

OLD GAME IN A NEW WORLD:
TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES FROM CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

AYŞE ÖMÜR ATMACA

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

MARCH 2011

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. İhsan Dağı (METU, IR) _____

Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık (METU, IR) _____

Prof. Dr. Çağrı Erhan (AU, IR) _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Lerna Yanık (BU, POLS) _____

Assist. Prof. Dr. Tuba Ünlü Bilgiç (METU, IR) _____

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last Name : Ayşe Ömür Atmaca

Signature :

ABSTRACT

OLD GAME IN A NEW WORLD: TURKEY AND THE UNITED STATES FROM CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE

Atmaca, Ayşe Ömür

Ph.D., Department of International Relations

Supervisor : Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık

March 2011, 292 pages

The main objective of this dissertation is to analyze Turkish-American relationship from critical perspective. In this study critical geopolitics is used to examine the US policymakers' discourses over representations of Turkey. Drawing on the theoretical literature, this dissertation took geopolitics as a deeply ideological concept and analyzed the ways in which US geopolitical discourse has shaped the Turkish-American relationship over time. The study outlined the historical evolution of the concept of the geopolitics since the end of the 19th century in order to reveal the limits of the classical geopolitical understanding, and to provide a theoretical framework against which the modern geopolitical imagination of the US has been formulated. Second, it revealed the ideological roots and the main characteristics of American geopolitical discourse. And third, the study applied critical geopolitics to the case of Turkish-American relations with respect to how the imagined geography of Turkey and the alliance have been shaped by the foreign and security policies of the US. Cold War, post-Cold War and post-September 11 periods are analyzed in separate chapters of this study. It is also argued in this dissertation that Turkey generally fits the geopolitical design of the United States and that these two countries have cooperated on numerous efforts in different parts of the world both during and after the Cold War. However, in this period the

two allies also experienced several problems that display the limits of US geopolitical discourse.

Keywords: US Foreign Policy, Turkish-American Relations, Geopolitical Discourse, Critical Geopolitics

ÖZ

YENİ DÜNYADA ESKİ OYUN: ELEŞTİREL BAKIŞLA TÜRK-AMERİKAN İLİŞKİLERİ

Atmaca, Ayşe Ömür

Doktora, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi : Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık

Mart 2011, 292 sayfa

Bu tezin temel amacı Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerini eleştirel bakışla analiz etmektir. Çalışmada, ABD siyaset yapıcılarının Türkiye'nin temsili üzerine söylemlerini incelemekte eleştirel jeopolitik kuramı kullanılmaktadır. Kuramsal literatür çerçevesinde bu tez jeopolitiği ideolojik bir kavram olarak ele almakta ve ABD jeopolitik söyleminin zaman içerisinde Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerini etkileme yollarını analiz etmektedir. Bu çalışma klasik jeopolitik anlayışın sınırlarını göstermek amacıyla jeopolitik kavramının 19. yy'dan itibaren tarihsel gelişimini özetlemekte ve modern ABD jeopolitik tahayyülünün biçimlendirilmesi karşısında kuramsal bir çerçeve çizmektedir. İkinci olarak çalışma Amerikan jeopolitik söyleminin ideolojik kökenlerini ve ana özelliklerini göstermektedir. Üçüncü olarak, çalışma eleştirel jeopolitik kuramını Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri örneğine Türkiye'nin tahayyül edilmiş coğrafyasının ve ittifakın ABD dış politikası ve güvenlik politikası tarafından nasıl şekillendirildiği hususunda uygulamaktadır. Soğuk Savaş, Soğuk Savaş sonrası ve 11 Eylül sonrası dönemler bu çalışmanın ayrı bölümlerinde incelenmektedir. Bu tezde ayrıca Türkiye'nin ABD jeopolitik kurgusuna uyduğu ve iki ülkenin Soğuk Savaş ve sonrası dönemlerde dünyanın farklı yerlerinde çeşitli olaylarda işbirliği yaptığı ileri

sür÷lmektedir. Ancak bu süreçte iki müttefik ABD jeopolitik söyleminin sınırlarının çizildiđi çeşitli sorunlar da yaşamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: ABD Dış Politikası, Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri, Jeopolitik Söylem, Eleştirel Jeopolitik

Serkan'a...
Beni dipsiz kuyularda merdivensiz bırakmadığı için...
Sinan'ı bana getirdiği için....

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Writing this dissertation was a long journey for me. I experienced both most difficult and most beautiful days of my life during this period. While only my name appears on the cover of this dissertation, so many people have contributed to its production. Of course trying to thank everybody is not possible. I owe my indebtedness to all those people who have made this dissertation possible.

My deepest gratitude is to my thesis supervisor Meliha Altunışık for her invaluable comments and advices. Her patience and support helped me overcome many crises and finish this dissertation. Not only her valuable academic advices, but also her positive attitudes in general made me feel relaxed in that difficult period. I am sure that without her, completing this dissertation would not have been possible. Teşekkürler hocam...

I also want to express my acknowledgements to my thesis committee, Prof. Dr. İhsan Dağı, Prof. Dr. Çağrı Erhan and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Lerna Yanık and Assist. Prof. Dr. Tuğba Ünlü for their patience and comments on the thesis.

I am gratefully indebted to my husband Serkan and my son Sinan. As for my husband Serkan, who has helped me in numerous ways, I find it difficult to express my appreciation. He is my best friend and also an amazing husband and father. We have laughed, cried, traveled, built, settled, planned and discussed our lives. Without his unending love and support, I would be lost. He has shared this long and sleepless journey with me, and its completion is as much his achievement as it is mine. I dedicate this dissertation to him. My dearest miracle, Sinan also deserves special thanks. He is a gift to our life. His joy and bright little smile always kept me in life context. He gives me a new purpose of life, so proud to be his mother. Nothing in a simple paragraph can express the love I have for the two of you. Home is wherever you are.

Of course, this work would have not been possible without the love, unconditional support and patience of my family. My dearest parents Sevim-Nihat Bostan, my sister Özlem Pektaş, my brother İlker Bostan and their families have

been a constant source of love, concern, support and strength all these years. I am completely indebted to them. My parents in-law, Yüksel-Yaşar Atmaca and my dearest grandmother Fatma Atmaca, sister-in law Ayşen İnan and her family, have also supported and encouraged me throughout this way. I appreciate the generosity and understanding of them. My dearest aunts Selver Sisli and Serpil Söyleriz, thank you for their endless emotional support.

I am also indebted to Prof. Dr. Benjamin Fordham and Binghamton University Department of Political Science for providing me with an opportunity to spend an academic semester at Binghamton. I should also express my thanks here to Katherine Krebs, the Director of the International Student Office and Oktay Şekercisoy, Coordinator of the Dual Diploma program in Binghamton University for their kindness, friendship and assistance.

I am very grateful to the people of METU Department of International Relations whose friendship, tolerance and support have made it more than a temporary place of work for me.

Many friends have helped me stay sane through these difficult years. I greatly value their friendship and I deeply appreciate their belief in me. My dearest friend Özlem Tür, thank you for your endless support, encouragement and wonderful friendship in my long journey. My special thanks also go to my dearest roommates Ahu Şenses, Funda Hülagü and Gülriz Şen for tolerating and encouraging me. I will never forget those lunches and our wonderful academic, non-academic, political and "geyik" conversations. During my painful period you girls were lifesavers! I also thank my other roommates Gülşen Şeker and Yasemin Atalay. Thank you for tolerating and helping me. My dearest terrible twins, Dilaver Arıkan Açar and Şadan İnan Rüma, thank you for your continued encouragement and friendship. It was really wonderful to work with you. I also thank Özgehan-Diana Şenyuva, Sait Akşit and Tuğrul Çağrı Öztürk for their support and encouragement. Asu Deniz and Tuba Erkuş, thank you girls for your encouragement, support and most of all your humor. I also thank my colleagues at

the Graduate School of Social Sciences Nezihe Bařak Ergin and Esra Can for their help and beautiful smiles.

I am also grateful to Zana ıtak, Bařak Kale and all other colleagues at the Department of International Relations. Thank you for creating a very positive atmosphere that makes it easier to withstand the difficulties that sometimes arise.

Special thanks go to my dearest friend Jane Jopling for their wonderful friendship and support both in Azerbaijan and in the United States. I am really lucky to know her and work with her. I will never forget her incredible hospitality in NYC when I was really desperate. Of course I also thank Linda Zurbruegg and Bundy team for opening their hearts and sharing our life in Binghamton. Thanks also Sanem-Saygın Salgırılı for their wonderful friendship in those cold and boring days. Azad, Nilay, Gölru and Deniz, thank you guys for being there. Special thanks go to Zeynep Civcık and Ceren Ergen for beautiful times we spent in Boston. I am also indebted to Sarı family for their hospitality in Washington D.C.

I owe my gratitude to Mertol Family and Özok Family who always supported me and believed in me in this period. And also dearest Gölur Aras, thank you also for taking care of my little son in my last painful year. I am also grateful to Prof. Dr. Kaan Sönmez for saving my son's life. Special thanks go to Janine Su for her wonderful proofreading and advice. Here I should also express my gratitude to producers of House M.D, and Behzat . for bringing fun to my life.

Finally, I appreciate the financial support from TÜBİTAK and Middle East Technical University Scientific Research Project Office (BAP) that funded this dissertation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZ.....	vi
DEDICATION.....	viii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS	xii
LIST OF TABLES	xv
LIST OF FIGURES	xvi
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	12
2.1 Introduction.....	12
2.2 Brief Literature Review	14
2.2.1 Theories of geopolitics.....	14
2.2.1.1 Classical geopolitics	16
2.2.1.2 Cold War geopolitics	24
2.2.1.3 New world order geopolitics	32
2.2.2 Critical geopolitics: A need for an alternative approach?	36
2.3 Conclusion.....	42
3. COLD WAR YEARS: AN ILLUSION OF GEOPOLITICS?.....	44
3.1 Introduction.....	44
3.2 US Foreign Policy during the Cold War	48
3.3 Political Developments.....	55
3.3.1 Historical roots of the relations.....	55

3.3.2 Question of the Turkish straits and the beginning of the relations	59
3.3.3 Truman doctrine	63
3.3.4 Korean war and NATO.....	69
3.3.5 U-2 affair and Jupiter missile crisis	72
3.3.6 Opium problem.....	74
3.3.7 Turkey and the United States in the Middle East.....	75
3.4 Military Relations.....	80
3.5 Limits of the Alliance: Cyprus Problem	89
3.6 Conclusion.....	100
4. END OF THE COLD WAR: A SEARCH FOR NEW IDENTITIES?	102
4.1 Introduction.....	102
4.2 US Foreign Policy in the 1990s	106
4.3 Different political imaginations of Turkey	116
4.3.1 Turkey as a "Strategic Base" or a "Strategic Ally".....	116
4.3.1.1 Political dimension	116
4.3.1.2 Military dimension.....	130
4.3.2 Turkey as an "Energy Bridge"	137
4.3.3 Turkey as a "Bridge" between the East and the West.....	143
4.3.4 Turkey as a "Model" country	147
4.4 Limits of the Alliance: Kurdish Issue.....	151
4.5 Conclusion	154
5. AFTER SEPTEMBER 11: FRIENDS OR FOES?	156
5.1 Introduction.....	156
5.2 The US Foreign Policy after September 11	159

5.3 Different Geopolitical Imaginations of Turkey.....	169
5.3.1 Turkey as a "Strategic Ally"	169
5.3.1.1 Political dimension	169
5.3.1.2 Military dimension.....	183
5.3.4 Turkey as an "Energy Bridge"	189
5.3.5 Turkey as a "Bridge" between the East and the West.....	193
5.3.6 Turkey as a "Model" Country.....	199
5.4 Limits of the Alliance: Iraqi/Kurdish Issue.....	204
5.5 Conclusion	212
6. CONCLUSIONS	214
REFERENCES	221
APPENDICES	
A. CURRICULUM VITAE.....	274
B. TURKISH SUMMARY	275

LIST OF TABLES

TABLES

Table 3.1 US Military Bases in Turkey During the Cold War.....	84
Table 4.1 Total Dollar Value of U.S. Arms Deliveries to Turkey through the Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Programs from FY 1950 to 1998	133
Table 5.1: US Military Assistance to Turkey (2001-2008)	186

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURES

Figure 2.1 Mackinder's Pivotal Area	20
Figure 2.2 Map of German Agression between 1936-1939	23
Figure 3.1 Map of the Cold War	50
Figure 3.2 Spykman's Rimland Map.....	52
Figure 3.3 Map of Treaty of Lausanne.....	58
Figure 3.4 Cold War Military Alliances.....	72
Figure 3.5 Cyprus Map after Turkish Military Intervention of 1974	95
Figure 4.1 Map of the Balkan States.....	128
Figure 4.2 Map of Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan Pipeline.....	143
Figure 4.3 Map of the No-Fly Zone.....	152
Figure 5.1 Map of the Iraq War	180
Figure 5.2 Map of the Energy Routes	192

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"All knowledge that is about human society, and not about the natural world, is historical knowledge, and therefore rests upon judgment and interpretation. This is not to say that facts or data are nonexistent, but that facts get their importance from what is made of them in interpretation... for interpretations depend very much on who the interpreter is, who he or she is addressing, what his or her purpose is, at what historical moment the interpretation takes place."

Edward W. Said¹

The Cold War has been accepted as a grand geopolitical narrative, one on which two superpowers shape the world politics, justifying their expansionist actions to each other. As a consequence of this superpower rivalry, Turkish-American "strategic" relations were established at the beginning of the Cold War with Turkey being prized a huge amount of American military and economic aid as a part of the US policy of containment to protect itself against the "communist threat". Thereafter, Turkey became a valuable ally to the United States and a significant "barrier" against Soviet expansionism during the Cold War. When the Cold War ended, the United States, as the only remaining superpower, declared its new geopolitical manifestation: The New World Order. In this new geopolitical narrative, Turkey retained its significance as a strategic ally helping to bring stability to the Balkans and Somalia, and to combat terrorism and political threats from such "rogue" states like Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Such metaphors like "model" or "bridge" also started to be used by the US officials in reference to Turkey.

However, the September 11 attacks and subsequent developments are accepted as important milestones in this relationship. After Afghanistan, Iraq became the primary target of the United States as a part of its fight against international terrorism. Turkey, as a northern neighbor of Iraq and a strategic ally

¹ Edward Said, *Covering Islam*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981), p. 154.

to the United States found itself in the middle of the war plans of the United States. However, despite the intense pressures by both the US military and the government on the Turkish administration, Turkey unexpectedly forced a change in US war strategy just prior the invasion. On March 1, 2003, the Turkish parliament refused to allow the US military to begin the invasion of Iraq from Turkish territory. Turkey's failure to support the United States in the war has called into question the future of its relationship with the United States. Thus, it is generally argued that, especially after 2003, the Turkish-American relationship has lost its strength of the past.

Inspired by the ideas of Foucault and Said, Gearóid Ó Tuathail argues that geopolitics is a form of power-knowledge relationship that aims to analyze the condition of world power in order to help the practice of statecraft by great powers.² Flint also argues that geopolitics is a tool of "seeing" the world, it is more than competition over territory.³ Here, it is important to stress the role of language in foreign policy making. Accordingly, geopolitical discourses are constructed for states by particular institutions and political forces in order to maintain their power or gain more power in world politics.⁴

In studying how Turkey imagined in US geopolitical discourse and in discussions on Turkish-American relationship, it has historically been argued that Turkey has a "strategic" location between the Western and the Eastern blocs, serving as a "military base" in the Middle East; is as an "energy bridge" between Europe and the oil rich regions such as Eurasia and the Middle East; and it is a "political and cultural bridge between the West and the Islamic world". In fact, US administrations take these geopolitical categories as natural and objective in determining Turkey's geopolitical practices. However, these geopolitical discourses of the United States define Turkey as *a pivot country, a bridge, a barrier, a*

2 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics*, (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 1.

3 Colin Flint, *Introduction to Geopolitics*, (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 13.

4 John Agnew, *Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics*, (2nd ed.), (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 2-3.

crossroad, an energy corridor, a model, an ally, a Western, a Middle Eastern, or a Mediterranean state in different periods of time.

Within this framework, this dissertation critically reassesses the Turkish-US relationship and intends to provide a framework for analyzing how the United States imagined Turkey in different periods of time. In this thesis, critical geopolitics is used to analyze the US policymakers' discourses over representations of Turkey. The main focus is based on the assumption that Turkish-American relations are directly influenced and shaped by the geopolitical discourses of the United States. Two aspects of this relationship will be explored. The first is to understand the main characteristics of the geopolitical relationship between the two countries. This is closely linked to the US government's perception of its own spheres of influence. Accordingly, the issue of "locating Turkey" has been defined, shaped, redefined or changed by the US policy-makers to justify their policy actions. Moreover, this study also attempts to demonstrate the differing meanings of the same metaphors in over time. For example, while the US had perceived Turkey as a "Western" and "secular" "model" for the Central Asian states in 1990s, particularly after the September 11 attacks, this "model" metaphor was used by the United States to define Turkey as a "moderate Islamic" country for the Middle Eastern states. The second aspect concerns possible explanations for crises between the two countries in different periods of time.

It is argued in this dissertation that Turkey generally fits the geopolitical design of the United States and that these two countries have cooperated on numerous efforts in different parts of the world both during and after the Cold War. US's geopolitical calculations have been the primary determining factor in these cooperations. However, crises between the two states display the limits of US geopolitical discourse. During the Cold War years, for example, the Cyprus issue, which was defined as the "national cause" of Turkey created a great tension between the two allies. During the 1990s Turkey perceived the Kurdish issue as a threat to its national integrity. Thus, the US's attempts to create a de facto Kurdish state in northern Iraq seriously damaged the strategic nature of the relations. Similarly, after the Iraq War of 2003 the Kurdish issue and the territorial integrity of Iraq have become the most problematic issues of the relationship.

The concept of geopolitics has been used in this thesis on two levels. One of these it refers to geopolitical language. Geopolitics is identified in practice by either explicit reference to geographical location and concepts or by the use of certain implicitly geographical policy rationalizations (e.g. Lebensraum, domino theory, containment, expansionism). The second level the study of geopolitics is taken as the study of foreign policy formulation and the mind sets of particular foreign policy actors. Thus, it can be argued that as in the formulations of Ó Tuathail and Dalby this thesis is a part of practical geopolitics defined as the practice of statecraft by presidents, prime ministers, ministers of foreign affairs, and of bureaucracy and political institutions.⁵

The period to be examined here is divided into three parts from the Cold War era until the end of the George W. Bush administration's second term. Each of these periods is significant in the examination of the dynamics of Cold War, post-Cold War, and post September 11 security environments and the changes in the structure of the Turkish-American relationship over time.

Geopolitics has been the most influential aspect of the direction of US foreign policy in the 20th century. Particularly since the beginning of the Cold War, the United States has dominated world politics as a superpower and developed geopolitical interests particularly in the oil-rich regions of the world. Thus, it is strongly believed that the importance of Turkey's geopolitical location has been at the center of the foreign policy discourse of the United States especially since the beginning of the Cold War. Within this framework, Turkey has primarily been perceived or imagined as a "strategic ally" by the United States due to its proximity to the oil-rich regions of the Middle East and Eurasia. Moreover, the US administrations' perceptions of Soviet expansionism, their strategic interests, and fear of a domino effect in the Middle East have provided a rationale to aid the Turkish government.

Therefore, during the late 1940s, Turkey began to receive American military and economic aid as a result of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. For its part, Turkey became a valuable ally to the United States and a member of NATO

⁵ Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby (eds.), *Rethinking Geopolitics*, (New York, London: Routledge, 2002), p. 4.

after the Korean War. Kissinger highlighted the importance of Turkey for the US in the Cold War years as follows:

"From the geopolitical point of view, Turkey was, if anything, even more important [than Greece]. Bordering the Middle East, Central Asia, the Soviet Union, and Europe, Turkey was indispensable for American policy in each of these areas. Turkey had been a staunch and loyal ally in the entire Cold War period. Turkish troops had fought with distinction at our side in Korea. Twenty six electronic stations were Monitoring Soviet missile and space activities from Turkish territory."⁶

As a result of this close "strategic" relationship, during the Cold War decades, Turkey provided critical base facilities for the United States military while, in turn the United States provided economic and military aid to Turkey. As we will see these military bases and military/economic aid were the most crucial component of this relationship. Indeed, during the 1950s and the early 1960s, Turkish-American relations were far from troubled. From Washington's perspective, Turkey was an effective ally for the Western interests in the Middle East. For Ankara, on the other hand, the United States was a necessary element guaranteeing Turkey's security and development. Turkish leaders gave so much importance to the alliance that Turkey supported and voted for all US decisions in the United Nations and other international organizations. The Cyprus issue, with an opportunity to involve itself in the Mediterranean, became the main challenge for the United States during this period.

With the end of the Cold War, has come a change in the threat perceptions of the United States. The absence of the threat of the Soviet Union has created a more uncertain environment for the political elites of the US.⁷ Various intellectuals and scholars have attempted to create a new cartography of world politics, and guidance for the foreign policy of the US in the post-Cold War era. The new geopolitical discourse of the United States has also changed the imagination of Turkey. US administrations used religiously loaded metaphors like "crescent of

6 Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, (New York: Touchstone, 2000), p. 225.

7 David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), p. 7.

crisis” referring the Gulf region. Meanwhile, Turkey was accepted as a part of “Northern Tier” countries in the Middle East. Since the beginning of the Cold War metaphors such as “flank”, “barrier”, “wall”, and “unsinkable aircraft barrier” were also used to describe Turkey.

After the Cold War, Turkey found itself in the middle of three geographic areas of growing strategic importance: the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Central Asia. For US officials, Turkey remained a critical geopolitical actor and a key strategic ally in the achievement of policy goals in each of these regions. US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke characterized Turkey as a “frontline” state for the US in a bad neighborhood and stressed the importance of Turkey in the post-Cold War environment: “Turkey also is an extremely important ally. It stands at the crossroads of almost every issue of importance to the U.S. on the Eurasian continent-including NATO, the Balkans, Cyprus, the Aegean, Iraq sanctions, Middle East peace, Russian relations in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and transit routes.”⁸ In addition to its role as a “strategic base”, because of its geographical proximity to the oil-rich Middle East region, Turkey was also imagined as a “model” country for the Central Asian states, a possible energy export “transit route” to the West and as an energy “bridge” or a “gate” between the Middle Eastern and Western markets.⁹

By the end of the 1990s, the United States started to give the relationship a new name. The concept of a “strategic partnership” a concept that was first announced during the visit of President Clinton to Turkey in 1999. For the then US ambassador to Turkey, Robert Pearson, this concept showed the strong belief of the US government in the increasing importance of Turkey both in the region and in the world. He added that “[i]t also recognized that the US has a significant stake in Turkey’s ability to integrate into the global economy, moving closer to Europe,

8 Richard C. Holbrooke, “Statement of Richard C. Holbrooke Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs before the International Relations Committee”, *US House of Representatives*, July 28, 1995.

9 Greg Bruno, “Turkey at an Energy Crossroads”, *Backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations*, November 20, 2008; Cenk Pala, “Turkey: Energy Bridge between East and West”, *Journal of Middle Eastern Geopolitics*, vol. IV, April - June 2006.

and contributing to the stabilization of a troubled region."¹⁰ However, the Gulf War and the US's attempts to redesign the region have become a source of tension between the two states.

In the aftermath of September 11 the US administration defined "terrorism" as a major threat to security in the Middle East and elsewhere. As a consequence, after Afghanistan, Iraq, a constituent of the "axis of evil", became a new target of the Bush administration. On March 1, 2003 the Turkish Parliament elected not to allow American soldiers to be based on Turkish territory as they fought against Iraq. The decision of the Turkish parliament disappointed Washington and seriously harmed Turkish-American relationship. The Iraq War has had an effect on the most sensitive problem of Turkey, the issue of Kurdish nationalism. After the 1990s, experiences in the region have showed that developments in Iraq are closely related to Turkey's internal security.

Since the 1990s, cooperation on energy security had become a cornerstone of the US-Turkey partnership and Turkey had been perceived as an important "energy bridge" for the West. In the 2000s, US perception was not changed on energy issue. Thus Turkey was still seen as an "energy bridge" by the United States.

To sum up, the dynamics of the Turkish-US alliance have been reassessed to a large extent especially in the post-September 11 period. The wars against Afghanistan and Iraq, the US's Greater Middle East Project, Iran's nuclear crisis and recent developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict have also begun to change the dynamics of the region. In short, while the United States' priorities have changed regarding the Middle East particularly after 2001, Turkey has also been trying to adapt itself to this new geopolitical environment. Altunışık, Güney and Lesser argue

10 Robert Pearson, "The New World Disorder: The United States and Turkey: A Model of Sustained Engagement", *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, Winter-Spring 2002; Aylin Güney, "An Anatomy of the Transformation of the US-Turkish Alliance: From Cold War to Iraq War", *Turkish Studies*, vol. 6, no. 3, September 2005, p. 346.

that the Kurdish issue, in particular, will be the most significant challenge to Turkish-American relations in the near future.¹¹

Turkish-American relations supports the Critical Geopolitics argument that geopolitical discourse shapes and is shaped by foreign policymaking. Most of the research on the Turkish-American relationship has focused either on security issues or historical/political developments. The Turkish-American relations have received only limited attention by critical geopolitics scholars, missing many promising analyses and predictions. By showing how geopolitical ideas and metaphors were originally designed to rationalize and justify foreign policy-making, this study provides a contribution to the literature on the dynamics of geopolitical discourse.¹²

It should be noted that the geopolitical framing of relations between Turkey and the United States have not been one-sided. Since the beginning of the Cold War, Turkey developed its own geopolitical discourse, and has accepted, changed, challenged, or rejected US geopolitical imaginations over different periods of time.¹³ However, this dissertation aims primarily to understand the impact of US geopolitical discourse on relations between these countries. Thus, Turkey's reactions to these imaginations are not examined in this study.

This dissertation attempts to answer both general and case-specific questions. In the second chapter of the study the meaning of the geopolitics is interrogated from various perspectives. In the subsequent chapters, the changing

11 Meliha Altunışık, "Turkey's Iraq Policy: The War and Beyond", *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, vol.14, 2006; Aylin Güney, "An Anatomy of the Transformation of the US-Turkish Alliance from 'Cold War' to 'War on Iraq'", Ian Lesser, "Off Autopilot: The Future of Turkish-US Relations", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, vol. 4, no. 4, 2005.

12 See Klaus Dodds and David Atkinson, (eds.), *Geopolitical Traditions: A Century of Geopolitical Thought*, (London: Routledge, 2000); James Derrick Sidaway et al., "Translating Political Geographies", *Political Geography*, vol. 23, no. 8, 2004.

13 Turkey's geopolitical discourse from critical perspective was examined by Pinar Bilgin and Lerna Yanık. For details see Pinar Bilgin, "Only Strong States Can Survive in Turkey's Geography: The Uses of 'Geopolitical Truths' in Turkey", *Political Geography*, no. 26, 2007; Lerna Yanık, "Constructing Turkish 'Exceptionalism': Discourses of Liminality and Hybridity in Turkish Foreign Policy", *Political Geography*, vol. 30, no. 2, February 2011; Lerna Yanık, "The Metamorphosis of 'Metaphors of Vision': 'Bridging' Turkey's Location, Role and Identity After the End of the Cold War", *Geopolitics*, vol. 14, no. 3, August 2009.

threat perceptions of the United States during different periods and their impact on the global geopolitical narrative are analyzed. Thereafter this dissertation examines the roots, dynamics, and main characteristics of the alliance. Understanding the different meanings of imaginations like "strategic ally" and metaphors like "barrier", "flank", "bridge", and "model" will be crucial in this analysis. Political developments and geopolitical discussions since the beginning of the Cold War will be studied with reference to significant turning points in this research framework. Finally, this study will attempt to explain the most significant causes and consequences of geopolitical crises between the two allies and the impact of these crises on these relations.

Within this framework, the following sources are used in this study: the theoretical component of this study, is informed by several books, articles, PhD theses, as well as by websites on geopolitics in general and on critical geopolitics in particular, sourced from the libraries of Turkish and American universities.

Moreover, an analysis of US administrations' geopolitical discourse required archival research. In this framework, archival documents about US foreign policy in general and the administrations' perceptions about Turkey in particular were collected from the Library of Congress and Binghamton University library in the United States. The third group of resources utilized in this analysis are the speeches of the presidents and other high level US officials on the geopolitical representation of Turkey, strategy documents and agreements by the United States particularly related to Turkey. It also includes reports and other publications on implemented policies.

Numerous articles, books and texts by academics and politicians, providing an overview of Turkish-American relations both conceptually and practically formed the fourth group of sources. In addition, the reports and publications of research institutions that have links with the government such as RAND are used to analyze US geopolitical discourse towards Turkey. Further research was conducted in the libraries of Middle East Technical University and Bilkent University in Ankara.

This dissertation is divided into six parts. After this introductory part, the second chapter outlines the theoretical framework and analytical tools of this study, starting with the definition of the concept of geopolitics. A general overview of the

historical evolution of the concept and its use in different ways is provided. An explanation of critical geopolitics as an alternative approach to the understanding of world politics, along with a critique, based in realism, of the mainstream approaches follows. This study seeks to question the impact of changes in US geopolitical discourse on the bilateral relations of Turkey and the United States. Therefore, while outlining the fundamental assumptions of classical geopolitics, this section also reveals the limits and aims of these approaches and questions the role of geopolitical discourses in foreign policy.

The third chapter initially focuses on US foreign policy during Cold War. Thereafter, the roots and characteristics of the relationship between the two states will be analyzed from a historical perspective. The historical background of relations between Turkey and the United States is an important issue to be considered in this analysis. The origins of the "strategic" nature of the relations, the impact of the US's Cold War geopolitical narrative on the relations, and the Cyprus problem as the limit of US geopolitical discourse will be analyzed by addressing political developments.

In the fourth chapter the post-Cold War period and its unstable environment will be analyzed. This chapter will focus on the period from the end of the Cold War through the September 11 attacks to the United States, interrogating the factors that constitute new geopolitical imaginations in US foreign policy. In doing so, the main ideology of the new US administration and the geopolitical assumptions that led to a redrawing of the map of the world will also be explored. Thereafter, the chapter will be dedicated to an attempt to understand how the post-Cold War geopolitical discourse of the United States reproduced Turkey's imagination. Thus, the meanings of imaginations like "enhanced partnership", or "strategic partnership" and metaphors such as "bridge", "flank", "model", will be analyzed in this part of the study. Finally, the causes and consequences of Gulf War, representing a major divergence in Turkish-American relations, are analyzed.

The fifth chapter is dedicated to an analysis the significance of September 11 and its impact on US geopolitical discourse. In this new period, "terrorism" was defined with a new enemy from the international community. Thereafter, US foreign policy has become more aggressive, especially in the Middle East. Turkey as

a significant "strategic ally" disappointed the United States during this era. US reform plans in the region, the components of the ideological construction of the New Middle East, the impact of the Iraq War, energy geopolitics, the settlement of the Cyprus problem and Turkey's potential role as a "model" for the region, will also be discussed in this chapter. The Kurdish/Iraqi issue will be examined as the limit of US geopolitical discourse in this period. Finally, the sixth chapter is to finalize and summarize the main conclusions of this thesis regarding US geopolitical discourse and reflections on the analysis of Turkish-American relations within the study of critical geopolitics.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

"the earth is in effect one world, in which empty, uninhabited spaces virtually do not exist. Just as none of us is outside or beyond geography, none of us is completely free from the struggle over geography. That struggle is complex and interesting because it is not only about soldiers and cannons but also about ideas, about forms, about images and imaginings."

*Edward Said*¹⁴

2.1 Introduction

All power involves knowledge and all knowledge supports existing power relations. Therefore it can be argued that there is no such thing as "truth" existing outside of power. As Foucault pointed out, how can history have a truth if truth has a history?¹⁵ Truth is not something outside of the social settings, on the contrary, it is a part of them. Postmodern international theorists used this approach to examine the "truths" of international relations to see how the concepts that dominate the discipline in fact are dependent on specific power relations.

Inspired by this idea, this chapter aims to clarify the theoretical framework of this dissertation, to understand and outline of the concept of geopolitics, its meaning and relationship with the study of international relations. It should be underlined that geopolitics is generally used in media, academic research or foreign

14 Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, (New York: Knopf, 1993), p. 7.

15 Quoted in Robert Jackson and Georg Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches*, (2nd ed.), (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 251.

policy discourses by geographers, political scientists, diplomats, military strategists and journalists. However, the concept is conceptually challenging, because mainstream theories take geography as a product of nature. For example, Napoleon Bonaparte, a military and political leader of France, summarized the importance of geography as follows: "The politics of a State lies on its geography".¹⁶ Similarly, Spykman, one of the founders of the classical realist school in American foreign policy, argued that because of its permanent situation, geography is the most crucial element of a state's foreign policy. He said, "Ministers come and go, even dictators die, but mountain ranges stand unperturbed".¹⁷ These statements are important examples of the ideologic aim and character of the discipline, serving also as a tool for politicians when confronted with decisions and their consequent implementations.

In this chapter I want to focus on definitions of the concept, and to give a short summary of its development since the late nineteenth century. The aim of this chapter is also to present some of the prevailing ideas of the current fields of study and the contemporary issues attached to the research conducted in the past decades. The analysis will be done within the framework of the critical geopolitics as represented mainly by Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby. Critical geopolitics primarily focuses on geopolitical discourses, providing a framework of different meanings in the study of international relations in particular and social science in general. Within this framework, it is argued that geopolitical assumptions are constructed mainly by scholars and politicians to organize, occupy, and rule the different parts of the world. Unlike orthodox geopoliticians, according to Ó Tuathail, the geography of the world is not a product of nature, it is a form of power-knowledge relationship.¹⁸ Therefore this thesis takes the concept of geopolitics as a deeply ideological and politicized form and analysis.

16 "Napoleon on Politics & Power", Available at http://www.napoleonguide.com/aquote_pover.htm, (Accessed on April 1, 2010).

17 Nicholas J. Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942), p. 41.

18 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics*, p. 1.

I apply the critical geopolitical approach to Turkish-American relationship, in which the concept of geopolitics has always played a crucial role. Since the beginning of the Cold War the relationship between Ankara and Washington has been described as "strategic" and today the strategic quality of the relationship can no longer be taken for granted as a result of new geopolitical priorities of the United States in the Middle East. Therefore, this thesis attempts to analyze the Turkish-American relationship with regard to US geopolitical discourses in three important periods – the Cold War, 1990s and 2000s- utilizing the approach of critical geopolitics.

2.2 Brief Literature Review

2.2.1 Theories of Geopolitics

Flint argues that geopolitics is a way of "seeing" the world; it is more than a competition over territory.¹⁹ It is a part of our daily lives, with several tools supporting it, such as books, movies and TV. On the other hand, geopolitics establishes a model of the world, geographically identifies and labels places such as "the United States", "Turkey" and "the Middle East". Moreover, it produces and reproduces metaphors and narratives of world politics. This understanding of geopolitics is particularly present in foreign policy making.²⁰ Before discussing the main premises of critical geopolitics, we have to examine the historical roots of modern geopolitical understandings.

In fact, the concept of "geopolitics" is understood and interpreted in several ways. On the one hand, it refers to the study of the relationship between politics and geographical conditions. It is a form of power wielded by states vying for territory and securing empires. Political geographers use this term the same way in creating geographical understandings of the arrangements of the world power.²¹

19 Colin Flint, *Introduction to Geopolitics*, (London, New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 13.

20 Klaus Dodds, *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 4-5.

21 Martin Johns, *An Introduction to Political Geography*, (London, New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 17.

Geopolitics constructs a framework for understanding the world; maps and tables also guide the global view using geographical metaphors such as “iron curtain”, “Third World” or “rogue state”. These terms are geographical because places are identified and labeled as such. For example, the term “Third World” not only served as a geographical description, it also helped to divide the political geographies of the Cold War involving the United States and the “First World” and the Soviet Union and the “Second World” in a global competition. The term also create a simple model of the world, which can be used to understand foreign and security policy making.²² This interpretation is also related to war, empire and diplomacy. On the other hand, geopolitics means a conservative political-territorial discourse associated with the strategic models of Henry Kissinger, Alexandr Dugin, and followers of the Geopolitik in Germany.²³

No doubt, all concepts have a history, and the term geopolitics is not an exception. The relationship between states or more generally political units and their geographic conditions has always been a very important topic for both academicians and politicians. For example, Cohen notes that some philosophers like Aristoteles, Montesquieu, Kant, Hegel and Strabo had an understanding of geopolitics.²⁴ Therefore we can say that the concept of geopolitics is as old as the concepts of security, diplomacy, strategy, and fear.

The Voyages of Discovery of the fifteenth century can be accepted as the roots of modern geopolitical thinking.²⁵ However, in order to better understand contemporary developments in the world, we have to focus on the emergence of the concept “geopolitics”, which came to the academic and political spheres only a hundred years ago.

22 Ken Booth (ed.), *Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 18.

23 Alexander B. Murphy et. al., “Is There a Politics to Geopolitics?”, *Progress in Human Geography*, vol. 28, no.5, 2004, p. 619.

24 Saul Bernard Cohen, *Geopolitics of the World System*, (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), p. 12.

25 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, “Problematizing Geopolitics: Survey, Statecraft and Strategy”, *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, vol. 19, 1994, p. 260.

Briefly, in the beginning, the concept of geopolitics, invented by Rudolf Kjellen, connected political power to the territorial shape, size and position of the "geographical organism" that was the state.²⁶ Later, this term began to be reproduced in accordance with the political objectives of the statecraft of powerful states. For example, German Karl Haushofer adapted Kjellen's usage for use as a tool in Nazi Germany's international affairs.

Later, until the 1970s, when Henry Kissinger used the term as a synonym for the world "balance of power"²⁷, geopolitics had been identified with the doctrines of German expansionism and militarism, beginning with Friedrich Ratzel's doctrine of "Lebensraum" (living space) and of the great powers' competition to be the most influential force in global "progress".²⁸ While geopolitics became a tool of superpower competition and power politics during the Cold War, the term has started to come into doubt, particularly in academia, after the Cold War.

According to Agnew, a periodization of geopolitical discourse helps us to understand representations and practices, dominant trends and understandings, continuities and differences.²⁹ In this part of the study, I will try to examine how contemporary geopolitics is influential on international relations and how it has evolved into several types of definitions using well-known geopoliticians' theories in a chronological order: classical/traditional geopolitics, power politics or Cold War geopolitics, and New World Order geopolitics.

2.2.1.1 Classical Geopolitics

Both in idea and practice, modern geopolitics is linked to the establishment of nation-states as the dominant political institutions. It is especially connected to

26 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics*, p. 45.

27 Leslie Hepple, "The Revival of Geopolitics", *Political Geography Quarterly*, no. 5, Supplement, 1986, p. 27.

28 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics*, pp. 143-151.

29 John Agnew, *Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics*, (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 85.

the end of the nineteenth century, and it is the theories produced during this period that we will label "classical geopolitics".³⁰

From a theoretical point of view, classical geopolitics is closely related to the Realist approach of international relations.³¹ Using realism's main premises, classic geopoliticians of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries took the world as it exists, constructed geographical images of the world based on their own conditions, and also established spatial generalizations to which to apply their policies.³² Moreover, they expressed their knowledge about "how the world works" and used a historical-theoretical perspective to justify the foreign policy action of their own countries.³³ Within the positivist methods, classical geopolitics was mainly dealt with land and sea power classifications, core-periphery models, and the rise and decline of states. The most important example of the classical school at work comes from Halford Mackinder's influential "heartland" pivot on Eurasia, one that continues to impact the strategic policies Russia and the United States.³⁴ Nicholas Spykman's "Rimland" idea³⁵, which expands the scope of Mackinder's heartland thesis, is another example from the classical school.

It can be argued that modern geopolitical discourse was born during the 1870s through 1945 era of imperialist competition.³⁶ In early the 20th century while colonialism and industrial modernization had been dominant trends in world

30 *ibid.*, p. 17.

31 Klaus Dodds, *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction*, p. 42.

32 Colin Flint, *Introduction to Geopolitics*, p. 24.

33 John A. Agnew, *Making Political Geography*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

34 Halford Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History", *The Geographical Journal*, vol. 23, no. 4, April 1904, pp. 421–437.

35 Nicholas J. Spykman, *The Geography of Peace*, (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1969), p. 5.

36 John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, *Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy*, (London, New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 26-37.

politics, geopolitics emerged as a form of power or knowledge mainly dealing with promoting state expansionism and securing empires.³⁷ This was also a period during which the idea of the natural supremacy of a particular race or state was dominant.

During this period, each of the imperialist states had their own leading scholars and developed their own geopolitical cultures, traditions and geopolitical discourses. The most important example of geopolitical competition was between British Empire and the German state in Europe. In order to understand the geopolitical competition between these two states, the works of Halford Mackinder and of Karl Haushofer should be examined. Moreover, we need to examine the geopolitical understandings of the United States, which emerged as a significant actor in world politics later on. But, before going into detail a review of the ideas of key scholars working on the concept is crucial.

For a historical perspective, at the beginning of the twentieth century Alfred Thayer Mahan, a United States Navy officer, geostrategist, and historian, tried to make a "geopolitical plan" for the United States to increase its global influence. By the end of the 19th century, the United States had emerged as a significant actor in international relations. It had started expanding its territories with naval forces. Admiral Mahan proposed "sea power doctrine" in his 1890 book, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1782*, which stressed the significance of overseas naval bases. For him, all great powers are naval powers and it is not necessary to obtain all territories and occupy them. He added that commercial and naval expansionism were the most important elements of great power. For example, what the United States needed was an informal empire based on "open door" trade and naval bases to protect power in a problematic region.³⁸

Even though Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan is accepted as the father of geopolitics in the academic literature, the term "geopolitics" was first used by

37 *ibid.*, p. 32.

38 Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1782*, (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1890).

Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellen in 1899. For Kjellen, the state is a unity and is related to the concepts of "Geo-politics", "Ethno-politics", "Social-politics" and "Regimental politics". He described geopolitics as "the theory of the state as a geographic organism or phenomenon in space, i.e. as a land territory, area or most especially, as a 'country'".³⁹

Later on, the concept of geopolitics became a model of world politics with the writings of the British geographer Sir Halford Mackinder in the early twentieth century. Indeed Mackinder's main idea was used to justify the nuclear policy of President Reagan, and academics and policy makers continue to discuss his famous "Heartland" theory from his article "The Geographical Pivot of History" published in 1904.⁴⁰

Influenced by the ideas of Admiral Mahan, Mackinder perceived global politics as a "closed system". This means that the actions of different countries were interconnected, and that the major conflicts were between land and sea powers. In his article he explained the relationship between geography and history in the context of land power and defined the core of Eurasia as the "Pivot Area" or "Heartland". The heartland was located in the European areas of Russia including Central Asia.⁴¹ Mackinder believed that while sea powers had maintained an advantage in the past, with the introduction of railways, the advantage had shifted in favor of land powers, especially if one country could dominate the "Heartland" zone.⁴²

39 Quoted in Ola Tunander, "Swedish-German Geopolitics for a New Century – Rudolf Kjellén's 'The state as a Living Organism'", *Review of International Studies*, vol. 27, 2001, p. 453.

40 Halford Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History", pp. 421-437.

41 *ibid.*

42 *ibid.*



Figure 2.1 Mackinder's Pivotal Area

Source: Halford Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History", *The Geographical Journal*, vol. 23, no. 4, April 1904.

Mackinder argued that if people and resources were effectively organized, the heartland was geographically located to dominate the "world island", then Eurasia, then the whole expanse from Western Europe to the Pacific, and then the rest of the world.⁴³ He explained this idea with his famous motto: "*Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the world island; Who rules the world island commands the world.*"⁴⁴ According to him, German expansionism in Eastern Europe and a German alliance with the Soviet Union needed to be prevented. He also underlined that Russia would dominate the world during the Cold War.⁴⁵

Moreover, Mackinder argued that "Geopolitics is a new way of seeing international politics as a unified worldwide scene" and adopted a god's eye global view on "the stage of the whole world" as follows:

⁴³ Gearóid Ó Tuathail et.al (eds.), *The Geopolitics Reader*, (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 17-18.

⁴⁴ Halford Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History", p. 430.

⁴⁵ Halford Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, (New York: Norton Library, 1919), p. 47.

"For the first time we can perceive something of the real proportion of features and events on the stage of the whole world and may seek a formula which shall express certain aspects, at any rate, of geographical causation in history."⁴⁶

In this sentence, the word "we" refers to geopolitical experts, educated and privileged men who can apprehend the "real" political issues.⁴⁷ These expressions reveal founding assumptions of classical geopolitics, including the idea of the great eye looking upon the world, and the idea that only experts possess the capacity to perceive the real and the desire to explain all of history. Flint claims that he used "a limited and dubious Western-centric 'theory' of history to claim an objective, neutral, and informed intellectual basis for what is in fact a very biased view with the aim of advocating and justifying the policy of one particular country."⁴⁸

Mackinder exemplifies one of the important cases of the crossover between academic geopolitics and state policy. It should be underlined that Mackinder's "Heartland" theory and his emphasis on alliances were used as a fundamental basis for US foreign policy makers' Cold War Containment Policy strategy against the Soviet Union.⁴⁹ Yet, before we move on to the Cold War period, we should briefly return to the German school of geopolitics to make some more points about classical geopolitics in general.

Perhaps, the most important and controversial turning point in the modern history of geopolitics was its association with Nazism and Hitler's geopolitical strategy for global domination. Mackinder's "heartland" theory was adopted by some German geographers and academicians to justify Nazi expansionist policies

46 Halford Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History", p. 421.

47 *ibid.*, p. 427.

48 Colin Flint, *Introduction to Geopolitics*, p. 18.

49 Fred M. Shelley, et.al., *Political Geography of the United States*, (New York, London: The Guilford Press, 1996), p. 208.

towards Eastern Europe in 1920s and 1930s.⁵⁰ It thereafter became a very popular term referring generally to German foreign policy. This movement damaged the legitimacy of geopolitics particularly in the United States until the 1970s by way of Henry Kissinger's use of the term.

The father of the German school of Geopolitik was Friedrich Ratzel. With his organic theory of state, Ratzel established a link between the Darwinian struggle for existence and the geopolitical struggle for space. Accordingly, states were not static but naturally growing organisms with borders being the skins of the state. He introduced the concept "lebensraum" -living space- to the German politics, claiming "[t]here is in this small planet sufficient space for only one great state."⁵¹

In 1924 Haushofer started to publish the journal *Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik* and this journal helped Haushofer create a new school of geopolitics.⁵² Bringing together Ratzel's and Mackinder's ideas, he described geopolitics as "the science of earth relationships to political developments" and also differentiated geopolitics from political geography in the sense that "while political geography studied the state from the view point of space, geopolitics studied space from the view point of the state".⁵³

According to Haushofer, conquest was a biological need for a state's survival and prosperity. He therefore believed the German state should understand the importance of "Lebensraum" to its survival in the world system, even at the cost of other nations' existence. Accordingly, the only way to achieve this was to develop an alliance with the heartland power, the Soviet Union.⁵⁴ In "Why

50 David Atkinson and Klaus Dodds, "Introduction", in David Atkinson and Klaus Dodds (eds.), *Geopolitical Traditions: Critical Histories of a Century of Geopolitical Thought*, (London, New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 4.

51 Quoted in Robert Strausz-Hupe, *Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power*, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1942), p. 31.

52 Andreas Dorpalen, *The World of General Haushofer*, (Farrar & Rinehart, Inc.: New York, 1984), pp. 16-17.

53 Quoted in Johannes Mattern, *Geopolitik: Doctrine of National Self-Sufficiency and Empire*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1942), p. 49.

54 *ibid.*; Gearóid Ó Tuathail et.al., *The Geopolitics Reader*.

Geopolitik", Haushofer emphasized that Germany was unsuccessful in World War I because the leaders of the German state did not understand the significance of geopolitics.⁵⁵ He also regarded the United States as the most successful country within its region because of its application of geopolitics. In fact, Haushofer's studies show that the classification of the world and peoples into a hierarchy justifies political actions such as empire, war or alliance. This classification also divides the world into good and bad, safe and dangerous, important and unimportant regions. Haushofer's works reinforced a Nazi regime that instigated the biggest war of the 20th century. Moreover, his writings supported or justified many chauvinist, racist, and imperialist ideologies.

Associating "geopolitics" with the Nazi regime corrupted the term. However, the idea or concept of geopolitics was not totally abandoned by scholars and politicians after World War II and the fall of Nazi Germany. All these views of classical/imperialist geopolitics opened a path to Cold War geopolitics.




Figure 2.2 Map of German Aggression between 1936-1939

Source: <http://users.telenet.be/jeroenWO2/hoer%20kwam%20het.htm>, (Accessed on February 10, 2011).

55 Karl Haushofer, "Why Geopolitik?", in Gearóid Ó Tuathail et al., *The Geopolitics Reader*, pp. 33-35.

2.2.1.2 Cold War Geopolitics

Geographical conditions have always been the most important part of state war strategies and World War II was not an exception. The main aim of the War was summarized by the editors of *Fortune* as, "whoever controls the main strategic postwar airbases, together with the technical facilities to keep them manned, will unquestionably be the world's strongest power".⁵⁶ After the War, decisions taken at Yalta and Potsdam restructured the world system and modified the dynamics of international relations in a very significant way. As a consequence two ideological blocs would fight each other for over forty years. This confrontation brought forth a new concept: the Cold War.

Geographical issues were also deeply ingrained in the discourse during the Cold War. This was described by Cox as a geopolitical system based on two contrary relations between the superpowers-opposition and dependence.⁵⁷ After the war, a bipolar system has been established, and the world was divided into three types of places: "ours", "theirs" and "disputed places". The conflict between the two blocks was inevitable and the end result was either communist or a capitalist world.⁵⁸ In this system, alliances were perceived as stable and state behaviors were much more predictable. Moreover, the term "Third World" was invented during the Cold War creating a division of space into a First World of capitalist states, a Second World of communist states, and a Third World of developing states. This division also produced the North-South issues of global inequality.

Primarily because of this ideological confrontation during the 1950s and 1960s the discipline of international relations was focused on security issues. The idea of the Cold War and its structure dominated the works of scholars in universities and the agendas of political leaders, particularly in the United States,

56 Quoted in Gearóid Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics*, p. 76.

57 Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory", in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and Its Critics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 244.

58 Colin Flint, *Political Geography*, p. 63.

where international relations was most strongly established as a field of academic study at the time. International economic issues were neglected unless if they related to questions of military policy or alliance politics.⁵⁹

After the World War II an interesting geopolitical irony resulted. On the one hand there was a criticism of "geopolitics" because of its association with aggressive Nazi politics. On the other hand, the United States started to redefine its role as a post-war world power and developed geopolitical strategic discourse to shape its foreign policy directions and justify its actions. In response to the Nazi association, Spykman redirected the concept of geopolitics towards the concept of security.

Spykman wrote two important books on geopolitics: *America's Strategy in World Politics* in 1942, and *The Geography of the Peace* in 1944. In his books, Spykman repeated Admiral Mahan's theory about the geographical bases of power, and he later adopted Mackinder's divisions of the world, renaming some "the Rimland" (Mackinder's inner/marginal crescent), and others "the Offshore Islands & Continents" (Mackinder's outer/insular crescent).⁶⁰ Unlike Mackinder's assumption that geographical formations made for the easiest access from the east, Spykman asserted that the littoral areas of the "Rimland" were crucial for control of the center. As a response to Mackinder, Spykman asserted that "If there is to be a slogan for the power politics of the Old World, it must be 'Who controls the rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world.'"⁶¹

Spykman also stressed the significance of location for a state's power potential and the importance of geopolitical change. As a conclusion to his theory he argued that "The northern Atlantic is today the most desirable body of water on

59 Ken Booth (ed.), *Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond*, p. 22.

60 Nicholas J. Spykman, *The Geography of Peace*, p. 5.

61 Nicholas J. Spykman and Francis P. Tampra, *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and Balance of Power*, (2nd ed.), (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2007), p. 147.

which a state can be located".⁶² Unlike Mackinder, he argued that geography gave the US a critical strategic and economic advantage. Moreover, Spykman also underlined the rise of the Pacific Ocean as a key route for world trade. Similar to previous geopoliticians, Spykman offered a division of the world: the Old World consisting of the Eurasian continent, Africa, and Australia, and the New World of the Americas. The United States dominated the New World.⁶³

Inspired by the Spykman's ideas, Harkavy defined geopolitics as a struggle for power and national interests affecting states' policies. Therefore it becomes a "map" of the relations between opposing nations.⁶⁴ In the same fashion, for Pierre Gallois and Pascal Boniface, geopolitics is the study of the relationships between the implementation of power policies and the geographical context in which they occur.⁶⁵ According to Pascal Lorot, geopolitics can be defined as the analysis of the conflict produced by the territorial expansion and alliances necessary for invasion.⁶⁶ In fact, these definitions grant the role of the military crucial importance, as the defense of boundaries against enemies became a central theme of the legitimation of states. The definitions were also consistent with the main assumptions of the realist approach.

Beyond their own countries the Cold War allowed both superpowers to keep control on their allies. As a result, both superpowers led a bloc of countries whose

62 Nicholas J. Spykman, "Geography and Foreign Policy I", *American Political Science Review*, no. 1, February 1938, p. 42.

63 Nicholas J. Spykman, *The Geography of Peace*, p. 5.

64 Robert E. Harkavy, *Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases: The Geopolitics of Access Diplomacy*, (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), p. 272.

65 Jean-Francois Gagne, "Geopolitics in a Post-Cold War Context: From Geostrategic to Geo-Economic Considerations", *Raoul Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies Occasional Paper*, no. 15, University of Quebec at Montreal, 2007, p. 7, Available at http://www.dandurand.uqam.ca/uploads/files/publications/etudes_raoul_dandurand/etude_rd_15_jfgagne_intcouv_240807.pdf, (Accessed on April 20, 2010).

66 *ibid.*, p. 7.

foreign policy options were strictly reduced. As Cole pointed out "The spheres of influence of the USSR and the USA could be seen as two halves of a tennis ball... On conventional maps the Soviet bloc could be seen to be encircled by the USA, with its many bases and allies, but from another angle the USA could be seen as encircled by the USSR and its allies, especially with the establishment of a Soviet military presence in Cuba after 1959".⁶⁷

The geopolitical order established by the Soviet Union during the Cold War was mostly limited to Eastern Europe. Because it did not have sufficient resources and wealth, the Soviet Union intervened in states like North Korea, Vietnam and Cuba, to compete with its counterpart, the capitalist West. On the other hand, the geopolitical order established by the United States was geographically wider than the Soviet order. In the domestic sphere, American policy makers overemphasized the Soviet threat to justify the US's role as an interventionist power supporting an open world economy and protecting the free enterprise system. Moreover, the US established for itself a space called the "Third World" onto which intervention and attack on peoples and states considered a threat to American values and economic interests could be carried out.

However, paradoxically both the United States and the Soviet Union had a similar geopolitical interests during the Cold War. According to E.P. Thompson and György Konrád, the Cold War was a mutually useful "geopolitical drama" for the United States and the Soviet Union, instead of a potential global nuclear disaster.⁶⁸ In fact, the Cold War provided the grounds for both of them to control their allies in Western and Eastern Europe. It also provided a reason to both for the military occupation of Europe. In addition, the Cold War created a consensus that the poorer parts of the world were to be dominated by the large world powers. Although both sides claimed that they were "anti-imperialist", the Cold War provided an excuse to take political and military control of the newly independent

67 John P. Cole, "The World of Jan Kowalewski: Pawns in Other People's Games", *Scottish Geographical Magazine*, vol. 106, no. 2, 1990, pp. 67-80.

68 Edward P. Thompson, *Beyond The Cold War: Not the Dimpleby Lecture European Nuclear Disarmament*, (London: Merlin Press, 1982); György Konrad, *Anti Politics*, (London: Quartet Books, 1984).

countries. Similarly M. Cox notes, "The Cold War served the interests of both the USSR and the US. For this reason neither sought to alter the nature of the relationship once it had been established. Their goal, therefore, was not so much victory over the other as the maintenance of balance. In this sense, the Cold War was more of a carefully controlled game with commonly agreed rules than a contest where there could be clear winners and losers."⁶⁹

It can be said that Europe was the main place at which the competing geopolitical orders confronted each other, and was the place of its greatest militarization. But developments in the Middle East region, which will be examined in the following chapters, were important examples of geopolitical competition between the two superpowers during the Cold War. The Soviet Union was much closer to the Middle East than the United States and this position forced the United States to maintain friendship and bases in the region to prevent the Soviet Union from improving its relative position. Indeed, the outcomes of the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan can be seen as an important example of the relevance of geography.⁷⁰ Obviously, the US's relationship with Turkey, which is the main theme of this dissertation, has been of particular significance because of geography.

Containment policy and the domino effect, the two geopolitical concepts, are key in the understanding of the Cold War geopolitical environment. United States official to the Soviet Union George F. Kennan's famous "Long Telegram" from Moscow and July 1947 "Mr. X" article in *Foreign Affairs* not only established the US foreign policy of containment during the Cold War but also framed the agenda of international relations.⁷¹ The thrust of his argument was that the Soviet Union was a fundamentally unfamiliar place, and meaningful cooperation was not

⁶⁹ Michael Cox, "From the Truman Doctrine to the Second Superpower Détente: The Rise and Fall of the Cold War", *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 27, no. 2, 1990, p. 31.

⁷⁰ George S. Harris (ed.), *The Middle East in Turkish-American Relations*, (Washington DC: Heritage Foundations, 1985), p. 42.

⁷¹ George Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-1950*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1967), pp. 547-559; X, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 25, no. 4, 1947, pp. 566-582.

possible. This claim had an important effect on the policy choices of the Truman administration.

During the Cold War years, the concept of containment became increasingly expansive particularly in American foreign policy discourse which experienced several changes from the 1940s to the 1980s. In their study O'Loughlin and Grant stressed that:

*"In the 1940s and 1950s, emphasis was placed on the perceived threat to the 'Rimland,' that zone of containment arranged in a semicircle around the Soviet heartland. In the 1960s, attention to specific conflicts in Cuba and Vietnam was added to the dominant U.S./U.S.S.R. competitive theme. In the 1970s decade of detente, attention to foreign policy was reduced, only to be revived strongly in a regional guise in the late 1970s and early 1980s by Presidents Carter and Reagan. During the 1980s, the regional focus of U.S./U.S.S.R. competition has shifted to the Middle East, Southern Africa and Central America."*⁷²

The policy of containment was expanded by domino theory. This theory asserts that client regimes and allies has to be protected. Accordingly, in any failure to protect one ally, the US could lose its credibility, which would create a domino effect leading to the loss of others.

On March 12, 1947 President Truman made a speech to the United States Congress that "drew the line" against communism in Greece and Turkey. Later called "the Truman Doctrine", the speech is accepted as the first significant statement and one of the most important of developments for American Cold War geopolitical imagination.⁷³ Similar to the classical geopoliticians, Truman used the simple and abstract categories, "the free world" and "the enslaved world", to divide the world into two distinct camps.⁷⁴

72 John O'Loughlin and Richard Grant, "The Political Geography of Presidential Speeches, 1946-87", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, vol. 80, no. 4, 1990, p. 527.

73 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, et.al., *The Geopolitics Reader*, (2nd ed.), (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 60.

74 Harry S. Truman, "Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine", March 12, 1947, John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, Santa Barbara, CA, Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12846>, (Accessed on April 7, 2010).

President Truman had used domino theory in his doctrine. Truman's Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, explained the geographical significance of Greece and Turkey before Congress as follows:

*"Like apples in a barrel infected by one rotten one, the corruption of Greece would infect Iran and all to the East. It would also carry infection to Africa through Asia Minor and Egypt, and to Europe through Italy, France, already threatened by the strongest domestic Communist parties in Western Europe. The Soviet Union was playing one of the greatest gambles in history at minimal cost."*⁷⁵

Indeed, domino theory suggests chain-reaction, whether in the rotten apple or falling dominoes metaphors. It effectively externalized local conflicts to aspects of the global conflict. These conflicts connected American national security with different parts of the world through the possibility of the spread communism. This logic was used again at the beginning of the Korean War, during the Vietnam War, and in Chile and Angola in the 1970s. Finally, President Reagan used it as the center of his administration's policy towards Central America in the 1980s.⁷⁶

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is credited with the revival of American interest in geopolitics. Geopolitics, for Kissinger was "an approach that pays attention to the requirements of equilibrium" in international politics.⁷⁷ Kissinger's timing was crucial – the Cold War was entering a détente period, even if the Soviet Union and the United States were still skeptical of one another's actions and geopolitical aims. The United States was unpopular because of the Vietnam War and Kissinger's use of the term geopolitics was in part an effort to deal with a new strategic environment.

In fact, Leslie Hepple noted that Kissinger used the concept to underline the importance of "global equilibrium" and "permanent national interests" in a world

⁷⁵ Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation, My Years at the State Department*, (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969), p. 219.

⁷⁶ Jack Matlock, *Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended*, (New York: Random House, 2004), p. 24.

⁷⁷ Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1979), p. 914.

characterized by a balance of power.⁷⁸ In order to promote a new relationship with China, he argued that Moscow's "geopolitical ambitions" needed to be contained. "Equilibrium" was the new keyword in this context. While the United States tried to contain the Soviet Union, Kissinger believed that existing American foreign policy had been too enthusiastic to promote a military response to this dilemma.⁷⁹ Although Kissinger's usage of the concept of geopolitics did not offer a complex and clear model, it can be argued that he repopularized the term in US political discourse.

Other important political figures such as President Carter's National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, became advocates of geostrategy and used the term to show their interest in projecting America's strategic interests in an era of rising global tension.⁸⁰

In conclusion, it can be argued that the Cold War as a geopolitical narrative was created by the strategic elites of superpowers. The Cold War geopolitical discourse consisted of powerful political ideology, representing the world politics as a struggle between "us" and "them". Overall, as Ó Tuathail argued "the discourse of Cold War geopolitics helped to secure and emphasize a set of geographical identities like 'the West,' 'the Soviet Union,' 'the United States', while serving to discipline domestic social and cultural differences within these spaces".⁸¹ The

78 Leslie Hepple, "The Revival of Geopolitics", p. 25.

79 Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years*, p. 920.

80 Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Permanent Purge: Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956); *Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967); *Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era*, (New York: Viking Press, 1970); *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981*, (New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1983); *Game Plan: A Geostrategic Framework for the Conduct of the U.S.-Soviet Contest*, (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986); *Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989); *Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century*, (New York: Collier, 1993); *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, (New York: Basic Books, 1997); *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership*, (New York: Basic Books, 2004); *Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower*, (New York: Basic Books, 2007); *America and the World: Conversations on the Future of American Foreign Policy*, (New York, Basic Books, 2008).

81 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics*, p. 42.

polarity between the United States and the Soviet Union was fundamental to this process. Even though some politicians, like President Nixon and his Secretary of State in the early 1970s Henry Kissinger tried to move American foreign policy from its bipolar mode into a multipolar balance of power system, their emphasis on demonstrating “credibility” led them through the domino analogy right back to bipolarity.

In the early 1990s, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cold War and the East/West bloc competition ended. The end of the Cold War brought with it the idea of a need for new perspectives on international relations. Not only had old enemies changed suddenly, but a new world economy had also emerged. A market-based world economy that in the mid-1970s involved only two-thirds of the total world population gained two billion new members with the opening up of China, the former Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries.⁸² Moreover, the geopolitics of modern Western conceptions and categories of territorial states have dissolved into the condition of postmodernity.⁸³ Various new discourses have emerged which dominate the world imagination in this era. These discourses shape perspectives on US/other identity in various contexts.

2.2.1.3 New World Order Geopolitics

Briefly, during the nineteenth century, and throughout most of the twentieth century, geopolitics was seen as the study of explaining and predicting the strategic behavior of states. States were the agents of geopolitics. This is the period of “classical geopolitics” discussed above. By the mid-1980s, the geopolitical discourse of the United States was effectively directed by a few scholars and policy makers mainly influenced by political realism. Geopolitics once more became an easy term to describe the great power rivalries of that time. The contemporary understanding of geopolitics, however, is much different.

In 1986, President of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev enacted the policies of glasnost and perestroika based on modernized communist principles.

⁸² John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, *Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy*, p. 27.

⁸³ Gearóid Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics*, p. 226.

However, this new political perception of Gorbachev and his arms reductions policy caused the fall of Berlin Wall and was the beginning of the end of the Cold War in Europe. Moreover, the geographical consequence of his new policies motivated the consequent dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the "new world order" of the 1990s.⁸⁴

After the end of the Cold War a new geopolitical order emerged, bringing with it economic questions, such as the impact of economic globalization on sovereignty and on the geopolitical structure of the world. Luttwak claimed that geopolitics in the post Cold War era could be defined as geo-economics.⁸⁵ Focusing mainly on the economic ability of the state, Japan emerged as a hegemonic competitor during this period. However, according to Dalby, this new geopolitics was not geo-economics but "ecopolitics".⁸⁶ Not only economic and environmental issues, but also perspectives on race, culture and the situations of ethnic minorities received considerable attention in geopolitics. Thus, new roles and new actors emerged continuously in international context.

With the collapse of Soviet Union, the US not only lost the powerful rivalry that drove it, but also its identity and role in global affairs.⁸⁷ The end of the Cold War left the US as the only remaining superpower, which also left it to attempt to reterritorialize world politics without a single rival.⁸⁸ This was the new world order.

84 Fraser Cameron, *US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?*, (London, New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 22.

85 Edward Luttwak, "From Geopolitics to Geo-economics", *The National Interest*, no. 20, p. 20.

86 Simon Dalby, *Environmental Security*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), p. 72.

87 Gearoid Ó Tuathail and Timothy W. Luke, "Present at the (Dis)Integration: Deterritorialization and Reterritorialization in the New Wor(l)d Order", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, vol. 84, no. 3, 1994, p. 382.

88 John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds.), *Globalization of World Politics*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 643.

But there was no sustained effort at remapping the world on the part of the Bush government during the early 1990s.⁸⁹

President George H.W. Bush declared a “new world order” during the Gulf War. This was seen as a way of achieving the national exceptionalism of the US.⁹⁰ He strenuously argued that the interests of the United States were universal interests of everyone. According to Bush, “the new world order” meant a new geopolitical map was drawn featuring the United States, in alliance with those who were willing to support it. Any change in the geopolitical order unfavourable to the US and the interests of “the West”, such as Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, was considered illegal aggression that “would not stand.” However, any change in the politics of the US, for instance the US invasion of Panama, was understandable and could be justified.⁹¹

During the Clinton era, US foreign policy was to integrate the “tamed zones” of global prosperity to enlarge liberal market democracies, and to contain the “wild zones” of threat and to be the world watcher of the global environment.⁹² The Clinton administration began to focus more on geoeconomical and environmental issues alongside political issues. During the Clinton administration, new opportunities and threats to the world and specifically to the US began to be written about, such as the threat of international terrorism, failed states, rogue states, cultural/civilizational conflict, and the opportunity to expand the democratic peace zone to the ex-Soviet countries, Asia, and the Middle East where freedom and free markets appeared to be lacking.⁹³ The ideas of the neo-conservatives

89 Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Timothy W. Luke, “Present at the (Dis)Integration: Deterritorialization and Reterritorialization in the New Wor(l)d Order”, p. 383.

90 Fraser Cameron, *US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff ?*, p. 15.

91 *ibid.*, pp. 15-17.

92 David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, pp. 196-197.

93 Luiza Bialasiewicz et.al., “Performing Security: The Imaginative Geographies of Current US Strategy”, *Political Geography*, vol. 26, 2007, p. 406.

particularly affected the geographical imagination and foreign policy of the Bush Administration.

After the Cold War global geopolitics was interpreted in new ways by the intellectuals of statecraft. During this time intellectuals attempted to make sense and to constitute grand geopolitical visions to the new world (dis)order, and have sought to reconstitute the identity of the US. Francis Fukuyama, while working for the State Department, argued that "history" had ended.⁹⁴ It means that all ideological conflict had been resolved because the superiority of liberalism was generally accepted.⁹⁵ Samuel Huntington, a political scientist at Harvard University, put forward the Clash of Civilizations⁹⁶ thesis, which was directly opposed to Fukuyama's message, and in so doing mapped out the forthcoming phase of global war. Huntington argued the conflict would continue but this time within a civilizational framework. A new map of blocs would be drawn on the basis of civilizations.⁹⁷ Finally, Thurows's projected economic clashes between Japan, the EC/EU and the US.⁹⁸ These are all attempts to give meaning to the new world (dis)order; to construct an identity and path for the US to follow.

In summary, it can be argued that geopolitical analysis in international relations is dominated by geopolitical considerations.⁹⁹ Moreover, the realist approach is broadly influential in contemporary geopolitics. Yet, especially after the end of the Cold War, geopolitics is experiencing a revival with the exploration of comprehensive models.

94 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?", *National Interest*, no. 16, Summer 1989, pp. 3–18; Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, (New York: The Free Press, 1992).

95 *ibid.*

96 Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 3, Summer, 1993, pp. 22–49.

97 *ibid.*

98 Lester Thurow, *Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle among Japan, Europe and America*, (New York: William Morrow, 1992).

99 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space*, (London, New York: Routledge, 1996).

2.2.2 Critical Geopolitics: A Need for an Alternative Approach?

In reaction to Kenneth Waltz's neorealist understanding of international politics and its positivist methodology, in the 1980s critical approaches to international relation theories emerged in Europe and the United States. Thereafter, the field of critical international relations has broadened to include critiques of international political economy, normative theory, security studies, and political community.¹⁰⁰

In the same way, "Critical Geopolitics" as a term was first used in the late 1980s and it appeared as an alternative route to orthodox geopolitical understanding. Its emergence has called into question the language, assumptions and practices of geopolitics. Unlike classical geopolitics which constructs, rules, shapes and organizes place mainly by language; critical geopolitics aims to understand geography-power relations and to deconstruct the hegemonic fixations of the spatial imaginations associated with it.¹⁰¹ Over time, literature on critical geopolitics has grown enormously. Studies range from macro scale analyses of how geopolitical imaginations frame world politics¹⁰² to smaller scale research, for example on the Ferghana Valley boundary dispute.¹⁰³ Despite some criticisms¹⁰⁴, critical geopolitics has been successful over the past two decades.

100 Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby (eds.), *Rethinking Geopolitics*, (New York, London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 1-16.

101 Klaus Dodds and James Derrick Sidaway, "Locating Critical Geopolitics", *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, vol. 12, no. 5, 1994; Gearóid Ó Tuathail, "(Dis)placing Geopolitics: Writing on the Maps of Global Politics", *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, vol. 12, no. 4, 1994; Gearóid Ó Tuathail and John Agnew "Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy", *Political Geography*, vol. 11, no. 2, 1992.

102 John Agnew, *Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics*.

103 Nick Megoran, "The Critical Geopolitics of the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley Boundary Dispute, 1999-2000", *Political Geography*, vol. 23, no. 6, 2004.

104 Phil Kelly, "A Critique of Critical Geopolitics", *Geopolitics*, vol. 11, no.1, Spring 2006; Susan M. Roberts et al., "Review Symposium on Gearoid O Tuathail's (1996) 'Critical Geopolitics: the Politics of Writing Global Space'", *Political Geography*, vol. 19, no. 3, 2000.

The roots of critical geopolitics can be dated back to the critical theories of the philosophers of the Frankfurt school, most significantly Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Jurgen Habermas, and later of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Antonio Gramsci. Indeed, the French philosopher Foucault is accepted as the philosophical father of critical geopolitics. Some scholars describe Foucault's 1976 interview with Yves Lacoste in the journal *Hérodote* and Edward Said's *Orientalism* as the first significant sources of critical geopolitics.¹⁰⁵ This new approach was developed by two political geographers, Simon Dalby and Gearóid Ó Tuathail and later by others such as John Agnew, Simon Dalby, Klaus Dodds, Leslie Hepple, Timothy Luke, and Paul Routledge.

Critical geopolitics is accepted as a project which became important in geography literature in the 1990s after the special "Critical Geopolitics" issue of the journal *Political Geography* in 1996¹⁰⁶, and the publication of Gearóid Ó Tuathail's influential *Critical Geopolitics* book.¹⁰⁷ According to Richard Jones, scholars of critical geopolitics have sought to produce a "process of emancipatory social transformation" with an emphasis on the "emancipatory potential inherent in communications"¹⁰⁸

There are different definitions of this new approach. For example Muller defines "critical geopolitics" as the examination of "the very construction and social effects of geopolitical imaginations and geopolitical identities- the imaginary spatial positioning of people, regions, states and the shifting boundaries that accompany this positioning".¹⁰⁹ Klaus Dodds has also claimed that "critical geopolitics

105 Leslie W. Hepple, "Geopolitiques de Gauche: Yves Lacoste, Herodote and French Radical Geopolitics", in Klaus Dodds and David Atkinson (eds.), *Geopolitical Traditions: A Century of Geopolitical Thought*; Edward Said, *Orientalism*, (London: Penguin Books, 1978).

106 Special Issue on Critical Geopolitics, *Political Geography*, 1996, vol. 15, vol. 6-7, 1996.

107 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space*.

108 Richard Wyn Johns, *Security, Strategy and Critical Theory*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), p. 46.

109 Martin Müller, "Reconsidering the Concept of Discourse for the Field of Critical Geopolitics: Towards Discourse as Language and Practice", *Political Geography*, vol. 27, no. 3, 2008, p. 323.

complemented new forms of political geography which questioned traditional understandings of the 'political' and the 'geographical'".¹¹⁰ In a more general way, as Ó Tuathail has noted, critical geopolitics is "no more than a general gathering place for various critiques of the multiple geographical discourses and practices that characterize modernity".¹¹¹

As discussed above, classical geopolitics was a general form of power/knowledge that tried to analyze the condition of world power in order to help the practice of statecraft by great powers. As a part of the imperialist projects of Western states during the nineteenth century, classical geopolitics created a broad understanding of world politics and also offered particular strategies for states to compete with their opponents.¹¹²

As a response, critical geopolitics initially critiques orthodox geopolitics by projecting its own ideologic and political assumptions.¹¹³ From the perspective of post-modernism, critical geopoliticians deconstruct the "objective" knowledge of traditional geographical method and reject any possible existence of an objective external world and a value-free social science. For them, geographical knowledge and representations are not innocent objective external realities, but are political and ideological or in other words "situated, contextual and embodied".¹¹⁴

While doing this, the critical approach tries to reveal the power/knowledge relations in both the study and practice of geopolitics. It shows that institutional power and disciplinary power/knowledge apparatuses centered in the United States

110 Klaus Dodds, *Political Geography*, p. 471.

111 Laura Jones and Daniel Sage, "New Directions in Critical Geopolitics: An Introduction", *Geojournal*, January 21, 2009, p. 16.

112 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, "The Postmodern Geopolitical Condition: States, Statecraft, and Security at the Millennium", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, vol. 90, no. 1, 2000, p. 166.

113 Phil Kelly, "A Critique of Critical Geopolitics", p. 27.

114 Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby (eds.), *Rethinking Geopolitic*, (New York, London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 5-6.

shape the rules of world order.¹¹⁵ Critical geopolitics identifies the structure of the production of geopolitical knowledge. Experts, institutions and ideology create the “necessary” geopolitical knowledge and present it to policy-makers. For classicists, the term “geopolitics” has an objective rather than subjective, and visual rather than verbal meaning. Critical Geopolitics argues that this is not the case. Associated with national security, geopolitics becomes a way to justify the exercise of power.¹¹⁶

In order to better understand how geopolitics works, Ó Tuathail and Dalby have divided it into three types – practical geopolitics, formal geopolitics, and popular geopolitics. Practical geopolitics is about the practices of statecraft performed by players such as the president, prime minister, minister of foreign affairs, and of bureaucratic and political institutions. Formal geopolitics is the production of geographical knowledge and practice at particular sites like strategic institutions, think tanks, and academies. Finally, popular geopolitics consist of the geopolitical representations of media, cinema, novels, or cartoons.¹¹⁷

All three forms become interconnected as academic writers and journalists share ideas and discourses with one another and both groups have regular contact with government officials and organizations. They are also related to the media and popular culture. Geopolitical frameworks can help both individuals and groups make sense of the world for themselves and a wider public. Metaphors such as “axis of evil” receive attention because they are designed to simplify world politics and locate friends and enemies. Ó Tuathail argued that this schema exists within a geopolitical culture which shapes a state’s policies in the world.

Critical geopolitics also demonstrates the importance of spaces in geopolitics. Along with the importance of representation of space, spatial practices and the importance of a spatial other are also seen as components of the geography of the world. Thus, the importance of the critical geopolitical research is

115 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, et.al., *The Geopolitics Reader*, (2nd ed.), (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 5-10.

116 *ibid.*, pp. 3-4

117 Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby (eds.), *Rethinking Geopolitics*, p. 5.

to show clearly that the construction of the images used in foreign policy making are themselves key geopolitical acts.

Ó Tuathail has also maintained that Critical Geopolitics does not only seek to uncover the power but also tries to understand different geopolitical arrangements. Critical geopoliticians are aware of the importance of the language of geopolitics used in foreign policy making. Inspired by post-modern scholars such as Michel Foucault and Edward Said, they identify discourse as a “matrix of reasoning”, an “ensemble of ideas and concepts” or a “regime of truth that functions as a power/knowledge system, constituting, representing and interpreting the ‘real’”.¹¹⁸

The impact of this discourse has been one of the main topics of critical geopolitics from the beginning. Discussions on critical geopolitics¹¹⁹, and the special issue of the Journal of Geopolitics dedicated to geopolitical discourse¹²⁰, show that it continues to be at the center of the intellectual agenda. As Ó Tuathail emphasizes that “the concept of ‘geopolitical discourse’ is perhaps the one concept associated with critical geopolitics more than any other area of study.”¹²¹ It connects power and space in an idea summarized by Sharp as follows: “Strategies of power always require the use of space and, thus, the use of discourses to create particular spatial images, primarily of territory and boundaries in statecraft, is inseparable from the formation and use of power.”¹²² Alongside discourse, different terms such as “geopolitical storylines,” “geopolitical imaginations,” “geopolitical scripts,”

118 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, “The Postmodern Geopolitical Condition: States, Statecraft, and Security at the Millennium”, p. 126.

119 Alexander B. Murphy, et.al., “Is there a Politics to Geopolitics?”.

120 “Geopolitics, Special Issue: the Politics of Geopolitical Discourse”, *Geopolitics*, vol. 11, 2004.

121 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, “Geopolitical Structures and Cultures: Towards Conceptual Clarity in the Critical Study of Geopolitics”, in L. Tchantouridze (ed.), *Geopolitics: Global Problems and Regional Concerns*, (Winnipeg: Centre for Defence and Security Studies, 2004), p. 82.

122 Joanne P. Sharp, “Publishing American Identity: Popular Geopolitics, Myth and the Reader’s Digest”, *Political Geography*, vol. 12, no. 6, 1993, p. 495.

“geopolitical narratives,” “geopolitical visions” and “geopolitical fantasies” are also used by the critical geopolitics scholars.¹²³

Indeed, for such scholars, discourses are not just text, images, speeches, or articulations of sovereign autonomous actors, but they are language, ideas and practices.¹²⁴ According to Bialasiewicz et al. “discourses refer to a specific series of representations and practices through which meanings are produced, identities constituted, social relations established, and political and ethical outcomes made more or less possible”.¹²⁵ They are performative. They are both representations and practices, with ontological effects. Discourses constitute both the objects and subjects they articulate. Unlike its perception of the geopolitical traditions of the “wisemen” of statecraft, geopolitics is a much broader cultural phenomenon of spatial practices of statecraft including both the material and the representational.¹²⁶

In sum, it can be argued that modern geopolitical imaginations are historically and geographically constructed discourses. As Ó Tuathail and Agnew noted, there are four specific points about geopolitical discourses and political elites. Their first point is that critical geopolitics questions the relationships between geographical/political reasoning and geopolitical practices of world politics. Secondly, modern geopolitical discourses are used for practical reasoning and they reflect dominant spatial representations. The third point is that geographical knowledge has a reductive nature, which is filtered to fit into formal geographical categories. The fourth point is that the political elites of the great powers have disproportionate influence on the constitution of dominant political discourse. While

123 Martin Müller, “Reconsidering the Concept of Discourse for the Field of Critical Geopolitics: Towards Discourse as Language and Practice”, p. 323.

124 *ibid.*, p. 325; Gearóid Ó Tuathail, “Theorizing Practical Geopolitical Reasoning: The Case of US. Policy towards Bosnia in 1992”, *Political Geography*, vol. 21, no. 5, 2002, pp. 605-606.

125 Luiza Bialasiewicz, et.al., “Performing Security: The Imaginative Geographies of Current US Strategy”, p. 406.

126 Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby, “Introduction”, in *Re-Thinking Geopolitics: Towards a Critical Geopolitics*, Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby (eds.), (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 3.

this discourse is not unchallenged, even challenges must be within the terms of dominant discourse.¹²⁷

Critical geopolitics also stresses the importance of metaphors in geopolitical discourse. According to Lakoff and Johnson, metaphors can be explained by the rule "X is Y".¹²⁸ The geopolitical metaphor is not simply a linguistic or conceptual construct, it is also a discursive tool used by policymakers to justify their actions and plans.¹²⁹ Yanik argues that when policymakers use metaphors such as "bridge" or "crossroads", "[t]hey are not simply using some vivid language to make their statement. Rather they are combining a discursive practice with a geopolitical imagination/representation, and also, with an international function and identity they are aspiring to play and become."¹³⁰

2.3 Conclusion

As mentioned above, the classical geopoliticians explained "how the world works" and used a theoretical perspective to justify the foreign policy directions of their own states. In Flint's words, "They constructed geopolitical images of the world within their own place-specific settings".¹³¹ On the other hand, Critical Geopolitics highlights the importance of space in geopolitics. According to critical geopolitics scholars, "the study of geopolitics is the study of spatialisation of

127 Gearóid Ó Tuathail and John A. Agnew, "Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy", *Political Geography*, vol. 11, no. 2, 1992, pp. 193–194.

128 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 3.

129 *ibid.*, pp. 3–6; Paul Chilton and Mikhail Ilyin, "Metaphor in Political Discourse: The Case of the 'Common European House'", *Discourse and Society*, vol. 4, no. 1, 1993, p. 10.

130 Lerna Yanik, "The Metamorphosis of 'Metaphors of Vision': 'Bridging' Turkey's Location, Role and Identity After the End of the Cold War", p. 533.

131 Colin Flint, *Introduction to Geopolitics*, p. 24.

international politics by core powers and hegemonic states".¹³² It also tries to reveal the power/knowledge relations in both the study and practices of geopolitics. Today, the United States with its disciplinary power/knowledge tools, can be described as the only actor, shaping the rules of the world politics.

Critical geopoliticians stresses the role of the language of geopolitics that is used in foreign policy making. Accordingly, geopolitical discourses can be defined as power structures. They are constructed by particular institutions and political forces in order to maintain their power or gain more power in world politics.¹³³ These discourses shape minds and serve as justifications for policy actions. They also serve to represent and reconstruct the meaning of the past, present and future.¹³⁴ This reconstruction allows people to specify geographies in particular ways.¹³⁵

In the next chapters, I will examine the construction of geopolitical imaginations of the United States and its different metaphors of Turkey in the world as a "barrier", "flank", "model", or "bridge".

132 Gearóid Ó Tuathail et.al., *The Geopolitics Reader*, (2nd ed.), p. 95.

133 John Agnew, *Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics*, pp. 79-80.

134 Martin Müller, "Reconsidering the Concept of Discourse for the Field of Critical Geopolitics: Towards Discourse as Language and Practice", p. 330.

135 Simon Dalby, *Environmental Security*, p. i.

CHAPTER 3

COLD WAR YEARS: AN ILLUSION OF GEOPOLITICS?

"Power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society."

*Michel Foucault*¹³⁶

3.1 Introduction

As argued in this dissertation Critical Geopolitics examines the geopolitical imagination of the state. The main premise of Critical Geopolitics is described to be "the contention that geography and historical discourse which is always intimately bound up with question of politics and ideology".¹³⁷ Thus, the Cold War geopolitical narrative, while proposing different political and economic models, also offered different "imaginings". This was made possible by the language of "blocs", "containment", and "dominoes". Ó Tuathail and Agnew assert that "[t]he simple story of a great struggle between a democratic 'West' against a formidable and expansionist 'East' became 'the most influential and durable geopolitical script of [the Cold War] period.'"¹³⁸ Similarly, Kaldor argues that the Cold War has always been a discourse, a conflict of words, "capitalism" versus "socialism".¹³⁹

Critical geopolitics shows how places were defined -as a "threat" or as "strategically important", and how these definitions have changed over time. Within

136 Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: The Will to Knowledge*, (London: Penguin, 1998), pp. 92-93.

137 Michel Foucault cited in Gearóid Ó Tuathail and John Agnew (eds.), *A Companion to Political Geography*, (Washington: Blackwell, 1998) p. 79.

138 John Agnew, *Geopolitics: Re-Visioning World Politics*, p. 190.

139 Mary Kaldor, *The Imaginary War: Understanding the East-West Conflict*, (London, Basil Blackwell, 1990).

this framework, this chapter is an outline the roots of Turkish-American relations and Turkey's geopolitical imagination in US foreign policy during the Cold War. I aim to understand the basis of this relationship and the factors affecting it. It has been held that primary US interest in Turkey during the Cold War was its geopolitical location. Under Cold War conditions the US created its own geopolitical discourse that shaped its foreign policy and aimed to prevent Soviet expansion into the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. Meanwhile Turkey's geographical position suited the US foreign policy of containment. As a part of this geopolitical imagination, Turkey was perceived as a "barrier" against the Soviet Union, a "guardian" of NATO's southern flank, and moreover an important "military base" in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean. Turkey's proximity to the Soviet Union and its historical ties with the Middle East affected US foreign policy in this period. This is why the US improved its relations with Turkey during the Cold War. In order to understand the relationship between Turkey and the United States in the post-Cold War period, it is necessary to know why the two countries established and maintained their alliance in spite of internal and international crises that affected their relationship. This relationship is studied within the context of critical geopolitics, which shows how geopolitical discourse shapes and, in turn, is shaped by foreign policymaking.

In fact, Turkish-American relations go back approximately 200 years, yet during the nineteenth century those relations were not defined as "strategic" to either side. It became a "strategic alliance" during the second part of the 20th century.

As it is argued above, the primary US interest in Turkey was geopolitics. Alliance with Turkey was an important part of the Cold War geopolitical discourse of the United States. From the Truman Doctrine to the Carter and Reagan doctrines, Turkey has been part of every strategic doctrine developed by Washington. From the time World War II ended, the US aimed to "contain" the Soviet Union. For the US, Turkey has been perceived as "the stopper in the neck of the bottle through which Soviet political and military influence could most effectively flow into the

eastern Mediterranean and Middle East.”¹⁴⁰ A State Department research paper stressed the importance of Turkish Straits and concluded that “[t]he principal reason for Turkey’s international significance, is its geographic location athwart the strategically important Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus”.¹⁴¹ Similarly, in 1951, a CIA Intelligence report explained the importance of Turkey and defined it geographically as follows: “The alignment of Turkey with the West is of primary strategic importance to the US because of Turkey’s political and military strength and its geographical position... The Turkish Army would be a major obstacle to Soviet advances in the Middle East through Turkey... Turkey is the only country in the Near East capable of offering substantial resistance to Soviet aggression”.¹⁴² As a result of this “geopolitical significance”, which was critical to the containment of Soviet expansion, Turkey and the United States became allies and consequently established close military ties.

Several of developments followed the strategic cooperation between the US and Turkey. During the late 1940s, Turkey was officially accepted as part of the Western bloc and received American military and economic aid with the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan to “protect” itself against the communist threat. Seeking a balance of power against Soviet expansion in the Middle East, Turkey received \$100 million in aid with the Truman Doctrine.

For its part, Turkey committed troops to the efforts of its ally the United States during the Korean War. Thereafter, the United States supported Turkey’s membership to NATO in 1952. In subsequent years Turkey and the United States formalized this alliance with the opening of US military bases in Turkey following

140 US Department of State, *FRUS: The Near East and Africa, 1946 vol. VII*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946).

141 US Department of State, “Factors Significant for Conditioning the Effectiveness of a US Information Program: IV, Greece, Turkey, Iran, January 28, 1949”, *The Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalog*, vol. 6, no. 2, April-June 1980, p. 201.

142 US Central Intelligence Agency, “Turkey’s Position in the East-West Struggle: Estimate of the Will and Ability of Turkey to Maintain its Alignment with the West and the Course of Action Turkey Might Follow in the Event of War, February 26, 1951”, *The Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalog*, vol. VII, no. 7, January-December 1986, p. 30.

the Military Facilities Agreement of 1954. Turkey also became a founding member of the Baghdad Pact in 1955, and endorsed the principles of the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957. In the Middle East, during 1950s and 1960s, Turkey improved its relations with pro-American countries such as Iran, Israel, and Jordan to prevent the influence of pro-Soviet countries like Egypt, Iraq, and Syria.

As a result of this close relationship, during the Cold War years, Turkey provided critical base facilities to the United States and in turn, the United States provided economic and military aid to Turkey. As we can see these military relations were the most important parts of US strategic interests, which were mainly based on the Heartland/Rimland discourse of US foreign policy. Strategically, the US perceived Turkey as a base from which to reach to the Middle Eastern oil and the problematic areas close to the Soviet Union.

Briefly, it can be argued that during the 1950s and the early 1960s, Turkish-American relations were far from troubled. Larrabee and Lesser described these early years of the Cold War as a "golden age".¹⁴³ From Washington's perspective, Turkey was an effective ally for the Western interests in the Middle East. For Ankara, on the other hand, the United States was a necessary element guaranteeing Turkey's security and development.

On the other hand, the alliance was affected by détente in the 1960s and 1970s and two countries endured serious crises as during the Cuban missile crisis and withdrawal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey, the Opium issue, and the Johnson letter. The Turkish invasion of Cyprus in July 1974 and the US arms embargo were accepted as the major turning points of the alliance. Turkey viewed the Cyprus issue as a domestic issue, a "national cause". As a result of the "Johnson Letter" and the arms embargo anti-American sentiment grew in the country. Consequently, Turkey dissolved the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) of 1969 and several related agreements unilaterally, and announced that all US facilities in Turkey would be placed on "provisional status". But despite these difficulties relations

143 F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), p. 163.

improved especially in 1980s, due to the end of the détente and international initiation of the "Second Cold War".

In the 1980s, US geopolitical discourse with regard to Turkey began to change. During the Cold War years, or even before, Turkey was located in the "Near East", in the "Eastern Mediterranean", or in the "Middle East". Turkey's joining NATO in 1952 and its application for the full membership to the EEC in 1987 were the significant turning points resulting in the location of Turkey in Europe by the US. The first important change occurred in the State Department in 1974. Before that, Turkey and Greece were under the responsibility of Bureau of the Near East Affairs (NEA). In fact, Turkey and Greece, and Iran, were formed a GTI (Greece, Turkey, Iran) subdivision within the NEA office. On April 18, 1974, the Department transferred responsibility of Turkey, Greece and Cyprus to the Bureau of European Affairs.¹⁴⁴ In 1983 Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle referred to US relations with Turkey as "the largest, most productive and least understood program in Southern Europe".¹⁴⁵

This chapter consists of four main parts. In the first part the United States' foreign policy directions during the Cold War will be analyzed. In the second and third parts political developments and military relations between Turkey and the United States will be explained. The Cyprus issue as the most important crisis during this period will be the main theme of the following section.

3.2 US Foreign Policy during the Cold War

After the Second World War, decisions taken at Yalta and Potsdam were to change the dynamics of international relations. During this period, international political actors united around the United States and the Soviet Union, creating a

¹⁴⁴ See <http://history.state.gov>, (Accessed on March 19, 2010).

¹⁴⁵ William Akin, "Playing Chicken in Turkey", *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist*, vol. 39, no. 8, October 1983, p. 4.

bipolar system and freezing international frontiers in the logic of East-West confrontation. The “Cold War” was the result of this confrontation.

The geopolitical concept of “Cold War” was first coined in 1947 by Bernard Baruch, advisor to President Harry Truman, to explain crises between the two superpowers.¹⁴⁶ In the most basic terms, the Cold War can be defined as the geopolitical system based on opposing relations between United States and the Soviet Union.¹⁴⁷ In that sense, it is described as a conflict over the control of territory justified through geopolitical images of the “Iron Curtain” and the “free world”, the “threat” of communism from the perspective of Western governments and the “imperialism” of America from the Soviet Union’s view.¹⁴⁸

During the Cold War, territoriality was more stable and delineated two ideological camps: On one side was the liberal capitalist bloc and on the other was the communist bloc.¹⁴⁹ The two blocs attempted to create their own fields and expand their spheres of influence and political-economy model to a “third world”. The geopolitical discourse of the Cold War also had ideological meaning.¹⁵⁰ The US represented capitalism, the Soviet Union represented communism and each idealized the other as foreign and threatening.

146 John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History*, (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005), p. 54.

147 Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory”, p. 244.

148 Colin Flint, *Introduction to Geopolitics*, p. 13.

149 Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Timothy W. Luke, “Present at the (Dis)Integration: Deterritorialization and Reterritorialization in the New Wor(l)d Order”, p. 383.

150 John Agnew and Stuard Corbridge, *Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy*, p. 68.




Figure 3.1 Map of the Cold War

Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/ff/Cold_War_Map_1980.png/1024px-Cold_War_Map_1980.png, (Accessed on March 31, 2010).

Agnew argues that “one way of thinking about the geographical framing of foreign policies is to recall the foreign policy ‘doctrines’” declared by different US presidents in years, from President Monroe in 1823 through President Truman in 1947 to President George W. Bush in 2002.¹⁵¹ Before the Cold War, pragmatism was keyword of the US foreign policy. The Monroe Doctrine, introduced by President Monroe in 1823, is accepted as the best example of this American pragmatism.¹⁵² It was primarily based on the idea of isolation and is justified in geographical terms. The aim was to isolate the US from the rest of the world, and make the country wealthier. With this “isolationist” policy, the US had yet decided not to interfere in European politics, and at the same time opposed all foreign intervention on the American continent. Over the years, however, the doctrine served as a tool to justify US military intervention in Latin America. Indeed, President Wilson’s fourteen points advocated free trade, openness of the seas, and

¹⁵¹ John Agnew, *Geopolitics: Re-visioning the World Politics*, p. 5.

¹⁵² James Monroe, “Seventh Annual Message”, December 2, 1823, John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, Santa Barbara, CA, Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29465>, (Accessed on April 24, 2010).

general liberties can be taken as another example of US pragmatism in the post-World War I period.¹⁵³

After World War II, the United States started to develop its role as a superpower and generated geopolitical strategic ideas that justified its actions. Before the war, Isaiah Bowman, president of the Association of American Geographers, suggested a pragmatic approach to the US's global role.¹⁵⁴ Nicholas Spykman also projected an active US foreign policy to establish and maintain a balance of power in the world and to prevent a challenge to the United States. He identified the "Rimland", similar to Mackinder's "inner crescent", as the key geopolitical arena.¹⁵⁵

Questions of geography were central throughout the Cold War. During this period, the geopolitical logic of American administrations dangerously simplified politics as global areas were divided into "friendly" and "hostile" spaces. The subsequent investment in military forces in the world was justified on the basis of these geographic and ideological blocs.

153 Woodrow Wilson, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress on the Conditions of Peace", January 8, 1918, John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, Santa Barbara, CA, Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=65405>, (Accessed on March 5, 2010).

154 Neil Smith, *American Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), p. 47.

155 Nicholas Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power*, p. 12.




Figure 3.2 Spykman's Rimland Map

Source: Mark Polelle, *Raising Cartographic Consciousness: The Social and Foreign Policy Vision of Geopolitics in the Twentieth Century*, (New York: Lexington Books, 1999), p. 118.

The Cold War also affected the works of scholars and the ideas of political leaders. Particularly in the US geopoliticians not only described the strategic realities of the Cold War, they also helped to shape them. It can be argued that, with the impact of some leading scholars like Hans Morgenthau, geopolitics became a vital part of the security discourse of the United States in these years. Cohen¹⁵⁶ and Brown¹⁵⁷ argued that policymakers such as Acheson, Brzezinski, Dulles, Eisenhower, Haig, Kennan, Kissinger, Nixon, Nitze, Rostow and Taylor were deeply influenced by geopolitical theories.¹⁵⁸ Mackinder's "Heartland" theory and Spykman's "Rimland" concept may have served as the foundation for US foreign policy makers' Cold War containment policy against the Soviet Union.

156 Saul B. Cohen, "Global Political Change in the Post-Cold War Era", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, vol. 81, no. 4, 1991, p. 550.

157 Seyom Brown, "Inherited Geopolitics and Emergent Global Realities" in Edward K. Hamilton (ed.), *America's Global Interests*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1989), pp. 166-77.

158 Saul B. Cohen, "Global Political Change in the Post-Cold War Era", p. 550.

Needless to say, the Cold War period was not monolithic. As a response to changes of the international dynamics, the “geopolitical codes” of American Presidents changed between the 1940s and the 1980s. O’Loughlin and Grant analyzed the presidential State of the Union addresses for their global geographical content, and described the following trend:

"In the 1940s and 1950s, emphasis was placed on the perceived threat to the 'Rimland,' that zone of containment arranged in a semicircle around the Soviet heartland. In the 1960s, attention to specific conflicts in Cuba and Vietnam was added to the dominant U.S./U.S.S.R. competitive theme. In the 1970s decade of detente, attention to foreign policy was reduced, only to be revived strongly in a regional guise in the late 1970s and early 1980s by Presidents Carter and Reagan. During the 1980s, the regional focus of U.S./U.S.S.R. competition has shifted to the Middle East, Southern Africa and Central America."¹⁵⁹

Despite all these changes, two main geopolitical concepts were used by the US Administrations to explain or justify their foreign policy actions during the Cold War. These were containment and the domino effect.

First expressed by George Kennan, a US official to the Soviet Union at the end of the Second World War, the term containment referred to the military and economic exclusion of the Soviet Union. Kennan, in his well-known “Long Telegram”¹⁶⁰ and “Mr. X”¹⁶¹ article claimed that there could not be meaningful cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. This claim had an important effect on the Truman administration in 1947 and the founding of NATO in 1949. Kennan divided the world into regions with political meaning, defining a maritime trading West and a despotic xenophobic East. This classification became a fundamental part of the Cold War geopolitical imagination. It can be argued that Kennan’s “Mr. X” article not only established the US foreign policy of containment during the Cold War but also framed the agenda of International Relations and US foreign policy later. In similar fashion more than forty years after Kennan’s article,

159 J. O’Loughlin and R. Grant, “The Political Geography of Presidential Speeches, 1946-87”, p. 527.

160 US Department of State, *FRUS*, “Eastern Europe: the Soviet Union, vol. VI”, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 696-709.

161 X, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”, pp. 566-582.

Samuel Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations"¹⁶² article in the Summer 1993 issue of *Foreign Affairs* would go on to significantly shape the post-Cold War discourse on International Relations and US foreign policy.

The scope of containment was enlarged by domino theory. For Agnew domino theory argues that "the sooner some potential threat to the global status quo was engaged, wherever it might occur, the less likely was it to produce a spread or contagion effect that could eventually lead all the way back to the United States."¹⁶³ The falling dominoes metaphor was first used by President Eisenhower in the mid-1950s to describe the consequences of the "loss" of South Vietnam. He said "You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have the beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences".¹⁶⁴ President Truman used the same logic in his speech before the Congress asking for support of American intervention in Greece and Turkey.

Geopolitics became an almost official doctrine of US foreign policy in the 1970s with the influence of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. After the defeat in Vietnam and due to the need to restore US power during the growing economic crisis, Kissinger and President Nixon reached out to the concept of geopolitics. For example, the softening of relations with China and the initiation of *détente* with the Soviet Union were both presented as "geopolitical necessities".¹⁶⁵

While Kissinger's geopolitics during the late 1960s and 1970s were about *détente* between the superpowers and controlled competition in the Third World, the Reagan administration's "new geopolitics" was a return to explicit ideological competition between the superpowers. In the early 1990s, with the collapse of

162 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", pp. 22–49.

163 John A. Agnew, *Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics*, p. 111.

164 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "The President's News Conference", April 7, 1954, John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, Santa Barbara, CA, Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=65405>, (Accessed on October 15, 2010).

165 Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years*, p. 298.

Soviet Union, the Cold War ended. Various discourses have emerged to compete for domination of the world imagination on particular arenas and on US identity in contrast with its others during this era.

It should be underscored here that the concept of containment and the metaphor of falling dominoes were key to the understanding of the roots and the nature of Turkish-American relationships. In the following section political developments between two states will be examined in this context.

3.3 Political Developments

3.3.1 Historical Roots of the Relations

While the Ottoman Empire attracted attention of the great powers in the late 19th century, there was no geopolitical relationship between the United States and the Ottoman Empire. For Eleanor H. Tejirian the American relationship with Turkey developed during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as a result of the activities of merchants and missionaries.¹⁶⁶ Political relations between the two states came into consideration after the Monroe Doctrine of 1823.¹⁶⁷ Tajirian also argued that until World War II, the main issues of the US government in the Middle East, "reflecting interests" rather than constituted a policy.¹⁶⁸

The United States and the Ottoman Empire signed the Ottoman-American Treaty of Trade and Navigation on 7 May 1830.¹⁶⁹ Americans received similar rights and privileges within the Ottoman Empire to Europeans under the terms of

166 Eleanor H. Tejirian, "The United States, the Ottoman Empire and the Post War Settlement", in Reeva Spector Simon and Eleanor H. Tejirian, *Creation of Iraq, 1914-1921*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 147.

167 James Monroe, "Seventh Annual Message", December 2, 1823, John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, Santa Barbara, CA, Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29465>, (Accessed on April 24, 2010).

168 Eleanor H. Tejirian, "The United States, the Ottoman Empire and the Post War Settlement", p. 148.

169 "Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ile Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Arasında Seyrisefain ve Ticaret Anlaşması", in Fahir Armaoğlu, *Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi), 1991, pp. 2-6.

capitulation. Erhan states that this treaty was the central document of bilateral relations between the two states for nearly ninety years.¹⁷⁰

Between 1830 and 1917, the focus of the bilateral relations was trade. But during this period the purpose of the missionary activities was questioned by the Ottoman administration. It was believed that these activities aimed to spread nationalism among the non-Muslim minorities.¹⁷¹ Meanwhile, as a result of the trade and missionary activities, the Ottoman Empire began to be imagined by American presidents as part of the "East" and the "Orient".¹⁷²

The Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers in World War I in August 1914 and declared war on Britain and Russia on October 31 and November 2 respectively. The United States finally entered the War against Germany in April 1917, at which point Ottoman-American diplomatic relations were broken. The United States did not declare war on the Ottomans, however, in large part because of concern for American missions in the Empire.¹⁷³

The war with the Ottoman Empire came to an end with the Armistice signed at Mudros on October 30, 1918. Relations between two states were relatively inactive between two world wars. The key to US policy and influence in the Middle East during and after World War I was President Woodrow Wilson, and particularly Wilson's Fourteen Points, presented to Congress in January 1918 as guiding

170 Çağrı Erhan, "Main Trends in Ottoman-American Relations", in *Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future*, Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan (eds.), (London, New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 5.

171 Recep Boztemur, "Religion and Politics in the Making of American Near East Policy, 1918-1922", *JSRI*, no. 11, Summer 2005, p. 48.

172 John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, Santa Barbara, CA, Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29472>; <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29550>, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29551>, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29552>, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29553>, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16295>, (Accessed on October 15, 2010).

173 Çağrı Erhan, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Kökenleri*, (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2001), p. 388; Eleanor H. Tejirian, "The United States, the Ottoman Empire and the Post War Settlement", p. 150.

principles for a peace settlement.¹⁷⁴ It can be argued that Wilson's fourteen points revealed the administration's aim to develop an activist foreign policy in Middle Eastern affairs.

At the end of First World War, the Sèvres Treaty of 1920 was signed between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied powers, though it was never ratified by the Ottoman Empire. Thereafter, as a consequence of the Turkish War of Independence, peace negotiations were started during the Conference of Lausanne. The US participated with observer status at the Lausanne Conference. Here, the Conference's full name can give us a hint to understand Turkey's location for the Western powers: "Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922-1923".¹⁷⁵

In the beginning, the United States did not want to be a part of the Conference. When the US officials were invited to join the negotiations, they responded that "the United States was neither at war with Turkey nor a party to the armistice of 1918 and does not desire to participate in final peace negotiations or to assume responsibility for the political and territorial adjustments which may be effected."¹⁷⁶ It can be argued that the intention of the United States was to limit its involvement, but it also tried to calculate the impact of the consequences of the conference on American interests in the Middle East. In October 1922, Bristol sent a message to the Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes: "As the United States is one of the capitulatory powers with extensive vested interests in Turkey, we cannot afford to remain inactive while the Allies give their consent to important changes in

174 Woodrow Wilson, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress on the Conditions of Peace", January 8, 1918, John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, Santa Barbara, CA, Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=65405>, (Accessed on February 12, 2010).

175 *Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923: Record of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace*, London, 1923.

176 US Department of State, *FRUS: Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1923 vol. II*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1923), p. 884.

the capitulatory regime."¹⁷⁷ In the end, the US administration sent officials to Lausanne to protect American economic and missionary interests in the region.

The Lausanne agreement was signed on July 24, 1923, and in August the United States signed a separate treaty with Turkey that "granted American philanthropic, educational, and religious institutions equal status with Turkish institutions of the same kind, accepting all American institutions recognized as of October 20, 1914, and pledging to give serious consideration to those operating as of July 24, 1923."¹⁷⁸ Turkey and the United States also signed trade agreements in 1929 and 1939.¹⁷⁹ However, it can be argued no stable relations existed between the two states until Stalin's demands of the Second World War era.




Figure 3.3 Map of Treaty of Lausanne

Source: <http://www.hri.org/docs/lausanne/turkey.gif>, (Accessed on March 17, 2011).

¹⁷⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁷⁸ Edgar W. Turlington, *The American Treaty of Lausanne*, (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1924), p. 577.

¹⁷⁹ "Türkiye ile Amerika Arasında Ticaret ve Seyrisefain Anlaşması", in Fahir Armaoğlu, *Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi), 1991, pp. 113-116; "Amerika ile Türkiye Arasında Ticaret Anlaşması", pp. 117-124.

3.3.2 Question of the Turkish Straits and the Beginning of the Relations

In fact, the most important issues bringing the United States and Turkey together were the post World War II environment and the Soviet Union's territorial demands on Turkey. The question of the Turkish Straits can be taken as one of the first geopolitical crises of the Cold War era. Indeed, the issue existed between Turkey and the Soviet Union even before World War II. The rules passage over the Turkish Straits had been determined by the Lausanne Treaty in 1923. In 1936, the Turkish government demanded a revision to these regulations. Consequently, on 20 July 1936, the Montreux Convention on the Regime of the Turkish Straits was signed.¹⁸⁰ Accordingly, with the Montreux Convention, the international regime of passage rights was abolished and Turkish military control over the Straits was established. This new Straits regime added valuable assets to the Turkish geopolitical image.

However, World War II changed the balance of power in world politics, and the Turkish Straits became more crucial for the Soviet Union. At the beginning of the War, after signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between the Soviet Union and Germany, Turkish Foreign Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu arrived in Moscow in September 1939 to sign a pact with the Soviet Union.¹⁸¹ The Soviet officials asked for mutual defense of the Straits, giving them the opportunity to control the "strategic bottlenecks". However, the Turkish government refused the Soviet demands. With the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, Turkish-Soviet relations deteriorated.

The Soviet request for revision of the Montreux Convention had been brought up by Soviet leader Joseph Stalin at the Yalta Conference. Here, Britain and the US agreed in principle.¹⁸² After Turkey's demands to renew the Treaty of

180 Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt 1: 1919-1980*, (Ankara: İletişim Yayınevi, 2001), p. 90.

181 Haluk Ülman, *Türk-Amerikan Diplomatik Münasebetleri: 1939-1947*, (Ankara: Sevinç, 1961), pp. 25-27.

182 *ibid.*, p. 51.

Neutrality and Non-Aggression of 1925, the Soviet Union officially repented on March 19, 1945 that this demand would be possible only if Turkey would agree to the joint defense of the Straits.¹⁸³ On June 7, 1945 the Soviet Union increased pressure over Turkey, demanding Kars and Ardahan provinces, as well as a base on the Straits.¹⁸⁴ After Yalta, Stalin raised the question again with Britain and the United States at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945. At that time, President Truman described the Turkish defense of the Straits as a "selfish control of the waterways of Europe" and "one of the persistent causes of wars in Europe in the last two centuries".¹⁸⁵

In November 1945, the US Department of State informed the Turkish government of its proposed revisions to the Montreux Treaty.¹⁸⁶ Indeed, Britain and the US were skeptical to accept the Soviet demands at Potsdam and thereafter. Britain perceived these demands as a serious threat to British interests in the Middle East and therefore wanted to respond. However, due to economic difficulties, it needed support from the United States in order to challenge the Soviet threat. At the Moscow conference of foreign ministers in December 1945, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin asserted that "His Majesty's Government could not be indifferent to a Russian threat to Turkey and would stand by her. We could not agree to the Soviet request for a base in the Straits and for the return of Kars and Ardahan."¹⁸⁷ Secretary of State Byrnes supported this idea and the United States backed the British position thereafter. Indeed, the main US aim was to prevent Soviet expansion into the Middle East where oil was the most important strategic concern of the US. Within this framework, Turkey's geopolitical position

183 Kamuran Gürün, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri: 1920-1953*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), pp. 276-277.

184 *ibid.*, p. 283.

185 Quoted in Harry Howard, "Some Recent Developments in the Problem of the Turkish Straits, 1945-1946", *Department of State Bulletin*, vol. 16, no. 395, January 26, 1947, p. 143.

186 "Boğazlar Konusunda Amerika'nın Türkiye'ye 2 Kasım Notası", in Fahir Armaoğlu, *Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri*, pp. 141-142.

187 "Position on Question of the Turkish Straits-Exchange of Notes Between the Soviet Chargé d'affaires and Acting Secretary Acheson", *Department of State Bulletin*, vol. 15, no. 374, September 1, 1946, p. 421.

became vital for the containment of the ideological and territorial expansion of the Soviet Union.

With this assessment by the US administration, the strategic and ideological borders of the Cold War in the region were drawn. According to Edwin Wilson, the American Ambassador in Ankara, the Russians' real purpose was to dominate Turkey and the Eastern Mediterranean.¹⁸⁸ The main reasoning for this argument was similar to that of domino theory: If Greece, Turkey, or Iran fell under Soviet domination, each would become more vulnerable. If the Soviet Union were strengthened by access to the Eastern Mediterranean, the American and British positions would be weakened, and Western Europe's vital oil supplies would be damaged. It can be argued that Soviet demands signified the "strategic" importance of the Turkish Straits to the United States.

In December 1945, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, gave private guarantees to the Turkish government as a response to the territorial demands of the Soviet Union.¹⁸⁹ This was perceived as the first significant sign of change in US foreign policy. The Turkish government refused the renewed Soviet proposal of July 1946, with the support of the United States. President Truman claimed that "The Turkish Government, encouraged by the American attitude, rejected the Soviet demands and showed admirable determination to resist if Russia should resort to open violence. But Turkey's army, though sizable, was poorly equipped and would have been no match for the battle-tested divisions of the Kremlin".¹⁹⁰

The US battleship Missouri arrived in İstanbul on 5 April 1946, carrying the body of Turkish Ambassador Mehmet Münir Ertegün, who died in Washington in November 1944.¹⁹¹ But in fact, the US sent the battleship to show that it would not

188 Edwin C. Wilson, *İstanbul Press Reactions March 14 to Truman Speech*, Ankara, March 14, 1947.

189 Melvyn P. Leffler, "Negotiating from Strength: Acheson, the Russians, and American Power", in Douglas Brinkley (ed.), *Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy*, (London: Macmillan, 1993), p. 177.

190 Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs, vol. 2, Years of Trial and Hope*, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1955), pp. 97-98.

191 Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt 1: 1919-1980*, p. 525.

allow the Soviet Union to expand into the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean, and that it would support Turkey as a barrier to Soviet expansion. The Missouri's İstanbul visit and the American response to the Soviet note can be taken as signs of the US's new geopolitical interests in Turkey and the Near East.¹⁹² Ambassador Wilson emphasized the importance of this visit as follows: "This demonstration can be mainly explained by hope engendered in the [Turkish Government] and people by recent developments [in] US foreign policy, culminating in Missouri visit, that [the] US has now established [an] independent policy in [the] Near and Middle East based in defense of its own interests in the region, these interests understood as maintenance of peace and security through support of principles of [the United Nations]." ¹⁹³ Consequently, the Missouri's visit is often seen as the symbolic beginning of the Turkish-American strategic relationship.

In the days that followed, the Soviet Union sent a note to Turkey on August 7, 1946, repeating its demands on the Straits.¹⁹⁴ In response, on August 19 the US replied that "the Soviet note does not appear to envisage a revision of the Montreux Convention...but rather the establishment of a new regime which would be confined to Turkey and the other Black Sea powers." The US further stated that Turkey should continue to be primarily responsible for the defense of the Straits.¹⁹⁵ The British administration reacted similarly in its reply note to the Soviet Union on August 21, 1946.¹⁹⁶ The exchange of notes ended without revision to the Montreux Convention.

On August 23, a memorandum was prepared by Jernegan, Assistant Chief

192 Şühnaz Yılmaz, "Challenging the Stereotypes: Turkish-American Relations in the Inter-War Era", *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 42, no. 2, March 2006, p. 230.

193 US Department of State, *FRUS: The Near East and Africa, 1946 vol. VII*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 822-3.

194 Cemil Bilsel, "The Turkish Straits in the Light of Recent Turkish-Soviet Russian Correspondence", *The American Journal of International Law*, vol. 41, no. 4, October 1947, p. 739.

195 "Position on Question of the Turkish Straits-Exchange of Notes Between the Soviet Chargé d'affaires and Acting Secretary Acheson", p. 421.

196 US Department of State, *Department of State Bulletin*, vol. 16, January-March 1947.

of Division to the Near Eastern Department, and approved by Secretary Byrnes and Undersecretary Acheson on October 21, 1946.¹⁹⁷ In this memorandum Jenegan asserted that the Soviet Union aimed to weaken Turkey in order to dominate it and use it both as a defense against possible outside attack from the Mediterranean and as a tool for political and military expansion into the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Turkey's representation in the Cold War became more visible in this memorandum. Accordingly, Turkey's key location in the Middle East and its decision to resist Soviet pressure would become an important example to all Middle East countries. In a potential war Turkey was perceived a "natural barrier" against an advance by the Soviet Union into the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.¹⁹⁸

At the same time, however, Britain informed the US that because of internal economic difficulties it would have to suspend economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey. Britain asked the Americans to take over its responsibilities. The Americans acceded to this request in the form of the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, the aid programs to Greece and Turkey.

3.3.3 Truman Doctrine

As has been pointed out, during the Cold War years, Turkey's "geopolitical location" was regarded as important for the containment of Soviet expansion. Before the Cold War, the question of the Turkish Straits showed the "geopolitical significance" of Turkey to the United States. Indeed, control of the Straits was the *raison d'être* of American strategic policies in the region, because of the Soviet demands. At that time, President Harry Truman heeded George Kennan's warnings from the "Long Telegram", which argued that the US should follow a policy of "containment" to stop Soviet expansion.

In this framework, the first concrete proof of American interest in Turkey can be found in the statements of the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, providing

197 US Department of State, *FRUS: The Near East and Africa, 1946 vol. VII*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 894.

198 US Department of State, *FRUS: The Near East and Africa, 1946 vol. VII*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), p. 895.

a private guarantee to Turkey that Soviet territorial demands extended into “spheres of world peace and security” in which the US took the “deepest interest”.¹⁹⁹ Similarly, based on the August 23 memorandum, Loy Henderson, Director of the State Department’s Near East and African Affairs, considered Turkey “the most important military factor in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East” and added that “by its geographical position, Turkey constitutes the stopper in the neck of the bottle through which Soviet political and military influence could most effectively flow into the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East.”²⁰⁰ Acheson also pointed out “the West had to keep Greece and Turkey out of Soviet hands- or be prepared to accept the subsequent loss of the strategic bases, lines of communication and resources of the Middle East”.²⁰¹ All these remarks can be accepted as the initial signs of Turkey’s representation in the new American geopolitical discourse.

Then, on February 21, 1947, the British government declared it was withdrawing its soldiers from Greece and ending its military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey.²⁰² The US administration stressed that without US support, Greece would be taken over by communists and Turkey would find itself in a weak position in the region, and the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near East would fall under Soviet domination. Joseph Jones, special assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs argued that “If Greece fell to communist control, Turkey, three-quarters encircled, would also fall in time. [The] whole of the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa would be laid open to Soviet adventuring”, which

199 Melvyn P. Leffler, “Negotiating from Strength: Acheson, the Russians, and American Power”, p. 177.

200 US Department of State, *FRUS: The Near East and Africa, 1946 vol. VII*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946)

201 “Statement by Acting Secretary Acheson”, *Department of State Bulletin*, vol. 16, no. 409-A, May 4, 1947, pp. 847-52.

202 Robert J. Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S Truman, 1945–48*, (New York: Norton & Company, 1977), p. 279–291.

would affect Western Europe's access to oil.²⁰³

On March 12, 1947, in the middle of the Greek Civil War, and the day Turkey became a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), President Harry Truman came before Congress, made one of the most important addresses of the postwar era requesting authorization to extend military and economic assistance to Greece and Turkey amounting to \$400 million dollars for the period ending on 30 June 1948.²⁰⁴ As argued before, this speech is considered to be the first important announcement of US Cold War geopolitical discourse.²⁰⁵

Briefly, it can be argued that the Truman Doctrine was a product of the American geostrategic and geopolitical perception of Greece and Turkey as key nation-states in the context of security in the Middle East, crucial to the protection of American national interests in the Mediterranean region. It codified the differences between the US and the Soviet Union, and is thus taken as the declaration of the Cold War. Truman described the Cold War as a choice between freedom and oppression and argued that "[i]t must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."²⁰⁶ Like the classical geopoliticians, in his speech Truman used the simple and abstract categories of "the free world" and "the enslaved" world, which is black and white reasoning. His geopolitical understanding divided the world into two camps, good versus evil, capitalism versus communism, the West versus the East, and the US versus the Soviet Union.

For Truman Greece and Turkey had become very crucial because "the failure of the West to prevent a communist takeover in Greece would not only put the Russians on a particularly dangerous flank for the Turks, but strengthen the

203 Joseph M. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks: February 11-June 5, 1947*, (New York: The Viking Press, 1955), p. 5.

204 Harry Truman, "The Truman Doctrine", *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States*, in Gearóid Ó Tuathail et.al., *The Geopolitics Reader*, p. 58.

205 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, et.al., *The Geopolitics Reader*, p. 60.

206 Harry Truman, "The Truman Doctrine", p. 58.

Soviet Union's ability to cut off allied supplies and assistance in the event of war."²⁰⁷ In his speech Truman notified Congress that, without its help, Greece would fall to Communism – and Turkey would follow. He argued that "[i]f Greece was lost, Turkey would become an untenable outpost in a sea of communism. Similarly, if Turkey yielded to Soviet demands, the position of Greece would be extremely endangered."²⁰⁸ In fact, it can be argued that a regional domino effect threat influenced the United States' decision.

After emphasizing the urgent situation in Greece, President Truman, in his speech, stressed the geopolitical importance of Turkey to the United States as follows:

"Greece's neighbor, Turkey, also deserves our attention. The future of Turkey as an independent and economically sound state is clearly no less important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece. The circumstances in which Turkey finds itself today are considerably different from those of Greece. Turkey has been spared the disasters that have beset Greece. And during the war, the United States and Great Britain furnished Turkey with material aid. Nevertheless, Turkey now needs our support. Since the war Turkey has sought financial assistance from Great Britain and the United States for the purpose of effecting that modernization necessary for the maintenance of its national integrity. That integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East. The British government has informed us that, owing to its own difficulties can no longer extend financial or economic aid to Turkey. As in case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the assistance it needs, the United States must supply it. We are the only country able to provide that help. I am fully aware of the broad implications involved if the United States extends assistance to Greece and Turkey, and I shall discuss these implications with you at this time."²⁰⁹

The Truman Doctrine can be taken as one of the most important steps of US Cold War containment policy, and was completed by way of the economic restoration of Western Europe by the Marshall Plan and military containment facilitated by the establishment of NATO in 1949.

207 *ibid.*, p. 59.

208 *ibid.*, p. 59.

209 *ibid.*, p. 60.

On 22 May 1947, President Truman signed an act of congress to help Greece and Turkey. After its ratification on 5 June 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall gave a speech at Harvard University introducing the Marshall Plan, a US aid program for Europe. In his speech, Marshall announced that the US was ready to supply Western Europe with economic and financial assistance in order to assist its economic recovery and thus stem the communist threat.²¹⁰

Economic aid resulting the Truman Doctrine amounted to approximately \$22.2 million. This number increased to \$236 million in 1949, and in 1950, it increased again to \$510 million. With the Marshall Plan, US military aid to Turkey was also started. However, the level of military aid was higher than the economic aid. During the first year, Turkey received \$497 million in military aid and \$24 million in economic aid.²¹¹

After the declaration of the Marshall Plan in November 1948, the Joint Chiefs of Staff published a memorandum in which the United States' strategic interests in Greece and Turkey were highlighted. According to the memorandum, Turkey's strategic location was more important than Greece's since it possessed major air, land and seaways extending from the Soviet Union to the oil rich regions in the Middle East.²¹²

After President Truman's speech before Congress, geopolitical discourse on the United States began to be institutionalized. As we will see in the following parts of the study, all these efforts helped to justify US interventions throughout the world. This document, called National Security Council Resolution-68 and published in 1950, is one of the key documents outlining the Cold War geopolitical discourse

210 OECD, "The Marshall Plan Speech at Harvard University, 5 June 1947", Available at http://www.oecd.org/document/10/0,3343,en_2649_201185_1876938_1_1_1_1,00.html, (Accessed on March 22, 2010).

211 USAID, *US Overseas Loans and Grants* (Greenbook) Available at <http://quesdb.usaid.gov/gbk>, (Accessed on October 22, 2010).

212 US Department of State, *FRUS: Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, 1948 vol. IV*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 191.

of the United States.²¹³

The document outlines the goals of world leadership in the face of the geopolitical challenge of the Soviet Union and Communism. The document asserts that “[t]he assault on free institutions is world-wide now, and in the context of the present polarization of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere”.²¹⁴ The geopolitical implication of this statement is that all parts of the world have equal strategic importance, and thus a world leader would have to assert its authority in all countries. The Soviet system was perceived as incompatible with the system of the United States²¹⁵, and as an obstacle to the establishment of “order” in the international system. The geopolitical role of the United States as world leader was clarified in the document as follows: “Our overall policy at the present time may be described as one designed to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish. It therefore rejects the concept of isolation and affirms the necessity of our positive participation in the world community.”²¹⁶ Accordingly, this American system would need to establish global geopolitical rules. Here, the main enemy was defined as the Soviet Union and friends were described as the countries advocating “free institutions.”

The twin policies of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan and document NSC-68 led to billions in economic and military aid for Western Europe, and for Greece and Turkey. As Gendzier pointed out, with these policies the US administration showed that it took over Britain’s role in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. Greece’s and Turkey’s military roles in the Marshall Plan and later in NATO were the key factors in the balance of power of the geostrategic

213 Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, *US Foreign Policy since 1945*, (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 3.

214 US Department of State, *FRUS: National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, 1950 vol. I*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950), section IV, A.

215 *ibid.*

216 *ibid.*

system. Accordingly, military bases in Greece and Turkey were established following several bilateral agreements with Washington in order to maintain US interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.²¹⁷

3.3.4 Korean War and NATO

On April 4, 1949, North Atlantic Treaty was signed and the organization known as "NATO" was established. It was perceived as an institution of the Cold War geopolitical order. In fact, for Turkish elites, membership in NATO was regarded as the most important step towards becoming a European state. Turkey applied for membership in NATO in May 1950, but its application was rejected.²¹⁸ The main reason for this rejection was Turkey's placement in the geopolitical imaginations of the United States and Britain. For them, "Turkey did not belong either to Western Europe or the Atlantic and consequently she could not join the Atlantic regional group."²¹⁹

However, as Altunışık and Tür underline that while the US military was not willing to enlarge its institutional commitments in the Mediterranean region, the State Department was concerned about a possible Turkish-Soviet rapprochement as a result of Turkey's exclusion from NATO.²²⁰ Moreover, for the United States administration the acceptance of Turkey into NATO was linked to Greece's acceptance, because of political and geographical considerations. In a report by the US State Department on June 13 1949, it was asserted that "[t]he loss of Turkey would critically affect US security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the

217 Irene L. Gendzier, *Notes From the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East, 1945-1958*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 22.

218 Melvyn P. Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952", *The Journal of American History*, vol. 71, no. 4, March 1985, pp. 807-825.

219 George McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained the Soviets*, (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1990), p. 87.

220 Meliha Altunışık and Özlem Tür, *Turkey: Challenges of Continuity and Change*, (New York: Routledge Curson, 2005), p. 104.

Middle East".²²¹ The memorandum continues: "It would be unrealistic to include Turkey if Greece were not included."²²²

In the wake of Turkey's rejection by the United States and Great Britain for membership in NATO, Turkish policy makers increasingly began to emphasize Turkey's geopolitical importance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and express their concern about Turkey's security. These early attempts, however, did not have any effect on the Americans and the British. Turkey, however, got a second chance for membership when a crisis erupted in Korea. On June 25, 1950, the Korean War broke out. It became the first military conflict of the Cold War. Under these circumstances Turkey made its second application on August 11, 1950.²²³ In order to guarantee its admission to NATO, the Turkish government decided to show its "friendship" with the US by sending 4500 troops to Korea on October 18, 1950.²²⁴ Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee called June 25, a day "which will long be remembered in Turkey, just as it will be remembered in the United States and in other countries of the free world."²²⁵

After the War, it became clear that the Western Bloc would need Greece and Turkey in the event of a war with the Eastern Bloc. As Acheson asserted that "if the [Soviet] attack came in Western Europe, there is nothing which would make the Turks or the Greeks take any move" unless they were included in NATO.²²⁶ At

221 US Department of State, *FRUS: The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, 1949, vol. VI*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. 38.

222 *ibid.*, p. 39.

223 Mehmet Gönlübol, "NATO and Turkey, An Overall Appraisal", *The Turkish Yearbook Of International Relations*, vol. XI, 1971, p. 25.

224 George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance; Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971*, (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972), pp. 39-40.

225 George C. McGhee, "Turkey, the United States, and the Free World," *Department of State Bulletin*, vol. 23, no. 592, November 6, 1950, p. 739.

226 US Senate, *Executive Session of Senate Foreign Relations Committee*, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., (Washington: USGPO, 1976), p. 451.

the North Atlantic Council's meeting in September 1951 in Canada, Acheson informed the Europeans that Turkey's and Greece's memberships would be the best way to strengthen the alliance.²²⁷ Finally, despite opposition from Britain and the Scandinavian states, and thanks to the positive reputation, the Turkish troops earned in the Korean war, along with the change in American attitudes toward Turkey's strategic importance after 1951, Turkey became a member of NATO on February 18, 1952.²²⁸ As a consequence, for the US administration, Turkey's geopolitical role in the alliance was defined as to stop Soviet expansionism by serving as NATO's southern flank.²²⁹ Indeed, the flanks were vital to prevent a possible Soviet attack on Europe. In this role, Turkey's strategic importance in the eyes of the US administration was reinforced.

With its involvement in the Korean War, Turkey not only became a strategic asset, but also a symbol of how successful US foreign policy could be in "containing" the Soviets. Turkey's NATO membership became the basis for a Turkish–American defense relationship.

Turkey's joining of NATO was perceived not only in military but also in political and cultural terms assuming a new role as a partner of the West. In Kuniholm's words, "The defender of the Western civilization was in Turkish eyes the proof that they were finally accepted and became part of the Western world. With almost total dedication to a cause encountered only among new converts to a faith Turkey appeared to have become more Westernist than the West."²³⁰ NATO membership allowed "for a continuous and spontaneous exchange of views between Turkey and her collective allies. The value of such diplomatic contacts in

227 NATO, "Final Communiqué", <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c510920a.htm>, (Accessed on April 1, 2010).

228 NATO, "NATO Enlargement", http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm, (Accessed on April 1, 2010).

229 Richard Perle and Michael J. McNamara, "US Security Assistance for Turkey and the Challenge of Aid for the Southern Flank", *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, vol. 32, no. 2, April 1987, pp. 94-97; see also Yasemin Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, (Westport: Preager, 1999), p. xii.

230 Bruce Kuniholm, "Turkey and NATO: Past, Present and Future", *ORBIS*, Summer 1983, p. 422.

political, economic, and cultural relations is inestimable; more than anything else, it has enabled Turkey to establish herself as a 'European' power."²³¹ However, the most important result of this orientation in Turkish foreign policy was isolation of Turkey from the Middle East and the Eastern Bloc.




Figure 3.4 Cold War Military Alliances

Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Cold_war_europe_military_alliances_map.png, (Accessed on April 12, 2010).

3.3.5 U-2 Affair and Jupiter Missile Crisis

During the 1960s, this bilateral relationship gradually began to come into question especially by Turkey. In May 1960 the Soviets shot down a US U-2 spy plane over Soviet territory. The incident led to an international crisis and consequently Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev left the Big Four Summit that had begun in Paris. Thereafter, the Soviet Union threatened Turkey because it had allowed the plane to use Turkish bases. Turkey defended itself by claiming that the U-2 took off from Pakistan, but also demanded an explanation from the US about

²³¹ *ibid.*, p. 422.

such flights and canceled all U-2 flights from its territory. As a consequence, this crisis opened a discussion within Turkey about the reliability of the US as a partner.²³²

Another crisis between the US and Turkey resulted from the US decision to remove Jupiter missiles from Turkey following the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The Eisenhower administration decided to send missiles to Europe in 1957, then in October 1959, the Turkish government signed an agreement, allowing the US administration to deploy fifteen Jupiter missiles in Turkey.²³³ For Turkish officials these weapons were the symbol that the Turkish-American alliance was enhancing the security of Turkey by preventing the Soviet threat.

After the United States detected the Soviet missiles in Cuba on October 16, 1962, it warned the Soviet Union to withdraw these missiles from Cuban territory. The Soviet Union countered that it would do so if the United States withdrew its Jupiter missiles from Turkey. President Kennedy agreed, though Ankara had not been invited to participate in, nor even informed of the negotiations to resolve this crisis.²³⁴

The withdrawal of Jupiter missiles in April 1963 brought the Cuban crisis to an end. Turkish decision makers began to believe that, if the US would make secret treaties with the Soviet Union or other states when it interested them to do so, perhaps Turkey was not indispensable or strategically important in the struggle between the Soviet Union and the US. This bargain increased doubts about the US commitment to Turkey's security.²³⁵ For the United States the removal of the Jupiter missiles "signaled a change in Turkey's strategic position" wherein "Turkey no longer held the position of extreme importance in the Cold War it had occupied

232 Leonard Victor Scott, *The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Threat of Nuclear War*, (New York: Continuum, 2007), pp. 58-59.

233 Barton J. Bernstein, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading the Jupiters in Turkey?", *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 95, no.1, Spring 1980, p. 98.

234 *ibid.*, pp. 98-99; George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, pp. 92-93.

235 George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance*, *op.cit.*, p. 94.

heretofore".²³⁶

3.3.6 Opium Problem

In the late 1960s the cultivation of opium also became a source of tension in Turkish-American relations. The US administration claimed that the main reason for the drug problem in the United States was the smuggling of Turkish opium into the United States.²³⁷ In order to control this trafficking, the US government put pressure on Turkey to decrease and prohibit opium production. In 1971 Prime Minister Nihat Erim prohibited opium cultivation "for humanitarian reasons". In exchange for this, the United States decided to compensate Turkish opium growers' losses and to assist the Turkish government with other agricultural investments.²³⁸ But, according to Turkish public opinion, these aid was not enough and the prohibition symbolized Turkey's dependence on the US.

After Prime Minister Ecevit was elected in the 1974 elections, he lifted the ban on opium cultivation.²³⁹ Relations between the two countries diminished as a result. In June 1974, the US State Department ordered the US ambassador to "return for consultation"²⁴⁰ and on 12 July 1974, the Senate passed a resolution introduced by Representative Lester to cut off economic and military aid to Turkey unless the opium ban was reinstated.²⁴¹ Nevertheless, while the Ecevit government did not prohibit opium cultivation, it took strict steps to prevent illegal opium traffic.

236 George S. Harris, "Turkey and the US", in Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-1971*, (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1975), p. 191.

237 *ibid.* p. 69.

238 James Spain, "The United States, Turkey and the Poppy", *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 29, no. 3, Summer 1975, p. 299.

239 *ibid.*, p. 307.

240 Süha Bölükbaşı and White Burkett, *The Superpowers and the Third World : Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, (New York: University Press of America, 1988), p. 180.

241 United States Congress House, *Turkish Opium Ban Negotiations: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess, July 16, 1974*; United States Congress House, *Foreign Assistance Request: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, June-July 1974*, p. 120.

As a consequence, the US government blamed Turkey for the narcotics traffic and the damaged to their relations.²⁴² As a result of America's threats, the Turkish administration saw and presented this problem as a symbol of Turkish dependency to the US interests.²⁴³ In 1975, the US undersecretary of State Joseph Sisco and the then US ambassador declared that Turkey's policies to control opium trade were sufficiently effective.²⁴⁴ With their testimony in the House of Representatives, the opium issue was removed from the agenda of Turkish-American relations.

3.3.7 Turkey and the United States in the Middle East

For Harris, the Middle East "formed a major testing ground for the Turkish–American alliance in the first decade of Turkey's membership in NATO".²⁴⁵ In order to better understand Turkey's geopolitical importance to the United States with respect to the Middle East, we have to clarify US aims in the region. As argued above, during the Cold War years, the United States as a global power had several geopolitical objectives. For example, it aimed to prevent a possible Soviet attack in the region, to secure NATO's southern flank, to support Israel, to maintain western supply lines in the Mediterranean, and to access and control Middle Eastern oil.²⁴⁶ Indeed, these aims were the bases of the geopolitical discourses of the Truman Doctrine, the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Nixon Doctrine and later, the Carter Doctrine. United States administrations had developed these doctrines as a foreign policy tool to achieve its strategic goals during the Cold War.

242 US Department of State, *FRUS 1973-1976: Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976 vol. XXX*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2007).

243 James Spain, "The United States, Turkey and the Poppy", p. 306.

244 Çağrı Erhan, *Beyaz Savaş: Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinde Afyon Sorunu*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1996), pp. 150-151.

245 George S. Harris, "Turkey and the US", p. 54.

246 Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: A History of a Distinctive Alliance*, (New York: Nova Science Publishers Inc., 2003), p.104.

According to Karasapan, although Turkey's main role in the alliance was to engage the Soviet Union, Ankara also played a major role in the strategy to preserve Western interests in the Middle East.²⁴⁷ In the absence of the Turkish barrier, "Soviet support for and accessibility to such countries as Syria and Iraq would have been much more pervasive and potentially threatening to US interest in the region" and Israel would not be able to "maintain its status as a regional power and cope with continuing Arab hostility without the risk of facing... the full force of the Red Army."²⁴⁸ In fact, Turkey contributed to the stability of the region, which was crucial to US interests and provided an important access point to the Middle East. Incirlik air base in Turkey served as the most important base for US allies in the Middle East.

At the beginning of the Cold War, President Truman argued that the loss of Turkey and Greece would bring the loss of the whole Middle Eastern region, and thus decided to help to Greece and Turkey. The US administration located Turkey by using various geopolitical metaphors such as a natural "barrier" to Soviet expansion, a "deterrent" to a Soviet attack and a "challenge" to the Soviet Union's southern flank. Another geopolitical image, called the "Northern Tier" was first used at the beginning of the Cold War during British-American talks on the Middle East held in Washington. Accordingly, it was agreed that the security of the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East were crucial to both powers, that both must support it and that the independence and territorial integrity of Turkey, Greece and Iran, which were later called "Northern Tier" countries, must be maintained. It can be argued here that the term "Northern Tier" stressed the strategic significance of Turkey in Anglo-American plans for defense of the Middle East against an attack from the Soviets toward the Suez Canal.²⁴⁹

Turkey was perceived as an important strategic factor linking the Western

247 Ömer Karasapan, "Turkey and US Strategy in the Age of Glasnost", *Middle East Report*, September-October 1989, p. 7.

248 *ibid.* p. 9.

249 Bruce Robellet Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 57.

world with the Middle East. The American officials used these metaphors very often in US public statements to justify large military aid programs to Turkey. As President Jimmy Carter said in 1979:

"By responding to [Turkey's urgent military] needs, the US can demonstrate to Turkish political and military leaders our commitment to increased security cooperation with their country. This increased cooperation is of great importance and relates directly to Turkey's NATO role, its geopolitical position and our intelligence collection operations, including facilities which the Turkish Government permitted us to reopen last fall. This grant military assistance program can make an important cooperation to maintaining a strong, stable, democratic and pro-Western ally in a troubled and vital region."²⁵⁰

It can be argued that Turkey's relations with the United States especially during the Cold War shaped its relations with Middle Eastern countries. The Middle East was not in the NATO's area of responsibility during the Cold War period. However, Turkey's increasing relations with the Middle East provided a link between the West and the Middle East.

During the 1950s Turkey proved its "geopolitical importance" in the eyes of the US administration and cooperated with other United States allies within the Middle East, including Iran, Israel and Jordan, to contain the influence of "Soviet clients" such as Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. As an evidence of this, Turkey joined the Baghdad Pact in 1955, allowed the United States to use its military bases in Lebanon Operation out of the NATO purposes after the Iraqi revolution in 1958, the Turkish government accepted the Jupiter Missiles to deploy in its territory in 1959, was the first Muslim country to recognize Israel in 1949 and proved to be a significant partner to US Middle East policy, as determined by the Eisenhower Doctrine, which was outlined in March 1957. In 1959, after Iraq withdrew, the Baghdad Pact was reestablished with the same members, along with the US in observatory status, and became the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), which mainly aimed to guarantee US military and financial aid to the region.²⁵¹

²⁵⁰ Jimmy Carter, *Military Assistance for Turkey: Communication from the President of the United States*, (Washington: USGPO, 1979), p. 1.

²⁵¹ Behçet Kemal Yeşilbursa, *The Baghdad Pact: Anglo-American Defense Policies in the Middle East: 1950-1959*, (New York: Frank Kaas, 2005), p. 210.

As a result of détente between the two blocs, the “geopolitical significance” of Turkey decreased, thus relations between the two allies deteriorated during 1960s and 1970s. The Nixon Doctrine, which suggested a twin pillars policy towards the Middle East, stressed the importance of Iran and Saudi Arabia as its military and financial pillars.²⁵² During these years, Turkey and the United States experienced several serious crises in the Middle East region. For example, Turkey refused to allow the US to use its military bases to support Israel during the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973.²⁵³ Similarly, the Bilateral Defense and Cooperation Agreement of 1969 limited US military activities in Turkey.²⁵⁴

However, the end of détente, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution in the Middle East region in 1979, strengthened the Turkish–American alliance in 1980s. Indeed, the reasons for this continuity were the same as in the 1950s. The Soviet threat and Turkey’s “strategic importance” were the primary factors of this rapprochement. Once again, as in the 1950s, the United States saw Turkey as a reliable ally in a problematic region. Former US Ambassador George McGhee supported this view. For him, “The fluid situation in Afghanistan since the Soviet withdrawal, the withdrawal of Iran from cooperation with the West, and the uncertainty regarding Greek NATO commitment leave Turkey as the only reliable element in the northern tier of the Middle East.”²⁵⁵

During the 1980s, the Carter Doctrine applied US containment policy to the Gulf region. As a consequence of the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan and Iranian Revolution, the US wanted to guarantee the protection of Middle East oil. Thus, on January 23, 1980, President Carter claimed that the United States would use

252 Richard Nixon, “Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam”, November 3, 1969, John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, Santa Barbara, CA. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2303>, (Accessed on March 13, 2010).

253 Bruce Robellet Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece*, p. 426.

254 Çağrı Erhan, “Türkiye ile ABD Arasında İkili Anlaşmalar”, in Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt 1: 1919-1980*, p. 556.

255 George McGhee, *The US-Turkish-NATO-Middle East Connection*, p. 177.

military force when necessary to protect its interests in the Middle East. Like previous presidential doctrines during the Cold War, the Carter Doctrine had strong geopolitical motives. In his speech Carter underlined the importance of the region for American interest as follows:

"The region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance: It contains more than two-thirds of the world's exportable oil. The Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet military forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Straits of Hormuz, a waterway through which most of the world's oil must flow. The Soviet Union is now attempting to consolidate a strategic position; therefore, that poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil. This situation demands careful thought, steady nerves, and resolute action, not only for this year but for many years to come. It demands collective efforts to meet this new threat to security in the Persian Gulf and in Southwest Asia. It demands the participation of all those who rely on oil from the Middle East and who are concerned with global peace and stability. And it demands consultation and close cooperation with countries in the area which might be threatened. Meeting this challenge will take national will, diplomatic and political wisdom, economic sacrifice, and, of course, military capability. We must call on the best that is in us to preserve the security of this crucial region. Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."²⁵⁶

This last and perhaps the most important sentence of the Carter Doctrine, was written by Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security Advisor. He applied the Truman Doctrine in Carter's speech and argued that these words aimed "to make it very clear that the Soviets should stay away from the Persian Gulf."²⁵⁷

As a result of these developments, at the beginning of the 1980s, the United States attempted to increase its military capabilities in the region. Consequently, Turkey and the US signed the Defense and Economic Cooperation

256 Jimmy Carter, "The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress", January 23, 1980, John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, Santa Barbara, CA, Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33079>, (Accessed on March 12, 2010).

257 Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981*, p. 444.

Agreement (DECA) on March 29, 1980.²⁵⁸ After the September 1980 military coup in Turkey, US military aid increased tremendously and Turkey became a pillar of Washington's strategy to protect American interests in the Middle East. Thus, as a part of the Carter Doctrine, Turkey received large amounts of economic aid principally organized by the OECD and military aid from the US.²⁵⁹

3.4 Military Relations

Military relations have always been the vital part of Turkish-American relations. During the Cold War period, the United States perceived Turkey as a "barrier" to the Soviet Union and perhaps more importantly as a "base" in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. Thus, supporting and modernizing the Turkish army and establishing military and intelligence facilities in Turkish territory were the major methods by which the United States achieved its global aims in the region.

In fact, the United States has begun a military relationship with Turkey even before the Truman Doctrine of 1947. During World War II, in March 1941, President Roosevelt implemented the Lend-Lease Act and declared the defense of Britain and Greece to be in the national interest of the United States.²⁶⁰ The US-UK Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed that "limited amounts of supplies should be allocated to [Turkey] as a means of influencing her to oppose Germany."²⁶¹ Roosevelt and Churchill met in Washington in May 1943 to discuss the neutrality of Turkey in the war and confirmed the British role in arranging the transfer of military

258 Dankwart A. Rustow, *Turkey: America's Forgotten Ally*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1987), pp. 104-105.

259 US Military Aid and Arms Sales to Turkey (see 1980-1992), Federation of American Scientists, Available at http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/turkey_fmchart.htm, (Accessed on October 17, 2010).

260 US House, *Lend Lease Bill*, HR1776, 77th Cong., 1st sess, January 10, 1941.

261 Roy G. D. Allen, "Mutual Aid Between the U.S. and The British Empire, 1941-45", pp. 252.

equipment to Turkey.²⁶² Thereafter, the United States decided to give Turkey military equipment worth \$40 million.²⁶³ Indeed, Turkey did not sign a formal Lend-Lease agreement with the United States until on the day it joined the War on the Allied side. Finally, in August 1944 Turkey cut off relations with Germany and later declared war on it on February 23, 1945.²⁶⁴

After the War, the Truman administration decided to increase Turkey's military capabilities in order to defend US interests in the Middle East. The State Department's Greece–Turkey assistance committee held that "the program of aid to Turkey will be primarily one of military aid and that aid for economic projects should be limited to those directly related to the military program".²⁶⁵ Ambassador Wilson wrote from Ankara that "money spent on Turkish armed forces can be considered [a] national life-insurance premium for the United States". For him, if a war occurs in the future, the Soviets would seek to invade Turkey immediately. Wilson added that "Because of her strategic position Turkey actually becomes the first line of defense for the United States in any aggressive move by Russia".²⁶⁶

During the Cold War, US security assistance programs were designed by the Truman Administration. On May 22, 1947, Congress approved the Greek-Turkish aid bill later known as Truman Doctrine. With this bill, the US administration conveyed that military/economic assistance was an important instrument in US post-war policy.²⁶⁷ Between 1947 and 1950, Turkey and Greece received \$600

262 US Department of State, *FRUS: The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 371.

263 US Department of State, *Twenty-Third Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations*, (Washington DC: USGPO, 1945), pp. 15-16.

264 Murat Metin Hakki, "Surviving the Pressure of the Superpowers: An Analysis of Turkish Neutrality During the Second World War", *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, vol. 8, issue 2, Winter 2005-2006, p. 21.

265 US Department of State, *Departmental Interim Greece–Turkey Assistance Committee Memorandum: "Nature of U.S. Program of Aid to Turkey"*, Washington DC, April 24, 1947.

266 Edwin C. Wilson, *Supplementary Report of the US Ambassador Recommending Continuing Aid to Turkey*, Ankara, July 15, 1947.

million in US military and economic aid. Thereafter Turkey became one of the most important recipients of US grants. The US also gave an assistance to Turkey through the Joint United States Military Mission for aid to Turkey (JUSMMAT). After 1951 JUSMMAT became the biggest military assistance and advisory group of the world.²⁶⁸

In the official documents, it was argued that US assistance would enable Turkey "to strengthen its security forces and to maintain the stability of her economy".²⁶⁹ Moreover, continuation of aid by Congress was justified by the geopolitical importance of Turkey. For example, in February 1948, in a State Department report titled Foggy Bottom argued that "By virtue of its peculiar geographic situation and because of the Westward orientation of its political concepts, the maintenance of Turkey's freedom and independence is of vital importance to the security of the entire Middle East".²⁷⁰ In May 1949 the US State Department justified US military aid to Turkey as follows: "Turkey's military strength will make available to the US and to our allies the use of this vitally strategic area as a base of operations in the event of war, and conversely deny the Soviet Union and its satellites access to its land and resources".²⁷¹

It should be noted here that this report located Turkey in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. It was claimed that "in resisting the current tide of Soviet expansion, Turkey is holding the fort not only for the Arab states with their

267 US Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs Hearings, *Assistance to Greece and Turkey*, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947, pp. 385-386.

268 William N. Farnen and Erwin F. Lessel III, "Forward Presence in Turkey: Case Study", *Parameters*, Autumn 1992, pp. 19-20.

269 United States, "Agreement Between the United States of America and Turkey Respecting Aid to Turkey", *United States Statutes at Large*, vol. 62, 1948, p. 2953.

270 "Greece and Turkey: Background Material: Political, Economic, and Military, Budget Presentation, Fiscal Year 1949", *Records of the Office of GTI Affairs*, 1947-50.

271 US Department of State, *Policy Statement*, Washington DC, May 5, 1949, p. 1.

vital petroleum reserves, but for the entire eastern Mediterranean basin".²⁷² Another report defined Turkey in a different way: "In the midst of troubled waters, Turkey has emerged as an island of stability. [While] the Near East in general remains unstable, and the trend in the Balkans is toward totalitarianism, in the last few years Turkey has been moving at an accelerated pace toward democracy as we understand it in the West".²⁷³

During the Cold War, by establishing military bases in strategic regions the US administration was attempting to defend its geopolitical interests around the world. Thus, the issue of military bases is accepted as one of the most important aspects of the Turkish-American relationship. In these years, Turkey allowed the opening of US military bases on its soil and the United States gave economic and military aid to Turkey. However, these US military facilities were used as a bargaining chip by Turkey during the *détente* years as when Turkey refused to allow the United States to use these bases to support Israel during the Arab-Israeli Wars.

Initially, Turkey and the United States signed the Military Facilities Agreement in 1954 and this agreement formalized the opening of US bases on Turkish territory. Accordingly, the following bases were established on Turkish territory:

Karamürsel, was the first major monitoring base of the United States, and remained as the most important one until it was closed by Turkey in 1975 as a reaction to the US arms embargo. Samsun, Trabzon and Sinop were opened to the establishment of a US intelligence monitoring base in the mid-1950s. US facilities monitoring Soviet nuclear tests followed in Belbaşı. There was also a small base in Anadolu Kavağı, close to İstanbul.²⁷⁴

There were also crucial US air bases in Turkey. The Piriçlik Air Base, for

272 "Greece and Turkey: Background Material: Political, Economic, and Military, Budget Presentation, Fiscal Year 1949".

273 "An Evaluation of the Development of Democratic Processes in Turkey Since 1945", *Records of the Office of GTI Affairs*, 1947–50.

274 Simon Duke, *United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 275; William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, (London: Frank Caas, 2000), p.123.

example, became the most critical US intelligence facility in Turkey. Similarly, İncirlik air base also became one of the networks of Strategic Air Command bases worldwide.²⁷⁵

During the Cold War, US and NATO bases provided a major strategic advantage toward the Soviet Union. Yet, these bases often became sources of conflict particularly in the 1970s when both the Turkish administration and also Turkish people wanted all of them closed. For example, by the late 1960s, with the impact of the domestic pressure, the Turkish administration aimed to decrease the US presence in the country. In this view, the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) of 1969 did not fundamentally change the status of US bases, but reduced the 35,000 US military personnel and their dependents to 16,000 in 1970.²⁷⁶ As a reaction of the US arms embargo of Turkey, Turkey suspended operations at most of these military bases between 1975 and 1978.

Table 3.1 US Military Bases in Turkey During the Cold War

Source: Serhat Güvenç, *Rise and Demise of a "Strategic Partnership": In Search of Context for the Post-Cold War Turkish-American Relations*, (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Bogazici University, 2003).

Location	Function
Alemdağ	Nuclear weapons relay station between Çakmaklı and Şahin Tepesi
Ankara	HQ, Northeastern Mediterranean, AFSOUTH, NATO Command, HQ, The U.S. Logistics Groups (TUSLOG); senior U.S. military commander in Turkey
Balıkesir AB	TUSLOG Det 184; nuclear bomb custodian for Turkish Air Force 191st and 192nd Squadrons (Filos) with F-104G/S, some 25 nuclear bombs stored on the base.
Belbaşı	Det 301, AFTAC, (TUSLOG Det 18), nuclear test detection station
Çakmaklı	HQ, 528th Army Artillery Group (TUSLOG Det 67), central HQ and storage site for Army nuclear weapons in Turkey * 70th Ordnance Company (TUSLOG Det 168); storage, assembly and maintenance of Army nuclear weapons in Turkey, including 57 8-inch artillery projectiles and 132 Honest John warheads.

275 Michael M. Gunter, "The U.S.-Turkish Alliance in Disarray", *World Affairs*, vol. 167, no. 3, Winter 2005, p. 115.

276 Richard F. Nyrop (ed.), *Turkey: A Country Study*, (Washington, DC: The American University, 1980), p. 278.

Location	Function
Çorlu	21st Field Artillery Det; nuclear warhead custodian for Turkish Army Honest John unit.
Diyarbakır	Support base for Piringlik radars, includes DSCS satellite communications terminal linked to Lakehurst, NJ.
Elhaç / Malatya AB	TUSLOG Det 93; nuclear bombs custodian supporting Turkish Air Force 171st and 172nd Squadrons (Filos) with some 25 bombs stored on the base.
Erzincan	Former nuclear weapons custodial site
Erzurum	27th Field Artillery Det; nuclear warhead custodian for Turkish Army Honest John unit; closest nuclear weapons storage site to the Soviet Union.
Eskişehir AB	7392nd Munitions Support Squadron (TUSLOG Det 100); nuclear bomb custodian supporting Turkish Air Force 111st Squadron (Filo) with F-4E aircraft (formerly with F-1 OOD/F) aircraft, some 25 bombs stored on the base.
İncirlik AB	39th Tactical Group (TUSLOG Det 10); supports up to 36 nuclear capable F-4 and F-16 aircraft on rotation from Spain and the United States, some planes nuclear-loaded on quick reaction alert, one hour by air from the Soviet Border* Global Command and Control Station. Giant Talk/Scope Signal III. INFORM Net. Cemetery Net transmitter/receiver * 1 of 3 HF radio stations for communications to Southwest Asia * İncirlik weather intercept facility * nuclear weapons storage site on base contains 200 nuclear bombs.
İzmir	HQ, 6th Allied Tactical Air Force, AIRSOUTH/Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe, AFSOUTH senior NATO commands in Turkey.
İzmit	14th Field Artillery Det.; nuclear warhead custodian for Turkish Army Honest John unit.
Kargaburun	Coast Guard LORAN-C Station; serving Mediterranean Sea chain.
Konya AB	Forward operating base for NATO AWACs * air to ground training range used by U.S. aircraft from İncirlik for low-level nuclear bombing training.
Mürted AB	TUSLOG Det 183; nuclear bomb custodian for Turkish Air Force 141st and 142nd Squadrons (Filos) with F-I04G/S, some 25 nuclear bombs stored on the base.
Ortaköy	10th Field Artillery Det.; nuclear warhead custodian for Turkish Army Honest John unit.
Piringlik	19th Surveillance Squadron; 2 AN/FPS-I 7 detection and 1 AN/FPS-79 tracking radar supporting long-range surveillance and intelligence collection on Soviet missile testing, also conducts satellite surveillance.
Şahin Tepesi	European Command and Control Console System (ECCCS) mobile communications and control van supporting nuclear weapons in Turkey.

Location	Function
Şirinyer	Joint Combat Operations Center/Air Defense Operations Center, 6th ATAF, NATO Command Center.

It should be noted here that Turkish-American intelligence cooperation against the Soviet Union also became crucial during this period. Turkey was perceived by the United States as an ally that provided a critical location for intelligence monitoring stations. Indeed, one study declared that “in 1977 it was estimated that 25 percent of the hard information the United States had obtained regarding Soviet missile launches had come from the Turkish facilities and that some of that data could not be totally replaced by relocation or other means.”²⁷⁷

It can be argued that the collapse of the Iranian regime in 1979 and the end of the US-Iranian intelligence relationship created a vacuum in the intelligence system of the United States covering the southern part of the Soviet Union and the military installations close to the oil regions of the Gulf. The US-Turkish intelligence connection thus became more significant during the 1980s. US intelligence facilities resumed their activities forthwith, and later Turkish and the US officials began to discuss new defense cooperation.²⁷⁸

The end of détente and the beginning of the “Second Cold War” between the US and the Soviet Union, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution in 1979, once again reinforced the Turkish–American alliance. President Reagan declared an interest in bringing US-Turkish ties “back to the period of the fifties”.²⁷⁹ It is important to note that the military intervention in Turkey on September 12, 1980 did not affect the relations negatively. On the contrary, after military coup, unlike its European allies, the United States did not criticize the military administration and confirmed that American aid to Turkey

277 Jeffrey Richelson, *American Espionage and the Soviet Target*, (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1987), p. 89.

278 Sam Kohen, “US Bases in Turkey to Reopen”, *Christian Science Monitor*, October 6, 1978, p. 7.

279 Ömer Karasapan, “Turkey and US Strategy in the Age of Glasnost”, p. 9.

would not be interrupted. Meanwhile, the United States began to perceive Turkey as a reliable ally in a problematic region. Indeed, the logic of this support was mirrored in the rhetoric of the Truman era. According to commander-in-chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe, Admiral William Crowe "Turkey sits on the flank of any Soviet thrust into Iran or the Persian Gulf and is the only alliance nation which is Muslim and geographically located in the Middle East". He also added that "[n]o Western or Soviet planner can address the Middle East challenge without considering Turkey's orientation, terrain, airspace, forces, and bases."²⁸⁰

In this context, the geopolitical importance of Turkey significantly increased under the conditions of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and the Iran-Iraq War.²⁸¹ At that time, Turkey began to change its foreign policy by taking into consideration American sensitivities and consequently withdrew its veto over Greece's entry into the military branch of NATO.

Meanwhile, in accordance with the Carter Doctrine, Defense Secretary Alexander Haig developed the idea of Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) to protect the US's "vital interests" in the region.²⁸² Thus, the US administration established a new military institution, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, which would become CENTCOM, to command operations in the Gulf region.²⁸³ Turkey and the United States have a shared policy to support multilateral and bilateral reactionary conduct against the communist bloc, and as a consequence of this policy, Ankara accepted deployment of the Rapid Deployment Force Project.

Turkey and the United States signed a new Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) on March 29, 1980. Maintaining a strong Turkish–American bilateral defense relationship as well as preserving US military facilities in

280 William J. Crowe Jr, "NATO's Southern 'Sideshow' due for Center Ring?", *Christian Science Monitor*, October 22, 1980, p. 23.

281 Albert Wohlstetter, "Meeting the Threat in the Persian Gulf", *Survey*, vol. 25, no. 2, 1981, p. 175.

282 *ibid.*, pp. 161-168.

283 İlhan Uzgel, "ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler", in Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt 1: 1919-1980*, p. 246.

Turkey was the objective of negotiating DECA.²⁸⁴ Thereafter, the Turkish-American Defense Council was established in 1981. Turkish Defense Minister Ümit Haluk, deputy Chief of Staff Necdet Öztörün, and US Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle joined the first meeting of the Council on 27 April 1982. On 29 November 1982 a "Memorandum of Understanding" was signed and accepted as the "supplementary agreement" to DECA.²⁸⁵ Article II guaranteed Turkey unlimited access to all of the intelligence gathered by the United States: "[a]ll intelligence information, including raw data, produced at intelligence collection installations in the Republic of Turkey shall be shared by the two Governments in accordance with arrangements determined jointly by the competent technical authorities of the two Governments." The three bases in Turkey, Erzurum, Batman and Muş, were upgraded according to the 1982 agreement. Aircrafts operating from these three bases would be deployed to protect the Turkish–Iranian–Transcaucasian border region.²⁸⁶ Turkey by ranking was the fourth in the number of US nuclear weapons deployed overseas – about 489 in 1985.²⁸⁷ US military aid levels during this period were the highest ever, except during the Korean War era. Both economic and military aid from the US began to decrease in 1984.

Following the general elections of Turkey in 1983, the Özal government was established. As a first step, Özal requested a revision of the Bilateral Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement in 1985. On 18 December 1985 DECA was renewed for another five years. However, largely on the basis of these discussions, which were related to the Cyprus and Armenian issues in the US Congress, Turkey did not put the agreement into effect until 1988.²⁸⁸ With the end of the Cold War

284 Ömer Karasapan, "Turkey and US Strategy in the Age of Glasnost", p. 9.

285 US Department of State, *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, vol. 35, no. 6., 1983-1984, p. 6063.

286 Robert McDonald, "Alliance Problems in the Eastern Mediterranean -Greece, Turkey and Cyprus: Part II", *Adelphi Series*, vol. 28, issue 229, Spring 1988 , p. 79.

287 *ibid.*, p. 214.

288 Meliha Altunışık and Özlem Tür, *Turkey: Challenges of Continuity and Change*, p. 112.

the question of Turkey's strategic importance increased concerns in both Turkey and the United States and this led to changes in the dynamics of the relations.

3.5 Limits of the Alliance: Cyprus Problem

During the Cold War, the state of the Turkish-American relationship was determined primarily by the international developments. Between 1960 and 1975, the decrease in tension between the United States and the Soviet Union, namely *détente*, also decreased the "geopolitical significance" of Turkey to the United States. During these years the two countries endured several crises which revealed the weaknesses of the internal dynamics of the relationship. It can be argued that "geopolitics" has been the *raison d'être* of this "strategic" partnership, and when the Soviet threat in the strategic Middle East diminished, so too the importance of the Turkish-American alliance diminished in US geopolitical discourse.

Indeed, the golden years of the US-Turkish alliance ended with the Cyprus crisis, which is taken as the most important problem between the two countries both in 1960s and 1970s.²⁸⁹ It is argued in this thesis that during the Cold War, Turkey enjoyed its geopolitical status as a "barrier" to the Soviet threat and its role as a "protector" of US interests in the Middle East, agreeing to cooperate both in political and military issues. However, Turkey and the United States experienced several crises that display the limits of the geopolitical discourse of the United States in different periods of time.

Because of its geographical proximity to Turkey and considerable Turkish population, Cyprus became a security concern for Turkey in the case of annexation

289 There is an ongoing debate in the literature on the Cyprus issue. It is argued that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had information about the planned intervention on Cyprus. For details see Geoffrey Warner, "The United States and the Cyprus crisis of 1974", *International Affairs*, vol. 85, no. 1, January 2009; Andreas Constandinos, *America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974: Calculated Conspiracy or Foreign Policy Failure?*, (New Jersey: Authorhouse, 2009).

of the island by Greece²⁹⁰ and thus became one of the main driving factors of Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War period.²⁹¹ In addition, Cyprus was perceived as a “national cause” for both Turkey and Greece.²⁹²

It is commonly accepted that the Cyprus issue was also the most important crisis of the Turkish-American relations during the Cold War. Before the Cold War, the US did not have any geopolitical interest in Cyprus because of the island’s relations with Britain until the mid-1950s. The Cold War, however, changed US strategic calculations to a great extent. The main US strategic concern with Cyprus can be explained with its containment policy, which aimed to prevent Soviet expansion, particularly in regions that were strategically important for the United States.

For the US administration, Cyprus has been strategically significant because of its geopolitical position at the crossroads of three continents and the major routes between the West with East; it is also the only island in the southern part of the Eastern Mediterranean.²⁹³ It controlled the passages of the pipelines north of the Suez Canal. Therefore, it became a crucial base for operations in those regions. The implications of the identity-based conflict²⁹⁴, seen in connection with the strategic significance of the island, were a major source of concern and involvement for the two superpowers throughout the Cold War years.²⁹⁵

According to Uslu, the following developments in the 1960s increased the strategic importance of the island for the United States; “the growth of Soviet

290 Semin Suvarierol, “The Cyprus Obstacle on Turkey’s Road to Membership in the European Union”, *Turkish Studies*, vol. 4, no. 1, 2003, pp. 55-57; İltir Turan and Dilek Barlas, “Turkish – Greek Balance: A Key to Peace and Cooperation in the Balkans”, *East European Quarterly*, vol. 32, no. 4, Winter 1998, p. 469-470.

291 Fiona B. Adamson, “Democratization and Domestic Resources of Foreign Policy: Turkey in the 1974 Cyprus Crisis”, *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 116, no. 2, 2001, p. 280.

292 Semin Suvarierol, “The Cyprus Obstacle on Turkey’s Road to Membership in the European Union”, p. 56.

293 Joseph M. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks: February 11-June 5, 1947*, p. 58.

294 *ibid.*

295 *ibid.*

political and military missions in various Arab states, the growth of the Soviet fleet in the area; the continuing Arab-Israel crisis; the increasing American concern about Middle Eastern oil supplies and the protection of oil shipping routes; the prospect of a reopened Suez Canal and the loss of American bases and base rights in the area."²⁹⁶

The central American concern on the Cyprus question was to contain the conflict and to prevent a war between Greece and Turkey, which were strategically important allies to the US. In Stearn's analysis there were several dangers, to be eliminated by the United States. First of all, for the US, in the event of war between Turkey and Greece, NATO could be destabilized and weakened and its southeastern flank could collapse. Secondly, the political, military and economic cooperation between the United States, Greece and Turkey could be undermined and the presence of American base facilities in these countries could be threatened. Finally, the prestige of the Western alliance could be damaged because such hostility would be a symbol of the Western disunity.²⁹⁷

By the mid-1950s, ethnic conflicts began to increase between the Turkish and Greek populations of Cyprus. Moreover, tension continued to increase between the Greece and the Turkey until 1959, when both states agreed to form a united Cyprus under one constitution and one flag. At the Zurich and London Conferences proposed constitution that granted the two sides equal rights and Republic of Cyprus was established in August 1960.²⁹⁸ The Treaty of Guarantee, signed by Britain, Turkey and Greece, was added to the Cypriot constitution. As a result, Britain, Turkey and Greece became guarantor states for the security and independence of Cyprus.²⁹⁹ The fourth article of the treaty provided each guarantor

296 Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: A History of a Distinctive Alliance*, p. 181.

297 Monteagle Stearns, *Entangled Allies: US Policy Toward Greece, Turkey and Cyprus*, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992), pp. 11-16.

298 Theodora Kalaitzaki, "US Mediation in Greek – Turkish Disputes since 1954", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, vol. 16, no. 2, Spring 2005, p. 112.

state with the right to consult with each other in the case of any violation of provisions. Moreover, according to the article each guarantor state had right to unilaterally take action if a collective intervention was not possible. Each guarantor state also had a limited right to take action with the aim of reestablishing the state of affairs on the island according to the Treaty of Guarantee and the constitution of Cyprus.³⁰⁰

After becoming an independent republic, in November 1963, demands of the Greek Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios moved to limit the political rights of the Turkish Cypriot community by way of constitutional amendment. This led to violence, especially against the Turkish community. Makarios' proposals were rejected by both the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish government.³⁰¹ When the Cyprus crisis broke out in November 1963, the Turkish government decided to intervene to protect the rights of the Turkish minority, Turkey informed Washington of its intention, assuming the United States was NATO's leading and most powerful member, and would be affected by any major incident anywhere in the world.³⁰² Indeed, increasing hostility and violence between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities led the United States to get involved in the Cyprus issue.

In June 1964, as conditions were worsening for Cypriot Turks, responding the impact of public pressure, the Turkish government decided to intervene militarily under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.³⁰³ As a response, on June 5, 1964 President Lyndon Johnson wrote Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü a letter that US Undersecretary of State George Ball called "the most brutal diplomatic note [he

299 For the full text of the agreement see www.mfa.gov.tr/kibris-cumhuriyeti_nin-kurulusuna-iliskin-temel-antlasma-_1960_ingilizce_.tr.mfa., (Accessed on April 12, 2010).

300 *ibid.*

301 Süha Bölükbaşı and White Burkett, *The Superpowers and the Third World : Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, pp. 55-56.

302 *ibid.*, p. 60.

303 Cihat Göktepe, "The Cyprus Crisis of 1967 and its Effects on Turkey's Foreign Relations", *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 41, no. 3, 2005, p. 435.

had] ever seen."³⁰⁴

In his letter, President Johnson stated that:

"I must call your attention, Mr. Prime Minister, to the obligations of NATO. There can be no question in your mind that a Turkish intervention in Cyprus would lead to a military engagement between Turkish and Greek forces... War between Turkey and Greece must be considered as 'literally unthinkable.' Adhesion to NATO, in its very essence, means that NATO countries will not wage war on each other... Furthermore, a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey would lead to a direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies".³⁰⁵

As we can see in the letter, President Johnson openly warned that NATO would not defend Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey intervened in Cyprus. Furthermore the letter also stated that the United States would not allow Turkey to use the military equipment supplied by the United States. In his response Prime Minister İnönü stressed that if the commitment of the alliance was conditional, this would damage the credibility of the alliance. "In the case of such an event, a new world order will be established and Turkey will take its place in that order," İnönü said. However, at the end the Turkish government withdrew its intention to intervene in the Cyprus conflict. In his reply İnönü claimed that "we have upon your request, postponed our decision to exercise our right of action in Cyprus conferred to us by the Treaty of Guarantee".³⁰⁶

The "Johnson letter" have a long-time impact on Turkish-American relations. The letter also showed that the United States was not willing to trigger the NATO mechanism in support of Turkey "even though the most vital Turkish interests were

304 Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: A History of a Distinctive Alliance*, p. 170.

305 "Correspondence between President Johnson and Prime Minister İnönü, June 1964, as released by the White House, January 15, 1966", *Middle East Journal*, vol. 20, no. 3, Summer 1966, pp. 386-393.

306 Cengiz Başak, "The Policies of the Major Powers Towards Cyprus Crisis and United Nations (UN) Operations in Cyprus (UNFICYP) Between the Years of 1964–1974", *Foreign Policy*, vol. 2, 1998, p. 116.

at stake.³⁰⁷ The Turkish government was disappointed to realize that "their most important ally, the United States, not only would not help them in a deeply felt cause, but apparently disagreed profoundly on the force of NATO commitment to defend Turkey."³⁰⁸ After its publication in newspapers, this letter provoked a widespread anti-American movement in Turkey.

The crisis underscored that there were costs associated with being so dependent on the United States and this forced Turkey to reduce its dependence. Consequently, the strong anti-West campaign in Turkey in the aftermath of the Johnson letter was followed by demands that Turkey should revise its foreign policy.³⁰⁹ After the shock of the Johnson Letter, the Turkish government decided to limit US military activities on Turkish territory. In July 1969 Turkey and the United States signed the Bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement in which the US was made to accept Turkish sovereignty over all installations.³¹⁰

The Cyprus issue was brought to the agenda when the ruling military junta in Greece supported a coup attempt against Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus in July 1974.³¹¹ Consequently, acting under Article 4 of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, Turkish troops intervened on the island to protect the Turkish community on July 20. While diplomatic efforts were initiated, the Turkish government invaded a second time on August 14, taking control of approximately 40 percent of the island, with the aim of resolving the security concerns of the Turkish community on the

307 H. W. Jr. Brands, "America Enters the Cyprus Tangle 1964", *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 23, no. 3, July 1987, p. 351.

308 Nasuh Uslu, *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: A History of a Distinctive Alliance*, p. 170.

309 Gökhan Çetinsaya, "A Tale of Two Centuries: Continuities in Turkish Foreign Policy and Security Policy" in Nurşin Ateşoğlu Güney (ed.), *Contentious Issues of Security and the Future of Turkey*, (London: Ashgate, 2007), p.13.

310 Süha Bölükbaşı and White Burkett, *The Superpowers and the Third World : Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, p. 72.

311 Melek Fırat, "Yunanistan'la İlişkiler", in Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt 1: 1919-1980*, p. 739.

island.³¹²



Figure 3.5 Cyprus Map after Turkish Military Intervention of 1974

Source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/maps/maptemplate_cy.html, (Accessed on April 22, 2010).

Perhaps, the most difficult period in the Turkish-American relationship followed the 1974 invasion. In response to Turkish military intervention, the American Congress put a military embargo against Turkey to force it to withdraw from Cyprus. While the US government did not consider an embargo to be an effective tool to achieve US policy objectives in the Eastern Mediterranean, Congress insisted on the prohibition of arms sales to Turkey. In the end, on February 5, 1975, the provisions of Section 620 (X) of the Foreign Assistance Act went into effect. As a result, over 200 million Dollars in arms purchases, grants and commercial military sales to Turkey were cancelled.³¹³

Supporters of the embargo in the US Congress asserted that Turkey illegally used US imported arms during the military operation on Cyprus.³¹⁴ According to this

312 Ellen B. Laipson, *Congressional-Executive Relations and the Turkish Arms Embargo*, (Washington: US Government Printing House, 1981), p. 1.

313 US House of Representatives and Senate, *Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1979: Current Legislation and Related Executive Orders: vol. 1*, (Washington, US Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 113.

314 Nasuh Uslu, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinde Kıbrıs*, (Ankara: 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, 2000), p. 325.

assertion "80 to 90 percent of the equipment used in that aggressive military action was made, paid for and delivered by the United States" and that "this was an unconditional violation of their own laws, the UN Charter, the NATO covenant and agreements between the two nations."³¹⁵

However, the US officials underlined their opposition to the embargo clearly in several statements. In his autobiography President Ford writes, "I considered this, the single most irresponsible, short-sighted foreign policy decision Congress had made in all the years I'd been in Washington...I urged Congress to reverse it."³¹⁶ Ford explained the main causes of his decision to veto the Turkish arms ban provision to House and Senate on October 15, 1974. He claimed that refusing to help Turkey would damage US efforts in the Cyprus peace negotiations. Ford added that this aid ban would also negatively affect Turkish-American relations and weaken the "crucial position of the United States in the East Mediterranean".³¹⁷

Moreover, Ford addressed in his address before a Joint Session of Congress on US foreign policy on April 10, 1975 with the following:

"I earnestly ask Congress to weigh the broader considerations and consequences of its past actions on the complex Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus...United States military assistance to an old and faithful ally, Turkey, has been cut off by action of Congress. This has imposed an embargo on military purchases by Turkey, extending even to items already paid for - an unprecedented act against a friend... We are continuing our earnest efforts to find equitable solutions to the problems, which exist between Greece and Turkey. But the result of the Congressional action has been to block progress towards reconciliation, thereby prolonging the suffering on Cyprus, to complicate our ability to promote successful negotiations, to increase the danger of a broader conflict.... Our longstanding relationship with Turkey is not simply a favour to Turkey; it is a clear and essential mutual interest. Turkey lies on the rim of the Soviet Union and at the gates of the Middle East. It is vital to the security of the eastern Mediterranean, the southern flank of Western Europe, and the collective security of the Western alliance. Our U.S. military bases in Turkey are as critical to our own security as they are to the defense of NATO."³¹⁸

315 Ellen B. Laipson, *Congressional-Executive Relations and the Turkish Arms Embargo*, p. 29.

316 Gerald R. Ford, *A Time to Heal*, (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), p. 302.

317 Nasuh Uslu, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinde Kıbrıs*, p. 331.

318 Gerald Ford, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress Reporting on United States Foreign Policy", April 10, 1975, John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, Santa Barbara, CA, Available at

Along the same lines, Senate Majority Leader Mansfield said that "If we adopt an amendment aimed directly and specifically against Turkey, ...for one thing, we might see a tilt on the part of Turkey toward the Soviet Union. They have a thousand-mile frontier, and within that area they have nuclear warheads and US installations...The Turks are a Muslim people. Perhaps there might be a tilt on the part of Turkey toward what we call the Middle East."³¹⁹

As seen here, the anti-embargo argument justified its opposition with geopolitical language and made several significant points. Firstly, according to this line of reasoning it was impossible to solve such a problem using blunt force. Indeed, the arms embargo did not compel the Turks to cooperate, but instead caused the US to lose its influence over Turkey. Moreover, the arms embargo would damage the geopolitical interests of the United States in the region.³²⁰ Closing US military bases on Turkish territory would also put an end to its intelligence facilities, and thus to its monitoring of Soviet military activities. Finally, the embargo would weaken the Southeastern flank of NATO.³²¹ On February 21, 1975, Interagency Intelligence Memorandum summarized US's concerns regarding the consequences of the arms embargo on Turkey as follows: "The Turks have no satisfactory alternative to US supply of arms, at least over the near term. Hence, the effectiveness of the Turkish armed forces and their ability to perform their key role in NATO will steadily deteriorate. The strategic implications of a protracted US cutoff could be profound, particularly in view of Turkey's geographic position anchoring NATO's southern flank and controlling Soviet access to the Mediterranean."³²²

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4826>, (Accessed on April 7, 2010).

319 Laurance Stern, *The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of the American Diplomacy*, (New York: Times Books, 1977), p. 152.

320 Nasuh Uslu, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinde Kıbrıs*, op.cit., pp. 334-335.

321 Ellen B. Laipson, *Congressional-Executive Relations and the Turkish Arms Embargo*, p. 26.

322 US Department of State, *FRUS: Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976, 1946 vol. XXX, Document 217*, Available at <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v30/ch3>, (Accessed on April 8, 2011).

As a first reaction to the embargo, Turkey unilaterally declared the establishment of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus on February 13, 1975. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Ecevit, overturned the prohibition on opium production. Moreover, on June 17, the Turkish administration announced that all US military and intelligence facilities in Turkey would be placed on "provisional status".³²³ On July 26, Turkey cancelled the Bilateral Defense and Cooperation Agreement of 1969 and closed all US military facilities except NATO bases in Turkey.³²⁴

Jimmy Carter was elected US president in 1976. He argued that the uneasy relations with Turkey produced important problems for the Western defense system. After three years, the embargo was lifted in October 1978. It is important to emphasize that this decision was critically taken just as the United States was about to lose Iran.³²⁵ On 3 October 1978, Turkey took the decision to end the "provisional status" while the United States officially did not approve the DECA.³²⁶

The second Cyprus crisis in 1974 marked a new era in American-Turkish relations. With the impact of détente between the two blocs and the strong anti-American feeling in the country after the Cyprus crisis, Turkey, for the first time, wanted to reduce its dependency on the United States and improve its relations with the Soviet Union.³²⁷ As Ecevit put it: "... the sources of imminent threat to Turkey changed considerably in recent years. Turkey does not see the Soviet Union as a threat".³²⁸ No doubt the embargo damaged Turkey's economy and defense

323 Laurance Stern, *The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of the American Diplomacy*, p. 155.

324 Ellen B. Laipson, *Congressional-Executive Relations and the Turkish Arms Embargo*, p. 25.

325 Theodore A. Coulombis, *The United States, Greece and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle*, (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 106.

326 Laurance Stern, *The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of the American Diplomacy*, p. 155.

327 Sedat Laçiner, "Turkish Foreign Policy (1971-1980): Ideologies vs. Realities", *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika*, vol. 6, no. 1, 2010, p. 91.

328 *ibid.*, p. 66.

capacity. It also harmed the southern flank of NATO. The arms embargo created a mistrust about the reliability of the US. On the other hand, an arms embargo against Turkey negatively affected the security interests of the United States. Turkey decided to isolate itself from the West despite its strategic importance to NATO and the United States in the Middle East.³²⁹ And finally, it failed to contribute to resolution in the Cyprus issue. Briefly, at the end of the embargo, the Western alliance was damaged, the United States lost its strategic military bases, and the US position in the Eastern Mediterranean was weakened.

However, efforts to reorient Turkish foreign policy were short-lived, as several developments increased Turkey's strategic importance to the United States once again. The Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 were responsible for this reorientation.

Since the end of World War II, the US administrations had assumed it had Turkey's unconditional support regarding US geopolitical interests in the region, regardless of its domestic interests. However, on Cyprus issue, US policies failed primarily because they "used" Turkey to realize its objectives in the region at the expense of Turkish national interests. The US administration also failed to understand that Cyprus was a more important issue to both Turkey and Greece than to the NATO alliance.³³⁰

During the Cyprus crises, Turkey also learned several lessons about its Western alliance. Despite the opposition of the United States, Turkish military intervention in Cyprus highlighted the importance of public opinion, even when foreign policy was shaped primarily by external factors. With the crises in 1964 and in 1974 began an era in which its domestic concerns took on a more prominent position in shaping Turkish foreign policy.³³¹ After these two crises, the Cyprus issue was clear evidence that Turkey's unconditional loyalty to the West could be costly for its own security. NATO support was conditional and political, and Turkey

329 Nasuh Uslu, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinde Kıbrıs*, pp. 334-335.

330 Theodora Kalaitzaki, "US Mediation in Greek – Turkish Disputes since 1954", p. 109.

331 William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, p. 159.

learned it could not rely on NATO in a time of crisis.³³²

3.6 Conclusion

This dissertation argues that “geopolitical imaginations” are closely linked to practice in that they are used to justify the decisions of states. Indeed, the geopolitical narrative of the Cold War -the term was itself a geopolitical metaphor- created a divided and bipolar world in which two superpowers tried to establish its own spheres of influence.

After World War II, Turkey, with its proximity the Soviet Union, found itself in a very problematic geography on which the two superpowers strategized about how to dominate the oil-rich Middle East region. Soviet territorial demands from Turkey in 1939 caught the attention of the US administration and forced Washington to cooperate with Turkey to prevent Soviet expansionism. It can be argued that the Turkish-American relationship was a product of these deeply ideological conditions.

During the Cold War, Turkey’s primary value in the eyes of the United States was its geographical imagination. Turkey became a part of the containment policy of the United States with the Truman Doctrine and received a huge amount of military and economic aid with Marshall Plan. President Truman used the “falling dominoes” metaphor with respect to Turkey and Greece to justify US military actions in the region. As a part of the containment policy numerous military bases and US facilities were opened on Turkish territory. These military bases and facilities have been central to understanding the strategic nature of the alliance during and after the Cold War. Thereafter, Turkey was regarded as a “barrier”, a “military base” or a “NATO ally” to contain and to prevent Soviet expansionism especially in the Middle East.

Turkey’s participation of the Korean War and inclusion in NATO showed that

332 Theodora Kalaitzaki, “US Mediation in Greek – Turkish Disputes since 1954”, p. 111; İltar Turan and Dilek Barlas, “Turkish – Greek Balance: A Key to Peace and Cooperation in the Balkans”, p. 472.

“security” and “geopolitics” were the key terms in US state discourse regarding Turkey. Accordingly, during this period Turkey was accepted as a Western ally and also part of the “West”. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union also collapsed the East-West division that had positioned Turkey with the West.³³³

However, the Cyprus issue became the most important conflict of the alliance in the Cold War period. Turkey perceived the Cyprus issue as a “national cause” because it was argued that ethnic conflicts would threaten the existence of the Turkish community on the island. Despite vigorous opposition by the United States, the Turkish military invaded the island on July 20, 1974. Consequently, it can be argued that the Cyprus issue and related developments such as the Johnson Letter and the US arms embargo created a deep mistrust and suspicion between the United States and Turkey and damaged relations during the 1960s and 1970s.

After the Cold War, geopolitical imaginations and practices of the US have also changed the meaning of geopolitical imaginations of Turkey’s geography. New geopolitical discourses of the US have constructed new definitions in the post-Cold War era, and Turkey’s redefinition has mostly been accepted and occasionally resisted by the Turkish administrations. It is therefore important to analyze the new geopolitical understanding of the United States in the post-Cold War era.

333 Pinar Tank, “Dressing for the Occasion: Reconstructing Turkey’s Identity”, *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, vol. 6, no. 4, 2006, p. 463.

CHAPTER 4

END OF THE COLD WAR: A SEARCH FOR NEW IDENTITIES?

"We are a nation of rock-solid realism and clear-eyed idealism. We are Americans: we are the nation that believes in the future. We are the nation that can shape the future."

*President George Bush*³³⁴

4.1 Introduction

According to Agnew, geopolitics connects the geographical representations and practices that produce the spaces of world politics.³³⁵ In this thesis geopolitics is taken as a "discourse", and an "imagination", and states maintain their own geopolitical imagery to explain world politics and justify the exercise of power. Accordingly, the Cold War was a geopolitical system that created two blocks, political discourses, state institutions, military forces, economic interests, and intellectual statecraft practices. Dalby asserted that during the Cold War years, US geopoliticians accused the Soviet Union of being an expansionist empire pursuing world domination.³³⁶ But, with the collapse of the Soviet Union the official geopolitical *raison d'être* of the United States disappeared.

When the Cold War geopolitical structure collapsed in 1989, there was a

334 George Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union", 29 January 1991, John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, Santa Barbara, CA, Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19253>, (Accessed on August 3, 2010).

335 John Agnew, *Geopolitics: Re-Visioning World Politics*, pp. 5-6.

336 Simon Dalby, "Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourse", *Alternatives: Social Transformation and Humane Governance*, vol. 17, no. 1, 1992, pp. 101.

need for a new geopolitical narrative to frame the transformations of world politics in the 1990s. As a consequence, in the early 1990s the geopolitical cartography and dynamics of the international system began to change. In fact, according to Ó Tuathail, this transformation of the system created a power vacuum in world politics.³³⁷ In the search for a new paradigm of world politics a number of strategists and policy-makers have declared that geopolitics had come to an end.³³⁸ However, Agnew claims that the post-Cold War geopolitical map was still organized geographically.³³⁹ Similarly, Bilgin argues that with the end of the Cold War the discourse of ideological geopolitics ended but replaced by numerous geopolitical discourses.³⁴⁰

In this new era, American policy makers needed to find new foreign policy directions. In 1990 President George Bush defined the new threat to the United States as "uncertainty and instability".³⁴¹ This perception of threat was reinforced by Colin Powell who said "the post-Cold War world will be a more dangerous place for the US than the Cold War because of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in hostile states, anti-American regimes in the Third World, drug traffickers, anti-democratic insurgents and terrorism".³⁴² The Gulf War in 1990 was taken as evidence of the end of the Cold War and as the basis for President Bush's call for a "New World Order", or as a discursive tool for a new post-Cold War geopolitical order.

337 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, "At the End of Geopolitics? Reflection on a Plural Problematic at the Century's End", *Alternatives*, vol. 22, 1997, p. 35.

338 *ibid.*, p. 37.

339 John Agnew et al. (eds.), *A Companion to Political Geography*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), p. 17.

340 Pinar Bilgin, "A Return to 'Civilisational Geopolitics' in the Mediterranean? Changing Geopolitical Images of the European Union and Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era", *Geopolitics*, vol. 9, no. 2, Summer 2004, p. 271.

341 George Bush, "Oklahoma State University Commencement Address (excerpts) 4 May 1990", *Survival*, vol. 32, no. 4, July 1990, p. 364.

342 Colin Powell, "U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changing World: Keeping Democracy Alive", *Vital Speeches of the Day*, LVI, no. 14, May 1, 1990.

In line with this change Turkey's strategic position vis-à-vis US interests and dynamics of the Turkish-American relations also changed. During the Cold War due to its geopolitical location, alliance with Turkey was crucial in order for the US to contain the Soviet Union. The post-Cold War environment eliminated the Soviet threat to Turkey's security. Therefore, the disappearance of the Soviet threat forced both the United States and Turkey to reassess and reshape their foreign policy directions in important ways.

Indeed, as it was pointed out, Turkey has found itself in the middle of three areas of strategic instability which were of interest to the US - the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East- and which a new activism initiated. At first, Turkey was concerned that the end of the Cold War would reduce its strategic importance in the eyes of the United States, which would mean less economic and military aid for Turkey. Therefore, Turkey tried to prove its geopolitical importance to the Western interest. However, these concerns were not realized; on the contrary, the strategic and geopolitical importance of Turkey to US administrations has increased since the end of the Cold War due to its continued proximity to regions considered "problematic". As a consequence, in the 1990s, both Turkish and American officials discussed the question of whether Turkey was a "bridge" or a "barrier", between Europe and the Middle East, and between Islam and the Western world.

For the US administrations, during the 1990s Turkey was a "pro-Western state" in a region of instability, a "supporter" of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, a "key" element of the US's Iraq policy, and a "base" for Operation Northern Watch. Moreover, Turkey has been a "model" for the Central Asian republics, a "bridge" of communication between the region and the West, a "buffer" against possible Russian aggression in the region, an "ideological counterweight" against fundamentalist Iran, an "alternative" to Russia and Iran, a "gateway" for Caspian energy resources, and a "supporter" and a "participant" in Balkan peacekeeping.³⁴³

343 Alan Makovsky, "US Policy toward Turkey: Progress and Problems", in Morton Abramowitz (ed.), *Turkey's Transformation and American Policy*, (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2000), pp. 221-222.

On the other hand some other terms have also been used to define Turkey. For example, in Serhat Güvenç's study, "Pivotal State", "Regional Hegemon", "Semi-Rogue State" and "Middle Power" are defined as terms used for Turkey in different ways.³⁴⁴ Brzezinski defined geopolitical pivots as "[t]he states whose importance is derived not from their power and motivation but rather from their sensitive location and from the consequences of their potentially vulnerable condition for the behavior of geostrategic players."³⁴⁵ In his analysis Turkey was presented as a "pivotal state" in terms of the security of the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia.³⁴⁶ In addition, for Lesser, the term "pivotal state" is the best definition for Turkey in order to understand Turkish-American relations in post-Cold War era.³⁴⁷

According to Kay and Yaphe, the term "strategic partnership" has become a major rhetorical and substantive tool of post-Cold War international relations.³⁴⁸ The Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Paul Wolfowitz underlined Turkey's strategic importance by using new geopolitical discourse of the United States. He said "perhaps no other country outside the former Soviet Bloc has seen its strategic position more radically transformed by the end of the Cold War than Turkey".³⁴⁹ He added that Turkey remained important for several reasons, "the war in the Balkans has demonstrated that the end of the Cold War did not bring with it the end of conflict in Europe; the country's location on the Black Sea, including its

344 Serhat Güvenç, *Rise and Demise of a "Strategic Partnership": In Search of Context for the Post-Cold War Turkish-American Relations*, (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2003), p. 39.

345 Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, p. 41.

346 *ibid.*, p. 47.

347 Zalmay Khalilzad et al., *The Future of Turkish-Western Relations: Toward a Strategic Plan*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), p. 59.

348 Sean Kay and Judith Yaphe, "Turkey's International Affairs: Shaping the U.S.-Turkey Strategic Partnership", *Strategic Forum*, no. 122, July 1997, p. 1.

349 Quoted in Edward Mortimer, "Active in a New World Role", in *Turkey, Europe's Rising Star, The Opportunities in Anglo-Turkish Relations*, (London: Lowe Bell Communications, 1993), p. 44.

proximity to Ukraine and Crimea, remains crucial; Turkey serves as a critical bridge to the Caucasus and Central Asia; and, in its least analyzed role, it occupies a strategic and possibly growing position in the Middle East."³⁵⁰

This chapter analyses the changing geopolitical discourse of the United States towards Turkey in the post-Cold War era. It is argued that the geopolitical discourse of the US, which shapes its relations with Turkey and the rest of the world, has been reconstructed after the disappearance of the common enemy, the Soviet Union. Turkey retained its position in the eyes of the United States during this era. Under these conditions, the exercise of "locating Turkey" in this new international context is significant to both academic and political circles. In this new era, however, the geopolitical metaphors used by the United States have changed. During the Cold War, metaphors such as "buffer", "flank", or "barrier" were used to describe Turkey. Yet, especially during 1990s Turkey was described as a "bridge", a "gate", or a "model" country.

This chapter is comprised of three parts. The first part is an evaluation of US foreign policy in 1990s. In the second part, geopolitical imaginations of Turkey by various US administrations will be analyzed with respect to the post-Cold War map of world politics. The most important problem of the Turkish-American alliance, the Kurdish issue, will be examined in the third section.

4.2 US Foreign Policy in the 1990s

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the most potent icon of the Cold War, an era of unipolar leadership of the United States began and geopolitical views were revisited.³⁵¹ President Bush stated that "the fall of the wall was the start of the Cold War's endgame and everyone understood that".³⁵² For President Clinton "[it was]

350 *ibid.*, p. 44.

351 John Agnew, *Making Political Geography*, p. 133.

352 Condoleezza Rice, "The White House and the Wall", *Newsweek*, November 22, 1999.

surely one of the happiest and most important days of the 20th Century".³⁵³

As Dodds argued during the Cold War years the concepts of bloc confrontations, domino theories, and Iron Curtains were at the center of the geopolitical narratives of the great powers.³⁵⁴ US-Soviet hostility helped to legitimate US military hegemony in the capitalist states.³⁵⁵ In the post-Cold War period new threats including AIDS, terrorism, and environmental degradation began to take place of the communist threat. In other words, as Agnew argues "threats from global warming, increased worldwide economic inequality, and global terrorism are all symptomatic of the geopolitical order after the Cold War".³⁵⁶

With the collapse of Soviet Union, the US not only lost its enemy, but its identity and role in global affairs. The Bush administration started to reterritorialize world politics retaining the Western geopolitical structure of the Cold War that positioned the US as the leader of free world with the responsibility to bring freedom to the rest of the world, but without a single rival. This was defined as the "new world order".

Even though "the end of the Cold War was clearly a victory for the forces of freedom and democracy", the world didn't become safer.³⁵⁷ As Bush said, "the problem is not in terms of world peace, the problem is how we are going to get along with Russia [and China]".³⁵⁸ For Kissinger, "The world into which America has

353 William J. Clinton, "Remarks by the President at Quandt Lecture", August 11, 2009, Available at <http://www.britannica.com/bps/additionalcontent/18/8868150/Remarks-by-the-President-at-Quandt-Lecture>, (Accessed on August 5, 2010).

354 Klaus Dodds, "Cold War Geopolitics", in *A Companion to Political Geography*, John Agnew, K. Mitchell, and Gearóid Ó Tuathail (eds.), (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), pp. 204-213.

355 Mary Kaldor, *The Imaginary War: Understanding the East-West Conflict*, p. 22.

356 John Agnew, *Making Political Geography*, p. 133.

357 "George Bush U. S. President", *CNN Perspectives Series: Cold War Episode 23: Conclusions: Interviews*, October 1997.

358 "George Bush U. S. President", *CNN Perspectives Series: Cold War Episode 24: Conclusions: Interviews*, September-October 1997.

been projected" has made that country even stronger.³⁵⁹ The question here was how America could manage that power with its new global mission.

In this new era, policy makers and strategic analysts have tried to find a new concept to replace the Cold War narrative. Accordingly, Francis Fukuyama's the "End of History" and Samuel P. Huntington's the "Clash of Civilizations?" were adopted as the most important ideological tools to construct meaning in new world order and to create a path for the US to follow.

In the early days of this new era, Fukuyama declared the ultimate victory of liberal democracy and claimed that it "may constitute the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the final form of human government and as such constitute the end of history."³⁶⁰ According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security advisor to President Jimmy Carter, this geopolitical narrative served the imagination of a new hegemon, the "only superpower USA".³⁶¹ This narrative was used by the US administration to help realize US strategic aims during the Gulf War. As Davutoğlu noted, the Cold War term of "Free World" has been replaced with "International Community" in the post-Cold War era.³⁶² It can be argued that Fukuyama's thesis shaped political affairs in the post-Soviet and pre-Bosnian era. However, the conflict between the US and Europe on Bosnia brought the end of the "New World Order."³⁶³

This new situation required a new analytical framework for the US policy-makers. Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" laid the foundation for this framework. Like Kennan's article, Samuel Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations?" article,

359 "Henry Kissinger U. S. Secretary of State", *CNN Perspectives Series: Cold War Episode 24: Conclusions: Interviews*, March-April 1997.

360 Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, p. xi.

361 Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*.

362 Ahmet Davutoğlu, "The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of the World (Dis)Order", *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 2, no. 4, December 1997-February 1998, p. 1.

363 *ibid.* p. 1.

which published in *Foreign Affairs* Summer 1993 has broadly affected the post-Cold War geopolitical discourse of US foreign policy. In spite of some terminological differences, in fact, these two articles share a similar ideological background for justification of foreign policy measures.

First of all, Huntington's thesis was different than Fukuyama's. While Huntington did not argue for a universal set of values, he tried to examine the existing political disorder and defined the areas of conflict in the world. Huntington's main claim was that "clashes of civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace", and that "in the post-Cold War world the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or economic. They are cultural."³⁶⁴ Huntington proposed a paradigm that stressed the importance of civilizational differences.³⁶⁵

It should be noted that Huntington's new paradigm has several similarities with the Cold War model. Mark Bassin argues that the Cold War blocks were characterized largely through state-based typologies such as "superpowers," "allied states," "client states," "non-aligned states," "neutral states," "gateway states," "dominoes," and "shatter belts". Similarly, Huntington's typologies for his post-Cold War civilizational blocks were state-based. His categories of the constituent parts of a civilizational block include "core states", "cleft countries", "torn countries" and "lone countries".³⁶⁶

Under these unclear circumstances, for Ó Tuathail, one of the most important factors of instability in the post-Cold War era was the geopolitical vacuum in some regions. The newly independent states in Central Asia and Caucasus in particular, an important gateway between the Heartland and the Rimland, were at the center of power struggles.³⁶⁷ Similarly, Brzezinski has

364 Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations", p. 21.

365 *ibid.*, p. 21.

366 Mark Bassin, "Civilisations and Their Discontents: Political Geography and Geopolitics in the Huntington Thesis", *Geopolitics*, vol. 12, no. 3, July 2007, p. 357.

367 Thomas W. Simons, *Eurasia's New Frontiers*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), p. 23.

emphasized the geopolitical importance of the Eurasia region for the United States and suggested that the US should dominate both the eastern and western Rimlands of Eurasia to control the Middle East and Africa.³⁶⁸ Thus, it can be argued that conflict over domination of these regions was the real motivation for the political and military crises and instabilities of the post-Cold War era.

In the 1990s, US administrations also attempted to prevent energy transport monopolization and guarantee the flow of energy resources to Western oil markets. A National Security Strategy document in 1997 underscores the significance of regional stability and transportation of its energy resources to international markets as follows: "A stable and prosperous Caucasus and Central Asia will help promote stability and security from the Mediterranean to China and facilitate rapid development and transport to international markets of the large Caspian oil and gas resources, with substantial U.S. commercial participation."³⁶⁹

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, both American policy-makers and intellectuals have searched for the new principles on which to base national strategy. According to Davutoğlu, a single framework was not enough for understanding post-Cold War decentralized world.³⁷⁰ By his analysis there were three different stages of American policy in the post-Cold War era. The first stage began in November 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall and ended in January 1991 with the start of the Gulf War. The rhetoric of the "New World Order" was the symbol of this period. The second stage was a transition period, which started with the Gulf War and ended in April 1992 with the eruption of the Bosnian crisis. There was a shift in use of the concept of "New World Order" during this transition period. Indeed, this shift became more visible during the third stage called as the post-Bosnian era.³⁷¹

368 Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, p.17.

369 William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, (Washington, DC: The White House, May 1997), p. 41.

370 Ahmet Davutoğlu, "The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of the World (Dis)Order", p. 7.

371 *ibid.*, p. 8.

Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait became an important opportunity for a re-articulation of the US's role in world politics. Accordingly, this role was to protect the "Western" way of life against anarchy, which threatened geopolitical order and the stability of the global economy.³⁷² The main motivation for US interventionism in the Gulf was what President Bush described as the "new world order". Both Bush and Robert Gates used this concept in speeches in April and May of 1991.³⁷³ However, it was in an address before Congress on September 11, 1990 that Bush first began to actively promote the concept as the new "big idea" in US foreign policy thinking.³⁷⁴ Accordingly, "The crisis in the Persian Gulf...offers a rare opportunity to move towards a historic period of cooperation. Out of the troubled times...a new world order can emerge."³⁷⁵

Indeed, in this new era, America's security did not depend on the success or failure of containing communism. The United States thus had to manage its relationships with Europe, Japan, Russia, and China, and with the other major players in world affairs. Moreover, despite congressional pressure to reduce overseas military assistance, for Chase et al. "it is vital that America focus its efforts on a small number of countries whose fate is uncertain and whose future will profoundly affect their surrounding regions".³⁷⁶ In this geopolitical understanding

372 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, "Post-Cold War Geopolitics: Contrasting Superpowers in a World of Global Dangers", in R. J. Johnson, P. Taylor and M. Watts (eds.), *Geographies of Global Change*, 2nd ed., (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), p. 23

373 George Bush, "The President's News Conference on the Persian Gulf Conflict", January 18, 1991, John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, Santa Barbara, CA, Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19229>, (Accessed on August 5, 2010); Robert M. Gates, *Weapons Proliferation in the New World Order: Hearing, United States, Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs*, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., January 15, 1992.

374 George Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit, Washington D.C., September 11, 1990, John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, Santa Barbara, CA. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=18820>, (Accessed on August 6, 2010).

375 George Bush, "Towards a New World Order", *US Department of State Dispatch*, September 17, 1990, p. 91.

376 Robert Chase, Emily B. Hill and Paul Kennedy, "Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 33, 1996, p. 33.

these countries have been begun to be called the "pivotal states". In the Cold War years, US policy makers such as Eisenhower, Acheson, Nixon and Kissinger referred to a country under the communist threat as a potential "rotten apple in a barrel" or a "falling domino". Interestingly, for Chase et al., domino theory fit US strategic needs in the post-Cold War era better than it did during the Cold War. The new dominoes, or pivotal states, "no longer need assistance against an external threat from a hostile political system; rather, the danger is that they will fall prey to internal disorder".³⁷⁷ Thus, the concept of pivotal states became a useful instrument to justify United States control of the developing world.³⁷⁸

Moreover, the Bush administration used the term "the rogue state" to justify its policy of comprehensive containment.³⁷⁹ It can be argued that categorizing states as "rogue" helped American foreign policy frame that perceive international affairs as a battle between good and evil.³⁸⁰ In this view, "the rogue states" were labeled based on their foreign policy outlook and perceived as the main threats not only to US interests but also to the order of the international community.³⁸¹ According to Bilgin and Morton there are three important characteristics of the rogue states: "the pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), the use of international terrorism as an instrument of state policy and a foreign policy

377 *ibid.*, p. 37.

378 *ibid.*, p. 38.

379 Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, *US Foreign Policy since 1945*, p. 172.

380 The idea of perceiving world politics as a battle between "good" and "evil" has not been a new phenomenon in US foreign policy. Indeed the idea was based on "Protestant millennialism" of seventeenth century. From this perspective, conflicts were primarily between heaven and hell, God and Satan, and good and evil. President Wilson's idealist outlook in the early 20th century was affected by this understanding. According to Wilson the primary aim of international relations was the eradication of "evil" behavior in the world. For details see Donald Schmidt, *The Folly of War: American Foreign Policy 1898-2005*, (New York: Algora Publishing, 2004), p. 10; John B. Judis, "The Chosen Nation: The Influence of Religion on U.S. Foreign Policy", *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief*, March 2005, p. 3.

381 *ibid.* p. 172.

orientation threatening US interests in key regions of the world".³⁸² It has been also argued that these points became the cornerstone of US post-Cold War containment policy. Within this framework, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright asserted that "dealing with the rogue states is one of the greatest challenges of our time ... because they are there with the sole purpose of destroying the system".³⁸³

The success of Operation Desert Storm raised again a number of questions about America's post-Cold War geopolitical aims. In fact the Pentagon, in the Defense Policy Guidelines report of 1992, asserted that the US had to do everything possible to keep its single superpower position and prevent the emergence of a rival regional or global power.³⁸⁴

However, despite the US success in the Gulf War, President Bush was reluctant to become involved in the Balkans because 1992 was an election year and Bush had been criticized by Bill Clinton for spending too much time on foreign policy. In a reference to the Yugoslav conflict, James Baker, Secretary of State, pointed out that the US "did not have a dog in that fight", and despite protests from some members of the administration, Washington refused to get involved in the early years of the conflict.³⁸⁵ This refusal resulted in serious criticism with an assertion that lack of involvement could be explained by the lack of US oil interests in the region. Yet in the end, Clinton initiated military effort in the Balkans for "humanitarian purposes".³⁸⁶

382 Pinar Bilgin and Adam David Morton, "From 'Rogue' to 'Failed' States? The Fallacy of Short-termism", *Politics*, vol. 24, no. 3, 2004, p. 172.

383 US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, "Secretary of State Madeleine Albright Address before the Council on Foreign Relations", September 30, 1997, Available at <http://www.secretary.state.gov/www/statements/970930.html>, (Accessed on March 5, 2011).

384 For the full text, see http://www.rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/1992_Draft_Defense_Planning_Guidance, (Accessed on August 22, 2010).

385 Matjaž Klemencic, "The International Community's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis: 1989-1995", Available at www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/MR320Klemencic.doc, (Accessed on August 21, 2010).

386 Fraser Cameron, *US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?*, p. 33.

It can be argued that the geopolitical narrative of President Clinton was a discourse of power that justified American political and economic geopolitical strategy.³⁸⁷ The Clinton administration shared similar arguments with George Bush government, saying that the 21st century would be an "American century", and that the "world needed the United States". According to Bacevich, during his administration, the United States was involved in 48 military interventions, triple the 16 military interventions of the Cold War period.³⁸⁸

The Clinton administration also confirmed existing US Middle Eastern priorities and policies as follows: "Securing a just, lasting and comprehensive peace between Israel and its neighbours . . . preserving Israel's security and well-being; maintaining security arrangements to preserve stability in the Persian Gulf and commercial access to its resources; combating terrorism and weapons proliferation; assisting U.S. businesses, and promoting political and economic reform."³⁸⁹

The prioritization of stability has also created a basis for the policy of "dual containment". The Clinton administration's strategy of engagement and enlargement stressed that the US had a "special responsibility for developing a strategy to neutralize, contain and, through selective pressure, perhaps even transform these backlash states into constructive members of the international community".³⁹⁰ The policy of Dual Containment was publicized on February 24, 1994 by Martin Indyk, senior director for Middle East Affairs of the National Security Council (NSC) at a symposium of the Middle East Policy Council.³⁹¹

387 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, "Geopolitics @ Millenium: Paranoid Fantasies and Technological Fundamentalism amidst the Contradictions of Contemporary Modernity", *Geographica Slovenica*, vol. 34, no. 1, 2001, p. 22.

388 Andrew J. Bacevich, *American Empire: the Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 143.

389 Robert H. Pelletreau, "American Objective In the Middle East", *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, vol. 7, no. 23, June 3, 1996.

390 Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 73, no. 2, March-April 1994, p. 45.

391 Martin Indyk, "The Clinton Administration's Approach to the Middle East", Available at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubs/indyk.htm>, (Accessed on June 11, 2010).

Defining Iran and Iraq as “rogue states” legitimized dual containment in the Middle East. It was hoped that economic and political pressures would force Iran to end its support of international terrorism and its efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was also contained for the same reasons. The US administration applied containment and isolation policies towards both countries.³⁹² On 30 April 1995 Clinton banned all American economic relations with Iran and the following year Congress passed the ILSA, which put in place sanctions against foreign commercial entities conducting business with Iran and Libya.³⁹³ However, European countries proceeded differently from the US, developing a “constructive engagement” policy towards Iran. This policy undermined the unilateral US sanctions and moreover increased its cost to America in maintaining them. As a result, dual containment for Dobson and Marsh “became a strategic cul-de-sac, neither offering a solution to indefinite resource expenditure nor allowing the flexibility to pursue different US objectives in Iran and Iraq”.³⁹⁴

The “rogue states” metaphor was replaced by the term “states of concern” in the last year of the Clinton administration. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright claimed that “we are now calling these states ‘states of concern’ because we are concerned about their support for terrorist activity, their development of missiles, and their desire to disrupt the international system”.³⁹⁵

392 Stephen C. Pelletiere, *Landpower and Dual Containment: Rethinking America’s Policy in the Gulf*, (Strategic Studies Institute: U.S. Army War College, November 1999), p. 3.

393 US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *CRS Report for Congress, The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA)*, by Kenneth Katzman, Congressional Rep. RS20871, (Washington DC: The Service, October 7, 2010).

394 Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, *US Foreign Policy since 1945*, p. 175

395 US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “Secretary of State Madeleine Albright interview on The Diane Rehm Show, Washington DC, June 19, 2000”, Available at <http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/2000/000619.html>, (Accessed on March 5, 2011).

4.3 Different Political Imaginations of Turkey

4.3.1 Turkey as a "Strategic Base" or a "Strategic Ally"

4.3.1.1 Political Dimension

During the 1990s the basic concerns of American foreign policy toward the region can be summarized as security of energy resources, security of its regional allies and security of Israel. In this new period, Turkey and the United States worked in cooperation on numerous regional security problems in the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Caucasus. Since participating in such efforts, the United States has begun to use different metaphors in description of Turkey. In the new geopolitical narrative of the United States, Turkey was viewed as a "strategic base" or "strategic ally" to the US operations in the Middle East and Balkans.

In this framework, Ian Lesser explains the term "strategic" as follows:

*"The US approach to Turkey is often characterized as 'strategic', in contrast to Europe's more political –and often more critical- approach to relations with Ankara. Indeed, the relationship continues to be strategic in several senses: strategic in terms of the primacy of security matters; strategic in terms of enduring and broad-based cooperation; and strategic in terms of Turkey's role in the broader geopolitical equation. The United States views Turkey, and measures Turkish cooperation, through the lens of a global power, and in this context, Turkey's trans-regional position is significant. The trans-regional quality goes beyond the country's geographic position adjacent to areas of interests –the Balkans, the eastern Mediterranean, the Caucasus, and the Gulf. Analysts and officials, both Turkish and American, often make this point –'location, location, location' in reference to Turkey's strategic significance."*³⁹⁶

In addition, Erickson stresses the importance of the US bases: "Turkey was viewed to fill an important niche in the US strategic position..., that of a force projection platform. In this case, American bases in Turkey were used as a direct launching point for combat operations over Iraq. Also, during the NATO air campaigns over Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999, Turkish airfields provided

396 Ian O. Lesser, "Turkey and the United States: Anatomy of a Strategic Relationship", in *The Feature of Turkish Foreign Policy*, Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis (eds.), (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), p. 84.

much-needed basing for additional air assets."³⁹⁷

At the beginning of the decade the Middle East became a new geographic focus of Turkish-American relations for both cooperation and competition. Since the 1950s American officials have traditionally viewed the maintenance of close military and political ties with Turkey as critical for US geopolitical interests in the Middle East. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was assumed that Turkey's crucial geographic position for the United States had been reduced. However, it can be argued that Turkey has become an even more important regional actor in the Middle East. According to General Ahmed M. Abdel-Halim as a result of the end of the bipolarity the United States became the only arbiter of the region's balance of power and thus a stable and strong Turkey was a vital component of regional peace and stability.³⁹⁸

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 was considered as an important evidence of the end of the Cold War geopolitical order. In order to understand the reasons and the consequences of the Gulf War of 1991, we have to analyze the significance of the Gulf in American geopolitical discourse.

As Sidaway pointed out, the Gulf was defined as "vitally strategic" to the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s.³⁹⁹ Similarly, in his 1982 study, Fred Halliday stressed the strategic importance of Gulf oil in the Second Cold War. He argued that the First Cold War's focus was Europe and the Far East, while the focus of the Second Cold War was South-west Asia, and in particular the Persian Gulf.⁴⁰⁰ According to Ó Tuathail "this was related to a geopolitical discourse of 'lifelines,'

397 Edward J. Erickson, "Turkey as Regional Hegemon – 2014: Strategic Implications for the United States" , *Turkish Studies*, vol. 5, no. 3, Autumn 2004, p. 29.

398 *ibid.* p. 20.

399 James Derrick Sidaway, "What is in a Gulf?: From the 'Arc of Crisis' to the Gulf War", in Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby (eds.), *Rethinking Geopolitics*, (New York and London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 224-239.

400 Fred Halliday, "Threat from the East? Soviet Policy from Afghanistan and Iran to the Horn of Africa", (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982), pp. 14-15.

'chokepoints' and 'arteries' – a vocabulary deployed to good effect with respect to other regions too, such as Central America and southern Africa".⁴⁰¹

During these years, the term of "arc of crisis" which had first been used by President Carter's national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski in 1979, entered Western geopolitical discourse.⁴⁰² Time magazine's January 1979 cover story on "Iran: The Crescent of Crisis" is an important example to how the idea of the Gulf in "danger" was constructed.⁴⁰³ In the article the crisis was defined as follows:

*"In the broadest and grandest of measurements, this crisis crescent ...reaches all the way from Indochina to southern Africa. In practical terms, however, what Brzezinski is really speaking of are the nations that stretch across the southern flank of the Soviet Union from the Indian subcontinent to Turkey, and southward through the Arabian Peninsula to the Horn of Africa. The center of gravity of this arc is Iran. . . . Regardless of what kind of regime comes to power in this immensely strategic land, the politics of the region, and indeed the geopolitics of the entire world will be affected."*⁴⁰⁴

In short, it can be argued that the Gulf War's historical background was directly linked to Brzezinski's 1970s geopolitical rhetoric.

On 2 August 1990, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait to resolve Iraqi historical claims.⁴⁰⁵ The US and the rest of the world was shocked by this invasion. Four days after the invasion President Bush declared "this will not stand."⁴⁰⁶

Indeed, President Bush argued that it was essential to protect America's vital oil interests in the region. In his 8 August 1990 speech, he asserted that Iraq

401 Gearóid Ó Tuathail, "The Language and Nature of the "New" Geopolitics: The Case of US–El Salvador Relations", *Political Geography Quarterly*, no. 5, 1986, p. 75.

402 "IRAN: The Crescent of Crisis", *Time*, January 15, 1979, Available at <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,919995,00.html>, (Accessed on August 17, 2010).

403 *ibid.*

404 *ibid.*

405 Tayyar Ari, "US Middle East Policy and the Role of Turkey: The Recent Development in Turkish-American Relations", Available at <http://www.tayyarari.com/download/tacc.doc>, (Accessed on August 10, 2010).

406 George Bush, "The Arabian Peninsula: US Principles", *US Department of State Dispatch*, August 8, 1990, p. 52.

is "a rich and powerful country that possesses the world's second largest reserves of oil and over a million men under arms. It's the fourth largest military in the world". On the contrary, the United States, "now imports nearly half the oil it consumes and could face a major threat to its economic independence. Much of the world is even more dependent upon imported oil and is even more vulnerable to Iraqi threats".⁴⁰⁷ It can be argued that Bush's main aim was to protect the US's geopolitical order in the Middle East. In his speech at the Pentagon on 15 August 1990 Bush defined the role of the US as that of "maintaining access to energy resources that are key -not just to the functioning of this country but to the entire world. Our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom, and the freedom of friendly countries around the world would all suffer if control of the world's great oil reserves fell into the hands of Saddam Hussein".⁴⁰⁸ He added that:

*"The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is one of the defining moments of a new era -an era full of promise but also one replete with new challenges. ...we must respond to the defining moments of this new era, recognizing the emergent dangers lurking before us. We are entering an era in which ethnic and sectarian identities could easily breed new violence and conflict. It is an era in which hostilities and threats could erupt as misguided leaders are tempted to assert regional dominance before the ground rules of a new order can be accepted."*⁴⁰⁹

Just after the invasion, the United Nations Security Council adopted sanctions against Iraq. The first sanction, Resolution 660, criticized the Iraqi invasion and ordered its immediate withdrawal.⁴¹⁰ Resolution 661 imposed a complete economic embargo on Iraq.⁴¹¹ Other sanctions were also applied, including an order to stop development of weapons of mass destruction and the

407 George Bush, "Against Aggression in the Persian Gulf" , *US Department of State Dispatch*, vol. 1, no. 3, September 1990, p. 52.

408 *ibid.*, p. 54.

409 James A. Baker III, "America's Stake in the Persian Gulf", *US Department of State Dispatch*, vol. 1, no. 10 September 1990, p. 69.

410 For the full text, see <http://www.casi.org.uk/info/undocs/scres/1990/660e.pdf>, (Accessed on August 5, 2010).

411 For the full text, see <http://www.casi.org.uk/info/undocs/scres/1990/661e.pdf>, (Accessed on August 5, 2010).

assignment of a United Nations inspection team to Iraq.⁴¹²

However, there had been some doubt about the military action in Congress. Many argued that the imposition of sanctions would be a sufficient response. The decisive vote in the Senate was only 52–47 in favor of using force.⁴¹³ Meanwhile, Bush was successful, not only in securing UN approval for a military response, but also in establishing a coalition that financed the war.

With a broad international coalition the American military attacked the Iraqi forces in February 1991. For President Bush, the Persian Gulf War of 1991 was about “more than one small country; it is a big idea; a new world order,” with “new ways of working with other nations... peaceful settlement of disputes, solidarity against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals and just treatment of all peoples.”⁴¹⁴ Thus, for Charles Krauthammer, the Gulf War was “a beginning of a Pax Americana in which the world will acquiesce in a benign American hegemony”.⁴¹⁵

The US military won an overwhelming victory in ‘Operation Desert Storm’. President Bush decided to end the war when Iraqi forces withdrew from Kuwait. As a consequence, Saddam Hussein had to accept UN inspectors’ presence in Iraq. The UN had also imposed a strict sanctions regime on Iraq and a “no-fly zone” covering the north and south of Iraq and monitoring by the US and British air forces.

As has been pointed out, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the redefinition of US geostrategic priorities, the Turkish government was preoccupied with the concern that this new strategic environment would reduce its importance

412 For the full texts, see <http://www.casi.org.uk/info/scriraq.html#1990>, (Accessed on August 5, 2010).

413 Donald E. Schmidt , *The Folly of War: American Foreign Policy 1898-2005*, (New York: Algora Publishing, 2005), p. 310.

414 Joseph S. Nye Jr., “What New World Order?”, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 71, no. 2, Spring 1992, p. 83.

415 Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment”, in Graham T. Allison and Gregory F. Traverton, (eds.), *Rethinking American Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order*, (New York: Norton, 1992), p. 300.

to Washington. Thus, for Prime Minister Özal, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 was an important opportunity to demonstrate Turkey's loyalty to the United States. With the decision to cut the flow of oil through the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline on August 6, 1990 he showed that Turkey took a role in the Western alliance in this war.⁴¹⁶ Although its economic results were harmful for Turkey, for Americans, Özal's decision to shut down the pipeline was crucial in order to isolate Saddam Hussein's regime.

During and after the Gulf War, Turkey clearly showed its "strategic importance" to the United States in different ways. For example, while Turkish troops did not take part in Operation Desert Storm, Turkey provided logistical support for coalition forces at Turkish air bases. Accordingly, on January 17, 1991, the day the US-led offensive started, the Turkish Parliament passed, by a margin of 250 votes to 148, a government motion, which declared that "the Turkish armed forces and foreign bases in Turkey could participate in military actions against Iraq, effectively signaling the opening of a second front from the north."⁴¹⁷

Turkey was also seen as an important "strategic ally" of the United States due to its cooperation in the post-War efforts in Iraq. In April 1991, a refugee crisis emerged as a result of Saddam Hussein's military campaign against the Kurdish rebellion in the north of the country. In the end, approximately 500,000 Iraqi Kurds escaped across the Turkish-Iraqi border. Security Council Resolution 688 declared that the repression of the Iraqi civilian population threatened international peace and security in the region.⁴¹⁸ Thus, Operation Provide Comfort (OPC), which was designed in 1991, aimed to manage humanitarian operations and return refugees to their homes. In July 1991, OPC was replaced by Operation Poised Hammer, which was known as "Çekiç Güç" in Turkey. On August 2, 1992, a "no-fly zone" was created and imposed north of the 36th parallel in Iraq, which aimed to protect

416 Bill Park, "Strategic Location, Political Dislocation: Turkey, the United States and Northern Iraq", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, vol. 7, no. 2, June 2003, p. 11.

417 Haim Bresheeth, and Nira Yuval-Davis (eds.), *The Gulf War and the New World Order*, (London: Zed Books, 1992), p. 81.

418 *ibid.*, p. 80.

Kurds from Saddam Hussein's regime.⁴¹⁹ In the meantime Turkey, as a "strong" and "reliable ally" to the US in the post-Cold War era, allowed the use of İncirlik airbase to conduct Operation Provide Comfort/Operation Northern Watch.⁴²⁰ Thus, the İncirlik airbase became critical to the no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel.⁴²¹ In the end, Saddam Hussein remained in power despite military intervention by US-led coalition forces and a UN embargo. The main result of the Gulf War, therefore, was the creation of a safe haven for Kurds in their desire of an independent Kurdish state.

It should be emphasized that the establishment of a *de facto* Kurdish state in northern Iraq under Western protection created a long-lasting problem between the two allies. Indeed, the no-fly zone in northern Iraq increased Kurdish nationalism in the region and provided a base for attacks on Turkish territory by the PKK. Consequently, the conflict and instability in Turkey's southeastern region was increased.⁴²² Thus, while the Gulf War was regarded as the zenith of US-Turkish cooperation, for many Turks, as Ian Lesser has noted, the Gulf War is "the place where the trouble started."⁴²³

At the beginning of the War, Turkish Prime Minister Özal assumed that his full support for the US military action against Iraq would serve as a reminder of Turkey's geopolitical importance to the United States in this new era, and would help Turkey to achieve membership in the European Community. Özal argued that

419 Sabri Sayarı, "Turkey and the Middle East in the 1990s", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 26, no.3, Spring 1997, p. 45; William Hale, "Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis," *International Affairs Royal Institute of International Affairs*, vol. 68, 1992, p. 688.

420 Patrick F. Gillis, "US-Turkish Relations: The Road to Improving a Troubled Strategic Partnership", *Strategy Research Project*, US Army War College, March 19, 2004, Available at <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA424313&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>, (Accessed on November 19, 2010), p. 2.

421 William Hale, "Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis", p. 689.

422 İsmet M. İmset, *The PKK: A Report on Separatist Violence in Turkey: 1973-1992*, (Ankara: Turkish Daily News Publications, 1992), p. 191.

423 Ian O. Lesser, "Turkey, the United States, and the Delusion of Geopolitics", p. 2.

economic benefit to Turkey was a prize for joining the War. He explained his personal views on Turkey's support of the US-led forces in the following terms: "This is the most profitable business deal of my life. It is the first time I am making such big profits with so little work."⁴²⁴

Economically, however, Özal's expectations were not realized after the War. First of all, as a result of closure of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline, Turkey lost its major trading partner in the region. Moreover, according to official reports, the cost to Turkey of the pipeline closure and the embargo on Iraq amounted to more than \$40 billion, and promises of compensation for Turkey's losses had failed to fully materialize.⁴²⁵

Politically, it can be argued that the Gulf War gave new direction to the Turkish-American relationship. First of all, Turkey played a key role in the US-led campaign and came to be defined by US officials as "an anchor of stability in a region of growing volatility."⁴²⁶ On the other hand, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in turn showed that Turkey's security depended on maintaining a strategic alliance with Washington. The RAND 1992 report noted that, "[t]he United States, both bilaterally and through its role in NATO, will remain the best guarantor of Turkish security in relation to the most dangerous risks facing Turkey over the longer term (notably, those emanating from Syria, Iran, and Iraq)."⁴²⁷ Yet, in the case of Iraq, Turkey's threat perceptions have been different from those of the United States. The future of Iraq after the Gulf War and Kurdish issue, which will be the focus of the next part of the study, has become a major source of conflict between Ankara and Washington.

424 Metin Toker, "Savaşın Türkiye'nin Hiçbir Çıkarı Yoktur", (Turkey has no Benefit from the War), *Milliyet*, January 17, 1991.

425 Mahmut Bali Aykan, "Turkish Perspectives on Turkish-US Relations Concerning Persian Gulf Security in the post-Cold War Era: 1989-1995", *Middle East Journal*, vol. 50, no. 3, Summer 1996, p. 346.

426 Heinz Krämer, *A Changing Turkey: the Challenge to Europe and the United States*, (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 2000), p. 225.

427 Ian O. Lesser, *Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold War*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1992), p. 29.

One of the most important differences between the Cold War and the post-Cold War periods is economic component of the Turkish-American relations. In 1991 the Turkish–American alliance entered a new period , called an “enhanced partnership.”⁴²⁸ The basic nature of this new relationship can be described as “extended cooperation in the political field, an increase in diplomatic consultations and an emphasis on enhanced economic partnership in compensation for the decreasing emphasis on security and defense-related matters”.⁴²⁹ The Chairman of the Department of Southern European Affairs, David Ransom, explained the meaning of this new form of relationship as follows: “The whole relationship is changing from one that is focused on NATO and on security problems to one that has focused on the small states around Turkey and diplomatic cooperation. So, to some extent [the] Turkish General Staff will be a less prominent part of the relationship and [the] Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be a more prominent part. This is the tilting of the balance.”⁴³⁰

Moreover, in 1997, as a response to the US Secretary of Commerce’s inclusion of Turkey among the “big ten emerging markets”⁴³¹, Turkey and the United States decided to frame their cooperation in the form of a “five item agenda”. The main topics of this agenda were described as energy, economy and trade, regional cooperation, Cyprus, and defense and security cooperation. With this cooperation, it can be argued that Turkey took on an important role in American trade and investment strategies in the post-Cold War era.

Another area of cooperation between Turkey and the United States in the post-Cold War period was with respect to Israel. William Hale argues that in the 1990s, the most important change in Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East was

428 William J. Clinton and Tansu Çiller, “The United States and Turkey”, *US Department of State Dispatch*, vol. 4, no. 44, 1 November 1993, p. 767.

429 *ibid.*, p. 768.

430 Quoted in Aylin Güneş, “An Anatomy of the Transformation of the US–Turkish Alliance: From “Cold War” to “War on Iraq””, p. 345.

431 US Department of Commerce, “The Big Emerging Markets”, *Business America*, vol. 115, no. 3, 1994, pp. 4-6.

the emergence of Turkey's "strategic" relationship with Israel.⁴³² For Turkey, cooperation with Israel would strengthen its influence in Washington, and help to change the geopolitical balance of power in favor of Turkey over Syria.⁴³³

While Turkey and Israel had established diplomatic relations in 1950, these relations were not upgraded to the ambassadorial level until December 1991. Following this diplomatic initiative, Turkey began to improve its relations with Israel, especially after the September 1993 Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) agreement.⁴³⁴ The relationship subsequently improved considerably with US support, including US participation in the first joint naval exercise between Israel and Turkey.

In 1996 Turkey and Israel signed two military cooperation agreements - a military training and cooperation agreement, which allowed each side to train in the other's air space and a defense industrial cooperation agreement -allowing the two countries to do exercises on each other's territory, share intelligence, and collaborate on procurement projects.⁴³⁵ Turkey also allowed Israel to use Turkish air space for training of the Israeli air force. In 1996, a third agreement was signed allowing Israel to undertake the upgrade of Turkish F-4 fighter jets.⁴³⁶ Israeli Minister Moshe Arens described the Turkish-Israeli military alliance as the most important development in the Middle Eastern history, having the potential to

432 William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, p. 329.

433 *ibid.*, p. 340.

434 Meliha Altunışık, "Turkish Policy toward Israel", in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı, (eds.), *Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy*, (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), p. 63.

435 For the unofficial text of this agreement see Michael Eisenstadt, "Turkish-Israeli Military Cooperation: An Assessment", *Policywatch*, no. 62, July 24, 1997.

436 Çevik Bir and Martin Sherman, "Formula for Stability: Turkey Plus Israel", *Middle East Quarterly*, vol. 9, no. 4, Fall 2002, p. 27.

change the regional balance of power.⁴³⁷

While developing their military ties, Turkey and Israel also expanded their diplomatic, business, and tourism links. The economic component of Israeli–Turkish relations developed in the 1990s. Turkish exports to Israel increased from \$30 million in 1989 to \$390 million in 1997. As a result of a free-trade agreement, which came into effect in 1997, exports further increased.⁴³⁸

The alliance brought several benefits to Turkey, enhancing its military, industrial, and technological capabilities, which gave Turkey an advantage in its relations with Syria and Iran. Some Turkish officials also hoped the cooperation would bring the support of the Israeli lobby in Washington against the Greek and Armenian lobbies in Congress.⁴³⁹

The improvements in Turkish-Israeli relations also strengthened Turkey's relations with the US and increased its geopolitical importance in the eyes of the Americans. From the US's perspective, these pro-Western or pro-American countries were the strongest, most reliable US allies in the Middle East. This alliance would therefore help the US's dual containment policy against rogue states like Iran, Iraq, and Syria and support a pro-Western Jordan.⁴⁴⁰ Moreover, because of this alliance, Turkey was able to increase its military capabilities with Israeli equipment, and thus compensate for losses taken as a result of a decision of the US Congress curbing arms transfers.⁴⁴¹

437 Alexander Murinson, *Turkey's Entente with Israel and Azerbaijan: State identity and Security in the Middle East and Caucasus*, (Londra and New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 43-54.

438 Meliha Altunışık, "The Turkish – Israeli Rapprochement in the Post-Cold War Era", *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 36, no. 2, 2000, p. 187; Michael, B. Bishku, "How Has Turkey Viewed Israel", *Israel Affairs*, vol. 12, no. 1, January 2006, p. 180.

439 Amikam Nachmani, "The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Tie", *Middle East Quarterly*, June 1998, p. 23.

440 Dietrich Jung and Wolfgang Piccoli, "The Turkish-Israeli Axis: A Matter of Geo-Strategic Change in the Middle East?", Working Paper 05/2001, *Copenhagen Peace Research Institute*, 2001, p. 16.

441 Efraim Inbar, "Regional Implications of the Israeli-Turkish Strategic Partnership", *MERIA Journal*, vol. 5, no. 2, Summer 2001, p. 60.

Consequently, the Clinton administration clearly supported the Turkish-Israeli rapprochement and welcomed the 1996 military agreement as "helpful for stability in the area" and as "good to enforce security in the region."⁴⁴² In May 1997 State Department spokesperson Burns defined this alliance as "strategic", and added that "it has been a strategic objective of the United States that Turkey and Israel ought to enhance their military cooperation and their political relations. ... If certain other Arab countries don't like that, that's just tough."⁴⁴³ In addition to official statements, the US also showed its support for this rapprochement by participating in Turkish–Israeli joint naval exercises in the Mediterranean in 1998 and 1999, which had been executed as part of a 1996 agreement.⁴⁴⁴

As described above, in the post-Cold War period, the Balkans, like Central Asia and the Middle East, became the one of the main cooperation areas for Turkey and the United States. In the 1990s Turkish officials assumed that Turkey's contributions to a "peaceful and democratic" environment in the Balkans was an opportunity to increase its geopolitical importance to the United States, and might also help Turkey's entry into the EU.⁴⁴⁵

Consequently, Turkey immediately recognized the independence of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992. However, during the 1990s, the region was deeply affected by the civil war between these former Yugoslav republics. The long lasting civil war resulted in a United Nations and NATO intervention in Bosnia, and later another in Kosovo.

442 "Turkey Clarifies Content of Accord", *Turkish Daily News*, April 11, 1996.

443 US Department of State, "Daily Press Briefing", May 9, 1997, Available at <http://www.hri.org/news/usa/std/1997/97-05-09.std.html>, (Accessed on March 4, 2011).

444 Meliha Altunışık, "The Turkish – Israeli Rapprochement in the Post-Cold War Era", p. 187.

445 Dilek Barlas, "Turkey and the Balkans: Cooperation in the Interwar and Post- Cold War Eras", *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies*, vol. 4, Annual 1998-1999, p. 70.



Figure 4.1 Map of the Balkan States

Source: The New York Times, Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/specials/bosnia/context/balkans-political.GIF.html>, (Accessed on January 3, 2011).

Initially, when Serbia initiated attacks against Bosnia, the Turkish administration declared that Turkey could not intervene in the crisis unilaterally and tried to affect developments in Bosnia in the context of multilateral structures like NATO.⁴⁴⁶ In addition to this, Turkey also permitted to use NATO bases during attack against Serbian targets in the Bosnia War.

Bosnia became an important turning point in Turkey's new Balkans policy.⁴⁴⁷ Turkey's primary goal was to end the violation, but in the end, it also wanted to use the crisis to expand its influence in the Balkans. Thus the Turkish-American "strategic partnership" moved towards the Balkans under NATO and was given new meaning because of the different perceptions of Europeans and the Americans. In this situation, Turkey began to take on the role of negotiator between them.⁴⁴⁸ It might be worth a reminder here that Turkey's historical ties with the Balkans were much stronger than those of the US and even most European powers. US officials

446 Şule Kut, "Turkish Diplomatic Initiative for Bosnia-Herzegovina," in Günay Göksu Özdoğan and Kemali Saybaşı (eds.), *Balkans: A Mirror of the New International Order*, (Eren Publications: İstanbul, 1995), p. 298.

447 *ibid.*, p. 295.

448 Burak Akçapar, *Turkey's New European Era: Foreign Policy on the Road to EU Membership*, (Maryland: Rowman&Littlefield, 2007), p. 151.

employed the “bridge” metaphor with reference to Turkey’s position in Bosnia. For them, Turkey could be useful in situations involving the deployment of NATO or US forces in Muslim countries like Somalia.

In the subsequent years, unlike in Bosnia, Turkey did not want to involve itself in the Kosovo crisis in 1998 because of its attention was focused on Kurdish separatist movement domestically.⁴⁴⁹ However, as a result of increasing Serbian violation and pressure from Kosovo Muslims, the Turkish government was compelled to change its policy and decided to participate in the NATO air strikes. After the withdrawal of Serbs from Kosovo, Turkey sent one thousand troops to the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR).⁴⁵⁰ Accordingly, it can be concluded that Turkish participation in these multilateral peacekeeping actions were also instrumental to strengthen of its relations with the US.⁴⁵¹

In 1999, the US officially gave the relationship a new title: “strategic partnership”, a concept that was officially used by President Clinton during his visit to Turkey.⁴⁵² As he noted in his historic address to the TGNA in November 1999, “in the post-Cold War era, our partnership has become even more important.”⁴⁵³ Accordingly, the US began to consider Turkey to be a strategically important country and a key member of NATO with the potential to influence military, political, and economic developments in the Middle East, the Balkans, the Aegean

449 “Turkey’s Attitude on Kosovo,” *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies*, vol. 4, Annual 1998-99, p. 303.

450 Stephen F. Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003), p. 77.

451 Kemal Kirişçi , “Between Europe and the Middle East: The Transformation of Turkish Policy”, *Middle East Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 8, no. 1, March 2004.

452 United States Mission to the European Union, “Ambassador Robert Pearson on US–Turkish Relations”, Available at <http://www.useu.be/Categories/US&EUEnlargement/Nov1402USTurkeyRelations.html>, (Accessed on December 14, 2010).

453 William J. Clinton, “Remarks to the Turkish Grand National Assembly in Ankara”, November 15, 1999 , John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, Santa Barbara, CA, Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=56935>, (Accessed on August 21, 2010).

and the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Washington's view of Turkey's geopolitical importance during the Clinton administration was summarized by the State Department's 1999 Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations:

"Turkey is vitally important to U.S. interests. Its position athwart the Bosphorus- at the strategic nexus of Europe, the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Caspian- makes it an essential player on a wide range of issues vital to U.S. security, political and economic interests. In a region of generally weak economies and shaky democratic traditions, political instability, terrorism and ethnic strife, Turkey is a democratic secular nation that draws its political models from Western Europe and the United States. Turkey has co-operated intensively with the U.S. as a NATO ally and is also vigorously seeking to deepen its political and economic ties with Europe."⁴⁵⁴

For US ambassador to Turkey, Robert Pearson the term "strategic partnership" represented a broad recognition of the US government.⁴⁵⁵ For example, Secretary of Defense William Cohen used this term describing the US and Turkey as "have a strong strategic partnership with shared interests that include preventing Iraqi aggression, promoting stability in the Middle East, and working together for stability in the Balkans, where Turkish and American soldiers stand shoulder to shoulder".⁴⁵⁶

4.3.1.2 Military Dimension

As it is argued earlier, military partnership was the key aspect of the Turkish-American alliance during the Cold War years. Regarding the particular importance of US military assistance to Turkey, its geostrategic location was a key

454 US Department of State, *Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations for Fiscal Year 1999*, (Washington, DC: U.S Department of State, 1999), p. 339.

455 Robert Pearson, "U.S.-Turkish Relations after November 3: Continuity and Partnership", Available at <http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2002/November/20021114154828lfenner@pd.state.gov0.4453089.html>, (Accessed on August 5, 2010).

456 "Joint Press Conference with Secretary Cohen and Deputy Prime Minister Sezgin", Turkey, April 17, 1998, Available at <http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=795>, (Accessed on July 12, 2010).

element in US strategy during the Cold War. As Captain Robey and Colonel Vordermark asserted that: “[t]he geostrategic position of the Republic of Turkey, at the heart of the most unstable triangle in the world, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East, makes it imperative that the United States help maintain a strong and allied modern Turkish military”.⁴⁵⁷ In this respect, it is important to note that main aim of US military assistance was not only to keep the Turkish military strong, but also allied.

During the Cold War Turkey received huge amounts of military and economic aid from the United States. Between 1946 and 1985, Turkey was the fourth largest recipient of US military assistance, totaling more than \$7.8 billion, after Israel, South Vietnam and South Korea. From 1984 until the end of the Cold War, Turkey was the third largest recipient of US military aid, after Israel and Egypt.⁴⁵⁸

The end of the Cold War did not mean the end of the Turkish-American alliance. On August 2, 1990, Iraq occupied Kuwait and the US and its allies formed a coalition against Iraq. Under these circumstances, Turkey perceived the 1991 Gulf War as an important opportunity to reassert its geopolitical significance to the United States and thus joined the coalition. Meanwhile, on August 8, 1991, Turkey closed its border with Iraq and shut down the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipelines. On January 17, 1991, the Turkish Parliament passed a government motion claiming that the Turkish armed forces and foreign bases in Turkey could participate in military actions against Iraq. Moreover, Turkey approved the opening İncirlik airbase to the coalition forces.⁴⁵⁹ Therefore, high-level American officials have begun to imagine Turkey as the new “frontline” country of NATO and a major actor, with the potential to impact developments in the Balkans, Middle East,

457 Richard Robey and Jeffrey Vordermark, “Security Assistance Mission in the Republic of Turkey”, *The DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management*, vol. 26, no. 2, Winter 2003, p. 11.

458 *US Overseas Loans and Grants* (Greenbook), Available at <http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/query/do>, (Accessed on January 13, 2011).

459 William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, p. 245.

Central Asia and Europe.⁴⁶⁰

As a matter of fact, because of changes in the geopolitical calculations of US foreign policy, after the end of the Cold War and in the absence of a "Soviet threat", the US Congress decided to end the military grant program to Turkey, Portugal and Greece and US military aid to Turkey decreased in the 1990s.⁴⁶¹ Republican Senator Robert Dole argued that the US should reduce its assistance to a group of countries, including Turkey, on the grounds that the end of the Cold War had diminished their importance for the United States.⁴⁶² The explanation for the cut in military aid came from Congressman Edward Derwinski: "We provide military assistance to countries only when there is a common military purpose."⁴⁶³ The other reasons for the reduction in aid were the increasing the visibility of human rights issues, the PKK and the Cyprus issue to Turkish–US relations.⁴⁶⁴ Consequently, in 1997, American aid to Turkey was decreased to a \$175 million loan and a cash grant of \$29.04 million. In 1998, this was reduced even further.⁴⁶⁵

Despite of the decision of the US Congress, with the outbreak of the Gulf Crisis, Turkey's importance to the US increased significantly. Thus, after the Gulf War, despite decreasing post-Cold War foreign aid budgets, American aid to Turkey

460 Ian O. Lesser, "Turkey's Strategic Options", *The International Spectator*, vol. 34, no.1, 1999, pp. 83-84.

461 Marc Parris, "Starting Over: U.S.-Turkish Relations in the Post-Iraq War Era", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, vol. 2, no. 1, 2003; George S. Harris, "U.S.-Turkish Relations", in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (eds.), *Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy*, p. 192.

462 Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, "Turkey's Grand Strategy Facing a Dilemma", *International Spectator*, vol. 27, January-March 1992, p. 25.

463 "Hearings Before the Committee of Foreign Relations", *US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Security and Development Assistance*, 100th Cong, 1st Session, Part 1, February 24, 25, 26 and March 10, 1987, p. 394.

464 Marios, L. Evriviades, "Turkey's Role in United States Strategy during and after the Cold War", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Spring 1998, p. 35.

465 *US Overseas Loans and Grants* (Greenbook), Available at <http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/query/do>, (Accessed on January 13, 2011).

was increased from \$706.4 million in 1991 to \$741 million in 1992.⁴⁶⁶ It should be noted that this increase was the result of the special conditions of the Gulf War. In fact, in these years, US military aid was turned to a commercial arms sale. Accordingly, Turkey started to buy weapons from private American companies and receive military equipment from the US administration in the form of credits or grants (Foreign Military Sales, FMS).⁴⁶⁷

Consequently, it can be said that limitations in American aid negatively affected Turkey's security priorities. On July 29, 1994, when the US Congress decided to suspend 10% of the \$453 million aid package on the basis of Turkey's human rights record and the Cyprus issue, the Turkish government refused the part of the aid package, that had been made conditional. This caused a serious reduction in the US weapons and equipment program, on which Turkey relied heavily especially in its fight against the PKK.⁴⁶⁸

Table 4.1 Total Dollar Value of U.S. Arms Deliveries to Turkey through the Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Programs from FY 1950 to 1998

Source: Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts, Defense Security Assistance Agency as of September 1997,

Available at [http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-](http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA346400&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)

[bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA346400&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA346400&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf), (Accessed on January 13, 2011).

Fiscal Year	DCS	FMS	Total
FY 1950 to FY 1983	63,831	1,132,234	\$1,196,065
FY 1984	26,751	304,907	\$331,658
FY 1985	27,848	389,296	\$417,144
FY 1986	23,813	282,300	\$306,113
FY 1987	67,947	277,138	\$345,085
FY 1988	47,464	699,944	\$747,408
FY 1989	342,653	620,929	\$963,582

466 Deputy for Financial Management Comptroller, "Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts", *Defense Security Assistance Agency*, September 1997, Available at <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA346400&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>, (Accessed on January 13, 2011).

467 *ibid.*

468 Mahmut Bali Aykan, "Turkish Perspectives on Turkish-US Relations Concerning Persian Gulf Security in the Post-Cold War Era: 1989-1995", p. 351.

Fiscal Year	DCS	FMS	Total
FY 1990	220,302	760,801	\$981,103
FY 1991	79,922	626,575	\$706,497
FY 1992	37,673	703,369	\$741,042
FY 1993	122,481	755,811	\$878,292
FY 1994	14,824	937,019	\$951,843
FY 1995	162,510	374,425	\$536,935
FY 1996	64,124	482,850	\$546,974
FY 1997	103,866	1,167,109	\$1,270,975
FY 1998* (estimate)	201,000	541,204	742,204
Total 1984 to 1998	\$1,543,178	\$8,923,677	\$10,466,855
Total 1993 to 1998 (Clinton Administration)	\$668,805	\$4,258,418	\$4,927,223
Total 1950 to 1998	\$1,607,009	\$10,055,911	\$11,662,920

As an extension of its arms reduction policy, the US government decided to reduce its military presence and personnel in Turkey. At the same time, the US decided to withdraw its military personnel and nuclear weapons from the Malatya and Eskişehir air bases without consulting with the Turkish government and this decision displeased Ankara.⁴⁶⁹ Out of twelve military air bases only 5 remained operational in 1994 - namely İncirlik, Batman, Diyarbakır, Malatya, and Muş. İncirlik airbase became the only remaining US/NATO military base, which has been crucial particularly during the Gulf War to conduct operations over Iraq.⁴⁷⁰

After the Gulf War, Turkey kept İncirlik airbase available to monitor the no-fly zone, and thus to protect Iraqi Kurds from the Iraqi regime. In fact, successive Turkish governments were unwilling to allow the use of İncirlik for anything other than the most limited, non-strategic operations in Iraq since 1991. Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel stated that Turkey would not permit the use of its bases because Turkey believed the territorial integrity of Iraq should be respected, and creating a

469 US Department of State, *Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations Fiscal Year 1986-2000*, Available at <http://www.fas.org/asmp/library> and <http://www.state.gov.documents>, (Accessed on July 12, 2010).

470 US Department of State, *Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations Fiscal Year 1986-2000*, Available at <http://www.fas.org/asmp/library> and <http://www.state.gov.documents>, (Accessed on July 12, 2010).

Kurdish state in northern Iraq would be a regional disaster.⁴⁷¹ The United States could not use Turkish bases for operations except those claimed in the 1980 Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement.

In the 1990s DECA was still the main framework agreement for Turkish-American military cooperation. However, as argued before, DECA 1980 had not satisfied Turkey. Turkish officials wanted the US to provide more help and transfer high military technology for the development of Turkey's defense industry.⁴⁷² In the end, with the impact of the Gulf War, DECA was renewed in 1991.⁴⁷³ In March 1993 Turkey demanded changes to the DECA from the US administration. The problems were not solved at that time, on the contrary, Turkey's dissatisfaction lingered over the following years.

US activity in the Middle East increased in December 1998 when the United States and Britain began Operation Desert Fox in Iraq. The military forces based in İncirlik were deployed in this operation. A disagreement occurred between Turkey and the US during the operation. Turkish authorities asserted that the US has not asked for Turkey's approval before the operation.⁴⁷⁴ In response, Turkey immediately closed the Habur border gate to any possible refugee flows. The US and Britain made a combined statement justifying this operation under the "right of self defense". On February 22, 1999, the Turkish and American Chairman of the Chief of Staffs came together to discuss damage control strategies. The result was an agreement on some changes in the "Document of Engagement Rules", which had previously been signed by military officials of Turkey, the United States, and

471 "Prospects of Further Division of Iraq Disturb Ankara", *Briefing*, no. 902, August 24, 1992, pp. 8-9.

472 Hasan Köni, "Gulf Savaşı Sonrasında Ortadoğu'nun Durumu", in *Değişen Dünyada Türkiye ve Türk Dünyası Sempozyumu*, (Hacettepe Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü: Ankara, 1993), pp. 48-49.

473 Nasuh Uslu, "The Factors Affecting Turkey's Relations with the United States in the Post-Cold War Period", *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, vol. 31, no. 2, 2000, p. 223.

474 Ömer Göksel İşyar, "An Analysis of Turkish-American Relations from 1945 to 2004: Initiatives and Reactions in Turkish Foreign Policy", *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, vol. 4, no. 3, Fall 2005, p. 21.

Britain.⁴⁷⁵

The United States also helped facilitate the important new Turkish-Israeli alliance. Turkey signed agreements with Israel on trade, tourism, scientific exchange, and defense in 1996. The intelligence relationship became crucial and Turkey received military technology from Israel. For the US this alliance would create stronger pro-US military cooperation in the Middle East.⁴⁷⁶

On February 16, 1999, Turkey captured Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK. Öcalan's capture was a result of US-Turkish intelligence cooperation. A report by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy stressed "the crucial role played by US intelligence in Öcalan's capture."⁴⁷⁷ Another report noted that "US diplomatic pressure backed by intelligence gathering helped to put Öcalan in flight from a safe haven in Syria, to persuade nation alter nation to refuse him sanctuary and to drive him into an increasingly desperate search for a city of refuge."⁴⁷⁸ At the end of the decade, this issue helped to improve the US relationship with Turkey.

The period from 1991–2003 can thus be defined as one of renewed active military cooperation between the US and Turkey in operations other than war. The active participation of Turkish combat forces in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan further enhanced cooperation between the two militaries.

As previously noted, following the Cold War, Turkey's importance within NATO had changed. Meanwhile, NATO's evolution created new problems in Ankara's relations with the Alliance. Turkey was the only country in NATO that faced a "serious threat" to its Middle East borders. Ankara had thus been displeased by the NATO's emphasis on "new missions" and non-Article V

⁴⁷⁵ *ibid.*, p. 23.

⁴⁷⁶ Daniel Pipes, "A New Axis: The Emerging Turkish-Israeli Entente", *National Interest*, vol. 50, Winter 1997-1998, p. 33.

⁴⁷⁷ Alan Makovsky, "The Ocalan Affair: What's Next?", *Policywatch*, no. 369, February 24, 1999.

⁴⁷⁸ Tim Weiner, "U.S. Played Key Role in Capture of Kurd Rebel, Officials Say", *New York Times*, February 20, 1999; Marcus Gee, "The US Helped Turkey Find and Capture Kurd Rebel", *Globe and Mail*, February 24, 1999.

emergencies.⁴⁷⁹ NATO's slow response to Turkey's request for reinforcements during the 1991 Gulf War was the most controversial issue for Turkey in the post-Cold War period.

4.3.2 Turkey as an "Energy Bridge"

Amineh and Houweling argued that, "[o]il and gas are not just commodities traded on international markets. Control over territory and its resources are strategic assets."⁴⁸⁰ The Gulf War is considered the first armed conflict of this era over control of energy resources. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Caspian region, which is located at the center of the Eurasian Heartland in Mackinder's terms, emerged as a new energy producer thanks to its huge natural resource reserves.⁴⁸¹ Thus, by Brzezinski's definition, the region resembled a "chessboard", and Russia, the United States, the EU, and China were the global players orchestrating development. Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Iran have also emerged as the important geopolitical pivots.⁴⁸² For Brzezinski Turkey "stabilizes the Black Sea region, controls access from it to the Mediterranean Sea, balances Russia in the Caucasus, still offers an antidote to Muslim fundamentalism, and serves as the southern anchor for NATO."⁴⁸³ Turkey's internal stabilization, thus, significant to keep control violence in the southern Balkans, to limit Russian control over the Central Asian and the Caucasian states.⁴⁸⁴

479 John Barret, "Current Political Agenda of the Atlantic Alliance and Turkey", in Mustafa Aydın (ed.), *Turkey at the Threshold of the 21st Century*, (Istanbul: Alfa Publications, 2001), p. 7.

480 Mehdi P. Amineh and Henk Houweling, "Caspian Energy: Oil and Gas Resources and the Global Market", in *Central Eurasia in Global Politics: Conflict, Security and Development*, Mehdi P. Amineh and Henk Housweling (eds.), (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2004), p. 82.

481 The region has more than 10 percent of the world's oil reserves, and more than 30 percent of the world's natural gas reserves.

482 Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*.

483 *ibid.*, p. 47.

484 *ibid.*, p. 47.

Indeed, according to US officials' geopolitical calculations, the region's huge amounts of oil and gas reserves would reduce the US's dependence on Middle Eastern oil. Therefore, while not a direct consumer of Central Asian oil and natural gas exports, protecting and controlling these reserves and bringing them to world markets have become geopolitical and economic interest of the United States.⁴⁸⁵ In 1999, the Silk Road Strategy Act articulated the major characteristics of the US's "geo-economic" interests towards the Central Asia and the Caucasus.⁴⁸⁶ Similarly, a National Security Strategy Paper of November 19, 1999, stressed the importance of economic issues and referred to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Project and Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline Declaration.⁴⁸⁷

Another strategic aim of the US was the exclusion of Iran from the participation in the production of Caspian oil and gas and the prevention of "the development of transportation routes or pipelines that would lead from the Caspian region to either the Persian Gulf or the Indian Ocean via Iran".⁴⁸⁸ As Peuch noted, "the real reason behind the US policy towards Tehran is perhaps that the White House is reluctant to see Iran turn into a regional power which could pose a potential military threat to Israel and compete with Turkey in the Middle Eastern oil market."⁴⁸⁹ Moreover, the United States also attempted to prevent Russian influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus because of the possibility that Russia might gain control of the region's energy resources.⁴⁹⁰ Subsequently, the United

485 Chuck Hagel, "Energy Supplies in Eurasia and Implications for U.S. Energy Security", *Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations*, September 27, 2005.

486 "Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999", 106th Congress, First Session, August 3, 1999, p. 579, Available at <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h106-1152>, (Accessed on 29 July 2010).

487 William J. Clinton, *U.S. National Security Strategy for a New Century*, (Washington DC, White House, December 1999), pp. 33-34.

488 Tyler Marshall, "Route of Caspian Sea Oil Pipeline Debated", *Los Angeles Times*, December 3, 1998.

489 Jean-Cristophe Peuch, "Private and National Interests in the Caspian Region" in Bülent Gökay (ed.), *The Politics of Caspian Oil*, (London: Palgrave, 2001), p. 176.

490 Bülent Aras, *The New Geopolitics of Eurasia and Turkey's Position*, (London: Frank Caas, 2002), p. 72.

States began to establish military relations and make investments with the newly independent states.⁴⁹¹

The question of oil transport had been in negotiation since 1993. US administrations aimed to prevent energy transport monopolization and guarantee the flow of energy resources to Western oil markets. Accordingly, in 1994, the Azerbaijani government signed the “contract of the century” with the Azerbaijan International Operating Company. Several pipeline proposals to move Caspian oil to markets had been put forward, each of them linked to the interests of states such as Russia, Iran, Turkey and the United States.⁴⁹²

The Russian proposal was to bring the oil to the terminal at Novorossiysk, a Russian port on the Black Sea, and carry it by tanker via the Turkish straits to the Mediterranean. Turkey opposed this proposal because it would negatively affect the straits’ traffic and create environmental problems. Russia on the other hand argued that the Turkish proposal was more costly and the route more unsafe due to the threat of terrorism in southeastern Turkey.⁴⁹³ The Iranian proposal was to build the pipeline from north to south shipping oil from the Persian Gulf to the world.⁴⁹⁴

Energy politics was also prominent in Turkish foreign policy in the 1990s. Developing a role for itself in the transportation of Eurasian oil was one of the main opportunities presented itself to Turkey in the post Cold-War era. Thus, in December 1994, Turkey proposed a more costly pipeline, called the “Caspian-Mediterranean Oil Pipeline Project” to carry oil from Baku, across Tblisi, to the

491 Martha Brill Olcott, *U.S. Policy in Central Asia: Balancing Priorities (Part II)*, Testimony Prepared for the House Committee on International Relations Hearing on the Middle East and Central Asia, April 26, 2006.

492 Kamer Kasım, “Oil Policy on Caspian Oil and Its Implications for Turkish-American Relations” in Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan (eds.), *Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future*, p. 32.

493 Canan Balkır, “International Relations: from Europe to Central Asia,” in Debbie Lovatt (ed.), *Turkey since 1970*, (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 196.

494 Kamer Kasım, “Oil Policy on Caspian Oil and Its Implications for Turkish-American Relations”, p. 132.

Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.⁴⁹⁵ In the eyes of Turkish rulers, "the project tabled by Turkey to transport oil from the vast reserves of the Caspian basin through a main pipeline from Baku to Ceyhan will have significant consequences for the prosperity of the entire region... Turkey offers a viable, reliable, rentable, technologically and environmentally most feasible and safe option."⁴⁹⁶ For Turkey, the economic benefits of the pipeline were a decrease in dependence on Middle Eastern oil and Russian gas, royalties and transportation fees, benefits to Turkish construction firms, and related employment opportunities. On the political side marketing of Eurasian oil would diminish Russian influence in the region.

In this case, the United States supported Turkey's proposal to appropriate Caspian energy resources, perceiving the diversification of energy supply and transit regions as a matter of national security. US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, expressed Washington's outlook on Caspian energy politics as follows:

"This administration remains committed to the Caspian Basin Initiative and to the strategic imperative of developing multiple transportation routes for bringing oil and gas to world markets. Let me emphasize in the strongest terms that our plans and our policy continue to feature the prospect for a pipeline running through Baku to Ceyhan. We will continue to make the case for that pipeline as commercial negotiations among companies and transit states move forward in the weeks and months ahead".⁴⁹⁷

Former Energy Secretary Federico Pena was also expressed that the US wanted "to foster viable and reliable alternatives for export of the region's resources, particularly avoiding transit routes through Iran".⁴⁹⁸ Turkey would be well positioned to help the United States attain its goal of resource diversification.

495 Meliha Altunışık, "Turkey and the Changing Oil Markets in Eurasia" in Libby Rittenberg (ed.), *The Political Economy of Turkey in Post-Soviet Era: Going West and Looking East?*, (London: Preager, 1998), p. 164.

496 Şükrü Gürel, "A General Appraisal of Current Turkish Foreign Policy" in Mustafa Aydın (ed.), *Turkey at the Threshold of the 21st Century*, (İstanbul: Alfa Publications, 2001), p. 16.

497 Strobe Talbott, "U.S.-Turkish Relations in an Age of Interdependence", *Washington Institute on Near East Policy*, Turgut Özal Memorial Lecture, October 14, 1998.

498 Federico Pena, *Testimony of Energy Secretary Federico Pena Before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on International Relations*, April 30, 1998.

The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan route would be an alternative or supplement to the Russian route because it would connect pro-Western countries and interests.

For the US, this route would also secure Turkey's geopolitical role as a "major player" in the Caspian region, which, in turn, "would boost the status of a loyal NATO ally whose secular, moderate government could," after all, "serve as a model for post-Soviet states such as Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan" and could control the influences of Iran and Russia in the region.⁴⁹⁹ US officials thus explicitly stressed the importance of Turkey as an "energy bridge" or "energy hub" and especially as a "crucial link" between Caspian and Central Asian energy reserves and world markets.⁵⁰⁰

In 1995 the AIOC declared that the Baku-Supsa and Baku-Novorossiysk routes were the "Early Oil" pipelines for transporting initial production to markets. In fact, the decision of the AIOC satisfied both Russian and Turkish interests.⁵⁰¹ Despite the AIOC's preference, Turkey followed oil diplomacy protocol in convincing other countries around of its point of view. As a result, in December 1997, Azerbaijani President Aliyev claimed to support plans to use Turkey as a transit route for Caspian oil. In April 1998, the presidents of Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan declared their support for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, and in May, President Aliyev again expressed his support of this route to Turkey's President Demirel.⁵⁰²

In late May 1998, US support for Turkey was officially declared by Secretary of Energy Federico Pena during his trip to Turkey. Pena called US support for this plan, calling the Baku-Ceyhan route "optimum".⁵⁰³ On 29 October 1998, the

499 Tyler Marshall, "Route of Caspian Sea Oil Pipeline Debated".

500 Ali Tekin and Iva Walterova, "Turkey's Geopolitical Role: The Energy Angle", *Middle East Policy*, vol. 14, no. 1, Spring 2007, p. 86.

501 Meliha Altunışık, "Turkey and the Changing Oil Markets in Eurasia", pp. 168-169.

502 Brent Sasley, "Turkey's Energy Politics in the Post-Cold War Era", *MERIA Journal*, vol. 2, no. 4, 1998, p. 33.

503 Saadet Oruç, "Turkey Considers Bypassing the AIOC", *Turkish Daily News*, 9 May 1998.

presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan signed the Ankara Declaration supporting the Baku-Ceyhan line and confirmed "their determination in realizing the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Project as the main export pipeline project."⁵⁰⁴

In April 1999 the İstanbul Protocol was signed by Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and US special advisor for Caspian energy, Richard Morningstar, for the purpose of speeding up talks on the pipeline.⁵⁰⁵ Thereafter, in early August 1999, officials from Turkey, Azerbaijan, and the AIOC announced they would begin a new round of talks on the pipeline project. On November 19, 1999, these presidents reiterated their dedication to the transportation of Caspian energy resources through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan route by signing the İstanbul Declaration during the İstanbul Summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, with US President Bill Clinton present as an observer. The US Secretary of Energy said "[i]t is a strategic agreement that advances America's national interests."⁵⁰⁶ Pumping from the Caspian began on 10 May 2005 and arriving at the Mediterranean terminus on 28 May 2006.⁵⁰⁷

504 For full text of the "Ankara Declaration," see <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/default2.asp?param=/GRUPH/Release/1998/Ankara.htm>, (Accessed on August 19, 2010).

505 Kamer Kasım, "Oil Policy on Caspian Oil and Its Implications for Turkish-American Relations", p. 138.

506 Stephen Kizner, "Caspian Lands Back a Pipeline Pushed by the West", *New York Times*, November 19, 1999.

507 "Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline: Milestones Along The Way", *Middle East Economic Survey*, vol. XLIX, no. 29, 17 July 2006, Available at <http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/v49n29-5OD02.htm>, (Accessed on January 17, 2011).




Figure 4.2 Map of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline

Source: <http://bakuceyhan.org.uk>, (Accessed on January 22, 2011).

4.3.3 Turkey as a “Bridge” between the East and the West

Another area of cooperation between Turkey and the United States in the post-Cold War period was the former’s application for membership in the European Union. Indeed, as US administrations enjoyed privileges relating to Turkey’s position and cooperation in the Middle East and Central Asia, it also invested diplomatic energy in lobbying its European allies for the inclusion of Turkey in the ongoing EU enlargement process. Makovsky argues that “probably in no other internal EU issue has the U.S. been so actively involved and asserted a right” as that concerning Turkish membership.⁵⁰⁸

The end of the Cold War not only changed the map of Europe, but also resulted in major changes in the international system. During the Cold War key European powers appreciated the central role that Turkey played in the containment of the Soviets. Turkey had participated in the maintenance of security in Europe during these years because of its strategically significant geographical

508 Alan Makovsky, “Turkey’s Faded European Dream”, in *Conference Report: The Parameters of Partnership: Germany, the U.S., and Turkey*, (Washington, D.C.: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 1998), p. 60.

location, and its pro-Western orientation.

Yet in the aftermath of the Cold War, the agenda in Europe changed in a significant way. Simply put, the end of the Cold War brought to issue the question of precisely where Europe's boundaries should be located. Integration of the former communist "East" into the EU had become a priority of the European agenda and Turkey was not viewed as an asset to this new agenda.⁵⁰⁹ Moreover, while Turkey's support for the US in the first Gulf War reinforced the importance of Turkey in the context of American strategic interests in the region, to the European states this new geopolitical environment suggested that Turkey's location in a "rough neighborhood" might become a source of instability.⁵¹⁰ The European states began to perceive Turkey as a "barrier" against military threats outside Europe, which can be argued to have been the source of increasingly ambivalent relations between the EU and Turkey.

The relationship became very difficult indeed when Turkey's application for full membership was rejected at the 1997 Luxembourg summit. EU officials maintained that human rights violations, Turkey's policies toward the PKK and Turkish military's involvement in politics were the primary factors making Turkey unsuitable.⁵¹¹

The United States and the EU had different perspectives on the possible consequences of Turkey's full membership in the Union. Accordingly, the Union was concerned that if Turkey became a full member, millions of Turkish citizens would migrate to Europe. Moreover, there is considerable public opposition to Turkey's

509 Carl Dahlman, "Turkey's Accession to the European Union: The Geopolitics of Enlargement", *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, vol. 45, no. 8, 2004, p. 557.

510 Pinar Bilgin, "A Return to 'Civilisational Geopolitics' in the Mediterranean? Changing Geopolitical Images of the European Union and Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era", p. 275.

511 "Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress towards Accession", *European Commission*, November 1998, pp. 13-14, Available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_11_98/pdf/en/turkey_en.pdf, (Accessed on July 12, 2010).

membership in many EU countries.⁵¹² The US, on the other hand, faced no such potential issues or consequences. The former American ambassador to Turkey, Morton Abramowitz, suggested that "the only cost to the United States [of support for Turkey's membership] was a certain European annoyance, perhaps anger at times."⁵¹³

The US perceived Turkey's membership into the EU as crucial for "anchoring" Turkey to the West.⁵¹⁴ US officials concerned that if Turkey were excluded from the EU, it might give up its traditional pro-Western orientation in favor of new regional alliances. Additionally, for the United States, the membership of a Muslim country in the EU would serve as a "bridge" between the West and the Islamic world.⁵¹⁵ As one high level American official argued that "integrating Turkey into the EU should be an important objective of the future strategic cooperation between the United States, Europe, and Turkey."⁵¹⁶ Therefore, Washington's diplomatic efforts toward Turkey's full membership created tension in transatlantic relations.

American policymakers explicitly showed their support for Turkish membership and criticized the European Union for failing to admit Turkey. As Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State to the Clinton administration, declared in 1998: "Turkey's ties to Europe are irreversible and unbreakable; they are a fact of life, not a privilege that comes with membership in this or that institution. ... We do not believe that European unity and integration will be fully successful if a key

512 Sabri Sayari, "United States and Turkey's Membership in the European Union", *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, vol. 14, 2003, p. 168.

513 Morton Abramowitz, "The Complexities of American Policy Making on Turkey," in Morton Abramowitz (ed.), *Turkey's Transformation and American Policy*, pp. 179-180.

514 Steven A. Cook and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, Generating Momentum for a New Era in U.S.-Turkey Relations, *Council Special Report*, no. 15, June 2006, p. 3.

515 Carl Dahlman, "Turkey's Accession to the European Union: The Geopolitics of Enlargement", p. 563.

516 Zalmay Khalilzad, "A Strategic Plan for Western-Turkish Relations" in Zalmay Khalilzad, Ian O. Lesser and F. Stephen Larrabee, *The Future of Turkish-Western Relations*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000), p. 93.

European country is set uniquely alone and apart."⁵¹⁷

Consequently, the US administration was involved in key developments in Turkey's relations with the European Union during the 1990s. First, Washington influenced the negotiations leading to the December 1995 signing of the Customs Union Agreement. Before the vote in the parliament, American officials actively lobbied the European Parliament in support of the agreement. The US also had a crucial role influencing the EU Council's Helsinki summit in December 1999, at which Turkey's candidacy for full membership was officially recognized. The EU was compelled to modify its policy toward Turkey as a result of pressure from the Clinton administration.⁵¹⁸

A series of new developments also affected EU policy towards Turkey. On the domestic front, in early 1999, PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan had been captured. The subsequent decline in violence allowed the Turkish military to relax. Also the Turkey's pro-Islamic Welfare Party had been removed from power by 1999. These developments significantly improved relations between Turkey and Europe, and the EU approved Ankara's candidacy for membership. Candidacy meant that if Turkey fulfilled the conditions of the Copenhagen criteria, which include rule of law, structures to guarantee democracy, and minority rights, it would become a full member of the Union.⁵¹⁹ The official statement released by President Clinton following the EU summit meeting welcomed the EU's decision "with pleasure" and noted that the US had "long supported Turkey's bid to join the EU in the belief that this would have lasting benefits not only for Turkey, but also for all EU members

517 Strobe Talbott, "Turgut Ozal Memorial Lecture", *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, October 14, 1998.

518 Gülnur Aybet, "Turkey's Long and Winding Road to the E.U.: Implications for the Balkans", *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, vol. 8, no.1, 2006, p. 67; Ekavi Athanassapoulou, "American-Turkish Relations since the End of the Cold War", *Middle East Policy*, vol. 8, no. 3, 2001, p. 144.

519 Godson Sunday, "Turkey's Post Cold-War Relationship with the United States: A Critical Reappraisal", Paper prepared for presentation at the 2008 Annual Conference of the International Studies Association in San Francisco, USA, March 26 – 29 2008, Available at http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/5/1/9/5/pages251958/p251958-1.php, (Accessed on January 20, 2011).

and the United States."⁵²⁰

4.3.4 Turkey as a "Model" Country

Under the unclear circumstances of the post-Cold War era, for Ó Tuathail, one of the most important factors contributing to instability was a geopolitical vacuum in some regions. The newly independent states in Central Asia and Caucasus, an important gateway between the Heartland and the Rimland, were at the center of such power struggles.⁵²¹ Similarly, Brzezinski emphasized the geopolitical importance of the Eurasia region to the United States and suggested that the US should dominate both the eastern and western Rimlands of Eurasia to control the Middle East and Africa.⁵²²

In the Post-Cold War geopolitical order, eight independent states have emerged in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Turkey took an interest in the Turkic States during this period and was imagined by the US to be a "key" country and a "model" in the future geopolitical formation of the new Caucasian and Central Asian states. Indeed, it can be argued, despite claims to the contrary, that the reason for this interest motivated less by ethnic, linguistic, religious, and cultural affiliations than by the huge oil and gas reserves in the region.⁵²³ The US supported Turkey's policy toward these newly independent countries. The well-known slogan "Turkic World from the Adriatic Sea to the Great Wall of China" was inspired by an October 1991 article in *The Economist*.⁵²⁴

Turkey was cited as a "model country" by the US and imagined to be the

520 The United States Mission to the European Union, "Clinton Welcomes Turkey's Acceptance of EU Offer", December 11, 1991, Available at <http://www.useu.be/ISSUES/turki211.html>, (Accessed on April 2, 2010).

521 Thomas W. Simons, *Eurasia's New Frontiers*, p. 23.

522 Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives*, p.17.

523 Mustafa Gün, "The USA-Turkey Relationship after Iraq Crisis", Available at <http://www.bilgestrateji.com/store/dergi2/Mustafa.pdf>, p.13, (Accessed on September 1, 2010).

524 "The Blur in Turkey: And a Big Weight on Suleyman Demirel's Shoulders", *Economist*, vol. 321, no. 7730, 26 October 1991, pp. 15-16.

best alternative to communism and the Iranian "Islamic" model because as the only country to communicate these emerging countries it would help to increase US influence in the region in spite of Russia and Iran. According to the US officials, Turkey as a "model" country would function as a "bridge" between the Central Asian states and the Western world and thus could affect the region shaping their systems in accordance with democratic and secular models. Moreover, in January 1992, the United States enacted a policy to prevent Iranian influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia.⁵²⁵ This policy was later redesigned by the Clinton administration in the context of its dual containment policy. In this way, Turkey has played an important role in this region as an alternative to Russia and Iran, which has been crucial to American interests.

The rediscovery of Turkic links from West China to the Balkans is considered the most important invention the end of the Cold War brought to Turkey. Here, Turkish and US discourses overlapped such that, Prime Minister Demirel began to speak of "the Turkic world", and about the 21st century being the "century of the Turk".⁵²⁶

A series of developments led to this point. In March 1991, just prior to Soviet dissolution, Turgut Özal visited Kiev and Almati , and the August 19 coup against Gorbachev can be argued to be a turning point in Turkey's approach towards the Soviet Union and its republics. Turkey became the first country to recognize the independence of all the Central Asia and Caucasian countries. Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin travelled to these Turkic states and Ukraine between February 28 and March 6, 1992, and Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel followed with a visit to all the Central Asian countries two months later. During his visit, Demirel introduced the possibility of establishing a Union of Turkish States. Thus, in November 1992, during the first Turkic Summit in Ankara, Turkey began to position

525 Shireen Hunter, "Bridge or Frontier? Turkey's Post-Cold War Geopolitical Posture", *The International Spectator*, vol. 334, no. 1, January-March 1999, p. 77.

526 "The Blur in Turkey: And a Big Weight on Suleyman Demirel's Shoulders", pp. 15-16.

itself for broad leadership and influence in the region.⁵²⁷

From the Turkish perspective, establishing close relations with the Central Asian states would increase Turkey's strategic importance to the US and EU. In order to ensure Western interest in Turkey, Turkish officials emphasized that they could help with Western initiatives in this region. In this context, Turkey's relations with the Central Asian states should not be accepted as an alternative to Turkey's connections with the West, but as a means of reinforcing these ties.⁵²⁸ Conversely, for the Central Asian states, the relationship with Turkey was crucial for building its ties with the West.⁵²⁹

Following all these developments, Russia began to be concerned about a widespread Turkish or Islamic influence in the region, and then moved to reestablish its dominance in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Turkey did not want to confront Russia in the region and adopted a stance in which it stressed the benefits of cooperation with Russia.

However, in the end both Turkey and the Central Asian states have faced many problems as a result of these developments. It has been argued that Turkish efforts to insert its "model" was done with a "big brother attitude" that negatively impacted these states.⁵³⁰ Meanwhile, the Turkish administration realized the Central Asian States needed much more military and economic aid than Turkey could provide.⁵³¹ The idea of establishing a strong Turkic union may not have been

527 Mustafa Aydın, "Foucault's Pendulum: Turkey in Central Asia and the Caucasus", p. 16.

528 M. Evert, "Turkey's Strategic Goals: Possibilities and Weaknesses", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, vol. 4, no. 4, Fall 1993, p. 32.

529 Nasuh Uslu, "The Russian, Caucasian and Central Asian Aspects of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Period", *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*, vol. 2, no. 3-4, Fall-Winter 2003, p. 164.

530 Gül Turan and İlker Turan, "Turkey's Emerging Relationship with Other Turkic Republics", in Libby Rittenberg (ed.), *The Political Economy of Turkey in Post-Soviet Era: Going West and Looking East?*, p. 191.

531 Philip Robins, "Between Sentiment and Self-Interest: Turkey's Policy towards Azerbaijan and Central Asian States", *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 7, no. 4, Autumn 1993, p. 601.

feasible because Turkey had insufficient financial resources to bring the Central Asian states together. Moreover, although these states seemed very close to Turkey, they could turn to Russia easily for economic, political and security issues. Ultimately, American officials' promotion of Turkey as a "model" country dissipated at the end of the 1990s.

However the idea of "Turkey as a model" was not totally abandoned by the US administration, and was brought back onto the agenda, this time with reference to the Middle East, at the end of the decade. In 1999, Anthony Blinkmen, President Clinton's Special Assistant and Senior Director for European Affairs, argued that "Turkey sits at the crossroads - or, if you prefer, atop the fault lines - of the world. Because of its place ... its history ... its size ... and strength, and most important, because of what it is-a nation of mainly Islamic faith that is secular, democratic, and modernizing-Turkey must be a leader and can be a role model for a large swath of the world."⁵³² Similarly, in a briefing on the Middle East in 2000, Marc Grossman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs claimed "[w]e do see Turkey as a model for the Muslim world. Turkey is a country that is simultaneously secular, democratic, and Islamic. How Turks deal with that balance is their business, but it certainly is in the interest of the United States and of Europe. Our objective in Turkey is to make it a success because it is important to the United States. We are interested in a democratic Turkey with a free market and respect for human rights. What is feasible in Turkey might not necessarily be feasible in other countries. So while I do see Turkey as one model for the Muslim world, I believe that each country should find its own way".⁵³³ These words reveal that Turkey's new role in the Middle East in the Greater Middle East Project was defined and shaped by the US administration even before the September 11 attacks.

532 Antony Blinken, "After the Summits: The Future of U.S.-Turkish Relations", *Washington Institute Policy Watch*, no. 426, 2 December 1999, Available at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=39>, (Accessed on January 28, 2011).

533 Marc Grossman, "U.S. Interests and Turkey", *Middle East Forum*, March 13, 2000, Available at <http://www.meforum.org/184/us-interests-and-turkey>, (Accessed on November 19, 2010).

4.4 Limits of the Alliance: Kurdish Issue

Indeed, the 1970s and 1980s was a period of Kurdish uprising in southeastern Turkey. The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) was established in 1978, but it was in 1984 that Abdullah Öcalan started a campaign committed to achieving a separate Kurdish state.⁵³⁴ During the 1990s, the Kurdish issue, initially viewed by the Turkish army as an internal security matter, became the most troubled dimension of Turkish foreign policy. It challenged the roots of Turkish identity and security, Turkey's relations with the West from a human rights perspective, and the security of rest of the region.

Indeed, the 1990s incarnation of Turkey's confrontation with the Kurdish issue began with the Gulf War, when Turkey sided with the United States in support of the embargo against Iraq. As a result of the embargo Turkey suffered huge economic loss and political instability in its southeastern region where the PKK had been active. As criticism against the state increased, Turkish officials began to question the utility of UN sanctions in Iraq. The Kurdish issue also became a foreign policy crisis because the PKK established its bases in northern Iraq in order to strike Turkey.

After the 1991 uprising against Saddam Hussein, Ankara took in nearly 500.000 Iraqi Kurdish refugees.⁵³⁵ Subsequently, on April 6, 1991, Ankara approved a limited US-UK military operation, called Operation Provide Comfort, to enforce a no-fly zone over northern Iraq. With the involvement of the international community, a no-fly zone, considered by many Turks to be a first step in a long term US plan to create an independent Kurdish State, was established north of the 36th parallel. To prevent a new attack on Kurds, on July 24, 1991, Operation Provide Comfort II was initiated.⁵³⁶ After the withdrawal of Baghdad's forces in

534 Nihat Ali Özcan, "PKK Terrorism in Turkey", in James Ker-Lindsay and Alastair Cameron (eds.), *Combating International Terrorism: Turkey's Added Value, Occasional Paper*, October 2009, p. 9.

535 Steven A. Cook and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, "Generating Momentum for a New Era in U.S.-Turkey Relations", p. 7.

536 Meliha Altunışık, "Turkish-American Security Relations: The Middle East Dimension", in Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan (eds.), *Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future*, p. 160.

October 1991, an autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government zone was established.⁵³⁷



Figure 4.3 Map of the No-Fly Zone

Source: US Air Force, Available at http://www.af.mil/shared/media/ggallery/hires/afg_021215_005.jpg, (Accessed on February 2, 2011).

During and after the Gulf War, the establishment of a centrally controlled Iraqi state became the focal point for bilateral relations with the United States. Steven Cook from the Council on Foreign Relations asserted that "it can be considered the most important foreign and domestic policy challenge on the Turkish agenda".⁵³⁸ Consequently, Kurdish separatist movements in Turkey took advantage of this security limbo and increased their activities in the region.

Despite Turkish officials' mistrust of the US-led multinational operation, OPC was routinely renewed and it became a symbol of the mutually dependent relationship between Ankara and Washington. The need to both contain Saddam and protect the Kurdish population made OPC a critical component to US policy. In effect, the United States became dependent on the forces based at İncirlik to sustain its policies toward Saddam's regime in Iraq. The US military continued to use İncirlik Air Base to conduct Operation Northern Watch. Ironically, even while

⁵³⁷ Tim Judah, "In Iraqi Kurdistan", *Survival*, vol. 44, no. 4, Winter 2002-2003, p. 42.

⁵³⁸ Steven A. Cook and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, "Generating Momentum for a New Era in U.S.-Turkey Relations", p. 39.

the US and Turkey were working together to protect Iraqi Kurds, the Turkish government launched another round of attacks against the PKK in southeastern Turkey near the Iraqi border. For the sake of OPC, the US did not criticize Turkish cross-border operations, and in fact assisted Turkey by offering intelligence and assisting in the capture of Abdullah Öcalan in 1999.⁵³⁹ In this sense, Turkey's Iraq policy cannot be dissociated from its relationship with the United States.

Indeed, Turkey's first priority was to stabilize a unified Iraq, maintaining its integrity and preventing Iraqi Kurds from creating an independent state in northern Iraq. Turkish Foreign Minister İsmail Cem claimed Turkey's opinion by saying that, "We are against judging the situation in Iraq along religious or ethnic lines. We cannot imagine an independent entity in southern Iraq based on religion, or in the north based on ethnicity with the centre of the country staying only Arab".⁵⁴⁰

However, Turkey's aims were damaged by the Operation Provide Comfort and with the creation of a safe haven, outside the control of the Iraqi government. Many believed that with the existence of Operation Provide Comfort II, a de facto Kurdish state was established in the region supported by the US. Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit said he "had sincere doubts about the real intentions of the Americans with regard to the Kurds in Iraq."⁵⁴¹ Moreover, as a result of increasing PKK activities in Turkey, Turkish officials became concerned that this would aggravate country's internal problems.

Ankara's allegation that the US had plans to establish an independent Kurdistan on Iraq's territory was denied by the American administration. In the late 1990s, Ankara declared its desire to be consulted more closely with the US regarding Iraq, and in 1999 the United States and Turkey announced they would establish a policy-consultancy mechanism to exchange views concerning Middle

539 Meliha Altunışık, "Turkish-American Security Relations: The Middle East Dimension", pp. 162-164.

540 İsmail Cem, "Press Release of Unofficial Translation", *Turkish Embassy*, Washington, D.C., October 24, 1998, Available at http://www.turkey.org/turkey/f_politics.htm, (Accessed on February 5, 2011).

541 "Iraq: Ecevit Says U.S. Directing Iraqi Kurds", *IPR Strategic Business Information Database*, October 20, 2002.

Eastern problems.⁵⁴² However, Turkish leaders still did not trust the United States not to betray Turkey's interests.

In brief, it can be argued that, during the 1990s Turkish-American relations deteriorated because of the Kurdish issue. While the two states cooperated on numerous issues in various regions, their geopolitical interests diverged on the issue of Turkey's "national security" perspective on the Middle East. As Altunışık argues this issue is the determining factor in the redefinition of Turkish-American relations in the post-Cold War era.⁵⁴³ While the problem was turned into a bargaining chip during these years, Turkish officials continued to argue that the American strategy would result in the collapse of Iraq and damage Turkey's security. Developments around the Kurdish issue have continued to be the most difficult aspect of Turkish-American relations.

4.5 Conclusion

In the post Cold-War era, the geopolitical reconfiguration of the "new world order" by the US influenced the representations of Turkey. At the beginning of the 1990s Turkey found itself in an unstable region open to threats to its security. Thirteen of potential crisis regions were identified around Turkey.⁵⁴⁴ Thus, American policy-makers began to view Turkey as a "frontline" country by virtue of its geographic proximity to these unstable regions and willingness to cooperate with the United States.

In the immediate aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Turkey was also positioned as a facilitator of American interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Accordingly, Turkey's role as a "bridge" between Western and Central Asian states also increased its geopolitical importance. In this new era, previous

542 "Ankara savunma derdine düştü", (Ankara concerned about the defense), *Radikal*, April 14, 1999.

543 Meliha Altunışık, "Turkish-American Security Relations: The Middle East Dimension", p. 176.

544 Ramazan Gözen, *Turkey's Delicate Position between NATO and the ESDP*, (Ankara: Dışişleri Bakanlığı S.A.M., 2004), p. 14.

definitions of Turkey, including "wall against the Soviet Union" or "NATO ally since the Korean War" were replaced by new metaphors, such as "energy hub" and "emerging market". Moreover, in the early 1990s, Turkey was imagined by the US as a "model" for the newly-independent Central Asian republics as a secular, Western, democratic state and free market economy counteracting the influences of Iran and Russia in this region.⁵⁴⁵ Primarily because of close military cooperation on disputed areas, the Turkish-American relationship was described at the beginning of the 1990s as one of "enhanced partnership" and later "strategic partnership".

In the Middle East, as a consequence of the Gulf War, Turkey retained its strategic importance to the US. Turkey was regarded as a "strategic ally", a "base", and moreover an "anchor of stability" with its democratic system in such disputed areas of conflict. Washington viewed a militarily strong Turkey as important to the success of its policy of containment of the Iraqi and Iranian threats. Turkey's importance to US foreign policy in the region was strengthened since the mid-1990s as a result of Turkish-Israeli security cooperation, which brought Washington's two most important allies in the Middle East closer to one another.

However, the Kurdish issue became the most important source of conflict to impact the alliance in the post-Cold War period. Turkey did not fully support US policies in the region since the outcome would damage Turkey's internal stability and territorial integrity. Thus, on the Kurdish issue, a deep mistrust and suspicion, which carried through into the 2000s, caused relations between the US and Turkey to deteriorate in the late-1990s. This mistrust also deeply affected Turkish-American cooperation in other parts of the Middle East.

545 Sha Blkbaşı, "Jockeying for Power in the Caspian Basin: Turkey versus Iran and Russia" in Shirin Akiner (ed.), *The Caspian: Politics, Energy and Security*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 219.

CHAPTER 5

AFTER SEPTEMBER 11: FRIENDS OR FOES?

"[Turkey] has always been important for its geography - here at the meeting place of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Now Turkey has assumed even greater historical importance, because of your character as a nation. Turkey is a strong, secular democracy, a majority Muslim society, and a close ally of free nations.... Your success is vital to a future of progress and peace in Europe and in the broader Middle East - and the Republic of Turkey can depend on the support and friendship of the United States."

*President George W. Bush*⁵⁴⁶

5.1 Introduction

The Cold War was an "imaginary war" between two ideological blocks ending with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent emergence of the United States as the single superpower. The terrorist attacks on Washington, D.C. and New York City on September 11, 2001 are considered to be another turning point, affecting the geopolitical cartography of the world. After 11 September, security became the US's primary concern, and the so-called war on terror has become the central element of US foreign policy. Ó Tuathail and Shelley describe the response of the United States to the attacks as providing new definition to a new geopolitical order.⁵⁴⁷ The attacks resulted in a new geopolitical understanding, initiated the "war on terror" and the targeting of the "axis of evil", led pro-American forces first into Afghanistan and then into Iraq. The "new world order" of the 2000s began to look very different from that of the 1990s.

546 George W. Bush, "Remarks at Galatasaray University in Istanbul", 29 June 2004, John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, Santa Barbara, CA, Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64397>, (Accessed on 22 September 2010).

547 Gearóid Ó Tuathail and F. Shelley, "Political Geography: From the 'Long 1989' to the End of the Post-Cold War Peace", in G. Gale and J. Willmott (eds.), *Geography in America at the Dawn of the 21st Century*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 168.

Turkish-American relations shaped by the US administrations' geopolitical concerns had mainly been based on security issues. Thus, the war against international terrorism initiated by the George W. Bush administration after September 11 once again brought the question of Turkey's geopolitical importance onto the agenda.

Even in the post-Cold War period, as during the Cold War, US officials perceived Turkey's geographic location as the basis of its strategic importance and the central factor for bilateral cooperation. Moreover, Turkey's proximity to troubled regions such as the Balkans, Central Asia, and the Middle East became the focus of the US's strategic cooperation with Ankara.⁵⁴⁸ As a result, in the 1990s, Turkey was imagined as an "strategic ally", a "model" country or a "bridge" between the East and the West.⁵⁴⁹

Since September 11, the geopolitical strategy of the US has been characterized by securing world energy resources, preventing rogue states from threatening the US, fighting against terrorism, and reshaping the Middle East. Within this framework, terrorism has been taken as the new enemy of the US, and countries that support terrorism have been described as the "rogue states" or the "axis of evil". For this purpose, with the National Security Strategy of 2002, known as the Bush doctrine, the US administration developed a strategy of "preemptive strikes" to destroy potential threats before they become active.

At the beginning of this new period, Turkey fit the new geopolitical discourse of the US. The war in Afghanistan became an area of cooperation between the two countries. Turkey was the location of one of the most important military bases through which these policies would be implemented and so was considered to have a crucial role in the Bush administration's new geopolitical discourse.

548 Ian Lesser, "Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold War", in Graham Fuller, Ian Lesser, et al., *Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China*, (Boulder: Westview, RAND, 1993); Ian Lesser, "Beyond 'Bridge or Barrier': Turkey's Evolving Security Relations with the West," in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (eds.), *Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy*, pp. 203-221.

549 Heinz Kramer, *A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States*, pp. 236-238.

Nevertheless, conditions changed as Washington's attention shifted from Afghanistan to Iraq and the transformation of the Middle East. Thus, the US intervention in Iraq in March 2003 created serious mistrust on both sides. Developments before and after the Iraq War revealed that the "strategic" nature of these relations, per Bill Clinton's 1999 description, had seriously deteriorated.⁵⁵⁰

The two countries also continued to cooperate on the energy issue, however. Since September 11, for the United States Turkey continued to be viewed as an "energy bridge" or "energy hub" for the transfer of oil and natural gas from Central Asia to the West and has become a very important player in the region.

In the context of EU-US relations the dynamics of the Turkey–US alliance are perceived to have changed dramatically, especially in the post-September 11 period. Developments before and after the Iraqi Crisis ironically brought Turkey closer to the EU. The Cyprus issue, the most important crisis during the Cold War years, has evolved into an area of cooperation between the two states mainly due to the changing threat perceptions of Turkey and the United States.

In its geopolitical imagination of the Middle East, the US administration redefined Turkey's geopolitical representation. Turkey had been perceived as a "model" country for the Central Asian states in 1990s. It was now considered an "example" of a democratic and pro-Western Muslim country, and also a significant "model" for transformation in the Middle East.

The first Iraq war exposed the most sensitive security problem of Turkish politics and gave the Kurdish question a new dimension. For years, the United States had viewed the Kurdish issue in Turkey largely as one of terrorism. Throughout the 1990s Washington supported the Turkish government's campaign against the PKK and played a crucial role in the capture of Abdullah Öcalan in 1999 by providing intelligence to Turkish authorities. Developments since 1990 have revealed that developments in Iraq were directly related to Turkey's internal security. The revival of the PKK after the Iraq war underlined the significance of

550 Rajan Menon and S. Enders Wimbush , "The US and Turkey: End of an Alliance?", *Survival*, vol. 49, no. 2, 2007, pp. 131-133.

developments in this area, and increased suspicions of US support for Kurdish independence in northern Iraq. In short, after September 11 the Kurdish-Iraqi issue became the most troubled dimension of Turkey's security policy, thus, in the wake of the Iraq War, it also became the central issue for bilateral engagement with Washington.

It can be concluded that apart from its national security issues, Turkey was willing to support US policies in the Middle East and Central Asia during the 2000s. However the future of Iraq and the Kurdish issue were considered the limits of the US geopolitical discourse at that time.

This chapter analyses the changing geopolitical discourse of the United States and its impact on the imagination of Turkey in the 2000s. The geopolitical discourse of the US, which shapes its relations with Turkey, was reconstructed by the neo-conservative Bush administration after the September 11 attacks. The United States has begun to use this new geopolitical discourse as a tool to redesign the broader Middle East. The impact of the Bush administration's new policy directions on Turkish-American relations and its consequences will be analyzed in this section.

This chapter consists of three parts. The first part will be an examination of the changes in US geopolitical discourse during the 2000s. In the second part, geopolitical imaginations of Turkey in the post-September 11 environment will be reviewed. Finally, in the third part, the Iraqi/Kurdish issue, the biggest challenge of the decade, will be analyzed.

5.2 The US Foreign Policy after September 11

In order to understand how the new US geopolitical discourse justified its foreign policy and national interests, we have to look at the post-Cold War environment that shaped US views. The changes in US geopolitical discourse, especially after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, have been described in this document. In the Clinton era, US foreign policy primarily centered around enlarging liberal market democracies and containing "rogue states". In this geopolitical

environment the Middle East and Eurasia took on new significance for the US, which had its sights set on the oil and natural gas reserves of the Caspian Sea.⁵⁵¹ The United States' post-Cold War interests were articulated in the writings of several US officials, such as Zbigniew Brzezinski, who regarded Eurasia as the "Grand Chessboard".⁵⁵² The United States, Russia and China were considered as the principal players in this geopolitical zone. US strategists noted that China, India and other Asian countries depended on Middle Eastern oil suppliers, "so were far less likely than Western allies to back US policies in the Middle East, especially if their energy needs were at stake".⁵⁵³

Therefore, in this period the positioning of US forces in the oil heartland was considered a necessity. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review stressed that keeping US forces in distant anti-access environments was one of its most important priorities⁵⁵⁴, meaning the United States intended to prevent any attempt on the resources of Eurasia and the Middle East⁵⁵⁵. These pre-September 11 statements laid the groundwork for the US's geopolitical discourse and were later used to justify the US foreign policy directions worldwide.

On November 7, 2000 Republican candidate George W. Bush won the US presidential elections. Nearly one year later, on September 11, 2001, four planes were hijacked; two of them attacking the World Trade Center in New York, a third

551 Bruno Ferrari, "Geopolitics - A Critical Assessment of the 'Great Game' in and Around the Caspian Sea", Available at http://www.ciari.org/investigacao/geopolitics_greatgame_caspiansea.pdf, (Accessed on August 7, 2010), p. 8.

552 Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives*.

553 Aylin Güney and Fulya Gökcan, "The 'Greater Middle East' as a 'Modern' Geopolitical Imagination in American Foreign Policy", *Geopolitics*, 2010, vol. 15, no. 1, p. 28.

554 Michèle A. Flournoy, (ed.), *Quadrennial Defense Review 2001: Strategy-Driven Choices for America's Security*, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2001).

555 Efstathios T. Fakiolas and Tassos Fakiolas, "Pax- Americana or Multilateralism? Reflecting on the United States' Grand Strategic Vision of Hegemony in the Wake of the 11 September Attack", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, vol. 18, no. 4, Fall 2007, pp. 65-66.

targeting the Pentagon and a fourth crashing into a field after unsuccessfully targeting the White House. As a matter of fact, the US was attacked in its own territories, which were assumed as immune.⁵⁵⁶ The September 11 attacks had an arguably comparable impact to those on the Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, which forced the US into World War II.⁵⁵⁷ As a consequence, President George W. Bush's first term was characterized by his administration's response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

Without any concrete evidence, Afghanistan became the first target of the US administration. On September 17, 2001, President Bush and his government began to develop a war stratagem against the Taliban regime. On the same day, Bush said to General Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "Let's hit them hard. We want to signal this is a change from the past. We want to cause other countries like Syria and Iran to change their view".⁵⁵⁸ Before the attacks, the American government requested international support from the United Nations and NATO. On September 12, both the UN Security Council and General Assembly adopted resolutions to this effect and, for the first time in its history, NATO invoked Article 5 of its Treaty. Thereafter, the first attacks were initiated against Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. Indeed, the war in Afghanistan strengthened the administration's perception that offensive strikes would be the best defense against terrorism.

From the theoretical perspective of critical geopolitics, we can say that after the September 11 the United States began to imagine new enemies and threats: "terrorists" and "terrorism". In other words, instead of communism, the issue of terrorism had become a strategic challenge and "the war on terror" dominated US foreign policy as its main geopolitical discourse. As an immediate reaction to the attacks, on September 20, 2001, George W. Bush stressed the importance of the conflict with terrorism, and claiming "[t]his is not, however, just America's fight. And

556 Simon Dalby, "Calling 911: Geopolitics, Security and America's New War", *Geopolitics*, vol. 8, no. 3, 2003, p. 61.

557 Michael Cox and Doug Stokes, *US Foreign Policy*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 358.

558 Bob Woodward and Dan Balz, "Combating Terrorism: 'It Starts Today'", *The Washington Post*, February 1, 2002, p. A1.

what is at stake is not just America's freedom. This is the world's fight. This is civilization's fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom". He can clearly be identified here as employing Cold War metaphors to define new enemies. He added that there was no neutrality in the war on terror: "Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists".⁵⁵⁹

Since September 11 the US administration issued several documents outlining the new security strategy of the United States. "The National Strategy for Homeland Security", and then "National Security Strategy" - known as the "Bush Doctrine"- were published in 2002.⁵⁶⁰ These were followed by the "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism" of 2003 and the "Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support" of 2005.⁵⁶¹

It should be noted that neo-conservative intellectuals of statecraft dominated in these government documents. Bialasiewicz et al. observed that there is a clear link between the Bush administration's strategic view and the "Defense Planning Guidance", prepared by Paul Wolfowitz and I. Lewis Libby in 1992.⁵⁶² This document was labelled the "first neoconservative security manifesto" of the post-Cold War world and described as an outline of a one-superpower world.⁵⁶³

559 George W. Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11", 20 September 2001, John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, Santa Barbara, CA, Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64731>, (Accessed on July 22, 2010).

560 George W. Bush, *U.S. National Strategy for Homeland Security*, (Washington DC: Office of Homeland Security, July 2002); George W. Bush, "A National Security Strategy for a New Century", (Washington DC: White House, September 2002).

561 "U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism", *Executive Office of the President United States*, February 2003, "U.S. Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support", *Department of Defense*, June 2005.

562 Luiza Bialasiewicz et. al., "Performing Security: The Imaginative Geographies of Current US Strategy", p. 415.

563 Patrick E. Tyler, "Pentagon Drops Goal of Blocking New Superpowers", *New York Times*, May 24, 1992; James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet*, (New York: Penguin, 2004), pp. 198-212.

Neo-conservatism, as a political movement, emerged in the mid-1970s as both a reaction to the *détente* in relations with the Soviets and to the Vietnam failure. Since then, it has evolved into set of normative beliefs supporting the American military power and values.⁵⁶⁴ The influence of neo-conservative thought linked national myths, missions and foreign policy formation. Similarly, Berggren and Rae argue that, especially in the aftermath of September 11, the Bush administration's discourse started to emphasize "democratic evangelism", and began to appear as the most important part of the administration's neo-conservatism.⁵⁶⁵ For them, this ideology includes several core beliefs: "that the USA is an exceptional hegemonic power with a strong adherence to the expansion of democratic values; that the values that the USA promotes are the universal values that would be welcomed by any nation; and that the homeland security and hegemonic position of the USA can be ensured through the spread of US military and political power".⁵⁶⁶

In order to understand the impact of neo-conservatism on the policies of the Bush administration, we have to look at the main premises of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), a think-tank founded in the spring of 1997. PNAC defined itself as a "non-profit, educational organization whose goal is to promote American global leadership".⁵⁶⁷ Indeed, the Project aimed to provide the intellectual basis for US military dominance in the world. PNAC argued that the US could not "avoid the responsibilities of global leadership" as a superpower. Therefore, the US should shape the world before such threats emerge: "the history of the 20th century should have taught us that it is important to shape circumstances before

564 Jonathan Monten, "The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy", *International Security*, vol. 29, no. 4, 2005, p. 143.

565 D. Jason Berggren and Nicol C. Rae, "Jimmy Carter and George W. Bush: Faith, Foreign Policy, and an Evangelical Presidential Style", *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, vol. 36, no. 4, December 2006, p. 622.

566 *ibid.*, p. 623.

567 "About PNAC", *Project for the New American Century*, Available at <http://www.newamericancentury.org/aboutpnac.htm>, (Accessed on July 12, 2010).

crises emerge, and to meet threats before they become dire”.⁵⁶⁸ These views have also shaped the US foreign policy of the Bush administration.

It is also important to stress the significance of the organic link between PNAC and the Bush administration. Some of the Project’s founders were also members of the Bush cabinet, including Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz. Moreover, famous neoconservative intellectuals such as Francis Fukuyama, Norman Podhoretz, and William Kristol were also the members.⁵⁶⁹ Indeed, the most explicit articulation of the aims of the Bush administration was written in PNAC’s manifesto “Rebuilding America’s Defenses”, published in the election year of 2000. Here, “Defend the American Homeland”, “fight and decisively win multiple, simultaneous major theatre wars”, “perform the ‘constabulary’ duties associated with shaping the security environment in critical regions”, and “transform U.S. forces to exploit the ‘revolution in military affairs’” were described as the US military’s central roles by PNAC.⁵⁷⁰ Already in 2000, PNAC had redesignated the major military mission; it was no longer to prevent Soviet expansionism but to “secure and expand zones of democratic peace; deter rise of new great-power competitor; defend key regions; exploit transformation of war”.⁵⁷¹

The American role in the new world order had been delineated by PNAC and these principles have appeared in a number of National Security Strategie documents.

The new security doctrine of the Bush administration, the National Security Strategy document, was announced on September 17, 2002. Although it consists of

568 “Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century”, *Project for the New American Century*, 2000, Available at <http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf>, (Accessed on July 12, 2010).

569 Francis Fukuyama, *After the Neo-cons: Where the Right Went Wrong*, (London: Profile Books, 2006), p. 26.

570 Thomas Donnelly, “Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century”, *Project for the New American Century*, 2000, p. iv and p. 5, Available at <http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf>, (Accessed on July 12, 2010).

571 *ibid.*, p. 2.

nine chapters this strategy can be summarized by preemption, unilateralism and primacy.⁵⁷² The National Security Strategy document, in order to ensure the survival of the United States, calls for preemptive military action against hostile states and terrorist groups seeking to develop weapons of mass destructions. According to Gaddis, pre-emptive action means striking first at an enemy that is about to attack.⁵⁷³ This might be called “the best defense is a good offense” strategy. Nevertheless, US officials have claimed their strategy of preemption is directed only at terrorists and rogue states. Despite Krauthammer’s argument that the doctrine of preemption is an improvement on classical deterrence⁵⁷⁴, the document declared that in the document that containment and deterrence, the strategic policies of the Cold War, were no longer applicable in a world where “the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders of rogue states.”⁵⁷⁵ Colin Powell asserted that preemption was necessary against undeterrable enemies, these being non-state actors that could not be deterred by traditional policies.⁵⁷⁶ Thus, in order to prevent such threats the state declared its authority to take any measure at any time.

In this new security environment, President Bush labeled Iraq, Iran and North Korea the “axis of evil”. According to him, “[b]y seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred”.⁵⁷⁷ The Bush

572 George W. Bush, *U.S. National Security Strategy for a New Century*, (Washington DC: White House, September 2002).

573 John Lewis Gaddis, “A Grand Strategy of Transformation”, *Foreign Policy*, November-December 2002, p. 53.

574 Charles Krauthammer, *An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World*, (Washington D.C.: The AEI Press, 2004), p. 13.

575 Jean-Yves Haine and Gustav Lindström, “An Analysis of The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, January 2004, Available at <http://www.iss.europa.eu/nc/actualites/actualite/browse/9/article/an-analysis-of-the-national-security-strategy-of-the-united-states-of-america/>, (Accessed on June 27, 2010).

576 Colin Powell, “A Strategy of Partnership,” *Foreign Affairs*, January-February 2004, pp. 25-26.

577 George W. Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union”, 29 January 2002, John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, Santa Barbara, CA, Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29644>, (Accessed on August 29, 2010).

administration asserted that these states, identified as "rogue states" had hostile policies and a destabilizing regional influence. They became a major concern of US policy, particularly with regard to the Middle East.

"Rogue states" have once again become the focus of post-September 11 threat analysis, as during the 1990s, and the Bush administration considered regime change to be the main aim of its foreign and security policy. In order to prevent this new threat, the United States had to be prepared to take military action against regimes it declared a threat. Indeed, the formulation of the concept of "rogue state" helped the US to legitimize its interactions with such states as Iraq, Iran, Libya and Syria.⁵⁷⁸ This idea was also articulated in the administration's National Security Strategy: "Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first".⁵⁷⁹

The president's "Axis of Evil" speech and the policy of preemption as a new strategic concept were viewed as the first signs that the Bush administration was abandoning the principles of deterrence and containment that had become mainstays of American foreign and security policy.

In this new climate, the US's biggest challenge, which was also a target of the global war on terrorism, was Iraq. The Saddam Hussein regime was accused of several "crimes" by the United States. President Bush and his advisors were insisted Saddam Hussein was involved in the September 11 attacks.⁵⁸⁰ Indeed, some officials, like Wolfowitz, believed regime change in Iraq would create an opportunity

578 John Agnew, *Geopolitics: Revisioning World Politics*, (2nd ed.), p. 122; Steven E. Miller, "The Iraq Experiment and US National Security", *Survival*, vol. 48, no. 4, Winter 2006-2007, p. 18.

579 George W. Bush, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, (Washington DC: White House, September 2002), p. 15.

580 James P. Pfiffner, "Did President Bush Mislead the Country in His Arguments for War with Iraq?", *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, vol. 34, no. 1, March 2004, pp. 25-27.

to restructure the entire Middle East. Moreover, it would also bring some relief to the Arab-Israeli conflict.⁵⁸¹ The Iraq therefore war perceived as a kind of "political engineering", an instrument to reshape both a country and the Middle East, and to protect the US's long-term geopolitical interests.⁵⁸²

It was thus argued in the Bush Doctrine that the appropriate strategy to deal with this "rogue state" was "pre-emption". President Bush declared: "I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer".⁵⁸³ It was also hoped that a victory in Iraq would have a deterrent effect on other "rogue states". Accordingly, President Bush decided to topple Saddam Hussein's regime and thus initiated the invasion of Iraq in March 2003.

On 20 March 2003 the US began launching missile strikes against targets in Iraq. However, while the military won a decisive victory, the proposed change did not start after the major operations ended. President Bush declared victory on May 1, but in the subsequent months, the United States did not manage to transform this military victory into a political success.

Despite the difficult situation in Iraq, President Bush won the elections on November 2, 2004. Immediately after his re-election, Bush stressed that he would continue to follow a foreign policy described by Colin Powell as "aggressive".⁵⁸⁴ He added that "[i]t's going to be a continuation of his principles, his policies, his beliefs". However, according to Dobins, US Special Envoy to Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, and Afghanistan, in his second term President Bush had significantly less

581 "Wolfowitz Shifts Rationale on Iraq War", *The Washington Post*, September 12, 2003, p. A 23; Michael Elliott and James Carney, "First Stop, Iraq", *Time Magazine*, March 31, 2003, p.75.

582 Jason D. Berggren and Nicol C. Rae, "Jimmy Carter and George W. Bush: Faith, Foreign Policy, and Evangelical Presidential Style", pp. 619-621.

583 George W. Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union", 29 January 2002, John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, Santa Barbara, CA, Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29644>, (Accessed on September 1, 2010).

584 "US to Remain 'Aggressive' Abroad", *BBC News*, 9 November, 2004, Available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3994699.stm>, (Accessed on August 12, 2010).

room to maneuver than he had during the previous four years.⁵⁸⁵

In the second term of the Bush administration a new National Security Strategy was published. While the 2002 National Security Strategy, which mainly focused on Iraq and North Korea, and defined the most serious challenges to US national security as the threat of rogue states and of terrorists, in the 2006 Strategy, the focus shifted to Iran and Syria as state sponsors of terror: "Some states such as Syria and Iran continue to harbor terrorists at home and sponsor terrorist activity abroad".⁵⁸⁶ Moreover, in the context of proliferation of WMD, the Strategy only focused on Iran: "We may face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran".⁵⁸⁷ According to the Strategy this is not only because of its attempts to develop nuclear weapons, but because of other concerns of the US administration: "The Iranian regime sponsors terrorism; threatens Israel; seeks to thwart Middle East peace; disrupts democracy in Iraq; and denies the aspirations of its people for freedom".⁵⁸⁸

The Bush era ended with serious questions regarding the US military presence in the Middle East, despite all of the Bush administration's attempts to justify its geopolitical calculations. It can be argued that the Bush administration's discourse of the war against terrorism affected Turkey's geopolitical role in the region because three "rouge states" and two "axis of evil" states were neighbors of Turkey. Moreover, the location of confrontation chosen by the US was next to Turkey. The US thus wanted to grant some role to Turkey. As a result of its geographic position and its alignment with the US, Turkey once again became a significant actor in this war as it had been in the Cold War period.

585 James Dobbins, "Iraq: Winning the Unwinnable War", *Foreign Affairs*, January-February 2005, p. 17.

586 George W. Bush, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, (Washington DC: White House, March 2006), p. 9.

587 *ibid.*, p. 20.

588 *ibid.*, p. 20.

5.3 Different Geopolitical Imaginations of Turkey

5.3.1 Turkey as a "Strategic Ally"

5.3.1.1 Political Dimension

As discussed, a new era in American geopolitical thinking was begun after September 11, 2001. The "war on terror" has become the US's number one foreign policy priority. Initially, Al-Qaeda was declared responsible for the attacks and President George W. Bush immediately ordered the invasion of Afghanistan to topple the Taliban regime, capture Osama bin Laden, and settle this strategic region.⁵⁸⁹ This military action continues today under the name "Operation Enduring Freedom", and is considered as the first attack by the US in its war against terrorism.

It was assumed that in this new era, the Turkish-American alliance would be strengthened both because of Turkey's location and their common perspective on terrorism. As a matter of fact, Turkey, as in 1990s, was still located at the center of the most troubled regions for the United States, and could thus be both an important "base" for the US operations and provide military support to its ally. In the beginning, Turkey strongly supported the new geopolitical discourse of the United States desiring to demonstrate that valued its relationships in the new global environment. Moreover, "terrorism" was also perceived as the main security threat to Turkish national security.

As a first response, Foreign Minister İsmail Cem stated on September 11 that Turkey shared the pain of the American people and was ready to "do whatever was necessary".⁵⁹⁰ On the following day, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit described the

589 George W. Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11", September 20, 2001, John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, Santa Barbara, CA, Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64731>, (Accessed on November 20, 2010); George W. Bush, "Address to the Nation Announcing Strikes Against Al Qaida Training Camps and Taliban Military Installations in Afghanistan", October 7, 2001, John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, Santa Barbara, CA, Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=65088>, (Accessed on November 20, 2010).

590 Bülent Alirza, "The Turkish Update", *The Center for Strategic and International Studies*, October 12, 2001.

attacks as "not just against the United States but against humanity and world peace". He also expressed that "[t]hese attacks have shown that leaders must come up with new strategies against terrorism. The entire humanity must unite against terrorism."⁵⁹¹ After its show of solidarity by supporting the activation of Article 5 of the NATO Charter on September 12, Cem asserted that Turkey, which had suffered from terrorism, considered the operation to be "beneficial both to NATO and to the peoples of the whole world".⁵⁹²

On September 21, as a response to the US request, Turkey opened its air corridors with "blanket permission".⁵⁹³ According to Douglas Bereuter, chairman of the subcommittee on Europe: "After September 11, Turkey was one of the first to join us in the struggle against global terrorism. Turkey became a staging area for the Afghan operation and later took command of the international security force there".⁵⁹⁴ Cem arrived in Washington on September 26 and met with Vice President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of State Colin Powell. After Cem's visit, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld visited Ankara on October 5 and met with then Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, Chief of the General Staff Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu, and Defense Minister Sabahattin Çakmakoğlu. After the meeting Rumsfeld stressed the importance of Turkey as a "NATO ally" with experience fighting against terrorism.⁵⁹⁵

On October 7, Turkey was informed of the initiation of the war against Afghanistan by Vice President Cheney. As a quick response to the US request, on October 10, the Turkish Grand National Assembly authorized the government to

591 *ibid.*

592 *ibid.*

593 Ömer Göksel İşyar, "An Analysis of Turkish-American Relations from 1945 to 2004: Initiatives and Reactions in Turkish Foreign Policy", p. 37.

594 "Turkey's Future Direction and U.S.-Turkey Relations", United States Congress House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on Europe, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on International Relations, *House of Representatives*, One Hundred Eighth Congress, First Session, October 1, 2003, p. 2.

595 Bülent Alırıza, "The Turkish Update".

"send Turkish troops abroad, allow foreign soldiers to come to Turkey, and use these forces under government-determined permission and principles within the framework of Operation Enduring Freedom and what follows it".⁵⁹⁶ Accordingly, on November 20, ninety Turkish Special Forces operators were sent to Afghanistan.⁵⁹⁷ During the operation, Turkish bases served as key points for humanitarian assistance.

Yet, it can be argued that Turkey's most important role in Afghanistan began after the Taliban regime was toppled. After "Operation Enduring Freedom", Turkey took an active role in the multinational peacekeeping force established in Afghanistan. Like in Bosnia and Somalia, Turkey, as a Muslim ally in NATO, was particularly successful in its assistance of the United States in Afghanistan. Turkish forces have twice led the NATO International Security Assistance Force in the region. Finally former Turkish foreign minister Hikmet Çetin served as NATO's senior civilian representative in Afghanistan from 2004 to 2006.

The strategic nature of Turkish-American relations was reasserted following Al-Qaida attacks in Turkey on November 15 and 20, 2003.⁵⁹⁸ After the attacks President Bush expressed his condolences and reiterated that Turkey and the US were together in the "fight against global terrorism". Moreover, US House of Representative passed a resolution that officially showed the support of the US to Turkey and the Turkish people. American officials also offered to extend support to investigations.⁵⁹⁹

596 TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 5. Birleşim, 10.10.2001, vol. 71, 2001, Available at tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem21/yil4/bas/b005m.htm, (Accessed on July 22, 2010).

597 Ralph H. Salmi and Gonca Bayraktar Durgun, *Turkish-U.S. Relations: Perspectives from Ankara*, (Boca Raton: Brown Walker Press, 2005), p. 4.

598 On November 15, Bet Israel and Neve Shalom synagogues in İstanbul, were bombed. On November 20 the headquarters of HSBC Bank AS and the British Consulate, were bombed in the same way. 57 people died and 700 wounded after the attacks. Turkish government declared that Al-Qaida was the responsible for the attacks.

599 US House, "Resolution Condemning the Terrorist Attacks in Istanbul, Turkey, on November 15 and 20, 2003, Expressing Condolences to the Families of the Individuals Murdered in the Attacks, Expressing Sympathies to the Individuals Injured in the Attacks, and Expressing Solidarity with the Republic of Turkey and the United Kingdom in

It can be concluded that September 11 is a significant milestone that Turkey prompted to adopt the US's new discourse that "terrorism" was the most important global threat to international order. Indeed, this new discourse allowed Turkey to justify its struggle with PKK terrorism. Turkey immediately joined the coalition forces in the war in Afghanistan, mainly because it was not perceived to be a threat to its own national security. Consequently, the Afghanistan War, which highlighted Turkey's importance to the US, was perceived as one of the biggest examples of Turkish-US cooperations after the Korean War. In this sense, Turkish support also helped to legitimize US policy on behalf of the Western world. However, when the United States started to use the same discourse towards Iraq, Turkey responded very differently and did not grant its full support to the US forces in Iraq.

Despite the two allies' cooperation in the war of Afghanistan, the "strategic" nature of these relations began to deteriorate as a consequence of the US administration's war plans on Iraq. September 11 is central to understanding the war on Iraq. In the new geopolitical environment generated by September 11, the Bush administration turned its "war on terror" into a campaign against the regime of Saddam Hussein. Although the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein's connection to the attacks was not proven,⁶⁰⁰ it was the object of a "preemptive war". For Hinnebusch, Iraq was also a test case both of Bush's strategy of constructing *ad hoc* "coalitions of the willing" that would "unquestioningly follow US leadership and of whether his declared right of pre-emptive war would be accepted by allies and rivals alike".⁶⁰¹ However, both before and after the Iraq War, the geopolitical discourse of the Bush administration and the legitimacy of its actions were widely questioned and challenged.

the Fight Against Terrorism", US House of Representative, S. Res. 273, November 24, 2003, *Congressional Record*, Proceedings and Debates of the 108th Congress, First Session, vol. 149, pt. 22, p. 30686.

600 James P. Pfiffner, "Did President Bush Mislead the Country in His Arguments for War with Iraq?", p. 28.

601 Raymond Hinnebusch, "The American Invasion of Iraq: Causes and Consequences", *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs*, Spring 2007, p. 25.

Indeed, reshaping the Middle East was critical to the success of the Bush administration's new foreign policy direction for several reasons. First, the neo-cons expected that the invasion of Iraq would transform the Middle East, marginalize radical forces and strengthen Israel. Moreover, invasion of Iraq would allow the US to secure access to Iraqi oil without Arab alliances.⁶⁰²

Another geopolitical interest of the US administration in the region was to establish alternative military bases. Indeed, the US had searched permanent military bases in the Middle East, and an invasion of Iraq would justify their establishment. Such bases would make it possible for the US to interfere with rogue states like Syria and Iran and impose a pro-Israeli Pax-Americana in the region.⁶⁰³

Indeed, before the invasion of Iraq, it had been discussed that the US required two fronts to help it achieve its goals in the war more expediently. The US administration argued that opening a "northern front" was imperative for success in the Iraq war. Accordingly, US officials indicated their intention to use Turkey as a "northern front" for the Iraq war months before the war. The deterioration of US-Turkish relations began after this problem because the US realized it had incorrectly assumed Turkey would open its territory for use as war's northern front without any objection.

The United States put pressure on Turkey to immediately grant permission for deployment of US soldiers into Turkey. President Bush claimed the US administration was working on an aid plan, and added that he expected an agreement satisfying both sides would be reached.⁶⁰⁴

In order to formalize this intention Vice President Dick Cheney visited Turkey at the beginning of 2002. Thereafter, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul

602 *ibid.*, p. 26.

603 Franklin D. Kramer and C. Richard Nelson, *Global Futures and Implications for U.S. Basing*, Working Group Report, (Washington D.C.: Atlantic Council, 2005), p. 9.

604 *ibid.*, p. 38.

Wolfowitz and Assistant Secretary of State Marc Grossman travelled to Ankara in July 2002 to negotiate the American request for access to Turkey's military bases.⁶⁰⁵ This meant that US war plans involved ground attacks launched from Turkish territory. During his visit, Wolfowitz stressed the significance of the Turkish-American alliance and asserted that "Turkey has been with us always in the past and will be with us now."⁶⁰⁶ He also added that "Turkish participation, if it does come to the use of force, is very important in managing the consequences, in producing the result as decisively as possible, and also in helping to make sure that post-war Iraq is a positive force in the region, not a destabilizing one. So, it is very crucial to have Turkey intimately involved in the war-planning process".⁶⁰⁷

In fact, Turkey, as a neighbor of Iraq and also a "strategic ally" of Washington, found itself in a position that challenged its national interests. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit's coalition government declared that Turkey opposed to military action against Iraq. In November 2002, Turkish elections brought the moderately Islamist Justice and Development Party to power. Wolfowitz returned from Turkey in December 2002 under the impression he had the support of the Turkish military.

These visits made clear to Ankara that war likely unavoidable. Thus, as negotiations continued between Turkey and the United States, on February 4, 2003 the Turkish Government decided to split the bill of permission into two parts. As a first step, on February 6, the Turkish parliament approved a motion to modernize airfields, bases and ports that the United States planned to use for the war effort.⁶⁰⁸

605 Bill Park, "Strategic Location, Political Dislocation: Turkey, the United States and Northern Iraq", p. 14.

606 Stephen F. Hayes, "Wolfowitz Talks Turkey, The Serious War Planning is under Way", *Weekly Standard*, December 16, 2002.

607 *ibid.*

608 TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 32. Birleşim, 06.02.2003, vol. 4, 2003, Available at <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem22/yil1/bas/b032m.htm>, (Accessed on July 22, 2010).

Meanwhile, State Minister Ali Babacan and Foreign Minister Yaşar Yakış travelled to Washington at the beginning of February. The ensuing negotiations between Turkey and the United States to determine the “requirements and costs” of cooperation were called the “most complicated negotiations of Turkish history”.⁶⁰⁹

During the negotiations, Turkish public opinion responded negatively to comments and caricatures in the US media criticizing Turkey for bargaining with the United States on this issue, with unexpected results.

Finally, under enormous political pressure by the Bush administration, the JDP cabinet drafted a second motion on February 25, 2003. The motion “authorized the entry of 62,000 US troops into Turkey, as a combination of the 4th Infantry Division, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, 255 fixed wing and 65 rotary wing aircraft, unspecified special operations units, and combat support.”⁶¹⁰ Furthermore, it also allowed the dispatch of Turkish soldiers abroad.

While supporters of the bill in the parliament did not like the idea of a war in Iraq, they believed that a US invasion was inevitable. For them, by helping the US, Turkey would both preserve its geopolitical importance in the eyes of the United States and have a role in the future of Iraq. The anti-bill contingent’s calculations were also formulated in terms of national interests, but their strategy was to stress the negative consequences of the first Gulf War. They were also ethically uncomfortable with attacking to a neighbor, a Muslim country.⁶¹¹ According to Ersoy and Yeğın the main argument was that if Turkey lent its support “the American war” that lacked a UN Security Council resolution, it would “violate the law, attack Iraq as the tongs of America, break up with the Islamic countries, [and]

609 Barak A. Salmoni, “Strategic Partners or Estranged Allies: Turkey, the United States, and Operation Iraqi Freedom,” *Strategic Insights*, vol. 2, no. 7, July 2003.

610 *ibid.*

611 Sedat Ergin, “Tezkere, AKP’yi çatlattı”, (Iraq Bill splitted JDP), *Hürriyet*, September 24, 2003.

become a country excluded from the European Union.”⁶¹² This opinion contained two geopolitical concerns: the first was the fear of exclusion from the EU, which was an issue mainly related to Turkish identity. The second and more important concern related to Turkey’s internal security and territorial integrity. According to the polls, public opinion was 91 percent against a possible war in Iraq.⁶¹³ On the day of the vote, thousands protested outside of the Turkish Parliament building.

Unsurprisingly, the Turkish military supported the bill but did not want take the sole responsibility for this decision. For them, Turkey’s geopolitical interests would be served if the government cooperated with the Americans. According to Kapsis, “the strategy of the Turkish military and at least part of the Turkish political establishment was to guarantee a certain degree of control over American post-war policy in northern Iraq in exchange for giving the Americans access to their prized northern front”.⁶¹⁴ On December 27, 2002, Chief of Staff Hilmi Özkök, expressed his view at a National Security Council meeting stating that Turkey should cooperate militarily with the United States.⁶¹⁵ At the meeting it was further decided that Turkey and the US should begin formal negotiations. The establishment of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, the safety of Turkmens living in Iraq and the status of Kirkuk and Mosul were taken as Turkey’s “red lines”.⁶¹⁶

In a final attempt to strengthen the pro-bill campaign, at a National Security Council meeting on February 28, Erdoğan asked military leaders to make a public statement supporting authorization. This time, however, the military did not make

612 Eyüp Ersoy and Mehmet Yeğin, “March 1, 2003: How to Explain the Turkish Foreign Policy Decision?”, *The Journal of Turkish Weekly*, 2 September 2010.

613 The German Fund of the United States, “Transatlantic Trends 2004 Partners”, 2004, Available at http://trends.gmfus.org/doc/2004_english_key.pdf, (Accessed on 9 April 2011).

614 James E. Kapsis, “The Failure of U.S.-Turkish Pre-War Negotiations: An Overconfident United States, Political Mismanagement, and a Conflicted Military”, *MERIA Journal*, vol. 10, no. 3, September 2006.

615 Sedat Ergin, “Biz Gemide Askerler var Sanıyorduk, Meğer Yokmuş”, (We thought that There were Soldiers in the Ships, Apparently There were Not), *Hürriyet*, September 22, 2003.

616 Henri J. Barkey, “Turkey and Iraq: The Perils (and Prospects) of Proximity”, *USIP Special Report 141*, July 2005, p. 5.

any recommendation regarding the bill, thus implicitly giving its consent to the decision of the Parliament.⁶¹⁷ As Robins put it, "[t]he Turkish military, though intentionally adopting a low profile both with an eye to the stipulation of the Copenhagen criteria and so that the JDP government might take responsibility for unpalatable war preparations".⁶¹⁸

Briefly, it can be argued that Turkish civil society, opposition parties, the military, and the political elites failed to agree on whether or not to open a northern front to US troops out of fear of an independent Kurdish state, associated economic costs, and of course an out of control PKK in northern Iraq.

While all these discussions were going on in Turkey, the United States began to discuss "military options without Turkey" toward the end of February. In the meantime, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Myers, White House and spokesmen from the Department of State delivered an announcement claiming that "the United States had the capacity to reach its aims with or without Turkey".⁶¹⁹ Yet, despite this announcement, the United States' expectations from Turkey were remained unchanged, and American ships still waited in the Mediterranean Sea at the beginning of March.

In the end, on March 1, 2003, the Turkish Grand National Assembly voted 264 to 251 not to allow American troops to use Turkish territory. Thus, the authorization bill was rejected by a margin of 4 votes,⁶²⁰ concluding approximately a year of official negotiations between US and Turkish officials.

617 "Tavsiye Kararı Yok", (No Suggestion to the Government), *Hürriyet*, February 28, 2003.

618 Philip Robins, "Confusion at Home, Confusion Abroad: Turkey between Copenhagen and Iraq", *International Affairs*, vol. 79, no. 3, May 2003, p. 63.

619 Quoted in "Turkish-US Relations in 2003", Available at "<http://www.turkishpress.com/specials/2003/yir/usa.asp>, (Accessed on September 27, 2010).

620 Michael Rubin, "A Comedy of Errors: American-Turkish Diplomacy and the Iraq War", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Spring 2005.

The decision of the Turkish parliament surprised and disappointed the Bush administration. The decision damaged Turkish-American relationship as never before. US officials accused Turkey of blocking the Pentagon's war plans and claimed that if the Turkish front had been opened, the Sunni Iraqi uprising would have been unsuccessful.⁶²¹ Moreover, since the decision came as surprise, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman warned that as a consequence, Turkey might lose its chance to take an important role in the future of Iraq.⁶²²

Soli Özel argues that military relations bore the brunt of the impact of the decision.⁶²³ After the vote, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz was very critical in one of his speeches that "the Turkish General Chief of Staff has not shown a good leadership to support America in Iraq War."⁶²⁴ Officials at the Pentagon also claimed that Parliament would have passed the motion had the Turkish military responsibly exercised its influence over the political leadership.⁶²⁵ The US government believed it had been betrayed by the Turkish military.

Consequently, the US military had to reconfigure its war plans only weeks before the scheduled invasion of Iraq. American ships in the Mediterranean began to sail towards the Persian Gulf. The US tried to find another way to enter Iraq, and this meant more resources and less efficiency of operations. According to the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff of the United States, General Myers, the American

621 Steven A. Cook, Douglas Dillon Fellow and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, "Fractured Alliance? The Future of U.S.-Turkey Relations", June 22, 2006, Available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/11014/fractured_alliance_the_future_of_usturkey_relations_transcript_federal_new_s_service_inc.html, (Accessed on September 7, 2010).

622 *ibid.*

623 Soli Özel, "Turkey at the Polls: After the Tsunami", in Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, and Daniel Brumberg (eds.), *Islam and Democracy in the Middle East*, (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), p. 174.

624 "Deputy Secretary of Defence Wolfowitz: Interview with CNN Turk", *CNN Türk*, January 29, 2004.

625 Gencer Özcan, "The Changing Role of Turkey's Military in Foreign Policy Making", *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, no. 23, May 2010, p. 36.

military had four alternative war plans for Iraq.⁶²⁶ While considering alternative war plans, the US administration asked Turkey to open its air corridors as assistance for the operation. Since almost all NATO allies had given permission for American flights, Turkey eventually also granted their permission.⁶²⁷

All of this has elicited a discussion on whether "strategic partnership" between the two countries had died or not. US Ambassador to Ankara, Eric Edelman stated that "the strategic partnership would be reshaped as soon as possible between Turkey and America".⁶²⁸ No significant improvement has subsequently been achieved. On the contrary, other critical issues, such as the PKK's activities in northern Iraq, the question of Iraq's territorial integrity, the future of Iraq's Kurds, and the status of Kirkuk continued to negatively affect Turkish-American relations.

Yet, Turkey, has somehow preserved its importance in US geopolitical discourse. The US needed Turkey to achieve its aims both in the Middle East and in Central Asia. Therefore, over the following months the US State Department led by Colin Powell tried to repair the damage. President Bush called Turkish President Sezer after the Bingöl earthquake on May 1, 2003 and he also made assurances that the US would try to maintain Iraq's territorial integrity. According to İşyar this behavior on the part of President Bush can be interpreted as "an effort to create a moderate improvement in the relations of two countries."⁶²⁹

At the beginning of March, the US administration took the decision to attack Iraq claiming that all measures, including diplomacy, UN Security Council

626 Ömer Göksel İşyar, "An Analysis of Turkish-American Relations from 1945 to 2004: Initiatives and Reactions in Turkish Foreign Policy", p. 39.

627 Michael M. Gunter, "The U.S.-Turkish Alliance in Disarray", p. 121.

628 "Edelman: 'Stratejik Ortaklığı Yeniden İnşa Etmemiz Gerek'", (Edelman: 'We have to Reconstruct the Strategic Partnership'), *Anadolu Ajansı*, June 13, 2003.

629 Ömer Göksel İşyar, "An Analysis of Turkish-American Relations from 1945 to 2004: Initiatives and Reactions in Turkish Foreign Policy", p. 42.

resolutions or UN weapons inspections failed to prevent Saddam Hussein's violation of the terms of the 1991 Gulf War cease-fire.⁶³⁰ On March 18, the US Government declared that thirty countries, including Turkey, wanted to participate in the coalition for the disarmament of Iraq. State Department spokesman Mike Boucher listed the countries, saying that each was "contributing in ways it deem[ed] the most appropriate". He said 15 additional countries were "participating in defensive measures or other things, but just don't feel they want to be publicly listed at this point."⁶³¹ Military operations began on March 20. Operation Northern Watch, the multinational task force responsible for protecting the 'no-fly zone' in northern Iraq, was annulled with this military operation.

The war on Iraq actually had very important impacts on the strategic partnership between the two countries creating a serious crisis of confidence on both sides and calling the alliance into question.




Figure 5.1 Map of the Iraq War

Source: http://maps.thefullwiki.org/Iraq_War, (Accessed on February 25, 2011).

630 "Meet the Press-Vice President Dick Cheney on NBC News", *NBC*, March 16, 2003.

631 Claire Taylor and Tim Youngs, "The Conflict in Iraq. International Affairs and Defence Section", *Research Paper 03/50, House of Commons Library*, 23 May 2003, Available at <http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2003/rp03-050.pdf>, (Accessed on September 14, 2010).

Turkish–American relations reached a new low on July 4, 2003, when American soldiers arrested a Turkish Army Special Forces Team in Sulaymaniya, Iraq. It was claimed that the soldiers were planning to assassinate the interim Kurdish mayor of Kirkuk. The soldiers were hooded, sacks placed over their heads. This treatment by the American soldiers caused injury to both the Turkish military and public.⁶³² The Turkish foreign minister Abdullah Gül called the American accusations were “unconvincing”.⁶³³

The Sulaymaniya Affair created another unexpected crisis in US-Turkish relations in this period. Hilmi Özkök, Chief of the General Staff called this “the most important crisis of confidence ever”⁶³⁴ and President Ahmet Necdet Sezer called the detentions “inexcusable”.⁶³⁵ The US administration refused Turkish demands for an official apology. The detained soldiers were released and brought to Baghdad on July 6, 2003. The atmosphere created by this situation was reminiscent of that between the two militaries was seriously damaged. In fact, this situation has similarities with the atmosphere created by the “Johnson’s letter” to Ankara in 1964, which had created a deep sense of mistrust in Turkish public opinion.

The March 1 Crisis and the Sulaymaniya affair revealed that Ankara and Washington had divergent interests in northern Iraq, and in this new era, unlike in Afghanistan, there was no longer a common threat perception regarding communism or the expansion of the Soviet Union. Before the Iraq War, the US was arguably unable to read the politics in Ankara properly and as a result took Turkey’s support for granted, as in the Cold War years. The US administration also miscalculated the power of the democratic mechanisms in Turkey and the role of the military in Turkish politics. Thus, at the end, strategic partnership has been greatly damaged. The damage to US-Turkish relations was also highlighted by

632 Murat Yetkin, *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2004), pp. 153-154, 173.

633 “Gül: ABD delilleri ikna edici değil”, (Gül: US Proofs are not Convincing), *Hürriyet*, July 10, 2003.

634 “Özkök: En Büyük Güven Bunalımı”, (Özkök: The Most Important Crisis of Confidence Ever), *Hürriyet*, July 7, 2003.

635 “Turkish, US Generals Meet, Eyes on Probe into Crisis”, *Turkish Daily News*, July 10, 2003.

Wolfowitz in 2004: "Our strategic partnership has changed. It is no longer as it was before. In the past, this relationship was based on a military basis. Only military relations used to be discussed. This era is now closed. Military relations, of course, do exist but the new strategic partnership is not based on a military field but rather on democracy and politics".⁶³⁶ It can be argued that the Iraq War revealed the limits of the Turkey's strategic relations with the United States in the post-September 11 period.

In the immediate aftermath of the March 1 Parliamentary decision, the term "strategic partnership" dropped out of Washington's discourse with respect to Turkey. But tensions in bilateral relations did not increase, because the strategic importance of Turkey was recognized by the American administration in the framework of the New Global Defense Strategy of 2003. Turkey became defined by the Bush administration as a "model country" in the Greater Middle East Project of 2004. Moreover, in another effort to repair the relations, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül signed a "Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advance the Turkish-American Strategic Partnership" document on July 5, 2006. The document stressed cooperation in the face of regional and global challenges, and established regular bilateral meetings to improve cooperation noting that Turkey and the United States "share the same set of values and ideals in our regional and global objectives: the promotion of peace, democracy, freedom, and prosperity."⁶³⁷

Accordingly, Turkey and the United States promised to work together on all issues of common concern; these were clearly defined in the document as Iraq, the Middle East, the Israeli-Arab conflict, Iran's nuclear program, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan. Moreover, peace and stability in the Middle East, energy security, the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs, and the comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue under the auspices

636 "Deputy Secretary of Defence Wolfowitz: Interview with CNN Turk," *CNN Türk*, January 29, 2004, *US Department of Defense*, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), News Transcript, Available at <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1461>, (Accessed on August 12, 2010).

637 "Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advance the Turkish-American Strategic Partnership", 5 July 2006, Available at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/SharedVision.pdf>, (Accessed on September 2, 2010).

of the UN were counted among the other significant concerns of both sides.⁶³⁸ The document also outlined the political, economic, military, energy and regional outlook of both countries and defined the principles of antiterrorism efforts. It was argued that with this document, nature of the relations was transformed gaining more of a civilian quality.⁶³⁹

5.3.1.2 Military Dimension

After the World War II, Turkey emerged as a vital “geopolitical” actor in a troubled region for the United States and therefore became an important NATO member to “contain” the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Thus, a defensive strategic partnership between the United States and Turkey established in these years. Turkey, according to Giachetti, “became a situational ally of the U.S., a country focused on the establishment of a Cold War containment policy aimed at the perfect geographically and geopolitically positioned partner.”⁶⁴⁰

US foreign and security policy priorities began to change as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union summed up by President George H.W. Bush’s statement “our enemy is uncertainty and instability.”⁶⁴¹ The foreign policy practice under the Bush administration was the use of military and political power in order to promote democracy and market economy in areas where terrorist networks had emerged as a threat to the US.⁶⁴²

In his speech on January 29, 2002, President W. Bush announced the

638 *ibid.*

639 Mehmet Ali Birand, “We’re No Longer Strategic Partners”, *Turkish Daily News*, July 7, 2006.

640 David M. Giachetti, “United States Military Relations with Turkey”, *A Research Report Submitted to the Air War Collage*, 15 February 2008, p. 5, Available at https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/q_mod_be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-670c0822a153/q_act_downloadpaper/q_obj_9692bb4e-a132-48c0-b7b3-03ea195ec95c/display.aspx?rs=enginespage, (Accessed on September 12, 2010).

641 Aylin Güney, “An Anatomy of the Transformation of the US-Turkish Alliance”, p. 344.

642 Jonathan Monten, “The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy”, p. 148.

administration had two objectives. First, the government would shut down the terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorists to justice. Second, terrorists and regimes who sought chemical, biological or nuclear weapons would be stopped from threatening the US and the world.⁶⁴³ According to Bush if other governments did not want to act against terror, the US would act alone. He labelled Iraq, Iran and North Korea as the "axis of evil" and underlined his intention to establish democracy in Iraq.⁶⁴⁴ In this context, military bases in the region became an integral part of the American military operations that target to control of what is defined as troubled areas.⁶⁴⁵

While Congress decided to reduce its grant and military aid programs in the early 1990s, the Gulf War strengthened ties between the US and the Turkish government and the military. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, may be considered the peak of military cooperation between the two countries in this new era. Washington appreciated Turkey's strong cooperation and participation in the "War on Terror". In fact, the Turkish government immediately accepted the US request for access to air space and bases in Turkey within the context of the Operation Enduring Freedom. With the support of the UN and NATO, Turkey also played a significant role in Afghanistan.

However, the Iraq war of 2003 created a great tension in the region and became an important turning point for Turkish-American military relations. The failure of the Turkish parliament to allow the US military to use Turkey created a negative atmosphere between the two states. Even more injurious, however, was the US's direct criticism of the Turkish military. When US Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz talked about the Turkish military's role in Iraq, he claimed that "for whatever reason, they did not play the strong leadership role on that issue that we

643 George W. Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union", 29 January 2002, John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, Santa Barbara, CA, Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29644>, (Accessed on September 1, 2010).

644 "President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East", *The White House*, November 6, 2003, Available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106_2.html, (Accessed on August 2, 2010).

645 Simon Dalby, *Environmental Security*, pp. 79-83.

would have expected.”⁶⁴⁶ Wolfowitz added: “all I’m saying is that when you had a issue of Turkey’s national interest and national strategy I think it’s perfectly appropriate, especially in your system, for the military to say it was in Turkey’s interest to support the United States in that effort.”⁶⁴⁷ This fundamental mistrust damaged Turkish-American military relations.

Military assistance has always been an important dimension of US-Turkish relations. Historically, Turkey has been one of the largest beneficiaries of the US Security Assistance program, receiving over \$177.7M in Foreign Military Financing and \$28.24M in International Military Education and Training between FY 2001 and 2008. The articulated aims of the program were “to further the goal of regional stability through defense cooperation between the United States and foreign countries and to increase the ability of foreign national military to absorb and maintain basic democratic values and protect internationally recognized human rights”.⁶⁴⁸ Despite this purported ambition, Foreign Military Financed Program funding decreased in 2003, following the Turkish Parliament’s decision not to permit the US military to access Iraq from Turkish territory.

646 “Interview of U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz by CNN Turk”, *CNN Türk*, 6 May 2003.

647 *ibid.*

648 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “International Military Education Training”, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Internet Publications and Policy Site, Available at http://www.dsca.osd.mil/home/international_military_education_training.htm, (Accessed on November 13, 2010).

Table 5.1: US Military Assistance to Turkey (2001-2008)

Source: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Custom Country Report, Turkey, Available at <http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/query/do>, (Accessed on January 19, 2011).

Fiscal Year	International Military Education and Training (in millions, constant 2009 \$US)	Foreign Military Financing Program (in millions, constant 2009 \$US)
FY 2001	2.05	.
FY 2002	3.29	57.37
FY 2003	3.28	20.31
FY 2004	5.70	39.95
FY 2005	4.11	37.28
FY 2006	3.24	15.87
FY 2007	3.65	14.78
FY 2008	2.92	6.92

Perhaps the most important consequence of the March 1 crisis was the US decision to reduce its military presence in Turkey, considering instead a long-term military presence in Iraq. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said on May 7, 2003 that the US was not supported by the Turkish military during the Iraq War, and that it seemed Turkey's İncirlik airbase would lose its importance.⁶⁴⁹ Moreover, Rumsfeld claimed possible changes in US basing policy in the Middle East, including the withdrawal of troops from Saudi Arabia and the withdrawal of attack and support aircrafts from Turkey.⁶⁵⁰ This meant that Turkey might lose its strategic value in the region, since the US existence in Iraq would eliminate the need for Turkish cooperation in the future. However, after March 1, the US military continued to use İncirlik Air Base as a crucial transportation hub in Iraq operations. Nearly 60% of all air cargo destined for US forces in Iraq passed through İncirlik.⁶⁵¹

649 "Interview of U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz by CNN Turk", *CNN Türk*, May 6, 2003.

650 Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, "Global Posture: Testimony as Prepared for Delivery by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Senate Armed Service Committee, Washington, DC, Thursday, September 23, 2004." U.S. Department of Defense, Available at <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=156>, (Accessed on March 11, 2011).

651 US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Memorandum Concerning US-Turkish Relations*, March 2007.

The Turkish government also continued to grant fly-over permission to Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom.

The Turkish troops issue had been brought onto the agenda after the start of the war. Turkey's willingness to contribute militarily was articulated by Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Uğur Ziyal in June during his visit to Washington. In meetings with the Turkish Chief of Staff, General Hilmi Özkök, Commander of US Forces in Europe General James Jones and Commander of US Central Command General John Abizaid expressed that Washington would welcome a Turkish military contribution in Iraq. The Turkish military encouraged Prime Minister Erdoğan to announce on July 20 that the US had "requested Turkey to send soldiers to Iraq." According to Erdoğan, this "demonstrated that the administration in Turkey is in good shape and is successfully conducting its strategic partnership with the United States."⁶⁵²

In contrast to the pre-March 1 discussions, the positions of the Turkish civilian and military elites were in harmony on this issue. On August 10, for example, Deputy Chief of Staff, General Yaşar Büyükanit, said: "We cannot turn a blind eye if there is a fire next door" adding that, "[i]f we do not get involved, we will not be able to have a say in the rebuilding of Iraq after a war."⁶⁵³ Needless to say, Turkish military's leaders were also aware of the criticisms directed at it by senior US officials like Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz after the March 1 vote, and wanted to rebuild their traditionally cooperative relationship with the Pentagon.

To repair US-Turkish relations, on October 7, 2003, the Turkish parliament in an attempt to the deployment of troops in Iraq as part of the post-war stabilization forces. After the vote, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared that Turkey had "come to the decision that it can't totally fulfill its duty as a neighbor in this big transformation process of Iraq with only political, humanitarian

652 "Turkey, The United States and Iraq: Continuing Differences", *Turkey Update*, November 19, 2003.

653 Bill Park, "Strategic Location, Political Dislocation: Turkey, the United States and Northern Iraq", p. 22.

and economic support, without military contributions.”⁶⁵⁴

However, the Iraqi Governing Council opposed Turkish participation in the post-war stabilization effort. Kurdish groups were hostile to the idea of a Turkish military presence in the region. The “sensitivities” of the Iraqi Kurds were relayed to Turkey by US Secretary of State Colin Powell on November 7.⁶⁵⁵ The Turkish government responded with a declaration that it would not be sending troops where they were not welcomed, and went on to publicly criticize the United States.

A fundamental shift in US foreign and security policies regarding with the PKK issue has created a positive atmosphere between the two states. Turkey has perceived the battle against the PKK as the most important aspect of US-Turkish cooperation in Iraq.⁶⁵⁶ A stabilized northern Iraq was declared to be in the national interest of Turkey and the US from the standpoint of border security and prevention of PKK attacks. The intelligence sharing agreement between the US administration and the Turkish military in their struggle against the PKK was taken as the first step in military cooperation. The US government officially defined the PKK as a terrorist organization and expressed its commitment to help Turkey fight the PKK.

To sum up, the Turkish-American alliance has lost the mutual defense understanding that sustained it during the Cold War, thus the issue of strategic importance between the two countries was questioned. The latest initiatives of the US administration showed that despite recent crises stemming from the different threat perceptions of these two countries, Turkey was strategically important and relevant to the US in terms of its national interests. According to Giachetti “Turkey’s geographical and geopolitical position in a historically volatile region and the U.S.’s economic and military might in a region of vital national interests, will necessitate

654 “Turkey, The United States and Iraq: Continuing Differences”, *Turkey Update*, November 19, 2003.

655 Owen Bowcott and Luke Harding, “Turkey Demands More Time on Troop Deal”, *The Guardian*, February 2, 2003.

656 Soner Çağatay, “Turkey’s Future Direction and US-Turkey Relations”, *Testimony before the House International Relations Committee*, October 2003.

US-Turkish “strategic partnership” for many years to come.”⁶⁵⁷

5.3.4 Turkey as an “Energy Bridge”

The 1990s was witness to a great geopolitical game around the Caspian Sea over the issue of pipeline routes. During the decade, the US developed a multiple pipeline policy regarding the oil and gas reserves of the region. The intent of this policy was to enable the region’s newly independent countries to bypass Russia and bring their products to Western markets.⁶⁵⁸ After September 11, a new period in the Caspian region began. In this new geopolitical environment, the United States strengthened its political and economic ties with Central Asian states. According to Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs A. Elizabeth Jones, security, energy, and internal reform were the main security interests of the United States in Central Asia. She added that since September 11, US strategic interests in the region had been focused on antiterrorism and that the Central Asian states had continued to support US operations in Afghanistan.⁶⁵⁹

Apart from the security of energy routes, the United States’ interest in the region was also based on some other geopolitical calculations. After September 11, the presence of US soldiers in countries such as Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan had decidedly altered the geopolitical map of the region. The US gained its tactical advantage in the global war on terror, especially in Afghanistan, on the backs of the Central Asian countries.⁶⁶⁰ By seizing control of Afghanistan, Washington would also be taking over one of the world’s biggest producers and exporters of opium. Considering all these facts, it can be argued that the United States exercised the “pipeline diplomacy” in order to guarantee its long-term

657 David M. Giachetti, “United States Military Relations with Turkey”, p. 7.

658 Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary European and Eurasian Affairs, “U.S.-Turkey-Azerbaijan: A Strategic Partnership”, Remarks to the Center for Eurasian Policy conference on “Azerbaijan-Turkey-U.S. Relations and Its Importance for Eurasia,” Mayflower Hotel, Washington, DC, December 10, 2007.

659 Elizabeth Wishnick, “Strategic Consequences of the Iraq War: U.S. Security Interests in Central Asia Reassessed”, *Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College*, May 2004.

660 Bruno Ferrari, “Geopolitics - A Critical Assessment of the ‘Great Game’ in and Around the Caspian Sea”, p. 10.

presence in the region by establishing alliances and commercial links with the surrounding countries.

It has been argued that having control over energy-transport routes may be as important as having control over energy resources themselves.⁶⁶¹ Turkey is neither a country with an excess of domestic energy resources nor a country that produces energy. However, since the 1990s, US geopolitical priorities have helped Turkey become an important “energy bridge” or “energy hub” for the West.

During the late 1990s, cooperation on energy security became a cornerstone of the US-Turkey partnership mainly because the US aimed to diversify energy transit routes both to stabilize world oil markets and to realize its strategic interests in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline proposed by Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan was seen as an important energy corridor. The United States strongly supported the project, working with these governments and with relevant companies to help bring it to fruition.

In the 2000s, the Bush administration used energy politics to restore the US-Turkey relationship, promoting Turkey as an “energy bridge” for oil and natural gas. The East-West Energy Corridor, initiated by Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the United States, was a crucial part of these initiatives.⁶⁶²

The East-West Energy Corridor was primarily intended to transport Caucasian and Central Asian crude oil and natural gas to international markets. This alternative route would bypass Russia and prevent a Russian monopoly on Caspian resources.⁶⁶³ The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline, the Shah-Deniz natural gas pipeline (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum), and other Trans-Caspian Natural Gas Pipeline

661 Zeyno Baran, “The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Implications for Turkey,” in S. Frederick Starr and Svante E.Cornell, (eds.), *The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Oil Window to the West*, (Washington: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, 2005) p. 103.

662 Gareth M. Winrow, “Turkey and the East-West Gas Transportation Corridor”, *Turkish Studies*, vol. 5, no. 2, Summer 2004, p. 39.

663 Daniel Fried, “U.S.-Turkey-Azerbaijan: A Strategic Partnership”.

projects (the Turkey-Greece-Italy Inter-connector Project and the Nabucco Project) were the most important branch of this energy strategy.⁶⁶⁴ The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline began to transport crude oil from Azerbaijan to Turkey's Mediterranean Sea port of Ceyhan in July 2006. The South Caucasus Gas Pipeline, transporting Azeri gas to a Turkish terminus at Erzurum, was realized in December 2006. The Southern European Gas Ring Project connecting the South Caucasus Gas Pipeline to an interconnecting Turkey-Greece-Italy pipeline was the first pipeline to transport Caspian gas to Europe bypassing Russian territory.⁶⁶⁵ Turkey thus became one of the most important actors in the United States's efforts to control Central Asian oil and gas resources.

The feasibility of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline increased further when Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan signed a Transit Agreement in June 2006 to connect Kazakh oil to Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan. Both countries' parliaments ratified the agreement, and as of October 2008, Kazakh oil began to flow into BTC. As a consequence, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan further increased Turkey's geopolitical significance turning it into a crucial energy corridor.⁶⁶⁶

664 Tuncay Babali, "Turkey at the Energy Crossroads: Turkey, Present and Past", *Middle East Quarterly*, vol. 16, no.2, Spring 2009, p. 27.

665 "Europe: A New Pipeline, a Different Direction", *Stratfor*, November 19, 2007, Available at http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/europe_new_pipeline_different_direction, (Accessed on September 7, 2010).

666 Tuncay Babali, "Turkey at the Energy Crossroads: Turkey, Present and Past", p. 29.



Figure 5.2 Map of the Energy Routes

Source: <http://www.trdefence.com/2010/05/15/russia-turkey-a-grand-energy-bargain>, (Accessed on January 29, 2011).

In addition to the East-West Energy Corridor, Turkey has also wanted to become a party of a possible North-South Energy Corridor. In such a project pipelines would transport Russian gas and oil to Israel and then eastward to countries like India. In July 2008, Turkey and Israel signed the Medstream agreement to initiate a feasibility study for a multi-purpose energy transport route.⁶⁶⁷

Turkey's role as an "energy corridor" was not of interest only to the United States. The EU member states also showed interest in the transport of energy from the region. When the Russian government temporarily cut the flow of gas to Ukraine in January 2006, EU leaders have made clear that diverting supplies from Russia was a priority.⁶⁶⁸ The EU thus took great interest in Turkey's success in

⁶⁶⁷ "Turkey, Israel in Joint Energy Project to Link Asia to Caspian", *Turkish Daily News*, July 18, 2008.

⁶⁶⁸ Zeyno Baran, "Lithuanian Energy Security: Challenges and Choices", *Hudson Institute Center for Eurasian Policy*, December 2006, p. 15; "The January 2009 Gas Supply Disruption to the EU: An Assessment", *Commission Staff Working Document, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council*, 2009, Available at http://ec.europa.eu/danmark/documents/alle_emner/energi/2009_ser2_autre_document_travail_service_part1_ver2.pdf, (Accessed on March 15, 2011).

transporting oil and natural gas from its eastern borders to Europe.

As can be seen, domination of world energy resources in the 2000s was one of the most important concerns of the Bush administration, as was also the case during the 1990s. Turkey was and still is considered by the US to be the best alternative route to prevent Iranian and Russian influence in the region, and this has become an area on which the United States, Turkey, and the EU have worked together.

5.3.5 Turkey as a "Bridge" between the East and the West

Since Turkey signed its association agreement with the European Economic Community in 1963, US administrations have supported Turkey's inclusion in Europe. Turkey's accession into the European Union is considered to be in the long-term interest of the United States. The United States is believed to support Turkey's full membership to the Union because accession would strengthen Turkey's ties with the West rather than allowing it to develop or strengthen ties with the Islamic world. Especially after September 11, the US administration has stressed that the inclusion of Turkey as a pro-Western Muslim country in the EU would make it a "bridge" between the West and the Islamic world. Representation of Turkey as a bridge between the East and the West can be found in several speeches by US officials. For example, on June 29, 2004, President Bush clearly used the bridge metaphor while articulating Washington's position on Turkey's European Union membership efforts:

"Mustafa Kemal Ataturk had a vision of Turkey as a strong nation among other European nations. That dream can be realized by this generation of Turks. America believes that as a European power, Turkey belongs in the European Union. Your membership would also be a crucial advance in relations between the Muslim world and the West, because you are part of both. Including Turkey in the EU would prove that Europe is not the exclusive club of a single religion, and it would expose the "clash of civilizations" as a passing myth of history."⁶⁶⁹

669 "President Bush Discusses Democracy, Freedom from Turkey", *White House*, June 29, 2004, Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040629-4.html>, (Accessed on September 19, 2010).

However, while some of the US's European allies like Britain supported the idea of the US, other member states have been concerned about the strategic, political, and cultural effects of Turkey's membership. The former group believed that rejecting Turkey would create an image of the EU as a Christian club, and this would damage the EU's relations with the Islamic world. For them, Turkey could function as a bridge between the West and Islam. To prevent Turkish accession would also make it more difficult for the EU to have access energy resources in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Central Asia. On the other hand, the latter group argued that Turkish accession would cause Europe to get bogged down in the problems of the Middle East. From this perspective, Turkey was perceived as a "wall" - a "barrier" that has protected Europe from a problematic region.⁶⁷⁰ The protective "wall" metaphor is fundamentally different from the connective "bridge" metaphor espoused by the United States.⁶⁷¹

Despite Turkey's difficult relations with the EU during the 1990s, Washington's support for Ankara had a major impact in two instances: on the 1996 Customs Unions, and at 1999 Helsinki summit. The Clinton administration tried hard to remind European leaders of Turkey's strategic importance.⁶⁷² The Helsinki summit restored Turkey's status as a candidate for full membership, and was accepted as a crucial turning point in Turkey-EU relations.

With the decision of the EU Commission to adopt an "Accession Partnership for Turkey" and with Turkey's decision to adopt its own "National Program for the Adoption of the EU *Acquis*", this process was officially underway as of March 2001. According to these two documents, the Turkish-EU Association Council began its regular meetings to draw a framework for Turkey to harmonize its legislation and

670 Ian Lesser, *Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold War*, p. 23.

671 *ibid.*, p. 23.

672 Ziya Öniş and Şühnaz Yılmaz, "Turkey-EU-US Triangle in Perspective: Transformation or Continuity", *Middle East Journal*, vol. 59, no.2, Spring 2005, p. 268.

practices with EU law.⁶⁷³

Before the Copenhagen Summit of 2002 the US once again began to lobby for the advancement of Turkey's prospects for entry into the EU. On December 2, US Deputy Secretary of State Paul Wolfowitz asserted that "[t]he decision on EU members is, of course. But history suggests that a European Union that welcomes Turkey will be even stronger, and safer and more richly diverse than today. The alternative, exclusionary choice is surely unthinkable."⁶⁷⁴ Similarly, on December 11, President Bush stated that the US "stands side by side with Ankara in its bid to join the European Union."⁶⁷⁵ Meanwhile, like Clinton, Bush also made several phone calls to European leaders. Moreover, the US Secretary of State Colin Powell warned the Union to set a date for the start of accession talks for Turkish membership. Washington's support of Turkey can be explained with its desire to open a "Northern Front" by deploying a large military force through Turkey during the Iraq War.

At the 2002 European Council meeting in Copenhagen, with the support of the US, Turkey worked hard to get an official promise to open accession talks. Between 2002 and 2004, Turkey passed seventeen legal reform packages to meet EU expectations. Moreover, the Turkish parliament's unexpected March 1 decision was welcomed by France and Germany, which had opposed to Turkey's inclusion to the EU. Thus, this decision by the parliament threw open the gates of the Union to Turkey while harming its relations with the United States. Accession talks with the EU formally commenced in October 2005.⁶⁷⁶

After the screening process, four chapters of the *acquis* were opened for negotiation between Turkey and the EU. However, the "Transport Policy" chapter

673 Ali Aybey, "Turkey and the European Union Relations: A Historical Assessment", *Ankara Avrupa Çalışmaları Dergisi*, vol. 4, no. 1, Fall 2004, p. 36.

674 "U.S. Press Turkey's Case on Europe and Cyprus Issues", *The New York Times*, December 2, 2002.

675 "Bush Throws Weight Behind Turkey Ahead of Key EU Decision", *Radio Free Europe*, December 12, 2002, Available at <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/12/11122002184838.asp>, (Accessed on March 1, 2011).

676 Burak Akçapar, *Turkey's New European Era: Foreign Policy on the Road to EU Membership*, p. 47.

was frozen in 2006 because of Turkey's refusal to open its air and sea ports to Cypriot ships and aircrafts.⁶⁷⁷

Both Washington and Ankara wanted to solve Cyprus problem, particularly because it has become clear that, left unresolved it would be the main obstacle to Turkey's EU membership. Moreover, while there were differences in perspective between the administrations over Cyprus, the US administration took Turkey's concerns more seriously than ever before. As US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, Marc Grossman pointed out "[t]he US reiterated the support of the US government to the UN Secretary General's efforts to solve the Cyprus problem" while also underscoring US support for the accession of Cyprus to the EU.⁶⁷⁸ As a result, Cyprus was taken as an opportunity for the United States and Turkey to work together.

In November 2002, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan put forward a US-supported reunification plan to both the Turkish and Greek sides. He proposed the establishment of a federation of two states on Cyprus, which included a territorial adjustment and a population relocation.⁶⁷⁹ After two years of negotiations between Turkish and Greek Cypriots with the support of the UN, Turkey, Greece, the European Union, and the United States, the Annan Plan was put to a referendum.

During negotiations, the Turkish side had been viewed as the main obstacle to a solution, at the April 2004 referendum, a large majority of Turkish Cypriots voted for reunification. In contrast, 76 percent of Greek Cypriots voted against it.⁶⁸⁰ Just after the vote, Secretary of State Colin Powell met with Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat at UN headquarters.

677 Ali Aybey, "Turkey and the European Union Relations: A Historical Assessment", p. 37.

678 "Pseka Conference Begins in Washington", Available at <http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/cypio/2002/02-06-20.cypio.html>, (Accessed on 12 January 2011).

679 *Annan Plan, The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem*, March 31, 2004, Available at <http://www.unficy.org/media/Other%20official%20documents/annanplan.pdf> (Accessed on April 29, 2010).

680 Michael Klosson, "U.S. Policy toward Cyprus After the Referenda", 27 May 2004, Available at www.americanembassy.org/cy/USpolicy/speechlist-klosson2002-2005.htm, (Accessed on August 22, 2010).

Following this, the United States initiated efforts to relieve the isolation of Northern Cyprus. At the beginning of 2004, the United States developed the "Cyprus Partnership for Economic Growth" to help Turkish Cypriot businesses in various sectors. In May 2005, the US Congressional Turkey Study Group used the Ercan Airport in Turkish Cyprus as the site of a series of meetings in Cyprus.⁶⁸¹ In the fall of 2005, Turkish Cypriot officials met with this group while Secretary of State Rice met with President Talat in Washington, DC.⁶⁸²

However, while Turkish officials appreciated US efforts to help end the isolation of Turkish Cyprus, they also asserted that the United States had not done enough. Ankara also contended that the internationally recognized government of Southern Cyprus, which became an EU member in May 2004, continued to prevent such efforts.

In January 2006, the Turkish government prepared an action plan for lifting restrictions on Cyprus. The plan included provisions permitting Greek Cypriot ships to enter Turkish ports, the opening of Northern Cyprus' seaports and airports to international traffic, and permission for Greek Cypriot air carriers to use Turkish airspace. The Cyprus administration rejected Turkey's action plan, asserting that it skirted "the substance of the Cyprus problem".⁶⁸³

For its part, the EU commission welcomed the Turkish proposal. EU Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn claimed that "[t]he commission welcomes efforts to achieve progress in the current deadlock with regard to the Cyprus problem. The current status quo is in no one's interest. Turkey's initiative, announced by Foreign Minister [Abdullah] Gul, deserves careful examination. ... I understand it is intended as a basis for further discussion with the concerned

681 This visit is remarkable since there is no direct international flight to Ercan Airport in Northern Cyprus.

682 Carol Migdalovitz, "Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations and Related Issues", *CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service*, July 20, 2007, p. 22.

683 Burak Akçapar, *Turkey's New European Era: Foreign Policy on the Road to EU Membership*, p. 52.

parties, under the auspices of the UN. The commission is ready to contribute to such a discussion".⁶⁸⁴

Similarly, Washington openly supported the action plan. For instance, the State Department defined the plan as "a positive expression of willingness to find a way forward."⁶⁸⁵ In answer to the Cypriot government's position, the Bush administration claimed that the United States "was disappointed at the tone and rapidity of the Cypriot government's rejection of the proposal."⁶⁸⁶ Moreover, Annan claimed that he was willing to restart negotiations after the May 2006 parliamentary elections in Northern Cyprus.⁶⁸⁷

In December 2006, in response to Turkey's refusal to open its ports to Cypriot trade, per the Customs Union Agreement of 1996, the EU Council voted to suspend eight out of 35 chapters in the accession negotiations. Relations with the EU became more complicated as a result.⁶⁸⁸

As we can see, the Cyprus problem, while no longer perceived as a security threat by Turkey, has become both an obstacle to its accession to the EU, and another area of cooperation between Turkey and the US. It can thus be argued that the United States and Turkey have worked to solve issues of mutual interest with renewed vigor during the Bush administration.⁶⁸⁹

684 "Statement by EU Commissioner Rehn on Turkey's Cyprus Initiative", January 24, 2006, Available at http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/fr/article_5606_fr.htm, (Accessed on February 20, 2011).

685 Stephen J. Flanagan and Samuel J. Brannen, *Turkey's Shifting Dynamic: Implications for U.S.-Turkey Relations*, (CSIS Press: Washington D.C, 2008), p. 27.

686 Steven A. Cook and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, "Generating Momentum for a New Era in U.S.-Turkey Relations", *Council on Foreign Relations*, p. 17.

687 *ibid.*, p. 17.

688 William Chislett, "Turkey's EU Accession Reaches an Impasse", *Elcano Royal Institute Working Paper 34/2009*, July 3, 2009.

689 Soner Çağatay, "The State of US-Turkish Relations", Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, *House of Representatives*, 109th Congress, 1st Session, 2005, p. 19.

5.3.6 Turkey as a "Model" Country

The September 11 attacks created a trauma that has led transformation of the geopolitical discourse of the US. The Middle East region was redefined in the American imagination as a "source of Islamist extremism" brought about by repressive governments. For the US administration the region contained various "rogue" or "failed" states that created a danger to US interests and international peace.⁶⁹⁰

Inspired by this geopolitical understanding, particularly after the military operation in Iraq, US officials began to discuss a project to change the economic and political conditions of the "Broader Middle East and North Africa" intended to help spread democracy and expand free market economies. According to Hazbun the transformation of the concept of the "Middle East" into the "Greater Middle East", and the "Broader Middle East and North Africa" revealed that the geopolitical discourse defining the allies and enemies of the US had clearly changed.⁶⁹¹ As a result, in order to prevent terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which were the major threats to the "New World Order" and in order to control energy sources and distribution, the US developed and launched the project known as the "Greater Middle East Project" which was later changed to the "Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative". Erhan argued that the main goal of the project was to create better conditions for the Middle Eastern peoples, and therefore to solve US security problems stemming from the region.⁶⁹²

690 Aylin Güney and Fulya Gökcan, "'The 'Greater Middle East' as a 'Modern' Geopolitical Imagination in American Foreign Policy'", p. 31.

691 Waleed Hazbun, "The Middle East through the Lens of Critical Geopolitics: Globalization, Terrorism, and the Iraq War", in Michael E. Bonine, Michael Gasper, and Abbas Amanat (eds.), *Where is the Middle East?*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), Available at http://hazbun.mwoodward.com/HAZBUN_Lens%20of%20Critical%20Geopolitics.pdf, (Accessed on December 12, 2010).

692 Çağrı Erhan, "Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative and Beyond", *Perceptions*, Autumn 2005, p. 160.

Indeed, the BMENA project was first published in an Arabic newspaper *Al-Hayat* on 13 February 2004.⁶⁹³ The newspaper published the "G-8 Greater Middle East Partnership Working Paper", which was the earlier version of the BMENA project.⁶⁹⁴ *Al-Hayat's* report about the Plan prompted a big debate in the Middle East region. While some supported the initiative, most claimed that "democracy can not be imposed from outside. The region should enter a period of transition to democracy depending on its own domestic parameters".⁶⁹⁵

In April 2004, the US presented its ideas in the form of a set of proposals for a Greater Middle East Initiative to the G-8 states, and on June 9, 2004, leaders of the G-8 issued a declaration titled "Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa" at its June Summit on Sea Island, Georgia, USA.⁶⁹⁶

In the declaration, the G-8 leaders clearly articulated that "this partnership will be based on genuine cooperation with the region's governments, as well as business and civil society representatives to strengthen freedom, democracy, and prosperity for all".⁶⁹⁷ The document also declared that "demographic changes, the liberation of Afghanistan and Iraq from oppressive regimes, and the emergence of democratic impulses across the region together present the G-8 a historic opportunity. ... G-8 leaders should forge a long-term partnership with the Greater Middle East's reform leaders and launch a coordinated response to promote

693 *ibid.*, p. 161.

694 "G-8 Greater Middle East Partnership Working Paper", *Al-Hayat*, Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, United States Committee for a Free Lebanon and the Middle East Forum, February 13, 2004, Available at <http://www.meib.org/documentfile/040213.htm>, p. 1, (Accessed on 17 August 2010); "G-8 Greater Middle East Partnership Working Paper", Available at <http://www.meib.org/documentfile/040213.htm>, (Accessed on August 17, 2010).

695 Çağrı Erhan, "Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative and Beyond", p. 162.

696 "Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa", *US Department of State Archive*, Available at <http://bmena.state.gov/rls/fs/55743.htm>, (Accessed on August 17, 2010).

697 *ibid.*

political, economic, and social reform in the region."⁶⁹⁸ According to the plan, a Forum for the Future, would be established and serve as a central platform for dialogue.⁶⁹⁹

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were seen as important opportunities to transform the Greater Middle East by the US administration. It can thus be argued that geopolitical discourse influenced by neo-conservative ideology was used as a tool to shape the geopolitical imagination of the US. From this point of view, the democratic model in Iraq would spread to other parts of the region. This time, the US started to justify its presence in the region with the mission of "democratization".⁷⁰⁰

Indeed, Said described Orientalism as "a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between 'the Orient' and (most of the time) 'the Occident.'"⁷⁰¹ The imagination of the "East" and construction of the fundamental differences between East and West is ongoing. Within this framework, the US administration imagined itself drawing the Middle East out from the past/undeveloped/backward into the present/future/freedom.⁷⁰² The Iraq War, thus, began to be seen as an instrument to reshape first a country and then the entire Greater Middle East and to protect the long-term geopolitical interests of the United States.

698 *ibid.*

699 "Forum for the Future to Study Economic, Political, Social Reforms", *U.S. Department of State*, 1 December 2004, Available at <http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2004/December/20041201180622ndyblehs5.512637e-02.html#ixzz1FA00ZFBY>, (Accessed on September 17, 2010).

700 Aylin Güney and Fulya Gökcan, "The 'Greater Middle East' as a 'Modern' Geopolitical Imagination in American Foreign Policy", p. 30.

701 Edward Said, *Orientalism*, p. 2.

702 Anthony Burke, "Freedom's Freedom: American Enlightenment and Permanent War", *Social Identities*, vol. 11, no. 4, 2005, p. 333.

In its geopolitical imagination of this region, the US administration also redefined Turkey's geopolitical representation. In Washington, the tension in relations with Turkey over the Kurdish issue was compensated for by cooperation with Turkey in the framework of the Bush administration's democratization project. Within this framework, Turkey emerged as an "example" of a pro-Western democratic country, and a useful "model" for transformation in the Middle East.⁷⁰³ Indeed, Ankara understood the BMENA project as a crucial aspect of US Middle East policy. The NATO summit held in İstanbul in June 2004 Turkey's acceptance of and willingness to participate in the project was confirmed.⁷⁰⁴

Turkey's decision to cooperate with the sponsors of the BMENA project with regard to its policies toward Iraq were a significant departure from its policies before the war. But perhaps the most important revelation in Turkish-American relations was that the relative decline in Turkey's geopolitical importance to the United States was compensated for by the appeal of its democratic political system. In that sense, perceiving Turkey as a "model" for Middle East democratization has become the new dimension of Turkey's importance to Washington.

Indeed, as pointed out in the previous chapter, while the idea of Turkey as a model had originally emerged after the end of the Cold War, it reemerged after September 11. On March 15, 2002 Wolfowitz argued that "Turkey is a model for those in the Muslim world who have aspirations for democratic progress and prosperity".⁷⁰⁵ Similarly, President George W. Bush, at the İstanbul NATO Summit in June 2004, said:

703 "Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa", *US Department of State Archive*, Available at <http://bmena.state.gov/rls/fs/55743.htm>, (Accessed on August 17, 2010).

704 Robert W. Olson, "Relations among Turkey, Iraq, Kurdistan-Iraq, the Wider Middle East, and Iran", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, vol. 17, no. 4, Fall 2006, p. 27.

705 "Remarks by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz", Turgut Özal Memorial Lecture, *Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, St. Regis Hotel, Washington, D.C., Wednesday, March 13, 2002, Available at <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=198>, (Accessed on August 4, 2010).

*"[Turkey] has always been important for its geography — here at the meeting place of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Now Turkey has assumed even greater historical importance, because of your character as a nation. Turkey is a strong, secular democracy, a majority Muslim society, and a close ally of free nations. Your country, with 150 years of democratic and social reform, stands as a model to others, and as Europe's bridge to the wider world. Your success is vital to a future of progress and peace in Europe and in the broader Middle East, and the Republic of Turkey can depend on the support and friendship of the United States."*⁷⁰⁶

Nonetheless, US officials were not successful in their attempts to bring this formula to fruition. The US promoted Turkey as a country in which Islam and democracy could successfully coexist and could play a central role in the US-led Greater Middle East Initiative. However, this perception became another source of tension between the two countries. The US administration began to emphasize the Muslim character of Turkey rather than its Western and secular character. From this perspective it was argued that although the initiative to democratize the Middle Eastern countries was useful and appropriate, Turkey would not be the "model" of the moderate Islamic country for this project.⁷⁰⁷ General İlker Başbuğ, Deputy Chief of General Staff, claimed that " 'moderate Islam' is not secular, for that reason Turkey has no claim on being a model".⁷⁰⁸ Secretary of State Colin Powell's reference to Turkey in April 2004 as an "Islamic Republic" once again revealed Turkey's concerns on this matter. Turkey responded to the American administration with serious criticism and a reminder that Turkey was a secular democracy. The issue was concluded crisis ended when Powell retracted his statement.⁷⁰⁹

During this period, US policy on the democratization of the Middle East clashed with Turkey's secularist identity for the first time. Thereafter, the word "model" was replaced by softer metaphors such as "source of inspiration," or

706 George W. Bush, "Remarks at Galatasaray University in Istanbul", June 29, 2004, John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, Santa Barbara, CA, Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64397>, (Accessed on September 22, 2010).

707 Meliha Altunışık, "The Turkish Model and Democratization in the Middle East", *Arab Studies Quarterly*, vol. 27, no. 1-2, Winter-Spring 2005, p. 57.

708 "Başbuğ: 'İlimli İslam' Laik Değil", (Başbuğ: 'Moderate Islam' is not Secular), *Radikal*, March 20, 2004.

709 "US Says It Sees Turkey as a Secular, Democratic Republic", *Turkish Daily News*, April 5, 2004.

"example country."⁷¹⁰ The Turkish-American relationship thus entered a new period characterized by an increased emphasis on the Greater Middle East project as proposed by the US administration.

5.4 Limits of the Alliance: Iraqi/Kurdish Issue

The Turkish-American relationship was founded on the issue security and the Iraq war put into question this essential understanding. Indeed, many American officials look back on the Gulf War as the heyday of US–Turkish cooperation. Yet, Turkey's unconditional cooperation with the United States during the Gulf crisis in 1990-91 had created serious problems for Turkey.

After the September 11 attacks, the most important source of tension between Turkey and the United States was the war in Iraq in March 2003. Cook believes that "it can be considered the most important foreign and domestic policy challenge on the Turkish agenda".⁷¹¹

At the beginning of the Iraq War in 2003, the US administration perceived Turkey as the "northern front" of the war effort. Like in Iraq and Afghanistan, US officials assumed that Turkey, as a "strategic partner" of the United States, would support the US immediately and unconditionally. Turkey, still troubled by the huge economic losses, the flood of refugees across the Turkish border and the "no-fly-zone" established in the northern Iraq was reluctant to lend its support to the US without more careful consideration.

Relations between the US and Turkey during the Iraqi crisis make it clear that, the common threat perception of the two states during the Cold War years had disappeared. The strategic partnership between the US and Turkey had been greatly damaged during the post-Cold War and post-September 11 periods due to the changing security environment and threat perceptions of both countries.

⁷¹⁰ Ömer Taşpınar, "The Anatomy of Anti-Americanism in Turkey", *Insight Turkey*, vol. 7, no. 2, April-June 2005.

⁷¹¹ Steven A. Cook and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, "Generating Momentum for a New Era in U.S.-Turkey Relations", p. 25.

In fact, Turkish leaders strongly objected to the US invasion of Iraq. While they did not like Saddam Hussein, he was also perceived to provide an important element of stability along Turkey's southern border. Turkish leaders feared his removal would lead the division of Iraq and the expansion of Kurdish nationalism the biggest threat to Turkish security. Turkey's fears were realized after the invasion. Iraq was thrown into ethnic violence and Kurdish autonomy was strengthened. Turkish administrations worried this might strengthen separatist movements among Turkey's own Kurdish population.⁷¹²

Three main security-related issue seperating Turkey and the United States with regard to Iraq . The first of these was the Kurdish problem. For Tukey, the Kurdish issue created a threat to regional stability and to Turkey's territorial integrity. The future of the Kurds was considered a critical national security issue. Turkish security forces fought a twenty-year war in the southeastern region of the country against the separatist PKK, at a cost of nearly 30,000 lives. The power vacuum created by the no-fly zones and safe havens in the aftermath of the Gulf War strengthened the PKK. The elimination of this threat thus became one of Turkey's priorities throughout the 2000s.

PKK violence decreased after the capture of Abdullah Öcalan in 1999. In June 2004, however, the PKK broke its five-year unilateral cease-fire resulting in a dramatic increase in violance. Turkish officials reiterated Ankara's support of the United States just after the September 11 attacks and demonstrated its loyalty to Washington with the Turkish military's missions in Afghanistan.⁷¹³ Turkey then pressured the United States, the major military power in Iraq, to include the PKK in its global war on terror and fight them in northern Iraq.⁷¹⁴ Ankara also demanded the United States put pressure on Iraqi Kurdish leaders to hand PKK leaders over to

712 Ian O. Lesser, *Beyond Suspicion: Rethinking US-Turkish Relations*, (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center, 2007) , p. 61.

713 Steven A. Cook and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, "Generating Momentum for a New Era in U.S.-Turkey Relations", p.11.

714 Ziya Öniş and Şühnaz Yılmaz, "Turkey-EU-US Triangle in Perspective: Transformation or Continuty", p. 56.

Turkey. But Washington was unwilling to take military action to eliminate the PKK threat in the region.

This US reluctance damaged bilateral relations and was one of the most important causes of the increase in anti-Americanism in Turkey. The continued presence of the PKK in northern Iraq, an American-controlled region, reinforced the belief that the PKK was being supported by the US.⁷¹⁵ According to Gordon and Taşpınar Turks considered that the United States disloyal to its promises to stop Kurdish supremacy in northern Iraq.⁷¹⁶

These types of strong criticisms were not limited to public opinion. Deputy Chief of General Staff Başbuğ also criticized the change in US policy toward Turkey during his visit to Washington. He asserted that "the fact that the US does not do anything to eliminate the presence of the PKK in northern Iraq shows that we are not on the same page. Such a situation is impossible to explain to anybody. ... Regarding the PKK problem, Turkey expects more from its American friends. ... We have been waiting for more than two years with patience. The Turkish public wants the U.S. to take action against the PKK."⁷¹⁷ Despite these criticisms the United States still took no military action against the PKK - and in August 2005 the PKK actually opened an office in Kirkuk.⁷¹⁸

Cooperation between the two countries on the PKK issue has increased in the following years.⁷¹⁹ In April 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Ankara with a message that the United States would work with Turkey "through

715 Ömer Taşpınar, "The Anatomy of Anti-Americanism in Turkey".

716 Philip Gordon and Ömer Taşpınar, "Turkey on the Brink", *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 29, no. 3, Summer 2006, p. 57.

717 Banu Eligür, "Turkish-American Relations Since the 2003 Iraqi War: A Troubled Partnership", *Middle East Brief, Crown Center for Middle Eastern Studies*, no. 6, May 2006, p. 4.

718 *ibid.*, p. 4.

719 Joseph Ralston, "Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe", March 15, 2007.

information sharing and other means to prevent any vacuum [in northern Iraq] from being used to inflict harm on Turkey". She also urged Turkey to improve its relations with Iraqi Kurds. This signified a major change in the United States policy regarding Turkey. As General Richard Myers, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff argued, "I think the difference now is that they [Turkey] are dealing with a sovereign Iraqi government, and a lot of these discussions will have to occur between Turkey and Iraq, not between Turkey and the U.S."⁷²⁰

While the US supported Turkey in talks with the Iraqi government toward a resolution to the PKK issue in northern Iraq, it also continued to define the PKK as a terrorist organization. US National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley emphasized that "the PKK is a terrorist organization. We condemn its activities. We understand its activities in northern Iraq affect Turkey and cost Turkish lives."⁷²¹ At the same line, US Chargé d'Affaires Nancy McEldowney maintained that "there can be no division between us, and no double standard in our words or our deeds. It makes no difference whether the bomb explodes in Istanbul or in New York. ... And it makes no difference whether the name is Osama bin Laden, or Abdullah Öcalan, or Al-Zarkawi".⁷²²

An agreement between the two countries regarding the presence of the PKK in northern Iraq was announced on October 2, which was largely made possible by the significant change in the Bush administration's policy on the fight against the PKK.⁷²³ Following the negotiations, State Department Counter Terrorism Coordinator Cofer Black claimed the two countries had agreed on an "action plan ... to eliminate the threat presented by PKK-KADEK to Turkey" by using "elements of

720 "US, Turkey Work to Save Ties after Iraq, PKK Rifts", *Turkish Daily News*, September 27, 2005.

721 *ibid.*

722 *ibid.*

723 Soner Çağatay and Ali Köknar, "The PKK's New Offensive: Implications for Turkey, Iraqi Kurds, and the US", *Policy Watch*, 25 June 2004.

statecraft, diplomacy, law enforcement agencies and cutting of financial links.”⁷²⁴ The agreement was immediately welcomed by the Turkish government. Gül commented on October 5, 2007, that Turkey would now “liquidate the terrorist organization together with the United States.”⁷²⁵ After a Bush-Erdoğan meeting on November 5, 2007, the United States provided intelligence support to Turkey and permitted the Turkish military to attack PKK bases in northern Iraq. The US took the step of appointing General Joseph Ralston as Special Envoy for Countering the PKK. However, for Turkey this has not resulted in concrete measures being undertaken against the PKK.⁷²⁶ Finally, in October 2007, Ralston resigned from the position over the US administration’s “lack of commitment”.⁷²⁷

Another security-related issue between Turkey and the United States was that of northern Iraq as an independent Kurdish state in the region. According to William Hale, Western policies towards Kurds had been problematic for Turkey since the end of the Gulf War, when Western powers were suspected of seeking to create an independent Kurdish state in Iraq.⁷²⁸ The creation of the “safe havens” and the “no-fly zone”, which in October 1991 led to the establishment of the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government were disturbing developments for Turkey. For Turkey, any move against its territorial integrity was taken as the most serious of threats. Kurds in Iraq were by extension Turkey’s most important security problem. US intervention in the region increased the possibility that a Kurdish state would be established.⁷²⁹ Increasing Kurdish nationalism in the region

724 Steven A. Cook and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, “Generating Momentum for a New Era in U.S.-Turkey Relations”, p. 27.

725 Banu Eligür, “Turkish-American Relations Since the 2003 Iraqi War: A Troubled Partnership”, p. 5.

726 Steven A. Cook and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, “Generating Momentum for a New Era in U.S.-Turkey Relations”, p. 27.

727 Ümit Enginsoy, “And Ralston Quits, Officially”, *Turkish Daily News*, October 11, 2007.

728 William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000*, p. 225.

729 Pinar Tank, “Analysis: The Effects of the Iraq War on the Kurdish Issue in Turkey”, *Conflict, Security & Development*, vol. 5, no. 1, April 2005, p. 76.

was perceived as a threat to Turkey's integrity.

Thus, Turkey considered the establishment of an independent Kurdish state to be a "casus belli". Moreover, the Turkish security elite stressed its respect for the maintenance of Iraq's territorial integrity. What was obvious was that for Tank, "finding a lasting solution to this contradictory situation was conditional upon the restoration of Baghdad's full control over the whole of the country, ending the authority vacuum in northern Iraq. That, however, and by default put Turkey and the United States at odds with each other".⁷³⁰

Turkey blamed the US's war on Iraq for creating the conditions leading to a potential independent Kurdish state. It also accused the US of ignoring Turkish red lines, concerns and demands. The Turkish administration further complained that the US preferred its new Kurdish allies over its old NATO ally.⁷³¹

Consequently, Ankara has repeatedly sought reassurance concerning Washington's commitment to Iraq's territorial integrity, especially during the January 2004 visits to Washington of Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül. During the visit, US Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz asserted that "some degree of ... federalism or federation is probably going to be inevitable, but that should be based on administrative and geographic lines, not on ethnic lines. Our message to the Kurds is your future doesn't lie in separating yourselves from the Iraqis."⁷³²

Moreover, L. Paul Bremer, the US administrator in Iraq, stated that "Washington did not want to see an independent Kurdish state in the region, not because this was against Turkish interests, but because it was against U.S. interests,"⁷³³ and this speech increased Turkish suspicions. According to Gunter, Bremer's declaration meant that "if the United States one day deemed a Kurdish

730 *ibid.*, p. 79.

731 William Hale, *Turkey, the US and Iraq*, p. 144.

732 *ibid.*, p. 148.

733 "\$ 8.5 bn. US Credit Terms Highlight Mutual Mistrust", *Briefing*, October 6, 2003, p. 6.

state to be in its interests, then the United States would endeavor to bring it about, regardless of Turkish concerns".⁷³⁴ In response to Iraqi Kurdish efforts to move toward establishing a Kurdish federal state, General Başbuğ declared that "[i]f there is a federal structure in Iraq on an ethnic basis, the future will be very difficult and bloody."⁷³⁵

Kirkuk, where Turkmens, Arabs, and Kurds live together atop 12 percent of Iraq's oil reserves, has become another source of tension between Turkey and the United States. The Turkish concern to protect the rights of Turkmens in northern Iraq was one of the determinants of its policy toward Iraq.⁷³⁶ In 1988, Saddam Hussein undertook a campaign to Arabize Kurdish areas of northern Iraq, including Kirkuk. When the United States toppled Saddam's regime, large numbers of Kurdish migrants returned to the city to restore Kirkuk's pre-1988 demographic balance, which favored the Kurds.⁷³⁷ Kurdistan Democratic Party leader, Massoud Barzani, declared that "Kirkuk is a Kurdish city with a Kurdish identity. Neither Turkey nor any other country has the right to speak about Kirkuk or any other Iraqi city."⁷³⁸

Turkey considered Kurdish efforts to resettle in Kirkuk to be critical parts of a Kurdish strategy to establish an independent state. Turkish officials feared that the Kurds would use the oil revenues from Kirkuk toward independence efforts⁷³⁹ and declared that if the Turkmens were threatened, Turkey might be forced to

734 Michael M. Gunter, "The U.S.-Turkish Alliance in Disarray", p. 121.

735 *ibid.*, p. 122.

736 Murat Somer, "Failures of the Discourse of Ethnicity: Turkey, Kurds, and the Emerging Iraq", *Security Dialogue*, vol. 36, no. 1, March 2005, p. 109.

737 Elizabeth Ferris and Kimberly Stoltz, "The Future of Kirkuk: The Referendum and Its Potential Impact on Displacement", *The Brookings Institution-University of Bern Project on International Displacement*, 3 March 2008, p. 8.

738 "Barzani Sees Establishment of Kurdish State, doesn't Know When", *Turkish Daily News*, January 31, 2005.

739 Lionel Beehner, "The Iraqi Question", *Council on Foreign Relations*, 23 April 2007.

intervene militarily.⁷⁴⁰ In this sense, strengthening the role of Turkmens was considered to be in Turkey's interest as it would counterbalance the power of the Kurds in the region. However, as Altunışık argues Turkey's support for the Turkmens in Iraq created an identity crisis in its Iraq policy. Turkey's partiality toward one ethnic group has created a tension in multiethnic Iraq and this policy "put Ankara in an awkward position".⁷⁴¹ Thus, the JDP government began to try to decrease the tension with emphasis on Turkey's impartiality toward all ethnic groups in Iraq.⁷⁴²

Despite its strong criticism of the Iraq war in 2003 and early 2004, the JDP government abandoned this rhetoric following Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's visit to Ankara and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's and Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül's visits to Washington. As a consequence of this policy change, Gül began a dialogue with Kurds in northern Iraq at the highest level, and the official visit of Iraqi President Jalal Talabani to Turkey was taken as the symbol of this initiative.⁷⁴³

In the summer of 2008 Prime Minister Erdoğan made an official trip to Baghdad. Erdoğan met with President Jalal Talabani and signed an agreement to establish a "Higher Council of Strategic Cooperation". Some participants argued this could be the beginning of a regional entente along the lines of the Franco-German alliance in Europe in the wake of the Second World War.⁷⁴⁴

740 "The Other Jerusalem", *The Economist*, 4 April 2007.

741 Meliha Altunışık, "Turkey's Iraq Policy: The War and Beyond", p 192.

742 *ibid.* p. 192.

743 Carol Migdalovitz, "Turkey: Selected Foreign Policy Issues and US Views", *CRS Report for Congress*, August 29, 2008, p. 9.

744 "Rebuilding a Partnership: Turkish-American Relations for a New Era : A Turkish Perspective", *TÜSİAD Publication*, No-T/2009-04/490, April 2009, p. 50.

5.5 Conclusion

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the main enemy of the United States was redefined by the Bush government as terrorists and their collaborators. The Greater Middle East region was constructed as a region with sources of Islamist extremism that were the result of repressive governments. It was therefore seen as necessary that these enemies be contained, controlled and transformed. It was further argued that the democratization of the region would be the solution to its problem with fundamentalism and terrorism.

Turkish-American relations since the 1960s have been described by both close political and military cooperation in the region and also by chronic tension, including widespread anti-Americanism, clashing interests over Cyprus, Kurds, and northern Iraq. Turkey's geopolitical imagination has been determined by US geopolitical agenda for Turkey and its surrounding regions. During the Cold War, Turkey was imagined as an important "barrier" against the expansion of Soviet power into the Middle East. In the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey became a "bridge", a "model" for the Central Asian countries. In the late 1990s, the relationship between Ankara and Washington was described as "strategic". Yet in this period, the interests of the two allies clashed in the absence of a common threat. Thus, Operations "Desert Shield" and "Desert Storm," and the "Operation Provide Comfort," became the sources of tension for Turkey and the United States.

When we look at the 2000s, it can be argued that the strategic part of the relationship could no longer be taken for granted as a result of divergent perceptions of the Iraq War, and more significantly, new international priorities of both sides. The fundamental problem for US-Turkey relations was that the geopolitical perceptions of Washington and Ankara changed considerably since September 11. While for the US, the primary threats have been al-Qaeda terrorism and Saddam Hussein, for Turkey, the main threats have been the PKK, instability in- and outside Turkey and the independence of Kurdistan. In the 2000s, however, Turkey's geopolitical importance for the United States depended on its capacity to act as a "model" to the Muslim world to serve as a stabilizing force in the Middle East and Central Asia.

The war in Iraq initiated by the US administration in order to reframe the regional and global order after September 11. Thus, the negotiations before the Turkish Parliament's decision on March 1, 2003 and the subsequent developments created a mutual mistrust. This mistrust existed not only in the minds of Americans but also in the minds of Turkish policy makers who had serious concerns regarding the uncertainty of the American plans and their impact on post-war conditions in Iraq. Increasing PKK terror in northern Iraq after the US invasion reinforced these concerns.

In this chapter the geopolitical discourse of the United States in the post-September 11 era and its effects on Turkish policies were discussed. The differences between Turkey and the US over Iraq in 2003 demonstrated that the factors leading to the US-led operations could not be the foundation of a "permanent" relationship between the two countries.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

*"Her gün bir yerden göçmek ne iyi
Her gün bir yere konmak ne güzel
Bulanmadan, donmadan akmak ne hoş
Dünle beraber gitti cancağızım,
Ne kadar söz varsa düne ait,
Şimdi yeni şeyler söylemek lazım."*

Rumi⁷⁴⁵

As a consequence of the emergence of critical perspectives in the field of International Relations, the relationship between geopolitical discourse and the foreign policy of states has received increased attention from the scholars in the last decades. Currently, scholars of critical geopolitics argue that foreign and security policies are the product of specific geopolitical imaginations that have framed world politics.

Drawing on the literature on critical geopolitics, this dissertation took geopolitics as a deeply ideological concept and was an attempt to analyze the ways in which US geopolitical discourse has shaped the Turkish-American relationship over time. Critical geopolitics stresses the importance of geopolitical language in foreign policy making. Discourses/narratives, imaginations/representations, ideas and metaphors are the most important ideological tools to construct language of the relations in this analysis. The study, thus, was an attempt to identify Turkey's role in US geopolitical discourse and to find out to what extent its geostrategic position accounted for its significance in relation to the United States' geopolitical interests, particularly in the absence of a Soviet threat. Turkey's responses to US geopolitical discourse are important to understand the dynamics of Turkish foreign

745 Rumi, *Mesnevi*.

policy and its geopolitical imaginations. However, this dissertation aimed to analyze the relations from US foreign policy perspective.

In this dissertation was also an analysis of several issues, such as the meaning of the concept of geopolitics, the major features of US foreign policy, Turkey's geopolitical imaginations in US geopolitical discourse, and the evolution of Turkish-American relations. The study had three objectives. First, it attempted to outline the historical evolution of the concept of the geopolitics since the end of the 19th century in order to reveal the limits of the classical geopolitical understanding, and to provide a theoretical framework against which the modern geopolitical imagination of the US has been formulated. Second, it tried to reveal the ideological roots and the main characteristics of American geopolitical discourse. And third, the study aimed to apply critical geopolitics to the case of Turkish-American relations with respect to how the imagined geography of Turkey and the alliance have been shaped by the foreign and security policies of the US.

Geopolitical thinking was developed at the end of the nineteenth century by geographers and politicians who tried to analyze, explain and understand world politics. Within this framework, geopolitics was considered to be a science dealing with natural and objective realities. After the Second World War the geopolitical imagination was centered on the competing ideologies of the United States and the Soviet Union, and the reorganization of the map of the world. It is argued that Cold War geopolitics was ideological and discursive. Indeed, the polarity between the United States and the Soviet Union was crucial to this process.

However, critical geopolitics provides ways of looking at the world and questioning the role of geopolitics in foreign policy making process, as opposed to accepting them as objective and natural. Accordingly, geopolitical imaginations determine the foreign policy actions of the states, help in the labeling of regions, such as "Middle East" and "Central Asia", and construct zones of imagination, like East and West. In this context, labeling becomes important because labels are socially constructed through historical experiences and thus help policy makers justify their practices.

From this theoretical perspective, it is argued in this dissertation that the Turkish-American alliance was a product of the US's Cold War geopolitical discourse wherein the United States considered Turkey to be a strategic ally. During the Cold War, the US administrations divided the world into "friendly" and "hostile" spaces. Military activities and political alliances were justified on the basis of this geographical and ideological division. Stalin's territorial demands after World War II were the motivating factor behind the establishment of a US strategic alliance with Turkey. Thereafter, the declaration of the Truman Doctrine on March 12, 1947 led to the expansion of US military ties with Turkey and became the basis of Turkey's inclusion into NATO in 1952. As a consequence, Turkey began to be defined as the anchor of NATO's strategic southern flank and a barrier against the communist threat in the Middle East and Mediterranean throughout the Cold War. Turkey has also been a major recipient of American military equipment and a supplier of important military facilities for monitoring the Soviet Union. Thus, as argued here, strategic/military relations were the most important aspect of the alliance.

The dissolution of Soviet Union and the consequent end of the Cold War changed the balance of power in the international system, and forced the US to reevaluate its foreign policy. Thus the reason behind Turkish-American relations was eliminated which caused concern in Turkey as to whether it would be perceived to lose its strategic significance to the US. The strategic nature of the relations was retained after the Cold War, primarily because transformation of the international system opened up new areas of cooperation in the Middle East and Central Asia. One of the major aims of the United States during the post-Cold War era was to protect world oil reserves concentrated in the "circle of instabilities", namely the Persian Gulf region and Central Asia. Thus, mostly due to its proximity to these oil-rich regions, Turkey's strategic significance has increased rather than decreased. No longer a barrier, Turkey found itself at the crossroads of a new strategic environment. Because of the military bases on its soil, Turkey's cooperation was critical for the achievement of US policy goals in these regions.

At the end of the 1990s the US-Turkish alliance that had been dominated by security issues during the Cold War began to change in parallel to the changes in US geopolitical discourse. Regarding the Caspian energy project, a new

cooperation was established in the arena of energy transportation. For example, the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project was signed during this period. In the meantime, cooperation continued on security issues, such as in Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia under NATO, and in northern Iraq under Operation Northern Watch. The Turkish-American relationship was no longer based exclusively on the security dimension, thus the nature of the bilateral relations -given the name "strategic partnership" in 1999- had changed.

After the September 11 attacks, the US administration identified new enemies and threats. Thereafter, the war on global terror has dominated US geopolitical discourse and the Middle East became a geopolitically imagined region that realized US national interests. Since September 11 Turkey has been viewed as a crucial partner in the war on terror and has continued to play an important role in US foreign policy and military policy towards the Middle East. Despite problems on the issue of Iraq, because of its political position as a bridge of both Islam and democracy, the United States has continued to perceive Turkey as an important political partner in the region.

As a second theme of this dissertation, I have shown how successive US administrations have used different metaphors when defining Turkey in various eras. Metaphors such as "flank", "barrier", "bridge", and "model" have been used not only to describe Turkey but also its location since the beginning of the Cold War. During the Cold War, Turkey was also seen as a part of "Northern Tier" countries, a neighbor of the region in "arc of crisis", and referred as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier".⁷⁴⁶ Apart from these metaphors, Turkey was represented as "strategic ally", "strategic partner", and "military base" of the United States. Moreover, divergent metaphors have also been used for Turkey in various times. For instance, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Central Asia, with its huge energy potential and strategic location, emerged as a crucial region for US interests. Turkey, primarily because of its historical, linguistic and cultural ties with these countries, was presented as a "model" country by the US administrations. The "model" metaphor was once again employed by the Americans to describe Turkey in the 2000s, this time with reference to the Middle Eastern countries.

⁷⁴⁶ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, pp. 120-163.

Whereas in the first case Turkey's pro-Western, democratic characteristics were stressed, in the second case its pro-Western but "Islamic" features were underlined. The metaphors have been adjusted to suit the changing new imaginative world order of US geopolitical discourse.

As a third point this study was an attempt to analyze the crises of Turkish-American relations during and after the Cold War. Turkey largely adapted itself to US geopolitical discourse. The main objectives of the United States, such as preventing the expansion of communism, negotiating transportation of energy resources, and fighting terrorism were shared and supported by Turkey. However, during and after the Cold War the two allies experienced several problems. These crises can be understood as the limits of US geopolitical discourse in the relations.

Finally this dissertation argued that September 11 and its aftermath have created deep mistrust between the two allies and changed the strategic nature of the relations. Particularly after 2003, Turkey's strategic importance to the United States has been defined by its capacity to function as a bridge to the Muslim world and serve as a stabilizing force in the Middle East and Central Asia two areas of increasing strategic importance to the United States.

Moreover, military bases in Turkey, particularly İncirlik airbase, were still important for realizing US geopolitical aims in the Greater Middle East. In fact, over 70 percent of US military cargo sent to Iraq and Afghanistan is sent by land through Turkey. If Turkey denied the US access to İncirlik, the capacity of the United States to support its forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, it would have been compromised.

While the slogan "change" broadly impressed both American and the world public opinion, the replacement of the Bush administration with the Obama administration in December 2008 has not totally changed the geopolitical imagination of the Middle East. According to the new administration, the "Greater Middle East" region, including Afghanistan and Pakistan, has retained its significance for the US interests. Yet, unlike the Bush administration, the main target of the war on global terrorism has not been defined by the Obama administration as Iraq but as Afghanistan and later Iran. For instance, in his first

days in office President Obama criticized Bush's Iraq policy, claiming that "Afghanistan had not received the strategic attention, direction and resources it urgently requires".⁷⁴⁷ Thereafter, he resolved to withdraw US troops from Iraq before the end of 2010. Indeed, the "democracy promotion" and "war on terror" policies of the Bush administration carried on by the new administration. However, the tools of these policies have been modified. With its emphasis on the importance of alliances, partnerships and institutions, the Obama administration has opted for more soft power instruments including diplomacy and multilateralism rather than the unilateral militaristic policy of the Bush administration.⁷⁴⁸

The election of a new administration in Washington has been perceived as an important opportunity to repair problems in the Turkish-American security partnership and putting relations on a normal track. President Barack Obama's visit to Ankara in April 2009 and his speech to the Turkish Grand National Assembly helped to set a new tone. According to President Obama, Turkey was "a critical ally and an important part of Europe." He claimed before the Turkish Parliament that "[t]he United States and Turkey have not always agreed on every issue, and that's to be expected no two nations do. But we have stood together through many challenges over the last 60 years. And because of the strength of our alliance and the endurance of our friendship, both America and Turkey are stronger and the world is more secure." He then concluded that Turkey and the United States had to "stand and work together to overcome the challenges of our time."⁷⁴⁹

During his visit President Obama also used the metaphor of "model partnership" to identify US-Turkey relations saying that "Turkey and the United States can build a model partnership in which a predominantly Christian nation and

747 Barack Obama, "Statement on United States Troop Levels in Afghanistan", February 17, 2009, John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, Santa Barbara, CA, Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=85783>, (Accessed on 30 March 2011).

748 Aylin Güney and Fulya Gökcan, "The 'Greater Middle East' as a 'Modern' Geopolitical Imagination in American Foreign Policy", p. 35.

749 Barack Obama, "Remarks to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in Ankara", April 6, 2009, John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, Santa Barbara, CA, Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=85972>, (Accessed on 30 March 2011).

a predominantly Muslim nation -a Western nation and a nation that straddles two continents- that we can create a modern international community that is respectful, that is secure, that is prosperous, that there are not tensions, inevitable tensions, between cultures- which I think is extraordinarily important."⁷⁵⁰ Similarly, former US Defense Secretary William Cohen underscored the importance of the alliance noting that Turkey sends "a very important signal to the rest of the Muslim world that the United States is not anti-Muslim as so many have thought we have been, but rather here is a very strong Muslim nation that is working hand in hand with the United States."⁷⁵¹

As it can be seen, the "model" metaphor was used once again with an adjust meaning, this time suggesting that the Turkish-American alliance should be a model for the rest of the Muslim world. While it was claimed that the concept of the "model partnership" was the new framework of Turkish-American relations, a new model has not appeared and the concept remains murky. It can be argued that all efforts during both the Bush and Obama administrations, to restore Turkish-American relations have been unsuccessful and the strategic basis for these relations has not been reestablished during the 2000s.

750 Barack Obama, "The President's News Conference With President Abdullah Gul of Turkey in Ankara", Turkey April 6, 2009, John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project*, Santa Barbara, CA, Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=85974> , (Accessed on 30 March 2011).

751 "Obama Says, U.S., Turkey can be Model for World", *CNN*, Available at <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/04/06/obama.turkey>, (Accessed on 28 March 2011).

REFERENCES

BOOKS

Abramowitz, Morton. "The Complexities of American Policy Making on Turkey," in *Turkey's Transformation and American Policy*, ed. Morton Abramowitz, 153-184. New York: The Century Foundation, 2000.

Acheson, Dean. *Present at the Creation, My Years at the State Department*. New York: W. W. Northon & Co., 1969.

Agnew, John A. and Corbridge, Stuart. *Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy*. London, New York: Routledge, 1995.

Agnew, John A. et.al, eds. *A Companion to Political Geography*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003.

Agnew, John A. *Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics (2nd ed.)*. New York, London: Routledge, 2003.

Agnew, John A. *Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics*. London: Routledge, 1998.

Agnew, John A. *Making Political Geography*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Akçapar, Burak. *Turkey's New European Era: Foreign Policy on the Road to EU Membership*. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007.

Altunışık, Meliha and Tür, Özlem. *Turkey: Challenges of Continuity and Change*. New York: Routledge Curson, 2005.

Altunışık, Meliha. "Turkey and the Changing Oil Markets in Eurasia." in *The Political Economy of Turkey in Post-Soviet Era: Going West and Looking East?*, ed. Libby Rittenberg, 157-176. London: Preager, 1998.

Altunışık, Meliha. "Turkish Policy toward Israel." in *Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy*, eds. Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı, 59-73. Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000.

Altunışık, Meliha. "Turkish-American Security Relations: The Middle East Dimension." In *Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future*, eds. Mustafa Aydın, Çağrı Erhan, 151-180. New York: Routledge, 2004.

Amineh, Mehdi P. and Houweling, Henk. "Caspian Energy: Oil and Gas Resources and the Global Market." In *Central Eurasia in Global Politics: Conflict, Security and Development*, eds. Mehdi P. Amineh and Henk Housweling, 77-94. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2004.

Aras, Bülent. *The New Geopolitics of Eurasia and Turkey's Position*. London: Frank Caas, 2002.

Armaoğlu, Fahir. *Amerika Belgelerinde Lozan Konferansı ve Amerika*. Ankara: TTK, 1991.

Armaoğlu, Fahir. *Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991.

Ataöv, Türkkaya. *Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye*. Ankara: Aydınlık Yayınevi, 1969.

Atkinson, David and Dodds, Klaus, eds. *Geopolitical Traditions: A Century of Geopolitical Thought*. London: Routledge, 2000.

Atkinson, David and Dodds, Klaus. "Introduction." in *Geopolitical Traditions: Critical Histories of a Century of Geopolitical Thought*, eds. David Atkinson and Klaus Dodds, 1-24. London, New York: Routledge, 2000.

Bacevich, Andrew J. *American Empire: the Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002.

Balkır, Canan. "International Relations: from Europe to Central Asia," in *Turkey Since 1970*, ed. Debbie Lovatt, 195-218. New York: Palgrave, 2001.

Baran, Zeyno. "The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Implications for Turkey." in *The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Oil Window to the West*, eds. S. Frederick Starr and Svante E.Cornell, 103-118. Washington: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, 2005.

Barret, John. "Current Political Agenda of the Atlantic Alliance and Turkey." in *Turkey at the Threshold of the 21st Century*, ed. Mustafa Aydın. İstanbul: Alfa Publications, 2001.

Baylis, John and Smith, Steve, eds. *Globalization of World Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Booth Ken, ed. *Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Bostanoğlu, Burcu. *Türkiye-ABD İlişkilerinin Politikası*. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayıncılık, 1999.

Bölükbaşı, Süha. "Jockeying for Power in the Caspian Basin: Turkey versus Iran and Russia." In *The Caspian: Politics, Energy and Security*, ed. Shirin Akiner, 198-207. London, New York: Routledge, 2004.

Bölükbaşı, Süha. *The Superpowers and the Third World : Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*. New York: University Press of America, 1988.

Bresheeth, Haim and Yuval-Davis Nira, eds. *The Gulf War and the New World Order*. London: Zed Books, 1992.

Brown, Seyom. "Inherited Geopolitics and Emergent Global Realities." In *America's Global Interests: A New Agenda*, ed. Edward K. Hamilton, 166-177. New York: W.W. Norton, 1989.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower*. New York: Basic Books, 2007.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *America and the World: Conversations on the Future of American Foreign Policy*. New York, Basic Books, 2008.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *Game Plan: A Geostrategic Framework for the Conduct of the U.S.-Soviet Contest*. Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century*. New York: Collier, 1993.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981*. New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1983.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership*. New York: Basic Books, 2004.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives*. New York: Basic Books, 1997.

Cameron, Fraser. *US Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Global Hegemon or Reluctant Sheriff?*. London, New York, Routledge: 2002.

Campbell, David. *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992.

Cohen, Saul Bernard. *Geopolitics of the World System*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002.

Constandinos, Andreas. *America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974: Calculated Conspiracy or Foreign Policy Failure?* New Jersey: Authorhouse, 2009.

Cook, Steven A. and Sherwood-Randall, Elizabeth. *Generating Momentum for a New Era in U.S.-Turkey Relations, Council Special Report No. 15* Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, June 2006.

Coulombis, Theodore A. *The United States, Greece and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle*. New York: Praeger, 1983.

Cox, Michael and Stokes, Doug. *US Foreign Policy*. New York: Oxford University

Press, 2008.

Çelik, Yasemin. *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*. Westport: Preager, 1999.

Çetinsaya, Gökhan. "A Tale of Two Centuries: Continuities in Turkish Foreign Policy and Security Policy." In *Contentious Issues of Security and the Future of Turkey*, ed. Nurşin Ateşoğlu Güney, 5-18. London: Ashgate, 2007.

Dalby, Simon. *Environmental Security*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002.

Dobson, Alan P. and Marsh, Steve. *US Foreign Policy since 1945*. London: Routledge, 2001.

Dodds, Klaus. "Cold War Geopolitics", in *A Companion to Political Geography*, eds. John Agnew, K. Mitchell, and Gearóid Ó Tuathail, 214-218. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003.

Dodds, Klaus. *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Donnelly, Thomas. *Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century*. Washington D.C.: Project for the New American Century, 2000. <http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf>, accessed July 12, 2010.

Donovan, Robert J. *Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S Truman, 1945–48*. New York: Norton & Company, 1977.

Dorpalen, Andreas. *The World of General Haushofer*. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1984.

Duke, Simon. *United States Military Forces and Installations in Europe*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Erhan, Çağrı. "Main Trends in Ottoman-American Relations." in *Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future*, eds. Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan, 3-25.

London, New York: Routledge, 2004.

Erhan, Çağrı. *Beyaz Savaş: Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinde Afyon Sorunu*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1996.

Erhan, Çağrı. *Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Kökenleri*. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayıncılık, 2001.

European Commission. *Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's Progress towards Accession*. Brussels: European Commission, 1998.

Flanagan, Stephen J. and Brannen, Samuel J. *Turkey's Shifting Dynamic: Implications for U.S.-Turkey Relations*. Washington D.C.: CSIS Press, 2008.

Flint, Colin. *Introduction to Geopolitics*. London, New York: Routledge, 2006.

Flournoy, Michèle A., ed. *Quadrennial Defense Review 2001: Strategy-Driven Choices for America's Security*. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2001.

Ford, Gerald R.. *A Time to Heal*. New York: Harper and Row, 1979.

Foucault, Michel. *The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: The Will to Knowledge*. London: Penguin, 1998.

Fukuyama, Francis. *After the Neo-cons: Where the Right Went Wrong*. London: Profile Books, 2006.

Fukuyama, Francis. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: The Free Press, 1992.

Gaddis, John Lewis. *The Cold War: A New History*. New York: The Penguin Press, 2005.

Gendzier, Irene L. *Notes From the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East, 1945-1958*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.

Gözen, Ramazan. *Amerikan Kışkacında Dış Politika; Körfez Savaşı, Turgut Özal ve*

Sonrası. Ankara: Liberte, 2000.

Gözen, Ramazan. *Turkey's Delicate Position between NATO and the ESDP*. Ankara: Dışişleri Bakanlığı S.A.M., 2004.

Gregory, Derek. *Ideology, Science and Human Geography*. London: Hutchinson, 1978.

Gürel, Şükrü. "A General Appraisal of Current Turkish Foreign Policy" in *Turkey at the Threshold of the 21st Century*, ed. Mustafa Aydın, 11-17. İstanbul: Alfa Publications, 2001.

Gürün, Kamuran. *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri: 1920-1953*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991.

Güvenç, Serhat. *Rise and Demise of a "Strategic Partnership": In Search of Context for the Post-Cold War Turkish-American Relations*. Unpublished PhD Thesis. İstanbul: Bogazici University, 2003.

Hale, William. *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*. London: Frank Caas, 2000.

Halliday, Fred. *Threat from the East? Soviet Policy from Afghanistan and Iran to the Horn of Africa*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982.

Harkavy, Robert E. *Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases: The Geopolitics of Access Diplomacy*. New York: Pergamon Press, 1982.

Harris, George S. *Troubled Alliance; Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971*. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972.

Harris, George S. "Turkey and the US", in *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-1971*, Kemal Karpat. Leiden : E.J.Brill, 1975.

Harris, George S. "U.S.-Turkish Relations." in *Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy*, eds. Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı, 189-202. Washington D.C: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000.

Harris, George S., ed. *The Middle East in Turkish-American Relations, Heritage Foundation Conference, Washington DC, 3-4 October 1984*. Washington DC: Heritage Foundations, 1985.

Hazbun, Waleed "The Middle East through the Lens of Critical Geopolitics: Globalization, Terrorism, and the Iraq War." in *Where is the Middle East?*, eds. Michael E. Bonine, Michael Gasper and Abbas Amanat. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010.

Hepple, Leslie W. "Geopolitiques de Gauche: Yves Lacoste, Herodote and French Radical Geopolitics." in *Geopolitical Traditions: A Century of Geopolitical Thought*, eds. Klaus Dodds and David Atkinson, 268-301. London, New York: Routledge, 2000.

Howard, Harry N. *Turkey, the Straits and US Policy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974.

İmset, İsmet G. *The PKK: A Report on Separatist Violence in Turkey: 1973-1992*. Ankara: Turkish Daily News Publications, 1992.

Jackson, Robert and Sørensen, Georg. *Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches, (2nd ed.)*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Johns, Martin. *An Introduction to Political Geography*. London, New York: Routledge, 2004.

Johns, Richard Wyn. *Security, Strategy and Critical Theory*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999.

Jones, Joseph M. *The Fifteen Weeks: February 11-June 5, 1947*. New York: The Viking Press, 1955.

Kaldor, Mary. *The Imaginary War: Understanding the East-West Conflict*. London, Basil: Blackwell, 1990.

Kasım, Kamer. "Oil Policy on Caspian Oil and Its Implications for Turkish-American

Relations" in *Turkish-American Relations: Past, Present and Future*, eds. Mustafa Aydın and Çağrı Erhan, 129-150. New York: Routledge, 2004.

Kennan, George. *Memoirs, 1925-1950*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1967.

Khalilzad, Zalmay et.al. *The Future of Turkish-Western Relations: Toward a Strategic Plan*. Santa Monica: RAND, 2000.

Kissinger, Henry. *The White House Years*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1979.

Kissinger, Henry. *Years of Renewal*. New York: Touchstone, 2000.

Konrad, György. *Anti Politics*. London: Quartet Books, 1984.

Köni, Hasan. "Gulf Savaşı Sonrasında Orta Doğu'nun Durumu." in *Değişen Dünyada Türkiye ve Türk Dünyası Sempozyumu*, 48-49. Ankara: Hacettepe Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü, 1993.

Kramer, Franklin D. and Nelson, C. Richard. *Global Futures and Implications for U.S. Basing*. Working Group Report. Washington D.C.: Atlantic Council, 2005.

Krämer, Heinz. *A Changing Turkey: the Challenge to Europe and the United States*. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 2000.

Krauthammer, Charles. "The Unipolar Moment." In *Rethinking American Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order*, eds. Graham T. Allison and Gregory F. Traveron, 295-306. New York: Norton, 1992.

Krauthammer, Charles. *An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World*, Washington D.C.: The AEI Press, 2004.

Kuniholm, Bruce R. *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980.

Kupfer, Andrea. *The Problem of Cyprus in the Framework of U.S. Policy Towards Greece and Turkey*. Princeton: Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, 1987.

Kut, Şule. "Turkish Diplomatic Initiative for Bosnia-Herzegovina." in *Balkans: A Mirror of the New International Order*, eds. Günay Göksu Özdoğan and Kemali Saybaşılı, 295-316. İstanbul: Eren Publications, 1995.

Laipson, Ellen B. *Congressional-Executive Relations and the Turkish Arms Embargo*. Washington: US Government Printing House, 1981.

Lakoff, George and Johnson, Mark. *Metaphors We Live By*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980.

Larrabee, F. Stephen and Lesser Ian O. *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003.

Leffler, Melvyn P. "Negotiating from Strength: Acheson, the Russians, and American Power." In *Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy*, ed. Douglas Brinkley, 176-177. London: Macmillan, 1993.

Lesser, Ian O. *Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold War*. Santa Monica: RAND, 1992.

Lesser, Ian O. "Beyond 'Bridge or Barrier': Turkey's Evolving Security Relations with the West." In *Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy*, eds. Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı, 203-221. Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000.

Lesser, Ian O. "Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold War." in eds. *Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China*, 99-140. Boulder: Westview, RAND, 1993.

Lesser, Ian O. "Turkey and the United States: Anatomy of a Strategic Relationship", in *The Feature of Turkish Foreign Policy*, eds. Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis, 83-100. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004.

Lesser, Ian O. *Beyond Suspicion: Rethinking US-Turkish Relations*. Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center, 2007.

Mackinder, Halford. *Democratic Ideals and Reality*. New York: Norton Library,

1919.

Mahan, Alfred Thayer. *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1782*. London: Little, Brown and Company, 1890.

Makovsky, Alan. "US Policy toward Turkey: Progress and Problems." in *Turkey's Transformation and American Policy*, ed. Morton Abramowitz, 221-222/. New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2000.

Mann, James. *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet*. New York: Penguin, 2004.

Matlock, Jack. *Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended*. New York: Random House, 2004.

Mattern, Johannes. *Geopolitik: Doctrine of National Self-Sufficiency and Empire*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1942.

McGhee, George. *ABD-Türkiye-NATO-Ortadoğu*. Translated by Belkıs Çorakçı. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1992.

McGhee, George. *The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry Contained the Soviets*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1990.

Murinson, Alexander. *Turkey's Entente with Israel and Azerbaijan: State Identity and Security in the Middle East and Caucasus*. London, New York: Routledge, 2010.

Nyrop, Richard F., ed. *Turkey: A Country Study*. Washington, DC: The American University, 1980.

Oran, Baskın (ed.). *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt 1: 1919-1980*. Ankara: İletişim Yayınevi, 2001.

Oran, Baskın. *Kalkık Horoz Çekiç Güç ve Kürt Devleti*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1996.

Özcan, Nihat Ali. "PKK Terrorism in Turkey," in *Combating International Terrorism:*

Turkey's Added Value – Occasional Paper, October 2009, eds. James Ker-Lindsay and Alastair Cameron, 9-12. London: Royal United Services Institute, 2009.

Özel, Soli. "Turkey at the Polls: After the Tsunami." in *Islam and Democracy in the Middle East*, eds. Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, and Daniel Brumberg, 162-176. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003.

Peuch, Jean-Cristophe. "Private and National Interests in the Caspian Region." in *The Politics of Caspian Oil*, ed. Bülent Gökay, 166-184. London: Palgrave, 2001.

Poelle, Mark. *Raising Cartographic Consciousness: The Social and Foreign Policy Vision of Geopolitics in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Lexington Books, 1999.

Richelson, Jeffrey. *American Espionage and the Soviet Target*. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1987.

Rustow, Dankwart A. *Turkey: America's Forgotten Ally*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1987.

Said, Edward. *Covering Islam*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1981.

Said, Edward. *Culture and Imperialism*. New York: Knopf, 1993.

Said, Edward. *Orientalism*. London: Penguin Books, 1978.

Salmi, Ralph H. and Bayraktar Durgun, Gonca. *Turkish-U.S. Relations: Perspectives from Ankara*. Boca Raton, Florida: Brown Walker Press, 2005.

Sander, Oral. *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri: 1947-1964*. Ankara: AÜSBF Yayınları, 1979.

Schmidt, Donald E. *The Folly of War: American Foreign Policy 1898-2005*. New York: Algora Publishing, 2005.

Scott, Leonard Victor. *The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Threat of Nuclear War*. New York: Continuum, 2007.

Shelley, Fred M. et.al. *Political Geography of the United States*. New York, London: The Guilford Press, 1996.

Sidaway, James Derrick. "What is in a Gulf?: From the 'Arc of Crisis' to the Gulf War." in *Rethinking Geopolitics*, eds. Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby, 224-239. New York and London: Routledge, 1998.

Simons, Thomas W. *Eurasia's New Frontiers*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008.

Smith, Neil. *American Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.

Sönmezöğlü, Faruk. *ABD'nin Türkiye Politikası (1964-1980)*. İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1995.

Sözüöz, Necati. *Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerine Genel Bir Bakış, 1923-1950*. İstanbul: Fakülte Matbaası, 1992.

Spykman, Nicholas J. *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and Balance of Power, (2nd ed.)*. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2007.

Spykman, Nicholas J. *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power* New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942.

Spykman, Nicholas J. *The Geography of Peace*. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1969.

Stearns, Monteagle. *Entangled Allies: US Policy Toward Greece, Turkey and Cyprus*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992.

Stern, Laurance. *The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of the American Diplomacy*. New York: Times Books, 1977.

Strausz-Hupe, Robert. *Geopolitics: The Struggle for Space and Power* New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1942.

Şahin, Haluk. *Gece Gelen Mektup, Türk Amerikan İlişkilerinde Bir Dönüm Noktası*. İstanbul: Cep Kitapları, 1987.

Tejirian, Eleanor H. "The United States, the Ottoman Empire and the Post War Settlement." In *Creation of Iraq, 1914-1921*, eds. Reeva Spector Simon and

Eleanor H. Tejirian, 146-161. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004.

The Treaty With Turkey: Statements, Resolutions and Reports in Favor of Ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne. New York: General Committee of American institutions and Associations in Favor of Ratification to the Treaty with Turkey, 1926.

The Treaty With Turkey: Why it Should be Ratified. New York: Council on Turkish-American Relations, 1926.

The Turco-American Treaty of Amity and Commerce Signed at Lausanne, August 6, 1923: A Report. New York: F.P.A. Committee on the Lausanne Treaty, 1924.

Thompson, Edward P. *Beyond The Cold War: Not the Dimpleby Lecture European Nuclear Disarmament*. London: Merlin Press, 1982.

Thurow, Lester. *Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle among Japan, Europe and America*. New York: William Morrow, 1992.

Truman, Harry S. *Memoirs, vol. 2, Years of Trial and Hope*. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1955.

Truman, Harry. "The Truman Doctrine", Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States." In *The Geopolitics Reader*, eds. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby and Paul Routledge, 58-60. New York: Routledge, 2006.

Tuathail, Gearóid Ó and Agnew, John, eds. *A Companion to Political Geography*. Washington: Blackwell, 1998.

Tuathail, Gearóid Ó and Dalby, Simon, eds. *Rethinking Geopolitics*. New York, London: Routledge, 2002.

Tuathail, Gearoid Ó and Dalby, Simon. "Introduction." in *Rethinking Geopolitics: Towards a Critical Geopolitics*, eds. Gearoid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby, 1-15. London and New York: Routledge, 1998.

Tuathail, Gearóid Ó and Shelley, Fred. "Political Geography: From the 'Long 1989' to the End of the Post-Cold War Peace", in *Geography in America at the Dawn of*

the 21st Century, eds. Gary L. Gale and Cort J. Willmott, 164-184. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Tuathail, Gearóid Ó et.al., eds. *The Geopolitics Reader*. London: Routledge, 1998.

Tuathail, Gearóid Ó, Routledge, Paul and Dalby, Simon, eds. *The Geopolitics Reader, (2nd ed.)*. New York: Routledge, 2006.

Tuathail, Gearóid Ó. "Geopolitical Structures and Cultures: Towards Conceptual Clarity in the Critical Study of Geopolitics." in *Geopolitics: Global Problems and Regional Concerns*, ed. Lasha Tchantouridzé, 75–102. Winnipeg: Centre for Defence and Security Studies, 2004.

Tuathail, Gearóid Ó. "Post-Cold War Geopolitics: Contrasting Superpowers in a World of Global Dangers." in *Geographies of Global Change (2nd edition)*, eds. R. J. Johnson, et.al., 174-190. Oxford: Blackwell, 2002.

Tuathail, Gearóid Ó. *Critical Geopolitics*. London: Routledge, 1996).

Tuathail, Gearóid Ó. *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space*. London, New York: Routledge, 1996.

Turan, Gül and Turan, İlker. "Turkey's Emerging Relationship with Other Turkic Republics." In *The Political Economy of Turkey in Post-Soviet Era: Going West and Looking East?*, ed. Libby Rittenberg, 177-204. London: Preager, 1998.

Turlington, Edgar W. *The American Treaty of Lausanne*. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1924.

TÜSİAD. *Rebuilding a Partnership: Turkish-American Relations for a New Era: A Turkish Perspective (TÜSİAD Publication, No-T/2009-04/490)*. İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 2009.

U.S Department of State. *Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations for Fiscal Year 1999*. Washington, DC: U.S Department of State, 1999.

Uslu, Nasuh. *The Turkish-American Relationship between 1947 and 2003: A*

History of a Distinctive Alliance. New York: Nova Science Publishers Inc., 2003.

Uslu, Nasuh. *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri*. Ankara: 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, 2000.

Uslu, Nasuh. *Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinde Kıbrıs*. Ankara: 21. Yüzyıl Yayınları, 2000.

Ülman, Haluk. *II. Dünya Savaşının Başından Truman Doktrinine Kadar Türk-Amerikan Diplomatik Münasebetleri (1939- 1947)*. Ankara: AÜSBF Yayınları, 1961.

Ülman, Haluk. *Türk-Amerikan Diplomatik Münasebetleri: 1939-1947*. Ankara: Sevinç, 1961.

W. Cox, Robert. "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory." In *Neorealism and Its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane, 204-251. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.

Yavuz, Turan. *ABD'nin Kürt Kartı*. İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1993.

Yeşilbursa, Behçet Kemal. *The Baghdad Pact: Anglo-American Defense Policies in the Middle East: 1950-1959*. New York: Frank Kaas, 2005.

Yetkin, Murat. *Tezkere: Irak Krizinin Gerçek Öyküsü*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2004.

ARTICLES

"Correspondence between President Johnson and Prime Minister İnönü, June 1964, as released by the White House, January 15, 1966." *Middle East Journal* vol. 20, no. 3 (Summer 1966): 386-393.

"Geopolitics, Special Issue: the Politics of Geopolitical Discourse." *Geopolitics* vol.11, no.3 (2006).

"Special Issue on Critical Geopolitics," *Political Geography* vol. 15, no.6-7 (1996).

"The Blur in Turkey: And a Big Weight on Suleyman Demirel's Shoulders." *Economist* vol. 321, no. 7730 (October 26, 1991): 15-6.

"Turkey's Attitude on Kosovo." *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies* vol. 4 (Annual 1998-99): 303.

Adamson, Fiona B. "Democratization and Domestic Resources of Foreign Policy: Turkey in the 1974 Cyprus Crisis." *Political Science Quarterly* vol. 116, no. 2 (2001): 280.

Akin, William. "Playing Chicken in Turkey." *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist* vol.39, no.8 (October 1983): 212.

Alırıza, Bülent "The Turkish Update." *The Center for Strategic and International Studies*, October 12, 2001.

Allen, Roy G. D. "Mutual Aid Between the U.S. and The British Empire, 1941-45." *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* vol. 109, no. 3 (1946): 243-277.

Altunışık, Meliha Benli. "The Turkish Model and Democratization in the Middle East." *Arab Studies Quarterly* vol. 27, no. 1&2 (Winter-Spring, 2005): 57.

Altunışık, Meliha. "The Turkish – Israeli Rapprochement in the Post-Cold War Era." *Middle Eastern Studies* vol. 36, no. 2 (2000): 187.

Altunışık, Meliha. "Turkey's Iraq Policy: The War and Beyond." *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* vol. 14, no. 2 (August 2006): 192.

Armaoğlu, Fahir. "Amerikan Belgelerinde Lozan Konferansı ve Amerika." *Bellekten* vol. 55, no 213 (August, 1991): 483-527.

Athanassapoulou, Ekavi. "American – Turkish Relations since the End of the Cold War." *Middle East Policy* vol. 8, no. 3 (2001): 144.

Aybet, Gülnur. "Turkey's Long and Winding Road to the E.U.: Implications for the Balkans." *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* vol. 8, no.1 (2006): 67.

Aybey, Ali. "Turkey and the European Union Relations: A Historical Assessment." *Ankara Avrupa Calismalari Dergisi* vol. 4, no. 1 (Fall 2004): 36.

Aykan, Mahmut Bali. "Turkish Perspectives on Turkish-US Relations Concerning

Persian Gulf Security in the post-Cold War Era: 1989-1995." *Middle East Journal* vol.50, no.3 (Summer 1996): 346.

Babali, Tuncay. "Turkey at the Energy Crossroads: Turkey, Present and Past." *Middle East Quarterly* vol. 16, no.2 (Spring 2009): 25-33

Baker III, James A. "America's Stake in the Persian Gulf." *US Department of State Dispatch* vol. 1, no. 10 (September 1990): 69.

Baran, Zeyno. "Lithuanian Energy Security: Challenges and Choices." *Hudson Institute Center for Eurasian Policy* (December 2006): 15.

Barkey, Henri J. "Turkish-American Relations in the Postwar Era: An Alliance of Convenience." *Orbis* vol.33, no.3 (1992): 447-464.

Barkey, Henri J. "Turkey and Iraq: The Perils (and Prospects) of Proximity." *USIP Special Report* no. 141 (July 2005).

Barlas, Dilek. "Turkey and the Balkans: Cooperation in the Interwar and Post- Cold War Eras." *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies* vol. 4 (Annual 1998-1999): 70.

Bassin, Mark. "Civilisations and Their Discontents: Political Geography and Geopolitics in the Huntington Thesis." *Geopolitics* vol. 12, no. 3 (July 2007): 357.

Başak, Cengiz. "The Policies of the Major Powers Towards Cyprus Crisis and United Nations (UN) Operations in Cyprus (UNFICYP) Between the Years of 1964–1974." *Foreign Policy* vol. 2 (1998): 116.

Bayülken, Ümit Haluk. "Cyprus Question and the United States." *Foreign Policy (Ankara)* vol. 4, no.2-3, (1974).

Berggren, D. Jason and Rae, Nicol C. "Jimmy Carter and George W. Bush: Faith, Foreign Policy, and Evangelical Presidential Style." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* vol. 36, no. 4 (2006), pp. 606-632.

Bernstein, Barton J. "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading the Jupiters in Turkey?" *Political Science Quarterly* vol. 95, no.1 (Spring 1980): 97-126.

Bialasiewicz, Luiza et al. "Performing Security: The Imaginative Geographies of Current US Strategy." *Political Geography* vol. 26 (2007): 415.

Bilgin, Pinar and Morton, Adam David. "From 'Rogue' to 'Failed' States? The Fallacy of Short-termism." *Politics* vol. 24, no. 3 (2004): 172.

Bilgin, Pinar. "A Return to 'Civilisational Geopolitics' in the Mediterranean? Changing Geopolitical Images of the European Union and Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era." *Geopolitics* vol.9, no.2 (Summer 2004): 271.

Bilsel, Cemil. "The Turkish Straits in the Light of Recent Turkish-Soviet Russian Correspondence." *The American Journal of International Law* vol. 41, no. 4 (October 1947): 739.

Bir, Çevik and Sherman, Martin. "Formula for Stability: Turkey Plus Israel." *Middle East Quarterly* vol. 9, no.4 (Fall 2002): 27.

Bishku, Michael B. "How Has Turkey Viewed Israel?" *Israel Affairs* vol.12, no.1 (January 2006): 177 – 194.

Boztemur, Recep. "Religion and Politics in the Making of American Near East Policy, 1918-1922." *JSRI* no. 11 (Summer 2005): 48.

Bölükbaşı, Süha. "The Evolution of a Close Relationship: Turkish-American Relations, 1917-1960." *Foreign Policy (Ankara)* vol. 26, no.1-2 (1991): 80-104.

Bölükbaşı, Süha. "The Johnson Letter Revisited." *Middle Eastern Studies* vol. 29, no.3 (1993): 505-525.

Brands, H. W., Jr. "America Enters the Cyprus Tangle 1964", *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 23, no. 3 (July 1987):348-362.

Bruno, Greg. "Turkey at an Energy Crossroads." *Backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations* (November 20, 2008).

Burke, Anthony. "Freedom's Freedom: American Enlightenment and Permanent War." *Social Identities* vol. 11, no. 4 (2005): 333.

Bush, George. "Against Aggression in the Persian Gulf." *US Department of State Dispatch* vol. 1, no. 3 (September 1990): 54.

Bush, George. "Towards a New World Order." *US Department of State Dispatch* (September 17, 1990): 91.

Bush, George. "Oklahoma State University Commencement Address (excerpts) 4 May 1990." *Survival* vol. 32, no. 4 (July 1990): 364.

Bush, George. "The Arabian Peninsula: US Principles." *US Department of State Dispatch* (August 8, 1990): 52.

Canbolat, İbrahim. "Siyasal Gerçeklik Açısından Bir Dış Politika Analizi ve Clinton Döneminde Türk-ABD İlişkilerinin Değerlendirilmesi." *Dış Politika* vol.4, no.2, (July, 1993): 99-120.

Cener, Erhan. "Understanding Romania and Turkey's Integration with the European Union: Conditionality, Security Considerations and Identity." *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* vol. 10, no. 2 (2009): 233.

Chase, Robert et.al. "Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy." *Foreign Affairs* vol. 33 (1996): 33.

Chislett , William. "Turkey's EU Accession Reaches an Impasse." *Elcano Royal Institute Working Paper* 34/2009 (July 3, 2009).

Clinton, William J. and Çiller, Tansu. "The United States and Turkey: Developing an enhanced relationship." *US Department of State Dispatch* vol. 4, no. 44 (November 1, 1993): 767-768.

Cohen, Saul B. "Global Political Change in the Post-Cold War Era." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* vol. 81, no. 4 (1991).

Cole, John P. "The World of Jan Kowalewski: Pawns in Other People's Games." *Scottish Geographical Magazine* vol.106, no.2 (1990): 67-80.

Coufoudakis, Van. "United States Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question: An

Interpretation." *Millennium* vol. 5 (1976-77): 245-268.

Cox, Michael. "From the Truman Doctrine to the Second Superpower Détente: The Rise and Fall of the Cold War." *Journal of Peace Research* vol. 27, no. 1 (1990): 25-41.

Crowe, William, J. Jr. "NATO's Southern 'Sideshow' due for Center Ring?" *Christian Science Monitor* (October 22, 1980): 23.

Dahlman, Carl. "Turkey's Accession to the European Union: The Geopolitics of Enlargement." *Eurasian Geography and Economics* vol. 45, no. 8 (2004): 557.

Dalby, Simon. "Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security Discourse." *Alternatives: Social Transformation and Humane Governance* vol. 17, no. 1 (1992): 101.

Dalby, Simon. "Calling 911: Geopolitics, Security and America's New War." *Geopolitics* vol. 8, no. 3 (2003): 61.

Davutoğlu, Ahmet. "The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of the World (Dis)Order" *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs* vol. 2, no. 4 (December 1997-February 1998).

Dobbins, James. "Iraq: Winning the Unwinnable War." *Foreign Affairs* (January-February 2005): 17.

Dodds, Klaus-John and Sidaway James Derrick. "Locating Critical Geopolitics." *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* vol.12, no.5 (1994): 515 – 524

Duffield, John S. "Oil And The Iraq War: How The United States Could Have Expected To Benefit, And Might Still." *MERIA Journal* vol. 9, no. 2 (June 2005).

Earle, Edward Mead. "American Missions in the Middle East." *Foreign Affairs* vol. VII (April, 1929): 400.

Eisenstadt, Michael. "Turkish-Israeli Military Cooperation: An Assessment." *Policywatch* no. 62 (July 24, 1997).

Eligür, Banu. "Turkish-American Relations Since the 2003 Iraqi War: A Troubled Partnership." *Middle East Brief, Crown Center for Middle Eastern Studies* no.6 (May 2006).

Elliott, Michael and Carney, James. "First Stop, Iraq." *Time Magazine* (March 31, 2003): 75.

Erhan, Çağrı. "Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative and Beyond." *Perceptions : Journal of International Affairs* (Autumn 2005): 160.

Erickson, Edward J. "Turkey as Regional Hegemon – 2014: Strategic Implications for the United States." *Turkish Studies* vol. 5, no. 3 (Autumn 2004): 29.

Ersoy, Eyüp and Yeğın, Mehmet. "March 1, 2003: How to Explain the Turkish Foreign Policy Decision?" *The Journal of Turkish Weekly* (2 September 2010).

Evert, M. "Turkey's Strategic Goals: Possibilities and Weaknesses." *Mediterranean Quarterly* vol. 4, no. 4 (Fall 1993): 32.

Evriviades, Marios L. "Turkey's Role in United States Strategy during and after the Cold War." *Mediterranean Quarterly* (Spring 1998): 35.

Fakiolas, Efstathios T. and Fakiolas, Tassos. "Pax- Americana or Multilateralism? Reflecting on the United States' Grand Strategic Vision of Hegemony in the Wake of the 11 September Attack." *Mediterranean Quarterly* vol. 18, no. 4 (Fall 2007): 53-86.

Farmen, William N. and Lessel Erwin F. III. "Forward Presence in Turkey: Case Study." *Parameters* (Autumn 1992): 19-20.

Fukuyama, Francis. "The End of History?" *National Interest* no. 16 (Summer 1989): 3–18.

Gaddis, John Lewis. "A Grand Strategy of Transformation." *Foreign Policy* (November-December 2002): 53.

Gearoid O Tuathail and Timothy W. Luke, " Present at the (Dis)Integration:

Deterritorialization and Reterritorialization in the New Wor(l)d Order." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* vol. 84, no. 3 (September 1994): 381-399.

Gerard, James W. "The Chester Oil Concession and the Lausanne Treaty." *Armenian Review* vol. 28, no.1 (1975): 24-38.

Gerger, Haluk. "Körfez Savaşı, ABD, Türkiye." *Mülkiyeliler Birliği Dergisi* vol.15, no. 130 (April, 1991): 6-8.

Gordon, Philip and Taşpınar, Ömer. "Turkey on the Brink." *The Washington Quarterly* vol. 29, no.3 (Summer 2006): 57.

Göktepe, Cihat. "The Cyprus Crisis of 1967 and its Effects on Turkey's Foreign Relations." *Middle Eastern Studies* vol. 41, no. 3 (2005): 435.

Gönlübol, Mehmet. "NATO and Turkey, An Overall Appraisal." *The Turkish Yearbook Of International Relations* vol. XI (1971): 25.

Gunter, Michael M. "The U.S.-Turkish Alliance in Disarray." *World Affairs* vol. 167, no. 3 (Winter 2005): 121.

Gün, Mustafa. "The USA-Turkey Relationship after Iraq Crisis." *Bilge Strateji - Jeopolitik, Ekonomi-Politik ve Sosyo-Kültürel Araştırmalar Dergisi*. vol. 1, no. 2 (Spring 2010) :13-26.

Güney, Aylin and Gökcan, Fulya. "The 'Greater Middle East' as a 'Modern' Geopolitical Imagination in American Foreign Policy." *Geopolitics* vol. 15, no. 1 (2010): 22-38.

Güney, Aylin. "An Anatomy of the Transformation of the US-Turkish Alliance." *Turkish Studies* vol. 6, no. 3 (September Autumn 2005): 341-359.

Hakkı, Murat Metin. "Surviving the Pressure of the Superpowers: An Analysis of Turkish Neutrality During the Second World War." *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* vol. 8, issue 2 (Winter 2005-2006): 21.

Hale, William. "Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis." *International Affairs*

Royal Institute of International Affairs vol. 68 (1992): 688.

Hepple, Leslie. "The Revival of Geopolitics." *Political Geography Quarterly* no. 5, Supplement (1986): 27.

Hinnebusch, Raymond. "The American Invasion of Iraq: Causes and Consequences." *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs* (Spring 2007): 25.

Hunter, Robert E. "United States Policy in the Middle East." *Current History* vol. 87, no. 526 (February, 1988): 49-90.

Hunter, Shireen. "Bridge or Frontier? Turkey's Post-Cold War Geopolitical Posture." *The International Spectator* vol. 334, no. 1 (January-March 1999): 77.

Huntington, Samuel. "The Clash of Civilizations." *Foreign Affairs* vol. 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22-49.

Inbar, Efraim. "Regional Implications of the Israeli-Turkish Strategic Partnership." *MERIA Journal* vol. 5, no.2 (Summer 2001): 60.

İşyar, Ömer Göksel. "An Analysis of Turkish-American Relations from 1945 to 2004: Initiatives and Reactions in Turkish Foreign Policy." *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations* vol.4, no.3 (Fall 2005): 21.

Jewett, Frank. "Why We Did Not Declare War on Turkey?" *Current History*, vol. XIV (September, 1921): 989-991.

Jones, Laura and Sage, Daniel. "New Directions in Critical Geopolitics: An Introduction." *GeoJournal* (January 21, 2009).

Judah, Tim. "In Iraqi Kurdistan." *Survival* vol. 44, no. 4 (Winter 2002-2003): 42.

Judis, John B. "The Chosen Nation: The Influence of Religion on U.S. Foreign Policy." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief* (March 2005): 3.

Jung, Dietrich and Piccoli, Wolfango. "The Turkish-Israeli Axis: A Matter of Geo-Strategic Change in the Middle East?." *Copenhagen Peace Research Institute Working Paper 05/2001* (2001).

- Kalaitzaki, Theodora. "US Mediation in Greek – Turkish Disputes since 1954." *Mediterranean Quarterly* vol.16, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 112.
- Kapsis, James E. "The Failure of U.S.-Turkish Pre-War Negotiations: An Overconfident United States, Political Mismanagement, and a Conflicted Military." *MERIA Journal* vol. 10, no. 3, Article 3-10 (September 2006).
- Karasapan, Ömer. "Turkey and US Strategy in the Age of Glasnost." *Middle East Report* (September- October 1989): 9.
- Kay, Sean and Yaphe, Judith. "Turkey's International Affairs: Shaping the U.S.- Turkey Strategic Partnership." *Strategic Forum* no. 122 (July 1997): 1.
- Kelly, Phil. "A Critique of Critical Geopolitics." *Geopolitics* vol. 11, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 24-53.
- Kirişçi, Kemal. "Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri: Belirsizlikten Yakınlaşmaya." *Avrasya Dosyası, ABD Özel* vol.6, no.2 (Summer, 2000): 68-90.
- Kirişçi, Kemal. "Between Europe and the Middle East: The Transformation of Turkish Policy." *Middle East Journal of International Affairs* vol. 8, no. 1 (March 2004).
- Klare, Michael T. "For Oil and Empire? Rethinking the War with Iraq." *Current History* vol. 102, no. 662 (March 2003): 129-135.
- Kohen, Sam. "US Bases in Turkey to Reopen." *Christian Science Monitor* (October 6, 1978): 7.
- Kuniholm, Bruce R. "Rhetoric and Reality in the Aegean: U.S. Policy Options Toward Greece and Turkey." *SAIS Review* vol. 6, no.1 (1986): 137-158.
- Kuniholm, Bruce. "Turkey and NATO: Past, Present and Future." *ORBIS* (Summer 1983): 422.
- Kurat, Akdes Nimet. "Turkiye ile ABD Arasındaki Munasebetlere Ait Arşiv Vesikaları." *Tarih Araştırması Dergisi* vol.5, no.8-9 (1967): 287-371.

- Laçiner, Sedat. "Turkish Foreign Policy (1971-1980): Ideologies vs. Realities." *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika* vol.6, no.1 (2010): 91.
- Lake, Anthony. "Confronting Backlash States." *Foreign Affairs* vol. 73, no. 2 (1994): 45.
- Leffler, Melvyn P. "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952." *The Journal of American History* vol. 71, no. 4 (March 1985): 807-825.
- Lesser, Ian O. "Turkey, the United States, and the Delusion of Geopolitics." *Survival*, vol. 48, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 2.
- Lesser, Ian O. "Turkey's Strategic Options." *The International Spectator* vol. 34, no.1 (1999): 83-84.
- Luttwak, Edward. "From Geopolitics to Geo-economics." *The National Interest* no.20 (1990): 17-23.
- Mackinder, Halford J. "The Geographical Pivot of History." *The Geographical Journal*/vol 23, no.4 (April 1904): 421-437.
- Makovsky, Alan. "The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy." *SAIS Review* vol.19, no.1 (1999): 92-113.
- Makovsky, Alan. "The Ocalan Affair: What's Next?" *Policywatch* no. 369 (24 February 1999).
- Megoran, Nick. "The Critical Geopolitics of the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley Boundary Dispute,1999- 2000." *Political Geography*, vol. 23, no. 6 (2004) : 731-764.
- Menon, Rajan and Wimbush, S. Enders. "The US and Turkey: End of an Alliance?" *Survival* vol. 49 no. 2 (2007): 129-144.
- Migdalovitz, Carol. "Türkiye'nin Kürt Sorunu ve ABD Politikası (Translated by Murat Güven)." *Avrasya Dosyası* vol.1, no.2 (1994): 119-137.

- Miller, Steven E. "The Iraq Experiment and US National Security." *Survival* vol. 48, no. 4 (Winter 2006-2007): 17-50.
- Monten, Jonathan. "The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy." *International Security* vol. 29, no. 4 (2005): 143.
- Murphy, Alexander B. et. al. "Is There a Politics to Geopolitics?" *Progress in Human Geography* vol. 28 (2004): 619.
- Murphy, Alexander B. et.al. "Is there a Politics to Geopolitics?" *Progress in Human Geography* vol. 28, no. 5 (2004): 619-640.
- Müller, Martin. "Reconsidering the Concept of Discourse for the Field of Critical Geopolitics: Towards Discourse as Language and Practice." *Political Geography* vol. 27, no. 3 (2008): 322-338.
- Nachmani, Amikam. "The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Tie." *Middle East Quarterly*, vol.5, no. 3 (1998): 23.
- Nye, Joseph S., Jr. "What New World Order?" *Foreign Affairs* vol. 71, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 83.
- O'Loughlin, John and Grant, Richard. "The Political Geography of Presidential Speeches, 1946-87." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* vol. 80, no. 4 (1990): 504-530.
- Olson, Robert W. "Relations among Turkey, Iraq, Kurdistan-Iraq, the Wider Middle East, and Iran." *Mediterranean Quarterly* vol. 17, no. 4 (Fall 2006): 27.
- Öniş, Ziya and Yılmaz, Şühnaz. "Turkey-EU-US Triangle in Perspective: Transformation or Continuity." *Middle East Journal* vol. 59, no.2 (Spring 2005): 268.
- Özilhan, Baki. "Ortadoğu'daki Son Gelişmeler ve Türkiye-ABD ilişkileri." *Mülkiyeliler Birliği Dergisi* vol.12, no.97 (July, 1988): 17-22.
- Pala, Cenk. "Turkey: Energy Bridge between East and West." *Journal of Middle*

Eastern Geopolitics vol. 4 (April - June, 2006).

Park, Bill. "Strategic Location, Political Dislocation: Turkey, the United States and Northern Iraq." *Middle East Review of International Affairs* vol. 7, no. 2 (June 2003): 14.

Parris, Marc. "Starting Over: U.S. – Turkish Relations in the Post-Iraq War Era." *Turkish Policy Quarterly* vol. 2, no. 1 (2003).

Pearson, Robert. "The New World Disorder: The United States and Turkey: A Model of Sustained Engagement." *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* vol.26, no.1(Winter-Spring, 2002).

Pelletreau, Robert H. "American Objective In the Middle East." *U.S. Department of State Dispatch* vol. 7, no. 23 (June 3, 1996).

Perle, Richard and McNamara, Michael J. "US Security Assistance for Turkey and the Challenge of Aid for the Southern Flank." *NATO's Sixteen Nations* vol. 32, no. 2 (April 1987): 94-97,

Pfiffner, James P. "Did President Bush Mislead the Country in His Arguments for War with Iraq?" *Presidential Studies Quarterly* vol.34, no.1 (March, 2004): 25-46.

Pipes, Daniel. "A New Axis: The Emerging Turkish-Israeli Entente." *National Interest* no. 50 (Winter 1997-1998): 31-38.

Powell, Colin L. "A Strategy of Partnership." *Foreign Affairs* vol. 83, no. 1 (January-February 2004): 25.

Powell, Colin L. "U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changing World: Keeping Democracy Alive." *Vital Speeches of the Day*, LVI no. 14 (May 1, 1990).

Rice, Condoleeza. "The White House and the Wall." *Newsweek* (November 22, 1999).

Robert McDonald, "Alliance Problems in the Eastern Mediterranean -Greece, Turkey and Cyprus: Part II", *Adelphi Series*, vol.28, issue 229 (Spring 1988).

- Roberts Susan M., et al. "Review Symposium on Gearoid O Tuathail's (1996) 'Critical Geopolitics: the Politics of Writing Global Space'." *Political Geography* vol. 19, no. 3 (2000): 345-346.
- Robey, Richard and Vordermark, Jeffrey. "Security Assistance Mission in the Republic of Turkey." *The DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management* vol. 26, no. 2 (Winter 2003): 11.
- Robins, Philip. "Between Sentiment and Self-Interest: Turkey's Policy towards Azerbaijan and Central Asian States." *The Middle East Journal* vol. 7, no. 4 (Autumn 1993): 601.
- Robins, Philip. "Confusion at Home, Confusion Abroad: Turkey between Copenhagen and Iraq." *International Affairs* vol. 79, no. 3 (May 2003).
- Rubin, Michael. "A Comedy of Errors: American-Turkish Diplomacy and the Iraq War." *Turkish Policy Quarterly* (Spring 2005).
- Salmoni, Barak A. "Strategic Partners or Estranged Allies: Turkey, the United States, and Operation Iraqi Freedom." *Strategic Insights* vol. 2, no. 7 (July 2003).
- Sander, Oral. "Türkiye'nin Batı Bağlantısı: ABD ve Türkiye." *AÜSBF* vol.34, no.1-4 (January-December, 1979): 63-86.
- Sasley, Brent. "Turkey's Energy Politics in the Post-Cold War Era." *MERIA Journal* vol. 2, no.4 (1998): 28-36.
- Sayarı, Sabri. "Turkey and the Middle East in the 1990s." *Journal of Palestine Studies* vol. 26, no.3 (Spring 1997).
- Sayarı, Sabri. "United States and Turkey's Membership in the European Union." *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*. vol. 14 (2003): 168.
- Sezer, Duygu Bazoğlu. "Turkey's Grand Strategy Facing a Dilemma." *International Spectator* vol. 27 (January-March 1992): 25.
- Sharp, Joanne P. "Publishing American Identity: Popular Geopolitics, Myth and the

Reader's Digest." *Political Geography* vol. 12, no. 6 (1993): 491-503.

Sidaway, James D., et al. "Translating Political Geographies." *Political Geography* vol. 23, no. 8 (2004): 1037-1049.

Somer, Murat. "Failures of the Discourse of Ethnicity: Turkey, Kurds, and the Emerging Iraq." *Security Dialogue* vol. 36, no. 1 (March 2005).

Soysal, İsmail. "Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinin Ana Çizgileri." *Bellekten* vol. 41, no.162 (1977): 257-276.

Soysal, Mümtaz. "ABD'nin Dış Siyasetindeki Yeni Gelişmeler ve Türkiye." *Forum* vol.12, no.138 (December 15, 1959): 6-9.

Spain, James. "The United States, Turkey and the Poppy." *The Middle East Journal* vol. 29, no.3 (Summer 1975): 299.

Spykman, Nicholas J. "Geography and Foreign Policy I." *American Political Science Review*, no.1 (February 1938).

Süvarierol, Semin. "The Cyprus Obstacle on Turkey's Road to Membership in the European Union." *Turkish Studies* vol. 4, no. 1 (2003): 55-78.

Tamkoç, Metin. "The Impact of the Truman Doctrine on the National Security Interests of Turkey." *Foreign Policy (Ankara)* vol. 6, no.3-4 (1976): 18-41.

Tank, Pınar. "Analysis: The Effects of the Iraq War on the Kurdish Issue in Turkey." *Conflict, Security & Development* vol. 5, no. 1 (April 2005): 76.

Tank, Pınar. "Dressing for the Occasion: Reconstructing Turkey's Identity." *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* vol. 6, no. 4 (2006): 463.

Taşhan, Seyfi. "Turkish-U.S. Relations and Cyprus." *Foreign Policy (Ankara)* vol. 4, no.2-3 (1974): 164-167.

Taşpınar, Ömer. "The Anatomy of Anti-Americanism in Turkey." *Insight Turkey* vol.7, no. 2 (April-June 2005).

TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 32. Birleşim, 06.02.2003 vol. 4 (2003).
<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem22/yil1/bas/b032m.htm>, accessed July 22, 2010.

TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 5. Birleşim, 10.10.2001 vol. 71 (2001).
<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem21/yil4/bas/b005m.htm>, accessed July 22, 2010.

Tekin, Ali and Walterova, Iva. "Turkey's Geopolitical Role: The Energy Angle." *Middle East Policy* vol. 14, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 86.

Tuathail, Gearóid Ó. "The Language and Nature of the "New" Geopolitics: The Case of US–El Salvador Relations." *Political Geography Quarterly* no. 5 (1986): 75.

Tuathail, Gearóid Ó and Agnew, John A. "Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy." *Political Geography* vol. 11, no.2 (1992): 190-204.

Tuathail, Gearóid Ó. "(Dis)placing Geopolitics: Writing on the Maps of Global Politics." *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* vol.12, no.5 (1994): 525 – 546.

Tuathail, Gearóid Ó. "At the End of Geopolitics? Reflection on a Plural Problematic at the Century's End." *Alternatives* vol. 22 (1997): 35.

Tuathail, Gearóid Ó. "Geopolitics @ Millenium: Paranoid Fantasies and Technological Fundamentalism amidst the Contradictions of Contemporary Modernity." *Geographica Slovenica* vol. 34, no. 1 (2001): 22.

Tuathail, Gearóid Ó. "Problematizing Geopolitics: Survey, Statecraft and Strategy." *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* vol.19 (1994): 260.

Tuathail, Gearóid Ó. "The Postmodern Geopolitical Condition: States, Statecraft, and Security at the Millennium." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* vol.90, no.1 (2000): 166-178.

Tuathail, Gearóid Ó. "Theorizing Practical Geopolitical Reasoning: The Case of US.

- Policy towards Bosnia in 1992." *Political Geography* vol. 21, no. 5 (2002): 605-606.
- Tunander, Ola. "Swedish-German Geopolitics for a New Century – Rudolf Kjellén's 'The state as a Living Organism.'" *Review of International Studies* vol. 27 (2001): 453.
- Turan, İlder and Barlas, Dilek. "Turkish – Greek Balance: A Key to Peace and Cooperation in the Balkans." *East European Quarterly* vol. 32, no. 4 (Winter 1998): 469-70.
- U.S. Department of Commerce. "The Big Emerging Markets." *Business America* vol. 115, no. 3 (1994): 4-6.
- Uslu, Nasuh. "1947'den Günümüze Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinin Genel Portresi." *Avrasya Dosyası, ABD Özel* vol.6, no.2 (Summer, 2000): 203-233.
- Uslu, Nasuh. "Körfez Savaşı ve Amerika'nın Politikaları." *AÜSBF* vol.54, no.3 (July-September, 1999): 165-200.
- Uslu, Nasuh. "The Factors Affecting Turkey's Relations with the United States in the Post-Cold War Period." *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations* vol. 31, no. 2 (2000): 223.
- Uslu, Nasuh. "The Russian, Caucasian and Central Asian Aspects of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Period." *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations* vol.2, no.3-4 (Fall-Winter 2003): 164.
- Ülman, Haluk. "Türk-Amerikan Yakınlaşması ve Sovyetler Birliği." *Forum* vol.13, no.165 (February 15, 1961): 11-14.
- Warner, Geoffrey. "The United States and the Cyprus crisis of 1974." *International Affairs* vol.85, no.1 (January, 2009): 129-143.
- Winrow, Gareth M. "Turkey and the East-West Gas Transportation Corridor." *Turkish Studies* vol. 5, no.2 (Summer 2004): 39.
- Wohlsteter, Albert. "Meeting the Threat in the Persian Gulf." *Survey* vol. 25, no.2

(1981): 128-188.

Wohlstetter, Albert. "The Strategic importance of Turkey and the Arms Embargo." *Journal of International Relations* vol. 3, no.2 (1978): 101-109.

X. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." *Foreign Affairs* vol. 25, no. 4 (1947): 566-582.

Yanık, Lerna. "Constructing Turkish 'Exceptionalism': Discourses of Liminality and Hybridity in Turkish Foreign Policy." *Political Geography* vol.30, no.2 (February, 2011): 80-89.

Yanık, Lerna. "The Metamorphosis of 'Metaphors of Vision': 'Bridging' Turkey's Location, Role and Identity After the End of the Cold War", *Geopolitics*, vol. 14, no. 3 (August 2009): pp.531-549.

Yılmaz, Şühnaz. "Challenging the Stereotypes: Turkish–American Relations in the Inter-war Era", *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 42, no. 2, (March 2006): 223 – 237.

NEWS

"Wolfowitz Shifts Rationale on Iraq War." *The Washington Post*, September 12, 2003.

"\$ 8.5 bn. US Credit Terms Highlight Mutual Mistrust." *Briefing*, October 6, 2003.

"Ankara savunma derdine düştü. (Ankara concerned about the defense)." *Radikal*, April 14, 1999.

"Barzani Sees Establishment of Kurdish State, Doesn't Know When." *Turkish Daily News*, January 31, 2005.

"Başbuğ: 'İlimli İslam' Laik Değil. (Başbuğ: 'Moderate Islam' is not Secular)." *Radikal*, March 20, 2004.

"Edelman: 'Stratejik Ortaklığı Yeniden İnşa Etmemiz Gerek'. (Edelman: 'We have to Reconstruct the Strategic Partnership')." *Anadolu Ajansı*, June 13, 2003.

"George Bush U. S. President." *CNN Perspectives Series: Cold War Episode 23: Conclusions: Interviews*, October 1997.

"George Bush U. S. President." *CNN Perspectives Series: Cold War Episode 24: Conclusions: Interviews*, September-October 1997.

"Gül: ABD delilleri ikna edici değil. (Gül: US Proofs are not Convincing)." *Hürriyet*, July 10, 2003.

"Henry Kissinger U. S. Secretary of State." *CNN Perspectives Series: Cold War Episode 24: Conclusions: Interviews*, March-April 1997.

"Interview of U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz." *CNN Turk*, May 6, 2003.

"IRAN: The Crescent of Crisis." *Time*, January 15, 1979.

<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,919995,00.html>, accessed August 17, 2010.

"Iraq: Ecevit Says U.S. Directing Iraqi Kurds." *IPR Strategic Business Information Database*, October 20, 2002.

"Meet the Press – Vice President Dick Cheney on NBC News." *NBC*, March 16, 2003.

"Özök: En Büyük Güven Bunalımı. (Özök: The Most Important Crisis of Confidence Ever)." *Hürriyet*, July 7, 2003.

"Prospects of Further Division of Iraq Disturb Ankara." *Briefing*, August 24, 1992.

"Pseka Conference begins in Washington." *Hellenic Resources*, June 20, 2002. <http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/cypio/2002/02-06-20.cypio.html>, accessed 12, January 2011.

"Tavsiye Kararı Yok. (No Suggestion to the Government)." *Hürriyet*, February 28, 2003.

"The Other Jerusalem." *The Economist*, April 4, 2007.

"Turkey Clarifies Content of Accord." *Turkish Daily News*, April 11, 1996.

"Turkey, Israel in joint energy project to link Asia to Caspian." *Turkish Daily News*, July 18, 2008.

"Turkey, The United States and Iraq: Continuing Differences." *Turkey Update*, November 19, 2003.

"Turkish, US Generals Meet, Eyes on Probe into Crisis." *Turkish Daily News*, July 10, 2003.

"US Says It Sees Turkey as a Secular, Democratic Republic." *Turkish Daily News*, April 5, 2004.

"US, Turkey Work to Save Ties after Iraq, PKK Rifts." *Turkish Daily News*, September 27, 2005.

Beehner, Lionel. "The Iraqi Question." *Council on Foreign Relations*, April 23, 2007.

Birand, Mehmet Ali. "We're No Longer Strategic Partners." *Turkish Daily News*, July 7, 2006.

Bowcott, Owen and Harding, Luke. "Turkey Demands More Time on Troop Deal." *The Guardian*, February 2, 2003.

Enginsoy, Ümit. "And Ralston Quits, Officially." *Turkish Daily News*, October 11, 2007.

Ergin, Sedat. "Biz Gemide Askerler var Sanıyorduk, Meğer Yokmuş. (We thought that There were Soldiers in the Ships, Apparently There were Not)." *Hürriyet*, September 22, 2003.

Ergin, Sedat. "Tezkere, AKP'yi çatlattı. (Iraq Bill splitted JDP)." *Hürriyet*, September 24, 2003.

F. Hayes, Stephen. "Wolfowitz Talks Turkey, The Serious War Planning is under

Way." *Weekly Standard*, December 16, 2002.

Kizner, Stephen. "Caspian Lands Back a Pipeline Pushed by the West." *New York Times*, November 19, 1999.

Marcus Gee, "The US Helped Turkey Find and Capture Kurd Rebel." *Globe and Mail*, February 24, 1999.

Marshall, Tyler. "Route of Caspian Sea Oil Pipeline Debated." *Los Angeles Times*, December 3, 1998.

Nachmani, Amikam. "The Remarkable Turkish-Israeli Tie." *Middle East Quarterly*, June 1998.

Oruç, Saadet. "Turkey Considers Bypassing the AIOC." *Turkish Daily News*, May 9, 1998.

Toker, Metin. "Savaşta Türkiye'nin Hiçbir Çıkarı Yoktur. (Turkey has no Benefit from the War)." *Milliyet*, January 17, 1991.

Tyler, Patrick E. "Pentagon Drops Goal of Blocking New Superpowers." *New York Times*, May 24, 1992.

Weiner, Tim. "U.S. Played Key Role in Capture of Kurd Rebel, Officials Say." *New York Times*, February 20, 1999

Woodward, Bob and Balz, Dan. "Combating Terrorism: 'It Starts Today'." *The Washington Post*, February 1, 2002.

ONLINE RESOURCES

"Obama Says, U.S., Turkey can be Model for World." *CNN*, April 6, 2009, <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/04/06/obama.turkey>, accessed March 28, 2011.

"1992 Draft Defense Planning Guidance." IPS – Right Web. <http://www.rightweb.irc->

online.org/profile/1992_Draft_Defense_Planning_Guidance, accessed August 22, 2010.

"About PNAC." Project for the New American Century.

<http://www.newamericancentury.org/aboutpnac.htm> , accessed July 12, 2010.

"Annan Plan, The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, 31 March 2004." United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus.

<http://www.unficyp.org/media/Other%20official%20documents/annanplan.pdf>, accessed April 29, 2010.

"Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline: Milestones Along The Way." *Middle East Economic Survey* vol. XLIX, no. 29 (July 17, 2006).

<http://www.mees.com/postedarticles/oped/v49n29-5OD02.htm>, accessed January 17, 2011.

"Clinton Welcomes Turkey's Acceptance of EU Offer." The United States Mission to the European Union. <http://www.useu.be/ISSUES/turk1211.html>, accessed April 2, 2010.

"Europe: A New Pipeline, a Different Direction. November 19, 2007." Stratfor. http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/europe_new_pipeline_different_direction, accessed September 7, 2010.

"Final Communiqué." NATO. <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c510920a.htm>, accessed April 1, 2010.

"Forum for the Future to Study Economic, Political, Social Reforms, December 1, 2004." U.S. Department of State. <http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2004/December/20041201180622ndyblehs5.512637e-02.html#ixzz1FAO0ZFBY>, accessed September 17, 2010.

"G-8 Greater Middle East Partnership Working Paper." Middle East Intelligence Bulletin. <http://www.meib.org/documentfile/040213.htm>, accessed August 17, 2010.

"Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nin Kuruluşuna İlişkin Temel Antlaşma (1960) (İngilizce)."

Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/kibris-cumhuriyeti_nin-kurulusuna-iliskin-temel-antlasma-_1960__ingilizce_.tr.mfa, accessed April 12, 2010.

"Napoleon on Politics & Power." Napoleon Guide. http://www.napoleonguide.com/aquote_pover.htm, accessed April 1, 2010.

"NATO enlargement." NATO. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm, accessed April 1, 2010.

"President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East. November 6, 2003." The White House. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html>, accessed August 2, 2010.

"Shared Vision and Structured Dialogue to Advance the Turkish-American Strategic Partnership, July 5, 2006." Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/SharedVision.pdf>, accessed September 2, 2010.

"Statement by EU Commissioner Rehn on Turkey's Cyprus Initiative, 24 January 2006." European Union at United Nations. http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/fr/article_5606_fr.htm, accessed February 20, 2011.

"The 'Marshall Plan' speech at Harvard University, 5 June 1947." OECD. http://www.oecd.org/document/10/0,3343,en_2649_201185_1876938_1_1_1_1,0.html, accessed March 22, 2010.

"Transatlantic Trends 2004 Partners." The German Fund of the United States – Transatlantic Trends, http://trends.gmfus.org/doc/2004_english_key.pdf, accessed April 9, 2011.

"Turgut Ozal Memorial Lecture – Remarks by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Washington Institute for Near East Policy St. Regis Hotel, Washington, D.C., Wednesday, 13 March 2002." U.S. Secretary of Defense. <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=198>, accessed August 4,

2010.

"UN Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq." Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq. Accessed August 5, 2010. <http://www.casi.org.uk/info/scriraq.html#1990>

"United Nations Security Council Resolution 660." Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq. <http://www.casi.org.uk/info/undocs/scres/1990/660e.pdf>, accessed August 5, 2010.

"United Nations Security Council Resolution 661." Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq. <http://www.casi.org.uk/info/undocs/scres/1990/661e.pdf>, accessed August 5, 2010.

"US to Remain 'aggressive' Abroad." BBC News, 9 November, 2004. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3994699.stm>, accessed August 12, 2010.

Ari, Tayyar. "US Middle East Policy and the Role of Turkey: The Recent Development in Turkish-American Relations." Tayyar Ari. <http://www.tayyarari.com/download/tacc.doc>, accessed August 10, 2010.

Carley, Patricia. "Turkey's Role in the Middle East.", United States Institute of Peace. <http://www.usip.org/files/resources/pwks1.pdf>, accessed August 20, 2010.

Cem, İsmail. "Press Release of Unofficial Translation, Turkish Embassy, Washington, D.C., 24 October 1998". http://www.turkey.org/turkey/f_politics.htm, accessed February 5, 2011.

Clinton, William J. "Remarks by the President at Quandt Lecture." Encyclopedia Britannica. <http://www.britannica.com/bps/additionalcontent/18/8868150/Remarks-by-the-President-at-Quandt-Lecture>, accessed August 5, 2010.

Cook, Steven A., et.al. "Fractured Alliance? The Future of U.S.-Turkey Relations, June 22, 2006." Council on Foreign Relations. http://www.cfr.org/publication/11014/fractured_alliance_the_future_of_usturkey_relations_transcript_federal_news_service_inc.html, accessed September 7, 2010.

Çağatay, Soner and Köknar, Aynur. "The PKK's New Offensive: Implications for Turkey, Iraqi Kurds, and the US." *Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP)*, June 25, 2004.

<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=1755>, accessed March 15, 2010.

Department of State, Office of the Spokesman. "Secretary of State Madeleine Albright interview on The Diane Rehm Show, Washington DC, June 19, 2000." US Department of State.

<http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/2000/000619.html>, accessed March 5, 2011.

Deputy for Financial Management Comptroller, DSAA. "Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts, Defense Security Assistance Agency as of September 1997." Defense Technical Information Center.

<http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA346400&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>, accessed January 13, 2011.

FAS. "U.S. Military Aid and Arms Sales to Turkey (see 1980-1992). Federation of American Scientists. http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/turkey_fmchart.htm, accessed October 17, 2010.

Ferrari, Bruno. "Geopolitics – A Critical Assessment of the 'Great Game' in and Around the Caspian Sea." Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq.

http://www.ciari.org/investigacao/geopolitics_greatgame_caspiansea.pdf, accessed August 7, 2010.

Ferris, Elizabeth and Stoltz, Kimberly. "The Future of Kirkuk: The Referendum and Its Potential Impact on Displacement." The Brookings Institution-University of Bern Project on International Displacement, 3 March 2008.

http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2008/0303_iraq_ferris.aspx, accessed October 27, 2010.

Fried, Daniel. "Remarks by Daniel Fried on U.S.-Turkey-Azerbaijan Relations,

December 10, 2007." America.gov. <http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2007/December/20071210175301xjsnommis0.4228022.html>, accessed September 7, 2010.

Gagne, Jean-Francois. "Geopolitics in a Post-Cold War Context: From Geostrategic to Geo-Economic Considerations." *Raoul Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies Occasional Paper*, no. 15., University of Quebec at Montreal, 2007.

http://www.dandurand.uqam.ca/uploads/files/publications/etudes_raoul_dandurand/etude_rd_15_jfgagne_intcouv_240807.pdf, accessed April 20, 2010.

Giachetti, David M. "United States Military Relations with Turkey." *A Research Report Submitted to the Air War Collage*, 15 February 2008.

https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/q_mod_be0e99f3-fc56-4ccb-8dfe-670c0822a153/q_act_downloadpaper/q_obj_9692bb4e-a132-48c0-b7b3-03ea195ec95c/display.aspx?rs=enginespage, accessed September 12, 2010.

Gillis, Patrick F. "US-Turkish Relations: The Road to Improving a Troubled Strategic Partnership, March 19, 2004 Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.

<http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA424313&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>, accessed November 19, 2010.

Grossman, Marc. "U.S. Interests and Turkey." Middle East Briefing in Philadelphia, March 13, 2000. <http://www.meforum.org/184/us-interests-and-turkey>, accessed November 19, 2010.

Haine, Jean-Yves and Lindström, Gustav. "An Analysis of The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Analysis – n°0, September 2002." Institute for Security Studies.

<http://www.iss.europa.eu/nc/actualites/actualite/browse/9/article/an-analysis-of-the-national-security-strategy-of-the-united-states-of-america/>, accessed June 27, 2010.

Indyk , Martin. "The Clinton Administration's Approach to the Middle East." The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubs/indyk.htm>, accessed June 11, 2010.

Kalin, M. Yasin. "The Implication of EU Admittance of Turkey on Turkish-EU Relations." Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 18, 2005. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil42.pdf>, accessed November 20, 2010.

Klemencic, Matjaž. "The International Community's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis: 1989-1995." Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/MR320Klemencic.doc>, accessed on 21 August 2010.

Klosson, Michael. "U.S. Policy toward Cyprus After the Referanda, 27 May 2004." Embassy of the United States Nicosia Cyprus. www.americanembassy.org.cy/USpolicy/speechlist-klosson2002-2005.htm, accessed August 22, 2010.

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense. "Global Posture: Testimony as Prepared for Delivery by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Senate Armed Service Committee, Washington, DC, Thursday, September 23, 2004." U.S. Department of Defense. <http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=156>, accessed March 11, 2011.

Office of the Press Secretary. "*President Bush Discusses Democracy, Freedom from Turkey*. Remarks By The President in Istanbul, Turkey. As Prepared For Delivery, June 29 2004)." The White House. <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040629-4.html>, accessed September 19, 2010.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, "International Military Education and Training (IMET)." Defense Security Cooperation Agency. http://www.dsca.osd.mil/home/international_military_education_training.htm, accessed November 13, 2010.

Pearson, Robert. "U.S.-Turkish Relations after November 3: Continuity and

Partnership." U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International Information Programs. <http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2002/November/20021114154828lfenner@pd.state.gov0.4453089.html>, accessed August 5, 2010.

Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Ankara Declaration." <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/default2.asp?param=/GRUPH/Release/1998/Ankara.htm>, accessed August 19, 2010.

Secretary of Defense Cohen, William S. and Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Sezgin. "Joint Press Conference with Secretary Cohen and Deputy Prime Minister Sezgin, Turkey, April 17, 1998." U.S. Department of Defense <http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=795>, accessed July 12, 2010.

Sunday, Godson. "Turkey's Post Cold-War Relationship with the United States: A Critical Reappraisal". Paper prepared for presentation at the 2008 Annual Conference of the International Studies Association, San Francisco, CA, March 26 – 29, 2008. http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/5/1/9/5/pages251958/p251958-1.php, accessed January 20, 2011.

Talbott, Strobe. "U.S.-Turkish Relations in an Age of Interdependence." Turgut Özal Memorial Lecture at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington D.C., October 16, 1998. <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=1222>, accessed March 7, 2010.

Taylor, Claire and Youngs, Tim. "The Conflict in Iraq. International Affairs and Defence Section." *Research Paper 03/50, House of Commons Library*, May 23, 2003. <http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2003/rp03-050.pdf>, accessed September 14, 2010.

U.S. Department of State Archive. "Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa. June 8, 2005." U.S. Department of State Archive. <http://bmena.state.gov/rls/fs/55743.htm>, accessed

August 17, 2010.

U.S. Department of State. "*Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations Fiscal Year 1986-2000.*" U.S. Department of State.
<http://www.fas.org/asmp/library>, accessed July 12, 2010.

U.S. Department of State. "Daily Press Briefing, May 9, 1997." U.S. Department of State. <http://www.hri.org/news/usa/std/1997/97-05-09.std.html>, accessed March 4, 2011.

US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman. "Secretary of State Madeleine Albright Address before the Council on Foreign Relations, September 30, 1997." US Department of State. <http://www.secretary.state.gov/www/statements/970930.html>, accessed March 5, 2011.

USAID. "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Custom Country Report, Turkey." USAID. <http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/query/do>, accessed January 19, 2011.

USAID. "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook)." USAID. <http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov>, accessed October 22, 2010.

USEU. "Ambassador Robert Pearson on US–Turkish Relations." United States Mission to the European Union.
<http://www.useu.be/Categories/US&EUEnlargement/Nov1402USTurkeyRelations.html>, accessed December 14, 2010.

Wishnick, Elizabeth. "Strategic Consequences of the Iraq War: U.S. Security Interests in Central Asia Reassessed, May 2004." Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.
<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub383.pdf>, accessed November 19, 2010.

Woolley, John T. and Peters, Gerhard. "Andrew Jackson: Second Annual Message, December 6, 1830." The American Presidency Project.
<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29472>, accessed October 15, 2010.

Woolley, John T. and Peters, Gerhard. "Barack Obama: Remarks to the Grand

National Assembly of Turkey in Ankara, April 6, 2009." The American Presidency Project, Santa Barbara, CA. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=85972>, accessed March 30, 2011.

Woolley, John T. and Peters, Gerhard. "Barack Obama: Statement on United States Troop Levels in Afghanistan, February 17, 2009" The American Presidency Project, Santa Barbara, CA. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=85783>, accessed March 30, 2011.

Woolley, John T. and Peters, Gerhard. "Barak Obama: The President's News Conference With President Abdullah Gul of Turkey in Ankara, Turkey, April 6, 2009." The American Presidency Project, Santa Barbara, CA. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=85974>, accessed March 30, 2011.

Woolley, John T. and Peters, Gerhard. "Dwight D. Eisenhower: The President's News Conference, April 7, 1954." The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=10202>, accessed October 15, 2010.

Woolley, John T. and Peters, Gerhard. "Franklin D. Roosevelt: Excerpts from the Press Conference, August 21, 1942." The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16295>, accessed October 15, 2010.

Woolley, John T. and Peters, Gerhard. "George Bush: Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 29, 1991." The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19253>, accessed August 3, 2010.

Woolley, John T. and Peters, Gerhard. "George Bush: Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit, Washington D.C., 11 September 1990." The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=18820>, accessed August 6, 2010.

Woolley, John T. and Peters, Gerhard. "George Bush: The President's News Conference on the Persian Gulf Conflict, January 18, 1991). The American Presidency Project <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19229>, accessed

August 5, 2010.

Woolley, John T. and Peters, Gerhard. "George W. Bush: Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, September 20, 2001." The American Presidency Project.

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64731>, accessed July 22, 2010.

Woolley, John T. and Peters, Gerhard. "George W. Bush: Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 29, 2002." The

American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29644>, accessed August 29, 2010.

Woolley, John T. and Peters, Gerhard. "George W. Bush: Address to the Nation Announcing Strikes Against Al Qaida Training Camps and Taliban Military Installations in Afghanistan, October 7, 2001." The American Presidency Project.

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=65088> , accessed November 20, 2010.

Woolley, John T. and Peters, Gerhard. "George W. Bush: Remarks at Galatasaray University in Istanbul, June 29, 2004." The American Presidency Project.

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64397>, accessed September 22, 2010.

Woolley, John T. and Peters, Gerhard. "Gerald Ford: Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress Reporting on United States Foreign Policy. April 10, 1975."

American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4826>, accessed April 7, 2010.

Woolley, John T. and Peters, Gerhard. "Harry S. Truman: Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine. March 12, 1947." American

Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12846>, accessed April 7, 2010.

Woolley, John T. and Peters, Gerhard. "James Monroe: Seventh Annual Message. December 2, 1823." American Presidency Project.

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29465>, accessed April 24, 2010.

Woolley, John T. and Peters, Gerhard. "Jimmy Carter: The State of the Union

Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress. January 23, 1980." American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33079>, accessed March 12, 2010.

Woolley, John T. and Peters, Gerhard. "Richard Nixon: Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam November 3, 1969." American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2303>, accessed March 13, 2010.

Woolley, John T. and Peters, Gerhard. "William Howard Taft: First Annual Message, December 7, 1909." The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29550>, accessed October 15, 2010.

Woolley, John T. and Peters, Gerhard. "William Howard Taft: Fourth Annual Message, December 3, 1912." The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29553>, accessed October 15, 2010.

Woolley, John T. and Peters, Gerhard. "William Howard Taft: Second Annual Message, December 6, 1910." The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29551>, accessed October 15, 2010.

Woolley, John T. and Peters, Gerhard. "William Howard Taft: Third Annual Message, December 5, 1911." The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29552>, accessed October 15, 2010.

Woolley, John T. and Peters, Gerhard. "William J. Clinton: Remarks to the Turkish Grand National Assembly in Ankara, November 15, 1999." The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=56935>, accessed August 21, 2010.

Woolley, John T. and Peters, Gerhard. "Woodrow Wilson: Address to a Joint Session of Congress on the Conditions of Peace, January 8, 1918." American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=65405>, accessed March 5, 2010.

DOCUMENTS

"An Evaluation of the Development of Democratic Processes in Turkey Since 1945", *Records of the Office of GTI Affairs, 1947-50*.

"Greece and Turkey: Background Material: Political, Economic, and Military, Budget Presentation, Fiscal Year 1949", *Records of the Office of GTI Affairs, 1947-50*.

"Position on Question of the Turkish Straits-Exchange of Notes Between the Soviet Chargé d'affaires and Acting Secretary Acheson." *Department of State Bulletin* vol. 15, no. 374 (September 1, 1946): 421.

"Statement by Acting Secretary Acheson." *Department of State Bulletin* vol. 16, no. 409-A (4 May 1947): 847-52.

Alyot, Halim. *Report from Nuri Esen (Press Bureau, New York) on Military Aid to Korea (sent on July 28)*. Ankara, 5 August 1950.

Bush, George W. *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*. Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002.

Bush, George W. *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*. Washington, DC: The White House, March 2006.

Bush, George W. *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*. Washington, DC: The White House, February 2003.

Bush, George W. *U.S. National Strategy for Homeland Security*, Washington, DC: Office of Homeland Security, July 2002,

Clinton, William J. *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*. Washington, DC: The White House, May 1997.

Clinton, William J. *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*. Washington, DC: The White House, December 1999.

Clinton, William J. *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*. Washington, DC: The White House, October 1998.

Clinton, William J. *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*. Washington, DC: The White House, May 1997.

Çağatay, Soner. *The State of US-Turkish Relations, Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives*. 109th Congress, 1st Session, 2005.

Çağatay, Soner. *Turkey's Future Direction and US-Turkey Relations, Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on International Relations*, October 2003.

Gates, Robert M. *Weapons Proliferation in the New World Order: Hearing, United States, Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs*, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., January 15, 1992.

Hagel, Chuck. *Energy Supplies in Eurasia and Implications for U.S. Energy Security, Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations*, September 27, 2005.

Howard, Harry. "Some Recent Developments in the Problem of the Turkish Straits, 1945-1946." *Department of State Bulletin* vol. 16, no. 395 (January 26, 1947): 143.

Howard, Harry. "Some Recent Developments in the Problem of the Turkish Straits, 1945-1946." *Department of State Bulletin* vol. 16, no. 395 (January 26, 1947): 143.

Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923. Record of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace. London, 1923.

Makovsky, Alan. "Turkey's Faded European Dream." in *Conference Report: The Parameters of Partnership: Germany, the U.S., and Turkey*. Washington, DC: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 1998.

McGhee, George C. "Turkey, the United States, and the Free World." *Department of State Bulletin* vol. 23, no. 592 (November 6, 1950): 739.

Olcott, Martha Brill. *U.S. Policy in Central Asia: Balancing Priorities (Part II)*,

Testimony Prepared for the House Committee on International Relations Hearing on the Middle East and Central Asia, April 26, 2006.

Pelletiere, Stephen C. *Landpower and Dual Containment: Rethinking America's Policy in the Gulf*. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 1999.

Pena, Federico. *Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, April 30, 1998.*

Ralston, Joseph. *Special Envoy Countering the Kurdistan Workers Party, Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe, March 15, 2007.*

U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. February 24, 25, 26 and March 10, 1987. Security and Development Assistance: Hearings Before the Committee of Foreign Relations. 100th Cong, 1st Sess., Part 1.

U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Near East and Africa, 1946 vol. VII*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946.

U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States: Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, 1946 vol. VI*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946.

U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States: National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, 1950 vol. I*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950.

U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970.

U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Near East and Africa, 1946 vol. VII*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946.

U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States 1973-1976:*

Greece; Cyprus; Turkey, 1973-1976 vol. XXX. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2007.

U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, 1949 vol. VI.* Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1949.

U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States: Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, 1948 vol. IV.* Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948.

U.S. Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States: Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1923 vol. II.* Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1923.

U.S. House. Lend Lease Bill. HR1776. 77th Cong., 1st sess., (January 10, 1941).

U.S. House. *Resolution Condemning the Terrorist Attacks in Istanbul, Turkey, on November 15 and 20, 2003, Expressing Condolences to the Families of the Individuals Murdered in the Attacks, Expressing Sympathies to the Individuals Injured in the Attacks, and Expressing Solidarity with the Republic of Turkey and the United Kingdom in the Fight Against Terrorism.* HR 273. 108th Cong., 1st sess. *Congressional Record*, vol. 149 (November 24, 2003).

U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. *CRS Report for Congress, The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA)*, by Kenneth Katzman. Congressional Rep. RS20871. Washington: The Service, October 7, 2010.

U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. *Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations and Related Issues*, by Carol Migdalovitz. Congressional Rep. RL34642. Washington: The Service, August 29, 2008.

U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. *Memorandum Concerning US-Turkish Relations*, March 2007.

U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. *Turkey: Selected Foreign Policy Issues and US Views*, by Carol Migdalovitz. Congressional Rep. RL33497.

Washington: The Service, July 20, 2007.

U.S. Senate. *Executive Session of Senate Foreign Relations Committee*. 82nd Cong., 1st sess., Washington: USGPO, 1976.

U.S. Senate. *Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999*. 106th Cong., 1st sess., August 3, 1999.

United States Congress House Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on Europe. October 1, 2003. Turkey's Future Direction and U.S.-Turkey Relations: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives. 108th Cong., 1st sess.

United States Congress House. July 16, 1974. Turkish Opium Ban Negotiations: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives. 93rd Cong., 2nd sess.

United States Congress House. June-July, 1974. Foreign Assistance Request: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives.

United States. "Agreement Between the United States of America and Turkey Respecting Aid to Turkey." *United States Statutes at Large* vol. 62 (1948).

US Central Intelligence Agency. "Turkey's Position in the East-West Struggle: Estimate of the Will and Ability of Turkey to Maintain its Alignment with the West and the Course of Action Turkey Might Follow in the Event of War, February 26, 1951." *The Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalog* vol. VII, no. 7 (January-December 1986).

US Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs Hearings. *Assistance to Greece and Turkey* 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947.

US Department of Defense. *U.S. Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support*, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, June 2005.

US Department of State. "Factors Significant for Conditioning the Effectiveness of a US Information Program: IV, Greece, Turkey, Iran, January 28, 1949." *The*

Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalog vol. 6, no. 2 (April-June 1980).

US Department of State. *Department of State Bulletin* vol. 16 (January-March 1947).

US Department of State. *Departmental Interim Greece-Turkey Assistance Committee Memorandum: Nature of U.S. Program of Aid to Turkey*. Washington, DC, April 24, 1947.

US Department of State. *Policy Statement*. Washington, DC: May 5, 1949.

US Department of State. *Twenty-Third Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations*. Washington DC: USGPO, 1945.

US Department of State. *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, vol. 35, no. 6*. Washington, DC: USGPO, 1983-1984.

US House of Representatives and Senate. *Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 1979: Current Legislation and Related Executive Orders, vol. 1*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1980.

Wilson, Edwin C. *Istanbul Press Reactions March 14 to Truman Speech*. Ankara, March 14, 1947.

Wilson, Edwin C. *Supplementary Report of the US Ambassador Recommending Continuing Aid to Turkey*. Ankara, July 15, 1947.

CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Atmaca, Ayşe Ömür
Nationality: Turkish (TC)
Date and Place of Birth: 29 July 1976, Konya
Marital Status: Married
Phone: +90 312 210 30 94
Fax: +90 312 210 79 83
e-mail: boztan@metu.edu.tr

EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MS	METU, International Relations	2003
BS	Ankara University, International Relations	1998
High School	Afyon High School, Afyon	1993

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
1999- Present	METU Department of International Relations	Research Assistant

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

English (advanced), Arabic (beginner)

PUBLICATIONS

1. Atmaca, Ayşe Ömür. "Kitap İncelemesi / Book Review: Ortadoğu'yu Anlamak. Ilan Pappé, NTV Yayınları, Ocak 2009. Çeviren: Gül Atmaca." Ortadoğu Etütleri vol.1, no.1 (July, 2009): 137-146.

2. Atmaca, Ayşe Ömür and Süer, Berna. *Arap-İsrail Uyuşmazlığı*. Ankara: METU Press, 2007.

TURKISH SUMMARY

Soğuk Savaş koşulları altında kurulan Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri hem Soğuk Savaş döneminde hem de sonrasında her iki ülkenin dış politikasında çok önemli bir yer teşkil etmektedir. Bu çalışmanın temel amacı Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerini ABD'nin jeopolitik söylemi üzerinden eleştirel bakışla analiz etmektir. Çalışmada, Amerikan siyaset yapıcılarının Türkiye'nin temsili üzerine söylemleri incelenirken eleştirel jeopolitik kuramı kullanılmaktadır. Kuramsal literatür çerçevesinde bu tez jeopolitiği ideolojik bir kavram olarak ele almakta ve ABD jeopolitik söyleminin zaman içerisinde Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerini etkileme yollarını analiz etmektedir.

Çalışmada, klasik jeopolitik kuramının sınırlarını göstermek amacıyla jeopolitik kavramının 19. yy'dan itibaren tarihsel gelişimi incelenmekte ve ABD modern jeopolitik tahayyülünün biçimlendirilmesi karşısında kuramsal bir çerçeve çizilmektedir. İkinci olarak çalışma Amerikan jeopolitik söyleminin ideolojik kökenlerini ve ana özelliklerini göstermektedir. Üçüncü olarak, çalışma eleştirel jeopolitik kuramı Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri örneğine, diğer bir deyişle Türkiye'nin tahayyül edilmiş coğrafyasının ve ittifakın ABD dış politikası ve güvenlik politikası tarafından nasıl şekillendirildiği hususuna uygulamaktadır. Soğuk Savaş, Soğuk Savaş sonrası ve 11 Eylül sonrası dönemler bu çalışmanın ayrı bölümlerinde incelenmektedir. Bu tezde ayrıca Türkiye'nin ABD jeopolitik kurgusuna temel hatlarıyla uyduğu ve iki ülkenin Soğuk Savaş ve sonrası dönemlerde dünyanın farklı bölgelerinde çeşitli olaylarda işbirliği yaptığı ileri sürülmektedir. Ancak bu süreçte iki müttefik ABD jeopolitik söyleminin sınırlarının çizildiği çeşitli sorunlar da yaşamaktadır.

Jeopolitik her ne kadar terim olarak ilk defa 1899 yılında Kjellen tarafından kullanılmış olsa da 15. yy'ın emperyalist yayılmacı politikalarında başat bir düşünme biçimi olmuştur. Ancak modern dünyada kullanılan jeopolitik kavramını anlamak için 19. yy'ın ikinci yarısına göz atmak gerekmektedir. Realizmin temel prensipleri temeline oturan klasik jeopolitik kavramı ilk olarak Amerikalı tarihçi ve asker Alfred Thayer Mahan tarafından ABD'nin dünyadaki etkinliğini arttırması için önerdiği jeopolitik plan ile gündeme gelmiştir. Daha sonra İngiliz coğrafyacı Halford Mackinder jeopolitiği dünya siyasetinde bir model olarak kullanmaya başlamıştır. Mackinder çalışmalarında Avrasya merkezini "Pivot Bölge" ya da "Dünyanın Kalbi" olarak nitelendirmiş ve bu

bölgeye hakim olan devletlerin tüm dünyaya hakim olacağına altını çizmiştir.

Modern jeopolitik kavramı daha sonra Alman yazarlar Fredrich Ratzel ve Haushofer'in çalışmalarının da etkisiyle ırkçı Nazi politikalarının bir parçası haline gelmiştir. Jeopolitiğin Nazi rejimi ile ilişkilendirilmesi terimden uzak kalınmasına neden olmuş ve bu nedenle 2. Dünya Savaşı ve sonrasındaki ilk dönemlerde akademisyenler tarafından yaygın olarak kullanılmamıştır.

2. Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra dünya siyasetinde iki kutuplu düzen kurulmuş ve bu çerçevede iki süpergüç kendi nüfuz alanlarını genişletmek ve birbirleri karşısında üstünlük kazanmak amacıyla dünyayı "bizimki", "sizinki" ve "tartışmalı bölgeler" olmak üzere üçe ayırmışlardır. Bu dönemde Spykman ABD'nin Soğuk Savaş jeopolitiğinin temellerini atmıştır. Çevreleme politikası ve domino teorisi ABD'nin bu dönemdeki siyasetini anlamada yardımcı olacak en önemli iki jeopolitik kavram olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Bu dönemde ABD jeopolitiği akademik çevreler ve siyaset yapıcılar tarafından da desteklenmiş ve dahası yeniden üretilmiştir.

Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesi ile iki kutuplu dünya yıkılmış, yerine ABD'nin tek süpergüç olduğu bir düzen ortaya çıkmıştır. Soğuk Savaş jeopolitik söyleminin de ortadan kalktığı bu süreçte yeni arayışlar ve açıklamalar bu yeni dönemin dinamiklerini tanımlamaya çalışmıştır. Bu açıklamalarda ekonomik ve çevresel faktörler, siyasi faktörlerin yanı sıra önem kazanmaya başlamıştır.

Uluslararası ilişkilerde 1980'lerin sonunda neorealizm kuramına ve onun pozitivist metodolojisine tepki olarak ortaya çıkan eleştirel yaklaşımlara paralel olarak eleştirel jeopolitik kuramı akademisyenler tarafından kullanılmaya başlanmıştır. Simon Dalby ve Gearóid Ó Tuathail'in öncülük ettiği bu yaklaşım temel olarak Frankfurt Okulu'ndan ve Michel Foucault ve Edward Said gibi postmodern akademisyenlerin görüşlerinden etkilenmiştir. Bu çerçevede eleştirel jeopolitik kuramı önce klasik jeopolitik anlayışının temellerini sorgularken bu terminolojide kullanılan kavramların objektif olmadığını, tam tersine güç-iktidar ilişkisinin sonucu olarak ortaya çıktığını ileri sürer. Bu görüşe göre dil ve söylem jeopolitik tahayyüllerin oluşturulması konusunda çok büyük bir etkiye sahiptir ve ülkeler bu söylem ve tahayyüller aracılığı ile yaptıkları siyaseti meşrulaştırırlar ve dolayısıyla dünya politikasına yön verirler. Bu çalışmanın geri kalanında ABD dış politikasının temel dinamikleri, Türkiye'nin jeopolitik olarak bu

söylemde nasıl tahayyül edildiği ve bu tahayyülün ilişkileri nasıl etkilediği eleştirel jeopolitik bakış açısından yararlanılarak incelenmeye çalışılacaktır.

Türk-ABD ilişkilerinin kökenleri yaklaşık 200 yıl öncesine dayansa da ilişkiler 20. yy'ın ikinci yarısından itibaren stratejik olarak tanımlanmaya başlanmıştır. 18. yy'ın sonlarında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu-ABD ilişkileri ticaret faaliyetleri ve misyonerlik bağlamında kurulmuştur. İki ülke arasındaki ilk resmi anlaşma 7 Mayıs 1830 tarihinde imzalanmıştır. Çağrı Erhan'a göre bu anlaşma 90 yıl boyunca iki ülke ilişkilerinde neredeyse en önemli belge olmuştur.

Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun 1914 yılında Almanya tarafında 1. Dünya Savaşı'na katılmasının ardından ABD'nin de 1917'de Almanya karşısında savaşa girmesiyle iki ülke arasındaki ilişkiler resmi olarak kesilmiştir. Savaşın ardından Wilson prensipleri ile bölgeye ilgisini belli eden ABD, Lozan Konferansı'na da ticari çıkarlarını ve misyonerlerin aktivitelerini gözetmek amacıyla gözlemci göndermiştir.

Türkiye ile ABD'yi bugün anladığımız anlamda biraraya getiren olay 2. Dünya Savaşı sonrası ortamında Sovyetler Birliği'nin Türkiye'den toprak talebinde bulunmasıdır. 2. Dünya Savaşı dünyadaki tüm dengeleri değiştirmiş ve dolayısıyla Türk Boğazları Sovyetler Birliği için hayati öneme sahip hale gelmiştir. Sovyetler Birliği 1936'da imzalanan ve boğazlar üzerindeki tüm yetkileri Türkiye'ye bırakan Montreux sözleşmesinde revizyona gidilmesini talep etmiş ve bu talebini Yalta'da bir kez daha dile getirmiştir. 1945 yılına gelindiğinde ise Sovyetler Birliği bir yandan boğazların ortak savunması hakkındaki talepleri hususunda Türkiye'ye yaptığı baskıları arttırırken diğer yandan da Kars ve Ardahan'dan toprak taleplerini ve boğazlarda üs isteğini de dile getirmiştir. Tüm bu gelişmeler karşısında ABD ve İngiltere başlangıçta çok net bir tavır sergilemezken daha sonra Türkiye'nin petrol bölgelerine de yakınlığı dolayısıyla Sovyetler Birliği'nin karşısında yer almışlardır.

5 Nisan 1946'da ABD savaş gemisi Missouri'nin Türkiye'nin Washington Büyükelçisi Münir Ertegün'ün cenazesini törenle İstanbul'a getirmesi ABD'nin Sovyetler Birliği'ne karşı Türkiye'yi destekleyeceğini açıkça göstermesinin yanısıra Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinin de sembolik başlangıcı olmuştur. Aynı yıl yaşadığı ekonomik sıkıntılardan dolayı İngiltere ABD'ye Yunanistan ve Türkiye'nin sorumluluklarını devretmiştir. Amerikan yönetimi de bu boşluğu Truman Doktrini ve Marshall Planı ile doldurmaya

çalışmıştır.

Kaldor'un da belirttiği gibi Soğuk Savaş aslında bir söylem, ya da başka bir deyişle kelimeler savaşıdır. Bir jeopolitik anlatı olarak Soğuk Savaş iki süper gücün bir diğeri karşısında yayılcı politikalarını meşrulaştırma çabaları olarak tanımlanabilir. Soğuk Savaş jeopolitiği farklı siyasi-ekonomik modeller yaratmasının yanısıra çeşitli metaforlar ve coğrafi tahayyüller de yaratmıştır.

Soğuk Savaş döneminde ABD'nin Türkiye'ye olan ilgisinin temelinde jeopolitik kaygılar yatmaktadır. ABD bu dönemde özellikle Doğu Akdeniz ve Ortadoğu'da Sovyet yayılcılığını engellemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu çerçevede Türkiye ABD'nin Sovyetler Birliği'ni çevreleme politikalarına tam olarak uymaktadır. İki kutuplu bu yeni düzende Türk-Amerikan stratejik ilişkileri Soğuk Savaş yıllarının başında ABD'nin komünist tehlikeyi çevreleme politikaları çerçevesinde Türkiye'nin hatırı sayılır miktarda askeri ve ekonomik yardıma başlamasıyla kurulmuştur. Daha sonra Soğuk Savaş yılları boyunca Türkiye Sovyet yayılcılığına karşı "bariyer" olarak görülmüştür. Bu jeopolitik algılamalar çerçevesinde Türkiye ABD tarafından değerli bir müttefik, Sovyetler Birliği'nin tehdidine karşı bariyer, NATO'nun güney kanadının koruyucusu ve dahası Ortadoğu ve Doğu Akdeniz'de askeri üs olarak görülmektedir. Türkiye'nin Sovyetler Birliği'ne yakınlığı ve bölgeyle tarihi bağları ABD'nin bu politikasını etkilemektedir.

İngiltere'nin bölgeden çekilmesinin ardından ABD yönetimi kendi desteği olmaksızın Türkiye ve Yunanistan'ın Sovyetler Birliği'nin etkisi altına girebileceğini düşünerek harekete geçti ve Başkan Henry Truman 12 Mart 1947 tarihinde Kongre karşısında savaş sonrası dönemin en önemli konuşmasını yaptı. Daha sonra Truman Doktrini olarak da anılan bu konuşmada Başkan Truman Kongre'den bu iki ülkeye ekonomik ve askeri yardımda bulunmak amacıyla 400 milyon dolar istedi.

Truman Doktrini ABD'nin bölgedeki jeopolitik çıkarlarının ve bu çerçevede yaptığı hesapların bir ürünü olarak kabul edilebilir. Bu konuşma ayrıca Soğuk Savaşın başlangıcı olarak da nitelendirilmektedir. Truman konuşmasında tıpkı klasik jeopolitik söylemlerinde olduğu gibi dünyayı "özgür" ve "esir" dünya olmak üzere ikiye ayırmış düşmanlarını bu çerçevede tanımlamıştır.

Truman'a göre bu koşullar altında Türkiye ve Yunanistan stratejik olarak çok önemli birer ülke haline gelmişlerdir. Bu yüzden eğer ekonomik yardım almazsa

Yunanistan komünizme yenik düşecek ve Türkiye ile diğer bölge ülkelerini de peşinden sürükleyecektir. Truman'ın konuşmasının ardından ABD Dışişleri Bakanı Marshall'ın 5 Haziran 1947'de Harvard Üniversitesi'nde yaptığı konuşma da ABD'nin Avrupa'ya yardım programı olan Marshall Planı'nın başlangıcı olmuştur.

Truman'ın konuşmasıyla ABD'nin Soğuk Savaş jeopolitik söylemi kurumsallaşmaya başlamıştır. 1950 yılında yayımlanan Ulusal Güvenlik Konseyi'nin 68 no.lu kararı ABD'nin Soğuk Savaş dönemindeki jeopolitik söyleminin en önemli dokümanları sayılmaktadır. Tüm bu politikalar sayesinde Yunanistan, Türkiye ve Batı Avrupa'ya milyonlarca dolarlık yardım akmaya başlamıştır.

1949 yılında Soğuk Savaş jeopolitik düzeninin en önemli kurumlarından olan NATO kuruldu. Türk yönetimi tarafından NATO'ya üye olmak "Avrupalı" bir ülke olma yolundaki en önemli adım olarak algılanmaya başlandı. Bu amaçla, Türkiye Mayıs 1950'de NATO üyeliği için başvuruda bulunmuş olsa da bu başvuru Türkiye'nin "Atlantik Ülkesi" olmadığı düşüncesi nedeniyle reddedildi. Ancak daha sonra ABD Türkiye'nin jeopolitik önemini altını çizdikten sonra Yunanistan'ın ittifaka kabul edilip Türkiye'nin reddedilmesinin gerçekçi olmayacağını kabul etmiştir. Tüm bu olaylar gelişirken 25 Haziran'da Soğuk Savaş döneminin ilk jeopolitik mücadelesi olan Kore Savaşı patlak verdi. Türkiye 11 Ağustos 1950'de NATO'ya ikinci başvurusunu yaptıktan sonra da ABD'ye destek vermek için Kore'ye asker gönderme kararını aldı ve 18 Şubat 1952'de NATO'ya üye oldu. Bu çerçevede Türkiye ABD yönetimi için Sovyet yayılmacılığını önleme mücadelesinde NATO'nun "güney kanadı" haline geldi.

1950'lerdeki problemsiz geçen altın yılların ardından 1960'lar boyunca iki blok arasındaki yumuşama nedeniyle Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinin boyutları sorgulanır hale geldi. Mayıs 1960'ta yaşanan Amerikan U-2 casus uçağının Sovyet topraklarında bulunması olayı ve Türkiye'nin bu olayda düştüğü zor durum bu dönemde yaşanan sorunların başlangıcı olmuştur. 1962 yılında yaşanan Küba Füze Krizi sonrasında yaşanan Jüpiter Füze Krizi Türkiye'nin ABD'ye olan güvenini derinden sarsmıştır. Bu kriz sonrasında Jüpiter füzelerinin Türkiye topraklarından çekilmesiyle Türkiye'nin ABD için jeopolitik önemi azalmıştır. 1960'larda yaşanan başka bir sorun da Türkiye'de afyon üretiminin yasaklanmak istemesi hususunda olmuştur. Türkiye 1971'de ABD'nin yoğun baskıları sonucunda tarımsal afyon ekimini yasaklasa da 1974 seçimleriyle iktidara gelen Ecevit hükümeti bu yasağı kaldırmıştır. Afyon yasağı Türkiye'de ABD'ye

olan bağımlılığın çok ciddi bir biçimde eleştirilmesine neden olmuştur.

ABD Ortadoğu bölgesine yönelik jeopolitik çıkarlarını Truman Doktrini, Eisenhower Doktrini, Nixon Doktrini ve Carter Doktrini ile biçimlendirmiş ve dillendirmiştir. Türkiye bu resimde Sovyetler Birliği'nin Ortadoğu'da etkinliğini arttırmasını engelleyici bir "bariyer" olarak tahayyül edilmiş ve kendisine bölgedeki ABD çıkarlarını korumaya yardımcı bir rol biçilmiştir. Türkiye, Yunanistan ve İran ile birlikte "Kuzey Kuşağı" ülkeleri olarak tanımlanmış ve bu tanımlama çerçevesinde Doğu Akdeniz ve Ortadoğu'nun güvenliğini sağlamadaki "kilit" rolü vurgulanmıştır. Bu çerçevede Türkiye 1955 yılında Bağdat Paktı'na katılmış ve bölgede İsrail'i tanıyan ilk Müslüman ülke olmuştur. Yumuşama döneminde Türkiye'nin stratejik öneminin azaldığı yönünde vurgular yapılmaktadır. Buna örnek olarak da ABD'nin "iki ayaklı" politikası çerçevesinde Suudi Arabistan'ı finansal ayak, İran'ı ise askeri ayak olarak tanımlaması ve Türkiye'nin ABD ile çok ciddi krizler yaşamaya başlaması verilmektedir. Ancak Sovyetler Birliği'nin 1979'da Afganistan'ı işgali ve İran devriminin ardından bloklar arasında yaşanan yumuşama döneminin sona ermesi Türkiye'nin bölgedeki önemini ABD'nin nazarında tekrar arttırmıştır. ABD Türkiye'yi 1950'li yıllardaki gibi sorunlu bölgedeki güvenilir bir müttefiki olarak tanımlamaya devam etmiştir. Bu koşullarda ABD bölgedeki askeri kapasitesini arttırmak amacı ile 29 Mart 1980 tarihinde Türkiye ile Savunma ve Ekonomik İşbirliği Anlaşmasını imzalamıştır. Türkiye'de 1980 yılında gerçekleşen askeri darbeden sonra ABD'nin askeri yardımları iyice artmış ve Türkiye ABD'nin Ortadoğu'daki en önemli dayanağı haline gelmiştir.

Askeri ilişkiler ve istihbarat ilişkileri ABD'nin stratejik çıkarları ve kaygıları üzerine kurulan bu ittifakın en önemli parçası haline gelmiştir. Soğuk Savaş yılları boyunca ABD bölgeye olan müdahalelerini gerçekleştirebilmek amacıyla Türkiye'yi askeri bir üs haline getirmiştir. Türkiye Soğuk Savaşın ilk yıllarında ABD için hayati derecede önemli olan bu askeri üsleri sağlarken karşılığında da büyük miktarda ekonomik ve askeri yardım almayı başarmıştır. ABD ve Türkiye arasında 1954 yılında imzalanan Askeri Tesis Anlaşması Türkiye'de resmi olarak ABD üslerinin açılmasını sağlamıştır. Soğuk Savaş yılları boyunca açılan bu ABD ve NATO üsleri Sovyetler Birliği karşısında Batı bloğuna büyük bir avantaj sağlamıştır. Ancak askeri üs meselesi özellikle Türkiye'nin 1970'li yıllarda bu üsleri kapatma yönündeki eğilimi sonucunda iki ülke arasında önemli bir sorun kaynağı haline gelmiştir. 1969 yılında imzalanan Savunma İşbirliği Anlaşması

ABD üslerinin statülerini radikal bir biçimde değiştirmese de bu üslerdeki ABD personelinin azalmasına neden olmuştur. 1975-1978 yılları arasında uygulanan ABD silah ambargosu döneminde de Türkiye bu üslerin pek çoğunun işlerliğini askıya almıştır.

Soğuk Savaş yıllarında iki ülke arasında yaşanan en önemli kriz Kıbrıs sorunudur. Kıbrıs sorunu Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri çerçevesinde bu dönemde ABD jeopolitik söyleminin sınırı olarak kabul edilmelidir. Kıbrıs, hem adanın Türkiye'ye coğrafi yakınlığı hem de adadaki Türk nüfusu yüzünden Türk dış politikasında çok önemli bir yer tutmaktadır. Kıbrıs aynı zamanda ABD için de Doğu Akdeniz ve Ortadoğu'nun güvenliği için stratejik bir öneme sahiptir. ABD'nin Kıbrıs konusundaki en büyük endişesi adadaki çatışmanın büyümesi ve bunun ileride bir Türk-Yunan savaşı haline gelmesidir. Böyle bir olası savaşın sonunda NATO'nun güney kanadı çökecek ve bu da ittifakın iyice zayıflamasına neden olacaktır.

1950'lerin ortalarında adada etnik çatışmaların iyice artması sonucunda 1959 yılında Türkiye ve Yunanistan Kıbrıs'ta tek bir devletin kurulması konusunda hemfikir olmuşlardır. 1960 yılının Ağustos ayında kurulan Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nin anayasasına İngiltere, Türkiye ve Yunanistan'ın da imzalamış olduğu Garanti Anlaşması eklenmiştir. Bu anlaşmaya göre adı geçen üç ülke Kıbrıs'ın güvenliği ve bağımsızlığı için garantör olmuşlardır. Ancak ilerleyen yıllar boyunca adadaki şiddet giderek tırmanmış ve 1964 yılına gelindiğinde Türkiye garanti anlaşması maddeleri uyarınca adaya müdahale etmeye karar vermiştir. Türkiye'nin bu kararına cevaben 5 Haziran 1964'te ABD Başkanı Johnson'un Türkiye Başbakanı İnönü'ye gönderdiği mektup iki ülke arasında çok büyük bir diplomatik krize neden olmuştur. Mektupta Başkan Johnson eğer adaya müdahale edilirse herhangi bir Sovyet saldırısında NATO'nun Türkiye'yi savunmayacağını sert bir dille belirtmiştir. Dahası Johnson Türkiye'yi Amerikan askeri malzemelerini bu amaçla kullanmaktan da men etmiştir.

Johnson Mektubu Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri üzerinde uzun süre etkili olmuştur. Türkiye ABD'nin NATO tehdidi sonucunda çok büyük bir hayal kırıklığına uğramış ve bunun sonucu olarak ülkede Amerikan karşıtı hareketler de gün geçtikçe artmıştır. Yaşanan kriz Türkiye'ye daha önce göstermiş olduğu bu bağlılığın bir bedeli olduğunu hatırlatmıştır. Sonuç olarak Türkiye ABD'ye olan bağlılığını azaltmaya ve topraklarında ABD askeri aktivitesini sınırlamaya karar vermiştir. Bu doğrultuda imzalanan 1969

Savunma İşbirliği Anlaşması çerçevesinde ABD Türkiye topraklarındaki askeri üsler üzerinde Türkiye'nin hakim olacağı kararını kabul etmek zorunda kalmıştır.

1960'lar Türkiye'nin adaya müdahale etmemesiyle sonuçlansa da Temmuz 1974'te Türk yönetimi adaya askeri müdahalede bulunmuştur. ABD Kongresi bu müdahaleye tepki olarak Türkiye'ye yaklaşık 4 yıl sürecek olan askeri ambargo uygulama kararı vermiştir. Aslında ABD yönetimi Türkiye'nin jeopolitik önemine vurguda bulunarak ambargo uygulanmasına karşı çıkmış olsa da, -Kongredeki Rum lobisinin de etkisiyle- Türkiye'ye karşı silah ambargosu 5 Şubat 1975 yılında uygulanmaya başlanmıştır. Türkiye bu ambargoya ilk tepkisini 13 Şubat 1975'te Kıbrıs Türk Federe Devleti'ni ilan ederek göstermiştir. Daha sonra Başbakan Bülent Ecevit afyon yasağını kaldırma kararı vermiş, ABD üslerinin statüsünü dondurmuş ve 1969 Savunma Anlaşmasını iptal etmiştir. Jimmy Carter ABD Başkanı seçilmesinin ardından Türkiye'ye karşı uygulanan silah ambargosu Ekim 1978 tarihinde kaldırılmıştır.

1990'ların başından itibaren dünyanın jeopolitik haritası ve uluslararası sistemin dinamikleri değişmeye başladı. Berlin Duvarı'nın çöküşü ile birlikte dünya düzeni ABD liderliğinde tek kutuplu bir sisteme dönüştü. Soğuk Savaşın sona ermesi kimileri tarafından jeopolitiğin bitişi olarak algılansa da dünyadaki bu dönüşümü açıklayacak yeni bir jeopolitik söylemin oluşumuna ihtiyaç duyulmaya başlandı. Ó Tuathail'e göre sistemdeki bu dönüşüm özellikle bazı bölgelerde büyük güç boşluklarına neden olacaktır.

Soğuk Savaş döneminde bloklar arası rekabet, domino teorisi, demir perde gibi kavramlar süper güçlerin jeopolitik söyleminin merkezine oturmuştu. Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde ise AIDS, terörizm, küresel ısınma gibi çevre sorunları komünist tehlikenin yerini almaya başladı.

Sovyetler Birliği'nin yıkılmasıyla ABD yalnızca düşmanını kaybetmemiş, aynı zamanda dünya meselelerindeki duruşunu ve kimliğini de yeniden tanımlamak zorunda kalmıştır. Bush yönetimi tek süpergüç olarak dünya siyasetini coğrafi olarak yeniden şekillendirmeye başlarken bu yeni yaklaşıma da yeni dünya düzeni adını vermiştir. Bu yeni dönemde stratejik analistler ve siyaset yapıcılar Soğuk Savaş anlatisının yerine geçecek yeni kavramlar bulmaya çalışmışlardır. Francis Fukuyama'nın "Tarihin Sonu" ve Samuel Huntington'ın "Medeniyetler Çatışması" bu dönemde yeni dünya düzeninin

anlamını inşa edecek en önemli ideolojik araçlar olarak kabul edilebilir.

Bu dönemde özellikle Orta Asya ve Kafkaslar güç mücadelesinin yeni merkezleri haline gelmiştir. Brzezinski Avrasya bölgesinin ABD için önemini altını çizerek ABD'nin Ortadoğu ve Afrika'da hakimiyet kurması için öncelikle bu bölgeyi ele geçirmesi gerektiğini belirtmiştir. 1990'lı yıllarda ABD yönetimi ayrıca enerji nakliyatının tekelleşmesini engellemek ve enerji kaynaklarının güvenli bir biçimde Batı pazarlarına aktarılmasını sağlamak için yeni bir enerji politikası uygulamaya başlamıştır.

Irak lideri Saddam Hüseyin'in Kuveyt'i işgali ABD'nin tasarladığı bu yeni düzendeki rolünü tanımlaması ve hatta uygulaması için çok önemli bir fırsat olmuştur. Bush yönetimi "haydut devlet" terimini de bu dönemde bölgedeki çıkarlarını ve çevreleme politikalarını meşrulaştırmak amacıyla bir araç olarak kullanmıştır. Burada da görüldüğü gibi ülkeleri "iyi-şeytan" olarak sınıflandırmak ABD dış politikasının en önemli özelliklerinden biri haline gelmiştir.

Özetle 1990'larda ABD dış politikasının temel prensipleri enerji kaynaklarının güvenliği, bölgedeki müttefiklerinin güvenliği ve İsrail'in güvenliği biçiminde özetlenebilir. Türkiye ve ABD bu dönemde Balkanlar, Orta Asya ve Ortadoğu'da pek çok konuda işbirliği yapmıştır. Bu işbirliği çerçevesinde ABD Türkiye'yi tanımlamada yeni metaforlar kullanmaya başlamıştır. Türkiye bu dönemde de ABD'nin Ortadoğu ve Balkanlara yönelik operasyonlarında stratejik üs olarak kullanılmaya devam edilmiştir.

Bu dönemde ABD Başkanı George Bush ve yönetimi ABD'nin yeni düşmanını belirsizlik ve istikrarsızlık olarak tanımlamıştır. Körfez Savaşı bu çerçevede Soğuk Savaşın bitişinin işaretçisi olmakla birlikte Başkan Bush'un yeni dünya düzeni ya da Soğuk Savaş sonrası kurulacak olan yeni jeopolitik düzenin oluşturulmasında bir araç haline gelmiştir. Soğuk Savaş sonrası Sovyet tehdidinin ortadan kalkması sonucunda Türkiye'nin ABD için önemi, jeopolitik konumu ve dolayısıyla iki ülke arasındaki ilişkiler de değişmeye başlamıştır.

Soğuk Savaş sona erdiğinde ABD tek süpergüç olarak jeopolitik manifestosunu Yeni Dünya Düzeni olarak açıklamıştır. Bu yeni jeopolitik anlatıda Türkiye Balkanlar ve Somali'ye istikrar getirmede İran, Irak ve Suriye gibi haydut devletlerden gelecek tehlikeye ve terörizme karşı mücadelede yardımcı olmada stratejik bir müttefik olarak önemini korumaya devam etmiştir. Bu dönemde "model" ya da "köprü" gibi metaforlar

ABD yetkilileri tarafından Türkiye'yi işaret etmekte kullanılmaktadır.

Türkiye bu yeni ortamda kendini ABD'nin de çıkarlarının bulunduğu üç istikrarsız bölgenin, Kafkaslar, Balkanlar ve Ortadoğu'nun, ortasında buldu. Türkiye'nin bu dönemdeki en önemli endişesi ABD nazarında öneminin azalmasıdır ki, bu da dolayısıyla Türkiye için daha az ekonomik ve askeri yardım anlamına gelmektedir. Ancak Türkiye'nin tüm bu kaygıları bahsedilen problemlerle coğrafi yakınlığı nedeniyle gerçekleşmemiştir. Sonuç olarak 1990'larda Türkiye ABD tarafından "köprü" olarak nitelenmeye başlanmıştır.

ABD yönetimine göre Türkiye istikrarsız bir coğrafyada Batılı bir ülke, Arap-İsrail barışının destekçisi, ABD'nin Irak politikasında kilit rolü olan bir ülke ve Operasyon Kuzey İzleme'de hayati öneme sahip bir üs olarak rol oynamıştır. Dahası, Türkiye bu dönemde Orta Asya ülkelerine model olarak gösterilmiş, Batı ile bölge arasında köprü olarak tanımlanmış, Rusya ve İran karşısında bölgede dengeleyici bir unsur olarak görülmüş, Hazar enerji kaynaklarının batı pazarlarına aktarımı konusunda bir kapı ya da köprü olarak görevlendirilmiş ve Balkanlardaki barışın sağlayıcısı ve koruyucusu olmuştur.

Türkiye, daha önce de belirtildiği gibi bu dönemin başlangıcında stratejik öneminin azaldığı yönünde endişeler taşımaktaydı. Körfez Savaşı bu dönemde Türkiye Başbakanı Turgut Özal tarafından Türkiye'nin ABD'ye olan sadakatini ve önemini göstermede çok önemli bir fırsat olarak görülmekteydi. 6 Ağustos 1990'da Kerkük-Yumurtalık petrol boru hattının kapatılması ile Türkiye Batı koalisyonu tarafında savaşa iştirak etmiş oldu. Türkiye savaş boyunca ABD'ye verdiği destekle stratejik öneminin altını tekrar çizmiş oldu. Nisan 1991'de ortaya çıkan mülteci krizi sonucunda yaklaşık 500.000 Iraklı Kürt Türk sınırlarına yığıldı. 1991'de oluşturulan Huzur Operasyonu bu mültecilerin evlerine dönebilmeleri için kuruldu. Temmuz 1991'de Huzur Operasyonu yerini Çekiç Güç'e bıraktı. 2 Ağustos 1992'de Irak'ın kuzeyinde 36. paralelde oluşturulan uçuşa yasak bölge bölgedeki Kürtleri Saddam Hüseyin'in rejimine karşı korumayı amaçlıyordu. Türkiye bu operasyonlarda kullanılması için İncirlik Hava Üssünün kullanılmasına izin vererek ABD nezdinde stratejik önemini daha da arttırdı. Ancak savaşın sonunda Saddam Hüseyin iktidarını korurken savaşın en önemli sonucu Kürtlerin bölgede bağımsız bir devlet kurabilmeleri için güvenli bir alan oluşturulması oldu.

Savaşın başında Başbakan Turgut Özal savaşa katılmanın hem Türkiye'nin ABD nezdinde önemini arttırması yönünde etkide bulunacağını düşünürken hem de Türkiye'nin Avrupa Topluluğu'na üyeliği için önemli bir fırsat olarak değerlendirmiştir. Özal'a göre savaşa katılmanın bir ödülü olarak Türkiye ekonomik olarak da bir kazanç sağlayacaktı. Ancak Özal'ın savaştan beklentileri gerçekleşmedi. Tam da aksine Yumurtalık petrol boru hattının kapanması sonucunda Türkiye ekonomik olarak büyük zarar gördü. ABD'nin de Türkiye'nin bu zararlarını karşılama vaatleri hiçbir zaman gerçekleşmedi.

Siyaseten Körfez Savaşı Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerine yeni bir yön verdi. Soğuk Savaş döneminde ilişkilerdeki en büyük değişiklik meseleye ekonomik boyutun da katılması oldu. 1991 yılında ilişkiler ABD yönetimi tarafından "geliştirilmiş ortaklık" olarak tanımlanmaya başlandı. 1994'te Türkiye "gelişmekte olan beş büyük pazar" içerisinde tanımlanmasının ardından 1997'de Türkiye ile ABD ilişkilerini "beş maddelik gündem" adı altında şekillendirmeye başladılar. Buna göre enerji, ekonomi ve ticaret, Kıbrıs meselesi, savunma ve güvenlik işbirliği konuları gündemin en önemli maddeleri olarak belirlendi. 1999 yılında ABD yönetimi Türkiye ile ilişkilerini "Stratejik Ortaklık" olarak tanımlamaya başladı.

Bu dönemde Türkiye ile ABD arasındaki en önemli işbirliği konularından bir diğeri de Türkiye'nin İsrail ile kurduğu ilişkilerdir. 1996 yılında Türkiye ile İsrail arasında imzalanan iki askeri işbirliği anlaşması ve aynı yıl imzalanan üçüncü anlaşma ile Türkiye ile İsrail hem askeri alanda hem de daha sonra diplomatik ve ekonomik alanlarda büyük bir işbirliği içerisine girmişlerdir. Bu işbirliği hem Türkiye'yi bölgede askeri alanda üstün duruma getirirken hem de Türkiye-ABD ilişkilerinin daha da güçlenmesine neden olmuştur. ABD perspektifinden bu iki batılı güvenilir müttefik ülkenin işbirliği ABD'nin ikili çevreleme politikası için de çok önemli bir destek noktası oluşturmaktaydı. Dahası bu ittifak ile Türkiye askeri anlamda kapasitesini geliştirecek ve bu konuda ABD'ye bağımlılığını azaltacaktı. Bu nedenle Clinton yönetimi Türkiye-İsrail ittifakına büyük ölçüde destek verdi.

Daha önce de belirtildiği gibi Balkanlar, tıpkı Orta Asya gibi Türkiye ile Amerika arasında önemli bir işbirliğine sahne oldu. Türkiye Yugoslavya'nın dağılmasının ardından bağımsızlığını kazanan ülkeleri derhal tanıdı. Ancak bölge 1990'lar boyunca büyük bir iç savaşa sahne oldu. Uzun süren iç savaş en sonunda Birleşmiş Milletler ve

NATO'nun önce Bosna-Hersek'e daha sonra da Kosova'ya müdahaleleri ile sonuçlandı.

Bosna Türkiye'nin Balkan politikasında önemli bir dönüm noktasını olmuştur. Türkiye Bosna'daki şiddetin sona ermesi için bölgeye uluslararası koalisyonlar çerçevesindeki müdahaleye katkıda bulundu. ABD'ye göre Türkiye'nin Müslüman kimliği tıpkı Somali'de olduğu gibi çok faydalı olacaktı. Ancak Kosova meselesinde Türkiye bu durumun ülkedeki ayrılıkçı Kürt hareketine benzetilmiş olması nedeniyle Bosna'da olduğu kadar istekli davranmadı. Ancak Sırp'ların Kosovalı Müslümanlara karşı gösterdiği şiddet arttıkça Türkiye fikrini değiştirerek bu olaya da müdahale kararı aldı. Sırp'lar Kosova'dan çekildikten sonra Türkiye bölgeye NATO çerçevesinde asker göndermeye karar verdi.

Soğuk Savaşın bitimi ve Sovyet tehdidinin ortadan kalkması nedeniyle ABD Kongresi Türkiye, Portekiz ve Yunanistan'a verdiği askeri yardımları sona erdirmeye karar vermiştir. Ancak Kongre'nin bu kararının ardından ortaya çıkan Körfez Savaşı Türk-Amerikan askeri işbirliğinin önemini bir kez daha altını çizmiştir. Bu yüzden tüm bu kesintilere rağmen Körfez Savaşı'nın ardından Türkiye'ye yapılan askeri yardımın miktarında artış görülmüştür. Bu artışın Körfez Savaşı'nın şartları altında gerçekleştiğinin altını çizmek gerekmektedir. ABD askeri yardımları bu dönemde silah satışları ve krediler olarak yeniden şekillendirilmiştir.

ABD yönetimi Kongre'nin bu askeri yardımı azaltma politikasının bir uzantısı olarak Türkiye'deki askeri varlığını ve personelini de azaltmaya karar vermiştir. Varolan 12 hava üssünden ancak 5 tanesi, İncirlik, Batman, Diyarbakır, Malatya ve Muş, açık bırakılmışlardır. İncirlik hava üssü bu dönemde de ABD-NATO üssü olarak hayati önemini korumaya devam etmektedir. 1991 yılında, Körfez Savaşı'nın da etkisiyle 1980 yılında imzalanan ve Türk tarafının revizyon istediği Savunma ve İşbirliği Anlaşması yenilenmiştir.

16 Şubat 1999'da PKK lideri Abdullah Öcalan'ın ABD desteğiyle yakalanması Türk-Amerikan istihbarat işbirliğinin artmasına neden olmuştur. Özetle, 1990'lar Türk-Amerikan askeri işbirliğinin savaş dışında başka alanlarda da yenilediği bir dönem olmuştur. Türkiye'nin Kosova, Bosna ve Somali'deki müdahalelere verdiği destek iki ordu arasında işbirliğinin artmasına neden olmuştur.

Körfez Savaşı Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde ABD'nin enerji kaynaklarını kontrol etmek amacıyla gerçekleştirdiği ilk savaş olarak kabul edilmektedir. Sovyetler Birliği'nin yıkılması sonrasında Hazar bölgesinin de çok önemli bir enerji üreticisi haline gelmesi ABD'nin bu dönemde enerji politikalarını bu bölge üzerine kurmasıyla sonuçlandı. ABD yöneticilerine göre bölgenin bu önemli miktardaki petrol ve gaz rezervleri ABD'nin Ortadoğu'ya enerji konusundaki bağımlılığını azaltabilirdi. Bu yüzden her ne kadar kendisi bu kaynakların en önemli tüketicisi olmasa da Orta Asya petrol ve doğalgaz kaynaklarının güvenliği ve kontrolü bu dönemde ABD'nin en önemli amaçlarından biri haline gelmiştir. ABD'nin bölgede diğer bir amacı da İran'ı ve Rusya'yı Hazar petrolünün ve doğalgazının üretiminde ve nakliyesinde rol oynamasını engellemektir.

Petrol boru hatlarının inşası meselesi 1993'ten itibaren görüşülmeye başlanmıştır. ABD'nin bu husustaki en önemli amacı enerjinin nakledilmesinde tekelleşmeyi engellemek ve enerji kaynaklarının güvenli bir biçimde Batı pazarlarına ulaştırılmasının sağlanmasıdır. 1994 yılında Azerbaycan hükümeti Azerbaycan Uluslararası İşletme Şirketi ile "Yüzyılın Kontratı"nı imzaladığını ilan etmiştir. Bu çerçevede Hazar petrolünün taşınması konusunda Rusya, İran ve Türkiye tarafından çeşitli projeler ve öneriler ortaya konulmuştur. Türkiye'nin önerisi Hazar-Akdeniz Petrol Boru Hattı Projesi petrolü Bakü'den alıp Tiflis üzerinden Ceyhan'a getirmektedir. ABD diğer öneriler içinde daha pahalı bir proje olsa da Türkiye'nin bu önerisini desteklemeye karar vermiştir. Bu çerçevede Türkiye ABD tarafından "enerji köprüsü" ya da "enerji merkezi" olarak tahayyül edilmeye başlanmıştır. 1995-1998 yılları arasında Türkiye petrol diplomasisini ABD'nin de desteği ile yoğun bir biçimde yürütmüştür. 29 Ekim 1998 tarihinde Azerbaycan, Gürcistan, Özbekistan ve Kazakistan Bakü-Ceyhan projesini destekleyen Ankara Deklarasyonuna, Nisan 1999'da ise Türkiye, Azerbaycan ve ABD'nin Hazar petroleri uzmanı İstanbul Protokolü'ne imza attılar. 19 Kasım 1999'da ise taraflar AGİT'in İstanbul Zirvesinde İstanbul deklarasyonunu imzaladılar.

Bu dönemde Türkiye ile ABD arasındaki bir başka işbirliği alanı Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği'ne üyeliği konusundaki gelişmelerdir. Aslında ABD Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu ve Orta Asya'daki konumundan ve işbirliğinden memnun olsa da jeopolitik nedenlerden dolayı Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği'ne girmesi için diplomatik çaba sarfetmiştir. Soğuk Savaş sonrasında Avrupa'da sınır ve kimlik meseleleri tartışılmaya başlanırken Türkiye'nin coğrafi olarak oldukça problemlili bir bölgede yer alması onun Avrupa için bu bölgelerde

bariyer olarak nitelendirilmesine neden olmuştur.

Türkiye-AB ilişkileri 1997 Avrupa Konseyi'nin Lüksemburg zirvesinde Türkiye'nin üyelik başvurusunun reddedilmesiyle daha da kötüleşmiştir. Brüksel bu çerçevede Türkiye'nin insan hakları ihlallerinin, PKK'ya karşı yürüttüğü operasyonların ve Türk ordusunun siyasete müdahalede bulunmasının alınan bu kararda etkili olduğunu belirtmiştir.

ABD, Avrupa Birliği'ne üyelik meselesini Türkiye'yi Batı tarafında tutması açısından çok önemli bir husus olarak görüyordu. Bu üyelik sayesinde Türkiye batılı kimliğini kaybetmeyecek ve bölgede ABD'nin istemediği ittifaklara girme ihtiyacı da duymayacaktı. Ayrıca ABD'ye göre Türkiye'nin AB üyeliği onun Müslüman dünyası ve Batı arasında köprü olmasını sağlayacaktı. Bu sebeple ABD 1990'lar boyunca AB'ye Türkiye'nin üyeliği konusunda diplomatik baskı yapmaya devam etti. Avrupa Konseyi'nin 1999 Helsinki Zirvesi bu diplomatik manevraların zirve noktası oldu ve sonuç olarak Türkiye'nin aday ülke olarak başvurusu kabul edildi.

Soğuk Savaşın bitiminin ardından Kafkasya ve Orta Asya'da sekiz devlet bağımsızlığını ilan ederken bu ülkeler ABD'nin ilgi merkezi haline geldi. Türkiye bu dönemde ABD tarafından bu ülkelerin gelecekleri için "model" olarak tanımlanmaya başlandı. ABD Türkiye'yi aynı zamanda bölgede İran'ın İslamcı modeline ve Rusya baskısına alternatif olarak görmeye başladı. ABD yetkililerine göre Türkiye bu ülkeler için hem bir model hem de bu ülkeler ve Batı dünyası arasında köprü vazifesi görecekti.

Türkiye başlangıçta bölgeyle ilişki kurabilmek için bu ülkelerle tarihi ve kültürel bağlarının varlığının altını çizdi ve bölgede büyük ağabey rolünü oynamaya çalıştı. Ancak bu noktada hem Türkiye için hem de bu devletler için sorunlar yaşanmaya başlandı. Öncelikle Türkiye Rusya ile bu mesele nedeniyle karşı karşıya gelmek istemiyordu. Öte yandan Türkiye'nin model olabilmesi için bu ülkeleri destekleyebilecek kadar finansal kaynağı yoktu. Orta Asya devletleri de geçmiş deneyimlerinden dolayı bu himaye düşüncesini kabul edemediler. Tüm bu nedenlerden dolayı 1990'ların sonuna gelindiğinde Türkiye'nin Orta Asya ülkelerine model olması fikri ortadan kalktı. Ancak Türkiye'nin "model" olması düşüncesi ABD tarafından tamamen terk edilmedi. 1990'ların sonunda bu mesele bu sefer Ortadoğu ülkeleri için dile getirilmeye başlandı.

1990'lı yıllarda Kürt meselesi Körfez Savaşı ve sonrasında uçuşa yasak bölgenin oluşturulması nedeniyle ABD'nin jeopolitik söyleminin sınırı olarak iki ülke arasındaki en büyük sorun haline gelmiştir. Savaş sırasında ortaya çıkan mülteci sorunundan sonra oluşturulan uçuşa yasak bölge bölgede batı destekli *ad hoc* bir Kürt devletinin kurulmasına ortam oluşturmuştur. Türkiye'deki ayrılıkçı Kürt gruplar da bölgedeki bu güvenlik boşluğundan büyük ölçüde istifade etmişler ve Türkiye'de istikrarsızlığa neden olmuşlardır. Bu yüzden bazı Amerikalılar tarafından Körfez Savaşı Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinin en yüksek noktası olarak tanımlanırken Ian Lesser'in de belirttiği gibi bu durum sorunların başlangıç noktası olarak kabul edilmelidir.

Çekiş Güç'ün süresinin uzatılması meselesi her iki ülke açısından da karşılıklı bağımlılığın sembolü haline gelmiştir. Saddam Hüseyin'in çevrenmesi ve ülkedeki Kürt nüfusun güvenliği ABD için bölgedeki en önemli politika önceliği haline gelmiştir. Bu nedenle, ABD bu zaman zarfında Türkiye'nin PKK'ya karşı yürüttüğü sınır ötesi operasyonlarına büyük ölçüde ses çıkarmamıştır. 1999'da PKK lideri Abdullah Öcalan'ın yakalanmasına verilen destek de iki ülke arasındaki tansiyonun düşmesine neden olmuştur.

Bu dönemde Ankara'nın Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinin geleceği konusundaki en büyük şüphesi ABD'nin bölgede bağımsız bir Kürt devletini destekleme konusundaki eğilimi olmuştur. Bu sorun daha sonraki yıllarda da iki ülke arasındaki en önemli sorun kaynağı olmaya devam edecektir.

7 Kasım 2000 tarihinde Cumhuriyetçi aday George W. Bush'un ABD başkanı olarak seçilmesi ve bir yıl sonra da 11 Eylül saldırılarının gerçekleşmesi ABD dış politikasında ve jeopolitik söyleminde önemli değişikliklerin yaşanmasına neden olmuştur. Saldırlardan sonra ABD yönetimi yeni düşmanını uluslararası terörizm olarak tanımlamıştır. Bu noktada Soğuk Savaş metaforlarının tekrar kullanılmaya başlandığı görülmektedir.

ABD ilk olarak saldırılardan sorumlu tuttuğu Afganistan'ı hedef almış ve NATO desteği ile Afganistan'a karşı savaş başlatmıştır. Ó Tuathail ve Shalley ABD'nin bu davranışını dünya üzerinde yeni bir jeopolitik düzen kurma çabası olarak tanımlar. ABD güvenlik belgelerinde tekyönlülük ve önleyici saldırı en önemli stratejiler olarak belirlenmiştir. Yeni-muhafazakarlık da denilen bu bakış açısına göre haydut ve terörist

devletlerin saldırılarına karşı önlem almak için onlara önceden saldırmak meşru bir politika olarak tanımlanmıştır. Bu yeni güvenlik ortamında Başkan Bush İran, Irak ve Kuzey Kore'yi şeytan eksenini olarak tanımlamış ve bu ülkeleri bölgelerindeki barış ve istikrarı bozmakla suçlamıştır.

Afganistan Savaşı'ndan sonra ABD'nin yeni hedefi Irak olmuştur. Irak'ın 11 Eylül saldırıları ile ilgisi olduğuna inanan ABD yönetimi 20 Mart 2003 tarihinde Irak'a savaş ilan etmiştir. Bu savaş sonunda gerçekleştirilmesi planlanan Irak'taki rejim değişikliğinin tüm bölgenin yeniden yapılandırılması için çok önemli bir fırsat olduğu düşünülmektedir. Bu sebeple Irak Savaşı ABD'nin bölgedeki çıkarlarını korumak ve bu çerçevede bölgeyi yeniden şekillendirmek için bir çeşit siyasi mühendislik olarak da kabul edilebilir.

11 Eylül saldırıları ve sonrasındaki gelişmeler Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri için de önemli bir dönüm noktası olmuştur. Türkiye'nin jeopolitik önemi bu dönemde ABD yönetimi tarafından tekrar sorgulanmış ve yeniden tanımlanmaya çalışılmıştır.

Türkiye bu yeni dönemde de tıpkı geçmişte olduğu gibi ABD'nin jeopolitik söylemine uygun bir biçimde pozisyon almıştır. Ancak Türkiye başlangıçta uluslararası terörizme karşı savaşta ABD'ye Afganistan operasyonunda verdiği desteği Irak Savaşı söz konusu olunca geri çekmiş ve bu mesele bu dönemde iki ülke arasındaki en önemli problem haline gelmiştir. Bu dönemde İncirlik hava üssü ABD'nin Irak ve Afganistan operasyonlarında hayati önemini korumaya devam etmiştir.

Bu dönemde Türkiye'nin jeopolitik tahayyülü konusundaki en önemli gelişme Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu için ılımlı İslam modeli olarak tanımlanmasıdır. ABD'nin bu dönemde bölgedeki en önemli amacı başta Irak olmak üzere bölgede bir dönüşüm gerçekleştirme çabalarıdır. ABD'nin Büyük Ortadoğu Projesi olarak tanımladığı bu planda Türkiye'nin model olarak sunulması ABD için de çok önemli bir politika meselesi haline gelmiştir. Ancak bu plan Türkiye'nin kimliği konusundaki hassasiyetleri nedeniyle eleştirilmiş ve çok işe yaramamıştır.

Irak Savaşı öncesinde ABD yetkilileri savaş planları yaparken kuzeyde bir cephe açmanın savaşı kazanmak için çok önemli bir husus olduğunu belirtmişlerdir. Bu plan çerçevesinde Türkiye üzerindeki askeri üsler hayati önem taşımaktadır. Amerikalı yetkililer bu planlarını resmi olarak Türk yetkililerle paylaşıp gerekli izinlerin alınması

için baskı yapmaya başlamışlardır. Türkiye Irak'ın komşusu ve ABD'nin stratejik müttefiki olarak bu konuda kendini çok zor bir durum içerisinde buldu. Uzun süren müzakereler ve görüşmeler sonucunda Türkiye topraklarının ABD ordusu tarafından kullanılmasına izin verecek olan tezkere metni TBMM önüne geldi ve 1 Mart tarihinde parlamentoda oylama yapıldı. Yapılan oylamada tezkere çok az bir oy farkıyla parlamento tarafından reddedildi. ABD bu konuda Türkiye'nin koşulsuz desteğini beklerken bu beklenmedik karar ile şok oldu ve alternatif savaş planları yapmaya başladı. Türkiye parlamentosunun 1 Mart kararı öncelikli olarak iki ülke orduları arasında derin bir güven bunalımına neden oldu. Bu karardan sonra iki ülke arasındaki stratejik ortaklığın ölüp ölmediği konusunda tartışmalar yapılmaya başlandı.

Türkiye'nin desteği olmadan başlayan Irak Savaşı ve sonrasındaki gelişmeler iki ülke arasında var olan sorunları beslemeye devam etti. İlişkiler 4 Temmuz 2003 tarihinde Süleymaniye'de Türk askerlerinin ABD askerleri tarafından başlarına çuval geçirilmiş halde tutuklanmaları ile yeni bir kriz dönemine girdi. Bu olay ABD'nin Türkiye'nin 1 Mart kararına karşı aldığı rövanş olarak görülürken Türk yetkililer tarafından affedilemez olarak nitelendirilmiştir. Türkiye 1 Mart sonrasında Irak'a asker göndermek amacıyla bir tezkere daha çıkarmış, ancak bölgedeki Kürt grupların isteği ve baskısı üzerine ABD Türkiye'nin bu talebini geri çevirmiştir. Bu sebeple Türkiye Irak'ta savaş sonrası kurulacak olan düzende rol alma planlarını da çöpe atmak zorunda kalmıştır. ABD iki ülke arasında yaşanan krizlere rağmen ilişkilerde düzelmeyi sağlamak amacıyla 2006 yılında Türkiye ile "Ortak Vizyon Belgesi"ni imzalamıştır.

Dünya üzerindeki enerji kaynakları üzerinde kontrol sağlamak 2000'li yıllarda, tıpkı 90'larda olduğu gibi, ABD yönetiminin en önemli önceliği olmuştur. Enerji konusunda Türkiye'nin köprü olarak görülmesi aynı şekilde 2000'li yıllarda da devam etmiştir. Türkiye'nin enerji konusunda transit ülke olması bu dönemde sadece ABD'nin değil Avrupa'nın da çıkarları doğrultusundadır. Bush yönetimi Türkiye ile yaşanan krizleri bu enerji politikası ile aşmaya çalışmıştır. Bu konuda ABD'nin desteklediği en önemli proje Doğu-Batı enerji koridoru projesidir. Bakü-Ceyhan petrol boru hattı 2006 yılında tamamlanmış ve çalışmaya başlamıştır. Bu hat Türkiye'nin bölgedeki stratejik öneminin daha da artmasına neden olmuştur.

Türkiye'nin AB üyeliği konusunda bu dönemde de ABD'nin desteği devam etmiştir. 2002 yılında Kopenhag'da yapılan Avrupa Konseyi zirvesinde Türkiye, ABD'nin de

desteđi ile AB ile resmi olarak mzakere srecine bařlamıřtır. İki lke arasında Sođuk Savař dnemindeki en nemli sorun olan Kıbrıs problemi bu dnemde nemli bir iřbirliđi alanı haline gelmiřtir.

Bu alıřma Trk-Amerikan iliřkilerinin ABD Sođuk Savař jeopolitik syleminin bir rn olduđunu ileri surmektedir. ABD ynetimleri Trkiye'yi tanımlarken farklı dnemlerde farklı metaforlar kullanmıřlardır. Kanat, bariyer, kpr ve model bu metaforlara rnek olarak verilebilir. Ancak bazı metaforlar farklı dnemlerde farklı anlamlarda kullanılmıřtır. rneđin model metaforu Trkiye iin 1990'lı yıllarda Orta Asya lkeleri bađlamında kullanılırken 2000'lere gelindiđinde bu metafor bu kez Ortadođu lkeleri bađlamında kullanılmıřtır. İki lke arasında yařanan krizler bu dnemlerde ABD jeopolitik syleminin sınırı olarak kabul edilmelidir.