EUROPEAN UNION – AFRICA RELATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

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ABSTRACT

EU-AFRICA RELATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

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This thesis is to study the evolution of the EU - Africa relations, and how they have been shaped in the 21st Century. Bearing a historical perspective of the relations, the cornerstone of the study will cover the period between 2000 and 2010. It is at the turn of the century that the EU-Africa relations gained momentum with the adoption of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement and the first EU- Africa Summit in Cairo, 2000 that laid the foundation of the Joint Africa EU Strategy. This strategy epitomizes the desire of the EU and Africa to forge a close bond of relations towards achieving their shared interests based on a 'partnership of equals'.

EU-Africa relations have been characterized on the basis of clientelism inherent from its colonial legacy in Africa. Thus the main question is whether the

strategy adopted guarantees a relationship based on a 'partnership of equals' or is it pure rhetoric?

The thesis concludes that, Africa's importance on the international arena has been increasing in the last decade with a proportionate increase in competition for its resources especially from emerging powers. This has threatened the EU's position in Africa and with the EU's quest to enhance its global actorness, there has been a need for the EU to restructure its relations with Africa. Though the strategy is based on a mutual partnership, it is skewed to the EU's favour due to its superior power both economically and politically.

Key Words: EU-Africa, Partnership, Joint Strategy, Security, EPAs

ÖZ

21. YÜZYILDA AB-AFRİKA İLİŞKİLERİ

Mujivane, Agufana Andrew

Yüksek Lısans, Uluslararası Ilişkiler Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sevilay Kahraman

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Bu tez, AB – Afrika ilişkileri evrimini ve 21. Yüzyılda nasıl şekillendiğini incelemek için yapılmıştır. İlişkilerinin tarihsel bir perspektif taşıyarak, çalışmanın temel taşı 2000 ve 2010 yılları arasındaki dönemini kapsayacaktır. Bu yüzyılın başından, AB-Afrika ilişkileri Cotonou Ortaklık Anlaşması ve Kahire'de olan ilk AB-Afrika Zirvesi'nin benimsenmesi ile ivme kazandı ve 2000 Ortak Afrika AB Stratejisi temellerini attı. Bu strateji, AB ve Afrika bir 'eşitlik ortaklık' dayalı kendilerin ortak çıkarlar ulaşma yolunda, ilişkilerin yakın bir bağ kurma arzusu özetler.

AB-Afrika ilişkilerinin temelinde Afrika'daki sömürgeci miras doğasında 'clientelism' karakterize edilmiştir. Böylece asıl soru benimsenmiş olan strateji 'eşittir ortaklık' dayalı bir ilişki garanti olup olmadığını yoksa saf bir retorik midir?

Tez sonucuna varıyor ki, Afrika'nın uluslararası arenada önemi, özellikle gelişmekte olan güçlerden kaynaklar için rekabet içinde orantılı bir artış ile son on yılda artan olmuştur. Bu, AB'nin Afrikadaki konumunu tehdit etti ve AB'nın küresel aktörlük geliştirmek için arayış ile, AB için, Afrika ile ilişkilerini yeniden yapılandırılmasına ihtiyaç olmuştur. Karşılıklı bir ortaklığa dayalı bir stratejisi olmasına rağmen, hem ekonomik ve siyasi açıdan üstün güç nedeniyle AB'nın lehine çarpıktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: AB-Afrika, Ortaklığı, Ortak Strateji, Güvenlik, EPA'lar

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AASM   Associated African States and Madagascar

ACP   Africa Caribbean Partnership

AEC   African Economic Community

AMIS   African union Mission in Sudan

AMISOM   African Union Mission in Somalia

APF   African Peace Facility

APRM   Africa Peer Review Mechanism

APSA   Africa Pease and Security Artchitecture

AU   Africa Union

CA   Cotonou Agreement

CSO   Civil Society Organisations

CFSP   Common Foreign and Security Policy

DCI   Development Cooperation Instrument

EC   European Commission

ECOSOCC   Economic, Social and Cultural Council

ECDPM   European Centre for Development and Policy Management

EDF   European Development Fund

EEC   European Economic Community

ESS   European Security Strategy

EESC   Economic Social Committee

ENPI	European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument
EP	European Parliament
EPAs	Economic Partnership Agreements
EPC	European Policy Centre
EU	European Union
EUROSUR	European Surveillance System of Borders
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FOMUC	Force Multinationale en Centrafrique
FRONTEX	External Borders of the Member States of the European Union
IFS	Instrument for Stability
IPE	International Political Economy
JAES	Joint Africa Europe Strategy
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MEDSEA	Mediterranean Coastal Patrols Network
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIEO	New International Economic Order
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PAP	Pan African Parliament
PSO	Peace Support Operations

RECs   Regional Economic Communities

SSA   Sub Saharan Africa

UK   United Kingdom

UN   United Nations

WTO   World Trade Organisation

PART 1: THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

1.0. INTRODUCTION

The European Union (EU) - Africa relations gained momentum in the 21st century, with the Joint Africa Europe Strategy (JAES) and its respective plan of action being the climax of these relations. This was achieved during the Second EU-Africa Summit held on the 8th and 9th of December 2007 in Lisbon under the Portuguese EU Presidency. The Summit brought together 52 countries of the African Union (AU), the 27 EU Member States, the EU Commission, and a series of representatives from the civil society, including non-governmental and youth groups.

With the geopolitical changes in mind, globalization, and the processes of integration both in Africa and Europe, the JAES was developed to provide an overtly political relationship between the two continents. Taking into account previous frameworks of relations developed earlier beginning with the Yaoundé agreements, Lome conventions to the Cotonou Agreement under the Africa Caribbean Partnership (ACP) umbrella a new innovation was to be developed. The main aim being to bring on board a framework that is distinctively EU-Africa oriented.

The JAES therefore, is to solidify the relations between EU and Africa based on the principle of 'a partnership of equals'. It contains several innovations; for the first time the EU treated Africa as a single entity, with the focus primarily on eight thematic partnerships that extend beyond the traditional spheres of aid and development (trade, regional integration and infrastructure, the MDGs) to peace and security, democratic governance and migrations. The holistic

ambition of the agendas also shows through the inclusion of energy, climate change along with science, information society and space. These partnerships have periodic action Plans attached on them, with measurable actions and objectives to be taken jointly by the EU and Africa with routine reviews at successive EU-Africa summits.

In emphasizing this 'partnership of equals', The Lisbon Declaration states: "In recognition of our ambitions... we are resolved to build a new strategic partnership for the future, overcoming the traditional donor-recipient relationship and building on common values and goals in our pursuit of peace and stability, democracy and rule of law, progress and development. We will develop this partnership of equals..."[1] This passage raises several questions: one is linked to the question of policy coherence between the new Joint Strategy and already existing development aid and traditional policy cooperation frameworks for Africa. Another question is linked to the idea of common values; first of all it can be discussed what is meant by this: does the concept of democracy and rule of law have the same meaning in Europe and in Africa? And do Europe and Africa share common goals in their pursuit of progress and development?

With the JAES being the principle policy defining the renewed EU-Africa relations, the thesis seeks to covertly examine the ambitious ideals and measures set out in the strategy and respective action plans. I will be seeking to find out primarily how the JAES has impacted on the EU-Africa relations and the direction of the relations as we advance into the future. The thesis will contain a description of the JAES, the historical background to its development, the innovations brought about by the strategy, its

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[1] The Lisbon Declaration, EU Africa Summit, Lisbon, 8-9 December, 2007

implementation and challenges endured and an overview on the future of the relations.

1.1. Problem statement

The main objective of this thesis is towards a thorough examination of EU-Africa relations in the 21st Century. The existing frameworks of cooperation that preceded the adoption of the JAES will be analysed.

In analyzing these relations, I will be seeking to examine the evolution of the EU- Africa relations and how the existing frameworks have formed the basis towards evolution and consolidation the relations into one distinct strategy. Does the JAES signify a paradigm shift in the EU-Africa relations or a continuation of the already existing relations?

Further, in the realm of the EU's perceived actorness in the global arena, the thesis will try to establish the impact of the EU policies on the relations and analyse how the conduct of EU's foreign policy has contributed in shaping African perceptions towards it.

1.2. Thesis Structure

Part one: Is mainly centered on explaining the theoretical approaches that have shaped the evolution of the EU-AU relations and offer an introduction to the thesis subject.

Part two: Is dedicated towards identifying the various frameworks of cooperation that have stood out in the course of the evolution of the EU-Africa relations, giving a detailed explanation of each initiative employed. Two distinct areas of the relations: Economic Partnership Agreements and the Peace and

Security partnership will be analysed as a means of establishing the link between the theoretical approaches and actual conduct of the relations.

Part three: Will provide an impact assessment of the nature of the EU-Africa relations, bringing out the perceptions of the relations on the African side, and finally the concluding remarks.

1.3. Theory and methodology

EU-Africa relations have been around for many decades since the colonial times. They became institutionalized in the 1960s through the Yaoundé association agreements, the subsequent Lome conventions, the Cotonou Agreement and eventually the current Joint Africa Europe Strategy. With the dynamic nature of the relations the theoretical debate will be centered on the European integration model. With integration process being a complex process, no single school of thought can exclusively account for it. In this regard, I will base my analysis on classical European integration theories: Federalism, Functionalism and intergovernmentalism. Further traditional international relations theories of realism, liberalism, and constructivism will be incorporated.

Due to the increasing changes in the global world, that have been influenced with rapid pace of globalization, I will seek to show how the various theories have been manipulated to respond to the different shifts in the relations.

1.4. Theoretical and methodological considerations

The analysis is based largely on material collected from official sites available on the Internet, which can be gathered in three main groups: the first is linked to the EU-Africa dialogue and the EU-Africa Joint Strategy, key documents

such as issue papers and other related documents as well as key documents linked to parallel EU strategies; the second encompasses documents collected from the European Commission Site on the President and the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) on the EU and Africa in a context of globalization; and the third includes material from think tanks, institutes for international strategies, such as the European Center for Policy Development Management (ECPDM) and the European Policy Centre (EPC) among others.

2.0 ANALYSIS OF THEORETICAL APPROACHES

Europe Integration Theory

This thesis is geared towards analyzing EU-Africa relations in the external realm of European integration. The European Union is a distinct actor in the International system, hence it is imperative to understand its role in the international system. The EU has developed an ambitious policy to play a big role in the international relations especially in issues such as trade, development, environment and social issues. More recently it is expanded into issues of security, good governance and human rights as espoused in the CFSP and ESDP. Thus EU's aspirations on the global stage are in line with the old European tradition that would see the rest of the world mirrored in European image.

First, we need to understand the concept of European Integration. It is "a process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new

political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones."[2] This explains the transformation of the European Community into the EU through the Treaty of Maastricht (1993) that necessitated the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy under the second pillar as a means to advance its interests as one voice. Thus, the EU is a unique supranational integration of European democratic countries that came together to promote peace and prosperity. Its Members have set up joint institutions to which they have submitted part of their sovereignty, so that decisions regarding issues of common interest would be reached democratically, on a European level. European Integration theory is divided into three major approaches: Federalism, functionalism, and intergovernmentalism.

Federalism formed the guiding principle of early European integration. Federalists plan to form a small nucleus of nonconformists seeking to point out that the national states have lost their proper rights since they cannot guarantee the political and economic safety of their citizens[3]. Their main objective being to establish a federation of European states instead of competing nation states where cooperation is layered at state, interstate and the EU level. The EU is not the traditional nation state, but a unity consisting of member states. Analysing the EU integration process, the Treaty of European Union ratified in 1993 to the current Lisbon Treaty depicts a transformation based on federal tendencies. Though the EU has not developed nation state competences the EU through its institutions have acquired complete competences in its foreign policy especially in areas of custom union and external trade, though other areas of foreign policy, more so defence are

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[2] Haas, Ernst B., 1968: The Uniting of Europe. 1950-1957. Stanford: Stanford UP, p. 16.
[3] Spinelli, Altiero, 1972: The Growth of the European Movement since the Second World War, in: Mark Hodges (ed.): European Integration. Harmondsworth: Penguin, p. 68.

still determined by member states through unanimity. The consolidation of EU's foreign policy under the Lisbon Treaty through the appointment of a High representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy it is an indication of the EU elevating its international profile by fronting a one collective and coherent voice.

Functionalism: Classical theory of regional integration that holds that a common need for technocratic management of economic and social policy leads to the formation of international agencies. Such agencies promote economic welfare, thus eventually gaining legitimacy, overcoming ideological opposition to strong international institutions, and in the long-run evolving into a sort of international government, though perhaps not a true state.[4] Thus, the basic assumption is that economic integration in one sector will foster integration in other sectors (economic spillover) and will make political integration necessary (Political spillover).

The basic element of this theory is the 'spillover' effect, where political integration is not a given rule, but is as a result of incremental steps. According to Haas, nation states will transfer competences to supranational level and with increased cooperation new challenges arise that they are forced to transfer further competences into new areas through transnational elites. The more the transnational elites continue to socialize, they develop common views and interests, the end result is their perception changes and they believe their interests are best served at a supranational than national level. Hence, for the elites development of a collective foreign policy instrument will represent how the EU works - Political spillover. However on a critical view, integration –

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[4] Dinan, Desmond (ed.), 2000: Encyclopedia of the European Union. Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner, p. 245.

political and economic – cannot be divorced from the member states, thus its success will depend on the will of member states to precede on that part.

Intergovernmentalism its basic assumption is European integration is based on actions and decisions of European nation states. Hence national interests define the nature of cooperation geared towards pooling or sharing of sovereignty. States will adopt a cost and benefit analysis where they will engage in with other states in low denominator deals that will not compromise their core national interests vis-à-vis sovereignty. Sovereignty being the notion of power, independence, and the exercise of will, thus they will pursue common actions where benefits derived from them involve little loss of sovereignty. This explains why EU's foreign policy orientation in 'low politics' has been a success, because gains derived by member states do not threaten their sovereignty hence the transfer of trade and development competences to EU institutions. This explains in why states in the realm of ESDP activities participation is based on a voluntary basis, also the major reasons why the new member states especially from the eastern bloc, their motivation in joining the EU was as a result of the benefits to be derived from the commercial policies. Intergovernmentalism explains the success of economic integration.

Trying to understand European Integration theories is an arduous and lengthy process. Looking back to the process of European integration since the Rome Treaty 1957, the pace of integration has often accelerated, slowed or reversed depending on the prevailing economic and political events at the respective period. The process has therefore confirmed or refuted the various contending theories out to explain this phenomenon. In this regard, it is impossible to prescribe to a single theory in analyzing European Integration as it is an amalgamation of the various approaches. The basic tenet in the various

theories is that, member states have preferred preferences that have predetermined outcomes; they will employ systems that will ensure they attain their predetermined outcomes. The member states are the principal actors in the EU foreign policy orientation, which they will delegate power to the EU if their interests are going to be realized. The bottom line is that, the EU in foreign policy is solely intergovernmental, and is no more than the sum of the convergence of the interests of member states.

It is important to take note while analyzing European integration not to take the EU in isolation but to view it as a segment of the wider international relations, by extension combining the various elements in the different schools of thought. According to Hedley Bull, [t]he modern international system reflects all three of the elements singled out respectively by the Hobbesian, the Kantian and the Grotian traditions: the element of war and struggle for power among states, the element of transnational solidarity and conflict, cutting across the divisions among states, and the element of co-operation and regulated intercourse among states. In different historical phases of the states system, in different geographical theatres of its operation, and in the policies of different states and statesmen, one of these three elements may predominate over the others.[5]

The main theoretical assumptions relevant to European integration do not remain in a fixed position within the three IR traditions since they combine elements of different school of thoughts.[6]The difficulty arises from the fact that "the term 'integration' glitters with a multiplicity of meanings", ranging from

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[5] Bull 1997, 1995, 39 in Viola, M. Donatella 2000, "International Relations and European Integration Theory: The role of the European Parliament," London School of Economics

[6] Viola, M. Donatella 2000, "International Relations and European Integration Theory: The role of the European Parliament," London School of Economics @ http://asrudiancenter.wordpress.com/2010/03/11/international-relations-and-european-integration-theory-the-role-of-the-european-parliament/

the creation of a fully-fledged federation of the states of Europe to the establishment of a loose concert of independent states.[7] The final hindrance to the explanation of European integration also stems from the fact that it is not a single definable event, but a "continuous series of processes" not comparable to other regional or international organizations.[8] Any search for a self-contained formula able to describe theoretically the evolution of this phenomenon is "doomed to fail" as its interpretation requires recourse to different notions and analytical methodologies from social science and history.[9]

The transformation in the EU in the 1990s with the signing of the Treaty of European Union (1993) that introduced the CFSP, the adoption of the European Monetary Union, and the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty (2009), have seen the reemergence of realism(neo-realism), liberal intergovernmentalism and constructivism theories in the analysis of European integration theory.

Realism:

Realism's most important insight is that power politics tend to dominate relations between states, because of the anarchic structure of the international system that is there is no world government. Since there is no overarching authority to prevent states from taking advantage of each other and since states cannot be sure about each other's future intentions, each state ultimately depends on its own relative power vis-à-vis other states to survive. Accordingly, international norms and institutions are unlikely to have any significant influence on state action or the nature of the international system in general. Instead, the overall stability and peace in the anarchic international

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[7] Abelshauser, 1994, 1in ibid.
[8] Harrison, 1974, 22-23 in ibid.
[9] Hill, 1994, 104-105 in ibid.

system is expected to vary with polarity that is the number of great powers. For these reasons realists conclude that fundamental change is unlikely in world politics. Power politics prevail.[10]

To realists, European integration is closely linked to global level. European integration is as a result of the power configuration in the international system. For realists, the puzzle of European integration is why states striving to survive in an international system dominated by considerations about relative gains and security issues are willing to give up a relatively large part of their autonomy in return for mostly economic gains.[11] It follows from this puzzle that European integration is not viewed as sui generis, but rather as an extreme case of inter-state cooperation.[12] Hence, after World War II, with the United States of America guaranteeing the security of Western Europe, integration fostered because the states did not concentrate on balancing each other but concentrated on absolute economic gains. However, with the end of the cold war and restructuring of the EU, through the development of the CFSP and ESDP, integration has been fostered by the need of the EU to exert itself on the international arena.

Liberal Intergovernmentalism

According to Moravcsik Liberal Intergovernmentalism builds on 'intergovernmental institutionalism', by adding an explicit theory of national preference formation grounded in liberal theories of international dependence. Liberals argue that in an anarchical society international cooperation and development of institutions is plausible. With regard to European integration,

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[10] Wivel Anders, "The Power Politics of Peace: Exploring the Link between Globalization and European Integration from a realist Perspective" pg 9
[11] Grieco, Joseph M (1995, 1996) in ibid. pg 10
[12] Ibid. 10

with the rise of democratic governments in post-cold war Europe, peace was likely to be maintained, because of the increase in interdependence among European countries making war unprofitable among the members of the EU. Thus, the first stage national chiefs of government aggregate the interests of their domestic constituencies, as well as their own interests, and articulate national preferences towards the European integration. In the Second stage, national governments bring their preferences to the intergovernmental bargaining table in Brussels, where agreements reflect relative power of each member state and where supranational organisations such as the European Commission exert little or no causal influence.[13] Preferences are not derived from a state's security concerns in the international system and bargaining power not by military or other material power capabilities. Hence bargains such as the Single European Act are a result of a gradual process of preference convergence among member states.

Constructivist approaches

Constructivists generally agree that institutions matter, but they fundamentally differ with rationalists in how the institutions matter. Constructivists define institutions more broadly to include informal norms and inter-subjective understandings as well as formal rules and posit a more important and fundamental role for institutions which constitute actors and shape not simply their incentives but their preferences and identities as well. In other words rational approaches are incapable of grasping and theorizing about the more profound and important effects of institutions. European

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[13] Pollack, Mark A. (2000) "International Relations Theory and European Integration" European University Institute working papers RSC No. 2000/55

integration is a process that has developed as a result of cultivating shared values and norms and a struggle towards achieving a single European identity.

Having understood what European integration process and the various approaches identified, it is important to examine how EU has projected itself on the international arena. The EU is not a super-power in the traditional sense, yet its deep integration of independent states has made it one of the most influential players on the world stage. The EU's role as an international actor has been enhanced in the post-cold war era, with the adoption of the Single European Act giving it an opportunity to develop a new robust external relations policy. From a Constructivist point of view "the EU has translated its value based identity into normative action, as a promoter of human rights and sustainability across the international system. As a development and humanitarian actor the Union is distanced from the imperial legacy of the member States and has developed a distinctive approach."[14]

The process of European integration also underlines a creation of a political European community of states, where shared interests would gradually converge and be assigned to a supranational authority which would extend its policy reach. Thus from a neo functionalist perspective, it is presumed that such a process would not be limited to domestic welfare issues of trade and production, but it would spillover from this area of low politics into the high politics of international relations and foreign policy.[15] Thus with the development of a CFSP and the ESDP, the EU and its Member States have undertaken to formalize and institutionalize its relations in the shaping of EU international relations and activities. This is evident in the steps taken in the

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[14] Bretherton, Charlotte and Vogler, John (2006) "European Union as a Global Actor" Routledge
[15] Tonra, Ben "The European Union as a Global Actor" UCD School of Politics and International Relations, University College of Dublin

Lisbon treaty to create a set of foreign policy institutions with a view to strengthening the visibility and coherence of the EU international relations (global actor - The EU, in other words, and the member states when revising the rules of the EU Treaties, has moved deliberately in recent times to raise the international profile of the EU and to strengthen the framework for it to engage as a global actor.)

In this regard, the EU seeks to export its form of regional integration to other regions, one that is mirrored to its own image in exerting its international relations image and securing its interests in the process. For purposes of this thesis, I will show how the EU as a global actor has exported its process of integration to Africa.

EU's foreign policy can be analysed as a case of trying to construct its normative power in the international relations sphere. EU-Africa relations provide a framework of understanding how the EU is using its normative power through empowering others while endeavouring to promote its core values internationally.[16] EU's normative power is understood as a process whereby the EU promotes its norms, such as human rights, democracy, rule of law and environmental protection. Ian Manners suggests that, the concept of normative power is that it refers to a specific form of power: "'power over opinion", or ideological power".[17] He defines normative power as "the ability to shape conceptions of 'normal' in international relations." Thus its predisposition is towards the use of non –military instruments in foreign policy, a case of 'carrots' rather than 'sticks'.[18] Even though the EU acquired military

[16] Scheipers Sibylle and Sicurelli Daniela (2008) "Empowering Africa: normative power in EU-Africa relations" Journal of European Public Policy Pg 607-623
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.

capabilities within the framework of ESDP, it does not necessarily undermine its role as a normative power (military means should not be prioritized over non-military ones).

In The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership, adopted by the European Council in December 2005, the primary goals of the EU's Africa strategy are the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and the promotion of sustainable development, security and good governance in Africa. Regional integration introduced under the heading Sustainable Economic Growth, Regional Integration and Trade is linked to the Economic Partnership Agreements, and to a whole array of objectives around the integration of Africa into the global economy, support for improved governance and for compliance with EU rules and standards, aid for trade, and environment and climate policies.[19] In this regard, the EU has promoted African regional integration as a way to face the main problems affecting the African continent. According to the EU's document, "The European Community's Development Policy" (2000), it argues that regional integration and cooperation can both be considered instruments to tackle poverty and instability in developing countries, since they "facilitate integration into the world economy, conflict resolution and resolution of cross border problems, for example in the field of environment".[20] These being the basis of partnership between the EU and Africa. Another area where the EU has exported its influence was during the transformation of the OAU into the AU in 2002. Where the AU adopted an institutional architecture mirrored on the EU, with the EU playing a key advisory role and funding

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[19] Farrell, Mary (2009) "EU policy towards other regions: policy learning in the external promotion of regional integration" Journal of European Public Policy Pg 1165 - 1184
[20] Scheipers Sibylle and Sicurelli Daniela (2008) "Empowering Africa: normative power in EU-Africa relations" Journal of European Public Policy Pg 607-623

towards capacity building with the purpose of strengthening operational and institutional development.

In general, the external promotion of regional integration can be used for various goals as pointed out in this theoretical assessment: to export the EU model of governance; to exercise international influence through the spread of EU values; and to strengthen the identity of the EU without compromising the national interests of the respective member states. In the next section I will therefore analyse the of the European integration process on the EU- Africa relations and its consequences on the relations by looking at the various frameworks of cooperation in existence.

PART TWO: FRAMEWORKS OF COOPERATION AND POLICY ANALYSIS

3.0. Introduction

The EU-ACP relations can be traced back to the European Economic Community (EEC) treaty of Rome 1957. This was designed to safeguard the special relationship between the EECs and their former colonies, and geared towards the enhancement of economic and social development of the colonies. Spearheaded by France and other founding members of the EEC Belgium and Italy, they envisaged, "With increased resources Europe will be able to pursue the achievement of one of its essential tasks, namely, the development of the African continent. In this way, there will be realized simply and speedily that fusion of interest which is indispensable to the establishment of a common economic system; it may be the leaven from which may grow a wider and deeper community between countries long opposed to one another by sanguinary divisions."[21]

Thus the framework of the 'privileged' relationship between the EEC and Africa was laid down through the Association Agreements signed between them, as provided in the Rome treaty under the "Association of Overseas Countries and Territories." With Africa being an important source of raw materials, by advocating for their interests the EEC had provided an opportunity of gluing their relations together as they pursued a pooled production model and also eliminated the threat of war among its members.

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[21] Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950

The first association agreement was signed in Yaoundé, Cameroon 1963 and subsequently renewed in 1969 (Yaoundé II), being an essentially reciprocal trade, technical assistance and economic assistance pact. The accession of the UK to the EEC in 1973 led to a new single agreement with the additional former British colonies that led to the Lome, Togo convention of 1975. The convention was subsequently renegotiated and entered into force in 1980 (Lome II), 1985 (Lome III), 1990 (Lome IV), and with each renegotiation new issues were introduced which was a sign of the gradual development of the relations.[22]

The changing international environment with the end of the cold war and the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht that transformed the EEC into the EU it was imperative that relationship be reviewed and a more comprehensive form of partnership be established. Thus, the EU in 1995 published a green paper that laid the ground work for the transformation of the EU-Africa relations under the ACP auspices. In this regard, the Cotonou Agreement 2000 was born to usher in the 21st century and a new era of EU-Africa relations.[23]

Over the last fifty years, we can examine that the EU-Africa relations have evolved from "unilateral associationism" to a multifaceted strategic partnership embedded in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy adopted at the second EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon in 2007, which heads of states and governments would like to "be remembered as a moment of recognition of maturity and transformation

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[22] Issues introduced included: non-reciprocal trade concessions (Lome I); the globalization of EU-ACP cooperation (Lome II); economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as human dignity (Lome III);and human rights, structural adjustment policy, economic diversification, intra-ACP regional cooperation, democratization and rule of law (Lome IV)
[23] Treaty of Maastrict 1992 and 1995 Green paper of the European Union on Africa

in our continent to continent dialogue, opening new paths and opportunities for collective action for our common future."[24]

In this part of the thesis, the various frameworks and process that define the EU-Africa relations are going to be analysed. I shall seek to understand the vision and guiding principles that have informed the various frameworks and process, and further analyse the objectives, approaches and strategies pursued by both parties in strengthening the complex nature of these relations.

3.1. Framework for EU-Africa relations

Notwithstanding their common history, and the evolving geo-strategic considerations and needs, there has been need to develop a more structured and consistent pragmatic relationship that would address the complexity and density of the EU-Africa relations. In this regard, the Cotonou Agreement (CA) 2000 was signed to provide the basic framework on how to pursue future EU-Africa relations. The CA therefore set the ground for focused process the Cairo process that culminated into the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy a more purpose driven strategy to address the most pertinent issues in the EU-Africa relations.

3.1.1 The Cotonou Agreement

The EU has had a long historical relationship with Africa and the Caribbean countries. A relationship that has spanned the last 5 decades as embodied in the Treaty of Rome in 1957 (Article 131) that aimed at preserving the existing economic relations between the EEC and its former colonies.) With the advent of independence in the early 1960s an association agreement was signed between the EEC and 18 Association of African States including Madagascar in

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[24] Lisbon declaration

Yaoundé 1963. The pact essentially geared towards reciprocal trade, economic assistance and technical assistance was subsequently renewed and signed in 1969 (Yaoundé II). The 1973 accession of the UK to the EEC necessitated for a new single pact between the AASM and the former British colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean Pacific. Hence the 1975 Lome Togo agreement that was signed between 9 EEC states and 46 ACP countries. Subsequent conventions were negotiated and signed: 1980 Lome II; 1885 Lome III; and 1990 Lome IV.

Subsequent Lome conventions also saw the expansion of the special EEC-ACP relations. Thus the Lome conventions exemplified the gradual incremental pace of the relations and with each Lome agreement, new issues were added albeit some being controversial. Among the issues were non-reciprocal trade concessions (Lome I), globalization of EU-ACP relations (Lome II) and economic, social and cultural rights, as well as human dignity (Lome III) while human rights, structural adjustment policy, economic diversification, intra-ACP regional cooperation, democratization and rule of law (Lome IV). The Lome conventions have been hailed as the model for the North South cooperation with the 25 year history of the accords gaining notoriety as EU's most strategic development policy with the extensive concessions given to the ACP.

With the nearing of the expiration period of 2000 coupled with the mixed results of the Lome conventions a new dynamic agreement was to be established between the EU and ACP. In this regard in 1996, the EU commission published a 'green paper' on the future relations of the EU and ACP. The 'green paper' recommended a renewed relationship preserving the contractual nature of the Lome conventions and adhering to growing international and regional developments. During this period the EU's position

as a global actor significantly increased with the EU signing bilateral and multilateral agreements with every region and countries and with the changing dynamics in the ACP countries, it was inevitable that a new partnership was necessary, hence the Cotonou Agreement.

The Cotonou Agreement has been termed as revolutionary in its substance and approach to Africa–EU relations. It is broader in scope than the original agreements, it does retain the concept of partnership that, in the early 1970s, was considered innovative in the conduct of North–South relations (Farrell, 2005). This notion of partnership is still fundamental to Africa–EU relations and has in fact been given stronger emphasis.

The Cotonou Agreement (CA) is a framework agreement consisting of objectives, principles and options for instruments, and it has been concluded for a period of 20 years.[25]

The main objective according to article 1: "…to promote and expedite the economic, cultural, and social development of the ACP states, with a view to contributing to peace and security and to promoting a stable and democratic political environment….The partnership shall be centered on the objective of reducing and eventually eradicating poverty consistent with the objectives of sustainable development and the gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world economy."[26]

The principle of equality between partners and respect of their sovereignty is still there and has been qualified in due regard of essential elements, which are; the respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law are

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[25] Babarinde & Faber 2004: 35
[26] Cotonou Partnership Agreement, 2000

enshrined.[27] Thus, the predecessors to the CA, were mainly self-contained system of rules, the latter is a more focused framework of cooperation with clear objectives, principles and options for instruments engineered towards its principle objective of eradicating poverty consistent with EU's development policy as enshrined in Article 177 EC treaty.

The CA therefore has redefined the principles of cooperation into various pillars:

I. The Political Dimension: calls for regular dialogue between the EU and the ACP group to address specific political issues of mutual interest and of general significance. This includes:

- Respect of human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law.

- Good governance is also considered a fundamental element.[28]

II. The Civil Society Dimension: is intended to encourage participation of non-state economic and social actors in implementation of programs and projects. It aim is to facilitate the sharing of information between state and non-state actors.

III. The Poverty Reduction Dimension: is the core objective of the agreement, with every aspect of the agreement being targeted towards eradication of

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[27] Babarinde & Faber 2004: 30

[28] Cotonou Partnership Agreement, 2000, defines good governance as "the transparent and accountable management of human, natural, economic and financial resources for the purposes of equitable and sustainable development. It entails clear decision-making procedures at the level of public authorities, transparent and accountable institutions, the primacy of law in the management and distribution of resources, and capacity building for elaborating and implementing measures aiming in particular at preventing and combating corruption."

poverty as a major goal. Hence the need for countries to develop their own consolidated development programs that will realize this end.

IV. The Trade Dimension: is the most controversial of all. It introduced a series of 'economic partnership agreements' (EPAs) with the EU such that EU-ACP trade regime conform to World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. The EPAs introduced a new trade regime based on reciprocity. The ACP countries are to enter into these EPAs with the EU either as individual countries or at a regional level. The EU has insisted on regional level negotiations, hence this has resulted in the ACP group being divided into six regional units for this purpose. However, the least developed ACP countries can opt for the continuation of non-reciprocal preferences under EU's preferences for least developed countries

V. The Financial Cooperation Dimension: includes provisions on both development assistance and the size of the assistance. ACP countries will be entitled to a lump sum for a five-year period, but based on the need and past performance. Moreover, it rationalizes the EDF instruments and introduces a new system of 'rolling programming', which allows the EU and the beneficiary country to regularly adjust their cooperation program.

The intent here has been to show the historical evolution of the main framework of cooperation between the EU and broader ACP region. It's on this basis that a more structured continent to continent relationship was to be developed. Hence in the next sections, the main process that has led to more focused EU-Africa relations is going to be examined; that is from the Cairo process to the Lisbon treaty that culminated into the Joint Africa-Europe Strategy (JAES) and thereafter a detailed analysis of the JAES.

3.1.2 The Cairo Summit

The Cairo process as it is popularly known was the first EU-Africa summit of its kind. It is the process that kick started more structured continent to continent relations that culminated into the Joint Africa-Europe Strategy signed at the Lisbon summit in 2007.

The Cairo summit was held in April, 2000 in Cairo (Egypt), and brought together Heads of State and Government of African States and the EU, the President of the EU commission, Secretary General to the Council of the EU/high representative of CFSP and a representative of the Secretary General of the UN. The summit was chaired by the then OAU and the EU.

The summit established five priority areas that established the framework of cooperation and political dialogue between the EU and Africa. The areas are:

1) regional integration in Africa; 2)integration of Africa into the world economy (trade, private sector development, investment, development resources, industrial infrastructure, research and technology, debt, cooperation international fora); 3) human rights, democratic principles and institutions, good governance and rule of law (including the role of civil society, migration and refugees); 4) peace-building, conflict prevention, management and resolution; 5) development issues (sustainable development challenges and poverty eradication, health, environment, food security, drug consumption and trafficking and culture-including the export and removal of African cultural goods).

The summit came up with the Cairo Declaration and Cairo Plan of Action which provided the framework for future EU-Africa political dialogue which was

structured at the levels of: Heads of State and Governments; Ministerial Levels; and Senior Officials levels.

The Cairo Declaration

The declaration rests upon the many years of cooperation that have existed between Europe and Africa and seeks to strengthen this cooperation further. "On the basis of shared values of strengthening representative and participatory democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, good governance, pluralism, international peace and security, political stability and confidence among nations."[29]

The declaration further states, in the desire to form a more strategic partnership between Africa and Europe in Twenty First Century, the main objective is to continually strengthening existing links… "through the creation of an environment and an effective framework for promoting a constructive dialogue on economic, political, social and development issues."

The declaration further gives the rationale behind the five thematic areas of cooperation:

With regard to Economic issues, regional economic cooperation and integration is recognized as integral part for the development of the African continent. Thus proper programmes and frameworks for development should be put in place on the basis that there is an important interrelation between political stability, peace and security on one hand and regional integration on the other."[30]

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[29] Cairo Declaration, 2000
[30] Ibid.

Under Integrating Africa into the World economy, involves several sub-topics: Trade, Private Sector Development, Investment, Resources for Development, Infrastructural Problem and Industrial Base, Research and Technology, External Debt, and Cooperation in International Fora.

Recognises that to achieve the eradication of poverty goal, a proper integration into the world economy is necessary. This can be effectively achieved by encouraging competitive advantages, economic growth, sustainable development and social stability in Africa. very high growth rates for external debt triggers a decline in investors' confidence, which results in declining foreign direct investment (FDI) flows and negatively affects the continent's economic growth, sustainable development and poverty eradication. Additionally Africa faces infrastructural problems in areas such as water supply, energy, transports and communications, knowledge, research and technology plus a weak or inexistent industrial and technological base.

Under Human Rights, democratic principles and institutions, good governance and the rule of law includes themes such as civil society, migration, xenophobia, refugees and internally displaced persons. Again there is recognition of the interrelation between democracy, development and the protection of fundamental freedoms and human rights. In the light of massive violations of human rights and law, acts of racism, genocide and ethnic cleansing taken place there is recognition of both governmental responsibility and civil society participation in protecting human rights and recognition of the vast consequences armed conflicts has on a continental scale in terms of

refugees and internally displaced persons as well as migration, brain drain and the rights of women and children.[31]

The strategic priority of Peace-building, Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution recognise the correlation between socio-economic development and peace, security, stability and justice. Included are issues linked to situations of disarmament, post-conflict assistance, demobilisation and reintegration; terrorism; arms and weapons; landmines; the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons Treaty; and Africa's conflicts, which cause great losses of human lives and destruction of property and infrastructure and "threaten peace, stability, regional and international security and hinder the aspirations of African peoples to peace, prosperity and development..."[32]

Finally under the priority Development Issues are included: challenges to sustainable development in Africa and poverty eradication; education; health; environment; food security; drug abuse and trafficking; and cultural issues. The primary challenge is the widespread poverty and linked to poverty reduction strategies are investments in human resources (education and health), food security (access and availability), and environment (rural and urban development strategies). The problem of drug abuse and trafficking is recognised as reinforcing crime, spreading diseases and reducing the productivity of human resources and the need for strengthened cooperation is stressed. The issue of cultural goods stolen or exported illicitly from Africa is the last development issue point aiming at cultural cooperation between Africa and Europe.

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[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.

The Cairo Plan of Action

As the preamble states, the Plan of Action are geared towards…"a new strategic dimension to the global partnership between Africa and Europe…"[33] It further prescribes the guiding principles that are to be considered by incorporating the necessary evaluation and monitoring mechanisms that will contribute to the achievement of the principles and commitments contained in the Cairo Declaration.

3.1.3. The Lisbon Summit

The Lisbon Summit was the second EU-Africa summit held in 2007. It brought together the Heads of State and Government from the EU and Africa. It was at this Summit that The Joint Africa-Europe Strategy was adopted. The strategy was aimed at enhancing the already existing political dialogue in the following areas of partnership: Peace and security; Governance and human rights; Migration; Energy and climate change; MDGs; Trade, infrastructures and development. To ensure a comprehensive implementation of the Joint Strategy and effective follow up mechanism, a first Action Plan was adopted. At the end of the Summit a declaration as a show of commitment to the strategy was agreed upon.[34]

Thus, in the Lisbon declaration, the success of the new strategy is stressed, whereby the Heads of State and Government made a commitment to ensure the new strategic partnership was given the necessary means and instruments that would enable it to fulfill the objectives of the Joint strategy and Action Plan adopted.(Lisbon Dec). A set of comprehensive and effective follow up

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[33] Cairo Plan of Action, 2000
[34] The declaration being referred to is the Lisbon Declaration adopted at the end of the 2nd EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon, 2007

mechanisms were developed as a basis of evaluation of the goals at the Third Summit that was held in 2010.

3.1.4. The Joint Africa Europe Strategy:

The Joint strategy outlines a long term shared vision of the future of Africa-EU relations in a globalized world. The strategy is geared towards developing "a partnership of equals, based on the effective engagement of our societies, in order to achieve significant results in our fundamental commitments, namely: the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals; the establishment of a robust peace and security architecture in Africa; the strengthening of investment, growth and prosperity through regional integration and closer economic ties; the promotion of good governance and human rights; and the creation of opportunities for shaping global governance in an open and multilateral framework."[35]

The Joint Strategy plays a fundamental role of enhance continent to continent partnership and as a result strengthening the political dialogue between Africa and EU and goes: beyond development cooperation by opening up the EU-Africa dialogue to issues of joint political concern and interest; beyond Africa by moving away from a focus on Africa matters only and openly address European and issues of global concern and to act accordingly in the relevant fora to make globalisation work for all; beyond fragmentation in supporting Africa's aspirations to find regional and continental responses to some of the most important challenges; and beyond

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[35] The Lisbon Declaration, 2007

institutions in ensuring a better participation of African and European citizens, as part of an overall strengthening of civil society in the two continents.[36]

The strategy has identified four priority areas which form the strategic framework for its operationalization, namely: (a) peace and security, (b) governance and human rights, (c) trade and regional integration and (d) key development issues. Under these priority areas eight thematic areas of partnerships were established to give a more focused approach on achieving the goals outlined in the strategy under the First Action Plan 2008-2010 which is the guiding principle in the implementation of the strategy. The eight priority areas of partnership are: 1. Peace and Security 2. Democratic Governance and Human Rights 3. Trade, Regional Integration and Infrastructure 4. Millennium Development Goals 5. Energy 6. Climate Change 7. Migration, Mobility and Employment 8. Science, Information Society and Space. The political rationale behind each strategic partnership largely carries on from Cairo, however it is stressed that in the light of new global challenges, the strategy embraces a shared vision on common values and principles; by establishing a political partnership of equals the aim is to address both bilateral issues and common global challenges while at the same time encouraging multilateral channels.

Looking at the four strategic areas, under Peace and Security, the main objective is to ensure continued peace and security in both Africa and Europe. Further, its recognized development cannot be attained without peace and security, thus continued EU assistance in capacity building initiatives to enable Africa prevent, manage and resolve conflicts, continued financial support of peacekeeping initiatives and international cooperation under multilateral settings.

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[36]News and resources on the Joint Africa EU strategy, http://europafrica.net/jointstrategy/

Under governance and human rights, the two continents will join efforts towards the enhancement of the effectiveness of the multilateral system and the promotion of the values of democracy, rule of law and human rights.

Under trade and regional integration, Involves enhancing African economic growth by assisting to be less dependent on donor aid and assist Africa in its integration into the global economy and enhancing coordination in coming up with joint positions on the international forums such as WTO.

Under key development issues, the issues involved are specifically geared towards attaining the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) which are crucial to the achieving sustainable development on the African continent.

The first Action Plan 2008-2010

The Africa-EU Joint Strategy is a long-term framework for EU-Africa Relation that will be implemented through successive short-term Action Plans and enhanced political dialogue at all levels, resulting in concrete and measurable outcomes in all areas of the partnership. The first Action Plan of the Africa-EU Joint Strategy had a three year timeframe (2008-2010) and was subsequently reviewed at the Third Africa-EU Summit in Libya, 2010. The Action plan gives a comprehensive framework on how the respective eight thematic "EU-Africa Partnerships" will be implemented.

EU-Africa Partnership on Peace and Security: Enhance dialogue on challenges to peace and security; Full operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture; and Predictable Funding for African-led Peace Support operations.

EU-Africa Partnership on Democratic Governance and Human Rights: Enhance dialogue at global level and in international fora; Promote the African Peer Review Mechanism and support the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance; Strengthen cooperation in the area of cultural goods

EU-Africa Partnership on Trade and Regional Integration: Support the African integration agenda; Strengthen African capacities in the area of rules, standards, and quality control; Implement the EU-Africa Infrastructure Partnership.

EU-Africa Partnership on the Millennium Developments Goals: Ensure the finance and policy base for achieving the MDGs; Accelerate the achievement of the Food Security Targets of the MDGs ; Accelerate the achievement of the Health Targets of the MDGs ; Accelerate the achievement of the Education Targets of the MDGs ;

EU-Africa Partnership on Energy: Implement the Energy Partnership to intensify cooperation on energy security and energy access.

EU-Africa Partnership on Climate Change: Build a common agenda on climate change policies and cooperation; Cooperate to address land degradation and increasing aridity, including the "Green Wall for the Sahara Initiative".

EU-Africa Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment: Implement the Declaration of the Tripoli Conference on Migration and Development; Implement the EU-Africa Plan of Action on Trafficking of Human Beings; Implement and follow up the 2004 Ouagadougou Declaration and Action Plan on Employment and Poverty Alleviation in Africa.

EU-Africa Partnership on Science, Information Society and Space: Support the development of an inclusive information society in Africa; Support capacity building in Africa and implement Africa's Science and Technology Consolidated Plan of Action; and Enhance cooperation on space applications and technology.

Financing

Existing financial Instruments in accordance with their respective scope and their relevance to the objective and activities concerned such European Development Fund (EDF), the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), and the Instrument for Stability (IFS) as well as the various thematic Programmes. Where possible these instruments shall be complemented by further contributions by EU Member States, African financial instruments and AU Member States, and an involvement of the African financial institutions.

Implementation Mechanism and Institutional Architecture

In order to ensure the implementation of the political commitments, promote the broadest possible ownership of the process, and create strong multilateral links between the two continents, the EU and Africa will establish an appropriate institutional architecture and implementation mechanism that reflects the ambitions and drive behind this partnership, namely through:

• more frequent contacts between African and EU political leaders, in particular between the Presidents of the EU and AU institutions;

• Complement bi-annual EU-AU Troika meetings of Foreign Ministers with sectorial Ministerial meetings as necessary;

• Establish mechanisms for closer cooperation and dialogue between the organs and institutions of the EU and AU, namely pursue the annual meetings between the College of Commissioners of the European and AU Commissions and of the 6-monthly Joint AU-EU Task Force meetings and initiate a regular dialogue and cooperation between the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) and the European Parliament (EP), as well as between the AU ECOSOCC and the EESC and local authorities;

• Strengthen the representation of the EU in Addis Ababa and of the AU in Brussels;

• Establish a mapping of existing European and African civil society networks;

•Create a web portal to facilitate Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) consultation ahead of key policy decisions;

• Invite representatives from European and African civil societies to express themselves ahead of Ministerial Troika meetings;

• Establish informal joint expert groups on all priority actions identified in the Action Plan. These informal Groups will bring together the African, European and international key-actors (including civil society organisations) with the necessary competence and commitment to work on the priority action concerned;

• Draw up an annual joint report on the progress and implementation of the Action Plan to be presented to the Ministerial Troika meetings;

• Hold a third EU Africa Summit at the end of 2009 in Africa. This Summit will review the results of the first Action Plan and approve the following one.[37]

3.1.5. The Third EU-Africa Summit

The Third EU-Africa Summit was held on November, 2010 in Tripoli, Libya. The Summit shaped the future relations between the two continents and adopted the Tripoli Declaration and the 2nd Action Plan 2011-2013. The Summit was an evaluation and assessment on the progress the JAES and implementation of the 1st Action Plan. The Heads of State and Government of the EU and Africa affirmed to continue improving and developing the EU-Africa partnership under the JAES. In this regard, they agreed to maintain the eight thematic partnerships in the 2nd Action Plan and a number of cross-cutting issues were agreed upon to enhance the effectiveness of the Action Plan and to improve its working methods.

The cross cutting issues were classified into four:

JAES: enhanced political dialogue and coordination: under this, the rationale is to streamline on levels of representation to accommodate changes in the EU institutional set up as a result of the Lisbon Treaty coming into force in the EU. This is both at the Heads of State and Government and Foreign Ministers and at the sectorial level they agreed to enhance frequency, scope and effectiveness of meetings at expert levels. Further, enhance levels of coordination both between the AU and EU and internally in the respective bodies.

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[37] Third summit was held in Libya, 2010

JAES institutional architecture and working arrangements: Guidelines defining the mandate, composition and working methods for JEGs were endorsed so as to enhance their effectiveness. On the other hand, the participation in the JTF has been enhanced to allow stakeholders to contribute more effectively and actively in the implementation of the Joint Strategy.

JAES financing: A joint Afro-European initiative would be required to deliver on the ambitious agendas of the JAES. Thus, financing shall remain in the realm of the existing instruments; it's the responsibility of all stakeholders: European and AU commissions, Member States, Financing Institutions, RECs as well as private sector and civil society on both sides. Proposals to establish a Joint African Integration facility are to be concluded.

A people-centered partnership: Last, but certainly not least, both sides agree to support the active involvement of the European and Pan-African Parliaments (EP, PAP) in the implementation and the monitoring of this Action Plan, in line with the principles agreed in Lisbon and the arrangements endorsed by the Ministerial Troika of 28 April 2009. Both sides also agree to support the active involvement of the Civil Society (including through ECOSOCC on the African side) to facilitate and promote a broad-based and wide-ranging people-centered partnership.

3.1.6. Objectives, Approaches and Strategies

The Joint Africa- EU Strategy identifies four main objectives of the long-term strategic partnership:

i) to reinforce and elevate the Africa-EU political partnership to address issues of common concern (peace and security, migration and development, and a clean environment); ii) to strengthen and promote peace, security, democratic

governance and human rights, fundamental freedoms, gender equality, sustainable economic development, including industrialization, and regional and continental development in Africa, and to ensure that all MDGs are met in all African countries by the year 2015; iii) to jointly promote and sustain a system of effective multilateralism, with strong, representative institutions, and the reform of the UN system and other key international institutions, and to address global challenges and common concerns; iv) to facilitate and promote a broad-based and wide-ranging people-centered partnership.

The formulation of these central objectives underscores the desire to transform EU-Africa relationship into a political partnership that goes beyond the issues that have traditionally dominated their relations (trade and development cooperation) and embraces a broad range of problems of interest to the international community. Deepening the relationship and jointly engaging the world community are the two fundamental dynamics that drive the current phase of EU-Africa relations. To that end, the two partners have identified ten key political challenges that need to be addressed to achieve the success of the new partnership:

a) to move away from a traditional relationship and forge a real partnership characterized by equality and the pursuit of common objectives; b) to build on positive experiences and lessons learned from our past; c) to promote more accurate images of each other; d) to encourage mutual understanding between the peoples and cultures of the two continents; e) to recognize and fully support Africa's efforts and leadership to create conducive conditions for sustainable social and economic development and the effective implementation of partner-supported development programmes; f) to work together towards gradually adapting relevant policies and legal and financial frameworks; g) to

ensure that bilateral relations, dialogue and cooperation between one or more European and African countries contribute to the achievement of the objectives set out in this Joint Strategy; h) to integrate in our agenda common responses to global challenges and strengthen our dialogue and cooperation in multilateral context; i) to encourage the full integration of members of migrant communities/diaporas in their countries of residence; j) to bear in mind that we can only achieve our objectives if this strategic partnership is owned by all stakeholders.

This new approach should guide EU-Africa relations in four defined "strategic inter-related priority areas": peace and security; governance and human rights; trade and regional integration and key development issues. It suffices to mention the importance that the two partners attach to the principle of coherence for development, whose goal is to promote "interactions and positive complementarities between sectoral policies and strategies" and to ensure that "measures taken in one policy area do not undermine results in other areas."[38] The affirmation of this principle is aimed at addressing one of the criticisms of EU-Africa relations, which seem to sometimes indicate a low level of coherence between the overall objectives of the partnership and the formulation and implementation of specific policies.

3.1.7 Institutional Architecture

Relations between the EU and Africa have been conducted through a complex institutional setup that reflects different levels (continental, sub-regional and national) and frameworks (the Cotonou Agreement, the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Trade and Cooperation Agreement with South

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[38] Joint Africa-EU Strategy.

Africa) of interaction between the two partners. This institutional framework has long been characterized as lacking coherence.[39] The EU-Africa strategic partnership is to be implemented through "an institutional architecture, which allows and promotes intensive exchange and dialogue on all issues of common concern." While recognizing the involvement of a large number of institutional and non-institutional actors to the partnership, the Joint Strategy stresses the central role of the AU and EU - as continental organizations- in advancing its objectives. The overarching partnership formalized in the Joint Strategy is structured around the following mechanisms of political dialogue.[40]

- Regular Africa-EU Summits

To reflect the importance of their partnership, the Joint Strategy calls for EU-Africa Summit of Heads of States and Governments to be organized every three years alternatively in Africa and the EU. These Summits should take stock of the progress made in the implementation of commitments made and provide political guidance for further work. In the period between the Heads of States and Governments' Summits, it is recommended that leaders of major EU and AU institutions - Council, Commission and Parliament - meet on a regular basis to review progress and provide political guidance to the partnership.[41]

- Africa-EU Troikas

Regular meetings of senior EU and African officials and ministers are also recommended to maintain the political dialogue in the period between the Summits. The troika format, which brings together a small number (3) of representatives who are mandated to speak on behalf of the EU and Africa, is

[39] ECDPM, 2007, p.2
[40] Mangala, Jack, "European Union and Africa: Old Partners in a Changing World"
[41] Joint Africa EU Strategy

preferred "in order to ensure an effective and balanced representation of both Unions." EU-Africa troika meetings of Foreign Ministers – and if possible other sectoral Ministerial meetings - will take place biannually to review and monitor the implementation of the Joint Strategy.

- Commission –to-Commission Dialogue and Joint EU-Africa Task Force

The EU and AU Commissions represent the central institutional actors of the partnership. To that end, the two Commissions are expected to enhance their cooperation. The Joint EU-AU Task Force serves as an instrument of permanent working level dialogue in support of the work of the Commissions whose meeting is scheduled on an annual basis.

- Parliaments and other Representative Institutions

The institutional architecture adopted by the Joint Strategy seeks to foster collaboration and political dialogue between "institutions that represent the people of the two continents", mainly the European Parliament, the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), the EU Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the AU Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOC). Dialogue between these different representative institutions is intended to "complement and/or feed into the institutional EU-AU troika dialogue (...) to achieve maximum coordination, coherence and consistency of policies and approaches."[42]

- Civil Society

In accordance with the principle of ownership, the Joint Strategy reserves a special place to various segments of the civil society in advancing the objectives of the partnership. It calls for "the development of a vibrant and independent

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[42] Joint Africa EU Strategy.

civil society and of a systematic dialogue between it and public authorities at all levels." While the civil society is encouraged to get involved in the partnership and take an active role in the implementation and monitoring of the Joint Strategy and Action Plans, the concrete modalities of its participation in the political dialogue are yet to be defined.

EU-Africa partnership represents the most complex and dense continent-to-continent relations in modern international relations. As we have seen, the two partners have developed a multi-layered and multi-faceted cooperation that has been carried out through an evolving complex web of institutional and legal frameworks.

4.0. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SUMMIT AGENDAS

An overall comment to the comparative Summit agenda analysis is that the Cairo Declaration is a "two-in-one", declaration and strategy, whereas the two are separated into two documents in the Lisbon Agenda: a declaration and a strategy. Both Summits resulted in a plan of action. The wording of the Cairo Plan of Action is generally much less assertive, quantifiable and measurable, than that of the Lisbon version, except for its last part, which sets off a more structured political dialogue. In the Lisbon Strategy, each of the eight strategic partnerships is presented separate from the Declaration with a rationale linking it to the overall objectives of the Joint Strategy. Then the Priority Actions are presented in the First Action Plan one by one, each stating one or more specific objective(s), expected outcomes, activities, actors to carry out these activities, and means of finance. It could be suspected that this structural difference would affect the comparability of the two strategies;

however, a careful observation of the respective contents confirms the possibility of a comparative analysis.

Any succession of issues on a Summit agenda is assumed to list priorities in order by placing the most important first and so on successively. This prioritization may be attributed greater or lesser importance. However, it is here assumed that there will always symbolically be a political interpretation associated with the sequence of the issues, i.e. with the order in which the themes are presented. When comparing the Summit agendas, it becomes clear that some major shifts in priorities have taken place. And new strategic partnerships have surfaced; the number of strategic partnerships has risen from five in 2000 to eight in 2007, and includes points such as energy, climate change, migration and Space.

In the Lisbon agenda, the number one strategic partnership, peace and security, has moved up four "positions" in relation to the Cairo agenda. New points foresee to fully operationalize the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and provide funding for African-led Peace Support Operations.

Also the number two strategic partnership, democratic governance and human rights, has moved up one position in relation to the Cairo agenda. New points include the promotion of the APRM (a novelty brought by NEPAD) and support of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. And a new "old" point has moved up from a fifth position in the Cairo agenda, namely the cooperation in the area of cultural goods. In the Cairo agenda, cultural issues was positioned under development issues, however it now appears under democratic governance and human rights, indicating recognition of the

importance the matter of returning African cultural heritage holds to the African continent.

The third strategic partnership in the Lisbon agenda, trade, regional integration and infrastructure, has moved down a position in relation to the Cairo agenda. And a whole new point foresees a strengthening of African capacities in the area of rules, standards and quality control: the inclusion of this point indicates recognition of a need for enhanced competitiveness, for tighter measures in a global marketplace with a trend to standardized rules, and is also in line with the with the aims to increase African capacity building to take on own responsibility for sustainable production and economic growth.

The fourth strategic partnership, Millennium Development Goals (MDG), have moved up a position in relation to the Cairo agenda, where it was denominated development issues. In the Lisbon Strategy the number one priority action envisages to ensure the finance and policy base for achieving the MDG, which is a clear recognition of the increased importance given to practicalities, whereas under the Cairo agenda, the number one priority under development issues was linked to challenges to sustainable development and poverty eradication, a point which has moved down to a seventh position in the Lisbon strategy and now figures under the strategic partnership of migration, mobility and employment. A further redistribution has taken place with respect to the prioritizing of target achievement: in the Lisbon strategy food achievement is listed over health and education, whereas in the Cairo strategy education was listed over health and then food security.

The fifth strategic partnership in the Lisbon strategy is energy, which represents a novelty in relation to the Cairo agenda, with a single priority

action previewed to intensify cooperation on energy security and access. This expresses a high priority concern for the EU, and institutionalises a strategic partnership in an area of great strategic importance to the EU, highly dependent on oil and gas from Russia, for example, with which it also has celebrated a strategic partnership in the area of energy.

Presently a diversification trend is evident, with rapidly expanding EU investments in the area of energy in Northern Africa (Morocco and Algiers) and plans to invest in solar energy in the Saharan desert. Also to the African continent, energy is a critical resource. It is noted that although Africa produces electrical power in hydro-power plants it only benefits a small percentage of the population, due to the low implementation of electrification in the rural population. Likewise, in spite of Africa holding some of the more significant oil reserves in the world, most of the extraction is exported, and only a slight percentage benefits the local population.

The sixth strategic partnership, climate change, also represents a novelty in relation to the Cairo strategy and testifies to the common recognition of a global challenge demanding global responses. It previews two priority actions: the first is to build a common agenda on climate change policies and cooperation, and the second is to cooperate to address land degradation and increased aridity, including the "Green Wall for the Sahara Initiative".

The seventh strategic partnership, migration, mobility and employment, is also new in relation to the Cairo agenda, although in part taken from already existing points in the Cairo strategy, as for example migration, which figured under human rights, democratic principles and institutions, good governance and the rule of law. This represents on the one hand a move four positions

down from a third position in the Cairo Declaration, but on the other hand it represents recognition of the importance of its vast impacts on development conceding it a separate strategic partnership. The priority actions regarding trafficking of Human beings and poverty alleviation were present in the Cairo Declaration under development issues in a fifth position, and likewise suffered on the one hand a downgrading in positioning from Cairo to Lisbon, while on the other hand was recognized a new importance taken from under "general" development issues to a new position specifically linked to the issues of migration, mobility and employment.

The eight strategic partnership, science, information society and Space, is equally new compared to the Cairo version, although some "old" points such as capacity building linked to science and technology have transited from the first Summit where it showed under the second strategy point integrating Africa into the world economy.

To sum up the comparative analysis, the following notes can be made: The Lisbon Joint Strategy claims to emerge in the context of a shared vision between the two Continents reflecting a political willingness to build a long-term strategic partnership capable of meeting new global challenges. It proposes a series of new approaches in order to respond to these challenges and to meet the objectives set forth: to move away from a donor-based relation towards a political partnership of equals; to build on positive experiences and lessons learnt from past experiences; to move away from inherited negative stereotypes and instead promote more accurate images of each other; to promote a mutual social and cultural understanding between the peoples of the two Continents; to support Africa's efforts and leadership to implement the Partnerships and create sound conditions for healthy social and economic

development; to cooperate in the development of relevant policies and frameworks; to ensure coherence in bilateral relations, dialogue and cooperation between various countries; to strengthen the multilateral cooperation in response to global challenges; to integrate migrant communities and diasporas in the development process; and to stimulate a general ownership through the inclusion on civil society and local authorities.

The Joint Strategy thus establishes a partnership between Africa and Europe, in which both parties commit themselves to address a series of objectives on strategic priorities to support African countries in their efforts to achieve all Millenium Development Goals by 2015, and in general to promote political, economic and social development and the inclusion of Africa in the world economy.

Situational Analysis

The Cairo Summit highlighted the increasing political commitment among European and African leaders to address the challenges, opportunities and problems of the African continent, a region which has been much neglected in terms of the EU's overall external relations policy. The Summit brought two very different groups of countries together. The EU is the world's largest trading and economic block. Africa, by contrast, is home to about 70% of the world's least developed countries and too many of the world's conflicts while it also faces relatively new disasters such as the HIV/AIDS pandemic and growing environmental degradation. Of the 590 million people in sub-Saharan Africa, 250 million do not have access to safe water and 205 million lack access to health care. The Summit declaration and plan of action expressed both African and EU leaders' intention of building up a strategic partnership to the same

level that the EU has with Asia, Latin America and the Gulf countries. It emphasised mutual benefits and both sides' determination to strengthen their political economic and cultural understanding of the other through the creation of a constructive dialogue on economic, political, social and development issues.[43]

While Cairo's ambitious agenda was translated into an increasing convergence of interests in the years following the summit, its practical implementation however run into difficulties due to differences between the EU and African states with regard to the primacy given to the identified priorities.[44]

Europeans by and large [were] putting the accent particularly on peace and security issues, and Africans more and more on the trade and economic aspects of the partnership, including the need to address the debt problem. On the African side, many still consider that some of the issues set out in the Cairo agenda have not been really addressed or at least not had the attention they deserved (e.g. debt issue and the return of African cultural goods, and these are, to some extent, still a source of frustration.[45]

In response to the aforementioned situation as well as a number of other changes affecting both the EU (the deepening of the European integration, the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy and the subsequent push for a European Security and Defense Policy) and Africa (the launching of NEPAD in 2001 and the transformation of the OAU into the African Union in 2002 and the subsequent reinforcement of trends towards greater regional integration and pan-African cooperation), the EU developed its own strategy for

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[43] Mangala Jack, "European Union and Africa: Old partners in a Changing World"
[44] European Center for Development Policy Management (ECDPM, 2006, p.2)
[45] Mangala Jack, "European Union and Africa: Old partners in a Changing World"

Africa in 2005. In presenting the Strategy, the European Commission stressed that...For too long the EU's relations with Africa have been too fragmented, both in policy formulation and implementation between the different policies and actions of the EU Member States and the European Commission; between trade cooperation and economic development cooperation; between more traditional socio-economic development efforts and strategic political policies. Neither Europe nor Africa can afford to sustain this situation.[46] The purpose of this Strategy for Africa is, therefore, to give the EU a comprehensive, integrated and long-term framework for its relations with the African continent.

The formulation of the EU Strategy for Africa was predicated on three central assumptions outlined as follows by the European Commission: (i) without good governance, rule of law, security and peace, no lasting development progress is possible; (ii) regional integration, trade and interconnectivity are necessary factors to promote economic growth; (iii) if Africa is to achieve the MDGs, more support is needed on issues with a direct impact on living standards, such as health, education and food security.[47]

The dual concept of "One Africa and One Europe" was the centerpiece of this strategy in that, for the first time, the EU wanted to "address Africa as one entity" and act towards it in a more unified manner than before. But the EU also made it clear that the principal objective of its strategy towards Africa was to promote the achievement of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).[48]

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[46] European Commission 2005
[47] European Commission, 2007
[48] Mangala Jack, "European Union and Africa: Old partners in a Changing World"

Unilaterally formulated by the EU, the Strategy for Africa was, from its inception, received with skepticism and a great deal of criticism by key African players. Criticisms centered on the fact that the Africa Strategy had been developed without sufficient consultations and retained elements of a traditional, unilateral donor-client approach. It was also pointed out that the Strategy reflected a "too biased European priority agenda, which would not be conducive to creating African ownership."[49]

In response to these criticisms, the two sides agreed, during the 5th EU-Africa Ministerial meeting in December 2005 in Bamako, "to take their partnership to a new, strategic level and develop a Joint EU-Africa Strategy – a partnership with Africa, rather than a strategy for Africa."[50] The EU and Africa were determined to make a quantum leap to their relationship by gradually transforming it into a more political, more global and more equal partnership. They also agreed on the need to seek the input of a wide range of stakeholders and key actors (members of the civil society, trade unions, entrepreneurs and simple citizens) on both sides in the formulation of the Joint Strategy, which was adopted by the second EU-Africa Summit in December 2007 in Lisbon. The joint Strategy epitomizes EU-Africa newly declared 'strategic partnership'. It is intended to bring a measure of coherence to a largely fragmented system of interaction.[51]

5.0. THE VISION OF THE EU-AFRICA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

The vision of the EU-Africa Strategic Partnership - projected in the Joint Strategy- stems from a changing regional and international context.

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[49] ECDPM, 2006, p.4
[50] European Commission, 2007, p.5
[51] Mangala Jack, "European Union and Africa: Old partners in a Changing World"

"Africa is now at the heart of international politics, but what is genuinely new is that Africa- and the African Union in particular- is emerging, not as a development issue, but as a political actor in its own right. It is becoming increasingly clear that Africa matters- as a political voice, as an economic force and as a huge source of human, cultural, natural and scientific potential (…) Meanwhile, the EU too has changed – its membership has expanded to 27 States, its role in the world has developed and it has adopted ambitious common policies on security, energy, climate change and innovation. Europeans have recognized that African economic prosperity is essential for European prosperity (…) The world has changed with the forces of global capital and financial markets, climate change, global media and information and communications technology, trans-national terrorism and organized crime, and global pandemics all making the world smaller by the day. The need for common global responses is therefore more vital than ever before. The EU and Africa are old partners, but in a world transformed".[52]

This transformed world is also one in which the traditional European dominance in Africa is being fiercely challenged by new comers. Taking into account this highly competitive environment, the European Commission has candidly admitted that if it "wants to remain a privileged partner and make the most of its relations with Africa, it must be willing to reinforce, and in some areas reinvent, the current relationship – institutionally, economically and culturally."[53]

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[52] Ibid. pg.2

[53] Ibid. (2007, p.3)

The shared vision formulated in the Joint Strategy is to strengthen EU-Africa political partnership and enhance cooperation at all levels. The new strategic partnership is based on a "Euro-African consensus on values and common interests" and should strive to bridge the development gap between the two continents. It is worth investigating those common values and interests before venturing further. In its opening paragraph, the Joint Strategy lists the following as forming the "community of values" between the EU and Africa: the respect for human rights, freedom, equality, solidarity, justice, the rule of law and democracy. Without dismissing Africa's progress on several of these elements over the past decade, it is only fair to mention that this community of values is still far from being a tangible reality in Africa. These values are more present on the European side than they are on the African side. Their affirmation seems more to correspond to a declaration of intent - a value agenda- than any political reality on the ground. As for the "common interests", they are not as clearly stated as the common values. They must therefore be inferred from selected priority areas and objectives pursued by the two partners in their political dialogue.[54]

The EU-Africa Strategic Partnership is to be guided by a number of fundamental principles: unity of Africa, interdependence between Africa and Europe, ownership and join responsibility, respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, coherence and effectiveness of existing agreements. In addition to these basic principles, a strong emphasis is also placed on the working principles of political dialogue, co-management and co-responsibility, burden-sharing and mutual accountability, solidarity and mutual confidence, equality and justice, common and human security, respect

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[54] Mangala Jack, "European Union and Africa: Old partners in a Changing World"

for international law and agreements, gender equality and non-discrimination and long-term approach.

Some of these principles are new (e.g. long term approach, mutual confidence and coherence and effectiveness of existing agreements), while others (e.g. ownership, equality and partnership) have been restated, over time, through multiple frameworks that govern specific aspects of EU-Africa relations. Less than a year after the adoption of the Joint Strategy, the former need still to be tested while the latter are more settled and deserve further comments to assess whether "their sense, significance and implications have changed with developments in the external political and economic context."[55]

- Equality

The principle of equality of partners has been consistently reaffirmed in all important instruments governing EU-Africa relations. Recently, this principle has attracted new interest due to the emergence of the AU and regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa and the consolidation of European integration. Both developments have created a new and more symmetrical institutional framework for relations between Europe and Africa, between the EU and the regional and continental institutions. Within this new environment, it has been stated that "equality implies mutual recognition, mutual respect and the definition of mutual collective interests."[56]

While the two partners have been keen to stress the centrality of the principle of equality, their relationship is dominated by such extreme asymmetrical distribution of power that equality has only been confined to the rhetorical

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[55]European Commission, 2005, p.18
[56] Ibid.

realm, a situation that has been referred to as "the myth of equal partners" which underscores "the credibility gap associated with presenting this as a partnership of equals when the reality showed the African countries to have institutional weaknesses and a dependence on aid, and an inability to withstand the conditionality demands now being imposed by the European Union."[57] Recent positive economic and political developments in Africa have not been able to alter the fundamental dynamics of the relationship. The principle of equality still retains its mythical status and doesn't reflect the reality of EU-Africa relations. An unequal client-donor relation is more reflective of the current state of affairs.[58]

• Partnership

Partnership appears to be the most praised principle and working method of EU-Africa relations. Mentioned 52 times in only 100 articles in the Cotonou Agreement, "partnership" is the defining concept of the agreed Africa-EU Strategic Partnership. However, it is difficult to find much reference to the concept of partnership in any of the main theoretical approaches, much less to find a useful definition of the term in any of the explanations of international cooperation on offer in contemporary literature.[59]

Although the European Union has been the architect of the "partnership model", an examination of various policy papers from the EU doesn't provide that much definitional clarity. The concept of partnership has implications at two levels. First, between the two partners, the relationship must not

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[57] Farrell, M. (2005), "A Triumph of Realism over Idealism? Cooperation between the European Union and Africa", *European Integration*, Vol.27, No. 3, 263-283, pp.263-283. (p.271)

[58] Mangala Jack, "European Union and Africa: Old partners in a Changing World"
[59] Ibid.

encompass only development or commercial issues but also include broad, concrete and constructive political dialogue. The relationship is expected to "go beyond the donor-recipient relationship of the past and reflect a political partnership of equals."[60] Second, the EU and Africa must be strategic partners in dealing with the rest of the world in that "EU-Africa dialogue should not exclusively be a forum for discussions on African matters." The pursue of a more multilateral world order, fairer global development and the promotion of diversity constitute, among other things, the basic values and objectives that the two partners must seek when engaging the world. In short, partnership means going beyond development cooperation and going beyond Africa. But, as Farrell asks "How does the EU model of partnership work out in practice? To what extent does this institutionalized form of interregional cooperation reflect the core values that the EU claims to espouse and, equally important, are these values shared by the other partner?"[61]

As a test of the success of any political partnership, Farrell suggests that we consider "the extent to which substantive outcomes can be measured against the aspirations of each party."[62] While the partnership concept brings an added dimension for it suggests free will, equal weight in terms of influence and ability to shape negotiations and outcomes, and the expectation of favorable results for each partner, a close examination of the power structures –especially aid conditionality- and implementation of the Cotonou Agreement for example seems to suggest quite "an Orwellian relation where one partner has no rights at all, the other perfect arbitrariness."[63] The concept of equal partnership seems more conjectural than fundamental. The New Strategic

[60] Commission, 2007 a, p. 3
[61] Farrell, 2005 p.24
[62] Ibid.
[63] Raffer, p. 19

Partnership feeds into, rather than challenges, the existing patterns of economic and trade relations – relations of dependency- which characterize the relationship between two sides. It has rightly been observed that "partnership cannot be assumed just because a contract has been signed; it needs to be achieved rather than declared."[64]

- Ownership

The principle of ownership has emerged as a fundamental tenet of the international consensus on development cooperation. In the context of EU-Africa relations, the principle of ownership permeates all sectoral areas of cooperation and is based on the belief that "development policies and strategies cannot be imposed from the outside."[65] The African partner has particularly insisted on the need for African-based and African- owned solutions and strategies to the continent's problems. While there seems to be a consensus on this premise, the two partners tend to emphasize different corollaries of the principle when it comes to its practical implementation.[66]

The EU, on the one hand, tends to underscore responsibility and participation. It has stressed that developing countries have the primary responsibilities for creating and enabling domestic environment for mobilizing their own resources, including coherent and effective policies (…) The EU acknowledges the essential oversight role of democratically elected citizens' representatives. Therefore it encourages an increased involvement of national assemblies, parliaments and local authorities (…) The EU support the broad participation of all stakeholders in countries' development and encourage all parts of the

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[64] ECDPM, 1996, p.33
[65] European Commission, 2005, p.19.
[66] Mangala Jack, "European Union and Africa: Old partners in a Changing World"

society to take part. Civil society, including economic and social partners such as trade unions, employers' organizations and private sector, NGOs and other non-state actors of partner countries in particular play a vital role as promoters of democracy, social justice and human rights.[67]/[68]

The African partner, on the other hand, tends to insist on modalities of aid delivery and assistance that support and strengthen Africa and country-owned policies, programs and priorities. It has been agreed that, In order to turn the principle of ownership into policy, budget support (aid directly contributing to a partner government's budget for sectoral policies or general programmes) should increasingly become the main aid delivery mechanism. This approach not only improves the ownership, efficiency and predictability of the support, but it will also enhance a more mature policy dialogue leading partner countries to take their responsibilities in terms of objectives, means and governance mechanisms.[69]

Although not always easy in practice finding a sound balance between the imperatives of responsibility, participation and adequate aid delivery mechanisms represents a crucial test when it comes to the implementation of the ownership principle.[70]

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[67] European Commission, 2006
[68] Mangala Jack, "European Union and Africa: Old partners in a Changing World"
[69] European Commission, 2005, p.19
[70] ECDPM, 2006, p.7,

6.0. Trade Policy: The Economic Partnership Agreements

Economic Integration refers to as "a close degree of economic intertwining that by formal agreement of informal circumstances, the countries involved begin to surrender some degree of sovereignty and act as an economic unit"[71] Through the common external trade policy, the EU has achieved a degree of economic integration, that has seen the EU as a strong and recognized economic actor speaking with one single voice.

The EU's trade policy in Africa is shaped by the fact that the EU is trying to establish the much talked about Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with geographically more focused regions and regional organizations. The EU claims to be combining trade and aid in a new way under the new EPAs. According to the EU's official policy, "the idea is to help the ACP countries integrate with their regional neighbours as a step towards global integration, and to help them build institutional capacities and apply principles of good governance. At the same time, the EU will continue to open its markets to products from the ACP group, and other developing countries."[72]

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[71] Kimugunyi Patrick, (2006) "Regional Integration in Africa: Prospects and Challenges for the European Union," Contemporary Europe Research Centre University of Melbourne, pg 2
[72] European Commission (2004), A World Player: The European Union's External Relations, DG for Press and Communication Pg 10

A closer integration of the African countries and regions into the global economy is, according to the EU's official rhetoric, seen as the way for future trading relations as well as a development strategy, which is of mutual gain, both for the EU and for the weaker partner regions.[73]

To grasp the need for the EPAs, we need to understand the nature of the EU-Africa trade relations prior to the introduction of the EPAs. Historically these relations can be traced to the legacy of colonialism. The founding members of the EEC with the exception of Luxembourg have colonial ties with Africa, the European countries sought to maintain the economic links, access to natural resources and raw materials, and other strategic interests they had enjoyed during colonialism. This formed the basis of the Yaoundé conventions (1963 – 1974). With the ascension of the UK to the EEC and subsequent decolonization process, the African group expanded and a new regime of the Lome conventions (1974 – 1999) was initiated.

The Lome trade and aid regime guided the relations of the EU and ACP countries for a period of 25years. It was heralded as a positive model for the development of the ACP group and eventual eradication of poverty. It was credited with being innovative and a revolution in the north – south relations. Being guided under the premise of equality, the trade and development component was to grant the ACP group non-reciprocal preferential access for most goods to the EU market. It also cushioned least developing countries from loss of export revenue on their raw materials through the STABEX scheme. However the intended results of this non-reciprocal trade regime were not realized, in the contrary the African countries continued not to realize development and even retrogressed compared to the Asian and Latin countries

[73] Ibid. pg 4

that did not enjoy preferential treatment. Thus Africa continued to be alienated from the global economy.

It is on this premise that a new trade regime was developed that would be based on reciprocity. This was entrenched in the Cotonou Agreement 2000 where Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) were introduced as the basis of economic cooperation. EPAs were regarded as the key instrument towards fostering the development of the ACP countries and achieving the key objective of the agreement in eradicating poverty and integrating the ACP group into the world economy. The pressure from the WTO necessitated the need to change from the preferential trade treatment. The WTO, with a rules based trading system supporting a global open trading order, the Lome preferences were contrary to the principle of multilateralism and contravened the most-favoured nation (MFN) clause embodied in the GATT/WTO agreement.[74] This also requires the commitment to ensure liberalization of trade affecting substantially all products and services, and covering all sectors.

With one of the objectives of the EPAs being fostering of regional integration, both at the "north- south" and "south – south", despite initial resistance from the ACP group, pressure from the European Commission resulted in grouping the ACP countries into six regions (Central Africa, West Africa, Southern Africa Development Community, East and Southern Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific). Thus the process of negotiations was to be conducted on an inter-regional basis. Negotiations started in 2002 and the EPAs were to be in place by 1st January, 2008 when the WTO waiver on preferential trade arrangements expired.

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[74] Kimugunyi, Patrick (2006) "Regional Integration in Africa: Prospects and Challenges for the European Union," Contemporary Europe Research Centre University of Melbourne, pg. 9

Negotiations focused on market access, on the role of development in these free trade agreements, and on services and trade related issues. As regards access for trade in goods, there existed different interpretations of the WTO rule that requires 'substantially all' trade to be covered in an FTA. EU demanded zero tariffs on products that account 90% of the current trade between the parties. The ACP wanted at least 40% of products – 'sensitive products'- from tariff liberalization. Another contention was the length of transition periods the DG Trade considering 1o years while the ACP group asking for 20 – 25 years to adapt to the world market. EU preferred that all countries in a region committed to the same obligations, while the ACP wanted rules that acknowledged regional diversity. Related to the development dimension of the agreement, the ACP saw little prospect for increased exports to the EU if they were not granted substantial additional development support to help them alleviate supply side constraints. DG trade was against including explicit development aid provisions in the EPA legal framework, as assistance was already covered by the Cotonou Agreement and in other forums.[75]

The impasse in these negotiations is conceived in the prism that African states are only exporters of raw materials or simply import markets. On the sidelines of the EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon, December 2007, African leaders criticised the EPAs as an attempt to opening of African markets, thereby hurting African infant industries and by extension loss of tariff revenues.

"Reciprocity" is perceived as an imposition, in keeping with a long line of previous "impositions" in the form of structural adjustment and donor conditionalities. Aggravating this is a seemingly self-serving discourse within

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[75] Ole Elgstrom "Partnership in Peril: Images and strategies in EU-ACP economic partnership agreement negotiations" in Lucarelli Sonia and Fioramonti, Lorenzo (2009) "External Perceptions of the European Union as a Global Actor" Routledge

which EC negotiators propound on what African countries need (which may well be correct) and how the EU is best placed to deliver such, whilst refusing to dismantle their systems of agricultural protection (albeit African countries benefit from them) Unfortunately this discourse, in combination with the perception of EPAs as an instrument of imposition, does not go down well in Africa where colonial memories bubble close to the surface. In Sub-Saharan Africa's case this dynamic is compounded by the perceived lack of autonomy countries have over their trade strategies owing to donor dependence. The fact that the EU and its member states are the largest donors by some margin, whilst the EC emits confusing signals, renders the EPA negotiating process even more problematic.[76]

The fact that the EU holds all the cards in the form of: market access to the common market; financial power in the form of development assistance; and negotiating muscle due to the expertise and experience further confounds the process of negotiations. It is the frustration experienced with the EU, that Africa has embraced the East and China in particular. African countries embrace China on the principle that: It does not dictate to African leaders their development priorities, It does not insist on democracy and good governance, It provides money in the form of grants and loans freely and quickly. This has cultivated indeed a relationship perceived to be a partnership of true equals.

By December, 2007, 0nly 35 out of the 77 ACP countries had initialed Interim EPAs with the EU. The IEPAs cover market access which is the principle matter of the WTO. Out of the countries that have not signed IEPAs, 32 are catagorised under least developed countries (LDCs). They have access to duty

[76] Draper, Peter (2007), "EU-Africa Trade Relations: The Political Economy of Economic Partnership Agreements" Jan Tumlir Policy Essays No. 02 June, 2007, European Centre for International Political Economy, pg 20

free and quota free access to EU market without the obligation of reciprocity under the 'Everything but Arms" (EBA) initiative concluded in February 2001.[77]

The EPA negotiations with a narrow trade approach, treating the EPAs as 'any other free trade agreement', hence the EU is perceived as self-interested actor that utilizes its superior power to further its own "mercantilist interests".[78] The EU Commission is claimed to have shown little interest in alternative solutions to the problem of WTO compatibility. According to the Commission, there was 'no plan B' and a failure to reach an agreement by the date of expiration could not spur the EU into an alternative strategy.[79] The wishes of the ACP group were blatantly denied. This shows urgency on the part of the EU to fulfill WTO requirements, without exploring any available alternatives. It therefore assumes that the ACP states have not been driving forces in this development. In the quest towards defending its economic and geopolitical interests, the WTO proved an avenue to establish remaining Lome instruments, hence an expression of realist politics.[80]

A similar argument is given by Goodison and Stoneman, stressing the thesis, that EU's "underlying motivations" are among others "securing a WTO agreement" providing "market expansion" and a "commercial advantage for EU producers over the international competitors."[81] Emily Jones notes, that "the only constraint on a fair agreement between the EU and ACP countries – apart

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[77] Schieder Siegfried, "Trade and Development in EU-Africa Relations" in Overhaus, Marco eds.(2008) "Perspectives and strategies of the European Union's Africa Policy after the Lisbon Summit" Foreign Policy in Dialogue, vol 8 – issue 24

[78] Ole Elgstrom "Partnership in Peril: Images and strategies in EU-ACP economic partnership agreement negotiations" in Lucarelli Sonia and Fioramonti, Lorenzo (2009) "External Perceptions of the European Union as a Global Actor" Routledge

[79] Ibid.

[80] Vogel, Christoph , "The African Policy of 'normative' power EU considering Cotonou Agreement and promotion of EPAs", Pg 8

[81] Ibid. Pg 8

from political will – is that any deal needs to be in compliance with World Trade Organization rules" with addition that this means an agreement which "includes the very basics needed for WTO compatibility"[82]

Looking at the normative side of the WTO compliance, "(t)he introduction of reciprocal liberalization under the FTA and Economic Co-operation proposals could expose some of the world's most food insecure countries to the dumping of heavily subsidized EU exports" . Even though this does not mean that EU is not acting in a normative way, there is to say that promoting food security is – ethically seen – a fundamental political aim. Hence this could only be a 'normative' behaviour, if it is defined as a pursuit of a norm given by WTO or if the term 'normative' is used in a self-referential way.[83]

On the regional integration front, EPAs are designed to contribute to regional integration and growth on the African continent. However, analysts have suggested that, the end result would be free trade that benefits the EU and undermines the intra/inter-regional cooperation.

The ongoing EPA negotiations are being conducted within in the structure of regional groupings, which in some cases do not constitute existing regional organisations in Africa. This is a threat to those sub-regional organisations that already operate across the continent. Hence, given the nature of multiplicity of such existing groupings in Africa, and the overlapping memberships of many countries in different organisations, it possible to consider the point that the approach taken by the European Commission to the EPA negotiations is likely to aggravate a situation, which is already unclear and fragmented. Ironically, the imperative of recognising the existing regional groupings is emphasised on.

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[82] Ibid. Pg 8
[83] Ibid.

So, there is need for a concerted and coherent programme to foster deeper integration among these regional organisations, which is one of the objectives of the African Union.[84] In summary, Africans must realize that there are significant political constraints in the EU. Whilst it is true that the EU is clearly the dominant partner it, too, needs a successful outcome to these negotiations and will have to be willing to compromise in order to get it. For EPAs to be truly developmental EU negotiators should properly tailor and sequence the broad agenda to African capacities. That means concluding the core goods market access deal first, and the complex regulatory agenda should be tackled piecemeal, possibly via revision clauses, in tandem with a targeted resource package.

6.1. Peace and Security in the realm of the EU-Africa Relations

The EU-Africa relations have been marked by a deepening partnership on the principle of equals since the beginning of the 21st Century. Despite having a long partnership of cooperation dating back to the Yaoundé convention 1963, it was until the EU – Cairo Summit, 2000 that collaboration in peace and security was given serious consideration. Africa's dismissal economic development at the end of the cold war coincided with a period of increasing violent conflicts. Thus the Cairo summit highlighted the connection between security and development, hence improving African stability gained prominence.

The transformation of the OAU into the AU has played a significant role in fostering the EU-Africa relations. The AU being a human centered norm promotion body and keen to ensure integration and development in Africa saw

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[84] Kimugunyi Patrick (2006), "Regional Integration in Africa: Prospects and Challenges for the European Union" Contemporary Europe Research Centre University of Melbourne

the establishment of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). With the main aim being the promotion of human security in Africa, the AU acquired a broader mandate and authority towards intervening in cases of "war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity"[85]

AU institutional incapacitation has however hindered the commitment in addressing the existing and budding conflicts and providing sustainable responses. Its capacity is stretched more because of the need to build a peace and security architecture while concurrently responding to crisis issues. It's due to these deficiencies that the EU has partnered with the AU in this field of peace and security, through the African Peace Facility (APF).

During the EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon, 2007, peace and security was acknowledged as an important priority in fostering development in the African continent towards achieving the MDGs. The EU and Arica agreed that "the APF has made a substantial contribution and is a good example to how partnership support can complement and reinforce [...] African led peace support operations". As a result, the EU indicated its preparedness to provide "continued and increased support for the AU in its efforts to – in cooperation with the relevant African regional organisations – operationalize the APSA".[86]

Thus through the ESDP, the EU aims to develop civilian and military capabilities for conflict prevention and crisis, management at the international level. The European Security Strategy (ESS), adopted in December, 2003 defines EU as a global actor: "Over the last decade, no region of the world has

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[85] Aning, Kwesi and Danso, Kwaku F. "An African Perspective" in Pirozzi, Nicoletta ed (2010) "Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa: implementing the new Africa-EU Partnership" Istituto Affari Internazionali

[86] Ibid.

been untouched by armed conflict. Most of these conflicts have been within rather than between states, and most of the victims have been civilians. As a Union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world's Gross National Product (GNP), and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal, the European Union is inevitably a global player."[87]

The strategy identifies the following main threats: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime. With regards to conflict prevention, management and resolution, the strategy recommends a multidimensional approach which enhances human security and includes a wide range of civilian and military instruments. Thus recognition of threats has contributed to the definition of EU security in global terms. This has seen the elevation of Africa's security concerns being elevated to the EU agenda, and the EU understands that it needs a "stable Africa in Order to protect itself and to address the threats in a better manner".[88] Also with EU's Foreign policy refocusing on Africa and in the wake of developing its ESDP a key foreign policy instrument which came into existence in 1998-99, Africa has become a testing ground on which to pull the EU's foreign policy trigger.[89]

"Geographical proximity and colonial legacy is sighted as another arena for EU's foreign policy, besides the increase in hard security threats".[90] Closely linked to this, the abundance of natural resources in Africa explain EU's

[87] Pabst Martin, "Building Peaceand Security – An Assessment of EU Efforts of Capacity- Building and ESDP Operations in Sub-Saharan Africa" in Overhaus, Marco eds.(2008) "Perspectives and Strategies of the European Union's African Policy after the Lisbon Summit" Foreign Policy in Dialogue Vol. 8 – Issue 24
[88] Aning Kwesi and Danso, Kwaku F. "An African Perspective" in Pirozzi Nicoletta ed.(2010) "Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa: Implementing The New Africa-EU Partnership" Instituto Affari Internazionali
[89] Besada, Hany "Crafting an African Security Architecture: Addressing Regional Peace and Conflict in the 21st Century" Ashgate 2010 Pg. 77
[90] Ibid. Pg 77

renewed interest in Africa, particularly in the area of energy security, "Africa is an alternative to the volatile Middle east and to Europe's dependency on Russia."[91] Further coupled with increasing competition from emerging economies such as China and India, Africa's stability is important towards the EU achieving its economic interests.

In this regard, analysts ponder, "'if the EU has transformed itself into a "realist", state like actor which pursues interests and employs "hard" instruments of power politics, or if it continues to be a multilateral, "civil" and "normative" power which is driven by the spread of European values and the use of "soft" instruments.[92] Thus the EU being an entity sui generis, it cannot escape its responsibilities as a global power, and through a convergence of member states' national interests it must follow the rules of the game. On the other hand, EU's prosperity derives its drive from the spread of its normative values like multilateralism, democracy and respect for the rule of law globally to enhance peace and security.

On a moral ground the EU derives its need to assist Africa in conflict management, from the guilt of the colonization and decolonization process, which in part is responsible of the many conflicts on the African continent, which have slowed down the pace of development.

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[91] Aning Kwesi and Danso, Kwaku F. "An African Perspective" in Pirozzi Nicoletta ed.(2010) "Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa: Implementing The New Africa-EU Partnership" Instituto Affari Internazionali
[92] Pabst Martin, "Building Peaceand Security – An Assessment of EU Efforts of Capacity- Building and ESDP Operations in Sub-Saharan Africa" in Overhaus, Marco eds.(2008) "Perspectives and Strategies of the European Union's African Policy after the Lisbon Summit" Foreign Policy in Dialogue Vol. 8 – Issue 24

Peace Initiatives launched in Africa with EU's support

EU security policy's key objective is to support African capacities in peace keeping. This is channeled through the APSA in the AU or the other sub-regional bodies such as Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). APSA is built around five core institutions: Peace and Security Council, Panel of the Wise, a Peace Fund, a Continental Early Warning System and an 'African Standby Force'[93]. The EU recognizes the principle of African ownership, and recognizes in these initiatives the opportunity not to deploy its own troops in the medium term.[94] Through the African Peace Facility, the EU has already supported a number of AU missions. In 2003, under the 9th EDF the APF had a startup budget of €250M, to provide a sustainable funding instrument for African –led PSOs and institutional capacity building programmes of the APSA.[95]

Within the framework, the EU has provided support in the following PSOs: AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB, €25M); the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS, €300M); and the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM,€15.5M). The APF finances peacekeeping expenditures: soldiers' per diem allowances, communications equipment, medical facilities, wear and tear of civilian equipment, and transport and logistics. The APF is, however, not permitted to cover military and arms expenditure.

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[93] The **African Standby Force** is intended to be an international, continental African military force, with both a civilian and police component, under the direction of the African Union. It is to be deployed in times of crisis in Africa. In 2003, a 2010 operational date for the force was set

[94] Aning Kwesi and Danso, Kwaku F. "An African Perspective" in Pirozzi Nicoletta ed.(2010) "Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa: Implementing The New Africa-EU Partnership" Instituto Affari Internazionali

[95] Besada, Hany "Crafting an African Security Architecture: Addressing Regional Peace and Conflict in the 21st Century" Ashgate 2010 Pg. 78

EU support is in African peace initiatives in two strands: on an operational and institutional capacity through the African peace Facility; and direct military engagements.

AU and EU in Darfur

During the Darfur crisis that erupted in 2003, pitted the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) against government targets. The attacks were intended to protest against what they called the "systematic […] policies of marginalisation, racial discrimination, exclusion, exploitation and divisiveness [as well as] the brutal oppression, ethnic cleansing, and genocide sponsored by the Khartoum Government."[96] The government in collaboration with the Janjaweed response was ruthless, resulting in violations of fundamental human rights and international humanitarian law. With the UN seeking a mechanism to address the conflict, the AU in April 2004, brokered the N'djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. It was geared towards ending hostilities, release prisoners, and open up humanitarian access to the civilian population. A temporary stay was achieved, but hostilities continued and in 2006 the AU brokered a further agreement the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). The government and a faction of the SLM/A signed it and AU peacekeeping was investable in enforcing the agreement.

The AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was deployed, but due to capacity weakness in terms of finances and logistics, the AU turned to the EU for support. From 2004 to 2007, the EU joined the AU to support AMIS in execution of its

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[96] Aning Kwesi and Danso, Kwaku F. "An African Perspective" in Pirozzi Nicoletta ed.(2010) "Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa: Implementing The New Africa-EU Partnership" Instituto Affari Internazionali

mandate. The EU contributed €500M (€300M from the APF, and €200M from individual EU member states) until the mission was transferred to the UNAMID in 2007.[97] These funds made it possible to pay personnel costs including salaries, allowances, insurance, travel, rations and medical costs; communications equipment; political support to the Darfur peace talks (leading to the DPA); and the Ceasefire Commission. EU support to the AMIS also came in the form of planning and technical assistance to AMIS levels of command, provision of additional military observers, training of African troops, provision of strategic and tactical airlifts and support for the civil police (CIPOL) component of AMIS.[98]

Capacity Building Support for the APSA and the RECs

The EU committed to building long-term capabilities of both the APSA and RECs. The RECs are expected to provide the brigades for the formation and launch of the African Stand-by Force (ASF) by 2010. As a result, the effectiveness of the ASF, the operational arm of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), is contingent upon the viability of the RECs. Between 2004 and 2007, the AU provided 35M for the capacity-building activities of the APSA and the RECs.[99] Specifically, the grant was to be directed towards the development of the AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the creation of liaison channels between the AU and the RECs, the facilitation of communication links across Africa and the enhancement of RECs initiatives.[100] The EU contribution to capacity building is ultimately aimed at supporting the AU and

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[97] Ibid.
[98] Ibid.
[99] Ibid.
[100] Ibid.

the RECs in developing proactive and comprehensive approaches to peace through operational as well as structural prevention.

Operation Artemis

This is an instance where the EU employed direct military engagement in Africa. Operation Artemis was the EU peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), conducted exclusively under the EU contrary to the principle of African ownership that backed African led PSOs.

In May 2003, factional fighting reignited between Hema and Lendu-based militia groups for control over Bunia, a town in the Ituri province of the DRC, after the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan forces. Following escalating violence and atrocities, the Secretary-General of the UN requested "the rapid deployment to Bunia of a highly trained and well equipped multinational force […] for a limited period until a considerably reinforced United Nations presence could be deployed".[101] France agreed to take up the challenge, and on 30 May 2003 the UN authorised the deployment of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) until 1st September, 2003, when an enhanced UN mission in the form of the UN Mission in the Congo (MONUC) could be deployed. The mandate of the mission was "to contribute to the stabilisation of the security conditions and improvement of the humanitarian situations in Bunia, to ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camp in Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town."[102]

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[101] Ibid.
[102] Ibid.

On 12 June 2003, the Council of the European Union decided to deploy Operation Artemis, the EU's first peacekeeping mission in Africa, with France as the Framework Nation. The mission was a significant success in terms of accomplishing its mandate and highlighting the possibility and necessity of partnerships between the UN and regional organisations, it also represented a missed opportunity for the EU-AU peace support partnership.

While the AU has clearly demonstrated its commitment to improving the human security architecture of the continent, the organisation still lacks the necessary capacity for effective structural and operational conflict prevention in Africa. Against this background, the AU-EU peace support partnership, through the APF, has been a prudent and desirable option for addressing Africa's peace and security challenges. However, closer and deeper collaboration between the AU, the EU and the UN remains a superior strategy for peacekeeping and peace building in Africa and beyond.[103]

6.2. Continuity, Change and Innovation

The creation of the European Community (EC) coincided with the period towards the beginning of the colonial era. Hence, the European Community approach towards Africa was geared towards steering the former colonial bond towards a mutually beneficial arrangement. The original six members of the EC had a degree of colonial legacy in Africa with the exception of Luxembourg. France instead that Association Agreement is included in the Treaty of Rome as a perquisite of accommodating some of its overseas territories. This was fundamentally a colonial arrangement but in a formalized manner designed to maintain the imperial relations of the EC countries in the post-colonial era.

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[103] Ibid.

This was formalized in the Yaoundé Conventions of 1963 and 1969. Yaoundé provided both aid and trade access to the EU market and played an important role in the emerging North-South relations. Access to EU market was on a "reciprocal basis and did not match the 'special treatment' in terms of non-reciprocal trade benefits that developing countries were establishing in the GATT at a global level".[104] The provision of aid was underscored through the creation of the European Development Fund (EDF) that signified the readiness of the EC member states to undertake joint responsibility for development efforts in former African colonies. While the move represented something of a 'multilateralisation' of post –colonial ties in that the arrangements were with the whole EU rather than simply the former colonial power, it also reflected French priorities in North-South relations, protecting as it did France's post-imperial ties with Africa.[105]

With the EC enlargement process in 1973, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark, provided the extension of European development policy to commonwealth countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. This led to bringing on board of 45 states representing these regions and the Lome convention in 1975 (Lome I) was brought on board to replace the Yaoundé Conventions. Trade was the prominent feature and "ACP states were granted preferential and non-reciprocal access to EC markets, and were offered higher than world prices for commodities including sugar and bananas. Financial instruments such as Stabex (compensation for price fluctuations on world markets) and Sysmin (to stabilize and encourage the minerals sector) were

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[104] Brown, William(2000) 'Restructuring north-south relations: ACP-EU development co-operation in a liberal international order', Review of African Political Economy, 27: 85, 367 — 383
[105] ibid.

intended to demonstrate the EC commitment to the orderly development of former colonies."[106] Development aid was committed for five year terms.

In order to promote the values of partnership and encourage North-South dialogue, group to group institutions were established. "They included the ACP-EU Council of ministers, the EU-ACP Committee of Ambassadors, and the Joint Consultative Assembly composed of an equal number of ACP parliamentarians and representatives from the European Parliament."[107] Important to note here is that the current references to Africa-EU Strategic partnership find their root cause in these group to group institutions.

These benefits were granted across the board during the Cold War: countries aligned with either side received equal benefits. Cooperation remained centered on trade and development assistance. In the preparations for Lomé III (1985-90), however, the mention of 'the importance of human dignity' was inserted (no consensus having been found to refer to 'human rights') as the first expression of concern about democracy related issues.[108]

The failure of the Paris and Cancun conferences on a new North-South international order, were a sign of Lome had progressively became a symbol of unfulfilled promises and differing expectations. Thus the desired objectives of Lome, to foster economic development were not achieved and more so regressed. Despite being termed as revolutionary, Lome presided over a period where ACP exports were losing ground on EU market share due to competition from south-East Asian and Latin American exporters, on the background of

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[106] Leroy, Marcel (2009) "Africa and the EU: Perspectives and Prospects" International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

[107] Bach, Daniel (2011) "The European Union and Africa: Trade Liberalisation, Constructive Disengagement, and the Securitisation of Europe's External Frontiers" Africa Review 3, 1, 2011:33-47

[108] Leroy, Marcel (2009) "Africa and the EU: Perspectives and Prospects" International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

ACP countries receiving preferential market access. Things were to change further with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, which put an end to the Cold War rivalry that had split Africa ideologically, and had fuelled many conflicts. This necessitated the EU to publish a green paper on the future of the EU-Africa relations. Though the ACP generally favoured a modification to the accord, the EU advocated for a total overhaul and set out a new agreement. A compromise was reached, though it was skewed to the EU's favour due to its dominant economic power.

Dissatisfaction with Lome also coincided with the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade that ushered that established the WTO in 1994. WTO provisions rendered Lome's preferential trade provisions unsuitable, hence the need to renegotiate. The EU proposed free trade agreements in the form of EPAs that were incorporated into the Cotonou agreement and formed an integral part in so far as achieving the desired goals of Cotonou. Simultaneously, the Treaty on European Union (signed in Maastricht in December 1991) transformed the European Community into the European Union (EU), and the subsequent enlargement process dictated a renegotiation of prior agreements to reflect the new realities of the EU. The Cotonou agreement was therefore negotiated at a time when the EU was emerging as a major global actor and negotiations were conducted in a manner to reflect this reality in the international relations arena.

Looking at the JAES, establishes a more political partnership between the EU and Africa beyond those provided in the previous existing frameworks of cooperation between the EU and Africa. It stresses on a dialogue of a 'a partnership of equals', geared towards to 'treat Africa as one', to contribute to "overcoming the incoherencies resulting from the patchwork of European

instruments and agreements focused on specific areas of the continent."[109] Hence, the JAES is a global framework that for the treatment of EU-Africa relations to transcend purely development oriented agendas. The JAES is therefore represents continuity in the development and deepening of EU-Africa relations.

The engagement between the EU and Africa has been steadily deepening in the 21st Century since the first Summit in Cairo in 2000. The transformation of the OAU into the AU provided a new avenue of cooperation beyond development aid with the European Union. The AU has a set of ambitious objectives, which go beyond promoting peace and security on the continent, but also "democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance"[110] and seeks to accelerate the political and social –economic integration of the continent".[111] The AU is expected to bring in a new wave of "the deepest possible integration of the continent socially, economically, militarily, culturally and politically."[112] The AU intends to have a pan-African Parliament, an African court of justice, new continental economic institutions, and harmonised policies.

Under the Umbrella of the AU, the New Partnership for Development (NEPAD) was established. In the framework of NEPAD, African leaders have agreed not only to broad economic and social development goals – revitalising education and health care, maintaining macroeconomic stability, making financial markets transparent and orderly – but also to promoting and protecting

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[109] Bach, Daniel "The European Union and Africa: Trade Liberalisation, Constructive Disengagement, and the Securitisation of Europe's External Frontiers" Africa Review 3,1, 2011: 33-47
[110] Kimunguyi Patrick (2006) "Regional Integration in Africa: Prospects and Challenges for the European Union" Contemporary Europe Research Centre University of Melbourne
[111] Ibid.
[112] Ibid.

democracy, human rights and accountability. They further pledge to combat the proliferation of small arms, strengthen mechanisms for conflict resolution and prevention, and promote the provision of public goods such as water, transportation, energy, and other infrastructure within the region and the various sub regions of Africa. Towards these ends, NEPAD promises to use official development assistance (ODA) more transparently and effectively, in a partnership of mutual accountability between the African states and aid donors.[113] Thus NEPAD, envisions fundamental policy and governance reforms on the African side in exchange for significant development assistance from multilateral and bilateral donors.

The AU on an institutional level mirrors the EU in this sense it depicts the influence of the EU in shaping its development. We can conclude that the EU has been able to project its being on the African continent, by shaping the identity of the AU on its structures.

6.3. African Perspectives

Through the NEPAD framework, AU's objectives coincide with the values and norms of the EU, which serves EU's desired interests. Thus this transformation on the African continent corresponds with the desire of the "EU to elevate the relationship between the two continents to one of greater partnership and mutual accountability built on shared values that underpin the formation of the EU, but also reflected in the founding documents of the AU."[114]

In the development of the JAES, most African countries have not really been in a position to fully interrogate the contents or indeed make significant input into

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[113] Ibid.
[114] Sidiropoulos, Elizabeth. (2007) "The EU-Africa Summit: African perspectives" The South African Institute of International Affairs

the paper during the course of its negotiations. This is largely due to their own capacity constraints, which were also stretched further by negotiation of the Economic Partnership Agreements.[115] This demonstrates the deficiencies in the institutional capacities of the two continents, with the AU lacking enough expert manpower to carry out the negotiations compared to what is at the disposal of the EU Commission. Though it's negotiated on the principle of equality, it explains a more euro-centric view.

On paper, both continents share the same values of democracy, good governance and people centered development. The bone of contention is always on how these values are addressed and articulated. "Many Africans often see the Europeans' 'obsession' with democracy and human rights when dealing with Africa, as a neo-colonial conditionality which pays little respect to the particular local conditions. Some argue that democracy and human rights are sometimes elevated above poverty alleviation and development.[116] The unfortunate fact is that notwithstanding the existence of a large body of declarations and institutions aimed at promoting the values noted above, African leaders are still uncomfortable with dealing with recalcitrant states, and in fact prefer not to use the stick of sanctions – except in the cases of unconstitutional changes of power, where states have been suspended from the AU.

Many African officials believe that if the Joint Strategy is truly about entrenching a real partnership, there should also be frank discussions of human rights violations in Europe, especially against many migrants from Africa, as well as on the practice of extraordinary renditions. There is a strong

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[115] Ibid.
[116] Ibid.

perception therefore that Europe's emphasis on values is littered with double standards and underlying hidden agendas. However, this does not make the concerns about human rights abuses in Africa any less relevant – whether they are raised by opposition parties, civil society or indeed European states. European approaches need to ensure that there is a consistent approach to human rights violations and that their inputs also take into consideration more fully any initiatives and mechanisms initiated by African institutions. The double standard which Europe applies is unlikely to help the cause of democratization and better governance in Africa. Since it demonises any violations on governance and human rights yet it seems okay when the German Chancellor Angela Merkel or French President Nicholas Sarkozy to go to China and sign contracts worth billions regardless of Chinese human rights record. This because the economic weight of China is much bigger than of all Africa put together, hence it goes to depict that, when countries are of "strategic geopolitical or economic importance their governance credentials are not important. Instead, small and poor countries are bullied into highhanded EU standards.[117]

'Partnership' has been espoused in many EU-Africa forums in the last decade; in an effort to portray a relationship based on equality and mutually agreed principles. From the African angle, "it means breaking out of the old reactive and sometimes passive mindset, which focused excessively on the donor-recipient relationship..... A mindset change is also essential in Europe. Viewing the relationship through the eyes of a donor, when that has defined much of the history of engagement and with many countries continues to do so even

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[117] Tegulle Gawaya "The EU Must Find Alternative Paradigms in its Relations with Africa" in Overhaus, Marco eds.(2008) "Perspectives and Strategies of the European Union's African Policy after the Lisbon Summit" Foreign Policy in Dialogue Vol. 8 – Issue 24

now, is particularly difficult and inimical to the development of a true partnership."[118]

Thus the challenge in achieving a true partnership is how to break out of the aid relationship syndrome. This includes recognising that learning is a two-way relationship and that home-grown initiatives, such as the African Peer Review Mechanism, should be supported and its outcomes integrated into the EU's own approach to assessing governance in Africa. This can happen while retaining the APRM as an African-owned initiative.

In breaking out of the aid relationship, Africans should also pay more attention to the areas where they can effect change with minimal resources ('low-hanging fruits') and that can contribute to unleashing the productive potential within their economies. The various initiatives of the EU in this regard, such as the Infrastructure Fund, provide a useful vehicle to realise some of these.

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[118] Sidiropoulos, Elizabeth. (2007) "The EU-Africa Summit: African perspectives" The South African Institute of International Affairs

7.0. CONCLUSION

In considering general approaches to explaining European motivations regarding international commercial policy in general and interregionalism in particular, some have advanced a standard realist approach to international relations, which holds that the EU as a unit responds to the structure of the international system in formulating its international economic policies, pushing those policies that promote EU's collective economic security as well as its global structural power (via the use of relational power) in ties with individual countries and regions. This view contends that continuities are more important than changes in EU-Africa relations and that the patterns of intercourse between the world's poorest continent and one of the leading economic powers have remained constant over the past fifty years. Beneath the rhetoric of universalistic sentiments and equal partnership, the past fifty years seem to show patterns of political and economic control and domination aimed at maintaining Europe's sphere of influence in Africa. The interplay of national interests is thus the best guide in understanding the evolution of EU-Africa relations. "EU-Africa relations have, from the beginning, been characterized by the realist tendencies of individual European states (…) The earlier phase of EU-Africa relations was initiated because certain member states wished to retain formal links with former colonial dependencies in order to ensure continued access to raw materials and natural resources, and to protect economic investment already made or being contemplated in what were now newly independent states."[119]

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[119] Farrell, M. (2005), "A Triumph of Realism over Idealism? Cooperation between the European Union and Africa", *European Integration*, Vol.27, No. 3, 263-283, pp.265-266.

Contemporary EU-Africa relations seem to indicate continuity in the pursuit of national interests by the EU and its member states, a situation which has been perpetuated due to the asymmetric bargaining strengths of both partners. Reflecting on the ongoing negotiations, of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) under the Cotonou Agreement. Farrel stresses that, the EU is promoting a model of regional integration that is far removed from the model of regional integration that has evolved within the EU itself. In fact, what the EU is promoting is a model of economic liberalization across the African continent and, in the process, attempting to secure for itself continued market access and privileged economic status in the continent's emerging markets. However, the European policy is much less active in addressing the real problems of poverty and instability that are likely to place severe limitations on either achieving economic liberalization or securing broad-based societal benefits in the long term.[120]

Even the normative agenda (promotion of democracy, good governance and the rule of law- all of which condition for EU development assistance) embedded in the political dialogue under both the Cotonou Agreement and the Joint Strategy is seen as "one effective way by which the EU can seek to impose its values" upon other African countries and promote "the objectives of economic liberalization more than any fundamental support for democratization". In that regard, the realist approach doesn't see EU-Africa partnership as a genuine alliance that would seek fundamental changes in the international system

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[120] Farrell, M. (2005), "A Triumph of Realism over Idealism? Cooperation between the European Union and Africa", *European Integration*, Vol.27, No. 3, 263-283, pp.266.

because " the current neo-liberal hegemony of ideas sits broadly compatible with the self-interest of political elites and the outward-oriented fraction of capitalist class in the EU member states".[121] Beyond the rhetoric on equal partnership and common values, it is argued, EU policy towards Africa is strongly realist in tone.[122]

Contrary to the realist approach, a liberal lecture of EU-Africa relations underlines the fact that cooperation is necessary and desirable not merely in pursuit of self-interest but as part of a wider agenda for peace, justice and equality, where power and politics are supplanted by an institutionalized framework to support dialogue and enhance the achievement of core values, including democracy and the rule of law. The liberal ideological underpinning of EU-Africa relations is believed to reflect the liberal nature of the European integration project itself, which emerged after WWII. The European project struck a compromise between the principles of integration and autonomy and emphasized interdependence and transnational cooperation in order to resolve common problems, as well as "consciously devised machinery" to serve the imperatives of peace and prosperity. It has been argued that the same liberal institutional ideas and assumptions that served as catalyst of integration theory in Europe continue to define EU's actorness in world politics and guide its interaction with other world regions. The nature of the EU as "political animal" is presented in the following terms by Jeremy Rifkin, Recent events on the world stage have thrown into sharp relief the apparent differences between the US approach to international cooperation, and its reliance upon military

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[121] Hurt, S.R. (2003), "Co-operation and Coercion? The Cotonou Agreement between the European Union and ACP States and the End of the Lomé Convention", *Third World Quarterly*, 24/1, pp.161-176.

[122] Mangala Jack, "European Union and Africa: Old partners in a Changing World"

power and the creation of ad hoc coalitions of the willing to support international policy. By contrast, the European Union represents itself as the supporter of a world based upon the rule of law, where multilateralism rather than unilateralism is the driving force behind collective actions to solve common problems and resolve disputes. In contrast to the hard power which is the basis of US influence, the European Union favours the use of soft power in order to exert influence on the international stage, with an agenda that is considered much more normative in tone.[123]

Important aspects of EU-Africa relations have thus been analyzed through the lenses of core liberal and neo-liberal concepts. For example, the neo-liberal institutional concept of "democratic peace" has been used to justify the increased centrality of conditionality – which has expanded from the requirement to liberalize and privatize the economic sector to include targets on good governance and compliance to human rights- in EU-Africa relations. Conditionality policies are thus seen as needed institutional leverage aimed at widening the zone of peace by embedding formally non-liberal states into the liberal world, guarantee of peace and security. This globalization of liberalism is being pursued on the liberal internationalist assumption that liberal values are universally shared. A more critical view, however, sees this expansion of liberal values, underneath of conditionality, as no more than a convenient fiction for promoting the commercial interests of European firms.[124]

The same liberal lecture has also been applied to explain the increasingly importance reserved to the civil society and non-institutional actors in advancing the objectives of the EU-Africa partnership. This trend is seen a

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[123] Rifkin, J. (2004), *The European Dream* (New York: Tarcher / Penguin).

[124] Mangala Jack, "European Union and Africa: Old partners in a Changing World"

direct response to the neo-idealist contention that encouraging or even coercing non-liberal states to become more democratic is only part of what is required in order to bring about a truly liberal order. A more radical approach should seek democratization at the "grass-roots" by bringing civil society and other social movements into the decision-making structures since they are closer to the ordinary people than their own governments. The embedment of the EU parliament and the Pan-African Parliament into the institutional framework of EU-Africa relations is also regarded as an illustration of the "cosmopolitan" model of democracy advocated by neo-idealists.[125]

The liberal theory of complex interdependence has also been used to explain EU-Africa growing sectoral cooperation on a number of issues (migration, environment and peace and security) that have compelled the two sides to find commonly agreed upon solutions which don't necessarily correspond to the realist logic of immediate self-interest.

The end of the Cold War clearly deprived the African continent of its strategic position in international politics and of its bargaining power in relation to the Northern donors. There is, however, another entry point for Africa in the international arena as it is an important stakeholder in the so-called "new interdependencies."[126] There has been a growing awareness that certain problems have a global reach and that they cannot be solved at a country or

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[125] Mangala Jack, "European Union and Africa: Old partners in a Changing World"
[126] Koulaimah-Gabriel (p. 19)

regional level. The geographical proximity between Africa and Europe makes the common management of these interdependencies all the more desirable.[127]

The liberal approach echoes the notion that Europe is a Grand experiment which, as Rifkin says, "is articulating a bold new vision for the future of humanity", a vision that attempts "an accommodation between the new forces of individuation and integration that are stretching human consciousness inward to the multiple identities of the post-modern persona and outward to the globalizing forces of the economy", and emphasizes "cooperation and consensus over got-it-alone approaches to foreign policy."[128]   EU's relations with Africa are ultimately seen as a reflection of this vision, which projects a path that departs from traditional power politics in international relations.

A number of interesting explanations to EU-Africa relations have been advanced from the International Political Economy (IPE) perspective. Some are rooted in the radical tradition, while others represent new approaches to IPE. To truly understand the nature and character of EU-Africa relationship and its development, one needs to investigate the interplay between economies and politics at the global stage and adopt a historical perspective which places the relationship within a much broader context of the origins and evolution of North-South relations more generally.[129] This politico-economic context shows

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[127] Mangala Jack, "European Union and Africa: Old partners in a Changing World"

[128] Rifkin, J. (2004), *The European Dream* (New York: Tarcher / Penguin).

[129] Brown, W. (2000), "Restructuring North-South Relations: ACP-EU Development Co-operation in a Liberal International Order", *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 27, No.85, pp. 367-383.

wider patterns that are reflected in the particular EU-Africa relations as it has responded and adjusted to global forces and trends. Against this background, development cooperation must be seen and approached "as encapsulating particular political and economic relationships rather than constituting some kind of 'apolitical' or 'technical' endeavor." EU-Africa relationship mirrors the shapes and contours of North–South relations as it has evolved and can be observed through four periods.[130]

First, the origins of EU-Africa relations must be situated in the context of decolonization which saw the accession of African states to independence under conditions of "negative sovereignty" that set the stage for to the development of a dependent relationship and the "multilateralisation" of post-colonial ties under the Yaoundé Conventions of 1963 and 1969. By granting particular and favorable treatment to ACP products, the Yaoundé Conventions also represented, in some respects, a departure from the liberal and multilateral order that emerged after WWII.

Second, while the signing of the first Lomé Convention in 1973 - in replacement of the Yaoundé Convention - seemed to have given some limited accommodation to Southern countries' attempts to redefine North-South relations through the demands for a new International Economic Order (NIEO),

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[130] Brown, W. (2000), "Restructuring North-South Relations: ACP-EU Development Co-operation in a Liberal International Order", *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 27, No.85, pp. 367-383.

it also retained the same dependent nature that had been characteristic of North –South relations in that.[131]

The more 'political' aspects of the agreement reflected the 'negative sovereignty' pattern of post-colonial relations in the explicit, formal recognition of equality between the parties, recognition of 'sovereign rights' of the ACP states, in particular over their development strategies, and in the formality of the agreement as one conducted between equal, independent states. That all these formal declarations of equality were included in an agreement that was based on one side granting financial and trade support to the other is a perfect illustration of the Convention as an example of this wider pattern of North-South relations.[132]

Third, the limited advances made in the Yaoundé Convention towards a NIEO would be progressively eroded in the 1980s and 1990s through successive renegotiations of the Lomé Convention. These decades were a time of restructuring of North-South relations through a reassertion of political and economic liberal principles.[133] This restructuring is reflected in the place that these instruments reserved to the political dialogue and the principle of conditionality, elements that were deepened and consolidated in the 2000 Cotonou Agreement, which replaced the Lomé Convention and represented a

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[131] Brown, W. (2000), "Restructuring North-South Relations: ACP-EU Development Co-operation in a Liberal International Order", *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 27, No.85, pp. 367-383.p373

[132] Mangala Jack, "European Union and Africa: Old partners in a Changing World"

[133] Brown, W. (2000), "Restructuring North-South Relations: ACP-EU Development Co-operation in a Liberal International Order", *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 27, No.85, pp. 367-383.

"wholesale reform" aimed at adapting EU-Africa relations to the imperatives of the global economy as mandated in particular by the WTO.

Four, the 2007 Africa-EU Joint Strategy can be seen as an attempt to solidify the neo-liberal changes made to the relationship since the 1990s while reasserting the centrality of EU-Africa relations at a time when the dialectic interactions between the two partners are being transformed due to a number of internal and external factors, chiefly the increased international competition for Africa' resources and political and economic reforms on the continent, all of which have –although in a limited way- increased Africa's actorness and bargaining power in a relation that still functions, very much, on a client-donor mode that perpetuates dependency.[134]

In contrast to the aforementioned traditional IPE approach, a new approach highlights social constructivist concepts of ideas and identity. From this vantage point, EU external commercial policies are believed to be determined by the overarching need to construct 'Europe' by defining its internal and external identity through relations with non-Europeans. Identity-building has been identified as one of the systemic functions of interregionalism as exemplified in the case of EU-Africa partnership.[135] Against this background, it is argued that the ideas, norms and values embedded in various legal and institutional frameworks of EU-Africa relations don't necessarily respond to the 'rational' calculations of long-term economic advantage and benefits from cooperation. They contribute to foster regionalism through interregionalism by

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[134] Mangala Jack, "European Union and Africa: Old partners in a Changing World"

[135] Aggarwal, V.K., and Fogarty, E. (2004), "Explaining Trends in EU Interregionalism", in V. Aggarwal. And E. Forgarty (eds.) *European Union Trade Strategies: Between Globalism and Regionalism* (London: Palgrave).

sharpening differences between self and other and thus helping galvanize regional solidarity on the basis of shared norms. From this perspective, Europe and Africa are said to build their respective collective identity by interacting with each at different levels of their extensive sectoral cooperation.[136]

Finally, while valuing trade liberalisation, the securitisation of Europe's external frontiers, and political stability. The ambitions assigned to the 'strategic partnership' with Africa are yet to be reconciled with the substantive interests subsumed under the equation of the 'Brussels Consensus'. Until an effective co-ordination and Europeanisation of policy orientations is undertaken, such bold inter-continental policy templates as the JAES will remain prone to rhetorical drift.

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[136] Mangala Jack, "European Union and Africa: Old partners in a Changing World"

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