

ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A PARALLELISM BETWEEN WITTGENSTEIN'S
UNDERSTANDING OF LANGUAGE AND MUSIC

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ABSTRACT

ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A PARALLELISM BETWEEN WITTGENSTEIN'S UNDERSTANDING OF LANGUAGE AND MUSIC

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In my thesis, my main aim is to examine the parallelism between Ludwig Wittgenstein's understanding of language and music. I will explain my ideas about the similarity between language and music with the linguistic concepts of Wittgenstein. Then, I will compare music and language in terms of their resemblance regarding the issue of meaning. Lastly, I will conclude that musical understanding is shaped through being a part of a particular social context just as in the case of understanding a language, and the value of music cannot be uttered by words.

Keywords: Wittgenstein, Music, Language, Understanding

ÖZ

WITTGENSTEIN’İN DİL ANLAYIŞI VE MÜZİK ARASINDAKİ BENZERLİĞİN OLANAKLARI ÜZERİNE

Durukan, Burcu

Yüksek Lisans, Felsefe Bölümü


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Tezimde temel amacım Ludwig Wittgenstein’in dil anlayışı ve müzik arasındaki benzerliği incelemektir. Dil ve müzik arasındaki benzerliğe ilişkin düşüncelerimi Wittgenstein’in dile dair kavramları üzerinden açıklayacağım. Daha sonra dil ve müziği anlam konusundaki benzerlikleri açısından karşılaştıracam. Son olarak müzikal anlayışın, tıpkı bir dili anlamada olduğu gibi, belirli bir toplumsal bağlamın parçası olma yoluyla şekillendiğini ve müzikteki değerin kelimeler yoluyla dile getirilemeyeceğini aktaracağım.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Wittgenstein, Müzik, Dil, Anlama

To My Beloved Parents



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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<i>PI</i>	<i>Philosophical Investigations</i>
<i>TLP</i>	<i>Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus</i>
<i>CV</i>	<i>Culture and Value</i>
<i>LE</i>	“A Lecture on Ethics”
<i>LC</i>	<i>Lectures and Conversations on Ethics, Aesthetics and Religious Belief</i>
<i>NB</i>	<i>Notebooks 1914-1916</i>

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

While I was reading Ludwig Wittgenstein's writings, his examples and the statements on music, and the metaphors of music have aroused my interest quietly, and I have started to think about them. I have wondered whether there is a particular reason that he uses these metaphors of music, and I have concluded that he does not use them incidentally. I think this is not a coincidence because of Wittgenstein's family background intimately related to music. Therefore, I wanted to exhibit his ideas on music by choosing the subject of the parallelism between his understanding of language and music in my thesis. Wittgenstein's understanding of language is also a basis for understanding of music. I will try to indicate the resemblance between these two.

First, in Chapter 2, I will explain Wittgenstein's general philosophy of language in his two different periods. I will emphasize that Wittgenstein conceptualizes language in the *Tractatus* as strict bounds, while in the *Investigation* they turn into more flexible boundaries around language through the concepts of "language game", "family resemblance" and "form of life," and this understanding of language also affects his views on aesthetics.

Before going to Wittgenstein's views on aesthetics, in Chapter 3, I will explain Wittgenstein's artistic background for telling his relationship with art, especially with music. The reason for writing this section is to show that it is not surprising that Wittgenstein, as a person dealing with art and music intimately, develops views on language by building parallelism with music. Then, I will explain his views on the concept of value as based on his ideas on "A Lecture on Ethics" by focusing on the fact and value distinction to show his views regarding aesthetics.

In Chapter 4, I will try to relate Wittgenstein's ideas on language into music. Firstly, I will handle Wittgenstein's concept of language game as linking it to music. I claim that music is exactly like language consists of language games, and one has to be involved in the game to understand music just as one has to understand a speech. Otherwise, playing an instrument or singing song merely by following music sheet cannot be more than just reading without understanding. Therefore, learning to play an instrument resembles learning language because it is more than knowing the technical rules of it. Here, I will evaluate music as similar to language regarding Wittgenstein's understanding of language in the *Investigations* as "meaning as use." Both in music and a verbal language, how to speak, meanings of words when they come together with other words, what they will mean in certain circumstances is learned through practice by the agent in use. Therefore, learning a language and playing an instrument, singing or listening to a melody is possible in practical life as experiencing them in use.

Secondly, in the next section, I will focus on music in terms of meaning. What does it mean to understand a piece of music? How do we understand music? What does affect one's to understand a tune? I will question the relationship between meaning and music by separating music with and without words. Although words give a particular kind of meaning to a piece of music, it does not necessarily consist of words, and one can talk about meaning or understanding for such music too. On the other hand, there are various types of understanding, and I will explain what sorts of conceptual ingredients can be talked about in relation to understanding music. It includes feelings, emotions, structural feature, and social context, so understanding music cannot be reduced into one single kind of understanding. To explain the subject of music and meaning relationship, I will discuss this topic under four main titles.

The first title under the "Music and Meaning" section is "Understanding Technical Structure," where I will put forward understanding as understanding the technical structure of music. Although knowing the technical rules or structural features is not the only criterion for determining whether one understands music, still, it means

something for understanding music instead of nothing. Then I will question what does affect understanding.

In the following title, I will discuss the possible ways of directing one's musical understanding. In this respect, I will try to explain that sharing a common "form of life," and past experiences of listeners have a crucial role in understanding music. The listeners of a piece of music understand the same meaning if their form of life is the same. Otherwise, it is not possible to talk about a consensus on meaning. And agents' past experiences towards a specific piece of music have an impact on musical understanding. It is similar to language in the sense that even if one does not know the meaning of a sentence in his/her native language, he/she is more close to understanding it in comparison with someone who does not know this language. Therefore, previous experience as related to the Wittgensteinian concept of form of life is also important for understanding music.

Then, I will extend my analysis to what can and cannot be evaluated as signs of understanding. First, I will discuss the signs of understanding music from the Wittgensteinian perspective which musical understanding depends on certain conditions which are the listeners' form of life, their experiences of music and their knowledge of the structure of music. Therefore, it can be said that the features of agents listening to music make differences for musical understanding, and it depends on agents' some qualifications on music as well. Then how can it be decided whether the agents really understand music? From the Wittgensteinian viewpoint, this question cannot be answered, but it can be said that some particular signs indicate one understands music. Facial expressions are one of these signs appearing during performing of listening to music. One's gestures may give a clue about whether one understands music, feels it, appreciates it, knows what is going on in music itself during the process of performing it, recognizes its technical structure, etc. Another sign of musical understanding is bodily movements accompanying the music. Second, I will deal with what cannot be the signs of musical understanding. One's reaction towards a piece of music such as having feelings while listening to music does not show one understands music.

Lastly, I will compare music and language in terms of Wittgenstein's philosophy. I will try to make a general view of literature in the context of the Wittgensteinian understanding of music. I will compare them firstly as considering Wittgenstein's understanding of ethics and aesthetics as beyond language, so I will conclude that in music, it is not possible to utter the meaning of it through verbal language. Secondly, the notes in music resemble the words in a language, therefore, if they are replaced by other notes or words, or their location in the whole sentence or composition are changed; then the meaning of the piece of music or the sentence transforms or disappears. Thus, music is similar to grammatical sentences in terms of it's not being a crowd of notes like words build a sentence. Third, music and language can be similar, because in music sometimes it is possible to sense when it will end or to be aware of the different sections that "tells" different things within a composition. A person who has a unique musical ability together with technical knowledge on music may grasp this. Fourth, it is possible to compare music and language regarding that being capable of reading the sheet music or the sentences written in a foreign alphabet does not indicate one understands what he/she can read on the text. Thus, the meaning of a melody cannot be grasped only through the ability to read the symbols of music like the meaning of a sentence is more than letters or words. And last, they are similar in the sense that, for both, understanding requires having an experience which is shared by others in a common "form of life," and understanding the "language games" of this specific language or music.

Overall, I tried to investigate the relationship between music and language more deeply as based on Wittgenstein's philosophy of language because the musical statements and metaphors that he builds his philosophy upon inspired me to write my thesis.

CHAPTER 2

WITTGENSTEIN – ON LANGUAGE

Ludwig Wittgenstein was born in 1889, in Vienna, Austria. He is one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth-century philosophy. His thoughts on logic, metaphysics, and philosophy of language have great importance, however, his studies are not only limited to these areas. He is also an engineer, a musician and he has experience in the architectural design process of a building. His multifaceted personality is also reflected in his writings. Although throughout his life, he was only able to see his book *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* as published in 1921, there are other books of him which are compiled from his notes and writings after his death. The most famous one among them is *Philosophical Investigations*. This book is considered as a turning point in his philosophy.

Wittgenstein's methodology in his philosophy and his understanding of language are different from each other in the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations*. Because of this distinction, his philosophy covering the stage in which he wrote the *Tractatus* is named as the Early Wittgenstein, while his philosophical thoughts when he wrote the *Investigations* is named as the Later Wittgenstein. However, this distinction does not create a contradiction, but it can be seen as evolution or expansion of his thoughts. Wittgenstein himself states his wish to see his old thoughts in the *Tractatus* and his new ideas published together so that his later thoughts should be understood in the right light as being compared to the old views (*PI*: viii).

In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein states seven main propositions. They are about the problems of philosophy concerning language. He defends the idea that the meaning in the language must be fixed and standard just like the language of mathematics, which is logic. In logic, the meaning is explicit and apparent, and the problems in philosophy are the problems of language. Therefore, if the philosophy uses the

language of logic, then all the philosophical problems would be solved, according to Wittgenstein. The reason behind the writing style of the book's numerical ordered system is his notion that logic is the answer to the problems concerning language, thought, and the world. Accordingly, he used such a logical method in his writing.

Wittgenstein's main idea in the *Tractatus* is that the world consists of "facts." According to his "Picture Theory," the thoughts and the propositions are the logical pictures of these facts. The facts are pictured in the thought through the language, and the world is only limited to those pictures. Therefore, he thinks that the boundaries of language determine the boundaries of the world. This does not merely mean that language has limited number of words rather this strictly bounded understanding of language is about the distinction between sense and nonsense, and the sayable and what cannot be said in terms of meaning in Wittgenstein's philosophy. According to him, ethics and aesthetics cannot be expressed through language, because they are outside the area of facts. It is possible to talk only about the facts, but value cannot be in this category of absolute sense. Therefore, he supports the idea of remaining in silence if it cannot be spoken. After he finished the *Tractatus* with those words which "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence" (*TLP*, 7), he thought that he solved the problems of philosophy regarding language.

In the *Investigations* also language is at the center of Wittgenstein's philosophy. However, his understanding of meaning and his methodology are different than that in the *Tractatus*. When the writing style of *the Investigations* is considered, it is seen that the numbering system of it, which constitutes the first part of the book, is also different than the *Tractatus*' decimal numbers. Therefore, it can be said that these two main works of Wittgenstein are unlike in terms of form, as well as content. In this period, which many Wittgenstein scholars call it as "Later Period of Wittgenstein," he believes that meaning cannot be fixed like the logic, so the boundaries of the language are not drawn sharply as in the earlier thought in the *Tractatus*. On the other hand, according to him, meaning is shaped through the "language-games," "family resemblance," and "form of life." I will explain what

these concepts mean in detail in the next sections. They are about ordinary language that refers to everyday use of language. Language is not limited to logic in that sense. He emphasizes that meaning emerges in use. This is a new way of looking at language in philosophy.

In brief, Wittgenstein focuses on the philosophy of language throughout his lifetime. Although some changes occurred in his thoughts and caused to be called these two stages as Early and Later Wittgenstein as separately, they are not oppositional separate understanding of language, but it is an improvement in his philosophy.

My aim in this thesis is to show that there is a parallelism between Wittgenstein's understanding of language and music in terms of meaning. Before going into the details about understanding of music, first I want to refer his ideas on language in the *Tractatus* in detail to be able to understand his improvement in his philosophy. Then, I will relate these thoughts to his understanding of aesthetics.

2.1 Sharp Boundaries of Language

In this section, I aim to show Wittgenstein's ideas which claim language has sharp boundaries. To understand Wittgenstein's aesthetics, I believe that it is had to be started from his early period which consists of his ideas regarding "what can be said," which takes place in those limits of language, in the *Tractatus*. Later I will discuss this topic in his "A Lecture on Ethics."

Wittgenstein says in the Preface of the *Tractatus* that the meaning of the book can be stated as following: "what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence" (*TLP*: 3). Therefore, even this small sentence from the Preface gives us a clue about his thought that there is a boundary between what can be said and what cannot be talked about. Then, what are these limits? What does it mean limits of language? Wittgenstein continues to the statement above as follows:

Thus the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather — not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought) (*TLP*: 3).

As it is understood from the paragraph, he wants to clarify that the book's main aim is not to draw a limit to thought, but the expression of thoughts. It is because, if the border is drawn to the thoughts, then this would mean that it is possible to think about things that cannot be thinkable and it would be already known both sides of this limit. However, it would be ridiculous. Therefore, he proceeds to a clarification while explaining the aim of the book. This is important because of the relationship between language and thought, and to be able to see in which side of the limit aesthetics stands in his understanding of language. The emphasis on the limit to the expression of thoughts is essential since, in Wittgenstein's philosophy, aesthetics is in the realm of what cannot be put into words as expression.

Before going into detail, let us start from the main propositions of the *Tractatus*. They are as following:

- 1 The world is all that is the case.
- 2 What is the case—a fact—is the existence of states of affairs.
- 3 A logical picture of facts is a thought.
- 4 A thought is a proposition with a sense.
- 5 A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions.
(An elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself.)
- 6 The general form of a truth-function is $[p, \xi, N(\xi - 6)]$.
This is the general form of a proposition.
- 7 What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.

As one can see, Wittgenstein reduces the world into a logical system. This system starts with what the world is and tells us about the facts, thoughts, and propositions, and finally implies the distinction between the sayable and unsayable that is the last proposition among the others which is declared by Wittgenstein as the summary point of the book. This last sentence is also crucial for my thesis because, in this logical system, music is what we cannot speak about, so we must be silent. Why is this so? Cannot we talk about music? It seems that we talk about musical pieces in daily life by saying such sentences: “This is beautiful!”, “What a nice melody!”,

“Wonderful!”, “This symphony is depressing.”, “As if the violin was weeping.” etc. However, they can be either the propositions within the language, and they are facts, nothing more, or they are nonsensical expressions according to Wittgenstein’s point of view. They are not in the realm of sayable. So it should be looked to what can be expressed through language? For example, when I react to a piece of music by saying “Beautiful!”, I actually say the short version of the sentence “This piece of music is beautiful.” And this does not include a truth value, unlike a sentence, say, “This piece of paper has been torn off.” The second sentence’s truth value comes from the precise meaning of being torn. It is already clear that what the definition of being torn is. Or when I say “Mozart composes this symphony,” it is previously known that whether the composer of this piece of music is Mozart or any other person. The truth-value of this sentence comes from the knowledge of compositions of Mozart.

On the other hand, when one says that “This music is beautiful” there is no point with reference to which it can be checked whether it is beautiful or not, while it is possible to check the paper’s being torn or the compositions of Mozart. Wittgenstein thinks that “it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.” (*TLP*, 6.42) and since he claims that “ethics and aesthetics are one and the same” (*TLP*, 6.421), it is possible to replace the word ethics from his saying “It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.” (*TLP*, 6.421) with aesthetics and to say, according to Wittgenstein, aesthetics cannot be put into words.

If I turn back to what can be sayable through language, it is seen that only facts are possible to be expressed using language. According to Wittgenstein, what constitutes a language is the totality of propositions (*TLP*, 4.001). These propositions must have the sense to be meaningful, and “only facts can express a sense” (*TLP*, 3.142). The sense is related to the truth function of propositions. In the language of logic, there is no room for uncertainty, and it is strict because “a proposition must restrict reality to two alternatives: yes or no. To do that, it must describe reality completely” (*TLP*, 4.023). Then it should be asked that what are these propositions restricting reality? In other words, which propositions are true and can be said? Wittgenstein answers it by

declaring that “the totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science (or the whole corpus of the natural sciences)” (*TLP*, 4.11).

On the other hand, “philosophy is not one of the natural sciences” (*TLP*, 4.111). In that case, does it mean that philosophy does not have true propositions? This would be wrong to say that propositions in philosophy are not true, because here the concern is not about whether philosophy has true propositions or not, rather it is about the method of philosophy. According to Wittgenstein, philosophy does not use the scientific method as natural sciences do, because “philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity” (*TLP*, 4.112). He also states that aim of philosophy is the logical clarifications of thoughts and its result is not philosophical propositions, but clarification of the propositions which would be blurred without the help of philosophy (*TLP*, 4.112). Thus, it is not surprising why Wittgenstein thinks that he solved all the problems of philosophy and made all these problems clarify through his book, the *Tractatus*, in the light of this proposition 4.112.

The following statement can be helpful to see the method of philosophy clearly:

The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science — i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy — and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other person — he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy — *this* method would be the only strictly correct one (*TLP*, 6.53).

In this paragraph above, Wittgenstein claims that propositions of natural sciences are the ones which can be expressed through language, so they can be said, and they do not include what cannot be said. The boundaries of language are fixed and strictly drawn, and the only correct method for philosophy is to stay within those boundaries like the natural sciences do. However, ethics and aesthetics are beyond these sharp boundaries, so they are transcendental (*TLP*, 6.421). Therefore, according to Wittgenstein, the correct method of philosophy does not allow them to be put into language as sayable, so they are beyond language and “what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence” (*TLP*, 7). Moreover, there is no comment on this last

proposition of the book, since it would be contradictory to speak about what we cannot talk about and all that could be said has already been said for him, so he thinks that he uses the correct method of philosophy by only saying what can be said.

2.1.1 Boundaries of “Sayable” in “A Lecture on Ethics”

Another source that should be evaluated while Wittgenstein’s arguments on what is sayable and the boundaries of language is “A Lecture on Ethics” which consists of the notes of the lecture delivered by Wittgenstein in Cambridge to a group called “The Heretics” in 1929. In this article, as parallel with his thoughts in the *Tractatus*, he claims the same idea on ethics and aesthetics by stating that they are beyond language, and the main idea of both is “what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence” (*TLP*, 7). To understand this central theme, I will explain the main arguments on “A Lecture on Ethics.” My aim is to relate Wittgenstein’s thoughts on being silent about what cannot be sayable with music as an aesthetical work.

To begin with, the distinction between relative and absolute value has to be considered in “A Lecture on Ethics.” Wittgenstein divides value judgments into two categories. One is the judgment of relative or trivial sense, and the other is judgments of absolute or ethical sense (LE: 5). He argues that although in language we use the words such as good, bad, right, beautiful, etc., we use them in a relative sense in ordinary language since absolute value judgments are impossible to be expressed through language. He says that “although all judgments of relative value can be shown to be mere statements of facts, no statement of fact can ever be, or imply, a judgment of absolute value” (LE: 6). This is one of the main arguments of “A Lecture on Ethics.” To make it clear, he gives some examples. For example, he says when it one says “a good chair” or “a good pianist,” they are good in a “certain predetermined standard” (LE: 5). For instance, something is called a good chair, it has to be comfortable to sit on, to be good for a particular purpose; or being “good” of a pianist includes a certain degree of difficulty with a certain degree of dexterity to play (LE: 5). According to Wittgenstein, we use the word “good” in such examples

in a relative sense as relatively good for a certain point. Therefore, for a relative understanding of value judgments, he emphasizes that such “good”s which are based in a good chair or good pianist are good for a predetermined standard, so it is possible to explain what makes them good by stating these predetermined standards.

On the other hand, according to Wittgenstein, absolute value judgments, in other words, ethical value judgments are not describable, unlike the judgments of relative value. Then, if it is not possible to explain, how can we understand the difference between judgments of ethical and relative value? From the Wittgensteinian perspective, this question can be answered in this way: absolute value judgments cannot be put into words as an explanation, but they include an “ought to” situation.

The “ought to” situation is elucidated by Wittgenstein with an example of a tennis player. He states that:

Supposing that I could play tennis and one of you saw me playing and said “Well, you play pretty badly” and suppose I answered “I know, I’m playing badly but I don’t want to play any better,” all the other man could say would be “Ah then that’s all right.” (LE: 5).

When a tennis player says that he/she does not know how to play well, and then it can be accepted this act of play is not good. Similar to the tennis player example of Wittgenstein, suppose that someone is drinking A branded water and you say that “Why do not you drink B branded water, B is better than A?” Then the person responds you by saying that “Yes, I know B is better, but it is also more expensive than A, so I prefer to drink A water.” so you can say that “Okay, it is all right.”. If the “good” water is A here, it is good because of certain predetermined features of it, such that its taste is softer, its pH level is proper, it is rich in terms of minerals in it etc.. In short, A is “better” in terms of certain conditions; but B can be preferable to A because of its cost and it is acceptable, so you can say “All right” to the person who does not prefer to drink A instead of B. However, it is not possible to accept such an expression for ethics for Wittgenstein. He states that:

But suppose I had told one of you a preposterous lie and he came up to me and said “You’re behaving like a beast” and then I were to say “I know I behave badly, but

then I don't want to behave any better," could he then say "Ah, then that's all right"? Certainly not; he would say "Well, you *ought* to want to behave better." (LE: 5).

The examples above show what determines the distinction between the relative and absolute value is this "ought to" situation. This situation that is the absolute value does not consist of predetermined standards and cannot be describable, unlike relative value. Therefore, the absolute good cannot be described through language; but the good chair, pianist, tennis player, or water can be described since they are about a matter of facts. As a result, this distinction leads us to what is sayable and cannot be sayable.

As I mentioned above, for Wittgenstein "no statement of fact can ever be, or imply, a judgment of absolute value" (LE: 6), so absolute value which judgments of ethics and aesthetics are supposed to be about, cannot be put into words; and even what we put into words about ethical or aesthetical propositions would not be more than just facts. Therefore, he thinks that ethics and aesthetics are transcendental; they are beyond the limits of language (*TLP*, 6.421); and he states his tendency at the end of "A Lecture on Ethics" by saying "to *go beyond* the world and that is to say beyond significant language" (LE: 11). He uses "beyond the world" as having the same meaning with beyond language, because this notion carries the impression of two propositions from his early work the *Tractatus* which are "*The limits of my language mean the limits of my world*" (*TLP*, 5.6), and "The world is *my* world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of *language* (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of *my* world" (*TLP*, 5.62). As it was said before, the sharp boundaries of language do not allow ethics and aesthetics to be sayable within these limits; so Wittgenstein says that this tendency of him and all other people who want "to run against the boundaries of language" is "absolutely hopeless" (LE: 11-2). Since the limits of language and the world are fixed, it is impossible to go outside of the limits, even the tendency is in this way. He thinks as follows:

Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense (LE: 12).

This notion of Wittgenstein above is also parallel to his thoughts in the *Tractatus* about the correct method of natural sciences which includes only what is sayable through language that are the propositions having sense and the truth value as I explained before. Then, absolute beauty also cannot be put into words, so whatever is said about it would not be more than just facts, so it would be possible to talk about beauty in a relative sense. Since beyond of the limits of language is not the area of science, ethics and aesthetics are not the topics of science. According to Wittgenstein, when the experiences which belong to the field of ethics and aesthetics are tried to be verbally expressed, then they would be nonsense (LE: 8). I will explain the notion of nonsense later in Chapter 3, while I discuss Wittgenstein and the concept of value.

One should not misunderstand that what cannot be verbally expressed does not mean there is no such thing or what cannot be said cannot exist. It is just about the limits of expression of thoughts as Wittgenstein said in the preface of the *Tractatus*. Therefore, he does not deny ethics and aesthetics surely. What he is saying is not refusing the absoluteness, but the expression of *the* absolute value. Wittgenstein thinks in both the *Tractatus* and the “A Lecture on Ethics” that aesthetics and ethics cannot be expressed within the sharp boundaries of language which only consists of the facts and the pictures of reality.

2.1.2 Picture of Reality – Facts

“Picture Theory” is an essential point in the *Tractatus*. It is important to be able to see Wittgenstein’s early thoughts about the limits of the language and the distinction between what is sayable and unsayable. In this section, I will briefly explain this theory of Wittgenstein.

In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein’s first statement is that “The world is all that is the case.” (*TLP*, 1), and it continues as follows: “The world is the totality of facts, not all things.” (*TLP*, 1.1). What do they mean? Are they just the words like riddles? It is

not simple to understand these sentences by first looking, but it is obvious that they have a certain point in the general point of view of the book. It can be interpreted in the following way. According to Wittgenstein, the world surrounding us is something limited. This limited world is not the total sum or ordinary physical objects, but it is what is the case which means the totality of facts. Then what is the difference between facts and objects? He distinguishes them by saying that “Objects are simple” (*TLP*, 2.02) and “A proposition is articulate” (*TLP*, 3.141). He does not directly say that facts are articulate, but it can be inferred that the facts are articulate, because a fact is something complex. It is composed of objects. Let us look into the following propositions of the *Tractatus*:

What is the case — a fact — is the existence of states of affairs (*TLP*, 2).
A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things) (*TLP*, 2.01).

It is possible to make a logical inference from these sentences above that a fact is a combination of objects or things. Therefore, a fact is not simple as an object, but it consists of simple objects. Objects can be considered as names or words, and facts can be considered as true propositions which have sense. For example, when one says “chair,” the name of the object says nothing to us. It is just a word. It is not possible to understand the meaning of this word if you do not know English or if this is the first time that you hear this word, so a word does not say anything by itself outside of a fact. Wittgenstein says that “A name means an object” (*TLP*, 3.203) and “a name is the representative of an object” (*TLP*, 3.22). Therefore, even if you know which object is represented by the word “chair”, the word itself does not say anything neither. If someone says “Chair”, then the possible reaction to this person could be “So what?” You can picture the image of the object called “chair” as a representation of this object in your mind, but it is clear that the word “chair” by itself is not a proposition. However, when it takes place in the combination of different words, then these different words constitute a fact such as “Bring a chair!”, “Sit on the chair.”, or “Chair is furniture.” etc. Then, what make a proposition a meaningful sentence is the relations that constitute a fact. Therefore, propositions are

articulate; they are not simple as words. Wittgenstein's comment on this issue is clear. He argues as follows:

A proposition is not a blend of words.—(Just as a theme in music is not a blend of notes). A proposition is articulate (*TLP*, 3.141).

Only facts can express a sense, a set of names cannot (*TLP*, 3.142).

Let us think about these statements. Wittgenstein says in 3.141 that a proposition is not just blending the words. In a proposition there are words, but in order to make a meaningful sentence, just mixing different words one after the other is not enough. There has to be a relational, factual combination which will make sense. Otherwise, they are just set of names. For instance, if I write down some random words one after another such as “Chair dust computer elegance,” this does not mean anything, so it does not express a sense. They are just mixing the random objects. On the other hand, according to Wittgenstein, the smallest constituent of language is not word, but proposition, in other words fact. Therefore, he states that “The world is the totality of facts, not all things” (*TLP*, 1.1).

Facts are crucial that they build language. Then what is the relationship between facts and picture? The answer of this question starts from the following statement that “We picture facts to ourselves” (*TLP*, 2.1). What does it mean to picture facts? This statement reminds me the some lines of a poem “Straw-Blond” written by Nazım Hikmet.¹ He asks Abidin Dino, who is a famous painter, whether he could paint happiness as follows:

...
can you paint happiness Abidin
but without taking the easy way out
not the angel-faced mother nursing her rosy-cheeked baby
nor the apples on white cloth
nor the goldfish darting among aquarium bubbles
can you paint happiness Abidin
can you paint Cuba in midsummer 1961
master can you paint *Praise be praise be I saw the day I could die now*
and not be sorry

¹ Nazım Hikmet wrote this poem for Vera Tulyakova. See also Hikmet, 1994: 243-255

can you paint *What a pity what a pity I could have been born in
Havana this morning* (1994: 253).

All the possible pictures that Hikmet calls “taking the easy way out” such as “the angel-faced mother nursing her rosy-cheeked baby”, “the apples on white cloth” or “the goldfish darting among aquarium bubbles” are actually some possible pictures of happiness that can be imaged in mind. When he says “the apples on white cloth”, a visual image of this will appear in your mind. Otherwise, if an utterance or written form of a sentence does not picture anything, then it does not represent a fact. However, according to Wittgenstein, “a picture is a fact” (*TLP*, 2.141). He states the relationship between picture and representation in the *Tractatus* as follows:

In a picture objects have the elements of the picture corresponding to them (*TLP*, 2.13).

In a picture the elements of the picture are the representatives of objects (*TLP*, 2.131).

For instance, think about still life painting. Each object in the painting corresponds an object in real life. The images on the canvas represent the objects from life. It can be an apple, a vase or a flower bouquet. According to Wittgenstein in his early stage, language is similar to this. He states that “In a proposition a name is the representative of an object” (*TLP*, 3.22). Therefore, if it is said “There are apples on white cloth,” then the name “apple” corresponds the object which is named by this word. On the other hand, the whole sentence states a fact, so it is a picture too. Maybe it can be called a bigger picture. Through language “we picture facts to ourselves” (*TLP*, 2.1), and “if a fact is to be a picture, it must have something in common with what it depicts” (*TLP*, 2.16), “there must be something identical in a picture and what it depicts, to enable the one to be a picture of the other at all” (*TLP*, 2.161). Therefore, the picture which is drawn by language is the representation of the proposition. This representation issue here is one of the changing points in Wittgenstein’s later period, but this topic will be discussed in the next section while I explain language games.

As I mentioned before, he argues that the totality of propositions constitute language (*TLP*, 4.001). In addition to that “A proposition is a picture of reality” (*TLP*, 4.01). Therefore, it would not be wrong to say that according to Wittgenstein, language pictures the reality, so it is a picture of reality. As long as a proposition could be pictured, it provides a representation of reality, because “A picture is a model of reality” (*TLP*, 2.12). Then, language and reality are intertwined. The picture that is drawn by language is a representation of the world, and language enables us to communicate through this way. If the picture corresponds to reality, only in this way it is possible to grasp the meaning of a proposition. Wittgenstein says about this situation as follows: “A proposition is a picture of reality: for if I understand a proposition, I know the situation that it represents. And I understand the proposition without having had its sense explained to me” (*TLP*, 4.021). Therefore, the relationship between picture and the world is important for expressions through language.

Another feature of picture according to Wittgenstein is its being logical. He states these two statements in the *Tractatus* that:

A picture whose pictorial form is logical form is called a logical picture (*TLP*, 2.181).

Every picture is *at the same time* a logical one (*TLP*, 2.182).

The statements above show that for Wittgenstein, picture, which enables us to utter and understand facts, is a logical picture. As I mentioned before, according to Wittgenstein, the problems in philosophy are logical problems in language, and if the propositions are logically analyzed, then all problems of philosophy can be solved. He clearly states this idea as follows:

Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical. Consequently we cannot give any answer to questions of this kind, but can only point out that they are nonsensical. Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language (*TLP*, 4.003).

Only facts can be expressed through language and merely they can express a sense (TLP, 3.142). Therefore, language is limited to express only facts, and the things that cannot be pictured are outside of the limits of language. As a result of this, in the light of the proposition above, it can be said that the propositions of ethics and aesthetics are not false, but nonsensical according to Wittgenstein, because “a proposition states something only in so far as it is a picture” (TLP, 4.03). Thus, Wittgenstein’s saying which “*The limits of my language mean the limits of my world*” (TLP, 5.6) can be considered as the summary point of this section that I have tried to show Wittgenstein’s understanding of sharp boundaries of language which distinguish the sayable and unsayable by means of language.

2.2 Flexible Boundaries of Language

In previous sections, I have tried to elucidate that Wittgenstein draws certain limits to language in his thoughts that belong to his early stage. In this section, I will explain Wittgenstein’s later thoughts in *Philosophical Investigations* which make the boundaries of language more flexible. What does it mean the boundaries’ being flexible?

In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein thinks that there is only one strictly correct method of philosophy that philosophy says nothing except the propositions of natural science which can be said; so they are only facts consist of true propositions. The boundaries are already determined within the boundaries of logical picture in the *Tractatus*. On the other hand, in the *Investigations* he says that “There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies.” (PI, 133).

While he uses a representational, strictly limited understanding of language in the *Tractatus*, in his later period it is seen that he abandons this previous thoughts regarding language. It is possible to see this improvement in his philosophy from the very beginning of the *Investigations*. The book starts with a quotation from Augustine’s *Confessions* as follows:

When grown-ups named some object and at the same time turned towards it, I perceived this, and I grasped that the thing was signified by the sound they uttered, since they meant to point *it* out. This, however, I gathered from their gestures, the natural language of all peoples, the language that by means of facial expression and the play of eyes, of the movements of the limbs and the tone of voice, indicates the affections of the soul when it desires, or clings to, or rejects, or recoils from, something. In this way, little by little, I learnt to understand what things the words, which I heard uttered in their respective places in various sentences, signified. And once I got my tongue around these signs, I used them to express my wishes (cited in *PI*, 1).

Augustine explains in the passage how children learn language. Wittgenstein's understanding of language in his early period is similar to this. In such an understanding, there is a strict relationship between the meaning of an object and the utterance of the word, which is the name of the object. While Wittgenstein states in the *Tractatus* that "A name means an object. The object is its meaning ('A' is the same sign as 'A'.)" (*TLP*, 3.203), in the *Investigations* he declares that the Augustinian understanding of learning language regarding ostensive definitions is not exactly valid. He criticizes Augustine's understanding of language as follows:

Augustine does not mention any difference between kinds of word. Someone who describes the learning of language in this way is, I believe, thinking primarily of nouns like "table", "chair", "bread", and of people's names, and only secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties; and of the remaining kinds of word as something that will take care of itself (*PI*, 1).

According to Wittgenstein, Augustine's argument regarding learning language does not satisfactorily explain learning all words in language, but it is only limited to the words that correspond to concrete objects such as "chair", "table" and so on. However, there are other kinds of words which are not names of the objects or actions such as "beautiful" and "good". Suppose that a child does not know the meaning of the word "beautiful" and "flower" and the child's mother holds a bouquet of roses in her hand and she looks towards the child and says "These are beautiful". If Augustine's understanding of learning language is the correct method while learning language when a person was a child, does this way allow to understand the word "beautiful" in the same way with the word "chair" or "table"? The answer is definitely not, because if we assume that the child does not know the meaning of the

words “flower” and “rose”, when his/her mother shows the roses and she says “These are beautiful,” there would not be any difference between the meaning of this sentence and “These are roses” or “These are flowers” for child, therefore the word “beautiful” could be understood as the word “flower” or “roses” which are the names of object. However, the word “beautiful” is not a name, but it is an adjective word. Therefore, Wittgenstein criticizes Augustine since he misses the point that there are different kinds of words other than just names of the objects. While he criticizes Augustine, actually he also makes a self-critique about his picture theory of language due to his similar understanding of language in the *Tractatus*.

Wittgenstein also rejects Augustine’s argument on learning language as ostensive explanations in the *Investigations* as follows:

Someone coming into a foreign country will sometimes learn the language of the inhabitants from ostensive explanations that they give him; and he will often have to *guess* how to interpret these explanations; and sometimes he will guess right, sometimes wrong.

And now, I think, we can say: Augustine describes the learning of human language as if the child came into a foreign country and did not understand the language of the country; that is, as if he already had a language, only not this one. Or again, as if the child could already *think*, only not yet speak. And “think” would here mean something like “talk to himself”. (*PI*, 32).

Therefore, for Wittgenstein learning language via this kind of method is only possible if a child already speaks and understands this language. In this respect, Sibel Oktar’s claim is as follows:

Even if ostensive definition could be applied to words that correspond to objects, in ordinary life the teaching process does not take place as it is suggested by ostensive teaching of words. As a matter of fact, you do not see parents walking around the house pointing to objects and repeating the names for the child to learn them. They simply talk to them, use sentences like “give me the toy”, “where is your toy?” (2008: 126).

As a result, the assertion claiming that language is learned through ostensive definitions is problematic. It does not work for all kinds of words in language, and it affirms such an understanding that as if child already spoke in a language and learned a new one and made a translation between them via ostensive definitions.

Wittgenstein rejects that meaning in language is learned through such a method and he says that:

For a *large* class of cases of the employment of the word “meaning” a though not for *all* a this word can be explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.

And the *meaning* of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its *bearer* (*PI*, 43).

The emphasis that “meaning is in use” is one of the most important statements to be able to grasp Wittgenstein’s understanding of language in his later period. In this period, he thinks that the boundaries of language not that much strict as he defends in the *Tractatus*, but these boundaries are more flexible. The causes of this flexibility of the boundaries depend on three concepts of Wittgenstein that are “language games”, “family resemblance” and “form of life” and they are directly related to meaning’s being use.

2.2.1 Language Game - Family Resemblance - Form of Life

How is meaning shaped within the use of language? What does “use of language” mean? It includes everything that has a role in language for communication. Language does not only consist of names, but there are also other kinds of words and other elements of language which serve for communication such as tone of voice, gestures and facial expressions. All these elements have a role in ordinary language. Therefore, they are parts of use in language. One of these parts which shape use of language is “language games” according to Wittgenstein. He starts to explain this concept from an example of language which is performed by a builder A and an assistant B. The example continues as follows:

A is building with building stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass him the Stones and to do so in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they make use of a language consisting of the words “block”, “pillar”, “slab”, “beam”. A calls them out; B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. — Conceive of this as a complete primitive language (*PI*, 2).

This language between the builder and the assistant that Wittgenstein calls primitive language works in the following way A utters the name of the stone and B understands what kind of stone is this and starts to act when the name of the object is said and brings it. Therefore, “block”, for instance, is not used just to mean the name of a stone, but it is also used to make someone to perform an action. Wittgenstein elucidates this primitive language by saying that:

We can also think of the whole process of using words in (2) as one of those games by means of which children learn their native language. I will call these games “*language-games*” and will sometimes speak of a primitive language as a language-game.

And the processes of naming the stones and of repeating words after someone might also be called language-games. Think of certain uses that are made of words in games like ring-a-ring-a-roses.

I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the activities into which it is woven, a “language-game” (*PI*, 7).

Therefore, language is used around such games and games allow words to be used for different functions. Various functions of language games are stated as follows:

Giving orders, and acting on them —
Describing an object by its appearance, or by its measurements —
Constructing an object from a description (a drawing) —
Reporting an event —
Speculating about the event —
Forming and testing a hypothesis —
Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams —
Making up a story; and reading one —
Acting in a play —
Singing rounds —
Guessing riddles —
Cracking a joke; telling one —
Solving a problem in applied arithmetic —
Translating from one language into another —
Requesting, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying (*PI*, 23).

For instance, at the end of a stage art such as a concert, opera or theatre, the audience applauds in order to show their appreciation of the players, singers, dancers or any other performers on the stage. If the applause continues for a long time, and the audience applauds standing, then in this game it means that the performers are highly

admired. Suppose that you went to a concert in a foreign country and before the show starts, you heard a kind of noise and you realized that the audience are hitting their feet on the floor and make that noise. However, you could not understand this for the first moments that you heard the noise; but when you looked at the smiling and happy faces of the audience around you, then you grasped that the act of hitting the foot on the floor corresponds to the act of applause in your own country. The reason why you did not immediately understand the meaning of the noise is because you are not involved in this language game. Or for instance, the applause may mean disapproval in another language game such as applauding a politician during his/her speech in front of a community in order to get him/her off the stage. Although the act of applause is not a word, it expresses something and therefore, it has a role in language in a certain language game. Language does not consist of merely the words, but behaviors, acts, gestures and facial expressions are also included in the parts that constitute language.

The second concept that is introduced by later Wittgenstein as a part of language that shapes the use of language is the concept of “family resemblance”. He introduces this concept based on the same reason he introduced the concept of language games, — i.e., in order to indicate that language is not composed of strictly determined rules and to show that it is not a picture of reality contrary to his previous views In the *Tractatus*. On the other hand, he thinks that how we locate the words into language is shaped around daily use. Then what is family resemblance?² He starts to explain his view on this issue in the *Investigations* as follows:

² Wittgenstein mentions the concept of family resemblance first in the “A Lecture of Ethics” while explaining that he uses the term ethics in a wider sense as which is the part of aesthetics. He explains that likewise in Francis Galton’s technique called “Composite Photographs”, which serves for categorizing the faces of certain groups of people such as those who have tuberculosis and the criminals, in order to indicate the typical features of their faces, ethics and aesthetics have similar features that make them put under the same family (LE: 4).

The aim of Francis Galton to use the method of composite portraits was “extracting the typical characteristics” of some group of people. In this technique, the portraits of different people were being combined through overlapping one after the other image, and they were

Here we come up against the great question that lies behind all these considerations. — For someone might object against me: “You make things easy for yourself! You talk about all sorts of language-games, but have nowhere said what is essential to a language-game, and so to language: what is common to all these activities, and makes them into language or parts of language. So you let yourself off the very part of the investigation that once gave you the most headache, the part about the *general form of the proposition* and of language.”

And this is true. — Instead of pointing out something common to all that we call language, I’m saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common in virtue of which we use the same word for all — but there are many different kinds of *affinity* between them. And on account of this affinity, or these affinities, we call them all “languages”. I’ll try to explain this (*PI*, 65).

As it is understood from the paragraph above, according to Wittgenstein it is impossible to talk about an essence of language that can be applied to the whole language. Instead of assuming that there is a common essence that combines all the same words in language and makes them language, rather he thinks that it is only possible to talk about the affinities between them that put them under the same roof of language. This relationship between such words can be considered as similar to the relationship between sets and subsets. For example, let us think about different shades of green. They are named distinctly such as mint green, olive green, Islamic green etc. If we put them into the set of green, then obviously they are the elements and the subsets of this set. There is no one essence that makes them green, because there is no rule common for all that makes them green, but there are just similarities between them. Even if you can show a color scale, and even if the range of green is roughly visible, there is no exact boundary between the shades, therefore you cannot point where green starts and ends, but we call “green” to the all dots among this scale. Therefore, all these shades are the members of the family of green. Similarly, Wittgenstein gives the example of the word “game” to clarify the affinities between different phenomena that we use the same word for all. He states that:

creating one single image which is the mixture of all the portraits which are combined. Galton’s aim was detecting the typical characteristics of human types. The technique, which is invented at the end of 1870s by Galton, was the basis of “eugenics,” which is the word suggested by himself, to differentiate the “healthy” human race from the others. See also “Composite Portraits, Made by Combining Those of Many Different Persons Into a Single Resultant Figure”, *The Journal of the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland*, 8, 132-144.

Consider, for example, the activities that we call “games”. I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, athletic games, and so on. What is common to them all? — Don’t say: “They *must* have something in common, or they would not be called ‘games’” — but *look and see* whether there is anything common to all. — For if you look at them, you won’t see something that is common to *all*, but similarities, affinities, and a whole series of them at that (*PI*, 66).

Wittgenstein compares the games and argues that even if it is thought that as if it had to be something common for all games to call them all “games”, there is no rule that is common for all games that makes them games. What his point that he tries to reach is that there is no essence of games and language in general, but there are similarities between them in practical use. Therefore, his emphasis which is on “look and see” is also important to understand his claim on meaning is in use of language. When you consider playing house games and motor racing, you clearly see that there is no such identical ground that makes them game. Looking is enough to understand that there is nothing common for them, but both are called as “game”. Wittgenstein continues to clarify the affinities between words as follows:

To repeat: don’t think, but look! — Look, for example, at board-games, with their various affinities. Now pass to card-games; here you find many correspondences with the first group, but many common features drop out, and others appear. When we pass next to ball-games, much that is common is retained, but much is lost. — Are they all ‘*entertaining*’? Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or is there always winning and losing, or competition between players? Think of patience. In ball-games, there is winning and losing; but when a child throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this feature has disappeared. Look at the parts played by skill and luck, and at the difference between skill in chess and skill in tennis. Think now of singing and dancing games; here we have the element of entertainment, but how many other characteristic features have disappeared! And we can go through the many, many other groups of games in the same way, can see how similarities crop up and disappear.

And the upshot of these considerations is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: similarities in the large and in the small (*PI*, 66).

Therefore, according to Wittgenstein, language consists of such a complex network that while it is easier to say for some games that they have certain similarities, sometimes it is not that much easy to say the same for the games which are in different categories. Thus, even though it can be commonsensically thought that since they all are named as “games”, they must share a certain similarity; it is *seen*

that there is no common essence that stands in equal distance to the all games when it is considered that how these games are played in the ordinary practical life. Therefore, the expression of him that “Don’t think, but look!” (*PI*, 66) is crucial.

Wittgenstein makes an analogy between the physical similarities of the members of a certain family and the words like “game” in language, and he states that:

I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than “family resemblances”; for the various resemblances between members of a family — build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, and so on and so forth — overlap and criss-cross in the same way. — And I shall say: ‘games’ form a family (*PI*, 67).

Then Wittgenstein gives the example of the word “numbers” like “games” to elucidate his notion of family resemblance. He states that:

And likewise the kinds of number, for example, form a family. Why do we call something a “number”? Well, perhaps because it has a — direct — affinity with several things that have hitherto been called “number”; and this can be said to give it an indirect affinity with other things that we also call “numbers” (*PI*, 67).

Considering the example of numbers, it is obvious that there are many different categories of numbers under the set of numbers. For instance, there are prime numbers, rational numbers, irrational numbers, negative numbers and so on. All they are called “numbers”, and they are the members of the family of numbers. There is an affinity relationship between them.

Wittgenstein gives both the examples of games and numbers in order to reveal that meaning of words are shaped within the practical life in use of language, so there is no common essence of language, but rather there are family resemblances as the way that we use language. Therefore, it can be said that the words “good” or “beautiful” also form a family. In the “A Lecture on Ethics”, while Wittgenstein explains the distinction between absolute and relative value, he uses some examples as I mentioned in the section 2.1.1. such as “good chair”, “good pianist”, “good tennis player” and “good person”. If these examples are considered, it can be said that although they are different than each other in terms of stating relative and absolute value according to Wittgenstein, they actually share an affinity relationship of being

“good”, although he does not explicitly express it as “family resemblance” in the “A Lecture on Ethics”. However, he states that there is a family resemblance relationship between ethics and aesthetics (LE: 4). Therefore, it is possible to say that, for instance, “good music” and “good person” are relatives of each other since they are the members of the same family which is the family of “good”. Lars Hertzberg explains the issue of family resemblance as follows:

In fact, the idea that our speaking is ultimately guided by formulated rules leads to an infinite regress. For the rules, being formulated in a language, would have to be applied, and this would then presuppose a different set of formulated rules for their application, and so on. What is basic to our speaking is not the knowledge of certain rules, but rather the fact that we have learnt to act in certain ways. This is a recurrent theme in Wittgenstein’s later work (cited in Kelly Dean Jolley, 2010: 46).

The third concept among Wittgenstein’s later period of thoughts about use of language is the concept of “form of life”. This term is highly related to the concept of language games and family resemblance, even it covers these two. Form of life, according to Wittgenstein, means a way of living that shapes language. He states that “to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life” (*PI*, 19). In this respect, it can be said that language is shaped through form of life, and it has a constitutive role in language.

Another sentence that Wittgenstein mentions “form of life” in the *Investigations* is that “The word ‘language-game’ is used here to emphasize the fact that the *speaking* of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life” (*PI*, 23). As I said above, the close relationship between language game and form of life clearly appears in this sentence. If we turn back to Wittgenstein’s example of builders which is stated in the second proposition of the *Investigations*, it is seen that his saying “the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life” fits to the dialogue between the builders when one says “Slab!”, then the other brings the slab although the one does not construct the sentence as the way that “Bring the slab.” In this language game, there is meaning of command in the tone of voice when the builder says “Slab!” and this short sentence which consists of just one word is understood as “Bring the slab.” To understand requires being involved in the same language game. If the second

builder, who is commanded, was an alien from another planet that way of life is different and there is no command in his/her life; then understanding the sentence “Slab!” is not possible for the alien builder from the tone of voice since he/she is not involved in the game here because of his/her different form of life.

Suppose that there are two people from two fictional countries A and B that have different life styles and languages, and they speak with each other by the third person who is a translator. In this scenario, the translator is from the country A and he/she shares a common form of life with the person who is from the same country. And consider that in the country B, there is no thanking. The people of the country B do not have any word or action for thanking for something, and it is not because they do not express their gratitude, but because there is no situation in this country to be thankful for and consequently there is no expression of gratitude or appreciation neither. Then, suppose that the person from the country A says to the one from B “Thank you for this conversation,” then can the translator translate it to him/her? It is not exactly possible, but not because there is no word which corresponds “Thank you,” but because in the country B gratitude is not a matter of fact. It is like having no marine terms in a society which never comes across the sea.

Wittgenstein talks about the term “form of life” also as follows:

“So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?” — What is true or false is what human beings *say*; and it is in their *language* that human beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life (*PI*, 241).

As a result, language is not only random words, but it is mainly the use of these words or expressions that do not include any words such gestures and facial expressions. Therefore, language is an activity which is shaped within a certain way of life that Wittgenstein calls “form of life.” The way of living shapes language and it has power to change and transform language. Therefore, Wittgenstein associates language with an antique city. He states that:

Our language can be regarded as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, of houses with extensions from various periods, and all this

surrounded by a multitude of new suburbs with straight and regular streets and uniform houses (*PI*, 18).

What is it that transforms the appearance of this ancient city? The answer is “form of life.” Depending on that, new language games emerge and new streets are articulated to the old ones, so as long as you walk around these streets it is possible to meet with the people who pass through the same roads. Therefore, language is the whole ancient city and if you are a foreign person to this city, it means that even you know the main roads, and you probably do not know the alleys. Consequently, how you learn language depends on in which language games you are involved and what kind of way of life you have, and they do not make language an entity that has an essence, but a system which rests on family resemblances. As a result, all these concepts of language games, family resemblance and form of life allow language to be more flexible system in contrast to just having rules of it. Therefore, the boundaries of language more flexible contrary to the strictly limited boundaries of language that Wittgenstein states in the *Tractatus*.

CHAPTER 3

WITTGENSTEIN'S AESTHETICS

In the previous chapter, I explained Wittgenstein's early and later stages in terms of his understanding of language by mainly focusing on its strict and flexible limits. Since my thesis is to show the parallelism between his understanding of language and music, here I put a comma for the part of language, and I will investigate the second part, which is music. In this chapter, I will make an introduction as to his relationship with art by starting from his family. After explaining his artistic respects, which are his relationship with music and architecture, I will give room to his thoughts on aesthetic value.

3.1 Wittgenstein and Art

In order to understand Wittgenstein's relationship with art, it is required to start from his family. Wittgenstein was born into a family that has really intimate relationships with art such that they were the notable names of the art world of Vienna. The family had relationships with plenty branches of art such as painting, music, sculpture, and architecture. Ray Monk states that Wittgenstein's father Karl Wittgenstein had a huge collection of artworks, thanks to his daughter Hermine who is a talented painter, that consist of especially valuable paintings and sculptures of the famous artists such as Gustav Klimt, Koloman Moser and Auguste Rodin; moreover, Klimt was the painter who painted the wedding portrait of Wittgenstein's sister Margaret in 1905 (1990: 8-9). Georg Henrik von Wright states that Wittgenstein's parents, but especially his mother Leopoldine Wittgenstein were highly interested in music and "the wealthy and cultured home of the Wittgensteins became a center of musical life" (2001: 4). Ray Monk explains the house's being center of Viennese musical life as

well. He explains the influence of Leopoldine for Wittgensteins on musical activities by stating that she has very high standards on music, and thanks to her, Alleegasse house of Wittgensteins has become a center of musical nights by the attendance of famous musicians such as Johannes Brahms, Gustav Mahler, and Bruno Walter (1990: 8). Moreover, Monk also states that “the blind organist and composer Josef Labor owed his career largely to the patronage of the Wittgenstein family” (1990: 8). According to von Wright, the famous musician Brahms, who was attending the musical evenings organized in Wittgenstein’s house, was also a close friend of the family (2001: 4). Monk states that Brahms was the piano teacher of Wittgenstein’s aunts, and the Clarinet Quintet (opus 115), that is the one of his major works, was performed for the first time at the Wittgensteins’ house (1990: 6).

In Wittgenstein’s family, not only his mother Leopoldine was interested in music, but also his elder brothers Hans and Paul Wittgenstein were very talented on music. Monk states that, music was an ambition for Hans (1990: 12). He expresses Hans’ extraordinary talent as follows:

With encouragement and support, Hans might have become a great composer, or at the very least a successful concert musician. Even by the Wittgenstein family – most of whom had considerable musical ability – he was regarded as exceptionally gifted. He was a musical prodigy of Mozartian talents – a genius. While still in infancy he mastered the violin and piano, and at the age of four he began composing his own work. Music for him was not an interest but an all-consuming passion; it had to be at the center, not the periphery, of his life (1990: 11-12).

Monk also explains Paul’s, the other brother of Wittgenstein, relation with music. He says that Paul was a very successful and famous concert pianist of that time in Vienna, and after he lost his right arm in the First World War, he trained himself to play piano just with his left hand, so he achieved to play with his left hand expertly and could be able to continue to perform music as a concert pianist (1990: 13). Monk also adds that Maurice Ravel composed his famous composition “Piano Concerto for the Left Hand” in 1931 for Paul Wittgenstein (1990: 13).

Wittgenstein had such great musically talented brothers and mother. Monk states that his mother Leopoldine was also very stern about music and she was intolerant to

second-rate playing (1990: 13-14). He states that Wittgenstein's sister Margaret was not talented on music as her mother and brothers, and once she gamely attempted a duet with Leopoldine, but she couldn't tolerate her daughter's performance and suddenly started to shout that "*Du hast aber kein Rhythmus!*" ("You have no sense of rhythm at all!") (1990: 13-14). And maybe because of his mother's high rate of sensitivity towards music and her intolerance against such a musical performance which is performed badly, Wittgenstein abandoned piano lessons when he was a child. Béla Szabados states that Wittgenstein got nothing out of these piano lessons and abandoned them, and much more later when he entered Teacher's College in 1920s he started to play an instrument — a clarinet —, since it is a requirement that he has to play an instrument to get the diploma of the school (2014: 27). Therefore, I cannot evaluate Wittgenstein as an artist, but it is obvious that he has intimate relations with art since he was born into such a family. However, it would not be wrong to say that he can be evaluated as an art critic.

When the fame of Wittgenstein's family in the Viennese art culture is considered, it is not surprising that in addition to his philosopher identity, Wittgenstein has also an intimate relationship with art, since he grew up in such an artistic atmosphere in the family. Although he does not play an instrument until 1920s, he was highly interested in music. His sister, Hermine, states about Wittgenstein's relationship with music as follows:

Music, too, came to have an ever stronger attraction for Ludwig. In his youth he had never played an instrument, but as a teacher he had to acquire this skill and chose the clarinet. I think that only from then on did his strong musical sense become really developed; at any rate, he played with great musical sensibility and enjoyed his instrument very much. He used to carry it around in an old stocking instead of in a case, and ... he often cut a curious figure (cited in Szabados, 2014: 27).

Paul Engelmann, one of Wittgenstein's friends, says that he heard Wittgenstein once he was playing Schubert's "Shepherd on the Rock" (cited in Szabados, 2014: 27).³ In addition to his playing clarinet, Wittgenstein was also known with his extraordinary

³ See also Engelmann, 1967: 89-90.

talent in whistling too. Maybe whistling cannot be considered as a great talent as playing an instrument by many people, however it should not be underestimated at all. The whistle here is not only uttering a sound through mouth, instead it is much more than that because it requires having a well-developed musical ear. The whistle that is mentioned here is a sort of playing a solo part of a concerto without making any mistake on notes. Engelmann also states that once when they talk about a viola part of a string quartet of Beethoven, Wittgenstein whistled the mentioned part of the quartet from beginning to the end as pure and strong as an instrument (cited in Szabados, 2014: 27).⁴ Furthermore, Szabados states that the whistler aspect of Wittgenstein is mentioned also in the diaries of David Pinsent,⁵ and he says that both Pinsent and Wittgenstein were “mad about Schubert” and while Pinsent was playing the piano part, Wittgenstein was accompanying him by whistle of the voice parts of Schubert songs (2014: 28). They were also both members of Cambridge University Musical Club, and they were often attending to the meetings of the club regularly, together with Bertrand Russell (2014: 28). Szabados also explains that “Bach, Mozart, Handel, Beethoven, Schumann, Schubert, and Brahms compositions are usually received with enthusiasm, while those of Richard Strauss usually avoided” at the club (2014: 29).

Wittgenstein’s relationship with music is not limited to playing an instrument, whistling in master degree, and joining a musical club. In addition to these acts, Monk mentions another side of Wittgenstein that he also conducted a research about the sense of rhythm in music at an experimental psychology laboratory at Cambridge (1990: 7). Szabados also explains this issue in more detail by saying that Pinsent was the subject of these experiments conducted by Wittgenstein in 1912-1913 and he was investigating the factors that affect appreciation of music such as rhythm, pitch, and the property of being musically meaningful (2014: 30).

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ David Pinsent was maybe the closest friend of Wittgenstein, so that he dedicated the *Tractatus* to Pinsent’s memoir when it is published three years after his death. See also Pinsent, 1990.

Wittgenstein's interest and ability towards art is not only restricted to the area of music, but also he was interested in architecture too. He had an experience on the design process of an architectural building. Even if he was not an architect, he was highly involved in this process. This building which is mentioned is the private property of his sister Margaret Stonborough in Kundmannngasse, Vienna, and it is called the "Wittgenstein House". Wittgenstein involved in this building process with the invitation of Margaret for the design of the house during the period between 1926 and 1929. Wittgenstein worked in this process by cooperating with the architect of the house, Paul Engelmann. Nana Last, who has published a book on the subject, says that although Engelmann is the architect of the house, Wittgenstein pushed his designs to the project by ignoring the architect role of Engelmann; as a result, Engelmann felt that he does not have a role in this project anymore, so he left Vienna in 1928 and he didn't return until after the house was completed (1998: 139).

Wittgenstein's interests in two branches of art which are music and architecture can be seen as a result of his thoughts on language. They are somehow related and can be read as parallel from Wittgenstein's point of view. Then the "How?" question should be asked. It can be said that music and architecture are similar to each other in terms of being language. Both of them are complex structures and they express something and have meaning just like language. Wittgenstein says that "Architecture is a gesture. Not every purposive movement of the human body is a gesture. Just as little as every functional building is architecture" (CV: 49). It is understood from these words that gesture is much more than just any movement of the body, because it is an expression. It means that a gesture says something. For instance, cracking knuckles, sniffing or touching the hair for tidying are just purposive movements, nothing more. They do not carry any other meaning aside from themselves. Therefore, when you crack your fingers during a conversation, it is not a gesture. On the other hand, if one shakes his/her head while you are talking with him/her, the shaking movement of the head means that this person does not agree with you. Therefore, it is a gesture, not just shaking head. It is an expression of negation. In the same manner that Wittgenstein thinks about being gesture of certain movements of body, he also thinks

that architecture is more than just any functional building, so it is a gesture. He states that architecture is not just buildings, therefore not every building is an example of architecture. Having a function is not enough to define a building as architecture. On the other hand, if the building is more than its function, so if it is an expression of something; only then it is possible to define it as architecture, and therefore it is a gesture. For example, think about a huge cathedral. It may express the greatness of God. As it is known, cathedrals are built for religious aims. Therefore, their sizes can be seen as parallel to the idea, which they carry, that the cathedrals signify the greatness of God. They are so huge, because they may symbolize the idea that God is so great. When a person enters inside a cathedral, he/she may feel that he/she is so small in this building, so he/she may feel God is so great that he/she is like a tiny grain beside his greatness. On the other hand, when Wittgenstein's view on aesthetics is considered again, it is known that aesthetics is unsayable, so it is in the realm of inexpressible through utterance for him. Of course, such a sentence can be said that the cathedral expresses the greatness of God, but this sentence is not something more than a fact. Or for example, think about a castle, say Neuschwanstein Castle. When you see such a castle, it may make you feel something. It is understood that it expresses something, may be magnificence. It is a reflection of beauty by means of architecture. However, this expression of beauty cannot be describable; but it is a gesture. It says something, and makes you feel something. Similarly, Wittgenstein also says music is a gesture as he thinks about architecture. He states that "the musical phrase is a gesture for me. It creeps into my life. I make it my own." (CV: 83). Then, how can it be a gesture? Suppose that we are in spring, birds are singing, there is green everywhere, it is a nice weather, etc. One may feel to respond this nature with a gesture and it was responded by Vivaldi with the "Spring Concerto" which is one of the four concertos known as "The Four Seasons". When you hear this music, it makes you feel something. "Four Seasons" consists of "Spring", "Summer", "Autumn" and "Winter" and they are like the different chambers of a house. They are parts of a whole; each of them is produced for different aims, and has different expressions like each room of a house is designed for different purposes.

Another aspect that architecture and music can be considered as similar from Wittgensteinian point of view is that they both glorify and immortalize something. Wittgenstein's different statements about architecture are situated consecutively in *Culture and Value*. First he says that architecture glorifies its purpose (CV: 74), then, in addition to the architecture's feature of glorifying, he adds that it also immortalizes something, therefore, he concludes that "there can be no architecture where there is nothing to immortalize and glorify" (CV: 74).

According to Wittgenstein, the principle that is required for architecture is its feature of glorification. In addition to that it glorifies something, he states that architecture also immortalizes something. In these statements, architecture may be replaced with music. It would not be wrong to say that music glorifies and immortalizes something. Classical music is still listened to by many people today for centuries. Composers like Mozart, Beethoven, Bach etc. immortalized both themselves and a way of life through their music. If nobody listened to them, they would lose the feature of being immortal. However, being listened makes the music alive. The same situation is also valid for architecture. For example, architecture of a huge cathedral glorifies a thought which is the greatness of God and as long as the art work stands, it will refer to the idea of the great God. It immortalizes the ideas. Or for example, the architecture of palaces glorifies aristocracy or delicacy. The palaces and the music performed in these palaces are somehow similar. They serve for the same group of people. As an art work, they are in the realm of the showable. Therefore, architecture and music stand side by side.

As a result, when it is considered that Wittgenstein's relationship with art in his family, it is inevitable that this situation has also reflected to his entire life as a good listener and performer in music and architecture. Moreover, the reflections of this intimate relationship with art are also seen in his philosophy. Therefore, it is not surprising that he gives room to aesthetics in his writings and he has reasons to make analogies between art and language while clarifying his ideas on language.

3.2 Wittgenstein and Value

To understand Wittgenstein's aesthetics, one should look at his viewpoints regarding value. It is a key concept that constitutes his understanding of ethics and aesthetics in "A Lecture on Ethics". This concept is important in terms of clarifying Wittgenstein's understanding of fact and value distinction while grasping his ideas on language and aesthetics. It should be considered that value, which is mentioned here, is "absolute value" that is suggested by Wittgenstein; and when aesthetic value judgments are talked about, it is absolute value that is implied. Thus, aesthetic value judgments are kind of absolute sense of judgments. I have already emphasized the distinction between absolute and relative value in Wittgenstein's philosophy. However, in this section I will underline the concept of absolute value while emphasizing this concept.

To begin with, the first question should be asked is "What is value?" As I mentioned in the Chapter 2, according to Wittgenstein, value is about something that is unsayable. Wittgenstein thinks that value is not in the realm of the sayable, rather it falls into the realm of the showable. In his "A Lecture on Ethics," as I mentioned before, ethics is considered as "the enquiry into what is valuable, or into what is really important, enquiry into the meaning of life, or into what makes life worth living, or into the right way of living." by Wittgenstein (LE: 5). Since he thinks that "ethics and aesthetics are one and the same" (*TLP*, 6.421; *NB*: 77), it would not be wrong to say this consideration of ethics is also valid for what aesthetics is concerned with. Maybe it can be rejected by saying that he does not think in the same way as he has written the *Tractatus*, but the difference between his early and later period of thoughts on language is a methodological difference, but his views on ethics, aesthetics and value in general do not change. Wittgenstein explicitly says in the "A Lecture on Ethics" that he uses the term ethics in a wider sense as which is the most essential part of aesthetics (LE: 4). Therefore, it is possible to say that aesthetics also covers ethics. Then, when aesthetics is taken into account, the same sentence can also be said for aesthetics; and so aesthetics is concerned with "what is valuable," "what is really important," "the meaning of life," "what makes life worth living," or

“the right way of living” likewise ethics (LE: 5). Moreover, as I mentioned in the Chapter 2, while I explain the issue of family resemblance, I emphasized that ethics and aesthetics are the members of the same family. The element that combines them into the same family is the concept of value. Then, again if we turn back to aesthetic value, what does it mean? It is about absolute good or absolute beauty. This “absoluteness” according to Wittgenstein, cannot be expressed through verbal language. He thinks that the obstacle against such an expression’s being impossible is not about the fact that there is limited number of words in language to express the absolute good or beauty in a correct way (LE: 11); rather it is about the distinction between the concepts of sense and nonsense. However, before going into explaining this distinction, I should firstly refer to fact and value distinction. Then, I will return to the subject of sense and nonsense.

As I mentioned before, according to Wittgenstein’s early thoughts, what can be described through language are only facts, nothing more. This view of him is firstly stated in the *Tractatus*, and then continues in “A Lecture on Ethics”. In order to understand the issue of “facts,” these two texts should be taken as guidelines. To grasp the idea that value cannot be described through language as facts can, firstly it is required to understand facts. Why is it not possible to place value and facts as same level in language? The question of why value cannot be put into words is related to the idea that what makes facts sayable.

What makes facts sayable? It is based on Wittgenstein’s early understanding of “Picture Theory” in language. According to Wittgenstein, in his early period, language pictures the reality. This claim is based on his logical conceptualization of language. For him, language makes sense only if it consists of propositions which carry truth value. This is language of logic. In order for a proposition to be true or false, it has to state a fact. Otherwise, if a proposition is neither true, nor false, then it is nonsense in logic. And language is full of such nonsensical expressions, and this is the problem of philosophy. Therefore, he argues that the aim of philosophy is logical clarification of thoughts (*TLP*, 4.112). In that sense, it is possible to say this claim corresponds with the frame of logical positivism. If the problems in language are

solved and language is used as logic, then the problems in philosophy would disappear according to this point of view. Thus, he says that “All philosophy is a ‘critique of language’” (*TLP*, 4.0031). Then, if we turn back to “Picture Theory,” how is language capable of picturing the world? Wittgenstein thinks in this period such a way that “the world is totality of facts” (*TLP*, 1.1), it is “determined by the facts and by their being *all* the facts” (*TLP*, 1.11), and “we picture facts to ourselves” (*TLP*, 2.1). Therefore, for him, the world is limited to facts, and they are pictures of what they represent in the world, so the truth value of propositions comes from the basis of their representation of reality as picture. This can be inferred from the propositions which “A picture agrees with reality or fails to agree; it is correct or incorrect, true or false.” (*TLP*, 2.21), and “If a fact is to be a picture, it must have something in common with what it depicts” (*TLP*, 2.16) that language is accessible only to state facts and this is what makes “the world all that is the case” (*TLP*, 1). Language is not capable of going beyond this limited world which is composed of facts. Thus, he states that “*The limits of my language mean the limits of my world*” (*TLP*, 5.6). As a result, facts are distinct from values because of their position in language. As long as they have truth value, they picture the world by language as it is the case, but value cannot be depicted as facts do. In order to have a meaningful language, it has to be built upon picturing the reality of the world with a sense. Otherwise, if a proposition does not picture facts, then it would not be clear as opposed to the language of logic, and such propositions are nonsense. Ethical and aesthetical value judgments are such nonsensical propositions according to Wittgenstein, because ethics and aesthetics are beyond language (*TLP*, 6.421). Therefore, in contrast to facts, value can only be shown, but cannot be said. As a result, there is a difference between using language for facts and value. Value cannot be expressible by means of method of picturing unlike facts as carrying truth value condition.

The concrete examples regarding fact and value distinction are given in “A Lecture on Ethics”. One of the examples given by Wittgenstein in this lecture is the example of description of a murder which is described with all physical and psychological

details, and he claims that even if such a description can cause feeling pain or any other emotion in person who reads or hears it, actually it is not different than the description of any ordinary situation such as falling of a stone (LE: 6). The reason of his claim on this subject is that both descriptions of a murder and falling of a stone are only the expression of facts. According to Wittgenstein, “our words will only express facts; as a teacup will only hold a teacup full of water and if I were to pour out a gallon over it.” (LE: 7). Therefore, Wittgenstein’s statement can be interpreted in the way that the utterances that are made by verbal language will be limited only to facts. Even if new vocabularies added to language, still they will not add any extra knowledge than they describe just facts. On the other hand, value judgments which are expressed by verbal language such as saying “Beautiful!” in front of a picture or while listening to a song can only be an expression of an exclamation or “show” for him. In “Lecture on Aesthetics,”⁶ Wittgenstein says about the words expressing aesthetic judgments as follows:

It is remarkable that in real life, when aesthetic judgements are made, aesthetic adjectives such as “beautiful”, “fine”, etc., play hardly any role at all. Are aesthetic adjectives used in a musical criticism? You say: “Look at this transition”, or [Rhees]⁷ “The passage here is incoherent”. Or you say, in a poetical criticism, [Taylor]⁸: “His use of images is precise”. The words you use are more akin to “right” and “correct” (as these words are used in ordinary speech) than to “beautiful” and “lovely” (LC: 3).

As I understood from this passage is that the reactions towards an art work can be aesthetic adjectives such as “beautiful” or “lovely,” but they are like empty words. The descriptions that are said for a piece of music in a concert of a chorus such as saying that “The bass part of the choir is more dominant than tenors.”, or

⁶ It is the chapter name of the book *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief* (1967). This book consists of the lecture notes taken down by Wittgenstein’s students (Rush Rhees, Yorick Smythies, and James Taylor) in his lectures at Cambridge. “Lecture on Aesthetics” consists of four lectures which are delivered in 1938. See Wittgenstein, 1967: vii.

⁷ Rush Rhees

⁸ James Taylor

“Intonations are as they should be.” describe the piece of music in more detail than just saying “It is beautiful!”. Maybe this issue is more apparent in the case of cinema. Suppose that you met with your friends on the street and they said that they have just an hour ago watched a movie. Then you ask that “How was the movie?”, and they replied “Amazing!”, but they did not say anything else. You understood that they liked the film, but saying an aesthetic adjective, “Amazing!”, did not create any extra knowledge in you. It does not describe value. Wittgenstein says that such words like “beautiful” and “lovely” are used more by the people who cannot express themselves properly (LC: 3). He thinks that such aesthetic adjectives that are said, for instance, while listening to a piece of music can be replaceable with a gesture that signifies appreciation such as just saying “Ah!” (LC: 3). Therefore, saying “What a beautiful music!” does not say anything more than a facial expression which implies a sign of appreciation. He states his view on facial gestures as follows:

When I read these poems I made gestures and facial expressions which were what would be called gestures of approval. But the important thing was that I read the poems entirely differently, more intensely, and said to others: “Look! This is how they should be read.” Aesthetic adjectives played hardly any role (LC: 4-5).

Then, this statement of Wittgenstein leads us to the concepts of sayable, showable, sense and nonsense. Since all we can describe by words are facts, then the words that are used for expressing aesthetic value such as beautiful, lovely, nice, amazing would also describe facts instead of value. And as I mentioned before, his thoughts on this issue is clear if it is considered his statement that “although all judgments of relative value can be shown to be mere statements of facts, no statement of fact can ever be, or imply, a judgment of absolute value” (LE: 6). Therefore, according to Wittgenstein, absolute value is not in the realm of sayable, but it is in the realm of showable as it is understood from his saying that “What *can* be shown, *cannot* be said.” (TLP, 4.1212). Aesthetic value judgments and ethical value judgments share a common feature in that sense. When it is said, for instance, “good attitude”, which is an ethical value judgment, or “beautiful music”, which states an aesthetic value judgment; the words “good” and “beautiful” do not say anything. Therefore, absolute value cannot be said, but only be shown from Wittgensteinian point of view. Thus,

when the questions asked towards art works such as “How should poems to be read?” or “How should ‘Mariage D’amour’ of Paul de Senneville to be played?” are replied by such an answer that “Beautifully”, then this answer does not have a role in describing the aesthetic value. What is beautiful? It is an empty word, because value is not describable through verbal language. Words like beautiful or good can only have sense in relative value judgments, but they do not have sense in describing absolute value judgments. For Wittgenstein, it is in vain to try to describe absolute value, because it is not possible through language. Therefore, he thinks that using such words for expressing absolute value is “misusing language” (LE: 8) and expressing something cannot be said is nonsense within the boundaries of language (LE: 11). The concept of nonsense is used, for Wittgenstein, as stating for expressing of something which cannot be sayable by words. If “what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence” (*TLP*, 7), but if it is not the case that we remain silent and try to say something on absolute value which cannot be expressed by words; then it is nonsense. As a result, saying “beautiful” towards an art work would be nonsense for him. “Beautiful” here is like an empty word, so it is not enough to describe value. He states in “Lecture on Aesthetics” regarding this subject as follows:

In order to get clear about aesthetic words you have to describe ways of living. We think we have to talk about aesthetic judgments like “This is beautiful”, but we find that if we have to talk about aesthetic judgments we don’t find these words at all, but a word used something like a gesture, accompanying a complicated activity (*LC*: 11).

As it is understood from the quotation above, aesthetic judgments are like gestures such as facial expressions or certain kind of body movements like shaking head to mean disapproval. Therefore, description by words is not enough to describe aesthetic value. Such a description which consists of aesthetic words such as beautiful, nice, fine or lovely would be nonsense to describe aesthetics, because value cannot be expressed in this way. “Beautiful” cannot be describable by the word itself. It would be a tautology. Therefore, using such expressions would be nonsense according to Wittgenstein.

In "A Lecture on Ethics", in order to explain this nonsensicality and misusing of language, he addresses some examples from daily language. The first one is the example of utterance "wondering at the existence of the world" (LE: 8). He claims that saying such phrases like "I wonder at the existence of the world", "How extraordinary that anything should exist", or "How extraordinary that the world should exist" is nonsense because it is not possible to wonder at the existence of something, because one can only wonder at something being the case only if it is conceived that this is not to be the case (LE: 8). Therefore, something which is not conceived as being not the case cannot be wondered. In order to clarify this notion, Wittgenstein gives an example about wondering at the size of a dog. He says that it is possible to wonder at the size of a dog, for instance, if it is bigger than any other ordinary dog which is ever perceived, and one can find this extraordinary; because one can imagine the ordinary sized dogs as opposed to seeing the extraordinary sized dog, so it is wondering at something that is not to be the case before (LE: 8). Therefore, existence of something which is not to be the case before is something can be wondered at. Similarly, he gives the example of wondering existence of a house. He states that one can wonder at the existence of a house in the sense that if one visited the house for a long time ago and when he/she saw it again, he/she could wonder that the house still exists because he/she expected that it could be pulled down in the meantime (LE: 9). Only in that case, when something being not to be the case is imaginable, then it is possible to say wondering the existence of something. Therefore, Wittgenstein states that saying "I wonder at the existence of the world" is a nonsensical expression, because one cannot imagine the world does not exist (LE: 9). The experience of perceiving the existence of the world is something continues. This experience cannot be interrupted by experience of the world's nonexistence. However, when you meet with an experience regarding wondering, this is an experience that interrupts your previous experiences. When you see something unexpected for you such as seeing the biggest sized dog ever, or seeing an old house still continues to exist although many years passed over, then these experiences are new and interrupt the previous experience of something being the case, and it is possible to talk about "wondering". Otherwise, when it is said that wondering at the

existence of the world, it is nonsense to say this phrase; because the world's being nonexistent is impossible to be the case, and cannot be imaginable according to Wittgenstein (LE: 9). The second example that he gives to show the nonsensical expressions in language is "the experience of absolute safety". He says that, like saying "wondering at the existence of the world", saying "I am safe *whatever* happens." is also a nonsensical expression (LE: 9). In both examples, they are nonsense because they are tautologies according to him, so they are the examples of how language is misused.

Distinction of sense and nonsense is also directly related to the distinction between the concepts of sayable and showable. The things which can be said by means of language are facts, and they have sense. Wittgenstein states that "only facts can express a sense" (*TLP*, 3.142). And description of value is not possible to be expressed by language, so if it is tried to be expressed, it would be nonsense for him. As a result, value cannot be said, but only be shown. Then, it is required to ask such questions as "What does it mean to show the value?", or "How can 'beautiful' be shown?" The word beautiful cannot be described by words. It is beyond words. However, it is not a matter of vocabulary. When it is asked "What is beautiful?", then it can be said that "Rainbow is beautiful", "The world is beautiful", or "The landscape is beautiful". Since "beautiful" is an adjective, it can be added a subject to this adjective such as "a beautiful landscape" or "a beautiful tree". However, when the question is changed to "What does it mean to be beautiful?" or "What is the meaning of beautiful?", it cannot be answered as that "Beautiful means to be beautiful". Such an answer is a tautology and it would be nonsense. However, Wittgenstein does not mean that it does not mean anything. Value is something based on quiddity of being "beautiful". For instance, what makes music "beautiful" cannot be described, but it is more than just notes on sheet music. This "more" is aesthetic value and it is the thing what makes music beautiful. Therefore, even if value is something cannot be said, it can be shown just in the act such as how poems should be read. Suppose that a girl reads a poem and someone asked that "What do you think about her reading of the poem?", and you said "She reads beautifully". The

aesthetic value in reading the poem is something can be shown in the act of reading. The gestures, tone of voice, making you feel emotions are the conditions that make it beautiful. Therefore, the aesthetic value is something emerges during the act of reading, and how beautifully she reads can be shown in such a way that just by looking her act of reading poem. Even if “the beautifulness” cannot be described by words, it is possible to be shown. Therefore, absolute value is in the realm of showable instead of sayable.

According to Wittgenstein, saying words to describe value is not only possible, but also it is not necessary. The following statement of him from “Lecture on Aesthetics” is a proper example of this:

What are expressions of liking something? Is it only what we say or interjections we use or faces we make? Obviously not. It is, often, how often I read something or how often I wear a suit. Perhaps I won't even say: “It's fine”, but wear it often and look at it (*LC*: 12).

He claims that the words that are used for expressing aesthetic judgments are not even necessary to express “liking”. His statement above can also be applied to liking a piece of music as well. For instance, it is not required to say “This is beautiful” when you like the compositions of a composer. Listening to these pieces often is enough to express that one likes these compositions. Expression of something is not only limited to the words in language. In addition to the words; gestures, body movements and tone of voice which have role in different language games, life style or attitudes also have role in expressions. Without using the statement of “This is beautiful”, appreciation of music or any other part of which considered as in the area of aesthetics can be expressed by means of behavior. Such an expression is not in the realm of sayable, but it is in the realm of showable. The expression of “beautiful” is directly manifested by showing it. It cannot be describable by words, and it is not even necessary to make gestures by face; but it manifests itself in the attitudes such as performing a musical piece by whistling it.

As a result, value cannot be put into words as the way that facts are expressed through language. Aesthetic value judgments which are phrases like “What a

beautiful piece of music!”, “This is amazing!”, “This is a beautiful melody” are actually nonsense, because the words “beautiful” or “amazing” are just empty words since they are tautologies according to Wittgenstein. They cannot be describable by words. He claims that language is only capable to state facts, but value is beyond language. Therefore, it is nonsense to say judgments about aesthetics. However, here the concept of nonsense does not mean aesthetics is worthless. On the contrary, as I have already explained that it is really important in Wittgenstein’s life. However, it is nonsense to say, because value manifests itself just in the attitude or performance. Therefore, even if it cannot be said by means of words, it is possible to grasp it by showing it.

CHAPTER 4

WITTGENSTEIN AND MUSIC

I have discussed the main points and concepts in Wittgenstein's understanding of language and his views on aesthetics so far. In this chapter, I will relate Wittgenstein's ideas on language into the specific area of aesthetics which is music. Therefore, in this chapter, the aim of my thesis which is to show the parallelism between Wittgenstein's understanding of language and music will be more clear in this chapter.

4.1 Music and Language Game

The concept of language game is introduced in later period of Wittgenstein in order to show that meaning in language is not strictly drawn as language of logic, as opposed to his early understanding of language in the *Tractatus*. I have mentioned this concept before, while I explain Wittgenstein's understanding of language in Chapter 2. In this section, I will correlate the concept of language game with music. Thus, it will be possible to understand music in terms of tools that gives chance for understanding language.

In the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein starts to question with the argument of Augustine concerning the essence of human language. Augustine supports the idea that a word is a tool in order to signify an object, so the words name the objects. As a result, the meaning of a word is the object which is signified (*PI*, 1). This is also the way how the native language is learned by a child when he/she was born. On the other hand, Wittgenstein criticizes in the *Investigations* this kind of understanding of language which is based on the idea that meaning of a word is the object carrying this name, and he finds this argument over-simplified. According to him, it has to be more than

that, because language does not consist of only the words naming the objects. Language is more complex than this. For instance, there are different functions of the words other than representing the objects and there are not only the words which show the concrete objects such as table, chair, lamp, bottle etc. Wittgenstein suggests the concept of “language games” while investigating the meaning in language in contrast to the representative view which sees language just as a representation of the objects. His suggestion is that the meaning changes depending on the context. A word, gesture or mimic can be a language game which is used for an expression of something to the other during communication and the other understands it in the same way. The concept of game in Wittgenstein is about knowing and applying the rules within the game in practice. For instance, if I lift my eyebrows when I talk with someone, it may mean surprise or shock, and if the other person knows the game, he/she would understand it easily. He/she does not ask me what I mean by this movement of eyebrows. Thus, the communication continues without interruption. Or for example, a word can be used as a question, a statement or an exclamation depending on the context. It is also valid for music too. Consider, there is a choir and a maestro who directs the choir. For instance, suppose that while the choir sings, maestro says “Piano!” during the performance and the choir starts to sing in a low voice. The term “piano” in music means to sing in soft-loud. It is also the name of a musical instrument, so it represents an object. In the case of choir, it is not an object, but an action. On the other hand, in this case, the saying “piano” means the same thing for all the members of the choir and they sing in a soft-loud since the calling of the maestro states an action. However, “piano” for anyone who is not familiar with musical terms, may not mean to sing softly, but just mean to the instrument. In order to be able to understand and react according to the calling “piano”, one must know what it means in this context. Although in both cases of action and the instrument the word is derived from the same meaning, a person joining a choir for the first time may not understand when the maestro says “Piano!” since he/she merely knows piano as an instrument.⁹ Hence, it is a matter of “form of life”. There is no fixed

⁹ I am thankful to Assos. Prof. Dr. Turgay Erdener for his valuable comments on this example, since he made me look at this issue as another way.

meaning in the word, it is not a mere representation of an object, but it gains meaning in use, in game. A word can declare an object as well as the action as in the example of choir and maestro. As a result, it is possible to say that in the *Investigations*, the language is not sharply bounded as in the *Tractatus*; instead, there are no longer such strict limits of the language in this period of Wittgenstein, and the meaning can be different depending on the context. He states that there are many diverse functions of the words just like the various functions of the tools in a tool-box (*PI*, 11). The analogy between the tool box and language is also used by Wittgenstein in “Lecture on Aesthetics” as follows:

I have often compared language to a tool chest, containing a hammer, chisel, matches, nails, screws, glue. It is not a chance that all these things have been put together-but there are important differences between the different tools-they are used in a family of ways-though nothing could be more different than glue and a chisel. There is constant surprise at the new tricks language plays on us when we get into a new field (*LC*: 1).

Therefore, the concept of language game in later period of Wittgenstein is more flexible compared with the concept of picture in the *Tractatus*. In order to know the rules of the game, one has to share a common form of life with the one who speaks that language. Sharing a common form of life makes language games to be “games” and to be involved by the speaker or listener into the game. This is not only limited to speaking language, but also applicable to language of music as in the example of saying “piano”. In music, parallel to verbal language, there are rules like the rules of language games. Likewise saying “Slab!” leads the assistant to bring a slab, and so it means the same thing with the sentence “Bring the slab.” (*PI*, 6), in music also there are different functions of words or signs depending on the context. Meaning of a word is understood within the game. Otherwise, without involved any game, it is not possible to learn or speak that language. In music, for instance, there are music sheets for playing an instrument or singing. On these music sheets, there are symbols and notes to show how the musical piece should be performed. These signs are the rules for playing or singing. When someone plays following these rules, then it is possible to understood by a musical professional what he/she has played and whether he/she play it well or not. Of course, I do not mean that playing beautifully only depends on

following the rules, but following a pattern is a part of learning. One can reject this idea by asking the question whether there any musicians who do not play restrictedly from music sheet. Surely, there are people playing instruments without looking at the notes, even who learn to play without knowledge of the notes. However, still it has to be somehow following a pattern. Even if they do not know the names of the notes, they have to differentiate each sound perfectly from one another, and have to understand the rhythm and the tempo of the musical piece. Otherwise, it would not be possible to learn. In verbal language also one does not learn to speak with the help of a grammar book or something. However, it is learned within a form of life. Alessandro Arbo states the parallelism between language game and playing an instrument as follows:

We learn to play by imitating, repeating, consolidating, correcting and adapting our behavior to new situations. This is what happens when we play a musical instrument: as useful as the study of theory can be, we cannot prescind from a specific training founded on the assimilation of muscular, nervous and perceptive competencies. Surely it is no coincidence that in many languages (such as in English, German and French) the Italian “suonare” and “giocare” are two meanings of the same word: the playing of an instrument is a good example of an activity that is based on rules (2013: 188).

All is about involving the same game. Arbo’s emphasis is on the act of practice while training for learning playing an instrument. Learning is not just about knowing the theoretical knowledge, but also it is not separable from practical training which is based on being involved in games such as imitating, repeating, adopting our behavior to new situations; and also physical activities during the learning process in addition to studying of theory. Therefore, learning to play an instrument is similar to learning language. Knowing the rules is not enough to learn language or playing an instrument, but how to use these rules in practical life shapes learning. As Wittgenstein says that it is part of an “activity” (*PI*, 23), so it cannot be learned just through an ostensive definition (*PI*, 29). Wittgenstein’s example of the king in chess is helpful to understand what it means to be the part of an activity. He states as follows:

When one shows someone the king in chess and says “This is the king”, one does not thereby explain to him the use of this piece — unless he already knows the rules of the game except for this last point: the shape of the king (*PI*, 31).

Similarly, when someone, who does not know how to read notes or symbols on music sheet, sees the symbol “ ♩ ” or “ ♭ ” these symbols are just symbols which does not refer any meaning for this person. As Wittgenstein says that “Every sign *by itself* seems dead” (*PI*, 432), and “use” gives the sign its breath (*PI*, 432), thus it becomes meaningful. Therefore, showing the sign “ ♩ ” and saying “This is the treble clef sign” would not mean anything, because showing it would not explain the function of this sign. However, this ostensive definition would be useful only for the person who knows the rules for reading the music sheet and functions of the symbol, but does not know the shape of the treble clef sign. Surely, in order to play an instrument, it is not necessary to know these symbols, because they are just signs of the formal language of music. On the contrary, it is possible to perform music without knowing the symbols, in an informal method. Playing an instrument can be learned by observing and imitating someone who plays it. It is learned around a form of life like speaking language is also learned within such a way. Both are learned within practice, depending on a context. A child does not learn the rules first, and then speak around these rules. It is not conceivable. On the other hand, the rules are learned within the game, in practice. Therefore, theoretical knowledge is not prior to learn language. Maybe it can be conceivable that if one learns another language other than his/her speaking language. In that case, theoretical knowledge may work to some extent.

Consider the example above which is “the king” in chess. Suppose that someone teaches German equivalents of the names of the figures in chess to another person who knows playing chess. He/she the points at the king and says “*der König*” as mean to “This is called ‘*der König*’ in German”. In this respect, prior knowledge on playing chess and English together provide the saying “*der König*” meaningful for this person, and it is possible through the definition function of language game. However, for someone who has not heard German ever may think in the way that

“der” as the equivalent of “the” in English; or may hear it as just a one word as “derkönig”, then in this time it is not even possible to match “the” with “der”. Nevertheless, even if in this scenario, one understands that this utterance corresponds to the name of the king figure. The reason behind such an understanding is that this person involves this language game that functions as defining the figure. Otherwise, if this person did not know English, what chess is and how it is played; it would not be possible to understand and matching what it means to point at the figure by saying “der König”. By looking at this example, it can be said that language games provide to understand meaning in language, because it cannot be understood just by naming the words. Wittgenstein states that “We may say: it only makes sense for someone to ask what something is called if he already knows how to make use of the name” (*PI*, 31). However, in order to be a master of language, there has to be an experience within this activity. Therefore, Wittgenstein’s emphasis on “use” is important to see the connection between understanding language and how words are experienced within language. As I mentioned before, when I explain the parts of “use of language” in Section 2.2.1, there are various functions of language games such as giving order, exclamation, question, reporting etc. Similarly, it is also valid for music. Consider Johann Strauss’ “Radetzky March”. When it is “beautifully” performed, then it may lead one to the feeling of clap out the rhythm of it. The melody is something more than just notes, and makes one behave to clap or shake the head, fingers or the whole body as accompanying the rhythm. In that sense, it is similar to that meaning of words emerge in how they are used or experienced within attitudes, similarly, meaning of music emerges in the same way. Likewise, when it is said “Slab!” then it leads to the behavior of bringing the slab and it becomes an order depending of the tone of voice or the context in general; a melody also should be understood within this way. It makes one act in some way, and how one should act depends on which language game he/she involves in. For instance, suppose that in a concert, the orchestra performs “Radetzky March” and some of the audience are accompanying to the orchestra by clapping. Then, consider, maestro turns to the audience and puts his/her hand near to his/her ear by expecting them to do something. What they should do is obvious in this language game. This movement in

such a concert hall means that “I cannot hear enough clapping sound, join us by clapping”. The attitudes of audience make maestro’s “saying” meaningful when they start to clap. Suppose, just then, the sound of music is getting higher. Even there are no words in such music, it reflects to the audience as continuing to clap more loudly. Therefore, involving in this language game leads the audience to act in a certain way, and it means that music here is not just melody, notations or symbols but it has also power to make the audience somehow move or act if they involve in “game”. Joachim Schulte states about gestures to talk about music that “...gestures and parallels *are* the best we can get. To be sure, they are not verbal descriptions but their expressiveness contains a descriptive element which we can grasp once we have learned to play this sort of language-game.” (2013: 183). In that sense, it is possible to make connections between language games in music and ordinary language.

According to Wittgenstein in his later period, as I have said before, language does not only consist of words that signify objects as opposed to the understanding of Augustine (*PI*, 1).¹⁰ This understanding is also opposed to the idea of Picture Theory that limits language with strict boundaries and ignores social practice that language emerges within. He criticizes that language does not only consist of names attached to the objects like tags (*PI*, 15). In this point language games enter into the ability of understanding language with their different functions apart from naming the objects. Language games provide what should be done with the words or sentences, so it enables us to understand. For instance, the word “water” is the name of an object, but it interacts with some relationships in use and gains meaning. For example, you can drink it, wash your hands with it, put it into teapot, clean floor with it, play with it etc. However, you cannot climb the water. Therefore, how this word can be used gives its meaning and its function changes depending on the context. Think about an injured man in a battlefield and he says “Water!” with a demanding sound and consider another example that you order coffee in a café and the waiter asks “Water?”. It can be claimed that the symbols “!” and “?” make a difference in

¹⁰ See section 2.2. “Flexible Boundaries of Language” above.

meaning, but they are the symbols in written language. When it is considered their utterances in these situations, both are the utterance of the same word. However, although they refer to the same “water” as an object, their meanings are different depending on the context. “Water!”, which is said by the injured man, means an expression of begging or demanding, while “Water?” in the other example is an expression of a question. In both cases, the meaning of the expression is based on which language game is played. What makes “Water?” a question is not the question mark, but there should be a question mark here because of the context itself and whether it is a demand or a question is understood from the tone of voice and in what conditions it is used. This leads me to the idea that in music also the musical piece shows itself in a context, and it is known that what should be done with this musical piece likewise it is known what should be done with the words.

In *Brown Book*, while Wittgenstein builds the similarity between understanding language and understanding music, he states that: “Consider also this expression: ‘Tell yourself that it’s a *waltz* and you will play it correctly’” (*BB*: 167). He emphasizes “waltz” here. The musical structure of waltz is clear. A person who is familiar with this music easily understands that it is waltz when it is played. And when this music is played, it is known that the dance should be accompanied to this musical piece. There is no need to say “This is waltz”, but when it is performed, it is immediately known that it is waltz. It already shows itself as a certain kind of music, and what should be done with this piece of music is understood by those who understand music just like language. This is only possible through sharing a common language game. As a result, music and language is connected in terms of the concept of language game.

4.2 Music and Meaning

Where does meaning of a piece of music lie? How do we understand music? These are essential questions in the philosophy of music. Before answering these questions, it is important to clarify the concept of meaning a bit more. What is meaning? What

does it mean to understand music? Although understanding and meaning are not replaced by each other, they cannot be separated either. It is not wrong to say that understanding is about grasping meaning. Where there is a meaning, then it is possible to talk about understanding. Therefore, they cannot be thought as totally different entities. When musical understanding is considered, it is necessary to handle the subject of meaning in music.

Before starting to discuss the issue of meaning in music, one needs to differentiate music with and without words from each other. And again, we should ask what is meaning? I will not try to define it, because it is not that much possible, but I will emphasize its conceptual ingredients. When understanding comes into account, it cannot be possible to talk about one particular kind of understanding. It includes feelings, emotions, structural features, and social context. Therefore, there are plenty of different kinds of understanding music. When the subject is music with words, then it can be said that the words may give the meaning to music but what about music without words? Then what kind of understanding should be mentioned for music without words? For instance, it may mean to grasp the technical structure such as knowing where there is decrescendo, crescendo or how the measure is divided in the music, what the meter of the music is, and what type of music is played, etc. All these questions concern understanding the technical structure of a piece of music without words. Another kind of understanding may be feeling the emotions from the musical piece without words. For instance, the theme can be understood sad or cheerful. The aim of a musical composition can be to make the listener feel an emotion such as happiness or sorrow, and when the listener gets this feeling, then it is possible to say that the listener understands the music in that sense. Therefore, in such an example, understanding is related to grasping the feeling in some music. In addition to these kinds of understanding of music, there is another kind of understanding which refers to know in which social context the music is performed. One can talk about this understanding both for music with and without words.

In that sense, for whom this music is composed, who the agents that listen to the musical theme are, are essential to determine the understanding music by the different types of agents. For instance, what the audiences from different cultural backgrounds may not be even close to understanding it, when they listen to Neşet Ertaş who is a master in Turkish folk music. It cannot be expected that a Turkish villager and a person from Hawaii understand the music of Neşet Ertaş in the same way. The reason is because of the cultural difference between the audiences. In addition to the cultural differences, understanding of listeners may change as depending on their biological, cognitive and personal experiences too. Therefore, it is essential to note that the features of the audience are decisive in understanding the social context of music. Thus, it should be considered that there are various kinds of understanding music, and the concept of understanding depends on different circumstances. Therefore, it should be said that there is no single way to determine what understanding music is.

In the light of the general information above about understanding music, in this section I will try to explain how musical understanding is conceptualized among different scholars in the literature. Then, I will try to show what can or cannot signify musical understanding, so I will look for an answer the question “How understanding can be understood by us or the others?” While I am doing this, I will relate Wittgenstein’s concepts and ideas to the answers. After mentioning the signs of understanding, I will compare language and music in terms of meaning from Wittgensteinian point of view through the different scholars’ perspectives on this issue. Let me begin with the idea of understanding music’s being the understanding the technical structure of it.

4.2.1 Understanding Technical Structure

As I have said in the introduction of the section “Music and Meaning” above, meaning of music cannot be reduced to one single kind of understanding. Among the plenty of kinds of understanding, one of them refers to understanding the technical

structure of music. I will point out that some of the scholars dealing with this issue, which is musical understanding means to have knowledge about the technical structure of music. Looking at some of their suggestions about this topic would be useful.

One of these scholars, who argues that musical meaning is about knowing the technical details of music, is Alessandro Arbo. His argument on meaning of music is as follows:

In order to understand music it is necessary to begin with an activity, or, more precisely, by improving a performative act. Grasping the meaning of a melody ultimately amounts to being able to convey it in a certain way (a crescendo here, a diminuendo there, etc.) The way we play it, and even the way we whistle it (we should note Wittgenstein's talent in this respect) suggests that we have been able to comprehend a certain morphology — but also a certain rhythm (“Tell yourself that it's a waltz”). ... understanding, in music, amounts to grasping certain aspects (2013: 192).

In a similar vein to Arbo's comprehension of understanding music as grasping certain aspects, also according to Aaron Ridley, musical understanding is directly related to a particular way of hearing. Ridley states that in order to be able to understand music, in a rudimentary form, firstly music has to be experienced “*as music*”, not just a cluster of sounds or noise (1993: 589). Therefore, according to Ridley, one has to have a certain “way of hearing” of perceptual properties such as hearing them “as tones, rhythms, harmonies, and so forth” to hear music with understanding (1993: 589). Therefore, his comprehension of meaning refers a kind of experience depending on a particular way of hearing, so for both Arbo and Ridley understanding is used as a certain kind of experience which includes grasping the technical structure of music.

In order to grasp technical structure of music, one has to have knowledge about this issue to experience understanding. Otherwise, it is not possible to understanding the technical features of music. To detect these features, one should know the rules of music. This situation can be explained through an example of painting. Suppose a person who has excellent knowledge about techniques of painting. It is not surprising

that this person may detect whether there is *chiaroscuro*¹¹ or *contre-jour*¹² method is used in a picture in front of him/her. To differentiate these terms and their use in a picture, one has to know the rules first. This is also valid for understanding the structure of music. The concept that can be taken into account for understanding music is Wittgenstein's concept of "mastery of a rule-governed technique." Regarding this concept, it should be asked that if one knows the technical structure of music and is a master on music about its rules, then is it possible to say that he/she understands music? This question can be answered in such a way that knowing the rules is not enough for understanding, so "mastery of a rule-governed technique" is not the only criteria for musical understanding.

According to Deborah Hansen Soles, someone may have technical knowledge on music and perform music by depending on the rules, but these are not the central indicators for understanding music, although they are not totally irrelevant (1998: 112). However, Sarah E. Worth thinks that rule-governed technique makes someone close to understand. This notion is based on Wittgenstein's saying in the *Investigations* that "To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to have mastered a technique" (*PI*, 199). Based on this quotation, Worth claims that one has to understand language as a whole with its rules (1997: 105). Therefore, mastery in techniques provides more musical understanding according to Worth. She thinks that knowing the rule-governed technique produces different behaviors such as being able to be involved in a conversation with native speakers of a foreign language, whereas it is not possible without learning this language. Although these behaviors may be the signs of understanding, they are not identical with understanding (1997: 105). In this respect, it will not wrong to say that Worth and Soles think in the same way.

¹¹ A term used for the contrast between light and dark in painting.

¹² A technique used in art which aims backlighting of the subject.

As a result, some scholars conceptualize understanding music as understanding its technical features and having knowledge about the structure of music. Although they do not claim that mastery of rule-governed technique in music is identical with musical understanding, it is possible to say at least having knowledge about musical techniques, its structure and its theoretical background mean something for understanding music. Then, what does affect one's understanding music? What can be signs of understanding? I will try to discuss these questions in the following section.

4.2.2 What Does Affect Understanding Music?

As I have said before, according to Wittgenstein, a word means something in the context of its use and language games (*PI*, 7). Then, how is this notion related to music in terms of understanding? Is this similar to learn the meaning in the use of a language? It seems that there can be established such a similarity between learning meaning in language and music. Gilead Bar-Elli claims that on this issue as follows:

The main point that emerges is that our understanding music, just like our understanding the meaning of words, is criterially revealed by grasping it under an aspect, which is manifested in our ability to make relevant comparisons and evaluate comparisons by our ability to “move about” and to feel “at home” with the piece, in all of which our grasp of internal relations are manifested. This kind of understanding, of our getting hold of the meaning of a passage, results from our ability to “hear the aspect in the notes,” very much like our ability to “see objects in the (lines of the) drawing.” (2006: 247).

It seems that in such an understanding that Bar-Elli claims, understanding a musical piece is like understanding the meaning of words by grasping their objects and aspects, so his analogy of “feeling at home” is proper to Wittgenstein's concept of “form of life”. This can be exemplified as, for instance, I may be born and live in a society that classical music is the culture of that society. And suppose there is a person who does not hear this kind of music before or who does not listen to this type of music in his/her life. Therefore, this person may be bored while listening to classical music. Then, is it possible to say that both of us understand the same thing?

Or does this person misunderstand this piece of music? Or although we both understand the same thing, are our reactions different towards the same tune? I think it is expected that I am closer to understand this kind of music than him/her, because this music is already a culture of the society that I live in, so I am familiar with this music. This can be interpreted from Ridley's point of view which musical understanding is related to listeners' past experiences regarding familiar music. He explains this as follows:

Listeners are thus engaged throughout in trying to make sense of (in trying to understand) the unfolding and the progression of their musical experience. They are likely to be successful in this attempt in proportion as the kind of music they listen to is familiar to them. If it is very familiar then their experience will already, in effect, have been practiced; if very unfamiliar, then its progression will probably baffle (1993: 592).

As it is evident in this paragraph, Ridley makes a distinction between listeners' experiences of music. In the light of this paragraph, it can be said that the progression of musical experience of listeners who have listened certain kind of music, which is familiar to them, is more likely in comparison with those who listen to music which is unfamiliar to them. This can be explained by the term "form of life" as Wittgenstein used. He states in the *Investigations* that "What is true or false is what human beings say; and it is in their *language* that human beings agree. This is agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life" (*PI*, 241). If this statement is considered from a closer look, it can be said that there should be a shared form of life in order to compromise about meaning. In that sense, it could be useful to look at Wittgenstein's example of a lion he gave in the second section of the *Investigations*. He invites us to think about a fictional situation that a lion could talk, and then he claims that even if such a scenario was real, we could not understand the lion (*PI*, 327).

In the example of the lion, the point which is emphasized is having a common form of life. The reason behind why we could not understand a talking lion is that the lion and we do not share a common form of life. However, Wittgenstein's view is not only about the difference between human and nonhuman creatures on language.

What he is saying is not that human and animals cannot understand their language, but what he emphasizes is that to understand language, it is necessary to share a common form of life with this person, or animal, or alien, or whoever is talked with. It is not only about different forms of lives between different species, but it is also valid in human to human communication. Since understanding language is more than speaking it, who you are talking with is being a person is not enough to understand his/her language. This does not mean that a person who speaks English as a mother tongue cannot understand another language such as Turkish or German. Wittgenstein states that instead, it is about having a shared lifestyle. He says that even if one meets people from a different kind of society that he/she has never met before, he/she may learn the language of the community, but still would not understand the people; this is not because of knowing what they say, but due to having an unfamiliar form of life (*PI*, 325). Therefore, understanding a language and music are related to this issue. To understand requires to be a part of that culture, so it can be agreeable that one who does not listen classical music before is not expected to follow this piece of music; because it does not take place in his/her form of life.

In contrast to the person never listened to classical music, the other person who was born in such music is much closer to understand it. However, what I try to say is not an elitist view that classical music can only be understood by those who have high taste and the other people cannot get it; or I do not say anyone who listens to classical music would certainly understand it. Instead, I say that understanding is related to living music as a “form of life,” and being understood of music by the people who experience music as a form of life is more possible than those who do not experience it in this way. For example, suppose Turkish is your native language, and you can read any sentence in that language. This does not mean that you could definitely understand every sentence in that language. Surely, understanding is more than reading. However, compared to a person who does not know Turkish, the possibility of being understood of a sentence written in Turkish is much higher for you. This is because Turkish is a part of your form of life.

As a result, in this section, I have tried to reveal what affects one's musical understanding. The first aspect that has an essential role in understanding is Wittgenstein's concept of "form of life." To grasp the same meaning in music, the audiences should share a common form of life. Therefore, common experiences of the listeners affect their understanding music. The second aspect that impacts understanding is the agents' previous experiences while listening to music. The experiences here refer to their experience of music the audiences are familiar. This aspect is not independent of the concept of form of life. Therefore, it would not be irrelevant to say that form of life also covers past experiences. I think understanding music, just as in the case of understanding a language, highly related to how much they take place in our lives. One understands a language or a piece of music only if it is a part of his/her life. Therefore, cultural differences and social environment are constitutive for one's musical understanding. Although there are individual differences, people having similar experiences of music and from the same culture perceive a piece of music belonging to that culture better than any other person foreign for this culture.

4.2.3 Signs of Understanding

4.2.3.1 What Can be the Signs of Understanding?

I have said that to understand, there has to be a shared form of life, but another question regarding understanding is that how do we understand that a piece of music is understood by ourselves or anyone else? What can be the signs of understanding? One possible answer is that gestures may be a clue of indicating musical understanding of someone. Wittgenstein's saying in *Culture and Value* that "The face is the soul of the body." (CV: 26) can be the guidance for investigating the signs of understanding. The sentence is important in terms of reflection of the expression of feelings by the face. It is the reflection of inside to the outside and what is seen from the outside could be the sign of what is going on inside. I use "inside" here for referring understanding, feeling, emotions, etc., so the facial expressions may give a

clue about “inside.” Therefore, the face can be a mirror for understanding. However, saying that gestures or facial expressions are the only criteria for understanding would not be correct. It is quite conceivable that a person who is laughing could be in pain (*PI*, 391), but also gestures may still say something, and it cannot be claimed that they do not have any relevance to understanding. The expression which reflects the face during listening or performing music is similar to a verbal expression for showing appreciation. Joachim Schulte states about gestures to talk about music as follows:

...gestures and parallels *are* the best we can get. To be sure, they are not verbal descriptions but their expressiveness contains a descriptive element which we can grasp once we have learned to play this sort of language-game (2013: 183).

As I have said above, sharing a common form of life is crucial for understanding from the Wittgensteinian point of view and whether it is possible to grasp meaning from expressions depending on which language game is played. It does not matter that it is a facial or verbal expression, but what matters is the expression’s being understood by the others, and understanding is only possible through playing the same game in a common form of life. Since the gestures are certain expressions, then it is possible to say that they can be evaluated as signs of understanding. On the other hand, according to Wittgenstein, gestures are not enough for understanding, but there must be a distinction between those who state aesthetic judgments with and without understanding. It is helpful to have a look at the following paragraph Wittgenstein states in “Lecture on Aesthetics”:

When we make an aesthetic judgement about a thing, we do not just gape at it and say: “Oh! How marvellous!” We distinguish between a person who knows what he is talking about and a person who doesn’t. If a person is to admire English poetry, he must know English. Suppose that a Russian who doesn’t know English is overwhelmed by a sonnet admitted to be good. We would say that he does not know what is in it at all. Similarly, of a person who doesn’t know metres but who is overwhelmed, we would say that he doesn’t know what’s in it. In music this is more pronounced. Suppose there is a person who admires and enjoys what is admitted to be good but can’t remember the simplest tunes, doesn’t know when the bass comes in, etc. We say he hasn’t seen what’s in it. We use the phrase ‘A man is musical’ not so as to call a man musical if he says “Ah!” when a piece of music is played, any more than we call a dog musical if it wags its tail when music is played (*LC*: 6).

It is understood from these statements that Wittgenstein's comprehension of understanding music is somewhat about knowing the technical structure of music, because he emphasizes in his example "knowing metres", "remembering tunes" and in which part of music bass comes etc. However, it is also about being familiar with the music, so it is related to form of life. Another crucial view can be interpreted from this passage above is that Wittgenstein makes a distinction between gestures of those who have knowledge about music and who do not have any knowledge, so it is clear from the passage that not all gestures can be evaluated as showing understanding. If it were, then it would be same that dog which wags its tail when hear music and person who have body movements during listening a piece of music. However, according to Wittgenstein, it cannot be said anyone who has gestures while hearing music is musical. It has to be something more than gestures to understand music. On the other hand, he does not totally ignore the role of gestures in relation to understanding. Although there are no certain judgments about understanding, accompanying music with gestures still may be a sign for understanding in some extent in his point of view. He says in *Culture and Value* "Understanding and explaining a musical phrase. — The simplest explanation is sometimes a gesture; another might be a dance step, or words describing dance." (CV: 79). However, these are not the rules for understanding music according to Wittgenstein. He adds that expression which emerges with appreciation of music sometimes includes movements, plays or hums; and someone who understands music may have different facial expressions while listening, he/she plays differently or hums differently (CV: 80). And he explicitly states that gestures should be understood as signs of understanding in the following paragraph:

If I now ask "What do I actually experience then, if I hear the theme & hear it with understanding?" — nothing but inanities occur to me by way of reply. Such as images, kinaesthetic sensations, thoughts and the like.

Sure enough I say "I go along with it" — but what does that mean? It *might* mean roughly that I accompany the music with gestures. And if we point out that after all this happens for the most part only in very rudimentary measure, we shall perhaps receive the answer that the rudimentary movements are supplemented with images. But let us nevertheless assume that someone does accompany the music with movements in full measure, — in what sense does *that* amount to understanding it?

And do I want to say, the movements are the understanding; or his kinaesthetic sensations? (What do I know about them?) — What is true is, that, in certain circumstances, I shall regard his movements as signs of his understanding (CV: 79-80).

When both quotations from “Lecture on Aesthetics” and *Culture and Value* are considered, it can be said that there is not a contradiction between these remarks, rather they complete each other. If the paragraph above is evaluated, it seems that according to Wittgenstein, someone’s understanding of music can be understood by looking at his/her facial expressions and gestures during performing or listening music although they are not the exact answers for the question of how it can be possible to understand someone understands music.

Roger Scruton, another scholar dealing with the notion of understanding music. He says musical meaning can be understood only if we grasp the distinction between hearing with understanding and merely hearing. In that sense it can be said that Scruton and Ridley’s comprehensions of music are similar. Scruton thinks that Wittgenstein relates the notion of musical understanding to facial expressions and first-person case. According to Wittgenstein, in order to understand music, our own case is not enough. He mentions that in *Culture and Value*:

Once again: what does it consist in, following a musical phrase with understanding, or playing it with understanding? Don’t look inside yourself. Ask yourself rather, what makes you say that’s what someone else is doing. And what prompts you to say he has a particular experience? Indeed, do we ever actually say that? Wouldn’t I be more likely to say of someone else that he’s having a whole host of experiences? I would perhaps say: “He is experiencing the theme intensely”; but ask yourself, what the expression of this is? (CV: 58).

Scruton thinks that in Wittgenstein’s viewpoint one should look through the “third person” perspective rather than his/her own in order to understand music. It is like understanding the certain words regarding mental states, such as pain, by looking at similar facial expressions of other people. In the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein states that the word “pain” cannot be understood by our own case by giving the example of beetle in a box as stating that if everyone had a box which includes something in it and called it “a beetle”, but no one can see what is inside of anyone else’s box, then

it would not be possible to say the meaning of “beetle” is same for anyone, because every box may have something different in it (*PI*, 293). If there is no mutuality in meaning of this word, then there would not be such a word; but there must be a publicly shared meaning so that we all understand what pain means. Scruton says “Wittgenstein implies that musical understanding is importantly like understanding a facial expression, and is displayed in similar ways.” (2004: 3). He concludes that “music criticism is so hard”, because to find meaning from “looking inwards” of one’s own case is impossible; on the other hand, just “looking outwards” also not enough since we need to apply inwards to be able to understand (2004: 9). Therefore, he suggests seeing music as an “act of communication which crucially depends upon placing within the listener’s first person perspective, a state of mind that is not his own.” (2004: 9).

As a result, from Wittgensteinian view, musical understanding depends on some conditions, and whether one understands music can be evaluated based on these conditions. These are the listeners’ form of life, their experiences of music which determine how they are familiar with a particular piece of music, and their knowledge of the structure of music. Therefore, he states a distinction between the agents on this issue as emphasizing that not all gestures should be interpreted in the same way. Then, this leads us to another question. If one has all these conditions, is it possible to say one understands music? Since there is not a simple exact answer to that question, it is only possible to speak of the signs to indicate one is “musical” or not. First, one’s face can be a clue about his/her musical understanding according to Wittgenstein. The expression reflects the face while listening or playing music can also be the expression of one understands music, although it is not a definite way to determine understanding. It expresses the reflection of one’s “inside”, which refers understanding music, feeling it, appreciating it, knowing what is going on in music itself during the process of performing it, recognizing its technical structure, etc., to the “outside.” Second, bodily movements like tapping a foot or hums accompanying music while listening or playing music can show one understands music. All they are expressions and they are possible signs for one’s understanding music. And the other

point which is a result of this section is that to talk about musical understanding, there must be certain mutuality between the listeners who understand music, and it is called “third person perspective” by Scruton. The matter of being understood is directly related to the others’ perspective rather than one’s own. Therefore, the gestures and body movements accompanying music should be similar to each other so that one can say that if this and that gestures are emerged in the many others, then these gestures may be the indicators for one’s musical understanding. To conclude, although it is not possible to say one’s gestures, facial expressions or body movements certainly mean he/she understands music, it cannot be ignored they are still a glimpse of understanding.

4.2.3.2 What Cannot be the Signs of Understanding?

So far I have explained the possible signs that can be seen to indicate musical understanding. In this section, I will deal with what cannot be considered as the signs of understanding music.

Instead of answering the question “What can be the signs of understanding?” some scholars approach to understand music by asking what is not the sign of musical understanding. According to Worth, one’s reaction to music does not necessarily show that he/she understands music. To be able to talk about music does not mean to understand it (1997: 102). And also having feeling does not show to understand music according to her. In order to show that there is no necessary connection between understanding and having feeling, she gives the example of “Pictures at an Exhibition”, the composition of Mussorgsky, which is originally composed for piano. She says that she may prefer listening to the orchestral version of this musical theme as finding it more pleasing than piano version and she may think that the piano version is lack of color without knowing the original piece has intended for piano, so she maybe “miss different styles of composition that are revealed in the solo piano version.” (1997: 102). She emphasizes that one may have feelings while listening a

piece of music without understanding. Therefore, according to Worth, having feelings is not a requisite for understanding (1997: 102).

Peter Kivy is another scholar who thinks about musical understanding. He discusses the relationship between understanding and enjoyment. Similar to Worth's perspective of one's having feeling while listening to music does not mean that the person understands music, Kivy also thinks that amusement accompanying the agent during listening to music is not enough to say that one who feel joy understands music. However, it should be noted that while he says understanding music, he refers to understand the mechanism of it, how it works, how it produces enjoyment (1986: 72). Can enjoyment be a sign for understanding music? Some thinks that the purpose of music is to amuse, provide a pleasurable experience. He criticizes this view of "stimulus-response", because he thinks that one does not have to understand the mechanism of music to enjoy it (1986: 73). He states that understanding music is different than understanding drugs as a chemist does, because he/she may understand the drugs' effects, their chemical structures affecting the human body, etc. but even if a musical expert may explain the enjoyment of one listening to music, the listener does not have to have such knowledge on music (1986: 73). Therefore, according to Kivy, understanding music cannot be explained in terms of "stimulus-response" view and enjoying from the music cannot be a sign of understanding. Then, understanding music is not understanding its mechanism for him.

According to Wittgenstein too the purpose of music cannot be entertainment. Therefore, Kivy's argument on "stimulus-response" view of musical enjoyment can be seen as parallel with Wittgenstein's this idea. He says in *Culture and Value* that "People nowadays think, scientists are there to instruct them, poets, musicians etc. to entertain them. That the latter have something to teach them; that never occurs to them." (CV: 42). He states that "The aim of music: to communicate feelings." (CV: 43), and also says "Feelings accompany our grasp of a piece of music as they accompany events in our life." (CV: 20).

Kivy draws a conclusion that there needs to be a kind of understanding to be able to enjoy, and understanding is about being able to describe music (1986: 73). Then what about someone who cannot describe music but enjoy it? Does not he/she understand? If so, how does he/she enjoy if understanding is prerequisite of enjoyment? Kivy argues that this description is something about perception. Understanding happens when hear music under a description even if it is unconscious (1986: 74).

I think that this notion of description — which lies behind musical understanding — would be rejected by Wittgenstein. He explains in the article “A Lecture on Ethics” that in order to talk or write about ethics, we have to go outside of the boundaries of language, because in language we can only talk within the framework of facts and descriptions (LE: 11-2). Since he says in the *Tractatus* “It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed. Ethics are transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one.)¹³” (*TLP*, 6.421), and he states that he uses the term ethics in a sense which includes aesthetics (LE: 4); music as an area of aesthetics should be beyond language. As long as we try to express it with language, it would be nonsense (LE: 8). Therefore, musical meaning for Wittgenstein cannot be verbally expressed. Because of this reason, expression of value is mostly based on similes and the experience of it is expressed through similes (LE: 10). For example, think about “Second Piano Concerto Opus 18” of Rachmaninoff. How can it be described? According to Wittgenstein, it should be described by saying “It’s as though...” (*CV*: 79). When music is expressed by language, it would be nonsense from Wittgenstein’s point of view. His saying that “‘The impression (made by this melody) is completely indescribable.’ — That means: a description is no use; you have to hear the melody.” (*CV*: 42) is also an indication of meaning cannot be expressed through language. On the other hand, in the *Investigations* his comprehension of description is not based on only facts unlike in his saying in the *Tractatus*. He says there are many kinds of “description” such as description of gestures, body movements, facial expressions, sensation of a mood, of

¹³ See also *NB*: 77.

a touch (*PI*, 24). Nonetheless, I think that description of an aesthetic work of art is different than a factual description such as description of weather forecast.

In conclusion, some scholars evaluate understanding music as based on the question that “What does not say anything about musical understanding?”. Therefore, one of these results is that one’s having feelings while listening music is not an indicator for musical understanding. One can feel sorrow, happiness, joy, etc.; but they do not have to emerge as a result of understanding music. In general, it can be said that one’s reaction towards music does not show that one understands music. The reaction may manifest itself as preferences of music such that preferring listening to one version of music to the other, however, understanding cannot be measured with preferences or feelings. Second, Kivy’s argument on “stimulus-response” view about understanding music is discussed in this section as the enjoyment which occurs as a response to music is not sign of understanding. Moreover, he conceptualizes understanding music as to be able to describe music to enjoy it. This idea leads me to Wittgenstein’s distinction of what is sayable and not sayable through verbal language, and I argue that from Wittgensteinian viewpoint, musical understanding cannot be such a description, because what can be describable are only the facts. On the other hand, since music is in the realm of aesthetics and value, it cannot be describable.

4.2.4 Comparing Music and Language

In this section, my focus will be on how music and language can be compared. I will try to emphasize the similarities between them from the viewpoint of Wittgenstein. First, I will try to show what has been said about understanding music in literature. Then, I will evaluate and interpret Wittgenstein’s statements about comparing music and sentences in the context of understanding.

Some scholars discuss musical understanding by approaching this issue from different angles. Stanley Cavell (in Worth, 1997: 104) claims that meaning in

metaphors is strongly attached to the exact words in them, so the exact meaning cannot be reached through paraphrasing, but just some meaning can be accessed with this way. Worth thinks that this argument is also valid for meaning in music. She claims, for Wittgenstein, when a theme is tried to be explained, it is not the correct way to understand music, because music is non-substitutable. Worth says the relationship between understanding a sentence and a musical theme are parallel when it is considered Wittgenstein's philosophy (1997: 101). She says, "Wittgenstein used music as a paradigm for understanding. Although music is not a language, Wittgenstein considers it to have special, different, comparable capabilities which give it a power to help us understand language." (1997: 110). She draws a picture that is an analogy between linguistic understanding and musical understanding. On the other hand, Deborah Hansen Soles criticizes Worth's ideas on Wittgenstein's musical understanding. While she agrees with Worth in saying that Wittgenstein's understanding of music and language are parallel, Soles disagrees with her in the notion that Wittgenstein uses music as a tool for understanding language (1998: 98). Worth's conclusion is that there is no particular characteristic of understanding for Wittgenstein, it is a very complicated state — but not a mental state — which constitutes continuation process and ability (1997: 106-7). Soles states that "Putting the puzzling metaphysical status of this 'state' aside, Worth's account does not escape the mode of thought from which Wittgenstein wants to release us." (1998: 98).

Worth also states that music is "less complicated" to understand compared to language for Wittgenstein, and the reason of this is music does not have any "outside referents" and "formal content" unlike a sentence (1997: 101). It makes music more advantageous compared to language to understand, because "abstract quality of music allows us to avoid being absorbed merely with the quest for referential meaning." (1997: 101). For Soles, this is the other point that she does not agree with her. She thinks that Wittgenstein does not argue that music is less complicated than understanding language and it is a paradigm for an explanation of understanding as Worth states (1998: 98). She says that although Worth's comparison between

Wittgenstein's understanding of language and music can be appropriate, what Worth writes about Wittgenstein's ideas on understanding music are actually her own thoughts, not his since she applies his thoughts on a linguistic understanding to musical understanding (1998: 99).

According to Soles, Wittgenstein also believes that understanding cannot be an inner state, mental state or a process; and he thinks there is no feature to constitute understanding or behavioral complementation of understanding (1998: 112). She says that:

We can get clearer on what it is to understand something if we consider trying to explain that something to someone, for understanding and explanation are (in the main) complementary concepts. But providing explanations must come to an end somewhere. At a certain point, the recommendation from Wittgenstein is that one must just look and see, or listen and hear. Then, one may begin to understand (1998: 113).

It is clear in this paragraph that although explanation is in a way revealing of understanding by words, not everything can be explained. However, it does not mean that the reason behind something is inexplicable is because of its not being understood. On the contrary, it is possible to understand; but may not be possible to explain it, and in order to understand, it is needed just to look, see, listen or hear. The meaning is exactly there, but it may not be possible to explain it by using the words. If we come back to Worth's claim concerning meaning of music, according to her understanding is neither only knowing rules-governed technique, nor in behaviors; neither a mental state, nor a process; neither ability, nor an ostensive thing; but understanding is beyond the musical notes. When it is tried to be explained, meaning disappears slowly (1997: 108). The verbal inexpressibility of meaning in music is mentioned by Wittgenstein also in *The Brown Book* as follows:

... if repeating a tune to ourselves and letting it make its full impression on us we say, "This tune says *something*," and it is as though I had to find *what* it says. And yet I know that it doesn't say anything such that I might express in words or pictures what it says. And if, recognizing this, I resign myself to saying "It just expresses a musical thought", this would mean no more than saying "It expresses itself" (*BB*: 166).

Peter Kivy, another scholar who thinks about musical understanding, also explains the question what musical understanding is by starting from what it is not. According to Kivy, understanding music is different than understanding a language, because if a sentence is understood, it can be paraphrased by the one who understands the language. However, this cannot be said for understanding instrumental music (1986: 71). Another point he states is that works of art which have objects such as sculpture, painting or a literary work can be interpreted, and therefore the object can be a bearer of the meaning; but there is no foothold in pure instrumental music (1986: 71). It is similar to Worth's idea that music has no "outside referents" (1997: 101).

Another scholar who deals with understanding music is Jerrold Levinson. He states that people tend to find what is said by a certain piece of music, and they often encounter with dissatisfaction when they try to exhibit what it is exactly said by words; but he suggests not to be dissatisfied by mentioning an anecdote which "Beethoven having played for some visitors his latest piano sonata, was asked, 'But what does it mean, Herr Beethoven?' to which his response was just to play the sonata over again." (2003: 62). According to Levinson, thinking in such a way that what thought behind the music with a verbal expression is a double standard, because we do not try to explain a thought behind a saying by putting it into music (2003: 62). It is related to Worth's example of saying "Juliet is the sun" and "Juliet is an immense ball of fire." are not same even though literal meanings of them are similar (1997: 104). Therefore, it is possible to say that both Worth and Levinson think that meaning starts to disappear when the explanation comes into account.

If there is meaning in a piece of music but cannot be put into words, then is it meaningful to ask what the meaning of a tune is? I believe that this is a rightful question. On the other hand, I think, the most explanatory answer which can be given to the question that "What does music tell us?" lies behind these words that Wittgenstein says in the *Investigations*:

'A picture tells me is itself.' is what I'd like to say. That is, its telling me something consists in its own structure, in *its* own forms and colours. (What would it mean to say 'A musical theme tells me itself?') (*PI*, 523).

Wittgenstein says that the meaning in music is nothing but only the music itself. These statements also correspond to the example of Beethoven given by Levinson. I argue that Wittgenstein would do the same thing if he were in Beethoven's shoes. The meaning in music cannot be put into words with its exactness. However, this does not mean that music is meaningless or nonsense since we cannot verbally express it. On the contrary, actually, there is a meaning in a piece of music, however, the words are limited to explain it. And as I have mentioned before, according to Wittgenstein this is not a matter of lacking number of vocabulary, but it is the matter of fact and value, and sayable and unsayable distinction. In that respect, it is possible to observe in some remarks of Wittgenstein that he claims meaning of a musical theme is similar to meaning of a sentence. He says the following in the *Investigations*:

We speak of understanding a sentence in the sense in which it can be replaced by another which says the same; but also in the sense in which it cannot be replaced by any other. (Any more than one musical theme can be replaced by another.)

In the one case the thought in the sentence is what is common to different sentences; in the other, something that is expressed only by these words in these positions. (Understanding a poem.) (*PI*, 531).

What I understand from these expressions is that while we talk about understanding a sentence, it can be replaced by another sentence which has the same meaning. However, the expression of the sentence would be replaced at the same time. Therefore, in fact, the exact meaning of the sentence cannot be provided by another sentence other than itself. The meaning of a sentence would be the same meaning only if the exact same words would be used in the exact same order. In short, the meaning of a sentence is the sentence itself. Just as a piece of music loses its meaning if a particular note is replaced with another, or the order of the notes are changed among themselves; the meaning of a sentence is like that. For example, suppose that I say "Today is the most beautiful day of my life." If I mix the order of the words and say "The most of my life is beautiful day today.", then what can be said about the meaning of this sentence? I used the exact same words, but it is not the same sentence anymore. It is possible to say that this situation is also valid for a

musical melody. If the notes are mixed, then the original melody disappears and it becomes a different piece of music. Therefore, the meaning is also gone with the replaced words or notes. Wittgenstein also refers to understanding a poem in the parenthesis. This quotation above is also essential to see the analogous relationship between his notion on understanding and meaning of music, and poetry. The expression in poems or music is peculiar to themselves, and if the form of the expression is changed to express in a different way; then the sense which is cohesive to the expression would vanish. Thus, trying to explain what music or poetry tells us is something absurd and meaningless.

According to Wittgenstein, there is a close relationship between understanding a sentence and understanding a musical piece; even they are much more similar than we think (*PI*, 527; *BB*: 167). Then, it is needed to ask the question “What kind of similarity can be drawn between understanding a sentence and music?”. In *The Brown Book* he states that:

What we call “understanding a sentence” has, in many cases, a much greater similarity to understanding a musical theme than we might be inclined to think. But I don’t mean that understanding a musical theme is more like the picture which one tends to make oneself of understanding a sentence; but rather that this picture is wrong, and that understanding a sentence is much more like what really happens when we understand a tune than at first sight appears. For understanding a sentence, we say, points to a reality outside the sentence. Whereas one might say “Understanding a sentence means getting hold of its content; and the content of the sentence is *in* the sentence” (*BB*: 167).

The paragraph shows that Wittgenstein draws a similarity between understanding sentence and music in terms of the meaning which is not the outside of the sentence or the music, and grasping their content immediately “in” the sentence and the musical theme. It is possible here to see the change of his thoughts about Picture Theory stated in the *Tractatus* claiming language draws the picture of the world. I have already mentioned in the previous sections that according to this view, language allows to utter the facts in the world that corresponds to the reality. On the other hand, it is possible to talk about a different view in the paragraph above; because in this paragraph Wittgenstein states that the view of “reality outside the sentence” can

be eliminated by saying that “the content of the sentence is in the sentence”. However, still, the answer to how understanding and music are similar may not be precise enough. Then, another related paragraph of him regarding this issue can be read deeply. In the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein similarly emphasizes the resemblance between understanding music and sentences. He states the following:

Understanding a sentence is much more akin to understanding a theme in music than one may think. What I mean is that understanding a spoken sentence is closer than one thinks to what is ordinarily called understanding a musical theme. Why is just *this* the pattern of variation in intensity and tempo? One would like to say: “Because I know what it all means.” But what does it mean? I’d not be able to say. As an ‘explanation’, I could compare it with something else which has the same rhythm (I mean the same pattern). (One says “Don’t you see, this is as if a conclusion were being drawn” or “This is, as it were, a parenthesis”, and so on. How does one justify such comparisons? — There are very different kinds of justification here.) (*PI*, 527).

These two quotations show that Wittgenstein holds that understanding music and sentence are quite similar to each other, but I think how they are similar is still open to interpretation. I evaluate these words in the way that sometimes we sense the end of a musical piece. It slows down, volume becomes lower, or the melody becomes like climbing to the peak and at this point of the peak, it finishes vigorously. I think that what Wittgenstein thinks as saying that as if a conclusion were being drawn is something like that. And sometimes we can recognize the different sections in a musical piece such as “The Four Seasons” of Vivaldi. It is possible to distinguish the section of “Winter” from “Summer” when listening to that music. Maybe it can be parallel to two different paragraphs which describe winter and summer. When we are reading these different sentences, we can understand that what they are all about. Therefore, these two paragraphs can be distinguished from each other easily. It also can be compared to the different musical pieces reflecting the features of different musical eras such as the Baroque Period and the Romantic Period. When listening to the music of these two different periods, one who is educated in the history of music can understand how they are different. It is like distinguishing the sentence of poems of two different poets of different periods such as Nedim and Orhan Veli. Nevertheless, if one distinguishes two sentences chosen from two poems of these poets and says which one belongs to whom; it does not mean that he/she understands

what they say. It is similar to the ability of differentiating German and Korean from each other when one speaks. This distinction is about physical or phonetic structure of these two. Therefore, it does not show one understands those languages since he/she can differentiate them from each other. However, it is still something for understanding, instead of nothing.

I also think that it can be inferred from the last quotation above from the *Investigations* that meaning in music is universal, even if it is performed in a language that we do not know, it tells us something universal. When a melody is heard, it is understood whether it is a cheerful or sad music. The rhythm, tempo, and melody give us such a feeling that it is about something sad, happy, anxious, angry or something else. I do not think that anyone who listens to the beginning of the “Funeral March” of Chopin for the first time does not accept that it is such a melody that is full of sorrow. I think, therefore, Wittgenstein’s idea about the analogy between music and sentence is reasonable. He says that “Reading the written sentence loudly or softly is indeed comparable to singing from sheet music, but ‘meaning’ (thinking) the sentence that is read is not.” (*PI*, 22). Therefore, it can be said that what one understands is beyond what is written. One can sing or play a song by following the musical notes or read it from a written text. However, the acts of playing, singing, or reading are not equal to understanding. What one reads or plays are the symbols, notes, letters and words; but the meaning is something more than what is written there. Wittgenstein says in the section XI of the *Investigations* as follows:

Just think of the expression “I heard a plaintive melody”. And now the question is: “Does he *hear* the plaint?” (*PI*, 229).

And if I reply: “No, he doesn’t hear it, he merely senses it” — where does that get us? One cannot even specify a sense-organ for this ‘sensing’.

Some would now like to reply: “Of course I hear it!” — Others: “I don’t really *hear* it.”

However, it is possible here to discern conceptual differences (*PI*, 230).

This is also closely related to meaning in music and sentence. It is a kind of dialogue, and which person in this dialogue represents Wittgenstein is not clear. Although it is

not certain, I suppose that Wittgenstein thinks that the meaning of a plaintive melody is in the melody itself, and to understand the plaint there, one has to feel it first. However, the expression of the plaint is the melody itself, it cannot be expressed by words, so understanding of it cannot be explained. Such an interpretation can also be inferred by reading his example of describing the aroma of coffee which:

Describe the aroma of coffee! — Why can't it be done? Do we lack the words? And *for what* are words lacking? — But where do we get the idea that such a description must, after all, be possible? Have you ever felt the lack of such a description? Have you tried to describe the aroma and failed?

((I am inclined to say: "These notes say something glorious, but I do not know what." These notes are a powerful gesture, but I cannot put anything side by side with it that will serve as an explanation. A grave nod. James: "We lack the words." Then why don't we introduce new ones? What would have to be the case for us to be able to?)) (PI, 610).

Our language cannot describe the aroma of coffee. For example, if you want to tell someone, who has never drunk coffee before, the taste of it; it is impossible to explain it with words. Maybe one can disagree with Wittgenstein and may say that "But you can say that the taste of the coffee is bitter, soft, or flavored with vanilla etc.". However, this could not be the appropriate answer for him, because even if one describes it in such a way, it would not mean anything for someone who does not know the taste of the coffee. It looks like describing a color to a person who was blind by birth. This conclusion can also be derived from Wittgenstein's example of an imaginary ethic book which is written by an omniscient person who writes all he/she knows which is the whole description of the world, all beings whoever live and died, all movements of all bodies (LE: 6). He concludes that this book would only contain the facts, but no Ethics (LE: 7). All this is about what we can describe is only facts for Wittgenstein. Other than facts, descriptions of any other expression would be "nonsense" for him. He says the following:

I see now that these nonsensical expressions were not nonsensical because I had not yet found the correct expressions, but that their nonsensicality was their very essence. For all I wanted to do with them was just *to go beyond* the world and that is to say beyond significant language (LE: 11).

Like being a limitation of the language while describing the taste of the coffee, describing Ethics and also Aesthetics — since Wittgenstein says that he uses the term Ethics in the sense of Aesthetics (LE: 4) —, so a musical piece would require transcending the boundaries of the language.

So far I tried to show the similarities between the meaning of a musical piece and the meaning of a sentence in terms of Wittgensteinian perspective that meaning which cannot be put into words. Another remark that is stated by Wittgenstein in *Culture and Value* which could give a clue about musical understanding is as follows:

“He is experiencing the theme intensely. Something is happening in him when he hears it.” Well, *what?*

Does the theme point to nothing beyond itself? Oh yes! But that means: — The impression it makes on me is connected with things in its surroundings — e.g. with the existence of the German language and of its intonation, but that means with the whole field of our language games (CV: 59).

I think he accepts that there is a musical understanding as an experience during listening and it occurs as an impression. However, this impression is not independent from the outside world. Understanding a sentence is possible only if you are involved in the language games of this sentence. Anyone who is outside of the game cannot grasp the meaning. Therefore, for him, understanding music is parallel with this situation. Understanding is not only an inner private thought, but also connected with the things around. Here, the concept of “form of life” should be taken into account. Wittgenstein’s example that is about people who do not have the same sense of humor could be helpful regarding this issue:

What is it like when people do not have the same sense of humour? They do not react properly to each other. It is as though there were a custom among certain people to throw someone a ball, which he is supposed to catch & throw back; but certain people might not throw it back, but put it in their pocket instead (CV: 95).

If understanding humor is laughing a joke, it is about sharing the same sense of humor which can be seen as parallel to the sharing common form of life or being involved in a language game, so understanding music is like understanding a joke require to be shared the same form of life. In the same manner, Kendall L. Walton

discusses musical understanding by comparing it to understanding humor. He begins his article “Understanding Humor and Understanding Music” by introducing an imaginary character Anthony, an anthropologist doing fieldwork on Mars. Anthony tries to find what make Martians laugh, but he cannot understand why they laugh when they do. For instance, when Martha who is an upper-class Martian sees a yellow square shape moving left to right across a movie screen, she laughs (1993: 32). Anthony may experiment and observe that what makes Martha laugh is not the shape or size, but the movement of the square; however, Walton says even in this situation, Anthony cannot be able to understand why Martha laughs; because what he can explain is just the *causes*, not which of the causes are also *objects* of it (1993: 34). He says knowing is not enough to understand, so what Anthony lacks is *Verstehen* that involves an ability to “empathize” with Martha when she laughs (1993: 35). Walton makes an analogy between understanding humor and understanding music. He thinks knowing the descriptions, being able to explain the parts in music as rhythm, pitch class sets, key structure etc. does not help to understand the question how music works on me (1993: 36). Such experimentation is also possible to find the variables that make Martians laugh. Suppose we know the results that, for instance, they laugh the movement of the square because of this or that reason, etc. However, these are still not sufficient for understanding in both cases. Walton’s conclusion is that understanding and experience cannot be separable, and this experience is multidimensional that includes intensional states including expectation, surprise, satisfaction, excitement, recognition, admiration; hearing, and noticing (1993: 43-4).

As a result, music and language are bound to each other in the same ground of understanding somehow. It is possible to compare them in some ways. Firstly, in music, it is not possible to utter its meaning through verbal language, and this is similar to Wittgenstein’s understanding of ethics and aesthetics are beyond language. Second, the notes in music are similar to the words in a language, so if they are replaced by other notes or words, or their location in the whole sentence or composition are changed; then the meaning of the piece of music or the sentence

transforms or disappears. Therefore, music resembles the sentences in terms of its not being crowd of notes like words build a sentence. Third, music and language can be similar, because in music sometimes it is possible to sense when it will end or to be aware the different sections that “tells” different things within a composition. This can be grasped by a person who has a special musical ability and technical knowledge on music together. Fourth, music and language can be compared because one’s being capable of reading the sheet music or the sentences written in a foreign alphabet does not mean that one understands what he/she can read on the text. Thus, meaning of a melody cannot be grasped only through ability to read the symbols of music like meaning of a sentence is more than letters or words. And last, they are similar in the sense that for both understanding requires having an experience which is shared by others in a common “form of life” and understanding the “language games” of this specific language or music.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Wittgenstein's understanding of language is also a basis for understanding of music. In my thesis, I have tried to indicate the parallelism between these two.

I have focused on meaning in music in the context of Wittgensteinian concepts. First, when Wittgenstein's early stage is considered in terms of what can be said through language meaningfully, it can be said that what music "tells" us cannot be uttered because one cannot describe ethics and aesthetics through language, so either music. Therefore, music, in terms of value, cannot be described because it cannot be put into words but can only be shown. This difference comes from Wittgenstein's distinction of fact and value. The value in music, its "beauty," also cannot be expressed by words, but it manifests itself in music. I have tried to emphasize this distinction of fact and value at the beginning of my thesis. Since Wittgenstein draws boundaries of language strictly in the *Tractatus*, his view about aesthetics is definite that one should remain silent, and this forces us to such a point that to talk about music, the beauty of a tune, etc. is "nonsense."

On the other hand, being "nonsense" in Wittgenstein's philosophy does not mean "worthless." I have tried to explain how aesthetics has an important role in his life. The distinction between facts and values constitutes Wittgenstein's aesthetics in the sense that indescribability of value. Therefore, as based on this notion of him, I can say that the absolute value of a piece of music, its beauty or what gives value to a musical work cannot be put into words. However, like language, aesthetic works of art is also an expression, and these expressions mean something. Therefore, it can be grasped through looking at the manifestations, attitudes of those who perform or listen to music, so this makes it possible to be shown.

The most important result that I have reached in this study is that music should be understood like a language. To explain this issue, I have developed my arguments on Wittgenstein's some main concepts. Firstly, it is highly related to the concept of language games. Likewise, language is learned through language games as depending on which game is played, in music also there are language games. Therefore, music also can be learned or understood in such games. Therefore, notes in music and words in a language resemble each other. Both gain their meaning in use. To explain Wittgenstein's notion of "meaning is in use," I have tried to indicate the opposite idea, Augustinian way of understanding language which also related to Wittgenstein's previous thoughts in his early period regarding how language is learned. And from this point, I have extended my views into Wittgenstein's concept of form of life.

Sharing a common form of life is a necessity of understanding a language from a Wittgensteinian point of view. Similarly, in my thesis, I have argued that this perspective is also valid for musical understanding. One has to be involved in a game which is played by those who share a common form of life in order to learn and speak this language, and it is also for the subject of music. To say that one understands a specific kind of music, one should already familiar with this type of music, so it should be some sort of form of life for this person, because musical understanding is shaped through being a part of a particular social context just as in the case of understanding a language.

When I have handled the issue of understanding music, I have asked the question of what does it mean to understand music? I did not give a single definite answer to this question. On the other hand, I have emphasized that when musical understanding is considered, it is possible to talk about various kinds of understanding such as understanding technical and structural features of music, having feelings and emotions, social context of the music, etc. And also I have focused on the possible impact of particular qualities of agents, who perform or listen to music, for musical understanding such as cultural background, cognitive or biological differences and personal experiences. Therefore, I have claimed that since understanding music

depends on different circumstances, it is impossible to determine what musical understanding is with a single way or answer. In my analysis, I have found that understanding a piece of music is highly related to the Wittgensteinian understanding of language, especially to his thoughts on language at the later period of him. One of the reasons behind this connection is that music and language regarding meaning resemble because understanding language also depends on the same conditions.

Another point I have handled is that there must be something common to be able to say that one understands or does not understand music as in the case of language. Only if a sentence means the same thing for the other person, then it is possible to talk about there is meaningful communication between these people. Similarly, in music also if there is a unity on understanding, one has to talk about what the possible signs of musical understanding that make people meet at the same point on musical meaning are. I have emphasized the signs of understanding from the Wittgensteinian viewpoint as gestures and bodily movements accompanying to a musical piece, and I have enlarged this topic to what cannot be evaluated as the signs of understanding. The result is that while facial expressions and body movements accompanying to music are interpreted as the possible signs of musical understanding similar to language, one's having a reaction such as feeling something while listening to music does not mean to one understands music.

Overall, I have claimed that Wittgenstein's using metaphors and statements on the issue of music, while he introduces a philosophy over language is not a coincidence. I think music and language should be thought as parallels in terms of meaning regarding his concepts of value, language games and form of life. Although his understanding of language is divided into two different periods, I argue that the parallelism between music and language can be inferred from both of his periods on language. While I build an analogy between music and language as a model in terms of language games and form of life, I also claim that music, in terms of value, cannot be describable just like language cannot express value; therefore, the value of music is beyond the notes.

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APPENDICES

A: TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bu tezin amacı 20.Yüzyıl'ın en önemli düşünürlerinden olan Ludwig Wittgenstein'in dil anlayışı ile müzik arasındaki benzerliği ortaya koymaktır. Öncelikle, Wittgenstein'in dil hakkındaki görüşleri ele alınacaktır. Bu görüşler, Wittgenstein'in özellikle *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* ve *Felsefi Soruşturmalar* kitaplarında ortaya koyduğu iki ayrı düşünce dönemi üzerinden tartışılacaktır. Daha sonra, Wittgenstein'in sanat ve müzikle olan ilişkisine yer verilecek ve estetik değer üzerine olan görüşleri açıklanacaktır. Son olarak, müzik ve anlam ilişkisi Wittgenstein'in kavramları çerçevesinde tartışılarak müzik ile dil arasındaki benzerlik ortaya koyulacaktır.

Wittgenstein, birinci döneminde dilin sınırlarının dünyanın sınırlarını belirlediğini iddia ederek bu sınırları oldukça keskin bir biçimde çizmiştir. Bu dönemde ele alınan dil, mantık ve matematiğin dilidir. Wittgenstein'a göre felsefe, mantık ve matematik gibi sınırları belirli, standart, açık ve net bir dil anlayışına sahip olduğu takdirde, dilde anlam konusunda hiçbir bulanıklığa yer olmayacak ve felsefi problemler ortadan kalkacaktır. Çünkü ona göre, bu problemlerin kaynağı dilin yanlış kullanımındır. *Tractatus*'u yazarken kullandığı sıralı sayı sistemi, mantıksal bir dili benimsediğinin adeta uzaktan bir göstergesidir.

Wittgenstein'in, erken dönem eseri olarak kabul edilen *Tractatus*'ta ortaya koyduğu en temel düşünce, dünyanın olgulardan oluştuğudur. Bu eserinde ortaya koyduğu Resim Teorisi'ne göre, olgular dil aracılığıyla düşüncede resmedilir ve anlam ancak bu şekilde mümkündür. Dünya sadece bu olgu resimleriyle sınırlı olduğu için Wittgenstein, dilin sınırlarının aynı zamanda dünyanın da sınırları olduğunu iddia eder. Söz konusu olan bu sınırlar, sadece niceliksel anlamda dilde mevcut olan kelime sayısı sınırlaması değildir. Daha ziyade, dil aracılığıyla söylenebilir /

söylenemez olan, anlamlı / anlamsız olan ayrımlarıyla ilgilidir. Wittgenstein'a göre etik ve estetik, olguları tarif edemeyeceği için dil ile ifade edilemez. Bu yüzden etik ve estetik dilin sınırlarının ötesindedir. Ne kadar dile dökülmeye çalışılırsa çalışılsın, Wittgenstein'a göre dilin sabit duvarlarının ötesine geçilemeyeceği için, bu boş bir çaba olacaktır ve değere ilişkin söylenen ifadeler anlamsız olacaktır. Dil ancak olguları ifade etmeye yetkindir, mutlak değer söylem alanında değildir. Bu yüzden değer, dil yoluyla ifade edilemez ancak gösterilebilir. Dolayısıyla, Wittgenstein'a göre etik ve estetik, değer yargıları açısından aynı anlama gelmektedir. "İyi" ve "güzel" gibi mutlak değer yargısı belirten ifadeler, gerçekliğe ait bir şey söyleyemeyecekleri için olgular alanında değildirler. Bu sebeple, mutlak değere ilişkin dildeki ifadelerin gerçeklikte karşılıkları yoktur. Ancak birer nidadan ibaret olabilirler. Sonuç olarak Wittgenstein'a göre, felsefenin dili de doğa bilimlerinin dili gibi açık olmalıdır ve sadece olguları ifade edebilen bu dilin ötesinde kalan etik ve estetik, hakkında konuşulamayacak olan, konuşmanın anlamsız olduğu alandır. Bu durumda Wittgenstein, felsefede doğru olan yönteminin sadece konuşulabilir olan olgular hakkında konuşmak olduğunu, etik ve estetik alan hakkında ise susmak gerektiğini iddia ederek *Tractatus*'u noktalar. Müzik, hakkında konuşmanın mümkün olmadığı estetik alanına girdiği için bu bağlamda değerlendirilecektir.

Dilin sınırları ve söylenebilir / söylenemez (gösterilebilir) olan meselesi, *Tractatus*'un tamamlanmasından daha sonra Wittgenstein'ın Cambridge'de bir gruba verdiği derslerin notlarından oluşan "Etik Üzerine Bir Ders" isimli metin üzerinden derinleştirilecektir. Değer ve olgu ayrımına bu metinde ayrıntılı olarak yer verilmiştir. Değer kavramı "görelî değer" ve "mutlak değer" olmak üzere iki şekilde incelenmiştir. Etik ve estetik değer anlamındaki mutlak değerın özü itibarıyla dil ile betimlenemeyeceği, ancak bu anlamdaki "iyi" ve "güzel"ın kendini davranışta göstereceği düşüncesi bu metnin temelini oluşturur. Bu bağlamda, bu metin *Tractatus*'taki konuşulamayan hakkında susmanın gerektiği düşüncesi ile örtüşür.

Öte yandan, Wittgenstein'ın *Felsefi Soruşturmalara* isimli eserinde dile getirdiği, geç dönem felsefesi olarak kabul edilen dönemdeki dil üzerine düşünceleri, ilk dönemdeki mantık dili anlayışından yöntemsel olarak farklıdır. Bu dönemde

Wittgenstein'in ele aldığı dil daha esnek, eğilip bükülebilir sınırlarla çevrili bir gündelik dil anlayışıdır. İddiası, dilde anlamın “dil oyunları,” “aile benzerliği” ve “yaşam biçimi” gibi kavramlar etrafında şekillendiğidir. Bu anlayış, katı ve değişmeyen bir anlam anlayışından uzaktır. Wittgenstein'a göre anlam, kullanımda ortaya çıkar ve şekillenir, sonuç olarak farklı kullanımlar ya da bağlamlar etrafında farklı anlamlar oluşur. Dolayısıyla Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*'ta belirttiği dil açısından tek bir doğru felsefe yapma yöntemi olduğu iddiasının aksine, çeşitli yöntemler olabileceğini savunur. Bu düşüncesini, Aziz Augustinus'un bir çocuğun kendi dilini nasıl öğrendiğine dair düşüncesini eleştirerek savunmuştur. Çocuğun anadilini öğrenmesinin Augustinus'un iddia ettiği gibi nesnelere işaret etme yoluyla mümkün olmadığını, bu tarz bir anlayışın ancak hâlihazırda bir dil bilen birinin yeni bir dil öğrenirken yararlanabileceği bir anlayış olduğunu düşünür. Çünkü dil yalnızca nesneyi işaret eden kelimelerin toplamı değildir.

O halde dilde anlam nasıl kullanımda ortaya çıkar? Wittgenstein'in kullanımdan kastı, anlamlı bir iletişim için dile dâhil olan her şeydir. Yani sadece nesnelere verilen isimler değil, nesneye karşılık gelmeyen başka kelimeler ve ses tonu, beden hareketleri, mimikler de dili oluşturan unsurlardır. Wittgenstein, dilde anlamın kullanıma göre nasıl şekillendiği sorusunun cevabını bazı kavramlar aracılığıyla açıklar. Bu kavramlardan ilki “dil oyunu” kavramıdır. Wittgenstein'a göre gündelik dildeki anlam, bu dili kullananların karşılıklı olarak aynı “oyun”a dâhil olmalarıyla mümkündür. Oyun metaforunu kullanmasının sebebi, oyunun birçok anlama gelecek şekilde farklı işlevlerinin olması, belirli kurallara dayanmaması, fakat oyunun kendisinin oyunu bilenlere göre anlamlı bir şey ifade etmesindedir. Bir kelime, bağlama göre bir soru, emir, rica ifadesi vb. gibi farklı işlevlere sahip olabilir. Hangi işlevin söz konusu olduğu hangi dil oyunu içerisinde kullanıldığına göre değişir. Ya da bazen bir yüz ifadesi, beden hareketi, ses tonu anlamı değiştirebilir. Bütün bunlar Wittgenstein'a göre dil oyunlarıdır. Müzikte de dilde olduğu gibi dil oyunlarından söz edilebilir. Müzik ve dil arasında kurulabilecek olan benzerliğin bir yönü dil oyunu kavramıyla açıklanacaktır.

Wittgenstein'a göre dilde anlamı oluşturan parçalardan biri olarak görülen bir diğer kavram "aile benzerliği" kavramıdır. Dil oyunu ile ilişkili olan bu kavram, Wittgenstein tarafından tüm dile uygulanabilecek dilin özü diye bir şeyden bahsetmenin imkânsız olduğunu fakat dil oyunlarını bir dilin parçası yapan şeyin bir öz değilse de birtakım benzerlikler olduğunu anlatmak amacıyla türetilmiştir. Ona göre dilin özünden bahsedilemez ancak bazı kelimeler arasında anlam açısından onları aynı çatı altında toplayacak birtakım benzerlikler olduğundan söz edilebilir. "Oyun" kelimesi çok çeşitli oyunları nitelediği halde, tüm oyunlar için aynı olan ortak bir öz yoktur ancak hepsine oyun denmesinin sebebi aralarında tıpkı aynı aileden olan akrabaların simalarının benzerliği gibi bir benzerlik olmasıdır. Dolayısıyla bu benzerlikler pratik dil kullanımında, davranışta gözlemlenebilecek benzerliklerdir. Sonuç olarak dilin biricik bir özü yoktur fakat belli bağlamlar ve benzerlikler vardır. Bu bağlamda, etik ve estetik değerlerin de aynı aileye mensup olduğu söylenebilir. "İyi insan" ile "iyi müzik" arasında "iyi" olma bakımından bir benzerlikten bahsetmek yanlış olmaz.

Wittgenstein'ın ortaya attığı dilde anlama yönelik diğer bir kavram "yaşam biçimi" kavramıdır. Bu kavram dil oyunu ve aile benzerliği kavramlarıyla yakın ilişkilidir. Ona göre dilde bir anlam birliği olabilmesi, bu dili konuşanların ortak bir yaşam biçimine sahip olmalarıyla mümkündür. Ortak bir yaşam biçimine sahip olmayanlar aynı dili anlayamazlar. Burada Wittgenstein, yaşam biçimi kavramıyla dilin bir pratik, yani bir etkinlik olduğunu vurgulamaktadır. Dil belirli bir yaşam biçimi içinde şekillenir ve anlam kazanır. Sonuç olarak Wittgenstein, dilin belli bir yaşam biçimi içerisinde, yeni dil oyunları etrafında antik bir şehir gibi sürekli değişip dönüştüğünü düşünür. Kişinin bir dili öğrenmesi hangi dil oyunlarına dâhil olduğuna, ne tür bir yaşam biçimine sahip olduğuna bağlıdır. Wittgenstein'ın ikinci döneminde benimsediği dil anlayışı, tek bir özü olan değil, aile benzerliklerine dayalı bir dil anlayışıdır. Bu çalışmada iddia edilen müzik ve dil benzerliğinin bir diğer yönü yaşam biçimi kavramıyla açıklanacaktır.

Wittgenstein'ın dil hakkındaki görüşlerinden sonra sanat, estetik ve özellikle müzik üzerine düşünceleri üzerinde odaklanılacaktır. Wittgenstein, Viyana'da dönemin ünlü

saygın sanatçılarıyla çok yakın ilişkiler içerisinde olan bir ailenin çocuğu olarak dünyaya gelmiş ve çeşitli sanat dallarını yakından deneyimleme şansı bulmuştur. Babasının Gustav Klimt, Koloman Moser ve Auguste Rodin'in eserlerini de içeren geniş bir resim ve heykel koleksiyonu vardır. Ayrıca ünlü ressam Gustav Klimt, kız kardeşinin düğün portresini yapan isimdir. Annesi ise bir müzisyendir. Müzik ile oldukça yakın ilişkileri olan Wittgensteinlar'ın evi adeta Viyana müzik yaşamının kalbi gibidir. Öyle ki Johannes Brahms, Gustav Mahler, and Bruno Walter gibi aile dostları olan dönemin ünlü bestecileri bu evde konserler vermektedirler. İki erkek kardeşi müzik konusunda oldukça yetenekli isimlerdir. Konser piyanisti olan ağabeyi Paul Wittgenstein I. Dünya Savaşı'nda sağ kolunu kaybedince Maurice Ravel kendisi için "Sol El İçin Piyano Konçertosu"nu bestelemiştir. Kız kardeşlerinden biri ressamdır. Kendisi de müzikle ilgilenmiş, müthiş bir ıslık çalma becerisinde sahip, klarnet çalan, müzikte beğeni hakkında psikoloji deneyleri yapmış, ayrıca kız kardeşinin evinin mimari tasarımında büyük rol oynamış, sanatla çok yakından ilişkili biridir. Dolayısıyla böyle bir ailede büyüyen ve sanat konusunda oldukça birikimli olan Wittgenstein'ın estetik ve müzik konusunda düşünceler üretmesi, müziği dil ile yan yana koyması tesadüf değildir.

Wittgenstein estetiği açısından mimari ve müzik değerlendirildiğinde, mimarının belirli malzemelerden yapılmış işlevi olan bir bina olmanın, müziğin ise seslerden meydana gelen bir ses kalabalığı olmanın ötesinde olduğu söylenebilir. Bu "öte" olma hali, Wittgenstein'ın değere ilişkin tutumuyla ilgilidir. Mimari de müzik de bir ifade ve anlam barındırdığı ölçüde dil ile benzer. Fakat bu ifade, dilin sınırlarını aşar. İfade, estetik olanın kendisindedir ancak dile dökülemez. Yani sadece gösterilebilir fakat söylenemez. Wittgenstein'ın iki dönemindeki dil anlayışı yöntemsal olarak birbirinden farklı olsa da, değer hakkındaki görüşleri aynı kalmıştır. Bu noktadan hareketle, Wittgenstein'ın dilde ifadesinin anlamsız olacağını iddia ettiği mutlak değer görüşü ele alınacaktır.

Mutlak değer kavramı, mutlak iyi ve mutlak güzel ile ilişkilidir. Mutlaklık, dil ile ifadesi mümkün olmayandır. Dil ile söylenebilir / söylenemez (gösterilebilir) olan ayrımı, değer ve olgu ayrımıyla ilişkilidir. Olguların ifade edilmesi mümkündür

çünkü gerçekliği düşüncede resmetmeye yetkindirler ve doğruluk değeri taşırlar. Fakat değer, doğruluk değeri taşıyan olguların dilde resmedilerek anlam bulması gibi bir yöntemle dile dökülemez ve aynı şekilde ifade edilmesi anlamsızdır. Bu yüzden, Wittgenstein etik ve estetiği dile aşkın bir alan olarak tanımlar. Ancak dil ile ifadenin mümkün olmaması, bu konuların kendisinin anlamsız ya da değersiz olduğu anlamına gelmemelidir. Aksine Wittgenstein'a göre etik ve estetik, felsefesine yön veren iki çok önemli konudur.

“Güzel” veya “hoş” gibi estetik değer yargıları müzik açısından düşünüldüğünde Wittgenstein'a göre içi boş kelimelerdir. Bu bakış açısına göre, örneğin bir koro tarafından seslendirilmiş bir müzik eseri için “Baslar tenorlardan daha baskındı.” veya “Entonasyonlar olması gerektiği gibiydi.” demek, sadece “Güzel bir müzik.” demekten daha detaylı bir betimlemedir. Bu sebeple Wittgenstein'a göre “Ne hoş bir müzik!” ifadesinin “Ah!” gibi bir nidadan ya da bir iç çekişle yüzde oluşan beğeni ifadesinden bir farkı yoktur. O, “Müzik nasıldı?” sorusuna “Hoştu.”, “İyiydi.”, “Güzeldi.” demenin aslında bir şey söylemeyen ifadeler olduğunu düşünür ve bu tür ifadeleri ancak kendini uygun bir şekilde ifade edemeyenlerin kullandığını iddia eder. Kelimelerle “güzel”i ifade etmek mümkün olmasa da Wittgenstein'a göre gösterilebilir. Yine söylenebilir olan ve gösterilebilir olan ayrımına dönersek, “güzel” müzik kelimelerle betimlenemez, notalardan daha fazlasıdır. Onu daha “fazla” yapan şey değerdir. Bu değer ne olduğu ancak gösterilebilir, tarif edilemez. Dolayısıyla değer, bu eylem esnasında ortaya çıkar.

Sonuç olarak bir müzik eseri için “Ne güzel bir melodi”, “Harika!” gibi cümleler kurmak Wittgenstein açısından saçmadır, totolojiktir ve bu dilin yanlış kullanımınıdır. Oysa ona göre estetik değer, zaten performans sırasında kendini gösterir.

Son bölümde dil ve müzik konusu, Wittgenstein'ın ikinci döneminde kullandığı kavramlar üzerinden daha ayrıntılı olarak anlam ve anlama konuları temelinde ele alınacaktır. Dil oyunları, dilde anlamı şekillendiren belirli durumlardır. Anlam, hangi oyunun oynandığına göre farklılık gösterir. Yazılı bir kelimeye herhangi bir bağlam yüklenmeden anlamdan bahsedilemez. Örneğin “su” kelimesini ele alalım. Tek

başına bir nesnenin adı olan bu kelime bir savaş alanında yaralı bir askerin “Su!” diye inleyişiyle bir yardım isteme cümlesine, bir kafede kahve sipariş eden müşteriye garsonun “Su?” demesiyle bir soru cümlesine dönüşür. Her iki durumda da kullanılan aynı kelime olduğu halde anlamlar bağlama göre değişmiştir. İşte bu ikisi arasındaki anlam farkını oluşturan oynanan dil oyunlarının farklı olmasıdır. Müzik için de tıpkı dildeki oyunlar gibi anlamda farklılıklara yol açan dil oyunlarının olduğu söylenebilir. Örneğin, Johann Strauss’un Radetzky Marşı’nın icra edildiği bir konser performansını düşünelim. Müziğin ritmi seyircide tempo tutma isteği uyandırır. Şefin orkestrayı yönetme biçimi, kullandığı beden hareketleri vs. müzikal performansı tamamen etkiler. Her bir beden hareketi orkestra açısından anlamlı olmalıdır ki karşılıklı bir iletişim mümkün olabilsin. Şefin alkışla ritim tutan seyirciye doğru dönüp elini kulağının yanına götürdüğünü ve bir şey isteyen, soran gözlerle baktığını düşünelim. Bu hareketin bu oyundaki anlamı açıktır, “Yeterince alkış sesi duymadım, daha coşkulu alkış bekliyorum.” demektir. Ve dinleyiciler küçük bir el hareketiyle daha coşkulu alkış tutabilirler.

Wittgenstein’in dil oyunu olarak verdiği en net örnek, inşaat ustasının çırağına “Tuğla!” dediğinde “Tuğlayı getir.” cümlesinin kastedilmesidir. Benzer şekilde müzikte de bunun örneği “Piyano!” üzerinden verilebilir. Yine koroyu yöneten bir şefin koroya “Piyano!” dediğini düşünelim. Oyuna dahil olan tüm koro ve müzik terimlerine hakim biri bunun “Alçak sesle söyle.” anlamına geldiğini bilirken, müziğe çok da ilgisi olmayan biri için bu sadece bir enstrümanın ismidir ve bu kişi oyuna dahil olmadığı için şefin sözünü ilk duyduğunda ne demek istediğini anlayamayacaktır.

Porte üzerinde, eserin ne şekilde çalınacağını veya söyleneceğini gösteren semboller bulunur. Bu semboller oyundaki kurallardır. Elbette bu kurallara bağlı kalmadan da müzik aleti çalmak mümkündür fakat belli bir şemaya uymak öğrenmenin bir parçasıdır. Hiç nota bilgisi olmadan enstrüman çalan biri bile aslında böyle bir şemayı takip ediyordur çünkü öğrenmek buna bağlıdır. Nota ve sembollerin isim ve işlevlerini bilmeseyse bile, bir sesi başka bir sestene ayırabilmeli, ritmi ve tempoyu anlayabilmelidir. Yoksa müziği icra edebilmesi mümkün değildir. Sonuç olarak dil

ve müzik arasında Wittgenstein'in dil oyunları kavramı açısından bir benzerlik kurulabilir.

Müzik ve dil benzerliğinden bahsedebilmek için "anlam" konusunu derinleştirmek gerekmektedir. Bir müzik eserinin anlamı neye dayanmaktadır? Müziğin anlamı nedir? Müzik nasıl anlaşılır? Müziği anlamak ne demektir? Bu sorular müzik felsefesi açısından önemli sorulardır. Bu soruları cevaplamaya çalışmadan önce sözlü müzik ve sözsüz müzik arasında bir fark olduğunu söylemekte yarar vardır. Dilde de müzikte de anlamı yaratan sadece sözler değildir. Bu açıdan sözsüz müzik temel alınacaktır. O halde sözsüz müzik için ne tür bir anlamdan bahsedebiliriz? Müziği anlama ya da müziğin anlamı dediğimizde tek bir anlama biçiminden bahsedilemez. Örneğin müzikteki teknik yapıyı anlamak, nerede crescendo / decrescendo yapıldığını bilmek, kaç vuruşluk ölçü kullanıldığını ayırt etmek vs. gibi teknik bir altyapı bilgisine sahip olmak anlamına gelebileceği gibi, sözsüz bir eseri dinlerken müzikle beraber hüznün veya coşku gibi çeşitli duyguları hissetmek de bir anlama biçimi olarak yorumlanabilir. Müziğin teknik kurallarına hakim olmak, Wittgenstein'in dil için ifade ettiği gramer kurallarına dayalı bir teknik ustalık olarak nitelendirdiği durumla benzeştirilebilir. Nasıl ki dile hakim olan birinin gramer kurallarını da bilmesi beklenirse, müziğin kurallarına hakim birinin de müziği anlamaya yaklaştığı söylenebilir fakat sadece kurallara hakim olmak müziği anlamayla eşdeğer değildir ve anlamak için gerekli olan tek şart kuralları iyi bilmek değildir. Ama yine de anlama ve teknik özellikleri iyi bilme arasında hiçbir ilişki yoktur da denemez.

Bir başka anlama biçimi ise müziğin hangi sosyal bağlamda kullanıldığının anlaşılması olabilir. Bu noktada bir eser kimler için bestelenmiş, öznesi kim(ler), nasıl bir kültürel altyapıya hitap ediyor vs. gibi unsurlar önemli hale gelecektir. Bu sebeple Anadolu'dan bir köylünün Neşet Ertaş müziğini duyduğunda anladığı şey ile Hawaii'den birinin aynı müziği duyunca anlayacağı şey farklı olacaktır. Bu durumda müziği anlamının bir başka şeklinin de dinleyiciler arasındaki kültürel, biyolojik, bilişsel farklar ve farklı yaşam tecrübeleri ile alakalı olduğu söylenebilir. Bu bağlamda Wittgenstein'in yaşam biçimi kavramıyla müzik yakından ilişkilidir.

Sonuç olarak müziği anlamak denince tek ve kısıtlı bir anlayıştan değil, belirli şartlara göre değişen bir anlam anlayışından söz edilebilir.

Peki, müzikal anlamayı neler etkiler? Müzik ve dil arasında, anlamın öğrenilmesi pratiği açısından bir benzerlik ilişkisi kurulabilir. Wittgenstein'in yaşam biçimi kavramı da dil ve müziği aynı çatı altında buluşturabilir. Nasıl ki ortak yaşam biçimine sahip olanlar birbirlerinin dilini anlayabilirlerse bu müzik için de benzer şekilde mümkündür. Bir dili anlamak veya öğrenmek o ortaklıkta buluşmakla ilgilidir. Müzikal anlayış da aynı şekilde belirli bir yaşam biçimi etrafında şekillenir. Örneğin klasik müziğin bir kültür olarak benimsendiği bir ailede doğan biri ile hayatında ilk kez klasik müzik duyan birinin anlayışı arasında ilk etapta bir fark olacaktır. İlk kez dinleyen kişinin bu müzik hoşuna gitmemiş olabilir ya da sıkılabilir. Bu durumda bu iki kişi için bu müzikten aynı şeyi anladıklarını söyleyebilir miyiz? Yoksa sıkılan kişi müziği yanlış mı anlamıştır? Veya aynı şeyi anladıkları halde tepkileri mi farklı olmuştur? Bu soruların cevabı, müziğe aşina olanın ilk kez duyana kıyasla anlamaya daha yakın olacaktır. Wittgenstein'a göre insanların dilde uyuşmaları, aslında düşüncelerde değil, yaşam biçimlerindeki bir uzlaşmanın göstergesidir. Yaşam biçimindeki ortaklık dilin anlaşılmasını mümkün kılar. Bu yüzden Wittgenstein bir aslan konuşabilseydi bile yaşam biçimlerimiz farklı olduğu için onu anlayamayacağımızı iddia eder. Bu sadece insan ve insan olmayan arasındaki dil sorunu değildir. Aynı yaşam biçimini paylaşmayan insanlar da birbirlerinin dilini anlayamazlar. Wittgenstein bunu daha önce hiç rastlamadığı bir topluluğun yaşantısına tanıklık eden yabancı biri örneğiyle açıklar. Ona göre, ortak paylaşılan bir yaşam biçimi olmadığı için bu kişi bu topluluğun dilini öğrense bile onları anlayamaz. Çünkü dili anlamak, o dili konuşmaktan fazlasıdır. Bu bakımdan müzik de dile benzer. Anlamak hem dilde hem müzikte bir yaşam biçiminin, bir kültürün parçası olmayı gerektirir. Dolayısıyla aşina olunmayan, yaşam biçiminde yer etmeyen bir müzik anlaşılabilir. Anlamın dinleyiciye geçmesi için müzik ile arasında ortak bir yaşam biçimi olması gerekir. Nasıl ki dilin anlaşılması için hayatımızda ne kadar yer tuttuğu önemliyse, müziği anlamada da aynı durum geçerlidir. Sonuç olarak müzik açısından anlamamanın iki yönden etkilendiği

görülmektedir. Biri yaşam biçimi, diğeri de de yaşam biçimiyle ilişkili olarak dinleyicinin önceki deneyimleridir.

O halde, kişinin dili anlaması ya da anlamaması gibi, müziği anlayıp anlamadığından nasıl bahsedilebilir? Gündelik dilde bir cümlenin iki kişiye aynı şey ifade etmesi ve karşılıklı anlamlı bir konuşmanın sürdürülebilmesi için dili kullanan kişiler arasında belli bir ortak nokta bulunması gerekmektedir. Ortak yaşam biçimlerinde ortak oynanan oyunlar çerçevesinde anlamdan bahsedilebilir. Eğer müzikte de bir anlam birliğinden bahsedeceksek belli ortak noktaların dilde olduğu gibi müzikte de olması gerekir. Kişinin müziğe aşinalığı, yaşam biçiminde yer etmesi, müziğin teknik özelliklerine dair bilgi sahibi olması gibi şartlara bağlı olarak kişinin müziği anlayıp anlamamasından söz edilebilir. Fakat tüm bu şartlar sağlandığında bile kişinin müziği anlıyor olduğunu söylemek kesin bir doğru olmayacaktır. Bu durumda müziğin anlaşıldığına dair bazı belirtilerin olduğu söylenebilir. Wittgenstein'in bakış açısından bakıldığında anlamın belirtileri, tıpkı dili anlamada olduğu gibi beden hareketleri ve yüz ifadeleridir. Müziği müzik olarak dinleyen birinin yüzünün aldığı şekil ya da bir kafa hareketiyle ritim tutması, o kişinin bu müziği anladığının ipuçları olarak yorumlanabilir. Bir nevi "iç" in "dış" a yansımasıdır. Fakat yine de bunlar müziğin anlaşılması için kesin kurallar değildir.

Bu çalışmada müziği anlamanın belirtilerine ek olarak bir kimsenin müziği anladığının belirtisi olarak görülemeyecek durumlara da değinilmiştir. Dinleyicinin müziği dinlerken mutluluk, hüzün, keyif gibi duygular hissetmesi bir anlama belirtisi olarak görülmemiştir. Bu duyguların müziği anlamadan da ortaya çıkabilmesi mümkündür. Kişisel tercihler, kişinin keyif aldığı bir müziği keyif almadığına tercih etmesi anlamaya dair kesin bir yargı bildirmez. Dolayısıyla müziği anlama kişisel tercihler ve duygular ile ölçülemez.

Dil ve müzik arasında genel bir kıyaslama yapıldığında, bu ikisinin bir şekilde anlam konusunda aynı zemine oturduğu söylenebilir. Genel olarak şu sonuçlar ortaya çıkmıştır: Wittgenstein'in etik ve estetiğin dilin ötesinde olduğu iddiasından hareketle, müzikte anlamı sözlü dil yoluyla ifade etmek mümkün değildir. İkincisi,

müziğin notaları dilin sözcüklerine benzer. Her ikisinin de cümledeki ya da bestedeki konumları değiştirilirse orijinal anlam değişir ve ortaya bambaşka bir ifade ve anlam çıkar. Bu yüzden, cümlenin sadece kelimeler toplamı olmaması gibi beste de notaların toplamından oluşan rastgele bir gürültü değildir. Üçüncüsü, müzikte de bazen cümlelere benzer ifadeler bulunabilir. Örneğin bir müzik eserinin ne zaman sona yaklaştığını söylemek veya bir eserin farklı bölümleri arasındaki geçişleri anlamak, aynı bestenin farklı bölümlerinin farklı şeyler “anlattığını” ayırt etmek mümkündür. Özel bir müzik yeteneği olan ve müzik hakkında yeterli bilgi donanımına sahip biri bunu yapabilir. Dördüncüsü, müzik ve dil yazılı olanı okuyabilme yetisi üzerinden kıyaslanabilir. Bir insan porte üzerindeki notaları veya hiç bilmediği yabancı bir dilin alfabesiyle yazılmış bir metni okuyabilir. Fakat her iki durum da okumaktan ötesine geçememek olabilir çünkü anlamak okumaktan fazlasını gerektirir. Dolayısıyla müzikte kağıt üzerindeki sembolleri okuyabilme yetisine sahip olmak melodinin anlamının anlaşıldığı anlamına gelmez. Bu durum, cümlenin anlamının harflerden ve sözcüklerden fazlası olmasıyla eşdeğerdir. Son olarak, gerek müziğin gerek dilin anlaşılabilmesi için başkalarıyla paylaşılan ortak bir yaşam biçimi olması ve aynı dil oyunlarının oynanması gerekmektedir.

Genel olarak, Wittgenstein’in dil felsefesi yaparken müzik ile ilgili metaforlar ve ifadeler kullanması tesadüf değildir. Müzik ve dil, Wittgenstein’in kullandığı değer, dil oyunu ve yaşam biçimi kavramları çerçevesinde anlam bakımından benzer bir ilişki içerisindedir. Wittgenstein’in felsefesi iki ayrı dönem olarak değerlendirilse de müzik ve dil benzerliğini her iki dönemine ait fikirlerinde bulmak mümkündür. Bu tezde dil, dil oyunları ve yaşam biçimi kavramları üzerinden müzik için bir model olarak ele alınırken, aynı zamanda değer kavramı açısından düşünüldüğünde müziğin değeri dil ile betimlenemeyeceği için notaların ötesindedir.

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