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Marmara University
European Community Institute

**GLOBALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND THE EFFECTS OF
THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN
THIS PROCESS**

Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirement for the Degree of
Master of Arts
in European Studies

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BS in International Relations, Bilkent University, 1992

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Istanbul, 1996

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZ	v
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	vi
INTRODUCTION	1
1. INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND GLOBALIZATION	12
1.1. Contemporary International System	12
1.2. Major Historical Factors Influencing the Evolution of the International System	14
1.3. Historical Evolution of the International System	16
1.3.1. The Emerging of the Nation States	16
1.3.2. The 18.th and the 19.th Centuries	18
1.3.3. The 20 th Century.....	20
1.3.4. The Cold War Period	21
1.4. A New Geopolitical World Order	26
1.4.1. Characteristics of the Cold War Bipolar System	28
1.4.2. Characteristics of the MultiPolar System.....	30
1.5. Political Developments of the Multipolar System.....	34
1.6. International Political Economy and Economic Integration.....	36
1.7. International Politics and Globalization	44
2. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION	50
2.1. The Evolution of the European International Society	50
2.1.1. Principles and Practices	50
2.1.2. Common Culture: The Society and the System	54
2.1.3. Comparison With Other Systems.....	56
2.1.4. The Dynamics of European Integration	57
2.1.4.1. Developments of the post-WWII period:.....	57
2.1.4.2. Integration Theories and European Integration	61
2.1.5. The European System Getting Worldwide	65

3. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL GLOBAL SYSTEM AND THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION	79
3.1. The Global International System.....	79
3.1.1. Unipolarity	80
3.1.2. Bipolarity	80
3.1.3. Loose Bipolarity.....	81
3.1.4. Tripolarity	82
3.1.5. Multipolarity	82
3.1.6. A Unit Veto System	84
3.1.7. Interdependence	84
3.2. The Need For a World Polity Theory.....	86
3.3. European Type of Integration As a Leading Example	93
4. A PROSPECTIVE OUTLOOK	103
4.1. A New World	103
4.2. The Concept of Global Governance.....	103
4.3. The Need for Change.....	107
4.4. The Need for Globalization.....	108
4.5. The Need for Vision.....	110
4.6. Necessary Values of Global Neighborhood	110
4.6.1. Respect For Life.....	112
4.6.2. Liberty	112
4.6.3. Justice And Equity	113
4.6.4. Mutual Respect	114
4.6.5. Caring.....	115
4.6.6. Integrity	115
4.7. The Global Community.....	116
4.8. The Strategic Environment of the 21 st Century	117
CONCLUSION	123
BIBLIOGRAPHY	125

ABSTRACT

Globalization is a significant process in contemporary international system. It has increased its effects especially after the second part of the 20th century. In the course of history of international system, from nation-state structure to international organizations, developing process constituted the globalization concept at the end. After the WWII, first bipolar system and then multipolar system, have contributed to the formation of a new geopolitical world order that is one of the steps of the globalization process. The trends and developments of international political economy and economic integration have consolidated international politics and globalization.

After the WWII, the other important issue has been the European integration movement. The evolution of the European society and the developments of global international system have resulted as the European Union, which is the most successful movement of integration in international relations. Like globalization process, the European integration movement is the culmination of a long and complex development of international political system . Thus, the European integration movement is a process and closely related with the global approach.

Further developments of the globalization necessitated a new theory, a world polity theory, in the system. This theory is, also, supported by the European integration movement because, the leading role of it among other regional formations, can be considered as an example for the globalization process.

Therefore, this relationship has created new concepts such as, the concept of the global government, the need for vision and change, and the values of global neighborhood in a global community, which, then can become the building blocs of a new environment in the 21st century.

ÖZ

Küreselleşme, çağdaş uluslararası sistem içinde önemli bir süreçtir. Özellikle, yirminci yüzyılın ikinci yarısından sonra bu süreç sistem içindeki etkisini arttırmıştır. Uluslararası ilişkiler tarihi içinde ulus-devlet yapısından uluslararası organizasyonlara kadar gelişen süreç sonunda, küreselleşme kavramı oluştu. İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra, önce iki kutuplu ve daha sonra da çok kutuplu olan sistem, küreselleşme sürecinin basamaklarından biri olan Yeni Jeopolitik Dünya Düzeni'nin oluşumuna katkıda bulunmuştur. Uluslararası siyasi ekonomi ve ekonomik bütünleşme gelişmeleri uluslararası siyaset ve küreselleşmeyi sağlamlaştırmıştır.

İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra bir diğer önemli konu da Avrupa Bütünleşme Hareketidir. Avrupa toplumunun evrimi ve küreselleşen uluslararası sistemdeki gelişmeler, uluslararası ilişkilerdeki en başarılı bütünleşme hareketi olan Avrupa Birliği ile sonuçlanmıştır. Küreselleşme sürecinde olduğu gibi Avrupa Bütünleşme Hareketi de uzun ve karmaşık bir uluslararası siyasi sistemin sonucudur. Bundan dolayı, Avrupa Bütünleşme Hareketi bir süreçtir ve Küresel yaklaşımla yakından ilgilidir.

Küreselleşme sürecinin daha sonraki gelişmeleri, çağdaş uluslararası sistemde bir Dünya Politikası Teorisi adlı yeni bir teoriye ihtiyaç olduğunu göstermiştir. Bu teori, diğer bölgesel oluşumlar arasında lider olan Avrupa Bütünleşme Hareketi tarafından da desteklenmiştir. Bu teori, uluslararası sistemde küreselleşme sürecine bir örnek teşkil etmektedir.

Bundan dolayı, küreselleşme ile Avrupa Bütünleşmesi arasındaki bu ilişki yirmibirinci yüzyıldaki çevrenin yapıtaşları olabilecek küresel hükümet, yeni bir vizyon ve değişim ihtiyacı ve küresel komşuluğun değerleri gibi yeni kavramları yaratmaktadır.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACP	African Caribbean Pacific
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CMEA	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON)
EC	European Community
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defense Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Area
EMS	European Monetary System
EPC	European Political Cooperation
EU	European Union
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
G7	Group of Seven
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GNP	Gross National Product
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IGOs	Intergovernmental Organizations
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INF	Intermediate Nuclear Forces
LCDs	Less Developed Countries
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Area
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Non-governmental Organizations
OECD	Economic Cooperation and Development

OEEC	Organization for European Economic Cooperation
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
SEA	Single European Act
SEATO	South East Asia Treaty Organization
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WCED	World Commission on Environment and Development
WW I	World War I
WW II	World War II

INTRODUCTION

For years, states in international arena have had different characteristics. Nationalism has always been an important force in international system. At the same time, however, although people identify with their state, they also hold an explicitly global identity. As the economic and cultural activities of the world have become more integrated, and as humans have extended their perspectives into outer space, people around the world have come to see their larger community as the whole world, even while maintaining ties to state-level and local communities. People do fly their flag of state, but they often fly the UN flag (unchanged since 1945) above it and their provincial or city flag below¹.

Moreover, in monetary issues, for instance, World Bank has a significant effect on national currencies of states of the international arena. The World Bank issues only the number of authorizations that will maintain the exchange of currency value relative to other states' currencies. All currencies are thus fixed at the same rate although they go by different names². In international trade liberal economics has prevailed because it worked so well. Goods crossing international borders do not have to pay tariffs, just as the people buying and selling them do not need to worry about currency exchange fluctuations. Thus, this example explains the global character of the international system. In this system, now, almost all actors are bound together in any field, either economic or political. This example is an evident of the importance of **globalization** in international relations.

In the 1970s, the international relations discipline tended to focus on the realist and the pluralist approaches. As a different image of these ideas, however, globalist perspective has become a new tendency recently. Globalists typically assume that the starting point of analysis for international relations is "the global context within which states and other entities interact"³. Globalists emphasize the whole structure of the

¹ Joshua S Goldstein, **International Relations**, Harper Collins College Publisher, 1994, p. 563.

² Ibid.

³ Paul R. Viotti, and Mark V. Kauppi, **International Relations Theory, Realism, Pluralism, Globalism**, Mac Millan Publishing Company, 2nd Edition, 1993, p. 8.

system with its all actors. According to them, to understand the reasons and effects of the external behaviors of states among international actors, states require more than merely examining factors internal to a state. Thus, the global environment, for instance, is a dominant theme within the global image. To evaluate the situation more broadly, gives us clearer perspectives to determine the condition and predisposition of states and certain actors in certain situations. Also globalists pay attention to the historical background of international relations in order to understand current environment within which world politics takes place. In this respect, the globalists view situations as dependent variables. More specifically, globalists are typically concerned with the development and maintenance of dependency relations among northern, industrialized states (in North America, Europe, Japan) and the poorer, underdeveloped, Third World countries of Latin America, Africa, and Asia⁴. Globalists, also, emphasize that economics is the key issue to understand the creation, evolution, and functioning of the contemporary world system.

Therefore, globalism is a key issue for this thesis as a contemporary world system. The second key issue is **integration**. To integrate generally, means to make a whole out of parts, that is to say, to turn previously separate units into components of a coherent system. According to Deutsch⁵, the essential characteristic of any system, is a significant degree of **interdependence** among its components, and “interdependence between any two components or units consists in the probability that a change in one of them - or an operation performed upon one of them will produce a predictable change in the other”⁶. Integration, then, is a relationship among units in a system in which they are mutually interdependent and jointly produce system properties which they would separately lack. Thus, it is easy to say that this thesis is composed of both globalism and integration in general. These two concepts are mutually interconnected because it is difficult to explain globalization without mentioning integrated economic and cultural developments, especially, in the last part of the 20th century.

⁴ Ibid., p. 9.

⁵ Karl W. Deutsch, **The Analysis of International Relations**, 3rd Edition, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1988, p. 212.

⁶ Ibid.

Similarly, we cannot assert an integrative process without stating global issues such as, global environment, dependent relations of states, and globally accepted organizations (the EU, the UN, etc.).

In detail, some important developments such as geopolitics, technology, human relations, environmental issues are directly related with globalism and integration. Generally, these issues can be found in “the global level of analysis” of Goldstein⁷. According to him, “the global level of analysis, seeks to explain international outcomes in terms of global trends and forces that transcend the interactions of states themselves”⁸. This level deserves particular attention because the evolution of technology, deepening human relationships and a certain degree of environmental consciousness attribute to this process towards the end of the century.

The global level of analysis comprises among others geopolitical analysis which is the preliminary aspect for analyzing global developments in international relations. Geopolitics is an important discipline that defines the formation of balance of power systems, and power of governments within the effects of geographical and natural properties of a country in international arena⁹. As a 20th century subject, geopolitics was presented chiefly by Halford Mackinder¹⁰ in his “**heartland theory**”. For many scholars, geopolitical analysis is important for revealing of fundamental truths about global geographical limitations on the behavior of states. Therefore, geopolitical analysis has been a considerable concern since the early period of the twentieth century. After 400 years of “Columbian era” dominated by sea-powers, Mackinder thought “the twentieth century to be the beginning of the post-Columbian era when global power would transfer to land empires: a key structural change of long-term importance was occurring”¹¹. Mackinder’s theory was confirmed in the Cold War period when the USA and USSR confronted each other.

⁷ Goldstein, op.cit., pp. 14-15.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Muzaffer Ozdag, **Jeopolitik Konusunda Notlar, Avrasya Dosyası**, Cilt1, sayı 3, 1994, pp. 153-165.

¹⁰ Halford John Mackinder, British geographer, studied on Great Britain Empire and Political Geography. His main books are **Britain and British Seas-1902**, and **The Geographical Pivot of History-1904**. He is well-known with his “heartland theory”.

¹¹ Peter J. Taylor, **Political Geography of the 20.th Century**, p. 33.

Geopolitical analysis, as a preliminary subject of further global integration, should be locate geopolitical world orders within the periods and cycles that form the twentieth century. Geopolitical codes, which are the building blocks of geopolitical world order, are used to describe the output of practical geopolitical reasoning. According to John Gaddis (1982), the geopolitical codes are the codes of geographical frameworks by which a government deals with the other international entities. In this context, the national interest of a nation is evaluated in terms of other states by comparing the consistency of meeting the needs of the other states. It means that other states are evaluated in terms of whether they are real or potential aids or obstacles to that interest. The formation of geopolitical codes are effective because they are contributed to the formal democratization of politics in many states in the twentieth century. Stated bluntly, national interest of a nation cannot be easily changed back and forth, “friends” and “enemies” once so identified have to some degree of permanency to make sense. For all states, their immediate neighbors are crucial components of their codes either as friends or enemies. Generally, most peaceful interactions such as trade occur between neighboring states, but also most wars are border wars. Every state, therefore, has its own local code. The majority of states have interests limited to their local areas, whereas the interests and power of some medium and large states extend to beyond their borders. Brazil in South America, India in South Asia and Nigeria in West Africa are the three clearest examples of states which include domination of their region as integral to their national interests¹². There are , also, world powers whose codes are global in extent. Their governments consider events across the world as being of potential relevance to their national interest as a Great Power. Through the second half of the twentieth century, the USA and the USSR were the superpowers claiming such extravagant interests.

The three-scale hierarchy of geopolitical codes which are mentioned above, define relations between codes. At its simplest, the local codes of relatively small states have to fit into the regional codes of medium states which in turn should fit into

¹² Ibid., p. 37.

overarching global codes. This relationship generally called “**sphere of influence**” that leads to a series of bilateral and multilateral patterns of associated codes across the world. The concept of a geopolitical world order asserts that the geographical organization of power across the world is more than an aggregation of these interlocking hierarchies of codes. Geopolitical world order will change according to the degree of conformity required by states. The world order before the Cold War have been much more flexible, although a general global structure of power was easily discernible. In fact, order can incorporate contrary codes. For instance, Spain and Portugal, two of the European countries, pursued policies akin to pre-WWII colonialism for two decades after such activity had been de-legitimized by the Cold War. In contrast, a nonaligned India refused to be forced into taking sides in the Cold War¹³. Geopolitical world order, as a stable pattern of power, represent what many regard as “surface features” of the world system.

As far as the geopolitical world order is concerned, the century has consisted of two distinctive geopolitical world orders together with very small parts of two others. These world orders were separated by relatively short geopolitical transitions that encompass two world orders which are named as the Geopolitical World Order of the British Succession and the Cold War Geopolitical World Order. We can generally draw a perspective in analyzing these two world orders. First, we must deal with the precursors of each new order. Secondly, we should concern the geopolitical transitions in detail¹⁴. Third element is the variety within each period. Within the parameters of the world order, different phases of political activity can be discerned. It is the identification of such phases that enables us to transcend WWI in our period. In fact, international politics changed after 1917-1919, but the dominant logic of the World Order of the British Succession remained: how to control German expansion as British decline continued.

¹³ Neutrality is a policy that is effectively a local code, a strategy against more powerful neighbors. Nonalignment is a global strategy, a policy against world geopolitical code.

¹⁴ In this second theme, interpretations of Wallerstein (1984) and Modelski (1987) will be considered when we are dealing with both WWI and WWII as essentially one prolonged “thirty-year war”, the German Wars. Also, we will be dealing with Dukes (1989) in viewing the Russian Revolution as a precursor of the Cold War.

In order to grasp the details of subject we, then, should give the definition of international relations and focus on international systems. International Relations can be defined as all interactions among states and other actors which includes international economic relations and international law as well as international politics¹⁵. International Relations examines the political, military, and economic interactions among nation-states and other non-governmental actors.

International system, which is generally known as the core of the international transactions, can be analyzed from different perspectives in order to understand the mutual relationships among international actors. According to some scholars of international relations, transactions between states are constituted by the concept of strength, which explains the interests of unique states. Thus, international system also contribute to the explanation of both globalization and integration. “Trans-system or ecological paradigm” and “integrative responses” are the only example explaining the concepts of globalism and integration respectively in general.

The first idea basically took its roots from the positivist school of science and the technological-edge concept¹⁶. As to some other scholars, the interactions between states should be based on the concept of law directly. They thought that the behavior of states could give similar results to similar actions. These ideas simply tried to apply the notion of social justice. With the development of state systems, international law became the standard to which states had to conform. After the WWII, the United Nations played a linking role between these two ideas, namely the “peace through strength ”and “the peace through law”¹⁷. These two approaches were important up to the last quarter of the 20th century and tried to explain the peaceful solutions between sovereign states in the international arena. As a result of these two approaches, we can also mention a third process which is called “trans-systemic or ecological

¹⁵ Jay M. Shafritz, Phil Williams, Ronald S. Calinger, **The Dictionary of 20th Century World Affairs, A Henry Holt Reference Book**, New York, Henry Holt Company, 1993, p. 367.

¹⁶ “The Positivist School” focuses on the customs and practices of society. They believe that law reflects society and the way people want that society to operate. Therefore, law is and ought to be the product of the codification or formalization of a society’s standards and practices.

¹⁷ Council on Foreign Relations, **Right versus Might: International Law and the Use of Force**, Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1989, pp. 71-74.

paradigm”¹⁸. According to scholars, what is new in this idea is that it expands human consciousness in all fields and this is one of the vital subjects of the globalization of international relations. Thus, in this issue, one talks about global and common security, sustainable development, pollution control, and common future. According to some scholars, the only hope in this world is to improve the consciousness of humankind, and to make sure that new values will eventually contribute to the development of initiatives that will bridge the gap between the major powers of the system and the rest of the world¹⁹.

Similarly, three possible organizers of a society such as, “exchange relations” and “threat or power relations”²⁰ evolve into “integrative responses” which involves the convergence of the utility functions of the areas toward each other. The “exchange relations” system is mixture of cooperation and competition because in this system, if you do something beneficial to someone, you will get a similar beneficial action in return, or otherwise this person will still be your competitor again. In the governmental sense, it means law and order, justice and defense against any threat. The “threat or power relations” system can also be described in terms of a relationship between two parties, the threatener and the threatened. In this system threat is credible and the party which has a power is the threatener and the other side is obliged to something beneficial to the powerful side, otherwise the threatened party will be lost in any situation. Again, as to the scholars, if an exchange system is the basis of economics, a threat system is the basis of politics, because the economical relations between states are mostly beneficial for both of the parties and do not easily deteriorate unless one party especially intend to do it. Unless economic relations, political relations between states and alliances make easily be vulnerable because of even just a border conflict. In fact, the two systems, either based on economic or political relations, should be considered altogether because for instance, the exchange system, which is based on economic transactions, alone cannot survive because, as Schumpeter (Joseph Schumpeter is the best known theorist stressing non-economic

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 123.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 124.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 126.

influences) says²¹, “nobody loves it although everybody is benefiting from it”. However, the international system is simply a system of interacting states and the behavioral relationships between them which then will determine the equilibrium of international system. Therefore, at that point we can mention the third possible organizer of a society, the integrative process. This is important because if nation states are guided only by maximization of economic or political interests, then it is bound to give rise to conflict situations. The solution for a long-run stable international system is the integrative way of thought that creates common values or common tastes in public goods. Therefore, we can say that, the current international system could be based on consciousness and integration at the same time.

Some prominent developments of the last decades have led to global cooperation in the international arena that give way to some specific formations such as, European Union (as the most successful regional integration process), NAFTA and APEC. The decline of distance in the modern world is the first development. It has immense effects on personal mobility which has a profound effect on economic relationships (creating a fast-integrating world economy), on social organizations (causing migration on an unprecedented scale between states and continents), and on political contacts (leading to the creation of multinational political movements and organizations). The revolution in the communication of images and ideas are other important developments. The capacity to transmit radio and television broadcasts or print messages across the globe, transforms the picture of the world that is widely held. Moreover, the area of interest and concern are widened as much as the area of knowledge is concerned. What happens in the next country is almost as well known as what happens ones’ own. Political ideas, loyalties, movements, classes and cultures spread and spill across increasingly, invisible national frontiers, become regional, even world-wide, in scope.

The change in political consciousness alters conceptions of political objectives : both the needs to be met and the means of meeting them. National defense policies, national welfare policies, national environmental policies, national human rights

²¹ Ibid.

policies, are no longer adequate. Wider political structures altogether are required to meet the new needs. Thus, all these developments lead to the creation of a more international society, in which the international action is significant, redistribution at the global level, transnational political movements, and new international institutions, more representative than those exist today, reflecting the views of groups and individuals as well as of governments.

Therefore, regional economic interactions, together with their political aspects, have constituted a new international system. In this global process, European experience has to be considered because its attempts were made to emulate it elsewhere and because lessons learned from what happened in the European Union could be applied in other regional contexts. Thus, this new international system can be analyzed through inspecting multipolar features, trying to explain the integral economic relations among countries and looking for the global formation together with socio-economic consequences.

Up to that point, the main idea was to focus on the global and the integrative character of the international relations. By stating some developments of international interactions we come to the point that states now should cooperate in order to benefit more mutually. Also we come to a point that states should consider regional integration movements because there are specific examples that will be cornerstones in the international arena, in the fields of politics, economics, and social activities. Moreover, social changes that countries face could be one important step to conscious people and states which will help to find concrete solutions to conflicting situations of international problems together with environmental matters. Therefore, this thesis will try to explain the importance of European integration movement as an important pioneer for the globalization of the international relations as approaching to the 21st century.

The detailed explanations and approaches mentioned up to this moment, are some examples of consolidating the mutual interaction of global aspect and integration in international relations. This thesis, therefore, will try to explain the global and integrated nature of the system with their supportive assumptions. It can be

said that, the international system has, now, a global character. Although each state has a nation and a different character, developments of the second era of the 20th century, confirmed that besides states alone, other prominent and developing notions, such as technology, environmental and humanistic consciousness, a new geopolitical world, strengthening regional movements such as the European Union, NAFTA , APEC, are important to carry out international relations. Thus, as approaching to the 21st century, scholars have to consider different aspects together with states. Although, there is no, yet, a perfect, convenient consistency between these issues, it is required to evaluate the situation as a process. As stated earlier, globalization is, especially, become stronger and effective after 1970s. This, justifies the earlier steps of the ever-growing process of globalization. Integration process makes states borders more permeable to people, goods, and ideas. Hence the ultimate expression of integration would be the merger of several states into a single state, it is also important to consolidate globalism. Therefore, the other assumptions that this thesis asserts, is the mutual interaction of both globalism and integration. Integration theory of international relations makes, also, contribution to the explaining of newly founded supranational system. The most important example for integration is the European Union. It had a developing process since the WWII. For about forty years, the developments of the European Integration has been conforming the integration theory successfully. Especially, after the Maastricht Treaty, the European Integration has made a great impact in international relations and contributed to the international arena. Thus, like globalization, integration is a process and although there are some negative or disadvantageous effects, such as competition with other groups (e.g. NAFTA, APEC), the movement of integration could emerge as a component of larger entities or at least ideas.

Therefore, in the first chapter, this thesis examines the brief development of international relations to reach the current global context. In this section, the historical background of international relations will be examined in order to sketch the evolution of the current political system. Also, different systems will be dealt with as it is closely related with the evolution of international relations. Moreover, a new

geopolitical world order, developments in the current multipolar system, international political economic movements, and economic integration process will be mentioned in the context of international politics and globalization. In the second chapter, European Integration will be explained in a broad manner. In this section, the developments of the European Integration will be dealt with as both an adjustment process and an environmental development to keep up the global arena. In this part, the relations in Europe will be explained as a common culture getting worldwide. The third chapter will be an analysis of the two chapters, that will try to match the complimentary points in order to reveal the relationship between the European Integration and the global International Relations. In this part, the European integration will be cited as a leading example with its effects through dialogue. In the fourth chapter, the prospective situation of the world in the near future will be discussed and the values of global life will be considered together with its strategic environment in the 21st century. Then, in the conclusion, the need for globalization will be emphasized together with its real example, the successful European integration process.

CHAPTER ONE

1. INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND GLOBALIZATION

1.1. Contemporary International System

In examining the international system, we have been realizing mainly five important models outlining the characteristics of contemporary international politics in which states and other actors conduct mutual relations. Basically, these five models are: realism, society of states model, pluralist-interdependence model, dependency model, and world society model.

According to **realist model**, states, as unit of analysis²², are the principle actors in the system. According to realists, state is viewed as a unitary actor. Moreover, realists usually make the further assumption that the state is essentially a rational actor. A rational foreign policy decision-making process would include a statement of objectives, consideration of all feasible alternatives in terms of existing capabilities available to the state. They consider states that can only rely upon themselves for their security and other purposes. There is no suppressive authority that can manage the relations between sovereign states. For realists, the great issues of international politics have to do with questions of security, war, and peace. The realist tradition goes back many centuries and it has been the predominant way of characterizing international politics throughout 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries.

The **society of states model** (of Hugo Grotius)²³ considers a group of actors who regulate their mutual relations through institutions such as diplomacy and trade, and who understand that armed force should be used only for purposes of self-defense, or for upholding the fundamental contours of the states system and its norms and laws. One of the important mechanism contributing to this model is the balance of the power in which states collaborate to maintain their independence against threats by hegemonic power. The balance is not intended to prevent war, its purpose is to safeguard the sovereignty and independence of states. Moreover, international law,

²²Viotti, and Kauppi, op.cit., p.5

²³ The Grotian prescription for international conduct is that all states are bound by the rules and institutions of the society they form.

diplomacy and some other rules of the game provide the states to carry out balance in the system.

Although realist and society of states models focus on states (and security, peace, and order as major problems), the **pluralist-interdependence model** considers political problems in the larger social and economic setting. The proponents of this model also defend states as important actors for states set the rules of the economy, communications, technology, and other games that occur simultaneously. But states are not authorized to constitute interests, values, and aspirations of millions of firms, banks, companies, political parties, citizen groups, etc. In this respect, non-state actors gain importance to create all sorts of interactions. Non-state actors act as international pressure groups and with the struggle of them, the power of publicity and scientific, technical, economic knowledge largely replace the power of guns and armies. Policy, then, emerges from a lengthy process of interaction and consultation between private transnational groups, politicians, bureaucrats, and many others.

Thus, the main characteristic of the contemporary global system is its interdependence. The commonsense meaning of this term is that events, trends, and decisions that happen in one place are likely to have an impact elsewhere. Interdependence suggests mutual dependence: The need of two or more actors to provide goods and services for each other. In the pluralist-interdependence model, then, questions of war and peace are no longer predominate. Also, governments and transnational, national and subnational groups act to raise many economic and technical problems for policy coordination or resolution.

The idea of interdependence implies equality and symmetry between societies. Dependency analysts contest the characterization of the world contained in the pluralist-interdependence model. The relations in the **dependency model** is hierarchical, unequal, and exploitative because the world capitalist system began to develop in the 15th century as explorers of Europe, and later their commercial agents and slavers expanded the continental commercial system to all corners of the world. Once the hierarchical structure of colonialism had been built, it did not require much effort to keep it in place. Formal independence for the colonies did not change much.

The personnel changed, but the superior-subordinate economic, communications, and cultural structures remained. The situation is called neo-colonialism, or dependency. The focus of this model is on the question of equity and equality, rather than on war and peace.

The final model, **world society model**, has some characteristics of both the pluralist-interdependence and dependency models. This model has connections with societies and suggests that political and security issues are embedded within larger socioeconomic structures. It also suggests that one has to look at the world globally, and not from the perspective of the nation-state. The main features of the global system is its social unity. All societies are interconnected and this could be an earlier step towards the formation of a genuine world society. Social patterns, such as family structures, life styles, are becoming more similar as the significance of political boundaries continues to erode. Today, there is an unprecedented amount of transnational collaboration among groups that are devoted to solve some of the problems that governments and multinational corporations have created.

These five models briefly describe the structures and processes of the contemporary global system. Realism offers an explanation for the causes of war and the conditions of peace. The Grotian model focuses on the problem of order and stability in the relations between states. The pluralist-interdependence model is concerned with reciprocity and wealth maximization. Dependency theory is an explanation of the origins and perpetuation of economic and other forms of inequality between societies. World society model is preoccupied with a long list of quality of life subjects. Although, none is right or wrong, this thesis focuses on the world society model. Because it suggests simply that one has to look at the world globally.

1.2. Major Historical Factors Influencing the Evolution of the International System

There are several factors in the historical background of the international system as well as the nature of the current world political system. The first factor that we must mention, is the **evolution of the actors**. The theme of actors in the international political relations was began to seen as the *state* or (country) in about the fifteenth century. Up to this century, the state-based system has existed considerably

important and powerful states in Europe. Thus, a great deal of the operation of the world system of today is based on European tradition. However, today, this Eurocentric nature of the system has changed. In fact, the European states declined in power after the two world wars. After the world wars, the non-European states such as the USA., Japan, and China have gained considerable importance and become central actors. Also in the last several decades, many countries have become international actors, especially Africa and Asia. The important thing that should be kept in mind that all these states are *sovereign* which means that a state recognizes no authority higher than itself. Structurally, this means that the international political system is generally organized horizontally, in contrast to domestic political systems²⁴. In addition to states, there are other actors that play a role in world affairs. International organizations, therefore, are important actors with international regimes, international law, and similar phenomena in front of the international arena.

A second major factor could be the **distribution of power among the actors**. This means that political power is distributed among a number of poles, that is, countries or alliances. Actually, especially late nineteenth century was experienced this kind of political interactions generally among Great Britain, Germany, France, and Austria. Namely, the European Concert *system is* the striking example from that period of history. However, after the world wars, a new power of distribution has emerged. After 1945, the United States and the Soviet Union dominated the world used their political power until 1980s. This distribution of power is called a *bipolar system* or the East-West Axis. But, in the last two decades, the dominance of the two superpowers has decreased that these changes have ended the bipolar system.

Another important factor or theme is the **level of interaction** between states. A striking change in the international system is the rapid increase of the level at which countries are interacting and cooperating²⁵. In fact, as the level of interaction increases, countries have lost most of their freedom, and they are also trying to

²⁴ John T. Rourke, **International Politics on the World Stage**, The Dushkin Publishing Group, Inc. 1991, p. 34.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

cooperate in many issues such as preventing environmental destruction and coordinating the value of their currencies.

The fourth factor is the **norms of behaviors** that regulate and characterize any political system. Generally, behavior is made constituted by a mix of coercion and voluntary compliance. In that respect, norms define voluntary compliance. For instance, the values about using force as a policy tool, are changing, and war has lost much of its legitimacy.

The final factor is about some **non-human** factors such as technology and resources. For instance, nuclear power is one technological factor that helped structure the bipolar system and the pattern of interaction. The combination of technology and resource factors are also used broadly in economic relations among countries. Productive capacity of a country and the extent of its trade have always played an important part. In the last few centuries, the industrial revolution and the distribution across the globe of such resources expanded the impact of economic considerations on world politics. Today, power is defined in terms of economics. There is also increased economic interdependence among countries, but there is also increased pressure to complete for scarce resources. Moreover, there is increased conflict over the uneven distribution of global wealth. In this sense, the developed countries of North have much unequal distribution, contrary to the undeveloped countries of the South. Thus, this major point express the division of the world into the North-South Axis.

Therefore, the major factors which have played significant roles in the evolution of the international system are actors, distribution of power, level of interaction, norms of behavior and non-human factors. These themes are definitive for the international system in order to pursue the historical developments of approaches that will help us to set up historical facts easily.

1.3. Historical Evolution of the International System

1.3.1. The Emerging of the Nation States

Secular political power in the West dispersed when Rome collapsed in 476. At that period, there were only short periods that one power ruled an outstanding empire. One example was Charlemagne, who ruled the Frankish empire from 768 to 814.

During the middle ages, the church was the leading force to integrate the Western civilization. At the end of the struggles of the church, the new Christian-Roman universal empire was re-created which was known as the Holy Roman Empire headed by King Otto I in the tenth century.

In the 20th century, military development, such as the increasing use of gunpowder, meant that the feudal lords were no more secure. Economic activity expanded, and new manufacturing and commerce needed larger political units in order to operate efficiently. Also, improved communication and transportation created more cooperative actions among people. This development increased the authority of kings and decreased the immense role of the church. Moreover, monarchs in some countries such as France, England, and Spain began to rule some small princedoms. Actually, the main reason of all these changes, especially the decreased papal authority and the increased power of kingdoms, were Renaissance (1350-1550), which was a period of cultural and intellectual rebirth and reform. In this period, educated people looked back to the classical cultures such as Hellenic and Roman to develop a concept of personal freedom.

Then, this secular movement led to another important process, called the Protestant Reformation. The significance of this movement was to consolidate secular thought in Europe and this campaign was headed by Martin Luther in the early period of the 1500s. Therefore, as a consequence of these developments, the growth of kingdoms and the breakdown of religious dominance, the modern *nation-state* system was created. Basically, the nation-state system was based on a sovereign political units.

The first great secular break with the Catholic Church occurred in England, where King Henry VIII (1509-1547) rejected the authority of the church and established a national Protestant religion. Also, the impacts of Reformation in Europe lasted for almost a century and a half. At that period, the general issue was religious freedom, but it had several political consequences. The struggle between the imperial and Catholic Holy Roman Empire and the nationalist and Protestant ethnic groups caused a warfare. And when this warfare ended with the Treaty of Westphalia (1648),

the central power in Europe was ended. The Holy Roman Empire had split into two parts as two rival Catholic monarchies such as Austria and Spain and also a number of Protestant entities such as Holland and German states gained independence from big dominating powers. Other big countries, France (Catholic) and England (Protestant) were secure in their independence. Thus, the year of 1648 meant the end of a period and the birth of the age of the modern national state, and world political system was based on sovereign states as the primary political actors.

The period following the Westphalia, the states in Europe expanded their interactions with other countries both economically and socially. In that period, monarchs such as Louis XIV of France (1643-1715), Frederick II of Prussia (1740-1786), and Peter the Great of Russia (1682-1725) consolidated their domains.

1.3.2. The 18.th and the 19.th Centuries

The late 18th. and the early 19th centuries were the years of major changes. The American Revolution (1776) and the French Revolution (1789) were the basic issues that changed the international politics largely. The principle of democracy was established which claimed that the political power of people should be superior than the monarch. This development also contributed to the concept of *nationalism* to include mass identification with and participation in the affairs of the state. One symbol of this change was that Napoleonic France, the first country to have a true military draft and to raise a strong army .

The democratic nationalism, which started in America and France, spread throughout Europe. In a century, monarchs lost most of their powers and the early 20th century marked the real end of monarchical government, with the collapse of China, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire.

In the 19th century, *industrialization* rapidly increased especially in America and Europe. This era could be considered as a period that the *non-human* factors became apparent. The technology and resource based developments made a great impacts. One of the impacts was a shift in the power of states such as Germany, which was rapidly industrialized, and grew in power. A second result of industrialization (and associated technological advances) was that the European powers gained strength

compared with non-industrialized Asia and Africa²⁶. Related with this issue, the industrial countries needed to find resources and markets to fuel and fund their capitalist expansion. But, the economic expansion needed colonies, so many countries owned colonies in the name of prestige as well as a key to resources. Thus, this created an era of Euro-American *imperialism* that subjected the peoples of Africa and Asia to white domination. In this respect, it should be kept in mind that China was never technically colonized, but after the second half of the 19th century, it was divided into spheres of influence among western powers, and China lost some amount of territories to Great Britain (Hong Kong), Japan (Taiwan), and Russia (a considerable amount of territory in Central Asia and Pacific Siberia).

The United States also acquired some territories in the last period of the 19th Century. Hawaii, Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and Philippines. Also, the American domination over some territories, such as Caribbean and Central American countries, became so strong that their true independence was in doubt.

Generally, the imperialist policies of powerful countries over African, and Asian countries constitute one important concept called North-South Axis. After that the significant struggle of subjugated countries gave way to anti-colonial movement and the European control over Western Hemisphere began to decay. In 1804 Haiti won its independence from France, and by 1824 all of Spanish colonies in Central and South America as well as Portugal's colony of Brazil had become free from colonial restrictions, and the North-South Axis had become to form.

After the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), the period which lasted to the mid 20th century can be named as the *multipolar balance-of-power* system. It was multipolar in the sense that political affairs were dominated by numerous major powers. For instance, during the period of 1815 (defeat of Napoleon) and 1914 (beginning of the WWI), the big powers were Britain, Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Italy, and the Ottoman Empire. Also, in the beginning of the 19th century, the United States, Japan, and China became powerful countries.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 39.

Therefore, the balance-of-power system during 1648 and 1945 was a time of shifting alliances, designed to prevent any single power or combination of powers from dominating European continent and the world. According to Bernholz, this concept of anti-domination underlies the basic “law of behavior of states in a balance of power system,” a rule that dictates that countries “join alliances against the strongest member or against a potentially hegemonic alliance. . . to prevent domination. Once the threatening country has been defeated, do not weaken it so much that cannot join you later as an ally to prevent another country from gaining ascendant power”²⁷.

1.3.3. The 20th Century

In the beginning of the 20th century, developments gained speed and many concepts became more useable by other states. For example, in the first two decades of the 20th century, czars, kaisers had gone. Nationalism also contributed to this process as removing the foundations of empires.

The period of WWI was an important cornerstone in the course of international political history. The significance of this period was to come up of a new concept called *self-determination* that was established by Woodrow Wilson as one of his famous 14 points. The source of self-determination was the ethnic societies of which acquired their independence from the two losers of the WWI, the Ottoman Empire and Austro-Hungarian Empire. The result was the new states such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine/Israel under the mandate control of the League of Nations which then became independent states after the end of the war. Thus, this period started the self-determination movement that became effective in the second half of the 20th century in the international arena.

Although balance-of-power of the 19th century created a stable international system, the world wars broke this stability and constituted a new system. Basically, breaking of the earlier alliance system and creating two hostile camps was the major change that caused the world wars. One camp was consisted of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire whereas the other side was consisted of France,

²⁷ Ibid., p. 41.

Britain, and Russia. As a defeated country, Germany was allowed to rebuild its strength in the 1930s. This was important because Germany would be one of the conflicting parties that, later, became one of the actors of the WWII. Russia experienced the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 which created a strong negative reaction in the West. At the same time, Britain frightened from the dominant positions of France and the Soviets because Great Britain had long followed the principle of preventing any single country from dominating all of the continental Europe and becoming a threat. At that point the British had mistakenly thought that France and the Soviet Union tried Germany regain its power in order to supply a new balance of power situation. Then, Britain agreed to dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, that was decided in the *Munich Conference (1939)*, in false hope that an *appeasement policy* toward Germany would maintain the peace in its head

In the first part of the 20th century, there was an expansion of the world community. Some states gained their independence, others, especially the United States and Japan began to play a more significant role in the international political system. Many other non-European countries became new members of international arena through membership of League of Nations. Up to that point, Europe was the major place of the international relations but especially after the WWII, other actors such as the United States, Japan, and China added to the big European powers.

1.3.4. The Cold War Period

For the USA, the USSR soon replaced Germany as a great ideological enemy threatening the building of a liberal world order anchored in the UN. As the USSR slipped into the role of Germany, the only change seemed to be the lack of military conflict itself, hence “cold war”²⁸. Cold War represented a freezing of international relations into a solid structure contrasting with the relative fluidity of previous world orders. The freezing of the inter-state system into two antagonistic blocs had an ideological basis. The new world order was proclaimed in civilization terms. The Cold War covers the period of US hegemony in the world-system. This world system,

²⁸ The term “Cold War” was popularized by the US political commentator Walter Lippman in 1947 (Steel, 1980)

seems very straightforward, with an “East-West” geographical pattern of power conflict dominating the inter-state system.

As to the precursors of a new order, the idea of a great ideological contest between bourgeoisie/capitalism and proletarians/communism predates 1945²⁹. What happened after 1945 was the transition to the inter-state system of the century-long domestic socialist challenge. This process actually began at the end of the WWI with the establishment of the USSR from the ruins of the old Tsarist state. At the end of the WWII, the peace was in the hands of the “Big Three”, though it was only in 1947 that the Big Three became definitively reduced to two and we enter the bi-polar world of the Cold War. The key point is that the geopolitical transition predates this bi-polar world³⁰. Geopolitical transitions are pre-eminently fluid periods of international relations when different geopolitical positions are vying for construction. According to Taylor, if we limit our “constructions” to just the Big Three, we can define five potential patterns of power in 1945:

- a) one world, where the Grand Alliance survives to lead an undivided and peaceful world,
- b) three monroes, where the three superpowers split apart and each concentrates on their division of the world,
- c) an any-imperial front producing two worlds where the USA and USSR combine to oppose Britain and other European empires,
- d) an anti-hegemonic front producing two worlds where Britain and the USSR combine to confront the overwhelming economic power of the USA, and
- e) an anticommunist front producing two worlds with Britain and the USA confronting the USSR.

As WWII ended, the expectation was that the Grand Alliance would be able to produce a peaceful world without deep divisions. At Yalta and Postdam the Big Three met to agree the post-war order.

²⁹ Taylor, op.cit., p. 50.

³⁰ Taylor, op.cit., p. 51.

Generally speaking, the Cold War is just another stage in the Great Game, but with a new team leader, the USA. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the geographer who codified the 19th century Great Game as world strategic model should have a second “life” as a major geopolitical theorist in the Cold War. Mackinder’s “heartland” thesis concerning the importance of the world-island and the inevitability of an era of sea-power versus land-power conflict derived a new resonance with the coming of the new world order. Mackinder’s two worlds finally came into being as the Cold War Geopolitical World Order³¹.

In terms of the phases of the Cold War, although the most stable of all geopolitical world orders, the Cold War has exhibited a variety of international relations within the single pattern. The standard approach to differences over time has been to contrast different degrees of enmity in East-West relations. Therefore, Taylor defined four phases in this manner,

a. Freeze, 1947-1953: This first phase represents the deepest the Cold War division was to reach: there were to be later crises in East-West relations, but the nadir of this politics is usually dated around 1950. In addition, the domestic populations of the major participants were being mobilized to the new way of thinking through anti-communism and anti-imperialism program. The Cold War begins with the division of Europe into two blocs. The US capital was made available to reconstruct Europe by Marshall Plan of 1947 which was resulted from the Truman Doctrine. Since the USSR refused to allow states it controlled to accept such funds, the operation of the plan in 1948 effectively divided Europe into two economic regions. Later this situation gave way to the formation of the NATO in 1949 that committed the USA to the defense of Western Europe. In this first phase the geopolitical codes of the chief protagonists become clear. For the USSR, Eastern Europe was paramount. The USA code was originally just as selective in its scope. George Kennan identified four advanced industrial regions that had the potential to sustain a war against the USA: Britain, Germany, Japan and the USSR. In 1949 and 1950 the focus of international relations switched from Europe to Asia. The communists won civil war in China in 1949, and a

³¹ Taylor, op.cit., p. 53.

year later the Korean War began. At the same time the US code was changed significantly from selective to blanket containment.

b. Conflict and concert, contest or conspiracy, 1953-1969: According to the description of Fred Halliday (1983), this phase is called as “oscillatory antagonism”. The traditional balance of power became translated into a balance of terror by the end of this phase, as the USSR could retaliate a US attack to guarantee “mutually assured destruction”. The events of this phase generally confirm the geopolitical codes of the superpowers. Both consolidated their positions in their own contiguous spheres of influence³². The USA continued its blanket containment policy and formed two further alliances, SEATO in 1954 and CENTO in 1959. Cuban revolution illustrates the fact that political events could not be universally controlled by the superpowers. The collapse of CENTO after a coup in Iraq provides a similar message. In terms of the South, this phase represents the great victory of decolonization: the rest of Asia and the Americas plus almost all of sub-Saharan Africa became independent of the old European empires. The Non-Alligned Movement was not the only major challenge to the assumption of a bi-polar world. Within each bloc there arose differences that exploded the myth of East-West as two frozen monoliths. After two decades of the US and the USSR dominance, both superpowers were having to face for the first time a relative decline in their powers. This was the key prelude to detente.

c. Detente and demands for a new order, 1969-1979: The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 stimulated both the beginnings of negotiations on controlling nuclear weapon testing and dissemination, plus improved communication between the USA and the USSR. The “hot-line” agreement between the two superpowers was one of the important developments of this process. Under the tutelage of the Secretary of State Henry Kissenger, the blanket containment code was replaced by a more pluralistic balance of power model. At this phase, the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) agreement of 1972 between the two superpowers represented the apogee of the detente. Economically, the USA withdrew the convertibility of dollar to gold in 1971. By doing this, the USA was reverting to ordinary competitive status within the world-

³² Taylor, op.cit., p. 54.

economy. Thus began a new period of what Kaldor (1978) termed “West-West conflict”. The Trilateral Commission was an informal organization bringing together the political and economic elite of the USA, Europe and Japan to encourage the development of a global management class- this position generally known as the G7 meetings. Also we can say that US economic hegemony had ended in the West. Pluralism was extended down the power hierarchy by the recognition of regional powers with special responsibility to maintain stability in their regions.

New Economic International Order was demanded that was a challenge to both the USA and the USSR with a new image of “one world”, where the needs of the South would take precedent over the Cold War and its unstable demand for wasteful arms. According to Taylor, there were three key events that aided the “cold warriors” in overturning detente. First, the popular overthrow of the Shah in Iran led to a radical Islamic regime that was explicitly anti-American, second, the radical Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua brought fears of a communist regime on the American mainland. Third, the USSR sent its army into Afghanistan in 1979. This later event, was to mark definitely the end of detente.

d. A process of freeze-thaw with deadly side-effects, 1979-1989: At this phase, the Cold war political agenda was reaffirmed and Third World demands simply ignored in a more aggressive approach to the UN. The geopolitical code of the USA returned to earlier time of simple bi-polarity. The most controversial decision came in 1983 with the go-ahead for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) which proposed the militarization of space.

There is no doubt who the losers were in this final phase of the Cold War. With the demise of the UN as a relevant tool of redress, the major political reaction to this change has been intensified “terrorism”. Promoting the Cold War agenda had other important implications. By bringing political issues to the fore again, it confirmed the USA’s standing as world leader. Towards the end of the 1980s, the processes underlying the West-West conflict that emerged during detente did not abruptly end. Hence, with a new thaw in East-West relations, voices could be heard in the US identifying Japan as more of a threat to US global pre-eminence than the

USSR. Major new initiatives resulted in the first major destruction of nuclear arsenals after the INF (Intermediate Nuclear Forces) agreement of 1987 . The following year USSR troops withdrew from Afghanistan, removing the original cause of the “second cold war”. The USSR indicated that it would no longer employ force to keep its sphere of influence, and the communist regimes collapsed one after another, starting in Poland and ending in Romania and finally the USSR was excised from the interstate system in 1991. And so the Cold War Geopolitical World Order began and ended in Europe, and benefits are expected from the healing of divisions there.

The joy in Europe, and in the North generally, at the ending of the Cold War must be severely tempered while the vast majority of humanity in the South struggle just to survive.

1.4. A New Geopolitical World Order

The demise of the USSR created a political power vacuum. To Taylor, there were three very important tendencies within detente that survived the early 1980s freeze: the attempt at a new concert of Great Powers, the new economic rivalry, and the challenge from the South.

The first major international crisis after transition, suggests that, we may be entering a new period of “rivalry and concert” . The UN emerged as a vehicle for great-power imposition of order as originally envisaged in 1945. While 1991 witnessed agreement on military action in the Gulf, there was fundamental disagreement at the GATT meetings. The question is whether the economic rivalry can be contained by the processes of concert.

If the economic rivalry comes to dominate the new world order, what form might it take? Wallerstein (1991) predicts a division through the Atlantic, with Japan and the USA leading a Pacific Rim bloc against a “greater Europe” incorporating the USSR and dominating the Middle East and Africa.

If there is an upturn in the geopolitical cycle in the near future, this will give opportunities to alleviate the worst problems of the South. However, given that domestic crises are going to dominate the states of the South into the foreseeable future, it remains that any of these states can provide the sort of leadership necessary

for a new political challenge. If there is to be a challenge, it is more likely to be from the resurgence of Islam than from any one state. This is the most intriguing precursor within the Cold War order, and one that was briefly activated during the Gulf War by the surprising popularity of Saddam Hussein among Moslem peoples.

The WWII is another significant event that changed the course of the history of the world politics. One important aspect was the changes within the political power structure. At that time the multipolar international system which began after the Westphalia Treaty (1648) ended and a new bipolar system replaced it. In this period the major actors were the United States on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other. This polarity of the international system brought nuclear armament concept with the help of technological development. Another prominent feature of this period was the rapid increase on travel, transportation, and especially communication. This point is very important because these developments became the basement of cooperation and integration processes. Other significant issue in that period was economic. Economic powers of countries are considered more important than their political and military capabilities. This property of economic relations played a definitive role in international relations so that world entered an era of growing economic interdependence. Economic interdependence also played a crucial role in integrative movements which prepared a basis for example to create European Union and other regional unions. However, this development of Western countries created a huge division between the North and the South. Another change involved the number and types of systems of actors. More national actors (states) came into existence in the South as the colonial empires collapsed. Also, many international organizations and other transnational organizations were established and they are , now , playing a significant role in the conduct of international relations.

All these changes taken place during a period of time made inevitable developments in international system and the international system of today is based on these crucial events. Thus, to examine these changes in detail, it could help us to understand the current global system and regional integration movements.

1.4.1. Characteristics of the Cold War Bipolar System

After the WWII, major European states lost their great powers, compared to the previous century, and in their places the United States and Soviet Union took over the significant roles in the international arena. Generally, as a specific aspect, the United States developed its nuclear power, whereas the Soviet Union created a huge conventional force and threatened Europe often. Also, Europe became a battlefield of two major ideologies represented by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Therefore, the East-West Axis was established and Europe was the playground of this dangerous game. In fact, the precise reasons of the confrontation of the two powers, termed as *cold war*, are complex and controversial. However, we can shortly say that varying economic and political interests and the power vacuum created by the collapse of the old balance-of-power system gave way to a new bipolar system in which a great deal of world politics was centered on the confrontation between the superpowers.

The United States reacted to Soviet threat in Europe as the policy of *containment*. In this policy, the U.S. aimed at the expansionist policy of Soviets not only in Europe, but also in other parts of the world. Also the U.S. constituted a related theory against Soviet approach, which was called the *domino theory* that supposed that if communism conquered one country, then its neighbor countries would be enter the dominance of the communist ideology. Based on these different political theories, the United States step from a policy of isolationism, which was applied before the war, to a postwar *globalism*. The United States became leader of some alliances, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was one of the most prominent that was established by the U.S., Canada, and major European countries in 1949. As a reaction, the Soviet headed Warsaw Pact was founded in 1955 so that the two blocs had different borders so far.

The two superpower became major actors of some international conflicts. For example, *Cuban missile crisis* was erupted in 1962 when the Soviets tried to launched medium-range nuclear missiles in Cuba and the U.S. government resolved to force the missiles out and at the end the Soviet missiles were withdrawn. As a consequence, the Soviets needed to improve their nuclear abilities to resist to the U.S. nuclear force.

Moreover, the two superpowers encountered in Vietnam in 1950s in which the country was divided into two parts controlled by U.S. and the Soviet Union. In fact, the Vietnam experience brought some important changes to international relations. First, after this antagonistic war, the United States decided to restrict its military power and determined not to fight in different parts of the world in the name of controlling or finishing communism. Also, this strife stated the preliminary reasons of the fragmentation of the bipolar international system. At that point, other powers which did not associate with either of the pole began to play more striking role in the political arena. The communist world divided into two parts and China improved more antagonistic feelings towards the Soviets. Also, Western Europe and Japan gained an importance economically and followed foreign policies that sometimes did not overlap with the policies of the United States. Thus, this situation created more smooth relations between the superpowers which was the policy of *detente*.

The relations between the United States and the Soviet Union showed a different and changing character in the period of 1970s and 1980s. However, things began to change rapidly since 1985 when *Gorbachev* became the secretary of the Soviet Communist Party. In this respect, he wanted to realize remarkable changes in the Soviet political life as well as its social life. He needed to change inefficient centralized planning bureaucracy and to bring a some level of free market to create a motivation for both managers and workers. He also wanted to establish the diminish the role of politburo and the communist party and increase the role of a government which has less ideological aspects together with the constitutional changes. He, then symbolizes his ideas in two worlds, *perestroika* (restructuring) and *glasnost* (openness) in order to articulate changes and to increase the volume and accuracy of information available to Soviet citizens respectively.

The subject on the Soviet Union and Gorbachev is very important because it is accepted as the turning point of the history of international political affairs. To accomplish his goals, mentioned above, Gorbachev started a “peace offensive” policy that was a combination of skilled diplomacy and action together. In that respect he cooperated with the United States in Afghanistan, Southern Africa and Central

America conflicts. Also, he set free East-European countries to govern themselves on the contrary of the earlier *Brezhnev Doctrine*. To this developments, the West responded slowly but, then progress was achieved , including the signing of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the first reduction of nuclear weapons.

As far as the Europe was concerned, the positive relations of the cold war developed loose ties with the West. A combination of rising economic rivalry ad a declining sense of threat from a common enemy left now economically recovered and politically confident Europeans and even Japanese more willing to follow their own foreign policy agenda rather than to give way to U.S. leadership. Thus, Western solidarity, while not early as fragmented as the former Soviet bloc, was also in serious disrepair by the late 1980s³³.

However, the term until 1989 was not so definite for the Soviets, and while the important changes affected and created positive atmosphere in the political scene of the world, the Soviet people began to experience a kind of frustration and finally, the lessening of political control prepared independence and autonomy demands among some states of the U.S.S.R, such as Lithuania, Azerbaijan and some other states. Thus, at the end the country entered a period of dismemberment, mostly because of political and economic trouble in 1990. In the same year, many East-European countries, such as Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Poland expressed their Western-side political choices. Also, as a result of these political developments, the two Germany became reunited again in 1990.

1.4.2. Characteristics of the MultiPolar System

After the collapse of the cold war and the dismemberment of the Soviet system, the international relations entered into a era, called polar system. In this system, especially *supranational* international organizations gained a considerable importance. If we speak theoretically, in the extreme case of this supranational system, it could be a world government, and the system would be *unipolar*. However, this kind of development would be simply improbable in the near future. Moreover, a *hegemonic* system could be equally improbable. According to the current

³³ Taylor, op.cit., p. 47.

developments of the world political system, it is hard to mention a universal empire, as another variation of a unipolar system.

In this new system, another possibility is a *tripolar system* in the United States, the Soviet Union, and China as three major powers. In that case, Japan and Germany are considered only economic powers. However, this kind of deduction will also be not correct because for instance, European Union, and other regional powers could be a polar in the near future. It can be assumed that China could be one of the polars of the world political system, but in 21. Century.

Therefore, the most likely possibility for a polar structure, is a *multipolar* system. The probable poles could be the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, Germany, European Union and may be India. In this structure, a mixed system of regional/national poles might be thought, and at that time, Germany and European Union could be considered in this regional/national mixed system. It should also be kept in mind that, North America (NAFTA) or even Western Hemisphere could become another regional pole. Thus the evolving polar structure will importantly effect our future.

As far as the nuclear issues are concerned, the developed atomic weapons changed power relationships in the international arena. The world was divided into two parts and created some consequences. One of them is that the nuclear superpowers are avoided war directly with one another. Another result is that nuclear arms talks have become a continuing process and this brought some limited success. The 1963 Test Ban Treaty and the 1972 SALT I treaty brought some restrictions but no reductions. The 1979 SALT II treaty was never ratified because of decline in relations. Also, 1987 INF Treaty eliminated a small class of missiles. Finally, 1992 START Treaty signed between the U.S. and Russia, in which for the first time the nuclear weapons not only restricted, but also reduced.

In terms of technology, the developments on international travel and communication made a great impact on international political relations. Among leaders, communications and even face-to-face meetings have become more common. The advances in communications have also affected the views of the general public,

and with the increase of the democratization of foreign policy-making, international politics is changed. The Gulf war was able to be watched by millions of people live broadcast.

As one of the catalyzers of the international relations, economic interactions among states made a significant effect especially in both trade and in monetary relations. The level of world trade had been gradually rising for several centuries, but after the war it greatly accelerated. In addition to nonpolitical technological and economic factors, trade was encouraged by the belief that trade barriers had contributed to the economic collapse that preceded and helped cause WW II. As a result, the United States led moves to remove tariffs and other trade restrictions. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) organization was primarily the focus of that activity. One result of increased trade is increasing *economic interdependence*: almost all countries have economies that rely on foreign markets and sources of supply.

After the war, monetary relations began to be reconsidered at a conference known as Bretton Woods in 1944. This Bretton Woods system was based on the gold standard and the strength of the American dollar. That system lasted until the early 1970s, when weakening of the dollar and the unwillingness of the United States to sell gold at a fixed rate. The Bretton Woods structure also included the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which was designed to help stabilize currency exchange rates by loaning countries money to meet international currency demands to keep the supply and demand stable.

Economic relations had some problems in the 1970s and 1980s. Trade and monetary tensions among the United States, Western Europe, and Japan created some imbalances (in favor of Japan). In recent years, the most serious problem has related to the massive loans made to the Less Developed Countries (LDCs) and the difficulty of those countries in having meeting principal and interest payment schedules. On a broader scale, economic relations and international politics are increasingly concerned with the wide gap between the relatively wealthy industrialized states and the poorer LDCs. These poorer *South's* economic conditions are slightly improving whereas the

gap between the North and South is widening. Increasingly, the poor countries are making demands that a new international economic order be established that based on a greater sharing of wealth and the end of trade and monetary policies that favor the North.

The Third World has also played a crucial role in the expansion of the world's nation-state system. After the WW II almost all previously subjugated countries gained their independence from the dominant powers. Almost all these powers are part of the third world. According to scholars, Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, between 16th and 20th centuries, the international scene was transformed by the expansion of the Europeans over to the rest of the world. Further, the crucial rule of the system, was that the European States had come to the conceive of themselves as forming an exclusive club that enjoying rights superior to those of other political communities.

In the last-century, the European and American power have changed significantly. The Third World countries are becoming more interested in the political scene of international relations, and have a considerable concern in its system. Many support international changes in the system and few of them take radical actions (such as Libya) that commands the attention of the developed countries. A few other third world countries, like Saudi Arabia, have achieved substantial wealth and influence, and some others like, Brazil, India, and Nigeria have become regional powers. Third World countries have joined to some groups and organizations , such as Non-aligned Movement and Group of 77 in order to promote their relationships with the other countries. These countries now command majority on the United Nations General Assembly, and they dominate some of the other agencies and bodies of United Nations

This expansion of the international system, the reducing Euro-American influence, and the growth of the Afro-Asian-Latin influence have had a profound impact. As Bull and Watson put it, “ the third world countries accelerated the pace of decolonization or national liberation, and brought about a new . . . climate in world affairs in which colonial rule . . . (and) . . . rule by settler minorities, came to be

regarded as illegitimate. They found a new target in neocolonialism. The domination of . . . weak countries by indirect means. They upheld the equality of races, especially in relation to the white supremacist governments of the Southern Africa. They formulated demands for economic justice between rich and poor nations . . . (and advocated) cultural liberation, the repudiation not merely of the political and economic, but the intellectual or spiritual suzerainty of the West. They propagated a Third World ideology or world view . . . that served to explain the history of relations between European and non-European people in terms acceptable to themselves³⁴. Although there were conflicting situations in international relations, the system experienced new relations and formations after the WWII. The United Nations was established in 1945 as a successor to the League of Nations, has made contributions in peacekeeping and economic and social betterment. Its role, however, has been limited by the resistance of all countries to compromising their own interests for the common good. Also, some *transnational* organizations have been established that work to better the economic and social conditions of the world. The concept of international law has also made progress, although international law remains a primitive system.

1.5. Political Developments of the Multipolar System

As to the *political developments* in the multipolar system, it can be said that significant changes in consciousness on international political concepts alters some themes of political objectives : both the needs to be met and the means of meeting them. National defense policies, national welfare policies, national environmental policies, and national human rights policies are no longer adequate. Wider political structures are required to meet the new needs. Thus, all these lead to the creation of a more just international society, in which the international action is significant, redistribution at the global level, transnational political movements , and a new international organizations, more representative, reflecting the views of groups and individuals as well as of governments.

By the same token, regional economic integration, together with their political aspects, have constitute a new international system. In this global process, the

³⁴ Taylor, op.cit., p. 55

European experience has to be considered carefully because attempts were made to emulate it elsewhere and because lessons learned from what happened in the European Union could be applied in other regional contexts. Thus, this new international system can be analyzed through inspecting multipolar features, trying to explain the integral economic relations among countries (especially among economic regional giants such as European Union, NAFTA, and APEC), and looking for the global formation together with socio-economic consequences.

Our world is made up of over one hundred political units, called nation-states. The first requirement of a state is that it possess a geographical base, a territory of its own. Another major contributing factor to the existence and unity of a nation lies in its common and interdependent economic patterns. Modern technology and the enlargement of markets work equally for the development of economic patterns that reach far beyond national boundaries. A common language, is another factor. In many countries a common tongue is an important integrative factor. Also, one of the most perplexing concepts is that of "national character" . In fact, this seems to be an indisputable factor but that no one knows exactly what it is. In summary, what constitutes a nation in our time may be characterized as follows, first it is sovereign political unit, secondly, it is a population that in being committed to a particular collective identity through a common image of past and future shares a greater or lesser degree of nationalism. Finally, it is a population inhabiting a definite territory, acknowledging a common government, and usually exhibiting common linguistic and cultural patterns.

Considering other nations, the nature of power of a nation is said to be one of the most elusive aspects of international relations. It is frequently suggested that a power nation is the total of its capabilities. The psychological aspect of power is crucial, since a power of nation may depend on considerable measure on what other nations think it is. Simply, geography, natural resources, population and the government of a country are principal elements of national power. In addition to all that, the quality of the leadership of a nation and the image which it projects upon the world is important source of power. Thus, as far as the anatomy of the power is

concerned, we can say that “power in international relations is the capacity of a nation to use its tangible and intangible resources in such a way as to affect the behavior of the other nations”³⁵. According to Edward L. Morse, the transformation of foreign policies created three conditions: First, the ideal and classical distinctions between foreign and domestic affairs have broken down. Secondly, the distinction between “high policies” and “low policies” has become less important as low policies have assumed an increasingly large role in any society. Thirdly, although there have been significant developments in the instrument of political control, the actual ability to control events either internal or external to modernize societies has decreased with the growth of interdependence³⁶.

As far as the international organizations are concerned, they are of interest to the statesman and the theorists of the world politics because of the variety of the roles they play in the international system and the widely differing interpretations which can be attached to those roles. First, international organizations are used by states, individually or collectively, as the instruments of the foreign policy. Second, they act, by their very presence in the system, to modify states' behavior³⁷. Third, they sometimes achieve a degree of autonomy and influence as political actors in their own right. International organizations may have divergent expectations as to their future development. Accordingly, they may apply different standards in measuring the success or failure of an organization.

1.6. International Political Economy and Economic Integration

Interdependence is one key word of the global economy. The rapidly increasing flow of the trade, direct and portfolio investment, and monetary interchange among countries means that the prosperity of people is intertwined with the products, consumption, and prosperity of others. The concept of national economy has not completely lost its validity but it is only a part of much clearer and even more complex global economic pattern.

³⁵ Richard Little, Michael Smith, *World Politics*, vol. XXII, no. 3, 1992, p. 34.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 371-392.

³⁷ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. *World Politics*, (review article), vol. XXII, no 1, 1988, p. 39-62.

There are numbers of problems associated with interdependence. Many of them stem from the clash between the reality of a global economy on the one hand, and the persisting attitudes of nationalism and the sovereign pursuit of self-interest by the nation-states, on the other. Trade protectionism, resentment of foreign investment, and other symptoms such as economic nationalism continue to play a strong role in international political economy. The global maldistribution of wealth that divides the world into a relatively wealthy North and a relatively impoverished South is a second key characteristic of the world economy³⁸. The arguments based on humanitarianism and on justice to ameliorate the living conditions of many in the South and to close the gap between North and South are obvious enough.

“What is being done to address growing economic interdependence and the persistent maldistribution of wealth?” is the principal question³⁹. Comprehensive economic cooperation may be one of the answers to this important question. Dealing with to it, there are number of developing and established organizations and interactions that address the broader range of international economic issues. These examples of economic cooperation can be divided into two parts as global and regional efforts. Among global efforts, the UN serves as an umbrella organization for host of agencies and programs that deal with economic issues through the General Assembly and the UN Economic and Social Council. Many of these programs came into being in the mid-1960s in response to the decolonization of much of the Third World and the needs and demands of the new countries. For example, UN Development Program (UNDP) was established in 1965 to provide both technical and assistance and to develop funds to less developed countries. Another important UN organization, the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was founded in 1964 to address the economic concerns of the less developed countries. These countries quickly coalesced into a voting bloc called the group of 77 after the number of less developed countries in at that time. The North also has its cooperative organizations.

³⁸ Rourke, *op.cit.*, p.534

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p.535.

The primary focus of cooperating among the Western industrialized countries is the 24-member Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) established in 1961. The OECD is involved in a wide variety of the economic issues of North and information exchanges.

Among regional efforts, the European Union (EU) is the most extensive example of cooperation and the most highly integrated regional effort in the world. At this stage, we should deal with European Union more detail. The Underlying idea of the Common Market which is the base for EU, goes back to the 16th century. Since that time, there had been the rise of rival allegiances, the Reformation, the spread of nationalism in Europe, and ideological indivisibility caused by the French and Russian Revolutions and the dictators in the 20th century. In modern times, starting from 1945, there were statesmen who were advocating a supranational institution by making sacrifices from some or all national sovereignty. The main features of the situation can be stated as follows:

1. Nationalistic state idea was non-sense from then on . It has also been understood that states individually were unable to survive and protect their people in some possible dangerous situations, as it has seen in attempts of Germany.
2. Germany had to be recovered by preventing it to become a threat again.
3. Europe was no more dominant in the world. It had to be strengthened both economically and politically with an economic cooperation.
4. US supported integration against the threat of communism and Soviet aggression.

In the post-war period, reconstruction of Europe was the most important issue. In 1947, Marshall Plan was instituted when Europe was in a desperate economic situation. In 1948, Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was founded when Council of Europe began to act to safeguard the European heritage and social progress. NATO was established in 1949 as an expanded way of treaty of Brussels. In fact, after the WWII, the idea of European Community was put forward by the plan of Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, on May 1950. According to this plan, Schuman and Jean Monnet tried to arrange French coal and

German steel industries under a joint High Authority, within an organization open to any other country in Europe. In real, there were two important factors behind this idea. First, it was to bind Germany politically and economically into a firmly based grouping of European States. This was the only solution to prevent a potential threat of fully independent Germany to peace. Actually, this idea was inspired by Winston Churchill in his speech in Zurich on 19 September 1946⁴⁰, when he had called for the creation of a United States of Europe, singling out the essential need for Franco-German cooperation. Thus, on 18 April 1951 Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and Netherlands signed the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and on 23 July 1952, it came into force. It was the first major step towards the European Economic integration.

In 1950, the French had already launched the idea of a European Defense Community (EDC) which was also known as the Pleven Plan. The outbreak of the Korean War and rising East-West tension necessitated the need for a greater defense effort by Western Europe. However, in August 1954, the plan was dashed when the French National Assembly refused to ratify the Treaty. Upon the failure of the European Defense Community, the members began to think of about political integration, and then in June 1955, the foreign ministers of the six founder members of the ECSC launched a new initiative for the creation of a united Europe. At the Messina Conference, they decided to form a greater European unity within themselves by focusing on not a political but an economic integration. Focusing on economy rather than politics, could create more tangible solutions and ideas because, the interests of nations on economy were looser the interests of politics. Now, the aim, focusing on economic integration rather than politic integration, was more modest but more realistic. In 1956, a committee, headed by Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgian Foreign Minister, concluded his studies on further integration. This report served as a basis for negotiations leading eventually to the Treaties establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Economic Community (EEC),

⁴⁰ Klaus-Dieter Borchardt, **The Origins and Growth of the European Union, European Integration**, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the EU, 1995.

which were signed in March 1957 and entered into force on 1 January 1958.

Upon the success of initial efforts on economic field, the members returned in the earlier goal of closer political integration. In 1961, Christian Fouchet, the French ambassador to Denmark, was chaired by a committee to submit proposals for a political charter for the union of the people of the Community. Although the Committee presented two successive drafts (known as the first and second Fouchet Plans), the differences between the members states over the nature of the union and the form were resulted to suspend the negotiations. Later, further improvements on both economic and political issues were made at the Hague Summit in 1969 and Paris Summits of 1972 and 1974. At the same time, in 1965, one of the important of the events was the unification of the institutions of the Community by the Merger Treaty. From then on, the community has had four principal institutions: the Council, the Commission, the Parliament, and the International Court of Justice. As the developments of 1970s, the Belgian Prime Minister, Leo Tindemans, was asked to work out a comprehensive plan for European Union on the basis of ideas put forward by the Commission, the European Parliament, the Court of Justice, and the Economic and Social Committee. His plan (the Tindemans Report) envisaged completion for the unity by 1980 through the establishment of economic and monetary union, reform of the community institutions, the implementations of a common foreign policy and the implementations of a common regional and social policies. But, once again, the fundamental differences between the member states on the constitutional structure and institutional reforms resulted to fail the achievement of the aimed goals on that basis.

However, there were two important developments in the 1970s. The first was European Political Cooperation (EPC), which was set up in 1970 as an instrument for voluntary foreign policy coordination. The second was the setting-up of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979, which created a new phase for the European monetary coordination. Its purpose was to form a zone of monetary stability in Europe to be free from currency fluctuations. At the same time, in 1973, Britain, Denmark, and Ireland became full members of the Community.

1980s marked important developments on European Union. The studies made by the Parliament created positive results on transferring new powers to the union in areas such as economic and monetary policy, social policy and foreign policy. Thus, the draft Treaty establishing the European Union in 1984 marked a qualitative leap forward by the Parliament on the road towards the European Union. More importantly, this draft Treaty, though it was not ratified, showed serious determination to the commitment to real progress towards European integration. Later, at the 1984 Fontainebleau and 1985 Milan Summits attributed to a new steps to European integration. Especially, the studies on institutional reform (studied by a Committee chaired by Irish Senator, James Dooge) and the improvement of the interests of the people of the Community made an impact towards a European Union. At the same time, joint actions in areas such as education, health, law, and the fight against drugs and terrorism contributed to this process.

A very important milestone along the road was the Single European Act, which entered into force on 1 July 1987. Its objective was broadly the creation of a European Union, which the Community and the European political cooperation are meant to help achieve. It, then figured out a detailed legal framework for establishing a single a market by 1992 and closer policy cooperation on the environment, research and technology. It had also meant foreign policy cooperation under EPC. Also, the Community accepted new members in 1980s. Greece became full member in 1981, while Portugal and Spain entered to the Community in 1986. Thus, in the beginning of the 1990s, the Community had 12 members.

In the beginning of the 1990, two crucial conferences contributed to the clear view of the European Union. One of the conferences constituted vital steps needed to establish economic monetary union while the second one tried to eliminate obstacles standing in the way of a political union. Thus, the outcome of the two conferences was the European Union signed in 1992 in Maastricht, which entered into force on 1 November 1993, promoting balanced economic progress “through the establishment of economic and monetary union, including a single currency”⁴¹. Moreover, the

⁴¹ The Road Ahead for Maastricht, *The Economist*, July 31st-August 6th 1993, p. 26.

acceptance of three more countries (Sweden, Finland, and Austria) to the Union expanded its borders. Thus, for the first time, the Union became the neighbors of Russia and the Balkans.

In addition to global and regional forms of general economic cooperation, there are number of global and regional efforts that focus on trade cooperation. The most common form of specialized economic cooperation involves agreements and organizations to regulate trade and lower trade barriers. On the global level, the GATT was founded in 1947 to promote free trade . It is a written agreement which concerns the conduct of trade among its members. Countries have come together to reduce their tariffs to achieve minimum variable. The goal is the maximum international trade through reduction of trade barriers such as tariffs and quotas. The principle is “the most-favored nation clause” in which, any state is assured that its goods will enter market of all GATT members at rates of duty, no less favorable than those applied to similar products of all other countries.

Another growing area of international cooperation is the regulation of currency exchanges. As trade and the level of other international financial transactions have increased, the need to facilitate and stabilize the flow of dollars, marks, yen, pounds, and other currencies has become vital. To meet this need, a number of organizations have been founded. The most important of these is the International Monetary Fund (IMF) . The IMF began operations in 1947, has 154 members, and receives its funds from member contributions and also from internal sources such as interest on loans to borrowing countries. The primary role of the IMF is to stabilize currency by granting loans to countries that are experiencing balance-of-payments difficulties because of trade deficits, heavy loan payments, or other factors.

A third type of multilateral economic cooperation occurs in the area of granting loans and aid for the economic development of less developed countries. The most significant development agency today is the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) or World Bank. The Bank began operations in 1946 and has over 150 members. It is associated with, but independent of, the UN .

The World Bank is involved in making international loans for development. Its resources come from members' contributions and from interest earned on loans.

Therefore, the need for cooperation is the basic issue for the economic integration of the world. One of the most impressive aspects of the international payments history of the last 30 years has been the steady rise of effective international cooperation. When the gold standard collapsed and the great depression overwhelmed the countries of the world, "every nation for itself" was the rule of the day⁴². Raising tariffs, competitive exchange rate devaluation, and all forms of beggar-my-neighbor policies⁴³ abounded.

After WWII, the countries of the world cooperated in bringing the Bretton Woods system and the IMF into being. The system itself was far from perfect, and it finally broke down as a result of its own international contradictions. But, international cooperation that was necessary to set up the system survived. The joint cooperative actions of central banks allowed them to weather speculative crises in the 1970s that would have forced them to devalue their currencies in the 1950s. Thus, the collapse of Bretton Woods did not plunge the world into the same chaos that followed the breakdown of the gold standard. The world was also better able to cope with the terrible strains caused by the sharp rise in oil prices in 1970s.

At the end of the 20th. Century, especially in 1980s, there was a powerful incentive for governments to manipulate economic policies in order to advance their economic, political and related interests. The Japanese tactic of "preemptive investment", the American retreat to earlier ideas of "conditional reciprocity"⁴⁴, and the temptation of all nations to move toward strategic trade policy are examples of such competitive policies. Developments in the 1980s such as the rise of New Protectionism, the spread of industrial policies and governmental support of their

⁴² Richard G. Lipsey, Peter O. Steiner, Douglas D. Purvis, *Economics*, 8th Edition, New York, Harper & Row Publishers, 1987, p. 838.

⁴³ Beggar-my-neighbour policies : policies designed to increase a country's prosperity (especially by reducing its unemployment) at the expense of reducing prosperity in other countries (especially by increasing their unemployment).

⁴⁴ Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1987

own multinationals illustrate this redirection of individual states to adopt policies that benefit themselves at the expense of other economies.

As a great international economic power, the Pacific Region has a number of problems:

1. Tendency toward bipolarization between industrialized economies of North-East Asia.

2. Over-dependence of the Asian members of the region on the American market as their engine of economic growth.

3. Political stability of East Asia since the end of the Vietnam War may not last, many domestic regimes are unstable and the Pacific is the focus of superpower confrontation.

Thus, although the Pacific Basin holds great promise, its serious difficulties must not be overlooked. Dynamic advantages to be gained from economies of scale, corporate alliances across national boundaries, and the sharing of technology suggested in the 1980s that sector protectionism, that is, international cartelization, particularly in high-technology and service industries, will also be a distinctive feature of the emergent international economy. The purpose of the sector protectionism is to divide up or cartelize individual sectors among various procedures.

1.7. International Politics and Globalization

The last period of the 20th century was a period of great risks, complexities and promises. However, accelerated developments on economy, ecology, and politics led to profound changes in the relationships among people, nations and governments. The welfare of humanity have been developed over the past few decades and the continuation of this process is awesome. New technological changes in biology, materials, construction, satellite monitoring and other fields increased the production of food, developed more benign forms of energy, raised industrial productivity, conserved the earth's basic stocks of natural capital and managed the environment. In fact, with the global communications and information technologies, people can now begin to exercise responsibility for every part of the planet.

Past gains, however, have been accompanied by vast increases in the scale of human impact on the earth. Since the beginning of the 20th century, the world population has multiplied more than three times. Its economy has grown twenty-fold. The consumption of fossil fuels has grown by a factor of 30, and industrial production by a factor of 50. Most of that growth, about four-fifths of it occurred since 1950⁴⁵.

Since 1945, governments have been preoccupied with economic interdependence, the coupling of local and national economies into a global system. But the world has now moved beyond economic interdependence to ecological interdependence. This is the new reality of the century, with profound implications for the shape of institutions of governance, national and international. For more than 40 years, world affairs have been dominated by the contest between East and West. The end of the cold war raised the possibility that money once used for military purposes could be channeled into constructive cooperation between the superpowers and their allies on international development, the protection of the environment, and the building of a durable peace. The world is on history's fastest growth tract. Population will double within the next half century so that if current forms of development were employed, a further five-to-tenfold boost in economic activity would be required over the next 50 years to meet the needs and the aspirations of 10 billion people⁴⁶. Many governments today fail to enable their people to meet even their most basic needs. Over 1.3 billion lack access to safe drinking water, 880 million adults cannot read or write, 770 million have insufficient food for an active working life, and 800 million live in "absolute poverty"⁴⁷.

The Third World countries, and parts of many industrialized countries, are based on their natural resources. Their soils, forests, fisheries, species, and waters make up their principal stocks of economic capital. The over-exploitation and depletion of these stocks can provide them with financial gains in the very short term,

⁴⁵ Jim Mac Neill, Pieter Winsemimus, Taizo Yakushiji, *Beyond Interdependence*, 1991, p.3.

⁴⁶ Jim Mac Neill, *Strategies for Sustainable Economic Development*, *Scientific American*, 261 (September 1989), p.154.

⁴⁷ Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures, 1988-1989*, World Priorities Institute, 1989, pp. 19-27

but will result in a steady reduction of their economic potential over the medium and longer term. Even at present levels of economic activity, there is growing evidence that certain critical global threshold are being approached, perhaps passed. Throughout history, the scale at which people transformed energy and materials have been minuscule in comparison with nature.

When human and natural processes approach similar magnitudes, human-induced disruption of global systems become a serious probability. Environmental effects that appeared simple and trivial are now seen to be complex and substantial, slowly changing ecological systems critical to economic development and to life itself. Cities and settlements that once grew in response to employment generation and in pace with basic services are now exploding in developing countries, overwhelming both jobs and services.

Overcoming the obstacles to sustainable development will require political vision and courage in policy and institutional change on a scale not seen in this century since 1945. The concept of “sustainable development” may provide the needed guide for this vision, as well a pragmatic approach to the paradox of growth and limits. According to the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), strategic imperatives for sustainable development can be summarized as follows⁴⁸:

1. Growth sufficient to meet human needs and aspirations.
2. Policies to increase equity within nations and between developed and developing countries.
3. Policies to reduce high rates of population growth.
4. Policies conserve and enhance the resource base.
5. Policies to ensure a rapid reduction in the energy and resource content of growth.
6. Institutional change to integrate environment in economic decision-making.

⁴⁸Our Common Future, The World Commission on Environment and Development, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1991, p.348

A critical condition for sustainable development is the maintenance of a nation's basic stock of natural capital. Nations are consuming their natural capitals at an accelerating pace. If use of the basic economic capital of earth is to be brought within the capacity of natural systems to generate it, governments will need to increase by several orders of magnitude their support for strategies aimed at abating pollution, protecting and preserving critical stocks of natural capital, and restoring and rehabilitating those assets that have already been depleted. Another condition concerns the nature of the production. If growth rates of 3.2 to 4.7 percent are to be maintained, a significant and rapid reduction in the energy and raw material content of every unit of production will be necessary. During the past two decades, economic and technological changes are resulted in a leveling off, or an absolute reduction in, the demand for energy and some basic materials per unit of production⁴⁹. The transformation to a more efficient economy is the result of a complex combination of factors such as new technologies and changes in historic relationships between capital, labor, and resources.

On global change, three major international conventions negotiated, a world climate convention, a world forestry convention, and a convention to conserve biodiversity. These were preparatory for the Earth Summit in June 1992. The crucial question at this stage is whether significant bargains to address issues need to await the unsuccessful completion of negotiations on a series of global conventions, or whether it might not be wiser to adopt a more opportunistic approach, encouraging actions at all levels and going with those that can be undertaken now, unilateral actions, bilateral actions, regional actions - actions supported by small groups of like-minded nations or by entire regions⁵⁰. The overriding goal is to promote environmental and economic sustainability on a global scale and on a broad range of issues, forests, soils, species, chemicals, the atmosphere, ocean, and fresh water. This eventually will require a number of globally comprehensive conventions and protocols that all could develop a kind of consciousness to act together both nationally and internationally. In this divided world, it is wiser to be opportunistic and actively

⁴⁹ **One Countries in East and West Berlin**, Science Center, July 1988

⁵⁰ Mac Ne Udo E, Simonis et al., **Structural Change and Environmental Policy, Empirical Evidence on Thirthy ill**, Winsemius, and Yakushiji, op.cit., p. 116.

promote deals that can be concluded now with a wide range of actors, bilaterally and regionally as well as globally.

If we summarize the global issues generally, we should first deal with some important challenges that affects the world. In current international situation, although some restricted successes such as falling infant mortality, increasing life expectancy, climbing read and write proportion, and increasing global food production, failures and dangerous points dominate the system. For instance, in terms of absolute numbers, there are more hungry people with less safe water or safe and sound homes. The gap between rich and poor nations is widening - not shrinking. There are environmental trends that threaten to radically alter the planet, threaten the lives of many species upon it, including human species. Each year, another 6 million hectares of productive dry-land turns into worthless desert⁵¹. Similarly, more than 11 million hectares of forests are destroyed yearly. In Europe, acid precipitation kills forests and lakes and damages the artistic and architectural heritage of nations.

There has been a growing realization in national governments and multilateral institutions that is impossible to separate economic development issues from environmental issues, many forms of development erode the environmental resources upon which they must be based, and environmental degradation can undermine economic development. The mandate of The World Commission on Environment and Development gave the UN three objectives : to reexamine the critical environment and development issues and to formulate realistic proposals for dealing with them, to propose new forms of international cooperation on these issues that will influence policies and events in the direction of needed changes, and to raise the levels of understanding and commitment to action of individuals, voluntary organizations, businesses, institutes, and governments.

Thus, in its broadest sense, the strategy for sustainable development aims to promote harmony among human beings and between humanity and nature. In the specific context of the development and environment crises of the 1980s, which

⁵¹ Our Common Future, op.cit., p. 2.

current national and international political and economic institutions have not and perhaps cannot overcome, the pursuit of sustainable development requires⁵²:

1. A political system that secures effective citizen participating decision-making
2. An economic system that is able to generate surpluses and technical knowledge on a self-reliant and sustained basis.
3. A social system that provides for solutions for the tensions arising from disharmonious development.
4. A productive system that respects the obligation to preserve the ecological base for development.
5. A technological system that can search continuously for new solutions.
6. An international system that fosters sustainable patterns of trade and finance,
7. An administrative system that is flexible and has the capacity for self-correction.

These requirements are more in the nature of goals that should underlie national and international action on development. What matters is the sincerity with which these goals are pursued and the effectiveness with which departures from them are corrected.

⁵² Our Common Future, op.cit., p. 65.

CHAPTER TWO

2. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

2.1. The Evolution of the European International Society

2.1.1. Principles and Practices

The most prominent distinguishing characteristic of the European Society was that all its members exercised free of action both internal and external. This was because that was a very unusual implementation throughout the history until then. “The Italian Renaissance princes, the princes and cities of the Holy Roman Empire, the victors who made the Westphalian settlement, the 18th century theoreticians, the settler colonies in the Americas as much as any 19th century nation-states, all wanted to push the practice of the society, and many of them also its legitimacy, far towards the multiple independence end of our spectrum⁵³, and they succeeded to a degree. The realization of demand for independence and the increase in the power of the states resulted in the question of order between the member states of the European society.

To find a solution, independent states were held together by an impersonal net of interests and pressures so that they were driven to make alliances and other agreements that bring a form of order into an inconsistent system. In addition, order was further promoted by voluntary general agreements and rules that restrict and benefit members of a system, to some extent, with their laws and institutions and codes of conduct, as attempts to ensure order.

Yet, neither the pressures of interdependence nor voluntary choice was the only factor limiting the freedom of action of independent states. Usually, a third factor that limited it more effectively was “hegemony”.

Adam Watson explains the experience of European society by the example of the pull of the “pendulum”: The propensity, in systems towards the independence end of the scale, for the strongest state or states not merely to assert their own advantage

⁵³ Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society, A Comparative Historical Analysis*, Routledge, 1992, p. 251.

but to establish a degree of hegemony order , and for many other states to acquiesce in it ⁵⁴.

Martin Wight indicated an integral feature of the European society of states when he called it “a succession of hegemonies”. The hegemonies and the corresponding anti-hegemonic activities - the coalition, the wars, the concept of the balance of power and the other rules which were designed to check hegemony - are the locomotive of the society⁵⁵.

Thus, the European society might be defined as a society independence half of the spectrum as an international system of political control, with a powerful state (or group of states) as its focus. Such a system can be said as “societies of multiple independence moderated and managed by hegemony”. Here we see supranational systems of political control in the lighter half of the spectrum, which are imperial structures moderated and made more manageable by autonomy. Within these generalizations, it becomes a little bit easier to see and interpret the historical development of the European society of states. Medieval Christendom saw itself as a single power and an organized society, held together by a common cultural tradition and common religion, which among other things laid down rules governing the external conduct of its princes. In the course of the time this unit slowly began to have been eroded by the growing effective power of local rulers and their administrations. It was further fragmented in Italy in the Renaissance by a new desire to see political realities as they were , outside the Christian context. At that point, the willful Italian princes whom Machiavelli appreciated flouted the rules, but did not put forward a theoretical right to independence.

Those who governed the new European states, wanted to liberate themselves from the old rules and also from new constraints imposed by the pressures of greater state power, and especially from a hierarchical or hegemonic ruler capable of regulating their conduct. So this situation created the conscious concept of the *balance of power*, that characteristically European contribution to anti-hegemonic practice ,

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 252.

⁵⁵ Martin Wight, *Systems of States*, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1977, Introduction.

and importantly to the precepts of a society of states.

According to Heeren, the purpose of the balance of power was “to protect the weak against stronger (that is, weak states or princes against stronger ones, no subject against princes - unless they rebelled and set themselves up as autonomous states)”⁵⁶.

If for convenience we take the European society of states as beginning at the start of the 16th century, the characteristic features of the society took about a century to emerge, and its rules and institutions were not formally promulgated until the landmark of Westphalia settlement a half-century later. In that time, the Habsburgs were able to exercise a *de facto hegemony* in the emerging European society of states, but they were too weak to establish their hegemony on a regular and accepted basis. In the long struggle, against the Habsburgs, the anti-hegemonic camp of forces opposed to integration came to accept a goal of full freedom of action for every member of the coalition, though many princes and cities of the empire and other participants were not legally sovereign. The members of the coalition also developed the practice of treating each other as *de facto* equals. The European members - the Ottomans had their own policies - did not want anarchy. They realized the order among their princes and cities. However, they were not ready to accept a stable order imposed hegemony by the Habsburgs: they wanted a *non-hegemonic order* such as operated between themselves under the pressures of war. This idea continued to inspire the legitimacy of the European system throughout its existence, and has taken over, sometimes with exaggerated legalism, by our contemporary international society. But the formula of genuinely anti-hegemonic society imposed on Europe by the victors at Westphalia had little chance to operate. As the Habsburg plans were too hegemonic for Europe, the Westphalian concept was too far along the spectrum towards multiple independence. It was soon replaced by the hegemony of Louis XIV. His hegemonic methods were elastic, and could be made quasi-legitimate by observing the forms of the new Westphalian society. In the phase of the beginning of the 19th century, the *grande republique* functioned on the basis of a multiple balance of power maintained by minor wars of adjustment. The achievement was regulated by the laws of the

⁵⁶ Watson, op.cit., p. 253.

European society. Its operations was made possible partly by the restraint and the sense of collegiate self-interest of the members of the princes' club in the age of reason , but largely by the chance that the hegemonic potential of the strongest power was temporarily in abeyance earlier and later. The Napoleonic France had an aim of dominating the *grande republique* and perhaps the Ottoman Empire, and also to remodel the internal government of the member states, to regenerate them according to its own ideas.

The 19th century *Concert of Europe*, which the five strongest powers agreed to operate together, was a collective hegemony tempered by the balance of power, and thus, a synthesis of the two opposed traditions of the quest of European society for order. In the first period of this phase, the informal approach functioned adequately to preserve order and peace, while managing a degree of change and acquiring a certain legitimacy. In the second period it functioned less well: collective authority was loosened by the forces of change and the nationalist desire for unfettered independence, and minor wars occurred between the five members of the concert. In the last three decades of the century the concert functioned more consciously and responsibly again, but it operated largely under the personal orchestration of Bismarck, and revealed its inelasticity in an age of nationalist self-assertion.

A powerful state or states may have defensive as well as offensive reasons to institute a hegemonic order. In the European system the Habsburg bid for hegemony was essentially defensive rather than acquisitive concept, given the Habsburg concept of what belonged legitimately to the family. The collective hegemony of the Concert of Europe was more defensive, especially at first, and later it regulated the expansionary aims of its five directing powers.

The effects of both hegemonic and anti-hegemonic concepts were not so strong on the European societies. A degree of hegemony was an integral part of the *practice* of the *grande republique*. The Austro-Spanish Habsburgs and the Franco-Habsburg Louis were able to operate a de facto hegemony, and Napoleon moved the society far towards dominion. But they were not able to establish the *principle* of hegemony, and each of the hegemonies was ultimately overthrown by an anti-

hegemonic coalition. The anti-hegemonic powers were able to legitimize their concept of a society of independent and juridically equal states, and to enshrine it in the succession of great peace settlements. But they were not strong enough to ensure obedience to the legitimacy except in the 18th Century after Utrecht.

2.1.2. Common Culture: The Society and the System

In the 16th century, there was the concept of the *stato* combined with the traditional practices and assumptions of late medieval Christendom, and with concepts inherited from classical Greek and Rome, to form a new society of vertically integrated states within a common cultural framework. The Europeans were the primary actors throughout, but played different roles. They determined the relations with the new states which they created in the Americas, and later in sub-Saharan Africa and Oceania, the European expansion was a process of mutual adjustment and synthesis.

The expansion of the European overseas empires was not a collective enterprise. It was carried out by individual states, and often by companies of private entrepreneurs within the states, and it involved armed struggles between rival imperial powers, deriving partly from local competition and partly from conflict in Europe. The expansion of the European states was regulated by collective agreements, and by joint intervention in which military operations found their place. The members of the European society regulated their expansion between themselves, from the first orderly partition of the 19th century arrangements for Africa, Oceania and Asia which avoided the colonial wars between Europeans that had previously marked their expansion. In the process the rules and institutions of the European society adapted themselves to the realities of overseas expansion, and thus incidentally became somewhat more acceptable to non-Europeans when they were admitted.

In terms of *European settler states* overseas, the Europeans regarded their colonies in the New World as dependent realms of European settlers, and later as overseas extensions of the European *grande republique*. When the settler states shook off their dependence, both culturally in general and relation to that particular product of European culture, the society of states, they avoided some of the entanglements of

their fellow states in Europe. Like European rulers, they wanted to be independent members of the society, no independent from it. They added to the European legitimacy and rhetoric of independence, the rhetoric of decolonization. The European settlements in Southern Africa, and in the 19th century in Australia and some smaller islands, were also self-governing and potentially independent members of the European society of states. The non-European elements of the population were subordinate, though in some cases a majority. In short, educated Europeans both in Europe and in the Americas had the parallel in mind, and it colored their thinking about their own colonies.

In Asia, the Europeans were faced with highly civilized and powerful states. Their neighbor, the Ottoman Empire, for most of the period controlled up to a quarter of geographical Europe, and always bulked large in the economic and strategic calculations of the Europeans. The principal interest of the Europeans who came into actual contact with the remoter Asian states was trade, however, in order to develop and protect their trade, the Europeans found themselves involved in administrative and military functions within the framework of the Asian systems. Until late in the 8th. Century Asian governments were usually able to determine the terms of their trade and other relations with the Europeans, who had to adapt themselves to Asian practices. After that, as the Industrial Revolution increased the power of the Europeans. Thus the relations of Europeans with the Ottomans and other Asian states derived elements from more than one cultural tradition.

However, in the second half of the 19th century and the first half of the twentieth, the rules and institutions of the European society gradually displaced the hybrid arrangements, and membership of the society became open not merely to European settler communities but to any state that was willing and able to comply with the rules. But, it was Europeans (including Russia and America) that decided who should be admitted to their club. When Europeans took it for granted that all other independent states should be admitted to their international society on the same terms as themselves, the European society can be said to have given way to a global one.

The spread of European techniques was accelerated in the 19th century by westernized elite of non-western cultures, whose aim was usually to westernize their countries as fast as possible. They resented the inferior status imposed on them by westerners, and many of them wanted to master the technical and administrative know-how of the west in order to stand on a more equal footing with it, but they did not doubt the superior value of what they were learning. The great majority of those concerned with relations between states wanted, not to establish a new international society, but to make their state an independent member of the European society on an equal footing. In this, they are like the European settlers.

2.1.3. Comparison With Other Systems

During the last four centuries, the European state system operated in the concept of independence and the rules and institutions of the “grande republique” were bound to the concept of multiple independence. In that sense, the only exceptional situation, the Napoleon’s imperial structure, lasted only a few decades. The propensity to hegemony seemed one important feature of the concept of independence. The formation of anti-hegemonic conditions is a kind of evidence of the progress, but the successive European hegemonies never acquired legitimacy. In fact, the nearest “grande republique” which became a legitimized hegemonic authority, was the 19th century *Concert of Europe*.

Hegemony played an important role in maintaining order in the “grande republique” as in other comparable societies of states. A hegemony is not a series of dictatorial commands, the hegemonies in Europe, involved continual negotiation between the hegemonic authority and other states.

Martin Wight, after describing the European system as hegemony, asked whether there is always the equivalent of great powers with special rights and responsibilities. In terms of experiences, that we face, this is so. In ancient Greece, for instance, the legitimacy of independence of every *polis* was different from the practice, which included the exercise of dominance by the stronger states (the Athenians, the Spartans, the Thebans, the Persian Empire) over certain others. The

Chinese society of the Warring States, the Macedonian system and others illustrate the same point.

The expansion of the European society beyond Latin Christendom, offers similarities with the diffusion in the ancient world of techniques used by the Assyrians, the Hellenized Macedonians and the Romans for managing relations between number of different communities in an imperial framework. More generally, looking at the ancient imperial structures, we can appreciate the real benefits which they in the form at peace, order, personal security and technical advance, as well as the brutalities and exploitation involved, particularly in the initial stages. In our time, we can realize the real injustices and sufferings inflicted by European imperial expansion, and its racial and cultural arrogance, but it is also important not to allow this awareness to obscure the benefits which it also brought to the area it dominated.

Similarly, the 19th century European dominance over the rest of the world, proved to be less durable than it once seemed. It carried within itself the seeds of its own dissolution. As the European states became the members of “grande republique” and as the capitulatory relations with Asian powers gave way to the diffusion of the institutions and legitimacy of the European society of states, the global system experienced a great loosening. The European relationship with the “outside world”, which in the 19th century seemed so firmly imperial and colonial, dissolved into a worldwide society nominally committed to the principles and practices hammered out in Europe.

2.1.4. The Dynamics of European Integration

2.1.4.1. Developments of the post-WWII period:

After the WW II, Europe has changed remarkably and an economic recovery has been accompanied by a degree of economic integration among West European countries. At that point, new political structures have been erected to manage European security, coordinate economic development, promote democratic values, and encourage social integration. The European Community, as one of the important structures, was established with the broader aim “to establish the foundations of an

ever closer union among the European peoples. It was a process which implied a beginning and an end: from the nation-state to the eventual European union.

There had been a rapid economic recovery after the end of the WWII, and the 1950s had witnessed the beginnings of a long and sustained increase in consumption and investment. In this period, production was becoming globalized and required circulation of capital and labor at the international scale. The necessity of market access and scale economies also pointed to the need for transnational strategies in both sales and production. Thus, the creation of a new European framework offered one response to the needs of private capital in Europe. In addition, the economic hegemony of the US contributed largely to the growth of Europe in the post-1945 period. This served to underline the economic weakness of individual European states on the world stage.

Although the Treaty of Rome (25 March 1957) is a long and a complex document, its short term objectives were, creation of a customs union, a common external tariff, and a common market for capital and labor. Moreover, policies for industry, agriculture, transport, etc. were other important objectives of the Community. In fact, the earlier developments of the Community was not so quick. For instance, the successful studies on the customs union were postponed to the late 1960s. In the beginning of the post-WWII period, the global context was compatible for the European Community to benefit from the developments of the economic integration. New arrangements on trade interactions between countries and the improvement of the market in international arena constituted these crucial developments leading to the benefit of the EU as a result of economic integration. Also, other trade interactions, especially between the European Community and the United States made an positive effects as compare to the other countries in similar situation.

The EC became prosperous during the 1950s and 1960s and the initial post-war trade deficit with the USA had turned into a European surplus as early as the late 1950. This helped to make the 1960s a decade of impressive achievement for the EC. The customs union was completed in 1968 and the frameworks of major policies such

as Common Agricultural Policy and the Social Fund were established. At the 1972 Paris Summit, the member countries agreed on the need for greater economic and monetary integration by the end of the decade. This was the preliminary steps for the economic union. However, the 1974 and 1979 oil crises affected the economic policies of the world, which led to world recession in the 1980s. In general, the development of the EC gave way to the decrease of the American hegemony in time. This, then led to the changes in flexible exchange rates in 1973. In this indefinite economic situation, the Community lost much of its positive dynamism and began to experience indecision and political failure to make internal policies within the Community. Cold War and the political partition was another step in the economic failure of Europe.

In the 1980s, therefore, the European Community was faced two main crises. First, the loss of global economic competitiveness and second, the stagnation of political and economic integration. Furthermore, the EC reached its peak point in its crisis point in the mid-1985. At that period, the Community had institutional weaknesses because of indefinite political and economic conditions.

After this pessimistic period, more positive developments began to be formed as a result of the studies that was stemmed from the White Paper. This was drawn up by the Commission in 1985, chaired by Jacques Delors. According to it, the Community set itself the task of creating a single market by January 1993. The Single European Act, signed in February 1986, confirmed this goal and introduced new procedures for adopting associated legislation. It came into force on 1 July 1987. The collapse of the Berlin Wall, followed by German unification on 3 October 1990, liberation from Soviet control and subsequent democratization of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991, transformed the political structure of Europe. The member states determined to strengthen their ties and negotiated a new treaty, the main features of which were agreed at the Maastricht European Council on 9 and 10 December 1991⁵⁷.

⁵⁷ Pascal Fontaine, *Europe in Ten Points*, Luxembourg, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1995.

The Treaty on European Union, which entered into force on 1 November 1993 sets one another crucial program: monetary union by 1999, a new common policy, European citizenship, a common foreign and security policy and internal security. In June 1994, to enable Europe to meet the world competitive market and to reduce unemployment, decided to launch major transcontinental infrastructure and communications works.

After the WWII, the European integration movement has had a profound effect on the development of the European Continent and the attitudes of the people of Europe. This movement has also changed the balance of power. In this new context, all governments now recognize that the era of absolute national power is gone. From then on, there is a joint forces that enable the countries of Europe continue to enjoy economic and social progress and maintain their influence and the feature of being a leading example as the most successful regional movement in the world. The Community respect the diversity of national traditions and the separate identity, while tries to involves constant balancing of national and common interests.

Therefore, after the long period since 1945, this structure of Europe has succeeded to describe patterns of economic, industrial, social, and educational interaction. At the end of this three decades, economic integration has drawn all the European members into a regional economy, social interactions across frontiers within this region have expanded considerably. Thus, the relationship of integration between the East and the West regions of Europe began to change in the last years of 1980s and the structure and dynamics of this process in the 1990s and beyond, will be profoundly affected the other parts of the world to create a whole integrated mentality which has developed formally since the 1950s.

The postwar Western Europe was one in which iron and steel occupied the vital basis of the industrial economy, and in which agriculture employed a quarter or more of the working population in the countries. During these long period, armed conflict was succeeded by armed confrontation and the perceived threat of internal subversion, electronics has displaced the old "heavy" industries as the key to industrial advance. Telecommunications now carry most of the traffic of financial and

service trade, air transport, a rising proportion of personal travel. Greater prosperity and better communications have also “shrunk” Western Europe. The international environment which imposed upon Europe its postwar shape has also shifted very substantially. The apparent certainties of that period had eroded in the course of the 1970s and 1980s. In parallel with this shift in political and security position of Europe, the rise of the East Asian economies has changed the shape of the old global economy. The rapidity of this transformation created a demand for new structures and institutions. Thus, the scale of economic, political, and social changes since the 1950s has transformed the quality and character of international integration from that which was envisaged by those who constructed the institutions of postwar Europe. This also, constituted an apparent stability of a region within an American-led alliance and an American-led liberal international economy in a more uncertain and more diverse world.

2.1.4.2. Integration Theories and European Integration

After the WWII, international arena has witnessed new transnational and non-state actors whose roles and influences are supranational. In the second part of the 20th century, the first supranational organization was the United Nations. However, the first true supranational entity is the European Community which is composed of state members. More broadly, in addition to these formal Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), the effects of information technologies that operate globally and regionally across state boundaries without formal political structure, can have a supranational property. Therefore, the integration theory can explain these new formations. International integration refers to “the process by which supranational institutions came to replace national ones - the gradual shifting upward of sovereignty from the state to regional or global structures. The ultimate expression of integration would be the merger of several (or many) states into a single state - or ultimately into a single world government”⁵⁸. According to Deutsch⁵⁹, the main tasks of integration can be recalled under four headings:

⁵⁸ Goldstein, op.cit., p. 392.

⁵⁹ Deutsch, op.cit., p.271

1) maintaining peace, 2) attaining greater multipurpose capabilities, 3) accomplishing some specific task, 4) gaining a new self-image and role identity. All these tasks are operationally testable. Whether stable expectations of peace are being maintained within a community can be tested by the absence or paucity of specific preparation for war among the political units, regions, and populations within it. Evidence can be found in data on the deployment of troops, weapons, and military installations, in diplomatic records and in budgetary data, and in opinion data on the elite and mass levels. Whether a community has achieved greater multipurpose capabilities would be indicated at least roughly by its total gross national product, its per capita GNP, and the scope and diversity of its current undertakings. Whether the community was fulfilling specific tasks would be indicated by the existence, and by the growth, of appropriate joint functions, joint institutions, and joint resources and sacrifices devoted to these specific ends. Finally, whether the members of the community had attained a new role identity, or were in the process of attaining it, would be shown by the frequency of use of common symbols, and by the creation and wide adoption of new ones, by data on relevant elite and mass attitudes, and by relevant aggregate data on the actual behavior of the population, including popular acceptance of unrequired transfers of wealth or other benefits within the community, and of some degree of sharing benefits and burdens within it⁶⁰.

European integration is the most prominent and the most successful movement in the world , so it is easier to focus on European integration while explaining the integration theories with its examples. The European experience is sufficiently informational with its both stagnation and disintegration periods. The earliest approach that was used to provide a framework for community integration was the theory of **functionalism**. This theory was first defended by David Mitrany⁶¹ in the inter-war years. For Mitrany, “the functional approach emphasizes the common index of need. There are many such needs that cut across national boundaries and an effective beginning could be made by providing joint government of them.

⁶⁰ Deutsch, op.cit., p.272

⁶¹ Martin Holland, **European Community Integration**, New York, St. Martin`s Press, 1993, p. 14.

This approach was not a matter of surrendering sovereignty, but merely of pooling so much of it as may be needed for the joint performance of the particular task”⁶². Functionalists did not regard regional unification as superior to the existing system of nation states. For Mitrany, the creation of new regional groupings would merely change the dimensions of nationalism, but not its nature, so Mitrany believed in serious of independent , but complementary international functional agencies. Moreover, the theory of functionalism in international relations is based on the hope that more and more common tasks will be delegated to more specific organizations and so that, each of them will become supranational in time. In this way, the nations of the World will gradually become integrated into a single community that has a supranational characteristic, that is to say, it is superior to its member governments in power and authority, in which war is impossible.

However, Jean Monnet’s ⁶³ idea of integration is somewhat different from the ideas of Mitrany. Monnet believed in creating the first concrete foundations of the European Federation which was indispensable to the maintenance of peace. The importance of this objective is evident in the preamble to the 1952 Paris Treaty which begins: “Considering that world peace can be safeguarded only by creative efforts commensurate with the dangers that threaten it. Convinced that the contribution which an organized and vital Europe can make to civilizations is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations . . . Resolved to substitute for age-old rivalries the merging of their (the six) essential interests, to create, by establishing an economic community, the basis for a broader and deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts, . . . Have decided to create A European Coal and Steel Community.”⁶⁴. Thus, the ideas of Monnet, was the combination of functionalist theory and the political objective of a form of federal government.

In addition to these ideas, a new idea which is called **neofunctionalism**, as a complimentary theory of functionalist approach, has come to the scene of the process of integration. This theory was specifically designed to address the European

⁶² Ibid., p. 15.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Bernard Rudden, and Wyatt Derrick, *Basic Community Laws*, 2nd Edition, Oxford, Clarendon Press,

Community experience and put forward by Ernst Haas⁶⁵. This approach contains a normative objective, which is a European federation, that has central institutions with supranational authority. To neofunctionalists, the process of integration is based on economic development and is related with interests group involvement. Unlike Mitrany, who argued that integration is not initially dependent on mass support, Haas put forward that the process of integration was dependent on the idea of spillover, which argues that, economic integration (functionalism) generates a political dynamic that drives integration further. Closer economic ties require more political coordination in order to operate effectively and eventually lead to political integration as well⁶⁶. Thus, the idea of gradual integration would lead to a political union through the process of interdependence. This idea is quite similar what Monnet is argued: successive functionalist forms of integration would inevitably create a type of federalism: this process would be gradual, but cumulative, as economic sectors were transferred from national to a Community level of competence. Consequently, central to neofunctionalist theory, as well as to Monnet's assumptions, was the *automatic effect* of the spillover process⁶⁷. However, the idea of *automatic effect*, then will be denied by others such as Keohane, Hoffman, and also Haas. They argued that spillover is a successful intergovernmental bargaining process. This reformulation of neofunctionalism, then, required that spillover is not an automatic procedure. Once the inevitability of spillover is denied and the limitations on the process acknowledged, the disappointments of the 1960s and 1970s and the resulting theoretical disillusion can be overcome.

Keohane and Hoffman evaluated the European integration as “an experiment in pooling sovereignty”⁶⁸. According to them, the Community exhibits (at least since the) a supranational style of decision-making, which is based on compromise and common interests.

⁶⁵ Holland, *op.cit.*, p. 16.

⁶⁶ Goldstein, *op.cit.*, p. 394.

⁶⁷ Holland, *op.cit.*, p. 18.

⁶⁸ Clive Archer, *The institutions of Integration*, Routledge, Chapman, and Hall, Inc., 1994, p. 283.

Keohane and Hoffman assert, therefore, that the deeper integration promoted by the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty had their origins in intergovernmental conferences. What is then achieved is a synthesis between intergovernmentalism and integration theory. Mutimer, has also contributed to the contemporary rehabilitation of neofunctionalism as the most useful theoretical context for discussing integration and the single market of 1992. To Mutimer, neofunctionalist theory stresses three elements relevant to the current debate. Firstly, I argues that there is a connection between economics and politics in the process of integration with economic integration given the casual role in producing a form of political integration. Secondly, the process of spillover provides the necessary, but not automatic, link between economics and politics and thirdly, spillover acknowledges and promotes the importance of institutionalization in the integrative process. Thus, this new approach can provide an important focus for evaluating the impact of the Single Market of 1992 on the broader process of European integration.⁶⁹

2.1.5. The European System Getting Worldwide

For the first time in history, the economic and strategic relations began to be examined into one whole, single net, in the 19th century. In this process, the Europeans were the pioneers for this worldwide unification which gave way to a global understanding today. Even today, this expanding system is constituting its rules in the world.

Especially, after 1815, Vienna Congress, European expansion had led to a considerably important changes in the relations between the communities of the world. The European countries settled their systems to the large part of the world, by using their military technologies and by using seas. By using the same means, they also went to Asia, eastward across the Indian Ocean and westward across the Pacific. Although many efforts of the Europeans to settle their economic systems on China, Japan, and some other regions, British and German forces achieved to penetrate India and east Indies respectively. Similarly, Russia also created a dominant power over the countries of Northern Asia. The Russo-Chinese state treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689, can

⁶⁹ Holland, op.cit., p. 19.

be regarded as a landmark in the slow process of incorporating China into a world society of states, and by the Vienna settlement, the Russians were finding their way along the Pacific coast of America as far as San Francisco, overlapping with British and American Expeditions.

In the second half of the 18th Century, when decolonization began, the European dominance over the world reached its peak point. Generally, statesmen in Europe evaluated this dominance as an important extension of the European state power and territory as well as culture. This extension, felt more frequently in Americas. However, new settlers in America wanted to extract themselves from dependence on the original European power and involvement in the European balance, and look after their own interests as independent members of European societies.

The United States gained its independence by armed secession from Britain in the 18th Century with the help of another European country, France. In the international arena, the importance of the United States is obvious. This country, when founded, was dominated and largely settled by people of Britain and other European countries.

As France supported the United States to gain its independence, Britain supported Latin American countries to be independent states in the American continent. In doing that, Britain had both economic and strategic reasons. Latin America was economically important because part of the Latin America had a great economic potential. It was also strategically important because the strategic dominance of Britain there, would give it a chance to establish new and more democratic states there to balance what were considered in London reactionary tendencies of the Holy Alliance. Then, nearly all of the Latin American countries became independent and found a place for themselves in the international society. In fact, there were many European-related connections for them so that some marriages enabled a close relationship which meant political interests between the European and Latin American countries. One of the most important of these Latin American countries, Brazil, for example, did so with an emperor from the Portuguese royal

family who was married to a Habsburg princess and therefore enjoyed Metternich's support.

Later, we saw the new concept of isolationism of the United States from other parts of Europe. With this concept, the US aimed to keep the western hemisphere insulated from European colonialism and power politics. Therefore, the American Monroe Doctrine changed the existent relations and excluded the European powers from further colonial activity in the American countries. Together with this significant change, the European powers began to focus on eastwards in the 19th century. As a result of it, some American statesmen began to see a joint responsibility with Britain for ensuring the special position of the Americas. This shared commitment of the two countries marked one of the main developments of the 20th century.

From the end of the 18th century, a third and different kind of nation was begun to form in the Americas. When the dependent states were constituted in the new world by the English and the Iberians acquired their independence, the settlers were Europeans (who were also citizens) or the descendants of Europeans, who had come there by individual decision. The dependent American states offered a different way of life, and in some English colonies a different religious establishment. Later, because the new states needed more immigrants, they welcomed Europeans who were attracted by their new way of life and wished to become members of it by an individual and voluntary act of choice. The Europeans had experienced a considerably important migration: notably the three prolonged expansion of the crusades, the mobility of priests and merchants and the extensive migration for religious reasons in the period of sectarian passion. The Independent European settler states of the Americas regarded themselves as members of the family. They exchanged diplomatic envoys to sign treaties and towards the end of the 19th century became members of international organizations like the Hague Court of Permanent Arbitration, which later became the Hague Court of International Justice. Also, they traded with Europe freely but kept themselves aloof from involvement in the interests and pressures which also played no part in European politics. In fact, the settler states of the Americas considered themselves members of the European family. When the European states

lost their dominance over Americas, the new kind of relationship was born in the name of multiple independence in the political arena. However, because the people of the Americas were originally Europeans, this disintegrative process and its effect was not as great as it would have been if a non-European system had reasserted itself in the Americas. The world-wide expansion of the European international system was not set back by the secession of American states from European empires, which took place within the compass of that system.

In Europe, in the course of the 19th century, the European states brought the whole non-European world to the East and South of Europe under collective hegemony of the European concert. The places where Europeans expanded themselves were the high civilizations of Asia and the Mediterranean, and the more primitive communities of Africa and Oceania. Although they incorporated large areas of those continents into their separate “empires”, the other areas like the Ottoman Empire and China remained a collective responsibility.

As a result of this expansion of Europe, many developments on technology, sometimes called the Industrial Revolution, gain speed which then lead to an increased economic and strategic power of European states as compare to other non-European countries in the world. At that time, the Europeans could now sell better and cheaper goods than Asians. Then the Europeans wanted to use their superior capabilities to dominate and modernize the non-European world. The non-European countries , upon these considerable achievement of the European states impressed and found it difficult to resist what the Europeans had to offer them especially technologically. The Ottoman Empire was one of the most important power for Europeans, located very near to the European system. The Ottomans were not a part in the Vienna settlement, though they were dominant in a huge part of the region. During the 19th , and 20th Centuries, the Ottoman regime was unable to keep up with the technological developments what the Europeans experienced. Then, the region of the Ottomans became a concern of interest.

The communities of the South-East Europe began to realize other ideas, mainly stem from the Europeans. These areas were in the rule of the Ottomans, which

then created a dispersion of the Ottoman Empire. While, at the same time, all the Europeans wanted to bring progress to the great Ottoman area, they did not agree about how to do so. The liberals wanted Ottomans to be divided into independent and more or less ethnically homogenous nation states with democratic institutions headed by imported European monarchs. To achieve this liberal end, the Ottomans must be driven out of Europe by force, and ethnic minorities could migrate on the *cujus regio ejus natio* principle⁷⁰. Russia and Austria, as the two big neighbors of the Ottoman Empire, both had a centuries-old tradition of wars of liberation against the Turks. In particular, the tsars of Russians regarded themselves as the protectors of the Orthodox Christians throughout the Ottoman Empire, and by the same token, especially after the WWII, the Russian governments regarded themselves as the protectors of the orthodox form of communism. Both of these big empires, therefore saw the crumbling of the Ottoman rule as an opportunity and an obligation to expand their imperial power and authority. By the way, France and Britain intervened jointly with Russia to establish an independent Greek state. However, some other statesmen like Palmerston and Disraeli in Britain and Napoleon III in France preferred to maintain and reform the Ottoman authority.

The consequence of these conflicting situations was a series of compromises on the eastern question. Diplomatic compromises did not aim at permanence or justice but were designed as adjustments that corresponded to the changing strength and determination of the states involved. After three major negotiations and treaties, Treaties of Adrinople (Edirne) and London in 1829-30 in which Greece became independent, the Treaty of Paris in 1856 in which the Ottomans were formally recognized as a member of the European society of states, and the Congress of Berlin in 1878 which ended the Ottoman-Russian war, the Ottoman Empire in Europe gave way to a number of funding independent states. The rest of the empire was partially europeanized, reformed and gained a progress, and involved in the rules and institutions of Europe.

⁷⁰ Watson; op.cit., p. 269.

European expansion toward the East showed a parallel character of the Russian and British movements across Asia between the Ottoman Empire and the Pacific. The Russians consolidated their situations in Siberia and Central Asia, assimilated native populations there and established a dominant power there. The British focus was in general India, where they reached there by sea and founded a semi autonomous imperial structure all around the Indian Ocean. However, because the maritime link was tenuous, the settlement was limited by the ocean, and they did not assimilate the native people there, their situation was much more fragile than the Russians. The states that made and modified the rules and institutions of the worldwide European international society of the 19th Century were the members of the “grande republique”. In this century, the rules and institutions which the Europeans spread out to China, Persia, and Morocco, were those which they had evolved with the Ottomans, including capitulations. Actually, those other powers like the Ottomans, China, Persia, and even Japan became a part of the European system, namely the “grande republique”.

While the European states expanded their power outside their borders, they , generally did not fight with those non-European states so, this positive attitude consolidated European expansion over non-European states. Instead of fighting, the Europeans managed to make negotiations and to arrange congresses in order to define their status. For instance, in Africa, the European power divided most of the continent as colonial parts through the Congress of Berlin in 1884. This way of thinking achieved even when they negotiate the situations with China, which was known as one of the conflicting states. The collaboration of the concert in China reached its peak in 1900, when all the great powers of Europe joined with the US and Japan in a combined military collaboration. The significant aspect for the system was the unique decision of the great powers of the system that it was necessary to intervene in the internal affairs of China on behalf of the international community. By the same token, interventions under UN sponsorship in the Congo and other conflicting areas in the present time. In terms of the European Concert, the aim of the imperial powers both in Africa and China was to make those areas safer and to supply raw materials for their

developed economies. Moreover, they also aimed at creating a force over those areas. Later, they began to insist on the observance of normative rules and institutions which they had developed within the matrix of their own culture. For instance, they wanted to abolish slavery. In fact, the European concert system regulated the implementation of these aims to avoid conflict between the imperial powers and to organize collective intervention where necessary.

As the European system spread all over the world, other non-European states wanted to join the European society of states, in order to be treated as equals rather than inferiors. Also, these non-European states wanted to join the European system in order to know how the new global international society was run. In that situation, the European society system constituted some rules and obligations for which join the European concert system, should obey the existing rules and obligations in the name of “standard of civilization”. Therefore, non-European states were admitted as members of the society provided that they adopted its rules and were able to attain an acceptable level of civilization in their activities as members. The great powers also insisted that all governments should observe certain European economic standards and commercial practices, particularly where they affected foreigners. Then, therefore, the non-European states began to obey the rules, laws, and practices to join the membership of the European society system. Thus, this insistence of the European society played an important part in the integrating process which established the European-dominated global international society.

In the beginning of the 20th century, the European system brought the whole world not only into a single empire but also into a single set of economic and strategic relationships. However, at the same period, the two great non-European powers, the US and Japan, began to challenge to the European system especially in Eastern Asia and the Pacific, that resulted the breaking the monopoly of control from geographic Europe, and also in this process some independent states in Americas, Africa, and Asia played an important role. Thus, the wealth and power of the European states were directly affected by this process. Then, the dependencies of the European powers, the US and Japan covered about half of the earth. The degree of imperial

control ranged through the concentric circles in which empires tend to organize, from some directly administrated extensions of Russia and France to the self-governing British settler dominions. The dependencies also varied largely in the degree of their economic development, and the relative weight of the extra-European dependent states in the system grew as they became more significant to the world economy - and in some cases strategically more important too.

During the 19th century, the concert of great powers, which were established in the Vienna settlement, became looser. At that time also, not only European powers but also the whole economic independence of the world, gradually diminished. In fact, the economic integration of the world was less visible because it was not imposed or managed by any single economic great power or group of powers. Moreover, the Eastern part of Europe did not appear to be something separate from Europe, most of it did not consist of politically independent states like the Americas.

Thus, in the just beginning of the 20th century, the world was much more integrated. The system was bound together by a tightening economic network, and by the empires of its leading powers, and also united into an international society by the global acceptance of common rules and assumptions for the conduct of international relations. The Concert of Europe was transformed in the course of the century into a society dominated by nation states whose people felt more in common with their fellow nationals, but less in common with other nations.

Outside Europe, the sense of obligation to the European system was even weaker. The US and Japan were both remote from Europe. The US and other Latin American republics avoided uncertain alliances and involvement in European affairs. The Japanese and other culturally non-European states admitted as members of international society. Consequently, 19th century international society was pulled by nationalism and democracy and non-European states gained a considerable importance in the international system. At the same time, improving technology and other factors contributed to the integration process in the whole world and step up the long way of an ever closer economic and strategic net of involvement and interaction. The European ideas of sovereignty, independence and juridical equality which

provided the formal legitimacy of the international society of states in 1900, put that society *de jure* that is so far as law and theory were concerned, appreciably nearer to the independence end of the spectrum than the operational practices of the system justified. This dichotomy between practice and theory was to grow wider in the 20th century.

As far as the 20th century is concerned, we can say that there is no actual dividing line between the European system and the present system. In fact, the European system was never confined to Latin Christendom or the European Continent. From its 16th century, both the Americas and the Ottoman Empire figured economic and strategic calculations of its members: and so to a lesser extent did Russians. When the global system emancipated itself from control by the Europeans, it became new ad different . Although, the majority of the global international society are non-European, there are many features largely inherited from Europe.

In the very beginning of the 20th century, there were both dominated European states and other states which shared their dominance with the US and Japan. After the WW II, it was clear that Europe no longer dominated the world affairs, and the interests and pressures of the system were truly global. The self-destruction of the European power, speeded up the process of transformation in the international relations.

The losing control of the European system can be examined in four different phases. In the first phase, Europe dismembered itself as a consequence of the WW I. The second was the twenty years of the Versailles settlement and the League of Nations, which disintegrated into the WW II. Third came the reorganization of the global system and of the new international society following the WWII. Finally, was the major change about by decolonization⁷¹.

The destruction of the European society states had many and complex causes. At the beginning of the 20th century, the European great powers moved from a concert into a rigid confrontation of two rival blocs. The triple alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy bound together the former eastern half of Latin

⁷¹ Watson; op.cit., p. 278.

Christendom. Opposed to it stood France and Russia, two great powers. But, almost all the powers of Europe became disturbed by the industrial and military capacity of the new German "reich". The new adjustments of this system pushed other states away from it and closer to each other. At the same time other European states were prepared to be so accommodating. Generally, their overseas colonialism competed with Britain and France, and they thought it necessary to protect their legitimate worldwide trade drive with a powerful navy. In Eastern Asia, there were many problems. The modernization and westernization of Japan, for example, released an expansionist dynamism comparable to that of Germany in Europe. Japan, after evicted Russia from Manchuria, proceeded to establish a special position for itself there in Northern China. Also, Japanese did not want to raise the global issue, as the Germans did, they counted on the Anglo-Japanese alliance to protect them from opposition by the US and Russia to their Chinese plans.

The WW I (1914-1918) was an important war because it effectively destroyed the European states system beyond the possibility of repair. George Kennan describes the damage as it appeared at the end of the war:

"The equilibrium of Europe had been shattered. Austria- Hungary was gone. There was nothing effective to take its place. Germany, smarting from the sting of defeat and plunged into profound social unrest by the breakup of her traditional institutions, was left nevertheless the only great united state in Central Europe. Russia was no longer there as a possible reliable ally, to help contain German power. From the Russian plain there leered a single hostile eye, skeptical of values of Europe, rejoicing at all misfortunes of Europe, ready to collaborate solely for the final destruction of her spirit and her pride. Between Russia and Germany were only the pathetic new states of eastern and central Europe, lacking in domestic stability and in the traditions of statesmanship - their peoples bewildered, uncertain, vacillating between brashness and timidity in the exercise of the unaccustomed responsibilities of independence. And to the other side of Germany were France and Britain, reeling

themselves, from the vicissitudes of war, wounded far more deeply than they themselves realized, the plume of their manhood gone”⁷².

The Versailles settlement is generally considered as the first constituent act of global self-regulation which is, however, known as a transitional arrangement. The aim was to establish an institution and to settle the rules and regulations of Europe again. But, contrary to predecessor treaties, Westphalia, Utrecht, and Vienna, Versailles failed to create its aims. Then, a new design, the League of Nations incorporated almost all the rules and practices of the earlier “grane republicque”. The Covenant of the League of Nations was drafted in accordance with anti-hegemonic legitimacy, as the keystone of a society of sovereign states. In fact, it was not effective as the Concert of Europe was earlier. League was not elastic and its main problem was to manage the change and to adjust the system to shifts in the power of states. Also, its new legitimacy was too weak to enforce it. Thus, the failures of this new attempt was a disturbing dichotomy between the elaborate and format apparatus of a collectively guaranteed world society of states. Nevertheless, the League was the first attempt at a constitution for the new global society of states. Moreover, the League was the presumption of the universality that was open to all states recognized as independent. Also, it provided a permanent forum, where smaller states could make their views known and play a part in deciding international issues. Further, the League represented the principle of collective security, the protection of the weak against the strong and the special responsibility of the great powers to provide the collective protection.

In the mobility of the system had been restored, the terms of the Versailles settlement could have been adjusted later. Economic recession, however, proved beyond the ability of statesmen to control, then the process of adjustment became steadily dangerous. Soon no effective balance remained. Stalin opted like Alexander for a deal with the hegemony power which shifted the weight of Germany against the West. Hitler’s area of occupation in Europe and the Japanese “co-prosperity sphere” in Eastern Asia were attempts at imperial control. They were both regional within the

⁷² Watson; op.cit., p. 281.

global system, they lasted only about four years each, and they were largely provisional, dominated by the exigencies of total war. The Japanese occupation, at the same time, made it impracticable to restore European colonial rule, or authority, in Eastern Asia. The co-prosperity sphere did not develop into an integrated system, though the ASEAN group of South-East Asian states is moving towards a closer union.

Therefore, in the first half of the 20th century, the state system was worldwide, but still centered on Europe. With the WWII, the system became increasingly constricted by the pressures of the development and the growing power of its leading states, combined with inadequate arrangements to manage the pressures. After the WWII, Germany and Japan were the great vanquished states whereas the damaged Russia and the USA, which had taken Britain's place in the system, were the two victors. The wartime conferences of the three allied powers (the US, Russia, and Britain) at Tehran, Yalta, and Postdam settled spheres of dominance de facto and in broad terms. Power in the global states system rearranged itself round two opposing poles, the Soviet Union and a Western alliance in which the US was very much the strongest partner.

Both of the new centers of the world power belonged to the European cultural tradition, but both lay outside the original Europe. This time the Soviet Union and the US would be the leading members of the new organization, called the United Nations. The Russians and other major states accepted a formula based on the experience of the great powers, permanent members of the Security Council, and the active opposition of any one of these powers could block a mandatory decision of the council, so that the support or at least acquiescence of the five powers was necessary for the UN to take any significant collective action. The Soviet Union regarded the UN machinery as inappropriate for resolving conflicts between the great powers. In other respects, the UN aimed at universality rather than effectiveness. Membership would be the symbol of independent statehood and of acceptance into the global international society. The UN also established a number of specialized organizations to diffuse and exchange between governments various aspects of technology, such as health and medicine or

food and agriculture. The UN as originally constituted did not in fact function as a concert of the larger powers , or effectively maintain order.

While the rules and institutions of the worldwide society emphasized continuity, the pressures of the system were now too altered for a restoration to be possible. The five great powers after Vienna acquiesced in each other`s actions within a single concert: the two superpowers after the WW II, acquiesced in the establishment of two separate spheres of authority. Also, the Americans thought it was necessary to contain Soviet power all round the world. Soviet control, at the same time, gave the impression that the globe was divided ideologically and strategically into two great hemispheres of influence.

The cold war was a global struggle, marked on both sides by defensive strategy and by competition for the allegiance or sympathy of people all over the world. This was a major change from the two catastrophic world wars of the first half of the century. In the cold war, the Soviet Union operated alone. It exercised dominion over the contiguous client states in which it had garrisons and it later offered a measure of protection and support to small states. And its worth remembering that for the last three centuries Russian policy has shown a considerable preference for stability in the European “grande republique” and for expansion elsewhere. The much looser strategic hegemony of the US permitted other states greater freedom of action. It was expressed institutionally in a chain of alliances. Also, the US hegemony stimulated the inevitable anti-hegemonic reaction in its junior partners and clients which were insulated from Soviet pressure by the American shield.

The European system was a succession of hegemonies, in which the practice was tighter than the theory: the practice of the global system in the decades following the WWII, was more hegemonic than the European norm. During the cold war the relations between the two superpowers were chilly but correct. The decoloniation of the postwar years was part of the more fundamental ebb tide of European power. When the Concert of Europe regulated European activities in Africa at Berlin in 1884-1885, it formulated the international obligation of colonial powers to act as “trustees” for the welfare and advancement of primitive and dependent peoples, which later

became the basis of the League of Nations mandates and the UN trusteeship system. After the WWI, self-determination replaced imperialism, and after the WWII, the same system was continued by the UN Trusteeship Council for those mandated states which had not yet achieved independence. At the end of the WWII , the European colonizing states were aware of their weakness. Decolonization was a massive political decentralization and a substantial swing of the pendulum towards the multiple independence end of the spectrum.

The fragmentation of the West European empires into a number of states entitled and able to achieve a circumscribed independence can be compared with the similar fragmentation of the Holy Roman Empire legitimized by the Westphalian settlement, and the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman empires after



CHAPTER THREE

3. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL GLOBAL SYSTEM AND THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

3.1. The Global International System

The global environment in which states act appears to be made up of a bewildering array of non-connected events and forces: a coup d'état in Nigeria, the destruction of the Amazon rain forest, a global grain shortage, East Germans fleeing to West Germany with the help of Hungary, government attacks on student protesters in China, and Palestinian rioting in the West Bank. However, upon closer examination, a different picture begins to emerge. Events are not totally random. Patterns and regularities do exist. While not all events and happenings in the global environment are linked together by some grand logic, it is possible for us to establish in advance to impact that certain types of events will have on other part of the international system.

The challenge that policy-makers face is to identify correctly the aspects of the international system that place the greatest constraints on the behavior of states. The most frequently cited system characteristics are the distribution of power and the pattern of interaction among the major actors. Based on these features, "rules" for survival can be formulated to guide their actions. Rules are established in one of two ways. First, rules may be formulated by examining earlier international systems (such as those in existence during the period of the Chou Dynasty, Renaissance Italy, and Greek city-states) to see how system members who operated under like conditions behaved, and then a judgment can be made as to whether those actions contributed to the prosperity and survival of that actor. Second, rules may be arrived at by looking at the logical implications that a particular distribution of power holds for system members and then translating those findings into rules. Note that the rules of an international system are dependent in large part upon the distribution of power in the system. If the distribution of power in the international system changes, the rules for survival change as well. Actions that will protect the national security interests of a state in one type of international system may not do so under another.

According to *Hastedt*⁷³, there are types of international systems based upon the distribution of military power:

3.1.1. Unipolarity

In this system, all power is concentrated in one place. The principal forms of interaction and communication run vertically from the dominant state downward to the weaker states and are controlled by it. The dominant state has no need for an alliance, because it can impose its will upon all others in the system. While the great disparity of power in a unipolar system makes it very stable, the system is not impervious to the forces of change. Based on the historical analysis of previous unipolar systems and the logic of its structure, observers have identified “rules” to help the dominant state select the correct policy option: a) seek to maintain or increase one’s power, b) insist on the status quo regarding the distribution of power in the system. c) respond to the probes or challenges to one’s power with restraint.

The Holy Roman Empire and China in the Western Chou period (1122-771 B.C.) are examples of two international systems that generally are acknowledged as being unipolar. One observer suggests that Europe during 1871-1890 can also be seen as unipolar, and some consider the period immediately following World War II to be unipolar because of the American monopoly of the atomic bomb and the ruinous state of the European, Soviet, and Japanese economies.

3.1.2. Bipolarity

In a bipolar system, power is evenly concentrated at two opposing poles. Around each pole exists a tightly knit and hierarchically organized alliance system. Members of the two alliance systems have virtually no meaningful contacts with each other that are not controlled or directed by the bloc leaders. Because of this distribution of power, each of the two dominant states regards the other as an adversary that must be kept in check at all times. The essential rules for a bipolar system can be summarized as follows,

a) a bloc must increase its capabilities compared to those of the opposing bloc.

⁷³ Glenn P. Hastedt, *Dimensions of World Politics*,

b) a bloc must engage in a major war rather than permit the rival bloc to achieve a position of preponderance.

c) a bloc must seek to eliminate the rival bloc.

d) a bloc must negotiate rather than fight, fight a minor war rather than a major war, and fight a major war rather than fail to eliminate the rival bloc.

Examples of bipolar systems can be found in ancient China, in the Greek city-state system, with Athens and Sparta being the two poles, as well as in the nineteenth-century Europe. Most observers classify the early post- World War II era as bipolar. The cold-war competition between the United States and the Soviet Union of drawing lines around the world through the creation of alliance systems is very much in accordance with the rules of bipolarity.

3.1.3. Loose Bipolarity

In a loose bipolar system, power remains concentrated in two opposing and competing poles around which alliance systems form. The fundamental dynamics of the system also remain unchanged as each superpower continues to view the other with suspicion and counters any move that it might take. Loose bipolarity differs from tight bipolarity in the lessened ability of the two superpowers to control their allies and, as a consequence, in the reduced desirability of competing for additional allies. Hierarchically organized blocs have given way to alliances in which the secondary powers can successfully challenge the position of the bloc leader seek out contacts on their own with members of the other alliance system. Now, we can present the essential rules for the superpowers in a loose bipolar system. These rules are in addition to the ones specified for the superpowers in the bipolar system:

a) a bloc must attempt to increase its membership but tolerate the actions of nonmembers if non-tolerance might drive that state into the bloc of enemy.

b) a bloc must keep the objectives of the universal-member international organization secondary to its own objectives, while trying to subordinate the goals of the rival bloc to those of the international organization.

Most observers hold that the post-World War II international system during the 1960s and 1970s had become loose bipolar. With increasing frequency, large

numbers of Third World states were now declaring themselves to be neutral in the East-West struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. Following the Sino-Soviet split in 1956, China could no longer be considered to be a subservient ally of the Soviet Union.

3.1.4. Tripolarity

A tripolar system has three relatively equal poles. Such a system might come into existence if the power of the United States and the Soviet Union should decline relative to other states and if the power of China were to increase significantly. Respect for spheres of influence and limited foreign-policy goals should characterize the foreign policies of the three major powers. There also would be no need to counter each gain made by one of the other poles, because the third pole is always available as an ally. The primary danger to be avoided in a tripolar system is diplomatic isolation. One observer has suggested the following as rules for a tripolar system:

- a) the existence of an “adversary number one” leads to “objective collusion” with number two.
- b) each of the three players should aim to reduce collusion between the others to a minimum.
- c) at the same time, it is in the interests of each to bluff or blackmail its chief adversary by threatening collusion with the other.
- d) the surest way for any of the three to provoke the other two into collusion is to display undue aggressiveness.

3.1.5. Multipolarity

Mobility and flexibility replace confrontation and counteraction as the key words in a multipolar system. In a multipolar system, there are at least five major poles, all of which are relatively equal in power. The large number of poles and the even distribution of power between them means that the identity of friends and foes is not determined in advance by the structure of the system. Any pole is as much a potential friend as it is a potential enemy. The particular alignment of forces in existence at any time will depend upon the specific issue being contested. The absence of intense ideological conflict between two warring blocs leaves states little

to be neutral toward, and the ability of the major actors to form alliances to solve particular problems robs permanent international organizations of much of their purpose in the international system. The rules that the five major powers should follow in conducting their foreign policy in such a system are as follows:

- a) they should increase their capabilities but negotiate rather than fight.
- b) they should fight rather than pass up an opportunity to increase their capabilities.
- c) they should stop fighting before they eliminate one of the other major states.
- d) they should permit a defeated major state to reenter the system as an acceptable alliance partner or elevate a secondary state to major state status to take its place.
- e) they should act to oppose any state or coalition of states that tries to assume a position of predominance within the system.
- f) they should act to constrain actors whose foreign policy is based on the realization of some unlimited or utopian vision of world order instead of the pursuit of narrowly defined national goals.

The most famous multipolar system was the balance-of-power system that existed in Europe from the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 until the outbreak of World War I in 1914. The five major powers were Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, Prussia, Russia, and France. The unique characteristic of this system was the manner in which Great Britain worked to create a balance by shifting its power from alliance to alliance so that no side gained a dominant position on the continent. World War I destroyed the balance-of-power system, and it was not until the 1930s that a new and global multipolar system began to take shape. Its major actors were Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany (the successor to Prussia), the United States, and Japan. This system proved to be short-lived. Its swift decline occurred because the major states failed to follow the rules of multipolarity. At a minimum, the unwillingness or inability of the other major states to state early steps to stop Hitler violated rules “e” and “f”.

The problem today facing policy-makers who want to follow “the rules” is that the current international system does not fit into any of the

categories that we have identified so far. Elements of bipolarity and multipolarity are present, yet neither model alone can be said to capture the essence of the current situation. On the one hand, this is not surprising, since our system models are “ideal types” and will never perfectly match up with reality. On the other hand, the combined presence of vast numbers of nuclear and conventional weapons and national economies under stress heightens our sensitivity to the consequences of following the wrong set of rules. The fact that the current international system does not fit into any one of our previously discussed categories leads to the important question of where it is going. One possibility is that one of the four traditional types of international systems will surface. A second possibility is that an entirely new type of international system will emerge. An additional concern is how we will get to wherever it is that we are going. We will conclude our discussion of international systems organized in terms of the distribution of military power by addressing these questions.

3.1.6. A Unit Veto System

This system takes as its point of departure the universal, or near universal, spread to nuclear weapons among all major political actors in the international system to the point in which each can threaten the destruction of any attacker, even though it cannot guarantee its own survival. To survive as a “pole”, actors must be prepared to resist all threats made against them and to retaliate when attacked. As a consequence, a unit veto system is a standoff system in which virtually no changes in the status quo are possible. There are few peaceful international transactions for such a body to facilitate, and actors see little use for it in advancing their own security interests. The rules for a unit veto system might look as follows:

- a) all nuclear powers must resist threats and retaliate if they are attacked.
- b) all nuclear powers must engage in military action rather than refuse to use force.

3.1.7. Interdependence

The fundamental foreign-policy problem for any policy-maker is to construct a foreign policy that allows the state to gain the maximum benefit from its international exchanges while minimizing the negative costs. Costs and benefits are not necessarily

distributed equally, and it is the existence of asymmetries in cost and benefits that allows some members to exercise power over others in an independent world. The costs of interdependence can be grouped under two headings: sensitivity and vulnerability costs. Sensitivity costs refer to how quickly changes in one country bring about costly changes in another and how costly those changes are. Vulnerability costs refer to the disadvantages suffered by a state, even after it has changed its policies to try and cope with the actions of another state. According to Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, complex interdependence has three main characteristics:

a) multiple channels connect societies. Not only are state-to-state relations (interstate relations) present, but also important transgovernmental and transnational relations exist. Transgovernmental relations refers to situations in which parts of a government such as Congress or CIA become important independent international actors in their own right and interact with other societies. Transnational relations refers to situations in which one of the actors is not a state. It might be an international organization.

b) there is no clear or consistent hierarchy of issues on the policy agenda, and the distinction between domestic and foreign policy becomes blurred. Most importantly, military issues do not consistently dominate over all others.

c) military force is not used by governments against other governments within the region or on issues in which complex interdependence prevails. It still may be used outside of this context.

Approaches, mentioned above, are important to show the difference of the systems of the international arena. Also, the evolution of the systems can be a vivid example of the nature of the “process” of international global system. One of these systems, interdependence system which is the corner stones of the globalization process, is the result of the developments of the other systems, and the change of international system into a interdependent, global one. Thus, all these systems have contributed to the current international system with their precious ideas and approaches.

3.2. The Need For a World Polity Theory

A theory of the world polity is needed to help the central predicament of the human species: the failure to develop systems of governance to keep pace with the expanding power of humans to alter the natural world. A theory that can contribute significantly to the understanding and possible amelioration of humankind's most pressing issues of governance must pose and attempt to answer fundamental questions concerning these global problems: anarchy, cooperation, war, wealth and poverty, ecology and human rights. Now, we can examine these issues more detailed.

In general, the world is so anarchic and almost all nations rely ultimately on their own military forces and military alliances for national security. Hence the global anarchy is an essentially unalterable political condition of world society, a theory of world polity should seek to explain the origins of this conditions. The theory tries to find out logical responses to whether there are certain unchangable traits of the human species that produce and sustain international anarchy, or whether other global political configurations are consistent with the essential characteristics of human beings. The theory of the world polity should be open to the possibility that the presumed behavioral constants of international politics, along with the anarchic structure, are products or expressions of other factors that may be more, or less, subject to change⁷⁴.

In then context of the anarchic structure of the world, virtually all countries belong to the United Nations and participate, either directly or indirectly, in the peace and security operations of the UN altogether with its programs in economic development, health, and environmental protection. In this situation, although this nation-state system basically the building bloc of the cooperation, it can be put forward that this cooperative representation could e an alternative way of conducting business that might eventually overcome the anarchic structure.

In international arena, war or the threat of war is one of the other characteristics.

⁷⁴ Seyom Brown, *International Relations in a Changing Global System, Toward a Theory of the World Polity*, Westview Press, 1992, p. 3.

Although it has a historical structure, based on nation-state system, there may be other ways to reduce the role of international violence. In order to achieve this goal, first of all, essential features of a basically peaceful world polity should be defined and stipulated among other countries. Also, it is needed to be able to outline the conditions under which such a polity could emerge.

As it is very well known, there is a huge gap between rich and poor countries. Especially, in economic conditions there is a vast difference between these opposite groups. In the global context, particular countries create huge disparities in this global economic market. However, there may be some necessary changes in the structure and functioning of the world polity to reduce the global economic disparities. Although there are some risks to arrange global economic redistribution, that would produce significant decreases or increases in gross world product, a politically and economically feasible restructuring of the global economy could be constituted.

In terms of ecological perspective, mutual forbearance and cooperation are required to preserve the essential ecological balances of the planet. Again, politically feasible modifications on polity theory could be matched the needs of the required ecological policies.

In human rights, there should be some configurations of the world polity that are compatible with the worldwide application. Also, the norms of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of countries, are the essential features of the nation-state system and it is difficult to set up this system on to the political philosophies and movements premised on universally valid rights and individuals. However, a developed world polity theory could be a basis for this important concept.

In order to verify these assumptions, we must ignore the “realist” approach that defends the world polity as an essential system of sovereign nation-states. Although the contemporary world polity is a nation-state system, it is not the same thing as equating the world polity with the nation-state system. The world polity

encompasses more than politics among the so-called nation-states. Transnational and sub-national entities of various sorts also perform political roles on the world stage.⁷⁵

The contrasting approach undertaken treats the nation-state system as a subsystem of the world polity, which in turn is seen as a subsystem of world society. This formulation allows for analysis and theorizing about 1) the relationships between what happens in society at large and what happens in the world polity, and 2) the relationships between what happens at various levels of the world polity and what happens in the nation-state system.

Brown defines the world polity as the “global pattern of structures and processes for conducting and resolving conflicts and making and implementing rules”.⁷⁶ The world polity thus comprises interactions of a special kind within the general field of human interaction. This is consistent with society’s distinguishable subfields: the polity, the economy, the ecology, and the variety of ideational or “cultural” connections between people. Societies or polities may be integrated by ideas or organization.

World society is the multitude of particular societies, some of which overlap in geographic space and in their memberships, but what peoples are included within a particular society is essentially arbitrary or definitional: The criteria for inclusion or exclusion can be set by the members themselves or they can be postulated by observers.

The polity comes into play to the extent that enforceable laws or hierarchical power are factors in the determination of who gets what, when, and how. Political contests of societies are not over any and all positions of authority, but precisely over those positions of authority that also carry the capacity to compel behavior through the provision or withholding of crucial positive inducements and negative sanctions. The economy is a society’s store of valued resources, goods and services, and other amenities, and its system for managing and exchanging such valued items among its population.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 5.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 6.

The polity intrudes on the economy to the extent that the performance of these management and exchange functions within a given society is determined not only by the supply-demand situation for various human wants within the society, but also by its institutionalized rules and sanctioning power-its system of governance, its “state”. The world polity can be defined as the worldwide configuration of systems of enforceable societal relationships.

The interactive effects of the polity and the larger society of which the polity is only a part. There are feedback relationships between the world political system and world economic system and various subsystems of the world polity and the world economy: countries, intergovernmental organizations and regimes, transnational associations, corporations, interest groups, political parties and movements, and influential individuals. According to James Rosenau⁷⁷, all actors are egoistic power maximizers that can reduce modern international history to a clash between security and economic interests, also that can ascribe all causation to the structural requirements of the global capitalist economy. The world polity, like any political system, is made up of diverse units (individuals, groups, institutions, rules, norms) that affect one another. The transnational interactions engaged in by various economic, occupational, ethnic, and religious groups across state boundaries are reflected in governmental policies.

The shape of the contemporary world polity is not simply given to us by natural laws of political evolution. Judgments are substantially the result of beliefs about the moral worth of the object condition preferred, and not simply judgments about practicality, utility, feasibility, and the like. Such judgments are appropriately called *normative*. The normative considerations will affect the extent to which any of us commit our minds, bodies, and material assets to certain courses of action and attempt to convince others to make similar commitments.

⁷⁷ James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics, A Theory of Change and Continuity*, pp. 112-143.

Accordingly, the normative framework set out below is meant to contribute to public debates over what is desirable, and consequently to affect the prospects of various developments, in the world polity.

The framework for assessing world political structures and behavior in the world polity starts with assumptions about what is good (or bad) for the world as a whole. Just as much of the foreign and domestic policy discourse within countries assumes that there are “national interests”, there is ample reason to think of “world interests” as those conditions that are desirable for the entire planet Earth viewed as an entity. Whether and to what extent world interests should override national, regional, or other particular interest is left open.

According to Brown⁷⁸, the following are items for highest-value interests:

1. Survival of the human species: This is the cardinal world interest. Survival of humankind is without doubt the necessary condition for the realization of any and every other human value. “Survival” here should be taken to mean in a reasonably healthy condition of body and mind so that reproduction of healthy offspring can be sustained by at least a portion of humanity. The survival of the species is also placed at risk by nature-altering agricultural and industrial processes and technologies capable of severely disturbing the meteorological and ecological conditions of the biosphere of the earth that sustain human life.

2. Reduction in the amount of killing and other extremely brutal treatment of human beings: This is a self-evident good requiring no other justification, mindful, of course, that its pursuit, like the pursuit of any good, may on occasion have to be constrained in order to avoid greater value losses.

3. Provision of the basic conditions for healthy subsistence to all the people of the world: This includes an obligation to eliminate pockets of starvation and eradicate life-threatening disease. It also includes the elimination of avoidable unhealthy degradation of global and local ecological systems. It starts from the premise that the most basic human right is the right to life, and recognizes that this right can be negated not only by physical violence but also by the denial of the

⁷⁸Brown, op.cit., p.87

requisites for human survival: uncontaminated and adequate water, food, and air, shelter against climatic extremes, and protection against disease⁷⁹. The philosophically stronger argument for a globalized subsistence policy rests on the deontological grounds that it is simply unjust for some members of the human community to be denied the basic requirements of physical survival while others exist with substantially more than they need.

4. Protection of individual citizen rights: This category includes the exercise of the standard civil, political, and economic rights now claimed by persons all around the world simply by virtue of being human. The Westphalian system originated as a pragmatic requirement for avoiding the total breakdown of civil order in Europe during the seventeenth-century wars of religion. In the twentieth-century nation-state system, however, an equally important source of bloodshed and violation of elementary standards of human decency has been the lack of international accountability by governments for how they treat the people within their jurisdictions. The universalization of the claim to basic participatory citizenship is now an unavoidable fact of life. Governments or ruling elite ignore this claim at their peril, at least over the long run.

5. The strongest normative justification for the nation-state system has been that its core principles of state sovereignty and mutual noninterference in domestic affairs have protected the right of peoples to practice and experiment with different ways of life and societal organization. In the decentralized world polity, the repressed minorities have the possibility of migrating to another state where they will be better treated, or perhaps even constitute the majority culture. Indeed, the opportunity to emigrate has at times provided a safety valve in the nation-state system, allowing for the deflation of dangerously combustible domestic situations that otherwise could lead to full-scale civil war and international intervention on behalf of the warring parties.

6. Protection of the basic natural ecology of planet and environment: This asserts that humans should themselves deeply respect, if not stand in awe of, nature's

⁷⁹ Henry Shue, **Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and US Foreign Policy**, p. 143.

givens. The objective should be to serve these ecological values without major sacrifice to the other, higher priority, world interests and, vice versa, to serve the other normatively imperative ends with minimum sacrifice of ecological values.

The world polity is largely an artifact that can be remodeled, maintained, or demolished. The structure and norms of the world polity are the products of policies chosen by the states and other actors that make up the world system and its various subsystems. At the same time, the structure and norms of the world political system influence the behavior of the subsystems comprising it. Change or stability can be generated at any level in the world polity. Developments in any nonpolitical fields will affect the conditions of life, perceptions, and values of the same persons who construct, operate, and transform the political system and subsystem of the world..

The world polity first of all should be viewed as the global configuration of governance (meaning the enforceable rules, and the rule-making and rule-implementing processes and institutions, relied on around the world for regulating human behavior). It efforts directed toward changing the prevailing configuration. The world polity is appropriately conceived of as a subsystem of the social system of the world. Other subsystems, would be the world economic system, the humanity-centered ecological system, the pattern of cultures of the world, and so on. The world polity, viewed as a system, itself comprises various political subsystems:

- 1) The “nation-state system” of official government-to-government relations among countries, including numerous regional and functional intergovernmental agencies.
- 2) The rapidly proliferating “transnational” organizations and political movements operating largely beyond the direct control of national governments.
- 3) The internal or domestic systems of politics and government of each nation-state, comprising their own subsystems: provincial and local governments, party systems, interest-group organizations.
- 4) The individual as political actor.

An essential feature of the proposed theory is that the various systems and subsystems are open to one another: causes and effects typically move laterally from

subsystem to subsystem, but also vertically from one level to the next, even leaping over levels. The *interpenetrability* of the various systems that make up the political system of the world would seem to be a more useful premise of a general theory of the world polity.

3.3. European Type of Integration As a Leading Example

In the contemporary world system, no nation can maintain itself apart from the rest of the world for very long. That is because individual nations depend for their own prosperity upon the prosperity of others for a far greater extent than in the past. This need paved the way for integration movements in the contemporary international environment. Within this context, integration meant that transnational actors like multinational corporations and economic cartels can have a powerful influence on what happens to national states. And in Europe, integration has led to the creation of a potential new superpower in the form of the European Union: The prosperity associated with market economics encouraged the growth of liberal democracies. This combination of idea and practice constituted the European Union to be the first and foremost example of global integration process.

The reason for the European integration to take attention and encourage the other regional integration movements and globalization is that it has achieved its aims and fulfilled the expectations of people. The idea of Jean Monnet and those around him was that the spill over effect in sector integration was believed to lead inevitably to full economic unity. It was the first move to lay the foundations of a broader and deeper community among people long divided by bloody conflicts. Therefore, the founders believed that progress in the integration of one area of economic life would spill over into others. They used the community idea which was the notion that policies should be carried out for the benefit of the inhabitants of a group of states as if frontiers did not exist between them. Consequently, it was hoped to bring economic and social benefit and to contribute to peace and security. This represented a use, on a regional basis, of the functionalist notions of David Mitrany, whereby the functions of everyday society life - transport, health care, agriculture, industrial development, education, and so on - are no longer carried out on a basis limited by the boundaries of

each sovereign state but undertaken across frontiers, thereby indirectly contributing to the prevention of warfare between states⁸⁰.

According to its preamble, the Treaty on European Union aimed at being a new stage in the process of European integration. That how transnational ties might lead to international integration is best explained by one scholar, David Mitrany. He tried to explain how the reduction of extreme nationalism might increase the chances for a stable international peace⁸¹. Mitrany argued that modern society has created a lot of problems that can best be resolved by experts as opposed to politicians. This is true within states as well as between states. He believed that the proliferation of common problems requires collaborative responses from states. Hence, these essentially nonpolitical problems should be assigned to nonpolitical experts from the affected countries for resolution. Mitrany reasoned that successful collaboration in one particular technical field or functional area would lead to further collaboration in other related fields. This process is called **ramification**. Governments would recognize the common benefits to be gained by such cooperative endeavors and so would encourage or allow for a further expansion of collaborative tasks. In effect, Mitrany saw a way to sneak up on the authority of the sovereign state. As states and societies became integrated due to the expansion of collaboration in technical areas in which all parties gained, the cost of breaking these functional ties would be great and hence give leaders reason to pause before doing so. In particular, Mitrany emphasized how economic unification would contribute to the development of political integration. Hence, as opposed to a tendency among some realists to view international interactions as basically a **zero-sum game** (what one side wins the other loses), Mitrany instead argued that international interactions could be turned into a variable or “positive-sum game” in which all the players could benefit. For Mitrany, this was not an idealistic dream far removed from reality.

⁸⁰ Archer, *op.cit.*, 86

⁸¹ Viotti, and Kauppi, *op.cit.*, p.241

Rather, he grounded his analysis in what he believed to be a realistic assessment of the likelihood of the need for international cooperation to deal with common problems deriving from a complex and modern world. As international integration based on cooperation in functional, nonpolitical areas developed, the chances for international peace would be enhanced, he felt.

The interest in Mitrany's **functionalist** theory (and integration in general) was spurred by the successful creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952 and the European Economic Community (EEC) in the 1956. The EEC seemed to hold out promise for the eventual political integration of Western Europe. Furthermore, The EEC's initial successes in the realm of economic integration increased interest in the more general question: Under what conditions is integration among states possible? Scholars noted that what was occurring in Western Europe did not match the Hobbesian Image of states constantly prepared to go war, an image included little faith in the possibility of collaborative behavior among sovereign states. Hence, alternative perspectives were devised to explain international cooperation.

One of the best-known theorists of regional integration, Ernst Haas⁸², defined integration as a *process* “ whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the preexisting national states”. Haas's conceptual approach to the study of political integration called **neofunctionalism**. In his writings, the concept of the integrated political community has undergone a continuous , subtle evolution. For integration to occur, Haas argued that it must be perceived by political elite to be in their self-interest. The assigning of tasks to an international organization will be attained and sustained only if actors believe their own interests are best served by making a political commitment to an international organization. Thus, Haas attempted to stipulate the conditions and processes whereby individuals find it in their own rational self-interest to collaborate for mutual gain, which results in the potential for a peaceful transformation of international politics.

⁸² Viotti, and Kauppi, op.cit., p. 242.

Early predictions of progress in regional integration did not occur. That strong nationally oriented leaders would emerge (such as Charles DeGaulle in France) to block transfer of too much authority to regional institutions had not been anticipated. Beyond this strong-leader explanation for the slowing down of regional integration , however, a more fundamental evolution of integration theory was offered by Haas himself.

Haas described the contemporary period as a “turbulent” one in which there are “confuse and calshing perceptions of organizational actors which find themselves in a setting of great social complexity.” Furthermore, the number of actors is huge, each has a different objective which is mutually incompatible, but each is also unsure of trade-offs between the objectives. Each actor is in the interdependency network. Consequently, some of the objectives pursued by each cannot be attained without cooperation from others.

Uncertainty or outright confusion on means-ends relation creates a great deal of problem. Besides, solution to the problem is also vague especially in areas such as the environment, energy, industrial policy, research and development, and technology transfer. Indeed, to solve a pròblem in one area might lead to negative consequences in another. Therefore, Haas argued that during the last part of the 20. Century, gaining control over such complexity emerged as the major political task. So, states began to seek non-regional solutions to these problems, whatever may be the effect of such solutions on the objectives of the regional integration. Haas concluded that regional integration ought to be subordinated to a general theory of interdependence. The European integration has set the example of integration process emerged more as a response to external stimuli than to internal processes at work within the EC. For example, the decision of establishing a single, open market among European Communities, creating central banking system with a common currency was resulted from the recognition by European leaders that European global competitiveness depended upon taking such steps.

Despite its predictive shortcomings, the literature on European integration has provided important insights on the nature of world politics and has contributed to the development of the pluralist image of international relations.

First of all, the European type of regional integration downplays the state as the unit of analysis. Economic, social, and technical transactions have also been the focus of attention as have interest groups, transnational non-state actors, and public opinion. Secondly, the neofunctionalist literature in particular has disaggregated the nation-state, examining such component parts as bureaucracies and elite. The latter are viewed as flesh-and-blood individuals with conflicting perceptions, opinions subject to change, and decision-making power. Thirdly, integration theorists pose the question of what other forms of political organization are possible and how they can be attained. Finally, the conditions under which international cooperation played an important role. The realist emphasis on state competition and international anarchy, it has been argued, provides few clues on this matter, but cooperation is just as much a defining characteristic of international relations as is conflict. The European type of integration, did not give the priority to military and security affairs to monopolize the agenda of international politics. But, in addition, paid attention to economic, social, and welfare issues.

Major contributions of the European Union to the functioning of European political system had important implications on the globalization process, simply because it highlighted the importance of regional integration notion. More than any other regional organization, the European Union has shown the ability to transform political inputs into their system into outputs such as rules, information, and activities. One of the most significant reasons why the European Union emerges as a leading example is that its members have developed a fairly sophisticated network for articulating and aggregating supports for and demand on their political system. The European Union has also managed to uphold its activities by means of socialization whereby citizens and groups within the member states have their system of beliefs and patterns of behavior affected. The European Union has become a system which has demands regularly made on it and which is fairly resilient because of its innate

political resources. It can respond to its environment, adapt itself and produce output in the form of authoritative allocation of resources that can be implemented.

The interaction between the EU and other groups of states is based on economic cooperation in its broadest sense and political consultations of varying depths. This interaction is determined by various factors including the internal dynamics of the EU and EPC, the role of the nation-states in an interdependent world and the behavior of the superpowers. This , also, explains the present role of the EU in the world. In terms to group-to-group relations, the trade concessions of the EU have been extended to the ACP countries, followed by the countries of the Mediterranean. The signatories of the Lome Conventions also receive the biggest share of the development aid of the EU, while the rest is destined for the technical and financial aid offered to the non-associated developing countries. The EFTA countries also enjoy free access to the common market on the basis of complete reciprocity. Other groups like the Gulf Cooperation Council and ASEAN do not profit from preferential agreements but are treated only according to the most-favored-nation clause. If they are granted developing country status, they are much better off and enjoy the Generalized System of Preferences.

Therefore, it can be inferred from the developments cited above that, the partners of Europe generally come from the Third World, the newly industrialized countries, the West and the East European countries. They are also located both in regions of crisis and peace. This relationship, therefore, can be understood as a phenomenon of a global dimension. The existence and policy of the EU can be seen as the major stimulus for such a development. It seems that this sort of collective approach is more effective in coping with the global challenges than the individual steps of the nation-states can be. They may fill the gap between traditional bilateralism and universalism, thus stabilizing the network of international relations without , however, replacing those other forms either in the short run, or in the long run.

In a more detailed manner, we can say that the cooperation between the two sides (the EU and the other groups) may increase the influence of the individual member states on the international scene while national foreign policy becomes more

vulnerable to pressure from the rest of the group. Participating in such a collective approach means a “give and take” and that limits the autonomy in foreign policy which ranks so high in the traditional perceptions of the sovereign nation-state in Western Europe. Although this situation seems a little bit conflicting for the Community, the constant extension of the external relations of the EU and the growth of the EPC activities suggest that cooperation is seen as a means of maintaining and even improving governments’ room for manoeuvring and of providing a certain influence on international developments. Group-to-group relations are part of this collective approach. Through regular contacts between the EU and their partner groups, the behavior and policies of the latter become more transparent and calculable for the EU governments.

This cooperation may be better described as pooling and mixing of national sovereignty with the powers assigned to the EU - sometimes also referred to as cooperative federalism in analogy to the present collective share in responsibilities in national federal systems. In the field of the external relations of the EU, this trend has expressed itself in the growing number of mixed agreements and in a complex system of outside representation, partly through the EC Commission alone, partly together with the Council.

The growth rate of the relationship of the EU with other groups, suggests a considerable convergence of views among the EU about the importance of the approach. Those directly involved may pursue quite different goals, but positions seem to converge at a given stage without anyone obstructing the approaching thoroughly.

The SEA reflected the reality of an evergrowing interdependence of the issues of international politics. Inter-regional cooperation could become the model for relations in that issues of both high and low politics are brought together and dealt with from an overall perspective. The mix of politics, actors and instruments typical of this approach could approximate what has been called a “composed” or a “clustered” European foreign policy. Such an interlocking EU system may be the best way to improve the international profile of Europe.

While the external trade of Europe is widely spread geographically, other states depend heavily on trade with the EU. This is true for the ACP Group where the EU represents the biggest export market (60 %). For EFTA, more than 50 % of exports go to the EU while several partners from the Mediterranean Basin depend even more on trade with the EU. Equally high are the shares in the EU in the markets of the CMEA countries, while the trade performance of Europe in the ASEAN region only accounts for around 15 %. Compared to other figures, it is also relatively low in Central America (23 %) where the EU ranks second to the United States.

Given the constant growth of group-to-group relations in European foreign policy in the 1980s, together with the general trends toward a regionalization of international politics, a new model may have emerged for the conduct of international politics. Inter-regional cooperation could be understood as the appropriate answer at a time when the old superpower condominium is replaced by an emerging multipolar system. Collectivity helps to alleviate the feeling of inferiority in size and number that single states increasingly perceive. Group-to-group relations with a restricted number of participants seem to be more promising in terms of the costs and benefits than institutions of a universal character like the United Nations. It is true that this relationship has become an important feature of modern diplomacy between individual states and other forms of multilateral cooperation still coexist with the inter-regional approach. It seems as if this interaction have not replaced other forms but offer only additional means to manage international politics instead of becoming its key element.

The European Union does not only set an eminent example for regional integrationist movements, but also has profound and continuing effects on the globalization of international relations. The European Union has managed to affect the globalization process by means of dialogue. This "dialogue" is not an accidental development. It based on economic cooperation in its broadest sense, and political consultations of varying depths. It is determined by various factors: The internal dynamics of the European Union, the role of the nation state in an interdependent world, behavior of the other regional powers, economic, political, and military

dynamics of the international system. A number of observations can be made about the significance of the dialogue of the EU with other groups of states that have contributed to the process of globalization of international relations.

To illustrate the number and range of activities that take place, the calendar of ministerial meetings organized during the German Presidency of January to June 1988 may serve as an example:

- the meeting of the EC and the EFTA Economic Ministers on 2 February 1988, the second in the history of his relationship,
- “San Jose IV”, the fourth conference since 1984 of Foreign Ministers of the EC countries and those of the Contadora Group and the five Central American states on 29 February-1 March 1988,
- the first meeting between the EC and 12 representatives from the ACP group (explicitly and exclusively devoted to the political situation in Southern Africa on 26 April 1988,
- an informal exchange of views at ministerial level between the EC and the Group of Rio (Contadora Group, Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Uruguay) to discuss the political developments in the region - the second meeting since its inception in 1987,
- the seventh meeting since 1978 between the EC and ASEAN at the level of Foreign Ministers on 2-3 May 1988,
- the annual Council of Ministers` session under the Lome Conventional between the EC and then 66 ACP countries, 10-11 May 1988,
- the meeting between the President of the Council and the Commissioner in charge of North-South relations with representatives from the Gulf Cooperation Council on the occasion of signing a Cooperation Agreement and a Joint (political) Declaration, 15 June 1988,
- the participation of Commissioner de Clercq (in charge of the EC`s external relations) at the Economics Ministers meeting of EFTA, 15 June 1988,
- the meeting between the Foreign Ministers (Troika) and representatives from the Arab League, 24 June 1988 - the first in the history of the Euro-Arab dialogue ,

- the meeting between the President of the Council and Commissioner de Clercq and the Secretary General from the CMEA on the occasion of the signing of the General Declaration, 25 June 1988 - the beginning of a new relationship between Eastern and Western Europe.

The list excludes all the contacts and negotiations undertaken at the official level, primarily by the Presidency staff and Commission personnel. In addition to all these activities at the ministerial and official levels, regular contacts took place between parliamentarians from both sides, thus adding another dimension to the complex network. Therefore, through this dialogue diplomacy, the European Union began to influence the newly emerging globalization process at the threshold of 21st century.



CHAPTER FOUR

4. A PROSPECTIVE OUTLOOK

4.1. A New World

The collective power of people to shape the future is greater now than ever before, and the need to exercise it is more compelling. Mobilizing that power to make life in the twenty-first century more democratic, more secure, and more sustainable is the foremost challenge of this generation. The world needs a new vision that can galvanize people everywhere to achieve higher levels of co-operation in areas of common concern and shared destiny.

Fifty years ago, international co-operation, collective security, and international law were powerful concepts. In 1945, world leaders met in San Francisco to sign the United Nations Charter, a document expressing the universal hope that a new era in international behavior and governance was about to begin to preserve international peace and to foster international cooperation in addressing the social and economic problems that plague the human polity⁸³. The onset of the cold war did not entirely disappear that hope, but it greatly diminished its fulfillment.

As the cold war ended in 1989, revolution in Central and Eastern Europe extended the movement towards democratization and economic transformation, raising the prospect of a strengthened commitment to the pursuit of common objectives through multilateralism. The world community seemed to be uniting around the idea that it should assume greater collective responsibility in a wide range of areas, including security, sustainable development, the promotion of democracy, equity and human rights, and humanitarian action.

4.2. The Concept of Global Governance

Governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action may be

⁸³ Kay Lawson, *The Human Polity, An Introduction to Political Science*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985, p.496.

taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest.

Examples of governance at the local level include a neighborhood cooperative formed to install and maintain a standing water pipe, a town council operating a waste recycling scheme, a stock exchange regulating itself with national government oversight, and a regional initiative of state agencies, industrial groups, and residents to control deforestation. At the global level, governance has been viewed primarily as intergovernmental relationships, but it must now be understood as also involving non-governmental organizations (NGOs), citizens' movements, multinational corporations, and the global capital market. Interacting with these are global mass media of dramatically enlarged influence.

When the United Nations system was created, nation-states, some of them imperial powers, were dominant. Faith in the ability of governments to protect citizens and improve their lives was strong. The world was focused on preventing a third world war and avoiding another global depression. Thus the establishment of a set of international, intergovernmental institutions to ensure peace and prosperity was a logical, welcome development.

Moreover, the state had few rivals. The world economy was not as closely integrated as it is today. The vast array of global firms and corporate alliances that has emerged was just beginning to develop. The huge global capital market, which today dwarfs even the largest national capital markets, was not foreseen. The enormous growth in concern of people for human rights, equity, democracy, meeting basic material needs, environmental protection, and demilitarization has today produced a multitude of new actors who can contribute to governance.

All these emerging voices and institutions are increasingly active in advancing various political, economic, social, cultural, and environmental objectives that have considerable global impact. Some of their agendas are mutually compatible, others are not. Many are driven by positive concerns for humanity and the space it inhabits, but

some are negative, self-serving, or destructive. Nation-states must adjust to the appearances of all these forces and take advantage of their capabilities.

Contemporary practice acknowledges that governments do not bear the whole burden of global governance. Yet states and governments remain primary public institutions for constructive responses to issues affecting peoples and the global community as a whole. Any adequate system of governance must have the capacity to control and deploy the resources necessary to realize its fundamental objectives. It must encompass actors who have the power to achieve results, must incorporate necessary controls and safeguards, and must avoid overreaching. This does not imply, however, world government or world federalism.

There is no single model or form of global governance, nor is there a single structure or set of structures. It is a broad, dynamic, complex process of interactive decision-making that is constantly evolving and responding to changing circumstances. Although bound to respond to their specific requirements of different issue areas, governance must take an integrated approach to questions of human survival and prosperity. Recognizing the systemic nature of these issues, it must promote systemic approaches in dealing with them. Effective global decision-making thus needs to build upon and influence decisions taken locally, nationally, and regionally, and to draw on the skills and resources of a diversity of people and institutions at many levels. It must build up partnerships that enable global actors to pool information, knowledge, and capacities and to develop joint policies and practices on issues of common concern.

In some cases, governance will rely primarily on markets and market instruments, perhaps with some institutional oversight. It may heavily depend on the coordinated energies of civil organizations and state agencies. The relevance and roles of regulation, legal enforcement, and centralized decision-making will vary. In appropriate cases, there will be scope for principles such as subsidiarity⁸⁴, in which decisions are taken as close as possible to the level at which they can be effectively implemented. The creation of adequate governance mechanisms will be complicated

⁸⁴ Global Governance, op.cit., p.151

because these must be more inclusive and participatory - that is, more democratic than in the past. They must be flexible enough to respond to new problems and new understanding of old ones. There must be an agreed global framework for actions and policies to be carried out appropriate levels. A multifaceted strategy for global governance is required. This will involve reforming and strengthening the existing system of intergovernmental institutions, and improving its means of collaboration with private and independent groups. It will require the articulation of a collaborative ethos based on the principles of consultation, transparency, and accountability. It will foster global citizenship and work to include poorer, marginalized, and alienated segments of national and international society. It will seek peace and progress for all people, working to anticipate conflicts and improve the capacity for the peaceful resolution of disputes. Finally, it will strive to subject the rule of arbitrary power-economic, political, or military- to the rule of law within global society.

Effective global governance along these lines will not be achieved quickly: it requires an enormously improved understanding of what it means to live in a more crowded, interdependent world with finite resources. But it does provide the beginning of a new vision for humanity, challenging people as well as governments to see that there is no alternative to working together and using collective power to create a better world. This vision of global governance can only flourish, however, if it is based on a strong commitment to principles of equity and democracy grounded in civil society. It should be noticed that the United Nations must continue to play a central role in global governance. With its universality, it is the only forum where the governments of the world come together on an equal footing and on a regular basis to try to resolve the world's most pressing problems. Every effort must be made to give it the credibility and resources it requires to fulfill its responsibilities. Vital and central though its role is, the UN cannot do all the work of global governance. But it may serve as the principal mechanism through which governments collaboratively engage each other and sectors of society in the multilateral management of global affairs. Over the years, the UN and its constituent bodies have made vital contributions to international communication and co-operation in a variety of areas. They continue to

provide a framework for collaboration that is indispensable for global progress. But both the United Nations itself and the broader UN system need to be reformed and revitalized, and this report addresses these needs in the context of the new world that has emerged.

4.3. The Need for Change

Nelson Mandela's inauguration as President of the Republic of South Africa in May 1994 marked the virtual completion of a major transformation of modern times. The enfranchisement of South Africa's black population may be seen as part of the final phase in the liberation from colonialism and its legacy. This process has nearly quadrupled the world's sovereign states and fundamentally altered the nature of world politics.

One effect of World War II was to weaken the traditional great powers of Europe - the United Kingdom and France - and so trigger a fundamental shift in the relative standing of world powers and the structure of world politics. Just as important was the role of the war in the collapse of the old colonial order. The most important development of the last five decades may be the emergence of new economic and political powers out of the developing world. In a relatively short time, countries such as Brazil and China the path has been different, but the result the same. To comprehend the immensity of these changes, just imagine the difference between the delegates present in San Francisco and those who would be present if such a conference were convened in 1955, or how different the Security Council, contributing to maintain the international peace and security⁸⁵, would be if it were created from scratch today. The transformation from colonialism was accompanied by a revolution in communication. Thirty years before Mandela made the transition from liberation leader to head of government before a global audience, no satellites carried images of the trial at which he was sentenced to life imprisonment. Over the years of struggle, the communications media revealed, and to some degree reinforced, progress towards liberation. In 1945, as the delegates of fifty countries assembled to form the United Nations, television itself was in its infancy. Many people probably had no idea

⁸⁵ Lawson, op.cit.,p.498

what had happened in San Francisco. In the fifty years since then, the revolution in communications has quickened the pace of interaction and strengthened the imperative of response.

The last few decades have also witnessed extraordinary growth in global industrial and agricultural productivity, with profound social consequences. Among these have been migration and urbanization that in turn have upset traditional household structures and gender roles. The same forces have depleted non-renewable natural resources and produced environmental pollution. They also first subdued and subsequently reinforced ethnicity, nationality, and religion as sources of identity and the focus of political commitment. The very tendencies that now require and even facilitate the development of global governance have also generated obstacles to it. For example, the perceived need for cooperation between developing states - whether through regional organizations or such broader groups as the Non-Aligned Movement or the group of 77- had to contend with the strong nationalism and regard for sovereignty borne out of independence struggles.

4.4. The Need for Globalization

Deregulation, interacting with accelerating changes in communications and computer technology, has reinforced the movement towards an integrated global market. The changing patterns of economic growth of the last few decades have produced new poles of dynamism. Germany and Japan, vanquished in World War II, have dislodged the United Kingdom and France in economic league tables. The European Union matches the United States as an economic power. New areas of economic vibrancy are appearing in Latin America. The striking performance of the four Asian “tigers” or “four dragons”⁸⁶ (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) and of China, with countries such as India and Indonesia not far behind, is shifting the world center of economic gravity. Developments such as these are even shifting the meaning of traditional terms and rendering many of them less useful. There is no longer an East to be juxtaposed against the West. With the abandonment of communism, capitalism has become even more of an omnibus term that hides

⁸⁶ Goldstein, op.cit.,p.515

important distinctions between different ways of organizing market economies. Similarly, the North-South dichotomy is becoming less sharp. And the problems of Africa are now strikingly different from those of South-east Asia or South America. More and more, it is disparities within nations and regions, both North and South, no less than the disparities among nations and blocs that reveal injustice and cause insecurity.

The term globalization has been used primarily to describe some key aspects of the recent transformation of world economic activity. But several other, less benign, activities, including the drug trade, terrorism, and traffic in nuclear materials, have also been globalized. The financial liberalization that seems to have created a borderless world is also helping international criminals and creating numerous problems for poorer countries. Global cooperation has eradicated smallpox. And it has eliminated tuberculosis and cholera from most places, but the world is now struggling to prevent the resurgence of these traditional diseases and to control the global spread of AIDS.

Technological advances have made national frontiers more porous. States retain sovereignty, but governments have suffered an erosion in their authority. They are less able, for example, to control the transborder movement of money or information. They face the pressures of globalization at one level and of grassroots movements and, in some cases, demands for devolution if not secession at another. In the extreme case, public order may disintegrate and civil institutions collapse in the face of rampant violence, as in Liberia and Somalia. Mounting evidence indicates that human activities have adverse environmental impacts, and that the world needs to manage its activities to keep the adverse outcomes within prudent bounds and to redress current imbalances. The links among poverty, population, consumption, and environment and the systemic nature of their interactions have become clearer. So has the need for integrated, global approaches to their management and world-wide embrace of the discipline of sustainable development counseled by the World

Commission on Environment and Development⁸⁷. The call is for fundamental changes in the traditional pattern of development in all countries.

4.5. The Need for Vision

The last fifty years have radically and rapidly transformed the world and the agenda of world concern. But this is not the first generation to live on the cusp of a great transformation. The turbulence of the last decade is not unlike those that accompanied the rise of Islam in the century following the death of the Prophet, the European colonization of the Americas after 1492, the onset of the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth century, and the creation of the contemporary international system in this century. Yet there is a distinction between the contemporary experience of change and that of earlier generations: never before has change come so rapidly on such a global scale, and with such global visibility. A time of change when future patterns cannot be clearly discerned is inevitably a time of uncertainty. There is need for balance and caution - and also for vision. Our common future will depend on the extent to which people and leaders around the world develop the vision of a better world and the strategies, the institutions, and will to achieve it.

4.6. Necessary Values of Global Neighborhood

The Preamble of the United Nations Charter pledged the resolve of the peoples of the world “to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors”⁸⁸. Those who drafted these words were not the first to hold out a vision one world in which all people are neighbors. A similar ideal had inspired the League of Nations earlier in the century. And long before that, philosophers and religious and political thinkers had spoken of “the family of man”. The commitment to care for others, to the highest quality of behavior among human beings, is for many cultures embodied in the metaphor of being a “good neighbor”. As human social organization has evolved to encompass knowledge of, and loyalty to, wider and wider human

⁸⁷ Global Governance, op.cit.,p.146

⁸⁸ Ian Brownlie, **Basic Documents in International Law** 3rd Edition, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989, p.3

⁸⁸ Ibid.

groups, the scope of neighborly duties has expanded. Even in 1945, few could envision the world as one neighborhood. But the changes of the last half-century have begun to transform the incipient global neighborhood into a reality.

To improve global governance to cope with contemporary challenges would be greatly helped by a common commitment to set of core values that can unite people of all cultural, political, religious, or philosophical backgrounds. These values must be appropriate to the needs of an increasingly crowded and diverse planet. Despite the far-reaching changes, states remain the single most important set of international actors. As long as this is true, traditional norms of interstate relations will provide a critical source of stability. But there is a need now to adapt some of these norms to new circumstances. It is fundamentally important that governance should be underpinned by democracy at all levels and ultimately by the rule of enforceable law. In stable times, when the authority and the capacity established institutions is strong and secure, the fundamental values and principles guiding human behavior are usually taken for granted. In unstable times, prevailing values are more likely to be doubted, questioned, or challenged. Paradoxically, then, values are often most in doubt when they are most needed. By providing a sense of direction, shared values can help people to see beyond immediate clashes of interest and act on behalf of a larger, long-term, mutual interest. We believe that all humanity could uphold the core values of respect for life, liberty, justice and equity, mutual respect, caring, and integrity. These provide a foundation for transforming a global neighborhood based on economic exchange and improved communications into a universal moral community in which people are bound together by more than proximity, interest, or identity. They all drive in one way or another from the principle, which is in accord with religious teachings around the world, that people should treat others as they would themselves wish to be treated. It is this imperative that was reflected in the call made in the UN Charter for recognition of “the inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family”⁸⁹.

⁸⁹ Our Global Neighborhood, *The Report of the Commission of the Global Governance*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1995, p.49.

4.6.1. Respect For Life

Respect for life and its corollary, non-violence, are vital to the well-being of any neighborhood. Violence against persons negates the inherent dignity of all human beings. And its widespread use in diverse situations undermines the claim of humanity to be civilized. Recent history is replete with instances of conflict and oppression in which human life has been treated with the utmost contempt and callousness. Extensive carnage, sometimes genocidal in intent and scale, has occurred in several parts of the world. At a broader level, the security of people is imperiled by the culture of violence that has infected many societies, with a consequent loss of respect for human life. This trend is in some cases linked to political extremism of one kind or another, but elsewhere it is part of a breakup of the value systems that give stability to societies. The sanctity of life is a concept shared by people of all faiths as well as by secular humanists. Dealing with the political, economic, social, or other causes of violence and promoting the principle of non-violence are vital objectives of governance.

4.6.2. Liberty

All human beings are born equal in their right to human dignity and are entitled to certain basic liberties: to define and express their own identity, to choose their form of worship, to earn a livelihood, to be free from persecution and oppression, to receive information. Basic liberties also include free speech, a free press, and the right to vote. Without these, the world becomes a battleground of warring individuals and groups, each seeking to protect its interests or to impose its authority on others. Next to life, liberty is what people value most. In its richest conception, liberty is all that enables people to choose the paths of their lives and to become whatever they can be. The rights and entitlements people actually enjoy across the globe fall far short of attaining liberty in this sense. Global governance is fundamentally concerned with enhancing rights, capabilities, and well-being. People around the world have become more aware of the possible threats to their liberty from a variety of forces and circumstances. The threat could come from autocratic rulers, from political groups that try to cling to power unlawfully or to usurp power, from

action to suppress or drive out ethnic groups, or from the collapse of a state and the accompanying anarchy. Even where order prevails, liberty is threatened by deprivation, economic disclosion, oppression based on gender or sexual orientation, abuse of children, debt bondage, and other social and economic patterns. The threat could also be external, from a state that turns predator, or even from an enterprise whose activities overwhelm a local community or its traditional culture. The threat to liberty in any part of the global neighborhood needs to be seen as a threat to the entire neighborhood. Action against attempts to violate the right to liberty is a common responsibility.

4.6.3. Justice And Equity

Justice and equity are essential human values. Respect for them is indispensable for peace and progress, as their absence can give rise to resentment and be destabilizing. Although people are born into widely unequal economic and social circumstances, great disparities in their conditions or life chances are an affront to the human sense of justice. Where large numbers of citizens are treated unfairly or denied their due, and where gross inequalities are not addressed, discontent is inevitable and conflict likely. When people lived in a less integrated world, the inequities that mattered were local or national. Today, with the enlarged reach of the media, global disparities have become increasingly obvious. There is also wider recognition that many inequities are caused or sustained by developments in other, once distant places. A concern for equity is not tantamount to an insistence on equality, but it does call for deliberate efforts to reduce gross inequalities, to deal with factors that cause or perpetuate them, and to promote a fairer sharing of resources. A broader commitment to equity and justice is basic to more purposeful action to reduce disparities and bring about a more balanced distribution of opportunities around the world. A commitment to equity everywhere is the only secure foundation for a more humane world order in which multilateral action, by blunting current disparities, improves global well-being as well as stability. Equity needs to be respected as well in relationships between the present and future generations. The principle of intergenerational equity underlies the strategy of sustainable development, which aims to ensure that economic progress

does not prejudice the chances of future generations by depleting the natural capital stock that sustains human life on the planet. Equity requires that this strategy is followed by all societies, both rich and poor.

4.6.4. Mutual Respect

Tolerance is indispensable for peaceful relations in any society. When it is transmuted into the more active attribute to mutual respect, the quality of relationships is distinctly raised. Mutual respect therefore offers a basis for making a plural society not only stable but one that values and is enriched by its diversity. Throughout history, intolerance has tended to intensify in difficult or uncertain periods. Racial and religious extremism has shown a marked increase in many parts of the world recently. There have been virulent eruptions of ethnic animosities, and some nationalist movements have displayed xenophobic edges. Neo-Fascist movements have appeared or gathered strength in some parts of Europe, and ethnic minorities have been early targets of their violence. Elsewhere, religious extremists have been ready to use violence to achieve their goals. Many civil conflicts have shown extreme levels of violence and brutality. Some assertions of particular identities may in part be a reaction against globalization and homogenization, as well as modernization and secularization. Whatever the causes, their common stamp is intolerance. In several parts of the world, the resort to violence to achieve political ends has become the pattern. This has been most obvious in terrible civil conflicts, in such places as Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, and Tajikistan, but it has also been evident in many societies where governments have used violence to suppress opposition or forcibly incorporate unwilling groups. The world community should reassert the importance of tolerance and respect for “the other”: respect for other people, other races, other beliefs, other sexual orientations, other cultures. It must be resolute in upholding these values and offering protection against the actions of those who would trample them. The guiding principle should be that all groups and individuals have a right to live as they see fit so long as they do not violate the coequal rights and liberties of others.

4.6.5. Caring

The quality of life in a society depends to a great extent on its members accepting a duty to care for their neighbors. Its sense of community and well-being are enhanced when more citizens are imbued by a spirit of care and concern for other citizens, whether deriving from African tradition, the Moslem obligation of hospitality, or the practices of other cultures. Attitudes such as these generally lead a society to initiate action to alleviate distress and hardship and deal with problems of many kinds. The instincts of caring and compassion provide the impulse for humanitarian action that all societies need. In addition to motivating people to undertake voluntary action, the instinct of care of citizens can be a catalyst for action by official agencies. The need for these qualities has deepened as the result of contemporary social trends that, while prominent only in industrial nations, have begun to show in other countries as well to varying degrees. These include tendencies towards looser family ties, more frequent marital breakup, a high incidence of single parents and elderly people in the population, and increasing anonymity in urban life. In the global neighborhood, the instinct of care must be given a global reach. Millions of people already demonstrate that they are moved by this when they help voluntary agencies that support anti-poverty projects or undertake humanitarian relief in different parts of the world. The ranks of those who are stirred by such instincts need to be enlarged. The task for governance is to encourage a sense of caring, through policies and mechanisms that facilitate cooperation to help those less privileged or needing comfort and support in the world.

4.6.6. Integrity

Integrity is the basis of trust that is necessary in relationships among people and organizations as well as between them. Vital to the orderly functioning of any organization or society, it is of paramount importance in systems of governance at all levels. The quality of governance depends to a crucial degree on policy makers and those in positions of authority adhering to the highest principles and ideals. The importance of integrity is underlined by the enlarging evidence of fraud and corruption of many kinds among persons in high positions in both public life and the

private sector. Ranging from bribery to insider dealing to money-laundering, corruption is a form of social pollution that weakens democratic governance. People are its main victims, and it is their insistence on the highest standards of public and business conduct that can ensure that integrity prevails. The widest concern with standards of integrity and commitment to upholding them must be a feature of the global neighborhood.

4.7. The Global Community

Governments, like other strong organizations, are inward-looking, competitive, and desirous of underlining their separate values. But whether they work for it or not, the erosion of differences among nations brings hope for a better international order. No country can economically supply nearly all that it needs, while numerous items can hardly be produced economically unless they can be sold globally. Trade barriers also interfere with production, which becomes internationalized by finding sources or placing facilities wherever is most advantageous. The broader the market, the more useful specialization becomes.

The European Economic Community shows the extent to which historically self-centered but democratic powers can be drawn together by economic needs. Their steady economic growth would not have been possible if the countries had retained their old walls. If a hundred special interests can be over-ridden, this will make a single market of 320 million customers with as much purchasing power as the United States⁹⁰. The export of this area in 1987 were 60 percent greater than those of the United States and double those of Japan. European producers, in a bigger and more competitive market, will become more competitive in the world. Taking a lesson from the European success, the United States and Canada agreed in 1988 to remove all tariffs between the two countries in ten years, also to ease barriers in most service sectors, liberalize controls on U.S. investments in Canada, and to remove many other restrictions on exchanges. Such free trade areas will doubtless grow. There has been discussion of extending the U.S.-Canadian arrangements to more or less of Latin America and Japan countries. This implies a reduced role for the state. As the

⁹⁰ Robert Wesson, *International Relations in Transition*, p. 238.

economic separation of European nations is erased, part of their sovereignty is transferred to the Community, and the European Parliament slowly adds to its powers. So far as the world is united economically, corporations extend themselves beyond the jurisdiction of the state, which loses control of both markets and productive units. Political authorities have the task of fostering and guiding production in the competitive arena, as the Japanese have done best.

Economic integration and the lessening of the artificial separation of peoples represent not only the hope of better relations among the industrial nations but also the hope of reduction of world poverty. Not much can be expected from aid programs, the most effective way in which the leading economic powers can help the poorer countries is by encouraging them to enter fully into the world economy. There is no good reason for any advanced country to restrict the sale of products of the developing nations. At present, raw materials and commodities produced by less developed countries have free or nearly free access to markets of the rich countries, but their industrial products are penalized. It is as though there were a conspiracy to keep them from advancing beyond the stage of primary producers serving the industrial interests of the advanced countries. A better integrated world economy would not only open countless opportunities for production but would imply freer flow of investments and would tend to raise earnings toward the level of the real value of labor.

4.8. The Strategic Environment of the 21st Century

Large continuities have shown in security policy and associated strategy from roughly 1947 through 1985. Before, the USSR. was identified as the principal enemy and the western strategy was: a) strategically defensive, b) primarily based on deterrence of conflict, c) politically determined to restore peace on favorable terms—usually defined as the *status quo ante bellum*. Another one, was the deterrence of the use of nuclear weapons especially between U.S. and the USSR. In conventional forces the U.S. and its allies had a strong preferences for maintaining naval superiority. Over time, for Americans, a) disproportionate confidence in nuclear weapons to deter across the entire conflict spectrum, b) a propensity to escalate from disadvantage, c)

over-reliance on the U.S. not only for naval and strategic air power but for men and supplies from CONUS to tip the European military balance in the earliest days of war.

Soviet leaders considered themselves to be on the strategic defensive. However, later they developed doctrine and fielded forces for initial offensive operations deep into western territory viewing nuclear weapons as certain to be used in war involving the U.S. and NATO. Later, they joined these concerns in doctrines of preemption for nuclear, non-nuclear and mixed conflict. Most importantly, Soviet leaders viewed their primary strategic task as defining against intrusion into, or disruption of, the USSR's "security zone". Soviet strategists in contrast to their western counterparts accorded more importance to quantity than to quality which was summed up by Lenin as "At a certain point quantity becomes quality". In the middle 1960s, Soviet forces showed evidence of growing political interest in power projection as understood in the West.

Soviet emphasis on armored formations and strike aircraft caused the west to worry about a short-warning attack, a replication of Blitzkrieg, which opened the WWII. These and other divergencies in Western and Soviet premises and perceptions resulted in strategic differences so fundamental that at least until the middle of 1970s East-West relations seemed destined to revolve indefinitely around managing threats, worst-case planning for war in Central Europe and the troubling possibilities of nuclear weapons use. For superpowers allies and other states, this condition also seemed to foreclose any possibility of overtaking Soviet-American confrontation in third areas, or of turning the influence, resources and attention toward increasingly urgent international concerns not directly affecting central military relationships.

Soviets see these general trends as discernably global: a) diffusion of power in the world, b) relative decline in the ability of the Soviet Union and the U.S. directly to determine or even, in some cases, much influence results on. The next two particular matters in politics, economics and even military affairs, c) growing international economics interdependence coupled with an increase in the applicability as well as the effectiveness of economic muscle as contrasted with sheer military might. These categories of change have engendered new relationships between and among military

forces: nuclear and conventional changes, offense and defense, and virtually certain reductions of nuclear and non-nuclear forces. Perhaps the most important consideration amid all this change is the growing role of economic influence. The new importance of economic influence in large part will determine which states will be “constant players” in coming years. It will also require increasingly sophisticated understanding of the relationships between internal political and economic matters and external affairs, which is essential to sound strategic planning both for investment and for operations. As far as the future trends are concerned:

a) over the next decade and beyond, there will be a slowing of growth in the more mature economies, including South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong and the U.S.. The advanced economies of Europe may see their already modest growth rates and potential further diminished by increasing integration with East European economies,

b) stagnation in advanced economies will coincide with a time when third world countries will have the greatest need for debt restructuring and development assistance,

c) relatively few states will hold enough convertible reserves and account surpluses to significantly deal with Third World economic needs,

d) increasingly, regional crises and conflicts in local affairs will have economic origins,

e) the U.S. will have to accept and , as necessary, act on the reality that the internal politics, economic conditions, level of technology, education and infrastructure, within other countries, may virtually affect U.S. interests. Both Eastern and Western Europe will increase their independence from the superpowers in political, strategic and economic matters, however, they work out the modalities of relationships among the European states themselves.

Japan will become an important military power as its military expenditures rise in consequence of a growing GNP and a slow, cautious movement beyond the informal but strong tradition of holding such expenditures to a nominal 1 percent of GNP. This will not, however, translate into usable military influence throughout the

region because, internal culture and political infighting will continue to keep Japanese forces less integrated and thus less capable than they otherwise could be. China, however, will probably resume economic and technological progress around the turn of the century.

Advanced military technology and weaponry will become increasingly available to Third World countries. Developing countries will accelerate pressures to re-orient the international political, economic and military agendas, and will meet with increasing success. Issues such as the decline of communist parties as formal state rulers, assaults on drug production trafficking and finance, environment, and energy-supply issues will require and receive increasing attention at the expense of more traditional sphere-of-influence and balance-of-power matters, with their clear-cut military dimensions. In every region, one or more states will attempt to establish regional hegemony. This will require novel superpower approaches to pursuing interests and exercising influence in most world regions.

As modern weapons and technology proliferate and new agenda issues come to the fore, regionally dominant states are likely to arise. The U.S. and perhaps Russia may well act more independently of the concerns of traditional allies, relying rather on temporary coalitions directed at specified contingencies. In the next two decades, then, the U.S. will pursue its interests in a world more complex than in the years since 1945. It would be pleasant if our tasks were eased by clear-cut, defined conditions: a world primarily bi-polar competitive or cooperative, one primarily multi-polar cooperative or competitive.

What can we expect over the next two decades?

- a) the cold war strategic premises of both East and West will largely be abandoned in the face of economic, technological and political change,
- b) there will be a substantial shift in planning focus from worst case to likely case,
- c) U.S. and Russia military forces will undergo sharp reductions but on the whole much more slowly than was expected in the 1980s and early 1990s.

Conventional forces will also decline significantly, but third world forces in most regions will continue to modernize, grow and become more competent and lethal,

d) there may no longer be such a thing as a “small war”. It will be increasingly difficult to field expeditionary forces military capable enough to secure and exploit local military superiority. Over the next two decades, leadership changes will continue to occur with great frequency in virtually every region of the world. In countries and regions where these do not lead to prolonged armed struggle, there will remain uncertainties and risks of consolidating successions, defining policies and building political institutions resilient enough to accommodate popular political participation and powerful enough to manage national economic, technological and military development.

Alternatives strategic futures should be:

1) a bipolar cooperative, multi-polar cooperative world would be the most benign for the U.S., imply lighter overall force requirements, and suggest a role for the U.S. as a strong supporter of an evolving but orderly world.

2) a bipolar cooperative, multipolar cooperative world would provide continuing and powerful incentives for U.S./ Russia cooperation in managing crises and contingencies, and in strengthening international institutions.

3) a bipolar competitive, multipolar competitive world would constitute the worst of the alternative futures the U.S. might face in the early decades of the next century.

4) a bi-polar competitive, multipolar competitive world would limit to some extent the range of the threats and contingencies really essential to U.S. force planning, military investments and strategy. It would return the U.S. to a condition most like that of the cold war, although perhaps without the solid alliance and comparatively easy-to-manipulate or control third country developments of the early post-war years.

In spite of numerous and rapid changes in the latter 1980s, early 1990s and out to about 2010, we will still be facing a transitional, mixed world in terms of major

regional relationships, superpower ties and the effects of the new international issues.

The critical variables affecting structure will be:

- a) the balance between competition and cooperation in super power relations,
 - b) the extent to which multilateral and regional affairs are characterized by cooperation or competition as power continues to diffuse ,
 - c) the relative prominence of “new agenda” issues and the perceived relevance of military approaches to differences concerning these as seen by next-generation leaders
- years are likely to be characterized by:

- a) more cooperative superpower relationships than was the case for most of the cold war, since it is clear that the superpowers will be most influential when cooperating rather than not,
- b) a more cooperative though, not necessarily more effective, multilateral strategic context,
- c) significant uncertainties about next directions and steps as numerous states experiment to find acceptable levels of security, prosperity, technological competence and long-term prospect in individual terms.

CONCLUSION

Today, we say that we have a global system because all political and social units of the world are interconnected. There is no longer any region which completely isolated from the rest, and with only some very minor exceptions, all societies in the world have been organized politically into states of one kind or another. Besides, there is a mutual interaction among those states though not in a symmetrical manner.

In contemporary world, we witness the elimination of boundaries between systems. All states and their societies belong to a single entity, what we call the global system. This system did not emerge spontaneously. Europe was the core throughout the 15th and 19th Centuries. The world witnessed waves of colonialism.

In fact, if we see the course of history, we can say that there is a continuing “process” which is explained by Haas as neofunctionalism. This process began with the birth of states and international system in the world. From very beginning, we can see this process by examining events throughout decades. Many scholars, like Kaplan, Singer, Small, Deutsch, Waltz, Rosecrance, and Young, have tried to put forward alternative models for international system in order to find out patterns that make clear the international field. They have figured out many factors for evolution of international studies such as, interaction among states, distribution of power, evolution of actors, norms and some non-human factors. These factors, then, have helped to set up historical facts such as, nationalism and imperialism of the 18th and the 19th Centuries, the balance of power system of the 19th and the 20th Centuries, and self-determination process which was explained by Bernholtz.

In explaining “process” of international relations, geopolitical developments have made an impact, because it has first explained the division between the East and the West, and then the fragmentation between the North and the South. It has also contributed to understand the sea-power and land-power concepts. Besides, the Cold War period has revealed the phases of “freeze”, “conflict and Concert”, “detente”, and “the need for a new world order” respectively. Then, this process has reached to a current global system.

Furthermore, in the process of international relations we have witnessed a successful integration of Europe with its name of European Union. This integration movement promised its people to common economy, social progress and then managed it with dialogue. Thus, it has become an example to other regional movements, such as NAFTA, and APEC, with other regional formations. This European type of integration has been noted by Mitrany as “ramification”. He has said that “collaboration in one particular area or field would lead to further collaboration”. He also added that European integration could make an effect which can be called “positive-sum game” (all players could benefit) instead of zero-sum game.

As a result, in the “process” of international events and systems, it seems that all developments prepare a new, more integrated global world. If we see the systems of international studies, we can realize that the process of development of each pattern ends up with a more integrated and global context. Humanity has now entering a new phase in all fields. This new era will not only comprise traditional way of life in terms of routine political, and economic transactions, but will also comprise consciousness in many different areas, such as environment, peace, technology, communication, social relations. European people have embraced the idea of integration which was established by their leaders under the motto of “E Pluribus Unum” that explains the “process” toward first integration, and then globalization as normal current flow of development of all factors related with people , states and various organizations in the world. Since the European integration is a genuine proof of a part of global nature of the world, which is managed to collect millions of people under the aegis of the idea of a common movement, we can expect the larger form of it that spreads all over the world in order to constitute a common way of life by using the real meanings of peace, democracy, equal opportunity, clean environment, and a wealthy society.

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