T.C.
MARMARA UNIVERSITY
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INSTITUTE

MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY PROCESS
(With Some Implications on Turkey)

MA Degree Thesis

Ceren UYSAL

Advisor: Prof. Dr. Cengiz OKMAN

İstanbul 2001

CONTENTS

LIST of TABLES

ÖZET

Soğuk Savaşın sona ermesi Avrupa için güvenlik ve savunma stratejilerinin yeniden gözden geçirilmesi sonucunu doğurmuş, güvenlik kavramı sadece askeri değil, siyasi, sosyal, ekonomik, kültürel boyutlarıyla da ele alınmaya başlanmıştır. Özellikle Merkez ve Doğu Avrupa ülkelerinin tehdit unsuru olmaktan çıkıp Avrupa Birliği üyeliği yolunda hızla ilerlemeleri sonucunda Akdeniz bölgesinden kaynaklanan güvenlik unsurları ve bölgenin güvenliği Avrupa Birliği üyesi ülkeler için giderek artan bir önem taşımaya başlamıştır. Bölgede Soğuk Savaş döneminden bu yana süregelen birincil güvenlik unsurları olan Orta Doğu'daki çatışma, Ege ve Kıbrıs sorunları ve kitle imha silahlarındaki artış gibi askeri tehditlerin yanında ekonomik işbirliğinin önündeki engeller, yasadışı göç, köktendinci hareketler, terörizm, çevre kirliliği, enerji kaynaklarının güvenliği gibi ikincil unsurlar da güvenlik ajandasındaki yerlerini almışlardır.

Bu çerçevede NATO'nun ve Avrupa Birliği'nin bölgedeki rolleri ve bu aktörlerin güvenlik kavramının değişik boyutlarına ilişkin girişimleri, Akdeniz bölgesinden kaynaklanan tehditlerin önüne geçilmesi yolundaki çabaların başlıcalarıdır. Öte yandan, sahip olduğu jeopolitik ve jeostratejik konumdan dolayı bölgedeki en önemli aktörlerden biri olan Türkiye'nin hem Ege ve Kıbrıs gibi taraf olduğu sorunlardaki tutumu, hem de laik bir ülke olarak bölgedeki diğer Müslüman ülkelere örnek olabilme potansiyeli dolayısıyla yadsınamaz rolü tartışmanın bir diğer boyutunu oluşturmaktadır. Sonuç olarak, tüm bu verilerin ışığında Akdeniz bölgesinden kaynaklanan güvenlik unsurları özellikle Avrupa Birliği için büyük önem taşırken Türkiye için de Avrupa Birliği ile ilişkilerini daha da sağlamlaştıracak bir araç olarak değerlendirilebilir.

INTRODUCTION

Mediterranean is a region where conflict has always been considered as the most significant characteristic. The reason for such a bad reputation might be the region's unique history. The prophets of the three monotheistic religions have sowed the seeds of their thoughts on the Mediterranean ground. Many civilisations have risen and fallen on the shores of the Mediterranean sea. Turquoise waters of this sea have witnessed the galleys of conquerors sailing in search of unknown lands. During the centuries, people have followed their kings, emperors and sultans who ordered them to fight in the name of God or for a piece of land and have gained nothing but the hatred of one another. Not surprisingly, in the modern times, the fate of the region was once more decided by the 'developed' European countries willing to help their naturally rich but economically, politically, socially 'inferior' southern neighbours. The colonisation period that lasted until the second half of the twentieth century has been another turning point in the Mediterranean region. Such a complex history may explain why the Mediterranean is called as an 'arc of conflicts'.

Although the term 'conflict' characterises the Mediterranean, during the Cold War the region did not constitute a major challenge in terms of European security. However, after the end of the Cold War, the security concerns of Europe have changed and the Central and Eastern European countries that used to be enemies have become partners of the European Union. Therefore, a new perspective leading to the consideration of the Mediterranean as a source of possible threats for European security have begun to be discussed in both political and academic circles. The reason why the Mediterranean security was chosen as a topic of this thesis has been the belief in the importance of the region for Turkey and the European Union. The more the role of Turkey as a secular and democratic country in the Mediterranean region be considered as an example for other countries, the less the security threats emanating from the region may occur. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Process launched by the European Union would be very constructive and help Mediterranean

countries to achieve better economic, political and social conditions for their citizens. Since most of the soft security concerns such as, illegal immigration, fundamentalist movements, environmental problems are directly related with the above mentioned conditions in the Mediterranean countries, reinforcing economic development and stable political and social system would be a solution at least to soft security concerns. On the other hand, hard security concerns such as Middle East conflict or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction necessitate the involvement of other actors such as the United States.

In the first part of this thesis, the changing security environment in Europe in the post-Cold War era has been assessed. The new meaning of security and its implications for Europe are the main point of this chapter. In the second part, the role of Mediterranean during the Cold War, shifting premises in the region with the end of bipolar world order, continuing hard and soft security concerns for Europe originating from the Mediterranean basin have been discussed. Readers would notice that the hard security issues have not been examined in detail. Since each of those issues are so important that they deserve time, space and research as separate thesis topics, comprehensive examination of these issues have been left to other researchers. The third part of the thesis has been devoted to the actors involving in the Mediterranean security structures. First, the role played by NATO through the Mediterranean Dialogue of the Alliance has been studied. Then, the European Union with its attempts to create a common foreign and security policy, its early relations with the Mediterranean countries and its ambiguous Euro-Mediterranean Partnership initiative have been explained. The other security initiatives launched in different frames in the region have been mentioned in general. Finally the role that can be played by Turkey, in terms of Mediterranean security, as a prominent actor in the region has been evaluated. Moreover, the Barcelona Declaration of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Common Strategy of the European Union on the Mediterranean region adopted at the Feira European Council in June 2000, and the Presidency conclusions of the Fourth Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Marseilles in November 2000 have been included as annexes.

1. NEW SECURITY CONCERNS FOR EUROPE

Cambridge International Dictionary of English defines 'security' as "protection of a person, building, organization or country against threats such as crime, criminals and attacks by foreign countries". This definition may seem simple as it basically remarks an instinctive need for 'feeling safe'. Theoretically, however, the concept of security turns out to be one of the most problematic issues of national and international politics and occupies a significant place in the literature. Academic, military and political circles have devoted considerable time and energy to the evaluation of security concept.

'Threat' is the key word which creates the need for security. There happens to be an actor whose security is threatened by either another actor or event. The threatened side generally retaliates and takes necessary measures to protect itself. Eventually, this chain of actions create a security concern. For instance, as Richmond quoted from Wolfers, security is the absence of threat to acquired values of dominant actors both within states and within the state system.[1]

On the other hand, according to Wæver, security is a specific way of framing an issue as having absolute priority. Something is presented as an existential threat that if we do not deal with it everything else will be irrelevant because we will not be here or not be free to manage future challenges in our own way. By naming it a security issue, the actor has demanded the right to tackle it by extraordinary means, to break the normal political rules.[2] Similarly, Huysmans contends that security questions refer to threats which challenge the capacity of the political actor to control developments. If actors do not successfully neutralise these threats, they would face

[1] Quoted from Wolfers A., "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol", *Political Science Quarterly*, 67, 1952, p.483 in Richmond O., *Broadening Concepts of Security in the Post-Cold War Era: Implications for the EU and the Mediterranean Region*, The University of Reading The Centre for Euro-Mediterranean Studies, Research Paper no:98/4, Autumn 1998, (http:www.reading.ac.uk/EIS/research/emc/publications/richmond.htm, 05.07.2001)

[2] Wæver O, "European Security Identities", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol.34, no:1, March 1996, p.106-7.

the danger of losing their political character. Consequently, security problems have priority over other questions and will enter the political sphere as extremely urgent issues.[3]

In the context of this thesis, the so-called actors of security issues are nation states and international or supranational authorities such as NATO or the European Union. States in the international system may form security complexes to deal with threats to their security. Haddadi explains a security complex with three patterns namely polarity, international society and density. Polarity means the number of powers in the international system. International society means a group of states which develops norms of conduct and establish institutions to manage and reduce the anarchy in international relations. A rising density is the result of the interaction between a rising population and development of technological, financial, organisational capabilities. As density rises, the need for political interaction also increases to deal with its consequences. The preservation of security requires that a rising density be in parallel with a rising political interaction and cooperation at all spheres.[4] Quoting from Buzan, Haddadi continues with contending that security is broader than power and peace. The security approach attempts to find solutions to reduce threats and vulnerabilities without causing a security dilemma which leads to others' perceptions of insecurity.[5]

---

[3] Huysmans J., "Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe", *European Journal of International Relations*, vol.4, no.4, December 1998, p.491.

[4] Haddadi S., *Western Mediterranean as a Security Complex: A Liason Between the European Union and the Middle East?*, Paper presented at the 2nd Summer School on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the New International Order, Catania, 20-26 June 1999, Department of Political Studies, Jean Monnet Centre EUROMED, pp.4-5,14.

[5] Quoted from Buzan B., "Peace, Power and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International Relations", *Journal of Peace Research*, vol.21, no.2, 1984, p.112 in Haddadi, Ibid. p.6.

1.1. Different Explanations of Security as a Theoretical Concept

As one of the main traditional frameworks of international relations, realist school accepts that international politics mainly involves with the states-system, embracing the state as the highest unit of analysis. Aiming to achieve their national interests, states are self-interested, self-serving and exist in an international environment of anarchy. Therefore, "as Waltz argued, in anarchy, security is the highest end, and it is only if survival is ensured that states can seek other goals such as tranquillity, profit, and power".[6] Consequently, according to realists, states strive for power and prestige in order to guarantee their security from the unwanted attentions of other states. However, this assumption presents a security dilemma according to Richmond, in which one state's achievement in its chase for power and prestige may create an impetus for accomplishment for more powerful states as a result of perceived threats. Presumably due to this dilemma, neorealists argue that security is achieved through being the most powerful actor. In sum, security is defined by the realist school as pertaining to the relations between states and is to be guaranteed by global and regional balances of power. [7]

The structural approach argues, on the other hand, that security is simply the product of the grand forces which autonomously define the shape of the international economy and the rise and fall of hegemonic powers. Focusing on the economic, political and social inequalities that lead to conflict not only between states but also at a substate or trans-state level, functionalists, liberals and pluralists also criticise the realist school. As pointed out in Richmond, liberal and pluralist approaches redefined security in a much broader sense, predicating that it tended to be dependent not only on the actions of states towards one another, but on the fulfilment of basic needs of all the actors within the system and particularly those of individuals.[8]

---

[6] Quoted from Waltz K., *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, 1979, p.126 in Richmond, op.cit.
[7] Richmond, Ibid.
[8] Richmond, Ibid.

Pluralists challenge the realist approach by claming that states are not necessarily the most important actors in international relations and that they are not always driven to action by the need to guarantee national security. They question the supremacy of high politics which is the competition between states to achieve greater power, over low politics which secures economic and social welfare for citizens. In a pluralist view, security issues that based on pure military power are of secondary importance to economic issues.[9]

Institutionalists, on the other hand, emphasise that economic, trade, environmental and traditional security issues have become more interconnected with important indications for international politics. For instance, they assume that the globalisation of national economies has weakened states and altered the essence of national security creating shared interests in stability and environmental protection.[10]

Accordingly, recent approaches have criticised traditional formulations of security on the basis of an identification of a broader range of serious and pressing security issues related to political, military and economic competition, which are ignored by realists. Richmond argues that if security is defined narrowly as being of a military and strategic nature, it only deals with the ability of states to control their own resources to develop a military-industrial complex and strategic foreign policies. However, if a broad definition of a security is accepted, then normative questions relating to regional and global standards of issues such as human rights, economic aid and development, coherent environmental policies must be included in policy responses of all states. At this point, he recommends that the emergence of regional organisations reduce strategic security concerns through the development of cooperation, interdependence, trust building and reduction of structural violence.[11]

---

[9] Tank P., "The CFSP and the Nation-State" in K.A.Eliassen, ed., *Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union*, London, Sage, 1998, p.13

[10] Peterson J., *Europe and America: The Prospects for Partnership*, 2nd ed., London, Routledge, 1996, p.173-4.

[11] Richmond, op.cit.

Therefore, the developing approach within the international relations studies dictates that a new, more comprehensive security framework concerns with a wide scope of actors ranging from states, non-state organisations and individuals. However, if the integrity of the state is threatened as it was in the case of Algeria for instance, then insecurity is perceived and strategic considerations at the state level are brought to the top of the threatened state's priorities. This indicates, according to Richmond, "that the state cannot be ignored as an actor, but neither can other actors be ignored as this can lead to internal unrest and the emergence of failed states".[12] This may explain the emergence of the European Union (EU)[13] or NATO as significant security actors dealing with either economic, social and political or military dimensions of European security.

1.2. Changing Security Concept in Europe after the Cold War

Main assumptions concerning the European security have experienced an intensifying process of change since the end of the Cold War. According to Lawrence, in the early 1990s a new consensus emerged on the security issue in Europe, recognising that the former problem of controlling a confrontation between armed blocs had been replaced by a situation that was more fluid and less tangible. It is argued that the end of the Cold War and the decline of bipolarity would lead to a less stable and more conflicting Europe.[14] Peterson also comments that "the new geopolitical reality makes risks to European security less easy to define."[15]

---

[12] Richmond, Ibid.
[13] In order to prevent confusion, the term 'European Union (EU)'has been used in the text except for the pre-Maastricht Treaty period where the 'European Community (EC)' was the official name.
[14] Lawrence P., "European Security A new era of crisis?" in R.Bideleux and R.Taylor, eds., *European Integration and Disintegration: east and west,* London, Routledge, 1996, pp.46, 50.
[15] Peterson, op.cit. p.129.

According to Kupchan, the most effective way of ensuring the vitality of the West would be to find itself a new enemy. Huntington, for instance, considers other civilisations as the new enemy against which America and Europe should unite. He claims that profound cultural differences will inevitably lead to a clash of incompatible civilisations. While he sees the most serious threat to the West originating from a Confucian-Islamic connection, some are more concerned about a division between Western and Orthodox Christendom. Kaplan, on the other hand, argues that the coming cleavage will be caused by socioeconomic rather than civilisational differences. The circumstances worsened by poverty, illness and violence in underdeveloped regions will threaten the stability of industrialised West. The South's scarce resources will become less sufficient as its population rises and wealth inequalities between the North and the South will widen. Therefore, the problems of overpopulation and poverty are more disturbing than cultural clashes.[16]

In order to evaluate these changes one has to look at the security concerns of the post-World War II era. In that period, discussion of security matters mainly focused on defence and strategy. Deployment of US forces to Western Europe through the institutional mechanism of NATO against a Soviet threat and the divided Germany were the two important dimensions of European security concerns. Therefore, based on these geostrategic arrangements, security was reduced to strategic analysis, that is, quantification of force levels and characteristics on the one hand, and the development of sophisticated models of deterrence and defence on the other.[17] Traditionally international security was a product of the balance of nuclear terror between East and West. Hence national security was viewed as military security.[18] Peterson writes that due to the oil crises of 1970s, these perceptions were changed and economic wellbeing and access to natural resources also became important components of national security.[19]

---

[16] Quoted from Huntington S., "The Clash of Civilizations?", *Foreign Affairs*, 72:4, Summer 1993, pp.22-49 and Kaplan R., "The Coming Anarchy" *Atlantic Monthly*, 243:2, February 1994, pp.44-76 in Kupchan C., *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy. From the European Union to the Atlantic Union*, European University Institute Working Papers, Robert Schuman Centre, no. 97/73, Italy, 1997, pp.4-5.
[17] Lawrence, op.cit. p.47.
[18] Peterson, op.cit. p.155.
[19] Peterson, Ibid. p.155.

In the 1980s, the enlarging concept of security introduced new issues such as, environmental questions, social and economic concerns, human rights and put them on the security agenda of Europe. For instance, pollution in Europe, acid rain and the fallout from the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster confirmed the interdependence of countries and demonstrated that new security concept had to be concerned much more than military threats.[20] Additionally, Peterson comments that increased awareness of environment and emphasised concern about human rights lead to the more holistic definitions of security.[21]

In a period between 1989 and 1991, with the end of the Cold War, dissolution of the Soviet Union, disintegration of Warsaw Pact and change of the economic and political systems in the Central and Eastern Europe, this new holistic notion of security grew up in an atmosphere of idealism. However, by the mid-1990s numerous civil wars broke out in the former Yugoslavia and in the former Soviet Union. Lawrence comments that the military threat posed by bloc systems and nation states replaced with the problem of substate nationalism and the use of violence to create new national political structures. Therefore, believing that the extension of scope of the security concept does not mean that the traditional concerns could be ignored.[22]

Peterson argues that by the mid-1990s four norms were accepted in terms of changing concept of security. First, wars are no longer considered as a rational method of settling disputes between major powers. The three classical functions of military power were to seize territory, hold it, and defend it against invasion. The most important change in international politics after the Cold War is a noticeable decline in the use of military power except for the third function. It is widely accepted that the possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) does not guarantee the national security of states since economic performance and dynamism of economic institutions cause a great shift in the international system after the

[20] Lawrence, op.cit. p.48.
[21] Peterson, op.cit. p.155.
[22] Lawrence, op.cit. p.49.

dissolution of Eastern bloc. Second and associated norm is that market economies are regarded as necessary for secure states with stable relations among themselves. Peterson suggests that instead of using them for military competition, scarce national resources could be deployed to strengthen national economic advantage in global economic competition to guarantee national economic security. Third norm is that Western states are willing to take steps to prevent local conflicts from turning into humanitarian tragedies, even though US and European governments often find it difficult to justify sending their military forces to countries that do not constitute direct threat to their own national security. Fourth norm is that actions have to be taken to protect the earth from environmental degradation. Since pollution does not respect national boundaries, environmental degradation is a problem which threatens the security of all countries and their people. For instance, public support for increased EU powers in environmental protection is stronger than for any other area of policy.[23]

Therefore, after the end of the Cold War, these norms reflecting non-military security concept began to be contemplated more clearly in Western policies. According to Peterson, non-military security means thinking about security holistically and accepting two main assumptions. The first is about the changed nature of international security indicating that a balance of military power is just one basis of secure relations between states that could be achieved through mutual political reconciliation. The second is concerned with national security expressing that a state can no longer obtain security by unilateral means because of interdependence. It can maintain its own security by sustaining the security of other states. Therefore, if a state acts to decrease the security of others, it leads to its own insecurity.[24]

Similarly, Haddadi points out that the notion of security requires to be given a new form in order to respond effectively to the needs and worries experienced in the contemporary international scene. In the post-Cold War era, non-military security concerns have gained more importance and collective security, alternative defence,

[23] Peterson, op.cit. pp.156-8.
[24] Peterson, Ibid. p.158.

arms control, nuclear non-proliferation, security interdependence, human rights, economic development, sociopolitical stability, environmental worries, immigration and so on have emerged as the main issues determining the security agenda. Thus, "security has been defined generally in a holistic way to include economy, society, politics, the environment, human rights, citizens' security and many other issues".[25] However, this development does not mean that the military aspects of security have lost their significance. They still constitute an important part of the security discussions in Europe.

Peterson, on the other hand, suggests that these new security assumptions may indicate a security dilemma in which weak or insecure states adopt violence as a response to real or imagined threats. Since weak states are unable to ensure domestic economic security or have popular legitimacy, they may remain dissatisfied with the status quo. Therefore a holistic approach to security implies that international cooperation is needed to resolve the security problems of weak states and thus create a more peaceful international order.[26]

This holistic approach to the security issues also points to the importance of individual or citizen's security, a catch-all term which includes economic and social wellbeing, political rights and the sustainable development of the environment as described by Gomez. He argues that the failures of states to supply these conditions and adequate living quality for their citizens would have implications not only for their internal security but also for global security.[27] Governments that reject the basic freedoms of their citizens may be overthrown by mass resistance. Besides Western tolerance for such governments that repress dissent and violate human rights has decreased since the Cold War ended.[28]

---

[25] Haddadi, op.cit. p.3.
[26] Peterson, op.cit. pp.158-9.
[27] Gomez R., "The EU's Mediterranean policy - Common foreign policy by the back door?" in J. Peterson and H. Sjursen, eds., *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing visions of the CFSP*, London, Routledge, 1998, p.139.
[28] Peterson, op.cit. p.160.

According to Wæver, the referents of security after the Cold War have appeared as a complex illustration of issues such as state, nation, environment and so on.[29] Dealing with environmental degradation, the population increases and nuclear proliferation could lead to international security as a result of adjustments in state behaviour. Consequently, "security policies must become preventive, not just reactive".[30]

Neorealists try to explain structural change in the international system but they still assume that nation states and military power are the key elements of the system. According to Peterson, some neorealists accept expanded notions of security, yet they insist that anarchy will exist as an unchangeable feature of the international system which will remain state-centred. Therefore the external threats will continue to be the major motivator of national security policies. On the other hand, other neorealists have doubts about whether the nature of security has changed much at all, while some argue that states should develop non-offensive defence structures which do not reduce their military power but signal a shift in their strategy from offensive to defensive capabilities. Peterson comments that neorealists do not reject the importance of economic power as a determinant of international relations. However, they believe that even if economic issues are important elements of foreign policy agendas, in case of an outbreak of a war in the Middle East or in the Balkans, the significance of military superiority would be assured as a primary source of international power.[31]

Peterson acknowledges that almost all international theorists could agree upon the two variables governing international relations in the 21st century. The first one is the concern about the possibility of occasions such as the Gulf War or the conflict in Bosnia which necessitate the military involvement of Western powers. The second variable is the question whether the European Union can enlarge and have common foreign and security policy.[32]

---

[29] Wæver, op.cit. p.111.
[30] Peterson, op.cit. p.160.
[31] Peterson, Ibid. p.172-3.
[32] Peterson, Ibid. p.178.

In terms of new security structures in Europe after the Cold War, neorealists doubt that the EU is a powerful international actor because of the impossibility of common foreign and security policy and the Union's lack of military power. They comment that the EU's weakness emphasises that sovereign nation states continue to be the only credible actors in international relations and that the military power provides the only credible deterrent to aggression. On the other hand, institutionalists, arguing that NATO, the EU and the other institutions can be revised to accommodate to new realities and perform new tasks, suggest that the interlocking institutions as the only solution to the new European security dilemma.[33]

Consequently, two main assumptions about the European security after the Cold War can be summarised in a conceptual and a geographical dimensions. First of all, as Peterson argues, conceptually even though military power remains an effective source of influence in international relations, it needs to be situated within a more comprehensive security concept. Secure relations between states concerning political, economic, social and cultural issues can solve the security dilemma, referring non-military dimensions of the security as a prerequisite for a stable peace.[34] Geographically on the other hand, as mentioned by Okman, geopolitical shifts in the current environment necessitate the achievement of stability in two main regions. These regions are the Middle East including North Africa (Maghreb and Mashreq), and Eastern axis (the Caucasus and Central Asian states) with the priority for Russia.[35] Therefore, the new security concept for Europe should be based on a holistic approach designed to cover not only military but also economic, social and political aspects of the security especially in the periphery of European continent.

---

[33] Peterson, Ibid. p.148.
[34] Peterson, Ibid. p.179.
[35] Okman C., "Avrupa Güvenliği Üzerine Ortak Savunma mı Ortak Güvenlik mi?" *Gümrük Birliği Sürecinde Türkiye*, no: 19-20, Eylül-Aralık 1995, p.148.

2. MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY

The Mediterranean region has been the cultural and economic heart of the world, as well as of Europe for thousands of years. The civilisations and religions that generated on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea contributed to the Western civilisation as a whole. Piening points out that the region has preserved its importance politically, economically and strategically in the modern times, since much of North Africa and the Middle East was under direct European colonial rule or mandate until the end of the World War II. For instance, the continuing conflict between Israel and Arab countries caused by the creation of the Jewish state has been one of the most important issues in the region. Moreover, oil from the Persian Gulf states was necessary for Europe's post-war economic recovery and for the growth and prosperity of the European Community. According to Piening, terrorism and hostage-taking that emerged from the struggle of Palestinians and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism have affected Europeans as well as Israelis. The situation of economic and political migrants, especially from North Africa, seeking a better life in the European countries has become another significant dimension of the Mediterranean region for Europe. Due to these events and more the Mediterranean basin has maintained its place in the European agenda.[36]

After the end of the Cold War, the main security concerns of Europe have changed. Since Central and Eastern European countries have begun to be considered as partners, the Mediterranean region turned to be the most important area for European security. De Vasconcelos states that the greatly reduced risk of global conflict paradoxically increases the probability of regional and domestic crises especially in the South due to drive for regional hegemony or disintegration. As reasons for this situation, de Vasconcelos comments that the Mediterranean is a region of great cultural and religious diversity, of difficult encounters of Catholic, Muslim,

[36] Piening C., *Global Europe: The European Union in World Affairs*, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 1997, pp.69-70

Orthodox and Jewish people, where empires have clashed and collapsed causing large movements of populations and unsolved nationalistic and ethnic tensions.[37]

The importance of the Mediterranean in terms of European security may be attributed to the characteristics of the region. First of all, strategically it is the point of intersection for three continents; Africa, Asia and Europe. Another important feature is that the Mediterranean consists of many subregions which have their unique concerns, interests and tensions, yet needs to be considered in its entirety. Moreover, the region as a whole has always been a considerable route through which commerce moves, people travel and civilisations exchange knowledge, ideas, technologies and values. Therefore, as Nimetz points out, when the Mediterranean region has had relative security, the whole world has benefited.[38]

Arguing whether it is useful to regard the Mediterranean as a region, Nimetz comments that operationally it is more important to concentrate on specific sectors where security problems need to be addressed. However, he subsequently accepts the utility of thinking about the Mediterranean as a whole, explaining that insecurity in one sector of the Mediterranean affects the region as a whole.[39]

On the other hand, Bin argues that the concept of Mediterranean security lacks a coherent and comprehensive definition. Some take into account the Mediterranean with its proximity to geostrategically sensitive areas such as the Middle East. Some look at the regional developments in terms of their effects on European security and stability. Some regard the Mediterranean as an area with its own problems in addition to its connection with broader European and Middle Eastern security issues. Some take a subregional approach and consider the Western and Eastern Mediterranean as distinct areas characterised by different problems and concerns. Therefore, one of the most important factors contributing to the confusion in the

---

[37] de Vasconcelos A., "The new Europe and the Western Mediterranean", *NATO Review,* no.5, vol.39, October 1991, p.27.
[38] Nimetz M., "Mediterranean Security After the Cold War", *Mediterranean Quarterly* (http://users.erols.com/mqmq/nimetz.htm, 06.10.1999)
[39] Nimetz, Ibid.

Mediterranean is the lack of political, economic, social and cultural unity in the region. Difficulties in developing regional security arrangements in the Mediterranean are mostly caused by these problems of definition and scope.[40]

There has been a continuing struggle between unity of concept and diversity of fact in the Mediterranean region: Unity, in terms of interdependence, means that what happens on one shore affects the other. Diversity means that disparity and imbalance between the two shores have caused a growing alienation at economic, demographic, religious and cultural levels. Growth rates in income and economic development have also been divergent. Low level of self-sufficiency in food supplies and poor level of economic activity in most countries of the South have aggravated the situation. Moreover, a profound identity crisis experienced by the countries of the South has been bringing about a process of polarisation between North and South. The rejection of Western values on the southern shore has had its counterpart in many European cities where racist tendencies have been reawakening. Therefore, this heterogeneity and disparity make the Mediterranean basin a potential scene of conflict.[41]

According to de Vasconcelos the problems of the southern hemisphere are serious economic and social issues, disputes over regional hegemony and over-armament.[42] Similarly, Francisco Fernandez-Ordoñez, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain, comments that the Mediterranean basin has been faced with a range of political, economic, ecological, demographic, and most important of all, security problems.[43] It is a fact that the northern Mediterranean shore is dominated by the European Union economically and politically and by NATO militarily, while the southern shore is experiencing difficult economic, political, and social transformations. Nimetz believes that the North/South dimension is the key to the

---

[40] Bin A., "The Security Dialogue Towards the Mediterranean", *Revista Cidob D'Afers Internacionals* no.49, May 2000 (http://www.cidob.es/Ingles/Publicaciones/Afers/49bin.htm, 22.11.2000)

[41] Fernandez-Ordoñez F, "The Mediterranean -devising a security structure", *NATO Review*, no.5,vol.38, October 1990, pp.8-9.

[42] de Vasconcelos, loc.cit. p.27.

[43] Fernandez-Ordoñez, op.cit. p.7.

general success of a Mediterranean security policy for the long term. Therefore, the stabilisation of the northern line is not enough. There has been a growing inequality in per capita income between North and South generally and in the Mediterranean region particularly. Moreover, great disparity in birth rates, and profound differences in religion, social institutions and political systems have been reasons for serious concern. Since the problem intensifies with a harsh anti-immigration, anti-Islamic tone in the politics of some European countries, Nimetz comments that the European Union must take upon the responsibility to initiate an effective trans-Mediterranean dialogue with North Africa.[44]

Nimetz concludes that the end of the Cold War has eliminated the major outside threat to Western interests in the Mediterranean, but the security of the region remains vitally important to U.S. and European interests. He believes that the key distinction between the relatively successful economies and political systems in the European Mediterranean states in contrast with the less successful experience on the North African side causes the most difficult long-term issue in the region. Only the United States and the European Union working together, primarily through NATO can provide security for the Mediterranean region as a whole.[45]

Accordingly, Bin comments that since the dominant problems of the region are mainly of a socioeconomic nature, it is reasonable that the EU takes the lead in promoting cooperative relations across the Mediterranean basin. Indeed, the Union offers an economic cooperation which is what the region needs most. However, it is also clear that the EU alone cannot deal with the various problems of the Mediterranean and does not represent the views of all nations that play an important role in the region such as Turkey or the United States. Therefore, in order the establish stability, security and prosperity in the region, the involvement of other actors such as NATO is necessary.[46]

---

[44] Nimetz, op.cit.
[45] Nimetz, Ibid.
[46] Bin, op.cit.

In order to conceptualise Mediterranean security, Aliboni describes three patterns of solidarity in the region. The first one is regional Mediterranean solidarity, including South European, North African and Near Eastern countries. This concept has its origins in a common cultural and historical heritage giving peoples in the Mediterranean a sense of community. However, this heritage is not seen in the present political, economic and military arrangements in the region. Aliboni suggests that the regional Mediterranean solidarity aim to regain political autonomy with marginal actors trying to challenge new political and ideological forces that have defeated the old Mediterranean centrality. This notion, for instance, covers the situation of the Catalans or the Sicilians assimilated by the nation states, the Arab or Islamic nations in relation to powerful Western countries, or the less developed regions on both North and South coasts of the Mediterranean in relation to values and changes of the Western modernisation. Therefore, regional solidarity identifies a South-South region in conflict with the North going beyond the limits of European solidarity at both national and international levels.[47]

The second form of solidarity in the Mediterranean, according to Aliboni has interregional characteristics which goes beyond the Mediterranean basin, reaching the Northern European countries on the one hand, and the Gulf countries on the other. This pattern is a regular North-South frame aiming cooperation for achieving development. The first example of this pattern is the economic and commercial agreements or the 1980 Venice solution of the European Community that recognised the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the representative of the Palestinians.[48] It cannot be wrong to classify the European Union's Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Process in this category.

The third pattern is the South European solidarity reflecting the specific identity that would connect the southern members of the Union, namely France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Aliboni comments that these countries may have a special role to

[47] Aliboni R., "The Mediterranean Dimension" in W.Wallace, ed., *The Dynamics of European Integration,* London, Pinter, 1990, pp.155-6.
[48] Aliboni, Ibid. p.156.

play between Northern EU countries and non-EU Mediterranean countries as a result of their sensitivity to the problems and claims of the latter.[49] Similarly, Wiarda claims that these countries has begun to see themselves as a special subregional caucus. Thus, owing to a widespread recognition of a common 'Mediterranean' cultural heritage and of linked if not common issues and problems such as immigration, oil needs, pollution of the Mediterranean Sea, and increased commerce and tourism, all Southern European countries have tried to establish closer ties with the North African countries.[50]

Beyond the borders of European member states, the growth of militant and politicised religious movements threatens the unity of nation state. If some of these challenges remain unresolved or even worsen, they are likely to spillover in the form of refugee flows which will affect the cultural homogeneity of the traditional European nation state. A loss of legitimacy for the national authorities might lead to a search for alternative regional or local sources in the Mediterranean states, potentially resulting in civil wars as can be seen in the example of Yugoslavia, or in militant religious movements as evidenced on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. Both conditions affect the EU's common foreign and security policy and underline that North-South cleavages of national interest to be found among the member states.[51]

Consequently, the Mediterranean security environment as a whole is characterised by significantly shared concerns in North-South terms which lead to the following assumptions: The relative insecurity of the Southern Mediterranean and the importance of internal security concerns for the states in the south are the main features of the Mediterranean security.[52] Richmond argues that internal conflicts in the region often arise from the declining legitimacy of states and governments. Since

---

[49] Aliboni, Ibid. p.157.
[50] Wiarda H.J., "Southern Europe's Transformation", *Current History*, vol.90, no.559, November 1991, p.393.
[51] Tank, op.cit. pp.16-7.
[52] Lesser I. et al, *The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative: Evolutions and Next Steps*, Santa Monica, RAND, 2000, p.3 (http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1164/MR1164.pdf, 12.09.2000)

nationalist conflicts almost always involve neighbouring states and threaten regional security, prospective reforms in human rights and support for liberal democracies have crucial implications for European security in the Mediterranean as they provide a formula for the settlement of the issues that affect much of the region.[53]

2.1. Mediterranean Security during the Cold War

In order to understand the present security environment in the Mediterranean, one has to evaluate the characteristics of the regional security concerns during the Cold War period. It is a generally accepted fact that during the Cold War the Mediterranean basin was regarded as of secondary importance and played a marginal role.[54] The real focus of diplomacy was Central Europe, while the Mediterranean region was a secondary theatre in the strategic East-West competition.[55] Yet it does not mean that the region was of no importance at all. With the Truman Doctrine and the American commitment for Turkey and Greece to oppose the Soviet Union, the Cold War has made its debut in the Mediterranean. Because of decolonisation process experienced especially in the North African countries, there should have been a diminution in the importance of the region in terms of European interests. However, based on the Cold War power calculations, the Mediterranean has ensured its geostrategic importance as a result of its ability to influence the balance of power between the USA and the USSR.[56]

In fact the dominant power in the Mediterranean after the World War II was NATO with the leadership of the United States. Diplomatically, the USA tried to bring Spain into the Western system, to arbitrate between Greece and Turkey on regional disputes, to support moderate Western oriented governments in the Middle East and

---

[53] Richmond, op.cit.
[54] Larrabee, F.S. et.al, *NATO's Mediterranean Initiative: Policy Issues and Dilemmas*, Santa Monica, RAND, 1998, p.1 (http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR957/MR957.pdf, 12.09.2000)
[55] Asmus, R.D., F.S.Larrabee, I.O.Lesser, "Mediterranean Security: New Challenges, New Tasks", *NATO Review,* no.3, vol.44, May 1996 (http://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/9603-6.htm, 10.12.1999)
[56] Tank, P. "Security Issues Emanating from the Mediterranean Basin" in K.A.Eliassen, ed., *Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union,* London, Sage, 1998, p.161.

North Africa and to prevent the Soviet Union from playing an important role in the Mediterranean. The establishment of a series of military bases serving the Sixth Fleet, and support forces in Spain, Sicily, Greece and Turkey were the means of exercising these US policies in the region. On the other hand, the Soviet Union was mostly unsuccessful in following its traditional Czarist southern strategy. As a result of its ineffectiveness in this difficult geography controlled by NATO, and its economic weakness, the Soviet Union had little to do both militarily and economically against the West in general.[57]

As Lesser points out, the security concerns in the region were closely connected with the assumptions about the character and duration of a possible East-West conflict. Therefore, the Mediterranean basin was an area of relatively low risk and diffuse interest.[58] Similarly, Perni comments that for many years the importance of the Mediterranean was determined by the strategy of two superpowers that operated their naval and air fleets in the region. However, she also believes that the Mediterranean defence was very linked to the security in the raw materials supply[59] since the oil reserves of the region had been important for both sides.

According to Turan, in the days of the bipolar world and the Cold War, the definition and the content of Mediterranean security for Europe seemed easy to establish. The Soviet Union was thought to be the major security concern. Therefore, "Mediterranean security was simply preventing the Soviets from establishing a dominant position as an ideological or a military power in the Mediterranean basin."[60]

---

[57] Nimetz, op.cit.

[58] Lesser, I.O., *NATO Looks South: New Challenges and New Strategies in the Mediterranean*, Santa Monica, RAND, 2000, pp.5-6 (http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1126/MR1126.pdf, 18.04.2001)

[59] Perni O., *Perspectives of Political Co-operation and Security in the Mediterranean*, Paper presented at the 2nd Summer School on The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the New International Order, Catania, 20-26 June 1999, Department of Political Studies, Jean Monnet Centre, EUROMED, p.1.

[60] Turan İ., "Mediterranean Security in the Light of Turkish Concerns", *Perceptions*, vol.3, no.2, June-August 1998 (http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/III%2D2/turan.htm, 23.02.2000)

Mediterranean issues were taken into consideration as a function of the broader East-West confrontation and competition. For instance, Libya was regarded troublesome as a possible springboard for Soviet Union. Morocco was strategically important because of its critical maritime choke point position in the naval competition with Moscow. Likewise, Greece and Turkey were major powers in the southern flank of NATO to help control Soviet access to, and influence in the Aegean, the Balkans and the Middle East.[61] Thus until the mid-1980s there was a fierce rivalry between the superpowers for influence in the Middle East and North Africa, with both sides providing their allies with everything from direct financial support to arms.[62]

Beyond the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, the security environment in the Mediterranean was relatively calm towards the end of the Cold War. For instance, the Balkans were stable in the 1980s. Although there were serious Arab-Israeli and Turkish-Greek conflicts in the region, they were unlikely to create direct threats to Western Europe. Moreover, Caspian oil was not on the European energy security agenda and the gas imports from North Africa were limited.[63]

Therefore, as a result of being Europe's strategic frontier during the Cold War, the Mediterranean region was influenced by the competition between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Consequently, NATO forces dominated the region primarily with a view of reducing Soviet pressure and influence.

[61] Asmus, R.D., F.S.Larrabee, I.O.Lesser, op.cit.
[62] Piening, op.cit. p.70
[63] Lesser, op.cit. pp.6-7

2.2. Present (Shifting Premises after the Cold War)

With the end of the Cold War, the source of risks and challenges affecting European security has moved south. Larrabee et.al. comment that the distinction between European and Mediterranean security has become less clear because of the spillover of economic and social problems from the Southern Mediterranean to Europe, such as immigration, terrorism, and so on.[64]

Since the Soviet threat as the main motivating force behind NATO's existence seems disappeared, Nimetz asks whether there is a long-term guiding principle motivating enough for the United States and the northern European states to maintain a consistent Mediterranean security strategy.[65] Notwithstanding this argument, the importance of the Mediterranean in security terms is based on its growing role in the strategic calculus of Europe, the United States and the Middle East.[66] The prosperity and security of key states are affected by events around the Mediterranean.

Some Western observers have been sceptical about the Mediterranean security notion, arguing that the region is too diverse in security terms as a result of wide range of serious but highly differentiated subregional problems. According to them the Levant (Eastern Mediterranean), the Aegean, and the Balkans are concerned with so different security aspects that it is not useful to talk about a 'Mediterranean' approach. However, according to Larrabee et al, there are reasons to take a broader view. First of all, the existence of subregional issues does not eliminate the importance of broader regional or transregional approaches to security problems. Second, the reasons of many of the security challenges in the region are similar, such as unresolved questions of political legitimacy, relentless urbanisation, slow economic growth, resurgent nationalism, religious radicalism, and the search for regional power. Third, the expanded reach of modern military and information systems resulted in the growing interdependence of traditionally separate security

[64] Larrabee et al, op.cit. p.xi
[65] Nimetz, op.cit.
[66] Larrabee et al, op.cit. p.1.

environments and created problems that are neither strictly European nor Middle Eastern. The Mediterranean is at the centre of this phenomenon.[67]

The issues affecting the security of the Mediterranean region are changing. For instance, instead of the Soviet military threat, the dominant issue is socio-political-economic disparity, with localised instability and risks of regional wars as Nimetz points out. While Europe is trying to complete its economic and political integration, it faces in North Africa and Middle East with largely unsuccessful economies, unstable political systems, increasing populations, and religious movements of unclear support and direction.[68]

Turan believes that there is a general optimism that in the near future, war is unlikely to constitute the means of settling differences in the Mediterranean area and that organisations and behaviour patterns based on the formerly existing hard security environment are no longer appropriate under the new conditions. However, he argues that there are some events illustrating that hard security concerns have not totally disappeared from the scene. The wars in the Gulf and Bosnia are important examples, or in other words, legitimate reasons for being concerned about security in the more traditional sense. Armed conflicts threatening the security of all or some Mediterranean countries may escalate and cause greater problems in the region.[69]

Consequently, a broader definition of security as mentioned in the previous chapter provides following assumptions: First, military security from other states is related to perceptions of threat; second, security is also required by states from secessionists; third, oppressed minorities and other groups also require security; fourth, all individuals and sociopolitical organisations require security from social, political, cultural and economic injustices; and fifth, security is also related to developmental and environmental issues. According to Richmond, these assumptions summarise the security issues that the Mediterranean deals with especially in the post-Cold War

[67] Larrabee et al, Ibid. pp.2-3.
[68] Nimetz, op.cit.
[69] Turan, op.cit.

world.[70] However, the importance of military conflicts in the region should also be taken into consideration.

2.3. Security Issues

In the bipolar world order security was defined as stability and as an absence of empirical or real conflicts in the centre of North-South and East-West axis, deterrence about military attacks and ideological competition. The main threat was identified with geographical and political matters and with international actors.[71]

After the Cold War, the concept of security has become multipurpose, including new issues, emphasising political democracy, economic growth and peaceful international relations. So, along with traditional issues of security as strategic matters or armed conflicts, there is also global and political cooperation. Moreover, peace and security are also linked to the limitation of the 'mass movements' and to the creation of sufficient economic condition to generate a good market. Therefore, Perni believes that security and political cooperation are closely connected as fundamental elements for a new Mediterranean space of economic and human prosperity.[72] Similarly, Busuttil expresses that even though there exist armed conflicts in the Middle East and in the former Yugoslavia, owing to the emerging structure in the Mediterranean basin, security and its perceived absence must be viewed as much less military and much more socioeconomic in nature.[73]

The RAND analysts have moved away from the common inclination to consider the Mediterranean region as an 'arc of conflict' arguing that such a simplistic characterisation, putting too much emphasis on the hard security aspects, does not fully explain the problems of the region. They believe that the situation in the region

[70] Richmond, op.cit.
[71] Perni, op.cit. p.1
[72] Perni, Ibid. p.1
[73] Busuttil S., *The Future of the Mediterranean*, Valetta, Malta, Foundation of International Studies at the University of Malta, 1995, p.129.

is shaped more by political upheaval and socioeconomic pressures, and by accompanying instability and tension.[74]

The expansion of the security agenda far beyond narrowly defined defence questions has been one of the important characteristics of the post-Cold War period everywhere, and the Mediterranean is an example of this tendency. Therefore, most of the discussions on the security environment in the region involve both hard and soft security concerns. Moreover, the specific geopolitical and sociocultural contexts of the regional issues give the Mediterranean a particularly complex security identity.

Similarly, Bin comments that the concept of security has been given a broader definition over the last decade than the meaning it had during the Cold War period due to the absence of military aggression. Hence, a comprehensive vision of security should take into account not only political and military requirements but also socioeconomic, environmental and cultural factors. Many of the security concerns emanating from the Mediterranean region after the Cold War are non-military issues that may correlate with more traditional security risks.[75]

According to Richmond, the dominant security issues in the Mediterranean region arise

> "from the inability of the international community and the EU to act as if it were part of a cosmopolitan international society, to undertake to bear some of the burden for the vital development and pacification of the region, but also, therefore, to come to a clear understanding on the rights of states vis-a-vis their sovereignty, and the principle of non-intervention in the light of overwhelming poverty, human rights infringements, or grand but futile visions of territorial domination."[76]

Richmond continues with arguing that most of the Mediterranean countries have been faced with the prospect of internal social-political unrest caused by the failure

---

[74] de Santis N., "The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative", *NATO Review*, vol.46, no.1, Spring 1998 (http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1998/9801-10.htm, 21.10.1999)
[75] Bin, op.cit.
[76] Richmond, op.cit.

of the post-colonial states ruling in such a manner that multi-ethnic and multi-religious groups can flourish. Moreover, the Mediterranean Sea is a symbolic and practical division line between civilisations and more importantly between developed and developing countries. There he accepts the Huntington's 'clash of civilisations' as a major concern in the Mediterranean basin, but also acknowledges the significance of related issues such as, economic inequality, poverty and population growth. Thus, the existence of conflict and violence in the region is generally perceived to originate from such economic deprivation and sociopolitical inequalities rather than from traditional militarism.[77]

Lesser offers four hypotheses about the content of the Mediterranean security. First, he comments that when one talks to Southern Mediterranean states about security, they talk about these countries internal security. These states are faced with unstable political futures, succession crises, and erosion of legitimacy. They cannot provide services, welfare and governance that their populations are increasingly expecting. There are also problems regarding demography, political instability, slow growth, and environmental degradation. Concern about personal security as a result of terrorism is another aspect of the internal characteristic of the regional security.[78]

The second assertion of Lesser is the importance of nationalism along with Islamic fundamentalism as a continuing political force for security concerns in the region. He argues that due to nationalism there exist traditional threats to borders such as the ones between Israel and Syria, Syria and Turkey, Turkey and Greece. Therefore, while thinking about new threats to stability, it should not be forgotten that there are still very traditional, conventional threats that require very traditional confidence building measures to deal with the defence and security of borders.[79]

---

[77] Richmond, Ibid.
[78] Lesser I.O., "Unresolved Issues: Assignments for the North and South" *Revista Cidob D'Afers Internacionals*, no:38-39, 1997, (http://www.cidob.org/Ingles/Publicaciones/Afers/38-39lesser.html, 22.11.2000)
[79] Lesser, Ibid.

The third hypothesis he puts forward is that the countries of the Southern Mediterranean are looking for new dimensions to their security relationships, whether these new dimensions come from relations with the European Union or with NATO. However, he comments that the Mediterranean Initiative of NATO has some problems due to the fact that there is a suspicion in southern states about NATO.[80]

The fourth observation of Lesser is that in the near future, one has to talk about European-Middle Eastern-Eurasian security, since these regions are going to be more interdependent as a result of three dimensions. First, politically, things that happen on the one shore of the Mediterranean affect Europe as can be seen in the immigration issues or the fear over Algeria. Second, energy sources and geopolitical issues emanating from Caspian and Caucasus and gas and oil transportation across the Mediterranean have an impact on the energy supplies of Europe. Finally, it is expected within a decade that almost every European capital could be in range of ballistic missiles based on Europe's periphery, even though the most of the motives for proliferation are South-South issues, not North-South.[81]

Aliboni comments that the Western countries take part in the conflicts which emanate from the southeastern Europe while they are not directly involved in the problems in the south and east of the Mediterranean Sea. Yet these conflicts and tensions have an impact on the broad security agenda of the European countries. First of all, there are religious or nationalist political players and ideologies with an exclusive attitude against West. This attitude has its roots in history, from the crusades to the colonialism and the implementation of Israeli state. Therefore, many Arabs consider the West as a source of their problems. Hence the governments, intellectuals or companies that would like to cooperate with the West are influenced negatively by those anti-Western ideologies. Second, the instability caused by diverse conflicts and tensions in the region may affect investments and natural gas supplies. Third, spillover effect of the regional conflicts and tensions may create problems for Europe, such as immigration, displacement of people for political

[80] Lesser, Ibid.
[81] Lesser, Ibid.

reasons and political terrorism. Fourth, the high level of mistrust causes a high level of armament in the region. Even though the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has a deterrent rather than an offensive purpose, they still may constitute threats against the Western countries. Hence, Aliboni regards proliferation as a spillover-like factor rather than a direct North-South confrontation.[82] These are the implications that the Southern Mediterranean region may have on the European security.

According to Aliboni the West has two challenges in its security relations with the countries of Southern and Eastern Mediterranean; first, enjoying an easier and less intrusive access to area, and second, dealing with the different kinds of spillover effects caused by the instabilities in the southern areas. In terms of access into the region, the most important political challenge is how Western countries can strengthen regional actors who are willing to cooperate since there is a risk of discrediting, destabilising or delegitimising them domestically.[83]

Biad emphasises that with issues such as proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, immigration, terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, there is a widespread feeling that Western civilisation is threatened by 'multidimensional' and 'multidirectional' phenomena originating from the South. However, from the southern point of view, the North is considered responsible for the unstable situation in the Mediterranean for accelerating the instability in the price of energy and raw materials, debt pressures, cultural intrusion, racism and xenophobia.[84]

---

[82] Aliboni R., *The Mediterranean and the New NATO. The European Vision: Political and Security Issues*, Paper presented at the Conference on Transatlantic Approaches to the Mediterranean. Impact of the New NATO on North and South Perspectives, Washington D.C., 24-25 May 1999. Documenti IAI 9906, EuroMeSCo. (http://194.235.129.80/euromesco/publi_artigo.asp?cod_artigo=38705, 11.05.2001)

[83] Aliboni, Ibid.

[84] Biad A., "A Strategy for Conflict Prevention and Management in the Mediterranean", *Revista Cidob d'Afers Internacionals*, no:37, 1997, (http://www.cidob.es/Ingles/Publicaciones/Afers/biad.html 28.10.1999)

Therefore, the complexity of security issues and mistrust between the two shores of the Mediterranean necessitate a cooperative security approach. Biad suggests that

> "response to a security threat should not be based on an imposed formula that carries with it the risk of being perceived as intrusive in the eyes of the southern countries: Rather such a response should be based on a co-operative approach that parts from a common definition of risks and responses"[85]

It would be convenient to evaluate Mediterranean security concerns in two parts namely, hard and soft security concerns. As important hard security issues, conflicts in the Middle East, conflicts between Turkey and Greece over the Aegean and Cyprus, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have been mentioned. As soft security concerns, obstacles to economic cooperation, illegal immigration, fundamentalist Islam, security of energy supplies, environmental pollution, and terrorism have been examined.

2.3.1. Hard Security Concerns

Although European attention began to turn away from hard security concerns having a direct or indirect impact on overall Mediterranean security, there emerged a number of situations such as the Gulf War and the Bosnian conflict which affected the security structure of the Eastern and southeastern Mediterranean. There are also other possibilities such as the outbreak of hostilities between Israel and Syria or between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Turan comments that these contingencies are neither NATO concerns, nor do they present an immediate threat to the security of western Mediterranean. However they are likely to affect the stability of European countries.[86]

The first category of conflicts is constituted by territorial and border disputes such as those between Israel and Palestine; Israel and Syria; Greece and Turkey and so on. The second category is represented by ethnic-cultural rivalry as in the former

[85] Biad, Ibid.
[86] Turan, op.cit.

Yugoslavia and Cyprus.[87] All these conflicting regions adjacent to the Mediterranean and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Mediterranean are the hard security concerns. However, as mentioned before it was decided that the detailed examination of these issues should be left to other researchers as each of these concerns deserve a time, research and space of a whole thesis.

2.3.1.1. Middle East

According to Turan, in the Middle East, two major security questions continue to present challenges affecting Mediterranean security: the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and the security of the Persian Gulf. In case of the former, either the possibility of armed conflict between some of the Arab states and Israel, which may lead to the possibility of the use of even nuclear weapons, or major domestic turmoil in such countries as Egypt, Syria and Jordan, would generate security problems for the Mediterranean basin.[88]

On the other hand, the security of the Persian Gulf affects Mediterranean security both directly and indirectly. For instance, part of the military capability that can be used in a possible armed conflict in the region is normally deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, some logistic support for operations in the Gulf is extended through the Mediterranean. There is a strong possibility that escalation would bring some of the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean into the conflict. These are direct security concerns related with the Gulf. There are also some other indirect concerns. For example, a crisis in the Gulf may have destabilising effects on the economic and political situation in the countries like Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon and Jordan.[89]

Church and Phinnemore write that "because of its dependence on Middle Eastern oil and the tendency of the Palestinian problem to create trouble in the West", the

[87] Biad, op.cit.
[88] Turan, op.cit.
[89] Turan, Ibid.

European Union has been concerned with the Middle East. It has attempted to act as a peace-maker and provided aid to Middle Eastern countries through the 1977 Mashreq accord.[90] According to Piening, in spite of its careful and long-standing diplomatic and economic support for the Arabs and the Palestinians, the European Union has also remained close to Israel, considering her as the Middle East's only functioning democracy. However, the EU has tried to adopt an impartial approach in the Middle East peace process, arguing that both sides have a right to secure their existence in the region. Since this principle has been accepted by all the parties, the Union and its member states have become the major international contributor to the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Gaza.[91]

In 1994 the European Parliament created an ad hoc delegation for relations with the PLO. This delegation visited the territories, held discussions with Palestinian leaders and took part in the observation of the 1996 elections for which a joint action under the Common Foreign and Security Policy provided EU finance and practical assistance to the Palestinians. The delegation became a permanent body of the European Parliament in January 1997 and was called the Delegation for Relations with the Palestinian Legislative Council. In 1997, the European Council signed an interim association agreement with the PLO.[92]

Aliboni comments that if the present regimes in the North Africa and the Middle East would like to initiate change for cooperation in the political and security field without internal destabilisation, NATO should consider some policies in the region. The bilateral tracks of the Middle East Peace Process must be completed and achieve fair political results for all the countries involved. Western security cooperation makes sense from the point of view of both Arab countries and Israel if it is in accordance with their national security agendas. Whenever the basis of a regional cooperative security framework is constituted in the Middle East, attempts to create

---

[90] Church, Clive H. and David Phinnemore, *European Union and European Community A Handbook and Commentary on the 1992 Maastricht Treaties*, (updated reprint), Harvester Wheatsheaf, Prentice Hall, 1994(5), p. 346
[91] Piening, op.cit. pp.84-5
[92] Piening, Ibid. p.85

North-South security cooperative framework would be successful whether with NATO or within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.[93]

Moreover, North-South security cooperation should be based on rules and aims convincing non-Western countries that they have an equal status in the frame of cooperation. Aliboni points out that what the Arabs expect from these dialogues is the prospect to share decisions to increase their security rather than being told that there are Western forces ready to intervene in crises. The way to handle this matter is the creation of a strong multidimensional political cooperation in such a way that indicated by the EMP's institutions (the Ministers, the Senior Officials, the Euro-Med Committee etc).[94]

2.3.1.2. Aegean and Cyprus

The Greek-Turkish dispute has been a major source of instability in the Eastern Mediterranean and a major concern for Greece and Turkey's NATO allies. During the Cold War, the importance of Turkey and Greece due to their strategic proximity to both the Soviet Union and the Middle East was significant as NATO's southern flank. Even though they have been allies in NATO, several conflicts and continuing tensions between the two states are another source of concern for the Mediterranean security structure. The problems can be classified as the ones related to the Aegean Sea and Cyprus question. First of all, problems concerning with the extent of territorial waters, remilitarisation of Aegean Islands and the delimitation of the continental shelf are in the category of Aegean problems. Relations between Greece and Turkey are based on the 1923 Lausanne Treaty which established a balance of rights and obligations for both countries. Problems arise essentially from Greek attempts to undermine this balance. Greece even rejects the existence of these problems other than the delimitation of continental shelf claiming that she has a right to remilitarise the islands and to extend the territorial waters.

---

[93] Aliboni, *The Mediterranean and the New NATO. The European Vision: Political and Security Issues.*
[94] Aliboni, Ibid.

First of all, the Aegean constitutes a main sea-lane of Northern Turkey to the Mediterranean. Turkey would like to keep this lane open as international waters. Turkey has insisted that this exceptional waterway is not appropriate for the application of the 12-mile territorial waters limit. If applied, 12-mile limit, according to the Article 3 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), would turn the sea into a Greek lake, an outcome which Turkey finds unacceptable.[95] Under the present situation with the 6-mile breadth of territorial waters, Greece holds 43.68% of the Aegean Sea. For Turkey, this percentage is 7.47, while the remaining 48.85% is high seas.[96] In case of an extension to 12 miles, Greek territorial waters will increase to 71.5% whereas Turkey's territorial waters will increase to 8.7%. The area of high seas will therefore drastically reduce to 19.7%.[97] Even though Greece claims that as a general rule of international law, she can enjoy this right without any exception as a coastal state, Turkey, on the other hand, argues that such an action will be detrimental to her vital and legitimate interests, blocking her access to the high seas and jeopardising her military, economic and scientific initiatives.[98]

Second, Turkey feels its security is threatened by the remilitarization of the Greek islands facing the Turkish coast, contrary to the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty. Greek claims are as follows: Based on rebus sic stantibus rule, the conditions have changed since the demilitarisation of the islands; the 1936 Montreux Convention empowered Greece to remilitarise the islands at the entrance of Dardanelles; and due to perceived Turkish threat Greece can deploy military means on the Aegean islands. Turkey, against these claims, argue that all treaties concerning with the status of those islands were based on the demilitarisation and there was not any fundamental change in the conditions as Greece has claimed; the Montreux Convention is not

[95] Turan, op.cit.
[96] Gürel Ş.S., "Türkiye ve Yunanistan: Ege'de Zahmetli Bir İlişki", in C. Balkır, A.M. Williams, eds., *Türkiye ve Avrupa İlişkileri*, İstanbul, Sarmal Yay., 1996, p.227.
[97] Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press release, 28.01.1998.
[98] Gürel Ş.S., *Tarihsel Boyut İçinde Türk-Yunan İlişkileri (1821-1993)*, Ankara, Ümit Yay., 1993, p.76; Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press release, 28.01.1998.

applicable to the Greek islands; and instead of Greece, Turkey feels threatened with the prospected remilitarization attempts of Greece.[99]

The third issue is the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf. In fact, disagreement on the way of settlement of this problem constitutes another concern for both countries. Turkey insists that this problem should be settled through bilateral negotiations, while Greece would like to bring the dispute before the International Court of Justice. The main Greek arguments on this problem are as follows: The Greek islands are part of Greek mainland and they have to be considered with their entirety; according to UNCLOS, islands have their own continental shelves; and the principle of equidistance should be applied with the nearest point to Turkey taken as baseline. However, Turkey contends that in case of the adoption of islands' continental shelves, the almost whole Aegean continental shelf would belong to Greece; a major portion of the Aegean seabed is the natural prolongation of the Anatolia, therefore islands located on the natural prolongation could not have their own continental shelves; and due to the semi-enclosed characteristic of the Aegean, delimitation should be based on equity considering the natural resources, security concerns and transportation means in the Aegean for both sides.[100]

As mentioned by Zunes, on several occasions, the United States has had to intervene diplomatically to prevent war from breaking out between Turkey and Greece. Such a war between two heavily armed and relatively developed nations would not only be a frightening scenario on humanitarian grounds but also one that could seriously destabilise the entire region.[101] An example of such intervention was experienced in 1996. In January 1996, the two countries nearly went to war over the islet of Kardak. Only last-minute, high-level U.S. intervention prevented a possible military clash between the two countries. Moreover, in the wake of the incident, the air forces of both sides continued to engage in mock dogfights, increasing the risk that any

[99] Gürel, "Türkiye ve Yunanistan: Ege'de Zahmetli Bir İlişki", pp.222-3.
[100] Gürel, Ibid., pp.224-5.
[101] Zunes S., "Greece and Turkey: Paying for Past and Present Sins", *The Progressive Response*, vol.3, no.40, November 1999, (http://www..foreignpolicy-infocus.org/progresp/vol3/prog3n40.html, 24.11.1999)

inadvertent accident or incident could spiral out of control and lead to armed conflict.[102]

Cyprus question has been one of the most problematic issues in the relations. The tension was heightened with the European Union's decision to start accession negotiations with the Greek Cypriots on behalf of the whole island. From a state-centric point of view, Uğur contends that the more active EU involvement in the Cyprus question can be explained with the end of the Cold War and Greek membership in the Union. First of all, European initiatives have been increased after the end of the Cold War. Second, with the veto power in cases requiring unanimity, Greece might have led to the Europeanisation of the problem.[103]

Accoring to RAND analysts, a major breakthrough on the Cyprus issue seems unlikely in the near future. Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) demands recognition as a coequal independent state—a nonstarter as far as the Greek Cypriots are concerned. Moreover, it is doubtful whether either Turkey or the Turkish Cypriots would ever agree to the demilitarization of the island, as the Greek Cypriots have proposed. The Turkish military presence is seen by both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots as a guarantee of the security of the Turkish Cypriot community. Turkey increasingly sees this presence as integrally linked to its own security. Hence, Ankara is likely to oppose any settlement that would lead to a significant reduction of this presence. Several factors, however, could provide an incentive for progress over the medium term. RAND analysts believe that a possible Greek-Turkish rapprochement that could resolve the outstanding differences over the Aegean could also provide the much-needed impetus for the two countries to address the Cyprus problem. Moreover, if a real reconciliation with Greece were to occur, Turkey might feel less of a strategic imperative to retain a large military presence on Cyprus.[104]

---

[102] Larrabee F.S., "Turkish Foreign and Security Policy: New Dimensions and New Challenges" in Z. Khalilzad, I.O. Lesser, F.S. Larrabee, eds., *The Future Of Turkish-Western Relations: Toward A Strategic Plan*, Santa Monica, RAND, 2000. (www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1241, 08.09.2001)

[103] Uğur M., *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye Bir Dayanak-İnandırıcılık İkilemi*, İstanbul, Everest Yay., 2000, pp.199.

[104] Larrabee F.S., "Turkish Foreign and Security Policy: New Dimensions and New Challenges", op.cit.

The EU's approach to Cyprus could also have an important influence on an eventual settlement. At the Helsinki summit in December 1999, the EU indicated that a Cyprus settlement would not be a precondition for the admission of the (Greek) Republic of Cyprus. Thus if a settlement of the Cyprus issue has not been achieved by the time of the completion of accession negotiations with the Greek Cypriot government, the EU might admit the Greek part of Cyprus. From the Turkish point of view, this would be highly disadvantageous, since Greek Cypriot membership would add another potential veto against Turkish accession to the EU.[105]

Turkey announced that a possible Greek Cypriot membership in the Union without Turkish and Turkish Cypriot membership is not acceptable. It is hoped that the European Union will soon realise its mistake to start negotiations with Greek Cypriots on behalf of the whole island. Unless a just and acceptable solution is found in Cyprus, this problem continues to constitute a security concern in the Mediterranean region for Turkey and Greece.

2.3.1.4. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the means for their delivery at longer ranges have become one of the leading issues in the post-Cold War security discussions. Lesser and Tellis contend that the region where the effects of proliferation trends are most felt is the Mediterranean, "where the European and Middle Eastern security environments meet, and where NATO allies are increasingly exposed to the spillover effects of instability to the south".[106]

NATO has been taking an active role in the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This issue is not specific to the Mediterranean yet it has a regional dimension since many countries, in North or South, will be at risk from the spread of

[105] Larrabee F.S., "Turkish Foreign and Security Policy: New Dimensions and New Challenges", Ibid.
[106] Lesser I.O. and Tellis A.J., *Strategic Exposure: Proliferation Around the Mediterranean*, Santa Monica, RAND, 1996, (http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR742, 18.04.2001).

such destabilising weapons. The new task of addressing the proliferation challenge was added to the NATO's agenda at the Brussels Summit in January 1994. The main aim of the Alliance in terms of proliferation is to prevent it from occurring, or if it occurs, to reverse it through diplomatic means.[107]

Proliferation of WMDs in the Mediterranean will not only have direct implications on the security of NATO members, but also have destabilising effects in the region by changing the strategic balance.[108] Many of the key regional actors such as Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Syria have been trying to acquire geopolitical weight and prestige after the end of the Cold War. Therefore, these countries consider having WMD capabilities as a contribution to their search for a regional power, assuming that they can be taken seriously in the international arena. Moreover, regional conflicts and internal and external threats also constitute motives for proliferation. Thus, many of the Mediterranean countries either possess or in the process of achieving WMDs along with the means for delivering them across the Mediterranean. Egypt has got active chemical weapons and long-range missile development programs. Both Libya and Syria have got chemical weapons while Algeria has been working on the development of a nuclear infrastructure. The possibility of Islamic regime in Algeria with its nuclear ambitions and missile interests could accelerate proliferation trends across North Africa.[109]

Therefore, the security structure in the Mediterranean should include the military aspect due to the risk of proliferation of WMDs. Multilateral arms control efforts, the establishment of confidence building measures, the utilisation of prevention, deterrence and defence are offered by Orhun as possible measures against the risks of conventional military build-up and proliferation of WMDs.[110]

---

[107] Solana J., "NATO and the Mediterranean", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, March 1997 (http://users.erols.com/mqmq/solana.htm, 06.10.1999)
[108] de Santis, op.cit.
[109] Lesser and Tellis, op.cit.
[110] Orhun Ö., "The Uncertainties and Challenges Ahead: A Southern Perspective", *Perceptions*, vol.4, no.1, March-May 1999, p.29.

The spread of WMD and longer range delivery systems leads to the assumption that traditional distinctions between European and Middle Eastern security concerns are disappearing. It has been predicted that within a decade every Southern European capital would be within range of ballistic missiles based in North Africa or Eastern Mediterranean. However, Lesser and Tellis mention that

> "the most pressing WMD risks are South-South, and the neighbors of proliferators in North Africa and the Levant are the most likely first victims of WMD use. The North-South dimensions of the WMD proliferation could become more prominent with the spread of longer-range delivery systems and, as important, to the extent that political-military relations across the Mediterranean worsen."[111]

From a different point of view, Biad criticises the European discourses on arms control issues that emphasises military threats coming from the South. However, in terms of nuclear and conventional weapons there has been a great disproportion in the military capabilities between the Northern and Southern Mediterranean countries in favour of the former. Thus he comments that "if it is commonly acknowledged that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a threat to international security, the question of deployment of such arms in the North (the so-called 'vertical proliferation') should therefore also be raised".[112]

2.3.2. Soft Security Concerns

Soft security concerns such as, obstacles to economic cooperation, illegal immigration, fundamentalist Islam, terrorism, security of energy supplies and environmental pollution should be considered as important as hard security concerns since they have been the source of instability in the region. De Santis argues that the political chaos in the region originates from the difficulty of adjusting the development of religious, cultural and economic pluralism and the emergence of a more active civil society with the demands of civil rights, accountability and transparency. Moreover, he continues with stating that "the instability deriving from

[111] Lesser and Tellis, op.cit.
[112] Biad, op.cit.

socioeconomic imbalances can have a direct impact, in the form of 'soft' security problems, on the vital interests and well-being" of the European countries.[113]

2.3.2.1. Obstacles to Economic Cooperation

Economic security depends on the ability of states to have access to external markets, credits and resources. At the regional level, economic security is related more to the economic interactions of actors and effects of these interactions on each other. It is due to interdependence that economic factors gain more importance especially in the Western Mediterranean. North African countries depend on European markets for the commercialisation of their agricultural and textile products and the Southern European countries depend on energy products imported from the South.[114]

Economic competition and protectionism constitute a major constraint to economic developments in the Mediterranean. Haddadi contends that

> "on the one hand, there is the internal competition between the Maghreb countries over EU markets as well as over securing special treatments with it, especially between Morocco and Tunisia. On the other hand, the dual role of the south-west European countries as both mentor and competitor with North Africa coupled with the EU's protectionist policies represents an important factor in the economic security equation in the region".[115]

Therefore, Turan believes that one of the current major concerns in the region should be defeating economic stagnation, achieving economic development, growth and prosperity. All countries of the region have to search for new forms of economic cooperation.[116] The economic aspect of a broader security concept in the Mediterranean should involve "the opening up of all the economies of the region to the global economy and the entry of all the countries of the region into the world of

[113] de Santis, op.cit.
[114] Haddadi, op.cit. pp.7-8, 15.
[115] Haddadi, Ibid. p.15.
[116] Turan, op.cit.

international trade".[117] The countries of North Africa are heavily dependent on the European market and there is very little economic integration at regional level. Agricultural products are major exports of Maghreb countries and they represent employment for a substantial proportion of the working population.[118]

As mentioned by Lennon, the European Union is the Mediterranean countries' main economic and trading partner, accounting for more than half their foreign trade. At the same time, Southern Mediterranean countries supply almost a third of the EU's fertiliser imports and nearly a quarter of its imported energy, particularly oil and natural gas. In 1995 EU exports to the region exceeded $56 billion while imports were more than $37 billion.[119] These figures indicate the significance of the European Union for the countries of Mediterranean region in terms of their economic development.

However, White argues that development assistance efforts by the EU have been inadequate. Moreover, since its implementation in the early 1960s, the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has contributed to the decline of the Maghreb's agricultural sectors. The Maghrebi countries, as net exporters of agricultural commodities in the 1950s, were able to feed themselves. By the 1970s, the Maghreb had lost its agro-alimentary self-sufficiency. Over the decades Maghrebi officials found it more cost effective to purchase cheap European commodities, causing a decrease in Maghrebi production. In addition, exports of Mediterranean products such as citrus, wine, tomatoes and olive oil have been excluded from the European market especially since Spain joined the then EC in 1986. Before Spanish accession, the EC was not self-sufficient in these commodities and Moroccan oranges and Tunisian olive oil could enter the European market. Therefore, he comments that rather than calling for economic development in the Maghreb and pressing Maghrebi governments to adopt politically infeasible economic policies, EU policy makers should examine their own foreign economic policy. Immigration as an interrelated

[117] Orhun, loc.cit. p.29
[118] de Vasconcelos, op.cit. p.28.
[119] Lennon, D., "Africa: Looking South", *Europe*, no.371, November 1997.

soft security concern is another result of these policies according to White. As the agricultural sectors have declined in recent decades, Maghrebis have migrated to overseas, escaping rural areas that have proven unable to support the population. If the EU wants Maghrebi people to stay in their countries as farmers, then it has to support equitable, sustainable development.[120] Nevertheless, as discussed in part 2.3.2., European Union's Euro-Mediterranean Partnership aiming to create a zone of shared prosperity and a free trade area by 2010, can be considered as a significant step forward.

2.3.2.2. Illegal Immigration

One of the most important concerns for the European security is the demographic issue and the fear of population explosion in the Mediterranean. First of all, a population increase may spill into Europe, mainly in the form of immigrants. Moreover, high population growth rates could also undermine stability in the South.[121] Consequently, migration is a significant inter-regional problem for the European Union. Aliboni comments that the slow economic growth expected in the non-EU Mediterranean countries will not allow the increasing young population to be fully employed and consequently will cause a large number of people to migrate to the EU.[122] Or in other words, the main feature of the social, economic and political problems of the southern shores of the Mediterranean is a very high population not matched by economic and industrial development. This largely very young population is being affected by unemployment.[123] Additionally, as de Santis foresees, this population growth will have implications on needs for housing, sanitation, food, water, transportation and communication systems in the region.[124]

---

[120] White, G., "Encouraging Unwnated Immigration: A Political Economy of Europe's Efforts to Discourage North African Immigration", *Third World Quarterly*, vol.20, no.4, August 1999.
[121] Rozin, M. M., *European Aid to the Palestinian Autonomy*, Paper presented at the 2nd Summer School on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the New International Order, Catania, 20-26 June 1999, Department of Political Studies, Jean Monnet Centre EUROMED, p.3
[122] Aliboni, op.cit. p.161.
[123] de Vasconcelos, op.cit. p.27.
[124] de Santis, op.cit.

Similarly, White argues that there exists a profound difference in the standards of living and economic development between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean. According to him, one useful indicator is the United Nations Development Program's human development index (HDI) which is an aggregate indicator that combines several factors such as GDP per capita, literacy rate, education and life expectancy in assessing the quality of life of a given country's population. Therefore, it provides an illustration of the disparities between countries. As can be seen in Table 2.1, the Southern European economies of France, Spain and Italy are ranked, respectively, 2nd, 11th, and 21st on the HDI list, while Maghreb countries Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco are ranked 82nd, 83rd, and 125th.[125]

Table 2.1. Human Development Index for Selected Countries

Country	HDI Rank	Life Expectancy (Years) 1995	Adult Literacy Rate (%) 1995	Educational Enrolment Ratio (%) 1995
France	2	78.7	99.0	89
Spain	11	77.7	97.1	90
Belgium	12	76.9	99.0	86
Germany	19	76.4	99.0	81
Italy	21	78.0	98.1	73
Portugal	33	74.8	89.6	72
Libya	64	64.3	76.2	90
Algeria	82	68.1	61.6	66
Tunisia	83	68.7	66.7	69
Egypt	112	64.8	51.4	69
Morocco	125	65.7	43.7	48

(Source: UNDP, 1998 Development Report, taken from White, 1999)

Therefore, the growing gap between 'rich' North and 'poor' and increasingly populous South have created migration as a security problem in European perspective. The population around the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean, i.e. North African countries along with Turkey, is around 350 million while the total population of the EU is less than 300 million. Thus, the demographic imbalance, along with the economic depression experienced in the Mediterranean countries has led to growing migration to Western Europe, more specifically to

[125] White, op.cit.

Southern Europe.[126] Accordingly, as the populations of North Africa and the Near East continue to grow at 2 percent a year, compared to the 0.2 percent in Europe, the pressure to escape from deepening poverty, social restrictions and political oppression grows too.[127]

The increasing number of people move from the economically more deprived to the economically more wealthy regions. Turan comments that such movements contribute to the worsening of the problem of unemployment in the more prosperous countries of Europe. Moreover, the presence of cultural and religious differences between the local and the immigrant populations causes occasional rioting, political agitation and other similar public disorders. On the other hand, the construction of legal barriers by the northern Mediterranean countries to control the movements of populations tend to stand in the way of closer relations and interactions among the countries of the Mediterranean basin.[128]

Obviously, the economic attraction of the North has been generating a flow of migrants from the South. Since there is a possibility that frontier controls and policing measures will be unable to stop this inevitable population movement, the only rational solution would be to promote economic development in these countries.[129]

Aliboni states that until the last decade only the Northern EU countries, especially Germany and France have acted as receiving countries for migrants. Since the first half of the 1990s, the Southern EU countries, especially Italy and Spain have become the destination of migrants. Source countries have also changed. The countries like Egypt and Lebanon must be added to Turkey and the Maghreb countries. Aliboni asks whether the inter-regional EU-Mediterranean solidarity would work by giving preference to Mediterranean migrant workers. Germany and Italy would prove

[126] Perni, op.cit. p.5.; Asmus, Larrabee, Lesser, op.cit.
[127] Lennon, op.cit.
[128] Turan, op.cit.
[129] Fernandez-Ordoñez, op.cit. p.8.

sensitive to East European migration, whereas France would try to preserve a preference for immigrants from the Maghreb countries. All of the Southern EU countries are interested in maintaining a high degree of openness because of tourism. Italy has recognised that foreign manpower was needed for the working of its economy. Moreover, the government and the political forces have been reluctant to regulate immigration, seeing such regulation as discrimination that could lead to racism. However, Portugal and Spain regard immigration as a threat to both domestic manpower and security. In France a strong racist movement has emerged and the wave of Lebanese-French terrorism since 1985 has caused fears that immigrants may become involved in terrorist activities.[130] Nevertheless, in some Southern European cities like Marseille, there are huge Arabic-speaking Muslim populations. Furthermore, it is estimated that 5 to 6 million migrants from North Africa and Near East have settled, many illegally, in Spain, France and Italy.[131]

Furthermore, wage remittances are of central importance to Magrebi economies. Remittances are earnings of migrant workers sent back to families remaining in their homelands and are an essential component of domestic economies. According to one estimate, foreign workers around the world remit as much as $67 billion to their homelands. In Morocco, for instance, remittances reached $2 billion in 1990 while the amount gained through foreign direct investment was only $165 million.[132]

However, illegal human trafficking also has tragic results. According to a report at *Newsweek*, it is estimated that at least 6,000 people have died since 1997 trying to get into Europe. European nations are tightening border security against a rising flow of illegal immigrants who are Afghans, Iraqis fleeing from their countries of Africans looking for jobs. Italy and Spain use special coastal radar stations to monitor the boats of traffickers as soon as they leave the shores of the Adriatic or the Mediterranean. Moreover, infrared and heat sensors that can detect humans scan

[130] Aliboni, op.cit. p.161.
[131] Lennon, op.cit.
[132] White, op.cit.

trucks and trains at the borders. Airlines, shipping and trucking companies face heavy fines if they are caught even unknowingly carrying illegal immigrants.[133]

Front-line countries like Spain and Italy are increasingly sending economic migrants back to their countries, no matter how much their labour may be needed. *Newsweek* reports Moroccan consul-general in Algeciras, a Spanish port that is a major link between Europe and Africa, saying that "They [European countries] have to shut their borders, for political reasons. But on the other hand, they need workers. The would-be immigrant who gets away is immediately absorbed into the work force".[134] An official from the United Nations High Commission on Refugees says that many European countries are starting to recognise that they will have to find a way to accommodate more immigrants if they want to stop the deadly trafficking across their borders. If the arrival of immigrants is legalised, they will be much more likely to contribute to the economies of the recipient countries by paying their taxes.[135]

In this respect, the president of the European Commission, Romano Prodi comments that the elimination of economic and demographic disparities between the two shores of the Mediterranean will be the biggest challenge. To this end, he suggests that immigration could be used as a means of achieving development since it is certain that Europe's need for new workers, along with immigration movements, will increase in the coming years. Through a joint effort of both sides of the Mediterranean, it will be possible to deal with this situation and benefit from its potential. Prodi continues with explaining that immigration policies must be considered in terms of the creation of an integrated area of around nine hundred million people over the coming thirty years. To achieve this aim, there has to be an intensified cooperation against illegal immigration that may create tension and anger in European countries.[136]

---

[133] Nordland, R., "Storming Fortress Europe; The desire to weed out the illegal and unskilled has turned immigrant smuggling into a deadly enterprise", *Newsweek*, 13.08.2001.
[134] Nordland, Ibid.
[135] Nordland, Ibid.
[136] Prodi R., "The Growth of Euro Mediterranean Cooperation", EUROMED Report, no.14, August 2000.

In sum, despite European efforts to limit illegal immigration in the 1980s and 1990s, the tide of people from the Maghreb continues. Europe's demand for cheap labour, the perceived and real differences in the economic conditions between the two shores of the Mediterranean, and the crucial significance of remittances to Maghrebi economies have served as encouraging factors for people to migrate northwards.[137]

2.3.2.3. Fundamentalist Islam

As one of the most prominent academics on Islam, Esposito comments that "Islam reemerged as a potent global force in Muslim politics during the 1970s and 1980s". Muslim governments as well as opposition groups resorted to religion for legitimacy and popular support. Islamic activist organisations have ranged from those who work within the system, like Muslim Brotherhoods in Egypt and Jordan to radical revolutionaries, such as Egypt's Society of Muslims or Lebanon's Hizbullah and Islamic Jihad. A common criticism of the military, political and sociocultural failures of the Western oriented development and a search for a more authentic society and culture emerged in an Islamic heritage and values.[138] Esposito continues with:

> The forms that the Islamic revival has taken have varied almost infinitely from one country to another. However, there are recurrent themes: a sense that existing political, economic, and social systems had failed; a disenchantment with, and at times a rejection of, the West; a quest for identity and greater authenticity; and the conviction that Islam provides a self-sufficient ideology for state and society, a valid alternative to secular nationalism, socialism, and capitalism.[139]

After decolonisation in North Africa, especially in the 1970s the new rulers were not willing to change the cultural and political hegemony established by the Western powers. The governments that were economically unstable and corrupt lost the political legitimacy necessary for their survival. In many cases, the ruling class was even harsher than their predecessors, attacking institutions and values that they

---

[137] White, op.cit.
[138] Esposito J.L. *The Islamic Threat Myth or Reality?,* 3rd ed., New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1999, pp. 9-11.
[139] Esposito, Ibid. p.12

regarded as obstacles in the way of modernisation. The result was a sense of inferiority and alienation experienced by not only poor and dispossessed but also university students and middle class professionals that led to the questioning of Western values and systems and reevaluation of the Islamic alternative. Therefore, the tendency for Western style of development became politically inappropriate and socially destructive.[140]

Until 1970's the Islamic world had been dominated by the secular nationalistic and socialist political movements. However, Western modernisation either in capitalistic form such as in Libya, or in Marxist form as experienced in Algeria and Egypt, failed to create material benefits and coherent systems. Thus rapid industrialisation and urbanisation led to radical inequality between the ordinary people and the ruling elite. Therefore, Islamic fundamentalism has been considered as mark of a rejection of Western modernisation and values.[141]

While there are common elements in Islamic revivalism throughout the region, it is not a monolithic threat. There has been an inclination to assume that Islamic fundamentalism would be capable of removing national differences and forming a unified front of opposition to West. However, there are national, political and economic divergences prevent Islamic movements from presenting a homogeneous challenge. First of all, national characteristics have always been a significant factor determining the nature of Islamic opposition. The strength and militancy of the movements are affected by factors such as the length of colonial rule, the response of national elite to fundamentalist movements and the impact of modernisation.[142]

In terms of political differences between countries, the examples of Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt can be given. In Algeria, the demands for political pluralism could not go in parallel with the economic change. In Tunisia, pluralism was guaranteed by the 1959 Constitution but retracted afterwards and the country was

[140] Tank, "Security Issues Emanating from the Mediterranean Basin", p.163.
[141] Waters M., *Globalization*, London, Routledge, 1996, p.132.
[142] Tank, "Security Issues Emanating from the Mediterranean Basin", p.164.

ruled by single party for 25 years. Morocco has adopted three constitutions in the last two decades and allowed the expression of opposition. However, they have all been problematic. The first and the second failed in less than two years, and the legislative provisions of the third one could be activated in five years. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood was founded as an opposition group in 1928, but only recently the government has allowed them to enter cultural sphere if not the political. The divergent economic structures of the countries and the decline in the living standards also have had effect on the growth of Islamic movements. Tank gives the cases of Tunisia and Morocco experiencing the effects of economic decline with a result in the rise of popularity in Islamists in the 1970s. Protected by oil revenues, Algeria was affected when the oil prices fell in the 1980s. Egypt suffered from a decrease in the annual growth rate that changed its position from lower-middle income countries to lower income. As can be predicted, population growth in the region worsened the problems of declining economies.[143]

Tank comments that the end of the Cold War revealed the growing dissatisfaction experienced by countries on the southern periphery of Europe where the growth of political Islam provides an evidence that the nation state is struggling to keep its internal authority. Islamic fundamentalism would appear to be a search for a lost cultural identity presenting an alternative to the nation state. Therefore, the ideology of Western culture is being replaced by the ideology of militant Islam in countries where dissatisfaction over living standards has produced a crisis of identity. Political Islam has the additional power of providing a competing doctrine in the perceived ideological vacuum created by the end of the Cold War. The Islamic world view introduces an alternative to the Western model of international order, replacing the competition of nation states with the cooperation of a community of believers. Tank suggests that this has been a significantly tempting alternative in the countries of the Mediterranean basin, "where capitalism and Western culture have not been capable of fulfilling their promises".[144]

---

[143] Tank, Ibid. pp.164-5.
[144] Tank, "The CFSP and the Nation-State", p.18

Richmond describes that it is along the borders of the European Union and especially in the Mediterranean region that international society has rediscovered the fear of civilisational conflict. Hence ethnic conflicts draw the frontiers of identity and "the frontier of Muslim world is seen by many as a truce line between the Western value system, within which the EU operates, and an alien 'other' world".[145] That is why the rise of fundamentalism is regarded by many as the new Western threat filling the void left by the disintegration of communist ideology.[146]

The main event that drew European attention in the early 1990s was the outbreak of violence in Algeria following the suspension of the electoral process in 1992. The Islamist challenge in Algeria and signs of unrest in other Arab countries led some Europeans to express fears about 'Islamic fundamentalism'. The best examples are the controversial description of the phenomenon by former Secretary General of NATO Willy Claes as at least as dangerous as the former Soviet threat, and Huntington's thesis about 'clash of civilizations'. However, many European and Mediterranean states have rejected these statements. As Gillespie contends, the predominant response has been that the Islamists may threaten certain Mediterranean regimes but do not constitute a direct threat to Europe. Nonetheless, there has been a growing awareness in Europe that the conditions that have fuelled the radical Islamist movements affect the European Union as a whole.[147]

On the other hand, Moqtedar Khan suggests that it is also possible to criticise the media and some policy makers for considering Islam as the new threat to free world, since moderate Islamic movements have contributed to the development of civil societies in Muslim countries. Some academics argue that violence and terrorism are the acts of a small minority often retaliating against state repression or Israeli attacks on Palestinians. Thus, labelling them as extremists has justified their repression by

[145] Richmond, op.cit.
[146] Tank, "Security Issues Emanating from the Mediterranean Basin", p.161.
[147] Gillespie R., "Northern European Perceptions of the Barcelona Process", *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacinals*, no.37, 1997, http://www.cidob.es/Ingles/Publicaciones/Afers/gillespie.htm, 28.10.1999

authoritarian regimes, leading to the unnecessary radicalisation of some of the moderate forces.[148]

Nevertheless, the RAND analysts believe that Europe's greatest challenge would be the role of Islam and nationalism along the Mediterranean coastline. It is a fact that, during the centuries, the Mediterranean has been a centre of conflict and cooperation between the civilisations. Centuries-long confrontation between the Ottoman Empire and the West may be considered as the first Cold War. Therefore, today the Islamic factor is playing a key role in the Mediterranean security. However, on the contrary of Huntington's 'clash of civilizations', the RAND analysts evaluate the situation as a main force for change within key states and as one of the new threats on Europe's periphery.[149]

According to Turan, it is feared that social movements based on religion could challenge the political order of some societies on the southern and eastern coast of the Mediterranean. In the future by exporting their activities, they will threaten the territory and peace of other countries. Moreover, it is believed that they would carry the potential of initiating action which may lead to the outbreak of hostilities between neighbouring countries each of which feels threatened by the political extremism dominant in others.[150]

Therefore, political Islam is one of the powerful forces at work in the Mediterranean region. It can be seen in the case of Algeria that the violent fundamentalist movements pose a threat to stability in a number of countries.[151] Algeria, with the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) has followed the Soviet economic model since independence in 1962, was dependent on the Soviet Union both economically and militarily. Therefore, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union caused doubts in the Algeria's economic and social policies. Such problems

[148] Muqtedar Khan M.A., "US Foreign Policy and Political Islam", *Security Dialogue*, vol.29, no.4, December 1998, p.452.
[149] Asmus, Larrabee, Lesser, op.cit.
[150] Turan, op.cit.
[151] Asmus, Larrabee, Lesser, op.cit.

that Blunden refers as the transformation of economy from a collectivist to a market system, a decrease in oil prices, rapid population growth were resulted in the rise of the fundamentalist movements.[152]

Not only because of repercussions of possible Islamist regime in Algeria but also because of threats of potential refugee flows and dependence on Algerian natural gas, the situation in this country is of interest to Western Europe.[153] However, European policies aimed at reinforcing stability have failed. External mediation was rejected by the military-backed regime, but Gomez argues that the European Union possessed neither the political leverage nor the political will to intervene the escalating crisis. Its position was complicated by the foreign policy orientations of the member states. France's relations with Algeria have always been sensitive due to colonisation period. The French government tried to avoid accusations of interference while behind the scene giving political support and economic aid to FLN's campaign against the opposition of Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). The southern member states were reluctant to see negotiations with FIS, believing that the status quo was better than an Islamic government. The northern members were more open to the idea of dealing directly with the Islamic movement. The result was neutrality, or in other words, inaction of the European Union.[154]

The record of corruption of the FLN, coupled with economic difficulties which have been intensified by poor economic management and high population growth have led to a dramatic rise in support for Islamic activism. According to Blunden, the government misrepresented the threat of fundamentalism to gain the support of the Europeans.[155] The 1991 elections in which FIS was the biggest single winner was annulled by the army. Political violence had been limited before the elections. However, the FIS considered the annulment of the elections as an incident that triggered the widespread confrontations leading to "... brutal violence in clashes

[152] Blunden M., "Insecurity on Europe's Southern Flank" *Survival*, vol.36, no.2, Summer 1994, p.134.
[153] Fuller G.E., *Algeria: The Next Fundamentalist State?*, Santa Monica, RAND, 1996, (http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR733, 17.08.2000)
[154] Gomez, op.cit. p.141.
[155] Blunden, loc.cit. p.134.

between the government and the FIS [that] have polarized the country, strengthening radical forces within the FIS, reinforcing hard-liners within the regime, and spawning a number of dangerous, independent, militant armed radical groups operating outside of FIS control".[156]

In 1998, the Algerian government intensified its counterinsurgency campaign against the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), and several militant groups joined the unilateral cease-fire declared in October 1997 by the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), the armed wing of the FIS. However, the GIA continued to conduct terrorist operations in 1998 targeting mostly Algerian civilians. Therefore, the undiscriminating violence against civilians was blamed both domestically and internationally and declined Islamist support for the group abroad.[157]

According to Gillespie, French policy towards Algeria has been the subject of a controversy in Europe, since virtually no other country expressed solidarity with the hardline policy which sought a military triumph over the Islamist insurgents. France subsequently criticised Germany, Britain, and the USA for being excessively 'liberal' in their treatment of 'fundamentalist' refugees.[158] Other Mediterranean members of the European Union, especially Spain, Italy and Portugal have interested in coordinating policies for a peaceful settlement of the Algerian problem. Fuller offers that economic incentives could be used to achieve political progress. Moreover, a European accord that allows for the participation of all political parties including FIS could end conflicts.[159] An internationally monitored institutional character of such an accord could also prevent FIS from using democratic means for its own undemocratic goals.

---

[156] Fuller, op.cit.
[157] *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1998*, US Department of State Publication, 1999, http://www.waac.org/rep99/US_patterns_of_global_terrorism1998.html, 28.04.2000)
[158] Gillespie, op.cit.
[159] Fuller, op.cit.

2.3.2.4. Terrorism

Terrorism is another significant security concern for European states since the terrorist activities either take place within their borders or on their periphery. These activities of nationalist or religious groups affect the whole region. Moreover, the vulnerability of energy transportation routes constitutes another dimesion of terrorist attacks. Along with the measures taken by the countries in which terrorist groups have their bases, an international cooperation seems an important decision that must be made. However, it is possible for some regional countries to give support to the activities of some terrorist groups in order to cause instability in other countries. The position of Syria in terms of her support for PKK has been an example of such possibility.

Terrorism is a well-established mode of conflict on the Middle Eastern scene. A variety of future regional conflict scenarios may stem from terrorist action and counterterrorism is likely to be a motivating factor in many examples of Western military intervention since they have a keen interest in limiting the threat of terrorism and preventing te spillover of political violence emanating from the region.[160]

Terrorist threats originating from the Mediterranean basin will have a more perceptible impact on European security due to their high profile in the media. It is assumed by the West that radical Islamic movements and political violence are the main sources of international terrorism. However, Tank suggests that "only 8 per cent of all terrorist incidents are the product of militant Islamist organizations". However, this fact is undermined owing this small proportion of incidents represents 30 per cent of the fatalities occurred. The reputation for violence stems from the lethality of religious groups. Tank describes the severity of situation for European security with exemplifying that "the effects of terrorism emanating from the South are increasingly being felt in Europe through incidents such as the spate of bombings

[160] Lesser I.O., Nardulli B.R., Arghavan L.A., "Sources of Conflict in the Greater Middle East", in Z. Khalilzad and I.O. Lesser, eds., *Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century*, Santa Monica, RAND, 1998, (http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR897, 18.04.2001)

in Paris in the summer of 1995 by Algerian extremists angered by France's continued economic assistance to the regime in power".[161]

Another form of terrorist activities is based on ethnic identities. Europe has experienced cross-border separatist terrorism as in the 1993 terror campaign by the PKK on several Turkish commercial and diplomatic centres in Germany and France.[162]

Tank explains the reasons of why European cities are increasingly being targeted as follows: First of all, the tough security measures exercised by southern regimes do not allow for opposition groups to express their dissent. Thus some of these groups choose to adopt violent means to make known their opposition in the more open, more vulnerable European cities. Moreover, the existence of extremist groups within European countries restricts the possibility of intervention in the Muslim world since European governments have to consider its implications for terrorist activities as a reaction.[163]

Therefore, terrorist groups have been carrying out their activities in European countries as well as their homelands, creating a consideration of cooperative measures against the issue of international terrorism. A possible cooperation in information exchange and a determination against countries that support terrorist activities can be considered as steps leading towards more comprehensive cooperation.

[161] Tank, "Security Issues Emanating from the Mediterranean Basin", p.177.
[162] Tank, Ibid. p.177.
[163] Tank, Ibid. p.177.

2.3.2.5. Security of energy supplies

Security of energy supplies is another soft security concern for Europe that emanates from Middle East, Caspian basin and Central Asia. Oil and natural gas resources of these regions provide important amount of energy supply of European countries. According to the RAND analysts, the emerging geopolitics of energy supplies demonstrate that the Middle Eastern and European environments are increasingly interdependent.[164] The Middle East is the main oil provider to Europe and the EU is concerned about any development in the region that may disturb the oil supply. The Union is anxious to ensure the security of oil facilities in the area against inter-state conflicts and terror attacks and to prevent the danger of possible external interference in the area which may expand to a global conflict or hinder Western accession to oil reserves.[165]

Nimetz comments that with the transformation of the Soviet Union and the movement toward a world market economy, the energy resources of Central Asia and the Caucasus will be transported largely through the Mediterranean region. Consequently, the existing and subsequent pipeline routes from the Middle East, the Gulf, the Caspian and Central Asia will cause increased traffic in the Black Sea, the Aegean and the Mediterranean.[166]

It must be recognised that oil and gas shipments may present hard and soft security concerns for all countries, which are producers, consumers or which are involved in the delivery of the resource to international markets. Such transportation will create soft security concerns like environmental dangers. Accidents by large oil tankers may cause grave environmental hazards on their routes. The more dangerous the routes like the Turkish Straits, the greater the possibility that environmental disasters such as oil spills and major fires will take place. Additionally, pipelines, for instance, are open to terrorist raids since the territories through which they pass are open to

[164] Asmus R.D., F.S.Larrabee, I.O.Lesser, op.cit.
[165] Rozin, loc.cit. p.3
[166] Nimetz, op.cit.

domestic and international instability. According to Turan, there is also a major hard security concern: sea-lanes must be kept open and loading facilities must be protected against potential military aggression and such protection is not available right away.[167]

Turan comments that the shipments of energy supplies make up an integral part of Mediterranean security system as well as they are of great concern to the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia. Oil is to be shipped through the Mediterranean, and the countries of the region will be among the consumers. Moreover, the industrialised countries of the Mediterranean may anticipate the expansion of their exports to the Caucasus and the Central Asian regions as sales of oil and gas begin to produce increasing amounts of income much of which will eventually go to the purchase of goods abroad.[168]

Consequently, the expanding network of gas pipelines along the North African shore and across the Mediterranean will create new perceptions of interdependence as well as vulnerability. The countries of Southern Europe are well aware of this situation.[169] For instance, as de Santis points out, 65 per cent of Europe's oil and natural gas imports pass through the Mediterranean; 30 per cent of Italy's oil is imported from Libya and 32 per cent of its natural gas from Algeria; France, Germany, Greece, Spain, Turkey and the United Kingdom import oil from Libya, while Algerian natural gas is exported to Belgium, France, Portugal and Spain; 74 per cent of Spain's natural gas needs, 50 per cent of Italy's and 29 per cent of France's were imported from the Maghreb states in 1996.[170] Therefore, security of energy supplies in terms of Mediterranean stability has been one of the most important economic considerations for Europe, especially Southern Europe.

---

[167] Turan, op.cit.
[168] Turan, Ibid.
[169] Asmus R.D., F.S.Larrabee, I.O.Lesser, op.cit.
[170] de Santis, op.cit.

Eventually, with the growth of new lines of communication for energy around the Mediterranean basin, energy issues as a security concern have appeared on the European agenda more broadly. According to RAND analysts, the development of new energy ties may be seen as a source of additional vulnerability to political turmoil in the region. Yet they suggest that these new links may also have a stabilising effect due to the diversification and economic interdependence along the two shores.[171]

2.3.2.6. Environmental pollution

The characteristic of environmental problems as a long term danger makes the environmental security concerns less significant in comparison with the other security issues. Haddadi contends that not all environmental dangers create security worries, nevertheless they have a potential to cause conflicts between the states.[172] Hence, it is not logical to deny that environmental pollution has emerged gradually as an issue of great concern for the European countries. According to Pridham, Cini and Porter, in the context of the notion of sustainable development, the potential conflict between the protection of environment and the aim of economic growth can easily be observed in the Mediterranean region. They comment that pollution and environmental degradation not only have consequences for public health, but also have significant ramifications for the tourist industries of the area. Therefore, the environment is an integral part of the economies of all countries. The projected increase in tourism in the Mediterranean suggests an environmental crisis that necessitates the strategic policy responses in the region at both national and international levels. Pridham, et.al. contend that the environmental pollution is not a new challenge but has been accumulating over several decades in the Mediterranean.[173]

---

[171] Larrabee et al, op.cit. p.4
[172] Haddadi, op.cit. p.18
[173] Pridham G., M. Cini, M. Porter, "Environmental Pollution and Policy Responses in Mediterranean Europe" in R. Gillespie, ed., *Mediterranean Politics*, vol.2, London, Pinter, 1996, p.42.

According to Haddadi, the major environmental issues in the Mediterranean are related to environmental degradation as well as threats to supply of sources such as water. The problem of degradation concerns with deforestation and desertification. It is important to comprehend how degradation affects security relations in the region in terms of human movements and how shortage of natural sources especially when it is at the basis of human security, i.e. survival can create conflicts between countries. Not surprisingly, security is more serious and less cooperative in relation to threats to supply of sources. For instance, water scarcity might cause both internal and external conflicts in the region.[174]

Moreover, marine environment is polluted by municipal and industrial effluents, agricultural run-off, deliberate or accidental discharges from ships, garbage originating in the sea or land and pollutants transported through the air, having originated as emissions from the activities on land. Oil spills and pollution from shipping are the main sources of marine pollution. About 40 oil related sites such as pipe terminals, oil refineries, offshore oil platforms, are distributed along the Mediterranean coastal zone. Approximately, 0.55 and 0.15 billion metric tons of crude oil and petroleum products are annually loaded, unloaded and transported throughout the Mediterranean by oil tankers. Similarly, more than 200,000 merchant ships cross the Mediterranean Sea every year, which is about 1/3 of the total shipping of the world and 1/5 of oil shipping. The oil trade is the main shipping since more than 200 million tones coming through the Suez Canal and from the loading terminals of the Middle East crossing the Mediterranean. There are about more than 50 maritime accidents in the Mediterranean Sea every year, of which 20 causes oil spills, especially near ports and oil terminals. Therefore, severe pollution is caused by oil tankers as a result of accidents.[175]

---

[174] Haddadi, loc.cit. p.18

[175] Ioannides, A. "Protection of Marine Environment", Report Proceedings of the Third Regional Seapower Symposium for the Navies of the Mediterranean and Black Sea Countries, 17-20 October 2000, Venice.

Apart from pollution caused by oil spills and maritime accidents, Peterson comments that great debts keep less developed countries poor and poverty leads to ecologically irrational economic practices. He comments that environmental protection is an objective that can only be achieved by rethinking the present global allocation of scarce resources. As Peterson mentions, 1992 Rio Summit inspired awareness of the environmental costs of Western consumption patterns and produced new ideas about lowering the debts of the poorest countries and about creating Western aid to less developed countries' commitments to reduce pollution emissions.[176]

[176] Peterson, op.cit. pp.159-160.

3. THE ACTORS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY STRUCTURES

In this part, the actors involving in the Mediterranean security structures have been discussed. First of all, NATO and its Mediterranean Dialogue have been assessed. Afterwards, following a detailed examination of the efforts of European Union to create a common foreign and security policy, its Euro-Mediterranean Partnership along with its previous policies and strategies have been explained. The other Mediterranean initiatives launched through different frameworks in different times have been mentioned in general. Then the role of Turkey as an important regional country has been evaluated.

3.1. NATO and the MEDITERRANEAN

During the Cold War, regional specificity of the Mediterranean was surpassed by the NATO's focus on Central Europe. Hence, the security in the Mediterranean was considered as a part of overall East-West confrontation and the region was characterised as the Alliance's "Southern Flank". The end of the East-West conflict allows NATO to adopt a more differentiated, more comprehensive perspective on the Mediterranean security.

However, since the end of the Cold War, one of the main concerns of NATO has been the enlargement and its internal implications, therefore the Mediterranean region has received secondary importance. As Central and Eastern European countries have become more stable and the enlargement process for Hungary, Poland, and Czech Republic has been completed successfully, de Santis comments that NATO has to shift its attention to the Mediterranean where its most important security challenges are likely to appear.[177]

[177] de Santis, op.cit.

As NATO's then Secretary General Solana points out while the countries along the Northern coast of the Mediterranean are increasingly prosperous as a result of European political integration, many countries on the southern coastline are seen to be moving in the opposite direction. This trend is portrayed by increasing birth rates, declining prosperity and a tendency towards a less stable political environment.[178]

Solana, commenting that the negative potential of developments in the region should not be denied or overemphasised, argues about the sceptical tendency reflected in many analyses. For instance, even though Huntington's notion of "clash of civilizations" points out the importance of cultural factors in determining security, Solana yet finds it very much Western ethnocentric. From a North American or North European perspective, it is a common tendency to characterise the Mediterranean as a kind of horizontal dividing line, separating the European North from an "arc of crises" located in the South.[179]

According to Solana, collective defence, crisis management and peacekeeping, and non-proliferation are the main areas that the Alliance can prove effective in the region. He suggests that providing for collective defence of its Mediterranean allies, France, Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Turkey, is a way of achieving stability in the wider Mediterranean basin. Arguing NATO's collective defence function has a strategic value in contributing to stabilisation in the region, he comments that this function has played an important role in preventing the possibility of conflict in spillovers in the Gulf War and the war in the former Yugoslavia.[180]

Crisis management is another element of the Alliance's contribution to security and stability in the Mediterranean. Since regional crises are more likely to affect the security of its allies than direct threats, NATO has been experiencing a fundamental orientation towards dealing with regional crises and conflicts.[181]

---

[178] Solana, op.cit.
[179] Solana, Ibid.
[180] Solana, Ibid.
[181] Solana, Ibid.

In almost each and every NATO document on the Mediterranean security subject, it is stated that "security in Europe is closely linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean dimension is one of the various components of the European security architecture."[182] Some questions may rise on the necessity of NATO's Mediterranean dialogue. According to Nordam, the answer is simple since "several allies border the Mediterranean, and there is only 12 kilometers between Europe and the Maghreb across the Strait of Gibraltar and 150 kilometers between Italy and Tunisia." She comments that because of such geographical fact there will always be a link between European and Mediterranean security concerns.[183]

At the key note remarks of the seminar sponsored by the RAND Corporation and NATO in October 1995, the Deputy Secretary General of NATO, Ambassador Sergio Balanzino comments that the security of Europe cannot be separated from the Southern Mediterranean countries. He continues with stating that there are six Mediterranean member countries of NATO, namely France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Turkey, enjoying a security guarantee under Article V of the Washington Treaty according to which the allies have an obligation to defend each other against an armed attack, and restore and maintain their security. He also emphasises that NATO's increasing interest in stability in and around the Mediterranean neither means that NATO sees Islam as a threat nor it needs to find a new role or new threat to keep itself busy.[184]

It is obvious that the end of the Cold War had a positive impact in the Mediterranean since the conflicts resulting from East-West confrontation have almost disappeared.

---

[182] Nordam J., "The Mediterranean Dialogue: Dispelling Misconceptions and Building Confidence", *NATO Review,* vol.45, no.4, August 1997, (http://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/9704-6.htm, 21.10.1999); The Alliance's Mediterranean Dialogue, NATO Handbook, 1998. (http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/1998/v072.htm, 21.10.1999);
The Mediterranean Dialogue, NATO Basic Fact Sheet no.16, May 1997. (http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/med.htm, 21.10.1999)

[183] Nordam, Ibid.

[184] Balanzino, S., "Mediterranean Security: New Issues and Challenges", Key Note Address at the RAND Seminar, 16 October 1995. (http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1995/s951016a.htm, 21.10.1999)

However, as a result of the Gulf War and the war in the former Yugoslavia, the Mediterranean security has become an important issue for NATO.[185]

Nimetz believes that the security of the Mediterranean region will be achieved if the United States remain a Mediterranean power militarily and a Mediterranean player politically in the next decades. He adds that there must also be a commitment from Europe, especially Germany, France, Great Britain and also Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey.[186] Therefore NATO, along with other structures, will be the means of achieving a sustainable Mediterranean security.

However, according to the RAND analysts US and European policy-makers have different views on the Mediterranean security. When senior US policy-makers think of the Mediterranean, they first think of the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece and Turkey as well as the Black Sea region. They consider the Mediterranean as the stepping stone to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. On the contrary, European policy-makers, particularly in France and Spain, first think of the Western Mediterranean, especially the Maghreb. This division no longer makes sense since the European, Middle Eastern, Southwest Asian and Central Asian strategic areas increasingly intersect.[187]

There has been a lack of an effective and coordinated strategy by US and European policy-makers to deal with the possible security challenges that emerge across the region. For instance, the conflict in Bosnia has demonstrated that crises on the periphery can spill over and affect NATO's interests. In such cases where the interests of its allies are involved, it is difficult for the United States to stay out of a conflict. Likewise, the United States cannot ignore North Africa because of the interests of some Alliance members and the possible impact of instability on the Middle East. Therefore, the RAND analysts argue that there must be a coordinated

[185] Balanzino, op.cit.
[186] Nimetz, op.cit.
[187] Asmus, Larrabee, Lesser, op.cit.

Alliance strategy to include both a political-economic and a political-military component.[188]

With maintaining NATO as the dominant military force in the Mediterranean including the Aegean, Nimetz comments that the PAX NATO is the only logical security regime to provide security in the traditional sense. As NATO preserves its controlling role in the Mediterranean it must recognise an expanding need in adjacent areas, particularly in Southeast Europe, the Black Sea region and in the Gulf. Therefore, the U.S. must continue to play a major role in this security system as the most important contributor of the North Atlantic Alliance.[189]

During the Cold War NATO paid hardly enough attention to developments in the Mediterranean if they were not directly related to the Soviet threat. With the establishment of the Expert Working Group on the Mediterranean and Maghreb in the 1960s, and later of the Ad Hoc Group on the Mediterranean, NATO conducted traditional monitoring of Soviet related activities in the region.[190]

In the early 1990s, the Ad Hoc Group on the Mediterranean began to discuss the emergence of the new security risks in the region such as the proliferation of WMD and capabilities of their delivery, the growth of instability and extremism in North Africa, and the conflict in Bosnia. The Southern European allies began to call for a stronger NATO interest in the region claiming that the repercussions of these new threats could affect their security.[191] Therefore, as mentioned by Aybet, the London Declaration of 1990 stated that the NATO's security was "inseparably linked to the security of its neighbours".[192]

Notably Italy and Spain have taken the lead and noted the rise of new regional security questions and their possible impacts on European and Alliance security.

---

[188] Asmus, Larrabee, Lesser, Ibid.
[189] Nimetz, op.cit.
[190] Larrabee et al, op.cit. p.45
[191] Larrabee et al, Ibid. p.45
[192] Aybet G., "NATO's New Missions", *Perceptions*, Vol.4, no.1, March-May 1999, p.67.

Therefore, the Alliance's interest in the stability of the Southern Mediterranean and Middle East was included in the NATO's Strategic Concept, which was adopted in Rome in November 1991 and created the groundwork of NATO's political mission in the post-Cold War era.[193] It included the provision of a foundation for a stable security environment in Europe, based on democratic institutions and the peaceful resolution of conflicts.[194]

Similarly, NATO's New Strategic Concept (NSC), approved at the Washington Summit in April 1999, recognises the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors besides the defence dimension for a broader security approach. It emphasised threats and risks which are mainly non-conventional on the NATO's broad security agenda and the will of the Alliance to deal with such problems in its peripheral and adjoining areas. Therefore, the Mediterranean and the Middle East are concerned by this new NATO concept. There are two policies dealing with the security matters of these regions: the Middle East Peace Process and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). According to Aliboni, there are effects of the New Strategic Concept on these policies since they are strongly related to non-conventional factors.[195]

Whichever would be the framework of North-South security cooperation; it should openly exclude the implementation of collective security, leaving its enforcement to the United Nations. Aliboni believes that this is the condition for the achievement of any regional policy of non-proliferation. It is clear that military cooperation should be based on a strong political cooperation forcing partners to make connection between military and non-military issues, thus giving cooperation a comprehensive and holistic character. The EU initiative EMP has such political and holistic characters, but it does not include the USA. On the other hand, NATO includes non-

[193] Larrabee et al, op.cit. p.45
[194] Moens A., "NATO's Dilemma and the Elusive European Defence Identity", *Security Dialogue*, vol.29, no.4, December 1998, p.466.
[195] Aliboni, *The Mediterranean and the New NATO. The European Vision: Political and Security Issues.*

European partners such as the USA and Canada, but it is neither a political nor a holistic institution.[196]

On the other hand, spillover effects deserve immediate policy responses. The third chapter of the Barcelona Declaration deals with these issues. The New Security Concept of NATO lists more or less the same issues as challenges the Alliance has to meet. According to Aliboni there are two questions regarding spillover effects. First, whether and to what extent the various spillover effects have to be considered as challenges or risks that the Western countries must be protected from; and second, whether NATO as a powerful military alliance is the right institution to deal with them. For instance, Aliboni regards immigration as a social and political challenge which affects national security in a very broad sense rather than a threat or risk. He further comments that unemployment or poverty is as much a risk or a threat to social cohesion and national security as immigration. In the NSC, NATO limits the notion of this challenge to "uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflict". This is the description of the destabilising Kosovar inflow in the Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania as a result of Serb ethnic cleansing. Aliboni suggests that this matter is a Petersberg-like task, in which a situation of extreme social disorder and danger may require the use of military instruments instead of or along with civilian agents. In the Mediterranean framework, however, the WEU's Petersberg tasks are regarded with suspicion and rejected by southern partners. Therefore he comments that an interregional organisation which includes Southern Mediterranean countries may generate better political results than NATO or WEU interventions.[197]

Organised crime and terrorism may require the use of military instruments but only on occasions and for very specific purposes. Undoubtedly, these issues are linked to armed conflict but they do not overlap with conflicts they relate to. While terrorism may have the same political sources of conflicts, organised crime and drug trafficking take advantage of conflicts yet remain a challenge caused by social

[196] Aliboni, Ibid.
[197] Aliboni, Ibid.

factors. The fight against international crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism relies on stronger intergovernmental cooperation rather than security cooperation in the military field. The most serious problem with international cooperation against terrorism is that political assessments relevant to terrorism are different. In the Mediterranean, many Islamists are regarded political refugees by the European governments and heads of terrorists by Southern Mediterranean governments.[198]

Therefore, Aliboni believes that NATO and WEU are not the right instruments to fight international crime, drug trafficking and terrorism. The social nature of these issues and the strong governmental political cooperation they require suggest to include them in a holistic framework for broad security cooperation more similar to the EMP rather than NATO or the WEU.[199]

Since the NATO's Rome Declaration, it is well known that the challenges coming from the south and east of Mediterranean are of political, economic, social and cultural nature. Because of these reasons they cannot be identified as threats and dealt with military policies and instruments. In order to improve Western access to and manage challenges emanating from disorder and instability in the region, strategies of deterrence or containment are not helpful. The policy that may be appropriate for the Mediterranean environment is enhanced political cooperation in a holistic institutional framework leading gradually to the security cooperation.[200]

If the conditions of political access improve, the Arab countries would become more available to multilateral economic cooperation. Moreover, the improvement of geopolitical situation would also make the disruption of the flow of vital resources and subsequent economic crises less likely.[201]

---

[198] Aliboni, Ibid.
[199] Aliboni, Ibid.
[200] Aliboni, Ibid.
[201] Aliboni, Ibid.

After the end of the Cold War, the security challenges that may emerge are multi-dimensional and often difficult to predict. The risks include uncertainty and instability in the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance. Some countries encounter serious economic, social and political problems. As Bin comments, ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, insufficient or failed efforts for reforms, violation of human rights, dissolution of states, proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, acts of terrorism, sabotage or organised crime, disruption of flow of vital resources, and uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people are the main factors that can lead to regional instability. Consequently, the resulting tension could affect Euro-Atlantic stability by spillovers into neighbouring countries including NATO members.[202]

The criticisms of France, Spain, Greece and other Mediterranean states about NATO centre on the following factors. First of all, NATO is seen as an institution of the Cold War that cannot address the new reality of Europe and that maintains an American hegemony. Moreover, it is not supposed to engage in out-of-area operations, although it did so under the auspices of the United Nations in the former Yugoslavia in 1993.[203]

According to RAND analysts, discussion of Mediterranean security and strategy is of growing interest to the Alliance as a whole. The Southern European countries traditionally active in regional affairs have been joined by countries such as Germany and Britain whose Cold War period concerns lay elsewhere. Even the United States has begun to consider the usefulness of a more specific Mediterranean policy.[204] Therefore, NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue is welcomed by almost all member states.

[202] Bin, op.cit.
[203] Lawrence, op.cit. p.52
[204] Lesser, et al, op.cit. p.4

3.1.1. NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue (Initative)

According to Bin, after the end of the Cold War, NATO began to consider the Mediterranean as a region with its own specific dynamics and challenges, and with a potential for dialogue and cooperation in security matters. Consequently, one of the most significant aspects of NATO's reorientation in the post-Cold War security environment has been the establishment of the Mediterranean Dialogue. He argues that this initiative is not a reaction to any particular event or threat but rather is a part of NATO's overall cooperative approach to security, stemming from the realisation that security in the whole of Europe is linked to the security and stability in the Mediterranean.[205]

At the Brussels Summit in January 1994, a policy initiative to extend a stabilising influence in the Mediterranean region was added to the NATO agenda. This was due to the growing opinion among the allies that NATO needed a more direct approach promoting dialogue, understanding and confidence building between the countries of the region. In launching the Mediterranean Dialogue, NATO Heads of State and Government signalled that NATO would play a greater role in strengthening regional stability and assigned the Permanent NATO Council to develop appropriate measures for the realisation of this aim. In December 1994, NATO Foreign Ministers outlined this commitment for a Mediterranean Dialogue and agreed to establish contacts with several Mediterranean countries.[206]

When NATO launched its Mediterranean Dialogue in late 1994, questions of enlargement were at the centre of Alliance debates. On the other hand, because of the instability in the Balkans and Algeria, the Alliance members had a growing concern that new security challenges were emerging outside the centre of Europe.[207]

---

[205] Bin, op.cit.
[206] Solana, op.cit.
[207] Lesser, et al, op.cit. p.1

NATO's Brussels Summit in January 1994 was a landmark in developing a more specific approach towards Mediterranean security. In that Summit, "Allied Heads of State and Government declared that the positive developments then underway in the Middle East peace process had opened the way for NATO to 'consider measures to promote dialogue, understanding and confidence-building between the countries in the region'. They also encouraged 'all efforts conducive to strengthening regional stability'".[208]

In December 1994, at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, it was decided by NATO Foreign Ministers to establish contacts between the Alliance and Mediterranean non-member countries on a case-by-case basis 'with a view to contributing to the strengthening of regional stability'. Consequently, they directed the Council in Permanent Session 'to continue to review the situation, to develop the details of the proposed dialogue and to initiate appropriate preliminary contacts.' In February 1995, the North Atlantic Council decided to invite Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia to discuss possible participation in this dialogue. Since the Alliance adopted a phased approach, the new countries could be invited to join at a later date. As a result of this approach, in November 1995, Jordan joined this dialogue. These six countries are also known as "dialogue countries".[209]

The purposes of the NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue with above mentioned non-NATO Mediterranean countries are to contribute to security and stability in the Mediterranean as a whole, to achieve a better mutual understanding, to correct misconceptions about the Alliance's purpose that could be perceived as a threat by Mediterranean dialogue countries and to build confidence through greater transparency, discussion and cooperation.[210] These aims are in consistency with the NATO's Strategic Concept that was launched in 1991. The Strategic Concept

---

[208] Nordam, op.cit.; The Mediterranean Dialogue NATO Basic Fact Sheet no.16; The Alliance's Mediterranean Dialogue NATO Handbook, 1998.
[209] Nordam, Ibid.; Balanzino, op.cit.; The Mediterranean Dialogue NATO Basic Fact Sheet no.16; The Alliance's Mediterranean Dialogue NATO Handbook, 1998.
[210] Nordam, Ibid.; The Alliance's Mediterranean Dialogue NATO Handbook, 1998; Statement by the NATO Spokesman on NATO's Mediterranean Initiative, 08.02.1995, Press release (95)12. (http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1995/p95-012.htm, 21.10.1999)

declares that the security policy of NATO has three components: dialogue, cooperation, and the maintenance of a collective defence capability.

The principles of the Mediterranean Dialogue are as follows:[211]
First, the dialogue is progressive in terms of participation and substance. Such flexibility has allowed the number of dialogue partners to grow and the content of the dialogue to evolve.
Second, the dialogue is bilateral in structure. It is important for Mediterranean partners who do not form a group and wish to conduct the dialogue as individual sovereign states. It has made the Dialogue less vulnerable to disruption due to future political developments in the region. The dialogue nevertheless allows for multilateral meetings on a case-by-case basis.
Third, all Mediterranean partners are offered the same basis for cooperative activities and discussions with NATO. Within this non-discriminatory framework, partners are free to choose the extent and intensity of their participation.
Fourth, the dialogue is meant to strengthen other international efforts to establish and enhance cooperation with Mediterranean countries. The EU's Barcelona Process, the Middle East peace process, and efforts by institutions such as the WEU and the OSCE are complementary to the Alliance's dialogue.
Fifth, activities within the dialogue take place on a self-funding basis, with the exception of certain information activities.

Contacts between NATO and the Mediterranean partner representatives began in May 1995. The first meetings were arranged to explain the nature and purposes of the Alliance. Later on, regular political discussions were established to review topics of common interest and the partners agreed upon agendas. For instance, topics discussed in 1996 involved political, social, and economic developments in the Mediterranean; peacekeeping; and opportunities for regional cooperation.[212]

[211] Nordam, Ibid; Bin, op.cit.
[212] Larrabee et al, op.cit. p.46

In terms of content, the Mediterranean Dialogue consists of a political dialogue and participation in specific activities. The political dialogue consists of regular bilateral political discussions, providing the opportunity for comprehensive briefings on NATO's activities. Mediterranean partners are also invited to share their views with NATO on issues relating to stability and security in the Mediterranean region.[213]

According to the RAND report, although the Mediterranean Dialogue has certain weaknesses, it also has some opportunities for development. First of all, the Dialogue is becoming more important in the light of the growing prominence of Mediterranean security and changes in the overall Alliance strategy. Second, the activities need to evolve from dialogue to more substantive cooperation in areas where NATO has a comparative advantage.[214]

Mediterranean Dialogue countries have been invited to take part in specific activities, like science, information and civil emergency planning. They can also participate in courses at NATO schools in fields such as peacekeeping, arms control and verification, the responsibilities of military forces in environmental protection, civil emergency planning, and European security cooperation.[215]

The Mediterranean Dialogue has been given new political impetus by the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) Madrid Summit of July 1997 which created the Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG). Until Madrid Summit, the NATO's Political Committee had the entire responsibility for the Mediterranean Dialogue. At the Madrid Summit it was decided to establish a new committee on the Mediterranean which is called the Mediterranean Cooperation Group. This group has the overall responsibility for directing the course of the political discussions with individual partners in a '19+1' format. Article 13 of the Madrid Declaration is as follows:

---

[213] Nordam, op.cit.; The Alliance's Mediterranean Dialogue NATO Handbook, 1998.
[214] Lesser, et al, op.cit. p.2.
[215] The Mediterranean Dialogue NATO Basic Fact Sheet no.16; The Alliance's Mediterranean Dialogue NATO Handbook, 1998.

> The Mediterranean region merits great attention since security in the whole of Europe is closely linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean. We [the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance] are pleased with the development of the Mediterranean initiative that was launched following our last meeting in Brussels. The dialogue we have established between NATO and number of Mediterranean countries is developing progressively and successfully, contributes to confidence-building and cooperation in the region, and complements other international efforts. We endorse the measures agreed by NATO Foreign Ministers in Sintra on the widening of the scope and the enhancement of the dialogue and, on the basis of their recommendation, have decided today to establish under the authority of the North Atlantic Council a new committee, the Mediterranean Cooperation Group, which will have the overall responsibility for the Mediterranean Dialogue.[216]

Through the MCG, NATO member states are directly involved in political discussions with Dialogue countries. Thus, it provides a forum for an exchange of views on the security situation in the region. As a rule, these discussions are to take place once a year, however, additional meetings can be held on an ad hoc basis. In principle, the MCG will meet at the level of political advisers from national NATO delegations. However, it also meets with representatives of Mediterranean Dialogue countries.[217]

The Mediterranean Dialogue provides a twofold approach: regular political discussions at least twice a year, and specific activities in the fields of information and scientific affairs and in more specialised areas, such as participation in peacekeeping courses at NATO schools. Civil emergency planning activities related to disaster management is also on this list of action.[218]

---

[216] Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation, Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Madrid, 08.07.1997, NATO Press release M-1(97)81 (http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-081e.htm, 25.10.1999)
[217] Nordam, op.cit.; The Alliance's Mediterranean Dialogue NATO Handbook 1998; Bin, op.cit.
[218] Solana, op.cit.

Solana comments that the Mediterranean Dialogue is progressive in nature, and in principle, bilateral in form although it allows for multilateral meetings on a case-by-case basis. The Dialogue offers all partners the same basis for discussion and activities. Furthermore, it strengthens other international efforts with Mediterranean partners such as those carried out by WEU, OSCE, the Barcelona Process and the Middle East Peace Process.[219]

The final communiqué of NATO's April 1999 Washington Summit states that the security in the whole Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. Moreover, the Alliance's Heads of State and Government declare their decision to strengthen both the political and practical dimensions of the Dialogue by for instance, increasing the frequency of political discussions between representatives from NATO and dialogue countries or by including additional activities in areas where NATO can add value, like in the military field or where dialogue countries show interest.[220] Bin believes that the Washington Summit shows that the Mediterranean Dialogue has the potential to evolve in terms of both participation and content.[221]

He also comments that in developing cooperation with the Southern Mediterranean countries, NATO needs to be careful because of the non-homogeneity of the region requiring separate and specific solutions to the problems. Regarding that the future of the Dialogue will be affected by developments in the EU's Barcelona Process and the Middle East peace process, Bin suggests that NATO should ensure that they are functioning well. Therefore, NATO should strengthen the Dialogue by concentrating on fields where it has a comparative advantage, namely defence and security. By this way it will complete the other initiatives in the region.[222]

---

[219] Solana, Ibid.
[220] An Alliance for the 21st Century, Washington Summit Communiqué, 24.04.1999, NATO Press release NAC-S(99)64. (http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm, 17.04.2001)
[221] Bin, op.cit.
[222] Bin, Ibid.

De Santis, on the other hand, comments that the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries generally consider NATO as a Cold War institution seeking for a new enemy. Therefore, he thinks that the best way of changing this perception is to focus more on soft security concerns, building mutual understanding and confidence before engaging in hard military cooperation. Public information activities through international conferences and seminars where the Mediterranean security issues and NATO agenda are discussed, or cooperation in peacekeeping, crises management and peace support activities can be appropriate means of achieving confidence.[223]

3.2. The EUROPEAN UNION and the MEDITERRANEAN

The Mediterranean region has the second highest external policy priority for the European Union after Central and Eastern Europe. At the time of the EC's creation, there were close economic, political and cultural ties between the member states, especially France and Italy, and the Mediterranean countries. As Bretherton and Vogler point out Tunisia and Morocco gained their independence from France only in 1956 and Algeria remained a French Department until 1962.[224]

Due to this close connection with the regional countries, the European Union has developed an expanding relationship with the Mediterranean basin. The first agreements with the Southern Mediterranean countries were concluded in the 1960s, and trade and cooperation accords were negotiated with all the Maghreb and Mashreq states in the 1970s. In the mid-1990s, Mediterranean association agreements were concluded between the EU and most of its southern neighbours.[225]

Barbé comments that

> "the disappearance of the Iron Curtain has produced not only centripetal forces, deepening the European construction process, but

[223] de Santis, op.cit.
[224] Bretherton C. and J. Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, London, Routledge, 1999, p.152.
[225] Piening, op.cit. p.8.

> also centrifugal forces that have driven the process of subregionalisation and created 'spheres of influence' among EU Member States. Southern European countries (Spain, France, Italy), motivated by the fear of destabilised Arab world, have created a Mediterranean *spécifité*".[226]

While the EU has been concentrating its efforts on Central and Eastern European countries after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it has also dedicated more attention than ever before to non-EU Mediterranean countries. Because, according to Gillespie, it is generally "accepted that instability and conflict to the south and south-east of the continent has direct consequences for political and social stability within the European Union."[227] Or in Blunden's words, "Southern European countries have identified the stability of North Africa as essential to their own security interests and the European Union has committed itself to promoting sustainable growth in the area".[228] In November 1995, Euro-Mediterranean Conference was organised in Barcelona under the leadership of the Spanish EU presidency. As a result of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, also known as the Barcelona Process, the Mediterranean countries have established political dialogue with the EU.[229]

After the end of the Cold War, with changing structures, instability and insecurity can be considered synonymous. So the new security scenarios have to include all the political, economic and sociocultural factors likely to create instability.[230] Therefore, the current EU involvement in the Mediterranean requires security dimension due to the important considerations such as immigration, terrorism, drug smuggling and pollution control.[231] The RAND analysts believe that the EU is the NATO's 'first line of defence' in dealing with many of the potential security challenges in the Mediterranean. In order to prevent many future crises in the region, the EU has to deal with their root causes which are primarily economic and social and ensure that

---

[226] E.Barbé, "Balancing Europe's Eastern and Southern Dimensions" in J.Zielonka, ed., *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy*, Great Britain, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p.118.
[227] Gillespie R., "Introduction Europe, the Mediterranean and the Islamists" in R.Gillespie, ed., *Mediterranean Politics,* vol.2, London, Pinter, 1996, p.1.
[228] Blunden, op.cit. p.134.
[229] Barbé, op.cit. p.117.
[230] Fernandez-Ordoñez, op.cit. p.9
[231] Piening, op.cit. p.9

they do not escalate into major crises requiring military action.[232] In order to understand EU's attitude towards security concerns, Union's efforts to create a common foreign and security policy should be assessed. The following part deals with the attempts of European Union in this respect.

3.2.1. From European Defence Community to Common Foreign and Security Policy

Political theorists have been arguing about the European Union's growing tendency to pursue foreign policy consensus and joint actions. According to Piening, explanations range from neo-functionalist spillover theory suggesting that action in one area may lead the actors concerned to cooperate in a related sector, to interdependence theory stating that the EU is compelled to react as an entity when its members are insufficient to do so.[233] For Gordon, among these numerous theories on the European Union, the most significant and competing explanations are functionalist – or neofunctionalist – and intergovernmentalist theories. According to functionalist theory, power is gradually transferred to a new centre as integration in some areas makes it more necessary in others. Institutions push to expand their power, leaders and people call for integration in new spheres as they are convinced by the success in others. Ultimately, as power is transferred to the new, central institutions, people agree to transfer their expectations and loyalty to the new bodies. Such functionalist theories dominated explanations of European integration during the 1960s. Intergovernmentalist theory, on the other hand, emphasises the importance of national interests, bargaining, lowest common denominator deals, the unwillingness of states to compromise their key national interests. This theory has been predominant since 1980s. He argues that functionalism still has a certain logic, however, intergovernmental approaches are more relevant to the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union.[234]

---

[232] Asmus, Larrabee, Lesser, op.cit.
[233] Piening, op.cit. p.31
[234] Gordon P.H., "Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy", *International Security*, vol.22, no.3, Winter 1997-1998, pp.77-8.

Foreign policy coordination has always been the difficult to achieve. As Barbé quotes from Regelsberger and Wessels "the difficulty is due to the 'DDS (discreet, discretionary, sovereignty) syndrome;' that is, that coordination of foreign policy and security rises immediately, and most visibly, the issue of national sovereignty". They suggest that the success of foreign policy coordination depends on bilateral efforts to accommodate differences in historical traditions, and an awareness of public prejudices in each country.[235] For Gordon, the prerequisite for the development of foreign and security policy is a convergence of the perceived interests of the main member states in such a way that either they no longer fear that the common policy would diverge significantly from their national policy, or they are forced by the development of an important common interest to believe that a common policy is worth sacrificing national autonomy. He continues with arguing that

> "states will only take the difficult and self-denying decision to share their foreign policy sovereignty if the gains of common action are seen to be so great that sacrificing sovereignty is worth it, or if their interests converge to the point that little loss of sovereignty is entailed".[236]

The attempts to coordinate security, defence and foreign policies of the six constituent members of the European Community began with an initiative to create a defence community. At the beginning of the 1950s, in order to allow West German rearmament, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg invented the project for the European Defence Community (EDC).[237] The proposal was prepared by Jean Monnet, French businessman and politician who was regarded as 'the architect of European Union', and presented to the French National Assembly by René Pleven, who was the President of the Assembly. Known as Pleven Plan, the proposal anticipated the creation of a European Army along with national armies.[238]

---

[235] Quoted from Regelsberger E. and W.Wessels, "The CFSP Institutions and Procedures: A Third Way for the Second Pillar", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, no.1,1996, p.31 in Barbé, op.cit. pp.117-8.

[236] Gordon, op.cit. p.81.

[237] The Council of the European Union and the Common Foreign and Security Policy, (http://ue.eu.int/pesc/pres.asp?lang=en, 28.06.2001)

[238] Karluk R., *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye*, 5th ed., İstanbul, Beta, 1998, p.6; Ceyhan A., *Avrupa Topluluğu Terimleri Sözlüğü*, İstanbul, Afa, 1991, pp.379, 421.

It was drafted and signed in May 1952 but never ratified since the French National Assembly voted against it in 1954 largely because it was too integrated and too Atlanticist. The EDC proposed a plan for political community and a creation of a joint European military structure forcing the Community to manage its external relations in a completely different way. Therefore, according to Piening, the EDC remains the first key event in the development of a common foreign policy for the EC.[239]

The EDC's failure led to the establishment of an economic route toward European integration with the creation of European Economic Community and the project for a common market. Another French initiative for giving the Community more political character took place afterwards. Chaired by the French diplomat Christian Fouchet, an intergovernmental committee on political union, after two years of negotiation, prepared a draft statute for a European Union of States in 1962, including plans for foreign policy and security cooperation based on President de Gaulle's preference for an intergovernmental rather than a supranational approach. However, member states except France rejected the plan due to its excessively intergovernmental character, concerning that the Fouchet Plan would turn the Community into "a Europe of nations".[240] Another reason of the rejection was that the desire to keep the defence links with the USA and NATO, since the initiative was to strengthen the members' security and to coordinate their defence policies.[241]

The leaders of the EC member states declared in the final communiqué of the 1969 Hague Summit that the creation of a common market would lead to a United Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow. In accordance with this declaration, in 1970 the foreign ministers of the Community adopted the Davignon Report in Luxembourg which created an intergovernmental machinery with regular meetings of the foreign ministers and a Political Committee of senior diplomats. The European Political Cooperation (EPC) was designed to encourage

[239] Piening, op.cit. p.32
[240] Piening, Ibid. p.32
[241] The Council of the European Union and the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

collaboration in the field of foreign policy between the member states. As a result of its intergovernmental nature in conformity with the French wishes, it did not involve the Commission or the other Community institutions and was not subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. The Commission would only be consulted if the discussions of the foreign ministers related to the work of the EC.[242] Gordon comments that "EPC was a recognition by European leaders that in the absence of a more integrated approach, regular meetings and discussions about foreign policy were better than nothing".[243]

As Piening points out, the protection of its worldwide interests, for instance in the fields of energy resources, commodity prices, investment security, etc, has always forced the Community to take a proactive role in international affairs by using the weapons of commerce and diplomacy instead of military power. In 1973, the foreign ministers of the enlarged Community, realising that the role of the member states could not always be separated from that of the Community, prepared the Copenhagen Report that established the principle of consultation among the members when taking important foreign policy decisions. Regarding to this report, the Commission participated in the discussions of economic cooperation on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Another example can be seen in relations with the Mediterranean countries. When the Euro-Arab dialogue was launched at the end of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the Commission was included in the discussions of the foreign ministers. For the rest of the 1970s, the strictly intergovernmental approach continued, largely at the insistence of France.[244]

The change in French presidency in 1981 led to a new approach. With the active support of France, the foreign ministers in their London Report of October 1981 officially connected the Commission with the European Political Cooperation process at all levels. They declared that the main aim of political cooperation would be joint action rather than simple coordination of policies. Moreover, the political

[242] Piening, op.cit. pp.33-34
[243] Gordon, op.cit. p.84.
[244] Piening, op.cit. pp.31,34

aspects of security were also involved in the political cooperation umbrella. The ministers agreed to strengthen the consultation machinery between their corresponding ministries, to collaborate through their embassies, and to permit direct contacts between EPC and third countries, using the troika of the current Council president with his predecessor and successor.[245]

The Genscher-Colombo Plan, named after the German and Italian foreign ministers, proposed to widen the scope of EC responsibilities, to improve the decision-making structures and EPC to have its own secretariat. The result was the Stuttgart Solemn Declaration of June 1983 which reaffirmed the principles and intentions but did not expand the EC's role or power in the field of foreign policy. However, it reinforced the role of the Council presidency in EPC, its powers of initiative, coordination and representation in relations with third countries.[246]

Meanwhile, the European Parliament prepared a Draft Treaty on European Union spelling out the Union's foreign policy and proposing that it should be subject to the same institutional rules as other activities. In the European Council in Fontainebleau in June 1984, it was decided that a report be prepared by an ad hoc committee chaired by Irish senator James Dooge. The Dooge Report adopted some of the ideas of the European Parliament's Draft Treaty proposing the completion of the internal market, expansion of foreign policy activities and addition of security to the issues on the EPC's agenda.[247]

In December 1985, the member states agreed on the Single European Act (SEA) which reforming the European Communities and involving with the European foreign policy cooperation. SEA came into force in 1987 and gave the Commission a role in the political and economic aspects of security. Title III of the Act ("Treaty provisions on European Cooperation in the sphere of foreign policy") established a legal basis for EPC for the first time. As Piening points out, article 30 of the SEA

[245] Piening, Ibid. p.34
[246] Piening, Ibid. p.35
[247] Piening, Ibid. p.35

provides that the member states will assume to achieve the joint formulation and implementation of a European foreign policy. However, the SEA does not mention about a common foreign policy and makes distinction between the activities of the Communities and of the EPC. The Commission is responsible of guaranteeing that there are no inconsistencies between EPC policies and Community policies in terms of external affairs.[248]

In 1989 the European Council decided to hold an intergovernmental conference (IGC) in order to discuss amending EC treaties to create Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). At the beginning of 1990s, European foreign policies were still nationally made, with EPC playing little more than a consultative role. In 1990, it was decided to expand the IGC to include political union. The primary aims of the IGC was to heighten the international profile of the Community and increase foreign policy cooperation between the member states beyond the framework of the EPC. The IGC was obliged to facilitate collective action by the members in dealing with the challenges and opportunities created by the end of the Cold War. It was also argued that the Community should develop a political role in the international arena equivalent to its economic position. Notwithstanding, as Church and Phinnemore indicate, all the member states agreed on the necessity of increasing foreign policy cooperation, there existed important differences over the extent to which the Union should create common policies and whether these policies should include security and defence along with simple foreign policy issues. Britain, for instance, favoured to conceive only closer coordination of foreign policies, and France, on the other hand, was eager to consider the creation of common foreign, security and defence policies. Correspondingly, "divisions existed among the member states as to whether such policies should be integrated into the Treaty of Rome, involve majority voting and be subject to review by the European Court of Justice, or whether they should remain the subject of intergovernmental cooperation and thus outside the decision-making structure of the EC".[249]

---

[248] Piening, Ibid. p.36; Gordon, op.cit. p.84; The Council of the European Union and the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
[249] Church and Phinnemore, op.cit. pp. 373-4; Gordon, Ibid. p.85.

Consequently, after long negotiations the Maastricht Treaty, officially known as the Treaty on European Union and entered into force in November 1993, turned the Community into a Union built on three pillars. The first pillar comprises the Community treaties and a number of new policies and institutional adjustments. The second pillar, Title V of the Treaty is a rewritten version of EPC. Based on intergovernmental principles, it is called Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The third pillar includes cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs, comprising such issues as illegal immigration, police cooperation, combating drug trafficking etc. This pillar is also intergovernmental in nature.[250] According to Gordon, CFSP was a response to EPC's insufficiency in dealing with the changes that took place in Europe in late 1980s and early 1990s.[251]

According to Tank, the external event that had the greatest effect on European security and foreign policy integration was the reunification of Germany in 1990. The member states of the EU, led by France and Germany itself, sought to integrate Germany into the European security architecture and transform EPC into a CFSP within the framework of the European Union. She also comments that "the pillar structure was a compromise solution owing to resistance in part from those countries opposed to qualified majority voting and in part from those objecting to the development of a 'common defence' in competition with NATO".[252] Similarly, Gordon describes the compromise as between one group of states, led again by France and Germany seeking significantly to strengthen the existing political cooperation and give it a more integrated and binding character, and another group, led by Britain not willing to give up its national foreign policy prerogatives and seeking to avoid any possible threat to the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance.[253] As mentioned in Church and Phinnemore, for members who consider closer European integration equal with the loss of national sovereignty and independence, such an intergovernmental structure is acceptable since the policies regarded continue to be

[250] Piening, op.cit. pp.38-9
[251] Gordon, op.cit. p.85.
[252] Tank, "The CFSP and the Nation-State", pp.15-6
[253] Gordon, op.cit. p.86.

within the jurisdiction of member states and not the European institutions. However, there are also concerns that the CFSP will remain the hostage of national interests preventing the Union from reacting adequately to the rapidly changing political and security environment.[254]

After the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty and the creation of CFSP, the European Parliament changed the name of its Political Affairs Committee to 'Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy'. The Commission divided DG I which covered external relations on its own, into DG I and DG IA, the latter have the responsibility for foreign policy issues.[255]

The Maastricht Treaty replaces the vague term of 'European Political Cooperation' which avoids using the words 'foreign policy', with 'Common Foreign and Security Policy' as an activity of the Union and its member states. The CFSP places the European Council at the top of the process. Responsibility for implementing the CFSP and representing the Union in foreign and security related matters lies with the Council Presidency and Political Committee, not the Commission. If required, the Presidency is to assisted by the previous and next member states to hold the post (Art.J.5). However, the Commission is fully associated with the work carried out in the CFSP field (Art.J.9). The European Parliament (EP) is consulted on the main aspects and the basic choices of the CFSP, and the presidency is to take its views into consideration. Moreover, the Presidency along with the Commission is required to keep the Parliament informed on how the CFSP is developing. For its part, the EP is allowed to interrogate and make recommendations to the Council on the CFSP and is obliged to hold an annual debate on the progress of CFSP (Art.J.7). The principles and general guidelines for the CFSP are defined by the European Council (Art.J.8).[256]

[254] Church and Phinnemore, op.cit. p. 374.
[255] Piening, op.cit. p.40
[256] Piening, Ibid. pp.39-40; Church and Phinnemore, op.cit. pp. 376.

Article J.1 of Title V of the Maastricht Treaty defines the goals of the CFSP as follows:

- To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;
- To strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways;
- To preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter;
- To promote international cooperation;
- To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

These objectives are to be achieved by the Union through the establishment of systematic cooperation between member states and through the gradual implementation of joint action in areas where the member states share important interests. Establishment of systematic cooperation through a process of information, consultation and policy coordination, involves, if necessary, the Council defining a common position (Art.J.2) which all member states must comply with and uphold in the international scene. Joint actions (Art.J.3) are decided on in principle by the European Council and the details are subject to qualified majority voting rather than unanimity. As Piening explains "once a joint action has been agreed, the Union's member states are bound by it and have to ensure that their own policies accord with it." Therefore, old EPC declarations and communiqués are replaced by new devices.[257] According to Stavridis, it is important to have a common position and a joint action as means of implementing CFSP, because the former requires the assurance of member states that their national policies will be in conformity with the common positions, while the latter provides for the possibility of decisions taken by a qualified majority.[258]

---

[257] Piening, Ibid. pp.40-1; Church and Phinnemore Ibid. p. 375.

[258] Stavridis S., "The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Why Institutional Arrangements Are Not Enough?", in S.Stavridis et.al, eds., *New Challenges to the European Union: Policies and Policy Making*, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1997, p.91.

However, the instruments of CFSP created by the Maastricht have been criticised for inefficiency. Duff argues that procedural innovations for CFSP have failed to prove effective, for instance in Yugoslavia.[259] In achieving peace in the Balkans, the European Union could not succeed in assuming any kind of leadership in addressing the Bosnian conflict.[260] This inability of the Union to deal effectively with the Yugoslav crisis led to some criticism. The supporters of Europe generally answer by explaining that the Yugoslav crisis broke out before effective institutions were created. However, the sceptics are not satisfied by this argument emphasising that national interests remain the only solid foundation for foreign policy. They believe that it is naive to expect institutions to defeat national rivalries.[261]

All these arguments and criticism necessitated revisions in the CFSP structure. The Amsterdam Treaty that was signed on 2 October 1997 and came into force on 1 May 1999 revised the provisions of the CFSP. Articles 11 to 28 of the Amsterdam Treaty deal with the CFSP. An important decision to improve the effectiveness and the profile of this policy was the appointment of a High Representative for the CFSP Javier Solana Madariaga, former NATO Secretary General, at the Cologne European Council in June 1999. The High Representative will assist the Council by contributing in particular to the formulation, arrangement and implementation of political decisions and, if necessary, by acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency and conducting political dialogue with third parties.[262]

As mentioned above, the European Council, bringing together the Heads of State or Government of the member states and the President of the European Commission, occupies the highest position in the CFSP determining the policy's principles and general guidelines. The Amsterdam Treaty indicates that the European Council shall decide on the common strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas where the member states have significant common interests. On the basis of these common

[259] Duff A., *Reforming the European Union*, London, The Federal Trust, 1997, p.77.
[260] Turan, op.cit.
[261] Guéhenno J-P., *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy. A Foreign Policy in Search of a Polity,* European University Institute Working Papers, Robert Schuman Centre no.97/65, Italy, 1997, p.1.
[262] The Council of the European Union and the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

strategies, the Council adopts decisions, actions or common positions by a qualified majority. If a member state wishes to oppose one of those decisions for reasons of important national policy, the Council can appeal to the European Council, which then functions as a 'court of appeal' and settles the issue on the basis of unanimity. The European Council has another major decision to take, the integration of the WEU into the European Union, an issue which is subject to ratification by the member states.[263]

The Council of the Ministers in which CFSP matters are dealt with is composed of Foreign Affairs Ministers of the member states. The Council has to take the necessary decisions concerning the formulation and implementation of the CFSP on the basis of general guidelines determined by the European Council. The Council is responsible for ensuring that the Union's action is unified, consistent and effective. The Amsterdam Treaty gives the Council a task of advising common strategies to the European Council and of implementing them through the adoption of common positions and joint actions.[264]

The Presidency that changes every six months, represents the Union in CFSP matters. Based on its responsibility for the implementation of CFSP decisions, it expresses the position of the Union in international organisations and at international conferences. The Presidency is assisted in these tasks by the Secretary-General of the Council, High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, in association with the European Commission.[265]

The Amsterdam Treaty indicates that the European Commission is to be fully associated with the work carried out in the field of CFSP. Such association is necessary to guarantee the consistency of CFSP with the Community policies, such as external economic relations and development cooperation. The Commission is also associated in the role of international representation and in the implementation

[263] Ibid.
[264] Ibid.
[265] Ibid.

of common measures. Like the Presidency, it informs the European Parliament of CFSP developments.[266]

The member states accept to give active and unconditional support to the implementation of the CFSP in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. Each member state can bring any foreign and security policy issues before the Council and submit proposals to it. They ensure that their national policies in harmony with the common positions, since they defend these positions in the international arena. They also assume to support the joint actions.[267]

The Amsterdam Treaty gave the CFSP two new instruments, common strategies and international agreements, in addition to the instruments provided for in the Maastricht Treaty which are common positions, joint actions, and declarations. Contacts with third countries are also important instruments of the CFSP.[268]

Common strategies are decided by the European Council on a recommendation from the Council in areas where member states have significant interests. Each strategy specifies its objectives, duration and resources that will be provided by the Union and the member states. The Council implements them by adopting inter alia joint actions and common positions.[269]

Common positions can be adopted by the Council to launch the Union's position on particular geographical or topical issues, for instance, with regard to a third country or at an international conference. The member states ensure that their national policies are in conformity with the common position.[270]

Joint actions are other instruments of the CFSP also adopted by the Council, in certain situations requiring operational action by the Union. Each action details its

---

[266] Ibid.
[267] Ibid.
[268] Ibid.
[269] Şahin M., *Avrupa Birliğinin Self-Determinasyon Politikası*, Ankara, Nobel Yay., 2000, p.71; The Council of the European Union and the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
[270] The Council of the European Union and the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

objectives, scope, the resources available to the Union and the conditions of implementation. According to Şahin, the difference between joint action and common position is that the former develops an approach for the Union in the international arena.[271]

International agreements with other states or international organisations in the CFSP sphere may be negotiated by the Presidency authorised by the Council. During negotiations the Presidency is assisted by the Commission, if needed. The agreements then concluded unanimously by the Council on a recommendation from the Presidency. However, no agreement shall be binding on a member state whose representative in the Council declares that it has to act in accordance with the requirements of its own constitutional procedure. The other member states may agree that the agreement shall apply to them provisionally.[272]

Declarations give public expression to a position, request or expectation of the Union with regard to a third country or an international issue. They are flexible instruments making possible to react quickly to unexpected events to declare the Union's point of view. They are called 'Declaration by the European Union' where the Council meets and adopts a position on an issue; and 'Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union' where the Council does not meet.[273]

Contacts with third countries generally take place through 'political dialogue' meetings and 'démarches'. The Union holds a political dialogue with a very large number of countries or groups of countries on questions of international policy. Démarches, which are confidential, are agreed by the Union with regard to third countries, usually with an aim to settle problems concerning human rights, democracy and humanitarian action.[274]

---

[271] Şahin, Ibid. p.70; The Council of the European Union and the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
[272] The Council of the European Union and the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
[273] Ibid.
[274] Ibid.

While the CFSP is not a common policy in the sense that the Common Agricultural Policy or the Common Commercial Policy, according to Piening, it has the potential to produce results that reflect the Union's priorities and concerns.[275] Moreover, it can be accepted that with the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, Hill's 'capability-expectations gap' – i.e. a wide gap between the actual capabilities of the Union in terms of its ability to agree, its resources and the instruments at its disposal, and the tasks it is expected to fulfil such as managing world trade, regional pacifier, mediator of conflicts, bridge between north and south and so on[276] – seemed reduced. Hill comments that a European foreign policy requires an executive capable of taking decisions on high policy matters, commanding the resources and instruments, enjoying a democratic legitimacy and having a sophisticated bureaucracy at their disposal.[277] In this respect, the creation of the High Representative for CFSP may be considered as a step forward in achieving a single European foreign policy.

Creating an effective common foreign and security policy would mean for the EU to establish a military power to support its diplomatic and economic initiatives. Not surprisingly, some member states, such as France, have tried to give Europe a more strategic capability, while others like Britain have always resisted doing anything that may threaten either NATO's role in the defence of Europe or close relations with the United States. Nevertheless, at the Maastricht Summit, the compromise was reached to declare that the Western European Union (WEU) was both the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and the defence arm of the EU by creating a nonbinding tie between the two institutions. Since its establishment in 1948, WEU has always been subordinate to NATO and only over the last decade it has played an operational role in events such as Iran-Iraq War, Gulf War, and Bosnian War.[278]

Therefore, the Maastricht Treaty established a link between the EU and the WEU for the Union to appeal to the WEU for making and implementing any Union decisions

---

[275] Piening, op.cit. p.40
[276] Hill C., "The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol.31, no.3, September 1993, pp.310-15.
[277] Hill, Ibid. p.316.
[278] Gordon, op.cit. pp.89-90.

and actions with defence implications. In June 1992 in Petersberg, WEU leaders agreed to strengthen the WEU's operational role, in accordance with the Maastricht decision of developing the WEU into the defence component of the EU. The Petersberg Declaration lists possible operations as humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and combat-force tasks in crisis management, including peacemaking.[279] The Amsterdam Treaty also stresses the importance of the Petersberg tasks. Gomersall explains that when NATO does not wish to involve in a crisis in Europe, the Amsterdam Treaty states that the EU will avail itself of the WEU in order to carry the Petersberg tasks.[280]

NATO's Brussels Summit of January 1994 acknowledged the concept of European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), the concept of 'separable but not separate' forces for European defence. When NATO foreign ministers met in Berlin in June 1996, they recognized the need for an operational capacity for the European defence identity, and France and Spain committed to integrate into this new structure. According to Moens, the arrangement of delegating NATO assets to the WEU in contingencies where US troops would not participate seemed a 'quiet revolution'.[281] Howort contends that "ESDI is an assertion by the European states of the desirability and legitimacy of their quest for more concerted influence over issues affecting European security".[282]

The Cologne European Council of June 1999 placed the Petersberg tasks at the heart of the process strengthening the European common security and defence policy, stating that "the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO".[283]

---

[279]The Council of the European Union and the Common Foreign and Security Policy; Gordon, Ibid. p.91.
[280] Gomersall S.J., "NATO and European Defence", *Perceptions*, vol.4, no.1, March-May 1999, p.76.
[281] Moens, op.cit. pp.464,466.
[282] Howort J., "National Defence and European Security Integration An Illusion Inside A Chimera?", in J. Howort and A. Menon, eds., *The European Union and National Defence Policy*, London, Routledge, 1997, p.10.
[283] Cologne European Council Presidency Conclusions, 03-04.06.1999; James B. and Schmid J., "EU Leaders Endorse a Common Policy for Defense" *International Herald Tribune*, 04.06.1999.

The meeting of French and British Prime Ministers in Saint Malo in December 1998 constitutes a turning point in the creation of a European Security and Defence Identity. In summary, the declaration of two governments consists of following statements: The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. Implementation of the Amsterdam provisions of the CFSP includes the responsibility of the European Council to decide on the progressive framing of a common defence policy. The Council must be able to take decisions on an intergovernmental basis. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, for responding to international crises. In order for the EU to take decisions and approve military action where NATO is not engaged, the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning. Therefore, Europe need strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks.[284]

At Saint Malo, France and Britain agreed that the main security responsibility for Europe should remain with NATO while the EU would strengthen institutional structure for acting together in responding crises that did not require US involvement.[285] Hoffmann explains the change in British policy with couple of reasons. First of all, Mr. Blair wanted to do something 'European' to compensate for his delaying a decision to join Euro. Second, he seems to have realised that he could maximise British influence in international affairs if he combined the support of the U.S. with a more cooperative position in the EU. He was also taking advantage of an opportunity to create a strong Franco-British link, compensating the Franco-German axis that established the EU. In the French political and military establishment, on the other hand, there had been a gradual shift of opinion requiring collective action not only in economic matters but also in strategic and diplomatic ones.[286] Therefore,

[284] Declaration on European Defence British-French Summit, Saint Malo, 03-04.12.1998.
[285] Fitchett J., "Blair and Chirac Sketch Defense Pact" *International Herald Tribune*, 04.12.1998
[286] Hoffmann S., "Towards a Common European Foreign and Security Policy?", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol.38, no.2, June 2000, p.193.

due to these changes, both Britain and France decided to have a stronger European security and defence identity at Saint Malo.

In June 2000, the framework of European Security and Defence Identity was announced. In November, as a first step, member states have pledged specific military units that they will make available for EU operations dealing with small, international crises. A communiqué reported that by 2003 the Union would meet the goal of being able to field a rapid reaction force of up to 60 000 ground troops within 60 days and maintain it on mission for one year. Britain, France and Germany will be the largest contributors, providing nearly 40 000 of total soldiers. Ireland and some Nordic countries will take part despite their long tradition of neutrality, but Denmark has opted out and Austria decided to consider its role. No member state tried to veto the EU force. EU members emphasised that the rapid reaction force poses no threat to NATO as the leading Western defence alliance, while the EU force could act autonomously in smaller crises. EU military activity is decided by the European Council and does not involve the European Commission. The policy is managed by the High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana. It is planned that the EU force can use NATO resources when necessary. Insisting that the decision-making procedure should be carried through the EU, this plan excludes the six non-EU members of NATO, namely Turkey, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Norway and Iceland, which are also WEU associate members. However, that procedure has been challenged by Turkey.[287] The arguments of Turkey are discussed in Part 3.4.1. under the heading of "Turkey's Role in the European Security after the Cold War".

[287] Fitchett J., "EU Force Takes Shape With Pledge of Troops", *International Herald Tribune*, 20.11.2000; "NATO Defense Ministers to Discuss Balkans, ESDP" *Turkish Daily News*, 05.12.2000; "EU Says 15 Nonmembers Want to Join Its New Military Force" *International Herald Tribune*, 22.11.2000; Vinocur J., "EU Defense Autonomy Lacks a Unifying Voice" *International Herald*

The five main features of the European Security and Defence Identity are described by Özen as follows:

1. Limitation of European Security and Defence Identity with Petersberg tasks.
2. Inclusion of WEU's operational activities in the EU.
3. Protection of institutional structure and autonomous decision-making procedure of the EU.
4. Creation of rapid reaction force.
5. Automatic access to NATO assets and capabilities.[288]

Discussions has been continuing in the Union with the aim of exercising political control and strategic guidance in the Petersberg operations operated by the EU, and the objective of determining the implementation of operations with or without the resources and capacities of NATO, and the arrangements for participation in the operations by members of the EU, the European members of NATO and the associate members of the WEU.[289]

Barbé believes that

> "the renationalisation process (converting European policy into policing each country's sphere of influence) has already begun. Two cases demonstrate this shift: the German policy, favouring the diplomatic recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, and the post-Cold War Spanish policy of linking European construction to Mediterranean stability. In both cases, the national strategies pursued by individual countries were converted into EU policies."[290]

Peterson states that advocates of a European defence identity assumed that the CFSP would increase the unity in EU foreign policy-making. However, gradually it became clear that Maastricht could not achieve a great development in the EU's defence and security role. The foreign and security pillar created by the Maastricht Treaty was a

---

Tribune, 09.04.2001; Pfaff W., "When Europe Gets Its Own Army, What Will NATO Be For?" *International Herald Tribune*, 05.12.2000.

[288] Özen Ç., "Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikasının Temel Özellikleri", *ATAUM Bülten*, vol.1, no.1, Kış 2000-2001, pp.2-3.

[289] The Council of the European Union and the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

[290] Barbé, op.cit. pp.118-9.

typical EU fudge between an Anglo-Italian proposal and a far more ambitious Franco-German plan. He argues that

> "The 1991 Dutch presidency's insistence that qualified majority voting should apply to the CFSP was appeased by subjecting to majority vote the 'implementation' of broad policies agreed by consensus, but still allowing member states to opt out of such decisions 'in cases of imperative need'. The CFSP's decidedly intergovernmental structure reflected agreement among member states that the 'Community method' of decision-making – majority voting on Commission proposals – was simply inappropriate for foreign or security policy."[291]

According to Piening, the fundamental difference between the CFSP and pre-Maastricht political cooperation is that for the first time since the failure of European Defence Community of early 1950s, security is brought into the Union area. Article J.4 says that the CFSP "shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence".[292]

According to Rosecrance, however, the CFSP is a wrong title since Europe does not speak with one voice on either foreign policy or defence matters. He further comments that there are significant foreign policy differences among member states, especially between France, Britain and Germany. Views of the European Commission do not usually correspond with national policies. He exemplifies with Greece's hostility towards Turkey or Germany's close ties with Croatia. Furthermore, Britain and France have a different opinion on the role of the USA in European security. Apart from these examples, when European states reach an agreement, as they have done from time to time on the Middle East, it is a lowest common denominator consent that has little influence on international politics.[293]

---

[291] Peterson, op.cit. p.138.
[292] Piening, op.cit. p.42
[293] Rosecrance R., *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy. The European Union: A New Type of International Actor*, European University Institute Working Papers Robert Schuman Centre, no.97/64, Italy, 1997, p.1.

Accordingly, Stavridis argues that the CFSP arrangements are destined fail to produce a common European foreign policy not only due their complexity and unsatisfactory nature, but also due to the different national interests of the member states cannot be reconciled by procedural means alone. The main point, he believes, is that there is no European voice since there is no European 'demos' (people) and therefore, the views of public opinion can only be expressed through national structures. Neither the Commission nor the European Parliament can claim that they represent exclusively Europe's voice. The national governments are the best representatives of the various national public opinions because they have to win elections to stay in power as well as they put their own national viewpoint first.[294]

Kupchan, likewise, defends that without a common Soviet threat, the security interests of individual states are drifting apart, not coming together. He argues that Germany, for instance, is more concerned about developments in Central Europe than Spain, Portugal or France, the members more preoccupied with North Africa and the Mediterranean. Moreover, the failure of the EU and NATO to take more effective and timely steps to stop the slaughter in Bosnia made clear that Europe's security is divisible. He also questions, as an example of common foreign and security policy issue, the EU members' willingness to defend the Finnish border in case of a Russian attack, a task to which all members should be committed in principle since Finland entered the EU in 1995.[295] Additionally, Tank comments that the member states have been reluctant to empower to the CFSP pillar regarding it as robbing the nation state of its sovereignty.[296]

According to Kupchan, the European Union's lack of progress in creating a common foreign and defence policy stems from two main sources. First, the Union continues to fight for a consensus among all its members which leads to the lowest common denominator. Second, France and Germany share less common ground on defence matters than they do on issues of economic integration. For Germany, the EU is a

[294] Stavridis, op.cit. pp.112-3.
[295] Kupchan, op.cit. p.10
[296] Tank, "The CFSP and the Nation-State", p.16

binding, moderating and managing power for preventing another destructive war in the continent. For France, the Union is about accumulating and projecting power, aggregating the military and economic resources so that it can turn itself into a global actor. Kupchan suggests that Britain could help define a middle road between Germany's desire to sacrifice national sovereignty for a deeper union and France's Gaullist insistence on preserving a strong national state. Another point put forward by Kupchan is that the eastward enlargement of the Union doubling its membership. He believes that a common foreign and security policy that would reconcile the interests of some 30 states, for instance, would be out of question.[297]

In terms of European security, there is a divide between the Atlanticists who believe that intergovernmental cooperation within the existing security organisations such as NATO is the best option, and the Europeanists who support the eventual development of a unified European approach in security and foreign affairs, free from American involvement.[298]

Tank gives further examples of differences of foreign policy approaches of the member states. For instance, Britain's close relationship with the United States and France's historical enmity towards a US dominated foreign policy have resulted in their opposing views in CFSP discussions. The colonial history of countries like France has had a specific impact on their desire to focus more on developments in the Southern Mediterranean. Similarly, as a result of Spain's links with Latin America and Portugal's ties with Africa and Asia, they have unique perspectives in their relations with these regions. Geographical proximity is another reason of national differences in terms of the creation of the CFSP. As mentioned before, Germany's aspiration to focus on projects to develop Eastern Europe is in contest with the Mediterranean countries' wish to encourage the development of a satisfactory policy for the Southern Mediterranean.[299]

---

[297] Kupchan, op.cit. p.10
[298] Tank, "The CFSP and the Nation-State", p.14
[299] Tank, Ibid. pp.14-5

Tank comments that a strengthened CFSP could serve to promote greater regional stability. However, the consent of the governed, without which nation states cannot concede greater sovereignty to the European Union, is necessary for the success of the CFSP. The development of a real European security and defence identity requires a vision of a common future, depending on the European citizens' ability to regard integration as a legitimate and tempting aim for the member states, as well as the institutional machinery to ensure CFSP's competency. However, she remarks that "focusing only on soft security can result in criticism when more decisive action is needed, as in the case of EU policy in the former Yugoslavia". Therefore, the CFSP should develop a stronger capability in hard security as well as in soft security by taking greater responsibility in regional conflicts.[300]

Guéhenno argues that the "European integration is based on the assumption that national interests can be changed" with the founders of the European Community expecting member states to overcome their old rivalries with the prospect of sharing permanent common interests. Thus a new European interests would substitute the old national interests as the basis of foreign policy. Nevertheless, the fundamental hypothesis that foreign policy is linked to interests remained unquestioned and the promoters of European integration believed that growing economic integration would create a common European interest that would lead to the creation of a common foreign and security policy. Therefore he believes that the failure of Europeans to develop a true foreign policy is a result of a basic mistake of denying that national interests are the substructure of a foreign policy. He assumes that the realist school seems to be justified by the vitality of national identities and the weakness of the present common foreign and security policy.[301]

As Hill comments, there are three categories ranging from convergence to divergence in terms of member states' willingness for CFSP. The members such as the Benelux countries are in the convergence category appreciating the discipline and protection of CFSP. The second category of countries consists of the majority of the

[300] Tank, Ibid. pp.20-1
[301] Guéhenno, op.cit. pp.1-4

members generally supportive of CFSP but still have distinctive concerns. Spain and Portugal are given as examples with enthusiasm for integration on the one hand, and their concerns for the Mediterranean and the southern hemisphere on the other. Similarly, the neutral states, Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden try to balance their wish for a common European shelter and their reluctance to involve in new defence commitments through a developing EU-WEU relationship. Germany and Italy, likewise, share the aim of a single European foreign policy, but in practice are inclined to step out of line, just in case of German recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. Finally, in the 'uncooperative' category, there involve Britain, France, Denmark and Greece. Britain and France are militarily powerful states, according to Hill, regarding themselves as having special responsibilities that cannot be restrained by communautaire procedures. Greece is integrationist in principle, but is not always in agreement with the majority view on issues like Macedonia and Cyprus. Denmark is concerned with independence, not relinquishing sovereignty in the CFSP partly for historical reasons and partly for an opposition to the federal tendency within the Union. However, even these countries are not willing to break up the CFSP. For instance, France is traditionally in favour of Europe developing as a significant actor in international relations. Therefore, divergence, as Hill points out, "exists within limits and coordination is accepted as an obligation and unquestioned benefit".[302]

Gordon argues that states are willing to transfer their sovereignty in particular arenas only if the perceived benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. In the area of foreign policy, because the gains of a common action are not always obvious and evenly distributed among the members, this condition can be met when national interests or governmental preferences have converged to the point where the potential costs and risks of a common action are low. If the interests of the EU members become more similar in the coming decades than they are today, integration will be more likely; otherwise possibility of developing a common foreign policy is less likely. It is important that spillover process resulting from integration in other areas might lead

[302] Hill C.J., *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy. Convergence, Divergence &Dialectics: National Foreign Policies &the CFSP* European University Institute Working Papers Robert Schuman Centre, no. 97/66, Italy, 1997, pp.2-3

to a relative convergence of European interests. For instance, elimination of internal borders in accordance with the Schengen Agreement cause same immigration worries and increase their concerns over stability in their periphery. However, he contends that there are some reasons that prevent member states from accepting foreign and security policy integration. First of all, one of the most compelling forces behind the need for a common security policy disappeared with the end of the Cold War. Second, the prospected enlargement of the EU up to thirty countries will mean a significant expansion of geographical and cultural diversity as well as of economic and security interests, foreign policy traditions, relationships and attitude toward the use of force and intervention. It is an acceptable argument that foreign policy traditions and cultures can change with time and political evolution through the interaction within the Union; yet these conceptual changes take place very slowly and the diversity in the strategic cultures of current members of the EU has hardly disappeared despite decades of interaction. Third, the functionalist arguments for integration through spillovers can be exaggerated. Theoretically, open borders make all states equally susceptible to regional instabilities, but in fact, due to geography, history, language and culture, there remain different concerns. For instance, refugees from Central and Eastern Europe would mostly go to Germany as the biggest, richest and nearest country to them, and refugees from North Africa would mostly go to Southern European countries where they might have family or other contacts and would understand the language.[303]

[303] Gordon, op.cit. pp.96-9.

3.2.2. The Early Mediterranean Policies of the European Union

When the European Community was founded, owing to the diversity in terms of geographical, political and socio-economical structure between the Mediterranean countries, the Community have lacked a clear strategy for the region. Main features of the Mediterranean policy including development aid and cooperation on security matters remained defined by the member states, while the Commission had the power to determine Community's external trade policy.[304]

3.2.2.1. Global Mediterranean Policy

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is designated to address the growing social and economic problems on the non-European side of the Mediterranean region. It is a culmination of a decades long efforts of deepening cooperation among the two shores of the Mediterranean. The first contacts between the European Community and the Mediterranean non-member countries (MNC) dated back to the 1960s. As Bretherton and Vogler note, the MNC, today, are considered to be Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya (with which the Union has no formal relations), Egypt, Israel, Jordan (though it does not have Mediterranean coastline), Lebanon, Syria, the Palestinian Authority, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta. Before their membership to the Union in the 1980s, Greece, Spain and Portugal were also included in this category. At the beginning the links were limited to trade and provided for the free access of industrial goods to EC markets and for specific agricultural export concessions. In the 1960s and at the beginning of the 1970s, these relations were extended into association agreements concluded with Greece (1961), Turkey (1963), Malta (1970), Cyprus (1972); Spain (1970), and Portugal (1972). Preferential trade agreements with Lebanon and Israel in 1964, followed by first generation association agreements with Tunisia and Morocco in 1969 and trade agreement with Egypt, in 1972 were also concluded. All of these agreements included financial protocols offering loans and grants to help development of infrastructures.[305]

---

[304] Gomez, op.cit. p.134.
[305] Larrabee et al, op.cit. p.24; Bretherton and Vogler, op.cit. pp.153, 279; Piening, op.cit. p.8.

Gomez explains that by differentiating between the type of agreements concluded with each country, the Community ranked its partners according to their economic and political importance. For instance, Greece and Turkey, as vital strategic allies during the Cold War, concluded association agreements aimed to create customs union with a full membership perspective. On the other hand, countries of less strategic importance like Morocco and Tunisia were offered limited commercial agreements. With the gradual definition of interests in the Mediterranean such as preferential market access, inexpensive imports of raw materials, promotion of political stability to guarantee energy supplies from the region, and extension of Community's sphere of influence, the EC realised the necessity of a unified policy in the Mediterranean.[306]

In 1971 the European Parliament, criticising the uncoordinated character of the agreements concluded with the Mediterranean partners, called for the formulation of a systematic policy towards the region. Consequently, The European Community launched its Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) at the Paris Summit of October 1972. Strongly supported by the Commission and the French government, the GMP reflected the importance of the Mediterranean region for the Community. The policy was designed to create a single and coordinated framework between the EC and the various Southern and Eastern Mediterranean states. The bilateral relations were economic in nature, and as by the end of 1970s the Commission has concluded cooperation agreements with all interested Maghreb and Mashreq countries. These agreements, with minor differences, had the same characteristics, such as trade preferences, financial and technical cooperation, common institutions in the form of council of ministers, and privileged status for migrant workers of the Maghreb partners.[307]

---

[306] Gomez, op.cit. pp.133-5.

[307] Piening, op.cit. pp.72-3; Bretherton and Vogler, op.cit. p. 153; Tovias A., "The EU's Mediterranean Policies Under Pressure" in R.Gillespie, ed., *Mediterranean Politics*, vol.2, London, Pinter, 1996, p.11.

The motivation of the Community's Global Mediterranean Policy was also mainly economic, to regulate relations with a view to create a Mediterranean free trade area. However, its capacity to deal with political and security issues was modest. In a region with continuing conflicts, European Political Cooperation provided a collective response mechanism in the form of common positions and political declarations.[308] According to Piening, it was the 1973 Arab-Israeli War that caused the EC to rethink its political as well as economic relations with the Arab world. The foreign ministers of the Community issued a declaration in November 1973 that urged the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories of Gaza and the West Bank and recognised the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Later that month, a meeting of Arab heads of state in Algiers welcomed the EC's position and launched the idea of a European-Arab dialogue stating that "Europe is linked to the Arab world through the Mediterranean by profound affinities of civilization and by vital interests which can only be developed within the framework of confidence and mutually advantageous cooperation".[309]

3.2.2.2. The Euro-Arab Dialogue

The Euro-Arab Dialogue officially came into being on 31 July 1974 at the meeting between the President and Secretary General of the Arab League and the Commission and Council Presidents. They reached an agreement to establish an institutional framework based on a general commission and specialised working groups for discussions on a range of economic, technological, social and cultural issues. The first meeting of the general commission took place in Luxembourg in May 1976. The reasons for delay were the EC's refusal to accept the formal presence of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) delegation on the Arab side and the question of the political dimension to be included in the dialogue. As Piening explains, the problem of Palestinian representation was settled by creating a unified Arab delegation, of which composition was determined by the Arabs. The question

[308] Gomez, op.cit. p.136.

of the nature of the dialogue resulted in a solution with practical issues dominating the work of the specialised groups and a more political agenda forming the basis for the general commission meetings.[310]

The Camp David peace accord in March 1979 between Israel and Egypt led to the subsequent suspension of Egypt from the Arab League. The EC considered the agreement a step away from its own preferred option of a global settlement of the Middle East conflict, referring that the partial solution presented by Camp David did not address the central problem of finding a homeland for the Palestinians. The Community expressed its concerns in the Venice Declaration of 13 June 1980 calling for a comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict. The EC stated the two principles that would form the basis of Community policy in the future; the right to existence and security for all states in the region, including Israel, and recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.[311]

The first principle stresses that every country is entitled to live in peace with secure, recognised and guaranteed borders, and the second emphasises that the Palestinian people must be placed in a position that they can exercise the right to self-determination. Moreover, the EC declared that it would not accept any unilateral initiative designed to change the status of Jerusalem and that Israel had to put an end to the territorial occupation, calling for a renunciation of the use of force by all the parties. Therefore the Venice Declaration pointed out that the EC considered Israel's borders inviolable and that the occupied territories and settlements to be an obstacle to peace. The Declaration remained the cornerstone of the EU policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict ever since. According to Piening, the policy has been successful that both parties have moved toward accepting the principles it contains, Israel's handing

[309] Quoted from Khader B., "Europe and the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1973-1983: An Arab Perspective" in Allen and Pijpers (eds.), *European Foreign Policy Making and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1984, p.166 in Piening, op.cit. p.74
[310] Piening, Ibid. p.74
[311] Piening, Ibid. p.75

over occupied territory to Palestinian Authority and the Palestinians' abandoning the PLO's pledge to destroy the Israeli state.[312]

The situation in the region deteriorated in the 1980s. The incidents such as, the Iran-Iraq War; the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat; the intensifying civil war in Lebanon and the Israeli invasion in 1982; the growth of terrorism in the form of hijackings, bombings and hostage-taking; the labelling of Syria and Libya as terrorist states made political dialogue with the Arab world difficult. The failure to agree on a final communiqué at the fifth meeting of the Euro-Arab Dialogue's general commission in Athens in December 1983 led to the end of the multilateral EC-Arab dialogue.[313] However, according to Biad, the reason of the failure was a deep misunderstanding between the two sides that the Arab countries emphasised the political dimension of the Dialogue, while the Europeans preferred to focus on economic issues.[314]

Although the Community launched a Global Mediterranean Policy in 1972 and tried to establish the Euro-Arab Dialogue, its relations with most of the Mediterranean countries remained bilateral in the 1970s and 1980s. Piening comments that the Euro-Arab Dialogue did not accomplish its aim of creating a political relationship and Arab countries like Libya, Syria and Iraq excluded themselves from the EC's efforts to have closer bilateral relations with them.[315] Similarly, as Bretherton and Vogler comment, the Euro-Arab Dialogue had the effect of separating the Middle East conflict from efforts of creating an extended EC-Mediterranean relationship and served to distract attention from the comprehensive GMP initiative. Hence the GMP proved unsatisfactory to all parties. The Commission hoped to negotiate an arrangement having the solidarity and political value of a multilateral, collective contract. However, this pattern was refused by MNC governments and strictly bilateral negotiations were conducted by the parties. Consequently, the Cooperation Agreements in terms of trade, financial assistance and bilateral common institutions

[312] Piening, Ibid. p.75
[313] Piening, Ibid. pp.75-6
[314] Biad, op.cit.

were concluded with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia in 1976 and with Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria in 1977.[316]

However, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, a stagnation was experienced in the trade relations due to the oil crisis and Greek, Spanish and Portuguese membership in the EC. The Community established restrictions on the export of textile and agricultural products during this period, owing to the greatly increased availability of such products as a result of its new members.[317] The creation of the Single Market further worsened the situation of MNC market shares. In consequence, when Morocco applied for EC membership in 1987 and was rejected on the grounds that it was not a European country, the Maghreb countries attempted to achieve cooperation within their own region through the establishment of the Arab-Maghreb Union (UMA) – examined in Part 3.3.1. – , comprising Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania.[318]

3.2.3. Pre-Barcelona Process Strategies of the European Union

Undoubtedly, Mediterranean is a region where long-lasting conflicts has delayed, encumbered or obstructed the development of cooperation and partnership ties between the European Union and its southern neighbours.[319]

European Political Cooperation (EPC)'s Mediterranean related activities have amounted little more than 'declaratory diplomacy'. Despite its focus on the Middle East, EPC did not change the Community's role in the Mediterranean as a peripheral player owing to the differences between the member states' foreign policies. For instance, French government's calls for a direct reference to a Palestinian state could not be accepted as a Community position by other member states. Similarly, in 1986,

---

[315] Piening, op.cit. p.78

[316] Bretherton and Vogler, op.cit. p.154

[317] Larrabee et al, op.cit. p.24; Dinan D., *Ever Closer Union ? An Introduction to the European Community*, Kent, Lynne Rienner, 1994, p.459.

[318] Bretherton and Vogler, op.cit. p.155.

[319] Poças Santos, J. A., *The Parliamentary Co-operation and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, Paper presented at the 2nd Summer School on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the New International Order, Catania, 20-26 June 1999, Department of Political Studies, Jean Monnet Centre EUROMED, p.2.

member states agreed to impose an arms embargo on Libya, after Kaddafi regime was held responsible by the USA for the bombing of a Berlin discotheque. The EC issued an EPC declaration on terrorism which included provisions for sanctions against suspected states. But soon after, Greece objected that no adequate evidence found on Libyan involvement and decided not to support the action.[320]

According to Gomez, Hill's 'capability-expectations gap' reflected in two forms in the Mediterranean. First, the association and cooperation agreements fell short of the Community's promise to make a real contribution to the economic development of the southern neighbours. Second, due to EPC's weak mechanism, the Community lacked both the ability to agree and the instruments necessary for proactive, rather than reactive, policy-making in the conflicts in the Mediterranean and especially in the Middle East. However, he suggests that "the transition from EPC to CFSP did little to address the continued absence of a meaningful politico-security dimension to Mediterranean policy". Nevertheless, the CFSP resulted in at least two important developments. First, foreign ministers of the member states realised the significance of Europe's security interests in the Mediterranean. Second, several joint actions related with Mediterranean were adopted, on reducing economic ties with Libya as a result of Lockerbie bombing and on the Middle East peace process.[321]

Events in the Central and Eastern Europe between 1989 and 1991 turned most of the countries in this region into Europe's favoured partners, while threatening the Mediterranean countries' privileges. As Bretherton and Vogler comment, with the end of the Cold War, the Community felt obliged to reconsider its relations with the near abroad. Consequently, since 1989 the French and Spanish governments with support from the Commission, have tried to achieve equivalence in policy towards the two peripheries, the Mediterranean and the Central and Eastern Europe.[322]

[320] Gomez, op.cit. p.137.
[321] Gomez, Ibid. pp.137-8, 141-2.
[322] Bretherton and Vogler, op.cit. p.155.

Therefore, after the end of the Cold War, the European Council introduced a new Euro-Mediterranean policy in 1990. Supported with financial aid, improved market access and efforts on political dialogue, this new policy assumed that European Community assistance along with structural reform would help to improve private sector activity in the economies of the Southern Mediterranean countries and lead to long-term growth. However, the effectiveness of the pre-Barcelona Process strategy was limited. As a result of the high degree of protectionism in the Southern Mediterranean partners and the European countries' reluctance on the export of agricultural goods, the EC had little effect on the improvement of the regional economies. Moreover, the major deficiency of these pre-Barcelona Process policies was the lack of a strategic vision of the Mediterranean as a geopolitical entity. Until the early 1990s, the EC was concentrating on different policies for the Maghreb, Mashreq, and Israel.[323]

According to Piening, EC diplomacy in the region tended to reactive rather than proactive, confronting events when they occurred. The beginning of the real reassessment of the Community policy toward the Mediterranean came into scene with the first series of Commission policy papers in the form of communications to the Council and European Parliament. The Commission's proposal to the Strasbourg European Council in December 1989 was called *Redirecting the Community's Mediterranean Policy*, and emphasised the significance of the social and economic development of the region for the Community's security in the broadest sense. It attempted to strengthen the market access, especially for Moroccan and Tunisian products, and increased financial assistance, primarily beneficial for Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. Moreover, it proposed to place greater emphasis on horizontal rather than bilateral cooperation including transport, energy and telecommunications.[324]

In 1989, the Spanish commissioner in charge of Mediterranean countries, Abel Matutes asked for some action in his area of responsibility and he proposed a

[323] Larrabee et al, op.cit. pp..24-25.
[324] Piening, op.cit. p.78; Bretherton and Vogler, op.cit. p.155; Gomez, op.cit. p.139.

Renovated Mediterranean Policy (RMP). The Rome Summit of December 1990 called for the completion of works on the RMP and then it was endorsed by the Council of Ministers on 18-19 December 1990. The RMP agreed to enlarge the aid package and to support horizontal cooperation, that is multilateral and decentralised aid program involving several EC countries and the Mediterranean countries and focusing on issues of common interest to those countries, such as the environment, urbanisation, human rights and so on. According to Tovias, the Renovated Mediterranean Policy can be characterised as a minor victory achieved by the Southern European countries over their northern neighbours in that more aid was distributed from Brussels.[325]

Along with political and security dimension, the economic gap between Europe and its southern neighbours should be reduced. Thus, the Commission proposed creating MED programmes directly funded by the Community budget. Environment, energy, migration, trade, and investment are described as the principal areas of Euro-Mediterranean interdependence and the Commission proposed using the MED funding to promote the socioeconomic development of the Mediterranean countries; to support modernisation and economic restructuring with a view to the establishment of a free trade area; to promote direct investment through joint ventures; to encourage job creation; to promote regional cooperation including in the environmental field; and to support the Middle East peace process.[326]

Unfortunately, the RMP could not have any effect on the economic and social crisis in the Arab world. The events in Algeria raised the possibility of a new movement of refugees arriving in the EC. Illegal immigration from Morocco to Spain was another issue that drew public attention. Eventually, new tensions developed between local populations and migrant communities with Italy, Spain, the Benelux countries and

---

[325] Kutlu M., "Avrupa-Akdeniz Ortaklığı", *İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı Dergisi*, no:134, Ocak-Şubat 1997, p.5; Tovias, op.cit. pp.13-4; Karauçak Oğuz Ş., *Avrupa Topluluğu'nun Akdeniz Politikası*, İstanbul, İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı Yay., 1991, pp.97-99; *Avrupa Birliği'nin Akdeniz Bölgesi Politikası*, İstanbul, İstanbul Ticaret Odası Yay., 1996, p.8.

[326] Piening, op.cit. p.80; *MED Programları El Kitabı Avrupa-Akdeniz Ortaklığı Rehberi*, Avrupa Komisyonu Türkiye Temsilciliği, Ankara, p.3.

France being the most affected. France accepted that its government's policy in the Maghreb would be inadequate in dealing with new security challenges including illegal immigration and the spillover effects of internal unrest in North Africa, calling for a collective action to achieve stability in the region. Spain also demanded a new structure of peace, security and cooperation in the Mediterranean. Sharing the southern perspective, Italy rejected a southern extension of NATO insisting that the EC was the most convenient organisation to deal with Italian concerns about security in the Mediterranean.[327]

In 1992, another Commission communication on the future of relations with the Maghreb countries proposing that a new regional framework should be set up leading to a 'Euro-Maghreb partnership' incorporating free trade, political dialogue, and economic, technical, cultural, financial cooperation. The Commission's ideas were supported at the Lisbon European Council in June 1992 that mentioned about significant foreign policy objectives in terms of geographical areas where political or economic instability could pose security threat to the EC. The three criteria set out for the urgent foreign policy cooperation are geographical proximity, strong interest in the political and economic stability of a region or a state, and the existence of a potential threat to the Union's security interests. Due to these criteria, the European Council recognised the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean as a priority area for joint action, and the Commission considered the region as highly susceptible to common EU approach under its new Common Foreign and Security Policy. It was also an attempt to balance the external policy attentions of the Union since Central and Eastern Europe had been at the top of the priority list after the end of the Cold War. In 1993, the Middle East was the subject of two other Commission papers. The first was on future relations and cooperation between the Community and the Middle East conceiving the aim of regional cooperation and a free trade area. The second was concerned with the support for a Middle East peace process and tried to establish the EU's role in the multilateral efforts then under way.[328]

---

[327] Gomez, op.cit. pp.142-3.

[328] Piening, Ibid. p.79; Bretherton and Vogler, op.cit. p.156; Dinan, op.cit. p.460; Poças Santos J.Á. op.cit. p.1.

According to Bretherton and Vogler, the EU policy in the Mediterranean region, even though the economic relations have been considerable, has not provided a basis for political influence. However, particularly due to following factors, a comprehensive approach towards the region was suggested in 1994. The first one was the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty providing an impetus for an explicitly political dimension to the EU'S partnerships generally. The second one was the Commission's experience with the Central and Eastern European countries suggesting an 'all-encompassing' strategy would be appropriate for the Mediterranean region. And finally, the progress achieved that time in the Middle East peace process permitted adoption of an overall process.[329]

At July 1994 Corfu Summit, the Council of Foreign Ministers asked Commission to prepare a report for strengthening the Union's Mediterranean policy to support socioeconomic development and peace, stability and security in the region.[330] In response to that, a Commission communication was formulated in October 1994 by Manuel Marín, the Spanish Commissioner in charge of relations with the Mediterranean countries. It was entitled *Strengthening the Mediterranean Policy of the European Union: Establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership* and declared that the Mediterranean basin constituted an area of strategic importance for the Community. Warning that political, social and economic problems in the region are sources of instability leading to mass migration, fundamentalist extremism, terrorism, drugs and organised crime, harmful both to area itself and to the Union[331], it continued:

> The peace and stability of the region are of the highest priority to Europe.
> To consolidate that peace and stability in the region, a number of challenges have to be faced, notably:
> • To support political reform, respect for human rights and freedom of expression as a means to contain extremism;

[329] Bretherton and Vogler, Ibid. p.156.
[330] Kutlu, op.cit. p.8.
[331] Gillespie, "Introduction Europe, the Mediterranean and the Islamists" p.1.

- To promote economic reform, leading to sustained growth and improved living standards, a consequent diminution of violence and an easing of migratory pressures.[332]

As Tovias points out, in the view of the Commission, the main elements of the new program had to be the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area to be completed by 2010; a doubling of the financial assistance from the Community's budget; and increased technical cooperation.[333] The assumption that political and economic instability in the Mediterranean negatively affect the Union and the trend of globalisation can be considered as reasons for EU to ponder on a regional policy far-reaching than the Renovated Mediterranean Policy.[334] Consequently, the Commission suggested setting up a Euro-Mediterranean zone of peace and stability, being realised with a code of conduct for the settlement of disputes among the Mediterranean countries and with confidence building measures. The Commission believed that the EU should develop its political dialogue with its Mediterranean partners with special emphasis on human rights and the principles of democracy and good governance and, extent the dialogue to include security issues.[335]

Gillespie comments that from initial perceptions that the problems of North Africa affected only certain EU member states those bordering on the Mediterranean, there has been a gradual realisation that the Maghreb, in particular, is of importance to the entire European Union. Various European countries, north and south, have experienced the problems of North Africa through the arrival of immigrants or the activities of Islamist terrorist groups.[336]

The Commission's communication proposed that a Euro-Mediterranean conference be held in 1995 to reach an agreement on economic and political guidelines for Euro-Mediterranean policy in the future. The idea for holding a conference was accepted

---

[332] European Commission Document COM(94) 427, 19 October 1994, p.5; "Avrupa Birliği'nin Akdeniz Politikası", *İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı Dergisi*, no.120, Temmuz-Ekim 1994, p.14.
[333] Tovias, op.cit. pp.15-6.
[334] Kutlu, op.cit. p.3.
[335] Piening, op.cit. p.80; *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye*, Ankara, T.C. Başbakanlık Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı, 1999, p.130.
[336] Gillespie, "Northern European Perceptions of the Barcelona Process"

by the Essen European Council in December 1994.[337] At the Cannes European Council in June 1995, the ambitious Mediterranean policy of France and Spain clashed with German-led Northern interests about the allocation of resources. In July 1996, a new budgetary regulation for the whole Mediterranean called MEDA was issued by the Commission.[338]

Spain, which played a leading role in drafting the proposal for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) a few years ago, was chosen to host the conference during the Spanish presidency of the Union in the second half of 1995.[339] According to Tovias, the conference "is supposed to address three central areas: politics and security, finance and the economy, and social and human issues. Of these, only the second area was addressed by previous EC policies".[340]

3.2.4. Barcelona Conference and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

The Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs held in Barcelona on 27-28 November 1995, was the starting point of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, also known as Barcelona Process, a wide framework of political, economic and social relations between the 15 Member States of the European Union and 12 Southern Mediterranean partners, namely Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey.[341] According to Bretherton and Vogler, in terms of content, the process envisages a close political and economic cooperation with a progress towards free trade supported by increased financial aid and also with reference to political issues such as, respect for democracy, good governance and human rights.[342]

---

[337] Piening, Ibid. pp.80-1.
[338] Gomez, op.cit. p.145; Barbé, op.cit. p.122; *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye*, p.131.
[339] Gillespie, "Introduction Europe, the Mediterranean and the Islamists" p.1.
[340] Tovias, op.cit. p.16.
[341] *Avrupa Birliği'nin Akdeniz Politikası*, p.54; *Avrupa Akdeniz Ortaklığı*, European Commission DG1B External Relations, Brussels, 1997, p.4
[342] Bretherton and Vogler, op.cit. pp.156-8.

This initiative laid the foundations of a new regional relationship and represents a turning point in Euro-Mediterranean relations. In the Barcelona Declaration (see Annex I), the 27 Euro-Mediterranean partners established the main objectives of the Partnership in three chapters:

1. The definition of a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of political and security dialogue (Political and Security Chapter);
2. The construction of a zone of shared prosperity through an economic and financial partnership and the gradual establishment of a free trade zone (Economic and Financial Chapter);
3. The rapprochement between peoples through a social, cultural and human partnership aimed at encouraging understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies (Social, Cultural and Human Chapter).

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership consists of two complementary frameworks, the bilateral and the regional:

· At the bilateral level, the Union negotiates Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements with the Mediterranean Partners individually taken. These agreements reflect the general principles governing the new Euro-Mediterranean relationship, although they each contain characteristics specific to the relations between the EU and each Mediterranean Partner.

· At the regional level, regional dialogue represents one of the most innovatory aspects of the Partnership, covering at the same time the political, economic and cultural fields (regional cooperation).

The multilateral dimension supports and completes the bilateral actions and dialogues taking place under the Association Agreements. The Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona Process, composed of representatives of the European Union and the Mediterranean partners, meets on average every three months, to ensure the overall guidance of the established work programme on regional cooperation. The European Commission prepares and manages the monitoring of all

the regional partnership work. In this framework, every six months, on average, two sectoral ministerial meetings and five meetings at expert level take place.[343]

Since the Barcelona Conference in 1995, three other Euro-Mediterranean Conferences of Ministers of Foreign Affairs were held, in Malta in April 1997, in Stuttgart in April 1999, and in Marseilles in November 1999 (see Annex II for Presidency's Formal Conclusions). An informal Foreign Ministers' meeting in Palermo in June 1998, a conference on regional cooperation in Valencia in January 1999 and a think tank meeting in Lisbon in May 2000 also took place under the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Association Agreements with Tunisia, Morocco and Israel and the Interim Association Agreement with the Palestinian Authority are in force. The agreements with Jordan and Egypt were concluded and soon to be ratified by the parties. The agreements with Syria, Algeria and Lebanon are being negotiated with regular meetings. The Association Agreements with Turkey, Cyprus and Malta are different from those that were concluded or being negotiated with the Maghreb and the Mashreq countries. Moreover, during the Stuttgart conference, Libya was welcomed for the first time as special guest.[344] On the other hand, A Common Strategy of the European Union on the Mediterranean Region was annexed to the Presidency Conclusions of the Feira European Council of 19-20 June 2000 (See Annex III).

Christopher Patten, the European Commissioner for external relations, explains that the Barcelona Process has two main instruments to achieve its aims: bilateral association agreements and the objective of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area by 2010. He also comments about the progress that has been achieved since 1995. First of all, the Barcelona Process is the only forum where Ministerial meetings of 27 partners have taken place even during the difficult periods of the Middle East Peace Process. In terms of economic relations, Mediterranean imports from Europe

[343] http://www.euromed.net/information-notes/barcelona_en.html, 05.06.2000. This page is no longer available. Related information can be found on the EU's official server, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/med_mideast/euro_med_partnership.htm

[344] The Barcelona Process – Five Years On 1995-2000, (http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/med_mideast/euro_med_partnership/brochures/

amounts to some 47% of the total volume of imports, and exports from Mediterranean to the Union comprises some 52% of the total. Additionally, since 1995, the Union has provided over 4.4 billion Euro to the Mediterranean region and also has become the largest donor of non-military aid. Moreover, cooperation initiatives in the culture and civil society chapter such as protection of cultural heritage, cultural dialogue, youth project and so on have been successful. However, Patten also foresees two main challenges in the near future: overcoming complacency about the early success of the Barcelona Process and achieving peace in the Middle East. In order to tackle with challenges concerning the Barcelona Process, first, he proposes that South-South trade needs to be encouraged, since economic integration in the southern rim is an imperative prerequisite for the development of the region as a whole. Yet the Barcelona has focused on North-South trade and cooperation often with bilateral emphasis. Secondly, creation of subregional free trade areas with a comprehensive trade liberalisation is recommended by Patten. Moreover, far beyond the issue of tariff levels and non-tariff barriers, he calls for an action for bringing together policies on a wide range of economic issues such as public procurement, competition and mutual recognition agreements. He also remarks the necessity of deepening the dialogue in issues like drug trafficking, terrorism, immigration, conflict prevention and human rights. In dealing with the problems in the Middle East, he admits that a far-reaching peace process will require support and financial help along with the implementation of agreements on security arrangements, on refugees and so on.[345]

The first chapter, political and security partnership consists of three parts: political dialogue on bilateral and regional levels realised through regular meetings; activities to create partnership-building measures such as seminars on terrorism, or the creation of regional network of foreign policy institutes (EuroMeSCo); and the Charter for Peace and Stability. The guidelines of the Charter were drawn up at the 1999 Stuttgart Conference. It will be a politically and morally binding agreement for all

---

barcelona_5yrs_en.pdf, 06.07.2001).

[345]Patten, C., *The European Union's External Policy and the Mediterranean*, Euromed Report, no.8, 4 April 2000. (http://www.euromed.net/tools/euromed-report/issue8.htm, 04.09.2000)

Euro-Mediterranean partners for the purpose of preventing tensions and crises and for maintaining peace and stability by means of cooperative security. It will also increase the institutionalisation of the political dialogue on security and stability concerns. However, it is not expected to enter into force before a sufficient progress could be achieved in the Middle East peace process.[346]

Tanner explains that the politico-security chapter includes a mandate providing the Mediterranean region with a region-specific security arrangements stating that the participants consider any confidence and security-building measures that could be taken between the parties with a view to the creation of an 'area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean', including the long-term possibility of establishing a Europe-Mediterranean pact to that end.[347] Gomez argues that "the EU's ability to influence the Mediterranean security climate has persistently been weakened by a lack of competence on the security and defence aspects of foreign policy, and by disunity among its own Members States". However, with the Barcelona Declaration, he suggests that the Union is furnished with a new channel through which it can engage in security policy cooperation with the Mediterranean countries, discussing subjects such as terrorism, proliferation and conflict prevention. Therefore, as a result of the EU's strategic thinking of connecting economic prosperity with political stability, the Barcelona Declaration did not consider political and security topics independently from the economic, social and cultural issues.[348]

Piening points out the commitments undertaken by the signatories. If implemented, they would totally dispel conflict and human rights abuses from the region. The signatories promise to honour the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and ensure the effective legitimate exercise of such rights and freedoms. They pledge to develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems and to guarantee

[346] The Barcelona Process – Five Years On 1995-2000; *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye*, p.131.
[347] Tanner F., "The Mediterranean Pact: A Framework for Soft Security Cooperation" *Perceptions*, vol.1, no.4, December 1996-February 1997, (http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/i4/i4%2D4.htm, 12.04.2000)
[348] Gomez, op.cit. pp.133-4.

respect for diversity and pluralism in their societies by fighting with manifestations of intolerance, racism and xenophobia. Each partner will respect the territorial integrity and unity of another participant, and disputes will be settled by peaceful means without recourse to the threat or use of force. They also promise to cooperate in preventing and combating terrorism and fight against the expansion and diversification of organised crime and combat the drug problem in all its aspects. The parties accept to pursue a reliable Middle East area free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and to consider practical steps to prevent the proliferation of such weapons. They will avoid from developing military capacity beyond their legitimate defence requirements. Finally the participants are to regard what confidence and security building measures they might take with a view to create an area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean, including the long-term possibility of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean pact to that end.[349]

The European Union believes that the threats to European stability emanating from instability in North Africa arise fundamentally out of socio-economic problems that require first and foremost an economic response to help the region acquire the financial help to satisfy the demands of its peoples. This is why the Barcelona Process is considered as a suitable vehicle to respond to Mediterranean problems.[350]

Undoubtedly, the economic and financial partnership is the most important and the most interesting element of Barcelona for the non-European partners. Perthes believes that "the Partnership offers the prospect of substantially increased financial aid, privileged access to European markets and European support to rationalise and modernise the economies of these countries to enable them to face the challenges of the prospective Euro-Mediterranean economic space."[351] Similarly, Richmond argues that the EU involvement in the Mediterranean is due to the Union's potential to offer economic incentives for interdependence, stability and peace since the conflicts arising in the region constitute a threat to its own emerging framework of

[349] Piening, op.cit. pp.81-2
[350] Gillespie, "Northern European Perceptions of the Barcelona Process"

supranational government. Therefore, he comments that "the EU model is that economic interdependence presents states with an opportunity for prosperity and development, which is much needed in the Mediterranean region".[352]

Piening points out that the economic and financial partnership has long-term objectives such as the acceleration of socioeconomic development, improvement of the living conditions of the region's people and increase in their employment opportunities, reducing the wealth gap between North and South, and encouraging regional cooperation and integration. These objectives can be achieved through three approaches; the progressive establishment of a free trade area, economic cooperation and concerted action, and an increase in EU aid to its partners.[353]

The free trade area is to be created in a fifteen-year period with a target date as 2010. The participants agree to eliminate tariff and nontariff barriers to trade in manufactured goods in a negotiable timetable. Trade in agricultural products will also be liberalised as far as the different agricultural policies allow. Trade in services will be liberalised progressively, too. Economic cooperation and concerted action cover a range of fields from investments to environment. The role of the women in development, fish conservation, the energy sector, water supply and management, the restructuring of agriculture, transport and telecommunications, maritime law and services, science and technology, exchange of statistics are other areas that were listed for cooperation. Another aspect of economic and financial partnership is the EU aid, which is a prerequisite for progress in the other areas of agreed action.[354]

The partnership in social, cultural and human affairs is the third basket of the Barcelona Process. It recognises the need for strengthened exchange programs between young people and students, teachers, clerics, journalists, scientists, trade unionists, businesspeople and, political leaders. It also lists people-related areas with

---

[351] Perthes V., "Germany and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Gradually Becoming A Mediterranean State" EuroMeSCo Papers, no.1, Portugal, February 1998, p.5.
[352] Richmond, op.cit.
[353] Piening, op.cit. p.82
[354] Piening, Ibid. pp.82-3

high priority, such as, migration, illegal immigration, terrorism, drug trafficking, organised crime, corruption and the fight against racism and xenophobia.[355]

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, is the most ambitious cooperation framework in the region, with the largest membership, the widest scope of cooperation - including free trade agreements, security discussions, cultural and civil society dialogues. Therefore, as Joffé remarks, it serves long-standing EU objectives stemming from European anxieties over potential security threats from the Southern Mediterranean as well as from the need to reconstruct the Union's Mediterranean policy. Additionally, he anticipates that the Barcelona Process is the only vehicle through which economic development of the Southern Mediterranean region can be achieved with the essential components of regional peace and security structure.[356]

Perthes argues that

> "References to the respect of human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law represent European concerns much more than the interest of the Mediterranean partners. Consequently, the EU has also insisted on a human rights article in all association agreements. It seems that some of the Mediterranean partners accepted the human rights rhetoric, but never actually intended to adjust their policies in this respect. Under the stipulations of Barcelona and the association agreements, European insistence on the respect of human rights in the partner states is not an illegitimate interference in the domestic affairs of these states."[357]

For Europe, on the other hand, the political and security partnership is the most important dimension. In order to increase its own security as the main concern, Europe is to make Mediterranean a less volatile region. Therefore, the EU has emphasised the need for confidence and security-building measures and it gives great value to the establishment of cooperative schemes and common regional and

[355] Piening, Ibid. p.83
[356] Joffé G., "The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Two Years After Barcelona", Royal Institute of International Affairs, Middle East Programme, Briefing Paper no:44, May 1998, (http://www.riia.org/briefingpapers/bp44.html, 05.09.2000)
[357] Perthes, loc.cit. p.5

subregional structures that would help to create a Euro-Mediterranean Area of Peace and Stability. Since it launched the Barcelona initiative, the EU had to learn that regional security cooperation is not as smoothly and quickly achievable as initially foreseen. It also had to accept that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership could not solve regional inter-state or intra-state conflicts by itself.[358]

Gomez claims that right after the signing of the Barcelona Declaration, some diplomats expressed reservations about the possible duplication of political and security initiatives of other organisations in the Mediterranean, namely NATO and the OSCE.[359]

On 2-3 April 1998, a conference entitled *"Is the Barcelona Process working? EU policy in the Eastern Mediterranean"* was held by the Philip Morris Institute in Athens. Amongst the conclusions of the conference some points on the achievement of peace and stability in the region deserve attention, such as;

- Negative evaluations of the Barcelona Process are based, in part, on unrealistic expectations of what the initiative could accomplish in a short time.
- An over-emphasis on security issues also bears some blame; the EU's weak CFSP limits its actions in the security sphere. But on the economic sphere, the Euro-Med Partnership is viewed positively.
- The Euro-Med Partnership must be supported with concrete actions, including more confidence-building measures. The EU should also endorse the Charter for Peace and Stability in the Euro-Mediterranean region.
- Soft security issues – social, economic, political and cultural matters – are extremely important in the Mediterranean. There is a growing polarisation of the societies on the southern shore of the sea, and these tensions must be reduced. The EU can play a role by enforcing conditionality clauses in all its economic agreements, shuttle diplomacy, and the development of special assistance programs.

[358] Perthes, Ibid. p.6
[359] Gomez, op.cit. p.147.

- Cooperative security initiatives can help develop a feeling of commonality among neighbours.
- The economies of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean need to be restructured and an appropriate conditions for investment should be encouraged.
- Energy needs and exports are important issues that should be developed as a subject for cooperation.
- Free trade among non EU Mediterranean countries should be encouraged.
- The EU's economic weight could be used for greater political impulsion.[360]

In terms of Middle East conflict, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership process cannot be separated from the Arab-Israeli peace process. If the latter stagnates, the former will not advance, especially in its security dimension. Gomez explains that a number of Arab countries were reasonably sceptical about the long-term relevance of the Barcelona Process in the absence of progress on the Middle East peace process. From the start, the EU tried to ensure that the former did not become conditional upon progress in the latter. However, at the Arab League meeting in September 1996, the Arab participants threatened to withdraw from the Barcelona framework if Israel did not fulfil their commitments in the Occupied Territories.[361] Similarly, at second Conference of Foreign Ministers in Malta in 1997, the Arab states refused to express their approval for a document on confidence building measures. Moreover, they made it clear that they would not support the idea of a Stability Charter as long as the territorial conflict between Arabs and Israelis remained unresolved. From an Arab perspective, European concept of stability involves the invariability of borders and might be used as a pretext for Israel's refusal to give up occupied territory. So, the leading Arab states fear that their negotiation position would be weakened if they agreed to a separation of "soft" security issues from the hard ones, especially Israel's territorial occupation and its possession of nuclear arms. They emphasise that Israel refuses to sign the Non Proliferation Treaty and to discuss its nuclear armament.

---

[360] *Is the Barcelona Process Working? EU Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean*, Conference Proceedings, Athens, 2-3 April 1998, The Philip Morris Institute, Lambrakis Research Foundation, the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy. pp.11,15,21,24.
[361] Gomez, op.cit. p.147.

Israel does not see the Mediterranean as the appropriate regional context for a discussion of its nuclear armament or for structural arms in general.[362]

Perthes believes that the Euro-Mediterranean structure will not be the proper framework to deal with the questions of arms control and hard security. If arms control is to be discussed, the Mediterranean cannot be separated from the rest of the Middle East, and relevant extra-regional actors, mainly the United States, will have to be included. Moreover, he points out that if the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is to deal with the softer Mediterranean security issues, such as migration, drugs, terrorism, the export of conflicts, the EU will have to accept the causal relationship between Middle East peace process and Barcelona Process. He thinks that the Barcelona framework can help to stabilise the Middle East peace process. Consequently, if the EU wants the Barcelona Process to advance, it will have to become more active in the peace process since declarations and financial support alone are no longer sufficient.[363]

However, according to Piening, the success of the Barcelona Process will depend on the ability of the Arab partners to work in a cooperative and integrative machinery. Thus, the lack of cooperation among Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries will cause doubts in the project. He believes that a period of progress in settling the disputes between Israel and its neighbours would help the Barcelona Process to be successful. Equally, the existence of such initiative should encourage the Arab-Israeli peace process by building confidence and helping to reduce economic disparities that continue to intensify existing differences.[364]

Barbé expresses that the mistrust between the two shores creates a problem in dealing with security matters in the region. She continues with stating that

> "the Arab world has criticised the Euro-Mediterranean operation, arguing that the Europeans have turned Mediterranean economic and

[362] Perthes, op.cit. p.6
[363] Perthes, Ibid, pp.6-7.
[364] Piening, op.cit. p.84.

> social problems into their own security problems. The mistrust stems as much from the traditional dimensions of security (military dimension) as from economic and societal dimensions, especially from factors relating to identity. A case in point is the interpretation of human rights between Europe and the Mediterranean region. Another point of contention is the reluctance of the Maghreb countries to accept NATO's new role in the Mediterranean. The Maghreb countries repeatedly have accused the Mediterranean lobby (France, Spain and Italy) of creating troops and units (Eurofor and Euromarfor) to interfere in South Mediterranean affairs".[365]

Furthermore, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership does not deal with some other interstate and domestic crises and conflicts in the Mediterranean region. For instance, while the conflicts in the Balkans are not on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership agenda, Europe has been unable to find solution to the Cyprus problem.[366]

The association agreements so far concluded, about to be concluded, and still to be negotiated have not only created a new type of relationship between each of these countries and the EU. They have also provided the EU with new policy instruments for their relations with these countries. The new type of relationship goes beyond the classical type of international, state-to-state relations. First of all, EU-partner state relations are set into a multilateral frame. Because of association agreements and the Barcelona Declaration, they have a normative dimension to human rights and democracy as the guiding principles for each partner's domestic and foreign policies and to peace, security, development, understanding and even tolerance as policy goals. Moreover, they allow direct interaction between societies of the both European and the Mediterranean partners.[367]

Perthes believes that by this 'new' partnership, the EU and the Mediterranean partner states have allowed one another a certain degree of interference into their domestic affairs. According to the association agreements, either party may take 'appropriate measures' if the other does not fulfil their commitments. For instance, in principle,

---

[365] Barbé, op.cit. p.127.
[366] Perthes, op.cit. p.7.
[367] Perthes, Ibid. p.9.

Morocco would take such measures if EU states were to discriminate against its citizens. However, in practice, because of the actual differences of economic power, and the rather one-sided structure of Euro-Mediterranean economic interdependence, the EU uses the non-compliance clause as means of pressure for human rights abuses or other violations of the guiding principles and goals of the agreements. Another strong tool is the financial aid. According to Perthes, the new aspect of this partnership is, first, the possibility of direct European support to non-governmental organisations in the partner countries. Second, the attribution of EU funds to a region rather than to an individual country.[368]

According to Tank, the EU has a potential for strengthening democratic institutions as well as promoting economic stability regarding the Mediterranean basin. Believing that the opportunity to improve the credibility of the CFSP should not be ignored, she exemplifies that "an issue on which it has already taken action is the joint action on dual-use goods which promoted the development of a more stable international political scene through prohibiting the sale of armaments to rogue states".[369]

Spain has undoubtedly played a major role in convincing the EU that the problems of North Africa are European, and not merely Southern European, problems. In its self-appointed task of lobbying on the need to strengthen the Mediterranean policy of the Union, Spain was able to work harmoniously with France.[370] Northern member states of the EU are also interested in the security dimension of the Barcelona process. However, the predominant domain of northern interest has remained the economic dimension.

To Southern European governments, the level of commitment of the northern Europeans to the Barcelona process inevitably remains disappointing. The slowness of Euro-Mediterranean developments since Barcelona may be attributed partly to

[368] Perthes, Ibid. p.9.
[369] Tank, "The CFSP and the Nation-State", p.19.
[370] Gillespie, "Northern European Perceptions of the Barcelona Process"

northern priorities relating to Central and Eastern Europe, and partly to the cumbersome nature of the European Union. Agreements can take several years to be ratified, prior to implementation, and unanimity is needed in decisions relating to EU external policy.[371]

3.3. Other Mediterranean Initiatives

Before Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, there have launched or proposed number of initiatives to achieve cooperation in the Mediterranean, such as Arab-Maghreb Union, the "Five plus Five", the Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM), the Mediterranean Forum, Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Summits, the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group (ACRS), the WEU Mediterranean Dialogue, and the OSCE's Mediterranean Contact Group. All these initiatives aimed at creating platforms where conflicts could be negotiated and solved. Some of them have succeeded, some of them have failed. These initiatives have been mentioned briefly below.

3.3.1. Arab-Maghreb Union[372]

The Maghreb is a strategic subregion in which the instability stems from the tension between modernity and fundamentalism, aggravated by the arms build-up in the Maghreb countries. For Italy, Spain, France and Portugal, the stability of the Maghreb is important because of its geographical proximity. A serious crisis in the region could have a powerful impact on neighbouring European countries. According to de Vasconcelos, in terms of security, the main problem lies in South-South relations, that is in the relations between the Maghreb countries themselves, on the issue of inviolability of borders inherited from the colonial period. Moreover, each country has a different vision of the regional balance of power. The differing views of this balance led to the war in the Western Sahara and to the conflict between Morocco and Algeria in the Western Sahara and in the 1963 Desert War and to the

[371] Gillespie, op.cit.
[372] de Vasconcelos, op.cit. pp.29-30.

dispute between Libya and Tunisia which became a military conflict in 1983. This tendency for conflict among the Maghreb countries and the desire for supremacy in the region explain the significant increase in military expenditure by these countries in the 1980s.

Economic, political, and social matters are at the root of the main problems facing the Maghreb countries. A preventive strategy must be formulated to protect the Western Mediterranean from being contaminated by the instability. Implementing economic policies of co-development may help to stop population growth and dispersal and encourage the more efficient management of resources. The framework of the cooperation in the Western Mediterranean is established by the relations between the EC and the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA). Economic, political and social issues, including security and confidence-building measures were on the agenda. In order to do this, UMA, comprising Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania, should be supported as a means of enhancing regional interdependence and development. According to de Vasconcelos, this is the most significant contribution that Europe can make to stability of Mediterranean.

UMA was a step towards finding solutions to local disputes through negotiation based on mutual trust. The Treaty of Marrakech pointed out that the purpose of the UMA was to "safeguard the independence of each member state". As an example of progress, the reconciliation between Algeria and Morocco paved the way for a referendum in the Western Sahara.

3.3.2. The "Five Plus Five"

In 1983, French President François Mitterand proposed the development of a trans-Mediterranean cooperation in the Western Mediterranean. This proposition avoided discussions on sensitive issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict or the Greek-Turkish dispute. Due to this feature, the initiative was found realistic and it led to the "Five plus Five".[373] The creation of the "Five plus Five" in 1990 was aimed at developing cooperation between Spain, France, Italy, Portugal, and Malta on the one hand, and Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritania on the other. Larrabee et.al. point out that "discussion topics included natural resource management, economic links and financial assistance, immigration, and culture". This initiative excluded military security discussions from the agenda and presented a unique approach of stimulating the economic development in the region that the Arab countries might have been interested in.[374]

However, the "Five plus Five" confronted with serious impediments, of which the most important one was the international embargo on Libya. The absence of Egypt, friction between Algeria and Morocco over the Western Sahara and Algeria's internal instability also weakened the initiative. The decision making process which allowed the most reluctant partner to determine the speed of the discussions was also appeared as one of the important flaws of the "Five plus Five".[375]

3.3.3. The Forum for Dialogue and Cooperation in the Mediterranean

Since Egypt was excluded from the "Five plus Five", it proposed the organisation of the Forum for Dialogue and Cooperation in the Mediterranean, or the Mediterranean Forum in 1991. The initiative was co-sponsored by France and supported by Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal. It was launched in Alexandria in July 1994. The founding members were Algeria, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Morocco, Portugal, Spain,

[373] Biad, op.cit.
[374] Larrabee et.al., op.cit. pp..34-5
[375] Larrabee et.al., Ibid. pp..34-5

Tunisia and Turkey. Malta was accepted as an 11th member. The participants created three working groups on political dialogue, dialogue between cultures and civilisations, economic and social cooperation. This initiative, unlike the "Five plus Five", partly focuses on security issues.[376] Seeming like an updated version of the Euro-Arab Dialogue, the objective was to establish a framework for political and economic dialogue between the partners.[377]

Larrabee et.al. comment that most of the functions of the Mediterranean Forum are being overtaken by the Barcelona Process. However, they argue that by differentiating its activities, the Forum could accomplish a special relationship between North African and Southern European countries "to discuss issues that are too sensitive for high-profile multilateral discussion". It was suggested at the May 1996 summit that the Forum could become an informal framework on subjects of common interest. Since the countries most closely involved in the Middle East peace process such as Israel, Lebanon and Syria are not members, the Forum can be a platform for Mediterranean states to informally review the topics not included in the Barcelona process, like proliferation and terrorism, without being complicated by ongoing regional disputes.[378]

The eleven members of the Forum continue to hold regular ministerial meetings on regional issues, discussing the Middle East peace process, terrorism and organised crime, economic and cultural cooperation. According to Lesser et.al., the major weakness of the Forum is that its lack of substantive discussion and concrete cooperation activities. However, it remains as a useful informal grouping with an open agenda.[379]

[376] Larrabee et.al., Ibid. p.35.
[377] Biad, op.cit.
[378] Larrabee et.al., op.cit. p.35.
[379] Lesser et.al., op.cit. p.38.

3.3.4. The Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group (ACRS)

ACRS was established during the Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid in 1991 as a part of the multilateral track of the negotiations. As Peters points out, this working group marks the initiation of a regional arms control process for the first time in the history of Middle East. Because of the sensitive nature of talks, the participation of states outside the region was restricted. It consists of Israel and 12 Arab countries with the exception of Syria, Libya, Iran and Iraq.[380]

From the very beginning, the talks were characterised by sharp and fundamental disagreements between Israel and the Arab states over priorities and the approach to be followed. Peters comments that the Arab states, led by Egypt, gave the highest priority to the problem of weapons of mass destruction in the region and tried to put the question of Israel's nuclear capability on the agenda. Israel, refused to discuss this issue, focused on the need for developing a set of confidence building measures, such as the pre-notification of large-scale military exercises, the development of hotlines and crisis prevention mechanisms and verification procedures.[381]

The work of ACRS is divided into two baskets: conceptual and operational. In the first basket, long-term objectives of the arms control process are discussed with the aim of providing a framework for the agreement of set of principles. Negotiations in 1993 and 1994 produced the first draft of a "declaration of regional security and arms control in the Middle East". The parties agreed to finalise the wording of this declaration.[382] In the operational basket, proposals for joint rescue-at-sea exercises, the establishment of regional security centre in Amman, and a regional communication centre in Egypt were discussed. However, in the last meeting of ACRS in December 1994, the participants failed to approve the declaration of principles and specific items on the operational basket.[383]

---

[380] Larrabee et.al., op.cit. p.36; Peters J., "The Multilateral Dimension of the Middle East Peace Process" in R.Gillespie, ed., *Mediterranean Politics*, vol.2, London, Pinter, 1996, p.33.
[381] Peters, Ibid. p.33.
[382] Peters, Ibid. p.34.
[383] Larrabee et.al., op.cit. p.36.

As expressed by RAND analysts, ACRS is dependent on voluntary and easily revocable commitments. Several key countries, such as Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Iraq and Iran refused to join the talks. Along with these drawbacks, the most important problem has been the disagreement over the nuclear issue, which has led to a stalemate in the talks.[384] However, Peters argues that the talks have produced a greater awareness between the participants of their security concerns and fears, "and have planted the seeds for the application of confidence-building and arms reduction measures in the Middle East.[385]

3.3.5. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Economic Summits

The World Economic Forum organised a Middle East/North Africa economic conference in October 1994 in Casablanca with the aim of creating partnerships between the public and private sectors and focusing on immediate commercial opportunities and project in the region. The last yearly summit took place in 1997 in Qatar. However, the impasse in the Middle East peace process affected the MENA process and many Arab countries, including Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Syria refused to send representatives to that summit to protest Israel. Continuing tension in the Middle East has led the World Economic Forum to suspend all MENA activities indefinitely. Joffé believes that it is extremely difficult to anticipate that the process will be revived. As Lesser et.al. comment, MENA summits were not security initiatives, however, they were security related since they tried to expand the constituency for peace in the region and to encourage stability through development. From the European perspective, though, they were competitive with EU Mediterranean initiatives.[386]

[384] Larrabee et.al., Ibid. p.36.
[385] Peters, op.cit. p.34.
[386] Larrabee et.al., op.cit. pp.36-7; Lesser et.al., op.cit. p.39; Joffé, op.cit.

3.3.6. Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean

Barbé believes that the interdependence of Europe and the Mediterranean made the region a diplomatic priority for Spain, Italy and France. One of the initiatives based on the global security approach and a multidimensional agenda including environmental, socio-economic and cultural issues was the Spanish-Italian proposal in 1990 to convey a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM).[387]

According to Fernandez-Ordoñez, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) model could have been used for the Mediterranean region. With the priority of economic and cooperative dimension, CSCM could have established its own internal balances. The humanitarian sector and issues of stability and security going with parallel progress, CSCM could have been progressive and cumulative. Advances would be made by the summing up of results, and a new phase would be initiated only when the first planned objectives have been achieved. As its basic principles, CSCM was proposed be comprehensive, universal and progressive. It would be comprehensive because it must have included not only the Mediterranean basin but the whole area affected by the region's geopolitical dynamic. Moreover, it must have concerned with both military and nonmilitary aspects of security. There must have been a Mediterranean Act capable of codifying the common values of both shores. It would have formulated provisions in three baskets: security, cooperation and the humanitarian dimension. The Mediterranean Act would constitute the regional codification of universally valid principles as declared in the United Nations Charter and gathered together in the Helsinki Final Act: sovereign equality of states; abstention from the threat or use of force; inviolability of frontiers; territorial integrity of states; settlement of disputes by peaceful means; non-intervention in internal affairs; respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms; equal rights and self-determination of peoples; cooperation between states; and fulfilment in good faith of contractual obligations in accordance with international

[387] Barbé, op.cit. p.120.

law. The right to economic development of all the states in the region could also be added to this list.[388]

The CSCM proposal adopted the CSCE's methodology of dividing the areas of cooperation into three baskets; political and security, economic, humanitarian and cultural:

1- Security demands a specific approach to promote stability, to encourage détente, and to assist in crisis management. Under this heading where the progressive principle should have been placed. It is not a question of discussing disarmament but of creating a shared security system leading to the building of confidence. As Fernandez-Ordoñez comments "the concentration and proliferation of weaponry in the region demand improved monitoring of the various arms categories (ballistic missiles, chemical weapons, etc.)." therefore, the establishment of confidence-building measures could have generated transparency and promote stability in the region.[389]

2- Cooperation: this basket has had two aims. First, systematising the whole field of bilateral and multilateral cooperation without taking place of other bodies but carrying out a synthesis of the whole scope of cooperation in the Mediterranean region. Second, initiating certain strategic efforts based on the new principle of cooperation and concerning, for instance, the protection of the ecosystem, a new policy for safeguarding food supplies, new financial mechanisms, ad an employment plan for the Mediterranean and so on.[390]

3- The human dimension has been the most sensitive basket given the differences in ideas on the two shores regarding society and the individual's relationship to religion and the state. The objective would be to encourage tolerance and to work towards a common definition of human rights.[391]

---

[388] Fernandez-Ordoñez, op.cit. p.10
[389] Fernandez-Ordoñez, Ibid. p.10
[390] Fernandez-Ordoñez, Ibid. p.11

CSCM was designed to include the Islamic countries (from Mauritania to Iran), the Southern European countries (from Portugal to Turkey) and the US and the USSR. However, its extremely wide scope and the Arab-Israeli conflict hindered the convening of this conference.[392] Similarly as Larrabee et.al. point out, the first obstacle was the difficulty of conducting talks with states from such a vast and a diverse area, the second was American fears that the CSCM would derail the Middle East peace process and lessen US freedom of action in the Mediterranean, and the third was the complex nature of the planned CSCM decision making process which was considered to be burdensome. The RAND analysts comment that the CSCM's principle of linking military security to an overall strategy of cooperation and partnership has been revitalised in the Barcelona Process.[393]

3.3.7. The OSCE's Mediterranean Dialogue

The Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) established an informal contact group at the 1994 Budapest Review Conference. Italy, France and Spain took the lead and the representatives from Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco and Tunisia participated in the program. Jordan has joined later. At the Lisbon OSCE Summit in 1996, it was decided that the Forum for Security Cooperation (an OSCE body) to share its findings with Mediterranean partner states. The OSCE also organises yearly summits with Mediterranean representatives. In the 1998 summit in Malta, the contact group focused on the human dimension of security, the promotion of democracy, and the rule of law.[394]

According to RAND analysts, OSCE can play a role in achieving Mediterranean cooperation. Its relatively low profile has allowed this initiative to continue despite continuing tension in the Middle East. However, more capable and regionally

[391] Fernandez-Ordoñez, Ibid. p.11
[392] de Vasconcelos, op.cit. p.27.
[393] Larrabee et.al., op.cit. p.34.
[394] Larrabee et.al., Ibid. pp.38-9; Lesser et.al., op.cit. p.39.

focused frameworks, such as Barcelona Process would reduce OSCE's direct role in the region to information sharing and expert meetings.[395]

3.3.8. WEU's Mediterranean Dialogue

In 1992, with the Petersberg Declaration, the WEU decided to develop its ties with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. The discussions later extended to Egypt, Mauritania, Israel and Jordan. The main purpose of the initiative is to exchange views on Mediterranean security and defence issues. Political talks between WEU representatives and Mediterranean partner ambassadors in Brussels are supported by a series of expert meetings and seminars on Mediterranean security.[396]

The creation of EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR has increased the attention for WEU Mediterranean policies. These two multilateral military formations with Spanish, Italian, French and Portuguese units, have humanitarian functions such as the emergency evacuation of European citizens in case of a crisis. Consequently, North African states viewed these forces with suspicion and declare their objections in November 1996, when EUROFOR headquarters opened in Florence, Italy. These forces often described as symbols of a growing European interest in military intervention across the Mediterranean.[397]

As Lesser et.al. argue, the WEU would like to associate its Mediterranean Dialogue with the EU'S Barcelona Process. However, some participants of the Barcelona Process who do not wish to see the EU Dialogue take on a military dimension have resisted such attempts.

---

[395] Larrabee et.al., Ibid. p.39; Lesser et.al., Ibid. pp.39-40
[396] Larrabee et.al., Ibid. pp.37-8; Lesser et.al., Ibid. p.40
[397] Larrabee et.al., Ibid. p.38; Lesser et.al., Ibid. p.40

3.4. TURKEY and the MEDITERRANEAN

Located in the middle of three continents, Turkey is in a unique geostrategic position to serve as a regional influence. It has had a history of Ottoman empire and a republic created with the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk against colonial forces. However, especially for two decades, it has struggled with internal difficulties caused by both ethnic and religious civil unrest and economic crises. With the decision of removing the clause denoting Islam as the official religion of the Turkish state from its Constitution in 1928, Turkey defined its secular status. Yet the fundamentalist movement has grown within the context of parliamentary democracy through several political parties instead of militant groups. [398]

Geostrategically located on NATO's southeastern flank, Turkey was instrumental in the defence of Europe during the Cold War. Therefore, as Lesser points out Turkey's foreign and security outlook was relatively defined and naturally dominated by her role in the containment of Soviet power.[399] However, with the end of the Cold War, in some circles Turkey has been portrayed as an isolated country, mistrusted by the successor states of the Soviet Union and despised by the Arab world. She also has a history of troubled relations with most of her neighbours. Moreover, in 1997, Turkey froze her ties with the European Union after she failed to win the status of candidate for membership. In 1996, she almost went to war with her NATO ally, Greece over the Kardak islet in the Aegean Sea.[400] Therefore, her problematic relations with her neighbours have been presented as obstacles in her way to full membership in the EU. Nevertheless, Turkey is a key state for Western policies in the Middle East and the Gulf and has a distinct role to play in the Balkans. According to Evans, Turkey will be instrumental to any development of strategic issues in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean because of her location and the influence she can bring to bear in the Turkic world. Therefore, he comments that Turkey has enormous

[398] Tank, "Security Issues Emanating from the Mediterranean Basin", p.169-170
[399] Lesser, I.O., "Turkey in a Changing Security Environment", *Journal of International Affairs*, vol.54, no.1, Fall 2000.
[400] McBride, E., "Survey: Turkey –A Prickly Friend", *The Economist*, vol.355, no.8174, 10.06.2000.

strategic value and she will continue to need Western partnership and assistance to realise her full potential as a secular state on Europe's conflicting southeastern flank.[401] In the light of these evaluations, the significance of Turkey's role in the European and Mediterranean security structures are beyond doubt.

3.4.1. Turkey's role in the European Security after the Cold War

Turkey as a secular state with a predominately Muslim population and as a buffer between Europe and the Middle East and Caucasus regions has proved its significance. Once valued as a deterrent to the Soviet threat, Turkey is now considered a key ally in stopping terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism from seeping across the Bosphorus Straits. Turkey also offers opportunities as an emerging market and a potential site for the Caspian Sea oil pipeline. Finally, Turkey won U.S. favour by supporting the Gulf War, participating in Bosnian peacekeeping, and providing a base for U.S. fighter planes monitoring the "no-fly-zone" in northern Iraq.[402]

Turkey's geostrategic position has changed with the end of the Cold War. Instead of clear cut threats coming from the opposite bloc, it is generally accepted that the breakdown of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union created unstable circumstances in regions surrounding Turkey. Hence Turkey's immediate environment is now more volatile and less predictable than at the time of the bipolar system.[403]

Turan comments that after the end of the bipolar world, European attention turned to soft security concerns, such as drug trafficking into Western Europe, unauthorised immigration, rise of Islamic fundamentalism, environmental pollution and terrorism. Therefore, "some European Union and NATO members began to think that Turkey's

---

[401] Evans, M.C., "Turkey and the European Union: A Strategic Dichotomy", *Royal United Service Institute for Defense Studies Journal*, vol.144, no.5, October 1999.

[402] Gabelnick T., "Turkey: Arms Sales and Human Rights", *The Progressive Response*, vol.3, no.40, November 1999, (http://www..foreignpolicy-infocus.org/progresp/vol3/prog3n40.html, 24.11.1999)

[403] Turan, op.cit.

role as a strategic ally was no longer important."[404] During the Cold War, Turkey served as a strong NATO ally for European security in the southern flank of the alliance. However, Tank argues that with the declining significance of NATO in the post-Cold War era and the rise of global division based on religious and ethnic differences, Turkey has been repositioned in the Middle East.[405]

However, Orhun comments that "Turkey's geographical location naturally makes her more sensitive and vulnerable to specific security issues in the region and requires her to be more active in cooperation schemes", commenting that Turkey regards NATO as the main security structure in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as in its own security policy. Turkey's general perspective on the importance of NATO is characterised by three factors. First, security has always been an significant issue for Turkey owing to her geopolitical location. Second, Turkey's NATO membership has been one of the main pillars of her foreign and security policy, not only due to Alliance's security guarantee, but also as a clear manifestation of her Western vocation. Third, Turkey has been one of the major providers of security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.[406]

Similarly, Lesser comments that NATO's New Strategic Concept declared at the 1999 Washington Summit emphasises a range of non-traditional missions along with traditional Article V commitments. This is of considerable significance to Turkey since, in functional terms, these new missions in defence of common interests are most likely to occur in the European periphery rather than in Central and Eastern Europe. Most of NATO's current planning scenarios involve contingencies in Turkey's neighbourhood, many involving Turkey itself. To the extent that this functional focus on Europe's southern periphery continues and deepens, Turkey will occupy more central role in NATO's planning. In addition, NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue is of increasing interest to Turkey because the initiative's centre of gravity has shifted to the Eastern Mediterranean in recent years. At the same time, with

[404] Turan, Ibid.
[405] Tank, "Security Issues Emanating from the Mediterranean Basin", p.161.
[406] Orhun, op.cit. pp.29-30.

multiple risks on its borders, Turkey retains a relatively strong interest in the preservation of a clear-cut Alliance commitment to territorial defence. If the enlargement of NATO membership and missions threatens to weaken the commitment or make it more conditional, Turkey would show her reluctance.[407]

According to Church and Phinnemore, after the end bipolar world order, the role of the Turkey has seemed faded in terms of European security. However, the transformation of the former Soviet Republics from communist system to market economy, the continuing situation in Cyprus, PKK violence in the European cities, the Islamic interest in the Bosnia and Macedonia have ensured her importance. Therefore, the European Union has its stake both encouraging Turkey's democratic stability and in using it as a bridge to unsettled regions.[408]

However, the creation of European Security and Defence Identity caused some problems for Turkey. First of all, at NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Florence in May 2000, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs İsmail Cem declared that Turkish position would be worsened with the ESDI in comparison with the country's situation in WEU. He summarised Turkish demands as follows:

1. Preservation of the rights achieved in WEU.
2. Participation in decision-making procedure of operations using NATO assets.
3. Consideration of Turkish security concerns in operations not using NATO assets.[409]

Similarly, Defence Ministers of 15 European countries, including Norway, Iceland, Turkey and 12 EU candidates, declared that they wanted to join the Union's planned rapid reaction force. It was also reported that Turkey had offered a substantial contribution to the force. However, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit announced that EU proposals for a new security structure in cooperation with NATO disrespected the Turkish rights by excluding Ankara from key decision-making procedures. The EU's

[407] Lesser, "Turkey in a Changing Security Environment"
[408] Church and Phinnemore, op.cit. p.496.
[409] "AGSK aynı tas aynı hamam" *Radikal*, 25.05.2000.

rapid reaction force's possibility of using NATO assets automatically disturbs Turkey. Turkish officials insist that such access be granted on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, due to its concerns, Turkey has been blocking an agreement between NATO and the EU. Recently, German and French Defence Ministers reiterated their call to Turkey abandon its objection, stating that this policy cannot work on a case-by-case basis since it needs a certain continuity.[410]

According to Lesser, Turkey view her unclear role in the European Union's security and defence arrangements as a key test case for her post-Helsinki place in Europe. The Helsinki decision to give Turkey EU candidate status, coupled with new European activism in defence initiatives, has revived Turkish concerns about country's place in future European security structures beyond NATO framework. Ankara is eager to preserve and expand the role accorded her as an associate member of the WEU, as the WEU organisation is being absorbed in an unclear manner by the European Union itself. If Europe is serious about building its stated common Foreign and Security Policy pillar and giving substance to the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), this question will gain importance. Specific Turkish concerns include the nature of Ankara's participation in EU decision making in matters of crisis management and military intervention, a voice in the use of NATO and its Turkish assets, and the maintenance of a strong transatlantic link.[411]

Lesser comments that Turkey's concern is understandable in light of European reserve on these issues. In the wake of Helsinki Summit, many EU states have shown little enthusiasm for giving Turkey an integral role in ESDI, and there is no consensus in Brussels about these questions. Turkey has offered to contribute a brigade to Europe's aim of 60,000 rapidly deployable troops in or around Europe, but has received no forma response. Basically, the European initiative toward a common foreign and security policy and a more independently European defence capability

[410] Gordon P.H. "How Bush Could Help Europe to Change Its Mind" *International Herald Tribune*, 12.06.2001, "Turkey Assails EU over Defense Plan" *International Herald Tribune*, 24.11.2000, Security Watch Electronic Newsletter, http://www.sipo.gess.ethz.ch, 04.07.2001.
[411] Lesser, "Turkey in a Changing Security Environment"

requires decisions about who is 'in' and what is to be defended. These are questions not only about potential threats to Europe but also its geographical definition and identity. Therefore, these issues are of supreme, long-term importance for Turkey's place in the Euro-Atlantic system.[412]

Due to these developments, Turkey's government faces delicate dilemmas. While Turkey is committed to closer integration with Europe, the primacy of her security concerns mandates a continued and close strategic relationship with the United States since her preferences in this regard are similar to those of Washington. Turkey wants Europe to emerge as a capable and concerted force in security matters, but wants a secure seat at the table. Moreover, Turkey also faces security challenges in her relationship with Russia and on its Middle Eastern borders that cannot be easily settled without the active involvement of the United States. Thus, according to Lesser, Turkey has an especially strong interest in maintaining a close combination of European and transatlantic defence, not only for deterrence purposes, but also to hedge against the possibility of Turkish exclusion from core EU defence efforts.[413]

In sum, in a security environment increasingly characterized by "transregional" problems, Turkey is a transregional actor. After the Cold War, there has been a rise in attention to transnational risks, from spillovers of terrorism and political violence, to the growing reach of ballistic missiles. In fact, these risks are not simply transnational, but, more significantly, transregional i.e., cutting across regional security lines. According to Lesser,

> Turkey has long viewed itself as a "bridge" in international relations, whereas the Western tendency, even after the Cold War, has been to see Turkey as a "barrier" to instability emanating from Eurasia and the Middle East. The notion of Turkey as a borderland state, to use the terminology of early 20th-century geopoliticians, has considerable relevance in an era of transregional challenges. But today, Turkey is not simply a barrier to security risks, but also an increasingly capable and assertive actor in its own right, and potentially a more valuable partner in managing transregional problems; that is, problems that

[412] Lesser, Ibid.
[413] Lesser, Ibid.

> may have regional origins but are capable of influencing the security environment further afield. Such problems abound on Turkey's borders, from the Gulf and the Arab-Israeli dispute, to the Caucasus and the Balkans. New lines of communication for energy and nonenergy trade, converging in or near Turkey, reinforce this transregional role.[414]

3.4.2. Geopolitical and Strategic position of Turkey in the Mediterranean

When one looks at the map of the Mediterranean region in a geography book, in the West, Spain is seen connecting Europe to Africa with its culture offering a mixture of Christianity and Islam. At the other end of the map, Turkey is seen linking Asia to Europe with its role in international relations as a model harmonising Western values with Islamic beliefs.[415]

Turkish strategic analysts see Mediterranean security as part of a greater security system consists of the Caucasus and Central Asia, the Middle East and the Balkans. According to Turan, when Turkey looks at the Mediterranean basin in terms of security relations, it comprehends a situation which differs in major ways from the relaxed security mood which illustrates the Maghreb and the EU member-countries located at the Western Mediterranean. First of all, although recognising that some soft security concerns have gained importance, Turkey feels there continues to exist some major hard security concerns in the region. Moreover, partly due to its location, partly to its history, and partly to its cultural, social and economic connections, Turkey views Mediterranean security as part of a set of interdependent security concerns which include the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Balkans and the Middle East.[416]

---

[414] Lesser, I.O., "Western Interests In A Changing Turkey" in Z. Khalilzad, I.O. Lesser, F.S. Larrabee, eds., *The Future Of Turkish-Western Relations: Toward A Strategic Plan*, Santa Monica, RAND, 2000. (www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1241, 08.09.2001)

[415] Bleda T., "The Mediterranean and the Black Sea", *Perceptions*, vol.1, no.3, September-November 1996, (http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/i3/i3%2D5.htm, 23.02.2000)

[416] Turan, op.cit.

Besides Turkey has some unique security concerns which have implications for Mediterranean security. Possible contingencies in those regions are of great concern to Turkey. First, each regional conflict has the possibility that Turkey will be asked to contribute to its settlement, such as making some facilities available to other military forces, or making force contributions to some international operation. Second, each of these conflicts carries with it the potential of escalation that might bring Turkey in. Another Middle Eastern conflict initiated by Iraqi actions, a new Arab-Israeli conflict and conflicts in the Caucasus are all examples of such possibilities. Third, each of these contingencies are likely to produce other soft security problems such as a new wave of immigrants or a re-exhilaration of terrorist movements.[417]

Hence the security position especially in the Eastern Mediterranean constitutes an important part of the Turkey's overall security policy. For Turkey, the Mediterranean region comprises the Middle East, Greece and Cyprus, the Balkans, and Europe, meaning that Eastern Mediterranean is one of the main concerns for Turkish foreign policy. Tayfur continues with stating that

> "This is because the Eastern Mediterranean presents a variety of problems that are perceived as important threats to Turkish territorial integrity and the country's vital interests. The problems with Greece and Syria, the Cyprus problem, the Arab-Israeli conflict and its spillover effects in the region constitute the main preoccupations of the Turkish foreign policy establishment in the Mediterranean overall."[418]

Similarly, Orhun claims that since the security of Turkey cannot be separated from that of the Eastern Mediterranean, she is more concerned with the conflicts, instabilities and risk factors in the region proposing that a broad and comprehensive approach is needed.[419]

---

[417] Turan, Ibid.
[418] Tayfur F., "The Turkish Vision of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership", EuroMeSCo Papers, no.8, Portugal, March 2000, p.6.
[419] Orhun, op.cit. p.30.

Turan comments that Turkish foreign policy and security community share a common feeling that the EU cannot be relied on for dealing with hard security concerns, criticising EU thinking as based on short-term tactical considerations. Furthermore, there is reluctance on the part of each EU member to bear the cost of security, trying to free ride on the others, and to pass the costs of hard security to the United States. The EU has a tendency to reduce all security concerns to soft security concerns and to avoid conceptualising any security matter as being one of hard security.[420]

Paying little attention to the EU as a reliable partner in addressing hard security issues (including those that have a connection with the Mediterranean security), Turkey has adopted a three-tract approach to cope with security challenges. First, it tries to cooperate with willing or interested allies within the framework of NATO. Turkey's willingness to extend cooperation to allied forces operating under UN auspices in the Gulf War, or sending patrol planes to fly over Bosnia are examples of this approach. A second approach requires forming other security links in the region, such as the military cooperation with Israel. A third approach includes efforts intended to reduce tensions so that the need for hard security concerns is lessen. Turkey's making facilities available for the implementation of Operation Provide Comfort is an example for this.[421]

Turkey's relations with Greece constitute a major part of her security concerns. Cyprus is one of the most conflicting issues on both sides agenda. Moreover, there exist problems concerning the Aegean Sea such as the extent of territorial waters, remilitarisation of Aegean Islands and the delimitation of the continental shelf. However, Greece has denied the existence of these problems other than the delimitation of continental shelf. Therefore, a possible armed conflict between these two countries would spread over the Mediterranean and create a great challenge for the European Union. According to Copley, the asymmetry between Turkish and Greek strategic and military capabilities had been of secondary consideration during

[420] Turan, op.cit.
[421] Turan, Ibid.

much of the Cold War, because of a suppression of regional rivalry as the two countries as part of NATO faced the Warsaw Treaty states. Now, due to a set of global and regional factors, the potential for instability and conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean is greater than at any time in the past two decades. Since the overall Eastern Mediterranean is at the centre of a number of geopolitical issues, how the balance of power resolves itself in the region during the coming decade will play a large role in determining how the new global balance of power emerges. This regional balance of power considers Greece and Turkey as the main actors in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea.[422]

At this point a comparison of military and strategic capabilities of two sides would be useful. Copley points out that, for more than a century, there has been an asymmetry between Greece and Turkey, largely in favour of Turkey in the sense of classic power factors. Today, because of a range of new, post-Cold War geopolitical and global factors, that asymmetry becomes significant. He also comments that "it is also a strategic theater in which external forces play a great role, and any mismanagement, or maladroit or imbalanced intervention, by well-meaning extra-regional players is likely to further tilt the situation in the direction of instability".[423]

As can be seen from Table 3.1., in every key determinant, Turkey dominates Greece. Even in the area of greatest parity – combat aircraft – Turkey still has a 17 percent margin over Greece. Moreover, in the ground force area, the Turkish manpower overwhelms Greece, with an almost five-to-one advantage. According to Copley, both Greece and Turkey can argue that most of their forces were developed to accommodate the needs of NATO until the end of the Cold War in 1990-91. However, the continued modernisation of their defence structures, and the inability to lessen force levels as a result of the end of the Cold War, has been due to other threats along with a degree of revived mutual suspicion between Greece and Turkey. During the late 1990s, the Greek and Turkish governments began a process of greater

[422] Copley, G.R., "Asymmetry Among Allies", *Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy*, vol.29, no.1, January 2001.
[423] Copley, Ibid.

openness towards each other, with a commensurate lowering of mutual tensions. Yet this brief interlude has been overshadowed by the fear of future threats which have not yet been fully quantified.[424]

Table 3.1. Comparison of Turkish and Greek defence capabilities

	Turkey	Greece	Turkish Position as % of Greek
Population	65,666,677 (July 2000 est.)	10,601,527 (midyear 2000 est.)	619%
Land Area	780,580 sq km	131,944 sq km	591%
GDP	$184.7 billion (1999)	$125.1 billion (1999)	148%
Defence Budget	$8.95 billion (1998)	$4.04 billion (1998)	221%
Defence Manpower	Appr. 800,000 of which 645,000 active (574,800 conscripts)	170,500 (112,500 conscripts)	470%
Main Battle Tanks	3,407	1,785	190%
Armoured Personnel Carriers	2,500	2,102	119%
155mm and + artillery pieces	864	580	149%
Attack helicopters	37	20	185%
Submarines	17	8	212%
Destroyers and frigates	24	17	141%
Heavy airlift aircraft	33	15	220%
Front-line combat aircraft	448+	381	117%

(Source: Copley, "Asymmetry Among Allies", *Defence & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy*, vol.29, no.1, January 2001)

In case of further destabilisation in the Eastern Mediterranean or Balkans theatre, the relative military strengths of Greece and Turkey obviously become of immediate importance. Copley believes that the Greek-Turkish geopolitical balance determines the future global strategic balance to a great deal between the market oriented West and an expansion of the existing radical Muslim region to the East. He finds it critical to the West that Turkey be helped to stabilise and modernise and be

[424] Copley, Ibid.

embraced into the West rather than be channelled into an alliance with bloc which rejects modernisation, free markets and freedom of belief.[425]

Therefore, with full membership in the European Union, Turkey, as a powerful NATO ally with her strategic and military capabilities, could become an important actor for the European Security and Defence Identity. However, the European Union declared the resolution of the Cyprus and Aegean related problems as part of the prerequisites to Turkish admission to the Union. Expectedly, this declaration caused an impasse in relations with European Union. For instance, in November 2000, Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz stated that Turkey would not make any sacrifices on issues such as Cyprus. He continued with saying that if the EU decides to solve the Aegean and Cyprus issues according to the demand of Greece, then being an EU member would not be beneficial for Turkey any more. Similarly, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit said that if a solution on these issues could not be reached in line with Turkey' expectations, Turkey's reaction would not be only verbal. Moreover, President of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Rauf Denktaş said on November 24, 2000, that he would not attend the next round of meetings to resolve the Cyprus crisis because the EU had cited resolution of the problem as a prerequisite to Turkish membership. On January 28, 2001, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's Special Envoy to Cyprus, Alvaro de Soto met with Denktaş but could not convince him to return to the proximity talks. Explaining why a new round for the proximity talks were unnecessary, Denktaş said "the reason for the failure of the proximity talks is the fact that the Greek administration was seen as Cyprus's legal government. If the UN demands a united island under a confederation, they must accept Greek and Turkish Cypriots as equal. There are two different nations, democracies and governments on the island".[426]

According to Copley, the belief by the Turkish General Staff, as well as by the Turkish electorate, that conditions imposed on Turkey for entry into the European Union are so difficult that membership could be a decade or even two decades away.

[425] Copley, Ibid.
[426] Copley, Ibid.

This means that the benefits of EU membership delayed for Turkey, while at the same time the political and economic requirements to meet EU conditions would cause problems in Turkey in the short term. He comments that the Turkish leaders believe that the EU requirements, including Turkish military withdrawal from Northern Cyprus and restructuring the economy, to be potentially the source of popular anger against the Government, should they be implemented. Therefore, the carrot is too far away to appear attractive, and the stick is too close for comfort.[427]

Middle East is another important region for Turkey's security concerns. According to Lesser, since the founding of the Republic, Ankara has been a relatively hesitant actor in the Middle East. This hesitance has several causes and is reflected by a similar atmosphere of ambivalence toward Turkey shown by most of its Middle Eastern neighbours. The Ottoman imperial experience in the region left a persistent legacy on all sides and contributes to Turkey's generally cool relations with her Arab neighbours. For secular Arab nationalists, Turkey has been a colonial power in the region, and has been an integral part of the Atlantic Alliance which is an unpopular institution in the region throughout the years. Turkey's cross-border operations in Northern Iraq and her expanding strategic relationship with Israel has invoked concern even in moderate Arab states like Egypt. For Islamists in the Arab world, Turkey is equally problematic. Atatürk's secular legacy is viewed with deep dislike by Islamists, and this has been reinforced by periodic pressures from Turkey's military and secular elites to contain Islamist politics within Turkey.[428]

Lesser comments that more traditional geopolitics also play a role. Syria has a range of tangible disputes with Turkey, including access to water from the Tigris and Euphrates, border disputes concerning Hatay, and has played the Kurdish card in relations with Turkey through the support for PKK operations. Egypt is concerned about Turkey's role as a rival in Middle Eastern affairs outside the Arab framework due to Turkey's unique links to NATO and more recently to Israel. Jordan has been open to strengthened security relations with Turkey partly as an additional measure

[427] Copley, Ibid.
[428] Lesser, "Turkey in a Changing Security Environment".

of reassurance against her own highly insecure environment, but is not prepared for the kind of apparent relationship that has emerged between Turkey and Israel.[429]

Turkish security concerns about Iran are also increasing. Iran is an important competitor as an outlet for Caspian energy in world markets. Observers often attribute the slow progress on commercial aspects of the proposed Baku-Ceyhan pipeline to investors awaiting favourable political developments in Iran that might make a shorter and cheaper pipeline to the Gulf there more practical. Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs are of substantial concern to Turkish defence analysts. Moreover, revelations about Turkey's shadowy Hizbullah groups have raised new questions about an Iranian role in Turkey's Islamist politics. Finally, the reduction in Syrian support for the PKK has had the effect of increasing the PKK presence across the border with Iran, and has provoked a strong Turkish response.[430]

By the end of the 1990s, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean had become a centre of the security policy activism that many analysts now see as the hallmark of a new Turkish approach to international affairs. There are several examples of this approach. The first one is Turkey's threat to use military force to neutralise Greek Cypriot S-300 surface-to-air missiles in case of their deployment. In the aftermath of the ensuing diplomatic maelstrom, Greek Cypriots did not deploy the missiles. Lesser comments that "Turkey's threat to act revealed a new assertiveness and confidence in its policy, and may also reflect the changing military balance in the post-Cold War eastern Mediterranean". Another example of this activist approach concerns Turkey's relations with Syria. After several years of repeated Turkish threats to act against PKK bases in Syria and Syrian-controlled Beka Valley, this pressure reached a level preceding Abdullah Öcalan's flight from Damascus. According to Lesser, many Western observers are convinced that if Öcalan had remained in Damascus, and if Syria had maintained its support for the PKK at past levels, Turkish forces would have intervened in some way across the border.[431]

---

[429] Lesser, Ibid.
[430] Lesser, Ibid.
[431] Lesser, Ibid.

Third manifestation of Turkey's new foreign policy has been the emergence of defence relations with Israel. Ankara has had an implicit and cooperative relationships with Israel for decades. Israel's need for allies on the Middle Eastern periphery and both sides shared interests during the Cold War encouraged quiet ties between the countries. By the end of the 1990s, this relationship has become explicit and included a range of cooperative efforts on trade and defence. Turkey has a diversified interest in a strategic relationship with Israel. At geopolitical level, shared interests and cooperation with Israel give Turkey additional power to contain security risks on its Middle Eastern borders. Intelligence sharing and cooperation on common and specific security threats like ballistic missiles and terrorism contribute to the relationship. According to Lesser, the benefits of Turkey are wide-ranging in terms of more specific defence cooperation. Turkish defence-industrial programmes and military procurement both of which are dependent on American sources and subject to arms transfer restrictions can be diversified. Joint exercises and exchanges constitute important dimensions of the relationship and Israeli aircraft regularly train in Turkish airspace. Finally, Turkish observers often describe the increasing relations with Israel as an opportunity to improve the Turkish profile in Washington in ways that might be helpful in arms transfer and human rights debates. Over the long term, Turkey's relationship with Israel is likely to create a more active strategic engagement in the Middle East for Turkey in terms of geopolitical and defence interests.[432]

Another important security concern for Turkey in the region is the security of the energy sources and transportation routes. According to Khalilzad, while the Gulf is critical to future energy security, the Caspian Basin can also play an important role and should not be ignored. Compared to the Gulf, the region has much less oil, production costs are much higher, and the cost of exports will be significantly higher. Nevertheless, it can assist in diversifying supplies. For Turkey's own energy security, the Caspian basin could become vitally important. If the current plans for bringing oil and gas from the region to Turkey materialise, Ankara will become

[432] Lesser, Ibid.

critically dependent on the Caspian Basin. A major part of the Turkish plan is to build the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, which would bring Caspian oil and gas across Turkey. The United States and Turkey have been very vocal supporters of the project. However, Khalilzad argues that the Turks, Western Europeans, and Americans have not been serious about building the pipeline. The initiative has been left largely to the private sector, and the energy companies involved are understandably reluctant to move ahead with such a costly project if the economics of the scheme are uncertain. If current trends hold, it is unlikely to be built. The reason for supporting the project has been geopolitical: to bolster Turkey's regional role; to orient the exporting countries toward the West and to consolidate their independence from Russia; to discourage increased reliance on Iran; and to reduce the environmental risks of increased tanker traffic through the Black Sea and the Bosphorus. Therefore, the investment can be justified in geopolitical terms, and can be one of the first steps in focusing the Turkish-European-American alliance on a new agenda on which energy security figures prominently.[433]

Turkey already consider the Caspian Basin as very important because of ethnic ties and geographic proximity. Energy dependence will make the region even more important. The Caspian Basin is also potentially very unstable because of internal factors in each of the key energy-producing countries, threats of regional conflicts, and possible intervention from outside the region. In order to get Turkish cooperation to provide security for energy supplies from the Persian Gulf, and because of the importance of the Caspian Basin, the West should be more attentive to Turkish interest in the security of the region and work with Ankara to promote its political and economic development. Should the alliance between Turkey, the United States, and Western European nations be revitalised along the lines proposed here, Turkey will become even more central in strategic terms. Turkey is ideally located to play a vital role to ensure security both in the Persian Gulf and in the Caspian Basin. Khalilzad comments that Turkish military facilities provide an excellent location for

[433] Khalilzad, Z., "A Strategic Plan For Western-Turkish Relations" in Z. Khalilzad, I.O. Lesser, F.S. Larrabee, eds., *The Future Of Turkish-Western Relations: Toward A Strategic Plan*, Santa Monica, RAND, 2000. (www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1241, 08.09.2001)

projecting power to both regions. For example, the bulk of Persian Gulf and Caspian energy resources are within 1,000 miles of Incirlik. An agreement between Turks, Europeans, and Americans on energy security will provide one clear, strategic direction for relations, and should focus on planning and developing scenarios to deal with these issues jointly. It will also provide a basis to determine the kind of forces that each will need for missions related to ensuring energy security, and the kind of presence and facilities the United States and the Europeans would need in Turkey.[434]

In sum, Turkey's position in a changing security environment also defines her role in the Mediterranean region. Since Turkey's own security debate has changed in fundamental ways over the past decade, the country's security horizons are now much wider than they were during the Cold War. According to Lesser, an important aspect of this evolution has been the persistence of internal security issues in the broader Turkish security debate, and the inclination to see some key developments in the external environment through this perspective. Moreover, the European security environment has evolved in ways that should give Turkey a more important role. Therefore the growing emphasis on security problems around Europe's southern periphery, from the Mediterranean to the Middle East and Central Asia, is central to this change. In critical regions such as the Middle East, Turkey has shown a willingness and an ability to act decisively in her own interests. At the same time, Ankara has played a key role in coalition approaches to regional security in the Balkans.[435]

[434] Khalilzad, Ibid.
[435] Lesser, "Turkey in a Changing Security Environment".

3.4.3. Turkish Foreign Policy and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

In a report prepared by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Euro-Mediterranean Process and Turkey, it is stated that the Process could proceed with the aim of bringing stability to the region since it was able to bring together most of the Mediterranean countries and had financial means for the projects that were envisaged. Moreover, as expressed by Turkey at the Barcelona Conference, due to the current world trend toward economic integration, it was natural that the Mediterranean basin should be a driving force. Therefore Turkey believed that the economic and financial aspects of the Partnership should be the dominant features.[436]

According to Tayfur, there has been a degree of indifference in the Turkish perception of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership since the EU launched it in 1995. However, after the acceptance of Turkish candidacy for EU membership in Helsinki Summit in December 1999, the degree of this indifference, especially in the economic and social spheres, decreased. Nevertheless, he believes that the EMP cannot be considered part of the immediate Turkish foreign policy agenda. While connecting this attitude with the fact that foreign policy is a function of the geo-strategic and geo-political position of a country, Tayfur comments that, because of her location, Turkey has to deal with problems in different regions such as Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans, Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.[437]

Furthermore, according to Turkey the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is not the appropriate structure for its relations with the EU. It is argued that Turkey cannot be included along with Maghreb and Mashreq countries since they do not have any intention such as being member of the Union. As Aliboni points out in the conference entitled *"Is the Barcelona Process working? EU policy in the Eastern Mediterranean"*, Turkey does not want to get involved with the Euro-Med

[436] The Euro-Mediterranean Process and Turkey, January 2001, (http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/adc/euromed.htm, 15.02.2001)
[437] Tayfur, op.cit. p.5

Partnership for fear of being put in the same category with the Southern Mediterranean countries.[438] It is also important that the EU has still unfulfilled financial responsibilities towards Turkey stemming from the Association Agreement and the Customs Union Decision. Moreover, the EU decided to transfer these funds to Turkey through Mediterranean MEDA Programme instead of direct EU channels and this is considered typical exclusionary behaviour of EU towards Turkey. Finally, in terms of security concerns, Turks think that, because of NATO membership and WEU associate membership, Turkey should not be considered in the same group with other Mediterranean countries. After Helsinki Summit, while the Turkish view of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is changing especially in the economic sphere, officials still emphasise that Turkey differs over political and security issues.[439]

According to Tayfur, Turks believe that EU's concern with the economically poor regions of its southern periphery is the cornerstone of the EMP project. For example, migration from the South has been one of the most important issues for Europe, particularly for economic reasons. Economic underdevelopment along with internal and regional political problems of the Mediterranean countries such as Algeria may create an unstable periphery for the EU which unavoidably affect the European security. Therefore, the EU launched a Mediterranean project, which foresees a system of economic and security cooperation in the region. It is acceptable that such cooperation could not have been established by the regional states without the European initiative. Tayfur states that Turkey welcomes the initiative because it promotes economic development and aims to reduce internal and external political tension in the region. However, Turkey feels that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is urgent for the security of the EU. While Turkey is willing to cooperate on economic matters with other Mediterranean countries, because of the EU emphasis, political and security considerations often dominate the discussions in official Euro-Mediterranean meetings.[440]

---

[438] *Is the Barcelona Process working? EU policy in the Eastern Mediterranean*, p.10.
[439] Tayfur, op.cit. p.7
[440] Tayfur, Ibid. pp.7-8

The main reason for Turkish indifference toward the Partnership is that Turkey simply refuses to be considered part of the Euro-Mediterranean periphery. Turkish foreign policymakers argue that Turkey and the EU signed an association agreement and concluded a customs union that envisages full membership. Because of this reason, for Turkey the EMP cannot be an alternative to the aim of integration with the Union. So, even though Turkey accepted to participate in the EMP, it does not consider it as a foreign policy priority. However, after Helsinki this 'status problem' with the EMP seems to be overcome but not in the security field.[441]

Turkish authorities view the security field of the EMP as an extremely utopian initiative. They believe that the EMP can achieve little in terms of hard security problems since the Arab-Israeli conflict has been the dominant issue in the Mediterranean region. Therefore, Turkey supports the multilateral initiatives of NATO, and bilaterally she tries to improve the relations of the countries of the region.[442]

Turkish policymakers points out that Turkey is a member state in the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue while she has only an associate status in the EU, even in the security field. Thus, Turkey participates in the decision-making process and is able to shape NATO policies. On the contrary, Tayfur remarks that "in the words of a Turkish diplomat, '...in the Mediterranean initiatives of the European Union, Turkey has a disadvantageous position because it does not take part in the decision-making process. The decisions will be taken by the European Union and dictated to Turkey.'" So, Turkey has a peripheral status in the EMP and accordingly pursues a low-profile participation in the EU initiatives and mainly prefers bilateral solutions to Mediterranean security issues. Tayfur states that Turkey supports multilateral relations and initiatives organised by NATO. However, even after Helsinki, Turkey does not feel enthusiasm about the EMP in the security field. In the interviews of Tayfur with the officials from the security departments of the Turkish Foreign Office, they explain that they do not have big expectations in the security field

[441] Tayfur, Ibid. p.8
[442] Tayfur, Ibid. p.9

because Turkey still sit at the other side of the table from the EU. They comment that in terms of security issues, Turkey feels European, but since she is not a full member in the Union, this creates problems especially in dealing with security problems. Consequently, they emphasise that until Turkey becomes a full member she cannot be more active in the security field.[443]

On the other hand, in terms of soft security issues, Turkey supports international cooperation against terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and international crime, as mentioned in the report of Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since it would be feasible to work on such issues, these must be accompanied by measures for combating racism, xenophobia and discrimination.[444]

According to some members of the Turkish foreign policy establishment, the heterogeneity of the states in the region is another handicap of the Barcelona Process. They comment that the internal problems of these countries and the intra-regional conflicts are not good signs for the future of the project. Furthermore, they point out that as a result of differing importance of hard and soft security issues in the Eastern and Western parts of the Mediterranean respectively; it is very difficult to establish a global cooperative model for the region. There are even some considerations of the Barcelona Process as an imperialistic project, created to promote the interests of the advanced countries in the region.[445]

As declared in the Ministry's report, the Barcelona Process has been disappointing for Turkey. However, she continues to follow the developments and wishes a more interactive and realistic attitude stressing that economic issues should be the main focus of concern.[446]

---

[443] Tayfur, Ibid. p.9
[444] The Euro-Mediterranean Process and Turkey.
[445] Tayfur, op.cit. p.10
[446] The Euro-Mediterranean Process and Turkey.

Tayfur suggests that

> "the Turks continue to feel that if the European Union does not want to give Turkey a more significant role and does not take into account its interests in the Eastern Mediterranean there is little reason for Turkey to participate in EU security policies and strategies in the region. In this context, they argue, Turkey must develop its own policy in the Mediterranean by taking advantage of its membership in the Atlantic alliance, its strategic location and historical ties, as well as its experience in organising regional co-operation initiatives."[447]

Commenting on the possibility for some countries to emerge as pivotal actors to which the Barcelona Process can be anchored, Uğur finds it arguable for Turkey, as the most integrated country with the high level of economic development, to play such a role due not only to the limits imposed on the country as a result of its historical legacy in the region and but also to changing characteristics of European dimension in the Turkish politics.[448]

[447] Tayfur, op.cit, p.10.
[448] Uğur M., "Book Reviews", *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, vol.1, no.1, May 1999, p.82.

CONCLUSION

With the end of the Cold War, the concept of a security concern in traditional terms has changed towards a more complex, multidimensional concept which includes issues such as political stability, economic and social development, and peaceful transformation of societies. Since European security means the security of the continent with its adjacent areas, the significance of the Mediterranean region is beyond argument. Economic, political and social difficulties experienced by the Mediterranean countries will easily affect the stability of European Union. Therefore, it is generally accepted that threats emanating from the region have to be tackled with cooperative policies addressed towards the causes of problems. In this case, NATO, and the EU are basic pillars of European security with their respective Mediterranean initiatives.

According to Tovias, the reasons behind the EU's continuing interest in having a special Mediterranean policy are as follows: First of all, Europe imports between 60 and 70 percent of its energy from the Southern Mediterranean countries and the Middle East. Its economic welfare also depends on the cheap labour coming from these countries. Moreover, the Union shares the same sea with the Maghreb, the Mashreq, Israel and Turkey and is directly affected by environmental dangers originating overseas. Freedom of navigation must also be protected since a lot of trade pass through the Mediterranean. Politically, rising fundamentalism and economic mismanagement are challenges to liberal democracies. Furthermore, in times of crisis, economic and/or political refugees might create massive unwanted migration flows. All these elements have attracted the attention of the European Community and led it to formulate and develop a specific policy for the region.[449]

Therefore, in terms of economic, social, political and security relations, interdependence can be considered as the main motivating factor behind the European Union's Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. As mentioned by Uğur,

[449] Tovias, op.cit. p.9.

> "Whether the European Union (EU) is capable of developing a Mediterranean policy has been a contentious issue. This has been due not only to the difficulties that the EU tends to have in formulating coherent external policies, but also to the particular difficulties that the Mediterranean basin poses for EU member states with diverging interests and degrees of involvement in Mediterranean affairs".[450]

Notwithstanding, the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, also known as the Barcelona Process, can be considered as an innovative policy development, extending the scope of cooperation to political/security and cultural/social issues.[451]

However, the Barcelona Process, as an ambiguous initiative to bring stability and peace to the Mediterranean region, has fallen short of expectations according to some analysts. The reasons of this argument are several. First of all, there has been a divergence in the expectations of both sides. For European Union, Political and Security Chapter, as the main motivation behind the Partnership, has priority over other issues. For Mediterranean partners, on the other hand, Economic and Financial Chapter is the most important part of Barcelona Process, since these countries need economic and financial aid of the Union in order to overcome their economic and social instabilities. This difference in the perspectives of European and Mediterranean partners should be minimised and expectations should be balanced. Otherwise, the Barcelona Process would be one of the several initiatives that have failed.

Moreover, the Process is likely to be hindered by the impasse experienced in the Middle East peace process. Even though the European Union has tried to separate these two processes, for Middle Eastern partners it is almost impossible to sit on a negotiation table without the Middle East question on their minds. Either, there should be a clear cut separation between Middle East peace process and the Barcelona Process, or the European Union should enforce the reactivation of peace

[450] Uğur, Ibid. p.81.
[451] Uğur, "Book Reviews", loc.cit.

talks in the region. With necessary modifications, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership can turn into a more convenient platform for both European and Mediterranean partners to evaluate security concerns of the region along with economic, financial and social dimensions.

The role of Turkey in the Mediterranean region is another important point. As mentioned by Williams, as a result of its location in the Middle East and strategic proximity to former Soviet Union republics, Turkey is not an ordinary Mediterranean country. According to him, not only Turkey's Mediterranean characteristics and connections have been dominant in its relations with the European Union, but also one of the key approaches in evaluating Turkish-EU relations is the Mediterranean dimension. Arguing that Turkey's connection with the EU in the Mediterranean is contingent, he suggests that Turkey is in a key position with its economic weight and strategic importance in shaping this Mediterranean dimension. Therefore, he states that in many respects Turkey is a hinge between the European Union and the Eastern Mediterranean/Middle East and can play an important role in relations with the southern republics of the former Soviet Union.[452]

In the Barcelona Process, Turkey has been considered as a Mediterranean partner. However, Turkey does not want to be categorised only in this Euro-Mediterranean periphery, arguing that this situation deteriorate her membership perspective. No other partner, except for Cyprus and Malta, enjoys an associate membership in the Union. Therefore, Turkish authorities have been more concerned with the full membership rather than partner position in the Barcelona Process. However, this Process may be turned into an opportunity for Turkish membership in the Union. By using her strategic, economic and political weight in the Mediterranean region, Turkey can prove her indispensability for the European Union. Since the Barcelona Process has been one of the significant arenas that concrete steps can be made, Turkey can maximise her gains and interests by achieving a leadership status in the Mediterranean.

---

[452] Williams A.M., "Türkiye: Akdeniz Bağlamı" in in C. Balkır, A.M. Williams, eds., *Türkiye ve Avrupa İlişkileri*, İstanbul, Sarmal Yay., 1996, pp.65, 89.

ANNEX I

THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP
BARCELONA DECLARATION
ADOPTED AT THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN CONFERENCE

(27-28 November 1995)

The Council of the European Union, represented by its President, Mr Javier SOLANA, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain,
The European Commission, represented by Mr Manuel MARIN, Vice-President,
Germany, represented by Mr Klaus KINKEL, Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Algeria, represented by Mr Mohamed Salah DEMBRI, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Austria, represented by Mrs Benita FERRERO-WALDNER, State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Belgium, represented by Mr Erik DERYCKE, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Cyprus, represented by Mr Alecos MICHAELIDES, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Denmark, represented by Mr Ole Loensmann POULSEN, State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Egypt, represented by Mr Amr MOUSSA, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Spain, represented by Mr Carlos WESTENDORP, State Secretary for Relations with the European Community,
Finland, represented by Mrs Tarja HALONEN, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
France, represented by Mr Hervé de CHARETTE, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Greece, represented by Mr Károlos PAPOULIAS, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Ireland, represented by Mr Dick SPRING, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Israel, represented by Mr Ehud BARAK, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Italy, represented by Mrs Susanna AGNELLI, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Jordan, represented by Mr Abdel-Karim KABARITI, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Lebanon, represented by Mr Fares BOUEZ, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Luxembourg, represented by Mr Jacques F. POOS, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Cooperation,
Malta, represented by Prof. Guido DE MARCO, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Morocco, represented by Mr Abdellatif FILALI, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs,
the Netherlands, represented by Mr Hans van MIERLO, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Portugal, represented by Mr Jaime GAMA, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
the United Kingdom, represented by Mr Malcolm RIFKIND QC MP, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
Syria, represented by Mr Farouk AL-SHARAA, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Sweden, represented by Mrs Lena HJELM-WALLEN, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Tunisia, represented by Mr Habib Ben YAHIA, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Turkey, represented by Mr Deniz BAYKAL, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs,
the Palestinian Authority, represented by Mr Yassir ARAFAT, President of the Palestinian Authority,
taking part in the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona:

- stressing the strategic importance of the Mediterranean and moved by the will to give their future relations a new dimension, based on comprehensive cooperation and solidarity, in keeping with the privileged nature of the links forged by neighbourhood and history;

- aware that the new political, economic and social issues on both sides of the Mediterranean constitute common challenges calling for a coordinated overall response;

- resolved to establish to that end a multilateral and lasting framework of relations based on a spirit of partnership, with due regard for the characteristics, values and distinguishing features peculiar to each of the participants;

- regarding this multilateral framework as the counterpart to a strengthening of bilateral relations which it is important to safeguard, while laying stress on their specific nature;

- stressing that this Euro-Mediterranean initiative is not intended to replace the other activities and initiatives undertaken in the interests of the peace, stability and development of the region, but that it will contribute to their success. The participants support the realization of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East based on the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and principles mentioned in the letter of invitation to the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference, including the principle land for peace, with all that this implies;

- convinced that the general objective of turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity requires a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understanding between cultures, which are all essential aspects of partnership,

hereby agree to establish a comprehensive partnership among the participants the Euro-Mediterranean partnership through strengthened political dialogue on a regular basis, the development of economic and financial cooperation and greater emphasis on the social, cultural and human dimension, these being the three aspects of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership.

POLITICAL & SECURITY PARTNERSHIP: ESTABLISHING A COMMON AREA OF PEACE & STABILITY

The participants express their conviction that the peace, stability and security of the Mediterranean region are a common asset which they pledge to promote and strengthen by all means at their disposal. To this end they agree to conduct a strengthened political dialogue at regular intervals, based on observance of essential principles of international law, and reaffirm a number of common objectives in matters of internal and external stability.

In this spirit they undertake in the following declaration of principles to:

- act in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as other obligations under international law, in particular those arising out of regional and international instruments to which they are party;

- develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems, while recognizing in this framework the right of each of them to choose and freely develop its own political, socio-cultural, economic and judicial system;

- respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and guarantee the effective legitimate exercise of such rights and freedoms, including freedom of expression, freedom of association for peaceful purposes and freedom of thought, conscience and religion, both individually and together with other members of the same group, without any discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, language, religion or sex;

- give favourable consideration, through dialogue between the parties, to exchanges of information on matters relating to human rights, fundamental freedoms, racism and xenophobia;

- respect and ensure respect for diversity and pluralism in their societies, promote tolerance between different groups in society and combat manifestations of intolerance, racism and xenophobia. The participants stress the importance of proper education in the matter of human rights and fundamental freedoms;

- respect their sovereign equality and all rights inherent in their sovereignty, and fulfil in good faith the obligations they have assumed under international law;

- respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States, as reflected in agreements between relevant parties;

- refrain, in accordance with the rules of international law, from any direct or indirect intervention in the internal affairs of another partner;

- respect the territorial integrity and unity of each of the other partners;

- settle their disputes by peaceful means, call upon all participants to renounce recourse to the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of another participant, including the acquisition of territory by force, and reaffirm the right to fully exercise sovereignty by legitimate means in accordance with the UN Charter and international law;

- strengthen their cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism, in particular by ratifying and applying the international instruments they have signed, by acceding to such instruments and by taking any other appropriate measure;

- fight together against the expansion and diversification of organized crime and combat the drugs problem in all its aspects;

- promote regional security by acting, inter alia, in favour of nuclear, chemical and biological non-proliferation through adherence to and compliance with a combination of international and regional non-proliferation regimes, and arms control and disarmament agreements such as NPT, CWC, BWC, CTBT and/or regional arrangements such as weapons free zones including their verification regimes, as well as by fulfilling in good faith their commitments under arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation conventions.

The parties shall pursue a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems.

- Furthermore the parties will consider practical steps to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as excessive accumulation of conventional arms.

- Refrain from developing military capacity beyond their legitimate defence requirements, at the same time reaffirming their resolve to achieve the same degree of security and mutual confidence with the lowest possible levels of troops and weaponry and adherence to CCW.

- Promote conditions likely to develop good-neighbourly relations among themselves and support processes aimed at stability, security, prosperity and regional and subregional cooperation.

- Consider any confidence and security-building measures that could be taken between the parties with a view to the creation of an "area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean", including the long term possibility of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean pact to that end.

ECONOMIC & FINANCIAL PARTNERSHIP: CREATING AN AREA OF SHARED PROSPERITY

The participants emphasize the importance they attach to sustainable and balanced economic and social development with a view to achieving their objective of creating an area of shared prosperity.

The partners acknowledge the difficulties that the question of debt can create for the economic development of the countries of the Mediterranean region. They agree, in view of the importance of their relations, to continue the dialogue in order to achieve progress in the competent fora.

Noting that the partners have to take up common challenges, albeit to varying degrees, the participants set themselves the following long-term objectives:

- acceleration of the pace of sustainable socio-economic development;
- improvement of the living conditions of their populations, increase in the employment level and reduction in the development gap in the Euro-Mediterranean region;
- encouragement of regional cooperation and integration.

With a view to achieving these objectives, the participants agree to establish an economic and financial partnership which, taking into account the different degrees of development, will be based on:

- the progressive establishment of a free-trade area;
- the implementation of appropriate economic cooperation and concerted action in the relevant areas;
- a substantial increase in the European Union's financial assistance to its partners.

a) Free-trade area
The free-trade area will be established through the new Euro-Mediterranean Agreements and free-trade agreements between partners of the European Union. The parties have set 2010 as the target date for the gradual establishment of this area which will cover most trade with due observance of the obligations resulting from the WTO.

With a view to developing gradual free trade in this area: tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in manufactured products will be progressively eliminated in accordance with timetables to be negotiated between the partners; taking as a starting point traditional trade flows, and as far as the various agricultural policies allow and with due respect to the results achieved within the GATT negotiations, trade in agricultural products will be progressively liberalized through reciprocal preferential access among the parties; trade in services including right of establishment will be progressively liberalized having due regard to the GATS agreement.

The participants decide to facilitate the progressive establishment of this free-trade area through

- the adoption of suitable measures as regard rules of origin, certification, protection of intellectual and industrial property rights and competition;

- the pursuit and the development of policies based on the principles of market economy and the integration of their economies taking into account their respective needs and levels of development;

- the adjustment and modernization of economic and social structures, giving priority to the promotion and development of the private sector, to the upgrading of the productive sector and to the establishment of an appropriate institutional and regulatory framework for a market economy. They will likewise endeavour to mitigate the negative social consequences which may result from this adjustment, by promoting programmes for the benefit of the neediest populations;

- the promotion of mechanisms to foster transfers of technology.

b) Economic cooperation and concerted action
Cooperation will be developed in particular in the areas listed below and in this respect the participants:

- acknowledge that economic development must be supported both by internal savings, the basis of investment, and by direct foreign investment. They stress the importance of creating an environment conducive to investment, in particular by the progressive elimination of obstacles to such investment which could lead to the transfer of technology and increase production and exports;

- affirm that regional cooperation on a voluntary basis, particularly with a view to developing trade between the partners themselves, is a key factor in promoting the creation of a free-trade area;

- encourage enterprises to enter into agreements with each other and undertake to promote such cooperation and industrial modernization by providing a favourable

environment and regulatory framework. They consider it necessary to adopt and to implement a technical support programme for SMEs;

- emphasize their interdependence with regard to the environment, which necessitates a regional approach and increased cooperation, as well as better coordination of existing multilateral programmes, while confirming their attachment to the Barcelona Convention and the Mediterranean Action Plan. They recognize the importance of reconciling economic development with environmental protection, of integrating environmental concerns into the relevant aspects of economic policy and of mitigating the negative environmental consequences which might result. They undertake to establish a short and medium-term priority action programme, including in connection with combating desertification, and to concentrate appropriate technical and financial support on those actions;

- recognize the key role of women in development and undertake to promote their active participation in economic and social life and in the creation of employment;

- stress the importance of the conservation and rational management of fish stocks and of the improvement of cooperation on research into stocks, including aquaculture, and undertake to facilitate scientific training and research and to envisage creating joint instruments;

- acknowledge the pivotal role of the energy sector in the economic Euro-Mediterranean partnership and decide to strengthen cooperation and intensify dialogue in the field of energy policies. They also decide to create the appropriate framework conditions for investments and the activities of energy companies, cooperating in creating the conditions enabling such companies to extend energy networks and promote link-ups;

- recognize that water supply together with suitable management and development of resources are priority issues for all Mediterranean partners and that cooperation should be developed in these areas;

- agree to cooperate in modernizing and restructuring agriculture and in promoting integrated rural development. This cooperation will focus in particular on technical assistance and training, on support for policies implemented by the partners to diversify production, on the reduction of food dependency and on the promotion of environment-friendly agriculture. They also agree to cooperate in the eradication of illicit crops and the development of any regions affected.

The participants also agree to cooperate in other areas and, to that effect:

- stress the importance of developing and improving infrastructures, including through the establishment of an efficient transport system, the development of information technologies and the modernization of telecommunications. They agree to draw up a programme of priorities for that purpose;

- undertake to respect the principles of international maritime law, in particular freedom to provide services in international transport and free access to international cargoes. The results of the ongoing multilateral trade negotiations on maritime transport services being conducted within the WTO will be taken into account when agreed;

- undertake to encourage cooperation between local authorities and in support of regional planning;

- recognizing that science and technology have a significant influence on socio-economic development, agree to strengthen scientific research capacity and development, contribute to the training of scientific and technical staff and promote participation in joint research projects based on the creation of scientific networks;

- agree to promote cooperation on statistics in order to harmonize methods and exchange data.

c) Financial cooperation

The participants consider that the creation of a free-trade area and the success of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership require a substantial increase in financial assistance, which must above all encourage sustainable indigenous development and the mobilization of local economic operators. They note in this connection that:

- the Cannes European Council agreed to set aside ECU 4 685 million for this financial assistance in the form of available Community budget funds for the period 1995-1999. This will be supplemented by EIB assistance in the form of increased loans and the bilateral financial contributions from the Member States;

- effective financial cooperation managed in the framework of a multiannual programme, taking into account the special characteristics of each of the partners is necessary;

- sound macro-economic management is of fundamental importance in ensuring the success of the partnership. To this end they agree to promote dialogue on their respective economic policies and on the method of optimizing financial cooperation.

PARTNERSHIP IN SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND HUMAN AFFAIRS: DEVELOPING HUMAN RESSOURCES, PROMOTING UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN CULTURES & EXCHANGES BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETIES

The participants recognize that the traditions of culture and civilization throughout the Mediterranean region, dialogue between these cultures and exchanges at human, scientific and technological level are an essential factor in bringing their peoples closer, promoting understanding between them and improving their perception of each other.

In this spirit, the participants agree to establish a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs. To this end:

- they reaffirm that dialogue and respect between cultures and religions are a necessary pre-condition for bringing the peoples closer. In this connection they stress the importance of the role the mass media can play in the reciprocal recognition and understanding of cultures as a source of mutual enrichment;

- they stress the essential nature of the development of human resources, both as regards the education and training of young people in particular and in the area of culture. They express their intent to promote cultural exchanges and knowledge of other languages, respecting the cultural identity of each partner, and to implement a lasting policy of educational and cultural programmes; in this context, the partners undertake to

adopt measures to facilitate human exchanges, in particular by improving administrative procedures;

- they underline the importance of the health sector for sustainable development and express their intention of promoting the effective participation of the community in operations to improve health and well-being;

- they recognize the importance of social development which, in their view, must go hand in hand with any economic development. They attach particular importance to respect for fundamental social rights, including the right to development;

- they recognize the essential contribution civil society can make in the process of development of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and as an essential factor for greater understanding and closeness between peoples;

- they accordingly agree to strengthen and/or introduce the necessary instruments of decentralized cooperation to encourage exchanges between those active in development within the framework of national laws: leaders of political and civil society, the cultural and religious world, universities, the research community, the media, organizations, the trade unions and public and private enterprises;

- on this basis, they recognize the importance of encouraging contacts and exchanges between young people in the context of programmes for decentralized cooperation;

- they will encourage actions of support for democratic institutions and for the strengthening of the rule of law and civil society;

- they recognize that current population trends represent a priority challenge which must be counterbalanced by appropriate policies to accelerate economic take-off;

- they acknowledge the importance of the role played by migration in their relationships. They agree to strengthen their cooperation to reduce migratory pressures, among other things through vocational training programmes and programmes of assistance for job creation. They undertake to guarantee protection of all the rights recognized under existing legislation of migrants legally resident in their respective territories;

- in the area of illegal immigration they decide to establish closer cooperation. In this context, the partners, aware of their responsibility for readmission, agree to adopt the relevant provisions and measures, by means of bilateral agreements or arrangements, in order to readmit their nationals who are in an illegal situation. To that end, the Member States of the European Union take citizens to mean nationals of the Member States, as defined for Community purposes;

- they agree to strengthen cooperation by means of various measures to prevent terrorism and fight it more effectively together;

- by the same token they consider it necessary to fight jointly and effectively against drug trafficking, international crime and corruption;

- they underline the importance of waging a determined campaign against racism, xenophobia and intolerance and agree to cooperate to that end.

Follow-up to the conference

The participants:

- considering that the Barcelona Conference provides the basis for a process, which is open and should develop;
- reaffirming their will to establish a partnership based on the principles and objectives defined in this Declaration;
- resolved to give practical expression to this Euro-Mediterranean partnership;
- convinced that, in order to achieve this objective, it is necessary to continue the comprehensive dialogue thus initiated and to carry out a series of specific actions;

hereby adopt the attached work programme:

The Ministers for Foreign Affairs will meet periodically in order to monitor the application of this Declaration and define actions enabling the objectives of the partnership to be achieved.

The various activities will be followed by ad hoc thematic meetings of ministers, senior officials and experts, exchanges of experience and information, contacts between those active in civil society and by any other appropriate means.

Contacts between parliamentarians, regional authorities, local authorities and the social partners will be encouraged.

A "Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona process" at senior-official level, consisting of the European Union Troïka and one representative of each Mediterranean partner, will hold regular meetings to prepare the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, take stock of and evaluate the follow-up to the Barcelona process and all its components and update the work programme.

Appropriate preparatory and follow-up work for the meetings resulting from the Barcelona work programme and from the conclusions of the "Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona process" will be undertaken by the Commission departments.

The next meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs will be held in the first semester of 1997 in one of the twelve Mediterranean partners of the European Union, to be determined through further consultations.

ANNEX : WORK PROGRAMME

I. Introduction

The aim of this programme is to implement the objectives of the Barcelona Declaration, and to respect its principles, through regional and multilateral actions. It is complementary both to the bilateral cooperation, implemented in particular under the agreements between the EU and its Mediterranean partners, and to the cooperation already existing in other multilateral fora.
The preparation and the follow-up to the various actions will be implemented in accordance with the principles and mechanisms set out in the Barcelona Declaration.

The priority actions for further cooperation are listed below. This does not exclude Euro-Mediterranean cooperation being extended to other actions if the partners so agree.

The actions may apply to States, their local and regional authorities as well as actors of their civil society.

With the agreement of the participants, other countries or organizations may be involved in the actions contained in the work programme. The implementation must take place in a flexible and transparent way.

With the agreement of the participants, future Euro-Mediterranean cooperation will take account, as appropriate, of the opinions and recommendations resulting from the relevant discussions held at various levels in the region.

The implementation of the programme should start as soon as practical after the Barcelona Conference. It will be reviewed at the next Euro-Mediterranean Conference on the basis of a report to be prepared by the European Commission departments, particularly on the basis of reports from the various meetings and Groups mentioned below, and approved by the "Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona process" set up by the Barcelona Declaration.

II. Political and Security Partnership: Establishing a common area of peace and stability

With a view to contributing to the objective of progressively creating a zone of peace, stability and security in the Mediterranean, senior officials will meet periodically, starting within the first quarter of 1996. They will:

- conduct a political dialogue to examine the most appropriate means and methods of implementing the principles adopted by the Barcelona Declaration, and

- submit practical proposals in due time for the next Euro-Mediterranean Meeting of Foreign Ministers.

Foreign policy institutes in the Euro-Mediterranean region will be encouraged to establish a network for more intensive cooperation which could become operational as of 1996.

III. Economic and Financial Partnership: Building a zone of shared prosperity

Meetings will take place periodically at the level of Ministers, officials or experts, as appropriate, to promote cooperation in the following areas. These meetings may be supplemented, where appropriate, by conferences or seminars involving the private sector likewise.

Establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area
The establishment of a free trade area in accordance with the principles contained in the Barcelona Declaration is an essential element of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership.
Cooperation will focus on practical measures to facilitate the establishment of free trade as well as its consequences, including:

- harmonizing rules and procedures in the customs field, with a view in particular to the progressive introduction of cumulation of origin; in the meantime, favourable

consideration will be given, where appropriate, to finding ad hoc solutions in particular cases;

- harmonization of standards, including meetings arranged by the European Standards Organisations;

- elimination of unwarranted technical barriers to trade in agricultural products and adoption of relevant measures related to plant-health and veterinary rules as well as other legislation on foodstuffs;

- cooperation among statistics organizations with a view to providing reliable data on a harmonized basis;

- possibilities for regional and subregional cooperation (without prejudice to initiatives taken in other existing fora).

Investment
The object of cooperation will be to help create a climate favourable to the removal of obstacles to investment, by giving greater thought to the definition of such obstacles and to means, including in the banking sector, of promoting such investment.

Industry
Industrial modernisation and increased competitiveness will be key factors for the success of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. In this context, the private sector will play a more important role in the economic development of the region and the creation of employment. Cooperation will focus on:

- the adaptation of the industrial fabric to the changing international environment, in particular to the emergence of the information society;

- the framework for and the preparation of the modernisation and restructuring of existing enterprises, especially in the public sector, including privatisation;

- the use of international or European standards and the upgrading of conformity testing, certification, accreditation and quality standards.

Particular attention will be paid to means of encouraging cooperation among SMEs and creating the conditions for their development, including the possibility of organising workshops, taking account of experience acquired under MED-INVEST and inside the European Union.

Agriculture
While pointing out that such matters are covered under bilateral relations in the main, cooperation in this area will focus on:

- support for policies implemented by them to diversify production;
- reduction of food dependency;
- promotion of environment-friendly agriculture;
- closer relations between businesses, groups and organizations representing trades and professions in the partner States on a voluntary basis;
- support for privatization;

- technical assistance and training;
- harmonization of plant-health and veterinary standards;
- integrated rural development, including improvement of basic services and the development of associated economic activities;
- cooperation among rural regions, exchange of experience and know-how concerning rural development;
- development of regions affected by the eradication of illicit crops.

Transport

Efficient interoperable transport links between the EU and its Mediterranean partners, and among the partners themselves, as well as free access to the market for services in international maritime transport, are essential to the development of trade patterns and the smooth operation of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership.

The Transport Ministers of Western Mediterranean countries met twice in 1995 and, following the Regional Conference for the Development of Maritime Transport in the Mediterranean, the Mediterranean Waterborne Transport Working Group adopted a multiannual programme.

Cooperation will focus on:

- development of an efficient Trans-Mediterranean multimodal combined sea and air transport system, through the improvement and modernization of ports and airports, the suppression of unwarranted restrictions, the simplification of procedures, the improvement of maritime and air safety, the harmonization of environmental standards at a high level including more efficient monitoring of maritime pollution, and the development of harmonized traffic management systems;
- development of east-west land links on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean, and
- connection of Mediterranean transport networks to the Trans-European Network in order to ensure their interoperability.

Energy

A high-level Conference was held in Tunisia in 1995 with a follow-up meeting in Athens and an Energy Conference in Madrid on 20 November 1995.

With a view to creating appropriate conditions for investment in and activities by energy companies, future cooperation will focus, inter alia on:

- fostering the association of Mediterranean countries with the Treaty on the European Energy Charter;
- energy planning;
- encouraging producer-consumer dialogue;
- oil and gas exploration, refining, transportation, distribution, and regional and trans-regional trade;
- coal production and handling;
- generation and transmission of power and interconnection and development of networks;
- energy efficiency;
- new and renewable sources of energy;
- energy-related environmental issues;
- development of joint research programmes;
- training and information activities in the energy sector.

Telecommunications and information technology
With a view to developing a modern, efficient telecommunications network, cooperation will focus on:

- information and telecommunications infrastructures (minimum regulatory framework, standards, conformity testing, network interoperability, etc.);
- regional infrastructures including links with European networks;
- access to services, and
- new services in priority fields of application.

Intensification of Euro-Mediterranean exchanges and access to the nascent information society will be facilitated by more efficient information and communications infrastructures.

A regional conference is planned for 1996 with the aim of paving the way for pilot projects to show the concrete benefits of the information society.

Regional planning
Cooperation will focus on:

- defining a regional planning strategy for the Euro-Mediterranean area commensurate with the countries' requirements and special features;
- promoting cross-border cooperation in areas of mutual interest.

Tourism
The Ministers for Tourism, meeting in Casablanca, adopted the Mediterranean Tourism Charter in 1995. The cooperation actions to be initiated will relate in particular to information, promotion and training.

Environment
Cooperation will focus on:

- assessing environmental problems in the Mediterranean region and defining, where appropriate, the initiatives to be taken;

- making proposals to establish and subsequently update a short and medium-term priority environmental action programme for intervention coordinated by the European Commission and supplemented by long-term actions; it should include among the main areas for action, the following: integrated management of water, soil and coastal areas; management of waste; preventing and combating air pollution and pollution in the Mediterranean sea; natural heritage, landscapes and site conservation and management; Mediterranean forest protection, conservation and restoration, in particular through the prevention and control of erosion, soil degradation, forest fires and combating desertification; transfer of Community experience in financing techniques, legislation and environmental monitoring; integration of environmental concerns in all policies;
- setting up a regular dialogue to monitor the implementation of the action programme;
- reinforcing regional and subregional cooperation and strengthening coordination with the Mediterranean Action Plan;
- stimulating coordination of investments from various sources, and implementation of relevant international conventions;
- promoting the adoption and implementation of legislation and regulatory measures when required, especially preventive measures and appropriate high standards.

Science and Technology
Cooperation will focus on:

- promoting research and development and tackling the problem of the widening gap in scientific achievement, taking account of the principle of mutual advantage;

- stepping up exchanges of experience in the scientific sectors and policies which might best enable the Mediterranean partners to reduce the gap between them and their European neighbours and to promote the transfer of technology.

- helping train scientific and technical staff by increasing participation in joint research projects.

Following the Ministerial meeting at Sophia Antipolis in March 1995, a Monitoring Committee was set up; this Committee will meet for the first time immediately after the Barcelona Conference. It will focus on making recommendations for the joint implementation of the policy priorities agreed at Ministerial level.

Water
The Mediterranean Water Charter was adopted in Rome in 1992.

Water is a priority issue for all the Mediterranean partners and will gain in importance as water scarcity becomes more pressing. The purpose of cooperation in this area will be as follows:

- to take stock of the situation taking into account current and future needs;
- to identify ways of reinforcing regional cooperation;
- to make proposals for rationalising the planning and management of water resources, where appropriate on a joint basis;
- to contribute towards the creation of new sources of water.

Fisheries
In view of the importance of conservation and rational management of Mediterranean fish stocks, cooperation in the framework of the General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean will be reinforced.

Following the Ministerial Fisheries Conference held in Heraklion in 1994, appropriate follow-up action will be taken in the legal sphere through meetings to take place in 1996.

Cooperation will be improved on research into fish stocks, including aquaculture, as well as into training and scientific research.

IV. Partnership in Social, Cultural and Human affairs : Developing Human Resources, Promoting Understanding between Cultures and Exchanges between Civil Societies

Development of human resources
The Euro-Mediterranean partnership must contribute to enhancing educational levels throughout the region, whilst laying special emphasis on the Mediterranean partners. To this end, a regular dialogue on educational policies will take place, initially focusing on vocational training, technology in education, the universities and other higher-education

establishments and research. In this context as well as in other areas, particular attention will be paid to the role of women. The Euro-Arab Business School in Granada and the European Foundation in Turin will also contribute to this cooperation.

A meeting of representatives of the vocational training sector (policy makers, academics, trainers, etc) will be organised with the aim of sharing modern management approaches.

A meeting will be held of representatives of universities and higher-education establishments. The European Commission will strengthen its ongoing MED-Campus programme.

A meeting will also be called on the subject of technology in education.

Municipalities and Regions
Municipalities and regional authorities need to be closely involved in the operation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. City and regional representatives will be encouraged to meet each year to take stock of their common challenges and exchange experiences. This will be organised by the European Commission and will take account of previous experience.

Dialogue between cultures and civilizations
Given the importance of improving mutual understanding by promoting cultural exchanges and knowledge of languages, officials and experts will meet in order to make concrete proposals for action, inter alia, in the following fields: cultural and creative heritage, cultural and artistic events, co-productions (theatre and cinema), translations and other means of cultural dissemination, training.

Greater understanding among the major religions present in the Euro-Mediterranean region will facilitate greater mutual tolerance and cooperation. Support will be given to periodic meetings of representatives of religions and religious institutions as well as theologians, academics and others concerned, with the aim of breaking down prejudice, ignorance and fanaticism and fostering cooperation at grass-roots level. The conferences held in Stockholm (15/17.6.1995) and Toledo (4/7.11.1995) may serve as examples in this context.

Media
Close interaction between the media will work in favour of better cultural understanding. The European Union will actively promote such interaction, in particular through the ongoing MED-Media programme. An annual meeting of representatives of the media will be organised in this context.

Youth
Youth exchanges should be the means to prepare future generations for a closer cooperation between the Euro-Mediterranean partners. A Euro-Mediterranean youth exchange programme should therefore be established based on experience acquired in Europe and taking account of the partners' needs; this programme should take account of the importance of vocational training, particularly for those without qualifications, and of the training of organizers and social workers in the youth field. The European Commission will make the necessary proposals before the next meeting of Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers.

Exchanges between Civil Societies
Senior officials will meet periodically to discuss measures likely to facilitate human exchanges resulting from the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, especially those involving officials, scientists, academics, businessmen, students and sportsmen, including the improvement and simplification of administrative procedures, particularly where unnecessary administrative obstacles might exist.

Social Development
The Euro-Mediterranean partnership must contribute to improving the living and working conditions and increasing the employment level of the population in the Mediterranean partner States, in particular of women and the neediest strata of the population. In this context the partners attach particular importance to the respect and promotion of basic social rights. To that end, actors in social policies will meet periodically at the appropriate level.

Health
The partners agree to concentrate cooperation in this area on:
- action on raising awareness, information and prevention;
- development of public health services, in particular health care, primary health centres, maternal and child health care services, family planning, epidemiological supervision systems and measures to control communicable diseases;
- training of health and health-administration personnel;
- medical cooperation in the event of natural disasters.

Migration
Given the importance of the issue of migration for Euro-Mediterranean relations, meetings will be encouraged in order to make proposals concerning migration flows and pressures. These meetings will take account of experience acquired, inter alia, under the MED-Migration programme, particularly as regards improving the living conditions of migrants legally established in the Union.

Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, Organised Crime
Fighting terrorism will have to be a priority for all the parties. To that end, officials will meet periodically with the aim of strengthening cooperation among police, judicial and other authorities. In this context, consideration will be given, in particular, to stepping up exchanges of information and improving extradition procedures.

Officials will meet periodically to discuss practical measures which can be taken to improve cooperation among police, judicial, customs, administrative and other authorities in order to combat, in particular, drug trafficking and organised crime, including smuggling.

All these meetings will be organized with due regard for the need for a differentiated approach that takes into account the diversity of the situation in each country.

Illegal Immigration
Officials will meet periodically to discuss practical measures which can be taken to improve cooperation among police, judicial, customs, administrative and other authorities in order to combat illegal immigration.

These meetings will be organized with due regard for the need for a differentiated approach that takes into account the diversity of the situation in each country.

V. Institutional contacts

Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Dialogue

An Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean was held in Valletta from 1 to 4 November 1995. The European Parliament is invited to take the initiative with other parliaments concerning the future Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Dialogue, which could enable the elected representatives of the partners to exchange ideas on a wide range of issues.

Other institutional contacts

Regular contacts among other European organs, in particular the Economic and Social Committee of the European Community, and their Mediterranean counterparts, would contribute to a better understanding of the major issues relevant in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership.

To this end, the Economic and Social Committee is invited to take the initiative in establishing links with its Mediterranean counterparts and equivalent bodies. In this context, a Euro-Mediterranean meeting of Economic and Social Committees and equivalent bodies will take place in Madrid on 12 and 13 December.

ANNEX II

FOURTH EURO-MEDITERRANEAN CONFERENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

(Marseilles, 15 and 16 November 2000)

PRESIDENCY'S FORMAL CONCLUSIONS

1. The fourth Conference of Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers, held in Marseilles five years after the inaugural Barcelona meeting, bore witness to the desire of all partners to reinvigorate the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The Ministers undertook to do their utmost to ensure that the positions agreed in Marseilles enable the Partnership to reach its full potential and attain the strategic objectives adopted in Barcelona in 1995.

2. As agreed at the informal meeting in Lisbon on 25 and 26 May 2000, the Ministers strove to make a faithful and shared assessment of the first five years of the Partnership in order to fix the guidelines necessary for reinvigorating it. While making a nuanced assessment of the implementation of the Partnership, the Ministers insisted on its unique contribution to peace, stability and development in the region. Since its inception the legitimacy and cohesion of the Process had been maintained and constantly reaffirmed, against a sometimes difficult backdrop. All the Ministers reiterated their deep attachment to the institutional framework of the Barcelona Process and the need for the parallel and balanced progression of its three complementary chapters. In that context the Ministers reaffirmed the central role of the Euro-Mediterranean Committee and stressed the need to enhance its strategic function for advancing, evaluating and following up the initiatives undertaken under the Partnership.

3. The Ministers noted with great interest the proposals for revitalising the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership put forward by the Commission in its communication "Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process" and the contributions made by the Mediterranean partners. They welcomed the consultations conducted by the Presidency, in liaison with the Commission and the Council General Secretariat, in the framework of organised visits to each Mediterranean capital in preparation for this Conference. For its part, the European Union confirmed its willingness to strengthen the Mediterranean dimension of its external relations. In that connection it drew attention to the objectives of the common strategy for the Mediterranean adopted by the Feira European Council and the priorities put forward by the Presidency for implementing it in the second half of 2000.

Contribution of the Partnership to stability in the Mediterranean region

4. The Ministers held a lengthy discussion on the situation in the Middle East. They expressed their deep concern at the situation which has obtained for several weeks in the region and the risk it entails for the future of the Middle East Peace Process and regional stability. They expressed their strong feeling at the loss of human lives and suffering of the civilian population, who should be protected.

5. Convinced that further confrontation and the use of armed force lead nowhere, the Ministers reiterated their support for the measures agreed in Sharm el Sheikh and in Gaza between Israel and the Palestinian Authority to put an end to the violence. They called upon them to act with determination for their full and immediate implementation of these measures with a view to returning to the situation obtaining prior to 28 September 2000. In

this context, many Ministers stressed the importance of restoring free movement of goods and persons in the Palestinian Territories as soon as possible and of lifting current restrictions.

They also welcomed the announcement of the establishment of the Fact-Finding Committee agreed on in principle at the recent Sharm el Sheikh Summit and expressed the wish that it be able to begin its proceedings without delay so that it could establish the causes of recent events and prevent their recurrence. The Ministers welcomed the participation of Mr Javier Solana, Secretary-General/High Representative of the Council of the European Union, in this work.

6. The Ministers stated their full support for the efforts currently being made by the United States President to relaunch the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Aware of the importance attaching to the restoration of a climate of understanding, mutual trust and respect between the parties, they called upon them to give consideration to initiatives that could be taken to that end.

7. The Ministers reiterated their commitment to a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, on the basis of the faithful application of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, to the terms of reference of the Madrid Conference – including the principle of land for peace – and of the agreements concluded in Oslo and thereafter. They called upon the parties to revive the Peace Process and restart their discussions at the earliest opportunity on all tracks, emphasising the urgency of also reviving the Syrian and Lebanese tracks.

8. The Ministers called for greater involvement of the European Union *vis-à-vis* all parties to foster dialogue and restore trust and confidence. The European Union reiterated its willingness to put its efforts at the service of the parties in order to facilitate the conclusion of peace agreements and to help implement them.

9. The Ministers of the European Union reiterated their common position based on the Declaration adopted in Berlin on 25 March 1999 and their support for the right of Palestinians to their own State, as well as their declaration adopted in Biarritz on 13 October 2000. They confirmed their attachment to seeing established in the near future, and preferably through negotiation, a sovereign, democratic, viable and peaceful Palestinian State, and urged the Palestinian Authority to continue with determination the gradual establishment of institutions representative of a constitutional State.

Political and security partnership

Situation

10. The Ministers recalled that political dialogue is an important asset of the Barcelona Process and plays a vital role in giving it its whole worth, in parallel with the other chapters. In spite of problems, which explain the poverty of the results attained, it has continued and broadened to include sensitive and important topics such as terrorism and, more recently, migration and human exchanges. The Ministers recorded that, although that dialogue had not made it possible to adopt new partnership measures, the measures already adopted had been maintained. Furthermore, the entry into force of new association agreements has enabled political dialogue to develop in a bilateral framework.

11. The Ministers considered that preparation of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability had provided the opportunity for a useful deepening of the political dialogue. They welcomed the work that had been done by the Senior Officials in producing the draft. The draft is based on an overall approach to stability, taking into account all of its political, economic, financial, cultural, social and human aspects, and takes the form of an evolutionary, non legally binding, framework agreement serving as a political instrument for the gradual implementation of the principles of the Barcelona Declaration with regard to the global issues of peace and stability. The Ministers nevertheless agreed, on a proposal from the Presidency, to defer adoption of the Charter owing to the political context.

Guidelines for the future

12. The Ministers reaffirmed the need, without waiting for the Charter to be adopted, to enhance the political dialogue, at their level too, in order to contribute to clearing up misunderstandings, foster the approximation of analyses and perceptions and make it possible subsequently to agree on measures to strengthen confidence and transparency. They instructed the Senior Officials to continue it and deepen it in the specific areas of terrorism and of migration and human exchanges. They took the view that there should no longer be any taboos where questions of mutual interest were concerned, and expressed a desire to extend the dialogue to other topics, such as regional trends as regards security, disarmament, the process of consolidating the rule of law, and respect for human rights and democratic principles. Furthermore, the Ministers felt that one worthwhile area for the dialogue might lie in the study of measures of particular importance for common security in the Mediterranean region, in sectors such as the environment, maritime safety or the fight against crime and illicit trafficking of all kinds. Those measures should be formulated in coordination with multilateral programmes already in existence or in preparation in the European or Mediterranean framework.

13. In conclusion, the Ministers confirmed the special importance they attached to the draft Euro-Mediterranean Charter, which should, in future, play a very useful role alongside the development of confidence and strengthening of stability in the region, notably with a view to the post-Peace Process. They took note of the report presented by the Presidency on the progress of work and instructed the Senior Officials to proceed with and complete the latter with a view to adoption of the text as soon as the situation permits, on the basis of the present draft, while taking into account the contributions submitted by the partners.

Economic and commercial chapter

Situation

14. The Ministers took note of the progress made by several partners, in particular those which had concluded association agreements with the European Union, in modernising their economies and implementing structural reforms. Particular attention should be paid to the social impact of the economic transition. But there is still much progress to be made in terms of improving public finances, of deepening reforms, in particular budget and tax reforms, of reforming the legal and regulatory framework and of reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers, with the technical and financial support of the European Union.

15. The Ministers noted that the level of investment, in particular foreign investment (FDI), was still insufficient to sustain the partners' growth and stimulate the supply side, as was emphasised by the conclusions of the Lisbon Conference on Investment in the Mediterranean

(29 February and 1 March 2000), a topic which called for discussion at regular intervals and should be institutionalized.

16. Lastly, the south-south regional integration process has only just begun and needs to be enhanced in order to promote the economic reforms and regional integration which are indispensable for attainment of the objectives of the Barcelona Process.

Guidelines for the future

17. The Ministers reaffirmed the full relevance of the objectives adopted in Barcelona in 1995 with a view to establishing an area of shared prosperity in the Mediterranean. Having reaffirmed the objective of creating a free-trade area by 2010, the Ministers stressed the need for the partner countries, with the support of the European Union, to open up further to one another economically in order to foster their successful integration into the world economy. In that regard the Ministers welcomed the desire already expressed by four countries – Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan – to establish closer links by creating a free-trade area amongst themselves, and emphasised the need for suitable back-up from the European Union to that end.

18. The Ministers felt that the efforts being made, firstly, to improve the legal, administrative and institutional framework, secondly, to develop financial intermediation mechanisms, thereby allowing the mobilisation and efficient allocation of savings and, lastly, to abolish restrictions on foreign investment, should all have a beneficial effect on the flow of investment towards the southern shore of the Mediterranean.

19. Taking account of the impact of the burden of debt on public investment and growth, the Ministers, encouraged by progress recently made in this area, expressed themselves in favour of a continuation of the dialogue in order to find solutions in the competent fora.

20. In order to promote improved coordination and give more specific encouragement to the implementation of reforms in the partner countries and make the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership a still more efficient and credible preferential instrument for upgrading economies, the Ministers agreed to enhance the dialogue on the economic and trade chapter of the Partnership. That should be achieved through regular meetings of Senior Officials from the ministries responsible for such matters, within the existing institutional framework. That enhanced dialogue would relate in particular to the macro-economic environment, structural reforms and economic liberalisation of the partners, while making it possible for them to follow the European Union's economic situation and trade policy. It would also facilitate exchanges of experiences between the partners. It could, in time, prepare for meetings of the competent Ministers of the 27.

21. The Ministers also agreed on the need for greater coherence in the work of the various existing fora in the economic and social fields (employers, trade unions, universities, etc.), and the need to take greater account of their views.

22. The Ministers placed emphasis on:
- the importance of the principle of free movement of goods and services in the Euro-Mediterranean area in all circumstances;

- the need to accelerate the negotiations under way with Algeria, Syria and Lebanon for the conclusion of association agreements; the European Union stated its wish to complete the negotiations in 2001;

- the urgency of signing the association agreement with Egypt and the importance of ratifying the agreement with Jordan, which should enter into force in the first half of 2001;

- the need to take new measures for greater liberalisation of agricultural trade, subject to gradual and reciprocal approach, in accordance with the principles set out in the Barcelona Declaration and the WTO rules;

- the advantage for the countries which had signed association agreements with the European Union to conclude free-trade agreements amongst themselves within five years, and to develop the European Union's cooperation on initiatives that contribute to the attainment of that objective, including the introduction of diagonal cumulation between countries which have identical rules of origin and which are committed to conclude a free-trade agreement between themselves;

- effective implementation of the existing regional programmes in the 6 priority areas confirmed in Stuttgart (industry, water, environment, transport, energy and information society) while ensuring their complementarity and the transfer of the results to national programmes;

- the value of establishing an indicative timetable for the adoption of harmonisation measures in certain priority sectors, enabling partner countries to benefit fully from the Euro-Mediterranean market;

- the advantage of initiating, in the context of industrial cooperation, new regional training and institutional support projects and of developing projects relating to innovation, technologies, including information technology, and quality;

- the strategic importance of water management and supply to regional cooperation, which demands the early launch of a call for proposals to implement the action plan approved at the Turin Conference;

- the particular attention that should also be paid to research sectors to develop synergies between MEDA and the Research and Development Framework Programme;

- the benefits, with a view to sustainable development, of considering the sectors of tourism, regional planning and territorial administration in particular.

Social, cultural and human chapter

Situation

23. The Ministers underlined the importance of the regional programmes under way in the fields of culture, audio-visual and youth. However, they regretted that not all the possibilities of this chapter had been fully exploited, especially as regards social aspects, civil society and the human dimension of the Partnership.

Guidelines for the future

24. Consensus was reached on the need to take greater account of the social effects of economic transition in national programmes by placing the emphasis on training, employment, professional requalification and the reform of education systems. The Ministers also recommended establishing a regional programme covering training policies, promoting the role of women in economic development, the reform of social systems and cooperation on health matters, as agreed at the Conference of Health Ministers in Montpellier in December 1999.
25. Regarding culture in the broad sense, the Ministers advocated building up existing programmes, through the establishment of the second phase of Euromed-Heritage, the start as soon as possible in 2001 of preparations for Euromed-Audiovisual II, on the basis of the proceedings of the conferences in Thessaloniki (1997) and Rabat (September 2000), and the launching of Euromed-Human Sciences. In addition, they expressed their desire to see conditions making it possible to develop the dialogue among cultures and civilisations or other new initiatives.

26. The importance of the human dimension of the Partnership was stressed. In this respect the Ministers confirmed the conclusions reached by the first ad hoc meeting of Senior Officials (October 2000) on migration and human exchanges and emphasised the advantage of intensifying dialogue on this question by favouring a comprehensive and balanced approach and by strengthening the policies of co-development and integration of third-country nationals residing legally in the territory of the Member States.

27. The Ministers also recommended the joint preparation in 2001 of a regional programme in the field of Justice and Home Affairs. The Ministers also welcomed the recommendations of the seminar on operational customs cooperation in the Mediterranean (3 and 4 April 2000) and, the first initiative taken to organise a pilot scheme of joint checks at sea in 2001.

28. The Ministers reaffirmed the need to take into account the aspirations of civil society – an essential dimension of the Partnership. They took note in this respect of the recommendations made by representatives from trades unions, local authorities and NGOs meeting within the Civil Forum and those from Euro-Mediterranean business circles. The importance of decentralised cooperation and its contribution to the success of the Partnership were stressed. The Ministers encouraged players from civil society to take a full part in existing and future regional programmes. In that connection, it was suggested that consideration be given to establishing a regional programme of scientific exchanges. They also wanted increased support for civil society, particularly through the MEDA–Democracy programme. Lastly, the role played by the network of Economic and Social Councils was recalled.

Financial cooperation

Situation

29. The Ministers held in-depth discussions on the measures accompanying the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, particularly the MEDA programme. They regretted the complexity of procedures in the European Union as well as in partner countries and the slowness of disbursement of payments. They noted the volume of appropriations committed over the period 1995 to 1999 (EUR 3,4 billion for MEDA). They commended the action by

the EIB over the same period (EUR 4,6 billion) and its provision of very long-term funding to the Mediterranean countries.

Guidelines for the future

30. The Ministers recalled that efficient and credible financial cooperation, "targeted" towards the major challenges of the Partnership, was essential. The European Union felt that MEDA remained a measure accompanying and encouraging the association process and that it was necessary to strengthen the link between this programme and the implementation of reforms initiated under the association agreements, from all aspects. The Ministers also considered it necessary to take greater account of the special characteristics of each partner and to strengthen strategic cooperation at the programming stage.

31. The Ministers noted with satisfaction the indicative figure adopted by the Council of the European Union for the MEDA II allocation, namely EUR 5,350 billion for the period 2000 to 2006, which bears witness to the continuing commitment of the European Union to the Mediterranean. They also welcomed the improvements made to the MEDA Regulation with a view to simplifying it, to accelerating procedures and to ensuring an enhanced role for partners in implementing projects, particularly through deconcentrating and decentralising their management.

32. The Ministers noted that the EIB would establish the main strands of its action (infrastructure, sustainable development, the private sector and reconstruction in the Eastern Mediterranean) within the framework of indicative multiannual sectoral programming for the entire Mediterranean area. They accepted the EIB's offer, over and above its mandate from the European Union (EUR 6,4 billion for the period 2000 to 2007), to contribute a further EUR 1 billion from its own resources and at its own risk over the same period, in accordance with Article 18 of its Statute. That additional amount would contribute to the implementation of projects of regional interest and to projects of common interest between the European Union and the Mediterranean partner countries, in particular in the communications and energy sectors.

33. In order to provide fresh impetus to regional cooperation, the Ministers recommended strengthening the subregional aspect of the Process by encouraging the voluntary introduction of south-south development and economic integration initiatives.

34. In order to increase the visibility of cooperation, an information and communication programme designed to increase public awareness in the 27 partners and a Euro-Mediterranean "label" will be established.

***

35. In the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue, a Ministerial meeting will be held under the Belgian Presidency during the second half of 2001. The Fifth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers (Barcelona V) will take place during the first half of 2002 during the Spanish Presidency.

ANNEX III

COMMON STRATEGY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ON THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION

ANNEX V of the PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS of the SANTA MARIA de FEIRA EUROPEAN COUNCIL

(19-20 June 2000)

THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL,
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, in particular Article 13 thereof,
HAS ADOPTED THIS COMMON STRATEGY:

PART I
VISION OF THE EU FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION

1. The Mediterranean region is of strategic importance to the EU. A prosperous, democratic, stable and secure region, with an open perspective towards Europe, is in the best interests of the EU and Europe as a whole.

2. The Mediterranean region continues to be faced with political, economic, judicial, ecological and social challenges. If these complex and diverse challenges are to be overcome, the EU and the Mediterranean Partners must work together with a common vision, sensitivity and mutual respect.

3. The EU's Mediterranean policy is guided by the principle of partnership, a partnership which should be actively supported by both sides. The EU will work with its Mediterranean Partners to: develop good neighbourly relations; improve prosperity; eliminate poverty; promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy, good governance and the rule of law; promote cultural and religious tolerance; and develop cooperation with civil society, including NGOs. It will do so by supporting the efforts of the Mediterranean Partners to attain the goals set out by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, by using its bilateral relations to pursue theses objectives, and by contributing to the creation of a peaceful environment in the Middle East.

4. This Common Strategy builds on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership established by the Barcelona Declaration and its subsequent acquis, the Berlin Declaration and the European Union's long-standing policy towards the Mediterranean with its bilateral and regional components.

5. The EU is convinced that the successful conclusion of the Middle East Peace Process on all its tracks, and the resolution of other conflicts in the region, are important prerequisites for peace and stability in the Mediterranean. Given its interests in the region and its close and long-standing ties with its constituent countries, the Union aspires to play its full part in bringing about stability and development in the Middle East. The cooperation that has already been initiated in the framework of the Barcelona Process is a determining factor in laying the foundations for after peace has been achieved. The Union will therefore support the efforts of the parties to implement the peace agreements. In this regard the adoption of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability, an objective which predates the adoption of this strategy, should be a deciding factor in the post-conflict process in the Mediterranean.

6. Bearing in mind the vital importance of the Mediterranean region to the EU, and with a view to further strengthening its Mediterranean dimension, the European Council adopts this Common Strategy. It covers all the EU's relations with all its partners in the Barcelona Process, and with Libya. But it does not include the EU's bilateral relations with those Mediterranean countries which are candidates for EU membership, since those relations are covered by the Accession Process. While the European Union will continue to play its full role in the Middle East Peace Process according to its acquis including the Berlin Declaration, this Common Strategy will cover the EU's contribution to the consolidation of peace in the Middle East once a comprehensive peace settlement has been achieved.

PART II
OBJECTIVES

7. The European Union has the following goals in its policy towards the Mediterranean region:

• to make significant and measurable progress towards achieving the objectives of the Barcelona Declaration and its subsequent acquis, i.e.:

- to establish a common area of peace and stability through a political and security partnership,
- to create an area of shared prosperity through an economic and financial partnership,
- to establish a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs: developing human resources, promoting understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies;

• to promote the core values embraced by the EU and its Member States – including human rights, democracy, good governance, transparency and the rule of law;

• to encourage and assist Mediterranean partners with the process of achieving free trade with the EU and among themselves in the terms of the Barcelona Declaration, economic transition and attracting increased investment to the region;

• to strengthen cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs, as outlined by the Tampere European Council;

• to pursue, in order to fight intolerance, racism and xenophobia, the dialogue between cultures and civilisations.

8. As far as security matters are concerned, the EU intends to make use of the evolving common European policy on security and defence to consider how to strengthen, together with its Mediterranean Partners, cooperative security in the region.

9. The Union has already played an active role in the past in the efforts to establish a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East and to bring about stability and development in the region. It regards the cooperation that has already been initiated in the framework of the Barcelona Process as a determining factor in providing a foundation on which to build once peace has been achieved. Within the framework of this common strategy, and taking its paragraph 6 into account, the European Union sets itself as objectives:

• to promote conditions which will help the parties implement agreements concluded among themselves;

• to develop the basis for normal good-neighbourly relations and encourage the parties to engage in regional cooperation;

• to contribute to the consolidation of peace in the region, including economic integration and mutual understanding between civil societies.

10. To increase the effectiveness, impact and visibility of EU actions and initiatives in the region, the following general objectives will be pursued:
• to enhance coordination, coherence and complementarity and ensure synergies between the different existing regional and subregional activities, instruments and interventions of the EU and its Member States;

• to ensure complementarity of the EU's Mediterranean policy with EU policies concerning other partners.

PART III
AREAS OF ACTION AND SPECIFIC INITIATIVES
11. The EU will, together with its Mediterranean Partners, undertake a comprehensive review of the Barcelona Process with the aim of reinvigorating the Process and making it more action-orientated and results-driven.

12. The European Union will endeavour to pursue the following specific initiatives, without precluding possible new initiatives, which could, where appropriate, take account of the specific situations and needs of the countries, regions or sub-regions concerned.

Political and security
13. The EU will strengthen the political and security-related dialogue with its Mediterranean partners at all levels: bilaterally with individual Mediterranean partners; in the Barcelona framework, including the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability after its entry into force; and in other multilateral contexts to:
• identify common ground on security issues aiming at establishing a common area of peace and stability;

• elaborate partnership-building measures, notably by promoting regular consultations and exchanges of information with its Mediterranean Partners;

• provide timely and appropriate information on initiatives that could be of concern to other Mediterranean Partners;

• reinforce cooperation against global challenges to security, such as terrorism, organised crime and drug trafficking;

• cooperate on possible arrangements for conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation including the encouragement of the peaceful settlement of conflicts and disputes, including by judicial means;

• explore possibilities to address problems of anti-personnel landmines in the Mediterranean region through cooperation in mine action, including mine clearance, mine awareness and victim assistance, with a view to promoting the objectives of the Ottawa Convention;

• promote the signature and ratification by Mediterranean Partners of all non-proliferation instruments, including the NPT, CWC, BWC and CTBT;

• pursue a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass-destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems.

In this context, the EU will take into account further developments of the Common European Security and Defence Policy.

Democracy, Human Rights and the Rule of law

14. In the framework of the Barcelona Process and in its bilateral relations with Mediterranean Partners, the EU will:

• actively promote the strengthening of democratic institutions and the rule of law, in particular through political dialogue and support for judicial reform, institution building, and freedom of expression, notably through the strengthening of the independent media;

• support and encourage efforts to promote good governance;

• stress the importance of promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms for all including by support for governmental and non-governmental actors in the region through human rights training, monitoring, advocacy and awareness-raising;

• in the context of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, urge accession to international human rights instruments including full implementation of civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion;

• take measures to persuade all Mediterranean Partners to abolish the death penalty in accordance with agreed EU guidelines.

Peace in the Middle East

15. The EU will, taking paragraph 6 of this Common Strategy into account,

• provide its expertise, submit ideas and make available its good offices and assistance to the core parties of the Peace Process in order to facilitate the conclusion of peace agreements and help prepare the "post peace era" in the Middle East;

• actively promote progress on the multilateral track of the Peace Process drawing also on synergies with the Barcelona Process. With regard to central issues such as water and refugees, the EU will offer its expertise whenever requested;

• in the context of a comprehensive settlement, and upon request by the core parties, give consideration to the participation of Member States in the implementation of security arrangements on the ground ;

• contribute to the international commitment needed to implement and consolidate peace in the Middle East, notably through support to regional economic cooperation and integration and the expansion of trade flows;

• work towards strengthening stability in the Middle East by means of cooperative security through its contributions to the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability once it is adopted and has entered into force.

Economic and financial

16. The EU will:

• actively work on the implementation of Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements, notably by further promoting the progressive liberalisation of trade in al; areas relevant to the Partners, in the terms of the Barcelona Declaration;

• make every effort to speed up the conclusion and implementation of the remaining Association Agreements;

• support measures to increase the attractiveness of the region to investors, particularly through the creation of a larger market, encouraging the alignment of policies relating to the EU Single Market, improving the regulatory framework, ensuring fair and equitable treatment of investors and raising awareness in the EU of investment opportunities in the region;

• encourage and support sub-regional cooperation, such as within the Arab Maghreb Union, within a framework leading to wider regional cooperation;

• encourage and support efforts by Mediterranean Partners to increase South-South trade, particularly through South-South trade agreements and the progressive harmonisation of rules of origin;

• assist Mediterranean Partners in strengthening their capacity to formulate appropriate trade policies and to participate actively in trade negotiations, in particular with regard to the development of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area and future negotiations in the WTO;

• encourage the liberalisation of current account payments with a view to full liberalisation of capital movements as soon as possible. It will also promote the euro as the contract and settlement currency for Mediterranean trade;

• support the interconnection of infrastructure between Mediterranean Partners, and between them and the EU, drawing on the experience of Trans-European Networks (TENs) in transport, energy and telecommunications;

• encourage policies enhancing the role of the private sector and the promotion of small and medium enterprises in Mediterranean partner countries, notably export-oriented SMEs, as one of the most effective means of wider job creation;

• ensure that appropriate consideration is given to the objective of creating a market economy with a social dimension, including core labour standards and the promotion of gender equality.

17. The EU will encourage WTO membership by all partners on the appropriate terms.

18. The EU will maximise the impact of financial cooperation through the EU budget, notably MEDA, and the EIB, by the following measures:

• the European Community and the Member States will coordinate their respective financial and development cooperation strategies, programmes and actions in favour of the Mediterranean Partners, and will also work with other donors, to ensure coherence, complementarity and, where appropriate, co-financing;

• the European Union will enhance economic dialogue with Mediterranean Partners, notably in the context of programming of financial assistance, with a view to promoting speedier economic transition, sound fiscal and monetary policies and structural reform;

• the Commission will ensure that other resources from the Community budget available to benefit the Mediterranean partners are used coherently. Improved coordination will be sought with other relevant EU programmes (Fifth R&D Framework Programme confirming the international role of Community research with partners, SYNERGY, LIFE, INTERREG III).

19. The EU will promote better integrated water strategies and water management policies in the Mediterranean region.

Environment

20. The EU will ensure that account is taken of the need to promote better integration of environmental concenrs with a view to the sustainability of economic development.

Social and cultural

21. In addition to cooperation within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the EU will:

• take all necessary measures to facilitate and encourage the involvement of civil society as well as the further development of human exchanges between the EU and the Mediterranean partners. NGOs will be encouraged to participate in cooperation at bilateral and regional levels. Particular attention will be paid to the media and universities;

• support efforts towards promoting cooperation in social matters, including the promotion of equal opportunities for men and women, and towards strengthening social dialogue;

• encourage efforts to improve education and vocational training, in particular for youth and women with the objective of enhancing their integration into the labour markets. In this context, regional cooperation will be improved through the exchange of best practices, transfer of know how and capacity-building.

Justice and Home Affairs

22. Building on the acquis of the Barcelona Process and further to the Conclusions of the European Council in Tampere, the EU will:

• act in accordance with the Geneva Refugee Convention and other relevant instruments, and promote full compliance by the Mediterranean partners;

• study the simplification and acceleration of visa issue procedures;

• promote the identification of correspondences between legal systems of different inspirations in order to resolve civil law problems relating to individuals: laws of succession and family law, including divorce;

• promote transparency and greater predictability of legal systems in the partners in order to encourage foreign investment, and to encourage lawful migrants to pursue activities in favour of co-development with their countries of origin;

• ensure that the rules of transfer of profits are liberalised and find solutions avoiding double taxation, particularly for lawful migrants and those with dual nationality;
• develop effective cooperation mechanisms to fight against illegal immigration networks, including trafficking in human beings, inter alia through the establishment of readmission arrangements relating to own and third country nationals as well as persons without nationality;

• enter into dialogues with a view to setting up modern and effective border control systems, offering inter alia access to training programmes and exchanges of officials;

• work with Mediterranean Partners to address the question of migration, taking into full consideration the economic, social and cultural realities faced by Partner countries. Such an approach would require combating poverty, improving living conditions and job opportunities, preventing conflicts, consolidating democratic states and ensuring respect for Human Rights;

• develop a common approach to ensure the integration into society of Mediterranean partners' nationals who have been lawfully resident in a Member State for a certain period of time and hold a long-term residence permit, aiming at approximating their legal status in that Member State to that enjoyed by EU citizens;

• exchange information and statistics with the Mediterranean partners on migration flows.

23. The EU will develop further its cooperation with Mediterranean partners to combat organised crime, including drug trafficking and money laundering, in particular through
• assistance in training for members of the judiciary and law enforcement authorities with an emphasis on information on the Union's acquis in the field of organised crime;

• offering collaboration with Mediterranean Partners to develop the necessary legal, institutional and judicial framework for the effective prosecution of these offences, and to develop cooperation mechanisms to combat cross-border crime.

The EU will continue to encourage Mediterranean Partners to adhere to the UN's international conventions on terrorism, and to follow the principle that the fight against terrorism must be firmly based on the principles of International Law and the respect for Human Rights.

PART IV
INSTRUMENTS AND MEANS
General provisions
24. This Common Strategy shall be implemented by the EU institutions and bodies, each acting within the powers attributed to them by the Treaties, and in accordance with the applicable procedures under those Treaties.

25. For the aspects of the Strategy falling within the CFSP of the Union, the Secretary General of the Council/High Representative for the CFSP, supported by the Special Envoy for the Middle East Peace Process, shall assist the Council and the Presidency in its

implementation and in the implementation of the acts adopted on its basis. Without prejudice to its powers under the TEC, the Commission shall be fully associated in accordance with Articles 18 and 27 TEU.

26. The Council and the Commission shall, in accordance with Article 3 TEU, ensure the consistency, unity and effectiveness of the Union's action. The effectiveness of this Common Strategy will be optimised by ensuring the greatest possible coherence between the various instruments and areas of activity undertaken by the Union, and between the activities of the Union and those of the Member States. The Union will ensure complementarity between its Mediterranean policy and other policies.

27. Member States shall contribute to the objectives of the Common Strategy by making appropriate and coordinated use of all relevant instruments and means available to them. Current arrangements by which Member States recognise states, decide on a state's membership of international organisations, or decide on the maintenance and conduct of bilateral diplomatic and other (such as political, sporting and cultural bilateral relations) will not be affected by this Common Strategy.

The Council, the Commission and Member States

28. The Council, the Commission and Member States shall:

- review, according to their competencies and capacities, existing actions, programmes, instruments, and policies outside the Barcelona Declaration and acts implementing it, to ensure their consistency with this Strategy; and, where there are inconsistencies, to make the necessary adjustments at the earliest review date;

- make full and appropriate use of existing instruments and means as well as all relevant EU and Member States' programmes, and to develop and maintain to this end an indicative inventory of the resources of the Union, the Community and Member States through which the Common Strategy will be implemented.

Coordination

29. Member States shall make additional efforts to coordinate their actions vis-à-vis the Mediterranean region, including within regional and international organisations such as the Council of Europe, the UN, the OSCE, and the IFIs; such coordination shall take due account of Community competence.

30. Member States participating in other fora, engaging either as their principal objective, or as a collateral activity in activities related to the Mediterranean, shall do so in a way consistent with the objectives of this Common Strategy.

31. The Representatives of the Member States and the Commission in the Mediterranean partners shall take full account of this Common Strategy when coordinating their activities on the ground.

32. The Council, the Commission and Member States shall work towards more effective cooperation with regional and international organisations, and will seek with other like-minded countries to achieve the objectives of the Strategy.

Implementation and review

33. The European Council requests the Council:

• to ensure that each incoming Presidency presents to the Council, in the framework of its general programme, priorities for implementation of this Common Strategy, based on the objectives in Part II and taking due account of the areas of action in Part III;

• to review and evaluate the Union's action under this Strategy and to report to the European Council on progress towards its objectives not less than annually;

• to review the situation in the Mediterranean region and the state of Mediterranean partners' cooperation in the implementation of this Strategy, and make an assessment in its report to the European Council;

• where necessary, to submit recommendations for amendments to Parts II and III of this Strategy to the European Council.

34. The Commission shall contribute to the above within its competence.

Cooperation with the Mediterranean partners

35. The European Union and its Member States shall work closely together with the Mediterranean partners when implementing this Common Strategy, in particular through the Association Agreements and through the Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona Process, including by considering recommendations and concerns expressed by Mediterranean Partners.

PART V

Duration

36. This Common Strategy shall apply from the date of its publication for an initial period of four years. It may be prolonged, reviewed and, if necessary, adapted by the European Council on the recommendation of the Council.

Publication

37. This Common Strategy shall be published in the Official Journal.

European Council Declaration on the Common Strategy on the Mediterranean region

The Council acts by qualified majority when adopting joint actions, common positions or any other decisions within the scope of Title V of the Treaty on European Union (Common Foreign and Security Policy), on the basis of the Common Strategy.

Acts adopted outside the scope of Title V of the Treaty on European Union shall continue to be adopted according to the appropriate decision-making procedures provided by the relevant provisions of the Treaties, including the Treaty establishing the European Community and Title VI of the Treaty on European Union.

On the occasion of the adoption of the European Union's Common Strategy on the Mediterranean region, the European Council confirms that the European Union will continue to support the efforts of the parties to conclude, and subsequently implement, the peace agreements. In doing so, the European Union will base itself on the principles set out in the Declaration made by the European Council in Berlin, March 1999.

It invites the Council, assisted by the Secretary-General/High Representative for the CFSP with the help of the EU Special Envoy for the Peace Process, and the Commission to consider what support the Barcelona Process can lend to stability in the Middle East, to work on enhancing the visibility of the Union and to put forward concrete initiatives for promoting regional development in the "post-conflict" framework. A report on these issues will be submitted to the European Council.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Aliboni, Roberto, "The Mediterranean Dimension", in W.Wallace, ed., *The Dynamics of European Integration*, London, Pinter, 1990.

Barbé, Esther, "Balancing Europe's Eastern and Southern Dimensions" in J.Zielonka, ed., *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy*, Great Britain, Kluwer Law International, 1998.

Bretherton, Charlotte and John Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, London, Routledge, 1999.

Busuttil, Salvino, *The Future of the Mediterranean*, Valetta, Malta, Foundation of International Studies at the University of Malta, 1995.

Ceyhan, Ayşe, *Avrupa Topluluğu Terimleri Sözlüğü*, İstanbul, Afa, 1991.

Church, Clive H. and David Phinnemore, *European Union and European Community A Handbook and Commentary on the 1992 Maastricht Treaties*, (updated reprint), Harvester Wheatsheaf, Prentice Hall, 1994(5).

Dinan, Desmond, *Ever Closer Union? An Introduction to the European Community*, Kent, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994.

Duff, Andrew, *Reforming the European Union*, London, The Federal Trust, 1997.

Esposito, John L., *The Islamic Threat Myth or Reality?*, 3rd ed., New York, Oxford University Press, 1999.

Gillespie, Richard, "Introduction Europe, the Mediterranean and the Islamists" in R.Gillespie, ed., *Mediterranean Politics* Vol.2, London, Pinter, 1996.

Gomez, Ricardo, "The EU's Mediterranean Policy Common Foreign Policy by the Back Door?" in J.Peterson and H.Sjursen, eds., *A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP*, London, Routledge, 1998.

Gürel Şükrü S., *Tarihsel Boyut İçinde Türk-Yunan İlişkileri (1821-1993)*, Ankara, Ümit Yay., 1993.

Gürel Şükrü S., "Türkiye ve Yunanistan: Ege'de Zahmetli Bir İlişki" in C. Balkır and A.M. Williams, eds., *Türkiye ve Avrupa İlişkileri*, İstanbul, Sarmal Yay., 1996.

Howort, Jolyon, "National Defence and European Security Integration An Illusion Inside a Chimera?" in J.Howort and A.Menon, eds., *The European Union and National Defence Policy*, London, Routledge, 1997.

Karauçak Oğuz, Şebnem, *Avrupa Topluluğu'nun Akdeniz Politikası*, İstanbul, İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı Yayınları, 1991.

Karluk, Rıdvan, *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye*, 5th ed., İstanbul, Beta, 1998.

Khader, Bichara, "Europe and the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1973-1983: An Arab Perspective" in Allen and Pijpers, eds., *European Foreign Policy Making and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1984.

Khalilzad, Zalmay, "A Strategic Plan For Western-Turkish Relations" in Z. Khalilzad, I.O. Lesser, F.S. Larrabee, eds., *The Future Of Turkish-Western Relations: Toward A Strategic Plan*, Santa Monica, RAND, 2000. (www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1241, 08.09.2001)

Larrabee, Stephen F., et.al., *NATO's Mediterranean Initiative: Policy Issues and Dilemmas*, Santa Monica, RAND, 1998. (http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR957/MR957.pdf, 12.09.2000)

Larrabee, Stephen F., "Turkish Foreign and Security Policy: New Dimensions and New Challenges" in Z. Khalilzad, I.O. Lesser, F.S. Larrabee, eds., *The Future Of Turkish-Western Relations: Toward A Strategic Plan*, Santa Monica, RAND, 2000. (www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1241, 08.09.2001)

Lesser Ian O., Nardulli Bruce R., Arghavan Lory A., "Sources of Conflict in the Greater Middle East", in Z. Khalilzad and I.O. Lesser, eds., *Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century*, Santa Monica, RAND, 1998, (http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR897, 18.04.2001)

Lesser, Ian O., *NATO Looks South: New Challenges and New Strategies in the Mediterranean*, Santa Monica, RAND, 2000. (http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1126/MR1126.pdf, 18.04.2001)

Lesser, Ian O., et.al., *The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative: Evolution and Next Steps*, Santa Monica, RAND, 2000. (http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1164/MR1164.pdf, 12.09.2000)

Lesser, Ian O., "Western Interests In A Changıng Turkey" in Z. Khalilzad, I.O. Lesser, F.S. Larrabee, eds., *The Future Of Turkish-Western Relations: Toward A Strategic Plan*, Santa Monica, RAND, 2000. (www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1241, 08.09.2001)

Lawrence, Philip, "European Security A New Era of Crisis?" in R.Bideleux and R.Taylor, eds., *European Integration and Disintegration: East and West*, London, Routledge, 1996.

Peters, Joel, "The Multilateral Dimension of the Middle East Peace Process" in R.Gillespie, ed., *Mediterranean Politics* Vol.2, London, Pinter, 1996.

Peterson, John, *Europe and America: The Prospects for Partnership*, 2nd ed., London, Routledge, 1996.

Piening, Christopher, *Global Europe: The European Union in World Affairs*, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997.

Pridham, Geoffrey, Michelle Cini and Martin Porter, "Environmental Pollution and Policy Responses in Mediterranean Europe" in R.Gillespie, ed., *Mediterranean Politics* Vol.2, London, Pinter, 1996.

Stavridis, Stelios, "The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Why Institutional Arrangements Are Not Enough?" in S.Stavridis et.al., eds., *New Challenges to the European Union: Policies and Policy Making*, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1997.

Şahin, Mustafa, *Avrupa Birliği'nin Self-Determinasyon Politikası*, Ankara, Nobel Yayın Dağıtım, 2000.

Tank, Pınar, "The CFSP and the Nation-State" in K.A.Eliassen, ed., *Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union*, London, Sage, 1998.

Tank, Pınar, "Security Issues Emanating from the Mediterranean Basin" in K.A.Eliassen, ed., *Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union*, London, Sage, 1998.

Tovias, Alfred, "The EU's Mediterranean Policies Under Pressure" in R.Gillespie, ed., *Mediterranean Politics* Vol.2, London, Pinter, 1996.

Uğur, Mehmet, *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye Bir Dayanak-İnandırıcılık İkilemi*, İstanbul, Everest Yay., 2000.

Waltz, Kenneth, *Theory of International Politics,* Reading, 1979

Waters, Malcolm, *Globalization*, London, Routledge, 1996.

Williams, Allan M., "Türkiye: Akdeniz Bağlamı" in C. Balkır and A.M. Williams, eds., *Türkiye ve Avrupa İlişkileri*, İstanbul, Sarmal Yay., 1996.

(--) *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye*, Ankara, T.C. Başbakanlık Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı, 1999.

(--) *Avrupa Birliği'nin Akdeniz Bölgesi Politikası*, İstanbul, İstanbul Ticaret Odası Yayınları, 1996.

Periodicals

Aybet, Gülnur, "NATO's New Missions", *Perceptions*, vol.4, no.1, March-May 1999

Asmus, Ronald D, F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, "Mediterranean Security: New Challenges, New Tasks", *NATO Review*, vol.44, no.3, May 1996. (http://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/9603-6.htm, 10.12.1999)

Biad, Abdelwahad, "A Strategy for Conflict Prevention and Management in the Mediterranean", *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals*, no.37, 1997. (http://www.cidob.org/Ingles/Publicaciones/Afers/biad.html, 28.10.1999)

Bin, Alberto, "The Security Dialogue Towards the Mediterranean", *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals*, no.49, May 2000. (http://www.cidob.org/Ingles/Publicaciones/Afers/49bin.html, 22.11.2000)

Bleda, Tanşuğ, "The Mediterranean and the Black Sea", *Perceptions*, vol.1, no.3, September-November 1996. (http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/i3/i3%2D5.htm, 23.02.2000)

Blunden, Margaret, "Insecurity on Europe's Southern Flank", *Survival*, vol.36, no.2, Summer 1994.

Buzan, Barry, "Peace, Power and Security: Contending Concepts in the Study of International Relations", *Journal of Peace Research*, vol.21, no.2, 1984.

Copley, Gregory R., "Asymmetry Among Allies", *Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy*, vol.29, no.1, January 2001.

De Santis, Nicola, "The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative", *NATO Review*, vol.46, no.1, Spring 1998. (http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1998/9801-10.htm, 21.10.1999)

De Vasconcelos, Alvaro, "The New Europe and the Western Mediterranean", *NATO Review*, vol.39, no.5, October 1991.

Evans, Michael C., "Turkey and the European Union: A Strategic Discontinuity", *Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies Journal*, vol.144, no.5, October 1999.

Fernandez-Ordoñez, Francisco, "The Mediterranean – devising a security structure", *NATO Review*, vol.38, no.5, October 1990.

Gillespie, Richard, "Northern European Perceptions of the Barcelona Process", *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals*, no.37, 1997. (http://www.cidob.es/Ingles/Publicaciones/Afers/gillespie.htm, 28.10.1999)

Gomersall, Stephen J., "NATO and European Defence", *Perceptions*, vol.4, no.1, March-May 1999.

Gordon, Philip H., "Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy", *International Security*, vol.22, no.3, Winter 1997-98.

Hill, Christopher, "The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol.31, no.3, September 1993.

Hoffmann, Stanley, "Towards a Common European Foreign and Security Policy?", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol.38, no.2, June 2000.

Huntington, Samuel, "The Clash of Civilizations?", *Foreign Affairs*, vol.72, no.4, Summer 1993.

Huysmans, Jef, "Revisiting Copenhagen Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe", *European Journal of International Relations*, vol.4, no.4, December 1998.

Kaplan, Robert, "The Coming Anarchy", *Atlantic Monthly*, vol.243, no.2, February 1994.

Kutlu, Melahat, "Avrupa-Akdeniz Ortaklığı", *İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı Dergisi*, no.134, Ocak-Şubat 1997.

Lennon, David, "Africa: Looking South", *Europe*, no.371, November 1997.

Lesser, Ian, "Unresolved Issues: Assignments for the North and South", *Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals*, no.38-39, 1997. (http://www.cidob.org/Ingles/Publicaciones/Afers/38-39lesser.html, 22.11.2000)

Lesser, Ian O., "Turkey in a Changing Security Environment", *Journal of International Affairs*, vol.54, no.1, Fall 2000.

Moens, Alexander, "NATO's Dilemma and the Elusive European Defence Identity", *Security Dialogue*, vol.29, no.4, December 1998.

Muqtedar Khan, Mohommed A., "US Foreign Policy and Political Islam: Interests, Ideas, and Ideology", *Security Dialogue*, vol.29, no.4, December 1998.

Nimetz, Matthew, "Mediterranean Security After the Cold War", *Mediterranean Quarterly*.
(http://users.erols.com/mqmq/nimetz.htm, 06.10.1999)

Nordam, Jette, "The Mediterranean Dialogue: Dispelling Misconceptions and Building Confidence", *NATO Review*, vol.45, no.4, August 1997.
(http://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/9704-6.htm, 21.10.1999)

Okman, Cengiz, "Avrupa Güvenliği Üzerine Ortak Savunma mı Ortak Güvenlik mi?", *Gümrük Birliği Sürecinde Türkiye*, no. 19-20, Eylül-Aralık 1995.

Orhun, Ömür, "The Uncertainties and Challenges Ahead: A Southern Perspective", *Perceptions*, vol.4, no.1, March-May 1999.

Özen, Çınar, "Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikasının Temel Özellikleri", *ATAUM Bülten*, yıl.1, no.1, Kış 2000-2001.

Regelsberger E. and W. Wessels, "The CFSP Institutions and Procedures: A Third Way for the Second Pillar", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, no.1, 1996.

Solana, Javier, "NATO and the Mediterranean", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, March 1997
(http://users.erols.com/mqmq/solana.htm, 06.10.1999)

Tanner, Fred, "The Mediterranean Pact: A Framework for Soft Security Cooperation", *Perceptions*, vol.1, no.4, December 1996-February 1997.
(http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/i4/i4%2D4.htm, 12.04.2000)

Turan, İlter, "Mediterranean Security in the Light of Turkish Concerns", *Perceptions*, vol.3, no.2, June-August 1998.
(http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/III%2D2/turan.htm, 23.02.2000)

Uğur, Mehmet, "Book Reviews", *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, vol.1, no.1, May 1999.

Wæver, Ole, "European Security Identities", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol.34, no.1, March 1996.

White, Gregory, "Encouraging Unwanted Immigration: A Political Economy of Europe's Efforts to Discourage North African Immigration", *Third World Quarterly*, vol.20, no.4, August 1999.

Wiarda, Howard J., "Southern Europe's Transformation", *Current History*, vol.90, no.559, November 1991.

Wolfers, A., "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol", *Political Science Quarterly*, no.67, 1952.

(--) "Avrupa Birliği'nin Akdeniz Politikası", *İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı Dergisi*, no.120, Temmuz-Ekim 1994.

Others

Aliboni, Roberto, *The Mediterranean and the New NATO. The European Vision: Political and Security Issues*, Paper presented at the Conference on Transatlantic Approaches to the Mediterranean. Impact of the New NATO on North and South Perspectives, Washington D.C., 24-25 May 1999. Documenti IAI 9906, EuroMeSCo. (http://194.235.129.80/euromesco/publi_artigo.asp?cod_artigo=38705, 11.05.2001)

Balanzino, Sergio, "Mediterranean Security: New Issues and Challenges", Key Note Address at the RAND Seminar, 16 October 1995. (http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1995/s951016a.htm, 21.10.1999)

Fitchett, Joseph, "Blair and Chirac Sketch Defense Pact", *International Herald Tribune*, 04.12.1998.

Fitchett, Joseph, "EU Force Takes Shape With Pledge of Troops", *International Herald Tribune*, 20.11.2000.

Fuller, Graham E., Algeria: The Next Fundamentalist State?, Santa Monica, RAND, 1996. (http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR733.htm, 17.08.2000)

Gabelnick, Tamar, "Turkey: Arms Sales and Human Rights", *The Progressive Response*, vol.3, no.40, November 1999. (http://www..foreignpolicy-infocus.org/progresp/vol3/prog3n40.html, 24.11.1999)

Gordon, Philip H., "How Bush Could Help Europe to Change Its Mind", *International Herald Tribune*, 12.06.2001.

Guéhenno, Jean-Marie, *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy A Foreign Policy in Search of a Polity*, European University Institute Working Papers, Robert Schuman Centre, no.97/65, Italy, 1997.

Haddadi, Said, *Western Mediterranean as a Security Complex: A Liason Between the European Union and the Middle East?*, Paper presented at the 2nd Summer School on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the New International Order, Catania, 20-26 June 1999, Department of Political Studies, Jean Monnet Centre EUROMED.

Hill, Christopher J., *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy Convergence, Divergence & Dialectics: National Foreign Policies & the CFSP*, European University Institute Working Papers, Robert Schuman Centre, no.97/66, Italy, 1997.

Ioannides, Andreas, "Protection of Marine Environment", Report Proceedings of the Third Regional Seapower Symposium for the Navies of the Mediterranean and Black Sea Countries, 17-20 October 2000, Venice.

James, Barry and John Schmid, "EU Leaders Endorse a Common Policy for Defense", *International Herald Tribune*, 04.06.1999.

Joffé, George, *The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Two Years After Barcelona*, Royal Institute of Foreign Affairs, Middle East Programme Briefing Papers, no.44, May 1998.
(http://www.riia.org/briefingpapers/bp44.html, 05.09.2000)

Kupchan, Charles A., *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy From the European Union to the Atlantic Union*, European University Institute Working Papers, Robert Schuman Centre, no.97/73, Italy, 1997.

Lesser, Ian O. and Ashley J. Tellis, Strategic Exposure: Proliferation Around the Mediterranean, Santa Monica, RAND, 1996.
(http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR742.htm, 18.04.2001)

McBride, Edward, "Survey: Turkey – A Prickly Friend", *The Economist*, vol.355, no.8174, 10.06.2000.

Nordland, Rod, "Storming Fortress Europe; The desire to weed out the illegal and unskilled has turned immigrant smuggling into a deadly enterprise", *Newsweek*, 13.08.2001.

Patten, Christopher, *The European Union's External Policy and the Mediterranean*, Euromed Report, no.8, 4 April 2000.
(http://www.euromed.net/tools/euromed-report/issue8.htm, 04.09.2000)

Perni, Orietta, *Perspectives of Political Co-operation and Security in the Mediterranean,* Paper presented at the 2nd Summer School on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the New International Order, Catania, 20-26 June 1999, Department of Political Studies, Jean Monnet Centre EUROMED.

Perthes, Volker, *Germany and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Gradually Becoming a Mediterranean State*, EuroMeSCo Papers, no.1, Portugal, February 1998.

Pfaff, William, "When Europe Gets Its Own Army, What Will NATO Be For?", *International Herald Tribune*, 05.12.2000.

Poças Santos, João Álvaro, *The Parliamentary Co-operation and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, Paper presented at the 2nd Summer School on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the New International Order, Catania, 20-26 June 1999, Department of Political Studies, Jean Monnet Centre EUROMED.

Prodi, Romano, *The Growth of Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation*, Euromed Report, no.14, 29 August, 2000

Richmond, Oliver, *Broadening Concepts of Security in the Post-Cold War Era: Implications for the EU and the Mediterranean Region*, The University of Reading The Centre for Euro-Mediterranean Studies, Research Paper no:98/4, Autumn 1998 (http:www.reading.ac.uk/EIS/research/emc/publications/richmond.htm, 05.07.2001)

Rosecrance, Richard, *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy The European Union: A New Type of International Actor*, European University Institute Working Papers, Robert Schuman Centre, no.97/64, Italy, 1997.

Rozin, Malka M., *European Aid to the Palestinian Autonomy*, Paper presented at the 2nd Summer School on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the New International Order, Catania, 20-26 June 1999, Department of Political Studies, Jean Monnet Centre EUROMED.

Tayfur, Fatih M., *Turkish Perceptions of the Mediterranean*, EuroMeSCo Papers, no.8, Portugal, March 2000.

Vinocur, John, "EU Defense Autonomy Lacks a Unifying Voice", *International Herald Tribune*, 09.04.2001.

Zunes, Stephen, "Greece and Turkey: Paying for Past and Present Sins", *The Progressive Response*, vol.3, no.40, November 1999. (http://www..foreignpolicy-infocus.org/progresp/vol3/prog3n40.html, 24.11.1999)

(--) "AGSK aynı tas aynı hamam", *Radikal*, 25.05.2000.

(--) An Alliance for the 21st Century, Washington Summit Communiqué, 24.04.1999, NATO Press release NAC-S(99)64. (http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm, 17.04.2001)

(--) *Avrupa Akdeniz Ortaklığı*, European Commission DG1B, External Relations, Brussels, 1997

(--) Cologne European Council Presidency Conclusions, 03-04.06.1999.

(--) Declaration on European Defence, British-French Summit, Saint Malo, 03-04.12.1998

(--) European Commission Document COM(94) 427, 19 October 1994

(--) "EU Says 15 Nonmembers Want to Join Its New Military Force, *International Herald Tribune*, 22.11.2000.

(--) *Is the Barcelona Process Working? EU Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean*, Conference Proceedings, Athens, 2-3 April 1998, The Philip Morris Institute, Lambrakis Research Foundation, the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy.

(--) Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation, Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Madrid, 08.07.1997, NATO Press release M-1(97)81. (http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-081e.htm, 25.10.1999)

(--) *MED Programları El Kitabı Avrupa-Akdeniz Ortaklığı Rehberi*, Avrupa Komisyonu Türkiye Temsilciliği, Ankara.

(--) "NATO Defense Ministers to Discuss Balkans, ESDP", *Turkish Daily News*, 05.12.2000.

(--) Patterns of Global Terrorism 1998, US Department of State Publication, 1999, (http://www.waac.org/rep99/US_patterns_of_global_terrorism1998.html, 28.04.2000)

(--) Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press release, 28.01.1998

(--) Security Watch Electronic Newsletter, (http://www.sipo.gess.ethz.ch, 04.07.2001)

(--) Statement by the NATO Spokesman on NATO's Mediterranean Initiative, 08.02.1995, Press release (95)12. (http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1995/p95-012.htm, 21.10.1999)

(--) The Alliance's Mediterranean Dialogue, NATO Handbook, 1998. (http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/1998/v072.htm, 21.10.1999)

(--) The Barcelona Process – Five Years On 1995-2000, (http:europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/med_mideast/euro_med_partnership/brochures/barcelona_5yrs_en.pdf, 06.07.2001)

(--) The Council of the European Union and the Common Foreign and Security Policy. (http://ue.eu.int/pesc/pres.asp?lang=en, 28.06.2001)

(--) The Euro-Mediterranean Process and Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 2001.
(http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/adc/euromed.htm, 15.02.2001)

(--) The Mediterranean Dialogue, NATO Basic Fact Sheet no.16, May 1997.
(http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/med.htm, 21.10.1999)

(--) "Turkey Assails EU over Defense Plan", *International Herald Tribune*, 24.11.2000.

(--) http://www.euromed.net/information-notes/barcelona_en.html, 05.06.2000.