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THEORIES OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL INTEGRATION
Classified and Compared in a Proposed Model

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TEZİMDEN FOTOKOPİ ÇEKTİRİLEBİLİR VE KAYNAK GÖSTERMEK KAYDIYLA ALINTI YAPILABİLİR.

Clearly one of the main problems in integration theory has always been the need for a scheme in which to order the multitude of variables which from time to time have been adduced to explain the process of change.

(Charles Pentland, *International Theory and European Integration*, New York: The Free Press, 1973, p.24)

.... (M)odels of European integration, if they are to lead to useful explanations, must derive less from familiar, concrete political experiences than from the mixture of evidence, concepts and explanations thrown up by many diverse studies of recent European developments -in short they must draw eclectically on the approaches we have been examining in this study.

(*Ibid.*, p.195)

Particular studies have been productive to the extent that the categories were clearly formulated and well adapted to the problem and to the content.

(Berelson, A., *Content Analysis in Communication Research*, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1952, p.95)

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PREFACE

The paper tries to formulate a modest fresh approach not to the concept of European political integration itself, but to the mass of the theories each trying to comprehend the European political integration from a different standpoint. In an eclectic manner, the paper takes up two distinguished and -at least seemingly-complementary conceptions by eminent scholars on the already existing political integration theories; adds nothing to this duo except combining -or positioning- them in a special fashion; and reaches to a simple new framework. The resulting product is also subjected to a process of classification and comparison. Some other minor assemblages -which might again be regarded eclectic- to this main body also take place throughout the text.

The aim has not been to reflect the contemporary developments in European integration efforts, nor has it been to cover the most recent theories striving to explain them. Instead, a different methodology has been applied to classical -and rather obsolete- approaches to European political integration. If these theories retain applicability in the efforts of integration other than the European example as Haas suggested, such a deed can be regarded meaningful. If not, it is hoped that the paper can still be esteemed as a somewhat retrospective text.

INTRODUCTION

a) General: Need for New Approaches

The following three parts, whilst ostensibly aiming at constituting a prolegomena for the reader to the concept by providing him/her with the definition and the intricate instruments of and the different contemplations about the European political integration, -as the side-titles insinuate- have, in fact, been devoted to evidencing the predicament of the field which seem to be afflicted with three shortcomings respectively: first, a lack of common -or at least well-grouped- definition(s), secondly, some inherent qualitative questions on, for instance, the existence of well-defined limits, viability and even necessity of the subject, and finally, despite the existence of a weighty pile of scripts in the area, the quantitative inadequacy of research on the subject.

The intent, in other words, has been to provoke an idea on the side of a requirement for new approaches to the field.

i) Meaning of the European Political Integration Studies: Need for a Common Definition

Search for a generally accepted definition of European political integration studies is rather a vain effort since the area is sketched by the spectra extending between the empirical and normative¹ poles, and between the scientific and ideological poles²; each point in this two dimensional Cartesian surface represents a different denotation defined by the remoteness to the reference poles. Furthermore, the multidisciplinary nature common to all international relations studies favours numerous approaches to the concept each having its own definition.

¹ As it was the case prior to the formation of the Community after the II. World War, normative parlance re-emerged from time to time whenever enlargement issue became a popular subject; suggestions appeared on the new institutional structure on a future enlarged Europe especially after the end of the Cold War period (as an example, see Vaclav Havel's address from 1990 in Appendix-I).

² For instance, for a long time, most of the researchers in international relations who had to deal with the European integration regarded it as not more than one *façade* of the more comprehensive Atlantic security community. As the Community proved to be a more independent actor in international arena, this time it came to be regarded as an extraordinarily far-reaching and successful co-operative venture between nation states that evolved out of the deliberate attempts of these nation states to maintain themselves in an international system dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, by means of employing some spot definitions divested from their contexts, which contour this melange and provide it an intelligible shape, we may render a preliminary acquaintance for the reader with the concept:

One of the most basic definitions belongs to Harrison who employs a common element in integration studies: "an interest in developments in international politics which show some signs of transcending the traditional interests and diplomacy of the nation-states and of realising the interests of a rudimentary international community of which they are a part"³. A more specific definition of international political integration is given by Pentland as "a process whereby a group of people, organised initially in two or more independent nation-states, come to constitute a political whole which can in some sense be described as a community"⁴. Frei puts forward a far more detailed interpretation which presupposes increased interdependence or sharing of political loyalties and commitments as common definitions of the term, wherefrom Matlárý avoids and suffices with a sole formal or informal transferral of power⁵. Deutsch denies the absolute exigency for centralised decision making⁶. Etzioni elaborates a bit more on terms and delineates the locutions 'political community', 'integration' and 'unification': integration means "the ability of a unit or system to maintain itself in the face of internal and external challenges"⁷, whereas for him a political community means

a community that possesses three kinds of integration: (a) it has an effective control over the use of the means of violence (though it may 'delegate' some of this monopoly to member-units); (b) it has a centre of decision making that is able to affect significantly the allocation of resources and rewards throughout the community; (c) it is the dominant focus of political identification for the large majority of politically aware citizens⁸.

³ Harrison, 1974, p.9.

⁴ Pentland, 1973, p.21.

⁵ Matlárý, 1993 p.182.

⁶ Harrison, *op. cit.*, p.18.

⁷ *Ibid.* p.19.

⁸ *Ibid.*

Whilst the process of obtaining these features is called 'unification' by Etzioni, it is the very process that is named as 'integration' by Haas and Lindberg. Yet, after their such painstaking and fastidious meditations, Haas, Lindberg, Deutsch, Puchala, Toscano and Etzioni, who all are classified as having been interested in integrative regional transformation response, converge on more modest and broad definitions "as the gradual creation of collective decision-making processes, that is, institutions to which governments delegate decision-making authority and/or through which they decide jointly via more familiar intergovernmental negotiation"⁹.

Wallace¹⁰ distinguishes between formal and informal integration. Formal integration is defined as 'deliberate actions by authoritative policy-makers to create and adjust rules, to establish common institutions and to work with and through those institutions', whereas informal integration consists of those 'intense patterns of interaction' that follow the dynamics of markets, technology, communications networks and social exchange without the intervention of public authorities¹¹.

Laffan, citing from Jordan and Feld¹², draws attention to the multifaceted nature of political integration. The concept has four different aspects, namely 'institutional integration' (that designates to 'the growth of collective decision-making among a group of states'), 'political integration' (that is concerned with the amount of policies dealt with by appropriate -and preferably higher- level of governments and especially by co-ordinated or joint means), 'attitudinal integration' (that means the support of public opinion in general, and of political and economic élites), and 'security integration' (that basically connotes to the expectancy of 'non-violent inter-state relations'¹³.

Smith and Wallace attempt at rendering a similar dissection, this time however on the specific 'EC integration model':

⁹ Pentland, 1981, p.555.

¹⁰ Wallace, W., *The Transformation of Western Europe*, London, Frances Pinter, 1990, p.54 *cit. in* Laffan, 1994, p.4.

¹¹ Laffan, 1994, pp.4-5

¹² Jordan, R. S. and Feld, W. J., *Europe in Balance*, London, Faber&Faber, 1986, p.91 *cit. in* Laffan, 1994, p.5.

¹³ *Ibid.* pp.5-6. For details of the 'security integration' (or better 'security community') see the title Pluralism below.

Four political components of the integration model stand out. First is the clear recognition that structured and sustained partnership, subject to embedded disciplines and mutual obligations and backed by some collective funding of agreed common policies, is preferable to the uncertainties of *ad hoc* and conditional co-operation. Second, west European integration has depended on collective and justiciable acceptance of shared values of liberal democracy and socio-economic welfare.... Third, political commitment involves an investment in shared institutions, codes of conduct and common jurisdiction.... Fourth, the EC integration model rested on agreement about the common search for 'transformations' of policy and politics to adapt to changing political economic and security conditions¹⁴.

For Pryce, European political integration, in particular, is the result of "the pressures generated in favour of union and the nature and extent of the support which it has enjoyed". Interestingly, however, he adds to these widely accepted effects "the rôle played by political leadership" epitomised in the personality of Jean Monnet¹⁵.

ii) Discourse and Perception of the European Political Integration Studies: Qualitative Questions

Some perplexities that come out of the very nature of the European political integration concept have already been touched upon under the previous heading. Corollary to this mess, there also exists a need for agglomeration and co-ordination among the studies of the researchers in the field. To illustrate this predicament, Puchala draws an often-quoted simile by "compar(ing) integration theorists to a group of blind men examining an elephant. Each man touched a different part of the animal and each of course concluded that an elephant had the shape of the part he touched"¹⁶.

Lindberg complains of the same plight in different words:

As a contributor to the European integration literature I have more and more come to feel as if I were excavating a small isolated portion of a large, dimly-perceived mass, the contours of which I could not make out. I

¹⁴ Smith and Wallace, 1994, pp.433-434.

¹⁵ Pryce, 1973, p.41.

¹⁶ Puchala, D. J., "Of Blind Men, Elephants and Internal Integration, *Journal of the Common Market Studies*, X, 1971, *cit. in* Pedersen, 1990, p.84.

know that there are others digging there too, for I can sometimes hear them, but we seldom meet or see each other, and we have seldom organised so as to combine our efforts¹⁷. What we see as we confront the ever-growing literature on Western European Integration is a multitude of events comprising the total economic political, social, and intellectual life of six countries and the product of their interactions, and a profusion of theories from a variety of disciplines seeking to order these events and make assertions about presumed patterns of persistence or transformation. But the theories hardly ever confront or complement each other or even appear in any clear relationship to each other¹⁸.

Harrison draws attention 'the existence of bias in selection of variables for comparative study' impending for all social sciences¹⁹. For instance, of the main streams of integration theory, functionalist approach to the integration phenomenon foresees the fate of nation-states as a result of problems transcend national boundaries and of ever-improving technology; drifted by and conformed with this process, transformation will actualise without the help of manipulation by political institutions. For federalists, another main stream, however, the existence of powerful central political institutions which co-ordinate to integration is a necessity.

Certain students of European politics seemed pessimistic or sceptical on the concept of the process of political integration itself. This being so, European political integration research would lose its subject-matter and remain as a mere empty shell. The words of famous realist writer Hoffmann, by proposing the 'logic of diversity' as an alternative to the 'logic of integration', exemplify this view:

The logic of diversity implies that, on vital issues, losses are not compensated by gains on other (and especially not on other less vital) issues: nobody wants to be fooled. The logic of integration deems the uncertainties of the supranational function process creative; the logic of diversity sees them as destructive past a certain threshold: Russian roulette is fine only as long as the gun is filled with blanks. Ambiguity lures and

¹⁷ 24 years later in 1991, conforming Lindberg's diagnosis, Stephen George in the second edition of his *Comparative European Politics* was politely complaining that some authors -like Roy Ginsberg- who had been 'apparently unaware' of the first edition of his book developed 'remarkably similar' ideas to those of himself (George, 1991, p.226).

¹⁸ Lindberg, 1967, p.345.

¹⁹ Harrison, *op. cit.*, p.21.

lulls the national consciousness into integration as long as the benefits are high, the cost low, the expectations considerable²⁰,

or "the balance sheet of the European experiment is that 'the most visible aspect is the survival of the nations' and 'the broadening of the differences in the calculations of the national interest' "²¹ ...

Similarly some deeply embedded historical frictions, for some authors, contribute the difficulty in realising political integration and renders its theorisation a laborious effort (Schmieding²² argues that France has been using the EC to attain its global and regional interests, Pedersen adds this the "rift between France-Spain and the UK (supported by Denmark and the Netherlands)" and the growing dominance of Germany²³ .

Another, however this time more moderate realist theoretician, Haas does not go that far to deny the whole concept of integration, but stressed his opinion that, the existing theories lost their efficacy, and a radical amelioration is an exigency in the field:

The theories we have developed for describing, explaining and predicting regional integration, however, have a tendency not to predict very accurately the events which come about , and not to explain very convincingly why events which were predicted did come about in fact. It has been suggested that we can probably devise better theories which would lead to more dependable findings. But I shall argue that the effort is not worth our while. Events in the world and conceptual developments in social science have conspired to suggest that the name of the game has changed, and that more interesting themes ought to be explored. These themes -grossly captured in the terms *interdependence* and *systems change*- can profit from incorporation of aspects of the theory of regional integration. But they are sufficiently different in scope and portent from integration as to suggest that theorising about it is no longer profitable as a distinct and self-conscious intellectual pursuit. In this sense -and in this

²⁰ Hoffmann, Stanley, 'Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of Nation State and the Case of Western Europe', *Daedalus*, vol.95, no.3, Summer 1966, p.882, *cit. in* Ifestos, 1987, p.104.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p.106.

²² Schmieding, Holger, 'A Concept for a Pan-European Integration', *European Affairs*, 3, 1989, (no page), in Pedersen, 1989, p.87.

²³ *Ibid.*

sense alone- regional integration theory is obsolescent. Its concepts, methods and assumptions continue to be applicable to many settings and processes. However, it now seems that the core conceptualisation, which was developed in the empirical setting of Western Europe will eventually infect other parts of the world where the older theories still retain relevance. In essence, I argue that the familiar regional integration theories are obsolete in Western Europe and obsolescent -though still useful- in the rest of the world²⁴.

Feld, on the other hand, agrees with Haas that more elaboration is needed on the theoretical concepts which fit the Western European experience in integration, but -by refraining from Haas' greenhouses where genetics of some original forms of integration theory have been being preserved- "disagree(s) with him that old concepts, for example, functionalism and neo-functionalism, retain applicability in Latin America or Africa"-²⁵.

Political integration studies seem to have been afflicted by one more deficiency: the theory may not have reflected the reality but have been driven by it; the vicissitudes of the integration have affected the character of the contemplations too much. This might be construed as a praiseworthy amelioration as well, that consistently keeps the theory adapted to the reality. However, this has also been the very factor that obstructed the flourish of one firm theory of political integration from a stable ground. As Ifestos²⁶ accentuates, post-war years until the end of 1950's, were marked by 'normative' studies each trying to mould the newly emerging European order. But, as the tangible institutions emerged one by one, and new political patterns were settled, this time 'prescriptive' studies started to appear that both set future goals for a new Europe and also propose strategies to achieve these definite ends. Throughout 1960s and 1970s, texts in the field got more cautious. The attribute of the outcomes of the writers of the time appeared to be rather 'descriptive' of what was happening. The 'victim' of this evolution, according to Ifestos, was the concept of

²⁴ Haas, E. B., *The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory*, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1975, p. 1, *cit. in* Feld, 1981, pp. 502-503. One year later, with some trivial revisions, the same passage took part at the beginning of an article of Haas: "Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration", *International Organisation*, 30, Spring 1976, pp.173-212.

²⁵ Feld, *op. cit.*, p.503.

²⁶ Ifestos, *op. cit.*, p.52.

'Europe becoming a superpower'. Corollary to this, we might add that this also proved to be a pernicious climate for the mental outcomes to accumulate to make up a more vigorous and a unique theory. Instead, theory seems to have retreated and cowered in front of the events of the real world.

iii) Current Research on the European Political Integration²⁷ :
Quantitative Inadequacy

The last four years might be said to have witnessed a phenomenal increase in research on European political integration. There did appear a certain stimulation as early as early 1980's. However, the Maastricht Treaty, as it has done in numerous other contexts, triggered a burgeoning in the activities of universities and institutes as well as umbrella organisations all over the world, incomparable with the former period.

Nevertheless, contrary to other subdisciplines of political science, European political integration process has been less a research topic. Although some research has appeared on such recurring themes like electoral studies and comparative politics within the framework of European political integration, as will be seen, in aggregate, these studies do not amount to a significant quantity. Below is an enumeration of studies both under international organisations and within national institutions of both Member States and non-members.

1) International Umbrella Organisations and European Institutes

World-wide functioning umbrella organisations might best be represented by International Political Science Association (IPSA) which holds regular congresses that sometimes directly or indirectly appeal to the subject. A similar position is shared by a counterpart summoning almost 300 academicians every year in the United States alone: the European Community Studies Association (ECSA)²⁸.

The three European Institutes of Bruges, Florence and Maastricht are also among the institutions carrying out theoretical studies on political integration. Research in College of Europe of Bruges, since the second half of 1991, has centred

²⁷ Except especially inserted footnotes, this Chapter has been summarised from Azzi, 1994, but presented in a different design from his. Unless otherwise stated, the interpretations of the material facts also belong to Azzi.

²⁸ Oğuz, 1991, pp.V-VI.

on the Intergovernmental Conferences on EMU and Political Union, on the Union Treaty provisions and on selected questions of the implementation of the Treaty. This Institute runs distinguished as it strives to probe its themes with the tools of political science rather than economics²⁹.

The European University Institute in Florence, though not having a common denominator in its political integration studies and putting less emphasis on the theoretical side, has been venue for important investigations, among others, on federalism (e.g., Majone's works that rather exceed the area towards political economics³⁰). Here, themes like Intergovernmental Conferences on EMU and Political Union, Union Treaty, subsidiarity principle, the Union Institutions are distinctive.

European Institute of Public Administration is another body that gives primary importance to the subject -a fact that is foremost indicated by the very classification of the research of the Institute by its Director General: "Research in the area of political science" and "(s)tudies undertaken by EIPA in other disciplines"-. Under the previous heading, even a specific title has been bestowed to 'integration theories' confined however to individual efforts of a few figures like Finn Laursen who has worked on, *inter alia*, federalism, Intergovernmental Conferences and institutional reforms³¹.

²⁹ See for example Monar, J.; Ungerer, W.; Wessels W. (eds.): *The Maastricht Treaty on European Union, Legal Complexity and Political Dynamic*, European University Press, 1993.

³⁰ Majone, G.: "Regulatory Federalism in the European Community", in: *Government and Policy*, vol. 10, 1992, pp.299-316; "Mutual Recognition in Federal Type Systems, in: *EUI Working Paper*, SPS, no 93/1; "L'innovazione Politica nella Comunità Europea", in: *Stato e Mercato*, vol.37, no.3, pp. 153-162; "Deregulation or Re-Regulations? Policy Making in the EC since the Single Act", in: *EUI Working Paper*, SPS, no 93/2; "The European Community: An Independent Fourth Branch of Government?", in: *Verfassungen für Ziviles Europas*, G. Brüggermeier (ed.), Nomos, 1994, pp. 73-91 all cit. in Azzi, *op. cit.*p.287).

³¹ Laursen, F.:(together with Vanhoonaeker, S. as eds.) *The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union. Institutional Reforms, New Policies and International Identity of the European Community*, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Maastricht and Dordrecht, 1992; *Unity with Diversity: Federalist Essays (1972-1986)*. Institute for Global Policy Studies, Amsterdam, 1993; "A Plea for Theory", in: Danish Research on Europe, Kurt Klauði Klause (ed.), Proceedings of a conference held at Odense University, Political Science Publications, Department of Commercial Law and Political Science, no 5/1992, Odense University, pp.7-10 all cit. in ., *Ibid*, p.297.

2) National Research

It is natural that the Member States have been the most fertile areas for these studies when compared to non-members. The studies in the Member States do not, of course, run in complete isolation. While exchange programmes among universities and Community-wide programmes provide co-ordination within the Community, other programmes like Med-Campus serve as an instrument that facilitate co-operation with non-members.

A) Member States³²

Belgium: Characteristic to the political science studies in the country, the area is not fully segregated from that of law or economics, and studies on European political integration suffer from this perplexity as well. These studies also lack co-ordination among themselves and centre around singular institutions and individuals. Ferry's studies on Habermas, Louis' consideration of a European constitution from the perspective of the clash between federalists and neo-functionalists³³, and numerous studies on the concepts of subsidiarity and networking are worth mentioning.

Denmark: Danish EU studies as a whole lagged far behind until the early 1990's and political integration studies as a portion of this sum proved to be much trivial; the latter remained subordinate to the studies having priority for the country such as agricultural matters or foreign policy until the Intergovernmental Conferences of 1985 and 1991 which arouse an interest to theoretical as well as empirical studies on the EC in general. Nevertheless, among these studies, the most important topic has been political integration theory. Here, a dominant inclination has come to the fore which tries to revise neo-functionalism or to associate it with inter-governmentalism as suggested by Keohane and Hoffmann. Haahr has applied neo-functional theory onto, among others, the EU policy of the Danish Social

³² Luxembourg is excluded in Azzi, possibly because of the inconsiderable amount of studies in quantity.

³³ Louis, J.-V.: "Elargissement-profondissement-réforme institutionnelle: considérations pour établir une stratégie" in: *The European Union in the 1990's -ever closer and larger*, Wolfgang Wessels and Christian Engel (eds.), Europa Union Verlag, Bonn, 1993 *cit. in Ibid.*, p.14.

Democrats³⁴. Kelstrup, stressing the importance of socio-cultural community building in the EU, has attempted to reconsider the system approach of Lindberg, Scheingold and Easton³⁵. Sørensen and Pedersen have preferred the apparatus of comparative politics based however on federalism and consociational democracy³⁶. Beukel has approached integration theory through the Educational Policy³⁷.

Germany: The idiosyncrasy of the German political science research on European unification has been that it has included recent political developments, in a ranking, however, based on being of close relation to Germany. In this framework, the German unification, the revolutionary changes in Central and Eastern Europe, the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (particularly its institutional effects)... all, by and large, have somehow been shaping factors in the preparation of the new theories. This multitude, however, has inspired German theoreticians an insufficiency on the side of political science per se, and a need for interdisciplinary studies. Yet, political integration studies in particular have held their relatively independent position: Zellentin has reworked on the concept of functionalism³⁸ and Schneider did the same thing for the old concept of 'Leitbild'³⁹. Héritier has dealt

³⁴ Haahr, J.-H.: *Looking to Europe. The EC Policies of the British Labour Parties and the Danish Social Democrats*, Aarhus University Press, Aarhus, 1993 cit. in *Ibid.* p.23.

³⁵ Kelstrup, M. (ed.): *European Integration and Denmark's Participation*, Copenhagen Political Studies Press, Copenhagen, 1992 cit. in *Ibid.*

³⁶ Sørensen, C.: *Europe. Nation-Union*, Fremad, Copenhagen, 1992; Pedersen, T.: "Danish EU Policy from the Perspective of Federalist Theory" in : *Proceedings from the Jean Monnet Colloquium in Tübingen* (July 1993), F. Knipping (ed.), Brussels, 1994; "Maastricht traktaten i føderalistisk belysning" in: *Europa etter Maastricht*, Cappelen, Oslo, 1992 cit. in *Ibid.*, p.24.

³⁷ Beukel, E.: "Reconstructing Integration Theory: The Case of Educational Policy in the EC" in: *Co-operation and Conflict*, vol. 29, no 1, March 1994 cit. in *Ibid.*, p.23.

³⁸ Zellentin, G.: "Der Funktionalismus-eine Strategie gesamteuropäischer Integration?", in: *Die Integration Europas, Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, M. Kreile (ed.), Sonderheft 23, Opladen, 1992, pp.62-77 cit. in *Ibid.*, p.39.

³⁹ Schneider, H.: "Europäische Integration: die Leitbilder und die Politik", in: *Die Integration Europas*, M. Kreile (ed.), PVS-Sonderheft 23, Opladen, 1992, pp. 3-35 cit. in *Ibid.*, p.37.

with the idea of policy-network-analysis⁴⁰, whereas Wessels has put forward a new 'fusion thesis'⁴¹.

Greece: Greek academicians took the European Union Treaty as a litmus test for the existing integration theories. The principle of subsidiarity, "Greek society's deep preoccupations with the perceived external threats"⁴², and worries on the preservation of the national identity and consciousness has been influential in contemplating a few theoretical works in the field, such as a comparison between EC and US federal models (Antonakis)⁴³, the consociational side of European integration (Chrysochoou)⁴⁴, an Aristotelian approach to the political integration process (Ioakimidis)⁴⁵ and a group study on the theory and politics of European integration under the leadership of Maraveyas and Tsinisizelis⁴⁶ seem worthy of enumerating.

Spain: Publications about political research in Spain constitutes 35 per cent of all the studies about Europe, whereas economic studies have a share of 50 per cent (15 per cent remains to legal studies). This 35 per cent almost all of which has been written in Spanish, primarily concerns with political consequences of social policy, admissions of new members, the idea of Europe and the immigration from non-Members. Political integration theories have been confined to the personal studies like the interdisciplinary studies of Lorca on the intersection point of political geography and economics⁴⁷.

⁴⁰ Hérítier, A.: "Policy-Netzwerkanalyse als Untersuchungsinstrument im europäischen Kontext: Folgerungen aus einer empirischen Studie regulativer Politik", in: *Policy-Analyse. Kritik und Neuorientierung*, A. Hérítier (ed.) PVS Sonderheft 24, 1993, pp.432-447 cit. in *Ibid.*, p.34.

⁴¹ Wessels, W.: "Staat und (westeuropäische) Integration. Die Fusionsthese", in: *Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 1992/1993*, Bonn, 1993, pp.41-52 cit. in *Ibid.*, p.39.

⁴² The phrase belongs to Stephanou and Yannis; see *Ibid.*, p.43.

⁴³ Antonakis, C.: *A Comparison of the European Community Political Institutions to the US Federal Model*, A. N. Saoulas Publ., Athens, 1991 (in Greek) cit. in *Ibid.*, p. 45.

⁴⁴ Chrysochoou, D.: *The Consociational Dimension of the European Integration. Limits and Possibilities of Transnational Democracy*, Occasional Paper no 6, Institute of International relations and Centre for European Affairs, Panteion University, Athens, 1991 (in Greek) cit. in *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ Ioakimidis, P.: *"Polis" and European Integration, Seeking an Aristotelian Approach of the Political Integration Process*, Themelio Publ., Athens, 1993 (in Greek) cit. in *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ Maraveyas, N.; Tsinisizelis, M.: (eds.): *European Integration, Theory and Politics*, Themelio publ., Athens, 1991 (in Greek) cit. in *Ibid.* p.46.

⁴⁷ Lorca, A.: *Las fronteras de la Unión Europea*, Instituto Internacional Carlos quinto/Taller de Estudios Internacionales del Mediterráneo, Madrid, 1993 cit. in *Ibid.*, p.53.

France: The process of European political integration has been evaluated by French academicians on several dimensions like political sociology, political philosophy, social anthropology, ethnology and international relations. However, the last field which is of primary concern to us, has rather been a venue for empirical concerns than theoretical approaches; researchers have preferred to chase the developments in Common Foreign and Security Policy, relations with Central and Eastern countries, migratory flows and space/territory/frontier concepts in geopolitical and politico-geographical context. Especially the neo-functionalist tide having been felt all over the world has not entered to the French soil.

Ireland: On the small area left by economic and legal studies, Irish political scientists have elaborated five main themes: institutional and constitutional change in the EU /Enlargement, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, economic and social cohesion, public opinion and the democratic deficit, and the New Europe. The first group does include such themes like cross-national networks on co-operative federalism. The near past of Irish theoretical studies on political integration of Europe however, devoted mainly to neutral and lesser developed position of Ireland and her geographical peripherality. Amongst the very few scholars on political integration theories Sinnott, who has worked on the theory of internationalised governance deserves mentioning⁴⁸.

Italy: With the belief in the failure of neo-functionalist approach in explaining the current phase of European political integration, Italian disciples have inclined to adopt a so-called 'neo-institutional' approach. Elaborated by Attinà, this view establishes a similarity between the democratic system of any nation state and the system of the Community which is considered to be a special type of federation⁴⁹. Attinà underlines the significance of the channels that make the democratic operation of the system possible. Federalism has also been worked on within the framework of constitutionality question by Dastoli and Villella⁵⁰ and of Monetary Union by Padoa-Schioppa⁵¹.

⁴⁸ Sinnott, R. : "Theory and the Internationalisation of Governance: Bringing Public Opinion Back in", CEEPA Working Paper, December 1993; "Policy, Subsidiarity and the Legitimacy of Internationalised Governance", CEEPA Working Paper, December 1993 both *cited in Ibid.*, p.16.

⁴⁹ Attinà, F.: *Il sistema politico della Comunità europea*, Giuffrè, Milano, 1992 *cit. in Ibid.*, p.84.

⁵⁰ Dastoli, P. V.; Villella, G.: *La nuova Europa: dalla Comunità all'Unione. I difficili scenari del dopo Maastricht*, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1992 *cit. in Ibid.*

⁵¹ Padoa-Schioppa, T.: *L'Europa verso l'Unione monetaria*, Einaudi, Torino, 1992 *cit. in Ibid.*, p.86.

The Netherlands: Prevalence of two views among the Dutch researchers is discernible: One which maintains that 'co-operation' rather than 'integration' is the definition of the history of the Union, and the other that goes much further predicting a European State. Reflecting the contest between neo-realists and neo-institutionalists in their works of general character, Jansen and De Vree⁵², Houweling and Siccama⁵³, Pijpers⁵⁴, Corbey⁵⁵ and Lieshout⁵⁶ have appeared as principal names in the area.

Portugal: In Portugal too, political science is afflicted with being inferior to economic and legal studies, let alone political integration studies as a sub-branch; in Portugal, it is only the last years that some political integration studies have been carried out not under the title of economics or legal studies but political science. Concerned with practical issues such as Portuguese sovereignty, her sovereignty and the rôle of her Constitution and Parliament within the integration process, European democracy, imbalance between large and small states and cohesion. Academicians have had not much choice for tackling with political integration theories. However they have had some -what they call- 'pedagogical concerns' when they have held that there exists a paradox which has come out of the reality that on the one hand functionalist type of concerns have been put aside and a return to politics overwhelmed, and contrary to the expectations of European citizens, less weight has been given to federalist views.

United Kingdom: In the United Kingdom, both research has mirrored the recent developments as much as possible, and also political science studies have, in general, appeared to be one of the fields with best infrastructure. These conditions have been made possible by first, the Europeanisation of the UK higher education system, secondly, the availability of funding for research, thirdly, a

⁵² Jansen, M.; De Vree, J.K. (eds.): *The Ordeal of Unity. The Politics of European Integration since 1945*, Prime Press, Bilthoven, 1988 cit. in *Ibid.*, p.94f.

⁵³ Houweling, H.; Siccama, J. G. (eds.): "Europa Speelbal of Medespeler. Europese machtspolitiek, in: *Verleden en Toekomst*, Anthos/In den Toorn, Baarn, 1988 cit. in *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ Pijpers, A. E.: *The Vicissitudes of European Political Co-operation. Towards a Realist Interpretation of the EC's Collective Diplomacy*, Leiden, 1990 cit. in *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ Corbey, D. : *Stilstand is Vooruitgang. De Dialectiek van het Europese Integratieproces*, Van Gorcum, Assen, 1993 cit. in *Ibid.*, p.97.

⁵⁶ Lieshout, R. H.: "Internationale Betrekkingen", in: *Handboek Politicologie*, Van Deth, J. W. Van Gorcum, Assen, 1993 cit. in *Ibid.*

developed environment of research institutes, fourthly, the links with other research groupings within the EU, and finally, a plethora of papers to reflect new developments. In this salubrious milieu, political integration studies have, however, remained mostly within the limits of subsidiarity/federalism -a domain which has always been of concern to the country. Amongst the people working in the area, prominent names can be exemplified by Jeffrey and Sturn, who have worked on federalism⁵⁷.

Austria: The shift from EFTA to the EC brought a heavy burden of extensive legal and economical studies and of the question of Austria's status of permanent neutrality to be resolved. Almost no remarkable study on political integration theories has been carried out except such studies like that of Rack and Renner-Loquenz⁵⁸ or Kiefer⁵⁹ who all have questioned the combination of Austrian federalism with that of the EU. However, these studies have inevitably had a practical focus.

Norway: Of 197 accepted finalising political science theses, 23 have been in the field of European integration, a number relatively higher when compared to the other Members. Theoretical studies have scrutinised such topics like confederalism, federalism and intergovernmentalism. Most of these have shared an eclectic character combining certain international relations, regional integration, economics, etc. concepts. Yet, some original views like that of Matlary's⁶⁰ or of Sæter's⁶¹, former depicting the state as a 'gatekeeper' between the supranational and the international level, and the latter recapitulated the EU process as 'comprehensive

⁵⁷ Jeffrey, C.; Sturn, R.: *Federalism, Unification and European Integration*, Cass, London, 1990 cit. in *Ibid.*, p.112.

⁵⁸ Rack, R.; Renner-Loquenz, B.: "Europa der Regionen: Vom politischen Schlagwort zur gelebten Praxis", in: *Schriftenreihe des Forschungsinstitutes für Europa-recht*, vol. 6, Universität Graz, Graz, 1993 cit. in *Ibid.*, p.123.

⁵⁹ Kiefer, A.: "Salzburgs Mitwirkung in europäischen Regionalinstitutionen", in *Die regionale Aussenpolitik des Landes Salzburg*, Floimaier (ed.), Salzburg, 1993 cit. in *Ibid.*, p.122.

⁶⁰ Matlary, J. H.: *Towards Understanding Integration: An Analysis of the Role of the State in EC Energy Policy, 1985-1992* (Ph.D. dissertation), University of Oslo/Faculty of Social Science, Oslo, 1994 cit. in *Ibid.*, p.133.

⁶¹ Sæter, M.: "Democracy, Sovereignty, and Supranationality: Institution-Building and European Union-a Neo-functionalist Perspective", paper presented at the ECSA Biennial in Washington May 1993, NUPI Working Paper no 497, Oslo, 1993 cit. in *Ibid.*, p.135.

confederalism' enhancing neo-functionalism to include supranational as well as intergovernmental dimension, as such, deserve mentioning.

Finland: The main supporter for research on topics related with the EU is the Finnish Academy financed by the Finnish State. This, however, is the very institution together with some other academic and semi-academic institutions, responsible for the infertility of the field of political science studies, by displaying a predilection for legal studies. A handful of students have opted for following the path of realism which still dominates the field in Finland. Under the influence of such time-honoured names as Morgenthau, Waltz and Gilpin, the present situation of European integration has been contemplated in terms of national interests.

B) Non-member States

Central and Eastern Europe states have appeared to be among the inquisitive countries. Political reasons like the three interruptions of 1938, 1948 and 1968 in Czechoslovakia (today the Czech Republic) and their attendant isolation in academic political studies, financial difficulties and lack of interest on the side of authorities, however, hamper this interest. Right after November 1989, 'scientific communism' department of Charles University in Prague has been renamed as 'politology', whereas the already existing 'politológia' departments in three major centres and 24 other places in Hungary have given an impetus to their publications. Maastricht has been a thrust for a similar but late development in Poland. A major shift has been experienced in Romania when, in 1993, their membership to Council of Europe has been realised and the EU has established a delegation in Bucharest. Deplorably, this zeal has not been reflected in the political integration studies which remained under the shadow of such themes as institutional topics, external relations, protectionism, the rôle of the new Germany in Europe and possibilities of membership of these countries to the EU. Holding the interests of their countries' in the focus, Szoboszlai from Hungary has edited a volume that analyses East and Central European realities from the perspective of democracy and political transformation and by means of comparing these realities with theories⁶²; Polish Barcz has examined the federal structure of Germany and its membership to the EU⁶³; Marga in Romania has

⁶² Szoboszlai, G. (ed.): *Democracy and Political Transformation: Theories and East-Central European Realities*, Hungarian Political Science Association, Budapest, 1991 cit. in *Ibid.*, p.187.

⁶³ Barcz, J.: *Federal Structure of the German Federal Republic and its Membership in the European Community*, Opole, 1992 cit. in *Ibid.*p.195.

formulated some articles, among other fronts of the Union referred to its theoretical foundations within the integration process⁶⁴.

Though one might expect that with their familiarity with and skill in bringing theoretical explanations to political realities, Russian scholars would approach to the EU via theories, August 1991 has been the starting point of a new scientific conception as well; still taking the European Integration as a long-term evolutionary process, they have however abandoned the Marxist explanation to the Union and the Cold War attitude. Democracy is seen now as narrative for the European Integration. However, the time seems not ripe for a publication solely devoted to the political theories of integration. Yet, between the lines of the works like that of Klemin which questions the powers of the PRG Länder as participants of the EC integration, one may find some references to the theory of integration⁶⁵.

Despite 1964, 1970 and 1975 agreements and an eager political attitude towards the Union, academic circles in Israel have not shown a considerable interest towards the EU in general. Among the individual studies we may cite that of Eschet-Schwartz's which has inquired whether the Swiss federalism could be a model for federal integration⁶⁶, Weiler's study on American federalism⁶⁷, Lapan's comparison of European integration to the American model⁶⁸, and Tovias' examination on the integration theory in general⁶⁹.

⁶⁴ Marga, A.: "The Idea of European Unification" in: *Tribuna*, nos 15-16, Cluj, 1994; "The Premices of European Unification", in: *Tribuna*, nos13-14, Cluj, 1994 cit. in *Ibid.*, p.201.

⁶⁵ Klemin, A.: *Powers of the FRG Länder as Participants of the EC Integration*, Kazan University, 1992 cit. in *Ibid.*, p.212.

⁶⁶ Eschet-Schwartz, A.: "Can the Swiss Federal Experience Serve as a Model of Federal Integration?", in: *Constitutional Design and Power-Sharing in the Post Modern Epoch*, D. Elazar (ed.), University Press of America, New York, 1991, pp.161-184 cit. in *Ibid.*, p.221.

⁶⁷ Weiler, J.H.H.: "Theorie und Praxis des Amerikanischen Foederalismus -Vorbild oder Kontrastmodell fuer Europa?", in: *Foederale Union-Europas Zerkunft?*, W. Wessels and H. Schneider (eds.), 1994 cit. in *Ibid.*, p.222 (This and the following text are seemingly the outcomes of the proximity of the Israeli higher education system to the American universities and material.)

⁶⁸ Lapan. A.: "European Integration and the American Model", Paper presented at the Third Conference of ISSEI in Aalborg, Denmark (August 1992) cit. in *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ Tovias., A.: "A Survey of the Theory of European Integration", in: *Journal of European Integration*, vol. 15, no 1, 1991, pp.5-23 cit. in *Ibid.*

Theory of European political integration has provoked a great appeal in the United States of America which also had a reliable past of international relations theory as a sound base. Ruggie has edited a volume about multilateralism⁷⁰, and Moravcsik's interdisciplinary composition on the intersection point of international political economy, negotiation analysis and regime theory has revised neo-functionalism by reserving more authority to the state and underlining the relative power differentials in inter-state bargaining⁷¹. Eichenberg and Dalton have introduced a model to explain the differences in the public support for the integration⁷²; Caporaso and Keeler have applied the regional integration theory to the case of European Integration⁷³.

Reaching its peak in Soldatos and Michelmann's studies, research in Canada has had a considerable volume. Whereas these co-authors examined the integration theories in general⁷⁴ and sub-national actors in particular⁷⁵, Randall and Gibbins have edited a book on federalism⁷⁶.

Chinese academicians too have produced a significant mass on theories of European political integration. Stirred mainly by the APEC project, some prominent Chinese personalities who have worked in the area include Wang Yizhou and Zhou

⁷⁰ Ruggie J. (ed.): *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1993 cit. in *Ibid.*, p.225.

⁷¹ Moravcsik, A.: "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach", in: *Economic and Political Integration in Europe: Internal Dynamics and Global Context*, S. Bulmer; A. Scott (eds.), Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1994 cit. in *Ibid.*, p.230.

⁷² Eichenberg, R. C.; Dalton, R.J.: "Europeans and the European Community: The Dynamics of Public Support for European Integration", in: *International Organisation*, vol.47, no 4, Autumn 1993, pp.507-534 cit. in *Ibid.*, p.229.

⁷³ Caporaso, J; Keeler, J.: "The European Community and Regional Integration Theory", paper presented at the annual meeting of the European Community Studies Association, May 1993 cit. in *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ Michelmann, H.J.; Soldatos, P. (eds.): *European Integration: Theories and Approaches*, University Press of America, Lanham, MD, 1994 cit. in *Ibid.*, p.238.

⁷⁵ Soldatos, P.; Michelmann, H.J. (eds.): "Les acteurs sous-nationaux dans l'intégration européenne-Subnational Actors and European Integration", in: *Revue d'intégration européenne-Journal of European Integration*, n^{os} 2-3, University of Calgary, Calgary, 1992 cit. in *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ Randall, S.J.; Gibbins, R. (eds.): *Federalism in the Post-cold War Era: The Gorbachev Symposium on the Future of Federalism*, University of Calgary Press, Calgary, (forthcoming) cit. in *Ibid.*

Jiangong both of whom have analysed the relationship between nationalism and integration⁷⁷, and Zhou Yue having worked on consociationalism theory⁷⁸.

Korea has had Heo Mane who has, at the beginning, seen the integration of the Community as being advancing on both functional and political paths; the former, according to him having engendered the evolution of institutions and systems of the EC, and the latter having procreated the political co-operation environment of today⁷⁹. Later on he has gone further to predict a future dominance of federal techniques in the European Union, different however from of a nation state⁸⁰. Hong Sik Cho has examined the political actors of nation-states of Europe and concluded that a political and administrative élite within these actors opted for European integration as a safe way to the health and viability of Western democracies⁸¹.

Empirical political science studies in general have outnumbered theoretical ones in Japan. Of a few studies in the area, we may cite Takehiko Kamo who have worked on the political integration in general⁸² and Koji Fukuda having explored the field between political and administrative sciences⁸³.

Studies on federalism have prevailed in Australia and political integration studies as a whole deserve attention. Annet has questioned the federal model presented in Maastricht⁸⁴; Cass has inspected federalism within the framework of

⁷⁷ Wang, Y.: "State Sovereignty under the Contemporary International Political Conditions", in *Europe*, no 6, 1993; Zhou, J.: "Europe between Nationalism and Integration", in: *Western European Studies*, no 4, 1992 cit. in *Ibid.*, p.246.

⁷⁸ Zhou, Y.: "Consociationalism Theory and the Construction of European Union", in *Europe*, no 3, 1993 cit. in *Ibid.*, p.247.

⁷⁹ Mane, H.: "European Integration: Problems and Prospects", in: *Journal of European Studies*, vol.II, no 1, 1991 cit. in *Ibid.*, p.256.

⁸⁰ Mane, H.: *A Perspective of the European Political Integration*, centre for Area Studies (unpublished) cit. in *Ibid.*

⁸¹ Hong, S. C.: "The European Integration and the Dynamic of the Nation States' Actors", in: *Europe: Statism, Regionalism, Globalism*, Korean Society of Contemporary European Studies (ed.) , Seoul, 1994 cit. in *Ibid.*

⁸² Kamo, T.: *European Integration*, Nihon Hoso Shuppan Kyokai, Tokyo, 1992 cit. in *Ibid.*, p.263.

⁸³ Fukuda, K. : *The Administrative Structure and Policy Process in the European Union*, Seibundo, Tokyo, 1992 cit. in *Ibid.*, p.262.

⁸⁴ Annet, I.: "Maastricht-A Model for Federalism?", Modern Europe Conference, 5-9 July 1993, La Trobe University. Panel on European Union, Problems and Prospects cit. in *Ibid.*, p.272.

subsidiarity and power sharing in Europe⁸⁵; Coombes has analysed the same subject in, however, a different context: the use of public power⁸⁶; and Holmes has dealt with the subjects sovereignty, nationalism and statehood in the future Europe⁸⁷.

b) On the Paper

i) Approach

Theories about the physical world undeniably illustrate the reality better when compared to the theories on social phenomena. However even the physical world does not overlap perfectly with the picture theories depict. Physics exhibits a paired picture. On the one hand, concepts of classical physics such as law of conservation of energy and of momentum, and law of gravitation retain their applicability in daily life, on very small and very big scales, concepts such as 'theory of relativity' and 'quantum physics' defy even very established senses of causality.

A similar situation might be said to be applied to the EC phenomenon. In an article from 1990, Kelstrup⁸⁸, among others, tries to interpret the political developments of the period in Europe, using theoretical tools. Referring to Viotti and Kauppi⁸⁹, Kelstrup determines three major 'directions' or 'schools': 'globalism', 'realism' and 'pluralism' -or slightly differently 'world-system theory', '(neo)realism' and 'interdependence theory'-. This kind of approach that analyses the EC phenomenon, presupposes that the EC is an animal which is not different from the other actors of international relations. This approach might be reliable to a considerable extent as long as the inquiry remains within the limits of the external

⁸⁵ Cass, D.: "Federalism Revisited-Subsidiarity and power-sharing in Europe", Modern Europe Conference, 5-9 July 1993. La Trobe University. Panel on European Union, Problems and Prospects *cit. in Ibid.*

⁸⁶ Coombes, D.: "European Integration and the Use of Public Power: The Relevance of Federalism", Modern Europe Conference, 5-9 July 1993. La Trobe University. Panel on European Union, Problems and Prospects *cit. in Ibid.*

⁸⁷ Holmes, L.: "Sovereignty, Nationalism and Statehood in the Future Europe", in : *The New Europe: East and West*, J. Beaumont (ed.) , Australian Institute of International Affairs, Melbourne 1993 *cit. in Ibid.*, p.274.

⁸⁸ Kelstrup, 1990, p.25.

⁸⁹ Viotti, Paul R. & Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism*, London: Macmillan, 1987 *cit. in Ibid.*

relations of the EC as a whole (as a matter of fact, even this is a difficult task since the identity of the EC pursuing a foreign policy of its own is not discernible yet).

However, European Community, when taken by itself, is not a suitable case for such an analysis with these tools; although they work in explaining macro-scale events such as on global level or in Europe in general, world-system approach or globalism, for example, can not penetrate into the internal mechanism of the EC, whereas for similar reasons, realism has been modified into neo-realism and this into school of interdependence...

Nevertheless, Kelstrup's method is but one example of examining one and the same phenomenon by using different approaches that are sub-classes under a higher level.

When we accept the integration theories as our higher level -instead of macro-theories of international relations-, then sub-classes obviously will differ. The new approaches are expected to explain the integration phenomenon better, since they are specially designed for this specific aim. Another problem, however, remains. Since almost all theories of integration are blamed with some defects, we do not achieve a perfect explanation of the reality again. A simplistic method to overcome -or disguise- this shortcoming is to couple some compatible theories with the expectation of attaining a theoretical 'Frankenstein'. This is what the present paper tries to do.

ii) Methodology

Four key terms play important rôle in the formation of the paper: 'classification', 'typology', 'comparison' and 'eclecticism'. The terms are explained below:

-Classification

Alberto Marradi, in his article "On Classification", distinguishes three 'main families' of the term classification as an operation:

1. Classification as an intellectual operation whereby the extension of a concept at a given level of generality is subdivided into several (two or more narrower extensions corresponding to as many concepts at a lower level of generality: this subdivision is obtained by stating that an *aspect* of the intension of the latter concepts is a different partial articulation of the corresponding aspect of the intension of the higher concept.

Similar operations, which are performed simultaneously on several aspects of a concept or successively on concepts of decreasing generality, belong in the same family of meanings.

2. Classification as an operation whereby the objects or events of a given set are grouped into two or more subsets according to the perceived similarities of their states on one or, more frequently, several properties: subsets may be successively grouped into subsets of wider extension and higher hierarchical level.

3. Classification as an operation whereby objects or events are assigned to classes or types that have been previously defined: in most instances, classes have been defined through the first process; however, they may also have been defined through the second process and then brought to bear on objects or events not belonging to the original set.

In order to distinguish among the kinds of classification, operations of family 1 could be named 'intensional' classifications, and operations of family 2 'extensional'. The difference between the two is apparent: 1 is prerequisite for 3 and, in most cases, family 1 operations will have been performed with the aim of making possible one or more operations of family 3. In clearer terms, classes or types are usually formed in order to have empirical instances assigned to them. The difference between operations in families 2 and 3 is also apparent, in that classes or types are the starting point of 3 while they are the final target of 2⁹⁰.

The first group, *i.e.* intensional classification is of primary importance to us here. Marradi underlines the phases of this type of classification: first, "concepts corresponding to individual classes are either formed or clarified by the definition of their boundaries with contiguous concepts", secondly "(d)ifferent terms or expressions

⁹⁰ Marradi, 1990, pp. 11-12.

are allocated to each class concept", and thirdly "the concept-term ties are fastened, as for all linguistic phenomena⁹¹, by the implicitly oppositive nature of any systematic allocation"⁹². To complement Marradi's explanation we may add that this is a careful superimposition of the two -so to say- 'stripes' of concepts and of terms so as to secure -what we would call- a 'one-to-one and onto function' or 'bijection'.

Among the 'instrumental concepts' in intensional classification in general, Marradi gives the first place to a Latin term: *fundamentum divisionis* (literally; the basis of division). This is one quality, feature or criterion *inter alia*, belonging to the intension of a concept, on the basis of which classes are formed. For instance, to divide up the concept 'political system' into classes, one should first consider its several constituting properties like 'the principle used to legitimate rulers' or 'the degree of autonomy of a state's territorial components', and pick out one of them as *fundamentum divisionis*. If our *fundamentum divisionis* is 'the principle used to legitimate rulers', the classes presumably will be 'theocratic', 'autocratic', 'plutocratic' and 'democratic'. But if we take 'the degree of autonomy of a state's territorial components' as *fundamentum divisionis*, the classes will appear as 'unitary', 'federal' and 'confederal'.

Another concept to be clarified is dichotomous classification. Here, the extension of a concept is divided into two classes. This division is usually performed according to existence of a predetermined criterion. For example, if we take 'the existence and functioning of democratic machinery as our criterion', we can divide a given group of countries into two -and only two- classes: 'democratic countries' and 'non-democratic countries'.

-Typology

It is also possible to take more than one *fundamentum divisionis* at the same time into account:

Rather than a one-dimensional set of classes, an n -dimensional set of classes, an n -dimensional set of types is then created, where n is the number of *fundamenta*. A type (from the Greek *typos*: cast, model) is

⁹¹ Saussure, Ferdinand de, *Cours de Linguistique Générale*, Payot, Paris, 1916 *cit. in Ibid.*, p.12. However, we should not forget that Saussure uses 'concept-sound image' combination which is called 'sign' see Saussure, 1959, p.12; for him a linguistic sign does not combine an 'object' and a 'name'.

⁹² Marradi, *loc. cit.*

therefore a concept whose intension is the intersection (in the set-theoretical sense) of the n classes that are combined to form it. On logical grounds, it will often be discovered empirically that the fact of being the combination of n classes, each belonging to a different dimension, will endow the type with features not implied by the intension of each of the n classes.

As the simplest possible example of this kind of intensional classification, take Apter's (1965) typology of regimes. It combines two *fundamenta*: predominant values with two classes (instrumental and consummatory) and type of authority with two classes (hierarchical and pyramidal) Each type of regime is the logical product of one class on the value dimension and one class on the authority dimension (e.g., pyramidal with consummatory values)⁹³.

-Comparison

A step further of classification (or typology in particular) is comparison.

Max Weber⁹⁴ explicitly noted that his typologies were to be regarded as analytical constructs, representing 'ideal types' against which politics in the real world could be measured and then compared with one another, and that actual politics were mixtures of these 'pure' types. Almond and Verba⁹⁵ likewise stress that in the real world each polity has its own particular mixture of participants, subjects, and parochials, just as each individual combines within himself feelings characteristic of each type⁹⁶.

In illustrating 'classification' we have given place to the concept 'the principle used to legitimate rulers' as a *fundamentum divisionis*, and arrived at the classes 'theocratic', 'autocratic', 'plutocratic' and 'democratic'. Now, at the next step, we might like to know the various shades of the last class, 'democracy'. To this aim, we have to resort to comparison.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, pp.14-15.

⁹⁴ *The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation*, trans. by A.M. Henderson and T. Parsons, New York, Oxford University Press, 1947, *cit. in* Scarrow, 1969, p.17.

⁹⁵ *The Civic Culture*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963 *cit. in* *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ Scarrow, *loc. cit.*, pp.17-18

A comparative concept is, in the last analysis, a more complex and useful type of classificatory concept. The members of a population are sorted out and placed in categories; but in addition, because the categories represent more or less of a particular property, the members are ranked according to how much of the property they each have. For instance, we might want to compare those nations which are very democratic, those which are moderately so, and those which are much less democratic⁹⁷. This would be done by categorising the empirical referents of democracy. Those political systems which fall in the upper one third of a list of ratios of total eligible voters to total population would be classified as very democratic, for instance. So, we could say that a nation placed in the first category is more democratic than one placed in the second or third categories⁹⁸.

Tiryakian draws attention to the comparative approach complementary to typology:

What may be asserted here is that for purposes of scientific research, types treated as central tendencies are no less necessary than variations from the type. Sophisticated users of typologies have fully realised that quantitative differences between individuals assigned to the same category may be, for another part of the investigation, as significant as qualitative differences between the categories themselves⁹⁹. In other words, *differences in degree are as essential to a good typology as differences in kind*. If this caveat is observed, and if one also remembers that, in our daily life, we experience nature as a continuum (*Natura non facit saltus*), the social scientist may put typological classification to fruitful use and bypass the ideological issues¹⁰⁰.

⁹⁷ Indeed, such a study was carried out to have an 'Index of Democratic Performance'. The indicators for this study were (a) percent of the adult population eligible to vote, (b) equality of representation, (c) information equality, and (d) competition (Deane Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy", *American Political Science Review*, vol. 61, no. 4, 1967, pp.1002-9, *cit. in* Isaak, 1969, p.86.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ This resistance of literature to clear-cut compartmentalisation is criticised by Wight: "Classification becomes valuable, in humane studies, only at the point where it breaks down" (Martin Wight (eds. Gabriele Wight & Brian Porter), *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, Leicester: Leicester University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991, p.259, *cit. in* Neumann, 1993, p.12)

¹⁰⁰ Tiryakian, 1968, p.183.

-Eclecticism

Coleman, in his article for Encyclopedia Americana defines eclecticism as "the selection of elements from a diversity of sources to create a new approach or style"¹⁰¹. Yet, 'eclecticism' as such, has been a description having derogative implications:

Eclecticism is the name given to the position of those philosophers whose thinking is limited to examining the results of the intellectual labour of others. They then pick out what seems true and valuable without making a serious philosophical effort to combine these truths into a unified whole¹⁰².

Use of eclecticist approach goes back to Greek philosophers. Victor Cousin, who coined the term in the 19th century, might be given place to exemplify the approach in action. Cousin strived for a threefold analysis of the mind.

Corresponding to the three faculties was a threefold division of philosophical problems into that of the good, the beautiful, and the true. In his book *Du Vrai, du beau, et du bien* (1853) Cousin argued that these problems were united in a whole which absorbed what was valid in sensation (Locke), reason (Plato), and the heart (for which he named no sponsor). These three parts of the soul are not independent of one another. Reason requires both sensation and the heart, sensation requires reason and the heart, and the heart requires both reason and sensation. By analogy epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics are all intertwined and inseparable except for purposes of exposition¹⁰³.

iii) Design

The introduction aims at, while acquainting the reader with the concept of political integration theory together with the world-wide studies in the field and providing him/her necessary methodological tools for the particular approach of the paper, persuading him/her on the necessity of new approaches.

¹⁰¹ Coleman, 1993, p.581.

¹⁰² Brugger, 1974, p.180.

¹⁰³ Boas, 1967, p.247.

The main parts of the paper are Part-I and Part-II. Part-I starts from a typology provided by Pentland. Four main individual approaches in this typology, namely pluralism, functionalism, neo-functionalism and federalism have, however, been dealt with differently from Pentland. Views of miscellaneous scholars have been inserted into the main framework of Pentland. In doing so, care has been taken not to spoil the unity of Pentland's model; especially, views that refer to external variables tried to be kept out in accordance with the idiosyncrasy of Pentland's work. Each approach has also been presented as a continuum. The choice of the criteria for the designation of continua have not been arbitrary. All the criteria have been derived from the different views of the solution to a non-existing problem. This fictitious room can be filled by any real issue, but the criteria remains: The criterion for pluralism is the quality and quantity of issue(s) it(them)sel(ves)f, for functionalism it is the locality of the issue(s) (global, continental, national *etc.*), for neo-functionalism it is the body that attempts to resolve the issue(s) (functional, political or cultivated spill-overs), and for federalism it is the position of the body that attempts to resolve the issue(s) in the hierarchy of mechanism of centralised institutions. Each approach is followed by concrete examples from European history. The examples have been chosen and interpreted within the limits of the treating of the respective approach in particular, and the model the paper is based on in general. The aim in choosing these examples has been to add the rather static-looking model of Pentland a flavour of dynamism. The examples also constitute material for the quasi-systemic synthesis in the Conclusion.

The data presented have been tried to be classified and compared as much as possible, and some dispersed classifications and comparisons also take place throughout the text like Deutsch typology of political integration efforts, a typology of co-operation in European market, or a comparison of the principal actors of the world politics as an external factor to political integration.

The absence of external variables is compensated by the availability of Part-II. The general section of this part has been almost completely summarised from (Neumann, 1993) -with the exception of diverting his focus on Nordic region- where it has also already been presented in the form of a continuum-, and implanted hereto. To this second part, a chapter has been added which once more addresses to the case in Europe. For Europe, first, different accounts of the limits of Europe have been given thanks to Buzan again in a classified form, and then, in a dichotomous classification, external variables have been designed.

Hence, it is expected that the main body of the paper, consisted of Part-I and Part-II appears as a whole in itself with internal and external dimensions complementing each other, and each has been either classified or compared when possible, along with interesting references to Europe. Each case from the European history in Part-I ends up with a pivotal sentence that highlights the importance of that case from the viewpoint of the respective approach (these sentences are written in bold characters).

The conclusion both recapitulates the introduction and the main part, and also comments on the pivotal sentences in aggregate form as lessons from European history. The aggregation of the pivotal sentences make up a pseudo-systemic picture of Pentland's model imparted an external background.

Since the whole text exists for the sake of leading to a specific conclusion, the scope is not an exhaustive one; no matter how venerable they are, works that have no relation to this process have not been given place. Moreover, some relatively new approaches like 'policy-making approach' that take place next to Pentland's typology in a later text of his (see Pentland, 1981, p.561) have not been given place not to damage the unity of Pentland's typology.

PART-I

INTERNAL VARIABLES: PENTLAND'S TYPOLOGY

I.1 GENERAL

Within the concern of grouping writings on integration, Pentland "arrive(s) at a two-fold classification"¹. However, in our opinion the term 'typology' fits better his attempt. Depending on three different *fundamenta* [(1)whether integration is an end-product or a process², (2)whether the end-product is a state-model or a community-model, and (3)whether the process is direct or indirect] he gives place to the following schematical representation³:

		END-PRODUCT	
		STATE MODEL	COMMUNITY MODEL
I N T P E R G O R C A E T S I S O N	DIRECT -Political Variables INDIRECT -Socio- Economic Variables	Federalism	Pluralism
		Neo- functionalism	Functionalism

¹ Pentland, 1973, pp.22-23.

² The same distinction takes part in Lindberg, 1963 pp.4-5, that predates Pentland's work. Although Pentland does not make a reference *in situ*, dispersed references to Lindberg throughout the book inspires a utilisation of either Lindberg's work or a third common source.

³ *Ibid.*, p.23. A tabular presentation of the same diagram is in Appendix-II, that also gives the summary of each approach.

A verbal reiteration of the scheme above would be that for some scholars who approach integration teleologically, it is an end-product a final situation to be achieved. This end-product might be in the form of either state-model or community-model. The state-model contains federalism and neo-functionalism, and the community model is consisted of pluralism and functionalism. On the other hand, students of integration theory might also be grouped according to their independent variables in explaining the process of change. In this context, integration can be either in direct or indirect form. The direct form, concentrating on political variables, includes federalism and pluralism, whereas indirect form, putting more emphasis on socio-economic variables, comprises neo-functionalism and functionalism⁴.

In the state-model, federalist writers stipulate 'a particular type of constitutional arrangement' for integration. Neo-functionalist writers also imagine existence of a 'supranational'⁵ setting though, however not necessarily in the federalist structure. This so-called 'community-model' focuses on élites and general publics of integrating states, placing less emphasis on emanation of common political institutions. Instead, 'certain common values, perceptions and habits' are regarded more important.

Political independent variables (the direct approach to the process of change) include "problems concerning the power, responsiveness and control of political

⁴ In fact, Pentland also gives place to a fifth approach -seemingly of his own contraption- which he considers a mixture of neo-functionalism and confederalism. Other than the approaches that Pentland provide, Laffan for example, also gives place to the 'interdependence approach' and a group of views assembled under the rubric of 'differentiated integration' The latter includes such views like 'Europe à la carte', 'two-speed Europe', 'graduated integration', 'variable geometry' and 'concentric circles' (Laffan, *op. cit.*, pp.12-13). These contemplations of European integration, being outside the scope of Pentland's model -and therefore of the present paper- have not been taken into consideration.

⁵ The notion 'supranationality' is an invention of Haas. For him supranationality "is not at the end of a continuum, whose other end is occupied by strict intergovernmentalism. Instead, supranationality refers to a process or style of decision-making , 'a cumulative pattern of accommodation in which the participants refrain from unconditionally vetoing proposals and instead seek to attain agreement by means of compromises upgrading common interests'. Haas saw this process as implying, structurally, 'the existence of governmental authorities closer to the archetype of federation than any past international organisation, but not yet identical with it" (Keohane and Hoffmann, 1994, p.245). However for de Gaulle and Monnet, supranationalism was identical with federalism (*Ibid.*). Bressard prefers federalism-deregulation dichotomy (Bressard, 1993, pp.319-320).

élites, and.... the political habits of general public"⁶, whilst socio-economic variables consist of "economic, social and technological factors which, by much less direct processes, are said to bring about political change"⁷.

Finally, before examining each approach in detail, it should be noted that these approaches are not completely incompatible with each other; despite the existence of conflicting hypotheses a) the boundaries between the approaches are rather grey bands reflecting an intersection to a certain extent, and b) these approaches might be construed as the 'primary colours' mixtures of which provide further hues. In the history of European Integration

the confrontation of the two approaches has typically been resolved in a synthesis, a new approach which then dominates the field until the rise of a new challenger and a new debate. Two complete cycles of this kind have occurred since World War II; the old, spent adversaries continue to exist alongside newer, more vigorous approaches in an increasingly populated intellectual landscape⁸.

It is this compatibility and dialectical productivity of these approaches that we build our own eclectic model⁹.

⁶ Pentland, *op. cit.*, p.22.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Pentland, 1981, p.546.

⁹ Indeed, eclectic models are not odd to integration theory. For example, the model developed by Stephen George is "eclectic in that it draws on elements from both pluralist and Marxian frameworks of analysis" (George, *op. cit.*, pp.225-226).

I.2 CLASSIFICATION

I.2.1 Pluralism¹⁰

I.2.1.1 General

In this approach, integration is seen essentially as the formation of a 'community of states' defined by a high and self-sustaining level of diplomatic, economic, social and cultural exchange between its members. The states are engaged in a continuous process of sensitive adjustment to each other's actions, supported usually (although not necessarily) by the socio-political behaviour and attitudes of their populations. There is, however, no suggestion that those common institutions which might emerge to facilitate international co-operation and communication, represent the embryo of a supranational state or are able to act independently of the will of the constituent states¹¹.

Such a conception of integration finds one of its best expressions in Karl Deutsch and others' famous book *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*¹². But Deutsch's *The Analysis of International Relations* which has a phraseology nearer to a textbook provides us a more concise expression of his ideas¹³. For his analysis, Deutsch takes up fourteen cases among four dozen examples of political integration recorded until that time¹⁴.

¹⁰ In (Pentland, 1981) the title Federalism comes first and Pluralism last. However, we will follow the sequence in (Pentland, 1973). Another writer on integration theory, Harrison envisages a similar classification with the exception that he omits pluralism. He offsets the absence of pluralism by dealing with the 'pluralist' writers of Pentland under the other titles. For instance, according to Harrison, Deutsch, who is one of the prominent representatives of pluralist thinking according to Pentland, "was not committed to any particular approach to integration nor to either a regional or universal scope" (Harrison, 1974, p.100). Harrison regards the writings of Deutsch as the mere starting point of neo-functionalism.

¹¹ Pentland, 1973, p.29.

¹² Princeton, 1957.

¹³ 1968, pp.191-202.

¹⁴ Deutsch classifies these fourteen cases according to the criteria whether they are historical and recent, and whether they are successful or not. This grouping -or 'typology' of Deutsch we might be present in the following diagram:

The examination of these fourteen cases leads him to some conclusions:

First, he enumerates 'the main tasks of integration' (the expectations of the states attempting to integrate): 1) maintaining peace, 2) attaining greater multipurpose capabilities, 3) accomplishing some specific task, and 4) gaining a new self-image and rôle identity. Each of these tasks also have their own criterion: For the first task, the 'absence of paucity of specific preparation for among the political units, regions and populations' in a community is an enough evidence, and data about it consist of 'the deployment of troops, weapons, and military installations,.... diplomatic records.... budgetary data, and opinion data on élite and mass level'. The indication of the second task is the community's 'total gross national product, its per capita GNP, and the scope and diversity of its current undertakings'. The third task might be probed 'by the existence, and perhaps by the growth, of appropriate joint functions, joint institutions, and joint resources and sacrifices devoted to these specific ends'. Finally, the last task can be investigated in 'the frequency of use of common symbols,.... the creation and wide adoption of new ones,.... data on the actual behaviour of the population, including popular acceptance of unrequited transfers of wealth or other benefits within the community, and of some degree of sharing benefits and burdens within it'.

Deutsch's studies convey him, secondly, to the conclusion that the above tasks can only be actualised in a suitable milieu. He stipulates the existence of some 'background conditions' for such a milieu: 1) mutual relevance of the units to one another, 2) compatibility of values and some actual joint rewards, 3) mutual responsiveness, and 4) some degree of generalised common identity and loyalty. For the first condition, one has to analyse three variables: 'the relative volume and weight of transactions'¹⁵ among the constituent units, such as 'trade, travel, and mail and

	HISTORICAL CASES	RECENT CASES
SUCCESSFUL CASES	England, England and Wales, England and Scotland, the United States, Germany, Italy, Switzerland	The Nordic Council, the European Economic Community
UNSUCCESSFUL CASES	Norway and Sweden, England and Ireland, Austro-Hungarian monarchy	The Federation of the West Indies, United Arab Republic

¹⁵ Reflecting the importance of the concept 'transaction' in Deutsch's view, Archer classifies Deutsch's approach as 'transactionalism' (See Archer, 1992, p.101).

other communications'; 'the extent to which such transactions exceed the levels which could be expected from mere chance and the size of the participating units'; and 'the extent of covariance between their effects on any two different participating political units'. The second condition exists if a remarkable 'positive covariance of rewards' for the constituting units is present 'so that a reward for one is associated with the significant probability of a reward for the other'. The third leans on the 'presence of significant capabilities and resources for communication, perception, and self steering'. It is also connected with 'the actual performance in terms of speed, adequacy and probability of responsive behaviour'.

The indicators of the fourth condition are "the frequency and saliency of perceptions of joint interests, both in terms of distributions of attention and of parallel expectations of reward, as shown by the survey data and by the content analysis of mass media and government communications;...the objective compatibility or consonance of the major values of the participating populations, permitting co-operation among them to be perceived as legitimate¹⁶;

and evidences of it consist of 'common subjective feelings of the legitimacy of the integrated community, making loyalty to it also a matter of internalised psychic compulsion'.

Finally, Deutsch enumerates the 'processes' and 'instruments' of integration: 1)'value production' ("production -or acquisition-.... of goods, services or relationships valued by the populations concerned", 2)'value allocation' (the allocation of the same items), 3)'coercion' (any type of enforcement-especially military-), 4)'identification' ("the deliberate promotion of processes and sentiments of mutual identification, loyalties and 'we'-feelings")¹⁷.

As Deutsch employs the term 'political community' then, it has the social-psychological content of ordinary usage of the term 'community' plus a vague governmental component. It does not, however, include centralised decision making. Decision making facilities may be either common or co-ordinated¹⁸.

¹⁶ *Ibid* , p.193.

¹⁷ *Ibid*.

¹⁸ Harrison, *op. cit.*, p.18.

It is within this framework that Deutsch presents his key division: amalgamation vs. pluralism. Adding another dimension (integration) to this contrast, he attains two *fundamenta divisionis* on which to set up the following typology¹⁹:

		NON-AMALGAMATION	AMALGAMATION
INTEGRATION		Pluralistic Security- Community <i>Example</i> (Norway-Sweden today)	Amalgamated Security- Community <i>Example</i> (U.S.A. today)
NON- INTEGRATION		Not Amalgamated Not Security- Community <i>Example</i> (U.S.A.-U.S.R.R. today)	Amalgamated but not Security- Community <i>Example</i> (Habsburg Empire, 1914)

Here, pluralistic security community needs a bit more elaboration. Deutsch provides us the three major conditions for the existence of pluralistic security:

- 1)Compatibility of major political values,
- 2)Capacity of the governments and politically relevant strata of the participating countries to respond to one another's messages, needs, and actions quickly, adequately, and without resort to violence²⁰,

¹⁹ Scheme taken from Deutsch, *op. cit.*, p.194. However, Deutsch does not use the term 'typology'; the title of this part in Deutsch's book is "Types of Communities: Amalgamation vs. Pluralism".

²⁰ The absence of common institutions of government in any versions of pluralism (more salient in security communities) is offset by emphasis put on 'communication of information'. Russett underlines the significance of the concept by stating that "(i)nformation is essential to continued responsiveness; without information, rational behaviour is impossible.... Without adequate communication the adjustment of conflict must become haphazard and accidental" (Russett, 1969, p.97).

3) Mutual predictability of the relevant aspects of one another's political, economic and social behaviour (but these relevant aspects are far fewer in the case of a pluralistic security community than they would be in its much more tightly-knit amalgamated counterpart²¹ .

The process going to a pluralistic security community, according to Deutsch, reflects some peculiarities: first, 'an increasing unattractiveness and improbability of war among the political units of the emerging pluralistic security community, as perceived by their governments, élites and (eventually) populations'; secondly, 'prevalence of promotion of integration in intellectual works, and finally, 'a gradually established tendency of 'mutual attention, communication and responsiveness'.

The incentive for Deutsch in devising the concept of 'pluralistic security community' was to overcome the evil of war and to define an international environment where peace and security would prevail. However, there do exist some other theorists who see such pluralistic integration attempts independent from peace and security aspirations. Plischke, for example defines integration as "an instrumentality of the modern multi-state system"²². This definition of pluralist integration covers a wide range of prospects other than giving birth to a peaceful and secure environment and leaves room for any form of co-operation with any method in multi-state system.

At the one end of our pluralistic spectrum, there exist Deutsch's Pluralistic Security Community model, and at the other Plischke's definition²³. If we approach


²¹ *Ibid.*, p.196.

²² E. Plischke (ed.), *Systems of Integrating the International Community* (Princeton: 1964), p.5, *cit. in* Pentland, *op. cit.*, p.31.

²³ The ends of the pluralistic spectrum can be determined in numerous ways. The most common division seems to be confederalism-intergovernmentalism, heavily leaning on the degree of institutionalisation and the proportion of common decisions. In confederalism "many of the attributes of a federal structure exist, except that the individual sovereign states maintain a final right in crucial areas (for example, foreign and defence matters) and they can leave the union" (Archer and Butler, 1992, p.191). Intergovernmentalism, on the other hand, can be considered as the identification of a situation where decisions are taken at the national level at the end of, however, consultations with other members and under the constraints of community membership.

The most important of our incentives, here, in making up this issue oriented 'Deutsch-Plischke setting' has been the fact that, in this way, it becomes easier to draw concentric circles (the integration effort having an additional goal to the peace and security concern constitutes the first circle

these two with an -what we would call- 'issue oriented' concern, we would realise that in Deutsch's model, states mostly get integrated with only one motive (for Deutsch, this motive is 'attaining a peaceful and secure environment')²⁴, whereas in the type of integration defined by Plischke, states are integrated for numerous purposes in addition to peace and security concerns²⁵. In other words, with an 'issue oriented' approach, pluralistic integration might be represented as a surface on the edge of which there is the type of integration which is realised just for one definite aim (e.g. having a peaceful and secure environment). The centre represents the attempts of integration having just one aim (Plischke's definition²⁶); the further a point is from the centre, the narrower is its scope in terms of its prospects. This image may be drawn as in the following diagram:



I.2.1.2 In Europe

Pluralism in Europe appeared on four occasions. The first occasion, started to come into view before the European Community appeared: some international

around the centre; if another integration attempt appears to have also two aims but by adding a more principal goal to the centre than the previous circle, then this last one 'overthrows' the preceding and becomes the second.

²⁴ Though as Deutsch stated they may also get integrated to achieve 'greater multi-purpose capabilities', often there is one specific task generally in the form of attaining a peaceful environment.

²⁵ But, as Pentland's diagram suggests, confined to political purposes only... This being so, Plischke's statement should be conceived within the boundaries of politics.

²⁶ ...where all the political decisions can be taken in co-operation. Plischke does not stipulate that all the decisions must be taken in co-operation, but underlines the suitability of the modern international arena for more than one decision to be taken in co-operation.

organisations²⁷ established after the II. World War prepared appropriate grounds for later arrangements of pluralistic character. OEEC, NATO and Council of Europe (from these, we are going to apply our version of pluralism to OEEC). The second occasion arose after the failure of the blueprints of the proposed European Defence Community. Corollary to that, the emergence of the Western European Union constituted the third venue for pluralistic patterns. The fourth occasion was the French strife against the supranational aspect of the EEC, which culminated in the last years of 1960s.

OEEC: Let us take up the OEEC first. The upsurge of Communist activity in the Eastern Mediterranean, and British government's relinquishment of the support that had been extended to the area until that time, resulted with the undertaking of upholding by the United States. President Harry Truman announced their backing to "free peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures"²⁸ in June 1947. Within this framework, an offer was extended to all European states including the Soviet Union -and faced with a possibly expected Soviet rebuff: on 5 July 1947 General George Marshall stated that "(their) policy is not directed against any country or against any doctrine but against hunger, poverty, despair and chaos; its aim is the renewal of active economy throughout the world"²⁹. The convention of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation came into existence as a result of a conference participated by sixteen West European countries, the recipients of 13 milliard dollars of future American aid. Though itself was not a pluralistic integration form, the OEEC both provoked a supranationalism-intergovernmentalism debate (the former championed by the French, and the latter by British), and also facilitated the emergence of a habitat of consultation and co-operation.

The importance of the OEEC phenomenon for our grasp of pluralism is that, while -similar to Deutsch's pluralistic security community concept- in its inception it had the sole aim expressed in General Marshall's words cited above, later on "the proposals for a free trade area in Europe and for a payments union originated in the Secretariat of the OEEC under M. Marjolin and both these ideas subsequently

²⁷ An international organisation *per se* cannot be regarded a pluralistic form of integration since 1)it does not retain a decision-making capacity of its own, and 2)it does not have power to produce a new political entity apart the spheres of the member states.

²⁸ Urwin, 1993, p.15

²⁹ Lasok and Bridge, pp.7-8.

flowered into institutional form"³⁰. This, we regard as a suitable case for our interpretation of pluralism: the history of the OEEC, in a way might be seen as a shift from the 'edge' of our 'pluralism surface' -representing one aim only- towards the 'centre' -where both the number and the content of the aims increase.

EDC: Secondly, failing plans for European Defence Community deserve attention. It was the very thrust explained in Deutsch's writings that seemed at the core of the European Defence Community efforts: 'peace and security'. However, contrary to Deutsch's suggestion, these would be attained with a well established military and political scheme.

Similar to the plight of Britain before the Marshall plan, the United States, under the economic burden of the Korean War, tried to persuade the Western European countries on that either they should increase their contributions to NATO or they should allow Germany rearm. None of these proposals were favourable for the other NATO members, but they could not refuse both of the options directly and overtly; they had to find a middle course. As a matter of fact, they themselves were unhappy with that they render a free protection to Germany. The solution that would both satisfy the US demands and also prevent Germany from having a separate German army under her own command, was a European army under supranational control. The Plevin plan, prepared with these intentions and named after the French premier, came to the scene. Whilst Britain had an implacable position of refusal, the plan was being promoted chiefly by France where pro-European parties had the majority. As a result, in 1952 the European Defence Treaty was signed. However, after the French defeat in Dien Bien Phu and following the futile controversies in the parliament over several more important issues -especially economic ones- that cast shadow onto the plan, the French National Assembly refused to ratify the treaty in 1954.

The EDC was to be a military organisation, but for many it was also to be a further step along the road to European integration. In addition to a common army, there was to be a common budget and common institutions. Indeed, in some ways the EDC treaty went beyond ECSC in that Article

³⁰ Pentland, *op. cit.*, pp.52-53. But, despite these prospects of advance "(t)he problem for integrationists was that OEEC not only had no political implications; it also had clear economic limitations. Its work was mostly concerned with the removal or reduction of quota restrictions on European trade" (Urwin, *op. cit.*, p.21).

38, which had been included at the insistence of Italy, required the Common Assembly to study ways of establishing federal institutions along with a popularly elected legislature³¹.

Or as Erhardt stated "(t)his supranational treaty in the most sensitive sector of sovereignty had sought to move too far in the direction of integration. Despite the Cold War the forces of the past were still strong"³². Lasok and Bridge call such a concrete structure as 'a kind of federation without a central federal government'³³.

It was after this demise of the plan that France sided with Britain in assuming a similar negative stance against supranationalism.

Here our concern with this story of the European Defence Community lays with the actuality that the pluralist compartment of Pentland's model bears an 'attractive' power which makes this 'square' a sanctuary for the states that refrain from more supranational forms³⁴; if the conditions are not ripe for supranational forms, but, despite this fact, a supranational form of integration is still born, the chance of living of this premature organism will be small, and it will most probably be 'decomposed' back into more pluralistic forms. All the other forms are more 'supranationalist' compared to pluralism.

WEU: Indeed, the outcome of this process appeared as the coming out of an organisation which is seen as pluralistic: Western European Union. After the debacle

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

³² Erhardt, 1987, p.109.

³³ Lasok and Bridge, *op. cit.*, p.15.

³⁴ The claimed dichotomy or incompatibility between 'supranationalism' and 'intergovernmentalism', however, is not an established fact. Keohane and Hoffmann, for example, claim that a mixture of supranational and intergovernmental characteristics shapes EC's actions. For them, since the machinery of the EC functions with negotiations and agreements, it has an intergovernmental nature. Similarly, through these negotiations and agreements they waive some of their interests for the common benefit, and this constitutes the supranational face of the token (Keohane and Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, *passim*). Kastendiek, similarly tries to reconcile the 'convergence' (of policies of Member States) with the 'diversity' (of policies of Member States (Kastendiek, 1990, esp. p.74). In like manner, Matlár, taking state as a 'gate-keeper' between national and international level starts from intergovernmentalist propositions. Yet, she reaches 'beyond intergovernmentalism' accepting the existence and functioning of the Commission as a body that can design policies which satisfy interests of Member States (Matlár, 1993, *passim*).

of the EDC, the United States pressure for either the inclusion of Germany in the defence of Europe or an increase in the others' contributions did not cease. As a *réchauffé*, the Brussels Treaty was fetched by the British to the table. The British had been getting along well with the Treaty, and would be happier if the comprehension of the Treaty was to be expanded with the accession of Germany since this would increase the pluralistic nature of the Treaty. To alleviate the France fears about both the inclusion of Germany, first, a supervision mechanism on German rearmament was devised wherein France would also take place, and also a deployment of British troops in Germany was provisioned. In October 1955 the West European Union Treaty was signed. The pluralistic flavour in the structure of the WEU can be best tasted in its main decision making body: the Council³⁵. Many of the binding decisions in this Council were taken by majority decision

Our concern with the WEU is connected with that this body proved to be also the location where stricter forms of integration tried to be imposed: "recurrent suggestions that its framework be strengthened to provide a forum for continuous evaluation of political and economic problems in Europe" (were put forward)³⁶. As it was the case in the breaking up of the early-born EDC, this, we interpret, is an example of a movement -this time not from supranationalism to pluralism- but an attempt from pluralism to supranationalism: pluralism contains seeds of supranationalism; these seeds try to blossom one by one; most of them which bud without a proper environment and before the season, destined to wither. However, the others do wait for more suitable conditions and there is a high possibility for each to survive.

EEC: The fourth and last occasion where pluralistic debates came to the fore was the stance of France under the presidency of de Gaulle. Since 1940s de Gaulle had been defending a pattern for Europe that was confederal or intergovernmental in essence. Yet, he seemed to waive this ideal for a short term: 1960s commenced with optimistic expectations felt all over the world.

³⁵ This Council is so vital to the Union that the whole Union itself is sometimes identified with the Council (e.g.: In Lasok and Bridge, *op. cit.*, p.15 the WEU takes place as the Council of Western European Union).

³⁶ Pentland, *op. cit.*, pp.55-56. But these ideas "met little success. The French consistently opposed the idea, suspecting, not entirely without reason, that its main purpose was to aid Britain's access to the EEC" (*Ibid.*, p.56).

Western Europe and the world were continuing to enjoy growing economic prosperity, though there were signs, as yet unheeded, that the rate of growth was slowing down. Politically, too, despite tensions over Berlin and the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the furore over the U2 incident when an American reconnaissance plane was shot down over the Soviet union, and the shock of the Soviet lead in space exploration and technology, tensions between the two superpowers had not returned to the glacial levels of a decade earlier. Indeed, the growing rift between the Soviet Union and China, which became public and final in 1963, heralded the end of world bipolarity, something which it was hoped would give Western Europe more room to consider its own development³⁷.

In August 1961 Denmark and Britain applied for EEC membership at a time when the economic indicators of the EEC were also well ahead than expected. Parallel to this economic improvement, also the supranational identity of the EEC was tried to be thriven; Hallstein, the President of the Commission, was taking the lead in this effort. It was, as if to complete this promising picture, de Gaulle declared his support for the EEC as a political unit -an event that might be regarded a departure from the original ideas of de Gaulle. Moreover, a rapprochement between France and Germany which culminated in January 1963 with a Treaty of Friendship increased the hopes of the supporters of a political union in the EEC. However, the scene shifted within a few years. Besides the changing parliamentary compositions in the Member States - especially de Gaulle's consolidation of his place in power-, world-wide changes like "the waning of American economic strength; the rise of Japan; the rapid expansion of decolonialisation; new superpower hostility with the Cuban missile crisis; the slowing down of economic growth and indications of problems to come"³⁸... all exacerbated the situation. De Gaulle's veto on British membership in 1963, the Fouchet plan that tried to institutionalise unanimity in taking decisions, the Luxembourg Compromise where unanimity in the Council decisions was agreed on (a Member State could veto a policy proposal if it has a 'vital national interest' at stake) and an informal conformity was reached limiting Commission's agility, and finally the 1965 crisis which seemingly arouse from that France tried to break the Community yoke on her agricultural policy -but, rather came out of the French discontent with supranational elements proposed by the Commission to work out the conflicting demands of the Member States marked a return of de Gaulle to his earlier vision of '*Europe des Patries*'.

³⁷ Urwin, *op. cit.*, p.101.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p.103.

This fourth occasion is an indication of the effect of the external environment, first, on the policies of the Member States towards the integration - especially in the context of pluralism/supranationalism- and secondly, on the form of the integration that dominate in the EC. As it will be seen in Part II in detail, the 'colour' of integration might heavily be determined by external events. In France's case, the importance of the external events that, first, to some extent diverted de Gaulle from his original vision and then, influenced him in returning his view does not seem negligible³⁹.

I.2.2 Functionalism

I.2.2.1 General

To scholars of social sciences, anthropology and biology 'functional explanation' is familiar which eliminates references to 'end' and 'purpose', and emphasises the importance of 'function' in explaining events; it is, said, the function of things, not a future end, that causes them to exist⁴⁰. Flanigan and Fogelman give a more peculiar definition in terms of political science in general:

....(F)unctionalism means simply that in analysing some phenomena the political scientist will be concerned with, among other things, the functions or purposes served by the phenomena. Here function is treated as one -and not necessarily a more significant one- among many relevant considerations that together comprise a comprehensive political analysis⁴¹.

The term functionalism in integration theory has more specific connotations⁴². The starting point of the functionalist view in the history of integration theory was the

³⁹ For an enumeration of the intergovernmental and supranational aspects of the "after-Maastricht" Community see Appendix-III.

⁴⁰ Wolf warns that "the approach.... should not to be confused with functionalism in sociology" (Wolf, 1969, p.348).

⁴¹ Flanigan and Fogelman, 1970, p.248.

⁴² Actually, "(t)he functionalist thesis was not originally related to the question of international regional integration, unless in opposition to it. Its principal exponent, David Mitrany, makes this

abandonment of the state-centric view towards international relations. Though still preoccupied with interstate relations and attendant questions of peace and security, Paul Reinsch's *Public International Relations*⁴³ and Leonard Woolf's⁴⁴ *International Government* were of the earliest examples of these pioneer texts published before the First World War:

We are accustomed to regard the world as neatly divided into compartments called states or nations.... But this vision of the world divided into isolated compartments is not a true reflection of facts as they exist in a large portion of the earth today⁴⁵.

Yet, functionalism had to wait after the Second World War to appear as an elaborate literature⁴⁶. The prevalence of *Realpolitik* after the War, which dignified the concepts 'nation state' and 'military power' whipped up the outburst of functionalist writings such as Mitrany's *The Progress of International Government*⁴⁷ and *A Working Peace System*⁴⁸. The first two masterpieces of Mitrany were based on the idea of growing of an international community from the satisfaction of the needs of peoples of different nations. In ever increasing number of problems that transcend

explicit in his *A Working Peace System*. He says the functional approach 'seeks, by linking authority to a specific activity, to break away from the traditional link between an authority and a definite territory' (Harrison, *op. cit.*, p.27); Mitrany preferred international community building to regional community building.

⁴³ Boston:Ginn&Co., 1911 *cit. in* Archer, 1992, p.82.

⁴⁴ Woolf, L. S., *International Government*, London: Allen&Unwin Books, 1916 *cit. in* *Ibid*. Woolf was a Fabian socialist, and functionalist ideas are claimed to have much inspiration from Fabian socialism as well as English utilitarianism (Burke in particular) and St. Simon's ideas on technocracy.

⁴⁵ Woolf *op. cit.*, pp.216-17, *cit. in* *Ibid*, 1992, p.88.

⁴⁶ Pentland argues that "(a)lthough it is possible to cull from functionalist writings a fairly coherent theory of international integration, much of the literature consists of reflections on international administrative experience and prescriptive strategies for world order. What this literature shares above all is a temperament, or a characteristic way of thinking about social change, institutions, and the relationship of the technical and political" (Pentland, 1981, p.552).

⁴⁷ New Haven and London, 1933.

⁴⁸ London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943.

national boundaries⁴⁹, international agencies would render service to everybody and this rendering itself would create a community of interests, valuations and actions.

We are thus dealing here essentially with two closely related processes:

- a. By the logic of "technical self-determination", problem-solving methods successful in an initial sector of activities are applied to other sectors, thereby expanding the original task⁵⁰, and
- b. By a process of attitude change individual loyalties are shifted away from national units and toward international organisations⁵¹.

This being so, all kinds of predetermined political or constitutional settings, which would anyway clog these processes are banned by functionalism. Federalism, in this context, is pronounced as being of that kind; Mitrany devotes a whole chapter 'The Functional Approach and Federalism' to this point of view in his *A Working Peace System*. For him

A federal system has many virtues. But in form and working it is a combination of rigidities: rigid in its framework, whether geographical or ideological; rigid in its constitution, which has to be formal and unchallenged; rigid in its general life, because of the limits and obstacles the constitution places in the path of fresh common action⁵².

As for the functional organisation of international activities in practice, Mitrany recommends to select each activity specifically and organise it separately. In doing so, three criteria would be taken into consideration: (1) the nature of the activity, (2) the environment in which the activity is to operate, and (3) and the exigencies felt at the time. Thanks to such an arrangement, he argues, we are offered a room for manoeuvre in both organising numerous functions and also adjusting a function to changing needs and conditions⁵³. To illustrate his ideas Mitrany takes up 'the group of functions which fall under communications':

⁴⁹ To name a few, environmental pollution, production of high technology items, problems of energy, inflation, monetary order and protectionism are the examples, on that functionalist approach might easily be applied.

⁵⁰ In functionalism jargon this process is called 'spill-over'.

⁵¹ Wolf, *op. cit.*, p.349.

⁵² Mitrany, 1966, pp.155-156.

⁵³ As Pentland states with such a flexible understanding of international system that refrains from focusing on 'need' and thereby dissenting from the teleological view of the majority of the system-

What is the proper basis for the international organisation of *railway* systems? Clearly it must be European, or rather *continental*, North American, and so on, as that gives the logical administrative limit of co-ordination. A division of the Continent into separate democratic and totalitarian unions would not achieve the practical end, as political division would obstruct that necessary co-ordination; while British and American participation would make the organisation more cumbersome without any added profit to function. As regards shipping, the line of effective organisation which at once suggests itself is *international*, or inter-continental, but not universal. A European union could not solve the problem of maritime co-ordination without the co-operation of America and of certain other overseas states. *Aviation* and *broadcasting*, a third example in the same group, could be organised effectively only on a *universal* scale, with perhaps subsidiary regional arrangements for more local services⁵⁴.

Then, for Mitrany, comes the question of co-ordination. He proposes the solution under four successive stages: (1) First, within the same group of functions, co-ordination will be brought about by either for purely technical reasons or for wider functional ends. (2) Then comes the co-ordination of several groups of functional agencies. Here co-ordination will appear spontaneously since each agency is somehow in relation to 'the products produced or the services rendered by others'; (3) He also imagines international planning agencies to functional agencies "to guide the growth of functional agencies into the most desirable channels and... (to).... watch their inter-relations and their repercussions"⁵⁵. (4) Finally, -reiterating his anathema to the concept of 'political authority above'- he reserves the top rank in his model to 'a council by all governments concerned' which would only constitute 'the mind and will of public opinion', however, would not be given power to interfere the running of the machinery⁵⁶.


oriented functional approaches such as Kaplan and Modelski display a weakness (Pentland, 1973, p.68).

⁵⁴ Mitrany, *op. cit.*, pp.70-71.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p.74.

⁵⁶ Yet, of course, not everything, in Mitrany's picture is so free from the fixity of prescribed rules. He devotes a special category for 'negative functions'. This exceptional category includes some areas of 'more formal nature' like law and order (which can be guaranteed by 'a hierarchy of courts') and security (which can be attained on an 'interlocking regional basis').

Mitrany's functionalism, we may redesign giving the regional dimension a central place. As noted above, once the solution of problem passes beyond the national possibilities -of course, if the issue could be worked out within national boundaries, it is welcomed- then it can be reached bilaterally. If this does not suffice either, then will follow continental, multi-regional and global endeavours:



Global solution being in the centre as the ideal and the most intricate form of functionalism, here, each group of solution is separated from its adjacent with a definite line and there are no grey areas within the solutions themselves. However leaps are possible from one solution to other as conditions change; local solutions might trigger more general solutions. It is also possible to have more detailed divisionings within each solution. States enter into co-operation to reach at every solution. Depending on two criteria, two types of co-operation can be defined in interstate co-operation at firm-scale. The first criterion is the sector of the co-operation (the sector can be either commercial, financial, technical, technological or general). The second criterion is the scope of co-operation (the scope can be unilateral or bilateral):

		SCOPE OF CO-OPERATION	
		Unilateral	Bi-/multilateral
A R E A S	Commercial	agent distributor franchising marketing service market study products promotion	reciprocal agency cross-distribution participation in a fair export club shared unit combined purchase promotion missions collective advertising joint bid
	Financial	loan lending majority holding minority holding	exchange of shares buying of shares third party participation
	Technical	after-sales service	shared manufacturing sub-contracting
	Technological	licensing transfer of technology	common development EC research programmes
	General	acquisition	joint venture merger

Source: Commission, 1992, p.19

I.2.2.2 In Europe

Functionalist approach on both theoretical and practical level showed an upsurge in the late 1940's in Europe. This is tied to two facts: 1) The majority of the leading adherents⁵⁷ of the approach were of French nationality at that time -a country

⁵⁷ To name a few, Monnet -but, it should be kept in mind that his "ultimate aim was not a non-territorial functionalist system; rather it was a Western European federation" (Monnet, J. *Mémoires*, 2

gradually getting influential in post-war Europe-, and 2) the war-torn milieu at global scale in general, and in Europe in particular, necessitated political and economic co-operation. Yet, the systematic promoters of functionalism after the war were the British and Scandinavians.

Functionalist schemes were promoted on several occasions by several bodies. The OECD, the Council of Europe, the UN's Economic Commission for Europe, the ECSC, and the EC... all at least for some time advocated such designs.

Despite the efforts of fostering and propagandising functionalism, so that it could find its expression in practice, the emergence of bodies with functionalist characteristics between 1945 and 1950 is attributed not to these efforts but to the avoidance of the constituent states from stricter schemes; functionalism has come to be known not by itself but by its rival: federalism.

OECD⁵⁸: Though having some non-European members such as the USA, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Australia, who joined the aforementioned OEEC which was, on this occasion changed into OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) on 30 September 1961, OECD, in its history, had important implications for the past of functionalism in Europe. Taking into consideration the importance of economic power and welfare to reach the aims of the UN, to protect the individual liberties and to increase the public prosperity, the Organisation aims at improving the already existing co-operation among its members. In a meeting held at the ministerial level on 21-22 June 1976, a declaration was prepared with the aim of improving the co-operation among the members in the area

vols., Paris, 1976, pp.393-395, *cit. in* Pentland, 1981, p.553)-, Marjolin -who was "sceptical by nature...; (who) saw even the establishment of a common market as a very difficult task" (Groeben, 1985, p.32) and who (as the Commission Member responsible for general economic policy later on in the Community) being "aware of the French Government's antipathy towards integration.... preferred a step-by-step, pragmatic approach in anticipation of the integrating effects of the developing common market" (*Ibid.*, p.209)-; and Armand -who, in 1968, wrote together with Drancourt that "(t)he inevitable effects of technology are general and world-wide; the structures for the government and organisation of society remain uncertain, limited and national. They will not enable us to meet certain dangers which public opinion, monopolised by the risk of atomic war, is hardly aware of but which infiltrate modern society no less insidiously" (Armand and Drancourt, *Le Pari Européen*, Paris, 1968 *cit. in* Pentland, 1973, p.669).

⁵⁸ This part has been summarised from (Kabaalioglu, 1982, pp.347-367).

of multi-national companies. From the Guidelines for Multi-national Enterprises added to the Declaration we get some useful clues. This text, first, lays down some general principles. The first two of these principles are important for us. The first one says that multinational companies should take the general political objectives of the country in which they operate into consideration. Corollary to that, the second underlines the necessity for the importance to be given the priorities and objectives set for their economic and social progress, including industrial and regional development, protection of environment, job creation, innovation and transfer of technology.

These two principles, among others, shaping the OECD's approach to the environment of multi-national companies is one of the indications of the fact that **pure functionalist schemes independent from political concerns are not deemed germane⁵⁹; no matter how ambitious they are, such schemes get somehow equipped with some mechanisms having political side.**

EC⁶⁰: In the EC, cross-border co-operation is tried to be promoted. The Community pursues a systematic approach directed to this aim. Within this context co-operation is defined as "(a)ny agreement, formalised or not, between two or more companies or organisations aiming at achieving together a previously defined objective". To this aim the Commission makes use of some instruments to help especially small and medium-sized companies (SMEs) as well as for the sectoral level to prepare for the Single Market. These instruments are enumerated below:

1) On the level of SMEs:

a) **Information:** The 196 Euro Info Centres (EIC) inform and advise companies in connection with business transactions pertaining to the Community. These centres are located in a local host organisation such as Chamber of Commerce.

b) **Instruments for promoting co-operation projects:**

I-BC-NET (Business Co-operation Network): Operating in such areas like finance, trade, engineering, technology and subcontracting, BC-NET is a network that links up almost six hundred consultants from the Member States.

II-BRE (Bureau de Rapprochement des Entreprises): Companies that want to make use of BRE fill out a form about themselves and their intentions in finding a partner. Depending on this form the BRE prepares an advertisement and

⁵⁹ This has been one of the main considerations in the contemplation of neo-functionalism; see the related section.

⁶⁰ Except especially inserted footnotes, this part has been summarised from (Commission, 1992, *passim*).

send it related organisations (for instance public organisations and regional development bodies) in other Member States. The advertisement takes part in the publications of these organisations.

c) Co-operation programme:

EUROPARTNERIAT is a programme designed to stimulate contacts between (a) companies in less developed regions (Objective 1) and in regions in a state of industrial decline (Objective 2) with (b) companies in

other Member States. Managed jointly by DG XXIII and DG XVI (Regional Policy), this programme is being implemented in steps:

- selection of companies from the region concerned,
- publication of a catalogue containing the profiles of the companies selected,
- organisation of a two-day event to arrange direct contacts between companies⁶¹.

d) Promotion of cross-border subcontracting: DG XXIII tries to promote cross-border subcontracting with such projects like issuing of standard nomenclatures by sectors in each language; by the creation of European documentation centre etc.

e) Financial instruments: Within this context the Commission "provide(s) financial incentives to a maximum of 24 seed funds spread over the whole territory of the Community"⁶². This will, it is expected, both foster the launching of companies and also improve the quality and viability of the existing seed capital projects.

f) Innovation and transfer of technology: The SPRINT programme is the most important of the instruments under this heading. It "aims at promoting technology transfer and innovation, particularly in SMEs. It makes use of networks of consultants for SMEs specialised in the management of innovation, industrial creation and financing"⁶³.

g) Regional development: Business and Information Centres (BICs) are the main tools in this area. These centres make use of a European network called EBN (European Business Network) and aim at promoting new companies in growth sectors (*i.e.* new technologies).

h) Research programmes: These programmes are run in five main areas:

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p.70.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p.71.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p.72.

- 1) Industry
 - a) In the area of information and telecommunication technologies, programmes like ESPRIT and RACE.
 - b) In the area of industrial modernisation of the traditional sectors, programmes like BRITE/EURAM.
 - c) In the area of standards and certification functioning of the Bureau for Community reference/nuclear measurement methods.
- 2) Biotechnology and Agriculture
- 3) Energy
 - a) Fission
 - b) Non-nuclear activities
- 4) Co-operation and information pooling in the field of research
 - a) Programme to promote European scientific co-operation
 - b) Forecasting (FAST programme)
 - c) Co-operative research programme (CRAFT)
- 5) Quality of life
 - a) Health
 - b) Environment

2) On sectoral scale: European Economic Interest Groupings (EEIGs)⁶⁴

This relatively new instrument was given birth on 25 July 1985 by Regulation No 2137/85 of the Council of Ministers of the European Community, acting on the basis of a proposal from the European Commission⁶⁵. Modelled upon the *Groupement d'Intérêt Economique* (GIE) which has been functioning since 23 September 1967⁶⁶, EEIG is a new entity, directly incorporated into Community law and aimed specifically at transnational co-operation.

The formula for the European Economic Interest Grouping answers the needs of companies anxious to collaborate on a transnational scale. Up to now their efforts were discouraged by the absence of a suitable legal instrument... Economic agents of any size or sphere of activity may consider establishing an EEIG.... It is an instrument for economic co-operation, not for integration. It cannot therefore be a company heading a group or holding company with shares in the member companies....(The

⁶⁴ To the enumeration in (Commission, 1992) we added this second title.

⁶⁵ For the full text of the Regulation see Appendix-IV.

⁶⁶ Kabaalioglu, 1989, p.15.

activity of the grouping can develop freely in widely differing sectors.... Natural persons, companies and all 'other legal bodies' governed by public or private law may be members of an EEIG.... Groupings may be created in any sector, be it agriculture, trade, industry, crafts, services or whatever.... From its registration, the EEIG may operate on the conditions provided for in (its).... contract and with the legal capacity recognised throughout the Community whatever its official address.... (An EEIG) may for example:

- be responsible for the sale of certain products for its members;
- in the field of new technologies, organise the pooling and joint exploitation of partial licences;
- co-ordinate the production and delivery schedules of members;
- develop their marketing;
- bid for and be awarded public works and public contracts;
- carry out joint research work;
- jointly supply services such as transport, purchasing and distribution.

An EEIG may also operate outside the Community in the exploration, research and penetration of new markets, or facilitate access to them.

It may for example:

- subcontract or conclude 'joint-venture' contracts with companies established outside the Community;
- acquire interests in companies or establish 'joint subsidiaries' with companies located outside the Community, within the limits specified by the regulation⁶⁷.

(T)he EEIG has not only provided a European legal framework for co-operation projects of the 'traditional' kind, but has also responded to co-operation needs that were either met inadequately or not met at all by other legal instruments: co-operation between partners of different kinds (public and private) or of different sizes (small and large enterprises); co-operation among many partners; 'trial co-operation that may not necessarily be very well defined at the outset but whose aim is to create a dynamic relationship (between enterprises and regions)⁶⁸.

As the functionalist logic imply, the summary of the instruments to facilitate cross-border co-operation, outlined above, themselves do not constitute a functionalist

⁶⁷ Commission, 1989, pp.3-9.

⁶⁸ Commission, 1993, p.62.

setting. However, they are designed to pave the way for sectoral co-operation beginning from small and medium enterprises. It is also important that, as cited in the last paragraph, larger scale forms of co-operation may flourish from these attempts. For our model, the importance of this example is that it is **difficult to divest any functionalist attempt from 'predetermined political or constitutional settings' and similar 'rigidities' which Mitrany bans⁶⁹; pure functionalism is difficult to maintain; and more or less the functionalist cell in the diagram is turned grey by some 'federalist' ingredients.**

CLASH WITH FEDERALIST PATTERNS: Tied to the above fact, as **federalist and functionalist schemes often get intermingled, they are tried to be separated and to be put within well defined boundaries. Sometimes this separation was rendered so severely that functionalism came to be known as a situation where federalist characteristics do not exist and federalism as a situation where functionalist characteristics do not exist. On 9 January 1964, in his address to Bundestag Dr. Ludwig Erhard, Chancellor since 1963, had pointed out that**

Europe cannot be achieved by automatic progress within the framework of the Rome Treaties, *i.e.*, solely in the field of economic integration.... It will take all our endeavours and all our political will to gather Europe into a unit that is not just technocratic but also political⁷⁰.

On 18 June in the same year in a speech to the European Parliament Dr. Hallstein, who repelled the guidance and control from a political organ construed political union as a peril to the Community would say that

the whole "distinction between economic and political unification.... (is) specious.... What is called economic fusion is in fact a political process⁷¹.

⁶⁹ See *inter alia* for instance "No fixed rule is needed, and no rigid pattern is desirable for the organisation of these working functional strata" (Mitrany, *op. cit.*, p.71); "The functional dimensions.... determine themselves. In a like manner the function determines its appropriate organs. It also reveals through practice the nature of the action required under the given conditions, and in the way the powers needed by the respective authority.... Not only is there in all this no need for any fixed constitutional division of authority and power, prescribed in advance, but anything beyond the original formal definition of scope and purpose might embarrass the working of the practical arrangements.... Co-ordination, too would, in that sense have to come about functionally" (*Ibid.*, pp.72-73).

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 178-179.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p.177.

Until the appearance of neo-functionalism, to some extent of course, federalism and functionalism are thought of as being in an opposition; federalism somehow meant 'non-functionalism' and functionalism 'non-federalism'.

UN'S ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE: And finally, to evidence the connection of functional processes with external environment, we may take the example of the UN's Economic Commission for Europe. Continental in its name but multi-regional its functioning, it was devised as a regional branch of the UN's Economic and Social Council in 1947. Though, in general it aimed at helping economic reconstruction, in particular, it proved to be the only venue of the time where representatives of the both sides of the iron curtain met and discussed European affairs. The Commission was expected to expand its original conception and trigger a series of dialogues between the sides. However, the covertly increasing tension felt globally and which was to culminate within a few years, hampered the working of the Commission. Its activity was truncated, and only some low-key committees for economic and technical co-operation remained intact. In the event of the ECE external connection worked not in a positive and fruitful way but in a negative and detrimental way. The suitable environment for spill-over mechanism to work properly, among other things, also depends on a delicately compatible external environment.

I.2.3 Neo-functionalism

I.2.3.1 General

Neo-functionalism in its inception appeared under three influences: a) Older theory of functionalism was being scrutinised, b) The newly emerging European Economic Community phenomenon was arousing an exigency for new and peculiar theories, and c) Accumulation of the tools of political science thanks to American scholars in the previous two decades was providing a salubrious climate for any new theories in the area. The beginning was marked by Haas' classical work *The Uniting of Europe* in 1958, and together with Lindberg's *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration* (1963) it remained one of the best expressions of neo-functionalism. Though the subject-matter of the both was regional integration in general, their 'laboratory' was the integration efforts in Europe; Haas worked on the

specific example of the ECSC -but later on referred to the EEC and Euratom as well-, whereas Lindberg remained within the limits of the EEC. Thus the first decade of the neo-functionalism meant its heyday as it was deliberately held in accordance with the reality. However 1970's began with some developments that neo-functionalism could not explain effectively. With the hope of amelioration studies in the area continued to the mid-1970's. Since then, the field seemed desolate. To some scholars however, the events after 1985 indicate another period which can be explained with the language of neo-functionalism.

Neo-functionalism can be regarded a blend of federalism and functionalism.

From classic functionalist theory the neo-functionalists retained: a) the stress on a compelling environment of growing interdependence among states; b) the gradualist sectoral strategy; c) the concept of 'spill-over'; d) the idea of an indirect attack on national sovereignty through appeals to enlightened self-interest; and e) the concern with growth in the power and scope of international agencies⁷².

On these however, some modifications were executed with some federalist characteristics:

In the first place, the supranational objective, even in its qualified form, makes neo-functionalism unambiguously a theory of European regional state-building. Integration is perceived as something akin to "political development", the aim being to increase the functional scope and degree of authority of central institutions which aspire to govern an unorganised political entity. Secondly, the process of change is neither technically determined nor purely based on rational material and administrative calculations, but is rather inherently political. The actors are politicians, national bureaucrats, interest groups and international (*i.e.*, Community) officials. Integration is the product of bargaining and coalition-formation among these actors, against a backdrop of broad governmental agreement on goals, a pressing (or alluring) economic environment, and a vague but permissive public consensus. Thirdly, as it progresses towards the core of national sovereignty and as the central authority acquires more power and legitimacy, the integration process is expected to become more controversial and politicised. Crises, indeed, are a major part of it, and

⁷² Pentland, 1981, p.555.

functionalist ideas about ever-widening circles of co-operation are considered somewhat naïve⁷³.

Haas and Lindberg -if the term fits- the two founding fathers of neo-functionalism- define integration in a rather similar way. For Haas, integration is

the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones⁷⁴.

For Lindberg it is

1) The process whereby nations forgo the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make *joint decisions*⁷⁵ or to *delegate* the decision making process to central organs; and 2) the process whereby political actors in several distinct settings are persuaded to shift their expectations and political activities to a new centre⁷⁶.

As it can be seen from the above definition, the proportion of the functionalist ingredient in the mixture of neo-functionalism is less than the federalist ingredient"; especially Haas' definition can well be taken as a kind of federalist interpretation. Mikkelsen describes three common points between the two definitions: first, both Haas and Lindberg sees integration as a process not a condition. Secondly, to some extent, they both stipulated the existence of a new central institution. And finally, the both underlined the shifts in attitudes of the political actors.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 555-556.

⁷⁴ Mikkelsen, 1991,p.3.

⁷⁵ Emphasises belong to Lindberg.

⁷⁶ Lindberg, *op. cit.*, p.6. Lindberg admits that he adapted his definition from the previous one which belonged to Haas. He says that he, however, "preferred to limit it to shifts in political expectations and activities, and to exclude shifts in values and any reference to a political Community end point, since it seems premature to undertake a study of value changes, even if an efficient way of measuring them could be devised. Changes in values can be expected to come about only as a result of new patterns of political expectations and activities" (*Ibid.*).

As Groom suggested the functional component of neo-functionalism has three elements: task expansion, spill-over and *engrenage*.

These components are not mutually exclusive, nor are they always clearly defined, but we can take task expansion to refer to increased co-operation in the same area, spill-over to mean co-operation in a new area often of a more salient political character arising out of existing co-operation, and *engrenage* to indicate a locking-in process⁷⁷.

The concept of spill-over which has a central importance in functionalism, is detailed and ramified in neo-functionalism. The concept is divided into three sections: functional spill-over, political spill-over and cultivated spill-over:

a) Functional spill-over: As mentioned within functionalism, this type of spill-over comes out of the peculiar nature of functional tasks. It assumes that since some sectors are intertwined in such a way that integration in one sector will eventually will bring -or require- some degree of integration in the other.

b) Political spill-over: Since neo-functionalism was developed on the concrete example of Western Europe, it pre-supposed the existence of élites and inter-élite bargaining⁷⁸ which is somehow already running there. According to this view, these élites gradually notice that their advantage lies on international scale which optimises the sources and offers a large spectrum of options. This will lead them to cede to a central decision making machinery through which they will be able protect their interests on international plane⁷⁹.


c) Cultivated spill-over: Though the previous two types of spill-over are expected to bring about a considerable degree of integration, the need for a third type in the form of an institution that occupies a central position is also expressed both by Haas and Lindberg. This institution, epitomised by the Commission of the EC, acting as a kind of mediator, would upgrade the common interest by trying to interfere the unproductive process of diplomatic negotiations.

⁷⁷ Groom, 1994, p.117.

⁷⁸ It is especially this component of neo-functionalism that profited from the studies of American scholars mentioned above who worked in the area of group theories.

⁷⁹ Within this framework Lindberg stresses the importance of the process of *engrenage* which means rendering of governments -which until that time functioned as gatekeepers- inert by direct ties between high ranking officials in the central organs of the integrated body and their national counterparts.

This division of spill-over concept provides us three separate and complementary rooms. All three types of spill-over function simultaneously on their respective problems; an issue, depending on its nature, falls into the field of one of these mechanisms of spill-over (it is either spontaneously and naturally concluded within the scope of functional spill-over, or supervised by élites in the meaning of political spill-over, and still or some common institutions may have to interfere as described by cultivated spill-over). Of course, proceeding of each issue does not entail a triggering which start the mechanism of spill-over; some issues may be terminated without having recourse to further integration. This last kind of issues are outside the magnitude of spill-over mechanism and of neo-functionalist integration, and just have a complementary and secondary function. Neither of the types of spill-over has a superiority or predominance over the others and as it was noted before, the three might act simultaneously on different problems. This situation might be represented by the following drawing:



In the cell, the issue at stake might be plotted according to the body which feels necessary to attempt to solve it. The nearer a point is to the centre of the cell, the more substantial is the spill-over so as the integrative thrust. As for the boundaries between the compartments, they are very vague between political spill-over and cultivated spill-over and a bit more perceptible elsewhere. In as much as it is especially difficult to determine the shares of diplomatic negotiators and of common institutions in the solution of a problem.

1.2.3.2 In Europe

OEEC and ECSC: It is possible to trace some properties of neo-functionalism in the structures and functioning of for example the OEEC or the ECSC. In the OEEC this was reflected in the inter-governmental decision making practice based on direct confrontation, but could not bring about a supranational structure of its own that would interact with the sphere of the national governments and stayed within the limits of being an international organisation. ECSC on the other hand, though, according to Haas, is the archetype of neo-functionalism on which he formulated his theory, is regarded by Pentland as a reflection of original functionalist theory since its "High Authority possessed real but sectorally-confined supranational powers"⁸⁰. To find its almost ideal application, neo-functionalism had to wait for the EEC and Euratom. OEEC and ECSC experiences might be said to have evidenced the **plight of neo-functionalism as a theory which requires co-existence of a number of conditions in the real world, so that it can explain and predict; if even one of these conditions is missing, neo-functionalist logic loses its applicability.**

EEC AND EURATOM: For a period of five or seven years EEC seemed to reflect or confirm the neo-functionalist propositions. In its beginning, the Community was set up on the optimistic experience of ECSC. In terms of neo-functionalist arguments, the Community might be regarded to have been established on two bases. These were first, the Commission as a true Community institution and secondly, both new (Euratom) and multiple and interrelated sectors (EEC's ample and complex structure). One may of course claim that already certain international organisations have some organs similar to the Commission and COREPER. However, it was the special operation of these organs that constitutes the reason for this method of functioning of the organs to be called as the 'Community method'. For the first few years, a Commission that represented roughly to an organ which both protected Community interests, and had a right to initiate, and a Council that might be regarded as a forum for individual Member States where decisions were taken by majority voting made up a picture that could be well explained by neo-functionalism. Contrary to the realist evaluation of diplomatic bargaining conjecture, in the Community method, negotiating governments, from the beginning, to some extent, reached an 'agreement to agree'⁸¹ before they began to negotiate; in principle, the governments

⁸⁰ Pentland, 1973, p.131.

⁸¹ Before long, following the 1965 crisis, this feature of the Rome Treaty was confused, for instance, by the so-called 'Luxembourg Compromise' which "was really an agreement to differ, with the French

were expected to be aware of that their interest in the long-term lies in the common well-being of the Community, not in insisting on their own views. To this aim also, they accept the superior position of the Commission.

After presenting first, John Pinder's distinction between 'negative integration' and 'positive integration'⁸² -the former term representing 'the removal of the obstacles to free exchange between the states' and the latter might be said to refer to creation of common organs and procedures with the aim of further integration- and secondly, Stanley Hoffmann's distinction of 'high politics-low politics' -the first, almost overlapping with the concept 'foreign policy', comprises such areas like security, sovereignty, political influence and prestige matters, whilst the second, similar to the concept of external relations, includes areas like economic and social spheres such as trade, migration and social welfare-⁸³, Pentland concludes that, as the difficulties arose one by one after the early 1960's, it seemed that almost all the success was in negative integration and in the field of low politics. The governments diverted from the mood neo-functionalism had once foreseen.

In functional areas such as agriculture, energy and transport, there has been much progress in the removal of discrimination and restrictions on fair competition and free exchange, but in common planning and policy-making and above all, in the structural change necessary to rationalise

insisting that where 'very important national interests' were at stake, discussion should continue until unanimous agreement was reached, and with the other Community governments (specially the Benelux) unequivocally opposed to the French view. To avoid a vote, enough countries must stand by the member government invoking the Luxembourg Compromise to make sure that no qualified majority can be found" (Archer and Butler, *op. cit.*, p.100).

⁸² Pinder, J. 'Positive Integration and Negative Integration: Some Problems of Economic Union in the EEC', *World Today*, 24:3, 1968, pp.90-91 *cit. in* (Pentland, *op. cit.*, p.136).

⁸³ The distinction 'high politics-low politics' has been a controversial issue. Starting with 'Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of Nation State and the Case of Western Europe', *Daedalus*, vol.95, no.3 Summer 1966, p.897 (*cit. in* Ifestos, *op. cit.*, p.78), Stanley Hoffmann elaborated this dichotomy in his several books and articles. In 1982 in another article ('Reflections on the nation-state in Western Europe Today' *Journal of Common Market Studies*, special issue, vol.21, nos. 1-2, 1982, pp.21-37 *cit. in* *Ibid.*) he writes that "the dichotomy can be misleading if it suggests that foreign policy and defence are always 'high' which is not the case, and economic and social policies are 'low' which is certainly false, especially in periods of economic crisis; moreover, he notes that 'whether an issue falls into one or the other category, depends on its momentary saliency' " (*Ibid.*) .

these economic sectors, the national positions diverge greatly even where the Commission itself has managed to produce policy proposals.

In some areas, there has been substantial progress toward common-policy making, but again this is not entirely explainable in terms of neo-functional methods. In social policy, for instance, there has been considerable success through Social Fund, in enhancing the mobility of workers and the transferability of their security benefits throughout the Community.... But social policy is also an area where, unusually, the Treaty lays down obligations in considerable detail as to positive integration.

In other areas where some success in common-policy making has been achieved, it is explainable largely in terms of an external challenge or pressure. This was the case, not only with the Free Trade area proposals but with the Kennedy Round negotiations under GATT, where the Commission established itself as the representative of the Community and negotiated on the basis of what amounted to a common policy⁸⁴.

⁸⁴ Pentland, *op. cit.*, p.140. A 'less political but more functional' explanation of the failure of neo-functionalism is given by Groom. He claims that task expansion, spill-over and *engrenage* mechanisms did not function as expected; pluralistic interest groups could not be influential; masses did not ensue élites; and national governments retained their power (Groom, 1994, esp. p.111).

For interest groups in the EC, Schmitter and Streeck argue that, for two reasons, first the weakness of central governments and secondly, business supremacy over labour, interest groups remained fragmented (Schmitter and Streeck, 1994, p.169).

For the political élites, Slater's classical article still leads the field. Though written before the Single European Act, his text still sheds light to the attitude of the political élites of the Community towards political integration. In accordance with Groom, he observes that élite groups were both uninformed about and uninterested in integration issue (Slater, <1982>1994, p.153).

For socio-economic élites, Leonardi states that, creation of a Community wide set of rules seemed a requisite; these élites seemed capable of achieving their aims only if they are protected. However, "the course of European integration after 1988 demonstrates that regional (socio-economic) élites.... are important actors and vigorous proponents of a new European institutional architecture in which Community organs are in direct contact with subnational élites" (Leonardi, 1993, pp.504-505).

During 1970s and early 1980s especially the last observation of Groom, that the national governments retained their power, gave rise to a body of writings so-called the 'domestic politics approach'. This approach claims that the domestic political processes of Member States have priority

These pessimistic words of Pentland which described the predicament of neo-functionalism until the beginning of the 1970's must have discouraged most of the theoreticians from meditating progressive texts in the area. However as Mikkelsen and Taylor observed, a period that can be explained with the discourse of neo-functionalism became visible in the second half of the 1980's⁸⁵. For this aim, Mikkelsen enumerates such events like the Fontainebleu Summit in June 1984, where an agreement was reached over the British budgetary contribution, and the White Paper by which a substantial number of barriers to the completion of the internal market were abolished -an achievement, however, he accepts, which might be regarded as rather a negative integration. Yet, in the developments of the period, Mikkelsen traces some lines of functional (as the governments were deprived of some policy instruments of theirs by the White Paper, like the disappearing of physical borders, the way got open for functional, common and co-ordinated policies), political ("business is strongly committed to the objectives of the White Paper and pressures towards positive integration were growing on the Left"⁸⁶) and cultivated (for example, the stance of the Commission under the presidency of Jacques Delors towards the government of Margaret Thatcher⁸⁷ which tried to uphold national interests) spill-overs and infers that, though there existed some limitations like countervailing forces (like predilection for charismatic nationalist personalities like Thatcher) or like some indeterminate forces which may either promote or impede integration (for example the concept of external security environment emphasised by Hoffmann)⁸⁸, the existence of a suitable environment justifies a scrutiny via neo-functional tools.

in analysing Community issues and have better explanatory power than the processes at the Community level (for details see Bulmer, 1994).

⁸⁵ Mikkelsen, *op. cit.*, p.10 and Taylor, 1993, p.77. To the extent that "the assumptions adopted by the neo-functionalists on the economic pillar and the rôle of economic expansion as the driving force for political expansion" Leonardi is of the opinion that the events of the last 40 years support neo-functional assumptions (Leonardi, *op. cit.*, p.512).

⁸⁶ *Ibid.* p.15.

⁸⁷ To have an idea about Mrs. Thatcher's thoughts on the issue, see the excerpts from her famous 'Bruges speech' which "was sharply criticised as being 'unrelentingly negative' by those who favoured a more supranational Europe...." (Taylor, *op. cit.*, p.75) in Appendix-V.

⁸⁸ To these forces, as a positively effecting force, we may add Taylor's phrase which reads as "(as the number of the Member States increase) diplomatic relations can emerge between core and peripheral states in such a way that all are subject to a greater incentives to integrate" (*Ibid.*, p.77).

This story of neo-functionalism within the Euratom and then -especially- EC, inspires the conclusion that, corollary to our previous inference in the cases of EEC and ECSC where we asserted that attaining the situations which can be explained with neo-functionalism is difficult, it is also difficult for neo-functionalism to keep its accordance with the vicissitudes; some variables, that have been excluded by the inevitably reductionist aspect by which more or less any integration theory is afflicted, come to the fore and undermine neo-functionalism. With its multi-variable and complex structure, neo-functionalism might be seen as resurrected. However, this new assertive period of neo-functionalism -if any- may last short if another unexpected variable of the asperity of the real world paws this delicate organism living in the suitable conditions of a greenhouse.

I.2.4 Federalism

I.2.4.1 General

The Director of the Federal Trust for Education and Research, an Honorary Director-General of the Commission and former *Chef de Cabinet* to Altiero Spinelli, Christopher Layton, among several definitions of federalism, prefers that of an encyclopaedia -which possibly would look more 'neutral', a merit for such a controversial term-. According to Encyclopædia Britannica, he says, federalism is a

mode of political organisation that unites separate states or other polities within an overarching political system in such a way as to allow each to maintain its fundamental political integrity. Federal systems do this by requiring that basic policies be made and implemented through negotiation in some form , so that all the members can share in making and executing the decisions. The political principles that animate federal systems emphasise the primacy of bargaining and negotiated co-ordination among several power centres; they stress the virtues of dispersed power centres as a means of safeguarding individual and local liberties" ⁸⁹ .

Lemco, on the other hand gives place to William Riker's definition as one of the best overall definitions which reads as follows:

⁸⁹ *cit. in* Layton, 1990, p.28.

a political organisation in which the activities of government are divided between regional governments and a central government in such a way that each kind of government has some activities on which it makes final decisions ⁹⁰.

Anthony Birch divides approaches to federalism into four groups⁹¹ :

1)The institutional or constitutional approach of K. C. Wheare and William Maddox: In Wheare's approach, well delineated spheres of power between the central authority and the constituent units are underlined. He gives the following:

By the federal principle I mean the method of dividing powers so that the general and regional government are each, within a sphere, co-ordinate and independent ⁹².

In other words, two main thrusts are at work in forming such a federal structure: a)'the advantage perceived by each authority in establishing a single central government charged with certain functions involving all the parties', and b)'the expected benefits from the retention by regional governments of authority over issues peculiar to each region'. Wheare enumerates the conditions contributing federal stability as:

i)a sense of military insecurity and the consequent need for common defence, ii)a desire to be independent of foreign powers, which makes union a necessity, iii)a hope of economic advantage, iv)the experience of some previous political association, v)geographical proximity among states, vi)a similarity of political institutions ⁹³.

Maddox lays down similar conditions:

⁹⁰ Lemco, 1991, p.6

⁹¹ Except especially inserted footnotes, these approaches have been summarised from (Lemco, *op. cit.*, pp.8-15)

⁹² K. C. Wheare, *Federal Government*, 4th edition, London, 1963, p.10, *cit. in.* Pentland, *op. cit.*, p.150.

⁹³ Lemco, 1991, pp. 9-10.

i)the presence of military insecurity, ii)the presence of economic insecurity, iii)the existence of uniformity among states of size, culture, and political and social development, iv)the existence of unifying spiritual, emotional or ideological forces, v)geographic contiguity among states, vi)the presence of independent sources of political, financial and military power for the central government⁹⁴.

2) The sociological approach of W. S. Livingston: Rather than polities' division of powers or its attendant institutional framework, Livingston states that social cleavages are important. This, according to him, becomes more visible if communal groups have considerable power in a geographical area and can send representatives to the centre. However, the Achilles' heel of Livingston's theory is that the design of any federal model might have been conceived in such a way that social cleavages can not concentrate and get influential.

3)The process or developmental approach of Carl Friedrich and Karl Deutsch: Seeing federalism as a process, Friedrich underlines the concept of communications whereby separate political communities try to find solutions to common problems. As mentioned under the Pluralism title above, Deutsch's 'amalgamated security community' gets similar to this federal model. Deutsch's model is based on healthy internal connections at social level and again communications. For federal stability he provides some conditions:

i)a mutual compatibility of primary values shared by the federal partners, ii)a distinctive way of life within each constituent unit, iii)the presence of popular expectations of stronger economic ties or gains to be made from a federal union, iv)a marked increase in political and administrative capabilities of at least some participating units, v) the presence of superior economic growth on the part of at least some participating constituent units, vi)the presence of unbroken links of social communications, both geographically between territories and sociologically different strata, vii)a broadening of the political élite throughout the federation, viii)the mobility of persons, at least among the politically relevant strata, ix)a multiplicity of ranges of communications and transactions within the federation⁹⁵.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.10-11.

⁹⁵ Lemco, *op. cit.*, pp.12-13.

4)The political approach of William Riker: Accepting Deutsch's prerequisites Riker emphasises that military, diplomatic and political forces are also consequential. Spheres of influence of the centre and the constituent units are determined through bargainings in political arena; units themselves also bargain; autonomy is renounced in return for economic or military power. For the viability of this version of federalism, according to Riker, depends on two criteria:

i)a desire on the part of politicians who offer the bargain to expand their area of influence by peaceful means, usually either to meet an external military or diplomatic aggression, ii)a willingness on the part of politicians who accept the bargain to give up independence for the sake of union, either because they wish protection from a military or diplomatic threat or because they desire to participate in the potential aggression of federation⁹⁶.

From the above approaches, Wheare's institutional or constitutional approach suits our model. As noted above, listing the incentives for a federal structure, he gives place to a second incentive for federal structure stemmed from "the expected benefits from the retention by regional governments of authority over issues peculiar to each region"⁹⁷. This idea, in the very terminology of the European Community⁹⁸, was taken up in the framework of the controversial concept 'subsidiarity'. The Preamble to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) makes mention of "continu(ing) the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity"; and Article 3b as amended by the TEU reads as follows:

The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein.

In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community...

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.13-14.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.9.

⁹⁸ Wheare's model however, in working out his approach, was the United States.

According to Wistrich

(a)ll the activities of the Community which do not fall within its exclusive competence will be subject to the principle of subsidiarity. This means that the Community will only take action when its objectives cannot be sufficiently achieved by member states acting separately and when it is considered that these objectives could be better achieved by the Community. Subsidiarity has an even wider meaning in countries with federal structures of government. It requires governmental decisions to be taken at the lowest possible and closest to the citizen, with the higher tiers of government being able to act only where the common interest so requires⁹⁹.

Federalism, from this point of view, might be conceived of as a continuum changing with the proportion of subsidiarity in the solution of each issue; at the one end the problem is solved at the lowest possible level and on the other exclusively at the Community level. The principle of subsidiarity, on which much disagreement arose, has been interpreted in two -seemingly incompatible- ways. The literature involves such writers like Paul Taylor who asserts that

"(the powers of governments) were not subject to any general principle, e.g. a federal principle, according to which the powers of future institutions were to be allocated. Indeed.... the opposite principle, that of subsidiarity, was asserted at Maastricht: powers were to be kept at the lowest level possible"¹⁰⁰.

or Jacques Delors for whom "acceptance of subsidiarity implies respect for pluralism and, by implication, diversity"¹⁰¹. These two represent a view which takes subsidiarity a concept that weakens the hopes of federalists. There are, also, another group of people who construe subsidiarity as a notion in favour of federalism. There is, however, yet another discrepancy within these scholars who see the existence of subsidiarity as an indication of federalism since one group emphasises the position of constituent units, and the other, of the federal government. A paragraph from Wistrich would exemplify the former view:

⁹⁹ Wistrich, 1994, p.10.


¹⁰⁰ Taylor, *op. cit.*, p.98.

¹⁰¹ Delors, 1994, p.60.

With the Community implicitly moving towards a federal structure, the principle of subsidiarity will become an increasingly important means of limiting the concentration of powers at European level and, where not absolutely essential, their diffusion down to member states and to regional and local tiers of government¹⁰².

Within the context of the latter opinion, Wolfgang Wessels claims that "(t)he subsidiarity principle will be interpreted in favour of European options; most resources -or at least central public resources- should be at the disposal of bodies at the European (federal) level, no longer at the national level"¹⁰³. Similarly, according to Layton federalism means 'the reverse of centralisation', and "(m)odern federalism is therefore guided by the principle of subsidiarity"¹⁰⁴.

For the purpose of our model, we accept that subsidiarity is not in favour of federalism. The lower the level where an issue is taken up also, the lesser federalist that particular issue is -if the reverse is correct, then, simply the core point gets to the periphery and the periphery comes to the centre:-



It should be noted that, neither the core point represents a situation where the issue is dealt with solely by central institutions, nor solutions on the fringe are executed independently by the respective constituent unit (sometimes regional or local)¹⁰⁵;

¹⁰² Wistrich, *loc. cit.*

¹⁰³ Wessels, 1994, p.449.

¹⁰⁴ Layton, *op. cit.*, p.28.

¹⁰⁵ In the Community, to insure the arrangement and organisation of such issues, a consultative Committee of the Regions was decided to be set up. The accounts of this Committee will be taken by the Commission and Council.

every point represents a combination of the authority of central institutions and the discretion of constituent components; neither component is 'zero' for any point. If decisions are to be taken by central government alone supranational face will overwhelm the intergovernmental component and *vice versa*¹⁰⁶.

1.2.4.2 In Europe

WAR TIMES: The First and Second World Wars were of the worst lessons Europe ever experienced. Scholars, for these catastrophes, accused unbridled national sovereignty that had turned international arena into a Hobbesian fiction. In 1933, Harold Laski, for instance, pointed out that "until we recognise that an independent economic world... is incompatible with a system of political units which bears no relation to that inescapable unity, we shall have left untouched the central cause of war"¹⁰⁷. Similarly, Lionel Robbins in his book written in 1939, where he advocated a European federation after democracy is re-established in Germany, stated that "the anarchic political organisation of the world is the root disease of our civilisation"¹⁰⁸. Towards the end of the Second World War declarations were made

with statements on union being produced independently and more or less simultaneously by resistance groups in Czechoslovakia, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Yugoslavia, as well as by underground groups in Germany. During 1944, for example, several French resistance groups in both France and North Africa argued for some supranational structure in Europe, built along federal lines, to replace the old system of independent states. The most vociferous groups were to be found in Italy, with many insisting that constructing a new federal Europe should take priority even over economic reconstruction. It was, in fact, in Italy that the idea of post-war union was first set out, in the Ventotene Manifesto of July 1941, written in, and smuggled out of jail by Altiero Spinelli¹⁰⁹ (who was an ardent European federalist throughout his later life) and his associates. The Ventotene ideas were adopted by the Italian resistance as a whole, and led eventually to the formation in August 1943 of a European Federalist

¹⁰⁶ For, intergovernmental and supranational characteristics of the post-Maastricht period of the Community see again Appendix-III.

¹⁰⁷ Laski, H. J., "The Economic Foundations of Peace" in Woolf, Leonard, *The Intelligent Man's Way to Prevent War*, London, Gollancz, 1933, p.502, *cit. in* Pinder, 1986, p.41.

¹⁰⁸ Robbins, L., *The Economic Causes of War*, London, 1939, p.99, 104-109, *cit. in Ibid*

¹⁰⁹ For extracts from an article summarising Spinelli's ideas, see Appendix-VI.

Movement (*Movimento Federalista Europeo*) which pledged itself to contact and align itself with similar groups in other countries¹¹⁰.

The proclivity for federalism in times of distress in Europe might justify the inference that **federalist options in times of welfare might not be esteemed as much as they are made recourse to when faced with an impasse.** This thesis seems defensible against proponents of federalism in the Community in times of tranquillity.

ADENAUER: Later on, when the blueprints for the EDC were attempted to bring into reality, federalism was pronounced again: a European army would be meaningless without a European foreign policy. This idea was made explicit by Konrad Adenauer on his visit to the United States in 1953¹¹¹. That this thought was disclosed in the United States must have been more than just coincidence. The Korean War and its consequent burden to the economy of the United States has already been outlined above. Without the support of the United States, Europe could, it was believed, resist the Soviet threat only if it got united.

This short period evidences that federative aspirations in Europe are also related to the changes in the global balance of power¹¹². **Together with previous assessment, it might be said that the federal cell is one of the most sensitive to the external environment.**

¹¹⁰ Urwin, *op.cit.*, p.8.

¹¹¹ Plans got beyond the contemplation stage, and even a draft treaty for the European Political Community consisted of 117 articles was prepared. This Community would however be of rather a confederal nature than federal, since there existed a powerful executive body representing national interests, and the responsibility of the governments would be restricted. For this treaty see Appendix-VII.

¹¹² An analogous example may be the discussions following 1989 whereafter a series of disintegrations of East European countries was triggered. Known as the discussions of 'deepening vs. enlargement', the debate was about whether priority was to be given to the accessions of the East European countries and so to the support for democracy, or Community would indulge in elaborating its own structure, converge and integrate more. To support the second view, in January 1990, Delors, for example, "argued that the Commission must be given greater decision-making powers to become a 'real executive'; it would be answerable to and counterbalanced by 'the democratic institutions of the future Federation', especially an enhanced EP which he wanted also to have a say in choosing the Commission" (Urwin, *op. cit.*, p.244), and "in the summer of 1988... mentioned the prospect of 80 per cent of the key decisions being taken in Brussels against 20 per cent in the national capital" (Bressard, *op. cit.*, p.319).

DE GAULLE: De Gaulle's words in a press conference in the September within the critical days of 1965 crisis, epitomise the resistance of governments to federal structures:

(W)e know -and heaven knows how well we know it- that there is a different conception of European federation in which, according to the dreams of those who have conceived it the member countries would lose their national identities, and which.... would be ruled by some sort of technocratic body of elders, stateless and irresponsible¹¹³.

It is a peculiarity of federalism which, for it, more than the other ways of integration, it is an exigency for all the prospective constituent units to be convinced; predication of central authority requires more abrupt changes¹¹⁴ even in most incremental versions of federalism; and the units resist to transfer of part of their authority more than any other types of integration.

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: In the period between the years 1980 and 1985, calls for reform within the EC institutions got visible. Within this appeal, two groups could be differentiated: the 'Crocodile Group' and the 'Kangaroo Group'¹¹⁵. The Crocodile Group, where Italians and Germans held the majority, was after strengthening of the European Parliament together with some other institutional reforms and some increase in the activities of the EC. This group was led by Spinelli mentioned above. The other group, consisted mainly of British and Dutch members, instead of federalist ambitions and institutional reforms, preferred working directly

¹¹³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴ "....(A)lthough they (federalists) have acted in support of the Community's step-by-step development, they have not thought deeply enough about 'the intermediary stage between normal interstate relations and normal intrastate relations' or about the concept of constitution-building as not just a single act, but also an evolutionary development of the Community, federalist theory needs to refer both a federalising process and to a federal end which implies substantial transfers of sovereignty. Its scope needs to incorporate steps in the development of European institutions and in their assumption of functions and competences; the resistance of member states to this process and the pressures that may induce them to accept it; and the perspective of possible 'qualitative breaks' involving 'a constitutional redistribution of powers'. Existing theories do not seem to deal adequately with these things" (Pinder, *op. cit.*, p.51).

¹¹⁵ It is an established practice for the groups in the European Parliament to call themselves with animal names.

with national governments and dealing with business interests. Under the leadership of a famous British industrialist Basil de Ferranti "(t)he Kangaroos encouraged parliamentary studies on economic topics, and in 1983 launched a public campaign in favour of a detailed EC timetable for abolishing administrative, technical and fiscal barriers...."¹¹⁶. **This division in the Parliament, which might be regarded as a model of functionalism-federalism quarrels on the Community scale, will be more important as the Parliament is incorporated into the decision making machinery of the Community; among others, decisive and abrupt changes towards federalist goals as well will have to pass the 'obstacle' of Parliament as well.**



¹¹⁶ Moravcsik, 1994, p.214.

EXTERNAL VARIABLES¹ : NEUMANN'S CONTINUUM

II.1 GENERAL

Pentland's holistic classification is one of the most compact and complete expressions of the approaches to integration theory; at least for practical purposes it is followed in several textbooks as well as it bears references in numerous academical texts. Yet, its plight of dealing solely² with internal variables draws criticism. Haas for example, states that

Pentland argues that the themes argued by pluralist, functionalist, neo-functional and federalist writers, respectively, are neither altogether wrong nor incapable of being combined. Their recombination, however, would result in a discrete theory of regional integration recognising the indeterminate nature of institutional outcomes and a more sophisticated notion of social change, *without*³ dealing with the issue of exogenous variables⁴ and their salience in throwing doubt on whether the regional focus is worth while⁵.

Archer cites that Haas himself, in his preface in 1968 to famous *The Uniting of Europe* originally written in 1958, in enumerating the failures of neo-functionalism to

¹ The environment of external variables in the wider context of political science refer to economic, social, cultural, religious, geographic... stimuli from within, as well as the own feedback of a political system model (see Golembiewski *et. al.*, 1969, pp.243-245). Here the term refers only to extra-regional factors be it social, cultural, economic, geographical.

² Except a mention consisted of two paragraphs in (1973, pp. 227-228).

³ Stress belongs to Haas.

⁴ A similar criticism -or rather a confession- comes from Feld, who first proposes "a different perspective on the process of regional integration, centred upon the importance of foreign and domestic policies of member states or potential member states", but then adds that "the task is far from finished" since among other factors that starts an integration process there lay "inputs from.... extra-regional national actors and events" (Feld, *op. cit.* p.518).

⁵ Haas, 1976, p.174.

which he contributed much, admits that "factors within the Community had been stressed to the detriment of those coming from the outside world"⁶.

In his model where he emphasised the important rôle played by élite-units in integration process, Etzioni points out that "an élite might be completely 'out', encouraging or forcing the merger of two or more units into a union which it does not join, sometimes relinquishing control once unification is initiated"⁷.

Though from the specific perspective of the German existence in Europe, Pedersen refers to the importance of the external environment in analysing integration:

Several analysts of European integration, among them Nye (1965)⁸ and more recently Sandholtz&Zysman (1989)⁹, have argued that the external environment is an important and somewhat overlooked factor in integration processes. Nye thus referred to the 'external catalysts'. The external catalyst may be quite different in nature. The formation of the EC was helped along by US *support*¹⁰ and the US military *presence* in Europe reduced the FRG's political rôle, thereby creating a stable balance between the 'big three' in Western Europe. this obviously facilitated West European integration.

The new breakthrough in EC integration in the mid-1980's drew much of its momentum from *perceived external challenges* (EPCs). Studies of EPC show that *positive expectations from third countries* -particularly the Third

⁶ Archer, *op. cit.*, p.97.

⁷ Etzioni, 1969, p.349.

⁸ Nye, S. J. Jr. "Patterns and Catalysts in Regional Organisation" *International Organisation XIX cit. in Pedersen, op. cit.*, p.85 (Pedersen omits page numbers).

"Nye argued that 'the functional linkage of tasks has been a less powerful mechanism that was originally believed to be the case' and sought to construct a 'revised neo-functional process model' in which deliberate linkages, actions of external actors, élite socialisation, and other factors played comparable role" (Keohane and Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, p.249).

⁹ Sandholtz&Zysman "Recasting the European Bargain" *World Politics XLII cit. in Pedersen, loc. cit.*

¹⁰ Stresses in this quotation belong to Pedersen.

World- played a major part in propelling the EC towards some sort of global political rôle (Regelsberger 1988¹¹, Rummel 1982¹²).

Similarly, the pressure of expectations from Eastern Europe might come to act as a new external catalyst within the EC. This dynamic will affect the EC not least through a more influential Germany. How strong this catalytic effect will be is hard to say¹³.

Among his 'forces which may either promote or impede integration', as mentioned above, Mikkelsen, gives place Hoffmann's 'external security environment' concept. Mikkelsen concludes that though there seem to be a relationship between this external security environment and the vicissitudes of the EC, this relationship is not a simple and direct one. That one of the two improvement periods of the EC coincides with the 'First Cold War', whereas the other is currently experienced in an atmosphere of *détente* and co-operation evidences this opinion. He also criticises Hoffmann's complete isolation of foreign policy and security issues from the sphere of action of the EC with the evidence of vast EC relief to East European countries¹⁴.

An analysis of external factors to integration within a complete spectrum that is also very compatible with and complementary to our special way of treating of Pentland model, belongs to Iver B. Neumann. Below is an outline of his approach as explained in his pamphlet "Regions in International Relations Theory: The Case for a Region-Building Approach"¹⁵.

¹¹ Regelsberger, E. "EPC in the 1980s: Reaching Another Plateau?" in Regelsberger *et. al.*(ed.s) *European Political Co-operation in the 1980s*, Martinus Nijhoff *cit. in* Pedersen,*loc. cit.*.

¹² Rummel, R. *Zusammengesetzte Aussenpolitik: EPZ als Internationaler Akteur*, Strasbourg *cit. in* *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Mikkelsen, *op. cit.*, p.17.

¹⁵ Norsk Utenriskpolitisk Institutt, 1993.

II.2 CLASSIFICATION¹⁶

II.2.1 General

As a matter of fact, the aim of Neumann is to exhibit his new approach to the study of regions. Taking the Northern Europe as a case study, he attempts to show that regions are defined by the discourse of state and non-state actors, whereby they try to get nearer to the 'territorial and functional cores of the region' which is, by its nature, a political process. To reveal the inadequacy of the existing approaches of defining 'region', he first, places all of them onto a continuum according to 'how much weight they assign to factors either internal or external to the region'¹⁷, and then applies them to the case of Northern Europe. It is only this very continuum we will use and incorporate into our model:

The first end of the continuum where integration is defined solely by internal factors to the region might be best represented by Edmund Burke. For him, 'informal wellsprings of the fellow feeling' is the basis for 'all human collectives':

Men are not tied to one another by papers and seals. They are led to associate by resemblances, by conformities, by sympathies. It is with nations as with individuals. Nothing is so strong a tie of amity between nation and nation as correspondence in laws, customs, manners and habits of life. They have more than the force of the treaties in themselves. They are obligations written in the heart. They approximate men to men, without their knowledge, and sometimes against their intentions¹⁸.

Complementary to this reasoning, Burke concludes that regions, as in the case of Europe, there are 'natural, culturally defined borders'.

¹⁶ Except especially inserted footnotes, this part has been summarised from (Neumann, *op. cit.*, *passim*).

¹⁷ A cognate continuum is given by Etzioni in the context of his above cited conception élites. For him, along this continuum, an élite forcing or encouraging 'merger of two or more units into a union' can be 'in' or 'out' (Etzioni, *op.cit.*, p.349).

¹⁸ Edmund Burke (ed. by F. W. Rafferty), "Letters on the Proposals for Peace with the Regicide Directory of France", letter one, *the Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke*, London, Oxford University Press, 1907 <1796>, pp. 85-175, on pp.155-156 *cit. in* Neumann, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

A more diluted approach which but still focuses on internal factors, belongs to Bruce M. Russett. After a quotation from Finch that reads as "(t)he characteristics of a region should be most pronounced in its interior"¹⁹, he resumes by stating the arbitrariness of regional borders. He categorises regions as 'regions of social and cultural homogeneity', 'regions of states which share similar political attitudes or external behaviour', 'regions of political interdependence, where the countries are joined together by a network of supranational or intergovernmental political institutions', 'regions of economic interdependence' and 'regions of geographical proximity'²⁰. Though geographical factors are generally regarded as external, 'geographical proximity' might be regarded internal since it does not have reference to outside or global system.

Karl Deutsch's 'security community' is built upon a stress on internal factors to a region; the abandonment of the 'war' option by the governments, élites and populations, an approximation in the area of cultural works, and an inclination of 'mutual attention, communication and responsiveness'... all prerequisites are the description of a formation shaped solely by inner forces.

A similar view is held by Amitai Etzioni who applied the concepts of his field of study sociology to international phenomena. As outlined above, he concerns with 'unification of political units that previously shared few or no political bonds'²¹. In his view, emphasis is on common cultural 'background variables' and 'internal transaction data about streams of persons, goods, capital and services'.

Close to the middle of the continuum, there lies Bengt Sundelius' approach. Similar to Etzioni, he underlines the importance of the activities of the domestic élites of the region, but he also adds that it is their harmonious apprehension of the external environment and their joint activities which make up their main incentives.

There are three separate views that can be plotted onto the middle of the continuum. The first one is the 'Nordic balance' notion. Conceptualised mainly by Arne Olav Brundtland, it is based on the idea of equilibrium between 'action' and 'reaction'. As a result of the policy orientations of the Nordic countries in aggregate, each superpower realises that, if it interferes in the Nordic region the other

¹⁹ V. C. Finch "Geographical Science and Social Philosophy" *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 29, 1, 1939, p.14, *cit. in*. Russett, 1969, p.7.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p.11.

²¹ Etzioni, *op. cit.*, p.347.

superpower would make no scruples about doing more in the same way. Later on, the internal component in the 'Nordic balance' notion has been further elaborated and, for example, Ole Weaver, instead of harmonious foreign policies in action, stressed the importance of dissuasive political discourse that laid behind that them. In any versions of the 'Nordic balance' the proportion of internal and external factors seem comparably equal, and it is difficult to opt for one of them. The second view, after the one on the specific example of the 'Nordic balance', is Cantori and Spiegel's framework. This conception is also difficult to place onto the either side of the middle. These scholars divide regions into two sectors: a core and a periphery. The core consists of a state or a group of states that constitute the focal point of the international relations within the region. The peripheral component, or what they call as 'the intrusive system' is made up of the influence of international system to the region and is as important as the internal dynamics themselves. The final view belongs to Bary Buzan. In his model, whereas external influence coming from the global rivalry of great powers is important in delineating a 'region', the amity and enmities between the states that shape a 'security complex' -a network of relations that ties each states security concerns to the other- among them, are also important.

On the other half of the continuum where systemic factors, states and geography are seen consequential, internal factors are rather trivial. Most visible of these criteria is the geographical one. For example, according to Johan Jørgen Holst Scandinavian peninsula and Finland together constitute a regional core. In a like manner, Jon Bingen defines the Nordic region referring to the lakes, mountain ranges and rivers surrounding it. These geographical formings might be definitive also when they do not surround but constitute the core area of the region. This latter view is often coupled with military capabilities. Captain Otley from Her Majesty's Committee of Imperial Defence, for instance, focuses on the Nordic region with reference to the Baltic sea within it, and discusses the Russian, German and to some extent British military capabilities in threatening the region via the sea. One of the most extreme approaches leaning on external factors belongs to Russian author Sergey Morgachev. Regions, for him, are defined by the developments at the global level; 'the system-wide confrontations of the great powers' give birth to a number of arenas different from the others and these are perceived as regions²². Neumann's continuum we represent as follows:

²² Though admitting the significance of internal factors as well, Fitzmaurice too, stresses the primary importance of global political shifts of influence in taking shape of regional co-operation efforts in Europe (Fitzmaurice, 1993, *passim*).

REGION DEFINED SOLELY BY
THE EXTERNAL FACTORS

REGION DEFINED SOLELY BY
THE INTERNAL FACTORS

II.2.2 In Europe

II.2.2.1 Outlining the External²³

In economical terms a common European identity has already been established and spheres of economics internal and external to the region clearly delineated. In post-Maastricht period, to imply Community's protectionism as well as its increasing competitiveness the term 'fortress Europe' has been coined. As the Community advances in political integration²⁴, a similar fortress seems to be built around it, that would separate intramural European space from the external world. A cadastre survey seems necessary for the exact borders along which the walls of this castle are to be built.

²³ Except especially inserted footnotes, this part was summarised from (Buzan, *et. al.*, 1990, *passim*).

²⁴ Pedersen holds that after 1980's 'a considerable body of academic literature' appeared that accepts 'separate European identity in foreign policy, security, and defence, and presents an exemplary bibliography (Pedersen, *op. cit.*, p.83): Schoueete, de P. *La co-operation politique europeenne*. Ed. Labor, 1986; Regelsberger *et. al.* (ed.s), *European Political Co-operation in the 1980's*, Martinus Nijhoff, 1988; Alford, J. & Hunt, K. (ed.s), *The European Defence Entity*, London, Macmillan, 1988; Tsakaloyannis, P. *The Reactivation of the Western European Union*, European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, 1985; Ifestos, P., *European Political Co-operation*, Avebury, 1987; Pedersen, T., *EF -en supermagt? Vesteuropæisk sikkerhedspolitisk samarbejde udenfor NATO*, København, 1989; Allen & Smith, 'Western Europe's Presence in the Contemporary International Arena', *Review of International Studies* 16, 19-37, 1990; Jørgensen, K. E. *The Western European Union and the Imbroglia of European Security*, (no place and date).

Wæver²⁵ has argued that in security terms there are four Europes. In ascending order of size they are: one encompassing the European Community (basically Western Europe); one from Poland to Portugal (non-superpower Europe); one from the Atlantic to the Urals ('Gaullist Europe' or Gorbachev's 'Common European House'); and one that stretches effectively from Vancouver to Vladivostok (CSCE Europe)²⁶.

The region Europe, until 1945 was defined by having recourse to internal factors; amities and enmities within, as well as a common European identity were definitive. The omnipotent European states extended their power all over the world. At the beginning of the century, only two other actors managed to co-exist with Europe: the United States and Japan. The United States could be seen culturally European, but, outside the coherency of Europe, it was left alone in its isolation policy. Japan was both non-European in terms of culture, and was also remote from the continent. Newly emerging Russia, although nearer in geographical terms was even less European than the United States that is much far away. This picture dominated the world scene until 1945, and corresponds to the non-superpower, from Poland to Portugal Europe.

The termination of the Second World War with the help of the United States marked an intermediary phase in identification of Europe. In fact, the United States did intervene in the First World War as well, but retreated back to its isolated position, restoring the status of Europe. This time, however, it asserted itself as a key factor in Europe's security. The concept security, as we have seen, is rather construed as an external factor. Yet, this time Europe was protected against itself; though with the help of a non-European power; the defeat of Germany could not be seen as a global systemic change, but an internal outcome of the region. Taking into consideration that the United States could be regarded culturally European as well, the period that overlaps the end of the Second World War bears the marks of both internal and external factors.

'The Cold War years Europe' was delineated by external factors. Within the context of NATO, Europe, tied to its ally United States, stood aloof towards the Soviet Union and its Eastern associates. This came to be called as 'EC Europe'. However, after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, the possibility of enlargement of the

²⁵ Wæver, Ole 'Conflicts of Vision-Visions of Conflict' in Wæver, Lemaitre and Tromer (eds.) *European Polyphony*, pp. 283-325 *cit. in. Buzan et. al., loc. cit.*

²⁶ Buzan *et. al., op. cit.*, p.45.

EC changed the nature of the term. With the admission of East Germany into the Community, this perception of Europe gets nearer to the 'Europe from Poland to Portugal' image.

Indeed, 'Europe from Poland to Portugal' image reappears nowadays, and a return to internal factors gets discernible. A 'European identity' is assumed to explain the coherency of such a Europe. Within the context of so-called 'multiplication of identities', no matter of which nationality or ethnic origin they are, peoples of Europe are expected to assume the European identity besides their own. But, it is this concept of identity that also poses an ambiguity when Turkey and western components of the ex-Soviet Union define themselves European.

The Gaullist or Gorbachev Europe typically stresses the importance of geographical location as an external factor. Europe, in this view, is the name of the continent that extends from the Atlantic to the Urals. In this view Russia is also admitted to Europe. However, it is often questioned whether Russia is European geographically, culturally and historically.

The largest contemplation of Europe in size, that is the CSCE Europe, designs a Europe stretching between Vancouver and Vladivostock. Since the primordial thrust behind the CSCE has been to ensure an approximation between the two blocs of the Cold War, this view also emphasises global systemic factors in delineating Europe. It seems difficult to conclude that as soon as the superpower rivalry has been terminated, the CSCE Europe view has been discarded. This view is promoted especially by the United States and Russian sides who strive to continue their influence over Europe.

II.2.2.2 Classification of the External Factors

Attempting at analysing the external factors to European integration in depth is beyond the limits of this paper. By oversimplification, we resort to a dichotomous classification. European integration, in our opinion, can be thought of as under the influence of two types of external factors, namely that 'attract' the core of integration and strive to merge with it, and that 'repel' the integrating body causing it to recede, alienate and cower²⁷.

²⁷ A third category might be concocted composed of 'zero-effect factors'. But, our oversimplification presumes any event in the furthest corner of the world generates an effect either push or pull.

II.2.2.2.1 The Attracting Factors

The account of the attracting factors is to a large extent confined to the enlargement issue of the Community²⁸. Pedersen²⁹ embarks on an inquiry with the tools of neo-functionalism to see the effects of integration over the political integration process. He says that the prevailing opinion is that enlargement is detrimental to political integration. Proponents of this view argue that 'the new Pan-European' and German unification will consume much of the sources previously allocated for Economic Monetary Union and Political Union; deepening process will have to be postponed. Also, as Etzioni argued Pan-Europe "could become the new focal point of identification"³⁰ diverting attention, which has just begun to shift to the level of 'common policies', to the Pan European level.

Contrary to the general expectancy yet, Pedersen³¹ adds, enlargement may have a constructive effect to political integration process. He presents three arguments in support of this thesis: 1) Enlargement will increase the possibilities for functional spill-over in economic field. This will possibly lead to another spill-over into political sphere as well, 2) As the EC assumes a more ambitious enlargement policy, this will convince both some other European countries that resist membership and also some Member States that resist political integration, 3) Once, the positive expectations from especially Third World countries propelled the EC to agree on European Political Cooperation; the Community seems to welcome a global political role. Today the same scenario might appear if the Third World countries are replaced by East European countries.

II.2.2.2.2 The Repelling Factors

In the previous chapters we have already outlined the effect of the external threats in the emergence of the EC.

²⁸ At first sight one might reach to the conclusion that such an attraction can certainly come only from countries contiguous to Europe. Nevertheless, the situation of Israel and of ACP countries which are far from the periphery of the Community and still transmit a pulling effect, and of countries like Norway though on the periphery but casts a rather pushing effect, prove that the research for pulling factors, in its ideal, could better exceed the limits of enlargement issue.

²⁹ Pedersen, *op. cit.*, pp.84-85.

³⁰ Etzioni, A., *Political Unification*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965, (no page) *cit. in Ibid.*, p.84.

³¹ *Ibid.*

"The.... breakthrough in EC integration in the mid-1980s drew much of its momentum from perceived external challenges (EPCs)"³². Buzan *et. al.* suggest that "the future of European security hinges on the interplay among three principal actors, the United States, the Soviet Union and Europe itself, and three variables, power³³, fear and interdependence³⁴"³⁵. A comparison³⁶ then is possible among the three actors for each variable. In terms of power, Buzan *et. al.* regard the United States as 'in a context of mild decline'³⁷. According to them, the positions of the Soviet Union (the book was first published in 1990) and of the EC will depend on the respective processes of integration or disintegration. After the publishing of the book, the adoption of the Treaty on European Union has been an indication for further integration of the EC whereas the components of the ex-Soviet Union continued to move far away from each other.

In terms of fear, the picture is one of all round diminution from the configuration of the Cold War decades. The big reductions in fear between East and West that occurred during the late 1980s look stable, though their final resting point will depend on many things, not least the process of arms reduction and re-configuration towards more defensive military postures on both sides. As military and political fears decline, there is some

³² *Ibid.* p.85.

³³ In accordance with the discourse of interdependence we define 'power' as "the ability of an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would not do (and at an acceptable cost to the actor)" (Keohane and Nye, 1989, p.11).

³⁴ For Keohane and Nye, interdependence "refers to situations characterised by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries" (*Ibid.*, p.8). Regarding 'interdependence' as a repelling factor seems difficult by definition. But different from the attracting factors in interdependence, there is still a feeling of rivalry atmosphere of a bargain. Yet, we will quote from Miall who says that, "(h)igh levels of interdependence between societies do not themselves determine either co-operation or conflict, but they increase the stakes of relationships. Sometimes they may foster a sense of common interests, at other times they may lead to a sense of vulnerability and threat. What matters is how, and whether, interdependence is managed" (Miall, 1994, p.5).

³⁵ Buzan *et. al.*, *op. cit.*, 166.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.166-174

³⁷ Mayall and Miall are of the same opinion when saying "The relative decline of the United States compared with its Japanese and EC partners weakened US leadership in monetary and broader economic management of the world economy. The end of the Cold War also raised question marks about whether US leadership will be preserved in security affairs. In a third emergent domain of international politics, the management of global environmental change, the US role has more often been to delay than to initiate co-ordinated international policies" (Mayall and Miall, 1994, p.268).

scope for increase in the economic sector. Between the United States and the EC these should be manageable.... Between East and West there will be strong fears of dependence on the Soviet side, and fears of risk both economic and strategic, within the West³⁸.

Slow but steady convergence among the component parts of the former Soviet Union and departures from Russia, the most ambitious claimant on the Soviet heritage alleviates the fears of 'dependence on the Soviet side'.

As for interdependence, Buzan *et. al.* regard the US-EC relationship to bid fair to remain 'stable at a high level'. They foresee a rise of interdependence between the EC and the Soviet Union of the time. After the dissolution, however, we may add, interdependence turned into a one sided dependence of the constituent units of the former Soviet Union to the Community.



³⁸ *Ibid.*, p.173. A few years later, developments justified the fears of the West, in particular the EC): "The controversies over NATO enlargement and the Russian claim to a security role in the space of the former Soviet Union clearly indicate the possibility that Europe may enter a new period of division. The rise of Zhirinovskiy and the setbacks for westernising reformers in Russia opened spectres of a new confrontation between states adhering to 'liberal democracy and market reform' and those which might be tempted to resort to exclusive nationalism, the defence of state industries and eventually militarism as a means of mobilising social support: the mixture pioneered by Slobodan Milosevic. A more cautious view of Russian developments, however, would argue that mainstream 'Eurasianist' policy, emphasising Russian national interests as a national power, which, although they might be formulated in neo-imperialist terms, are not, are not intrinsically incompatible with western (or even east) interests" (*Ibid.*, pp.271-272).

CONCLUSION

A typology that compartmentalise the theories of political integration into pluralism, functionalism, neo-functionalism and federalism is coherent in itself when it leans on the following three criteria: [(1)whether integration is an end-product or a process, (2)whether the end-product is a state-model or a community-model, and (3)whether the process is direct or indirect].

This model, however, should not be thought of as static. As the specific references to the history of European political integration exemplified:

1)No approach can be perceived completely free from the others and free from the context. As the OECD example of the Functionalism title has typified for instance, approaches in pure and isolated schemes are not germane.

2)As each approach exposes a continuum, shifts within an approach is possible; it has already been manifested in the OEEC example of the Pluralism title.

3)It is also likely for the compartments to interact among themselves. a) As in the WEU example of the Pluralism title where pluralism contains the seeds of supranational mechanisms, approaches may be born from each other; b) as it has been implied in 'Clash With Federalist Patterns' example of the Functionalism title, with the current milieu in Europe, approaches might often get intermingled, and -as implied thereafter- are tried to be separated; c) as also asserted in the same example, within the same context, the clash between federalism and functionalism displays the nature of a polar dichotomy within the model; and finally, d) as the examples of the EDC under the Pluralism title, and 'War Times' examples of the Federalism title have shown, some approaches surpass the others and predominate.

4)As de Gaulle's words under the Federalism title -when perceived with the following example that depict the European Parliament as a cumbersome machinery for any substantial change- have implied, the way to some approaches are steeper than to the others; their birth gives more pains than the others', whilst, as the OEEC and ESCS example of Neo-functionalism title has demonstrated, some approaches require an assembly of several elements carefully selected and delicately balanced; this time not their birth but caring about them is troublesome.

5) External environment have substantial effects. a) As the world-wide changing environment have changed the colour of the political integration at the EC level through Member State policies in the EEC example under the Pluralism title, and, under the Federalism title (in the Adenauer example), outside events affect the choice between approaches; b) as the UN's Economic Commission for Europe example in the Functionalism title have implied, a suitable environment is among the prerequisites of the viability of individual approaches. The approaches both individually and as a whole, more than Pentland stressed, are sensitive to the external environment.

For the external environment we are confronted with a large spectrum of options. We can define Europe solely with internal variables -when the proportion of external ingredient is zero- or think of a Europe solely delineated under the influence of external factors -maximum proportion of external factors. External factors, in our view are classified into two categories: attracting and repelling. The attracting influences come from the countries who either aspire for full membership or who, for historical or political reasons, have been in close relation with Europe. The repelling influences are from countries or country groups who are rivals to the EC at the global scale. This rivalry is of course is not in an overt and direct one, and should be seen in the long run. When all these attracting and repelling factors are taken into consideration and the proportion of external factor is decided, we arrive at one of the definitions of Europe extending among the choices between one encompassing the European Community (basically Western Europe) -the smallest contemplation of Europe, or another from Vancouver to Vladivostock -the largest contemplation of Europe.

APPENDIX-I

TWO NORMATIVE EXPRESSIONS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

A paragraph from Wolfgang Wessels article "Rationalizing Maastricht: The Search for an Optimal Strategy of the New Europe"

The renationalization strategy is also based on a certain reading of the history of 1989. This concept stresses that the altered realities of a 'new Europe', with the fundamental changes in the international system away from superpower bilateralism, the new situation in Eastern Europe and German unification have confirmed that nation-states are and continue to be the basic units of the international and thus also of the European system. The nation-state remains the 'master of the game', but sovereign states will be prepared -whenever they perceive it to be in accord with the pursuit of national interests- to co-operate with each other. For this purpose, they even prepared to accept a fixed framework; but it must be a framework without too many legal strings attached to it and free from excessive influence by non-national institutions. The European Union, especially with the restated importance of the European states, is to be shaped in the direction of a 'confederation' designed to tackle a limited number of common problems by extending procedures of intergovernmental co-operation to all major policy areas. The 1996 conference should therefore divert the development process from the fundamental trends of the last 40 years into the 'right' direction. Not a Maastricht II but a 'Rome/Maastricht Europe minus' is the objective.

(Wessels, Wolfgang, "Rationalising Maastricht: The Search for an optimal strategy of the new Europe", *International Affairs* 70: 3, 1994, 445-457, p.451)

Address by the President of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Vaclav Havel, at the opening session of the Assembly on the European Confederation

...I think that the idea of a European Confederation has two dimensions.

I would call the first dimension a futurological one. Supposing that everything proceeds smoothly and all the major problems we are grappling with today are gradually resolved, we can ... fairly easily imagine Europe emerging as one large confederated formation in fifteen or twenty years...

The most frequently expressed doubts or objections to the initiative of the European Confederation stem from the fear that, for some reason, a new institution is being planned or invented while there are already many other tested international institutions in Europe whose number would thus, quite uselessly, be enlarged, and whose fields of action would, quite uselessly, overlap the ambitions of the new institution.

...It is my opinion that contemplating at this stage any institutionalisation ... of the idea of the European Confederation, is meaningful only if it is clear from the very beginning that such an institutional embryo by no means wants to take over the functions of the existing tested or viable institutions and organisations, but that, on the contrary, it wants to complement their activity...

Let me give a few examples in this respect:

(1) I think that the Europe Confederation should not, on principle, at least for the time being, deal with security issues. I believe that European security is a major theme of the Helsinki process and am convinced that, within the process, there are as yet unused, dormant potentialities for gradually creating an entirely new system of European security guarantees...

(2) In the many years of doing its important work, the Council of Europe has created and continues to create foundations for a Pan-european unification of the law, and the creation and development of a European political culture in general. Competing with the Council of Europe would be senseless...

(3) Then there are the European Communities, by far the most integrated European formation. I think that the idea of the European Confederation cannot overlook the existence of the European Communities or consider them something parallel that is unrelated to Europe as a whole, as an élite club that others have nothing to do with; it must rather view the EC as its motor, its standard bearer, the model of its own future...

I also think it would be wrong and even harmful to stability throughout Europe if the process of the creation of the European Confederation slowed down in any way the approach of the new Central and East European democracies to the European Communities. If it institutionalised, in any way, their position as second-class countries, for which belonging to the Confederation should constitute a satisfactory substitute, pacifying their higher ambitions.

(Weigall, David and Sirk, Peter, *The Origins and Development of the European Community*, Leicester University Press, Leicester and London, 1992, pp.192-193)

APPENDIX-II

A Summary of the Four Approaches of Pentland

	PLURALISM	FUNCTIONALISM	NEO-FUNCTIONALISM	FEDERALISM
I. The End-Product: Structure	Community of states	Administrative network responsive to community needs	Supranational decision-making system	Supranational
Evidence	Probability of peaceful conflict resolution; communications (flow intensity)	Degree of 'fit' between structures & functions; need-satisfaction	Locus of decisions (scope & level)	Distribution of power (formal & informal)
II. The Process: System	Self-sustaining growth of interdependence & informal structures	Technical self-determination; imperatives of functional needs & technological change	Political development: growth of central institutions through 'forward linkage'	Constitutional revolution: dramatic redistribution of power and authority
State	Increase of capacity for decision-making, information & responsiveness	Reluctant co-operation to solve technical & economic problems	Bargaining process where governments pursue interests among other groups	Bargaining resulting in Hobbesian contract among élites of states
Individual	Social learning through communications & interaction (élite & mass)	Habits of co-operation derived from satisfaction of utilitarian needs by new institutions	Effects of successful decision-making & conflict resolution on élite attitudes	Differentiation of loyalties according to level of government

(Pentland, Charles, *International Theory and European Integration*, The Free Press, New York, 1973, p.190)

APPENDIX-III

(Below are some intergovernmental (≈pluralistic) and supranational aspects of the European Community after Maastricht amendments):

The principal intergovernmental characteristics are as follows:

- In most of the major areas of public policy -including foreign affairs, defence, macroeconomic policy, financial and monetary policy, education , health and law and order- decisions are still taken at the national level. Each state consults and co-ordinates with its Community partners on aspects of these policies, and is sometimes subject to constraints as a result of Community membership, but usually, in the last analysis, a state can decide for itself what is to be done.
- Virtually all major decisions of the Community are taken by the European Council or the Council of Ministers. These institutions bring together the political representatives of the member states.
- In the European Council and the Council of Ministers most major decisions are taken on the basis of consensus and unanimity. Where, in the Council of Ministers, there is constitutional provision for majority voting, it is still theoretically possible (although it may be politically difficult) for any state, as a result of the Luxembourg Compromise, to veto a policy proposal if it has a 'vital national interest' at stake.
- The Commission and the Parliament, the two most obvious supranational power rivals to the European Council and the Council of Ministers, are restricted in their decision-making powers, and have had only very limited success in imposing policies on the Council which it did not really want.

Of the supranational characteristics of the Community, the following are particularly important:

- The Commission may have to defer to the European Council and the Council of Ministers with respect to the taking of major decisions, but it is an extremely important decision-maker in its own right when it comes to secondary and regulatory decision-making. Indeed in quantitative terms most Community legislation is issued in the name of the Commission and not the Council.
- In the Council of Ministers, majority voting has always been an acceptable practice for budgetary decision-making, but, since the mid-1980s, it has come to be increasingly used in other areas too. By extending the spheres in which majority voting is constitutionally permissible -including to the crucial sphere of the internal market -the Single European Act gave a considerable impetus to this growth in the use of majority voting.
- The European Parliament's constitutional powers may be limited, but its rôle in Community decision-making should not be dismissed altogether: it has important powers over the budget, and it exercises a by no means inconsiderable influence on

Some intergovernmental and supranational aspects of the European Community

legislative proposals -especially where the two reading co-operation procedure applies.

● The force and status of decision-making outcomes is crucial to Community supranationalism for, clearly, the Community could hardly be described as supranational at all if its decisions had no binding force. Some, indeed, do not and are merely advisory and exhortative. But many do, and constitute Community law. It is a law that constitutes an increasingly prominent part of the legal systems of all member states. It is a law, too, that takes precedence over national law should the two conflict, and a law that, in the event of a dispute, finds its final authority not in national courts, but in the interpretations of the Community's own Court of Justice.

(Nugent, Neil, *The Government and Politics of the European Community*, Macmillan Press Ltd. Hong Kong, 1993, pp.385-387)



APPENDIX-IV

COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) No 2137/85 of July 1985 on the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, and in particular Article 235 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the Commission¹,

Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament²,

Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee³,

Whereas a harmonious development of economic activities and a continuous

and balanced expansion throughout the Community depend on the establishment and smooth functioning of a common market offering conditions analogous to those of a national market; whereas to bring about this single market and to increase its unity a legal framework which facilitates the adaptation of their activities to the economic conditions of the Community should be created for natural persons, companies, firms and other legal bodies in particular; whereas to that end it is necessary that those natural persons, companies, firms and other legal bodies should be able to co-operate effectively across frontiers;

Whereas co-operation of this nature can encounter legal fiscal or psychological difficulties; whereas the creation of an appropriate Community legal instrument in the form of a European Economic Interest Grouping would contribute to the achievement

of the abovementioned objectives and therefore proves necessary;

Whereas the Treaty does not provide the necessary powers for the creation of such a legal instrument;

Whereas a grouping's ability to adapt to economic conditions must be guaranteed by the considerable freedom for its members in their contractual relations and the internal organisation of the grouping;

Whereas a grouping differs from a firm or company principally in its purpose, which is only to facilitate or develop the economic activities of its members to enable them to improve their own results; whereas, by reason of that ancillary nature, a grouping's activities must be related to the economic activities of its members but not replace them so that, to that extent, for example, a grouping may not itself, with regard to third parties, practise a profession, the concept of economic activities being interpreted in the widest sense;

Whereas access to grouping form must be made as widely available as possible to natural persons, companies, firms and other legal bodies, in keeping with the aims of this Regulation shall not however, prejudice the application at national level of legal rules and/or ethical codes concerning the conditions for the pursuit of business and professional activities;

Whereas this Regulation does not itself confer on any person the right to participate in a grouping, even where the conditions it lays down are fulfilled;

Whereas the power provided by this Regulation to prohibit or restrict participation in grouping on grounds of public interest is without prejudice to the laws of Member States which govern the pursuit of activities and which may provide further prohibitions or restrictions or otherwise control or supervise participation in a grouping by any natural

¹ OJ No C 14, 15.2.1974, p.30 and OJ No C 103, 28.4.1978, p.4.

² OJ No C 163, 11.7.1977, p.17.

³ OJ No C 108, 15.5.1975, p.46.

person, company, firm or other legal body or any class of them;

Whereas, to enable a grouping to achieve its purpose, it should be endowed with legal capacity and provision should be made for it to be represented *vis-à-vis* third parties by an organ legally separate from its membership;

Whereas the protection of third parties requires widespread publicity; whereas the members of a grouping have unlimited joint and several liability for the grouping's debts and other liabilities, including those relating to tax or social security, without, however, that principle's affecting the freedom to exclude the liability of one or more of its members in respect of a particular debt or other liability by means of a specific contract between grouping and a third party;

Whereas matters relating to the status or capacity of natural persons and to the capacity of legal persons are governed by national law;

Whereas the grounds for winding up which are which are peculiar to the grouping should be specific while referring to national law for its liquidation and the conclusion thereof;

Whereas groupings are subject to national laws relating to insolvency and cessation of payments; whereas such laws may provide other grounds for winding up of groupings;

Whereas this Regulation provides that the profits or losses resulting from the activities of a grouping shall be taxable only in the hands of its members; whereas it is understood that otherwise national tax laws apply, particularly as regards to apportionment of profits, tax procedures and any obligations imposed by national tax law;

Whereas in matters not covered by this Regulation the laws of the Member States and the Community law are applicable, for example with regard to:

- social and labour laws,
- competition law,
- intellectual property law;

Whereas the activities of groupings are subject to the provisions of Member States' laws on the pursuit and supervision of activities; whereas in the event of abuse or circumvention of the laws of a Member State by a grouping

or its members that Member State may impose appropriate sanctions;

Whereas the Member States are free to apply or to adopt any laws, regulations or administrative measures which do not conflict with the scope or objectives of this Regulation;

Whereas this regulation must enter into force immediately in its entirety; whereas the implementation of some provisions must nevertheless be deferred in order to allow the Member States first to set up the necessary machinery for the registration of groupings in their territories and the disclosure of certain matters relating to groupings; whereas, with effect from the date of implementation of this Regulation, groupings set up may operate without territorial restrictions.

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

1. European Economic Interest Groupings shall be formed upon the terms, in the manner and with the effects laid down in this regulation.

Accordingly, parties intending to form a grouping must conclude a contract and have the registration provided for in Article 6 carried out.

2. A grouping so formed shall, from the date of its registration as provided for in Article 6, have the capacity, in its own name, to have rights and obligations of all kinds, to make contracts or accomplish other legal acts, and to sue and be sued.

3. The Member States shall determine whether or not groupings registered at their registries, pursuant to Article 6, have legal personality.

Article 2

1. Subject to the provisions of this regulation, the law applicable, on the one hand, to the contract for the formation of a grouping, except as regards matters relating to the status or capacity of legal persons and, on the other hand, to the internal organisation of a grouping shall be the internal law of the State in which the official address is situated, as laid down in the contract for the formation of the grouping.

T.C. YÜKSEKÖĞRETİM KURULU
ARAŞTIRMALARI MERKEZİ

2. Where a State comprises several territorial units, each of which has its own rules of law applicable to the matters referred to in paragraph 1, each territorial unit shall be considered as a State for the purposes of identifying the law applicable under this Article.

Article 3

1. The purpose of a grouping shall be to facilitate or develop the economic activities of its members and to improve or increase the results of those activities; its purpose is not to make profits for itself.

Its activity shall be related to the economic activities of its members and must not be more than ancillary to those activities.

2. Consequently, a grouping may not:

- (a) exercise, directly or indirectly, a power of management or supervision over its member's own activities or over the activities of another undertaking, in particular in the fields of personnel, finance and investment;
- (b) directly or indirectly, on any basis whatsoever, hold shares of any kind in a member undertaking; the holding of shares in another undertaking shall be possible only in so far as it is necessary for the achievement of the grouping's objects and if it is done on its members' behalf;
- (c) employ more than 500 persons;
- (d) be used by a company to make a loan to a director of a company, or any person connected with him, when the making of such loans is restricted or controlled under the Member State's laws governing companies. Nor must a grouping be used for the transfer of any property between a company and a director, or any person connected with him, except to the extent allowed by the Member State's laws governing companies. For the purposes of this provision the making of a loan includes entering into any transaction or arrangement of similar effect, and property includes moveable and immovable property;
- (e) be a member of another European Economic Interest Grouping.

Article 4

1. Only one of the following may be members of a grouping:

- (a) companies or firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty and other legal bodies governed by public or private law, which have been formed in accordance with the law of a Member State

and which have their registered or statutory office and central administration in the Community; where, under the law of a Member State, a company, firm or other legal body is not obliged to have a registered or statutory office, it shall be sufficient for such a company, firm or other legal body to have its central administration in the Community;

- (b) natural persons who carry on any industrial, commerce, craft or agricultural activity or who provide professional or other services in the Community;

2. A grouping must comprise at least:

- (a) two companies, firms or other legal bodies, within the meaning of paragraph 1, which have their central administrations in different Member States, or
- (b) two natural persons, within the meaning of paragraph 1, who carry on their principal activities in different Member States, or
- (c) a company, firm or other legal body within the meaning of paragraph 1 and a natural person, of which the first has its central administration in one Member State and the second carries on his principal activity in another Member State.

3. A Member State may provide that groupings registered at its registries in accordance with Article 6 may have no more than 20 members. For this purpose, that Member State may provide that, in accordance with its laws, each member of a legal body formed under its laws, other than a registered company, shall be treated as a separate member of a grouping.

4. Any Member State may, on grounds of that State's public interest, prohibit or restrict participation in groupings by certain classes of natural persons, companies, firms, or other legal bodies.

Article 5

A contract for the formation of a grouping shall include at least:

- (a) the name of the grouping preceded or followed either by the words 'European Economic Interest Grouping' or by the initials 'EEIG' unless those words or initials already form part of the name;
- (b) the official address of the grouping;
- (c) the objects for which the grouping is formed;
- (d) the name, business name, legal form, permanent address or registered office, and the

number and place of registration, if any, of each member of the grouping;
(e) the duration of the grouping, except where this is indefinite.

Article 6

A grouping shall be registered in the State in which it has its official address, at the registry designated pursuant to Article 39 (1).

Article 7

A contract for the formation of a grouping shall be filed at the registry referred to in Article 6.

The following documents and particulars must also be filed at that registry:

- (a) any amendment to the contract for the formation of a grouping, including any change in the composition of a grouping;
- (b) notice of the setting up or closure of any establishment of the grouping;
- (c) any judicial decision establishing or declaring the nullity of a grouping, in accordance with Article 15;
- (d) notice of the appointment of the manager or managers of a grouping, their names and any other identification particulars required by the law of the Member State in which the register is kept, notification that they may act alone or must act jointly, and the termination of any manager's appointment;
- (e) notice of a member's assignment of his participation in a grouping or a proportion thereof, in accordance with Article 22 (1);
- (f) any decision by members ordering or establishing the winding up of a grouping, in accordance with Article 31, or any judicial decision ordering such winding up in accordance with Articles 31 or 32;
- (g) notice of the appointment of the liquidator or liquidators of a grouping, as referred to in Article 35, their names and any other identification particulars required by the law of the Member State in which the register is kept, and the termination of any liquidator's appointment;
- (h) notice of the conclusion of a grouping's liquidation, as referred to in Article 35(2);
- (i) any proposal to transfer the official address, as referred to in Article 14(1);
- (j) any clause exempting a new member from the payment of debts and other liabilities which originated prior to his admission, in accordance with Article 26(2).

Article 8

The following must be published as laid down in Article 39, in the gazette referred to in paragraph 1 of that Article:

- (a) the particulars which must be included in the contract for the formation of a grouping, pursuant to Article 5, and any amendments thereto;
- (b) the number, date and place of registration as well as notice of the termination of that registration;
- (c) the documents and particulars referred to in Article 7 (b) to (j).

The particulars referred to in (a) and (b) must be published in full. The documents and particulars referred to in (c) may be published either in full or in extract form or by means of a reference to their filing at the registry, in accordance with the national legislation applicable.

Article 9

1. The documents and particulars which must be published pursuant to this regulation may be relied on by a grouping as against third parties under the conditions laid down by the national law applicable pursuant to Article 3(5) and (7) of Council Directive 68/151/EEC of 9 March 1968 on co-ordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent throughout the Community¹.

2. If activities have been carried on behalf of a grouping before its registration in accordance with Article 6 and if the grouping does not, after its registration, assume the obligations arising out of such activities, the natural persons, companies, firms or other legal bodies which carried on those activities shall bear unlimited joint and several liability for them.

Article 10

Any grouping establishment situated in a Member State other than that in which the official address is situated shall be registered in that State. For the purpose of such registration, a grouping shall file, at the appropriate registry in that Member State, copies of the documents which must be filed at the registry of the

¹OJ No L 65, 14.3.1968, p.8.

Member State in which the official address is situated, together, if necessary, with a translation which conforms with the practice of the registry where the establishment is registered.

Article 11

Notice that a grouping has been formed or that the liquidation of a grouping has been concluded stating the number, date and place of registration and the date, place and title of publication, shall be given in the *Official Journal of the European Communities* after it has been published in the gazette referred to in Article 39(1).

Article 12

The official address referred to in the contract for the formation of a grouping must be situated in the Community.

The official address must be fixed either:

- (a) where the grouping has its central administration, or
- (b) where one of the members of the grouping has its central administration or, in the case of a natural person, his principal activity, provided that the grouping carries on an activity there.

Article 13

The official address of a grouping may be transferred within the Community.

When such a transfer does not result in a change in the law applicable pursuant to Article 2, the decision to transfer shall be taken in accordance with the conditions laid down in the contract for the formation of the grouping.

Article 14

1. When the transfer of the official address results in a change in the law applicable pursuant to Article 2, a transfer proposal must be drawn up, filed and published in accordance with the conditions laid down in Articles 7 and 8.

No decision to transfer may be taken for two months after publication of the proposal. Any such decision must be taken by the members of the grouping unanimously. The transfer shall take effect on the date on which the grouping is registered, in accordance with Article 6, at the registry for the new official address. That registration may not be effected until the evidence has been produced that the proposal

to transfer the official address has been published.

2. The termination of a grouping's registration at the registry for its old official address may not be effected until evidence has been produced that the grouping has been registered at the registry for its new official address.

3. Upon publication of a grouping's new registration the new official address may be relied on as against third parties in accordance with the conditions referred to in Article 9(1); however, as long as the termination of the grouping's registration at the registry for the old official address has not been published, third parties may continue to rely on the old official address unless the grouping proves that such third parties were aware of the new official address.

3. Upon publication of a grouping's new registration the new official address may be relied on as against third parties in accordance with the conditions referred to in article 9 (1); however, as long as the termination of the grouping's registration at the registry for the old official address has not been published, third parties may continue to rely on the old official address unless the grouping proves that such third parties were aware of the new official address.

4. The laws of a Member State may provide that, as regards groupings registered under Article 6 in that Member State, the transfer of an official address which would result in a change of the law applicable shall not take effect if, within the two-month period referred to in paragraph 1, a competent authority in that Member State opposes it. Such opposition may be based only on grounds of public interest. Review by a judicial authority must be possible.

Article 15

1. Where law applicable to a grouping by virtue of Article 2 provides for the nullity of that grouping, such nullity must be established or declared by judicial decision. However, the court to which the matter is referred must, where it is possible for the affairs of the grouping to be put in order, allow time to permit that to be done.

2. The nullity of a grouping shall entail its liquidation in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article 35.

3. A decision establishing or declaring the nullity of a grouping may be relied on as against third parties in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article 9 (1).

Such a decision shall not of itself affect the validity of liabilities, owed by or to a grouping, which originated before it could be relied on as against third parties in accordance with the conditions laid down in the previous subparagraph.

Article 16

1. The organs of a grouping shall be the members acting collectively and the manager or managers.

A contract for the formation of a grouping may provide for other organs; if it does it shall determine their powers.

2. The members of a grouping, acting as a body, may take any decision for the purpose of achieving the objects of the grouping.

Article 17

1. Each member shall have one vote. The contract for the formation of a grouping may, however, give more than one vote to certain members, provided that no one member holds a majority of the voted.

2. A unanimous decision by the members shall be required to:

- (a) alter the objects of a grouping;
- (b) alter the number of votes allotted to each member;
- (c) alter the conditions for the taking of decisions;
- (d) extend the duration of a grouping beyond any period fixed in the contract for the formation of the grouping;
- (e) alter the contribution by every member or by some members to the grouping's financing;
- (f) alter any other obligation of a member, unless otherwise provided by the contract for the formation of the grouping,
- (g) make any alteration to the contract for the formation of the grouping not covered by this paragraph, unless otherwise provided by that contract.

3. Except where this Regulation provides that decisions must be taken

unanimously, the contract for the formation of a grouping may prescribe the conditions for a quorum and for a majority, in accordance with which the decisions, or some of them, shall be taken. Unless otherwise provided for by the contract, decisions shall be taken unanimously.

4. On the initiative of a manager or at the request of a member, the manager or managers must arrange for the members to be consulted so that the latter can take a decision.

Article 18

Each member shall be entitled to obtain information from the manager or managers concerning the grouping's business and to inspect the grouping's books and business records.

Article 19

1. A grouping shall be managed by one or more natural persons appointed in the contract for the formation of the grouping or by decision of the members.

No person may be a manager of a grouping if :

- by virtue of the law applicable to him, or
- by virtue of the internal law of the State in which the grouping has its official address, or
- following a judicial or administrative decision made or recognised in a Member State

he may not belong to the administrative or management body of a company, may not manage an undertaking or may not act as manager of a European Economic Interest Grouping.

2. A Member State may, in the case of groupings registered at their registries pursuant to Article 6, provide that legal persons may be managers on condition that such legal persons designate one or more natural persons, whose particulars shall be the subjects of the filling provisions of Article 7 (d) to represent them.

If a Member State exercises this option, it must provide that the representative or representatives shall be liable as if they were themselves managers of the groupings concerned.

The restrictions imposed in paragraph 1 shall also apply to those representatives.

3. The contract for the formation of a grouping or failing that, a unanimous decision

by the members shall determine the conditions for the appointment and removal of the manager and managers and shall lay down their powers.

Article 20

1. Only the manager or, where there are two or more, each of the managers shall represent a grouping in respect of dealings with third parties.

Each of the managers shall bind the grouping as regards third parties when he acts on behalf of the grouping, even where his acts do not fall within the objects of the grouping, unless the grouping proves that the third party knew or could not, under the circumstances, have been unaware that the act fell outside the objects of the grouping; publication of the particulars referred to in Article 5(c) shall not of itself be proof thereof.

No limitation on the powers of the manager or managers, whether deriving from the contract for the formation of the grouping or from a decision by the members, may be relied on as against third parties even if it is published.

2. The contract for the formation of the grouping may provide that the grouping shall be validly bound only by two or more managers acting jointly. Such a clause may be relied on against third parties in accordance with the conditions referred to in Article 9(1) only if it is published in accordance with Article 8.

Article 21

1. The profits resulting from a grouping's activities shall be deemed to be the profits of the members and shall be apportioned among them in the proportions laid down in the contract for the formation of the grouping or, in the absence of any such provision, in equal shares.

2. The members of a grouping shall contribute to the payment of the amount by which expenditure exceeds income in the proportions laid down in the contract for the formation of the grouping or, in the absence of any such provision, in equal shares.

Article 22

1. Any member of a grouping may assign his participation in the grouping, or a proportion thereof, either to another member or to a third party; the assignment shall not

take effect without the unanimous authorisation of the other members.

2. A member of a grouping may use his participation in the grouping as security only after the other members have given their unanimous authorisation, unless otherwise laid down in the contract for the formation of the grouping. The holder of the security may not at any time become a member of the grouping by virtue of that security.

Article 23

No grouping may invite investment by the public.

Article 24

1. The members of a grouping shall have unlimited joint and several liability for its debts and other liabilities of whatever nature. National law shall determine the consequences of such liability.

2. Creditors may not proceed against a member for payment in respect of debts and other liabilities, in accordance with the conditions laid down in paragraph 1, before the liquidation of a grouping is concluded, unless they have first requested the grouping to pay and payment has not been made within an appropriate period.

Article 25

Letters, order forms and similar documents must indicate legibly:

- (a) the name of the grouping preceded or followed either by the words 'European Economic Interest Grouping' or by the initials 'EEIG', unless those words or initials already occur in the name;
- (b) the location of the registry referred to in Article 6, in which the grouping is registered, together with the number of the grouping's entry at the registry;
- (c) the grouping's official address;
- (d) where applicable, that the managers must act jointly;
- (e) where applicable, that the grouping is in liquidation, pursuant to Articles 15, 31, 32 or 36.

every establishment of a grouping, when registered in accordance with Article 10, must give the above particulars, together with those relating to its own registration, on the documents referred to in the first paragraph of this Article uttered by it.

Article 26

1. A decision to admit new members shall be taken unanimously by the members of the grouping.

2. Every new member shall be liable, in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article 24, for the grouping's debts and other liabilities, including those arising out of the grouping's activities before his admission.

He may, however, be exempted by a clause in the contract for the formation of the grouping or in the instrument of admission from the payment of debts and other liabilities which originated before his admission. Such a clause may be relied on as against third parties, under the conditions referred to in Article 9(1), only if it is published in accordance with Article 8.

Article 27

1. A member of a grouping may withdraw in accordance with the conditions laid down in the contract for the formation of a grouping or, in the absence of such conditions, with the unanimous agreement of the other members.

Any member of a grouping may, in addition, withdraw on just and proper grounds.

2. Any member of a grouping may be expelled for the reasons listed in the contract for the formation of the grouping and, in any case, if he seriously fails in his obligations or if he causes or threatens to cause serious disruption in the operation of the grouping.

Such expulsion may occur only by the decision of a court to which joint application has been made by a majority of the other members, unless otherwise provided by the contract for the formation of a grouping.

Article 28

1. A member of a grouping shall cease to belong to it on death or when he no longer complies with the conditions laid down in Article 4(1).

In addition, a Member State may provide, for the purposes of its liquidation, winding up, insolvency or cessation of payments laws, that a member shall cease to be a member shall cease to be a member of any grouping at the moment determined by those laws.

2. In the event of the death of a natural person who is a member of a grouping, no person may become a member in his place except under the conditions laid down in the contract for the formation of the grouping or failing that, with the unanimous agreement of the remaining members.

Article 29

As soon as a member ceases to belong to a grouping, the manager or managers must inform the other members of that fact; they must also take the steps required as listed in Articles 7 and 8. In addition, any person concerned may take those steps.

Article 30

Except where the contract for the formation of a grouping provides otherwise and without prejudice to the rights acquired by a person under Articles 22(1) or 28(2), a grouping shall continue to exist for the remaining members after a member has ceased to belong to it, in accordance with the conditions laid down in the contract for the formation of the grouping or determined by unanimous decision of the members in question.

Article 31

1. A grouping may be wound up by a decision of its members ordering its winding up. Such a decision shall be taken unanimously, unless otherwise laid down in the contract for the formation of the grouping.

2. A grouping must be wound up by a decision of its members:

(a) noting the expiry of the period fixed in the contract for the formation of the grouping or the existence of any other cause for winding up provided for in the contract, or

(b) noting the accomplishment of the grouping's purpose or the impossibility of pursuing it further.

Where, three months after one of the situations referred to in the first subparagraph has occurred, a members' decision establishing the winding up of the grouping has not been taken, any member may petition the court to order winding up.

3. A grouping must also be wound up by a decision of its members or of the remaining member when the conditions laid down in Article 4(2) are no longer fulfilled.

4. After a grouping has been wound up by decision of its members, the manager or managers must take the steps required as listed in Articles 7 and 8. In addition, any person concerned may take those steps.

Article 32

1. On application by any person concerned or by a competent authority, in the event of the infringement of Articles 3, 12 or 31(3), the court must order a grouping to be wound up, unless its affairs can be and are put in order before the court has delivered a substantive ruling.

2. On applications by a member, the court may order a grouping to be wound up on just and proper grounds.

3. A Member State may provide that the court may, on application by a competent authority, order the winding up of a grouping which has its official address in the State to which that authority belongs, wherever the grouping acts in contravention of that State's public interest, if the law of that State provides for such a possibility in respect of registered companies or other legal bodies subject to it.

Article 33

When a member ceases to belong to a grouping for any reason other than the assignment of his rights in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article 22(1), the value of his rights and obligations shall be determined taking into account the assets and liabilities of the groupings as they stand when he ceases to belong to it.

The value of the rights and obligations of a departing member may not be fixed in advance.

Article 34

Without prejudice to Article 37(1), any member who ceases to belong to a grouping shall remain answerable, in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article 24, for the debts and other liabilities arising out of the grouping's activities before he ceased to be a member.

Article 35

1. The winding up of a grouping shall entail its liquidation.

2. The liquidation of a grouping and the conclusion of its liquidation shall be governed by national law.

3. A grouping shall retain its capacity, within the meaning of Article 1(2), until its liquidation is concluded.

4. The liquidator or liquidators shall take the steps required as listed in Articles 7 and 8.

Article 36

Groupings shall be subject to national laws governing insolvency and cessation of payments. The commencement of proceedings against a grouping on grounds of its insolvency or cessation of payments shall not by itself cause the commencement of such proceedings against its members.

Article 37

1. A period of limitation of five years after the publication, pursuant to Article 8, of notice of a member's ceasing to belong to a grouping shall be substituted for any longer period which may be laid down by the relevant national law for actions against that member in connection with debts and other liabilities arising out of the grouping's activities before he ceased to be a member.

2. A period of limitation of five years after the publication, pursuant to Article 8, of notice of the conclusion of the liquidation of a grouping shall be substituted for any longer period which may be laid down by the relevant national law for actions against a member of the grouping in connection with debts and other liabilities arising out of that grouping's activities.

Article 38

Where a grouping carries on any activity in a Member State in contravention of that State's public interest, a competent authority of that State may prohibit that activity. Review of that competent authority's decision by a judicial authority shall be possible.

Article 39

1. The Member States shall designate the registry or registries responsible for effecting the registration referred to in Articles 6 and 10 and shall lay down the rules governing registration. They shall prescribe the conditions under which the documents referred to in Articles 7 and 10 shall be filed. They shall ensure that the documents and particulars

referred to in Article 8 are published in the appropriate official gazette of the Member State in which the grouping has its official address, and may prescribe the manner of publication of the documents and particulars referred to in Article 8(c).

The Member States shall also ensure that anyone may, at the appropriate registry pursuant to Article 6 or, where appropriate, Article 10, inspect the documents referred to in Article 7 and obtain, even by post, full or partial copies thereof.

The Member States may provide for the payment of fees in connection with the operations referred to in the preceding subparagraphs; those fees may not, however, exceed the administrative cost thereof.

2. The Member States shall ensure that the information to be published in the *Official Journal of the European Communities* pursuant to Article 11 is forwarded to the Office for Official Publications of the European Communities within one month of its publication in the official gazette referred to in paragraph 1.

3. The Member States shall provide for appropriate penalties in the event of failure to comply with the provisions of Articles 7, 8 and 10 on disclosure and in the event of failure to comply with Article 25.

Article 40

The profits or losses resulting from the activities of a grouping shall be taxable only in the hands of its members.

Article 41

1. The Member States shall take the measures required by virtue of Article 39 before 1 July 1989. They shall immediately communicate them to the Commission.

2. For information purposes, the Member States shall inform the Commission of the classes of natural persons, companies, firms and other legal bodies which they prohibit from participating in groupings pursuant to Article 4(4). The Commission shall inform the other Member States.

Article 42

1. Upon the adoption of this Regulation a Contact Committee shall be set up under the

auspices of the Commission. Its function shall be:

(a) to facilitate, without prejudice to Articles 169 and 170 of the Treaty, application of this Regulation through regular consultation dealing in particular with practical problems arising in connection with its application;

(b) to advise the Commission, if necessary, on additions or amendments to this Regulation.

2. The Contact Committee shall be composed of representatives of the Member States and representatives of the Commission. The Commission shall provide the secretariat.

3. The Contact Committee shall be convened by its chairman either on his own initiative or at the request of one of its members.

Article 43

This Regulation shall enter into force on the third day following its publication in the *Official Journal of the European Communities*.

It shall apply from 1 July 1989, with the exception of Articles 39, 41 and 42 which shall apply as from the entry into force of the Regulation.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States

Done at Brussels, 25 July 1985,

For the Council
The President
J. POOS



APPENDIX-V

A FAMILY OF NATIONS

Excerpts from the speech of Ex-Prime Minister of Britain Margaret Thatcher, made at the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium, on 20 September 1988

Mr. Chairman, you have invited me to speak on the subject of Britain and Europe. Perhaps I should congratulate you on your courage. If you believe some of the things said and written about my views on Europe, it must seem rather like inviting Genghis Khan to speak on the virtues of peaceful co-existence!

I want to start by disposing of some myths about my country, Britain, and its relationship with Europe. And to do that I must say about the identity of Europe itself. Europe is not the creation of the Treaty of Rome. Nor is the European idea the property of any group or institution. We British are as much heirs to the legacy of European culture as any other nation. Our links to the rest of Europe, the continent of Europe, have been the dominant factor in our history.

.....

The European Community belongs to all its members. It must reflect the traditions aspirations of all its members. And let me be quite clear. Britain does not dream of some cosy isolated existence on the fringes of the European Community. Our destiny is in Europe, as part of the Community. That is not to say that our future lies only in Europe. But nor does that of France, Spain or indeed any other member.

The Community is not an end in itself. Nor is it an institutional device to be constantly modified according to the dictates of some abstract intellectual concept. Nor must it be ossified by endless regulation. The European community is the practical means by which Europe can ensure the future prosperity and security of its people in a world in which there are many other powerful nations and groups of nations. We Europeans cannot afford to waste our energies on internal disputes or arcane institutional debates They are no substitute for effective action. Europe has to be ready both to contribute in full measure to its own security and to compete commercially and industrially, in a world in which success goes to the countries which encourage individual initiative and enterprise, rather than to those which attempt to diminish them.

This evening I want to set out some guiding principles for the future which I believe will ensure that Europe does succeed, not just in economic and defence terms but also in the quality of life and the influence of its peoples.

My first guiding principle is this: willing and active co-operation between independent sovereign states is the best way to build a successful European Community. To try to suppress nationhood and concentrate power at the centre of a European conglomerate would be highly damaging and would jeopardise the objectives we seek to achieve. Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France

as France, Spain as Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions and identity. It would be folly to try to fit them into some sort of identikit European personality.

.....

I am the first to say that on many great issues the countries of Europe should try to speak with a single voice. I want to see us work more closely on the things we can do better together than alone.... But working more closely together does not require power to be centralised in Brussels or decisions to be taken by an appointed bureaucracy.

.....

My second guiding principle is this: Community policies must tackle present problems in a practical way, however difficult they may be. If we cannot reform those Community policies which are patently wrong or ineffective and which are rightly causing public disquiet, then we shall not get the public support for the Community's further development.

My third guiding principle is the need for Community policies which encourage enterprise. If Europe is to flourish and create the jobs of the future, enterprise is the key. The basic framework is there: the Treaty of Rome itself was intended as a Charter for Economic Liberty. But that is not how it has always been read, still less applied.

The lesson of the economic history of Europe in the 1970s and 1980s is that central planning and detailed control do not work, and that personal endeavour and initiative do.... Our aim should not be more and more detailed regulation from the centre: it should be to deregulate and to remove the constraints on trade.

My fourth guiding principle is that Europe should not be protectionist. The expansion of the world economy requires us to continue the process of removing barriers to trade, and to do so in the multilateral negotiations in the GATT....

.....

What we need now is to take decisions on the next steps forward rather than let ourselves be distracted by Utopian goals. Utopia never comes, because we know we should not like if it did. Let Europe be a family of nations, understanding each other better, appreciating each other more, doing more together but relishing our national identity no less than our common European endeavour.

(Nelsen , B. F. and Stubb, A. C-G. (eds.), *The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration*, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1994, pp.45-50)

APPENDIX-VI

ALTIERO SPINELLI AND THE STRATEGY FOR THE UNITED STATES OF EUROPE

What distinguishes Spinelli's approach to European federalism from that of its former supporters is his commitment to turn it into an active movement with a political program. That is why his ideas about a campaign strategy for the United States of Europe, which he had always considered as a first stage in the process of unifying the whole world, amongst the most important, if not the most important contribution to federalism.

...I will not trace the origins of Spinelli's strategic concepts, but the basic theses that emerged from his ideas and actions. In my view these boil down to three:

1. The autonomous nature of the movement for the European federation;
2. The European Constituent Assembly;
3. The exploitation of the contradictions of the functional approach to European unification.

The arguments in favour of the autonomy of the movement for the European federation stem from the belief that the national democratic governments are, simultaneously, the means and the obstacles to European unification.

They are the means because unification can only be achieved as a result of freely arrived at decisions by democratic governments. This implies the rejection of two ways forward. Spinelli rejects any attempts to unite Europe by force.... (H)e also rejects unification by illegal and violent means from below, because the federalist struggle takes place in Western Europe within democratic political systems which provide legal means for even the most radical change. Moreover such unification stems from the historical development of European democracy.

Whilst European unification can only be achieved by the free decisions of democratic governments, by their very nature they represent obstacles to its attainment....

With regard to this obstacle one must clarify Spinelli's important distinction between the permanent agents of executive power, such as diplomats, civil servants and the military, and those who wield political power temporarily, such as the heads of governments and their ministers. The strongest opposition to the transfer of sovereignty usually comes from the former because they would suffer immediate and substantial loss of power and status. After all, the permanent agents of executive power, were originally created to put into effect the unfettered sovereignty of the state, and they thus became the natural defenders of nationalist traditions. For the latter, wielders of temporary power, the situation is rather more complex for three reasons: (1) without permanent positions of power they have much greater opportunities of playing a rôle within a wider European political framework; (2) they represent support for European federation; (3) they are in direct touch with public opinion which, in countries suffering from the decline and crisis of the nation state, is generally

favourable to European unification.... Nevertheless, there remains the fact that democratic national governments, by the very nature of their structures, are unfavourably inclined towards federal unification....

A direct consequence springs from these structural problems: namely, that an essential condition for exercising pressure on governments and political parties in favour of genuine federal unification is the existence of an independent movement for a European federation, which is able to persuade them in favour of action they would not, otherwise, take readily on their own.

.....

I will now deal with second main theme of Spinelli's strategy -the concept of a European constituent assembly.

The fact that national governments are simultaneously the means and the obstacles to the federal unification of Europe carries important implications for the procedure needed to establish European institutions: if one wants federal institutions then one must proceed by way of a constituent assembly and not by the use of intergovernmental or diplomatic conferences....(I)n a constituent assembly composed of people representing public opinion, a favourable attitude towards federal institutions is likely to be incomparably stronger than nationalist tendencies.

.....

Spinelli's constituent concept stemmed from his belief that the functional approach to European unification will not achieve profound and irreversible unity.

.....

One needs to recognise, however that Spinelli accepted that unification could start with effective supranational powers being first confined to economic issues, while postponing their immediate adoption in matters of foreign and security policies (as provided in the draft treaty for European Union). And this from the consideration that convergence in the latter sectors was already being influenced by American leadership. But he always stressed the need for genuine federal institutions which would ensure the ultimate extension of supranational powers from economic to defence and foreign policies.

Spinelli's criticism of the functional method was not confined to a dialectical and doctrinaire preference for the constitutional approach. First he was clearly aware that the functional approach stemmed largely from the contradictory nature of the attitudes of national governments to European unification. As objective historical circumstances force them to face the need for supranational unification, whilst they resist giving up their sovereignty, it is natural that they prefer an approach that postpones indefinitely the establishment of an authentic supranational authority. At the same time he recognised that the functional approach could assist the

constitutional process by exposing, due to its inadequacy, the contradictions of the former, that could be exploited in the course of the federalist struggle.

These contradictions boil down to two. The first stems from the precariousness and inefficiency of functional unification. Functional institutions established by the unanimous decisions of national governments have shown themselves to be weak and incapable of acting decisively at critical moments when particularly grave problems face them. As a consequence, positive results obtained in more favourable circumstances tend to be compromised or abandoned in time of crisis. This leads to the disappointment of expectations in the development of European integration and can lead to support for federal solutions. The second contradiction stems from the democratic deficit which arises when important responsibilities and powers are transferred to the supranational level without subjecting them to effective democratic control. This causes uneasiness among political parties and to democratically sensitive public opinion which can be thus influenced to favour the concept of supranational democracy. Spinelli's federalist campaign had always aimed at exploiting these contradictions in order to initiate the democratic constituent procedure.

(Pistone, S. "Altiero Spinelli and the Strategy for the United States of Europe" in Nelsen, B. F. and Stubb, A. C-G. (eds.), *The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration*, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1994, pp.69-75.)

APPENDIX-VII

THE 'DRAFT TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN UNION' OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

An extract from Panayotis Ifestos' chapter on the subject¹

The Draft Treaty was the culmination of the work by a Committee set up under Altiero Spinelli at the start of the newly elected European Parliament. The Draft Treaty's principle, as outlined in the Preamble and Article 9, is the commitment to pluralist democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the promotion of international peace and liberty, and the construction of an ever closer union in Europe. The rationale of the Draft Treaty was to continue the revival of the democratic unification of Europe, 'of which the European Communities, the European Monetary System and European Political Co-operation represent the first achievements'. Moreover, it was stated that 'it is increasingly important for Europe to assert its identity' and redefine the objectives of European integration. The Draft Treaty was divided into six parts: the Union; the objectives, methods of action and competences of the Union; institutional provisions; the policies of the union; the finances of the Union; and general and final provisions. The approach followed in the Draft Treaty was to outline the path towards European Union, but carefully so, in order to avoid making it appear a political a political union. The drafters wanted to escape the fate of past grandiose plans, which sank into oblivion because of their unrealisable objectives. Thus the words 'federal' and 'federalism', appear nowhere in the Draft Treaty; in their place, the ambiguous words 'European Union', 'union' and 'co-operation', dominate the text, terms which in the context of European integration may refer to the most disparate visions and strategies.

The European Parliament's Draft Treaty of 1984 differs from the Treaty of Rome, because the latter does not contain a separate chapter on international relations, much less so a competence in the 'high politics' area, a field of activity for which European Political co-operation was created and kept distinct from the EEC institutions (although, as we saw, this distinction was somewhat blurred in functional terms). The first characteristic of the Draft Treaty, as regards international relations, is that, unlike the Treaty of Rome, it proposed to bring political co-operation under the auspices of the union. Title III of the Draft Treaty is devoted to the objectives and competences of the Union; the fourth paragraph of the preamble reaffirmed the members' desire 'to contribute to the construction of an international society based on co-operation between peoples and between states, the peaceful settlement of disputes, security and the strengthening of international organisations'; Article 4, paragraph 3 refers to the union's legal personality, and specifies that in 'international relations the Union shall enjoy the legal capacity it requires to perform its functions and attain its objectives'; Article 7, paragraph 4 integrates the *acquis* of the EEC, the European Monetary System and European political Co-operation in the Union, 'until such time as they (previous acts and measures adopted by the institutions of the Union'; Article 16, section 1, Article 21, section 2, and article 28, section 7 refer to international

¹ Footnotes omitted.

The 'Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union' of the European Parliament

functions of the Parliament, the Council and the Commission ; lastly, under objectives of the Union in Article 9 are also included 'the promotion of international relations of security, peace, co-operation, détente, disarmament and the free movement of persons and ideas, together with the improvement of international commercial and monetary relations'. Title III, which is devoted to international relations, should therefore be seen in conjunction with the overall spirit and letter of the Draft Treaty, regarding its objectives, competences and policies.

To begin with, it should be noted that title III, Articles 63-9 of the Draft Treaty, are cautious, realistic and respectful of political sensitivities which in the past were the source of division and stalemate. In paragraph 1 of Article 63 -somewhat repetitively in terms of the corresponding reference of article 9- the Treaty sets out the objectives in international relations:

The Union shall direct its efforts in international relations towards the achievement of peace through the peaceful settlement of conflicts and towards the achievement of peace through the peaceful settlement of conflicts and towards security, the deterrence of aggression, détente, the mutual balances and verifiable reduction of military forces and armaments, respect for human rights, the raising of living standards in the third world, the expansion and improvement of international economic and monetary relations in general, and trade in particular, and the strengthening of international organisation.

In the articles which follow, the Draft Treaty subtly distinguishes between common action and conduct of common action, and between co-operation and common action. Earlier, in Article 10, 'common action' was defined as 'all normative, administrative, financial and judicial acts, internal or international, and the programmes and recommendations, issued by the union itself, originating in the institutions and addressed to those institutions, or to states, or to individuals'; 'co-operation' in turn, was defined as 'all commitments which the member states undertake within the European Council'. the transfer from co-operation to common action (see Article 11) would be done on the basis of 'a proposal from the Commission or the Council of the Union, or the Parliament, or one or more member states'. Subsequently 'the European Council may decide after consulting the Commission and with the agreement of the Parliament, to bring those matters within the exclusive or concurrent competence of the Union'. Generally speaking, political co-operation matters were treated in articles 63 to 69, under 'co-operation', especially in article 66, which introduces flexibility by including provision for co-operation to take place 'where a policy of the Union appears necessary', and in the 'fields in which the member states in which the member states acting individually cannot act as efficiently as the Union. In paragraph 2 of article 63, there is some (deliberate?) confusion as regards means and objectives. In the first place it pointedly distinguishes between 'common action' and co-operation refers to the objectives; and in the second place this common action or co-operation refers to the objectives of Article 9 and not to the ones of the preceding paragraph. The desire of the drafter to allay the fears of the members as regards extension of competences and definition of rôles is further reflected by the fact that though EPC was placed within the scope of the Draft Treaty, its *modus operandi* was none the less not drastically altered. As a commentator observed in this respect, it seems that the authors of the Draft Treaty attempted to preserve the EPC system at its present stage

of evolution while introducing it into the framework of the Treaty². In Article 64, it is mentioned that 'the Union shall act by common action in the fields referred to in this Treaty where it has exclusive or concurrent competence'. Further on, however, in the same article, it is clarified that exclusive competence refers to the field of commercial policy. In other fields, such as development aid, 'in so far as the member states continue to pursue independent programmes, the Union shall.... ensure co-ordination, observing current international commitments'. act by common action in the fields referred to in this Treaty. In Article 66, co-operation refers to 'matters directly concerning the interest of several member states', fields 'in which the member states acting individually cannot act as efficiently as the Union', 'fields where a policy of the Union appears necessary to supplement the foreign policies pursued on the responsibility of the member states'; and matters 'relating to the political and economic aspects of security'. Here, in addition to the fact that, as already noted, co-operation criteria are loosely defined, the text is also careful -like the EPC's London report of 1981- to clarify that it refers to the political/economic and not military aspects of security. On the other hand, the above definition of the scope of the co-operation is an effort to be more specific than the constituent reports of EPC which referred to common endeavours whenever possible and desirable. None the less, the terminology in the Draft Treaty remains vague enough, so that it could be all-inclusive as well as all-exclusive. This level of commitment does not seem to be drastically different from previous commitments, despite the fact that the co-operation referred to would have been embodied in a legal text. This view is further reinforced if seen in conjunction with Article 68. In a prudent formulation, it is clear that a (unanimous) decision of the member states could on the one hand 'extend the field of co-operation in particular as regards armaments, sales of arms to non-member states, defence policy and disarmament' (paragraph 1), and on the other hand (unanimously) decide on the transformation of co-operation to common action in external matters. Furthermore, an additional degree of flexibility and pragmatism is introduced when, in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 68, the Draft Treaty empowers the European Council to decide on restoration of fields transferred to common action either to co-operation or to the competence of the member states. As regards Articles 65, 67 and 69, the text refers to the delegation of powers and rôles to the Commission and the European Parliament, and it is difficult to see how this could be accepted by the member states. On the other hand, paragraph 1 of Article 65 enhances the Commission's rôle to represent the Union, and on the other hand, it increases the powers of the European Parliament, by saying that all international agreements must be approved both by the Council and by Parliament. In Article 67, paragraph 1, the Commission is granted the right to propose policies and actions in international relations which in turn -following a request from the European Council or the Council of the Union -shall be implemented either by the Commission or the member states. As regards Article 69, it grants the Commission with the approval of the Council of the Union -the right to represent the Union in international organisations or in dealings with non-member states and the responsibility of representing the union in all matters of common action

² Bruckner, Peter, 'Foreign Affairs Powers and Policy in the Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union' in Bieber, Roland, Jacque, Jean-Paul and Weiler, Joseph (eds.) *An Ever Closer Union, European Perspectives*, Commission of the EC, Brussel, 1985, pp.127-131.

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It may also -in co-operation with the presidency- 'co-ordinate the diplomatic activity of the member states in the fields subject to co-operation'.

(Ifestos, P., *European Political Co-operation*, Avebury-Gower Publishing, Aldershot, 1987, pp.329-333)



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