve kurallara göre kullanmaları için gerekli düzenlemelerin hükümet tarafından yapılmasına, Anayasanın 92 nci maddesi uyarınca 6 ay süreyle izin verilmesini arz ederim.

<div align="right">Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Başbakan</div>

APPENDIX D: 7 OCTOBER 2003 MOTION

Gereği, kapsamı, sınırı ve zamanı hükümet tarafından belirlenecek şekilde Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri unsurlarının Irak'ta güvenlik ve istikrara katkı yapmak amacıyla Irak'a gönderilmesine ve bu kuvvetlerin görev ve kullanılmasına ilişkin gerekli düzenlemelerin hükümet tarafından yapılmasına Anayasanın 92 nci maddesi uyarınca bir yıl süreyle izin verilmesine ilişkin Başbakanlık tezkeresi (3/361)

Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Başkanlığına

Koalisyon güçlerinin Irak'a yönelik askerî harekatının sona ermesiyle Irak'ta yeni bir döneme girilmiştir. Baas rejiminin devrilmesi, Irak halkının bu acı geçmişi geride bırakarak ümit ve güvenle bakacağı huzurlu bir gelecek inşa etmesi imkânını beraberinde getirmiştir.

Türkiye, ortak bir tarihi ve coğrafyayı paylaştığı, Türk Milletiyle yakın dostluk, kardeşlik ve akrabalık bağları olan Irak Halkının güç dönemlerinde her zaman yanında olmuş, kendilerine her desteği sağlamıştır.

Bugün, Irak Halkı, tarihinin çok güç bir döneminden geçmekte, millî devletini kurma sürecinde sancılı bir geçiş dönemi yaşamaktadır. Uzun yıllar otoriter bir rejimin baskısı altında ve Birleşmiş Milletler müeyyidelerinin ağır ve olumsuz şartlarında yaşayan ve büyük sıkıntılar çeken kardeş Irak halkı, bugün de askerî müdahale sonrası dönemin acılarına ve sıkıntılarına katlanmak durumuyla karşı karşıya kalmıştır.

Bu sancılı dönemin mümkün olabilecek en kısa sürede aşılması ve bunun için gerekli ortamın ve şartların hazırlanması büyük önem taşımaktadır.

Hükümetimiz, bu amaçla Irak'a ihtiyaç duyduğu yardım ve desteğin verilmesinin uluslararası camianın ortak görev ve sorumluluğu olduğu düşüncesindedir.

Bugün hüküm süren şartlarda, ülkede güvenliğin sağlanarak istikrar ortamının tedricen tesisi en acil konudur. Irak Halkının temel ihtiyaçlarının karşılanması, altyapı hizmetlerinin ihyası ve merkezî ve mahallî yönetim birimlerinin işlerlik kazanmasının temini, çok büyük ölçüde, ülkedeki kargaşa ve kaos ortamının sona erdirilmesine bağlıdır.

Irak'taki durum, uluslararası camia için ciddî bir endişe kaynağı olmayı sürdürmektedir. Askerî harekât sonrası dönemde olumsuz şartların düzelmesi yönünde kaydedilen bazı gelişmelere rağmen, Irak'taki durum, uluslararası barış ve güvenlik için tehdit teşkil etme niteliğini korumaktadır.

Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyinin 22 Mayıs 2003 tarihli 1483 sayılı Kararında da bu tespit yapılmış ve bu durum karşısında Birleşmiş Milletler üyesi ülkeler Irak'ta istikrar ve güvenlik şartlarının oluşmasına katkıda bulunmaya ve Irak Halkına ülkenin yeniden inşai için destek vermeye davet edilmiştir.

Komşumuz Irak'ta yaşanan gelişmeler ve Irak'ın geleceği Türkiye'yi doğal olarak yakından ilgilendirmektedir.

Irak'ın toprak bütünlüğünün ve millî birliğinin korunması, Irak toplumunu oluşturan tüm millî grupların ve tüm Irak vatandaşlarının temel hak ve hürriyetlerini teminat altına alacak yeni demokratik Irak'ın tesisi, Türkiye için de hayatî önem taşımaktadır.

Irak'ta kalıcı bir istikrar ortamının kurularak Irak Halkının kendi geleceğini demokratik ve barışçı yollarla belirlemesine imkân verilmesi ve Irak'ta egemenlik yetkilerini tam olarak kullanacak, Irak Halkını temsil niteliğini taşıyan ve uluslararası standartları karşılayan bir hükümetin oluşturulması ve bu suretle bu geçiş sürecinin en kısa sürede tamamlanması, Türkiye'nin en samimî arzusu ve temennisidir.

Irak'ın, toprak bütünlüğünü koruyacak, millî birliğini ve dayanışmasını güçlendirecek yeni bir siyasî yapıya kavuşması ve etkili bir demokratik sistemin bütün icaplarıyla ve kurumlarıyla oluşturulması, uluslararası toplumun, bölge ülkelerinin ve tüm Iraklıların çıkarına olacaktır. Irak'ın bölgemizde bir istikrar unsuru olarak barış ve güvenliğe katkıda bulunması da esasen buna bağlıdır. İçinden geçilen bugünkü hassas dönemde herkesin sorumluluk duygusuyla azamî dikkat ve ihtiyatla hareket etmesi, bu bakımdan büyük önem arz etmektedir.

Irak'ın millî devlet inşa etme sürecinde, Irak'ın kurucu halkı olan Arap, Kürt, Türkmen ve Asuriler etkili bir rol oynamalı, hiçbir millî gruba imtiyazlı bir statü verilmemeli ve tüm millî gruplara bu sürece eşit statüde katılma imkânı tanınmalıdır.

Irak'ın yeni siyasî ve anayasal yapısı da, tüm millî grupların meşru endişe ve beklentilerini karşılayacak şekilde belirlenmelidir. Birleşik ve demokratik Irak'ın, millî bütünlüğünün zedelenmemesinde ve devlet yapılarının sağlam esaslar üzerine bina edilmesinde bu temel husus tayin edici olacaktır.

Tüm Irak Halkını bir bütün olarak kucaklayan Türkiye, bu geçiş sürecinde Irak'ta güvenli bir geleceğin inşa edilmesi için gerekli ortam ve şartların hazırlanmasının en öncelikli konu olduğuna inanmaktadır. Irak'ta hüküm süren kaos ortamının açılamaması ve güvenlik şartlarının daha da ağırlaşmasının, sonuçları kestirilemeyecek kalıcı ve çok olumsuz etkileri olabilecektir. Ülkenin, millî birliğinin ve toprak bütünlüğünün korunmasını

güçleştirecek ve sosyal dokusunun tahrip olmasına yol açacak tehlikeli bir mecraya sürüklenme riskinin bertaraf edilmesi, bu bakımdan hayatî önem taşımaktadır.

Öte yandan, Irak'ın güvenliğinin, Türkiye'nin güvenliği üzerinde çok yönlü ve doğrudan etkileri olduğu da acı tecrübelerle sabit bir gerçektir. Türkiye, bölgedeki gelişmelerden ve özellikle ve öncelikle Irak'taki durumdan kaynaklanan güvenlik tehdit ve risklerine uzun yıllar maruz kalmış, bu mücadelede ağır bir bedel ödemiştir.

Bu bakımdan, Türkiye'nin millî birliğini ve toprak bütünlüğünü hedef alan terör unsurlarının Irak'ta yuvalanmalarının önlenmesi, Türkiye için birinci öncelikli hayatî bir konudur. Bu amaçla, Irak'ın PKK/KADEK terör unsurlarından temizlenmesinde ve Irak topraklarının ileride teröristler için melce olmaktan çıkarılması için gerekli tüm tedbirlerin alınmasında Türkiye kesin kararlıdır.

Bu konudaki haklı güvenlik endişelerimiz, başta ABD olmak üzere, koalisyon güçleri tarafından da iyi bilinmekte ve anlaşılmaktadır.

PKK/KADEK terör örgütünün Irak'tan tasfiyesi ve buradan kaynaklanan terör tehdidinin kesin olarak bertaraf edilmesi konusunda ABD ile resmî görüşmeler başlatılmıştır. Bu görüşmelerde, PKK/KADEK'in Kuzey Irak'tan tasfiyesi konusundaki ortak anlayış birliği teyit edilmiş ve bu amaçla alınacak tedbirler üzerinde durulmuştur. 59 uncu cumhuriyet hükümeti, başlatılan bu sürecin tüm etkili tedbirler alınarak ortak hedefler doğrultusunda ilerletilmesi ve sonuçlandırılmasında kararlıdır.

Hükümetimizin Irak'taki duruma ve geçiş sürecinde yaşanan gelişmelere bakış açısını şekillendiren temel düşünceler bunlardır. Bu sürecin mümkün olacak en kısa sürede tamamlanması ve Irak'ta kalıcı bir güvenlik ve istikrar ortamının tesisi, Türkiye'nin temel çıkarlarının da bir icabı olarak görülmektedir.

İçinde yaşadığı hassas ve sorunlu bölgede barış ve güvenliğin hüküm sürmesi için çok yönlü çaba sarf eden Türkiye'nin, istikrar unsuru bir bölge ülkesi olarak kendi güvenliğini ve temel çıkarlarını da haleldar edecek gelişmelere karşı kayıtsız ve ilgisiz kalması, basiretli ve sorumlu bir siyasî yaklaşım olmayacaktır.

Bu nedenlerle, Türkiye'nin Irak'ta güvenlik ve istikrar şartlarının oluşturulması ve Irak'ın yeniden yapılandırılmasında üzerine düşen yardım, katkı ve desteği vermesi kaçınılmaz bir millî sorumluluk olarak görülmelidir.

Bu düşüncelerle hareket eden 59 uncu cumhuriyet hükümeti, bu ilke ve amaçlar doğrultusunda, Türkiye'nin çokuluslu güçlerin bir parçası olarak Irak'ta istikrar ve güvenlik harekâtına askerî güç katkısında bulunmasının yerinde ve gerekli olacağı sonucuna varmış ve bu amaçla Anayasanın 92 nci maddesi uyarınca Yüce Meclisimizden izin istenmesini kararlaştırmıştır.

Yüce Meclisimizin bu konuda vereceği karara bağlı olarak, Irak'taki İstikrar Gücüne fiilî katkımızın askerî ve teknik diğer veçheleri ile siyasî çerçevesinin belirlenmesi amacıyla başlatılmış olan temas ve çalışmalar, hükümetin vereceği görev ve yetki çerçevesinde ilgili kuruluşlarımızca sonuçlandırılacak ve bu konulardaki gerekli düzenlemeler somut esaslara bağlanacaktır.

Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri sorumluluk bölgesinde kendi millî komuta yapısı içinde görev yapacaktır.

Bu konularda üzerinde mutabık kalınacak esaslar ışığında Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin görevlendirilmesinin kararlaştırılması halinde, Irak'taki geçici askerî mevcudiyetimizin amacı ve misyonu, sadece güvenlik ve istikrara katkı göreviyle sınırlı kalmayacaktır. İstikrar Gücüne katkımızın askerî boyutunun yanı sıra, önemli bir siyasî ve insanî boyutu da olacaktır. Silahlı Kuvvetlerimiz, kamu düzeninin sağlanması, insanî yardım ve ekonomik yapının yeniden düzenlenmesi ve gelişmesine destek verme görevlerini de icra edecektir.

Bu çerçevede, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri unsurlarımız, Irak'ta, güvenlik ve istikrarın teminatı bir barış askeri olarak görev yapacaktır. Kardeş Irak Halkına barış, güvenlik, huzur ve hizmet götürmek için Irak'a gidecektir. Etnik köken, din ve mezhep ve geçmiş siyasî eğilimler temelinde herhangi bir ayırım yapmaksızın tüm Irak Halkını bir bütün olarak kucaklayacaktır.

Silahlı Kuvvetlerimiz, ülkedeki işgal durumunun sürdürülmesine yardımcı ve bu durumun bir aracı, bir askerî unsur olarak Irak'a gitmeyecek, aksine, ülkede durumun süratle normalleşmesine ve güvenli ve istikrarlı bir ortamda Irak Halkının insanî ihtiyaçlarının karşılanmasına faal katkı yapacak bir unsur olacaktır. Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin Irak'ta bu anlayışla görev yapması, ülkenin toprak bütünlüğünün, siyasî ve millî birliğinin de teminatını teşkil edecektir.

Irak'ın yeniden yapılanması sürecinde her alanda katkı yapmaya hazır olan Türkiye'nin, İstikrar Gücü kapsamında Irak'taki geçici askerî mevcudiyetinin amacı, fonksiyonu ve gerçekleştirmeye çalışacağı temel hedefler bu çerçeve içinde kalacaktır. Türkiye'nin, Irak'ta, bunun dışında bir gündemi bulunmamaktadır.

Silahlı Kuvvetlerimizin Bosna, Kosova ve Afganistan'daki örnek başarıları, feragat ve fedakârlıkla sergilediği üstün görev anlayışı, Irak'taki misyonunun başarısının da güvencesi olarak görülmektedir.

59 uncu cumhuriyet hükümetinin Irak'a ilişkin siyasî vizyonu ışığında, İstikrar Gücüne fiilî katkıda bulunulması konusundaki değerlendirmesine yön veren temel mülahazalar bunlardır. Bölgemizde yaşanan gelişmeler karşısında ve Irak'ın içinden geçmekte olduğu bu tarihî dönemeçte, Türkiye'nin millî çıkarlarını uzun

vadeli bir perspektif içinde gözeten bir bakış açısı geliştirilmesinin gerekli olduğuna inanan hükümetimiz, Irak'ta hüküm süren belirsizlik ortamı ve olumsuz şartlar ile arazideki güvenlik risk ve tehlikelerine rağmen, bu konuda yaptığı çok yönlü ve mukayeseli değerlendirme ışığında askerî katkıda bulunulmasının, Türkiye'nin bölgesel bir güç olarak taşıdığı sorumlulukların bir icabı olacağı sonucuna varmıştır.

Bu düşüncelerle, gereği, kapsamı, sınırı ve zamanı hükümet tarafından belirlenecek şekilde Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri unsurlarının Irak'ta güvenlik ve istikrara katkı yapmak amacıyla Irak'a gönderilmesine ve bu kuvvetlerin görev ve kullanılmasına ilişkin gerekli düzenlemelerin hükümet tarafından yapılmasına Anayasanın 92 nci maddesi uyarınca bir yıl süreyle izin verilmesini arz ederim.

<div style="text-align:center">

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

Başbakan

</div>

APPENDIX D: 17 OCTOBER 2007 MOTION:

Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin, bir yıl süreyle, Irak'ın kuzeyinden ülkemize yönelik terör tehdidinin ve saldırıların bertaraf edilmesi amacıyla, sınır ötesi harekât ve müdahalede bulunmak üzere, Irak'ın PKK teröristlerinin yuvalandıkları kuzey bölgesi ile mücavir alanlara gönderilmesine ve görevlendirilmesine Anayasa'nın 92'nci maddesi uyarınca izin verilmesine dair Başbakanlık tezkeresi (3/199)

Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Başkanlığına

Türkiye, Irak'ın kuzey bölgesinde yuvalanmış bulunan PKK terör unsurlarından kaynaklanan ve halkının huzur ve güvenliğiyle ülkesinin millî birliğine, güvenliğine ve toprak bütünlüğüne yöneltilmiş ciddi bir terörist saldırı ve açık bir tehditle karşı karşıyadır.

Dost ve kardeş Irak'ın toprak bütünlüğünün, millî birliğinin ve istikrarının korunmasına büyük önem atfeden Türkiye, PKK teröristlerinin Irak'ın kuzeyindeki mevcudiyetine ve faaliyetlerine son verilmesini sağlamak amacıyla uzunca bir süredir yoğun siyasi ve diplomatik girişimlerde ve uyarılarda bulunmuştur. Bu çabalarımızdan istenilen sonuçların alınması bugüne kadar mümkün olmamıştır.

Türkiye'ye yönelik terörist saldırılar ve tehdide karşı, terörizmle mücadelenin bir parçası olarak uluslararası hukuk çerçevesinde gerekli tedbirleri almak üzere, hudut, şümul, miktar ve zamanı Hükûmetçe belirlenecek şekilde, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri unsurlarının, Irak'ın kuzeyinden ülkemize yönelik terör tehdidinin ve saldırılarının bertaraf edilmesi amacıyla, sınır ötesi harekât ve müdahalede bulunmak üzere, Irak'ın PKK teröristlerinin yuvalandıkları kuzey bölgesi ile mücavir alanlara gönderilmesine ve görevlendirilmesine Anayasa'nın 92 nci maddesi uyarınca bir yıl süreye izin verilmesini arz ederim.

Recep Tayyip ERDOĞAN

Başbakan