

THE CELALI EFFECT IN 17TH CENTURY-OTTOMAN TRANSFORMATION

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ABSTRACT

THE CELALI EFFECT IN 17TH CENTURY-OTTOMAN TRANSFORMATION

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This thesis aims to examine the effects of the Celali Revolts -a series of rebellions in Anatolia- in the 17th century Ottoman transformation period. The transformation period refers to a period in which the empire experienced important difficulties and changes in military and financial institutions due to the effects of local developments and external events during the transition from the 16th to the 17th century. In this thesis, the effects of Celali Revolts are examined concentrating especially on demography and economy by using the concept of “*the Celali Effect*”. The short and long run effects of these revolts are examined by focusing on the regions Northern and Central Anatolia, which were heavily affected by these revolts. The destructive effects of the Celali Revolts are dealt with between 1576 and 1643 owing to the availability of the case studies and Ottoman archival sources namely, the *mukataa defters* (tax-farming registers), *iltizam talepnameleri* (records of demands for tax-farms), and *mühimme* registers (records of imperial decrees). Moreover, the reports of the French Embassy are also used since they provide important information that one can use to follow the destructive effects of the Celali Revolts.

Keywords: The Celali Revolts, The Celali Effect, The 17th century Ottoman Transformation, mukataa registers

ÖZ

17.YÜZYIL OSMANLI TRANSFORMASYONUNDA CELALİ ETKİSİ

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Yüksek Lisans, Tarih Bölümü

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Bu çalışma 17. yüzyıl Osmanlı transformasyon döneminde Anadolu’da meydana gelen Celali İsyancıları’nın sonuçlarını incelemeyi hedeflemektedir. Bu çalışmada transformasyon dönemi, imparatorluğun yerel şartlar ve imparatorluk dışında gelişen olaylardan etkilenecek askeri ve ekonomik alanlarla çeşitli problemlerin ortaya çıkması neticesinde söz konusu alanlarda 16. yüzyıldan 17. yüzyıla geçiş döneminde meydana gelen değişimlerin görüldüğü dönemi ifade etmektedir. Bu tezde Celali İsyancıları’nın etkileri demografik ve ekonomik alanlarda “*Celali Etkisi*” kavramı kullanılarak incelenecektir. *Celali Etkisi*, Celali yıkımının en etkili olduğu İç Anadolu ve Kuzey Anadolu bölgelerinde uzun ve kısa vadeli olarak ele alınacaktır. Literatürdeki mevcut çalışmalar ve tezde kullanılan mukataa defterleri, iltizam taleplerleri ve mühimme defterleri gibi Osmanlı arşiv belgeleri göze önüne alınarak *Celali Etkisi* incelemesi 1576 ve 1643 arası dönemi kapsayacaktır. Bunların yanında Celali İsyancıları’nın yıkıcı etkilerini görmek açısından kullanışlı olduğu görüldüğü için Fransız Büyükelçiliği tarafından tutulan raporlar da kullanılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Celali İsyancıları, Celali Etkisi, Osmanlı Transformasyon Dönemi, mukataa defterleri

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The General Crisis of the 17th Century

The prevalent discussion on the 16th century Europe is marked with a general economic development and the population rise thanks to the expansion of agricultural production, which entailed commercial and industrial progress.¹ Yet, the period of general expansion started to stagnate in the second half of the century and the 17th century started with reversal of prosperity. The 17th century was the era of crisis, social upheavals and revolutions. The attributions to the crisis and rebellions are found as early as the first decade of the century. The *Gazettes* and *le Mercure françois* often spoke of the upheavals in Europe and the Ottoman Empire.²

Voltaire was the first to interpret these events in a different perspective.³ In this work, “*Essais sur les Moeurs et l’Esprit des Nations*”, he claimed that these simultaneous revolts ranging from England to Europe were parts of a “global crisis”. He examined revolts in Germany, Poland, Russia, Italy, Spain and France. Voltaire focused on the General Crisis in Europe; however, he did not confine the crisis to the European continent. He pointed to revolts and crisis in the Ottoman Empire (Sultan Ahmed I),

¹ Ruggiero Romano, “Encore la Crise de 1619-1622,” *Annales. Economies, Sociétés, Civilizations*. 19e Année, 1 (1964): 32; Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and The Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, vol.1 trans. Sian Reynolds (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 326-327.

² The *Gazettes* and *Le Mercure françois* were two French journals published regularly since the beginning of the 17th century. They in their columns gave priority to the pathbreaking events like wars, disasters, political events and rebellions happened in Europe and the Ottoman Empire. For example, Goubert benefitted a lot from these papers while writing his book *Les Paysans français au XVIIe Siècle* which is on the 17th century social upheavals in France. Pierre Goubert, *Les Paysans français au XVIIe Siècle* (Paris: Hachette, 1994).

³ Voltaire, *Essais sur les Moeurs et l’esprit des Nations*, 17 vols. (Neuchatel: Edition de Neuchatel, 1773).

Safavids (Sultan Husayn) and China (Li Tsu-Cheng).⁴ He resumed the general situation in Europe like the following.

*The throne of the German Empire was strangled by the famous Thirty Year War. The civil war desolated France, it forced mother of Louis XIV to escape from her capital with her children. Charles I in London was condemned to death by his subjects. Philippe IV, the king of Spain, after having lost almost all his possessions in Asia, lost Portugal too. The beginning of the seventeenth century was the times of usurper.*⁵

After Voltaire's claims, Paul Hazard examined the general crisis in Europe and he stated that this period witnessed "great changes".⁶ Hobsbawm put forward that there was a *General Economic Crisis* in Europe, and he claimed that the crisis was a reflection of break between feudal order of society and the capitalist production forms.⁷ Mousnier expanded the realm of crisis and he asserted a demographic, political, diplomatic and intellectual crisis.

*The 17th century is a period of a crisis which affected everybody in all their activities of economic, social, politic, religious, scientific and artistic...Not only they coexisted in the same era in Europe but also in the same states, in the same social groups.*⁸

It was argued that the crisis ended with revolutionary movements in England, France, Catalonia, Portugal, Naples and in the Netherlands.⁹

⁴ Voltaire, *Essais sur les Moeurs*, vol.7, 339-363, 373-384, 398-413.

⁵ Ibid., 347-348.

⁶ Paul Hazard, *La Crise de la Conscience Européenne* (Paris: Boivin et Cie, 1935).

⁷ Eric J. Hobsbawm, "The General Crisis of the European Economy in the 17th Century," *Past & Present* 5 (May, 1954): 33-53.

⁸ Rolan Mousnier, *Les XVIe et XVIIe Siècles: Les Progrès de la Civilisation Européenne et le Déclin de l'Orient (1492-1715)* (Paris: Press Universitaire de France, 1956), 143.

⁹ See Roger Bigelow Merriman, *Six Contemporaneous Revolutions* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1938).

The general crisis was debated for the New World and Asia. It was claimed that trade and economy entered into a period of depression in the 1620s in Mexico.¹⁰ The Central America suffered from an economic and demographic crisis around the late 1630s.¹¹ It was asserted that China, Japan and Korea were depressed by economic difficulties and upheavals.¹² Dissimilar to East Asia, South Asia witnessed the crisis a bit later. Indian subcontinent did not signal any great difficulties almost throughout the 17th century. Mughal Empire faced political crisis and economic disruption between the turn of the century and the first half of the 18th century.¹³

Although the courses of crisis seen in a wide geography from the New World to the East Asia in the mid seventeenth century have been portrayed in detail,¹⁴ its causes are still controversial. Effects of the Price Revolution¹⁵ and the Little Ice Age¹⁶ are widely discussed.¹⁷ On the other hand, these events, which are accepted to be globally effective, are not enough to comprehend the causes of a general crisis. As the each state is handled within its regional conditions and institutions, the local factors come forward. For instance, economic burden of the Thirty Years' War is discussed to provoke the crisis. Trevor-Roper highlighted that increasing taxation, related to the oppression and defeats of the war, triggered the revolts in Catalonia, Portugal, Germany and France.¹⁸ On the other hand, the effects of the Thirty Years' War seem

¹⁰ Jonathan Israel, "Mexico and the 'General Crisis' of the Seventeenth Century," *Past & Present* 63 (May, 1974):33-57.

¹¹ Murdo J. Macleod, *Spanish Central America: A Socioeconomic History 1520-1720* (London: University of California Prss, 1973): 264-329.

¹² William S. Atwell, "A Seventeenth-Century 'General Crisis' in East Asia?," in *The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century*, edit. by Geoffrey Parker and Lesley M. Smith (London: Routledge, 1985).

¹³ John F. Richards, "The Seventeenth-Century Crisis in South Asia," *Modern Asia Studies* 24, 4 (1990): 625.

¹⁴ Parker's work is the widest recent study see Geoffrey Parker, *Global Crisis: War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century* (Cornwall: Yale University Press, 2013).

¹⁵ For price revolution see Earl Jefferson Hamilton, *American Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain, 1501-1650* (New York: Octagon Books, 1970), 139-283.

¹⁶ For climatic changes and cooling period see Le Roy Ladurie, *Histoire du Climat depuis l'An Mille* (Paris: Flammarion, 1983).

¹⁷ See Hugh R. Trevor-Roper, "The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century," in *Crisis in Europe 1560-1660*, edited by Trevor Aston (New York: Basic Books, 1965): 59-96.

¹⁸ Trevor-Roper, "The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century," 60-61.

to be irrelevant to the crisis in Asia. The causes of the crisis should be examined with global events and local conditions.

1.2 The Ottoman Empire and the General Crisis

Similar to the states in Europe, Asia and the New World, the Ottoman Empire was dealing with a crisis triggered by the effects of wars, economic difficulties and revolts.¹⁹ The difficulties were accompanied by an extraordinary event in administration. For the first time in its history an Ottoman sultan was deposed and killed by his own military forces in 1622. These events were interpreted as signs of decline by the contemporary observers. Thomas Roe, English ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, noted his concern about the decline of the empire and revolts in 1623.²⁰ Once the Ottoman crisis is examined, the question about their causes comes forward. It seems that the answer is quite controversial because the causes were very intertwined. There are cases which prove that the crisis was triggered by more than one reason. For instance, once the rural demographic crisis in the central Anatolia is discussed, the effects of the population pressure, urban economic developments, harvest failures and the Celali Revolts should be taken into consideration.

The Ottoman crisis should be handled with the effects of some global and local developments. It is widely discussed that the effects of the Price Revolution and the Little Ice Age were the important global events, which influenced Ottoman economic and demographic crisis.²¹ However, the global events are not enough to explain the Ottoman crisis. The local conditions should be taken into consideration. The effects of

¹⁹ For the Ottoman case in the context of the General Crisis of the 17th Century see Parker, *Global Crisis*; Jack Goldstone, *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991)

²⁰ “*The fall of this empire; now perhaps it begins. The bassa of Arzerum, whom I have often mentioned, joined with other and a great army is in his march towards Angria...*” Thomas Roe, *The Negotiations of Sir Thomas Roe, in his Embassy to the Ottoman Porte, from the Year 1621 to 1628* (London: Samuel Richardson, 1740), 187.

²¹ Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning Point in the Economic History of the Near East,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 6, 1 (Jan., 1975): 3-28; Sam A. White, *The Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

the population pressure, debasements of *akçe*, increasing war expenditures are widely discussed.²² While the center was dealing with the effects of these external and local developments, the Anatolian countryside was exposed to the one of the most violent era of revolts. The center had to deal with the Celali Revolts which challenged the central forces destructing social and economic order.

While the central state was dealing with these difficulties, some imperial institutions, such as *timar* system and taxation, were going through a period of adaptation or transformation. Contemporary Ottoman observers interpreted these events as the signs of dissolution and they presented their own analysis in their advice books.²³ The works of Koçi Bey²⁴, Katip Çelebi²⁵ and Hüseyin Hazerfen²⁶ are the famous examples of this genre. Western chronics, mostly under influence of these advice books (*nasihatnameler*), depicted a declining empire in internal and external spheres at the end of the 16th century.²⁷ The classic Ottoman historiography regarded the defeat of Lepanto (1571) as the major event which started the Ottoman decline.²⁸ Historians discussed for a long time that the Ottoman Empire entered into phase of military, economic and administrative decay at the end of the 16th century.²⁹

²² Şevket Pamuk, *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1-31; Michael Cook, *Population Pressure in Rural Anatolia 1450-1600* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972).

²³ On mirror for princes see Pal Fodor, "State and Society, Crisis and Reform, in 15th-17th Century Ottoman Mirror for Princes," *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 40, 2/3 (1986):217-240.

²⁴ Görüceli Koçi Bey, *Koçi Bey Risâlesi*, ed. Yılmaz Kurt (Ankara: Ecdâd Yayınları, 1994).

²⁵ Kâtip Çelebi, *Düstûru'l-Amel li Islâhi'l-Halel*, ed. Ensar Köse (İstanbul: Büyüyen Ay Yayınları, 2016).

²⁶ Robert Anhegger, "Hezarfen Hüseyin Efendi'nin Osmanlı Devlet Teşkilatına Dair Mülâhazaları," *Türkiyat Mecmuası* X (1951-53): 365-393.

²⁷ See Paul Rychart, *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire* (London: John Starkey and Helen Brome, 1670).

²⁸ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford Univeristy Press, 1968), 21-39.

²⁹ Bernard Lewis, "Some Reflections on the Decline of the Ottoman Empire," *Studia Islamica* 9 (1958): 111-127.

The Ottoman decline paradigm has been challenged severely thanks to new perspectives since the late 1970s. İnalçık wrote an article on the 17th century finance and military changes in the context of transformation.³⁰ Faroqhi highlighted the elements which made the empire survive more than 300 years and she drew the attentions of historians to these elements rather than an Ottoman *decline*.³¹ These new approaches led historians to question the ‘declining’ military, administration and economy.³² These works highlighted that the empire faced a crisis at the end of the sixteenth century in different fields and it could manage the crisis by readapting to the new conditions.³³ As a result of simultaneous crisis and adaptation, this era is called “Period of Crisis” and “Transformation Period”.³⁴

1.3 The Celali Revolts and the Celalis

While the center was dealing with difficulties and adaptations in some fields and imperial institutions, the Celali Revolts³⁵ broke out in Anatolia towards the end of the 16th century, which continued, until the end of 17th century at intervals.³⁶ The revolts were most destructive particularly in the central and northern Anatolia. The center squashed the revolts either by violence or through bargain. As the revolts came to an end, the Anatolian countryside was already in a great disorder, which had started in the first years of the rebellions. The armies which ranged from hundreds to thousands

³⁰ Halil İnalçık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700,” *Archivum Ottomanicum* 6 (1980): 283-337.

³¹ Suraiya Faroqhi, “Crisis and Change, 1590-1699,” in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914*, edited by Halil İnalçık and Donald Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 414.

³² See Linda Darling, *Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire 1560-1660* (Leiden: Brill, 1996); Baki Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

³³ Linda Darling, “Ottoman Fiscal Administration: Decline or Adaptation?” *The Journal of European Economic History* 26, 1 (1997): 157-179.

³⁴ İnalçık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700,” 284-286; Darling, *Revenue Raising*, 1-21.

³⁵ Mustafa Akdağ, *Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası “Celâlî İsyânları”* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2017).

³⁶ The last Celali leader Yeğen Osman rebelled between 1685-1688. Oktay Özel, “The Reign of Violence: The Celalis c.1550-1700,” in *The Ottoman World*, ed. Christine Woodhead (London: Routledge, 2012), 191.

of men, who were depended on pillage, destructed the social and economic life wherever they passed. The Celali Revolts left behind a desolated countryside and collapsed rural economy.

The human source of the Celali Revolts, *the Celalis*, was composed of different members of the society. They should be handled mainly in two categories. Firstly, the former members of *askeri* class constituted the most important part. The governors and lower ranking provincial administrators, who were unsatisfied with their ranks or offended for any reason by the center, headed the great revolts. The important Celali leaders like Hüseyin Paşa and Abaza Mehmet Paşa were provincial governors. The *sipahis* who lost their timars and unrecruited mercenaries constituted the basic human source who were familiar with arms. Secondly, the *reaya*, both uprooted peasants and semi-nomadic groups, reinforced the revolts joining the Celali armies. The high degree of depopulation cannot be associated with deaths and immigration only. A certain part of deserted peasants became Celali yielding to the rebels. It seems that the border between being a victim and turning into a Celali was not strict. It is reasonable to claim that the *reaya*, who was subjected to the violence, could take its place easily in the groups inflicting it.³⁷

The sources that are used in this study signal that in the era of unprecedented violence³⁸, notably between 1598 and the 1620s, the smaller groups which were simply recorded as *eşkiya*, could very well be accepted as the branches of great armies or modest Celali groups. The registers should be handled prudently and the cases, in which the word Celali is not clearly seen, should not always be a decisive reason for exclusion. As an addition to the destruction of these groups, there were some examples which were far to be associated with the Celalis like brigandage and unlawful activities of *ehl-i örf* (administrative class), *askeri* members (particularly janissaries and *sipahis*). I argue that the definition of Celali should be broad and inclusive. The Celalis

³⁷ For the most recent evaluation and discussion see Özel, “The Reign of Violence: The Celalis c.1550-1700,”

³⁸ For emphasis on the violence, see Ibid., 193-199.

were not composed of the only well known outstanding leaders like Karayazıcı and Kalenderoğlu. The Celali groups do not necessarily mean the great armies.

1.4 The Celali Effect and the Sources

1.4.1 The Celali Effect

This study aims at separating the effects of destruction of the Celali Revolts on demographic and economic fields from other prominent events which could influence these areas directly and indirectly in the same era. As the revolts started, the Ottoman demography and economy were already going through some difficulties and changes. The increasing Celali violence either exacerbated the crisis or influenced the course of events. The concern of this study is to question the role of the revolts in the era of crisis. This thesis discerns the effects of the Celali Revolts using the term “*Celali Effect*” on the changing economic and demographic spheres.³⁹ The effects are classified into the long and short terms while analyzed in the context of *the Celali Effect*. The primary benefit of *the Celali Effect* is to discuss if the Celali Revolts meant only destruction and social turbulence or it was a more long lasting and deeper phenomenon. This study locates *the Celali Effect* in the era of transition from the 16th to the 17th century when the center had undergone severe difficulties which resulted in changing some basic state, finance and military politics as in the example of tax collection.⁴⁰

After discussing *the Celali Effect*, I will argue that these effects showed varieties according to the regions where they happened and the degree of protection of these towns. The geographic situation of rural settlements played important role on the regional *Celali Effect*. The villages on higher lands were more secure than the

³⁹ For a recent work on *the Celali Effect* see Kayhan Orbay, “ ‘The Celâlî Effect’ on Rural Production and Demography in Central Anatolia: The Waqf of Hatuniyye (1590s to 1638),” *Acta Orientalia* 71,1 (March 2018): 29-44.

⁴⁰ See the “Introduction” chapter. Kayhan Orbay, “Economic Development of the Imperial Waqfs; A Study in the Institutional and Local Economic History in the Transformation Period” (Unpublished Doctorate’s Thesis, University of Vienna, 2006).

settlements on lower plateaus. Moreover, the towns which were covered by great fortress were better defended. Thus demographic and economic activities received the lesser damage than a town which was not protected. Thus the unprotected settlements in the regions which were plundered by the Celali bands received greater damage and experienced violence when compared to the settlements which were protected and lucky with its geographic location. However, the current urban demography studies do not allow, for the time being, to compare İstanbul case with an other town with numerical indices. On the other hand, regional differences in the rural demography were indicated with some examples.

This study dealt with *the Celali Effect* by making a special use and reading of the existing literature, and by employing some new archival material. Firstly, some studies are rehandled with respects to *the Celali Effect*. The wage index of İstanbul and prices of raw silk of Bursa are examined and it is seen that there were remarkable fluctuations in the Celali years. Even if the wage and price studies were not prepared with the primary aim of showing the effects of the rebellions, they can serve to follow the problems in production and trade. Moreover, the studies which offered data from *tahrir*, *avarız* and *waqf defters* are used in a comparative way. Secondly, the new materials from the Ottoman and French archives are employed.

1.4.2 The Sources

1.4.2.a *Mukataa* Registers

In order to elaborate *the Celali Effect* more productively, the fields in which the effects are discussed, the geography, the date and primary sources are limited. Firstly, the abundance of primary sources and studies are taken into consideration as demographic and economic spheres are considered. The current archival studies are not enough to cover all aspects of the economic and demographic changes in the Celali years. While the rural demography is investigated on a larger area with more examples thanks to abundance of the case studies, mainly based on the *tahrir* and *avarız* registers, the existing literature allows to investigate only İstanbul with numerical indices in the urban demography. Secondly, the selection of the geography and location was dependent on the regions where the Celalis were seen most actively and violently, mainly in the central and northern Anatolia. The agricultural crisis and stock raising are examined in this thesis through case studies and *mukataa* registers concentrating on the central and northern Anatolia. Thirdly, the limitation of period was decided according to the important dates that the tax registers were compiled, which were significant to discuss the demographic trends before and after the Celali Revolts. The mentioned earliest *tahrir* defter is from the 1570s and the first comprehensive series of the *avarız* registers are from the 1640s. Taking the significance of these *defters* into consideration, this study is limited between the 1570s and the 1640s. Fourthly, the *mukataa defters* are examined for this study as the most important primary source due to following reasons.⁴¹ *Mukataa* registers were compiled in shorter periods for the same regions, which differ from *tahrir* and *avarız* registers in this respect, and this allows to follow demographic and economic changes of a certain area. These registers, even if not compiled for demographic purposes, give some ideas about depopulation and Celali destruction. As an addition to the demographic purposes, these *defters* are used for their primary reasons in the economy chapter.

Mukataa registers, compared with the *avarız*, *tahrir*, *waqf*, *mühimme* and *kadı sicil* records, are the least used sources of the era. It is persistently emphasized that *mukataa*

⁴¹ For *mukataa* see Mehmet Genç, “Mukâtaa” *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, 31 (2006): 129-132.

registers offer very rich data on economy and demography. This thesis attempts to revive their importance by delving into the concept *the Celali Effect*. The majority of remaining *mukataas* is for Rumeli part of the empire. While Rumeli *has mukataas* portray a prosperity, Anatolia *has mukataas* depict various functioning problems and revenue collection difficulties in the years which are named as the Celali years covers mainly the end of the 16th and the early 17th century. An extremely low revenue of a *mukataa* could be an indicator of some problems when there are many *bakis* (arrear). It is possible to see that sometimes the *kâtip* (scribe) or *nâzır* (supervisor)⁴² of *mukataa* complains about Celali destruction, which prevented *mukataas* from functioning properly.⁴³ There are examples of Celali theft of *mukataa* goods.⁴⁴ There are also notes in *derkenars* (additional notes on the margins) in *defters* indicating that *has mukataas* could not be sold to *mültezims* because Celalis had ravaged the region.⁴⁵ *Mültezims* did not want to buy *mukataas* in the era of destruction.⁴⁶

In addition to *mukataa* registers, *iltizam talepnameleri* are precious sources for this period. While *mukataa* registers may not always make references to the past, *iltizam talepnameleri* usually make references to the former *mültezims* and *iltizam* values, where a short story of the *mukataa* can be followed (as old as 3-5 years). Moreover, the *Has Mukataa* registers and *iltizam talepnameleri* can be consulted when the *tahrir* and *avarız* registers are absent since they give information on the important changes concerning population and economic activities in their localities.⁴⁷ *Mukataa* registers

⁴² *Nâzır* might be translated as supervisor. On the missions of a *nâzır* and *kâtip* of *mukataa* see Baki Çakır, *Osmanlı Mukataa Sistemi (XVI-XVIII. Yüzyıl)* (İstanbul Kitabevi, 2003), 124-125, 137-138.

⁴³ The general discourse was like this “*Celali zühur etmekle vilayet ihtilal üzerinde olup...*” BOA.MAD.d,18147/6-7.

⁴⁴ BOA.MAD.d,04689/70; BOA.MAD.d,18147/6-7; BOA.MAD.d,04684/114; BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/19-29.

⁴⁵ For a *kadı*'s complain on a tax collection problem due to *the Celali Effect* in a *derkenar*. BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/60.

⁴⁶ BOA. MAD.d, 04689/5

⁴⁷ Joseph Goy underlines the significance of tax-farming records to help follow economic trends. Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie and Joseph Goy, *Tithe and Agrarian History from the Fourteenth to the Nineteenth Centuries: An Essay in Comparative History*, trans. Susan Burke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 43-44. The tax-farming records have been used for demographic and economic studies in the European history. Jean-Claude Waquer, “Les Fermes Générales dans l’Europe des Lumières: Le Cas Toscan,” *Mélanges de l’école française de Rome* 89-2 (1977): 983-1027; Gérard

could be found in shorter period of times, which enable us to follow short time regional changes. These registers signal that the regional differences could sometime be at surprising levels. Two *mukataas*, which were situated in the same region, could experience the Celali violence differently. While a *mukataa* was damaged severely, another one in the same area may not signal any problem.

As addition to *the Celali Effect*, these records could allow to see other causes damaging *mukataa* revenues like wars⁴⁸, epidemics⁴⁹ and great fires.⁵⁰ These *defters* could also make an important contribution to the argument of the Little Ice Age. Even if attributions to the climatic conditions are rare, a wide *mukataa defter* study would help construct a climate map for the central Anatolia.⁵¹

This thesis does not claim to have examined these sources exhaustively and in detail. However, the *defters* which are about the central Anatolia, point to the some basic problems. There is a complex system of recording the collection of taxes. There are so many calculations on the pages and marginal notes (*derkenar*). While the scribe sometime added notes or titles which explained the calculation, there are cases which do not contain any clues. This complexity causes some problems about evaluating the *defters* correctly. Despite these problems the *defters* of *has mukataa* of Anatolia and *iltizam talepnameleri* proved to be useful. As an addition to the *mukataa defters* and *iltizam talepnameleri*, there are different registers which were compiled to follow the *bakis*. These records were not used owing to being very complex, which would surpass the limits of this study. These problems would be solved in the future studies the explanation of the recording system of these *defters*. These registers are found at

Gayot, “La Ferme Générale des les Ardennes en 1738. Le témoignage d’Helvétius,” *Dix-Huitième Siècle* 3 (1971): 73-94.

⁴⁸ “(Bursa) *mizan-ı harir mukataası Acem Seferi vaki olmağla çatdan? işlemeyüp külli kesirim olmağın...*” BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/113.

⁴⁹ “*Reayası dahi ekseri taundan mürd olup iltizam-ı sabıka tahammülü olmamağla kimesne kabul eylemeyüp hali kalmağla...*” BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/176.

⁵⁰ “Samsun kalesi ihrak olmağla...” BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/192.

⁵¹ “*Tahvilimiz içinde ziyade şiddet-i şita olmağla... mukataa-yı mezburesinde iki yüz akçe kesr idüp külli zaif ve temerrüt olup...*” BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/146. “*Bu sene ziyade şiddet-i şita vaki olup mukataalar kat’a işlemeyüp...*” BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/157.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü (General Directorate of State Archives of the Prime Ministry of the Republic of Turkey).

1.4.2.b The Other Sources

In this thesis, beside the Ottoman archival sources, the French archival sources were studied as well since they provided important information on the Celali armies and the destruction they made in Anatolia. There is a huge collection of the letters and secret reports sent from İstanbul by the French embassy to the French king. The first documents are found as early as the 1530s and they continue, at intervals, until the 19th century. These letters and reports were sent from Pera to France regularly once in a 10 or 15 days. They cover various issues such as trade, diplomatic relations with France and other states, political tensions, economic situation, military actions and the Celali Revolts. Among hundreds of letters investigated, the examples presented signal that a systematic study of them can serve to extend our knowledge on the period. Moreover, these letters give details about variety of issues such as customs, daily life, epidemics, great fires, inflation, the attitude of the center towards representative of foreign states and so on. It should be reminded that these records might exaggerate some events and they can present the news with prejudice. There are also manuscripts resuming the yearly political activities of the Ottoman Empire, copies of capitulations and agreements. There are also a few voyage manuscripts written by the French ambassadors. These documents are found at the Center of Diplomatic Archives of Nantes (*Archives Diplomatiques- Centre de Nantes*) and Manuscript Department of National Library of France (*Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Département des Manuscrits*).

1.5 Outline of the Study

The Celali Effect is discussed in two main chapters. In the first chapter, the Ottoman demography is handled and demographic changes under *the Celali Effect* is revisited on urban and rural population. Urban population is examined through İstanbul example and rural population is handled in Amasya and Tokat. In the second chapter, the Ottoman economy is examined under three headings. The first section discusses breakdown of rural economy in the central and northern Anatolia. The following

section focuses on the silk and mohair industries. While silk is discussed in Bursa case, mohair is examined in Tosya and Ankara. The last section attempts to discuss the question of the 17th century Ottoman economic difficulties and the fiscal transformation through *mukataa* registers and destruction of the *timar* system. These two main chapters are followed by a general conclusion of the thesis where the findings and new questions are present



CHAPTER II

THE OTTOMAN DEMOGRAPHY IN THE CELALİ YEARS

It is widely accepted that there was a general demographic growth in the 16th century in the Mediterranean world and in Europe.⁵² Fernand Braudel had included the Ottoman Empire in his thesis of demographic expansion, which was confirmed by Ömer Lütfi Barkan first time in 1953.⁵³ Local studies revealed that there was almost a linear increase in the tax paying urban and rural population in the Ottoman Empire.⁵⁴ The population growth rate was not the same for all regions but it exceeded 100% in many parts.⁵⁵ Despite the problems regarding demographic calculations, the Ottoman population is predicted to be about fifteen million and it kept increasing substantially until about 1580/87-8.⁵⁶ Some historians indicated that the demographic growth expanded arable lands, which increased total crop yields in rural areas to a certain degree.⁵⁷ However, it is widely accepted that the agricultural lands of north-central

⁵² Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “Essai Sur Les Données Statistiques Des Registres de Recensement dans L’Empire Ottoman aux XV et XVIe Siècles,” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 1, 1 (1957): 23-30.

⁵³ Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “Tarihi Demografi Araştırmalar ve Osmanlı Tarihi,” *Türkiyat Mecmuası* 10 (1953): 19-23.

⁵⁴ For instance, Mehmet Öz, *XV-XVI.Yüzyıllarda Canik Sancağı* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi,1999); Feridun Emecen, *XVI.Yüzyılda Manisa Kazâsı* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2013); Jennings discusses the urban population increase and he shows the rate of expansion for Kayseri, Karaman, Amasya, Trabzon and Erzurum between 1500-85. He concludes that the level of expansion in these towns confirms Braudel’s thesis. Ronald C. Jennings, “Urban Population in Anatolia in the Sixteenth Century: A Study of Kayseri, Karaman, Amasya, Trabzon, and Erzurum,” *Int. J. Middle East Studies* 7 (1976): 50-57.

⁵⁵ Oktay Özel, “Population Changes in Ottoman Anatolia During the 16th and 17th Centuries: The “Demographic Crisis” Reconsidered,” *Int.J. Middle East Studies* 36, 2 (2004): 184. For some regions the proportion of expansion was much higher. In the example of Bursa, according to the findings of Koç, number of *hanes* in the rurality of Bursa increased about 98.1% and *mücerreds* increased round 300% between 1521-1574. Yunus Koç, “XVI. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Köylerin Parçalanması Sorunu: Bursa Kazası Ölçeğinde Bir Araştırma,” in *Uluslararası XIII. Türk Tarih Kongresi*, 4-8 Ekim 1999, Kongreye Sunulan Bildiriler Cilt III, Kısım III (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2002):1962-63.

⁵⁶ Robert Mantran, *La Vie Quotidienne à Constantinople au Temps de Soliman le Magnifique et de Ses Successeurs: XVIe et XVIIe Siècles* (Paris: Hachette, 1965), 61-62.

⁵⁷ For instance, Mehmet Öz indicates a growth in cereal production and he relates it to the demographic growth. He states that the agricultural production increased in Canik region between 1520-1576. Öz, *XV-XVI.Yüzyıllarda Canik Sancağı*, 89, 179. İnalçık states that 1470-1570 witnessed a general

Anatolian districts proved to be insufficient for growing population and the Ottoman peasants were exposed to population pressure.⁵⁸ As a result of the pressure, *çift* units got fragmented in order to provide arable land to the newly emerging surplus population.⁵⁹

The general trend of population growth seems to have reversed at the turn of the century. Mustafa Akdağ was the first to emphasize the remarkable demographic decline in the Anatolian countryside.⁶⁰ The studies of Oktay Özel and Mehmet Öz demonstrated with numerical indices that the Anatolian countryside witnessed a large scale abandonment of rural settlements and a drastic decline of tax paying rural population which occurred some time between the end of the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth century. Rural lands of central and northern Anatolia lost 70-80% of its tax paying population.⁶¹ The high rate of population decline in the early 17th century ended in deserted villages and uncultivated lands. Settled villages in open plains were abandoned and the peasants either immigrated to large towns or settled down in secure lands.⁶²

expansion of arable lands. İnalçık and Quataert, eds. *An Economic and Social*, 159. Some historians claimed a relationship between expansion of cultivable lands and “capitalisation” of the agricultural production. Haim Gerber, *Economy and Society in an Ottoman City: Bursa, 1600-1700* (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1988), 28-29, 81-83. See Huricihan İslamoğlu-İnan, *State and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire: Agrarian Power Relations and Regional Economic Development in Ottoman Anatolia during the Sixteenth Century* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994), 203-237.

⁵⁸ It is still debated that if 16th century population growth really resulted in a population pressure. See Cook, *Population Pressure*; İslamoğlu-İnan, *State and Peasant*; Özel, “Population Changes in Ottoman Anatolia During the 16th and 17th Centuries,” 186; Öz, “Population Fall in Seventeenth Century Anatolia: Some Findings for the Districts of Canik and Bozok.

⁵⁹ For examples of land fragmentation, see Volkan Ertürk, “XVI.Yüzyıl Anadolu’su’nda Ziraî Yapı ve Köylülerin Geçim Durumları Hakkında Bir Değerlendirme: Akşehir Örneği,” *Turkish Studies* 6/4 (2011): 520-530; Turan Gökçe, *XVI. ve XVII. Yüzyıllarda Lazıkıyye (Denizli) Kazası* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000), 334-336, 343; Öz, *XV-XVI.Yüzyıllarda Canik Sancağı*, 51-52. On the other hand, the *kanuns* indicate that the center aimed at protecting the entirety of *çift* lands. “Çiftlik ve baştına paralanub bozulması kat’iyyen câiz değildir.” Halil İnalçık, “Osmanlılar’da Raiyyet Rüsûmu,” *Belleten* XXIII, 91 (1959): 582.

⁶⁰ Akdağ, *Celali İsyamları*, 423-463.

⁶¹ Özel, “Population Changes in Ottoman Anatolia During the 16th and 17th Centuries: The “Demographic Crisis” Reconsidered,” 192.

⁶² Oktay Özel, *The Collapse of Rural Order in Ottoman Anatolia Amasya 1576-1643* (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 109.

The high degree of dispersal of tax paying rural population in the northern and central Anatolia comes with a bunch of questions about what actually triggered a mass population movement. The demographic changes in this period were associated with different reasons. For instance, epidemics could have led population to drop. According to some research, central and northern parts of Anatolia experienced epidemics occasionally but these epidemics seem to have been effective in a limited area.⁶³ For example, 1604 *avarız* registers of northwestern Anatolian districts of Manyas show that a group of villages had been deserted because of a deadly plague which broke out before 1604.⁶⁴ There are also traces of a plague in Erzurum region between 1644-45 which could have possibly culminated in population fall.⁶⁵ It is clear that the Anatolian rural population was hit by several epidemics which resulted in population loss or land desertion.⁶⁶ However, the effects of epidemics were restricted in local base and it lacks to explain the huge mass population movements in Anatolia. The question of demographic crisis in Anatolian countryside is still popular in the Ottoman studies. The pull and push factors as put forward by İnalçık and İslamoğlu-İnan doubtlessly had effects on Ottoman demographic movements. As proposed by pull factors, the growing towns and commercialization might have offered new opportunities for peasants who were either landless or in economic difficulties.⁶⁷

⁶³ For plague in the empire, see Daniel Panzac, *La Peste dans l'Empire Ottoman 1700-1850* (Louvain: Editions Peeters, 1985).

⁶⁴ Özer Küpeli, "Klasik Tahrirden Avârız Tahririne Geçiş Sürecinde Tipik Bir Örnek:1604 Tarihli Manyas Kazası Avârız Defteri," *Belgeler Dergisi* XXXII, 36 (2011).

⁶⁵ Özel, *The Collapse of Rural Order*, 149.

⁶⁶ A French chronic written in 1687 defines the plague in Ottoman Empire as something seen very frequently. The plague was an ordinary event and its effects could vary depending on the season. Sieur Du Vignau, *L'état présent de la Puissance Ottomane avec Les Causes de Son Accroissement et celles de Sa Décadence* (Paris: D.Hortemels, 1687), 214-15. The words of François Savary Brèves (French ambassador in İstanbul between 1591-1605) could be a indicator of frequency of plague. He came to the southern Anatolia (Antalya) with a ship for a mission around 1605 and his companions were afraid of traveling inner Anatolia. The ambassador states that two dangers prevented them from going further, which were any possible plague contamination and the Celali Revolts (*la peste... les Rebelles de la Natolie*). François Savary Brèves, *Relation des Voyages de monsieur de Breves, tant en Grèce, Terre Sainte et Aegypte qu'aux Royaumes de Tunis et Arger, ensemble un Traicté faict l'an 1604 entre le Roy Henry le Grand et l'Empereur des Turcs, et trois Discours dudir Sieur, Le Tout Recueilly par le S.D.C* (Paris: Nicolas Gasse, 1628), 21.

⁶⁷ Murphey puts emphasis on the importance of better economic conditions which triggered peasant immigration. Rhoads Murphey, "Population Movements and Labour Mobility in Balkan Context: A Glance at Post-1600 Ottoman Social Realities," in *Studies on Ottoman Society and Culture, 16-18th Centuries* (Burlington: Ashgate Pub., 2007): 90.

Enlarging *kapıhalkı* (retinues) of provincial governors and increasing need for soldiers using fire arms created new job opportunities that pulled peasants from countryside to urban areas.⁶⁸ The push factors are associated basically with population pressure, land fragmentation and frequent bad harvests related to the weather conditions.

Accepting the effects of pull, push factors, epidemics and forced immigrations on the Ottoman demography, the Celali Revolts played the major role on the mass demographic movements and decline of the tax paying population in the Anatolian countryside. When the Celali terror reached its peak, the Anatolian countryside experienced one of its biggest demographic movements which is called The Great Flight (*Büyük Kaçgunluk*).⁶⁹ As a result of the Great Flight, a remarkable part of rural population abandoned their lands and immigrated to either large towns or secure hilly lands. Some percentage of these fugitive peasants became a part of Celali violence by joining Celali bands.⁷⁰

This chapter discusses the relationship between the Celali Revolts and Ottoman population. *The Celali Effect* on population will be divided into two main parts. In the first part, *the Celali Effect* on the urban population will be dealt. Urban population changes during the Celali years in İstanbul will be handled in the light of current archival studies of wages of skilled and unskilled construction workers. In the second part, rural population will be analyzed. The sharp demographic decline, deserted villages and newly emerging “Celali settlements” will be handled. The effects on the urban and rural population will be evaluated on short and long terms.

⁶⁸ Özel, “Population Changes in Ottoman Anatolia During the 16th and 17th Centuries,” 188. Cezar puts emphasis on increasing recruitment of *levends*. He states that the insecurity in the Anatolian countryside resulted in the expansion of *kapı halkı* and *levends*. Mustafa Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2013), 180-190.

⁶⁹ Akdağ, *Celâlî İsyancıları*, 423-463; William J. Griswold, *The Great Anatolian Rebellion 1000-1020/1591-1611* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1983), 49-50.

⁷⁰ Mustafa Akdağ, *Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası Celali İsyancıları* (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1995), 493.

2.1 The Celali Effect on Urban Population

The great Ottoman cities such as İstanbul and Bursa had always been attractive for rural dwellers thanks to wide urban economic opportunities. The era of insecurity that Celalis created in the Ottoman countryside around the late 16th century turned the great towns into safe centers. On the other hand, it seems that the central state desired the peasants to stay in their settlements and continue to be a part of the rural economic life. The central state did not permit the peasants to change their status by immigrating from rural to urban. It is evident that the efforts of the center were related to the continuity of agricultural production and rural economy because *timariots*, the backbone of the Ottoman army, were dependent on the rural taxes extracted from his subjects in kind and cash.⁷¹ The fief-holding *sipahi* was given certain authority in order to keep peasants settled down in their localities.⁷² However, the *sipahi* did not have eternal rights on the peasant for the sake of continuation of rural economic activities, in other words, his authority on the subject was limited. Despite the efforts of the central state to prevent peasant immigration to towns on paper by the *kanunnâmes* (legal codes) or by the legal rights of *sipahis*, a certain number of immigrant might have crowded into the cities. Surviving *kanunnâmes* give an impression that the central government limited strictly the movements of its subjects; nevertheless, the Ottoman rural society in 16th and 17th centuries was actually mobile.⁷³

The mobility of Ottoman peasants entered into a different phase as the Celali Revolts broke out in the second half of the 16th century.⁷⁴ Celali Revolts drove Anatolian peasants into a period of immigration and extraordinary mobility. The Ottoman peasants abandoned their current settlements to arrive in secure urban or rural lands.

⁷¹ Nicoara Beldiceanu, *Le Timar dans l'Etat ottoman (Début XIVe-Début XVIe Siècle)* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1980), 34, 59-62. The *sipahi*, whose *reayas* fled, would lose his income. Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600* (New York: Orpheus Publishing, 1989), 111.

⁷² One of these authorities include that a *sipahi* had 10-15 years to force a fugitive peasant to return to his land. If the peasant could earn his living in the town, he could have gained the right to change his status from rural to urban *reaya* by paying certain amount of compensation called *çift bozan akçesi*, which amounts slightly more than one gold ducat a year. *Ibid.*, 111.

⁷³ Suraiya Faroqhi, *Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia: Trade, Craft and Food Production in an Urban Setting, 1520-1650* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 268.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 272.

Some peasants sought refuge in fortifications or fled to İstanbul, İzmir, Rumeli, Syria, Crimea and even north Africa.⁷⁵ The remaining peasants tried to provide their own security in their localities by forming local militants (*il erleri*)⁷⁶ or erecting fortifications (*palanka*)⁷⁷ as it is seen in Turgudlu and Ankara.⁷⁸ The huge Celali armies could even threat great fortified cities like Urfa, which was occupied by Kara Yazıcı, where more than ten thousand inhabitants were living.⁷⁹

The demographic studies done so far based on the basic sources like *tahrirs* and *avarız* registers provide the size of demographic decline on the countryside. On the other hand, the absence of these registers for the Celali years makes difficult to follow the demographic movements. The lack of sources coinciding with the exact dates of revolts does not necessarily mean that the central administration was not aware of mass population coming to towns for a livelihood. It seems that the Ottoman statesmen were

⁷⁵ Özel, "The Reign of Violence: The Celalis c.1550-1700," 190. Simeon mentions that there were around 200 Armenian households (*hane*) in Cairo who had fled from Celali violence. Hrand Der Andreasyan, *Polonyalı Simeon'un Seyahatnamesi (1608-1619)* (İstanbul: Everest Yayınları, 2013), 127.

⁷⁶ Suraiya Faroqhi, *Osmanlı'da Kentler ve Kentiler: Kent Mekânında Ticaret, Zanaat ve Gıda Üretimi 1550-1650*, trans. Neyyir Kalaycıoğlu (İstanbul, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1994), 335. For more information on *il erleri* see Mücteba İlgürel, "İl Erleri Hakkında," *Güney-Doğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi* 12 (1998): 125-140. It is understood that the policy of central state about *il erleri* changed from time to time. While it allowed armement against the Celalis, it could ban the arming and collect all arms from peasants. See Hikmet Ülker, *Sultanın Emir Defteri (51 Nolu Mühimme)* (İstanbul: TATAV, 2003), 92. İnalçık states that the center could allow peasants to defend themselves under some conditions. Halil İnalçık, "Adâletnâmeler," *Belgeler* II, 3-4 (1965): 84.

⁷⁷ *Palanka* was a supplementary fortification erected to be protected from Celali attacks. A petition sent from Lâdik in 1603 was asking for a permission to build a *palanka* against banditry. See Akdağ, *Celâli İsyânları*, 419. English traveler Sir Henry Blount (1602-1682), states to have seen one in the Ottoman Balkans, describes a *palanka* (*palanga*, in the original text) a mud wall constructed against thieves. Henry Blount, *A Voyage into the Levant a Brief Relation of a Journey, Lately Performed by Master H.B. Gentleman, from England by the way of Venice, into Dalmatia, Sclavonia, Bosnah, Hungary, Macedonia, Thessaly, Thrace, Rhodes and Egypt, unto Gran Cairo* (London: Andrew Crooke, 1636), 13. Richard Pococke (1704-1765) saw Ankara around the end of 1730s and describes a fortification built of stone and mud to get protected from the Rebellion of Gadick (?) 60 years before his trip. It seems that this was one of the *palanka* examples constructed to protect the town. "These fortifications were raised 60 years ago against the Revolt of Gadick, who was ravaging the town with his 12.000 men." Richard Pococke, *Voyages de Richard Pockocke: en Orient, dans l'Égypte, l'Arabie, la Palestine, la Syrie, la Grèce, la Thrace, etc, vol.5*, trans.la Flotte (Paris: J.P. Costard, 1772-1773), 185.

⁷⁸ Hülya Taş, *Ankara'nın Bütüncül Tarihine Katkı: XVII.Yüzyılda Ankara* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2014), 106; Mustafa Akdağ, "Celâli Fetreti: A.1596 Sırasında Osmanlı Devleti'nin Umumî Durumu 1-İran ve Avusturya Harblerinin Uzamasından Doğan Hoşnutsuzluk," *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi* 16, 1/2 (1958): 42, 100-103.

⁷⁹ Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, edit. Mehmet İpşirli, *Tarih-i Selânikî* (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1989), 836, 842, 863.

well aware that there were huge population movements in the Anatolian countryside and they tried to comprehend the changes. For example, the Ottoman bureaucracy proposed their own analysis of peasant flight in an *adâletnâme* of the years around 1600s.⁸⁰ Moreover, there are mentions of Celali immigration from rural settlements to the towns in *mühimme*, *telhis* registers and in the works of contemporary Ottoman intellectuals.⁸¹

Despite the lack of direct demographic data, there are other sources which help investigate *the Celali Effect* on urban population. The records regarding construction and repair works can yield some data indirectly on the fluctuations in urban population during the Celali years. The records contain the wages paid to the workers on daily or monthly terms and they can provide some clues about remarkable demographic changes. The wages are expected to be affected by mass demographic movements. The wages of the construction workers in Istanbul showed signs of decay around the last decade of the 16th century and the second decade of the 17th century. It seems that the period of decay did not last very long and once the Celalis were eliminated by the imperial center, the wages started to rise because a remarkable size of the newcomers may have started to go back to their lands. The correlation indicates that *the Celali Effect* was a short-term result on the urban population in İstanbul.

2.1.1 An Urban “Population Pressure”

In a similar manner to the rural population pressure, newcomers to the big towns starting from the last decades of the 16th century may have created an *urban population pressure* on limited food sources and employment capacity. The towns of the empire, just like its Early Modern contemporaries, were composed of certain balance between the inhabitants, production and food sources. The provision issue was so crucial that one of the most important duties of the grand vizier was to control the

⁸⁰ Faroqhi, *Towns and Townsmen*, 269. For *adâletnâmes* see İnalçık, *Adâletnâmeler*, 49-142.

⁸¹ For instance, Kâtip Çelebi, *Düstûru'l-Amel*, 113.

price and quality of the most basic foodstuff, like bread, personally.⁸² It was a major task for the government to provide bread at fair prices and on daily bases in İstanbul.⁸³ It is known that the sultan himself used to inspect the bazaars in disguise during severe food shortages. The Celali immigrants may have disrupted the provision creating a “pressure” over limited sources. The Ottoman statesmen, who were aware of the necessity to keep the balance between the sources and dwellers, had already tried to limit the number of migrants to İstanbul from the late 16th and early 17th centuries.⁸⁴ Population of İstanbul continued to expand throughout 16th and 17th centuries despite the measures.⁸⁵

⁸² İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti'nin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilâtı* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1988), 141-144. For *kola çıkmak* see Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlılarda Narh Müessesesi ve 1640 Tarihli Narh Defteri* (İstanbul: Enderun Yayınları, 1983), 19-20.

⁸³ For provisioning of İstanbul see Suraiya Faroqhi, “İstanbul’un İâşesi ve Tekirdağ-Rodosçuk Limanı (16.-17. Yüzyıllar),” *ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi*. İktisat Tarihi Özel Sayısı (1980): 139-154.

⁸⁴ Halil Sahillioğlu, ed. *Koca Sinan Paşa'nın Telhisleri* (İstanbul: IRCICA, 2004), 100-101. A mühimme record from 1567 warns about the newcomers. “Rumeli ve Anadolu'dan bazı reaya yerlerin ve çiftlerin koyub birer tarik ile mahruse-i İstanbul'a gelüb kimi İstanbul'da ve kimi Eyyub ve Kasımpaşa'da derya kenarını mesken idiniüp...” Ahmet Refik, *On Altıncı Asırda İstanbul Hayatı (1553-1591)* (İstanbul: Devlet Basımevi, 1935), 141-142.

⁸⁵ It was claimed that the population of İstanbul was around 400.000 in the first half of the 16th century and it increased to 800.000 in the second half of the century. See Robert Mantran, *17. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında İstanbul: Kurumsal, İktisadi, Toplumsal Tarih Denemesi*, vol.1, trans. Mehmet Ali Kılıçbay and Enver Özcan (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1990), 46.

2.1.2 Inflation of Labour

New arrivals into the urban life were the poor peasants who deserted their agricultural lands and immobile properties in rural areas. Once they arrived into towns, the first problem that the immigrants faced was the question of making a living. These immigrants were gaining their livelihood from agricultural production and other rural activities in the countryside, which mean that the majority of peasants arrived without a specific profession. However, the situation was not that desperate, and the great urban towns could offer a few job opportunities. Faroqhi categorizes the new job opportunities for the new comers under three subheads.⁸⁶ **a)** The new comers could earn their livings working as a servant in a household. **b)** They could be employed in the construction works as a low-rank construction worker, *irgad*.⁸⁷ **c)** Selling some goods as pedlar was a suitable job as well.⁸⁸ This study discussed only the construction workers because the records about their wages provide the most detailed data about *the Celali Effect*.

Şevket Pamuk and Süleyman Özmucur worked on 5.000 account books of construction and repair projects and they prepared a wage index of construction workers who worked in projects belonged either to waqfs or the central state.⁸⁹ Their indices show that there was a general drop in the real wages of unskilled workers around 30%-40% in the 16th century.⁹⁰ The rates kept changing slightly until the mid 18th century, after which they would increase about 30% up to the mid 19th century.⁹¹ The decline in the nominal daily wages (in silver) of skilled and unskilled workers,

⁸⁶ Faroqhi, *Osmanlı'da Kentler ve Kentliler*, 340-346.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 343-344.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 344.

⁸⁹ Şevket Pamuk and Süleyman Özmucur, "Real Wages and Standards of Living in the Ottoman Empire, 1489-1914," *The Journal of Economic History* 62, 2 (2002): 304

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 305.

⁹¹ Pamuk and Özmucur, "Real Wages and Standards of Living in the Ottoman Empire, 1489-1914," 305.

which experienced two periods of decay between 1590-1599 and 1620-1629 in İstanbul, will be handled in this part.⁹²

There could be different reasons behind the period of decay of the wages in the last quarter of the 16th century in İstanbul. Ş. Pamuk and S. Özmucur related the decline partly to the general demographic expansion of the 16th century.⁹³ The 16th century demographic expansion possibly aggravated the decline of wages like the general trend seen in some parts of the European and Mediterranean states.⁹⁴ On the other hand, the declines between 1590-1599 and 1620-1629 were most likely related to the Celali immigration. The great rebellion of Karayazıcı in 1598 and Abaza Mehmet Paşa in 1622 might have resulted the surplus labour to rise in İstanbul temporarily which led the wages to decline.⁹⁵

The Anatolian countryside was exposed to ravages of different groups in the second half of the 16th century. The small scale brigand bands, unrecruited *levends* and groups of former graduated students of *medrese* lodges (*suhte*)⁹⁶, who could not find any

⁹² Pamuk and Özmucur, “Real Wages and Standards of Living in the Ottoman Empire, 1489-1914,” 301.

⁹³ Ibid., 309.

⁹⁴ Pamuk, Urban Real Wages Around the Eastern Mediterranean in Comparative Perspective, 1100-2000,” 217. See the chart of fluctuations of builder’s wages and the cost of living in Europe. Rich Edwin Ernest, Wilson Charles and Clapham John Harold, *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe IV: The Economy of Expanding Europe in the 16th and 17th Centuries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 482-483.

⁹⁵ Moreover, despite the effects of the plague at the end of the 16th century, which might have caused a decrease in the population of town, the wages kept declining. A French report dated 14 October 1598 states that the plague broke out in the the town. Anonymous, *L’admirable et Heureuse Prince de La Ville de Bude et Hongrie par L’armée Imperiale, sur les Turcs. Ensembe le Retablissement de Battori, Voivod de Transilvanie* (Lyon: Thibaud Ancelin and Guichard Jullieron, 1598), 10; Henry Castela (1570? -16..), voyager of the Holy Lands and North Africa between 1600-1601, mentions the plague in İstanbul in 1601. Henry Castela, *Le Sainct Voyage de Hiêrusalem et Mont Sinay, faict en l’an du grand Jubilé, 1600* (Paris: Lauren Sonnius, 1603), 474.

⁹⁶ Akdağ states that *suhte* ravages increased remarkably at the end of the reign of Süleyman I (1566). See Akdağ, “Medreseli İsyancıları” *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 1, 4 (1949):361-387; Çağatay Uluçay, *XVII.Asırda Saruhan’da Eşkiyalık ve Halk Hareketleri* (Manisa: Manisa Halk Evi Yayınları, 1944), 23-30. A *mühimme* from 1574 warned the *kadı* of İstanbul *suhte* ravages. “*İstanbul kadısına hüküm ki Hâlâ Semaniye müderrislerini kendülerine müteallik Tetümmat kapuların gice ile kapatmyub açık durmakla suhte tayifesi taşra çıkub fesad ve şenaat etdüikleri...*” Refik, *On Altıncı Asırda İstanbul*, 33.

position in Ottoman religious and bureaucratic establishments, were plundering the countryside.⁹⁷ For instance, *kadı* of Kütahya reported to the center that the district of Lazkiye was being ravaged by 50-60 fire armed men and more than 300 *suhtes* around 1583.⁹⁸ The big towns like İstanbul can be supposed to have become safer places for Celali immigrants before the first great Celali rebellions. However, the wage index shows that the immigration was not in great number because the wages did not show any serious changes. The first drastic wage decline is seen between 1590-1599, when the great revolt of Karayazıcı and Hüseyin Paşas in 1598 influenced a wide geographical area.⁹⁹ The great violence of Karayazıcı rebellion pushed Ottoman peasants to the great towns and the population of İstanbul expanded in this period.¹⁰⁰ Polish voyageur Simeon, who visited İstanbul sometime between 1608-1619, emphasizes that a great part of the Celali immigrants went to İstanbul. He mentions that the Celali immigrants constituted more than 40.000 *hanes* (households) and they were densely situated in Galata and Üsküdar regions.¹⁰¹ It is highly probable that Simeon had exaggerated the number of households, but statements of an eyewitness is worth some attention. Katip Çelebi, who was another contemporary witness, mentions the Celali immigrations to the towns (*karyelerden şehre firar itdiler*) and he emphasized the immigrations to İstanbul.¹⁰² The Celali immigration is reflected on the wages. While the daily nominal wages of an unskilled worker were around 3.5 grams of silver between 1580-1589, it declined to 2.6 between 1590-1599. The skilled workers experienced a lighter decline than the unskilled. While their nominal wages were around 5.4 grams of silver between 1580-1589, it decreased to 4.6 between 1590-

⁹⁷ *Mühimme* registers mention unlawful actives of *suhtes*. For some examples see Ülker, *Sultanın Emir Defteri*, 15, 40-41, 71, 81, 121, 126, 140; 12 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (978-979/1570-1572), Cilt I, Divan-ı Hümayûn Sicilleri Dizisi: IV (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 1996), 348, 351, 392; BOA. Mühimme Defteri, 78 (h.1018/m.1609-1610): 50/134.

⁹⁸ Ülker, *Sultanın Emir Defteri*, 126.

⁹⁹ Griswold, *The Great Anatolian Rebellion*, 24-38; Andreasyan, *Polonyalı Simeon*, 106.

¹⁰⁰ Akdağ, *Celali İsyanları*, 358.

¹⁰¹ Andreasyan, *Polonyalı Simeon*, 5.

¹⁰² Kâtip Çelebi, *Düstûru'l-Amel*, 113-114.

1599.¹⁰³ The shrinkage of wages for unskilled ones was around 25% and for the skilled ones it was 14%.¹⁰⁴

The second wave of immigration to İstanbul might have taken place between 1620-1629. The nominal daily wages of unskilled workers declined from 4.1 (1610-19) to 3.4 (1620-29) grams of silver, which is equal to a 17% decline.¹⁰⁵ The skilled workers experienced a deeper loss in the same period. While their nominal daily wages were 6.6 grams of silver between 1610-1619, it declined to 4.1 between 1620-1629. The revolt of Abaza Mehmet Paşa in Erzurum region between 1622 and 1628 may have provoked a second great immigration to İstanbul. Abaza Mehmet Paşa took control of Sivas, Ankara¹⁰⁶, Niğde and Kayseri regions.¹⁰⁷ He sacked the region until his final defeat by the central army in Kayseri.¹⁰⁸ The periods of wage decline signal that İstanbul may have been exposed to two great remarkable immigrations during the rebellions of Karayazıcı and Abaza Mehmet Paşa between the last quarter of the 16th and the second decade of the 17th centuries.

¹⁰³ Pamuk and Özmucur, “Real Wages and Standards of Living in the Ottoman Empire, 1489-1914,” 301.

¹⁰⁴ Three *mühimme* records composed in 1587 and 1588 point that skilled and unskilled construction workers were not content with their daily wages. The wages were not enough for their lives (*maişetlerine kifayet etmeyüb*) and they were demanding for a raise. When their complaints are taken into consideration before the *Celali Effect*, it could be assumed that following period of wage decline worsened their situation. “*Benna ve naccar ve senk tıraşların yevmiyeleri on ikişer üzre olub maişetlerine kifayet eylemeyüb on altışar akçe tayin olunmasın arz eylediğünde...*” (1587); “*Neccar ve eğer senk tıraşın yevmiye ücretleri on ikişer akçe olub ırgadların altışar iken sen ki mimarsın on altışar akçe olmak lâzımdır deyu arz etdiğün üzre zikrolunan taifeden üstadlara yevmiye ücretleri on altışar akçe verilüb minbaad ziyade olmiya deyu ferman-ı şerifim virilüb ve kadimden ırgad dahi üstadların nısıf ücretlerin alagelüb hâliyâ üstadlar on altışar olıcak nihayet ırgadların ücreti sekizer akçe ola...*” (1587); “*Sen ki kadısın mektub gönderüb hâliyâ kadimü'l eyyamdan mahrus-i mezburede neccar ve benna tayifesi yevmi on ikişer akçeye ve ırgad tayifesi yevmi beşer akçeye ücretle işleyügelmişler iken şimdiki halde kaht-ı galâ olduğuna binaen...*” (1588). Refik, *On Altıncı Asırda İstanbul*, 73-74.

¹⁰⁵ Pamuk and Özmucur, “Real Wages and Standards of Living in the Ottoman Empire, 1489-1914,” 301.

¹⁰⁶ As quoted from the letter of Thomas Roe dated 1 November 1623; “*Abaza Paşa had taken Tokat (Tocatt)...and arrived before the city of Ankara (Angria); they opened the gates, all yields to him... He tells them (the dwellers of Ankara) that he is the true slave of the present emperor but he must execute his commission, to revenge the blood of Sultan Osman...*” Roe, *The Negotiations*, 187.

¹⁰⁷ Halil İnalçık, *Devlet-i Aliyye: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Üzerine Araştırmalar II Tagayyür ve Fesâd (1603-1656): Bozuluş ve Kargaşa Dönemi* (İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2016), 194.

¹⁰⁸ İnalçık, *Devlet-i Aliyye II*, 195-196.

2.1.3 The Reversal of “Labour Pressure”

The two periods of drastic decline show the signs of rise after the central army defeated the Celali leaders. In the period of 1590-99, nominal daily wage of the unskilled workers was 2.5 grams of silver. The following period of 1600-1609 it rose to 4.0.¹⁰⁹ The skilled workers were influenced similarly in the same period. Their nominal daily wage was 4.6 grams of silver in 1590-1599 and it increased to 6.5 in 1600-1609. The rise was around 60% for the unskilled and 41% for the skilled workers. A part of this increase was influenced by increasing prices after the debasement of 1600. One *akçe* was 0,384 gram of silver after 1586 debasement and it was reduced to 0,323 in 1600.¹¹⁰ On the other hand, relating the increasing wages totally to the debasement of 1600 seems questionable. Accepting the effects of the debasement, the Celali campaigns of Vizier Mehmet Paşa, Sokolluzade Hasan Paşa, Hüsnü Paşa and Kuyucu Murat Paşa against Karayazıcı and other Celali bands were the main reason.¹¹¹ After the first great Celalis were destructed, Anatolia entered into a short period of normalization and a remarkable part of the immigrants in İstanbul was forced, and might have tended to, return to their former lands.¹¹² The declining number of immigrants in the town led wages to rise.

The second fall in the wages is observed during the rebellion of Abaza Mehmet Paşa (1622-1628). In following period of his elimination, the nominal wages of unskilled workers rose from 3.4 (1620-1629) to 4.2 (1640-49). The skilled workers experienced a better rise and their nominal daily wages increased from 4.1 (1620-1629) to 8.2 in grams of silver (1640-1649). The increase of wages around 23% (unskilled) and 100%

¹⁰⁹ Pamuk and Özmucur, “Real Wages and Standards of Living in the Ottoman Empire, 1489-1914,” 301.

¹¹⁰ Barkan, “XVI. Asrın İkinci Yarısında Türkiye’de Fiyat Hareketleri,” *Belleten* XXXIV, 36 (1970): 574-575.

¹¹¹ For details about fights of the pashas against Celalis, see Akdağ, *Celâli İsyânları*, 357-362. Kuyucu Murat Paşa is known for his cruel actions against Celalis. He was called “*Kuyucu*” after his Celali massacre in Konya. Joseph Von Hammer-Purgstall, *Histoire de L’Empire Ottoman depuis Son Origine Jusqu’à Nos Jours*, vol.8, trans. J.-J. Hellert (Paris: Bellizard, 1835-1843), 116.

¹¹² Sam White states that Sultan Ahmed I attempted to expulse the immigrants in 1610. There were another attempts in the era of Sultan Murad IV. He handles the immigration with the notes extracted from Venetian *relazionis*. See White, *The Climate of Rebellion*, 257-260.

(skilled) points that a huge part of Celali immigrants might have left the town as the rebellion was quashed.

2.1.4 Conclusion

The Celali Effect observed through the construction and repair records indicates waves of migration to İstanbul. The city was receiving immigrants from the second half of the 16th century but they were not as crowded as the immigrants fleeing from the first great Celali revolt of Karayazıcı. The town received the first mass immigration sometime during his revolt and it created a labour surplus which caused wages to decline between 1590-1599. The index does not indicate the yearly differences, which could serve to compare the wages before and during his revolt. On the other hand, Karayazıcı's destruction in a wide geography at the end of the century was the major reason, which aggravated the immigration to the town and following fluctuations in the wages. The surplus labour started to diminish when the remarkable part of immigrants left the town after the defeat of Karayazıcı by the central army and the wages increased between 1600-1609. The second mass migration arrived at the town during the revolt of Abaza Mehmet Paşa (1622-1628). The wage index could not show the indices year by year, which prevents us from seeing the exact difference in 1622 once his revolt started. The index points that the wages declined between 1620-1629. This decay was exacerbated during his revolts between 1622-1628. After his elimination in 1628, which created a safe environment in Anatolian countryside, the wages increased when the immigrants started to leave the town in the period of 1640-1649. As an addition to the temporary normalization period created after the elimination of Celalis, the central state was forcing the immigrants to return back after the revolts. For instance, Armenians who settled down in the city after the *Asia Revolts* (in the original document) in the last 40 years were threatened to return to their former lands within 20 days in 1635.¹¹³ Faroqhi mentions that the center forced the Celali

¹¹³ The Armenians who refuse to leave the city in 20 days were threatened with capital punishment. The documents indicate clearly that these immigrants must return to their former lands and continue their former life. Théophraste Renaudot, *Recueil de Toutes Les Gazettes Nouvelles: Ordinaire & Extraordinaire & Autre Relations* (Paris: Le Bureau, 1635), 479. Murphey mentions the non-Armenian Christian population coming to İstanbul from the Balkans in the early 1640s. Murphey, "Population Movements and Labour Mobility in Balkan Context: A Glance at Post-1600 Ottoman Social Realities,"

immigrants in different areas to return back in 1610 and 1635 once the destructive Celali activities ended.¹¹⁴ On the other hand, these actions did not give the expected results.¹¹⁵

The fluctuations in the wages depict that *the Celali Effect* on the urban population did not have a long-term result in the example of İstanbul. A remarkable part of the immigrants could have left the town as the rebels were eliminated by the central power. The rise of wages does not mean that all the immigrants left Istanbul. However, a respectable part of immigrants might have abandoned the town because small size of immigration would not have been reflected on the wages. As an addition to İstanbul, *the Celali Effect* could be questioned in towns like Bursa, İzmir and Kayseri. There are indices that the population of Bursa increased in the era of Celali destruction.¹¹⁶ The town attracted a part of immigrants because it was regarded secure and it could offer economic gains thanks to being a center of trade. İzmir was a moderate town in the 16th century but its population started to expand and the town became an important trade area in the 17th century. A part of fleeing peasants from Anatolia refuged in İzmir, which may have made a contribution to the expansion of the town. There are traces in *kadı* records that Kayseri attracted so many immigrants from the east that one of the neighborhoods was called *Şarkiyun* (the easterners/ones coming from the east). The revolts and Safavid campaigns pushed the habitants out of their lands. Although these immigrants were forced to return back, they kept living in the town even after the revolts.¹¹⁷

91. *The Gazettes* could sometimes refer to Celali Revolts calling them The Asia Revolts (*Les Rebellions d'Asie*). The *Gazettes* (*Gazette de France*) was a semi-official regular publication. They published outstanding events from France and other great states in European continent including the Ottoman Empire. They had been exploited for different purposes. One of them was the 17th century revolts in France. See Goubert, *Les Paysans français*.

¹¹⁴ Suraiya Faroqhi, *Orta Halli Osmanlılar: 17.Yüzyılda Ankara ve Kayseri'de Ev Sahipleri ve Evler*, trans. Hamit Çalışkan (İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2014), 56.

¹¹⁵ Oktay Özel, *Türkiye 1643: Goşa'nın Gözleri* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2013), 205. See Murphey, "Population Movements and Labor Mobility in Balkan Context: A Glance at Post-1600 Ottoman Social Realities," 92.

¹¹⁶ See Gerber, *Economy and Society*.

¹¹⁷ Faroqhi, *Orta Halli Osmanlılar*, 56.

2.2 The Celali Effect on Rural Population

2.2.1 The Sources and Studies

The Ottoman demographic history had evolved around *tahrir* registers since their first introduction to the Ottomanists by Ömer Lütfi Barkan in the 1940s.¹¹⁸ The *tahrir* registers were carried out in the districts where tımar was introduced. The major function of the *tahrirs* was to project the potential taxable sources in kind and cash.¹¹⁹

The use of *tahrir* registers exploded in the 1980s¹²⁰ and a respectable number of studies was completed until the early 2000s most of which focused on two aspects **a)** the economic activities of the Ottoman peasants, **b)** the demographic figures of a certain region.¹²¹ The conclusion of these studies signed two general trends for Anatolian countryside **a)** the general population growth **b)** partial increase in agricultural production related to expansion of cultivable lands. The tax paying Anatolian rural population expanded respectively and doubled in some regions.¹²² If we assume that there was not a significant discovery or invention that increased the productivity or

¹¹⁸ Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “Türkiye’de İmparatorluk Devirlerinin Büyük Nüfus ve Arazi Tahrirleri ve Hâkana Mahsus İstatistik Defterleri (1),” *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* II, 1 (1940): 20-59.

¹¹⁹ Mehmet Öz, “Tahrir Defterlerinin Osmanlı Tarih Araştırmalarında Kullanılması Hakkında Bazı Düşünceler,” *Vakıflar Dergisi* 22 (1991), 430. Despite the importance of *tahrir* registers, there are some significant problems that have not been solved yet like problem of *hane* (household) or some suspicions about their application and accuracy of the content. For a similar case on the accuracy of tithe records, compare with the French case. Marie-Thérésé Lorgin, “Un musée imaginaire de la ruse paysanne: la fraude des décimables du XIVE au XVIIIe siècle dans la région lyonnaise,” *Etudes Rurales* 41 (1973): 112-124. When the Ottomans started to carry out *tahrir* registers is not known for sure but the oldest existing *tahrir* in 1431 indicates that the Ottoman were practicing it in the early 15th century. Barkan states that practice of *tahrir* goes as old as the first sultans of the empire. See Barkan, *Türkiye’de İmparatorluk Devirlerinin Büyük Nüfus ve Arazi Tahrirleri*, 31.

¹²⁰ Erhan Afyoncu, “Türkiye’de Tahrir Defterleri’ne Göre Hazırlanmış Çalışmalar Hakkında Bazı Görüşler,” *Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi* I/I (2003): 268.

¹²¹ For example, İbrahim Solak, *XVI. Asırda Manisa Kazası* (İstanbul: Akçağ Yayınları, 2004); Nejat Göyünç, *XVI. Yüzyılda Mardin Sancağı* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1991); Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu, *XVI. Asırda Çeşme Kazasının Sosyal ve İktisâdî Yapısı* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2010). For an assessment and bibliography see Adnan Gürbüz, *XV.-XVI. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Sancak Çalışmaları Değerlendirme ve Bibliyografik Bir Deneme* (İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 2001).

¹²² According to İnalçık, the general expansion was around 40% in the countryside. Halil İnalçık, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Klâsik Çağ (1300-1600)*, trans. Ruşen Sezer (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2014): 52-57.

upgraded agricultural methods, cultivable lands were also expanded by the growing rural population.¹²³

The *tahrir* registers were well exploited until Ottoman demographic studies entered into a new epoch when *cizye* and *avarız defters* were used for the 17th century demographic studies. Classic *tahrir* registers had almost stopped to be compiled in the 17th century as a result of fiscal and military transformation. The last general survey of the empire was practiced in the 1570/80s and after that time, the surveys were made for some special cases.¹²⁴ The Ottoman financial system went through a transformation and *tahrirs* were replaced by *avarız* registers starting from the early 17th century. These registers focused on the muslim and non-muslim tax payers and they could yield demographic data which allows a comparison with the demographic figures of the *tahrir* registers.

It was Bruce McGowan who emphasized the importance of summary *avarız* and *cizye* records for demographic studies of the 17th century.¹²⁵ He developed his argument, which he based on quantitative data obtained from these sources, and he claimed a “demographic catastrophe” in the Balkans. His method and controversial findings were criticized by Maria Todorova in the following years. She criticized his misinterpretation of sources and his conclusion. She highlighted that the idea of demographic catastrophe was insupportable, and his claim was -with her words- “spurious”.¹²⁶ Despite McGowan’s misinterpretation of sources, he could be regarded as a pioneer who encouraged the exploitation of these sources.

¹²³ Cook, *Population Pressure*, 10-11.

¹²⁴ Gilles Veinstein, “Les Registres de Recensement Ottomans. Une Source pour La Démographie Historique à l’Époque Moderne,” *Annales de Démographie Historique* (1990): 366.

¹²⁵ See Bruce McGowan, *Economic Life in Ottoman Europe: Taxation, Trade and the Struggle for Land, 1600-1800* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). He used *icmal avarız* records.

¹²⁶ Maria N. Todorova, “Was There a Demographic Crisis in the Ottoman Empire in the Seventeenth Century?” *Etudes Balkaniques* 2 (1988): 62-66.

Preceding to the notion of a 17th century demographic catastrophe in the Balkans, there were historians who argued an extraordinary period of demographic movements and a population decline in the rural districts of central Anatolia between the last decade of the 16th century and the first half of the 17th century. Mustafa Akdağ was a pioneer who drew attentions to huge demographic movements in the rural Anatolia which he associated with the vagabond groups of *suhte* activities and Celali Revolts.¹²⁷ Akdağ based his arguments on the revolts that destructed rural economy which ended in huge land abandonment.¹²⁸ Although he emphasized mass peasant immigrations and land desertions with some numerical data by using reports sent to the center from the provinces, he could not handle it in detail because it seems that he was not aware of the existence of *avarız* registers to project the population fall. He tried to sustain his argument with examples of price rises of some basic foodstuff from *narh* registers.¹²⁹ He associated dramatic price rises of foodstuff like barley, wheat or bread with Celali desertion.¹³⁰

2.2.2 Filling the Celali Gap

There are two major recent developments which unearthed *the Celali Effect* on rural population. The first development is the detailed comparative studies of detailed *cizye* and *avarız* registers with the *tahrirs*, which yielded some concrete numerical figures.¹³¹ Oktay Özel developed the most comprehensive study using classic *tahrir defters* and detailed *avarız* registers in a comparative way in terms of revealing the Celali depopulation in rural lands.¹³² Mehmet Öz approached these sources in detail and he observed the similar demographic changes in the northern parts of Anatolia.¹³³

¹²⁷ Akdağ, *Celali İsyamları*, (1995), 488-497.

¹²⁸ Ibid., 446.

¹²⁹ For *narh* registers see Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlılarda Narh Müessesesi*, 3-38.

¹³⁰ Akdağ, *Celali İsyamları*, (1995), 452-454

¹³¹ Mehmet Öz, "Population Fall in Seventeenth Century Anatolia: Some Findings for the Districts of Canik and Bozok," *Archivum Ottomanicum* 22 (2004): 6.

¹³² See Özel, *The Collapse of Rural Order*, 89-177.

¹³³ See Mehmet Öz, *Orta Karadeniz Tarihinin Kaynakları VIII Canik Sancağı Avârız Defterleri (1642)* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2008).

A similar comprehensive work was accomplished by Ali Açıkel, in which he handled Tokat region.¹³⁴ Their pioneering works revealed the size of the demographic decline in the Anatolian countryside. There are other studies as well based on *avarız* records which allow us to evaluate the limits of the demographic decay between the 1580s and the 1640s.¹³⁵

The other development is related to the new perspective on the exploitation of waqf account books. The waqfs were religious institutions which accomplished some duties like helping the poor or distributing foodstuff to the needy.¹³⁶ The waqfs had a significant place in economic and social order of the Ottoman Empire. The economic and commercial activities of waqfs, especially huge imperial ones, required a complex system of redistribution to be able to maintain their existences. They derived income from vast agricultural lands, shops, bathhouses, inns or various manufactories from rural and urban areas. The waqfs recorded their incomes and expenditures systematically and these registers can show any changes in their localities on short terms and long terms.¹³⁷ Waqf accounts are suitable to yield many different conclusions thanks to the diversity of records regarding local economic and demographic conditions, which should make them particularly important to reveal *the*

¹³⁴ I am very thankful to Ali Açıkel for sharing his unpublished PhD thesis with me. See Ali Açıkel, "Change in Settlement Patterns, Population and Society in North Central Anatolia: A Case Study of The District (Kazâ) of Tokat (1574-1643)" (Unpublished Doctorate's Thesis, University of Manchester, 1999).

¹³⁵ See Mehmet Ali Ünal, "1646 (1056) Tarihli Harput Kazası Avarız Defteri," *Ege Üniversitesi Tarih İncelemeri Dergisi* XII, (1997): 9-73; Bilgehan Pamuk, "XVII.Yüzyıl Ortalarında Gümüşhane (Torul) Kazası," *Bellekten* LXXIII/266 (2009): 115-143; Mehmet İnbaşı, "Erzincan Kazası (1642 Tarihli Avarız Defterine Göre)," *Atatürk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Enstitüsü Dergisi* 41 (2009): 189-214; Süleyman Demirci, "Avarız and nüzul levies in the Ottoman Empire: An assessment of tax burden on the tax-paying subjects. A case study of the Province of Karaman, 1628-1700," *Erciyes Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi* 1, 11 (2001): 1-17.

¹³⁶ For general information on waqfs, see Mehmet Genç, "Klâsik Osmanlı Sosyal-İktisadî Sistemi ve Vakıflar," *Vakıflar Dergisi* 42 (2014): 10-17; Bahaeddin Yediyıldız, *XVIII.Yüzyılda Türkiye'de Vakıf Müessesesi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2003).

¹³⁷ The records of the Early Modern waqf-like institutions, like abbeys, constitute one of the principal sources of European economic history. Joseph Ruwet, "Mesure de la Production Agricole sous l'Ancien Régime," *Annales Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations* 19,4(1964): 626-628; Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, "Dîmes et Produit Net Agricole (XVe-XVIIIe Siècle)," *Annales. Economies, Société, Civilisations* 24, 3(1969): 826-828.

Celali Effect.¹³⁸ A detailed and comparative analysis of waqf records would reveal long and short term economic trends, fluctuations in agricultural production, prices of basic goods and foodstuff, rents of various properties and certain disasters like epidemics or earthquakes.¹³⁹ For instance, while a remarkable rise in the agricultural production can be indicator of a good season, a drastic decline could be indicator of a problem. The waqf account books can fill the “gaps” in economic and demographic history in the absence of general *tahrir* registers.¹⁴⁰

Waqf records were introduced by Ömer Lütfi Barkan in the early 1960s.¹⁴¹ His meticulous transcriptions of account books and attentive calculations about waqf economy were followed by Suraiya Faroqhi in the 1970s. She dealt with some waqf account books in the era of Ottoman transformation -or *crisis*- at the turn of the 16th century.¹⁴² Following her pioneering works, these sources have been revived by comprehensive studies of Kayhan Orbay in the 2000s. He handled certain waqfs in Anatolia and Rumeli in the period of Celali Revolts and Ottoman transformation period.¹⁴³ His works emphasized that waqf account books are actually unique archival sources to follow local economic and demographic changes.

¹³⁸ For a recent study see Orbay, “‘The Celâlî Effect’ on Rural Production and Demography in Central Anatolia: The Waqf of Hatuniyye (1590s to 1638),” 29-44.

¹³⁹ For instance, a *mühimme* from 1584/85 mentions that an earthquake destroyed Erzincan completely. Registers of a waqf situated in the region would help detail the level of destruction. BOA. Mühimme Defteri, 52 (h.992/m.1584-1585): 164/414.

¹⁴⁰ See, Kayhan Orbay, “Filling the Gap in Demographic Research on the Ottoman Transformation Period: Waqf Account Books as Sources for Ottoman Demographic History (The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries),” *Turcica* 49 (2018): 85-118.

¹⁴¹ Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “İmaret Sitelerinin Kuruluş ve İşleyiş Tarzına Ait Araştırmalar,” *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 23/1-2 (1962-3): 239-96; idem, “Edirne ve Civarındaki Bazı İmaret Tesislerinin Yıllık Muhasebe Bilançoları,” *Türk Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi* 1/2 (1964): 235-377.

¹⁴² For example, Suraiya Faroqhi, “A Great Foundation in Difficulties: or Some Evidence on Economic Contraction in the Ottoman Empire of the mid-Seventeenth Century,” *Revue D’Histoire Magrebine* 47-48 (1987): 109-121; idem “Agricultural Crisis and the Art of Flute-Playing: The Wordly Affairs of the Mevlevî Dervishes (1595-1652),” *Turcica* XX (1988):43-69.

¹⁴³ Kayhan Orbay, “Financial Development of the Waqfs in Konya and the Agricultural Economy in the Central Anatolia (Late Sixteenth-Early Seventeenth Centuries)” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 55 (2012): 74-116; idem, “The ‘Celâlî Effect’ on Rural Production and Demography in Central Anatolia,”

2.2.3 The Question of Lost Peasants

The Ottomanists agree that the Ottoman rural population underwent a period of turbulence and extreme mobility sometime between the last quarter of the 16th and the first half of the 17th centuries.¹⁴⁴ The high degree of tax paying rural population decline resulted in a breakdown of rural structure and production in the Anatolian countryside.¹⁴⁵ Ottomanists have asserted various causes to analyze drastic demographic decline between 1574s and 1643s. Among these factors, the most widely disputed ones are demographic pressure, the lewendisation of countryside, some new employment chances in big cities associated with economic growth and finally the effects of Celali Revolts. Moreover, there are recent arguments about catastrophic effects of extreme climatic events associated with *the Little Ice Age*.¹⁴⁶

Rural demographic studies that covered the 16th and 17th centuries evolved so much around the notion of *the demographic pressure* in the central Anatolia.¹⁴⁷ Michael Cook dealt with the problem of population pressure in detail. In his reputed work, Cook argued that Ottoman *çift* lands got fragmented in north-central Anatolia owing to increasing surplus population, which impoverished Anatolian peasants and pushed them out of their localities. He presented numerical data that confirms the land fragmentation for some districts of rural Anatolia.¹⁴⁸ There are other works which approve Cook's argument on the land fragmentation.¹⁴⁹ The greatest challenge to the demographic pressure dispute came from İslamoğlu-İnan.¹⁵⁰ She rejected the

¹⁴⁴ Özel, *Goşa'nın Gözleri*, 190-198.

¹⁴⁵ See Özel, *The Collapse of Rural Order*.

¹⁴⁶ Sam A. White, "Climate Change and Crisis in Ottoman Turkey and the Balkans, 1590-1710," in *The Middle East-Past Present and Future*, 20-23 November 2006 (Istanbul: Istanbul Technical University, 2006): 395-398.

¹⁴⁷ On the "demographic pressure" see Thomas Robert Malthus, *An Essay on Population* (London: J.M. Dent, 1958).

¹⁴⁸ Tables A16, H12 and R.13. Cook, *Population Pressure*, 37-39, 85.

¹⁴⁹ Ertürk, "XVI. Yüzyıl Anadolu'sunda Ziraî Yapı ve Köylülerin Geçim Durumları Hakkında Bir Değerlendirme: Akşehir Örneği," 523-537.

¹⁵⁰ İslamoğlu-İnan, *State and Peasant*.

demographic pressure with the theory of Boserup¹⁵¹ ; however, she seems to ignore that the development of agricultural methods, intensification of cultivation and expansion of cultivable lands could also be linked to increasing population pressure on the limited cultivable plots.¹⁵² The *tahrir* records of the central and northern districts of Canik, Amasya and Çorum provide some data which supports the demographic pressure.¹⁵³ They show the signs of dense settlements particularly in low lands and on high plateaus suitable for cultivation. Some inhabited or unused lands were reactivated as supplementary arable land.¹⁵⁴ Özel states that even if a general demographic pressure for all Anatolian rural lands cannot be accepted for the time being, north-central parts of rural Anatolia were exposed to such a pressure.¹⁵⁵

As a result of population pressure, Ottoman peasants might have found it economically difficult to get married. For instance, the proportion of married men in the total adult male population in Tokat countryside in 1574 decreased around 30% compared to 20 years earlier.¹⁵⁶ The worsening economic conditions seems to have proven for other districts as well. The number of bachelor peasants (*mücerred*) increased about 300% in rural districts of Bursa region.¹⁵⁷ While a part of this “surplus population” found some new arable lands to earn their living thanks to the relative expansion of cultivable lands, the other landless portion may have looked for alternative ways with an inclination for the abandonment of their settlements.

¹⁵¹ Ester Boserup, *The Conditions of Agricultural Growth: The Economics of Agrarian Change Under Population Pressure* (London: G. Allen&Unwin, 1965).

¹⁵² “Demographic pressure” was not peculiar to Anatolian rural lands in the 16th century. For example, rural lands in France went through a period of expansion of cultivated lands and then fragmentation in the 16th century like the Anatolian countryside. Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie et Jean-Marie Pesez, “Les Villages Désertés en France: Vue d’Ensemble,” *Annales. Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations* 20, 2 (1965): 278-283.

¹⁵³ For instance, Öz, *XV-XVI. Yüzyıllarda Canik*, 51.

¹⁵⁴ See White, *The Climate of Rebellion*, 69-71.

¹⁵⁵ Özel, “Population Changes in Ottoman Anatolia During the 16th and 17th Centuries: The “Demographic Crisis” Reconsidered,” 188.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 186.

¹⁵⁷ Koç, “XVI. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Köylerin Parçalanması Sorunu: Bursa Kazası Ölçeğinde Bir Araştırma,” 1962-1963

A part of these bachelors (*mücerred*) and landless peasants got involved in brigandage activities in their localities with groups of 15-20 or 30-40 men.¹⁵⁸ Mustafa Cezar had discussed the connection between demographic expansion and increasing brigandage activities in the countryside in his work. He asserted that a part of landless peasants got involved in banditry activities and they became “*levends*” in the second half of the 16th century.¹⁵⁹ Moreover, the increasing availability to the firearms in the 17th century might have contributed to the increasing *levendisation*.¹⁶⁰ The terms like *levents* and *gurbet taifesi*¹⁶¹ started to be used very often in the second half of the 16th century, which was an indicator of increasing *levendisation* and land desertion.¹⁶²

Some historians maintained that the effects of “the Little Ice Age” were so harsh that it brought an end to the growth and welfare of “*Le Beau XVI^e Siècle*” in the Mediterranean states.¹⁶³ Catastrophic climatic events were associated with subsequent agricultural failures which ended in impoverishment and land desertion.¹⁶⁴ Similar

¹⁵⁸ Cezar, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Levendler*, 137.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 59-63.

¹⁶⁰ Some historians claim that the cost of fire arms in the 16th century declined, which facilitated the access to fire arms. André Corvisier, “Guerre et Mentalités au XVII^e Siècle,” *XVII^e Siècle* 37 (1985):228. Jennings found out that the price of firearms in Kayseri (Central Anatolia) was not very high to create an obstacle to reach it in the first quarter of the 17th century. He states that the use of firearms among the *non-askeri* dwellers was very widespread in some parts of the empire in the beginning of the century. Ronald C. Jennings, “Firearms, Bandits, and Gun-Control: Some Evidence on Ottoman Policy Towards Firearms in the Possession of Reaya, from Judicial Records of Kayseri, 1600-1627,” *Archivum Ottomanicum* 6 (1980): 343-345. A *mühimme* record from 1609/1610 could be an example to indicate the accessibility to fire arms. A *mühimme* sent to the governor of Bolu was asking 295 firearms (*tüfek*) collected from bandits (*eşkiya*) and inhabitants (*reaya*) to be sent to the imperial center immediately. (*Liva-yı mezburun reayalarında ve eşkiyalarında bulunan tüfekleri cem idüp...reaya ve eşkiyalarında bulunan tüfekler cem idilüp cemen iki yüz doksan beş aded tüfek...*) BOA. *Mühimme Defteri*, 78 (h.1018/m.1609-1610): 17/44. Moreover, it is worth mentioning here that the efforts of the center to collect fire arms in the following decades were reflected on the notes of French ambassador. It is stated the Sultan Murat IV works to disarm (*désarme*) everybody carrying firearms (*les armes à feu*) including embassies (*désarme tous sans excepter les ambassadeurs*). AD(Nantes) Série A: Vol.4, 2mi2215/52

¹⁶¹ *Mühimmes* record banditry of *gurbet taifesi* in the second half of the 16th century. (*Gurbet taifesi evi ve barkı ile etrafı gezüb gündüz tenha buldukların katıl ve esbabların garet ve ketmile uğruluk edüb...*) See Dağlıoğlu, *On Altıncı Asırda Bursa*, 38, 43, 74.

¹⁶² İnalçık, *The Classical Age*, 52.

¹⁶³ Faruk Tabak, *Solan Akdeniz 1550-1870: Coğrafi-Tarihsel Bir Yaklaşım*, trans. Nurettin Elhüseyni (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları,2010), 278.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 288.

effects of the climatic events on the dispersal of rural population have been discussed for the Ottoman Empire.¹⁶⁵ The effects of the so called extraordinary climatic changes on population crisis cannot be ignored because the Ottoman rural society was highly depended on agricultural economic activities for their livings. Ottomanists are well aware of that there were some harsh climatic events which affected agricultural production and demography. Studies of the waqf account books point out that the decline of agricultural production related to the harsh climatic events usually lasted 1-2 seasons and such a short term cannot have pushed 70-80% of peasants to desert their settlements.¹⁶⁶

In short, the shared point among historians is that the central and northern parts of rural Anatolia went through a period of demographic crisis. The size of demographic crisis in north-central parts of Anatolian districts was illuminated thanks to extensive and meticulous studies of Özel and Öz. On the other hand, it has been still disputed the forces which pushed the tax paying peasants to go out of their localities and simply got “lost” from the records. It is without doubt that the push and pull factors mentioned triggered mass population movements partly between second half of the 16th century and the 17th century. On the other hand, *the Celali Effect* was the major reason behind the demographic crisis.

¹⁶⁵ White, *The Climate of Rebellion*, 78-85.

¹⁶⁶ For example, Orbay, “Financial Development of the Waqfs in Konya and the Agricultural Economy in the Central Anatolia (Late Sixteenth-Early Seventeenth Centuries,” 86, 99, 100, 104.

2.2.4 The Celali Effect: An Assessment on Rural Population

“*Tutalum Basalum, Ele Getürelüm*”¹⁶⁷

Anatolian peasants were under pressure of small scale bandit groups composed of *çiftbozan reayas*¹⁶⁸ and former *yevmlü levends* in the second half of the 16th century.¹⁶⁹ On the other hand, violence in the countryside entered into a harsh phase with the first great Celali Rebellion of Karayazıcı (head of a *sekban* division in Sivas) and Hüseyin Paşa (the governor of Karaman) in 1599.¹⁷⁰ Karayazıcı’s army defeated forces that the central state sent against him near Maraş¹⁷¹ and Antep regions in 1599 and 1600.¹⁷² Karayazıcı besieged Bursa and Sivas castles damaging local economy and dwellings.¹⁷³ Bursa *mukataa* records reflect difficulties as the Celalis attacked. As a result of the destruction, *mukataa* lands rested unsold or their values did not increase.

¹⁶⁷ Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selânikî*, 215.

¹⁶⁸ Koçi Bey, *Koçi Bey Risâlesi*, 17-18.

¹⁶⁹ Some historians argued that the Anatolian countryside was exposed to banditry by former *yevmlü* soldiers of Ottoman princes, who wanted to expand their entourage and supporters in order to be able to claim the throne. Landless *mücerreds* and *çiftbozan reayas* gathered around these princes for the purpose of getting a timar or being recruited in the janissary army. As an addition to peasants, former *sipahis* -who had lost their timars- constituted the *kaphalkı* of an Ottoman prince. Having a crowded army and influential *kaphalkı* were significant factors to eliminate other rival princes. For example, when prince Bayezid lost the fight against his brother Selim, his *yevmlü* soldiers, who lost their hopes to get a timar or an office, started brigandage activities because they were basically “unemployed”. It was also argued that the *yevmlüs* of prince Bayezid constituted the first beams of “*Celalism*” in the Anatolian countryside. See Şerafettin Turan, *Kanunî'nin Oğlu Şehzâde Bayezid Vak'ası* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1961), 159-173. For the prince fights and entourage see H. Erdem Çıpa, *Yavuz'un Kavgası: I. Selim'in Saltanat Mücadelesi* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2013).

¹⁷⁰ “*Vilayet elden gitti, Müslümanların ehl ü iyâlleri ve mal ü menâlleri pâymâl oldu.*” (For Hüseyin Paşa) “*Eşkiya ve erâzilden yanına cem olan eli tüfenglü sekbân, niçe yüz nefer melâ'in evbâş u kallâş mübâhî taifesiyle reâyâ-yı memlekete tekâlîf-i şâkka itmeğle, kuzât-ı zemân ile zindegânî idemeyüp niçe mahall ü mekânda fesâdâtları ceng ü cidâle mueddi olup ifrât u tefrît ile siyaset iderek nâmu Celali oldu.*” Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selânikî*, 816; Naima, *Tarih-i Naima*, I, 232; İbrahim Peçuylu, *Tarih-i Peçevî*, II, 252-253.

¹⁷¹ Simeon mentions Celali destruction in Maraş. Andreasyan, *Polonyalı Simeon*, 186.

¹⁷² “*Serdârlık ile üzerlerine giden vezîr Mehmed Paşa hazretleri üstüne cem olan leşker ekall-i- kalıldür ve yeni yazılan bin yeniçeri taifesinden ancak üç yüz nefer adem vardır. Düşmen olan Celali taifesi hadden fuzûn olmuştur. Şâm'dan ve Halep'ten gelecek leşker henüz gelüp yetişmedi. Bendergâhlardan kimse gelüp geçmeğe mecâl ü imkân kalmadı.*” Selânikî Mustafa Efendi, *Tarih-i Selânikî*, 827, 863.

¹⁷³ Voyage books describe Bursa castle well fortified and built on the top of a hill. See Evliya Çelebi, *Seyâhatnâme*, Cilt 1. yay.haz. Seyit Ali Kahraman (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2013), 222-223. “*Castle of Bursa was as big as the city and it was fortified with strong walls.*” Jean Thévenot, *Relation d'un Voyage fait au Levant* (Paris: Th.Joly, 1664), 165.

Mukataas of Bozahane and Han-ı Cedid in Bursa show the decline between 1596 and 1620.

Mahruse-i Bursa'da vâkî olan Bozahane ve Han-ı Cedid mukâtaası 1004 zi'l-kaadesinin gurrasinde üç yıla iki yüz kırk beş bin akçe ziyâde ile? uhdesinde iltizâmda iken tahvili tamâm olalı hayli zaman olup mukâtaa-yı mezbûre ? ziyadeye çıkmakla bu iltizâm kabul ider kimesne bulunmamakla nice zaman hâli ve muattal kalmagın...¹⁷⁴

Another record points out that these *mukataas* were still dealing with some difficulties and they had remained unsold for two years in between 1611 and 1617.

Bursa'da vâkî Bozahane ve Han-ı Cedid mukâtaası 1020 muharremi gurrasinde üç yıla yüz yirmi bin akçe iltizâmda iken tahvili tamâm olup ahırde talep zühur eylemeyip iki sene hâli kalıp mukâtaa-yı mezbûrun tahvil-i cedidi 1026 muharreminin gurrasinde iltizâm-ı sabık üzere üç yıla yüz yirmi bin akçe iltizâm kabul ederim...¹⁷⁵

These two *mukataas* could not provide the tax amount expected from them until 1620. It seems that the *mukataa* demands started to normalize but the *mukataa* value did not increase between 1596 and 1620. While these *mukataas* were sold with 245.000 *akçe ziyade* (the offer was increased) in 1596 for three years, now the total value paid declined to 120.000 *akçe* for three years in 1620.

Mahruse-i mezbûrede (Bursa) vâkî bozahane ve han-ı Cedid mukâtaası bundan akdem sene 1030 muharremi gurrasinde üç yıla yüz yirmi bin akçeye Kâmil nâm kimesne uhdesinde iltizâmda iken merkûm fevt olmağla ? nâm kimesne gelüp mukâtaa-yı mezbûreye ibtidai târihte iltizâm-ı sabık üzere üç yıla yüz yirmi bin akçe iltizâm kabul iderim şol şartla ki...¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁴ BOA. MAD.d,04689/9.

¹⁷⁵ BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/73.

¹⁷⁶ BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/164.

Karayazıcı roamed the countryside of north-central Anatolia for four years until the imperial administration bargained with him to end his revolt.¹⁷⁷ The rebellion of Karayazıcı and Hüseyin Paşa was followed by rebellious brother of Karayazıcı called Deli Hasan.¹⁷⁸ His violent actions were effective in a huge area, he was active in several regions such as Sepedlü (the north of Sivas), Tokat, Amasya, Çorum and Kütahya.¹⁷⁹ Deli Hasan's forces moved to south Çorum in 1602 and he defeated Ottoman army led by Hüsrev Paşa in the same year. After his success on battlefield against the central forces, he moved towards Ankara and he besieged the town extorting 80.000 gold kuruş from its citizens.¹⁸⁰ The Celali violence in Ankara region led its dwellers to flee to safer urban towns or rural lands like safer corners of mountains. According to a official inspection 33 out of 28 villages were completely abandoned by 1604 in the subdistrict of Bacı.¹⁸¹ *Mukataa* records reflect the Celali destruction and demographic dispersal in Ankara as early as 1601.

*“1009 şaban guresinde Ankara vilayetine eşkiya müstevli olmagın tahvil-i cedidi üç aydan ziyade muattal kalup talep ve rağbet olmamagın eşkiya havfından reaya ve beraya perişan olmağla...”*¹⁸²

Bundan akdem nefsi-i Ankara'da vâkii olan İhtisap ve Pazarcık tevabii mukâtaası 1009 şabanının guresinde üç yıla ? akçe iltizâm olunan ? tahvili tamâm olalı dört ay mürur idüp...talep olundukda

¹⁷⁷ The imperial state bargained with some Celali leaders offering them high offices. Karayazıcı died towards the end of 1601. Akdağ, *Celali İsyantları*, 383.

¹⁷⁸ Mustafa Naima, *Tarih-i Naima*, I, 294.

¹⁷⁹ Polish voyager Simeon was an eyewitness of Celali destruction in Tokat region and he mentions the Celali depopulation in the region. Andreasyan, *Polonyalı Simeon*, 104. Kütahya region was sacked once more by Tavi Halil in 1605. Kaza of Şeyhlü was invaded by 12.000 rebels for 34 days. The settlements around Kütahya like Uşak, Güre, Selendi, Simav, Çal, Baklan, Home and Geyikler were pillaged several times. Süleyman Polat, “Osmanlı Taşrasında Bir Celali Yıkımının İzleri: Tavi Halil'in Kütahya (Kazaları) Baskını ve Sosyo-Ekonomik Yansımaları Osmanlı Taşrasında Bir Celali Yıkımının İzleri,” *Gazi Akademik Bakış* 35, 6:12 (Yaz, 2013): 38.

¹⁸⁰ Griswold, *The Great Anatolian Rebellion*, 41.

¹⁸¹ Akdağ, *Celali İsyantları*, 415.

¹⁸² BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24262/9-10.

*Celâlî hayfindan bazarlar hâli ve muattal kalmıştır ve bir kimesne talep ve rağbet olmamagın...*¹⁸³

The counter-violence of the imperial center and Deli Hasan was stopped by the initiatives of the center and Deli Hasan was offered the Beylerbeylik of Bosnia in 1603. However, Istanbul government got suspicious of his disloyal activities and Deli Hasan was executed, possibly at the suggestion of Kuyucu Murat Paşa, in 1606.¹⁸⁴ On the other hand, Akdağ states that the central state's efforts to stop Celali violence by offering Celali leaders high offices did not yield the expected results and the Celali groups continued.¹⁸⁵

After Deli Hasan's execution, the central power faced the most challenging rebellion led by an Ottoman pasha. The governor of Aleppo, Canbuladoğlu Ali, wanted to benefit from the internal weakness into which the Ottomans had fallen, rebelled in northern Syria with an army composed of 5.000-6.000 men.¹⁸⁶ The character of his rebellion was different from other Celali Revolts because he was the governor of Aleppo and his family had an autonomy near hereditary in the region, which might have threatened the central authority directly.¹⁸⁷ The Canbuladoğlu case was particularly important for the imperial center to win him over.¹⁸⁸ Canbuladoğlu's struggle with other emirs like Ali, Yusuf and Fahreddin in the region forced İstanbul, facing both a successful Syrian rebel and Anatolian Celali civil war, to bargain with

¹⁸³ BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24262/11.

¹⁸⁴ Griswold, *The Great Anatolian Rebellion*, 45.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 437.

¹⁸⁶ Hrand D. Andreasyan, "Bir Ermeni Kaynağına Göre Celali İsyanları," *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi* 13, 17-18 (1963): 34-35. The French ambassador of Pera confirms that he had forces around 5-6.000 horsemen. Jean de Gontaut-Biron, *Advis et Relation de Turquie envoye au Roy par Monsieur de Salignac de Tout ce qui c'est passé* (Paris: Pierre Menir, 1608), 9. Another contemporary French chronic mentions 15.000 horsemen additionally. Micheal Baudier, *Inventaire de l'Histoire Générale des Turcz...depuis l'An 1300* (Paris: S. Chappelet, 1617), 739. It seems that he declared his rebellion sometime between 13th and 29th of September 1606. See the report, BNF.Français, 16145-4 (Années 1605-1623)/55-56.

¹⁸⁷ Canbuladoğlu was the member of a family which was dominating the region for a long time. Gontaut-Biron, *Advis et Relation de Turquie*, 9.

¹⁸⁸ Özel, "The Reign of Violence: The Celalis c.1550-1700," 190.

him.¹⁸⁹ He was given the title of Beylerbeyi of Temeşvar in September 1608.¹⁹⁰ While Kuyucu Murat Paşa defeated Canbuladoğlu Ali Paşa and retook Aleppo in 17 November 1607,¹⁹¹ the city of Ankara was frustrated by another Celali leader called Kalenderoğlu Mehmet.¹⁹² His destruction was reflected on waqf records. A certain tax farmer Süleyman could not pay 81.000 akçe to the wafq of Bayezıd II in Amasya in 1605-1606 because his tax farm unit of Has-Virancık in the district of Murtazaabad of province of Ankara was ravaged.

*Mukâtaa-yı mezbûrenin mültezimi olan Süleymân nâm yeniçerinin tahvili tamâm oldukda zimmetine lâzım gelen mâl-ı vakıftan 81.000 akçe talep oldukda vilâyete Celâlî bad-kitâl müstevli olup...ber-mûceb-i hüccet-i şeriyye 81.000 akçe merkûm Süleymân'ın zimmetinden ref olunmagın şerh verildi.*¹⁹³

After his attempts in Ankara, he moved to Bursa where he tried to once again to pressure the imperial center to be given a *beylerbeylik*.¹⁹⁴ Bursa *mukataas* reflect his destruction in the region. The tax farmers were experiencing difficulties to collect revenues from their tax farm units and to make payments to the center.

Mahruse-i Bursa'da...bundan akdem bin on altı muharremi guresinde tahvili iki yük akçeye Ahmet ve Nuri nâm kimesneler iltizâm eyleyüp üç sene tamâm oldukda vilayet-i mezbureye(?) Celâlî eşkiyası müstevli olmağla mukâtaa battal kalmagın...tahvili

¹⁸⁹ Griswold, *The Great Anatolian Rebellion*, 118.

¹⁹⁰ Canbuladoğlu came to Istanbul in 26 January 1608 to ask to be forgiven and he was executed on 1 March 1610. BNF.Français, 16171 (Années 1574-1610)/ 360-369.

¹⁹¹ Kuyucu Murat Paşa defeated Canbuladoğlu and he retook Aleppo in 17 Novembre 1605. BNF.Français, 16171 (Années 1574-1610)/ 359.

¹⁹² Ankara castle was occupied by Kalenderoğlu during 5 days in 1606. Records of Ankara kadı (Ankara Şeriye Sicilleri) in 1607 mention permanent Celali attacks effective in Ankara since the last 5-6 years. Özer Ergenç, *Osmanlı Tarihi Yazıları: Şehir, Toplum Devlet* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2013), 106, 130.

¹⁹³ Extracted from Kayhan Orbay, "Celâlîs Recorded in the Account Books," *Rivista degli Studi Orientali* LXXVIII, 1-2 (2004): 77.

¹⁹⁴ Kalenderoğlu came to Bursa with 2000 horsemen. "He attacked to Bursa (Bursia) and he took control of a huge part of the city, which were very close to the castle." Gontaut-Biron, *Advis et Relation*, 14. Dwellers of Bursa had built fortified walls between Tatarlar-Yeşil-Şehreküstü regions for security reasons against Celali groups. Ergenç, *XVI.Yüzyıl Sonlarında Bursa*, 23.

*yüz ellişer bin akçe üzere bâ-berât ve bilâ-kefil zabt ittirüp hâlâ iki tahvil de mürur idüp teslimatları görüldükde iki yüz kırk bin akçe bâkileri zühur eyleyüp talep olundukda küllî kesir eyledim deyü cevap verüp mezbûrlar müflis ve düyûn olmağla tahsil de mümkün olmayup ve mukâtaanın tahvil-i cedidiyle âhir talep ? olundukda tahammülü olmamağla kimesne talep olmayup muattal kalmış...*¹⁹⁵

The presence of Kalenderoğlu in Bursa can be followed on the accounts of the waqf of Çelebi Mehmet (known as the Yeşil İmaret). The waqf lands were exposed to Celali attacks and the agricultural production decayed in 1606-1607. The repair costs were extremely high in 1608, which could be associated with the Celali destruction.¹⁹⁶

Kalenderoğlu was defeated in 1608 by Kuyucu Murat Paşa near Elbistan. While the central state was struggling with the great Celali revolts, there were also small-scale groups in Anatolian countryside like Derviş Nazır, Hayalioğlu, Karakaş, Kara Said, Gurguroğlu, Gezir-oğlu, Çakı-oğlu, Kürt Mahmut, Yusuf Paşa, İlyas Paşa, Kumkapılı, Akmirza and so on, who ravaged their localities.¹⁹⁷

The Celali devastations led Ottoman peasants to flee in mass to safer areas in the short period called The Great Flight (1603-1607), as termed by the peasants “*Büyük Kaçgunluk*”.¹⁹⁸ The Great Flight period can be marked as the peak point of violence in the Anatolian countryside inflicted by the Celali armies and the central forces. The government’s response to the Celalis costed the lifes of around 80.000 rebels between

¹⁹⁵ BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/60.

¹⁹⁶ Kayhan Orbay, “16. ve 17. Yüzyıllarda Bursa Ekonomisi: Sultan Çelebi Mehmet Yeşil İmâreti’nin Mali Tarihi (1553-1650),” *A.Ü. Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi (OTAM) Dergisi* 22 (2007): 141-142.

¹⁹⁷ There must have been hundreds of small bandit groups in Anatolian countryside who were locally active. For instance, a certain Hamza (former governer of Karesi) ravaged villages of the waqf of Sultan Murat Han in Bursa region with his 300-400 horsemen and 100 *sekbans* around 1609-10. Ayşe Erol, “78 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri’nde (h.1018/m.1609-1610) Yer Alan Anadolu Eyaleti’ne Ait Vakıflarla İlgili Hükümlerin Tasnifi,” *Gazi Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi* 3, 6 (2016): 23-24.

¹⁹⁸ The high level of desolation attracted attention of foreign observers. A contemporary French chronic calls it “the great desolations and -demographic- moves (*des grandes desolations & remuements*)”. Palma Cayet, Pierre Victor, Renaudot Théophraste, *Le Mercure François, ou, La Suite de l’Histoire de Commençant l’an M.D.CV. pour Suite du Septenaire du D. Cayer&Finissant au Sacre du tres Chrestien Roy de France&de Nauarre Loys XIII*, vol.3 (Paris: Par Iean Richer, 1611-1648), 220.

1606 and 1608-9.¹⁹⁹ On the other hand, despite harsh counter-actions of the imperial center, the *Celalism* did not come to an end after Kuyucu Murat Paşa's campaigns.

The second phase of the great Celali Revolts broke out with the rebellion of Abaza Mehmet Paşa, the governor of Erzurum, in 1622. The revolt of Abaza Mehmet Paşa turned the affairs in the region worse because "Old" Halil Paşa was in Safavid campaign with the central army during his revolt.²⁰⁰ Abaza Mehmet besieged Erzurum and destroyed the forces there sent against him.²⁰¹ He attacked Ottoman forces with the object of taking revenge of murdered Sultan Osman II.²⁰² As an addition to his pillage in Erzurum region, he besieged Ankara with a force of around 50.000 men²⁰³ and he occupied the city of Bursa for 3 months.²⁰⁴ Despite his rebellious activities, he was pardoned twice in 1624 and 1628.²⁰⁵ He was assigned to a governorship in the

¹⁹⁹ Özel, "The Reign of Violence: The Celalis c.1550-1700," 190.

²⁰⁰ AD(Nantes) Série A: Vol.3, 2mi2215/274-275.

²⁰¹ As an addition to Abaza's forces, the winter conditions were also effective in failure of Halil Paşa. The army of Hasan Paşa faced a complete failure. The French ambassador, who was in the imperial center during the revolts, puts emphasis on the Ottoman defeat before the Celali army. AD(Nantes) Série A: Vol.3, 2mi2215/274-275.

²⁰² French consul of Aleppo between 1623-1625 states that Abaza Paşa was a humble servant of the sultan. However, he rebelled for the revenge of Sultan Osman II after he commanded several times by the prophet in his dreams to take the revenge. Louis Gédoyne, *Journal et Correspondance de Gédoyne "le Turc", consul de France a Alep, 1623-1625*, ed. A. Boppe (Paris: Impr. de Plon-Nourrit et Cie, 1909), 49.

²⁰³ A. De La Martine, *Histoire de La Turquie*, vol. 5 (Paris: Libraire du Constitutionnel, 1854), 387. Similar to the other foreign chronics, he seems to have exaggerated the numbers.

²⁰⁴ French agent reports, dated 13 October 1623, state that after Abaza Paşa "tired" all janissaries (*tous les janissaries de cet empire*) in Bursa, the center sent the Aga of Janissaries and his companions to stop his revolt in Bursa and to prevent from taking all the town (*pour empêcher qu'il ne la prenne la ville de Burcia...*). Abaza Paşa's army dissolved the central forces, commanded by Sinan Paşa (*Cigale*, in the original text), and they retreated to Ankara to wait orders from the center (*se retirer dans la ville d'Angouri pour attendre les commandements de la porte...*). 5-6.000 janissaries (*cinq ou six milles janissaries*) were sent to Bursa to fight Abaza, the sipahis were not willing to fight because of approaching winter. BNF.Français, 16145-4 (Années 1605-1623) /221-222.

²⁰⁵ A letter that was sent by a French agent in March 1623 to France states that the soldiers were not very willing to fight Abaza. The grand vizier had to make extra payment to janissaries and *sipahis*. BNF.Français, 16149-4 (Années 1619-1624)/456. On the other hand, as it is understood from the letter of English ambassador dated 1 November 1623, Abaza Paşa challenged the central forces very severely that the center had to forgive him to stop his advance. The ambassador states that there were rumors that Abaza Paşa would march towards Istanbul after Bursa. Roe, *The Negotiations*, 187-188. A contemporary French chronic states that Abaza Paşa was waiting spring to march towards Istanbul and he was five days distance away to the capital. Cayet, Victor and Théophraste, *Le Mercure François*, 276.

Balkans until he was executed in 1634.²⁰⁶ Abaza's revolt was followed by the local Celali brigandage like İlyas Paşa (around Balıkesir-Manisa, 1630) and Karahaydaroğlu (1647).

The large scale Celali Revolts were just resumed above between 1576-1643. As an addition to the great Celali Revolts, there were so many smaller Celali bands composing of 30-40 bandits active in local areas.²⁰⁷ Taking all of those Celali activities into consideration, the next section will cover three issues related. Firstly, the Celali destruction on rural population will be displayed. Some numerical data will be presented to see the size of *the Celali Effect* on rural demography. Secondly, the question of lost villages will be touched slightly. The high degree of land desertion ended in a total village abandonment in some districts. Thirdly, while some villages were deserted, their peasants escaped to the hilly lands to evade Celali brigands and settled there. This section will be about these new villages.

2.2.4.1 Drastic Decline: “A Demographic Crisis”

The high degree of population decline in some parts of northern and central Anatolian lands allows historians to define it a “demographic crisis” more than a “demographic decline”. The rate of decline had reached until 100% in some rural areas which ended in totally abandoned settlements.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁶ He took part in Poland campaign commanding 80.000 soldiers short time before his execution. Renaudot, *Gazettes Nouvelles, Relations, Extraordinaire*, 1.

²⁰⁷ Mühimme registers are full of examples of the brigandage activities of small scale Celali packs and local bandits in the Anatolian countryside. See 3 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (966-968/1558-1560), Divan-ı Hümayun Sicilleri Dizisi:I (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 1993), 625; 5 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (973/1565-1566), Divan-ı Hümayun Sicilleri Dizisi:II (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri, 1994), 33,34,35; 12 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (978-979/1570-1572), Cilt I, Divan-ı Hümayun Sicilleri Dizisi:IV (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 1996), 412; Mühimme Defteri 90 (İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırma Vakfı, 1993), 298, 334; BOA. Mühimme Defteri, 78 (h.1018/m.1609-1610):16/41.

²⁰⁸ Simeon notes having seen so many big villages deserted while he was going to Sivas from Tokat. Andreasyan, *Polonyalı Simeon*, 105.

The Celalis were active mainly in the central and northern parts of Anatolia and these regions received the greatest damage. One of the regions they were most cruel was district of Tokat. Rural population figures of 1641 demonstrate extraordinary changes when compared with 1574. The records of 1574, 1600, 1601, 1611, 1620 and 1641 allow us to investigate the drastic decline gradually. While there were 10.004 rural households in 1574, it declined to 8820 in 1601.²⁰⁹ The decline in rural population corresponds to desertion and disappearance of 44 (18.88%) villages in the same period.²¹⁰ *The Celali Effect* might have reached at the peak during the Great Flight years when the population of the whole kazâ declined sharply from 8820 households to 2745 households only between 1601 and 1611.²¹¹ The sharp fall of 68.87% caused the desertion or disappearance of around 52 (22.9%) villages in the region.²¹² The comparison of the total households of 1601 and 1641 proves that there was about 63.60% fall (from 8820 households to 3202.5 households) in the rural population in Tokat region. *The Celali Effect* could have struck the region at least three times. The first dispersal was experienced during the revolt of Karayazıcı at the turn of the 16th century. The second immigration was seen during the Great Flight between 1603 and 1607. Finally, the third one might have been related to the revolt of Abaza Paşa after the 1622s when he ravaged Tokat²¹³ and most of the parts of province of Rum.²¹⁴

²⁰⁹ Açıkel, "Change in Settlement Patterns, Population and Society in North Central Anatolia: A Case Study of The District (Kazâ) of Tokat (1574-1643)" 174.

²¹⁰ This decline is seen only in five nahiyes of Venk, Kafirni, Yıldız, Tozanlu, and Kazabad). Ibid., 174-175.

²¹¹ Ibid., 175. Simeon notes that there were about 1000 Armenian households in Tokat before the Celalis. However, it declined around 50% after the Celalis. Andreasyan, *Polonyalı Simeon*, 104. Account books of the Waqfs of Hatuniyye in Tokat show that the the waqf was in financial difficulty before 1610. The most possible explanation of the financial difficulty is related to the Celali attacks. The tax base of waqf lands could have abandoned their villages and fled to safer areas during the invasion. I am thankful to Kayhan Orbay for sharing his unpublished article with me. Kayhan Orbay, "A Case for Research in *the* "Celali Effect" on Rural Production and Demography in Central Anatolia; Revenue Loss and Shrinkage in the Waqf of Hatuniyye" 6-9.

²¹² Açıkel, "Change in Settlement Patterns, Population and Society in North Central Anatolia: A Case Study of The District (Kazâ) of Tokat (1574-1643)" 175.

²¹³ A letter dated 12 October 1623 states that Abaza Paşa took the castle of Tokat (Tocatt). "Suddenly, pretending obedience (Abaza Paşa), he assaulted and took the castle of Tocatt...All that part of Asia obeys him..." Roe, *The Negotiations*, 185.

²¹⁴ Özel, "The Reign of Violence: The Celalis c.1550-1700," 190.

The Celalis were active in other districts around Tokat. Amasya, which is situated 113 km north of Tokat, faced several Celali attacks. The figures extracted from records between 1520 and 1643 present historians the changing demography of the region in a long period. The general demographic expansion of the 16th century and the Celali demographic crisis in the following decades can be traced thanks to the recent study of Oktay Özel.²¹⁵ The total population of *kaza* of Amasya depicted a high rate of increase of 78.78% between 1520 and 1576.²¹⁶ The sharp demographic expansion was accompanied with an increase in the number of rural settlements, inhabited *mezraas* and cultivated lands.²¹⁷

Table 1: Some Examples of the Rural Demographic Changes (*Hane*) in the Kâza of Amasya Between 1520 and 1643. Based on *Tahrirs* of 1520, 1576 and *Avarız* of 1643²¹⁸

1520		1576	1643
Nâhiye	Hane	Hane	Hane
Amasya (nefs)	90	312	193
Akdağ	892	1463	637
Argoma	2986	4326	1202
Aştagul	458	809	85
Geldigelen (âbâd	3246	6479	1910
Gelikiras	688	975	252
<i>Total</i>	<i>8360</i>	<i>14364</i>	<i>4279</i>

²¹⁵ Özel, *The Collapse of Rural Order*.

²¹⁶ The rise of *mücerreds* in the same period was striking, it rose around 201.72%. Ibid., 114. The expansion rate of *mücerreds* could also give traces of worsening economic. The young bachelors might have found getting married difficult.

²¹⁷ It is assumed that there was not a border change in this period. Özel, *The Collapse of Rural Order*, 114.

²¹⁸ Ibid., 113.

The demographic expansion faced a sharp decline sometime between 1576 and 1643 because the region was exposed to the great Celali attacks many times.²¹⁹ When the *tahrir* of 1576 and *avariz* of 1643 (*mufassal*) records are compared, the limit of demographic dispersal appears. The figures show that there was a 78.67% decline in the total rural tax-paying population in the kâza between 1576 and 1643. The high degree of demographic dispersal is also reflected to the number of villages and 144 (38.70%) villages were totally deserted or disappeared.²²⁰

²¹⁹ The great Celali armies were violent enough to penetrate into Amasya despite being protected by a fortress. Busbecq noted that “*On the highest hill, we find the fortress of Amasya. It is rather big and guarded perpetually by the Turks.*” Ogier Ghislain de Busbecq, *Ambassades et Voyages en Turquie et Amasie de Mr. Busbequius* trad.S. Gaudon (Paris: P. David, 1646), 138. French voyager and diplomat François de La Boullaye-Le Gouz (1623-1668) saw Amasya in the late 1640s. He states that there were deserted settlements, *hans* and destructed mosques. Moreover, it seems that he was also a victim of the brigand activities. While his group was resting during the night, a certain group of brigands called “*Kara Kise (?)*” or “*noir valeurs*” (in the original text) attempted to steal their belongings. François de La Boullaye-Le Gouz, *Les Voyages et observations du Sieur de La Boullaye Le Gouz, où sont Décrites Les Religions, Gouvernements et situations des Estats et Royaumes d’Italie, Grèce, Natolie, Syrie, Palestine, Karaménie, KaldéeAssyrie, Grand Mogol, Bijapour, Indes Orientales des Portugais, Arabie, Égypte, Hollande, Grande-Bretagne, Irlande, Dannemark, Pologne, Isles et Autres Lieux d’Europe, Asia et Afrique* (Paris: G.Clousier, 1653), 66-67.

²²⁰ Özel, *The Collapse of Rural Order*, 118.

Table 2: Changes in the Rural Population Between 1576 and 1643 in *nefer*.²²¹

Nahiye	1576 Nefer	1643 Nefer	% Decrease
Amasya (nefs)	486	193	60.28
Akdağ	2536	709	72.04
Argoma	8289	1424	82.82
Aştagul	1571	128	91.85
Bergome/Yavaş-İli	2684	1135	57.71
Geldigelen (Âbâd)	11124	2154	80.63
Gelikiras	1897	326	82.81
<i>Total</i>	<i>28587</i>	<i>6069</i>	<i>78.67</i>

The extent of demographic crisis and deserted villages varied from *nâhiye* to *nâhiye*. For example, while Aştagul lost more than 90% of its population, the *nâhiyes* of Bergome and Yavaş-ili could keep nearly half of their previous population.²²² The principal reason was related to the degree of Celali violence and Celali-like activities of members of provincial military-administrative class (*ehl-i örf*) who sacked the countryside with their *levends*.²²³ Amasya region might have experienced demographic decline which roots from the demographic pressure as well. However, it seems that demographic crisis was the result of activities of two great Celali leaders of Karayazıcı and Deli Hasan. Karayazıcı entered Amasya around 1600 and he stayed in the region during six months.²²⁴ His sojourn destructed rural economy and demography because his Celali army, composed of 50-60.000 soldiers, might have extracted their needs from the dwellers like nourishment, housing and so on.

²²¹ Ibid., 117.

²²² Özel, *The Collapse of Rural Order*, 118.

²²³ For an example of roaming activities (*yağma ve zülüm*) of *ehl-i örf* and insecurity, see Andreasyan, *Polonyalı Simeon*, 109-110.

²²⁴ Griswold, *The Great Anatolian Rebellion*, 33.

A similar demographic dispersal that Amasya and Tokat regions experienced is seen in the Bozok and Canik districts. The high degree of lost tax paying peasants and deserted villages, about 70-80%, between 1576 and 1642 in the region lead demographic historians to look for a connection with Celali Revolts because the regions were exposed to Celali attacks several times in the period. The comparison of figures extracted from *tahrir* records of 1576 and detailed *avarız (mufassal)* records of 1642 displays the extend of *the Celali Effect* on rural population. The demographic destruction will be shown with some examples in the region below

Table 3: A Comparison of the Data Derived from *Tahrir* of 1576 and *Avarız (Mufassal)* of 1642. Number of Peasant Households (*Hane*) in the District of Bozok²²⁵

1576		1642	
Subdistrict (Nâhiye)	Household(Hane)	Subdistrict (Kaza)	Household(Hane)
Akdağ	1970	Akdağ	948
Gedik+Çıbık	3025	Gedik+Çıbık	531
Çıbık	1388	-	0
Emlak	2022	Emlak	367
Boğazlıyan	2793	Boğazlıyan	195
<i>Total</i>	<i>11198</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>2041</i>

The region was hit most seriously by Celali revolts of Karayazıcı, Hüseyin Paşa and Deli Hasan between 1590 and 1610.

²²⁵ Öz, “Population Fall in Seventeenth Century Anatolia: Some Findings for the Districts of Canik and Bozok,” 13.

Table 4: A Comparison of the Data Derived from *Tahrir* of 1576 and *Avarız* (Mufassal) of 1642. Number of Peasant Households (*Hane*) in the District of Canik²²⁶

1576		1642
Subdistrict (Kaza)	Household(Hane)	Household(Hane)
Arım	4707	1288
Kavak	1730	667
Samsun	1789	603
Bafra	3546	1211
Satılmış	4666	200
Ünye	856	445
Terme	3747	731
<i>Total</i>	<i>21041</i>	<i>5145</i>

As seen in the examples presented above, the rural population of region witnessed a drastic decline between two record periods.²²⁷ A great part of this demographic crisis could have been caused by the Celali bands who were active in the region between the 1598s and 1607s (the end of the Great Flight). When the first great Celali leader Karayazıcı had lost his first major battle against the imperial center, the survivors of his army fled towards north via Sivas and Amasya to the Canik mountains around

²²⁶ Öz, “Population Fall in Seventeenth Century Anatolia: Some Findings for the Districts of Canik and Bozok,” 11.

²²⁷ Ibid., 22-29.

1601.²²⁸ It is highly probable that the surviving Celali comrades formed many bands in the region.²²⁹ The army of Deli Hasan, composed of 20-30.000 men,²³⁰ may have sacked the villages because it is sure that he was in the Tokat region in 1602 where he defeated two Ottoman pashas.²³¹

The examples presented above in the charts indicate a demographic crisis which took place between the 1580s and the 1640s. However, these studies cannot provide information on the demographic situation and fluctuations on shorter periods during violent years of Celali attacks. On this issue the waqf account books could provide regional demographic fluctuations year by year and allow to see *the Celali Effect* on short notices in the waqf lands of Selîm II.²³² The general demographic trend in the waqf region was a decline because Konya region was under violent Celali attacks starting from the final years of the 16th century. The Celali leader of Karayazıcı and Hüseyin Paşa (governor of Karaman) ravaged the central Anatolian since 1598. Their damage in the central Anatolia was followed by Celali leader of Deli Hasan in 1602.²³³ Rural population, based on *çift-tax* households, declined from 611 (1594) to 349 (1600-1), which is equal to a 42% drop. The number of *mücerreds* declined from 846 (1594) to 259 (1600-1) which means that 69% of *mücerreds* either evaded tax records or got married or fled totally. The number of *bennaks* witnessed a similar decline and while their number was 1014 in 1594, it declined to 320 in 1600-1, which is equal to a 68% fall. The rural population of Konya region can be assumed to have continued

²²⁸ Mustafa Naima, *Tarih-i Naima*, I, 293.

²²⁹ A *mühimme* from 1609-1610 approves violent actions of Celali comrades in the region. Sivas dwellers were under Celali attacks (*zaleme zulmünden reyası perakende ve perişan olup...*) since the last 7-8 years (*yedi sekiz seneden berü Celali istilası...*). BOA. Mühimme Defteri, 78 (h.1018/m.1609-1610): 11/26. It is highly probable that these were the the Celali bands who fled towards the north after 1601.

²³⁰ İbrahim Peçuylu, *Tarih-i Peçevî*, II, 270.

²³¹ Griswold, *The Great Anatolian Rebellion*, 39.

²³² Orbay, "Financial Development of the Waqfs in Konya and the Agricultural Economy in the Central Anatolia (Late Sixteenth-Early Seventeenth Centuries)," 88, 91.

²³³ Griswold, *The Great Anatolian Rebellion*, 40-41.

declining during these difficult periods of Celali attacks after 1600-1s.²³⁴ There is some data which confirms the Celali depopulation in Konya region in the following years of the 1600s. For instance, a *mukataa* record dated 1602 signals difficulties in collection of some taxes, including the *cizye*, in Karaman, which was related to the Celali destruction (*Celali hayfindan*).²³⁵ Records of waqfs in Konya region indicate a general harvest crisis between 1607-1609 when the grain prices were extremely high which might sign the Celali rural depopulation.²³⁶

2.2.4.2 The Question of the Lost Villages

As discussed above the general demographic decline in the central and northern Anatolian districts was around 70-80%. The depopulation was followed by temporary and permanent abandonments of villages. The total abandonments started with the first great Celali revolts at the turn of the 16th century. For example, a certain *voyvoda* İbrahim Ağa informs the imperial center that 36 villages in the subdistrict of Haymana (attached to Ankara) were totally deserted in 1603 because the region was under pillage.²³⁷ Subdistrict of Bacı witnessed a drastic decline in the number of villages in the same period. 33 villages out of 38 were completely abandoned.²³⁸ The number settlements in the northern Anatolian parts of Canik and Bozok districts declined between 1576 and 1642. For instance, the number of villages of Arım (in Canik) declined from 148 to 80 (45%).²³⁹ Subdistrict of Boğazlıyan (in Bozok) lost 52% of its villages in the same period.

²³⁴ Faroqhi, "Agricultural Crisis and the Art of Flute-Playing: The Wordly Affairs of the Mevlevî Dervishes (1595-1652)," 46.

²³⁵ BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24262/1

²³⁶ Orbay, "Economic Development of the Imperial Waqfs; A Study in the Institutional and Local Economic History in the Transformation Period" 96, 107.

²³⁷ Akdağ, *Celâli İsyânları*, 416. We learn the existence of *eşkiya* in Haymana around 1593-1594 from a *mühimme* record. BOA. Mühimme Defteri, 71 (h.1002/m.1593-1594):188/373.

²³⁸ Akdağ, *Celâli İsyânları*, 415.

²³⁹ Öz, "Population Fall in Seventeenth Century Anatolia: Some Findings for the Districts of Canik and Bozok," 10.

The lost and totally deserted settlements will be discussed in this part between 1570s and 1640s. Amasya and Tokat cases will be dealt in detail and the village abandonments will be handled on short and long terms.

2.2.4.2.a Amasya

Özel indicated that the majority of the lost villages were situated in lowlands and plateaus in Amasya.²⁴⁰ The 45% of abandoned villages were the small ones composed of a few *hanes* with less than 25 taxpayers in total.²⁴¹ These two elements made them vulnerable against the Celalis. The bigger villages were exposed to the attacks and they lost a part, in some cases substantial portion of their population; however, the great size villages with more than 250 taxpayers experienced lesser total abandonment or disappearance.²⁴²

The nahiyes of Akdağ, Argoma and Geldigelen, with the largest plains, experienced the great village loss. Özel showed that the common point of these regions is that the most of the villages attached to these *nahiyes* were in small size composed of 1-24 *nefers*. The small size settlements received greater damage than the big ones. The greatest settlements with 200-250 *nefers* experienced a 1% total desertion.

It was shown that 144 villages were deserted between 1576-1643.²⁴³ It could be assumed that, there might have been so many actions regarding disappearance or resettlement of villages between these two registers. On the other hand, it cannot be shown for the time being because of the absence of *avarız* or *tahrir* registers between two periods. Future studies with different documents, which could yield some numerical data about settlement numbers, like waqf defters, could reveal the changes

²⁴⁰ Oktay Özel, “Osmanlı Anadolu’sunda Terkedilmiş/Kayıp Köyler Sorunu (17-19.Yüzyıllar),” in *Ötekilerin Peşinde: Ahmet Yaşar Ocak’a Armağan*, ed. Fatih Yeşil, Mehmet Öz (Ankara: Timaş Yayınları, 2015): 575

²⁴¹ Özel, *The Collapse of Rural Order*, 106; idem, “Osmanlı Anadolu’sunda Terkedilmiş/Kayıp Köyler Sorunu (17-19.Yüzyıllar),” 578.

²⁴² Özel, *The Collapse of Rural Order*, 106.

²⁴³ Ibid., 105.

in shorter periods. Özel stated that 43 out of 144 abandoned villages seem to have reappeared sometime after 1643 and they survived to the beginning of the 20th century.²⁴⁴ The remaining 101 villages, which had existed in *tahrir* of 1576, did not show up.²⁴⁵ These indices signal that *the Celali Effect* had long and short term results in rural population of Amasya. While there was a recovery after 1643, some settlements got dispersed permanently.

2.2.4.2.b Tokat

Tokat region reflects *the Celali Effect* more in detail thanks to the records of *tahrir* (detailed) of 1574, the *avarız* registers of 1600, 1601, 1611 and 1643 (the latter is *timar-zeamet* register). The revolts seem to have been quite effective in the region at the turn of the 16th century because the comparison of 1574 *tahrir* and 1600 *avarız* (summary) points a 18% drop in the number of villages. 44 villages that existed in 1574 disappeared in 26 years.²⁴⁶ The features of deserted villages show similarities with Amasya. The majority of lost settlements were the smallest ones with less than 25 *hanes*.²⁴⁷ The *avarız* of 1601 shows that 3 villages which appeared in the previous register got disappeared between 1600-1601.²⁴⁸ The next *avarız* register in 1611 indicates that 59 of the populated villages in 1601 were deserted.²⁴⁹ The total number of disappeared villages between 1574 and 1611 is 99 (plus 7 *hasa* settlements that got lost between 1601-1611). While some settlements were totally abandoned in the previous register, they could have been resettled in the following record. For example, 11 villages, which appeared in 1574 and got disappeared in 1601, are found again in 1611 records. If the re-emerged settlements between 1574-1611 are not counted, 86 villages could be deserted in the same period.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁴ Ibid., 109.

²⁴⁵ Özel, *The Collapse of Rural Order*, 110

²⁴⁶ Açikel, "Change in Settlement Patterns, Population and Society in North Central Anatolia: A Case Study of The District (Kazâ) of Tokat (1574-1643)" 158.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., 158-159. 33 villages of 44 had less than 25 *hanes*.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., 159.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., 160.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 162.

The comparison of previous three registers with records of 1643 (*timar-zemat defteri*)²⁵¹ signals that the desertion was a temporary action against the Celalis. 18 villages that existed in 1574, but lost in other three records, reappeared in 1643. 20 of the deserted villages during 1601-1611 re-emerged in 1643 register.²⁵² On the other hand, 48 of the deserted villages between 1574 and 1611 did not appear in 1643 records. Their absence in 1643 does not guarantee that the situation kept unchanging. The maps and documents of the 20th century confirm that 20 out of 48 disappeared villages reappeared sometime after 1640s.²⁵³ The other 28 villages may have disappeared completely, or some might have re-emerged with different names after 1640s. *The Celali Effect* shows signs of short and long-term results on the settlements in Tokat. The reappearance of villages after a short period of time indicates that while some part of peasants tended to return back, some dwellers kept staying in the new settlement.

As an addition to the numerical data presented in this study, there are some cases on *mühimme* registers which support this idea for other regions. For example, the *mühimme* of 1617-18 points out that the *kâza* of Koçhisar was deserted (*celâlî fetretinden ahâlisi perişan olup dağılan*) owing to the Celali Revolts but the district was resettled (*daha sonra tekrar bayındır hale gelen*) most possibly after a short time the revolts were quashed in the region.²⁵⁴

2.2.5 The New Celali Settlements

The lowlands and wide plateaus received the maximum Celali destruction because their location made them susceptible and visible to Celali armies. They were more

²⁵¹ Only kılıç-villages are recorded in this *defter*. Ibid., 162-163.

²⁵² Açıkel, “Change in Settlement Patterns, Population and Society in North Central Anatolia: A Case Study of The District (Kazâ) of Tokat (1574-1643)” 162. Some of these villages might be found in Niksar. A *mühimme* from 1616-1617 mentions resettlement projects in Niksar (Tokat region). BOA. Mühimme Defteri, 81 (h.1025/m.1616-1617):207/472.

²⁵³ Açıkel, “Change in Settlement Patterns, Population and Society in North Central Anatolia: A Case Study of The District (Kazâ) of Tokat (1574-1643)” 162-163.

²⁵⁴ 82 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (h.1026-1027/m.1617-1618), Divan-ı Hümayun Sicilleri Dizisi:VI (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2000), 134.

densely settled. Özel showed that the villages in the lowlands experienced the highest depopulation and the settlements which were situated on the high hills or relatively higher lands received relatively lesser destruction in Amasya region.²⁵⁵ Açıkel's findings show similar results about the rate of demographic drop between low and high lands.²⁵⁶ Hütteroth had reached a similar conclusion for Karaman province of the central Anatolia. He stated that while the mountain villages experienced abandonment around 30-40%, the open plains had been deserted around 90% in the same period.²⁵⁷ The similar trends can be expected for other rural parts of central and northern Anatolia between the 1570s and 1640s.

The lost peasants bring the question about their fate during and after the revolts. They cannot be assumed to have been killed by the Celalis. The majority of lost peasants may have chosen one of the four alternatives; **a)** joining the Celali armies or forming bandit groups (*köylülerin bir kısmı malları ve başları havfından eşkiya yanına varıp*)²⁵⁸, **b)** immigration to big towns, **c)** returning back to their former lands some of which was occupied by the members of military (*askeri*) class,²⁵⁹ **d)** formation of the new settlements. This section demonstrates the formation of new settlements in the Celali period.

While Celali violence was ending in disappeared villages in the lowlands, the new ones were established in the higher lands for security reasons. *Avarız* registers of 1640s indicate that there was a proliferation of *kazas* (sub-district) and villages in some districts of central and northern Anatolia. Öz's findings demonstrate that the number of *kazas* in the district of Bozok and Canik increased. There were 2 *kazas* in Bozok district in the 1576 *tahrir* and it rose to 9 between 1576-1642. Canik region

²⁵⁵ Özel, *The Collapse of Rural Order*, 105-106.

²⁵⁶ Açıkel, "Change in Settlement Patterns, Population and Society in North Central Anatolia: A Case Study of The District (Kazâ) of Tokat (1574-1643)" 157-166.

²⁵⁷ Özel, *The Collapse of Rural Order*, 106-107.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 172.

²⁵⁹ See İnalçık, "Adâletnâmeler," 90-91.

experienced a bigger proliferation and the number of *kazas* increased from 7 to 19 in the same period.²⁶⁰

The increase of village numbers could not be a result of the natural demographic rise because *hane* numbers do not match with the villages. Kavak region had witnessed a 30% rise in villages; however, the *hane* number was 61% (667 hanes in 1642) lower when compared with the figures of 1576 tahrir (1730 hanes).²⁶¹ Samsun shows similar results with Kavak. Even if the rise of village number was around 4%, there were 66% (1789 households in 1576) less *hanes* in 1642 (603 households). Both districts show that the villages were splintered during the revolts and the new ones appeared in remote regions with lesser households.

The districts of Bozok experienced a similar trend with Canik. The proliferation was around 68% for Akdağ and 69% for Sorkun.²⁶² The households in Akdağ region declined from 1970 (1576 *tahrir* register) to 948 in 1642 (*avarız*). It is most probable that the villages got fragmented and new settlements were established with lesser inhabitants. The size of increase was around 69% in Sorkun region. On the other hand, the region expanded demographically and the number of household (*hane*) rose from 238 (1576) to 976 (1642) in Sorkun. This drastic rise could be related the movement of Turcoman groups. It is known that there were semi-nomadic Turcoman groups in the region.²⁶³

To conclude, there was a proliferation of villages and *kazas* between 1570s and 1642. On the other hand, this increase was not related to a natural demographic expansion. Most of these new settlements were founded in higher mountainous regions to evade

²⁶⁰ Öz, "Population Fall in Seventeenth Century Anatolia: Some Findings for the Districts of Canik and Bozok," 6.

²⁶¹ See Öz, Population Fall in Seventeenth Century Anatolia: Some Findings for the Districts of Canik and Bozok," 11.

²⁶² The number of villages increased from 63 (1576) to 106 (1642) in Akdağ. There were 11 villages (1576) and it rose to 87 (1642) in Sorkun.

²⁶³ The number of villages increased from 11 (1576) to 87 (1642) Öz, "Population Fall in Seventeenth Century Anatolia: Some Findings for the Districts of Canik and Bozok," 7, 13.

the Celalis. There should be just a few households in these villages because despite the proliferation, there was a general decline in the number of households around 70-80% in the region. It seems that these new villages were temporary safe places to evade the Celalis and the majority of peasants may have returned to their former settlements when the damaging effects of the Celali came to an end.

2.3 Conclusion

The Ottoman demography entered into a complicated era in the last decade of the 16th century when the great demographic expansion came to an end coinciding with the first great Celali Revolts. The Celali armies destructed rural economy and pushed a great part of Ottoman peasants out of their settlements. *The Celali Effect* drove the Ottoman rural population into an extraordinary period of demographic mobility. The degree of mobility and desertion was so wide that some historians call it a “demographic crisis”.

The Celali Effect on demography was discussed in two main sections. The first section argued the urban demography. It is a great loss that we do not have enough official surveys for towns to reveal *the Celali Effect* with numerical demographic data. The scarcity of these registers led historians to use different sources like chronics, juridical records, *mühimmes*, *telhis* and waqf registers. The urban changes were attempted to be projected in İstanbul through the repair and construction registers. The conclusion showed that the city was exposed to two great immigrations during the great revolts which created a “surplus labour” in the town. The immigrations reversed after the great rebels were calmed down and Anatolian countryside entered into a short period of normalization. After the elimination of two great rebels, the town evacuated the surplus labour and the wages returned to the normal levels before the revolts. It is most probable that the peasants had tendency to return to their former lands after the revolts. Moreover, the central state may have encouraged or forced them to do so.²⁶⁴ The

²⁶⁴ Faroqhi mentions two forced return attempts in 1610 and 1635. See Faroqhi, *Orta Halli Osmanlılar*, 56. It seems that one of Faroqhi's statements is also found on the *gazettes* of 1635. See Renaudot, *Recueil de Toutes Les Gazettes*, 479.

fluctuations indicated that *the Celali Effect* was a short-term result in the urban population in the example of İstanbul.

The second part discussed the rural demography. The comparison of *avarız* and *tahrir* registers signaled three chief changes. The first section aimed at showing the size of demographic dispersal and following crisis during and after the great revolts. Presented examples showed that the rural population of some parts of central and northern Anatolia declined around 70-80% between the 1570s-1640s. In the second part, sharp decline in the number of settlements was followed in Amasya and Tokat regions. The Celali destruction resulted in total abandonment and disappearance of some villages. *The Celali Effect* was most destructive in the settlements which were situated in the low lands or wide plateaus. The records showed that *the Celali Effect* on the deserted villages differed regionally. While some of the abandoned villages were recovered as early as the first decades of the 17th century, some of them remained desolated. The village desertion was accompanied by new settlements most of which was in high lands. The following section argued that the peasants fled to higher mountainous lands to evade the bandits and they established new settlements composed of a few households. The registers of 1640s indicated that the number of villages rose in some districts. This rise was not related to the natural demographic rise because despite the increasing settlements, the household (*hane*) kept declining during the revolts. As a result of Celali bands, the villages got dispersed into smaller new villages. Even if the records point out an augmentation in village numbers, they were actually villages formed by fleeing peasants. We are not sure yet how much percentage of these new villages kept remaining in their new locations. These settlements could be thought as temporary shelters against banditry. It is most probable that the majority of peasants returned to their former lands by their own wills²⁶⁵ or attempts of the center²⁶⁶ once the destructive effects of the revolts ended.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁵ For example, A mühimme mentions attempts of resettlement after the Celalis in Karahisar-i Sahib in 1611/1612. BOA. Mühimme Defteri, 79 (h.1020/m.1611-1612):313/792.

²⁶⁶ A mühimme record dated 1609/1610 indicates that the center guaranteed some tax exemptions (*tekalif-i örfiye ve şakkadan muaf ve müsellemler*) to reaya of Erzurum who returns back to their former lands. BOA. Mühimme Defteri, 78 (h.1018/m.1609-1610):11/26.

²⁶⁷ 82 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri (1026-1027/1617-1618), Divan-ı Hümayun Sicilleri Dizisi:VI (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2000), 33.

CHAPTER III

THE OTTOMAN ECONOMY AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY AND THE CELALI REVOLTS

The period under examination marked by severe financial difficulties which started to be felt in the late sixteenth century. The Ottoman economy had entered into a period of depression owing to different reasons which are still widely discussed. The economic depression of the empire has been dealt in global and local bases. Some historians handled the question in the context of the 17th century General Crisis.²⁶⁸ The Ottoman economic depression was explained by global trends like the effects of American silver, catastrophic climatic events -the Little Ice Age- or changing international trade routes. On the other hand, these works lacked to penetrate into the local economic conditions and economic institutions peculiar to the empire. Some historians asserted recently that neither American silver nor the Little Ice Age had played outstanding roles in the Ottoman economic crisis. Şevket Pamuk emphasized the effects of the local economic conditions and he argued that the Ottoman economy entered an extended period of instability, which lasted until 1640s, after the debasement of 1585-1586.²⁶⁹ He showed that the general price increase, or *Price Revolution*,²⁷⁰ was actually triggered by several debasements of Ottoman *akçe* in the last decades of the 16th century.²⁷¹ As long as the amount of the American silver that entered into Ottoman lands is not known, the classic argument of the effects of

²⁶⁸ See Parker, *Global Crisis*.

²⁶⁹ Pamuk, *A Monetary History*, 1-31.

²⁷⁰ For a pioneering work of the Price Revolution in Ottoman Empire see Barkan, "The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning Point in the Economic History of the Near East," 3-28.

²⁷¹ The debasement of 1585-6s had reduced silver content of *akçe* by 44%. Pamuk, *Paranın Tarihi*, 135. It is known that Ottoman *akçe* had been debased several times between 1580-1586s. In each debasement, *akçe* lost its silver content more. See Nicoara Beldiceanu, "La Crise Monétaire ottomane au XVIe Siècle et Son Influence sur Les Principautés roumaines," *Südost-Forschungen XVI* (1957): 70-86.

American silver on the Ottoman Price Revolution cannot be shown in detail.²⁷² On the other hand, the lack of solid data should not end in ignorance of the cheap silver in the Ottoman lands. There are still important traces that signal the effects of the American silver on deterioration of Ottoman economy. For instance, a certain French chronicler Vignau who was at the same time one of the secretaries and interpreters of the French embassy in İstanbul mentioned the destructive effects of high quality silver which came from Spain and Poland in high quantities into the Ottoman lands.²⁷³ Even if he seems not to be aware that this silver was of American origin, he argued the new silver impoverished Ottoman *reaya*.

Development of climatic studies made some historians search a direct relationship between Ottoman economic crisis and some extraordinary climatic events.²⁷⁴ The catastrophic effects of the *Little Ice Age* was believed to lead to an agricultural production crisis associated with the price rises and the Celali Revolts.²⁷⁵ Some recent studies showed us that the effects of climatic changes were experienced locally and in a minor basis. On the other hand, since there is not a detailed climate index for the central Ottoman lands, i.e. Anatolia, any connection between the Little Ice Age and 17th century agricultural crisis would remain incomplete.

²⁷² Unlike Ottoman Empire, there is some data about the amount of silver that entered in Europe, see Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et Le Monde Méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*, 2e édition. (Paris: A. Colin, 1966), 433-454; Ruggiero Romano, *Conjonctures Opposées: "La Crise" du XVIIe Siècle en Europe et en Amérique Ibérique* (Geneve: Université de Geneve, 1993), 110-154. The Period 1550-1610-20 is distinguished by the reign of American silver in the European finance. By 1600-10 the supply of American silver had for the first time shown a downward trend, which was paralleled by a decline in the volume of shipping on the Carrera de Indias. Henry Kamen, *Crisis and Change in Early Modern Spain* (Galliard: Aldershot Variorum, 1993), 45-46.

²⁷³ The work mentions huge amounts of silver coming from Sevilla (*Les Piastres Sevillanes*) and Poland (*Quarts de Pologne*) into the Ottoman lands. He puts emphasis on the silver coming from Sevilla because it was high in amount and it was in very good quality. He relates the impoverishment of Ottoman subjects to flow of silver. Vignau, *L'état Présent*, 144-145.

²⁷⁴ The change in climate cannot be totally ignored or denied. It is accepted that European continent experienced a cooling period and harsh climatic events which were felt most direly in the 16th century and early 17th centuries. See Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée*, II, 245-252. There are examples in French manuscripts which point extraordinary climatic events. "The present year (1599) is too cold and it snowed so much that there are some people who died and got lost in ice fields. A certain messenger found dead on his horse by the soldiers who wanted to talk to him. He could not endure this coldness." and "There are sentinels who died during their guard on the city walls. River of Mezelle got so frozen that one could dig ways under the ice." BNF.Français, 14530.

²⁷⁵ See White, *The Climate of Rebellion*.

The dissertation which relates economic difficulties of the empire to the changing trade routes and decline of Mediterranean trade seems to be lacking.²⁷⁶ The Ottoman Empire may have felt the effects of growing Atlantic trade in the long term; however, the switch from the Mediterranean trade to Atlantic trade may not have happened that fast to affect the Ottoman economy deeply at the turn of the 16th century. Moreover, the size of the “decline” of the Mediterranean trade and the changing situation of the trade routes in the 16th century is still very controversial.²⁷⁷

There are some studies which handled the Ottoman economic crisis in more local basis with imperial financial institutions. These works assume that Ottoman central treasury was under pressure principally owing to three major internal reasons. The first of them was the long-lasting wars with the Safavids in the east and Habsburgs in the west in the second half of the 16th century.²⁷⁸ These wars began to drain the financial reserves of the central treasury. It is stated that the treasury experienced the first major silver shortage with the outbreak of war with Iran in 1578, when the payments of soldiers brought a huge pressure.²⁷⁹

The second was the expansion of fire arm using janissary army and increasing recruitment of mercenary.²⁸⁰ After the second half of the 16th century, *sipahis* lost their crucial position in the wars because the warfare was changing and there was a

²⁷⁶ See Suraiya Faroqhi, *The Ottoman Empire and World Around It* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 154-155.

²⁷⁷ See Tongas Gérard, “Les Relations de la France Avec L’Empire Ottoman durant La premiere Moitié du XVII Siècle et l’Ambassade à Constantinople de Philippe de Harlay, Comte de Césy: 1619-1640” (Unpublished Doctorate’s Thesis, Université de Toulouse, 1942), 141-142.

²⁷⁸ See İnalcık and Quataert, eds. *An Economic and Social*, 420-423.

²⁷⁹ Pamk, *A Monetary History*, 132. Fiscal difficulties may have continued. A *mühimme* record dated 1609/1610 could be an indicator of fiscal difficulties to pay military payments. The center was requesting 20 *yük akçe* -equal to 2000000 *akçe-* (*tedarik ve irsal*) hastily (*ber vech-i istiâcel*) from Karaman *mukataas* for military payments (*kul mevacibi için*). BOA. Mühimme Defteri, 78 (h.1018/m.1609-1610): 5/12.

²⁸⁰ The empire was in need of firepower against European armies. Virginia H. Aksan, “Locating the Ottomans Among Early Modern Empire,” *Journal of Early Modern History* 3, 2 (1999): 115. It was put forward that there was a general expansion in the fire arms soldiers related to the changing warfare associated with the Military Revolution. See Geoffrey Parker, *La Révolution Militaire : La Guerre et l’Essor de l’Occident*, trans. Jean Joba (Paris: Gallimard, 1993).

growing need for fire arm soldiers.²⁸¹ Inefficiency of *sipahi* cavalry army,²⁸² which fought with conventional weapons like bow, sword and lance, against Austrian musketeers led Ottoman statesmen to expand the janissary army.²⁸³ A work dated 1588 is important to mention to comprehend the situation of *sipahis* against fire arm soldiers from a perspective of a foreign observer at the end of the century. It is stated that the *sipahis* started to lose their principal place in the Ottoman army because they could not endure before the infantry on the horseback.²⁸⁴ As a result of inefficiency of *sipahis*, the number of janissaries was increased from 13.000 in the 1550s to 37.000 in 1609.²⁸⁵ Each new recruited janissary put pressure on the central army.²⁸⁶ While the paid army expanded, the *sipahis* were assigned to other tasks.²⁸⁷ A contemporary

²⁸¹ İnalçık and Quataert, eds. *An Economic and Social*, 24.

²⁸² It is widely accepted that the *sipahis* were old fashioned fighters and their methods were not capable to defeat fire arm soldiers. According to a contemporary observer, *sipahis* were still effective at the end of the 16th century. He states clearly that European states received the greatest damages and defeats from *sipahi* army. Their methods were still powerful; however, they could not stand before infantry with fire arms because their capacity of movement was very restricted with their horses in the rough lands. Moreover, the sound of artillery frightened cavalry army which caused a organization problem in the campaigns. René de Lusinge *De La Naissance, Durée et Cheute des Etstats, où sont Traittées Plusieurs Notables Questions sur L'establissement des Empires & Monarchies* (Paris: Marc Orry, 1588), 158-180. Two war recits written 1621 and 1622 by anonymous writers state that the Ottoman army was quite powerful and frightening (*effrayant*). Compare Anonymous, *Récit Véritable de Ce qui s'est Passé entre L'armée du Roy de Pologne et Celle du Grand Turc, depuis Le Premier Septembre dernier, jusques au 24 Décembre 1621* (Lyon: Claude Armand, 1622); Anonymous, *La Description Générale de L'effroyable Armée du Grand Turc Envoyée Contre Le Roy de Pologne et la Description de L'armée de Pologne et du Secours Général Fourni par La Chretienté Contre Les Dessesins du Grand Seigneur* (Paris: Abraham Saugrain, 1621).

²⁸³ From the era of Süleyman I, the number of janissaries equated with fire arms was increased. By 1609, their number reached 37.000. İnalçık, *The Classical Age*, 48.

²⁸⁴ There is no doubt that these infantries were fire armed soldiers. “*The sipahi, which was a powerful cavalry unit, destructed by the infantry.*” René de Lusinge (1550-53?-1610-15?) was a seigneur and bureaucrat. He was close to the king of France Henri III. This part of work discusses the Ottoman army. Lusinge, *De La Naissance, Durée et Cheute*, 158. I am thankful to Martin Genty (University of Nantes, History Department) for his comments on my translation of this complicated work.

²⁸⁵ There were 16.000 janissaries in the era of Sultan Süleyman and the number was increased constantly. İnalçık, *Klâsik Çağ*, 53.

²⁸⁶ There are deficits in the budget of the central treasury between 1592 and 1608. The deficit reached the highest point in the period of 1597-8. The deficit could be related to the wars and janissary payments. See Ahmet Tabakoğlu, *Gerileme Dönemine Girerken Osmanlı Maliyesi* (İstanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 1985), 14-15. The rising numbers of janissaries was one of the mostly mentioned issues in the *nasihatname* (advice) literature. Contemporary *nasihatname* writers Kâtip Çelebi (1609-1657) and Koçi Bey (?-1650) put emphasis on the growing number of paid soldiers and their financial pressure. Çelebi, *Düstûru'l-Amel*, 118-119; “*Bu denlü mevâcib mi yetişür? Ve bu denlü mevâcibe hazîne mi vefâ eder?*” Koçi Bey, *Koçi Bey Risâlesi*, 52.

²⁸⁷ Linda T. Darling, “Nasihatnameler, İcmal Defterleri, and the Timar-Holding Elite in the Late Sixteenth Century-Part II, Including the Seventeenth Century,” *The Journal of Ottoman Studies* XLV

observer René de Lusinge states that the *sipahis* were recruited in the janissary army and artillery.²⁸⁸

Finally, I argue *the Celali Effect* on three different fields of the economy in short and long runs. The first part deals with the breakdown of rural economy and following “agricultural production crisis”. The depopulation brought a remarkable decline in the agricultural production and livestock raising. In the second part, the difficulties in production and trade of Ankara mohair and Bursa silk are handled. While *the Celali Effect* on Bursa silk is dealt with a price index, mohair is handled through examples from *kadı* registers, travel accounts and *fermans*. The last part will demonstrate the problems in *mukataa* revenue collection, the destruction of *timar* system and burden of the Celali campaigns, all of which I argued to be effective in the fiscal transformation.

3.1 The Celali Effect on The Rural Economy

3.1.a Temporary Scarcity of Basic Foodstuff

As indicated in the first chapter, the northern and central lands of Anatolian countryside experienced high degree of depopulation between the last decade of the 16th century and the first half of the 17th century. The depopulation resulted in deserted settlements especially in low lands and plateaus, on which the rural economic activities could have been practiced most densely and productively. It could be assumed that the Ottoman peasants were engaged in two main rural economic

(2015):10. When the tımarlı *sipahis* were the backbone of the Ottoman army, they were covering 30-40% of military expenses. Pamuk, *A Monetary History*, 132.

²⁸⁸ See Lusinge, *De La Naissance, Durée et Cheute*, 158-180. Another work dated 1637 claimed that the Ottoman army lacked modern artillery and fire arms. A certain Jean Douet (15..-1657) wrote a book dedicated to the French king on the military to defeat enemies of France and to make it the most powerful state. He states that the Ottoman army lacks artillery and their information on war machines are very limited. The writer must refer to some fire arms when he used the term “war machines”. Jean Douet, *Discours sur Les Machines de Victoires et Conquestes. Pour la Deffense, Augmentation & Gloire de la France* (Paris: Michel Brunet, 1637), 82.

activities, which were agricultural production and stock raising.²⁸⁹ It is seen that these two fields were damaged severely during the revolts.²⁹⁰

Akdağ states that *narh* prices signal a famine which started to threaten the Ottoman *reaya* with the first great revolts toward the end of the 16th century.²⁹¹ The scarcity might have been seen most remarkably in the regions which the Celalis hit most violently, i.e. central and northern Anatolia. For example, 1 *akçe* could buy 480 grams (150 *dirhem*) of bread in Ankara around 1599 but it declined to 386 grams (120 *dirhem*) in 1606. This decline was most probably related to the first great Celali Revolts of Karayazıcı and Deli Hasan. A *telhis* of Yemişçi Vizier Hasan Paşa points out a similar portrait about breakdown of cereal production in Sivas, Tokat and Turhal regions. The paşa states that rebels stole the cereals in warehouses and even the growing ones on the fields.

²⁸⁹ The rural economic activities could be followed on the *tahrir* records. The agricultural production constituted the first rural activity. Stock raising was an important economic activity and it was usually practiced by nomadic groups (*yörük* and *aşiret*). Moreover, cultivators could also be engaged in stock raising as an additional activity. See Güçer, *Hububat Meselesi*, 13-19.

²⁹⁰ Akdağ, *Celâli İsyamları*, 421-422.

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 425.

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Sivas etrafında yeni hâsil yedişmedi, üçer yüz zorbaları Tokat ve Zile Turhal etrafında çıkup bulduklarını katl edüp kimesne tarlalardan arpa biçdürüp evlerinde buldukları zahireleri alup, merkeblerine ve arabalarına yükleyüp giderler; reaya ekinlerin ve harmanların biragup dağlar başına ehl ü ıyâllerin alup gitmişler...
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A similar scarcity was present in Kayseri region as well. The weight of bread experienced reductions during the Great Flight, while 1 *akçe* could buy equal to 320-160 (100-50 *dirhem*) grams of bread it was reduced up to 224-230 gram (70-75 *dirhem*) in 1608.²⁹⁴ It is clear that the reason behind the diminishing weight of bread was the disruption of cereal production (*yağma ve talan*).²⁹⁵ The wheat scarcity reached the top point during the Great Flight (1603-1607), when the great number of peasants deserted their agricultural lands.²⁹⁶ Akdağ stated that the famine did not last

²⁹² Akdağ, *Celâli İsyânları*, 425.

²⁹³ Orhonlu, *Telhisler*, 22.

²⁹⁴ Akdağ, *Celâli İsyânları*, 426.

²⁹⁵ A group of people living in the villages of Hisarcık and Enderek (around Kayseri) went to kadı court to complain about brigand activities. “İş bu bin on altı senesinde vaki olan mah-ı rebiiülevvelde (1607 Temmuz), Zülfikar Paşa ve Ömer Paşa ve Macar nam reisü’z-zaleme on bine karip eşkiya ile Kayseri’yi ve etrafında olan kariyeleri muhasara edüp, nice bigünah Müslümanları katl ve nice mazlumlari kapsetmekle malını ahzedüp emvâl ve erzaklarımızı nehbü garet ettiklerinden gayri, hâlâ darü’l-harp misâli cümle memleketimizi yağma ve talan ettiklerinden mâadâ...” Akdağ, *Celâli İsyânları*, 442.

²⁹⁶ “Reyanın kuvvetli olanları dağlara çıkıp haydut oldular ve yolları set eylediler. Zayıf olanları dahi kâfiristana kaçıp memâlik hali ve harap kaldı.” Akdağ, *Celâli İsyânları*, 428.

so long and the production started to reach its normal levels after the victory of Kuyucu against Celali leaders when cultivation started to increase.²⁹⁷ *The Celali Effect* seems to have caused a short term pause in the cereal production, which ended in a short period of price increase.

The rising price of meat shows that the stock raising was damaged during the revolts. Akdağ's findings indicate that while a sheep could be bought 100-120 *akçe* in 1595, the price rose drastically, and a sheep costed 217 *akçe* in 1609.²⁹⁸ There are traces which signal that the meat entered into a period of scarcity during the Great Flight. *Mühimme* registers confirm *the Celali Effect* on stock raising. There are examples which point out that the great Celali packs or small-scale brigand groups usually usurped the livestock (*ellişer ve yüzer koyunların ve öküzlerin ve sığırların alıp, koyunların ve öküzlerin ve at ve katırların alıp ambarları yıkıp, tavarların ve sığırların sürüp garat ve hasarat edüp*) during their raids.²⁹⁹ An anecdote told by Polish voyager Simeon is interesting to see the level of livestock scarcity. He witnessed that some mohair (*tiftik*) sellers were arrested because they were caught selling fake mohair mixed with wool. Their pretext was that there was a scarcity of mohair because the Celalis had either killed or stolen the goats.

“Memleketimizde tiftik kalmamıştır. Celâlîler her tarafı harebeye çevirerek keçileri telef ve gasp eylemiş olduklarından fakir düştük ve bunu yaptık.”³⁰⁰

²⁹⁷ Ibid., 426.

²⁹⁸ Ibid., 428.

²⁹⁹ “*Ellişer ve yüzer koyunların ve öküzlerin ve sığırların alıp, koyunların ve öküzlerin ve at ve katırların alıp ambarları yıkıp, tavarların ve sığırların sürüp garat ve hasarat edüp...*” 85 Numaralı *Mühimme Defteri* (1040-1041 (1042)/ 1630-1631 (1632)), *Divan-ı Hümayun Sicilleri Dizisi:VIII* (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2002), 144. A certain Ahmed, with his band composed of 400 horsemen, was extorting 10 sheeps from each *karye* he arrived in Kestel (Kestel should be found in Bursa region) around 1646-47. 91 Nolu *Mühimme Defteri* (H.1056/1646-1647) İstanbul:Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2015), 258. See Dağlıoğlu, *On Altıncı Asırda Bursa*,105.

³⁰⁰ Andreasyan, *Polonyalı Simeon*, 57.

Mukataa registers signaled some difficulties. *Mukataas* of *adet-i ağnam* in Kastamonu could not be sold because the Celalis had ravaged the region several times between 1600-1608.

*Reis-i eşkiyadan Karakaş, Kalenderoğlu, Kara Said, Küçük Hüseyin ve Top nâm Celâlîlerin hareketinden bâkî kalan reaya dahi gitmişlerdir...kaza-yı mezbûrede koyun kalmayıp adet-i ağnam mukâtaası mahlul ve nâfiruht kalmıştır...*³⁰¹

There was no demand for *mukataa* of *adet-i ağnam* in Kengiri (Çankırı) because there was a scarcity of sheep in 1610-1611.

*“Liva-yı Kengiri’ye tabii kaza-yı Kırca ve ? ahalisi Celâlî istilâsından perakende ve perişan olmağla reayada koyun kalmayıp adet-i ağnam mukâtaası ile tahvili nâfiruht kalmıştır...”*³⁰²

A case in Ankara *kadı* records from the first decade of the 17th century shows that the Celalis sometimes chose to sell the livestock to the sellers whom they had a collaboration.

*Bundan akdem mezbûr Hakverdi Celâlî zorbasından birkaç yüz koyun getirüp ekal bahâ ile otuzar akçeye koyun satup, alup sattığı koyun fukarânın sürülen koyunlarıdır...mezbûrun alup sattığı koyunları Celâlîden getirdi deyü şehadet etmeğın...*³⁰³

Akdağ states that the meat was still expensive at the end of the Great Flight (1603-1607). There is no numerical indice about increasing abundance of meat in the years following the Great Flight; however, it could be assumed that the short period of normalization created by the Kuyucu Campaign might have increased stock raising after the 1610s. The *Celali Effect* resulted in a short period breakdown of rural

³⁰¹ BOA.MAD.d,04684/114.

³⁰² BOA.MAD.d,04684/115.

³⁰³ Akdağ, *Celâlî İsyânları*, 441. It is possible that he was working with the Celalis

production and following food scarcity. In the next section, the size of Celali destruction on the agricultural production will be discussed using the studies based on waqf accounts.

3.1.b Agricultural Production Crisis

Tahrir registers that are used by economic historians entered into a period of obscurity after the last *tahrirs* of the 1590s, when it started to be practiced for some special cases. The general fiscal transformation and the transition from *tahrirs* to *avarız* records caused some problems for modern economic historians. While *tahrir* was concentrated on the economic activities, the concern of *avarız* was not production or taxes taken from any kind of surplus. *Avarız* registers were prepared to extract, a sum (which could change depending on the burden of war) in kind, in cash or service from a group of *hanes*, which is termed as “*avarızhanesi*”.³⁰⁴ This feature of the new system did not yield much information about rural economic breakdown in the Celali period.

As some examples were shown in the first part, the decline of agriculture production was tried to be dealt through *mühimme* registers, *telhis* and *narh* prices. It is sure that these sources provided some data on *the Celali Effect*; however, they could not show the size of destruction so much in detail. The information in these registers is usually shallow or inadequate to compass the shrinkage in the production. The problem regarding the sources is partially solved when the waqf registers are handled in this context. They allow to monitor any breakdown or development in the rural economy periodically of a limited area in the Celali years thanks to extensive revenue records.³⁰⁵

³⁰⁴ There was not a standard about how many real *hanes* constituted an *avarızhane*. 3, 5, 7 or 9 real *hanes* could be equal to one *avarızhane*. See Ergenç, *Osmanlı Tarihi Yazıları*, 22, 82. *Avarız* taxes could be converted from kind to cash and service or vice versa. This flexibility of taxation might have answered to the current fiscal needs better in the Celali period. For instance, a *mühimme* record dated 1609/1610 could show that while the center could not extract the *avarız* in service because of *the Celali Effect*, the tax was transformed into cash. A *kaza* attached to Bolu (the name of *kaza* could not be read) was objected to the banditry (*Celali ve zorba eşkıyası...tecavüz eyledikleri ecilden...*) and the tax of *mekkari* (animals used for transportation of goods) was converted into cash. (*avarızhanelerin her hanesiden...140 akçe bedel-i mekkâri cem ve tahsil ve ordu-yı humayun hazinesine teslim ettirmek...*). BOA. Mühimme Defteri, 78 (h.1018/m.1609-1610): 23/58.

³⁰⁵ The figures on the agricultural production can be assumed to be more proper and reliable than the *tahrirs*. While the rural production figures on the *tahrirs* were the average of the last three years, the waqfs recorded them yearly.

In this section, the works that are based on the account registers of three waqfs situated in Konya and one in Tokat will be handled. These two regions were hit several times by the Celalis and detailed records of the waqfs reflect the level of their damage in local base. It will be shown that the agricultural production was so low in some years that it would allow us to call an *agricultural crisis* than a mere decay.

3.1.b.1 Konya

Orbay's studies indicate that the imperial waqfs of Mevlânâ Celâleddîn-i Rûmî, Sadreddîn-i Konevî and Selîm II experienced agricultural failures and financial difficulties many times. Among these failures three periods seem to have come forward as *the Celali Effect* when there was a regional harvest crisis at the turn of the 16th century, the first decade of the 17th century and around 1621-23.³⁰⁶ The first period of agricultural crisis may have been aggravated by the revolt of Karayazıcı in 1598. As discussed in the first chapter, the number of *çift-tax* households had declined 46% between 1596 and 1600-1 in the waqf of Selîm.³⁰⁷ This decline was accompanied by a remarkable drop in the agricultural production. The prices of barley and wheat rose remarkably from 1599 to 1600-1.³⁰⁸ While a *kile* of barley was 24.75 *akçe* in 1599, it rose to 40 *akçe* in 1600-1. The price of wheat (in *kile*) went through a period of rise from 47.14 *akçe* in 1599 to 60 in 1600-1.³⁰⁹ The waqf of Konevî and Mevlânâ experienced similar agricultural failures. The agricultural yields of Konevî were very low (and prices very high) in 1597-8.³¹⁰ Waqf of Mevlânâ experienced financial difficulties related to the harvest failure in 1600 and it received lower amount of wheat

³⁰⁶ Comparisons of Faroqhi's and Orbay's waqf economy works indicate very clearly that the effects of the Celalis on agricultural production in the waqf lands and waqf economies should be handled regionally. While these three waqfs were going into difficult years at the turn of the century, the waqf of Seyyid Gazi (Konya region) was not affected negatively by the Celalis and the revenues in 1599-1600 were quite high.

³⁰⁷ Orbay, "Financial Development of the Waqfs in Konya and the Agricultural Economy in the Central Anatolia (Late Sixteenth-Early Seventeenth Centuries)" 88, 91.

³⁰⁸ Orbay, "Financial Development of the Waqfs in Konya and the Agricultural Economy in the Central Anatolia (Late Sixteenth-Early Seventeenth Centuries)" 90, 92. The price of grain increased when the production declined.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 89.

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 93.

and barley compared to previous period.³¹¹ The agricultural failures did not last more than 2-3 seasons. For instance, records of Mevlânâ indicate that the prices of barley and wheat declined remarkably in 1601, which could be related to a better agricultural production compared to previous years.³¹²

The second period is around 1607-1609, when high prices signal some difficulties in the agricultural production and even a harvest crisis. The crisis might have been triggered by the climatic conditions because 1607-8 was a dry season.³¹³ The other reason could be related to the Celali destruction and local banditry. A letter sent to the French Ambassador by the Janissary Aga in 1607 shows that there were central forces and Celalis fighting in Konya and vicinity.

We tell him (the French ambassador) the news from us that we arrived at Konya (Cognâ) on the 11th of August (1607). The general first vizier waits to punish the guilties (méfaisants) and rebels. By now, 10 important rebel chiefs have been executed. These 10 chiefs were collected from different lands and from up to 10 fortresses. These fortresses were razed completely. As an addition to these, there was a great chiefs of rebels called Solimis Oğlu (Sülemiş Oğlu?), towards whom we sent a great troop which will catch (surprendre) him. We pray to the God that there are other rebels around as well (which our army will catch). It is necessary to send an army against Kalender Oğlu ve Saîr, the great rebels. We sent there a Beylerbeyi and Sancak Beyi (with) two companions of sipahis and 2500 janissaries and still we sent there another Beylerbeyi and 3000 janissaries for rebellious Sancak Beyi called Celali Musti. We sent some troupes to two different places. With the help of God, there will survive no a rebel and even (their) name on the earth (sur la terre). We keep waiting to send our army to anyone who does not show obedience and to anyone who does not join this army to punish them (the rebels). We are waiting to go to Alep from Konya with our general, through the way of Kaisaria (Kayseri?). I salute (the ambassador) with all of my heart.

Aga of Janissaries (l'Aga des Janissaries)³¹⁴

³¹¹ Ibid., 97.

³¹² Ibid., 97.

³¹³ Ibid., 100.

³¹⁴ BNF.Français, 16146-1 (Années 1605-1611) /127-128.

The activities of these Celali leaders and their struggle with the central forces in the region might have disturbed rural economic activities.

The third period was around 1621-22 and 1622-3.³¹⁵ Records of Mevlâna indicate that price of a *kile* of wheat increased from 60 akça in 1621-2 to 120 akça 1622-3.³¹⁶ This sharp 100% rise signals that there was a severe decay in the agricultural production. The waqf of Sadreddîn-i Konevî went through a similar production crisis between 1621-5. Faroqhi related this crisis to the Celali destruction in the region.³¹⁷ There were small scale Celali activities in the region some of which could be identified. For example, there were *sekban* and *levend* bands in Karaman region in the same period. A group of them killed the governor Sefer Paşa and ravaged his properties.³¹⁸ It could be supposed that there were other groups which distracted agricultural production. The production might have been influenced most direly by the revolt of Abaza Mehmet Paşa of Erzurum in 1622. His destructive activities were not concentrated in Konya region. However, his troops were effective in neighboring regions of Kayseri and Niğde.³¹⁹ French agent notes state that his revolt caused damage in Karahisar (*Carahissar*), where he massacred the dwellers.³²⁰ Abaza challenged Serdâr Mehmet Paşa, who came with his army to convince him to end his revolt, around 1624 in Konya.

³¹⁵ Orbay, "Financial Development of the Waqfs in Konya and the Agricultural Economy in the Central Anatolia (Late Sixteenth-Early Seventeenth Centuries)" 104.

³¹⁶ Ibid., 104.

³¹⁷ Suraiya Faroqhi, "Vakıf Administration in Sixteenth Century Konya: The Zaviye of Sadreddin-i Konevi," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of Orient* 17/2 (1974): 162.

³¹⁸ İnalçık, *Devlet-i Aliyye*, II, 195.

³¹⁹ İnalçık, *Devlet-i Aliyye*, II, 194.

³²⁰ BNF.Français, 16149-4 (Années 1619-1624)/466-467. An another report dated 10th of September 1623 states that Abaza Paşa besieged an Ottoman Pasha (the name of the pasha is not clarified) in Karahisar (*douze journée d'icy*/12 days away from Pera) with a force of 30.000 men (*une armée de trente mille hommes*) and 20 pieces of artillery (*vingt pieces d'artillerie*). "This news worried the janissaries a little bit because the two letters (*courriers*) confirmed that Abaza Pasha did not pardon the janissaries when he took *Halissea* (it is understood from a different document that this is a village or town close to Georgian frontier) ... *The Grand Vizir and the Janissary Aga with his all militias (toute la milice) left Constantinople to defeat Abaza.*" BNF.Français, 16145-4 (Années 1605-1623)/210. An earlier report dated 3 September 1623 confirmed that Abaza had killed 500-600 janissaries in *Halissea*. BNF.Français, 16145-4 (Années 1605-1623)/202.

The account period of Mevlânâ demonstrates that the agricultural conditions in the waqf lands started to recover in 1623-4. There was not a drastic increase in the grain collection, but it was higher than the previous year. The next year, 1624-25, the traces of former agricultural failures were recovered partly. The registers show that the rural production normalized, when the prices of wheat and barley dropped almost to the old levels in 1625-6.³²¹

The account books of three waqfs signal that there were three periods of agricultural production decline. The first period coincides with the break out of the first Great Celali Rebellion. Karayazıcı is accepted to be the most destructive in the central Anatolian lands where these three waqfs were situated. The second period was triggered by the climatic conditions and Celali activities of Kalender Ođlu, Saît, rebellious Sancak Beyi Celali Musti and Sulimis Ođlu in Konya vicinity. The third period of crisis was around 1621-22 and 1622-3. Farođhi stated that the waqf of Sadreddîn-i Konevi went through a financial crisis in 1621-5 and she related the crisis to Celali activities. The revolt of Abaza broke out in 1622 in Erzurum. His revolt was effective in the vicinity of Konya, which might have damaged waqf villages. His revolt could have resulted in a drop of agricultural yields in 1622 and 1624. The decline and recovery periods point out that *the Celali Effect* on the agricultural production in the region was a short-term result.

3.1.b.2 Tokat

The region was ravaged several times by revolts of Karayazıcı, Deli Hasan, Taviil Halil and Meymun at the end of the 16th century.³²² The accounts of waqf of Hatuniyye reveal the level of destruction on the rural economy. The Celali desertion resulted in a drastic decline in rural revenues which ended in a financial crisis.

³²¹ Orbay, "Financial Development of the Waqfs in Konya and the Agricultural Economy in the Central Anatolia (Late Sixteenth-Early Seventeenth Centuries)" 106.

³²² Celali leader Meymun, brother of Kalenderođlu, traversed Tokat with his 6.000 men. Visit of such a big rebel army can be assumed to have disturbed the dwellers. Hammer-Purgstall, 8, *Histoire de l'Empire Ottoman*, 150.

The waqf did not experience any extraordinary agricultural failures or any economic crisis between 1593 and 1599. There were only minor fluctuations in agricultural production and cereal prices. It is unfortunate that after 1599 the records lack until 1610.³²³ The absence of registers prevent us from following the situation when the first great rebellion hit Tokat in 1601. The region was ravaged and a remarkable number of tax payers (around 80%) deserted their lands as handled in the first chapter. The size of destruction in the waqf lands and finance appears in 1610.

A comparison of 1599 - 1610 points out the expected *Celali Effect*. The waqf was going through a severe financial crisis between these two dates. The absence of records does not allow to see the destruction before 1610; however, it could be assumed that the waqf had already been dealing with severe financial difficulties. The waqf income fell drastically from 443.000 *akçe* to 119.000, which might have stemmed from *the Celali Effect*.³²⁴ The financial problems seem to have continued because the revenues declined to 78.000 *akçe* between 1610-1612.³²⁵ It seems that there were still problems with the lost tax base. Orbay states that the waqf did not show any significant recovery up to 1638.³²⁶

The Celali Effect on economy might be approved by disruption of charity activities and functioning of the waqf. The financial problems forced waqf administration to curb its expenses. For instance, while there were twenty employed personnels in 1593, it was decreased to six in 1612. The kitchen expenses were reduced, and they declined from 270.000 *akçe* (1593) to 5.820 (1614).³²⁷ The number of beneficiary was affected

³²³ Orbay, "A Case for Research in the "Celali Effect" on Rural Production and Demography in Central Anatolia; Revenue Loss and Shrinkage in the Waqf of Hatuniyye" 6.

³²⁴ Orbay, "A Case for Research in the "Celali Effect" on Rural Production and Demography in Central Anatolia; Revenue Loss and Shrinkage in the Waqf of Hatuniyye" 7.

³²⁵ Ibid., 7.

³²⁶ Abaza Paşa'a ravages in Tokat might have been effective on the ongoing difficulties. Roe, *The Negotiations*, 185.

³²⁷ Kayhan Orbay, "A Case for Research in the "Celali Effect" on Rural Production and Demography in Central Anatolia; Revenue Loss and Shrinkage in the Waqf of Hatuniyye" 9.

by crisis and their number was reduced from fourteen (1593) to two in 1610. The ongoing financial crisis forced waqf to shrink its fundamental charity activities.

A comparison of waqf of Hatuniyye with other three waqfs in Konya demonstrates that Hatuniyye experienced a deeper financial crisis during the revolts. This could be related to the three main factors. **a)** The Celali activities were more destructive. **b)** The waqf finance was not as powerful as other imperial waqfs in Konya. **c)** The waqf registers signal that, regardless of the level of Celali violence, the tax base of waqf did not return to their lands until 1639. There is no clear evidence to show if the revolts were more devastating than Konya, but the crisis was so severe in Tokat region that waqf of Hatuniyye had to close the public kitchen (*imâret*) between 1610-1612. The ongoing financial crisis of the waqf does not approve that depopulation continued in the whole region. As shown in the first chapter, there were peasants who returned back to their lands in the early 17th century. However, it could be assumed that the deserted waqf lands were not totally resettled at least until 1639. *The Celali Effect* is observed a longer term in the waqf lands of Hatuniyye, the Celali crisis, which started most possibly in the first years of the 17th century, continued up to 1638.

3.1.c Conclusion

The Ottoman rural economy went through a severe period of crisis between the first decades of the 16th century and the first half of the 17th century. The Celali revolts and the Great Flight, which led 70-80% of tax paying peasants to desert their lands, resulted in breakdown of cultivation and stock raising.

Narh prices indicate that low cereal production and stock raising caused a temporary period of food scarcity.³²⁸ The crisis in the wheat production might have resulted in derogation of breads. The weight of bread equal to 1 *akçe* was decreased gradually and it reached at the peak point in the Great Flight. Akdağ points out that the bread might have entered into a period of normalization thanks to the campaign of Kuyucu Murat.

³²⁸ The effects of instability of *akçe* is *a priori* accepted on the fluctuating prices.

The Celali Effect caused a short-term period of cereal scarcity. I argue that central Anatolia witnessed a moderate *tragedy of cereal* during the revolts.³²⁹ Cereal famine might have led peasants to eat lower quality bread.

The indices of *mühimme*, *telhis* and *narh* prove that the *tragedy of cereal* was accompanied with a shortage of meat. The drastic rise of meat prices between 1595 and 1609 points out a decline in the stock raising.³³⁰ As stated in the *mühimme* and *kadı* registers, the Celali bands were stealing livestock for their consumption and sale. There is no detailed numerical data for meat after Kuyucu Murat Paşa campaign (1609). On the other hand, as Akdağ stated the meat prices should have normalized partly after the campaign when a relative resettlement started.³³¹

The size of Celali destruction could be followed more detailed in the waqf account registers. Orbay's studies on the waqfs of Mevlâna, Konevî, Selîm II in Konya and Hatuniyye in Tokat demonstrate many periods of financial difficulties and agricultural declines. The waqf registers signaled a general regional agricultural crisis in Konya around the end of the 16th century, the first decade of the century and in 1621-22 - 1622-3. The three periods of decay could be associated with revolts of Karayazıcı, Deli Hasan, Kalender Oğlu, Sait, *Sulimis Oglu*, Celali *Musti* and Abaza Mehmet Paşa. The decline of rural revenues did not last more than 2-3 subsequent seasons, the *Celali Effect* was short term in Konya region.

On the other hand, the waqf of Hatuniyye experienced a deeper financial crisis. The registers reveal that agricultural lands were deserted and production had collapsed sometime between 1599 - 1610. The depopulation led by Karayazıcı, Deli Hasan and Tavi Halil might be the fundamental factor behind the agricultural production crisis. The waqf witnessed a financial catastrophe and it had to cease the basic charity activities. For instance, the waqf kitchen stopped to serve food to the needy between

³²⁹ For the original term "*La Tragédie du Blé*" Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *Les Paysans de Languedoc* (Paris : Flammarion, 1969), 82-84.

³³⁰ Akdağ, *Celâlî İsyamları*, 428.

³³¹ *Ibid.*, 426.

1610-1612.³³² The registers indicate that the financial situation of waqf and rural revenues did not recover so much until 1639. While the waqf in Konya overcame the *Celali Effect* in a few years, Hatuniyye was still suffering from breakdown of rural economy and depopulation of waqf lands. The long term *Celali Effect* is observed on the waqf finances in Tokat region.

Four waqfs from two different regions show that *the Celali Effect* changed regionally. They prove that it is not possible to speak a general *Celali Effect* at the same time for all parts of Anatolia.

The Celali Effect on rural economy had another side for peasantry. The *tragedy of cereal* ended up more expensive bread and, most possibly, lower quality bread. As for the meat, it did not constitute a major part as significant as bread in diet of an Ottoman peasant. French voyager Jean Dumont notes that the Turks do not raise livestock for meat, because the other products like leather and wool were much more valuable.³³³ However, it seems reasonable to state that the scarcity resulted in consumption of lesser meat.

3.2 Silk and Mohair Industry in the Celali Years

This chapter handles the obstacles in Bursa silk and Ankara mohair industries during the Celali uprisings. The first section aims at showing *the Celali Effect* on Bursa silk industry using price index of raw silk prepared by Çizakça.³³⁴ The second section argues that the Celali ravages caused a regional Ankara goat shortage and it resulted in a short period of difficulties in mohair and *sof* production. *The Celali Effect* on

³³² Orbay, “A Case for Research in the “Celali Effect” on Rural Production and Demography in Central Anatolia; Revenue Loss and Shrinkage in the Waqf of Hatuniyye” 9.

³³³ Jean Dumont, *Voyages de Mr. Du Mont en France, en Italie, en Allemagne, à Malthe et en Turquie*, vol.1 (La Haye: Etienne, 1699), 58.

³³⁴ Çizakça, “Price History and the Bursa Silk Industry: A Study in Ottoman Industrial Decline, 1550-1650,” *The Journal of Economic History* 40, 3 (Sep., 1980): 533-550.

mohair are dealt in two different regions, Ankara and Tosya, and local differences of *the Celali Effect* are emphasized.

3.2.a Bursa Silk Industry

Çizakça's price index of Bursa raw silk between 1550 and 1650 allows to follow price fluctuations in a long period of time.³³⁵ He associates the rises with the Price Revolution, Ottoman-Iran wars, Celali uprisings and increasing European demand. In this section I argue that the drastic rise of raw silk price at the turn of the century was related to the break out of the great Celali uprisings.

The index shows that the prices (in *akçe*) increased constantly between 1595 and 1603 about 78%. This period coincides with the *suhte* activities and boom of the first great revolt. The revolt of Karayazıcı and Hüseyin Paşa was effective in a wide area including Bursa.³³⁶ The following period witnessed Deli Hasan's revolt in 1602, which caused a great panic in Bursa.³³⁷ On the other hand, the price rises between 1595-1597 cannot be associated with the rebellions of 1598 and 1602. These rises could have been influenced by local production conditions or *suhte* movements, that have not been identified in detail yet.

The traces of small scale banditry of *suhtes* and the Celali groups before the boom of the great Celali Revolts are found in the voyage books. John Newberie, arrived at Bursa in 1581, witnessed execution of three thieves. H Lowry interprets this as the sparks of the Celali robbery in the region.³³⁸ Jean Palerne, voyager who traveled from Paris to Jerusalem for pilgrimage, visited Karaman sometime around 1581-1583. He

³³⁵ Çizakça used court registers about inheritance (*tereke defters*). The problems of these records to reflect the real market prices of goods are *a priori* accepted. For *tereke defters* and some of their problems, see Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "Edirne Askerî Kassamı'na Âit Tereke Defterleri (1545-1659)," *TTK Belgeler* III, 5-6 (1966): 1-18.

³³⁶ Evliya Çelebi, *Seyâhatnâme*, I, 222-223.

³³⁷ Dwellers of Bursa were asking for aid from the central state against Celali attacks. A group of bandits composed of 600 horsemen was active in Bursa in 1603. Akdağ, *Celâli İsyanları*, 375, 382.

³³⁸ Heath W. Lowry, *Seyyahların Gözüyle Bursa (1326-1923)*, trans. Seldar Alper (İstanbul:Eren Yayıncılık, 2004), 54.

states that while he was expecting to see a beautiful place, the town was in ruins. He notes to have seen a huge hole on the city walls.³³⁹ The voyager does not mention any specific reasons to explain the bad situation of the town. On the other hand, this destruction could be related to the activities of *suhtes* or Celali groups. A *mühimme* dated 1583 warns Mehmed Paşa about *suhte* destruction in Karaman. These *suhtes* were ravaging the region with bows and guns.

*Sûhte taifesi yanlarında görde ve ellerinde ok ve yay ve tüfenk ile cemiyyetle gezüp müslimânların akçe vü esbâb ü davaların ve oğulların alup küllî fesâd eyleyeler...yarar âdemlerünle ve muhâfazaya kalan sipâhîler ile kalkup al'l-gafle ol ehl-i fesâd olan sûhtelerin üzerine varup...*³⁴⁰

The effects of the 1578-1590 Ottoman-Iran war could be another contributing factor. As Ergenç states Ottoman-Iran wars led to some difficulties in supply and trade of silk.³⁴¹ On the other hand, Çizakça's raw silk price index shows that the Ottoman-Iran wars of 1603-12, 1615-18,³⁴² 1624-39 and price fluctuations were not very consistent.³⁴³ For instance, the price of raw silk experienced one of the lowest periods during the war of 1615-18. Even if the war of 1578-90 really increased the prices, this correlation may not be a general conclusion for other Ottoman-Iran wars and raw silk prices.³⁴⁴ While the prices increased around 14% between 1595-1597, the rise between

³³⁹ Jean Palerne, *Peregrination du S. Jean Palerne* (Lyon: Jean Pillehotte, 1606), 339-340.

³⁴⁰ Ülker, *Sultanın Emir Defteri*, 105.

³⁴¹ Ergenç, *Osmanlı Tarihi Yazıları*, 228-230. For the classic argument about the effects of the Safavid-Ottoman relations on silk, see Fahri Dalsar, *Türk Sanayi ve Ticaret Tarihinde Bursa'da İpekçilik* (İstanbul: Sermet Matbaası, 1960), 302-306, 335.

³⁴² A *mukataa* record shows that war with the Safavids had caused problems in *mukataa* of *mizan-ı harir* in 1616. "*Mahruse-i mezburda* (Bursa) *mizan-ı harir mukataası mültezimi olan Yasih nam-ı Yahudi geliip iltizamda olan mizan-ı harir mukataası Acem Seferi vaki olmağla çatdan(?) işlemeyüp külli kesirim olmagın...*" BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/113.

³⁴³ Çizakça, "Price History and the Bursa Silk Industry: A Study in Ottoman Industrial Decline, 1550-1650," 536.

³⁴⁴ H. Lowry, basing his argument on the interpretation of travel accounts, states that the flow of Iranian silk to Bursa might have declined in 1580s because of growing local production. Lowry, *Seyyahların Gözüyle Bursa*, 85. For increasing mulberry trees and local production, see Gerber, *Economy and Society*, 81-83. The high dependency on Iranian silk could have declined through the end of the 16th century. Bursa became one of the centers of silk production. Halil İnalçık, "İpek," *İslâm Ansiklopedisi* 22 (2000): 364.

1597-1603 was around 56%. The accelerating price rises at the turn of the century could be associated directly with the Celali destruction.³⁴⁵ The destruction can be traced in *mukataa* registers. There were financial difficulties, *mültezims* (tax-farmers) could not make payments and demand for *mukataas* declined around 1603-1604. The Celali destruction is followed clearly on the *mukataas* of *şemhane* (candlemaker) and mine.

*Mahruse-i Bursa'da vâki şemhâne mukâtaasının bir tahvili yüz altmış bin akçe ve ihzariye mukâtaasının bir tahvili yüz otuz bin akçe Nusrettin nâm kimesne uhdesinde iltizâmda iken tahvilleri tamâm olah hayli zaman mürur edip mezkûr mukâtaalara tâlip ahir zuhur eylemeyüp...mezbûr Nusrettin meclis-i şerhe ihzar olunup sual olundukda şöyle cevâp eder...Celâlî eşkiyası müstevli olmak ile berât ittirmek müyesser olmayıp ve ol arzlar zâyî olup gitmiştir...bu kulları uhdesinde yalnız şemhâne mukâtaası kalup aslen iyileşmeyüp muattal kalmıştır...mukâtaa-yı mezbûre iki seneden ziyâdedir ki bî-berattır.*³⁴⁶

The mine *mukataa* in İnegöl was going through difficulties because the dwellers in the region had dispersed.

*Hâlâ İnegöl madencilerinden ? nâmı zımî divân-ı âliye gelip ve arz-ı hal sunup hâlâ emin nâzırımız olmamakla maadenler battal kalıp mâl-ı miriye külli zarar olmuştur...reaya ihtilalden hâli olmayup maaden battal olmuştur...*³⁴⁷

Mukataas in the region continue to signal destruction in the following years. There were some problems in 1609 in İnegöl mines and some Bursa *hasları*.

Eşkiya ve haramzade ihrak ü binnar idüp ve ekser katl idüp bir nefer kimesne kalmayup bir akçe hasıl olmayup ve bunlardan maada

³⁴⁵ The destruction of Katır Hanı (Mehmed Bey Hanı) could be one of the most solid examples of Celali destruction of silk trade and supply. Dalsar states that this *han* may have been a residence of silk merchants. Dalsar, *Bursa'da İpekçilik*, 21.

³⁴⁶ BOA. MAD.d, 04684/66-67.

³⁴⁷ BOA.MAD.d,04689/64.

Anca(?) kurayı dahi ihrak eylemişlerdir...İnegöl maadeninde bir dane işçi ve bayıcı (?) ve üstâd kalmayup...Rumeli'den üstâd gelmesi için arzlar gelüp...vech-i meşruh üzere Bursa ve Yenişehir ve ? ve Kine(?) ve İnegöl kadıları dahi arzlar göndermişler ve mukâtaalar külli kesir ve zarar eylemişlerdir...³⁴⁸

The İnegöl mine *mukataa* was still experiencing difficult years and it was sold to a tax farmer 50.000 *akçe* lower (*İnegöl madeni elli bin akçe aşağı olmak üzere*) than normal price in 1613.³⁴⁹ The *mukataa* signals traces of recovery towards 1616 as the tax farmer offered 50.000 *akçe* increase (*ziyade*).

Hüdavendigâr Sancağı'nda vâkî İnegöl maadeni mukâtaası bundan akdem bin yirmi beş şevvali guresinde üç yıla iki yüz seksen yedi bin beş yüz akçeye dergâh-ı âli çavuşlarından Ali çavuş nâm kimesne uhdesinde iltizâmda olup hâlâ tahvili tamâm olup tahammül olmamasıyla kimesne talep olmayup hali ve muattal kalmış iken hâliya mahruse-i Bursa'da Hazret-i Emir Sultan mahallesi sakinlerinden Hüseyin kulları divân-ı âliye gelüp mukâtaa-yı mezbûrenin tahvil-i cedide işbu bin yirmi dört şevvali guresinde elli bin akçe ziyade ile üç yıla üç yüz otuz yedi bin beş yüz akçeye iltizâm kabul ederim şol şartla ki...³⁵⁰

The price of raw silk in 1603 (351.05) remained the highest until 1635 (373.47). The price starts to decline after 1603 until 1617.³⁵¹ This could indicate four points about *the Celali Effect*. Firstly, the effects of revolts of Karayazıcı, Hüseyin Paşa and Deli Hasan on the production and supply did not last very long. Secondly, the uprising of Kalenderoğlu (active between 1604-1608) and his destruction in Bursa around 1608 did not affect the silk remarkably. Thirdly, the short period of normalization after Kuyucu campaign in 1608 might have led prices to drop. The effect of the campaign is seen in the raw silk price index, when the prices declined sharply in 1608 compared

³⁴⁸ BOA.Bab-1 Defteri, 24265/8-9.

³⁴⁹ BOA.Bab-1 Defteri, 24265/8.

³⁵⁰ BOA.Bab-1 Defteri, 24265/59.

³⁵¹ Apart from the great revolts, this period kept witnessing Celali destruction. Tavukpazarı Hamamı was damaged by the Celalis in 1619. Ergenç, *Şehir, Toplum Devlet*, 94. The high amount of repair costs of Sultan Murad II waqf could be associated with Celali events in Bursa region in 1609. Kayhan Orbay, "Bursa'da Sultan II. Murad Vakfı'nın Mali Tarihi (1608-1641)," *İ.Ü. İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 61 (2011): 311.

to the previous year. Fourthly, it can signal that the population was not disturbed remarkably, which could have affected silk production negatively. Gerber's findings on the population³⁵² confirm that the region suffered lesser than central Anatolian lands some of which experienced a demographic drop around 70-80%. He argued that rural and urban population of Bursa had increased during the rebellion years.³⁵³ Bursa could have been regarded a secure town against Celali attacks and it received Celali immigrants.³⁵⁴ The traces of rise can be seen in some *mukataa* registers during the revolt of Abaza Paşa. It is understood that the number of *cizye* households (*hane-i cizye*) increased from 270 households to 280 around 1622-1624. These were the *cizye* households attached to the *mukataa* land. These new comers could be the Celali immigrants coming from eastern Anatolia during the revolt of Abaza Paşa in Erzurum around 1622.³⁵⁵

The price decay until 1617 experienced a 93% rise in 1622. *Mukataa* records signal some difficulties for payments of silk *mukataas* (*mukataa-yı mizan-ı harir*) between 1622 and 1624 in Bursa.³⁵⁶ The price rise and difficulties in *mukataa* payments could signal some problems in production and silk supply. The index does not monitor the prices until 1627. The price of 1627 was still high compared to years 1607-1617. Even if the price fluctuations between 1622 and 1627 are not demonstrated, the high prices of 1622 and 1627 could signal some problems in Bursa silk. These rises could be related to increasing local banditry and murder of Sultan Osman II in 1622 which led to the revolt of Abaza Paşa in the same year. As a French report, dated 13 October 1623, states Abaza Paşa besieged Bursa and he managed to defeat all janissaries (*tous les janissaries de cet empire*) commanded by Sinan Paşa (*Cigale*).³⁵⁷ It could be assumed that prices rose remarkably in 1623 because of the great rebellion.

³⁵² See Gerber, *Economy and Society*, 12-16.

³⁵³ *Ibid.*, 12-13.

³⁵⁴ Gerber, *Economy and Society*, 13

³⁵⁵ “*Nefs-i Bursa’da kadimde 270 hane-i cizyeleri olup 10 hane zeyl olup ceman 280 hane olup...*” In the following part of the document, the total amount that *mültezim* would collect from these *cizye hanes* is calculated. BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 25377/1

³⁵⁶ BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 25377/1.

³⁵⁷ BNF.Français, 16145-4 (Années 1605-1623)/222.

The index shows that the prices declined around 67% between 1627 and 1630. The destruction of Abaza Paşa in the region had already ended in these years and decaying prices could be affected by safe environment. Therefore, it could be stated that *the Celali Effect* caused a short term effect on the raw silk prices in Bursa. There was a sharp price rise in 1622 and most possibly the prices reached the top in 1623 when the town was besieged. Since there is not a price index for this year, it cannot be maintained with numerical data. On the other hand, the difficulties in payment of silk *mukataas* between 1622-1624 seem to be a solid example of some difficulties in the production. There is no price data between 1622 and 1627 but the prices declined in 1627 and the following periods. It seems that once Abaza Paşa left the town, the prices might have started to decay, which reached the lowest point in 1630. The revolts damaged Bursa silk but *the Celali Effect* was seen short term. Once the revolts ended, the high prices started to normalize.

3.2.b Ankara Mohair

As there are not many studies showing price index of Ottoman textile, the traces of *the Celali Effect* on mohair³⁵⁸ are aimed to be followed through different sources like voyage literature and works based on the primary sources like *kadı sicils* and *fermans*.³⁵⁹ The works share the common point that the production of mohair experienced difficult years at the turn of the 16th century when the Celalis plundered Ankara goats (*tiftikkeçisi*) with other livestock. *The Celali Effect* on mohair is dealt in

³⁵⁸ Mohair was a special raw material obtained from Ankara goat. It was believed that the goat was peculiar to Anatolian steppe and the quality of the mohair would be worse when the goats were taken from their natural habitats. Faroqi states that Evliya Çelebi mentions the failures of Europeans when they tried to breed this animal in their own countries. Suraia Faroqi, "Mohair Manufacture and Mohair Workshops in Seventeenth-Century Ankara", *İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası* 41, 1-4 (1985):211-212. French traveler and historian Jean Dumont (1667-1727), who possibly saw Ankara goat during his trip in the Ottoman Empire, differentiates this species from ones he saw in Europe. "A different type of sheep is bred in Anatolia, which were physically different than sheeps in Europe (*Des Moutons d'Occident*). This different type was bigger than others and its tail seems distinct. The climatic conditions and peculiar herbage caused this different type of sheep to appear." Dumont, *Voyages de Mr. Du Mont*, 58.

³⁵⁹ There are only a few price studies of Ottoman textile in the 16th and 17th centuries. Barkan had pioneered the field. See Barkan, "Edirne Askerî Kassamı'na Âit Tereke Defterleri (1545-1659)," 1-479.

two regions, Ankara and Tosya (in Kastamonu), where the production of mohair and *sof* was an outstanding economic activity.³⁶⁰

Polish traveler Simeon could be one of the first voyagers who saw the Celali destruction in the first years of the 17th century. A case he witnessed is important to see the size of *the Celali Effect* on Ankara mohair. Some sellers were brought to *kadı* court, their guilt was to attempt to sell mohair, brought from Ankara, Sofya and Tosya, mixed with wool. The sellers confessed that the Celalis ravaged all goats in the empire (*Celaliler keçileri telef ve gasp etmiş olduklarından, memlektimizde tiftik kalmayıp...*), which forced them to sell the false mohair.³⁶¹

There are sources which approve that *sof* production went through some difficulties at the end of the 16th century in Tosya region because of Celali movements. Faroqhi points out that Tosya craftsmen asked for permission to shorten the length of *sof* used in *kaftans*. The craftsmen were given permission by an imperial order (*ferman*) around the 1600s to shorten them from 12 to 11 *arşın*.³⁶² Faroqhi associates this request with destructive effects of the banditry activities. A *mukataa* record reveals that Kastamonu was ravaged by Karayazıcı and Deli Hasan with a Celali army composed of 1000 bandits in 1600-1601.

*Teftiş olundukda iptida 1009 tarihinde huruç eden Karayazıcı ve kardaşı Deli Hasan nâm reis eşkıyasınca bin eşkıya ile gelüp livaya mezbûre (Kastamonu) üzerine müstevli olup nice fukarâyı katl ve emval ve erzaklarını yağma ve garet eylediklerini ektirip sürülmeyip reaya perişan olduklarından...gayri târih-i mezbûrda bin on altı senesine gelinceye değin reis-i eşkıyadan Karakaş, Kalenderoğlu, Kara Said, Küçük Hüseyim ve Top nam-ı Celâlilerin hareketinden bâkî kalan reaya dahi dağılıp gitmişlerdir...*³⁶³

³⁶⁰ *Sof* was woven mainly in Tosya, Koçhisar and Ankara. Kütükoğlu, *Osmanlılarda Narh Müessesesi*, 59.

³⁶¹ Andreasyan, *Polonyalı Simeon*, 37.

³⁶² Faroqhi, *Osmanlı'da Kentler ve Kentliler*, 175.

³⁶³ BOA.MAD.d,04684/114. Presence of such a Celali army may have affected *sof* in Tosya.

The insecurity that the first Celali uprisings created damaged the production and trade of mohair and *sof*. The length of cloth was still 14 *arşın* in Koçhisar around 1588-89 before the great Celalis.³⁶⁴ Even if the great revolts were not concentrated in Tosya, the region was affected negatively because the Celalis could possibly block the trade routes during their raids in Kastamonu, which might have created a mohair (*tiftik*) shortage. The complaints on shorter kaftans increased remarkably around 1600s and it supports the idea about increasing difficulties in mohair production.³⁶⁵

As I argued before, *the Celali Effect* differed regionally. While Tosya was not a center of Celali violence, Celali banditry caused some difficulties in mohair supply and *sof* production. This could be related to the conditions of protection. Tosya was not well protected with fortified walls, compared to Bursa and Ankara, and it was more susceptible to any Celali ravages.³⁶⁶ Ankara experienced several attacks of big Celali armies; however, it could overcome the revolts and mohair trade could continue even at the turn of the 16th century, when the great revolts broke out. Faroqhi states that Ankara was protected with fortified walls and it was a big town which could have provided a relatively good situation for production and trade in the revolt years.³⁶⁷ The number of inhabitants in Ankara did not decline as much as some of the other towns in the central Anatolia and it could prevent any discontinuation in the production and trade.³⁶⁸ Ergenç's detailed studies on Ankara mohair trade verify Faroqhi's assertion. His findings indicate that the mohair trade at the turn of the century was very active. While the armies of Karayazıcı and Hasan Paşa were ravaging central Anatolian lands, there were European merchants in Ankara who came to buy mohair in 1599.³⁶⁹

³⁶⁴ Faroqhi, *Osmanlı'da Kentler ve Kentliler*, 175.

³⁶⁵ See *Ibid.*, 175.

³⁶⁶ The Celalis were more effective in rural lands than the towns because of the same reason. The level of rural depopulation was much more higher than the urban.

³⁶⁷ Faroqhi, *Osmanlı'da Kentler ve Kentliler*, 175.

³⁶⁸ Faroqhi, "Mohair Manufacture and Mohair Workshops in Seventeenth-Century Ankara," 234.

³⁶⁹ Ergenç, *Osmanlı Tarihi Yazıları*, 156.

Continuing Celali attacks in the following years could not preclude Ottoman and foreign merchants to come to the town for trade.³⁷⁰

The price fluctuations of mohair have not been brought into the light yet. However, it could be assumed that prices experienced fluctuations in upward trends.³⁷¹ As I argued for the silk, the price rises would not have lasted more than a few years for mohair. *The Celali Effect* was seen on short term on mohair.

3.2.c Conclusion

The major textile sectors of Bursa silk and Ankara mohair went through a short period of difficulties during the revolts. The index pointed out that the price of raw silk increased at the turn of the century, which lasted continuously until 1603. The decisive factor behind this rise could be associated with the Celali uprisings. The armies damaged the production and blocked the trade ways which could stop the silk production and flow in the town.³⁷² The following years showed a period of price decay until 1622 and this can be interpreted as a short term *Celali Effect*. The regional conditions and Kuyucu campaign prepared suitable conditions to recover silk production and trade.

As far the situation of mohair, two different regions were handled. The first region, Tosya, demonstrated that the uprisings affected the sector. Faroqi's statement, based

³⁷⁰ Ibid., 156-161. The European demand for Ankara *sof* and *tiftik* was so high that Ankara craftsmen wanted the center to forbid sale of these goods to European merchants in 1615. Ankara craftsmen were about to experience difficulties in providing *tiftik* for *sof* production. Tabakoğlu, *Osmanlı Maliyesi*, 237.

³⁷¹ French diplomat Louis Deshayes de Courmenin (1600-1632), who was in the Ottoman capital in 1624, mentions that Abaza Paşa was in Ankara with his 80.000 soldiers sometimes around 1623-4. If his words are taken into consideration, (despite possible exaggeration of the number) presence of such a big Celali army in the town could be assumed to affect the mohair production, trade and prices. "He is now in Ankara (Angoury) with his 80.000 men." Louis Deshayes de Courmenin, *Voyage de Levant: Fait par le Commandement du Roy en l'année 1621* (Paris: A. Tapupinard, 1624), v.

³⁷² The Celali armies could block the city ways, which would cut connection with surrounding towns or the center. For instance, Karayazıcı had blocked the ways to Sivas during his ravage. "*Sivas beğlerbeğisi hâlâ Sivas içinde imiş ve sakî-i mezbûr Sivas çayırklarına konmuş, yanında olan eşkıyanın havfından ne kimse şehre girer ve ne hod şehrden çıkar...*" Orhonlu, *Telhisler*, 14.

on *fermans* and court records, was an indicator of difficulties in mohair supply and *sof* production. Ankara went through a relatively good period in terms of trade and production compared to Tosya. Ergenç's findings show that the mohair could overcome the Celali crisis in Ankara. Regardless of the destruction in the region, Ottoman, Venetian, Polish and English merchants visited the town often even during the revolts. As Faroqhi states the fortified walls and relatively less Celali depopulation helped the town. Moreover, the region recovered its population fast when the difficult years of Celalis came to an end.³⁷³

The level of Celali destruction changed regionally and it is quite normal to observe the effects at different sizes. This difference could be associated with the degree of Celali violence and some peculiar conditions such as being well fortified with strong walls and a good location as seen in Ankara. While textile in Bursa and Tosya experienced difficulties years, Ankara seems to have overcome the revolts better compared to them. There is not a mohair price index, but it would be reasonable to assume that the prices fluctuated during the revolts. A possible price rise associated with the Celalis would have lasted a short period. Regardless of this idea on mohair prices, the other examples indicate that *the Celali Effect* on silk and mohair textile was not long term and the sectors escaped the revolts without severe loss.

3.3 The Adaptation of the Central Finance System

The Ottomanists have argued that the central treasury experienced fiscal difficulties between the late 16th century and early 17th century. The argument was developed basically on the effects of the changing trade routes, advent of great amount of cheap American silver to Ottoman Empire, "decline" of Ottoman industry and luxury consumption of the ruling class.³⁷⁴ The changing military technology was put forward

³⁷³ Faroqhi, "Mohair Manufacture and Mohair Workshops in Seventeenth-Century Ankara," 234.

³⁷⁴ See Barkan, "The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning Point in the Economic History of the Near East," 5. Two pearls costed 10.000 *sequins* (gold coins) might be a solid example of luxury consumption of the ruling class in the era financial difficulties and Celali activities (1606). This had attracted the attention of the French embassy. BNF.Français, 16145-4 (Années 1605-1623)/63.

to have contributed to the fiscal crisis. The increasing dependency on fire arms resulted in expansion of janissary army and recruitment of mercenary soldiers called *sarıca* and *sekban*, which increased burden on the central treasury.³⁷⁵ The long-lasting wars on two fronts against Safavid and Habsburg exhausted Ottoman treasury. The inflationary period and debasements exacerbated the financial crisis. *Telhis* of Vezir Yemişçi Hasan Paşa (in office between 1601-1603) at the turn of the century could be regarded as a reflection of these financial difficulties:

*Saâdetlü pâdişahım baş defterdâr kulunuzu çağırdup hâzînedede ne mikdâr altun vardur deyü suâl eyledüğümde 50.000 çil akça vardur, gayri nesne yoktur deyü cevâb eyledi; devletlü pâdişâhum hâlâ hazînenin müzâyakası kemâlinedür malûm-ı humâyûnunuzdur ki akça tahsîl edecek bir yer yokdur ve az çok tahsîl olunan akçanın dahu kimin Matbah-ı âmireye ve kimin Âhura ve kimi dahu sâir mevâcibe sarf olunur ve akça yetüşmeyüp kalanın dahu nihâyeti yokdur husûsâ cebeci ve topçu ve ehl-i hiref ve âhur ve tersâne halkunun dahu ekserine mevâcib verilmemişdür her gün gelüp ulûfelerin taleb etmeden hâli değıllerdür; mesârîfe nihâyet yok nereden tahsîl edeceğümüz bilemezüz...ve şimdi bir mevâcib dahu gelüp erişdi hazîne olmaduğundan aklumuz başumuzda değıldür eğer memleket mamûr olup akça tahsîli mümkün olsa devletlü pâdişâhumdan sakınur mıydum?*³⁷⁶

It is known that the treasury was already under the pressure of increasing expenditures before Vezir Yemişçi Hasan Paşa wrote this *telhis*. Akdağ states that the central treasury was experiencing difficulties as early as the beginning of the second half of the 16th century.³⁷⁷ The Ottoman statesmen had taken some cautions to overcome the financial difficulties. One of the fastest responses to the crisis was the debasement of Ottoman *akçe* around 1584-6. However, as the Ottoman statesmen were aware, the

³⁷⁵ İnalçık, "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700," 292. Janissary number increased from 12.789 in 1568 to 37.627 in 1609. The first official translator of French embassy, Guillaume Postel (1510-1582) was sent by François I to the imperial center, mentions that the number of janissaries around 1550s was around 12.000-13.000. See Guillaume Postel, *La Tierce Partie des Orientales Histoires, ou est Exposée La Condition, Puissance & Revenue de l'Empire Turquesque: avec Toutes Les Provinces & Pais Generalement depuis 950 Ans en Ça par Tous Ismaelites Conquis* (Poitiers: Enguilbert de Marnef, 1559), 30.

³⁷⁶ Orhonlu, *Telhisler*, 30.

³⁷⁷ Akdağ, *İktisadi ve İçtimai Tarih*, 656.

debasement was a short-term solution. It was argued that the debasement contributed to instability of *akçe* and worsening fiscal problems.³⁷⁸

The failure of debasement in the long term and the deepening financial crisis ended in a principal change in the Ottoman taxation system. The center adapted the taxation to current conditions. The practice of classic system of *tahrir* diminished and *avarız* system came forward as an important source of revenue.³⁷⁹ While the center was dealing with economic problems and increasing need for cash, the Celali Revolts had broken out in the central Anatolia. Taking the conditions mentioned above into consideration, I argue that *the Celali Effect* on the period of fiscal transformation is seen in three ways. Firstly, one of the most important cash revenues of the treasury³⁸⁰, Anatolian *mukataas* collected through *iltizam* or *emanet* system, started to decline as early as the end of the 16th century with the boom of the first great revolts. Difficulties in collection decreased the annual revenues of the central treasury. Secondly, the Celali desolation in timar villages resulted in disfunction of this timar system because the primary condition of the system, peasants attached to the soil, was destructed. Thirdly, declining *mukataa* revenues and payments expected from provincial treasures led center to increase the share of expenses from central treasury for the Celali campaigns. This situation increased the pressure on the central treasury and accelerated ongoing fiscal difficulties.

3.3.1 On the Transformation of Taxation

The social and economic changes had usually been interpreted as the signs of “decline” or “corruption” in the earlier Ottoman historiography.³⁸¹ This was closely related to the domination of Ottoman chronics and *nasihatnames* (advice literature) on history writing, which lasted until the late 20th century. The writers of these works described

³⁷⁸ Pamuk, *Paranın Tarihi*, 153-156.

³⁷⁹ The practice of classic *tahrirs* was not abandoned completely in the 17th century. For instance, there is a *mufassal* (detailed) *tahrir* register for Ordu in 1613. See Bahaeddin Yediyıldız, *Ordu Kazası Sosyal Tarihi (1455-1613)* (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1985).

³⁸⁰ Çakır, *Osmanlı Mukataa Sistemi*, 71-73.

³⁸¹ For instance, see Barkan, “The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning Point in the Economic History of the Near East,” 5.

any changes in their times as breakdown of traditional institutions (*kadimden gelen*).³⁸² Linda Darling's detailed studies on Ottoman treasury offices depicted that the Ottoman fiscal crisis and following changes should be regarded as efforts of adaptation to the new conditions. She highlighted that the changes in the classic land system and taxation were applied to overcome the fiscal crisis.³⁸³ These were not signals of decline or corruption as chroniclers and *nasihatname* writers had dictated once.

3.3.1.a Shift from *Tahrir Registers* to *Avarız*

Avarız (*avarız-divaniye* and *tekalif-i örfiye*) was composition of taxes either paid in kind (*nüzul*, *sürsat* and *iştira*), cash (*avarız akçesi*) or some services.³⁸⁴ It was levied for extraordinary cases usually at the times of wars. The amount of tax was not predetermined, it changed according to burden of the war. The tax was imposed to a predetermined number of *avarızhanes*. It was collected from Muslim and non-Muslim *reayas* who could provide their living from any urban or rural property.³⁸⁵ Some exemptions were given under various conditions.³⁸⁶ For instance, *derbendcis* (guardians of mountain passes), *köprücüs* (bridge guardians), *madencis* (miners) and *çeltükçüs* (rice grower) were exempted from *avarız*.³⁸⁷ Moreover, the central state could exempt some groups which were not very suitable to yield required tax. For instance, *reaya* living around the war zone would be exempted.³⁸⁸

³⁸² See Douglas Howard, "The Ottoman Tımar System and Its Transformation, 1563-1656" (Unpublished Doctorate's Thesis, Indiana University, 1987), 22-29. I am thankful to Douglas Howard for sharing his thesis with me.

³⁸³ See Darling, *Revenue-Raising*. Idem, "Ottoman Fiscal Administration: Decline or Adaptation?" 157-160.

³⁸⁴ Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "Avârız" *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, II (1979), 13.

³⁸⁵ Tabakoğlu, *Osmanlı Maliyesi*, 155.

³⁸⁶ Barkan, "Avârız" 15.

³⁸⁷ Darling states that 20-40% of the total number of households was exempted from *avarız*. There were some other groups which were given exemption. See Darling, *Revenue-Raising*, 88-89. For instance, a *mukataa* record highlights that 250 (out of 3050) non-Muslim *nefers* were exempted from *avarız-ı divaniye* and *tekalif-i örfiye* for their services in Limni Castle. There were 4000 *normal cizye hanes*. BOA.MAD.d,01850/44.

³⁸⁸ Darling, *Revenue-Raising*, 89.

The imposition of *avarız* tax was an exception in the early 16th century and it was collected once needed. However, it was turned into a regular tax at the end of the century.³⁸⁹ According to Koca Sinan Paşa, it became an annual exaction during the Safevid campaign in 1580s owing to increasing expenditures.³⁹⁰ Historian Selaniki states that it was collected every year in the first five years of reign of Mehmet III (1595-1603) but Murad III (1574-1595) had never levied *avarız*.³⁹¹ İnalçık asserts that it might have been turned into regular tax in the period of 1593-1606 Ottoman-Habsburg war.³⁹² Darling highlights that it became annual during the long war with the Habsburgs (1593-1606) and she claims that the transformation to a regular collection was completed by 1620-1621.³⁹³ The effects of expansion of janissary army and burden of wars in the center may have played the decisive role. *Avarız* continued to be levied regularly after the war and this registering system took place of classic *tahrir* registers, which started to be practiced for some special cases after 1580s. Accepting the effects of wars and increasing expenditures, I argue that the Celali Revolts exacerbated the financial crisis and influenced the fiscal transformation period in three ways.

3.3.1.a.1 Mukataa Revenue Collection Problems

The *has mukataa* registers of Anatolia indicate that the tax farmers were going through a period of severe difficulties to make payments to the center in the Celali years. The tax farmer, whose *mukataa* did not function properly, could not make payments. As the *mukataa defters* of Rumeli and Anatolia are compared, the *mukataa* payments coming from Rumeli constituted the major part. On the other hand, some cases showed that the amount of the *bakis* (arrear) in Anatolian *mukataas* exceeded a few millions of *akçe*, which deserves the attention. The cases show that even modest amounts of *akçe*, compared to the yearly budget and Rumeli *mukataas*, could be very important

³⁸⁹ Barkan, “The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning Point in the Economic History of the Near East,” 26; Darling, *Revenue-Raising*, 90.

³⁹⁰ See Sahillioğlu, ed. *Koca Sinan Paşa'nın Telhisleri*, no.105, 146-147.

³⁹¹ Darling interprets this as an exaggeration of Selaniki. Darling, *Revenue-Raising*, 93.

³⁹² İnalçık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700,” 315.

³⁹³ Darling, *Revenue-Raising*, 93.

for the center owing to the financial pressure. An example from 1609-1610 points to the level of financial difficulties and cash need. A *mühimme* register points that the center was requesting (*tedarik ve irsal*) 2.000.000 *akçe* (20 *yük akçe*) hastily (*ber vech-i isti'cal*) from Karaman *mukataas* for military payments (*kul mevacibi için*).³⁹⁴ I argue that the destruction of *mukataa* lands and following collection problems exacerbated ongoing fiscal difficulties. As an addition to increasing sums which the center could not collect, the demand for *mukataa* lands and *mukataa* values declined in the Celali years because the insecure atmosphere created by the bandits discouraged tax farmers to be a candidate.

The *mukataa* revenues of the central treasury started to decline with the boom of the first great revolts. A record from 1601 was pointing to the *baki akçes* and *gühercile* from 1599 in Uşak. The amount of tax farmer's debt reached to 7.447.812 *akçe* and 3819 *kantar gühercile*. The *gühercile* (nitre) was paid in kind because this raw material was used to produce gunpowder.

*Nezâretinde bâkî kalan 43 yük ve doksan sekiz bin yüz dört akçe ki ceman zıkr olunan bekaya-yı ? ve cedid yetmiş dört yük ve kırk yedi bin sekiz yüz on iki akçe olup Celâlî zühûr etmekle vilayet ihtilal üzere olup ve nezâretlerin dahi tahvil-i cedidleri dört kimesneye virilüp miri yetmiş ve seksen atlu ile devr etmekle fukarânın tahammüleri olmadığından... Mehmet ve Numân çavuşun iki tahvilden ? teslimâtlarından maada bâkî kalan üç bin sekiz yük doksan kantar gühercile...*³⁹⁵

A *mukataa* record points out that after Yenişehir *has mukataa* agreement came to the end in 1601-1602 (*tahvili tamam olup*), no candidate wanted (*talep ve rağbet olmadığından*) to buy the *iltizam* for a while (*bu ana değin hali kalıp*).³⁹⁶ It is acceptable that the *mültezims*, who were not very sure about his economic profits in the era of Celali violence, did not aspire to be a candidate.

³⁹⁴ BOA.Mühimme Defteri, 78 (h.1018/m.1609-1610): 5/12.

³⁹⁵ BOA.MAD.d,18147/6-7

³⁹⁶ BOA.Bab-ı Defteri,26001/1.

An another example from Kastamonu depicts that the Celalis destructed the *mukataa* stealing *gühercile* produced. The dwellers on the *mukataa* land deserted and it stopped functioning.

“*Karayazıcı'nın adamları kârhane üzerine gelip (gühercile madeni) üç kantar hâsıl olmuş gühercileyi ahz idüp, reayası dahi celâ-yı vatan edip kârhaneleri hâli ve muattal olduğunu ilâm ederler.*”³⁹⁷

Tax farmers were not willing to buy *mukataas* in Ankara, İnönü and Sultanönü regions between 1599-1602 because of insecure environment.³⁹⁸ As some *mukataas* left unsold more than 5 months, the center tried to sell them without any increase in the *mukataa* values. An another record signals that these regions were still coping with some difficulties in 1603 because of land desertion.

“*Mukâtaa-yı mezbûre ziyade perakende ve perişan olup...külli mâl zayîi olunmak üzere...*”³⁹⁹

A petition sent by the inspector (*müfettiş*)⁴⁰⁰ demonstrates that there was a severe problem in *mukataa* revenue collection in a huge geography between 1602-1605. It seems that the tax farmer could not make any payment and *baki* was 850.000 *akçe*.

Müfettiş Mevlânâ Abdürrahman arz gönderüp bundan akdem vilayet-i Anadolu ve Karaman ve Rum ve Diyarbekir ve ?...cizye-i kıbtıyan ve cizye-i ? ve cinâyet-i ? ve ? mukâtaası 1010 zi'lkaadesinin yirmisinden üç yıla sekiz yük ve elli bin akçeye iltizâm iden Süleymân Çavuş gelüp mukâtaa-yı mezbûre ziyade perakende ve perişan ve kesr-i mukâtaa olunmak ile şimdiye değin tahvil ? tutanlar haklaşmayıp külli bâkileri kalmış iken bu kulları dahi

³⁹⁷ BOA.MAD.d,04689/70.

³⁹⁸ BOA.MAD.d,18147/11.

³⁹⁹ BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24262/4. For similar cases from Bursa, Kastamonu, İnegöl *mukataas* see BOA.MAD.d,04689/5, 9, 29, 63-64; BOA.MAD.d,04684/1, 66-68, 114-115, 123.

⁴⁰⁰ For *müfettiş* see Çakır, Osmanlı Mukataa Sistemi, 6-7.

Celâlî hayfindan çıkup ? akçe kefiline mecal olmaya...bana külli zulüm olmuştur...⁴⁰¹

A petition of Piri Çavuş clarifies that the *mukataas* in Bursa were dealing with the Celali destruction and there was 240.000 *akçe baki* around 1609.

Celâlî eşkıyası müstevli olmağla mukâtaa battal kalmagın...tahvili yüz ellişer bin akçe üzere bî-berât ve bilâ-kefil zabt ittirüp hala iki tahvil de mürur idüp teslimatları görüldükde iki yüz kırk bin akçe bâkileri zühur eyleyüp talep olundukda külli kesr eyledim deyü cevap verüp mezbûrlar müflis ve diyûn olmağla...⁴⁰²

The value of Yenişehir and İnegöl mine *mukataas* signaled difficulties in 1609. After the petitions, which highlighted that the *mukataa* lands could not function properly, the *mukataa* value was decreased.

Eşkiya haramzade ihrak ve binnar idüp ekser katl idüp bir nefer kimesne kalmayup bir akçe hasil olmayup...tahammülleri yoktur deyü kazanın arzları mucebince...İnegöl maadeni elli bin akçe aşağı olmak üzere deruhte olunup...⁴⁰³

A register of Mihaliç points out a severe payment problem in 1609-1610. The center emphasized the financial pressure (*müzayaka virmek üzeredir*) and requested 7.000.000 *akçe baki* to be sent.

“Hala dahi bâkî olan yetmiş yük hassa harc? Hasan kulları mübaşeretiyile tedarik ve irsâl üzere...teala ihmal olunmayup irsâl ve itmam...”⁴⁰⁴

⁴⁰¹ BOA.Bab-1 Defteri, 24262/1

⁴⁰² BOA. Bab-1 Defteri, 24265/60.

⁴⁰³ BOA. Bab-1 Defteri, 24265/8-9

⁴⁰⁴ BOA.MAD.d,04684/52.

The destruction caused *mukataas* to remain unsold usually for a few months and, in rare cases, some years. Certain *mukataas* in Bursa remained unsold during two years after the end of the contract in 1611.

“*Bursa’da vâkî bozahane ve han-ı cedid mukâtaası bin yirmi muharreminin guresinde üç yıla yüz yirmi bin akçe iltizâmda tahvili tamâm olup âhirde talep zühur eylemeyüp iki sene hâlî kalıp...*”⁴⁰⁵

There were other *mukataas* in Bursa which remained unsold. There was no tax farmer demand for *mukataas* in Kancak (?) during six months in 1613.

*Bursa kazasına tabii Kancak tevabii mukâtaası bin yirmi iki ramazan guresinde üç yıla yüz doksan bin üç yüz otuz beş akçeye (tax farmer’s name?) iltizâm olup tahvili tamâm olalı altı ay mürur eyleyüp talep zühur eylememekle...*⁴⁰⁶

The *mukataas* kept signaling revenue collection problems in 1620s. The *mültezims* of *has mukataas* in Bursa, Yenişehir, Bilecik, Akmeşe (?) and *vilayet-i Anadolu* were experiencing difficulties to make payments to the central treasury around 1622-1624. It is noted that the treasury was facing financial difficulties (*müzâyaka çekilmeğe*) because of unpaid *mukataas*. The center was asking the payment of 4.131.000 *akçe*.

“*Mâl-ı miri tahsil olunmak mümkün olmamağın irsali lâzım gelen...kifâyet-i kadri irsal olunmayup müzâyaka çekilmeğe...*”⁴⁰⁷

Taking the fiscal depression and continuing Celali destruction into consideration, the center paid special attention to protecting continuation of *mukataa* revenues. The most

⁴⁰⁵ BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/73

⁴⁰⁶ BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/74.

⁴⁰⁷ BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 25377/1. As an addition to this sum, *baki cizyes* from *evkaf-ı selatin* and *nefs-i Bursa*, the amount could not be read, were requested.

important reason was related to the fact that the *mukataas* were making one of the greatest cash contributions to the budget. It seems that there were three basic strategies of the center in order to prevent *mukataas* from being unsold and deserted (*nafüruht ve mahlul*). The first one was the transition to *emanet* system, the least applied, the second strategy was to contact the former tax farmer in order to convince him to repurchase the same *mukataa*. The third one was some kind of negotiation and acceptance of some payment facilities by the center.

Firstly, some registers showed that once there are severe problems of payment and decaying tax farmer demand, the center could transfer the *mukataa* revenue collection from *iltizam* to *emanet* system. The center was interfering directly in the collection process and a collector was being assigned. This was a temporary reaction against the Celali destruction. An example from Bursa in 1614-1615 shows that as the tax farmer started to experience difficulties, the *mukataa* was given to the *emanet* (*ber vech-i emanet*).⁴⁰⁸

*Saadetli sultanım hazretlerinin hâkî pâ-yı şeriflerine arz-ı hal oldur ki, Bursa'da İkizceler ağnamı emini olan (?) nâmu kimesnenin tahvili âhir olmaya karib olup iltizâma zarar götürmek üzere ber vech-i emânet bu kullarına sadaka buyurulmak babında...*⁴⁰⁹

On the other hand, the center avoided the *emanet* system because simply the revenue collection with *iltizam* was more profitable. In the *emanet* system tax collector, assigned by the center, was not responsible for any fluctuations in revenues. He was just sent to collect the expected sum. On the other hand, there was a contract in the *iltizam* system in which the sum and certain conditions were strictly clarified. As an addition to these, the application of *iltizam* system was much more practical for the center.

⁴⁰⁸ For *emanet* system see Çakır, *Osmanlı Mukataa Sistemi*, 150-154.

⁴⁰⁹ BOA.MAD.d,01850/59.

Secondly, once a certain *mukataa* cannot be sold fast, the center was contacting the former tax farmer to convince him to repurchase the same *mukataa*. After some *mukataas* in Bursa remained unsold, the center proposed them to the former tax farmer in 1611.

*Mahruse-i Bursa'da vâkî Bacı pa-yı ağnam ? ve tevabii mukâtaası sene 1020 rebîi'levvelinin guresinde üç yıla yüz elle bin akçeye otuz ikinci bölükte yevmi on üç akçe ulufeye mutasarrıf olan Mustafa uhdesinde iltizâmda olup hâlâ tahvili tamâm olup muhasebesi görüldükde bî't-tamâm cevâb vermekle mukâtaa-yı mezbûrenin tahvil-i cedidine ahirde talep(?) olunduk da kimesne zühur eylememeğe merkûm Mustafa'ya iltizâm-ı sabık üzere teklif olundukda...*⁴¹⁰

On the other hand, the center's efforts were sometimes ignored by the tax farmers and the Celali destruction made them reject the proposition. Once the former tax farmers were proposed to buy *mukataas* in Yenişehir, İnegöl, Bursa in 1609-1610, they rejected the proposition stating that these *mukataas* cannot function properly.

*"Mukâtaa-yı mezbûrenin tahvil-i cedidlerinden al deyü teklif olundukda bu iltizâm mukâtaalarının tahammülleri yokdur deyü cevap virdiklerinden..."*⁴¹¹

Thirdly, the center could accept some payment convenience that the tax farmer requested. Once there are some problems with revenues, the tax farmer proposes to buy the *mukataa* under a condition which permits to split the yearly payment burden as he wishes because he assumes that there could be difficulties to pay the exact amount that was requested. This condition is usually recorded like the followings on the contract.

⁴¹⁰ BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/168.

⁴¹¹ BOA.MAD.d,04684/21.

“*Mukâtaa-yı mezbûreyi iltizâm eylediğimde bir senenin fazlasını bir senenin kesrine mahsup olmak üzere iltizâm kabul idüp...*”⁴¹²

“*Mukâtaayı üç yıla on dokuz yük akçeye iltizâm ve kabul ider de şol şartla ki mukâtaalar birbirinden ayrılmayup birinin fazlası diğerinin kesrine mahsup oluna...*”⁴¹³

A few examples above signal that despite center's efforts to protect *mukataa* revenues, the treasury suffered from revenue collection difficulties with the first great Celali Revolts at the end of the 16th century. *Mukataa* payments, one of the most significant cash revenues, either decreased or could not be collected properly from Anatolia. The center requested the unpaid sums emphasizing that the treasury was under pressure (*müzayaka çekilmeğe*).

These cases presented above were just some chosen examples from *defters* to depict the general turbulence in *mukataas* and they signal that unpaid *mukataa* revenues exacerbated the fiscal difficulties. It is reasonable to think that *bakis* just between 1599 and the 1610s had already exceeded some tens of millions of *akçe*. On the other hand, the collection problems did not last very long. As mentioned shortly in the demography chapter, there are indices proving that as the Celalis were squashed, the *mukataas* and tax farmers started to recover. *The Celali Effect* caused a short term crisis on the central treasury. This crisis was influential in the era of fiscal transformation because any problem in the collection of *mukataa* revenues meant lesser amount of *akçe* sent to the central treasury and this period is marked with the increasing need for cash, which is associated with the *avarız* taxes becoming an annual levy.

3.3.1.a.2 The Changing Conditions of Taxation

The proper operation of classic *tahrir* registers was dependent on the functioning of *timar* system. There were two indispensable conditions for *timar*; **a)** attached cultivator to the soil and **b)** adherence to *miri land* principle (the center had the ultimate authority

⁴¹² BOA.MAD.d,04689/25. The *mukataa* of Mihaliç dock in 1600.

⁴¹³ BOA. Bab-1 Defteri, 24265/8. *Haslar mukataası* of Yenişehir, Gine(?), Tüca(?) and Bursa in 1609.

on the tımar lands).⁴¹⁴ The first condition of *tahrir* tax system was destructed remarkably at the turn of the 16th century because the Celalis caused a wide demographic dispersal. The Celali land desertion increased in the following periods and reached the peak with the Great Flight. Half of the population living in villages in Tokat and Sivas regions had already deserted their lands as early as 1609, when Kuyucu Murat Paşa suppressed the major revolts.⁴¹⁵ Despite the efforts of the center to force fleeing peasants to return back to their lands, it did not end in a complete return in a short period. The state was still coping with the problem of fugitive peasants as late as 1635.⁴¹⁶ A *tımarlı sipahi* could not endure 20-30 years for a complete return.

Akdağ stated that while the central treasury was looking for ways to compensate its expenses, the center did not concentrate all its attention on improving the worsening conditions of the *dirlik* owners (*dirlik sahipleri*).⁴¹⁷ He added, the center tried to improve the financial condition of *sipahis* by encouraging fleeing peasants to return to their former lands and increasing the amount of *çiftbozan akçesi*⁴¹⁸ in the period of revolts and the Great Flight. The return of tax paying peasants could help the *sipahi* economically once cultivation restarted. Akdağ stated that the *tımarlı sipahis* and *has* owners asked to increase *çiftbozan akçesi* from 75 to 300 *akçe*.⁴¹⁹ It is not very clear if this rise was applied really but it is important to evaluate the worsening fiscal conditions of *tımarlı sipahi*. This attempt could be seen in two ways. Firstly, the *sipahis* aimed at preventing the land desertion. Secondly, the high amount could be

⁴¹⁴ McGowan, *Economic Life in Ottoman Europe*, 105.

⁴¹⁵ Özel, "Banditry, State and Economy: On the Financial Impact of the Celali Movement in Ottoman Anatolia," 74. Moreover, see the *hüküm* sent to *kadis* in Rum Beğlerbeğliği about Tokat and Sivas dwellers (Tokat ve Sivas ahalisi) in 1609/1610. BOA. Mühimme Defteri, 78 (h.1018/m.1609-1610): 23/59.

⁴¹⁶ Renaudot, *Recueil de Toutes Les Gazettes*, 479.

⁴¹⁷ Akdağ, *Celâli İsyânları*, 56-57.

⁴¹⁸ For *çiftbozan akçesi* see Nicoara Beldiceanu and Irene Beldiceanu-Steinherr, "Recherches sur la Province de Qaraman au XVIe Siècle. Etude et Actes," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 11, 1 (Mar., 1968): 23-24.

⁴¹⁹ The center attempted to increase it from 74 to 300 *akçe* in the period of revolt but it is understood that the center had to undo it. See Akdağ, *Celâli İsyânları*, 51-52. Taking these reasons into consideration, the possible effect of the inflation is *a priori* accepted. However, the only factor behind this rise should not be related just to the inflation in the era of high percentage of *çiftbozan* events. This action could be thought to discourage the land desertion.

thought as the efforts of *sipahis* to guarantee their economic situation in the era of desertion. On the other hand, it seems that the center did not channel all its attention to reestablish the classic system in the era of crisis (*ihtilâl zemâni*). The works of Darling and Barkey showed that the imperial system could be very flexible and Ottoman statesmen took pragmatic decisions to overcome the problems. For instance, Barkey showed that the state chose to bargain and “buy”⁴²⁰ the great Celali leaders offering them high offices. While a Celali leader was considered an enemy, it could turn to a high officer after a short period. Similar to this approach, the central state may have decided to replace *tahrir* registers with the *avarız* instead of a complete recovery of the previous system. The fiscal crisis was tried to be overcome by changing the most basic features of a classic imperial institution.

The taxation was based on predetermined production and imperative economic activities of a *hane* in the classic *tahrir*. On the other hand, the rural population dispersal and following breakdown of rural economy damaged *timar* lands and *sipahis*, which ended in the dysfunction of application of *tahrir* registers. On the other hand, the amount of *avarız* tax was not predetermined, the center could decide it depending on its needs either in cash, kind or service. When the center arranged the sum of *avarız*, it took into consideration the situation of *avarız* payers (*reayanın kudret ve tahammülerine göre*).⁴²¹ The *avarız* was imposed to *avarızhanes*, which were composed of 3-10 real *tahrir hanes*.⁴²² The fundamental condition to be an *avarız* payer was to earn a living (*kâr ve kisbe kadir murahik*).⁴²³ *Avarız* records do not contain detailed information on the economic activities and rural production of tax

⁴²⁰ The revolt of Abaza had caused panic in the center. Agent reports of Istanbul French embassy state that the mother sultan sent some valuable vests and a good sword to Abaza in order to start the bargaining process. BNF.Français, 16149-4 (Années 1619-1624)/466-467.

⁴²¹ Barkan, “Avârız”14–15.

⁴²² The general assumption is that 3-10 real *tahrir hanes* were equal to 1 *avarızhane*. Darling, *Revenue-Raising*, 106-108.

⁴²³ Akdağ, *İktisadi ve İçtimai Tarih*, 561. As directly quoted from Tabakoğlu, “*Avarız yükümlülerini vergi takatları açısından hâneye tâbi olabilmeleri için ödeme yerinde bir mülkü kullanmaları gerekiyordu. Buna göre hâne sayımı defterlerinde yer alan nüfus köyde ise toprağa, şehirde ise geçimini sağlayacak sürekli bir işe sahip olan faal nüfustur.*” He based his argument on a record about *avarız* levy. See Tabakoğlu, *Osmanlı Maliyesi*, 155.

payers. The peasant desertion and following breakdown of rural life might have led the center to give up its hopes of tax extraction from predetermined rural production, on which *tımarlı sipahi* was dependent.⁴²⁴

3.3.1.a.3 The Burden of the Celali Campaigns

A study discussed the Celali campaigns from a financial perspective using the *ruzmançes*.⁴²⁵ It is indicated that the Celali campaigns increased the pressure on the central treasury. The *beylerbeyliks* of Anatolia, Sivas, Karaman and Erzurum could not make a great financial contribution to the Kuyucu Murat Paşa's campaign because these regions were under Celali attacks.⁴²⁶ The depopulation and continuous Celali activities in these regions, as *mukataas* reflected the turbulence, affected provincial treasures (*eyalet hazinesi*) negatively.

Polat revealed that the contribution of *mukataa* revenues constituted the greatest part in the campaigns. He argued that the Celali destruction caused lesser amount of *akçe* to be collected than expected from Anatolian *mukataas*. The examples used in this study support this idea. A comparison of average of financial contribution coming from *mukataa* revenues to two different military operations resumes the situation better. The total contribution of *cizye* and *mukataa* revenues to Kuyucu Murat's Celali campaign was around 10-11% in the total campaign treasury.⁴²⁷ On the other hand, this average was higher in the other future military operations. The contribution of *mukataas* to the eastern campaign of Hüsrev Paşa in 1627-1629 was 23.50% and of the *cizyes* were 10.40% of the campaign treasury.⁴²⁸ This situation was closely related to the Celali destruction.⁴²⁹

⁴²⁴ Özel, "Banditry, State and Economy: On the Financial Impact of the Celali Movement in Ottoman Anatolia," 71.

⁴²⁵ For *ruzmançes* see Polat, "Kuyucu Murat Paşa'nın Celali Seferi Finansmanı," 565-566.

⁴²⁶ Ibid., 570.

⁴²⁷ Polat, "Kuyucu Murat Paşa'nın Celali Seferi Finansmanı," 572.

⁴²⁸ Ibid., 572.

⁴²⁹ Ibid., 572.

As a result of the problems with provincial treasuries and declining contribution of *mukataas* to the Celali campaigns, the central treasury had to increase its part in the campaigns. While the payments (*irsaliye*) of *Hazine-i Amire* and *Enderun Hazinesi* to the wars consisted usually 25-34% of the expenses, it exceeded 46% in the Celali campaign.⁴³⁰ The center had to take loans from high class Ottoman statesman. For instance, former *Defterdar* of Karaman Mehmet Paşa lent 1.010.766 *akçe* for Kuyucu Murat's Celali campaign.⁴³¹ Once this amount is compared with unpaid *mukataas*, the level of financial depression and cash need is understood better. The *baki* requested only from Mihaliç *mukataas* was 7.000.000 *akçe* in 1609-1610.⁴³²

There are some indices that the center was requesting *bakis* from *mukataas* for finance of military operations. This should be closely related to the current economic difficulties of the treasury. A *mühimme* register from 1609-1610 signifies the necessity of payments of *baki* (2.000.000 *akçe*) from Karaman *mukataas* for military payments (*kul mevacibi için*) and the sum was requested as fast as possible (*ber vech-i isticale*).⁴³³

Moreover, it is an interesting point to note here that the difficulties of the central treasury to finance the Celali campaigns had been noticed by the members of the French embassy. A report mentions that the center looked for loans from great *dirlik* owners in order to finance and convince the janissary army to suppress Abaza Paşa's revolt.⁴³⁴ According to these reports, the financial difficulties were influential on the the bargaining process.⁴³⁵

⁴³⁰ Ibid., 580.

⁴³¹ Ibid., 575.

⁴³² BOA.MAD.d,04684/52.

⁴³³ BOA. Mühimme Defteri, 78 (h.1018/m.1609-1610): 5/12.

⁴³⁴ BNF.Français,16149-4 (Années 1619-1624)/466-467; BNF.Français,16145-4 (Années 1605-1623)/192.

⁴³⁵ The same document states that although the Müfti had declared war against Abaza (*Moufti a déclaré la guerre contre le Bacha d'Erzeroum...*), "everybody was asking for peace". The declare of war against the rebel pasha caused some tension among some pashas (*brouilleries entre plusieurs pashas d'Asie*

To conclude, this part aimed at discerning *the Celali Effect* on the era of fiscal adaptation and financial difficulties. The period is marked by transition from classic *tahrir* registers to *avarız* in the early 17th century. I argued that *the Celali Effect* influenced the financial transformation in three ways. First, the *mukataa* revenues declined remarkably, which were one of the significant cash sources of the central treasury.⁴³⁶ Second, the basic condition of the *tumar* system was destructed profoundly and the *tumars* could not function. Third, the financial problems were exacerbated by the Celali campaigns because the central treasury had to increase its contribution to the campaigns. The indices pointed out the short term *Celali Effect* was seen on the fiscal adaptation and crisis.

3.4 Conclusion

The goal of this chapter was to discuss and highlight *the Celali Effect* on the Ottoman economy and following period of fiscal transformation. The question of *the Celali Effect* was handled in three main parts. In the first part, the rural economy was handled. It was shown that the revolts caused problems in the rural production, which ended in a short period of scarcity of basic cereals and meat. The level of shortage was tried to be monitored with the examples of *narh* prices, *mukataa* registers and account books of waqfs in Konya and Tokat. Akdağ showed that the prices of wheat, bread and meat rose in the Celali period. The primary factor behind this rise was the Celali dispersal, which led to a period of decay in agricultural production and livestock raising. *Mukataa defters* remarked a notable decline in the number of livestock. Some *mukataas* of *adet-i ağnam* could not be collected and the demands to buy *adet-i ağnam mukataas* decayed. Waqf records showed that the prices of basic foodstuff like barley and wheat (these were cultivated most widely) rose remarkably once the Celalis hit the region. The *narh* prices and waqf registers depicted that *the Celali Effect* on rural economy and agricultural crisis was seen on short term in discussed regions of central and northern Anatolia. Similar to *narh* and waqf registers, *mukataas* could allow to follow the longevity of *the Celali Effect*; however, it requires a wider *mukataa* study,

celuy de Maras vers Damas) who were against the war. BNF.Français,16145-4 (Années 1605-1623)/192-193.

⁴³⁶ See Çakır, *Osmanlı Mukataa Sistemi*, 71-73.

which surpasses the limits of this master thesis. It should be noted that *mukataas* studied so far do not show any severe long term *Celali Effect*. Taking the regional differences into consideration, it is probable that most of the damaged *mukataas* started to recover in a few years.

In the second part, the industries of Bursa silk and Ankara mohair were handled. The price index of raw silk by Çizakça showed that the prices rose in the violent years of revolts. The prices of raw silk were influenced by the Celali activities. *The Celali Effect* on Bursa silk was seen short term. The situation of Ankara mohair was handled in regions of Ankara and Tosya. I argued that while Ankara could overcome *the Celali Effect*, Tosya went through a period of difficulties in production and supply of mohair. It is highlighted that *the Celali Effect* differed regionally. Despite Ankara region was hit by the Celalis many times, the mohair could maintain its production in the region. On the other hand, Tosya was not a Celali violence center but mohair felt the crisis deeper. *The Celali Effect*, regardless of the level of violence, could differ regionally.

In the last part, I argued that among other causes influential in the era of financial adaptation *the Celali Effect* played an outstanding role. The Celali depopulation damaged *mukataas* and *timar* system. The *mukataas* did not work properly owing to the desertion and the central treasury faced a short term Celali crisis. The *timar* system was damaged profoundly. The *sipahi* had lost the vital condition of the system. The pressure on the central treasury had been exacerbated in the Celali campaigns. The treasury had to increase its part in the campaigns because the provincial treasuries could not send money and *mukataa* revenues had declined remarkably. These three factors accelerated the transition from *tahrir* to *avarız* system. The decaying *mukataa* revenues and pressure of the Celali campaigns were fiscal reasons. On the other hand, the destruction of *timar* lands was institutional cause. The center tried to return the fugitive peasants back to their lands as early as the first desertion started at the end of the 16th century. On the other hand, this process was not that fast and the expected return was not seen in a short time. This situation made center to give up hopes from any kind of rural economic activities on which that the *timar* system would be based. The *avarız* system did not require an attached cultivator to the soil. The base of taxation

was transformed from rural production, that the *sipahi* used to collect in kind and cash for himself, to *avarız* taxes levied by the center composed of kind, cash payment and some services. In short, the new system was compatible with the new conditions created by desertion, remarkable *mukataa* revenue decline and the fiscal crisis. *The Celali Effect* discussed in three sections speeded up the fiscal transformation which ended in *avarız* taxes becoming an annual levy.

It seems that *the Celali Effect* was much deeper on the economy than argued in this study. While discussing *the Celali Effect* and the Ottoman economy at the end of the 16th century, one should be careful to discern the roles of revolts because the economic problems had been provoked by different causes. There are some gaps which wait to be filled by new archival studies. For instance, our knowledge about agricultural production crisis seems to be limited between the 1590s and 1640s. There are some *narh* prices giving an idea about the changing prices, but they are not enough to cover such a long period. It seems that waqf registers come forward remaining as one of the most important sources to fill the gaps in agricultural production crisis.

The situation of textile sectors of Bursa silk and Ankara mohair was handled in the Celali years. It was shown that these sectors were affected by the Celali violence. Even if there are some problems in the price index of raw silk of Çizakça, his study provided an important source to follow *the Celali Effect* with numerical data. His efforts to prepare a price index in the 1980s were not followed by the future historians and not a detailed price index could be prepared since then covering the Celali years. The situation for mohair was more obscure. The Celalis caused some difficulties in mohair production and supply but their reflections cannot be followed on a price index, which would monitor the changes yearly. A mohair price study would make an important contribution to the field to see the exact level of Celali destruction. In this study some *Celali Effect* on mohair was shown through studies based on *fermans*, *kadı* records and voyage books; however, these sources need to be supported by numerical indices.

It appears that Ottoman economic difficulties and transformation of fiscal system have not been illuminated completely yet. It is widely accepted that these were affected by

many external and internal factors. The effects of the American silver on prices need to be shown more. For instance, the inflation on Akdağ's price examples of foodstuff in the Celali years should be questioned more widely. These prices were used as indicators of Celali destruction in this study. As Akdağ had stated the major factor behind the rise was the revolts but it could still be challenged once the inflation is handled deeper.

The transition from *tahrir* to *avariz* should be studied more widely because *the Celali Effect* on rural demography directly affected the proper functioning of economic activities in *mukataa* lands and continuation of *timar* system. Accepting the effects of increasing war burden on *avariz*, which turned it into an annual extraction, *the Celali Effect* should be emphasized once more in the era of fiscal transition. As discussed in this study, the *mukataas*, which provided one of the major cash revenues of the central treasury, were destructed in the era of violence. As a result of the desolation, *mukataa* lands could not function properly and the pressure on the central treasury was exacerbated owing to uncollected revenues.

A detailed study of Anatolian *has mukataa* registers is crucial in order to see the uncollected *mukataa* revenues and the following economic burden of the Celalis in yearly budgets. As shown in this study, the central treasury had difficulties to collect *mukataa* revenues. The majority of *mukataa* registers studied for this study were recorded between the 1590s and 1620s. There are still many records left aside, for the time being, that could signal *the Celali Effect*. These records will provide some numerical data and important notes (*derkenars*)⁴³⁷ on the Celali destruction.

These records could fill an important gap in the Celali period. On the other hand, despite the future contribution of these registers to the demographic and economic history, Anatolian *mukataas* in the Celali years have not been studied in detail yet.

⁴³⁷ For instance, a *derkenar* mentions a tax collection difficulty in Bursa because of the Celali activities. BOA. Bab-1 Defteri, 24265/60.

There are important studies on *mukataa* system.⁴³⁸ These studies cover how *mukataa* system works and *mültezim* buys *iltizams*. On the other hand, the system of these registers has yet to be studied completely. Any work handling the systematic of *defters* would make an important contribution.



⁴³⁸ See Çakır, *Osmanlı Mukataa Sistemi*; Erol Özvar, *Osmanlı Maliyesinde Malikane Uygulaması* (İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2003).

CHAPTER IV

THE GENERAL CONCLUSION

The Ottoman narrative sources describe the Celalis as violent and cruel great armies who ravaged the settlements and disturbed *reaya* in Anatolia. The findings reached in this study demonstrate that not only the demography but also the economy of the Ottoman Empire was prone to be affected by widespread violence and brigandage. This study discussed the effects of the Celali Revolts, *the Celali Effect*, by evaluating the existing literature from a different perspective and by examining archival sources. The case studies, mainly based on numerical data, were revisited in terms of *the Celali Effect*. The Ottoman and French archival materials were used. The study of archival documents pointed to the importance of *mukataa* registers. *Mukataa defters*, which are surprisingly left aside despite their apparent richness, can help analyze the Ottoman demography and economy. In the light of these methods, the study has reached the following conclusions.

First, the question of the urban demographic changes in the Celali years were examined through the wages of skilled and unskilled construction workers in İstanbul. The wage fluctuations pointed that the town had received mass migration in the era of rebellions. This conclusion was a concrete proof of the words of the contemporary observers.⁴³⁹ This attempt emphasizes the necessity of similar wage index, preferably of the construction workers, for other Ottoman towns. For instance, the important cities, such as Bursa, Ankara and Kayseri, can be examined through the same method. Compared to İstanbul, these towns faced the Celali violence directly and it is reasonable to expect that the fluctuations in wages reached the peak during the Great Flight. Accepting the difficulties of preparing a wage index, these studies will make an important contribution to understanding the level of demographic mobility in the era of violence.

⁴³⁹ Kâtip Çelebi, *Düstûru 'l-Amel*, 113-114.

Second, the rural demographic crisis was discussed through case studies which presented a comparison of the data extracted from *tahrir* and *avariz* registers. As an addition to these *defters*, this study indicated the significance of the waqf and *mukataa* records to follow rural demographic fluctuations on shorter terms. There are a few waqf studies which question the records for this purpose.⁴⁴⁰ On the other hand, *has mukataa defters* have not been examined systematically yet. This study demonstrated that these registers reflect the traces of demographic changes.

The very first aim of the *has mukataas* is actually to record and follow *mukataa* revenues of the central treasury. On the other hand, they present data indirectly about changing demography. The *kâtip* (scribe) noted any changes in the *mukataa* lands which caused a remarkable decline in the economic activities. The majority of the cases showed that the principal cause was related to the demographic fluctuations.⁴⁴¹ The *mukataa* registers of the central and northern Anatolia studied so far confirmed the land desertion and the demographic crisis that were proposed by comparative studies of *tahrir* and *avariz defters*. The *defters* studied indicated that the remarkable demographic fluctuations usually lasted a few years. They should be used owing to their three features. Firstly, there are *defters* for the significant years of the Celali Revolts, such as the Great Flight, and they will allow to assess the limits of the depopulation. Secondly, these registers were compiled on shorter periods. For instance, the *mukataa* of İnegöl mines can be investigated, minimum, three times until second decade of the 17th century (in 1609, 1612 and 1616). Thirdly, since these registers were compiled for all *mukataas* situated in different parts of the central and northern Anatolia, they allow us to follow the regional changes. These three features may indicate the very short term regional fluctuations in the Celali years. A wide *mukataa* study exceeded the limits of this study; however, the examples used prove that a systematic study of these registers is necessary. In order to make use of these documents properly, a study which explains the complex *defter* system is required.

⁴⁴⁰ Orbay, “The ‘Celâlî Effect’ on Rural Production and Demography in Central Anatolia,” 29-43.

⁴⁴¹ There are a few examples of negative effects of climate, epidemic, great fires and wars. See BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/113, 124, 145, 146, 157, 176, 192.

Third, as an addition to the demographic fields, *the Celali Effect* was discussed in economic spheres. The mohair and silk industries were going through hard periods because the production and trade were suffering from the rebellions. The index of raw silk prices gave the expected results and the silk production experienced remarkable fluctuations. On the other hand, the exact situation of mohair could not be discussed with numerical indices because of lack of a mohair price index. Present indices allow us, for the time being, to assume that the prices of mohair had fluctuated remarkably too. This claim needs to be proven by future studies presenting mohair prices, which would be an important contribution.

Fourth, the economic difficulties of the central treasury, a part of which was associated with the effects of the revolts, can be studied very productively with Anatolia *has mukataa* records. The *defters* studied validate the words of the contemporary observers about increasing financial difficulties and pressure on the treasury.⁴⁴² The *mukataa* revenues, after payments of *mevacibs*, were sent directly to the central treasury.⁴⁴³ The *mukataa* revenue collection problems naturally reflected to the total revenues of the treasury and yearly budgets. A calculation of *bakis* (arrears) will give an idea about economic loss of the treasury. Only future studies will allow to see the degree of the economic damage of the Celalis on the central treasury. It should be noted that there are hundreds of cases about *bakis* and *müflis* (bankrupt) tax payers between 1590s and 1620s. Moreover, a new study will show that the number of *müflis* tax-farmers and amount of *bakis* increased remarkably in this period. As an addition to the economic loss associated with the decaying economic activities in *mukataa* lands, some cases depict that the treasury could not collect the *cizyes*, one of the most significant cash revenues of the center, in the Celali years.⁴⁴⁴ As an addition to the cash lost, the problems of *cizye* payments give an idea about the level of non-Muslim depopulation.

⁴⁴² See Orhonlu, *Telhisler*, 30.

⁴⁴³ *Mevacib* was some payments made, which tax farmers had promised in the *mukataa* contract, once the revenues of the *mukataa* were collected. Military payments, janissaries of certain fortress in particular, constituted the greatest part. If Anatolian and Rumeli *mukaatas* are compared, *mevacibs* were very modest in Anatolia.

⁴⁴⁴ For example, MAD.d,04684/17.

There are also important *derkenars* (notes on the margins) which clarify the problems in *mukataa* lands.⁴⁴⁵

Fifth, French archival sources offered data about the great Celali leaders, the actions of the center towards rebels and the Celali destruction. The content of letters on the revolts, despite being often prejudiced, showed similarities with *mühimme* registers and contemporary Ottoman narrative sources. Considering that these letters were composed minimum once in each 10-15 days, a systematic study of these documents could give traces of mass immigration and social life in İstanbul.

Sixth, the discussions indicated the importance of regional differences of *the Celali Effect* in the economic and demographic spheres. The rural demography chapter showed that the rate of depopulation and resettlement was regionally different.⁴⁴⁶ The future studies of *mukataa* registers can make an important contribution to revealing the regional differences in the countryside. The *mukataa* examples used signaled that there could be remarkable differences in the degree of *the Celali Effect* even in a small region. These differences can be examined widely by comparing *defters* of different *mukataa* units situated in the same area. On the other hand, the number of urban demography studies seems to be inadequate to handle the regional differences of towns clearly. We need more studies of urban demography which allow to follow, or deduce at least, the demographic changes yearly.

Last but not least, at first glance the Celali Revolts look like a series of temporary rebellions composed of hundreds of armed men who came from different layers of the society. These groups inflicted unprecedented violence during a few years in a wide

⁴⁴⁵ For instance, a *derkenâr* mentions a tax collection difficulty in Bursa emphasizing Celali attacks. BOA. Bab-ı Defteri, 24265/60.

⁴⁴⁶ A recent study highlighted the regional differences. Mehmet Kuru showed that the western Anatolia became shelter for peasants who fled from the Celalis and population of the western Anatolia and Mediterranean coastal regions rose while there was a great depopulation in the central and northern Anatolia. I am thankful to him for sharing his unpublished thesis with me. Mehmet Kuru, "Locating an Ottoman Port-City in the Early Modern Mediterranean: İzmir 1580-1780" (Unpublished Doctorate's Thesis, University of Toronto, 2017), 57-66.

geography. The first reaction to the revolts was an immediate land desertion which started to take place as early as the first years of the 17th century. A part of the deserters joined the Celalis and reinforced human source of violence. After a while, the victims became rebels and this turned into an interminable chain of *Celalism*. The center squashed the revolts through counter violence and the rebels were massacred. Once the revolts in the countryside were calmed down, while a part of immigrants had already merged with urban life, some others returned back to their *çifts* and villages.

Some of the effects of the revolts discussed emphasized that the Celali Revolts meant more than a story of destruction and social turbulence. The effects appear to be more complex and extensive phenomenon than dealt with in this study. Once the immigrants started to return back to their *çifts* and villages, they found their fields invaded by members of *askeri* class, effects of which constitute a part of the long lasting and complicated debate of *çiftik*.⁴⁴⁷ The future studies will surely find answers to some questions and challenge the findings proposed by the present study. One of the greatest contributions to the field will be made after a systematic study of *mukataa* registers, which deserve to be given more attention.

⁴⁴⁷ Özel, *The Collapse of Rural Order*, 180-181.

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24265	04684
25377	04689
26001	18147

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- 52 Numaralı Mühimme Defteri
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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bu çalışma 16.yüzyılın son yılları itibariyle Anadolu’da başlayan Celali İsyanları’nın etkilerini demografik ve ekonomik alanlarda incelemeyi ve bir “Celali Etkisi” kavramı oluşturmayı hedeflemektedir. Tezin temel sorunu Osmanlı “Transformasyon Dönemi”nde meydana gelen demografik ve ekonomik alanlardaki değişim ve problemlerin hangilerinin Celali İsyanları’yla ilişkili olduğunu ortaya çıkarmak, isyanların etkilerini dönemi etkileyen diğer olaylar içinden ayırtmaktır.

Kabul gören genel görüşe göre 16.yüzyıl Osmanlı İmparatorluğu için bir büyüme çağıydı. Kırsal ve şehir nüfusu hızla artmış ve imparatorluk geniş topraklara ulaşmıştı. Bu gelişmeler sebebiyle klasik tarih yazımında 16.yüzyıl “Yükselme Devri” olarak adlandırıldı. Ancak 16.yüzyılın sonlarına doğru büyüme duraklamış ve imparatorluk bir dizi problemle uğraşmak zorunda kalmıştır. Genel nüfus artışı yüzyılın ikinci yarısında kırsal alanlarda nüfus baskısına yol açmaya başladı. Artan nüfusa tarım alanları yaratabilmek için tam çift niteliğindeki araziler parçalanma sürecine girdi ve yeni tarım arazileri açıldı. Ancak bunlara rağmen nüfus baskısı kırsal alanda devam etti ve topraksız köylülerin bir kısmı ekonomik kaygılarla büyük şehirlere göç etmeye başladı. Yerlerinde kalan reyanın bir bölümü ise çeteler kurarak yağma ve talan faaliyetlerine girişti. Artan güvensizlik ortamı kırsal ekonomiyi olumsuz etkiledi ve üretim yapan köylünün çiftini terk etmesine sebep oldu.

Transformasyon Dönemi Askeri Devrim tartışmaları içinde anılan bir dizi olaya şahit oldu. Habsburg ve Safevi savaşları ateşli silah kullanan yeniçeri sayısında bir artışa yol açtı. Yeniçeri sayısı hızla arttırıldı ve merkezi gelirlerin en büyük gider kalemini oluşturdu. Asker ödemelerinin yanında iki cephede süren savaş masrafları merkezi hazine üzerindeki baskıyı arttırdı. Diğer taraftan maaşlarını köylerinden topladıkları vergiyle elde eden ve klasik dönemde Osmanlı ordusunun bel kemiği sayılan tımarlı sipahi sayısı düşüşe geçti. Sipahilerin geçirdikleri dönüşüm konusunda modern tarih

yazımı çeşitli görüşler sunmuştur. Bunlardan en çok kabul göreni Sipahilerin ateşli silahlarla savaştan Habsburg Ordusu karşısında yenilgiye uğramasından sonra bunların bir kısmının Topçu Ocağı'na ve bir kısmının da cephe arkası görevlere alınmasıdır. Geçimini tımarından sağlayan askerlerin sayısı azalırken, ateşli silah kullanan ve düzenli maaş alan ordu büyüdü. Bütçelerdeki yıllık giderler artan maaşlı asker sayısının ve bunun mali yükünü yansıtır. Artan yeniçeri sayısına ek olarak merkez paralı asker sayılarını da arttırmıştır. Savaş bitiminde terhis edilen ve geliri kesilen bu askerler kırsal alanlarda gruplar halinde haydutluk yaparak tarımsal üretime zarar vermiş ve reayanın yerlerini terk edip kaçmasına sebep olmuştur.

Bu dönemi etkileyen bir diğer olay da Fiyat Devrimi ile ilişkilendirilen fiyat hareketlerinin etkileridir. Enflasyonist dönem Amerika'dan bol miktarda gelen ucuz gümüşün etsiyle bağdaştırılırken, son dönemlerde bazı tarihçiler tağşişlerin etkileri üzerinde durmuştur. Transformasyon Dönemi'nde yapılan tağşişler neticesinde para değer kaybetmiş ve maaşlı kadrolar arasında memnuniyetsizliğe ve isyanlara sebep olmuştur. Artan mali yükün altında tağşiş ve enflasyon birbirini besleyen süreçler haline gelmiştir. Ücretler düşüş yaşarken genel fiyat artışları maaşlı kadronun yanında reayayı da olumsuz yönde etkilemiş olmalıdır.

Merkezi hazinenin artan yükü karşısında uzun vadede kazanç sağlamayan tağşişlere ek olarak vergilendirme sisteminde de adaptasyona gidilmiştir. Tımar sistemine dayalı tahrir kayıtları 16.yüzyılın sonlarında neredeyse terk edilmiş ve savaş zamanı gibi acil durumlarda toplanan avarız vergisi yıllık düzenli bir gelir haline dönüşmüştür. Merkez, ihtiyacı ölçüsünde avarız vergisini nakdî, aynî ya da hizmet olarak talep etmiştir. Avarız gelirlerinin belirlenmesi için tahrir kayıtları bırakılıp avarız sayımları yapılmaya başlanmıştır. Avarız gelirlerine ek olarak cizye gelirlerinin de merkezi hazinedeki önemi artmıştır.

Son dönem Osmanlı tarih yazımı Küçük Buz Çağı olarak adlandırılan aşırı soğuk ve kuraklık gibi iklimsel olayların etkilerini vurgulamaya başlamıştır. Erken Modern dönemde tarımsal üretimin iklim karşısındaki hassasiyeti göz önüne alındığında, iklimsel felaketlerin tarımsal üretime zarar vererek kırsalda yaşayan reayayı olumsuz

etkilediği kabul edilebilir. Birbirini takip eden hasat krizlerinin köylerden kentlere göçü tetiklediği akla makul görünebilir. Osmanlı arşiv belgelerinde de iklimsel olaylara bağlı bazı aksamalar yaşandığının izlerini bulmak mümkündür. 17.yüzyıl Osmanlısında iklimsel olaylar ve kırsal ekonomi arasındaki korelasyon inkar edilemez; ancak tarihçilerin elinde bazı data eksikleri vardır. Avrupa ve Balkanların büyük bir kesimi için yıllık iklimsel olayları gösteren listeler mevcutken, Anadolu'nun merkezi için bu tür çalışmaların artmasına ihtiyaç vardır. Başta vakıf defterleri ve mühimme kayıtlarından yıllık iklimsel felaketsel olaylara değinen çalışmalar varsa da bunların sayısı fazla değildir.

Merkezi yönetim yukarıda sözüne edilen şartlar altında demografik ve ekonomik alanlarda çeşitli zorluklarla karşılaşmış ve güncel duruma adapte olarak çözüm yöntemleri aramıştır. Vergi sisteminde değişiklikler ve mali hazine bürolarındaki düzenlemeler bunun en somut örneklerindedir. Bunlara ek olarak 16.yüzyılın son yıllarında Anadolu'da Celali İsyancılar patlak vermiş ve var olan zorluklar karşısında merkezi yönetimin yükünü arttırmıştır. Celali liderlerine karşı pragmatik davranan merkez kimi liderleri savaş meydanlarında öldürürken kimilerine yüksek görevler vaat ederek isyandan caydırma yoluna gitmiştir.

Bu çalışma Osmanlı Transformasyon Dönemi'nde görülen problemler içinden Celali İsyancılar'nın etkilerini ayırtmıştır. İsyancıların etkileri demografik ve ekonomik alanlarda "Celali Etkisi" kavramı adı altında incelenmiştir. Kavramdaki amaç çeşitli sebeplerden etkilenen Osmanlı demografisinin ve ekonomisinin içinden sadece Celali Etkisi ortaya çıkarmak ve vurgulamaktır. Bu kavram Celali İsyancılar'nın Osmanlı demografisi ve ekonomisindeki etkilerini ortaya koymak ve vurgulamak amacıyla kullanılmıştır. Bu ayırım Celali İsyancılar'nın felaketsel derin problemlere mi yoksa geçici duraklamalara mı sebep olduğunu cevaplamayı hedefler. Celali Etkisi'ni ortaya çıkarmak için çalışmada çeşitli arşiv belgelerinden faydalanılmıştır.

Çalışmanın en önemli arşiv belgelerini has arazilerin çeşitli mukataa gelirlerini gösteren defterler ve iltizam talebnameleri oluşturmaktadır. Buna ek olarak mühimme

defterlerinden de faydalanılmıştır. Osmanlı arşiv belgelerinin yanında Fransız elçilik raporları da incelenmiştir.

Yukarıda özetlenen giriş bölümünden sonra tezin ikinci ana başlığı Celali Etkisi altındaki kentsel ve kırsal nüfusu tartışır. Birinci alt başlık kentsel nüfustaki etkileri işçi fiyatları üzerinden İstanbul örneğinde ele alır. Celali yıkımından yerlerini terk eden reayanın bir bölümü İstanbul'a kaçmış ve şehir nüfusunda kısa süreli artışlara sebep olmuştur. Bu artışlar "nüfus baskısı" ve işçi ücretlerinde enflasyonla sonuçlanmıştır. İşçi ücretleri ve büyük isyan yılları beraber ele alındığında ücretlerin iki dönemde önemli ölçüde etkilendiği görülmüştür. Bunlardan birincisi küçük çaplı yağmaların olduğu ve ilk büyük Celali olaylarının patlak verdiği 16.yüzyıl sonudur. Karayazıcı ve Hüseyin Paşa'nın yıkımından kaçan halkın bir kısmı İstanbul'a göç etmiştir. Gelen göçmenlerin büyük çoğunluğu inşaat işlerine yönelmiş ve işçi ücretlerinde düşüş görülmüştür. İkinci düşüş 1620'lerin başlarında görülür; ancak bu yıllarda Anadolu'da büyük çaplı bir Celali İsyanı olmamıştır. Bu düşüşün bir kısmı Anadolu'nun birçok yöresinde görülen yüzlerce Celali haydutluğu ile ilgili olabilir. Söz konusu düşüş Abaza Paşa'nın 1622'deki isyanı sırasında hızlanmış olmalıdır. Bu isyan geniş bir coğrafi bölgede etkili olmuş ve merkez tarafından panikle karşılanmıştır. Her iki düşüş de kısa süreli olmuş ve isyanlar merkezi yönetim tarafından bastırıldıktan sonra ücret düşüşü tersine dönmüştür. Bunun arkasında isyanlardan sonra İstanbul'dan kendi istekleri ve merkezin zorlaması sonucu ayrılan göçmenler vardır. Celali Etkisi kentsel nüfus üzerinde İstanbul örneğinde incelenmiş ve etkilerin kısa süreli olduğu görülmüştür.

İkinci alt başlıkta kırsal nüfustaki etkiler geniş ölçüde ele alınmıştır. Tahrir ve avarız defterlerinin karşılaştırılmasına dayalı çalışmalar kabaca 1580 ve 1643 yılları arasında büyük bir nüfus düşüşüne işaret ederler. Bu düşüşün arkasındaki en büyük sebep Celali İsyanları'nın yol açtığı yıkımdır. 16.yüzyılın son yıllarında başlayan Karayazıcı ve Deli Hüseyin'in isyanını 17.yüzyılın başlarında Kalenderoğlu ve daha küçük Celali grupları izlemiştir. Kuyucu Murat'ın Celali seferleri sona erdiğinde Anadolu'nun birçok yeri yağmalanmış ve Celalilerin yoğunlukta olduğu yerlerdeki reaya dağılmıştır. Büyük Kaçgunluk (1603-1607) adı verilen dönemde Anadolu büyük demografik

hareketlere şahit oldu ve bazı bölgelerin kırsal nüfusu %80-90 civarında azaldı. Kuyucu Murat Paşa'nın Celali seferlerinden sonra Anadolu'da başlayan "normalleşme" süreci uzun sürmedi. Kalenderoğlu'nun 1608'de sonlanan isyanından sonra 1622'de Abaza Mehmet Paşa isyan bayrağını çekti. İsyân geniş bir coğrafyada etkili oldu ve Anadolu Celali dalgası altında bir kez daha sarsıldı.

Avarız ve tahrir defterlerinin karşılaştırılmasına dayalı çalışmalar azalan nüfusu göstermekle beraber akla bazı sorular da getirir. Bunlardan ilki Celali Etkisi altındaki kısa süreli nüfus hareketleridir. Avarız ve tahrir defterleri karşılaştırmaları genellikle yaklaşık olarak 60 yıllık dönemi kapsar; ancak kısa dönemli demografik hareketler hakkında ipucu vermez. Kırsal nüfus üzerindeki Celali Etkisi'nin tam olarak ortaya çıkartılması için demografik hareketlerin mümkün olduğunca kısa zaman aralıklarında takip edilmesi gerekir. Vakıf defterleri Celali yıllarında nüfus değişimlerini izlemeye yardım edebilir. Özellikle Selatin Vakıfları'nın kendi vakıf arazilerinde yaptıkları tahrirler Celali Etkisi'ni yıllık olarak gösterebilir.

Bu çalışmada kırsal nüfus düşüşü Amasya ve Tokat bölgelerinde ayrıntılı olarak incelenmiştir. Bu bölgelerde yaşayan kırsal nüfusun ortalama olarak %70-80'i yerlerini terk etmiştir. Yüksek orandaki düşüş meskûn köy sayılarında da azalmaya neden olmuştur. Kaybolan köylerin çoğu Celalilerin kolay ulaşabildiği platolarda bulunan büyük ölçekli olmayan yerleşmelerdir.

Yüksek oranlardaki nüfus düşüşü bu insanların Celaliler tarafından katledildiği anlamına gelmez. Genel düşüş içinde isyanlar sırasında hayatını kaybedenlerin oranı göç oranının yanında düşük miktarlarda kalmış olmalıdır. Celali yıkımıyla karşılaşan reaya şu dört seçenekten birini seçmiş olabilir. Bunların ilki Celali ordularına dahil olup, yağma ve yıkım zincirinin bir parçası olmaktır. Bunlara ait örnekler mühimme defterlerinde karşımıza çıkar. İkinci olarak bunların büyük şehirlere göç etmesidir. İstanbul incelenendiğinde bunun örnekleri görülebilir. Üçüncüsü, kaçan reayanın kısa bir süre sonra eski yerlerine dönmesidir. Yerlerine geri gelen reayanın bir kısmı boşalan arazilerinin askeri sınıf tarafından işgal edildiğini görmüştür. Son olarak,

yerlerini terk eden reayanın Celali yağmasından korunmak için güvenli gördüğü engebeli dağlık arazilere yeni yerleşim alanları kurmasıdır.

Bu kısımda ayrıca “Celali yerleşkeleri” olarak adlandırılan isyanlardan etkilenip farklı bir yere yerleşen köylülerin kurdukları yerleşkeler incelenmiştir. Celalilerin kolayca ulaşabildiği platolardaki yerleşim yerlerinden kaçan reaya çareyi daha yüksekteki korunaklı alanlarda bulmuştur. Bu yerleşmelerin bir kısmı bir çeşit geçici Celali barınağı gibi hizmet etmiş olabilir. Bozok ve Canik ele alınmış, bu bölgelerde Celalilerden kaçan reayanın bir bölümünün daha güvenli dağlık alanlarda yeni köyler kurdukları ve buna bağlı olarak köy sayısının arttığı gözlemlenmiştir. Yerleşim sayısındaki artış doğal nüfus artışından kaynaklanmamış olmalıdır; çünkü yerleşim yerlerinin sayısı artarken hane sayıları Celali öncesi dönemle karşılaştırıldığında hala düşüktür. Köylerden dağılan reaya küçük gruplar halinde farklı yerleşim yerleri oluşturmuştur. Ancak Celali yıllarındaki nüfus hareketleri bundan çok daha karışık olmalıdır. Tokat bölgesi bu açıdan ipucu sunabilir. Söz konusu bölgede Celali yıkımı altındaki reayanın yerlerini terk etme ve yeni yerleşim alanları kurma konusunda oldukça dinamik olduğu görülmüştür. Celalilerin Tokat’ı vurduğu daha ilk yıllarda reaya yerlerini terk etmeye başlamıştır. Konya’da bulunan II.Selim Vakfi’nin kayıtları da reayanın Celali İsyanları’da karşı ne kadar hassas olduğunu göstermiştir. İsyanların Konya’da etkili olduğu ilk yıllardan itibaren vakıf arazilerinde yaşayan reaya kaçmaya başlamıştır.

Bu çalışma mukataa defterlerinin bu alanda kullanılması gerektiğini de göstermiştir. Bu defterler ana amaçları gereği demografik kayıtlar olmasalar da mukataa arazileri nüfustaki önemli değişikliklerden etkilenmiştir. Bunun en bariz örneklerinden biri isyanın ve kaçışların başladığı henüz ilk yıllarda mukataa gelirlerinin düşmesi, mültezimlerin öngörülen ödemeleri yapamamaya başlamasıdır. Sayısal verilerin incelenmesi sonucu ortaya çıkan bu durum bazen de mültezim veya mukataa müfettişi tarafından açıkça vurgulanmıştır.

Celali Etkisi’nin kırsal popülasyon üzerindeki uzun ve kısa vadeli olarak değerlendirilmesi bölgesel farklılıkların önemini ortaya koyar. Kırsal nüfusta Celali Etkisi hem uzun hem de kısa vadeli olarak görünür. Demografik düşüşün detaylı olarak

incelendiđi Amasya ve Tokat bölgelerinde Celali Etkisi farklılıklar göstermiştir. Amasya’da 1576 tahririnde meskûn olan ve 1643 avarız defterinde terk edilmiş gözükten köylerin bir kısmı daha sonra iskân edilmiş ve 20.yüzyıla kadar ulaşmıştır. Diğer yandan 1643 avarız defterinden sonra tekrar ortaya çıkmamış köyler de vardır. Bölgesel farklılıklar Celali Etkisi’nin Amasya ölçeğinde hem uzun hem kısa dönemli olarak görüldüğünü gösterir. Tokat da benzer sonuçları göstermiştir. 1574 tahrir defterinde meskûn ve 1601 avarız kayıtlarında terk edilmiş görünen köylerin bir kısmı 1611 avarız defterinde tekrar meskûn görünür. 1574 tahririnde meskûn kaydedilen fakat 1600, 1601 ve 1611 avarız defterlerinde terk edilmiş köylerin bir kısmı 1643’te tekrar iskân edilmiştir. Diğer yandan söz konusu karşılaştırmada 1574’de meskûn olduđu halde 1643’te tekrar ortaya çıkmayan köyler de vardır. 1643’te ortaya çıkmayan köylerin bir kısmı daha sonra iskân olurken diğer bölümü tamamen ortadan kaybolmuş olmalıdır. Tokat örneğinde de Celali Etkisi’nin kırsal nüfus üzerinde hem kısa hem de uzun dönemli etkili olduđu görülmüştür.

Çalışmanın üçüncü ana başlığı Celali Etkisi’ni ekonomik alanlarda tartışır. Bölümün ilk konusu kırsal ekonomideki Celali Etkisi’dir. İsyen yıllarında tarımsal üretimde ve hayvancılıktaki düşüşe bađlı olarak yiyecek sıkıntısı ele alınır. Tarımsal üretim Konya ve Tokat’ta bulunan vakıflar üzerinden işlenir. Hayvancılığın durumu mukataa defterlerinden örneklerle tartışılır. İkinci bölümün konusu Celali Etkisi altındaki ipek ve tiftik endüstrileridir. İpek Bursa’da, tiftik Ankara ve Tosya (Kastamonu) bölgelerinde incelenir. Son bölüm merkezi ekonominin isyanlardan nasıl etkilendiğini irdeler ve Celali Etkisi’nin deđişen vergi sistemindeki rolünü ele alır.

Kırsal alanlardaki Celali kaçkını sonucu tarımsal üretim ve hayvancılık zorlu yıllara girmiştir. Narh fiyatları üretimdeki düşüş dönemlerini yansıtır. Tahıl üretiminin azalması ekmek fiyatlarını yükseltmiştir. Örneğin Celalilerin en çok etkili yerlerden biri olan Ankara ve çevresinde 1 akçe 1599 yılında 480 gram ekmek alabiliyorken, 1606’da ancak 386 gram alabilmiştir. Celali orduları reyanın tarlasındaki hasatı biçmiş, ambardaki tahılları da yağma etmiştir. Hayvancılık da etkilenmiş ve narh fiyatları yükseltilmiştir. 1595’te fiyatı 100-120 akçe arasında deđişen bir koyun 1609’da 217 akçeye yükselmiştir. Narh fiyatlarına ek olarak mühimme defterleri, gezi

yazıları ve mukataa defterlerinde de Celali Etkisi'nin kırsal ekonomik faaliyetler üzerindeki etkisi görülür. Bu çalışmada kullanılan mukataa defterlerin haycanvanlığının uğradığı zararın derecesiyle ilgili bilgi de sunmaktadır. Örnek olarak Kastamonu'da 1600-1608 yılları arasındaki Celali yağmaları yüzünden adet-i ağnam mukataaları vergilendirilecek koyun kalmadığı gerekçesiyle satılamamıştır. Mukataa defterleri tarımsal üretim ve hayvancılıkta görülen duraklamanın birkaç sezon sürdüğünün sinyallerini verir. İsyân dönemleri sonunda kırsal üretim kısmen iyileşme eğilimi göstermiştir. Celali Etkisi tarımsal üretim ve hayvancılık üzerinde kısa süreli etkili olmuştur.

Vakıf muhasebe defterleri Celali Etkisi'ni daha kısa dönemlerde ve daha ayrıntılı ortaya koyar. Osmanlı'da vakıflar dini birer hayır müessesesi olmanın yanında kırsal ve kentsel alanlarda çeşitli gelir kalemlerini yöneten kuruluşlardır. Bu kalemlere ait gelirlerin ve vakıf giderlerinin muhasebesi tutulur. Kentsel ve kırsal üretimdeki dalgalanmalar bu kayıtlar üzerinden değerlendirilebilir. Konya'daki Selatin Vakıfları'nın muhasebe defterleri Celali Etkisi'nin derecesini detaylı gösterir. Konya'da bulunan Mevlânâ Celâleddîn-i Rûmî, Sadreddîn-i Konevî ve Selîm II vakıfları bölgede 16.yüzyılın sonu, 17.yüzyılın ilk onluğu ve 1621-1623 yıllarında tarımsal üretimde Celali Etkisi sinyalleri verir. Üretimdeki sıkıntılar nedeniyle vakfın tarımsal gelirleri düşmüş ve tahıl fiyatları yükselmiştir. Ancak defterler takip edildiğinde Celali krizinin birkaç sezon sürdüğü ve isyanın etkilerinin azalmasıyla birlikte tarımsal faaliyetlerin artmaya başladığı görülür. Bu artışla ilişkili olarak tahıl fiyatları da düşmeye başlar.

Tokat'ta bulunan Hatuniyye Vakfı muhasebe defterleri de tarımsal üretimdeki Celali Etkisi'ni gösterir. 1593 ve 1599 yılları arasında vakfın muhasebe defterleri önemli bir tarımsal düşüş göstermez. Celali yıllarının başlangıcını kapsayan 1599'u ve takip eden yılların defterleri mevcut değildir. Ancak 1610 yılına gelindiğinde kayıtlar mevcuttur ve 1599 yılı verileriyle karşılaştırıldığında vakfın bir Celali krizi yaşadığı görülür. Vakfın gelirleri büyük oranda düşmüştür ve vakıf bazı temel işlevlerini yerine getirememektedir. Vakıf mutfağı 1610-1612 yılları arasında kapatılmıştır. Vakıf muhasebe defterlerine göre Tokat'ta Celali Etkisi daha ciddi ve uzun süreli

görülmüştür. Hatuniyye Vakfı'nda muhtemelen 17.yüzyılın ilk yıllarında başlayan Celali Etkisi en azından 1638 yılına kadar sürmüştür. Vakıf arazileri bu süre zarfından yeniden iskan edilmemiş olmalıdır. Konya ve Tokat'taki Celali Etkisi'nin bölgesel farklılıkları Celali şiddetinin düzeyinin yanında vakıfların mali güçleriyle de ilgilidir.

İkinci bölümün konusu ipek ve tiftik endüstrilerindeki problemlerdir. İpek Bursa'da incelenirken tiftik Ankara ve Tosya'da (Kastamonu) ele alınır. Bursa ham ipek fiyat endeksi 16.yüzyılın ikinci yarısıyla 17.yüzyılın ilk yarısı arası fiyat hareketlerini takip etmeyi mümkün kılmaktadır. Celali Etkisi Bursa'da değişen fiyatlar üzerinden incelenir. Tiftik için henüz geniş çaplı bir fiyat çalışması yapılmamıştır. Tiftiğin geçirdiği zorluklar kadı sicilleri ve fermanlara dayalı yapılan çalışmalarda görülebilmektedir. Ayrıca gezi yazıları da tiftik keçilerinin Celali yıllarında azaldığının ipuçlarını verir.

Bursa ham ipek fiyatlarında 1595 ve 1603 yılları arasında ciddi bir artış görünür. 1595-1597 arasında büyük bir Celali İsyanı yoktur; ancak fiyatlar Bursa ve çevresinde yaygın olan haydutluk faaliyetlerinden etkilenmiş olabilir. 1598-1603 arasında fiyatlar %56 artmıştır. Bu yükseliş Karayazıcı ve Deli Hasan'ın Celali yıkımıyla ilişkilidir. Fiyatlar 1603'ten itibaren 1617'ye kadar düşmüştür. Bu düşüş dört farklı şekilde yorumlanabilir. İlk olarak, Karayazıcı ve Deli Hasan'ın isyanları ipek üzerinde uzun süreli hasara neden olmamıştır. İkinci yorum ise Kalenderoğlu'nun isyanının da (1607) ipek üzerinde sarsıcı etkileri olmadığı yönündedir. Üçüncü olarak, Kuyucu Murat'ın Celali seferi ve takip eden görece normalleşme zamanı ipek fiyatlarının düşmesine yardımcı olmuştur. 1603-1608 arasındaki düşüş gözle görülür şekilde fazladır. Son olarak, fiyatlardaki düzelme eğilimi isyanların Bursa'da ipekçiliğin yapıldığı yerlerde nüfusun ciddi olarak düşmediği sinyalini verebilir. İsyân yıllarında Bursa'nın göç aldığı ve nüfusunun arttığına dair bulgular vardır. 1603'ten 1617'ye kadar düşüş gösteren ham ipek fiyatları 1622'ye gelindiğinde çarpıcı şekilde yükselmiştir. 1617-1622 yılları arasında fiyat bilgisi olmadığı için fiyatların tam olarak hangi yılda artmaya başladığı kestirilemez. Diğer taraftan 1622'de patlak veren Abaza Paşa isyanı fiyatların artmasında en etkili rolü oynamıştır. Mukataa kayıtları bu durumu destekler niteliktedir. 1622-1624 arasında ipek (*mizan-ı harir*) mukataalarında ödeme problemleri görülür. 1622 -1627 tarihleri arasında fiyat bilgisi mevcut değildir; ancak 1627'ye gelindiğinde fiyatların düşüşe geçtiği görülmektedir. Bu düşüş 1630'a kadar

sürmüştür. Abaza Paşa'nın isyanı ipeğin üretimini ve tedarikini etkilemiş; ancak uzun süreli krizlere yol açmamıştır. Celali Etkisi Bursa ipeğinde kısa dönemli olarak görünür.

Tiftik endüstrisi Tosya ve Ankara bölgelerinde incelenir ve Celali Etkisi'nin bölgesel farklılıkları vurgulanır. Tiftikte yaşanan üretim problemleri tiftik keçilerinin yağmalanması gibi sebeplerle sayılarının azalmasıyla doğrudan ilgilidir. Polonyalı Simeon'un anlattığı vaka bu bakımdan kayda değerdir. Simeon birkaç satıcının tiftik keçisi yokluğu yüzünden içine yün karıştırılmış kusurlu tiftik sattıklarını kaydeder. Tosya bölgesinde 16.yüzyılın sonlarında tiftik sıkıntıları görünmeye başlar. Ustalar kaftanda kullanılan sofun boyunun kısaltılmasını istemişlerdir ve kendilerine 1600 yılında fermanla bu izin verilmiştir. Bu istek tiftiğin bulunmasının zorlaşmasıyla ilgilidir; çünkü sof tiftikten dokunan bir kumaştır. Tiftik tedarikinin zorlaşması Celali Etkisi ile ilişkilidir. Tosya Celalilerin saldıkları ana merkezlerden birisi olmamasına rağmen Celali zulmünden etkilenmiştir. Mukataa kayıtları 1600-1601 yıllarında Karayazıcı ve Deli Hasan'ın 1000 kişilik bir orduyla Kastamonu'da yağma yaptıklarını kaydeder. Tosya'daki tiftik üretim ve tedariki bu isyanlardan etkilenmiş olduğunu düşünmek mantıklıdır. Sayısal veriler üzerinden tartışılmasa da tiftiğin üretiminde ve sağlanmasında görülen bu zorlukların fiyatları arttırması olasıdır. Ancak Bursa ipek endüstrisine benzer şekilde isyanların ardından tiftiğin bir normalleşme dönemine girdiği düşünülebilir. Celali Etkisi Tosya örneği üzerinden bakıldığında tiftikte kısa vadeli olarak görünür. Ankara da ise durum daha farklıdır. 16.yüzyılın sonlarında ve 17.yüzyıl başlarında bölgede görülen Celali olayları Ankara tiftiğini sarsmamıştır. Celali şiddetinin görüldüğü yıllarda dahi şehre yerli ve yabancı tüccarlar tiftik almak için gelmişlerdir. Ankara esnafının 1615'teki şikayeti Avrupalı tüccarların yüksek talebi hakkında bilgi verebilir. Esnaf sof üretimi için tiftik bulmakta zorlanmaya başladığından 1615 yılında Avrupalı tüccarlara bu ürünlerin satılmasının yasaklanmasını talep etmiştir. Tosya ile karşılaştırıldığında Ankara tiftiği Celali krizini daha kolay atlattığı görünür. Bunda Ankara'nın sağlam duvarlarla daha iyi korunması ve Celaliler sebebiyle kentten kaçan nüfusun hızlıca iyileşmesinin rolü olabilir. Ankara ve Tosya bölgeleri karşılaştırıldığında Celali Etkisi'nin bölgesel farklılıklarının önemi ortaya çıkar. Tosya bölgesi krizi hissederken, Ankara'da Celali yıllarında dahi tiftik ve sof üretimi canlıdır. Tiftiğin yıllar içinde değişen değeri her iki

bölgede de fiyat endeksiyle takip edilemese de, Celali Etkisi'nin kısa vadeli etkili olduğu iddia edilebilir.

Son bölümde merkezi hazine ve tımar sistemi üzerindeki Celali Etkisi üç alt başlık altında tartışılır. İlk başlığın konusu merkezi hazinenin temel nakit gelirlerinden birini oluşturan mukataa gelirlerinin düşmesidir. Geniş bir mukataa çalışması bu tezin sınırlarını aşacağından defterlerden seçilen bazı örneklerle Celali yıkımının mukataalara zarar vermesi sonucu merkezi hazinenin mukataa gelirlerinin düştüğü gösterilmiştir. Özellikle merkez ve kuzey Anadolu'da bulunan mukataalar üzerindeki ekonomik aktiviteler sekteye uğramış ve bazı durumlarda ise Celali kaçkını sonrası mukataa arazilerinin boş kalmasıyla mukataalar tüm işleyişlerini durdurmuştur. Mültezimler Celali tehlikesi sebebiyle mukataalar almak istememişler ve bunun neticesinde mukataalar satılamamıştır. Bazı mukataaların iki seneye kadar boş kalması çarpıcıdır. Merkezi yönetim durumdaki zorluğa karşı stratejiler geliştirmiş, mukataaların devamını sağlamaya ve mukataa gelirlerini korumaya çalışmıştır. Diğer taraftan Celali Etkisi baskın gelmiş ve en şiddetli Celali yıllarında mültezim talepleri düşmüştür. Mültezimler Celali İsyanları'nın başladığı ilk yıllardan itibaren ödeme sıkıntıları çekmiş ve bazıları birkaç sene içinde iflas etmiştir. Ayrıca üzerinde durulması gereken bir diğer nokta da baki akçelerin birkaç milyon akçeden çok daha fazla olmasıdır. Ekonomik zorluklar ve artan masraflarla uğraşan merkezi hazine üzerindeki yük mukataa gelirlerinin düşmesiyle daha da şiddetlenmiştir. Bu baskının bir göstergesi de merkezin hazine üzerindeki zorluğu belirterek mültezimlerden baki akçelerin istemesidir

İkinci alt başlığın konusu Celali Etkisi'nin tımar sistemi üzerindeki etkisidir. Yaklaşık olarak 1580'lerde klasik tahrir pratiği terk edilmeye başlanmıştır. Tahrir yapılabilmesi tımar sisteminin işleyişiyle yakından ilişkiliydi. Celali yıllarında tımar köyleri boşalmış, bir kısmı da tamamen kaybolmuştur. Bu durum karşısında tımarlı sipahi gelir kapısını kaybetmiş ve boşalan köyler tahrir yapılmasını olanaksız hale gelmiştir. Merkezi yönetim reayayı yerlerine geri dönmeye zorlasa da elimizdeki bulgular kısa sürede istenilen oranda dönüş olmadığını gösterir. Köylüsü kaçan sipahinin bu duruma ne kadar dayanabileceği ayrı bir sorun olarak çıkar. Bu açıdan bakıldığında merkezi

yönetim köylüsü kaçan sipahinin durumunu reayayı köyüne geri dönmeye zorlayarak düzeltmeye çalışırken diğer yandan tarımsal üretim çevresinde dönen tımar sistemini arka plana atmaya başlamıştır. Tımar sisteminin temel şartı olan toprağa bağlı köylünün artık yerlerinde olmaması, sistemin fonksiyonunu yerine getirememesine sebep olmuştur. Bunun sonucunda da tahrir pratiği eski önemini yitirmiştir.

Son olarak merkezin Celali seferlerinin finansı için hazineden yaptığı harcamaların getirdiği mali yük vurgulanmıştır. Sefer hazinesi için eyalet hazinelerinden gönderilen irsaliyeler öngörülen miktardan daha düşük kaldı. Bu durum Celali Etkisi'nin yarattığı yıkımın bir sonucuydu. Bunun üzerine merkez kendi bütçesinden yaptığı katkıyı arttırdı. Hazine-i Amire ve Enderun Hazineleri genellikle savaş masraflarının %25-34'ünü karşılarken Kuyucu Murat'ın Celali Seferi'nde masrafların %46'sından fazlasını karşılamak durumunda kalmıştır. Bu durumda merkezi hazine üzerindeki baskı artmıştır. Tüm bunlara ek olarak düşen mukataa gelirlerinin getirdiği yük de göz önüne alındığında, maliye bir Celali krizi yaşamıştır. Fransız raporlarında da bütçenin karşılaştığı zorlukların yansımaları görülür. Bu dokümanlara göre merkezi yönetim Halil Paşa'yı Abaza Mehmet Paşa'nın isyanını bastırması için gönderirken mali zorluklar çekmiş bunun neticesinde bazı büyük dirlik sahiplerinden borçlar almak zorunda kalmıştır. Ayrıca bu raporlara göre merkezin Abaza Mehmet Paşa'yla anlaşma sürecini tetikleyen faktör ekonomik zorluklardır.

Merkez, ekonomik baskılar altında değişen şartlara ayak uydurmuş ve klasik tahrir kayıtlarından uzaklaşarak avarız sayımları yaptırmaya başlamıştır. Avarız vergileri acil durumlarda toplanan bir vergiyken 16.yüzyıl sonuyla 17.yüzyılın ilk dönemleri arasında düzenli vergi haline gelmiştir. Bunda avarız vergisinin esnek yapısı sayesinde mevcut şartlarda kullanışlı olması etkilidir. Devlet ihtiyaç durumunda avarız vergisini aynî, nakdî ve hizmet olarak toplayabiliyordu. Celali Etkisi avarıza geçiş sürecinde hazine üzerindeki varolan baskıları ağırlaştırarak nakit ihtiyacını arttırmış ve avarızın düzenli vergiye dönüşmesinde kısa dönemli olarak rol oynamıştır.

Çalışmanın son ana başlığında buluntulardan yola çıkarak alanla ilgili yeni fikir ve sorular öne sürülür. Celali Etkisi'nin İstanbul örneğinde olduğu gibi diğer önemli

Osmanlı şehirlerinde de çalışılabilmesi için sayısal veri sunabilen daha çok çalışmaya ihtiyaç vardır. Bu yeni çalışmalar Celali Etkisi'ni farklı kentlerde tartışmayı ve karşılaştırmayı mümkün kılacaktır. Kırsal nüfusta ise vakıf ve mukataa defterleri Celali yıllarında kırsal nüfustaki değişimleri izlememize yardım edecek önemli kaynaklardır. Vakıf defterlerini bu sorular için kullanan çalışmalar varsa da Anadolu mukataa defterleri hala yeterli ilgiyi görememiştir. Bu çalışmada defterlerin sadece bir kısmı ele alınmış ve mukataaların söz konusu alanda kullanılabileceği gösterilmiştir. Mukataa defterleri genellikle kısa aralıklarla tutulmuş ve tüm mukataa birimlerini kaydetmiştir. Defterlerin bu iki özelliği kısa periyotlarla bir bölgedeki önemli demografik dalgalanmalar hakkında fikir verir.

Ekonomik alanlara gelindiğinde ise tiftik fiyatlarındaki dalgalanmaları gösteren bir çalışmanın eksikliği göze çarpar. Celali Etkisi altındaki ipeği sayısal verilerle tartışabiliyorken, sof için henüz bu mümkün değildir. Son olarak merkezi ekonominin Celali Etkisi altındaki durumu ele alındığında mukataa defterlerinin önemi bir kez daha ortaya çıkar. Mukataa defterlerinin sistematik çalışılmasına ihtiyaç vardır. Bu çalışma neticesinde Celali yıkımı sebebiyle merkezin toplayamadığı akçeler ve merkezi hazine üzerindeki baskı sayısal verilerle gösterilebilir. Bu dönemde baki akçeler oldukça artmış ve mukataalar birbiri ardına boş kalmıştır. Bu çalışma yapılmadan önce karışık mukataa defterlerinin sistematikliğini ve girift yapısını açıklayan bir çalışmaya oldukça ihtiyaç vardır.

Fransız elçilik raporları bu çalışmada ele alındığında bu belgelerin mühimme kayıtlarını doğrular nitelikte görece güvenilir kaynaklar olduğu görülmüştür. Yaklaşık olarak her 10-15 günde en az bir defa rapor tutulduğu düşünülürse binlerce mektup keşfedilmeyi bekliyor. Bu belgeler sistematik olarak çalışıldığında özellikle İstanbul'da Celali göçlerinin ve değişen sosyal hayatın izlerini bulmak mümkün olabilir.

Celali Etkisi'nin bölgesel farklılıklar göstermesi bu çalışmanın önemli bir diğer buluntusudur. Belirli bir bölgenin mukataa serileri incelenip karşılaştırıldığında bölgesel Celali farklılıklarının dikkat çekecek derecede olduğu göze çarpar. Bu

kayıtlar küçük bir bölgede bulunan mukataaların isyanlardan farklı derecelerde etkilendiğini sayısal veriyle gösterir. Bu durum Celali şiddetinin derecesiyle doğrudan ilişkilidir.

Son olarak, Celali İsyancıları ilk bakışta sadece bir karışıklık ve şiddet dönemi ifade ediyor gibi görünse de sonuçları bu tezde tartışıldığından çok daha önemli ve derin. İsyanın görünen ilk sonucu büyük bir demografik hareketlilikle köylerin terk edilmesiydi. İsyancıların bastırılmasından sonra reayanın bir kısmı artık kentsel hayatın bir parçası olmuşken, diğer kısmı görece normalleşen kırsala kendiliğinden veya merkezin emirleri sonucu geri döndü. Köye dönen reaya, çiftlerinin askeri sınıf üyeleri tarafından işgal edildiğini ve çiftliklere dönüştürüldüğünü görecekti. Bu durum uzunca bir süredir devam eden Erken Modern Osmanlı tarihinin önemli tartışmalarından birinin içinde anılmaktadır.

B. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

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YAZARIN

Soyadı : Cabar

Adı : Oğuz

Bölümü : Tarih

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : The Celali Effect in 17th Century-Ottoman Transformation

TEZİN TÜRÜ :

Yüksek Lisans

Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılsın ve kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla tezimin bir kısmı veya tamamının fotokopisi alınsın.
2. Tezimin tamamı yalnızca Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi kullanıcılarının erişimine açılsın. (Bu seçenekle tezinizin fotokopisi ya da elektronik kopyası Kütüphane aracılığı ile ODTÜ dışına dağıtılmayacaktır.)
3. Tezim bir (1) yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olsun. (Bu seçenekle tezinizin fotokopisi ya da elektronik kopyası Kütüphane aracılığı ile ODTÜ dışına dağıtılmayacaktır.)

Yazarın imzası Tarih